

**TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND BORDER CAPACITY
IN CENTRAL ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF TAJIKISTAN**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
For award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

**SUBMITTED BY
MEHA PANT**

**UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
PROF.K WARIKOO**



Centre for Inner Asian Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi 110067
2016

CENTRE FOR INNER ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

Tel.: 011-26704350

Date: 12 July 2016

DECLARATION


I declare that the thesis entitled "Transnational threats and Border Capacity in Central Asia: A Case Study of Tajikistan" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.




Meha Pant

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


(Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal)
Chairperson, CIAS


(Prof. K Warikoo)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As I finish one journey and tread on a different path I would like to thank some people who have influenced, nurtured and motivated my journey of life. My first and foremost thanks goes to Jawaharlal Nehru University and the staff of my Centre who have not only guided me in my journey of academics but left no stone unturned in providence of material and moral strength in my years in this campus. PhD is an important phase of my life as I submit my PhD my humble gratitude goes to Prof Warikoo who was a pillar of constant guidance and support all through my Doctoral journey. Giving me enough space to nurture my thoughts and ideas he has always been a beacon of hope and blessings I can look up to all my life.

Mother is a god's messenger has been rightly said and my two angels 'Maa' and 'Mausi' have affirmed my believe and trust on the supreme power. I wish I had words to describe my gratefulness to you but then I know you are well aware of what I feel.

MY WORK AND LIFE ARE DEDICATED TO THE BLESSINGS OF MY
GRANDPARENTS AND THE LOVE AND CARE OF MY MAUSI AND MAA

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

SECTION A

1.1	INTRODUCTION	1
1.2	GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS	3
1.3	HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA FROM NOMADISM TO FOREIGN POSSESSION	8
1.4	ECONOMY OF TAJIKISTAN	9
1.5	SECURITY IN QUESTION	
1.6	RUSSIAN DESPOTISM AND TAJIKISTAN'S POST INDEPENDENCE SECURITY	11
1.7	THE BORDER	19
1.8	TERRORISM AND TRAFFICKING	24

SECTION B

	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	26
	HYPOTHESIS	26
	RESEARCH METHODS	26
	TENTATIVE CHAPTERIZATION	27

CHAPTER 2: CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

	INTRODUCTION	29
2.1	DEFINING BORDERLAND	29
2.2	CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY	32
2.3	DEFINING TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS	35
2.4	BARRY BUZAN AND SECTORAL THREATS	36
	2.4.1 BARRY BUZAN'S COMPONENT OF THE STATE	36

2.4.2 STATE UNDER SIEGE	39
2.5 POLITICAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE CONNECTION	40
2.6 SECURITY INTERVENTIONS AND TAJIKISTAN	41
2.7 SHIFT IN SECURITY PARADIGM	42
2.8 THE REASONS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN TROUBLEMAKING	44
2.9 CONCLUSION	45
REVIEW OF LITERATURE	45

CHAPTER 3: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA

INTRODUCTION	61
3.1 THREATS TERRORIZING THE STABILITY OF CENTRAL ASIA	64
3.1.1 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CAUSES OF SECURITY THREATS IN THE REGION	64
3.1.2 DRUGS AND ECONOMY OF CENTRAL ASIA: TAJIKISTAN	65
3.2 DRUG TRADE	67
3.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF DRUGS TO AFGHANISTAN	69
3.2.2 TAJIKISTAN AND THE FACTORS FOR THE OPIUM ECONOMY	71
3.3 OTHER FACTORS THAT HAVE ERUPTED WITH TIME	74
3.3.1 CORRUPTION	74
3.3.2 ISLAMIST EXTREMISM	79
3.4 RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM IN TAJIKISTAN: SOCIETY, RELIGION AND POLITICS	82
3.5 GORNO-BADAKHSHAN REGION	84
3.6 THE ISLAMIC ARMS AND AFGHANISTAN IN RELATION TO CENTRAL ASIA	86
3.7 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIZATION	87
3.8 ISLAMIC PARTIES IN ACTION	90

3.9	TAJIKISTAN AND DRUG ABUSE	91
3.10	THE LINK BETWEEN DRUGS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING	92
3.11	HISTORY AS AN ANSWER TO CONTEMPORARY THREATS	93
3.11.1	A PLUNGE INTO HISTORY FOR THE ANSWER OF CONTEMPORARY TURMOIL	93
3.11.2	THE SCENARIO AT THE END OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RISE IN DRUG ECONOMY	95
3.12	TAJIK AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE SCENARIO	97
3.13	TALIBAN AND IMPACT	99
3.14	9/11 DEVELOPMENTS AND BEYOND	101
3.15	ONGOING AFGHAN CONFLICT AND THE SPILL OVER IMPACTS ON CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY	103
3.16	INSTABILITY AND CHAOS PREVAILS	105
3.17	THE GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE REGION OF CENTRAL ASIA	106
3.17.1	RUSSIA A BIG PLAYER IN DEFINING CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY	106
3.17.2	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	108
3.17.3	US INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIAN REACTION	109
3.17.4	CHINA AND REACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	109
	CONCLUSION	111
CHAPTER 4: BORDER SECURITY SITUATION ON TAJIK- AFGHAN BORDER		
	INTRODUCTION	112
4.1	CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY AND THE RISING STATE FEARS	112
4.2	TAJIKISTAN AND ITS BORDERS	113
4.3	THE TRADE AND THE ROLE OF THE SILK ROUTE	116

4.3.1	BORDER SECURITY	117
4.3.2	THE AFGHAN IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA AND TAJIK INVOLVEMENT	118
4.4	THE BORDERS AREA OF TAJIKISTAN AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND STABILITY	120
4.4.1	POROSITY OF BORDERS	120
4.4.2	AFGHANISTAN AND INSTABILITY: THE TAJIK- AFGHAN CONNECTION OF ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	121
4.4.3	THE REASON OF BONDING AMONG THE PEOPLE OF LOWER TAJIKISTAN AND THE NORTH AFGHANISTAN WHICH LEDS TO A SMOOTH EVER RISING TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONS	123
4.4.4	TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER: THE BADAKSHAN AND GORNO-BADAKSHAN	123
4.5	THE RISE OF DRUGS AND ITS TRADE	131
4.5.1	HEROIN AND ITS STAGES	134
4.5.2	UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE TAJIK DRUG TRADE	136
4.6	SMALL WEAPONS AND TRADE	137
4.7	ILLICIT TRAFFICKING ACROSS THE AFGHAN TAJIK BORDER AND THE FAILURE TO STOP THE FORCES	139
4.7.1	SMALL ARMS AND GORNO-BADAKSHAN	140
	CONCLUSION	141

CHAPTER 5: TAJIKISTAN'S STATE CAPACITY AND MEASURES AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

	INTRODUCTION	143
5.1	CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN: THE LINKAGE AND FEARS THAT LURK WITHIN	145
5.2	SECURITY IMPEDIMENT AND THE STATE	148
5.2.1	STATE CAPACITY	148
5.3	TAJIKSTAN AND THE WEAK STATE TITLE	149

5.3.1	CRIMINALIZATION AND CORRUPTION	151
5.4	CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING	154
5.5	THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY AFFAIRS	155
5.6	THE MESS MAKER- GORNO BADAKSHAN	156
5.6.1	AN INDICATION OF THE SCALE AND QUASI-FEUDAL NATURE OF THE OPIUM ECONOMY IN BADAKSHAN	158
5.7	GLOBALIZATION AND BORDER DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES	158
5.8	BORDER CONTROL IN QUESTION	159
5.9	MEASURES TO BE TAKEN FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT	160
5.9.1	LAW ENFORCEMENT	161
5.9.2	FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REGION	162
5.10	ESCALATION OF SECURITY	167
5.11	THE PEACE BUILDING IN PLAY	170
5.12	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AT WORK	171
5.12.1	RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN BORDER PROTECTION:	171
5.12.2	THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS ORGANIZATIONS AT WORK	173
5.12.3	THE VIENNA DECLARATION 2004	174
5.12.4	ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CENTRE FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR CENTRAL ASIA	174
5.12.5	USA ENDEVOURS	177
5.12.6	ACTORS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PAMIRS AND SOME FLAWS TO BE OMMITTED	179
5.13	THE REBUILDING OF THE COLLAPSED STRUCTURE (ROLE OF THE AGA KHAN FOUNDATION)	180
5.13.1	PROBLEMS FACED	182

5.13.2	DAWN OF POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND END AS A DEMARCATED TERRITORY	183
5.13.3	FEARS AND TENSIONS	186
	CONCLUSION	186
 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION		
	INTRODUCTION	187
6.1	THE SCENARIO AT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2014	190
6.2	THE ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESIS	192
6.3	MEASURES WHICH NEED TO BE ADOPTED	193
6.4	SUGGESTIONS	194
6.5	CONCLUSION AND MEASURES	195
	APPENDIX	198
	REFERENCES	204

ABBREVIATION

AIDS :Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AKDN : Aga Khan Development Network,
ATV : All-Terrain Vehicles
BBC :British Broadcasting Cooperation
BMSC : Border Management Staff College
BOMBAF : Border Management in Badakhshan province
BOMNAF : Border Management Northern Afghanistan
CABSI :Central Asia Border Security Initiative
CADAP : Central Asia Drug Action Programme
CANWFZ :Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
CARICC : Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre
CBW : Chemical/Biological weapons
CIS : Commonwealth of Independent States
CJL : Constitutional Loya Jirgah
CORF : Collective Operational Reaction Force
CST : Central Standard Time
CSTO :Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTITF : Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
DCA : Drug Control Agency
DOSAAF:Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet
ELJ : Emergency Loya Jirgah
EU : European Union
EXBS :Export Control and Related border security Assistance program
FSB : Federal Security Bureau
GBAO : Gorno Badakshan Autonomous Region
GBAT : Gorno Badakshan Autonomous region
GKNB :State Committee of National Security in Kyrgyzstan
HIV :Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HT: Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami
IBM :Integrated Border Management
ICG : International Crisis Group
IJU : Islamic Jihad Union
IMF :International Monetary Fund
IMU : Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INL : International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office
IOM : International Organization for Migration's
ISAF : International Security Assistance Force
ISIS : Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
JA : Jamaat Ansarullah
JaK : Jund al-Khilafah
KGB :Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
KOGG : Tajikistan's Committee for State Border Protection
MNC : Multi National Cooperation
MoS :Ministry of Security in Tajikistan
MoUs : Memorandum of Understandings
MSDSP : Mountain Societies Development Support Program
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC: National Executive Committee
NGO :Non Governmental Organization
OIC : Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OMC : Office of Military Cooperation
OSCE :Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDPT : People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan
PoA : Plan of Action
PRDP : Pamir Relief and Development Program
RECCA :Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SALW :Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCO :Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SNB: The National Security Service of Uzbekistan
SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic
TALCO :TajikistanAluminum Company
TAPI : Tajikistan Afghanistan Pakistan India
TOC : Transnational Organized Crime
UAZ :Ulyanovsky Avtomobilny Zavod
UN : United Nations
UNCAC: The United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNODC : United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRCCA :United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNTOP : UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
US : United States
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UTO : United Treaty Organization
WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction

PREFACE

Though Central Asia has been drawing international attention since not a long time, now it seems to be in the limelight with the rising turbulence and transnational threats emanating from Afghanistan. The development that took place during the decades of Soviet rule brought enlightenment to the region which had a history of wars and Nomadism until the Samanid Empire which restored glory in terms of culture to Central Asia. This was the only reason that the elites and the government were not willing for independence from the Soviet realm which came up as a result of the disintegration of Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan Soviet Union found itself enmeshed in the domestic social-economic and political turmoil. The Afghan intrusion took all the strength the Soviet state had in the wake of the fall of policies, widespread poverty and disillusionment of the people. The widespread resentment which came to the forefront of the closely guarded state structure after the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika was seen as a fault line of these policies which had been introduced by Gorbachev at that time.

The war had left the Afghan state as a war torn arena with poverty and resentment in every fold. The Soviet Union had sent Tajik fighters into the field as spies or translators but as a result of this intermingling there was an influx of religious books into the atheist Soviet Union. This flow of religious ideas and literature during the Afghan war and afterwards led to a sudden upheaval of religious sentiments amongst the Central Asian populace which had been kept under shadows for long. Leading to a sudden spurt of religiosity and coming up of Madarsas and religious schools. There was a resurgence of fundamentalists or Wahabism which was a violent form of Islam aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state. But when these forces seemed to be becoming a fear for the elitist regimes, severe measures were taken on the governmental side to curb them and as a result the members of such extremist organizations were forced to flee to the Afghan side to find a safe haven for themselves.

At that time the Afghan state was in a mess after the war and various factions were on a constant fight. The state of affairs was such that any country or even international

foundations were fearful of granting aid. The destruction of economy led to opium cultivation becoming a profitable business which would help support the economy in its state of peril.

In today's scenario when the US and the ISAF have withdrawn their forces from Afghanistan it has become evident that the state would go into an era of instability and the threats emanating from there will affect the stability of Central Asia as well. As an example, the state of Tajikistan which shares its border with this turbulent state is in a constant fear of the threats which are transnational in nature. As a result, there has been a flow of international and regional help to secure the porous borders between these states. Huge amount of aid has flown to these areas in terms of finance, weapons, food and infrastructure for securing stability and safety. Yet some fault lines remain which put a question mark on the border management. The study defines the state of the Central Asian states and the security paradigm from the initial to the current phase.

Chapter one introduces the realm of the region of Central Asia. Geographically the land is one of contrast with mountains and deserts and plains. The chapter introduces the region in the fore line of history which it has undergone and the turbulences in the past which define its current state and the future. It talks about the influence of the Afghan war and the Soviet disintegration in the shaping of its history while defining the impact these have had on their governmental structure. Later this chapter lurks a little into the security impediments for Tajikistan which defines this whole study.

Chapter two sets into the issue of security. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union changed the way security had been defined in the parameters of the Westphalian system. The older version of security revolved around the state and its security but this new pillar which was added also dealt with the other types of security like social, human and environmental. Something which had been neglected and sidelined for all these years. Though this did not underestimate the military power of the state or the security at its borders, yet these paradigms took a front seat in taking into consideration any further actions against another state. As a result the wars rather than being brutal and savage turned into consideration of the people being attacked as well. The realist school which was defined by power was overruled by the new one more humane in nature. This chapter

also dwells into the transition of threats for the Central Asian states. The threats which had been defined by the fights between the British India and the Russian Tsar and later by the Afghan Emirs and the Soviet state had complete change in dimension. Now with the Soviet disintegration, the threats to security were not posed by external attacks but internal chaos and threats more delicate and transnational in nature where no state or governments were involved. Rather it was the involvement of non-governmental threats like the religious and extremist groups, drug barons and mafias of arms and human trade.

The third chapter talks about the threats in detail. It starts with the poor state of Afghanistan and the war torn economy which was a result of the decades of war which have rocked the nation. The dialogue then jumps into the current tensions in the Afghan state which has led to threats having home in here looking for more avenues and spreading their wings into the neighbouring states. The world leaders here fear that this if not curbed would gradually get hold over the unstable Central Asian region with the borderline states being mostly at stake. The Central Asian states are currently facing the tensions of transnational threats like that of fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and small arms trafficking. Of which drugs and terrorism or fundamentalism pose the greatest threats.

The border security situation in the Central Asian realm is a question at the present time with many fears emanating from the country of Afghanistan. The fourth chapter completely dwells into this section full of fears of stability for the Central Asian realm. It starts with the countries of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, trying to study the reasons these two countries become so important for each other. Then from the historical perspective it talks about the Silk Route and later the commonality in culture and language which draws the populace of these countries into a closer fold. Later it highlights the region of Gorno-Badakshan which is the place where the turbulence belongs with Afghan Badakshan sharing close linkages with this region which makes the transmission of threats and drugs through this region easy. The fifth chapter is all about the role of the national, international and regional organizations for safeguarding the borders from the transnational threats while also applying measures to curb them on a local level. Like drug production in Afghanistan and improving the state of affairs of the people in the

regions of Afghanistan and Tajikistan mainly in the far off areas which are the genesis of stability with active role in trafficking and fundamentalism due to lack of opportunities and basic necessities.

The final call comes with the conclusion in the sixth chapter which fits all into it and talks about the measures which have been taken so far with the changes that have occurred in the state of affairs and the suggestions which if implies in a correct form may lead to the achievement of the desired goals. Leading to threats being curbed at the very intersection while also achieving goal of all round development and democratization in these countries long torn by instability and poverty and war.

Thus this thesis hopes to cater to the construction of the new safer paradigm on Central Asian which would result in a better tomorrow for these states and a safer world for the generations to come.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Central Asia is of fundamental importance for understanding Eurasian History....

It is the missing link in World History”,

Christopher Beckwith

The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia



http://www.centralasiatravel.com/images/central_asia_big.jpg

SECTION A

1.1 AN INTRODUCTION:

Central Asia, a land-locked area, is a region of unstable frontiers and presents an astonishing mix of geopolitical interests. Its political status has generally been determined by a balance of power between its populace and the surrounding region. The twentieth century brought with it a series of events which led to bringing in a change in the geopolitical equation of the region and Central Asian states in particular. “Central Asia has been eroticized in the West-and in the East- it has captivated the imagination of many”¹. Various descriptions by various authors from time to time have added to the literature reviving the importance of the region while highlighting its beauty. As Mehmood opines, “A land with a mixture of various natural extensions like the lake Balkash on the east to Aral Sea in the middle to Caspian on the west Central Asia wavers in its composition of diverse flora and fauna”². A land of diversity not only in terms of people and their culture, but also geographically with plains on one end and deserts on the another. The mountainous ranges extend from Pamir to Tien Shan serving as a division from the rest of the continent³. There are various theories about Central Asia but two of these works hold prominence while varying along each other in many regards. Anatoli Khazanov in his work in 1979 clearly distinguishes between Middle Asia and Central Asia describing the latter as confined to Kashgaria, Jungaria, Mongolia and Tibet. Defining the area of Middle Asia to be defined by the Caspian sea on the west, Aral sea on the north and the Hindukush along the Pamirs defining the north and the western boundaries of the region, he clearly instates the countries of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey along the Central Asian Republics being the sole inheritors of the region and its history. While on the other hand Khazanov clearly distinguishes Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan as being the near Arabic Middle East, while the area of Central Asia comprising Manchuria(China) and the parts

¹ Levi and Sela, (2010), *Islamic Central Asia: 'An Anthology of Historical Sources,'* Indiana University Press,1

²Mahmood, T.(1996-1997), "Pakistan and Central Asia". *Eurasian Journal*, 4, 79.

³Kaushik, D. (1970). *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History From The Early 19th Century.* (N. Khalfin, Ed.) Moscow: Progress Publishers,13.

of Siberia, Southern Russia along with Ukraine and other parts of Eastern Europe had been parts of Inner Asia.⁴


It has been central in the picture for all these years as a vital part of the Silk Route, a leverage which was denied after the dawn of the era of orientalism in the region. Central Asia had always been a vital part of the Great Silk Route and an area which nurtured various empires though, always being a transmitter than a creator of something new. The coming up of the Soviet rule took the so called nomadic countries to a period of development and modernization. But even the Soviet rule was defined by the communist and socialist strategies which come to a halt with the tumbling down of the Soviet Union initiated by the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika. It was this wave introduced by Gorbachev which initiated a new process of reconstruction and development in the Central Asian region influenced by the trends of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization with a mixture of the Soviet developmental strategies which Central Asia had been witnessing for all these years. The Soviets had lost out to others on their home ground, and Central Asia ceased to be so central in world historical forums. Moreover, these two losses were intimately related to each other eventually shifting the world historical centre of gravity outward, sea-ward, and westward.

1.2 GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

The Central Asian steppes...provide an overland channel of communication among the centers of civilization strung out in Eurasia's periphery....Thus the history of Eurasia was to a great extent moulded by this interaction

L.S. Stavrianos, The World to 1500: A Global History

⁴Frank Andre Gunder ,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), 'The Centrality of Central Asia,' Amsterdam:VU University Press.



<http://geocurrents.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Chabahar-vs-Gwadar-map.jpg>

According to Cynthia Weber⁵, who applies Judith Butler's theory of performativity to states, 'sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in processes, constantly performed into being through repeated acts signifying statehood. These acts constitute the state as a 'discursive effect of performative practices'⁶.

The breakup of the Soviet Union though unexpected, came up to be counted as the most historic event of the region after the fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire. The independence of Central Asian Republics came up as a breath of fresh air but with it came up the revelations of secrets which for all these years had been kept well guarded. They varied from border disputes and terrorism to the "resource curse", water pollution

⁵Weber Cynthia.(1998), 'Performative States', Millenium, 27/1, 78

⁶ Fjæstad Kristin, Kjærnet Heidi. (2014), 'Performing Statehood: Afghanistan as an arena for Central Asian States', *Central Asian Survey*, 33:3, 312-328, DOI:10.1080/02634937.2014.941713

and the deterioration of physical infrastructure and human capital converting the area into nothing but a “a bag of mixed problems”⁷.

The attainment of ‘decolonization by default’ led to the Central Asian states entering into a state of shock as the very structure of the region which had defined the social, political and cultural aspects of the regions life had all of a sudden come to a halt. According to Gorbachev, the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, through the action taken by its Slavic republics in Minsk, Belarus, in the summer of 1991, presented the Central Asian republics with a *fait accompli*. The Central Asian states had landed up in the focus of the world politics surrounded by a mixture of turbulent strife-torn neighbours like Afghanistan on one end and powerful regional players on the other end resulting in the emergence of a mix of various geopolitical interests in the region. Looking into the history of the people of the region, it had been an area which attained prominence from time to time considering the nomadic groups which created nothing more than waves which rose and fell, from prominence to extinction.

Various scholars have concluded the prevalence of three stages where the rise and migration of these nomadic groups took place (4300-4200 BC, 3400-3200 BC, 3000-2800 BC) mainly towards the west with comparatively more greenery and fertility as compared to the mountainous South or the East as stated by Marija Gimbutas. Some prominent migrations from the area were that of Hittites and Kassites to Asia Minor; Aryans into India and Iran; and the Hurrians and Hyksos went to the Levant and Egypt during the period of 1700-1500 BC⁸. While history was defined by the empires established, the cultural aspects of the area were defined by the transmission of various religious waves of Buddhism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, etc which also made the region rich in terms of art leaving behind ceramic, cave paintings and various sculptures as a witness of their existence in the region.

Though the region inherited a rich history it was overshadowed with the flaws that came by eclipsing the prominence and vitality of the region of Central Asia. The major

⁷ Frigerio Alessandr, Kassenova Nargis.(2013), ‘Central Asia: Contemporary Security Challenges and Sources of State Resilience’, Department of International Relations and Regional Studies KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Martin Publishers, *Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 123-135* ijrii.cdM/.shrs

⁸ Frank Andre Gunder ,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), ‘*The Centrality of Central Asia*,’ Amsterdam: VU University Press.

drawback was the ‘role of a transmitter than a creator’, the Central Asian countries had been playing all these years which demeaned the authenticity of the region and its developments, the other drawback being the lack of a written language which led to most of the history being forgotten with time. Most of the history has been derived from historical remains until the Sogdian language which developed in the 6-7th centuries and the Persian and Chinese contexts which are taken as a measurement for the accounts of the history and details of the region⁹. It was not until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that the Central Asian states gained prominence enough to be recognized on the world stage.

The advent of the twentieth century and the demise of the communist domination with the end of the Cold War was a break for different illusions as well as the bipolar system which turned out to be a new beginning for many. The illusion that had been created of Soviet Union being invincible and powerful had tumbled down and various states were born from its demise. The emergence of five independent Central Asian states along with the sharing of its borders with the regional powers (Iran, Russia, China and close proximity to India, Pakistan and Turkey) and centre of turbulence (Afghanistan) emerged as an influential geostrategic region. The prevalence of large Muslim population would play a prominent role in the upcoming times, while creating a dilemma at the present state as the elites are confused as to whether adhere to defined religious ideology or opt for a the liberal democratic order. Although religion became the guiding tool for their state activities and bring the desired changes but it has more demerits rather than merits to count. “The permeation of politics by irrational religious currents can only hinder the quest for rationality and nationhood”¹⁰. The security notion has become elastic in nature, open for various interpretations which makes it hardly impossible for the construction of a defined narrative as a result of varied notions of enumeration and analyses¹¹. The independence thus changed the whole geo-political scenario with the Central Asian states having more importance in the strategy of the world especially on the Asian front.

⁹<http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview>, Author: Morris Rossabi, Assesed on 17 Feb 2015.

¹⁰Warikoo K (1995), *Central Asia Emerging New Order*, Har Anand Publications,45

¹¹ Frigerio Alessandr, Kassenova Nargis.(2013), ‘Central Asia: Contemporary Security Challenges and Sources of State Resilience’,Department of International Relations and Regional Studies KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Martin Publishers, *Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 123-135* ijriiii.cDm/.shrs

In these turn of events it was realized that while the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops had been done and over with, huge stockpiles of arms, military and nuclear stuff were still left with the newly independent states which had less but no ability in regard to the regulation and security from the illicit factors of the region. The situation was aggravated with the prevalence of poor economies and porous borders. “Despite significant achievements in safeguarding arms, many in the international committee continue to emphasize the potential of a huge transnational threat emanating from the region. The reality is that the risk varies from state to state and that weapons have been made increasingly secure over the past decade”¹². Though the instability of the Tajik-Afghan border and the amount of weapons left behind after the Tajik civil war and that in Afghanistan leads to some fears among the states¹³. The forces of illegal trade and organized crime attract the people which have suffered lack of opportunities and poverty due to the corruption prevalent in the system, even the government officials contribute to corruption due to profits and gifts earned in the process.

Tajikistan lies adjacent to Pakistan and the Gilgit- Baltistan region, separated by the Wakhan Corridor. Due to its common border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan has become a strategic frontline in the region being directly affected by the spillover effects of cross border terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. Central Asia’s modern processes are full of contradictions and challenges and point to the directions of disintegration in the region. After independence, each state of Central Asia has pursued its own ways to resolve issues and problems with its own methods and techniques, and it has produced conflicts among them. There is a lot of negative, destructive and pessimistic side to the current policy of political confrontation. For development and prosperity, however states must cooperate, allow free border movement, relax the visa regime and allow free exchange of goods and products across borders¹⁴.

The end years of the Soviet Union were marked by the coming of the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika which led to freedom of expression, as a result of which the ethnic

¹² Monitoring of the implementation of small arms controls(MISAC): small arms control in Eurasia, *Eurasia series* no 3, International Alert, London, January 2004,pp 30-33.

¹³ Jackson R,(2005), ‘*Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter Terrorism*’, New York, Manchester University Press, p 42

¹⁴ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press,16.

discords became evident¹⁵. There is violence for acquiring hold over resources like that of land and water. Unemployment among the younger generation was the main cause which led indigenous youth to turn against the people with higher living standards¹⁶. Thus the history of Central Asia has been that of trifles and turbulence where in the recent times the countries are trying to forego the differences and acquire a cooperative environment which would be beneficial for all.

1.3 HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA FROM NOMADISM TO FOREIGN POSSESSION

The history of the nomadic culture of Central Asia dates back to the 8-7th century B.C. starting with the Scythians having their genesis in Central Asia and sweeping the entire Black sea. Though nomadic in nature they did have a level of stagnancy with a great role of women in the society along with a desire for gaining things which were not available with them¹⁷.

Like most of the empires this too faced a downfall due to the basic reason of lack of system of inheritance as well as the role of liquor. Overwhelmed by the other nomadic groups the Scythians began inheriting in their customs leading to decline in the 5th century B.C as a result of the internal rifts and civil war. The influence from the other nomadic group led to residents of one group jumping into the lifestyle of another. The next group to come into influence was the Xiongnu who came into prominence in the 3rd century B.C. Being the ancestors of the Huns they began to challenge the Han dynasty which was established in China at the same time. They were desperate to trade with the Chinese which created tussle between the two a number of times. Even the marital exchanges said to be the best way for mellowing down the expansionist policies did not work in solving the economic problems. As a result the Chinese devised a tribute system that worked rather well. This system was really a trade system but it portrayed the Xiongnu as inferiors. If the Xiongnu accepted these three requirements -- accepting the Chinese calendar as their calendar, paying respect to a newly enthroned emperor, and

¹⁵ Payam Foroughi.(2002), 'Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 39-61, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827.

¹⁶ Saidbaev,T.(1992). "Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Central Asia," in K.Rupesinghe,P King and O.Vorkunova (eds), *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, London : The Macmillan press, p 167

¹⁷Rossabi Morris <http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview>, Author: Morris Rossabi,assessed on 15 feb 2015.

sending periodic tribute to the Chinese court, they were allowed to set up tribute embassies which were really trade missions. This resolved the conflicts between the Central Asian nomads and the Chinese for quite some time¹⁸.

This nomadic culture was inherited by the Uyghurs (the first Turkic group) which attained prominence in the 8th century and developed the first written language based on Aramaic. They also introduced silver and textiles and also Islam into China, acting as cultural transmitters. The later periods were that of decline when Islam gained prominence due Arab and Persian incursions. As a result mosques were built in the big Central Asian cities like that of Samarkand and Bukhara. The following decline of Chinese empire led to Central Asia losing the function of a transmitter which it had been playing for all these years. The Mongol history and its contribution to Central Asia cannot be underestimated as their rule brought Central Asia into new levels of prominence until its decline where the other actors came into play. The nomadic culture had been demised and Central Asia had lost the role of a transmitter, as a result it became a region of tussle between the two powers of the region Russia and China. The Central Asian region became stagnant WITH the Russians having the intentions of converting it into a buffer zone between itself and China. As a result a trade treaty was signed between them and the Chinese in 1689 and also acceptance of Russian students into the Chinese universities to study Chinese and Manchu languages. In return Chinese gained extra territories in Inner Asia. Meanwhile the Russian expansionist policies were in play and by the 19th century Central Asia came under Russian rule.

1.4 ECONOMY OF TAJIKISTAN :

“Since ancient times Tajiks were the prominent majority of the population of Central Asia, which continued to be faithful to the aspirations of the pre-Islamic period, although it was not in power, it did not stop however to civilize its governors”(A Vamberi)

Devastated by the fall of the Soviet Union for creating a history of its own, the republic of Tajikistan began looking for the cultural and political benchmarks in the history which it had for centuries shared with other Central Asian states. State power was organized and

¹⁸Rossabi Morris <http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview>, Author: Morris Rossabi, assessed on 15 feb 2015.

reorganized by often nomadic peoples on the basis first of tribal allegiance; then of political alliances, rivalries, and conquests; and lastly, on shifting and temporary territorial bases¹⁹. The earliest inhabitants of Central Asia – the Tajiks and their forbearer (the Bactrians, Sogdians and Khwarazmians) – were the founders of the region's first organized states. But as fate would have it, they had to endure a multitude of trials and tribulations virtually throughout their history. The fall of the Samanid state (ninth–tenth centuries), which they established after the Arab invasion, was a great tragedy for the Tajik people. Thereafter they were deprived of a national state for a thousand years; living under the rule of a variety of foreign states²⁰. Looking back the pivot point seemed to be the coming of the Samanid state which was an era of upheaval for the Tajik state in the realms of culture, medicine, science and language. But that era of flourish-ment would not stay for long as was proven by the three great tragedies of the campaign of Alexander the great, the Arab and the Mongol invasion of Transoxiana, Khorosan and Iran, accompanied by arson, murder and unimaginable destruction not to forget the expansion of the nomadic Uzbek tribes of Dasht-e-Qebchaq in Transoxiana in the beginning of the 16th century²¹. As a result the process of pushing the Tajiks from the places of their natural habitat had begun²².

The genesis of the modern state of Tajikistan in the contemporary sense took place only when in 1895 Russia and Britain signed an agreement on the delimitation of spheres of influence between each other in the western independent principalities of the Pamirs and Afghanistan, and to accurately define the boundaries of the territories which were under their influence. While with this act, adopted by the two states, boundaries had been well defined yet a single territory with the Tajik population on the left and the right of the Panj River was divided into parts. It was the third time; the territory inhabited by the Tajiks from the ancient centuries was divided²³ and with it was the reframing of the history of the Tajik state. The Soviets a community brought with it new hopes for the Tajik state. Yet the process of modernization and rebuilding of its economy was only achieved after

¹⁹Frank Andre Gunder ,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), *'The Centrality of Central Asia,'* Amsterdam:VU University Press.

²⁰Chahryar Adle .(2005), 'History of Civilizations of Central Asia,Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century' ,Volume VI, *Multiple History Series*, UNESCO Publishing,2005, FRANCE, ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ,283

²¹ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), *'Tajikistan in the 21st century'*, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press 10

²² Kamol Hamza.(2012), *'The History of the Intrusion of Nomadic Tribes Dasht-e-Qebehaq into Movarounnahr and khoroson in the 16th Century'* , Dushanbe,2012,p 297.

²³ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), *'Tajikistan in the 21st century'*, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press 12

1924 when it came up as Tajik SSR as part of Uzbekistan only to be separated into an individual entity in the year 1929.

Most of Tajikistan's population of 8 million people belongs to the Persian speaking Tajik ethnic group, who share their language, culture and history with Afghanistan and Iran. The interaction between the Central Asians and the people from the East, West, South and North took multitudinous forms leading to an era of migration, invasion, war, alliances, and trade. With the diffusion of technology, artifacts, social institutions, culture and religion, political, social and economic organization also underwent far reaching transformations. This resulted in the process of States and Empires developing, decaying, and being overthrown or incorporated by others. But these would not be possible without the adaption and diffusion of social consequences among the more civilized Central Asian neighbours.²⁴ Tajikistan remains the poorest country among the present Central Asian states, as the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. The revenue derived is basically from cotton and aluminum while remittances from migrant workers also makes up as a source of income. Tajikistan is rich in hydropower and possesses the highest dam in the world, Nurek. This has led to Tajikistan aiming from attracting investment projects for internal and export use. Apart from the illegal sources of income, it serves a corridor for trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan being the new found route after the Balkans into the countries of Europe.²⁵

1.5 SECURITY IN QUESTION:

“The traditional concept of security was more about the survival of the fittest, but unlike that the present times having dominance of judicial sovereignty has lead to even the failed states being given help by the superiors to survive and improve their state of affairs. Robert Jackson states that unlike the “law of the jungle” which believed in usurping the power of the weak, the present system believes in healing the cracks of

²⁴Frank Andre Gunder ,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), *The Centrality of Central Asia,* Amsterdam:VU University Press.

²⁵ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), *Tajikistan in the 21st century*, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press.

insecurity and underdevelopment. This brings in the region of Central Asia into a safe zone taking in regard the atmosphere it was born in”²⁶.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the demise of the well established security structure leading to new challenges coming up for the newly arrived states of Central Asia. As stated in their work ‘Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia ’Dr. RoubenAzizian and Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis²⁷ opine that even after 24 years of independence the security structure of the Central Asian states remains a complex one. Encompassing the highly sought after themes of religious extremism, poverty, corruption, political instability and authoritarian governance, suspicion and rivalry between the great powers these countries have come up to attain a more high order of threats with the newer dimensions like illegal narcotic trade, violent extremism, trans-border terrorism, human trafficking and refugee influx and the threat of smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some researchers have already done the forecast of the Central Asian region becoming the ‘set to become a global hub for drug trafficking’²⁸ turning as a lucrative and easy route for drug traffickers, taking into account the prevalent corruption and lack of a strong governmental institution. The complicity of the law enforcers themselves into the whole scenario has resulted in the drug peddlers and traffickers coming into using the main roads for their transfers rather than working under hiding. Wherein in other parts the routes targeted are those which fall under the areas in war against the Central Government or the state authorities which have been neglected for all these years. The turbulence seems to be on a rise and with the US withdrawal of 2014 States of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia have become bounded into common security concerns. When in his State of Union speech on February 12 2013, U.S President Barack Obama declared that by the end of 2014 “our war in Afghanistan will be over.” The researchers like that of Herbst and Courtney professed the exacerbation of the security scenario in neighbouring Central Asia, facilitating an increased movement of

²⁶ Jackson Robert.(2005), Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International jurisprudence and the Third World, in: *International Organization* 4/1987, pp. 519-549.

²⁷Executive Summary Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia Dr. RoubenAzizian and Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

²⁸ Swanstrom Niklas.(2003), ‘The Southeast Asia and Chinese connection to drug trade in Central Asia’, *Central Asia—Caucasus Analyst*, 27 August 2003. http://www.cacl-analyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1676 (Accessed 2 November 2004).

terrorist and narcotic flows instigating the already weakened states into more corruption, despotism, ethnic conflicts and interregional tensions. But here we can also see the writings of Toynbee²⁹ stating that the dangers that lurked over the region also depended over the responses the civilizations gave to them. As³⁰ Stavrianos suggests the ancient, classical and medieval periods of Eurasian history were heralded by major turning points primarily attributable to these nomadic invasions. While on the other hand it is said that the people of Central Asia could have changed the course of history when the military development was being set up in the area.

Closely jointed by an unmarked border and a common culture (the two regions of Afghanistan and Central Asia) until the British and the Russians initiated a process of demarcation for better and peaceful administration. Amu Darya was taken up as the demarcation point, though still trade between the two sections went on. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed to have worked as a catalyst to wake up the ethno-linguistic ties bringing in the Mujahedeen to fight the 'kafirs' or infidels who were trying to take over the region. As the politics around the event grew, the Central Asians too were instigated to join the fight for attainment of independence which led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian states.

The events which had been waging in the neighbouring country brought in the forgotten aspects of the torment and turmoil the Central Asian had faced under the Soviets. When the Soviets entered the region they had adopted a non-interference policy in the religious matters but the officers sent to various parts did not adhere to the given command. This led to suppression of the religious practices in the name of socialism and Soviet policies. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the attainment of freedom, a vacuum was created for development and survival in the modern world. Here the religious forces gushed in to fulfill the vacuum and religious extremism came up as a new way of Islamic renewal in the region of Central Asia³¹. Interlinked webs were created with the religious forces and people looking for opportunities in the region leading to the coming up of

²⁹ Toynbee Arnold J,(1934). *Growth of Civilizations*, Oxford University Press 1934.

³⁰ Stavrianos,(1970). *A Global History: From Periphery to the 21st Century* (7thed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.[1970]. ISBN 978-0-13-913897-0, p 6

³¹ Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History("Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History is republished with permission of Stratfor.")

transnational challenges to the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan in the early 1990's.. The continuity of a military contiguous environment ranging from the region of Pakistan to that of the Ferghana valley has led to the problems of one effecting the other relatively, leading to murkiness establishing fears being used by the political lobby and the elites for their own political gains.

Sharing the boundaries with Afghanistan the states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are in great danger of the spillover effects from the Afghan front. The result seems to be more visible with increased prevalence of drugs, human trafficking and arm smuggling route through these counties into the European front. Various regional and international organizations involved in the process do not let the governments to be at peace. When the Central Asian states came up into the world front they sought peace and stability as they intended a secure future and development. But with the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan and the instability caused by Taliban and Mujahideen wars along with the Tajik Civil War the dream seemed to be a hard one to achieve. The 'War on terror' brought in a new era of turbulence for the state of Afghanistan when the people were trying to make peace with the changing times. In these times the international scenario was shaken rather aghast with the popular belief of Central Asia exploding with the forces of immediate violence and extremism as the NATO and the US made their presence in the region. But unlike the popular belief the Central Asians took the matter quiet well not indulging into the disturbances of the neighbouring state. But drug trade is a vital issue to be dealt with apart from geography and the diverse demography of Pashtuns being 42%, Tajik being 27%, Hazaras 9%, Uzbeks 9% and Turkmen 3%. Of this Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen are concentrated in the north contiguous to their brethren on the other side. This similarity leads to the drug trade getting easy for the drug barons who use this feeling among the populace to spread their markets beyond borders for better profit³².

According to Barry Buzan security is nothing but a pursuit of freedom from any fears that would question the identity and integrity of the state and the dimensions of the fears may include a substantial range of concerns. But the states seem to be lacking in this gaining

³²Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History("Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History is republished with permission of Stratfor.")

constant attention due to the concerns of the international community on the potential proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons which may be there within or in transition through the region. Various steps were taken for securing the region as 'nuclear weapons free zone' Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) which legally stopped the five Central Asian countries not to manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons. This treaty came to be also known as the Treaty of Semey³³. However, the availability of the items used in the production of 'dirty bombs'-conventional explosives packed with radioactive waste-are widely understood to be significant. For example Kazakhstan has been reported to being involved in the smuggling of a radioactive substance, osmium-187, often highlighting the potentially negative possibilities of proliferation. Another repeatedly expressed fear is that trafficking may increase due to greater demand for weapons from terrorists and would-be nuclear powers as well as from disgruntled opposition groups within the regions. Thus, the international concern about small arms and light weapons in Central Asia should be centered more on specific knowledge about the potential from particular states(e.g Tajikistan) instead of the often-vague pronouncements about the dangers throughout the region³⁴.

³³ Wikipedia on CANWFZ

³⁴ Jackson R,(2005), '*Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter Terrorism*', New York, Manchester University Press, p 42-43

1.6 RUSSIAN DESPOTISM AND TAJIKISTAN'S POST INDEPENDENCE SECURITY:



http://www.ruby-sapphire.com/images/tajikistan_ruby_and_spinel/tajikistan_map.jpg

The start of the territorialization of Central Asia began with the establishment of the Turkistan ASSR in 1918 as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). But the establishment of the Khwarazm and Bukhara People's Soviet Republics in 1920 highlighted the problems which the people had been facing on economic and cultural grounds taking in view the nationalist and territorial dispersion which was a result of the Soviet divisions of republics. The USSR National Executive Committee (NEC) on 27 October 1924 decided to divide the Central Asian states into national states leading to the birth of the Tajik ASSR as part of the Uzbek SSR encompassing the regions of Turkistan and Bukhara which had huge Tajik population. Though the demarcation led to the people believing that the demarcation was crude in

nature, it was compared to the moment of a separate state after the Samanids in 999. But Tajiks had been deprived of the main cultural centers which had been the centers of Tajik legacy, barring every major city which had played a major role in the establishment of the prominence of the ethnic group. Tajikistan became a full member of the Soviet Union and the seventh union republic in 1929. Repressive campaigns in the 1930s purged ethnic Tajiks from the ranks of local republican government in favor of ethnic Russian settlers. Even though the Tajiks may be said to have their own space, the area allocated had nothing to be proud of. There was lack of resources as only 7% of the total land was worth cultivation with the most backward areas coming under their share³⁵. The forced collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s involved large-scale irrigation projects which increased the arable land and led to an explosion in the republic's population. Cotton emerged as a staple crop of the Soviet period, but the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers over the years led to widespread ecological and health problems. At the time various people were resettled from the Garm valley, Fergana valley and other Central Asian republics into the Kulob and Qurghonteppa lowlands, especially the Vakhsh Valley. Though settled there for years, these laborers failed to gel up with the local populace or the Russian style as they had shifted due to the economic incentives provided failing to melt into the new identities. This led to the continuous boiling of ethnic differences and trifles which gained prominence only during the vacuum caused by independence. This combined with the national political divides of the opposition parties vs. the ex-communists, with their leaders being from the Gharm and Kulob regions, respectively, made a deadly stew³⁶. The process of modernization brought some economic and social benefits, but for the most part, the standard of living remained low. The influence of Islam increased in the 1980s as a result of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan and the anti- Soviet war in that country. The re-emergence of nationalist sentiments in the last decade of the Soviet Union manifested itself in different forms,

³⁵Chahryar Adle .(2005), 'History of Civilizations of Central Asia,Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century' ,Volume VI, *Multiple History Series*, UNESCO Publishing,2005, FRANCE, ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ,283

³⁶ Foroughi Payam.(2002), 'Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 48, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827).

including attacks by indigenous Tajiks against immigrant nationalities. Anti-Russian sentiment peaked during a 1978 riot in which 13,000 people were arrested³⁷.

9th September 1991 was marked in history as the date of independence for Tajikistan. Yet the upsurge of civil war led the celebration of independence to be short lived where the state underwent complete toppling of its statehood, economy, political and cultural life³⁸. With the vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the civil war and the drying up of economic resources, drug trade becoming a lucrative opportunity. While the poor were deprived of their resources, the rich accumulated the inflow of wealth from the drug trade. The elites became the drug barons taking charge of the trade with the help of their resources and the poor were left at the mercy of the elites. The US and ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan brought in a new wave of illicit trafficking among the barons which led to a sudden rise in the drugs being caught by the security personnel's proving that the inflow of drugs had undergone a sudden increase.

The region of Gorno-Badakshan is worth a mention when it comes to talking about the inflow of illicit activities into the region of Central Asia in particular Tajikistan from the borderline areas of Afghanistan. Having earned the name of the most viable route among the region, Gorno-Badakshan is the most deprived area of the state of Tajikistan. Having been left at the mercy of the local strongmen and the local barons, this part of Tajikistan is an example of the failure of the state to impose an effective control over the country. The area of Badakshan covering an area of 64,200 kilometer per square, has been nestled amongst the inaccessible region of Central Asia with Tajikistan GBAO on one side and Afghan Badakshan on the other along the Panj river. It is a barren arid plateau with around 190000 people scattered at the range of 3 people per kilometer per square. As compared to the northern side, the Afghan Badakshan (44,059 kilometre per square) has better agricultural production while being strategically laid amongst the Wakhan Corridor which separates this region with that of Pakistan's northern areas. Most of GBAO's population is made up of self-identified Pamiris, who speak a mix of similar Eastern Iranian languages. The majority of Pamiris belong to the Shiite Ismaili branch of Islam

³⁷Hooman Peimani ,2009,*Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*., 2009, abc-clio,llc, California.page 158-159.

³⁸Chahryar Adle .(2005), 'History of Civilizations of Central Asia,Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century' ,Volume VI, *Multiple History Series*, UNESCO Publishing,2005, France, ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ,283

centered on the leadership of the Aga Khan, but there is a Sunni Tajik minority in select areas and a sizeable Kyrgyz population on the Pamir Plateau. Afghan Badakhshan has a Sunni Tajik majority, but the areas located alongside the Panj River are predominantly Shiite Ismaili. Other minorities in Afghan Badakhshan include Kyrgyz, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Turkmen. While Central Asia has long been a mixing ground of Arab, Persian, Chinese, and Turkic peoples. Badakhshan, sitting mostly at high altitudes, accessible only through difficult passes, and lacking much arable land, was never a focus of invasion or foreign settlement. Thus, the people of Badakhshan – and particularly the Ismaili Pamiris – have been able to maintain a mixed but broadly similar set of cultural traditions³⁹.

The main reason for the sorry state of affairs is the 1992–97 civil war which took the level of development back to the era of the 1950's. While the elites fled for safety, 85% of the populace slipped into below poverty level mark, which in turn had a ripple effect on the other sectors like that of science, education, the arts, health care, physical culture and sport. This forced the government to apply all means for establishment of a much stable government which would take the people level of living to a state where at least the basic needs of the people were met. As part of that strategic policy, state property was privatized on both small and large scale, and the systems of education, science and health care were reorganized in line with international standards. All these measures were designed to take Tajikistan out of its systemic crisis and to ensure its stable and durable development within the next decade⁴⁰.

1.7 THE BORDER:

The whole security dimension for Tajikistan seems to be ranging in and around the country of Afghanistan. The current security threats that Tajikistan faces have their genesis from Afghanistan. In the light of this situation, Tajikistan has cooperated with International Organizations like NATO, while also allowing transit of goods for the

³⁹ Middleton, R.(2008). “*The Great Game – Myth or Reality?*.” In Tajikistan and the High Pamirs, edited by Robert Middleton, and Huw Thomas, 295–330. Hong Kong: Odyssey Books.Middleton 2008

⁴⁰Chahryar Adle .(2005), ‘History of Civilizations of Central Asia,Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century’ ,Volume VI, *Multiple History Series*, UNESCO Publishing,2005, France, ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ,297

Northern Alliance in the wake of Taliban inroads⁴¹. The state of Tajikistan shares a violent, weak and vulnerable border with the state of Afghanistan along a distance of 1344 km, becoming the second largest border Afghanistan shares with any other country after Pakistan. The basis of demarcation is the agreement of 1895 that was undertaken between Tsarist Russia, the British government and Afghanistan ruler. The Tajik side of Khatton and Badakshan share their borders with Takhar and Kunduz provinces of northern Afghanistan, being mostly mountainous in nature the borders are difficult to guard. A number of challenges in regard to the security threats have been prevalent amongst the citizens of Tajikistan⁴². The major being the fears of drug trafficking and extremism. Many of the Tajik border residents were even the victims of kidnapping and livestock thefts by the smugglers. The state of affairs during the civil war period had gone from good to worse, where every form of illicit trade was going on in one form or another. As a matter of fact the porosity of the borders and the turmoil played a big part in defining the current situation. As the civil war came to an end, the challenge for controlling the organized crime yet remained a big thing to be dealt with. The era of American intervention in the area led to a dramatic increase in drug smuggling in Tajikistan. Numerous government officials have been accused of illegal trafficking, including former deputy minister of defense Colonel Nikolai Kim. The People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) won 80 percent of seats in the Supreme Assembly in 2005 elections, and Rahmon was re-elected president in November 2006⁴³.

While the porous border plays a vital role in the flourishing of the lucrative trade, the homogeneity on both sides of the borders too have a great role to play, which is usually managed by the warlords. There is close linkage between the trafficking of drugs and weapons with the region of Gorno-Badakshan being the main route. The Russian troop withdrawal in the year 1998 led to the region earning the name of being a viable route for traffickers, with violence along with the use of weapons like assault rifles, submachine guns, grenade launchers being used, obtained from the other side of the border in

⁴¹ Umarov Akram.(2014), "The Relations of the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan in the new century" , *Opinion, Defence Journal*, page 26.

⁴² Zubaidullo Ubaidulloev (2014) Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: Past and Present, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 21:1, 120-136, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2014.921966

⁴³ Hooman Peimani ,2009, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus:, 2009, abc-clio, llc, California. page 160-161.

Afghanistan. The civil war complicated the very security of Tajikistan. Cockayne⁴⁴ says that borders may remain porous in the region of conflict, as it causes an erosion in the capacity of the state to provide security to the populace and poses a question to its own sovereignty. This in turn results in erosion in the authority and accountability of the state on the question of security of the borders which in turn initiates illicit activities. The situation in Tajikistan earned it the name of the “bottleneck of drug-trafficking to the north”⁴⁵. The inefficient resources with the security forces make it difficult to keep a check on the illicit activities, resulting in the drug money laying the foundations of various sectors of the state. The region of Gorno-Badakshan has deep resentment against the state forces of Tajikistan Gorno-Badakshan has become a point of genesis of growth of resentment among the populace against the state. Establishment of the economy has done nothing for its regional development and the area has not benefitted from governmental welfare programs as resources in these areas are maintained by the local strongmen and powerbrokers, leading to generation of internal and external extremism, criminalization of economy and resentment.

Along the riparian borders with Afghanistan, Tajikistan has faced number of security challenges and with Taliban coming up towards north Afghanistan near Badakshan province recently, threats have increased manifold. The establishment of the Taliban regime in 1994 and the siege of Kabul in 1996 from Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud, both ethnic Tajiks led to a new era of Islamic laws and Shariate regime. The late 1990’s were marked by conflict with the Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as the Shiite Hazaras, as these communities concentrated in the northern Afghanistan were opposed to the Taliban who were Sunni Muslims and extended their territorial control to the north. The incidents on both sides of the borders coincided with each other as the Central Asian regimes had no experience of ruling the territories themselves. This state of political and economic challenges led to complexities which led to Civil wars in Tajikistan and extremism in Uzbekistan. While the two Islamist leaders Namangani and Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan to seek refuge in Tajikistan, they were constantly pressurized to leave Tajikistan looking at the security dilemma the state faced.

