

**POLITICS OF “RECOGNITION” AND “REDISTRIBUTION”  
IN NAGALAND**

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**BY**

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DECLARATION

The Doctoral thesis entitled **POLITICS OF "RECOGNITION" AND "REDISTRIBUTION" IN NAGALAND**, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my original work to the best of my knowledge and has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any institution.


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*Dedicated to Mum and Dad*

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**T. Longkoi Khamniungan**

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## Content

Acknowledgement

Content.....i-ii

List of Images in the Text.....iii

List of Tables in the Text.....iv-vi

Abbreviation..... viii-ix

Abstract

### **Chapter One: Introduction: Statehood Demand and Differential Development.1-32**

1 Nagaland: Its Socio-Economic and Political Realities .....4

2 Recognition and Redistribution.....7

3 Research Questions.....9

4 Objectives of the Study.....10

5 Field: A note on methodology.....10

(a)Research Design

(b)Sample Survey

    Sampling techniques and size of the sample

    Sample Characteristics

    Technique of Data Collection

(c) Civil Society Leaders: Second sample

    Sampling techniques and size of the sample

    Technique of Data Collection:

    Secondary Data

6 Field Note .....15

7 Field Sites: Districts and Selected Assembly Constituencies .....18

8 Structure of the dissertation.....32

### **Chapter .Two: Identity and Politics of Recognition and Redistribution: A Theoretical Review33-68**

1. Introduction.....33

2. Theoretical Perspective: Recognition and Redistribution.....35

3. Debate on Frazer (Redistribution) and Honneth (Recognition).....36

4. Power and Recognition.....38

5. Frazer’s-Redistribution Concept.....	39
6. Participatory Parity and Self-Realization.....	40
7. Multiculturalism: Majority versus Minority .....	45
8. The Need of Accommodation in Multicultural Society.....	47
9. Representative: Cultural Identity.....	49
10. Development: An Appraisal of Different Approaches.....	61
11. Capability approach: Development as Freedom.....	61
12. Trickle Down and Bottom Up Approach.....	64
13. The question of exclusion or discrimination.....	64
14. Human Rights Approach.....	66
15. Population and Development.....	66
16. Human Development Index.....	67
<b>Chapter Three:Politics of Redistribution:A Survey on Differential Development.....</b>	<b>69-106</b>
1. Human Development Indices.....	70
2. Literacy and Education.....	74
3. Employment/Profession.....	79
4. Household and Basic Amenities.....	83
5. Access to Health facilities.....	95
6. Access to Decision Making.....	101
7. Conclusion .....	106
<b>Chapter Four: Statehood Demand and Naga politics .....</b>	<b>107-33</b>
1. Naga Nationalist Movement: A Brief History.....	107
2. Eastern Nagas and ENPO.....	115
3. Statehood Demand and Its Reasons: A Brief Account.....	117
4. Difference in perception.....	121
5. Conclusion .....	132
<b>Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusion .....</b>	<b>134-40</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>141-53</b>
<b>Appendix</b>	
1. ENPO Memorandum	
2. Interview Schedule	
3. Interview Guide (Civil Leaders)	
4. Images of Field Visits	

### **List of Images in the Text**

Image 1. Dimapur City

Image 2. Dimapur Road

Image 3. Kiphire Village.

Image 4. Kiphire district.

Image 5. Kohima locality road

Image 6. Kohima district

Image 7. Respondent, Longleng district

Image 8. Respondent Longleng district.

Image 9. Village Road, Mokokchung district

Image 10. School, Mokokchung town

Image 11. Angh house, Longwa village

Image 12. With the Chief inside his house

Image 13. A Traditional Practices in Meluri

Image 14. Phek village

Image 15. Villagers engaged in Work

Image 16. Women folk returning from the field

Image 17. On the Way to Locate Households, Wokha district

Image 18. Bridge in Lower Wokha

Image 19. Church in Lumami Village, Zunheboto district

Image 20 Khamniungan lady in demonstration of traditional Indigo dye extracted from the fermented leaves.

## **List of Tables in the Text**

Table 1. Households in terms of tribe/community

Table 2. Civil society leaders

Table 3. Human Development Indices of Nagaland, 2013 (district wise)

Table 3a. Human Development (region)

Table 3b. Gender Development Index (region)

Table 3c. Human Poverty Index (region)

Table 4. District Wise Literacy Rate (2001 and 2011 census)

Table 4a. Educational Qualification of the Respondents (district)

Table 4b. Educational Qualification of the Respondents (region)

Table 4c. Number of family Members Who are Graduate (district)

Table 4d. Number of family Members Who are Graduate and Above

Table 4e. Number of family Members Who are Graduate and Post Graduate (region)

Table 4f. Number of Government and Private Schools (district)

Table 4g. Number of Government and Private Schools (region)

Table 5. Profession of Respondents (district)

Table 5a. Profession of Respondents (district)

Table 5b. Employment Patterns of Family Members of Respondents (district)

Table 5c. Distribution of Tribe in Government Employment

Table 6. Type of Family (district)

Table 6a. Type of Family (region)

Table 7. Type of House (district)

Table 7a. Type of House (region)

Table 7b. Households Having Automobiles (district)

Table 7c. Households Having Automobiles (region)



Table 7d. Households Having Four Wheeler (district)

Table 7e. Households Having Two Wheeler (district)

Table 7f. Households Having Automobiles (region)

Table 8. Households Having Television (district)

Table 8a. Households Having Television (region)

Table 9. Households Having Telephone Connection (district)

Table 9a. Households Having Telephone Connection (region)

Table 10. Number of Houses Electrified (district)

Table 10a. Number of Houses Electrified (region)

Table 11. Habitations With Access to Water in Nagaland (secondary)

Table 11a. Households With Access to Water (survey)

Table 12. Number of Health Facilities in Nagaland

Table 12a. Total Number of DH/CHC/PHC (region)

Table 12b. Total Number of DH/CHC/PHC/SC (region)

Table 12c. Number of Beds in Health Facilities in Nagaland (2011-2012)

Table 12d. Number of Hospital Beds (region)

Table 12e. Number of Medical Personnel, 2011-2012 (district)

Table 12f. Number of Doctors (region)

Table 13. Representation of Tribes Among IAS/IPS/NCS/NPS

Table 14. List of Chief Ministers of Nagaland

Table 14a. Number of Chief Ministers of Nagaland (tribe wise)

Table 14b. Number of Chief Secretaries (tribe wise)

Table 15. Do you think Eastern Nagaland is under-developed in comparison to the rest of State?

Table 16. Whether there is discrimination towards Eastern Nagaland by the Government of Nagaland?

Table 17. Rating of School (district)

Table18. Rating of School (region)

Table19. Rating of Healthcare (survey)

Table 20. Condition of Road (survey)

Table 21. Have you heard of Statehood demand (region).

Table 22. Do you support the demand for separate statehood (region)?

Table. 23. Table Do you think Naga Integration is possible (region)?

Table 24. Do you think ENPO statehood demand is contradictory with the politics of Naga Integration? (region)

## **Abbreviation**

ABAM	Ao Baptist Arogo Mungdang
ADC	Autonomous District Council
BRGF	Backward Region Grant-in-Fund
CHC	Community Health Centre
DRDA	District Rural Development Fund
DHDR	District Human Development Report
DUDA	Department for Development of Underdeveloped Areas
ENWO	Eastern Nagaland Women Association
ENPO	Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization
FGN	Federal Government of Nagaland
GNP	Gross National Product
GDI	Gender Development Index
GOI	Government of India
HDI	Human Development Index
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IPS	Indian Police Service
KBCA	Khiamniungan Baptist Churches Association
MLA	Member of legislative Assembly
NBCC	Nagaland Baptist Church Council
NCS	Nagaland Civil Service
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency

NER	North East Region
NHTA	Naga Hills and Tuensang Area'
NHDTC	Naga Hills District Tribal Council
NMA	Naga Mothers Association
NNC	Naga National Council
NPMHR	Naga people's Movement for Human Rights
NPC	Naga People's Convention
NPSC	Nagaland Public Service Commission
NPF	Naga People' Party
NPS	Nagaland Police Service
NSCN	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
PMC	Primary Health Centre
TMPO	Tuensang Mon Public Organization
RCS	Regional Council System
RCM	Regional Council Member
SHC	Subsidiary Health Center
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UT	Union Territory
VDB	Village Development Board
VEC	Village Education Committee

## **Abstract**

The Naga politics which largely operate from Nagaland called for integration in Naga inhabited areas all over Northeast, has been an important aspect in understanding the politics of development in Northeast India. However, within Nagaland, a new aspect in the form of demand for “separate Statehood” by Eastern Nagaland has been growing over the years.

The study, thus, have taken up the development question which concerns both these issues, analyzing as to whether these two demands are the same or contradictory. The work also is an attempt to look at the differential development in Nagaland. Nagaland has eleven districts with 16 recognized Tribes. The districts are concentrated along the tribes unlike any other states. There are exceptional cases of some districts like Kohima and Dimapur. Kohima being the capital, it is concentrated by more than one tribe.

The thesis has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter looked at the introduction and methodology. The second chapter has looked at the theories on multiculturalism, (majority versus minority), recognition and redistribution to understand differential development. The third chapter discusses on HDI (secondary data) and the survey data. It has looked in detail and critically analyzed the differential development from these two sources i.e., Human Development Index (HDI) and Household Survey. A comparative analysis has been drawn on the differential development of all the eleven districts in Nagaland. The fourth chapter is on the Naga politics and the statehood demand of Eastern Nagaland. The chapter discusses whether these two issues are same or contradictory to each other. The fifth chapter discusses on the conclusion and its limitations of the study.

Overall, the thesis has highlighted in detailed how Nagaland though a tribal state, is not exceptional from inequality and differences.

**Chapter: 1**  
**Statehood Demand and Differential Development**

## **Chapter: 1**

### **Introduction: Statehood Demand and Differential Development**

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#### **Introduction**

The Eastern Naga People's Organization (ENPO), an apex body of the 'backward tribes' from the eastern Nagaland, submitted a memorandum to the Government of India on 25 November, 2010, demanding for a new state called 'Frontier Nagaland' to be carved out of the present state of Nagaland. In the memorandum, it is stated that the people in the eastern parts of Nagaland have been neglected in terms of development and political representation for a long time, and only the creation of a separate state would do justice. Thus, ENPO insists<sup>1</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> The Memorandum for Separate State for Eastern Nagaland Under Special Provision and State (Erstwhile Tuensang Division Of North East Frontier Agency-NEFA (Submitted to GOI On 25<sup>th</sup> Nov 2010).

The upliftment of our people's socio-economic condition is very limited in scope that no matter what the offer and redressal that may be initiated in response to the demand by both the State government and Central Government is already too little too late, Therefore granting and fulfilling the demand and aspirations of a 'full-fledged State only' with special status and provisions to the people of Eastern Nagaland is the only answer (Memorandum, p. 7).

The demand and its rationale raise a series of questions on the issues of underdevelopment, socio-economic inequalities and disparities and their relationship with the social and political tensions. Indeed, many scholars have acknowledged such issues, especially the linkages between socio-economic disparities and political assertions. For instance, Ravindra Dholakia maintains that "regional disparity in income and human capital is often a source of political tensions and dissatisfaction in a federal system' (Dholakia 2003, p. 41). Similarly, as Chinese scholar Yifan Ding (2014) puts it, "a large economic and social disparity leads to social instability, thus damaging economic development that connects with also other social disparities which affect human dignity" (pp. 1-2).

Incidentally, Northeast India is replete with examples of such issues. Tiplut Nongbri (2014) argues that "the disparity is particularly staggering in the context of North East India, a region described by some as being in the grip of a perpetual 'crisis of development'. For most of the states in the North East, development has been and continues to be an elusive dream" (p.1). Identity assertions by different communities and under development are the two dominant issues of India's North-East. In this sense, the assertion of ENPO does not come as a surprise as Nongbri (ibid.) observes,

A close examination of inter-ethnic conflict among tribes of the North East...(and) autonomy movements...reveals that at the root of the matter lies people's deep discontent at the economic and political neglect by the state, which more often than not represents the interest of the dominant groups. A notable example of this is the demand for separate state by the tribes of Eastern Nagaland. Fed up with the poor state of development, the tribes of eastern Nagaland are openly accusing the major tribes in the state of indulging in the politics of discrimination. While some tried to underplay the charge by projecting it as a



case of inter-ethnic conflict stemming from cultural and ethnic differences, evidence clearly suggests that the conflict is primarily socio-economic in origin (p. 20)<sup>2</sup>.

However, the issue does not merely raise the question of redistribution but also that of recognition. I shall come to this shortly. Before that, a brief commentary on the present state of socio-economic and political background of Nagaland is in order.

### **Nagaland: Its Socio-Economic and Political Realities**

Nagaland was inaugurated as a state of the Indian Republic in 1963. It is a small state with a total area of 16,579 sq km (6400 sq m). Presently it has eleven districts and there are sixteen recognized tribes<sup>3</sup> by the state.

Each tribe has a unique history, language and culture. The diversified economic and social formation coupled with the varied ethos and styles of life have always attracted various scholars to study them. Anthropological literature characterizes the Nagas like other tribes as people living in hilly mountain and forest areas; isolated or semi-isolated from the wider community; having economic self-sufficiency with subsistence economy; backward technology; lack of division of labour; having mechanical solidarity, political autonomy; egalitarian values; having own religion; sense of belongingness to the community. However, the above characteristics of tribes have been considered as colonial construction of tribes and the situation has changed in present times. Changes have been attributed by different scholars mainly pertaining to cultural contact.

Till the American missionaries and Britishers came to their land, it appears that the Nagas did not have a common name for the whole community. According to the 2011 census report, the population of Nagaland is 19, 80,602, which shows Nagaland has produced a negative decadal growth. Of this total population 82% lives in rural area and

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<sup>2</sup> . According to the figures in the latest *Human Development Report for the North Eastern States* released by Planning Commission in December 2011, while the western district of Mokokchung has a literacy rate of 92.68% the literacy rate in the eastern district of Mon is as low as 56.60%, a gap of 36.08 percentage points (GOI, 2011)

<sup>3</sup> The eleven districts are: Dimapur, Kiphire, Kohima, Longleng, Mokokchung, Mon, Peren, Phek, Tuensang, Wokha and Zunheboto. The 16 recognised tribes are: Ao, Angami, Chakhesang, Chang, Khamniungan, Konyak, Lotha, Phom, Pochury, Rengma, Sangtam, Sema, Yimchunger, Zeliang, Kuki and Kachari.

the density of population is 120 per sq. km. Agriculture is the most important activity of the people of Nagas, where they practice both jhum and terrace cultivation. Besides agriculture, they are also engaged in weaving, blacksmith, handicrafts, etc. to meet their requirements during off season.<sup>4</sup>

Incidentally, each district in Nagaland is dominated by some particular tribe. For instance, Kohima district, the headquarter of which also serves as the state capital as well, is dominated by the Angami tribe, Wokha district by the Lothas, Mokokchung district by the Aos, Zunheboto district by the Sumi tribe (also called Sema), Phek district by the Chakhesang and the Pochury tribes, Peren district by the Zeliangs, Mon district by the Konyaks, Tuensang district by the Chang, the Khiamniungan, the Sangtam and the Yimchunger tribes, Kiphire district by the Sangtam tribe and the Yimchunger tribe, and Longleng district by the Phom tribe. Dimapur district is a cosmopolitan area which has roughly 57% Naga population (majority of whom are the Sumi) and remaining are the non-Nagas.

The 'socio-economic structure'<sup>5</sup> of Nagaland is stratified into 'advanced' and 'backward' tribes.<sup>6</sup> The Aos, the Angamis, the Lothas, and the Sumis are the four major tribes which are referred to as the 'advance tribes', which also includes the Rengams. The Chang, the Khiamniungan, the Konyak, the Sangtam, the Yimchunger and the Phom tribes are termed as the (most) 'backward tribes'. These latter six tribes which reside in the eastern four districts of Tuensang, Mon, Kiphire and Longleng constitute the Eastern Naga People's Organization that demands to constitute a separate state called 'Frontier Nagaland'.

Social inequality, in terms of class-like divisions is an emerging issue in the Naga society. Areas of inequality includes un-equal access to job, education, development,

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<sup>4</sup> Statistical Handbook of Nagaland 2008, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Nagaland, Kohima, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> According to Jonathan H. Turner social structure has both macro and micro structures. Macrostructure are structural properties: stratification (class structure) social institutions, differentiation, heterogeneity, inequality and their consequences for the integration of social structures while micro structure views structure as constructed from integration (Turner 2007: 420-21).

<sup>6</sup> Generally, these concepts might be inappropriate for the tribal society like Nagaland, since, besides the word 'tribe', there cannot be any special category in appropriating whether some of the tribes/communities belong to backward or forward or for that matter who has better living or position.

access to health care and other factors concern which determines the welfare of the community and individuals. Social inequality exists because the lack of resources in certain areas prohibits these people from obtaining the same housing, health care, etc. Social inequality is also linked to disparate distribution of wealth.

Such inequality and disparate distribution of wealth also seem to exist amongst different tribes and districts. For instance, ENPO claims that,

The factor constraining the development convergence to the Eastern Nagaland areas is that all who matter in the officialdom are from advanced areas, which practice outright nepotism, favouritism and discrimination upon the under-developed and backward people of Eastern Nagaland. The representation of our people in Government Service sector is hardly in the range of 3% inclusive of all categories and hence not in a position to have any say particularly in policy makings, proposals and implementations (ENPO memorandum pp.3-4).

Similarly Bimol Akoijam observes,

There are similar variations amongst different sections of the population in terms of development indexes or differential participation in the political and economic, or variations in different parts of the state of Nagaland. There are gaps in development or variations in different parts of that State or amongst its tribes. The variation can be stark as the gap in literacy rate (a crucial development index) between the tribes of Ao's with 85.9% whereas the Konyaks with 40.2% as per 2001 census. (2010, The Sangai Express).<sup>7</sup>

However, the State government takes initiatives for the upliftment of the 'backward tribes'. The Chang, the Konyak, the Khiamniungan, the Phom, the Sangtam and the Yimchunger are given 25% reservation in government jobs and institutions. And other tribes such as the Chakhesang, Sumi (Kiphire), Pochury, Kachari, Kuki and Zeliang are also given reservation of 7.5%.<sup>8</sup> Besides providing job reservation to these tribes, certain areas in the 'advanced' or 'developed' areas of Nagaland, some areas have also been marked out as underdeveloped (such as Bhandari, Baghti etc under Wokha district) and special measures in terms of funds and developmental schemes are accordingly allocated.

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<sup>7</sup> Akoijam, A.B. (2010) Communal Politics: Whose Interest does it serve? *Sangai Express*, 30<sup>th</sup> Sep retrieved from: <https://www.google.co.in/#q=Communal+Politics:+Whose+Interest+does+it+serve>

<sup>8</sup> Nagaland Public Service Commission, Ad. No. NPSC-3/2015, Dated 29.07.2015.

In this sense, the tag or label being 'advanced and backward' tribes is used by the government of Nagaland to ensure equal job opportunities to the less developed tribes and regions. In other words, the basic target of this demarcation is to bridge the gap between the socio-economic status of different communities and regions in the state.

Incidentally, such affirmative action of the state seem to be resented by the 'advanced tribes' which they feel that there is no differences between the tribes, and often tend to look at it as a practice that perpetuates parochial in-group tribal outlook or 'tribalism'. On the other hand, the 'backward tribes' claim that all the benefits are in the hands of the 'advanced tribes' because almost all the heads of the offices are manned by people from the 'advanced tribes'. Such schism is seemingly at the root of the demand for a separate State.

Thus, the question that we have here is whether the demand for a separate state and the issue differential development between the areas of the 'advanced' tribes and those of the 'backward' tribes are related and if they do, what is its nature. These are the central concerns of this work. In order to grapple with this issue, the study invokes the theoretical framework of what has been referred to as the 'politics of recognition and redistribution' (Taylor, 1994; Fraser & Honneth, 2003). In the next few paragraphs, I shall briefly look at the theoretical issues on 'recognition' and 'redistribution' so that the central concerns of the work can be located.

### **Recognition and Redistribution**

Charles Taylor (1991) argues that recognition is a fundamental human need; it comes essentially as a need to be acknowledged of one's being or identity. The underlying idea is that our sense of self is critically shaped by the recognition of our being by the 'significant other'. Therefore, 'misrecognition' can lead to serious issues of denial of self and exclusion.

This issue of recognition has larger import in understanding group dynamics in contemporary society. For instance, Taylor further insists,

What has come about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which they can fail. So, assuming the human incapability of maintaining the equality, it's in a way recognition theory has developed powerful tools for understanding a variety of social problems through the lens of misrecognition.<sup>9</sup>

In the context of this work, the demand for a separate state by the people in eastern Nagaland is seemingly rooted in the 'incapability of maintaining the equality' amongst the different tribes and regions in the state. But does it also implicate the question of identity? What is the relationship between the issues of identity and differential developments and inequalities in Nagaland? These questions are reflected in a long standing debate between scholars on the issue of 'politics of recognition and redistribution. One of the most noted debate is between the American philosopher Nancy Fraser and European philosopher Axel Honneth.

This debate assumes significance for the purpose of understanding whether identity struggles which also often demand political power in the form of autonomy or sovereignty arise out of injuries inflicted by misrecognition or due to injustices suffered by a collective through mal-distribution of material or economic resources. The issue becomes all the more complex given that practices of mal-distribution can occur due to socially institutionalized forms or practices of misrecognition. On the contrary, mal-distribution itself can lead to, and often accentuate existing refusal to recognize or misrecognition. In this context, scholars tend to see the primacy of one over the other. What is distinctive about the Honneth-Fraser exchange (2003) is that both acknowledge that the Hegelian figure of 'the struggle for recognition' has come to be reactivated due largely to 'transcultural contacts' brought about by the spread of capitalism. The demand for recognition emerged as a consequence of the resulting pluralization of values, and fracturing of interpretative schemes, which in turn politicized identities and differences. (ibid.) The recognition paradigm, according to them, came to replace that of distributive justice, which had so far served as egalitarian liberalism's response to the social struggles of the Fordist era.

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<sup>9</sup> Cited in O'Neil and Smith (2012, p.63)

Both thinkers agree that neither recognition nor redistribution can be dismissed; rather, any adequate conception of justice must be able to account for the set of concerns raised by both. Further, both also ‘reject’ as ‘economistic’ any understanding that reduces recognition as ‘a mere epiphenomenon of distribution’ (ibid).

However, for Honneth, recognition enjoys the status of an ‘overarching moral category’. Proposing a ‘normative monism’ of recognition, he views redistribution as a ‘subvariety’ of the struggle of recognition. Claiming that recognition itself is a ‘differentiated concept’, he argues for redistribution to be understood within the matrix of ‘recognition of rights’, ‘cultural appreciation’ and even ‘claims of love’ — which the concept encompasses. This framework, according to him, ‘accommodates’ the concerns of economic distribution raised by Fraser.

On the other hand, for Fraser, recognition and distribution are ‘co-fundamental’ categories, each with specific ‘non-reducible dimensions of justice’. Arguing against ‘widespread decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, of the politics of difference from the politics of equality’ (ibid: 8) she instead proposes a ‘two dimensional,’ ‘perspectival dualist’ approach. In this account, maldistribution can be ‘entwined with misrecognition’ but not necessarily ‘reduced to the latter’.

## **Research Questions**

There are four specific questions that have been derived as the research questions as follows:

1. Is there a development disparity between Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state?
  - a) If yes, what are the major features of those disparities?
  - b) If yes, why do we have such development disparity in such a small State?
2. Given that these areas (Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state) are marked out in terms of specific tribes/communities who inhabit these areas, do cultural factors and identity politics get implicated in producing such development disparities?

3. What are the political implications of the developmental disparity and challenges thereof vis-a-vis the issue of Nagaland as a unified polity?
4. How do people understand this demand for a separate state ('Frontier Nagaland') vis-a-vis development and long standing 'Indo-Naga' political issue?

### **Objectives of the Study**

Based on the above research questions, following can be noted as objectives of the present research.

1. To map out the hitherto existing development pattern in Nagaland.
2. To delineate (outline) the factors/causes of the hitherto existing development pattern in Nagaland.
3. To ascertain the implications of development disparity for Nagaland as a unified polity.

### **Field: A note on methodology**

Methodology is a key aspect of any knowledge generation. It is said that there is no view from nowhere; every knowledge claim is founded upon certain vantage points and ways of searching for answers to our queries. Thus, in this segment, I shall try to lay out the methodology of this study, particularly the approach and methods that I have deployed in this study along with the rationale behind those methods. It shall also include my notes on the sites of the study.

### **Research Design**

The present research seeks to answer to the above questions which pertain to the issue of demand for a separate state called 'Frontier Nagaland' by the 'backward tribes' of eastern Nagaland and the issue of development disparity in the state. While attempting to answer to those questions, I have used both primary and secondary data.

For the primary data, the study carried out a sample survey and also interviewed some prominent people of Naga society. And secondary data have been culled from existing official documents and other sources.

## **(a) Sample Survey**

In order to investigate development disparities between the 'advanced' and the 'backward tribes' by mapping the patterns of the development across Nagaland, a sample survey sample of household has been conducted.

(i) **Sampling techniques and size of the sample:** The sample for the survey has been drawn up using a multi-stage mixed random design involving simple random sampling technique, cluster sampling technique, and systematic random sampling technique. For drawing up this sample, the electoral list prepared by the Election Commission of India has been used as the sampling frame.

The first cluster is organized in terms of district-wise assembly constituencies and the next cluster is organized in terms of polling stations district-wise. Using simple random technique, half of the total number of assembly constituency per district have been selected, which results into a sample of 31 (thirty one) assembly constituencies out of the total 60 (sixty) in the state.<sup>10</sup> From this sample of assembly constituencies, keeping in mind the percentage of polling stations per district, 99 polling stations have been drawn up.

From each of the selected polling station, using the list of electorates as the sampling frame and keeping in mind the percentage of electorate per district<sup>11</sup>, the final sample units have been selected using systematic random sampling technique. Treating each selected individuals as respondents, a total of 230 (two hundred and thirty) households have been initially selected as sample units to be surveyed. However, out of that 230 (two hundred and thirty), only 196 (One hundred and ninety six) have been actually covered during the survey. This was primarily due to logistic reason and/or difficulty in locating the selected respondents.

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<sup>10</sup> However, two constituencies were dropped during the field work (one in Peren district and another in Wokha).

<sup>11</sup> The number of electorates per district has been compared with the total population in each district. The pattern between the two (total number of electorates and total number of population) are found to be similar (i.e, higher the population, higher the number of electorates).



(ii) **Sample Characteristics:** The respondents who have been selected from the sampling frame (i.e., electoral list), whose households constitute the unit of study, are between 21-97 years of age. Average age of the respondents of the sample is 52.5 years (average age of the respondents from the rest of Nagaland is 53.5 years of age while that of the respondents from Eastern Nagaland is 51 years of age). In terms of gender, there are 124 males (68 males from the rest of Nagaland and 56 males from Eastern Nagaland) and 72 females (40 females from the rest of Nagaland and 32 females from Eastern Nagaland).

In terms of tribe, the sample consists of the following tribes:

**Table 1. Households in terms of tribe/community**

<b>Tribe/Community</b>	<b>Rest of Nagaland</b>	<b>Eastern Nagaland</b>
Angami	11	0
Ao	27	0
Chang	0	17
Chakhesang	22	0
Khiamniungan	2	3
Konyak	0	28
Lotha	20	0
Phom	0	9
Sangtam	0	18
Sumi	17	0
Yimchunger	0	13
Pochury	6	0

'Non-local' (non-tribal)	3	0
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(iii) **Technique of Data Collection:** Various socio-economic information about the respondents, their households and their opinions on various issues such as, amongst others, the demand for a separate state by the people of eastern Nagaland and deferential development in the state have been generated through interview. A semi-structure interview schedule has been prepared and used while interviewing the respondents (see, appendix II).

**(b) Civil Society Leaders: Second sample**

To augment the sample survey, a sample consisting of leaders of Naga civil society, political parties etc have also been selected to elicit their opinions on the central concerns of this study.

**Sampling techniques and size of the sample:** The sample units are selected using purposive sampling technique. The size of this sample is 13 (thirteen). The names, designations and their organizational affiliation of those 13 (thirteen) leaders are given below:

**Table 2. Civil society leaders**

<b>Sl.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>Organization</b>
1	Esther	Female	34	President	Naga Students Federation
2	Abieu	Female	50	President	Naga Mothers Association
3	Mongsen	Female	47	President	Eastern Nagaland Women's Organization
4	Sasha	Male	35	President	Eastern Nagaland Students Federation
5	Toshi Wungtung	Male	48	Steering Committee Chairman	Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization
6	Akum Longchari	Male	38	Chief Editor	Morung Express Editor
7	Longon	Male	53	Minister, Health and Family Welfare	Legislator (ENPO)
8	Pohwang	Male	62	MLA	Legislator (ENPO)
9	Benjong	Male	54	Minister, Agriculture	Legislator (advanced tribe)
10	Chonta	Male	41	President	Khiamnungan Students Union
11	Metsikhoyo	Male	50	President	Naga Hoho President
12	Sano	Female	65	Former	Women Commission

	Vamuzo			chairman	Of Nagaland
13	Ongchong	Male	63	General Secretary	Nagaland Baptist Churches Council

(ii) **Technique of Data Collection:** The opinions on a range of issues pertaining to the research have been generated from this second sample using an interview guide. An interview guide was used to interview these respondents (see, appendix III).

