

**THE PROBLEMATIC OF TEMPORALITY
IN PHILOSOPHIZING POST-ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE**


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Ph.D. Thesis

July 2016



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CERTIFICATE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Debts, owed, can only be reminded. Foremost is my gratitude to my supervisor Franson Manjali for his delicate details and, most importantly, for his kindness and patience. I also extend my special thanks to Ayesha Kidwai (Chair, CIL) and Saitya Brata Das (Chair, CES) for confidently vetting an extension to complete my writings; and Manidipa Sen, for being always so welcoming. I would also like to acknowledge my present Chair, P.K. Pandey, for his favourable support.

My appreciation and heartfelt thanks goes to—Veio Pou, Elvina Amongla, Davinder Singh, Subansh Prasad Singh, Vipin Aggarwal, and Rishi Pal, for going beyond their ways to help me; and, also, Lovitoly Jimomi, Suilila Anar, Amenuo Suokhrie, Gideon Shadang, Ningamananda Das, Rosemary Dzüvichü, Akho-o Kuotsu, Nixon Ngoru, Kevi Tepa, Phureingam Hongchui, Neikuo Kuotsu, Solomon Zingkhai, Nana Sechü, Dr. Poade A., and my silly baffeuleus at Nagaland University, for their unflinching company; my cousin Akhrie and wife Dziesebeinuo, for their ever-ready hospitality; Yuireipem, Art Director, Harpers Bazaar, particularly for managing all technical matters including figures and mathematical expressions; Monalisa Arthur for helping with some proof reading; Michael Heneise for expert comments on the music chapter, especially on the inverted ninth chord; and, finally, for the endless warm conversations of Akshaya Tankha (University of Toronto), Michael Heneise (University of Edinburgh), Mark Elliott (University of Cambridge), Dolly Kikon (University of Stanford & Melbourne University), and Sanjoy Borbora (Tata Institute of Social Sciences), whose impeccable and diverse scholarships have been a great refrain.

Libraries consulted include JNU Central Library; CU, Hyderabad; DU, Delhi; Teen Murti Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi—for which I am grateful to all the gentle librarians. Certain websites (which shall not be mentioned here) are indispensable in providing the many books and without which my work will be a complete failure— thank you whosoever for not only democratizing the digital territory but also for ensuring free access to the conglomerate of corporate publishing houses.

And, of course, everything goes to my loving wife, Yirmiyan, who refuses to read even a single page of my work but who only, also, knows the joke and urgency behind the many years of my study. Ningshina hairakho!

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Introduction:  
**The Subject of Irreducible Love**

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“‘[P]hilosophy’... means... love of thinking, since thinking is love.”

—Jean-Luc Nancy.<sup>1</sup>

“Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love.”

—Emmanuel Levinas.<sup>2</sup>

“Wisdom has changed a great deal.”

—Deleuze & Guattari.<sup>3</sup>

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**I**

*Apologia:*

“My eyes are tired,” wrote James Joyce to his son Giorgio, in 1935—  
 “For over half a century, they have gazed into nullity where they have found a lovely nothing.”<sup>4</sup> Like Joyce, my eyes too are tired, gazing into books and the virtual screen, for over six years, trying to conceive a PhD *dissertation*, which, given the institutions it is bound for audit, may turn out to be nothing lovely! Therefore, an initial claim of introducing the spinal argument of the thesis, which simply *retraces* the carcass of representational discourses, is shy of its own *bluntness*: what is the post-ontological<sup>5</sup> status for language, today, and where is its *philosophizing* headed, heading?

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<sup>1</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” (trs.) Lisa Garbus and Simon Sawhney, in *A Finite Thinking*, (ed.) Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 245-74, p. 247.

<sup>2</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, (tr.) Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. 162.

<sup>3</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, (trs.) Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Verso, 1994), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> James Joyce, quoted, in Phillip F. Herring, *Joyce’s Uncertainty Principle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 92.

<sup>5</sup> A note is definitely required here since the title prominently displays so. Post-ontology or, alternatively, After-Ontology, is not another theoretical field yet. Not “yet” because, unlike

Blunt—given the exhausted history of philosophy; the endless philosophizing on/of language or representation; and the complex crucibles of ontology—because it may appear as yet another tautological venture, given the thresholds that have been through, thought and after-thought, debated and argued, on similar if not likewise issues, and even speculated or judged, as exegetical closures or ends. For, the suburb of the ends of philosophy, initiated by the closure of metaphysics, by the close of twentieth century,<sup>6</sup> lay scattered

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post-humanism or post-phenomenology, to cite two examples, it still does not have a devout herd-leader. This is not to say we are garnering one.

Our general usage of the term is premised on what becomes (or, *is*) of language after deconstruction, after the purges to re-present anymore. Otherwise, “post-ontology” is a post-deconstruction “crisis” product, to invoke Gillian Rose, referring to “beyond Being.” See Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 57. Luhmann also develops his “postontological theory of observing system,” in what he calls *Second-Order Observing* as a response to Derrida’s *Deconstruction*, in making the distinction between “distortion of reality” and “construction of reality.” See Niklas Luhmann, *Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity*, (trs.) Joseph O’Neil et. al., (ed.) William Rasch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 108. ,

In “Foreword: Post-Ontological Theory?”—Lars Ovortrup and Søren Brier question—“a post-ontological philosophy may be necessary as the effect of a turn from ontology to epistemology as well as a shift from philosophies of identity to philosophies of difference; but is it possible as a theory in its own right if it, in its asserted overcoming of metaphysical being, unavoidably clings to a handful of undisputed, ontological (non-) concepts?” See *Cybernetics and Human Knowing*, Vol. 1. No. 3, pp. 5-8, p. 7. Also, in the same issue, see Niels Lehmann, “On the Different Uses of Difference: Post-ontological Thought in Derrida, Deleuze, Luhmann, and Rorty,” pp. 56-80.

<sup>6</sup> “How modern,” questions Habermas, “is the philosophy of the twentieth century?”

“Contemporary philosophers, too, are celebrating their farewells. Members of one group call themselves postanalytic philosophers, others call themselves poststructuralists or post-Marxists. The fact that the phenomenologists have not yet arrived at their own ‘post-ism’ almost makes them suspect.”

See Jürgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, (tr.) Willam Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), p. 3.

with ‘turns’ and wrecking junks of preemptive impasses, in no particular or meritorious order: “linguistic turn,”<sup>7</sup> “aesthetic turn,”<sup>8</sup> “communicative turn,”<sup>9</sup> “historic turn,”<sup>10</sup> “religious turn,”<sup>11</sup> “speculative turn,”<sup>12</sup> “analytic turn,”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Amongst the many commentaries available now, first, and, second, how the same term is loosely used now to individuate different philosophers (Derrida’s ‘linguistic turn’, for instance, in this dissertation Chapter Two), is important to situate the German tradition, particularly Habermas’ conception of language and Communicative Action. See Christina Lafont, *The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy*, (tr.) José Medina (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 1999). Also, the standard introduction to the rich tradition on this issue is Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method: With Two Retrospective Essays* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, [1967] 1992). And, of course, we owe the term, too, to Gustav Bergmann (1953), who puts that philosophy had taken the “linguistic turn.”

<sup>8</sup> Alun Munslow traces the progenitors of aesthetic turn to Giambattista Vico and, properly, Friedrich Nietzsche—on the question of whether “history” is an “aesthetic,” “a narrative representation of/about the past.” See Alun Munslow, *The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies* (London; New York: Routledge, [200] 2006), p. 21. Also, for the genesis of Nietzsche’s “eschewal of truth,” see James J. Winchester, *Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn: Reading Nietzsche after Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). In this regard, we shall also take up Friedrich Schelling in Chapter Four (The Poetic Turn).

<sup>9</sup> For an excellent study that situates the fate of Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory after the preeminent rise of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in the 1940s, see Martin Morris, *Rethinking the Communicative Turn: Adorno, Habermas, and the Problem of Communicative Freedom* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

<sup>10</sup> The displacement of the anthropocentric is our interest here though, as seen in Jacques Derrida. This can also be extended to raptures (as discussed in Chapter One) of a logico-linguistic (analytic) tradition that sees itself as anti-historical or premising its very existence as ahistorical. In this regard see Erich H. Reck (ed.), *The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy* (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Also, see the various essays in the context of human sciences in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, [1996] 1999).

<sup>11</sup> There is however a twist of interest in recent times that seek to address the concerns of a religious *re*-turn, which I found it to be purposeful for the ensuing argument. Of course, we are here referring to the predominant works of Richard Kearney, Michael Caputo, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, and, even, Jacques Derrida. For debates about the character of universal in philosophy and particularism in religion, see Hent de Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999) and, also, Dominique Janicaud et. al. (eds.), *Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

“hermeneutic turn,”<sup>14</sup> “cosmological turn,”<sup>15</sup> “narrative turn,”<sup>16</sup> “normative turn,”<sup>17</sup> etc.; or, of late, body-centric reconfigurations by matter, the social, or

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<sup>12</sup> In the post linguistic-turn, the anti-realism (heralded by a fresh fuse of methodological energy through Meillassoux’s “correlationism”) is central to speculative realism’s response. See Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, (tr.) Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum, 2008). For an agenda forming expositions on speculative realism, see the various excellent essays in the edited works of Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (eds.), *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism* (Melbourne: re-press, 2011). Graham Harman remain their grand historian, which traces anti-realist figure back to Immanuel Kant—see *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court; 2002); *Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court; 2005); *Quintin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making* (Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 2011).

<sup>13</sup> See Michael Beaney, “The analytic turn in early twentieth-century philosophy,” in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1-30. Many of our references are also drawn from the essays in this edited book.

<sup>14</sup> The general perception is—if it is a paradigm shift in science after Thomas Kuhn, it is the ‘hermeneutic turn’ after Richard Rorty. However, allaying such misconceptions, which is actually not even a huge concern here, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1990) may be mentioned as the first one to employ the term by identifying Martin Heidegger with “the transition from Neo-Kantianism to Phenomenology” to “Husserl’s phenomenology.” Gadamer, quoted, in István Fehér, “On the Hermeneutic Understanding of Language: Word, Conversation, and Subject Matter,” (tr.) Lawrence K. Schmidt, in Lawrence K. Schmidt (ed.), *Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s hermeneutics* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 59-67. Gadamer, Fehér points out, uses ‘hermeneutic turn’ as the *second corresponding event* of the ‘linguistic turn’.

<sup>15</sup> Technically, a “cosmological turn” was there even in Plato (*Timaeus* through *Laws*) although its usage refers mostly to Copernicus. M.A. Granada dates 1588 as the ‘cosmological turn’, by locating the first publications on the geo-heliocentric model, i.e., Ursus’s *Funadmentum astromicum* and Brahe’s *De mundi aetheriesi recentioribus phaenimenis*, although this is a disputed matter since other writings on the same preexisted, i.e., Erasmus Reinhold and Paul Wittich’s manuscripts and K. Peucer’s *Hypotheses Astronomicae* (1571). See Pietro Daniel Omodeo, “Perfection of the World and Mathematics in the Late Sixteenth Century Copernican Cosmologies,” in James Dougal Fleming (ed.), *The Invention of Discovery: 1500-1700* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), pp. 93-108, esp. p. 95.

technology like the “affective turn”<sup>18</sup> and “corporeal turn,”<sup>19</sup> and, as warned, one’s orientation of approaching, or even re-approaching, the heart of philosophy, whether it is analytical or continental philosophy, or any other bracketed philosophies or theories or methods or systems—is identified, or depleted by a divide, in a divide rather by choice. As Richard Rorty *decries*:

“[O]ne’s identification as a philosopher will be purely in terms of the books one reads and discusses, rather than in terms of the problem one wishes to solve.”<sup>20</sup>

By illustrating these nuances in the environ of contemporary philosophical practices, an attempt to introduce the scope and objective of the study is thereby informed an ambivalent, since it involves a re-turn to the intimacy, the immediacy, and the primacy of “a philosophical language within language”—or, the *re*-call for “concept’s baptism”<sup>21</sup>— in the very name through

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<sup>16</sup> By far the best work that examines the narrative turn but also positions narrative studies in contemporary wakes—see Daniel Punday, *Narrative After Deconstruction* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), esp. Chapter 1, “The Narrative Turn,” pp. 1-20.

<sup>17</sup> Normativity is mostly political in inception. Paul Patton saw in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s later works a ‘normative turn’. See “Philosophy, Politics, and Political Normativity,” in Paul Patton, *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 137-160. Also, for a wider interpretation in political philosophy, refer Christoph Henning, *Philosophy after Marx: 100 Years of Misreadings and the Normative Turn in Political Philosophy*, (tr.) Max Henninger (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Patricia Ticeneto Clough (with Jean Halley), (ed.), *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007); Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (eds.), *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010).

<sup>19</sup> John Tambirino, *The Corporeal Turn: Passion, Necessity, Politics* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002); Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Corporeal Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader* (Exeter; Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 315. Also, quoted, in Gerald L. Burns, *Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy: Language, Literature, and Ethical Theory* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. xi.

<sup>21</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 8.

which the mourning sites of philosophizing needs to take its place, or engaged itself. On a fatalistic note, Gillian Rose emotively *deploras* contemporary status and trends of anti-foundationalism:

“It is strange to live in a time when philosophy has found so many ways to damage if not to destroy itself. One by one all of the classical preoccupations of philosophy have been discredited and discarded: eternity, reason, truth, representation, justice, freedom, beauty and the Good.”<sup>22</sup>

Such rueful reminiscence of philosophy—as “man experiences his absolute foundationlessness”<sup>23</sup>—stems from its own travesty! As Miguel de Beistegui *bemoans*, on the question of what is “philosophy *today*”—

“...philosophy’s most dangerous temptation today consisted in presupposing its own object, in regulating its discourse on the discourse of other disciplines, in short, of constituting itself as a meta-discourse (and not a metaphysics) grafted onto the discourses of other disciplines. Much of philosophy today seems like a great lady fallen into destitution, who knocks at every door, and especially at that of the sciences, begging them to give her some function, some task to keep her busy, however modest it may be; for that is better than disappearing altogether. But is it? Philosophy would rather become business ethics, or transcen-*dental* ethics, than vanish in the face of the overwhelming successes of the natural sciences and the omnipresent reality of the business paradigm. It will undergo the most meaningless metamorphosis rather than give up or reinvent itself.”<sup>24</sup>

Recall Edmund Husserl’s deeply felt inadequacies, his “absolute lack of

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<sup>22</sup> Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law*, op. cit., p. 1. For a transhistorical reading on “emotion indexes strains in philosophy,” see Rei Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the ‘Death of the Subject’*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2001).

<sup>23</sup> Miguel de Beistegui, *Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 340.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 335.



knowledge” in the search for “wisdom,” which, by contrast, is a statement of loyalty to the legendary humbleness in the Socratic foundation (of valorizing oneself in the unknowable, in ignorance). Husserl’s *reactions to Cartesian Mediations* was cofounded on mixed feelings of having lost an “original vitality,” which is informed by an uneasiness that the “radicalness of philosophical self-responsibility has been lost.”<sup>25</sup> Yes—this is a deep feeling of loss. A nostalgic sense perturbs, even as Husserl writes his final (incomplete) book, the *Crisis of European Sciences*. Or, responding to a fear for an “absolute disaster”—Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari wrote *What is Philosophy?*—or, should it not actually read: ‘*What is the Future of Philosophy?*’—as an abhorrent feeling for an imminent “universal capitalism.”<sup>26</sup> But then these profound reactions are just mere imperfect examples for, in the end, there are many more such feelings, more profound feelings on how to *philosophize...* (philosophize with a hammer [*Götzendämmerung*], for instance<sup>27</sup>).

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<sup>25</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (tr.) Dorion Cairns (The Hague; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1960), p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>27</sup> How does the “hammer speaks?”—

“Why so hard!’—spake the kitchen coal once unto the diamond: ‘for are we not close kin?’

Why so soft? Oh my brethren, this I ask of you: for are you not—my brethren?

Why so soft, so yielding and submitting? Why is there so much denial and disavowal in your hearts? so little destiny in your gazes?

And if you will not be destinies, and inexorable ones: how could you ever join with me in—vanquishing?

And if your hardness will not flash and cut and cleave: how could you ever join with me in—creating?

For all creators are hard. And bliss must it seem to you to press your hands upon millennia as upon wax—

—Bliss to write upon the will of millennia as upon bronze—harder than bronze nobler than bronze. The noblest alone is truly hard.

This new table, oh my brethren, do I set over you: become hard! —”

“What then is a feeling?”<sup>28</sup>

Is it more than love?

When his contemporaries were busy, yes, busy engaging with the major philosophical questions and problems of the day, the quiet and insignificant activities of Novalis (1772-1801) reminds us—that “feelings” can be measured through indexes to correlate the question of philosophy:

“/Philosophy is originally a feeling. The philosophical sciences conceptualize the intuitions of this feeling./”<sup>29</sup>

After Novalis (or von Hardenberg), or, rather, after Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), everything, then, became philosophizable—period!

Is everything philosophizable, then? François Laruelle has a ready-made answer—*dualysis*—or “the unacknowledged faith in philosophy that everything is philosophizable.”<sup>30</sup> Is Fichte (or Novalis) saying something new in the history of philosophy?—between knowledge and feelings?—

“Knowledge comes from something. It always refers to a something—It is a reference to Being, in the determined being in general, namely in the I.

In *knowledge* of the determined being, the *accent*, the stress is on the being; the determined [thing] is only baggage [‘brought along’], it is an accident. With *feeling* it is the opposite. The accent lies on the form, on the determination. The being is only baggage, is an accident.

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See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, (tr.) Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 82.

<sup>28</sup> Novalis, *Fichte Studies*, (ed.) Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), § 15, p. 13.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> François Laruelle’s method of thinking—“dualysis”—is premised on an improvisation of inverting Leibniz’s ‘Principle of Sufficient Philosophy’. François Laruelle, *Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. xiii

Consciousness is the sphere of knowledge. In feeling it [consciousness] can only occur mediately.”<sup>31</sup>

Therefore—it is not surprising, or even remorseful, when Jacques Derrida mentions what a certain ancient Greek said:

“It was a Greek who said, ‘If one has to philosophize, one has to philosophize; if one does not have to philosophize, one still has to philosophize (to say it and think it). One always has to philosophize’.”<sup>32</sup>

Philosophy is love.

Love has a history, indeed.

A disquiet history, a broken history, more or less exposed, by now.

But, then, we are not here to mend this hegemony—broken love, broken history, broken love-history, or, least to say celebrate, or even mourn! Or, do we, actually?—as has been?

Perhaps—and this is assuming—every ‘opening has its own primal violence to older thoughts’? And, would that be saying too little, if not too simplistic? Or, would it be saying too much, given the predictable anxieties and ambitions but of a learner-student? An “Introduction” therefore proposes to heighten the consequence of philosophy (and, therefore, the thinking of love) in the trajectories of some key traditions: the linguistic, the metaphysical and the epistemological, the logico-mathematico, the phenomenological—and see how it intersects (or, actually, its intersections)—with thoughts—with thinking—with

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<sup>31</sup> Novalis, *Fichte Studies*, op. cit., § 2, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Derrida’s allusion is to Aristotle, drawn from *Protrepticus*. An earnest rendering may read:

“If you ought to philosophize you ought to philosophize; and if you ought not to philosophize you ought to philosophize: therefore, in any case you ought to philosophize.”

Aristotle, quoted, in Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 152.

language—with ontology, or with love, actually, and its place in philosophizing (rather than philosophy).

In a time, and also at a time, when foundations of knowledge has never been so radically questioned, ruthlessly overturned, and impersonally removed from the primal scene of truth, of reason, either as traditionally framed or contemporarily suspected, it is solely the energy of surplus love that is seemingly avowed with enough strength to engage or even perpetuate the very inventory of philosophizing. Yes, indeed, even till recently, till Martin Heidegger who maintains that philosophy exemplifies a particular love, indeed a clearly erotic line of relation to thought—“‘*thought*’ and ‘*loves*’ form the center of the line. Inclination [*Mögen*] reposes in thinking.”<sup>33</sup>

Or, is the love in the love of knowledge disrupted too? But, again, this is not a new task. The discourse involving what is love’s relation with knowledge, or what is the place of knowledge in love, whether behooved as an issue of embodiment or disembodiment—from systematic philosophy to post-humanism to the post-post-phenomenology—has, nonetheless, fundamentally encountered, and exposed, the same regimented constitution or creativity: metaphysics and ontology—as wounded sites of contention and contradiction. And, as the case is, the task of philosophizing has never been an impediment to its own exemplarity in the history of philosophy, and even now: “a unitary conception of philosophy that operates as a hallucination of what philosophy is.”<sup>34</sup> The task or act of

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<sup>33</sup> As Heidegger affirms in *What is Philosophy?* (1955):

“Because the loving is no longer an original harmony with the *sophon* but is a particular striving towards the *sophon*, the loving of the *sophon* becomes ‘*philosophia*.’ The striving is determined by Eros.”

Martin Heidegger, quoted, in Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood, Like flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 5-6. Also, see “The Passion of Facticity: Heidegger and the Problem of Love,” in Giorgio Agamben, *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

<sup>34</sup> François Laruelle, *Future Christ*, op. cit., p. xiv.

philosophy, “love for wisdom,” or “wisdom for love,”—this surplus energy of love—from antiquity’s virtuosity of an “examined life” to contemporary’s cosmopolitanism of a post-secular world, redoubtably, enlists its own charm, logic and reason, inquiry, and, more pervasively, its own method, telling tales of love: induction, deduction, seduction, reduction. But, then, negation, or antifoundationalism,<sup>35</sup> is a constituent to the very dialectical (or, even, logical) aspect of foundationalism, in the unstable history of philosophy.

How then and where then have we arrived at? The “phenomenon of *bio theoretikós*, the reflective life,” called by its name philosophy, heralded by the ancients’ quest for “truth and wisdom”—is it “still causing controversy today”?<sup>36</sup> Heraclitus, yes, was it him who first coined “the word” *philosophos*?<sup>37</sup> Is philosophy nonetheless a fiction of knowledge?<sup>38</sup> [Or, in square bracket,

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<sup>35</sup> As against the common belief that foundationalism is chiefly restricted to analytic philosophy, Tom Rockmore expands the version by showing that foundationalism and antifoundationalism (methodologically synonymous) is “widespread” in German Idealism. See “Introduction,” in Tom Rockmore and Beth J. Singer (eds.), *Antifoundationalism: Old and New* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 1-12; also, “Hegel, German Idealism, and Antifoundationalism,” pp. 105-125.

<sup>36</sup> Peter Sloterdijk, *The Art of Philosophy: Wisdom as Practice*, (tr.) Karen Margolis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 9-10.

<sup>37</sup> Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Eileen John’s uncomfortable stance on what is the “philosophical” stems from the “vagueness” that infers when the “experience with fiction... lead us to conceptual knowledge.” In pleading the need for philosophers “to avoid claiming literature... assess literary value in philosophical terms alone... [or] ignore the philosophical dimension of literary value,” John follows Hilary Putnam by cautioning such “thinking of conceptual knowledge as knowledge,” which, but, should be limited to “giving us new ideas about the materials for thought and the context that can sustain those processes of inquiry.” See “Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical Thought in Literary Context,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1998, pp. 331-48.

In ancient Roman civil law, *fictio* is regarded as “a process or an act, not as a result or product of a process or an act” (p. 6.). On the development of fiction in knowledge till modern times, see the essays in Richard Scholar and Alexis Tadié (eds.), *Frontiers of Knowledge in Europe*,

challenging the *Dichtung* in Heidegger's "poetizing essence of reason," where the *idea* is *Gestalt*, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the former understood it in terms of "fashioning" or "fictioning," by posing the question—"What is the fictioning essence of reason, then?"<sup>39]</sup>

What we know from the ancients, apart from the definition of "philosophy," particularly Plato's reference to Socrates, is merely the privileging of philosophy over poetry, over a brief squabble, in *The Republic*.<sup>40</sup> Beyond which, via Saint Augustine, the Hegelian owl of Minerva hoots and takes flight,<sup>41</sup> which gave philosophy a stable and physiognomic form, by the tag end of post-German idealism, only to be softly interrupted by Søren Kierkegaard.<sup>42</sup> The initial motivation of the monoglot Greek's *Erôs*,<sup>43</sup> which was distinctively linked

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1500-1800, (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), esp. "Introduction," pp. 1-16.

<sup>39</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, (eds.) Christopher Fynsk and Linda M. Brooks (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 69.

<sup>40</sup> *The Republic*, Book 10 (607b-c).

<sup>41</sup> "When philosophy paints its gray on gray, then has a form of life grown old, and with gray on gray it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known; the Owl of Minerva first takes flight with twilight closing in." See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, (tr.) T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 13.

<sup>42</sup> As Hale remarks in regard to Kierkegaard:

"To speak is to participate in a language already in existence, not to originate that language and its meanings as if from nothing, from nowhere; and every linguistic utterance participates in that existence, partakes of it, and carries it forth without resolving it in any singularly coherent way. This predicament lies at the heart of what we might call the linguistic promise. Language always promises access to a meaning that would be universal and totalizable, although its very occurrence continues to resist complete foreclosure in universality."

Geoffrey A. Hale, *Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>43</sup> Here, the timely suggestion by Scott and Welton, in their defense on the question of the "erotic" in the conceptualization of philosophy, is helpful. Accordingly, they identify "two salient features of philosophy as depicted in the *Symposium*: the first is that philosophy is fundamentally erotic; the second is that as erotic, philosophy lies between ignorance and wisdom

to the embodiment of philosophy, was gently subsumed throughout by a monotheistic metaphysics, and the same was not given its due interrogation, but, rather, the derivative and problematic of knowledge became central to post-Cartesian, post-Hegelian, post-Kantian, Post-Nietzsche, Post-Husserl, Post-Heideggerian, etc., insofar, or, speculatively, a soon to be, a perhaps post of another post-, a Post-Derrida, Post-Badiou, Post-Deleuze, etc. The love for knowledge therein became enigmatic to philosophical practices, for knowing the subject and the subject's experiential modalities were intricacies in themselves, logos and physis as *ethos*, initially, to methods,<sup>44</sup> styles,<sup>45</sup> conditions,<sup>46</sup> or even writing,<sup>47</sup> as of now. Knowledge equates truth qua wisdom.<sup>48</sup> "From Kant

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and also between the human and divine. Somehow philosophy partakes of each member of these pairs of contraries simultaneously; at the same time, precisely because it partakes of each, its intermediacy is properly characterized by neither of them." Gary Alan Scott & William A. Welton, *Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato's Symposium* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Gary Peters, *The Philosophy of Improvisation* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). I have greatly profited from Peters reading on methodology.

<sup>45</sup> See especially Berel Lang, *The Anatomy of Philosophical Styles* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) and Berel Lang (ed.), *Philosophical Style* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980).

<sup>46</sup> Reacting to Alain Badiou's "prescription of certain conditions" (science, politics, art and love) as the four "truth procedures," Jean-Luc Nancy defends that "[T]he definition of philosophy must allow for its own multiplication." Pertinent to this reference is Jean-Luc Nancy's position on philosophy and its irreducible task. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Philosophy Without Conditions," in Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 39-49, esp. p. 39.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980)*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), esp. Chapter 6, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing," pp. 9-109.

<sup>48</sup> Reiterating Lacanian statement: "Something true can still be said about what cannot be demonstrated," Jottkandt insists that, for psychoanalysis, it "famously distinguishes between truth and knowledge, the lack of a basis in physical reality has never stopped one from claiming that something—an hysterical symptom, say—possesses *truth*." Sigi Jottkandt, *First Love: A Phenomenology of the One* (Melbourne: re.press, 2010), p. 127.

Also, Jacques Lacan points out this enigmatic shift, what Jottkandt labels as "Analyst love" —

onward,” as Tom Rockmore *recalls*, the “entire German idealist tradition is centrally concerned with the problem of knowledge.”<sup>49</sup> This reaffirmation of an ancient radical love in the *form*-determination of the Subject therein inscribed its own taxonomy<sup>50</sup> (and, later, topology). Thereon, any critique of wisdom in the Being, first philosophy or the principles of philosophy, however constrained by the metaphysical tradition, seeks a unity and a unifying identity of the Absolute One. Commenting on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s contract in *Julie*, Paul de Man *observes* that—like Man—Love is—

“...a figure that disfigures, a metaphor that confers the illusion of proper meaning to a suspended, open semantic structure. In the naively referential language of the affections, this makes love into the forever-repeated chimera, the monster of its own aberration, always oriented toward the future of its repetition, since the undoing of the illusion only sharpens the uncertainty that created the illusion in the first place.”<sup>51</sup>

It is also this monotheistic definition and invested concentration on love to the object and spirit of the Absolute where philosophy needs to be situated in

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“Indeed, the analyst, of all [those whose] orders of discourse are sustained currently (*actuellement*)— and that word is not nothing, provided we give “action” its full Aristotelian meaning —is the one who, by putting object *a* in the place of semblance, is in the best position to do what should rightfully (*juste*) be done, namely, to investigate the status of truth as knowledge.”

See, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Book XX Encore 1972-1973*, (ed.) Jacques-Alain Miller, (tr.) Bruce Fink (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975/1999), p. 95.

<sup>49</sup> Tom Rockmore’s description of German Idealism includes Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx. See “Hegel, German Idealism, and Antifoundationalism,” in Tom Rockmore and Beth J. Singer (eds.), *Antifoundationalism: Old and New* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 106-126, esp. p. 105-6.

<sup>50</sup> As Rene Descartes says—“the whole of philosophy is like a tree, the roots of which are metaphysics, the trunk physics, and the branches that come out of this trunk are all the other sciences.” Quoted, in Miguel de Beistegui, *Truth and Genesis*, op. cit., p. 7, esp. footnote 6.

<sup>51</sup> Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 198.



the tradition, vis-à-vis the thinking of the linguistic or language and the production of truth and knowledge.<sup>52</sup> Gabor Boros et. al.<sup>53</sup> assess that for 17-18<sup>th</sup> century thinkers, love was seen as one of the most important “emotions.” Wilhelm Leibniz formulates justice as “charity of the wise,”<sup>54</sup> as a kind of emphatic love. For Benedict de Spinoza, love is the “first effect after the primary ones.”<sup>55</sup> Nicolas Melebranche attributes love and aversion as the “primary passions that succeeded admiration.” René Descartes also situates the primacy of passion in a general definition, which is highlighted in Article 79 of the *Passions of the Soul*—“Love is an emotion of the soul caused by a movement of the spirits, which impels the soul to join itself willingly to objects that appear to be agreeable to it.”<sup>56</sup> Taking a regress from the objective of love, it would be Arthur Schopenhauer, who hides no distaste for his contemporary Georg Hegel, blaming the latter’s “misuse” of language, thereby announcing that a new perspective on representation and wisdom.<sup>57</sup> Notwithstanding whatever avoidable Hegel said

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<sup>52</sup> As I shall show later, the linguistic as a category of thinking, especially in logic, has a close but categorical distinction with the use of the term “language,” which is seen either in the history of linguistics of theories revolving on the evolution of language, in particular, and as the case is, the divide between continental and analytical philosophies. As of now, I shall be using these two terms as two categories, the same of which is no longer given distinction, in current practices in continental philosophy.

<sup>53</sup> Gabor Boros, Herman De Dijn & Martin Moors (eds.), *The Concept of Love in 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007).

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>56</sup> René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I*, (tr.) J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 356.

<sup>57</sup> Schopenhauer argues that:

“...all wisdom is certainly contained in the works of the pictorial or graphic arts, yet only *virtualiter* or *implicite*. Philosophy, on the other hand, endeavours to furnish the same wisdom *actualiter* and *explicite*; in this sense philosophy is related to these arts as wine is to grapes. What it promises to supply would be, so to speak, a clear gain already realized, a firm and abiding possession, whereas that which comes from the achievements and works of art is only one that is to be produced afresh.”

on women in *Philosophy of Right*, Alice Ormiston, yes a certain Alice-woman, confirms that—the “knowledge of love—in the experience of forgiveness—is *objectified in a manner accessible to reason* as the very substance of the will that is unfolded.”<sup>58</sup> In effect, it would be somewhere close to constituting a transcendental becoming, where intuition leads to consciousness, through the “experience of Christian love,” and subjectivity is embodied as autonomous but without the supports of reason, as celebrated in/by Immanuel Kant.

The innumerable conceptions on love, therefore, as one would like to suspect, is ineluctable with Project Philosophy—the universal articulation of knowledge and the reasons of knowledge. As Roy Brand questions: “[W]hat is the love that turns to knowledge and how is the knowledge that we seek already a form of love?”<sup>59</sup> Given the unitary project, First Philosophy, which acts as its own supplement, of *philosophia*, some fundamental discords are still visible: “Could wisdom become the object of love? Could we really pursue the understanding of love? Do wisdom and love share the same myth? Or, do they have to supplement each other? Then, how does truth go with them?”<sup>60</sup> At this point, a clarification is perhaps required. As Kristine McKenna seeks “the difference between knowledge and wisdom,” in an interview with Jacques Derrida:

“They aren't heterogeneous, and you can know lots of things and have no wisdom at all. Between knowledge and action there is an abyss, but that abyss shouldn't prevent us from trying to know as much as possible before making a decision. Philosophy is the love of wisdom. *Philia* is love and *sophia* is wisdom, so the duty to be wise is what philosophy is. Nonetheless, decisions don't depend exclusively on knowledge. I try to

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See, Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation, Volume II*, (tr.) E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 407.

<sup>58</sup> Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-interpreting Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 80.

<sup>59</sup> Roy Brand, *LoveKnowledge: The Life of Philosophy from Socrates to Derrida*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. x.

<sup>60</sup> Synopsis for Call for Paper, “Love of Wisdom Vs. Wisdom of Love,” *3<sup>rd</sup> Comparative Literature Graduate Conference*, SUNY-Buffalo, 2013.

know as much as possible before making a decision, but I know that at the moment of the decision I'll make a leap beyond knowledge."<sup>61</sup>

To be a soldier of love, then, at the “service of love,” on the call of a “duty to be wise,” in contemporary notions on the task of philosophy, is however no longer knowledge-based. Decisions matter more than knowledge. Or, to illustrate further, it is an uneasiness of *nonknowledge*, as Georges Bataille (1897-1962) proposes.<sup>62</sup> The impossible finality of knowledge, or the “abyss” that separates the charm of *aknowing* knowledge, as an accessible embodiment, is replaced with a locus on “decision,” the “auto-hetero-affection,” which conversely becomes the very “principle of philosophy,” the inaugural of experience rather than the logic of knowledge.<sup>63</sup> Similarly, reading Samuel Beckett’s *Enough*, Alain Badiou defines the “interval” (like Derridean “abyss”) that binds the non-objectifiable relations of experiences, through love, as emancipated by its own “paradoxical circulation” logic of emptiness:

“Love is this interval in which a sort of inquiry about the world is pursued to infinity. Because in love knowledge (*savoir*) is experienced and transmitted between two irreducible poles of experience, it is subtracted from the tedium of objectivity and charged with desire. In love, we are not seized by what the world is—it is not the world that holds us captive. On the contrary, love is the paradoxical circulation—between ‘man’ and ‘woman’—

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<sup>61</sup> Kristine McKenna, “The Three Ages of Jacques Derrida: An Interview with the father of Deconstructionism,” *LA Weekly*, November 6, 2002. Available at <http://www.laweekly.com/2002-11-14/news/the-three-ages-of-jacques-derrida/3/> <accessed on 02 October, 2013>

<sup>62</sup> To specify what I mean by nonknowledge,” says Bataille, is “that which results from every proposition when we are looking to go to the fundamental depths of its content, and which makes us uneasy.” See “The Consequences of Nonknowledge,” in Georges Bataille, *The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge*, (ed.) Stuart Kendall, (trs.) Michelle Kendall and Stuart Kendall (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 112

<sup>63</sup> Jacques Derrida, ‘Le toucher’, *Paragraph*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1993, p. 140.

of a wondrous knowledge that makes the universe ours. Love then is when we can say that we have the sky, and that the sky has nothing.”<sup>64</sup>

This emptiness, the nothing, which constitutes a relation-that-is-not-a-relation but a relation that is relatable only by a non-communicable or incomprehensible “abyss” or “interval,” is breached by its own *différance*—the issue of temporality that we shall explore further in Jacques Derrida—or “desire,” a casuistic thematic that is consistent in the concerns of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.<sup>65</sup> A love that is breached (reversed) by an impossible knowledge, or a language that is incommunicable, inversed in its own emptiness and meaninglessness (but one which is not nothingness). Here, it is pertinent to mention Walter Benjamin’s reiteration, co-founded in Wilhelm Leibniz, that language means truth—and not a “matter of the mind” at all—unlike Leibniz’s later critics, like Bertrand Russell or Louis Couturat, who conclude that the “foundations of logic and mathematics do not lie in the makeup of the mind but are, rather, to be found in a limited set of principles.”<sup>66</sup> This is how the limits of language or, rather, philosophy, are contested, as yesterday, as today, too— the

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<sup>64</sup> Alain Badiou, *On Beckett*, (eds.) Alberto Toscano & Nina Power (Manchester: Clinamen Press Ltd., 2003), p. 67.

<sup>65</sup> On Desire:

“If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it.”

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (trs.) Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (London; New Delhi; New York; Sydney: Bloomsbury [1984] 2003), p. 26.

<sup>66</sup> Peter Fenves, *Arresting Language: From Leibniz to Benjamin* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 7.

post-ontological status of language; for language was ontology once upon a time... Nonetheless, it took several detours.

*Finally.*

Although the direction of the thesis is not guided by an enumerative historiography of love, the flow of the arguments looks at the variable conceptualization of love (and therefore wisdom) and the perspectives drawn on the location of the linguistic and language. This, then, is our notion of philosophizing. Between the relations of thoughts and thinking, the linguistic and language, or, especially, the production of truth and knowledge—there is a redundant reversion that marks the practices of love, and the love for wisdom. One notes here, how Frederick Nietzsche *implores* the “linguistic conventions,” or the “genesis of language” itself, by radically critiquing the efficacies of “subjective simulations”:

“And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities? ... If truth alone had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to say ‘the stone is hard,’ as if ‘hard’ were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!”<sup>67</sup>

How are the limits of language experienced—from the transcendental comforts of logocentricism to the immanent regimentations of becoming? How do we inverse the relation between (and, also, the experience of) ignorance and knowledge—as a love for wisdom, as the task of philosophy, which Plato’s

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<sup>67</sup> Frederick Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, (tr.) Daniel Brazeale (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 81-82. Also, see epigraph, Chapter One.

Socrates valorizes, or equate true wisdom with religious faith,<sup>68</sup> which follows Saint Augustine through the culmination of Humanism in Francesco Petrarch and, later on, the emergence of German Idealism, German Romanticism, French Enlightenment—with the periodic histories and breaks involved in the evolution of the “One,”<sup>69</sup> in the signatures that dotted the evolution of linguistic thoughts through mathematical thoughts, giving the place and status of language, in its perpetual confrontation and riddle with the “Many.” Beyond the challenges confronting Western theological or philosophical terms—primarily accentuated in the development of subjectivity and divinity—what new clarifications have been sought so radically, taking into consideration the momentum that led to the closure of metaphysics of presence, in the principles of philosophy, in the privileging of mourning (or, “one must love the future,” as Jacques Derrida puts it)? How is the movement of first love traced, or, even situated, the “first kiss,” which is the very “kernel” of philosophy, as the inaugural of all experiences, “in particular speech and the declaration of love.”<sup>70</sup> For Jean-Luc Marion, the question of love is still more fundamental than the question of knowledge, a waning disconnect he ruefully sees in his book *The Erotic Phenomenon*.<sup>71</sup>

In thus conjecturing the trajectories of philosophy’s relation with its own task of philosophizing, or even the other way around, the movement of the double bind in ignorance-knowledge is constantly incorporated, or progressively disseminated: Ignorance—Absolute Knowledge—Synthetic Reason<sup>72</sup>—as excess

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<sup>68</sup> See John F. Wippel, *Medieval Reactions to the Encounter Between Faith and Reason* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995).

<sup>69</sup> Todd May, “Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many,” in Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 67-76. Also, for a psychoanalytical perspective on the development of the One, see Sigi Jöttkandt, *First Love*, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> See Jacques Derrida, ‘Le toucher’, *Paragraph*, 1993, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 140-41.

<sup>71</sup> Jean-Luc Marion, *The Erotic Phenomenon*, (tr.) Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago and London: The Chicago University Press, 2007).

<sup>72</sup> Manuel De Landa, *Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).

of knowledge (or, a return to Platonism?). The differential historical movements of beings or what Reiner Schürmann identifies it as variable exigencies of *hegemon* at play—Logos-Man-World—acts as the local denominator across through the explication of (or in) language, the aesthetic to the sublime.<sup>73</sup> Erin Manning traces this movement, where,

“[The] malleability of concepts that move, the expressivity of thoughts as they become feelings, the ontogenetic potential of ideas as they become articulations. This complex passage from thought to feeling to concepts-in-prearticulation to events-in-the-making foregrounds how thinking is more than the discrete final form it takes in language. To come to language is more than to finalize form. To come to language is to feel the form-taking of concepts as they prearticulate thoughts/feelings.”<sup>74</sup>

The constituting or the constituent of language as the desiring machine—as a movement passage or a relation—or as an embodiment or dis embodiment—needless to say, owes to the question of who is the philosopher in Plato’s Socrates or Socrates’ Plato.<sup>75</sup> What, then, is the ac-knowledge (desire) that involves or subverts philosophizing? Is philosophy limited to the standard practice of care for the self and perpetuation of social wisdom, the Socratic one, or potentially limited to ‘human wisdom’?<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Reiner Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies*, (tr.) Reginald Lily (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003).

<sup>74</sup> Erin Manning, *Relationescapes: Movement: Movement, Art, Philosophy* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 2009), p. 5.

<sup>75</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>76</sup> The direction of desire in Eros as a prescriptive phenomena—both for the conservation of the political individual and for the maintenance of the same through an ethic of good in the social—finds resonance of continuity from Plato’s *Symposium* to Rousseau’s *Emile* to Nietzsche’s *Will to Power*, as Cooper argues, because it is motivated around similar issues of “ambition, aspiration, longing, and the spirited willingness to risk life.”

See Laurence D. Cooper, *Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche: The Politics of Infinity* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).

“Socrates as the master of *Erôs* represents the fact that philosophy can understand the human psyche through seeing all human longing in relation to its own longing. Socratic philosophy thus knows the psyche as a structure of longing and knows the psyche’s possibilities as ways in which those longings can interact and combine. Socratic philosophy is a type of *Erôs* that understands *Erôs*. But this paradoxical kind of wisdom emerging from the very need for wisdom illustrates the in-between nature of *Erôs* and how erotic desire acts as a messenger from the object of desire, imparting something of its nature, or at least impressing its effect, upon the desiring mind. For Socrates’ desire for wisdom in his awareness of his ignorance grants him a kind of wisdom, his ‘human wisdom’.”<sup>77</sup>

What is Socrates’ understanding of love? It is latent psychologism and theistic non-knowledge that is composite to, or embodies, as Scott and Welton suggest, the relation “between the ignorance and wisdom contained in the philosopher’s *Erôs*.”<sup>78</sup> It is the “ordering of psychic harmony” that wants to find a place in the embodied transcendence—“longing for the eternal in every desire”—“the character of desire and how it affects the psyche has everything to do with the character of the objects desired.”<sup>79</sup> “In the case of Plato’s Socrates,” Scott and Welton remind us again, “Socrates’ awareness of his ignorance is inseparable from some partial recollection of the Forms.”<sup>80</sup>

Form—as a relation, as a representation, or, even, as a substance of knowledge, as a dualism between mind and body, as a structure of objectivity and subjectivity, as formulated in Kantian faculties as well, or in the history of psychologism, or in an axiom toward truth and its phenomenological departures. Form—which thinly or insufficiently operates on aporetic and para-doxa readings, a confabulation that is marked by a refusal for seductive language (earlier speech, and now writing). Therefore, as Manning warns us in the note of

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<sup>77</sup> See Gary Alan Scott & William A. Welton, *Erotic Wisdom*, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.



“form” *relationscapes*: “to think language before it takes form we must first understand how to conceive of taking form itself.”<sup>81</sup>

/Form-less Love./

Love as an addendum: Isn't it the ancient Greeks? Seeking love? Seeking knowledge? A *certain* Form? —Victoria Wohl tells us: the “erotic fantasy of reciprocal love is also a specifically political fantasy.”<sup>82</sup> The politics of love; the politics of wisdom; the forms of love; the forms of wisdom<sup>83</sup>—which is inscribed in a name, a name called knowledge, a proper noun called philosophy—seeking its own meaning.<sup>84</sup> Isn't it Peter Sloterdijk who *bemoans* the assiduous task of fathoming that “knowledge is power”—where philosophy *dug* its own *grave* with this love for knowledge in the nineteenth century?<sup>85</sup>

—and, yet, the mournful cries for (the mismanagement of) love continues... Has the knowledge in love for wisdom transgressed its own power-mongering? Has love subverted a knowledge that actually seeks to transcend subjectivity?

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<sup>81</sup> Erin Manning, *Relationscapes*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>82</sup> Victoria Wohl, *Love among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 265.

<sup>83</sup> Esp. Chapter 4: “Love of Wisdom versus Love of the Wise: Eros in Action,” in Laurence D. Cooper, *Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche*, op. cit., pp. 95-133.

<sup>84</sup> Adriaan Peperzak, *The Quest for Meaning: Friends of Wisdom from Plato to Levinas* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003).

<sup>85</sup> On “knowledge is power,” Sloterdijk comments:

“This is the sentence that dug the grave of philosophy in the nineteenth century... This sentence brings to an end the tradition of a knowledge that, as its name indicates, was an erotic theory—the love of truth and the truth through love (*Liebeswahrheit*)... Those who utter the sentence reveal the truth. However, with the utterance they want to achieve more than truth: They want to intervene in the game of power.”

Peter Sloterdijk, *The Critique of Cynical Reason*, (tr.) Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 [1983]), xxvi–xxvii.

“Perhaps philosophy today suffers too often from a false alternative—either to explain or to use—as well as well as a false problem: the impression that a too-precise approach would amount to canonizing a current author. Consequently, we are not surprised to occasionally find philosophical production divided on the one hand into disincarnated exegeses, and on the other into essays which, although ambitious, still seize their concepts *from above*.”<sup>86</sup>

Has another time come for us to philosophize,<sup>87</sup> to chart an impossibility (of ‘sense and dignity’) for philosophy,<sup>88</sup> and for what purpose?<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event* together with *The Vocabulary of Deleuze*, (eds.) Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, (tr.) Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 140.

<sup>87</sup> “The time has come to philosophize,” in the enthusiastic words of Jean-Francois Lyotard, in *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, (tr.) Georges Van Den Abbeele (Oxford Road: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. xiii. Also, see, Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Why Philosophize?*, (tr.) Andrew Brown (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2013).

<sup>88</sup> As Jacques Derrida observes:

“[It] seems to disappoint every claim to an objectivity which is absolute, to a foundation which is autonomous. By situating Reason and philosophical consciousness in a time which is natural and objective, genesis seems to pose the problem of the possibility of philosophy as a search for autonomous foundation, along with the problem of philosophy’s relations to the physical and anthropological sciences, which, before any philosophy, seem to give us the spectacle of real geneses. But is not this spectacle originally possible for and through a philosophical consciousness that not only founds its scientific value but also makes itself arise there, be engendered there, comprehend itself there? It is the whole of philosophy which seems to be asking itself here about its own sense and dignity.”

Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*, (tr.) Marian Hobson (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. xviii.

<sup>89</sup> Says Deleuze: “A philosophy that saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not a philosophy.” Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Continuum, [1983] 2002), p. 106.

## II

Following the discussions below, the five chapters are divided into two parts. The first part, “Cloistered Ruptures,” serves a running commentary on how philosophizing diversely affirms itself. The second part, “Radical Temporalities,” attempts to shed perspective on two extremes—poetry and music—in its defiance of presencing and immediacy.

Chapter One, “Logico-Linguistic Confluences” is rather an orientation that draws to attention the background and perspective that is consequently developed in the ensuing chapters—the transcendental approximations and logico-calculus deductions in the tradition of western thought. Starting with Immanuel Kant’s displacement of Greek logic with mathematical logic, the chapter traces the dominant element of mathematical thinking in conceptualizing language.

Taking our departure cue from a logico-linguistic tradition, Chapter Two, “The Mathematics of Being(s),” thereon investigates two stellar but polar contemporary thinkers: Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou. Prior to his death in 2004, Derrida had long held a sway, particularly across the Atlantic. Badiou is seen today as the most challenging living philosopher in Europe. For what is their appeal, besides being recognized as towering figures in contemporary thoughts? Their notoriety remains similar: the radical and sweeping questioning of the entire western tradition—Derrida critiques the ‘metaphysics of presence’ and Badiou critiques the ‘ontology of presence’. The determination of being inasmuch, as a continuity of the traditions they both inherited, is complicit in their preoccupations—the endemic questions on language, the indiscernible, the undecidable, the impossible, truth, etc.

This, however, does not entail a convergence. On being, Derrida extracts whereas Badiou subtracts. Derrida, for one, is avowed with a disdain for mathematical thinking whereas Badiou cannot philosophize without his

mathematical axioms. Also, notwithstanding how it is now so fashionable a practice in the academic to compare the thoughts of contemporary thinkers (particularly on tangents), there are hardly any literature on a comparative montage of Badiou and Derrida. This chapter is however not an attempt to fill such a void. It is neither a comparative analysis of their corpus. By however choosing Badiou and Derrida, the earnestness of the study simply attempts to illustrate the engagements of disparity in philosophizing, given their strict reservations for the mathematical. The mathematical then is a central motif that binds our study on Badiou and Derrida. Two indulgences naughtily guide our approach to both of them. First, Derrida and Badiou both resorted to their own respective muses. Derrida found in Kurt Gödel a mathematical theorem validating the impossible in the undecidable; whereas Badiou turned to the ancient atomist Titus Lucretius as an advocator of multiplicity. Second, Badiou unabashedly premises his entire critique based on axioms from set theory, whereas Derrida subtly recedes to analogy. A highlight of these two references is guided with a hope to elucidate a structural technique of validation in philosophizing. Besides that, we look at the oeuvre in their respective approaches. Three handlers manage Badiou's subject of being—Jacques Lacan, Gottfried Leibniz and Martin Heidegger—in his attempt to escape from the 'enframing of being by one'. Badiou's 'mathematical turn', then, also becomes a tautological anxiety—which allows us to feature the incompatibility of mathematizing an intrinsic ontology in realizing the being of event—given the inconsistencies of 'generic' rules with axiomatic procedures. In Derrida, we find a close derision with Edmund Husserl, the 'failed mathematician'. By subjecting Derrida's earliest writings, which in turn investigate the problematics of 'origin' and 'genesis', the study realizes that Derridean notions of 'undecidability' and 'différance' are essentially and solely derived from rubbishing Husserl. This will be disappointing news, no doubt, for those who long naively but fondly believed in the primacy of Martin Heidegger to Derrida's thoughts. Finally, by stipulating the strictures of Derrida's anti-mathematical crusade and Badiou mathematical Maoism—the findings of the study make a speculative but contradictory reversal of their losing warpaths.

Chapter Three, “Chronomimetic Concepts,” interrogates the notion of *concepts* in systematic philosophy. Our investigation again begins with Kantian development on the imperative of concepts, which insofar is largely unaddressed. The chapter begins with Georg Hegel’s definition of concepts and traverses through Michel Foucault, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and ends with Jacques Derrida. By constantly attempting to situate the relevance of ‘what are concepts?’—this chapter contests the place of concepts in philosophizing. At once, concepts are employed as idiosyncratic terminologies or explicative references. But, beyond such innocence, concepts are not merely latent terms possessing the character of language, or capacitated to clarify philosophical practices into a totalizing process. Epistemological shifts on concepts as representational is however not constant. Hegel, of course, suggests a material ontology to concepts and, along with Kant’s employment of concepts as a module for rational recognition, this tradition can be located as the hallmark of western thought. Wittgenstein’s radicalization of concepts, for instance, has been commented solely within the strictures of this logical-intuitive tradition. Wittgenstein weariness is a good indicator but remains inconclusive since a critique of concept is also modeled on an aversion for language. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s attempt to purge language from philosophy, which, no doubt, remains his greatest contributions, is however within the range of earlier attempts as initiated by Nietzsche. By delineating concepts as vectors, Deleuze found a new enthusiasm to promote concepts as a creative process and, in fact, reorganizes the entire frame of philosophy and philosophizing as tasked to creating concepts. Rather than purging the spatial extents of language, philosophy’s new task seems to be endeared at subverting the temporal dimension of concepts. How does thinking take place in such locale? From Foucault’s concept-formation to Deleuzean segmentation of how concepts operate, to Derrida’s notion of *différance*, this chapter then concludes by revealing the facelessness of concepts, as form-less and time-less.

The next chapter initiates a re-visitation to figural anxieties at the limits of language, which is as old as the ancient Greek’s debate over the hierarchical

privileging of either poetry or philosophy.<sup>90</sup> By titling this chapter as “The Poetic Turn(s),” the chapter re-surveys the established interpretations on the ancient quarrels, and also re-interrogates the privileging of poetry in Western tradition, which initially comes to us from Aristotle, via Kant-Hegel and, recently, through Hölderlin-Heidegger. The primary accord in favoring poetry is no longer a complex web of disputations on *genre* or aesthetic canons but remains in the question of language as an embodiment—as seen in the various poetic turns. There is a recent proliferation of interests in poetry by major continental philosophers—avowed with a certain flock mentality (i.e., purging the limits of language). This urgency (for difference) has also deepened the dissonancy for mimetology. By investigating the claims that the problematic in language is itself the question of finitude (which, erstwhile, is solely from the phenomenological *notioning* of the ontological), the focus of the Chapter shall argue (the other argument being the verges of the ethico-dimensional parlances) the framework of what I have broadly indentified as a phenomenological process of elucidating a temporality that is necessarily involved in summoning an ontological resistance to language. The “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology,” as Heidegger proposed to expedite, is, rather, an ontological destruction of the phenomenological, as the case is with currents in speculative thinking. The problems Martin Heidegger encountered (particularly, on *Ereignis*) gave a fresh twist on poetry and language: first, an ontological attempt to locate the unrepresentable (the subjectless) and, second, the drafting of a historico-transcendental into a meta-linguistic tradition. Which is, without modesty, language is a given ontology in itself or, otherwise, it is a question of language proto-ontology<sup>91</sup> or post-ontology.

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<sup>90</sup> William S. Allen discusses the issue of truth (*eidōs*) in the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry (whereas my perspective looks at hierarchies associated with such privileging).

<sup>91</sup> The possibly nearest description would be something like “the resistance of language to language that grounds other forms of resistance,” as employed by Wlad Godzich in his “Foreword” to Paul de Man’s *The Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986/2002), p. xvii.

Chapter Five, “Beyond the Ineffable: ‘Where is the Music?’” looks at the junctures of music: between the traditional-modern, secular and non-secular, or word-music. Music is the last bastion that has severely resisted post-modern theorizing and, also, remains as the first art that has capitulated maximum exposure to immediacy. A re-look at the various responses to musical meanings provide an interesting intersection between the old remains of composition, sound theory, or listening, with emerging challenges posed by Derridian or Deleuzian thoughts.





Part I  
**CLOISTERED RUPTURES**



Chapter One:  
**The Logico-Linguistic Confluences**

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“A thing is what it is, and remains in its identity forever: nature is eternal.”

—Edmund Husserl.<sup>1</sup>

“And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with *things*? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?”

—Friedrich Nietzsche.<sup>2</sup>

“What belongs to the mark of a thing belongs also to the thing itself; and what contradicts the mark of a thing contradicts also the thing itself.”

—Immanuel Kant.<sup>3</sup>

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## I

In understanding contemporary discourses around the thinking and working on the life of language, it is first necessary to locate (at least, comprehensively) how Reason displaced Greek logic and how Mathematical Logic eventually crept in, particularly after Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This chapter, through selective surveys leaning on a historiography of the mathematico-logical, therefore serves as a preparatory introduction, culminating in to the disparate thoughts of major continental philosophers, which is taken in the following chapters, and, most importantly, establishes the corpus of debates around language through a recast on problems of temporality in language.

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<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, quoted, in Jacob Klein, “Phenomenology and the History of Science,” in Martin Farber (ed.), *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 143-63, esp. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's*, (tr. & ed.) Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990), p. 81. (*Italics*, my emphasis).

<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, (tr. and ed.) J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 617-18.

But, first, why start with Kant? To put once again Kant into perspective is also to acknowledge not only the overlooked “transcendental”<sup>4</sup> issues he raised but also the debates that were successively influenced thereafter—seminally, and culminating, through the publication of his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and notably through the question of *Problematik*, which attempts to establish a mathematical epistemology. This point of departure, perhaps, even suggests a tenor of where we intend to head, i.e., to what eventually led to a resistance of the ‘mathematization of language’, in the words of Jacques Derrida.<sup>5</sup> Kant’s contributions, and influences, on integrating mathematical thought and science, firstly started with his attempt to situate the “subject,” as Michael Detlefsen<sup>6</sup> (b. 1948) points out, which, otherwise, is *a priori* and loosely gathered and, also, synonymously associated as “being,” or “reason,” or “truth,”<sup>7</sup> or “universe,” in the

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<sup>4</sup> On the word “transcendental,” Kant reiterates that it “never signifies a relation of our cognition of things, but only to the *faculty of cognition*.” See Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, (tr.) Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1997] 2004), p. 45. Earlier, too, in *Critique*, Kant states: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*.” Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 149. Also, for an excellent update of authoritative essays on Kant’s transcendental debates, see Jeff Malpas (ed.), *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) and, for an earlier insightful work, see Eva Schaper (ed.), *Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy* (Oxford; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> Refer Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), esp. pp. 32-35.

<sup>6</sup> Michael Detlefsen, “Philosophy of mathematics in the twentieth century,” in Stuart G. Shanker (ed.), *Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume IX* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 50-123.

<sup>7</sup> “Truth,” for Kant’s contemporary Hegel, “has only the notion as the element of its existence.” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (tr.) A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 4.

clamor of the tradition.<sup>8</sup> Post-Cartesian and post-Hegelian critiques on the reign of the “subject” (and the subject, here, enabled mediations of language, its role in cogito), one notes, is directly influenced by classical physics and, quite recently then, by Copernican physics.

Hegel’s idealism, unlike British idealism, in the wake of Kant, remains one of the last surviving forts too—given the historical assault on Aristotelian physics and metaphysics by way of development in calculus, notably through Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s<sup>9</sup> (1646-1716) concepts of indivisible and infinitesimal differentials and, later, through the emergent preeminence of Issac Newton’s (1643-1727) inductive mathematical method of differentials and integration,<sup>10</sup> which reinforced the Copernican (heliocentric) turn.<sup>11</sup> Where Leibniz “could do calculus using arithmetic without geometry—by using infinitesimal numbers,”<sup>12</sup> Newtonian physics, in particular, modeled on Euclidean geometry, which resulted in the publication of *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687), encodes universal physical laws within a closed system. Both Newton

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<sup>8</sup> The “thinking of the proper man is inseparable from the question or the truth of Being.” See Derrida’s critique on the anthropocentric metaphysic in western tradition in See Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 111-135, esp. 124

<sup>9</sup> The birth year of *calculus* (and, subsequently, the development of modern mathematics) is often dated as 1684 with the publication of Leibniz’s paper entitled “A New Method for Maxima and Minima.”

<sup>10</sup> Niccolò Guicciardini, *The Development of Newtonian Calculus in Britain 1700-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>11</sup> In philosophy, remarks Peter Klepec, “the Copernican turn is usually connected with the Kantian revolution, which puts the subject in the center—cognition no longer follows the object, the constitution of objectivity itself becomes dependent upon the subject.” See Peter Klepe, “Lyotard and the ‘Second Copernican Turn,’” in *Filozofski vestnik*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 2004, pp. 107-23, esp. 110. This is however a generalist definition on the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus. For an interesting special issue on Copernicus, see Matjaž Vesel (ed.), *Copernicus and the Philosophy of Copernican Revolution*, *Filozofski vestnik*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez, *Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind brings Mathematics into Being* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 224-25.

and Leibniz impacted upon the young Kant [and Gilles Deleuze,<sup>13</sup> in hindsight, which we take up afterwards], leading to the publication of *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1746) at the tender age of twenty. Kant's pensiveness with Newton's supernaturalism of the solar system, reiterated by Leibniz's eternally living and monadical pre-orderliness of the universe substance, resulted in the interrogation of matters and dynamics, of nature and mechanics, eventually ending with Kant-Laplace Theory (1796). Also, on Cartesian mathematical mechanics to nature, which is supplemented by Leibniz's doctrine of living through the metaphysical approach to nature, the young Kant was able to "confidently judged that mathematics worked only for forces arising from external causes" rather than the former's explanations that "only mathematics grasped the living forces of nature."<sup>14</sup> Kant's substance ontology and the nature of substance, which was initially grounded as oppositions to Leibniz's scholastic monadology, were already established in his dissertation works (*Magister*, which is equivalent to present day Ph.D) like *A New Elucidation of the First Principle of Metaphysical Cognition* (1755) or, on a mathematical model, in *Physical Monadology* (1756). The distinction between mathematical

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<sup>13</sup> Deleuze, like Kant, was largely influenced by Leibniz and Newton. Where both were able to arrive at their calculus with the same results—although ontologically (and therefore methodologically) different, as Simon Duffy points out—with Leibniz hypothesizing a symbolic number and infinitesimal length—and Newton having no need of numbers and using real length to measure the relation between fluents, i.e., lengths, areas, distances, temperatures, volumes, etc. (fluxions). Deleuze employs these two methods to characterize the mind-body dualism in order to fix Leibniz's monad:

"The physical bodies (fluxion) is not identical to the psychic mechanism of perception (differentials), but the latter resembles the former."

See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque*, (tr.) Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1993), p. 98. Also, see Simon Duffy, "Leibniz, Mathematics and the Monad," in Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.), *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 89-111, esp. p. 95.

<sup>14</sup> Gary Dorrien, *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 29.

and metaphysical, for Kant, will also underline a clear departure from Leibniz as well as highlight an emphasis on the entity of mathematical physics.<sup>15</sup>

Another direct influence on Kant, Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who was a strong proponent of Leibniz (whom, we have seen, held that view that our idea of the world exists because it was already pre-established as a conceptual harmony by God), was also a contemporary of Kant. In 1721 Wolff perilously took Leibniz debate further by advocating a mathematical rationalism that “one did not have to believe in God to arrive at sound principles of moral and political reasoning,” leading to his banishment by the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm I, only to be recalled by the son Friedrich (the Great) II, in 1740, and thereafter enjoyed a wide influence over German universities when Kant was undertaking his studentship.<sup>16</sup> Kant also succeeded a bitter attrition between Wolff, consequent to his return and sway, and his principal detractors, the Pietists,<sup>17</sup> especially A. F. Hoffmann, J. Lange, J. F. Budde, Christian August Crusius, who were also mostly Kant’s teachers, and Martin Knutzen, under whom Kant defended his doctoral thesis. Gary Dorrien divides Kant’s preoccupation into different phases: between 1744-59, Kant was immersed in the search to “provide a new foundation for metaphysical claims about God, immortality, and the first causes of nature;” between 1760-66, there was a “skeptical turn,” where Kant developed arguments about “the sense-bound limitations of scientific knowledge;” between 1766-72, Kant returned to metaphysics, attempting to fashion a “modest ontology;” and, lastly, between 1772-81 onward, Kant purged, by precipitating a mathematical foundation for metaphysics and, thereon, a metaphysical foundation for natural sciences.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See, also, Jürgen Mittelstrass, “Leibniz and Kant on Mathematical and Philosophical Knowledge,” in Kathleen Orkuhlik and James Robert Brown (eds.), *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz* (Dordrecht; Boston; Lancaster; Tokyo: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 227-62.

<sup>16</sup> Gary Dorrien, *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit*, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>17</sup> Pietists advocated that philosophy’s task “should analyze concepts given in experience.” Ibid. p. 27.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 28.

The times of Kant were interesting. Despite the rapid developments in European Enlightenment rationality, what is considerate in the study of language and consciousness, however, is also the reiteration that the systems of thought affirm a tradition of mathematical thinking and dialectic logic, which can be traced as far as Pythagoras of Samos (B.C.E. 570-495) to Zeno of Elea (B.C.E. 490-430), pre-dating Socratic period, in the search (and need) for harmony and coherent order.<sup>19</sup> The creative tension pertinently persisted till medieval renaissance, despite the decentering of the subject, namely the conflicts of free will, God, and immortality of the soul, which Kant took up in “Transcendental Dialectic,” along with the intellectual strife of the day, and is best reflected by Eyolf Østrem about the spirit of its age:

“What complicates this quest, but also gave it tremendous impetus, is that it involves both ontology (‘what is the character of God and the creation?’), epistemology (‘how can we, the creation, know anything about God, the Creator?’), and linguistics (‘what do the words we use to describe God mean, and how? If God is beyond anything human, including human reason, how can we use the same words about God and man?’). Thus, question which originally—and, perhaps, ultimately—concerned only a certain theological dogma, became, through the wealth of implications the question carried with it, a major drive in the late-medieval development of theories of language, poetics, and the arts.”<sup>20</sup>

Kant’s *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences* (1786) sincerely reiterates both an inter-dependence and co-extension of mathematics and natural sciences:

“[I]n any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much *proper* science as there is *mathematics* therein. For, according to the preceding, proper science, and above all proper natural science, requires a pure part lying at

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<sup>19</sup> Dominic J. O’Meara, *Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

<sup>20</sup> Eyolf Østrem, “Deus Artifex and Homo Creator: Art between the Human and the Divine,” in Nils Holger Petersen et. al., (eds.), *Creations: Medieval Rituals, the Arts, and the Concept of Creation* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 15-48, esp. p. 21.



the basis of the empirical part, and resting on a priori cognition of natural things. ... [A] pure doctrine of nature concerning *determinate* natural things (doctrine of body or doctrine of soul) is only possible by means of mathematics. And, since in any doctrine of nature there is only as much proper science as there is a priori knowledge therein, a doctrine of nature will contain only as much proper science as there is mathematics capable of application there.”<sup>21</sup>

Kant’s transcendental idealism<sup>22</sup> seeks to explain this best by advocating mathematics as a synthetic *a priori* condition of intuition (knowledge is not derived *from* experience but are, rather, *imposed* upon as conditional necessities for the possibilities of experiencing the empirical world, i.e., Kant’s *empirical realism*).<sup>23</sup> Therefore, “mathematical reasoning does give us assured knowledge of the structure of the empirical world (natural world) because mathematical

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<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, (ed. & tr.) Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Kant idiosyncratically stated his idealism thus:

“Idealism consists in the claim that there are none other than thinking beings; the other things that we believe we perceive in intuition are only representations in thinking beings, to which in fact no object existing outside these beings corresponds.” (p. 40).

Further, on his theory of “transcendental idealism” as different from Descartes’ “empirical idealism” or Berkeley’s idealism, Kant playfully tosses on the idea whether it may be also called as “dreaming idealism,” or “visionary idealism,” or “critical idealism.” See Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> Kant’s argues:

“Pure mathematics, as synthetic cognition *a priori*, is possible only because it refers to no other objects than mere objects of the senses, the empirical intuition of which is based on a pure and indeed *a priori* intuition (of space and time), and can be so based because this pure intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of objects, since it in fact first makes this appearance possible. This faculty of intuiting *a priori* does not, however, concern the matter of appearance—i.e., that which is sensation in the appearance, for that constitutes the empirical—but only the form of appearance, space and time.”

Ibid. p. 35.

principles underlie the mental processes by which experience is constituted as experience of an external empirical reality.”<sup>24</sup> Similarly, Kant’s philosophy of science is premised through the engagement of metaphysics and metaphysics as the *a priori* basis,<sup>25</sup> where there is apodeictic certainty. The establishment of reason via mathematical logic will thereon guide the entire debates post-Kant.

Although the context is marginal, Kantorovich captures the rise of evolutionary epistemology, which has its roots in the attempt to naturalize discovery, as formulated by running a parallel to the scientific rules or rule-governed processes (as postulated by Francis Bacon [1561-1626], for instance) through which logicians otherwise conceptualize reason.<sup>26</sup> What remains undisputed is that reason remains as an “indispensable part of the process of scientific discovery,” but what is exhaustive to this tradition is whether it is the terms in the role of reason, or in the notion of discovery, or in the sense of method, which Kantorovich labels it as “the role of tinkering in generating novelty,” and the fidelity for a genotype-phenotype structure through which the logic of discovery is also perpetuated.<sup>27</sup> The model as accentuating analogy of knowledge, in the ontogeny mode, therefore, *prescribes* laws to nature, as in Kantian method, rather than *propose* laws to nature, as propounded in the genetic epistemology of Swiss man Jean Piaget (1896-1980), which are otherwise determined by the subject’s logic of “cognitive apparatus.”<sup>28</sup>

What precipitates the rise of Kant is also the downfall of Georg Hegel (1770-1831).<sup>29</sup> And, Hegel, not that we see him in poor light, was a philosopher proper

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<sup>24</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 23.

<sup>25</sup> See Peter Klaass, *Kant’s Theory of Natural Science*, (tr.) Alfred E. and Maria G. Miller (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, 1994), especially Section 2, pp. 10-16.

<sup>26</sup> Aharon Kantorovich, *Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 251.

<sup>29</sup> Derrida comments are relevant here:

of nature, a true non-believer in transcendence, although he introduced the subject, too, via Descartes' cogito.<sup>30</sup> Hegel's subject lacks sense-certainty and therefore is deprived of a component of consciousness. "Man is Self-Consciousness," thus begins Hegel but repeats Plato.<sup>31</sup> Using the Master-Slave dialectics, Alexander Kojève (1902-1968), Hegel's most authoritative interrogator, argues that only when "Consciousness overcomes itself as Being-for-itself and thereby does itself what the other Consciousness does to it,"<sup>32</sup> therein bringing in the element of *recognition* through "trans-form" liberation,<sup>33</sup>

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"Hegel was already caught up in this game [of onto-ontological difference]. *On the one hand*, he undoubtedly *summed up* the entire history of the logos. He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-proximity of infinity subjectivity."

See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, (tr.) Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> The negation of Hegel's contributions here is consistent with what Descartes himself was tinkering. Descartes introduced two worlds: the universe-physical world and the world of spirit and human consciousness. Hegel seems to be unfamiliar with this objectivity, devoid of human agency, which then was conceived. Between Kant-Hegel-Descartes, the dividing departures are consistent with the observations of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari:

"Descartes created the cogito as concept, but by expelling time as *form of anteriority*, so as to make it a simple mode of succession referring to continuous-creation. Kant reintroduces time into the cogito, but it is a completely different time from that of Platonic anteriority. This is the creation of a concept."

See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (trs.) Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London and New York: Verso, 1994), p. 32.

<sup>31</sup> Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, (ed.) Allan Bloom and (tr.) James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, [1969] 1980), p. 83.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> Hegel's statement on the self-other alterity, which is more of a self-fashioning (through "activity," i.e., *work*), upward mobility empowerment, is found expressed here:

"Work transforms the World and civilizes, educates, Man. The man who wants to work—or who must work—must repress the instinct that drives him 'to consume' 'immediately' the 'raw' object. And the Slave can work for the Master—that is, for another than himself—only by repressing his own desires. Hence, he transcends himself by working—or, perhaps better, he educates himself, he

which, otherwise, illustrates that it is “only the risk of life does it come to light that Self-Consciousness is nothing but pure *Being-for-itself*.”<sup>34</sup> Moreover, Hegel shows no interest or poor formulation on the issues of time.<sup>35</sup> His dialectical strategy in the problematization of ‘Now’ (reality of the present) is twofold:

1. “The Now that *is*, is another Now than the one pointed to.”
2. The Now “contains within it many Nows.”

In the first instance, situating the Now is impossible because the “Now to which one intended to refer would be the Now that was actually occurring.” This can be critiqued with a simple law of physics. Hegel’s second proposition, which attempts to articulate a divisibility and instability of the Now, is nonetheless inconsequential but for a mere privileging on the part of the “observer in determining the temporal sequence of event,” as David Couzens Hoy mentions. By problematizing a “naïve intuition that time is objective and mind independent,” Hegel’s contributions however remain primarily in the establishment of a conception of “time that seems objective and independent [but turning] out to be dependent on subjectivity.”<sup>36</sup> Similarly, though Hegel was simply collaborating Augustinian<sup>37</sup> conception on time and temporality—i.e.,

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‘cultivates’ and ‘sublimates’ his instructs by repressing them. On the other hand, he does not destroy the thing as it is given. He postpones the destruction of the thing by first trans-forming it through work; he prepares it for consumption—that is to say, he ‘forms’ it. In his work, he trans-forms things and trans-forms himself at the same time; he forms things and the World by transforming himself, by educating himself; and he educates himself, he forms himself, by transforming things and the world.”

Ibid. pp. 24-25.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 12.

<sup>35</sup> In the first chapter, “Consciousness,” of his *magnum opus*, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel himself expressed skepticism over the reality of the present.

<sup>36</sup> David Couzens Hoy, *The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 2009), p. 43.

<sup>37</sup> In the Augustinian conception of temporality, to give a Hegelian explanation, the intuition for the now (present time) is absent. Since the now (present) does not occupy any time, there is also no such thing as the now (present). “What, then,” as St. Augustine of Hippo originally asks, “is time?”

“Of these three divisions of time, then, how can two, the past and the future,

that the intuition for present time is absent, or that the present does not occupy any time, and therefore there is no such thing as the present—what is mildly significant to his contribution is the introduction of the presence of a self-fashioning agency.<sup>38</sup> It also problematizes Cartesian capture of temporality where inner experience is seen as the only immediate or instantaneous experience.

On language, it was at Jena where Hegel's most mature description on how language translates into consciousness was formulated; explicated in the *Berlin Enzyklopaedie* (§ 457–64)—the commentary notes for his 1820s lectures. O'Neill Surber comments that the “recent ‘discovery’ of linguistic issues serving as important and fundamental to the philosophical tradition of Kant and the

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be, when the past no longer is and the future is not yet? As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity. If, therefore, the present is time only by reason of the fact that it moves on to become the past, how can we say that even the present is, when the reason why it is is that is is not to be? In other words, we cannot rightly say that time is, except by reason of its impending state of not being.”

See Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, (tr.) R.S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 264.

<sup>38</sup> Hegel's statement on the self-other alterity, which is more of a self-fashioning (through “activity,” i.e., *work*), upward mobility empowerment, is found expressed here:

“Work transforms the World and civilizes, educates, Man. The man who wants to work—or who must work—must repress the instinct that drives him ‘to consume’ ‘immediately’ the ‘raw’ object. And the Slave can work for the Master—that is, for another than himself—only by repressing his own desires. Hence, he transcends himself by working—or, perhaps better, he educates himself, he ‘cultivates’ and ‘sublimates’ his instructs by repressing them. On the other hand, he does not destroy the thing as it is given. He postpones the destruction of the thing by first trans-forming it through work; he prepares it for consumption—that is to say, he ‘forms’ it. In his work, he trans-forms things and trans-forms himself at the same time; he forms things and the World by transforming himself, by educating himself; and he educates himself, he forms himself, by transforming things and the world.”

Hegel, quoted, in Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

German Idealists” has propelled new interests in Hegel, but in a “‘crablike’ fashion”—falling back on his immediate predecessors, which includes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854) and J. G. Fichte (1762-1814); Kant and his immediate successors; Romantics like the Brothers Schlegel and A. F. Bernhardt (1769-1820); the “Metacritics” in J.G. Herder (1744-1803), F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819), and J.G. Hamann (1730-1788); and, more recently, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and W. von Humboldt (1767-1835).<sup>39</sup> Preceding Hegel, the linguistic approach was predominated by three groups: empirical, metacritical, and philosophical. Hegel formulated self-consciousness and language-consciousness (*Identitätssystem*) as natural mediation between Nature and Spirit, by modeling Schelling’s “claim”<sup>40</sup> that language is the Subject-Object paradigmatic. The “inner content” of consciousness (Spirit) “first becomes objective” via *Äusserung* (‘expression’ or ‘externalization’), making language “the first potency of consciousness.”<sup>41</sup> The transitional path taken by the subjectivity of Objective Spirit in to the ultimate Absolute Spirit is mediated through theoretical Psychology where *Vorstellung* (Representation) reconciles Intuition into Thinking, and thinking is externalized through language. Therein, for “external expression” or communication (whether written or spoken) to take place, *Einbildungskraft* (imagination) directly mediates representational images into types of *Zeichen* (sign). Meaning and intuition thereafter are then fixed and stabilized through *Erinnerung* (recollection) and *Gedächtnis* (memory).<sup>42</sup> Hegel’s simplistic and naturalistic explanation on language relies on a theory of language as memory (*Gedächtnis*)—namely, the *Mnemosyne of the ancients*—“through which a people gives itself a *name*,” and consciously gather its *gedacht* (place) too, allowing man to step out of “the sheer undifferentiated flow of space and

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<sup>39</sup> Jere O’Neill Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 1-2.

<sup>40</sup> While acknowledging that Hegel perfected Schelling’s absolute idealism, Whistler however points out that a contrast of their system of philosophy is not an *Aufhebung* but is a *differend*. See Daniel Whistler, *Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 67.

<sup>41</sup> Hegel, quoted. Jere O’Neill Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. pp. 12-13.

time.”<sup>43</sup> “Language,” according to Hegel, is therefore “a supra-individual medium, the form of its memory communal.”<sup>44</sup> Further, Hegel’s *Zeichen* (verbal sign) is simply an “empty placeholder” and therefore the temporality of consciousness is reconciled only by appropriation of spatial-referent mediations, namely the prospective function of language itself or, properly, “speech.”<sup>45</sup>

Differing from Hegel, anti-idealist Immanuel Kant propounded an empirico-realist version on temporality, which locates time as *a priori* to experience. Inserted in the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism” was initially aimed as a rebuttal of George Berkeley’s (1685-1753) subjective realism, by arguing that a synthetic unity of consciousness is primary to any conceivable self-consciousness, but it ultimately ended-up in attacking Descartes too. Whether a mathematical reason is paramount in situating temporality or not—Kant’s empirical thought appears to be guided by such a subjective logic that the determination of time is a both a transcendental and conscious experience and can be propelled only by external influence (matter or a substance of intuition). The “self,” Couzens Hoy remarks, “is both constrained by time and independent of time.”<sup>46</sup> Time therefore has features of the perpetual, a “permanence,”<sup>47</sup> but

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<sup>43</sup> Martin Donougho, “Hegel’s Art of Memory,” in Rebecca Comay and John McCumber (eds.), *Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1999), pp. 139-159, esp. p. 143.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>45</sup> As Alexander Kojève remarks:

“He is conscious of himself, conscious of his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially different from animals, which do not go beyond the level of simple Sentiment of self. Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment when—for the ‘first’ time—he says ‘I’. To understand man by understanding his ‘origin’ is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I revealed by speech.”

Alexander Kojève, “In Place of an Introduction,” in *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, op. cit., esp. p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> David Couzens Hoy, *The Time of Our Lives*, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>47</sup> In *Critique*’s earlier translation, Kant notes:

“This idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is an *à priori* necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently also of

also “nothing abiding” in it, and yet gives cognition to its determinants, but is externally free of the determinable objects.

Kant’s transcendental logic<sup>48</sup> falls within the fold of Aristotelian tradition.<sup>49</sup> And, although Kantian logic is not logic proper or has any bearing with the historical development of formal logic, Kant was chiefly preoccupied with logic<sup>50</sup> during his

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the internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external things.”

See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (tr.) J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: Henry G. Bohn, MDCCCLV), p. 168.

<sup>48</sup> The constituents of unity seen in aesthetics (beautiful as a principle of reason) and the fundamental unity of science in logic are tied to each other closely:

“I call a science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility the transcendental aesthetic. There must therefore be such a science, which constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contrast to that which contains the principles of pure thinking, and is named transcendental logic.”

See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>49</sup> J. Michael Young, in “Translator’s Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, op. cit., p. xv. It is however appropriate to also remind ourselves on how the word “science” was considered during Kant’s contemporary, as Gary Hatfield points out:

“English speakers are familiar with ‘science’ as having the connotation ‘natural science’, and hence as denoting physics, chemistry, biology, and (sometimes) psychology. In the eighteenth century the German word *Wissenschaft*, as well as the French, Latin, Italian, and English cognates for ‘science’, were understood to mean any systematic body of knowledge, usually with the implication that it would be organized around first principles from which the rest of the body of knowledge might be derived (more or less rigorously). Mathematics, and especially Euclid’s geometry, was a model for how ‘scientific’ expositions of knowledge should be organized. Disciplines as diverse as mathematics, metaphysics, and theology were all called ‘sciences’. Hence, it was entirely normal for Kant to speak of metaphysics as a science.”

Gary Hatfield, “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. xxiv.

<sup>50</sup> Kant’s usage of the term “logic,” as Gary Hatfield provides an insightful one, “meant not only general logic, which in his time was syllogistic logic, but also what he called ‘transcendental logic’, in which the cognitive conditions on ‘thinking’ objects are determined. The term ‘to think



pre-Critical years and would persistently continue to do so throughout his latter years.<sup>51</sup> Kant developed and privileged his “transcendental logic”—“since it is restricted to a fixed content, namely, only to pure cognitions *a priori*, [which] cannot imitate general logic in this division.”<sup>52</sup> Consequently, Kant defends the same by saying “that the *transcendental use of reason* is not objectively valid at all, hence does not belong to the *logic of truth*, i.e., to analytic, but rather, as a *logic of illusion*, [which] requires a separate part of the scholastic system, under the name of transcendental *dialectic*.”<sup>53</sup> Ironically, despite the centrality and years of investing in logic, Kant never produced any substantial works on the same except for the posthumous *Logic Lectures*,<sup>54</sup> which were luckily compiled through class notes, especially by his student Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762-1842), often blurring whether the documented works were properly those of the teacher’s or actually edited versions of the student’s! J. Michael Young insists that Kant emphasized the place of logic “only as a canon for the sciences” and “not as

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an object’ is a characteristically Kantian form of expression. Kant used the German *denken* (English ‘to think’) as a transitive verb taking a direct object. This gives the connotation not merely of ‘thinking of an object’, as when we picture an object, such as a favorite chair, to ourselves, but it expresses a conception of this process as an active forming of a mental representation of the chair.” *Ibid.* p. xxiv.

<sup>51</sup> Immediately after defending his *Magister* (Ph.D) dissertation in 1755, Immanuel Kant was offered a Lecturer at University of Königsberg. Starting from his first course in 1755-56 till the Summer Semester of 1796, Kant offered Logic as part of his course, uninterrupted for forty years, which were all well attended. In 1770, he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the Albertus University.

<sup>52</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 171.

<sup>53</sup> Kant, as we saw above, is categorical of his logic enterprise. “General logic,” similarly, for Kant, “contains no precepts at all for the power of judgment... *since it abstracts from all content of cognition*, nothing remains to it expect the business of analytically dividing the mere form of cognition into concepts, judgments, and inferences, ad thereby achieving formal rules for every use of the understanding.”

*Ibid.*, esp. pp. 171-72.

<sup>54</sup> Based on the person in whose possession it was, or who compiled, or where the lecture was delivered, Kant’s Logic Lectures is accordingly named as: Blomberg Logic, Philippi Logic, Vienna Logic, Hechsel Logic, Pölitz Logic, Hoffmann Logic, Dohna-Wundlacken Logic, and Jäsche Logic.

an organon” for the sciences.<sup>55</sup> So, what makes Kant’s Logic so central to our discussion here?

First. Logic, for Kant, is simply a communication vehicle required for coherent articulation, a necessary form of rule to a norm in the cognition or representation processes, with an avowed aspiration for “logical perfections.” In quotidian terms, it is about representational harmony and cardinal equivalence. Kant, therefore, finds logical perfections in “mathematics” and “propositions.”<sup>56</sup> Moreover, Kant’s sacrificial and predatory privileging<sup>57</sup> of logical perfection as the ultimate, illustrated mostly in *The Blomberg Logic*, is also a parallel quest consistent with his search for “aesthetic perfection.”<sup>58</sup> “All the perfections of cognition,” Kant says, are divided into logical and aesthetic conditions:

“1st *aesthetic*, and consist in agreement with subjective laws and conditions.

2nd *logical*, and consist in agreement with objective laws and conditions.

All the *requisita* of these perfections of cognition are:

1. *sensation*[,] how I am affected by the presence of the object.
2. *the power of judgment*.
3. *Mind*[,]
4. *taste*.

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<sup>55</sup> J. Michael Young, in “Translator’s Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, op. cit., p. xix.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 37.

<sup>57</sup> Kant says that “one must let the small perfections go if greater ones are hindered by them. Greater logical perfections must be put ahead of small aesthetic ones, and greater aesthetic perfections, again, ahead of smaller logical ones.” Ibid. pp. 46-47.

<sup>58</sup> Kant argues:

“Logical perfections are ones that are perceived only when one regards the thing distinctly. Aesthetic perfections, however, are ones that are sensed by means of confused concepts.”

Ibid. p. 36.

A cognition agrees with the subject when it gives us much to think about and brings our capacity into play. This requires especially ease, intuition, and this requires *similia*, examples, instances. But sensation has only the 2nd position, intuition the 1st. For we cannot judge by means of sensation, but we can by means of intuition, and just for that reason the former has the lowest position in what has to do with aesthetic perfection, the latter the highest.

With cognition there are two sorts of perfections: (1.) that it agrees with the constitution of the thing.

2nd that it has an effect on our feeling and our taste. The former is a *logical* perfection, the latter an *aesthetic*, but both are formal.”<sup>59</sup>

Therefore, the place of “cognition or representation” in the division between logical and aesthetic perfection, as Kant would continue to elaborate, is defined in its functional and descriptive roles. The logically perfect “teaches us to make representations that conform to the constitution of the thing, which the logic that we now intend to treat does;” whereas the aesthetically perfect “must deal with those representations that have effect on our feeling.”<sup>60</sup> This is Kant’s subjective notion of aesthetic freedom, operating on speculative dialectics.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, by creating hierarchies in unity of perfections, a visible tendency Kant is seemingly notorious by now,<sup>62</sup> and by privileging “intuition” over “sensation”—the sublime or “[l]ogical perfection is [attributed as] the skeleton of our cognitions.”<sup>63</sup>

Second. Kant’s *a priori* argument, which also betrays a complex but paradoxical *sui generis*, can be evaluated on his question of the “transcendental schemata”—

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 30.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 31.

<sup>61</sup> Jacques Taminiaux, *Poetics, Speculation, and Judgment: The Shadow of the Work of Art from Kant to Phenomenology*, (tr.) Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), esp. pp. 69-71. For an attempt to link Kant’s aesthetic freedom to his moral theory, see Jane Kneller, *Kant and the Power of Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>62</sup> For instance, the hierarchies between poetry and philosophy, which is taken up in Chapter 4.

<sup>63</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, op. cit., p. 270.

or “the third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter.”<sup>64</sup> Obviously, here, Kant’s third thing is the question of “time-determination,” which is presented as perpetual<sup>65</sup> and “homogenous,” as a sensibility that function as an “inner sense” for any pure understanding. The temporality Kant describes or arrests therein is not only a product of “imagination” within the fold and process of *schematism*, but also integrally suicidal to the unity of apperception for presenting.<sup>66</sup> “The schema,” says Clayton Bohnet, “is an activity that ‘brings together’ the manifold presented by intuition and the pure concept of the understanding in a relation of *subsumption*. It makes this unity possible, and thus represents the limit conditions of intelligibility. This condition is the transcendental time determination and the power of imagination that makes it possible.”<sup>67</sup> Richard Kearney, while reiterating similar lines,

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<sup>64</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., p. 272.

<sup>65</sup> See, above, footnote number 47.

<sup>66</sup> Kant is explicit about the role of transcendental imagination and time-determination here:

“[t]he *image* is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the *schema* of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure *a priori* imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate. The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something that can never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together *a priori* in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception.”

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., pp. 273-74.

<sup>67</sup> Clayton Bohnet, *Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 105. Italics, mine.

critiques this “poetic productivity of imagination” as appearing “timeless” since it “precedes the chronology of linear time, prefiguring the future in terms of memory and refiguring the past in terms of anticipation.”<sup>68</sup> Kant’s appropriation of the manifold (i.e., nature, experience, and knowledge) into an autonomous singular agency, representing a unity of one consciousness, also strictly negates the temporal succession, given the diversity for any analogies of experiences, thereby making it contradictory.<sup>69</sup> In the “Transcendental Deduction,” Kant discusses how the unity of consciousness can be forged by unifying two polar concepts: a.) analytic unity of apperception and b.) the synthetic unity of apperception, with the former being dependent of the latter.<sup>70</sup> Kant’s concepts of

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<sup>68</sup> Kearney rates Kant’s “transcendental self” or “primordial time” or “imagination” as all “inextricable allies.” Kearney also compares Kant’s schemata to Heidegger’s temporalization: “no *Sein* without *Dasein*; no time without imagination.” *Dasein*, therefore, like imagination, “is the poetics of the possible.” See Richard Kearney, “Surplus Being: From Kant to Heidegger,” in Babette E. Babich (ed.), *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J.* (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 70-86, esp. pp. 85-86.

<sup>69</sup> Obviously the issue of a perpetual temporal succession and the recognition of *a priori* conditions are both two levels of description:

“[T]ime is the *a priori* sensible condition of the possibility of a continuous progress of that which exists to that which follows it, the understanding, by means of the unity of apperception, is the *a priori* condition of the possibility of a continuous determination of all positions for the appearances in this time, through the series of causes and effects, the former of which inevitably draw the existence of the latter after them and thereby make the empirical cognition of temporal relations (universally) valid for all time, thus objectively valid.”

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., p. 316.

<sup>70</sup> Gary Hatfield has given a very lucid and concise explanation on one of Kant’s most important expositions. Below is a full quote:

“Analysis rests on the principle of contradiction, which is a logical principle; in a sense, therefore, logic can tell us all that we need to know about how knowledge resting on such analysis is possible. Synthesis, on the other hand, which provides the basis for the perfection of cognition in mathematics and natural science, has to be treated in a discipline other than logic. That discipline is what Kant eventually came to call *critique*.”

*analysis* and *synthesis* are pertinent to his 'logical turn', if we may term it so, which also heralded the development of a critical theory of knowledge or the philosophy of logic and, dominantly, a departure from the Rationalist, who sees "logic" as the sole provider of cognition.<sup>71</sup> On the subject's role in the apperception process, Kant, similarly, as Bryan Wesley Hall points out, involves two acts: "1.) an analytic act via concepts by which apperception *thinks* itself as an object, and 2.) a synthetic act via intuition by which the subject cognizes itself as an object of sense."<sup>72</sup> Charles Parsons confers that although Kant establishes the possibility of mathematics as conditions of reflective analysis (*ratio cognoscendi* or the order of knowing) in the form of intuition, he was never fully able to reconcile or justify the possibility of experience, with or as a concrete knowledge.<sup>73</sup> The later Kant, observes Hall, as seen in his latter works, exhibits a reversal of his earlier positions: "instead of the synthetic unity of apperception (*dabile*) making possible the analytic unity of apperception (*cogitabile*), it seems as if the analytic unity is making possible the synthetic unity."<sup>74</sup>

On temporality and, of course, the temporal segments between apperception and consciousness, Kant has a limited view. Kant's contemporary, Salomon Maimon

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See introductory note by Hatfield in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, op. cit., pp. xix-xx.

<sup>71</sup> Knowledge is directly based on intuition, as Kant highlights, but the faculty of intuition is of the sensible and not of the intellectual. Kant is therefore clear that a theory of knowledge or things can come about only through this sensible intuition and not from intellection, as the rationalists would claim.

<sup>72</sup> Bryan Wesley Hall, *The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus postumum* (New York and London: Routledge, 2015), p. 187.

<sup>73</sup> Charles Parsons, "Infinity and Kant's Conception of the 'Possibility of Experience'," in Patricia Kitcher (ed.), *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 45-58

<sup>74</sup> Immanuel Kant, moreover, says:

"I am conscious of myself (*apperceptio*). I think, i.e., I am to myself an object of the understanding. However, I am also to myself an object of the *senses* and an empirical intuition (*apprehensio*). The thinkable I (*cogitabile*) posits itself as the sensible (*dabile*) and this *a priori* in space and time which are given *a priori* in intuition and are merely forms of appearance."

Kant, quoted, in Bryan Wesley Hall, *The Post-Critical Kant*, op. cit., p. 187.

(1753-1800) had to—who was forced by Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), one of Kant’s severest critics, to explain the positions he forwarded in *Briefe Philaltheses an Aenesidemus* (1794)—defend Kant’s logic of transcendence, which also serves to clarify many of the misconceptions of Kant’s metaphysics and psychology. In arguing that transcendental philosophy has little to do with speculations on the origins or causes of knowledge and experiences but with the synthetic establishment of an *a priori* knowledge (“the truth conditions of our judgments”)—Maimon rejects Schulze’s claims that transcendental philosophy is a self-defeating project since it does not have a “principle of casuality” to determine the conditions or origins of knowledge.<sup>75</sup> Correspondingly, on psychological language, Maimon does not see Kant, which is similar to Newton’s position, as holding the mind as the source of our knowledge but employing the same as a metaphor or faculty (mental power) for the logical conditions or possibilities of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Maimon’s most difficult defense, which is of interest to us here, as Frederick Beiser points out, is Schulze’s clubbing of the idealisms in both Kant and Berkeley, as indifferent. Although Berkeley and Kant, both, no doubt, deny the “existence of things independent of consciousness,” Maimon restates that what makes them different however is the category of experiences—“subjective” (which are arbitrary and private) and “objective” (which are necessary and universal)—which Berkeley “conflates” whereas Kant “distinguishes,” in their differences.<sup>76</sup> The spatio-temporal relation of the subject’s sensation in response to the noumena in Berkeley is therefore arbitrary and finitely anarchic, whereas in Kant it is fixed and absolute (cognition is *a priori* to space and time and is not reducible to them). Interestingly, Maimon’s spatio-temporal contentions also seriously questions Kant’s inconsistencies. The spatio-temporal antinomies of two identical objects with identical relations to other objects in two different points of space and time, postulated in Kant’s *Critique*, as an absolute identity of the indiscernible contradicts Leibniz principle of sufficient reason (a.k.a., Leibniz’s “that nothing

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<sup>75</sup> Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 321.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* p. 322.

happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise”);<sup>77</sup> for there cannot be any reason for them to be in these different space and time.”<sup>78</sup> Maimon observes that Kant’s incongruence therefore testifies that “space and time act as signs to show that our empirical knowledge is still incomplete.”<sup>79</sup>

Kant was stuck with the view that “time cannot be perceived by itself.”<sup>80</sup> He further believes that “[a]ll appearance are in time... in which all changes of appearance is to be thought, lasts and does not change; since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as a determination of it.”<sup>81</sup> For instance, by clubbing both space and time as *quanta continua*, a magnitude that is “flowing” (or, “elapsing”),<sup>82</sup> Kant contradicts his three *modi* of time, i.e., “persistence,” “succession,” and “simultaneity” (and hence the three rules of all temporal relations of appearance), can be determined only through the basis of its “unity of time,” which “precede all experience and make it possible.”<sup>83</sup> Kant says,

“Our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether this manifold, as object of experience, is simultaneous or

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<sup>77</sup> In *Theodicy*, Leibniz illustrates his foundation of mathematics as based on the “principle of contradiction or identity, that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, and that therefore A is A and cannot be not A.” See “Leibniz’s Second Letter,” in G.W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, (ed. & tr.) Roger Ariew (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 321.