⁴⁴ Cockayne J, Pfister D.(2008), *‘Peace Operations and Organised Crime’*, Geneva Papers, International Peace Institute, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

⁴⁵ Alikuzai Hamid Wahed.(2013), *‘The Concise History of Afghanistan’*, Trafford Publishing, page no 422.

As a result they fled into Afghanistan where the Taliban agreed to give them refuge on the terms of Uzbek group's participation in Taliban against the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras in northern Afghanistan.

With the Taliban pitted against the Northern Alliance (Rabbani, Massoud, Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum and Hazara leader Abdul Karim Khalili) there was violence, lawlessness and a web of militancy and transnational linkages that made the borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries wide open from a logistical and operational standpoint, harking back to the chaos of the pre-Soviet era⁴⁶. The Afghan civil war was a major source of concern for Tajikistan; the armed conflict threatened its fragile internal stability with the arrival of thousands of refugees. Afghanistan also serves as a point of origin for virtually all illegal narcotics that transit Tajikistan on their way to European markets. The Taliban's fall in 2001 led to the resumption of large-scale opium/heroin production and international trafficking, both of which had been significantly reduced by the Taliban in its last two years under regional and international pressure⁴⁷. The insecurity in the Taliban rule was not confined to southern and western Afghanistan now but came up to the borders of Tajikistan threatening the calm borders and Nato's Supply line. This extension of the Taliban northwards led to the Gorno-Badakshan (GBAT) province of Tajikistan becoming an area of conflict. This area which encompasses around 45% of the Tajik territory became witness to violence. While in 2009 the violence spread to Tajikistan from the Kunduz province of Afghanistan resulting in clashes between Al-Qaeda linked groups and Tajik security forces on 21st July 2012. General Abdullah Nazarov, 56 persons were stabbed to death in Khorog with links being thought to be with the Taliban forces coming up from the GBAT borders which led to the fear of upsurge of extremism and militancy from Afghanistan. Tajikistan in order to curb the influx of terrorist activities restricted the press and religion which according to them might help the spread of fundamentalist activities

- 2009: a rule was passed banning prayers in the cities which were unregistered to commencing them.

⁴⁶Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History("Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History is republished with permission of Stratfor."

⁴⁷Hooman Peimani ,2009,*Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*., 2009, abc-clio, llc, California, page 166

- 2011: children were forbid from participating in religious activities.
- 2012: cameras were installed for monitoring religious activities in religious institutions or seeking government permission for establishing relations with religious institutions established abroad.

What is generally seen is that the more you restrict the more the fear increases of religious extremism becoming the language of the opposing forces⁴⁸The consequences estimated are the rising up of a long war funded either by illicit activities or legitimate actions. Though various achievements have taken place since the time of independence, still the Central Asian region seems to be looked as a region emanating security threats, as it geographically shares the boundary with Afghanistan which is a producer of around three-quarters of the world's heroin supply⁴⁹. The trafficking of drugs through the Afghan-Tajik border seems to be new phenomenon as during the Soviet times the borders had been sealed and most trafficking incurred from the Iranian front through the 'Balkan route'⁵⁰.

As per UN Drug Report, the breach of borders has led to Tajikistan becoming one of the most lucrative routes for heroin flow with much seized drugs found still in original Afghan packaging, which are later repackaged upstream with authorities being skeptical about the usage of exported cotton bales and potatoes sacks to contain drug packets as well. The Tajik- Afghan border causes difficulty due to it being porous and easily penetrable, with many incidents of drug trade turning violent. In the year 2008 a fierce gun battle took the lives of several Turkmen police officers linked to dreaded IMU and other Al-Qaeda groups. Along the drug trafficking route, extremists too intrude the region. In addition to insurgency, the drug trade has brought in corruption. The drug traffickers are facilitated by the levels of poverty in the region as the level of rural earning is 1\$ per day. The lack of coordination and problems of underfunding of law enforcement agencies leads to, the border guards being allured to the drug trade initiating corruption in the region. This is reflected by 375 tons heroin trafficked through the region

⁴⁸ Borgeas Andreas.(), 'America's Managed (Dis)Engagement Policy Toward Central Asia: Surveying the Challenges and Opportunities', *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, page 100

⁴⁹ The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2002 (Vienna: UNODC, 2002), p 160.

⁵⁰ UNODC 2003, "Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Balkan states-Western Europe", 'Status Report on Afghanistan; Informal Consultations', UNODC, Vienna, p 4.

in 2008, of which only 1% was seized by the forces. “People are protected by corruption we have in this country. The higher you come in the hierarchy the harder it is to target those really responsible for these illegal activities”, says Christer Brannerud who worked for the UN office on Drugs and Crime in Tajikistan. This process in turn has precluded the development of coherent national counter policy against these transnational threats in Tajikistan. The feasible approach to contain extremist threat in Central Asia is through a coordinated political, economic and social change. As for the military component of the struggle, the enhancement of Central Asia’s counter terrorism capacity needs to be the priority.

1.8 TERRORISM AND TRAFFICKING:

The end of the Cold War brought the traditional concepts of security to a standstill while highlighting the security aspects which had for all these years been neglected by the elite of the states. Various non-traditional threats came up to be highlighted unlike the concept of state security and sovereignty which had been for all these years been the limelight of security studies. Terrorism was one such dimension which got prominence after the Cold war failed to make the people understand the various dimensions of the same. It was not until the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, that terrorism started to be broadly studied leading to states attaining a greater power to fight the so called the directly interlinked ‘threats’. ‘Global Terrorism’ became the rhetoric for any actions to secure the region whether US, Russia, China or organizations in Central Asia (UN, OSCE, EU, IOM, SCO) articulating their concerns about links between radical Islamic groups and trafficking activities. The result of this has been

- ‘Securitization’ of trafficking activities. These are now widely perceived as ‘global security threats’ (as opposed to distinct, local criminal activities).
- More international attention and funds have been devoted to international policies to counter trafficking.
- Some similar traditional security strategies have been adopted to counter both trafficking and terrorism.

While some analysts hold the opinion of the resurgence of the groups others downplay their role. Roger McDermott, 'Indeed, the nature of such links, long suspected by regional intelligence services, points to potentially explosive nexus of militant Islamic groups, drug traffickers, and criminal groups'⁵¹. There are a number of fears that have risen amongst the regimes and the local populace in regard to the region being doomed by the recent events occurring in the world. One such fear has been that the factions like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Jund al-Khilafah (JaK) and Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) which remained dormant for all these years may rise up to create turbulence in the already poverty stricken region after the US troops left Afghanistan. Departure of the US troops from Afghanistan led to increase in the extremist activity in the northern regions of Afghanistan as well as an increasing number of attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second is the increase in the number of Central Asians travelling to countries like Syria and Iraq to fight along with the ISIS, who on their return home would join the regional forces for a stronger and well trained faction against their regimes. It is estimated that around 2000 citizens have already joined the ISIS. They have returned in huge numbers and have been trying to spread their fangs over the people who have been long stricken by poverty and are fed up of the corruption and policies of the Central Asian governments⁵².

CONCLUSION:

Thus the Central Asian region as a whole or rather the individual state of Tajikistan seems to be enrolled in a prefixed notion of instability and acquirance of the very state of peace which is necessary for the establishment of sovereignty on the international front and development on the internal side. Even after so many years the basic questions of all round development, peace and welfare along the parameters of infrastructural development remain on the forefront of national attention. They are not only important for development of the state but also a vital step to curb the influx of dissatisfied, uneducated and unemployed youth into the stream of radical extremism. Security in Central Asian paradigm may start up with an explanation of the security state but then

⁵¹ Roger N. McDermott, 'Countering global terrorism: developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries', Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2004.

⁵² Nodirbek (2015), 'Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan', *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, Volume 7, issue 1, January- Feb 2015

penetrates the realm of reality and the field study where not only the state structure and law enforcement agencies play an important role but the general populace takes up the focus for development and study.

SECTION B

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

- What are the dangers lurking in the Republic of Tajikistan?
- Do the transnational threats challenge the very notion of sovereignty and security (societal, economic) of the Central Asian States?
- What are the measures taken by the Tajik government to ward off these inimical forces?
- Which other ‘actors’ beyond Tajikistan can combat the destabilizing forces in the region?
- How will the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan affect security situation in Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in particular?

HYPOTHESES:

- The security structure of Tajikistan, which lacks proper directions and authority, has been unable to curb the trans-border threats effectively.
- The working of the drugs and arms trafficking network along with the corrupt police officials, has aggravated economic woes of the people of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

RESEARCH METHODS:

Historical-analytical and descriptive methodology is followed while examining the capacity of the Central Asian states in curbing and watching over the spill over of the transnational threats from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The proposed research is based on available primary sources such as government documents in the form of various treaties, agreements, memorandum of understandings (MoUs), speeches, statements, statistical data and reports as well as secondary sources such as books, journals and

newspapers etc. It analyzes various materials available to derive a conclusion whether the Central Asian states have been successful in curbing or to some extent monitoring their borders properly.

TENTATIVE CHAPTERIZATION:

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The chapter discusses the geopolitics of the region with particular reference to linkages of Pakistan and Afghanistan with Central Asia. This study becomes important in order to define and understand the issues in the region which now have gained much relevance for understanding the security dimension in the region.

CHAPTER 2: CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter analyzes the specific security challenges to Central Asia due to the upcoming transnational threats, applying the concept of security to the Central Asian states particularly Tajikistan.

CHAPTER 3: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA

The threats prevailing in the region have led to the entire process of securitization of the Central Asian states revolving around the curbing of these threats, which pose serious challenge to stability of Central Asia and Tajikistan in particular.

CHAPTER 4: BORDER SECURITY SITUATION ON TAJIK-AGHAN BORDER

Tajikistan faces security dilemma in regard to the border issues with Afghanistan, which has become a hub of illegal transnational activities. The threats faced by Tajikistan originate from Afghanistan whether it is the narcotic trade forces of religious extremism and terrorism. The base of the dreaded IMU is said to be in Afghanistan which is also the hub of the Taliban. Along with this, the level of corruption prevalent among the officials enhances the problem all the more.

CHAPTER 5: TAJIKISTAN'S STATE CAPACITY AND MEASURES AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

The chapter evaluates the attitude of Tajikistan in the creation and adaption of measures for curbing the threats. It questions the efficiency of the state government in the proper application of the measures adapted on the national and regional level.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This chapter presents the major findings about the scenario and the success that has been achieved securing Tajikistan from the destabilizing effects of these transnational threats. It also makes some suggestions for better application of the efforts for the curbing of these crimes, to bring peace in the region.

CHAPTER 2

CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

Security issues in international relations, particularly during the era of the Cold War, were and had been dominated by the realist paradigm which saw the preservation of the state from external threat. Such a conception of security provided a very myopic and narrow understanding of the security problem of states, particularly smaller states. Since the past decade, attempts are being made to broaden the security agenda to include not only military but also other sectors: political, economic, societal and ecological. Furthermore, globalization and the opening up of the economy have provided scope for cross-border migration and also illicit trade, especially narcotics, terrorism and a dangerous mix of both: narco-terrorism.⁵³ What is to be addressed here is the issue of 'transnational threats' which unlike the other concepts is not based on military action and would lead to widespread destruction while on the other hand can never be secure as the very personnel's are themselves complicit in the crimes. An unusual consensus has evolved on a common agenda of promoting democracy, good governance and human rights in pursuit of "their" development and "our" security⁵⁴ leading to a more people centric approach than that of a state centric one which seemed to prevail during the Cold War. These concepts seek to challenge the norms of the notion of a state while also providing means for curbing these threats. Something which had been well defined and protected since modern history was defined by those of Ancient Greece, Aristotle and Socrates.

2.1 DEFINING BORDERLAND:

History has been mostly written from the national perspectives with "nation" states or at most about "civilizations" being the epitome of study. That is also because history is

⁵³ Jellissen, Gottheil,(2013), "On the Utility of Security Fences along International Borders", *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2013,DOI:10.1080/14751798.2013.842707,pages 266-279)

⁵⁴ Duffield.(2001), '*Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Critique. Influence. Change.)*', London: Zed Books.

written by the victors. Moreover, national(ist) or not, historical writing or written history has been overly Eurocentric. This Euro (or Western) centrism has marked and (de)formed not only historical writing about "the West," but also about "the East" and the "South", leading to many non-Western historian's writings about their own countries and cultures being infected by the virus of Euro-centrism. It blinds people to the Central Asian region and especially to anything important or good coming out of it. Sino-centric, India-centric, Persian-centric, Islamo-centric and other histories also omit adequate reference to Central Asia and even to its large influence on their own histories. "Civilized" peoples write their own histories about themselves and not about their "barbarian" neighbours, whom they consider beyond the pale⁵⁵.

For the region like that of Central Asia and South Asia borders are the peripheries of the state and the point of transition which delineate the territory of the state both physically and symbolically. There exist some borderlands which are anything but clear lands of delineation, as forces and activities like smuggling, illegal crossings, safe havens and areas of resistance for groups living in the margins of their country. Poorly controlled borders contribute to insecurity, transnational crime, and a host of other problems in various regions around the world. For example a semi-porous border might lead to greater corruption rather than borders with essentially no controls whatsoever⁵⁶. When it is clear to those citizens of the country living at the border that the institutions that they understand to be part of the state security apparatus are anything but making them secure, they look to other avenues for protection and justice. This appears the case of Badakshan, on both the Tajik and the Afghan sides. The formalization of institutions at the border have contributed to deepening informal networks of cooperation and the same time leading to a disconnect from the formal institutions to which the borders belong⁵⁷.

Borders are both the state's final point for cooperating with neighbours as well as the most important place for it to secure as means to assert sovereignty⁵⁸. The recent traditional and non-traditional security threats have generally emanated from the unfortunate situation of Afghanistan becoming the largest producer of drugs. Not only the

⁵⁵ Frank Andre Gunder ,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), *'The Centrality of Central Asia,'* Amsterdam: VU University Press.p 57

⁵⁶ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), *'Tajikistan in the 21st century'*, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press,p 268

⁵⁷ Ibid,p 267-268

⁵⁸Ibid, p 268.

geographical proximity but also the internal situation of one's state defines the stability such forces may lead to. In case of Afghanistan's neighbours on the western front China and Iran have maintained high levels of security levels. On the other hand in case of Central Asia the states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not share the same situation, as both the economies are poor and fragile. Apart from that the law enforcement institutions, social, educational, and health institutions all are in the worst perceivable condition. This lack of effective institutionalization is also due to the policies of the ruling party, as generally the threats which may not cost a tumbling of their power are not well sought after. Not only in economic or security terms but the threats from arising from the drug trade seem to have a negative societal impact as the number of people being infected by HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C is expanding.

Peter Andreas says "the dynamics of the illicit economy provide a new and powerful, if rather unconventional lens through which to examine core issues of concern to international relations scholars: the changing nature of states and the sources of cooperation and conflict between and among states and non-state actors. The popularity of the border as a political stage is based as much on the 'expressive role' of law enforcement as it is on the 'instrumental goal' of law enforcement (effective defense of physical boundaries)" ⁵⁹. The increase in border controls in a place like Tajikistan/Afghanistan Badakshan only magnifies the challenge of legitimacy on actual geographical border. The rhetorical assertion by the state that it controls the borders contrasted continually by the fact that the border is impossible to control, only causes a crisis of legitimacy for the institutions as they develop and formalize⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ Andreas Peter and Nadelman Ethan.(2006), '*Policing the Globe*', Oxford University Press,2006

⁶⁰ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),2015, '*Tajikistan in the 21st century*', Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon press,269

2.2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY:

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a cleavage between the communist and the capitalist regimes to be dissolved. The concept of security which had always been associated with military had led to the ignorance of the other security aspects for a country leading to them spreading into numerous domains being multifaceted in nature. In keeping with Hobbes description of the state as the great leviathan, domestic peace and defense against external aggression are regarded as the quintessence of what modern states do(1968). A Hobbesian leviathan is essentially charged with protecting the states and the citizens against other states and with ensuring that its citizens can escape the raw anarchy where all are fighting all and where human life is “solitary, poor, brutish, nasty and short” resulting in the need of a more stronger than the rest⁶¹. The realist school of thought in regard to the concept of state and security had always focused on the field of military competition between two states. This never gave way to the other realms of insecurity that a state could face. These issues were kept under departments like those of sociology rather than security or political studies. The end of the Cold War highlighted these realms as that of importance where much attention was needed. There is an increased acceptance of studying the implications of the drug trade from a security perspective. Non-traditional (which tends to be transnational) threats to security have risen to prominence, primarily in developing and post-communist areas and then particularly in Greater Central Asia⁶². The issue of ‘new security threats’(narcotics, arms, human trafficking and terrorism) had been generally seen as one rather than distinctively which leads to solution for one while another remains untouched.

The peripheral regions have gained importance leading to Central Asia coming up as an area of prominence for the study of various security dimensions. The newly found focus on border management and policies seems to have highlighted the paradigm of the geopolitics of the world leading to a whole new dimension of world geography. The fear of transnational activities has led to expansive border controls not only on a domestic

⁶¹ Anderson Louise (eds).(2007), *Fragile states and insecure people: violence, security and statehood in the twenty first century*, Danish Institute of international studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

⁶² Swanström Niklas.(2007), “The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications,” *Global Crime* 8 (2007): 1-25; Niklas Swanström, “Political Development and Organized Crime: The Yin and Yang of Greater Central Asia?” *China and Forum Quarterly* 5, 4 (2007):83-101

level but also other region incapable of providing a higher standard of security. Central Asia is one of a number of regions lying in a peripheral zone in the world system. Such zones are beset by political turbulence and economic stagnation and are caught up in a vicious circle of conflict, domestic unrest and underdevelopment⁶³. According to this argument, while there is an incentive for such a region to avert the threat of marginalization, the regional arrangement that develops is fragile and ineffective⁶⁴, which results in any optimism in regard to the regionalism in Central Asia to be either misguided or at least premature. The process of nationalism which took place right after the disintegration seemed to have failed as a process of creating a patchwork of ethnic and religious identities took place. It seemed to be a cauldron which was creating an 'arch of crisis' which dually came up during the Tajik civil war. As a result the whole process of Tajik civil war came into comparison where the term 'civic' represented the good western form of civilizations while on the other hand the upheaval of 'ethnic forces' was the bad Eastern type of nationalism⁶⁵. The Tajik civil upheaval failed to cater to the cross country nature to identity that Stalin had created leading to measures of violence in the other Central Asian parts against the Tajiks⁶⁶. A stable and effective state is a precondition for human development and security, and a state which fails to provide development and security to its citizens is neither strong nor stable, it is fragile⁶⁷.

The state-centered approach that dominated the realm of international relations after the establishment of the Cold War till its end with the demise of the Soviet Union established the core belief in military interaction being the very basis of security. While the Post-Cold war came up to question the notion with the upsurge of globalization lead to the erosion of this very closely held notion of sovereignty with the pattern of conflict going beyond the protection of the state. According to historical sociology the modern state evolved through dual-sided processes of internal "pacification" and "external

⁶³ Allison Roy.(2004), 'Regionalism and changing International order in Central Eurasia', *International Affairs, Royal institute of International Affairs*, Vol, 80, No 3, , May 2004,465

⁶⁴ Bjorn Hettne.(2001), 'Regionalism, Security and development: a comparative perspective', in Bjorn Hettne et al, '*Comparing regionalisms: implications for global development*', Basingstoke:Palgrave,2001,pp 8-9. 8-9

⁶⁵ Kuzio, T. (2001). 'Nationalising states' or nation-building? a critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence. *Nations and Nationalism*,7(2), 136–137

⁶⁶ Conrad Burkhard.(2000), "The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Tajikistan", *Strategic Analysis*, 24:8, 1479-1493... 1480.

⁶⁷ Anderson Louise (eds).(2007), '*Fragile states and insecure people: violence, security and statehood in the twenty first century*', Danish Institute of international studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,3

warfare”⁶⁸. While political scientist claim sovereignty to be the most exclusive feature of the modern state along with it being in charge of the “authoritative allocation of values for a society”⁶⁹. The rise of the state on the very means of violence brought in “Trinitarian warfare” which according to van Creveld is a distinction with government, people and army. Army here would be that police force for internal security along with those outward security maintainers –the military. What is worth noting here is whether acting as enforcers of the law or the defenders of the nation, the means of violence are supposed to be controlled by the government, which in turn is supposed to be representing or acting on behalf of the population⁷⁰.

Since the cold war, security and development have been reinterpreted and the boundaries between them increasingly blurred. In 1992, the concept of preventive diplomacy was revived with the publication of "An Agenda for Peace" on the initiative of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This document dedicated an entire section to preventive diplomacy, breaking it down into four components: fact finding, confidence building, early warning and preventive deployment⁷¹. Developmental agencies who used to shun violent conflicts are now actively engaged in conflict prevention and the conflict transformation, while their colleagues from the defence and foreign policy have taken much broader interest in this part of the world that previously appeared on their radar⁷².

The nature of crimes in today’s world does not identify with a certain nature, state or society, rather it is transnational in character as quoted by James Rosenau “distinguished from conventional issues by the fact that they span national boundaries and cannot be addressed, much less resolved, through actions undertaken only at the national and the local level”⁷³. While the “sceptics” define the state to be an architect rather than a victim of the flow of globalization they explain it on a better level. According to them the new wars that have come up have marked the reconfiguration of the states rather than the demise as the civil conflicts during this period involved the use of force to carve out new

⁶⁸ Giddens 1985, Tilly 1985,1990; Mann 1988

⁶⁹ Easton D, (1953), ‘*The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*’, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 129

⁷⁰ Anderson Louise (eds).(2007), ‘*Fragile states and insecure people: violence, security and statehood in the twenty first century*’, Danish Institute of international studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,

⁷¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali.(1992), ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping’, New York.

⁷² Anderson Louise (eds).(2007), ‘*Fragile states and insecure people: violence, security and statehood in the twenty first century*’, Danish Institute of international studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 3

⁷³ Griffith,1997,p 5

sovereign states from the existing ones which according to them defines the norm of state hood to be a real key motivation for intra-state conflicts. On the other hand the transformalists have given a better view which can be much appreciated in the sense that they state “transnational pressures on the sovereign states from without and within are promoting a broader and more cooperative approach to security”⁷⁴. Which leads to a better and more vast understanding of the fact that the present security challenges cannot be resolved on a pure national basis so the security needs to be widened to encompass the security of the individual.

Emma Rothschild classifies the extension of security “from the security of the nation to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards towards nations to individual: it is extended in the second upwards from the nation to the biosphere and the third it extends horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question.. the question of security is extended therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or human security...in the fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security...is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government and sideways to non governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of the nature or of the market”⁷⁵.The end of the cold war brought up issues which involved mobilization of movements along religious, ethnic and racial lines as these organized crimes were associated with mass killings, forcible resentment, crime and almost by definition , major human right violations⁷⁶. The Tajikistan civil war in itself is an example for the study along with that of Kosovo, Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone.

2.3 DEFINING TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS:

Organized crime has the ability to corrupt and undermine the already weak institutions in many of these states. To the extent that organized crime takes over the functions of the state, particularly those of local law enforcement resulting in the repression of the society

⁷⁴ Patman Robert., ‘Globalization and the end of the Cold War’, in Robert g Patman(eds), ‘Globalization and Conflict, National Security in a New Strategic Era’, *Contemporary security studies*, Routledge.

⁷⁵ Rothschild Emma.(2007), ‘What is Security?’, In Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (eds.) ‘*International Security-Widening security*’, Vol. III, Sage Publications, pp. 1-35p.55


⁷⁶ Kaldor M.(1999), ‘*New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era*’, Oxford: Oxford Polity press, p 15.

from both state as well as non-state actors resulting in growing resentment against the state and its organizations. This state of vulnerability leads to the increase and generation of internal and external extremism with further fears of having spill-over effects on the neighbouring countries resulting in fear of chaos in the area. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) poses a threat to all nations. When organized crime escalates, economic development, political independence, the environment and human and global security is threatened. The spread of radical political Islam, the criminalization of state institutions and economic transactions, the increase in cross-border narcotics trafficking, and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent an interrelated network of transnational challenges to the states and societies.

2.4 BARRY BUZAN AND SECTORAL THREATS:

Barry Buzan along with Waever and De Wilde (1998) in their work brought into play the five sectors which could make the concept of national security come into play. These sectors being Economic, Environmental, Military, Political and Societal though separate were interlinked by security of the state. Bringing the transnational threats into play these factions had their own importance. In the political field the transnational organized groups would always try to topple down the stability of a nation as a stable and secure nation with efficient governance is adverse to the notion of a illegal group.

2.4.1 BARRY BUZAN'S COMPONENT OF THE STATE



While the idea of the state being abstract the ideology is the very basis of the economic and political system. The idea of the state depends upon the concept of nation building and state building. The state of Tajikistan has gone under the same colonial lens where demarcations of the territory were made not by suggestion but by choice of the ruling elite. The demarcation and the creation of the country of Tajikistan in 1920's deprived it of its cultural centers like Bukhara and Samarkand which were given to Uzbekistan. Though a compensation was made by giving Leninabad to the country it could not make up for the loss Tajikistan had suffered. The same goes with the eastern part of the country known as Gorno-Badakshan which is linguistically and religiously different from the rest of the country and has 44% of the land mass. Thus the state nation strategy being emphasized upon after the Soviet Union disintegration is nothing but an endeavor to tightly hold on to the new identity of independence.

In the process of state building the role of the institutions has always been of importance. In this respect the state of Tajikistan falls under the category of *decentralised authoritarianism* where no leader has the capacity to destroy opposition and establish undisputed power within a given territory. This is because of the fact that the system has been captured by one religious faction of the *kulyabi* clan leading the other groups considering the rule to be illegitimate. The lack of a strong state and bureaucratic system has led to organized crime penetrate into the system and make use of the power vacuum to criminalize the system for its own benefits. Threats like Islamist extremism, terrorism, criminal networks dealing in narcotics and weapons emanating from the region have become transnational in character, while the rise of the factions of Taliban and Al-Qaeda along with the recent rise of the ISIS have taken the level of soft securities to a whole new level.

Since 1998 with the rise in terrorist activities, the underground Islamist factions Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have been advocating the overthrow of the governments and establishment of Islamist regimes in Central Asia. But though security cooperation would help initiation of measures against insurgency and terrorist activities, human rights violation should not take place as a measure to curb

these flows of insurgency⁷⁷. Thus “ the criminal idea of the state is useless without the co-option of the institutions expressing it, and vice versa. Hence the threat emanating from drug trafficking to this part of the state is linked to organized criminals infiltrating and destabilizing, or in the worst case, co-opting the institutional structures, and as a result distorting the institutional machinery of the state in order to facilitate criminal activities”⁷⁸. The drug mafia is prevalent all over the world but does not pose a threat to the state security. It is only when combined with the violent and the armed groups that it seems to pose a deadly threat to the security of the very structure of the state.

There is much linkage between the three parts of the state. The linkage of the Tajik state with the organized criminal network has both internal and external repercussions which lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of the idea of the state. Once the organized crime network infiltrates into the area it becomes difficult to hold back the ill effects. The Tajik economy is very much supported by the money of the drug barons. Like Afghanistan if the drug economy is thought to be cracked down without providing an alternative source of income it would lead to an uprising and toppling down of the economy. But the roots of drug trade are so deeply rooted that no such measure is bound to work in a small time. As could be seen in the BBC documentary which proved that the growing demand of drugs in the west has resulted in no experimentation for rehabilitation being successful. On the economic front though the drug trade helps in providing income for the state as well as means for survival for the people. These are notions which in the long run turn out to be negative in character. If seen in the case of Afghanistan the worldwide demand for opium has resulted in the arable land being used for opium production rather than the vital goods. Which leads to import of basic necessities and a burden on the economy of the nation. In a recent documentary filmed by BBC...it was portrayed that the initiation by the government of Afghanistan and NATO failed in making the people basically farmers grow maize and other crops. It was because of the growing demand of opium that these farmers would not get enough buyers of a margin of profit on the crops they sow. The crops would get infected due to over production and less


⁷⁷ Collins Kathleen.(2009), ‘Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian regimes: The Case of Central Asia’, *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 61, no. 2, march 2009, 249–281

⁷⁸Engvall Johan.(2006),“The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organised crime in Tajikistan”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 55.6, p 827-854, 833.

demand. The farmers even who had come up for the initiative had no choice but to go back to opium farming. The opium market has led to growing drug abuse resulting in societal insecurity. This has resulted in the blending of criminal and politically motivated groups to come up in the shape of narco-terrorist groups. This profit making trade along with usurping the power has resulted in various consequences which have been beautifully illustrated in the figure below.

2.4.2 THE STATE UNDER SIEGE

Criminal ideas and interest exploiting the vacuum arising from the lack of a coherent idea of the state (political threat)



2.5 POLITICAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE CONNECTION:

Though in the start, the criminal and the terrorist networks were on a different end but with the passage of time the two ends have met to create a more dangerous network. Now the terrorist groups mainly with a political motive have criminal activities like drug trade at its base. If we look at the case of Afghanistan the religious faction of Taliban which ruled the country has come up as a big criminal network. Taliban controls all the drug trade in Afghanistan exporting it by various means to the countries from which the demand comes up. The end of the Cold War and the flow of the globalization led to more openness and inter-connecters widening the area of interest and trade for the drug trade in the region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia found that the age old well defined borders that it had defended had disappeared resulting in being vulnerable to penetration from all sides.

New borders had to be defined and codified into treaties. According to a study conducted by the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* new borders stretching over nearly 14,000 kilometers had to be demarcated and codified. Till this is done Russia will continue to feel an intense sense of vulnerability, and more so in its southern flank where the borders have always been porous.⁷⁹ The deadly mixture of weak states and security threats as a result further weakens the government structures forming a vicious circle, which is turning to legitimize the movement against the government. The dwindling government as a result leads to poor health, educational and sustainability levels which again leads to people turning to other means for livelihood and sustenance and increasing number of participants in the radical stream. Weak infrastructural investments and trade fails to reach the peripheral areas which leads to large consumer market being deprived of advantages of economic development, while lack of proper health and educational institutions lead to devastating challenges for the poor populace. The area of Gorno-Badakshan of Tajikistan is one such example, where during the Soviet times the health facilities were quite good but with the independence and the following civil war, this area has been cut off from the rest. As a result it has become a genesis for turmoil against the government as drug money in the area has led to the quality of life improving which

⁷⁹ Joshi N, 'Keeping an eye on Taliban: Russian and Central Asian response', *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 25/26, Vol. 25, no. 4/Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 148.

obviously leads to people supporting the trade which helps them sustain than the forces of the government which has always neglected them. The growing unemployment; weak government sponsored health care, social welfare at large, as well as a lack of belief in the future can be stated as the causes of fundamentalism.

2.6 SECURITY INTERVENTIONS AND TAJIKISTAN:

Tajikistan is the country of Central Asia which is most prone to threats from Afghanistan. It being a weak state as compared to the other Central Asiaborder states has been accused of providing a safe haven to the extremist and criminal networks from Afghanistan. The IMU attacks that rocked the Ferghana valley brought into light the weakness of the Tajik state. These attacks rather than challenging the military of the states was a move to bring in chaos in the region leading to strengthening of the criminal and drug network.

First the events showed that Tajikistan was continuously used as a springboard for narco-terror incursions into the heart of Central Asia, and the actions conducted by the IMU clearly manifested the lack of central control over the territory.

Secondly, Narco-terrorism has also undermined the external legitimacy of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan-the principle power in Central Asia-in particular has aggressively accused. Tajikistan of providing militant Islamic groups and criminals with a safe haven, and has demanded that the Tajik government expel the rebels. External factors could perceive Tajikistan to be lawless narco-terror area that affects stability and security in their own countries, and earlier responses have shown that at least Uzbekistan does not hesitate to intervene⁸⁰. The Narcotization of insurgencies has moved drugs more fully into national security domain⁸¹ with the merging of two major fields of drugs and insurgencies in the cold war era has led to the complexities in the very concept of security. As cited 'One does not know if the drug trafficker is a guerrilla or if the guerrilla is a drug trafficker. The line is now blurred, it is a brotherhood community'⁸².

⁸⁰ Engvall, J.(2006) 'The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan', *Europe-asia studies* 58(6), September ,839-840

⁸¹ Kan P R. (2006), "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 19:4, 586-599,DOI:10.1080/08850600600829783.

⁸² Davids, D.(2002), *Narco-Terrorism: A Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace*, New York: Transnational Publishers,2002,p 13

The merging of the two sections has created a big confusion for the powers who are involved in the elimination of the drugs and insurgencies. A focus on the insurgencies leads to a divergence from the anti-drug factor leading to the damaging of economic well being and also losing the faith of the local populace. As Alexandra Guaqueta notes “ Drugs have special features and connection to war that they are ‘lootable’, that is easily ‘extracted and transported by individuals and small teams of unskilled workers’ ”⁸³. In the past, the armed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was heavily involved in the heroin trade. But after the 2001 attack on Afghanistan it seems to have lost its base⁸⁴ yet the question arises as to what if these ‘regroup’ with other factions to come up as a bigger force. Which would lead to them making use of the poor border controls to their advantage resulting in an enhancement of trafficking and terrorism⁸⁵. International NGOs like that of International Crisis Group (ICG) are of the opinion that IMU members who were in a passive state due to the ‘war on terror’ must have already been hired by criminal or drug barons to help the trade by the use of their knowledge on the routes through the region⁸⁶.

2.7 SHIFT IN SECURITY PARADIGM:

The academic debate presently affords greater importance to regional, intrastate, and transnational issues. These include economic, societal and environmental security issues. This shift has occurred as the collapse of the bipolar world order and the globalization processes in transportation and communication have increased links across geographic processes in transportation and communication have increased links across geographic areas. While it has brought a host of beneficial effects, it also has a dark side: non-traditional and transnational threats to security have risen to prominence globally, with the largest consequences in the developing and the post communist world⁸⁷.

⁸³ Guaqueta Alexandra.(2003) “The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions”, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict*, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,p.91

⁸⁴ Rashid Ahmed.(2002), ‘*Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*’,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp 144–145

⁸⁵Svante E. Cornell, ‘The nexus of narcotic, conflict, and radical Islamism in Central Asia’, *Caspian Brief*, No 24, June 2002, p 2

⁸⁶ ICG Asia Report, Is radical Islam inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for engagement’, *ICG Asia Report*, No 72, 22 December 2003, p 8, fn 34.

⁸⁷ Svante E Cornell(2005), Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia:the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, *Terrorism and Political Violence*,17:4,619-639,DOI:10.1080/095465591009395

Brad Mcallister and Julia Khersonsky in their article have termed the causes of the Central Asian turbulence to be three fold ranging from political to geographical to economic. What is important here is to conduct an effective response to the three

- 1) Political: The threat is political to the extent that the radical islamists hope to found a “Greater-Turkistan”, or a “Pan-Central-Asian Caliphate”, as an alternative to secular rule from Tashkent, while a multitude of ethnic minorities, particularly in the Ferghana valley, demand greater autonomy of the state.
- 2) Economic: Islamist radicals benefit from the inferior social conditions wrought by the underdevelopment endemic in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia.
- 3) Geographic: geopolitical realities in the region hamper efforts at controlling the movement of extremists across borders. When one haven becomes inhospitable, extremists simply cross one of the many borders in the region in search for a new one⁸⁸.

Lippman claims that security is when “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able to, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such war”⁸⁹. This traditional set of meanings to security have shifted dimension to a whole new regime in this globalised world where borders are mere demarcations. Though after the end of the Cold war in 1991, the security dimensions had changed and distinction was made between “hard” security and “soft” security. Yet the Westphalian peace treaty in 1648, under which today’s western concept of the nation-state was created has not forgone its hold. As even today any security concern whether terrorism, water or environmental is always measured in terms of military power. So it can be stated that though various versions of security continue to emanate from concerns for the world the security of the state still remains the point of concern and preference.

2.8 THE REASONS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN TROUBLE MAKING:

⁸⁸ Mcallister Brad, Khersonsky Julia (2007), ‘Trade, Development and Non-Proliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,30:5, 445-458, DOI:10.1080/10576100701250244, page 445

⁸⁹ Lippman Walter (1943), ‘*U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*’, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1943, p. 53.

Holsti had argued that: “the security between states in the Third world, among some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security within those states.”⁹⁰ The overlapping of the geography of the states of Afghanistan and Tajikistan has led to major common issues that need to be addressed on a common basis. When seen in accordance to the security perspective in a traditional way, Buzan states that “national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference, and where the idea of state, its institutions and its territory will be clearly defined and stable in their own right”.

We all know that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had resulted in the coming of the Central Asian countries. The independence though unwelcome was the only way they could decide their own future. The start of the glorious post-independence period though was not at all bed of roses. The civil war and the unsettled governmental and social system had led to the state become a weak one. “The end of a centralized government-run economy and state-run social welfare system resulted in the decline of living standards and social benefits. These conditions created a vast reservoir of people who had no stable source of income or sustainable livelihood and faced difficult times with an uncertain future, unemployment and poverty”⁹¹. The youth which form the backbone of the society have also become the victims of the rapidly changing society. The lowering of the standard of living, along with employment loss, decreasing income and purchasing power, and rising prices has lead various phases of one’s life being hit. The education system which was established by the Soviets with equal opportunity for girls and boys seems to be dwindling. With the state subsidized educational system coming to a close, the pattern of boy education being preferred over girls seems to being established. The social and economic deprivation of the Badakshan province facing severe issues seems to be sowing seeds for another war which is a serious threat for Tajikistan’s stability and economic and social progress⁹². What is humorous here is that while the government is trying to fight the soft security threats, it is the lack of initiation on these by the government which actually causes the radical groups to derive their appeal, freedom from

⁹⁰ Kalevi J. Holsti.(1996), *The State, the War and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 15

⁹¹ Amanbayeva Aida.(2009),“The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia”, *Asian Criminology* 4:165-186.

⁹². Hooman Peimani ,2009,*Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*., 2009, abc-clio,llc, California, 15

operation from the same. The imbeddedment of the forces of corruption in the government which does not change with the change in the government leads to initiation of the radical groups to fight against the system. The radical groups like that of Taliban, IMU, Hizb-Ut- Tahrir have time and again come up openly in their fight against the system and seem to be strengthening their hold over the states due to the lack of power amongst the social and government structure to curb such forces. In today's world drug trade and drug abuse has become one of the feared threats as it threatened the societies fabrication it also has varied political and economic consequence. While addiction leads to crime and corruption, the insurgency and terrorism involved being the other faces leads to impairing a state's economic and political functioning⁹³. Leading to affecting both "hard" and "soft" security dimensions of a nation's security.

2.9 CONCLUSION:

The chapter thus finely deals with various aspects which define the security paradigm with Barry Buzan and his theory of Regional Security Concept Theory being the main pivot point of discussion. Yet this proves that though various fears and threats have come up with times the security of the nation is the main point of attention and study even today.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A) Conceptual and Historical Perspective

As regards the theoretical aspects of the study of the Central Asian region, the following books and articles provide an insight into the security dimensions of the region. This helps us in making a framework of the genesis of the security studies in regard to the linkages between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. A region which has in recent times gained much popularity among the security analysts who question and also define the political, economic and social diaspora in regard the question of regional security.

⁹³ Saltanat berdkeeva, "Organized Crime in Central Asia: A Threat Assessment," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 7, 2 (2009): 75-100.

Levi (2010) in the very first line of the book says ‘this anthology is designed primarily to complement an introductory study of Central Asia’s history’ defining the various social, cultural, political and economic features of the history of Central Asia. Being an inclusion of the various translations of the originals it takes one along the journey of time defining the remarkable incidents of history, which defined this region as Central Asia. Emphasizing not only on the incidents of prominence pointing out the daily life of the people of the region in the times of prosperity but also in times of crisis, strife and that of relative isolation, with an insight of the Muslim world of which Central Asia had been a part and parcel of. While (Singh, 2004) deals with the history of the region, focusing on the 19th and the 20th century talks about the changes in the balance of power in the region and the increased involvement of external powers, leading to Central Asian countries being left to decide their fates. Being part of the regional organizations has made them realize being self-reliant that would guarantee their independence. As regards the Afghan problem, there is unanimity among CARs in regard to curbing the threats they face in terms of drug trafficking and spillover of Islamic fundamentalism. Defining and describing the phase of the 1990’s, the book ends with assuring that the demise of Taliban has to much an extent relaxed the security concerns of the Central Asian states. There has also been the rise in the hope of the Central Asian countries of building a secular and democratic polity in the region.

After the end of a historical insight into the region. Luong, (2004) takes us in a journey into the incidents and political scenario which rocked the country of USSR leading to the disintegration and the atmosphere in the political circles at that time giving rise to the new countries of Central Asia. While Peimani (1998) brings in the question of complexity of times when the disintegration of USSR led to the scenario of searching a new identity by the Central Asian states. The book explains how despite their differences in terms of size, population, military, security and geographical factors, these are the very same factors which tie the Central Asian countries together, to the extent that achievement and preservation of security is not just bound on the national level rather but on the regional level. The range of ethnic groups spread along the region leads the author to state that no single Central Asian state can be stable with the neighbours lacking their stability. The author says that Central Asia underwent the time of the so termed ‘security

complex' where the weakness of these new states has made them vulnerable to the external powers whose sole motive is to dominate the region. . Farkhod Tolipov(2010) states that like other the post-Soviet transition processes, the problem of national identification, which became a basic and even fashionable topic serving as a key for explaining the political, social and cultural processes. The study of nationalist processes would further help in knowing the cross- border divides among the countries of Central Asia and the neighbouring countries as well. Hunter, a renowned scholar has said, "The history of Central Asia has been about empires and tribes. The concept of nation and nation state to denote a triangular relationship among the territory, ethno-cultural identity, and political authority is very recent in the region" she writes. According to her old disputes between Turkic- Persian speaking nations of Central Asia over territory (mainly Samarkand and Bukhara) would continue. This linkage of Persian history in itself joins Central Asia and Afghanistan into a closer bond of history and thought.

Diverting from the theme of history, insurgency, terrorism and Crime a book written by Max.G.Manwaring Aptly describes and defines the multiple conflict syndrome which lurks over the nations, transforming a war into a state of 'Super insurgency'.For example in the Afghan War there was an influx of fighters not only from the surrounding areas but also far off countries with sending soldiers for the Islamist cause.

The multi-dimensional paradigm of this political-terrorist war was the genesis of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia lurks in a constant fear of terrorism and transnational threats like drug trafficking and human trafficking.

Anuradha M.Chenoy and Ajay Patnaik (2011) opine that Central Asia has assumed a special place when talked about as a region where conflicts are interwoven intricately with each other in the conflicts arising from cross -border and trans-border ethnic settlements, forcible displacement of nationalities during the Stalinist era, arbitrary demarcation of borders between states , resource locale and water sharing arrangement and several other related issues tend to tear apart relations among the Central Asian states. On the other hand its sharing of borders with the war torn country of Afghanistan brings in another series of challenges for the book is a conglomeration of series of articles

which discusses different issues which have risen up as threats to the very nature of the Central Asian states.

The study of history and geopolitics takes in a theoretical shift with the work of Kirill Nourzhanov(2009) who defines how in the fore of regional security complex theory, the region of Central Asia after gaining independence in 1991 formed a distinguished security complex. Faced with a multitude of military, societal, environmental and transnational threats, they have rarely managed to counter them in a cooperative and efficient manner. Security thinking in the region has been dominated by a focus on regime survival in individual countries on the one hand and the forceful imposition of the global agenda on the other. Without resolving border issues, territorial disputes and conflicts over natural resources at the regional level. Central Asia will not have internal peace and stability nor be able to play useful role in the international efforts to defeat terrorism. The focus in all the studies lands up to the question of security to which to which Barry Buzan's concept of 'security complex' provides the theoretical framework to this research. He discusses and emphasizes on the societal, military and economic factors as they are the ones which clearly define another dimension of politics. Discussing vividly the process of formation of Central Asia, it lays stress on the way it has fitted itself into various political settings with time. He defines the three rivals of Iran, Turkey and Russia in the region and the various factors of ethnicity, language and religion being significant to these rivals in their penetration into the region. At the end it defines the involvement of these countries economically with the rival countries and the current fluid situation in these countries which would define the future of Central Asia. Luis Tome in the article 'Security and Security Complex: Operational Concepts starts with defining the basic concept of 'traditional security' which has become contested and ambiguous leading to the upsurge of various factions in one term like common security, cooperative security, collective security and security community.

A Gojko Pavlovic defines the change in the international scenario after the end of the Cold War which changed the very dimension of the state, and military lead security which had been established after the Westphalian system. The traditional concepts of security are no more able to handle the complex nature, antilogy and phenomology that

the contemporary security challenges posed. While ‘Dimensions of Security’ a joint paper by Dr Bakreski and Tanja Miosevaska and Dr Stojan Slaveski highlights the genesis and intensification of the two concepts of security and the ‘deepening of Security’. While the broadening of the perspectives of security is that of other security concerns other than the military aspect, the deepening means the shift of focus from state to other levels of analysis. “International Security Theory : Understanding change and Debating Strategy” eds Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Infantis is a collection of papers which defines the paradigm of security or the basis of various dimensions like the act of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, geopolitics, legitimization of terror and lastly describing the contemporary security challenges talks about the US transformation of world order and the war on terror pre and post the twin tower.

Coming back to Central Asia, T K Oomen(2006) defines the witnessing of two extremities of security, the world witnessed in 2005, while one was military in nature one created by man, other was natural problems of environmental concern. Unlike the traditional concepts of security where the state was the sole protector of the individual, with time new security concerns have come up as a result of which people in the state can be vulnerable to economic, environmental, societal, political threats which impact upon the safety and security of the citizens where the traditional powers and instruments of the state do not provide much help.

B) Cross Border Trafficking and Terrorism Posing a Threat

Cross border trade had been active among countries since ancient times but in the current scenario things have changed. What was known simply as illicit trade has come up to earn the title of cross border trafficking which poses a threat to the security of countries. In the Central Asian border areas of Afghanistan, there exists a kingdom where lies the genesis of all illegal trade and world intoxication with poppy farming and opium production. According to Gul (2006) the war –torn country of Afghanistan holds on to a delicate nature of peace and security scenario alarming its neighbouring countries also with the jeopardisation of security and stability in the region with the presence of super power in the region. The provocative factor of Taliban in the region is a major reason for the rising question of stability in the state as well as the neighbouring countries due to the

recent reports of the resurgence of the Islamic factions in the region along with the prevalence of extremists, terrorism and organized crime forces in the region. The UNODC report on “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium” 2009, describes the threat caused by the poppy cultivation and supply of opium from the country of Afghanistan. Looking deeply into the problem, the study helps us understand the very basic nature of the trade and how the opiate economy poses a transnational security threat facilitating cross-border trafficking and posing a threat to the very nature of security of the Afghan state as well as the security of the neighbouring states. After the insight of drug trade UNODC report on “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment”, 2010 takes in a different perspective to the whole system of transnational organized crimes. The report unfolds a series of threats of transnational organized crime, with a section which discusses the role of the Central Asian states in the transit route to the Russian Federation and European markets in the drug trade having its origination in the state of Afghanistan. Later the report dwells into the impact of the transnational cocaine market on the stability of the region of Central Asia.

Stephen Blank (2002) discusses how the region of Central Asia has had its strategic gains and failures with the gaining of independence in 1991. While having the freedom of defining its own course of history, it has come up to serve as a pivotal theatre for the US and other powerful countries from which forces and missions can be launched in any of four directions: the Middle East, East Asia, South Asia and Europe. Talking about possibility of a greater Middle-East that stretches from Turkey to Afghanistan and perhaps for some aspects includes all of North Africa and Central Asia, the author is of the opinion that the possibility of Islamic extremism exists in the region which may be of disturbance for the whole world. Thus the opening of the military base by the US in Central Asia serves as a reason for the future impediment to the curbing of any disturbance in the region and neighbouring areas like South Asia, Russia, Europe and West Asia. The globalization process according to Flynn (2000) with open societies and liberalized economies not just facilitate the movement of products and workers but also expedites the passage of terrorists and other cross-border activities leading to a rise in the transnational threats. Suggesting that it is better to stop the threats in the frontier itself

rather at the internal scenario he also put forth some viable suggestions for fighting the threats which have caused such menace to the region of Central Asia. Mushtaq A.Kaw in his article 'Globalization and Central Asian Space' in the Journal of Central Asian Studies Vol 19,2010 aptly describes the process of globalization and the costs and benefits which have been involved in the process. While defining the shortening of the world space and the notion of 'world as a village' due to various open borders, trade and communication it also does quite aptly describe the costs of the local populace has to pay in this regard. Mentioning the Central Asian Scenario it talks about the influx of corruption and international dominance of the developed countries. 'Globalization is the reincarnation of the Western imperialism/colonialism' leading to unprecedented progress with also a juxtaposed subject to various complications. To this Andreas (2003) opines that as territory demarcated institutions states has always put in restrictions in order to refrain the undesirables, but in the current era of globalization, borders are not eroding or remaining unchanged but are being recreated for desired ambitions and here territorial policing creates new geopolitics of the region based on law enforcement programs. Where Central Asian region particularly Tajikistan has to play a vital and defensive role for the defence of its borders against the transnational crimes and extremism up surging in the region.

Rashid (1999) defines the transnational nature of the threats coming up in Afghanistan and their effect on the neighbouring region. He says 'Chaos in Afghanistan is seeping through its porous borders, as the enormous economic disruption created due to conflict in the area has led to dependence on smuggling and drug trafficking along with Islamic Extremism Activities which are exporting it to the neighbouring regions.' In his another work Rashid (2002) discusses about his former book published in 1994, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or nationalism? He opines that whether these Central Asian states would use ethnic nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism for building of a democratic order had not been directly answered at that time and his current book attempts to answer that early question. The book delves into the history of Islamic movements from the sixth century BC to the end of the communist era. It also discusses how the repressive measures by the governments of the moderate Islam have led to their being dragged into the orbits of Islamic movements like Taliban and Al- Qaeda. Beautifully describing the

Central Asian situation the author ends with the words that ‘you can question in Central Asia, but don’t expect straight answers.’ According to Rashid(2010) ‘ A mixture of fear, acceptance, total exhaustion and devastation after years of war and more than 1.5 million dead have forced many Afghans to accept the Taliban ways of Justice’. The book describes the upsurge of Taliban who had suddenly appeared to the scene backed up by Pakistan. The scene in Afghanistan has changed with Taliban. They brought up peace and security to Kandhar and the neighbouring provinces. They crushed the warring tribal groups, had their leaders hanged and unarmed populace along with starting the lucrative smuggling trade between Pakistan, Afghanistan , Iran and Central Asia Implementing strict form of Sharia and Islamic rules .

With excessive secrecy Taliban had been playing their politics, bringing in the long dead question of clan, tribal and feudal structures on one side while questioning the process of modernization and economic development on the other. Shocking the whole neighbourhood with its advance, neighbouring countries like Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and the five Central Asian republics like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan backed the Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to halt the Taliban advance. Describing the history of Afghanistan, along with the rise of Taliban, Ahmed Rashid explains how it had actually ‘spilled over’ on the countries of Central Asia linking Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The new transnational threats of Drug Trafficking and religious extremism here posed new challenges for the world community. Taking this in to consideration Jashau S Krasna in his article “Testing the Salience of Transnational Issues for International Security: the Case of Narcotics, Production and Trafficking” defines and describes the new security paradigm of transnational security politics. This growing web of international norms may be causing convergence and compatibility of national security objectives and a gradual shift away from the traditional anarchy of the international system, increasing its cooperative, collaborative/complementary component relative to its competitive one. As a result of this the world states have come together in defining and protecting themselves and poor and weak nations from any fears which may turn out to be a world problem in the long Run.