**Secondary Data:** Besides the primary data which have been collected through the survey and interview of the leaders, various data from government sources and other documents have been also been collected and utilized for the research.

### Field Note

As a student of social sciences, the field work has been a tremendous learning experience. Even though it is my state, I have come across so many experiences that have taught me about the life and times of the people in my state. Truly, ‘field’ as a community of human beings who are being studied” (Srinivas *et al* 1979, p. 1), I have not only learnt about human beings whom I have studied in this work, but also gives me insights in my own world as a researcher and as a Naga.

I have visited the sites three times for the survey, and two visits for the secondary sources. As the nature of the site required, on an average, I have taken more than two to three days in all the constituencies, and at the district level, it took 7-10 days. In most of the villages, the farmers leave for agriculture early in the morning and return in the evening. Hence, in most of the time the interview took place in the evening. Besides some of the villages are located in far flung areas, it also posed tremendous challenges.

In terms of stay and accommodation during the field work, friends and relatives as well as churches had extended their support for my stay. And some of them even

extended financial support during the course of my fieldwork. Most of the time it is through administrators, village councils, tribal leaders, relatives, friends and cousins who helped me throughout the fieldwork.

For some, development is not just government oriented facility. There were intriguing observations in some of the districts where the tribes help themselves along with the government funds and schemes and not completely depend upon the Municipal Corporation or the government to look after them. Such initiatives lead a great step to proper development. However this is noticed in some of the well set up villages in Mokokchung district and one village in Eastern Nagaland. They don't feel that their contribution would impact their family expenses. For instances, to have cemented foot-steps, regular health centre to open etc in the villages.

As a researcher it was quite curious to explore the field sites in an extensive mode. In one of the villages, I was told that, there is a community of non-Christian colony and they are concentrated in one locality only. Much before I asked anything regarding them, the informant and his wife has told me something that is secretive about their practices to the extent of harming people. I was very curious, (My mother who accompanied me to the field was not and I understood her position completely) and wanted to take them as my respondents. There is a perception to see how they are different from the Christians (Nagaland being the Christian dominated state). Since I was determined I convey it to my informant that I would like to include them as my respondents. It went on for few days no interest was taken to take me there and moreover I was not sure of the locality. But one fine morning I insisted my local guide/informant to take me there. As we approach closer to the locality, he just withdrew himself and pretended that he has to join a community social work (I could understand from his long pending refusal of taking me there). So in comparison to interviews that I carried out with the help of my informant and carrying out interview by myself helped me a lot in understanding on the issues of development disparity. Development constitutes all forms of institutions and not only the resources. This has been argued by M.N. Srinivas in his book *'The Fieldworker and the Field'* where his host (village chairman- Brahmin) had

refused to take him to the *Harijan's* (lower caste) area for the fact that he belong to the upper caste. He describes that:

To my pleasant surprise I found the Harijans cooperative and friendly and I had a feeling that my own was the right tactic'... I learnt from them about their conditions of work and their fears and hopes. I was able to look at the village from their point of view (true rural village life they represent (Ibid 25).

With the same observation that I have made regarding the views on development disparity in Nagaland, this people do not access to any financial support (school fees concession and other free education that Catholic does for the Christians) very less children go to the catholic sponsored schools though they know that education system is better than the government schools. Also, in terms of development level and wealth, they are not very ambitious like other (religion and neighbors) as they believe in self reliance(less money, agricultural production etc).

I have also encountered some information which helped me to understand my work. Shamatore village in Tuensang district which is an inter tribal conflict prone area. Having seen the deplorable condition there, left me with questions as I could not think of human survival. Suffering from basic necessity like water that too due to political instability, other basic facilities being far from reach is another shocking thing to be observed. There is also another observation that cannot be ignored. In the nearby village called Waphur village, where the electricity frequency is very poor. The frequency is just 2-3 hours in a day and whenever the current comes it's such a joy *and smile on their face*. One would not even feel the need of mentioning as part of field experience, but the interesting part is that burning firewood was sufficient for them to brighten the house and no other alternative light seems to be required atleast for the kitchen purpose (as they appear to be). But, for other purpose they are affected worse, for instance I have travelled for two days and by that time both the cameras and mobile batteries got exhausted and could not even charge to capture the photographs of that village to an extensive mode. For my satisfaction my local taxi driver managed to capture some (I have asked him to watch out as an when the light would come) while I was busy with the interview.

The distance and the time taken in each of the district and village were quite risky. In one of the villages, I did not know local people. We were quite hesitant and being informed about the situation, along with my mother and the taxi driver, we could not hold the night so we travelled back to my uncle's house which was a different town altogether. By that time, the sun was set, and it wasn't a safe place to travel at night (I took out my laptop and sat over it so that any unfortunate happens, my laptop would be save, because the entire data was in the laptop).

Another experience was in Mon district, where I was told that there is a nearby village that does not have electricity. I requested my local guide who happened to be my friend's cousin brother to take me there. He took me on his two wheeler motor cycle to Old Jaboka village. The village does not have electricity and other facilities. The village is divided into old and new Jaboka. While interviewing, many of the respondents said "some of us (who retain the old village) decided not to shift to the new Jaboka as we are the founder of this village". It has been observed that, the tribal traditional land claim or the prestige that adds to their disadvantages too as the village was situated in the hillock. Infrastructure facilities like health facilities are very poor. There is no health care facility and the village is in absolute shortage of medical facilities, even the basic vaccines need to be brought on head from where the main road ends. There is a strong determination to having at-least sub centre in the village. After I finished interview with them, they politely asked me if I could write a *forwarding letter* to the Health Minister or the MLA (representative) to launch a sub centre in the village.<sup>12</sup> I was very reluctant as I would not want to portray myself that I could look at their needs immediately, though I was aware, my purpose is to make the government know the plight of the people.

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<sup>12</sup> For some time I thought of extending my help which may not be of immediate but at least to share their grievances as the issue is urgent. But knowing my limitations and weak spot in the power relations I could not help but simply take note of it.

## Field Sites: Districts and Selected Assembly Constituencies

The present study covers ten (10) districts of Nagaland and 33 assembly constituencies. These sites of the survey and field experiences are briefly noted below to foreground the findings of the study which shall be reported and discussed in the next three chapters.

### 1. Dimapur district

Dimapur is one of the most populated districts in Nagaland and the city of Dimapur is one of the largest city in the state. According to 2011 census, its population is 3, 75,782. The total area is 121 sq km. Its density is 2, 558/km sq. Historically, it was founded by the Kacharis and used to be the capital of the Dimasa Kachari rulers. It is a commercial hub of Nagaland. Dimapur is the only city in the state which is connected by railways, airways and national highways. Three constituencies from the district are covered in this survey. Those constituencies are:



Image 1. Dimapur City.

Source: Personal Collection



Image 2. Dimapur Road.

Dimapur I: This constituency is particularly dominated by the Sumi tribe. The schools, road condition and health centres are relatively good. In terms of accessibility to



households for the interview, it was not difficult compared to other constituencies. However, I found the respondent not particularly welcoming, especially in its urban areas.

(b) Dimapur-II: This constituency is dominated both by the Sumi and the Angami tribes. In its character, it is more or less like the Dimapur I constituency. There are small villages that surround this constituency which are mostly inhabited by the Sumi tribe.

(c) Ghanspani I: This constituency is mostly dominated by Angami tribe. It is located on way to Kohima and the national highway passes through this constituency. They have vast agricultural land, and many practice terrace cultivation. I found the people in this constituency a little conservative unlike the ones I have encountered in other constituencies.

## **2. Kiphire district**

Kiphire is the newly formed district of Nagaland which was carved out of Tuensang district. Kiphire has remained under Tuensang district as an administrative subdivision till it was bifurcated from Tuensang district and was inaugurated as the eleventh district of Nagaland on 24th January, 2004. As of 2011, after Longleng district it is the second least populous district in Nagaland. Kiphire have multi-tribal inhabitants. There are three officially recognized tribes - the Sangtam, the Yimchunger and the Sumi tribe (in some part). These Sumi tribes are recognized as a backward tribe and known as the Sumi-Kiphire. Pungro-Kiphire has been selected for the survey out of two constituencies in this district.

(a) Pungro-Kiphire constituency: It is dominated by the Yimchunger tribe. This was one of the difficult sites that I had encountered during the study as the communication and connectivity is poor. Besides, the people are mostly illiterate and had difficulty in understanding some of the questions. However, on the question of the demand of separate state, they were aware.



Image 3. Kiphire Village.

Source: Personal Collection.



Image 4. Kiphire district.

### 3. Kohima district

Kohima is the capital of Nagaland. The district is the traditional home of the Angami tribe. As this is also the capital of the state, other tribes also settled in Kohima. As of 2011 it is the second most populous district of Nagaland after Dimapur. Kohima is located south of Kohima District and has an average elevation of 1261 metres (4137 feet). The town of Kohima is located on the top of a high ridge and the town serpentine along the top of the mountain ranges as is typical of most Naga settlements. Four assembly constituencies have been covered in this survey.



Image 5. Kohima locality road.



Image 6. Kohima district.

Source: Personal Collection.

(a) Western Angami: This constituency is an Angami constituency. The famous and historically significant Khonoma village is located in this constituency.

(b) Kohima Town: This constituency is located in the middle of Kohima. It is an urban area and most inhabitants are either into government job or engage into small jobs. Even though it is traditionally an Angami area, many other tribes also inhabit in this constituency.

(c) Northern Angami II: It is a constituency dominated by the Angami tribe. But it also has sizable villages of Rengma tribe.

(d) Southern Angami II: This constituency is situated in the Southern Part of Kohima. It is inhabited by Angami. It is a rural constituency. Terrace cultivation is practiced in an extensive manner.



4



### **ng district**

Longleng is also one of the least populous districts of Nagaland. It borders with Mokokchung district. Longleng is tenth district of Nagaland. It borders by Mon district in the north, Mokokchung district in the west and Tuensang district in the south. One constituency has been selected for the survey.

Longleng constituency: It is one of the constituencies out of two in Longleng. This constituency is largely dominated by the Phom tribe. However, it has been observed that most of them could also speak Ao language as it is bordered with Mokokchung district. Most of them are unemployed. In terms of connectivity and access to other facilities, it is quite poor as compared to other districts.

Image 7. Respondent, Longleng district district.

Source: Personal Collection

### 5. Mokokchung district

It is the home of the Ao tribe. It is also an important hub of theological studies in Nagaland. Incidentally, the Ao tribe is the first Naga tribe who were converted into Christianity in Nagaland in 1872. The district covers an area of 1,615 sq km. It is bounded by the state of Assam to its north, Workha district to its west, Tuensang and Longleng district to its east, and Zunheboto district to its south. It is one of socio-economically developed districts in Nagaland. Five constituencies have been chosen for the survey from this district.



Image 9. Road Mokokchung Village.

Image 10. School in Mokokchung town.

Source: Personal Collection.

(a) Impur constituency: It is an urban assembly constituency. It houses one of the well known theological hubs of Mokokchung. Good road connectivity did not make it difficult to locate the households. It was established as a mission centre in 1894 by the American missionaries. It is also the Headquarters of Ao churches, Ao Baptist Arogo Mission Mungdang (ABAM) in Nagaland, which has about 159 churches under its fold.

(b) Mokokchung town: It is one of the most urban constituencies in Mokokchung district. Being located in the centre, it is also the commercial hub of Mokokchung district. Most people were not willing to be interviewed in this part unlike in other places in eastern Nagaland.

(c) Angyetyongpang constituency: It is located in Mokokchung town itself. It is marked by considerably good infrastructural facilities. In terms of accessibility, one could see better access to schools, connectivity with surrounding areas and miscellaneous facilities.

(d) Dongtentsuyong constituency: It is also more or less within the town. During the fieldwork, people appeared rather suspicious and not very keen to give interviews. This again exhibited better facilities than many other areas.

(e) Mongoya constituency: It is also located in the town itself. The socio-economic conditions looked good in terms of housing and other living conditions.

## **6. Mon district**

The northernmost district of Nagaland is bounded by Arunachal Pradesh to its north, Assam to its west, Myanmar to its east, Longleng district to its south-west and Tuensang district to its south. The town of Mon is its district headquarters. According to the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, GoI, in 2006, Mon is one of the country's 250 most backward districts (out of a total of 640). Four assembly constituencies have been selected for the survey.



Image 11. Angh house, Longwa village.



Image 12. With the Chief inside his house. The house of the Chief is cut through in the middle of the kitchen by the boundary between Myanmar and India.

Source: Personal Collection

- (a) Wakching constituency: It is a Konyak tribe dominated area. The road connectivity, health care facilities and education system are very poor. I found the respondents friendlier in this constituency.
- (b) Phomching constituency: It is also one of the Konyak tribe dominated areas. The area appeared backward in terms of living conditions, infrastructural development. People were keen to talk and share experiences, views on development. They were most willing to talk about statehood demand. Some of them wanted my help in bringing a health care centre to the area.
- (c) Mon town constituency: It is located in the town. This too is a Konyak tribe dominated area. The people here mostly engaged in agricultural work. They have rich tradition of



making ornaments, which they also export to other districts. It is also one of the most densely populated constituencies.

(d) (d) Tizit constituency: It is a Konyak dominated constituency. It borders with Assam. Tea is widely cultivated in this area, but since it lacks sufficient access to facilities, and the existing factory is not



equipped to process large quantities, most of the raw material goes to Assam. The constituency, especially the interior villages, had little or no access to electricity. People related stories of hardship in availing drinking water.

## 7. Phek district



It is dominated by two tribes, the Chakhesang and the Pochury tribe. The larger area is dominated by Chakhesang tribe in four constituencies and Pochury tribe with just one constituency. There are four dialects: Chokri, Kheza, Sapu and Pochuri. Three constituencies have been selected for the survey.

Image 13. A Traditional Practices in Meluri

Image14. Phek village

Source: personal collection

- (a) Chizami constituency: It is a Chakhesang tribe dominated area. This constituency is the way to Kohima district. In terms of accessibility, it is comparatively better than the other constituencies in the district. Kezha dialect is predominantly spoken in this constituency.
- (b) Chozouba constituency: It is also Chakhesang dominated area. This is one of the areas with poor connectivity within Chakhesang area. Dominant dialect is Chokru in this constituency.
- (c) Meluri constituency: It is a constituency which is dominated by the Pochury tribe. In terms of development, there is a clear difference even within Meluri itself. There is a division between the Christian and the non Christian Khels (locality). Those who avail of Christian sponsored facilities like fee concession in schools and local development fund are seen in Christian khel. Overall, there is a development disparity between the Chakhesang and Pochury areas.

## **8. Tuensang district**

It is the largest and the eastern most district of Nagaland. Its headquarters is Tuensang. This district is dominated by the Chang tribe but other tribes like the Khamniungan, the Yimchunger and the Sangtam also reside there. Four constituencies have been selected for the survey from this district.



Image 15. Villagers engaged in Work.  
field.



Image 16. Women folk returning from the

Source: Personal collection.

(a) Noksen constituency: It is dominated by Chang tribe. It is borders Mokokchung district. I have observed that the people in this constituency is influenced by the Ao tribe. Their dialects are more or less like the Ao language. For basic facilities, they go to Mokokchung than the district headquarters of Tuensang district itself as it is closer.

(e) Longkhem-Chare constituency: It is dominated by the Sangtam tribe. I have observed that in terms of connectivity, the road condition is comparatively good and most of the villages are situated along the highways. The villages are well maintained.

(f) Shamatore-Chessore constituency: It is dominated by the Yimchunger tribe. This is located close to the district headquarters of Tuensang district. As far as facilities are concerned, it is very poor. I have observed that many households do not get access to electricity and water supply, and there seems to be a massive unemployment. This

constituency is one of the most poverty stricken area compared to the rest of the constituencies in this study.

(d) Tuensang Sardar I constituency: It is dominated by the Chang tribe. It is located in the eastern most part of Tuensang district. I have observed that, the road connectivity, schools and other facilities are relatively weak. Most of them are unemployed and engaged in cultivation.

## **9. Wokha district**

Wokha district, often referred to as “the land of plenty” because of her rich mineral and hydrocarbon deposits, hydro power potential, soil fertility and abounding flora and fauna is located at the latitude of 26° 8’ North and Longitude of 94° 18’ East. The district is situated at an economically strategic location sharing borders with Assam in the west and the north, and connected with Kohima and the commercial city of Dimapur in the south, Zunheboto in the East and Mokokchung in the North East.

Wokha district is dominated by the Lotha tribe. It is one of the relatively developed areas. During the course of my fieldwork, I have observed that there is a development disparity within Wokha district itself. Two assembly constituencies have been selected for the survey from this district.



Image17. On the Way to Locate Households, Wokha    Image 18. Bridge in Lower Wokha.

Source: Personal Collection

- (a) Wokha town: This is the main city in Wokha district. This town serves as the main commercial centre and other facilitates for the district.
- (b) Bhandari constituency: It is the one of the backward areas in Wokha district. It is located in lower range of Wokha district. They also access to Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF). This area is quite difficult to cover because of the tension between Nagaland and Assam over the boundary dispute. It so happened that I reached there, the curfew was just withdrawn.

## **10. Zunheboto**

Zunheboto is bordered on the north by Mokokchung district, Kohima district and Wokha district on the west, Phek district in the south, and Tuensang district and Kiphire district in the east. The entire district is predominantly inhabited by the Sumi tribe and it's District Headquarter is in Zunheboto town. Three constituencies have been picked up. However, only two (Atoizu and Akuluto constituencies), I could cover during the survey; Aghunato constituency was dropped.

- (a) Atoizu constituency: It is a comparatively well connected constituency in terms of road connectivity. This is a Sumi constituency. It has some of the important institutions such as Khelhoshe Polytechnic Atoizu.
- (b) Akuluto constituency: It is situated near Mokokchung district. It is dominated by the Sumi tribe. Nagaland University is situated in this constituency. During my fieldwork, I have found that almost all the households are engaged in government job.

19.



**Image**

**Church in  
Lumami  
Village,  
Zunheboto  
district.**

**Source:  
personal**

**collection**

Although Tening constituency (Peren) was picked during designing the sample, I could not cover the constituency.

**Structure of the dissertation**

The above research questions are being explored in this work in the following chapters. In the next chapter, which is the second chapter, I shall review some of the literatures on the issues and debates on 'politics of recognition and redistribution', particularly in the context of the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. It also looks at other relevant ideas and issues, especially those related to 'minority and majority' issues and multiculturalism drawing from the works of scholars like Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and Gurpreet Mahajan. The review of literature and discussion in this chapter is to set up the theoretical framework to grapple with the material or the issue at hand, that is, the issue of the demand for a separate state of 'Frontier Nagaland' and the questions on the differential development in the state of Nagaland, between the 'advanced' and the 'backward' tribes.

In chapter three, which follows the chapter on the review of literatures, I shall discuss the findings from my fieldwork. It will primarily focus on the differential development based on the measures of Human Development Index (HDI) and the household survey as the basis for drawing a comparison between the eastern and the rest of the areas in the state of Nagaland. Besides the finding from the field work, this chapter also uses secondary data (e.g., official records/data/documents).

In chapter four, I shall look at the politics of recognition and redistribution in terms of a paradox of Naga politics, between the decades old Naga nationalist movement and the demand for 'Frontier Nagaland' as a separate state for the eastern Nagas. It shall briefly look at people's opinions on the ironies of the Naga nationalist movement that is based on the notion of 'right to self-determination' of the Naga people, which is also talking about 'integration' of all the Nagas under one 'administrative unit', and this demand for a 'separate state' by the 'backward tribe' from the eastern Nagaland.

The last chapter shall briefly look at what the study seeks to investigate and what has been achieved as well as the shortcomings of the work. It shall, therefore, present a

brief discussion on each chapter and an overall discussion on the central concerns of the work and draw a brief conclusion.

The following chapter will discuss on the literature review in an extensive manner.



**Chapter: 2**

**Politics of Recognition and Redistribution:**

**A Review**

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*Suffering can generate moral insights that, in turn, may take the form of political resistance.*

Lois McNay 2008: 274.

**Introduction**

Justifying their demand for a separate State, called ‘Frontier Nagaland’, by the Eastern Nagaland People’s Organization (ENPO), an organization representing six tribes (Chang, Konyak, Phom, Khamniungan and Yimchunger) writes in memorandum submitted to the Government of India on 25<sup>th</sup> November, 2010.

The people of the six tribes...were historically under the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)...(and this) Tuensang Frontier Division...(was brought together with) the Naga Hills of Assam...(to form) the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA) in the year 1957 and subsequently formed Nagaland as the 16th State of Union of India in 1963...

...Article 371A Clause (1) sub-clause (d) a special provision was inserted to administer their areas as a Special Instrument to look after the special needs of these areas/ people under special status...(However) had not brought any desired effect upon the development of the people due to deliberate negligence and manipulation by the ruling dispensations in the state. Lack of education, accessibility, training and exposure has resulted falling behind the rest of the Nagas by much more than a century...<sup>1</sup>.

Legacy of the century gap and the ever fast escalating and widening gap resulting in acute imbalances and lopsided growth in all spheres between forward and backward communities and the schism that is developing while remaining in the same state has multiplying effects to the disadvantage of the latter” (ibid 2-3).

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<sup>1</sup> On 25<sup>th</sup> Nov.2010 Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization (ENPO) has submitted a Memorandum for Separate State for Eastern Nagaland under special provisions and status, ENPO/Memo-011(statehood)/PM/GOI/02.

This chapter intends to look at how recognition and redistribution holds true in the understanding of identity. It is an assertion of a group of communities, which had a different historical trajectory before they were brought together with the rest of the tribes in present day Nagaland in the form of a demand for a separate state called 'Frontier Nagaland'. It is a demand which is backed up by an assertion that some communities/tribes in Nagaland have been deprived<sup>2</sup> of 'development' or that there is huge development disparity amongst peoples and regions in the state of Nagaland. This development is intriguing for another reason: Naga nationalists have been demanding that Indian State recognize them in terms of their 'unique history' and that their demand has nothing to do with the issue of 'discrimination' or 'lack of development' but of being 'different', that the 'Nagas' are not 'Indians'. In short, the demand has been that of what has been called 'politics of recognition' (Taylor 1994).

The development disparity also questions the issue on demand for separate state which reflects upon whether this demand is a question of recognition or redistribution? Because in recognition and redistribution there is an inevitable overlapped concern of development per se. Simultaneously, there has been a demand that all Nagas must be allowed to live under 'one administrative unit', a controversial demand that have elicited stiff resistance from neighboring states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur (particularly, more strongly the latter). And here is a demand, which has been placed in front of the Govt. Of India<sup>3</sup> that the Nagas in Eastern Nagaland have been deprived of development due to policies, and indirectly, if not directly blaming the so-called '*advanced tribes*', who dominate the political and economic life in the state of Nagaland for that lack of development. Therefore it is interesting to know whether there is an identity politics because recognition and redistribution is a question of being deprived and discriminated off from what it is

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<sup>2</sup> "It is politically noted that the population of the Eastern Nagaland is about 50% but only 20 legislative members are given and the rest 40 members are represented by the rest of Nagas. In the process, the people of Eastern Nagaland are being denied and deprived of Political Representatives in the State Assembly", (Ibid: 2). (*however, this figure differs when we compare with the Census 2011, rather it is approximately 30%*).

<sup>3</sup> On 25<sup>th</sup> Nov.2010 Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization (ENPO) has submitted a Memorandum for Separate State for Eastern Nagaland under special provisions and status, ENPO/Memo-011(statehood)/PM/GOI/02, See p:1.

supposed to benefit. They claimed that they have unique history and never been under British administered area hence their area is called 'Un-administered area'.

It is, in this sense, an issue of 'recognition' in so far as it is asking the Government of India to recognize these tribes, their existence as a separate category, through history (that they were part of erstwhile NEFA who were brought together with other tribes of the present day Nagaland while the State was inaugurated in 1963 as the 16<sup>th</sup> State of India) and their state of 'backwardness'<sup>4</sup>. It is also an issue of 'redistribution' insofar as its demand for a separate state ('Frontier Nagaland') is backed up by an assertion that the people in Eastern Nagaland have been deprived of development since the formation of the State in 1963. Thus, the background of the context in relation to the understanding of recognition and redistribution from development perspective is analyzed.

### **Theoretical Perspective: Recognition and Redistribution**

Briefly, I would look at the meaning and definition of recognition and redistribution. The term 'Recognition' comes from the French word '*Reconnaître*' meaning 'to recognize something or somebody that one has encountered before'<sup>5</sup>. Greek word *gnoscere* means 'acknowledge, become cognizant of/ acquainted/familiar with' (Corcoran 2008). Concoran observes that the range of recognition meaning refers to the 'faculty of knowing, awareness, relearning and knowing again'. We return to something that inhabits us (a means of identification) but it has already become other or altered (De Certeau 1997: 71). According to Oxford dictionary recognition means, 'the act of accepting that something exists is true or official'<sup>6</sup>. In German language it is to 'recognize' individual or group means ascribing them 'positive statuses'. Honneth (1995 X) categorizes recognition as, granting of certain status and failure to give someone due recognition is 'misbatching' meaning 'disrespect'. According to Merriam Webster dictionary, "redistribution is to alter the distribution of or to spread to other

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<sup>4</sup> I have clarified this in chapter one, see the terms used in Nagaland; in education, employment economic etc like Ao, Angami, Sema, Lotha, Rengma are in upper hand that is why it is referred to them as advanced tribes. Also refer (Ibid: 4)

<sup>5</sup> <http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconna%C3%A9tre#>

<sup>6</sup> Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, (2010), Oxford University Press. New Delhi, p. 1270.

areas”<sup>7</sup>. It is concentrated to justice, fair, just equitable, distribution of benefits and burdens. These benefits and burdens span all dimensions of social life and assume all forms, including income, economic wealth, resistance political power, taxation, work obligations, education, shelter, health care, military service, community involvement and religious activities.

With these two broad definitions, I hope to broaden our understanding the politics of recognition and redistribution.

### **Debate on Fraser (Redistribution) and Honneth (Recognition)**

Honneth argues that misrecognition need not necessarily lead to mal-distribution. The struggle for recognition such as identity politics is because of redistribution but should not be considered as same. Therefore, mal-distribution is not the result of misrecognition. Fraser is more inclined towards redistribution and economic condition. Fraser maintains that both recognition and redistribution are fundamental to social justice but are not reducible to each other and hence both are distinct from each other. Lois McNay observed that, for Honneth, social and political conflicts have their source in the “moral” wounds that arise from them in myriad ways in which the basic human need for recognition is disregarded in unequal societies. Eastern Nagaland claims that they are neglected and their due share is not given especially after the attainment of statehood in 1963. They were under un-administered area and were never under British rule, basically it was a self governed administration. The meaning of recognition discussed above clarifies the position of the statehood demand as they have claimed ‘we were left as free Nagas under the British rule’. Therefore, asserting the term ‘recognition’ could be appropriate as recognition means something that has encountered before, which qualifies in a sense to believe that rights and privileges have been undermined.

Fraser pointed that Honneth’s recognition is subjectivism and her redistribution is objectivism. Honneth concludes that “legal recognition enables a person to understand herself as someone who possesses the capacities-the prerequisites of competent subjectivity and agency that makes her appear as a full member of

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<sup>7</sup> Merriam Webster, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/redistribute> [Accessed 9.7.15]

society who is able to participate in the processes of will information by which a society gives itself a law” legal recognition permits a form of positively relating to oneself, that Honneth labels as “self respect” (Owen and Bert 2007, p. 13). Fraser redefines recognition not as a “psychological injury but as “status subordination” understood as institutionalized patterns of discrimination and value inequality” (in McNay 2008, p. 272). The non recognition and its implication is infact deeply rooted in the status of one’s life and it is beyond psychological point. What Honneth asserts could be true as non recognition is not only to the extent of mental disturbances but also at the practical level in the understanding of discrimination, subjugation, and domination of minority in a given society. For Honneth ‘politics of recognition is all about disputes of who is authentic’ (ibid) and integral part of it? Now, the question of authenticity strikes the chord to determine who is original or authenticate one? (Waldron 2000, p. 157) was quoted in Paul Corcoran in simplifying the understanding of authenticity of Taylor and its understanding on recognition. Taylor linked “identity with the notion of authenticity, the demand for recognition, the idea of difference, and the principle of equal dignity.