<sup>78</sup> Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, op. cit., pp. 302-03.

<sup>79</sup> Beiser further notes Maimon’s point:

“If there are two apparently identical objects that appear to differ only spatially and temporally, then that means that we have insufficient knowledge of their inner nature and that we ought to extend our inquiry.”

Ibid., p. 303.

<sup>80</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., p. 299.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 299.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p. 292.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. p. 296.



successive, if something does not ground it *which always exists*, i.e., something *lasting* and *persisting*, of which all change and simultaneity are nothing but so many ways (*modi* of time) in which that which persists exists. Only in that which persists, therefore, [is] temporal relations possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time), i.e., that which persists is the *substratum* of the empirical representation of time itself, by which alone all time-determination is possible.”<sup>84</sup>

In reviewing Kant, Peter Strawson mockingly interjects “that anything which can be ascribed to a man as a case or instance of such self-consciousness must be something which occurs in time” and “that it must be a consciousness *of* himself as reasoning or recognizing or thinking something, as intellectually engaged at some point, or over some stretch, of time.”<sup>85</sup> On a lighter vein, Kant is seen by Hammer as a neat Weberian bourgeois, advocating a work ethic for a “life in pursuit of happiness” (and, sure enough, “It is impossible to tell in advance what will make us happy”)—where time has to be “seized upon, conquered, and controlled,” given the conditions of a rather modern and “disenchanted temporality.”<sup>86</sup> It is heartening to note that what emerges from this deadlock, amongst almost every Kantian scholars, then and now, is to fashionably start with Kant’s transcendental idealism and ends up interrogating the “thing-in-itself.”<sup>87</sup> We shall not pretend to be the exception here!

Likewise, what is of interest to us from the above two trajectories—which also reminds us of the “thing-in-itself,” quoted in the epigram—is Kant’s views on reality and his project on “realism,”<sup>88</sup> of accessing *this* reality as the object of

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid. p. 300.

<sup>85</sup> P.F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (London and New York: Routledge, [1966] 2006), p. 248.

<sup>86</sup> Epsen Hammer, *Philosophy and Temporality from Kant to Critical Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 58-66

<sup>87</sup> Gary Dorrien, *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit*, op. cit. p. 23.

<sup>88</sup> Tom Rockmore makes a lists of different realism and identifies the last, i.e., representational realism as closest to a description of his expositions on the thing-in-itself: *metaphysical realism* (“a claim to know the mind-independent real as it is in itself”); *empirical*

knowledge. Insofar we have dealt with Kant's idealism of cognition and his propositions on temporality. To evaluate Kant's perspectives on "representation," and thereon the place of language, it would be incomplete without situating the thing-in-itself.<sup>89</sup> By piecing these ends, we may recapitulate the significance of attempting a mathematico-logical derivative for consciousness and language.

Prior to Kant, highlights Tom Rockmore (b. 1942), the Englishman and materialist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) has already developed a discussion on "the thing itself," in terms of body motions in human psychology. All "conceptions," Hobbes maintains, "originally" emerges from the actions of the thing itself and, from it, "sense" and the "object of sense" is produced. Closely following, John Locke's (1632-1704) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) takes the debate further by integrating the philosophical ramifications with the nature of language, i.e., idea is sense-reflex derived and sense is reflex-computed. Locke's proposal on "things-as-they-are,"<sup>90</sup> more or less blinded by

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*realism* ("the claim to know the world only as it occurs within experience"); *scientific realism* ("that science is the only reliable source of knowledge"); *direct realism* ("asserts [that] the object is known directly as it is, is widely thought to be defeated by problems of illusion and delusion"); *representational realism* ("claims to know are indexed to a categorical framework" and "knowledge consists in correctly inferring from a representation to what it represents"). See Tom Rockmore, "Fichte, German Idealism and the Thing in Itself," in Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds.), *Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism* (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2010), pp. 9-20, esp. pp. 12-13.

<sup>89</sup> Or the "thing," in western tradition, and in recent times via Nietzsche-Freud, also occludes to the metaphysics of the homoerotic and desire. For a differently brief introduction to this tradition, see Mario Perniola, *Sex Appeal of the Inorganic*, (tr.) Massimo Verdicchio (New York; London: Continuum, 2004).

<sup>90</sup> John Locke's proposal merits full quote here:

"if we . . . speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat. . . . 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since

the anti-Platonic stances on rhetoric, seeks to distinguish “simple” against “complex” ideas—but, poor him, he could not even explain why ideas *should be* simple in the first place! A simplistic interpretation of Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” in tandem with the *a priori* principles, would rather mean the possibility of a “mind-independent external world.”<sup>91</sup> Salamon Maimon, Kant’s contemporary, would intervene again, by defending the thing-in-itself and the place of the transcendental subjectivity in experiencing the same—which, earlier, Schulze had mentioned it as an impossible task since it harps on relation with an exhaustive disjunction—by arguing that the transcendental subject is not an entity in the first place and, secondly, the *noumenon* is but a “formal unity of all representations, the necessary condition of having consciousness at all.”<sup>92</sup> Another contemporary, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), who, however, was stiffly opposed to Kant’s critical philosophy as pure subjective idealism, was also critical of the “thing-in-itself,” accounting it as a nihilistic threat to any objective or independently-existing reality: “Without the thing in itself I cannot enter the Kantian philosophy, and with it I cannot remain.”<sup>93</sup> In fact, what we noticed here is that almost all major contemporaries of Kant, initiated by Johann Georg Hamann’s (1730-1788) *Metakritik*<sup>94</sup> and his student J.G. Herder, and

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Rhetorick, that powerful instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation.”

Quoted in Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche on language, Consciousness, and the Body* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 40.

<sup>91</sup> Tom Rockmore, “Fichte, German Idealism and the Thing in Itself,” in Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds.), *Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism*, op. cit., 2010), pp. 9-20, esp. p. 11.

<sup>92</sup> Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, op. cit., p. 322.

<sup>93</sup> Jacobi, quoted, in Tom Rockmore, “Fichte, German Idealism and the Thing in Itself,” in Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds.), *Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism*, op. cit., pp. 9-20, esp. p. 10.

<sup>94</sup> Hamann’s *metakritik* (1783) directly questions Kant’s epistemological philosophy of language:

“...no deduction is necessary to show that language is the original ancestor in the genealogy of the seven sacred functions of logical premises and conclusions. Not only is the entire possibility of thinking founded in language..., but language is also the center of reason’s misunderstanding with itself, in part due to the frequent

including Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel,<sup>95</sup> have unpalatable issues with the “thing-in-itself.” It was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who scathingly attacked the absurdity of Kant’s thing-in-itself (*noumenon*)<sup>96</sup> as *contradictio in adjecto*, for equating the same as unintelligible objects; for the thing-in-itself is

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coincidence of major and minor terms, to its vacuity and abundance of ideal phrases, in part because of the infinite number of verbal figures in respect to syllogistic one.”

Hamann, quoted, in Karl-Otto Apel, “The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of First Philosophy (Towards a Critical Reconstruction of the History of Philosophy in the Light of Language Philosophy,” in Hamann Parret (ed.), *History of Linguistics Thought and Contemporary Linguistics* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), pp. 32-61, esp. p. 44.

In fact, Hamann’s *Metakritik* owes its origin purely to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and, also, as exemplified in Hamann’s letter to Herder of 8 August, 1784: “Reason is Language.” See Oswald Bayer, *A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical Enlightener*, (trs.) Roy A. Harrisville and Mark C. Mattes (Grand Rapids, Michigan; Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, [1988] 2012), p. 155.

<sup>95</sup> Hegel reads Kant’s “thing-in-itself” as “the product of thinking, and precisely the thinking that has gone to the extreme of pure abstraction, the product of the empty ‘I’ that makes its own empty self-identity into its ob-ject.” Of course, Hegel’s objection, as a historical perspective, is however, now, more of a disagreement with the then emerging play with a science of logic (Hegel equates the “thing” as an embracement of God or the spirit). See *Encyclopedia Logic (with the Zusätze)*, (trs.) T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991), p. 87.

<sup>96</sup> Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood have rightly pointed out that “Kant’s use of the term *phenomena* is self-evident, but the meaning of *noumena* is not, since it literally means not ‘things as they are in dependently of appearing to us’ but something more like ‘things as they are understood by pure thought’. Yet Kant appears to deny that the human understanding can comprehend things in the latter way. For this reason, Kant says it is legitimate for us to speak of *noumena* only ‘in a negative sense’, meaning things as they may be in themselves in dependently of our representation of them, but not *noumena* ‘in a positive sense’, which would be things known through pure reason alone. A fundamental point of the *Critique* is to deny that we ever have knowledge of things through pure reason alone, but only by applying the categories to pure or empirical data structured by the forms of intuition.” For our purpose here, *noumenon* is used as an equivalent of “thing-in-itself.” See “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

not possible to experience or is comprehensible within the language system.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the conceptualization of the thing-in-itself as representative of objects (or possible objects of experience) is daringly contradictory to what can be perceived or ascertained as human cognition. Nietzsche's flux ontology on *thinghood*, Hermann Grimm comments, sees the lack of any "dynamic relationships" in the thing-in-itself, since "a thing outside of any relationship is both an impossibility and a contradiction."<sup>98</sup> Claudia Crawford<sup>99</sup> in fact sees the formulation of Nietzsche's theory of language as directly interjected by Schopenhauer's reading of Kant's thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer's attempt to rebuff Kant's logical proofs of the concept of the thing-in-itself through the "will," along with its three predicates, namely, unity, eternity (timelessness), freedom (causelessness), as Nietzsche argues, "all stem from the contradiction to the world of representation."<sup>100</sup> While discrediting Schopenhauer's claim for the *will*, or the unity of the will, as the thing-in-itself, as a *phenomenon*, Nietzsche highlights that its characteristic markers are "completely outside the sphere of knowledge, and which does not remain in accord with the assertion that it is not subject to the most universal form of knowledge, namely, to be object for a subject."<sup>101</sup> Rather, Schopenhauer's "thing in itself," Nietzsche remarks, "demands that something, which can never be an object, nevertheless should be thought of objectively: a path which can only lead to an apparent objectivity, in so far as a completely dark and ungraspable."<sup>102</sup> It simply lacks an explanation onto how the intellect originated, or fails to explain how consciousness of other

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<sup>97</sup> Nietzsche says that the "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for." See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's*, (tr. & ed.) Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990), p. 81.

<sup>98</sup> Ruediger Hermann Grimm, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), pp. 56-57.

<sup>99</sup> Claudia Crawford, *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

<sup>100</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Schopenhauer," pp. 226-232. *Ibid.*, esp. p. 228.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* p. 228.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 229-30.

things emerged, thereby making it a *principium individuationis*—where the law of casualty is shown even before the appearance of the intellect. On a different beat but summing the radicalization of the thing-in-itself as a fantasy organization, a substitution for the real thing, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) sees this tale in line with the “fetish” in western thoughts, i.e., Hegel-Marx-Freud, by interrogating the truth claims:

“[T]he thing itself..., the origin of presence..., what occupies the center function in a system... If the fetish substitutes itself for the thing itself in its manifest presence, in its truth, there should no longer be any fetish as soon as there is truth, the presentation of the thing itself in its essence. According to this minimal conceptual determination, the fetish is opposed to the presence of the thing itself, to truth, signified truth for which the fetish is a substitute signified... Something—the thing—is no longer itself a substitute; there is the nonsubstitute that is what constructs the concept fetish. If there were no thing, the concept fetish would lose its invariant kernel.”<sup>103</sup>

Whereby, the thing-in-itself is also the phrase for the demand of thought, like Herman Melville’s *Bartleby*’ polite but paradoxical and “anaphoric” answer of neither refusing to answer: “I would prefer not to prefer not to,” which both Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942) took keen interest in.<sup>104</sup> In the thing itself is its own erasures, following a certain measure that is neither nihilistic nor affirmative.<sup>105</sup> The thing is the sign, the *langue* (as Saussure refines), language, and concept (which is not necessarily Wittgenstein). Deleuze finds in Alfred Jarry (1873-1907) what Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) failed to

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<sup>103</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, (tr.) John P. Leavey (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p. 209.

<sup>104</sup> Refer “Bartleby; or, The Formula,” in Gilles Deleuze, *Essays: Critical and Clinical*, (trs.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 68-90; and Giorgio Agamben’s “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, (ed. and tr.) Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 243-71.

<sup>105</sup> Phillippe Jaworski’s observation, as noted by Giorgio Agamben. *Ibid.* p. 255.

overcome: “the sign neither designates nor signifies... but shows the thing.”<sup>106</sup> Deleuze goes on to arrange a quantificational equation for sign-thing-language axis: the “limit of language is the Thing in its muteness—vision. The thing is the limit of language, as the sign is the language of the thing... the  $n^{\text{th}}$  power of language.”<sup>107</sup> Whereas, Agamben will confront the “Idea of the thing” as the “thing itself,” thereby rekindling the relation of the “sign” and the “thing” in the locale of a “pure dwelling”—of the “thing” in “language” *per se*.<sup>108</sup> Referring to Mathieu Lindon’s (1955-2001) observation, Deleuze notes that *Bartleby, or The Formula*, is “devastating,” the basis of “indiscernibility or indetermination,”<sup>109</sup> where the “formula ‘disconnect’ words and things, words and actions, but also speech and words—it severs language from all reference, in accordance with *Bartleby*’s absolute vocation, to be *a man without reference*, someone who appears suddenly and then disappears, without reference to himself or anything else.”<sup>110</sup> Reason, then, for *Bartleby*, is “dashed” because it “rests on a *logic of presupposition*” and, instead, he invents “a new logic, a *logic of preference*, which is enough to undermine the presupposition of language as a whole.”<sup>111</sup> For Agamben, on the other hand, the *Bartleby, the Scrivener*, or, “The Formula,” again, is of “potentiality,” is the “extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives; and at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication of this Nothing.”<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays: Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. p. 98.

<sup>108</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, (tr.) Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 76.

<sup>109</sup> It is interesting to note here Badiou’s critique on Deleuze’s attempt to “conjure the double specter of equivocity and the dialectic... by posing that the two parts of the object, the virtual and the actual, cannot in fact be thought of as separate.” The mathematical expression being the key reading, which is apparently derived from Leibniz’s principle of *the indiscernibility of identicals!* See Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, (tr.) Louise Burchill (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 52.

<sup>110</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays: Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. p. 73.

<sup>112</sup> Giorgio Agamben’s “*Bartleby, or On Contingency*,” in *Potentialities*, op. cit., pp. 253-54.

Likewise, Agamben and Deleuze both decimates language through the substance and form of truth in the thing-in-itself, the embodiment of Kant's blind trust is for the *a priori* truth, as compared to Nietzsche, on the other hand—on the origin of language—who reiterates his “instinct” that the “deepest philosophical knowledge lies already prepared in language.”<sup>113</sup> Where Kant took refuge in the transcendental metaphysics of noumenon, Nietzsche's turned to metaphors by subtracting any metaphysics—with both, ironically, seeking the comforts of “intuition” in their own measures! While Kant emphasizes that “representations are embedded in a transcendental aesthetics of space and time,” as Christiana Emden differentiates, Nietzsche goes one step further and “considers concepts to be largely rhetorical, embedded in the predispositions of human physiology.”<sup>114</sup> An intuitive philosopher like Nietzsche does not agree to metaphysical truth as capable of establishing or understanding an objective world. Like Kant, Nietzsche's rejects metaphysics as privileging consciousness, in order to “tranquelize itself against more disturbing unconscious processes,”<sup>115</sup> whereas the former rejects the essence of consciousness in any metaphysical concepts, in order to facilitate the “insistence that empirical individual judgments of real possibility require sensible conditions in addition to logical intelligibility and non-contradictoriness.”<sup>116</sup>

Between Kant and Nietzsche's notion of subjectivity, we therefore see a reversal of the privileged fortitudes of consciousness through the subjugation of who is the subject! Whilst Kant's mediating medium, intuition, realizes concepts that are

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<sup>113</sup> By this (i.e., Nietzsche's statement that “Language is the product of instinct, as with bees—the anthills, etc.”), Edmen interprets it to mean that “the deepest knowledge of philosophy lies already prepared in language before the possibility of conceptuality or reason, and actually determines the eventual shape of these.” See Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche on Language*, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 81.

<sup>115</sup> Alan Bass, *Interpretation and Difference: The Strangeness of Care* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. xi.

<sup>116</sup> “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., pp. 17-18.



*a priori*, through transcendental logic and, therein, necessitating mathematics to not only access consciousness but also define its principles—Nietzsche’s almost raw medium, instinct, arrests metaphors that are intuitive (which, to stress, are not concepts, but are likeable to “unconscious language”), through genealogy and, therefore, negates any mathematical reason. Nietzsche, the true philosopher artist, along with Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898), appears to be having their last laugh:

“The artist does not gaze upon ‘ideas’: he feels pleasure in numerical ratios. All pleasure [depends upon] proportion; displeasure upon disproportion. Concepts constructed according to numbers. Perceptions which exhibit good numerical ratios are beautiful. The man of science *calculates* the numbers of the laws of nature; the artist *gazes* at them. In the one case, conformity to law; in the other, beauty. What the artist gazes upon is something entirely superficial; it is no ‘idea’! The most delicate shell surrounding beautiful numbers.”<sup>117</sup>

Nietzsche’s skeptical comments on the literariness of language are mostly scant in form, but always generous with content. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) upholds the philologist turned philosopher as “the first to connect the philosophical task with a radical reflection upon language.”<sup>118</sup> As early as *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872/1886), reports Sarah Kofman (1934-1994), Nietzsche had sought to clarify the suspicion about “conceptual language of philosophy [as] the most inappropriate to express the ‘truth of the world’, since it is at three removes from it, simply a metaphor for a metaphor”—by claiming, therein, that

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<sup>117</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, (ed. & tr.) Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey and London: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1979), p. 53.

<sup>118</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, [1970] 1994), p. 305. Foucault discovered Nietzsche in 1953 through Maurice Blanchot and Georges Bataille—whose influence runs deep in all his major themes, i.e., language-thought-knowledge—rather than through Louis Althusser and Jean Hyppolite, his teachers. For an authoritative reading, see Michael Mahon, *Foucault’s Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

what we actually claims to know is “only representations of the essence of thing.”<sup>119</sup> Metaphor, which Nietzsche sees it as the “original conception of philosophy and of philosophical ‘style’,” is therefore presented as long repressed by science and philosophy—risking its own status, as Kofman argues, “of being confused with poetry,” since “philosophy is a form of poetry.”<sup>120</sup> By privileging metaphor, which is “the most accurate, the truest, the simplest,” Nietzsche relegates mathematical expressions to be “not a part of the essence of philosophy,” but, rather, an “invention beyond the limits of experience... the continuation of the *mythical drive*.”<sup>121</sup> By also ascribing philosophy as “essentially pictorial,”<sup>122</sup> in harmony with the rules of analogies and possibilities, Nietzsche, similarly, heightens the place of imagination too.

After Kant, it is simply impossible to ignore Nietzsche.<sup>123</sup> Between the 1840s and 1900 Germany’s intellectual scene was radically experiencing what Emdem calls “epistemic transitions”—and Nietzsche could not have possibly ignore the apocalyptic debt of an intellectual tradition. The study of (and, even, on) language (*Sprachforschung*) was predominant. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s comparative and historical linguistics, which is largely informed through Herder-Condillac-Locke, remain influential although he died in 1835. Similarly, both Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) and Franz Bopp (1791-1867), although largely overshadowed by Humboldt, along with the Schlegel brothers, i.e., August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) and Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), were all towering figures, preoccupied with studies on the intersections

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<sup>119</sup> Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, (tr.) Duncan Large (London: Athlone Press, 1993), p. 6.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.* p. 17.

<sup>121</sup> See “Preface” to *The Genealogy of Morals*, in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy & The Genealogy of Morals*, (tr.) Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor Books, 1956), § VIII, p. 157.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> For a crisp and excellent biographical tribute, see Robert Pippin’s “Introduction,” in Robert B. Pippin (ed.), *Introductions to Nietzsche* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)—including the accompanying essays. For a more intensive treatment on the question of language, the following two are helpful: Claudia Crawford, *The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language*, *op. cit.* and Christian J. Emden’s *Nietzsche on Language*, *op. cit.*

of philosophy and language. Nietzsche's own contemporaries are the Marburg School founder Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875), a logicist neo-Kantian; the Dutchman Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), whom Nietzsche stumble upon only in 1865; the "unconscious" philosopher Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), whose reading of Schelling allowed Nietzsche to develop the idea of congruency in thought and language; the German-Swiss philologist Wilhelm Wackernagel (1806-1869) and father of Indo-Europeanist Jacob Wackernagel (1853-1938), who, adopting Herder's organic model of language development and degeneration, largely influenced Nietzsche's basis of metaphors and, who also succeeded Nietzsche at Basel University; and, of course, Nietzsche's own classical philology teacher Georg Curtius (1820-1885), who also exerted influence on culture-language-consciousness debates. Nietzsche, the philosopher of "many masks and many voices," was himself a student of philology.

On the developments of language and consciousness, Nietzsche simplistically concludes that both are inevitably interconnected:

"[C]onscious thinking *takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication*, and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness... go hand in hand... The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being that becomes ever more clearly conscious of himself."<sup>124</sup>

In Nietzsche's "origin of conceptual language," Kofman reiterates that consciousness is in fact "developed under the pressure of the need to communication."<sup>125</sup> Echoing Kofman's consciousness as the product of a metaphorical process, Emdem adds that it is "also the effect of physiological processes and biological predispositions. As such, Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness is based on both conceptual and bodily aspects, on both rhetoric and physiology"—where he "wants not to destroy our notion of self-

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<sup>124</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, (tr.) Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 254.

<sup>125</sup> Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, op. cit., p. 36.

consciousness but to point out its fragile foundations.”<sup>126</sup> Now that is a very sweet thing to say about Nietzsche. Earlier, on 28 May, 1869, delivering the Inaugural Address at Bâle University, Nietzsche’s concluding remark was already charting the “soul of the people” thesis at the age of twenty-four:

“[A]ll philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a philosophical view of things... in which great homogeneous views alone remain.”<sup>127</sup>

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## II

Logic is not interchangeable with mathematics; but that is not the case with its historical development of such analogy.<sup>128</sup> Post-Hegelian interventions on linguistics saw a categorical situation where three schools, i.e., formalism, intuition, and logic, were predominantly informing mathematics. Prior to that, however, logic is an ill-informed conception, but already enjoys considerable status within the field of philosophy, which also implies that the context of logic is far more than what we claim to cover. The Greeks, amongst no competitors, has a word for logic: *logos*. Logos, given its well-documented accounts, can mean

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<sup>126</sup> Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body*, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>127</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche: The First Complete and Authorised English Translation, Volume Three, On the Future of Our Educational Institution, Homer and Classical Philology*, (ed.) Dr. Oscar Levy, (tr.) J.M. Kennedy (Edinburgh and London: T.N. Foulis, 1910), p. 170.

<sup>128</sup> On such note, refer Polya:

“Numbers and figures are not the only objects of mathematics, Mathematics is basically inseparable from logic, and it deals with all objects which may be objects of an exact theory. Numbers and figures are, however, the most usual objects of mathematics, and the mathematician likes to illustrate facts about numbers by properties of figures and facts about figures by properties of numbers. Hence, there are countless aspects of the analogy.”

See George Polya, *Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Volume I of Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 26.

both “reason” (“false reasoning,” in Aristotle)<sup>129</sup> and a question of “speech.”<sup>130</sup> The Hellenistic period interchangeably and dualistically employs both reason and speech as integral to logic. A visible shift came about through the Stoics, particularly on the “scope of logic,” “whose philosophical taxonomy was by far the most complete and systematic of any at the time.”<sup>131</sup> Stoics expanded logic to include the study of language, particularly “rhetoric,” as also propositions (which, we can safely conclude, was initiated through Plato-Aristotle, including the means for determining whether it is true or false, or neither).<sup>132</sup> The eccentric Stoics, in studying the myriad facets of rhetoric as logic (structures, components, and argument’s validity), also stress on the idea of “whether and how we can tell the way the things really are,” which—“in other words, material that for us would fall under epistemology.”<sup>133</sup> Despite the downfall of the Stoics and the rise of the Epicureans, who rejected logic as useless, there is, however, a methodical priority in ascertaining or determining what is “true,” which finds testimonies as early as in both Lucius Annaeus Seneca (B.C.E. 4-56 A.D.) and Sextus Empiricus (160-210 A.D.).

Paramount to the continuity of Greek tradition, continued in the elucidations of Hegel-Kant, is the allure for an exacting science, namely truth—a sorry case where the results are same but the methods differ.<sup>134</sup> Plus, the birth of

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<sup>129</sup> Scott G. Schreiber, *Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

<sup>130</sup> For Aristotle’s approach to logic, see Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle and logical theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

<sup>131</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, (tr. and ed.) Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. xv.

<sup>132</sup> See, also, Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961).

<sup>133</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, op. cit., p. xv.

<sup>134</sup> Commenting on Hegel and Kant, George di Giovanni highlights that for Kant “method is an order which reason seeks indeed to discover in experience out of a need which is typically its own, but which remains nonetheless external to the content of [subjective] experience.” Whereas, for Hegel, he puts “method” as embedded in “the rhythm (*Lebenspuls*) of experience itself”—making it a “category which brings the Logic to an end.” See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

mathematic is not a recent event.<sup>135</sup> If, from Plato and Aristotle onwards, as Mary Tiles<sup>136</sup> informs us, mathematics (inter alia, logos) was the locus and source of “image of reason,” it was the crisis of situating this “reason,” away from the “image,” which marked the Kantian and neo-Kantian departures from Greek mathematics. For Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), who holds the view that language is an “intellectual instinct of reason,”<sup>137</sup> being is prior to language and language is prior to logic. It is the logical formulation that concerns us here.<sup>138</sup> Our objective here however seeks to locate the logic on how the metaphysical linguistic sign is embedded in the ontological question itself. Towards this—our concern is also focused on the logical structure of how the sign is perceived, validated, and used as a functional entity: as a communicative stratagem, as a mediating deduction and, most importantly, how the sign or its system is valued in the very structure of philosophical discourses.

In B.C.E. 385, we are told, forty-five year old Plato opened the ‘Academy’, in Athens. In less than twenty years Plato’s initiative already has a sizeable amount

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Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, (tr. and ed.) George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. liii.

<sup>135</sup> For an authoritative and interesting read, see François Lasserre, *The Birth of Mathematics in the Age of Plato* (Larchmont, N.Y: American Research Council, 1964).

<sup>136</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason*, op. cit.

<sup>137</sup> “Man could not become man except by language,” says Humboldt, “but in order to possess language he needed already to be man.” Humboldt, quoted, in Anna Morpurgo Davies, *History of Linguistics: Vol. IV: Nineteenth Century Linguistics*, (ed.) Giulio Lepschy (London; New York: Longmans, 1998), p. 108 and p. 109.

<sup>138</sup> Already a plethora of studies exist in the direction of validating philosophical discourses through logical-linguistic continuities. See, particularly, Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* (trs.) Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). Also, see Zeno Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1967); Ernst Tugendhat, *Traditional and analytical philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language* (trs.) P.A. Gerner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Eric Gans, *The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1981); Hector-Neri Castañeda, *Thinking, Language, and Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) and Koen DePryck, *Knowledge, Evolution, and Paradox: The Ontology of Language* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

of scholars and students, Aristotle included, attending his Academy from all parts of the Greek world. Plato's Academy divides the disciplines (based on 'syllabus') into two—Physics (which includes Zoology or Botany) and Mathematics (which includes Arithmetic, Astronomy, Harmony, etc.). Plato served his Academy for thirty-eight years till his death in B.C.E. 347 and, also, exhaustively produced works of mathematical interest: *Meno* (B.C.E. 380), *Republic* (written between B.C. E. 375-370 and a book which privileges mathematic instructions), *Statesman* (B.C.E. 360.), and *Laws* (Plato's uncompleted work). The importance given by the Academy on mathematics is often attributed to Plato's meeting with the mathematician Archytas (of Tarentum) at Sicily, around B.C.E. 387 or 386, who was a quadrivium part of Pythagoras' Magna Graecia schools. Amazed that Plato's Academy provides "so much importance ... to mathematics, and in particular to the such difficult disciplines as geometry and astronomy," the visiting rhetorician Isocrates, in his *Antidosis* (B.C.E. 355), expresses recognition and wonderment over the Academy's "incomparable exercise for the powers of reasoning."<sup>139</sup> Based on Eudemus's account, Reviel Netz attributes Hippocrates (B.C.E. 460-370) as probably "the earliest mathematical author" and, by the middle of the fifth-century, mathematics was already employed as a "scientific activity."<sup>140</sup>

Two kinds of arithmetic dominated the Greeks—one is the 'given number' associated with trade and the other is number that existed independently.<sup>141</sup> Inasmuch, two kinds of geometry exist too—the concrete and purpose oriented geometry, and the philosophical geometry. There was however no neutrality in this distinction, especially when it comes to measures and accuracy.<sup>142</sup> For instance, Plato talks about the double character of mathematics when a morality

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<sup>139</sup> François Lasserre, *The Birth of Mathematics*, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

<sup>140</sup> Reviel Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: As Study in Cognitive History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1999] 2004), p. 275.

<sup>141</sup> See esp. Book VII, 525a-e. Our reference here uses Allan Bloom's second edition of *The Republic of Plato*, (tr.) Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), esp. pp. 204-205.

<sup>142</sup> Entry under Book VII 525A of James Adam (ed.), *The Republic of Plato, Volume II, Books VI-X and Indexes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1902] 1980), p. 114.

was woven into its truth—the “boundary between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or, more accurately, ‘better’ and ‘worse’ mathematics.”<sup>143</sup> Similarly, deductions<sup>144</sup> or, rather, the deductive logic of syllogistic argument, in Greek mathematics, highlights Reviel Netz, employs both the lettered diagram and a mathematical language as its lexicon, which is “object-centered.”<sup>145</sup> Therefore “Greek mathematical lexicon is strange,” as Netz further notes, “marking mathematics strongly.”<sup>146</sup> The mathematical form caters to the “literate elite,” and therefore the ruling class, who knows the “arts of calculation and number,”<sup>147</sup> allying oral form of persuasion with numbers—but, at the same time, as Netz points out, is also “regimented and formulaic,” in order to reflect its compatibility with its other origin of style, i.e., the written.<sup>148</sup> Serafina Cuomo also collaborates that the Greeks were actively using Mathematics, as in Geometry, for “practical tasks” and in “political sphere,” i.e., in establishing and maintaining a “general notion of order and regularity.”<sup>149</sup> Mathematics was very much a “public activity”: “it was played out in front of an audience, and it fulfilled functions that were significant at a communal level, be they counting revenues, measuring out land or exploring the limits of persuasive speech.”<sup>150</sup> This modality is best captured in Aristotle’s axiom that people hear only what they want or expect to hear:

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<sup>143</sup> Serafina Cuomo, *Ancient Mathematics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 43.

<sup>144</sup> James Adam maintains that the mathematical numbers in question are not “Ideas” (but “half-way house between sensibles [sic] and Ideas, and for this reason valuable to Dialectic.”). Refer Book VII, 525D of James Adam (ed.), *The Republic of Plato, Volume II, Books VI-X and Indexes*, op. cit., p. 114.

<sup>145</sup> Netz describes that Greek mathematics “is not about circles, lines, etc., i.e. about general objects and their properties, but about concrete object, individuated through the article and the letters and spatially organised through the prepositions.” See Reviel Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction of Greek Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. p. 106.

<sup>147</sup> *The Republic of Plato*, Allan Bloom (tr.), op. cit., esp. pp. 204-205.

<sup>148</sup> Reviel Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 311.

<sup>149</sup> Serafina Cuomo, *Ancient Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p. 39.



“The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits; for we demand the language we are accustomed to... *Some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically*, others unless he gives instances, while others expect him to cite a poet as witness. And some want to have everything done accurately, while others are annoyed by accuracy... Therefore one must be already trained to know how to take each sort of argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge, and neither is easy to get.”<sup>151</sup>

And, besides the point, Aristotle succinctly highlights that the “minute accuracy of mathematics is not to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter. Therefore its method is not that of natural science.”<sup>152</sup> In establishing the metaphysical properties of mathematics, Aristotle deconstructs and sets apart a series of conundrums for his contemporaries.<sup>153</sup> It is therefore appropriate to put Aristotle’s wisdom (*sophia*) in perspective, i.e., “the science of substance must be of the nature of wisdom,”<sup>154</sup> which requires two components: i) explanation and justifications (*episteme*) and ii) intuitive ability to comprehend (*nous*) the first. Aristotle’s mathematical proposition, Mary Tiles (b. 1946) informs us, requires that “the function of a proof of a proposition is then to give an explanation [*episteme*] of *why* it *must* be true. It is presumed that it may very well be known *that* the proposition in question is true before proof is provided.”<sup>155</sup> Here, the process of discovery, for Aristotle and also for Euclid of Alexandria, is differentiated and separated from the process of proof. A sample of

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<sup>151</sup> Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 995a, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume Two*, (ed.) Jonathan Barnes (Princeton; Chichester: Princeton University Press [1984] 1995), p. 1572. Italics, mine.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p. 1572.

<sup>153</sup> Mostly taken up in Book III (B) of *Metaphysics*, it includes questioning the unity principle of substance ontology in Pythagoras-Plato; the naturalist turn in Empedocles, who relegates “love” as a metaphysical “substratum”; the Sophists’ (particularly Aristippus) ridicule of mathematics; the doctrine of nothingness by Zeno (of Ela), which presupposes if unity-itself is indivisible; and, among others, Parmenides’ thesis on the One.

<sup>154</sup> Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 996b, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, op. cit., p. 1574.

<sup>155</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason*, op. cit., p. 9.

Euclidean *Elements of Geometry* therein follows the following structure: *protasis* (enunciation); *ekthesis* (setting out); *diorismos* (definition of goal); *kataskeuê* (construction); *apodeixis* (proof); and *sumperasma* (conclusion).<sup>156</sup>

Significant to our discussion of the Greeks, although numbers were known to exist much earlier—apart from the historical evidence that antecedents on inquiries in Mathematics flourished amongst the Egyptians or Mesopotamians—the privileging of Mathematics in Greek antiquity lies in methodology; the considerations of moving beyond “specific exercises with verification of the result”—by supplanting it with a “justification of the method employed,” in its “quest for general propositions which could be proved in such a way as to be objectively persuasive.”<sup>157</sup> The techniques on the art of calculations, known in the field of mathematics as “analysis,” emerged only in the seventeenth-century. Till Newton, as a passing remark, as David Sepkoski highlights, it is remindful to note that “mathematics *was* philosophy.”<sup>158</sup> Paolo Mansocu (b. 1960) highlights that “during the seventeenth century the mathematical method—either in its analytic or in its synthetic form—represented for many authors a guarantee of clarity and order in the development of a discipline.”<sup>159</sup> Sepkoski also reiterates the same in stating that by the sixteenth and seventeenth century, mathematics came to be relied for its “predictive accuracy and explanatory power” and for the strong believe that “mathematics expressed an underlying truth about the natural world that the universe *is*, in some real sense, mathematical.”<sup>160</sup> Prominent amongst them will be René Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), and the ‘epoch-making discoveries’ of Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716). The seventeenth century seeks new objective knowledge by seeking the

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<sup>156</sup> Reviel Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics*, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

<sup>157</sup> Serafina Cuomo, *Ancient Mathematics*, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

<sup>158</sup> David Sepkoski, *Nominalism and Constructivism in Seventeenth-Century Mathematical Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 2.

<sup>159</sup> Paolo Mancosu, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 3.

<sup>160</sup> David Sepkoski, *Nominalism and Constructivism*, op. cit., p. 1.

relations between ideas (innate, or experience) and the mind (i.e., personal). Thereon, modeled on Galileo Galilei's (1564-1642) mathematization of mechanics, "mathematics" became a "type of approach."<sup>161</sup> Philosophy, for Galileo Galilei, is written in the "language of mathematics" and mathematics is seen as a "language of nature."<sup>162</sup> Following Galilei, we have numerous and influential contemporaries/successors in the likes of the mathematical structure propounded in Spinoza's *Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata*; or, the theory of demonstration in Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and, later on, in Bernard Bolzano (1791-1848); or the contest for "proofs" between Kant and Bolzano; the "paradoxes of the infinite," or Bonaventura Cavalieri's (1598-1647) "geometry of indivisibles"; or the "geometry of infinites" (Evangelista Torricelli [1608-1647]); or Leibniz's "differential calculus" to the "differential techniques" forwarded by the Paris Academy of Sciences, where Pierre Varignon (1654-1722), Gottfried Leibniz, Michel Rolle (1652-1719), etc. were members; or Paul Guldin's (1577-1643), the Swiss Jesuit mathematician, attempt to formulate a mathematics without proof (by contradiction). Overall, the processes during this period saw the algebraization of mathematics (and, subsequently, the "arithmetization of analysis"), which Mary Tiles conclusively points out as the most definitive departure from the Greeks, which is best illustrated in the form of the birth of algebra ("axioms").<sup>163</sup> Whereas, taking a specific trend in the "epistemology of mathematization," Sepkoski notes that this movement "is fundamentally linked to the epistemology of language. ...[M]athematization was a larger discussion about the nature of linguistic and mental representation."<sup>164</sup> Concurrently, it brings forth the questions of what was the philosophical basis of language? How 'natural philosophers justified claims about knowledge of the physical world'? For now, post-Greek, let us restrict ourselves to the various highs in the movements and developments of mathematics, which can be thus situated under the following chronological order:

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<sup>161</sup> Paolo Mancosu, *Philosophy of Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>162</sup> David Sepkoski, *Nominalism and Constructivism*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>163</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason*, op. cit., esp. pp. 13-15.

<sup>164</sup> David Sepkoski, *Nominalism and Constructivism*, op. cit., p. 3.

Non-Euclidean Geometry  
 Transcendental Deduction  
 Transcendental Reasoning  
 Mathematical Intuitionists  
 Mathematical Epistemology  
 Kant: Mathematics Physics  
 Mathematical Structuralism (German mathematics of 1920s-30s)

As mentioned earlier, the dual linkages between reason and mathematics was something pertinent in ancient Greek thoughts. Mary Tiles also highlights that there was a faulty approach within this tradition—given the fact that the discovery of Archimedes' (B.C.E. 287-211) treatise on *method*<sup>165</sup> by the Danish philologist and historian Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1854-1928) appeared only in 1906, something which Descartes is totally incapable of being aware of (and the latter includes “motion” [mechanics] as part of the geometrical concept) —and for which Descartes had earlier and erroneously concluded “discursive reasoning to a sequence of intuitions.”<sup>166</sup> Reason therefore acquires the task of an intuitive faculty. Reason therein came to be employed as a “method of discovery” or knowledge.<sup>167</sup> “Reason,” Tiles argues, “is thus a source of

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<sup>165</sup> Archimedes' method proposes methods to measure volumes and areas of solids and geometric shapes: “Any segment of a right angled cone (i.e., a parabola) is four-thirds of the triangle which has the same base and equal height.” See Archimedes, *The Method of Archimedes Recently Discovered by Heiberg: A Supplement of the Works of Archimedes, 1897*, (ed.) T.L. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), p. 14.

<sup>166</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason*, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>167</sup> Although we take up Derrida in the next chapter, it is worthwhile to look at his sweeping statement on Reason:

“Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason.”

Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 207-71, esp. p. 213.

enlightenment, a means of transcending the purely experiential, empirical perspective. In neither case was the natural order of understanding presumed to be *merely* the order of the human mind. ... Reason being that God in every man is guaranteed as a source of divinely objective (transcendent) knowledge.”<sup>168</sup> Here, one should take note, experience gives rise to perception.

Following the tradition, it is therefore not a surprise that both the Empiricists (who stress on reason and the *a priori*) and the Rationalists (who stands with experience and the *a posteriori*) uniformly reject deductions (or, Aristotelian logic) in the acquisition of knowledge—while commonly subscribing to knowledge as “a matter of relation of ideas.”<sup>169</sup> It is also not confounding to justify the ideality of the source—for, whereas the “empiricist is obliged to separate deductive reasoning and justification from the process of discovery and the acquisition of ideas,” the “rationalist wishes to unite them.”<sup>170</sup> The deductive validation of “proof,”<sup>171</sup> to summarize the Rationalists position, is consistent to a rationally compelling argument. However, Empiricists like Locke and David Hume (1711-1776), while rejecting the Rationalists, treats all mathematics (“demonstrative reasonings”) as a fundamental issue related to ideas, i.e., as habits of the “mind,” or as expectations, which can be only developed rather than accrued from any other previous dispensation of knowledge.<sup>172</sup> There was a sort of conversation between them, despite their differences either in methods or sources—something that is almost absent in recent times.<sup>173</sup> For instance, Locke published *Essays Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) and Leibniz

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<sup>168</sup> Mary Tiles, *Mathematics and the Image of Reason*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. p. 23.

<sup>171</sup> Judith V. Grabiner, “Why Proof? A Historian’s Perspective,” in Gila Hanna and Michael de Villiers (eds.), *Proof and Proving in Mathematics Education* (Dordrecht; Heidelberg; London; New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 147-168.

<sup>172</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed.) L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1748] [1888] 1960).

<sup>173</sup> Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007). See, below, footnote 270.

responded with *New Essays on the Understanding* (1704). Similarly, Descartes, who solely grounds his physics on matter (through the nature of “wax”) through self-knowledge, is Thomist-informed in his necessity of divine will, without referring to classical texts or experiential information, unlike his principal interrogator, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), whose nominalist-informed contingency of divine will, who differs, although both agreed on the human essence of *res cognitans* and mediated on Aristotle’s physics, thereby bringing disparate theological assumptions into natural and mechanical philosophies.<sup>174</sup> Despite these deeply heterogenous schools, as Lee Braver sums up, Kant’s greatest accomplishment remains in *reconciling* them: by incorporating “the empiricist dependence on experience into the rationalist ideal of universal and necessary knowledge.”<sup>175</sup> Apart from the epistemological groundings, Michael Detlefsen too, contrastingly, attributes Kant’s conception of space as pivotal to 1820s discoveries of non-Euclidean geometries, or nineteenth-century developments in logic, or even the “main currents of twentieth-century philosophy of mathematics.”<sup>176</sup> Having situated in perspective how our survey began with Kant, let us now turn to Edmund Husserl to shed the divergent and yet twin convergence of logic and phenomenology.

Although Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was attributed as the father/pioneer of phenomenology, he was nonetheless treated as “one of the most important

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<sup>174</sup> Margaret J. Osler, *Divine will and the mechanical philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on contingency and necessity in the created world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>175</sup> Braver further asserts: Kant, “[a]t one stroke... authenticated empirical science as genuine knowledge and placed traditional metaphysics beyond our ken, combining rationalism’s ambition to attain genuine Truth which empiricism’s insistence on humbly admitting our limitations into a single remarkable system which seems to flow naturally from this idea.” See Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World*, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>176</sup> Michael Detlefsen, “Philosophy of mathematics in the twentieth century,” in Stuart G. Shanker (ed.), *Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit., pp. 50-123.

philosophers of logic of his own time.”<sup>177</sup> Such ceremonial distinction is however unimportant for the course of the study here, but it undeniably highlights a close reading of continuity and diversity in the history of philosophy. Immanuel Kant, of course, was still an inconvenience for Husserl, too, amongst many others. Plus, developments in logic’s quantification and the formulation of a theory of description are inevitably posing threats to Husserl’s thoughts. Language and conceptual logic, crudely gathered from mathematical and logical derivatives, were imprinting a fashionable direction in analytical philosophy. It is, therefore, not without tension that Husserl’s moorings on phenomenology are distinctively integrative and interpretative—almost cleverly verging on a topology of delineating the essence of cognition/being and re-tasking the very object of such cognition. What is spectacular in Husserl’s attempt, and central to our study, is the unhesitant statement on time-space problem in consciousness, which remains enigmatic throughout in Kant. Husserl’s *Idea of Phenomenology* outlined (although crisply) most of the definitions on temporality:

“The original object of time constitutes itself in perception and the retention that belongs to it. Only in such a consciousness can time be given. Thus the universal constitutes itself in a consciousness of universality that is built upon perception or imagination, and in imagination as well as in perception it constitutes itself by disregarding the positing of the existence of the intuitive content in the sense of singular essence.”<sup>178</sup>

Marking a departure from Kant, Husserl, through the exposition of time, categorically differentiates between Kantian psychology and the *a priori* structures of consciousness. As Couzens Hoy shows: “a.) Whether experienced temporality or objective time (clock time?) comes first? b.) How can there be one time if everybody has different temporalities? c.) Whether temporality can be

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<sup>177</sup> Leila Haaparanta, “The Relations between Logic and Philosophy, 1874–1931,” in Leila Haaparanta, *The Development of Modern Logic* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 223.

<sup>178</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology* (tr.) Lee Hardy (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 52.

said to flow? If so, in what direction? What happens to the present, which is always there even though the content is different?"<sup>179</sup> Husserl's significant contribution on temporality lies on his distinguishing and categorizing between 'time' as the *noematic* or objective correlate and 'temporality' as the *noetic* correlate (i.e., consciousness or experience).<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, Husserlian temporality is a three-layered phenomenon: "primal impression," "protention," and "retention." These categorizations gave important impetus on two issues: the issue of memory in 'retention' (the role of 'imagination' and 'remembrance') and the creative play of inter-subjectivity,<sup>181</sup> which is very pronounced in Husserl:

"I can at any time/bring into play and continue in a certain synthetic style, whether or not I am at present actually experiencing objects belonging to the realm in question. It signifies furthermore that other modes of consciousness corresponding to them vague intendings and the like exist as possibilities for me, and also that these other modes of consciousness have

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<sup>179</sup> David Couzens Hoy, *The Time of Our Lives*, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>180</sup> A note of caution and distinction is still relevant, as Couzens Hoy, too, takes precautionary note in similar vein:

"To avoid ambiguous references to 'time,' where whether one is talking about universal time or human time is unclear, let me stipulate provisionally a conceptual distinction between the terms 'time' and 'temporality'. The term 'time' can be used to refer to universal time, clock time, or objective time. In contrast, 'temporality' is time insofar as it manifests itself in human existence."

Ibid. p. xiii.

<sup>181</sup> On the issue of transcendental solipsism, Warren argues that Husserl's interrogation of inter-subjectivity is "minimally acknowledged," that the "inter-subjective identity of the thing (as a "spiritual" [geistig] and cultural object) refers to a higher-order constitution based on the primary constitutional accomplishment of perceptual experience." Similarly, Husserl's early lectures, which include *Cartesian Meditations*, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *First Philosophy*, address the problem of inter-subjectivity without a 'robust formulation' subscribing to transcendental phenomenology and, latter, through *Ideen*, which presents the framework of transcendental phenomenology without a robust formulation of inter-subjectivity. See Nicolas de Warren, *Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 212.



possibilities of becoming fulfilled or disappointed by experiences of predelineated types. This involves a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a certain genesis in conformity with eidetic laws.”<sup>182</sup>

In situating the experience of temporality, by unifying *something* logical (concepts) and *something* nonlogical (intuition), Husserl introduces us to the more complex issue of “intentionality” (which, simply, means consciousness of *something*)—using his favored example of intentional object as a temporal object (in relation to melody/tone)—and his explanation of ‘duration’:

“... we must distinguish between, on the one hand, what is objective, what is and was, what endures and changes, and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of the present and the past, the phenomenon of duration and change, which is at times a now, and in whose profiles, which it contains, and in the constant alteration it undergoes, brings temporal being to appearance, to presentation. The object is not a real [reelles] part of the phenomenon—in its temporality it has something that cannot be found in or resolved into the phenomenon even though it constitutes itself within the phenomenon. It presents itself in the phenomenon, and in the phenomenon it is given with evidence as ‘existing’.”<sup>183</sup>

Amongst the subversive outcomes that emerged from the development of phenomenological studies is the contribution to a theory of representation, impacting all pluralities of constricted subjectivities. A theory of representation therein attempts to not only reduce its political signifier and therefore a philosophically immanent identity, but is also caught in a tautological inhibition to overload this very phenomenological problematic. It is towards this that a segmented feature in human sciences developed a rather sophisticated understanding of, and explanation thereof, for exterminating and annihilating the very premise for which temporality, even after its segregation from

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<sup>182</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, (tr.) Dorion Cairns (The Hague; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1960), p. 76.

<sup>183</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, op. cit., p. 49.

spatiality, or from re-presentation itself *per se*, exists and expounds, through its own dismantling of concepts, its own effacement of historicity. By breathing fresh whiff of temporality into the life of consciousness, Husserl immediately rearticulated the absolutist and prosaic fixation on “an idea of time” in Kantian psychology.<sup>184</sup> By presencing a memory-based temporality<sup>185</sup> and eidetic consciousness, Husserl reconstituted an intuition that vibrantly liberates imagination. And, decidedly satisfied but still drugged by Kantian scientific temper, Husserl routinely names his “wholly new point of departure”<sup>186</sup> as *phenomenology*:

“Phenomenology: this term designates a science, a complex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and above all a method and an attitude of thought: the specifically *philosophical attitude of thought*, the *specifically philosophical method*.”<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> In *Meditations*, Husserl reminds us:

“We are reminded here of the long-familiar problems concerning the psychological origin of the ‘idea of space’, the ‘idea of time’, the ‘idea of a physical thing’, and so forth. In phenomenology such problems present themselves as transcendental and, naturally, as problems of intentionality, which have their particular places among the problems of a universal genesis.”

Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>185</sup> “Memory,” declares Husserl, “is not a simple matter. From the very start it offers different forms of objectivity and givenness, all interwoven with each other. Thus one could refer to the so-called primary memory, to the retention that is necessarily bound up with every perception. The experience that we are now undergoing becomes objective for us in immediate reflection, and in this experience the same object continues to present itself: the same tone, which has just existed as an actual now, remains the same tone from that point on, and now moving back into the past and thus constituting the same objective point in time.” See Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>186</sup> Husserl, one reminds us here, while maintaining a cautious awareness of the positivist influence on mathematics and mathematical natural science from seventeenth century, still chooses to remain undecidedly faithful to the traditional need for “logical procedures,” in his search for the possibility of knowledge. Ibid. p. 20.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid. p. 19.

Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger, early on, in his 1920 Freiburg Lectures, would develop a skeptical view of the designated science, which is much less irrelevant here. Relevant here, however, is Heidegger's clubbing together of Husserl and Paul Gerhard Natorp (1854-1924)—who was a great influence on Husserl<sup>188</sup> and had earlier denied any pattern of temporality in consciousness—over the former's conception of “primordial phenomenological time,” which anchors an “ultimate time of consciousness” (*Bewußtseinszeit*). Heidegger finds it to be distastefully atypical “(eidetic) complex of lived experience,” which generalizes “a specific sense of order” from various lived experiences.<sup>189</sup> Heidegger's ontologico-linguistic turn brought about a totally new perspective on language and temporality. His ontological turn is attributed to an attempt to deconstruct metaphysics of presence, which Jacques Derrida in turn took up vigorously, by narrowing onto ontological differences. Joseph Kockelmans locates Heidegger's “ontological turn” between 1929 and 1935.<sup>190</sup> Herman Rapaport however finds that Heidegger himself appears to have abandoned this “turn,” since the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935/1953) has already “transposed the work of transcendence into a discourse about the language of metaphysics—polemos—which comprised an aboriginal conflict wherein differences were affirmed even as the binding together that is logos was achieved.”<sup>191</sup> Rapaport, citing Thomas Sheehan, further informs that

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<sup>188</sup> Between 1895 and 1899, Paul Gerhard Natorp was the main reviewer of German writings on logic, whose positions are contagious to the development of Husserl's early ventures on mathematics and logic. For Husserl's early works, see Edmund Husserl, *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, (tr.) Dallas Willard Hardy (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, 1994).

<sup>189</sup> Heidegger observes that “the ultimate time of consciousness (*Bewußtseinszeit*) is a classification into an order complex in which the lived experiences belong to an ‘I’ that forms the unity of the complex of lived experience.” See Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation*, (tr.) Tracy Colony (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 116.

<sup>190</sup> Joseph J. Kockelmans, *On Heidegger and Language* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, [1972] 1986).

<sup>191</sup> Herman Rapaport, *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language* (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 13.

Heideggerian ontological turn had also seeped in through *Being and Time*, where Heidegger talks about “mentology”:

“The temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around [*Kehre*], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent overturning [*umschlag*]. Here the turn-around [*Kehre*] is carried out, and it is turned over into the mentology.”<sup>192</sup>

One recalls, language, for Husserl, is “the form of logical predication,” rule-governed by a “pure logical grammar” to express “meanings in predicative form.”<sup>193</sup> The mode of language in articulate expressivity also does not have a unity of referent as “statements are in either case possible which differ in meaning while referring to the same object.”<sup>194</sup> Husserl’s phenomenology of language,<sup>195</sup> formulated on ‘pure logic’ of the ‘sign’—“between expression and meaning as ideal entities”—forms an attempt to critique western metaphysics of re-presentation:

“...the hypothesis whose conceptual content can appear as the same intentional unity in many possible thought-experiences, and which evidently stands before us in its unity and identity in the objectively-ideal treatment characteristic of all thinking.”<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (tr.) Michael Heim (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 158

<sup>193</sup> Translator’s “Preface,” in Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, (tr.) David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. xxxiii.

<sup>194</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, (tr.) J. N. Findlay (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 115.

<sup>195</sup> James Mensch, “Derrida-Husserl: Towards a Phenomenology of Language,” in Burt Hopkins & Steven Crowell (eds.), *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Seattle: Noesis Press, Ltd., 2001), pp. 1-66.

<sup>196</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, op. cit., p. 113.

From a phenomenological perspective, what is however pertinent here, aside from the redundant and reductionist delineation of thinking language through mathematics solely as object-subject, there is also an ontological inadequacy in addressing being's "intentionality" and "appearing" (the eidetic 'consciousness'),<sup>197</sup> which establishes the subject's temporality and historicity of structures. Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) reviews Husserl's *act of ideation*, where the "factual sciences depend on the eidetic sciences," as dependent on "logic."<sup>198</sup> "The task of the study of eidetic relations between forms is the task of *formal ontology*," Levinas observes, and formal ontology is but "pure logic." What Husserl achieved was to identify pure logic "with a *mathesis universalis* and understood science a science of forms,"<sup>199</sup> therein rating him poorly as still remaining committed to Cartesian *cogito*. Jacques Derrida's critique on Husserl's idealization of a "mathematical object" comes from its topologically structured historicity of metaphysics.<sup>200</sup>

A Fregean logic informed debate on Husserl,<sup>201</sup> on the other hand, is guided more by a methodological orientation—"model-theoretical" vs. "logic-as-calculus"

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<sup>197</sup> Zahavi argues that Heidegger "persisting" emphasized Husserl's inability to effect the conceptualization of "the cardinal difference between reality and consciousness" because "this difference amounts to an ontological difference." See Dan Zahavi, "Inner (Time-)Consciousness," in Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi (eds.), *On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time* (Dordrecht; Heidelberg; London; New York: Springer, 2010), pp. 319-339.

<sup>198</sup> Emanuel Levinas, *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, (trs. and eds.) Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 7.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. p. 8.

<sup>200</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, (tr.) John P. Leavey (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska, 1989).

<sup>201</sup> Husserl's distinction between objects of expression and their meanings is seen as influenced by Frege, as J.N. Mohanty, quoting Hubert Dreyfus, pointed out in 1975:

"Husserl simply accepted and applied Frege's distinctions... the only change Husserl made in Frege's analysis was 'terminological'. Now, if Husserl's review of Schröder already contains that distinction, then is surely antedates the publication

view—to the extent of being severe about the “correct method for doing philosophy.”<sup>202</sup> This also confirms a crisis that is also intricate to contemporary studies on logic: the search for “a mathematical concept of unity.”<sup>203</sup> Marina claims that the “method” in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction “itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus.”<sup>204</sup> Although phenomenology and analytic philosophy were conceived around the same time (1903<sup>205</sup> as a marker?), with its purpose of surmounting the same historical problem of subjectivity and consciousness, there was a rapid growth of discord inclined to a “growing crisis about how to characterize the proper methods and role of philosophy, given the increasing success and separation of the natural sciences.”<sup>206</sup> On methodological issues, definitely there

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of Frege’s celebrated chapter ‘Über Sinn and Bedeutung’ of 1892, and Husserl must have arrived at it independently of Frege.”

See J.N. Mohanty, “Husserl and Frege: A New Look,” in J.N. Mohanty (ed.), *Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 22-32, p. 23.

<sup>202</sup> See Mirja Hartimo, “Logic as a Universal Medium or Logic as a Calculus? Husserl and the Presuppositions of “the Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth Century Philosophy,” in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, 2006, pp. 569-580.

<sup>203</sup> Burt C Hopkins, *The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics: Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 2011), p. 8.

<sup>204</sup> Banchetti-Robino Marina, “Husserl’s theory of language as calculus ratiocinator,” in *Synthese*, Vol. 112, No. 3, 1997, pp. 303-321.

<sup>205</sup> Michel Dummett, an authority between the history of divergence between analytic and continental philosophies, notes:

“Frege was the grandfather of analytic philosophy, Husserl was the founder of phenomenological school, two radically different philosophical movements. In 1903, say, how would they have appeared to any German student of philosophy who knew the work of both?”

Andreas Vrahimis, *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 42.

<sup>206</sup> Amie L. Thomasson, “Conceptual analysis in phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy,” in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology: Transforming the Tradition* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 270-84.

is no doubt in the influence of source. The Husserl's papers—"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" (1935) and "The Origin of Geometry as an Intentional-Historical Problem" (1936)—as Burt Hopkins highlights, were originally intended for a "radical 'historical reflection' on the Galilean origin of modern physics and the Greek origin of the geometry Galileo employed."<sup>207</sup> As a direct response to Husserl's two essays, Jacob Klein published "Phenomenology and the History of Science" (1940), which serves a gentle reminder on the problems in trying to "geometrize nature."<sup>208</sup> Klein's foray on Greek mathematics and origin of algebra actually preceded Husserl, which Hopkins remarks, "represents an uncanny anticipation."<sup>209</sup> What Hopkins undeniably saw between the two "accounts of the nature of and relationship between non-symbolic and symbolic numbers" is a fundamental methodological difference "that gets to the heart of their radically different accounts of the origination of the 'logic' of symbolic mathematics."<sup>210</sup> Hopkins' observation is crucial:

"[T]he difference in question here concerns the traditional contrast between the 'empirical' approach to science characteristic of the history of science and the 'epistemological' approach characteristic of the philosophy of science. Hence, on the one hand, the history of science is usually defined by its investigation of the contingent series of mathematical, scientific, and philosophical theories involved in the formation and development of a given science. On the other hand, the philosophy of science is usually defined by its investigation of the cognitive status of the philosophical the knowledge claims advanced by the systematic sciences. Corresponding to these methodological differences are the contentual differences between the domains typically treated by the historical and the philosophical

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<sup>207</sup> Burt C Hopkins, *The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematic*, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>208</sup> See Jacob Klein, "Phenomenology and the History of Science," in Martin Farber (ed.), *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., pp. 143-63, esp. p. 162.

<sup>209</sup> Burt Hopkins, "Jacob Klein and the Phenomenology of History, Part 1," in Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell (eds.), *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology*, op. cit., pp. 67-110, esp. p. 70.

<sup>210</sup> Burt C Hopkins, *The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 8.

investigations of science. Thus the content of the history of science reflects the changes over time that define the development of a science, whereas the content of the philosophy of science reflects the stability over time that defines scientific knowledge.”<sup>211</sup>

It is beyond the scope of the present study to go in depth into a historicized version of the conflict between schools of languages and philosophies. Nonetheless, by illustrating the emergence of phenomenological interpretations in arresting consciousness, which, earlier, was predominated by contestations over metaphysics, the common denominator to many of these variables is predominantly ontological. Although Husserl became the focus of such attention, it would be left to his successor Heidegger to heighten such anxieties. Similarly, the Cambridge School of Analysis, for instance, whose debacle with the “nature and role of analysis” gave a formalized interplay in questioning language and language system, as one between “logical” or “same-level” analysis—is, actually, to “simply transformed one sentence into another, and ‘philosophical’ or ‘metaphysical’ or ‘reductive’ or ‘directional’ or ‘new-level’ analysis”—which, nonetheless, revealed “underlying ontological commitments.”<sup>212</sup>

Precursors to the logico-linguistic tradition were distinctively reifying the Greek binary-structure, and, along the way, also added a transcendental political signifier, as in neo-Kantian, the logico-positivists, and even an early phenomenology of, let us say, the subject, on objectivity itself, by stressing on the derivatives of subjectivity narratives and meanings for truth axioms. The mathematico-logical model being pervasive. The possibility of formalizing logic, which in itself immediately announces the need for mathematical reasoning, as indicated by Gottlob Frege, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), led David Hilbert (1862-1943) to formulate consistency as

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<sup>211</sup> Burt Hopkins, “Jacob Klein and the Phenomenology of History, Part 1,” in Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell (eds.), *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology*, op. cit., pp. 67-110, esp. pp. 70-71.

<sup>212</sup> Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn*, op. cit., p. 5.



a mathematical problem and also an avoidance of paradoxes.<sup>213</sup> Here, it is indispensable to note that, for Frege, consistency in a system can be shown only through interpretation. On the American shores, we have Lady Victoria Welby (1837-1912), a close associate of (and also largely overshadowed by) pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), who also advocated the cultural contingency and universality of language, having been largely influenced by Alfred Bray Kempe (1849-1922). Welby's 1903 book *What is Meaning* distinguishes between meaning-sense-significance (intention-reference-moral aspect). An interesting development in Welby's case is the attempt by Gerrit Mannoury (1867-1956), a Dutch mathematician, who took up her works to mathematically formalize a relationship between thinking and speaking, but inevitably finds it inadequate "because it attempted to capture infinite, continuous multitudes with a finite use of symbols."<sup>214</sup> Similarly, on Peirce's logic of relation, Alfred Tarski (1901-1983) made an early attempt, but Alfred Kempe got closer to the conclusion: "that between the mathematical theory of points and the logical theory of statements, a striking correspondence exists. Between the laws defining the form of a system of points, and those defining the form of a system of statements, perfect sameness exists with one exception," i.e., the parallel postulates.<sup>215</sup> Of coincidence?—perhaps not, because the measure of re-appropriating knowledge as mathematical reason was already in full swing by then!

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<sup>213</sup> The logic being: "if a mathematical concept is consistent, then there exist entities representing this concept." See Pavel Pudlák, *Logical Foundations of Mathematics and Computational Complexity: A Gentle Introduction* (Cham; Heidelberg; New York; Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2013), p. 600.

<sup>214</sup> Jeremy J. Gray, "Languages for Mathematics and the Language of Mathematics in a World of Nations," in Karen Hunger Parshall and Adrian C. Rice (eds.), *Mathematics Unbound: The Evolution of an International Mathematical Research Community, 1800-1945* (Providence: American Mathematical Society and London mathematical Society, 2000), pp. 201-228, esp. p. 216.

<sup>215</sup> Quotes are G.J. Stokes comments on Kempe. See Irving H. Anellis, "Tarski's development of Pierce's Logic of Relations," in Nathan Houser, Don D. Roberts, and James Van Evra (eds.), *Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 271-303, esp. p. 286.

In 1925, David Hilbert (1862-1943) presented his most mature thoughts on mathematical elements in his lecture “On the Infinite,”<sup>216</sup> where he makes the distinction between *concrete* and *ideal* objects. The infinite, which is a continuum theorem problem of the *ideal*, “is not to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought.”<sup>217</sup> Hilbert’s Formalism, which immediately rejects Kantian’s ideal, where reason transcends all experience by totalizing the concrete, also makes a serious effort to depart from Gottlob Frege (1878-1925) and Richard Dedekind (1831-1916)—by highlighting that “logic alone is not sufficient” to situate the infinite, since it “can be made certain only by the finitary.”<sup>218</sup> Hilbert’s early interests were on logic, although he never wrote on one. His initial interest was invested in the formulation of geometry, particularly axiomatic methods, and therein the relationship of logic with foundation of mathematics. The 1899-1900 correspondences between Hilbert and Frege reflect the nature of axiom (i.e., without an axiom of completeness, geometry is incomplete) and its twenty-three findings of ‘unsolved problems’ were presented at the 1900 International Congress of Mathematics in Paris:

“We hear within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution. You can find it by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no *ignorabimus*.”<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> David Hilbert, “On the Infinite,” Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (eds.) *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [1964] 1983), pp. 182-201. The Lecture was in honour of Karl Weierstrass, organized by the Westphalian Mathematican Society, in Munster, Germany.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid. p. 201.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid. p. 201.

<sup>219</sup> David Hilbert, quoted in Pavel Pudlák, *Logical Foundations of Mathematics and Computational Complexity: A Gentle Introduction* (Cham; Heidelberg; New York; Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2013), p. 602. The formal engagement of the word *ignorabimus* (“we shall never know,” in Latin) is often attributed to German physiologist Elil du Bois-Reymond.

Noteworthy of citation here is not just the ubiquitous but also the fashionable stimulus that every resolve can be established through a mathematical logic. Hilbert's claim that "certain intuitive concepts and insights are necessary conditions of scientific knowledge"<sup>220</sup> nonetheless reiterates the main locus of logic in Gottlob Frege or Richard Dedekind. It looks like the philology-trained Nietzsche was the only one left, refusing to capitulate. In fact, the transformative shifts from logico-positivist to logico-linguistic turns, attributed to the likes of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Georg Hamann, and Ferdinand de Saussure, who problematized a materiality of language— are essentially progenitors having no mathematical background. Jeremy Gray, reflecting nineteenth-century's then vastly European monoglots who dominated the debates, highlights that against what should be the language of mathematics, "analogous claims were made for logic as a language," with Frege as one of the receptive ones.<sup>221</sup> The peak of linguistic revolution in the 1920s and 30s left little to wonder, which grounded a logico-linguistic future, which was pregnant with mathematical logic—given the sheer shifts to serious thoughts on language through logic. By mid-twentieth century philosophy had its modern moment, with towering figures in the like of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), George Edward Moore (1873-1958), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), etc., who were instrumental in the formation of an analytic philosophy. These developments not only established coherence on language analysis but also created usual suspects to concepts and language as having both 'transformative' and 'decompositional' valences. Concepts therein were stabilized as "explication"<sup>222</sup>—as denoting and clarifying concepts—and the logical truth of

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<sup>220</sup> David Hilbert, "On the Infinite," op. cit., p. 201.

<sup>221</sup> The occasion dateline being August 1900, when the International Congress of Philosophy met in Paris. Jeremy J. Gray, "Languages for Mathematics and the Language of Mathematics in a World of Nations," in Karen Hunger Parshall and Adrian C. Rice (eds.), *Mathematics Unbound: The Evolution of an International Mathematical Research Community, 1800-1945*, op. cit., pp. 201-228, esp. pp. 206-07, and p. 212.

<sup>222</sup> Carnap uses the word "explication" as a specific term to "clarification of concepts" and constitutes one of the most important tasks for the philosophies of the logical-positivists, especially in its concern with "the main categories of human thought." See Rudolf Carnap's

language was reviewed and re-audited from explicatory analysis [rational reconstruction].<sup>223</sup> Wittgenstein will take on language to the farthest, along with the Cambridge School,<sup>224</sup> with his skepticism informed by Russell's logical atomism. Language, for Wittgenstein here, "is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments."<sup>225</sup> And, that is saying too little:

"Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.)"<sup>226</sup>

The logical atomism of Russell-Frege proposes that it is only in the conceptions of language-logic-intentionality where access to knowledge can only happen (either by description or acquaintance). Also, for Wittgenstein too, the "concept" is more important, rather than the language.<sup>227</sup> The concept of language in

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"Preface to Second Edition," *The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, (tr.) Rolf A. George (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, [1967] 2003), p. v.

<sup>223</sup> See Reck's Paper in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn*, op. cit.

<sup>224</sup> Evolved as a reaction to the Vienna School, two schools were predominant after World War Two: the Oxford School of Linguistic Philosophy and the Cambridge School of Therapeutic Analysis. The latter holds greater sway, stressing more on reality rather than on language, thereby illustrating a rather Moorean than a Wittgensteinian approach. The Oxford School, like Vienna School, meantime, is more Fregean, i.e., logical. The Cambridge School tried to preserve metaphysics, i.e., abstraction, as opposed to Vienna or Oxford's stiff oppositions. See Nikolay Milkov, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 2003). Also, see Michael Beaney, "Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis," in Friedrich Stadler (ed.), *The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives* (New York; Boston; Dordrecht; London; Moscow: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 339-350.

<sup>225</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (tr.) G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, [1953] 2009), § 569, p. p. 151.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid. § 96, p. 44.

<sup>227</sup> Wittgenstein reminds us: "What forces itself on one is a *concept*. (You must not forget that)." Ibid. § 191, p. 204.

Wittgenstein, says his translator Anscombe, is viewed as “a family-resemblance concept, language has no *essence*, i.e. defining characteristic marks (*Merkmale*); but it does not follow that it doesn’t have a *nature* just as propositions or numbers have a specifiable nature but no essence.”<sup>228</sup> Similarly, following Russell-Moore, Wittgenstein faithfully defends the natural and scientific basis in detailing his concept formation—but out rightly rejects any complicity of metaphysical reference. On concept-formation, Wittgenstein is clear about the “nature” debate, especially against the background of the science-experience synthesis as forwarded by Russell’s teacher, Alfred North Whitehead:

“If concept formation can be explained by facts of nature, shouldn’t we be interested, not in grammar, but rather in what is its basis in nature?—We are, indeed, also interested in the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept formation; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.”<sup>229</sup>

At the triumphant reign of *Tractatus*, i.e., truths of logic, Wittgenstein easily displaced Russell-Moore’s fuzzy rootedness in science or logic by stabilizing concepts as *a fortiori*, with our without language. The destitution of language has its early witness in him. Wittgenstein would, however, baselessly reject his own language-games as emanating from mathematical logic, thereby also ending the zeal of Cambridge School. One also notes that, earlier, Gottlob Frege, who, like Kant, rejects Hegelian absolute idealism, which, again, was vigorously returned by Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore, who, in insofar, or initially, were all not bothered with language or thought, unlike Nietzsche’s avowed engagements. Russell and Moore were busy with their realism, in search of a

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<sup>228</sup> See translators footnote 92. Ibid. p. 250.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. p. xiii. See, also, Russell’s difference on the claims of science with his contemporary: Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, *Bertrand Russell’s Dialogue with His Contemporaries* (Oxon: Routledge, [1989] 2013).

methodological model toward the ‘truth about the world’. The theory of denoting concepts, theory of descriptions, and theory of types, are not characteristic of linguistics, but only limited by its leanings. Similarly, Frege’s central thesis was that “arithmetic is *reducible* to logic,”<sup>230</sup> which was already established in *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1891)<sup>231</sup> and expounded further in *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893). Frege’s “quantificational logic,”<sup>232</sup> i.e., theory of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, where the “signs of [pure] logic represents the core of an ideal language,”<sup>233</sup> is framed on Leibnizian<sup>234</sup> language model to question the relationship between formal logic and ordinary language,<sup>235</sup> and is external to nature or human agency:<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Which, inter alia, also implies “the question of whether there is, for each truth of arithmetic, a *proof* from purely logical premises” (p. 50). See Patricia A. Blanchette, *Frege’s Conception of Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 3.

<sup>231</sup> Says Frege:

“I hope I may claim in the present work to have made it probable that the laws of arithmetic are analytic judgments and consequently a priori. Arithmetic this becomes simply a development of logic, and every proposition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit a derivative one. To apply arithmetic in the physical sciences is to bring logic to bear on observed facts; calculation becomes deduction.”

Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number*, (tr.) J.L. Austin (New York: Harpers & Brothers, [1950] 1960), p. 99.

<sup>232</sup> Frege’s 1879 *Begriffsschrift* logic (distinction between sense [*Sinn*] and meaning [*Bedeutung*], quoting Evans, modeled a “new conception of sense,” which stems from axiomization of logical language. See Danielle Macbeth, *Frege’s Logic* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 5.

<sup>233</sup> Kevin C. Klement, *Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference* (New York & London: Routledge, 2002), p. 6.

<sup>234</sup> For a discussion on Frege’s import of the term *Begriffsschrift* from Leibniz via Adolf Trendelenburg, see Hans Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 48-52.

<sup>235</sup> Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>236</sup> Michael Dummett, one of Frege’s most loyal interlocutors, however differently argues that “if our only access to thoughts is through their linguistic expression, an account of what is to grasp the thought expressed by a sentence should be easier for us: and this will in any case be needed if we are to explain how thoughts can be expressed and communicated in language. We thus arrive at the following position. Frege has an account of what is for a sentence to express a

“In my *Grundlagen* [Foundations] *der Arithmetik*, I sought to make it plausible that arithmetic is a branch of logic and need not borrow any ground of proof whatever from either experience or intuition. In the present book this shall now be confirmed by the derivation of the simplest laws of Numbers by logical means alone. But for this to be convincing, considerably higher demands must be placed on the conduct of proof than is customary in arithmetic. ... The laws of number, therefore, are not really applicable to external things; they are not laws of nature.”<sup>237</sup>

The theory of denoting concepts is therefore important in the analytical surge for language and logical certainty. Frege’s conception of logic is premised on rules of a “truth-preserving character,” which establishes a role for sense and reference (*Begriffsschrift*<sup>238</sup>), when applied to/by its own rule of inference. But it also appeals “to the substitution of a potentially infinite number of expressions into a linguistic frame” which, even as Tarski critiques Frege’s *Begriffsschrift* as an erroneous move to define quantifiers, also “presupposes a grasp of the

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though. Either as parallel account of what constitutes a naked thought can be arrived at by simply deleting the references to linguistic items, or it cannot. If it can, then an account of thoughts, independent of language, is easily derived from an account of reference to language. In the former case, the first axiom of analytical philosophy is established, but not the second: in the latter case, both are established.” Of course, Dummett’s tainted readings of Frege’s “sense” qua “truth” stems from a failure by the latter to articulate an assertion that truth is directly inferred from sense. See Michael Dummett, “The Linguistic Turn,” in *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 11-12.

<sup>237</sup> Gottlob Frege, *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System*, (tr. and ed.) Montgomery Furth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 29.

<sup>238</sup> A varied translation, including literal and figural, of *Begriffsschrift* can imply either “concept-script” or “conceptual notation.” See, also, Gottlob Frege, “*Begriffsschrift*, a Formula Language, Modeled upon that of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought,” in Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), *From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 1-82.

infinite.”<sup>239</sup> Using Redundancy Theory of Truth (or metalogic of Truth-Value Thesis), Thomas Ricketts had earlier rejected Frege’s logic for looking at truth as a non-property of thought and, instead, precluded the same by a “conception of [metaphysical] judgment.”<sup>240</sup> Jason Stanley also confirms Ricketts-Frege dispute by particularizing the latter as “committed to ineliminable occurrences of the truth-predicate.”<sup>241</sup> In the observations of William Aspray and Philip Kitcher, it was a simple case where Frege was battling a self-contradiction till the end of his life in his attempt to create a science in arithmetic (*Foundations of Arithmetic*, 1884) and, elsewhere, a denial that “arithmetical statements are meaningless and arithmetic is simply a game that mathematicians (and others) play with signs.”<sup>242</sup> On Frege’s major contributions on number sense as constituting a concept (cardinal numbers, as the case is, here, which comes through a critique of the Greek’s definition of numbers as “set of units”), Alain Badiou highlights the inconsistencies where Frege totally ignored ordinal, real, or complex numbers, by treating them as outside the concept of number.<sup>243</sup> However, Frege’s readings of Euclid<sup>244</sup> and Kant, questioning whether the “analytical character of

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<sup>239</sup> John MacFarlane, “Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism,” in Michael Beaney and Erich H. Reck (eds.), *Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers* (London and New York: 2005), pp. 71-108, esp. footnote 4, p. 99.

<sup>240</sup> See Thomas Ricketts, “Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgement,” in L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), *Frege Synthesized* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), p. 83.

<sup>241</sup> Jason Stanley, “Truth and metatheory in Frege,” in Michael Beaney and Erich H. Reck (eds.), *Gottlob Frege*, op. cit., pp. 109-153, esp. p. 120.

<sup>242</sup> See “An Opinionated Introduction,” in William Aspray and Philip Kitcher (eds.), *History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 5.

<sup>243</sup> Also, in additionally noting Italian Giuseppe Peano’s (1858-1932) derivation of real numbers through the rule-governed axiomatics of Archimedes, Badiou questions whether the essence of number resides in the axiomatic logic of “statements,” like Frege, too, which will thereby exhibit that the concept of “whole numbers and real numbers have nothing in common.” See Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, (tr.) Robin Mackay (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2008), p. 11.

<sup>244</sup> Frege’s 1914 lecture notes on “Logic in Mathematics,” which finds discussion in Danielle Macbeth, *Frege’s Logic* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005).



mathematical propositions” can actually be made “deducible solely from purely logical laws,” resulted in two important conclusions: the limits of deduction in certainty and the inevitability of intuition in the analytic.<sup>245</sup> The Vienna Circle logical-positivist Rudolf Carnap, who attended Frege’s course in mathematical logic, thereafter wrote a thesis that saw tussles between physics and philosophy and, latter, linked and bonded language-concepts qua classificatorial semanticity.<sup>246</sup> Carnap’s *Aufbau* method, “rational reconstruction,”<sup>247</sup> set in *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928), unmistakably set the agenda and departure clear:

“The main problem concerns the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given. By rational reconstruction is here meant the searching out of new definitions for old concepts. The old concepts did not ordinarily originate by way of deliberate formulation, but in more or less unreflected and spontaneous development. The new definition should be

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<sup>245</sup> This exhaustion is pertinent is pertinent to the many other mistakes of Frege’s quantificational logic:

“The mathematician rests content in ever transition to a fresh judgment is self-evidently correct, whether it is logical or intuitive. ... [T]he correctness of such a transition is immediately self-evident to us, without our ever becoming conscious of the subordinate steps condensed within it... [S] ince it does not obviously conform to any of the recognized types of logical inference, we are prepared to accept its self-evidence forthwith as intuitive, and the conclusion itself as a synthetic truth—and this even when obviously it holds good of much more than merely what can be intuited.

On these lines our synthetic based intuition cannot possibly be cut cleanly away from our analytic.”

See Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, op. cit., pp. 102-03.

<sup>246</sup> For Carnap, the distinction among classificatory is one of comparative and quantitative concepts. See Rudolf Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1950).

<sup>247</sup> See Rudolf Carnap’s “Preface to Second Edition,” *The Logical Structure of the World*, op. cit., p. v.

superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and above all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts.”<sup>248</sup>

Carnap’s pledge for a renewed vigilance for the semantic-conceptual—which also calls for an epistemological clarifications on ‘new concepts’ and the standardization toward a universal/formal logical axiom—has traces of David Hume’s radical empiricism, and the logicism of Whitehead, Frege, and, Russell, in particular.<sup>249</sup> Successive to Frege-Carnap logico-linguistic tradition, two schools emerged to lay claims on modern logic: algebra of logic and quantification theory. In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort (1912-1986), representing the first school, published an edited volume in 1967,<sup>250</sup> which Volker Peckhaus (b. 1955) locates it as “one of the most important years in the historiography of modern logic.”<sup>251</sup> In the same year, van Heijenoort, who is also one of Frege’s severest critics, published an authoritative position paper on the historiography of logic. It distinguishes the duality of “logic as calculus” and “logic as language,” which fairly gives an evaluative departure to “logical systems” in conflict. In privileging the contributions of George Boole (1815-1864) over Fregean’s, logic as ‘calculus ratiocinator’ over ‘lingua characterica’, or algebraic logic over quantification theory (which is premised on universality, internal semantics and fixed universe), Van Heijenoort argues that there can be no universality or fixed universe, and, further, insists that semantics need to be externalized.<sup>252</sup> Boolean

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid. p. v.

<sup>249</sup> Rudolp Carnap via W.V.O. Quine, Russell is also attributed of promoting similar “supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing”—“[w]henever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.” Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Analytic Turn*, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>250</sup> Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), *From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1967).

<sup>251</sup> Seminally, the book for the first time gathered “fundamental texts from the history of mathematical logic,” which includes *Begriffsschrift*. See Volker Peckhaus, “Calculus ratiocinator versus characteristica universalis” the two traditions in logic, revisited,” in Michael Beaney Beaney and Erich H. Reck (eds.), *Gottlob Frege*, op. cit., pp. 176-190, esp. pp. 177-78.

<sup>252</sup> Jean Van Heijenoort, “Logic as calculus and logic as language,’ in *Synthese*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1967, pp. 324-330.

algebra<sup>253</sup> or ordinary logic, as developed by George Boole, uses mathematico-logical calculus in the theory of probability, i.e., reasoning and universal laws of truth. A comparative graph will thus illustrate the factional positions, which is, again, only representative:<sup>254</sup>

| <i>Fregean</i>        | <i>Boolean</i>        | <i>van Heijenoort</i>    |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Quantification theory | Propositional logic   | No quantification theory |
| Universality          | Variable universality | No universality          |
| Internal semantics    | Dualist semantics     | External semantics       |
| Fixed universe        | Arbitrary universe    | No fixed universe        |

Remarking that Van Heijenoort’s assessment of Frege and F.W.K. Ernst Schröder (1841-1902), despite their later differences, is incorrect, Volker Pechaus argued that both of them actually attempt to reach Leibniz’s computations on language. Schröder is seen as having come closer, although Frege’s *Begriffsschrift*<sup>255</sup> characterizes his *lingua characterica* as mathematics first, rather than a calculus restricted to logic. Nonetheless, there is a general agreement that *Begriffsschrift*, despite the paradoxes and as highlighted in his mature work *Grundgesetze [Basic Laws]*, was “designed to be both a *lingua characterica* and a *calculus ratiocinator* [since] Frege was not interested in creating merely a formal system or logical calculus, but a new, more logically perspicuous, *language*.”<sup>256</sup> Therein the task of

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<sup>253</sup> Boole argues:

“No general method for the solution of questions in the theory of probabilities can be established which does not explicitly recognise, not only the special numerical bases of the science, but also those universal laws of thought which are the basis of all reasoning, and which, whatever they may be as to their essence, are at least mathematical as to their form.”

See George Boole, *Studies in Logic and Probability*, (ed.) R. Rheas (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., [1952] 2012), p. 273. Originally published as *The Laws of Thought* (1854).

<sup>254</sup> Volker Peckhaus, “Calculus ratiocinator versus characteristica universalis” the two traditions in logic, revisited,” in Michael Beaney Beaney and Erich H. Reck (eds.), *Gottlob Frege*, op. cit., pp. 176-190, esp. p. 180.

<sup>255</sup> See, above, footnote numbers 232 and 238.

<sup>256</sup> Kevin C. Klement, *Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference*, op. cit., p. 25.

seeking a universal standard is what is consistent with any logico-linguistic attempt to address applications for consciousness-language equivalents.<sup>257</sup>

Here, one recalls Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), who claims that Leibniz never mentioned “characteristica”—but interchangeably employs “lingua generalis,” “lingua universalis,” “lingua rationalis” and “lingua philosophica.”<sup>258</sup> For Leibniz, “human reasoning” is all based on “signs” or “characters” and, also, by applying it to the “ideas of things,” he was simply integrating calculus with basic semiotics. There was no complication. On Hegel’s critique on Leibniz’s characteristic (mathematical symbolism, formalism, and “being-outside-of-itself”) as a resistance to a theory of language, Jacques Derrida, commenting on the latter’s “ethnocentric metaphysics,” however, reassures that Leibniz himself “cannot provide the pure exit from metaphysics.”<sup>259</sup> Kant’s “Transcendental Analytic” took up Leibniz’s monadology under “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” where the amphiboly is but categorized as a ‘confusion’. Leibniz, as pointed by Guyer and Wood, “has taken mere features of concepts through which we think things, specifically concepts of comparison or reflection such as ‘same’ and ‘different’ or ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, which are in fact never applied directly to things but only applied to them through more determinate concepts, as if they were features of the objects themselves.”<sup>260</sup> Similarly, Gray points out that for Hilbert and Husserl, unlike the language Universalist Frege, “did not conceive of language as the conveyor of thoughts about the world expressed in as logical manner as possible”—they were already “becoming linguistic calculators.”<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Also, see, Dresner Eli, “Hintikka’s ‘language as calculus vs. language vs. universal medium’ distinction,” *Pragmatics and Cognition*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1999, pp. 405-421.

<sup>258</sup> Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) of Weimar School was one of the strongest proponents who long held that Leibniz advocated for language universalis or characterica.

<sup>259</sup> Sean Gaston, “Even Leibniz (OG 3; DG 11-12),” in Sean Gaston and Ian Maclachlan (eds.), *Reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology* (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), pp. 10-11.

<sup>260</sup> “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. and eds.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

<sup>261</sup> Jeremy J. Gray, “Languages for Mathematics and the Language of Mathematics in a World of Nations,” in Karen Hunger Parshall and Adrian C. Rice (eds.), *Mathematics Unbound: The*

### III

Guided by the nominalism of W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000)—the 1940s witness the empiricist critique of logic and mathematics and its strong anti-Carnapian call for dissolution of boundaries between the synthetic and analytic, i.e., which also puts natural science and mathematics at par with each other. In Quine, whose entire focus was on logical structures, there is no patience for mathematical practices. Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), being a product of this anti-realism, developed the biological component of (what he calls “post-Darwinian Kantianism”) the lexicon—“the lexicon supplies preconditions for possible experience.”<sup>262</sup> Like Kant, Kuhn seeks an *a priori* permanence (“permanent,” “stable,” and “fixed”) of these lexical structures and categories, devoid of the instability of time and space that is in the human agency. Stefano Gattei therefore remarks that “it is not language that needs to be adapted to the world, rather, it is the world that is an outcome of the mutual adaptation of language and experience.”<sup>263</sup> Slightly earlier, mathematics was dominated by the likes of Edward Kasner (1878-1955), Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), Jacques Hadamard (1865-1963), Francois le Lionnais (1901-1984), James Roy Newman (1907-1966), etc., where the processes of imagination, inventing, discovering, calculating, verifying, etc., act not only as a continuity but also as a reinforcement to a recent tradition, however relative and in sharp contrast, to the death of truth. The 1960s also saw the dominance of Imre Lakatos (1922-1974), who ruefully reacted against how

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*Evolution of an International Mathematical Research Community, 1800-1945*, op. cit., pp. 201-228, esp. p. 221.

<sup>262</sup> Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview*, (eds.) James Conant and John Haugeland (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 104.

<sup>263</sup> Stefano Gattei, *Thomas Kuhn's “Linguistic Turn” and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth* (Hampshire; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p. 135.

the philosophy of mathematics strongly adheres to its foundational ideas, set around 1880-1930:

“The history of mathematics, lacking the guidance of philosophy, has become *blind*, while the philosophy of mathematics, turning its back on the most intriguing phenomena in the history of mathematics, has become *empty*.”<sup>264</sup>

Post-Lakatos, his ideals, although unsuccessful, were further carried over, calling for a proper audit of mathematical practice—whether foundational fidelity or methodological articulation should take precedence. These “maverick” philosophers, as Paolo Mancosu labels,<sup>265</sup> challenge the continuity of mathematical logic in their radical but polemical works, which, amongst others too, include Kitcher’s *The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge*<sup>266</sup> (1984), Tymoczko’s *New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics*<sup>267</sup> (1986), and Aspray and Kitcher’s *History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics*<sup>268</sup> (1988). Despite their foremost weariness with foundationalism and mathematical logic, which they believe is but a fallible habit and inadequate analysis, what is unsettling is that the same is also the canon for the development of mathematics or its dynamic discoveries.

The ‘linguistic radicalism’ in the 1960s brought about a comprehensive overhauling of mathematical thought and logicist thinking, factionalizing philosophy. Clayton Bohnet identifies the “problem of quantification” as

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<sup>264</sup> Imre Lakatos, *Proofs and Refutations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 2.

<sup>265</sup> See “Introduction,” by Paolo Mancosu (ed.), *The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-21.

<sup>266</sup> Philip Kitcher, *The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

<sup>267</sup> Thomas Tymoczko (ed.), *New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1986] 1998).

<sup>268</sup> William Aspray and Philip Kitcher (eds.), *History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

permanently dividing philosophy into analytic and continental in the twentieth-century.<sup>269</sup> No substantial attempts were also made to bridge the difference and source behind contemporary divisions in the traditional Analytic and the new Continental Philosophies, as Braver captures it as “worse than the one that faced early modern philosophy.”<sup>270</sup> The divide is at once a question of discourses based on naturalizing the mathematico-logic, which is perceived to be inherently flawed within the conflicting interpretation of methodologies, as we discussed earlier, but, most importantly, the consequential problems is centered on presencing subjectivity and the consciousness of language remained the main casualty.<sup>271</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy (b. 1940) attributes the receptiveness for a new thinking system in continental practices as an outcome of World War Two post-trauma and societal restlessness.<sup>272</sup> The deconstruction of a mathematized tradition on temporality, and the supplementary logic of thinking embedded in such thought-consciousness system—complemented a language-based interpretation (more so through an avowal reading of Heidegger) of temporality, the relation of sublime to time, the time of the sublime; the question of the experience of language...

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<sup>269</sup> Clayton Bohnet, *Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>270</sup> Especially, “Introduction: The Kantian Root,” in Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World*, op. cit., pp. 3-12. Braver, citing Kevin Mulligan (1991) and Richard J. Bernstein (1971), points out that twentieth century and contemporary “level of engagement between analytic and continental thinkers has rarely risen above mutual disinterest, uninformed dismissal, or plain insult; it is hard to imagine a major figure from either side dedicating a work to the careful analysis of a text from the other tradition. While the number of scholars who are doing work influenced by both or which defies easy categorization is growing, there is still a great deal of mutual misunderstanding, distrust, and even hostility” (p. 4.). Interestingly, it is the speculative philosophers who continue to rig the recurrent theme of divide between continental and analytical philosophies.

<sup>271</sup> Richard Rorty immediately comes to mind here, especially with his attempt to locate the differences on similarities. See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Also, refer, footnote 20, in “Introduction: The Subject of Irreducible Love.”

<sup>272</sup> Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 4.

In displacing meaning-language and the logic of its determinism, it is interesting to note the debacle that followed, particularly on Derrida's readings on J.L. Austin (1911-1969), which was negatively defended by one of the latter's loyal students John R. Searle (b. 1932), which also furthered the division, detractors and indifferent apologetics alike—recasting not only lines of arguments beyond the school of individual idiosyncrasies but also institutionalizing the same in academic bodies.<sup>273</sup> On the “ambiguity of meaning,” Derrida's aporetic readings take the case of the *pharmakon* in Plato's *Phaedrus*:

“Here, O King, says Theuth, is a discipline (*mathêma*) that will make the Egyptians wiser (*sophôterous*) and will improve their memories (*mnêmonikôterous*): both memory (*mnêmê*) and instruction (*sophia*) have found their remedy (*pharmakon*).”<sup>274</sup>

Here, the *pharmakon* “constitutes the original medium of that decision, the element that precedes it, comprehends it, goes beyond it, and can never be reduced to it, and is never separated from it by a single word.”<sup>275</sup> Derrida comments that the sense of *pharmakon* (poison and remedy/cure) has the double gesture (functionality and ambiguity) of erasures (“it repairs and

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<sup>273</sup> The high point being the controversial protest by nineteen (Quine included) leading scholars from across the world, protesting Cambridge University's award of a Doctorate Degree to Jacques Derrida in 1992. Derrida's comment on the controversy is found in “Honoris Causa: ‘This is *also* very funny’,” in *Points...: Interviews, 1974-1994*, (ed.) Elisabeth Weber, (trs.) Peggy Kamuf & others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 399-421. Also, see, Simon Glendinning (ed.), *Arguing With Derrida* (Oxford; Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 2001); also, for a crisp comment, see the chapter “Derrida and Searle: The Abyss Stare Back?” by Andreas Vrahimis, *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 160-181; on Derrida's reply to Searle in the form of a letter to Gerald Graff, see “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” in Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, (tr.) Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 111-54, and, for an excellent update and impassionate review, see Raoul Moati, *Derrida/Searle: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language*, (trs.) Timothy Attanucci and Maureen Chun (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

<sup>274</sup> Plato, quoted, in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, (tr.) Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1982), p. 99.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.* p. 99.



produces, accumulates and remedies, increases knowledge and reduces forgetfulness.”).<sup>276</sup> Like the “pharmakon” or the “hymen” (consummation and virginity) that also acts as a dissimulation of truth, or the open-ended possibilities on how the circulation of truth can take place, Derrida illustrates the associative terms of a woman in the veil of truth unveiling an absence, where “there is no such thing as the truth of woman, but it is because of that abyssal divergence of the truth, because that untruth is ‘truth’.”<sup>277</sup> Derrida notes that Plato already favours a “logic that does not tolerate such passages between opposing senses of the same word,”<sup>278</sup> although the focus is on a one-track determination of an essence, of a particular truth. The logic of the logic (logic-intra-logic) therefore remains erroneously administered. Reiterating that Derrida’s “*pharmakon* has no ideal identity; it is aneidetic,” John Sallis interprets the same as a situation where “the *pharmakon* withdraws from [the] essential, ideal determination, from determination through—determination as—[their beings].”<sup>279</sup> As concepts of instability, as well as to destabilize totalities, Derrida employs a variety of terms, apart from *pharmakon* and *hymen*, including neologisms like *différance*; trace; cinder; arche-writing; aporia; phono-, logo-, and phallo-centrism(s); supplementarity; exappropriation; supplement; dissemination; desistance; iterability; deconstruction; undecidability; metaphysics of presence; auto-affection, re-mark; etc., among many others.