The regional players have a great role to play in the security of the region, while James C Tentas (2010) finds the Central Asian states to be facing common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism and faltering commitments to economic and democratic reforms. However, he talks about the security in the region to be varying from country to country. The article puts the fact into relativity in regard to the internal development and politics in the neighbouring countries to affect the security dynamics of the region. These developments may include the more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an economically growing China, instability in Iran and the south Caucasus region and re-surgng drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan which has led to the rise in cross-border activities posing challenges to the border security of the Central Asian states. ‘Tajikistan: Another Afghan War’ a paper in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists defines the eagerness of the Mujahedeen forces to penetrate the Tajik border with weapons in hand for extending the War on Islamism and imposing the rule of Sharia into the Central Asian countries. Russia and other Tajikistan neighbours cannot afford to wait for things to settle down in Tajikistan as it serves as bedrock of Islamist activities, if things are not normalized soon after with borders being stable and well guarded.

Apart from the above article where it is the challenges posed by neighbours Marlene Larauelle (2011), defines the role of the European Union, in the securitization of the region of Central Asia. As regards the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship it recalls that the states of Central Asia are directly threatened by the insecurity emanating from Afghanistan. Border Security programs are given priority, while “the prevention of extremism and counter-terrorism cooperation” does not really give a clear idea how Europe can pragmatically interact with Central Asian governments and societies on the matter of Afghanistan. John Heathershaw has brilliantly put up the fear of the trafficking of small arms through the country of Tajikistan in his paper “The Paradigm of Peace Building :Peril, Promise and Small arms in Tajikistan”. As Olivier A and J.Brennikmeijer have aptly put up for the relevance of separate institutions for the country of Tajikistan. “Western Ideals of constitutional democracy human rights, free and fair multi-party elections and party reconciliation are worthy objectives, but they do not fit within the Tajik’s own conceptions of future”.

Brilliantly putting up solutions to the problem Britt Sloan (2011) in his article emphasizes the need to grapple with the economic, political and combat power that some terrorist groups enjoy through their involvement in crime and conflict. Fragile states with pools of unemployed labour and population, injured and traumatized by violence have competitive advantage for terrorist organizations, criminal networks and violent leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three financing terrorism, protecting crime and securing political control. After decades of forced Soviet-style secularization the Central Asian states experienced a process of Islamization. Which was seen by the populace as a progressive, democratic and inevitable process which resulted in the increase in radical elements. But when the process turned violent it was curbed by the states which wanted to project a secular image. The populace of the nations respected the decision and peace was restored. Being ousted by the government in the 1990's, the IMU developed their basis in Pakistan and has come up as a powerful faction again.

C) Border security and Measures against the Threats

Upsurge of transnational threats like Islamic extremism, trans-border terrorism, trafficking in narcotics, human trafficking and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose security challenges to Central Asia. Talking about the web of organized crime prevalent in the region Syed Nazakat (2013) in his article "Like Cattle from Kabul" talks about the level of human trafficking which has come up Afghanistan as a result of decades of war resulting in the displacement of millions. Chronic crime and poverty have resulted in the increase of the vulnerability of women. Its geographic situation having six direct neighbours including Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan, has led to trafficking from Afghanistan into the neighbouring countries as well. This leads us to the question about the nature of border security in the region, with many of the borders being nearly impossible to guard due to the inaccessible terrain and the tribal fiefdoms.

The authors Arieal Cohen and Morgan L.Roach (2010) speaking from the US point of view historicize the "War on Terror" and the Central Asian response to the same. They explain how the states at the individual and collective level are trying to tackle the problem of terrorism which has been spreading its fangs in the region since the states attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. There have been repeated

incidents of terrorist attacks and government crackdown on the same. The process of denial and acceptance has been one of regularity but the Central Asian states have uniform policy against terrorism as they share their borders with Afghanistan.

The US initiation against the War on Terror is well known but Andreas Borgeas, “America’s managed (Dis)engagement Policy towards Central Asia: Surveying the challenges and opportunities” rightly states that while its fight against terror which started after the 9/11 attacks or the twin tower. The US government for their vested interests have ignited religious resistance groups (Taliban is one of the biggest example), financed repressive government and also exuberated tensions with the neighbouring states. Thus US indeed recalibrated its traditional foreign policy towards this region in order to perceive a forward operating position in the theater of Central Asia in support of the mission in Afghanistan.

Daniela Corti (2009) and Ashok Swain in their article debate about the much talked about subjects "war on drugs" and "War on Terror", linking the two with the case study of Afghanistan. With the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the fundamentalist regime by Taliban in Afghanistan led to fears rising in the Tajik state which taken into consideration the unstable regime and the governance of the Afghan state became vigilant of the lurking dangers over the Central Asian region. Thus began an era of coordinated efforts and strategies which Tetsuro Lji describes in his article ‘Cooperation, coordination and complementary in international peace making: The Tajikistan experience.’ USA has always been an established power and after the attacks of 9/11 it seems to have taken up the baston of ‘Anti-Terrorism activities’ thus Sarka Waisova in the article ‘the consequences of 9/11 for the US security sector: New Actors, New Procedures and new practices’ argues about the new security governance and US participation in the stabilization and reconstructing Afghanistan. But the core of the change seems to be weakening of security policy as a hierarchical policy with clear institutions, rules and the chain of command and the building of a non-linear horizontal networked policy where multiple agents meet and collaborate on various levels on the basis of flexible structures. P. Stobdan in his article “The Afghan Conflict and Regional Security” states that Afghanistan today has descended into chaos and complete anarchy, imperiling its people

and searing its neighbours with threats. It is these threats which have led to dismantling the peace of the Central Asian Region which is already fighting through its troubles of instability and insecurity after gaining independence from the Soviet fold.

George Gavrilis in his article “Central Asia’s Border woes and the Impact of International Assistance” gives a detailed mention of the importance of the Central Asian Border for the security of the region as a whole. To which the International Organizations like the OSCE, UN, EU and the countries like the United States of America, Russia and China have designed programs for equipping the border forces of these countries with the best arms and ammunitions along with various organizations and centers being set up to overhaul and equip the Central Asian states from any threat arising mainly from the Afghan side. Which would not only lead to destabilization of the border line areas but also extend to the European States. The biggest example of this would be the lucrative drug trade which has the largest number of victims in the European nations and are on a constant rise. As a result of such an initiation by the organizations barracks have been built for border guards at remote crossings, sophisticated parts of entries have been bankrolled facilitating a legal movement of goods and people and also trained offices have been stationed to detect forged documents. Leading to the ultimate goal of more secure borders against threats and more open to licit civilian crossings and lucrative trade flow.

Britt Sloan and James Cockayne in their article state that terrorists, criminals and insurgents have been increasingly collaborating despite the fact that there has been a global campaign against terrorism. They suggest that an approach to counterterrorism needs to incorporate the policies of criminology, conflict transformation, peace building, development and sociological arenas along with the measures of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, Improved border control and Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and legal-institution capacity building. George Gavrilis(2008), *The dynamics of interstate boundaries*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 216 pages, ISBN 9780521898997 and Nick Vaughen Williams(2009), *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign power*, Edinburgh University Press, 200 Pages propose theoretical explanations of important problems like the interaction between states and their border

protection agencies and the role of both spatial and non-territorial borders in securitized politics. Thus in today's globalised world, the border security agenda has become a key policy concern not only for the state themselves and the region but the world as a whole. "Countering Transnational Threats-Terrorism and Narco-Trafficking is a series of articles edited by Mathew Levitt and Michael Jacobson which deals with measures which should be built in for tackling terrorist threats and building in Global Counter Terrorism networks and also curbing of drug trafficking networks groups which are on a constant rise."

D) Tajikistan

Tajikistan as a region has come up to be known as the "Bottleneck of the Drug Trade", which makes it important to be studied minutely and to understand the situation prevailing in the region. The following section provides an insight into the history of the region which framed the circumstances of the present times:

(Aye, Schweizer 2012) prepares the ground for the study of the region in their book "Birds of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan" vividly describing the various states in regard to the history they have shared together with the region of Central Asia. Here it may be noted that though Afghanistan is not the part of the Central Asian region, it has shared its culture, history and religion with the region since ancient times. This unique feature makes it an indispensable part in the study of the region of Central Asia. (Hiro, 2010) in his recent book describes the story of Central Asia beyond the realm of the Soviet legacy. It goes into the history of the region even beyond the Mongol times. Describing the Afghan factor in relation between the two regions, it talks about the Islamic assistance from the Tajik factions of Islamic Renaissance Party. The victory of the Islamists in Iran had provided great boost to the religious forces in the neighbouring area resulting in the beaming Islamic broadcasts in Tajikistan. Further the situation in Afghanistan also led to rise in the religious sections/factions amongst the Tajiks. These various developments during Afghanistan's turbulent times and the involvement of the Central Asian countries in the forum have resulted in closeness and security breaches of transnational factors. (Djalili, Shirin 1998) while looking at the region of Tajikistan, also dwell into the

causes that lead to the post independence turmoil and also provide an insight into the political and social dynamics of the region. It examines the causes of the post-independence turmoil, and analyses social and political dynamics at work throughout Central Asia.

(Kuzmits, 2013) goes beyond the subject of describing the country and studies the borders and attitudes of the people in regard to the countries of Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. These two countries share the largest borders with the country of Afghanistan and it is this that raises a question of security for the region. Uzbekistan has very stern security rules which makes Tajikistan coming up as a safe realm for the upsurge and initiation of the transnational forces, which in the current times, have posed a threat to the security dimension of the Central Asian states and Tajikistan in particular.

([Heathershaw](#), 2011) The country of Tajikistan had been devastated by the conflict that rocked the country. The article looks into the arena of post-conflict Tajikistan and the role of the international intervention for the cause of liberal peace building. Tajikistan being an exclusive piece of authoritarianism, the book tries to prove how peace building as an initiator is a process of democratization or institutionalization serving as a facilitator of increased authoritarian peace and fostered popular accommodation and avoidance strategies. It dwells into the role the international organizations have played in the assistance to political parties and elections, the security sector and community development.

The transition that the Muslim youth faced in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is beautifully illustrated in the writing of ([Harris](#), 2006). He dives into the wave by which the Central Asian youth were swept as new western influences showed up after the demise of Soviet Union. This wave of democracy and of a right to raise one's voice has led to coming up of various Islamic organizations, who in the name of freedom of speech, have enrolled people for their own benefits and the rise of Islamic hold in the region. The religion that binds the two regions of Afghanistan and Central Asia has led to (Stein, 2014) bringing in the question of regional security prevailing amongst the Central Asian states. Like the international players, the Central Asian states also have speculations in regard to the scenario that will prevail in the region after the US

withdraws its troops from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is one of the biggest states which shares its borders with Afghanistan, while guarding its borders. The article evaluates the dangers which would arise from the flow of transnational threats from the country of Afghanistan into the Central Asian forum. Historicizing the links of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the causes and fight against the turbulent Islamic terrorism times, the article builds in the web of the fear of Islamic resurgence in the region. The country of Tajikistan is dominated by the religious faith of Islam with almost 97% of the population as Muslims. Tajikistan is home to various Islamic activities and the first Central Asian country which has officially registered an Islamic political party-Hizbi-Nahzati-Islamii-Tojikistan. Yet the underground Islamic groups have always flourished. One such group is Hizb-Ut-Tahrir-Al-Islami, which poses danger to the state and the governance due to the policies it adheres. It is this fear for the Tajikistan state which is aptly described by Emmanuel Karagianms in his paper “The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islam”.

Along the lines of security, the role of the regional groups cannot be omitted and in this regard, especially the role of Russia and CSTO cannot be undermined. The article “The Significance of the Tajik-Afghan Border, 2013” ponders over the arena of Tajik-Afghan border attaining importance after the decision of the US-NATO forces to disengage from combating operations in Afghanistan in 2014. The Russian state too is concerned with the growth of terrorism and narcotic flow which will take place in the resulting in Russia coming up with ideas in regard to the patrolling of these routes. Prof Warikoo and Umarov in their latest book ‘Tajikistan in the 21st Century: society, economy and politics’ have excellently laid down every detail of the Tajik state. Ranging from language and culture to the internal and external problems being faced by the contemporary government, it seems has highlighted the entire process of establishment jump into a period of chaos to fight against turbulences caused by various factors.

Taliban and other religious/fundamentalist organizations fears which have been emanating from the country of Afghanistan have put the Central Asian states in a lot of pressure. Poonam Mann in “Taliban at the doorstep of Central Asia” describes the fuelling of insurgency backed by Taliban. Following the steps of providing sanctuaries to

the movements in Central Asia. Taliban now bets on the unsettled atmosphere in these countries leading to them becoming the happy hunting grounds for clergy of various faiths. The article in the BBC monitoring international reports (2013) talks about the rising concerns among the members of the CSTO and Russia to safeguard the Tajik-Afghan border. This concern has risen due to the rise in speculations in regard to the expansion of insecurity and terrorism on the borders along with expansion of drug trade from the country of Afghanistan through the region of Central Asia. Tajikistan needs help in guarding border with Afghanistan which was put up in the CSTO meeting by the Tajik president in 2013. This clearly shows that Tajikistan as a country lacks the required security structure in order to curb the dangers emitting from the region of Afghanistan. The CSTO leaders have seriously taken a stand to fight against the threats from Afghanistan. In article titled “CSTO leaders to confer on threats from Afghanistan, Syria, aid to Tajikistan”(published in 2013) gave an overview of the aid which would be provided to the country of Tajikistan. The sole motive of this aid was to strengthen the border security of the state to curb the transnational threats like terrorism and narcotics flowing into the region from the country of Afghanistan. The Central Asian states which share the borders with Afghanistan are today treated as relevant participants in the making of the Afghan strategy, despite the state of strength or effectiveness of the policies even their relevance in the world arena. This according to the author Kristin Fjaestab and Heidi Kjaernet “Performing Statehood: Afghan as an arena for Central Asian states, serves as a boost to the overall cooperative measures between the state of Afghanistan and Central Asian in the fields of Border management.”

CHAPTER 3

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA

INTRODUCTION:

The advent of the Central Asian countries on the international realm began with the perception of being a major transit route since ancient times, owing to be the part of the famous Silk Route. But in real terms during the Soviet period the borders were effectively guarded and were closed, this was the reason that the trafficking of drugs came up as a whole new phenomenon for the recently independent Central Asian. The USA which is the major donor for anti-drug trafficking measures and the key advocate for the ‘war on drugs’, perceives Central Asia to be one of the major transit links of the global narcotic industry and thus a ‘security threat’⁹⁴. Central Asia though recently has come up as an obvious choice for the transition of drugs, was not always so. The rise as weak states and corrupt officials has led to enhancing of the flow of drugs. Traditionally, most of the drugs from Afghanistan were transferred through the open Iranian borderland trafficked among the ‘Balkan Route’⁹⁵

The geopolitical realities have led to the impediment of various efforts to curb the movement of traffickers in the region. What leads to be a harsh reality is that the porous borders resulting in the organized networks shifting their base to another country or region when the pressure of enforcement of laws becomes intolerable in one country. This can be linked or associated to the “balloon effect” similar to that found in the South American counter-narcotics efforts, where enforcement pressure in one area merely leads to the spread of illicit activities to other regions⁹⁶. Post-Soviet era highlighted the accidental borders which were drawn by a bunch of people with no knowledge of either the terrain or on any scientific basis. Molotov who was a high ranking Soviet official

⁹⁴ Jackson R,(2005), *Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter Terrorism*, New York, Manchester University Press,40

⁹⁵ UNODC, Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Balkan states-Western Europe, (Status Report on Afghanistan: Informal Consultations, Vienna,24 June 2003,p 4


⁹⁶McAllister Brad, Khersonsky Julia.(2007), ‘Trade, Development and Non-Proliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia’ , *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,30:5, 445-458, DOI:10.1080/10576100701250244, page 448.

states the creation of the Central Asian states as much more than Stalin's cartographic whim⁹⁷. As a result Tajikistan has been compared to be the shape of post colonial Africa which had been assigned the most impossible terrain and disparate population, and its great historical centers deliberately left out of its boundaries⁹⁸. Tajikistan was deprived of its 'two sacred cultural centers of Samarkhand and Bokhara'⁹⁹, which had for all these years defined its history. Tajikistan has been compared to a France without Paris¹⁰⁰.

The Geography of Terrorism

Global patterns of attack, 2001-2011

a) Transnational attacks:



In the present times Afghanistan seems to determine the fate of the Central Asian states in the present times. Three out of the five Central Asian states share their border with Afghanistan which puts the Central Asian states at a much bigger risk. There had been no demarcation between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan until the power tussle arose between the Tsarist Russia and the British India for defining their territory. Both regions are divided by a single river which can be easily crossed from either side. The cultural and the ethnic affinity between the two binds the region all the more. Ethnically speaking still there are a large number of Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik minorities in Afghanistan.

⁹⁷ Payam Foroughi. (2002), 'Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 39-61, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827

⁹⁸ William O. Beeman. 'The Struggle for Identity in Post-Soviet Tajikistan', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol 3, No 4, 1999.

⁹⁹ *Shari Adjari, 'Interview with the Chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Dr Shodman Yusuf, and his Vice-Chairman, Professor Rahim Musalmanian Ghobadiani', *Central Asian Monitor*, No 3, 1994, pp 10-14

¹⁰⁰ Dagiev Dagikhudo. (2013), *Regime Transition in Central Asia: Stateness, Nationalism and Political Change in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*, Routledge, 30-Oct-2013 - [Political Science](#) – pp 256

In the recent times Tajikistan has come up to be known as the ‘Gateway of drugs’ from Afghanistan into the Central Asian front. Adding to the difficulty for the patrolling units on the Tajik-Afghan border is the mountainous terrain, as a result of which this route is used for transaction of drugs and chemicals used in the illicit manufacturing of heroin flow in the opposite direction¹⁰¹. The drug and its usage has not left a single country away from its wrath, leading to even the Western countries becoming high consumers of the drugs and the prominence of this non-traditional threat reaching a whole new level. The western countries have become a valuable market for the drug trade centered on Afghanistan as a result of which they have started initiating various steps for curbing the flow of drugs through these channels. The EU’s policy is to ‘set up a system of “filters “between the main source of opiates and heroin, Afghanistan and Western Europe’¹⁰².

Apart from the drug economy what is disturbing is the role of the religious factions and parties neither hidden nor new in the region. Central Asia came face to face with the realities and upheaval of religious Islam which apparently took up a monstrous shape, leading to revolutions, wars and instability in the region. They seem to have joined hands together maintaining close linkages between the narcotics trafficking which are transnational in character. Transcending the international borders with much ease they live up to the title of being transnational organizations with illicit trafficking as the basis of operation. One of the biggest and well known organizations is that of IMU which in many of its incarnations has been located in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they draw funds and other resources¹⁰³ mainly from trafficking. According to the United Nations International Drug Control Program, about 60 metric tons of dry opium passes through Central Asia every year¹⁰⁴. This would not be possible without the close linkages between the drug cartels and the Islamic radicalize with more chances of the Islamic organization being the one owning the drug and illicit arms or human trafficking trade, all being highly profitable in character.


¹⁰¹ Jackson R,(2005), ‘*Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter Terrorism*’, New York, Manchester University Press, p 42

¹⁰² Background note: Short Review on EU programme to fight drugs along the Heroin Route, Brussels, 15 May 2003, AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D, 2003

¹⁰³ Mcallister Brad, Khersonsky Julia (2007), ‘Trade, Development and Non-Proliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,30:5, 445-458, DOI:10.1080/10576100701250244, page 448

¹⁰⁴ Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action.(1999) , “Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia”, New York: Century Foundation Press, p 70

3.1 THREATS TERRORIZING THE STABILITY OF CENTRAL ASIA



*<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/>

3.1.1 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CAUSES OF SECURITY THREATS IN THE REGION

The Russian control over the region and the resulting cartographic division on the basis of ethnicity or language by the communist rulers, brought in with time the trickling down of various issues which would rise up to question the very notion of security of the states. The question on the very notion of sovereignty has led to the Central Asian states sharing a complex security environment which have resulted in the resurgence of both traditional and non-traditional security fears.

Bringing in a whole new concept of state fears and questioning the old notion of states being seen as usurpers of foreign state territory, these new fears cause a spill over effect from one territory to the another leading to tumbling down of economies and states

turning into failed state in nature. Known as the transnational threats they include the forces of extremism, terrorism causing instability in both economic and social fields, posing a question on the security maintenance and sovereignty of the state concerned. This is true in case of the Central Asian states which share their borders with the turbulent region of Afghanistan.

3.1.2 DRUGS AND ECONOMY OF CENTRAL ASIA: TAJIKISTAN

Central Asia seems to have joined hands with Afghanistan on the illegal passage of drugs into the region along with other forms of illicit trade. The process has escalated to the transactions into the country of Europe despite various surveillance and assistance programs from the west. The Tajik civil war highlighted the importance of the area in regard to illicit trafficking which became the first preferred route after the Balkans into the northern states of Russia and Europe. Central Asia has always been historically important; the ancient Silk Route passes through the region which again is being revived. It is the very same Silk Route which is being used for the transfer of opium and narcotics as has been analyzed by various experts. The Ferghana valley which has been divided among the three countries of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) has already been a hub of extremist activities leading to it gaining prominence and using their linkages to supply drugs which also comes up as a source of income for incurring the expenses on arms and required ammunitions. Using the forbidden passes from Afghanistan these groups are said to possess the major drug business. Namangani controls about 70% of heroin trafficking business in the region of Osh in Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan has the longest borders with Afghanistan which are highly porous in nature. Even with other Central Asian countries forming a part of the drug circle, Tajikistan has earned the title of being the “bottleneck for drugs trafficking to the north”, due to less inspected and secured borders. It is due to the geography of the area with intractable mountains which make the work of the security personnel all the more difficult. The recent trend has been the rise of HIV/AIDS among the youth which seems to be the reason for the high transit of drugs through the region, which makes it readily available for the populace. Not just the drugs but there has been a rise in the fear in the recent years

as the same routes are managed by particular leaders for trafficking of ferry weapons and explosives by the religious groups. “A substantial amount of drug money was actually used to jump-start certain sectors of the economy in Tajikistan, and it undoubtedly helped support the revival of the home construction industry and the service sector more generally. The illegal drugs trade also seems to have helped ordinary Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan keep afloat, providing income to small traders who would otherwise have no livelihood. But in southern Kyrgyzstan in particular drug-based organized crime has overshadowed many forms of legal business, as drug barons have sought to become legitimate businessmen by buying up large amounts of commercial property. This has contributed to the bribery of politicians and voters and the general instability of political life.”¹⁰⁵ As a result these mafias turn to challenge or involve in the matters of the state leading to the increase in the vulnerability to external and internal destabilizing factors. The society turns hostile due to the corruption and lack of provision of basic necessities by the government leading to the religious forces feeding on the much thought. The terrain, the corruption and resentment leads to increase of the threats for the spill over into neighbouring countries. The Tajik state has a majority of population which are living below poverty levels. The country seems to be relying on the money which is brought through the migrant workers, foreign loans and drug money is a very important source. *The Economist* even reported that drug money is likely maintaining the Tajik economy. The route for Tajik drug money is through Afghanistan and while the government on the international forums condemns drug trafficking, it been the major beneficiary as corruption in the highest levels exist for reaping the benefits of money derived from the booming drug economy¹⁰⁶. The Tajik government not only lacks the resources needed in the securing of its borders but its very officials and elites are involved in the development of trafficking enterprise due to the remunerations that come with it. As mentioned the major part of the Tajik economy seems to be based and built up on drug money¹⁰⁷.


3.2DRUG TRADE:-

¹⁰⁵ Olcott, Martha Brill, (2007), “Strategic Concerns in Central Asia: Central Asia at the Crossroad”, *Disarmament Forum* P. 10.

¹⁰⁶ Borgeas Andreas(), ‘America’s Managed (Dis)Engagement Policy Toward Central Asia: Surveying the Challenges and Opportunities’,*Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* page 100

¹⁰⁷ Borgeas Andreas(), ‘America’s Managed (Dis)Engagement Policy Toward Central Asia: Surveying the Challenges and Opportunities’,*Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* page 103

If the drug transactions in Central Asia in particular Tajikistan have to be understood, Afghanistan is a battlefield, a lack of whose study narrows down the subject to a failure at large.



The country had been left in shackles after the Afghan war and the withdrawal by Soviet troops. Any source of employment was being sought after and poppy cultivation seemed to be the one which would provide the state with some stability as well as earn revenue. Till then the poppy cultivation had not been so prevalent in Afghanistan but now being seven times more profitable than the regular crops was enough for the economy for this to grow. While providing the youth with sources of employment, immense revenue was thought to be generated which would help in building up the worn up country. This profitable nature led to the local warlords also providing the needed support..The fact that it was seven times more profitable than the ordinary wheat cultivation allured the local warlords to provide adequate support for the upbringing of the cultivation of the rich opium farming. The other crops though persisted yet this easy profit attainment

technique had come up as a new thing in demand ‘one farmer estimated that he could get 1000-2000 lakhs annual profit from poppy cultivation compared to 20 lakhs if he cultivated wheat. “Just recently people’s life has improved because of cultivation of opium. Now people have two to three sets of clothes and many household goods- Women from Deh Dehi”¹⁰⁸.


But with the trade grew the transnational nature spilling into the nearby areas through the help of drug barons and local warlords. Tajikistan come up as a corridor of drug trafficking apart from the Balkans which had been for so many years been the main route of trafficking. Johan Engvall in his article “The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized crime in Tajikistan”¹⁰⁹ rightly illustrates the drug and crime network in Tajikistan. He with the help of a diagram represents the four groups in the crime terror spectrum of Central Asia:-

- In Afghanistan and all the Central Asian republics these groups of drug mafia operating at a micro level do not go beyond the membership on a clan to clan or a particular ethnic group. Their political interest and influence is limited¹¹⁰.The groups basically transnational groups and networks which bring in the Afghan products to European markets pose a great threat to the region, ‘in part because they are composed of a chain of regional and international players including officials in several government and security services.’ In order to achieve the highly profitable goals an infiltration is made into the state system and relations and linkages with the institutional and political forums get established.
- A control over the power sources both money and violence leads to an active participation of the Afghan and Tajik warlords in the trafficking process, thus playing an instrumental role in the creation of political and military entourage.
- The involvement of the insurgent groups in the enterprise is more of a profiteer rather than the organizers for furthering of their politics in the arena.

¹⁰⁸ Goodhand Jonathan.(2000), “From Holy war to Opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan”, *Central Asian Survey*, 19(2),265-280.

¹⁰⁹ Engvall Johan.(2006),“The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organised crime in Tajikistan”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 55,6, p 827-854

¹¹⁰ Makarenko,T.(2002), Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of Networks, *Jane's Intelligence Review*,May 2002.




3.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF DRUGS TO AFGHANISTAN


The importance of the Afghan state cannot surpass the Central Asian importance as Robert Blake, the Secretary within the US State Department for Central Asia had already stressed the importance of the Central Asian states for the stabilization of Afghanistan in July 2012. He described the New Silk Route strategy being important in terms of not only security but trade, energy and transport as well. The concept of Greater Central Asia had already been proposed by Frederick Starr, a US expert on the region, who argued the need for Central Asia to be linked with South Asia through routes both of trade and energy and this would of course take place via Afghanistan¹¹¹. Yet with the desperate security situation in the region and the war damaged structure Afghanistan still remains the weakest link with only drugs being the trade between the region.. Almost 90 per cent of the global heroin supply is made from Afghan opium. Russia claims that there are 30,000 Russian victims of the "heroin attack from Afghanistan" each year. The opium and heroin trade follows three main routes, with at least a quarter of the traffic taking the northern route through Central Asia.¹¹²

¹¹¹ S. Frederick Starr, In Defense of Greater Central Asia, Silk Road Studies Program, Policy Paper, Washington, /Stockholm, September 2008.)

¹¹² Halbach Uwe.(2013), 'Afghanistan 2014: Shadows over Central Asia?', Martin Publishers, *Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 123-135* <http://www.martinpublishers.com/shrs>,139-140.



Afghanistan Opium Cultivation



*<http://fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chap2.html>.

“Acting like a family bank, Afghan opium has turned into a non-perishable, low-weight, high-value product that represents a commodity to be exchanged, where it not only provides food, but also food security to the resource poor while working as a credit sometimes. Thus meeting the parameters for providing a sense of security to the country lacking in secure financial institutions.”¹¹³. This statement in itself validates the importance of drug cultivation and trade for the country of Afghanistan. The US government and the UN as in their peace building measures introduced the cultivation of other crops other than the poppy cultivation like maize etc. But this measure of theirs was not much of a success as while the farmers with better access to roads and reliable

¹¹³ The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, David Mansfield, aug 2001, international conference on alternative development in drug control and cooperation, Feldafing jan 7-12, 2002

markets might be able to reap the benefits of the cash crop it was not the same for the others. While in need to hedge their bets a *modus vivendi* was also needed with the local warlords. As they determined the scope of the poppy cultivation in the area they ruled. The prospect of acquiring an effective counter-narcotic program in Afghanistan is remote as both the Afghan government and the insurgents rely heavily on revenues from opium and heroin trades¹¹⁴. What both nations and international groups rely on is funding through narcotics for their operations in various states. According to Roger McDermott, ‘Indeed, the nature of such links, long suspected by regional intelligence services, points to a potentially explosive nexus of militant Islamic groups, drug traffickers, and criminal groups’¹¹⁵. The local groups Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)—the Party of Islamic Liberation with its history of violent activities seek their main sources of income from overseas contribution or money from narcotics trafficking in and beyond the region¹¹⁶, thus validating the role of the drug money in various strata of politics.

3.2.2 TAJIKISTAN AND THE FACTORS FOR THE OPIUM ECONOMY:-

Tajikistan which has come up as a new route for the drug traffickers has been much studied upon. The power vacuum that surrounded the initial years of the post cold war period and the independence scenario of the Central Asian countries led to the upbringing of various mafias and local strongmen which held the region from breaking away. At this juncture when the economies had tumbled and insecurity prevailed the cultivation and trade of opium served as the only basis for earning of revenue as the results were seven times more profitable as compared to those of the other crops. “The possibility that the region’s economies could come to depend largely on the production and the export of narcotic substances seems a very real prospect”¹¹⁷. The IMU since its genesis in 1998 has continued to evolve and operate even after being inflicted by various measures for its demolition like that of Operation Enduring Freedom. Opium and the Drug Trade has always been a vital part of the strategy that has been created for the financing of its

¹¹⁴ Inkster Nigel and Comolli Virginia.(2012), Chapter three: The Producer States, Adelphi Series.52:428, 55-84, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2012.677277>

Interfax September 27,1993

¹¹⁵ Roger N. McDermott, ‘Countering global terrorism: developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries’, Strategic Studies Institute, *US Army War College*, February 2004.

¹¹⁶ ‘Involvement of Russian organized crime syndicates, criminal elements in the Russian military, and regional terrorist groups in narcotics trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Chechnya’, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, October 2002, p 18.

¹¹⁷ Rensselaer W.Lee 3, “Drug in Communist and former Communist states”, *Transnational Organised Crime*,1995(1:2), 200

activities in the region in and around Central Asia. They have become increasingly involved in trafficking facilitation while strategically placing themselves for finance and expansion of the organizational needs and as a result the 2012 surge in opium production has dually affected the whole scenario¹¹⁸.

There were various reasons for the establishment of the Opium Economy which can be underlined as follows.

1) **The Silk Route and Connectivity:**

The stagnation of the great Silk Route and trade within with the dawn of orientalism led to years of denial of trade benefits for the region. Thus when a process of revivalism took place with the sudden spurt of the process of globalization, Badakshan an already disturbed region came up as a centre of supplies of the desired product.

2) **Market Deregulation:**

The Afghan conflict and the following traumas like social and political insecurity had led to the populace of the Afghan state looking for various avenues to gain a sense of security by earning the basic needs. “While Globalization and Liberalization have not caused these forms of instability, market deregulation has made it easier for warring parties to develop parallel or grey international-linkages necessary for survival”¹¹⁹.

3) **The Collapsed state:**

The Afghan and the Tajik governments had never been able to achieve an all over governmental control/hold due to the some parts being way far away from the centres of prominence. Leaving these areas coming up as a breeding ground of political and societal desposition. Being generally authoritative regimes political prosecution was an only end of going against the system. Weak governmental hold along with widespread discontentment and weak political structure leads to the local warlords attaining a genuine support for increasing their illicit activities earning these less treaded mountains the title of the hub of illegal trade and narcotics.

¹¹⁸ *UNODC, *World Drug Report* (2012) (United Nations, New York, June 2012), 26

¹¹⁹ Duffield M.(1999), ‘Reading development as security. Post-nation state conflict and reconstruction normality’, Draft paper presented at the conference on ‘NGOs in a Global Future’, University of Birmingham,1999.

4) **Removal of Subsidies:**

The governmental interventions and policies too have a distinct impact on the various measures the people adopt for survival. The country had already been war torn by the Soviet intervention and the events that had followed further worsened the condition. After the Soviet withdrawal the people needed the government to be people friendly but unlike that Najibullah government at the centre brought in new rules which talked otherwise. The basic removal of subsidies on the primary products led to the farmers opting for opium cultivation which was more profitable and required less labor.

5) **The Soviet Withdrawal, Power Vacuum and the Role of Commanders:**

The Soviet withdrawal led to the creation of a power vacuum giving the local warlords an opportunity to attain a stronghold over the drug nexus which was quiet profitable in nature. The drug barons along with the warlords came up providing finances and security to the drug trade and thus enhancing it to higher levels.

6) **Economic and Environmental Hazards:** The war always has the worst effect on the economy and the people are the biggest sufferers. The Afghan war created scarcity of all the resources including land. This created an intense competition for land with pastures and mode of cultivation. With the removal of subsidies by the government on the primary resources the poppy and opium cultivation become prevalent as it was seven times more profitable than the other basic crops which were cultivated.

7) **Contact with the World Outside:** The contact with the outside world lured them into the gifts mankind had in store for them with so many development¹²⁰. Jonathan Goodhand in his article mentions the change of views of the younger populace from the village elders after they had seen the limelight of the outside world.

We have more contacts with outsiders now. We feel like a silk-worm coming out of its pupa.

A village elder

¹²⁰ Goodhand Jonathan.(2000), "From Holy war to Opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan", *Central Asian Survey*, 19(2),265-280.,272.

When I came back I compared my village to Pakistan, where I saw good conditions and development like roads and big buildings. I looked at my village and it was like a graveyard.

Young religious leader.

3.3 OTHER FACTORS THAT HAVE ERUPTED WITH TIME:

3.3.1 CORRUPTION

Corruption and its faults for security: Corruption is a problem throughout the region and this is compounded by the illegal narcotics trade: many states lie on transit routes for narcotics from Afghanistan. This tight link between business interests—both legal and illegal—and the state is a significant concern throughout the region. Corruption is rife in Central Asia as members of ruling elites profit from foreign sales of natural resources, and in some places even from illegal drugs trafficking. While close ties between politicians and business ensure loyalty to the regime and therefore a degree of stability, any sign of weakness among those in power is likely to be seized upon by those competing for access to resources and by a frustrated population, creating a risk of violence in the struggle for political power¹²¹”.

Central Asia is a great study for the corruption as an initiator and facilitator of anti-social activities like that of drug trafficking. The very nature of the country seems to be initiated by corrupt practices. Many positions in the government and the military are not only obtained but also maintained through bribing of the upper officials. It's the extortion of money on the lower levels that reaches the higher one, actively participating in it. One Tajik law enforcement officer claimed, nearly all law enforcement and border patrolling officers in the border districts are involved in drug trafficking. Some of them smuggle drugs into Tajikistan; others deliver drugs from border districts to other parts of the country; others still 'open' the border to traffickers and provide them with crucial information. An example of high level involvement is the arrest of Tajikistan's Ambassador to Kazakhstan twice for drug transfer.

¹²¹ Olcott, Martha Brill, (2007), “Strategic Concerns in Central Asia: Central Asia at the Crossroad”, *Disarmament Forum* P. 4.

Pinpointing the corrupt officials can be as simple as determining which officials live moderately and those who live luxuriously¹²². What is generally done is the arrest of people who due to poverty, underdevelopment carry small couriers for sustenance.

Corruption seems to be the main genesis for any political decision for Tajikistan. Even during the 1997 peace accord brokered by the UN, the UTO, and the government in Dushanbe., it was made clear that a power sharing government would be created with amnesty to the civil war participants. Which on failing to integrate all militias led to war-lordism over their respective regions. The further involvement of these militias into the regular life has led to private armies with no accountability to the central government¹²³.

After 9/11 when the world launched a war against terror, the politicians and local militia in Central Asia seemed to take over the drug trade as it was not them but the terrorists who were being targeted. Here the IMU has always had a hold and its resurgence would be easy from locations such as Tavildar. They made their hold over the region during the initial years of Tajikistan's President Rahmanov rule as then he was weak to enforce rule of law in region away from the capital, though measures have been applied to revert the same¹²⁴. The government has been trying to maintain its stronghold over areas which were considered to be inaccessible and never got due attention. As a result of which the region of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast underwent a successful military operation in 2012¹²⁵.

A whole new system has been established taking corruption beyond the boundaries of the state to becoming a transnational character.¹²⁶. The following are some of the actors which are involved in the process of corruption

MNC ⇔ elites in host countries ⇨ offshore financial vehicles ⇨ conduits
middlemen and brokers ⇨ destination financial institutions.

¹²² Erica Marat.(2006), "The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute*, Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, 46.

¹²³ Gleason,G. (2001) 'Tajikistan Minister's Murder Points to Drug-Route Conflict', *Eurasia Insight*,16 March, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insights/articles/eav041601.shtml>, 125-126.

¹²⁴ "Tajikistan Claims Militant Leader Killed," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15 April 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_says_militant_leader_killed/3558497.html (16 July 2012).

¹²⁵ "Negotiations to End Fighting in East Tajikistan Continue," *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty*, 27 July 2012, <http://www.rferl.org/content/negotiations-to-end-fightingin-east-tajikistan-continue/24658259.html>> (2 August 2012).

¹²⁶ 'In Central Asia, the fortunes of the region's billionaires are directly tied to the progression (or not) of national economies as well as closely integrated to national politics' (Forbes, March 25, 2013).

The level of importance of this can be measured by the very thing that the United Nations was compelled to bring in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) which was agreed in 2003. It was the first comprehensive global treaty (signed by over 165 countries) that prohibited different forms of corruption while establishing various mechanisms for international monitoring and cooperation for anti-corruption effort. Individually, the elements of transnational corruption networks include:

Domestic elites:

On the national level it is the governmental officials and elites who are in control of all the national resources and are the ones who will be granting access to private firms and international ones by granting them contracts and access in various dimensions like security and defense.

Brokers:

Another level of corrupt officials are the middle men who form a link between the international forces and the local elites facilitating side payments to the parties while providing them with legal entities which may not be subject to national regulations like that of taxation, disclosure etc.

Destination havens:

The money laundering forces may also require destinations for concealing their money transfers which lead to them seeking dependable and reputable banks in major onshore financial centres for their gains, along with holding of property and conspicuous consumption (World Bank and UNODC 2009).

The access of the authoritarian regime to the states sources lead to the enrichment of a few and that were the elites. Leading to the Central Asian states turning into predatory Kleptocracies following the Soviet disintegration, where the elites got hold of all the lucrative assets and later used them for their own individual gains and benefits. A few instances from the country of Tajikistan proves the statements

- The Guardian December 12, 2010 states that Imomali Rahmon, 20-year leader of Tajikistan, according to Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (October 2, 2013), while accumulating hundreds of millions has also got an unofficial control over the states aluminium revenues and hydroelectric enterprises
- The Tajikistan Aluminium Company (TALCO) was reported of having ties with the ruling family while using offshore registries to conduct and hide its dealings (Heathershaw 2011);
- In 2013 the National Bank Tajikistan admitted: It's possible that funds are transferred from Tajikistan to Britain, Germany, Russia and other countries and then from those places to offshore regions. For this reason, it is difficult to determine the amount of funds that go to offshore regions. (BBC January 22, 2013)

Sometimes corruption or any force which is considered to be negative does have positive impacts. In the case of Central Asia not all governments in the region have been capable enough of providing development to its populace. The governmental policies have not yet reached the region of Gorno-Badakshan which is still inaccessible and faces widespread poverty. Here corruption and trafficking are 'security dichotomies' though paradoxical, they provide some money to the local populace for meeting their everyday needs. What needs to be focused beyond the borders is also the internal situation which leads to

corrupt practices keeping the security of the nation at stake. Even though measures on the international level are taken from time to time yet something always lacks the desired results. As an example it can be seen that though a Drug Control Agency (DCA) was established in 1999 alongside the UNODC yet an inadequate number of 400 members cannot tackle the situation¹²⁷. And the less adequate an institution the more the chances of corruption seeping in as was seen that the DCA has attempted to take charge of the trafficking rather than helping in curbing it¹²⁸. This unwillingness to curb drug trafficking on the part of Tajikistan has led to the creation of conditions favorable enough for insertion of the IMU and other radical forces into Tajikistan's burgeoning opium trade.

When an officer or a border guard is bribed it leads to whole chain of corruption where law enforcement of a state is questionable. The integrity of the government stands in question as often consular and other diplomatic personnel too are held in the process to obtain needed travel documents¹²⁹. With drug traffickers belonging to same community, leads to enrichment opportunities for the whole community thus instigating the involvement of other people too into the system or drug trade. Though mostly the organizations receive aid from the government bureaucracies it is only in the countries like that of Mexico and Central Asia that these officials are actually the key actors rather than just being facilitators¹³⁰. The Low ranking military personnel on the Tajik-Afghan border are compelled by the low salaries and the high cost of living to facilitate trafficking of drugs as well as illicit movement of people¹³¹. The extensive involvement of high to low ranking officials of the government machineries in the drug trade reduces the risk of confiscation while increasing the profits. The existing realities of the world seem to be far away from what the task forces and anti-drug units are made of to be operational. Therefore anti-trafficking efforts can be made much more effective by using some of the resources that are presently deployed against drug traffickers-intelligence,

¹²⁷ Erica Marat.(2006), "The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program*, October 2006, 46.

¹²⁸ Lawrence P. Markowitz.(2012), "Tajikistan: Authoritarian Reaction in a Postwar State," *Democratization*, 19:1 , 103.

¹²⁹ Holmes, L.(2009). "Corruption and Trafficking: Triple Victimization?" in C.Friesendorf(Ed), *Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector*, 83-114. Vienna : National Defense Academy and Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sport.

¹³⁰ Louise Shelly. (2012), 'The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective', *Eurasian Journal for Criminal Policy Res*18:241-253, DOI 10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1.

¹³¹IOM.2009. Redesigning continuing education in the Health Professions. Washington,DC:The National Academics Press.

task forces and coordinated operations that combat the networks and organizations that trafficker in both human being and drugs¹³².

3.3.2 ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

While the early years of independence for the Central Asian countries brought in a wave of nationalist and democratic feelings, the reassertion of Islamic culture and feelings too came up as a new trend. This sudden upheaval of the Islamic traditions and values gave rise to both the moderate and extremist factions of Islamic cultures. There was an upcoming of various mosques and religious education came up as a new social law. The wave of religious affirmation and the quest for the lost culture led to the extremist elements of the society rising up to make the values of Islamic state and law as mandatory. The steps by these factions for dismantling the peace of the region led to various repressive measures to be incurred by the states. Ahmad Rashid mentions that with the democratic and nationalist opposition effectively crushed, the survivors had moved underground and become armed and radicalized by Islamic fundamentalism, which seeks to overthrow the ruling elites, impose upon the region an imagined Islamic community of believers that has its reference point seventh-century Arabia and the Era of Prophet Mohammed, and to restructure Central Asia through an Anti-Western and Anti-Russian Crusade¹³³. Central Asia had been the land of the genesis of the cultures like that of Jadidism or Sufism which were based on tolerance, moderate and modernist interpretation of Islam. But the militants who came into the forefront for the establishment of Islam in the region were based on the philosophy of the Talibani version of Islam. While Jadidism and Sufism were strict adherents of the *Ijtihad*, the Talibani form was based on the concept of holy war or Jihad or rather *Taqlid*. Here it is worth mentioning the difference in the aspects of Islam. The term *Ijtihad* means to defend one's point through logical reasoning or rather "thorough knowledge of theology, revealed texts and legal theory (usul al-fiqh); an exceptional capacity for legal reasoning;

¹³² Louise Shelly. (2012), 'The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective', *Eurasian Journal for Criminal Policy Res*18:241-253, DOI 10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1

¹³³ Rashid Ahmed.(2001) , 'The Fires of Faith in Central Asia', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 45-<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209731> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:35,45

thorough knowledge of Arabic."¹³⁴*Taqlid* means "to follow (someone)", "to imitate". In Islamic legal terminology it means to follow a mujtahid in religious laws and commandment as he has derived them, that is, following the decisions of a religious expert without necessarily examining the scriptural basis or reasoning of that decision, such as accepting and following the verdict of scholars of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) without demanding an explanation of the processes by which they arrive at it, hence adherence to one of the classical schools (*madhhab*) of jurisprudence"¹³⁵. The militants applied such thoughts in the opposite sense to that of the basic ideology of the propagators of Jadidism and Sufism.

The Pan-Islamic or Pan-Central Asian movements (Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami or Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) were the major contributors to changing the security dimension of the region. Various Central Asian fighters had contributed to the fights in the Afghan war and are said to be quite large in numbers who still have not left the country. On the other hand the governments of these countries fear that the return of these well trained fighters back to their countries would pose a greater danger for the stability of the region. As was seen with the South East Asian fighters who returned to their area and initiated the formation of terrorist groups who would fight the regime for the causes that they adhered to, which was basically religious in nature. According to security experts close to the government of Uzbekistan, the return of armed IMU fighters poses a serious threat to the Fergana Valley, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet. A similar spill-over is feared for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, even though neither of those countries shares a border with Afghanistan¹³⁶.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) role is the most known along the various small splinter groups which are closely attached to the parent organizations. What can be termed interesting is the nature of stability amongst the religious groups, while some are well organized ones others have been functioning like freelancers with no idea about the true teachings and justice notions of the Islam for

¹³⁴ Esposito, John. (1995), '*Ijtihad, The Islamic World: Past and Present*', Oxford Islamic Studies Online.


¹³⁵(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqlid>)

¹³⁶Halbach Uwe.(2013), '*Afghanistan 2014: Shadows over Central Asia?*', Martin Publishers, Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 123-135 [ijrii.cdm/shrs,tional and Security Affairs \(SWP\)](http://www.ijrii.cdm/shrs,tional and Security Affairs (SWP)

which they are fighting for. The IMU (being the biggest known organization) follows the Al-Qaeda though the major focus is on a greater Central Asian forum. This prevalence of a common ideology not only links the Central Asian states with those of Pakistan and Afghanistan but also those influencing these states link that of the Arab world. As a result Pakistan and Afghanistan turn into Safe Havens for the terrorists while the Central Asian states come up as the new battlefield for the establishment of an Islamic regime. An example of the linked militant network is that when a crackdown of the Taliban government happened by the US, the neo-IMU networks which had been spurting in the safe havens of Afghanistan after being shunned away by the Uzbek government spread as far as that of the country of Pakistan in the 2000's. Which at the end proves that the myriad manifestations of the neo-IMU will certainly be impacted by the situations of the surrounding nations.

The two factions of Islam:-

The death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD led to the development of two factions Shia and Sunni as a result of the dispute in regard to the real political-religious leader of Islam.



3.4 RELEGIOUS REVIVALISM IN TAJIKISTAN: SOCIETY,RELEGION AND POLITICS:

In Tajikistan, the only country where an Islamic party is legally allowed, the government has adopted legislation restricting religious activities, and members of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan are regularly harassed. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have taken similar measures as well¹³⁷.

The trends seem to be changing in regard to the religious application of Islam. Unlike the Soviet days when modern education provided by the Soviets drew the youth away from the religious matters and involvement, nowadays there is an increase in intensity among the youth basically those ranging between the years of 18-25 to know more about the facts of their religion. Atheists are hard to find as Islam among the youth is flourishing. The youth have been exposed to religion at a young age, though still religion is a private family affair with no links to the social or political levels¹³⁸. Here it is worth a mention that while in Kyrgyzstan where the society has come across the religious norms, with religion being sternly adhered only by the aged. In Tajikistan the participation in the religious affairs was due to a sense of duty towards the older members of the family. As a result of which various conducts of Islam are bound to be conducted as definite canons of Islam's indication of belonging to certain groups split by social status, age and sex¹³⁹.

“People's Islam” is a new concept which has come up where notions and customs based on the law of Sharia for regulation of societal affairs are taken into consideration. While unifying the people and their life's as acceptable to the communities it stabilizes affairs between the government and society, bringing lifestyles, politics and ideology into parallel conflicting streams¹⁴⁰. There are two factions where while one wants religious interference in governmental matters the other advocates the regulation of religion from entering executive governmental authorities. The group defines government intervention as important and that Sharia should be included in legislation and religious education in

¹³⁷ Frigerio Alessandr, Kassenova Nargis.(2013), 'Central Asia: Contemporary Security Challenges and Sources of State Resilience', Department of International Relations and Regional Studies KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, M a r t i n P u b l i s h e r s, *Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 123-135* ijrii.cDm/.shrs,132.

¹³⁸Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),2015, '*Tajikistan in the 21st century*', Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon press, 44-45.

¹³⁹Ibid, p 46.

¹⁴⁰Ibid, p 47.

the school curriculum. Others debaring the involvement of with certain aspects of governance connected with ethics and charity¹⁴¹. They people of Tajikistan are disposed of peaceful manner of expressing their opinions, positions and interests. They do not support the use of power and force to protect Islam¹⁴². Difficulties have been coming up in the state of Tajikistan due to the process of Islamization. These can be underlined as follows more due to governmental policies rather than the people in general.

1: The government actively participates in the involvement in the international Islamic organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Islamic development bank, Islamic sports organization etc. Consequently Tajikistan expands and strengthens official business, cultural and human contacts with the Muslim countries that are facilitated with the implementation of bilateral projects on revival of silk route. Hence construction of roads and projects which connect Central Asia with Afghanistan, China, Iran and Pakistan with further development of connections with the Middle East and South Asian countries promote the growth of transportation transit, merchandise trade and labor exports, as well as exchange of ideas between the concerned countries. In this context, the influence of international Islamic countries increases among the Central Asian countries.

2: At the societal level a greater outspread of Islamic influence is observed on the lifestyle and conduct of the people.

3: At the individual level, the formation of regimes is the biggest initiator for the causes of re-Islamization in the country. Inverse development of the post-Soviet political systems in the Central Asian countries leads to an acknowledgement of patrimonial dominance based on material incentive oriented on incomes, but not on traditional and ideological motives by conduct of actors¹⁴³.

¹⁴¹Ibid, p 47.

¹⁴²Ibid, p 48.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p 52-53.

Re-Islamization

The regime of Central Asia seems to be advocating the process of Sultans which when described in terms of Weber is nothing but an authoritarian government with a strong leader and no power bestowed to either the parliament or the authority of the people. This section of the people does not believe in any form of governance which is opposed to it. This has led to the governing elite using Islam for their individual benefits, leading to acute crisis of legitimacy and prevalence of an authoritarian power core. The patrimonial and the patriarchy being the basis of this cultural and societal has led to the Islamic forces being the only substantive forces against the authoritarian governmental forces¹⁴⁴.