The notion of authenticity connotes the idea that each of us should live in a way that is true to himself, not conforming to a way of life simply because it is accepted by others. As Concoron suggest, Recognition is the idea that others should be sensitive to my quest for authenticity. They have the responsibility to interact with me on the basis of who (as far as they can tell) / think I really am; they have a responsibility to respect me as the authenticity self I think I am and am striving to be, rather than as the person they think it convenient for me to be” (Concoron 2008, p. 84). Honneth uses recognition to describe “both the basic inter-subjective structure of social relations and also refers to the overall normative direction of social development, in that, it’s most fully realized form represents them in maximal conditions for positive self-realization and personal integrity” (ibid). In this sense, McNay’s interpretation or understanding of Honneth and Fraser on recognition and redistribution is noteworthy. This has been come across where Akum Longchari in an interview said, underdevelopment or for that matter any discrimination is not a distributional problem but a recognition problem.

## **Power and Recognition**

Recognition is a political problem because politics is the way power is distributed, which is to say who oppresses whom, and secondly, “withholding recognition can be a form of oppression” (Taylor 1994, p. 36).

Suffering comes from disrespect? Or, it explains change in terms of individual or group struggles for power (Weber) or objective inequalities (Marx) that downplay the emotional dimension so from oral indignation or suffering that often catalyze social conflict. The motives for rebellion, protest and resistance have generally been transformed into categories of ‘interest’ and these interests are supposed to emerge from the objective inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities without ever being linked to the everyday web of moral feelings.<sup>8</sup>

The struggle for recognition, struggle for survival, the domination over the slave, the demand and agitation from the slave and between the slave and the lord (Marx) are all objectives of inequalities. Honneth’s model highlights the emotional grounds of action, in particular,

the suffering that arises from disrespect and the moral insights that it generates in the context of the emotional responses associated with shame, the experience of being disrespected can become their motivational impetus for a struggle of recognition” (Honneth 1995, p. 138).

In any kind of suffering there is likelihood of the emergence of such as moral insights which in turn may take the form of political resistance. Thus, the notion of recognition can also question the well being, as suffering comes from non recognition like unemployment, lack of educational facilities, lack of health care facilities and inadequate development. In so far as individual experiences of disrespect can be interpreted as typical for an entire group, then they may form the basis of struggles for recognition. Hurt feelings can become their motivational grounds for collective resistance only if individuals can articulate them within shared interpretative frameworks that are typical for a given group (Ibid 74).

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<sup>8</sup> Honneth was quoted in McNay (2008).

Honneth's recognition is more to do with identity while Fraser redistribution is to do with the economic. There are also many types of distributive injustice that are not accompanied by any sense of personal injury or shame at all and would therefore not be identifiable within a recognition paradigm (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp.34-35). She also asserts that

Over simplifying of process of identity formation, the recognition model ends up as a "vehicle of misrecognition" that all too easily reinforces" repressive forms of communitarianism which promote conformism, in tolerance, and patriarchalism" (Fraser 2003, p. 26).

Along these lines, Fraser's central criticism of Honneth is that:

His depiction of all social and political conflict as expressions of a fundamental struggle for recognition is inaccurate, ahistorical, and psychologically reductionist. Although Honneth does not ignore distributive injustices, his assertion is that they can be remedied through a politics of recognition is questionable (Honneth, quoted in McNay 2008).

### **Fraser's Redistribution Concept**

Fraser's understanding of redistribution is not only confined "to class centre orientations like liberalism, democracy and socialism but also takes into consideration various forms of feminism and anti-racism that look to socio-economic which would bring social justice. For instance, claims for redistribution from North to South, from rich to the poor, and from owners to the workers" (Fraser 1996, p. 1). For her, recognition is secondary and redistribution is a primary concern. Social justice leads to redistribution and recognition. "Neither redistribution alone nor recognition can suffice to remedy injustice today, hence that they to be pursued in tandem" (Ibid 4). This explains why that grievances regarding the distribution of goods in society are ultimately struggles for recognition. Fraser maintains that "politics of redistribution is exclusively concerned with injustices of class, whereas the politics of recognition, reductively equated with "identity politics", is exclusively concerned with injustices of gender, sexuality and race" (ibid 5). The Marxian idea of class paradigm is more relevant for the notion of redistribution whereas Weber's idea on status groups, which are distinguished by the lesser esteem, honour and prestige they enjoy relative to other groups in the society is applicable in the discussion on recognition. Fraser argues that any injustices will ultimately require redressing economic redistribution and not of cultural recognition, hence for her injustice is the root of both recognition and redistribution. For her,

Treating recognition as a matter of justice is not only to be conceived as status injury in terms of misrecognition rather it is a denial of the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem (ibid 17).

Misrecognition is a matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some people's standing as full members of society. Overcoming misrecognition requires changing institutions and social practices which may be more accommodative and representative in the opportunities sector. In justifying claims for recognition, Fraser stated that, whether it is recognition or redistribution, claimant must show that institutionalized arrangements unjustly prevent some from participating on a par with others in social life. For Fraser, economy is the counterpart of political and in every economic struggle, political movement follows. Roland argues that more extensive redistribution makes a society more equal (the more accommodative, the more redistribution goes along with the citizens). For him, Redistribution comprises of both leisure and consumption with similar abilities.

More extensive redistribution tends to lower inequality by benefiting low-ability individuals at the expense of high-ability individuals, but to increase inequality by benefiting leisure-loving individuals at the expense of consumption-loving individuals with similar abilities. Less distribution would lead to have more inequality. More extensive redistribution tends to decrease inequality but not when redistribution is limited. When redistribution is generous it lowers inequality, because an individual's equivalent wage depends primarily on her opportunities, and privileges. Extensive redistribution, however, makes it impossible for an individual to achieve much higher level than the average; all individuals thus choose similar bundles consisting of high leisure and relatively low consumption.

### **Participatory Parity and Self-Realization<sup>9</sup>**

Fraser observed that recognition, redistribution and representation are important to understand participation parity. She further maintains that "not every claim for recognition is warranted, just as not every claim for redistribution is warranted"<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Fraser's theory is represented by Simon Thompson.

<sup>10</sup> Participation parity is the standard for warranting one's legitimate claim. She also notes that not all disparities are unjust (injustice-economic inequalities).



However, those claimants must show that social arrangements unjustly deny them resources and opportunities that are necessary objective conditions for participation parity. Thomas Simpson argues,

Parity of participation is a necessary condition of self-realization. If individuals have sufficient status, resources and voice to be able to participate across a range of social institutions on a par with their peers, then they will be having the opportunity fully to develop all of the various aspects of their personalities, if some individuals don't enjoy participatory parity, if they are marginalised within or excluded from certain social arenas, then they are lack of opportunity to develop the capacities which are particular importance in these arenas.<sup>11</sup>

Table 1. Honneth, Fraser and Thomas Simpson idea on recognition, redistribution and parity of participation (Ibid 12).

		Honneth's Principles of Recognition			
		1.care/love needs	2.respect–autonomy	3.esteem contribution	
Fraser's Modes of Social Ordering	a.cultural" recognition – status	1a.appropriate valuation of care-work necessary	2a.culture must value capacity for autonomy	3a.culture must provide opportunities to contribute	Parity of Participation
	b. economic redistribution – resources	1b.appropriate resourcing of care-work necessary	2b.redistributive policies must underpin capacity for autonomy	3b.redistributive policies must enable and reward contribution	
	c. political representation voice	1c.deliberative spaces responsive to need required self-realization	2c.political system must facilitate autonomous action	3c.political system must enable all to participate	

<sup>11</sup> Simple presentation of Honneth, Fraser and Simpson theory.

Honneth is completely in opposition to the concept of redistribution when he was interviewed. “So then you don’t think that a theory of recognition could be subsumed under a theory of distributive justice? No”<sup>12</sup>. As social struggles of the last few decades have made clear, justice demands more than the fair distribution of material goods. For even if conflicts over interests were justly adjudicated, a society would remain normatively deficient to the extent that its members are systematically denied the recognition they deserve (Honneth 1995, p. X). However if recognition is all about respect, care, love and esteem, and simply ignoring justice and equal distribution, this may not stand the need to have recognition at all, argued Honneth. Honneth questions, “can citizens with diverse identities be represented as equals if public institutions do not recognize our particular identities, but only our more universally shared interests in civil and political liberties, income, health care and education.

The notion of recognition entails questions like how educational institutions play a vital role in the importance of recognition. Apart from ceding each of us the same rights as all other citizens, what does respecting people as equals entail? In what sense should our identities as men or women, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, or Native Americans, Christians, Jews, or Muslims, English or French Canadians *publicly matter*” (Gutmann *et al*, 1994, p.3). “One reasonable reaction to questions about how to recognize the distinct cultural identities of members of a pluralistic society is that the very aim of representing or respecting differences in public institutions is misguided” (ibid).

Is claim for recognition also a struggle for equality? (equal citizens in the public sphere). According to liberal political theorists, ‘politics of recognition’ is considered as an ethical inquiry about human rights. So, this kind of recognition is shared based and because of their shared humanity and also perhaps more importantly, recognition of their material, linguistic, racial or other cultural differences, it seems to have justified its claim and this kinds of recognition has highly used by the liberal theorists (Corcoran 2008, Tully 1995 Conover 1995). They also suggests that

Having a more elaborate concept of identity formation, the more visible one's participation in the public realm which means participating without shame, capable of unfurling his or her own personality's potential in an unforced manner and of thus developing a personal identity (ibid).

In ordinary discourse, to recognize is a verb expressing the perceptual ability to discover, realize or enter into the awareness and understanding of something. The literal semantic sense of recognize is to 'know again, identify as known before. Sometimes this can be done very easily, perhaps even involuntarily. At other times it takes a great deal of effort" "Are particular identities (categorizing) worthy of recognition? To which kind of rights, if any, are minorities entitled? (ibid 66-67). So accordingly, is Eastern Nagaland identity worthy of recognition? Identity politics must be thought of not only as struggles for recognition, but also as games of disclosure and acknowledgment. Jocelyn stated that

When we try to articulate the meaning of contemporary identity politics using the Hegelian language of recognition, we can but conclude that these struggles over "who we are" are means of enhancing self-respect and self-esteem (or dignity).

There is obviously an element of truth in the Taylor/Honneth argument. Misrecognition or non-recognition can be demeaning and can prevent individuals or groups from even entering in the process of competing over an appropriate form of recognition (that is, a form of recognition consonant with the individual's or group's own narratives (Maclure 2003, p. 5).

Jocelyn argues that recognition is the necessary requirement for self-respect and self-esteem, where this idea has been borrowed from Taylor. "Identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *mis*recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. As Taylor observed,

Everyone should be recognized and it is the desire to be recognized. Non-recognition or misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect, it can inflict a harm, can be a form of

oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (Gutmann 1994, p. 25).

Taylor argues that “recognition is essential to human being and points out how this discourse of recognition and identity seem to have come familiar” (Gutmann 1994, p. 26). The recognition should be acquired with the demand of universal equality and no other grounds. “What has been the shortcoming of pursuing social equality through a politics of recognition based on distinct group identities? Can a politics based on such identities overcome their limitations”? (Ruparelia 2008, p. 47). “Political equality of resources would mean procedural (access) and substantive (influence) resources at both the agenda-setting and decision-making stages” (Dworkin 1987, Knight and Johnson 1997).

The equality of resources therefore, means that individual assent to arguments resulting in outcome is uncoerced, and that the capacity to advance persuasive claims is supported equally. That all claims are subject to critical scrutiny, and that all participants should be able to challenge and defend the positions of themselves and others, and that asymmetries of socio-economic resources should not impede this process (Rai 2007, p. 70).

Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and of genders. Taylor argues that,

The equal recognition is not about the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society; even its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it, according to a widespread modern view. Emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens and the equalization of rights and entitlements, what has to be avoided at all costs is the existence of ‘first-class’ and ‘second-class’ citizens (ibid 37).

Has dignity come into prominence after modernity got introduced? Or is it all humans being were placed in an egalitarian way and no preferences were bestowed to any? “Equalization has affected only civil rights and voting rights; for others, it has extended into the socio-economic sphere. People who are systematically handicapped by poverty from making the most of their citizenship rights are deemed on this view to have been relegated to second-class status, necessitating remedial action through equalization” (Gutmann 1994, p. 38). Charles Taylor continues to remind us that everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity and meant to be

universally same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of the individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity.

### **Multiculturalism: Majority versus Minority**

There is no precise definition of multiculturalism; however it conveys different things to different people. Multiculturalism is a way of helping us to understand the racial hierarchy: superior or subordinate group. Understanding multiculturalism may not necessarily concentrate on culture but it has a direct lineage with the political, social and other possible perspectives that underpinned its nature. Will Kymlicka argues that

Around the world, ethno-cultural minorities are demanding greater recognition and accommodation of their cultural practices and identities. Examples include demands for the recognition of customary law for indigenous peoples; demands for language rights by sub-state national groups; demands for the accommodation of cultural and religious practices by immigrant groups; and so on”, to reflect a demand that ethno-cultural diversity be respected and accommodated, rather than suppressed or ignored by the state (Kymlicka, 2004, p.1).

Further Kymlicka suggests that it is important as it reshapes the political life. Ethno-cultural minorities in the modern world have typically faced multiple forms of disadvantage and exclusion and political exclusion is one of the forms faced by the minority groups today. For example, groups may face *political exclusion*: they may be denied access to citizenship, or the right to vote, or the right to run for political office, or they may be prevented from having access to public media to present their views. Groups may also face state sponsored *economic exclusion*: for example, they may be denied the right to own land, or to engage in certain professions, or they may be denied access to public-sector employment.

According to Jack and Sears, “minority is a historical product and almost an invention-to legitimate a new way of looking at citizenship that relies on a classificatory logic of its own” (Citrin 2001). Goldberg argues that,

Multiculturalism is a contested concept which has been used to refer not only to ethnic, gender and sexual identities but also to a wide range of

policy proposals, many dealing with education. Multiculturalism as a fact refers to the presence of people of diverse racial or ethnic backgrounds within a single polity. This demographic heterogeneity generally is a result of the conquest of a territory or of large-scale migrations. Multiculturalism as an ideology is a political response which assumes that differences in culture, in the sense of a coherent cluster of beliefs, values, habits and observances, accompany this demographic diversity (Goldberg 1994, p. 43).

Multiculturalism underlines the importance of collective identities in everyday life. The presence of many is a precondition for the recognition of difference argues Gurpreet Mahajan. Similarly Alan Patten argues, “if multiculturalism is meaningful, it must stand for social justice as well as respect for difference. Respect for diversity, in their view, implies equal space and opportunity for different cultures to sustain themselves. Mahajan positively asserts that the question of peaceful existence with numerous populations is possible and it is continuing. Gurr suggest that,

These questions need to be considered seriously, particularly since more and more societies today are confronted with challenges from within. ‘In the past it was wars between nation-states that were the cause of destruction and displacement of populations. Today it is ethnic conflicts that have their roots within the nation-state that are yielding the same result’.<sup>13</sup> That is, these conflicts began as inter-ethnic conflicts within a nation-state though in some cases, as conflicts escalated, neighboring countries intervened or joined in these struggles thereby leading to wars between nations. There were many different reasons for these ethnic conflicts. In some cases it was the desire ‘to access socially and economically valued goods, and to share political power, while in other cases the very basis of the formation of the nation-state and the ordering of its boundaries was being questioned (Gurr 1994).

Similarly, the claim made by Eastern Nagaland and its demand for autonomy on the basis of their development disparities seems very well positioned in the discourse of ethnic based demand. Mahajan maintains that,

Either way, communities that were in a minority were seeking recognition and some degree of self-determination. They were asserting their difference and on that basis seeking some sort of accommodation and autonomy. They could recognize claims for political participation and equal civil and political liberties but other forms of accommodation seemed

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<sup>13</sup> David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly “Changing Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management”, in *Democracy and Deep-Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, edited by Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (Stockholm: International Institute for Electoral Assistance, 1998), were quoted in Gurpreet Mahajan, “Responding to Identity Conflicts: Multiculturalism and the Pursuit of Peaceful Co-Existence”, (*South Asian Journal of Peace building*, No. 3, Vol. 2: Winter 2010)

unacceptable. This was primarily because the nation-state had been conceived as a political community with a shared history and culture. Giving up this sense of common identity seemed therefore to be a challenge to the existence and the survival of the nation-state. Under the circumstances, almost all expressions of cultural difference were frowned upon and treated with suspicion (Mahajan 2010, p. 2).

### **The Need of Accommodation in Multicultural Society**

“Any imposition of homogeneity is likely to be counter-productive and it is likely to create fissure rather than solidarity among the citizens” (ibid 4). Accommodation of different tribes and communities signifies larger population in full participation. There are different types of accommodation that one can see even in the tribal society. There is also a sense how accommodation needs to be looked at in terms of policies, programmes: how far they are accommodated, giving them the spaces and opportunities. For instance, whether accommodation is in terms of reservation, backward funds and special funds for the minority and less privilege group of people. But also at the same time this gesture of giving special attention has been criticized by Amir Ali who argued that the public sphere should be made more conducive rather than giving or protecting them from other discrimination in the public sphere.

Do different kinds of accommodations (cultural, development accommodation) weakens the nation-state? Is demand for statehood a political influence as when it's been claim that the movement is purely on socio-economic based? Is it granting statehood is another form of accommodation? Therefore, considering them and giving them special treatment might serve the true democratic in nature.

Accommodation is particularly difficult, and this is the third kind of challenge, when we are dealing with competing claims of different minorities co-existing in a region. When a minority is asserting its claims against the majority or the state that seeks to impose its agenda of cultural assimilation, it is relatively easier to build a consensus around what would be considered fair and equal treatment. The problem becomes more complicated when minority communities conflict with each other and seek territorial division and separate domains of self-governance for themselves. Accommodation under these circumstances meets with greater resistance and suspicion. While each minority, at one level, stands in some degree of opposition/distance from the state, challenge from other communities in the region appears to be a way of marginalizing it further. Triangular conflicts involving the state and different minority communities requires therefore a

greater effort to build lines of communication and trust between communities—elements without which accommodation is not possible (ibid).

Besides self-governance through a federal system of power sharing the state could address the concerns of the minority by ensuring the community representation in key political bodies and through other related forms of affirmative action. Further, the chosen policies of affirmative action may not involve formal power sharing; they may take the form of preferential hiring or opportunities for education or simply providing more funds for a given minority-dominated region. All these elements are context-specific. There is no doubt that in

Several cases minority claims are asserted because the existing policies disadvantage them and make it difficult for them to compete with other groups in society for prestigious social, economic and political positions. But this should not be taken to imply that minorities are always worse off or that cultural claims made by them are just a front to seek redistribution of material goods. Questions of recognition and accommodation arise in most democratic societies. What needs to be reiterated here is that cultural claims have their own rationale and importance; they need to be taken seriously and attended to. It is equally important to recognize that cultural claims do not always stand in for the seemingly more 'real' claims for material redistribution. Consequently, it is not always sufficient to focus on the latter. Availability of resources and prospects of the 'development' of a particular region are always welcomed, and they can help to de-escalate the problem, but when redistribution claims are backed by the rhetoric of cultural distinctiveness and difference, the latter too have to be accommodated (Ibid 9)

It is not sufficient to simply improve the living conditions. In fact the concerns of redistribution and cultural recognition have to go hand-in-hand and it is this that necessitates some form of relative autonomy for regionally concentrated minority populations. Policies of accommodation have therefore a twin task to perform: ensuring equal treatment for a community and equal treatment for minorities within the community/region where the minority is concentrated (ibid 10).

Each of these tasks in itself quite difficult and together they pose an even greater challenge. Just as the nation—state is often suspicious of the minorities seeking special or separate treatment, minorities which receive recognition and accommodation are suspicious of any effort to create prior safeguards for internal minorities. They view such efforts as a continuing sign of mistrust of the community and external intervention. Hence, bringing the state on board along with the minorities to



accommodate a given minority while simultaneously protecting vulnerable members of the group/region poses a big challenge. Indeed, efforts at accommodation are usually so focused on accommodating a protesting minority that the fate of internal minorities and dissenters is often forgotten. It is this neglect of the fate of marginalized groups within the community that eventually builds resistance to policies of accommodation. Hence, both in the interest of building a consensus in the larger society as well as for due recognition to members of a minority, accommodation must attend to the twin concerns of equality between groups as well as equality within the community. It is the ability to successfully fulfill these two tasks that determines the survival and the fate of a democratic state”.

The important part is do concepts such as multiculturalism or the protection of minorities adequately addresses the needs of all? As individuals with mixed identities or national or indigenous communities who share a different historical memory than that of the nation-state? To what extent have various programs targeting inequality been successful or just increased class differences within target groups and in the wider society? (Raj and Andrew 2009, p. XV).

## **Representation: Cultural Identity**

Mahajan states that,

Commitment or belonging is reciprocal in nature. A citizen cannot be committed to her political community unless it is also committed to her, and one cannot belong to it unless it accepts her as one of it. The political community therefore cannot expect its members to develop a sense of belonging to it unless it in turn belongs to them. It must, therefore, value and cherish them all equally and reflect this in its structure, policies, conduct of public affairs, self-understanding and self-definition. This involves granting them equal rights of citizenship, a decent standard of living, and the opportunity to develop them and participate in and make their respective contributions to its collective life”. Mahajan further argues that “to be an effective reality, non-discrimination entailed that all public spaces be opened to persons of all categories. In particular, it required that no one should be kept away from positions that are economically and socially prestigious; multiculturalism makes us aware that promoting sameness may itself be a mode of unequal treatment (Mahajan 2002 24).

“The idea that sameness may be oppressive and that it may disadvantage minority populations, is a lesson that multiculturalism brings home to us”.<sup>14</sup> Lanunungsang (1993 202) observed that,

Development is purely a political commitment, created with vested political interest, the level of development and the size of population vary from constituency to constituency and the volumes of their needs are not the same<sup>15</sup>.

At the same time, some smaller constituencies are better developed than many larger constituencies in terms of development and do not require but more attention with more funds is required especially in backward areas. The distribution of equal amount is, therefore, likely to create unequal development.

In terms of differences In any manner in the public sphere what are the notions of equality that prevail in a heterogeneous public sphere? At what level must differences exist in the public sphere? These are questions that can be examined carefully once we recognise the ways in which the notion of complete identity and sameness discriminate some communities in the nation-state (Mahajan 2002, p. 25).

Discrimination, in other words, exists and takes in many different forms within the nation-state. And the very fact that some sort of oppression and disadvantages could be of stereo-typed form. It is evident in the laws and the policies of the state as well as in the forms in which communities are represented in the public arena. Indeed, “representations of otherness, particularly in the form of stereotype are some of the most resilient and pervasive modes of discrimination that continue to exist even today” (ibid: 26). These representations of *otherness*<sup>16</sup> are important for they play a crucial role in the way institutions of state and society perceive minority populations.

*“As the two petite Ao tribal girls demonstrated Indigo dye being extracted from the fermented leaves of Osak, many young Naga men and women looked on with interest and excitement”*, Sentila, T. Yanger (Hornbill Festival 2009)<sup>17</sup>. This is one of the

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<sup>14</sup> A retired Prof. from Nagaland University who has contributed extensively in the academia.

<sup>15</sup> Ao, A.Lanunungsang., in Sinha A. C ed, (1993 202).

<sup>16</sup> (“Before the colour fades away”-December 11, 2009) Yanger, Sentila T, 2009, Hornbill Festival, (<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-fridayreview/before-the-colour-fades-away/article660927.ece>)

<sup>17</sup> Yanger, 2009, Hornbill Festival,

forms of mis-representation. In many cases “minority communities get discriminated and mis-represented because the majority enjoys special privileges, either on account of the past policies of the state, or its current practices” (Mahajan 2002, p. 27).

The historically advantaged position of the majority community is only one of the many sources of discrimination in contemporary liberal societies. On many occasions, it is the cultural policies and orientation of the nation-state that place minority communities at a disadvantage juncture. For instance, the above picture clearly shows the cultural practices which try appropriate the majority tribe in the public domain but in actual sense it’s the minority rich culture. Misrepresentation either by the minority or majority is another kind of discrimination.

This kind of misrepresentation and domination over the minority may perpetuate to misrecognise their unique identity as Taylor maintains that such misrecognition may inflict harm in the form of oppression. This



Image 20 Khamniungan lady in demonstration of traditional Indigo dye extracted from the fermented leaves.

particular tribe belongs to Khamniungan and not Ao tribe in the given above picture. Such is the instance that derived from certain misrecognition and discrimination.

Some of the minority theories states that to reflect on the minority implication, numerical may not necessarily represents the number rather locate the amount of ‘subjugation and oppression’ that one experiences. Some of them are being

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(<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-fridayreview/before-the-colour-fades-away/article660927.ece>). The above misrepresentation of the culture by the dominant community clearly depicts the discrimination over the minority community. Many times backward tribes are used as a ‘cultural specialised’ when it comes to show case and portraying the rich culture of the Nagas whether to be performing or to representing during different occasions and functions held at the State level. As Lajwanti Chatani argued that, this not only compels the minority as “their” national culture, it also systematically encourages and allows for the disappearance or disrespect of the culture of the minority. P. 59).

marginalized based on socio-economic (quantitative marginalization) Minority claim should be quantitative and not qualitative (the minority claim on being tribal as backward). This we can locate where differences occur at the tribe and district level. One tribe blames the other for its disadvantages in the society. Though cultural minority is not very clearly pointed out during the course of my fieldwork, it does not seem like there is a cultural minority. But it is visibly indicated as a misrepresentation (the above picture) where a cultural demonstration of Khamniungan tribe on *Indigo dye being extracted from the fermented leaves and this has been portrayed as Ao's cultural practices*. In another instance, an Angami tribe designer has made a Sangtam tribe male shawl which was worn by Priyanka Chopra. This has become a huge issue because in Naga society, male and female shawl is to be maintained with sanctity<sup>18</sup>. The USSC states that, “the designer being a Naga should know the customs and its usage because it is disparaging to the Sangtams in particular and even to other tribes too.” These are some of the instances in common platform how culturally also some of the tribes are being treated differently (minority). Loosely this can be viewed in terms of power relation, as Akum Longchari has rightly said in the interview that, some handful minority rules Nagaland and marginalized the larger section (qualitative marginalization).

Mahajan argues that ‘the majority community is one whose culture is recognised by the state and while minorities are those whose cultures are not represented in the public domain’ therefore when such differentiation being maintained by the state, it is likely to collapse the ethos of accommodation. This notion of the majority and the minorities follows from the multicultural reading of cultural discrimination and marginalisation. Minorities are said to be marginalised because these cultures are excluded from the public arena and policies of the state which eventually makes them a less attractive option. If the State sees the potentiality from this particular communities, how far they are being given the opportunities to improve themselves by giving them proper policies, incentives, programmes? However till

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<sup>18</sup> United Sangtam Students' Conference (USSC) heat on Priyanka over Naga shawl insult. Priyanka Chopra's wardrobe was designed by Atsu Sekhose (Angami tribe), a Naga fashion designer. People of the Sangtam tribe are inhabitants of Tuensang and Kiphire districts of the state.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/United-Sangtam-Students-Conference-heat-on-Priyanka-over-Naga-shawl-insult/articleshow/30489903.cms> [Accessed 23.02.2016].

today, many of the cultural talents are not put into strength in-order to help improve the economy. Had the government being careful enough then, there are numerous avenues to locate themselves and claim of their identity being distinct from the rest of the Nagas in Nagaland. Further mahajan posits that,

The multicultural agenda of preserving marginalised minorities through a system of group-differentiated rights is supposed to protect minority cultures from this fate: namely, gradual disintegration and extinction (Mahajan 2002, p. 37).

Similarly, Taylor stated that Authenticity which is related to recognition, as for him recognition only lead or instills the capability to claim for the original or authenticity. One can also enquire whether Eastern Nagaland history is sufficient to prove its originality or authenticity. Taylor emphasizes authenticity is a valid self understanding more than autonomy and equal dignity. Therefore authenticity, autonomy and equal dignity comes under the rubric of politics of recognition and one's origin is important than any other claim and more-so. To agree with Mahajan, claiming of economic resources and other necessities are nothing and doesn't seem to qualify as much as history does. As no one has natural right to exercise power over others. Therefore recognition is a demand of public acknowledgement of their particularity, to recognize its unique identity of its groups and individuals for many feel denied of free and equal being status. Not sufficient resources, claim for certain rights, and attained its equality, that would be the meaning of free and equal status but free in what sense, where and for what? Equal beings: as to how, why, when, where, whom and for what? As Lajwanti Chatani maintains that:

Justice requires a more equitable distribution of collective goods for compensating the unequal conditions of life in capitalist societies; and such distribution is achievable and agreeable under conditions of our intuitive and political rationality" (Tripathy and Sudarsan 2014, p. 52).

In the same vein, Chatani explains Rawls understanding on distribution in terms of infrastructure of transportation, health care and education. The tension emerges when rights are to be awarded to groups, that is, when groups and collectivities are to be recognized as minorities and guaranteed minority rights. This led to two fundamental questions: first, can rights squarely (directly) worked out for individuals are applied to groups and collectivities? Second, when should be group be recognized as a minority?

Recognizing minority rights and being just to other cultures would then inevitably depend on the questioning and possible disintegration of the dominant culture of nationalism. It would require a rethinking of the conditions for living together and a respect for the different cultural entities that inhabit the social space (ibid: 60). Taylor observed that:

It is a certain way of being human that is My way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me (Gutmann 1994, p. 30).