By grounding the metaphysics of presence, Derrida attempts to structurally situate a critique of the play of presence and absence in the continental human sciences. While he does not directly deal with the play of time in the given conceptions of presence and absence, there is also no specific exposition of how this intersection of trajectories are explicated. Rather, on the issue of presencing, which has its vitality attached strongly with his main work, Derrida builds a

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<sup>276</sup> Ibid. pp. 96-97.

<sup>277</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, (tr.) Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 51.

<sup>278</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>279</sup> John Sallis, *The Verge of Philosophy* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 75.

corpus of postulations that accost the permanence of western foundations of thinking systems and the brevity of how such engineering systems of philosophy and thought itself come to accomplish the complicity of privileging a certain syntactical idiom, consistently and perpetually. Derrida's formulations initially emerge from the absolute rejection of Edmund Husserl's mathematical transcendence, which we take up in Chapter Two. Such oppositions against the mathematical and realism has not been however taken kindly, particularly with the development of speculative realism and materialism in the twenty-first century. At the same time, we also see a resurgent return of the mathematical, especially through interpretations of and studies on diagonalization, which also marks Derrida's anti-formalism and mathematical-linguistics with deep suspicion.<sup>280</sup> Lee Braver notices the gathering loneliness of Derrida in the history of philosophy, while labeling his metaphysics of presence as "a form of realism," thereby places him as one of the last amongst the greatest and original anti-realist thinker arching two hundred years from Kant onwards.<sup>281</sup> Gianni Vattimo's student and a former co-author with Jacques Derrida, Maurizio Ferraris will also consequentially start his New Realism a couple of years back.<sup>282</sup> Still closer, we have approaches that are deeply informed by Derrida,<sup>283</sup> but extending its trajectories on embodiments of reason and knowledge to its "prosthetic coevolution" with the machinic and technological—"how thinking confronts... a thematics of decentering of the human in relation to either evolutionary, ecological, or technological coordinates"—as prompted in

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<sup>280</sup> This investigation is taken up in Chapter 2, particularly through the works of David King, Arkady Plotnitsky and Vladimir Tasiç.

<sup>281</sup> See Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World*, op. cit., esp. p. 434.

<sup>282</sup> Maurizio Ferraris, *Manifesto of New Realism*, (tr.) Sarah De Sanctis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014).

<sup>283</sup> Cary Wolfe, "Response to Christopher Peterson, 'The Posthumanism to Come,'" in *Angelika: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011, pp. 189-193.

Posthumanism.<sup>284</sup> Consequently, the “talk of the old analytical/continental divide,” Gary Gutting says, “is no longer fashionable.”<sup>285</sup>

In recent times, speculative philosophers, prominently Alain Badiou and his protégé Quentin Meillassoux, strongly adheres mathematical logic. Badiou,<sup>286</sup> for one, argues an inevitable need to return to Plato, since only mathematics has the “ontological capacity” for philosophical inquiries. Moreover, in claiming the superiority of mathematics as the first most secular thinking, in engaging the problem of “infinite multiplicity” and as free from “theological concept” (of both the Infinite and the One), Badiou claims that mathematics is the rational discourse on being *qua* being, or on the indifferent multiple thought as such.<sup>287</sup> On similar lines, Meillassoux, whose *After Finitude* (2006), seen as the textual and epochal inauguration of the Speculative Turn, outlines an a working term called *correlationism*, which is—“the exceptional strength of its antirealist argumentation”<sup>288</sup>—“the idea according to which we can only have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.”<sup>289</sup> The origin of correlationism traces back to Kant’s critical philosophy, which, amongst the speculative philosophers, accuses the

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<sup>284</sup> Cary Wolfe, *What is Posthumanism?* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), p. xvi.

<sup>285</sup> Gary Gutting, *Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 [2013]), pp. 1-2.

<sup>286</sup> See Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings* (eds. & trs.) Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum Press, 2004); *Being and Event* (tr.) Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum Press, 2006); *Numbers and Numbers* (tr.) Robin Mackay (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event, 2* (tr.) Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum Press, 2009).

<sup>287</sup> Alain Badiou, in “Philosophy, Sciences, Mathematics: Interview with Alain Badiou,” in *COLLAPSE I* (trs.) Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (Oxford: Urbanomic, September 2007), p. 16.

<sup>288</sup> Quentin Meillassoux, *Time Without Becoming*, (ed.) Anna Longo, in *Mimesis International*, Philosophy, n. 6, 2014, p. 10. Accordingly, the formulation of correlationism is given as: “there can be no X without a givenness of X, and no theory about X without a positing of X.” Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, (tr.) Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum, 2008), p. 5.

former for “famously” abjuring “the possibility of ever knowing a noumenal real beyond human access,” for structuring experiences as *a priori* categories thereby cordoning the cognitive aspects of “reality-in-itself” and for “renunciation of any knowledge beyond how things appear to us.”<sup>290</sup> Like the excitement of newly liberated prisoners of metaphysics from dungeons of ontology, the enthusiasm and expanse has been acerbic, particularly on what they qualify as a “now tiresome ‘Linguistic Turn’.”<sup>291</sup> Earlier, the mathematical empiricism or

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<sup>290</sup> Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (eds.), *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism* (Victoria; Melbourne: re.press, 2011), p. 4.

<sup>291</sup> As outlined by the editorial committee in “Towards a Speculative Philosophy,” the agenda and clarification of Speculative Realism and Materialism is laid bare:

“It has long been commonplace within continental philosophy to focus on discourse, text, culture, consciousness, power, or ideas as what constitutes reality. But despite the vaunted anti-humanism of many of the thinkers identified with these trends, what they give us is less a critique of humanity’s place in the world, than a less sweeping critique of the self-enclosed Cartesian subject. Humanity remains at the centre of these works, and reality appears in philosophy only as the correlate of human thought. In this respect phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, and postmodernism have all been perfect exemplars of the anti-realist trend in continental philosophy. Without deriding the significant contributions of these philosophies, something is clearly amiss in these trends. In the face of the looming ecological catastrophe, and the increasing infiltration of technology into the everyday world (including our own bodies), it is not clear that the anti-realist position is equipped to face up to these developments. The danger is that the dominant anti-realist strain of continental philosophy has not only reached a point of decreasing returns, but that it now actively limits the capacities of philosophy in our time. ... By contrast with the repetitive continental focus on texts, discourse, social practices, and human finitude, the new breed of thinker is turning once more toward reality itself. While it is difficult to find explicit positions common to all the thinkers collected in this volume, all have certainly rejected the traditional focus on textual critique. ... The speculative turn, however, is not an outright rejection of these critical advances; instead, it comes from a recognition of their inherent limitations. Speculation in this sense aims at something ‘beyond’ the critical and linguistic turns. As such, it recuperates the pre-critical sense of ‘speculation’ as a concern with the Absolute, while also taking into account the undeniable progress that is due to the labour of critique.”

Ibid., pp. 2-3.

naturalism of W.V.O. Quine and Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) subscribes to a notion that the “ontology of mathematical entities and mathematical truth is based in human experience and reveals itself to be indispensable to scientific theory.”<sup>292</sup> The origins of continental anti-realism nonetheless trace its departure to Kant’s Copernican revolution and the implicit agenda of anti-realism in ‘Kantian prohibition’. In mathematics proper, the recent studies by Sha Xin Wei, Andrew Pickering and, particularly Brian Rotman,<sup>293</sup> attempt to recast a semiotic-cultural turn in the mathematico-linguistic field—through practices that examined the gestural, performative, and aspects of technical (and technology related)—with actions like the creation of notations, methods, proofs, diagrams, digital simulations etc. Also, although departing from the valorized relations between mathematics and logic, Albert Lautman’s<sup>294</sup> (1908-1944) brief but major contributions on mathematical physics have major influences on both Alain Badiou<sup>295</sup> and Gilles Deleuze<sup>296</sup> [both use the word “admirable” to describe his work], who are both seen as high priests in the direction of speculative philosophy. As a passing note, perhaps, the solace to the title of this thesis remains very much Lautman: “the only *a priori* element we allow is that given in

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<sup>292</sup> Arielle Saiber & Henry S. Turner, “Mathematics and the Imagination: A Brief Introduction,” in *Configurations*, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, winter 2009, p. 4.

<sup>293</sup> See Brian Rotman, *Mathematics as Sign: Writing, Imagining, Counting* (Albany: Stanford University Press, 2000); also, see “Towards a Mathematics of Semiotics,” in Reuben Hersh (ed.), *18 Unconventional Essays on the Nature of Mathematics* (Heidelberg; Dordrecht; London; New York: Springer, 2006), pp. 97-127.

<sup>294</sup> Albert Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas and the Physical Real*, (tr.) Simon B. Duffy (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).

<sup>295</sup> See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, (tr.) Oliver Feltham (London; New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 482. For Badiou’s Lautman, see Sean Bowden, “The Set-Theoretical Nature of Badiou’s Ontology and Lautman’s Dialectic of Problematic Ideas,” in Sean Bowden and Simon Duffy (eds.), *Badiou and Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), pp. 79-96. Also, see Simon Duffy, *Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In the Defense of the ‘New’* (London; New Delhi; New York; Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013), especially Chapter 4, “Lautman’s Concept of the Mathematical Real,” pp. 117-137.

<sup>296</sup> Deleuze’s debt is visible particularly on the issue of “problem” in the formulation of the ‘image of thought’. Refer Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (tr.) Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), esp. pp. 163-67.

the experience of this urgency of problems prior to the discovery of the solutions..."<sup>297</sup>

Concurrently, from a non-phenomenological or logico-mathematical background, Gilles Deleuze would later insist on rescuing a place for temporality through Henri Bergson, the mathematico-physics of static time (or, space domesticated by time as propounded by Albert Einstein 1879-1955] and W.R. Hamilton [1805-1865]), which Manuel de Landa argues to be a case of circumvention through 'arrow of time' in early thermodynamics:

"Logic is always defeated by itself, that is to say, by the insignificance of the cases on which it thrives. In its desire to supplant philosophy, logic detaches the proposition from all its psychological dimensions, but clings all the more to the set of postulates that limited and subjected thought to the constraints of a recognition of truth in the proposition."<sup>298</sup>

The locating of temporality in Derrida takes a different approach (via memory) whereas for Deleuze and Guattari it derives from a tradition that emphasizes imagination (David Hume)<sup>299</sup> via Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and Marcel Proust (1871-1922). It is also on the issue of temporality that contemporary thought, which otherwise seemingly appear tautological, is actually highly divergent, particularly on its informed sources.<sup>300</sup> On another level, by taking a Deleuzian or neo-realist approach, which integrates the imperatives for a "genesis of form"

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<sup>297</sup> Alfred Lautman, quoted, in Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (tr.) Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), esp. footnote 24, p. 323.

<sup>298</sup> Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>299</sup> For Hume, "the imagination... is the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." See David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed.) L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1748] [1888] 1960), esp. Book I, Part IV, Section IV, p. 225.

<sup>300</sup> Deleuzian framing of temporality is—often seen as a reference to Stoic conceptualization, but based on asymmetrical multiplicity or of manifold—seen as a 'new philosophy of time', for James Williams, *Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 1-2.

but eliminates “essence,” Manuel de Landa,<sup>301</sup> too, traces the departures of neo-Kantian constructivist perspectives on the phenomenon and the noumenon, which is recognized as integral to human praxis and knowledge—and the inexperienceable is seen not as a being but a “becoming,” thereby inserting the angle of temporality and experience as a reflux of possibility, another hallowed hallmark in continental philosophy’s tautology.<sup>302</sup> The realist borderlines of Deleuze and Guattari in envisaging the principles of time—genesis, rhizomic, genealogy, (mutation in genetics) or referred to as “divergent individuation”—underlines a principle of anarchic zone for temporality: not bound, unpredictable, having its own elements of intensities, a machinic model in communication, interaction (“intercalary”), in mitigation, between or without “entities”—catalyst (Deleuze’s “singularities” and “attractors”) in random, and most famously expressed as “What is thought’s relation to earth?”<sup>303</sup> Eric Alliez, a student of Deleuze, also significantly proposes a rescue reading on temporality as process interplay of potential time/power time, from the static and sterilized Augustinian mercantile “capital time”—with the “processes of extension, intensification, capitalization, subjectivization,” etc., as the very enabling “conditions for a history of time.”<sup>304</sup>

Within such divergent commentaries how does the locating of time, in a value of economy where there is negation at the one level and a symmetric dislocating of

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<sup>301</sup> Manuel de Landa, “Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World,” in Elizabeth Grosz (ed.), *Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 29-54.

<sup>302</sup> Jean-Francois Courtine, “Phenomenology and/or Tautology,” (tr.) Jeffrey S Librett, in John Sallis (ed.) *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 241-257.

<sup>303</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 68-69. We shall come to this reference in detail in Chapter 3.

<sup>304</sup> See Gilles Deleuze’s “Foreword,” in Eric Alliez, *Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time* (tr.) Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. xiii. Alliez also alludes to how Don Scotus’ unconscious [“unbeknownst”] foundation of “the *air of time* and the labor of the human being were going to determine each other in the metaphysical flash” (p. 198).

such continuities or discontinuities persist? How does Derrida accomplish the translation of decentering the logos with a genealogy measured in caustic physics? What is the place of time itself in the play of presence and absence, and whether it is onto-theologically derived? While it is a phenomenological impudence in the first place, is the sense of arriving to think through language, post-Heideggerian, also to think language through language as thought?

The recalcitrance of language has been thereafter since reflected and established in post-aesthetics: presence, presencing, sublimated like a temporality detoxify centre, one day at a time: No past, no wrongs; just the future... neither right nor wrong, no binaries, just hope... It is from here that the stemming of, the germinating of and, gradually, the mutating of thinking, thoughts—how much it may be absolute or finite—still bears the sovereign, the individual microcosm, the unsavory singularity—expressing those hopeful insecurities of unknowability; but also emboldening the unpredictable rhizomic play of such presence or possibilities, that it exists without being seen, without being represented, implying or imploring that: “[O]ntology remains popular because we are still reluctant to yield to the Romantic’s argument that the imagination sets the bounds of thought.”<sup>305</sup> It has no direction or origin; no encumbrances or siblings. At its heart, ontology is always an orphan... lonely, but not abandoned, and therein within time; indestructible, and therein messianic.

Temporality is central because it is seen as chaotic and anarchic, open to possibility, undecidability, creativity, and therefore not subordinate or determinate by any perception of closures. The linguistic and extra-linguistic extents of historical consciousness or philosophical conceptions are also absolved of any signifier referent, giving an “anarchic character of language.”<sup>306</sup> The performative in elocutionary or the *gramme* in writing is therein an

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<sup>305</sup> Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism and Romanticism,” in *Philosophy as Cultural Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 106

<sup>306</sup> Christopher Fynsk, *The Claim of Language: A Case for the Humanities* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 59.



autolectic act, *ad infinitum*. Language is no longer [or, can no longer be] a sign system, since there is no possibility of a consensual metaphor.<sup>307</sup> The Western element of essence in language and presence in temporality is alleged, and logic surpassed its own metaphysicality, its own mathematical metaphysics. The in-between and representational relations have become inconsequentially empty, conjunctive/relative but impossible. A relation that is not a relation! Inasmuch contemporary<sup>308</sup> engagements with time and temporality today present an array of highly disorganized but experimenting and compelling focus. A preliminary survey of these efforts elicits nascent enthusiasm, motivated notably and initially by receptions for French theories<sup>309</sup>—illuminating post-success deconstruction of the subject and the destitution of language once again—but tracing its disputation with the clamor in metaphysical tradition.<sup>310</sup> This knowledge-

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<sup>307</sup> Jacques Derrida aversion to ‘metaphor’—Metaphor is never innocent—is another interesting theme, which we shall not be taking up though. See *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 17. For an extensive history of Metaphor as “dangerous,” see Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 207-71. For a full treatment of Derrida’s metaphor, see Geoffrey Bennington, “Metaphor and Analogy in Derrida,” in Zeynep Birek and Leonard Lawlor (eds.), *A Companion to Derrida* (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), pp. 89-104.

<sup>308</sup> On a definition of “contemporary”—

“What are things contemporary? Consider a late-model car. It is disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions dating from different periods. One can date it component by component: this part was invented at the turn of the century, another ten years ago... Not to mention that the wheel dates back to Neolithic times. The ensemble is only contemporary by assemblage, by its design, its finish, sometimes only by the slickness of the advertising surrounding it.”

See Michel Serres & Bruno Latour, *Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 45.

<sup>309</sup> On ‘French Theory’, and its global intellectual import beginning in late quarter of twentieth century, see Sylvere Lotringer and Sande Cohen (eds.), *French Theory in America* (New York & London: Routledge, 2001) and, more recently, François Cusset, *French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States* (trs.) Jeff Fort et. al. (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

<sup>310</sup> For a status on French philosophy, see Alan Montefiore’s “Introduction,” in Alan Montefiore (ed.), *Philosophy in France Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. vii-xxvi.

culture-market industry<sup>311</sup> has moreover proliferated into a seemingly avowed obsession, given the corpus of discourse already available or now emerging, and given the keen interest and urgency with which the same continues to be engaged.

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<sup>311</sup> On post-1960s “relationship between state-centered and market-created intellectuals,” see Niilo Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility: Institutional and Symbolic Transformations in the Post-Sartrian Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

Chapter Two:  
**The Mathematics of Being(s)**

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“Everything which is known to us has a number, for it is not possible either to perceive or to know anything at all without number.”

—Philolaus.<sup>1</sup>

“The mathematical, in the original sense of learning what one already knows, is the fundamental presupposition of all ‘academic’ work. [...] Therefore, we must now show in what sense the foundation of modern thought and knowledge is essentially mathematical.”

—Martin Heidegger.<sup>2</sup>

“Mathematics has the virtue of not presenting any interpretations. The Real does not show itself through mathematics as if upon a relief of disparate interpretations. In mathematics, the Real is shown to be deprived of sense. It follows that when mathematics turns back upon its own thought, it bears existential conflicts. This ought to give us food for thought regarding the idea that every grasping of Being, as related to existence, presupposes a decision that decisively orients thought without any guarantees or arbitration.”

—Alain Badiou.<sup>3</sup>

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**I**

Introducing Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) “Anaximander Fragment” (1946), David Farrell Krell (b. 1944), referring to the Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English lexicon version, clarifies the conflicting translation-definition of ‘Being’ (τὸν) and ‘the world of things’ (τὰ ὄντα) in Plato, as compared to the German singular

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted, in François Lasserre, *The Birth of Mathematics in the Age of Plato* (Larchmont, N.Y.: American Research Council, 1964), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?*, (trs.) W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deustsch (South Bend, Indiana: Gateway Editions, Ltd., 1967), p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> See “Mathematics is a Thought,” pp. 45-58, of Alain Badiou’s *Briefing on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology* (tr.) Norman Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 57-58.

'Being' (*Sein*) and plural 'beings' (*das Seiende*).<sup>4</sup> For Plato, as also for other Greeks, too, Farrell Krell points out, the notion of "world of things" has, actually, nothing to do with the "world" or, for that matter, "things," which, properly, belongs to "a domain of beings called εἶδη."<sup>5</sup> Rather, the Greek word ὄντα means 'truth' or 'reality'.<sup>6</sup> Alain Badiou, in turn, identifies Heidegger's φύσις (nature) as the "fundamental Greek word for being," which, in other words, "designates being's vocation for presence, in the mode of its appearing."<sup>7</sup> For the Greeks,<sup>8</sup> therefore, Being simply implies the "ontologico-temporal" (as opposed to the spatio-temporal) instantaneity of "presence" (*Anwesenheit*)<sup>9</sup>—the "idea of a

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<sup>4</sup> David Farrell Krell, "Introduction," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*, (trs.) David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, [1975] 1984), pp. 3-12, esp. pp. 7-9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> In *Logic: The Question of Truth*, Heidegger uses the terms λόγος-truth ("truth of speech") and νοῦς-truth ("truth of intuition") to give a more sustained questioning on Greek's (particularly Aristotle) formulation of how a "proposition has the property of truth." See Martin Heidegger, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, (tr.) Thoman Sheehan (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 74-103.

<sup>7</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, (tr.) Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 123.

<sup>8</sup> The Greeks understood being as *hypokeimenon* ("that which lies before, that which looms up"). The term does not have the distinctiveness or awareness of modern ego or self yet. Caroline Williams, *Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the Subject* (London and New York: The Athlone Press, 2001), pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> In the older translation of *Being and Time*, Heidegger remarks on how the ancients engage presence:

"[T]he ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented to the 'world' or 'Nature' in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 'time' that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this... is the treatment of the meaning of Being as *parousia* or *ousia*, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' (*Anwesenheit*). Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time—the 'Present' [*Gegenwart*]"

See §25, in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (trs.) John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, [1962] 2001), p. 47.

phenomenological chronology”<sup>10</sup> or “presentification of presence, offering what is veiled”<sup>11</sup>—or, Being as a perpetual “metaphysics of presence,” as Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) locates it, by implicating it as a totalizing and constant kernel in Western philosophemes:

“The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix—if you will pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to come more quickly to my principal theme—is the determination of Being as *presence* in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence—*eidos, archê, telos, energeia, ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject), *alêtheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”<sup>12</sup>

On the determination of Being, which Heidegger had initially taken up most rigorously with Aristotle, as “the fundamental question of metaphysics,” in his controversial *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935)<sup>13</sup> with the following summons—“Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”<sup>14</sup> By harping on the

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<sup>10</sup> Pre-*Being and Time*, Heidegger’s 1926 Lectures reflect the consternation between philosophical and scientific reasoning in the determination of Being: “Philosophy can make good its claim to being a science (in fact the basic science) only if we drive our common sense out of philosophical reasoning.” See Martin Heidegger, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, op. cit., p. 168.

<sup>11</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>12</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in *Writing and Difference*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278-93, esp. pp. 279-80.

<sup>13</sup> Reference to this text uses both the older and recent translations, which is indicated in the year. Refer Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, (tr.) Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1961) and Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, (trs.) Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).

<sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, (2000), op. cit., p. 77.

grammatical and etymological derivatives<sup>15</sup> of Being in *Metaphysics*, Heidegger would attempt to stabilize the essence of Being<sup>16</sup> towards a shift for the onto-ontological.<sup>17</sup> Earlier, in *Logic: The Question of Truth* (1925),<sup>18</sup> Heidegger questioned Being as presence; and, in *Being and Time* (1927), address the “sense” (*Sinn*) of Being, as Being in Time, Being as Time (*Dasein*). In fact, the ‘question of Being’ (*Seinsfrage*) and the interrogation for the overcoming of the ‘forgetfulness of Being’ (*Seinsvergessenheit*),<sup>19</sup> through its reversal “homecoming” (*heimkunft*),<sup>20</sup> and in its process of “remembering” (*Andenken*),

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<sup>15</sup> While Heidegger identifies two roots in the etymological interrogation of Being: Indo-European (Sanskrit) and both Latin and Greek, his interest and partiality (and later inquiries) lie in the verbal character of the latter. “What is most thought-provoking for Heidegger,” about the Greek’s Being as presence, “is the *coming to presence* of whatever presents itself, the Being of beings,” as Farrell Krell remarks. See Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, op. cit., p. 7.

As a passing note, it is ultimately this metaphysics, which derives its initial source of inquiry from the linguistic referent—that prompted Heidegger to take up the issue of fundamental ontology, particularly in using the temporal orders of presence (concealment/unconcealment), vis-à-vis *Dasein*.

<sup>16</sup> Although Aristotle is clear about the one-being category, there is also an implicit twofoldness in his characterization of the Greek word *phusis* (“being,” in general), which Heidegger inductively (*epagōgê*) investigates and, also, by highlighting the relations between *logos* and *eidos*, and between *sophia*, *phronêsis* and *praxis*. Moreover, Heidegger is familiar with the Latinization of the Greek work *ousia*, i.e., *substantia* (“substance”). See Walter A. Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). For a discussion on *Alêtheia*, see “The Manifold Meaning of *Alêtheia*,” in David Farrell Krell, *Intimations of Morality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being* (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), pp. 67-79.

<sup>17</sup> For the most comprehensive and yet concise study insofar focused on the ontological-metaphysical shifts in Heidegger, see Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being* (London & Atlantic Highlands: Athlone, 1996).

<sup>18</sup> Here, Heidegger attempts to locate the temporality of *Dasein* by integrating Kantian schematism presented in “Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic,” *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Martin Heidegger, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, (tr.) Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

<sup>20</sup> Based on a 1943 Lecture on Hölderlin’s elegy “Homecoming” (Franco Volpi adds Nietzsche’s influence too), Heidegger’s interlocutors do not take this word innocently. It is radically charged for his political connection with the Nazi. For a cursory reading, see Brnedan

were to remain central to Heidegger's overall investigations, i.e., albeit as a progression and as an extension of problematizing temporality. Jeff Malpas has, amongst many others, outlined the phases (which is also invariably conflicted upon, but one which is not our focus here) of Heidegger's *topological* thinking of Being, i.e., "temporalizing of space" as a *reaction* to the "dominant spatialization of time," as falling into three stages: the centering on the "meaning of being" (1910s through 1920s); the centering on the "truth of being" (1930s through mid-1940s); and, finally, the search for the "place of being" (1940s onward).<sup>21</sup> Little wonder, for, in "On the Question of Being," a 1955 letter addressed to Ernst Jünger, Heidegger attempts to clarify the meta-mathematical confusion ("the judiciary of *ratio*")<sup>22</sup> over the locating and presencing (*An-wesen*) of being, arising from the earlier destruction of metaphysics and Nietzschean readings on nihilism. And, by 1961, Heidegger was more concerned about the ontological

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O'Donoghue, *A Poetics of Homecoming: Heidegger, Homelessness and the Homecoming Venture* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011); Robert Mugerauer's *Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings* (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2008) is by and large the most comprehensive interrogation, encompassing the tradition; and, on the question of Being, see Franco Volpi, "'We Homeless Ones': Heidegger and the 'Homelessness' of Modern Man," in Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell (eds.), *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. III* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 277-283.

<sup>21</sup> See Jeff Malpas, "Heidegger's Topology of Being," in Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (ed.), *Transcendental Heidegger* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 119-134, p. 124 and Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 2006), esp. pp. 2-3, pp. 149-55.

<sup>22</sup> Here is Heidegger's full remarks:

"Reason and its representational activity are only *one* kind of thinking and are by no means self-determined. They are determined, rather, by that which has called upon thinking to think in the manner of *ratio*. That the domination of *ratio* is erecting itself as the rationalization of all order, as standardization, and as leveling out in the course of the unfolding of European nihilism, should give us just as much to think about as the accompanying attempts to flee into the irrational."

See Martin Heidegger, "On the Question of Being," in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, (ed.) William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 291-322, esp. p. 293.

predicate of being<sup>23</sup> (how “to furnish information about what is called ‘being?’”), for which he had to return<sup>24</sup> to Kant and logic.<sup>25</sup>

Heidegger’s fault, like the Greeks, like Derrida’s unassuming rejection of the entire systems of thought in Western canon, rests firstly, and firmly, in “the properly *temporal* sense of the identification of being and presence,” which remains “unquestioned” since the Greek theory of ontological truth.<sup>26</sup> Or, as Badiou questions Heidegger: “what does [Heidegger] want us to hear again when he says φύσις [nature] is the remaining-there-in-itself?” or “how can one recognize” the Greek definition of “nature” [φύσις], “written in mathematical language” via Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), from a Heideggerian position?<sup>27</sup> Recall Heidegger’s anxieties prior to the determination of Being: “Nothing arises through mere loss...[or, where] meaning unites and merges elements that were originally different.”<sup>28</sup> Heidegger’s ontological, rather than axiomatic, calculations are therein properly illustrated, even prior to the definition of the essence of Being: “What kind of *abstraction* come into play in the formation of the word *sein* [Being]?”<sup>29</sup> “Can the meaning of being... be shown through language?”<sup>30</sup> And, again, by 1947,<sup>31</sup> Heidegger’s final sourcing for Being will

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<sup>23</sup> Ted Klein, “Being as Ontological Predicate: Heidegger’s Interpretation of ‘Kant’s Thesis About Being,’” in *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1973, pp. 35-51.

<sup>24</sup> Reference, again, is to the winter semester lectures of 1925-26, published as Martin Heidegger, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, op. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Refer Martin Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis about Being,” (trs.) Ted E. Klein Jr. and William E. Pohl, in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, pp. 337-63, op. cit. The essay was originally published in 1962.

<sup>26</sup> Françoise Dastur, *Telling Time: Sketch of a Phenomenological Chronology*, (tr.) Edward Bullard (London and New Brunswick: The Athlone Press, 2000), p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* [1961], op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>29</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* [2000], op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* [1961], op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>31</sup> For the following quote by Heidegger, Heidegger attributes this statement to have been composed in 1947, which was however first published only in 1954. For this insight see note 1, Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology*, op. cit., p. 317.



smartly turn to poetry, the poetic,<sup>32</sup> in order to escape from the trappings of its own ontological logic: “But poetry that thinks is in truth the topology of Being.”<sup>33</sup> Heidegger’s determination of being/Being<sup>34</sup> therefore is an occluded departure of an ontic-ontological for the linguistic, which is actually a lazy and soft target for Derrida to easily stumble upon, since the basis on which it is grounded is on both a reductive and deductive thinking of language itself as a “representational activity.”<sup>35</sup> But, then, Derrida’s seemingly cat-mouse play does not initially engage Heidegger. It would come entirely from elsewhere, through an audit of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).<sup>36</sup> His translator John P. Leavey therefore cites David Carr’s then seminal work on phenomenology and historicity to justifiably raise doubt as to how Derrida could have had possibly ignored Heidegger in the first place, by making Husserl’s “concern with the problem of history” preeminent.<sup>37</sup> Leonard Lawlor, translator of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 1959-60

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<sup>32</sup> The poetic and Heidegger is taken up in length in Chapter 4, “The Poetic Turn(s).”

<sup>33</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Thinker as Poet,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, (tr.) Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> While duly noting Heidegger’s distinction between Being and being, I have not used it interchangeable without any reference or relevance to the same.

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger’s reading on the “metaphysical power” of Ernst Jünger’s *Gestalt* in the presencing of being, for instance, does not give a sufficient explanation or a decisive interrogation on why the “crossing over the line” still has to have remnants of “language,” which was, apart from overcoming/recovering nihilism through essence, central to the question of being. See Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, op. cit., pp. 291-322.

<sup>36</sup> Critic Peter Dews, appealing for a Merleau-Pontian/Adornian sympathy, grounds Derrida’s disillusionment with the “methodological fecundity” of structuralism as finding perfect home in the “reactivation of the *anti-relativist* impulse of Husserl’s phenomenology,” by questioning that “the meaning of objectivity is considered *de jure* prior to any objective enquiry” (p. 7). See Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London; New York: Verso, 1987), esp. Chapter One, “Jacques Derrida: The Transcendental Difference,” pp. 1-44.

<sup>37</sup> David Carr, as Leavey points out, asserts that Husserl is very much familiar with Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, a reading which he took up seriously in 1932, but “the problem of history did not arise from his acquaintance with Heidegger.” The reference alludes here to David Carr’s *Phenomenology and the Problem of History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

course notes of Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry* and a Derridean scholar-translator, too, flatly "conclude[s] that in 1962 Derrida has not read Heidegger profoundly."<sup>38</sup> Now, that is a bit strange, to uphold the primacy of Husserl in Derrida's initial and consequential readings!<sup>39</sup> However, the important point here being, for example, taking the issue of origin, which both Husserl and Heidegger took up, is—how could Derrida possibly establish his deconstruction *firstly* through Husserl *Rückfrage* (turning back) and not through Heidegger's *Rückgang* (retrogression)? Does it also imply that Husserl's departure overlaps Heidegger's *Kehre* (turn)? Or, is it actually irrelevant?

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## II

In March 1954 the young Jacques Derrida undertook a scholarly pilgrimage, the first "border crossing"<sup>40</sup> (the first "foreign country"), to Louvain, Belgium, where Edmund Husserl's unpublished manuscripts of over 40,000 pages were freshly archived since 1939.<sup>41</sup> This journey will ultimately led to the translation of Husserl's posthumously published essay [1939] *Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem* ["The origin of geometry as an intentional-historical problem"], which was originally written in 1936, with the

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<sup>38</sup> Leonard Lawlor, "*Verflechtung*: The Triple Significance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry'," in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology: Including Texts by Edmund Husserl*, (tr. and ed.) Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), pp. ix-xxxviii, esp. p. xxvi.

<sup>39</sup> Basing on Derrida's own account to Dominic Janicaud, Benoît Peeters mentions Heidegger's first introduction ("What is Metaphysics?") to the former around 1948-49 by his Algier teacher Jan Czarnecki and, also, citing the deep influence of the concept around "the nothing." Peeters, of course, defends Derrida by stating the lack of Heidegger's works in French translation, which, in a way, also stands justified but lacks any incisive comments here. See Benoît Peeters, *Derrida: A Biography*, (tr.) Andrew Brown (Cambridge; Malden: Polity, 2013), pp. 32-33.

<sup>40</sup> Catherine Malabou and Jacques Derrida, *Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida*, (tr.) David Wills (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 291.

<sup>41</sup> Benoît Peeters, *Peters, Derrida: A Biography*, op. cit., p. 67.

intention for publication in the collection of essays under *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* [1936].<sup>42</sup> Thereafter, it was Derrida's "Introduction" to the 1962 published French translation, *L'origine de la géométrie*,<sup>43</sup> which, incidentally and immediately, was also his first-ever published work, also brought him to notice. But for the English-speaking world, both the essays would be made available only in 1978—David Carr's translation of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* and John Leavey's translation of Derrida's *Introduction*. Paradoxically, the interest for Derrida across the Atlantic would come much earlier than the English-translations, when, in 1966, he delivered his first America Lecture, on "Structure, Sign and Play," to a packed audience at the John Hopkins University, Baltimore. Aside from his France assignments, United States from thereon will become his second permanent residency, in his life-long academic career.<sup>44</sup>

To understand Jacques Derrida's appeal, and thereupon French Theory's<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Published posthumously, given the circumstances, which was also Husserl's last work, *The Crisis* is not a unified book but rather a "collage," as Dermot Moran calls it, that was assembled by Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe and Walter Biemel, particularly from K-III Groups of manuscripts. Refer Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, (tr.) David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

<sup>43</sup> The introductory essay was actually completed by July 1961, entitled as "Faculty of literature and human sciences, History of colonization," and shown to Jean Hyppolite and Paul Ricoeur for reviews.

<sup>44</sup> See "Jacques Derrida in America," in Geoffrey Bennington, *Not Half No End: Militantly Melancholic Essays in Memory of Jacques Derrida* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 144-148. See, also, footnote 46, below.

<sup>45</sup> French theory, Lotringer and Cohen argue, is "an American invention, going back to at least the eighteenth century." For what is the French *pensée* (thought) is what Americans call as "theory." See Sylvère Lotringer and Sande Cohen, "Introduction: A Few Theses on French Theory in America," in Sylvère Lotringer and Sande Cohen (eds.), *French Theory in America* (New York; London: Routledge, 2001), p. 1. Similarly, Julia Kristeva takes a historico-political stand: "The most urgent and the noblest mission of French theory is, after all, that of drawing attention to human diversity in its experience of freedom. French theory is just another experience of freedom." See Julia Kristeva, "Europhilia, Europhobia." *Ibid.*, pp. 33-46, p. 46.

collective and vulnerable reception in America,<sup>46</sup> is also to equally situate the history of popular/public cultures and practices of academic scenes in the 1960s onward but that is not our main concern here.<sup>47</sup> What is pertinent remains in the revolutionary reception for Derrida, which, perhaps, may be captured in spirits in the following radical statements announced in his 1953-54 *agrégation* dissertation for the *diplôme d'études supérieures*, which failed to pass the jury that year, at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, which, also, was hurriedly written (a couple of months after his visit to Louvain), under the watchful supervision of Maurice de Gandillac (1906-2006):

“[Husserl’s] *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is the book of a disappointed mathematician. The logicism that was then triumphant in the philosophy of mathematics was becoming one with the antipsychologism of Natorp. It is

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<sup>46</sup> While there are some who accord Derrida’s influence in France in the 1960s and 70s, preceded by Roland Barthes but, alongwith, including Michel Foucault, as incarnating the “French intellectual ideal” [Niilo Kauppi, p. 77], there is a contested view that by 1980s, when French Theory was beginning to take roots in American campuses (through Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Francois Lyotard, including Derrida), there was a tendency to “demonize” them in France as “the epitome of an outdated ‘libidinal’ and leftist type of politics.” See François Cusset, *French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States*, (tr.) Jeff Fort (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. xviii and Niilo Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility: Institutional and Symbolic Transformations in the Post-Satirian Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). As a reference, here, the successful and widely respected *Yale French Studies*, published by Yale University, was already in circulation since 1948.

See, also, Michael Naas, “Derrida’s America,” pp. 118-137, and Peggy Kamuf, “The affect of America,” pp. 138-150, both written with personal accounts of Jacques Derrida in American, in Simon Gledinning and Robert Eaglestone (eds.), *Derrida’s Legacies: Literature and Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

For a short and general comment on Derrida’s reception, including John Searle’s “Reply,” see Leslie Hill, *The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially Chapter 4, “Reception and further reading,” pp. 115-129.

<sup>47</sup> For quick reference purpose, see the various essays in Stephen Macedo (ed.), *Reassessing the Sixties: Debating the Political and Cultural Legacy* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), especially the essays by Sheldon Wolin, Walter Berns and Alan Wolfe under “Part Two: The Universities and Education.”

not well able to explain autonomous forms of mathematics and to situate them in the concrete life of consciousness. Prisoners of a psychological or logical conception of consciousness, the logicians of that time used to *preserve the objectivity of mathematical meanings only by isolating them in their origin from any consciousness*. But if one keeps to ideal mathematical forms, atemporal regulators of all the acts that aim at them, neither the progress of mathematics as a whole, nor the concrete possibility of any actual operation, of any synthesis, can be understood. For these cannot take place without an act of consciousness."<sup>48</sup>

It is not a regular feature for Derridean scholars to mention him debunking the mathematical inconsistencies of Husserl or, far more uninterestingly, expositing his works using mathematical signs. There is however a dense mathematical expression in Derrida, although incomparable with his contemporaries like Gilles Deleuze (1925-95) or Alain Badiou (b. 1937), for instance, or Husserl himself. Derrida's masters dissertation [*mémoire*], of course, was published much later, and, therefore, was not publicly accessible till then.<sup>49</sup> The *agrégation* dissertation in hindsight, in spite of its youthful energy, was ambitiously novel in philosophical investigations: an outright subversion of the mathema in humanism and anthropologism. Similarly, prior to the publication of *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction* (hereafter, *EHOG*), in circulation publicly but limitedly available, again, is Derrida's first paper presentation in 1959, at Cerisy-la-Salle, entitled "'Genèse et structure' et la phénoménologie," which, later on, was published in 1965, in French, as an essay for an edited volume.<sup>50</sup> An overall overhauling of Husserl appears later in *Speech and Phenomena*, which retains the preliminary investigations but which, by then, also

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<sup>48</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*, (tr.) Marian Hobson (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 16. Italics, in stress, mine.

<sup>49</sup> The original French version appeared only in 1990 and the English-translated version in 2003, under the heading *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*.

<sup>50</sup> On the French edition, Simon Critchley's additional note is a useful clarification. See *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, [1992] 2014), esp. entry under footnote 12, pp. 98-99. The English version appears as "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology," in Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., pp. 154-158.

presents Derrida's comprehensive positions for a language-centric break from an anthropo-centric tradition.<sup>51</sup> Derrida's reference to Husserl's *weak mathematics* was since long forgotten by then! Between 1956 and 1960—the year he graduated and the year he took up an assistantship at Sorbonne—Derrida married Marguerite Aucouturier, went to Harvard as an exchange student, and had completed his twenty-seven months military service without “uniform,” serving as an assistant teacher at Koléa, Algeria and, also, served as a teacher at Le Mans, which is accounted as one of the most trying times in his life.

The brief digression on the historical development of Derrida's philosophy is necessary. For, what we know of the earliest philosophical works and orientation of Derrida till the 1962 publication of *EHOG*—is his 1959 paper presentation and the 1954 unpublished dissertation.<sup>52</sup> A passing remark: Michel Foucault's *History of Madness*, which was the focus of Derrida's first public lecture (“Cogito and the history of madness”)<sup>53</sup> at Paris' Collège Philosophique, on 4 March, 1963, was rather an outcome of the wide reception that came about with his 43-pages *Origin* translation and 170-pages *Introduction* (this refers to the first and French edition), which ironically won the Jean Cavallès Prize in 1964, instituted in memory of a philosopher of logic. A note, also, of reminder: it is not the objective here to make a comparative analysis of the insofar first three available works of

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<sup>51</sup> It is difficult to establish this position (and it remain speculative) since Derrida preoccupations are invariable to a history of philosophy, implicit or explicit, with *Of Grammatology* being the nearest exception, though. Leonard Lawlor's investigation appropriately discusses the anti-humanity in Derrida (via Hegel via Jean Hyppolite). See Chapter 5, “The Root, That Is Necessarily One, of Every Dilemma: An Investigation of the *Introduction to Husserl's* ‘The Origin of Geometry’, in Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 88-142.

<sup>52</sup> Derrida's translated work of Husserl (i.e., *The Origin of Geometry*) appeared as Edmund Husserl, *L'Origine de la géométrie* Paris: PUF 1962 (cf. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Amsterdam: M. Nijhoff, *Husserliana*, Vol. 6, 1954: pp. 365-386). Source: “Bibliography of Works by Jacques Derrida,” at: <http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/jdyr.html> <accessed 26 June, 2015>

<sup>53</sup> The essay is part of Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, op. cit.

Derrida. The digression on Derrida's early works is also not an attempt to evaluate a young and mature Derrida.<sup>54</sup> Rather, what is properly significant and astounding here is Derrida's rather sole preoccupation with Edmund Husserl's phenomenology (particularly the *Origin of Geometry*<sup>55</sup>)—which was also the univocal basis on which the entire tradition of western metaphysics of presence was critiqued upon. In fact, Leonard Lawlor says that the “‘germinal structure’ of Derrida's entire thought” can be situated only “in relation to Husserl's philosophy.”<sup>56</sup> Now, that could be intimidating, considering Derrida's massive corpus of works.

Derrida's interrogation of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* is altruistically founded on the “irreducibly complex” problems of origin(s), i.e., of “historicity” [*Geschichtlichkeit*]. It is important to note here about how Derrida's translator John P. Leavey prudently warns us about the then current circulation of another equivalent term for *Geschichtlichkeit*— “temporality”—which Heidegger uses in *Being and Time*. But Derrida, till then, has no interest in Heidegger's metaphysics or ontology. Of course, Derrida's treatment on Heidegger's ontotheological questions on origin, in problematizing the entrenchment of impossible presence,<sup>57</sup> comes much later (starting with the “Anaximander Fragment”

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<sup>54</sup> For such similar attempt, see Joshua Kates, *Derrida and the Development of Deconstruction* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).

<sup>55</sup> *EHOG*, passim. Husserl main texts for *EHOG*'s include: *Cartesian Meditations* (1931 [French], 1931 [English], 1950 [German]); *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936/1954); *Experience and Judgement* (1939); *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929); *Logical Investigations* (1900 [Vol. I] & 1901 [Vol. II]); *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (1928); and *Concerning the Concept of Number* (1887).

<sup>56</sup> Leonard Lawlor's comments are not entirely wrong but it is in the context of his translation of Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, (tr.) Leonard Lawlor (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), p. xi. Like, Lawlor, as our investigation develops, I also endorse this position.

<sup>57</sup> In fact one can say that Derrida's serious engagement with Heidegger started concomitantly through the Lectures in 1964 with the philosophical question of the anthropological being, in conjunction with Emmanuel Levinas, in “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.” See *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., pp. 79-153.

through *Being and Time*), or, specifically, with the first seminar course he ran on the latter at the École Normale Supérieure between 1964-65.<sup>58</sup> Leavey, one notes again, further, tried to rightly influence the readers into accepting “historicity” as Husserl’s actual direction of thought, by citing the strong assertions of David Carr<sup>59</sup> and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), too. Whereas, David Hoy, who is familiar with Derrida’s direct avoidance to address the distinction between historicity and temporality in the “Introduction,” cautiously refers him as a “subtler philosopher.”<sup>60</sup> This—although Hoy justifies the same by referring to Derrida’s later engagement with messianicity—is however an exaggeration since the question of Walter Benjamin’s deconstruction of universal history is yet to figure at all just then. This misleading pattern is also glaringly recognizable in the archival-intensive work of Edward Baring’s *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy*, which particularly fails to highlight the contradistinction in Derrida’s early thoughts on Husserl with Heidegger’s.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, the tendencies are all too

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Derrida’s other major readings on Heidegger include: questions on writing (*écriture*) under some sections in *Of Grammatology* (1967); the issue of time in “Ousia and Grammê,” in *Margins of Philosophy* (1972); conjunctural reading with Nietzsche’s “Truth” and “Style” in *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles* (1974); review of “Origin of the Work of Art” in *Truth in Painting* (1976); the political language of “spirit” (*Geist*) based on Rectoral Address in *Of Spirit* (1987); metaphysics in *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2002); and the *Geschlecht* (I -IV) project series (1983, 1985, 1953, and 1989).

<sup>58</sup> Edited by Thomas Dutoit, a French edition of these lectures is available since 2013. The English translation (by Geoffrey Bennington) is presently not available yet. My source references are therefore from David Farrell Krell’s *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015).

<sup>59</sup> David Carr is also Husserl’s *The Origin and Crisis* translator. See, esp. Note 35, in John P. Leavey, “Preface,” Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, (tr.) John P. Leavey (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, [1978] 1989), pp. 10-11.

<sup>60</sup> David Couzens Hoy, *The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 2009), p. 165.

<sup>61</sup> Edward Baring, *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-68* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 191.



clear amongst leading Derridean or Heideggerian scholars to easily obfuscate the role played by Husserl on Derrida's most illustrative pattern of thought.<sup>62</sup>

Also, another quick reminder here: Derrida's full-scale treatment of Husserlian temporality was already initiated in 1954—"reducing temporality to an eidetic structure that has already been constituted by an originarity that is atemporal"—in *The Problem of Genesis*.<sup>63</sup> In the section "The Becoming of Logic," Derrida enumerates his main problem with Husserl's puzzling situating of genesis/origin on pure logic ("prefiguration of a teleology"<sup>64</sup>), i.e., by conflating the empirical and ideal (or uniting the binary conditions of formalism and psychologism). Husserl, accuses Derrida, was eager to flaunt his departure from the Aristotle-Scholastics-Kant tradition but refuses to shed the 'infinite task of philosophy' with the "pure phenomenological sense."<sup>65</sup> This continuity, maintained in *EHO*, is further elaborated in *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), which unmistakably pronounces that the "omnitemporality of ideal objects is but a mode of temporality."<sup>66</sup> Husserl's phenomenology, describes Derrida, is but "classical ontology."<sup>67</sup> Similarly, in Derrida's deconstruction of origin and genesis, which is the most coextensive in his summons for Husserl (and, later, Heidegger, of course) including on being and language—it is otherwise the sheer challenge or, rather, attempt in positing a non-mathematical and non-logical attempt to situate an ontological rhetoric of temporality and historicity that is

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<sup>62</sup> Particularly so is the case of Françoise Dastur, a student of Derrida and a Heideggerian scholar. She says that "if it is clear that Derrida discovered" through Husserl the deconstructing of logocentrism or phonocentrism, it is "nevertheless Heidegger's thinking that constitutes not only his major reference, but the very milieu, the 'element' of his philosophical enterprise." See "Derrida's reading of Heidegger," in Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.), *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 273-98, esp. p. 273.

<sup>63</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., pp. 46-47.

<sup>66</sup> See, especially, "The Voice That Keeps Silence," in Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, (tr.) David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 70-87, p. 83.

<sup>67</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 22.

less settling than the resolve on closures of metaphysics. This, of course, is our key interest.

In retrospect, no significant attention has been given to Derrida's first major work, described as "one of the least well known."<sup>68</sup> In fact, *EHOG* can be roughly described as a continuation of an attempt to locate a post-mathematical ontology of origins (something like a *there is* vs. *already there*), by using what Derrida already calls as an "originary and dialectical synthesis of being and time."<sup>69</sup> An ambivalent silence therein belies a primary core of influence to Derrida's intensive and extensive scholarship and, inasmuch, to the proliferation of a vast body of Derridean interrogators today, too. Although the question of sense-history is obvious in Derrida's earliest preoccupation with Husserl, it will be an understatement to say that, in the words of John Leavey, the overall concern was merely to "understand phenomenology as it is '*stretched* between the *finitizing* consciousness of its final *principle* and the *infinetizing* consciousness of its final *institution*' ... the dialectic... of phenomenon and idea."<sup>70</sup> Rather, the central thesis of Derrida's temporal critique—and this is most important for our context—is the embodiment of a "synthetic style of mathematical tradition,"<sup>71</sup> which he uses in the "apriori determination"<sup>72</sup> of the unity of geometry (or objects of ideality, of sense). In fact, Derrida rejection of Husserl is at once an impossible question of

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<sup>68</sup> Vladimir Tasić, "Poststructuralism and Deconstruction: A Mathematical History," in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 177-98, p. 182.

<sup>69</sup> Derrida, quoted (p. 63). Critiquing Derrida's "originary dialectic is not pure," Leonard Lawlor argues that Derrida himself "realizes that, no matter how complete, the transcendental reduction cannot completely eliminate the 'already constituted' and reach the origin of the world." History, therein, is "always 'already there' before transcendental constitution" (pp. 62-63). Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl*, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> See, esp. Note 35, in John P. Leavey, "Preface," Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

<sup>71</sup> Apropos footnote 48. Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

“methodological rule” or “technique.”<sup>73</sup> The unity of the world, science, geometry, or mathematics (what Derrida uses interchangeably) is not based on “the finite totality of sentient beings, but as the infinite totality of possible experiences in space in general,” which is facilitated by the “primordial concrete sense of geometry.”<sup>74</sup> This may be alluded to as an attempt to critique Cantor’s set theory by inserting a temporal dimension unto it.<sup>75</sup> In other words, it is the “definiteness” of a unity of time and space (the old rule of omniscient and omnipresent) where Derrida has cultivated problems with mathematics playing the role of God. It is within the scope of this brevity that our interest here is to reexamine the seminal text of Derrida’s *EHOG* as a corporeal reading onto the other corpus, rather than vice versa, or by superimposing its entirety.<sup>76</sup>

On the poor interest accorded to the singularity of *EHOG* these days, Rudolf Bernet’s kind of rueful comments<sup>77</sup> have become the standard reference of woes,

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 53. Also, in his “Preface to the 1953/54 Dissertation,” Derrida maintains the same position: “It is not here a question of a necessity of method or of technique” since “the shape that we will give to our accounts is intimately and dialectically linked to an answer to the problems posed speculatively.” See Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., pp. xxii-xxiii.

<sup>74</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>75</sup> See, below, footnote 258.

<sup>76</sup> Geoffrey Bennington reiterates that Derrida’s “early work is quite plausibly thought to be about origins... to identify an origin for deconstruction itself... The deconstruction of the origin, the *arkhê*, entails a concomitant deconstruction of the *telos* [too] and thereby the whole ‘arche-teleological’ structure that metaphysics is.” Bennington further points out that what “has been perceived as a shift in later Derrida toward more obviously ethico-political concerns might better be described as an often subtle change of emphasis from deconstruction of *arkhê* to deconstruction of *telos*, which was itself there from the beginning.” See “Forum: The Legacy of Jacques Derrida,” in Emily Apter et al. (eds.), *PMLA*, Vol. 120, No. 2, March 2005, pp. 464-494, esp. p. 470.

An observant point here is how the guarded thesis developed in *The Origin* is consistently and centrally reflected throughout all his other works. What I proposed to do here is to merely to take the debate further by examining Derrida’s methodological formulates developed on historicity and being.

<sup>77</sup> Rudolf Bernet bluntly finds it “surprising” that the “first work of Derrida has been more or less equally ignored by the standard interpreters of Husserl’s work and by the

but also reaffirming quick fixes for Husserlian summarization or displaying academic impatience paramount in continental preoccupation.<sup>78</sup> Other works that have playfully revisited *EHO*G include: Paola Marrati's *Genesis and Trace*,<sup>79</sup> an excellent and evaluative work, which is also the most authoritative work till today, but having little to say on the mathematical tradition Derrida was essentially critiquing in Husserl. Similarly, from a phenomenological perspective, Burt Hopkins insightful interlocution highlights the methodological departures of reading: "Derrida challenges not so much the specific nature of the decisions that Husserl makes, but rather the, for him, one basic (and no doubt more decisive) question of the decidability of the issues with respect to which Husserl makes his decisions."<sup>80</sup> And, coming from the fraternity of contemporary formal mathematicians, Brian Rotman's apprehensions are worth referring too. Expressing surprise over the lack of any diagrams in Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, either for illustration or explication or comment purpose, and, considering Derrida's extended two-hundred page systematic reading of Husserl, too, which is "likewise silent about the significance of diagrams vis-à-vis

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supporters of Derrida's thought." See Rudolf Bernet, "On Derrida's 'Introduction' to Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*," in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), *Derrida and Deconstruction* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 135-148, p. 135. Also, Rudolf Bernet, "Is the Present Ever Present? Phenomenology of the Metaphysics of Presence," in Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton and Gina Zavota (eds.), *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. III* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 273-298.

<sup>78</sup> The same is true of recent studies, as in Yannis Stamos, *Speech, Writing and Phenomenology: Derrida's Reading of Husserl*, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, June 2008, Unpublished PhD Thesis.

<sup>79</sup> Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace: Derrida's Reading Husserl and Heidegger* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

<sup>80</sup> Derrida's reading of Husserl, Hopkins highlights, gave two conclusions: (1) "that the 'irreducible proximity of language to primordial thought' [*Introduction to Origin*, p. 70] is something which 'eludes by nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality'" and (2) "the legitimate scope of Husserl's phenomenological reductions reaches its limit with the uncovering of the intertwining of *arche* and *telos* in the historicity that is announced by the sense (*Sinn*) of every fact." See Burt C. Hopkins, "Husserl and Derrida on the Origin of Geometry," in William R. McKenna and J. Claude Evans (eds.), *Derrida and Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 1995), pp. 61-94, esp. pp. 64-65.

alphabetic texts as well as silent about Husserl's several silences," Rotman disapprovingly rues over "twentieth-century example of the tradition's insensitivity."<sup>81</sup> "Diagrams," for Rotman, is "the study of spatial extension, is an inherently 'pictorial' domain of mathematics, in that—regardless of its various algebraic representations and axiomatizations—diagrams are inseparable from the ideas geometry studies and the means by which it furthers itself."<sup>82</sup> Similarly, given that the language of mathematics itself is "vast and never-finished,"<sup>83</sup> as Rotman interjects, Derrida's privileging of [literally, here] *writing* proposes to polarize virtual writing vs. arche writing.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, an important reference that has been largely ignored is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 1956-58 course notes on Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*,<sup>85</sup> published two years prior to Derrida's *EHO*. However, *EHO* suffers total ignorance to this save a disconnect but brief mention of Merleau-Ponty. Leonard Lawlor, for one, finds important convergences in the late readings of Merleau-Ponty and early reading of Derrida on Husserl, especially on the place of *writing* as constituting "ideal objects."<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Brian Rotman, *Becoming Beside Ourselves: The Alphabet, Ghosts, and Distributed Human Being* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 125.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>83</sup> Consider Brian Rotman's definition of mathematics:

"[M]athematics is essentially a symbolic practice resting on a vast and never-finished language—a perfectly correct but misleading description, since by common usage and etymology 'language' is identified with speed, whereas one doesn't speak mathematics but writes it. Equally important, one doesn't speak mathematics but write or notates speech; rather, one 'writes' in some other, more originating and constitutive sense."

See *Mathematics as Sign: Writing, Imaging, Counting* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. ix.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>85</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology: Including Texts by Edmund Husserl*, (tr. and ed.) Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002).

<sup>86</sup> Especially see the comparison between Derrida's "non presence" (and therefore metaphysics of presence) and Merleau-Ponty's "originary non-presentability." Lawlor concludes that:

Lawlor's insights are masterly and at the same time are the most extensive works available insofar on Derrida's interrogation of Husserl, including *EHOG*.<sup>87</sup>

In retrospect, Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*, written forty-five years after the immature *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, as Gina Zavota points out, still faithfully adheres to the principles enumerated in the erstwhile concept of multiplicity and number. Zavota's basis of critiquing Husserl's mathematical analysis is based on the element of the "authentic" (self-evidence), which was earlier argued in "The authentic concepts of multiplicity, unity and whole number," as the three foundations of arithmetic, as expressing not only a "logical construction, but rather through experience in which their proper objects are intuitively present to consciousness."<sup>88</sup> Where knowledge has been linguistically codified, there is production of a sort of self-evident identity (i.e., "authentic") "that ultimately leads to the objectivity of geometrical knowledge."<sup>89</sup> Thereon, different commentaries notwithstanding, Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* or, rather, Derrida's reading of Husserl, has been limitedly summarized or debated under the following simplistic rubrics of definitions and equations:

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"Derrida and Merleau-Ponty are still trying to think through Husserl's discovery of intentionality. Merleau-Ponty is putting the silence of Husserl's thought into language, while Derrida is bringing Husserl's language into an intuition. We must conclude: Husserl's spirit is coming to presence in Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, and therefore Husserl could have no greater legacy."

Leonard Lawlor, "The Legacy of Husserl's 'Ursprung der Geometrie': The Limits of Phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida," in Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (eds.), *Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl* (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, 2002), pp. 201-223, esp. p. 223. Also, see, how Merleau-Ponty, like Derrida, "recognizes the irreducible role of writing," in Leonard Lawlor, "Verflechtung: The Triple Significance of Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry,'" in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, op. cit., pp. ix-xxxviii, esp. p. x.

<sup>87</sup> Esp. Leonard Lawlor, "The Root, That Is Necessarily One," op. cit.

<sup>88</sup> Gina Zavota, "'The Origin of Geometry' and the Phenomenology of Number," in Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton and Gina Zavota (eds.), *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. II* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 236-49, p. 236-37.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 246.

- Ideality of mathematical objects [is geometrically derived, or there is a finite geometrical truth]
- Origin of Ideal Objects [Derrida's problem is one of cognition, intuition and perception: how do we know its originality-originary<sup>90</sup> (“*essence-of-the-first-time*”)]
- Ideal objects = [*Sinn*] sense<sup>91</sup>
- Sense = ideality [language, truth, Being, Living Present]
- Ideality = the intuitive “source of all sense and history”<sup>92</sup> and therein “[i]deality is a determination of being, of being as presence.”<sup>93</sup>

These running commentaries are entirely right but indeed limited to the usual regressive process of situating the phenomenological impossibility of presencing posited in the Husserlian movement of *Rückfrage* (“the inquiry back” or as “questioning back into genesis”) that oscillates between the disparate polarities of the ideal and the sensual. What I propose to do here is to look at the mathematical logic Derrida saw in Husserl's geometry and highlight the brief invocation of Kurt Gödel, which also led to the mathematico-historical location of a spatio-temporal Being in “origin” and, subsequently, “différance,” which is to say, there is an integral preeminence of a quasi-mathematical<sup>94</sup> logic informing Derrida's deconstruction and reading projects. The rather bold attempt in

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<sup>90</sup> The “‘ideal’ and the ‘idetic,’” for Hopkins, “are not the same for Husserl.” See Burt C. Hopkins, “Husserl and Derrida on the Origin of Geometry,” op. cit., esp. p. 73.

<sup>91</sup> Again, for Burt C. Hopkins, the equation is historicity=tradition=sense. Ibid., esp. p. 66.

<sup>92</sup> John P. Leavey, “Preface,” Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>93</sup> Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace*, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>94</sup> Meaning to say, as against Rodolphe Gasché's reading of Derrida's metaphoricity as “quasi-transcendental.” By prefixing “quasi,” Gasché defends that “metaphoricity has a structure and a function similar to transcendentals without actually being one. [...] [It has the] conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the very conceptual difference between subject and object and even between *Dasein* and Being.” See *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, [1986] 1997), pp. 316-17.

Derrida in critiquing the entire canons of western thoughts using the axiom of presence, originally and majorly evolved from testing the limits of Husserl, is, however, not without a sense of mathematical weariness for the traditional formalism of a historico-intentional analysis, already outlined in *The Problem of Genesis*, which also found fertile grounds for the young Derrida (at twenty-four) to quickly and also inevitably plant an early position:

“In spite of the immense philosophical revolution that Husserl undertook, he remains the prisoner of a great classical tradition: the one that reduces human finitude to an accident of history, to an ‘essence of man’ that understands temporality against the background of a possible or actual eternity in which it has or could have participated. Discovering the *a priori* synthesis of being and of time as foundation of any genesis and every meaning, Husserl, to save the rigor and purity of ‘phenomenological idealism’, did not open up the transcendental reduction and did not adjust his method. To this extent, his philosophy cries out to be overtaken in a way that will only be a prolongation or, inversely, for a radical explicitation that will be a veritable conversion.”<sup>95</sup>

As to the teleological pervasiveness of a mathematico-logical determination (shifting, later, to teleology of “logocentrism,” or “phonocentrism”), namely, ‘temporality’, ‘passive genesis’, and ‘alter ego’,<sup>96</sup> Derrida specifically highlights Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry*,<sup>97</sup> which enable him to understand the technique and, subsequently, validate his initial recluses.<sup>98</sup> So early, and—yet Husserl’s influence remains lasting and central, which is reiterated in Derrida’s 2 June 1980 Thesis Defense:

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<sup>95</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>96</sup> Benoît Peeters, *Derrida: A Biography*, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>97</sup> “In this text of twenty pages,” one recalls Derrida in saying about the *Origin* as “one of Husserl’s most beautiful, [where] the author proposes to retrace the intentional genesis of Geometry and thus to define, through this example, the type of analysis by which it must always be possible to grasp again the transcendental originality of a historical production of consciousness at its very birth.” See Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

<sup>98</sup> Refer, above, footnote 73.



“Naturally, all of the problems worked on in the Introduction to *The Origin of Geometry* have continued to organize the work I have subsequently attempted in connection with philosophical, literary and even non-discursive corpora, most notably that of pictorial works: I am thinking, for example, of the historicity of ideal objects, of tradition, of inheritance, of filiation or of wills and testaments, of archives, libraries, books, of writing and living speech, of the relationships between semiotics and linguistics, of the question of truth and of undecidability, of the irreducible otherness that divides the self-identity of the living present, of the necessity for *new analyses concerning non-mathematical idealities*.”<sup>99</sup>

Accrued from a reading of early Derrida thereof, what we have first is the anthropological question of human nature, or the “essence of man,” or on the empirical or transcendental basis of how the faculties work, or on how the phenomenological sensory is experienced, or on how the psychology of the empirical is constituted... and its relation with the cognitive or immanent structures of embodiment, including intuition and language, which is also a pervasiveness in the tradition on humanism (“human sciences”).<sup>100</sup> Derrida indeed “discover[s] that writing is an irreducible condition for sense and perception [but] nevertheless [realizes that] although [it is] a condition for knowledge, writing is not an intuition and cannot be determined by intuition.”<sup>101</sup> Second, how Derrida smartly dresses-up his critique of Husserl through Kant, which *inter alia* ambitiously targets the tradition of western metaphysics, is not without curiosity or a background. Following the two major mathematical triumphs<sup>102</sup> in the seventeenth-century, post-Galileo’s scientific revolution, the

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<sup>99</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” (tr.) Kathleen McLaughlin, in Alan Montefiore (ed.), *Philosophy in France Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 39-40. Italics, mine.

<sup>100</sup> Lawlor can be attributed as successfully problematizing the first reading of Derrida’s reading of Husserl *Origin of Geometry*, via the Hegel-Hyppolite route. See Chapter 5, Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl*, op. cit.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>102</sup> Seventeenth-century mathematics, Felix Browder points out, has two triumphs:

nineteenth-century precluding Husserl's period too is not without excitement with Kant's all-out formulations, basing entirely on mathematics.<sup>103</sup> Similarly, through René Descartes and François Vieta, algebra replaced traditionally Greek-influenced deductive methods in mathematics (which, now, relied on calculations and symbolic or diagrammatic expressions, charting the practice of formalism and calculus). Derrida's dreariness for this tradition of conflating time and being, as developed in *EHOG* and as stated in his thesis defense too, is apparently justified in a need of "the necessity for new analyses concerning non-mathematical idealities."<sup>104</sup> And, so—what exactly is Derrida's alternative on objective idealities, or an analysis that is non-mathematical, or, electively, justifications for raising such objections? The line of limits in the tradition was clearly drawn:

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"The first was the creation of an analytic geometry through which the geometric structure of space could be transformed by coordinatization into the subject matter of algebraic analysis. The second was the invention of the great analytic engine of the differential and integral calculus, by which the sophisticated and difficult arguments by exhaustion of Eudoxos and Archimedes for handling infinite processes were replaced by much simpler and more manageable algebraic formulae or calculi. This was the tool with which Newton built his great mathematical world-machine, the central paradigm for the scientific world pictures of all succeeding ages."

See Felix E. Browder, "Mathematics and the Sciences," in William Aspray & Philip Kitcher (eds.), *History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 278-92, p. 289

<sup>103</sup> As Kant puts it in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*—"In every special doctrine of nature, only so much science proper can be found as there is mathematics in it." See Immanuel Kant, *Philosophy of Material Nature and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. (tr.) James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), p. 6. Moreover, to note, that Immanuel Kant knows nothing of, if not contributed anything towards, mathematics but indeed taught mathematics for a decade—see, for a serious and well-documented account, Gottfried Martin, *Arithmetic and Combinatorics: Kant and His Contemporaries*, (tr. & ed.) Judy Wubnig (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985).

<sup>104</sup> See, footnote 99, above, for the full quote. Also, quoted, Jacques Derrida, in John P. Leavey, "Coda," in Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 186.

“The mathematical object seems to be the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding Husserl’s reflection. This is because the mathematical object is *ideal*. Its being is thoroughly transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality. Absolutely objective, i.e., totally rid of empirical subjectivity, it nevertheless is only what it appears to be.”<sup>105</sup>

Recall Derrida’s earlier reading of Husserl’s *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), for his *agrégation mémoire*, as the “book of a disappointed mathematician,” revealing mounted frustration, not just for the content of the book but also for the writer himself.<sup>106</sup> And, this is not without historical verity. For, it was not only Derrida who first showered expletives on Husserl, who was simply trying to improve his teacher’s, i.e., Karl Weierstrass (1815-1897), origin of numbers using Franz Brentano’s method of descriptive psychology. Earlier, Gottlob Frege, too, discredits Husserl’s *Philosophy of Arithmetic*—which proudly proposes itself as the “true philosophy of the calculus” and equates the conceptual origins of natural numbers through a process of mental abstraction—as an exhibitionistic case of mixing “psychology and logic,”<sup>107</sup> where “everything becomes a

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>106</sup> Recall the quote, footnote 48, above.

<sup>107</sup> The distinction between the boundaries of logic and psychology is pertinent to Frege’s naturalistic empiricist critique, where *thoughts* are proper to the scientific establishment of truth, rather than *subjective ideas*:

“[I]t falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. [...] Laws of nature are the generalization of natural occurrences with which the occurrences are always in accordance. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth. This is, to be sure, not a matter of what happens so much as of what is. Rules for asserting, thinking, judging, inferring, follow from the laws of truth. And thus one can very well speak of laws of thought too. But there is an imminent danger here of mixing different things up[!] Perhaps the expression ‘law of thought’ is interpreted by analogy with ‘law of nature’ and the generalization of thinking as a mental occurrence is meant by it. A law of thought in this sense would be a psychological law. And so one might come to believe that logic deals with the mental process of thinking and the psychological laws in accordance with which it takes place. This would be a misunderstanding of the task of logic, for truth has not been given the place which is its due here. [...] In order to avoid this misunderstanding and to prevent the blurring of the boundary

presentation [*Vorstellung*]... the objects are presentation.”<sup>108</sup> After Frege’s harsh critique over psychologism, the reclusive absence of Husserl (about fourteen years in self-exile) is punctuated by the publication of the first volume *Logical Investigations* (1900), with a prefatory note clarifying his earlier positions.<sup>109</sup> Moving away from the general perceptions among scholars that such a clarification imply that Husserl was departing from his earlier ‘guilt’ and “fundamental error” of “presentation of number and seeking the ‘psychological origin’ of the concept of number,” Philip Miller defends the development of Husserl’s thoughts by pinpointing that he was not even referring to the earlier studies on number but rather underlying the logical methods for Volume II of *Logical Investigations* (1901).<sup>110</sup> We shall however limit our comments on Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and successors beyond this point. Instead, looking at whether Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence was informed and

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between psychology and logic, I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not of assertion or thought. The meaning of the word ‘true’ is explained by the laws of truth.”

See Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” (trs.) Mr. P.T. Geach, in *Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy*, Vol. LXV, No. 259, [1918] 1956, pp 289-311, esp. pp. 289-290.

<sup>108</sup> Husserl, quoted, in Marvin Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1943), p. 55. Also, noting Frege’s argument against Husserl’s defence of “numbers in themselves,” purportedly to illustrate objectivity, Marvin Farber highlights that it is based on “if my presentation of a number is not the number itself, then the ground is removed from under the psychological point of view, so far as the investigation of number is concerned. [Therefore] there is obviously a great difference between investigating a number-presentation itself and a presentation of a real object” (pp. 56-57).

<sup>109</sup> In the foreword to the 1900 first edition in German, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, Husserl thus remark:

“A regards my frank critique of psychologistic logic and epistemology, I have but to recall Goethe’s saying: There is nothing to which one is more severe than the errors that one has just abandoned.”

In Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, (tr.) J.N. Findlay (London and New York: Routledge, [1970] 2001), p. 3.

<sup>110</sup> J. Philip Miller, *Numbers in Presence and Absence: A Study of Husserl’s Philosophy of Mathematics* (The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), esp. pp. 19-30.

formulated because of the “limitations of both philosophical language and philosophical concepts,” as Gary Gutting maintains,<sup>111</sup> which is also a kind of standard and most commented interpretation now,<sup>112</sup> or whether the “indeterminacy” category of the mathematical is used analogously to influence an ontology of impossibility, or whether “incomprehensibility,” like any excuses from the usual detractors, as is the norm, is composite in situating the limits of mathematical ideality of objects—is a trajectory calling for tangency and one that appears uncomfortable to be addressed yet. To arrive at this, we observe that Derrida’s premise of assessing the phenomenologico-mathematical is initially marked by a twin critique of, first, how historicity and continuities subsist congruently (and therein the question of origin) and, second, the pervading sense of ideality and identity to access such reaches (and therein the question of logos and truth). Husserl’s accord on language or signification in *Origin of Geometry*, according to Derrida, “produces truth or ideality rather than records it.”<sup>113</sup> It is therefore not mere coincidence (as mentioned earlier) that Husserl’s *Lebenswelt* (or how the immediacy of experience is constituted or consciousness correlates with the origin truth of static geo-metric experience) and how the urge for a transcendental genesis in *The Crisis of European Sciences* intersect prominently in Derrida’s *EHOG*, which is suspected as merely positioning a phenomenological garb of post-existentialist and post-humanist anxieties in the France of 1950s.<sup>114</sup> Or, whether the mathematical contingency of the day prompted the early and radical departure of Derrida’s thought into a quasi-mathematical or metamathematical philosophy is debatable but, also, remains

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<sup>111</sup> Gary Gutting, *Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 [2013]), p. 152

<sup>112</sup> Refer Burt C. Hopkins, “Derrida’s Reading of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*: Ontologism and the metaphysics of presence,” in *Husserl Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1985, pp. 193-214. See, also, David B. Allison, “Derrida’s Critique of Husserl,” op. cit., pp. 89-99.

<sup>113</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>114</sup> Edward Baring, *The Young Derrida*, op. cit., esp. Chapter 5, “The God of mathematics: Derrida and the *Origin of Geometry*,” pp. 146-81.

largely speculative.<sup>115</sup>

Also recall Husserl's earlier attempts to situate the historical determination and constitution of objectivity in *Logical Investigations* (1901-01)—and the objective limits encountered in the determination of being. James Mensch<sup>116</sup> insightfully argues that Husserl's "universal sense of being" is featured synonymously with "object." "Being *qua* knowledge," Mensch argues, "is understood as being *qua* object of knowledge." The result, therein, implies that "being stands in relation to consciousness precisely through its character of standing against it." By characterizing an "epistemological presence," Husserl therefore effectively eliminates the "bodily presence" of Kant's thing-in-itself but also ineffectively brings conflict between "sense and presence,"<sup>117</sup> i.e., the question of origin, which led to an urgent need for locating the static transcendental origin in *Ideas I* (1913).<sup>118</sup> Subsequently, Husserl's genetic phenomenology shifts its object-centric (in-itself) limits to an investigation of structural historicity in objectivity, while carefully threading on the temptations of historical relativism.<sup>119</sup> In this regard, it is pertinent to mention here the contradistinction outlined between [bracketed] "reality" and "transcendental ideality" [appearance] in Husserl's final bid to outline a "true meaning of transcendental phenomenology in an evidential

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<sup>115</sup> For a background reading, which stresses on Jan Patocka's review of Husserl, see L'ubica Ucník, Ivan Chvatík and Anita Williams (eds.), *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematization and the Question of Responsibility: Formalisation and the Life-World* (Cham; Heidelberg; New York; Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2015).

<sup>116</sup> Esp., Chapter IV, "The Being of the Ideal," in James R. Mensch, *The Question of Being in Husserl's Logical Investigations* (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1981), pp. 53-72.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>118</sup> The question of origin of the world pervades the entirety of Husserl's *Ideas I* (1913).

<sup>119</sup> Heidegger's *Existenzanalytik*, Husserl notes, is already trapped in the "subjective" and the "anthropological," by abandoning the "objectivities" of transcendental ideality." See Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology," in Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931)*, (trs. & eds.) Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 1997), pp. 485-500.

way,” which, also, in a way, is an apparent attempt to settle for once and all “the problem of the possibility of philosophical anthropology.”<sup>120</sup> This elusive attempt, inevitably and curiously, but nonetheless, establishes objectivity’s dependence on the subjective: “how does linguistic embodiment make out of the merely intrasubjective structure [of an already ideal] *objective* structure?”<sup>121</sup> This “startling twist” into the sequence of *epoché* (phenomenological reduction), as Peter Dews<sup>122</sup> illustrates, through ‘linguistic incarnation’, is also the most assertive loophole (“style of *turnabout*”<sup>123</sup>) where Derrida saw it as his most valid and ultimate entry point. Note Derrida reviewing his original tryst with Husserl: “I was fascinated with the un-thought out axiomatics of Husserlian phenomenology.”<sup>124</sup> Before jumping straight into Derrida, for the sake of coherence, it will be however appropriate to take a brief detour on Husserl’s mathematical idealization.

Husserl’s incomplete *Crisis of European Sciences* was (supposed) to be his *magnum opus*. Written with a “strong sense of a philosopher with a mission,” the *Crisis* was “a mission to defend the very relevance of philosophy itself in an era defined both by astonishing scientific and technological progress and by political barbarism.”<sup>125</sup> It was also a search for clarity—laden with other anxieties too, i.e., the polity and the philosophical orientations of the day:

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<sup>120</sup> Husserl (June 1931) concludes by arguing that “any doctrine at all of human being, whether empirical or apriori, presupposes the existing world or a world that could be in being. A philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into that naïveté the overcoming of which has, in our opinion, been the whole meaning of modernity. Once this naïveté has finally been unmasked for what it is, once the genuine transcendental problem has been arrived at in its apodictic necessity, there can be no going back.”

Ibid., p. 499.

<sup>121</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” in Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>122</sup> Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration*, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>123</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>124</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>125</sup> Dermot Moran, *Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 1.

“clarity concerning the *origin of the modern spirit* and, together with that—because of the significance, which cannot be overestimated, of mathematics and mathematical natural science—clarity concerning the origin of these sciences. That is to say: clarity concerning the original motivation and movement of thought which led to the conceiving of their idea of nature, and from there to the movement of its realization in the actual development of natural science itself.”<sup>126</sup>

Here, and as expected, Husserl critiques Galileo Galilei’s *mathematization of nature*<sup>127</sup>—on the basis of equalizing nature’s movement itself as becoming the “mathematical fold” [*Mannigflatigkeit*].<sup>128</sup> Already the world is a pre-given (and, therefore, already a “life of prescientific knowing”) and can be accessed via a mathematical index.<sup>129</sup> Husserl’s Galilei reading offers two important observations on the mathematized tradition of thought-world relations, which is quoted here:

“*First*: by idealizing the world of bodies in respect to what has spatiotemporal shape in this world, [mathematics] created ideal objects. ... Thus mathematics showed for the first time that an infinity of objects that are subjectively relative and are thought only in a vague general representation [*Allgemeinvorstellung*] is, through an a priori all-

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<sup>126</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>127</sup> As Galileo Galilei famously sums up in 1623:

“Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe ... It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures. Without such means, it is impossible for us humans to understand a word of it, and to be without them is to wander around in vain through a dark labyrinth.”

See Galileo Galilei, “The Assayer,” (tr.) Stillman Drake, in Stillman Drake (ed.), *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo* (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 237–8.

<sup>128</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>129</sup> Husserl, as Moran comments, realizes that “Galileo not only developed a new ideal of scientific method in involving idealization, but also generated a new conception of nature as the object studies by science.” See Dermot Moran, *Husserl’s Crisis*, op. cit., p. 84.



encompassing method, *objectively determinable and can actually be thought as determined in itself*, or, more exactly, as an infinity which is determined, decided in advance, in itself, in respect to all its objects and all their properties and relations.

...

*Second*: coming into contact with the art of measuring and then guiding it, mathematics—thereby descending again from the world of idealities to the empirically intuited world—showed that one can universally obtain objectively true knowledge of a completely new sort about the things of the intuitively actual world, in respect to that aspect of them (which all things necessarily share) which alone interests the mathematics of shapes, i.e., a [type of] knowledge related in an approximating fashion to its own idealities. All the things of the empirically intuitable world have, in accord with the world-style, a bodily character, are *res extensae*, are experienced in changeable collocations which, taken as a whole, have their total collocation; in these, particular bodies have their relative positions, etc. By means of pure mathematics and the practical art of measuring, one can produce, for everything in the world of bodies which is extended in this way, a completely new kind of inductive prediction; namely, one can ‘calculate’ with compelling necessity, on the basis of given and measured events involving shapes, events which are unknown and were never accessible to direct measurement.”<sup>130</sup>

In Galilei’s induction of mathematics as “pure,” as a “being-in-itself,” and as an “ideal geometry” (from where a general method of knowing the real is sourced) of “abstraction” (“applied geometry”), Husserl suspiciously deduced a contradiction in its logical “strangeness,”<sup>131</sup> thereby resorted to challenging the

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<sup>130</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

<sup>131</sup> Foremost to Husserl’s early conclusion on Galilei is more of a logical question:

“[W]e must make clear to ourselves the *strangeness* of his basic conception in the situation of his time; and we must ask, accordingly, how he could hit upon this conception, namely, that everything which manifests itself as real through the specific sense-qualities must have its *mathematical index* in events belonging to the sphere of shapes—which is, of course, already thought of as idealized—and that there must arise from this the possibility of an *indirect* mathematization, in the

variable roles of “sense-qualities,”<sup>132</sup> or the infinite indeterminacy of “our empirically intuited surrounding world,” i.e., the inter-subjective and non-universal “empirical over-all style.”<sup>133</sup> What prompted Husserl’s attention and departure to this Galilean logic is the methodological processes and applications of “idealization” (i.e., the “underlying basis of the pregeometrical, sensible world and its practical arts”)—“questions about the origins of apodictic, mathematical self-evidence,” and about the problem of “the ‘origin’ of knowledge” itself.<sup>134</sup> This is also precisely where Derrida brings in the problem of “teleological idea [as] the very being of transcendental subjectivity or its noematic correlate,”<sup>135</sup> accusing Husserl of Eurocentricism—something, which, as a philosophical phenomenology, the latter denied. And, given the political experience Husserl himself underwent, such accusations from Derrida is seen as unfairly attributed or even remotely possible.<sup>136</sup> Paolo Marrati traces Husserl’s limits in failing to think on the “originary of the temporality of sense” as an “idea of crisis,” highlighted in the “crisis of the ‘European sciences,’” to be actually about “the

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fullest sense, i.e., it must be possible (though indirectly and through a particular inductive method) to construct *ex datis*, and thus to determine objectively, *all* events in the sphere of the plena.”

Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>132</sup> This psychologism will remain critical and pervasive in later critiques on Husserl. Translator David Carr intuitively added a note in this regard, tracing it as a Lockean tradition. See footnote \* [yes, in asterisk]. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>133</sup> The “universal casual style of the intuitively given surrounding world,” argues Husserl, “makes possible hypotheses, inductions, predictions about the unknowns of its present, its past, and its future. In the life of prescientific knowing we remain, however, in the sphere of the [merely] approximate, the typical.”

*Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>135</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. 157.

<sup>136</sup> Citing the case of Friedrich Würzback’s (1866-1961) collaboration with the Nazis in accusing Husserl’s “Jewish universalism,” Dermot Moran defends Derrida’s scathing attack on Husserl’s allusion to Greeks and the primal issue of “Spiritual Europe” as the birthplace, which, nonetheless is a bad comparison, by stating that the “turn to history, then, is an inevitable part of any phenomenology that seeks to understand human as such.” See Dermot Moran, *Husserl’s Crisis*, op. cit., p. 64.

crisis of history.”<sup>137</sup> Husserl is therefore juxtaposed in a situation where his “ideality can no longer do without historicity as the possibility of origin.”<sup>138</sup> What Husserl wisely resorted to, however, as Marrati observes, is the advocacy for “the possibility of *internal animation*, the purely spiritual face of language and writing in their relation to consciousness.”<sup>139</sup> Derrida, too, in fact, is seen as corroborating Husserl’s position on the “possibility of language” as possible only within the frameworks of the juridical and the phenomenological.<sup>140</sup> Husserl’s *Lebendigkeit* therefore satisfactorily reaffirms that the transcendental is always an act of the living—the “source of sense is a living act, the act of a living being”—where the transcendental life is privileged as possible only through the reduction of the empirical life.<sup>141</sup> The fault lines of Husserl as seen by Derrida, Marrati further elaborates, is clearly stated where “the absolute right of the intentionality of living animation is bound to the ineffaceable possibility of its future.”<sup>142</sup> Such assessments are however too opinionated or, in fact, irrelevant, first, in complicating the risk of trusting a transcendental existence to a metaphysical entity, as the case actually is simply is, and, second, blurring the significance of how Husserlian deduction and reductions are gained or excused. Our task here is to merely illustrate the mathematical inputs that informed Husserl and see whether Derrida’s challenge compensates. For, already, in *The Problem of Genesis*, the core of Derrida’s derision with Husserl (and even Kant), which remains in the constitution of the ‘structural forms of the known’ as the locale of genesis, is succinctly discussed:

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<sup>137</sup> Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace*, op. cit., p. 47. Also, see David Carr, “Husserl’s Crisis and the Problem of History,” op. cit., pp. 184-203.

<sup>138</sup> Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace*, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>140</sup> On the “juridical value,” Derrida says that “the right to a distinction between fact and intentional right, depends entirely on language and, in language, on the validity of a radical distinction between indication and expression,” the two signs proposed by Husserl. See Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>141</sup> Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace*, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[T]he price of the actual originality of becoming that the final form is not only 'known beforehand' but in a way that is even more precise and more complex, 'known beforehand as the product of genesis'. Husserl is interested only in the *a priori* and ideal form of the constituted product of genesis. It is from this form that he starts off. It is no longer here a transcendental act of genetic constitution that gives sense to itself, but forms and conditions of a *a priori* possibility that makes genesis itself intelligible. Defined in these terms, genesis in its irreducible actuality is understood, as in a Kantianism, in the form of an empirical genesis or of a manifold sensibility—here object of a purely passive synthesis—which becomes possible and intelligible through the transcendental activity of a subject that, in the last analysis is not actually endangered. The 'structural forms of the known'... intervene in philosophical reflection and in eidetic description only at the moment when they can define *a priori* the sense of every possible genesis."<sup>143</sup>

Also, we notice that Derrida's reading on Husserl mischievously narrows down to the "primal phenomenon (*Urphänomen*) of spiritual Europe,"<sup>144</sup> although the central critique is on the term "primal instituting" (*Urstiftung*)—which has multiple references: teleology, origin, genesis, etc., but, nevertheless, as mentioned just above, its objective signification remains in the paradoxical status of the unknown already knowing *a priori* a unified structure (or form) of the known.<sup>145</sup> It is now predictable on how a Husserlian term is identified with a Freudian import, which forms priority in Derrida's next and immediate interrogation (i.e., "Freud and the Scene of Writing"). The event of "primal scene" stems from Sigmund Freud's (1856-1939) Wolf-Man story (1918)—which originally sees it as a phylogenetic endowment implying both a universal and a

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<sup>143</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., pp. 145-46.

<sup>144</sup> Edmund Husserl, quoted. Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>145</sup> This "primal instituting" [*Urstiftung*], Derrida quotes Husserl, highlights that:

"Everything known to us points to an original becoming acquainted what we call unknown has, nevertheless, a known structural form: the form 'object' and, more particularly, the form 'spatial thing,' 'cultural Object,' 'tool' and so forth."

Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. 145.

natural trait—is associated with implications of a fantasy as well as a trauma,<sup>146</sup> or, in Harold Bloom’s (b. 1930) words, it “testify the power of imagination over fact.”<sup>147</sup> Read as an “ontological undecidability of the constructed event,” Ned Lukacher identifies Freudian psychoanalysis to be “more closely linked” with Heideggerian philosophy. Accordingly, Lukacher situates two inter-textual readings on this tradition—Jacques Lacan’s Freud-Heidegger, which reconciles “Heidegger’s abortive project toward a fundamental ontology” to Freud’s problematic of recollection in analysis, and—Jacques Derrida’s Freud-Heidegger, which presents Freud’s failures to arrest the “recollected event over the constructed event” to Heidegger’s *Erinnerung* (as a “dispossession” process) discord with *Ereignis* (the uprooting of the event from ontology, i.e., “concealment”).<sup>148</sup> Moreover, the alterity in the *unconscious*, for which Derrida attributed Freud as giving its “metaphysical name,”<sup>149</sup> is not a proxy for the conscious as such.

But to bring along Heidegger or Freud in Derrida’s Husserl is still out of place just now. It is always Husserl and Kurt Gödel (1906-78) in the first place. Derrida’s direct reference to Kurt Gödel appeared in *EHOG*, by engaging the theorem of “undecidable propositions.”<sup>150</sup> The same meta-mathematical reading is further developed in *Disseminations* (1972), particularly in the essay “The Double Session,”<sup>151</sup> and, similarly, is also taken up in *Positions* (1972).<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> For a general description, the following article is concise: Danielle Knafo and Kenneth Feiner, “The Primal Scene: Variations on a Theme,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, Vol. 44, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 549-69. Also, see “Translator’s Remarks” § 4 on “A Primal Scene,” in Maurice Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster*, (tr.) Ann Smock (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska, 1986).

<sup>147</sup> Harold Bloom, *A Map Of Misreading* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1975] 2003), p. 48.

<sup>148</sup> Ned Lukacher, *Primal Scene: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 21.

<sup>149</sup> “Différance,” in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>150</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 53

<sup>151</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, op. cit., pp. 173-286, p. 219.

However, in a 1999 published interview-dialogue, Derrida will admit and yet reject Gödel's proximity with his own readings on Husserl's "logic of undecidability."<sup>153</sup> This refusal to acknowledge is out rightly complex—given Derrida's unfettered thoughts that were initially and promptly developed piggy riding on Gödel's discovery of what the former himself duly celebrates it as a "rich possibility."<sup>154</sup> Is this treachery of a conscious denial or a complicit shame for the anti-mathematical faith?

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<sup>152</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), esp. pp. 42-43.

<sup>153</sup> Relevant statement by Derrida from the interview is quoted below:

"The word, if not the concept, 'undecidability' comes not from Husserl but from Gödel, whose notion of 'indecidables' I came across when writing the Introduction to *The Origin of Geometry*. Now, of course, what I mean by 'undecidability' does not correspond to Gödel's 'indecidables', but the word comes from here and I try to displace the word in other fields. Even at the time when I wrote this first text on Husserl, there was, on the one hand, a certain passage referring to Gödel's discourse on undecidability, but throughout the Introduction, the logic of undecidability was at work without the name or the noun. It was only when I began to take some distance from Husserl that I developed the logic of undecidability, which is not compatible, I would argue, with the strictest practice of phenomenology. On the one hand, I drew undecidability from some interest in Husserl, but, on the other hand, I was interested in undecidability to the extent that I was taking a distance from Husserl. When, in reply to a previous question, I said that it was thanks to Husserl that we can formulate the alterity of the alter-ego, I was implying that he sought to interrupt the principle of principles (the *ego cogito*). This is the moment of undecidability in Husserl."

See "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida," in Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds.), *Questioning Ethics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 65-83, p. 81. Also, John Caputo views Derrida's "undecidability" as a move towards an all encompassing and open-ended "responsibility." See *Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

<sup>154</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 53.

Kurt Gödel's famous first incompleteness theorem (1931),<sup>155</sup> which was subsequently improved by Barkley Rosser (1936), goes on to state that “for any consistent formalized system  $F$ , which contains elementary arithmetic, there exists a sentence  $G_F$  of the language of the system which is true but unprovable in that system.”<sup>156</sup> The implication here being logical possibilities and logical truths are neither equivalent nor probable. The second incompleteness theorem meanwhile states that “no consistent formal system can prove its own consistency.”<sup>157</sup> Alan Turing's machines, whose lemma models a mechanical logic from formal logic, will later on, as Panu Raatikainen pointed out, fine-tuned that Gödel's “theorems presupposes a mathematical explication of the intuitive notion of effective calculability or decidability.”<sup>158</sup> (Alain Badiou will develop his axiom-based determination of being based on this notion of mathematical organicity). The importance of Gödel's response, historically, is primarily against the formalization of mathematics—specifically the formal system of Whitehead-Russell and the axiom system of set theory Zermelo-Fraenkel (and later John von

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<sup>155</sup> The standard reference to Gödel's theorem is the entry by John van Heijenoort, in Paul Edward (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. III* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 348-49:

“By Gödel's theorem the following statement is generally meant:

In any formal system adequate for number theory there exists an undecidable formula, that is, a formula that is not provable and whose negation is not provable. (This statement is occasionally referred to as Gödel's first theorem.)

A corollary to the theorem is that the consistency of a formal system adequate for number theory cannot be proved within the system. (Sometimes it is this corollary that is referred to as Gödel's theorem; it is also referred as Gödel's second theorem.)”

Quoted, in Hilary W. Putnam, “The Gödel Theorem and Human Nature,” in Matthias Baaz et. al (eds.), *Kurt Gödel and the Foundations of Mathematics: Horizons of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 325-38, p. 325.

<sup>156</sup> Panu Raatikainen, “On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 4/2005 (No. 234), pp. 513–534. Available online (from where all quotations are drawn):

<[http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID\\_ARTICLE=RIP\\_234\\_0513#s1n2](http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ARTICLE=RIP_234_0513#s1n2)> <Accessed: 03 January, 2016>

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

Neumann and David Hilbert)—which is objectively stated at the very beginning of his *On Formally Undecidable Propositions* (1931).<sup>159</sup> Gödel’s eleven propositions (particularly VI) realize that there are undecidable propositions included in any or in all consistent axiomatics of number theory. The consistency of axioms therefore cannot be validated in totality from any decidable formula or theorem. Undecidability, therefore, is neither provable nor disprovable but indicates a limit. It escapes the mathematic logic of consistency in finite numbers of axioms—whether as an equivalence or by the rules of inference.<sup>160</sup> Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem therein implies that mathematics is open-ended, non-decidable, and non-formal.<sup>161</sup>




Figure: Exhibit: Peter Trevelyan, “The Incompleteness Theorem.”<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Kurt Gödel, *On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems*, (tr.) B. Meltzer (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1992), p. 37. The text is also found in Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), *From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 592-617

<sup>160</sup> Gödel’s framework of undecidable propositions outlines that:

“There are undecidable propositions in which, besides the logical constants (not),  $\vee$  (or),  $x$  (for all) and  $=$  (identical with), there are no other concepts beyond  $+$  (addition) and  $\cdot$  (multiplication), both referred to natural numbers, and where the prefixes ( $x$ ) can also refer only to natural numbers.”

Kurt Gödel, *On Formally Undecidable Propositions*, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>161</sup> For the looseness that has also crept into non-mathematical discourse over Gödel’s theorems, namely its abuse and use, see the defense by Torkel Franzén, *Gödel’s Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse* (Wellesley: AK Peters, 2005).

<sup>162</sup> Peter Trevelyan, “The Incompleteness Theorem,” 19 Sep – 18 Oct 2008, The Physics Room: <<http://physicsroom.org.nz/exhibitions/the-incompleteness-theorem>> <Accessed: 11 January 2016>.