3.5 GORNO-BADAKHSHAN REGION:

The division of the religious population in Tajikistan cannot be termed to be being heterogeneous or homogenous in nature. The country has a majority of Sunnis but the region has Gorno-Badakhshan with majority of Ismailis (Shia sect). This mountainous region has Shiite people who are Ismailis as the major religious faction residing on either side of the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Being the followers of Aga Khan and sharing the same cultural affinity an easy transaction of illegal trade becomes possible. It shares borders with Afghanistan and is a major route for passage of illegal drugs, weapons and extremism. The period of evolution of Islamic ethnics, legal codes and scientific research after the independence of Central Asia from the Soviet hold has led to an increased importance of the region of Central Asia.

Taking a plunge into the history of extremism in the region. Central Asia has never been the hub of extremist religiosity but a land for the genesis of Sufism (Islamic mysticism) which taught tolerance and moderation. The rise of Jadidism led to rifts between the religious traditionalism and Russian modernism. As it came after the Russian intrusion into the area and posed a threat to both the factions. Questioning the reactionary and obscurantist policies of the mullahs while Russian colonialism and absolutism were also being questioned¹⁴⁵. The Soviet policies had never been very supportive of religious

¹⁴⁴Ibid, p 53.

¹⁴⁵ Rashid Ahmed.(2001) ,‘The Fires of Faith in Central Asia’, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 45-
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209731> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:35.

practices as a result of which the phase after 1991 was that of religious revival. During this brief period of religious transformation an attempt was made by Uzbek intellectuals to republish as well as re-popularize Jadid writings, but to the astonishment of all under the circumstances of Islamic radicalism taking hold Uzbek President Islam Karimov suppressed the thought¹⁴⁶. The people cannot be held in charge for religious feeling taking an extremist turn as the suppression of religious feeling by the Soviets from time to time had filled in a sense of depression and fatigue among the people of the region. Whenever the people tried to raise their voice for the rights of religious adherence, like the Bashmachi's revolution (stood for Islam and Turkic nationalism) it was dealt with stern hand termed as being anti-communist in nature¹⁴⁷. Any religious activity was banned leading to forced collectivization of both nomads and peasants leading to large scale massacres and the flight of Muslim populations to China and Afghanistan¹⁴⁸.

But one cannot blame the Soviet Union for completely barring the religion. During the Cold War and 1960's the Soviet Union was trying to spread communism and re-establish relations with other countries, bearing the term "Official Islam". According to which religious practices could take place under the registered mosques, madaras with a small contingent of Muslims being allowed to visit Mecca on pilgrimage every year. It was only when during the Gorbachev era when enough freedom was provided to Islam that a more vivid picture of Islam came up. It came to light that the depth of Islam was more than stated and it had always flourished underground in defiance of the repressive Soviet Regime with only in Tajikistan, 500 shrines being served by 700 unregistered mullahs¹⁴⁹.

3.6 THE ISLAMIC ARMS AND AFGHANISTAN IN RELATION TO CENTRAL ASIA:

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had made the Russian state a direct enemy of the Afghan people and that of Islam. A rapid politicization of religion (islam) led to

¹⁴⁶ Rashid Ahmed.(2001) ,'The Fires of Faith in Central Asia', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 45-
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209731> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:35.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

Tajikistan emerging as a fundamentalist propagator of the movement in Central Asia and beyond. The success of the Khomeini revolution (Iran) linked the broken edges of the Central Asian states with the extremist side of Islam. Wahibism (form of Islamic extremism) became the new learning process for the Central Asian clerics and Sufi brotherhoods. A large part of the Soviet army soldiers comprised of the Tajik soldiers¹⁵⁰. The Afghan mujahedeen taking the leverage of the situation began to establish contacts with the Central Asian soldiers. Thus the Soviet intervention in 1979 proved to be bridge for the establishment of a renewed relationship between the Afghans and their Tajik brethren.¹⁵¹

The Afghanistan war in the 1980's had initiated a process where the Central Asian Muslims were introduced to a wider Muslim world while playing a role in greater politics beyond the region of Central Asia. Stung with the Islamic zeal it is said that many Tajik and Uzbeki citizens travelled to Afghanistan to serve in the Afghan army. It was Afghanistan which was the battle field. In 1986, the US and Britain along with Pakistan even agreed for launching guerrilla attacks on the Tajik side for disrupting the Soviet supply lines. But it was only in March 1987 that the international borders were actually crossed under the leadership of the Mujahedeen. The 'Iron Curtain' created between the Soviet Muslims and the Muslims of adjoining countries began to crumble¹⁵². Impetus for Tajik Islamic revival was gained under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood (an Afghan Tajik).

The Tajik Civil War was the main chapter for the revival of the process of Islamic revival in Tajikistan as well as Central Asia. The wave of Tajik-Islamic nationalism served as an inspiration for Tajik Islamist faction who considered themselves as Basmachis heirs while providing an inspiration also to the younger generation who came out in large numbers in support of the wave of Islam. The process of Islamic revival attained leaders like Muhammad Rustamov Hindustani, Sayyed Abdullah Nuri, Muhammad Sharif Himmatzade, Dawlat Osman . The oppression by the state led to them seeking refuge in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Support for around 50000

¹⁵⁰ Warikoo, Umarov.(ed.),(2015), 'Tajikistan in the 21st century, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation', Pentagon press,67

¹⁵¹ see interview of Rabbani, Massod and Khallik with AFP dated february 15,1990

¹⁵² Bhatti Maqbool Ahmed,(1992), " Impact of Central Asian Changes on South and West Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol 10,No,2, Spring 1992,p 17.

supporters and their families were asked from countries like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Even though the Taliban government (Anti Tajik in character) and a pact between the two were not in their best interest yet a peace agreement between the two was sought in the year 1997.

The cross border fraternization between the two areas of Afghanistan and Central Asia is a result of the shared geographical contiguity as well as the racial and religious affinity along with the long established border trade which they shared along centuries. Not only border wise but the community in the north of the Afghan state is a majority of the Central Asian stock. Besides the Pamir Tajiks living in the Gorno-Badakshan autonomous oblast of Tajikistan share their language, beliefs and lifestyle with their counterparts in the Badakshan region of Afghanistan¹⁵³.

For most part of history, the influence of Pashtuns and the Central government at Kabul over Afghan Turkestan including Badakshan remained tenuous at least till Amir Abdul Rahman Khan subdued the area in 1884. With the division of the borders under the Russian, Afghan and the British authority, the Russians or the Soviets used the cultural similarities among the people living north and south of the Oxus, to bolster pro-soviet regimes in Afghanistan. Closer interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was encouraged (exchange of students, academics even literature, artist and media persons) with Mazar-e-sharif becoming the main centre of economic exchange between the two.

3.7 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIZATION :

The 74 years curb on the unofficial Islamic practice in the Soviet Union along with the Central Asian countries had led to a vacuum to be filled. Even when the Soviet Union and America were ready to settle the Afghan Crisis, “Fundamentalist factions formulated a militaristic strategy to dislodge the whole peace process in Afghanistan which has further indirectly affected the region”¹⁵⁴. The Russian government’s policy of differentiating between official and unofficial Islam led to a number of revolts in various regions (Khiva, Kirghizia, Kiria(1918-20), Bukhara and Ferghana Valley) of which the

¹⁵³ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press,66.

¹⁵⁴ Mutahir Ahmed.(1992), ‘Prospects of Fundamentalism in Central Asia’, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 71-82, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393384> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:36, 71.

Basmachi revolt stands out . The eruption of Jihad under the leadership Naqsh bandiya Sufi Brotherhood left an incredible psychological and political heritage which remains alive even today¹⁵⁵.

The measures adopted by the leaders of the Soviet Union had been quite tough on the people. Their strategies had been so harsh that ‘by the end of the World War 2 the traditionalist Muslim establishment in Central Asia and Caucasus had been totally destroyed’¹⁵⁶. Khrushchev like his predecessor had adopted measures for religious suppression. The intolerance amongst the populace was on a rise yet the leader was uncompromising in regard to matters of Islam. It was during this period that the concept of ‘Official Islam’ came up. The world was changing and so in order to portray the Soviet Union as a nation which stood in support of peaceful existence of religion especially Islam, around 50 agreements were signed between Soviet Union and Islamic countries¹⁵⁷.

The roots of the ideological trends were inadvertently nurtured by Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost¹⁵⁸. The Gorbachev period instated full independence to the religious forces and thus started a period of pleasing and appeasement for the Central Asian Muslims only to be granted a share of religious freedom in the year 1988 on demand. According to a scholar, “At first Muslims were rather passive and did not react quickly to what was happening elsewhere in the country. Now we are demanding the same privileges accorded to other religions. For Moscow the assertion of Muslim power comes first, on ethnic and then on religious grounds, is a challenge to reckon with”¹⁵⁹. The countries were ill prepared for the sudden political freedom leading to the creation of an ideological void among the various sections of the elite. Except the state of Kyrgyzstan the leaders of other countries were neither supportive of the idea of democratization neither the idea of religion or in particular adherence to the norms of an Islamic state. One school of “moderate” thought was supportive of Islamic revival but with that being a secular one. Another one was that of the theocratic fundamentalists who were strictly in favor of

¹⁵⁵ Benningsen Alexandra.(1989), *Soviet Strategy and Islam*, London: The Macmillian Press,1989, p 21

¹⁵⁶Ibid, p 22.

¹⁵⁷Ibid, p 56.

¹⁵⁸ Haghayeghi Mehrdad.(1994), ‘Islam and Democratic Politics in Central Asia’, *World Affairs*, Vol. 156, No. 4 (SPRING 1994), pp. 186- URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672397> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:37, 186, 186

¹⁵⁹ Ahmar Moonis.(1991), “Implications of Perestroika for the Soviet Asian Republics,”*Central Asia*,29(Winter 1991):36

establishment of an Islamic state like that of Iran and Saudi Arabia. A state of confusion and division prevailed among the new elite class of rulers who were mostly ex-communists.

“Proclivity towards Islam varies considerably from republic to republic with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan having the weakest and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan having the strongest tendencies”¹⁶⁰. It was this variation that while all the other states ruled out the idea of violence, Tajikistan was the only country which faced a period of civil war extending for seven years with clashes between the religious factions and the government. According to Benningson and Wheeler, this wide disparity in Islamic proclivity is intimately related to the broad nature of Central Asian societies within which Islam gained popular acceptance. Islam first penetrated the sedentary regions of Central Asia where it succeeded in altering the structural makeup of the Uzbek and Tajik societies. In contrast, the Kazakh, Krygyz and Turkmen societies were tribal and thus more difficult to penetrate¹⁶¹.

¹⁶⁰Haghighy, Mehrdad. "Islam and Democratic Politics in Central Asia." *World Affairs*. World Affairs Institute. 1994. Retrieved April 21, 2016 from HighBeam Research: <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-15232351.html>

¹⁶¹ Geoffery Wheeler, *The Modern History of Central Asia*, New York, Frederick A Praeger, 1964, 20-23) (Mehrdad Haghighy, "Islamic Revival in the Central Asian Republics," *Central Asian Survey*, 13 1994)

3.8 ISLAMIC PARTIES IN ACTION

PARTIES	DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT	OBJECTIVE
Islam and Democracy	28 th October 1988 Almaty	Objective: According to Chairman the objective was “the spiritual cleansing of people from immorality and preaching of the democratic principles of the Koran” (Annette Bohr, “Background to demonstration of Soviet Muslims in Tashkent,” Radio Library Report, 24 February 1989)
The People’s Front of Uzbekistan	-----	Islamic Democratic Party Head: Dadkhan Hassan Kyrgyz Democratic Wing was founded in 1990, city Osh (supported the establishment of an Islamic Republic and was inspired by the thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini)
Islamic Revival or Islamic Renaissance(IRP) or <i>Partiya Islamskovo Vozrozhdeniya</i>	10 th June 1990 in Astrakhan,	

3.9 TAJIKISTAN AND DRUG ABUSE:

The state which produces drugs is the one with most drug abusers.

This statement can rightly be associated with Afghanistan and now Tajikistan. The worn up structure as a result of sudden independence, followed by a civil war provides all the needed ingredients for the genesis of a narco-criminal networks. A poor governmental structure, a poor healthcare infrastructure adds up to the already poor border security surveillance situation which leads to lack of adequate measures for curbing the threat to the social structure of Tajikistan. As Afghanistan became the biggest opium producer so did the unofficial revenue for the state of Tajikistan rise. The very nature of drugs is of a lootable kind leading to the involvement of terrorists and Afghan nationals which started as a grievance has acquired the nature of greed. This nature has led to prolonging the non-separatist conflicts due to disproportionately benefiting insurgents averting their defeat- these resources can render wartime exploitation so profitable that combatants prefer war to peace¹⁶². With an area of around 63,674 hectares under poppy cultivation and a produce of 3,269 tones¹⁶³, 91% of the cases booked by the UNODC in 1997-2001 were under that of dry drugs¹⁶⁴. While drug trade forms around 30 to 50% of the Tajik economy ‘the average cost of life-sustaining treatment for one AIDS patient is around \$10,000 annually, however in 1999 Tajikistan had a health budget of \$13 per capita, and one commentator has pointed out that for the majority of the people, a diagnosis of AIDS would therefore mean a death sentence¹⁶⁵.’

The rising cases of HIV due to the increase of drug trade leads to insecurities causing the toppling down of the basic security structure, as is seen with the rise of addicted users from 823 to 6243 in the period between 1991-2001. This led to the government of Tajikistan establishing a National Security Agency for Narcotics in the year 1989. Even though the government agencies have been on a continues watch UNODC states that the real numbers are far beyond that of government record. Even after the establishment of

¹⁶² Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict*, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,p.5.

¹⁶³ UNDCP report,1998

¹⁶⁴ UNODC 2003, “Afghanistan–Iran–Turkey–Balkan states–Western Europe”,‘Status Report on Afghanistan; Informal Consultations’, UNODC, Vienn, P 198.

¹⁶⁵ Buzurokov,A. (2002), ‘HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Time is Running out for Central Asia’,*Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*,10 April, available at, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=29,accessed 29 April 2006

Tajikistan's National Security agency for Narcotics in the year 1989 the numbers rose from 75,000 in 2001 it rose to 100,000¹⁶⁶ with largely being opium and heroin users, clearly stating the lack of the inefficiency of the governmental agencies.

3.10 THE LINK BETWEEN DRUGS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING:

The human trafficking and drug trade seem to be closely interlinked as usage of various drugs compels an individual to enroll and engage themselves in acts like that pornography, ingestion and transportation of drugs. The drugs (heroin synthetic one) leads to such an addiction that the victims become indebted to the masters (drug barons, sex traffickers). As a result there are long intensive hours of work causing more profit for the masters whether it is in the field of drug trade, sex trade, agricultural workers, beggars and also child soldiers. Human smuggling and trafficking with its high demand from both individuals in source and recipient countries has become a logical area for the diversification of the drug trafficking organizations¹⁶⁷. This has led to the drug baron's spreading themselves into the market of human tracking as avenues of profit are increased manifold. Drugs and women can be moved along the same routes and sometimes simultaneously¹⁶⁸. Human trafficking is an activity which is more of a human rights violation rather than an international threat. What is funny is that as the western states do not think it to be a considerable danger it has been shoved below the carpet, rather the illegal migration issue which creates a pressure for their country is seen as an issue. Having little awareness over the issue in the Central Asian states, it is the women with economic difficulties who become victims. As they are driven with lucrative offers. International Organization for Migration in the year 2003 estimated that 1000 women and children were trafficked alone in the year 2000¹⁶⁹. Even the governments of these states seem to sideline the issue as prostitution is a taboo and even if victims would be freed they would never be able to go to their families as they would be discarded.

¹⁶⁶ Ponce,R. (2002) 'Rising Heroine Abuse in Asia Raises Threat of Public Health Crisis', Eurasia Insight,29th March, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032902a.shtml> and F.Najibullah(2003) 'Tajikistan:En Route to West, Trafficked Drugs Leave Social Crisi in their wake', RFE/RL,Q18 June, available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/06/sec-030618-rfel-154021.html>

¹⁶⁷ Aronowitz,A.(2009), '*Human trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings*', Westport, Ct.and London: Praeger.

¹⁶⁸ Bosco, F, D Cortemiglia. (2009), 'Human Trafficking Patterns', In C.Friesendorf(Ed.), *Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector*(pp. 35-82). Vienna: National Defense Academy And Austrain Ministry of Defense and Sport.page 53

¹⁶⁹ OSCE press release, 'OSCE holds training seminars on fights against human trafficking in northern Tajikistan', 3 July 2003

The strategies of coercion adopted by the traffickers result in an individual getting addicted to the drug both psychologically and mentally due to the various kind of disorientation ,humiliation and isolation. While the victims are forced to work in the most dangerous of the conditions, they also face isolation due to frequent movements leading to no human relations, while harming their body with the danger of HIV/AIDS catering to huge number of customers and forced stimulants¹⁷⁰ . The victimization too differs in accordance to the field. While in the field of drugs women play a role on the lower levels it is opposite in that of human trafficking with each women or commodity being used repeatedly. With the availability of a wide range of facilitators for false documents, safe houses and ultimately dispose of the profits¹⁷¹ . Apart from the drug barons, the involvement of legitimate businessmen too is involved with lawyers, accountants and real estate agents being part of the circle.

3.11 HISTORY AS AN ANSWER TO CONTEMPORARY THREATS:

3.11.1 A PLUNGE INTO HISTORY FOR THE ANSWER OF CONTEMPORARY TURMOIL

Afghanistan witnessed a fratricidal war when the Soviet Union forces retreated after the signing of the Geneva Accords which ended the war between the two factions. The legacy which was left with the departure was nothing to be proud of, as what was left of the great Afghan nation was a war torn country with the un-stabilizing forces gushing in to fill the vacuum. The Islamic forces were the ones which had been in the supreme position for making a mark among the populace, and with the role the mujahedeen's had played to answer back the infiltrators was way beyond the notion of gaining of supremacy. Yet the rise of the Taliban gave way to the two faction's mujahedeen and Taliban fighting for supremacy over the region. After a period of great role in the Afghan war front, the Central Asian Muslims themselves faced a period of turbulence with the disintegration of Soviet Union.

¹⁷⁰ Louise Shelly. (2012), 'The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective', *Eurasian Journal for Criminal Policy Res*18:241-253, DOI 10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1.

¹⁷¹ Kara, S.(2009). '*Sex Trafficking : Inside the business of Modern Slavery*', New York: Columbia University Press

The revival of the suppressed forces of Islam and other religious activities for so many years gave way to an Islamic revival process. But not all revival processes taken up for the benefit of a larger good end up on a positive note. The process of Islamic revival which had started as a nation building process got divided into two different secular and the rebellious factions. Having played a vital role in the Afghan war, the extremists had gained a good support base from the neighbouring countries. They came up together for the establishment of an Islamic state and the measures adopted grew so uncontrollable and intolerable to the social structure of the country that a ban was levied by the government of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on these movements. Apart from the question raised on the security structure of the state, the international community had its own fears. “The growth of Islamic extremist and terrorist groups in Central Asia is directly impacting the stability of the Central Asia itself but also, Pakistan and US/NATO interests in Afghanistan. The volatile Afghanistan and Pakistan borderland is being made even more unstable and dangerous by Central Asian insurgents and it is unlikely real progress can occur without dealing with this issue head on”¹⁷².

The Central Asian region has always been a region of unstable frontiers. Before the Soviets it was the nomadic life with few periods of stagnation and development. But with the advent of the Russians it became an area of triangular contestation between the powers of Britain, Russia and China (Great Game) with stability being determined by the balance of power being determined between its populace and the surrounding region. It had been an area of triangular contest between Britain, Russia and China during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, known as the “Great Game”¹⁷³.

But even during this time of regional and power contestation the security of the borders had been questioned again and again. While the national security of the region was being talked about the inflow of refugees of Afghan war and forces like that of Islamic militarism or narcotic trafficking were slowly altering the whole security equation of the region. The implication of the web of transnational crime emanating from the region has led to this area being under surveillance from national and international agencies who want to stop the flow of these forces into Europe and Russia and beyond. ‘When looked

¹⁷² “International Terror Threat”, HYNDS BLOG FEBRUARY 25, 2011 • 3:18 PM.

¹⁷³ Warikoo, K. (Ed.). (1995), ‘*Central Asia: Emerging New Order*’. Har Anand Publications, 17.

upon from the aspect of these Central Asian states which since the attainment of independence have faced many turbulences with the primary goal of regime survival and their own domestic concerns the Af-Pak region poses two primary security challenges which are narcotics trafficking and Islamist extremist groups'¹⁷⁴.

3.11.2 THE SCENARIO AT THE END OF AFGHANISTAN: AND A RISE IN DRUG ECONOMY

The dwindling economy at the end of the Cold War was a gift that the Russians and the other international forces had left for the Afghans to bear. During the war immense power had been stated to the warlords who led them to enhance the not so frequent drug economy to rise in their favor. As these warlords had a say in their area, they rose up as drug barons providing security for trade and transportation for the stuff which would lead them to a profitable trade and as a result finance their arms and ammunitions against the fight for the infidels (kafirs). "when local warlords were incorporated into the early state-building efforts...they gained enlarged freedom to participate in organized crime... the result is a significant illicit economy which undermines human security throughout the country, foster corruption, decreases state tax revenues, destabilizes the local currency, encourages market speculation and inflation. Crowds out investment in the licit economy and increasingly forces large sections of the population into the illicit economy in the search for access to credit and a reliable income"¹⁷⁵. This change could be stated as Barnett Rubin said 'powerful new protectors of the opium trade'.

The governmental agencies did not tend to have a stronghold against these warlords as in itself for in a turbulence state dwindling between the Mujahedeen and the Taliban. Drug production became directly linked to the economic condition of the local spreading itself into the folds of the local economy.

Here a case study of Afghanistan is quite enlightening, "According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 60% of the country's 2004 gross domestic product was derived from illegal opium activities, and nearly 2.3 million people(356,000 families)

¹⁷⁴ Foust Joshua.(2010), "Post-Soviet Central Asian interests in Afghanistan ", New York: Century Foundation.

¹⁷⁵ Cockayne James,and Pfister Daniel.(2008), 'Peace Operations and Organised Crime' ,Geneva Papers, International Peace Institute, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

were directly involved in opium cultivation¹⁷⁶. It is more difficult to tackle drug trade at the centre of genesis rather than the countries which merely serve as the transit points as there are a number of repercussions under the reinforcing dynamics of drug trade and insurgency. Clamping down on drug crops not only hurts political efforts to end the insurgency, but also increases the street price of the drug, thereby making the drug business even more profitable¹⁷⁷. Thus drug production has become a major contributor to the country of genesis and beyond. While on a global front this economy has a contribution of around 85% in accordance to a UNODC report, these mark 48% of the Afghan and 30% of the Tajik economy which is an important point of transaction of Afghan drugs towards the north.

The European markets and Russia serve as the main basis or consumers of the Afghan heroin and other drug products with the former with the demand of 88 metric tones(1.6 m addicts) and the later 70 metric tons (1.6 m addicts). With being a constant battlefield Afghanistan became a safe haven for the prevalence of all kinds of illicit activities. The financing of Islamic factions by international players like US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia led to the growth of such activities which at that time received high support from the international forces. The country was torn with war and the agriculture was torn by the constant spell of drought in the region. The only profitable crop with the addition of being drought resistant was only opium. Other than that the gate prices were way higher than the rest of the crops leading to the farmers getting attracted towards it serving as respite to their poverty and troubles.

These measures which have led to the rise in the number of HIV/AIDS cases rising to an alarming level are nothing but what was a doing of the west itself. Now the very initiators propose to tumble an economy which is hugely dependant on the money received from drugs. Various measures for alluring farmers to grow other crops have failed taking into account the profit which is generated from the cultivation of drugs. The rate of profit can be assumed by the level of disparity in the pick up prices (25\$ per kg from the farm) to 3000\$ per kg on reaching the borders of Tajikistan. In this regard a policy which adheres

¹⁷⁶ *United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime(UNODC), *Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2004*

¹⁷⁷ Kan P R. (2006), "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 19:4, 586-599,DOI:10.1080/08850600600829783

to the needs and concerns of all including international, regional, nongovernmental organizations, national along with local populace would work better with a long lasting result for the benefit of all. According to Anthony James Joes, Intelligence should be directed at supporting military actions that involve “minimum violence through an emphasis on conservative but effective tactics, and, second [designing] a political program focused on splitting the revolutionary elite from their followers”¹⁷⁸.

3.12 POST-INDEPENDENCE SCENARIO IN TAJIKISTAN:

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the world seemed to be swaying in the flow of democratic powers. The newly established Central Asian states too seemed to be dwelling into the framework of democracy without any changes in the authoritarian behavior. Terming the authoritarian behavior as a measure for maintenance of peace in a place where system is influenced by clan influence and corruption, the dignitaries’ or the elites continue working for suppression of pluralism. Yet unlike the country of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan cannot be labeled as a fully authoritarian country as there is an existence of various institutionalized forms which use individuals and/or interest groups, economic, regional, and political reasons as a source of compromise between the other factions and the government.

When the Tajik state gained independence it was free to decide its own future. This led to a wave of ‘irrational nationalism’ according to Vasilev which led to governments trying to nationalize their regimes while deriving genesis from the Samanid Empire, drawing closeness with the Persian heritage as well. Ethnicity was brought into focus trying to derive a common heritage. This all seemed nothing but a recipe for disaster as a huge number of European minorities were present as well. This over emphasis on religion and heritage precluded the very process for the attainment of a virulent nationalism and as a result of which a xenophobic sort of sort nationalism was attained which soon led to the Tajik state plunging into the civil war. The much postulated changes after the 1991 disintegration of leaving behind the past for the glories of the future, received a jerk when Tajikistan fell into an era of civil war. The refuge which was sought by the Tajik

¹⁷⁸ Anthony James Jones, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*(Louisville:University Press of Kentucky,2004),p.9.

opposition forces from the Afghan religious forces highlighting the role of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia served as a genesis for fears of spilling of uncertainty into the newly independent region. With the rising fears of spill over of uncertainty and fratricidal fighting from the war torn country of Afghanistan, the regional actors came up to the conclusion that if the situation was not adequately curbed it had the potential to destabilize the entire Central Asian region. ‘In Russian perception, it was imperative to insulate Central Asia from the divisive tendencies emanating from Afghanistan’¹⁷⁹.

This event was more of a learning experience leading to the Central Asian state’s immediate response against the protection of its borders with the coming up of Taliban and the signing of the Collective Security Treaty. The *Kommersant Daily* in their 15 July 1998 issue had already claimed of Taliban making territorial claims over the countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan ¹⁸⁰.The Russian troops held the opinion that Taliban had promised not only finance but also military training to the Tajik opposition groups¹⁸¹. This situation led to the coming up of a northern alliance and strengthening of the ties between the country of Russia that the Central Asian countries the fears of instability. As Mr Gennady Seleznev(speaker of the State Duma) had quoted that “ Provocations should not be allowed to lead to a war in the region”¹⁸². Michael Rywkin in his article “Central Asia in the Forefront of Attention, American Foreign Policy Interests” mentions the six main trends developed in post-Soviet Central Asia during the early independence period¹⁸³:

- (1) The establishment of autocratic presidential regimes in four of the five republics and of rule by warlords fighting one another in the poorest fifth (Tajikistan);
- (2) The ability of the native Muslim party apparatus from the Soviet era to retain leadership positions by adapting itself to new post-Soviet circumstances;

¹⁷⁹ Joshi N, Keeping an eye on Taliban: Russian and Central Asian response,*India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 25/26, Vol. 25, no. 4/Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 147.

¹⁸⁰Ibid, p. 154.

¹⁸¹Ibid, p. 155.

¹⁸²Ibid, p. 155

¹⁸³ Rywkin Michael.(2002), Central Asia in the Forefront of Attention, American Foreign Policy Interests: *The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, 24:1, 35-42, DOI: 10.1080/108039202753503660To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/108039202753503660>

- (3) The impoverishment of the bulk of the population, as contrasted with the prosperity achieved by the few through nepotism and corruption rather than by business acumen;
- (4) The growing economic gap between the energy-rich and the energy-poor republics, a gap that was much narrower when all were parts of a single country—the Soviet Union;
- (5) The growth of the fundamentalist menace coming from across the southern borders;
- (6) The mass exodus of the Russian and other non-native settler population and the parallel lessening of Russian influence.

3.13 TALIBAN AND IMPACT:

The localization of Islamic activities and the threats that have been coming up question the state of security along with the import of religious extremism into the Central Asian front. While the government tries to marginalize or rather destroy the big players, new terrorist cells on the local front are on a constant rise. Spreading their business from the illegal to the legal front they have found means to legitimize their activities with active involvement of elites into the profitable business of drug trafficking.

A process of Islamic revival which had started with the initiation of the policies like *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* under Mikhail Gorbachov did not take much time in becoming religious extremism which was more painful than Russian expansionist policies. The biggest victim of this religious wave was Uzbekistan. A country which had been a historic seat of Islamic learning ranging from a revival of Hanafi teachings (the dominant school of Islamic law in Central Asia) to the spread of more radical (locally termed "Wahhabist") forms of Islam¹⁸⁴ had to undergo the worst attacks on the stability as groups like IMU, IRP literally ripped the country of its stability unless adequate measures were levied by the government to free the country of the religious forces. . Unlike IRP which was peaceful in its measures IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir opted for use of force, with

¹⁸⁴Olcott, Martha Brill, (2007), "Strategic Concerns in Central Asia: Central Asia at the Crossroad", *Disarmament Forum* P. 10.

the support of local Muslims in fund generation these groups had maintained a stronghold over the area.

Money which could be used for developmental process was getting squandered in achievement of terrorist goals .This revolutionary role resulted in a government crackdown with the leaders fleeing to the neighbouring countries only to infiltrate with the ideology again. The coming up of the Taliban in the 1990's in Afghanistan spurred up the extremist activities in the region of Central Asia. Deriving support from the Taliban regime the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) carried out activities like bombing, kidnapping in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These groups shot to prominence to such an extent that in 2004 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) even claimed the suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and even targeted the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. Having been holed for so many years in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan, these groups may again shoot back to prominence carrying the fight back to their homelands once NATO leaves Afghanistan fully, a work which has already been initiated with the American troop withdrawal from the country of Afghanistan.

The experts and researchers in the field have already professed the country going back to opium cultivation which currently serves as one-third of the country's gross domestic product, while the northward trafficking of the drug will stagger addiction problems in the Central Asian countries. "Afghanistan and nearby areas provide over four-fifths of Europe's heroin."¹⁸⁵

The widespread social and economic deprivation along with political authoritarianism and corruption leads to larger enrolment of the young into the sector that constantly are searching for means of employment and livelihood. While on the military front an extension of the Central Asia's counterterrorism capacity should be a priority while a well thought process and measures are needed on the three realms of politics, economics and social front.

¹⁸⁵ Herbrand John Courtney William .(2013), 'After The Afghan Pullout, The Dangers For Central Asia', Assessed site <http://www.rferl.org/content/central-asia-afghan-pullout/24904747.html>, assessed on June 14, 2013

The breaching of borders in regarding to the flow of narcotic trade is nothing new as it was seen in the year 2010 when in accordance to the demands in the Central Asian region and the Russian federation, around 90 tons of heroine was smuggled into the Central Asian region. “Tajikistan accounts for most of the heroine flow, followed by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Drugs seized in southern Tajikistan are often still in the original packaging from the Afghan laboratory and stamped with a quality insurance logo. Seizures in northern Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia are likely to be encountered in this form, which may indicate repackaging upstream. At the same time, logos can be found as far afield as the Russian Federation, perhaps as the result of direct and uncut deliveries”¹⁸⁶.

The security discourse of Central Asia has long been dominated by the Afghan factor and its impact on Central Asian security. The assumption of power by the Taliban in the year gave way to assumptions of this force taking over the Central Asian paradigm. But the Taliban’s theocracy did not hold anything in common to the forces of Islamic revivalism that were rocking the Country of Central Asia. The fear of the Central Asian people are not baseless either as before 2001, there have been instances where the Taliban forces had directed the ‘holy sites’ of Samarkhand and Bukhara. While it has been quite apparent that Afghanistan has always provided a safe haven for the Central Asian radical groups¹⁸⁷.

3.149/11 DEVELOPMENTS AND BEYOND :

The “War on Terror” which rocked the region of Central Asia was seen as a ray of hope by these countries undergoing a massive repercussion of the events in Afghanistan. The very “Concept of Security” in regard to the Central Asian dimension was limited to the study of the former Soviet Union Diaspora. The very system of illicit markets (drugs and weapons) was so widely spread that due assurance was issued by the security agencies in the area for freelance, while actively funding their regional and international operations. The events of 9/11 led to a sudden expansion of the U.S. military in Central Asia as the U.S. government needed assistance in their operations against the extremist

¹⁸⁶ *UNODC REPORT: Opiate Flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia:A Threat Assessment: 45

¹⁸⁷ Halbach Uwe.(2013), ‘Afghanistan 2014: Shadows over Central Asia?’, Martin Publishers, *Security and Human Rights* 24 (2013) 123-135 ijrii.cDm/.shrs,

forces residing in the Afghan state. The Central Asian countries served as bases for the launch of attacks on the northern parts of Afghanistan.

The much needed promise of participation on the cleansing of the area of extremism was given on the basis of America adopting a negligent attitude towards the human rights violations in the Central Asian states, providing a green light to the leaders to commit human rights abuses without fear of major international reaction. The major violations led to local populace already striving to make a decent living and rise from the ashes of stable governance under the Soviets turn towards the opposing wings (extremists). As has been seen that the already weak states with a post-imperial setting represent a variant (in its extreme form) of collision of security actors on one hand and criminal actors on another. The rest of the state capacity of coping with external and internal threats is diminished by the resulting collision of illicit actors (smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering and dry trade) and local security officials.

As President Barack Obama (In his State of the Union speech on February 12, 2013 U.S.) declared that by the end of 2014 *"our war in Afghanistan will be over."* This step, long expected, will decrease security in neighbouring Central Asia. Flows northward from Afghanistan of terrorists and narcotics will put at greater risk a region already weakened by corruption, despotism, and ethnic and water tensions¹⁸⁸. This fruit of uncertainty seems to be ripping with the recent increase in events of extremism like that of bombing and kidnapping in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

After decades of forced secularization by the Soviets, the trends of de-secularization and islamization were not very well received by the ruling elites. Who rather than channeling it to a broader democratic or secular process started adopting measures of curbing the flow of extremist activities which had been rising for the establishment of an Islamic state. This suppression of the political process which was seen by the people as democratic, progressive and inevitable led to decline of extremist activities. But the on the other hand when the peaceful organizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir were silenced the

¹⁸⁸ Herbrand John Courtney William (2013), 'After The Afghan Pullout, The Dangers For Central Asia', Assessed site <http://www.rferl.org/content/central-asia-afghan-pullout/24904747.html>, assessed on June 14, 2013

protest which was curbed at that times seem to be on the upsurge taking into consideration the stability of the area again rising up as a question for the state.

While there is a global initiative on the curbing of drug trade, the trade in narcotics in the region of Central Asia and Afghanistan is a support system that not only supports the recent currents of extremism but also serves as a finance support system to the regimes of the states which have been fighting for finances for running various spheres of government. On the other hand the derivation of the financial rent from these sources leads to the royalty of the state in maintaining their status quo. These factors of support and finances lead to neither an effective government initiation for curbing the process but also initiating a vicious cycle of socio-economic upheaval. Europe on the other hand being the high demand house for drugs from the Afghan state is not only morally but also practically responsible for alleviating the drug trade involving a high profit gain at the end of the process not only for the drug barons(along the Central Asian drug route) but also the local populace. The profits involved have led to the deprived youth and the local poor population of north Afghanistan and Gorno-badakshan moving to drug trade as an alternative form of income. The trade has tightened its hold to such an extent that it has become difficult for the government of the region to combat the problem, not even after 9/11 has the drug trade gone down. Even the districts like Helmand which had been strictly guarded by the international forces have seen a rise in drug production and trade.

3.15 ONGOING AFGHAN CONFLICT AND THE SPILLOVER IMPACTS ON CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY:

Worth quoting here “Where conflict has eroded the capacity and will of security institutions or has created autonomous regions and devolved states, borders can remain porous due to ambiguous authority and accountability. De facto military boundaries typically delineate partitions between ethnic groups or frontlines of opposing militant groups, replacing de jure political boundaries. Economic opportunities, however

incentivize transactions that disregard ethnic and political affiliations, and the continuation of violence facilitates illicit activity.¹⁸⁹”

Having faced decades of turmoil and turbulence the fate of Afghanistan does not seem to change. It has become a centre for non-traditional threats with religious extremism, drug trafficking, human trafficking arising from Afghanistan to Europe and Russia with Central Asia being the main route of the illicit activities. Although there is no hard evidence of the transport of fissile material or chemical/biological weapons (CBW) along the main smuggling routes, there is a growing concern that the logistical capability exists.

The Central Asian states have inherited a neighbour which has been in a state of turmoil since long. The result of which has been that they have been most at stake rather than the other countries as Pakistan has played the role of a supporter in the Afghanistan war to the US and shares a upper hold in the issues while the region of Central Asia has been continuously curbed since it came under the Tsarist and then the communist rule. The independence paved way to the governments facing opposition from small radical groups, which was curbed with the help of harsh measures leading political engagement becoming severely restricted. Many thinkers are of the opinion that it was this that helped fuel the radical groups more powerful than the former ones. These radical groups had been predominantly Islamic organizations. It was this triggering that led to all the Islamic organizations coming up to become inter-twined bringing in what is known today as the “international terror threat”¹⁹⁰.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have suffered the most in the process, while for Uzbekistan the thing starting with domestic terrorism metastasizing into a transnational security challenge in the form of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Tajikistan faced numerous security challenges along its riparian border with Afghanistan both from militant groups and narcotics smugglers¹⁹¹. The Fergana valley a densely populated region split between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been the hub of the IMU which proved to be the biggest Islamic faction with a military uphold. Islamic Movement

¹⁸⁹ Sloan, Britt and James Cockayne (2011), “Terrorism, Crime and Conflict: Exploiting the Difference among Transnational Threats”, *Policy Brief*, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Pp. 23-41.

¹⁹⁰ ‘International Terror Threat’, HYNDIS BLOG FEBRUARY 25, 2011 • 3:18 PM.

¹⁹¹ Foust Joshua.(2010), “*Post-Soviet Central Asian interests in Afghanistan*”, New York: Century Foundation.

of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Union along with Hizb-ul-Tahrir have been the institutions which have grown outbound and now work from northwest Pakistan. Along with the challenges of security in terms of the Islamic militancy prevailing it is also the refugee issue which is of great relevance in the region which in itself is a big transnational threat. Refugees have resulted in the altering of the security perspectives of the region of Central Asia.

3.16 INSTABILITY AND CHAOS PREVAILS:

Even after years of gaining independence from the Soviet fold the security environment of the Central Asian continues to be of a complex nature in regard to the phenomena of terrorism and religious extremism, poverty and corruption, political instability and authoritarian governance, great power suspicion and rivalry,¹⁹² which still serves as a basis of concern for these republics. Though having faced spurts of un-stabilizing forces during the tulip revolution or the Tajik civil war, the Central Asian states have not faced any significant security threats till now. But despite this there have been various levels of uncertainty which have erupted time and again, the worst being the economic backwardness of the states particularly Tajikistan. The disparities based on region, clan politics and the underdevelopment that still persist were the main reasons for the spread of civil war to such an extent¹⁹³.

Though sharing similar interest and concerns each Central Asian state has its own individual identity. The three states of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share their border with the state of Afghanistan thus facing any spill over affect from the country of Afghanistan and thereafter leading to a desire to end the situation as soon as possible.

Though the problems being faced are not entirely their own as the whole region seems to be under the same fold, but what makes them more vulnerable to them is that the newly formed states are undergoing a significant political, social and economic

¹⁹² *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia Dr. Rouben Azizian and Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

¹⁹³ Peimani Hooman.(1998), '*Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia, the Competition of Iran, Turkey, Russia,*' Praeger Publishers. 28–30, 32–33, 66–67.

transformation. Just as pushing on one part of a balloon another portion pops out, when counterdrug activities are pushed in one area, drug production moves to another area in the region¹⁹⁴

3.17 THE GREAT POWER POLITICS AND CENTRAL ASIA :

*“As if it was not enough that Central Asia is squeezed by China, Russia, and the Muslim World, now we also have an American eagle flying over it”*¹⁹⁵

3:17:1 RUSSIA A BIG PLAYER IN DEFINING CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY

The Central Asian states though themselves shaped as a result of the unfolding of a new security dynamics in the state of the Soviet Union had little role in the process that would define its future. It was only after the attainment of independence that the ability to constrain intrusive influence on the part of the former world power was practiced to some level by them. But when seen from the rationalistic point of view in the security dimension ‘sub regional security actors’ are relatively small or underdeveloped nations, often subscribing or on the opposite end susceptible to intimidation or manipulation by external powers.¹⁹⁶

The Russian state has before and even after independence seemed to be the one reinstating its power over the Central Asian scenario. The Central Asian states have their own level of indifference leading to even the basic attainment of limited coordination of security and defence policies being as a uphill struggle. The state of Russia working as a regional hegemon is more restraining for the Central Asian security dimension as a range of influence seems to be fluctuating.

The influence of the Russian state on the Central Asian stability is such that it is said to be defined by the type of nationalism, robustness of political institution and effects of economic reforms. But the increased dynamics and involvement of the American power since 11 September 2001 in the Central Asian states seems to add up a whole new

¹⁹⁴ Rexton Kan Paul.(2006), “Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 19:4, 586-599, DOI:10.1080/08850600600829783

¹⁹⁵ Rumer Boris(2002), ‘The powers in Central Asia’, *Survival*, 44(3), p 65.

¹⁹⁶ William Tow, *Subregional security Cooperation in the Third World*, Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner, 1990, pp 4-5

dimension of the existence of competitive dynamics among the powers of the region¹⁹⁷. The US seems to be playing an important part in devising a new strategy for Central Asian cooperation. Though regionalism as understood in the traditionalist sense bolsters regional cooperation, integration, convergence and coherence and identity does not seem to be the case of Central Asia, a region with each state having individual identities and interstate problems relating to power, border issues yet to be solved¹⁹⁸. The overbearing influence of Russia as a supranational structure has preserved at least some of the effects of the superpower 'overlay' of the Cold War period¹⁹⁹. The researchers have laid out certain aspects of clashes between Russia and Central Asia:

- Democratic Russia and a stable Central Asia would result in peace.
- Authoritarian Russia and a stable Central Asia would lead to the process of Neo-imperialism.
- Instability in Central Asia and a Democratic Russia would in the process would attract Russia towards Central Asia.
- An Authoritarian Russia and an Unstable Central Asia would result in a dangerous situation.

When seen in the context of the relation that Central Asian states share with the regional power of Russia according to Schultz: regions with little space for maneuver in decision making caught up in internal and regional conflicts, often with relatively weak and dependant economies and characterized by strong nationalism and an emphasis on sovereignty²⁰⁰.

When major powers try to integrate a certain region for a greater strategic benefit it is usually done on the terms in accordance to the wishes of the power which is very much in control of the whole scenario. By comparison the definitions of the dividing lines in Central Asia between Russia and its southern neighbours, which mostly maintain close relations with Moscow, are less obvious, and although Russia has participated in a

¹⁹⁷S.Neil Macforlane, The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia, *International affairs*.

¹⁹⁸ Allison Roy.(2004), 'Regionalism and changing International order in Central Eurasia', *International Affairs*, Royal institute of International Affairs, Vol, 80, No 3, , May 2004

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Achultz Michael, Soderbaum Fredrik and Joakim Ojendal, eds.(2001), '*Regionalization in a Globalizing World, A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes*', London and New York:Zed, 2001, pp, 264,5-7

number of groupings in this region it has consistently sought to integrate the region on its own terms. Moreover, in the Central Asian region at large the competitive dynamics between major powers in the security field are reflected in sensitivity to Russian inclusion in or exclusion from regional groupings²⁰¹ which rather treats these groupings more to be a power platform more as alliances that prevailed in the Cold War period.

After the brief period between 1990's when the Russian influence was not much to be seen on the Central Asian front, it reasserted itself in 2002 with the American influence deepening in the region with the call of 'War on Terror'. But it is to be noted here that both regional hegemon and US on the international realm seem to be reluctant to abandon the unilateralism that they share which leads them to avoiding the making of deep commitments.

But the question of disparity in power and the need for the attainment of regime security has led to the Central Asian states to lastly bandwagon the Russian power and preponderance. While CIS which is more of a platform for talks among Central Asian states has led to Russian state and its involvement which now acts as a soft power posing no fear or challenge to the incumbent regimes.

3.17.2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had the US administration eyeing Central Asia as these states had been well acclaimed to have valuable gas and oil resources. But while the area was too remote to count on the US strategic radar it also did not want to sever its relations with Russia, though eager to integrate the Central Asian economies for the resources and reduce the world reliance on Persian Gulf hydrocarbon. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States resulted in the region of Central Asia coming up into the limelight again. The attention that it had received after the end of the Cold War era was highlighted again. The claims of Al-Qaeda of being behind the twin tower attacks and their presumed residence in the country of Afghanistan waged in a 'War on Terror' against the Islamic extremist forces. The salient ascendancy of security concerns in the US foreign policy made Central Asia an important theatre of activity, and relegated to the

²⁰¹ Allison Roy.(2004), 'Regionalism and changing International order in Central Eurasia', *International Affairs*, Royal institute of International Affairs, Vol, 80, No 3, , May 2004, p 467.

background diplomatic concerns with Moscow's reactions²⁰². The Central Asian countries becoming a launching pad for operations against the extremist forces of Afghanistan also brought these countries to look up to America to solve its own problems. But what came into question was whether America by greater involvement in the region may become part of the intensification of rivalries of the regional and world powers on one hand and on the other may be supportive of the corrupted and authoritarian practices of the Central Asian leaders like in the case of Uzbekistan. In the long run the consequences of these geopolitical realities would be immense²⁰³

3:17:3 US INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIAN REACTION

When the 'war on Terror' brought US into the Russian realm of influence in the Central Asian states a number of speculations arose as to the level of influence the state of Russia would have once the another big power would make a hold over the region. *Svobodnaya Mysl* stated the deployment of US troops in Central Asia was the last phase of Russian's 'withdrawal from the world'²⁰⁴. To which a number of reactions emerged where it was made clear that US administration was asked to leave once their aim of defeating terror was achieved or even in 2002 Moscow established an anti-terrorism force in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, less than 50 kilometers from the American forces stationed in that republic. This force operates within CIS Collective Security Treaty pact that joins Russia with the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan²⁰⁵.

3:17:4 CHINA AND ITS REACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

It was not only Russia which was endangered with the American presence in the region but another regional power which came into play almost immediately. The common problem led to SCO cooperation increasing between the two powers and establishment of an anti-terrorist network in 2002 with its office in the city of Bishbek with anti-terrorist military exercises in 2003.

²⁰² Akbarzadeh Shahram.(2004), Keeping Central Asia Stable , *Third World Quarterly* 25(4). 700)

²⁰³ Ibid , p 689.

²⁰⁴ Andranik Migranian, 'Konets Rossii?', *Svobodnaya Mysl*, 7,2002, p 7

²⁰⁵ * Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 December 2002 , in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press(CDPSP).

SCO gained importance as an organization as it was a common platform where the Russian and the Chinese could meet up in order to fight to counter the increased influence of a common enemy. As a multinational regional body, in Beijing's view, the SCO has the potential to represent an indigenous solution to indigenous problems. So while the US operation against the Taliban was welcome, the continued presence of USA in the region censured as unnecessary, even smacking of hegemonies²⁰⁶.

'Central Asia is witnessing a re-enactment of the Great Game. The convergence of US, Russian and Chinese attention in Central Asia has complicated relations between the states in the region and is drawing neighbouring powers into the fray. On the one hand, The US-Uzbek partnership has increased tensions between Tashkent and its Central Asian neighbours as the latter feel the pinch of Uzbekistan's regional Assertiveness, bordering on hegemonies. Russia and China have tried to take advantage of this resentment and have moved to consolidate their links with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, a move which has in turn aggravated Uzbek leaders. The presence of Russian forces in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is constantly cited by Tashkent as destabilizing the region. On the other hand, neighbouring powers, which have had varying degrees of interest in Central Asia, are being actively courted by the great powers. Russia has a history of good relations with Iran and India and welcomes their greater involvement in the region. At the same time China has also been on friendly terms with Iran and seems to have overcome its differences with India, as it also regards positively India's contribution to the line-up of states against ' Ameican hegemonism'. The possible admission of Iran and India to the SCO would strengthen the hand of Russia and China and give them stronger footing to challenge the presence of US force in their backyard'²⁰⁷.

²⁰⁶ **Inter Press Service*, 8 January 2002.

²⁰⁷ Akbarzadeh Shahram.(2004), Keeping Central Asia Stable , *Third World Quarterly* 25(4).704).

CONCLUSION:

The threats from Afghanistan have toppled the very security structure of the Central Asian states and Tajikistan. Not having a hold over the far off regions it becomes difficult to command a hold over their structures which are being power driven by the local warlords. These warlords and even the border police seem to be involved in crimes which is a result of widespread corruption. Apart from this the people in the border areas of Tajikistan (Gorno-badakshan) and Afghanistan (Afghan Badakshan) not only share a cultural and religious affinity but also have high remorse towards their respective governments. But after 2001 the Hamid Karzai government did set up certain measures for bringing these people into the fore of aid and humanitarian help so that they are not left out again leading to them turning against the government. On the Tajik side too the international and regional organizations are constantly working for building in infrastructural facilities diminishing the long inaccessibility to these areas. What is to be dealt with sternly is the border security situation which is not at par with the times due to the highly porous and inaccessible nature of the mountains which are the borderline alongside the river Panj.

CHAPTER 4

BORDER SECURITY SITUATION ON THE TAJIK-AGHAN BORDER

Don't ever take a fence down until you know the reason it was put up.

(G.K Chesterton, 1874-1936)

4.1 CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY AND RISING STATE FEARS:

Conglomeration of various structures based on ethnicity, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic and at the end society, the Central Asian region has a beauty of its own. Adapting to various changes that came its way in time, the Central Asian states have survived peacefully with various diversities like Muslims and Atheist, Turkic Asian, Russian, Slavic under one roof.

The Russian control over the region and the resulting cartographic division on ethnic or linguistic basis by the communist rulers, brought in with time the trickling down of various issues which would rise up to question the very notion of security of the states. The forces of nationalism, localism, regionalism, tribalism, clan politics, and gender discrimination which had been suppressed for long under the Soviet ideology based on equality rose again after the disintegration providing the unstabalizing forces with a rich recipe to work in their favor. This led to various instances of violence against various affinities based on clan, tribe and ethnicity bringing the Central Asian states into a state of turbulence²⁰⁸. The question on the very notion of sovereignty has led to the Central Asian states sharing a complex security environment which have resulted in the resurgence of both traditional and non-traditional security fears.

The whole new concept of states fears has risen up. From the ancient notion of states being usurpers of state territory, they now uphold a fear of spill-over effect of transnational threats. This is true in case of the Central Asian states which share its borders with the turbulent region of Afghanistan. Facing forces like terrorism, extremism,

²⁰⁸Hooman Peimani .(2009), '*Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*':, 2009, abc-clio,llc, Californpage 13

instability in both economic and social fields along with authoritative regimes in various states, whole concept resulting in the maintenance of security and sovereignty of the nation has come up in recent times.