For Taylor,

Identity was largely fixed by one's social position what people recognized as important to themselves was to a great extent determined by their place in society, and whatever roles or activities attached to this position". Identity does not developed in isolation but negotiate through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal with others (ibid 34).

The understanding of Identity and recognition has become a problematic because of the modern rights and awareness of one's rights and probably resources related conflicts. Similarly Fraser comments that conflicts turned chiefly on resources and were disputed in distributive terms. Fraser argues that both recognition and redistribution are important. But both are not reducible to each other. Hence, the demand for one's recognition is always determined by the conflict resources that usually aimed for.

The distinguishing idea of "warranted from unwarranted"<sup>19</sup> claims as suggested can be understood. How then, should recognition claims be judged in a larger picture? What constitutes an adequate criterion for assessing their merits? The approach proposed here appeals to participatory parity as an evaluative standard.

Advocates of 'Participatory Development' emphasized a difference between participation as "an end in itself", and participatory development as a "process of empowerment" for marginalized populations. In the case of Nagaland it has failed to take the marginalized opinion and next to non participation in the decision making. Some were non-participants because of the absence of power, where empowerment

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<sup>19</sup> For Fraser, warranted and unwarranted is that the current arrangements prevent them from participating on a par with others in social life. The claim should be valid to access to one's justice. Redistribution claimants must show that existing economic arrangements deny them the necessary objective conditions for participatory parity (ibid 38).

should have been considered as the sole criteria for any kind of development. The proponents of participatory development tries to “foster and enhance people’s capability to have a role in their society’s development” (Mohan 2007, p. 781). Hence for well informed participation to occur, it is argued that some version of transparency, e.g. radical transparency, is necessary, but not sufficient. It has also been argued that those most affected by a decision should have the most say while those that are least affected should have the least say. Furthermore, the fundamental aim of empowering people to handle challenges and influence the direction of their own lives is inherent in participation. “Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, and negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan 2005, p. 5). Participatory parity is the standard for warranting claims as Fraser suggested. Fraser argues that whether they are demanding redistribution or recognition:

Claimants must show that the social changes they seek will in fact promote parity of participation. Redistribution claimants must show that the economic reforms they advocate will supply the objective conditions for full participation to those currently denied them without introducing or exacerbating disparities along with other dimensions in a manner that is unjustifiable (Taylor 1994, p. 39).

One would agree that “Recognition is a remedy for social injustice not the satisfaction of a generic human need” (ibid 44). Misrecognition does not directly entail mal-distribution, although it, too, surely contributes to the latter. Misrecognition does not always lead to mal-distribution, however they compliment and attributes to each other.

Honneth and Fraser conceives that,

We also agree that one familiar account of the relation between them is inadequate: both of us reject the economic view that would reduce recognition to a mere epiphenomenon of distribution. There, however, our agreement ends. One of us, Honneth, conceives recognition as the fundamental, overarching moral category, while treating distribution as derivative (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p 2).

In some sense, they both thrust on recognition rather than redistribution. Honneth reinterprets the socialist ideal of redistribution as a sub variety of the struggle for recognition (basically recognition is the means for redistribution). It is also important to analyze as Fraser pointed out how misrecognition does not always led to mal-

distribution, and let's try to understand the conjecture of development in the context of 'Eastern Nagaland'. Development with dignity as it is understood to be the credentials, however, in economic view it may not be the only unit to be associated with recognition and one's dignity. So is it a question of not being recognized that has led to mal-distribution within Nagaland? It is also curious to know whether the development disparities have a connotation of both this desired goals or not? Taylor comments that

Injustice is a social injury and distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social disrespect or, better said, of unjustified relations of recognition" (ibid 114).

If this can be shown and Fraser's dichotomy of "recognition" and "redistribution" turns out to be doubtful, then the question of the normative justification of demands for recognition remains as a final and decisive problem.

Injustice is seen as humiliation and disrespect (Honneth) that reveals misrecognition and mal-distribution which constitute all sorts of marginalized attributions. Fraser stresses that,

It makes a fundamental difference whether the culturally defined groups are demanding a kind of social appreciation or the legal recognition of their collective identity, these two alternatives gives rise to the suspicion that, because of the rigid distinction between "redistribution" and "cultural recognition"<sup>20</sup>.

This argument creates the impression that social groups basically struggle for material resources or for cultural recognition. Cultural aspects related to one's deprivation could be directly relate it to other developmental prospects as Amartya Sen would argue the same and this may be associated with the above cited claim by Eastern Nagaland demand.

As Sen argues that, culture and economy both have its own contribution by maintaining its own purpose and objectives, on the positive side, development efforts including economic expansion, can be integrated with programmes for supporting and helping the dissemination of indigenous cultural expressions, for example the expansion of traditional music and dancing. These too are cultural investments, but these activities may be aimed primarily at cultural objectives, as opposed to generating

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<sup>20</sup> Fraser's argument has intrigued upon the struggle over the material resources. Basically it is the problem of distribution which she would term it as mal-distribution.



incomes. There is, of course, nothing contradictory in pursuing several objectives simultaneously. If cultural related development takes place, it is in the benefit of the majority or the so called 'advanced tribes' dominates over the opportunities and circumscribe the 'backward tribes'. Indeed, spread of cultural contacts - between different countries as well as within them - through films, paintings, music, dancing, etc., can expand cultural opportunities and also provide income and employment to many. As long as the need of development is maintained, Sen argued that, Social Choice and Democracy have to be realised so as to have inclusive social decisions (democracy). For example, there may be some tussle between economic modernity and cultural traditionalism, each of which may be valued by different people differently.

As Bhikhu Parekh has also maintains that recognition is a matter of justice to enjoy equal access to the rights, opportunities, material resources and basic capabilities needed to lead such lives. He stresses the importance of state's and role rightly questions the plea for the indiscriminate public recognition of all identities made by some of the advocates of recognition. We cannot deny their basic point that the State should not as a matter of principle remain indifferent to the claims of identities. Can we also understand development disparities in terms of poor functioning of State government? Because the inequality persistence cannot be blamed only towards the higher authority but somewhere the state policy also could not tackle with the lacunae as it happens in Nagaland. As Parekh argues the importance of State's role, similarly this observation would also like to draw attention why there is a disparity and a less government attention to the minority tribes usually? For him redistribution and recognition are equally important and need to be integrated into a coherent theory of politics. He said redistribution is not purely economic and social equality and cannot be given as it is because it needs deep psychological, moral and cultural changes among the oppressed. Nancy Fraser has called this transformation process a transition from the idea of 'redistribution' to the notion of 'recognition unlike Honneth observed. Hence, recognition has rather deeper implication in the whole gamut of mal-distribution, but we cannot ignore the fact that when one is not given the equal allocation or distribution people would remain stagnant.

The history of Eastern Nagaland has been catalogued in the Memorandum submitted on 25<sup>th</sup> Nov 2010.

The present Eastern Nagaland area was under the then one single administrative unit i.e. Tuensang District, which was administratively and politically functioning independently through the Tuensang Regional Council System (RCS) consisting of thirty five Regional Council Members (RCM) with special provisions and status. However, after the dissolution of RCS and amalgamation with the Nagaland Legislative Assembly (NLA), the present four districts were unfairly and arbitrarily adjusted with twenty members only in the Nagaland Legislative Assembly out of sixty members to represent the people with comparatively large number of local voters in each Assembly Constituencies. It is to be politically noted that the population of the Eastern Nagaland is about 50% and where all forty members are represented by other remaining tribes. In the process, the people of Eastern Nagaland are being denied and deprived of balanced Representatives in the State Assembly. Moreover, the area was geographically unexposed and excluded/un-administered free from the influence of the outside world and totally untouched both by modern culture and western rule and from the mainland as well<sup>21</sup> (Memorandum paragraph 9<sup>th</sup>& 10<sup>th</sup>).

From the above claim, there is a crystal motivation of political deprivation being there for many years. Where the region being efficiently administered and have their own economic development but as the new infringement came in, the scenario of political, social and economical lose its originality and tend to depend on the novel idea of administration in Eastern Nagaland. So is it possible to say that the political deprivation has inter-linkage with the power distribution in determining the problem of dislocated development? When we analyze the statistical proportion of Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) seats, it is obvious that it has been disproportionately distributed. The ratio of the assembly seat is 20:40 unlike the strength of the population of Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the tribes' population. Where, in terms of population of Eastern Nagaland it constitutes 45-50% (ENPO claim) to that of the rest of the tribes in Nagaland, but according to 2011 census, it is recorded as 30% of the Nagaland population. It might say that, accordingly, looking at the population strength, the assembly seats should have been allotted proportionately and its relevance but unfortunately, population has over weighed the assembly seats and importantly rather than the needs of the people.

According to Population census 2011, in fact the Konyak tribe of Eastern Nagaland itself constitutes 2, 50, 671 out of the total population of 19, 80, 602 in Nagaland. However only nine constituencies are allotted to them compared to

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<sup>21</sup> On 25<sup>th</sup> Nov. 2010 Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization (ENPO) has submitted a Memorandum for Separate Statehood under special provisions and status (Memorandum paragraph 9<sup>th</sup>& 10<sup>th</sup>).

Mokokchung district population of 1, 93, 171 and ten constituencies are allotted to this district. There are some constituencies where hardly three to four thousand populations with just 494 voters out of the total district voters of 1, 34,178 and a district population of 1,93,171 have constituted the assembly. So, is it a question of misdistribution when there is a disproportionate distribution in the representative allotment? As development packages are specified as per the representative in respective areas. Thus, large portion of the requirement would definitely capture by the majority in terms of representation, power and not of population and this 'deliberate discrimination' is catalogued transparently in their statehood demand.

As Honneth argues that the primary component is recognition and not redistribution. Ruparelia argues that, "we have in the meantime become conscious of the fact that the recognition of human dignity comprises a central principle of social justice. What explains the emergence of the politics of recognition based on distinct group identities in post-independent India? Was the consolidation of modern Indian democracy a result of these politics? To what extent its contemporary burdens impact their legacy? Do we need to embrace other intellectual traditions- such as liberalism, republicanism, and Marxism - to remedy the deficits of democracy in India, or are its various forms of identity-based politics capable of overcoming their own limitations" (Ruparelia 2008, p. 41). Many might not agree but democracy is just an illusion for those who are marginalized as they are giving their best to meet the necessities in life. From these contributions and different perspectives we come to understand that recognition and redistribution are very significant to locate identity concerns and the question of why one should be deprived and being discriminated and on what ground one should be recognized and also access to equal distribution?

Within the forces of our existing democratic institutions and procedures, a minority is a group which not only experiences discrimination, domination and denial, but one which, in terms of numbers, must be a force to reckon with. On the other hand, a numerical majority is one which reserves the democratic right to rule and define. Does it mean within democracy only minority can take a chance to claim their rights? Or democracy is something that favors the minority? Democratic multiculturalism produces minority as observed Barbara Franz (Tripathy and Sudarsan 2014, p. 39). The demands for the guarantee of minority rights have resulted in growing cynicism

and skepticism about the recognition of minorities and the politics of identity. “The contention is often that groups and communities in India endeavor to become a minority in order to gain privileges and entitlements, which they justly do not deserve” (ibid 48). Chatani pointed that minority rights from the vantage point of democracy rather than secularism may not be fair (ibid 49). Then there is a question, can minority be made and put up for special attention?

Barbara Franz argues that the majority will make gestures of support and cultural recognition, however these gestures will not challenge the source of economic inequality that keeps the minority relatively powerless. Instead, recognition is expressed through cultural gestures that indicate a hope of maintaining minority identities without acknowledging the existing economic differences (ibid 39). Similarly, it can be said that the culture is the issue here and may not be the manifestation of economic condition but the underneath challenge is in itself.

Avishai Margalit clears his point from Honneth and argues that,

It is not justice that brings us into normative politics, but injustice. Not equality, but inequality. Not freedom, but despotism, and more to the point-not recognition and respect, but rejection and humiliation” (Honneth and Margalit 2001, p. 128).

Hence for him there is an ‘urgency to deal with humiliation than to dealing with recognition and respect’. One has to recognize and to be recognized by the other, in order to be able to cognize oneself. Avishai made his departure from Honneth and suggested that there are three distinct senses in explaining recognition; it is the identification: being able to (re-) identify objects and events; second is the recognizing, or detecting, mistakes-especially admitting one’s own mistakes, third, acknowledging and honoring the status of others. Similarly, mass movement initiated by Eastern Nagaland their resistance against discrimination and all other failure on the part of State itself has to do with the political implications. As I have mentioned earlier, where I am trying to situate recognition and redistribution in understanding development. After being examined recognition and redistribution stand in an extensive manner, now I would like to look at different development approaches in the following discussion.

## **Development: An Appraisal of Different Approaches**

'Development' is a concept which is contested both theoretically and politically, and is inherently both complex and ambiguous. There is considerable confusion over the wide range of divergent conceptualizations of development. It is true that economic growth, by increasing a nation's total wealth, also enhances its potential for reducing poverty and solving other social problems. But history offers a number of examples where economic growth was not followed by similar progress in human development. Instead growth was achieved at the cost of greater inequality, higher unemployment, weakened democracy, loss of cultural identity, or over consumption of natural resources needed by future generations. As the links between economic growth, social and environmental issues are better understood, experts including economists tend to agree that this kind of growth is inevitably unsustainable that it cannot continue along the same lines for long (World Bank).

Different countries have different priorities in their development policies. But to compare their development levels, we first have to make up our mind about what development really means to us, what it is supposed to achieve. Indicators measuring this achievement could then be used to judge countries' relative progress in development. Is the goal merely to increase national wealth, or is it something more subtle? Improving the well being of the majority of the population? Ensuring people's freedom? Increasing their economic security? Recent United Nations documents emphasize "human development," measured by life expectancy, adult literacy, access to all three levels of education, as well as people's average income, which is a necessary condition of their freedom of choice. In a broader sense the notion of human development incorporates all aspects of individuals' well-being, from their health status to their economic and political freedom" (World Bank: 1999, p. 9).

## **Capability Approach: Development as Freedom**

Economic attainment refers to access to or command over resources by households and individuals, which enhances their capabilities. At the most elementary level, the status of employment of household members and ownership of assets determine a household's income, which to a very large extent determines the individual's command over resources (Sen 1999, p. 1).

For the better existence we need adequate and equal distribution of resources in the society. Development as Sen defines the development as the “real freedoms that people enjoy” (ibid). “Development as Freedom<sup>22</sup> proceeds from the basic recognition that freedom is both (1) the primary objective, and (2) the principal means of development. The former is a normative claim and includes the understanding that the assessment of development must not be divorced from the lives that people can lead and the real freedoms that they can enjoy” (ibid). Development of any region is a cumulative outcome of several processes which operate continuously embracing political, social, cultural and economic activities in that area. The challenges of development is to improve the quality of life which not only calls for higher income but also better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, reduction of poverty, a cleaner environment, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life.

Sen in his book *‘Development as Freedom’* observes that “the basic proposition is that we should evaluate development in terms of the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of people to lead the kind of lives they value and have reason to value”<sup>23</sup> which is Sen’s definition of freedom. Unlike increases in income, the expansion of people’s “capabilities” depends both on the elimination of oppression and on the provision of facilities like basic education, health care, and social safety nets. Basic education, health care, and women’s rights are themselves constitutive of development. Growth in real output per head is also likely to expand people’s capabilities, especially at lower levels of income, but it cannot be considered, in itself, the ultimate yardstick of development or well-being. To have a development in the strength of capability is the main argument and contention of Sen’s capability approach. And see what are the ‘approaches’ to be done, are we capable enough to value the development that brings about? As he further expands the argument in development, ‘Social Choice’ also made a significant contribution in determining whether in concrete or cultural development. He further argues that “conomic Unfreedom can breed Social Unfreedom, just as social or Political Unfreedom can also

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<sup>22</sup>The freedom or the real freedom as Sen emphasises is the basic recognition people needs to have like the primary objective such as a rise in the GNP (or in personal incomes), or industrialisation, or technological advance which is very basic to the inhabitants and to have the resources as the principle means of development.

<sup>23</sup> Sen’s Unfreedom explains the poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states (Sen 1999: 3).

foster Economic Unfreedom” (ibid 18). Development therefore denotes not merely the improvement in income and output, but radical changes in institutional, social and political administrative structures along with those in popular belief, customs and attitudes are required.

According to Sen, culture determines development in an extensive manner. To enhance living standard, culture is an integral part of development. He observes that economic and social changes are pursuit of development which certainly influences positively or negatively the opportunities for cultural pursuits, and it would be appropriate to see that the effects on these opportunities receive serious attention. Then he talks about freedom that is the cultural freedom where it would enhance the broad view of development. For example, cultural conditions can exert a strong influence on human behavior, and through that can affect economic choices and business decisions, as well as social and political behaviour as observed. He further argues that the connections relate both to the ends and to the means of development.

For him cultural development is also one of the developments avenues to understand development per se. Cultural development has a broad contribution towards making the economic viable. For example those that strengthen efforts in expanding tourism can be directly beneficial from an economic and even commercial point of view if the people welcome the open atmosphere of introducing tourism, then the government would also initiate various programs in meeting the unemployment adversaries, or open competition in the field of creativity. Cultural projects can in this direct and immediate way for better economic investment as well.

Therefore, cultural influences on behaviour do make existence in the contribution to the process of economic and social development. It is hard to ignore the fact that people’s behaviour pattern varies between different regions and with distinct cultural backgrounds. It is usual to ask to what extent these variations are important for development analysis in general and economic development in particular. According to Sen, it seems like there are significant influences of cultural traditions and behavioural norms on economic success and achievement. He also stressed on Values, how different society has different interest and preserves the identity. Like the value of Education, for instance the nature of education cannot but have been important to the special characteristics of *Japanese* values. Values have a clear connection with the

nature of many accomplishments, varying from such simple matters as the prevention of litter on the street or the use of adequate recycling of waste material, to more complex achievements such as providing enough community support to the economically disadvantaged and the elimination of economic and social exclusion and isolation. And for all, education is vehemently important in any kind of development.

According to Sen, culture is as means and instruments to the ends of development. For him,

Development is seen not just as growth of GNP (or as increases in some other inanimate objects of convenience) but more broadly, as an enhancement of the freedom and well-being of people, then cultural issues can figure among the ends of development as well as among its means. It is, in particular, important to take note of the impact of economic and social development on established culture (ibid).

### **Trickle Down and Bottom Up Approach**

Jawaharlal Nehru was one who used the expression “the exploitation of India and other countries brought so much wealth to England that some of it trickled down to the working class and their standard of living rose” (Nehru 1933, p. 24). Arndt (1983) observed that, “the Trickle-Down Mechanism in a strict sense is the expression which implies a vertical flow from rich to poor that happens of its own accord. Theories like trickle down and bottom up approach are the primary mode of development being used by countries where the centre makes policies and allocates resources to the various federal and far off places. It was believed that economic development at the level of the nation will eventually “trickle down” to the masses. The term was coined by humorist Will Rogers during the Great Depression saying that money was all appropriated for the top in hopes that it would trickle-down to the needy. The minor in number yet major in opportunities seeking could be another threatening zone for the nation state as it leads the higher top most rank well influential so that they occupy the larger socio, economic and political institutions (power). There is a need of systematic and positive involvement of state is required.

### **The Question of Exclusion or Discrimination**



Amit Bhaduri points out that “when political failures are presented as economic achievements, it may not be easy to separate rhetoric from reality” (Bhaduri 2010, pp. 7). Human development is an integral part of today’s policy agenda of the government’s world over. The most basic capabilities for human development are to lead a long and healthy life, to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living and participate in the life of community. In the process of human development certain sections of people in India are socially excluded from the advantages of developments and development programmes. It is a known fact that social exclusion can lead to economic poverty and it is quite interconnected with sociological perspectives. In the process of exclusion the people cut themselves off and finally get isolated. Rao has explained that

It is a profound impact on the quality life of the poor, who are really segregated, stigmatised and marginalised from the institutions of social development. Vulnerable groups and people with special needs and disadvantages are often caused by marginalization and exclusion from the socio-economic growth and decision-making processes, which give rise to the lack of access to economic resources and opportunities” (Rao 2011, p. 26).

As Dudley Seer’s have put forward four questions, “what has been happening to basic necessities? What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all these have been declining continuously, then beyond doubt, because there has been a rapid development in the State. If one or two have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result ‘development’ even if per capita doubled” (Seers 2005, p. 7). Also Seer’s continue to explore his views to explain development which involves more than economic growth and changes in economic structures. He formulated three dimensional requirements that are, decrease in poverty and malnutrition, that income inequality should decline, and that the employment situation should improve to balance the social structure. Development must, therefore, be conceived of as a multi dimensional process involving changes in structures, attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth.

## **Human Rights Approach**

Within such a framework, the conditions needed to achieve a decent standard of living are to be treated as basic human rights, rather than the uncertain results of charitable actions or policies aimed exclusively at economic efficiency. In 1986 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development which, albeit not enjoying legally-binding status, is often regarded as a holistic vision integrating civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights, and striking a balance between national and international human rights responsibilities of states.

In Nagaland, human rights have violated badly in all forms: social, legal civil, political, all are in mess. The access to drinking water and health as human rights (the super example is Shamatore Village, this particular village do not have access to drinking water, electricity, nor education, massive unemployment because of all politics, as this would be discussing elaborately in the following chapters). This all happened because humanity failed. As (Sen 1999) maintains that,

Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it” ( p. 45).

In the line of human development, politics and human rights have special entities. The violation of human rights do not stand anywhere in this modern state.

## **Population and Development**

Here the idea of population and development has been taken in correlation with the notion of redistribution. When we analyze development, there is also another element that supplements its features which is the economic growth. So the concept of development also involves- economic growth and its changes in economic structures. Dudley Seers formulated three dimensional requirements for the economic growth “decrease in poverty and malnutrition, that income inequality should decline, and that the employment situation should improve.”<sup>24</sup> Economic growth is an indicator of the development of a region or a State. In order to make the economic development sustainable, an effective planning with proper monitoring as well as follow up action

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<sup>24</sup> Dudley, (2005) as quoted in Szirmai, p. 7.

need to be done at each level of the governmental administration. Development therefore has to be conceived as a multi-faceted process, and understood structural problem as development in a broader sense means improving the well being of the population.

Ehsanul Haq has observed that population and development are relative concepts. The departure point is that,

If the population growth is an issue, then the growth of population would be seen in terms of its adverse impact on the sustainable conditions of development. And thereby, population growth may decelerate development and cause underdevelopment which in turn reinforces population growth (Haq and Singh 2006, p. 3).

If the population is doing quite well then the space of development will accelerate. However in the case of Eastern Nagaland it is opposite. The decisions and implementations are taken and enjoyed by a certain section of the population which led to unequal access to basic facilities. The population of Eastern Nagaland undoubtedly has considerable population with six tribes in four districts as compared to the rest of the Nagaland. The population per se is not a problem in dealing with the underdevelopment here as far as the above argument is concerned. But there are certain factors that seriously hold back where equal opportunities in terms of education, income and health services are not adequately distributed. Therefore, if population and economic growth determines development, then there is also a question of why Eastern Nagaland is not representative. According to 2011 census, Eastern Nagaland population is 5, 72,098 comparing with the rest of the population of 14, 08, 504. If one compares the 2001 and 2011 census, then the question which arises is of why Eastern Nagaland population remains still undeveloped.

### **Human Development Index**

HDI is designed to reflect average achievements in three basic aspects of human development – leading a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and enjoying a decent standard of living. Today, the concept of human development has come to occupy a prominent place in development policies (UNDP 1990, p. 9) suggestions for

India states, 'the basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives'. It is also defined Human development as 'a process of enlarging choices' (UNDP 1990, p. 9). Similarly, Amartya Sen, has also stressed on defining development is based on choices.

The next chapter will discuss on politics of redistribution: A survey on differential development.

### Chapter 3

## Politics of Redistribution: A survey on Differential Development

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*As I stepped out with my mother trying to reach one of the villages, I noticed there was no means of communication. Fortunately we met a local guy and he helped us find a truck. As the heavy loaded truck started moving, I was trembling but my mother was confident; I could see it on her face. The narrow and slippery road frightened me. I could see the village nearing, but I didn't say a word nor smiled at anyone inside the truck. I knew my mother and me may not see the day. I murmured to my mother, that I'm jumping out but she held me back. The heavy truck was unable to climb; I became numb and could not think of anything. At-last the brake hooks on from skidding down and finally we reached the local guide's residence.*

(Field work in Longleng district, dated 18/02/2014 at 9pm)

“Too little too late” (ENPO Memorandum, 2010)

Well known sociologist Tiplut Nongbri observes that “we should not blindly treat tribes as an undifferentiated and monolithic category but should be aware of the internal differentiation and divisions that beset the society” (2003, p.2). As it has been noted in earlier chapters, this issue of differentiation and division amongst the Naga tribe is one of the main concerns of this study. More specifically, the issue of differences in development in various parts of Nagaland in the light of the demand for a separate state called 'Frontier Nagaland'. In this chapter, we shall look at the findings and discussion on the specific question on whether there is a difference in the level of development between the eastern and the rest of Nagaland. It shall be primarily based on the survey that has been carried out in this study.

Development is basically understood from access to infrastructural development, income and economic growth etc. However, initially development is also understood from income parameter. But now this approach has been shifted from single index to multiple indices. The shift of single index to multiple indices has been propounded by Amartya Sen and Mahbub Ul Haq. The multiple indices is a

composite of three indices; life expectancy, education, and income. They both look at the idea of capability approach. The capability approach focuses mainly on,

The quality of life that individuals are able to achieve and have it. The basic proposition is that we should evaluate development in terms of “the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of people to lead the kind of lives they value and have reason to value” is the definition of freedom (Sen 1999, p. 3).

This approach insists that unlike increases in income, the expansion of people’s “capabilities” depends both on the elimination of oppression and on the provision of facilities like basic education, health care, and social safety nets” (ibid). Thus, in the following pages, we shall look at various parameters to see whether there is any differential development pattern in Nagaland by using both primary (survey data) and secondary sources.

### **Human Development Indices**

The Human development index (HDI) has three vital dimensions - longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio; and standard of living or command over resources, measured by per capita GDP. The Human Development Index<sup>1</sup> of Nagaland is 0.61 which is among the higher bracket of the States of the Country. But there are variations within Nagaland as it can be seen from the table below (Table 3).

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<sup>1</sup> The Human development index (HDI) has three vital dimensions - longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio; and standard of living or command over resources, measured by per capita GDP.

Table 3. Human Development Indices of Nagaland, 2013 (District-wise)

District	HDI	Rank	GDI	Rank	HPI	Rank
Dimapur	0.81	2	0.72	2	16.4	10
Peren	0.60	6	0.54	6	27.1	8
Kohima	0.82	1	0.76	1	27.2	7
Phek	0.67	3	0.55	5	40.67	2
Mokokchung	0.61	5	0.57	4	22.56	9
Zunheboto	0.51	9	0.49	8	28.3	5
Wokha	0.66	4	0.61	3	32.56	4
Mon	0.42	11	0.295	9	54.65	1
Longleng	0.54	7	0.5	7	27.95	6
Tuensang	0.53	8	0.49	8	36.6	3
Kiphire	0.50	10	0.54	6	36.6	3
Nagaland	0.61		0.55		31.87	

Source: Draft Annual Plan 2014-15, Planning and Coordination Department, Govt. of Nagaland.

From the above table, as expected perhaps, one can see that Kohima is ranked first with 0.82 point closely followed by Dimapur in the second position with 0.81 points. This is understandable because Kohima is the state capital and thus has most of the facilities that is usually expected of a capital city/town of a state. It is also home to one of the 'advanced tribes' the Angamis, who also played a significant role in the growth of nationalist idea amongst the Nagas. Similarly, Dimapur is also the commercial hub of the state. Besides, it is also an old capital of the Khachari kingdom. It is connected to the rest of the country by railways and airline. Amongst the Naga tribes, the Sumi, one of the advanced tribes, are the dominant tribe in Dimapur. Incidentally, besides other facilities, both the areas are connected by national highways.

Expectedly, out of the five advanced tribes, two areas associated with two of those tribes, namely Wokha (the Lotha tribe) and Mokokchung (the Ao tribe) also figured as the fourth and fifth in the list with 0.66 and 0.61 respectively. Likewise, all those areas associated with the (most) backward tribes are found towards the bottom

of the table with two of them finishing off the list as the 10th (Kiphire District with 0.50 point) and 11th (Mon District with 0.42 point). The other two districts of eastern Nagaland also found themselves at 7th (Longleng District with 0.54 point) and 8th (Tuensang District with 0.53 point). The above pattern clearly shows that there are differences in the development status of the different regions of Nagaland. In fact, such different pattern is not unique to Nagaland. For instance, Kulkarni (1980) points out with reference to Maharashtra,

Tribal development is a very complicated task and needs more careful attention than has been paid to it so far. The problems of tribals in Maharashtra vary from tribe to tribe and from region to region. The main problems faced by the tribals are poverty, exploitation, inadequate education etc (p. 1598).