Although the young Kurt Gödel participated in the group discussions of Vienna Circle at the invitation of his supervisor and co-founder Hans Hahn (1879-1934), whose active members include founder Friedrich Schlick (1882-1936) and Rudolph Carnap (1891-1970) and Karl Menger (1902-1985), among others, with discussions immersed on Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Gödel, early on, did not share their logical-positivist outlook but, rather, “quickly realized the similarities between the self-referentiality involved in the investigation of language through language and the mathematical formalization of mathematical systems.”<sup>163</sup> Drawn from an unpublished 1959 source, Raatikainen highlights that Gödel was totally against the view “which interprets mathematical propositions as expressing solely certain aspects of syntactical (or linguistic) conventions,” thereby directly implicating almost all of his earlier associates at Vienna Circle.<sup>164</sup> Gödel’s radical break is influential for Derrida’s too. In other words, Derrida was sheep-clothing a mathematical statement of undecidability to validate his critique on the metaphysics of presence and the ontology of being.

Before reverting to Derrida’s Husserl, it is useful to note the recent inheritance of conflicts between intuitionism and formalism as seen in foundational mathematics—which, in fact, was actualized by Kant and the Königsberg Circle, including the theologian-mathematician Johann Schultz—by privileging axioms as a strong basis in mathematics, which also implies the heavy stress for a form of proof. The axiomization of arithmetic and the formalization of arithmetic therein require the distinction of dividing mathematical propositions into

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<sup>163</sup> Mark C. Taylor, *The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 95.

<sup>164</sup> Panu Raatikainen, “On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems,” op. cit.

For a commentary background on the life and works of Kurt Gödel, see Solomon Feferman et. al (eds.), *Kurt Gödel: Collected Work, Vol. I, Publications 1929-1936* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) and Hao Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, [1987] 1995).

principles and theorems—which, in the intuitive thesis, also presupposes (deduction) an intuitive probability<sup>165</sup> (aphorism and axiom) that there are (or, ‘maybe’) unprovable principles, *versus* the logically set theory dependent propositions that relies on equivalent corollaries. In the axiomatic group we have the likes of Giuseppe Peano, David Hilbert, Ernst Zermelo, Edmund Husserl, and Kurt Gödel and, in the other opposing group, the logicians, we have Rudolph Carnap, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Louis Couturat, Gottlob Frege, Hans Reichenbach, Bertrand Russell, etc. Within this division, therefore, to state that “geometry is *axiomatic* is completely compatible with the view that arithmetic is *logician*,” whereas “an axiomatic arithmetic certainly requires an axiomatic geometry.”<sup>166</sup> On this axiom-logic divide, Husserl’s theorems of geometry privileges and relies on the purely formal analytics of axioms:

“If the Euclidean ideal were actualized, then the whole infinite system of space-geometry could be derived from the irreducible finite system of axioms by purely syllogistic deduction (that is to say, according to the principles of lower level logic); and thus *the a priori essence of space could become fully disclosed in theory*. The transition to form then yields the form-idea of any multiplicity that, conceived as subject to an axiom-system with the *form* derived from the Euclidean axiom-system by formalization, could be *completely explained nomologically*, in a deductive theory that would be ‘equiform’ with geometry.”<sup>167</sup>

Modeled on this axiomatic nomology, Husserl’s central thesis in *The Origin of Geometry* thus questions the very core of any axiom’s very own logic, while safely harboring the transcendental implications of the subject’s whereabouts and identity:

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<sup>165</sup> Husserl’s “eidetic variation” develops from an inheritance, via his teacher Weierstrass, of Bolzano’s (and later, Carnap’s) probability theories. To state an “aphorism” (the “purest form” from where intuitive probability stems from)—“*knowledge is possible, while certainty is not.*” See B.O. Koopman, “The Axiom and Algebra of Intuitive Probability,” in *Annals of Mathematics*, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1940, pp. 269-92, esp. p. 269.

<sup>166</sup> Gottfried Martin, *Arithmetic and Combinatorics*, op.cit., p. 6.

<sup>167</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, op. cit., p. 95. Italics, in original.

“How does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?”<sup>168</sup>

Husserl's answer, of course, is prompt: “by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body (*Sparchleib*).”<sup>169</sup> Language therein became the limits of geometric truth. The excitement of Derrida's ultimate inquiry is founded on this. Leonard Lawlor audaciously terms it as Derrida's “linguistic turn,” the transformation of the “problem of genesis into the problem of the sign.”<sup>170</sup> By relegating the problematic of geometrical idealities as a mediation of language, the linguistic, however curious enough as the case is, Husserl's answer, thereon, become the backbone of Derrida's principal investigation, with a more explosive question of doubt emerging from it:

“[H]ow does linguistic embodiment make out of the merely intrasubjective structure the *objective* structure which, e.g., as geometrical concept or state of affairs, is in fact present as understandable by all and is valid, already in its linguistic expression as geometrical speech, as geometrical proposition, for all the future in its geometrical sense?”<sup>171</sup>

With the conclusions effortlessly jumping from the limit of geometry to its possibilities in language, Derrida was definitely left astounded with Husserl's vulnerable trappings of the mathematical. How does Husserl arrive at this; what was Derrida's understanding of this translation? The mutable possibility or decidability of objective ideality in “language” (“the possibility of history as the possibility of language”<sup>172</sup>), as Husserl claims, with self-informing capacities or

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<sup>168</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit. pp. 353-78, esp. pp. 357-58.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

<sup>170</sup> Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl*, op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>171</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., p. 358.

<sup>172</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 69.

capabilities to transcend its own historicity, or “establishes the possibility of its own appearing”<sup>173</sup> (through the “eidetic world of significations or pure lived experiences”<sup>174</sup>), which Derrida vehemently objects to, are the key points of serious conflict here. Husserl’s “transcendental historicity,” while attacking empirical historicism, still remains “ahistorical Platonism” and therein the attempt to establish the supremacy and recognition of mathematics as the ideal object of science, through *theorems*.<sup>175</sup> Historicity therein becomes a theorem for Husserl, a matter of ‘theoretical object’ in fact. From Husserl, Derrida therefore deduced three major issues—the problems of temporality, the status of language, and the intricacies of *doxa* (inter-subjectivity) in western metaphysics: “[a]t bottom, the problem of geometry’s origin puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that of the phenomenological origin of language.”<sup>176</sup> The general impression amongst Derridean scholars is that he was able to derive these problem issues only in his later and more major work on Husserl, *Speech and Phenomena/Voice and Phenomena*.<sup>177</sup> This is also where, insofar as a historicity is concerned, the shadow of Heidegger is typically cast, engulfing Husserl’s primacy<sup>178</sup>—which has become the erroneous standard to survey on Derrida’s early corpus. But then, who cares? For, as we have seen now, Derrida’s early foray into Husserl is unprecedented. Leonard Lawlor points out that a major contribution by Derrida in *EHOG* is the purging (and non-translatability) of language into the structure of history through the project of

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>174</sup> Edmund Husserl, quoted. Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>175</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Some Statements and Truisms about Neo-Logisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms,” in David Carroll (ed.), *The States of Theory: History, Art, and Critical Discourse* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 63-94, esp. p. 92.

<sup>176</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>177</sup> This is the general conclusion in David B. Allison, “Derrida’s Critique of Husserl and the Philosophy of Presence,” in *Veritas*. V. 50, n. 1, Março 2005, pp. 89-99, esp. p. 91.

<sup>178</sup> Robert Bernasconi, for instance, attributes the “Heideggerian model of the history of Being” as the basis of Derrida’s understanding of history. Refer “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida,” in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 13-29, esp. p. 20.

univocity. In his critique of Husserl's "imperative of univocity," as Lawlor highlights, Derrida is clear that the "equivocity is absolutely irreducible"<sup>179</sup> and therein the limits of univocity, where both equivocity and univocity are previously seen as absolutely co-dependent on each other:<sup>180</sup>

"If, in fact, equivocity is always irreducible, that is because words and language in general are not and can never be absolute *objects*. They do not possess any resistant and permanent identity that is absolutely their own. They have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as mediations. The 'same' word is always 'other' according to the always different intentional acts which thereby make a word significant [*significant*]. There is a sort of *pure* equivocity here, which grows in the very rhythm of science."<sup>181</sup>

Between the historical and the precepts of univocity (the absolute one, pure origin) and equivocity (equivalence, analogous, reductionism, mediacy), it therefore becomes simply clear that Derrida is clever enough to not only delineate but also deviate from the usually informed mathematical expressions. Alain Badiou, meanwhile, whom we examine in the later part of this chapter, will jump in here, where Derrida fears to tread. When Derrida talks of Husserl's "renascent equivocity into pure historicity," or an *absolute univocity* that "sterilize and paralyze history in the indigence of an indefinite iteration,"<sup>182</sup> are we capable of suspecting Derrida to be poaching temporal dimensions of mathematical or physical derivatives and masking such quasi-mathematical

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<sup>179</sup> See Leonard Lawlor, "The Primordial Unity of Essence and Fact: A Reading of Derrida's *Introduction to Husserl's The Origin of Geometry*," in *Imagination and Chance: The Difference Between the Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 91-110, esp. p. 99.

<sup>180</sup> For Husserl, as Derrida critiques, "univocity is both the a priori and the teleological for all historicity; it is that without which the very equivocations of empirical culture and history would not be possible." See Jacques Derrida's *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., pp. 104-05.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, esp. p. 102 and p. 103.

thoughts in the ornate language, which is, if not literal or metaphorical, can be both cardinal and ordinal? Very importantly, is Derrida reincarnating exacting terms within the frame of a mounted attack on temporality vis-à-vis historicity, science, language, intuitive psychologism, or geometrics? Given Derrida's assiduous task to purge mathematics from the philosophizing processes, one can see that there is a conscious care on language choice and also a remarkable scoutish cleanliness to leave the camp-scene without any evidence of the mathematical traces. Since Derrida never engages mathematical thoughts explicitly unlike many of his contemporaries and, moreover, given the rich mathematical thoughts Derrida inherited or interpreted, albeit in a non-mathematical expression, there is definitely an urge to "know what Derrida's philosophy of mathematics might look like."<sup>183</sup> Of course, such urges are both mild and scant, and remain properly within the realm of the speculative, verging almost unto allegorical or syllogistic readings, but integrative of aporetic readings too, i.e., on uncertainty, as a problem of the mathematical and philosophical. Of course, then, our approach to Derrida's excursive on any alleged mathematical thinking is more geared towards controversializing him rather than problematizing him.

Vladimir Tasiç, for one, argues that many of Derrida's arguments "bear resemblance to critiques of logic and excesses of formalist mathematics,"<sup>184</sup> of "importing the notion of writing-in-general into functionalism,"<sup>185</sup> while defending such suspicion with a verbatim by Derrida himself: "the effective progress of mathematical notation goes along with the deconstruction of metaphysics."<sup>186</sup> Tasiç thereon picks the problem of *identity* in Derrida and postmodern debates, an *identity that is not present to itself*, which purportedly

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<sup>183</sup> Vladimir Tasiç, "Poststructuralism and Deconstruction: A Mathematical History," in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 177-98, esp. p. 197.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., esp. p. 197.

<sup>185</sup> Vladimir Tasiç, *Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 141.

<sup>186</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, op. cit., p. 35.

“view logic itself on ungrounded assumptions about the absolute self-identity of objects, assumptions which cannot be formally deduced in a way,” which is but a corollary of what the French mathematician Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) forwarded in the concept of identity.<sup>187</sup> Similarly, on the deconstruction of identity under speech-act theory through the semantic invariance in “iterability,” which, like geometry’s dependence on axioms to make “ungrounded assumption about the invariance of objects,” Tasiç questions, using Poincaré again, whether Derrida’s “identity” actually can be constructed a posteriori to objects—since identity as a concept is subordinated to the concept of difference and identity can never be established absolutely since it is not a concept logically grounded in the first place.<sup>188</sup> Poincaré’s geometric identity, however, one notes here, is not grounded through axioms but assumed through the presupposition of a notion of object—as opposed to the derivation of Heidegger’s subject-identity [*Dasein*] from existential understanding—which, as Tasiç grossly concludes, is a parallel found in Derrida too! Tasiç, one should note here, again, is basing his comments entirely by reasserting Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s (1762-1814) A=A proposition [“I am’ must also be certain,” which implies that *the principle of identity is not logically certain but inevitably involves a hypothetical judgment on the part of the subject.*] and, also, in failing to situate Derrida’s discussion that is not on objects in themselves *per se* but as idealities, whereas Poincaré’s case is restricted to geometric objects. Similarly, Tasiç uses the “essentially languageless” model of

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<sup>187</sup> Vladimir Tasiç, *Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought*, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>188</sup> Given the numerous allusion to Poincaré, let us review Tasiç’s discussion on his *effects of the circulatory involved in impredicative definitions*:

“1. The identity of an object is not given by the structure that governs the interrelations of such objects.

2. The identity of an object is knowable only if we allow the possibility (the flow of time, “history”) that this object could change, and then notice that it did not change, that it in fact remained invariant.

3. Therefore, identity is a concept that can come only as an afterthought to the concept of difference, but can never be logically deduced from it (unless you can observe an object throughout the entire history to make sure it remains invariant).

4. Hence, finally, identity always already involves a hypothetical judgment.”

Vladimir Tasiç, “Poststructuralism and Deconstruction,” op. cit., p. 182.

Dutchman Luitzen Brouwer's (1861-1966) intuitive time continuum<sup>189</sup> (1917)—which is an intuitive concept but cannot be known or reduced to language or logic's justification—to illustrate similar positions for Derrida's *EHOG*. A mathematical critique or comparison with Derrida therein also curiously compliments him for structurally conceiving a *dynamic intuitionist* model although "it cannot be known."<sup>190</sup> Apart from the mathematical, there are attempts to link Derrida's thoughts with quantum physics. This is not a huge surprise given Heidegger's deep inspiration from the quantum mechanics of Werner Karl Heisenberg's (1901-76) uncertainty principle, especially in the search for "the lost trace of Being" through a "cosmic formula."<sup>191</sup> Arkady Plotnitsky has particularly roped in Neils Bohr's (1885-1962) complementarity theory<sup>192</sup> and Georges Bataille's (1897-1962) general economy<sup>193</sup>—and,

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<sup>189</sup> On Brouwer's *time continuum*, Tasiç says:

"[T]he continuum is not intuited as a collection of points that happen to be on anything like a straight line. It is a unified plurality that emerges from my realization that I could continue to insert numbers 'between' those that I may already have constructed, to insert them not according to a determinate procedure or by giving them emptily conceived names, but rather by means of spontaneous, free, authentically individual choices. A way of thinking about the 'points' of Brouwer's continuum would be to imagine them as open, indeterminate processes that actively involve the individual—creative processes that extend in the continuous privacy of inner time."

Vladimir Tasiç, *Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought*, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>191</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted, in Arkady Plotnitsky, *Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 95.

<sup>192</sup> Given Neils Bohr's use of complementarity as a methodological critique rather than a system definition, the following definition hopes to illustrate what is the theory, based on the revised definition of his 1927 introduction of the term:

"The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition respectively.... Indeed, in the description of atomic phenomena, the quantum postulate presents us with the task of developing a 'complementarity' theory the consistency of which can be judged only by weighing the possibilities of description and observation."



although irrelevant, let us also note that both of them have significantly engaged with the question of the biological too—to review Derrida’s deconstruction and anti-epistemology approaches. Plotnitsky identifies similar linkages between Derrida’s *trace*—with Bohr’s “translations without the original”<sup>194</sup>— and the notion of mechanical reproduction (like Walter Benjamin’s too) in an age of quantum mechanics. This calls for Derrida’s economy of writing, i.e., the “nuclear traits of all writing,”<sup>195</sup> which “relates the question of *writing* to the question of mathematical formalism... and symbolism.”<sup>196</sup> The notion of *writing*, as Plotnitsky insists, therefore “must obey the economy of chance or of complementarily chance and necessity and their undecidable and interminable calculus”—inasmuch Albert Einstein (1879-1955) too was troubled by as such deterministic configuration—and since Derrida too projects an all constants of “undecidable determination to all forms of indeterminacy of indetermination.”<sup>197</sup> What Plotnitsky was essentially attempting is to implicate that Derrida’s “himself opposes his economy of undecidability to indeterminacy, which may be associated with complementarity.”<sup>198</sup> Einstein, one notes, was a colleague of Gödel at Princeton University. Plotnitsky’s discussion therefore seem to be suspiciously veered against Gödel’s *undecidability* and Derrida’s use of the same referent to initiate a *closure* (read *indeterminacy*), by openly advocating for the continuity that is pertinent in Bohr’s *complementarity*. There is little hope therefore when Plotnitsky strongly advocates the view that “the concept of undecidability can be applied only by analogy and metaphorically outside the field of mathematical logic,”<sup>199</sup> although Derrida’s undecidability was

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Niels Bohr, *Collected Works, Volume 10: Complementarity Beyond Physics (1928-1962)*, (ed.) David Favrholdt (Amsterdam et al.; Elsevier: 1999), p. xxiv.

<sup>193</sup> Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Volume I: Consumption* (New York: Zone Books, 1988).

<sup>194</sup> Neil Bohr, quoted, in Arkady Plotnitsky, *Complementarity*, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>195</sup> See the four list in Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 316.

<sup>196</sup> Arkady Plotnitsky, *Complementarity*, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

hopelessly dressed as *indeterminacy* (uncertainty), hoping it will conform to in Bohr's *complementarity*. "Gödel's undecidables are strictly determined,"<sup>200</sup> Plotnitsky sums up, where "determinations are in fact only possible by virtue of indeterminacy."<sup>201</sup>

There is however no confusion that Derrida's philosophical formulation of algebraic "undecidables," as Plotnitsky admits, is directly modeled through Kurt Gödel's mathematical logic<sup>202</sup> and, also, via Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-98), but, otherwise, essentially rooted in Leibnizean genealogy.<sup>203</sup> Here, for our information, it is pertinent to mention James Joyce's (1882-1941) *uncertainty principle*, too, although Derrida's invocation of him in *EHOG* (and other subsequent works, i.e., the two *Ulysses Gramophone*) bears no knowledge of the same. Only decades after Joyce's employment of the Euclidian term *gnomom*,<sup>204</sup> as Phillip Herring recollects, mathematical and scientific theorizing on uncertainty, the void, nullity, etc., appeared—particularly through Heisenberg—although there is no validation to illustrate whether the latter benefited from Joyce or not. It is on Joyce's principle that we have a sense of the "objectification of nothing"<sup>205</sup> (that is, *if matter was created out of nothing, then nothingness preceded matter as nonexistence preceded existence*), which, subsequently, is found in the works of Alexius Meinong (1904), Henri Bergson (1907), Martin Heidegger (1924 and 1928 Freiburg Lectures), Paul Valéry, Sartre (1943), etc.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>203</sup> Arkady Plotnitsky, "Algebras, Geometries and Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathematical Thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarmé)," in Paul Patton and John Protevi (eds.), *Between Deleuze and Derrida* (London; New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 98-119.

<sup>204</sup> Phillip F. Herring, *Joyce's Uncertainty Principle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 92.

<sup>205</sup> Which, in other words, as Herring illustrates, imply that "nonexisting objects have properties just as existing objects do; the property of objects does not imply existence, which allows us to discuss the legitimate properties of square circles, married bachelors, and the like."

Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p. 91.

Joyce, for Derrida, is the alternative Husserl “to render philosophical thinking univocal.”<sup>207</sup> Joyce’s outlooks on language, which assume to threaten philosophical and scientific truths, which “assume and interiorize the memory of a culture in a kind of recollection (*Erinnerung*) in the Hegelian sense,”<sup>208</sup> nonetheless, remain restricted, like Husserl’s approach to language: “the ontic validity is destroyed through the original consciousness of nullity”<sup>209</sup> Derrida therefore celebrates Joyce’s language ontology while bemoans his mathematical logic. Now, let us look quickly at Derrida’s Gödel’s reference to Husserl.<sup>210</sup> The first one cited below is from *EHOG* and the second one is from *Dissemination*:

“[I]f the primordial act of grounding that Husserl wishes to elicit here was the institution of an axiomatic and deductive field or even the institution of axiomatics and the ideal of deductivity in general . . . then the Husserlian project would be seriously threatened by the evolution of axiomatization toward a total formalization within which one necessarily comes up against the limits stated by Gödel’s theorem (and related theorems).”<sup>211</sup>

“An undecidable proposition, as Gödel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition which, given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms. *Tertium datur*, without synthesis.”<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Andrew J. Mitchell and Sam Slote (eds.), *Derrida and Joyce: Texts and Contexts* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), p. 4.

<sup>208</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>209</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” op. cit., esp. p. 362.

<sup>210</sup> Husserl never referred to Gödel, but Hilbert, possibly not even knowing the latter’s new insights (1931). Føllesdal however claims that around 1959 Gödel developed a deep interest in Husserl—while listing similarities in their works. See Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Gödel and Husserl,” in Jean Petitot et al. (eds.), *Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 385-400.

<sup>211</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>212</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, op. cit., esp. p. 219.

The above statements are not expositions. It therefore arouses curiosity—why did Derrida involve Gödel? What are the trackside arguments? By summoning Gödel, Derrida subtly uses him to taunt and nullify the probable stability or decidable limits of axiomatic propositions of “form” for a theory of the manifold (multiplicities<sup>213</sup>) in formal logic, which Husserl has been sparingly but devotedly cultivating all along since *Prolegomena* (1900),<sup>214</sup> and, also, despite knowing all too well its failure in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929).<sup>215</sup> Nevertheless, in bringing along Gödel, Derrida, strangely, is quick to discredit Gödel model of undecidability, immediately following in the next sentence: “But that is not so!”<sup>216</sup> Which, meaning to say, in Derrida’s version, Husserl’s metrical or lexical axioms, without even employing Gödel’s indisputable theorem, does not require any grounding because the axioms are already internalized in its own predicative proposition. Derrida picks two references in this case: the *ideal*

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<sup>213</sup> Premised like the *ideal* Euclid (there is no truth about space if it is not deducible by space-axiom), Husserl defines “multiplicity” as “properly the *form-idea of an infinite object-province for which there exists the unity of a theoretical explanation* or, in other words, the unity of a *nomological science*. The form-ideas, ‘theoretically explainable province’) province a deductive science) and ‘definitive system of axioms’, are equivalent.” See Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, (tr.) Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 95. Also, quoted in Jacques Derrida’s *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 54, esp. footnote 49.

<sup>214</sup> The manifold for Husserl, following Bernhard Riemann, represents the “highest methodological importance”—“without which there can be no talk of understanding the method of mathematics”—

“The *objective correlate* of the concept of a possible theory, definite only in respect of form, is *the concept of a possible field of knowledge over which a theory of form will preside*. Such a field is, however, known in mathematical circle as a *manifold*.”

See Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations, Volume I*, (trs.) J.N. Findlay (London and New York: Routledge, [1970] 2001), pp. 156-57.

<sup>215</sup> The manifold as the “concept of a totality,” Husserl reminds us, belongs to “the form-concept” in “deductive science,” following “the strict characterization of the idea of a formal theory of theory-forms—correlatively, a formal theory of multiplicities.” He ruefully adds: “I cannot improve on it; but we must have its content in mind.” See Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>216</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 54.

*geometer*—whose experience and product of “geometrical seeing of essences and eidetic thinking” is by itself a “grounding act”<sup>217</sup>—and *geometrical idealities*—“which have been ‘explicated’ but not brought to primordial evidence.”<sup>218</sup> The failure of Husserlian axiomatics, as Derrida further notes, is the presupposition in a “sedimentation of sense”—i.e., “a primordial evidence, a radical ground which is already past.”<sup>219</sup> *Axioms*, for Derrida’s Husserl, “are in principle the results of primordial sense-fashioning.”<sup>220</sup> Inasmuch, it is not so much in the axiomatics where Derrida targets Husserl, but in the “already exiled from the origins to which Husserl now wishes to return.”<sup>221</sup> This is a curious deviation in Derrida; although the essence of *EHOG* remains intact in its critique of axioms. Nonetheless, Husserl nostalgic desire to “return” to an impossible past has been formulated on two grounds—mathematically, on the “notion of geometrical determinability,” through [misguided] guidance of “nonhistorical investigation,” which, in turn, is facilitated by “the present state of *ready-made* science”<sup>222</sup>—and through phenomenological intuition, that is, through “apodictic self-evidence,” where “we can convince ourselves with truly apodictic certainty,” of knowing “the unknown world, which yet exists in advance for us *as* world, as the horizon of all question of the present and thus also all questions which are specifically

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<sup>217</sup> This is linked with the “ideal of mathematization,” as Husserl notes, which—  
 “is the practical ideal of exact eidetic science ... [which] show how to bestow on any eidetic science the highest degree of rationality by reducing all of its mediate steps of thinking to mere consumptions under the axioms of the particular eidetic province, these axioms having been assembled once for all and reinforced with the whole set of axioms belonging to ‘formal’ or ‘pure’ logic (in the broadest sense: *mathesis universalis*)—unless, of course, from the very beginning it is a matter of that logic itself.”

Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, (tr.) F. Kersten (The Hague; Boston; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 16.

<sup>218</sup> Jacques Derrida’s *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

historical.”<sup>223</sup> What remains the bone of contention here is Husserl’s attempt to ground language through a mathematical proposition<sup>224</sup> and Derrida’s challenging of the same, which but finds reference as mathematical impossibilities. The irony therefore remains in the invocation of Gödel to complete the rite of passage. For, what is essentially the realist statement in Gödel’s metamathematical logic of undecidable propositions is but an interrogation of the ontological status of mathematical entities:

“[A] rule about the truth of sentences can be called syntactical only if it is clear from its formulation, or if it somehow can be known beforehand, that it does not imply the truth or falsehood of any ‘factual sentence’ or ‘proposition expressing an empirical fact’. But, so the argument continued, this requirement would be met only if the rule of syntax is consistent, since otherwise the rule would imply all sentences, including the factual ones. Therefore, by Gödel’s second theorem, the mathematics not captured by the rule in question must be invoked in order to legitimize the rule, and thereby

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<sup>223</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” op. cit., esp. p. 374.

<sup>224</sup> Husserl, says Geoffrey Bennington,

“... wants to preserve a purity of self-presence to consciousness, also needs, if he is to save the ideality of meaning, the repetition which casts this same purity into doubt. Without this ideality, meaning could no longer be subordinated to truth. The presence of meaning to a consciousness free from all facticity cannot be a function of me as empirical and finite individual: the presence of the present, the form of an experience in general, is not my personal doing, it outlives me, and that is the measure of its transcendental. If I want to establish any purity of expression and maintain it in the horizon of truth, I must therefore recognize in it an originary capacity of repetition beyond my death. And for there to be tradition and progress in the pursuit of truth, there must be written transmission (mathematical objects are the most ideal objects; but without a written tradition there would be [...] no progress in mathematics, and each generation of researchers would be condemned to find the same things over again-writing, which threatens ideality with exteriority and death, becomes more necessary as ideality becomes more ideal.”

See Geoffrey Bennington & Jacques Derrida, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

the claim that mathematics is solely a result of syntactical rules is contradicted.”<sup>225</sup>

Derrida’s contention with Gödel’s basis is however far from the impossible establishment of a truth—i.e., the “irreducible contradiction”<sup>226</sup> of ‘true’ and ‘false’ axiomatics—or, as is the case is with mathematical linguistics<sup>227</sup>—and therefore the strong denial of morphing a mathematical undecidability into a critique of undecidabilities. Husserl, in fact, in *Ideas I*, as Derrida allegedly points out, has abandoned such axiomatic tendencies. That the “ideal of decidability” (the deductive, exact sciences) is in itself a reduction—on which, Derrida is in full agreement with Husserl—goes on to imply that the “truth,” or a “geometrico-mathematical truth-sense in general,” actually and irreversibly escapes the very trappings of deductive axioms.<sup>228</sup> Rather, as we can see now, Derrida’s morbid but inconclusive disagreements with Husserl, which is at once a problematic of temporality colliding with presencing being, is actually premised on rudimentary principles of objective analogy—which, again, is guided *not* in the possibilities of “a history of truth” but in the impossibilities of such mathematical or material phenomenology. And, the impossible statement or expression here is a mathematical derivative or premised on *mathematical models*, as Derrida himself illustrate,<sup>229</sup> in line with Husserl’s earlier assertions in *The Idea of Phenomenology*.<sup>230</sup> This impossibility is the analogy of time itself. Time conflated

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<sup>225</sup> Panu Raatikainen, “On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems,” op. cit.

<sup>226</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. xxiii.

<sup>227</sup> The purported view being “linguistics lacks the resolving power to serve as the ultimate arbiter of truth in the social sciences, just as physics lacks the resolving power to explain the accidents of biological evolution that made us human. By applying mathematical techniques we can at least gain some understanding of the limitations of the enterprise.” See András Kornai, *Mathematical Linguistics* (Cambridge, MA: Springer, 2008), p. 2.

<sup>228</sup> Jacques Derrida’s *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>229</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>230</sup> Husserl, in his *Idea of Phenomenology* remarks:

“[T]he most rigorous forms of mathematics and mathematical natural science here have not the slightest advantage over any actual or alleged knowledge

as historical but time also as physics. David King, for instance, finds Derrida's irreducibility of presence as nothing spectacular but binary confirmations in the play of presence and absence as justifying a diagonalization reading of orthogonal systems, where a "deconstruction of the binary system provides a kind of unary, transcendental critique of the system."<sup>231</sup> Leonard Lawlor is also quick to point out that "Derrida never contests the founding validity of presence."<sup>232</sup> Derrida, too, is in agreement:

"Since a fact's opacity could be reduced from the very beginning by the production of ideal objects, historical interconnections are interconnections of sense and value, which—by capitalizing *ad infinitum* and according to an original mode—can never keep their sedimentary deposits out of circulation. That is a possibility, but not a necessity, since the interest and the difficulty of Husserl's analysis result from what this analysis accrues on both planes at once."<sup>233</sup>

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belonging to common experience. Thus it is clear that there can be no talk of philosophy (which begins with the critique of knowledge and remains entirely rooted in such a critique) orienting itself to the exact sciences methodologically (or even with respect to its subject matter!), or taking the method of the exact sciences as a model, or that it is the task of philosophy to extend and perfect the work accomplished in the exact sciences according to a method that is essentially the same for all the sciences."

Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, (tr.) Lee Hardy (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 21.

<sup>231</sup> Departing from Judson Webb's definition (1980) of diagonalization, King reminds us that we cannot simply subscribe to "the idea of the derivation from the binary of something that is irreducible to the binary" (p. 337). King therefore sees Derrida's "textualism" in tune with Quine's "indeterminacy of translation," by reiterating that it is a problematic continuation in line with Pythagorean demonstration that "the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with one of its sides," or Cantor's diagonal argument that "real numbers are not countable," or Gödel's undecidable theorems. See David King, "The Diagonalization of Metaphysics," in *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998, pp. 337-44.

<sup>232</sup> Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>233</sup> Jacques Derrida's *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 56.



If, as Derrida hypothetically questions, there is “a history of truth,”<sup>234</sup> which, in Husserl,<sup>235</sup> represents *Ur-region*, it is about history itself establishing “the possibility of its own appearing.”<sup>236</sup> The debacle herein lies in the complexity of producing or simulating (the appearing *illusion*)<sup>237</sup> truth, with, consequentially, the “play” as a unique but common yardstick to measure the dative dimension of any phenomenological temporality. That is one possibility. This shift crucially enabled Derrida to formulate his critique on the valorization of speech (logocentric), and, also, critically review the subsumation of a mathematical tradition in the logos to the written in Plato<sup>238</sup> and others (especially, Saussure’s

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>235</sup> See, also, footnote 113, above.

<sup>236</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>237</sup> Here, Derrida is talking about the tradition of “Western metaphysics [which] constitutes a powerful systemization of [the] illusion,” via the lure of Kant’s “transcendental illusion,” of “the effect of language that impels language to represent itself as expressive representation, a translation on the outside of what was constituted inside.” Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>238</sup> Writing, Derrida argues, for Plato,

“is considered suspicious and the alert exercise of memory prescribed. What Plato is attacking in sophistics, therefore, is not simply recourse to memory but, within such recourse, the substitution of the mnemonic device for live memory, of the prosthesis for the organ; the perversion that consists of replacing a limb by a thing, here, ‘substituting the passive, mechanical ‘by-heart’ for the active reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present. The boundary (between inside and outside, living and nonliving) separates not only speech from writing but also memory as an unveiling (re-)producing a presence from re-memoration as the mere repetition of a monument; truth as distinct from its sign, being as distinct from types. The ‘outside’ does not begin at the point where what we now call the psychic and the physical meet, but at the point where the *mnêmê*, instead of being present to itself in its life as a movement of truth, is supplanted by the archive, evicted by a sign of re-memoration or of com-memoration. The space of writing, space as writing, is opened up in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the difference between *mnêmê* and *hypomnêsis*. The outside is already *within* the work of memory. The evil slips in within the relation of memory to itself, in the general organization of the mnesic activity. Memory is finite by nature. Plato recognizes this in attributing life to it. As in the case of all living organisms, he

phonocentrism),<sup>239</sup> and, finally, privilege writing ('grammatology' or 'graphocentrism').<sup>240</sup> In critiquing Husserl's production of "for-itself of self-presence" (*für-sich*) rather as a simulation effectuating *an* "in the place of" (*für etwas*)<sup>241</sup>—which is a logical choice of supplement—Derrida's *supplementarity* upholds that "the signifier does not first re-present merely the absent signified," but, rather "substitutes itself for another signifier... since the play of difference is the movement of idealization and because the more the signifier is ideal, the more it augments the potency of repetition of presence."<sup>242</sup> Presence, therein, for Husserl, is situated in-the-place-of, which is a false and impossible play of temporality. Derrida continues to play on similar trend with Plato's *antre* and Mallarme's *entre*, as Barbara Johnson notes, which "is thus a passage from ontological semantics to undecidable syntax, from the play of light and shadow to the play of articulation."<sup>243</sup> Presence as supplement is further found applied in Derrida's reading of Rousseau's *Confessions* (i.e., "writing-masturbation")—projected as a dangerous supplement to natural intercourse, which evoked

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assigns it, as we have seen, certain limits. A limitless memory would in any event be not memory but infinite self-presence. Memory always therefore already needs signs in order to recall the non present, with which it is necessarily in relation. The movement of dialectics bears witness to this. Memory is thus contaminated by its first substitute: *hypomnêsis*. But what Plato dreams of is a memory with no sign. That is, with no supplement. A *mnêmê* with no *hypomnêsis*, no *pharmakon*. And this at the very moment and for the very reason that he calls *dream* the confusion between the hypothetical and the anhypothetical in the realm of mathematical intelligibility (*Republic*, 533b)."

See "Plato's Pharmacy," in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, op. cit., p. 108-9.

<sup>239</sup> Insofar the most explicit and compressed essay on Derrida's relation with and debt to Saussure, see Geoffrey Bennington, "Saussure and Derrida," in Carol Sanders (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 186-202.

<sup>240</sup> For a definition of *grammatology* as one that "*inscribes and delimits science*," see Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>241</sup> "The *for-itself*," Derrida says, "would be an *in-the-place-of-itself*: put *for itself*, in the first place." See Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>243</sup> See, "Translator's Introduction," Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, op. cit., pp. i-xxxiii, esp. p. xxviii.

“nothing less than a revolution in the very logic of meaning.”<sup>244</sup> The supplement or surrogate (i.e., writing) is seen as “ambivalent” and “dangerous” because it has the aspect that it “can present itself as a thing, as a being-present.”<sup>245</sup> For it opposes opposites, claiming itself to be the “differance of difference,” an *economy of signs*, and reveling in the production of its “own blind spot,” i.e., an *a priori* “knowledge that is no knowledge at all.”<sup>246</sup> “The logic of the supplement,” Barbara Johnson further notes, “wrenches apart the neatness of the metaphysical binary oppositions”—the dangerous and the redemptive, the necessary and the superfluous.<sup>247</sup> The relation of the “supplementarity,” Derek Attridge also argues, thereby “always involves a contradictory logic that relates it to the workings of *différance*, both of leaving the final determination of what counts... and rendering [the] impossible.”<sup>248</sup> Derrida’s consistent arguments marking the instability of truth therein oscillate on a wide range of analogical referents—with the mathematical impossibility (and undecidability) of presencing being as the gross common denominator. Although Derrida’s strategy of *analogy* deserves discussion here, we shall take up the same in the next chapter.

In *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles* (1978), notice the preference of “style”<sup>249</sup> rather than method, Derrida will develop an analogical equation on the non-necessity as well

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<sup>244</sup> Derrida’s dangerous supplements list includes: “Writing, pedagogy, masturbation, and the *pharmakon* share the property of being—with respect to speech, nature, intercourse, and living memory—at once something secondary, external, and compensatory, and something that substitutes, violates, and usurps.” Refer footnote 46, in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>245</sup> “Plato’s Pharmacy.” Ibid., p. 109.

Also, see the section on Rousseau, particularly Ch. 2, “...That Dangerous Supplement...,” in Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, (tr.) Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 141-64.

<sup>246</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 164.

<sup>247</sup> See, “Translator’s Introduction,” Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, op. cit., esp. p. xii.

<sup>248</sup> Derek Attridge, “Introduction: Derrida and the Questioning of Literature,” Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, (ed.) Derek Attridge (New York; London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-32, esp. p. 24.

<sup>249</sup> See footnote 123, above.

as an impossible history of truth:<sup>250</sup> “The history (of) truth (is) a process of appropriation. ... For the question of the truth of being is not *capable* of the question of proper-ty (*propre*). On the contrary, it falls short of the undecidable exchange of more into less.”<sup>251</sup> For now, for Husserl, the “temporality of the synthetic interconnections of sense,” which he differentiates from David Hume’s “psychological temporality as successiveness,” is akin to the birth of geometry—as “a continuous synthesis in which all acquisitions maintain their validity,”<sup>252</sup> i.e., the truth of historicity as well as the historicity of truth. Also, one notes, Husserl, in *Origin of Geometry*, was ambitious in outrightly attempting to secure that “[a]nything that is shown to be a historical fact...necessarily has its *inner structure of meaning*.”<sup>253</sup> Here, Derrida offers two comments of the impossible temporal: one, engaging and quoting Gaston Bachelard’s *rational memory* to critique, the paradox of Husserl’s inter-subjective “omnitemporal validity” between “egological subjectivities” and the “universal normativity” (*doxa*), and, two, the logical paradox of grounding the synchronic or timeless (*uchrinique*) with the instable multiplicity of a “purely empirical diachrony.”<sup>254</sup> What Derrida was essentially proposing on the question of temporality necessarily does not imply a departure from mathematical thinking—although cited in another context—and this context (see the quote following immediate footnote, below) is imperative.<sup>255</sup> The contention therefore rather remains in whether Husserl’s

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<sup>250</sup> See footnote 73, above.

<sup>251</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles*, (tr.) Barbara Harlow (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 56.

<sup>252</sup> Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., p. 371.

<sup>254</sup> On the first, which is a intentionality-objectivity issue, Derrida asks bring back Husserl’s *Idea of Phenomenology*—“how can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object?” and, on the second, asserts that “[n]either pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history.” See Jacques Derrida’s *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., pp. 60-63.

<sup>255</sup> Responding to Julia Kristeva’s question on whether *grammatology* would not “be a nonexpressive ‘semiology’ based on logical-mathematical notation rather than on linguistic notation,” Derrida gave a rather vague, albeit potentially controversial, defense, despite the resistance to the ‘mathematization of language’:

“unity of geometrical truth’s primordial sense” could possibly be captured within the range of mathematical logic. Derrida comments,

[W]hat is mathematical determinability in general, if the undecidability of a proposition, for example, is still a mathematical determination? Essentially, such a question cannot expect a determined response, it should only indicate the pure openness and unity of an infinite horizon.”<sup>256</sup>

There is a pattern in mathematical logic to either disprove or prove a mathematical practice as true. David King, in critiquing Derrida’s notion of “writing under erasure,” employs the mathematical ‘reflection principle’ in set theory to reiterate a diagonal argument that “if something is true in a non-formalized sense it can always be seen to be true in a formalized sense as well—that is, in a particular formation.”<sup>257</sup> And, to also overcome the tautological in Derrida—what is imperative to the ‘reflection principle’, as King appropriately elaborates, remains in the exchange (and practice) of truth between formalized and non-formalized structures:

“What is meant by ‘true in a non-formalized sense’ is not defined; indeed, it is essential to the operation of the reflection principle that it cannot be defined; for it is as though there is an inexhaustible reservoir of pre-formal truth from which can be drawn higher and higher formalizations of truth. Nevertheless, *even though the notion of pre-formal truth is perceived always to escape complete formalization, mathematicians nevertheless express the idea in formal terms.*”<sup>258</sup>

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“The effective progress of mathematical notation thus goes along with the deconstruction of metaphysics, with the profound renewal of mathematics itself, and the concept of science for which mathematics has always been the model.”

Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, op. cit., pp. 32-35.

<sup>256</sup> Jacques Derrida’s *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>257</sup> David King, “The Diagonalization of Metaphysics,” op. cit., p. 341.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341. Italics, mine.

However, what we noticed in Derrida is, by picking on Husserl's geometry, he starts integrating a temporal dimension to a theory of space, and the spatial exception of language as a "form," and not a "substance" or "genus."<sup>259</sup> Between these conflicting terms, the first one, as we have seen above, involves a temporal dimension in mathematical thought and the second one revolves around a mathematical thinking of the temporal, which we will take up in perspective the next chapter—which, inter alia, circulates in the regimes of origin, language, truth, undecidability, etc. Derrida's radical critiques, it will appear too simplistic a make-believe task here, call for radical departures! For now, let us recall the Stoics, who remarkably tried something of such scale—to evolve a new measure of cynicism called "scientific truth"<sup>260</sup> as well as revise immediate Greek methods in "assessment," which continues to be a starting point, if not a departure, on how the contestation of a singularity of "logocentric" frame of philosophemes is put into tradition and continuity. Afterward, it was the anthropocentric question of agency, or affect, and dualism that predominated till, shall we mention once again, the arrival of Derrida.<sup>261</sup> In Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, which was a youthful venture, attempts were made to comprehend not only what are numbers but also numerical relations, i.e., the Cantorian<sup>262</sup> concept of

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<sup>259</sup> In highlighting Husserl's distinction of two types of sign in the First Logical Investigations—the sign as expression and the sign as indication—Derrida realizes that "the category of the sign in general is not a genus but rather a form." See Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>260</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>261</sup> On *spiritual humanism*, Derrida accuses the "neutralization of every metaphysical or speculative thesis" as concerning the "unity of the anthropos," which is a "faithful inheritance" of the trio Hegel Husserl-Heidegger. Phenomenological ontology, to "the extent that it describes the structures of human-reality," is seen as philosophical anthropology. See Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 111-135.

<sup>262</sup> In 1883 Georg Cantor defines his radical notion of a set [*Menge*]:

"By a 'manifold' or 'set' I understand in general any many [*Viele*] which can be thought of as one [*Eines*], that is, every totality of definite elements which can be united to a whole through a law. By this I believe I have defined something related to the Platonic *eidos* or *idea*."

Quoted, Cantor, in Paul Livingston, *The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 4.

multiplicity or manifold, or Set Theory (“many as one”), and, further, expands Newtonian-Leibnizian determination of ‘universal arithmetic’.<sup>263</sup> It will be again, however, the “subjective origin” of how finite cardinal arithmetic and conceptual set theory are constituted, which predominated Husserl’s reductionism and transcendental phenomenology and, also, alternatively, served the kernel of his critiques, where the epistemological grounds of mathematics and its associated problematic issues are located. Husserl, according to Richard Tieszen, “thinks that arithmetical knowledge is originally built up in founding acts from basic, everyday intuitions in a way that reflects our a priori cognitive involvement.”<sup>264</sup> This Husserlian derivative that “natural number concept has a basis on intuition,” Tieszen further notes, holds the view (as Poincaré too took similar positions) that the origin of “mathematics is built in founded acts of abstraction, collection, reflection, idealization, and formalization from our basic experience in the life world”—unlike the other logicians (including Frege and Cantor) who attempt “to derive the principles of arithmetic from logic.”<sup>265</sup>

At another level, in commenting on Husserl’s ahistoricism, Paul Ricoeur’s (1913-2005) “distanciation” positions the former’s *eidetic reduction* as a “reduction of history”—and the “notion of origin” as “no longer [signifying a] historico-genesis but rather [a] grounding.”<sup>266</sup> Derrida however takes a different path in the shape of advancing a rigour of a syntax that is scientifically neither grounded nor expressed through an “absence of a centre or origin.”<sup>267</sup> Leonard Lawlor

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<sup>263</sup> For the most authoritative commentary on post-Newtonian formulations, particularly in Great Britain, see Helena M. Pycior, *Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and Geometric Entanglements: British Algebra through the Commentaries on Newton’s Universal Arithmetick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>264</sup> Richard Tieszen, *Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 304.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>266</sup> Paul Ricoeur, esp. “Husserl and the Sense of History,” in *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, (trs.) Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 164.

<sup>267</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., esp. p. 289.

comments that the “dialectical notion of temporality” in Derrida, which he uses throughout in *EHOG*, separates the latter from Ricoeur.<sup>268</sup> “There cannot be a science of differance itself in its operation,” Derrida further adds, “as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin.”<sup>269</sup> Similarly, the “origin,” as Derrida clarifies, “was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin,”<sup>270</sup> which is to imply that there is no absolute origin. In fact, between 1963 and 1968, and interposed by three book publications in 1967, Derrida contentiously developed a methodological approach that is not premised on a “system but rather a strategic device, opening to its own abyss, an unclosed, unenclosable, not wholly formalizable ensemble of rules for reading and writing and interpretation.”<sup>271</sup> The issue of “methodological fecundity”<sup>272</sup> in genesis and origin will largely continue to all other metaphysical concepts (which is found present in any science or transcendental philosophy) as mere and redundant methods. However, the ‘strategic device’, which is literally not a method in a strict formal system and includes deconstruction, the trace and supplement, and

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<sup>268</sup> See Leonard Lawlor, “The Primordial Unity of Essence and Fact: A Reading of Derrida’s *Introduction to Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry*,” op. cit., esp. p. 107.

<sup>269</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>271</sup> As Derrida outlines his methodological difference:

“I was able to develop this device and this interpretation only by according a privilege role to the guideline or analyser going under the names of writing, text and trace, and only by proposing a reconstruction and generalization of these concepts: writing, the text, the trace, as the play and work of *différance*, whose role is at one and the same time both of constitution and of deconstitution. ... I believe that every conceptual breakthrough amounts to transforming, that is to deforming, an accredited, authorized relationship between a word and a concept, between a trope and what one has every interest to consider to be an unshiftable primary sense, a proper, literal or current usage.”

Jacques Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” op. cit., pp. 40-41.

<sup>272</sup> See, above, footnote 36.



“graphics of *différance*,” in Derrida’s own fond admittance, both ironically and paradoxically, can *only* be indicated in an “algebraic manner.”<sup>273</sup>

Derrida, faced with Husserl’s recourse to language at the limits of the mathematical, converted Husserl’s turn to language as a problem of temporal limits, and a problem of language as a mathematical impossibility. Derrida, in questioning the issue of origin as a problem of infinite’s finitude, is also heralding a finitude in the infinitudes of language, well within the limits of its own undecidable temporalities. Undecidability, as Derrida warns us, is not indeterminacy, or non-certainty. There is no probability here. Undecidability then remains within its closures of the indiscernible. Only a temporal order or a mathematical exigency can access such explanation—unless Derrida is proposing a new/different order of temporality. To conclude for the moment, let us recall Cornelius Castoriadis, who, ridiculing what was then fashionably a Parisian search for a “well-formed formula,” which is but a *chimera*, could only help but contemplate: “if [only] mathematics were simply the ordered manipulation of signs.”<sup>274</sup>

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### III

Being, for Alain Badiou, is *not* the One. It is non-presentatable, especially as an object of number. There is, therefore, no *there is* in being. There “is no structure of being.”<sup>275</sup> For, one is a number, metaphysically enframed since Parmenides and Plato, till its liberation by Badiou himself, perhaps! Numbers are not objects and, therefore, presumably, there can be no ontology of being, i.e., that “being

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<sup>273</sup> This should not be construed as an out of context quote, although we are now familiar with Derrida’s almost cryptic and allergic use of mathematical terminologies. See Jacques Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>274</sup> Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, (tr.) Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 184.

<sup>275</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 26.

qua being is number.”<sup>276</sup> [Here, the role of ontology is “the thought of the inconsistent manifold, that is, what is reduced without an immanent unification to the sole predicate of its multiplicity.”<sup>277</sup>]. Rather, coming back, being is the “one *is not*,”<sup>278</sup> or, in simpler phrase, being is not what is one, the One. In fact, being is not the “multiple” either. What, then, is being, according to Badiou? How does one access the non-being that is being? What is the place of the mathematical and the ontological in relation to accessing Being? What is the value of *operation*, or *intervention*, or *appearance*, or *presentation* that accords the presence of (or the being of being) in the multiple? And, to paraphrase Badiou’s own question, what counts are one because it is not *one* that “turns out to be multiple?”<sup>279</sup>

Before we come to these questions, let us take a quick survey on the reception of Badiou. Post-Derrida, i.e., 2004, Badiou (b. 1937) is regarded today as “probably the most important living French philosopher and, along with Slavoj Žižek [b. 1949] and Jürgen Habermas [b. 1929], possibly the most important living European philosopher.”<sup>280</sup> Burhanuddin Baki datelined the status comment last year: 2015. The mentioned philosophers, including Derrida, however, have little in common. We discussed in the above section how Derrida has been apparently stalking Husserl all along, having failed to express his mathematical frustrations and concerns.<sup>281</sup> The tragic moment for the opportune wait and the violent attack eventually came in the shape of *EHOG*—which deserves to be actually Derrida’s *magnum opus*, incidentally his first major work too. If Derrida’s central problem with Husserl is premised on refuting the ideality of mathematical objects, we find Badiou’s contrary and strong defense of mathematical ontology completely antithetical. Nonetheless, despite both Derrida and Badiou appending

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<sup>276</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>277</sup> Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>278</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>280</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event and the Mathematics of Set Theory* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 1.

<sup>281</sup> Refer footnote 48, above.

divergent approaches, there exist a parallel conclusion between them, namely, the grounding of truth through the limits of language and its exhaustion in the determination of being. Derrida's derision with Husserl appears to complement Badiou's on Frege, despite both differently drawing their fundamental basics. Both led the system in critiquing western metaphysics rooted from the classical world. Badiou has an erratic relation with classical thoughts; Derrida is selectively verbose. As contemporaries, the relations between Derrida and Badiou, inasmuch, personally or philosophically, were never close—except after the former's death in 2004.<sup>282</sup> Earlier, in fact, at a 1990 colloquium on Jacques Lacan, Badiou and Derrida quarreled.<sup>283</sup> From a Rouen high-school philosophy tutor turned 1968 stone-throwing ultra-radical Maoist-leftist,<sup>284</sup> Badiou's temperaments and intolerance with many of his contemporaries often find mentioned, sometimes going beyond the intellectual engagements of name-calling.<sup>285</sup> Badiou's writings, which are not an implication we are attempting with his "militant intelligentsia," are rather polemical many a time. On the orientation of Derrida's philosophical methods and moorings, Badiou identifies

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<sup>282</sup> See Badiou tribute to "Jacques Derrida," in Alain Badiou, *Pocket Pantheon: Figures of Postwar Philosophy*, (tr.) David Macey (London; New York: Verso, 2009), pp. 125-44. Here, Badiou, though briefly, tried to converge the trajectories of his own work and Derrida's—particularly through their common treads—"inscription of the non-existent" and the "existent," "impossibility," "being," "language," etc. An earlier version of the same essay appeared in Costas Douzinas (ed.), *Adieu Derrida* (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 34-46

<sup>283</sup> Albin Michel published the proceedings, including the quarrel contents, in 1991, for which an English translation from the French is yet to appear. I, therefore, have no access beyond this mild reference.

<sup>284</sup> Oliver Feltham, *Alain Badiou: Live Theory* (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), pp. 1-2. This book is insightful in providing a biographical perspective on Badiou's oeuvre.

<sup>285</sup> The attrition between the mild mannered Gilles Deleuze and the disruptively militant Badiou, for instance, and their 1992-94 correspondences, which will never see the light of the day, are highlighted in "The 'Fascism of the Potato'," in François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, (tr.) Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 365-74. Also, see, Mathew R. McLennan, *Philosophy, Sophistry, Antiphilosophy: Badiou's Dispute with Lyotard* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

the same as a “sinuous approach” to conclude a “thinking of the inexistent.”<sup>286</sup> Also, between Derrida-Badiou, there are no major literatures available insofar—not that a comparative study is necessary or encouraged—apart from Christopher Norris’<sup>287</sup> introductory attempt that contrasts readings of their classical “depth and acuity” and their commonly misunderstood ethical positions—and, substantively, Antonio Calcagno’s<sup>288</sup> earlier work, whose study attempts a temporal contrast by inverting Badiou’s corpus over Derrida’s political *aporia*. What binds Badiou and Derrida together remains too in their common grounds: on the irreducibility of multiplicity and the indeterminacy of origin in the determination of being. Badiou talks about “ontology of presence” whereas Derrida talks about “metaphysics of presence.” Likewise, if Derrida’s most singular and devastating critique against the western tradition is premised on the contingency of being as presence, Badiou’s equivalent critique is on the contingent linking of being as One and as embedded in all thinking and thought processes of western philosophies. Unlike Derrida, however, Badiou’s conception and philosophy on ontology are literally drawn from the mathematical world (using axiomatic(s) as legitimate). Mathematically, moreover, Badiou departs from Cantorian (via Leibniz) and Gödelian undecidabilities and indiscernibles, while Derrida uses these as static markers of impossibilities. For Badiou, in the description of Burhanuddin Baki, “mathematics ‘conditions’ the philosophy.”<sup>289</sup> Introducing *Being and Event*, Baki projects it as the most “innovative” and “revolutionary”<sup>290</sup> work, although it was initially received nonchalantly. *Being*

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<sup>286</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event, 2*, (tr.) Alberto Toscano (London and New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 545.

<sup>287</sup> Christopher Norris, *Derrida, Badiou and the Formal Imperative* (London & New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012).

<sup>288</sup> Antonio Calcagno, *Badiou and Derrida: Politics, Events and their Time* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007).

<sup>289</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>290</sup> Where, in Baki’s description, “the deployment of mathematical thinking to reconfigure the entire landscape of our present investigations into the most central philosophical issues” takes place.

Ibid., p. 1.

*and Event*, in the words of Justin Clemens, also marks the “return of ontology.”<sup>291</sup> Badiou makes not mistake by listing “five mathematical ‘bulwarks’,”<sup>292</sup> which were individually pivotal and foundational in his investigational and methodological approaches to metaphysics:

- “1. the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms of Set Theory, including the Axiom of Choice
2. the theory of ordinal numbers
3. the theory of cardinal numbers
4. Kurt Gödel’s work on the constructible universe, which led to his proof of the consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis with respect to the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms
5. Paul Cohen’s work on generic models and his technique of forcing, which proved the independence of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis with respect to Zermelo-Fraenkel”<sup>293</sup>

Badiou’s debt (and our man here has a knack to pay rich tributes to debts) to mathematical figures includes Jules Vuillemin (1920-2001), Jean Cavailles (1903-44), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Friedrich Kittler (1943-2011), Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), Georg Cantor (1845-1918), and Albert Lautman (1908-44). We also have Jacques Lacan (1901-81), Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), Jacques Derrida (whom we mentioned briefly), Michel Serres (b. 1930), François Laruelle (b. 1937), and Jean-Toussaint Desanti (1914-2002), amongst a host of more others, who were also some of the severest auditors on Badiou. Also, specifically on the mathematical interrogation of “presentation as pure multiple,” which is the focus here, Alain Badiou admits his intellectual debt to two others: Jean-Francois Lyotard’s (1924-98) *juridical* (Critique) and Gilles Deleuze’s (1925-95) ‘natural’ (in Spinoza’s sense)

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<sup>291</sup> Justin Clemens, “Platonic Meditations: the Work of Alain Badiou,” in *PLI*, No. 11, 2001, pp. 200-229, p. 201.

<sup>292</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>293</sup> The above list is paraphrased from Badiou’s list in *Being and Event* (p. 20). Given the clarity and proper reference inserted by Burhanuddin Baki, it adds lucidity to Badiou’s list. See *Badiou’s Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 8.

approaches.<sup>294</sup> Badiou has however since remained apprehensive of Deleuze, suspecting him to be qualifying the One as metaphysical and in refusing to liberate the multiple from the One.<sup>295</sup> Nevertheless, despite the primacy and vogue of Badiolism-Badiolize<sup>296</sup> today, hardly any “straightforward implications of Badiou’s new conceptual framework [are] yet to emerge.”<sup>297</sup> The same lack also applies to the acute dearth of commentaries on Badiou. One reason is mathematical practitioners themselves don’t have any need for his interpretative works. Plus, the sole reliance on English translations or works on Badiou, to be alarmist, given our present context. The other resonating reason is that mathematics intimidates<sup>298</sup>—and, conversely, Badiou himself has tried his best to lure aficionados by allaying the fears for mathematics as a “social construction,” without any “intrinsic reason for it.”<sup>299</sup> Besides Burhanuddin Baki’s *Badiou’s Being* (2015), which is the most excellent introduction insofar for the technically mathematical-disadvantaged on Badiou, Peter Hallward’s 2003 *Badiou* can be treated as a biographical primer with a fortuitous appendix-glossary sort on set theory (like Badiou’s apologetic *Appendixes*, too). Christopher Norris’s *Reader’s Guide*<sup>300</sup> (2009) is set on Badiou’s *Being and Event*, understandably underlying a philosophical orientation is necessary for a growing interest in a work otherwise that is densely set on the possibilities of set theory. Ed Pluth’s<sup>301</sup> recent introduction (2011) therein capitalizes on this

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<sup>294</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 483.

<sup>295</sup> Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, (tr.) Louise Burchill (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 10.

<sup>296</sup> Name callings becoming proper nouns in François Laruelle, *Anti-Badiou: On the Introduction of Maoism into Philosophy*, (tr.) Robin Mackay (London; New Delhi; New York; Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013).

<sup>297</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>298</sup> And, also, because Badiou “is so firmly at odds with every dominant philosophical orientation in both the French and the Anglo- American domain” (p. xxii). See Peter Hallward, *Badiou: A Subject to Truth* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 323.

<sup>299</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>300</sup> Christopher Norris, *Badiou’s Being and Event: A Reader’s Guide* (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009).

<sup>301</sup> Ed Pluth, *Badiou: A Philosophy of the New* (Cambridge; Malden: Polity, 2011).

growing interest and market on Badiou inasmuch as Jason Barker's<sup>302</sup> earlier introduction (2002), which focuses on the political. In regard to the a political reading of Badiou's work, the independent works of Bruno Bosteels (2010) and Oliver Feltham (2008) are the most original and comprehensive.<sup>303</sup> Other serious commentaries (perhaps *serious* is misnomer here) include Fabio Gironi's<sup>304</sup> (2015) attempt to place Badiou in the canons of post-Enlightenment debates and François Laruelle's truly *Anti-Badiou* (2011, in French) that sets to rubbish "the project of the re-education of [Maoist] philosophy through mathematics."<sup>305</sup> Talking about education, A.J. Bartlett's *Badiou and Plato: An Education by Truths* (2011) remains one of the most important works on the Platonic influences, which also systematically investigates some of Badiou's key concepts and categories.<sup>306</sup> There is also a steady interest in reading Badiou theologically<sup>307</sup> but perhaps the best serious commentaries emerging today are from philosophers with background in Speculative and New Materialist philosophies, which coincidentally are younger Turks.<sup>308</sup> Amongst the younger lot, we cannot afford to ignore the posthumous works of Sam Gillespie's (1970-2003) *The Mathematics of Novelty*<sup>309</sup> (2008), for whom Badiou is the unofficial materialist muse and guruji. Then, of course, the secret to reading Badiou still remains in the

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<sup>302</sup> Jason Barker, *Badiou: A Critical Introduction* (London; Sterling: Pluto Press, 2002).

<sup>303</sup> See Bruno Bosteels, *Badiou and Politics* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010) and Oliver Feltham, *Alain Badiou: Live Theory*, op. cit.

<sup>304</sup> Fabio Gironi, *Naturalizing Badiou: Mathematical Ontology and Structural Realism* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

<sup>305</sup> See François Laruelle, *Anti-Badiou*, op. cit., p. vii.

<sup>306</sup> A.J. Bartlett, *Badiou and Plato: An Education by Truths* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).

<sup>307</sup> An instance is Hollis Phelps' *Alain Badiou: Between Theology and Anti-Theology* (Durham: Acumen, 2013). But, for a more concise reading, refer Christopher Watkin, *Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) and Clayton Crockett & Jeffrey W. Robbins, *Religion, Politics, and the Earth: The New Materialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>308</sup> Particularly, Oliver Feltham (see, above), Quentin Meillassoux, Alberto Toscano, and Adrian Johnston.

<sup>309</sup> Sam Gillespie, *The Mathematics of Novelty: Badiou's Minimalist Metaphysics* (Melbourne: re.press, 2008).

couple of insightful articles in edited<sup>310</sup> or single journal issues. Lastly, given Badiou's prolific writings, it appears that there are more explanatory books by the author himself rather than by his commentators. Crisp and short (notably the *Meditations*), Badiou's works however include dense repetition, verging on confusion. On the lighter side, happily, this has also fortunately led to a sizeable proliferation of many a translator's forewords or introductions, coming from different constituencies of thoughts, which are equally incisive and textually substantiated, making it easy and beneficial to our study. For purpose of the study here, we shall however restrict ourselves to the procedurals involved in the mathematical derivatives of Being.

Back to Badiou's Being, let us straightaway begin with how he derives the "effective conditions"<sup>311</sup> of the "subject"<sup>312</sup> of *being*—either as a trade unionist,

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<sup>310</sup> The standard and best edited collection of essays, of course, is Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again: Alain Badiou ad the Future of Philosophy* (London; New York: Continuum, 2004); also, see Gabriel Riera (ed.), *Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); Paul Ashton, A.J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens (eds.), *The Praxis of Alain Badiou* (Melbourne: re.press, 2006); A.J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens (eds.), *Alain Badiou: Key Concepts* (Durham: Acumen, 2010); and Jim Vernon and Antonio Calcagno (eds.), *Badiou and Hegel: Infinity, Dialectics, Subjectivity* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; London: Lexington Books, 2015).

<sup>311</sup> To illustrate the full quote on the subject's conditions

"The mode according to which a body enters into a subjective formalism with regard to the production of a present. Accordingly, a subject has as its effective conditions, not only an event (and thus above all a site), but a body, along with the existence in this body of an organ for at least some points."

Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, *op. cit.*, p. 594.

<sup>312</sup> The *subject*, Badiou defines, is "any local configuration of a generic procedure from which a truth is supported." Accordingly, Badiou identifies six concepts of the subject in modern metaphysics: i. *a subject is not a substance*, ii. *a subject is not a void point either*, iii. *a subject is not a sense of experience*, iv. *a subject is not an invariable of presentation*, v. *every subject is qualified* and vi. *a subject is not a result—any more than it is an origin* (pp. 391-92). See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, *op. cit.*, p. 391.



or the ordinary, or the political<sup>313</sup> [as drawn from his seminars dating January 1975 and June 1979].<sup>314</sup> And, ten years later, around 1988-89, how a spatio-temporal notion of a locale [and, therein, a temporal relativity] was additionally supplemented to the element of truth—with both seen as essentially consequential either to, or from, the subject: “I call subject the local or finite status of a truth. A subject is what is *locally born out*.”<sup>315</sup> Maintaining the anthropological *subject*, for Badiou therefore, is an expedient political incursion—a “post-Sartrean conception”—as Nina Power sees it as fundamentally crucial to understand *subjectivation*—which is not possible since “it will always be an event that constitutes the subject as truth.”<sup>316</sup> In our opinion, however, Badiou was also attempting to locate the subject as residing in the finitude of non-universal (local) truth.<sup>317</sup> For, “the subject is not a substance” and is also free of any “transcendental function.”<sup>318</sup> The complicity of Badiou’s

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<sup>313</sup> On “the worker as a political figure” and Badiou’s readings on the “process of subjectification,” an interesting and short read when I first encountered Badiou is Jason Read’s “Politics as Subjectification: Rethinking the Figure of the Work in the Thought of Badiou and Rancière,” in *Philosophy Today*, No. 51, 2007, pp. 125-32.

<sup>314</sup> Indeed, for Badiou, *there are only* three visions of the world, according to which one may choose two definitions of the subject mutually opposed to one another:

—“the subject is a consistent repetition in which the real ex-sists (Lacan)

—the subject is a destructive consistency, in which the real ex-ceeds” [i.e.,

Heidegger]

Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, (tr.) Bruno Bosteels (London; New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 239.

<sup>315</sup> Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” (tr.) Bruce Fink, in Eduardo Cavada, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 24-32, esp. p. 25.

<sup>316</sup> Nina Power, “Towards an Anthropology of Infinitude: Badiou and the Political Subject,” in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, 2006, pp. 186-209, esp. p. 186, p. 196, and p. 209

<sup>317</sup> Badiou’s stratagem against the bodies and language of knowledge at the expense of truth—the “encyclopedic structuring of objects and beings within a framework of finitude”—is critical to the decidable guarantees of time: “the indiscernibility of what is undecidable be impossible.” See A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 93.

<sup>318</sup> Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” op. cit., esp. p. 26.

subject contra the subject is also rather exposed as a case of disenchantment, by his severest critics, given Badiou's tampered political past, and his reaction to the postmodern is often interpreted as a political carrier of a certain dogmatism.<sup>319</sup> Badiou, on a radical run, as one commentator sees, was desperately searching "a differentiated concept of subject."<sup>320</sup> Therefore, to illustrate Badiou, let us choose his all time two favorite departures on the *subject*: Martin Heidegger<sup>321</sup> and Jacques Lacan.<sup>322</sup> This is also where the problematic begins:<sup>323</sup> between the

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<sup>319</sup> For Badiou, as Jason Barker comments, "there is nothing outside thought, and questions of objective knowledge and/or existence must be posed solely in terms of what is what is not thinkable—accepting the aphorism of Parmenides that thought and being are identical—for the subject" (p. 9). Barker therefore finds it unpalatable that "the paradoxical sense of Badiou's argument[for] the subject" forces being ("in the capacity of in discernment"), to quote Badiou, "to take a decision in relation to truth" (p. 110). See *Alain Badiou*, op. cit.

<sup>320</sup> Norman Madarasz, "The Biolinguistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology," in Jim Vernon and Antonio Calcagno (eds.), *Badiou and Hegel*, op. cit., pp. 123-54, p. 125.

<sup>321</sup> Badiou expresses his indebtedness to Heidegger—"for having yoked philosophy... to the question of being. We are also indebted to him for giving a name to the era of the forgetting of this question, a forgetting whose history, beginning with Plato, is the history of philosophy as such." See Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings*, (eds. & trs.) Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London and New York: Continuum, [2004] 2005), p. 39.

<sup>322</sup> Indebtedness seems to be apparently a stern intellectual politeness with Badiou: "We must recognize that we are indebted to Lacan—in the wake of Freud, but also of Descartes – for having paved the way for a formal theory of the subject whose basis is materialist; it was indeed by opposing himself to phenomenology, to Kant and to a certain structuralism, that Lacan could stay the course." See Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>323</sup> The reference here is with the political activism and ideological lineage of Badiou. There is a small but devoted list that follows Badiou's corpus into developing the question of the political, especially on the issue of emancipation and political practices. There are also attempts to inscribe a break in Badiou's works, especially in the shape of early and later. Nonetheless, what is consistent with Badiou is his serious engagement with political thoughts and politics of issues throughout, including contemporary politics and provincial Europe. For the most authoritative and extensive review that asserts a political continuity in Badiou's works, see Bruno Bosteels, *Badiou and Politics*, op. cit. Also, see Adrian Johnston's *Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), which heavily imports Badiou's ontology and Žižek's subject in presenting a materialist critique on their political philosophies.

“political militancy” of a dialectical Badiou and the high priest of a “militant of truth”<sup>324</sup> in the mathematical Badiou.



Figure: 2012 Verso’s cover for Alain Badiou’s *Philosophy for Militants*.<sup>325</sup>

For, Badiou, it is first Maoism and Maoism alone as an “apogee of the modern tradition of philosophy”<sup>326</sup> and then mathematics and mathematics alone, again, properly, that gives us *the thought of being*. (Nevertheless, for the purpose of this mathematical investigation I shall however ignore the gentler part of the biopolitics in Badiou’s metapolitics.)<sup>327</sup> The “thought of being,” asserts Badiou,

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<sup>324</sup> In the “Author’s Preface” to *Being and Event*, Badiou expresses in 2005:

“A subject is nothing other than an active fidelity to the event of truth. This means that a subject is a militant of truth. I philosophically founded the notion of ‘militant’ at a time when the consensus was that any engagement of this type was archaic. Not only did I found this notion, but I considerably enlarged it. The militant of a truth is not only the political militant working for the emancipation of humanity in its entirety. He or she is also the artist-creator, the scientist who opens up a new theoretical field, or the lover whose world is enchanted.”

Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p.xiii.

<sup>325</sup> Book cover picture of Alain Badiou’s *Philosophy for Militants*, (tr.) Bruno Bosteels (London: Verso, 2012). Source: Google Commons.

<sup>326</sup> In an acerbic tone, François Laruelle thus introduces Badiou:

“Badiou would have it that ‘modernity’ is a fusion of Platonist mathematicism and Maoism, thus demonstrating his astonishing plasticity, his ability to fuse with liberalism on one hand, mathematicism on the other. From this point of view, mathematicism is the condition of communism, with the authoritarian Platonist model finding a new lease of life in Maoism [p. viii] ... and its conservation-reeducation by Cantor and Mo under the sign of Plato.”

See François Laruelle, *Anti-Badiou*, op. cit., p. xvii.

<sup>327</sup> As a passing remark, recall the audit of Martin Heidegger’s thoughts and his association with the National Socialism, which has produced tremendous body of unending debates around politics and philosophy. Also, recall Alain Badiou’s philosopher-student activist in the 1960s to his association and activities with the militant organization Union des

presupposes that there is an immediate correlate in every ontological concept and therein the proposal that the nature/character of *being* can be determined not in itself but through an axiomatic sense. Two issues may be noted here: first, the thought of being cannot be objectified mathematically and, second, the mathematical manner in which the presupposition of [even] a possibility to [even] have a thought of being to happenchance is not an acute concern, albeit, contrary to what was an issue of “origin,”<sup>328</sup> the core capital for Derrida. How Badiou constitutes the elementary of being is therefore by regressing over the *ordinal finitude*<sup>329</sup> of Plato and Parmenides, by acknowledging the equation of being as φύσις (nature) in the Aristotelian thought of being-qua-being, which is then spilled over to Heidegger’s *ontical* difference—which, but then, is an ontotheological difference between the finite and the infinite—thereby conserving the Greek finitude, i.e., “the compatibility of a theology of the infinite

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Communistes de France Marxiste-Léniniste (UCFML) in the 1970s. Will historians of thoughts judge Badiou’s emancipatory politics? Like how the “event” in Badiou is now beginning to be commented upon today?

<sup>328</sup> The following statement by Badiou essentially distinguishes the differences and departures from Derrida’s stakes:

“Actual mathematics is thus the metaphysics of the ontology that it is. It is, in its essence, forgetting of itself. [...] In this sense, mathematical ontology is not technical, because the unveiling of the origin is not an unfathomable virtuality, it is rather an intrinsically available option, a permanent possibility. Mathematics regulates in and by itself the possibility of de constructing the apparent order of the object and the liaison, and of retrieving the original ‘disorder’ in which it pronounces the Ideas of the pure multiple and their suture to being-qua-being by the proper name of the void. It is both the forgetting of itself and the critique of that forgetting. It is the turn towards the object, but also the return towards the presentation of presentation.

This is why, in itself, mathematics cannot-however artificial its procedures may be-stop belonging to Thought.”

Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., pp. 446-47.

<sup>329</sup> An *ordinal*, explains Badiou, is “a multiple of multiples which are in themselves ordinals. This concept literally provides the backbone of all ontology, because it is the very concept of Nature.”

Ibid., p.133.

with an ontology of the finite.”<sup>330</sup> Heidegger’s *presencing* of being is therefore a sorry affair of remaining “enslaved” to “the figure of ontology as the offering of a trajectory of proximity,”<sup>331</sup> a relation that remains intuitively imaginary, where it is not possible at all to locate being, since “the radically subtracted dimension of being [is] foreclosed not only from representation but from all presentation.”<sup>332</sup> The determination of being in Badiou, accrued from reading Heidegger, does not even dispense an issue, a concern for an investigation because, in the first place, being is not the One—being is *nothing*, the *void*:

“The void is the name of being-of inconsistency-according to a situation, inasmuch as presentation gives us therein an unrepresentable access, thus non-access, to this access, in the mode of what is not-one, nor composable of ones; thus what is qualifiable within the situation solely as the errancy of the nothing.”<sup>333</sup>

What Badiou deduced from the ancients are two possible trajectories. The one taken by Heidegger in constituting the subject through the vector of *pros hen*<sup>334</sup> and the position taken by Aristotle himself in the deadlock of *pros en*. In rejecting Heidegger, Badiou therein turn to the mathematical in order to “develop a theory of subject *without an object*—which also means a subject *without a body*.”<sup>335</sup> In short, to allude to Badiou’s invocation of Samuel Beckett (1906-89), “being is nothing other than its own becoming-nothingness.”<sup>336</sup> Or, a/the “subject is the antonym of an empty idiom.”<sup>337</sup> Reading Heidegger therefore allows Badiou to

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<sup>330</sup> Ibid., p.143.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>334</sup> See, also, footnote 457, below, for *pros hen*.

<sup>335</sup> Norman Madarasz, “The Biolinguistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>336</sup> Alain Badiou, *On Beckett*, (eds. & trs.) Alberto Toscano & Nina Power (Blackett Street, Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), p. 48.

<sup>337</sup> Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” op. cit., esp. p. 32.

find fault with philosophy<sup>338</sup> and privilege mathematics as the sole model of accessing being. Badiou's fear for Heidegger's "hidden algebra and a submissive topology,"<sup>339</sup> eventually, resides in the case of a constructivist attempt to "put an end to the philosophical idea of a *guarantee of consistency by the cause* [or, the One]."<sup>340</sup> Brian Smith identifies twofold profit for Badiou from reading Heidegger: a) "to separate philosophy from ontology" and b) "to propose a systematic ontology not based on the one."<sup>341</sup> For Badiou, as a quick comment cum note for now, "*there are no mathematical objects.*"<sup>342</sup> Mathematics, for Badiou, is Ontology. This statement of reversal equation (or axiom) is also the central thesis and method of his *Being and Event* (1988)—defended with expositions using selective set theories—and, fended, again, in *Logics of the World* (2006), through logic and voyeuristic category theory.

Like Heidegger—Jacques Lacan too, as Leslie Hill notes, "exploited modern mathematics, set theory, and topology in similar ways, too, as part of an effort to arrive at a rigorous formalisation of the logic of the unconscious, though some would insist its status was at best merely metaphorical."<sup>343</sup> However, Hill's overt statement undermines Badiou's undertakings, which, similar to Peter Hallward's, easily concludes how the Lacanian register of the Symbolic is literally translated as consistent with the formulation of Badiou's ontological shifts to mathematical

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<sup>338</sup> In Heidegger, as Alain Badiou complains, the "sayable of being is disjunct from the sayable of truth. That is why philosophy alone thinks truth, in what it itself possesses in the way of subtraction from the subtraction of being." See *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 355.

<sup>339</sup> Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, op. cit., p. 238.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., p. 235.

<sup>341</sup> Brian Anthony Smith, "The Limit of Subject in Badiou's *Being and Event*," in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vo. 2, No. 1-2, 2006, pp. 134-58, p. 136.

<sup>342</sup> The mathematical objects Badiou refers to in the tradition include *ideal object* (Plato/Platonism), *objects drawn by abstraction from sensible substance* (Aristotle), *innate ideas* (Descartes), *objects constructed from pure intuition* (Kant), objects constructed from a *finite operational intuition* (Brouwer), objects as *conventions of writing* (Formalism), objects as *constructions transitive to pure logic* (Logicism). See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>343</sup> Leslie Hill, *The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 74.

axiom of emptiness, i.e., that “nothing exists except on an assumed foundation of absence.”<sup>344</sup> Justin Clemens defends this misreading of Badiou’s set theory ontology by highlighting that, for instance, “the void is the void of being, scripted by a mathematics which subtracts itself precisely from the divagations of the symbolic and of *la langue*; [whereas] for Lacan, the subject is a void, the correlate of a void object (*objet a*) fallen from the void of the signifier.”<sup>345</sup> However, Badiou’s reading on Lacanian void,<sup>346</sup> particularly through the logic of *pas-tout*, which outlines female sexuality and a formula on sexuation, is seen as too hasty a politically correct remark, categorically exposing his intolerant realism.<sup>347</sup> On similar lines, Badiou’s readings on love and *tout court*, on Sophocles’ Antigone, as an exemplary of the One-Two differences as essentially non-universal, Kaufman critiques, conjoins the paradigmatic project of “truth-process” that has no fidelity for the event with the ethical action of a subject, thereby upholding the flexible model of ethics in Lacan.<sup>348</sup> Nonetheless, Badiou critiques of Lacan is based on intuitionist logic (by stating that it limits the power of negation in pure logic or

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<sup>344</sup> Peter Hallward, *Badiou: A Subject to Truth*, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>345</sup> See, footnote 11, in Justin Clemens, “Doubles of Nothing: The Problem of Binding Truth to Being in the Work of Alain Badiou,” in *Filozofski vestnik*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 2005, pp. 97-11, esp. 101.

<sup>346</sup> For Lacan, the one is void; love takes place in the impossibility of the one, that is, in the otherness:

“The One everyone talks about all the time is, first of all a mirage of the One you believe yourself to be. Not to say that that is the whole horizon. There are as many Ones as you like— they are characterized by the fact that none of them resemble any of the others in any way...”

This was taken up in Seminar XX, Encore (1972-73). See Jacques Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, (tr.) Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 47. Also, Bruce Fink highlights Badiou’s identification of Lacanian “pass” with his own “generic procedures” as a consideration for “a larger attempt to establish a scientificity particular to psychoanalysis.” See Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 145.

<sup>347</sup> Russell Grigg, “Lacan and Badiou: Logic of the *Pas-Tout*,” in *Lacan, Language, and Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), pp. 81-94.

<sup>348</sup> Eleanor Kaufman, “Why the Family is Beautiful (Lacan Against Badiou),” in *Diacritics*, Vol. 32, No. 3-4, 2002, pp. 135-51.

acerbates *reductio* argument), which potentially endears to create confusion between logic and mathematics—and for allegedly warranting a pre-Cantorian conception of the infinite<sup>349</sup>—which purportedly positions “the actual infinite to be an imaginary object”<sup>350</sup> (thereby leading to the accusation that “Lacan has no concept of the infinite other than in terms of operational inaccessibility”).<sup>351</sup> “For Lacan,” comments O’Sullivan, “the infinite is within the gap of the split subject; for Badiou the infinite is the very atmosphere in which subjects are produced and, crucially, is instrumental in how they are produced.”<sup>352</sup> “Lacan had repeatedly, throughout his career,” Sam Gillespie however remarks, “sought to separate philosophy from psychoanalysis—he refused to elevate the former into a master discourse which sought truth through submitting the claims of philosophy to the finite horizon of human consciousness.”<sup>353</sup> Here, therefore, Badiou’s objection is understandable because he sees the ‘structures of desire’ as finite whereas Lacan’s idea of ‘feminine enjoyment’ is purely infinite; thereby incurring the paradoxes of a “disjunctive truth,”<sup>354</sup> i.e., the “profound relation between [the subject’s] finitude and the sexual non-relation... between finitude

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<sup>349</sup> Badiou quotes Lacan to assert this point:

“Set theory [. . .] yields what it calls the non-denumerable [. . .] but which, translating it into my vocabulary, I do not call the non-denumerable, an object I would unhesitatingly qualify as mythical, but the impossible to number [*dénombrer*].”

Jacques Lacan, quoted, in Alain Badiou, “The Subject and Infinity,” in *Conditions*, (tr.) Steven Corcoran (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), pp. 211-27, esp. p. 219.

<sup>350</sup> Badiou’s reaction is premised on Lacan’s statement that “the basis of analytic discourse in the perfectly finite list of drives. Its finitude is related to the impossibility which is demonstrated in a genuine questioning of the sexual relation as such.”

*Ibid.*, p. 226.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>352</sup> Simon O’Sullivan, *On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams on the Finite-Infinite Relation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. endnote 10, p. 261.

<sup>353</sup> Sam Gillespie, “Subtractive,” in *Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconsciousness: One*, 1996, pp.7-10, esp. p. 7.

<sup>354</sup> Alain Badiou, “The Subject and Infinity,” *op. cit.*, p. 227.



and the infinitude of secondary enjoyment.”<sup>355</sup> The subject is neither a substance nor a consciousness—and Badiou corners Lacan’s import of the Cartesian the “‘*there is*’ was always there”—and “nothing generic could ever be imagined in this space [of the subject].”<sup>356</sup> Generic, here, as Madarasz prudently warns us, implies “ontology is innate.”<sup>357</sup> Inasmuch, the “Lacanian doctrine of the subject,” as Badiou concludes, “is essentially finite to the extent that even the infinite has to show that its existence does not exceed that of the finite.”<sup>358</sup> Nevertheless, Badiou, in engaging Lacan’s ‘new knowledge’ hunt model Theory, and in problematizing the latter’s neologism of “ex-istence” (i.e., the consequential effacement of the real in the symbolic order<sup>359</sup>), attempts to rehabilitate the Lacanian subject (and the subject’s scientific substance as an ideological category) as philosophy’s proper task (where, *the impossible characterizes the real*).<sup>360</sup>




Figure: Diagram of Badiou’s production of the subject.<sup>361</sup>

- 1: Situation/world;
- 2: Elements/count;
- 3: Event site;
- 4: The subject;
- 5: Path of the militant/re-count;
- 6: The event;
- 7: Inconsistent multiplicity

<sup>355</sup> Ibid., p. 226.

<sup>356</sup> Alain Badiou, “Descartes/Lacan,” (tr.) Sigi Jöttkandt and Daniel Collins, in *Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious: One*, 1996, pp. 13-16. This article translation predates *Being and Event*’s translation into English, where it is also included.

<sup>357</sup> Norman Madarasz, “The Biolinguistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>358</sup> Alain Badiou, “The Subject and Infinity,” op. cit., p. 225.

<sup>359</sup> As Badiou argues in “La subversion infinitesimale,” (p. 128):

“[W]hat is excluded from the symbolic reappears in the real: under certain conditions what is specifically excluded from a mathematical structure reappears as the inaugurating mark of the real (historical) process of the production of a different structure.”

Badiou, quoted, in Oliver Feltham, *Alain Badiou: Live Theory*, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., esp. p. 19 & p. 27. Also, see, footnote 346, above, for Bruce Fink’s comment.

<sup>361</sup> Simon O’Sullivan, *On the Production of Subjectivity*, op. cit., p. 161.

On the question of the subject, we shall add Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) as Badiou's third. Leibniz two principles interested Badiou: i. *being-possible*<sup>362</sup> and ii. *being-existent*.<sup>363</sup> The first principle is a blind trust for an Idea that there is an "infinite understanding of God," where the ontological postulate is premised on a logicism that "every non-contradictory multiple desire to exist."<sup>364</sup> If the first principle is based on what we identify as blind trust, the second one, then, as Leibniz terms it, is against the faith of "blind chance," which also logically eliminates the contingency of a *there is*. This sufficient reason allows, as Badiou interprets it using the axiom of foundation, a "multiple, and the multiple infinity of multiplies from which it is composed, [or] can be circumscribed and thought in the absolute constructed legitimacy of their being,"<sup>365</sup> that-there-is-being. This is Leibniz ontological model of being-qua-being, or being-in-totality. Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, however, as Badiou points out, is in axiomatic conflict with Leibniz own principle of contradiction or identity<sup>366</sup>—"why is there something rather than nothing?" In other words, the contradiction specifically endangers a primacy given to reason as an "essence" over an "existence." Leibniz's "synthetic maxim," as Badiou terms it, is based on "'what is not a being is not a *being*', which establishes the reciprocity of being and the one as a norm."<sup>367</sup> The schema proposed by Leibniz is on "the basis of there being something rather than nothing, [where] it has already been inferred that there is some being in the pure possible, or that logic desires the being of what conforms to it."<sup>368</sup> That there is a being-presented,

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<sup>362</sup> "In possible thing, or in possibility itself or essence," Leibniz says, "there is a certain urge for existence, or, so to speak, a striving to being." Leibniz, quoted, in Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 316.

<sup>363</sup> This is the premise for principle of sufficient reason, as Leibniz says: "we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise." Leibniz, quoted. *Ibid.*, p. 316.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 316.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>366</sup> G.W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, (ed. & tr.) Roger Ariew (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 321.

<sup>367</sup> Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>368</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 316.

given the logical nominalism, following either a language of logic (*if the void exist, language is incomplete*<sup>369</sup>), or the intrinsically nameable, whichever is the case, is the question of the Leibnizian *indiscernible*,<sup>370</sup> coming close to Divine Mathematics, where God is the “constructibility of the constructible,” the creator of a complete, “well-made” language. Badiou therefore questions Leibniz: “[i]f two beings are indiscernible, language cannot separate them” and “[i]f all difference is attributable to language and not being, *presented* in-difference is impossible.”<sup>371</sup> In short, if the indiscernible is “a language in which what exists conforms to the reason for its existence,” the same also goes on to say that there is “no reason for the existence of what it divides can be given and thus ‘language’ as nomination through rule is contradicted.”<sup>372</sup> The indiscernible therein contradicts with the nomination of language. This allows Badiou to surreptitiously claim that Leibniz’s indiscernible “proposes to extract laws, or reasons, from situations *on the sole basis of there being some presented multiples*.”<sup>373</sup> It also corroborates the viewpoint that the “Constructivist thought is founded on the impossibility of the existence of the void qua situation, which is to say the indiscernible and that which presents it... [does] not know [that] the void is not a matter of knowledge but of constitution—hence it falls to decision.”<sup>374</sup> We can note here that a mathematical reading of Paul Cohen’s (1934-2007) “forcing”<sup>375</sup> into Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis<sup>376</sup> of

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid., p. 321.

<sup>370</sup> Leibniz principle of indiscernible states that “if what is true of A is also true of B then A is identical to B.” See Jason Barker, *Alain Badiou*, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>371</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., pp. 352-53.

<sup>372</sup> See A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 216.

<sup>373</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 316.

<sup>374</sup> See A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou*, op. cit., p. 216.

<sup>375</sup> It is difficult to express forcing as a statement. Let us try. There are irreducible statements (axioms like ZF, or CH, for instance), i.e., “elementary statements.” These statements are equivalents/analogous to the “there is” or “there exists,” to give a bad example but for facilitating us. These statements are also finite and are not self-contradictory, i.e., discernible statements of irreducible truth. Cohen’s notion of forcing thereon goes to illustrate that it is still “plausible to conjecture” an “inductive definition from the knowledge of a finite number of

indeterminacy with Zermelo-Fraenkel Axiom of Choice (ZFC) therein, which was developed in “the absence of any temporality,” i.e., without any “future anterior,” allows Badiou to formulate the “ontological schema of the relation between the indiscernible and the undecidable... thereby show[ing] us that the existence of a subject is compatible with ontology... [where,] [d]espite being subtracted from the saying of being (mathematics), the subject is in possibility of being [ontology].”<sup>377</sup> Put in other words, Badiou simply was still battling against Leibniz’s “immanence of a situation and its horizon of verity.”<sup>378</sup>

Having discussed how Badiou critiques the Lacanian-Heideggerian-Leibnizian model of the subject, let us recall the Platonic subordination of being’s *aletheia* to the *idea*, which paved a tradition for “the delineation of the Idea as the singular presence of the thinkable [which] establishes the predominance of the entity

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elementary statements.” In another words, *forcing* is a relational issues, a “concept of implication,” which is forced from what we thought cannot be further reduced. See Paul Cohen, “The Discovery of Forcing,” in *Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2002, pp. 1071-1100.

From the indiscernible to the undecidable, the use of *forcing* is central to Badiou conclusion:

“Every Subject passes in force, at a point where language fails, and where the Idea is interrupted. What it opens upon is an un-measure in which to measure itself; because the void, originally, was summoned.

The being of the Subject is to be symptom-(of-)being.”

See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 430.

<sup>376</sup> Georg Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (1878) states that:

“There is no set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the integers and the real numbers”

David Hilbert (1900) unsuccessfully Paul Cohen contested of its veracity, which also conflicts with Zermelo-Fraenkel Axiom of Choice as Kurt Gödel pointed out (1940), and it was Paul Cohen who proved the Hypothesis independence (veracity of statement) only in 1963. The Continuum Hypothesis, in the words of Cohen, “is a very dramatic example of what might be called an absolutely undecidable statement.” See Paul J. Cohen, *Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., [1966] 2008), p. 1.

<sup>377</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 410.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

over the initial or inaugural movement of the disclosure of being”—till Heidegger,<sup>379</sup> who conceives metaphysics as the “history of the withdrawal of being”—as Badiou sums up, charting an immanent inscription of ‘metaphysics as history of being’:

“The paradigm of the thinkable is [in] the unification of a singular entity through the power of the one; it is this paradigm, this normative power of the one, which erases being’s coming to itself or withdrawal into itself as *phusis*. The theme of quiddity—the determination of the being of the entity through the unity of its *quid*—is what seals being’s entry into a properly metaphysical normative register. In other words, it is what destines being to the predominance of the entity.”<sup>380</sup>

Like the tenor in Derrida’s radical departure from the metaphysics of presence, Badiou’s aversion for metaphysics as the “*enframing* of being by the one,”<sup>381</sup> therefore, and, in fact, for philosophy itself, stems from the question of the One. Being is the One.<sup>382</sup> Therefore—against One—there is no “Whole.”<sup>383</sup> Starting with Parmenides (through Plato) to Heidegger, as we narrate the *modus operandi* just above, Badiou saw (actually, *eleven*<sup>384</sup>) philosophers falling like a pack of cards comfort-seeking an impossible retreat in the metaphysical One, for

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<sup>379</sup> On how the “distinctive feature of metaphysics is decided” on the basis of the *hen* (the One), see Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, (1980), op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>380</sup> Alain Badiou, “The Question of Being Today,” in *Theoretical Writings*, op. cit., pp. 39-48, esp. p. 39.

<sup>381</sup> “We can define metaphysics as follows: the *enframing* of being by the one.” Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 34. Earlier, Badiou says that “[w]e can therefore define metaphysics as the commandeering of being by the one.” See Alain Badiou, “The Question of Being Today,” op. cit., esp. p. 40.

<sup>382</sup> Gironi comments: “If ontology is the science of inconsistent multiplicity, metaphysics is defined by Badiou (in Heideggerian spirit and lexicon) as ‘the enframing of Being by the One.’” See Fabio Gironi, *Naturalizing Badiou*, op. cit., see footnote 19, p. 155.

<sup>383</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 111.

<sup>384</sup> Based on Badiou’s claim and his meditations: Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, Mallarmé, Pascal, Hölderlin, Leibniz, Rousseau, Descartes, and Lacan. See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 18.

a *presence* that is “an essentially ineradicable trap,”<sup>385</sup> which is “language” for both Leibniz’s *indiscernible*<sup>386</sup> and Deleuze’s *event*, and poetry for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger<sup>387</sup> (we shall take up Heidegger’s *poetic turn* independently in Chapter 4), etc. Therefore, particularly after Heidegger, it is important to examine how Badiou attempts his escapades from the unbearable yoke of metaphysics<sup>388</sup>—the ‘normative power of the one’—to a solacing freedom of the mathematical one, which remains his most central *aim* throughout.<sup>389</sup> Badiou’s mathematical notion of a radical multiplicity (the *there is* of infinite multiplicity) allows a complete negation of the metaphysical one. Like Derrida’s validation of infinite undecidability as a mathematical possibility (actually, probability), Badiou also substantiates his arguments using the nine<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>385</sup> Justin Clemens, “Platonic Meditations,” op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>386</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 320.

<sup>387</sup> Badiou on Heidegger and Wittgenstein (who both turned to poetry):

“Wittgenstein and Heidegger share the equating of mathematics with logic lying at the heart of a calculational disposition in which thought no longer thinks. They each turn that identification into an appeal to the poem as what persists in naming what is withdrawn. With Heidegger, all that remains for us is the song naming the Earth. Yet Wittgenstein also writes, ‘I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.’”

Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>388</sup> In Badiou’s parlance, “the grip of a logicist thesis.” Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>389</sup> As Badiou puts it, the “thinkable of being... that is not subordinated to the power of the one”—

“To invent a contemporary fidelity to that which has never been subject to the historical constraint of onto-theology or the commanding power of the one—such has been and remains, my aim.”

Alain Badiou, “The Question of Being Today,” op. cit., esp. p. 39.