Having faced decades of turmoil and turbulence the fate of Afghanistan does not seem to change. It has become a centre for non-traditional threats with religious extremism, drug trafficking, human trafficking arising from Afghanistan to Europe and Russia with Central Asia being the main route of the illicit activities.

4.2 TAJIKISTAN AND ITS BORDERS:

With the demise of the former Soviet Union, the Soviet security structure has crumbled and new arrangements have been worked out. Dr. Rouben Azizian and Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis in their work ²⁰⁹ “Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia” opined that even after 22 years of independence from the Soviet fold, the security environment of Central Asia continues to be of a complex nature, in relation to the phenomena of terrorism, religious extremism, poverty, corruption, political instability and authoritarian governance, and suspicion and rivalry between the great powers. The prevalence of extensive underdevelopment and poor economy has backfired for the state in terms of human security which provides a ground for popular dissent which may lead to gaining of popularity for Islamic factions. As was seen during the 1990s with groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir in the region. The spillover of the Afghan civil war into these Central Asian countries has been a feasible scenario since their independence in 1991, with the likely potential of destabilizing the entire region²¹⁰. The downfall of the Taliban provided a sense of security for the adjoining nations from Afghanistan. Though the recent changes in the Afghan political scenario and the gaining popularity of the ISIS in the Arab region and nearby areas has brought in new fears for the state.

Formidable enough, these challenges have come up in newer dimensions like illegal narcotic trade, violent extremism, trans-border terrorism, human trafficking and refugee’s

²⁰⁹ Executive Summary Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia dr. Roubena zizian and dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

²¹⁰ Hooman Peimani ,2009,*Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*:, 2009, abc-elio,llc, California.page 4

influx. Furthermore, recently added to this theatre, is the threat of smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)'s from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Tajikistan sharing its borders with Afghanistan has though shared much culturally and ethnically fails to guard its borders against the ill effects which this country in the south of Central Asia has come to face. It wouldn't come as a surprise if the region of Central Asia and Tajikistan in particular closes up its border. Later following the policy of "zero openness" towards Afghanistan until the country achieves some kind of stability and is able to find out a way to fight with the religious factions of the country.

Here it would be apt to quote the lines of Robert Frost's 1915 poem *Mending Wall*²¹¹ which he had written with the idea of fences if constructed on a good note would lead to a more friendly environment among neighbours. But in the current times the creation of walls and fences for bifurcation of borders is well intended to serves a medium to withdraw the ill forces crossing the borders into the state.

"There where it is we do not need a wall:
He is all pine and I am a apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, "Good Fences make good neighbours"
Spring is the only mischief in me, I wonder

If I could put a notion in his head:
Why do they make good neighbours? Isn't it
Where there are cows?
But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I'd Ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out."

²¹¹ Edward Cannery Lathem, ed.(1969), '*The Poetry of Robert Frost: The Collected Poems, Complete and Unabridged*', 1st ed, New York, Henry Holt and Co,33

Here the poem by Robert frost though talking about the fences that have come up with the times to come and built among nations has various connotations. While referring to the one side to be “Pine” and the other side to be “Apple”, one can also distinguish the state of affairs to be in two different countries. While the “Pine” can be taken up as a country which is less developed and poor. “Apple” on the other hand can be seen as a developed and rich country. While saying that the “Apples” wouldn’t ever cross and savor the “ Pine”, he does not put in the aspect the rich though wouldn’t go to the poor it cannot be possible for the pines. As they being less developed and poor would love to seek the benefits of the other side of the fences. But it is this that leads the dangerous neighbours turning more dangerous in nature. As lurking aspects of growth may lead to the transmission of instable forces to the other side as well as wave of refugees seeking a better future away from than the current state they are in.

But the case of Tajikistan and Afghanistan is the different scenario. None are extensively developed though Tajiks are better off. While Tajikistan may not be a much prosperous country but unlike the war prone Afghanistan it is in a much better condition. The border areas are extremely porous in nature and the populace residing is poor. While Afghanistan has to rise up as a stable nation, Tajik authorities have not been able to provide the much needed development in the mountainous border areas. In particular the area of Gorno-Badakshan has been left out, which has resulted in much resentment among the people of the region. It is the porosity of the borders that lead to Illegal Immigration and cross-border drug traffic along with refugee spill over’s imposing severe cost on the populace residing in the region. “That is to say, open borders, however beneficial, often come to a state and sometimes the cost can be exorbitant”²¹². Though being insufficient in countering the threats hovering around the region, Tajikistan has always been concerned in regard to the providence of a secured structure to the region of Central Asia. Terming the necessity of stability in Afghanistan like “ as much as the air we breathe” in his address at the Supreme Assembly (*Majlisi Oli*) on 25 April 2011, President Emomali Rahmon reaffirmed that, “Addressing modern threats and challenges and joint struggle against other negative phenomena, as well as helping and promoting

²¹² Jellissen, Gottheil,(2013), “On the Utility of Security Fences along International Borders”, *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2013, DOI:10.1080/14751798.2013.842707, pages 266-279

Afghanistan's efforts, training necessary personnel for Afghanistan in our country and other areas will always be in the spotlight of the agenda of our cooperation with this friendly country."²¹³

4.3 THE TRADE AND THE ROLE OF SILK ROUTE:

Central Asia has a legacy which binds the region to the far west and the friendly east. It was the middle kingdom for the travelers of the Silk-Route. This relationship of a common history leads to the region plunging into wars which never generated in their own land. One of the wars that changed the history of the times to come was the war of Afghanistan. The Central Asian region which had for decades been under the Soviet rule rose as an independent entity. What it could not throw off from its shoulders was the less secured borders with the country of Afghanistan. This very concept has led to the generation of a much hyped up route with its genesis in Afghanistan via the region of Central Asia up to the European markets north of the region.

The Central Asian region is made up of mountainous ranges which seclude the border areas with the rest of the region. While some borders are made up of just rivers others are rugged mountains difficult to be travelled. The secluded border areas have not benefitted from governmental welfare programs as resources in these areas are maintained by the local strongmen and powerbrokers, leading to generation of internal and external extremism, criminalization of economy and resentment. The strengthening of this local basis has led to drug being a lucrative proposition with process of bribing of politicians and voters leading to corruption and instability of political life. Along with the problem of physical determinants inadequate resources have stymied reforms in the security sector as a result of which the law enforcement agencies fail to tackle the activities of the criminal groups.

²¹³ President Emomali Rahmon, "Address by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan his Excellency Emomali Rahmon to Majlisi Oli on key directions of internal and foreign policy of the republic of Tajikistan" (address, Dushanbe, 25 April 2011).

4.3.1 BORDER SECURITY:

The Tajik crisis brought into light the fault lines of the Central Asian security. During this period the tussle between the Islamic forces and the Nabiyeve government crossed the limits with even an assassination attempt by throwing a bomb on the Nabiyeve barricade. The storming of the capital by the Nabiyeve supporters in December 1992 and the establishment of the government left the Islamic forces to retreat back to the areas of Gorno Badakshan while some went back to the country of Afghanistan. Even after being defeated by the anti-Islamist forces in the centre the Islamic state supporters concentrated themselves in the southern mountainous areas in the Pamir's in the provinces of Badakshan, Tavildra, Komsomolabad, Kharog and other areas where the rugged terrain would pose a problem for penetration for the penetration for the Tajik governmental forces²¹⁴.

The Tajik-Afghan border was highlighted with the infiltration and illicit cross border activities in the year 1993. A number of incidents were reported where clashes took place between the two. Some of them can be reported as

- 1) April 20, 1993 : more than 50 militants were killed when some 200 to 300 Islamic radicals and afghan Mujahidin intruded Shurohabad²¹⁵. July 13,1993 eruption of serious clashes on the Tajik-Afghan border when at least 25 Russian border guards, 70 Islamic fighters and 200 civilians were reportedly killed²¹⁶.
- 2) August 10,1993 : The July incident had sparked up an outrage in Russia leading to it launching artillery and armed attacks on the basis of Tajik and Afghan militants. The august incident was marked by 1 Kazakh and 4 Russian border guards being held hostage²¹⁷.

The Tajik IRP, National Front and Lal-e-badakshan had joined hands to form a government in exile while in Taloqan(Afghanistan) while Gulbadin Hikmatyar gave training to around 1000 Tajiks under his organization which were later filtered back to Tajikistan.

²¹⁴ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), '*Tajikistan in the 21st century*', Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press,72.

²¹⁵*FBIS-SOV-93-140 July 7,1993,72

²¹⁶ *Hindustan times May 4,1993

²¹⁷ *Hindustan times, Aug 31st,1993).

October 1993 marked the escalation of fighting in Pyanj and Gorno-Badakshan area with the Islamic commander in Gorno-Badakshan being quoted by Interfax that 15000 trained Tajiks had been filtered across the border²¹⁸. What is to be marked is the claim made by the then IRP leader M.S.Himatzade that “more than fifty percent of the Tajik territory was now in the hands of the alliance of the forum main resistance parties”²¹⁹.

4.3.2 THE AFGHAN IMPACT ON CENTAL ASIA AND TAJIK INVOLVEMENT

The crisis in Afghanistan resulted in a spill over to the neighbouring states in particular the state of Tajikistan where the illegal supply of arms and ammunitions for the establishment of an Islamic government was also followed by the training of Tajik infiltrators by the Mujahedeen. The area was marked by tussles both external and internal, whether it was the Afghan crisis, the disintegration of the Soviet Union which resulted in the coming up of the five Central Asian states with a question of how to define their future and most importantly the state of Tajikistan which was the poorest among the rest. The situation of unrest, turmoil and question provided a boost to the drug trade with the ‘Golden Crescent’ being gifted with another lucrative drug route through the Pamir’s to the European states and Russia. Imperiling its people and neighbours since two decades and the threats that have been on a constant rise, Afghanistan has posed a greater danger for the stability of the Central Asian states. Keeping in view the rise of the geo-strategic importance and legacy of strategic thinking and security policy perception, Afghanistan has become the pivot point of security issues both traditional and non-traditional in the current scenario. While the politics which has been based on the concepts of religion, ethnicity and regionalism has made it more explosive in nature, leading to fears of spill over to the Central Asian forum.

The Afghan nation shares one of the biggest boundaries with the states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, along with the Diaspora that resides in the nation. P.Stobdan in his article

²¹⁸* Interfax September 27,1993)

²¹⁹* Russia’s Radio, Moscow 6 may 1994 SWB/SU/1993, G/3 dated 10th may 1994).

clearly states the fears and the negative impacts the country of Afghanistan would have on the neighbouring countries, especially that of Central Asia²²⁰:

- (i) Domestic cleavages being affected by the religious fundamentalism and ideology.
- (ii) The impact of the neighbouring nation on the developmental programmes of the future amongst the Central Asian states.
- (iii) The Afghan nation serving as a constraint over the development of communicational and energy pipelines towards South Asia to countries of Pakistan and India. Though here it must be noted that the long awaited TAPI pipeline has been inaugurated in December 2015 in the meet of the four heads of states.
- (iv) The presence of the 'Narco-corridor' which originates from the country of Afghanistan and engulfs the Central Asian states to become a part of the golden crescent.
- (v) The presence of Wahabhi activists in Afghanistan which leads to fears amongst the states in regard to the threat of trans-border terrorism.
- (vi) The Soviet disintegration resulted in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan becoming the 'frontline' states in regard to security which became major players for controlling the instability of Afghanistan to spilling over to the region of Central Asia, which faces a turbulent neighbourhood and is encircled with conflicts, ethnic intolerance, religious extremism, sectarian violence, regional and tribal conflicts, drug trafficking and external pressures of different kinds.

Uzbekistan fears that if the same situation as Afghanistan shows up in the Tajik state influenced by religious fundamentalism and extremist, it will eventually result in posing a security quotient to the security paradigm of the Uzbek state. The fear is that any solution of the Afghan problem on the basis of Pushtun ethnic affinity will lead to greater Tajik nationalism that will inadvertently undermine Uzbekistan's national unity. The growing strife between the non-Islamist and Islamist factions for gaining a control over the region

²²⁰ Stobdan P. (1999), 'The Afghan conflict and regional security', *Strategic Analysis*, 23:5, 719-747, DOI: 10.1080/09700169908455080 To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700169908455080>

lead to the Tajik civil war which rather than being positive in note, led to deaths and turmoil. To add to it the Afghan mujahedeen under the leadership of Hekmatyar were actively providing training to the Tajik extremists on the other side of the border. With the rising tensions and the continuous negligence/failure of peace talks by the fundamentalists, the neighbouring countries came together to bring into action a better border guard with the concept of “inviolability of state borders”. It was only in 2005 that the Russian forces withdrew from the state and Tajikistan took full responsibility of its borders²²¹.

4.4 THE BORDERS AREAS OF TAJIKISTAN AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND STABILITY:


4.4.1 POROSITY OF BORDERS

Borders areas of Tajikistan and Afghanistan

Tavildara – Badakhshan- Shignan- Roshan- Ishkashim- Vranj –Wakhan- Zong -

Passing along the turbulent regions of the Gram valley the vulnerability of the borders becomes well established can be seen passing through the Garm valley. This provides a safe gateway not only for the drug peddlers but also forces like that of Taliban. Formally it was the Russian troops who guarded the region but now the Tajik Border Forces are in charge of the security. The patrolling of around five to seven soldiers of every 40-50 kms leads to immense gaps for allowing cross border trafficking through the region. The situation remains the same even with millions of dollars pouring in from various organizations like the EU or the UNDP or even countries like that of the USA with the prevalent corruption and the limited patrolling of this mountainous terrain.

²²¹ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),2015, ‘Tajikistan in the 21st century’, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press, 79-80.



*<https://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/media/maps.html>

General Sharef Fayzulloyev, Deputy Commander of the Tajik border troops “most of the border outposts along Tajikistan’s southern frontier were built before the 1960’s and are beyond rehabilitation. Soviet era vehicles have outlived their use. Every kilometer of barbed wire installed along the Afghan border would cost 1 million \$ and even the barrier wouldn’t stop cross-border crime”²²².

4.4.2 AFGHANISTAN AND INSTABILITY: THE TAJIK-AFGHAN CONNECTION OF ILLICIT ACTIVITIES.

The religion worked as a binding force between the nations of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The years of 1979-1991 report many incidents when Tajik soldiers who reported of being reluctant to fire on its Afghan brethren would often exchange the rifle allotted to him to fight the Afghan rebels for a copy of the Quran²²³. The Soviet authorities accepted the prevalence of hostile ideological elements that were coming from the other side of the

²²² Jamestown foundation, Tajikistan suffers the Effects of Porous Afghan Border, 16 June 2011. See <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e5637aa2.html> (accessed on 21 March 2015).

²²³ *Interview of Rabbani, Masood and Khalik with AFP dated February 15, 1990

border, while revolutionary writing papers and even translated works of Said Kutab, Muhammad Kutab and Jamal-din-Afghani (revolutionary founders of the Jamaat –e-islami) were sent across the border as stated in the *Kommunist Tadjikistana* Dec 30, 1987. While the militants in Afghanistan like the members of Jamaat-i-islami and Hizb-e-Islami in order to spread the validity of the cause and the members against the Soviet regime continued enrolling members into the party along with distribution of *Shabnameh*(night letters) in the adjoining countries of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan²²⁴. Burhaddin Rabbani and Ahmad shah Masood being both Tajik and belonging to Jamaat-e-islami faction reacted strongly to the Dushanbe disturbances of Feb. 1990(anti Armenian riots) stressing the linguistic, cultural, religious and racial affinity of Tajiks and Afghans, these leaders exhorted the Muslims in Central Asia to break away from Moscow²²⁵. The Afghan conflict has laid the very basis of the catastrophe which now indulges the region of Central Asia and in particular the country of Tajikistan with the problems which question the very security of the region in the current times. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was an initiator in the process of the turbulence that would prevail in the region in the times to come. Making the region a hub for accumulation of weapons being merged with the neighbouring country of Afghanistan as a single market for weapons and drugs²²⁶. Afghanistan was never the original producer of the crop but it was from Iran that the development had come. When in Iran ban took place on the cultivation and production the charge was taken up by Pakistan, which made Afghanistan a major foothold of the coming crops. The Civil War led to arise in the production and smuggling as the unruly state provided the drug barons to increase their hold over the drug trade. While in the 1990's Badakshan had very less production compared to Nangarhar and Helmand areas, in 2004 Badakshan along with the adjacent provinces produced 72 tons of Heroin, and around 160 tons of this is said to be smuggled to Central Asia²²⁷.

²²⁴ *Central Asian Newsletter VOL 7, no 3, July 1987, p 3

²²⁵ AFP Report February 15, 1990

²²⁶ Conrad Burkhard.(2000), “ The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Tajikistan”, *Strategic Analysis*, 24:8, 1479-1493... 1480.

²²⁷ Svante E Cornell(2005) ,Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Terrorism and Political Violence,17:4,619-639,DOI:10.1080/095465591009395

4.4.3 THE REASON OF BONDING AMONG THE PEOPLE OF LOWER TAJIKISTAN AND THE NORTH OF AFGHANISTAN WHICH LEADS TO A SMOOTH EVER RISING TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONS:

“The year 1929 marked the establishment of the Republic of Tajikistan which was formerly the part of the Emirate of Bukhara which are said to also include the parts of Turkestan and Badakshan which now form a part of the country of Afghanistan. Thus the populace of the south of the country of Tajikistan and the north eastern areas of Afghanistan though developed under different ethnic policies and socio-economic can be considered to be a part of a single large group.

The treaty of 1895 between the Emir of Bukhara and the Emir of Kabul(Abdur Rahman) led to the Darya-Ye-Panj (Amu-Darya)becoming the border for the first time between the two areas. Under this treaty the Emir of Kabul was to concede the right bank of the river (Gorno Badakshan) to the Emir of Bukhara. This left the Emir of Kabul with the right side of the river. This left the groups like that of Ismaili Muslims like Rushanis, Shughnanis, Ishkashimis and Wakis being distributed on either sides of the borders some in the region of Gorno-Badakhshan and while others in the region of North-East Afghanistan(including the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhar along with that of Badakshan). The north east region of Badakshan still has retained the ethnic makeup similar to what existed in the 12th century.²²⁸” the region has had boundaries yet culture served as a bond between the two surpassed by the chains of borders.

4.4.4 TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER: THE BADAKSHAN AND GORNO-BADAKSHAN

GORNO-BADAKSHAN: Amu Darya (Amu River) serves as the southern border of Tajikistan with Afghanistan, a border which was politically determined in the year 1895 between the khanate of Bokhara and Imperial Afghanistan. The populace of the either side of the border are part of the same cultural, ethnic and religious continuities but separated by the circumstances out of their control. The ethnic identity in southern Tajikistan and Northern Afghanistan being mainly Ismaili Muslim is difficult to determine and categorize, formed by social and political constraints, often disregarding

²²⁸ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.).(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press,271.

linguistic, historical and racial features. The geographical space of the Tajik side of Badakshan known as the area of Gorno-Badakshan is defined by the Hissar-Alai range and the known Pamir and Tien range. This region is highly mountainous and inaccessible in most parts. Defined by a single road at a 3252-metre high pass which in itself goes through the Kyrgyz state has international security issues though closed most of the time. The security dilemma in recent times resulted in the construction of a road running along the Pyandzh river passing through Kulyab till the city of Khorog with a population of about 24,800.10 residents. Structurally along deeply incised valleys running from the North East to the North West of the province on the western side is a contrasting plateau like area (2700-4000 mtrs) on the eastern side which also forms the boundary of two nations Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

While the rest of the region speaks the ‘Mountain Tajik’ dialects (Shugnani, Ishkashimi, Bartangi with Kyrgyz being the dominant language amongst the rest) this region with 3.4%²²⁹ of the country’s population is dominated with Pamiri people speaking Iranian dialects. The historical demarcation of both the Badakshans between the Emirate of Bukhara and the Afghans lead to the destiny of one people being defined in a very different course of history. This region being so isolated could never be administered on the basis of the direct rule by emirate of Bukhara²³⁰, leading to independent principalities managed by the Emirate of Kokand²³¹.

The civil war of Tajikistan saw the ready availability of guns as a result of the infelicitous opportunity of sharing the longest borders in the region, about 1400 km, with one of the foremost global epicenters of violence, i.e. Afghanistan, the Soviet graveyard of confrontation²³² which provide the settings for a ‘vacuum of institutions and plethora of arms’²³³. Apart from being a heartland of war Afghanistan has come up to be posing a new security threat for Tajikistan with IMU having around 3000 well armed battle experienced fighters lead by Juma Namangani with their bases in eastern Tajikistan and

²²⁹ *UNDP/United Nations Development Programme, *Tajikistan—Human Development Report* (Dushanbe:UNDP, 1998), p 130

²³⁰ Bliss, F. (2006), *Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs*, London: Routledge

²³¹ Stein, A. M.(1928), *Innermost Asia: Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia, Kan-su, and Eastern Iran. (Vol. 1-5)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press

²³² Foroughi Payam.(2002), ‘Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions’, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 48, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827).

²³³ Tadjbakhsh, ‘National Reconciliation’, op.cit.

Northern Afghanistan²³⁴. The drug trade has already made Tajikistan known as the ‘most criminalized economy in the region’²³⁵.

AFGHAN BADAKSHAN:

This province borders the state of Tajikistan with the *Panj Darya* serving as the only borderline between the two regions. Apart from this it is among some of the areas left under Taliban influence under the northern alliance. Before the war broke out it served as a periphery to the city of Kabul which was much dependant on the central regime for amenities and subsidies being one of the poorest region in the country of Afghanistan. Like its separated brother, the region of Gorno-Badakshan in Tajikistan it has always been a food deficit area relying on the mercies of the government for subsistence agriculture and trading. The conflict has disrupted the infrastructure that prevailed leading to cutting down the basic trade offs for the region. It is this lack of development and backwardness which has lead to both the brothers on either side of the borders becoming the hub for rise of militancy and drug trafficking. Being one of the remaining ruminants of Taliban regime and stronghold “the province comes under the remit of Ahmad Shah Masoud’s administration, the Shura-e-Nizar, which has military and civil functions. The Political context in Afghanistan has however always been characterized by shifting alliances and extreme fluidity”²³⁶.

“War is a form of contention which creates new form of contention”

As history beholds, the area of Afghan Badakshan was time and again pulled into isolation due to one reason or another. Afghan kingdom though had established itself in 1747 failed to establish permanent governance over the area of Badakshan. The Afghan rule marked by bias and atrocities against the Ismali population which led to them fleeing into the remote areas²³⁷. As a result the local warlords became the unprecedented leaders. The already weak structure was further toppled down with the Russian invasion of

²³⁴ Utyagonova Maria, ‘IMU incursions in Central Asia: Earlier and Larger?’ Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, Washington, DC: Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, John Hopkins University. Available online at <http://www.cacianalyst.org>(28 March 2001)

²³⁵ Olcott Martha Brill(2012), ‘Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and the Pacific on Democracy in the Central Asian republics’, International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, 12 April 2000.

²³⁶ Kapila, M., Templer, G., & Winter, E. (1995). Review of British aid to Afghanistan. *ODI, June*.

²³⁷ Kreutzmann, H.(1996), *Ethnicity in the Development Process: The Wakhi in High Asia*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.

1979, though still the level of damage was far less than that of the areas of Afghanistan. As can be stated that the 'siege economy' which followed led to the opium cultivation becoming a much sought after trade and tend to provide them, with household food security and an escape from debt after a long time. The independence of Afghanistan from the clutches of a foreign rule or even the Taliban has resulted in a spurt of renaissance amongst them. The government has adopted a policy of improved ties and secularism between these faiths. The support of their spiritual leaders too and democratization and freedom from religious hierarchy as lead to the masses becoming the active participants of new structural building for their community in the 21st century.

The province of Badakshan sharing borders with Pakistan and China is an underdeveloped province in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan with a total population of about 938,500 in an area of 40,886 sq. km . As a result of the inaccessibility from the mainland and the bias in governmental policies the region has not developed much. Which has lead to dearth of cultural, social, political, educational and civic institutions along with a weak infrastructure and agricultural lands(except the province of Baharak which produces wheat, barley, opium, vegetables and fruits). Yet the region has been resource rich like 'lapis lazuli, lead and copper in Yamagan and Teshkan valleys in Jurm; gold in Daunag and Shahr-e-Bozurg; iron and salt in Arghanjwa, Baharak; garnets and rubies in Khanjar, Darayam and Teshkan valley in Jurm'²³⁸ which has lead to fights and demarcations between the warlords.

THE STARK REALITIES: The Following chart portrays the sharp differences in both sides of the border which has led to the genesis of tracking and the Tajik state seen as a lucrative region. The following is the difference in status and policies between the two regions during the Soviet Rule in Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakshan) and Afghanistan (Afghan Badakshan).

²³⁸ Guy Brailsford, (1989), 'A Survey of Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan', Unpublished report prepared by Afghanaid, p 8

GORNO-BADAKSHAN

- **Military:** Military: 20th century saw an establishment of Russian and Emirate of Bukhara sovereignty. As a result military posts were established throughout the Pamirs.
- **Administration:** Taxes were reduced resulting in living standards improving
- **Administration:** Anti Russian Basmachi uprising from 1918-1922 led to tightening of Moscow's grip on Central Asia.
- **Administration:** By the mid-1920s, with the elimination of the Emirate of Bukhara, Badakhshans were incorporated into a fully fledged Tajik SSR and this Pamir region came up as a Gorno-Badakshan.
- **Administration :**Show casing the Soviet superiority: Soviet development policy in GBAO had two key ideological objectives 1) to demonstrate to the area's own 'backward' peoples the benefits and opportunities afforded by the

AFGHAN BADAKSHAN

- **Military:** Afghanistan in the early twentieth century was subject to varying degrees of British influence, particularly in foreign affairs, but this period also saw the introduction of reforms that would give the Afghan state a degree of unification and centralized leadership.

communist system; 2) to display to neighbouring Asian peoples the superiority of communism to their own capitalist/feudal societies.

- **Agriculture:** In the early 1930's 'kolkhozy' was adopted, a policy where though the farmers held ownership of their land they were to work communally, share inputs. Mechanized inputs were provided while wages were paid in proportion to the amount of land they made available and in relation to earned profits.
- **Agriculture:** 1960's marked changes and 'kolkhozy' was replaced by state-run farms called 'sovkhozy'. Unlike the former policy where farmers had an option for giving land to the government here land was compulsorily taken from farmers and handed to the state. They turned into employees of the state who would be paid on a monthly basis. It was not a successful endeavour as GBAO is a small area, unsuitable for large scale economies. The initiation of prioritization of livestock production led to GBAO's farmland
- **Agriculture and feudalism:** Afghan Badakhshan existed largely as a feudal society for much of the twentieth century, with a highly unequal system of land ownership. Large landowners were a common source of credit to smallholder farmers as well as landless peasants and often provided these groups with marginal land at extortionate rents.
- Bonded labor was frequent, and the standard of living for most of the population was poor. Faizabad, Kishm, Jurm and Khash, Baharak, Zibak and Ishkashim were the centres for poppy cultivation which were later taken to laboratories in Yamagan, Darayam, Teshkan, Gandah Qol for further processing into the valuable opium. The main reason for cultivation is the huge revenues which are generated. Though the poppies are used for various household purposes like that of 'extracting oil out of the

being turned into fodder farms—from 23.7% in 1965 to 69.8% in 1987 which in itself brought down the life in the region as ability of self production of food declined to only 20%.

- One policy for the benefit of another : ‘sovkhozy’ may have failed as a policy but under this a number of benefits were earned by the region: responsibility for building and maintaining the rural infrastructure, providence of a primary school and nursery, health care centres, and access to electricity though it was not provided for all the day. For recreational activities seniors day clubs and youth centres with a nice stocked library was provided.
- **Health and education:** An achievement was for the Soviet Union of making the GBAO a developed area in the field of a comprehensive health care system. By the year 1987, GBAO had 24 hospitals with 2070 beds, 124 medical and surgical centres, and 24 gynaecological, prenatal, and early childcare clinics. The locals could access the medical amenities free of

dried poppy seeds, employing the dross seeds for manufacturing kunjarah, animal fodder (mixing with hay and grass) burning the stalks as a fuel for cooking, and manufacturing soaps from the ashes of the burnt poppies’. But the high revenues have also lead to the demerits of high levels of addiction and HIV/AIDS becoming prevalent in the society.

- Soviet sovkhoz shops provided a ready market for selling both crops and locally produced goods, communities in Afghan Badakhshan.
- **Attempt of modernization:** A failed attempt to modernize the state was made. The measures of secularization, female education, western technology and publication of non-religious books were discarded by the afghan society. Education: investment on education was only done in 1950’s and in the year 1974 there were 197 schools for boys and 27 schools for girls.

cost and in a more serious case free transportation was provided to the best hospital nearby. .

- Education was well achieved with 44 schools for 6300 pupils, with a total of 800 trained teachers in the province of Ishkashim by the year 1990 with well trained teachers with high standards. Along with this equal emphasis was levied on the importance of female education.
- **Infrastructure and investments:** Between 1926 and 1929, 30 million Soviet roubles (over USD 200 million in today's value) were invested into the region of GBAO by the Soviets.
- **Infrastructural and other services** : Infrastructural progress from airport (in Khorog), to bridges, and basic roads, including highways connecting GBAO to Stalinabad (Dushanbe) and Osh were done.
- **Health services** were few and poorly equipped until the beginning of this century, with the start of a more coordinated health programme in 2003.
- **Investment:** Until the 1970s, little investment was made by the central government or its regional/provincial equivalents in education or health, the country remained technologically 'backward'.
- **Infrastructure:** Communities in Afghan Badakhshan remained connected primarily by owingi, perilous cliff-top paths unfit for most types of vehicles and sometimes too narrow even for donkeys.
- **Infrastructure:** Homes in Afghan Badakhshan were mainly windowless mud structures; firewood remained the sole energy

source for heating and cooking.

- **Freedom:** While Afghanistan had earned its freedom from the British in 1919 the Soviet backed from the promise: in the initial years of the revolution, a promise of granting independence to the far areas was made, which faded off soon after the win in the revolution.
- **Political rights:** The denial of political rights and subjugation of local cultural traditions surpassed the welfare strategies and the local populace had immense grievance against the authority.
- **Freedom from external influence:** After the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, Afghanistan freed itself of British influence in exchange for formally accepting a border with British India along the Durand Line.

The above chart has been prepared with the references from:

*Hiro (2009) Hiro, D. 2009. *Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran.* New York: Overlook Press)

*Bliss, F. (2006), *Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs*, London: Routledge

*Cleinow, G. 1930. "The New Republic of Tajikistan." *Osteuropa* 5 (2): 116–120. Cleinow 1930

*Kreutzmann, H. (1996), *Ethnicity in the Development Process: The Wakhi in High Asia*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.

*Shahrani M N, (1984), *From Tribe To Umma: Comments on the Dynamics of identity in Muslim Soviet Central Asia*, *Central Asian Survey*, vol 3, no 3, pp 385-402.

*Omran, B. 2007. "Afghanistan and the Search for Unity." *Asian Affairs* 38 (2): 145–157. Omran 2007.

*Breu, T., and H. Hurni. 2003. *The Tajik Pamirs: Challenges of Sustainable Development in an Isolated Mountain Region*. Berne: Centre for Development and Environment.

4.5 THE RISE OF DRUGS AND ITS TRADE:

The Central Asian Republics may also become a major refining region for Afghan heroin following the strengthening of the drug legislation in tribal areas of Pakistan where refining has traditionally taken place²³⁹. Central Asia has become the new hub of trafficking from Afghanistan to the European nations. Around a quarter of the Afghan

²³⁹* Interpol, Weekly Intelligence Message, 1995(26/95).

produce is being trafficked through the states²⁴⁰. This change has been initiated by the problems that had been occurring through the Iran route where the authorities have become strict in nature leading to huge losses and seizures. The UNODC report 2010 clearly showed that Iran had confiscated around 33% of the total seizures²⁴¹ and around 580 in 2009. While in the Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan 0.1 percent ,Tajikistan accounted for 0.2 percent of global opium seizures, and Kyrgyzstan .06 percent. On the other hand the crackdown by Pakistani military forces has initiated the route being diverted through Central Asia²⁴².

The rise of the Afghan drug barons and the influx (increase) in the drug trade has impacted the Central Asian country of Tajikistan at the highest level. In 2005 when approximately 87% of the world's opium production took place in Afghanistan²⁴³ it was Tajikistan which paid the most price for the forces of globalization sweeping its area. The routes are mountainous and inaccessible in the borders of Afghanistan and Tajikistan or even the Panj River which tends to channel the shipments. The case of Central Asia is such that mostly the highways are taken for transfer of shipments unlike the border areas which are mountainous. The shipments have the final destination to Osh from where further marketing is done into Russia and Europe. It's in Osh that the criminal networks finally take their position²⁴⁴. The networks are so closely binded by kinship that only around 5% at max is stopped from the 20000 kg which passes through the region²⁴⁵.In the early 1990's the 'Pamir Highway' which runs through Tajikistan had become "the most trafficked route in the world " but continued developments due to foreign assistance has lead to more accessibility into the markets by these transnational groups leading to even militancy infiltrating into the market. Dr. Svante Cornell recognizes the significance of these routes and enclaves that geography makes possible, such as Chorku in the Isfara district of Tajikistan, where both via administration and geographically these areas have

²⁴⁰ *International Crisis Group, "Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats," Asia Report N°205—24 May 2011, 17, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/centralasia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx>>

²⁴¹ UNODC, "World Drug Report (2012)," 29

²⁴² Gretchen Peters,(2009). *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda* , New York: Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin's Press, 160

²⁴³ * United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2005, P 1

²⁴⁴ Svante E Cornell(2005) ,Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Terrorism and Political Violence,17:4,619-639,DOI:10.1080/095465591009395, 588

²⁴⁵David Trilling, "Organized Crime Helps Stoke Instability in Kyrgyzstan's Southern Provinces." *Eurasianet.org.*, material is stopped 17 May 2010, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61078>> (2 August 2012

not been able to be brought under strict governmental control. Which has led to Stein and Bartles comparing it to the “Wild West”.

There are various reasons which have led to Tajikistan being the biggest sufferer in the realm of drug trade through the Central Asian countries²⁴⁶:-

1. The first of these factors is geographical: 1,206 kilometres long Tajik-Afghan border with its mountainous terrain has been the ideal entry point for smugglers, especially since neither of these two countries possess the law enforcement capabilities necessary for effectively deterring illegal cross-border operations.
2. Tajikistan is also the Central Asian country with the best connections to both the producer countries, Afghanistan and Russia, the principal destination of Central Asian smuggled heroin.
3. Tajikistan’s main link to Afghanistan is the large ethnic Tajik population estimated at 20-25% of Afghanistan’s population, the majority of who are situated in the northern part of the country near the border.
4. The link to Russia draws on the fact that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has maintained Tajikistan as its main military outpost in Central Asia.

The Central Asian Republics are playing an increasing role in the heroin industry, in terms of both cultivation and heroin refining. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, deteriorating economic conditions, weak law enforcement and political conflict has led to an increase in opium cultivation²⁴⁷.

There are certain contextual conditions that may give rise to vulnerability of illicit drugs production like

- Corruption or insurgency
- Economic insecurity
- Isolated rural areas
- Accessible raw materials

²⁴⁶ Engvall Johan.(2006),“The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organised crime in Tajikistan”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 55,6, p 828.

²⁴⁷ Lee Rensselaer W 3.(1995), “Drug in Communist and former Communist states”, *Transnational Organised Crime*,1995(1:2), 193-205.

- Economic insecurity along with not being a labour intensive crop with less specialization needed.

Some areas attract organic drug industries (with the exception of herbal cannabis), due to the dynamics created by rural economic insecurity and the disruption caused by active insurgent movements or corruption. Under these circumstances, law enforcement is weakend or non-existent leaving the whole regions opening to the cultivation of illicit crops by farmers motivated by poverty or coerced by “Narco-insurgents”. For the farmers, these crops provide a higher income that other agricultural commodities and the drug itself is sometimes used for traditional therapeutic or religious purposes. For the insurgent groups who buy the crops from the farmers or extract tax from the trafficking groups who do so, a lucrative source of funding arises to further their campaigns and by looking after the financial interests of the people, insurgent groups may be awarded with a degree of loyalty, thus furthering their principle goal of an increased legitimacy. So, relationships between the insurgents, the traffickers and the local people are mutually beneficial. Rural isolation assists these dynamics by reducing opportunities for surveillance and intervention²⁴⁸.


4.5.1 HEROIN AND ITS STAGES

The labs which transform the raw (poppy) to the valuable (heroin)are adapted to the illegal trend of make and shift as seen in the 2008 United States Department of State Foreign Operations Report “ For the first time since 2001, seizures of precursor chemicals have been carried out by Afghanistan’s neighbouring including:156 kilos of acetic anhydride seized in Tajikistan;1.6 tons of acetic acid in Uzbekistan; and six tons of sulphuric acid in the Kyrgyz republic. Follow up investigations was launched in each of the cases and trafficking group operating in the Republic of Korea has been identified and dismantled, and the prosecutions are underway”²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁸ Shona Morrison,(1997), ‘*The Dynamics of Illicit Drug Production:Future sources and threats, Crime, law and Social Change*’, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 126-127.

²⁴⁹ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.)(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in The 21st century*’, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press,271.

There are generally forms of heroin production: Where the crop is transformed into a source of high end revenue generating product for the local populace of the war torn Afghan nation.




In a more theoretical manner the Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LVII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2005 describes the various stages of heroin product which takes place before it is transferred to various destinations

If legal trade and humanitarian cross border cooperation decreases due to unsafe conditions or instability at the border as a result illicit networks increase their cooperation due to financial incentives from illicit trade, resulting in the flow of Afghan heroin to Europe and Russia through Tajikistan increasing and impacting the overall security of Tajikistan ²⁵¹.Badakshan is a microcosm representing the overall challenges for development in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the overarching problem being that informal structures trump, legal institutions. Every law that is written has an equal or more powerful informal norm or agreement that law enforcement officials always consider as theydecide to enforce or do not enforce a law in accordance to their benefits. This

²⁵⁰ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.).(2015), '*Tajikistan in The 21st century*', Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press 271.

²⁵¹Ibid, p 272.

includes legal and illegal trade, human flows and visa issues²⁵² resulting in various consequences for the state as well as the populace.



4.5.2 UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE TAJIK DRUG TRADE

Tajikistan is a corridor for the enormous drug trade leaving from Afghanistan²⁵³. This trade has limited trickle down effects and most of the large youthful population is without employment. Consequently one third of the Tajik households have a member working abroad to send home remittances²⁵⁴. Some Tajik as well other labour migrants from other countries in Central Asia are forced to carry drugs as a way of paying for transport to Russia and other work locales²⁵⁵.

The expansion of drug traffickers into the human smuggling and trafficking business is explained by the limited sanctions, high profits and reduced risk of confiscation of assets. This suggests that the present law enforcement policies that target human and drug traffickers separately are not based on an existing and developing reality in many regions of the world. Therefore, anti trafficking efforts can be made much more effective by using some of the resources that are presently deployed against the drug traffickers-intelligence, task forces and coordinated operations to combat the networks and

²⁵² Warikoo, Umarov(ed.).(2015), '*Tajikistan in The 21st century*', Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Pentagon Press,272.

²⁵³ Paoli et al.(2009), '*The World Heroin Market: Can Policy Reduce Supply?*', New York: Oxford University Press: 181-198.

²⁵⁴ IOM Tajikistan in cooperation in Sharq Scientific Research Center, "Labour Migration from Tajikistan 2003,"www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/.../Tajik_study_oct_03.pdf.

²⁵⁵ Louise Shelly. (2012), 'The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective', *Eurasian Journal for Criminal Policy Res*18:241-253, DOI 10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1..

organizations that traffic in both human beings and drugs²⁵⁶. States like Russia which form an important destination of labour migrants from the Central Asian region have expressed fears of drugs, and aggressive forces of nationalism and religious extremism that they fear may spread from the Central Asian states to Russia. ‘Georgy Kunadze, then Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed these fears in an interview to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* he said “ Russia has a specific geo-political interest in Central Asia, that is, to prevent the explosive charge of Islamic extremism from penetrating into the country²⁵⁷.” While the European states are more into their security by trying hold on the trade rather than the genesis in the Afghan front.

4.6 SMALL WEAPONS AND TRADE :

Tajikistan serves as a basis for the very formation of the cycle of the distribution of small and light weapons in the region, which once fallen in place are difficult to be tracked, collated and then destroyed. NATO defines the arms as in those that are crew portable direct fire weapons, up to 50mm caliber, with a secondary capability against light armour and aircraft²⁵⁸.

a) Small Arms and Trade in Tajikistan

Tajikistan was never a militarized country until the dawn of the Russian troops in Afghanistan in the year 1979. This lead to the supply of weapons passing through the region and the growing dependence of the military on Russia which affected the local militarycapabilities. NATO defines small weapons as “arms that are crew portable direct free weapons, up to 50mm caliber, with a secondary capability against armor and aircraft”²⁵⁹.

The Tajikistan civil war between various factions resulted in Tajikistan becoming a hub of weapons ‘merging with its neighbour Afghanistan into a single market for weapons and drugs’²⁶⁰. Though various measures had been initiated by the Tajik government the

²⁵⁶ Louise Shelly. (2012), ‘The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective’, *Eurasian Journal for Criminal Policy* Res18:241-253, DOI 10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1..

²⁵⁷ **Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, July 29,1993, in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press(CDPSP)August 18,1993.

²⁵⁸ T.Kartha, “Light Weapons Proliferation and Regional Instability in Central Asia,” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol 19, no.9, (1996) pp.1278/9

²⁵⁹Ibid, p 1278/9.

²⁶⁰ Conrad Burkhard.(2008), ‘Der Augenblick der Entscheidung: zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs’, *Nomos*, 2008

local warlords along with other armed gangs ignored the demands of disarmament and demobilisation for pursuing their own criminal interest. With a number of arms being stolen from army units only a few of which were later discovered. The rebellion in November 1998 hyped up the reality all the more resulting in most of these troops using the foreign territory as a shelter place.

Various sources can be underlined which gave Tajikistan its arms supply:

- During the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan masses of weaponry was on the move to the southern part of the Soviet Union which resulted in a serious influx of weaponry in Tajikistan
- The Soviet withdrawal again led the arms mafia of Tajikistan acquiring a lot of weaponry
- The Tajikistan civil war saw the accumulation of weapons with around 10000 arms being divided among the social factions. The Russian sources in the country along with Tajik KGB were the supporters and suppliers some factions from their own surplus stockpiles.
- The Soviet army support centres(DOSAAF schools), military training departments, ministries and police precincts,.
- The Uzbeks as well as the Russian provided a *de facto* support to the official factions. Both the fear of the spill over effect of the conflict in their region.
- Afghanistan terrorist factions came up as a criminal network providing weapons to the opposite factions. Prices ranged from \$400 for an AK 47 to \$600 for a machine gun in 1994.leading to the awash of such weapons which could be saved and easily hidden for future use²⁶¹.

²⁶¹Ibid.

4.7 ILLICIT TRAFFICKING ACROSS THE AFGHAN TAJIK BORDER AND THE FAILLURE TO STOP THE FORCES:

The problem of trafficking which has caused such a huge menace for the Tajik forces in the current times does not seem to be a new factor after all. Even during the times of the Soviet control over the region the incidents show the helplessness of the forces to stop the same. It was at the time of the soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the forces of Wahabism (literature which was critical of the traditional and tolerant Sufi trend of Central Asia and laid emphasis on religious absolutism)²⁶² that it had access to the region and strengthened its roots on the rural areas of the Tajik-afghan border which had lead to smuggling of arms and militant cadres all along the Oxus. The Soviet border guards under the authority of the KGB failed to prevent the illicit trafficking on the Tajik-Afghan border was illustrated in March and April 1987 when afghan mujahedeen staged two cross-border armed attacks in Kulyab and Kurga Tyube regions of southern Tajikistan²⁶³.

The Tajik crisis escalated the whole presence of Afghani extremist forces and their role in the Islamic revival in Tajikistan. “The trans-border infiltration of armed bands and smuggling of arms became the most destabilizing factors”²⁶⁴. While the communist forces (basically the government of Tajikistan) were struggling hard to fight the Islamic extremist forces, the areas adjoining Afghanistan like that of Kurgan Tyube and Gorno Badakshan became the hub for the cross border activities²⁶⁵. The issuing of a statement by Shodmon Yusufov the chairman of Democratic Party of Tajikistan appealed to the Afghan people for aid²⁶⁶.

It became a everyday scenario where clashes between the armed Russian and Tajik border guards with the extremist forces coming from Afghanistan became a common

²⁶²Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press ,69

²⁶³ Washington post april 13 and 19,1987).

²⁶⁴ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press,70.

²⁶⁵Ibid, p 70.

²⁶⁶ Summary of world broadcasts, SU/1379 May 13,1992, resulted in an increase in attempts for crossing the border according to the then Deputy Commandment of the Central Asian Border District, Major General A Matrovitsky(summary of world broadcasts, SU/1379 May 13,1992).

scenario. The establishment of the mujahidin government provided a boost to the Tajik Islamic faction. While 500 transgressors were held at the Tajik-Afghan border²⁶⁷.

4.7.1 SMALL ARMS AND GORNO-BADAKSHAN

The Tajik-Afghan border came up as a whole new viable trafficking route with weapons, drugs and arms business getting closely linked. The civil war turned the mountainous and south west region of Tajikistan into the most prosperous and frequently used route. The route further opened up to Osh in Krygystan which served as a local market and also as a further booster to the European and Russian markets. The year 1998 saw the military presence in the borderline areas decreasing, the Pamir region suffered all the more, with the smugglers being well equipped. The best portion is that Tajikistan has only 20 percent of its borders being secure which has come down from 85 percent as it was six years ago²⁶⁸. The uprisings and the tussles among the authorities and the populace is enough evidence to proof the prevalence of arms and ammunitions in the area. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan seem to have become a safe haven for the armed militants and trafficking community. The Afghan state still under turmoil and fighting for stability gave a boost to the profession. It is said that Tajikistan and Russia are the main sources for the arms with airlifts of arms and weaponry being done as the same way as trucks used for surface deliveries²⁶⁹. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and subsequent disintegration that followed, lead to huge stockpiles of military hardware and nuclear material being left in the newly independent states which had little or no ability to take care of the regulation of these wealthy yet dangerous material. Now that the Afghan forum too has acquired such a turbulent scenario, the porosity of the Tajik-Afghan border has come up as an endangerment between the two. Where poverty, unemployment and regional tensions may lead to trafficking of arms to either of the sides causing more instability while bringing in a new transnational trade of smuggling in small arms.

²⁶⁷ Summary of world broadcasts, SU/1928 July 9,1992) 50 afghan were detained with drugs near Termez(summary of world broadcasts, SU/1377 May 11,1992.

²⁶⁸ Jonson.(1998),“The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy ,” Discussion Paper 74, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, page 53.

²⁶⁹ Kartha.(1999), “ *Tools of Terror-Light Weapons and India's Security*”,New Delhi :Knowledge World, page 83.

THE RECENT FEARS:

An article “Big increase in armed and drugs-related crime in 1998”²⁷⁰ states that the aforementioned rebellion in Leninabad district saw the theft of some 600 sub-machine guns, 28 machine guns, around 1000 battle grenades and ammunition from army bases. Although an unspecified amount of these weapons was confiscated later on, rebels and also the general population supplied themselves on this occasion with a considerable quantity of arms. It is likely that some of these weapons moved with the retreating insurgents into the Uzbek territory. According to figures published by the Interior ministry, thefts of arms and ammunitions rose in 1998 by 28 percent in comparison to 1997. Recently it (22 January 2014) was reported that even children were being recruited by the ISIS and other militants as interpreters. In other incident in August 2014, ISIS appointed a Tajik man as “Emir” of the northern alliance in the Province of Raqqa. In September 2014 11 members of the IMU had been arrested of which two had fought in Syria.

Many citizens have been arrested while attempting to travel to Palestine for jihad against Israel, as on 12 November 2014 Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) members had been arrested attempting to recruit members to fight in Syria. What is to be seen here is that this organization which is a branch of the IMU targets a Sharia based government in Tajikistan. The JA has come up as a new terrorist organization which applies various tactics like that of ambush, bombing and grenade attacks in Tajikistan under the leadership of Amriddin Tabarov who has risen up as the new face of terrorism in the Tajik state. Terrorist outfit, JA was responsible for several bloody incidents in Tajikistan, using various tactics including a suicide bombing, ambush and grenade attacks.

CONCLUSION:

The border security situation between the State of Tajikistan and that of Afghanistan seems to a dwindling economy where the threats are on a constant rise. The General Agreement of June 1997 and the widespread availability of light weapons up to sophisticated SAMs has resulted in an air of hope or at least in the theoretical way a step

²⁷⁰ SWB,SU/3438 G/1+2,ITAR-TASS, “ Big increase in armed and drugs-related crime in 1998,” January 1,1999

towards a stabilized Central Asian region. The war has resulted in a collapsed economy and insecurity in the societal sense. With weapon procurement easily affected, to make a living through fighting becomes a convenience; other forms of employment are less attainable²⁷¹. Since then there have been an increase in the measures which have been applied on both the governmental and the International and regional paradigm as would be seen in the next chapter which gives a detailed account of the measures and the result of the initiatives on such a large scale.

²⁷¹ SWB,SU/3618 G/3, Interfax, "Official confirms air strikes against Tajik rebels" August 17,1999

CHAPTER 5

TAJIKISTAN'S STATE CAPACITY AND MEASURES AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

INTRODUCTION:

GORNO-BADAKHSHAN, TAJIKISTAN

TREKKING ROUTES

- Trekking Routes
- National Border
- Oblast Border
- District Border
- Principal Road
- River



*<http://www.pamirs.org/images/maps/gbaorm.gif>

The Central Asian steppes have always served as a battleground for various civilizations and great empires while turning into a detention ground for Soviet convicts, testing ground for nuclear bombs and also a land of extraction for raw materials. Yet in modern history the prominence was attained only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and

in the wake of the tumultuous history its neighbour shared. The region now faces the fears of reawakened tribalism, Islamic fundamentalism and resurgent nationalism as a gift of independence and an escalated ISIS presence making a hold over the region. While the world's focus was on Afghanistan and cheering for the win of capitalism over communism, the Central Asian region in the contemporary times is facing a spurt of religious awakening in the scenario where sentiments remained curbed for decades. This flood of religious sentiments unleashed spreading fear of an intraregional or national civil war across the Central Asian realm. This region has had a history of a beautiful conglomeration of the soft side of Islam like that of Sufism and the radical nature of the religious transformation leading to the fears that would haunt the region. As these were more intolerant and talked about the establishment of the forces of 'Jihad' which was all the more deadly for the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia serving as other nail into the coffin of the international peace studies alarming the governments of the incursions and enrolments of citizenry into the extremist fold²⁷². This in turn led to the validating of fears lurking in the region leading to government crackdowns with no option for radicals but to leave the country into a safer haven of Afghanistan.