This difference is also roughly in agreement with the fact that most of the districts inhabited by the 'advanced tribes' are in the upper region of the table (table 3) with higher HDI values while most of the districts inhabited by the backward tribes are at the bottom of the list with lower HDI values. The only exception to this pattern is Phek district (3rd position with 0.67 point) which is inhabited by the Chakhesang tribe and Zunheboto district (9th position with 0.51 point) which is inhabited by the Sumi tribe. However, we may as well note that Phek is closer to the state capital, that is Kohima, and the Chakhesangs were in fact treated earlier as part of the Angamis; they were called 'Eastern Angamis'. This may probably explain as to why the Chakhesangs, though described as 'backward tribe', the HDI of Phek is still higher than places like Zunheboto. The latter is closer to the Eastern Nagaland (it borders Tuensang District). This may also explain as to why the HDI ranking of Zunheboto is very low, even though it is inhabited by the Sumis, one of the 'advanced tribes' in Nagaland. It is worth remembering that the Sumis are also the dominant tribe in Dimapur, which stands at second position as far as HDI value, is concerned.

However, when we calculate the means of the districts in terms of two categories, namely, the Eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland, the pattern of development is still clear. As it can be seen from table (3a) below, the mean value of HDI of all the districts in Eastern Nagaland is 0.497 (approx. 0.50) while the mean value of the districts in the rest of Nagaland stands at 0.668 (approx. 0.67), roughly 0.17 higher than that of the mean value of the Eastern Nagaland.



Table 3a. Human Development Index (region)

Rest of Nagaland (7 districts)	Eastern Nagaland (4 districts)
0.668	0.497

Source: Draft Annual Plan 2014-15, Planning and Coordination Department, Govt. of Nagaland.

When we look at the Gender Development Index (GDI), similar pattern is more or less observed (see, table 3). The gender-related development index (GDI) measures the same indicators as the HDI, but captures inequalities in achievements between men and women. GDI is simply the HDI adjusted downward to measure gender inequality. In terms of districts, GDI ranking more less corresponds to that of HDI, except Kiphire district which considerably improves its position (6th position with 0.54 GDI points). Nonetheless, when we calculate in terms of the means of all the districts in Eastern Nagaland and those in the rest of Nagaland, we find the same pattern as HDI with the former scoring 0.456 (approx. 0.46) and the latter stands at 0.605 (approx. 0.61), 0.05 higher than the former.

Table 3b. Gender Development Index (region)

Rest of Nagaland (7 districts)	Eastern Nagaland (4 districts)
0.605	0.456

Source: Draft Annual Plan 2014-15, Planning and Coordination Department, Govt. of Nagaland.

As far as Human Poverty Index (HPI) is concerned, the picture is a little more complex in the sense that even as it shows broadly the same tendency, it does not exactly follow the patterns that we have noted with respect to HDI and GDI. For instance, as compared to its HDI and GDI standings, Phek shows the second highest poverty level even though it stands at 3rd position in HDI and 5th position in GDI while Kohima shows relatively speaking, high level of poverty. Mokokchung shows one of the least poverty level. Perhaps, it shows the education and literacy rate of the Ao tribe and their access to employment both in Government and private sector.

However, when we calculate the mean values of HPI of districts in eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland, we see (table 3c below) that poverty is higher in Eastern Nagaland (HPI value at 38.95) as compared to the rest of the state (HPI value at 27.82)

Table 3c. Human Poverty Index (region)

Rest of Nagaland ( 7 districts)	Eastern Nagaland (4 districts)
27.82	38.95


Source: Draft Annual Plan 2014-15, Planning and Coordination Department, Govt. of Nagaland.

These trends of HDI, GDI and HPI that indicate differential development pattern between eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland was further explored in the survey. The information gathered during the survey and some secondary data show similar trends. These shall be discussed in the following pages.

### **Literacy and Education**

Literacy and level of education are keys to development. In this segment, we shall look at the literacy rate as per census data and information on the educational qualifications of the respondents and number of graduates in the household gathered during the survey. To start with, the literacy rate of different districts in Nagaland are given below (Table 4). Here, we see that literacy rate differ considerably across districts. The highest literacy rate is found amongst the districts inhabited by the 'advanced tribes' while the lower literary rate marks the districts in Eastern Nagaland. The highest literacy rate is recorded in Mokokchung district (91.6 % in 2011) and the lowest is recorded in Mon district (57 % in 2011).

Table 4. District Wise Literacy Rate (2001 and 2011 census)



Source: <http://www.nagalandstat.com/searchresult.aspx>

As the above table shows, all the four districts which belong to the 'advanced tribes' registered the first four highest literacy rates: Mokokchung district which is inhabited by the Aos records the highest (91.6%), followed by Wokha, a Lotha area, with 87.7 %, Zunheboto which is a Sumi area recording 85.3 % in the third and Kohima, an Angami and Rengma area recording 85.2 % in the fourth. Likewise, all the four districts in eastern Nagaland find themselves with low level of literacy rates. As we can see from the above table, Mon records the lowest (57.0 %) followed by Kiphire (69.5 %) are the two with the lowest literacy rates in Nagaland. The other two districts in eastern Nagaland, Tuensang (73.1 %) and Longleng (72.2%) as the 7th and 8th in the list with the lowest literacy rates. If we calculate the means of these literacy rates in terms of the districts in Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state, we do find a stark difference with Eastern Nagaland recording 67.95 while the rest of Nagaland recording 83.45.

This difference in the literacy rate is also reflected in terms of the educational qualifications of the respondents and number of graduates in the households which

have been covered in the survey. In the tables below (Table 4a and Table 4b), we see that there are more number of respondents are graduates in the rest of Nagaland as compared to those respondents from eastern Nagaland.

Table 4a: Educational qualification of the respondents (district)

District	Total Respondents	Educational level			
		Graduate and above	Class 10 and above	Class 10 and below	Illiterate
Dimapur	18	17	1	0	0
Kiphire	14	1	3	3	7
Kohima	14	12	2	0	0
Longleng	9	2	0	3	4
Mokokchung	24	15	9	0	0
Mon	28	6	2	2	18
Peren	-	-	-	-	-
Phek	24	6	13	2	3
Tuensang	37	4	10	11	12
Wokha	20	6	12	1	1
Zunheboto	8	5	2	1	0

Source. Fieldwork

Out of 108 respondents from the rest of Nagaland, 61 of them were graduates, 39 are above class ten but below graduate, 4 are below class ten and only 4 are illiterate (see, Table 4b). In comparison, out of 88 respondents from the eastern Nagaland, only 13 of them are graduates, 15 of them are above class 10 but below graduate, 19 are found to be below class 10 and 41 of them were found to be illiterate. We see that amongst the respondents, out of 196 respondents, 31.12 % are graduates in the rest of Nagaland as compared to only 6.63 % are graduates in eastern Nagaland. When we subject the data to chi-square test, it is found to be significant ( $X^2 = 80.01$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ), which means the fact of living in these two different regions have a relationship with the level of education that people have. The finding complements the differences that we have noticed in the HDI and the literacy rate between eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland.

Table 4b. Educational qualification of the respondents (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Graduate	61 (31.12%)	13 (6.63%)
Above Class 10	39 (19.89%)	15 (7.14%)
Below Class 10	4 (2.04%)	19 (9.69%)
Illiterate	4 (2.04%)	41 (20.91%)

Source: Fieldwork

This difference that we find amongst the respondents can also be checked in terms of the number of the graduates and post-graduates that we find in the households which have been covered in the survey. As we can see in the following table below (Table 4c, 4d, and 4e), there is a difference in the number of graduates and postgraduates in the two regions, namely eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state.

Table 4c. Number of family members who are graduates (district)

<b>Districts</b>	<b>Graduates</b>
Kohima	15
Dimapur	20
Wokha	29
Mokokchung	26
Phek	13
Peren	-
Kiphire	5
Longleng	5
Tuensang	22
Zunheboto	5
Mon	16

Source: Fieldwork

Table 4d. Number of family members who are post-graduate and above (district)

Districts	Post-graduate and above
Kohima	7
Dimapur	6
Wokha	3
Mokokchung	7
Phek	4
Peren	-
Kiphire	2
Longleng	1
Tuensang	3
Zunheboto	3
Mon	3

Source: Fieldwork

Table 4e. Number of family members who are graduate and post-graduate and above (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Graduate	108	48
Post- Graduate	30	9

Source: Fieldwork

The difference in the literacy rate and number of graduates and post-graduates between the two regions seems to reflect on the educational facilities in these two regions as well. The total number of schools (both government run as well as private ones) are much higher in the rest of the state as compared to those in the eastern Nagaland (see, table, 4f and 4g). There are higher concentrations of schools in districts like Dimapur, Kohima and Mokokchung.

Perhaps, these differences in literacy rate, educational qualifications and facilities are also reflected in terms of the employment opportunity or pattern in these areas. We shall look in to this aspect in the following segment.

Table 4f. Number of Government and Private Schools (district)

Districts	Government Schools	Private schools
Kohima	23	68
Mokokchung	30	31
Tuensang	21	17
Mon	17	26
Phek	29	22
Wokha	12	21
Zunheboto	18	31
Dimapur	21	125
Kiphire	7	11
Longleng	12	7
Peren	11	15

Source: <http://www.nbsenagaland.com>

Table 4g. Number of Government and Private Schools (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Govt. School	144	57
Private school	313	61

Source: <http://www.nbsenagaland.com>

### **Employment/Profession**

The numbers of respondents who are employed (either in Government sector or private sector) also indicate that more people in the rest of Nagaland are employees (either in Govt. or private sector jobs) than those in eastern Nagaland. The numbers of

respondents who are not employed are much higher in eastern Nagaland than in the rest of the state (see, Table no. 5 and Table 5a).

Table 5. Profession of respondents (district)

District	Total Households	Government Employee	Private Employee	Unemployed
Dimapur	18	10	8	0
Kiphire	14	4	0	10
Kohima	14	14	0	0
Longleng	9	0	0	9
Mokokchung	24	19	5	0
Mon	28	5	1	22
Peren	-	-	-	-
Phek	24	15	6	3
Tuensang	37	6	4	27
Wokha	20	15	3	2
Zunheboto	8	6	2	0

Source: Fieldwork

When we subject these frequencies on employment/unemployment (table 5a) to chi square test, it was found to be significant ( $X^2 = 109.49$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ). More number of respondents from the rest of Nagaland are employees, either government or private sector, than those from the eastern Nagaland.


Table 5a. Profession of respondents (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Govt. employees	79	15
Private employees	24	5
Unemployed	5	68

Source: Fieldwork



Table 5b. Employment patterns of family members of respondents (district)



Source: Fieldwork


What has been noted on employment with reference to the respondents can also be seen in terms of the employment patterns of the family members as well. From the above table (Table 5b), the number of employed people, either in government or private sectors, are different in these two regions, namely eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland. During the survey, it has been found that there are a total of 109 and 28 government employees, and a total of 79 and 21 employees in private sectors in the rest of Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland respectively. In short, the numbers of people with jobs are higher in the rest of Nagaland as compared to eastern Nagaland.

Incidentally, those districts which are inhabited by the advanced tribes have more employed persons than those areas which are inhabited by the backward tribes. For instance, Mokokchung which is inhabited by the Ao tribe has the largest number of people who are employed (29 in government sector and 28 in private sector; total 57). Similarly, from the above table (Table 5b), Kohima (Angamis) and Wokha (Lotha) districts have the second and the third highest numbers of employed people

respectively. Dimapur and Zunheboto (the latter is a district inhabited by the Sumi tribe, which also is the largest Naga tribe in the former) come as the fourth and fifth in the table. All the districts which are inhabited by the backward tribes in the eastern Nagaland are below these areas in terms of the numbers of employees.

This employment pattern that we have noticed from the survey data are more or less in agreement with the data from the government sources as well (Table 5c). As we can see from the table below, the Ao tribe has the highest number of government employees amongst all the tribes (22.50%), followed by the Sumi tribe (14.64%), the Angami tribe (11.88%) and the Lotha tribe (10.13%). All the backward tribes in eastern Nagaland are below 5% except for the Konyaks who constitute 6.68% of the total number of government employees in Nagaland.

Table 5c. Distribution of tribe in government employment.<sup>2</sup>



<sup>2</sup> The data has been obtained through RTI, received on 23 May and 6 June 2106 respectively from the Department of personnel and Administrative Reforms (DoPR), Kohima, Nagaland.

#### (4) Household and Basic Amenities

In this segment, we shall look at the development issue in terms of basic amenities that each household has. This can give us some sense of the socio-economic status of the household. In the next few pages, basic aspects of such socio-economic status shall be seen in terms of the nature of the house, automobiles, access to electricity, TV and telephone etc.

##### (i) Type of family

When we do the household survey, it is also pertinent to check the nature of the family that characterizes that household. In this regard, the survey has also investigated whether the household are nuclear or joint families.

Table 6. Type of family (district)

District	Total Respondents	Total Family Members	Type of family	
			Nuclear Family	Joint Family
Dimapur	18	91	18	0
Kiphire	14	137	13	1
Kohima	14	93	14	0
Longleng	9	38	9	0
Mokokchung	24	108	24	0
Mon	28	275	10	18
Peren	-	-	-	-
Phek	24	65	24	0
Tuensang	37	237	37	0
Wokha	20	49	20	0
Zunheboto	8	24	8	0

Source: Fieldwork

As it can be seen from the above Table (Table 6), except for the Mon and Kiphire districts, all the households which have been covered by the survey are nuclear families. In Kiphire, one household was found to be joint family while 18 out of 28 households in Mon which have been covered in the survey are joint families. Thus, the areas inhabited by the advanced tribes are found to be nuclear families (108) whereas out of 88 households, 69 of them are found to be nuclear in the eastern Nagaland. And joint families are found to be 19 (out of 88) in eastern Nagaland (Table 6a). Perhaps, this may indicate the level of urbanization and individualization associated with cultures which have been exposed to western and modern cultures or way of life.

Table 6a. Type of family (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Nuclear family	108	69
Joint family	0	19

Source: Fieldwork.

## (ii) Type of House

One measure to sense the socio-economic status of household is to see the nature or type of house: whether it is *kucha* or *pucca*. From the table below (Table 7), it can be seen that all the four districts in eastern Nagaland (Kiphire, Longleng, Mon and Tuensang), the *kucha* houses are more than the *pucca* houses. While out of the remaining six districts in the rest of the Nagaland which have been covered by the survey, in three districts, namely Zunheboto, Wokha and Phek, similar pattern has been found (i.e., these districts have more *kucha* houses than *pucca* houses). In the remaining three districts (Mokochung, Dimapur and Kohima) there are more *pucca* houses than *kucha* houses.

But when we organize these districts into two regions as eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state, it can be seen that the number of *pucca* houses in the rest of Nagaland, areas which are inhabited by the advanced tribes, are more than those found in eastern Nagaland, and the number of *kucha* houses in eastern Nagaland are more than those found in the rest of Nagaland (see, Table 7a). Within each of these

two regions also, the number of *kucha* houses are more than the number of *pucca* houses in eastern Nagaland while in the rest of Nagaland, the number of *pucca* houses are more than the *kucha* houses (Table 7a). Chi square test also shows that the difference is significant ( $X^2 = 37.231, df=1, p>0.001$ ).

Given that building a *pucca* house is financially more expensive than building a *kucha* house, this difference in the type of houses also indicates a difference between the two region in terms of their income level or financial and/or material condition. This is to say that eastern Nagaland is materially less well-off than the rest of the state.

Table 7. Type of House (district)

Type of house	Kucha House	Pucca house	% of Kucha houses	% of Pucca houses
Kiphire	12	2	85.71%	14.28%
Mokokchung	10	14	41.67%	58.33%
Dimapur	4	14	22.22%	77.78%
Zunheboto	5	3	62.5%	37.5%
Kohima	2	12	14.28%	85.71%
Wokha	14	6	70%	30%
Longleng	8	1	88.88%	11.11%
Mon	28	0	100%	0%
Phek	21	3	87.5%	12.5%
Tuensang	33	4	89.19%	10.81%
Peren	--	--	--	--

Source: Fieldwork.

Table 7a. Type of House (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Kucha House	56	81
Pucca House	52	7

Source: Fieldwork.

### (iii) Household with Automobiles

Another criterion that can speak of the material well-being of the people can be the ownership of automobiles. This survey also try to find this aspect as well in order to determine any differences in the material well-being of people in these two regions, that is eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state. In the following table (Table 7b), it can be that in all the districts in eastern Nagaland, the number of households which own automobiles are less than those which do not own automobiles. In two of those districts, namely Tuensang and Mon, overwhelming number of households do not own automobiles. In the former, out of thirty-seven, thirty three of those households do not own any automobiles while in the former, out of twenty-eight households, twenty-five of those households do not own any automobiles.

On the other hand, those districts in the rest of the state, it can be seen that those households which own automobiles are more than those households which do not own automobiles, except Wokha district where the number of households which own and do not own automobiles are equal in number. In fact, in three out of those six districts which have been covered in this survey, in three of those, namely Dimapur, Kohima and Zunheboto, all the households have automobiles.

When we organize the districts in term of regions, namely eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state, the difference can be clearly seen. Sixteen households in eastern Nagaland as compared to eighty-eight households in the rest of the state have automobiles while an overwhelming 72 households in eastern Nagaland as compared to twenty households in the rest of the state do not own any automobile (Table 7c). When chi-square test is given, the difference is found to be significant ( $X^2 = 78.009$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p>0.001$ ). Thus, people in eastern Nagaland are materially less better off than those people in the rest of the state.

Table 7b. Households having automobile (district)

District	Total households	Having automobile
Dimapur	18	18
Kiphire	14	6
Kohima	14	14
Longleng	9	3
Mokokchung	24	18
Mon	28	3
Peren	-	-
Phek	24	20
Tuensang	37	4
Wokha	20	10
Zunheboto	8	8

Source: Fieldwork

Table 7c. Households having automobile-Survey (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
With Automobile	88	16
Without automobile	20	72

Source: Fieldwork.

The above difference in the material well-being (expressed in terms of owning automobiles) between the two regions can be further checked by looking at the type of vehicles that the households have (viz, four-wheeler and two-wheeler). In the following table 7d, it can be noted that the number of households which own four-wheelers are less in those districts in eastern Nagaland as compared to those in the rest of the state. Half of those households which have automobiles in eastern Nagaland have four-wheelers. While in the rest of the state, out of the total number of households which have automobiles (i.e., eighty-eight), sixty-nine of those have four-wheelers (Table 7d). In Dimapur and Kohima, all the households which have been covered in the survey have four-wheelers.

Table 7d. Households having four wheeler (district)

<b>District</b>	<b>Households having four wheeler (car)</b>
Dimapur	18
Kiphire	2
Kohima	14
Longleng	1
Mokokchung	15
Mon	2
Peren	-
Phek	12
Tuensang	3
Wokha	5
Zunheboto	5

Source: Fieldwork

Similarly, when we see the numbers of two-wheelers (Table 7e), it is seen that the number of households with two-wheelers are lesser in eastern Nagaland (eleven out of sixteen household which owns automobile) as compared to those in the rest of the state (forty-three out of eighty eight households which have automobiles).

Table 7e. Households having two wheeler (district)

<b>District</b>	<b>Households having two wheeler</b>
Dimapur	9
Kiphire	6
Kohima	4
Longleng	2
Mokokchung	7
Mon	1
Peren	-
Phek	8
Tuensang	2
Wokha	8
Zunheboto	7

Source: Fieldwork



In terms of overall ownership of four-wheeler and two wheeler automobiles, we see that eastern Nagaland has less than the rest of the state. Thus, this also points towards a difference in the material well-being of the two regions, with the latter doing well than the former.

Table 7f. Households having automobiles (region)

	<b>Rest of Nagaland</b>	<b>Eastern Nagaland</b>
With four wheeler	70	18
With two wheeler	53	30

Source: Fieldwork

#### **(iv) Household with Television**

Another aspect that could add to our effort to determine the overall material well-being or financial condition of the people is the ownership of television. It is also a sign of being connectivity. It is through the television that people keep themselves aware of the world outside.

Table 8. Households having TV (district)

<b>District</b>	<b>Have TV</b>	<b>Does not have TV</b>
Dimapur	18	0
Kiphire	10	4
Kohima	14	0
Longleng	3	6
Mokokchung	24	0
Mon	2	26
Peren	-	-
Phek	15	9
Tuensang	12	25
Wokha	18	2
Zunheboto	8	0

Source: Fieldwork

As it can be seen from the table above (Table 8), majority of households in eastern Nagaland do not have television. Only twenty-seven out of eighty-eight households (i.e., only 30.68%) have televisions in eastern Nagaland and sixty-one out of eighty-eight households (i.e., 69.31%) do not have televisions. In contrast, in the rest of the state, an overwhelming ninety-seven out of one hundred and eight households (89.81%) have televisions as compared to eleven out of one hundred and eight households (10.18%) do not have television.

When we give chi square test, the difference is found to be significant as well ( $X^2= 72.96$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.0.001$ ).

Table 8a. Households having TV (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
TV	97	27
No TV	11	61

Source: Fieldwork.

#### (v) Household with Telephone

Another criterion to determine the connectivity and access is telephone. The survey also explores this dimension as well. Here also, it has been found that the number of households in eastern Nagaland which have telephones is less than those in the rest of the state. While sixty-one out of eighty-eight households (i.e., 69.31%) have telephones and twenty-seven out of eighty-eight households (i.e., 30.68%) do not have telephones do not have telephones in eastern Nagaland, an overwhelming number of households (one hundred and out of one hundred and eight, i.e., 93.51%) and only seven out of one hundred and eight households (6.48%) do not have telephones in the rest of the state.

Table 9. Households having telephone connection (district)

District	Have telephone	Does not have telephone
Dimapur	18	0
Kiphire	10	4
Kohima	14	0
Longleng	9	0
Mokokchung	24	0
Mon	17	11
Peren	-	-
Phek	17	7
Tuensang	25	12
Wokha	20	0
Zunheboto	8	0

Source: Fieldwork.

When we give chi square test, the above difference between eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state is found to be significant ( $X^2=19.81$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $P<.001$ ).

Table 9a. Households having telephone connection (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
With telephone	101	61
Without telephone	7	27

Source: Fieldwork

#### (vi) Household with Electricity

One of the most important criterion to determine the development and well-being is the access to electricity. In this regard, it can be seen from the table below (Table 10), that all the households in the districts in the rest of Nagaland, except Phek, have been electrified. Incidentally, the area in Phek district which has un-electrified

houses are in Meluri, which is a backward area in the district. Out of the four districts in eastern Nagaland, three districts have household which have not got access to electricity.

As it can be seen from Table 10a, total number of households which have been electrified in eastern Nagaland is sixty-three out of eighty-eight (71.59%) while in the rest of the state it stands at eighty-seven out of one hundred and eight (93.51%). The total number of households which are not electrified is twenty-five out of eighty-eight (28.40%) in eastern Nagaland and only seven out of one hundred and eight (6.48%) in the rest of Nagaland. When the finding is subjected to chi square test, the difference is found to be significant ( $X^2=17.07$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $P<.001$ )

Table 10. Number of Houses Electrified (district)

District	No. of houses electrified	No. of houses not electrified
Dimapur	18	0
Kiphire	10	4
Kohima	14	0
Longleng	9	0
Mokokchung	24	0
Mon	17	11
Peren	---	---
Phek	17	7 (Meluri area)
Tuensang	27	10
Wokha	20	0
Zunheboto	8	0

Source: Fieldwork (2014)

Table 10a. Number of houses electrified (region)

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Electrified	101	63
Not Electrified	7	25

Source: Fieldwork

**(vii) Household with access to water**

Drinking water being an essential aspect of our life, access to this source is also an indicator of people's well-being, of having access to basic necessities of life. In the table below (Table 11), it can be seen that the number of habitations<sup>3</sup> with hundred percent population covered under Rural Drinking Water Supply under the Government of Nagaland are much lower in the districts in eastern Nagaland as compared to the rest of the state. In fact, out of the eleven districts, the three districts in eastern Nagaland are found at the last three in the list while the other remaining district Tuensang occupies 7th in the list (Table 11). When we group the districts in terms of eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland, the percentage of the habitation with hundred percent population coverage, we find that eastern Nagaland (62.97%) is much lesser than that of the rest of Nagaland (83.42%).

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<sup>3</sup>Habitation - It is a term used to define a group of families living in proximity to each other, within a village. It could have either heterogeneous or homogenous demographic pattern. There can be more than <http://indiawater.gov.in/IMISReports/MenuItems/AboutSite.aspx>.

Table 11. Habitations with access to water in Nagaland (secondary)

Sl. No.	District	Total Habitations	No. of Habitations with Population Coverage $\geq 25\%$ and $< 50\%$	No. of Habitations with Population Coverage $\geq 50$ and $< 75\%$	No. of Habitations with Population Coverage $\geq 75$ and $< 100\%$	Total (4+5+6+7)	No. of Habitations with 100% Population Coverage
1	Dimapur	242	1	2	0	31	211
2	Kiphire	113	4	13	2	47	66
3	Kohima	113	1	0	1	23	90
4	Longleng	46	0	0	0	21	25
5	Mokokchung	123	0	3	8	25	98
6	Mon	127	4	9	4	51	76
7	Peren	102	1	0	2	16	86
8	Phek	121	0	0	0	4	117
9	Tuensang	116	1	3	2	24	92
10	Wokha	150	2	2	1	49	101
11	Zunheboto	207	2	11	3	31	176
	TOTAL	1460	16	43	23	322	1138

Source: PHED Department, Government of Nagaland.

A similar pattern is found in terms of households which get tape water supply (see, Table 11a). Least number of households get tape water supply as compared to those in the rest of the state. As it can be seen from the table below (table 11a) that out of the four districts in eastern Nagaland, three districts, namely, Kiphire, Mon and Longleng occupy the last three in the list with only 50%, 46.42% and 22.22% of households have access to tape water supply respectively. The other district, Tuensang stands at sixth number in the list with 70.27% of households with access to tape water supply.

When we group these districts in term of eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state, we find that 47.23% of households in eastern Nagaland and 75.84% of the households in the rest of Nagaland have access to tape water supply (Table 11a). This is to say, more than 50% of the households in eastern Nagaland do not have access to tape water supply while around 25% of the households in the rest of the state do not

have access to tap water supply. Thus, the lack of basic amenities like water supply is noted in eastern Nagaland.

Table 11a. Households with access to water (survey)

District	Total households	Tap
Dimapur	18	14 (77.78%)
Kiphire	14	7 (50%)
Kohima	14	10 (71.42%)
Longleng	9	2 (22.22%)
Mokokchung	24	17 (70.83%)
Mon	28	13 (46.42%)
Peren	-	-
Phek	24	24 (100%)
Tuensang	37	26 (70.27%)
Wokha	20	12 (60%)
Zunheboto	8	6 (75%)

Source: Fieldwork

### (5) Access to Health facilities

One of the most important aspects to measure development is access to health facilities. In this regard, certain health related aspects, namely number of hospitals, hospital beds, and number of doctors etc can be used see whether there is any difference between eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state. As it can be seen from Tables 12, 12a and 12b. that there is a difference in the number of health facilities (e.g., hospitals and health centres) in districts as well as regions.

Table 12. Number of Health facilities in Nagaland

Sl. No	Districts	No. of DH (1)	No. of CHC (2)	No. of PHC (3)	Total of 1+2+3 (4)	No. of SC (5)	Total of 4+5	Population
1	Dimapur	1	2	15	18	41	59	379,769
2	Peren	1	1	9	11	48	59	94,954
3	Kohima	1	3	8	12	17	29	270,063
4	Wokha	1	2	12	15	38	53	166,239

5	Phek	1	3	23	27	45	72	163,294
6	Kiphire	1	1	4	6	21	27	74,033
7	Zunheboto	1	2	13	16	49	65	141,014
8	Mokokchung	1	3	14	18	52	70	193,171
9	Tuensang	1	2	12	15	39	54	196,801
10	Mon	1	2	15	18	51	69	250,671
11	Longleng	1	-	4	5	7	12	50,593
Total		11	21	129		408		19,80,602

Source: <http://nagahealth.nic.in>.

While all the districts have district hospitals, the number of Community Health Centres, Primary Health Centres and Sub-Centres in these districts differ. The number of health facilities in eastern Nagaland is less as compared to the rest of the state. If we remove the sub-centres and count only those hospitals where doctors are assigned, namely District Hospitals, Community Health Centres and the Primary Health Centres, it is found that eastern Nagaland has a total of forty-four health facilities as compared to one hundred and seventeen health facilities in the rest of the state. In terms of percentage, for 5,72,098 people in eastern Nagaland (i.e., 28.89% of the population in the state), there are 44 health facilities (i.e., 27.33% of the total number of health facilities in terms of District Hospital, Community Health Centres, and the Primary Health Centres in the state). In the rest of the state, the figure is a little better than that of the eastern Nagaland: for 14,08,504 people (i.e., 71.11% of the population of the state), there are 117 health facilities (i.e., 72.67% of the total number of health facilities in terms of District Hospital, Community Health Centres, and the Primary Health Centres in the state). In other words, for every 13002 persons, there is a health facility in eastern Nagaland, and for every 12038 persons there is a health facility in the rest of the state. As it can be seen from Table 12a that the ratio in the rest of the state is more or less the same as that of the entire state that stands at one health facility for every 12301 persons.