<sup>390</sup> Burhanuddin Baki has added “Axiom of Pairing,” given the new development in set theory, making it ten:

“Given two sets, there exists a third set consisting of those two sets as its members. Given sets  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , the set  $\{\alpha, \beta\}$  exists. So we are allowed to collect a finite number of elements together into a set. “

See Badiou’s *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 60.

ontological schemas (see table-chart, below) of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory and Axiom of Choice (ZFC). Therefore, Badiou’s topology of being can be described within the structure of this process, which he forwarded in *Being and Event* in 1988, and an English translation of which made available only in 2005.

| – Axioms                                                                                                                                             | Formal Notation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | – Ontological Schema                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| – <i>Extensionality</i> . A set is determined solely by its members. Two sets are the same if they have the same members.                            | $\forall \alpha \forall \beta \forall \gamma (\gamma \in \alpha \leftrightarrow \gamma \in \beta) \rightarrow \alpha = \beta$                                                                                                                                                    | – The schema of “same” and “other.”                                                                                                              |
| – <i>Empty Set</i> . There exists a set which has no members.                                                                                        | $\exists \alpha \forall \beta (-\beta \in \alpha)$                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | – The empty set is the proper name of Being.                                                                                                     |
| – <i>Separation</i> . Given a set $\alpha$ , there exists a subset $\beta$ of elements of $\alpha$ which possess a particular, definite condition.   | $\forall \alpha \exists \beta \forall \gamma (\gamma \in \beta \leftrightarrow \gamma \in \alpha \ \& \ \varphi(\gamma))$                                                                                                                                                        | – Being is prior to language.<br>Or: presentation precedes discernability.                                                                       |
| – <i>Union</i> . There exists a set whose elements are the elements of the elements of a given set.                                                  | $\forall \alpha \exists \beta \forall \gamma (\gamma \in \beta \leftrightarrow \exists \delta (\gamma \in \delta \ \& \ \delta \in \alpha))$                                                                                                                                     | – The schema of the dissemination of multiples, which ensures the presentative consistency of those multiples.                                   |
| – <i>Power Set</i> . There exists a set whose elements are the subsets of a given set.                                                               | $\forall \alpha \exists \beta \forall \gamma (\gamma \in \beta \leftrightarrow \gamma \subseteq \alpha)$                                                                                                                                                                         | – The schema of the state of the situation.                                                                                                      |
| – <i>Infinity</i> . There exists an infinite set. Or: there exists a limit-ordinal. (The first limit-ordinal is known as $\omega_0$ ).               | $\exists \alpha (\emptyset \in \alpha \ \& \ \forall \beta (\beta \in \alpha \rightarrow \beta \cup \{\beta\} \in \alpha))$                                                                                                                                                      | – Natural-being admits the infinite. The schema of the “Other-Place.”                                                                            |
| – <i>Replacement</i> . If a set $\alpha$ exists, there also exists a set obtained by replacing the elements of $\alpha$ by other existent multiples. | If $\forall \alpha \forall \beta \forall \gamma (\alpha \in A \ \& \ \varphi(\alpha, \beta) \ \& \ \varphi(\alpha, \gamma) \rightarrow \beta = \gamma)$ then $\exists B \forall \beta (\beta \in B \leftrightarrow \exists \alpha (\alpha \in A \ \& \ \varphi(\alpha, \beta)))$ | – Being-multiple (consistency) transcends the particularity of its members. Members are substitutable, and the multiple- <i>form</i> retains its |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                               | consistency following such substitutions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| – <i>Foundation</i> . Every non-empty set possesses at least one element whose intersection with that set is empty.                                                                                               | $\forall \alpha \exists \beta (\alpha = \emptyset \vee (\beta \in \alpha \ \& \ \forall \gamma (\gamma \in \alpha \rightarrow \neg \gamma \in \beta)))$                                       | – Of the event (which belongs to itself), ontology can say nothing: the latter deals only with well-founded multiples.                                                                                                                                         |
| – <i>Choice</i> . Given a set, there exists a set composed of a representative of each of the non-empty elements of the initial set. With regards to infinite sets, such a “choice” set may not be constructible. | If $\alpha \rightarrow A\alpha \neq \emptyset$ is a function defined for all $\alpha \in x$ , then there exists another function $f(\alpha)$ for $\alpha \in x$ , and $f(\alpha) \in A\alpha$ | – The schema of the being of intervention: the procedure by which a multiple is recognised as an event, and which decides the belonging of an event to the situation where it has its site. It involves giving a name to an unrepresented element of the site. |

Fig. 2: Tables of Axioms and their Ontological Schema.<sup>391</sup>

Badiou’s *Being and Event* is considered remarkably as his “mathematical turn,” even from some of his harsh political critics. Jason Barker, for instance, whose attempt overhauls Badiou’s corpus with a parallel reading of his revolutionary politics (and writings till the 1970s) and his philosophical moorings—views his philosophy as consistently anchored in a mathematical one.<sup>392</sup> Bruno Bosteels, whom we mentioned earlier, also sees an “irrevocable shift from dialectics to mathematics” in Badiou’s major works of the 1980s, i.e., from *Theory of the Subject* (1982) and *Can Politics be Thought?* (1985)—to *Being and Event* (1988) and its sequel *Manifesto for Philosophy* (1989).<sup>393</sup> Nonetheless, Badiou corroborated himself in Mediation 15 on Hegel: “Mathematics occurs here as a

<sup>391</sup> Justin Clemens, “Doubles of Nothing,” op. cit., esp. p. 102. Also, see “The ZF Axioms,” in Mary Tiles, *The Philosophy of Set theory*, op. cit., pp. 121-22.

<sup>392</sup> Jason Barker, *Alain Badiou*, op. cit.

<sup>393</sup> See, esp., Chapter 4: “The Ontological Impasse: The Turn to Mathematics,” in Bruno Bosteels, *Badiou and Politics*, op. cit., pp. 157-62.



discontinuity within the dialectic.”<sup>394</sup> However, for the purpose of our inquiry here, we shall not go into the finer details of the metaphysical shift from Heidegger and Nietzsche.<sup>395</sup> Rather, we shall concentrate on the implication of Badiou’s ontological-mathematical turnabout. Notice how Badiou conveniently created a pick up of figures—particularly Spinoza, Hegel, Nietzsche, Descartes, Lacan, and Heidegger—and label them as a band of anti-philosophy philosophers who refuse the “uses of reason for seeking truth, and humanist in its rejection of the mathematical as a form of reason (in fact, of truth) sustained into itself,” as Sam Gillespie comments.<sup>396</sup> Radical departures, we should now be familiar, call for radical critiques. What was Derrida thinking when he brought in Kurt Gödel? Similarly, and that is: if at all Badiou’s ontological-mathematical shift is to be located—it is to Lucretius whom we may need to return to. Titus Lucretius Carus (B.C.E. 99-B.C.E. 55), the ‘joyful and confident’ Epicurean, the Roman poet and philosopher, the man who challenged Plato,<sup>397</sup> the man who dared a “world full of gods and superstitions” by forwarding a “radical thesis that atoms and the

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<sup>394</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>395</sup> Of course, Badiou, based on his reading of Heidegger and Nietzsche, concludes that “the One normatively decides on Being that the latter is reduced to what is common, reduced to empty generality. This is why it must also endure the metaphysical eminence of beings.” See Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 34. Also, I have mentioned Heidegger and Nietzsche in particular here because it is with this same orientation that Badiou had earlier (1997) critiqued Deleuze’s “construction of metaphysics” (*the philosopher’s ideal*) for questioning “Are we capable of it?” rather than with “Is it still possible?”—which, accordingly, Badiou poorly rates it as “the construction of a transcendence as an unfolding.” See Alain Badiou, *Deleuze*, op. cit., p. 100.

<sup>396</sup> Sam Gillespie, “Subtractive,” in *Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconsciousness: One*, 1996, pp.7-10.

<sup>397</sup> Badiou sums up Lucretius’ disagreements with Plato in three arguments: i) the “presentation of [the] obscurity of being requires light and language,” ii) the disengagement [*subtraction*, for Badiou] of the “spirit from the tight bonds of religion,” and iii) the anteriorization of truth as the “philosophical place.” See Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and Art,” in *Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy*, (trs. & eds.) Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London; New York: Continuum, [2003] 2004), pp. 91-108, esp. 106.

void are all there is,”<sup>398</sup> and the man who tried to solve the “problem of matching poetry and philosophy.”<sup>399</sup>

Let us therefore begin with the paradoxes of Lucretius as a proper name, as someone who was totally absent in *Being and Event*, but profoundly and repetitively acknowledged as paramount to the entire inspiration (and disposition) of Badiou’s mathematical turn. An ancient atomist, Badiou was drawn to the acosmic propositions advanced by Lucretius’ *clinamen*<sup>400</sup> (or pure chance)—particularly in radicalizing the Parmenidean notion of the one and in the founding of multiplicity, which is the central thesis in the epochal *Being and Event*. Ironically, however, Badiou’s belated reference to “the magnificent figure of Lucretius”<sup>401</sup> in *Briefings on Existence* (1998) or even to Lucretius’ book, *On the Nature of Things*, finds no absolute mention of him in *Being and Event* (1988).<sup>402</sup> Badiou’s muse but eventually appeared in clear terms in some of his much later works—as “the best-known philosophical poem... [on the] Void... [which] is the original principle of every uncompromising materialism”<sup>403</sup> in *Conditions* (1992)—as the advocator of the *only* principle of “material dissemination”<sup>404</sup> in *Infinite Thought* (1992)—as equating “philosophical

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<sup>398</sup> Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, *Philosophy and the Event*, (tr.) Louise Burchill (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2013), p. 125.

<sup>399</sup> For an introductory reading, see Alexander Dalzell, “Lucretius,” E.J. Kenny (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vol. II: Latin Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 207-229, esp. p. 229.

<sup>400</sup> Determinism as possibly one conception of materialism, which is yet insufficient in itself, still finds its historical interpretation, for instance, in the *primitive atomism* of Lucretius. Clinamen, herein, describes “that sudden deviation of atoms that is without rhyme or reason, introduc[ing] an event that is removed from any determination.” See Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, *Philosophy and the Event*, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

<sup>401</sup> Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>402</sup> Except maybe in the form of “Democritus and his successors” under the meditations, “The Void: Proper Name of Being.” Badiou underscores the Greek atomist’s “absolutely primary theme of ontology is the void” since, “in the last resort, *all* inconsistency is unrepresentable.” See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., pp. 52-59, esp. p. 58.

<sup>403</sup> Alain Badiou, *Conditions*, op. cit., esp. pp. 46-47.

<sup>404</sup> Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and Art,” in *Infinite Thought*, op. cit., pp. 91-108, esp. 105.

writing” as “didactic”<sup>405</sup> in *Philosophy and the Event* (2010)—and, a little earlier, in what is the second magnum opus for Badiou, *Logics of Worlds* (2006), the indebtedness to Lucretius (alongwith Democritus) finds expression again—for charting “the possibility of an infinite plurality of worlds... [and, possibly], under the name of the ‘void’, they ascribed infinity to the ‘ground’ of being–there.”<sup>406</sup> So, given the strange invocation, we might as well remind ourselves once again: who is Badiou’s Lucretius? Earlier, Badiou hails the Roman poet-philosopher Lucretius for “*maintaining the power of the poem instead of subtracting thought from any returning to the gods and for ascertaining it in the steadfastness of the multiple.*”<sup>407</sup> Lucretius, Badiou valorizes, “is the one who directly confronts thought to subtraction from the One, which is none other than inconsistent infinity, that is, what nothing can collect.”<sup>408</sup>

The brief invocation of Lucretius cannot go unnoticed. We also briefly noticed one Kurt Gödel in Derrida. Both are neither innocent. Likewise, there exist no thick commentary insofar on such connections, except for stray and brief comments. Badiou’s essay, “The Question of Being Today,”<sup>409</sup> is more or less a short homily on Lucretius. Referring to this reference of Lucretius by Badiou—but without problematizing the link and with no inkling about its importance except— Peter Hallward paraphrases Badiou’s own revealed debts to Epicurus and Lucretius (for opening the “ontological path”) and, also, aiding a remark on Badiou’s final challenge to Deleuze through Lucretius.<sup>410</sup> Similarly, Christopher

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<sup>405</sup> Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, *Philosophy and the Event*, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>406</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 300.

<sup>407</sup> Quotation slightly altered on grammatical count. See Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-43.

<sup>410</sup> Peter Hallward’s reference on Badiou merely highlights Lucretius daring act of going beyond the “unrepresentable inconsistency,” rather than remaining as a “mute testimony of a divine beyond,” which is but “the very ‘substance’ of every consistent structure” (p. 92.).

Hallward further adds:

“The whole effort of Badiou’s philosophy (as distinct from his ontology) has been to equate this unrepresentable inconsistency or no-thing with the very be-ing of

Watkin's comments, which takes its cue from the Lucretius-Plato encounter, uphold the attempt by Badiou to show *poetry* as "not merely illustrative or exemplary," but also demonstrate that poetry in "itself seeks to establish the thinking of the multiple," which establishes that the "language and charm of the verses are only in the position of a supplement."<sup>411</sup> But for such improbable allusions, Lucretius' presumable importance to Badiou, although there are a lot of inconsistencies too, it may sound presumptions. That is not to say that Lucretius was not discussed enough—but perhaps not discussed where he should have been. For instance, like Derrida's exhortative praise for Kurt Gödel, Badiou's appeal for Lucretius, then, fits into the scheme of a schemata enfranchising and legitimizing the mathematico-ontologico project—which, as we discussed on Derrida's validation process, also runs parallel to what Jean-Toussaint Desanti's identifies as Badiou's total misunderstanding<sup>412</sup> of his project as "intrinsic ontology."<sup>413</sup> Moreover, what is revealing about the primacy accorded to Lucretius remains in the clever fact that spells either a spell of Platonic fidelity as already inscribed in Badiou, which he has consistently/earlier defended,<sup>414</sup> or,

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every consistent situation, but to reserve the articulation of this equation to the subject of a truth procedure. Access to inconsistency can be only subjective: though it can never be grasped as the object of knowledge, it is occasionally possible to affirm its truth."

See *Badiou: A Subject to Truth*, op. cit., esp. pp. 92-93, and, also, p. 105, p. 174.

<sup>411</sup> Christopher Watkin, *Difficult Atheism*, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

<sup>412</sup> Badiou's reaction to Desanti's critique of *Being and Event* was received as simplistic misconceptions of conceptual tools ("the dialectic between structure and historicity," i.e., between site, situation, and multiplicity), while clarifying that he will no longer "recourse to a mysterious naming." See Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 361.

<sup>413</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, "Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Badiou," (tr.) Ray Brassier, in Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again*, op. cit., pp. 59-66.

<sup>414</sup> For an incisive comment on the argument of the "return to Plato," see Gabriel Riera, "The Question of Art: Badiou and Hegel," in Jim Vernon and Antonio Calcagno (eds.), *Badiou and Hegel*, op. cit., pp. 77-101, esp. endnote 19, pp. 99-100. Also, review how François Laruelle's critique on the non-philosophy of Badiou is primarily based on two counts: on converting Platonic idealism into a materialist idealism and for dissolving transcendental realism into a "lived materiality," i.e., "a duality of the real-One and of the unilateral thought that flows from the

rather, it betrays a methodological perspective in the development of Mathematics of Being, which is a multiple part of our curiosity here.

First. On the import of the metaphysician-materialist Lucretius! Badiou's serious mention of Lucretius prior to *Being and Event* is found only in *Theory of the Subject*. The only worthwhile interest here is the Lucretiusean position that "the subjective time of knowledge is null."<sup>415</sup> Here, Badiou simply reiterates the attempt to situate the movement in how the "guarantee of truth" is transported from the *material assemblage* to its *image*. This *transportation* of "re-production" or "repetition," one can seriously take note of this, is Badiou's positioning of the univocity of truth of being. It, however, does not presuppose or give value to temporality or language.<sup>416</sup> Reality, as Badiou establishes, "engages no truth"—which should also, pedantically, be "the point of departure for any philosophy."<sup>417</sup> Philosophy, it is pertinent to mention, is also Badiou's Althusserian philosophy.<sup>418</sup> Apart from Lucretius, Badiou, therein, was also

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One," or what the former calls it as "superposition of the One," i.e., "immanence through superposition." François Laruelle, *Anti-Badiou*, op. cit., esp. p. 10 and pp. 111-18.

<sup>415</sup> See Position 4: in Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>416</sup> Sam Gillespie, Badiou's apologetic, thus makes it clearly—for Badiou (including Deleuze), "being is inherently multiple and is irreducible to the tenets of language, that philosophical novelty proceeds from an event, and that, despite its different manifestations in the world, being in and of itself is inherently univocal." See *The Mathematics of Novelty*, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>417</sup> Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, op. cit., p. 122.

<sup>418</sup> Badiou's philosophy may be summed in his own suggestive model obtained from Louis Althusser: "Every truly contemporary philosophy must set out from the [three] singular theses according to which Althusser identifies philosophy"—

—"Philosophy is not a theory, but a separating activity, a thinking of the distinctions in thought. Therefore it can by no means theorise politics. But it can draw new lines of partition, think new distinctions, which verify the 'shifting' of the political condition.

—Philosophy has no object. In particular, the 'political' object does not exist for it. Philosophy is an act whose effects are strictly immanent. It is the discovery of new possibles *in actu* which bends philosophy towards its political condition.

critiquing the equation of reality and truth—in what he calls as *four philosophical types*.<sup>419</sup> This investigation, however, forebodes no novelty, especially from a Derridean perspective. The earliest reference to Lucretius is simply a recollection of a history of thought and the perpetual anxiety of *presencing* being. The later references, which also comes after the mathematical turn Badiou took in *Being and Event*, but minus Lucretius, only illustrate that the importance of engaging a muse is more or less simply an ancillary to justify the axiomization of being. Like Derrida’s import of a mathematical “undecidability” from Gödel—to justify and legitimize the order of temporal conjunction of effacing the transcendental trap between the real and the sign—Badiou’s methodological inclination also lies in axiomizing the metaphysics of Lucretius’s ontology. Moreover, Lucretius, without any temporal prejudice, predates the development of complex axioms in modern set theory. If Lucretius’s poetic sense (the “power of the poem,” as Badiou defines,<sup>420</sup> to open possibilities of the multiple from the one) is such an allure for Badiou, besides the question of the manifold and the void, we find no special imperative or pertinence accorded with grace to such thresholds. Rather, it may sound outrageous, here, but it is tantamount to saying ‘give a bad name to a dog and shoot it’. Jean-Toussaint Desanti saw this all too

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—Philosophy is guarded from the danger of confusing history and politics (therefore science and politics) on account of itself lacking history. Philosophy authorises a non-historicist perception.”

See Alain Badiou, “Althusser: subjectivity without a Subject,” in *Metapolitics*. (tr.) Jason Barker (London; New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 58-67, p. 63.

<sup>419</sup> The four philosophical types:

1. *Metaphysical idealism*
2. *Dialectical idealism*
3. *Metaphysical materialism*
4. *Dialectical materialist*

Wherein—a “materialist is whoever recognizes the primacy of being over thinking (being does not need my thinking in order to be). Idealist, whoever posits the opposite. A dialectician is someone who turns contradictions into the law of being; a metaphysician, whoever does the same with the principle of identity.” See Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, op. cit., pp. 116-17.

<sup>420</sup> See footnote 407, above, on the ‘power of the poem’.

clearly, by particularizing on the problematic of the word “operation” in “as” of ‘being as being’ (*on ê on*),<sup>421</sup> without realizing the non-obvious naughtiness of its methodology. This brings us to the next observation, the Badiou-Derrida muse-formula of validation.

Second. The mathematical practice of philosophizing and the process of determining being in Badiou! Prior to Alain Badiou’s arrival, the ontological problem of the manifold has engaged the entire history of western metaphysics, whether as a question of representation, mechanics, theology, mathematics, or politics. In short, the infinite-finite correlation is the most pervasive summon! Therefore, contemporary ecstatic return to Badiou’s subversion of Aristotelian being *qua* being, through the “event” in mathematics=ontology, however, has not been received without suspicion, given its corrosive history of philosophy.<sup>422</sup> In *Logics of Worlds*, Badiou poorly attempts to clarify his earlier and faulty construction of the *event* in *Being and Event* but as a “purely ontological characterization,” which is rather a semantic trap, but one which he will never admit to. Of course, Badiou’s answer to his justification is rather hilarious: blaming the then lack of a “theory of “being-there.”<sup>423</sup> The question we may then put forward is—has Badiou found a new axiom to validate the priority accorded to the *event* [ever] since *Being and Event*? Recall Badiou’s attempt to rectify the same by equating *site* and *evental multiplicity*—while also attempting to justify that between existence and being, of the opposition between situation (*presentation* or *forcing*) and event, that it is not about a “banal aporias of the dialectic between structure and historicity.”<sup>424</sup> How, then, does Badiou reconcile the “absolute partition” of “pure being” and “being-there,” embodied by “there is”? Or, what neutralizes (perhaps that’s a wrong word) the “objectivation” of the

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<sup>421</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” *op. cit.*, pp. 59-66, p. 60.

<sup>422</sup> Determining “the ‘truth’ of the *event* is that of a type of truth which ‘makes no sense’ and is thus identical to truth alone.” Norman Madarasz, “The Biolinguistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” *op. cit.*, esp. p. 133. *Italic, mine.*

<sup>423</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 361.

logic of existence and the ontology of being—the problems of “connection and continuity... between ‘generic procedure’ and ‘intra-worldly consequences of the existence and an inexistent’”? The first answer, Badiou gave, in *Logics of Worlds*, is: “I leave them for another time, or for others to solve.”<sup>425</sup> Badiou’s second “solution,” which, to humour ourselves, is founded on a compounded problem that cannot be mathematically grounded, and therein solved by inverting a dialectical juxtaposition, is rather revealing:

“A change, if it is a singularity and not a simple consequence (a modification), comes about neither according to the mathematical order that grounds the thinking of the multiple nor according to the transcendental regulation that governs the coherence of appearing. [In other words,] [w]ordly objectivation turns the multiple into a synthesis between the objectivating (the multiple support and referent of a phenomenality) and the objectivated (belonging to the phenomenon). We call such a paradoxical being a ‘site’.”<sup>426</sup>

Here, the equation of Badiou’s *site* and *event* is eventually tested on the merit of a process called “objectivation,” which we shall problematize. Is the “site” an alternative jargon equating or replacing the “event,” having seen its own critiques, or given its own implications? Or, again, is *objectivation* an equivalent of Badiou’s *conditions*? What is an objectivation in axiomatic parlance? Let us answer these questions in two perspectives:

- a. The “event” is the most contestable thought in Badiou. Its formation, its deduction, its network, its “presentation,” and its absolutization with “fidelity,” thereon, is also composite to the problems of how mathematics=ontology is worked out in Badiou. In “Badiou’s philosophy,” Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens observe, “there is no such thing as a

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<sup>425</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid., p. 360.



subject without such a process of subjectivization [by the event].<sup>427</sup> The event is both anterior and exterior to the subject, but is finitely linked to the network of the enterprise: “the relation between the being of the subject and the general domain of Badiou’s ontology is a *contingent* relationship, which hinges on the occurrence of an event and the decision of a subject to act in fidelity to that event.”<sup>428</sup>

What is the “event,” for Badiou, then? In *Number and Numbers* (1990), published as an explanatory sequel to *Being and Event*, Badiou makes quite evident his irritation in the attempt to use the “infinite” and the “void” as materials for the thinking of number—from Gottlob Frege to Giuseppe Peano to Richard Dedekind or Georg Cantor via Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell.<sup>429</sup> For Badiou, such attempts are futile because the void or the infinite cannot be “inferred from experience, [or] propose themselves to any intuition, or submit to any deduction, even a transcendental one.”<sup>430</sup> Numbers, including the void and the infinite, is just “*a form of Being*” and “is not an object.”<sup>431</sup> Number, however—and this is important for us in order to comprehend the core of Badiou’s *event*—prompts “a *decision*, whose written form is the axiom; a decision that reveals the opening of a new epoch for the thought of being.”<sup>432</sup> This prompting, which is simply just not a reflex, is rather a *subtraction* from the “reign of number”—and subtraction is merely and “only a law of this [autolectic?] *situation*.”<sup>433</sup> Situation, or the whole in the universal, or *the* evil One, or the (albeit, false) absolute totality—to evoke Hegelian dialectical dimensions—is where the abstractive *subtraction* of the void

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<sup>427</sup> Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, “An introduction to Alain Badiou’s philosophy,” in Alain Badiou, *Infinite Thought*, op. cit., pp. 1-38, esp. p. 7.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>429</sup> Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, (tr.) Robin Mackay (Cambridge: Malden: Polity Press, 2008), p. 212.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>431</sup> This is Badiou’s Hegelian transmission. Ibid., p. 211.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid., p. 214. Italics, mine.

takes place, i.e., what Badiou calls “the site of the unrepresentable.”<sup>434</sup> Despite numbers being countable, therefore, which is the given qualification for its *reign*, it “is not a category of truth.”<sup>435</sup> Does this suppose that the non-denumerable countable is presentable? The subtraction is what otherwise “count-as-one,” or “count-for-one,” or the “several ones,” which is the *multiple* or, in the *eyes* of Badiou, “evidence of presentation.”<sup>436</sup> In the connection between “truth” process and “event,”<sup>437</sup> therein, lies the subtraction (or extraction<sup>438</sup>) process, which is a *situation*, that is, if ontology *exists*, as Badiou evenly singularizes such probabilities:

“[Truth’s] origin is evental. But the event is not non-being, however much it exceeds the resources of situation-being. The best way to say it would be that the event is of the order of trans-being: at once ‘held’ within the principle of being (an event, like everything that is, is a multiple) and in rupture with this principle (the event does not fall under the law of the count of the situation, so that, not being counted, it does not consist). Evental trans-being is at once multiple and ‘beyond’ the One—or, as I have chosen to call it, ultra-One. The possibility that there can be a truth, in a

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<sup>434</sup> Adriel Trott’s insights on Badiou’s departure from Hegelian dialectics by employing and expanding the notion of *subtraction* has been useful. See “Badiou *contra* Hegel: The Materialist Dialectic Against the Myth of the Whole,” in Jim Vernon and Antonio Calcagno (eds.), *Badiou and Hegel*, op. cit., pp. 59-76.

<sup>435</sup> Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>437</sup> On the event and truth process, Badiou says:

“A truth supposes that the situation of which it is the truth attains non-self-identity: this non-self-identity is indicated by the situation’s being supplemented by an ‘extra’ multiple, one whose belonging or non-belonging to the situation is, however, intrinsically undecidable. I have named this supplement ‘event’, and it is always from an event that a truth-process originates. Now, when the undecidable event must be decided within the situation, that situation necessarily undergoes a vacillation as to its identity.”

*Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>438</sup> Badiou uses subtraction and extraction interchangeably, especially later works. Alain Badiou, in *Theoretical Writings*, op. cit., p. 98.

situation whose state has wholly succumbed to numbers, depends upon a fidelity, subtracted from numbers, to this ultra-One.”<sup>439</sup>

Earlier, in *Being and Event*, Badiou had resisted the whole problem of one and the multiple traditionally stuck to an immanent situation—on the issue of presenting the unrepresentable, i.e., the void, or zero, or the nothing—by opting that “ontology is a situation” and therefore the *void* is a *proper name*.<sup>440</sup> Now, having established how truth leads to event (and, here, we are still presupposing that the possibility of *trans-being* is concomitant to the possibility of axiomatic truths), or how Being realizes its presence or, numerically, how the *one is not* count-as-one-as-the-multiple (note, here, again, we are not even talking about zero or the void<sup>441</sup>)— let us survey the event, as a subject, as a presentation, or as the multiple. Sam Gillespie has put it so succinctly:

“The event, insofar as it is not derived from any given term of the situation, is neither a category of presentation or representation. To put it schematically, it is an unpresentation. The status of this unpresentation rests upon a problematic circularity, since events are events insofar as they are named and put into play in situations, which seems to be the exact same operation that informs presentation. Presentation presents, and this is constitutive of situations, while the naming of events is what is constitutive of truth procedures, but in both cases what is presented or named is purely nothing: what presentation presents is neither more nor less inconsistent than the events that are named. Being, in this instance, is univocal. But this

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<sup>439</sup> Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>440</sup> As Badiou notes:

“[T]he unrepresentable occurs within a presentative forcing which disposes it as the nothing from which everything proceeds. The consequence is that the name of the void is a pure *proper name*, which indicates itself, which does not bestow any index of difference within what it refers to, and which auto-declares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being *nothing* which is numbered by it.”

See “The Void: Proper Name of Being,” Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., pp. 52-59.

<sup>441</sup> This is Norman Madarasz’s critique on Badiou’s mathematical determination of being, which we will consequently take up. See “On Alain Badiou’s Treatment of Category Theory in View of a Transitory Ontology,” in Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again*, op. cit., pp. 23-43.

leaves us with a problem. The only manner in which we can distinguish the appearance of inconsistent multiplicity (qua presentation and representation) from the appearance of inconsistent multiplicity (qua event) is through a rather crude recourse to experience. That is, we can assume that presented multiples are more or less recognized by everyone (given a proper paradigmatic framework), whereas events are presented or seen only by those subjects who declare it and recognize it as such. The distinction, then, hinges upon the ability of a select number of human beings to recognize events.”<sup>442</sup>

What we have above is the repetitive theme that the event originates from truth.<sup>443</sup> There is also a thin line that possibly is confusing. Events then are co-dependent<sup>444</sup> on the free-play of situations.<sup>445</sup> The existential notion of situation is also co-dependent only in that it is an ontological question. The “concept” of

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<sup>442</sup> Sam Gillespie, “Giving Form to its Own Existence: Anxiety and the Subject of Truth,” in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, 2006, pp. 161-85, esp. p. 164.

<sup>443</sup> Note the stress given here:

“Events are the creation in the world of the possibility of a truth procedure and not that which create this procedure itself.”

Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, *Philosophy and the Event*, op. cit., p. 9. Also, see, the quoted text in footnote 437, above, on how ‘a truth-process originates’ and text of footnote 439, above, on how truth’s origin is evental.

<sup>444</sup> On the contrary, Bartlett maintains that the event can be independent, i.e., the “event is also made up of itself. ...[A]n event presents itself in its occurring.” See A.J. Bartlett, *Badiou and Plato*, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>445</sup> Badiou talks about different multiplicities and, more importantly, in the context of “evental caesura” and “evental site,” which is essentially framed to respond the Heidegger’s “non-being” as oppose “being” of φύσις (nature). I have however failed to cover this investigation and therefore have no inkling whether it is deterministic to the conditions of the event, which is discussed within the limits of a single multiplicity. Similarly, the notion of free-play employed here is mine and is premised on what Badiou calls the “errancy of the void,” which is subjected to the “law of all presentation.”

Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 57 and p. 179.

the situation is both different and indifferent to historicity.<sup>446</sup> Subtraction (actually, helplessly) is only a *law of situation*. The “event’s subtraction from being,” Miguel de Beistegui comments, “in no way constitutes a return to the one.”<sup>447</sup> Therein, the process of “subtraction is not complete... [since] the being is not out-of-being.”<sup>448</sup> Badiou’s “event is an unfounded multiple” premised on an ontology where “there is no room for ontological difference in it.”<sup>449</sup> Having said that, let us refer to Sam Gillespie’s remark, the option of a univocity of historicity versus the possibility of such limits, which, alternatively, also opens the possibilities of undecidable subjective historicities. But, one notes, Gillespie is not contesting the validity of axiom of foundation, which was the premise for any singular event, or the distinctions between “natural” or “abnormal” situations, which Badiou himself carefully clarified as possibilities of mutating events, i.e., “being-multiple in-consists.”<sup>450</sup> The other possible answer, which Badiou too anticipated, is the problem of the “site,” which defines the relation between the event and the situation.<sup>451</sup> We shall return to the problematic of the site soon. Meanwhile, Badiou one answer on possibility says, “only an *interpretative intervention* can declare that an event is presented in a situation; as the arrival in

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<sup>446</sup> “Historicity,” says Badiou, “is thus presentation at the punctual limits of its being. [Unlike] Heidegger, I hold that it is by way of historical localization that being comes-forth within presentative proximity [“on the edge of the void”], because something is subtracted from representation, or from the state.”

Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>447</sup> Full quote:

“There is no question of a return to the one by means of the event, and the event does not come to take the place of the one.”

Miguel de Beistegui, “The Ontological Dispute: Badiou, Heidegger, and Deleuze,” (tr.) Ray Brassier, in Gabriel Riera (ed.), *Alain Badiou*, op. cit., pp. 45-58, p. 48.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>450</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 177.

<sup>451</sup> Badiou says:

“There is an event only in so far as there exists a site for it within an effectively deployed situation (a multiple). [A] site is not just any fragment of an effective multiplicity.”

Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings*, op. cit., p. 98.

being of non-being, the arrival amidst the visible of the invisible.”<sup>452</sup> The second answer is where Badiou perhaps decided to try his luck by playing the dice of chances:

“[F]or me, given that the void of Being only occurs at the surface of a situation by way of the event, chance is the very matter of truth. And just as truths are singular and incomparable, so the fortuitous events from which they originate must be multiple and separated by the void. Chance is plural, which excludes the unicity of the dice throw. It is by chance that a particular chance happens. All in all, the contingency of Being is only completely realized if there is also the Chance of chances.”<sup>453</sup>

Badiou’s best critique insofar on the event and being is Gilles Deleuze, although the latter has written almost nothing about the former’s work. The extrajudicial compliment is not only on how the themes (multiplicity and the one) of their works intersect, but also on how Badiou reacted to its non-intersections, which enables an extract of perspectives, chiefly in a book length (*Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*) and other fragments, one of which interests us here. In his critique on Deleuze’s “event,” drawn from Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense*, Badiou argues that the “event is not the risky passage from one state of things to another. It is, [rather], the immanent stigmata of a One-result of all becomings. In the multiple-which-becomes, in the between-two of the multiple which are active multiples, the event is the destiny of the One.”<sup>454</sup> As one of the chief critiques on the One, Badiou’s restlessness becomes clearer with Deleuze. The event in Deleuze, Badiou believes, is morphed into the immanent One, instead of escaping from it—leading Miguel de Beistegui to question the need even for “a theory of the event?”<sup>455</sup> The event is therefore just a process of intensities toward a

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<sup>452</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 181.

<sup>453</sup> Alain Badiou, *Deleuze*, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>454</sup> Alain Badiou, “The Event in Deleuze,” (tr.) Jon Roffe, in *Parrhesia*, No. 2, 2007, pp. 37-44, p. 39.

<sup>455</sup> This area of Badiou’s thought attracts Miguel de Beistegui’s severest response. Premising that Badiou’s “event is an unfounded multiple,” Beistegui argues that a “multiple of all

*becoming*—while simultaneously getting reincorporated into the immanent virtual, an *always-there*. Deleuze’s event is therefore sense-event and, as Badiou raises the issue, “sense is a sufficient name for truth.”<sup>456</sup> What Badiou perceives of the intensities or singularities in Deleuze is a confusion of equating the same as phenomenological beings (in plural); the same also goes in equating the (singular) being as the ontologically silent. Sam Gillespie, whom we quoted above, premises his understanding on this Badiou-Deleuze intermission. Therein, Badiou’s reading on Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism through the being-of-beings (“toward Being-ness”<sup>457</sup>) is therefore harboured with erroneous oversights, as Todd May points out, claiming that “beings themselves are merely simulacra whose ontological reality lies only in their participation in the Oneness of being that expresses them.”<sup>458</sup> Badiou’s reading of Deleuze is often overstated: “[t]he thesis of the univocity of Being guides Deleuze’s entire relation to the history of philosophy”<sup>459</sup> Even on Deleuze’s virtual (“the virtual is real in so far it is virtual”) Badiou faults that “Deleuze’s ground remains for me a transcendence.”<sup>460</sup> Of course our arguments here put Badiou as impulsive and reactionary but yet another major disagreement include the simplification of the event as the transcendental horizon that makes language (speech, here) possible,

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multiples would be nothing other than the One-all.” Two “misunderstandings,” therein, were highlighted:

“First, the event’s subtraction from being in no way constitutes a return to the one. There is no question of a return to the one by means of the event, and the event does not come to take the place of the one.

Second—this subtraction is not complete: the event is not out-of-being.”

See Miguel de Besitegui, “The Ontological Dispute: Badiou, Heidegger, and Deleuze,” (tr.) Ray Brassier, in Gabriel Riera (ed.), *Alain Badiou*, op. cit., pp. 45-58, p. 48.

<sup>456</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>457</sup> Badiou’s “toward Being-ness,” notes Norman Madarasz, is an assimilation of *Dasein* to a *pros hen*, i.e., the “natural being as never-ending,” i.e., the entire driven inertia of Being from Aristotle to Heidegger. See “Translator’s Introduction, Alain Badiou: Back to the Mathematical Line,” in Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., pp. 1-19, p. 6.

<sup>458</sup> Todd May, “Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many,” in Peter Hallward (ed.), *Think Again*, op. cit., pp. 67-76, p. 69.

<sup>459</sup> Alain Badiou, *Deleuze*, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>460</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

which we shall not highlight or try to defend further.<sup>461</sup> As for the empiricist and dogmatist Deleuze (Badiou's expression), whom we shall take up in the next chapter, to conclude, we can only have no doubt for the political and militant Badiou—in that the idealistic and formulaic hope of the “event” only remains in “something that brings to light a possibility that was invisible or even unthinkable.”<sup>462</sup>

- b. Badiou's mathematical turn is but the acceptance of the empty-set axiom of a non-finitude “here” as the god who survived all deaths, or re-turn(s), unlike the Nietzschean, the Spinozan, or the god(s) of the mathematical, poetic, ontological, or metaphysical. In mathematics, Badiou found the “serenely established irreversible element of God's death,” a post-secular Absent God devoid of sense of ‘come-back’, ‘return’, or ‘re-enchantment’.<sup>463</sup> There is therefore no other explanation as to what is “objectivation” other than the here-withal conformities of mathematics, axioms in particular. “The axiomatization of being, while itself being an axiomatization of nothing,” Sam Gillespie notes, “nonetheless inaugurates certain properties (say, of multiplicity or equality) which can produce

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<sup>461</sup> Badiou's claim is based on Deleuze quote, the latter quoted: “The event is sense itself. The event belongs essentially to language, it entertains an essential relationship with language.”

Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>462</sup> Or, on a more elaborate note:

“The event creates a possibility but there, then, has to be an effort—a group effort in the political context, an individual one in the case of artistic creation—for this possibility to become real; that is, for it to be inscribed, step by step, in the world. It's a matter, here, of the consequences in the real world of the rupture that the event is. I speak of truth because something is created that sets down, not simply the law of the world, but its truth.”

Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, *Philosophy and the Event*, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>463</sup> See. especially “Prologue: God is Dead,” an introductory remark on contemporary atheism and also on the purging of God from mathematics. Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., pp. 21-32.



decisive effects in situations. ... Being, in other words, is not inferred from presentation, but axiomatized.”<sup>464</sup>

Axioms, given its derivation from ancient Greek, are originally and generally “definitions,”<sup>465</sup> preceding the popular practice of axioms or, still better, axiomization—as introduced to us through Euclid’s extraordinary *Elements*, which has a curious mix of rudimentary logico-linguistic propositions, accompanied by well-developed geometrical metrics and ratios. The development of modern calculus and set theory, which we discussed in the previous chapter, mediated in-between by the search for a mathematical unity through logics of symbolic mathematics,<sup>466</sup> are crucial and complementary to the stabilization of axioms as a categorical practice in philosophical thought, although all axioms in themselves are not necessarily true or, even worse, mathematically acceptable. To further expand this quick digression (and this is important to our understanding of Badiou, whose reliance on axiom is absolutely central to his oeuvre inasmuch as Derrida on analogy) let us refer to Mary Tiles, whose influential work<sup>467</sup> informs us that “axioms” may be viewed in three ways:

- “(a) as expressing basic truths about a universe of objects of a certain kind which exists independently of the mathematician’s thought or of his constructions, or
- (b) as giving the basic building blocks and principles for constructing a universe of objects of a certain kind...

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<sup>464</sup> Sam Gillespie, “Giving Form to its Own Existence: Anxiety and the Subject of Truth,” in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, 2006, pp. 161-85, esp. p. 161, including footnote 1.

<sup>465</sup> Reviel Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1999] 2004), p. 95.

<sup>466</sup> See Burt C Hopkins, *The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics: Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011).

<sup>467</sup> Mary Tiles, *The Philosophy of Set theory: An Historical Introduction to Cantor’s Paradise* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1989). See, esp. Chapter 6: “Axiomatic Set Theory,” pp. 118-137.

(c) as giving the rules of a ‘game’ to be played with newly introduced symbols; rules which determine the permissible symbolic moves in the game of constructing proofs.”<sup>468</sup>

Accordingly, Euclid’s axiomization of geometry operates solely on (a) and (b), as Tiles infers. On Badiou’s grounding of ontology with mathematical axiom, we can safely conclude that it totally relies on the generous use of (c), notwithstanding the compulsory application of the first two, too. Also, recall, how Badiou lavishly turned to axiomatic mathematics.<sup>469</sup> There is no confusion here! “My entire discourse originates in an axiomatic decision,” states Badiou in *Being and Event*, i.e., in the “that of the non-being of the one” (p. 31). Further, on axioms, he adds:

“[O]nly an axiom system can structure a situation in which what is presented is presentation. It alone avoids having to make a one out of the multiple, leaving the latter as what is implicit in the regulated consequences through which it manifests itself as multiple.”<sup>470</sup>

In mathematical thoughts axiom occupies the highest place of possibilities and, within mathematics, set theory in turn occupies the most esteem position, as Badiou himself admits. The seduction of Badiou’s thoughts with ZFC as the mother of all set theories<sup>471</sup> is therein emblematic. Burhanuddin Baki has done an excellent work (for the mathematically challenged) by linking some of Badiou’s major propositions with entries formulated under the relevant ZFC axioms,<sup>472</sup> while also enthusiastically citing that “set theory [is] one of the conditions for housing a new site for philosophical investigations.”<sup>473</sup> We shall not repeat Badiou’s axiomatic formulates except for referential propriety.

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<sup>468</sup> Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>469</sup> See, also, footnote 293, above, for Badiou’s list.

<sup>470</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>471</sup> Apart from Zermelo-Fraenkel, other set theories include Quine’s New Foundations, which finds no takers amongst mathematicians; Tarski-Grothendieck axiomatization and von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel axiomatic set theory, etc.

<sup>472</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event*, op. cit., pp. 59-61.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

Instead, let us return to the problematic of the *site* again. Through this problem in Badiou, which leads to more problems, we hope to converge with some of his major critiques. On the *event*, as discussed above, and its *relation* with the *situation*, Badiou himself was confounded with its enigma, namely, its launching station, the *site*, the harmony of appearance, or presentation: “[I]s the event or is it not a *term* of the situation in which it has its site?”<sup>474</sup> Badiou’s problematic with the site was further exacerbated, as discussed above too, with a singularity of the multiplicity and the multiplicity of multiplicities—as opposed to the set theory axioms that effortlessly allowed him to deduce the distinction between the one and the multiple. The mounting enigma, if not the contradictions, of the *site* are a central concern across many of Badiou’s works, as seen in the following series:

“A site is therefore the minimal effect of structure which can be conceived; it is such that it belongs to the situation, whilst what belongs to it in turn does not. The border effect in which this multiple touches upon the void originates in its consistency (its one-multiple) being composed solely from what, with respect to the situation, in-consists. Within the situation, this multiple is, but that of which it is multiple is not.”<sup>475</sup> [*Being and Event*]

“The site designates the local type of the multiplicity ‘concerned’ by an event. It is not because the site exists in the situation that there is an event. But for there to be an event, there must be the local determination of a site; that is, a situation in which at least one multiple on the edge of the void is presented.”<sup>476</sup> [*Numbers and Numbers*]

“A site is an object to which it happens, in being, to belong to itself; and, in appearing, to fall under its own transcendental indexing, so that it assign to its own being a value of existence. A site testifies to an intrusion of being as

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<sup>474</sup> As Badiou remarks: “If there exists an event, *its belonging to the situation of its site is undecidable from the standpoint of the situation itself*. That is, the signifier of the event is necessarily supernumerary to the site.” Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>475</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>476</sup> Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, op. cit., p. 179.

such into appearing.”<sup>477</sup> [*Logics of Worlds*]

The site is only ever a condition of being for the event. Of course, if the situation is natural, compact, or neutral, the event is impossible. But the existence of a multiple on the edge of the void merely opens up the possibility of an event. It is always possible that no event actually occur. Strictly speaking, *a site is only ‘evental’ insofar as it is retroactively qualified as such by the occurrence of an event.* However, we do know one of its ontological characteristics, related to the form of presentation: it is always an abnormal multiple, on the edge of the void. Therefore, there is no event save relative to a historical situation, even if a historical situation does not necessarily produce events.<sup>478</sup> [*Numbers and Numbers*]

Note the italicized portion in the fourth [immediate] paragraph above. Given, that “thought is a matheme”<sup>479</sup>—and this is the moment where, to use an allegory, it is like Claude Lévi-Strauss’ thinking-thought encountering taboo and incest, where thought exhausts its own predicate-limits of thinking, and not in the subject of culture and nature, or, as the case is with Badiou, in the “eternal” mathematical. What, then, to invoke our initial question posed by Badiou, is an objectivation in axiomatic parlance—or the relation between the logic of existence and the ontology of being? What then becomes of the impasse necessitated by “an abnormal multiple,” leading to a situation where there can be *no event save relative to a historical situation, even if a historical situation does not necessarily produce events?*<sup>480</sup> The question is pertinent because the impasse was created by structural ambiguities in mathematical idealities, i.e., the limits of set theory rather than Badiou’s inability to determine the destinal matheme of a/the site. In other words, if Levi-Strauss was unable to think, it is because of the structural limits intrinsic to the body of culture-nature rather than the idealities

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<sup>477</sup> Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, op. cit., p. 294.

<sup>478</sup> Alain Badiou, *Number and Numbers*, op. cit., p. 179. Italics, mine.

<sup>479</sup> Alain Badiou, “Author’s Preface,” in *Theoretical Writings*, op. cit., p. xv.

<sup>480</sup> Bartlett’s readings on Badiou’s event rigidly and erroneously proposes that “[o]nly a historical situation admits an event.”

See A.J. Bartlett, *Badiou and Plato*, op. cit., p. 78.

of such indiscernible or undecidable event(s). Jean-Toussaint Desanti aptly states this problem, although in a different context:

“The necessity of having to link instance of conduct to the determination of an underlying structure once again poses the question of the subject. The subject is not abolished, since if the structure signifies nothing there is no structure. Where experience is missing, there is no structure.”<sup>481</sup>

In Badiou’s case, it led to a situation where only in the structure of a mathematical overture can the ontological impasse be broken or vitiated. Badiou’s mother of all problem-solution then is derived from the ZF axiom of empty set, with the ontological variant proscribing a proper name of being (see, above, Tables of Axioms and their Ontological Schema), which results in reaffirming the Parmenidean aphorism of “thinking and being as the same thing.”<sup>482</sup> The ontology of being is therefore possible within the logical existence provided by ZF empty set axiom—whereas, at the same time, given the asymmetrical behavior of the matheme-thinking matrix, the thinking, which is a matheme, it faces its own contradiction in a contingent agency or in the host site. In short, ontology faces its own pervasiveness, its own challenges, and contradictions, as a mathematical entity, given its categorical properties of being intrinsic. Jean-Toussaint Desanti’s critique is more or less premised on how Badiou’s intrinsic ontology remains essentially intrinsic—meaning to say the mathematical thinking of an ontological being still “determine[s] nothing in its concept other than what properly and exclusively pertains to it.”<sup>483</sup>

From the above discussion, the contradictory stature of the “site” produces two impossible possibilities: the structural problem of mathematics=ontology and the question of “intrinsic ontology,” already elaborated by Jean-Toussaint

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<sup>481</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, quoted, in François Dosse, *History of Structuralism, Volume I: the Rising Sign, 1945-1966*, (tr.) Deborah Glassman (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 286.

<sup>482</sup> Parmenides, quoted, in Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 485 and p. 38.

<sup>483</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 59.

Desanti. On the mathematical One, to remind ourselves once again, “mathematics is not the thought of its own thought,” much in tune with Wittgenstein’s,<sup>484</sup> and therefore “mathematical thought is coextensive with Being.”<sup>485</sup> But, mathematics, in going back to its own thought (*orientation*), it reveals bare, like Lautréamont’s “a maxim of thought,” where existence once again allows the binding of thought to Being.<sup>486</sup> Here, “being is only multiple inasmuch it occurs in presentation”—and, therefore, “the multiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to presentation, is an operational result; being is what presents (itself).”<sup>487</sup> The mathematical determination of being, therein for Badiou, is justified and put to rest. On 14 October, 1996, narrates Badiou,<sup>488</sup> “Natacha Michel organized a day against negationism at the *College International de Philosophie*,” the significance of which was to contest the maintenance of an a priori inviolability in the declaration of an *unthinkable and unsayable* event through the “revisionist thesis” of a singularity that is not a singularity of a site—(to negatively re-paraphrase) that there was no extermination of European Jews; that there was no gas chambers! This “negationism” (which is more or less a call to witness) of the “intermediary,” comments Badiou, is “nonetheless a site,” i.e., “the provisional territory of some protocols of thought.”<sup>489</sup> The latency and heterogeneity of truth, which exists independently and predates its own summons (i.e., of philosophy or philosophizing)—is therefore endangered here, as an ontological eclipse! Truth therein becomes relative; it loses its absoluteness. Or, to put it more aptly, how is the *subtractive* that is already a multiple of the multiple capable of presenting or, to be precise, of “forcing” the

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<sup>484</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted, “The mathematical proposition expresses no thought,” in *Tractatus* 6.21. See Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, op. cit., p. 108.

<sup>485</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>487</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>488</sup> See Alain Badiou, “Against Negationism,” in Alain Badiou and Cécile Winter *Polemics*, (tr.) Steve Corcoran (London; New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 195-201.

<sup>489</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

one *is not*?<sup>490</sup> How can the site subsume the generic conditions of the situation, or the appearance of the event? How can a non-existent truth (“conceptless immanence”<sup>491</sup>) estimate (the call for inconsistency) the knowledge of its own existence? Will that not breach the singularity of fidelity, onto, as capable of, generalizing the entire structure of how Badiou built his operation? We shall now conclude on Badiou by positing why the mathematics of being is possibly not tenable, or in the words of his harshest critic, not possible, “I believe.”<sup>492</sup>

Third and final: the mathematics of being seen through critique of structure and validation. Mathematics, says Baki, “is the scientific study of Being” and “is what is left of science when it is without any object.”<sup>493</sup> Early on, we were asked whether ‘mathematics is ontology’ is qua being? Badiou denies this,<sup>494</sup> but his mathematical explications were all engineered on innate and intrinsic properties. Fabio Gironi also thinks likewise<sup>495</sup>—it “is neither a thesis about

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<sup>490</sup> Madarasz’s critique on Badiou’s subtraction is premised on the ground that it “is not given to presence [and] its technical possibilities is always a gamble.” See Norman Madarasz, “The Biolinguistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>491</sup> Alain Badiou, *Manifesto for Philosophy*, (tr. & ed.) Norman Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 107.

<sup>492</sup> Originally commented orally for Alain Badiou’s Habilitation in 1990, the published version ended with the following remarks:

“Badiou’s intrinsic ontology is too impoverished to accomplish what he expects of it. Must an intrinsic ontology deploy itself within a set theoretical universe? Do contemporary mathematics offer possibilities that would allow for another basic ontology? For my part, I believe they do, though I doubt such an ontology could still satisfy the criteria of the intrinsic as indicated so long ago by the little word ‘ê’. But this problem would require a new analysis.”

Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>493</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>494</sup> Badiou simply subverts Aristotle’s Being-qua-Being by qualifying it as the “thinking of presentation,” and thence the defense, as well as the critique on who operates the contingency of such presentation of the presentation?

<sup>495</sup> Fabio Gironi’s conclusion is based on Badiou’s reference, where:

“[T]he thesis that I support does not in any way declare that being is mathematical, which is to say composed of mathematical objectivities. It is not a

Being nor its it a thesis about a Platonic realm of transcendent entities, or of a Husserlian field of transcendental ideal objects. It is a ‘thesis about discourse’, that is, a mathematical discourse (specifically set theory) capable of saying the sayable (or thinkable) about Being *qua* Being as presented through content-independent formalization. Ontology/mathematics, so to speak, sets the rules for the inconsistent multiplicity of Being to be presented/counted as one.”<sup>496</sup>

Perhaps, then, the relevant question should be—is mathematical truth *qua* being? What we know for sure is that Badiou’s quest is all for “generic multiplicities as the ontological form of the true.”<sup>497</sup> Generic, which we mentioned earlier, implies the innateness of the mathematical ontology.<sup>498</sup>

Generic, let us remind ourselves once again, found value in Badiou’s ideological disposition of Lacan’s symbolic as a condition and, also, as an import of Paul Cohen’s generic models, a.k.a., the conditions of forcing. Is it standard, therefore, to sense a betrayal in Badiou’s use of the term ‘generic’ as a validation, a process of legitimizing a truth claim, because it is also found to be innately conditioning the mechanism of truth (or, rather, the innate truth as innately conditioned by the intrinsic conditions of its own generics)? Generics, for Badiou, are firstly innate conditions (avowed with the aims of trapping situations): *matheme*, love, politics, and poetry. Generics are exteriorities that condition the possibilities of philosophy but are (independently) anterior to the very process of thinking such (dependent) possibilities. The subject of philosophy is an outcome from such generic procedures. Badiou’s ontology, one notes here, “thinks the law of the concept, not the subject itself.”<sup>499</sup> This also implies that “the intrinsic deploys

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thesis about the world but about discourse. It affirms that mathematics, throughout the entirety of its historical becoming, pronounces what is expressible of being *qua* being.”

Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>496</sup> Fabio Gironi, *Naturalizing Badiou*, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>497</sup> See “Mathematics and philosophy: the grand style and the little style,” Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings*, op. cit., pp. 3-20, p. 17.

<sup>498</sup> By innateness I am following Norman Madarasz. I am also using the same term interchangeably with intrinsic, as used by Desanti. See Norman Madarasz, “The Bilingualistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>499</sup> Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 411.



itself and perseveres in itself a passion for the formal, in its mathematical (or better, set-theoretical) version)”<sup>500</sup> The intrinsic fold in such mathematical ontology is a continuity of mathematical ideality, in the tradition of Jean Cavailles, Albert Lautman, and Jean-Toussaint Desanti—and Badiou militantly went further than his predecessors—which implies an invention of “a certain kind of ‘mathematics’.”<sup>501</sup> Through Badiou the ZF power set axiom brought life to mathematics as an ontological. By engaging ZF axiom and Cantor, Badiou “provides the theoretical basis for the entire enterprise,” “making it function in conformity with its own intrinsic requirements in a context other than the one in which it originated.”<sup>502</sup> Therein the “ZF axiomatic enters into the real of traditional question concerning Being”<sup>503</sup> and “presents itself as the given matrix for all ontology.”<sup>504</sup> There is however no guarantee that such mathematical axiomization can, to employ one of Badiou’s critical terms in the critique of philosophy, also not become vulnerable to its own *suturing* [su-ture]!<sup>505</sup> Badiou’s project of “a pure ontology” demands that it rigorously preserves the “intrinsic character” of *being as being*, which implies operating an “object-act correlation” in its pure sense of any meaningful ontology and an “access [to] the modes of presence of what seems to give itself as present.”<sup>506</sup> Since there are inherent contradictions in the two cases, Desanti observes that it entails Badiou’s readers no choice but to indulge in a “speculative passion for the intrinsic.” Similarly, Badiou’s equation “mathematics=ontology,” argues Beistegui, reduces philosophy to a “supplement of thought required by mathematics for itself,” i.e., “thinks being as being without deploying its own thinking dimension.”<sup>507</sup>

One also needs to highlight that Badiou’s allure for set theory and the turn to set

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<sup>500</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>501</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>504</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>505</sup> See note on “Sutures,” in Alain Badiou, *Manifesto for Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 61-68.

<sup>506</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>507</sup> Miguiel de Beistegui, “The Ontological Dispute,” op. cit., p. 47.

theory, explains Norman Madarasz, is something natural because it “establishes rigorous parameter for ontology in its categorical construction as well as in its ontological claims.”<sup>508</sup> Two counts are accounted for such a turn: a) in set theory the notion of “‘belonging’ does not presuppose the category of relation” and b) “set theory postulates the category of the irreducible multiple as the basic ‘unit’ of its processes.”<sup>509</sup> Desanti also opines that Badiou achieves two objectives: putting “set theory back on track with a view to rewriting the writing of the margins of ontology” and reducing ontology to a “purely instrumental function”<sup>510</sup> Likewise, following Desanti’s remark, Madarasz also affirms that set theory “builds from the fundamental idea that every multiple is [already] *intrinsically* a multiple of the multiple,” which Badiou himself is aware.<sup>511</sup> Nonetheless, Madarasz opines why Badiou’s central thesis of “ontology is mathematics”—which makes the *deontic* rule over the *semantic*—or is even necessary since “making sense” (the axiom of being qua being) has always been the intrinsic cardinal root of philosophy. Likewise, Madarasz contests Badiou’s choice of set theory over category theory,<sup>512</sup> which potentially risks both “the philosophical principles of transitory ontology” and a “self-contradictory mathematical foundation”—“If categories were irreducible sets, would ontology and Being themselves be multiplied to such an extent that their contours would dissipate into the very inconsistency to which sets are minimal marker-limits?”<sup>513</sup> Badiou, in short, chooses to “install his discourse into a version of set

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<sup>508</sup> Norman Madarasz, “The Bilingualistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>510</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>511</sup> Norman Madarasz, “The Bilingualistic Challenge to an Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 129.

<sup>512</sup> Simon Duffy also point out that “Badiou remain over committed to the pure ontology of set theory while developments in mathematics, namely in category theory, outflank and outpace his attempts to reconcile his work with it.” See Simon B. Duffy, *Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In Defense of the “New”* (London; New Delhi; New York; Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013). Esp., Chapter 5, “Badiou and Contemporary Mathematics,” pp. 137-159, p. 159.

<sup>513</sup> Norman Madarasz, “On Alain Badiou’s Treatment of Category Theory,” op. cit., p. 27.

theory and decides to submit to its norms.”<sup>514</sup>

At the heart of western philosophical thoughts is the impossible destitution of ontology and, at the same time, the indiscernible continues to remain the host that rehabilitates ontology. Whether we give concession or not to Badiou’s mathematico-ontological adorning of Being as the undecidable and infinite multiplicity, which otherwise is developed not only from the ontologicals of metaphysics but also from a disenchantment sown in the material dialectics of Moa Tse-tung (1893-1976), is a question that is now self-explanatory to the politics of possibilities. “The subject,” as Badiou fondly but disenchantedly recalls, “if such an effect exists, is material—like everything else that exists. It follows that it can be grasped both by way of reflection and by way of the asymptote, through algebra and through topology.”<sup>515</sup> The anti-phenomenon conceptualizing of the presentation of being and event, its appearance, says Ray Brassier, “is riven by a fundamental methodological idealism,” in the “attempt to generate an account of extra-ontological truth-events on the basis of an a priori mathematical formalization of ontological discourse”<sup>516</sup> Badiou’s audacious wager, in the words of Burhanuddin Baki, *perhaps* lies in “the mad gamble of a militant who follows through with the trajectory of truth... a militant madness.”<sup>517</sup> Unlike Derrida, Badiou’s traces are littered with junks of mathematical concepts.

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<sup>514</sup> Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology,” op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>515</sup> Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>516</sup> Ray Brassier, “Presentation as anti-phenomenon in Alain Badiou’s *Being and Event*,” in *Continental Philosophy Review*, No. 39, 2006, pp. 59-77, p. 60.

<sup>517</sup> Burhanuddin Baki, *Badiou’s Being and Event*, op. cit., p. 27.

Chapter Three:  
**Chronomimetic Concepts**

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“Who besides God, has ever created, literally ‘created’, a concept? Freud had no choice, if he wished to make himself understood, but to inherit from tradition.”

—Jacques Derrida.<sup>1</sup>

“One could know the beauty of the universe in each soul, if one could unfold all its folds, which only open perceptibly with time. But since each distinct perception of the soul includes an infinity of confused perceptions which embrace the whole universe, the soul itself knows the things it perceives only so far as it has distinct and heightened [*revelées*] perceptions; and it has perfection to the extent that it has distinct perceptions. Each soul knows the infinite—knows all—but confusedly. It is like walking on the seashore and hearing the great noise of the sea: I hear the particular noises of each wave, of which the whole noise is composed, but without distinguishing them.”

—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.<sup>2</sup>

“Chronos want to die, but has it not already given way to another reading of time?”

—Gilles Deleuze.<sup>3</sup>

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I

Written in 1816, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s “The Doctrine of the Concept”<sup>4</sup> is perhaps the principal lead for us to begin on the issue of a proper noun called ‘concept’. Proper nouns, however, are they relevant? Moreover, concepts are not names or vocabularies. Or, least to say, a concept is not language. When Hegel embarked upon the ‘logic of the *concept*’, or on the ‘*nature of the concept*’, he was already enthralled and entrenched in the subjective glory

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<sup>1</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Resistance of Psychoanalysis*, (trs.) Peggy Kamuf, Pascale-Ann Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> G.W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, (eds. & trs.) Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 211.

<sup>3</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, (tr.) Mark Lester (ed.) Constantin V. Boundas (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), p. 164.

<sup>4</sup> The full title reads: “The Science of Subjective Logic or The Doctrine of the Concept.” Refer Volume II of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, (tr. and ed.) George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

of “cognition [being] more sublime than *truth* itself.”<sup>5</sup> In the (subjective) determination of cognition, therefore, “the *concept* [*Begriff*] is at first to be regarded simply as the *third* to *being* and *essence*.”<sup>6</sup> Never in the system of philosophy has the conjunct of concept been given such pedestal high—given its elucidation on the subject and history. Hegel’s philosophical tradition gives supremacy of the concept as part of the triumvirate that rules the kingdom of truth. Or, to use Hegel’s own lingua feudal referent—“[i]n the *concept*, the kingdom of *freedom* is disclosed.”<sup>7</sup> The ‘concept’, unlike the other two, i.e., *being* and *essence*, is however a benign supremacist: “the concept is their *foundation* and *truth*”—“not just a subjective presupposition but as *absolute foundation*.”<sup>8</sup> Being and essence, in other words, are earthly gods, then, and concept, how lucky, then, is divine matter! So much for Hegel and kingdom(s)! In sum, Hegel privileges the archaic superiority of the concept over its own temporality. “Truth,” therefore, as Hegel puts it, “has only the notion as the element of its existence.”<sup>9</sup>

First things first: What are *concepts*? What are concepts in the history of philosophy and, more crucially, in the system of philosophy? Barfield argues that “Philosophy is not expressed in paint, stone, or musical notes. It is expressed in language. Philosophical ideas emerge in and through language, and these ideas

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 508.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. Italics, in original.

<sup>7</sup> The concept, for Hegel, is “free because the *identity that exists in and for itself* and constitutes the necessity of substance exists at the same time as sublated or as *positedness*... is the very identity. ... [T]he originariness of their self-subsistence that makes them causes has passed over into positedness and has thereby become self-transparently *clear*; the ‘*originary fact*’ is ‘originary’ because it is a ‘*self-causing fact*’, and this is the *substance that has been let go freely into the concept*.”

Ibid., p. 513.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 508-9.

<sup>9</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (tr.) A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 4.

are called concepts, notions.”<sup>10</sup> But, again, these are too simplistic a definition; almost irrelevant to contemporary discourses. In philosophy, then, concepts assume pedagogical status—“concepts are only created as a function of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badly posed.”<sup>11</sup> On concepts, some names immediately come to mind: Georg Hegel, Ludwig Wittgenstein (highlighted in Chapter One, too), Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze [and Felix Guattari]. These canonical names are now part of the philosophical scape(s). We have indentified them, intentionally, because of their implicit and explicit use of the very term “concept” literally. Representation (*Vorstellung*) and *concept* (Begriff) “functioned as synonymous,” we are informed, in pre-Kantian usage.<sup>12</sup> Kant, of course, is well attributed for founding “the chemical doctrine of the concept.”<sup>13</sup> For Kant, all concepts (i.e., synthetic *a priori* cognition) is firstly “established by the principles of understanding, which anticipate experience”—therein, “all the concepts... lie not in experience but themselves in turn only in reason.”<sup>14</sup> Concepts, like how we saw of Hegel just now, are not just terms of reference; they speak more or less about the troubles, the joy, the problems, and the entirety of what is a philosophical range. There is a reason. Concepts are what are called by different names—consequently tied to the very notion of philosophy, of philosophizing. We owe this to Kant: systematic philosophy as “rational cognition through concepts.”<sup>15</sup> Concepts are what engage the “business

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<sup>10</sup> Raymond Barfield, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 169.

<sup>11</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, (trs.) Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Verso, 1994), p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> J. Alberto Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station*, (ed.) Linda Wessels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1991] 1993), p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (tr.) Paul Guyer, (ed.) Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1998] 2000), § A763/B791, p. 655.

<sup>15</sup> Immanuel Kant, “First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*,” in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trs.) Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [2002]), p. 3.

of philosophers,"<sup>16</sup> as Martin Heidegger refers to Immanuel Kant.

Our first suspect and most rudimentary introduction on the concept is informed by whether it is a case of a how a new set of lexical and semantic integers are attempting to disrupt/dislocate the syntactical habitations on how we understand the sense of the world (and the world of sense). Our undertaking on concepts herein is a simplistic valuation of concepts: its terminological embodiments and its practices (which, should not be taken as a purely functional aspect) in philosophy. Remember, the inheritance from the tradition includes, to give some basic examples, concepts like—*noésis* (thought), *ousia* (substance), *psyche* (soul), *eidos* (form), or *morphe* (concept of form), *eidos eidōn* (form of forms), *noein* and *einai* (thought and being), *nous* (intellect), etc. To therefore reinforce the displacement/dislocation proposal, we have an elective list in the pantheon of contemporary philosophizing—undecidability, indiscernibility, exteriority, impossible, alterity, ineffable, plasticity, unthinkable, *différance*, unsayable—or to extend the list, i.e., Rodolphe Gasché's infrastructures list of Derrida: the re-mark, arche-traces, *différance*, supplementarity, and iterability,<sup>17</sup> etc. The list can be endless, notwithstanding every individual philosopher has his/her own idiosyncrasies. Noticeable, however, is the machinic question of representation—which remains the centrally most pervading technology in the summons of the concept. From Kant's sublime to the unrepresentable in Jean-Francois Lyotard to Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari's virtual-actual relations (or, for Guattari, the independent virtual is the Event)—not that this is the tread we need to follow—the illustrative purpose, then, is also to define how Concepts then are also bearings that order to understand the notions of temporalities. For, the fact of the matter is, there is no real understanding of what concepts are, except as a contingent continuity and interrogation following Kantian legacy.

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<sup>16</sup> Kant, quoted, in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 23. The reference of concept here, of course, is the question of temporality.

<sup>17</sup> These ultratranscendental infrastructures constitute a "system beyond being," according to Gasché, and "no system is ultimately possible on the level of the infrastructures." Rodolphe Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Relection* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 224.

Perhaps Hans-Johann Glock is right when he highlights that the greatest philosophers till today has not “bequeathed to us a fully convincing account of concepts.”<sup>18</sup>

In the first section we shall look at the variable remains of a concept. This should allow us to understand the system of philosophy but, more importantly, introduced us to the gap in the practice of philosophy. Subsequently, in the second section, we shall turn to Gilles Deleuze, described in the words of Slavoj Žižek as Badiou’s “great opponent-partner.”<sup>19</sup> Finally, we shall also once again return to Jacques Derrida, with the objective of looking at his concepts that attempt to frame planes of locating temporalities.

Let us begin again from where we have stopped. Let us return to Hegel. The foundational primacy Hegel gave to concept as superior than ‘being’ and ‘essence’ is in the potentiality, in the temporal-differential process of forms *becoming*. (This is rudimentary *plasticity*, in a Catherine Malabou’s terminal invention).<sup>20</sup> Let us quote Hegel in full to arrive at our first definition on what is a concept:

“Being and essence are therefore the moments of its *becoming*; but the concept is their *foundation* and *truth* as the identity into which they have sunk and in which they are contained. They are contained in it because the concept is their result, but no longer as *being* and *essence*; these are determinations which they have only in so far as they have not yet returned into the identity which is their unity.

Hence the *objective logic*, which treats of *being* and *essence*, constitutes in truth the *genetic exposition of the concept*. More precisely,

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<sup>18</sup> Hans-Johann Glock, “Wittgenstein on concepts,” in Arid Ahmed (ed.), *Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 88-108, p. 108.

<sup>19</sup> Slavoj Žižek, “Hallward’s Fidelity to the Badiou Event,” in Peter Hallward, *Badiou: A Subject to Truth* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Catherine Malabou’s *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction*, (tr.) Carolyn Sheard (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).



*substance* already is *real essence*, or *essence* in so far as it is united with *being* and has stepped into actuality. Consequently, the concept has substance for its immediate presupposition; substance is implicitly what the concept is *explicitly*. The *dialectical movement* of *substance* through causality and reciprocal affection is thus the immediate *genesis of the concept* by virtue of which its *becoming* is displayed. But the meaning of its becoming, like that of all becoming, is that it is the reflection of something which passes over into its *ground*, and that the at first apparent *other* into which this something has passed over constitutes the *truth* of the latter. Thus the concept is the *truth* of substance, and since *necessity* is the determining relational mode of substance, *freedom* reveals itself to be the *truth of necessity* and the *relational mode of the concept*.”<sup>21</sup>

By unveiling what is a concept, Hegel proposes to distinguish the natural and functional aspects of concept in philosophical practices. The above statement not only gives us an idea of how the notion of concept is employed but also contextualizes its material ontology. The concept is a differential mediatory mediation, definable as an existence in its own ephemeral and twilight injunctions. It is not a substance but unfolds the temporalities of the substance. Also, given its relational tangencies, or, properly, trajectories, it immediately heralds questions of representations, questions of concepts as vectors of substance materiality or truth. The definition of Hegel’s concepts are however rudimentary. It is immediately given to a natural immanence. Dario Perneti argues that Hegel’s logic was simply targeted in “making sense rather than at preserving the truth of representation”—by treating concepts as “intentional bearers of semantic properties or marks, and as standing in relations of determinate negation to other contextually related concepts.”<sup>22</sup> Hegel’s “theory of concepts,” therefore, “is a conceptual history and, as such, like naturalistic conception of logic, is descriptive rather than prescriptive... a description of

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<sup>21</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit., p. 513.

<sup>22</sup> Dario Perinetti, “History, Concepts and Normativity in Hegel,” in David Gray Carlson (ed.), *Hegel’s Theory of the Subject* (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 60-72, p. 68.

relations between concepts, rather than facts about concepts.”<sup>23</sup> “Being-as-concept,” Stephen Houlgate also argues, “in turn proves to be objectivity and being-as-Idea”—where the “Idea then finally discloses itself to be nature”—about “space, time and matter.”<sup>24</sup> Hegel’s logic of the concept therein precludes the natural. In the history of Hegel’s philosophy, which comes after the *Science of Logic*, philosophy constitutes its own form and it is therefore the most superior form of rationality about the knowledge of truth—since the concept-form allows philosophy to adequately produce both the subject and the object. The concept also allows access to the subject and object as an absolute unity of form and content. All of Hegel’s “logical concepts are the whole,” David Klob summarizes, “definitions of the Absolute—and the whole becomes more complex and mediated as the *Logic* moves from Being through the categories of essence to the Absolute Idea.”<sup>25</sup> Andy Blunden bluntly describes: “Being is the concept in-itself.”<sup>26</sup> The “history of concepts,” Jacques Derrida says, is also the “history of

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Houlgate, “Why Hegel’s Concept Is Not the Essence of Things.” Ibid., pp. 19-29, esp. p. 19

<sup>25</sup> David Klob, “The Logic of Language Change,” Jere O’Neill Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 179-95, p. 182.

<sup>26</sup> Andy Blunt, *Concepts: A Critical Approach* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 121. Blunt’s generalization of this statement must have stemmed out from Hegel’s equally blunt statement: “[T]he ‘I’ is the pure concept itself, the concept that has come into *determinate existence*.”

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit., p. 514.

This point of departure also validates the twin commentaries presently available particularly on Hegel’s concept and logic: one, like the instance of Andy Blunt or Richard Dien Winfield (see, reference, below), whose twist takes the route of the psychological problem of consciousness in realizing Hegel’s notion of logic and cognition—and the other, which interpolates the dimension of historical contingency into the establishment of the Absolute, which is our reference. Another interesting interpretation which has been brought to our notice again, and different from the trajectories mentioned above, is the attempt to view logic as dialectical and as a response to Kant’s critical philosophy. By engaging Hegel’s absolute concept as a descendancy of Kant’s unity of apperception, Béatrice Longuenesse attempts to look at the constitution of a totality of thought-determinations by problematizing Hegel’s *concept* and *ground*. See Béatrice Longuenesse, *Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics*, (tr.) Nicole J. Simek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1981] 2007), esp. Chapter 3, “Ground against

the concept of man.”<sup>27</sup> Therein, Hegel “establishes the dialectical significance of the relation between eternity of truth and philosophy’s own historicity,” as Angelica Nuzzo points out, and thereby reconciles and synchronizes a ‘metaphysics of time’ as eternally present (*Gegenwart*) with the “relation between moments of object and absolute spirit.”<sup>28</sup> “Philosophy,” adds Nuzzo, is therefore the “rational reflection on the spirit’s own historical origins”<sup>29</sup>—and this is capitulated and mediated solely through concepts:

“This absolute *universality* which is just as immediately absolute *singularization*—a being-in-and-for-itself which is absolute positedness and *being-in-and-for-itself* only by virtue of its unity with the *positedness*—this universality constitutes the nature of the ‘I’ and of the *concept*; neither the one nor the other can be comprehended unless these two just given moments are grasped at the same time, both in their abstraction and in their perfect unity.”<sup>30</sup>

Where Hegel has conflated the *concept*<sup>31</sup> into the cogito sum and

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Concept?” Also, see Richard Dien Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic* (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006) and Richard Dien Winfield, *Hegel’s Science of Logic: A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012).

<sup>27</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 111-135, p. 184. Also, see, “The Poetic Turn(s),” footnote 354.

<sup>28</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, “Hegel’s Method of a History of Philosophy: The Berlin *Introductions to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1819-1831),” in David A. Duquette (ed.), *Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New Interpretations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 19-34, esp. pp. 24-25.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit., p. 515. Italics, in original.

<sup>31</sup> The concept, for Hegel, therein is not a fixed form. Its legitimization processes remain in the temporal order of becoming. See “Preface,” in G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit.

subtractively (*negatively*, actually)<sup>32</sup> historicized the same temporal abstraction as an eternal predisposition of “the circle,”<sup>33</sup> it will be left to Michel Foucault to “coalesce” concepts by modeling genealogy as “problematization.”<sup>34</sup> Foucault therefore occupies an unusual presence, solely as a reference point. Unusual because his presence is not as urgently favoured, but for his brief and flirtatious comments on *concepts* (actually, the *preconceptual*)! Foucault’s concept therein presents a scope for better articulation in our attempt to situate the limits of the representational and the proclivities of the temporal, which was an acute perspective amongst his contemporaries. What we shall attempt to do so in the next couple of paragraphs is to streamline the recent interest in Foucault, specifically on the linguistic and non-linguistic implications of the terms concept and preconceptual.

Foucault—having inherited nineteenth century’s discomfiting and unsettling terminologies on ideas, thoughts and knowledge and, propelled by Saussurean linguistics of diachrony and synchrony, *langue* and *parole*, which modeled the methodological rubric for his entire genealogical investigation on intellectual history—took to cultivating a subtle interpretation of both irregularities and order, via a perpetual suspicion for the subject’s enunciation, and ideological suspects for discursive or conceptual formations and discursive practices. Given such suspicious re-visitations on historiographies, it is without doubt that language is not only important but also imperative to Foucault’s entire corpus of genealogical investigation. There has been however a reluctant interest to review Foucault within the orbit of language-centric philosophers,

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<sup>32</sup> See Ben Noys, *The Persistence of Negativity: A Critique of Contemporary Continental Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

<sup>33</sup> “Hegel’s circle,” notes Gilles Deleuze, “is not the eternal return, only the infinite circulation of the identical by means of negativity” (p. 50). Deleuze calls this Hegelian dialectic of circles as “insipid monocentricity of circles” (p. 263). See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (tr.) Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994).

<sup>34</sup> Colin Koopman, “Two uses of genealogy: Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams,” in C. G. Prado (ed.), *Foucault’s Legacy* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), pp. 90-108, p. 105.

which is justifiable and which is also partially due to the chief occupation and popularity with his histories of ideas that actually distracts any invitation of focus, and for employing categorically ambiguous and impudent markers like seemingly absolute “truth.” Language, inasmuch as literature, were Foucault’s main foci, like how any other contemporary took to, although his opinionated commentaries will doubtfully and actually have any reach today, despite the belated enthusiasm in the form of his recently translated and edited book *Language, Madness, and Desire*.<sup>35</sup> The fact that Foucault crucially brought back the importance of Nietzsche’s intervention on language,<sup>36</sup> from amongst the then predominantly philologist philosophers, and also imported the latter’s method of *genealogy* as a historicism of presupposition however testifies that he was very much in sync with the currents of his contemporary thinkers.<sup>37</sup> For an instance, just as Derrida and Husserl were having problems on “origin,” Foucault, too, was having his own thoughts on the same<sup>38</sup>—vexing but often verging on similar or

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<sup>35</sup> Based on Foucault’s 1963 radio talk (*The Use of Speech*) on literature, literary figures, and language, the vast editorial but short introduction makes a rather faint and desperate plea to arouse an interest—some of which are outrightly Blachotian or Levinasian or Derridean terms, as if attempting to create a fashionable seduction. And, Foucault’s text, seen from the perspectives of literary importance, appears scant in relevance, especially to our context here. See Michel Foucault, *Language, Madness, and Desire: On Literature*, (eds.) Philippe Artières, Jean-François Bert, Mathieu Potte-Bonneville, and Judith Revel, (tr.) Robert Bononno (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

Foucault’s more mature perspective on literature and language, although lacking focus but for many stray comments, are illustrated in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, [1970] 1994): literature as “a manifestation of a language which has no other law than that of affirming—in opposition to all other forms of discourse—its own precipitous existence” (p. 300); writing as the “silent, cautious deposition of the word upon the whiteness of a piece of paper..., where it has nothing to say but itself, nothing to do but shine in the brightness of its being” (ibid.).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 305. Also, see footnote 118, Chapter 1.

<sup>37</sup> For a comparative treatment of Nietzsche’s genealogy between Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze, see Joseph Ward, *Genealogy and its Shadows: Reading Nietzsche with Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, September 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Genealogy, for Foucault, much in line with the anti-realist, “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’” (p. 140); *values* that it is “as inaccessible [to] the vicissitudes of history” (p. 144); “is

parallel conclusions. Also, by extending the “history of concepts to interdisciplinary contexts,” as Gary Gutting highlights, “Foucault is able to show how philosophical concepts such as *resemblance*, *representation*, and *man* pervade the thought of an entire period,” which also enabled him to utilize “the notion of an episteme as the system of concepts” in the investigation of the structure and nature of various intellectual periods.<sup>39</sup> Gutting further comments that Foucault was trying to look beyond the mere “play of theoretical formulations,” which is highlighted in “conceptual similarities and differences.” For example, Foucault views Natural History<sup>40</sup> as complemented by *structure* and *character* (what he calls “the two organizing concepts”). Thus, in effectuating classical studies on living things, Foucault also consciously rejects the standard terminologies of *system* and *method*, valorized by his predecessors.<sup>41</sup> Concluding on Foucault’s archaeology, Gutting observes that its methodological orientations employ *concepts* that are directly rooted in Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy of science or are imported from Georges Canguilhem’s history of science.<sup>42</sup> A third name may be added, as Robert Nola points out, i.e., Thomas Kuhn (with his succession of conceptual changes), is also seen as commensurable with Foucault’s interest in discontinuities and ruptures.<sup>43</sup>

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not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation” (p. 162). See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, (ed.) D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139-64.

<sup>39</sup> Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 218.

<sup>40</sup> Also, refer Michel Foucault’s comments:

“Natural History was not simply a form of knowledge that gave a new definition to concepts like ‘genus’ or ‘character’, and which introduced new concepts like that of ‘natural classification’ or ‘mammal’; above all, it was a set of rules for arranging statements in series, an obligatory set of schemata of dependence, of order, and of succession, in which the recurrent elements that may have value as concepts were distributed.”

See *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>41</sup> Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology*, op. cit., p. 218.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. x-xi.

<sup>43</sup> Robert Nola, *A Critique of Anti-Rationalist Views of Science and Knowledge* (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), esp. 287-89.

Notwithstanding the above digression on Foucault's intellectual debts and his own intellectual lineage, let us also remind ourselves that there is already a dreaded climate of weariness with the linguistic effects between General Grammar and Natural History since sixteen and seventeenth centuries. Foucault's essay, "The Formation of Concepts,"<sup>44</sup> therefore easily exposes such betrayals of perspectives as an abiding inclination for the linguistic, although based on biological inheritance.<sup>45</sup> Foucault, here, makes an interesting proposition through the "preconceptual." The pre-conceptual (literally something before the conceptual) "refers neither to a horizon of ideality nor to an empirical genesis of abstraction... it is not an inexhaustible *a priori* at the confines of history... [n]or is it a genesis of abstractions, trying to rediscover the series of operations that have made it possible to constitute them: ...intuitions ..., disconnexion of imaginary themes..., definition of the adequate formal structure, etc."<sup>46</sup> The pre-conceptual level is simply the *locus of emergence of concepts*, which is responsible for establishing the field of discourse.<sup>47</sup> As a passing remark, compare this with Deleuze's "transcendental field," i.e., the *plane of*

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<sup>44</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, op. cit., esp., "The Formation of Concepts," pp. 56-63

<sup>45</sup> Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology*, op. cit., p. 193.

<sup>46</sup> Michel Foucault further adds,

"[T]o analyse the rules for the formation of object, one must neither, as we have seen, embody them in things, nor relate them to the domain of words; in order to analyse the formation of enunciative types, one must relate them neither to the knowing subject, nor to a psychological individuality. Similarly, to analyse the formation of concepts, one must relate them neither to the horizon of *ideality*, nor to the empirical progress of *ideas*" (p. 63).

*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, op. cit., esp. pp. 62-63.

<sup>47</sup> Michel Foucault says, in "The Formation of Concepts,"

"The preconceptual field allows the emergence of the discursive regularities and constraints that have made possible the heterogeneous multiplicity of concepts, and, beyond these the profusion of the themes, beliefs, and representations with which one usually deals when one is writing the history of ideas."

*Ibid.*, p. 63.

*immanence*. We shall come back to Deleuze. We are also not comparing Deleuze-Foucault here, although the former has a lot to say about the latter.<sup>48</sup> On Foucault's use of the preconceptual level, Caroline Williams argues that it is not about the "representation of consciousness as in transcendental phenomenology or the phenomenological *body* as in the final work of Merleau-Ponty, but a field wherein the rules that call particular concepts into existence and regulate their possible emergence."<sup>49</sup> Foucault's concept and preconceptual therein attract two directions of thought—the simple linguistic-language embedded change principle of utilizing concept as a logical entry point to locate differential values of the episteme,<sup>50</sup> notably carried out faithfully in the works of Reinhart Koselleck<sup>51</sup> and Frank Ankersmith,<sup>52</sup> and the more complex, rule-logic-intuition-perception driven ambulation of thought or thinking, which is at the heart of any philosophy. Of course, between these two, there is no point further wasting our energy to find out which one was the intended choice of Foucault. The pre-conceptual as a movement to the concept, however naïve such an explanation is, is enough to illustrate the persistence of justifying an embodied subject. Foucault has never been deep enough, which we mentioned and okayed, particularly on

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<sup>48</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, (tr. and ed.) Seán Hand (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota, 1988).

<sup>49</sup> Caroline Williams, *Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the Subject* (New York and London: The Athlone Press, 2001), p. 164.

<sup>50</sup> In *The Order of Things*, op. cit., Foucault forayed into the various positions taken on language: Classical Age ("language, instead of existing as the material writing of things, was to find its area of being restricted to the general organization of representative signs" p. 42) and during the Renaissance ("language is not what it is because it has meaning; its representative content... has no role to play here" p. 35). For post-Kant and Modern Age positions, see Gary Gutting's introduction, "Michel Foucault: A User's Manual," Gary Gutting (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1-28.

<sup>51</sup> Doubling historical reality, Koselleck's method shifts from history of ideas to a linguistic history of concepts: "Concepts can become outdated because the contexts within which they were constituted no longer exist." Refer Reinhart Koselleck, *Future Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, (tr.) Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 62.

<sup>52</sup> "Language is where experience is not," says Ankersmit, "and experience is where language is not." Refer Frank R. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 79.



thematics dealing with logical or phenomenological interventions on representation. The subject and the place of the subject has always been the predominant angle of explaining historical subjectivities. Arun Iyer has done a curious but marvelous task of contrasting Heidegger and Foucault by appropriating the phenomenological and the historical.<sup>53</sup> David Hoy has also undertaken an equally curious attempt to bring the temporal dimensions into Foucault's forte, i.e., the notion of power.<sup>54</sup> At the height of the emblematic May 1968, Michel Foucault was in Italy on a trans-sabbatical. Watching the event from a distance, the twice removed but radical Foucault gave interviews<sup>55</sup> and also commented on Manet's painting. It is on the latter activity, which brings forth the flesh to his earlier skeletal discussions on concepts and its significance. Manet, concludes Foucault, did not invent "non-representative painting." Manet was busy engaging picture as materiality (picture-object or painting object)—that is, making "representational play" as the "fundamental material elements of the canvas"—thereby allowing space to play with its own "material properties" by getting rid of "representation itself."<sup>56</sup> Now, isn't that deep enough, to put him on a different league with Hegel and, at par with Deleuzian notion of 'mathesis'?<sup>57</sup> If Deleuze has routed his understanding of concepts through differential calculus, Foucault, we should have no disagreements, routed the same through discursive practices. For, by the end of the day, by common

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<sup>53</sup> Arun Iyer, *Towards an Epistemology of Ruptures: The Case of Heidegger and Foucault* (London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, [2014] 2015).

<sup>54</sup> David Couzens Hoy, "The temporality of power," in C. G. Prado (ed.), *Foucault's Legacy* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), pp. 6-18. The issue of power was also Deleuze's interest (Foucault's functionalism), given in a "new topology [diffusion of the "local"] which no longer locates the origin of power in a privileged place." See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>55</sup> Michel Foucault, *Speech Begins after Death. In Conversation with Claude Bonnefoy*, (ed.) Philippe Artières (tr.) Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota, 2013).

<sup>56</sup> Michel Foucault, *Manet and the Object of Painting*, (tr.) Matthew Barr (London: Tate Publishing, 2011), p. 79 and, also, pp. 29-31, esp.

<sup>57</sup> Through Mackay's editorial, this 1946 term by Deleuze was introduced to me. See Robin Mackay (ed.), "Editorial Introduction," *Collapse III* (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007), pp. 5-38, p.27.

agreements, the notion of concept in philosophical parlance, in its formation, is still tied “neither to the horizon of *ideality*, nor to the empirical progress of *ideas*.”<sup>58</sup> Concepts, therein, are more than what meets the eye—in its enigmatic temporality, in its unrepresentability, and in its “strategic possibilities”—

“Rather than seeking the permanence of themes, images, and opinions through time, rather than retracing the dialectics of their conflicts in order to individualize groups of statements, could one not rather mark out the dispersion of the points of choice, and define prior to any option, to any thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities?”<sup>59</sup>

For now, let us turn to the elusive skeptic and inheritor to sophist tradition, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the pragmatist anti-philosopher, who unsparingly upholds, in the words of Alain Badiou, “the firm virtue of criticism that invades us but a kind of vertigo.”<sup>60</sup> Born Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) to one of the then richest families in Europe—his two most important books are *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), the only book published in his lifetime, and the edited book (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*.<sup>61</sup> Wittgensteinian scholars often have a tendency to divide works with the young-mature frame, coinciding his self-exile for a decade after his first work was published (we shall not be going into this detail). Kelly Jolley labels the former book as a philosophy of logic and the latter as a theory of knowledge.<sup>62</sup> This generalization, along with the well-established interpretation that *Tractatus* advances a realist theory of meaning, is however inadequate to capture the

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<sup>58</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>60</sup> Alain Badiou, *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy*, (tr.) Bruno Bosteels (London & New York: Verso, 2011), p. 139.

<sup>61</sup> References are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (tr.) G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., [1953] 2009).

<sup>62</sup> Kelly Dean Jolley, *The Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual Investigations: A Prolegomenon to Philosophical Investigations* (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2007), p. 79.

*autonomy of language* which guided and remains central to Wittgenstein's initial forays.<sup>63</sup> Wittgenstein is known for his enigmatic approach (and, therefore, anti-Socratic stances) to solving problems without raising questions or defining definitions. Explanations therein are Wittgenstein's oeuvre and therefore the resorting to examples, exemplifications, or analogies. It is not a surprise then to note that Wittgenstein is apprehensively stuck with the double meaning of "methodology."<sup>64</sup> Inasmuch, the concept of the concept is something that has been equally enigmatic to a tradition of Wittgensteinian scholars—premissing the interpretation of the concept itself on a theoretical model. Moreover, Wittgenstein's guarded skepticism on language (versus language-games<sup>65</sup>),

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<sup>63</sup> See Marie McGinn, "Simples and the Idea of Analysis in the *Tractatus*," in Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian and Oskari Kuusela (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker* (Malden; Oxford; Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 200-220.

<sup>64</sup> Between judging and motive, or between motive [reason] and cause, or between length and determining, etc, Wittgenstein says that there it illustrates a double meaning to methodology: "A physical investigation may be called a methodological one, but also a conceptual investigation."

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 338, p. 225.

<sup>65</sup> Consider this statement—

"You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the *general form of the proposition* and of language."

*Ibid.*, § 65, p. 32.

For Wittgenstein, language-games are elusive and can be viewed in multiple perspectives [see entry under "Language-games," in Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), pp. 193-98]—with the analogy of communication the most extensive [see Roy Harris, *Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words* (London and New York: Routledge, [1988] 1990)]. However, there has been a shift from a position that strictly views language-games as liberal version of a rule-governed system in formal language (based on the *calculi* referent)—to a general opinion on the agency-activity centric interpretation of language-games, especially on Wittgenstein's mature works, "as the basic semantical links between language and reality." See Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, "Language-Games in Wittgenstein's Later Thought," in Meredith Williams (ed.), *Wittgenstein's*

which we briefly mentioned in Chapter One, and the strong position taken against Gottlob Frege<sup>66</sup>—allows the privileging of concept over language, concepts over objects. Concepts, nonetheless, are vaguely defined—and our ascertaining of its vitality is based mostly on its interlinkages, i.e., from concept-grammar,<sup>67</sup> or concept-word,<sup>68</sup> or concept-meaning,<sup>69</sup> or on the correlates of language itself.

On Wittgenstein's concepts, the other ways of approaching it is its nature. As mentioned, the innumerable commentaries insofar have mostly focused on Wittgenstein's theory of concepts. The importance of the concept in Wittgenstein's works therefore remains in its account as a conditioning of

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Philosophical Investigations: *Critical Essays* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), p. 33.

Reality, again, is a problematic word, however. Wittgenstein interchangeably uses the German words (possibly 1905, for the first time) *Lebensform*, *Lebensformen* and *Form des Lebens*—translated into English as an equivalent as “Forms of Life.” For two excellent readings that drafted a problematization of this reading into Wittgenstein's language-games—as an integral expression of a rational linguistic behaviour (Hacker)—and its erroneous interpretations by correlating pragmatics and praxis (Gálvez). See Jesús Padilla Gálvez, “Language as Forms of Life,” pp. 37-56, and P.M.S. Hacker, “Language, Language-Games and Forms of Life,” pp. 17-36, in Jesús Padilla Gálvez and Margit Gaffal (eds.), *Forms of Life and Language Games* (Frankfurt; Paris; Lancaster; New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2011).

<sup>66</sup> Frege, says Wittgenstein, “compares a concept to a region, and says that a region without clear boundaries can't be called a region at all. This presumably means that we can't do anything with it.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 71, p. 34. For Gottlob Frege, word meaning is solely restricted to the context of a sentence. See *The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number*, (tr.) J.L. Austin (New York: Harpers & Brothers, [1950] 1960), p. x.

Kelly Dean Jolley, *The Concept 'Horse' Paradox*, op. cit.

<sup>67</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, (trs.) D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London and New York: Routledge, [1922] [1961] 2001).

<sup>68</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., esp., “Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment,” pp. § 133, p. 196.

<sup>69</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigation*, (ed.) Peter Docherty (London: Wiley Blackwell, [1969] 1991).

philosophy,<sup>70</sup> i.e., as conceptual problems (expandable as “therapies”<sup>71</sup>); as a reflection on *our* life;<sup>72</sup> or as a perceptual tool.<sup>73</sup> The most interesting elucidation, however, for our reference, is on the concept-formation (*Begriffsbildung*), as was the case with Foucault. We shall come back on this in a while. Otherwise, Hans-Johann Glock is right in mentioning that there is no known “scholarly interpretation” on Wittgenstein’s *nature of concepts*,<sup>74</sup> which is clearly Hegelian nostalgia, to talk of *nature*, which is also of our interest here. Glock lists five philosophical “questions” about concepts:

- the definition question
- the possession question
- the priority reasons
- the individuation question and
- the function question<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Wittgenstein says: “What forces itself on one is a *concept*.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 191, p. 204.

<sup>71</sup> Apropos: “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.”

Ibid., § 133, p. 51.

<sup>72</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*, (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe, (tr.) L. McAlister and M. Schattle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), p. 302.

<sup>73</sup> See Michael N. Foster, *Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Peter Michael Stephen Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

<sup>74</sup> Hans-Johann Glock, “Wittgenstein on concepts,” in Arid Ahmed (ed.), *Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 88-108, p. 90.

<sup>75</sup> Glock’s methodological approach is quite interesting. Quoted here is the full structure of how he interrogates Wittgenstein:

*Definition question:* What are concepts?

*Individuation question:* How are concepts individuated?

*Possession question:* What is it to have a concept?

*Function question:* What is the role of concepts?

Once we keep apart these four questions, one further question arises:

*Priority question:* Which of these questions—definition, individuation, possession or function—is the most fundamental?

Similarly, on the nature of concepts, Glock mentions two conceptual precepts in Wittgenstein: a) that “concepts exist independently of individual minds,” i.e., *objectivist position* and b) *subjectivist position*, i.e., “concepts are phenomena in the minds or brains of individuals.”<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, Glock assesses Wittgenstein’s two important contributions on our understanding of concepts: a) in “delineating connections between concepts and concept-possession” and b) the explanation and explanation of “linguistic meaning.”<sup>77</sup>

One should also note that Wittgensteinian frame of the concept in *Philosophical Investigations* oscillates by inverting a philosophical attempt to arrest the psychological tensions<sup>78</sup> within the grammatical tenses. Inasmuch, concepts are often related as contradictories of the linguistic sense, i.e., of “seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word,”<sup>79</sup> or as a disjuncture of visual matter, i.e., of *sensing*, or seeing, seeing-of, observing, observed, etc., to cite a few examples. What, the dilemma, then, “is observed is a *conceptual statement*”—for,

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Now for the answers that one can find, more or less explicitly, in Wittgenstein’s later oeuvre.