With the withdrawal of the international forces from the Afghan front fears of transmission of radical fundamentalism and transnational fears have escalated leading to stern measures being taken by both international and national forces in the Central Asian realm to safeguard it from turning into an extension of the Afghan battlefield. Though the event of 9/11 may have led to fears amongst the terrorist organizations yet it has also led them to venture into other avenues for financial assistance. As a result drug trafficking seems to have escalated and with the withdrawal the passive organizations are set to come back in a more active form. Here the mention of the IMU (Islamic movement of Uzbekistan) needs a special mention. This was the most dreaded organization in the 1990's when the Central Asian states were fighting for their upliftment and it even after being passive for so many years after governmental crackdown has built up a network in the countries after their banishment by the governmental forces. IMU's ability to cross

²⁷² Omelicheva, M. (2007), "*Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia*", Oxon: Routledge

into the realm cannot be underestimated²⁷³ and even during the passive nature it has already raised innumerable splinter groups across the Central Asian realm. It holds mostly all the Central Asian countries under its control with various organizations in each of the country. The nature of this organization is more jihadist than Islamist with belief in the imposition of their version of religion on other states and communities²⁷⁴. It is quiet axiomatic that in the wake of a weak governmental structure and the repressive under-developmental nature of the authoritarian regimes (corruption being main), the precipitation of the anti state activities would be quite a providence of state for future conflicts.

5.1 CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN: THE LINKAGE AND FEARS THAT LURK WITHIN:

Tajikistan's security remains fragile as the US troops which sought to have developed a fear amongst the militants of the region have left Afghanistan. John Schoeberlein in his article has speculated the current tensions being faced by Tajikistan being far deadlier than the scenario of war. Though in regard to a major outbreak he opined that 'war-weariness of the population may provide some insurance against any widespread outbreak of violence'²⁷⁵. Islamic fundamentalism though for long has been portrayed as the main cause of Central Asian dismay. Seemingly as a scourge which led to the current state of Central Asian politics, yet there are some researchers who seem to think otherwise holding a different view. Atkin holds the opinion that while the massive expansion of mosques was termed as a fundamentalist event, it held more of a personnel societal significance in the wake of recognition of religion not much preferred in the Soviet times. Tajikistan's religion is heterogeneous in nature which leads to less strength amongst the radical classes; even the IRP which was termed the fundamentalist organization during the civil war has always had its aims clear of maintaining a separation of politics and religion. Qazi Turajonzoda (now split from the IRP) and Said Abdullo Nuri have both consistently argued for maintaining a separation between state and religion.

²⁷³ Baran Zeyno(et all).(2006), "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU," *Silk Road Paper*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, July 2006, 47.

²⁷⁴ Khalid A.(2007), '*Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*', London: University of California Press, 16

²⁷⁵ John Schoeberlein.(2002), 'Regional introduction: a host of preventable conflicts', in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, eds, *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp 476-477

The fears arise from the threats coming out of the factions like that of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) which though have kept a low profile exist in the safe havens of Afghanistan and Pakistan. More recently it has been seen that very many Central Asian youths were reported to have fought alongside the jihadists in Syria and Iraq. Dwelling into the Central Asian history and that of Afghanistan, the fighters who had travelled from other countries and those of Central Asia to serve alongside the Mujahedeen and the Taliban in the war against the Soviets had stayed back or returned to their respective nations creating organizations for the attainment of an Islamic state within their countries leading to a state of chaos. Today's principle security concern remains the return of some of these ISIS battle hardened Jihadists into the home front to launch attacks²⁷⁶. Even during the Soviet invasion the Tajik served in Afghanistan for the Russian army due to the cultural and linguistic affinity, while schools for Afghan children were also opened on the Tajik side. Sharing close cultural, linguistic and historical ties they tend to share the same religion, values and customs which lead to the strong affinity between the two. The people of both the states have been peacefully living in either state sharing the same nationality with their brethren. Demarcated by borders they do not seem to be demarcated by hearts as can be seen linked up by blood ties and kinship like in the areas of Gorno Badakhshan- Afghan Badakhshan, Kulob- Takhar, Qurghonteppa -Kunduz.

The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the independence of Central Asian Republics lead to the two neighbours and their history being dominated by a number of factors:

1. The collapse of the Soviet Union;
2. Inability of Tajikistan to establish a government that would control the entire country;

²⁷⁶ Zubaidullo Ubaidulloev. (2014), ' Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: Past and Present', *Asia-Pacific Review*, 21:1, 120-136, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2014.921966 (120-121)

3. The newly formed government of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, which was based on the ideological approach, supported the Islamic opposition of Tajikistan in the fight against secular/pro-communist forces during the civil war in Tajikistan²⁷⁷.

Even after independence, the Tajik state developed diplomatic ties with the new Afghan nation in the year 1992, leading to the establishment of embassy in the year 2002. Though trade has been facilitated between the two yet the fears of rising instability continue to haunt the Tajik state. The war has had a deep impact on the economy of the state of Afghanistan as well as the neighbouring states. The smuggling of goods amidst the neighbouring nations had been a major financial resource to the groups of the country of Afghanistan as a result of which they have found out other measures to continue the lucrative trade. The compatibility between the militant and the criminal organizations seem to have reached a whole new level with the instability and corrupt practices of the government being used for the benefit of these groups in making use of the resources in the region for their own benefit. With the fear of suppression after the launch of the “War on Terror” the Islamist groups turned into the criminal ones deriving finances from the lucrative opium industry. Thus the war which was meant to be for Afghanistan is also affecting the economies of Afghanistan’s neighbours²⁷⁸. The profits do not just include the drugs but also other goods which find their way in the hands of the mafias linked to the networks of Central Asia. A 1500\$ profit was nearly estimated for a local person involved in drug trafficking which according to local news opium which was sold at the farm gate for \$25 per kg has already reached \$3000 by the time it reaches the border with Central Asia²⁷⁹.

Leading to these fears and the importance of the Afghan state for Tajikistan in his address to the Supreme Assembly (*Majlisi Oli*) on 25 April 2011, President Emomali Rahmon noted that security and stability in Afghanistan was necessary for Central Asia, particularly for Tajikistan “as much as the air we breathe.” The president reaffirmed that, “Addressing modern threats and challenges and joint struggle against other negative

²⁷⁷ Ubaidulloev Zubaidullo.(2014), ‘Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: Past and Present’, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 21:1, 120-136, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2014.921966, Page 123.

²⁷⁸ Goodhand Jonathan.(2000), ‘From Holy war to Opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan’, *Central Asian survey*, 19(2), 265-280

²⁷⁹.Johnson C.(1998), ‘ *Afghanistan, A Land in Shadow*’, Oxfam Country Report.

phenomena, as well as helping and promoting Afghanistan's efforts, training necessary personnel for Afghanistan in our country and other areas will always be in the spotlight of the agenda of our cooperation with this friendly country"²⁸⁰. Even though Tajikistan seems to be deeply concerned about its internal and the region's security, it lacks the capability to adhere to the needs prevalent at the ground level.

5.2 SECURITY IMPEDIMENT AND THE STATE :-

The internal weakness and the internal troubles and debates that exist between the Central Asian countries has led to the insurgent and criminal forces being provided a ready stage to start up their activities. The post-independence instability has led to corruption and political co-option as a result of criminal and shady structures that had developed, leading to forces of extremism and organized criminal groups becoming apparent and substantial distrust being generated amongst the five states of Central Asia.

While in a strong state the internal state institutions provide enough stability, such may not be the case of the Central Asian states. Being economically or environmentally unstable, it is of concern when huge masses of refugees move from one state to another. As was the case when drought hit the Aral Sea region leading to huge number of people shifting to neighbouring states or the Tajik civil war where huge number of people changed their areas of accommodation or even left the country as refugees to neighbouring states of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The weak states are more vulnerable to the internally generated threats than strong states as endemic political instability has been a result of a loose framework of cohesion and political stability. Thus at this moment according to Ayoob the "major concern – indeed –obsession" of elites of developing states "is with security at the level of both states structures and governing regimes"²⁸¹.

5.2.1 STATE CAPACITY

²⁸⁰ *"Address by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan His Excellency Emomali Rahmon to Majlisi Oli on Key Directions of Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan" (address, Dushanbe, 25 April 2011.

²⁸¹ Ayoob Mohammed.(1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Lynne Rienner Publishers *op. cit.*, p. 4.

The pressure and fear of transnational threats lurk more over the three Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The National Security Service of Uzbekistan (SNB), the Ministry of Security in Tajikistan (MoS) and the State Committee of National Security in Kyrgyzstan (GKNB) are the basic intelligence organizations responsible for security maintenance in these states. Despite being the inheritors of the KGB, their nature seems to differ in preoccupation and use of arms(while Tajik intelligence is less violent, the Uzbek intelligence is ready to resort to any measure for the attainment of the set goals). While the Tajik intelligence concentrates on the achievement of internal security issues, the Uzbek intelligence is more into the safety of their President.

5.3 TAJIKISTAN AND THE WEAK STATE TITLE:

The first look at the state of Tajikistan reinstates the fact of Tajikistan being a weak power. The most important being the governance which lies only in the hands of the few. Weak and fragile the elites have tried to retain their power since the year 1991 while the local populace still lacks the power to define their own future. Mohammed Ayoob²⁸²(1995,p 4) opines that ‘the Third World state elites major concern indeed, obsession is with security at the levels of both state structures and governing regimes. While on the national level the elites have tried retaining their power on the local level, in areas like Gorno Badakshan which are far away from the capital it is the warlords and chieftains which administer the same. They too try their best to hold on to power along with accumulation of money and trade dynamics in the region. It is due to the reins of power residing in the hands of the few that drug trafficking and drug barons have come up as political persons and high profile businessmen leading to drug money being used for setting up the country’s infrastructure and other developmental activities. On the economic and political front the country of Tajikistan faced a civil war as a result of sub-national divisions which lay within the state rather than being termed as those on the basis of ideology or religious extremism²⁸³. Tajikistan still remains the poorest country in the region. A World Bank poverty assessment in 2003 showed that 64 percent of

²⁸² Ayoob Mohammed.(1995), ‘*The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict,and the International System*’, Lynne Rienner Publishers *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁸³ Akiner,S and Barnes,C.(2002), ‘The Tajik Civil War:Causes and Dynamics’, in Barnes C.and Abdullaev,K(eds) *Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, Conciliation Resources:Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiative*,Issue 10.

households in Tajikistan lived under the poverty line. High unemployment and its poor economy have driven nearly 800,000 residents to become migrant workers, who send inconsistent remittances home due to the unstable and depressed world economy. Susceptible to drought and dependent on others for natural gas, Tajikistan has suffered financially from low levels of production in its cotton and aluminum industries, and of other chief exports such as hydroelectricity. Therefore, outside assistance is required to prevent Tajikistan's economy from imploding²⁸⁴.

Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Soderberg²⁸⁵ have in their study indicated three major conditions which term a state to be weak in nature and the Tajik state seems to be living upto it in all its dimension.

- a) The lack of consensus in social terms in regard to the contestation for power and its execution. Low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with minimum levels of security and well being.
- b) High vulnerability to external economic and political forces.
- c) Low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of state power by portions of the citizenry.

The country's domestic as well as border security remains weak as a result of which instances of draft dodging and banditry can be seen on a frequent manner. While the motivational levels of citizens joining the military too are weak as the payment options are poor(only USD 60 million dedicated to the defense budget) resulting in even the enrolled personnel getting into corruption(a vast majority of illegal narcotics trafficking passes by the Tajik border guard) to adopt to better lifestyle. Tajikistan's Committee for State Border Protection (KOGG) remains "underfunded, poorly trained and equipped, and fails to protect the Afghan border", even after the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the U.S., China, and the UNODC financially assisting the country. Institutional corruption furthermore prohibits the KOGG from stemming the flow of drugs across the border²⁸⁶. The Tajik government has failed in showing interest in covering and guarding

²⁸⁴IHS Janes, "Security" and "Executive Summary," in "Country Report.

²⁸⁵ Ohlson Thomas, Söderberg Mimmi.(2002), ' From Intra-state War to Democratic Peace in Weak States',Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2002 - Conflict management ,pp 6-7)

²⁸⁶ IHS Janes, "Executive Summary," "Security," and "Foreign Forces," in "Country Report– Tajikistan

its borders as can be seen with less initiation even when approximately 6,000 Russian troops are stationed in Tajikistan²⁸⁷. Former military men have accepted the fact that government has been itself involved into trafficking as the perks are quite high, while underpaid, understaffed, and underequipped staff leads the military susceptible to bribes. The payment of an average soldier is less than \$30 per month.

5.3.1 CRIMINALIZATION AND CORRUPTION

The zest for power and luxuries has led to the genesis of the forces of corruption which as a result has led to the flourishing and prevalence of the drug trade and organized crime in Central Asia. Penetrated to all levels corruption has led to the forces and institutions for fighting it as inconsequential. Tajikistan has undergone three presidencies. Even during the November 1999 elections Imomali Rakhmonov running unopposed (after other candidates were barred, the only remaining contender boycotted the elections), he received 96.9 percent of the votes cast. This election was questioned by many as 30% of the governmental positions were given to the Islamic groups. Even after years of independence from the Russian fold, the state still relies on the Russian support against the fundamentalism approaching from the state of Afghanistan²⁸⁸.

According to Gavrilis the Tajik state is itself involved in the trafficking of drugs while extracting protection fares from the drug peddlers “The Tajik border thus contributes to the perpetuation of Tajik state remaining open to contraband”²⁸⁹ as a result of which the estimated seizures are way less. But it must be noted that the involvement of few officials does not lead to the generalization of the corruption of the state of the entire system of law²⁹⁰. The forces of corruption are so deeply rooted into the system that drug barons themselves hold certain high posts resulting in assassination of any traitor or informer to the system, as was the case with Deputy Interior Minister Khabib Sanginov who was the head of the UTO and the government crackdown operations²⁹¹. As a result the official’s

²⁸⁷*“Kazakhstan & Central Asia: Defense & Security Report,” *Business Monitor International*, Ltd. London, U.K. 2012, 73.


²⁸⁸ Dodojon Atovulloev, “Tadzhikistan: kto predotvratit novye bedy,” *Rossia imusul’ manskii mir*, no. 4, 106 (2001): 61ff.

²⁸⁹ Gavrilis George.(2010), ‘*The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries*’, Cambridge University Press p 116

²⁹⁰ Serghei Golunov. (2011), ‘ Border Policies Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Towards Conceptualisation’, *Geopolitics*, 16:1, 239-245, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2010.493795, .241.

²⁹¹ *Gleason,G. (2001), ‘Tajikistan Minister’s Murder Points to Drug-Route Conflict’, *Eurasia Insight*,16 March, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insights/articles/eav041601.shtml>.

willingness to challenge the interests of these barons rent effect²⁹². The kaleidoscope of identities that is wrapped into each border guard also is intimately linked to their own security, their families security, and in many cases, particularly in Gorno-Bdakshan(GBAO), their communities security²⁹³.



The study of the situation proves that the training being provided by the government and international institutions of how to catch a criminal leads to the officials avoiding creating the mistakes which would land them up in trouble. Not all of the border guards are involved in illicit trade or eschewing the law, but the majority are due to peer pressure or necessity. A number of border guards, as well as family members, discussed how people they knew who would not take bribes lost their job or even worse were framed in a crime they did not commit²⁹⁴.The drug barons have come up to attain various high state positions according to a report in 2001 by the secretary of Tajikistan’s Security Council. There have been many incidences where these drug barons were caught with huge amount of drugs. The destabilization of institutional system and control over the state

²⁹² Engvall, J.(2006) ‘ The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan’, *Europe-Asia Studies* 58(6).

²⁹³ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press 273

²⁹⁴Ibid, p272.

structures leads to better control of the criminal factions over the trade. This results in “Profit for the few and hardships for the many”²⁹⁵. This relocation of resources leads to the entire system being relocated and functionality of the government to protect its citizens gets diminished. The following table highlights the same.

High profile person	Caught	Amount of drugs
Ambassador to Kazakhstan	Twice	62 kgs heroin and \$1 million cash*
Tajikistan’s Trade Representative	Once	24 kilograms of Heroine**
Former Deputy Defence Minister in 2004	Once	Used military helicopter to smuggle drugs***
Former Tajik Interior minister and Powerful military commander Yakub Salimov	-	-
Salimov detained in 2003****	Detained with 15 years in prison	-

- International Crisis Group 2001, p 15*
- International Crisis Group 2001, p 15-16*
- McDermott 2002
- Marat 2006,p 108

5.4 CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING:-

The trafficking of drugs has a number of effects on a society which can be underlined as follows:

²⁹⁵ Engvall, J.(2006) ‘ The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan’, *Europe-Asia Studies* 58(6).

- 1) The frequent drug use results in increase in petty crimes for money as well as high levels of addiction which would ultimately lead to life threatening epidemics of HIV/AIDS.
- 2) The state's legitimacy is lost due to the addiction and corruption related to the already weak states which as a result hamper the economic and political functioning of the state. This as a whole questions the idea of Barry Buzan's theory of a strong state.
- 3) The constant linkage to the non-state actors like criminal groups, drug traffickers etc leads to posing a threat to national, regional and international security²⁹⁶.
- 4) The inter-linkage of the two dimensions of transnational implications and security threats has led to drug trade effects becoming quite apparent in the Central Asian region. The increasing trafficking of heroin northward through post-Soviet Central Asia to markets in Russia, China and Europe from Afghanistan and terrorism involved has led to the other threats in the region like environmental, water, economic and other security threats drawing among the attention these two dimensions behold²⁹⁷. The lack of economic development and high levels of resource proliferation amongst the elite sections has given a big reason for recruitment in illegal activities. The drawing of attention only to the drug cartels has sidelined the water issues which still drives these states away from each other while depriving many areas from any better chance of human sustainability. The tension is particularly high between upstream states (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and downstream states (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and to certain extent Turkmenistan)²⁹⁸.

A centre-periphery divide that seems to have cemented amongst the Central Asian states seems to further block the system of any positive development. Which is a result of either the central government losing control over the further parts or has lost interest with the minority leading to lack of effective institutionalization which further draws the areas

²⁹⁶ Svante E Cornell.(2005), 'Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia:the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Terrorism and Political Violence',17:4,619-639,DOI:10.1080/095465591009395

²⁹⁷ Olcott Martha Brill and Udalova Natalia(2000), "Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road," Working paper 11, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2000.

²⁹⁸ Olcott Martha Brill and Udalova Natalia(2000), "Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road," Working paper 11, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2000. 36-37

into the hold of the local warlords who get involved as drug barons providing security to the transnational criminal groups. In the state of Tajikistan it is quite apparent that criminal warlords and drug barons now hold high positions in the government while drug money seems to be financing most of the developmental activities in the country. This lack of centre-periphery relationship hampers the economic development and initiates radicalization from the political life. Which as a result leads to the security providence role of the government being replaced by the Islamic radicals and drug dealers.

5.5 THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY AFFAIRS:

The civil war that rocked the country led to the people being dragged back into an era of poverty. Peace could only be attained at the expense of tolerating the disruptive warlords into the political process. Even after the 1997 peace accords there has been an increase in insurgency by the IMU after 2009²⁹⁹. Tajikistan is aware that it lacks the border capacity for guarding its borders against the tracking elements resulting in the Tajik parliament signing an agreement ratifying Russian military presence in the state of Tajikistan in October 2013 till 2042. Even before the US troops initiated their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Central Asian forum under the CSTO (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia) held a meet on 24 September 2014 at Sochi, Russia where the Border Security situation was very much highlighted. As a decision military aid was increased for border security. And the display that Rahmon forces put up against the insurgency that occurred in the year 2010-2011 has led to an increase in the fear of that if any further incursions occur the tattered forces won't be able to save them from the extremist wave rising from the east³⁰⁰ even more so after the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan³⁰¹.

5.6 THE MESS MAKER- GORNO BADAKSHAN:

²⁹⁹IHS Janes, "Security" and "Executive Summary," in "Country Report – Tajikistan," *Jane's Military and Security Assessments* (IHS Global Limited, 2011).

³⁰⁰ Stroehlein Andrew and Abbott Kimberly, "Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats," International Crisis Group, Report no. 205 (24 May 2011), Executive Summary and Recommendations; available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/asia/tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx.

³⁰¹ *"Tajikistan Fears Security Threat after NATO Troops Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *Russia and CIS Military Newswire* (19 December 2011).

- 1) Various scholars, writers and historians have attributed different definitions to the meaning of the name Badakhshan. According to one definition that depicts the geographical characteristics of the region, Badakhshan has its origin in the word Badakhshwargar that is broken into ba, dakhshwar and gar. With the prefix 'ba' the word 'dakhshwargar' in the ancient Aryan language means rugged and 'gar' refers to a mountain; thus the word 'badakhshwargar' implies an inaccessible and rugged mountainous region. In the Pamiri language Badakhshan is pronounced 'badaxun' comprised of 'badax' and 'un', or region³⁰². When it comes to divisions in terms of borders in the highlands of Asia, the validity always remains a question to the local populace. Whether the countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan or more relevant the Afghan-Central Asian border. Demarcated in 1895 this border though being based on the division of the Amu Darya a natural outline is as unnatural to the river community which resided in the region continuously passing through.
- 2) The life is made all the more challenging for the populace due to the remoteness of the terrain and the inclement weather. Here what remains a question for the local populace in particular of Gorno-Badakhshan is that when they could easily get their supplies from the Afghan side have to take a whole new route to reach the far reaching cities in Tajikistan in order for their survival.
- 3) Having a rich linguistic history of its own (eleven distinct languages), the region on both sides of the river presents a rich history on every turn. Whether while there may be differences on the basis of clans (neighbouring areas such as Khorog and Ishkashim and seven streets, clans and sections of the main city Khorog itself) yet many Pamir houses portray a mixture of Shia Islamism with the symbols of Zoroastrianism. Yet the local populace is always at the idea of safeguarding their small community from the influences of the outer world, with protection of Islamies and the integrity of the Pamiri people, language and culture³⁰³. This has come up as

³⁰² Pamirzad Khush Nazar.(1998), 'Badakhshan dar Joghrafiya-e-Tarikh-e-Avesta' [Badakhshan in Avesta's Historical Geography], *Farhang-e-Aryana*, No 3-4, 1998, p 33.

³⁰³ Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), '*Tajikistan in the 21st century*', Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press,270.

a result of the Tajik civil war where the Ismailias were targeted by the mainland people leading to influx of huge refugee population into the area.

The collapse of the Soviet state brought in the dawn of a whole new era for the Central Asian republics. This process has turned out to be more onerous and drawn-out than originally expected³⁰⁴and effected all the sections and structures of the society. The states had always been dependant on the Russian policies and a sudden shock resulted in drastic reductions in productivity, steep increases in all prices and dramatic erodible Badakshan region. Already in the Soviet period, Tajikistan had the reputation of being the poor man of the Union and the transition, therefore further severely handicapped it. The start of the Tajik state's independence was surrounded by the problems that spurt up like that of fundamentalism, corruption, identity crisis and the civil war which lead to an era of turbulence and the later consequences. In this state fear was expressed that these countries from the so-called former second world could end up in the third world ³⁰⁵. Nonetheless, despite the serious problems which beset the country, the mountainous regions of the Pamirs and Gorno-Badakshan area has been seeing a lot of developmental activities due to the efforts of both the governmental and regional³⁰⁶ organizations which are involved.

Gorno Badakshan seems to have become the point of interaction and importance after the Tajik Civil War hit the Tajik paradigm which led to the region becoming the prime repository of arms from the Afghan nation³⁰⁷.The increase in violent incidents between the authorities and the non-state actors(the usage of assault rifles, sub machine guns, grenade launchers) reinstates the linkage between the drug and arms traffickers which is mainly a result of the decrease in the number of border troops since 1998³⁰⁸.

5.6.1 AN INDICATION OF THE SCALE AND QUASI-FEAUDAL NATURE OF THE OPIUM ECONOMY IN BADAQSHAN:

³⁰⁴ Hoeyneck W.(2000), 'OSCE activities in Central Asia', *Helsinki Monitor* Vol 4, 2000, pp 19–26 (see p 19).

³⁰⁵ Khazanov A.M.(1995), *After the USSR. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Madison, p 155

³⁰⁶Herbers Hiltrud. (2001). 'Transformation in the Tajik Pamirs:Gornyi-Badakhshan#an example of successful restructuring?', *Central Asian Survey*,20:3, 367-381, DOI: 10.1080/02634930120095367.

³⁰⁷.Kantha T.(1996), "Light Weapons Proliferation and Regional Instability in Central Asia," *Strategic Analysis*, vol 19, no.9, (1996) pp.1278/9.

³⁰⁸ Conrad Burkhard.(2000), " The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Tajikistan", *Strategic Analysis*, 24:8, 1479-1493... 1480.

“A stable rise in illegal drug trafficking across the Tajik-Afghan border to smuggle narcotics to other CIS countries and Western Europe is a serious threat to the common interests of the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, lieutenant General Nikolai Reznichenko, commander of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, told news conference here on Sunday. To substantiate his words, the Russian general noted that 135 attempts at crossing the border, mostly by smugglers, were thwarted by border guards. The number of armed clashes increased as compared with the last year. In 1998, 35 transgressors were killed and seven wounded as a result of 40 armed clashes with smugglers. According to Reznichenko, the Moskovsky and Pyandah sections of the Tajik-Afghan border remain the main areas for smuggling narcotics. According to border guards, several tones of drugs, including about two tones of pure heroin, are hoarded at these sections of the Afghan territory. The general stressed that border guards detain smugglers at these sections almost every day. Afghan drug barons now send threats to commanders of border posts, promising to murder them if border guards continue sealing off smuggling paths.”³⁰⁹.

5.7 GLOBALIZATION AND BORDER DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES: -

The end of the Cold War brought up a new dimension to the economic and political scenario and that was the spurt of the forces of globalization. This had such an impact where the world became a smaller place with the dissolution of borders resulting in providing an upper hand for the transnational illicit interests along with the licit activities which it was designed to promote. Adapting themselves to the new environment of instability amongst countries and borders, these groups had found new dimensions of emanating profit from the trafficking of drugs and weapons across the Central Asian forum. This came up as a result of Afghanistan in the realm of instability superseding Burma as the largest world producer of opium. When the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, a huge number of small arms (AK-47 and AK-74 assault rifles, sniper rifles, sub-machine guns, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades) were left behind. Many of these fell into the hands of the local citizens as well as the criminal groups, which led

³⁰⁹Dushanbe, 24 January, 1998 ITAR TASS

to measures by the government to collect the illicit weapons held through an official disarmament process. Thus two presidential decrees were issued one in the year 1994(2nd December) and another in the year 2000 under which all weapons were banned except the ones held with the security forces. Though much trafficking was linked with the drug dealers yet Buckhard Conrad stated that the trafficking of arms existed independently of them³¹⁰. Thus every initiation for the betterment of the nation or the world may along with it carry some consequences which may spurt up against the intentions of the programme that was launched with a different aim.

5.8 BORDER CONTROL IN QUESTION:

Border management is one of the most important strategies which have come up as to counter the transnational forces in the region of Central Asia. Border management and the related security dimension is one topic vital for the Central Asian states. It was the Soviet troops which had been kept in guard of the borders till 1991 which were then replaced by Russian army. But the decision of withdrawal by the Russians in the year 2005 led to an influx of international players (USA , EU) and internal organizations offering assistance for security enhancements. As a result Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) organized many training programmes for border officers which would help in better detection and interdiction of illegal border movements. Along with the ground level contributions, OSCE established a Border Management Staff College (BMSC) in Dushanbe and UNODC in the year 1999 implementing the “Strengthening Control along the Tajik/Afghan Border,” based on the funds of the American embassy in Tajikistan.

As an initiation for attainment of the same several international organizations had been along with the US trying to focus on the issue. But the whole thing received a backlash when there was a shift of the organizations into the military front after 11 September 2011. Central Asia as a region comprises of porous and highly inaccessible borders, thus demanding a defined well established strategy for containment of a wide range of illicit activities prevalent in the region. While some advocate the border policies others hold a

³¹⁰ Heathershaw John.(2005), ‘The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise, and small arms in Tajikistan’, *Central Asian Survey* (March 2005) 24(1), 21 – 38, page 29.

different opinion stating that even with effective border controls these transnational criminals will find one way or another to reach the country if the demand is not checked.

Thus rather than curbing out trade and cross border activity, these follow expansion of border controls while regulation of policing activities and other clandestine activities. While the west tries to secure itself from the troubles emanating in the east, they fail to recognize and address their own past of the Berlin Wall, or The Great Wall of China or even the border of Mexico which has the maximum number of border crossing to USA. What lacks in the international realm is the understanding at a local level. It is seen that though international organizations like EU, UN and OSCE talk and are constantly working for achievement of policies of good governance and human rights they receive less funds than the one's addressing the new security threats.

5.9 MEASURES TO BE TAKEN FOR BORDER MANAGMENT:

The management of borders has become an important vital issue in today's world and that for the Central Asian region in the wake of the constant threats which have been posed time and again. In the wake of the American withdrawal and the fear of escalation of threats these nations need to adopt a range of certain measures which may help in barring the entrance of transnational wave of chaos into the realm of Central Asia.

- At first it is important that 'securitization' of trafficking activities which are internationally perceived as a security threat which would immensely affect the new paradigm of globalization.
- Apart from securitization the policy of counter trafficking basically of drugs and arms is immensely funded and sought after.
- Even though traditional state security strategies have been adopted for fighting the flows of trafficking and terrorism yet perceptions about interlinked threats does not wholly summarize the involvement of militant groups in trafficking activities whether arms, drugs or human.

5.9.1 LAW ENFORCEMENT:

While the borders are made to be secure it is also important that a defined law enforcement is carried out. Which makes the two pillars of effective policing and intelligence gathering as vital parts of the institution like that of police, intelligence and criminal justice reforms. These though most suited for an effective control to prevent criminal incidents are not void of corrupt activities while also being devoid of essential equipment. The intrusions that have become a common stance have led to the Tajik authorities engaging themselves in the process of securitization of their less guarded borders from the Afghan side with fears of alignment between the ethnic Tajik groups and the drug mafias³¹¹. There have been various measures which the countries facing the backlash from drugs have taken but they do not seem to address the real problem. European Union is trying to filter the various sources between opiates rather than addressing the whole dynamics of demand and supply³¹². What is pretty clear is the fact that, if the demand is high the traffickers would go to any means to fulfill them as the incentives would be all the more high. To this Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan have given a very beautiful and apt definition where a security issue is presented as posing an existential threat (which is anything that questions the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority) to a designated referent object (which could be a state, but not necessarily)³¹³. The Definition in itself incorporates both the failures of the states as well as the expectations of the individual and international actors in regard to the forces of corruption, economic performance or elitism.

The incapability to guard their own borders has led to the role of the US and other international organizations coming up into the forefront to guard the Central Asian dimension. The role seems to have been divided amongst the two. While the West tries to secure the borders, the UN organization of UNODC (principal international agency supporting efforts to counter narcotics and crime in the Central Asian region)³¹⁴ being established counter narcotic institutions is providing training and equipment to local

³¹¹ Using Probabilistic Terrorist Risk Modelling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, Rand Center for Terrorism Risk Management POLICY, P 13, May 2007.

³¹² 'Background note: short review on EU program me to fight drugs along the heroin route', Brussels, 15 May 2003. AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D (2003)

³¹³ Buzan Barry, Waever Ole, Wilde Jaap de.(1998), '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', London: Lunne Lienner Publications. *op. cit.* pp. 21-22.

³¹⁴ * UNODC, 'Strengthening drug control and crime prevention capacities in the Central Asia States, 2002–2005, strategic program me framework', UNODC, Vienna, 2002 .

officials. Recently courts have been established which prosecute drug related crimes of which the Drug Control Agency established in Dushanbe has been the most successful and serves as a model to other states.

5.9.2 FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REGION

The question of security and stability has risen up as so much of importance that suggestions and researchers in this regard seem to erupt from different corners and various dimensions but the right way for disrupting the illegal market for drugs would be the application of an accurate, timely intelligence across the institutional boundaries which would help in the realization of the stated measures. ‘When combating the illicit drug trade alone “accurate, timely intelligence and intelligence across organizational boundaries are at the heart of disrupting the market of illegal drugs”³¹⁵. In this regard the four factors which would help in defining the maximization of a states border policies based on the demarcation of territory can be underplayed as follows³¹⁶ especially in the face of a new Afghan neighbour.

- Preferred state building strategies are applied in the extension of designing the new states boundaries.
- Conflict prone strategies are adopted as a result of border formation by the other neighbouring states.
- The cooperation of border authorities across the boundaries is vice a versa to the degree of state intervention.
- Joint interaction across the borders amongst the security forces leads to better border policing.

A great measure for boosting up such organizational activities was the year 1998 and the signing of a Troika agreement between the countries of Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which stated that any threats internal or external posed to the constitutional sector would be commonly dealt for the benefit of all. But this plan received a backlash once Turkmenistan decided to cooperate with the Taliban government for the benefits the

³¹⁵ Efron Sonni(2005), “US Backs Away from Afghan Aerial Spraying,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 22 January, 2005, p.3.

³¹⁶ Golunov Serghei.(2011), ‘Border Policies Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Towards Conceptualisation’, *Geopolitics*, 16:1, 239-245, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2010.493795. page 240

TAPI pipeline project (sidelining the common good to an individual one) limiting the Russian role taken in regard the consequences the Russian intervention had in Afghanistan³¹⁷.

Transparency amongst the ranks and the institutions is a vital issue necessary for maintaining the rule of law and a sense of fairness amongst the officials along with adequate pays which would result in lack of hospitality and derivations of incentives for them under the present corrupt activities and less pay³¹⁸. Terrorism and the process of eradication cannot be just levied under the norms of institutionalization rather there are three other factions which need to be addressed for overall achievement³¹⁹.

One being the terrorist or fundamentalists themselves.

- Other is the financial and radical institutions which serve as the basis for recruitment, ideological and financial support.
- The alienated regions, communities and sectors which due to lack of proper development, attention feel deprived from the mainstream leading to acting as sympathizers for such groups in different countries³²⁰.

In this regard counter terrorism would be an effective yet damaging policy but seems to be applied in various dimensions in the Afghan war. Counter terrorism as a policy involves a number of offensive, proactive and aggressive actions which may encompass actions, decisions, behaviors and pronouncements of policy makers³²¹. As in today's world the boundaries have dissimilated so have the fears become transnational too. Thus the term *Anti-terrorism* has been employed which primarily focuses on defending a state from the terrorist activities, while dealing with collection of information and reduction of the vulnerability of people, security forces, and property to terrorism³²². While in the realm of counter terrorism both offensive and defensive strategies are applicable yet when seen in the Central Asia mould and the history attached to it, this has three

³¹⁷ *Daily Review, Part 2, October 13, 1998.

³¹⁸ McAllister Brad and Khersonsky Julia. (2007), 'Trade, Development and Non-Proliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 30:5, 445-458, DOI:10.1080/10576100701250244, page 448.

³¹⁹ Davis Paul and Jenkins Brian. (2002), 'Deterrence and influence in counterterrorism: a component in the war on Al-Qaeda', Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002.

³²⁰ Warikoo, Umarov (ed.), 2015, '*Tajikistan in the 21st century*', Himalayan research and cultural foundation, pentagon press, 73

³²¹ Omelicheva, M. (2007), '*Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia*', Oxon: Routledge

³²² Celmer Marc. (1987), '*Terrorism, U.S Strategy and Reagan Politics*', New York, Greenwood Press.

dimensions. When the process of religious upheaval was going on after the attainment of freedom from the Soviet fold, it was the ‘perception’ of the governments of these states which lead to define the ‘scope’ of radical or fundamentalist activity resulting in ‘brutal’ measures being applied by the Uzbek and Tajik governments to get rid of the fears that were prevailing to their government, rule and peace of the nation.

Yet the dialogue between the Afghan government or the Afghan mujahedeen with the Tajik government took place in various phases which dwindled from good to bad and bad to worse though a ray of light always kindled at the end of the tunnel. The start was occasional contacts between the guards and officials on either side to resolve the situation which failed to bring in the desired results. So the talks were put up on a higher level.

A. PHASE OF APPROACH AND INSTABILITY: The then Tajik Prime Minister Akbar Mirzoyev led a delegation in July 14,1992 to Afghanistan to meet the new government from helping in curbing the border problem but were met with only concerns and expression of inability to exercise any control over the General Latif Ibrahimy , the commander of Hizb-e-Islami who controlled the Panj river area. In October visit of Rabbani to Tashkent the same opinion was expressed³²³.

B. PHASE OF AGREEMENTS AND CHALLENGES : 1993 mid-August the Afghan Foreign Minister visited Dushanbe at the invitation of the Tajik Counterpart. The venture led to the establishment of a trilateral commission between the Afghan, Tajik and UN Chief Commissioner of Refugees on the basis of faith in the “principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other’s affairs”³²⁴. Events took a wrong turn when the talks were messed up with the kidnapping of 1 Kazakh and 5 Russian border guards on 10th august only left in the end of the month. A goodwill gesture was made by the Tajik authorities by releasing 5 Afghan prisoners which seemed to have no effect. On one occasion Gulbadin Hekmatyar refused to free the CIS troops on the plea that Russian troops were

³²³ *SWB SU/1512 October 15,1992.

³²⁴ *FBIS-SOV-93-156 August 16,1993.

attacking Tajik refugees on the Afghan territory. There was renewed fighting in the border and the talks were stuck to the establishment of a trilateral organization.

- C. PHASE OF TURMOIL: Having disrupted the peace talks another setback was faced with the fresh kidnappings of 3 Russian and 3 Kazakh Border Guards by Afghan/Tajik militants. Though Rabbani still visited Dushanbe to meet Rakhmanov and signed a friendship and cooperation treaty and also a accord on border security which became meaningless with the dispute between the two factions. While the Islamic opposition leaders also discounted the possibility of any trade between the two states. The turn of events proved nothing but a setback to the process of peace and cooperation between the two states.
- D. STALEMATE IN TAJIK-AFGHAN TALKS: piqued by the recurring events against the Tajik government officials, the Tajik authorities sent a protest letter to the Afghan authorities for sidelining and not respecting the December 1993 bilateral treaty. The situation at the border turned very complex and tense as the Tajik state reserved the right to strike and destroy the Tajik opposition basis in the border areas³²⁵.
- E. BREAKING THE ICE: the turn of events were positive when the Tajik government and the opposition met in Moscow in April 1994 which resulted in agreement of working together to bring the refugees home. In this regard Tajik Labour Migration S.Zahurov even visited Afghanistan and met the refuges along with meeting general Dostum³²⁶.
- F. THE RUSSIAN ROLE: Russia was worried about the prevalence and upcoming of Islamic terrorism which would indirectly also impact its security. This resulted in its role in the Tajik-Afghan crisis. Though the Russian military was not in favor of disarming the Tajik military, yet the Russian

³²⁵ *Itar Tass, Moscow 22 February 1994 cited in SWB/SU 1930,G/2 dated 24 February 2004.

³²⁶ *Tajik Radio, Dushanbe 2 May 1994, SWB/SU/1989,g3 DATED 5 May 1994) which lead to confirmation on 26th May 1994 that over 35000 out of 60000 UN registered refugees would returning back to the country (Itar Tass, Moscow 8 July 1994 SWB/SU/2045,G/9 Dated 12 July 1994).

president Boris Yeltsin and Imamoli Rakhmanov chairperson of the Tajik Parliament issued a joint communiqué professing their interest to curb the tensions over the border between the Afghan and the Tajik border. A call was made to both the authorities to not let the situation worsen. But the tussle between the Rabbani and the Hekmatyar led to complication in the conflict. Though even after this the Ambassador to Russia Abdul Wahab Asefi in Moscow on 9th August 1994 stated “Islamic State of Afghanistan with President Burhanuddin Rabbani as its head is interested in untying the knotty problem prevailing currently on the Tajik Afghan border and will sincere efforts to normalize the situation in this region”³²⁷.

G. PHASE OF WORSENING OF THE SITUATION AND CEASEFIRE:

though the governments wanted a solution to the border problem, it seemed to be worsening. The next few months were marked with violence and kidnappings. Even led to the raids and bombings by the Russian air force on the Tajik militant and Afghan extremists. The Tajik government had been constantly issued protest letters to the Afghan government on involvement, to which the foreign minister issued a statement on 12 April 1995 stating the government of Afghanistan believed in the concept of non-interference in the conflict between the Tajik government and the opposition forces. It also claimed that all the problems had been steaming out of the country of Tajikistan itself and could only be resolved through a dialogue between the two. It was the UN which initiated a dialogue resulting in a ceasefire between the two sides of the border.

H. PHASE OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE:

The talks which had been initiated by the UN took up a great course and led the government of Rakhmanov and the opposition leader Nuri signing a joint statement at the Afghan Foreign Ministry in Kabul on 19th May 1995. The break in ice had resulted in Rakhmanov stating that he was ready to meet Nuri

³²⁷ *Itar-Tass, Moscow, 9th Aug 1994, SWB/SU/2071,G4, dated 11th Aug 1994.

at any time and any place³²⁸. Peace was also initiated by Rabbnai who conveyed his desire to meet the leaders of the border areas of Gorno-Badakshan for preventing armed opposition from Tajik groups in Afghnaistan³²⁹. Border security officers like the Tajik forces, the Russian guards and the leader of Afghanistan met to bring in stability in the region and boost up the peace process which had been dually achieved. The whole scenario though received a set back with the takeover of Kabul by Taliban in September 1996.

5.10 ESCALATION OF SECURITY:

Since 2002, however, security cooperation has escalated on paper and in practice. The CST mandate expanded in 2002, when Russia and the member states established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); it subsequently became focused on Islamist extremist threats, developed a rapid deployment force and since 2005 has organized joint military exercises in Central Asia. In December 2003, the CSTO expanded its rapid deployment force and claims it remains in constant readiness.

³²⁸* Interfax News agency, Moscow 7th March 1996,SWB/SU/2556/G/1, Dated 9th March 1996

³²⁹* Interfax News agency, Moscow 7th March 1996,SWB/SU/2556/G/1, Dated 9th March 1996.

INTEREST POLITICAL WILL

Stated Concern for Afghanistan	Past Support for Afghanistan	Planned Support for Afghanistan	Bi- or Multi-lateral approach
<p>1) Increased Insurgency threat</p> <p>2) Narcotics infiltration most tangible threat 3)</p> <p>Although security inextricably linked to Afghanistan, Tajik financial benefits from Afghan Instability</p>	<p>1) Training security personnel</p> <p>2) Political, security, military, and trade cooperation with Afghanistan</p> <p>3) Overflight rights for ISAF</p>	<p>1) Not only military action req'd</p> <p>2) International economic and financial institutional dev.</p> <p>3) Training prof. civ. & military for construction of transport infrastructure</p> <p>4) Train for coop. in education, sports, Culture.....</p>	<p>1) Four-party security and socioeconomic framework (Tajik, Afghan, Pakistan, Russia)</p> <p>2) CASA-1000 electric power project</p> <p>3) Coop w/ SCO, CSTO, UN, OIC</p>

CAPACITY				LIMITATIONS	FUTURE OUTLOOK
Economy	Security Force Capacity	Armed Forces Capacity	Foreign Policy Dynamics	Limiting Factors	Planned Approach toward Afghanistan post 2014
<p>1) Poorest in region</p> <p>2) Majority live in poverty</p> <p>3) Highly dep. on Intl funding</p> <p>4) Thousands are migration workers</p>	<p>1) KOGG largely ineffective</p> <p>2) Under-funded</p> <p>3) Poorly trained</p> <p>4) Poorly equipped</p> <p>5) Under-manned</p> <p>6) Heavily reliant on RU instruction and Support</p>	<p>1) Poor leadership</p> <p>2) Poor Discipline</p> <p>3) Under-funded</p> <p>4) Low morale</p> <p>5) Slow military reform</p> <p>6) Heavily relies on Russian-led CSTO & SCO</p> <p>7) CSTO CTOF and RU military supplements</p>	<p>1) Heavily reliant on Russia for economic and security needs</p> <p>2) Respects OSCE and Western affiliation</p> <p>3) Relations depend on best security and economic benefits to Tajikistan</p>	<p>1) Repressive regime instigates domestic unrest</p> <p>2) High corruption prevents effective counter-narcotic efforts</p> <p>3) Poor cooperation with other CA States</p>	<p>PASSIVE DEFENSIVE</p> <p>1) Lessons learned from its civil war make it prone to advocate lassie-faire style approach.</p> <p>2) Defense against insurgency with assistance from RU, CSTO, SCO</p> <p>3) Assistance through infrastructure development and electrical powerdelivery.</p>

5.11 THE PEACE BUILDING IN PLAY:

The Tajik peace process is endorsed with both promise and peril. While the international forces have come up to support the country from plunging into the dark shallows of fundamentalism and violence, it also brings in a promise of installation of democratization and instating the rule of law. But in the Tajik scenario the paradox of state is that the democratization process as promised is against the illiberal and authoritarian forces³³⁰. Each and every country defines peace building in accordance to its needs, as according to Canadian government ‘aims at building human security, a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security’³³¹.

As defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali the peace building process involving peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping are nothing but, ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’³³². Policies are often made by leaders and states by taking up a perspective of the other leaders (while seeking judgments and appraisals) which have already initiated in a particular field as a result the external models are well referred and ideas borrowed for initiation on the home ground³³³.

While seeking utilitarian and informational needs the states and the law makers need reference. Thus the concept of a reference group would be the states or groups of states like that of US, RUSSIA AND CHINA in the case of Central Asia would suggest and approve the states actions while also helping in requiring adequate information of help to the recipient state. Though peace may prevail in the Tajik state the stability is based on the order with various episodes of heavy criminality at the borders and elsewhere. According to an international representative in Dushanbe. This peace is based on pacts with minorities, ethnicities in Tajikistan and also the drug dealers and fundamentalist

³³⁰(John Heathershaw, Emil Juraev, Michael von Tangen-Page and Lada Zimina, ‘Small arms in Central Asia’, Eurasia Studies Series (International Alert, 2004). Available at http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/MISAC_eurasia_4.pdf.)

³³¹ Ball Nicole.(2002), ‘The reconstruction of war-torn societies and state institutions: how can external actors contribute?’, in Tobias Debiel, ed, with Alex Klein, ‘Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions.’, London: Zed Publishers, 2002, p 35.

³³² *Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: UN, 1992). p 11

³³³ Omelicheva, M.(2007), “*Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia*”, Oxon: Routledge, page 11.

forces which question the very basis of the legitimacy of the peace force. 'while the international factors are talking about Quiet diplomacy and the merits involved what needs to be seen is also the process of political development which may in itself undermine and pose danger to the international community dedicated at protecting the state'³³⁴.

5.12 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AT WORK:

In the wake of the intensity and the innumerability of the threats that are posed by the dangers which seem to lurk over the region of Central Asia both on the internal and external forum. It is seen that the role of the international organizations and also the regional powers has escalated for the achievement of peace while addressing the very basis of the troubles caused due to the wars and instability in the neighbouring states. The following segment would address the different organizations that have come up into play with the United Nations and its organizations, the US and the seeking of Russian help for attainment of stability.

Before the UN and the US could understand the vitality of the region it was the Central Asian states themselves which realized what the disintegration from the Soviet Union and the Soviet withdrawal from the country of Afghanistan had put them into. Assuming an era of chaos and instability along with the religious and cultural upsurge and the civil war led to looking up to the Russian state for help. Many assume Russia still to be a parental organization for these states. The following section dwells into the various strategies and aid from both regional and international organizations³³⁵.

5.12.1 RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN BORDER PROTECTION:

Like any other Central Asian country Tajikistan too relies on its bilateral relations for strengthening its security efforts. Here Russia plays an important role as a supplement for border security as any threats emanating from the Central Asian region would hamper its growth and security too. Russia has in many aspects helped and contributed to the growth of the strength of the Tajik security forces. There are many examples portraying the

³³⁴ International Crisis Group, 'Tajikistan's politics: confrontation or consolidation?', *Asia Briefing*, 19 May 2004, p 19.

³³⁵ *Krambs Timothy A. (2013), 'Status Quo? Central Asia's Role in Regional Security Regarding Afghanistan after 2014', The Quarterly Journal Spring. 2013*

involvement and contribution in Tajikistan's external and internal security paradigms. Though the policy of regionalism was quite slow in terms with Russia as it was skeptical about its role in the Central Asian forum though trying to maintain its hold over now independent realm³³⁶. As a result of which most of the security agreements signed whether CIS, CST failed to create an atmosphere of military integration in the region. Yet in many realms Russia has come up as a huge contributor to the security realms especially in the wake of fear of international players like USA making their stronghold in the region.

- Russian instructors train the Tajik National Guard along with the 1st Special Operations Brigade following the doctrine and training methods of the 'Russian airborne forces'.
- Russia has also installed Okno ("window") a tracking device guarding the Central Asian air space up to the height of 40,000 km.
- Russia's 201st motor rifle division though well equipped and meant for serving the CSTO's Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF)³³⁷, failed in its Endeavour during the civil war and served to protect the Tajik ex-communist regime from the 'Islamist democratic' opposition³³⁸. A pact signed in September 2011 reinstates the preservation of the Russian state in Tajikistan with Russian personnel working for border securitization of the Republic of Tajikistan³³⁹.
- A quadrilateral meeting in Dushanbe in September 2011 also led to a pledge of cooperation between the SCO, CSTO, UN, and OIC and Tajikistan and also Tajikistan becoming the host for the Fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA V) in March 2012³⁴⁰.

³³⁶Allison Graham (2004), '*Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*', New York: Owl Books. p. 463

³³⁷IHS Janes, "Executive Summary," "Security," and "Foreign Forces," in "Country Report– Tajikistan."

³³⁸Allison, R. (2004) 'Regionalism, Regional Structures, and Security Management in Central Asia', *International Affairs*, 80, 3, pp. 463–83, 474.

³³⁹Tynan, "Central Asia: Russia Taking Steps to Reinforce Security Relationships."

³⁴⁰*"Afghan, Pakistani, Tajik, Russian Leaders Sign Joint Statement," *BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit* 2 September 2011.

- Furthermore the year 2012 ratified all previous agreements between the two states whether assistance on advisory personnel, training, transportation, and equipment assistance with Tajikistan's Border Control³⁴¹.

5.12.2 THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS ORGANIZATIONS AT WORK

Whether blamed or praised for its roles in various forums, Russia remains an important partner in various Central Asian endeavors and its role and power are ever on the increase with the revival of Russian power in the world forum. The understanding of the threats and the challenges which were being faced by the region which if left unaddressed would cause tensions in the process of sustainable development lead to coming up of various programmes on national, regional and international level.

With the launch of the “WAR ON TERROR” in Afghanistan it was also the Central Asian states and the fears to their stability from the Afghan nation which was taken into hold. As a result of which various aids both monetary and with weapons were provided to the three countries of Central Asia which were more endangered by them.

1. The 1996: \$2 million were provided by the UN international Drug Control Program as an initiation for a project meant to strengthen the borderline areas of the countries of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. A call for construction of border post with better telecommunication facilities were initiated as a result of which the Ayritom Customs complex came up in Uzbekistan 9 November, 2003 Termez-Khayraton Bridge on the borders of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan on the Uzbek-Afghan border.
2. In July and August 2003 under the Export Control and Related border security Assistance program (EXBS), administered by the bureau of Non proliferation at the UD Department of State a huge amount of donation was made for the border surveillance of these countries.
 - 146 UAZ vehicles to the State Customs Committee and the State Border Protection Committee.

³⁴¹ .“Tajik Parliament Ratifies Tajik-Russian Agreement on Border Cooperation,” *Russia and CIS General Newswire* (29 February 2012).

- The Vehicles Valued \$800,000 included 5 UAZ vans, 10 UAZ ambulances, 55 UAZ trucks and 76 UAZ four wheel drives vehicles.
- in August 2003 EXBS provide Uzbekistan's Border Protection and Customs Committee with 17 tonnes of communication equipment worth a \$1.8 million, including 3,776 Motorola radios and 708 antennas³⁴².