Table 12a. Total Number of DH/CHC/PHC (Region)

	No. of Health facilities	Population	Population per facility
Rest of Nagaland	117 (72.67%)	14,08,504	12038.50
Eastern Nagaland	44 (27.33%)	5,72,098	13002.23
Total	161		

Source: <http://nagahealth.nic.in>.

Table. 12b. Total Number of DH/CHC/PHC/SC (region)

	No. of Health facilities	Population	Population per facility
Rest of Nagaland	402 (70.66%)	14, 08, 504	3503.74
Eastern Nagaland	162 (28.48%)	5, 72, 098	3531.47
Total	569		

Source: <http://nagahealth.nic.in>.

Even though all the districts have a District Hospital each, the difference between eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state is due to the fact that the Community Health Centres (CHC) and the Primary Health Centres (PHC) are less in the former. As it can be seen from the Table 12 that out of the total of 21 CHCs, there are only 5 in eastern Nagaland (i.e., 23.81% of the total CHCs in the state) for a population of 5,72,504 (i.e., 28.89% of the entire population of the state). Whereas, in the rest of the state, out of the total of 21 CHCs, there are 16 CHCs (i.e., 76.19% of the total CHCs in the state) for a population of 14,08,504 (i.e., 71.11% of the entire population of the state). Similar trend is more or less found in the case of Primary Health Centres (PHC). As it can be seen from the Table 12 that out of the total of 129 PHCs, there are 35 in eastern Nagaland (i.e., 27.13% of the total PHCs in the state) for a population of 5,72,504 (i.e., 28.89% of the entire population of the state). Whereas, in the rest of the state, out of the total of 129 PHCs, there are 94 PHCs (i.e.,

72.87% of the total PHCs in the state) for a population of 14,08,504 (i.e., 71.11% of the entire population of the state).

The pattern changes a little bit when the sub-centres (which are the contact point between the community and health services; these centres consist of two health workers but not doctor) included as well. As it can be seen from Table 12b, the total number of the health facilities in eastern Nagaland is one hundred and sixty-two while the total number of health facilities in the rest of Nagaland is four-hundred and two. In terms of percentage, for 5,72,098 people in eastern Nagaland (i.e., 28.89% of the population in the state), there are 162 health facilities (i.e., 28.48% of the total number of health facilities in the state). In the rest of the state, for 14,08,504 people (i.e., 71.11% of the population of the state), there are 402 health facilities (i.e., 70.66% of the total number of health facilities in the state). In other words, for every 3531 persons, there is a health facility in eastern Nagaland, and in the rest of the state for every 3503 persons there is a health facility. As it can be seen from Table 12b that the ratio in these two regions are more or less the same as that of the entire state that stands at one health facility for every 3480 persons.

This change is effected as the number of Sub-centres have been proportionately distributed, unlike CHCs and PHCs, between the region. Out of the total 408 Sub-centres, there are 118 in eastern Nagaland (i.e., 28.92% of the total Sub-centres in the state) for a population of 5,72,504 (i.e., 28.89% of the entire population of the state). Whereas, in the rest of the state, out of the total of 408 Sub-centres, there are 290 Sub-centres (i.e., 71.88% of the total Sub-centres in the state) for a population of 14,08,504 (i.e., 71.11% of the entire population of the state).

Thus, in terms of having proper and better equipped health facilities, there is a lack of better health facilities in eastern Nagaland as compared to the rest of the state. This can be seen in term the number of hospital beds available in these regions as well as doctor-patient ratio.

In the following table (Table 12c), the number of the beds available in the entire is state is 2705 of which 635 are in eastern Nagaland and the remaining 2070 are in the rest of the state. This is to say, 23.47% of hospital beds in Nagaland are available for 28.89% of population of the state who live in eastern Nagaland (population of eastern Nagaland is 5,72,098 out of the total 19,80,602 of the state)

while 76.52% of hospital beds in Nagaland are available for 71.11% of the population in the rest of the state (which is, 14,08,504 out of the total 19,80,602 of the state). This roughly translated into one bed per 900 people in eastern Nagaland and in the rest of the state it stands at one bed per 680 people. Thus, the health facility is poorer in eastern Nagaland as compared to the rest of the state.

Table 12c. Number of Beds in Health facilities in Nagaland (2011-2012)

No. of Beds in	Kohi ma	Dima pur	Moko kchung	Tuensang	Zunheboto	Wokha	Phek	Mon	Peren	Longleng	Kiphire	Total
DH	300	150	150	100	50	50	75	50	50	50	50	1075
CHC	90	60	90	60	60	60	90	60	30	-	30	630
PHC	84	48	102	90	108	78	138	102	54	18	24	846
SHC	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Dispensary	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
T.B. Hospital	50	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Mental Hospital	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
Total Beds	574	259	394	251	218	188	303	212	134	68	104	2705

Source: 2013, Statistical handbook of Nagaland, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, p. 123.

Table. 12d. Number of Hospital Beds (region)

	No. of Beds	Population
Rest of Nagaland	2070 (76.52%)	14, 08, 504 (71.11%)
Eastern Nagaland	635 (23.47%)	5, 72, 098 (28.89%)
Total	2705	19, 80, 602

Source: 2013, Statistical handbook of Nagaland, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, p. 123.

Similarly, in terms of doctor-patient ratio, it can be seen from the following table (Tables 12e & 12f), the number of doctors under the state Health Services is 390 of which 106 are allotted to eastern Nagaland and the remaining 284 are in the rest of the state. This is to say, 27.18% of doctors of the State Health Services in Nagaland are available for 28.89% of population of the state who live in eastern Nagaland (population of eastern Nagaland is 5,72,098 out of the total 19,80,602 of the state) while 72.82% of doctors in Nagaland are available for 71.11% of the population in the rest of the state (which is, 14,08,504 out of the total 19,80,602 of the state). This roughly translated into one doctor per 5397 people in eastern Nagaland and in the rest of the state it stands at one doctor per 5397 people. The state average is 5078 people per doctor. In this regard also, the facility is a little better in the rest of Nagaland as compared to eastern Nagaland.

Table 12e. Number of Medical Personnel, 2011-12 (district)

Sl. No.	District	No. of Doctors	No. of Pharmacists	No. of Nurses	Total
1.	Kohima	76	75	277	428
2.	Dimapur	37	53	179	269
3.	Mokokchung	47	76	247	370
4.	Tuenang	37	42	212	291
5.	Zunheboto	31	36	154	221
6.	Wokha	31	54	145	230
7.	Phek	40	37	171	248
8.	Mon	35	30	145	210
9.	Peren	22	22	78	122
10.	Kiphire	16	15	78	109
11.	Longleng	18	12	65	95
Total		390	452	1751	2593

Source: 2013, Statistical handbook of Nagaland, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, p. 124.

Table 12f. Number of Doctors (region)

	Total No. of Doctors	Population	Population per Doctor
Rest of Nagaland	284 (72.82%)	14,08,504	4959.52
Eastern Nagaland	106 (27.18%)	5,72,098	5397.15
Total	390	19, 80, 602	

Source: 2013, Statistical handbook of Nagaland, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, p. 124.

## (6) Access to Decision Making

One of the major criteria to gauge the level of development is the access to decision making structure. A crucial indicator of such an access is the number of people in the bureaucracy, which is the backbone of administration.

### (i) Representation in Bureaucracy

Different tribes have different levels of representation in Nagaland. It can be seen from the table below (Table 13) that the number of people from different tribes and communities in Nagaland differ in crucial services like Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), Nagaland Civil Service (NCS) and Nagaland Police Service (NPS).

Table 13. Representation of tribes among IAS/IPS/NCS/NPS

Sl. No.	Tribe	No. of IAS	No. of IPS	No. of NCS	No. of NPS
1	Angami	3	2	39	29
2	Ao	7	10	52	78
3	Lotha	4	3	53	26
4	Sema	1	2	19	24
5	Rengma	0	2	4	8
6	Kuki	0	1	4	0
7	Kachari	0	0	0	0
8	Zeliang	2	1	2	7
9	Pochury	0	0	3	4

10	Chakhesang	2	2	9	10
11	Konyak	0	1	9	4
12	Khiamniungan	0	0	6	3
13	Phom	0	0	8	5
14	Sangtam	1	1	11	7
15	Chang	0	1	7	7
16	Yimchunger	2	1	3	4
17	Non- local	28	7	0	0

Source:<http://dpar.nagaland.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IAS.pdf>;

[http://nagapol.gov.in/directory\\_ips.html](http://nagapol.gov.in/directory_ips.html);

[http://nagapol.gov.in/directory\\_nps.html](http://nagapol.gov.in/directory_nps.html)

<http://dpar.nagaland.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NCS.pdf>.

Presently, there are 50 IAS officers under the Govt. of Nagaland of which 22 of them (44% of the total IAS officers) are members of the recognized tribes in the state (i.e., 'local' officers); the remaining 28 officers (56% of the total IAS officers) are 'non-local' officers (people who are not members of the recognized tribes of Nagaland). As it can be seen from Table 13, out of the 16 recognized tribes, only 8 of them have members in the IAS, and overwhelming numbers of these officers come from 'advanced tribes'. In fact, out of the five 'advanced tribes', four of the them, the Angami, the Aos, the Lotha and the Sumi together consist of 15 officers out of 22 (i.e., 68.19% of the 'local' IAS officers). In terms of the tribes in the rest of the state other than those in eastern Nagaland, there are altogether 19 IAS officers out of the total of 22 IAS 'local' officers (i.e., an overwhelming (86.37%) while the backward tribes of eastern Nagaland have only 3 IAS officers out of the total of 22 (i.e., 13.63% of the 'local' IAS officers).

Amongst the IPS officers, there are 27 out of the total of 34 IPS officers are 'local' people representing 12 out of 16 recognized tribes in Nagaland. The remaining 7 IPS officers are 'non-local' officers. In other words, 79.41% of the total IPS officers are 'local' officers while 20.59 % are 'non-local' officers. Amongst the 'local' IPS officers, the five 'advanced tribes' (the Angami, the Ao, the Lotha, the Sumi, the Rengma) together consist of 19 IPS officers (70.37% of the total 'local' officers). In terms of the tribes in the rest of Nagaland other than those in eastern

Nagaland, they consist of 23 (i.e., 85.19%) out of the total 27 'local' IPS officers while those 'backward tribes' in eastern Nagaland have 4 IPS officers (14.81%) of the total 'local' IPS officers.

Thus, in terms of two crucial organs of the bureaucracy (viz, IAS and IPS) in Nagaland which play crucial role in administration and implementation of government programmes and policies, the 'backward tribes' in eastern Nagaland have a miniscule representation.

The same patterns are also noticed with respect to state services like Nagaland Civil Service (NCS) and Nagaland police Service (NPS). There are 229 NCS officers in the state, of which 167 (72.93%) are from the 'advanced tribes', and 185 officers (80.79%) are from the 'advanced tribe' and others from the rest of Nagaland while 44 (19.21%) of the officers come from the 'backward tribes' from eastern Nagaland.

Similarly for Nagaland Police Service (NPS), there are 216 police officers in the state, of which 165 officers (76.39%) are from the 'advanced tribes', and 186 officers (86.11%) are from the 'advanced tribes' and others from the rest of Nagaland, while 30 (13.89%) of the officers come from the 'backward tribes' from eastern Nagaland.

Incidentally in all the four services, the presence of Ao is conspicuous by its overwhelming presence. This is not surprising since they were first tribes among the Nagas who had been converted into Christianity and got modern education in 1872.

Thus, from the four above crucial civil services that constitute bureaucracy, it has been found that the 'backwards tribes' from eastern Nagaland are barely represented while the 'advanced tribes' are overwhelmingly present.

## **(ii) Chief executives**

The differences in the presence of different tribes, particularly the 'advanced' and 'backward' tribes, in the bureaucracy is also reflected in the two highest decision-making offices: the Chief Minister and the Chief Secretary.

Table 14. List of Chief Ministers of Nagaland

Sl.No.	Name	Took Office	Left Office	Party	Tribe
1	P. Shilu Ao	1 Dec 1963	14 Aug 1966	Naga Nationalist Organisation	Ao
2	T.N. Angami	14 Aug 1966	12 Feb 1969	Naga Nationalist Organisation	Angami
3	Hokishe Sema	22 Feb 1969	26 Feb 1974	Naga Nationalist Organisation	Sumi
4	Vizol Angami	26 Feb 1974	10 Mar 1975	United Democratic Front	Angami
5	John Bosco Jasokie	10 Mar 1975	20 Mar 1975	Naga National Democratic Party	Angami
6	President's rule	20 Mar 1975	25 Mar 1977		
7	Vizol Angami	25 Nov 1977	18 Apr 1980	United Democratic Front	Angami
8	S.C. Jamir	18 Apr 1980	26 Feb 1985	United Democratic Front-Progressive	Ao
9	John Bosco Jasokie	5 Jun 1980	18 Nov 1982	Naga National Democratic Party	Angami
10	S.C. Jamir	18 Nov 1982	28 Oct 1986	United Democratic Front-Progressive	Ao
11	Hokishe Sema	29 Oct 1986	7 Aug 1988	Indian National Congress	Sumi
12	President's rule	7 Aug 1988	25 Jan 1989		
13	S.C. Jamir	25 Jan 1989	10 May 1990	Indian National Congress	Ao
14	K.L. Chishi	16 May 1990	19 Jun 1990	Indian National Congress	Sema
15	Vamuzo Phesao	19 Jun 1990	2 Apr 1992	Nagaland People's Council	Angami
16	President's rule	2 Apr 1992	22 Feb 1993		
17	S.C. Jamir	22 Feb 1993	6 Mar 2003	Indian National Congress	Ao
19	Neiphiu Rio	6 Mar 2003	3 Jan 2008	Nagaland People's Front	Angami
20	President's rule	3 Jan 2008	12 Mar 2008		
21	Neiphiu Rio	12 Mar 2008	23 Mar 2014	Nagaland People's Front	Angami
22	T.R. Zeliang	24 May 2014	Present	Nagaland People's Front	Zeliang


Source: <https://www.nagaland.gov.in/portal/portal/StatePortal/Government/ChiefMinister>

Nagaland has had 10 chief ministers in its life of some five decades as a state in the Union of India. Out of this 10 Chief Ministers, 9 have been from the 'advanced tribes' (5



Angami, 2 Ao and 2 Sema). There has been no Chief Minister from among the 'backward tribes' of eastern Nagaland, even as tribes like the Konyak happens to be the largest tribe in terms of population in Nagaland. The incumbent Chief Minister is the first who doesn't belong to the five 'advanced tribes'; he belongs to Zeliang tribe from Peren District.


Table 14a. Number of Chief Ministers of Nagaland (tribe-wise)



Source: <https://www.nagaland.gov.in//portal>

Similarly, there has been so far 19 Chief Secretaries, out of which 10 are 'non-local' officers and 9 are from the recognized tribes of Nagaland. Among the 9, 8 of them are from the 'advanced tribes' (4 Ao, 2 Sema and 2 Lotha) and 1 from the Zeliang tribe. Here also, it may be noted that none of the 'backward tribes' from eastern Nagaland have been a Chief Secretary so far.

Table 14b. Number of Chief Secretaries of Nagaland (tribe-wise)



Source: <https://www.nagaland.gov.in/portal/portal/StatePortal/Government/Secretaries>

Thus, in the offices that matters in decision-making such as political as well as bureaucratic executives, the 'backward tribes' in eastern Nagaland are barely represented indicating their backward and disadvantaged positions in the overall political and administrative structure of the state of Nagaland.

## **Conclusion**

From a perusal of the above survey data as well as secondary data, it can be conclusively said that the four districts of Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Tuensang are less developed than the rest of Nagaland. This has been observed across varied categories ranging from HDI, literacy, education, facets of incomes such as employment and ownership of properties, access to electricity and water, and health facilities as well as representation in the decision-making structures of the state. The standard of living of the households can also be taken as marker of the relative development or deprivation of the regions. Looked at through this lens, it is also seen that households in the four districts of Eastern Nagaland have less number of pucca houses with majority staying in kucha houses; they have lesser number of automobiles per household, lesser TV sets and are less likely to have access to a telephone connection. Political representation is also a marker of the relative development of a region. It has been seen that from the highest bureaucracy inclusive of Chief Secretaries, tribes representation and other civil servants, there is almost an exclusive monopoly by the 'advanced tribes'.

All the data analyzed point to the fact that there is indeed a differential development between Eastern Nagaland and the rest of Nagaland. Thus, as far as the question of redistribution is concerned, the survey of the present study, and some of the secondary data, suggest that Eastern Nagaland needs more attention to make it at par with the rest of Nagaland in terms of various development parameters. Whether such an attention call for a need to create a separate state consisting of the districts of Eastern Nagaland is a different issue that shall be addressed in the following chapter.

**Chapter: 4**

**Statehood Demand and Naga politics**

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“Too little too late” (ENPO Memorandum, 2010)

In the preceding chapter, we have mapped out the issue of differences in the development pattern in Nagaland. The demand for a separate state called 'Frontier Nagaland' is linked to this issue of differential development between eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state. In fact, this lack of development and a corresponding sense of being discriminated are at the centre of the demand for the separate state<sup>1</sup>. This chapter shall look into this aspect as well as its paradoxical relationship with the familiar trajectory of Naga nationalist movement. To set up the context of these issues, a brief historical account of the Naga nationalist movement and the demand for 'Frontier Nagaland' are called for. The next few paragraphs shall deal these two aspects.

**Naga Nationalist Movement: A Brief History**

Identity based on human collectivity has been a central feature of human existence, even in a world where human individuality has been celebrated. We organize ourselves into groups and lead our lives in a world inhabited by these groups. The sense of identity that we derive from our belonging to human groupings has become a crucial aspect of our sense of being. Identity is belongingness, the sense of sameness, positionality and directionality.

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<sup>1</sup> We shall come to this aspect shortly.

Naga nationalism is derived from the inner and dormant resources of the Nagas being an ethnic community and the perception and sentiments they aspire. There is also the importance of a common identity and shared culture of the Nagas. According to Atai Shimray, the cultural components which have prompted nationalism among the Nagas include dress, food, music and crafts as well as customs and mode of village administration (Shimray 2005). The absence of a common Naga language has not impeded the growth of a common consciousness. Also the most common cultural element shared by the Nagas is religion which is embodied in the general accepted ideal 'Nagaland for Christ'. Abraham Lotha argues that Naga nationalism is centered on and motivated by a functioning 'navel'- an ethnic core comprising of kinship, history, origin, myths, race, polity, language territory, symbols and religion which provides the cultural resources for identity people and which supports the struggle to protect the 'Naga way of life (Lotha 2009) .

The Nagas are a distinct ethnic stock of Mongoloid race that migrated to the present areas of settlement from South-East Asia, probably through Myanmar after crossing the Chindwin and Irrawady rivers. They remained unconquered and unadministered by any foreign power for ages until the British imperialists came and forcefully occupied certain portions of their territory from 1882. The British attempted to extend their colonies and declared a "British District" with Kohima as its administrative headquarters against the wishes of the Naga people, and they ruled for about six decades (1881-1947) in the southwestern and western parts of the Naga territory. The northern and the eastern part of the Naga territory were, however, left uncontrolled and unadministered.

Realizing the uniqueness of the Naga situation, the British India Government passed an Act called the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act of 1873, prohibiting outsiders from entering into Naga territory without an Inner Line Permit. Even today, no outsider can enter into Naga country without an Inner Line Permit. Nagas have always considered themselves as belonging to an independent nationality. Hokishe stated that, "We are Nagas by birth, Indians by accident," (Hokishe Sema 1986) is a common refrain among the people of Nagaland. The Nagas have always wanted to live as one people,

under one administrative roof. The concept has even found approval in mainstream Naga politics. There have been three resolutions in the Nagaland Legislative Assembly since 1993, supporting Greater Nagalim, which is to be an independent Naga homeland comprising Naga-settled areas in various states of India's North-east region and Myanmar. The call for Greater Nagalim is championed by the NSCN-IM who call for the merger of all Naga-inhabited areas in adjoining Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, the four hill districts of Manipur: Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong, and Ukhrul in addition to 26 villages in the district of Churachandpur inhabited by the Zeliangrong tribe, and if possible those in Myanmar with the present state of Nagaland.

The call for integration of all the Nagas didn't arise in vacuum, with the NSCN-IM just being the latest in a long list of individuals and organizations who have worked for Naga integration. A brief summary of the trajectory of Naga nationalism would be attempted in the following pages.

Nagaland became well known during World War II, in the fierce battle between the Allied forces and the Japanese imperial army at Kohima. Nagas were caught in the crossfire and engaged as porters, spies and scouts for both the British and the Japanese. But even before the war started, Naga nationalism had already begun. During the First World War, the British government recruited about 2000 Nagas and sent to France as labour corps. Even though the War did not directly impact the Nagas, it indirectly made them conscious about their identity and their existence itself. The journey across seas and countries awakened the spirit of Naga nationalism and they began to develop the concept of a Naga nation which had not been dreamt of before. Accordingly in 1918, an association called the Naga Club was formed with the joint efforts of government officials, village headmen, dobashis, and those Nagas who returned from France. This club was the first of its kind with members from various Naga tribes and was social and political in nature.

In 1929, when the Simon Commission came to India, the Naga club on behalf of the Nagas submitted a memorandum demanding that the Naga Hills should not be included in the Reformed Scheme of the Government of India and that if the British were

to withdraw, the Nagas should be left alone to chart their own political future and determine for themselves as in ancient times. The British parliament decided to treat the Naga Hills as an Excluded Area and Partially Excluded Naga inhabited areas by the Government of India Act 1935. The administration of the Naga Hills was left to the Governor of Assam. From 1935-45, the Naga nationalist negotiated intensely with the British for independence.

In April 1945, Charles Pawsey, the then Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district founded the Naga Hills District Tribal Council (NHDTTC) with the aim of uniting the Naga tribes. With their roots in the Naga club, the Naga nationalist leaders changed the NHDTTC into the Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) and it became a national institution. Thus the Naga struggle took a direction in which their determination was to attain freedom. This was the beginning of the modern phase of the Naga movement (Shimray 2005).

In 1947, Sir Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam tried to negotiate with the NNC on behalf of the Government of India. The negotiation brought about an agreement between the NNC and the Government of India known as the 9 point agreement or the Hydari Accord. But the ninth point of the Accord was the most controversial which gave rise to another deadlock. It said that the Governor of Assam as the agent of the Government of Indian union will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observation of this Agreement. At the end of this period, the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the above Agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at (Shimray 2005, p. 58).

It was claimed by the NNC that it ensured Nagas have the right to complete independence after 10 years. It was a clear promise of self-determination and assurance. On 9 November 1949, a three member delegation of the NNC met with representatives of the Government of India. The GOI representatives refused to ratify the Accord and it was no longer considered to exist by the Indian Government. On July 17, 1947, a Naga delegation under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo met Jinnah and on 19<sup>th</sup> July met Gandhi. Gandhi after meeting the Naga delegation stated:

Nagas have every right to be independent. We do not want to live under the domination of the British and they are now leaving us...if you do not wish to join the Union of India nobody will force you to do that (ibid).

Gandhi did not live to carry out his promise and as no agreement or understanding was reached between the two parties, and with the independence of India and Pakistan coming closer, the Naga nationalists were anxious and thus declared independence on August 14<sup>th</sup>, 1947. They sent their declaration of independence to the Government of India and also to the United Nations and informed that the Nagas did not accept the Indian Constitution. (ibid)

The NNC under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo conducted a plebiscite in 1951. The support to live as a sovereign nation was overwhelming and the referendum turned out to be 99.9 percent in favour of independence from India. But this result was ignored by the Government of India. Nehru when faced with the demand of independence simply exploded with anger and said “whether the heaven falls or India goes to pieces and blood run red in the country I don’t care, Nagas will not be allowed to become independent” (ibid 59).

In 1952, the NNC launched a civil disobedience campaign refusing to pay taxes. There was total non-participation in the first Indian general election. No Naga stood or voted in the election. On March 30 1953, the Nagas welcomed Nehru’s decision to visit Kohima. He was accompanied by his daughter Indira Gandhi and Burmese prime minister U Nu. The NNC were busy preparing to submit a memorandum. But just before the meeting he gave instructions to stop any Nagas from making any written or oral address at the reception. As a result, the Naga delegation walked out of the meeting. Nehru was humiliated and left to address only a handful of Government servants. Arrest warrants for the NNC leaders were issued.

Realizing the danger of an armed repression, the formation of People’s Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland was announced. This was the political wing of the NNC to direct and monitor its activities mainly in eastern Nagaland (Burma). In 1956, the NNC formed the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) and with it its armed wing was also

formed known as the 'Naga Home Guard', later known as the 'Naga army'. It was the first armed resistance group to oppose the Indian armed force. The Assam Disturbed Areas Act of 1955 was introduced which enabled the Assam armed police and Assam rifles to act without any legal restriction whatsoever. Thus the 'reign of terror' broke out. There was an open war which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. There was intense fighting between the Naga resistance and Indian security forces. It forced the Naga leaders to go underground. Thus, an undeclared war between the Nagas and India began which led to much bloodshed, armed violence, raids, murder, arson, looting, kidnapping, and burning of villages. Even churches were not spared and many innocent victims lost their lives (ibid).

However, while armed confrontation continued, efforts were also made to bring peace. In the late 1950's the idea that statehood within the Indian union might provide an answer to the demand for independence surfaced. This was the proposal associated with the new organization called the Naga People's Convention. It was formed as an over-ground organization to act as an intermediary between the Government of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland. The NPC was, however, looked upon with suspicion by the FGN and its sympathizers as an attempt by the GOI to divide and delude the Nagas by injecting the idea of statehood. The participation of Indian intelligence bureau in the setting up of the NPC can be found in the memoirs of the bureau's Director, B.N. Mulik.

The first Convention was held in Kohima from August 22, 1956 under the chairmanship of Imkongliba Ao. It recommended that "the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Area should be amalgamated and a new unit called 'Naga Hills and Tuensang Area' (NHTA) should be formed". It came into effect in December 1957 and was placed under the Ministry of External Affairs. The second convention was held on May 21, 1958, in the Ao village of Ungma. This convention set up a liaison committee to contact the Federal Government of Nagaland in order to bring a political settlement. In the third Naga People's Convention (NPC) held in October 1959 at Mokokchung, it decided to propose that Nagaland be made into a separate state within the Indian Union. It further



emphasized local autonomy for the Naga Hills District, and a separate electorate for the Naga tribes.

Here the 16 point agreement was drafted and was put to the Government of India. With the signing of the 16 point agreement by NPC representatives and the Indian officials in July 26<sup>th</sup>, 1960, it appears that the appeal for statehood was officially recognized. The Government of India passed the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment Act and thereby created the state of Nagaland on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1963. The creation of statehood did not create any major abatement in the nationalist movement. The movement did not fall as was expected. Instead there was an even greater explosion of Naga nationalist sentiments which continues till today.

The undeclared war between the Indian armed forces and the Naga Army claimed many lives on both sides and with the aim of bringing peace to the Naga territory, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Government of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland on September 6, 1964. The Government of India also constituted a high level commission called the Formation of Peace Mission in 1964 to try to normalize the situation. But all these endeavors failed to deter and curb the Naga struggle. In 1975 the Shillong Accord was signed between the Government of India and some authorized underground representatives. This created further division among the Nagas and was seen by some as simply a political trap to suppress the Naga National Movement for freedom. Consequently after the formation of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980, they procured more sophisticated arms from foreign countries to defend the motherland. In 1988, the NSCN again split into the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). It was followed by the NSCN Cease-fire agreement of 1997, signed between the Government of India and NSCN (IM) with the sole objective to continue the peace process during which the Naga political talk could be held<sup>2</sup>.

Talks between the GOI and the NSCN-IM have resulted in the signing of a 'Framework Agreement' between the two on 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2015. The peace accord, as it is

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2. Naga Hoho (2005), *Uniqueness of Naga History*, Mokokchung Press, Mokokchung, Nagaland, p.7.

being called, marks the culmination of over 80 rounds of negotiations that spanned 16 years and seeks to end animosity and usher in a new era of peace. It was signed in the presence of the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, Home Minister Rajnath Singh and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval by the NSCN-IM's leader T. Muivah and government's interlocutor R.N. Ravi at the PM's residence in New Delhi.

Topan Bose observes,

Two aspects of the Framework Agreement have been made public, acceptance of the "uniqueness of Naga history and culture" by the Indian Government and the acceptance of the primacy of the Indian Constitution by the NSCN-IM. While Atal Behari Vajpayee had acknowledged the "unique history of the Nagas" in 2003, the NSCN-IM accepting the "primacy of the Indian Constitution" is a new development. It puts at rest the earlier ambiguities about the NSCN-IM's position on the Indian Constitution.<sup>3</sup>

Notwithstanding the new contours of engagement between the GOI and NSCN-IM, many remain skeptical about the recent accord. This isn't surprising if one were to consider the faith of three earlier accords signed between the Indian government and the Nagas: the Hydari accord of 1947, the 16-point agreement signed between the GOI and the Naga's People Convention in July, 1960, and lastly, the Shillong Accord of 1975. Far from finding an acceptable solution for the Nagas, the accords have only served to further divisions within the Nagas.