*Priority question:* The question of what it is to possess a concept is prior to the question of what concepts are, in that it provides a better starting point for elucidating the nature of concepts.

*Possession:* Concept-possession is a particular kind of ability. To possess a concept is to have mastered the use of an expression.

*Individuation:* Concepts are as finely individuated as word-meanings, yet it is left open how fine that is.

*Definition:* Concepts are techniques of using words.

*Function:* The role of concepts is to allow classification and inference.”

Ibid., pp. 92-93.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>78</sup> Although Wittgenstein himself admits that there is a limit for the psychological to arrest (explain) the full nature of experience (§ 236, p. 210) and, also, that, “in psychology, there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion” (§ 371, p. 232.). Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., § 261, p. 214.

observing, it “does not produce what is observed.”<sup>80</sup> Later, in *Foundation of Mathematics* (sourced from notes taken between 1937-44), which was written in the shadows of defending cardinal numbers over real numbers—lest “a future generation will laugh at this hocus pocus”<sup>81</sup>—with the problems of set theory in the background, Cantor’s theory of infinity, Russell’ logic, and Gödel’s expositions on probability and truth.<sup>82</sup> In *Foundation of Mathematics*, notwithstanding the earlier statement that “mathematical certainty is not a psychological concept,”<sup>83</sup> Wittgenstein remarks that the “word ‘concept’ is too vague by far.”<sup>84</sup> The value of mathematics for Wittgenstein,<sup>85</sup> then, remains in how it “teaches us to operate with concepts in a new way... [or] change the way we work with concepts.”<sup>86</sup> “A concept,” therein, “is not essentially a predicate.”<sup>87</sup> Mathematics “forms

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., § 67, p. ix.

<sup>81</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, (eds.) G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe, (tr.) G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, [1956] 1991), p. 132.

<sup>82</sup> See “Editors’ Preface to the Revised Edition,” of Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, (eds.) G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe, (tr.) G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, [1956] 1991), pp. 29-33, p. 30. For a comprehensive detail on Wittgenstein’s mathematical inheritance and engagements, see Pasquale Frascolla, *Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics* (London; New York: Routledge, 1994). Ray Monk’s article, “Bourgeois, Bolshevik, or Anarchist? The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” however, gives an incisive, interesting, extensive and crisp assessment of the politics behind allure for Wittgenstein’s mathematics and, particularly, post-2006, the “odd, peculiar and unexpected” new interest that has evolved. See Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian and Oskari Kuusela (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker* (Malden; Oxford; Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 269-94.

<sup>83</sup> Full quote: “Mathematical certainty is not a psychological concept. The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 332, p. 224.

<sup>84</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 412.

<sup>85</sup> See the various essays by Oskari Kuusela, P.M.S. Hacker, Andrew Lugg, Severin Schroeder and André Maury, in “Part II: The Significance of Logic and Mathematics,” in Nuno Venturinha (ed.), *The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations* (New York; Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), pp. 93-176.

<sup>86</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 413.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 299.

concepts”—and “concepts help us to comprehend things.”<sup>88</sup> Wittgenstein is careful to clarify how the mathematical “give[s] us a concept”—“‘To give a new concept’ can only mean to introduce a new employment of a concept, a new practice.”<sup>89</sup> That’s quite simplistic, indeed! Nonetheless, concept formation, although it is not necessarily and specifically a mathematical one, as Wittgenstein clarifies, is still found to be governed by the same “rule for the formation of an infinite decimal,” which “may mean various things.”<sup>90</sup> “Could God have known this,” Wittgenstein answers, which, is a “No.”<sup>91</sup> Therefore, there is no convincing clarity with the mathematical—as Wittgenstein himself admits—“The question whether intuition is needed for the solution of mathematical problems must be given the answer that in this case language itself provides the necessary intuition.”<sup>92</sup>

Wittgenstein’s concept-language notwithstanding—his main contribution comes in the form of philosophy battling against the bewitchment of language—“All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’.”<sup>93</sup> “Language,” says Wittgenstein, “cannot express what belongs to the essence of the world. Language can only say what we could also imagine differently.”<sup>94</sup> “Language disguises thought.”<sup>95</sup> In other words, “language [is] a labyrinth,”<sup>96</sup> “language cannot represent. What

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 430.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 432.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 409 & p. 25.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 408.

<sup>92</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 369, p. 231.

<sup>93</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., § 4.0031, p. 23.

<sup>94</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, (ed.) James Carl Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 189.

<sup>95</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., § 4.002, p. 22.

<sup>96</sup> Wittgenstein’s full quote is:

“Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way out.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 203, p. 82.



expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of language.”<sup>97</sup> Here, we may note, language can be seen at two levels—as an inadequate or limited form of absolute expression<sup>98</sup> or as a totalizing form-structure<sup>99</sup> (from where philosophy is trapped). Without a resolve, it is no surprise wherein Bertrand Russell remarks: “Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language.”<sup>100</sup> Having discussed Wittgenstein’s resistance to language, let us conclude by having a quick look at his claim that language internalizes *propositions*:

“The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them.”<sup>101</sup>

Recall, our earlier discussion on mind-independent concepts and attempts to emancipate psycho-philosophy, which, given the above statement, possibly guides us to how concepts derive their meanings or functions. Wittgenstein’s elucidation on concept-formation<sup>102</sup> clearly holds that concepts

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<sup>97</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., § 4.121, p. 31.

<sup>98</sup> As Wittgenstein remarks: “*The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 369, p. 231. Italics, in original.

<sup>99</sup> Refer, “the totality of proposition is language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., § 4.001, p. 22.

<sup>100</sup> Bertrand Russell, “Introduction,” in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., pp. ix-xxv, p. x.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, § 4.125, p. 32.

<sup>102</sup> On concept-formation, this is the most oft-quoted mantra:

“If concept formation can be explained by facts of nature, shouldn’t we be interested, not in grammar, but rather in what is its basis in nature? —We are, indeed, also interested in the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept formation; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history a since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 365, p. 230.

are far from being “natural” occurrence as also “grammatical illusions.”<sup>103</sup> He also contradictorily mentions it as an excess of nature’s generality.<sup>104</sup> Wittgenstein identifies “thinking” and “talking in the imagination” as two different concepts,<sup>105</sup> while appending that “concept of an aspect is related to the concept of the imagination.”<sup>106</sup> The agency that acts on these concepts is not defined. It also implies that, for example, since there can be no category of natural language, it is as good as saying that concepts are in the range of a metaphysical language or orbits within an ontological structure. Rather, Wittgenstein alludes to how one “get[s] the *idea* of a memory content only through comparing psychological concepts. It is like comparing two *games*. (Soccer has goals, volleyball doesn’t.)”<sup>107</sup> “Memory *experiences* are accompaniments of remembering,”<sup>108</sup> says Wittgenstein, and “a person learns the concept of the past by remembering” and, here, again, “remembering has not experiential content.”<sup>109</sup> This brings us back to a totally tautological oeuvre in Wittgenstein. We also need to contextualize Frege’s (“Function and Concept”)

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<sup>103</sup> Refer,

“What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance, of a concept are often extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality.”

Ibid., § 143, p. 56.

<sup>104</sup> Also, refer,

“‘Language (or thinking) is something unique’—this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.”<sup>104</sup>

Ibid., § 110, p. 47.

<sup>105</sup> Also, note, “The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as...’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’ (§ 254, p. 214)

Ibid., § 246, p. 211.

<sup>106</sup> Here, “Now I see it...” = “Now I am imagining *that*,” where the value of *that* must be (mine) “Now I see it...”

Ibid., § 253, p. 213.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., § 369, p. 231.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., § 368, p. 231.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., § 370, p. 231.

use of the word “assumption” (*Annahme*)<sup>110</sup> and see a correlate of why such logical deductions are subversively alienating in Wittgenstein.

Lastly, let us mention Badiou’s interest in Wittgenstein, which otherwise emanates from his own obsession with set theory. Likewise, Badiou has never problematized Wittgenstein’s concepts with his own mathematical investigation—although there is a sharp and unmistakable reference that precedes the former’s work: “how is it possible to have a concept and not be clear about its [mathematical] application?”<sup>111</sup> Nevertheless, Badiou, having read Wittgenstein, it is interesting to note how he affirms concepts: “I have assigned philosophy the task of constructing thought’s embrace of its own time, of refracting newborn truths through the unique prism of concepts.”<sup>112</sup> Does it imply that concepts are stable or constant universals—from Wittgenstein to Badiou, or in the overall practice of systematic philosophy itself? Recall Nietzsche valorizing language as “a sum of concepts”—“The *concept*, in the first moment of its emergence, an artistic phenomenon: the symbolization of a whole variety of appearances, originally an image, a hieroglyph. Thus, an *image* is place of a thing. [...] This is the way human beings begin with their *projection of images* and *symbols*.”<sup>113</sup> A perspective on Wittgenstein, then, in similar manner (although this should not be a guide to his works), perhaps, then, remain in an overall summation of how concepts are integral to philosophizing:

“Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no *great* difference *which* concepts we employ.”<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, (ed.) B. McGuinness (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, [1984] 1991), p. 149.

<sup>111</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 165.

<sup>112</sup> Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings*, (ed. and tr.) Alberto Toscano and Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 14.

<sup>113</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted, in Christian J. Emdem, *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005P, p 73.

<sup>114</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., § 569, p. 151.

“Concepts lead us to make investigations. They are the expression of our interest and direct our interest.”<sup>115</sup>

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## II

“No longer a ‘subject’ ... but ‘Deleuze’ as *Idea*,” note Graham Jones and Jon Roffe,<sup>116</sup> in their concluding remark, in introducing Deleuze’s philosophical lineage. This remark also aptly functions to not only introduce the labyrinth of Deleuze’s philosophical engagements but also tidily sum up his entire oeuvre. Deleuze, the philosopher of the virtual, of pure immanence, who disengages the subject, effaces the ‘image’ from thought.<sup>117</sup> Deleuze, also the philosopher who upholds that “philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts.”<sup>118</sup> It is to Deleuze whom we must also attribute the notion that “the comprehension of the concept is infinite.”<sup>119</sup> As a creationist, Deleuze’s notion of this constructivist idea however should not to be confused with [literally] philosophy as a creation of concepts. Paul Patton opines that Deleuze’s concepts imply “a commitment to a certain politics of conceptual form.”<sup>120</sup> In fact no serious commentators on

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., § 570, p. 152.

<sup>116</sup> Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (eds.), *Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 6.

<sup>117</sup> By arguing that the ‘image of thought’ “profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, Deleuze’s imageless thought envisages:

“The thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but endangered in it geniality, is a thought without image.”

Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (tr.) Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p. 167.

<sup>118</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, (trs.) Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Verso, 1994), p. 5. Italics, original.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>120</sup> Paul Patton, “Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in *Mille Plateaux*,” in Gary Genosko, *Deleuze and Guattari: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, Vol. II (London and

Deleuze has realized the importance and implication of the *concept* more than Paul Patton.<sup>121</sup> Similarly, the importance of recognizing this important element in Deleuzian thoughts is still largely ignored—Daniel Smith being an exception.<sup>122</sup> The ramification of the concept is key to understanding Deleuze’s conception of philosophy. Whereas Patton’s readings on Deleuzian concept as an “act of thought”<sup>123</sup> is intended toward enlarging it into a scope of the political—our present reading is a continuity in examining the place of concept(s) in the practice and system of philosophy.

Therein, we ask the same question posed at the beginning of this chapter—what are *concepts*, according to [hereafter] *Guattareuze* (Guattari + Deleuze)?<sup>124</sup> Fortunately, for us, this time, we have a lot of answers, apart from the *creation* definition given above:

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New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1277-1298, p. 1277. Originally published in *Substance*, No. 44/45, 1984, pp. 61-80.

<sup>121</sup> Paul Patton, *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). Also, see Chapter 1: “Concept and Image of Thought: Deleuze’s Conception of Philosophy,” in Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11-28. For other fragmentary interpretations, see concepts as “poetics of chaos” (p. 37.) in Gregg Lambert, *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* (New York; London: Continuum, 2002), esp. Chapter 4: “The Paradox of Concepts,” pp. 28-37.

<sup>122</sup> See the essay devoted to Paul Patton, “Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition: Normativity, Freedom, and Judgment,” in Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), esp. p. 431-45. A key highlight on Smith’s comment is the exclusion of Patton’s discussion on Deleuzian *conceptual personae*, which is integrated in our discussion.

<sup>123</sup> Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>124</sup> Where necessary, which is, where Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari had both collaborated on a work, the term *Guattareuze* (origin, probably 1977) shall be used. This term of two proper names coalesced together, although playfully tossed by Gary Genosko—and having had read the extensive and insightful reasons Genosko cited so—still in a sense do justice; despite how Franco Bifo Berardi delineates their works: Guattari’s “molecular perturbations” and Deleuze’s “ontology of events.” Although it is clear that the explication of the concept is purely a Deleuzian reading, which goes back to his third book on Kant (1963) and through the 1978 Seminar on Kant. Our polite shift—to this new proper noun—implies only a pure convenience and in no other way however reflects any motivated reasons or support for Genosko arguments. See Gary Genosko, “Deleuze and Guattari: Guattareuze & Co.,” in Daniel W. Smith and Henry

*Guattareuzean* list of concept definition

First,

- “The concept is [an] act of thought, it is thought operating at infinite speed.”<sup>125</sup>
- “The concept is not a proposition at all; it is not propositional, and the proposition is never an extension.”<sup>126</sup>

Second,

- “The concept is incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies.”<sup>127</sup>
- “...a concept also has a *becoming*.”<sup>128</sup>
- “The concept is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”<sup>129</sup>

Third,

- “[C]oncept also has an exoconsistency with other concepts.”<sup>130</sup>
- “The concept is defined by *the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed*.”<sup>131</sup>

Fourth,

- “The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing.”<sup>132</sup>

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Somers-Hall (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 151-69.

<sup>125</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 21. Italics, in original.

- “[T]he concept is not discursive, and philosophy is not a discursive formation.”<sup>133</sup>

Fifth,

- “A concept always has the truth that falls to it as a function of the condition of its creation.”<sup>134</sup>

- “The concept is obviously knowledge—but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embedded.”<sup>135</sup>

Sixth,

- “The concept belongs to philosophy and only to philosophy.”<sup>136</sup>

This list is by no means exhaustive.<sup>137</sup> Before we undertake more briefings on Guattareuzean (and, importantly, Deleuzian) concepts, let us take a quick mention of the three ages of the *concept*: encyclopedia age (post-Kantian), pedagogy age, and commercial (capitalism) age. As described in our “Introduction”—the entirety of *What is Philosophy?* is purportedly a love affair targeted at safeguarding the pedagogic<sup>138</sup> value of philosophy from the other

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>137</sup> For instance I have not taken up the unitary character of concept-image [“The concept is in itself in the image, and the image is for itself in the concept” p. 161.] seriously or attempt to see how the same is also posited as differentials. See Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson (London: The Athlone Press, [1989] 2000). Also, see, for a short commentary that looks at the binary opposition till Deleuze, Kenneth Surin, “On Producing the Concept of the Image-Concept,” in Jacques Khalip and Robert Mitchell (eds.), *Releasing the Image: From Literature to New Media* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 171-80.

<sup>138</sup> For a study that has literally translated the emblematic question raised by Guattareuze into integrating the philosophical planes of pragmatism into the tradition of John

two.<sup>139</sup> In other words, the book enumerates the contemporary challenges of philosophy—for which, although this study is not an equal partner, our attempt also partially illustrates the status and trends—and about the need to “protect us from chaos,”<sup>140</sup> the distresses of “thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off...”<sup>141</sup> A note of reminder—therefore—our engagement with Deleuze or Guattareuzean, given the countless studies already in existence, shall be provisionally restricted to commentaries on the concept of the concept and the largesse of problematic(s) it countenanced while conceptualizing and philosophizing concepts. A significant input associated with Deleuzian philosophy is outrightly “the ontological issues raised by the use of mathematics to model the real world”<sup>142</sup>—as is quasi-mathematical validation for Derrida. Paul Patton sees Deleuze as departing from the mathematical set theory of extensional object, which models concepts as classes, by inverting it as “intensional.”<sup>143</sup>

Also, before we come back to the life of concepts—it is imperative to grasp two ancillaries of the concepts—*plane of immanence* and *conceptual personae*. First, Guattareuze marks a clear extensional understanding of concepts (the elastic fragmentary) with the plane of immanence (the fluidic infinite) as “strictly correlative”<sup>144</sup>—“concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of the

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Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce, see Inna Semetsky, *Deleuze, Education and Becoming* (Rotterdam; Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2007).

<sup>139</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>140</sup> This insertion in Guattareuzean philosophy is very much Guattari’s. See Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, (trs.) Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995). Also, see Félix Guattari, *The Anti-Œdipus Papers*, (ed.) Stéphane Nadaud, (tr.) Kéline Gotman (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), for notes that highlights Guattari’s inputs in the earlier joint works.

<sup>141</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 201.

<sup>142</sup> Manuel de Landa, “Deleuze, mathematics, and realist ontology,” in Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, op. cit., pp. 220-238.

<sup>143</sup> Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.



events.”<sup>145</sup> Concepts, and this is important, however “are not deduced from the plane.”<sup>146</sup> Borrowing Etienne Souriau’s, Guattareuze reaffirms that the “concept is the *beginning of philosophy* and the plane of immanence its *instituting*.”<sup>147</sup> The plane of immanence is the “image of thought,”<sup>148</sup> bestowed with a Janus-like double face of “power of being and power of thinking.”<sup>149</sup> In Baruch Spinoza, the *prince of philosophers*, “the Christ of philosophers,”<sup>150</sup> Guattareuze (actually Deleuze) found the “vertigo of immanence”<sup>151</sup>—the life of immanence.<sup>152</sup> Also, given the long history of “illusion” as inseparable from the various eras of philosophical projections (i.e., eidetic-critical-phenomenological, or contemplative-reflective-communicative), Guattareuze warns us of the trap of *solipsism* in immanence: only “when immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence.”<sup>153</sup>

Second, as opposed to the Cartesian ‘concept’ that is formulated from an implicit subjective presupposition (“preconceptual,” also recall Foucault’s term)—Guattareuze introduces us to the “conceptual personae,” “the true agents of enunciation.”<sup>154</sup> Conceptual personae “is thought itself that requires the thinker to be a friend,” a conceptual persona is the Friend, Judge, Stammerer, or, Idiot, “who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.”<sup>155</sup> To give a crude

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 37. Italics, mine.

<sup>148</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., esp., “The Image of Thought,” pp. 127-67.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>152</sup> How substance itself expresses itself through attributes is central in Gilles Deleuze’s *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (tr.) Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1997).

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

allegory here, the conceptual persona is the muse<sup>156</sup> (who is also a ‘friend’) of our thoughts. They are, to employ Guattareuze’s exact term, the “philosopher’s ‘heteronyms’.” Like Derrida’s Gödel, or Badiou’s Lucretius, Guattareuze refers to Plato’s Socrates, Nietzsche’s Dionysus, or Nicholas’s (of Cusa) Idiot, or Kierkegaard’s Don Juan. These conceptual personae however are “irreducible to *psychosocial types*”<sup>157</sup>—rather, these “are no longer empirical, psychological, and social determinations, still less abstractions, but intercessors, crystals, or seeds of thought.”<sup>158</sup> *The role of conceptual personae is to show thought’s territories, its absolute deterritorialization and reterritorializations.*<sup>159</sup> Finally, on correlates and relations again, the Friend, the “conceptual persona is needed to create concepts.”<sup>160</sup> Or, reversing the statement, the life of concepts is co-dependent (to stress, not dependent) on the conceptual personae. On the other hand, the conceptual persona and the plane of immanence also “presuppose each other.”<sup>161</sup> “A concept like knowledge has meaning only in relation to an image of thought to which it refers and to a conceptual persona it needs.”<sup>162</sup> At this point of our description, it is important to see the inter-linkages in Guattareuze’s construction of the concepts, the plane of immanence (chaos), and the conceptual persona:

“Conceptual personae constitute the points of view according to which planes of immanence are distinguished from one another or brought together, but they also constitute the conditions under which each plane finds itself filled with the concept of the same group. Every thought is a Fiat, expression a throw of the dice: constructivism. But this is a very complex

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<sup>156</sup> Quoting Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon*, Babette E. Babich signifies the role of Muses: “*any art over which the Muses preside, esp. music or lyric poetry.*”

Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood, Like flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 98.

<sup>157</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>159</sup> Quoted, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. *Ibid.*, p. 69. Italics, in original.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

game, because throwing involves infinite movements that are reversible and folded within each other so that the consequences can only be produced at infinite speed by creating finite forms corresponding to the intensive ordinates of these movements: every concept is a combination that did not exist before.”<sup>163</sup>

The above statement by Guattareuze sums up the core structure of Deleuzian thoughts on thinking, language, and its temporal coordinates. The three elements of his philosophy—*immanence* (“prephilosophical plane”), *insistence* (the conceptual persona that “must invent and bring to life”) and *consistency* (“the philosophical concepts it must create”)—do not deduce from each other but are co-adaptive with each other. These three elements are what Guattareuze constitutively calls the “philosophical trinity”—with its roles including “laying out” (*diagrammatic*), “inventing” (*personalistic*), and “creating” (*intensive features*).<sup>164</sup> Together, they are composite to Guattareuzean *geophilosophy*—the place (*refrain*) of thinking and the taking place of thinking.<sup>165</sup> Any reading of Deleuze or Guattari will best benefit by departing from this schema—not that we are here proposing the 1991 book as the most illustrative or (not to get into the same old debate) its most mature outlook—given its definitive structuring of how node of thinking takes its flight, encounter, or affect, with the other consequential thoughts.

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>165</sup> Geophilosophy, or the *refrain* of philosophy’s thought:

“Philosophy is inseparable from a Homeland to which the a priori, the innate, or the memory equally attest. But why is this Fatherland unknown, lost, or forgotten, turning the thinker into an exile? What will restore as equivalent a territory valid as home? What will be philosophical refrains? What is thought’s relationship with earth?”

Ibid., p. 68-69.

In 1963 Deleuze “wrote a book on an enemy,”<sup>166</sup> Kant—his third, in fact, and the only major work undertaken on the latter.<sup>167</sup> The first was on Hume’s *Theory of Human Nature*,<sup>168</sup> which, like the fashionable practices of the day, and even now, was a “struggle for subjectivity,” as Constantin Boundas the translator points out.<sup>169</sup> The second one was on Nietzsche, which exposes Deleuze to an “aggressive” and “great polemical range” of “absolute anti-dialectics,” previously mystified in metaphysics.<sup>170</sup> This brief deviation is inconsequential but for the fact that Deleuze, by then, was already threading on a clarity of questioning. Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s ‘Beautiful’<sup>171</sup> (*Critique of Judgement*) is important to our understanding of concepts in the Guattareuze of 1991. In between, in 1978,

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<sup>166</sup> By the translator’s reference, this is Deleuze’s own admission. See “Translators’ Introduction,” in Gilles Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. xv.

<sup>167</sup> Deleuze’s “Kantianism,” McMahon rightly points out, “is ‘felt’ rather than stated... [as] an explicit reference [of] influences.” See Melissa McMahon, “Immanuel Kant,” in Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (eds.), *Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage*, op. cit., pp. 87-103. McMahon’s analysis however do not take cognizance of Kant’s influence on Deleuze’s temporal and conceptual, the only worthwhile reference actually required.

<sup>168</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature*, (tr.) Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

<sup>169</sup> Constantin V. Boundas, “Deleuze, Empiricism, and the Struggle for Subjectivity” *Ibid.*, pp. 1-19.

Nonetheless, Deleuze’s earliest interests were on knowledge, using mathematical probabilities. In fact, Gilles Deleuze admits in his preface (1989) to the English edition his interest in Hume was led by how the latter “established the concept of *belief* and put it in the place of knowledge. [Hume laicized belief, turning knowledge into a legitimate belief.” See “Preface to the English-Language Edition,” *Ibid.*, p. ix.

<sup>170</sup> On a knowledge front, Deleuze was visibly enamoured that “[n]egativity as negativity of the positive is one of Nietzsche’s anti-dialectic discoveries” (p. 198). On the question of subjectivity, Nietzsche’s *ressentiment* and *excellence* appealed to him. Deleuze happily concludes his examination on various aspects of Nietzsche’s thought by saying: “Affirmation remains as the sole quality of the will to power, action as the sole quality of force, becoming-active as the creative identity of power and willing” (p. 198). See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Continuum, [1983] 2002), p. 195.

<sup>171</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 7.

Kant faintly returned to Deleuze's Seminar,<sup>172</sup> further elevating the status of "an enemy" into one that of "the inventor of concepts" and "the fanatic of the formal concept."<sup>173</sup> Deleuze reading of Kant in 1963 is entirely focused on concepts but propelled by a temporality vector that "demands a new definition of time which Kant must discover or create."<sup>174</sup> Deleuze, however, did not formulate any significant intervention on the question of temporality,<sup>175</sup> except to problematize Kant's schematic synthesis ("imagination *schematizes*" or synthetic *a priori*). In doing so, Deleuze differentiates the *schema* from the image, by showing that the conceptual embodies or realizes relations in any spatio-temporal relations, from that of the *synthesis* that individuates the spatio and the temporal.<sup>176</sup> And, rather, what Deleuze eventually and hugely benefited in the analysis of Kant's concepts is the interpretation by Kant, of course, and, then, Deleuze's own interpretation and, finally, as is the case is later, Deleuze's own independent interpretation of concepts. In fact we can rightly mention here that Deleuzian and Guattareuzean notion of concepts owe solely to Kant, although some have attributed to Leibniz<sup>177</sup> and Spinoza,<sup>178</sup> too. A critique of Kantian concepts, coupled with Leibniz, therein, brings forth Guattareuzean geophilosophy into full circle.

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<sup>172</sup> A rendition of the 14 March 1978 Seminar is available in French at: <<http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=58&groupe=Kant&langue=1>> <last accessed: 01 December, 2015>

<sup>173</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy* op. cit., see, esp., See "Translators' Introduction," p. xvi.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. viii.

<sup>175</sup> However, there are a couple of commentators who find Deleuze's reading of time in Kant significant. I do not see any substantive argument defending it. See A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), esp. pp. 80-82. Similarly, Beth Lord's seemingly compelling article however does not pinpoint to any significant argument either of Kant's concept or temporality, which were actually the two most discussed; see Beth Lord, "Deleuze and Kant," in Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, op. cit., pp. 82-102.

<sup>176</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

<sup>177</sup> Reading Leibniz allows Deleuzian "concepts," as Tom Conley points out, to become subjects and, like the Cartesian reason, "keeps the one—either subject or predicate—from being an attribute of the other." See Tom Conley, "Translator's Foreword," in Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque*, (tr.) Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1993), p. xviii.

Deleuze understood Kant's concepts in two ways<sup>179</sup>—inasmuch Kant was using concepts in two ways without understanding it. A reminder here: Deleuze's foray into Kant was prompted by the investigation of the concept of causality and the concept of freedom. However, that imagination *schematizes*, as mentioned above, becomes the departing point. Let us explore a little more. Kant's understanding of the beautiful is different from Kant's experience of the beautiful. Deleuze finds this as a discord of imagination between aesthetic judgement and teleological judgement.<sup>180</sup> Here, imagination's role is to "reflect a particular object from the point of view of form," which, as Deleuze points out, "does not relate to a determinate concept of the understanding [b]ut it relates to the understanding itself ["faculty of concepts."]."<sup>181</sup> The discord of imagination then becomes an issue of *reflection*. Reflection therefore changes the entire meaning of the beautiful—"it is no longer the formal reflection of the object without concept, but the concept of reflection through which the content of the object is reflected on."<sup>182</sup> In other words, "it is reflection without concepts which itself prepares us to form a concept of reflection."<sup>183</sup> Therein, Kant's concept is simply an object of experience, which translates into understanding. Here, Kant failed to situate the place of an other concept, which is an Idea of reason.<sup>184</sup> Idea, for Kant, is also a concept—and the concept therefore is "beyond the possibility of experience and which has its source in *reason*."<sup>185</sup> Therefore, Kant's

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<sup>178</sup> See Deleuze's discussion on Spinoza's differentiation between abstract concepts and common notions, esp. Chapter Four, "Index of the Main Concepts of the *Ethics*," in Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, (tr.) Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), pp. 44-99.

<sup>179</sup> Deleuze calls it "two fold movement."

<sup>180</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

(categories of) “concepts” reduce objects as transcendental deductions, a “subjection of phenomena.”<sup>186</sup> As Deleuze concludes—

“As distinct from an Idea of reason, *the concept of natural end [finality]* has a given object; as distinct from the *concept of the understanding*, it does not determine its object. In fact, it intervenes to allow the imagination to ‘reflect’ on the object in an indeterminate way, so that the understanding ‘acquires’ concepts in accordance with the Ideas of reason itself. The concept of natural end is a concept of reflection which derives from the regulative Ideas: within it all our faculties are harmonized and enter a free accord which allows us to reflect on Nature from the standpoint of its empirical laws. Teleological judgement is thus a second type of reflective judgement.”<sup>187</sup>

Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s *a priori intuitions* is commonplace, now, like any other major critiques we saw in the previous chapter. What makes it distinctive, then, is the integrative critique with an approach to concepts—against the bestowing of “infinite conceptual power to [not only the *a priori*] understanding”<sup>188</sup> but, also, the Kantian [*a priori*] “metaphysical deduction of concepts.”<sup>189</sup> Deleuze, therein, inverted the same by giving autonomy of inner sense of time to the concept itself, uplifting its status to an “act of thought,” while, also, at the same time, giving its operational limits at “infinite speed.”<sup>190</sup> Tactically, this is not even Deleuze’s original; it is a simple application of Leibnizian “transcendental philosophy.”<sup>191</sup> Deleuze’s debt to the calculus of Leibniz and Newton<sup>192</sup>—which we mentioned earlier—is clearly marked in the

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<sup>186</sup> Julia Kristeva, *Proust and the Sense of Time*, (tr.) Stephen Bann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 4.

<sup>187</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 63. Italics, mine.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xii.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>190</sup> See, above, first ‘*Guattareuzean* list of concept definition’.

<sup>191</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, op. cit., p. 120.

<sup>192</sup> See Chapter One, “Logico-Linguistic Confluences,” footnote 13. Further, it is important to note Deleuze reference to Newton and Leibniz:

former's deduction of the "sum of the theory of the fold," i.e., the correspondence of perceptions fixated to a monad with the organic body—*I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression*.<sup>193</sup> It is also evident that Deleuze's views on expressionism drastically changed from the one that initially sees philosophy (through Spinoza) as "analogy," "harmony," and "symbolization" in *Expressionism in Philosophy*<sup>194</sup> (1968) to one of "allegory" in *The Fold*<sup>195</sup> (1988). Deleuze—highlight Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen—"situates Leibniz in relation to the question of the movement of thought and the conditions of its genesis... Deleuze's reflections on the concept of the fold act as a kind of prism through which this movement of thought can be articulated in philosophical terms."<sup>196</sup> Leibniz, therein, "fuels Deleuze's nomadic empiricism"<sup>197</sup> that recklessly leads to a "free and wild creation of concepts."<sup>198</sup>

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"Leibniz's calculus is adequate to psychic mechanics where Newton's is operative for physical mechanics. The difference between the two is as much metaphysical as it is mathematical. We would not be wrong to state that Leibniz's calculus resembles Newton's. In effect, it applies to nature only by means of resemblance, but we must recall that it is the likeness that is the model, and that it determines whatever it resembles."

Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>194</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, op. cit., see, esp., p. 232 and 329.

<sup>195</sup> As Deleuze remarks:

"appertaining—belonging to—is the key to allegory... Leibniz's philosophy must be conceived as the allegory of the world, the signature of the world, but no longer as the symbol of a cosmos in the former manner [... wherein] description replaces the object, the concept becomes narrative, and the subject becomes point of view or subject of expression."

See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque*, op. cit., p. 127.

<sup>196</sup> "Introduction," in Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.), *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 7.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>198</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 105.



This brings us back to the question—how does the incorporeal body of concept derive its immanence,<sup>199</sup> its life,<sup>200</sup> firstly, and, secondly, as different from art or science?<sup>201</sup> And, here, it should not be confused with Deleuze’s (vitalistic) concept of life—which is already the focus of innumerable studies,<sup>202</sup> particularly as a thematic under *biophilosophy*.<sup>203</sup> Rather, what we are proposing here is: What is the Life of Concept(s)? This will be entirely complicit as to how do we locate or situate the Guattareuzean list of concept definition enumerated in *What is Philosophy?*—and, particularly, the realist notion of geophilosophy! In this connection, there is an absolute need to integrate, far less from being methodological, a reading of Leibniz’s four principles into Deleuzean or Guattareuzean concepts.<sup>204</sup> There are two ways of approaching the life of concepts. But—before heading straight into that—let us propose some questions

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<sup>199</sup> This thread of thought, which we mentioned in the “Introduction” as ‘affective’ and ‘corporeal’ turns, resonates heavily in posthumanist studies.

<sup>200</sup> This topic is insufficiently discussed in Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, (tr.) Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), which is actually one of Deleuze last major works.

<sup>201</sup> Similar attempts already existed. See François Zourabichvili, “Six Notes on the Percept (On the Relation between the Critical and the Clinical,” in Paul Patton (ed.), *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Oxford; Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 188-216; Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

<sup>202</sup> An interesting read is John Protevi, “Deleuze and Life,” in Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, op. cit., pp. 239-61. For a more extensive study on vitalism that incorporates the tradition with Deleuze, see Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010).

<sup>203</sup> See, esp., John Protevi’s list. *Ibid.*, footnote 2, p. 261.

<sup>204</sup> Already Daniel Smith has done an excellent job in modeling Deleuzean philosophy/thoughts in the frame of Leibnizian differential calculus and principles. In fact one can say that our study here uses the same approach to study concepts, an area that insofar in not sufficiently articulated. This, as a reasonable argumentation, should therefore allows us to, like how we have done with Derrida and Badiou in the previous chapter, speculate whether validation (and, here, through the mathematical) is composite to philosophizing? See Daniel W. Smith, “G.W.F. Leibniz,” in Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (eds.), *Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage*, op. cit., pp. 44-66.

to give a sense of apprehension, which should nonetheless translate into a sense of direction. First, how do concepts *objectivate* themselves—to use a Badiouian term and a problem we visited in the preceding chapter—in the first place, which is, or prior to its life-form? This is also a question of concepts “becoming”—as incorporeal and incarnated bodies—and, also, being “real without being actual.”<sup>205</sup> Second, how does one locate the translative properties of the concept? Which is to say, how does one translate “thought’s relation with earth” as a non-discursive formation or, again, translate the concept that is *not* a “proposition,” or an extensional essence of a thing [event], but as a concept that is an “act of thought,” which is very much a concept capable of becoming.<sup>206</sup> In short, what is the riddle behind a concept that is real without actually being actual? Third, what is the temporal dimension of the life of concept(s)? In other words, where is the value and place of philosophy in the siege of capitalism? Is philosophizing simply an addendum of concept traveling at infinite speed, individuated and freed from any points of tangency or intersection, or does it still resonates its affirmation in the Leibinizian vanishing difference? Is there a thinking, a philosophizing, a concept, to use Guattareuzean term-phrase, capable of being “ideal without being abstract”? Or, to use the axiom of irreducible love, how *spontaneous* and, more importantly, immanent is this non-spontaneous “love of truth?”<sup>207</sup> Having said that, our two approaches to the life of concept should now be familiar to walk the path of its own defined terrain, without falling into the trap of riddles. Deleuze himself largely defines our first approach, i.e., the approach to the life of concept;

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<sup>205</sup> See, above, Guattareuzean list of concept definition, especially second definitions.

<sup>206</sup> See, above, footnote 165, for “thought’s relation” and also Guattareuzean list of concept definition, especially first and fourth definitions.

<sup>207</sup> As Zourabichivili argues:

“Philosophy fails in its search for a first concept because beginning does not depend on it. If there is no natural link between thought and truth, if thought is not originally related to the truth, then it does not depend on philosophy to commence the search for truth, and it would not even originally have the taste for it. *The love of truth is not spontaneous.*”

See François Zourabichivili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event* together with *The Vocabulary of Deleuze*, (eds.) Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, (tr.) Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 56. Italics, mine.

and the second approach comes about by our questioning the approach inaugurated by Deleuze.

First. The life of concepts, or giving life to concepts, is central to Guattareuzean, inter alia Deleuzean geophilosophy or diagrammatic thinking. We have illustrated above the *philosophical trinity*—the three elements that are individuated but co-adaptive and co-dependent on each other for the constitutive happenstance of the appearance of the event. The event,<sup>208</sup> in geophilosophy, is thinking. In other words, thinking is geophilosophy.<sup>209</sup> To simplify, thinking, for Deleuze, gives life to the concept—“the concept is a system of singularities appropriated from a thought flow.”<sup>210</sup> Here, to shed any misreading, let us remind ourselves that a *concept* is an ‘act of thought’; but “the concept is not the same thing as thought.”<sup>211</sup> What is thought is therefore not an important reference here—we find innumerable quotations in the history of philosophy or, as Deleuze mentions, traveling without any life. Plato, for instance, was very happy thinking a thought that is filled with but a lifeless (‘dogmatic’) image of thought.<sup>212</sup> We also saw Kant’s double jeopardy of

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<sup>208</sup> Chaos, that is, monads, like thinking, or polytonalities, which does not exist, but is inseparable from appearance, as non-horizontal but diagonal and transversal. See, Chapter 6, “What is the Event?” in Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold*, op. cit., pp. 76-82.

<sup>209</sup> Or, “a speculative cartography of the milieus and rhythms of thought.” See Éric Alliez, *The Signature of the World, or, What is Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy?*, (trs.) Eliot Ross Albert and Alberto Toscano (New York; London: Continuum, 2004), p. 7.

<sup>210</sup> Gilles Deleuze, “Seminar on Leibniz,” Cours Vincennes (15 April, 1980). Available at: <<http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=50&groupe=Leibniz&langue=2>> <accessed 11 January, 2015>

<sup>211</sup> Gilles Deleuze full sentence:

“[A] concept is not the same thing as thought: one can very well think without concepts, and everyone who does not do philosophy still thinks, I believe, but does not think through concepts. If you accept the idea of a concept as the product of an activity or an original creation.”

Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> For the most extensive treatment insofar on this, see “The Dogmatic Image of Thought,” in Daniela Voss, *Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 18-74.

experiencing and conceptualizing. Alongwith Jean-Luc Nancy,<sup>213</sup> to specifically mention him, Deleuze joins the post-Heideggerian<sup>214</sup> *human condition* gang of “Thinking.” If Spinoza breathes only of immanence; equally, Deleuze breathes only of life: thinking. A *life*, here, should be differentiated from a *subject*. Daniel Smith highlights:

“A ‘life’ is constructed on an *immanent plane of consistency* that knows only relations between affects and percepts, and whose composition, through the creation of blocks of sensations, takes place in the indefinite and virtual time of the pure event (Aeon).

A ‘subject’ is constructed on a *transcendental plane of organization* that already involves the development of forms, organs, and functions, and takes place in a measured and actualized time (Chronos).”<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it:

[T]hinking is the condition of everyone, the *human condition* (assuming that we know anything about other conditions). This said, we all carry their weight. Weight means to fall outside of oneself. Or, rather, we do not carry it: we *are* this weight.”

Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Gravity of Thought*, (trs.) François Raffoul and Gregory Recco (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1997), p. 2. Sentence juxtaposition modified. Also, see Jean-Luc Nancy, “Finite Thinking,” (trs.) Edward Bullard, Jonathan Derbyshire, and Simon Sparks, pp. 3-30, and “Concealed Thinking,” (tr.) James Gilbert-Walsh, pp. 31-47, in *A Finite Thinking*, (ed.) Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

<sup>214</sup> Earlier, see Martin Heidegger’s “What Calls for thinking?,” pp. 365-92, and “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” pp. 427-49, in *Basic Writings*, (tr.) David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, [1977] 1993). Another important 1965 paper by Heidegger is “On the Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking,” (tr.) Richard Capobianco and Maie Göbel, in *Epoché*, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 213-23. “Thinking,” says Heidegger, “itself can be transformed only by a thinking which has the same origin and calling.” Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” (trs.) Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo, in Richard Wolin (ed.), *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Guide*, (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, [1991] 1998), pp. 91-116, p. 113.

<sup>215</sup> Daniel W. Smith, “Introduction: ‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ Project,” in Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (tr.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. xi-lvi, pp. xxxv-vi.

We shall now quickly explore how the subject is transformed. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze identifies two subjects:<sup>216</sup> “passive selves” and “larval,” but only the latter is significant since it only has permutative dynamism. Larval subjects, even the philosopher is one of them, are all *patients* awaiting an effraction. The “patient” is the retro-thinker. In other words, larval subjects, unlike the Platonic-Cartesian cogito, are in a ‘nightmare’, a ‘dreamless sleep’. To give a rough example, it is something like a zero-language (“‘wordless’ experience”) in Giorgio Agamben’s *infancy* (“in-fancy”)<sup>217</sup>—which also tantamount to a zero-thought-like in larval subjects. Deleuze also identifies that “thought thinks only on the basis of an unconscious.”<sup>218</sup> How thoughts enter the larval subject is where we begin to see the role of concepts as life-giving! But, before that, a little more on the movement of this transfiguration. “Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy,”<sup>219</sup> says Deleuze, while cosmically painting a visual effect of such *violence* as “thunderbolts... preceded by an invisible, imperceptible *dark precursor*,” or “phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning.”<sup>220</sup> [A movie-version will no doubt fall under horror genre]. But the larval subject cannot be frightened; in fact this violence is happy moment, absolutely necessary (and absolutely unmediated) for giving itself a life of thought and thinking. It is dormancy mutating, which also implies there is life in the lifeless.

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<sup>216</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 118.

<sup>217</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience*, (tr.) Liz Heron (London; New York: Verso, 1993), p. 47.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

For a spirited work on Deleuze’s Freudian and Jungian reading, see Christian Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London; New York: Continuum, 2007).

<sup>219</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.




Figure: “Diagrams for Deleuze & Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*.”<sup>221</sup>

[For both statements and desires, the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or to interpret it or to make it signify according to a tree model. The issue is to produce the unconscious, and with it new statements, different desires: the rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious.<sup>222</sup>]

How does the facilitation of this mutation take place? Is it a spatial or temporal mutation? “Something in the world forces us to think,” Deleuze informs us, and this “something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*.”<sup>223</sup> Two complementary movements evolve here—what *forces* the think and the *object of encounter*. Here, it is pertinent to recall Deleuze’s reading on Nietzsche, as mentioned above, particularly on the problem and history of

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<sup>221</sup> Marc Ngui, “Diagrams for Deleuze & Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*,” *INFLexions* No. 1- How is Research-Creation? (May 2008). Available at: <<http://www.inflexions.org/1000platos-intro-6.gif>> <accessed on 23 September 2013>

<sup>222</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>223</sup> On the other hand, says Deleuze:

“The object of encounter really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense. It is not an *aisthêton* but an *aisthêteon*. It is not a quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being *of* the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given.”

*Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

“existence.”<sup>224</sup> In Heraclitus, the “tragic thinker,” Deleuze finds “that existence is not responsible or even blameworthy.”<sup>225</sup> In Nietzsche’s *ressentiment*, an “imputation of wrongs and responsibilities,” Deleuze finds “irresponsibility,” a return to pre-Christian Greek notion of ‘sin’, as “the pious interpretation of existence.”<sup>226</sup> Coupled with this sense of absolving and radicalizing existence, Deleuze also reads Nietzschean chaos=mass of force:

“We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds meaning only in an existing force.”<sup>227</sup>

Zourabichivili highlights that the establishment of “a relation between forces and sense is a very new idea in philosophy.”<sup>228</sup> This statement can be taken in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s preface to *Anti-Oedipus*—there was “a certain way of thinking correctly” between 1945-1965 in Europe, which is, “one has to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one’s dreams stray too far from Freud; And one had to treat the sign-systems—the signifiers—with the greatest respect.”<sup>229</sup> The sense, then, in thought’s relation with earth, the

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<sup>224</sup> Thus begins Deleuze on the history of existence:

“The story of the meaning of existence is a long one. Its origins are Greek, pre-Christian. As we have seen suffering was used as a way of proving the *injustice* of existence, but at the same time as a way of finding a higher and divine *justification* for it. (It is blameworthy because it suffers, but because it suffers it is atoned for and redeemed.) The Greeks themselves interpreted and evaluated existence as excess.”

Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>228</sup> François Zourabichivili, *Deleuze*, op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>229</sup> Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (trs.) R. Hurley et. al (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. xi-xiv, p. xi.

composite refrain of a geophilosophy, begins here, which is actually nothing new in the history of philosophy, but novel in its philosophizing strategies. Is it then a political actualization in philosophy? Or, is it, in the words of Franco Berardi, where “Sense is not to be found in the world, but in what we are able to create”?<sup>230</sup> Force, therein, represents pure existentialism. It is the exteriority of sense to which only through an encounter can existence transfigure as a thought of banalities or joys, whose domain is pure heterogeneity. Again, in *Foucault*, Deleuze relates Foucault’s claims—“power is a relation between forces” and, yet, how force remains a singularity (autoimmunity)<sup>231</sup>—with the idea of force as “defining life,” as resisting “death.”<sup>232</sup> Here, again, Deleuze uses the anterior-exterior ontological dialectics of “the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life.”<sup>233</sup> It is here where Deleuzian *abstract machine* or *diagram*<sup>234</sup> evolves to “display the relations between forces which constitute power.”<sup>235</sup> The “outside,” therein, is that “something,” the *object of encounter*, the concept, which gives life and resists death.

Force generates conditions of thinking to become thought.<sup>236</sup> Conditions are however a priori to thinking, or with the encounter. It is nonetheless a relation without a relation, to express it in the atypical phrase.<sup>237</sup> In the traditional way of looking at things, it is thought which is internalized to the

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<sup>230</sup> Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *Previous Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation* (London: Minor Compositions, 2009), p. 117.

<sup>231</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>234</sup> For Deleuze’s diagrammic, see Jakub Zdebik, *Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization* (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012).

<sup>235</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>236</sup> “Thinking,” says Deleuze, “depends on forces which take hold of thought.” Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 108.

<sup>237</sup> For a comparison between the thoughts of Deleuze and Derrida, see the edited essays in Paul Patton & John Protevi (eds.), *Between Deleuze & Derrida* (London; New York: Continuum, 2003).



image of thought. Thought, therein, is the image; the image of thought is its truth. What Deleuze is proposing therein is a radically and powerfully rechristened<sup>238</sup> “new image of thought—or, rather, a liberation of those images which imprison it,”<sup>239</sup> wherein “the element of thought is sense and value,”<sup>240</sup> and not the ideologically tainted truth.<sup>241</sup> In this sense, the actual is the virtual, “the destratified Plane of Consistency,” i.e., the new image of thought (*body without organ*) or the plane of immanence.<sup>242</sup> Sense is the force-appropriated appointed phenomenal. Force, in other words, is capable of impregnating sense (virtual) with the phenomenal (actual). This conforms to the three series of Deleuzian “actualization,”<sup>243</sup> both as process and definition. And, coming back to concepts, remember (?), Deleuze treats the “concept as object of an encounter.”<sup>244</sup> That “something” which “forces” us to think is the concept. The concept therein is the hallmark of transcendental empiricism. Zourabichivili questions why “a theory of sense and of thought need a logic of forces?”<sup>245</sup> Claire Colebrook also finds that it

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<sup>238</sup> Daniela Voss pointed out that Deleuze initially used the image of thought as an “established order,” determining its functions through *postulates*. Only later, which nonetheless does not change its meaning, it was given teeth as a “productive machine or apparatus of power,” consonant with Deleuze founding of these concepts. See Daniela Voss, *Conditions of Thought*, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>239</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. xvi-vii.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>241</sup> A better explanation of the new image (i.e., post-Heideggerian) is given in *Dialogues*:

“‘Images’ here doesn’t refer to ideology but to a whole organisation which effectively trains thought to operate according to the norms of an established order or power, and moreover, installs in it an apparatus of power, sets it up as an apparatus of power itself.”

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 23.

<sup>242</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (tr.) Brian Massumi (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, [1987] 2009), p. 72 & p. 154.

<sup>243</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xx.

<sup>245</sup> Zourabichivili answers his own question by saying that it is because “thought is in a fundamental relation with affect.” Zourabichivili’s problem with exteriority and its relations with

is “deeply repugnant to us.”<sup>246</sup> Levi Bryant otherwise thinks Deleuze is intelligent in this sense—the ability to “depart from the philosophy of representation characterized by the primacy of the concept, then, is because he discovers intelligibility in the aesthetic itself, in the very fabric of the given in the form of the differentials of perception.”<sup>247</sup> Essentially, Deleuze’s task with sense as a mode of perception (actualization) is to delineate conflicts between ‘recognition’ and ‘representation’. This is motivated with the task of philosophy too, as seen in Deleuze’s remarks: “the good will of the thinker along with the good nature of thought,” and including an “ideal form of recognition,” is “that *philia* which predetermines at once both the image of thought and the concept of recognition.”<sup>248</sup> Good, here, is not a judgement but a predicament for affirmation of life, which is directly drawn from Spinoza. Similarly, Deleuze’s category of Idiot and excurses into Stupidity can be framed in the line of a certain responsibility to philosophy that goes beyond Cartesian’s (Eudoxos) ‘private thinker’.<sup>249</sup> These structural refrains in Deleuzian thought nevertheless contribute to labeling it as a future philosophy. A debate over temporality often ensues with this category and, although we shall not be demonstrating, this is an outcome that confusingly results from conflating the actualization of concepts as a life with biophilosophy as a genetic life. A clarification can be sought because both have the same refrain and genesis. As Daniel Smith remarks, *affects* and *percepts* are “the genetic and immanent elements of constitutive life.”<sup>250</sup>

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the transcendental field, particularly on forces and encounter, drifts through his work. See François Zourabichivili, *Deleuze*, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>246</sup> Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>247</sup> See “Preface,” of Levi R. Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), p. ix.

<sup>248</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>249</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 60-63.

<sup>250</sup> Daniel W. Smith, “Introduction: ‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ Project,” in Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., pp. xi-lvi, p. xxxv.

Let us now return to the standing refrain and genesis of philosophy—“nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with *misosophy*.”<sup>251</sup> Here, which is our own explanation, philosophy must therefore begin by countering the hatred of love of knowledge or wisdom (*misosophy*). The task of philosophy, then, is to overcome this hatred, literally.<sup>252</sup> “If philosophy begins with the creation of concepts,” Deleuze reminds us, “then the plane of immanence must be regarded as pre-philosophical [its *instituting*].”<sup>253</sup> Likewise, when Deleuze says that a “concept is not at all something that is given,”—and that “each thing must have a reason”<sup>254</sup>—Deleuze is simply reiterating Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.<sup>255</sup> There is also a clear mention that “the plane of immanence is not a

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<sup>251</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>252</sup> Perhaps this interpretation is not entirely wrong, for what follows the sentence immediately are some homily advises from Deleuze:

“Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks... *count upon* the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think.”

Ibid., p. 139. Italics, mine.

Also, note, Guattareuze uses the same term as “non-philosophy” (p. 40), which, in their conclusion, substantiates the spell of François Laruelle’s definition (p. 218).

<sup>253</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>254</sup> Gilles Deleuze, “Seminar on Leibniz,” op. cit.

<sup>255</sup> Four Principles of Leibniz:

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*Principle of Identity*

Reason: *ratio essendi* (‘reason for being’: *Why is there something rather than nothing?*)

Popular Formulation: ‘A thing is what it is’.

Philosophical Formulation: ‘Every analytic proposition is true’.

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*Principle of Sufficient Reason*

Reason: *ratio existendi* (‘reason for existing’: *Why is there this rather than that?*)

Popular Formulation: ‘Everything has a reason’.

Philosophical Formulation: ‘Every true proposition is analytic’.

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*Principle of Indiscernibles*

Reason: *ratio cognoscendi* (‘reason for knowing’)

Popular Formulation: ‘No two things are the same’.

Philosophical Formulation: ‘For every concept, there is one and only one thing’.

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*Law of Continuity*

Ratio: *ratio fiendi* (‘reason for becoming’)

Popular Formulation: ‘Nature never makes leaps’.

concept... but an image of thought,"<sup>256</sup> i.e., "the internal condition of thought."<sup>257</sup> The actualization of this image of thought as the virtual through concepts ["plane of reference"], which is the becoming of life of the concept, is indicated in a geophilosophy, the necessary refrain of thought's habilitation ["transcendental field"<sup>258</sup>] and maintenance of its ["haecceity"] "singularity."<sup>259</sup> As Guattareuze says:

"Philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept. The concept is not object but territory. It does not have an Object but a territory. For that very reason it has a past form, a present form and, perhaps, a form to come."<sup>260</sup>

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Philosophical Formulation: 'A singularity is extended over a series of ordinary points until it reaches the neighborhood of another singularity, etc'.

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See Daniel W. Smith, "G.W.F. Leibniz," op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>258</sup> 'What is a transcendental field?' This question in fact pervades the entirety of Guattareuzean or Deleuzean works. Deleuze finds that there is 'something wild and powerful' but not in the ordinary 'element of sensation'— this is *immanence*. See, esp., "Immanence: A Life," in Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, op. cit., pp. 25-34.

<sup>259</sup> In the discussion on what is not philosophy, Guattareuze illustrates that:

"Constructivism requires every creation to be a construction on a plane that gives it an autonomous existence, to create concepts is, at the very least, to make something. This alters the question of philosophy's use or usefulness, or even of its harmfulness (to whom is it harmful?)."

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., p. 101.




Figure: Mehrdad Iravanian, "Volatile Boundary."<sup>261</sup>

Here, the concluding phrase above, "to come," or "people to come,"<sup>262</sup> may sound familiar. What we have failed to integrate here is the ethical dimension of this becoming temporality. Nonetheless, the refrain is integral to the ethical and the diagonal dimensions of temporalities or multiplicities. For both Derrida and

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<sup>261</sup> Mehrdad Iravanian, "Unknown Deleuze," In R. Mackay (ed.), *Collapse III* (Falmouth, Urbanomic, November 2007), pp. 231-242, p. 242.

<sup>262</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 345.

Deleuze, who both advocated philosophies of ‘difference’ and a thematic “to come” notion of temporality, Bruce Baugh finds a direct influence of Heidegger’s own notion of temporality (i.e., being-towards-death)—where “death is the never-reached horizon of experience, in light of which authentic decisions must be taken.”<sup>263</sup> Baugh therein finds this Heideggerian temporality as the diverging points for both Derrida and Deleuze. In the former case, Baugh argues that Derrida never seriously contested Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death inasmuch “the future illuminates, determines and so is ‘prior’ to the past and present.”<sup>264</sup> On the other hand, Deleuze takes a completely different approach first, by departing from Heideggerian temporality and taking Spinoza’s affirmations and, second, by comparing the differences between animal and human deaths. Therein death, for Deleuze, is merely an accident, of finite modes. The outlook toward life, or should we say the refrain, of Deleuze, therein, is geared towards a “becoming-intense, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible,”<sup>265</sup> where “death” is “always eternal, is of little significance.”<sup>266</sup> Concept, like death, we may coalesce, “is an idea whose reality cannot be unfolded empirically; an object, consequently, that is both outside experience and can only be represented within a problematic form.” For who can experience death, but life, or, *of* becoming? This then is also drawn from Leibniz law of continuity. Ultimately, both Deleuze and Guattari are risking a becoming *concept* that aspires for a “possible world, [an] existing face, and real language or speech.”<sup>267</sup>

Deleuze confesses that it was only in *Difference and Repetition* (*magnum opus*; doctoral d’État) that he has actually tried to “do philosophy.” Let us end by

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<sup>263</sup> Bruce Baugh, “Death and Temporality in Deleuze and Derrida,” *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2000, pp. 73-83, p. 73.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> See Chapter 10: 1730, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 323-209.

<sup>266</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 41. Also, see “death as Figure,” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>267</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 17.

quoting<sup>268</sup> the place of “concept” in philosophizing, which Deleuze places in the opening paragraph of his “*Preface to the English Edition*”—

There is a great difference between writing history of philosophy and writing philosophy. In the one case, we study the arrows or the tools of a great thinker, the trophies and the prey, the continents discovered. In the other case, we trim our own arrows, or gather those which seem to us the finest in order to try to send them in other directions, even if the distance covered is not astronomical but relatively small. We try to speak in our own name only to learn that a proper name designates no more than the outcome of a body of work—in other words, *the concepts* discovered, on the condition that we were able to express these and imbue them with life using all the possibilities of language.<sup>269</sup>

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### III

In recapping his 1962 *EHO*, and this is important, Jacques Derrida says that “the problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of ‘deferral’ in its relationships to consciousness, presence,

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<sup>268</sup> Or, alternatively, this other quote is what I was having in mind:

“If I believe that a worthwhile book can be represented in three quick ways. A worthy book is written only if (1) you think that the books on the same or a related subject fall into a sort of general *error* (polemical function); (2) you think that something essential about the subject has been *forgotten* (inventive function); (3) you consider that you are capable of creating a new *concept* (creative function). Of course that’s the quantitative minimum: an error, an oversight, a concept... Henceforth... abandoning necessary modesty, I will ask myself (1) which error it claims to correct, (2) which oversight it wants to repair; and (3) what new concept it has created.”

Gilles Deleuze, quoted, in François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, (tr.) Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 112.

<sup>269</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. xv. Italics, mine.

history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of origins, etc.”<sup>270</sup> This statement also sums up the importance of re-writing the place of writing or grammatology as the pivotal departure of any of Derrida’s corpus. And, given the coherent fashion, the feature that accompanied this radical assertion is the notion of *deferral*. The exigency on deferral was earlier indicated briefly in *Genesis* and *EHOG* as *different*, and later developed as a neologism *différance* in 1959.<sup>271</sup> This term will become the central locus to contest the deconstruction of metaphysics of presence, following Husserl and Heidegger and Hegel. Derrida’s translator David Allison provides a fuller description on the etymological source and use of the neologism *différance*,<sup>272</sup> in 1968, through a lecture and its subsequent publication the same year.<sup>273</sup> Two equally lucid English translations are available for the same: Alan Bass and David Allison.<sup>274</sup> Between the *gramme* and the *ousia*, therefore, are the roots and origins of Derrida’s temporal notions, which we shall examine below. Accordingly, we may propose whether the topological notion of to-come, which were later integrated into Derrida’s a “justice”<sup>275</sup> or “democracy” *to come*, seeks a revival or is a continuation of his earliest premises that critiques and subsequently develops temporality via ineffable language.

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<sup>270</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 5.

<sup>271</sup> Derrida’s biographer Edward Baring erroneously discusses the year as 1965 by linking it with the publication of the article “La Parole Soufflée.” Edward Baring, *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-68* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 201.

<sup>272</sup> See footnote 8, in Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, (tr.) David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 82.

<sup>273</sup> Initially delivered before the *Société française de philosophie* on 27 January, 1968, which was published by the same in their *Bulletin* (Volume LXII) and, again, reprinted in *Théorie d’ensemble*, a collection of essays published in *Tel Quel* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968).

<sup>274</sup> See “Différance,” in Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., pp. 129-160; and, also, “Différance,” in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 1-28.

<sup>275</sup> Jacques Derrida, “For a Justice to Come,” interview with Derrida by Lieven De Caeter, *The Brussels Tribunal*, 05 April, 2004. Available at: <<http://archive.indymedia.be/news/2004/04/83123.html>> <accessed on 8 December, 2015>



In the last chapter we briefly discussed Derrida's notion of supplementarity as presence. The supplement or the surrogate is "being-present." Derrida takes the analogy of writing as the supplement, as the surrogate, of being-present, or, having the power to present itself.<sup>276</sup> The constitution of writing or, rather, writing in itself, in Derrida, is a multiplicity that is devoid of any subjectivity or transcendental intuition, and is centrally the neatest thesis against the metaphysics of presence. Also, it is in the early situating of the finitude of language<sup>277</sup> that Derrida added the term "play," the play of substitutions, which, consequentially, relates with the play between presence and absence. The debt of Derrida (in the questioning of language-temporality) owes to—to construct our own list—a critical interplay of Plato's *antre* and Mallarmé's *entre*, and a critique of speech in both Rousseau, and Saussure. Similarly, the notion of origin and a critique on intuitional objects, which we discussed in perspective in the previous chapter, is drawn from an investigation of Husserl. Derrida's questions on truth owe much to Nietzsche. Gödel's mathematical exposition of undecidability allows Derrida to integrate and relate an engagement with the impossible, the indiscernible, or the imperceptible. So also, in some of the earliest readings on Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida can be found testing the western destinies of ontology and metaphysics. To also give a quick recap, we tried to implicate that the impossible, in itself, for

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<sup>276</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, (tr.) Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), p. 110.

<sup>277</sup> On the finitude of language, Derrida comments:

"[I]t is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language, and a finite language—excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions."

Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278-93, esp. p. 289.

Derrida, as an analogy of time.<sup>278</sup> It however appears both difficult and incorrect to trace Derrida's conceptualization or notion of temporality on a single and thematic scale, unlike Deleuze.

We also notice how Derrida's rendering of Rousseau-Saussure linguistic readings is strongly anchored to a metaphysical location of temporal movements. Meaning to say, the passivity of speech belongs to a logos that is "not a creative activity," but which is an onto-theology, which, but, has to "return to finitude" ("awakening," in Husserl's term), i.e., the language form, the "imprint" of language, from where "the activity of speech can and must always drawn from,"<sup>279</sup> which, again, is difference, if it is a form. This circulatory movement, i.e., of the temporal-intuitional unity, which is responsible for the "origin of signification," therefore, "has determined the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech."<sup>280</sup> On Husserl's concept of language, which is governed by an intuitionist theory of knowledge, Derrida argues that it "demonstrates that speech then is still fully legitimate speech," adhering to "[p]ure logical grammar, the pure morphology of significations, [which] must tell us *a priori* under what conditions a discourse can be a discourse, even if it makes no knowledge possible."<sup>281</sup> This is also where Derrida saw in Saussurean proposition<sup>282</sup> for a "linguistic value" not just a pure

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<sup>278</sup> See page 134, above, Chapter 2.

<sup>279</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, (tr.) Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 68.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>281</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, (tr.) Leonard Lawlor (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), p. 76.

<sup>282</sup> Note Roy Harris' visibly miffed critique on Derrida:

"Before [Ferdinand de] Saussure is never mentioned by name in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida is already discussing language and writing in Saussurean terms: *signe, significant, signifié, langue, parole*, etc. are straight away... assumed to belong to a vocabulary with which the reader is familiar and which therefore does not call for preliminary discussion or explanation."

Roy Harris, *Reading Saussure* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), p. 172.

geometry or an algebraic of language at work<sup>283</sup> but also the collusion of spatiality and temporality: “spacing,” which is “the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time,” or the “articulation of space and time.”<sup>284</sup> This is Derrida’s “dead time”—or *temporization*—or, to repeat, “becoming-time of space.”<sup>285</sup> “Arche-writing,” therein, is “dead time at work.” This is where the “constitution of the present” as an interval called “*spacing*” takes place, as Derrida refers elsewhere too, “as an ‘originary’ and irreducible nonsimple (and, therefore, *stricto sensu* nonoriginary) synthesis marks... [what] I propose to call arche-writing, arche-trace, or *différance*.”<sup>286</sup> The “(active) movement of (the production) of *différance* without origin,” therein is “*differentiation*,” which, again, “negate[s] the economic signification of the detour, the temporizing delay, ‘deferral’.”<sup>287</sup>

While invoking that *différance* “is neither a *word* nor a *concept*,” Derrida also brings in his critical debt to Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Levinas, and Heidegger.<sup>288</sup> Robert Bernasconi identifies Heidegger’s initial influence over Levinas on Derrida’s use of the term.<sup>289</sup> Levinas’ reading of Heidegger premises *Dasein* as an idealist subject and it is *via* from this where Derrida is said to have allegedly imported the notion of ontico-ontological difference. Marian Hobson also affirms this Heideggerian import and also admits that transcendentalism in

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<sup>283</sup> Given language as a form and its possibility rested in the totality of infinitely opposed difference, Saussure’s linguistic value (“grammatical fact”) finds allure in the exactitudes of algebraic operations. See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (tr.) Wade Baskin, (eds.) Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 120-122.

<sup>284</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>285</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>287</sup> Here, Derrida acknowledges the import of the notion of “*différance*” from Koyré’s reading of Hegel. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>288</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 130.

<sup>289</sup> Robert Bernasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida,” in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 13-29.

Derridean *grammatology* is definitely Husserl's, while also extending the influence from Saussure and Freud. In Saussure, Hobson refers to *differentiation* as "what gives rise to meaning within language" (language, negatively, only has differences).<sup>290</sup> In Freud's case, examining the message component in the translation from unconscious to conscious, Hobson argues that Derrida supervened time (*différer/deferral*) to situate life/meaning not as possibilities of elements but as "a trace or passage."<sup>291</sup> Similarly, while drawing comparisons between Derrida and Heidegger, Walter Brogan notes that Derrida's "*différance* is always more than the binding together and separating ["relational" aspects] which is the work of comparisons."<sup>292</sup> In fact, Derrida has assiduously defended his notion of *différance* from Heidegger's *difference* in *Speech and Phenomena*<sup>293</sup> and, aggressively, in *Of Grammatology*.<sup>294</sup> Brogan also points out that as early as the French edition of the essay "Différance," Derrida had inserted a footnote disclaiming its association with Heidegger's, which, nonetheless, was not continued in the English translations. If Derrida has been particularly troubled in differentiating his notion of *différance* as different from Heidegger's, Brogan's equally troubled insistence that the same neologism emanated as an inspiration from interrogating Heidegger's *Dasein* is more troublesome. For Heidegger, Brogan argues,

"otherness is an accessible otherness—an otherness with which *Dasein* dwells. *Dasein* is the being who can transcend the insurmountable gap which separates beings and Being. *Dasein* is the scene where this contradictory relation occurs. For Derrida, this contradiction need[s] to be radicalized and experienced as a contradiction... Heidegger crosses out

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<sup>290</sup> Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 10.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>292</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 132 and Walter A. Brogan, "The Original Difference" in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance*, op. cit., pp. 31-39, p. 31.

<sup>293</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., esp. p. 139, pp. 153-58.

<sup>294</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 23-24.

Being and thereby opens up a space for thinking the ontological difference.  
Derrida crosses out the ontological difference.”<sup>295</sup>

Therein, as Brogan further highlights, the “tracing within the text of metaphysics is an *effect*, a signature, of *différance* which is itself a self-erasing trace. *Différance* is a trace that no longer belongs to the horizon of Being. *Différance* is not the genesis—the *of* and *between* that govern the emergence of beings.”<sup>296</sup> Brogan’s claim—premised on Derrida’s version that “there is no essence of *différance*”—reiterates for a non-metaphysical definition since “metaphysical relations presuppose that there are already fixed entities and concepts which are then related.”<sup>297</sup> Similarly, Hobson’s claim implicates Derrida as integrating “Husserl’s idea of living present and Heidegger’s question of being with developments in linguistics.”<sup>298</sup> However, as we claimed in Chapter Two, Husserl remains the basic key to unlock Derrida’s derivation of the neology, and as posited in *Speech and Phenomena*, which clearly removes any confusion:

The living present, a concept that cannot be broken down into a subject and an attribute, is thus the conceptual foundation of phenomenology as metaphysics.

While everything that is *purely* thought in this concept is thereby determined as *ideality*, the living present is nevertheless in fact, really, effectively, etc., deferred *ad infinitum*. This *différance* is the difference between the ideal and the nonideal. Indeed, this is a proposition which could already have been verified at the start of [Husserl’s] *Logical Investigations*, from the point of view we are advancing. Thus, after having proposed an essential distinction between objective expressions and essentially subjective expressions, Husserl shows that absolute ideality can only be on the side of objective expressions.”<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Walter A. Brogan, “The Original Difference” op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., p. 31 & p. 39.

<sup>298</sup> Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>299</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., pp. 99-100. In original, ‘*différance*’.

Two contentions emerge in the reading Derrida's *différance*: the independent possibility for a "logicity of signification" and a "*logical a priori*" that is independent of "pure grammar"—which thereby "presupposes that we knew implicitly what 'being-for' means, in the sense of 'being-in-the-place-of'."<sup>300</sup> In both cases, which is already an analogous play of contradictions in logical paradoxes—as a question of "origin" and as a (re)presentation (or "becoming" *what is not*) of being's alterity<sup>301</sup>—the inverse problematic of temporality and language are consistently endemic. Martin Hägglund's recent work is a compelling lead in critiquing the engagement of temporality with what he challenges as "nothing less than a revision of the logic of identity."<sup>302</sup> Origin, for Hegel, as we examined in the preceding chapter, is tied to man's "consciousness of himself" through language, or specifically "speech."<sup>303</sup> For Rousseau's "zero degree or origin," as Derrida terms it, "language is born out of the process of its own degeneration,"<sup>304</sup> by hijacking or substituting the presence its own future origin, i.e., which, impossibly, is "[t]o speak before knowing how to speak."<sup>305</sup> Similarly, we also saw that the "development of language and the development of consciousness," which enables man to become "conscious of himself," or

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<sup>300</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

<sup>301</sup> Earlier, in *The Problem of Genesis*, Derrida had already outlined the contradictory perspectives on the concept of genesis:

"[T]wo contradictory meanings in its concept [of genesis]: one of origin, one of becoming. On the one hand, indeed, genesis is birth, absolute emergence of an instant, or of an 'instance' that cannot be reduced to the preceding instance, radicalness, creation, autonomy in relation to something other than itself; in brief, there is no genesis without absolute origin, originarity if it is envisaged ontologically or temporarily, originality if it is envisaged axiologically; any genetic production makes its appearance and takes on meaning by transcending what is not it."

See Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., p. xxi.

<sup>302</sup> Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life* (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 52.

<sup>303</sup> See footnote 85, Chapter 1.

<sup>304</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 242.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

according to Nietzsche, “go hand in hand.”<sup>306</sup> Derrida’s critique on Husserl is on the basis that the “consciousness of being-in-community [intersubjectivity] in one and the same world [that] establishes the possibility of a universal language.”<sup>307</sup> Therefore—post-Greeks via Hegel-Rousseau-Nietzsche through Husserl-Heidegger—Derrida’s attempt to debunk the “fiction of the origin”<sup>308</sup> is more or less settled as neat, although unstable. What continues to be interesting is why the question of origin is in itself so pervasive (which is not another way of putting it as privileging, which Derrida himself was consistently doing so) within the body of thinking or expression. What needs to be put into perspective here is the resistance to mimesis in language, being, consciousness and temporality, in no particular order or specific hierarchy, unlike Kant’s naughty hallmark of contradistinction or Hegel’s submission to the limits.<sup>309</sup> As an interlocutor on the physics of reason, where knowledge is previously a matter as well as a substance, Derrida was therefore wary on how foundational methods may be legitimized or formalized and, also, on whether ontology can be actually exposed to rules of discernability, given its fluidity and instability. The task will remain in reworking “metphysico-theological roots”—between numbers and figures, between totality and nullity, between the intelligible and the sensible.<sup>310</sup> The

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<sup>306</sup> See footnote 124, Chapter 1.

<sup>307</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, (tr.) John P. Leavey (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, [1978] 1989), p. 79.

<sup>308</sup> As Derrida argues in “The Time before first,”

“Any statements about the pre-beginning, about the fiction of the origin, about the indeterminacy of the seminal imperfect into which the pluperfect of some event without a date, of some immemorial birth, is inserted (‘something had begun...’) cannot themselves escape the rule they set forth.” (p. 335)

“All oppositions based on the distinction between the original and the derived, the simple and the repeated, the first and the second, etc., lose their pertinence from the moment everything ‘begins’ by following a vestige. *I.e.* a certain repetition or text.” (p. 330)

Refer “The Time before first,” in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, *op. cit.*

<sup>309</sup> Gary Dorrien, *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

<sup>310</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

“analogy” of *différance*, then, is Derrida’s conception of *presence*, rather than *origin*. It is in the violence of presence as temporal versus presence as *temporalization of sense*.<sup>311</sup> “Presence as violence,” Derrida argues, “is the meaning of finitude, the meaning of meaning as history.”<sup>312</sup> The “meaning of being,” which is *presence*, is co-dependent and coterminous on the “historical sequences.”<sup>313</sup> The notion of an experienceable past, a cognitive history, of presenting a substance or consciousness, Derrida concludes,<sup>314</sup> which is constituted within its own “transcendentality,”<sup>315</sup> is therefore simply “impossible-unthinkable-unstatable [unsayable].”<sup>316</sup>

Also, to make a brief remark here—consequent to the development of *différance* as a temporal sequence, Derrida will subsequently compound the twining of ‘defer’ and ‘differ’ into a radical conceptual philosophy. Derrida’s suspicion of “all the concepts of metaphysics”<sup>317</sup> is therefore justified, and necessary to, in his project of critiquing western metaphysics. He talks about “the systematic interdependence of the concepts”<sup>318</sup> that has eventually taken the

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<sup>311</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>312</sup> Derrida says:

“If the living present. The absolute form of the opening of time to the other in itself, is the absolute form of egological life, and if egoity is the absolute form of experience, then the present, the presence of the present, and the present of presence, are all originally and forever violent.”

Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., pp. 79-153, p. 133.

<sup>313</sup> Such is also the logocentric tradition of western metaphysics, what Derrida remarks as the “historical consequences” where *presence* is coterminous to substance, essence, existence, or *eidōs* [form], or the now [*nun*].

Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>314</sup> Refer Chapter 2 where we have argued that Gödel’s mathematical undecidable allowed Derrida to also easily debunk the impossible, by engaging such quasi-mathematical equations.

<sup>315</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>316</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” op. cit., pp. 79-153, p. 132.

<sup>317</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.



epistemological totality of an objective expression, like Husserl's, while integrating the same into subjective expressions. Derrida commensurate this position by affirming that there is "nothing outside the text," which is based on a non-sense that "the generalized graphics has always already begun, is always grafted on to a 'prior' writing."<sup>319</sup> Gayle Ormiston notes that the "motif of *différance*, when marked by a silent *a*, in effect plays neither the role of a 'concept', nor simply of a 'word' ... This does not prevent it from producing conceptual effects and verbal or nominal concretions."<sup>320</sup> The radicalization of concepts is largely aimed at a thematic deconstruction of how we think, how concepts-in-itself are transient carriers of virulent meanings and idealities. Let us review how Derrida engineers *différance*, which is self-explanatory:

First, *différance* is therefore capable of producing:<sup>321</sup>

- conceptual effects
- verbal concretions
- nominal concretions

Second, *différance*—

- has "unlimited power of perversion and subversion"<sup>322</sup>
- "is a betrayal of *Aufhebung*"<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> Jacques Derrida, "The Double Session," in *Dissemination*, op. cit., p. 328.

<sup>320</sup> Gayle L. Ormiston, "The Economy of Duplicity: *Différance*," in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance*, op. cit., pp. 41-50, pp. 41.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid. p. 41

<sup>322</sup> See Jacques Derrida, "Ellipsis," *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 296.

<sup>323</sup> Derrida's commentary on Hegel's *Aufhebung*:

"Since the ontological question (what is this? what is? what does being mean (to say) and so on) unfolds itself here only according to process and structure of *Aufhebung*, cofounds itself with the absolute of *Aufhebung*, one can no longer ask: what is the *Aufhebung*? as one would ask: what is this or that? Or, what is the determination of such and such a particular concept? Being is *Aufhebung*. *Aufhebung* is being, not as a determinate state or like the determinable totality of beings, but as

Third, *différance*—

- “gives life”
- “gives death”<sup>324</sup>

Fourth, *différance* is:

- “not present being”<sup>325</sup>
- is the “primordial nonself-presence”<sup>326</sup>

Fifth, *différance* is:

- “certainly but the historical and epochal *unfolding* of Being or of the ontological difference. The *a* of *différance* marks the *movement* of this unfolding.”<sup>327</sup>
  - “older”<sup>328</sup> [ also, refer, “more originary”], “has never been present to itself.”<sup>329</sup>

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the ‘active’, productive essence of being. So the *Aufhebung* cannot form the *object* of any determined question. We are continually referred back to this, but that reference refers to nothing determinable.”

Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, (trs.) John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 34.

<sup>324</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Living On: Border Lines,” (tr.) James Hulbert, in Harold Bloom et. al (eds.), *Deconstruction and Criticism* (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 75-176, p. 116.

<sup>325</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>326</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Voice That Keeps Silence.” *Ibid.*, pp. 70-87, p. 82.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>328</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Voice That Keeps Silence,” in *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>329</sup> Observe how Derrida circumvent the impossible re-presentation of presentation:

“[W]e no longer know whether what was always presented as a derived and modified re-presentation of simple presentation, as ‘supplement’, ‘sign’, ‘writing’, or ‘trace’ ‘is’ not, in a necessarily, but newly, ahistorical sense, ‘older’ than presence and the system of truth, older than ‘history’. Or again, whether it is ‘older’ than sense and the senses: older than the primordial dator intuition, older than the present and full perception of the ‘thing itself’, older than seeing, hearing, and touching, even prior to the distinction between their ‘sensible’ literalness and their

- Sixth,
- “Differance—*arrêt de mort* or triumph of life—defers (differs like) the narrative of (from) writing.”<sup>330</sup>
  - Difference is “the necessary interval... the ‘lapse of time’”<sup>331</sup>
  - “Differance is therefore the formation of form... the being-imprinted of the imprint”<sup>332</sup>

Excepting the first, the rest (two to sixth) are Derrida’s own description of *différance*. Derridean economy of *différance*, as shown above, is also not built around a singular theme. Rather, there is a pattern in the objectivation of *différance*: as a critique (of metaphysics of presence and epistemology of origin), as a system (that is, as a conceptual repertoire or a subversive and deconstructive tool) and, most importantly, as a temporal philosophy of eschatology (stemming from consistent attacks on Husserl’s “living”). Of course, that is, notwithstanding, how, Derrida, by 1968, has clearly stated the functional and historical idea behind “*différance*,” through an essay devoted on the same topic: “*it is the determination of being as presence or as beingness that is*

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metaphorical elaboration staged throughout the history of philosophy. We therefore no longer know whether what has always been reduced and abased as an accident, modification, and re-turn, under the old names of ‘sign’ and ‘re-presentation’, has not repressed that which related truth to its own death as it related it to its origin. We no longer know whether the force of the *Vergegenwartigung* [re-presentation], in which the *Gegenwartigung* [presentation] is de-presented so as to be re-presented as such, whether the repetitive force of the living present, which is re-presented in a *supplement*, because it has never been present to itself, or whether what we call with the old names of force and *différance* is not more ‘ancient’ than what is ‘primordial’.”

Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of Origin,” in *Speech and Phenomena*, o. cit., pp. 88-104, p. 103.

<sup>330</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Living On: Border Lines,” o. cit., p. 136.

<sup>331</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, o. cit., p. 277.

<sup>332</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, o. cit., p. 63.

*interrogated by the thought of différance.*"<sup>333</sup> To recollect, this is also Derrida's central critique on Husserl's temporality; on the latter's claim that the "omnitemporality of ideal objects is but a mode of temporality."<sup>334</sup> It implies a pure auto-affection of an agency, i.e., the "primal impression,"<sup>335</sup> which, in another term, is a living subjectivity totally in pure harmony within a "pre-expressive lived-experience."<sup>336</sup> It provokes two interconnected connotations: issues of identity<sup>337</sup> and [its subservience to] time.<sup>338</sup> First, in short, Derrida's *différance* proposes that it is impossible to experience (actually, self-experience) the living or being-alive, simply on the technicalities of time. Time, for Derrida, is not well defined. Time is a metaphor, and is arrived at using the same as an analogy. In the history of metaphysics, says Derrida, the idea of "time" enjoys the status of a "metaphor"—and, therefore, "a metaphor which *at the same time* both indicates and dissimulates the 'movement' of auto-affection."<sup>339</sup> Auto-affection, here, for Derrida, does *not* imply "a modality of experience characterizing a being

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<sup>333</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 21. Italics, mine.

<sup>334</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 83. Also, see, footnote 66, Chapter Two.

<sup>335</sup> Also, "primal source," which is Husserl's term. See Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>336</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p.71.

<sup>337</sup> This is in light of notwithstanding the categorical markers reminded by Claire Colebrook that distinction need to be maintained between *difference* ("the relation between two terms or identities") and *différance* ("the problem of the relation between identity and difference"). See "Difference," in Zeynep Direk and Leonard Lawlor (eds.), *A Companion to Derrida* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014), pp. 58-71.

<sup>338</sup> Refer Derrida's comment:

"The existence of any genesis seems to have this tension between a transcendence and an immanence as its sense and direction. It is given at first both as ontologically and temporally indefinite and as absolute beginning, as continuity and discontinuity, identity and alterity. This dialectic (at least that is the idea on which we want to throw light in this work) is at the same time the possibility of a continuity of continuity and discontinuity, of an identity of identity and alterity, and so forth."

Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis*, op. cit., pp. xxi-xxii.

<sup>339</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 83.

which would already be itself (*autos*). It produces the same as relation to oneself within the difference from oneself, the same as the non-identical.”<sup>340</sup> We see this too in the musical works of Gustave Mahler’s Fourth Symphony—where the negative dissolution of individuation (like “germinal cells”) reintegrates and reproduces its own individuality, like splitting atoms. Derrida’s strong rejection of Husserl therein is consistent with our second observation—“temporality is never the real predicate of being.”<sup>341</sup> Peter Dews<sup>342</sup> identifies that both in *Speech and Phenomena* and “The Double Session,” Derrida explicitly equates “différance within auto-affection,” i.e., with the “identity of identity and non-identity,”<sup>343</sup> and, similarly, abolishes “the difference between difference and nondifference,”<sup>344</sup> especially in the analysis of the “hymen” (“the spacing between desire and fulfillment”) in Mallarmé.<sup>345</sup> How then is it possible to have a consciousness of non-identity or, strictly speaking, is it possible to even have a consciousness of difference, that is, to even think of a self-identity? From a history of consciousness that is not even a sense, that is non-sense, how does one derive

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<sup>340</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of Origin.” *Ibid.*, pp. 88-104, p. 92.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>342</sup> Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London; New York: Verso, 1987).

<sup>343</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>344</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>345</sup> To repeat, says Derrida, the “hymen” is:

[T]he confusion between the present and the nonpresent, along with all the indifferences it entails within the whole series of opposites (perception/nonperception, memory/image, memory/ desire, etc.), produces the effect of a medium (a medium as element enveloping both terms at once; a medium located between the two terms). It is an operation that *both* sows confusion *between* opposites *and* stands between the opposites ‘at once’. What counts here is the between, the in-between-ness of the hymen. The hymen ‘takes place’ in the ‘inter-,’ in the spacing between desire and fulfillment, between perpetration and its recollection. But this medium of the *entre* has nothing to do with a center.”

*Ibid.*, esp. pp. 211-12..

(or “not give way”<sup>346</sup>) to another *sense*? The un-decidable and the impossible then became the obvious!

Sense, or “concepts of sense,” as Derrida identifies, include “ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception, and expression.”<sup>347</sup> He also implicates that their “common matrix is being as *presence*: the absolute proximity of self-identity, the being-in-front of the object available for repetition, the maintenance of the temporal present, whose ideal form is the self-presence of transcendental *life*, whose ideal identity allows *idealiter* of infinite repetition.”<sup>348</sup> It is only in the “concept of *différance*,” says Derrida in a 1968 interview, where these concept-sense-bearing identities “become non-pertinent”—by dissolving “all these metaphysical oppositions (signifier/signified; sensible/intelligible; writing/speech; parole/langue; diachrony/synchrony; space/ time; passivity/activity; etc.).”<sup>349</sup> Let us also return to the notion of “ad infinitum,” when Derrida asserts: “the living present is nevertheless in fact, really, effectively, etc., deferred *ad infinitum*. This *différance* is the difference between the ideal and the nonideal.”<sup>350</sup> Also, Husserl’s “living present,” which Derrida generously confers to it as an embodiment of all western metaphysics, represents “a concept that cannot be broken down into a subject and an attribute, is thus the conceptual foundation of phenomenology as metaphysics.”<sup>351</sup> Deduced from the above observations, three pertinent issues

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<sup>346</sup> Obviously, given the strictures, Derrida answer is the “un-decidable.” But, then, it also has to follow its own circumventing:

“Thus, undecidability has a revolutionary and disconcerting sense, it is *itself* only if it remains essentially and intrinsically haunted in its sense of origin by the *telos* of decidability—whose disruption it marks.”

See Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl*, op. cit., p. 53, esp. footnote 48.

<sup>347</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p. 99, and, also, parallel arguments in Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>349</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Semiology and Grammatology,” *Positions*, op. cit., pp. 17-23, p. 29

<sup>350</sup> See, footnote 299, above, for full quote—that the “*différance* is the difference between the ideal and the nonideal.”

<sup>351</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 99.

can be highlighted: first, Derrida's understanding of and usage of "concept" is non-problematizing—it is inscribed within the system of ordinary language; two, given that there is a close accusatory tone with the stabilization of concepts that have come to take the place of stable metaphors, thereby acquiring meaning and sense, idealities and identities in themselves (in the name, i.e., in the concept)—the call for a radical and revolutionary inventory of "new names,"<sup>352</sup> or new concepts, in our measure, therefore, which, at another level, also, implies a rapture for radical identity from an authentic or ideal identity<sup>353</sup> and, finally, third, the metaphysics of concepts is equitable with the metaphysics of presence, insofar as the living present is engaged within the montage of "concepts of sense." Derrida's engagement and challenge of the double-bind concept-sense rather than an interrogation of ontological methods follows a double gesture trick of an analogy (Derridean syntax,<sup>354</sup> in Marian Hobson's analysis). This

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<sup>352</sup> The categorical re-visitation of the semantic-linguistic is pertinent to Reinhart Koselleck's works. Derrida is taking no exceptional approach here:

"In order to conceive of this age, in order to 'speak' about it, we will have to have other names than those of sign or re- presentation. New names indeed will have to be used if we are to conceive as 'normal' and preprimordial what Husserl believed he could isolate as a particular and accidental experience, something dependent and secondary—that is, the indefinite drift of signs, as errance and change of scene (*Verwandlung*), linking re-presentations (*Vergegeniudrtigungen*) one to another without beginning or end. There never was any 'perception'; and 'presentation' is a representation of the representation that yearns for itself therein as for its own birth or its death."

Jacques Derrida, "The Supplement of Origin," in *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., pp. 88-104, p. 103.

<sup>353</sup> For a comment coming from the background of the "Cambridge Affair," see Thomas Baldwin, "Presence, truth and authenticity," in Simon Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone (eds.), *Derrida's Legacies: Literature and Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 107-117.

<sup>354</sup> Hobson's comments, like couple of others too, attempt to re-turn to Derrida's critique (metaphysics of presence) by soberly looking at how the textual is engineered rather than the context. On such count, it is therefore interesting not to overlook such remarks:

"This 'syntax' has been on occasions acknowledged by Derrida quite explicitly (he says, for instance, of his own work on the word 'idea', that he refuses to choose between 'perfectly closed systematic structures' and a 'transcendental

pattern in general is seen as creating confusion about *différance* as a “nonrepresentable principle of representation.”<sup>355</sup> A Derridean ‘syntax’, says Hobson, is:

“[A] form of argument which is articulated by philosophical terms acting in relation to their distribution, that is, as functions rather than as lexemes, and which, as does syntax, conveys a form of meaning which is not lexical, but structural. The piece of ‘syntax’ [in Derridean *oeuvre*] articulates philosophy with history of philosophy; it articulates a set of problems considered as a system and separable from their historical circumstance, with history as a complex succession of interdependent effects, events, or moments; or it sets off different values of ‘transcendence’ (according to the context he is working in, Husserlian or Heideggerian and occasionally Kantian) against ‘history’.”<sup>356</sup>

Hobson’s analysis may appear that it is a discourse trick of ‘philosophy against philosophy’ rather than analogy. Derrida’s analogy of the syntax, one recalls, is strictly an issue of displacement. Along with syntax, it includes other consensus like effects of language, or writing—which were never accessory to, as opposed to Hobson’s argument, “the dialectical overturning of a concept (signified).”<sup>357</sup> A dialectical approach would entail an end or beginning of philosophy. Derrida rescues this, based on his reading of the hymen in Mallarmé,<sup>358</sup> who, thoughtfully, “has marked [the] syntax at the point of its

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history of philosophy’, that is between viewing a system internally, so that its elements relate primarily to each other, and, on the other hand, moving beyond the patterns of specific systems, and constructing a history which works at a different level).”

Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>355</sup> Irene E. Harvey, *Derrida and the Economy of Différance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 203.

<sup>356</sup> Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>357</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, op. cit., esp. p. 211.

<sup>358</sup> See, above, footnote 345, on the “confusion between the present and the nonpresent” in *hymen*.



sterility, or rather, at the point that will soon, provisionally, *analogically*, be called the undecidable.”<sup>359</sup> Here, we are dealing with two issues simultaneously (if not analogously). First is “the historial ambiguity of the word appearance... which is neither synthetic nor redundant... *under the false appearance of a present.*”<sup>360</sup> The semantic primacy, and therein the organic conceptual, is contested. Second, Derrida’s concept of “re-mark,” like how Mallarmé marked the syntax, therein, obfuscates “the irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic.”<sup>361</sup> “The decisive, [the] undecidable ambiguity of the syntax of ‘any more’ [*plus de*],” then, says Derrida, represents “both supplement and lack.”<sup>362</sup>

The semantic value of the concept, like Derrida’s view on Saussurean ‘linguistic value’, has never been a casualty. For instance, Derrida has strongly defended that “there is no such thing as a ‘metaphysical concept’.”<sup>363</sup> At the same time, Derrida also insists that “differance remains a metaphysical name.”<sup>364</sup> Duplicitous of Marian Hobson, but on a more direct scale, Vernon Cisney too interprets Derrida’s view on language as “a war of language against itself,” as is the case with Husserl, who “use[s] language in order to subvert language,” which, means to say, “exclude language in its entirety from the purity of meaning.”<sup>365</sup> But this is not a fair comment—because, even as a basic indication, the engagement of language is rule governed whereas the rule is not governed by language to be called a language. Paradoxically, given that there is a troubled

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<sup>359</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, op. cit., esp. pp. 211-12. Italics, mine.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>361</sup> One might as well link this Derridean position as a summation of Gödel:

“The hymen must be determined through the *entre* and not the other way around. The hymen in the text... is inscribed at the very tip if this indecision. This tip advances according to the irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic.”

Ibid., esp. pp. 220-21.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., p.. 274.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>364</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>365</sup> Vernon W. Cisney, *Derrida’s Voice and Phenomenon: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2014), p. 67.

thought and a need to clarify, Derrida's opening lines in *Of Grammatology* clearly states and attempts to highlight "the problem of language."<sup>366</sup> "If language never escapes from analogy, even if it is analogy through and through, it must, having reached this point, and at this very point," " Derrida will continue to argue, "freely take up its own destruction and cast metaphors against metaphors."<sup>367</sup>

On a note on analogy, let us take a brief foray here. The constants and translations of opposition between the proper and the figurative betray Derrida's reckless but subtle use of the word "analogy."<sup>368</sup> Of course, Derrida is familiar with how Aristotle treats analogy as "metaphor par excellence,"<sup>369</sup> which originally came via the Arabs. By then Greek mathematical notions like ratio and proportion (of Euclidean derivatives) were already in circulation. Thomas Aquinas extended these "mathematical meaning to terms outside the category of

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<sup>366</sup> Derrida says:

"[T]he problem of language has never been simply one problem among others. But never as much as at present has it invaded, as such, the global horizon of the most diverse researches and the most heterogeneous discourses, diverse and heterogeneous in their intention, method, and ideology. The devaluation of the word 'language' itself ... are evidences of this effect. This inflation of the sign 'language' is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself. ... It indicates, as if in spite of itself, that a historico-metaphysical epoch *must* finally determine as language the totality of its problematic horizon. It must do so not only because all that desire had wished to wrest from the play of language finds itself recaptured within that play but also because, for the same reason, language itself is menaced in its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness, brought back to its own finitude at the very moment when its limits seem to disappear, when it ceases to be self-assured, contained, and *guaranteed* by the infinite signified which seemed to exceed it."

Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 6. Italics, in original.

<sup>367</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>368</sup> See Eve Tavor Bannet, "Analogy as Translation: Wittgenstein, Derrida, and the Law of Language," in *New Literary History*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1997, pp. 655-672. Also, see Geoffrey Bennington, "Metaphor and Analogy in Derrida," in Zeynep Birek and Leonard Lawlor (eds.), *A Companion to Derrida*, op. cit., pp. 89-104.

<sup>369</sup> Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 207-71, p. 242.

quantity,”<sup>370</sup> and gave a new outlook on analogy.<sup>371</sup> In the medieval context, analogy became an integral complexity of reference with the theological community.<sup>372</sup> “Analogy,” George Polya (1954) interjects a definition, “is a sort of similarity.” It “treads on less solid ground,” and yet exudes “a more definite and more conceptual level,” purportedly to give the subjective (“intentions of the thinker”) an expressive and accurate articulation. Two *systems* are said to be analogous or stand as a ‘clarified analogy’, therefore, “if they *agree in clearly definable relations to their respective parts.*”<sup>373</sup> But that is a mathematical ratio—does Derrida’s use of analogy sustains the precepts of the traditional truth or, is it based on probabilities?<sup>374</sup>

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<sup>370</sup> Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*, (tr.) E.M. Micierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), p. 97, note 23.

<sup>371</sup> For Aquinas, Bernard Montagnes highlights, the “vocabulary of analogy in the *De principiis naturae* is constituted principally of the following terms: 1) Analogia; 2) *Attributio* ; 3) *Proportio* ; 4) *Per prius et posterius*. —1) The term analogia is taken in two different meanings, first, that of proportion in the mathematical sense, and then that of relation to the primary instance (the latter becoming the principal meaning). —2) This relative meaning of the term analogia is also expressed by the terms *attribui* and *attributio* which came from the Arabic-Latin version of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. To translate proportional unity, the most appropriate term is *proportio*, but sometimes this term serves to designate a relation and is taken as a synonym for *attributio*.”