5.12.3 THE VIENNA DECLARATION 2004

The 2004 Vienna Declaration (initiated by the UNODC and OSCE) came up as a breakthrough in the realm of international cooperation for tackling world terrorism as it highlighted the members states measures of cooperation for ratifying UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, joint technical assistance, joint effort in anti-terrorist action plans³⁴³. The OSCE in particular intends to address those factors that may engender corruption and the proliferation of clandestine activities and extremism by promoting human rights, tolerance and multiculturalism, institution building and strengthening the rule of law.

5.12.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CENTRE FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR CENTRAL ASIA:

The positive image of the United Nations also worked for the advancement of talks on the regional and international level. But rather than the establishment of a stable state structure which of course was initiated, it was the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan which was created in May 2007. Its aim was to provide assistance to the Central Asian states for fighting the threats and regional challenges through the application of the preventive diplomacy measures³⁴⁴.

This organization staged in various Central Asian forums would address the differences and commonalities which bring in the forefront of their attention in respect to the local

³⁴² Mcallister Brad and Khersonsky Julia. (2007), 'Trade, Development and Non-Proliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 30:5, 445-458, DOI:10.1080/10576100701250244, page 454.

³⁴³ *Vienna Declaration, 11–12 March 2004, Vienna (from a follow-up meeting to the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) Special Meeting) of 6 March 2003.

³⁴⁴ * UNRCCA, *Background*, at: <http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabids9305&language=en-US>.

traditions without meddling with the same. The Centre's engagements are based on the following principles:

- The UNRCCA is a platform for dialogue and exchanges among Central Asian countries with a view to assisting them in finding solutions that are equally acceptable to all;
- The UNRCCA is impartial. It does not insist on pre-determined models, but tries to foster the elaboration of local solutions based on models that conform to the needs and traditions of Central Asian societies, which increases the chances that these solutions will be sustainable.
- The UNRCCA favors an inclusive approach. It reaches out to all relevant domestic and international stakeholders to foster international cooperation and to ensure transparency in the conduct of its activities.
- The UNRCCA seeks to equally involve all five states in regional projects by organizing events in each of them. Representatives of Afghanistan are invited as well³⁴⁵.

The UNRCCA even tied up with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and even the regional organizations with the aim of fighting against the transmission of drugs from Afghanistan into the Central Asian states and beyond. The fear of the region of Afghanistan and Central Asia relapsing into the era of instability and transnational crimes after the ISAF 2014 led to a seminar being organized with the title "The Problem of Illegal Drugs in the Region in the Context of the ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014" by the centre in cooperation with the UNODC in April 2013. Here it is to be noted that though the domestic factors are the main cause for driving the drug (such as marginalization, social inequalities, poverty, poor governance, corruption and human rights abuses) yet the region is also faced by infiltration of extremist groups. The fear lurked to increase with the NATO withdrawal in Afghanistan as well which also led to UNRCCA in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) of the UN Department of Political Affairs and the European Union, and the

³⁴⁵Jenca Miroslav. (2013), 'The Concept of Preventive Diplomacy and Its Application by the United Nations in Central Asia', *Security and Human Rights* 24 (2013) 187)

Central Asian governments , led to the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia. A high-level meeting in November 2011 in Ashgabat approved a Joint Plan of Action for the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the first such regional implementation strategy in the world."³⁴⁶. This year, the UNRCCA and the CTITF have launched a follow-up project aimed at supporting the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action. Sharing a long unguarded, mountainous border with the country of Afghanistan, the fear rose amongst the political class in regard to the upsurge of religious fundamentalism along with trafficking of arms, drugs in the Tajik state. As a result due to the threat posed to the territorial integrity with areas like the dreaded hub of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley president Rakhmonov was forced to seek the Russian help under the supervision of the CSTO³⁴⁷.

Public international discourse with respect to Tajikistan consciously reflects peace building's positive dimension. UNTOP was established, according to the Security Council, 'in order to consolidate peace and promote democracy'. The UN Secretary-General's representative in Tajikistan, Vladimir Sotirov, who heads the UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP), remarked in 2002 that, '*there is a wish and will in the leadership of the country to introduce democratic principles of governance and development in the society, in an effort to create a vibrant civil society*'. However, a lot of difficulties have to be overcome, especially in the field of further separation of powers, mass media, promotion and the protection of human rights, thereby encouraging civil society, reforming power structures, and continuing with a spirit of tolerance and dialogue in the society³⁴⁸. But there seems to be another dimension too to the governmental policies on the upper level and the real scenario existing on the ground. According to Dadmehr Tajikistan is nothing more than 'a vulnerable post failed state'. This is due to the absence of free and fair election involving every strata of the Tajik Diaspora. Not only do the people have more faith on the local leaders than the state authorities which are termed as corrupt but these warlords also tend to possess armies

³⁴⁶ *UNRCCA, *Central Asian states agree to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation through Joint Plan of Action*, *Featured News*, 30 November 2011, at: <http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=930i&ctl=Details&mid=i2342&ItemID=io696&language=en-US>.

³⁴⁷ Joshi N, Keeping an eye on Taliban: Russian and Central Asian response, *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 25/26, Vol. 25, no. 4/Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 150.

³⁴⁸ **Tajikistan: Interview with UN Secretary-General's representative*, 27 November 2002, (IRIN), available at www.irinnews.org, accessed 22 May 2004

leading to Tajikistan being in a ‘semi-anarchical state’. Which as a result makes the country being every ready for a violent turf taking into recognition a little spark which would ignite the flame³⁴⁹.


According to the UN PoA: Dealing with confiscated weapons and managing official stockpiles. Article 16 of the UN PoA encourages states to destroy such weapons, ‘unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered’. Articles 17 and 18 of the UN PoA call for the establishment of ‘detailed standards and procedures’ and a ‘regular review’ of government stocks of SALW. Article 20 of the UN PoA calls on states to raise public awareness and encourage the voluntary surrender of SALW, ‘if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations but this doesn’t not seem to be the case with the Tajik state as the law enforcement measures differ from the international efforts leading to high unaccountability and human rights violation. The levels of corruption has jumped to an extent that while Drug Control Agency (DCA) in Tajikistan stated 61% increase in Drug production only 3 % was intercepted.

5.12.5 USA ENDEVOURS:

In February 2013 the US Embassy in Dushanbe along with the Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS) and the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) managed to make a contribution to the border patrolling of Tajikistan by gifting around some tactical equipments like 33 light trucks and All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) to the border guards of Tajikistan. Recently in March 2014 new Tajikistan National Security Forces Communications Center at the Border Guards Communications Battalion (3.6 million USD) was handed over to Border Guards Commander General-Lieutenant Rajabali Rahmonali by US Ambassador to Tajikistan Susan Elliott. Also, the US Embassy in Tajikistan through its International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office (INL) funded International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) multi-year assistance project to the Khorogh Border Guard Training Center. During the 12-month training course, IOM has trained 70 Tajik and 90 Afghan border guards on border and

³⁴⁹ Nasrin Dadmehr.(2003), ‘Tajikistan: regionalism and weakness’, in Robert I. Rotberg, ed, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), p 254.-259

immigration control. The training covered the main principles of border security, cross border cooperation, visa policy, detection of fraudulent documents, counter-narcotics, combating human trafficking, and anti-terrorism. In the contemporary times the consumption of heroin and drugs has increased in the USA. In accordance to an article the American involvement for drug eradicated seems to be all the more because according to DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) report 2000-2014 showed that around 46000 Americans were dying every year surpassing deaths caused by guns, accidents etc. The part city of Baltimore, Maryland's Department of Health estimated that one out of 10 residents were using heroin with around 50-60000 heroin addicts in a population of 645,000³⁵⁰. But it should also be noted that the production remains the same and so does the transaction. Thus in the recent state of affairs American role increases manifold in regard to saving its populace from the influence of drugs and its usage.



*http://securityassistance.org/central-eurasia/fact_sheet/us-security-assistance-central-asia

³⁵⁰ *The United States Can Stop Killing and Dying, and Start Building Again*, <https://larouchepac.com/20151229/us-joins-new-silk-road#.VuUyEgvXzIQ.facebook>

5.12.6 ACTORS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PAMIRS AND SOME FLAWS TO BE OMITTED:

The success of the process of transformation entirely depends on the participation of the related actors. The following segment would witness the various actors which are involved for the betterment of the society and process of reconstruction and development of the area.

- **The Government:** The central government of Tajikistan is a vital actor for bringing in changes in the agrarian sector in the Pamirs. It is the government which has created the legal and juridical pre-conditions for privatization and its realization through the establishment of the Land Committees (land-measurement, registration of the new owners, etc.) without which restructuring the terms of ownership would not have been possible.
- **Limitations of the Government:** The activity of the central government is limited to introducing changes in the law and does not extend to other measures to provide support for the agricultural transformation. One reason why the central government has opted for privatization is the pressure of international donors (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, EU, etc.) in whose eyes this measure represents the centerpiece of a functional market economy.
- **Local elites:** These include the provincial government, the leadership of the Communist Party of Gornyi-Badakhshan and the directors of the former Sovkhozes. The provincial government has not only supported the enactments of the central government but also the work of the MSDSP, which regularly mentions in its reports the close and good co-operation it has received from the provincial authorities.
- **During the Soviet Times:** The adverse conditions in the region has always led to accusations of poor performance from the Soviet times. Yet the elites or the Sovkhoz directors tried to use the authority for their own personal interest which led to discontent amongst the populace.
- **MSDSP** is the main actor concerned to agricultural development, the situation is such that the basic works have been in a positive manner letting it to earn the

title of ‘motor of development’ in Gornyi-Badakhshan³⁵¹. The privatization process initiated by the MSDSP has two ways First, the persuasion process where the farmer is made to understand the positive aspects of enrolling into their program of privatization and rebuilding of the economy leading to better lifestyle. Yet on the other hand it only catered to private farmers rather than the government initiated one.

- Finally it is the local population which is a vital actor in the transformation process. Yet what needs to be understood that they never desired or initiated any of the changes that came up on the political or economic front.

The support to the recent changes and developments are only on the basis to avert any future deterioration as they know that the old Soviet times cannot come back and the recent policies would take a lot of time to reap benefits.

5.13 THE REBUILDING OF THE COLLAPSED STRUCTURE (ROLE OF THE AGA KHAN FOUNDATION):

The civil war brought in havoc in the Badakhshan region which not only wrecked the infrastructural lines built by the Soviets but also claimed the lives of innocent populace as a result of which the region plunged into the dark era where fear seemed to lurk from all directions. A number of organizations offered help for rebuilding the region. Here it must be noted that Pamiri’s or the people residing in the area of Gorno-Badakhshan are mainly the Ismailies whose leader is Aga Khan IV. Under his supervision the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) has worked immensely for the development of the nation and the region. The end of the Russian hold led to the region losing its ability to cope up with the crisis which had hit the region on such a big level. The agricultural models like the ‘Sovkhoz’ failed to provide the people with the required security. As a result of which huge dependence came up on the foreign aid in regard to food for sustaining the population which went as high as 90%³⁵². The lack of land in urban areas resulted in the parks being turned into fields for cultivation of potatoes to survive the era of devastation and lack of basic amenities. The situation in the region seemed to be so

³⁵¹ Mamadsaidov M, Javhariyeva. R. and F. Bliss. (1997), ‘Pamir relief and development programme. Socio-economic change in Gorno-Badakhshan. A monitoring report of the PRDP’, unpublished manuscript, Khorog, 1997, p 66.

³⁵² Bliss, F. (2006), *Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs*, London: Routledge

poor that alone in the district of Murgab between the period of 1992 and 1996 around 300 to 1800 tons of food was delivered³⁵³. Initiatives had already been taken for improving the agricultural facilities as a result of which by 2000 the infrastructural and food capacity of the region had increased manifold³⁵⁴. Against this alarming background, the Pamir Relief and Development Programme (PRDP) was set up in 1992 under the aegis of the Aga Khan Foundation. The principal aim of the project was to provide foodstuffs (• our, oil, milk-powder, sugar, pulses, salt and, to some extent, tea and soap), and the rest shipments arrived in August 1993. Simultaneously, an agricultural development programme was planned with the aim of improving living standards in the longer term. Up to 1997 this programme was limited to Gornyi-Badakhshan, but thereafter was extended westwards to include the Garm valley. Consequently , it was renamed Mountain Society Development Support Programme (MSDSP). In addition to the Ismaili community, the USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, the UK and the EU are helping to initialize these measures. What is more, other aid organizations have gradually started working in Gornyi-Badakhshan, e.g. the World Food Project, the International Red Cross, Medecins sans Frontie`res, as well as other branches of the Aga Khan Foundation, such as the Aga Khan Education Service and the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development.

- On 30th July 1996 while the peace process between the two factions of the civil war was still going on a delegation was sent for building up a course of action. In March 1997 an NGO called FOCUS worked on the providence of relief aid into the most neglected and inaccessible districts in Badakhshan with establishment of offices at the three points (Ishkashim, Baharak and Faizabad) with distribution of the daily needs like that of wheat in various areas which had been badly hit by the war and its related after effects.

³⁵⁴Kreutzmann Hermann.(2014), ' Pastoral practices in High Asia: Agency of 'development' effected by modernisation, resettlement and transformation, Netherlands: Springer.

- A year later FOCUS distributed 4797.59 metric tons of wheat provided by the US Agency for International Development, USAID to 250,195 persons in several districts in Badakhshan ³⁵⁵.
- A US\$400,000 aid was provided by the Aga Khan foundation for building in around five bridges across the Panj River amidst the countries of Afghanistan and Tajikistan for ending the isolation the region faced. In the AKDN press release November 2002 it was stated that Aga Khan had inaugurated the first bridge in the line on 3 November 2002 linking Shughnan, Afghanistan to Khorog, Tajikistan while on 6 June 2004 the second bridge in the Darwaz region was inaugurated. These bridges helped in the facilitation of the flow of goods and services while also leading to information, knowledge exchanges between the two. Though here it needs worth mentioning that the fear of threats that emanate from Afghanistan has led to the Tajikistan bureaucratic procedures preventing the flow of goods, people and also sometimes turning inhuman by not allowing the people in need of medical treatment in Shughnan to cross the bridge into Khorog.
- The Aga Khan should be praised for the measures which he has initiated for the modernization of religious institutions and appointment of new leaders to become the path makers for the regional populace. Marking the hereditary structure as being incompatible in accordance to the modern times, on 7 July 2002 the Aga Khan approved the appointment of this new generation of institutional leaders to commence on 11 July 2002 (11 July is significant as the date in 1957 that the present Aga Khan assumed leadership of the Isma'ili community internationally).

5.13.1 PROBLEMS FACED:

The changes in the Isma'ili Constitution of institutional leaders being appointed for a three-year term which was renewable once was opposed by many internally. In the forefront were the *Pirs* who opposed it as their vested interest were not being met trying to reverse the developmental activities which had been initiated by the foundation. Yet the measures gained and received a humongous support from the educated sections of the

³⁵⁵ *FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, Unpublished report, 1999.

region. As a result many educated people were appointed to the newly changed institutions at high positions, a change which came up in 2002.

5.13.2 DAWN OF POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND END AS A DEMARCATED TERRITORY:

The end of the Taliban rule came up as an end to the repressive measures of the various warlords and the central government which for centuries had been against the population residing in the upper parts of the Afghan state and that of the Pamir's, who they considered to be different from them in all aspects. The US-backed government headed by Hamid Karzai gained support from the Ismaili representatives who travelled to Kabul to cast their votes in this favor in the Emergency Loya Jirgah (ELJ) which took place in June 2002. During the Constitutional Loya Jirgah (CJL) convened in December 2003 Isma'ili representatives took all the necessary measures in order to highlight the poor living conditions of their populace and also called upon the government for financial assistance for rebuilding the shattered state. Same has been the case of the Tajik Badakshan where the Ismailis have been constantly trying to get favours of the central government for the betterment of the region, the failure of which has led to growing voice against the authoritarian regime.

The improvement in the quality of life on either side of the border initiated by the Aga Khan Developmental Network would result in the further areas of the Badakshan region to link up with the developed sections particularly on the other side. As a result of which there would be a steady flow of not only the cultural aspects but also bringing in the GBAO in line with the wider markets improving the state of the region economically. This economic upheaval would in itself result in bringing in better development in societal and infrastructural abilities. Building the cross development on the basis of the model of the Asian Developmental Bank.

The most important thing which would be a result of the initiatives in the region will be the ending of the aloofment of the region from the greater wider world and the development in all sectors would end the problems of long ranging poverty which has led

this region to become a breeding ground for future conflicts. In this regard initiations in various sectors have taken place which can be underplayed and defined as follows:

I. ENERGY SECTOR

The energy sector which has been established between the two countries on the initiation of the government of Tajikistan and the private sector AKDN now caters to around 85% Gorno Badakshan and around 30000 Afghan people which has been a first ever initiation of reliable power. This has led to many positive incentives for the populace long drawn with poverty and aloofment.

- 1) Increasing levels of economic activity (e.g. encouraging new businesses and types of production, and increased productivity, and allowing bazaars/shops to be open for longer hours)
- 2) Improving health outcomes by allowing households to move away from cooking using firewood – with positive implications for rates of respiratory illness – and allowing health facilities to provide around-the-clock care and operate better equipment (e.g. fridges to store vaccines)
- 3) Improving education outcomes by allowing increased time for studying and opportunities for reading, as well as access to computers for learning; and
- 4) Improving community lighting at night – thus improving perceptions of safety and providing more opportunities for community events.

II. HEALTH

The health programmes on a inter country level have lead to better training for the doctors and the nurses due to better interaction and initiation. The Khorog hospital is the best in the region and as an initiation for improving the Quality of health of the northern Afghan patients they can now cross over for better treatment.

III. EDUCATION

Both vocational and professional training is being sought to be given by the Institute for Professional Development and the University of Central Asia. This aims for education in

vernacular languages which enable students to pursue higher education and also scholarship for further educational enhancement.

IV. DISASTER MANAGEMENT

The area of Gorno-Badashan and the Afghan Badakshan has been prone to earthquakes which leads to challenging the political stability and the challenge of accessibility for the markets. To counter this structural reinforcement of building with capacity to undergo shocks in the event of disaster re being dealt with.

V. BRIDGES

The bridges which have been built with the initiation of the Aga Khan network has increased the accessibility to various goods from China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran with also increased opportunities for commerce beneficial for the overall development of the region. This strategy inadvertently helped to resolve an administrative problem civilians had often encountered in traveling to the government center, as more residents now had government centers opened close to their communities. Districts, towns and villages vary in size and density of population. Villages typically comprised of 10–30 households scattered throughout high altitude valleys and pockets of land along the Panj River. Members of a village are often closely related to each other and help each other in times of need. The scarcity of irrigated land compelled people to cultivate on steep slopes with low yield and greater environmental degradation such as soil erosion. Landownership varies from one region to another. In Wakhan average landownership per household is one hectare while in Darwaz and Shekay a household possesses a quarter of a hectare. Upon a father's death the land is divided among the surviving sons that further reduce the size of landholdings per family. Poor and landless farmers work as tenants and sharecroppers and some even migrate to other provinces as well as to the neighbouring countries, mainly Iran and Pakistan, in search of employment.

Though the initiatives may take time to bring in the regions from decades of suffering and hatred that they have undergone. Yet they have positively initiated the deliverance of incremental improvement in these regions along with measures for peace. The creative programmatic response which these organizations have dealt with has lead to opening up

of these closed sections of state and society which never existed due to their isolation and inaccessibility. The improvement and expansion of these facilities may result in providing an impetus to international donors leading to better facilities and future.

5.13.3 FEARS AND TENSIONS

Though the developmental sector has reached new heights in the area yet the society remains conservative which has led to restricting the women's mobility and education. While the existence of weak political and border security along with the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan has led to fears of ethnic tensions making a way into the region through the various fundamentalist groups which have remained passive all this while. However, social cohesion in the Badakhshans has remained resilient throughout a turbulent past, and it is hoped that by reconnecting the Badakhshans, the region as a whole will be stronger and its people in a better position to improve their quality of life³⁵⁶.

CONCLUSION:

In the wake of the tensions which seem to take an active form after lying down in a passive one has led to new measures being applied and innovated for curbing them from making home in the Central Asian realm. Both International and regional organizations are constantly working for achieving the set parameters of the Afghan instability not spilling into these countries which in itself are yet to achieve the level of development which is vital for a state for the acquirance of a stable nature like that of democratization, good governance, all round development and governmental measures for far areas. Yet much has been achieved in terms of border security though it lacks in some other dimensions.

³⁵⁶ Emadi Hafizullah. (2005), 'Nahzat-e-Nawin: modernization of the Badakhshani Isma'ili communities of Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 24:2, 165-189, DOI: 10.1080/02634930500155054.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

The Central Asian states need no introduction when it comes to the point of the social fragility and governmental disposition that it faces in today's world. The sudden acquisition of power it was attached to and with the sudden absence of financial and infrastructural aid which it derived from Soviet Union led to the toppling down of the economy which had been brought to acquire a stable nature after facing years of inaccessibility and resistance from the local populace. The social fragility of the nation's structure which has been a result of the failed transition has led to highly polarized societies with an elitist faction and the poorest class with no middle class prevalent. While one section has all the riches and facilities the other does not even have means for providence of a meal a day. A BBC journalist had stated that a man was caught for drug trafficking to get enough money to get his family two eggs. There is no social moderation with the absence of a defined middle class. Tajikistan's stability thus seems to be threatened with security fears from the neighbouring state (religious extremism, drug trafficking and small weapons) and internal instability in the form of centre-regional relations, intra-elite contestation.

The Soviet disintegration and the sudden emergence of independence republics led to race or a tussle for the usurping of power from falling into the hands of the non-existent forces. It became quite apparent that the elites of the former Soviet Union were trying every means to hold on to the power they enjoyed. This led the former communists to come up as tolerant statesman who were ready to let go their stern ideology for once to safeguard their interests and riches in the steadily growing nations. The new government was confused enough in regard to the history they wanted to apply which was apart and different from the Soviet times. This led to the establishment of Islamic history which once ruled the nation and as a result Islam gushed into getting its hold over the newly formed state from all directions. The countries like Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan

became the participants of this renewal of ideology apart from that of communism which had been established over the region for all these years, rushing to fill in the vacuum that had been created after years of Soviet dominance and existence of atheist ideology amongst these states. With the tussle for maintenance of power and creation of the state based on an ideology, the poor took respite in God/Allah as the government didn't seem to initiate for their benefit as well apart from securing their own status in society.

This deadly mixture of religion and anger led to a rise in extremism and upheaval against the state authorities in the form of extremist political groups which would have been peaceful in nature in the prevalence of a middle class and less gap between the rich and the poor, acting as a buffer group between the two. This mixture of under development (infrastructural, economical, employment and educational) and poverty and then the emanating threats linked with religion and intoxication caused by opium, is the current state of the Tajik state leading to fragility marred with an authoritative government (persecution of opponents, media control, prohibition of topics linked with the presidential family, political system patronage, and growing repression of religious expression in the name of the fight against radical Islam) and corrupt structure. Poverty, low living standards, widespread corruption, and extensive human rights abuses have turned the state of Tajikistan as a ready breeding ground for such extremist activities. The authoritarian nature of the Tajik regime left no space for the development of democratic movements as a result of which extremists force was the only way left to be sought for expression of hatred and anger against the state authorities. The lack of political alternatives amongst the Tajik people and the prevalence of problems which does not seem to be addressed have led to the region becoming a hot bed for these activities which are constantly at a rise. When the economic, political and social problems are not being addressed by the state, religion becomes a tool and in this case this tool gives rise to fundamentalism and instability with the toppling of the government and its corrupt officials.

With the attack on the twin towers the world seemed to finally address the terror forces which had been long neglected. This led to the famous article of 1373 which gave a new definition and paradigm to this threat and the launch of the 'War on Terror' which was

meant to free the world from the demon of terrorism. This sudden upsurge led to books, research and the whole world focusing on the Afghan war. As a result the world seems to have linked the causes for these destabilizing forces while trying to link the chain of events from one to another. This led to the surrounding regions and countries coming up in focus on the security realm rather than a trophy area after the death of communism after the Soviet disintegration. The terrorist forces had been deriving their finances from forces which were not just from Islamic elites in Muslim countries. This led to the international forces coming to such a conclusion after gaining some examples of the inter-linkages of one threat to another. To their surprise while it was established that the terrorism loop was way beyond expectations, yet there were also groups which maintained the monopoly by staying in one section only even when the benefits are immense. Because trying to reap benefits from all would lead to dangers of being caught by the authorities. Here it must be noted that these other factions came up into the forefront of world attention when the realm of terrorism was started to be researched. The financial assistance led to the means and trailed back to Afghanistan and the drug economy.

War that was waged against the Al-Qaeda after the twin tower attack on the US and the launch of the 'War on Terror' led to the state of Afghanistan turning into a battlefield. But the amount of devastation which was caused in the process led to the international peace forces thinking about other measures which would help the surrounding regions not turning into a ground of devastation in the wake of these terrorist factions finding a safe haven in their lands. Border management and policy were taken up as a new dimension for securing the regions to such an extent that military measures and devastation could be curbed. Yet the thinkers are of the opinion that though these measures would to some extent stop the influx of terror, yet what about the terror inside which would be a result of negligence, poverty and absence of basic necessities for the people by the government. Thus the localization of strategies with the structuring of an efficient law enforcement, law development and intelligence gathering system may be of help for stopping the genesis of turbulence based on various grounds. For this various measures have been applied and the Central Asian forum seems to be the new paradigm of attention along

with other countries which according to the United States of America and its allies need their assistance in rebuilding their economy from authoritarian to that of democratic one.

This paradigm of attention has led to the regional powers coming into the forefront of the developmental and restructuring process as American presence is dreaded both by China and Russia which are again rising into prominence in the world forum leading to a 'New Cold War'. Here it must be kept into mind that these new forms of threats which are transnational in nature may cause fears amongst the world actors but would directly strike the regional ones who share their borders with the country of Afghanistan or that of Central Asia. It has led to Russia and China rushing in to secure its borders while also constantly providing the Central Asian states with the required arms and ammunitions to safeguard their borders along with lessons on security being given by these forces. The paradigm of security which was just confined to military and borders has spread itself for turning into a widespread fungus which needs attention on all fronts at a deeper societal and governmental level.

6.1 THE SCENARIO AT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2014:

The war in Afghanistan had also brought in the terrors of the surrounding regions into the limelight as well. As a result of which the Central Asian states came into the forefront of international attention. 'The international community's major concern over safeguarding their own borders and internal threats is about the negative implications for the stability and development of the Central Asian states themselves, which in turn makes them more likely to become breeding grounds for other transnational threats. For example, as seen in Columbia , the narcotic industry may destabilize states and civil society, damaging long-term economic development while compromising the rule of law. It is significant, for example that the drug trade in Central Asia seems to be currently expanding, particularly in areas that are especially weak or in conflict with the central government, e.g. Tajikistan, Southern Kyrgyzstan and parts of Xinjiang in China. These regional economies are being increasingly criminalized as a concern is not so much about the

present but the future of the trafficking industry and its eventual impact on Central Asian states’.

This situation was seen when Afghanistan was attacked to fight the Al-Qaeda. The situation has changed since then. The ‘War on Terror’ had led to forces of turbulence taking up a passive form while terrorists engaging themselves into other professions. The drug trade though being tried to be curbed suffers from corruption itself. It was reported that the Helmand province of Afghanistan which had seen lowering of opium production during the Taliban rule seems to have risen again in amount and production even while the international forces try to curb and stabilise the situation.

The world seems to wait in horror while the transnational extremist groups seem to wait in patience. The patience seems to be paying as the closure of ISAF in Afghanistan seems to have brought in an increased attack in Afghanistan, Pakistan and even the Tajik state feels the turbulence. On the other hand the growth of the ISIS and refugee problems and also the recent attacks on the European Nations seem to question not just the security of the undeveloped or underdeveloped nations or regions of the world which have been treated for long as the breeding ground of terrorism but also the societies in the developed sections which have become equally involved in the scenario with its own citizens being used to launch attacks on their own country in the name of religion. Though some believe that the Taliban will not pose any security threat to the Central Asian countries, this cannot be validated as Taliban, surely provided safe haven to the radical forces which were meant to destabilize Central Asia. Taliban had been peacefully co-existing until it hosted the Al-Qaeda which was the force behind the twin tower attack. Hadn’t the attacks taken place, the Taliban regime and other terrorist groups would have peacefully co-existed in the regime carrying out menace in the name of Islam. Thus the danger posed to the international security changed the whole paradigm bringing in even regional security and well being under the international scanner. Though a number of issues are to be looked up for between the Afghan and the Tajik state like the escalation of the refugee problem from Afghanistan in wake of instability yet the Tajik state is left with no choice. Afghanistan is the only viable partner for Tajik trade as internal politics of trade blockades and resource distribution still prevails amongst the nations sidelining the Tajik

state. Thus Tajikistan is left with on a lookout for every viable opportunity from Afghanistan even the signing of an agreement (March 26, 2012) with the Afghan state for building in transmission channels for free flow of goods, electricity and fuel amongst them as the democratic regime of Mr Karzai was dually set in Afghanistan. Alongside this was the strengthening of borders which in the wake of rise of Taliban or the new forces of ISIS in the region is a must for the avoidance of drugs and weapons trafficking, as well as the activities of radical extremist movements.

Thus while the twin tower incident questioned the state of security amongst the developed nations, the Central Asian security sector is still not fully equipped for any flow of unwanted events which may follow. The borders remain still untraceable and porous in nature. The government fails to maintain a stronghold over the region. The internal problems like poverty, lack of educational facilities, lack of infrastructure still fails to be met by the government though the NGO's are on a constant work. Until and unless these are not addressed on a national level with uncorrupted law agencies and police structure, the Tajik state remains at stake from the external transnational threats which easily victimize such regimes for the derivation of their profit.

6.2 THE ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES:

The PhD thesis questioned the two dimensions on which the whole study was based. These were under laid as follows. While one stated that the security structure of Tajikistan, lacks proper directions and authority and has been unable to curb the trans-border threats effectively. The other talked about the working of the drugs and arms trafficking network along with the corrupt police officials, which has aggravated economic woes of the people of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

The study seems to have adequately proved the above statements. The state of Tajikistan since its independence has undergone various stages of violence and turbulence. While the initial years were based on acquiring an identity which was away from the Russian one which it was bided by for more than seven decades. The later led to the curbing of the extremist factions which this sudden religious resurgence had caused leading to these

factions seeking a safe haven in the war-torn country of Afghanistan. This phase of up's and down's led the state and its authorities becoming busy in settling and securing their own profits and legacy. As a result of which not much attention was given to the state of security on the borders and the far off regions of the state, leading to growing remorse against the state authorities amongst the local populace which preferred local warlords more than their state government. The state has not been able to establish a strong hold over all its areas and the far regions like that of Gorno-Badakshan which is the main route for the passage of illicit trade and trafficking along the Tajik-Afghan border. Again questioning the state and legal structure is the nature of the border officials and the corruption prevalent amongst them which further enhances the woes of the Tajik people. In the wake of the accumulation of wealth amongst a few and a widespread poverty and low wages of the state border police, widespread corruption is prevalent amongst the various state officials which has toppled the state security structure. It is only on the international forefront that various organizations have been on a constant run for stabilizing the state, unattendance of which would lead to unleashing a wave of turbulence across the continent both to the European and the South Asian front.

6.3 MEASURES WHICH NEED TO BE ADOPTED:

The security structures have time and again underlined the need of grappling down the economic, political and military resources which the terrorist groups seem to extract in the achievement of their mission. In the achievement of which the macroeconomic reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts would require an incorporation of various developmental, sociological and criminological arena leading to building up of the capacity of the both legal and state security structures. One such program which has successfully achieved its tentative goal is Project BOMCA which provides technical assistance to Border Guards, Customs Service, Drug Control Agency and other agencies involved in border management in Tajikistan. Though the programme was meant for the areas of GBAO in the Tajik-Afghan border, the programme has successfully initiated the up gradation of structure in terms of infrastructure, border strength through training of guards and provision of specialized equipment to the forces

also in the other Tajik border areas of Tajik Uzbek border in Sogd oblast and Khatlon oblast of the country

The level of corruption and political will has taken up the Tajik state to such a state that even the donor agencies have got tired enough to direct their assistance in terms of kind rather than cash with trainings in capacity building.

As both the Central Asian and the Afghan state suffer from a huge threat with the same enemy to be tackled the defense mechanism should be in cooperation between the army and the border police along the state institutions. A balance of development and prosperity is a better state for curbing of internal turbulence and external threats than just the signing of bilateral treaties and cooperation between various actors in the process.

6.4 SUGGESTIONS :

If globalization can help facilitate the forces of turbulence it can also help in curbing the same through better cooperation. A number of suggestive measures which if applied with the right frequency may result if the acquirance of the needed measures for a more stable Central Asian forum. Sometimes history in itself provides an answer to one's woes, which according to me falls right in place in regard to the Central Asian forum on various regard.

Firstly the region of Central Asia has not only acted as a transmitter of civilizations from west to the east or vice-versa but has also strategically been part of the great Silk Route. Trade and its facilitation has always been a means for prosperity and peace. Here in the current times the resources of Central Asia can be put to good use for the betterment of not just the economy but also on the societal and security front. The oil and gas pipelines, railways and electronic cable communication networks can serve in linking the old roads for the new era of development and prosperity of even the far off regions of the Central Asian front. The recent initiative of the TAPI pipeline which had been in the talks for a long time is set to change the whole paradigm of transmission of Central Asian resources to the rest of the world.

The Russian invasion in Afghanistan had led to small weapons being left in various regions and endurance of peace means that Tajik government should continue the various measures which it has been initiating in the realm of submission of illegal arms to the government for which various programmes have been initiated from time to time. The lack of weapons would directly curb the strength of the illicit forces to fight in the name of religion, while development reaching the far lined areas would lead to no need of the youth to indulge in such activities as various employment opportunities would be generated and quality of life would automatically improve.

While fears lurk opportunities too knock the Tajik door with ample reasons to prove its multivectored” principals in realization of its underplayed national interests in the new constitution. The Tajik state is set to play an effective role in the making of the state of Afghanistan while reaping its own benefits only if it first meets out the challenges it faces on the internal front like that of high end corruptive practices and reduces state capacity.

6.5 CONCLUSION AND MEASURES:-

Despite the states of the region bringing and adapting various measures for strengthening border security and the operability and capabilities of the terrorist groups, a deployment of non-commissioned officers with an agenda of multilateral emergency responses becomes important. The Tajik state like the others perceives a military presence of any state as questioning its internal stability while being well aware of the fact of its inability to control its very borders without external help. Taking this into account indirect support is being derived rather than direct initiation on part of the countries and international organizations.

The risk of spillover from Afghanistan

Central Asian governments fear in regard to the Afghan spill out has been more of perceptions rather than being an objective reality where their own domestic anxieties are layed on the forefront and the fear of the waning down of international funds which have been in a constant flow in regard to the fears emanating from the region.

While the Central Asian regimes seem to legitimize the secular authoritarianism in the folds of Islamic upheaval from Afghanistan rather to maintain their control over administration and the countries resources, the populace seems to be in a feeling of disparagement with any Islamic upheaval of the Afghan Islamic forces like the Taliban. Rather than the Talibani form of Islam the debated Islam from the Russian side seem to allure the populace while drugs, militias, arms and refugees are a greater risk to the Central Asian forum.

Here the Intra-Tajik interactions on both sides of the border may or may not be a cause of concern. While the elements fighting against Dushanbe's stranglehold could seek refuge in Afghanistan on the other hand if there is ever a breakup in the alignment of Pashtuns and the other groups a war waged would undoubtedly effect the balance of the Tajik border. Which will be a result of the affinities the Tajiks share on either side of the border. What derives attention is the Afghan paradigm and its powerbrokers in the realm of the intrinsic weakness of the Tajik state.

The Barbed wires, checkpoints, watchtowers wouldn't just be the appropriate measure for countering the flow of drugs or any illicit activity. A more different approach is important apart from equipping the guards with better equipment or practices. A separation of the criminal networks from their hold in the state apparatus will be major breakthrough in the process of curbing the trafficking of illicit material and men along the Tajik state from the Afghan nation. Permeability here is not just from the physical realm in terms of porosity of the borders but also in terms of human permeability offered by the forces of corruption prevalent in the border guards and the state authority. What is seen is that rather than the 'black' and 'green' routes which are in the main focus of international authorities it is often the main roads which carry this material through the heart of the country. While the efforts for combating the supply routes of the drugs from the Afghan state is important, what needs foremost attention is the focus on prevention and demand reduction while also the treatment being important to bring out the youth which constitute the major labour force for the nations from the fears of addiction. Here it must be noted that while international actors and states focus on securitization of the forces which may lead to internal troubles in their country, the efforts on the grass root level are primarily

left to the regional actors and the states concerned. This is nothing but a selfish agenda where if while the regional actors prevent the turbulence from spreading into their territory, the nation state concerned becomes nothing more than a battlefield leading to turbulence in all ends. Like the forces of corruption in the state machinery and poverty and underdevelopment on the ground level. The further synergy that drugs, terrorism and insurgency leads to the approaches of a secure supporting structure for fighting the drug trade fall back without any success. As a result of which criminalization of the drug addicts into various criminalized networks further complicates the situation. Though there seems to be no easy solution to the drug threats emanating from the Afghan state in regard to the widespread effects it has on the society of the victim state and the others nearby. Afghan state also provides a number of economic opportunities to the Central Asia states only if well exploited by the states concerned. On the extremist front the recent developments in Afghanistan with Taliban and ISIS making a hold over the region defines the series of steps which will be needed to be initiated for curbing the spill over. Tajikistan and Russia convened a large scale military drill in March 2016 which validates the fears the region is facing as well as the growing participation for curbing further spills of instability into the Central Asian front.

APPENDIX ONE

REGIONS AT RISK OF BECOMING SOURCES OF SYNTHETIC DRUGS

Asia and Pacific	Africa and Middle East	The Americas	Europe
E Asia (China, Vietnam, Burma,	South Africa	Central America	Eastern
Europe			
Taiwan, S Korea, Indonesia,	Middle East		(El Salvador
,Guatemala	(Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary)		
Philippines)	(Iraq, Israel, Lebanon)		Nicaragua, Mexico)
India Sub-Continent	North and C AFRICA		S America
Western Europe			
(Bangladesh, India)	(Egypt,Nigeria,Niger,		(Venezuela, Argentina
(Denmark, Croatia, France,			
	Zimbabwe, Ethiopia		Ecuador,
Colombia, Brazil)	Belgium, Finland,Spain, Greece,		
Mozambique)			Ireland, Italy, Portugal
Central Asia			
(Tajikistan,Kazakhstan,			
Kyrgystan, Georgia, Russia)			

APPENDIX TWO

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGARD TO ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFGHANISTAN

Article 18 of the international convention for the suppression of terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999 by UN General Assembly resolution 54/109, entered into force 10 April 2002, 2178 UNTS 229) states that the states under the supervision of the United Nations are bound to adopt measures that prohibit in their territories “ illegal activities of persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission of offenses set forth in article 2(which is in regard to any criminal offence against the state)”

Article 7 of the SCO convention on combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism(2001) states that “illicit manufacturing , procurement, storage, transfer, movement, sales or use of strong toxic, and poisonous substances, explosives, radioactive materials, weapons, explosive devices, firearms, ammunition, nuclear, chemical, biological or other type of weapons of mass destruction, as well as material and equipment that can be used for their production, for the purpose of committing acts for disturbance of world order”.

UNGA Resolution 59/112 (8 December 2004): Emergency international assistance for peace, normalancy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan and the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, extracts

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need to tackle the remaining challenges in Afghanistan, including the lack of security in certain areas, terrorist threats, the comprehensive nationwide disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Afghan militias, the timely preparation of the parliamentary and local elections scheduled for the spring of 2005, the

reconstruction of institutions, the promotion and protection of human rights and fight against narcotics,

...

Noting that, despite improvements in building the security sector, terrorist attack caused by Al-Qaida operatives, the Taliban and other extremist groups and the lack of security caused by factional violence and criminal activity, including the illicit production of and trafficking in drugs, still remain a serious challenge, threatening the democratic process as well as reconstruction and economic development,

...

UNGA Resolution 59/161 (20 December 2004): Providing support to the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to eliminate illicit opium and foster stability and security in the region, extracts

The General Assembly,

...

Recalling also that the International Narcotics Control Board, in its report for 2003, pointed out that trade in Afghan opiates generated funds that corrupted institutions, financed terrorism and insurgency and led to destabilization of the region.

...

UNGA Resolution 61/183(20 December 2006): International cooperation against the world drug problem, extracts

The General Assembly,

...

Concerned by the serious challenges and threats posed by the continuing links between illicit drug trafficking and other national and transnational criminal activities and transnational criminal networks, inter alia, trafficking in human beings, especially women

and children, money-laundering, financing of terrorism, corruption, trafficking in arms and trafficking in chemical precursors, and reaffirming that strong and effective international cooperation is needed to counter these threats,

27. Urges States to strengthen action, in particular international cooperation and technical assistance aimed at preventing and combating the laundering of proceeds derives from drug trafficking and other related criminal activities, with the support of the United Nations system, international institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as regional development banks and, where appropriate, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and similarly styled regional bodies, to develop and strengthen comprehensive international regimes to combat money-laundering and its possible links with organized crime and the financing of terrorism, and to improve information-sharing among financial institutions and agencies in charge of preventing and detecting the laundering of those proceeds;

28. Calls upon States to consider including provisions in their national drug control plans for the establishment of national networks to enhance their respective capabilities to prevent, monitor, control and suppress serious offences connected with money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, to counter in general all acts of transnational organized crime and to supplement existing regional and internal networks dealing with money-laundering;

...

IPU Resolution adopted by the 122nd IPU Assembly, Bangkok, 1 April 2010. ‘Cooperation and Shared Responsibility in the Global Fight against Organized Crime, in Particular Drug Trafficking, Illegal Arms Trafficking, Trafficking in Persons and Cross-Border Terrorism’

The 122nd Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Cognizant to the fact that while globalization fosters many positive advancements, interdependence between the states and the opening of borders, it also has a negative effect, that of facilitating transnational organized crime, in particular drug trafficking,

illegal arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, cross-border terrorism and money-laundering, and that this requires the implementation of relevant international and domestic legal instruments,

Recalling the resolutions on combating terrorism adopted by the IPU at its 108th Conference (Santiago de Chile, 2003) and its 111th (Geneva, 2004), 115th (Geneva, 2006) and 116th (Bali, 2007) Assemblies,

...

Recognizing the nexus between drug trafficking, corruption and other forms of organized crime, including trafficking in persons, trafficking in arms, Cybercrime, cross-border terrorism, money laundering and financing of terrorism,

Considering that illegal arms trafficking contributes to conflict, the displacement of persons, crime and terrorism, thereby undermining global peace, safety and security

...

Mindfull that the phenomenon of cross-border terrorism continues to represent a substantial threat to peace and security in the world and continues to endanger political institutions, economic stability and the welfare of nations.

...

23. Calls on IPU Member Parliaments to take into account, in exercising their legislative and oversight functions, the fact that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or ethnic group, and hence profiling based on any of these factors should not be used by national and transnational agencies in their efforts to combat terrorism;

33. Invites parliamentarians to make use of the technical services and expertise provided by UNODC in specialized workshops and training courses, and to call on the United

Nations General Assembly in cases related to crime prevention, international drug control and the fight against terrorism³⁵⁷.

³⁵⁷ Saul Ben.(2012), 'Terrorism', Oxford:Hart Publishing.

REFERENCES

- *Address by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan His Excellency Emomali Rahmon to Majlisi Oli on Key Directions of Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan” (address, Dushanbe, 25 April 2011).
- *Afghan Foreign Minister and Tajik Leaders Underline Strong Bond Between The Two Countries, Jul 30, 2011,<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/2948>.
- *Afghan, Pakistani, Tajik, Russian Leaders Sign Joint Statement, *BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit* 2 September 2011.
- *Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 , Volume 1: Overview. Achilova Firuza T.(2012), ‘Opening the Doors of Policy-Making: Central Asia and South Caucasus UNDEF Project Number: UDF-GLO-09-281 ISAF troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014: How should Tajikistan be prepared for that?’, United Nations, the United Nations Democracy Fund or its Advisory Board. PASOS - Policy Association for an Open Society 2012.
- *Background note: short review on EU program me to fight drugs along the heroin route, Brussels, 15 May 2003. AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D (2003).
- *Background note: short review on EU programme to fight drugs along the heroin route, Brussels, 15 May 2003, AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D, 2003).
- *Bijlert Martine van.(2011) , ‘Political Insecurity and Reports of Worrying Developments’, 9 August 2011,<http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/political-insecurity-and-reports-of-worrying-developments/>.
- *Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. p 11.*for All*, New York: United Nations, 2005.
- *Background note: short review on EU programme to fight drugs along the heroin route, Brussels,15 May 2003, AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D,2003.
- *Caldwell William B IV, ‘Drop by Drop, A River is Formed: Transition Begins in Afghanistan’,<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/drop-by-drop-a-river-is-formed-transition-begins-in-afghanistan> ,July 19, 2011.
- *Caldwell William B IV, ‘Learning from the Echoes of the Past in Afghanistan’,<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/learning-from-the-echoes-of-the-past-in-afghanistan>,OCTOBER 17, 2011.
- *Chandrasekaran Rajiv.(2011), FEBRUARY 28, 2011,Accuser in psyops scandal admits he is not a psyops officer,The Washington

Post,<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/accuser-in-psyops-scandal-admits-he-is-not-a-psyops-officer>, february 28, 2011.

- *Cordesman Anthony H.(2011), ‘U.S. Casualties in Afghanistan: The Need for Perspective’, AUG 8, 2011,<http://csis.org/publication/us-casualties-afghanistan-need-perspective>.
- *Dr. AzizianRouben and Dr. Davis Elizabeth Van Wie, Executive Summary Terrorism Geopolitics and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia.
- *Dushanbe,24 January,1998 ITAR TASS
- *Daily Review, Part 2, October 13,1998.
- *Deputy Foreign Minister Meets Tajikistan Foreign Minister, Mar 12, 2015 ,Kabul – Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Hekmat Khalil Karzai met with the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, Mr. Sirojiddin Aslov in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan on 10 February 2015. <http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/deputy-foreign-minister-meets-tajikistan-foreign-minister>.
- *Fatemi Tariq.(2011), ‘Dangers in the endgame’, The Express Tribune > Pakistan,, , June 28, 2011,<http://tribune.com.pk/story/198056/dangers-in-the-endgame/>.
- *FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, 2012.
- *FBIS-SOV-93-140 July 7,1993.
- *FBIS-SOV-93-156 August 16,1993.
- *Flawed US strategy,AUG 07, 2011,<http://www.dawn.com/news/650079/flawed-us-strategy>, The Dawn.
- *Gleason,G. (2001), ‘Tajikistan Minister’s Murder Points to Drug-Route Conflict’, Eurasia *Insight*,16 March, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insights/articles/eav041601.shtml>.
- *Guy Brailsford,(1989), ‘A *Survey of Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan*’, by Afghanaid, p 8.
- *<http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview>, Author: Morris Rossabi, Assesed on 17 Feb 2015.
- *<http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview>, Author: Morris Rossabi,assessed on 15 feb 2015.
- *<http://www.world-check.com/ar/insights-ibrief/jersey-jails-abachas-business-associate/2010/07/14>.
- *<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqlid>.

*Hindustan times May 4,1993.

*Hindustan times, Aug 31st,1993.

220

*‘Involvement of Russian organized crime syndicates, criminal elements in the Russian military, and regional terrorist groups in narcotics trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Chechnya’, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, October 2002, p 18.

*International Organization of Migration (IOM)2003 Tajikistan in cooperation in Sharq Scientific Research Center, “Labour Migration from Tajikistan 2003,”www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/.../Tajik_study_oct_03.pdf.

*‘In Central Asia, the fortunes of the region’s billionaires are directly tied to the progression (or not) of national economies as well as closely integrated to national politics’ (Forbes, March 25, 2013).

*ICG Asia Report, Is radical Islam inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for engagement’, ICG Asia Report, No 72, 22 December 2003, p 8, fn 34.

*Interfax News agency, Moscow 7th March 1996,SWB/SU/2556/G/1, Dated 9th March 1996.

*Interfax September 27,1993.

*International Crisis Group 2001, p 15-16.

*International terror threat” ((HYNDS BLOG FEBRUARY 25, 2011 • 3:18 PM).

*Interpol, Weekly Intelligence Message, 1995(26/95).

*Interview of Rabbani, Masood and Khalik with AFP dated February 15, 1990

*International Crisis Group(2011), “Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats,” Asia Report N°205—24 May 2011, 17, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/centralasia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx>.

*International Crisis Group, ‘Tajikistan’s politics: confrontation or consolidation?’, *Asia Briefing*, 19 May 2004, p 19.

*Interpol, Weekly Intelligence Message, 1995(26/95).

*Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,‘Transition in Afghanistan looking Beyond 2014’,November 21, 2011.

*IRIN:Humanitarian news and Analysis.(2006), ‘Central Asia Weekly News Wrap’,24 March 2006,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/40585/central-asia-weekly-news-wrap>.

- *IRIN:Humanitarian news and Analysis.(2006),Central Asia: Human rights situation remains poor, 23 May 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34324/central-asia-human-rights-situation-remains-poor>.
- _____(2009), Redesigning continuing education in the Health Professions. Washington,DC:The National Academics Press.
- _____, Catherine James, ‘Can New Governors turn the Taliban tide in Northern Afghanistan?’,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/102073/can-new-governors-turn-the-taliban-tide-in-northern-afghanistan>.
- _____(2007) ,Tajikistan: Abduholik Kamolov, Tajikistan, “Instead of going to school I work as a shoe polisher to help my Mum”, 14 May 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/hov/72128/tajikistan-abduholik-kamolov-tajikistan-instead-of-going-to-school-i-work-as-a-shoe-polisher-to>.
- _____(2006), ‘Tajikistan: Interview with new WHO head’, 31st March 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/33983/tajikistan-interview-with-new-who-head>.
- _____(2006), Kyrgyzstan: Tajik refugees should repatriate or naturalise – UNHCR,28th April 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34261/kyrgyzstan-tajik-refugees-should-repatriate-or-naturalise-unhcr>.
- _____(2006), Tajikistan: Demining on the Afghan border started, 12th April 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34216/tajikistan-demining-on-the-afghan-border-started>.
- _____(2004), ‘In-depth: Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War’, Tajikistan: Stemming the heroin tide,2 Aug 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/63031/21/tajikistan-stemming-the-heroin-tide>.
- _____(2002),Central Asia: Border disputes increase potential for conflict 15 April 2002 (IRIN) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/18298/central-asia-border-disputes-increase-potential-for-conflict>.
- _____(2002),Pakistan: tajiks offered return home, 24 July 2002 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/18497/pakistan-tajiks-offered-return-home>.
- _____(2003), Drug abuse becoming a problem, says UN, Kabul, 26 June 2003 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/20199/afghanistan-drug-abuse-becoming-a-problem-says-un>.
- _____(2005) ,Tajikistan: Interview with Vladimir Sotirov, head of UN peace-building office in Tajikistan,26 May 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28630/tajikistan-interview-with-vladimir-sotirov-head-of-un-peace-building-office-in-tajikistan>.