Patricia Mukhim, thus, argues,

Peace accords are always met with some amount of cynicism. The Naga Peace Accord signed on August 3<sup>rd</sup> was no exception; it too had people just waiting for it to fail. Several of these people wrote long pieces in the media too. The problem with these experts is that they look at peace from the conventional prism of the state, putting so much pressure on militants that they eventually surrender. This method of bringing about peace in Nagaland was tried for several decades, but met with no success. This is

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<sup>3</sup> Tapan, B. (2015) 'Indo-Naga Framework Agreement: Apprehensions and Expectations', Available: <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article6157.html>. [accessed 1.07.16]

because the Nagas want an ‘honourable settlement’, and that can only take place when the peace dialogue is among equals.<sup>4</sup>

There is also a huge question mark on the NSCN-IM’s claim to speak for all Nagas. It remains to be seen how other groups such as FGN and the NSCN-K react to this new development. It is also not clear what ‘shared sovereignty’ as spelled out in the accord would affect the demand for the call for integration vis-à-vis Greater Nagalim.

There appears to be growing fragmentation on the Naga Integration issue among the general public. Vamuzo, former Nagaland Women Commission chairperson, in a personal communication maintained that the movement was for the rights of the Nagas initially, but in the process it collapsed, and there is a leadership crisis now, with some demanding sovereignty and others integration.

However, there are still others who sympathize with and are positive about sovereignty and hopeful about a solution. For instance, the Naga Hoho President asserts that, “as of now it may not be possible but it is possible” (personal communication)

The question of Integration remains a central issue for the Nagas and certainly the most prominent. However, it isn’t the only issue which plagues Naga society. In the midst of this Naga story, of their demand for sovereignty and integration, paradoxically, there is this demand for a separate state, 'Frontier Nagaland', by the Nagas from eastern Nagaland under the ENPO (Eastern Naga People's Organization). In the next segment, the background on this demand and issues around that shall be discussed.

### **Eastern Nagas and ENPO**

The expression 'Eastern Nagas' refers to those tribes who inhabit in the four districts of Nagaland. It also sometimes incorporates other tribes in Myanmar who have close affinity with those six tribes who live in the four district of Nagaland. These four districts are Kiphire, Longeng, Teunsang and Mon. The former two were carved out

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<sup>4</sup>Patricia, M. (2015) ‘Puncturing wrong notions of the Northeast’, available: <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/puncturing-wrong-notions-of-the-northeast/article7686906.ece> [Accessed 01.07.16]

of Tuensang District in 2003, namely Longleng and Kiphire which became 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> districts of Nagaland.

There are six tribes in eastern Nagaland. They are the Chang, the Konyak, the Khiamniungan, the Phom, the Sangtam and the Yimchunger. According to 2011 census, the total population of Eastern Nagaland is 5, 72, 098, which is 29% of the total population of Nagaland.

The region is considered backward region by the government of Nagaland taking into account the condition of underdeveloped region. Looking at the historical account, tradition, culture, this region is marked out differently in comparison with the rest of Nagaland.

Eastern Nagaland has its own history before they became part of Nagaland. The region was never part of Nagaland but they have their own administration and governance. During British period, it was called 'free land' and was not under British administration which comes under North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA). The North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (formerly the North-East Frontier Tracts) was one of the political divisions in British India and later the Republic of India till 1972, when it became the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Its administrative headquarters was Shillong (till 1974, when it was transferred to Itanagar).

So the present day eastern Nagaland had their administration in the form of Regional Council Members (RCM) with 35 members with special provisions and status. So this administration was not part of Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) where the rest of the Nagas initially belong to. In 1957 (NHTA) Act was passed. The formation of Naga Hills states that, there shall be new administrative unit in the State of Assam by the name of Naga Hills Tuensang Area comprising the tribal areas which at such commencement were known as the Naga Hills District and Tuensang Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/727141>.

## **Statehood Demand and Its Reasons: A Brief Account**

The Memorandum states that,

In terms of Socio-Economic condition, there is unequal distribution of funding, all round developmental policies and activities in the state. Despite, these four districts being inhabited by 6(six) declared backward and under-developed tribes which form almost half of the total geographical area of the state and the population, the Yearly Assembly Allocation is comparatively very negligible in real terms of the actual allocation and implementation in contrary to the project figures and proposal in the papers shown before the central Government not to mention the un-reflected and hidden diversion of funds etc. Besides, all the Development Establishments and major projects are headquartered and position in the forward and comparatively much more privileged and developed districts, where the fund flow pattern and the allocation follow the same pattern. Thus, the Eastern Nagaland areas in the state receives the last and least of priorities in the all round development especially road communications and other vital infrastructural developments (ENPO Memorandum 2010, p.3).

When the six tribes initially started its movement for the separate statehood demand, it was called Tuensang Mon Peoples Organization (TMPO) in 1975. During that time, there were only Tuensang and Mon districts. After the creation of Longleng and Kiphire districts, it has changed to Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization. The founder of the movement is Pohwang (the present MLA) who belongs to Konyak tribe.

The demand for separate state is three decades old since 1970s to date. For the leaders, the present demand is a renewal of the past. They have started with the demand for Union Territory (UT) where Article 3 empowers the people to demand for separate statehood based on historical claim. The movement was not a continuous but spontaneous movement because of different reasons as the leaders and the common people shared during the interview.

The memorandum on the separate statehood demand by Eastern Nagaland Peoples Organization (ENPO) which was submitted to Government of India has cited different claims and reasons. The first is a historical claim that eastern Nagas were “historically under the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division under the aegis of the Indian

Agency (NEFA) Govt. of India, which was geo-politically a byproduct of the Mc Mohan Line of 1914”<sup>6</sup>. This area was basically not covered/ administered under the British rule during 1940s. But when Nagaland was to be formed, they brought together NEFA and Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) together in 1957 and carved out the present state of Nagaland. So historically, the present state of Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland has different historical trajectories.

This claim has been substantiated by different opinions by the civil leaders. According to Sasha (ENSF President) “Historically, we are different and we slowly realized the ill treatment from the advanced tribes and if we remain part of Nagaland, we will be discriminated forever by the Nagas”. In the same line Toshi Wungtung, ENPO Steering Committee Chairman said that,

The demand is also ethnically, historically and economically justified. There are countries which has a country and a nation within and also a state. In article 371 (A), historical necessity is mentioned. ENPO is a black spot in the entire Indian state.

Pohwang (Eastern Nagaland legislator) stated that,

We are not demanding based on the record of the population but based on history, because we were different from them and we merged with the Nagaland state just because they assured us that everything will be equally distributed. But once the statehood has been granted, they are not looking after us.

Another civil society leader Chonta, KSU President feels that,

It’s a people’s demand and not a political issue irrespective of different political parties. We have no other intention demanding for a separate state but for equal development only. This demand is a renewal of the past, it has been started in 1970’s, our first demand was Union Territory. Article 3 of the Indian Constitution empowers the people to demand for separate statehood and it’s a historical based. During British period, it was called ‘free land’ and was not under British colony which is now called Indian government NEFA in 1957 NHTA Act was passed which states that, ‘this Act may be called the Naga Hills- Tuensang Area Act, 1957’.

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<sup>6</sup>. ENPO/Memo-01 *A Memorandum for Separate State for Eastern Nagaland under special provisions and status*. (Statehood Memorandum) PM/GOI/02, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2010, Office of the ENPO, H.Q: Tuensang-797811: Nagaland. p. 2.

A crucial reason for demanding separate statehood is political deprivation. In terms of political representation, prior to joining Nagaland, it has been noted that the eastern Nagaland was administratively and politically functioning independently through different forms of representation called Regional Council Members (RCM) which gives them special provision and status. There were 35 members for Tuensang and Mon districts where they function that are different from what we called it general election. When they were interviewed during the survey, they said that, even in political system, they were different. But after they joined to form Nagaland state, this has been converted into Nagaland Legislative Assembly at present. The distribution of 20 members out of 60 indicates discrimination because the other 40 members are represented by the rest of the Nagas which lies a huge margin. It has been noted that, “the unceremonious dissolution of the special provisions of the regional Council System in 1973-74 was done unjustly by misleading and manipulating the representatives and leaders” (Ibid). Longon, (eastern Nagaland legislator) states that “There is a need to look at the administration, as it not properly administered, and we are administratively sidelined”.

Another reason for demanding separate state is, as ENPO claims, that after Nagaland was born with the agreement to hold the benefit in an equal distribution in different respects but it was not so. This they called it ‘deliberate discrimination and negligence’. The memorandum states,

Lack of education, accessibility, training and exposure, etc of the people have resulted in falling behind the rest of the Nagas by much more than a century backwardness of the people may have been by destiny in the early stages, but now, it is by deliberate and perpetual design that the pathetic and deplorable conditions of the people of the area are doomed to remain unchanged in this combative milieus of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ibid).

Similar thoughts have also been expressed by many civil society leaders. According to Sasha (ENSF President),

In the employment sector, whenever they called for the departmental recruitment, same qualification people will appear for the same post, but our people are kept in such a way that, they are put into 25% reservation and that too never gets implemented and never give us more than the reservation though we qualify on merit position.

Similarly, Toshi Wungtung, ENPO Steering Committee Chairman, observes that,

For decades, gross injustice has been done to the people of these four districts by the successive governments, both in the State and at the Centre". Of the eleven districts in Nagaland, these four backward districts have almost half of the State's total population. But despite that, they continue to remain extremely undeveloped.

This sense of being discriminated comes up in the interview with Chonta, the KSU President. In his words,

We don't need to blame completely the advanced tribes for their educationally advanced because education and Christianity came to them first and yes came very late to us and over that there is a massive discrimination, for instance, the tribes like Ao and Angami, they totally captured all the teaching post taking the advantage of our ignorance, recently 271 teaching posts went back to other districts which is meant for the Eastern Nagaland. In real sense, the total no. of teaching post is 17,000 in primary school so according to the population 12070 would be for the rest of the Nagaland and 4930 should be for the Eastern Nagaland, but we are given only 3600, whereas 1330 post have been diverted to other districts.

Incidentally, Ongchong, NBCC General Secretary, also feels that the demand for a separate state is 'genuine' because 'there is prejudice and discrimination all over'. However, some people are quite circumspect while responding. For instance, Akum Longchari, Chief Editor Morung Express, a leading newspaper in Nagaland, while insisting that it is 'the people to decide', says,

The problem is the state structure and state government (system itself) and negligence is everywhere, the state of nature breeds inequality. The system that we have it perpetuate statuesque of deprivation. So it is not necessarily to one particular community or region, but as a whole there is problem in the structure of the state government. We need to really question Naga as a nation and not actually look at whether we really embody Naga as a whole or not because the problem lies there? And we can come to the conclusion that, present state government does not really embody the aspiration of the Nagas as a whole whether in-terms of systems of governance or development, or on the question of peace and justice. So demand for Frontier Nagaland is a reaction to Naga aspirations as a whole, and may be response to the present state Nagaland? Because that will have different implications and ultimately you have to look at the will of the people.

Longon, an MLA from eastern Nagaland corroborates such feelings. He observes that the

Reservation quota is not implemented' as it is supposed to be. Such a situation often pushes people like him to 'seek for frontier development', for 'economic,



education and other development facilities'. But he admits that when 'it comes to education...the advanced tribes are far better than' the eastern Nagas, and that 'there is a huge generation gap' between the Nagas of the two regions.

However, some of the civil society leaders feel that there is no discrimination as such. For instance, Abieu, the President of Naga Mothers Association (NMA) insists, "All are same there is no particular community discrimination and in fact they get almost all the share more than other regions". Similar opinion also comes from Benjong, an MLA who belongs to an advanced tribe, who feels that there "is no particular discrimination but all are same".

Thus, there is a strong socio-economic reasons behind the demand for a separate state. Many in eastern Nagaland feel that there is no equal developmental policies and activities between the Nagas in the eastern Nagaland and those in the rest of the state. As all the development establishments, headquarters are located in the advanced area which is already privileged and developed districts in the state. As a result, all the developmental activities and opportunities are in the hands of the advanced tribes. But arguably, from the opinions of the civil society leaders, there is a difference of opinions between those who come from eastern Nagaland and those from the rest of the state. In the next segment, we shall look at this difference in perception a little more from the responses from the sample survey.

### **Difference in perception**

The preceding chapter alludes to certain objective differences in the development patterns between eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state. But it seems that people in these two regions also differ in terms of their perceptions on the matter and the demand for a separate statehood. In this segment, some of these perceptions shall be discussed.

It is said that social movement and rebellion are often driven by a perception of deprivation rather than concrete condition<sup>7</sup>. In that sense, the present demand for a separate state is no difference. Besides the objective condition of differential

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<sup>7</sup> Relative deprivation theory holds such position (see, Gurr, 1971)

development between the two regions, eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state, people in the eastern Nagaland have a strong perception being under-developed and discriminated. Thus, to a question as to whether eastern Nagaland is under-developed in comparison to the rest of the state, majority of the respondents (122 out of 196 respondents, that is, 62.24% of the respondents) think that eastern Nagaland is relatively backward or underdeveloped in comparison to the rest of the state. In contrast, only 74 (37.76%) of the total respondents do not feel that eastern Nagaland is underdeveloped in comparison to the rest of the state.

Table 15. Do you think Eastern Nagaland is under-developed in comparison to the rest of State?

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Yes	38	84
No	70	4

Source: Fieldwork

Out of those 122 respondents, 84 of them (i.e., 68.85%) come from eastern Nagaland while the remaining 38 of them (i.e., 31.15%) come from the rest of Nagaland. These 84 respondents constitute a huge majority (95.46%) of the total respondents from eastern Nagaland (i.e., 88) while those 38 respondents from the rest of Nagaland constitute 35.19% of the entire respondents from that region. In contrast, out of the 74 respondent who do not feel that eastern Nagaland is underdeveloped, an overwhelming 70 (i.e., 94.59%) come from the rest of Nagaland and only 4 (i.e., 5.41%) come from eastern Nagaland. These 70 from the rest of the state constitute 35.71% of the total respondents (i.e., 196) while those 4 respondents from eastern Nagaland constitute only 2.04% of the total respondents.

Thus, majority of the people in eastern Nagaland feel that their area is underdeveloped as compared to the rest of Nagaland while only a few in the rest of the

state feel that way. When the data is subjected to chi square test, it is found to be significant ( $\chi^2 = 74.95$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $P < .001$ ).

Table 16. Whether there is discrimination towards Eastern Nagaland by the Government of Nagaland?

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Yes	0	88
No	93	0
Can't	15	0

Source: Fieldwork

The study has also sought to follow up this issue differential development by enquiring into whether it could be linked to some discriminatory practices. Thus, to a question as to whether there is a discrimination towards Eastern Nagaland by the Government of Nagaland, all respondents from Eastern Nagaland (88 out of 196 respondents, that is, 44.90% of the respondents) think that Eastern Nagaland is discriminated against in comparison to the rest of the state. In contrast, none of the respondents from the rest of the state think there is any form of discrimination. Out of the total of 196 respondents, 93 of the respondents (47.45%), which constitutes 86.11% of the total of 108 respondents from the rest of Nagaland, think that Eastern Nagaland is not discriminated against at all. And out of the total sample of 196, 15 respondents (7.65%), which constitutes 13.89% of the total respondents from the rest of the state, couldn't say if there is any discrimination. Incidentally, all these 93 and 15 respondents were from the rest of Nagaland.

When the data is subjected to chi square test, it is found to be significant ( $\chi^2 = 196$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $P < .001$ ). Thus, an overwhelming majority of the respondents from the rest of Nagaland think that Eastern Nagaland isn't discriminated against while all the respondents from Eastern Nagaland think that they are discriminated against by the Government of Nagaland.

The feeling of ‘deliberate discrimination’ has been substantiated by some of the civil leaders in terms of unequal representation in the employment sector. Sasha (ENSF President) said that,

In the employment sector, whenever they called for the departmental recruitment, same qualification people appears for the same post, but our people are kept in such a way that, they are put into 25% reservation and that too never gets implemented and never give us more than the reservation though we qualify on merit position.

Another reason they felt discrimination as the memorandum states that,

There are no equal developmental policies and activities between the rest of the Nagas and eastern Nagaland. As all the development establishments, headquarters are located in the advanced area which is already privileged and developed districts in the state. As a result, all the developmental activities and opportunities are in the hands of the advanced tribes.

Toshi Wungtung, ENPO Steering Committee Chairman said,

Even in terms of human resource, in comparison with the other districts they claim that, there are no worthy educational institutes (infrastructure) and even the strength of the teachers exist as “Single Teacher School” and in rest of the districts it has surplus teachers in the government schools. The Lotha tribe though the region (Bhandari) could be under backward region, look at the other human resource development (bureaucrats) in larger scenario, they are not less than any other advanced tribes.

Some of the perception and views on the discrimination is also reflected on the question asked below to rate the condition of school in the village/block/town. This can be seen in table 17. When we put into Chi Value it was found to be significant ( $X^2 = 24.63$ , df is less than 5, and  $P < 0.001$ ). Which also strengthen the position of discrimination.

Table17. Rating of School (district)

Districts	Condition			
	Excellent	Good	Poor	Can't Say
Dimapur	3	11	3	0
Kiphire	0	4	10	0
Kohima	0	10	4	0
Longleng	0	4	5	0
Mokokchung	0	18	1	5
Mon	0	8	18	2
Peren	-	-	-	-
Phek	2	1	10	1
Tuensang	0	20	16	1
Wokha	4	10	5	1
Zunheboto	0	5	3	0


Source: Fieldwork

Table18. Rating of School (region)

Condition	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Excellent	9	0
Good	66	36
Poor	26	49
Can't Say	7	3

Source: Fieldwork

Table19. Rating of Healthcare (survey)




Source: Fieldwork

The size and the number of allocation of health centres are quite unsatisfactory. No doubt the overall state allocation is very less. Second, when the districts are compared

with the population, there is a huge difference. Mostly, in Eastern Nagaland areas, numbers of health care facilities are very poor. For instance, most of the villages which are in Mon district are not recognized so there is no sub centre. The number of visits to health center is low. For instance, in Kiphire district when they are asked about the satisfaction of the overall health facilities, they have given the rating of 0% good, 90% Not good, 10% is ignorant respectively. In Mokokchung district, Good is 50%, Not good 40% and ignorant is 10%. The people from Mon district prefer to go to Kohima (354km), Dimapur (280 km), Guwahati, Sibsagar (200km), Sonari (118), Jorhat (158 km), Dirbugarh as they do not get the medical facilities and moreover there are no health centres in most of the villages. The road condition is not good so it takes one and a half to two days to reach to those places. The kilometers may look quite short in distance but mostly are kacha roads, so it becomes hurdles for most of the people. Distance and kilometer can also determine the level of development in the district. Most of them prefers to visit such places as there are no facilities even in district hospitals. While, in Mokokchung, almost all of them make use of the district hospital as it provides sufficient and quality medical facilities. When they were asked to give the ratings as per their satisfaction, it was either “very good” or “good”.

Table 20. Condition of Road (survey)



Source: Fieldwork

We can see from the above (table 20) the response from different districts accessing to pucca and kucha roads. Different districts like Dimapur, Kohima and Mokokchung are mostly connected well with pucca roads and Phek and Zunheboto districts also has good connectivity. No doubt, there is a difference between the districts where at the most State highways covers only the headquarters especially in Eastern Nagaland which has been observed. Some of the districts like Kohima, Dimapur, Mokokchung, Phek, Wokha and Zunheboto have access to pucca roads. Whereas Kiphire, Mon, Longleng and Tuensang do not have access to pucca roads as compared to the other districts. We could see the response from Mon, Tuensang, Longleng and Kiphire where they don't have much pucca road connectivity but kucha roads.

Table 21. Have you heard of Statehood demand (region)?

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Yes	106	88
No	2	0

Source: Fieldwork

To the question as to whether they have heard of a separate Statehood demand by the tribes in Eastern Nagaland, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (194 out of 196 respondents, that is, 98.98% of the respondents), including all the respondents from Eastern Nagaland, have heard of the demand. Only 2 (1.02%) of the total respondents, who are from the rest of Nagaland, have not heard of the demand.

With this, when being asked whether they support the demand for a separate state by the tribes in Eastern Nagaland, 47.44% of the respondents, which include all the respondents from Eastern Nagaland and 5 respondents from the rest of the state, responded in the affirmative while 52.56% of the respondents did not support the demand. What is significant here is the difference in the responses between those from Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state.



Table 22. Do you support the demand for separate statehood (region)?

	<b>Rest of Nagaland</b>	<b>Eastern Nagaland</b>
Yes	5	88
No	103	0

As it can be seen from the Table 17 above, an overwhelming majority of the respondents from the rest of the state (103 out of 108, i.e., 95.38%) did not support the demand whereas all the respondents from Eastern Nagaland support the demand. Only 4.62 of the respondents from the rest of the state support the demand and none from the Eastern Nagaland did not support the demand. The chi square test yields a significant results as well ( $\chi^2 = 176.88$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $P < .001$ ). Thus, it seems that the demand for a separate state seems to a popular demand amongst the people in Eastern Nagaland.

The above findings suggest that there is a difference between the respondents from Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state in the way they perceived the issues of differential development, discrimination and statehood demand. Clearly, from the above survey, the people in Eastern Nagaland seem to feel that Eastern Nagaland is not only less developed as compared to the rest of the state but also discriminated by the Government. These feelings seem to have been in line with their support for the statehood demand. This divide between Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state is an intriguing phenomenon if we look at the history of Naga nationalist movement.

This can be substantiated from some of the respondents. Incidentally, very few of them have also supported this demand from Ao, Sema and Lotha tribes. Like other rest of the districts they are reluctant to comment on it and strongly oppose to this demand. As for those who opposed the movement said,

The population is also very less and Nagaland is such a small state to further divide into two. Second, there is an assumption that the funds and schemes which are allotted are not being properly implemented Third, the representative from Eastern Nagaland and other concern departments are altogether negligible in taking care of the development lacunae. Fourth, some says that it's because of the

leadership claim and vested interests from Eastern Nagaland and not exactly for the development or other socio-economic purposes.

Some of the respondents said, “We should be more united than to go for separate state, there is no deliberate discrimination, and should not take it that way, we should negotiate within the tribes”. In a similar line a respondent from Sema community said,

If we are to claim that we are advanced we should be advanced in every field...but just handful of people they are doing well doesn't mean that they have to blame the entire community. ENPO demand is genuine because they are neglected...and I support this demand, it's the leaders who misused the money and don't do their work and given a chance, Eastern Nagaland can administer themselves.

This has been contradicted by another respondent from Suku village, a VDB chairman who said that,

There is not much of difference...ENPO demand is genuine, however, division is not a good idea and I would not support. As within Nagaland there is no black/white or eastern/western/southern Nagaland it's all politics.

Again a respondent who was not in support said that,

ENPO demand is not the right time to demand as we know there is a political problem going on, and at this juncture if Nagaland gets divided then it will be a problem, they are not getting share like others is different thing. And they would not administer themselves and will take time. There is not much discrimination. But the trend in Nagaland is that if you are not in the ruling then you will not get your share in the constituency, so it is somewhat like step-mother/father treatment, this is one of the causes and also during election expenses is very huge so instead of development they started saving for themselves, and bureaucrats are also helping the minister during the election which is a very bad practice, so instead of development they all do this corruption and only few money left.

This has been further elaborated by a respondent from Lotha community (Longsa village) chairman that,

If we divide Nagaland like ENPO different, Tenyimie different then what will happen, it is very small, so we should not divide and should stay together, but there is also a question whether state government is looking after eastern Nagaland or not, if you look at the present status development, they get more than us in real sense, so that they also will be like advanced tribes, so what do they want more? In order to take advantage from others, for example more teachers are given to them on contract work just that they are backward, in all the fields they are given the advantages still then why are they demanding for

separate state? By name Lothas they have high literacy rate and are being called advanced tribes but we are not, and worse than the eastern Nagaland actually, centre-sponsored scheme, Backward Region Grant-in-Fund (BRGF), everything they get and moreover they get reservation quota, so now they are not backward, it might be educationally but now they are not, and it's just because they received education very late, like in political and culture they are also fine and in-terms of representative they have more than us, like education minister is from eastern Nagaland.

The respondent from rest of Nagaland said that,

ENPO demand is genuine as they are very poor economically, and they must be demanding thinking that their status will be uplifted, I don't think they would get because in terms of population also they are very small.

Eastern Nagaland respondent justified his support,

Job opportunity is the main concern for me supporting this demand. For instance, it's very difficult like to reach Dimapur, we need to travel for days. When there will be different states, my focus is road connectivity, then will have good houses, but since we don't have health facilities, all of them they come to my wife (ASHA employee) from small to big injuries if it is granted we will get more employees like her. Like even in employment sector there is a huge discrimination, tribalism is very much there.

Table. 23. Do you think Naga Integration is possible (region)?

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Yes	98	8
No	2	65
Can't Say	8	15

Source: Fieldwork

The above table indicates that from the rest of Nagaland, majority of them seems to have agreed there is a possibility of Naga integration. The total respondents of 108 from the rest of Nagaland, almost all of them are in support of the Naga Integration with 90.74%. While out of 88 respondents from eastern Nagaland, only 9.09%, are in support of the same and 74% of them seems do not think that Naga Integration is possible.

Table 24. Do you think ENPO statehood demand is contradictory with the politics of Naga Integration (region)?

	Rest of Nagaland	Eastern Nagaland
Yes	104	86
No	4	2

Source: Fieldwork

One of the important aspects in this chapter is also to look at the nature of politics in terms of the statehood demand and Naga Integration whether the concern of these two demands are same or contradictory to each other. From both the region, they have said that the twin demand is altogether different and contradictory. From the rest of the Nagaland 92.29% said it is contradictory and 97.72% from eastern Nagaland respectively. While only 3.70% from the rest of Nagaland and 2.27% from eastern Nagaland said it is not contradictory but of the same in demand.

## Conclusion

We have started with Naga Nationalism and its history. The question on the demand for Greater Nagalim which spells out the Naga integration as a process of integrating the Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland. Second the demand for a separate state within the present Nagaland by the people in Eastern Nagaland based on the claim of being underdeveloped and neglected area.

We have also looked at ENPO and its constituents how four tribes have felt neglected in terms of development and started demanding for separate state. Its background and brief history of the movement on separate state. The memorandum has been analysed to situate with the discrimination claims. Their claims of discrimination is correspondingly is seen in the findings from different indicators. The question on whether

they are aware of the statehood demand or not. Also the question on whether they support statehood demand or not. These question were also asked to civil leaders in order to have complete understanding on the issue. Also on the question of whether there is a differential development or not.

The following chapter is on discussion and conclusion of the thesis.

## **Chapter: 5**

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

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This work has in fact raised far too many issues to conclude in brief. As I have started with the question whether there is a development disparity in Nagaland or not.

The question of statehood demand does not concentrate on the demand in itself but it has a linkage with other entities: political, social, economic etc. This broad view put us through that no doubt there is disparity and differential development in the present state of Nagaland. This has been again further substantiated or shown with the tag of advanced and backward tribes. These components are all interrelated in some way or the other. Hence, it is not feasible to isolate from each other to understand the present context of Nagaland. The question on development is indeed far clearer now.

In the light of the discussion (third and fourth chapters) on the data generated through field work, we are now ready to return to the theoretical questions as posed in the beginning of this study. The study sought also to understand which of the paradigms – recognition or redistribution— is better equipped to explain the statehood demand by the people of eastern Nagaland. It may be pointed out again that the demand for a separate state is made by tribes who belong to the same Naga fold, who were granted statehood in 1963. The questions then as now were centered on the question of identity. It was Naga identity then, which needed to be preserved and which accordingly were given constitutional protection through the incorporation of Article 371 (A). The article specifically provides that

No act of Parliament in respect of:

- i. Religious or social practices of the Nagas,
- ii. Naga customary law and procedure,
- iii. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law,
- iv. Ownership and transfer of land and its resources shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides<sup>1</sup>.

What is pertinent to be noted is that recognition in the domain of culture of the Nagas is constitutionally safeguarded. The article seeks to further ensure that command and control of economic resources remain in the hands of the Nagas. Does the fact that preservation of Naga way of life and identity is constitutionally enjoined mean that the question of a separate Naga state out of the already existing Nagaland is to be looked at as an issue of just distribution of material resources? Or does it mean that existing framework of identity protection as already provided for by Article 371 fall short equal recognition of all tribes within the state? As we saw in Chapter one and two, both Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser are against an economistic reduction of recognition claims to questions of redistribution.

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<sup>1</sup>. <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/371998/> [Accessed 3.3.2016].

It is in this background that the demand for a separate state of Frontier Nagaland has to be examined. In the light of the data as presented in the memorandum submitted to the Government of India by the ENPO as also those that was obtained through field study, the question is again posed as to whether the demand for Frontier Nagaland is an issue arising out of cultural misrecognition or one arising out of maldistribution. As pointed out in the beginning of this study, either may be seen as giving rise to the other too. Or as Nancy Fraser contends maldistribution can be entwined with misrecognition (2003).