Ibid., p. 49, note 16.

<sup>372</sup> Battista Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1963).

<sup>373</sup> George Polya, *Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Volume I of Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 13.

<sup>374</sup> On the value of induction and analogy, Pierre-Simon says:

“[N]early our knowledge is problematical; and in the small number of things which we are able to know with certainty, even in the mathematical sciences, our principal means for ascertaining truth—induction and analogy—are based on probabilities.”

Reference is sourced from Marquis de Laplace Pierre-Simon, *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, (trs.) F.W. Truscott and F.L. Emory (New York: Cosimo Classics, [1901] 2007), p. 2. A better and recent translation from the French is *Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, (tr.) Andrew I. Dale (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995).

Derrida explicitly uses analogy in Benjamin's "finality" ("a justice of ends that is no longer tied to the possibility of law") versus the "universalization of law"<sup>375</sup> as an "analogy between 'the undecidability' of all the problems of law' and what happens in a nascent language in which it is impossible to make a clear, convincing, determinant decision between true and false, right and wrong."<sup>376</sup> Michael Naas also argues that Derrida shuttles from the analogical to the anagrammatical.<sup>377</sup> Naas's intervention bases analogy as 'a structure of resemblances' irreducible to 'a common meaning'—but appearing as "an irreducible anagram that at once opens up... the condition of possibility and impossibility of all analogy."<sup>378</sup> Two compelling works are available on Derrida's analogy. First, Kas Saghafi<sup>379</sup> extensively traces Derrida's textual use of analogy in the construction of identity and alterity, thereby revisits the works on Emmanuel Levinas, in particular. Saghafi argues that Derrida never explored beyond Levinas' use of the "scholastic" notion of analogy and, therefore, the ipseitous excurses on Descartes or Husserl reflects *analogical appresentation*. By picking on some of Derrida's choicest aporia, i.e., impossible relations ("a relation without relation to any other relation") or impossible alterity ("can only present itself *as other*, never presencing itself")—Saghafi questions Derrida's aporetic analogy of alterity ("ana-onto-logy"<sup>380</sup>), since Levinas himself had previously admitted to the ontologically non-totalizable *Autrui*. Second, Geoffrey

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<sup>375</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" (tr.) M. Quaintance, in *Acts of Religion*, (ed.) Gil Anidjar (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 228-298, p. 286.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

<sup>377</sup> Naas circulatory reference alludes to "a language where what is essential is the signified to a text where the sign is at once signifier and signified, where the signifier, the *grammê*, is irreducible to the signified." See Michael Naas, *Jacques Derrida: From Now On* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), esp. Chapter 2, "Analogy and Anagram: Deconstruction as Deconstruction of the *as*," pp. 37-67, p. 44.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45. Esp., Chapter 2, "Analogy and Anagram: Deconstruction as Deconstruction of the *as*," pp. 37-67.

<sup>379</sup> Kas Saghafi, "'An Almost Unheard-of Analogy': Derrida Reading Levinas," in *Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2005, pp. 41-71.

<sup>380</sup> Derrida's term, implying or having the value of "*as*" or "*as such*."

Bennington's argument stems from Saghafi's—by poorly centralizing a reference that was not mentioned (i.e., Pierre Aubenque).<sup>381</sup> Bennington's only merit remains in arguing Derrida's use of analogy (or, metaphor) as a “means of access to thinking situation.”<sup>382</sup>

Coming back to *différance*—Derrida's affirmation that “there cannot be a science of *différance*”—analogically, therein, overturns an equivalent statement that “it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence.”<sup>383</sup> Such plays are, by now, no longer occasional! Origin, for Derrida, is always “origin-heterogeneous.”<sup>384</sup> The play of origin and nonorigin are rooted in the same problematic of temporal impossibilities, a non-binding difference notwithstanding its pronounced analogy of *anachronism*.<sup>385</sup> For, “there is no absolute origin of the sense in general” but, rather, it is in the “trace,” which is “the *différance*” that “opens appearance and signification” (and, mark here, *no concept of metaphysics can describe the trace*).<sup>386</sup> The notion of *différance*, Derrida ambiguously proposes, is both a “formation of form” and also “the being-imprinted of the imprint,”<sup>387</sup> which, but, refers back to the trace. The enigmatic

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<sup>381</sup> Geoffrey Bennington, “Metaphor and Analogy in Derrida,” op. cit. Esp., see, footnote 5, p. 103.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>383</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>384</sup> Three senses are implied here [quoted, in full]:

- (1) heterogeneous from the origin, originally heterogeneous;
- (2) heterogeneous with respect to what is called the origin, other than the origin and irreducible to it;
- (3) heterogeneous *and* or *insofar as* at the origin, origin-heterogeneous because at the origin of the origin.

Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, (trs.) Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, [1989] 1991), pp. 107-08.

<sup>385</sup> Quoting Shakespeare's Hamlet, Derrida's anachronism refers “time is out of joint,” meaning it “would still be determinable.” Jacques Derrida, *Specter of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, (tr.) Peggy Kamuf (London and New York: Routledge, [1994] 2006), p.1.

<sup>386</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

“trace,” which is a Levinasian import, is “a past that has never been present,” as Derrida announces it, and, therefore, it cannot “incommensurate with that of retention, that of becoming-past of what had been present.”<sup>388</sup> Or, forget about the past, the “trace cannot be conceived on the basis of either the present or the presence of the present.”<sup>389</sup> In “*Ousia and Grammê*,” Derrida highlights,

“[The] now is given simultaneously as that which is *no longer* and as that which is *not yet*. It is what it is not, and is not what it is... Thereby time is *composed* of non-beings. Now, that which bears within it a certain *no-thing*, that which accommodates nonbeingness, cannot participate in presence, in substance, in *beingness* itself (*ousia*).”<sup>390</sup>

Critics like Levi Bryant views that Derrida’s time (non-beings) “assimilates substances, things, to presence” and therefore “substance” is treated as synonymous for “presence, such that to speak of substance is to speak of presence and to speak of presence is to speak of substance.”<sup>391</sup> Peter Dews accuses the “metaphysical dogmatism”<sup>392</sup> of Derrida’s as “offering us a philosophy of *différance* as the absolute,”<sup>393</sup> as “an essential *logical priority* of non identity over identity.”<sup>394</sup> The frustration of Derrida’s detractors is often contained in the inability to transcend or translate the event itself. Therein, the

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<sup>388</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op.cit., p. 152.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>390</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

<sup>391</sup> See Levi R. Bryant, “The Time of the Object: Derrida, Luhmann and the Processual Nature of Substances,” in Roland Faber and Andrew Goffey (eds.), *The Allure of Things: Process and Object in Contemporary Philosophy* (London; New Delhi; New York; Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 71-91, esp. p. 71.

<sup>392</sup> Here, to be noted is Peter Dews conclusion based on a parallel reading of Schelling’s critique of Fichte with Derrida’s on Husserl—by centralizing Schelling’s “the absolute *I* is ascertained as *that which can never become an object at all*”—implying, as Dews argues, that “finitude and discursivity of thought renders it *in principle* incapable of attaining the absolute” since “the absolute is unknowable, then the task of philosophy becomes nothing other than the explication of this unknowability itself.” Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration*, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid., p. 27

aporia (the irreducible *différance*, or the irreducible arche structure) is easily concluded as a paradox of impossibility: one, in the temporality of the event that is impossible and, second, in the attempt to enforce a relation between the double binds of temporality. One is clear here, for Derrida is not confused. When he argues for a relation-that-is-not-a-relation, there is no interjection of temporality or the temporal into sense as an intervention or interval. Badiou bridges this gap into the kairological, which was never even the intent of Derrida.<sup>395</sup> Similarly, Derrida's concept of "non-presence,"<sup>396</sup> hopelessly, should have either ways eliminated any confusion.

One can argue that *différance* sets apart Derrida's own critique on "the philosophy of presence,"<sup>397</sup> while his thoughts envisage two different notions of temporality, which can be articulated in the *trace* (or, *gramme*) and the *future anterior*. (This should not be however strictly constructed, nonetheless, inasmuch as the reading here is inadequate to elaborate). It is the latter which has appropriately received more attention than the notion of trace. For Derrida, the "*trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general.*"<sup>398</sup> The trace therein is neither mutative time nor mythic time, but not definitely empty time. Further, "*the trace is the difference which opens appearance [l'apparaître] and signification.*"<sup>399</sup> However, as cited earlier, Derrida is quick to clarify that "*no concept of metaphysics can describe [the trace].*"<sup>400</sup> Therein, the trace is the non-

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<sup>395</sup> Antonio Calcagno, *Badiou and Derrida: Politics, Events and Their Time* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), esp. conclusion chapter: "Filling the aporia that is politics," pp. 98-109.

<sup>396</sup> Derrida says: "The [Kantian] idea is the pole of a pure intention, empty of every determinate object. It alone reveals, then, the being of the intention: intentionality itself."

<sup>397</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid., p. 65. Italics, original.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid., p. 65. Italics, original.

<sup>400</sup> Jacques Derrida says,

The trace is "origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, . . . is no more ideal than real, no more intelligible than sensible, no more transparent signification than an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it."

conceptual, the non-linguistic, the non-language, and (is it?) the non-metaphysical too. It is also the non-originary, the alterity of both origin and absolute origin. Given such ambivalence, one could possibly ask: where does the *trace* reside? Derrida implies that it permanently escapes residency in human intuition or consciousness—the trace is “absolutely” “‘anterior’ to all *physiological* problematics.”<sup>401</sup> Derrida’s temporal trace cannot be captured, as in the sense of a sensibility that is already temporal, least to talk mention physical time. The trace “is *a fortiori* anterior to the distinction between regions of sensibility, anterior to sound as much as to light”<sup>402</sup> At another level, the trace defines the “eschatological character of experience.”<sup>403</sup> The trace is the dead drive, the force.

Second, Derrida mentions “future anterior” across a wide range of discussions,<sup>404</sup> which confirms its employment as a stable operation of a concept. Although the same phrase was used paradigmatically to question different issues, the “future anterior” is retrospective to the temporality that is irreducible to the metaphysics of presence. In *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud*, Derrida uses an equivalent—i.e., “future perfect”—to describe its (*art*, here) non-compatibility with “representation, reappropriation, reintegration, transposition, or figurative translation of the same.”<sup>405</sup> The future anterior therein is the “the last ruse of presentations.”<sup>406</sup> Or, what Derrida also calls the

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Ibid., p. 65. Italics, original.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>402</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>403</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>404</sup> Derek Attridge’s reference has been helpful in identifying the use of “future anterior” in Derrida’s works. See “Art of the Impossible?,” in Martin McQuillan (ed.), *The Politics of Deconstruction: Jacques Derrida and the Other of Philosophy* (London; Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 54-65.

<sup>405</sup> Jacques Derrida & Paule Thévenin, *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud*, (tr.), Mary Ann Caws (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 116.

<sup>406</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, *Jacques Derrida*, (tr.) Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 1-315, p. 140.



“moment of separation,” the *secret*, the *partition* and *parturition*.<sup>407</sup> In his tribute to Louis Marin (but also expanding on to the works of Leon Battista Alberti), Derrida gives the most definitive view on future anterior:

“Louis not only saw death coming, as we all see it coming without seeing it, as we all expect it without expecting it. He approached death, which approached him, more and more quickly; he approached it in preceding it, and anticipated it with these images and glosses, for which the grammar of the future anterior no doubt does not suffice to convey their force and time, their tense. The future anterior is still a simplistic modalization of a fundamental present or representation; simplistic because still too simple to be able to translate the strange temporality that here gives its force to the mourning affect of which we are speaking.”<sup>408</sup>

This “strange temporality” that transgresses the simplistic modalities of physical time has two complementary movements—an inevitability (*will*, as different from probability) that is not commensurable by a linearity, progression, or even going back, and a *force* that accelerates or facilitates. This explanation becomes clearer when Derrida returns again to Lacan—although we have not included here the reasons why— and this re-visitation allows a spectral view on how temporality is engaged not only in philosophy but also in philosophizing. Readers by now are familiar with Derrida’s *envois*—illustrated at length in *The Postcard*<sup>409</sup>—a differential temporal between retro love letters “left unclaimed” and “destined.” Derrida brings back an old term “destinerrance”<sup>410</sup> to interrogate

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<sup>407</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud*, op. cit., p. 148.

<sup>408</sup> Jacques Derrida, “By Force of Mourning,” (trs.) Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, in Jay Williams (ed.), *Signature Derrida* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), pp. 326-49, p. 342.

<sup>409</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Postcard: From Freud and Beyond*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 1-256.

<sup>410</sup> The equivalent definition will be:

“It inflicts an internal drift on the destination of the letter, from which it may never return, but to which we will have to return.”

“[w]hat happens to the *with between two* when there is chiasmus, the after-the-fact of the future anterior, and chiasmatic invagination?”<sup>411</sup> Except the “promise,” therefore, as Derrida responds, the “question of knowing *whether or not there is*”—which is simply deconstruction at work, i.e., “incalculable, unimaginable, unaccountable, or unattributable”—is *the experience of the impossible* (“there is”) itself, displaced by a force of *as if by itself*.<sup>412</sup> In charting Derrida’s answer with *destinerrance*, as is the purpose of the return to Lacan, we can therefore identify the chiasmus (paradoxical criss-crossing) involved both in the process of “philosophizing” and in the “nonknowledge of truth,” which takes the course of an invagination, *which may never return, but to which we will have to return*. In other words, if we may, the future anterior in deconstruction is a philosophizing non-movement, which is there as if by itself, without any destinal return but given its drift (a “life-death”<sup>413</sup>) it *may* have to return. Here, “may” is our presupposition; Derrida’s is a definitive “will.” The “impossible” therein will always be an “*already* occurred.”<sup>414</sup> This is however not a conflation of temporalities. Or, to propose a clubbing from a Derrida’s often-repeated Blanchotian and Levinasian mantras: philosophizing, then, is the *there is* knowledge of the unknown.

Amongst the critics, David Krell leads the pack by calling it Derrida’s “beloved *future anterior, or future perfect*,” while arguing that it “fails to provide a perfect future.”<sup>415</sup> Krell identifies and labels the

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Jacques Derrida, “For the Love of Lacan,” in *Resistances of Psychoanalysis*, op. cit., pp. 39-69, pp. 42-43.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>413</sup> This is composite to Hägglund’s central critique: “Derrida proposes neither a philosophy of life nor a philosophy of death but insists on the strictures of ‘life-death’. ... If one can no longer die, one is already dead.” Hägglund’s argument, nonetheless, is literally grounded on the binary of mortality-immortality. Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism*, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>414</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>415</sup> David Farrell Krell, *The Purest Bastards: Works of Mourning and Art and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 116.

ultratranscendental passages into three domains, which also immediately announces a spatial content: “*first domain of the trace,*” of “life and alterity,” or the *daimon life*— the “*second domain*” is the mysteries of “tempor(al)ization and spatialization,” or the “engorged voice that hears and (mis)understands itself while speaking and with that hands that weaves lines of writing”—and the “*third domain,*” the subject-less *language*, which “grants language new possibilities of analysis” through “exciting new possibilities on an experience of *impossibility.*”<sup>416</sup> A reading of democracy *to come* (non-originary origin), similarly, entails three traits, as Antonio Calcagno figures out: universality of political idioms— admittance of the individual (within the universal) “‘being subject’ to the spation-temporization that is *différance*”—and the “constant differentiation” (*différance*) that results in a “constant pluralization of difference among subjects but also within subjects.”<sup>417</sup> The double bind in “to come” is therefore *anticipatory* (temporal dynamism without certainty, though)—*futurous* or *futurity* or “future anterior,” in Derrida’s term<sup>418</sup> (constant and therefore non-dynamic)—*promissory* (horizonary or hauntological aspect, both as a possibility and as an impossibility, or as presence and absence)—and, finally, *desiring*. Antonio Calcagno identifies and concludes that the “futurity folded into the structure of a promise is an impossibility *ab initio.*”<sup>419</sup> Simon Crithchley’s reading encompasses both “the future would be a modality of presence” (i.e., “the not-yet-presence”)—and an “arrival happening now” (*à venir* of democracy), i.e., an *advent*, futural, but also arrival that is happening now, “the messianic now

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<sup>416</sup> Ibid., pp. 115-16.

<sup>417</sup> Antonio Calcagno, *Badiou and Derrida*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>418</sup> Derrida, remarks Calcagno, however “would be wary to adopt the grammatical structure of time as future anterior, for its sense is much too rooted in the foundational and regulative tense of the present.”

Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

blasting through the continuum of the present.”<sup>420</sup> Crichtley also sees the ethical content in Derrida’s final words on Levinas—“The future anterior is the temporality of the trace of Illeity: it is perhaps the time of ethics.”<sup>421</sup> Also, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy critique Derrida’s departures on “differance” as *ad infinitum* as a problematic that announces itself as *finitude per se*—where, difference, or “spacing, and thus writing, would be the law of the law”—for, the “law is the essence without essence of writing.”<sup>422</sup> Lastly, on an alleged claim that Derrida’s trace derives itself, Giorgio Agamben differs by saying that it “must be conceived as ‘before being’.” “The origin is produced as a retroactive effect of nonorigin and a trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin.” Although Derrida’s concepts (“undecidables”) “call into question the primacy of presence and signification for the philosophical tradition,” comments Agamben, “yet they do not truly call into question signification in general... these concepts presuppose both the exclusion of presence and the impossibility of an extinguishing of the sign. They therefore presuppose that there is still signification beyond presence and absence, meaning the nonpresence still signifies something, it posits itself as an ‘ache-trace’, a sort of archiphoneme between presence and absence.”<sup>423</sup>

The above comments on Derrida are by no means the most lucidly available. There are too many commentaries available, especially on the whole

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<sup>420</sup> Simon Crichtley, “Frankfurt Impromptu—Remarks on Derrida and Habermas,” in Lasse Thomassen (eds.), *The Derrida-Habermas Reader* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 98-110, p. 108.

<sup>421</sup> Simon Crichtley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, [1992] 2014), p. 116. Also, see Simon Crichtley, *Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, & Contemporary French Thought* (New York; London: Verso [1999] 2009).

<sup>422</sup> See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Retreating the Political*, (tr.) Simon Sparks (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), esp. p. 49 and p. 53. See, also, footnote 351, “The Poetic Turn(s).”

<sup>423</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, (tr.) Patricia Dailey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 103.

projected future past or a future perfect. As a passing note, Slavoj Žižek labels them as “the usual gang of democracy-to-come-deconstructionist-postsecular-Levinisian-respect-for-Otherness suspects.”<sup>424</sup> Derrida himself had clarified his deconstruction project of the future anterior as an issue of “nonidentical same” and, also, on the fallible character in a “grammatical category of the future perfect.”<sup>425</sup> Given Derrida’s prolific writings, he has also found the luxury to seriously warn us that “no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation.”<sup>426</sup> Similarly, he has spoken of on behalf of the collective about the ancient’s desire: “We are dispossessed of the longed-for presence in the gesture of language by which we attempt to seize it,” i.e., a certain mode of *tense*, “which relates us to presence within living colloquy.”<sup>427</sup> Over and all, it is understandable that the “temporalization of a *lived experience*”<sup>428</sup> should not necessarily be an expedient matter of philosophy.<sup>429</sup> Nonetheless, to have reached this part of the necessity to conclude, it is like an expedient relief of coming out from a labyrinth, from an undecidable maze of decidable idioms. It will require a whole new argument to defend or illustrate the various positions critiquing Derrida, within this ambit.

More than any other thing, let us ask whether Derrida’s critique of a ‘philosophy of time’ that eventually led to his deconstruction project, was

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<sup>424</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View: Short Circuits* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 11.

<sup>425</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>426</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Living On: Border Lines,” op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>427</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 141.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>429</sup> As Heidegger otherwise argues in “Temporality and Everydayness”—

“Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.”

Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (tr.) Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), §350, p. 334.

actually even about time? Almost all of Derrida's severest critics premise the question of temporality and time, with some of them extending exceedingly to the spatialization of time. Is it possible for us to relook at Derrida's vast repository of idioms on temporality, and heed his call for "that which must elude mastery"—*presence*?<sup>430</sup> Or, if infinity is within the frame of time and the eternal outside of time,<sup>431</sup> are we also referring to the "impossible" as an outside of time?<sup>432</sup> Derrida's answer for this Heideggerian question<sup>433</sup> ("the difference between the finite and the infinite") comes from Hegel's reading of Aristotle—"...Hegelian concept of time is borrowed from a 'physics; or from a 'philosophy of

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<sup>430</sup> "Ousia and Grammê," in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 29-68, p. 65.

<sup>431</sup> In the determination of time in Hegel ("...it is not time [*in der Zeit*] that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the *becoming*, this coming-to-be and passing away), the outside of time is out rightly conceptualized from the Aristotelian tradition, as Jacques Derrida points out:

"Eternity," therefore, "is not the negative abstraction of time, nontime, the outside-of-time. If the elementary form of time is the present, eternity could be outside of time only by keeping itself outside of presence. It would not be presence; it would come before or after time, and in this way would become again atemporal *modification*. Eternity would be made into a moment of time. Everything in Hegelianism that receives the predicate of eternity (the Idea, Spirit, the True) therefore must not be thought outside of time (anymore than in time). 'Eternity as presence is neither temporal nor intemporal. Presence is intemporality in time temporality impossible. Eternity is another name of the presence of the present. Hegel also distinguishes this presence from the present as now."

Ibid., pp. 45-46.

<sup>432</sup> Unlike Emanuel Levinas' ethico-theo-logical explorations on "infinity," which Caputo calls it as "something metaphysical and even theological," Derrida's notion of the same "is not only symbolic but hyperbolic infinity," "a hyperbolic responsiveness and responsibility, a hyperbolic sensitivity," which is marked by an "affirmation of the singular one" (*affirmatio ad infinitum*)—that is, "without limit, for the only limit of responsibility to the other is other responsibilities, responsibilities to still others." John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 200.

<sup>433</sup> "Infinity," says Bernasconi, in Derrida's import of Hegel, is "relative to the finite," which "bears the mark of the finite within." Robert Bernasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida," in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance*, op. cit., pp. 13-29, p. 15.

nature', and that in this way it essentially passes unchanged into a 'philosophy of nature', or into a 'philosophy of history'. Time is also this passage itself."<sup>434</sup> Therefore, Hegel's present-future-past is an externalization of "becoming," which is actually a "vanishing of its being into nothing and of nothing into its being."<sup>435</sup> Whereas, Husserl, on the other hand, as Paola Marrati highlights, would propose that repetition is finitely possible, where the "interdependence of repetition and presence" is also evident—relegating it to a case where [t]emporality is reabsorbed into an *eidōs*."<sup>436</sup> The question of repetition, here, or what is repeated as a succession, as Marrati comments, refers to "presence as the face-to-face relation of the object with consciousness in the presence of the now as the form of time. The *origin* of truth in time—its birth—and the becoming of truth—its tradition—are both thought" within the structures of a metaphysics of presence, a *horizon of the present* as "the origin of sense, transmitted in the present of the reactivation of sense, toward a future present that is the *telos* of history as accumulation and transmission of knowledge."<sup>437</sup> For, it is within these transcendental frames of temporal and atemporal orders, inasmuch as is also the symmetry with the consciousness-sense-temporal tradition, that the contestations of origin and impossibility are unfolded in Derrida through notions of messianicity and emancipation via the ultimate manifest of a "messianic structure that belongs to all language."<sup>438</sup> We may therefore conjecture whether

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<sup>434</sup> See Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and Grammê," in *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>435</sup> Hegel's "nature is outside spirit, but as spirit itself, as the position of its proper being-outside-itself." Ibid., see, esp., footnote 22, p. 46.

<sup>436</sup> "The reduction of time to an *eidōs* or to a *telos*," says Marrati, "which amounts to much the same thing, makes its most obvious appearance in Husserl's thinking of transcendental historicity." See Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace: Derrida's Reading Husserl and Heidegger* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 45-46.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>438</sup> The following statement is a surprise surmise of Derrida's position:

"Even if I would not wish to inscribe the discourse of emancipation into a teleology, a metaphysics, an eschatology, or even a classical messianism, I none the less believe that there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I would call a 'Yes' to emancipation, to the discourse of emancipation, and even, I would add, to some messianicity. It is necessary here to explain a little what I mean by

it is possibly a case where Husserl [or, for that matter, Heidegger, too] was using language without interrogating or acknowledging its exacting powers on/of temporal conjunctions,<sup>439</sup> which, actually, was the case, and, also, one which Derrida claim to rectify or exemplify!

Here, it is imperative to recall the “notion of infinity.” As Eli Maor highlights, infinity was historically “forgotten as a scientific issue” and “instead [became] the subject of theological speculations” since the Middle Ages, which was revived only in the Sixteenth Century, particularly through the intervention of French mathematician François Viète, in 1593, with the discovery that the value of the number  $\pi$  “can be calculated solely from the number 2 by a succession of additions, multiplications, divisions, and square root extractions.”<sup>440</sup> Working around the number-symbol  $\pi$ , John Wallis (1616-1703)

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messianicity.

It is not a question of a messianism that one could easily translate in Judaeo-Christian or Islamic terms, but rather of a messianic structure that belongs to all language. There is no language without the performative dimension of the promise, the minute I open my mouth I am in the promise. Even if I say that ‘I don’t believe in truth’ or whatever, the minute I open my mouth there is a ‘believe me’ at work. Even when I lie, and perhaps especially when I lie, there is a ‘believe me in play. And this ‘I promise you that I am speaking the truth’ is a messianic apriori, a promise which, even if it is not kept, even if one knows that it cannot be kept, takes place and *qua* promise is messianic. And from this point of view, I do not see how one can pose the question of ethics if one renounces the motifs of emancipation and the messianic. Emancipation is once again a vast question today and I must say that I have no tolerance for those who— deconstructionist or not— are ironical with regard to the grand discourse of emancipation. This attitude has always distressed and irritated me. I do not want to renounce this discourse.”

See Jacques Derrida, “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,” (tr.) Simon Critchley, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Simon Critchley, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau and Richard Rorty* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 79-90, esp., pp. 84-85.

<sup>439</sup> A follow-up to this proposition is taken up in Chapter 4, “The Poetic Turn(s).”

<sup>440</sup> Eli Maor, *To Infinity and Beyond: A Cultural History of the Infinite* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 12.



would formulate the proposal of infinity with the symbol  $\infty$ . James Gregory (1638-1675) also interjected another formula involving  $\pi$ , giving shape to the notion of “infinite series,” which, sometimes also referred as the Gregory-Leibniz series, on account of Leibniz’s independent discovery (1674) and as co-inventor (with Newton) of calculus. What is pertinent to the formulaic expressions emerging from the  $\pi$  is, as a base of natural logarithm with an approximate value of 2.71828, and one that belongs to a class of numbers called “transcendental” in the mathematical world, following Archimedes, the method of indivisibles, which was geometrically posed by Bonaventura Cavalieri (1635), as seen in the invention of differential and modern integral calculus. The notion of “infinitesimal” as a new calculus or branch of mathematics (*analysis*), undeservingly celebrated and attributed to the duo Newton-Leibniz, is premised on the proposal that “shape [is] being made of infinitely many elements, each infinitely small,”<sup>441</sup> and indivisible to the captured area of the parabola, under the value of  $\pi$ . Bishop George Berkeley would severely critique (1734) the twist following the formulation of the “infinitesimal” as “ghosts of departed quantities.” Three dots (...), or, *ad infinitum*, is conceived thus.

Therein, regressing back, given the “living present” [“messianic eschatology”<sup>442</sup>] is “deferred *ad infinitum*,” what do we have in Derrida’s consistent rejection of temporal relativity (and supports absolute temporal uniformity<sup>443</sup>)? Is Derrida, the seeming master of textual relativity, also explicitly dismissive of temporal relativity? In writing about one of Baudelaire’s short stories, Derrida states, at no given or desired moment “can one reasonably hope to find, outside any relativity, noon at two o’clock.”<sup>444</sup> Similarly, on Einstein’s “constant,” Derrida views that it “is not a constant, is not a center. It is the very

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<sup>441</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>442</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>443</sup> Derrida, comments Hobson otherwise, “does not make the problematic limits of the linear conception of time merely an effect of atemporal paradox.” Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>444</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*, (tr.) Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 7.

concept of variability—it is, finally, the concept of the game. ...[I]t is not the concept of *something*—of a center starting from which an observer could master the field—but the very concept of the game... It is *the* constant of the game.”<sup>445</sup> Perhaps Derrida’s version of time or, rather, aversion of time, has not been noticed properly by his interlocutors. First published in *L’endurance de la pensée* (1968), Derrida’s *Ousia* and *Grammê* remarkably gives an early version/aversion of time:

“*Time*, then, would be but the name of the limits within which the *gramme* is thus comprehended, and, along with the *gramme*, the possibility of the trace in general. *Nothing* other *has ever been* thought by the name of *time*. Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something—which bears a relation to time, but is not time—is to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that still could be called *time*.”<sup>446</sup>

And... to end—“philosophy lives in and from *différance*.”<sup>447</sup>

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<sup>445</sup> In “Discussion,” in Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (eds.), *The Structuralist Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 267.

<sup>446</sup> Jacques Derrida, “*Ousia* and *Grammê*,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>447</sup> Full quote:

“[P]hilosophy lives in and from *différance*, thereby blinding itself to the same which is not the identical. The same is precisely *différance* (with an ‘a’) as the deviant and equivocal passage from one differing thing to another, from one term of the opposition to another. One could thus take up all the oppositional couples on which philosophy is constructed and from which our discourse lives, in order to observe not the effacement of the opposition, but the announcement of a necessity such that one of the terms appears as the *différance* of the other, as the other ‘differed’ in the economy of the name.”

“*Différance*,” in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 17.

Part II  
**RADICAL TEMPORALITIES**

Chapter Four:  
**The Poetic Turn(s)**

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“Poetry is the beginning and the end of philosophical knowledge.”

—Friedrich Hölderlin.<sup>1</sup>

“...language as an infinite power devoted to presence, is precisely the unnamable of poetry.”

—Alain Badiou.<sup>2</sup>

“If the poem is a calling into question, we know that it is first a calling of language into question.”

Maurice Blanchot.<sup>3</sup>

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“The art of poetry (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius, and will be guided least by precept or example),” wrote Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), “claims the highest rank of all.”<sup>4</sup> Kant, thus, in 1790, seems to be exhaustingly satisfied that he was putting to rest the “ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry”<sup>5</sup>—our knowledge of which is primarily drawn from those engagements

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<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke, Vol. 3* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957), p. 89. Quoted in Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood, Like flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. x.

<sup>2</sup> Alain Badiou, *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, (tr.) Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Maurice Blanchot, “Poetry and Language,” in *Faux Pas*, (tr.) Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 137.

<sup>4</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trs.) Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 203-04. Bracket in original.

<sup>5</sup> The main argument for this ancient quarrel lies with the problem of disclosure (*alêtheia*) or the process of formulating *eidōs* (forms):

“Philosophy is thus itself true in that thought is able to apprehend this essence directly, by *theoria*, in the supersensible appearance of the Idea, whereas poetry, by recapitulating this appearance in another mode, by way of sensible images, is only able to apprehend it indirectly and thus its truth is obscured and distorted. The word that Plato uses for this action of art in general is *mimêsis*, or ‘imitation,’ for by rendering appearance in another mode poetry or art repeats it

between Socrates (469-339 BCE) and Plato (427-348 BCE) in *The Republic*, and Aristotle's (384-322 BCE) response to the same.<sup>6</sup>

In privileging philosophy over poetry as a treatment of art and criticisms,<sup>7</sup> the Greeks were aware of its linguistic matters (an attempt to negate metaphoricity and rhetoricity) but nonetheless favoured "methods of mathematics and the natural sciences."<sup>8</sup> Charting a reverse perspective, by privileging poetry over philosophy, Kant, on the other hand, tried to sealed the fate of the Greeks by:

"expand[ing] the mind by setting the imagination free and presenting, within the limits of a given concept and among the unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its presentation with a *fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate*, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideas."<sup>9</sup>

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and thereby dissembles its appearance. As a result art, for Plato, is distant from truth and thus subordinate to philosophy."

See William S. Allen, *Ellipsis: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language After Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Blanchot* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp. 5-6.

<sup>6</sup> See Plato, *The Republic*, Book 10, esp., 595a-602b and 607b-d and, also, Aristotle's *Poetics*.

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Ford, *The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002). Also, surveying German Idealism and Romanticism, Alberto Toscano highlights the daring difference between antiquity and modernity over the use of "criticism." Criticism, notes Toscano, "is one of the defining features of modern culture and it does not necessarily have to produce false concepts to guide artistic production... In fact, criticism could produce correct concepts for artistic production, criticism then offers itself a third term, a point of possible synthesis... a possible way to resolve the deadlock between antiquity and modernity; it also proposes the way to establish and aesthetically valid culture." See translator's "Critical Introduction" in Friedrich Schlegel, *On the Study of Greek Poetry*, (tr. & ed.) Stuart Barnett (Albany: State University of New York Press), esp. pp. 7-8. See, also, Leslie Hill, *Radical Indecision: Barthes, Blanchot, Derrida, and the Future of Criticism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 187.

<sup>9</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, op. cit., pp. 203-04. *Italics mine*.

“strengthen[ing] the mind by letting it feel its capacity to consider and judge of nature, as appearance, freely, self-actively, and independently of determination by nature, in accordance with points of view that nature does not present by itself in experience either for sense or for the understanding, and thus to use it for the sake of and as it were as the schema of the supersensible.”<sup>10</sup>

And, *as if* vigilant of how the Greeks may react to his views, and perhaps wary of the recent reaction by Rènè Descartes (1596-1650) and John Locke (1632-1704),<sup>11</sup> Kant craftily went on to clarify his position on “rhetoric”—yet another canonically debated mistrust directly dealing with language:

“Rhetoric, insofar as by that is understood the art of persuasion, i.e., of deceiving by means of beautiful illusion (as an *ars oratoria*), and not merely skill in speaking (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from the art of poetry only as much as is necessary to win minds over to the advantage of the speaker before they can judge and to rob them of their freedom; thus it cannot be recommended either for the courtroom or for the pulpit.”<sup>12</sup>

Kant’s militant approach to liberate poetry from the seductions of rhetoric, however, inasmuch like the Greeks, did not go down well, as an apology to language, as a “schema of the supersensible.” Rather, the circumvented interlocution was stressfully preoccupied with the psychological play of “the mind”—how it “plays with the illusion which it produces at will, yet without thereby being deceitful; for it itself declares its occupation to be mere play, which can nevertheless be purposively employed by the understanding for its

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 203-04.

<sup>11</sup> Descartes and Locke were both unanimous in their rejection of “rhetoric” as a manipulation of language or words, as detrimental provocateurs in the formulation of judgment or truth, much in line with the stance taken by Plato in Book X of the *Republic*.

<sup>12</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, op. cit., pp. 203-04.

own business.”<sup>13</sup> The contest of business over hierarchies of genre was very much against a fractious background of disengaging language, as an “illusion,”<sup>14</sup> as a posterior to the mind, as even amongst the ancients, which is perceived with a certitude of knowledge/truth as epistemology, and therein also the attachment of metaphysical ideas on representation as calculable meanings, within such reaches, through the noumenal. Kant’s notion of “presentation” (minus the re-) or Hegel’s “presentation” (*Darstellung*)<sup>15</sup> are therefore poor retrenchment of body-mind approaches to distinction between art and meta-/para-language, set within the “epistemological dichotomies” of “appearance vs. the thing in itself,” restricting the parameters of “being” as replicating itself.<sup>16</sup> The ontology of language had to suffer all over, once again, in its failure to overcome consciousness and “thought,” in its complicity with “intentionality,” despite the well-motivated but misguided attempt to locate “truth” or “knowledge” or “language” through psychologism!<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 203-04.

<sup>14</sup> “Post-Kantian Idealists,” observe Gabriel and Žižek, particularly Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, “share Kant’s preoccupation with transcendental illusion but argue that illusion (appearance) is constitutive of the truth (being).” This flawed “‘system of philosophy’ [therefore] no longer represents the alleged ontological structure of reality, but becomes a complete system of all metaphysical statements. ...[and] what we get at the end is not the Truth that overcomes [or] sublates the preceding illusions—the only truth is the inconsistent edifice of the logical interconnection of all possible illusions.” See Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, *Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), pp. 1-2.

<sup>15</sup> The “notion of *Darstellung*,” Helfer argues, “forms the cornerstone of all the leading theories of Idealism and early Romanticism” (p. 9). For an extensive treatment on the same, refer Martha B. Helfer, *The Retreat of Representation: the Concept of Darstellung in German Critical Discourse* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

<sup>16</sup> Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, *Mythology, Madness and Laughter*, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Some of Jacques Derrida’s earliest writings, between 1953-54, when he was preparing for the ‘diplôme d’études supérieures’, identify the tradition of logicism and psychologism, particularly in Kant-Husserl. See *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*, (tr.) Marian Hobson (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), esp. pp. 30-12. Giorgio Agamben, too, on Kant’s attempt to ontologize the semiotic—entrenching ontology through

And, likewise, despite the Kantian testimonials that “no linguistic expression is fully adequate,” the presentation of poetry was barely suspected as a new dilemma, insofar as the position of language is concerned, given the ominous blindness infatuated by the psychological quantification of “thought.” Therein, both, Kant and Hegel, made poetry pervasively natural and even transcendental.<sup>18</sup>

What Kant effectively attempts to achieve in the process of debunking the Greek notion (particularly of Aristotle) of tragic art is to formulate a predetermined unity for aesthetics<sup>19</sup>—art as a universal self-affirmation. The idealism in Kant, Bjørn Myskja (b. 1959) observes, is guided by the belief that the “free production of poetry is clearly not restricted to imitation of nature, but includes images or illusions that cannot be experienced in nature. ... Representations in poetry are [therefore] free from determination by nature...”<sup>20</sup> Basing on the “aesthetic turn” of this period, Dennis Schmidt offers a view on the “philosophical appropriation of the idea of tragedy,” from the time of the Greeks till the Germans, by interrogating whether “the question of tragedy is indeed an

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transcendental linguistic—identifies the deficit in “Kantian psychologism.” See *Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience*, (tr.) Liz Heron (London; New York: Verso, 1993).

<sup>18</sup> The nationalist project comes to picture here. Hegel’s projection of poetry as “the most universal and widespread teacher of human race” (p. 972) also stems from the transitory stage of language as a property of the absolute spirit where poetry “open the lips of a nation, to bring ideas into words, and by this means to held the nation to have ideas” (p. 1009). See G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (tr.) T.M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975).

<sup>19</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy vehemently disagrees that there was never a Kantian aesthetics since the “*Bild* precedes all image.” There is “no object,” but a “form forming itself.” Kant’s faculty of “presentation (i.e., imagination) [therefore] presents nothing beyond the limit, for presentation is delimitation itself,” and there is “nothing beyond the limit, nothing either presentable or nonpresentable.” See Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Sublime Offering,” in Jean-Francois Courtine et. al., *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question*, (tr.) Jeffrey S. Librett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 25-54, esp. p. 41.

<sup>20</sup> Bjørn K. Myskja, *The Sublime in Kant and Beckett* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), p. 258.



imperative of history at this historical juncture, and whether or not this imperative permits itself to be explained and justified with reference to a notion of destiny.”<sup>21</sup>

Correspondingly, what Kant naughtily attributed to his attempt as an apodictic achievement is otherwise the establishment of a hierarchical order, which may be rebuffed nonetheless as cultural or historical relativism: the privileging of poetry over philosophy, as a reversal of the ancients, and, even, the hierarchical superiority of poetry over music, which we take up in this chapter’s next section. By combining poetry’s capabilities to illustrate both the beautiful and the sublime (*genius*), or in making “fine art even more artistic [*noch künstlerischer*],”<sup>22</sup> Kant esteemed poetry to have the highest aesthetic value. But, beyond the hierarchical interplays, Kant, otherwise, was merely echoing Plato in all fullness of the tradition, betrayed by loyalty to move beyond natural philosophy and philosophical psychology.<sup>23</sup> And—a matter of disappointment—the ‘ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry’ were in fact rekindled rather than dispersed.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Dennis J. Schmidt, *On Germans & Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Bjørn K. Myskja, *The Sublime in Kant and Beckett*, op. cit., p. 258.

<sup>23</sup> The concerns addressed by Immanuel Kant elsewhere (the other two *Critique[s]*) is commonly generalized here: the mathematical difficulty of formulating a synthetic judgment as *a priori*. This generalizing indulgence has benefited from Ben Lazare Mijuskovic—of what he calls “simplicity argument”—in gauging the various forms of rationalist arguments, as a “conceptual continuity” and as a “conceptual framework,” particularly the shifts seen from Cambridge Platonist to 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries. See *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonist to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). For a comparative development in the philosophy of mind, see Simo Knuuttila & Juha Sihvola (eds.), *Sourcebook for the History of the Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant* (Dordrecht; Heidelberg; New York; London: Springer, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> This is contrary to what Millán-Zaibert argued for: that the “early German Romantics remove the very battlefield that gives rise to the quarrel in the first place.” See Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 187.

On the hierarchical order advantaging poetry,<sup>25</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)<sup>26</sup> too astutely upholds the primacy of Kant's predicament between sense/cognition and "figurative images," particularly in his lectures on *Aesthetics*.<sup>27</sup> Poetry, nevertheless, will be further reengaged within the metaphysical tradition, with an ontological approach to understand language and perceive thought's value.<sup>28</sup> It would not be until 1935, when, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), delivering a lecture entitled *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, negotiates a proper rapture with this Platonic-Kantian tradition.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> "Poetry," for Hegel, is a privileged form of "imaginative and artistic conceptions," and is superior than painting and music, since it "can comprise in the form of the inner life not only the inner consciousness but also the special and particular details of what exists externally, and at the same time it can portray them separately in the whole expanse of their individual traits and arbitrary peculiarities." See G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, op. cit., p. 961.

<sup>26</sup> Gary Shapiro highlights that Hegel considers the dialectical potency of poetry not only as a "form of knowledge, but a form which is quite distinct from that of prosaic thought." See Gary Shapiro, "Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry," in *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 8. No. 2, Spring 1975, pp. 88-107.

<sup>27</sup> On poetry, Hegel observes:

"...we may describe poetry's way of putting things as figurative because it brings before our eyes not the abstract essence but its concrete reality, not an accidental existent but an appearance such that in it we immediately recognize the essence through, and inseparably from, the external aspect of its individuality; and in this way we are confronted in the inner world of our ideas by the conception of the thin and its existence as one and the same whole."

In G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, op. cit., esp. Chapter III, p. 1002.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger saw Kant's *a priori* problematic (*ontic knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge*) as a transcendental (metaphysical) attempt to access the "object" (*objects hinging on knowledge rather than knowledge hinging on object*), which is but ontological determinations, actually. See Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs.) Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), esp. pp. 35-45.

<sup>29</sup> Martin Heidegger's arrival includes his commentary on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, esp. the lectures of Winter Semester, 1936-37. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*, (tr.) David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991). The overcoming metaphysics being the rapture, Heidegger's "language-thought problematic" is central to the development of a subversion to foundations. See James Grant Lovejoy, *Heidegger's*

To be noted, however, is a German Romantics' contemporary, Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), who tried to highlight the caveat: "the necessity of poetry is based on the requirement to represent the infinite, which emerges from the imperfection of philosophy."<sup>30</sup>

Coming back to Kantian Idealism, the enigmatic connection between the "fullness of thought" and the lack of a "linguistic expression," Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) too wanderlust around similar issues (although not so much on a technical scale) by announcing that the first speech of man was in the *figurative* ("only poetry was spoken"): "words are transposed only because ideas are also transposed, otherwise figurative language would signify nothing."<sup>31</sup> If Rousseau had valorized the role of poetry by dwelling on the origin and development of language vis-à-vis human migration—such obsessions are further enriched and continued till recent times in the form of the Belgian Henri Michaux's (1899-1984) search for a universal language (the "poetical") by traveling to Asia, and his confabulation with Indian gesturals.<sup>32</sup> This is however not the direction of the investigation. The interest here remains in the connect of language and poetry— and the simultaneous tangents associated with the development of modern philosophy on language, i.e., mind-body dualism, consciousness, aesthetics, the universal, thought, experience, knowledge, etc.

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*Early Ontology and the Deconstruction of Foundations*, Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Friedrich Schlegel, cited in Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 170.

<sup>31</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music: The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol. 7*, (tr. & ed.) John T. Scott (Hanover and London: The University Press of New England, 1998), pp. 289-332, esp. p. 294.

<sup>32</sup> Margaret Rigaud-Drayton remarks:

"In the same way that Rousseau argues that primitive gestural and vocal languages survive among some non-European and Southern European groups, so Michaux finds different incarnations of the language of nature in the gestures and utterances of the Other."

See Margaret Rigaud-Drayton, *Henri Michaux: Poetry, Painting and the Universal Sign* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 63-64.

Kant's aesthetic (or synthetic) judgment ("the principle of ideality of the purposiveness in the beauty of nature") was simply a reiteration of the constitution of the "onto-theological," a framework already established in the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason*,<sup>33</sup> which is illustrated as an *a priori* formulation, where experience or knowledge is justly not necessary: "For in such an act of judging the important point is not what nature is, or even, as a purpose, is in relation to us, but how we take it."<sup>34</sup> By conflating the then reigning epistemologies of René Descartes' (1596-1650) "cogito" and Gottfried Leibniz's (1646-1716) "apperception,"<sup>35</sup> Kant formulated a faux knowledge of an

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<sup>33</sup> Preceding Kant's *Judgment*, his *Reason* has already formulated the view that:

"Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then termed ontotheology."

Immanule Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (tr.) J.M.D. Meiklejon (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1950), §A247/§B303. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood's translation drastically differs; a clarification for which they gave in the Introduction. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. & eds.) Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (New York, NY: Hafner Press, 1951), p. 195. Alternatively, the Oxford translation for the same reads as:

"For in such judging the question does not turn on what nature is, or even on what it is for us in the way of an end, but on how we receive it."

See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* (tr.) James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1952] 2007), p. 177.

<sup>35</sup> On the history of "apperception," Lee A. Rithfarb notes:

"The term 'apperception' goes back to Descartes (1649), but it was Gottfried w. Leibniz who explicitly distinguished between perception and apperception, the former meaning passive reflection, the latter active, conscious reflection (1714?). Johann Friedrich Herbart used the term to mean that activity which organizes diverse, raw data of perception, resulting over time in an 'apperceptive mass' (1825). For Wilhelm Wundt, who gave the term its meaning from many early twentieth-century writers, apperception was the synthetic cognitive act (1896).

imaginary experiential and, predictably, (super)imposed or equated the same as a/the real (experience of) self-consciousness, i.e., a conceptual method termed as *reine Apperzeption* (“pure apperception”). Hegelian analogies of “appearance,” similarly, fall within such hubris—the use of “transcendental deduction” as a method of realizing self-knowledge; the problematic forward on “consciousness.”

Schlegel’s interjections, by employing “irony”<sup>36</sup> as a form as introduced by Socrates, as the ultimate strategy for locating “clear consciousness of eternal agility, of infinitely teeming chaos,”<sup>37</sup> therefore, challenged the then prevailing and traditional thinking on the nature of philosophy. For Schlegel, Socratic irony “contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete communication.”<sup>38</sup> Forms, similarly, like the “fragment”<sup>39</sup> and the “dialogue,”<sup>40</sup>

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See footnote 11, in Ernst Kurth, *Ernst Kurth: Selected Writings*, (tr. and ed.) Lee A. Rithfarb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 43.

<sup>36</sup> Irony once again brings to attention Paul de Man’s “watershed” readings on Romanticism, “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1969), and the ensuing rages of debates it evoked in the 1980s, in Paul de Man, *Blindness & Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism* (Oxon: Routledge, [1971] 1996), pp. 187-228. de Man’s notion of “*dédoublement* as the characteristic that sets apart a reflective activity,” which is also a departure from Schlegel to Charles Baudelaire, is marked by a treatment of what Strathman observes as a “consciousness [that] is characterized by its inevitable slippage, by virtue of its dependence upon language and its exposure to temporality, into a state of inauthenticity.” See Christopher A. Strathman, *Romantic Poetry and the Fragmentary Imperative: Schlegel, Byron, Joyce, Blanchot* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 14.

<sup>37</sup> Quoted, Schlegel, in Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 229.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 171.

<sup>39</sup> The “fragment has a history,” as Glenn W. Most describes:

“[The] development in German literature and philosophy lend a new dignity to the fragment. For the German romantics, like Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, the fragment was not necessarily a derivative form of literary communication to be dismissed as defective and incomplete in comparison with systematic treatises and extended narratives: instead it could be commended as the only appropriate vehicle for expressing revolutionary insights that went beyond established forms and genres. Not only did the romantics entrust many of their

were used as competing carriers to allow the play of *irony*, as an alternative to engage the roles poetry and philosophy have traditionally and mutually impinged upon each other; which, but, makes the question of language the central preoccupation.<sup>41</sup> The emergence of “fragments,” as the origin of literature, also exposed the “crisis” of philosophy, especially post-Kant.<sup>42</sup> On the Romantics’ contributions, Christopher Stratham sums up best:

“The romantics open poetics to the possibility of being more than the classification of the genres and at the same time situate it along a fault line between poetry and philosophy; this line exposes philosophical narrative to the threat of the revolution of poetic language in a way that

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most important ideas to the various collections of witty, provocative, and irritating fragments they published—by theorizing and philosophically justifying these fragments they helped to train a generation of readers willing to take fragments seriously, to meditate upon their implications and to see out the hidden links between them.”

See “On Fragments,” in Willam Tronzo (ed.) *The Fragment: An Incomplete History* (Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 2009), pp. 9-22, esp. p. 16. Also, see ‘fragment’ as a “new kind of writing not entailing harmony, concordance, or reconciliation...” in Maurice Blanchot, esp. “The Fragment Word,” in *The Infinite Conversation*, (tr.) Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971).

<sup>40</sup> The Socratic “dialogue” in question here equates the “ironic, fragmentary, many-sided Socrates of the *Symposium* rather than the conceptual, systematic, hyperrational Socrates of the more philosophical dialogues. ... [R]omantics rethink dialogue as a genre-beyond-genre, or better, a genre-without-genre, a genre composed of bits and pieces of all the other genres but somehow more (and less) than merely the sum of these parts.” See Christopher A. Strathman, *Romantic Poetry*, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

<sup>41</sup> The immediacy of language being the erstwhile western tradition, yet it is the modernist who enlarged the preoccupation with language vis-à-vis the representation vs. presentation debates.

<sup>42</sup> Faced with the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of “ideas,” literature as an external and alternate to philosophy, for discursive theorizing, the fragment became the central thematic experiment in German Romanticism. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*, (trs.) Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

calls into question philosophy's own way of knowing."<sup>43</sup>

Highlighting that the German Romantic Schlegel is far from being an absolute idealist, Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert defends him by pointing that the "central goal of his romantic project" rather accentuates "philosophy into closer contact with poetry and history, odd bedfellows in the wake of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, a work that celebrated philosophy's relation to the ahistorical sciences."<sup>44</sup> Working alongside Schlegel on the Romantics' problematization of life and poetry, which is essentially geared to overturn Kantian domination, is also contemporary Christian theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who, despite fidelity to poetry in line with his Idealist predecessors, interrogates the "interpretative problem" between the heard and uttered, earning him the "father of modern hermeneutics"<sup>45</sup>—and (Novalis) Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801), who rejects Fichteian metaphysics and ushered a new approach to philosophy as semiotic and linguistic problems.<sup>46</sup> Referring to the work corpus of Novalis, Bruce Donehower recalls the period's problematization of life and poetry, which is illustrated with a recurring central theme, in the notion of "paradigmatic axiom," as one that is seen in the "poeticized moment of erotic-mystical yearning and transfiguration."<sup>47</sup> The Romantics, Donehower

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<sup>43</sup> Christopher A. Strathman, *Romantic Poetry*, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert maintains:

"Schlegel uses the relation between the portrayer and the portrayed in order to discuss representation. He was well aware of the value of irony and the lightness it granted to the representation of ideas, and it is in connection to irony that Schlegel's connection to Socrates-Plato is strongest."

See *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 171 and p. 174.

<sup>45</sup> Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 97.

<sup>46</sup> Wm. Arctander O'Brien, *Novalis: Signs of Revolution* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 78-80.

<sup>47</sup> Bruce Donehower (tr. and ed.), *The Birth of Novalis: Friedrich von Hardenberg's Journal of 1797, with Selected Letters and Documents* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 2.

further notes, is marked by a “magical-idealist approach to identity construction [which] mirrors themes common to the late eighteenth century—particularly in regard to the era’s questioning of subjectivity and the era’s radical use of aesthetic theory to trespass boundaries Immanuel Kant had delimited for philosophy.”<sup>48</sup>

In becoming the first to censor Kant’s view on aesthetics,<sup>49</sup> Schlegel’s inclination was also a submission based on a “style” that follows “empirical descriptions,” and about a “method that depended on knowledge of individual artists and works.”<sup>50</sup> Kant’s intervention on the proposal that “objects... must conform to our knowing [knowledge]”<sup>51</sup>— primarily raised against David Hume’s (1711-1776) proposition that “[o]bject have no discoverable connection together”<sup>52</sup>—emerged as a metaphysical shift to a historicized search for an

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>49</sup> See Mark A. Cheetham, *Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>51</sup> The Cambridge translated version reads:

“Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognition, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them *a priori*, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the *experience* in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence *a priori*, which rule is expressed in concepts *a priori*, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.”

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., pp. 110-11.

<sup>52</sup> David Hume (1711-1776) had earlier proposed that: “Objects have no discoverable connection together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.” See David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed.) L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, [1888] 1960), p. 103.



aesthetic ideal (“intuition of objects”). The question of immediacy, or the location of the artist-spectator,<sup>53</sup> which is but a rough sketch of arresting the problem of temporality and the conflicts over the Absolute, therein constitute the chiefly disagreed contentions, by disclaimers of Kant’s own contemporaries.<sup>54</sup>

A reading of the history of philosophy or system of philosophy on the art-poetry accords therein introduces us to the intermittent laceration of mimesis and language, and the chagrin of subjectivity and aesthetics—with gradation of genre as the common denominator for a prevalent fear—that there is a “‘disenfranchisement’ of art by philosophy.”<sup>55</sup> In arresting the changes and continuities, the imperatives of relegating shifts in ahistorical and historical attributes in the constitution of the art of poetry, in or by itself, is not merely an issue of representation and its elements; the conditions for which was initiated between the Idealists and Romantics and one which still remains “unclear what the demonstration that there must be an ‘unconditioned’ aspect of subjectivity actually means.”<sup>56</sup> The notion of temporal structures that are definitive—whether it is faith and knowledge, reason and truth, or death and soul—to the explanatory significance (or, even hierarchies of poetry and philosophy) are concerns that reactively and bindingly summoned the reaches of how the constitution of art<sup>57</sup> and the *apperception about* language invariably exchange

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<sup>53</sup> See, below, footnote 58, Nietzsche on Kant.

<sup>54</sup> Whether Schlegel effectively managed to steer this clear from Kant, as a counter-Enlightenment project, is put into doubt, over the former’s position on *Greek Poetry*. Stuart Barnett, amongst many others, notices traces of a “confusing presence of an almost neoclassical yearning for antiquity together with the firm conviction that contemporary culture is irrevocably distinct from antiquity.” See translator’s introduction in Friedrich Schlegel, *On the Study of Greek Poetry*, op. cit., pp. 1-17, esp. p. 9.

<sup>55</sup> See Mark A. Cheetham, *Kant, Art, and Art History*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>56</sup> “Do art and philosophy,” Andrew Bowie questions, “have the same purpose, or can they be separated?” For post-Kantian readings on Idealists and Romantics, see Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, [1990] 2003).

<sup>57</sup> J.M Bernstein remarks:

the temporality of the absolute, the material, and beyond. And, also, apart from the cruxes, the thetic privileging of art over science, or, alternatively, its conflict, in the tradition, in the tension of a/the history of philosophy of art, remains as a forerunner in the contestation of modernity, or even as a precursor to avant-gardist philosophy!

The art-language discord has been eminently featured by a limited contest that attempts to surpass its own subjectivity-temporality disjunction. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) too saw the recalcitrant explicitness of temporality in Kant's subjectivist expressions: the problem of familiarity and access, the removal of "vivid authentic experiences," and the "lack of any refined first-hand experience."<sup>58</sup> Nietzsche's view on Kant and art, intersected by Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) popular notion of alterity, i.e., the subject's

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"If art is taken as lying outside truth and reason then if art speaks in its own voice it does not speak truthfully or rationally; while if one defends art from within the confines of the language of truth-only cognition one belies the claim that art is more truthful than that truth-only cognition."

See *The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Nietzsche on Kant, Book III, Section 6 of *Genealogy of Morals*:

"Kant, like all philosophers, instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from the point of view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the 'spectator', and unconsciously introduce the 'spectator' into the concept 'beautiful'. It would not have been so bad if this 'spectator' had at least been sufficiently familiar to the philosophers of beauty—namely, as a great personal fact and experience, as an abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights in the realm of the beautiful! But I fear that the reverse has always been the case; and so they have offered us, from the beginning, definitions in which, as Kant's famous definition of the beautiful, a lack of any refined first-hand experience repose in the shape of a fat worm of error."

See Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (trs.) Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale and *Ecce Homo* (tr.) Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967/1989), pp. 103-04.

aesthetic consciousness with “timeless subject of knowledge,”<sup>59</sup> as an intermediary, however, failed to yield any delivery from the “aesthetic problem” that was initially posited, specifically on the issues of delineating the subject in question or the anxiety over temporality.<sup>60</sup> Joan Stambaugh (1932-2013) also affirms that Nietzsche “never worked out his own theory of time, but rather accepted the theory, traditional since Plato and Aristotle, of time as the form of finitude. This theory gets crystallized in [Isaac] Newton’s [1643-1727] formulation of time as an empty, infinite substance that contains all things. All things are ‘in’ time.”<sup>61</sup>

On the issue of subject-object and aesthetics, therefore, which is

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<sup>59</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer’s “genius,” as framed in *The World as Will and Representation I*, (p. 179):

“[I]n aesthetic contemplation, the individual is no longer an individual but pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge”; “as the subject is wholly absorbed in the object that it contemplates, it becomes this object itself.”

Quoted in Friedrich Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science*, (tr.) Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 153.

<sup>60</sup> Manuel Dries’s introduction to the excellently edited book remarks that Nietzsche’s “emphasis on time and history is usually both a critique of the staticist worldview and, less often so, his attempt to develop an alternative worldview, an alternative that is, however, not simply a negation of the staticist worldview.” Accordingly, Dries sums up Nietzsche’s *On Becoming History* as premised on:

a. The world is best conceived as a world of relatively easily distinguishable, property-instantiating objects that remain sufficiently identical over time to be named, referred to and remembered.

b. The collection of objects called ‘the world’ is governed by laws that are sufficiently determinate to prevent chaos from ensuing, and to allow humans, objects with special properties, to make some predictions about what will happen in the future.

c. The existence of this deterministic world of objects is somehow compatible with the possibility of actual choice and voluntary action.

Refer Manuel Dries (ed.), *Nietzsche on Time and History* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), p. 2.

<sup>61</sup> Joan Stambaugh, *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*, (tr.) John F. Humphrey (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press & London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1987), p. 9.

embedded within the ontology of language and the consciousness of its representation, three directions are well enumerated:

1. First, the visible distinction between the non-historical and historical, through Descartes-Kant-Hegel, which was contested through the definition of the subject and consciousness. The disputants between poetry-philosophy, similarly, are premised on hierarchical elucidation of the arts, which developed from precepts of psychologism-phenomenology onto aesthetics-consciousness.

2. Second, the anti-historical turn that evolved as a parallel to the above, through Schlegel-Schopenhauer-Nietzsche, which attempts to delink the subject from the object, leads to a rapprochement to art-language as a singular compliant, and one that is built upon rudimentary initiations on consciousness-phenomenology.

3. Third, the radicalization of the “subject,” through Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel-Heidegger-Marx, where the problematic dichotomy of consciousness-language is reinforced, is constituted through a redoubtable reception and apprehension for discourses on representation-temporality.

What emerged through these directions are, as they are as the centre of contemporary debates, is the question of poetry-mimesis, of thinking and historicity. The works of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1940-2007) is important, particularly his discussion on “mimetologism,” which is discussed over the course. The common trench through which the overcoming of aesthetics was waged, i.e., *Darstellung*, art as self-presentation, continued through post-Heidegger, through Adorno,<sup>62</sup> till contemporary times, primarily over the

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<sup>62</sup> Alexander García Düttmann’s take on Adorno’s conceptualization of *Darstellung* is daringly generous:

“*Darstellung* is language as constellation or configuration. It is in no way the representation of a sublating movement which reaches a result. Language designates here the non-negative other of speculation. By definition, a constellation entails the chance of an apparition. Something allows itself to be thought through a constellation, something provokes thought in a constellation.”

contestations on the autonomies of language. By and large, it presents and reinforces the task of how philosophizing should or can take place within or outside the limits of language, either as an epistemic process or as a system of ontology, given the various frames of temporality that accompanied the ahistorical and historical framing of art and aesthetics, language, consciousness, and representation, and, most comprehensively, as a resistance to *telos*:

“The idea that history has a telos is thus not a metaphysical doctrine, but a tool of thought which has become transforming memory. The telos is history is then a necessary theme, of transforming thought. But it has a problematic status, for (in addition to its possibly overgenerated formulations) it partakes of both the present and the past. The present is not a realm of completed transformations, for to be completed is to lose one’s possibilities for change. To see a moment in time as *nothing more than* the telos of a previous transformation is to see it is as something past and dead. To say that history has a telos, and that the present is that telos, is thus to say that the present already contains a moment that is entirely defined as how previous transformations turned out: it is to admit that the past is already gobbling up the present. The telos of history is thus always something about to become past, about to lose its possibilities, about to die.”<sup>63</sup>

Whereas we have seen that the subject becomes the object in Hegel-Kant; the Neo-Kantian tradition would see the Heideggerian formulation of a *Sinn* of Being as becoming the temporality of *Sinn* of *Dasein*.<sup>64</sup> Martin Heidegger’s

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See *The Gift of Language: Memory and Promise in Adorno, Benjamin, Heidegger, and Rosenzweig*, (tr.) Arline Lyons (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Italics in original. See John McCumber, “Introduction: Transforming Thought,” in Rebecca Comay and John McCumber (eds.), *Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 8.

<sup>64</sup> As Schürmann concurs:

“The basic problem that one encounters in trying to understand *Being and Time* is the following: in order to work out Time as the meaning or directionality (*Sinn*) of Being, Heidegger ends up working out the temporality as the meaning or

“experience is the element in which art dies,” too, or sees “aesthetics as guided by the subject-object dichotomy as well,”<sup>65</sup> a continuity emergent from Cartesian meditations. There is an anxious Hegel in Heidegger because the later deduced much of the ahistorical attempt to transgress the Platonic tradition from the former. Hegel, observes Raymond Bardfield, embraced the “power of poetry,” notwithstanding an ultimate realization that “poetry is not enough”—since the “idea that poetry is adequate to the fullness of self-consciousness is what speculative philosophy resists.”<sup>66</sup> Like the allure of Hegel to Heidegger, Paul de Man (1919-1983) too (paraphrasing Adorno’s reading of Hegel) reduces Hegel’s philosophy of art in his *Aesthetics* as “the place where the inadequacy of Hegel’s theory of language would be revealed.”<sup>67</sup>

On the question of historicity and the ontological site of language, Hegel continues to find prominence because of his notion of history, which “assimilates death to negation, the driving force behind the historical process of becoming, and treats it as the limit within which we all strive, the ultimate human horizon

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directionality of Dasein.”

Refer Simon Critchley and Reiner Schürmann, *On Heidegger’s Being and Time*, (ed.) Steven Levine (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 62.

<sup>65</sup> Keith Hoeller makes this assessment by referring to the “Epilogue” and the “Addendum,” in Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”—

“Almost from the time when specialized thinking about art and the artist began, this thought was called aesthetic. Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of *aisthesis*, of sensuous apprehension in the wide sense. Today we all this apprehension experience.... Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps experience is the element in which art dies.”

See “Translator’s Introduction,” in Martin Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, (tr.) Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), p. 10.

<sup>66</sup> Raymond Bardfield, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 186.

<sup>67</sup> Paul de Man, quoted, in Martin Donougho, “Hegel’s Art of Memory,” in Rebecca Comay and John McCumber (eds.), *Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger*, op. cit., pp. 139-159, esp. p. 141.

which is the source of our activity, mastery, and accomplishments.”<sup>68</sup> Hegel’s affinity with poetry, moreover, is based on his “formulation of the element of truth,” as elucidated in *Phenomenology*, which is an artifact of late consciousness.<sup>69</sup> Given this background, it is only understandable that any renewed interest on Hegel and language has not subsided even in recent times.<sup>70</sup> And, as mentioned, Heidegger would be the most consistent to further pursue interest and problematize Hegel.<sup>71</sup>

Apart from the interrogations on Hegel, Heidegger’s discursive work with poetry (*Dichtung*)—much unlike Nietzsche who also wrote poetry—effectively began after the first lectures on Johann Christian Fredrich Hölderlin’s (1770-1843) two poems (“Germania” and “The Rhine”),<sup>72</sup> during the 1934-35 Winter Semester.<sup>73</sup> Hölderlin, a contemporary of Hegel, remains one of Heidegger’s most

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<sup>68</sup> John Gregg, *Maurice Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression* (Princeton & New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 10.

<sup>69</sup> Raymond Barfield, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry*, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>70</sup> See John McCumber, *The Company of Words: Hegel, Language, and Systematic Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993); Jere O’Neill Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Jim Veron, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Language* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007); Jeffrey Reid, *Real Words: Language and System in Hegel* (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

<sup>71</sup> Hegel is attributed with “the discovery of the history of philosophy.” Heidegger acknowledges Hegel as “the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experience the history of thinking.” This insight is mentioned in Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being* (New Jersey: Humanities, 1985), pp. 4-5, and, see Jacques Taminiaux, who uses a translated source of “Hölderlin and Hegel,” in *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, (trs. & ed.) Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 203. Main text, of course, is Martin Heidegger, *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, (trs.) Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).

<sup>72</sup> Published earlier in 1980 as Volume 39 of *Heidegger’s Complete Works*, a new English translation is recently made available. See Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine,”* (trs.) William McNeill & Julia Ireland (Urban: Indiana University Press, 2014).

<sup>73</sup> Robert Bernasconi in fact puts the dateline as early as 1919, quoting the impact of Hölderlin then translated works on Heidegger (“these two books hit us students like and earthquake”). See “History is Seldom’: Hölderlin and Heidegger,” in *The Question of Language*, op.

enigmatic influences<sup>74</sup> (whom he addresses as “the poet of poet”<sup>75</sup>). And this obsessive interest lies solely on the fact that the former’s “poetry was borne on by the poetic vocation to write expressly of the essence of poetry.”<sup>76</sup> “We may know something about the relations between philosophy and poetry,” Heidegger had earlier mentioned in the *Metaphysics*, “but we know nothing of the dialogue [*seinsgeschichtlich*] between poet and thinker, who [to quote Hölderlin] ‘dwell near to one another on mountains farthest apart’.”<sup>77</sup> Hölderlin “the poet” (as Hegel was “the thinker”) will become the launching pad in formulating much of Heideggerian controversial thoughts—

“All philosophical thinking, and precisely the most rigorous and most prosaic, is in itself poetic, and yet is never poetic art (*Dichkunst*). Likewise, a poet’s work—like Hölderlin’s hymns—can be thoughtful in the highest degree, and yet is never philosophy.”<sup>78</sup>

And, would the above statement imply that Heidegger was attempting a relative recast of Platonic hierarchies on genres via Hölderlin, between poetry (*poiesis*) and thinking (*noein*), as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe<sup>79</sup> illustrates? Peter Fenves considers Hölderlin’s appropriation and transformation of Leibnizian

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cit., pp. 29-47, esp. p. 29. Also, significant to the dateline of the first Hölderlin Lectures, is the resignation of Martin Heidegger from the Rectorate a couple of months later. Heidegger ran three lectures on Hölderlin. The first two in 1934/35 and 1941/42, and concluding with the last in 1942.

<sup>74</sup> Heidegger’s main influence comes from Theology, although his Doctorate was on *Theory of Judgment Psychologism* (1913). Edmund Husserl was his teacher. The works of Søren Kierkegaard and Fyodor Dostoevsky were then translated. Hegel and Schelling were already invoking interests. Nietzsche’s *Will to Power* was already available. Heidegger was interested too in the poems of Rilke, Trakl and Dilthey.

<sup>75</sup> Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” (tr.) Douglas Scott, in *Existence and Being*, (Chicago; Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), pp. 291-315, esp. p. 295.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 294-95.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” pp. 353-92, esp. pp. 391-92.

<sup>78</sup> Quoted, Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche I* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 329.

<sup>79</sup> See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*, (tr.) Jeff Fort (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 2007).



terminologies (arrest of “divine wisdom”), as “poetological reflections,” in line to what the later attempt to formulate a “poetic logic.”<sup>80</sup> Heidegger’s compelling forays into poetry is extensively linguistic and phenomenological: metaphors and embodiments.<sup>81</sup> “The essence of art is poetry,” for Heidegger, which, also, is “the founding of truth.”<sup>82</sup> “Art,” therein, “as the setting-into-work of truth is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but... to bring our own essence itself to take a stand in the truth of beings.”<sup>83</sup> Further, it charts a fresh post-subjective thinking on language, art, and thought—by engaging poetry as parataxis.<sup>84</sup>

Whether it was the lecture on Hölderlin’s [primordial] essence or discussion on Georg Trakl’s (1887-1914) “Poetic Work,”<sup>85</sup> Heidegger’s attempt to do poetry resounds a totally new challenge onto how the directions on the debate of language and historicity are to be further carried forward. “When

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<sup>80</sup> Peter Fenves, *Arresting Language: From Leibniz to Benjamin* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 6.

<sup>81</sup> The “essence of poetry must be understood through the essence of language,” argues Martin Heidegger, and, “in the reserve manner, the sense of language must be understood through the essence of poetry.” See *Existence and Being*, op. cit., p. 307.

<sup>82</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Basic Writings*, (ed.) David Farrell Krell & (tr.) Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarpersCollins Publishers, [1977] 1993), p. 199.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>84</sup> Essentially a modernist style of juxtaposing words in random rather following logical rules or operating meaning-centered order: “Conjoined by *and*, phrases and events follow each other, but their succession does not obey a categorical order... Paratext thus connotes the abyss of Not-Being which pens between phrases, it stresses the surprise that something begins when what is said is said.” See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, (tr.) Georges van Den Abeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 66. Adorno uses this method to examine Hölderlin late lyric poetry by delineating “the sphere of the coincidence of content and form, their specific unity within the substance of work.” “Parataxis: On Holderlin’s late Poetry,” in *Notes to Literature, Vol. 2*, (tr.) S. Weber Nicholson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 109-149, esp. p. 140.

<sup>85</sup> Martin Heidegger, “Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work,” in *On the Way to Language* (tr.) Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, [1971] 1982), pp. 159-98.

Hölderlin poetizes the essence of the poet,” Heidegger concludes, “he poetizes the relations that do not have their ground in the ‘subjectivity’ of human beings.”<sup>86</sup> Reading Hölderlin’s poetizing (*Dichten*) therefore provoked Heidegger’s thinking (*Denken*) of Being.<sup>87</sup> If Hölderlin had brought forth the anxiety of what it means to be Greek<sup>88</sup> and, crucially, German<sup>89</sup>—Trakl’s

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<sup>86</sup> Refer Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn: ‘The Ister’*, (trs.) William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 165.

<sup>87</sup> Heidegger, notes Keith Hoeller in his “Translators’ Introduction,” is obviously not doing a literary criticism of Hölderlin. A claim Heidegger himself defended in his 1971 fourth “Preface”—“The present *Elucidations* do not claim to be contributions to research in the history of literature or aesthetics. They spring from a necessity of thought.” See Martin Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, op. cit., p. 8 & p. 21. Lacoue-Labarthe also observes that the thought, as a *technê*, as an “essence of knowledge,” allows Heidegger to substitute “*Denken* and *Dichten* for science,” toward a function—

“This function may be allotted to art because it is in its essence *Dichtung*, and in its turn *Dichtung* is conceived as more essentially *Sprache* (language) and this latter as *Sage*: myth. Only a myth, in other words, is able to allow a people to accede to its own language and thereby to situate itself as such in History. The historical mission of a poet is to bestow his language upon a people.”

See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, (tr.) Chris Turner (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 55-56.

<sup>88</sup> James Phillips, commenting on the notion and politics of people (*volk*), observes:

“Hölderlin asks of himself the impossible. Witnessing the fall of Greece through art, he nonetheless does not renounce poetry. What Hölderlin asks of himself is a differentiation from the Greeks that does not depart from their realm. Poetry is to retain the concreteness of the reified and yet it is to heed the uncanny of the national.”

This “uncanny,” for both Hölderlin and Heidegger, Phillips concurs, is about promises of “a nationalism more deeply rooted than any chauvinism and a reconciliation more inclusive than any cosmopolitanism.” See *Heidegger’s Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 210 & p. 217. Lacoue-Labarthe too notes that “Heidegger, following Hölderlin’s practice directly, ‘invents’ a Greece.” Greece as the “finitude,” but represents “*a fortiori* National Socialism,” and, therein, “national aestheticism,” i.e., Germany. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, op. cit., p. 58; and, also, on similar lines, Charles Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005).

“[s]omething strange is the soul on the earth” stands justified by Heidegger in calling for the need of a “dialogue of thinking with poetry [that] aims to call forth the *nature* of language, so that mortals may learn again to live within language.”<sup>90</sup> This “dialogue” (*seinsgeschichtlich*), mentioned earlier too, is at the heart of language-ontology:

“Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. ...poesy... is the most original form of poetry in the essential sense. Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, poesy appropriates in language because language preserves the original essence of poetry.”<sup>91</sup>

In privileging poetry, Heidegger tried to assert poetry as the essence of art; poetry as the progenitor and elucidator of truth; that Being is found in the poet’s “word,” in the poet’s language—“poetic thought” over “science”<sup>92</sup>—Being is language, or “coming to language.” For, overall, “language alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first time.”<sup>93</sup> In helplessly attempting to overcome the anthropocentric triad of western metaphysics, i.e., the order of temporality-

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<sup>89</sup> The manifest of this contrast refers to the much exploited letter of Hölderlin to his friend Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff (1775-1825)—

“But what is one’s own must be learned as thoroughly as what is foreign. For that reason the Greeks are indispensable to us. But precisely in what is our own, in what is our national gift, we will not be able to keep apace with them, since, as I said, the *free* employment of *what is one’s own* is most difficult.”

—which finds spirited commentaries (critical, by Martin Heidegger, and polemical, by Peter Szondi). See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I*, op. cit., p. 104. Also, Jeff Fort remarks that Heidegger assigned poetry the task of thinking, something which philosophy could no longer do (enumerated in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”), because he was attempting “a political program based *a mytho-poetic annunciation of the historical destiny of Germany and the German people.*” See “Translator’s Introduction: The Courage of Thought,” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*, op. cit., p. ix.

<sup>90</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>91</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” op. cit., p. 199.

<sup>92</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>93</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” op. cit., p. 198.

being-language,<sup>94</sup> and also in attempting to situate an ontology of poetizing-thinking language, i.e., the order of historicity in philosophizing, Heidegger blamelessly turned to Hölderlin:

“Hölderlin writes poetry about the essence of poetry—but not in the sense of a timelessly valid concept. This essence of poetry belongs to a determinate time. But not in such a way that it merely conforms to this time, as to one which is already in existence. It is that Hölderlin, in the act of establishing the essence of poetry, first determines a new time.”<sup>95</sup>

Heidegger however remains unforgiving.<sup>96</sup> His preoccupation with Hölderlin has been scathingly attributed to a disillusionment with the “language of politics,” a grim reminder of his 10-months Rectorship at Freiburg University, and thereof the delusional and guilty shift to a “language of poetry,”<sup>97</sup> or “poetry as politics.”<sup>98</sup> Robert Bernasconi (b. 1950)<sup>99</sup> also uses the same tone of

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<sup>94</sup> “Poetry,” situates Heidegger, “is the primitive language of historical people.” See Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, op. cit., p. 307.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>96</sup> Instead of listing out Heidegger’s many interlocutors on the question of National Socialism, Víctor Farías, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Tom Rockmore being the sensational and prolific amongst them. See the crisp and comprehensive review on the divide by Dominique Janicaud: Heidegger “intended to build a politics on the basis of an ontology, while his censors claim to judge the ontology on the basis of the politics.” See “Heidegger’s Politics: Determinable or Not?,” (tr.) Pierre Adler, in *Social Research*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Winter 1989, pp. 819-847, esp. p. 847. For an extensive and sober elaboration on the same, see Dominique Janicaud, *The Shadow of That Thought: Heidegger and the Question of Politics* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996).

<sup>97</sup> William S. Allen confronts that this “turning to the language of poetry was no arbitrary choice arising from his disillusionment with the language of politics,” a faint attempt in “not only setting out his position by re-establishing the terms of his philosophical work after the failure of his political engagements during his rectorship.” See William S. Allen, *Ellipsis*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>98</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*, op. cit.

<sup>99</sup> Robert Bernasconi comments:

“The parallel between the experience of the poet Hölderlin and his own experience as a thinker is crucial to Heidegger’s thought of ‘another beginning’ (*der andere Anfang*). Both experiences arise initially as a default. For the poet, it is the

indictment to appraise Heidegger's complicit silence, the "said" and "unsaid," and the different political phases of his "career as a thinker," making Hölderlin and Poetry a perfect recluse (or, rather, "unconcealment"<sup>100</sup>) for habitation of the *Ereignis* (event). The value of Heidegger's poetry to his thinking is however less complicating, unlike the difficult task posed in drawing the line of distinction as the case is with Nietzsche's poems and his thinking, or Hölderlin's almost total preoccupation with poetry. "Heidegger's poetic words are set into the philosophical substance of his thinking."<sup>101</sup> In reviewing a literal reading of Heidegger's poems by George Steiner (b. 1929),<sup>102</sup> Babette Babich (b. 1956) endorses the "masterly overview" undertaken by William Richardson<sup>103</sup> (b. 1920) and proposes that if "most readers of Heidegger's poetry have been literary scholars... the value of this poetry for his [Heidegger] thinking... is plain for philosophy."<sup>104</sup> A dismissive tendency on Heidegger does subsist, although he was not a poet in the first instance.

Notwithstanding the usual righteousness in post-Holocaust thoughts, the perfect alibi as well as guise in cornering Heidegger's implicit and explicit political franchisee revolves around the theme that "language is grounded in silence."<sup>105</sup> Heidegger, asserts Gabriel Ricci, "tried to flesh out the way language

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departure of the gods; for the thinker, it is the failure of the truth of Being to arrive, Heidegger understands both these experiences as experiences of language. ... *Ereignis* is the word of the thinker of thinking, as Hölderlin's word *the holy* was the word of the poet of poetry"

See *The Question of Language*, op. cit., p. 90.

<sup>100</sup> For an excellent study on Heidegger's grounding of ontology on unconcealment, refer Mark A. Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>101</sup> Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>102</sup> Refer George Steiner, *Martin Heidegger* (Sussex: Harvester, 1978).

<sup>103</sup> Refer William J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

<sup>104</sup> Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood*, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

<sup>105</sup> Alejandro A. Vallega's examination of this silence, echoing Fançoise Dastur's "to make silence come to the word," is pertinently important in the formulation of *Da-sein*:

is existentially suited to probe the depths of consciousness. In his own effort at verse in *The Thinker as Poet*, he [Heidegger] addressed the proximity of poetic thinking to Being. As he put it, 'poetry that thinks is in truth the topology (*Ortskunde*) of Being'. The word *Ortskunde* indicates the familiarity that poetry has with the place in which Being resides."<sup>106</sup> Ricci sums up Heidegger's *Dasein* in the context of deploying strategic multiplicities:

"When philosophy embraces the historical, the foundational role of sensuous creation is also acknowledged. Heidegger's early philosophy, with *Dasein* as its centerpiece, simultaneously embraces the grand aspirations of philosophical ontology, since *Dasein* is that ontic entity endowed with ontological privilege, and equally acknowledge the explicit historicity of philosophy, since *Dasein* is the paradigmatic historical entity. That entity which is forever comported toward completion in a process that involves that self-transcending dynamic through which it is capable of creating out that which creates it. How the poetic emerges as a philosophical discourse in Heidegger's later philosophy must recognize that *Dasein* is simultaneously posited as ontological and historical."<sup>107</sup>

The tautological attempt to exhaust subjectivity through the ontology of

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"...silence figures the abyssal withdrawal of being, and Language may be said to be grounded in silence as it unfolds in the reservedness of the word exposed to its silences and lack. At the same time, this undergoing of silence in reservedness also figures the opening to the overflowing of being. In the undergoing of their silence language and word find a limit that situates them, and that does so as they encounter a relation to all senses of beings that they cannot determine, control, or fully preconceive. It is that sense of impossibility of domination that grounds language in the abyssal fecund opening of beings."

See Alejandro A. Vallega, *Sense and Finitude: Encounters at the Limits of Language, Art, and the Political* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), pp. 35-36. For a reading of Heidegger's silence on the Jewish Question, see Berel Lang, *Heidegger's Silence* (London: Athlone, 1996).

<sup>106</sup> Gabriel Ricci, *Time Consciousness: The Philosophical Uses of History* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), p. 125.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

language in Martin Heidegger is captured in the formulaic expression that “language is the house of being.”<sup>108</sup> While Heidegger maintained that “the original language is the language of poetry”<sup>109</sup>—his formulation of/on language is inconclusively premised on the notion of bringing the “being of language to language.”<sup>110</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1903-1961), who was a student of Heidegger, saw the linguistic faultlines of *Dasein*: “the subject who no longer has the impression that he coincides with his own speech.”<sup>111</sup> However, Merleau-Ponty’s “indirect ontology” or ontological diplopia (double vision), developed in *The Visible and the Invisible*,<sup>112</sup> remains “incomplete,”<sup>113</sup> notwithstanding the attempt that “it discounts the ontological role of language.”<sup>114</sup> Merleau-Ponty merely stated the “pre-objective”<sup>115</sup> topologies that “language has a flesh” (‘*Sur la phénoménologie du langage*’)<sup>116</sup> and “perception” is the body-constant subject,

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<sup>108</sup> “A Dialogue on Language,” in Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, op. cit., pp. 1-54.

<sup>109</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted, in William S. Allen, *Ellipsis*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>110</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>111</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, (tr.) Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), p. 67.

<sup>112</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible, Followed by Working Notes*, (tr.) Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

<sup>113</sup> Douglas Low “dangerous” task of finalizing Merleau-Ponty’s work is however inconclusive, despite the claim to project a presupposedly shift from phenomenology to language in the latter’s work. The embodied subject is simply aware of its linguistic consciousness and its difficulty. See *Merleau-Ponty’s Last Vision: A Proposal for the Completion of The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000).

<sup>114</sup> Christopher Watkin, *Phenomenology or Deconstruction: The Question of Ontology in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 34.

<sup>115</sup> Merleau-Ponty maintained that “being in the world” is a “pre-objective perspective” (precluding the “act of consciousness”) that finds itself limited to a function of “the junction [between] the ‘psychical’ and the ‘physiological’.” Reference is from the recently translated version: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (tr.) Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 82.

<sup>116</sup> “By introducing the language of flesh,” David Brubaker reviews Merleau-Ponty by defending that “he speaks of the body in pre-objective terms and includes it in a formula for something which can never be understood as an object, namely, the actuality of the concrete life

largely ignoring the “historical dimension of language that is so central to Heidegger’s conception.”<sup>117</sup> Dastur limits Merleau-Ponty’s “‘critique’ of language” as one that is still premised on the traditional body-soul dialectics of “reflexive philosophy,” arguing that the “corporeity” of “living speech” is but an attempt to “rejoin what the poets know obscurely of language and what one among them knew how to explain, namely, that its secret resides precisely in monological nature.”<sup>118</sup> The notion of temporality, via “experience,” which is taken up in the concluding chapter, similarly, will become the philosophical perverse for thinking language and poetic language.<sup>119</sup> The temporal order of *Dasein* vis-à-vis ontology and language would similarly become the main preoccupation for most of all post-Heideggerian continental thinkers<sup>120</sup>—poetry being the much-

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of a person, suddenly, there is a formula for the union of thought with the native and self-evident place of the flesh of the body. ... The body is not merely a thing to be understood in terms of a well-defined physical conditions open to the perception of any external observer; it is suddenly a pre-objective *interior* which is displayed within subjectivity.” See David Brubaker, “The Problem of the World: Merleau-Ponty on Flesh, Soul and Place,” in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. 79: Does the World Exist?: Plurisignificant CIPHERING of Reality*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), pp. 167-181, p. 174.

<sup>117</sup> Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>118</sup> Françoise Dastur, “The Body of Speech,” in Bernard Flynn, Wayne J. Froman and Robert Vallier (eds.), *Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), pp. 257-274, esp. p. 269.

<sup>119</sup> Joseph J. Kockelmans remarks:

“Everyone who has experience (Being [Sein])... has at the same time experienced the duality of the insurmountable twofoldness of the thinking language and the poetic language; thinkers and poets, in a way that is characteristic of both, preserve language, ‘spare’ it, bring it to completion.”

See *On Heidegger and Language* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, [1972] 1986), p. 165.

<sup>120</sup> Between Heidegger and Hölderlin, right till contemporary engagements on such continuities, an excellent reading is Marc Froment-Meurice, *That is to Say: Heidegger’s Poetics*, (tr.) Jan Plug (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).



valorized entity.<sup>121</sup>

Before examining the question of poetic thinking and the summons for language, and locating where the trajectories and intersections of such discourses are headed in contemporary times, let us take a brief detour on the philosophical audits on/of *language* as an ontic contention of ontological exasperation in thaw (the thinking of language and language as or of thought). The refusal of a historicity of philosophy (and therefore the call for language) was a pervading challenge and politics, as we have seen in the post-Idealism critiques, even before contemporary initiatives took an all-together different impetus.

In the list of such exasperation, it is not easy to ignore the Frankfurt School.<sup>122</sup> There can be a sense of mischief here too.<sup>123</sup> The influence of

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<sup>121</sup> Who has not spoken about poetry and language of late? See the semiological inheritance of Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, (tr.) Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Giorgio Agamben, *The End of the Poem*, (tr.) Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); William Franke, *Poetry and Apocalypse: Theological Disclosures of Poetic Language* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Alain Badiou, *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, (tr.) Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) and *The Age of the Poets*, (trs.) Bruno Bosteels and Emily Apter (London: Verso, 2014); Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Poetry as Experience* (tr.) Andrea Tarnowski (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999) and *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*, (tr.) Jeff Fort (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Jacques Derrida, *Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan*, (ed.) Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Kevin McLaughlin, *Poetic Force: Poetry after Kant* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), etc.

<sup>122</sup> Gerhard Richter has remarkably defended the generic use of the 1924 Felix Weil-founded Institute for Social Research, its members as well as those associated with its members, as both a generalized and homogenized entity. Remarkably so, because of the brand-claim it proposes to have found through a common bond, in the interrogation of the unifying term *denkbilder*. For a definition on this term—see below, footnote 134.

<sup>123</sup> On the qualification that initially brought the Frankfurt School members together, Rolf Wiggershaus opines:

“But what was it that united the members of the Frankfurt School, even if only temporarily in most cases? Was there something all of them had in common?”

neopositivism as ubiquitous to Frankfurt School's engagement with language is moreover redoubtable.<sup>124</sup> Whether they understood the debate of the day and its significance remains inconclusive. Moreover, within the main exponents of the School, there are unspoken differences on the predicament of language and thought.<sup>125</sup> For instance, true to the School's objective, Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), under the influence of Karl Kraus (1874-1936) and German Romanticism, and strongly a loyalist to Hegelian 'logic' of the subject and object, developed a Marxian 'socio-historic' perspective on language and philosophy, primarily in *Eclipse of Reason* (1947), simply to objectify an attempt secure an approach to the phenomena of society.<sup>126</sup> The School's two giants Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) solemnly tendered the group's objective and problematic in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944):

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The first generation of the Frankfurt School consisted wholly of Jews or people who had largely been forced back into an affiliation with Judaism by the Nazis."

"Jews must have had a sense of the alienatedness and inauthenticity of life in bourgeois-capitalist society, comments Wiggershaus further, "no less acute than that of the working class." See *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*, (tr.) Michael Robertson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 4-5. This book is by and large the most authoritative historical account of the School.

<sup>124</sup> In 1942, Max Horkheimer wrote a letter to Kirchheimer highlighting that he himself is working on Enlightenment, Adorno on mass culture, and Marcuse on language, saying that all the "three section are, of course, closely connected." Wiggershaus observes that there is an inherent pattern of language becoming a victim to its own two contradictions—"functionalized and schematized." *Ibid.*, p. 505.

<sup>125</sup> Zoltán Tarr, *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1977/2011).

<sup>126</sup> On language and philosophy, Horkheimer comments:

"Language reflects the longings of the oppressed and the plight of nature; it releases the mimetic impulse. The transformation of this impulse into the universal medium of language rather than into destructive action means that potentially nihilistic energies work for reconciliation. [...] Philosophy is at one with art in reflecting passion through language and thus transferring it to the sphere of experience and memory."

See Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (London; New York: Continuum, [1947] 2004), p. 121.

“If public life has reached a state in which thought is being turned inescapably into a commodity and language into celebration of the commodity, the attempt to trace the sources of this degradation must refuse obedience to the current linguistic and intellectual demands before it is rendered entirely futile by the consequence of those demands for world history. [...] In reflecting on its own guilt, therefore, thought finds itself deprived not only of the affirmative reference to science and everyday phenomena but also of the conceptual language of opposition.”<sup>127</sup>

It is not surprising therefore to note Adorno’s extensive and motivated reference to Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956)—who actually “wanted to provoke social change” but could not do so because “in order to resist the all-powerful system of communication they must rid themselves of any communicative means that would perhaps make them accessible to the public.”<sup>128</sup> And, also, at another level, Adorno is a sheer intellectual prodigy—easily lambasting Heidegger,<sup>129</sup> or dissecting Hegel,<sup>130</sup> or Kant,<sup>131</sup> rather polemically.

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<sup>127</sup> The quote is from the “Preface (1944 and 1947)” in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, (ed.) Günselin Schmid Noerr & (tr.) Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. xvi-xvii.

<sup>128</sup> Brecht’s work mentioned here refers to *Saint Joan of the Stockyards*. See Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, (eds.) Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, (tr.) Robert Hullot-Kentor (London & New York: Continuum, [1997] 2002), pp. 242-43.

<sup>129</sup> While privileging Karl Kraus’ ontological view of language, Adorno, paraphrasing Gershom Scholem, finds Heidegger’s procedure in situating language as “Teutonizing cabbalism.” Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, (tr.) E.B. Ashton (London and New York: Routledge, [1973] 2004), p. 112.

<sup>130</sup> “Hegelian dialectics [*Aufhebung*],” Adorno argues, “was a dialectics [*linguistic figures*] without language”—something which Hegel does not need too—since he “remained an adept of [the then] current science.” *Ibid.*, p. 163. Similarly, Adorno’s critique on Hegel’s claim that language is “the perfect expression... for the mind” or having the “highest power possessed by mankind” (p. 117) is conceived from a reading of Hegel’s *Logic* and *Phenomenology*. “Without batting an eye,” Adorno accusingly remarks:

“Hegel uses language to convict language of the empty pretense of its self-satisfied meaning. The function of language in such passages is not apologetic but critical. It disavows the finite judgment that in its particularity acts as though it had the absolute truth, objectively and without being able to do anything about it.

Frankfurt's diversity is also seen, in another instance, in a summation by Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), previously an assistant to Heidegger when he moved to Freiburg in 1928, on a definition of "art"—one that "can express its radical potential only *as art*, in its own language and image, which *invalidate* the ordinary language, the '*prose du monde*'."<sup>132</sup> This kind of statement is consistent with how Frankfurt School too, atypical of histories of concepts, employs gestural technique of paleonomy,<sup>133</sup> avowed with "specific and potentially unstable figures of presentation," as Gerhard Richter highlights, through a much "neglected literary genre" of the "thought-image" or *denkbilder*.<sup>134</sup> "The Denkbild," Richter explains, "encodes a poetic form of condensed, epigrammatic writing in textual snapshots, flashing up as poignant meditations that typically fasten upon a seemingly peripheral detail or marginal topic, usually without a developed plot or a prescribed narrative agenda, yet charged with theoretical insight."<sup>135</sup> The theoretical thinking is re-embedded within Critical Theory, especially seen in the (1960s) violent students resistance to Theodor Adorno about the praxis of reality and theory.<sup>136</sup> David Farrell Krell (b. 1944) observes

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Equivocation is intended to demonstrate, with logical means, the inappropriateness of static logic for something that is inherently mediated and that by virtue of existing is in the process of becoming."

Theodor W. Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies*, (tr.) Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 116

<sup>131</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, (tr.) Livingstone Rodney, (ed.) Rold Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

<sup>132</sup> Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 103 (*italics* in original).

<sup>133</sup> Jacques Derrida defines "paleonomy" as "the maintenance of an *old name* in order to launch a new concept." Quoted, in Gerhard Richter, *Thought-Images: Frankfurt School Writer' Reflections from Damaged Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 1.

<sup>134</sup> "Denkbilder," Richter comments, "can be understood as conceptual engagements with the aesthetic and as aesthetic engagements with the conceptual, hovering between philosophical critique and aesthetic production." *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>136</sup> Heidegger too unsuccessfully attempts to invalidate the "primacy of the theoretical... to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side." See, Martin Heidegger,

that Adorno was simply and faithfully reaffirming Walter Benjamin and Heidegger's "what is poetized compels us to philosophize."<sup>137</sup> The poetic, post-Heidegger, somewhere lost its way and, also, aura, which also saw the disenfranchisement of the aesthetic and the merging of disenchantment.