- _____,(2003),Special report on poppy cultivation in Badakhshan 26 March 2003 (IRIN)<http://www.irinnews.org/report/19543/afghanistan-special-report-on-poppy-cultivation-in-badakhshan>.
- _____,(2003),Tajikistan: Border-guard training centre opens with the support of IOM, 18 December 2003 (IRIN) ,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/21432/tajikistan-border-guard-training-centre-opens-with-the-support-of-iom>.
- _____,(2004),Weekly news wrap, 9 January 2004 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/40393/central-asia-weekly-news-wrap>.
- _____,(2006),Tajikistan: HIV/AIDS fuelled by drugs, poverty and ignorance, 12 June 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34397/tajikistan-hiv-aids-fuelled-by-drugs-poverty-and-ignorance>.
- _____,(2002),Tajikistan: Focus on trafficking, 23 July 2002 (IRIN) ,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/18494/tajikistan-focus-on-trafficking>.
- _____,(2003),Tajikistan: MSF to cease operations, 15 December 2003 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/21420/tajikistan-msf-to-cease-operations>.
- _____,(2004), ‘Tajikistan: Drug use, migration and ignorance fuel rise in HIV infections 24 Feb 2004’,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/23131/tajikistan-drug-use-migration-and-ignorance-fuel-rise-in-hiv-infections>.
- _____,(2004),16 Feb 2004,Tajikistan: Focus on Afghan refugees ,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/40399/tajikistan-focus-on-afghan-refugees>.
- _____,(2005) ,Tajikistan: Reaction to OSCE urging more democracy, 20 April 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28554/tajikistan-reaction-to-osce-urging-more-democracy>.
- _____,(2005),Tajikistan: Independent media face registration challenges ,8 November 2005 (IRIN), <http://www.irinnews.org/report/29444/tajikistan-independent-media-face-registration-challenges>.
- _____,(2006),Afghanistan-Tajikistan: Growing regional drugs problem,17 May 2006,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/34315/afghanistan-tajikistan-growing-regional-drugs-problem>.
- _____,(2007),Tajikistan: Poverty fuels child labour, 1 May 2007,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/71890/tajikistan-poverty-fuels-child-labour>.
- _____,(2004),Central Asia: Weekly news wrap, 22 Oct 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/40467/central-asia-weekly-news-wrap>.
- _____,(2004) ,Tajikistan: Interview with media activist, 6 Sep 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/26017/tajikistan-interview-with-media-activist>.

- _____,(2002),Tajikistan: Deportation of Afghans halted, 2 October 2002 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/18620/tajikistan-deportation-of-afghans-halted>.
- _____,(2004) ,Tajikistan: Access to snow-affected areas remains poor, 7 Feb 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28087/tajikistan-access-to-snow-affected-areas-remains-poor>.
- _____,(2004),Afghanistan-Central Asia: Regional impact of the Afghan heroin trade,24 Aug 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/25848/afghanistan-central-asia-regional-impact-of-the-afghan-heroin-trade>.
- _____,(2004),Tajikistan: Independent paper seized by authorities, 16 Nov 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/26482/tajikistan-independent-paper-seized-by-authorities>.
- _____,(2005) , ‘Tajikistan: Poverty reduction initiative announced’, 26 June 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28697/tajikistan-poverty-reduction-initiative-announced>.
- _____,(2005) ,Tajikistan: The year in review, 20 Jan 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/40483/tajikistan-the-year-in-review>.
- _____,(2006), ‘Tajikistan: UN appeal for 2006 launched’,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/33733/tajikistan-un-appeal-for-2006-launched>.
- _____,Tajikistan: IOM announces new programme on labour migrant remittances, 2 Nov 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/26454/tajikistan-iom-announces-new-programme-on-labour-migrant-remittances>.
- _____,(2006),Tajikistan: UN praise peace building, condemns poverty,14 June 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34403/tajikistan-un-praise-peace-building-condemns-poverty>.
- _____,(2007), Afghanistan-Tajikistan: Some Afghan refugees said under pressure to leave Dushanbe, 16 June 2007,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/72762/afghanistan-tajikistan-some-afghan-refugees-said-under-pressure-to-leave-dushanbe>.
- _____,(2007),Tajikistan: Demining on Tajik-Afghan border underway, 27 March 2007,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/70962/tajikistan-demining-on-tajik-afghan-border-underway>.
- _____,(2003),Tajikistan: WFP closes Pamir aid corridor to Afghanistan 3 July 2003 (IRIN)<http://www.irinnews.org/report/20431/tajikistan-wfp-closes-pamir-aid-corridor-to-afghanistan>.
- _____,(2004) ,Tajikistan: ban on women attending mosques debated, 24 Nov 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/26498/tajikistan-ban-on-women-attending-mosques-debated>.

- _____,(2004) ,Tajikistan: Explosion rocks emergency ministry, 3qst Jan 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28048/tajikistan-explosion-rocks-emergency-ministry>.
- _____,(2004), ‘Tajikistan: Interview with US Ambassador Richard E Hoagland’,6 May 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/24229/tajikistan-interview-with-us-ambassador-richard-e-hoagland>.
- _____,(2004), Afghanistan: Women and addiction,24 Aug 2004, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/25846/afghanistan-women-and-addiction>.
- _____,(2004),Tajikistan: Stemming the heroin tide, 13 Sep 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/25849/tajikistan-stemming-the-heroin-tide>.
- _____,(2005) ,Tajikistan UN appeal already 50 percent funded, 10 May 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28597/tajikistan-un-appeal-already-50-percent-funded>.
- _____,(2005), ‘Tajikistan: Interview with head of UNHCR country office’, Francisco Galindo-Velez, 1 Nov 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/29431/tajikistan-interview-with-head-of-unhcr-country-office-francisco-galindo-velez>.
- _____,(2006) ,Central Asia: Tajiks who fled civil war no longer refugees ,3 July 2006,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/34686/central-asia-tajiks-who-fled-civil-war-no-longer-refugees>.
- _____,Tajikistan: UN Micro-credit Project helps women in rural areas, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/33721/tajikistan-un-micro-credit-project-helps-women-in-rural-areas>.
- _____,(2007) ,Tajikistan: New studies reveal major gap in HIV/AIDS awareness among youth,19 April 2007,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/71694/tajikistan-new-studies-reveal-major-gap-in-hiv-aids-awareness-among-youth>.
- _____,(2004), ‘Tajikistan: IOM welcomes new law to combat human trafficking’,6 July 2004,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/24421/tajikistan-iom-welcomes-new-law-to-combat-human-trafficking>.
- _____,(2004), Tajikistan: Year ender: Tajikistan at the crossroads - Continued Dushanbe, 5 January 2004 (IRIN) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/22670/tajikistan-yearender-tajikistan-at-the-crossroads-continued>.
- _____,(2004),Tajikistan: Yearender: Tajikistan at the crossroads 5 January 2004 (IRIN)<http://www.irinnews.org/report/22666/tajikistan-yearender-tajikistan-at-the-crossroads>.

_____,(2005) ,Afghanistan-Tajikistan: New bridge to provide key economic link, 20 June 2005,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/28681/afghanistan-tajikistan-new-bridge-to-provide-key-economic-link>.

_____,(2006), Tajikistan: Year in Review 2005 - Steady progress in a tough neighbourhood12 January 2006 (IRIN) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/33643/tajikistan-year-in-review-2005-steady-progress-in-a-tough-neighbourhood>.

_____/3438 G/1+2,ITAR-TASS, “ Big increase in armed and drugs-related crime in 1998,” January 1,1999.

_____,(2006),Central Asia: UNAIDS launches key regional conference,15 May 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/34304/central-asia-unaid-launches-key-regional-conference>.

_____,(2006),Central Asia: Weekly news wrap,16 June 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/40603/central-asia-weekly-news-wrap>.

_____,Mullah Omar key for US in Afghan talks: Experts’, AFP,June 20, 2011,<http://tribune.com.pk/story/192616/mullah-omar-key-for-us-in-afghan-talks-experts/>.

_____,The Kabul meetings, Najmuddin A Shaikh, July 1, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/200413/the-kabul-meetings/>.

*13 December 2005 (IRIN)<http://www.irinnews.org/report/29549/tajikistan-sharp-rise-in-trafficking-arrests>.

*18 June 2003 (IRIN),<http://www.irinnews.org/report/20178/tajikistan-un-donates-money-for-anti-drugs-drive>.

*26 June 2003 (IRIN)<http://www.irinnews.org/report/20195/tajikistan-focus-on-constitutional-referendum>.

*26 June 2007,<http://www.irinnews.org/report/72937/tajikistan-afghan-narcotics-fuel-drug-addiction>.

*28 November 2005 (IRIN) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/29505/tajikistan-border-guards-seize-122-kg-of-heroin>.

*Itar Tass,Moscow 22 Febraury 1994 cited in SWB/SU 1930,G/2 dated 24 February 2004.

*Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 2005, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 2005 *Tajikistan*. Retrieved November 2005 from<http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/tajikistan.asp>.

*Kazakhstan & Central Asia: Defense & Security Report,” Business Monitor International, Ltd. London, U.K. 2012.

- *Khan Tahir, The Express Tribune Pakistan, ‘Purported Taliban negotiator ‘goes missing’’, August 8, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/226557/disrupted-dialogue-purported-talibannegotiator-goes-missing/>.
- *Lubin, N., & Rubin, B. R. (1999). *Calming the Ferghana Valley: development and dialogue in the heart of Central Asia: Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action* (Vol. 4). Twentieth Century Fund.
- *Manan Abdul .(2016), ‘Pakistan pledges to cooperate with Indian attack investigation’, January 8, 2016, The Express Tribune Pakistan, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1024155/pakistan-pledges-to-cooperate-with-indian-attack-investigation/>
- *Memorandum of Understanding between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America On Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan, Mar 09, 2012 <http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/7671>.
- *MoU signed on Afghanistan’s second report on UN Convention Against Torture. Sep 01, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/mou-signed-on-afghanistans-second-report-on-un-convention-against-torture>.
- *“Negotiations to End Fighting in East Tajikistan Continue,” *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty*, 27 July 2012, <http://www.rferl.org/content/negotiations-to-end-fighting-in-east-tajikistan-continue/24658259.html> (2 August 2012).
- *O’Hanlon Michael E.(2011), ‘Gauging the Effect of Obama’s Troop Cuts’ The Washington Times, Opinion | June 23, 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/06/23-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
- *Radio Free Europe, ‘Karzai Stresses Pakistan’s Role In Afghan Reconciliation’, http://www.rferl.org/content/Karzai_Says_Afghanistan_Does_Not_Want_Proxy_Wars/1980674.html, Radio Free Europe.
- *Rakhimov Abdullo.(2011), ‘Tajikistan Claims Militant Leader Killed’, RADIO FREE EUROPE April 15, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_says_militant_leader_killed/3558497.html.
- *Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action.(1999) , “Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia”, New York: Century Foundation Press, p 70.
- *Rogin Josh. (2011), Full text of President Obama’s speech on Afghanistan, , JUNE 22, 2011 - 8:02 PM, The Cable, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/22/full-text-of-president-obamas-speech-on-afghanistan/>.
- *Security Council Resolution 1386, (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. (S/RES/1386).

- *Shari Adjari, ‘Interview with the Chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Dr Shodman Yusuf, and his Vice-Chairman, Professor Rahim Musalmanian Ghobadiani’, *Central Asian Monitor*, No 3,1994, pp 10-14.
- *Singapore: MOE,Singapore Management University [SMU 2001], LEADING THE FUTURE.
- *Statement By His Excellency Hamid Karzai President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Istanbul Conference for Afghanistan: Security & Cooperation at the Heart of Asia, Nov 02, 2011,<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/4585>.
- *Summary of World Broadcast SU/1512 October 15,1992.
- *Security Council Resolution 1363, (20 July 2001) on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. (S/RES/1363).
- *Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) on the Situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. (S/RES/1373).
- *Security Council Resolution 1806, (20 March 2008) on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. (S/RES/1806).
- *Security Council Resolution 1868, (23 March 2009) on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. (S/RES/1868).
- *SWB,SU/3618 G/3, Interfax, “Official confirms air strikes against Tajik rebels” August 17,1999.
- _____SU/1379 May 13,1992)resulted in an increase in attempts for crossing the border according to the then Deputy Commandment of the Central Asian Border District, Major General A Matrovitsky(summary of world broadcasts, SU/1379 May 13,1992.
- _____, 9th Aug 1994, SWB/SU/2071,G4, dated 11th Aug 1994.
- _____, SU/1928 July 9,1992) 50 afghan were detained with drugs near Termez(summary of world broadcasts, SU/1377 May 11,1992.
- *SWB,SU/3438 G/1+2,ITAR-TASS, “ Big increase in armed and drugs-related crime in 1998,” January 1,1999.
- *“Tajikistan Claims Militant Leader Killed,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15 April 2011,
http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_says_militant_leader_killed/3558497.html
(16 July 2012).
- *Tajik Parliament Ratifies Tajik-Russian Agreement on Border Cooperation, *Russia and CIS General Newswire* (29 February 2012).

- *Tajik Radio, Dushanbe 2 May 1994,SWB/SU/1989,g3 DATED 5 May 1994) which lead to confirmation on 26th May 1994 that over 35000 out of 60000 UN registered refuges would returning back to the country(Itar Tass,Moscow 8 July 1994 SWB/SU/2045,G/9 Dated 12 July 1994).
- *Tajikistan Fears Security Threat after NATO Troops Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” *Russia and CIS Military Newswire* (19 December 2011).
- *Tajikistan: Interview with UN Secretary-General’s representative’, 27 November 2002, (IRIN), available at www.irinnews.org, accessed 22 May 2004.
- *The Express Tribune Pakistan, ‘Afghanistan crisis: Gilani, Clegg seek Afghan-led solution’,July 20, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/213438/gilani-uk-trip/>
- *The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2002 (Vienna: UNODC, 2002), p 160.
- *The White House.(2009),Office of the Press Secretary,For Immediate Release,December 01, 2009, ‘Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan’,<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/way-forward-afghanistan>.
- *Tir & Quadrilateral Processes,The Desk for Trilateral and Quadrilateral Processes: <http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/6546/6565/tir-quadrilateral-processes>.
- *18th Informal Meeting of ECO Council of Ministers (COM), New York-September 27, 2011,<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/3726>.
- *Transit and Trade Negotiating Meeting Holds among Afghanistan-Pakistan-Tajikistan,Mar 13, 2015,<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/transit-and-trade-negotiating-meeting-holds-among-afghanistan-pakistan-tajikistan>.
- *United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) report(1998), ‘Consumption for Human Development’,<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1998>.
- *United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDP) report (1994), “Redefining Security,” Human Development Report, pp. 229-234.
- *United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDP) report (2000), Tajikistan human and development report.
- *United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDP) report(1998), *Tajikistan—human development report*, Dushanbe, p 130.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs, & Crime.(2003). *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003*.United Nations Publications.

- *United Nations Office on Drugs, & Crime.(2003). *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003*.United Nations Publications.Vienna ,P 198.
- *United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2004, *Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2004*.
- *United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime(UNODC), *Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2004*.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2005, P 1.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2005, P 1.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reveals devastating impact of Afghan opium,21 October 2009
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/October/unodc-reveals-devastating-impact-of-afghan-opium.html>.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (2009), “ Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium”, [Online: web] Accessed 18 November 2012 URL:
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/October/unodc-reveals-devastating-impact-of-afghan-opium.html>.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (2010), “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, Accessed 12 March 2013.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Strengthening drug control and crime prevention capacities in the Central Asia States, 2002–2005, strategic programme framework’, UNODC, Vienna, 2002.
- *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC reveals devastating impact of Afghan opium 21 October 2009
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/October/unodcrevealsdevastatingimpactofafghanopium>.
- *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Principles and Guidelines, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 5, (2008), Pp.742-799.
- *United Nations, General Assembly, Resolutions adopted by General Assembly at its 60th.
- *University of Central Asia and Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs host symposium on “Trade and Cooperation between Central Asia and Afghanistan”,Nov 11, 2012, Kabul, Afghanistan, 12 November 2012 –<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/14540>.
- *UNODC (2004), World Drug Report 2004. Vienna.
- *UNODC (2005), World Drug Report 2005, Vienna.

- *UNODC 2003, “Afghanistan–Iran–Turkey–Balkan states–Western Europe”, ‘Status Report on Afghanistan; Informal Consultations’, UNODC, Vienna, p 4.
- *UNODC 2003, P 198.
- *UNODC Prevention Sub-Office in Tajikistan(2000) “The drug trade in Afghanistan and its regional implications: Trafficking patterns along the Afghan Border with Tajikistan”.
- *UNODC REPORT 2012 : ‘Opiate flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment’, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf ,45.
- *UNODC(2007), World Drug Report Seizures (2007). Retrieved August 2007 from <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/seizures.pdf>.
- *UNODC, “World Drug Report (2012),” 29.
- *UNODC, Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Balkan states-Western Europe, (Status Report on Afghanistan: Informal Consultations, Vienna,24 June 2003,p 4.
- *UNODC, *World Drug Report* (2012) (United Nations, New York, June 2012), 26.
- *UNODCCP (2008), Reports on Drug situation in Afghanistan, [Online: web] Accessed 6 april 2013, URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR08_WEB.pdf
- *UNRCCA, *Background*, at: <http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabids9305&language=en-US>.
- *UNRCCA, *Central Asian states agree to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation through Joint Plan of Action, Featured News*, 30 November 2011, at: <http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9305&ctl=Details&mid=i2342&ItemID=io696&language=en-US>).
- *Russia Challenged to Disclose Status of BW,” *The Washington Post*, February 26, 1998.
- *Russia’s Radio, Moscow 6 may 1994 SWB/SU/1993, G/3 dated 10th may 1994.
- *Vienna Declaration, 11–12 March 2004, Vienna (from a follow-up meeting to the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) Special Meeting) of 6 March 2003.

- *Zoellick Robert B.(2011), 'Afghanistan's Economic Test',Monday, July 25, 2011, Pakistan Observer,<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=105172>.
- Achultz M, Soderbaum F, Joakim O, eds.(2001), *Regionalization in a Globalizing World, A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes*, London and New York:Zed, 2001.
- Ahmar M.(1991), "Implications of Perestroika for the Soviet Asian Republics",*Central Asia*,29(Winter 1991):36.
- Ahmed, M. (1992).Prospects of Fundamentalism in Central Asia. *Pakistan Horizon*, 71-82.
- Akbarzadeh S.(2004), Keeping Central Asia Stable , *Third World Quarterly* 25(4).689.
- Akiner,S and Barnes,C.(2002), 'The Tajik Civil War:Causes and Dynamics', in Barnes C.and Abdullaev,K(eds) *Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process*,Conciliation Resources:Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiative,Issue 10.
- Alikuzai H W.(2013), *The Concise History of Afghanistan*, Trafford Publishing, page no 422.
- Allison G.(2004), *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, New York: Owl Books. p. 463.
- Allison R.(2004), 'Regionalism and changing International order in Central Eurasia', *International Affairs*, Royal institute of International Affairs, Vol, 80, No 3, , May 2004.
- Amanbayeva A.(2009),"The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia", *Asian Criminology* 4:165-186.
- Anderson L (eds).(2007), *Fragile states and insecure people: violence, security and statehood in the twenty first century*, Danish Institute of international studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Andreas P. Nadelman E.(2006), *Policing the Globe*. Oxford University Press.
-
- Aronowitz,A.(2009), *Human trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings*, Westport, Ct.and London: Praeger.
- Aydın M, Ifantis K.(2006), 'International Security Today Understanding Change and Debating Strategy', *Centre of Strategic Studies*, SAM Papers No 1/2006.
- Ayoob M.(1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict,and the International System*, Lynne Rienner Publishers *op. cit.*, p. 4.

- Azizian, R., & Van Wie Davis, E. (2006). 'Terrorism, Geopolitics, and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia'. *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES*, 23(3), 149.
- Baldwin, D.(1997), 'The Concept of Security'. *Review of International Studies*.Vol. 23, No.1.
- Ball Nicole.(2002), 'The reconstruction of war-torn societies and state institutions: how can external actors contribute?', in Tobias Debiel, ed, with Alex Klein, '*Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions.*',London: Zed Publishers, 2002, p 35.
- Ballentine, K., & Nitzschke, H. (2003). Beyond greed and grievance: Policy lessons from studies in the political economy of armed conflict. *Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity*, 164.
- Baran Zeyno(et all).(2006), "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU," *Silk Road Paper*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, July 2006, 47.
- Beeman W.(1999), "The Struggle for Identity in Post-Soviet Tajikistan", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol 3,No 4.
- Benningsen Alexandra.(1989), *Soviet Strategy and Islam*, London: The Macmillian Press,1989.
- Berdal M.,Keen D.(1997), 'Violence and economic agendas in civil war: some policy implications', *Millennium:Journal of International Studies*, Vol 26, No 3, p 795.
- Bhatti Maqbool Ahmed,(1992), " Impact of Central Asian Changes on South and West Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol 10,No,2, Spring 1992,p 17.
- Bjorn Hettne.(2001), 'Regionalism, Security and development: a comparative perspective', in Bjorn Hettne et all, '*Comparing regionalisms: implications for global development*', Basingstoke:Palgrave,2001.
- Bliss, F. (2006), *Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs*, London: Routledge.
- Borgeas Andreas.(2014), 'America's Managed (Dis)Engagement Policy Toward Central Asia: Surveying the Challenges and Opportunities',*Seton Hall Journal o f Diplomacy and International Relations*.
- Bosco, F, D Cortemiglia. (2009), 'Human Trafficking Patterns' , In C.Friesendorf(Ed.), *Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector*(pp. 35-82). Vienna: National Defense Academy And Austrain Ministry of Defense and Sport.
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali.(1992), '*An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*',New York.

- Breu, T., and H. Hurni. 2003. "The Tajik Pamirs: Challenges of Sustainable Development in an Isolated Mountain Region". *Berne: Centre for Development and Environment*.
- Brown Bess A.(1995), "Security Concerns of the Central Asian States," in Jed C. Snyder (ed.) 'After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia', Washington D C, National Defense University Press.
- Buzan Barry, Waever Ole, Wilde Jaap de.(1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lunne Lienner Publications. *op. cit.* pp. 21-22.
- Buzan Barry.(1998), *People, States and Fear, An agenda for International Security Studies in*
- Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and Wilde de Jaap.(1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzurokov,A. (2002), 'HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Time is Running out for Central Asia',*Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*,10 April, available at, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=29,accessed 29 April 2006.
- C.Johnson.(1998), *Afghanistan, A Land in Shadow*, Oxfam Country Report.
- Celmer Marc.(1987), *Terrorism, U.S Strategy and Reagan Politics*, New York,Greenwood Press.
- Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History("Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History" is republished with permission of Stratfor.")
- Central Asian Newsletter VOL 7, no 3, July 1987.
- Chahryar Adle .(2005), 'History of Civilizations of Central Asia,Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century',Volume VI, *Multiple History Series*, UNESCO Publishing,2005, FRANCE, ISBN 92-3-103985-7 .
- Chenoy A M.(1996), 'Islam, Women and Identity in Contemporary Central Asia', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 31, No. 9 (Mar. 2, 1996), pp. 516- URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4403854> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:40.
- Chouvy, P. A. (2003). Opiate smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia. *Janes Intelligence Review*, 15(3).
- Cleinow, G. 1930. "The New Republic of Tajikistan." *Osteuropa* 5 (2): 116–120.Cleinow 1930.
- Cockayne J, Pfister D.(2008), 'Peace Operations and Organised Crime',*Geneva Papers*, International Peace Institute, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

- Colleen C. (2014), 'Towards a Framework of Alignment in International Relations', *South African Journal of Political Studies*, 41:1, 141-157, DOI: 10.1080/02589346.2014.885682.
- Collins K, Owen E.(2012), 'Islamic Religiosity and Regime Preferences: Explaining Support for Democracy and Political Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus', *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 65, No. 3 , pp. 499-515.
- Collins K.(2009), 'Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian regimes: The Case of Central Asia', *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 61, no. 2, march 2009, 249–281.
- Conrad B.(2000), " The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Tajikistan", *Strategic Analysis*, 24:8, 1479-1493... 1480.
- _____,(2008), 'Der Augenblick der Entscheidung: zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs', *Nomos*, 2008.
- Cooley A,Sharman J.C. (2015), "Blurring the line between licit and illicit: transnational corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond", *Central Asian Survey*, 34:1, 11-28, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2015.1010799.
- Cornell, S. E. (2002). Nexus of Narcotics, Conflict and Radical Islamism in Central Asia. *Caspian Brief*, (24).
- Cornell, S. E. (2005). "Narcotics, radicalism, and armed conflict in Central Asia: the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan". *Terrorism and Political Violence*,17(4), 619-639.
- Easton D, (1953), *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*,New York:
- Edward C L, ed.(1969), *The Poetry of Robert Frost: The Collected Poems, Complete and Unabridged*, 1st ed, New York, Henry Holt and Co.
- Efron S.(2005), "US Backs Away from Afghan Aerial Spraying," *The Los Angeles Times*,22 January, 2005.
- Emadi H. (2005), 'Nahzat-e-Nawin: modernization of the Badakhshani Isma'ili communities of Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 24:2, 165-189, DOI: 10.1080/02634930500155054.
- Engvall, J.(2006), 'The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan', *Europe-Asia Studies* 58(6), September :827-854.
- Esposito, J. (1995), *Ijtihad, The Islamic World: Past and Present*' Oxford Islamic Studies Online.

- Fjæstad K, Kjærnet H. (2014), 'Performing Statehood: Afghanistan as an arena for Central Asian States', *Central Asian Survey*, 33:3, 312-328, DOI:10.1080/02634937.2014.941713.
- Foroughi P.(2002), 'Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 48, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827).
- Foust J.(2010),*Soviet Central Asian interests in Afghanistan*, New York: Century Foundation.
- Frank AG,H. Bosmansstraat.(1992), *The Centrality of Central Asia*, Amsterdam:VU University Press.
- Frigerio, A., & Kassenova, N. (2013). Central Asia: Contemporary Security Challenges and Sources of State Resilience. *Security and Human Rights*,24(2), 123-135.
- Gavrilis G.(2010), '*The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries*', Cambridge University Press p 116.
- Gleason,G. (2001) 'Tajikistan Minister's Murder Points to Drug-Route Conflict', *Eurasia Insight*,16 March, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insights/articles/eav041601.shtml>.
- Gleditsch, Nil Peter, et. al. (2002), "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.39, No.5, p.615-37.
- Goldstone, J (2002), "Population Security: How Demographic Change can lead to Violent Conflict", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.56, No.1, Pp.3-21.
- Golunov S.(2011), 'Border Policies Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Towards Conceptualisation', *Geopolitics*, 16:1, 239-245, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2010.493795.
- Goodhand J.(2000), 'From Holy war to Opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 19(2), 265-280.
- Grant J(1994), 'Decolonization by Default: Independence in Soviet Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 13, No 1, 1994,pp.51-58.
- Gregory G.(2001), "Power sharing in Tajikistan: political compromise and regional instability," *Conflict, Security & Development*, 1:03 ,125-26.
- Gritzner, J A. (2007), *The Soviet Invasion and Its Aftermath*, New York: Chelsea House.
- Guaqueta A.(2003) "The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions", Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict*, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,p.91.

- Haanggi, Heiner and Scherrer, Vincenza (2008), "Towards An Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4, Pp.486-500.
- Haghayeghi M.(1994), 'Islam and Democratic Politics in Central Asia', *World Affairs*, Vol. 156, No. 4 (SPRING 1994), pp. 186- URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672397> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:37, 186.
- Haghayeghi M.(1994), "Islamic Revival in the Central Asian Republics," *Central Asian Survey*.
- Halbach, U. (2013). Afghanistan 2014: Shadows over Central Asia?. *Security and Human Rights*, 24(2), 137-148.
- Hambly G.(1966), '*Central Asia*', New York, Delacorte Press.
- Hamid W A, *The Concise History of Afghanistan*, Trafford Publishing, 2013.
- Harris C. (2006), *Muslim Youth: Tensions and Transitions in Tajikistan*, Westview Press.
- Heathershaw J.(2005), 'The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise, and small arms in Tajikistan', *Central Asian Survey* (March 2005) 24(1), 21 – 38, page 29.
- _____, (2011), *Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peace building and the Emergence of Legitimate Order*, Routledge.
- _____,(2005). The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise, and small arms in Tajikistan. *Central Asian Survey*, 24(1), 21-38.
- Herbers H. (2001). 'Transformation in the Tajik Pamirs:Gornyi-Badakhshan#an example of successful restructuring?', *Central Asian Survey*,20:3, 367-381, DOI: 10.1080/02634930120095367.
- Herbstanto J , Courtney W.(2013), 'After The Afghan Pullout, The Dangers For Central Asia', By,February 17, 2013, assessed site<http://www.rferl.org/content/Central-asia-afghan-pullout/24904747.html>, assessed on june 14, 2013.
- Hiro D, (2010), *Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Iran*, Harper Collins Publisher , India.
- Hoeynck W.(2000), 'OSCE activities in Central Asia', *Helsinki Monitor* Vol 4, 2000, pp 19–26 (see p 19).
- Holmes, L.(2009). "Corruption and Trafficking: Triple Victimisation?" in C.Friesendorf(Ed), *Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector*, 83-114. Vienna : National Defense Academy and Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sport.
- IHS Janes, "Security" and "Executive Summary," in "Country Report – Tajikistan," *Jane's Military and Security Assessments* (IHS Global Limited, 2011).

- Inkster, N, Comolli, V. (2012). Chapter Three: The producer states. *Adelphi Series*, 52(428), 55-84.
- International Security-Widening security*, Vol. III, Sage Publications, 2007, pp. 1-35.
- Jackson R.(2005), *Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter Terrorism*, New York, Manchester University Press.
- Jackson R.(2005), Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International jurisprudence and the Third World, in: *International Organization* 4/1987, pp. 519-549.
- Jackson, P. (2011). Security sector reform and state building. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(10), 1803-1822.
- Jamestown foundation(2011), 'Tajikistan suffers the Effects of Porous Afghan Border', 16 June 2011. See <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e5637aa2.html>(accessed on 21 March 2015).
- Jane Davis (ed.) *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996.
- Jellissen, S. M., & Gottheil, F. M. (2013). On the utility of security fences along international borders. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29(4), 266-279.
- Jenca M.(2013), 'The Concept of Preventive Diplomacy and Its Application by the United Nations in Central Asia', *Security and Human Rights* 24 {2013} 187).
- Johnson C.(1998), 'Afghanistan, A Land in Shadow', Oxfam Country Report.
- Joshi N, Keeping an eye on Taliban: Russian and Central Asian response, *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 25/26, Vol. 25, no. 4/Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 147-157
- Jones A J.(2004), *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*, Louisville:University Press of Kentucky,p.9.
- Jones, P., & Weinthal, E. (2002). New friends, New fears in Central Asia. *Foreign Affairs*, 81(2), 61-71.
- Jones, R, Wyn.(1996), 'Travel without Maps: Thinking About Security after the Cold War', In
- Jonson, L. (1998). *The Tajik war: A challenge to Russian policy* (pp. 8-9). London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Kaldor M.(1999), *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era*, Oxford: Oxford Polity press, p 15.

- Kalevi J. H.(1996), *The State, the War and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 15.
- Kamal, M. (1999). *The Taliban Phenomenon in Afghanistan 1994-1995*.
- Kamol H.(2012), ‘The History of the Intrusion of Nomadic Tribes Dasht-e-Qebehaq into Movarounnahr and khoroson in the 16th Century’ , Dushanbe,2012,p 297.
- Kan P R.(2006), ‘Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 19:4, 586-599,DOI:10.1080/08850600600829783.
- Kapila, M., Templer, G., &Winter, E. (1995). Review of British aid to Afghanistan. *ODI*, June.
- Kaplan, R (1994), “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet”, *Atlantix Monthly*, [Online: Web] accessed 25th February 2013, URL: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/thecominganarchy/4670/.html.
- Kara, S.(2009). *Sex Trafficking : Inside the business of Modern Slavery*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kartha T.(1996), “Light Weapons Proliferation and Regional Instability in Central Asia,” *Strategic Analysis*, vol 19, no.9, (1996) pp.1278/9.
- _____,(1999), *Tools of Terror-Light Weapons and India’s Security*,New Delhi :Knowledge World, page 83.
- Kaushik, D. (1970). *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History From The Early 19th Century*, Moscow: Progress Publishers,13.
- Kenneth W.(1979), ‘*Theory of International Politics*’, New York: Random House.
- Khalid A.(2007), *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*, London: University of California Press.
- Khan, Ali (1987),“A Theory of International Terrorism”, Washburn University-School of Law” *Connecticut Law Review*, No.19.
- Khazanov A.M.(1995), *After the USSR. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Madison.
- Kimmage, D (2007), “Security Challenges in Central Asia: implications for the EU’s Engagement Strategy”, *EU Foreign Policy, CEPS Policy Briefs*, P.6.
- Kofi A. Annan, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, New York: United Nations, 2005.
- Konstantin P(Sep 2001), “Anti-Drug Trafficking Effort Could Help Fight Terrorism”, *Eurasia Insight*, 20 September 2001.

- Krambs Timothy A.(2013), 'Status Quo? Central Asia's Role in Regional Security Regarding Afghanistan after 2014', *The Quarterly Journal Spring*. 2013.
- Kreutzmann H.(2014), *Pastoral practices in High Asia: Agency of 'development' effected by modernisation, resettlement and transformation*, Netherlands: Springer.
- Kreutzmann, H.(1996), *Ethnicity in the Development Process: The Wakhi in High Asia*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.
- Kristin Fjæsta, Heidi Fjærnet (2014), "Performing Statehood: Afghanistan as an Arena for Central Asian States", *Central Asian Survey*, 33:3, 312-328, doi: 10.1080/02634937.2014.941713.
- Kuzio, T. (2001). 'Nationalising states' or nation-building? a critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence. *Nations and Nationalism*, 7(2), 135-154.
- Kuzmits B.(2013) , '*Borders and Orders in Central Asia: Transactions and Attitudes Between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*', Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Laruelle, M. (2011), "Involving Central Asia in Afghanistan's future- What can Europe do?", *Open Society Foundations, EUCAM*, P.20.
- Lawrence P. M.(2012), "Tajikistan: Authoritarian Reaction in a Post-war State," *Democratization*, 19:1.
- Levi, Sela, (2010), *Islamic Central Asia: 'An Anthology of Historical Sources*, Indiana University Press.
- Lippman W.(1943), '*U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*', Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1943, p. 53.
- Lubin, N.(1999), "New Security Threats in the Southern Tier," in Rajan Menon, Yuri Fyodorov, and Ghia Nodia (eds.), *Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Armonk.
- Luong, P. J. (2004). *The transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*. Cornell University Press.
- Macforlane S.N.(1996), *The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia, International affairs*.
- Magnus, Ralph H. and Eden Naby (1998), *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid* , New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Mahmood, T. (1996) 'Pakistan and Central Asia'. *Eurasian Studies*, 3(4).
- Makarenko, T.(2002), 'Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of Networks', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 2002.

- Maley, W. (Ed.). (1998). *Fundamentalism reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. NYU Press.
- _____,(2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mamadsaidov M,Javharieva. R. and F. Bliss.(1997), ‘Pamir relief and development programme. Socio-economic change in Gorno-Badakhshan . A monitoring report of the PRDP’, unpublished manuscript, Khorog, 1997.
- Mansfield, D. (2002, January). “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan”. In *International Conference on Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing (January 7-12)*.
- Marat E.(2006), “The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute*, Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, 46.
- _____,(2006, February). Impact of drug trade and organized crime on state functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.In *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* (Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 93-111).
- McAllister, B., & Khersonsky, J. (2007). Trade, development, and nonproliferation: Multilevel counterterrorism in Central Asia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(5), 445-458.
- McCulloch, J (2007),“Transnational Crime as Productive Fiction”, *Social Justice*, Vol.34, No.2, Pp.19-32.
- McDermott, R. N. (2004). *Countering global terrorism: developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries*. DIANE Publishing.
- Menon R.(1998), “After Empire: Russia and the Southern Near Abroad,” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) (1998), p. 153.
- Mickolces’, E F. (2002), *Transnational Terrorism-A chronology of Events-1968-79*, Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Middleton, R.(2008). “*The Great Game – Myth or Reality?*.” In Tajikistan and the High Pamirs, edited by Robert Middleton, and Huw Thomas, 295–330. Hong Kong: Odyssey Books.Middleton 2008.
- Mihlka, M (2006), “Counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, state-building and security cooperation in Central Asia”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol.4, No.2, Pp.131-151.
- Miroslav J *Security and Human Rights 24 {2013} 183-194*.
- Misra, K. P. (eds.) (1981), *Afghanistan in Crisis*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

- Mohapatra, N. K. (2007). Political and Security Challenges in Central Asia The Drug Trafficking Dimension. *International Studies*, 44(2), 157-174.
- Monitoring of the implementation of small arms controls(MISAC): small arms control in Eurasia, *Eurasia series no 3, International Alert*, London, January 2004,pp 30-33.
- Mostowlansky, T. (2013). “‘The state starts from the family’: peace and harmony in Tajikistan's eastern Pamirs”. *Central Asian Survey*, 32(4), 462-474.
- Murtazashvili J.(2015), ‘Gaming the state: consequences of Contracting out state building in Afghanistan’, *Central Asian Survey*, 34:1, 78-92, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2015.1014162.
- Nasrin D.(2003), ‘Tajikistan: regionalism and weakness’, in Robert I. Rotberg, ed, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), p 254.-259.
- Nazakat, S, (2013), “Like Cattle from Kabul”, *The Week*, P.40.
- Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 December 2002, in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press(CDPSP).
- Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 29,1993, in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press(CDPSP)August 18,1993.
- Nodirbek.(2015), ‘Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan’,*Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, Volume 7, issue 1,January-Feb 2015
- Nourzhanov, K (10 March, 2009), “Changing Security Threat perceptions in Central Asia”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.63, No.1, Pp.85-104.
- Novotny, D D. (2006), “What is Terrorism?”, in Edward V. Linden (ed), *Focus on Terrorism*, New York: Nove Science Publishers, Vol.8, No.2, Pp. 23-32.
- Ohlson, T., & Söderberg, M. (2002). *From intra-state war to democratic peace in weak states* (No. 5). Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
- Olcott M B(2012), ‘Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and the Pacific on Democracy in the Central Asian republics’, *International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research*, 12 April 2000.
- _____,(1994), "Ceremony and Substance: The Illusory Unity of Central Asia," in M. Mandelbaum, ed., *Central Asia and the World* ,New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, 26-29.
- _____,(2007), “Strategic Concerns in Central Asia: Central Asia at the Crossroad”, *Disarmament Forum* .

- Olcott, M. B., & Udalova, N. (2000). *Drug Trafficking on the great silk road: the security environment in Central Asia* (No. 11, pp. 1-31). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Omelicheva, M. Y. (2010). *Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia*. Routledge.
- Omrani, B. 2007. "Afghanistan and the Search for Unity." *Asian Affairs* 38 (2): 145–157.
- Oomen, T K (2006), *Understanding Security-A New Perspective*, Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd.
- OSCE press release(2003), 'OSCE holds training seminars on fights against human trafficking in northern Tajikistan', 3 July 2003.
- Öström, K. (1997). *Understanding the Economy of Afghanistan: An Exploratory Study*. Sida, Asia Department.p 21.
- Pain 2010
- Pamirzad K N.(1998), 'Badakhshan dar Joghrafiya-e-Tarikh-e-Avesta' [Badakhshan in Avesta's Historical Geography], *Farhang-e-Aryana*, No 3–4, 1998, p 33.
- Paoli et al.(2009), *The World Heroin Market: Can Policy Reduce Supply?*, New York: Oxford University Press:181-198.
- Patman, R.(2006), *Globalization and Conflict, National Security in a New Strategic Era*, Oxon:Routledge, Contemporary Security Studies.
- Pattnaik, A and Chenoya A (eds.), (2011), *Traditional and Non-Traditional Threats to Central Asian Security*, New Delhi: K W Publishers Pvt Ltd.
- Payam F.(2002), 'Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, conflict and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22:1, 39-61, DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124827.
- Peimani H.(1998), '*Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia, the Competition of Iran, Turkey, Russia,*' Praeger Publishers ,28–30.
- Peimani, H. (2009). *Conflict and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Abc-Clio.
- Peters G.(2009), *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda*, New York: Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin's Press, 160.
- Piazza, J A. (2008), "Incubators of Terror: Do failed and failing states promote Transnational Terrorism?", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.52, No.3, Pp.469-488.
- Piazza, J A. and Walsh J I.(2009), "Transnational terror and Human Rights", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.53, No.1, Pp.125-148.

- Ponce, R. (2002). Rising Heroin Abuse in Central Asia Raises Threat of Public Health Crisis. *Eurasia Insight*, 14.
- President Emomali Rahmon, “Address by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan his Excellency Emomali Rahmon to Majlisi Oli on key directions of internal and foreign policy of the republic of Tajikistan” (address, Dushanbe, 25 April 2011).
- Rahmon, (2013), “Tajikistan Needs Help in Guarding Border with Afghanistan”, *Russia & CIS General Newswire*, Collective Security Treaty Organization.
- Rashid A.(2001) , ‘The Fires of Faith in Central Asia’, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 45- <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209731> .Accessed: 04/08/2014 02:35.
- _____,(2002), ‘*Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*’,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp 144–145.
- _____,(2006), “Afghanistan: Progress Since The Taliban”, *Asian Affairs*, Vol.37, No.1, Pp.31-35.
- _____,(2010), *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, New York, I.B Tauris.
- _____,(2008), *Descent Into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security*, London: Penguin Books.
- _____,(2002), *Jihad: the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, New York, Penguin Books.
- Reeves M. (2011), “Introduction: Contested Trajectories and a Dynamic Approach to Place”, *Central Asian Survey*, 30:3-4, 307-330, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2011.614096.
- Rensselaer W.Lee.1995(1:2), “Drug in Communist and former Communist states”, *Transnational Organized Crime*, 193-205.
- Rexton K P.(2006), “Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 19:4, 586-599,DOI:10.1080/08850600600829783
- Roberts, A (2009), “Doctrine And Reality in Afghanistan”, *Survival*, Vol.51, No.1, Pp.29-60.
- Roberts, J J. (2003), *The Origins of Conflict In Afghanistan*, London: Praeger Publication.
- Robison, K et al. (2006), “Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism”, *Social Forces*, Vol.84, No.4, Pp.2009-2026.
- Rothschild E.(2007), ‘What is Security?’, In Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (eds.) *International Security-Widening security*, Vol. III, Sage Publications, pp. 1-35.

- Rubin, B R. (1995), *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Rumer B.(2002), “The powers in Central Asia”, *Survival*, 44(3), p 65.
- Rumer, E.(2006), “The U.S. Interests and Role in Central Asia after K2”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.3, Pp.41-154.
- Rustom Q. (2013), “Recruiting Drug Couriers in Tajikistan”, BBC News, [Online: web] Accessed 17 Jan 2013, URL: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21024235>.rview with Al JazeeraApril 3, 2012,<http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/3886/4207/6385>.
- Rywkin, M. (2002).“Central Asia in the Forefront of Attention”. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 24(1), 35-42.
- Sahin, M. (1999), “Political Effects of the Geographical Location of Central Asia”, *Eurasian Studies*, No.16, Pp.129-142.
- Saidbaev,T.(1992). “Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Central Asia,” in K.Rupesinghe,P King and O.Vorkunova (eds), *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, London : The Macmillan press, p 167.
- Saikal, A (2012), “The UN And Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization And Statebuilding”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.19, No.2, Pp.217-234.
- Saltanat B.(2009), “Organized crime in Central Asia: A Threat Assessment,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 7, 2 (2009): 75-100.
- Sarafian, Gregory R. (2001), “Islamic Extremism in former Soviet Union Republics”, *Military Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Pp.64-73.
- Sau, R (2002), “Reconstruction of Afghanistan into a Modern Nation”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.37, No.2, Pp.118-120.
- Schatz, E. S (2008), “Transnational image making and soft authoritarian Kazakhstan”, *Review*, Vol.67, No.1, Pp.50-62.
- Schoeberlein, J. (2002). Regional introduction: a host of preventable conflicts. *Searching for peace in Europe and Eurasia: an overview of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities*, 476-477.
- Senior Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 139-140.
- Shahrani, M. N. (1984). “From Tribe to Umma”: Comments on the dynamics of identity in Muslim Soviet central Asia 1. *Central Asian Survey*, 3(3), 27-38.
- Shameem,A.(1992), “ Strategic Significance of Central Asia”, *Pakistan Horizan*, Vol.45, No.3, Pp.49-56.

- Shari A, 'Interview with the Chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Dr Shodman Yusuf, and his Vice-Chairman, Professor Rahim Musalmanian Ghobadiani', *Central Asian Monitor*, No 3, 1994, pp 10-14).
- Shelley, L. (2012). The relationship of drug and human trafficking: A global perspective. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 18(3), 241-253.
- Shona M.(1997), '*The Dynamics of Illicit Drug Production: Future sources and threats, Crime, law and Social Change*', Kluwer Academic Publishers, 126-127.
- Shustov, Aleksander (2009), "Central Asia's Volatile Borders", [online: web] Assessed 10 April, 2013, URL: <http://www.en.fondsk.ru/article.html>.
- Sidky, H. (2007), "War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.41, No.4, Pp.849-888.
- Simes Dimitri(1980), "The Death of Detente," *International Security*, no. 5, pp. 111-139.
- Singh, K. R. (2004), "Post War Afghanistan: Reconstructing A Failed State", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.28, No.4, Pp.546-560.
- _____,(1992), "Central Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: The Strategic Dimension", *U.S.I Journal*, Vol.122, No.510, Pp.461-472.
- Sitter, N., & Parker(2013), T. NGOs and the Containment Approach to Counter-Terrorism FP7 Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks.
- Sloan, B., & Cockayne, J. (2011). Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats?. *Policy Brief, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Brussels*, 2.
- Söderberg, M., & Ohlson, T. (2003). Democratisation and armed conflicts in weak states.
- Soderblom, J. (2005). Eurasia's Organized and Transnational Organized Crime. *World International Community Experts Feature Report*.
- Stankevich S.(1992), "A Power in Search for Itself," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 28, 1992. Translated, *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP)*, vol. 44, no. 13 (April 29, 1992): 1-4.
- Starr, S. F. (2005). *A Greater Central Asia partnership for Afghanistan and its neighbours*. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
- _____,(2008). "*In Defense of Greater Central Asia*". Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.
- State-building And The United Nations, (2003), *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 103, No.1, P. 49-64.

- Stein, A. M.(1928), *Innermost Asia: Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia, Kan-su, and Eastern Iran. (Vol. 1–5)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stephen E. F, (2000), “Beyond Border Control” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No 6, Pp 57-68.
- Stobdan, P. (1993), “Looking Towards Central Asia”, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.16, No.8, Pp. 1109-1124.
- _____,(1999). The Afghan conflict and regional security. *Strategic Analysis*, 23(5), 719-747.
- Stone, M. (2009). Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. *Security discussion papers series, 1*, 1-11.
- Stroehlein A, Abbott K, “Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats,” International Crisis Group, Report no. 205 (24 May 2011), Executive Summary and Recommendations; available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/asia/tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx.
- Swanström, N. (2003). “The Southeast Asian and Chinese connection to drug trade in Central Asia”. *Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst*, 27.
- Swanstrom, N. (2007). “The narcotics trade: a threat to security? National and transnational implications”. *Global Crime*, 8(1), 1-25.
- Tadjibaksh S.(1996), ‘National Reconciliation: The Imperfect Whim’, Central Asian Survey ,vol
- The Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
- Times of Central Asia, (2013), “Tajikistan and Afghanistan Sign Four Cooperation Documents”, *The Times of Central Asia*, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
- Tolipov, F (2010), “Nationalism as a geopolitical phenomenon: a Central Asian case”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.20, No.2, Pp.183-194.
- Trilling, D. (2010). “Organized Crime Helps Stoke Instability in Kyrgyzstan’s Southern Provinces”. *Eurasianet.Org*.
- Turbiville, G. H. (1992). “Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia: A New Colombia”. *Military Review*, 72, 55-55.
- Turbiville, G.H. (1997), “Flashpoints in Central Asia: Sources of Tension and Conflict—Drug and Weapons Trafficking,” paper presented on May 16, 1997 at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.
- Tynan, D. (2012). “Central Asia: Russia taking steps to reinforce security relationships”. *EurasiaNet.org*, 2.
- Ubaidulloev Z.(2014), “Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: Past and Present”, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 21:1, 120-136, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2014.921966,Page 123.

- Umarov A.(2014), “The Relations of the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan in the new century” , *Opinion, Defence Journal*.
- Utyagonova M, ‘IMU incursions in Central Asia: Earlier and Larger?’ *Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst*, Washington, DC: Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, John Hopkins University. Available online at <http://www.cacianalyst.org>(28 March 2001).
- Vaezi, M (2008), “Geopolitical Changes and Crises in the Caucasus”, *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol.3, No.4, Pp.56-79.
- Vendrell, F. (2008), “Current Conflicts: Afghanistan”, *The Adelphi Papers*, No.48, Pp.47-52.
- Vertigans, S (2011), *The Sociology of Terrorism- People, Places and Processes*, Oxan: Routledge.
- Walker, E. W. (2001). *Roots of rage: militant Islam in Central Asia*. *University of California, Berkeley*. http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/articles/walker_2001-1029.pdf.
- Warikoo K (2004), *Central Asia Since Independence*, Shipra Publications.
- _____, (1995). *Central Asia: Emerging New Order*. Har Anand Publications.
- _____, (2011), *Religion and Security in South and Central Asia*, Routledge Publications.
- Warikoo, Umarov(ed.),(2015), ‘*Tajikistan in the 21st century*’, Himalayan research and cultural foundation, Pentagon Press.
- Washington post April 13 and 19,1987.
- Wenger, E., McDermott, R. A., & Snyder, W. (2002). *Cultivating communities of practice: A guide to managing knowledge*. Harvard Business Press.(ISBN 1-5781-330-8).
- Wheeler Geoffery.(1964), *The Modern History of Central Asia*, New York, Frederick A Praeger, 20-23.
- Wignaraja, M.D. (2006), “Central Asia after Fifteen years of Transition: Growth, Regional Cooperation”, *Asia-Pacific Development Journal*, Vol.13, No.2, Pp.113-144.
- Wildman, David and Bennis, Phyllis (2010), “The War In Afghanistan Goes Global”, *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol.42, No.3, Pp.469-480.
- William O.B. ‘The Struggle for Identity in Post-Soviet Tajikistan’, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol 3, No 4, 1999.

- William T, Subregional security Cooperation in the Third World(Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp 4-5.
- Willis, H. H., & LaTourrette, T. (2008).“Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in the Land Environment”. *Risk Analysis*, 28(2), 325-339.
- Wolf, E.R. (eds) (1991), *Religious Regimes and State Formation-Perspectives from European Ethnology*, State University of New York.
- Wolff, S. and C. Yakinthou (eds) (2011), *Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practice*, London and New York: Routledge, Pp.1-39.
- Yeo, A (2009), “Not in Anyone’s backyard: the Emergence and Identity of a Transnational anti-base Network”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.53, No.3, Pp.571-594.
- Yilmaz, Muzaffer E. (2005), “UN Peacekeeping in The Post-Cold War Era”, *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol.22, No.2, Pp.13-28.
- Zain, O F (2006), “Afghanistan: From Conflict To Conflict”, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.59, No.1, Pp.79-86.
- Zubaidullo U. (2014), ‘ Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: Past and Present’, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 21:1, 120-136, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2014.921966 (120-121).
- Zviagelskaia,Vitalii N (2004), “The Southern Tier: Non-Traditional Threats”, *International Affairs*, Vol.80, No.2, Pp.277-293.