One may again recap the main theoretical arguments at stake here. Seeing recognition as a fundamental human need, Charles Taylor is of the opinion that lack of recognition is a harm done to those not recognized. It harms one's sense of well being and self-esteem. Recognition for him arises out of a dialogical relationship with others. This relationship therefore already assumes one's membership in a larger social collective. And being part of a society in turn already implicates one in a power relationship. Struggles for recognition are therefore not merely matters of cultural narcissism but an active form of participation in a power struggle, in a quest for justice. The question of recognition has become so significant in contemporary times that for Taylor, the issue is no longer a one whether or not to recognize but the 'conditions under which it can fail'.

However, such understanding does not answer questions relating to the nature of recognition itself. What does recognition consist of? What is its relationship with questions of redistribution? Can one subsume the other? Or will a decoupling of the two better the purposes of each? Would the giving of primacy over the other lead to the negation, in the long run, of the one being given primacy? Such are questions that emerge of necessity once the two issues of recognition and redistribution are juxtaposed against each other. It is in this context that the Fraser – Honneth debate emerged.

By keeping all these in discussion, we have looked at in which argument the present situation of Nagaland falls in. This work has looked into whether there is a development disparity between Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state? I argue that the regional divisions have both political and historical implications. These postulations of inequalities or disparities have deep concern amongst the people. As Nagaland is a small state compared to others, it is also interesting to see the features of disparity and why there is development



disparity. This also flags off concerns like, should there be any differences to the extent of demanding for separate statehood by Eastern Nagaland called 'Frontier Nagaland'. Secondly, if deliberate discrimination has prompted the demand for separate state (another important way of looking at this issue is from the development deficit. As it is mentioned, "the very nature of the statehood demand is based on development deprivation and its deliberate discrimination" (Memorandum, P.2). Obvious question emerge as to why they have been deprived of recognition by the government of Nagaland and whether this marked out region been not recognized and being deprived from related resources. Eastern Nagaland region is also synonymous with 'backward tribes', consisting of six tribes in four districts<sup>2</sup>. One may ask whether cultural factors and identity politics get implicated in producing such development disparities. Nagaland has a long history of political instability which invites the curiosity of whether political situation is also the reason for the disparity. For the purpose of understanding the differential development, it is also essential to look at what are the political implications and challenges thereof vis-a-vis the issue of Nagaland as a unified polity? How do people understand this twin demand for 'Indo-Naga' political issue/ integration and demand for a separate state ('Frontier Nagaland') vis-a-vis development? It is assumed that to understand any given society especially like Nagaland which is politically vibrant state for many years, it is not possible to look at development without understanding the nature of political history. A respondent from Zunheboto said, "no doubt, there is a

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<sup>2</sup>. This analysis comes from my own understanding and does not reflect to any source but completely of personal view. When one mentions about Eastern Nagaland, there is always this stereotyped towards this particular region called it backward tribes or isolated area, far flung area, undeveloped area, even when one is appointed as a government servant: administrator, teacher, clerical job etc., people from other region would not easily accept or welcome to work in Eastern Nagaland. In addition, this experience has been shared by a respondent " Though they get posted they don't want to come and work, there is no conviction, 50% give excuses because of the underground taxation, poor infrastructural justification because we don't have facilities". A Phom tribe respondent from Orangkong village narrated, "An Ao guy was appointed in government school and within no time he got transferred to Dimapur with the medical reason, so are the other problem in all over Eastern Nagaland, they don't want to come and work this side". This could be true as so called advanced tribes are the first to be educated compared to the rest of the communities who have access to education cum Christianity in 1870s. Gradually, that has made a great impact on different tribes. So now, loosely, the Govt. of Nagaland is using this connotation for the upliftment of the weaker sections especially in Eastern Nagaland. Among the tribes like Ao, Angami, Sema and Lotha have spread Christianity across Nagaland as religious leaders; Pastor, women-pastor, school principal, teacher and Secretary in the tribal religious body like KBCA (Khamniungan Baptist Churches Association) who act as the head of the tribe in the religious body till late 2000s).

development disparity but they too have certain privileges and everything comes in politics”. Another respondent from Tronger village (Sangtam tribe) puts his view metaphorically, he said,

When the parents asked to two siblings, whether they have shared the food with the younger brother, the elder brother would obviously say ‘yes’ we did and had equal share since the younger brother cannot speak against the elder one. In actual sense, the younger one had just the small piece for the name sake, in the same way central government sends us funds and schemes but half or almost all are being utilized by the advanced tribe those who are at the influential position.

From the questions asked and its findings there is undoubtedly a differential development in Nagaland though it is a small state. The findings of differential development based on secondary have also been analyzed. For the study, the sample units have been selected using systematic random sampling technique which has surveyed 196 respondents from 31 assembly constituencies and 13 civil leaders in order to arrive at the conclusion on the question of differential development.

The development indicator like HDI has been included to see the development status of Nagaland. From the data and its analysis, it shows that there is a difference in the overall representation of HDI, GDI and HPI. The poverty index is very high in eastern Nagaland compared to rest of Nagaland.

Education is one of the important indicators to measure the development. In terms of educational qualification from the respondent’s profile, eastern Nagaland does not have graduate and above except Mon district just 1. The school infrastructure and its condition, most of the respondents from the eastern Nagaland are not happy and not satisfied with the existing facilities. From the literacy rate, we could clearly see the differences of each district.

The differential development is also seen in the respondent profession. From the family members profession, tribe wise distribution of employees where we see advanced tribe or few tribes have occupied the most. Another differential development can be seen from access to household amenities and assets. The percentage of type of house, number of electrified houses. The percentages of kucca houses are alarmingly high in the eastern

Nagaland and only very few of them have pucca house. This also shows the socio-economic condition of the region.

When we look at the communication facilities at the regional and districts level- mobile phones/telephone connection, TV, automobile vehicle, road condition etc, there is a huge difference. The available data shows that some of the village road of rest of Nagaland is as equal to eastern Nagaland headquarters, which indicates the differential development. Another indicator is health sector, where we have seen from the data that the health care facilities are not distributed equally. The distributions of health care facilities are not according to the existing population.

In terms of political representation, only few tribes have been represented especially as political leaders. This is also an indication how political representation plays an important role in development activities. Though each constituency has been represented with their elected representatives yet in the decision making level, it is not being shown representative. The same has been witnessed in the status of bureaucracy, we see only few tribes have been represented well. This indicates that there is negligence towards certain section of people.

The political scenario in Nagaland is that it does not absolutely focuses on inclusion. It has been observed that there are sections of people who are deprived of opportunities. The available data and interview being carried out, the Eastern Nagaland is relatively marginalized socially, politically and economically. Some of the respondents from Eastern Nagaland are of the opinion that their culture is superior to the rest of the tribes. But to relate with multicultural theory, it is all connected. We cannot isolate culture and understand only economic and political scenario, the question with which I have started in the beginning of this work.

Looking at the overall development indicators, the opinions have also been surveyed in which only few from rest of Nagaland consisting of seven districts are of the opinion that

there is a differential development whereas the four districts of eastern Nagaland stand denied that there is a differential development.

In order to understand the differential development, the question on advanced and backward tribes have also been surveyed. Some of the questions like what is their view on differential development? Why there is a differential development in such a small state. The question on whether eastern Nagaland is discriminated by the state government. From the findings and analysis in the overall aspects, we could see that there is a differential development in Nagaland.

There are limitations to position differential development from identity and redistribution approaches alone as they are intrinsically dynamic in nature. At the same time these two issues do not precisely articulate as the ground reality is different.

Methodology limitations have also encountered as I have mentioned in chapter one. The attempt in this work is to have a comparative study of all the eleven districts in Nagaland. However, I could not cover Peren district out of eleven districts due to many logistic reasons. This is one of my major limitations in this work. Another limitation is that during the fieldwork, locating the households was difficult following random sampling method. But the best have been taken care from the available secondary sources which could not be touch upon in the interview schedule. As the purpose of using survey data is to see whether the existing published data are in corresponding with the survey or not. This might create a little imbalance in the views and perceptions on the statehood demand and also views on 'advanced' and 'backward' tribes.

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## **Appendix 1. ENPO Memorandum**



**OFFICE OF THE  
EASTERN NAGALAND PEOPLES' ORGANISATION (ENPO)**  
H.Q. : TUENSANG - 798612 : NAGALAND

cf. No.....

Date.....

**N.B:- Resolved unanimously that the name of the proposed STATE shall be  
"FRONTIER NAGALAND".**

Yours faithfully,

  
(MANGKO PHOM)

President

Eastern Nagaland Peoples' Organisation


  
(TOSHI WUNGTUNG)

General Secretary

Eastern Nagaland Peoples' Organisation

  
(POHWANG KONYAK)


Chairman, Steering Committee  
Eastern Nagaland Peoples' Organisation

  
(ODITEMBA PHOM, EX- MLA)  
Member, Hist./Geo. Committee  
Eastern Nagaland Peoples' Organisation

  
(KHOWANG KONYAK)


President  
Konyak Union


  
(HAMNYEI PHOM)  
President  
Phom Peoples' Council

  
(KIUS CHUBA)  
Working President  
Yimchunger Tribal Council

  
(SERANGMONG SANGTAM)  
President  
United Sangtam Likhum Bumji

  
(KAIMANG CHANG)  
President  
Chang Khulie Setshang

  
(W. CHUBA LAM)  
President  
Khamniungan Tribal Council

  
(HAWANG T. WANGSHA)

  
(W. CHUBA LAM)



OFFICE OF THE  
**EASTERN NAGALAND PEOPLES' ORGANIZATION**

H.Q. : TUENSANG - 798611 : NAGALAND

Ref. No. ....

Date .....

May we also be allowed to say that the people of Eastern Nagaland are still comparatively unreached and undelivered in terms of a real and meaningful socio-economic development and growth and thus a Geo-Political Frontier in position from all flanks and aspects.

As a summation of all factors, the up-liftment of our people's socio-economic condition is very limited in scope that no matter what the offer and redressal that may be initiated in response to the demand by both the State Government and the Central Government is already too little too late. Therefore, granting and fulfilling the demand and aspirations of a '*full-fledged State only*' with special status and provisions to the people of Eastern Nagaland is the only answer.

In conclusion to the premises of the foregoing conditions of the problems and prospects, and the experiences of our association with other advanced groups of the State for about 50 years even before and after formation of the State of Nagaland, the people find themselves incompatible to continue to co-exist due to the mentioned circumstances, and for which, the people of the area have en-masse resolved to opt for separate channel for socio-economic up-liftment and to politically avail the privileges of Fundamental Democracy by demanding a "SEPARATE STATEHOOD" through the GRASS-ROOTS under special Status and Provisions, solely and exclusively for the people as represented through this Memorandum before and from the Government of India (GOI) under your progressive leadership and magnanimity.

We remain ever grateful.



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Date .....

**(AFSPA) in 1958 in our area.** The area was thus brought about into an era of disturbances, conflicts, violence, systematic cultural destruction, turmoil and unrest etc. much more than the other Naga areas then, which ultimately resulted in alienating the people apart from grossly depriving the area of the crucially initial developmental fruits of post-Independent India i.e. in terms of meaningful and purposeful infrastructural development, human resources development and progress in the overall process of modernity and advancement etc. as compared to other fellow Nagas of the State and the people of North-East (especially tribals). The area (Eastern Nagas of Nagaland) comparatively continues to remain sharply neglected and deprived socially, economically, politically both by the State and the Centre as well.

To further substantiate the above, it may be worthy to once again mention that the **population of the four Districts inhabited by distinct 6 (six) tribes is about 50% out of the total State LOCAL population**, in which sadly and unfortunately, the percentage of the employment in Govt. sectors of the people from our four Districts is disturbingly just about 3 % only (*Detail Tribe-wise data of all Deptt. etc. will be provided by January 2011, the delay is due to non co-operation by the Govt. of Nagaland in giving information regarding the same.*) and reportedly more shocking is the total absence and absolute negligibility of employees in numerous Govt. Departments, various Govt. Undertakings, Boards, Agencies, Authorities, Corporations and Commissions etc., from the people of Eastern Nagaland.

All these four districts are rich in mineral and natural resources like petroleum, coal, chromium, limestones etc., and varieties of commercial stones and large areas covered by pristine forests with rich



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Ref. No. .... Tuensang Regional Council system with 35 (Thirty-Five) Regional Council Members (RCM) with special provisions and status. However, after the dissolution of Regional Council System and amalgamation with the Nagaland Legislative Assembly, the present four Districts were unfairly and arbitrarily adjusted with only 20 (Twenty) Members in the Nagaland Legislative Assembly out of 60 (sixty) Members to represent the people with comparatively large number of local voters in each Assembly Constituencies. It is to be politically noted that the population of the Eastern Nagaland is about 50% minus non-locals, and where all remaining 40 Members are represented by other locals' i.e. Nagas. In the process the people of Eastern Nagaland are being denied and deprived of balanced political Representatives in the State Assembly. Date .....

Moreover, the area was geo-politically unexposed and excluded/un-administered, free from the influence of the outside world and totally untouched both by Modern culture and Western rule, and from the mainland as well. The absence in terms of the privilege of early education/ literacy and exposure in particular became a major drawback and an overwhelming disadvantage for the people of the Eastern Nagas, which resulted in a one-sided and a lop-sided affairs as mentioned above, from the start of the formation of the State of Nagaland- a defeat from Day 1. The second contextual defeat and oppression thereof, for the people of the area was the unceremonious dissolution of the special provisions of the Regional Council system and other provisions in 1973/74 of Tuensang Area, which was unjustly done by misleading and manipulating the Representatives and leaders of the area particularly the Regional Council Members (RCMs).

Politically, it may be pertinent to briefly mention that the area potentially became the culminating flash-point of the initial battle-ground of an intensified Indo-Naga Political Conflict from mid-1950's till early 1960's, which the Govt. of India is well aware of the fact.



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Ref. No. .... of all categories and hence not in a position to have any say particularly <sup>Date .....</sup>  
in policy-makings, proposals and implementations.

Apart from the above, the four districts inhabited by the 6 tribes of Eastern Nagaland border with Myanmar/ Burma except Longleng District which also borders Assam State along with Mon District are faced with communication difficulties particularly in the hilly terrain of those adjacent to international borders with Myanmar. The major part of these four districts has to pass through Assam as the major link to the State Capital and other commercial towns of the State. However, frequent agitations and road blockades in Assam subsequently create and bring untold hardship and difficulties upon the mobility and livelihood of the people of Eastern Nagaland.

- 2) **Human Resources Development:** - As mentioned earlier, the contextual and present backwardness has basically stemmed from lack of quality education, accessibility, training and exposure, etc. There are no worthy educational institutes apart from the total lack of higher and technical educational institutes in the whole of four districts areas except four Government Colleges and few Higher Secondary and High Schools. Further, these institutes lack basic facilities and teaching faculties. The conditions of lower and primary educational institutes remain neglected and pathetic as these schools are manned by inadequate strength of staffs which in addition lack proper and required infrastructures. The adage "Single Teacher School" is very common in the primary level of these areas in irony to the many surplus teacher-schools in the advanced districts.

- 3) **Political Deprivation:** - The present Eastern Nagaland area was under



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Ref. No. ....

Date .....

The legacy of the century gap and the ever fast- escalating and widening gap resulting in acute imbalances and lopsided growth in all spheres between forward and backward communities and the schism that is developing while remaining in the same State has multiplying effects to the disadvantage of the latter. A brief study of the conditions of the people can be seen in the context of the following features, viz:-

- 1) **Socio-Economic Condition:** - There is unequal distribution of funding, all round developmental policies and activities in the State. Despite, these four districts being inhabited by 6(six) declared backward and under-developed tribes which form almost half of the total geographical area of the State and the population, the **yearly Assembly Allocation is comparatively very negligible in real terms of the actual allocations and implementations in contrary to the projected figures and proposals in the papers shown before the Central Government not to mention the un-reflected and hidden diversions of funds etc.** Besides, all the Development Establishments and major projects are headquartered and positioned in the forward and comparatively much more privileged and developed Districts, where the fund-flow pattern and the allocations follow the same pattern. Thus, the Eastern Nagaland areas in the State receives the last and least of priorities in the all round development especially road communications and other vital infrastructural developments. An example of these instances can be illustrated by the fact that whenever any Central Government officials visit the State for monitoring developmental activities, only Kohima-Dimapur and its adjoining forward Districts are shown to these visitors routinely to satisfy and certify the developmental works. Another factor constraining the development convergence to the Eastern Nagaland areas is that all who matter in the officialdom are from advanced areas, which practice outright nepotism, favouritism and discrimination upon the under-developed and backward people of Eastern Nagaland. The representation





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**H.Q. : TUENSANG - 798611 : NAGALAND**

Ref. No. ....

Date .....

disputed areas bordering Assam. It may also be worthwhile to state that there are other Eastern Naga areas in the present State of Arunachal Pradesh and in Myanmar/Burma as well, which were under the then initial and undivided NEFA. Thus the geo-political location of Eastern Nagaland is extremely crucial and critically vital.

The people of the six (6) Tribes of the ENPO namely Chang, Konyak, Phom, Sangtam, Khamniungan and Yimchunger living in the districts of Tuensang, Mon, Longleng and Kiphire and in the Sub-Divisions of Noklak and Shamator (which are also the Tribal Headquarters respectively) were historically under the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division under the aegis of the Indian Frontier Administrative Services (IFAS) and management of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) Govt. of India, which was geo-politically a by-product of the McMohan Line of 1914. This area (ENPO) was basically and largely outside the administration of the British India Rule and other foreign rule/ influence, hence free from any direct foreign rule, which only later became a part of the Indian Union in the year 1947-48. In the wake of granting Statehood to the present Nagaland and mainly to make it a viable dispensation, the Tuensang Frontier Divisio.. of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) Govt. of India, and the Naga Hills of Assam formed the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA) in the year 1957 and subsequently formed Nagaland as the 16<sup>th</sup> State of Union of India in 1963 thereafter.

By the Act of Parliament under Article 371 A Clause (1) sub-clause(d) a special provision was inserted to administer these areas as a Special Instrument to look after the special needs of these areas/ people under special status. The 10 (ten) year period under the provision of the above i.e. Clause (1) sub-clause (d) of article 371 A, had not brought any desired effect upon the development of the people due to deliberate negligence and manipulation by the ruling dispensations in the state. Lack of quality education, accessibility, training and exposure, etc of the people have resulted in falling behind the rest of the Nagas by much more than a century. Thus, the backwardness of the people may have been by destiny in the early stages, but now, it is by deliberate and perpetual design that the pathetic and deplorable conditions of the people of the area are doomed to remain unchanged in this combative milieus of the 21st Century.



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Ref. No. ....

Date .....

**ENPO/Memo-01(Statehood)/PM/GOI/01**

**25<sup>th</sup> November 2010**

To,

The Prime Minister  
Government of India  
South Block,  
New Delhi-1, India

Subject: **MEMORANDUM FOR SEPARATE STATE FOR EASTERN NAGALAND  
UNDER SPECIAL PROVISION AND STATUS**  
(of the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division of North East Frontier Agency-NEFA)

Hon'ble Prime Minister Sir,

The undersigned, representing the people of the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division of the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) i.e. the present Eastern Nagaland of Nagaland State would like to submit herewith the Memorandum on the subject as cited above before your esteemed authority and office and to draw your kind attention to the plight of the people as above. The Memorandum is substantiated and based on popular "GRASS-ROOT" "Resolution and Mandate" encompassing every Village Councils (Gram Panchayats) and Tribal Councils of Eastern Nagaland.

Physically, the total area of Eastern Nagaland is 8154 Sq.Km and is located within the present Longitude and Latitude of 25°6' N 27°4'N (Nagaland State). The areas of Eastern Nagaland is bounded by Myanmar/Burma in the East along the International Border Pillars from ID No 124 - 155



OFFICE OF THE  
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Ref. No. ....

Date .....

**ENPO/Memo-01(Statehood)/PM/GOI/02**

**25<sup>th</sup> November 2010**

Copy to:

1. The Hon'ble Minister for Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.
2. The Hon'ble Minister for Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.
3. The Hon'ble Minister for Defence, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.
4. The Hon'ble Minister for Foreign Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.
- ✓ 5. The Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, New Delhi for information.
6. The Hon'ble Leader of Opposition, Lok Sabha, New Delhi for information.
7. The Hon'ble Leader of Opposition, Rajya Sabha, New Delhi for information.
8. The Secretary for Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.
9. The National Security Advisor, Govt. of India, New Delhi for information.

  
**(MANGKO PHOM)**  
President

  
**(TOSHI WUNGTUNG)**  
General Secretary



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H.Q. : TUENSANG - 798611 : NAGALAND

Ref. No. ....

Date .....

**ENPO/Memo-01(Statehood)/PM/GOI/02**

**25<sup>th</sup> November 2010**

To,

The Prime Minister  
Government of India  
South Block,  
New Delhi-1, India

**Subject: MEMORANDUM FOR SEPARATE STATE FOR EASTERN NAGALAND  
UNDER SPECIAL PROVISION AND STATUS  
(of the erstwhile Tuensang Frontier Division of North East Frontier Agency-NEFA)**

Hon'ble Prime Minister Sir,

In reference to the subject vide letter no.. ENPO/Memo-01(Statehood)/PM/GOI/01 dated the 25<sup>th</sup> November 2010 as enclosed herewith inclusive of the Annexure (Maps) I, II & III, the undersigned have the honour to forward the Memorandum on behalf of the people of Eastern Nagaland which is presently within Nagaland State.

This is for the official information for the Hon'ble Prime Minister, Government of India and for the kind perusal thereof in the democratic and fundamental interest of the people of the geo-politically far-flung Eastern Nagaland bordering Myanmar/ Burma, Sir.


Thanking you.

Yours sincerely,


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ANNEXURE II Map: Proposed "FRONTIER NAGALAND"  
within present NAGALAND ST



ANNEXURE I Map: Proposed "FRONTIER NAGALAND"







## **Appendix 2. Interview Schedule**

### **Interview Schedule**

#### **INTRODUCTION:**

I am T. Longkoi Khamniungan from CSSS/SSS doing Ph.D at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I am carrying out a survey as a part of my Ph.D work titled 'Politics of Recognition and Redistribution in Nagaland'. I have a set of questions on the issues related to socio-economic condition and issues around development in Nagaland. This might take approximately one hour. I want your honest views and opinions on these questions. If you have any clarification please feel free to do that.

#### **SECTION I. Basic information of the respondent**

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Gender
4. Marital status:
5. Educational qualification:
6. Profession:
7. House NO:
8. Polling station:
9. Constituency:
10. District:
11. Type of family: joint/nuclear
12. How many members are there in your family?

13. Please provide the following information

Sl. No	Name	Gender	Age	Education	Profession	Relationship
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						

14. Please provide information on the nature of employment of family members.

Sl. No	Govt.	Private	NGO's	Self
1				
2				
3				
4				

5				
---	--	--	--	--

15. What is the type of a house you live in?

- a) Pucca
- b) Kucha

16. Is your house electrified?

- a) Yes
- b) No

17. Where do you get the water for the consumption of the family?

- a) Tape
- b) Other

18. Do you have a mobile phone?

- a) Yes
- b) No

19. Do you have access to Television?

20. Do you have automobile vehicle?

- a) Yes
- b) No

21. If yes, what are those:

- a) four Wheeler (no.)
- b) two Wheeler (no.)

**Section II. Information on village/block/town**

22. How many educational institutions are there in your village/town?

1. Colleges (General)	
2. Colleges/institute (Technical)	
3. Secondary Schools	
4. High Schools (government/private)	
5. Middle	
6. Primary	

23. Rate the educational system in your village/block/town

- a) Excellent
- b) Very good
- c) Very poor
- d)

24. Rate the school condition in your village/block/town.

- a) Excellent
- b) Good
- c) Poor
- d) Can't Say

25. Rate the road condition in your village/block/town.

- a) Excellent
- b) Good
- c) Poor

26. Where do you get access to health facilities?

Facilities	Place	Distance	Condition	Rate
a) District Hospital				

b) Community health centre				
c) Primary health centre				
d) Sub centre				

27. Rate the condition of health facilities.

- a) Good
- b) Not good
- c) Ignorant

### **SECTION III. Development differences**

28. Do you think there are differences in development among different districts of Nagaland?

- a) Yes
- b) No

29. What are the reasons for development disparity?

30. Do you think there is a difference between advanced/backward tribes?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) May be

31. (a) If YES, how, in what sense?

31. (b) If NO, how, in what sense?

32. Do you think Eastern Nagaland people are being discriminated by government of Nagaland?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) Can't say

#### **Section IV. Opinion on Naga politics and Statehood demand**

33. Are you aware of statehood demand of 'Frontier Nagaland'?

- a) Yes
- b) No

34. Do you support this statehood demand?

- a) Yes
- b) No

35. Do you support Naga Integration?

- a) Yes
- b) No

36. Why? Reasons.

37. Do you think Naga integration is possible?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) May be
- d) Can't say

38. (a) Does ENPO statehood demand contradicting with the politics of Naga Integration?

- a) Yes
- b) No

39. (b) Why? Reasons.

### **Appendix 3. Interview Guide (Civil Leaders)**

#### **Questions for Civil Leaders.**

1. What is your take on demand of 'Frontier Nagaland'?
2. Do you support this statehood demand?
3. Given that these areas (Eastern Nagaland and the rest of the state) are marked out in terms of specific tribes/communities who inhabit these areas, do cultural factors and identity politics get implicated in producing such development disparities?
4. How do you see in what way it will impact on granting statehood?
5. Will the statehood attainment fulfil equal development?
6. Do you think there is deliberate discrimination? If yes, on what basis?
7. What are the political implications of the developmental disparity and challenges thereof vis-a-vis the issue of Nagaland as a unified polity?
8. Do you think there is discrimination towards Eastern Nagaland by Government of Nagaland?
9. Why do you think there are twin issues going on in Nagaland?
10. What is your opinion on Naga Integration?
11. Do you think Naga integration is possible
12. What is your take on 'Indo-Naga' political issue?
13. What do you think of the ongoing Peace process?





Image 30: Members of Village Council, Orangkong Village, Longleng District



Image 31: Govt. Primary School, Oushok, Longleng District



Image 32: Govt. School, Longleng District



Image 33: Respondent, Tuensang District.



Image 34: Type of house, Tuensang District.



Image 35: Respondent, Tuensang District.



Image 36: Type of House, Tuensang District.



Image 37: Type of House, Tuensang District.



Image 38: School, Tuensang District.



Image 39: Health sub-centre, Tuensang District.



Image 40: Govt. School, Tuensang District.



Image 41: Respondent, Tuensang District.



Image 42: Health sub-centre, Tuensang District.



Image 43: Respondent, Zunheboto District



Image 44: PHC, Zunheboto District



Image 45: Govt. Primary School, Zunheboto District



Image 46: Govt. Shool, Zunheboto District



Image 47: Govt. Primary School, Kiphire District



Image 48: Community Health Centre, Kiphire District



Image 49: Respondent, Kiphire District



Image 50: Respondent, Kiphire District



Image 51: Type of House, Kiphire District



Image 52: Respondent, Mon District



Image 53: Gathering of people, Mon Town



Image 54: Wife of village chief (Angh) in Longwa village, Mon District



Image 55: Type of House, Mon District



Image 56: School, Mon District.



Image 57: Govt. Middle School, Mon District.



Image 58: School, Mon District.



Image 59: Condition of Govt. School, Mon District.



Image 60: School Building, Mon District.



Image 61: Type of House, Mon District.



Image 62: Road in the village.



Image 63: School in the village.



Image 64: With respondent.



Image 65: School, Longjang village.



Image 66: foot path within the village.



## Appendix 4. Images of Field Visits.



Image 1: Respondent, Kohima District.



Image 1: Respondent, Kohima District.



Image 3: School, Kohima District.



Image 4: Road, Kohima District.



Image 5: Respondent, Kohima District.



Image 6: Respondent, Dimapur District.



Image 7: Naga Mother's Association President, Dimapur District.



Image 8: Road, Dimapur District.



Image 9: Health Centre, Khumasu Village, Phek District.



Image 10: Govt. School, Phek District.



Image 11: Health Centre, Phek District.



Image 12: Govt. School, Phek District.



Image 13: Village, Phek District.



Image 14: Water Crisis in Phek District.



Image 15: With Respondent, Phek District



Image 16: Type of House, Phek District



Image 17: With Respondent, Phek District.



Image 18: With Respondent, Phek District.



Image 19: Type of House, Phek District.



Image 20: Type of House, Wokha District.



Image 21: With Respondent, Wokha District.



Image 22: Govt. School, Wokha District.



Image 23: Sub centre, Wokha District.



Image 24: With Respondent, Mokokchung District.



Image 25: Road, Mokokchung District.



Image 26: With Respondent, Mokokchung District.



Image 27: Village, Mokokchung District.



Image 28: Higher Secondary School, Mokokchung District.



Image 29: PHC, Longjang village, Mokokchung District.