It is however ill-advised to ignore the corpus of intersections and mediations the Frankfurt School built around—both philosophically and historically—notwithstanding the raw directions on which philosophy ended or parted. This period, in a confusing way, saw the worst. It opened up a whole range of discursive practices that are pertinent to contemporary debacles. Adorno, in particular, failed to arrest the margins but definitely suspected the predominant disjoints on language philosophy and the emergent phenomenological expressions—self-admitting that his *dialectics* is, "literally," a summation of "language as the organon of thought."<sup>138</sup>

For the School firstly there is a barrage of canons to be fired: Enlightenment being the first casualty. Then, of course, the attack on mathematization, and the foundations of calculation-based epistemes and nature in western thoughts.<sup>139</sup> Then comes word of accusation about infantile linkages

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*Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, (tr.) Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2000), p. 50. Whereas, for Adorno, it was outrightly explicit:

"I still believe that one should hold on to theory, precisely under the general coercion toward praxis in a functional and pragmatized world. And I will not permit even the most recent events to dissuade me from what I have written."

See Gerhard Richter (ed. & tr.), "Who's Afraid of the Ivory Tower? A Conversation with Theodor W. Adorno," in in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil: Adorno and Late Philosophical Modernity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), pp. 227-238, esp. p. 237.

<sup>137</sup> David Farrell Krell, "Twelve Anacoluthic Theses on Adorno's 'Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry'." *Ibid.*, pp. 195-205, esp. p. 195.

<sup>138</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>139</sup> Although it appears to be a stray comment that the "adaptation to death through language contains the schema of modern mathematics," it significantly alludes to post-Galileo's "mathematization of nature" and therefore the very foundation of Enlightenment. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, op. cit., p. 48.

between ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ as frugal faculties—and the primacy of language, no doubt<sup>140</sup>—which, accordingly, is guided by a presumed fear that “philosophy cannot survive without linguistic effort.”<sup>141</sup> In the process, methods were critiqued upon: the limits Adorno saw in Hegel<sup>142</sup> is on the consideration that “all philosophical language is a language in opposition to language, marked with the stigma of its own impossibility.”<sup>143</sup> Hegel, Adorno deliberates, failed to apply a method called “determinate negation.”<sup>144</sup> Clearly, and seriously, Hegel was on the wrong foot:

“Hegel uses language to convict language of the empty pretense of

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<sup>140</sup> Theodor W. Adorno comments:

“[T]he presentation of philosophy is not an external matter of indifference to it but immanent to its idea. Its integral, nonconceptually mimetic moment of expression is objectified only by presentation in language. The freedom of philosophy is nothing but the capacity to lend a voice to its unfreedom. If more is claimed for the expressive moment, it will degenerate into a *weltanschauung*; where the expressive moment and the duty of presentation are given up, philosophy comes to resemble science.”

See *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>141</sup> The primacy of the sociolect in language has always been the primacy for Adorno:

The “alliance of philosophy and science aims at the virtual abolition of language and thus of philosophy, and yet philosophy cannot survive without the linguistic effort. ... For to abolish language in thought is not to demythologize thought. Along with language, philosophy would blindly sacrifice whatever is not merely significative in dealing with its object; it is in language alone that like knows like.”

*Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>142</sup> “Hegel’s language,” Adorno accuses, “has the demeanor of the language of doctrine. What gives it that air is the preponderance of quasi-oral delivery over the written text.” See Theodor W. Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies*, o. cit., p. 109.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>144</sup> Adorno wrongly applied this phrase yet it is constitutive of the stratagem of his negative dialectics, wherein “to break out of the reification of consciousness and its objects, it cannot comply with the rules of the game of reified consciousness without negating itself, even though in other respects it is not permitted simply to disregard those rules if it does not want to degenerate into empty words.” *Ibid.*, p. 101.

its self-satisfied meaning. The function of language in such passages is not apologetic but critical. It disavows the finite judgment that in its particularity acts as though it had the absolute truth, objectively and without being able to do anything about it. Equivocation is intended to demonstrate, with logical means, the inappropriateness of static logic for something that is inherently mediated and that by virtue of existing is in the process of becoming. Turning logic against itself is the dialectical salt in such equivocations.”<sup>145</sup>

Wherein, in attacking Hegel’s “concept of the concept [*Begriff*]” as lacking “clarity” because of its “equivocation”—Adorno then goes on to accuse him of “pure nominalism,” which is but a premise for “bourgeoisie bedrock,”<sup>146</sup> therein “denying the existence of objective truth.”<sup>147</sup> Moreover, in his “Depersonalization and Existential Ontology,” Adorno equates Schelling’s “egoity” and Heideggerian<sup>148</sup> principal’s principle of his works as an “essence of subjectivity *qua* existence.”<sup>149</sup> Similarly, Adorno accuses the anti-empirical methodology of Husserl-Heidegger duo and labels this as flirtation with “scientific language.”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>147</sup> This appears as a common tendency. Elsewhere, too, Rolf Wiggershaus recollects a September 1941 correspondence between Horkheimer and Adorno regarding Rudolph Carnap’s thesis of identity-reason-language, which, later on, Jürgen Habermas, Adorno’s research assistant, substantiates it by arguing that reason resides in language. Horkheimer is said to have rubbished the “Carnap people” as a history of bourgeois philosophy. See Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 504.

<sup>148</sup> Here, Rolf Wiggershaus sums Heidegger’s and Adorno’s limited perspectives on language:

“What was language? It surely meant something different to Adorno from what it meant to Heidegger. For Adorno, language was not something that came over the subjective consciousness, but rather something which only existed to the extent that subjective consciousnesses were free. But one must then distinguish between crystalline forms, which exacerbated the bitterness, and forms which were mere impoverishments.”

Ibid., p. 529.

<sup>149</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 279.

<sup>150</sup> Adorno’s view sometimes hinges on the polemical:

On Hölderlin, Adorno blames him for transforming “language into concatenation.”<sup>151</sup>

Along the rampage,<sup>152</sup> Adorno begins to falter.<sup>153</sup> All along, Adorno misread Heidegger’s ontic-ontology of language by confusing it with his own elements of “truth” and “dialectics.”<sup>154</sup> Plus, considering the oft-repeated

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“Insofar as the anticipations of the concept, the medium of exemplary thought, are confronted by empirical inquiry with concrete proof that the quasi-direct categorial view of a particular is not universal, the Husserl-Heidegger method—which avoids this test and yet flirts with a scientific language that sounds as if the test were submitted to—stands convicted of its failing.”

Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>151</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Werke*, (ed.) R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970–86), Vol. 11, p. 57. Translation as quoted in Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 528. Also, see Robert Savage, “The Polemic of the Late Work: Adorno’s Hölderlin,” in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil*, op. cit., pp. 172-194.

<sup>152</sup> Apart from *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., Adorno’s polemical capacity is also liberally exhibited in his 1964 published *The Jargon of Authenticity*, (tr.) Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

<sup>153</sup> The works of Ulrich Plass too, who finds Adorno to be a “judgmental reader” and having tendencies to make “sweeping arguments,” adequately confirms this. Plass’ comments on Adorno’s “objective” also justifies the marked limits:

The relative lack of restraint that one finds in Adorno’s essays on literature is reflected in almost obsessive musings on language and presentation [what he calls *Darstellung*]. It is as if Adorno had to make up for the lack of systematic philosophy of language with a wealth of linguistic and stylistic observations that almost invariably issue in the formulation of paradoxical figures. The persistence of paradox in the writings of the great dialectician Adorno serves as a reminder that philosophical reflection on the medium of thought, language, will not liberate thinking from its inherent intellectual and historical tensions and contradictions.”

Ulrich Plass, *Language and History in Theodor W. Adorno’s Notes to Literature* (New York; Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. xviii.

<sup>154</sup> Here, Adorno is interchangeably using the portent in language: as an ontological entity and as a dialectical process. In whichever case, Adorno is not aware of Heidegger’s dialectical emergence of language as an ontological movement within the conceptualization of an ‘ontological difference’:

“[T]he constitutive share of language in truth does not establish an identity



assertion on language as mediation (*unmittelbar*), Adorno reveals his inadequacy<sup>155</sup> and—also traps himself with his insularity on “significant language,” which is simply termed as different from “language of expression,” but because it is simply [epistemically?] “older,”<sup>156</sup> and just because it attempts to link the same with a definition of “art.”<sup>157</sup> Adorno then boldly attempts a pre-Derridean move: “Artworks are language only as writing”<sup>158</sup>—but for the exception that the soul<sup>159</sup> of the *arche* has universal and anthropocentric

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of truth and language. ... Language becomes a measure of truth only when we are conscious of the nonidentity of an expression with that which we mean. Heidegger refuses to engage in that reflection; he halts after the first step of language-philosophical dialectics.”

Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 111.

<sup>155</sup> Adorno’s view on the mediatory action of language is rather insular:

“Language mediates the particular through universality and in the constellation of the universal, but it does justice to its own universals only when they are not used rigidly in accord with the semblance of their autonomy but are rather concentrated to the extreme on what is specifically to be expressed.”

See Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112. Similarly, whether Adorno is familiar with Heidegger’s employment of the word “older,” used in the formulation of the latter’s *Ereignis*, is another issue. Heidegger’s envisaged difference in *Ereignis*, the very basis of spatial and temporal destruction, i.e., the onto-ontological difference, refers to the constitutive element of difference as “older” than Being itself. Jacques Derrida will ultimately pick on this on two counts: “older” has no differential order in temporality and “older” as a “différance has no name in our language.” See “Différance,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1982), pp. 1-28, p. 26.

<sup>157</sup> As the argument is, this is a rather bold statement from Adorno:

“Art’s purposiveness, free of any practical purpose, is its similarity to language; its being ‘without a purpose’ is its nonconceptuality, that which distinguishes art from significant language.”

*Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>158</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>159</sup> Read this statement with the footnote following immediately, below, on the contradictory statements on ‘universality’, i.e., footnote 160:

“[A]rt must through its form bring the exchangeable to critical self-consciousness. The telos of artworks is a language whose words cannot be located on the spectrum; a language whose words are not imprisoned by a prestabilized

manifests.<sup>160</sup> Eventually, Adorno reveals that there is a trait of positivist dispute<sup>161</sup> in him too: “fundamental ontology cannot annul epistemology at will”<sup>162</sup> or that the “ontological need can no more guarantee its object than the agony of the starving assures them of food.”<sup>163</sup> Which is to say—there is simply a living and healing potency in the work of art and ‘lyric poetry’:<sup>164</sup>

“The artwork must absorb into its immanent nexus its discursive components in a movement that is contrary to the externally directed, apophantic movement that releases the discursive. The language of advanced lyrical poetry achieves this, and that is how it reveals its specific dialectic. It is evident that artworks can heal the wounds that abstraction inflicts on them only through the heightening of abstraction, which impedes the contamination of the conceptual ferment with empirical reality: The concept becomes a ‘parameter’. Indeed, because art is essentially spiritual, it cannot be purely intuitive. It must also be thought: art itself thinks. The prevalence of the doctrine of intuition, which contradicts all experience of artworks, is a reflex to social reification. It amounts to the establishment of a

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universality.”

Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>160</sup> The “moment” is what Adorno never attempt to formulate:

“The moment of universality in language, without which there would be no language, does irrevocable damage to the complete objective specificity of the particular thing it wants to define.”

Theodor W. Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies*, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>161</sup> In reference is the controversy surrounding the 1961 post-conference held in Tübingen and hosted by German Sociological Association, where Karl Popper presented his 27 theses. It is a reminder of the methodological anxieties surrounding the social sciences and philosophy, which lack clarity. Refer Theodor W. Adorno et. al, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, (trs.) Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976).

<sup>162</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>164</sup> The lyric aura, for Adorno, much like Walter Benjamin’s mystical and divine language, is seen endemic, equally as a constellation for the harmony of the social. Adorno’s musical writings raise little doubt, given this captivation. See Theodor Adorno, “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” in *Notes to Literature, Vol. 1*, (tr.) Shierry Weber Nicholzen, (ed.) Rolf Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 37–54;

special sphere of immediacy that is blind to the thing-like dimensions of artworks, which are constitutive of what in art goes beyond the thing as such.”<sup>165</sup> “[I]t takes pride in standing in opposition to reality: The work actually becomes positivistic.”<sup>166</sup>

The relation of “vagueness” in the negated dialectic for clarity,<sup>167</sup> which Adorno himself confers inconsequentially as Freudian, may be summed up in the following last public interview:<sup>168</sup>

“Spiegel: In *Negative Dialectics*, we find the following resigned observation: “Philosophy, which once seemed passé, remains alive because the moment of its realization was missed.

Adorno: I would rather say that the compulsive clinging to what is positive stems from the death drive.”<sup>169</sup>

Two bulls eyes, however, for Adorno, in the gamble with the “experience of vagueness”: that “[a]rtworks move toward the idea of a language of things only by way of their own language”<sup>170</sup> and that “the ontological asceticism of

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<sup>165</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>167</sup> Rather than a tautological order, it is dogmatism guided Adorno’s explication at times. The statement however is not suggestive of how Adorno charted his negative dialectics:

“The idea of many artworks that want to realize the experience of vagueness actually demands that the boundaries of their constitutive elements be effaced. But in such artworks the vague must be made distinct. Authentic works that defy the exigency of clarity all the same posit it implicitly in order to negate it; essential to these works is not an absence of clarity but rather negated clarity.” Ibid., p. 295. See “Paralipomena.”

<sup>168</sup> Adorno’s interview with *Der Spiegel* appeared in its 5 May, 1969 issue. He died in August 1969. Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* was never completed and was posthumously published by his wife with the help of a student.

<sup>169</sup> See Appendix, “Who’s Afraid of Ivory Tower? A Conversation with Theodor W. Adorno,” (tr. & ed.) Gerhard Richter, in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil*, op. cit., pp. 227-238.

<sup>170</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, op. cit., p. 140.

language is the only way to say the unutterable.”<sup>171</sup> As rated statements, it is classic to modernism and formalism; as post-aesthetic statements, it is clearly apologetics for the avant-garde—with Adorno bringing anything but simply a poetic dimension in language to the everyday.<sup>172</sup> In fact, Adorno’s foray into language—“language without soil”<sup>173</sup> or the non-aesthetics propositions in his aesthetic theory (Marxian rigging of Hegel’s dialectics and Kant’s aesthetics)—only confirms a tautology of negatively affirming immanence of a beyond-the-concept with the tools of the conceptual (“Zum Ende”), or a radicalized thinking of alterity through non-identity as the necessary conditions toward futurity (*Auspinseln*).<sup>174</sup> In fact there are attempts to evaluate Adorno’s [social] “disenchantment” and philosophical proclivities as the “eclipse of sensuous human activity”<sup>175</sup>—often verging on reducing language as limited by “its own

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<sup>171</sup> Concentrating on what Walter Benjamin observed—“the elimination of the unutterable is no more than the concentration of language on the particular, the refusal to establish its universals as metaphysical truth”—Adorno confers this status to be “the ontological asceticism of language [which] is the only way to say the unutterable.” *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>172</sup> Krzysztof Ziarek’s “poetic dimension of the everyday” informs that—

“a liberation of the work of art from aesthetic categorizations is also... at the heart of the avant-garde. This postaesthetic understanding of the avant-garde poetry shows that, contrary to common misperceptions, the avant-garde does not exhaust itself in its negative or self-destructive impulse but reaches toward a new understanding of experience and temporality ...[through a] notion of a poetic figuration of experience in the work of art as a contestation of the technicization of the everyday. ... [T]he possibility of the work of art, its contemporary significance, lies in the alternative configuration of experience: What such a ‘post-’ or ‘nonaesthetic’ art figures is the possibility of a poetic formation of experience.”

See *The Historicity of Experience: Modernity, the Avant-Garde, and the Event* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001), pp. 4-6.

<sup>173</sup> Refer Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil*, op. cit.

<sup>174</sup> Neil Larsen, “The Idiom of Crisis: On the Historical Immanence of Language in Adorno,” in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil*, *ibid.*, pp. 117-130.

<sup>175</sup> David Brubaker, “Art and the Reenchantment of Sensuous Human Activity,” in Marlies Kronegger and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (eds.), *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. 65: The Aesthetics of Enchantment in the Fine Arts*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 137-149; also, see, J.M. Bernstein, *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

objective substance [for] social expression” (in *Minima Moralia*), or ascribing “the object of language as neither a ‘pure facticity’ nor a mere product of thought” (in *Negative Dialectics*).<sup>176</sup> Adorno’s callous and often-parabolic view on language can best be recounted in the content of what he wrote to Max Horkheimer, who was then developing “Critique of Language,” in 1941:

“I totally agree with the thesis about the antagonistic nature of every language that has yet existed . . . If humanity is still not yet mature, then it means that, in the most literal sense, it has not yet been able to speak; [Karl] Kraus's illusion was that it had lost the ability to speak. Your [Horkheimer] new variation on the philosophy of language is also very closely connected with our critique of psychology. In psychology, the utopia of a beneficent generality, however inadequately represented by logic, goes by the board, while the bad generality, i.e. simple commonness, emerges in it all the more decisively. I should like to give my passionate support to the new trend in the philosophy of language, together, of course, with its dialectical antithesis. In fact I am so convinced by it that I can hardly understand your hesitation. It should not be called critique of language, but something like ‘language and truth’ or ‘reason and language’. . . . My sense of language’s claim to truth is so strong that it vanquishes all psychology and tends to give me a degree of credulousness towards the person speaking which forms a glaring contradiction to my experience, and is usually only overcome when I see something written by the person concerned and recognize precisely that he cannot speak.”<sup>177</sup>

We shall take up further Adorno’s language problematic in the next section on music. Emerging however from the same School with a totally different conception on language is Walter Benjamin<sup>178</sup> (1892-1940), which has

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<sup>176</sup> For a discussion on similar contradictions in Adorno, see Mirko Wischke, “The Homeland of Language: A Note on Truth and Knowledge in Adorno,” (tr.) Eric Jarosinski, in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil*, op. cit., pp. 147-156.

<sup>177</sup> Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 505.

<sup>178</sup> Theodore W. Adorno offered a course on Walter Benjamin at the University of Frankfurt between 1931-32, perhaps the first of its kind on the latter.

attracted much intense exploration in recent times. Benjamin tried to establish himself as the principal mediator between Germany and the new cultural trends emanating from France and the Soviet Union. His *One-Way Street* attempts to domicile, if not a new genre, then a new avant-gardist form (the only real competitors then being Franz Kafka [1883-1924] and Robert Musil [1880-1942])—through disenchantment and “thought figure” [*Denkbild*].<sup>179</sup> However Benjamin’s explorations on language are therein much in disconnect with his colleagues. Benjamin and Heidegger’s thoughts, Howard Caygill indicates, are thematically parallel although they never met (plus, with the former “uniformly hostile” to the latter): tradition, origin, technology, and art.<sup>180</sup> Benjamin’s theology of language, illustrated in his 1916 essay, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,”<sup>181</sup> highlights language to be “an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical”<sup>182</sup>—

“The infinity of all human language always remains limited and analytic in nature, in comparison to the absolutely unlimited and creative infinity of the divine word.”<sup>183</sup>

The quantification (mathematical) and qualification (experience) involved in Benjamin’s process of situating language, observes Caygill, “translate his speculative concept of experience into philosophical linguistics... by distinguishing between the infinity of possible contents which may be communicated *through* a language, and the infinity which communicates itself *in*

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<sup>179</sup> Michael Jennings, “Walter Benjamin and the European avant-garde,” in David S. Ferris (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 18-34.

<sup>180</sup> Refer Howard Caygill, “Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition,” in Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (eds.), *Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-31.

<sup>181</sup> Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,” in *One-Way Street and Other Writings*, (tr.) Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London: NLB, 1979), pp. 107-123, esp. p. 114.

<sup>182</sup> Walter Benjamin, quoted, in Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>183</sup> Walter Benjamin, *One-Way Street and Other Writings*, op. cit., pp. 107-123, esp. p. 116.

a language, and which is anterior to its use as a medium of communication.”<sup>184</sup> Benjamin’s “speculative experience,” as interplay of visual affirmation and philosophy of language, Caygill accounts, is but “characterized by an immanent totality,” which is directly derived from Johann Georg Hamann’s (1730-1788) 1781 mystical/linguistic linguistic metacritique of Immanuel Kant.<sup>185</sup> Peter Fenves also exemplifies the postulates in Benjamin’s “divine” language/word as an imported reiteration of Kant’s postulates on human language of names as *intuitus originarius* as *intuitus derivativus*, simply by replacing the theme of “‘language and mathematics’ with the exegesis of the Book of Genesis.”<sup>186</sup> Benjamin’s introduction of “Adamic language”<sup>187</sup> (i.e., “languages passes into man”<sup>188</sup>) confronts two challenges: origin and translation (communicability) of language.

Which brings us back to the origin of language, back to Heidegger’s admittance for lack of words,<sup>189</sup> in his fundamental question: “How does the essence of language originate in the essential occurrence of being?”<sup>190</sup> The

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<sup>184</sup> Howard Caygill, *Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 15.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113, & esp. pp. 154-55.

<sup>186</sup> Peter Fenves, *The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 142-43.

<sup>187</sup> Hans Aarsleff’s work (1982) chiefly contributes to mapping seventeenth century’s widely held view on the nature of language with the notion of ‘Adamic language’. George Steiner’s (1975) is quoted here for perspective: “Each time man spoke he re-enacted, he mimed, the nominalist mechanism of creation.” Quoted in George W. Grace, *the Linguistic Construction of Reality* (London; New York; Sydney: Croom Helm), p. 14. Notwithstanding, of course, most writers nowadays identify and use the same description for Walter Benjamin’s—“*It is therefore the linguistic being of man to name things.*”

<sup>188</sup> Walter Benjamin, *One-Way Street and Other Writings*, op. cit., pp.

<sup>189</sup> Heidegger’s question is on whether “the creative opening of being in reservedness [is] out of a certain lack of words: *Es verschlägt einem das Wort.*” Quoted, Martin Heidegger, in Alejandro A. Vallega, *Sense and Finitude*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>190</sup> “The essence of language can never be determined,” Heidegger answers this question, “otherwise than by naming the origin of language.” See Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to*

mimetic perversion for the “original language,” which Maurice Olender (b. 1946) remarks, as a product of and gaining its impetus from “nationalist ideology,”<sup>191</sup> therefore, is something that has been concurrently interpreted as interchangeable as well as comfortably parallel, in the readings of western tradition. Before going into the details, it is worthwhile to address the same through a rapid survey of an unlikely trio: Heidegger-Benjamin-Freud.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) mentioned about “the original archaic method of communication between individuals” as akin to something like how insects communicate in their communities without words or speech.<sup>192</sup> Freud’s atrocious answer to the origin of human language therefore involves a “course of phylogentic evolution,” i.e., the appearance of the unconscious linguistic—whose undescribable but suspectable function-process (the thing-language or non-linguistic) involved in the sensory impetus for this unconscious was already situated in his 1915 essay, “The Unconscious,” which described the unconscious as operating on “the relations of words to unconscious thing-representation.”<sup>193</sup> The term “transference” (*Übertragung*), which first appeared in *The Interpretation of Dream* (1900), will become central to post-Freudian analysis of realizing (mediation, or “suggestion”) the linguistic-language structures in relation to the parameters of desire and the paramount question of intersubjectivity between the analyst-analysand.<sup>194</sup> Subsequently Jacques Lacan<sup>195</sup>

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*Philosophy (of the Event)*, (trs.) Richard Rojcewicz and Danniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), pp. 392-93.

<sup>191</sup> Maurice Olender, “From Language of Adam to the Pluralism of Babel,” in *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2, December 1997, pp. 51-59, p. 55.

<sup>192</sup> Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Vol. 2 of the Penguin Freud Library*, (tr.) James Starkey, (ed.) James Starkey with the assistance of Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 86.

<sup>193</sup> Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious,” in *On Metapsychology, Vol. 2 of the Penguin Freud Library*, (ed.) Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 210.

<sup>194</sup> Russell Grigg “argued that the unconscious is essentially a discourse, not merely structured like a language, and that with changes in the nature of this discourse, the nature of interpretation itself has also been forced to undergo modification.” See Russel Grigg, *Lacan, Language, and Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 58.



(1901-1981) developed a linguistic nature of this “unconscious” as structured like a language—therein giving the register of the “symbolic” as the central primacy in psychoanalysis—from where language can be experienced (the “imaginary” or second register) and from where the real or *jouissance* (third register) actually stems from. At another level, Benjamin’s “time-moment” (*Zietmoment*) too talks about the appearance of how human possession of language (“canon”) takes place: “on the basis of which we can bring towards clarification the obscurity attached to a concept of non-senuous similarity [mimetic-faculty of language].”<sup>196</sup> If mimicry is a natural presupposition for the “gift” (either “magical” or language); the “answer” to this, according to Benjamin, also “presupposes a clear reflection on the phylogenetic importance of mimetic behaviour [...]—the powerful compulsion to become similar and also to behave mimetically [...]—[w]hat the stars affected millennia ago in the moment of being born into human existence wove itself into human existence on the basis of similarity.”<sup>197</sup> Kia Lindross examines the phases and issues Benjamin took up, given the paramount politics of the day, but delineate such corporeality by observing that: “[f]rom the beginning, Benjamin bound the ideas of beauty and mystery, also in his idea of art critique. However, the mystical did not apply to the *work* of art, but rather to language and the critique surrounding the works.”<sup>198</sup>

And—lastly, the non-phylogentic version in Heidegger. Words lack, for Heidegger, and, again, Adorno saw this problem, but insufficiently.<sup>199</sup> Otherwise,

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<sup>195</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, (tr.) Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977).

<sup>196</sup> Walter Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar (1933),” (tr.) Knut Tarnowski, in *New German Critique*, No. 17, Special Walter Benjamin Issue, Spring 1979, pp. 65-69.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>198</sup> See Kia Lindross, *Now-Time Image-Space: Temporalization of Politics in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy of History and Art* (University of Jyväskylä, Finland: SoPhi, 1998), p. 113.

<sup>199</sup> In a way, as Adorno says—

“No concept would be thinkable, indeed none would be possible without the “more” that makes a language of language. ... This is what Heidegger makes of it: something added to the individual entity. He pursues dialectics to the point of

for Heidegger, it was a simple affair: “The thinker says Being. The poet names or hails the Holy.”<sup>200</sup> “Poets,” notes Vallega in a rather polemical reference, “if heard by philosophers, could transform and spur thought in thinking through its finitude and therefore its very undergoing and withstanding of being.” Therein, for Heidegger, “Hölderlin’s word become hearable and is replied by *da-sein* and in such a reply becomes grounded as the language of future man.”<sup>201</sup> Adorno literally saw this “future man” in Heidegger as a colonizing machine, renouncing all dialectical systems, in appropriating Hölderlin’s otherwise utopian and late poetry into “something all-too-familiar... [the] history of being” (*Beschlagnahme*).<sup>202</sup> Adorno’s impatience with “what Heidegger makes of it” is but the existential analytic of the Dasein, fundamental ontology.

Robert Bernasconi concurs that Heidegger’s interest lies in tracing the “the fundamental similarity of poetry and thinking”<sup>203</sup>—which it is—“The like is

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saying that neither the subject nor the object are immediate and ultimate; but he deserts dialectics in reaching for something immediate and primary beyond subject and object.”

Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>200</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted, in Joseph J. Kockelmans, *On Heidegger and Language*, op. cit., p. 165.

On the question of The Holy (*Das Heilige*), Theodore Kisiel traces the theo-logical influences on Heidegger, particularly Wilhelm Widelband’s teleological conception of the history of philosophy (“The holy is thus the normative consciousness of the true, the good, and the beautiful experienced as transcendent reality.”)—which ‘lifts’ “the distinction between being and value, what is and what ought to be, the metaphysical and the critical”—and Rudolf Otto’s *Das Heilige* (1917), which highlights the “way in which the distinction of rational and irrational is to be applied to the divine or holy.” Heidegger, according to Kisiel, appropriated these influences. See, esp., “Theo-logical Beginning: Toward a Phenomenology of Christianity,” in Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 69-115.

<sup>201</sup> Alejandro A. Vallega, *Sense and Finitude*, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>202</sup> David Farrell Krell, “Twelve Anacoluthic Theses on Adorno’s ‘Parataxis: On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry,’” pp. 196-97.

<sup>203</sup> Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language*, op. cit., p. 31. This view is however not shared by others, including Steven Burik, who highlights that “Heidegger’s focus on poetry

like only as different.”<sup>204</sup> This mediation, i.e., *aesthetics*, as a process of subjectification—art as the residency of Being and art as the philosophical mediation on the truth of Being—overall constitutes Heidegger’s attempt to situate being in metaphysics and overcome metaphysics (overcoming aesthetics and the grounding of Being).<sup>205</sup> For Heidegger, Bernasconi highlights, the “poet and thinker are bound to each other” (being-held) and the curiosity of “dialogue” as decidability “arises out of a resemblance between their fundamental experiences with word and thing”—reducing, thereby, in the “language of thing, ‘the word for the word’” as “the names for the Being of language.”<sup>206</sup> It allowed the thinking of the “unthought” and therefore “the abandonment of thought in its philosophical mode,” Françoise Dastur notes, “in no way led Heidegger to the overcoming of metaphysics but rather to its appropriation.”<sup>207</sup> This “self-overcoming of metaphysics is nihilism,” for Dominique Janicaud, which stands the risks of being a “perfect alibi for laziness, because taking one’s leave of philosophy is never so easy as when one has not been involved with it in the first place.”<sup>208</sup> Heidegger’s 1935 “origin” (*Ur-sprung*) essay makes no zealous elaboration on language,<sup>209</sup> unlike the phylogenetic.<sup>210</sup> Instead, Heidegger’s

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however does not mean that all poetry is automatically related to thinking,” in *The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), p. 24.

<sup>204</sup> Quoted, Martin Heidegger. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>205</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, (tr.) Joan Stambaugh (New York; Evanston; San Francisco; London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973).

<sup>206</sup> Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language*, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>207</sup> Françoise Dastur, *Heidegger and the Question of Time*, (trs.) François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p. 69.

<sup>208</sup> Dominique Janicaud’s reading on Heidegger “overcoming” (“destruction” being the originally proposed term) metaphysics remain far the most incisive; a project that is seen as “less partial and methodological, yet more fundamental and meditative,” since overcoming, which is “not new” venture nonetheless, beginning from the like of Parmenides, is a constant “battlefield,” as Kant puts it. See “Overcoming Metaphysics?” in Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi, *Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought*, (tr.) Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 1-13, esp. pp. 5-6.

<sup>209</sup> Heidegger’s seminal essay was first delivered in 1935 to the Society for the Study of Art in Freiburg/Breisgau, and again presented two times before converting it into a lecture series

closest achievement comes from the proposal that the “essence or being of language, is rooted in the ‘dialect’, in the idiom [“mother tongue”].”<sup>211</sup> Here, one

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in 1936. It was first published in 1950, in Holzwege. In the essay, Heidegger defends that “the art work is something else over and above the thingly element.” Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, (tr.) Albert Hofstadter (New York: Perennial, [1971] 2001), p. 19. This “thingly,” which Heidegger later elaborates in a 1949 lecture (incidentally coinciding with the ban-lifting on his teaching), “Insight Into That Which Is,” is the fourfold: earth, sky, gods and mortals, which is reproduced in “The Thing,” *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 161-184. On the fourfold, see Andrew J. Mitchell, “The Fourfold,” in François Raffoul & Eric S. Nelson (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 297-302.

<sup>210</sup> Philip Tonner’s conclusion, while comparing Heidegger with Georges Bataille, on the issue of “origin,” is insightful:

“Unlike Bataille, for Heidegger, the ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*) of the artwork is, paradoxically, ‘art’. This is because, unlike Bataille, Heidegger is not after an actual historical origin (or a causal one, where the artist would be the causal origin of their works) of art. While the ‘greatest’ art by Heidegger’s estimation occurred in eighth-to fourth century Greece, this is nevertheless not the historical origin of art. Ultimately, Heidegger’s greatest question will account for the nature of what issues from its source.”

See Phillip Tonner, “Art, Materiality, and the Meaning of Being: Heidegger on the Work of Art and the Significance of Things,” in Amanda Boetzkes and Aron Vineger (eds.), *Heidegger and the Work of Art History* (Surrey; Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 121-169, esp. p. 127.

<sup>211</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted (pp. 61-62). This reference is drawn from Heidegger’s text on Hebbel (1960), “Sprache und Heimat.” Similarly, like Nietzsche’s “words, like flowers”—Jacques Derrida’s *retrait* of the metaphor looks at the “value” of *Ereignis*:

“the themes of the proper, of propriety, of appropriation, of de-appropriation, and with that of light, the clearing, the eye (Heidegger says that one may hear *Er-aügnis* in *Ereignis*), and finally, in current usage, with what *comes* as event: what is the place, the taking-place, the metaphoric event, or the event of the metaphoric? What is going on, what is happening, today, with metaphor?” (p. 61)

Here, “the idiom is not only the language of the mother, but is at the same time and above all the mother of language.” Rather, Derrida argues, on the value of maternity, the treatment should be:

“A mother tongue would not be a metaphor for determining the sense of language, but the essential turn that must be taken to understand what ‘mother’ means.” (p. 62).

notes the diversity of issues emerging as well as diverging. There are three likely references that interrogate Heideggerian existential figuration and notion of origin, temporality, and appearance—Being's *Augenblick* (moment of vision or 'wink'), Johann Gottlieb Fichte's (1762-1814) *Ursprache*<sup>212</sup> (living primal language) and *Ereignis*<sup>213</sup> (disclosure as such, "appropriation," or the "event"). We shall attempt to arrest a coherence by problematizing the same. But, before coming to that—a brief note on translation:

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Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Vol. I*, (trs.) Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

<sup>212</sup> This concept was first developed by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) on language in 1794 and initially described *Ursprache* as primitive language (Hieroglyphic language). Elsewhere too he mentioned about "living language" (*lebendige Sprache*) and mother-tongue (*Muttersprache*). See Andrew Fiala, "Fichte and the *Ursprache*," in Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds.), *After Jena: New Essays on Fichte's Later Philosophy*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), pp. 183-97.

<sup>213</sup> Translator Albert Hofstadter's note is helpful here:

"Thus *ereignen* comes to mean, in his writing, the joint process by which the four of the fourfold are able, first, to come out into the light and clearing of truth, and thus each to exist in its own truthful way, and secondly, to exist in appropriation of and to each other, belonging together in the round dance of their being; and what is more, this mutual appropriation becomes the very process by which the emergence into the light and clearing occurs, for it happens through the sublimely simple play of their mutual mirroring. The mutual lighting-up, reflecting, *eräugnen*, is at the same time the mutual belonging, appropriating, *ereignen*; and conversely, the happening, *das Ereignis*, by which alone the meaning of Being can be determined, in this play of *eräugnen* and *ereignen*; it is an *Eräugnen* which is an *Ereignen* and an *Ereignen* which is an *Eräugnen*.

It is because of this interpenetrating association of coming out into the open, the clearing, the light—or disclosure—with the conjunction and compliancy of mutual appropriation, that I have ventured to translate '*das Ereignis*', in the Addendum to 'Origin', not just as 'the event,' 'the happening', or "the occurrence," but rather as 'the disclosure of appropriation'. This translation has survived the critical scrutiny of Heidegger himself, as well as J. Glenn Gray and Hannah Arendt, and therefore I repose a certain trust in its fitness."

See "Introduction," in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, op. cit., pp. xx-xxi.

On the issue of translation in Benjamin, Christopher Fynsk (b. 1952) maintains Benjamin's redemption for securing language's finitude as coming through a "concept of relation," i.e., the "language of translation" as a "complementary language" towards the impossible "language of truth."<sup>214</sup> Rodolphe Gasché's (b. 1938) expediency has been however resoundingly extensive and persuasive. "For naming and translation to be possible, a priori," Gasché rationalizes, the "identity of the creative and at once cognizing divine word—this ultimate community—is the condition of possibility of all expression and all naming, or translation."<sup>215</sup> Gasché further informs us that although Benjamin was against Kantian epistemological and metaphysical dichotomies (therein between dogmatic philosophy and criticism), his "unitarian approach to the question of the ultimate ground" (re-envisioning a Kantian "philosophical cognition and experience... in the absolute, as existence") comes with "the demand for difference" (as opposed to profane language and the other) as the "saturnine vision."<sup>216</sup> This vision of the untranslatable goes under different names by the turn of the threshold: the unrepresentable, the impossible, the anarchic, the messianic, the undecidable, the ineffable, the unidentifiable, the ineluctable, the unassignable, the initerable, the indeterminable, etc. It is also this "risky passage" of assuming coherence for a *fictio* or *figura*—where the "experience of thought is also a poetic experience" rather than "a thought of translation"—where Jacques Derrida confronts the task of desisting totality and

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<sup>214</sup> Christopher Fynsk, *Language & Relation... that there is language* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 177-78.

<sup>215</sup> Rodolphe Gasché, "Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on Walter Benjamin's Theory of Language," in Rainer Nägele (ed.), *Benjamin's Ground: New Readings on Walter Benjamin* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), pp. 33-104, p. 96.

<sup>216</sup> "Such vision," Rodolphe Gasché identifies, "or theoretical glance, realizes reference to the Absolute, to that which is completely separated from the embroilments of myth and the mythical interconnectedness of language, not through cognitive abstractions, but in 'close touch' with what is, namely, by violently tearing its texture to shreds. This vision's transcending glance reaches only beyond the realm of interconnectedness to the extent that it stands under the sign of the natural powers and their mythical embroilments that it seek to overcome." *Ibid.*, p. 103.

the paradox of mimesis.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, in no anxious terms, Andrew Bowie (b. 1952) warns us “whether the philosophical attempt to represent that which is unrepresentable is not mere self-delusion.”<sup>218</sup>

Let us return to some of our pertinent proposals: why was poetry privileged and, later, culminated onto the shape of *Dasein*? What essentially (no pun here) is a work of art—and least to say, its confabulatory parallels like the aesthetic, the avant-garde, and the sublime—or its conjunctiva with genesis and origin, the originary, or pre-ontological? What correlates determine (apart from but also given the phenomenological nuances) the efficacies and exigencies (the “strife between earth and world,” in Heidegger’s terms, inter alia “thought’s relation with earth,” in the words of Gilles Deleuze [1925-1995]) of—to give some examples, Hölderlin’s “pure speech,” Jacques Derrida’s (1930-2004) “arche-writing,” Benjamin’s “pure language,” Emanuel Levinas’ (1906-1995) impersonal and anonymous *il y a* (“there is”), Giorgio Agamben’s (b. 1942) “infancy” or “potentiality” (*potenza*), etc.— the post-anthropocentric or, the beyond of linguistic unconsciousness, the ‘ethical turn’, and other paraphernalia of post-human manifestations? Why has there been a huge interest, then and now, on matters of origin and the *techné*, and also the distinctive pervasiveness between the authentic and inauthentic in the historicity of being—and, within this tradition, a discourse avowed with politics, or as a politics of alterity as the ultimate political yet non-political, i.e., ethicality? And, most imperatively, what are the methodological impossibilities and irreconcilable trajectories that decide (if not dictate) the divergence of thought’s difference, or the demand for difference, but as a secular disembodiment? Or, beyond the poetic, poetizing, what is the place of aporetic thinking, what is post-fundamental ontology, the

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<sup>217</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Introduction: Desistance,” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, (eds.) Christopher Fynsk and Linda M. Brooks (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 1-42, esp. p. 6.

<sup>218</sup> Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, op. cit., p. 53.

“subjectless subject?”<sup>219</sup> Is there a site for language other than language as the alterity of thinking, as we see in Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946)?

Heidegger’s *Fundamental Ontology* in the first place attempts to foreclose all dichotomies and instead looks toward the “overcoming” of metaphysics, the “exhaustion” of metaphysics, the “completion” of metaphysics, the ends of metaphysics.<sup>220</sup> It inevitably succeeded in putting a standstill to *prote philosophia* or *prima philosophia* (i.e., metaphysics of subjectivity). Earlier, what we saw in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is an attempt to implant an eidetic consciousness that is free of transcendence and immanence, and therefore purify/purge philosophy of its anthro-biologism, historicity and psychologism. Husserl encountered complicity because—the notion of *intentionality* he encountered and interrogated—the phenomenological is re-consigned within the very structures of the eidetic. And, without intentionality, for Husserl, it was inaccessible for imagination or judgement or perception to emerge—similar to the “kernel” problem, as illustrated by Jacques Lacan.<sup>221</sup> Husserl’s methods,

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<sup>219</sup> Plato, Lacoue-Labarthe insists, saw this problem (“mimeticians are the worst possible breed”), which, nevertheless, was outrightly rejected rather than pursued. See *Typography*, op. cit., p. 259.

<sup>220</sup> Mooted as provisional, with “intents and purposes to make itself understandable,” “overcoming metaphysics” is an otherwise rendering of Heidegger’s 1968 *Difference Between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*. “The true ‘overcoming’, Janicaud suggests, “is not accomplished by thought itself confronting a lifeless and crippled onto-theology; it is metaphysics itself that overcomes itself in world technology.” See Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi, *Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought*, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>221</sup> Between the analyst and the patient, the interchange is limited not by the “kernel” of meaning but the kernel itself becoming the “inaccessible, inert, and stagnant with respect to any dialectic” (p. 22). Therefore, the “ever-present possibility of bringing desire, attachment, or even the most enduring meaning of human activity back into question, the constant possibility of a sign’s being reversed as function of the dialectical totality of an individual’s position, is such a common experience that it’s stupefying to see this dimension forgotten as soon as one’s fellow whom one wants to objectify is concerned” (p. 23). See Jacques Lacan, *Seminar III: The Psychoses, 1955-56*, (ed.) Jacques-Alain Miller and (tr.) Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 1993).



*epochê* and reduction,<sup>222</sup> therein, failed to bare the question of language. Heidegger tenaciously took his teacher's dilemma further by interrogating the notion of "categorical intuition," which is "possible only on the basis of the phenomenon of intentionality having been seen before it."<sup>223</sup>

Also, in tracing the antecedents to Heidegger's formulation of the *Dasein*, Jacques Taminiaux (b. 1928) points out that Hegel had already traced that the "ethical life of a people is described in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by drawing on an interpretation of Sophocles' (497-406 BCE) *Antigone* that focuses on the foundational link that the relationship to death establishes between the individual and the community."<sup>224</sup> Inasmuch, Hegel was therein necessarily repeating the Greek notion of *polis*, from where the agency originates (the *praxis*) and is conditioned (the *poiesis*). What Heidegger's *Dasein* had blatantly chosen to ignore is Being's preoccupation within this symbiotic and plural temporality, whose metaphysics of truth is eternal (read Kant's "Being is not a real predicate") and necessary to the mode of living. Rather, Heidegger had imposed finite time on beings-for-itself as the authentic Being ("existence is in the care of oneself—for the *Dasein* that each and every time is mine"<sup>225</sup>), through the

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<sup>222</sup> Kevin Hermberg has pointed out that—opposed to Husserl's interchangeable use of "reduction" and *epochê*—these two terms are not in the same process. Elisabeth Ströker also suggests that "the distinction may be properly restored by seeing in the transcendental reduction the *measure* that leads to the attitude of the *epochê*"—as opposed to Dan Zahavi's "the *epochê* makes the reduction possible." See Kevin Hermberg, *Husserl's Phenomenology: Knowledge, Objectivity and Others* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), esp. footnote 4, p. 110.

<sup>223</sup> Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, (tr.) Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 72.

<sup>224</sup> Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>225</sup> On the formulation of fundamental ontology, François Raffoul too, referring Jacques Taminiaux, also highlights this Cartesian legacy: "it is hard to conceive how fundamental ontology could have centered on the character of mineness of *Dasein* without being in any way tributary to the Cartesian irruption of the *ego sum*." See Footnote 3: Martin Heidegger, quoted in Jacques Taminiaux, the later quoted [here] in François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, (trs.) David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1999), p. 306.

radicalization of Being's *Augenblick* ('wink' or "moment of vision"<sup>226</sup>) as the opening of authentic temporality.<sup>227</sup> Commenting on the "scope and import of Heidegger's reflection on language in the period" of *Being and Time*,<sup>228</sup> Jean-Francois Courtine (b. 1944) highlights the general perception that there is a "failure to consider the 'aesthetic' or 'poetic' dimensions of language. *Dichtung* is almost completely absent from the 'pragmatist' perspective of *Sein and Zeit* as is moreover the *Kunstwerk*. Instead, the artisan's workshop constitutes the horizon of the analyses."<sup>229</sup> Similarly, on Heidegger's anfractuous captivation with poetry, Taminiaux shudderingly links and identifies it as "the existential problematic of individuation as we have it in fundamental ontology: it is by assuming finite time and in anticipation of death that Dasein reaches individuation and conquers itself from its own forgetfulness."<sup>230</sup> To quote Heidegger:

"Poetry is no way a game, one's relationship to it is not the playful relaxation in which one forgets oneself. Instead it is the awakening, the shaking-up of the ownmost essence of the individual, by which the latter reaches again into the foundation of its Dasein. If indeed it is from that foundation that each individual originates, then the authentic gathering of

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<sup>226</sup> On *Augenblick*, Heidegger says:

"[T]his resolute disclosedness is what is as such only and always as the *moment of vision* [*Augenblick*], as the moment of vision of genuine action. These moments of resolute disclosedness only come about in time because they are something temporal themselves, and only ever happen within the temporality of Dasein."

In Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, (trs.) William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 295.

<sup>227</sup> See "Translator's Preface," in Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>228</sup> All reference are drawn from this edition: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (tr.) Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

<sup>229</sup> Jean-Francois Courtine, "Phenomenology and/or Tautology," (tr.) Jeffrey S. Librett, in John Sallis (ed.), *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 241-257, esp. pp. 247-48.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

individuals in a primordial community has already occurred. The harsh insertion (*Grosse Verschaltung*) of the superfluous (*Allzuvielen*) in what is called an organization, is nothing more than a temporary expedient, it is not the essential.”<sup>231</sup>

Poetry, then, is the fight against forgetfulness, of being forgotten. If the work of art is the grounding and origining of the exemplary in the historical experiences (*Dasein*), as Heidegger proposed, then, Emmanuel Levinas abhorrently reviews—“The analytic of *Dasein* will be about rediscovering man in his entirety and of showing that this understanding of *being is time* itself.”<sup>232</sup> This review, along with Reiner Schürmann’s (1941-1993), demonstrates that “being is time” (the transcendental analytic of *Dasein*) or “Being *as* time” (in its fundamental ontology).<sup>233</sup> The Heideggerian *Dasein* therein becomes the revelation of the structure of human existence. This *Dasein* reflects the banality of excesses, a grim reminder of the historico-political readings insofar and the permutation of exigencies within practical thoughts. At this level, the configuration and articulation of “presence,” presencing, or how *Dasein* unfolds and takes its place, as a matter of concern therein, has been the clamor and predominant preoccupation. Which, needless to mention, “being-itself,” by then, has no referent to any subjectivity. William Blattner takes a different reading, however, on the concept of time Heidegger was working toward. The reference

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<sup>231</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>232</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Heidegger and Ontology,” (tr.) Committee of Public Safety, *Diacritics*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1996, pp. 11-32, esp. p. 17. *Italics*, mine.

<sup>233</sup> See Steven Levine’s introductory comments:

“Because one cannot get from the temporality of *Dasein* to the temporality of Being as such, Heidegger abandoned *Being and Time* and attempted to find a path of thinking that could retrieve the question of Being as such. Paradoxically, it is only by reading Heidegger ‘backwards’ in the light of the notion of Being that became fully manifest in his later work, that one can discern not only the necessary aporia that governs *Being and Time* but also its continuity with the later work in the thesis that Being is time.”

In Simon Critchley and Reiner Schürmann, *On Heidegger’s Being and Time*, (ed.) Steven Levine (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 2-3.

to Being or Dasein as *is time itself*, which Heidegger developed in *The Concept of Time* (1927) and recurred earlier in *Prolegomena* (1925) and *Logic* (1925), Blattner explains, “is a primitive exposition of Heidegger's thought, or perhaps an exposition of Heidegger's thought while it was in a primitive stage.”<sup>234</sup> Heidegger's inconsistencies on the same theme was conceived differently in his later works, as Blattner surmises, although it was alleged that *Being and Time's* philosophy of time and its ambitious project on *temporal idealism* remained unfinished. Therein *Being and Time's* two parts, i.e., the “interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being”—is appreciated as inconsequentially incomplete and invested with problematic of politico-historical subjectivity—and the “phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of temporality” is seen as a celebratory “turn” or precluding the ends of Western metaphysics.

Rather than stipulating on what is the Dasein *is* about, here, let us now return to how Heidegger formulated his conception of the same vis-à-vis from the blinds of ordinary time. Comparing with Hannah Arendt's (1906-1975) *natality*, Peg Birmingham confers Heidegger's Dasein as “being-toward-birth,” which in its own uniqueness comes only through the process of *Augenblick*.<sup>235</sup> Towards this, the notion of *Augenblick* (moment of vision) is central. Similarly, taking an ironic cue on Arendt-Heidegger relationship, Heidrun Friese establishes “*Augenblick* as presence of time and simultaneously as the other of time. This unique *Augenblick*, which resists any repetition or iteration, is not writeable, it lacks words; the *Augenblick* is not describable, but language nevertheless comes forth in this relation, in and through the encounter, in the

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<sup>234</sup> William D. Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. xv.

<sup>235</sup> “The *Augenblick*,” for Peg Birmingham, “is the moment in which a speech without prior authorization nevertheless can assume authorization in the course of its saying.” See “Heidegger and Arendt: the Birth of Political Action and Speech,” in François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (eds.), *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 191-203, esp. pp. 200-01

answer.”<sup>236</sup> *Augenblick* is a term Heidegger borrowed from Søren Kierkegaard,<sup>237</sup> (1813-1855) who is attributed to have “really comprehended for the first time in

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<sup>236</sup> Frieses’ explications on *Augenblick*, which surveys the tradition, i.e., Martin Buber, Franz Hessel, Martin Heidegger, etc., is quite definitive:

“The *Augenblick* as a unique event, like the word and like historical meaning, is locked into a particular relation in which ‘remembrance’ and forgetting mix. Being unique, it gives itself both as remembrance and as farewell, as that final farewell that refutes the normalization of uniqueness. But just as language only comes to be through the encounter with language, as the response to language, just as dialogue only comes to be in the encounter, in the rejoinder, into which forgetting is always also imprinted, precisely to give testimony to uniqueness, in the same way the event of the *Augenblick* demands something. It demands the labour of the glance, and it expects, no, it insists on a response, a response that responds specifically to the uniqueness. An event, to become event, does not only need to occur, it needs also, and precisely, to be held, to be kept. Such holding, keeping, through which the *Augenblick* can maintain itself, however, does not mean either remembrance or memory, either recollection or ritualistic repetition—a repetition that can never succeed—or even the representation of an irretrievably lost *Augenblick*. Rather, it demands a holding that responds to the singularity of the *Augenblick*. This is neither annihilation, nor repression, nor a shoving aside of that which is past in the attempt at its repetition; rather, it is the safeguarding of its uniqueness and of that which once occurred and will never occur again. Such insistence of the glance is possibly the nameless and unique happiness of the *Augenblick*.”

See Heidrun Friese, “Augene-Blicke,” in Heidrun Friese (ed.), *The Moment: Time and Rapture in Modern Thought* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), pp. 73-90, p. 74.

<sup>237</sup> Kierkegaard, notes Koral Ward, developed the concept of moment (*Augenblick*) from “a mere instant in time.” Ward also highlights that the concept owes its origin from Christianity but the moment it was developed by Kierkegaard “the moment [*Augenblick*] receives its meaning for existentialism. The elevation of the concept from the ‘external’ to the ‘internal’ domain, from a moment of experience in ordinary temporality to a subjective experience which allows a surpassing of ordinary time and forges a connection with something ‘external’ or ‘transcendent’ is crucial to each philosopher’s rendition of the concept. This... dialectic of the eternal is fundamental to Kierkegaard’s intention throughout his work.” See Koral Ward, *Augenblick: The Concept of the ‘Decisive Moment’ in 19<sup>th</sup>- and 20<sup>th</sup>-Century Western Philosophy* (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), p. 1.

philosophy,"<sup>238</sup> and one where Heidegger himself sees "the *possibility* of a completely new epoch of philosophy" as beginning "for the first time since antiquity."<sup>239</sup> Here is what Heidegger proposed on Dasein's entrapment and subsequent ontic possibility through the *moment of vision*:

"The temporal entrancement can be ruptured only through time itself, through that which is of the proper essence of time and which, following Kierkegaard, we call the moment of vision. The moment of vision ruptures the entrancement of time, and is able to rupture it, insofar as it is a specific possibility of time itself. It is not some now-point that we simply ascertain, but is the look of Dasein in the three perspectival directions we are already acquainted with, namely present, future, and past. The moment of vision is a look of a unique kind, which we call the look of resolute disclosedness for action in the specific situation in which Dasein finds itself disposed in each case."<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted. Otto Pöggeler disagrees otherwise. He indicates that Kierkegaard himself had attributed the convergent transformation of the meaning of "sudden" (*Plötzliche*), following Plato, to "moment" (*Augenblick*) in his *The Concept of the Dread* (1844/1944). Conversely, notes Pöggeler, Kierkegaard erroneously "reproached Hegel with having seen the connection of the dialectic to the moment." Accordingly, Kierkegaard's decisive break with the Greeks, Pöggeler highlights, comes directly from the Christian connect:

"This is where Kierkegaard goes beyond Plato: this 'blink of an eye' [is to be understood] as a limit which leads us out of our given situation, the moment (*Augenblick*) in which time and eternity intersect. Time in itself is an empty succession; but when it takes the eternal into itself, qualitative differences and the leap to the new become possible, future and past differentiate themselves. The Greeks were not able to see this relation so clearly, since they excluded nothingness from Being."

See Otto Pöggeler, "The Future of Hermeneutic Philosophy," (tr.) Dale Snow, in Timothy Stapleton (ed.), *The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 17-35, esp. p. 23.

<sup>239</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 150.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

Further, on the “look of resolute disclosedness for action,” Heidegger gave an account of temporal vicissitudes on how the ontological disclosures of *Augenblick* operates or concedes:

“Only in the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, in the moment of vision, does it make use of that which properly makes it possible, namely time as the moment of vision itself. The moment of vision is nothing other than the *look of resolute disclosedness* in which the full situation of an action opens itself and keeps itself open. What time as entrancing accordingly keeps to itself, and in keeping it to itself simultaneously announces and tells of as something that can be given to be free, giving it to be known as possibility, is something of that time itself; it is that which makes possible, which that time itself and it alone can be: the moment of vision. Dasein’s *being impelled into the extremity of that which properly makes possible* is a being impelled *through entrancing time into that time itself*, into its proper essence, i.e., *toward the moment of vision* as the fundamental possibility of Dasein’s existence proper.”<sup>241</sup>

An examination of this self-disclosure therefore, without doubt, allows the opening of time within time, the rapturous, or with time itself. It is the very instant, the appearance of the temporal order of the instant in itself, where Dasein realizes and secures itself, as its own presence and existence, as its own time, as the ecstatic. Moreover, in solitude, Heidegger affirmed that the “Dasein exists for the sake of itself.”<sup>242</sup> Schürmann and Levinas, as we briefly referred them before, attest to this harmony of the Dasein. However, what is missing in explanation, is the circulation that “Dasein’s freedom and finitude are at the very heart of this temporality of the *Augenblick*,” which Birmingham pointed out—but could not address the how.<sup>243</sup> William McNeill’s (b. 1961) critique on

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid., p. 149. *Italics*, in original.

<sup>242</sup> See Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, op. cit., p. xxi.

<sup>243</sup> Peg Birmingham, “Heidegger and Arendt,” op. cit., p. 199.

*Augenblick's* temporal openings (rapture) toward finitude<sup>244</sup> captures this temporal collision: “an indeterminate and open horizon of possibility that is nonetheless the futural closure of presencing as such, marking all presencing finite, the way in which the phenomenon of world comes to be inscribed within Dasein as originary *praxis* is thus not a mere anthropomorphizing of the Aristotelian conception of the divine actuality of the *kosmos*. It is not to be aligned with the modern turn to subjectivity.”<sup>245</sup> Miguel de Beistegui (b. 1966) too looks at Dasein’s mode of being in “resoluteness”<sup>246</sup> as an active engagement in the disclosure of the Moment:

“[T]he Moment is not linked to the disclosure of a particular situation but to the disclosure of situatedness as such. It is the present or the time of truth’s disclosedness to itself as the originary event of being. Thus the *Augenblick* designates a different relation to time and to the present in general: it marks at once a rupture or a caesura (*Gebrochenheit*) in the continuum and the fascination or the entrancement of ‘fallen’ time, and a return to the essence of time as ecstatic and rapturous, as finite and

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<sup>244</sup> A misleading notion of subjectivity (i.e., Dasein, as the case is, here)—as breaking free—in relation to *Augenblick* stands to illuminate Heidegger’s statement:

“[T]he time that entrances as a whole announces and tells of itself as that which is to be ruptured and can be ruptured solely in the moment of vision in which time itself, as that which properly makes Dasein possible in its actions, is at work.”

Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 149.

<sup>245</sup> William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 134.

<sup>246</sup> de Beistegui explains resoluteness:

“In resoluteness, existence liberates itself from its own entrapment in the absorbed life of everydayness. It frees itself for itself, as this ability to be or disclose being. Thus the modification or conversion brought about by resolute disclosedness also is at the source of a renewed understanding of what it means to act, of the very possibility of action in the most essential sense, and, yes, of what I would be tempted to call, albeit under erasure perhaps, the very possibility and beginning of ethics.”

Miguel de Beistegui, “*Homo Prudens*,” in François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (eds.), *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 125.



horizontal. This, then, does not mean that the Moment marks the possibility of a flight from time into eternity. On the contrary: it means that existence becomes *all the more* open to the world and to the situation in the essential modification that takes place in resoluteness.”<sup>247</sup>

For Beistegui, it can only be the “phronetic” or the “prudent”—since *Augenblick* (the moment) is different from the abstract present ‘now’ or the ordinary present<sup>248</sup>—that which can only actually allow the human Dasein to act or work (“activate its own-most and uttermost ontological potential”) because the moment of the (or, rather, its) disclosure itself is paramount for “the affirmation and the enacting of man’s essence as the ecstatic disclosedness to the truth of being.”<sup>249</sup> Whereas, in questioning the resoluteness in Heidegger as the “phenomenal basis for the distinction between the originary future itself and the authentic future,” Michel Haar (1937-2003) maintains that “the future is originarily [and presupposedly] inscribed in Dasein’s existential structure, and not through resoluteness.”<sup>250</sup> The temporality Heidegger proposed in *Augenblick* can be therefore read simultaneously in consonance with the issue of *Ereignis*—given the obvious choice of logico-linguistic tradition; and, at the same time, this parallel trajectory situating ontology-temporality (on one hand) and temporality-language (on the other hand) is what is pertinently linked to how Dasein (being-in-the-world) is centrally attested or even configured. In the lack

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>248</sup> “Rather,” de Beistegui highlights, “the present that is at issue in the ‘moment’ is that present in which existence is present to itself as the very operation of disclosure, or as the very *there* of being. In the moment of vision, or the *Augen-blick*, Dasein ‘brings itself before itself’: it sees itself for the first time for what it is, that is, for the originary clearing, the truth or the ‘there’ of being.”

Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., pp. 126-28.

<sup>250</sup> Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, (tr.) William McNeill (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 33. Also, on the “originary,” François Raffoul attempts to identify its ethical dimensions, a stance Heidegger never (overtly) admitted to or was comfortable with either. See esp. Chapters 6-7, in *The Origins of Responsibility* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). Box *italics*, mine.

of words, the time of Dasein was emblemized rather than analyzed. Let us examine further.

How then thus is the disclosure linked to the moment or is accomplished, and what is the place of language within such ontological categorization? Before dealing with this it is imperative to quickly observe two notes. First, a survey of literature highlights inadequate examination of Heidegger's "pre-ontological" submissions, relegating it or deviating from it instead to a continued traditional focus that interrogates the ontological difference to the Dasein Analytic. Starting with Joseph J. Kockelmans,<sup>251</sup> perhaps, who limited his investigation of the "pre-ontological" but as a cursory (and even normal) process of a transcendental Dasein graduating into an ontological difference. Moreover, Kockelmans simplified the Heideggerian turn as an equivalent diversion breaking the Aristotle (arche) to Leibniz (principle of ground) tradition. Second, Heidegger had already illustrated the "pre-ontological understanding of being" as a compendium to the ontic-ontological priority of Dasein. This context remains largely ignored, especially in ancillary but combined readings on *Augenblick*, *Ereignis*, and Fichteian *Ursprache*.

The complicating translatability of Heidegger's *Ereignis* makes reading difficult in the first place.<sup>252</sup> Moreover, the departure from "Heideggerian

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<sup>251</sup> See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language," in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), *On Heidegger and Language*, op. cit., pp. 195-234.

<sup>252</sup> See Translator Albert Hofstadter's note, in footnote 213 (above) and also Michael Roth's in footnote 297 (below), too. Further, Roth also mentions that:

"*Ereignis* is related to *eigen*, meaning 'own' and 'proper' with clear connotations of *eigentum* meaning 'property' or 'a possession'. *Ereignis* is also related to *ereigen* meaning 'to prove' or 'to show' in the sense of a demonstration (Grimm's lists it as the Latin *monstrare*). And lastly, it is related to *eignen*, meaning 'suitable' or 'appropriate' where appropriate may be understood both as 'proper' and as 'to acquire'. Along with all these connotations, *Ereignis* must also be thought as 'event' and it is usually translated as 'event of appropriation' so as to reflect some of these relationships. In the event of *Ereignis*, entities are brought forth into their

problematic,” which is centrally placed on the “transcendental horizon of the question of Being” and “particularly to the concepts of *origin* and *fall*,” which Derrida identifies and warns us, also needs to “correlatively” look for the “the value *proper* (propriety, propiate, appropriation, the entire family of *Eigentlichkeit*, *Eigen*, *Ereignis*) which is perhaps the most continuous and most difficult thread of Heidegger’s thought.”<sup>253</sup> It was around 1936-38, when Heidegger had developed the notion that between Dasein and being is *Ereignis*, the “truth, i.e., *the truth itself*, [which] essentially occurs only if *sheltered* in art, thinking, poetry, deed. It therefore requires the steadfastness of the *Da-sein* that repudiates all the semblant immediacy of mere representation. Being essentially occurs as the event.”<sup>254</sup> Here, Heidegger was mainly concerned with the establishment of “truth,” rather than situating the temporal, where the temporal appearance (“gift of presence”) of Dasein’s is already seen as indwelt (constitutive) in the event as *Ereignis*, as a “species of Appropriation.” What Heidegger achieved is therefore merely “the shift from the revelation of the forgetfulness of Being to the appropriation of time,” as Janicaud concludes, where “the history of Being is thought in terms of *Ereignis*, and not the reverse.”<sup>255</sup> The temporality of Dasein (“truth of being”) therein is foremost the opacity and facticity of existence<sup>256</sup> and the valuative “understanding”<sup>257</sup>

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own, becoming what they are. Bearing these multiple meanings in mind, reading some of Heidegger’s writing on the matter should help.”

Refer Michael Roth, *The Poetics of Resistance: Heidegger’s Line* (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1996), p. 38.

<sup>253</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 54.

<sup>254</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>255</sup> Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi, *Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>256</sup> Heidegger insisted that “because understanding always has to do with the complete disclosedness of Da-sein as being-in-the-world, the involvement of understanding is an existential modification of project as a whole. In understanding the world, being-in is always also understood. Understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of world.” See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 137.

("sight") of this existence is immanently ("there is," i.e., "temporality," is "care"<sup>258</sup>) embedded to or in the event (as appropriation of, i.e., language, relation, or static time):

"Finally and above all, the 'event' can be inventively thought (haled before inceptual thinking) only if beyng itself is conceived as the 'between' for the passing by of the last god and for Da-sein.

The event consigns god to the human being by assigning the human being to god. This consigning assignment is the appropriating event [*Diese iibereignende Zueignung ist Ereignis*]; in it, the *truth* of beyng is grounded as Da-sein (and the human being is transformed, set out into the decision of being-there [*Da-sein*] and being-away [*Weg-sein*]), and history takes its other beginning from beyng. The truth of beyng, however, as the openness of the self-concealing, is at the same time transposition into the decision regarding the remoteness and nearness of the gods and so is preparedness for the passing by of the last god."<sup>259</sup>

On the issue of *Ereignis* qua appropriation, Jacques Derrida clearly delineates his conception of "différance" from Heidegger's by disclaiming that it

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<sup>257</sup> "Da-sein," according to Heidegger, "has always already transferred its potentiality of being into a possibility of understanding. In its character of project, understanding constitutes existentially what we call the sight of Da-sein. In accordance with the fundamental modes of its being which we characterized as the circumspection of taking care of things, the considerateness of concern, as the sight geared toward being as such for the sake of which Da-sein is as it is, Da-sein is equiprimordially the sight existentially existing together with the disclosedness of the there." Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>258</sup> The notion of "care" is central to Heidegger's exploration of temporality and Dasein and, matter of discussion, the ethical ethos of his thoughts:

*"Care does not need a foundation in a self. But existentiality as a constituent of care gives the ontological constitution of the self-constancy of Da sein to which there belongs, corresponding to the complete structural content of care, the factual falling prey to unself-constancy. The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning of care which we defined as the totality of being of Da-sein."*

Ibid., p. 297. In original, *italics*.

<sup>259</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, op. cit., p. 201.

is not a “‘species’ of the genus *ontological difference*” since there is “no process of appropriation in any sense whatever.”<sup>260</sup> The contention derived from Heidegger’s conjecture that the “gift of presence is the property of Appropriating”—which Derrida understood it to be the ontological localities of the locational (i.e., “position” as in “appropriation”) and the dialectical (i.e., “negation,” as in “expropriation”). Heidegger’s compulsive reiteration of his thoughts throughout with locative adverbs and referents, systematically poached from primordial spatiality and divine ecology (the fourfold, amongst the many), and also from the traditional linguistic debates, establishes the figuration of Dasein as an “existential spatiality” and not as a “categorical” stalemate.<sup>261</sup> His expositions on being and the world, or the inter-subjective and integrative<sup>262</sup> affections of being with the fourfold element, one recalls, are consistently experimented upon (and interplayed along with) a spatio-temporal simulation in the form of exposing contacts and inheriting locations. In the interlocution of the Greeks, especially on Heraclitus’ (535-475 BCE) *Fragments*, terse visual features like “fire,” “clearing,” “brightness,” and, particularly, “lightening” are pertinently contracted to evolve the refusal of “truth in thinking,” akin to an atemporal arrest of the transitory blink<sup>263</sup> (“shying-away”) of the lighting (gaze), which is the core of pointing towards the event [*das Ereignis*].<sup>264</sup> Despite the tautological and difficult in

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<sup>260</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 26.

<sup>261</sup> The argument emerging here refers to Heidegger’s clarification of W.V. Humboldt uncertainty about the rendering of personal nouns by locative adverbs, and the controversy over whether the “primordial meaning of locative expressions is adverbial or pronominal.” See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 112.

<sup>262</sup> William Blattner suggests that as early as 1928, when *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* was in process, Heidegger was already beginning “to waver in his commitment to temporal idealism.” See *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, op. cit., p. xvi.

<sup>263</sup> For an interesting trajectory on the idea of split second, read in the analytical tradition, and although unrelated to the concerns here, see Jimena Canales, *A Tenth of a Second: A History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).

<sup>264</sup> Heidegger says:

“The lighting, therefore, is no mere brightening and lightening. Because presenting means to come enduringly forward from concealment to unconcealment,

reading Heidegger, the fullness of *Ereignis* (disclosure) is perhaps best described in the mature works like *Parmenides* (1942), which now performs a nondescript hint in engaging temporality:

“‘Disclosure’ understood in its full essence, means the unveiling sheltering enclosure of the unveiled in unconcealedness. It itself is of a concealed essence. We see this first by looking upon [*létthe*] and its holding sway, which withdraws into absence and points to a falling away and a falling out.”<sup>265</sup>

Earlier, in *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger had already detailed three features in the ontic-ontological priority of the Dasein as descriptive to the question of fundamental ontology: the “ontic affair” (*existentiell* understanding); the very structures of *existentiality* and the *existential analysis of Da-sein*.<sup>266</sup> Accordingly, the methodological question of the pre-ontological is framed and inversed within the context of fundamental ontology:

“[The] fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must be sought in the *existential analysis* of Da-sein... [but] the roots of the *existential analysis*, for their part, are ultimately *existentiell* they

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the revealing-concealing lighting is concerned with the presenting of what is present.”

Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Thinking*, (tr.) David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), See p. 120.

<sup>265</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, (trs.) André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 133.

<sup>266</sup> On the ‘ontic’ affair or *existentiell* understanding: “Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself... the question of existence only through existence itself.” On the *structures of existentiality*: “The question of structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence... [where] the theoretical transparency of the ontological structure of existence is not necessary.” And, finally, on the *existential analysis*: The “existential analysis of Da-sein is prescribed with regard to its possibility and necessity in the ontic constitution of Da-sein [and] since existence defines Da-sein, the ontological analysis of this being always requires a previous glimpse of existentiality.” See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 12-13.

are ontic. Only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an *existentiell* way—as a possibility of being of each existing Da-sein—does it become possible at all to disclose the *existentiality* of *existence* and therewith to get hold of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems.”<sup>267</sup>

Therefore, one recounts, Heidegger knows too well that “a pre-ontological being belongs to Dasien as its ontic constitution,” while also feeling for the “need [of] an original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, in terms of temporality as the being of Da-sein which understands being.”<sup>268</sup> Heidegger’s pre-ontological conceptualizing of temporality, here, faced its own paradox, similar to Fichte’s own paradoxical situating of the concept: “Before anyone could have sought the designation of a concept, the concept must already have been there”<sup>269</sup> Which, however, does not mean to say that Heidegger did not understand the possibilities and limits of the beginning, the origin. He sought, once again, the Greeks, and thought that they “overlook the primordially of the beginning” (because they were still faithful to the “most primordial experience of the still wandering beginning”):

“The law of proximity is grounded in the law of the beginning. The beginning does not at first allow itself to emerge as beginning but instead retains in its own inwardness its beginning character. The beginning then first shows itself in the begun, but even there never immediately and as such. Even if the begun appears as the begun, its beginning and ultimately the entire ‘essence’ of the beginning can still remain veiled. Therefore the beginning first unveils itself in what has already come forth from all. As it begins, the beginning leaves behind the proximity of its beginning essence and in that way conceals itself. Therefore an experience of what is at the beginning by no means guarantees the possibility of thinking the beginning itself in its essence. The first beginning is, to be sure, what is decisive for

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-13. *Italics* mine.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>269</sup> Fichte, quoted, in Wm. Arctander O’Brien, *Novalis: Signs of Revolution*, op. cit., p. 93.

everything; still, it is not the primordial beginning, i.e., the beginning that simultaneously illuminates itself and its essential domain and in that way begins. This beginning of the primordial beginning comes to pass at the end. We know, however, neither the character nor the moment of the ultimate end of history and certainly not its primordial essence. Therefore the completion of the history of the first beginning can be a historical sign of the proximity of the primordial beginning, which latter includes future history in its proximity.”<sup>270</sup>

Ontologically via phenomenology,<sup>271</sup> this ‘law of proximity’ dealing with the primordial can be read diversely. It allows Heidegger to see Western metaphysics as interned in its fidelity to (primordial) origin—which, by now, is neither nothing new or old. Moreover, it laid down the terms that the act of mimesis “by no means guarantees” access to origin. The origin (“first beginning”) is therefore inscribed in its own eschatology, therein eliminating the substance ontology problematic. Having situated these backgrounds, let us first look at it in a phenomenal manner<sup>272</sup> of unlocking origin, future, and temporality, and therefore the “pre-ontological.” Here, “proximity” is the inevitable desire to unlock (but *not* the lock) the certitude of beginning and origin. Similarly, “temporality” is the key but *not* the lock. “Care” is what awaits (“anticipation,” the “awaiting”)—whose valence is (and remains) “the self-constancy of Dasein to which *there* belongs.”<sup>273</sup> Care, however, is the other side (and also the same) of

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<sup>270</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, op. cit., pp. 135-36.

<sup>271</sup> Heidegger had maintained that “ontology is possible only as phenomenology” but this “phenomenological concept of phenomenon” should be restricted only to a non-arbitrary “self-showing” (meaning, the “being of beings,” limited to “something that ‘does not appear’”) rather than something that appears (“behind which”). See, Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit. p. 31.

<sup>272</sup> Perhaps it is not totally *unHeideggerian* to employ such examples toward “the final preparation for phenomenally grasping the totality of the structural whole of Da-sein... [which] need the *unwavering discipline* of the existential line of questioning” (p. 324.). In original, *italics*. See, particularly, Section (#65) on “Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care,” in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit.

<sup>273</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 297.



the key (i.e., “temporality”). Let us say the “there” (which is not a time within time, or the Husserlian “internal,” or beginning or origination)—which, thankfully, Heidegger reminds us, is, insofar, all premised on the “vulgar concept of time.”<sup>274</sup> But, nonetheless, ontologically the “there” is *not* the lock to be unlocked, or *can be*. The lock, simply put, was missing. The lock, or “whatever-finitudes”<sup>275</sup> is to be unlocked, is, similarly, *not* the origin. Having listed the manifest of the phenomenological, Heidegger then directly jumped into an ontological explanation (which, as be warned, is not a corollary reading) or, rather, conclusion. Heidegger’s phenomenological justifications do not identify the *lock* or what is to be *unlocked*. It was simply listed as missing in action, in the act. What is critically missing however, in the proposition, is the ontological attempt to illustrate how the “ontological difference” is instituted and formalized—“the origin of inauthentic temporality from primordial and authentic temporality without any gap”—which, baffling enough, Heidegger suggests the need to “work out correctly the primordial phenomenon concretely.”<sup>276</sup> This is where Heidegger faced several problems.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Heidegger’s “phenomenal” format on “the significance of the term temporality” is described here, before describing the ontologically constituent:

“Only because Da-sein is determined as temporality does it make possible for itself the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness which we characterized. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.”

Ibid., p. 300.

<sup>275</sup> This is Patrick O’Connor’s explanation:

“Only finitude by necessity can become the other of finitude. The result of this is that the relation between finitudes can have no specific end but only that which radically open; the relation between finitudes is always one of dissolution and re-affirmation. This is what I will name ‘whatever-finitudes’. The ‘whatever’ of whatever-finitudes designates the action of finitization, which is neither a transcendental signified nor teleological purpose.”

See *Derrida: Profanations* (London & New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 50.

<sup>276</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 300.

<sup>277</sup> Amongst Heidegger’s foremost and best critics on the issues of phenomenological ontology is Jean-Luc Marion:

Therefore, forget tautology in ontology, Heidegger can be disappointing—and therein contradictingly misleading: “Temporality ‘is’ not a being at all.”<sup>278</sup> Temporality is, in fact, Dasein. The “third constitutive factor of care,” which Heidegger talks about, is “entangled being-together-with”—which is something like *being* caught in a “snare:”<sup>279</sup> becoming or “falling prey.”<sup>280</sup> Entrapped, yes,

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“Phenomenology therefore does not only offer a method for making evident all the phenomena which are proximally and for the most part visible; but it offers itself above all as the sole method that might make visible one phenomenon, the phenomenon par excellence because the least visible, the Being of beings. Consequently, it does not in this way extend its field of operation to include one more object, but it is itself dedicated, in principle and by predilection, to this nonobject that it alone can make accessible. Not to recognize in phenomenology the sole appropriate method for ontology, in short, to ordain it to other objects—or quite simply to *objects*—amounts essentially to misunderstanding its essence. Consequently, then, the second thesis becomes intelligible.” (p. 142)

Therefore, Marion’s overall conclusion is: “if ontology completes phenomenology and if phenomenology alone renders ontology possible, it is necessary that a ‘phenomenon of Being’ manifest itself; now, *Sein und Zeit* in 1927 does not reach that point; it is therefore suitable to repeat its undertaking by a more direct path, as *Was ist Metaphysik?* attempts in 1929; if that repetition does not arrive at the ‘phenomenon of Being’, it will be necessary either to give up the latter, or to envisage an entirely different determination of the completion of phenomenology. Or else the one *and* the other.” (p. 169). See Jean-Luc Marion, *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*, (tr.) Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).

<sup>278</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 302.

<sup>279</sup> The “snare” here is not a corporal digression or a reference Heidegger directly employed. It is a Kierkegaardian term and paradox:

“The truth is a snare: you cannot have it, without being caught. You cannot have the truth in such a way that you catch it, but only in such a way that it catches you.”

Søren Kierkegaard, *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vol. IV*, (trs. and eds.) Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malanstschuk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 503.

<sup>280</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., pp. 301-302.

but least to worry—because there are several possible ways out!<sup>281</sup> And, with good news too—first, like a sieve, contradistinction and hierarchies are both ensured and protected. To use a poor but necessary example, it will be something like—‘Look I am the lucky one to have escaped’! ‘For I am Being and not being’! Second, since it involves a kind of heroic escape, non-transcendental, of course, it reveals that “Da-sein has brought itself back out of falling prey in order to be all the more authentically ‘there’ for the disclosed situation in the ‘Moment’ [Augenblick].”<sup>282</sup> Third, the phenomenologically inclined is geared toward a celebratory moment of happily forever kind of “future.”<sup>283</sup> Ecstasies? Actually, given the proclivities of “vulgar time” and “phenomenon,” it is a not bad news for the ontological, too! Firstly, again, “temporality is not a being that first emerges from *itself*,” which means, the “*ekstatikon par excellence*” that was just recently awarded (for escaping from the snare-like “fall”) was meant to be joint-award, to display that the fraternal “essence is temporalizing in the unity of

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<sup>281</sup> The central thesis of Heidegger’s temporal notion may be premised on “temporality temporalizes” itself, rather than temporalizing itself, although he did not indicate:

“Temporality temporalizes, and it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of the modes of being of Da-sein, in particular the fundamental possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence.”

See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 302.

<sup>282</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., pp. 301-02.

<sup>283</sup> On the “derivative” future, Heidegger remarks:

“[F]uture has priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality, although temporality does not first originate through a cumulative sequence of the ecstasies, but always temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different. And the difference lies in the fact that temporalizing can be primarily determined out of the different ecstasies. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future, and indeed in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. *The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.* The priority of the future will itself vary according to the modified temporalising of inauthentic temporality, but it will still make its appearance in derivative ‘time’.”

Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., pp. 302-303. *Italics*, in original.

ecstasies.”<sup>284</sup> Second, the *ecstasies* (as opposed to “the ‘time’ accessible in the vulgar understanding”) are mathematical-free; it does not signify any trace nor indicate any “succession,” but is realized in the “constitution of being of Da-sein on the basis of temporality: Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness.”<sup>285</sup> Third, “Da-sein,” therein and therefore, “becomes ‘essential’ in authentic existence that is constituted as anticipatory resoluteness. This mode of the authenticity of care contains the primordial self constancy and totality of Da-sein.”<sup>286</sup>

Whether it is Dasein’s correlates with *Kehre* (turning) or *Caesura*,<sup>287</sup> the ontic construction of Da-sein—either as a question of an origin, or as an ontological thesis of temporality, or as a phenomenological trace in ontology—remains in the question of finitude. Commenting on Heidegger’s justifications, Schürmann posits that “self-ordering of presencing” in Dasein thus must be understood as “the primordial language.”<sup>288</sup> A reflexive philosophy of temporality about the “future,” which Heidegger proposes as “Being-ahead-of-oneself,” also, similarly, does not arise. What we have, instead, is finitude commensurate with Dasein, poetry, temporality, and thinking, or vice versa, in no particular order. Language (speech, in particular) as *logos* has no place (and, matter of fact, no time). There is no mistake, then, but how is it possible? The possibility of Dasein, as we have seen, is also intertwined to *Ereignis* and temporality. “Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.”<sup>289</sup> Nihilism is origination and language is *ex-nihilo*.

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<sup>284</sup> Heidegger’s *ecstasies* refer to the appropriation of the elements in what is vulgar time: past, present, future.

<sup>285</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 304.

<sup>286</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 297.

<sup>287</sup> Hölderlin’s *Caesura*, or “pure word,” which Heidegger too took up, and which is also critique upon as an inimical contradiction, given the latter’s politico-historical involvement, though very central to our arguments, here, is, however, already given a wider and comprehensive treatment, in Chapter Three.

<sup>288</sup> Reiner Schürmann, in Hubert L Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (eds.), p. 78.

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 321.

Heidegger's formula is premised on finitude (and the versatility of "dwelling") as the originary, but also the abyss, from where language is given appearance or accessed:

"Language is *neither* merely the field of expression, *not* merely the means of expression, *nor* merely the two jointly. Thought and poesy *never* just use language to express in themselves with its help; rather, thought and poesy are in themselves the originary, the essential, and therefore also the final speech that language speaks through the mouth of man."<sup>290</sup>

But Heidegger was not looking for the source of "thinking"—he was neither dumbstruck with language. The question of thinking and language became the embodiment of its own answer. Although failing to explicate any further and without any direct reference to his teacher, Merleau-Ponty definitely saw this tension: "Living language is precisely that togetherness of thinking and thing which causes the difficulty."<sup>291</sup> Heidegger realized the impossible origin and yet reverts to transcendental mimesis, phenomenologically, by proscribing it as an ontological status, despite the difference, through a strange proximity, but in estranging and destituting logos. Moreover, that Heidegger took the road most

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<sup>290</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, (trs.) Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 128. Stress, mine, in *italics*.

<sup>291</sup> Merleau-Ponty:

"As often happens with philosophical insights, the union of philosophy and history lives again in more recent and special investigation... the theory of signs, as developed in linguistics, perhaps implies a conception of historical meaning which gets beyond the opposition of *things* versus *consciousness*. Living language is precisely that togetherness of thinking and thing which causes the difficulty. In the act of speaking, the subject, in his tone and his style, bears witness to his autonomy, since nothing is more proper to him, and yet at the same moment, and without contradiction, he is turned toward the linguistic community and is dependent on his language. The will to speak is one and the same as the will to be understood. The presence of the individual in the institution and of the institution in the individual is evident in the case of linguistic change."

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays*, (trs.) John Wild, Joohn O'Neill and James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, [1963] 1988), pp. 54-55.

traveled, which forms the basis of all accusations on his transcendental reading, is altogether a necessity that repeats the socio-linguistic valor in Fichte. The *Ursprache*, according to Fichte, was a language. The definition of *Ursprache* as the initial and the originary equates the same as “true language,” the “first and universal language.”<sup>292</sup> Fichte’s addresses to the German nation further contrast the linkages of living language, thought, poetry and “general life” (i.e., German nationalism, as the case is here):

“Of the means for introducing into general life [*das allgemeine Leben*] the thinking begun in the individual life the most excellent is poetry; and so poetry is the second main branch of a people’s spiritual culture. When the thinker designates his thought in language (which, as we have said, cannot but happen symbolically) and creates new forms beyond the existing sphere of symbolic expression, he is already a poet; and if he is not, then with the first thought language will fail him and with his second attempt thinking itself. To transfuse the enlargement and completion of the symbolic sphere of language instigated by the thinker throughout the entire domain of symbols, so that each receives its proper share of the new spiritual ennoblement, so that life, right down to its ultimate sensuous foundation, appears bathed in the new radiance, pleases, and in unconscious illusion is ennobled as if by itself—this is the task of true poetry. Only a living language can possess such poetry, for only in a living language can the symbolic sphere be expanded by creative thought; only in a living language do previous creations remain alive and open to the influx of kindred life. Such a language carries within it the capacity for an infinite poetry, eternally refreshed and renewed; for every stirring of living thought in it opens up a new vein of poetic inspiration. And so for a living language poetry is the best

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<sup>292</sup> “Fichte’s understanding of *philosophical language* as the *telos* of history,” William Arctander O’Brien highlights, “motives his essay’s two greatest innovations: his insistence that ‘true language’ is composed of signs ‘arbitrarily determined’ regardless of motivation, and his invention of a ‘primeval language’ composed of motivated signs arbitrarily employed.” See *Novalis: Signs of Revolution*, op. cit., p. 91 & esp. p. 92.

means of transfusing into general life the spiritual development  
[*Ausbildung*] that has been accomplished.”<sup>293</sup>

In the Fichte-Heidegger frame of speculative thinking, although the latter never explicitly discussed on German as a language,<sup>294</sup> the uncanny similarity is a suspect here.<sup>295</sup> The correlates between “living language” and “kindred life,” as also the conduit role of “poetry,” in Fichte, have strong resonance (“analogous,” as Derrida<sup>296</sup> sarcastically remarks, to this similarity) even in Heidegger’s thought. Consider Heidegger here, below, on the element of “living language,” which is a Fichtean import, as we saw above, and its non-doubtable linkage with *Ereignis*:

“The word *Ereignis* [event] is taken from living language. *Er-eignen* [to occur, to happen] means originally: *er-äugen*, that is, to view, to call towards oneself by viewing.”<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Gregory Moore (ed.), *Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 64-65.

<sup>294</sup> The reference here is the posthumously published (1976) interview (1966) of Martin Heidegger by *Der Spiegel*, which appeared as “Only a God Can Save Us.” Jacques Derrida too refers this in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, (trs.) Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989); also, Esposito goes on to explain the intricacies of geophilosophy’s encounter with the territorializing “characterization of thought [which] is no way identical to philosophical nationalism.” See Roberto Esposito, *Living Thought: The Origin and Actuality of Italian Philosophy*, (tr.) Zakiya Hanafi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), esp. p. 14.

<sup>295</sup> Another instance worthwhile for mention here is the “historically meta-physical question” about *Da-sein* and *Volk*, i.e., about the “determination” (*Die Bestimmung*) of the essence of human being (*des Menschen*). Fichte’s *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* [1799] explores the sense of “vocation” in the essence of being whereas Heidegger’s concludes the essence of being as “the essence of being itself” (thinking qua being). Inasmuch, the conclusion here is to highlight the forbearing thoughts of Fichte in Heidegger. See Charles Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, Nationalism, and the Greeks* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 147-48.

<sup>296</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, op. cit., esp. p. 69-72.

<sup>297</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990 [1957]), pp.24–25. Quoted in Heidrun Friese, “Augene-Blicke,” in Heidrun Friese (ed.), *The Moment: Time and*

Although the stress Heidegger puts has been on the etymological articulation of *Ereignis*, the derivative, as is the source, *Ursprache*—whether its translation reads as ‘natural’ or ‘original’—is pertinently revealing, giving language the status of an implicated substance or substratum. Similarly, *Ereignis*, as an event of appropriation, is, again, tied to language, as in a language-event. Heidegger’s equivocation of “language” and “poetry,” and “thought,” which we have discussed earlier, and its correlates with “people,” is once again illustrated, given the Fichtean disposition:

Poetry is the founding naming of Being and of the essence of all things—not just any saying whatever, but the saying by which everything which we subsequently discuss and deal with in everyday language first comes into the open. That is why poetry never treats language as material that is present-at-hand, but poetry itself first makes language possible. Poetry is the originary [*Ursprache*] language of historical people.”<sup>298</sup>

While maintaining why poetry is Heidegger’s central engagement, Alejandro A. Vallega clarifies a usual confusion that it is not a case where “poetry will take up the place of thought.”<sup>299</sup> For, *Ereignis*, otherwise, is but the violent

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*Rapture in Modern Thought* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), pp. 73-90, p. 81. Also, see, Michael Roth’s translation:

“The word ‘Ereignis’ is taken from natural language. Originally er-eignen means [N.B. Coming to pass calls or evokes originally]: er-äugen, that is to say, er-blicken, to see or catch sight of, to call to oneself in looking, an-eignen, to en-own, ap-propriate.”

Michael Roth, *The Poetics of Resistance*, op. cit., p. 37. Joan Stambaugh’s English translation and subsequent editions of *Identity and Difference* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1969) however does not feature this part.

<sup>298</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted, in Leslie Hill, *Radical Indecision*, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>299</sup> First of all, Vallega indicates, “Heidegger poetry is not the same as thought, a recurrent misunderstanding often present in interpretations of his thought in relation to poetry. Poetry [rather] opens a way for thought in its enacting a break in the word.” Refer Alejandro A. Vallega, *Heidegger and the Issue of Space: Thinking on Exilic Grounds* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), p. 186.



“passage to thought.”<sup>300</sup> On language and the speech, Krzysztof Ziarek indicates that it is case where the *Ereignis* rather unfolds “the inceptual Word, as the breaking open of language.”<sup>301</sup> The problematic of *Ereignis*,<sup>302</sup> Dastur highlights, is an issue of Being and the problem of language, which was admittedly slow to come for Heidegger. Early in 1915 when Heidegger wrote his dissertation to the appearance of *Being and Time* in 1927, the discussion around language remain unclear and “regrettably short.”<sup>303</sup> Moreover, in his 1946 *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger did not seem to be mindful of any “contradiction” between “existential conception of language” in *Being and Time* and his ontological “determination of the essence of language as Being itself.”<sup>304</sup> It was only in the 1959 *On the Way to Language* where, Dastur interjects, Heidegger developed a comprehensive explanation on language—the need for another language (“discourse”) to “think the ‘temporality’ of Being.”<sup>305</sup> Dastur problematizes this language mediation

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<sup>300</sup> While posing the question of “how do we understand this glimpse beyond machination towards thought’s finitude or temporality at this point?”—A. Vallega affirms that:

“Heidegger finds the passage to thought in the most violent break in the homogeneous continuity of machination and thought in the overflowing movement of being. It is this radical opening that Heidegger calls a thinking, *vom Ereignis*. This, in the sense that in encountering the dissolution of machination we find an opening, a space for the possible thinking of the senses of being of beings, humans, reason, and language out of their finite ephemeral and concrete temporal passage, and beyond the rule of machination.”

See Alejandro A. Vallega, *Sense and Finitude*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>301</sup> Krzysztof Ziarek, *Language After Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 5.

<sup>302</sup> See Françoise Dastur, “Language and *Ereignis*,” in John Sallis (ed.), *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 355-369.

<sup>303</sup> In reference here is Chapter 34, “Da-sein and Discourse. Language,” in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (tr.) Joan Stambaugh (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). pp. 155-164.

<sup>304</sup> See Françoise Dastur, “Language and *Ereignis*,” op. cit., pp. 355-356.

<sup>305</sup> Lilian Alweiss also affirms Heidegger’s attempt to reduce “language to a secondary phenomenon.” Similarly, quoting Heidegger—

“The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk” and “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion”—

since the value of language (actually, “discourse,”<sup>306</sup> proper) in relation is, which is in line with Derridean propositions too, withdrawn from the “metaphysics of presence” and, therefore, it is actually Being-in-the-World with another Being as *Ereignis*, or conversely language explicating “Being itself in its unity... to submit language to the ontological problematic.”<sup>307</sup> Reiner Schürmann indeed proposed that the corpus of Heidegger should be read backward in order to understand the how he constituted his writings, particularly the “internal conflict arising from singularization” on the “question of being for its own sake and out of itself.”<sup>308</sup>

The phases in Heidegger’s thought and writings—between early and later works with 1927 as the segmenting year—have been a matter of concern in many Heideggerian scholars. The expectation for consistency in coherence being another occasion that is expected but is inconsequential for the arguments here. Following Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), Heidegger’s initial interest lies in the language of logic (the “task of *freeing* grammar from logic”<sup>309</sup>), which, in the process, he became fully aware of the finitude of language.<sup>310</sup> Yet he

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Alweiss explains the choice of categorical distinction between discourse and language, which is “hierarchical” in itself: “Being an ontic phenomenon, language is constituted and never constitutive, while discourse, being ontological, is constituting. The significance of discourse lies in the fact that it discloses the pre- predicative forestructure of understanding.” See Lilian Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 172.

<sup>306</sup> Dastur’s reference is on Heidegger’s remark that the Greeks do not have a word for language, but understood the same as an instance of discourse (i.e., discourse is a priori condition for the possibility of language). Françoise Dastur, *Heidegger and the Question of Time*, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>307</sup> Françoise Dastur, “Language and *Ereignis*,” op. cit., pp. 357-59.

<sup>308</sup> Reiner Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies*, (tr.) Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2003), pp. 581-82.

<sup>309</sup> The limits of Humboldt’s language problem, Heidegger notes, is because the “doctrine of significance is rooted in the ontology of Da-sein.” Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 155.

<sup>310</sup> Springing from Heidegger’s remark:

proceeded ahead, despite the given problematic and exhaustion, and therefore turned to poetry, and so thereon to the logic of language. Ultimately, Heidegger's Dasein found an additional four-folds: Hölderlin, the Future, Poetry, and God: "Hölderlin is the poet who points to the future, who expects god."<sup>311</sup> In retrospect, it would be difficult to pinpoint which one he found first—which, understandably, is also not our primary concern, here.

However, the turn from poetry to god is well announced and retrogressive.<sup>312</sup> In this beaten track, where Hölderlin stopped with the "doctrine of the leave-taking of the gods," *Ereignis* became the pathological as well as the excesses of Heidegger's unfinished task—the cryptic "god who is coming."<sup>313</sup> In

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"Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remain still unthought."

Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, op. cit., p. 107.

There are a couple of misleading assessments, including attempts to literally link the sense of existential finitude to human mortality. For instance, Joachim L. Obrerst [*Language and Death: The Intrinsic Connection in Human Existence* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009)] argues that death-language is "constitutive to human existence," where language is the "ontic-ontological extension of existence" and "[l]anguage discloses what death conceals." Carol J. White's *Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude*, (ed.) Mark Ralkowski (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2005) too defends language as a portent agency ("possibilities of significance") that can "transform us just as death can" but maintains that language, like being, will always have some remain of "unthought." Lastly, Jacques Derrida's indictment that Heidegger "does not say the experience of death *as such*... depends on language" is rather tautological, verbose, and distracting over determination. See "Finis," in *Aporias*, (tr.) Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-42. For an insightful reading, see Paola Marrati, *Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger*, (tr.) Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

<sup>311</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us," in Richard Wolin (ed.), *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, [1991] 1998), p. 112.

<sup>312</sup> George Kovacs, *The Question of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990).

<sup>313</sup> On the time of gods and god:

the western tradition, Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942) refers this format of *atheology* to *a-prosody* as Paul's "messianic heritage" to "modern poetry"—a "true theological heritage unconditionally assumed by poetry"—where "the articulation of a difference between semiotic series and semantic series" pervades, where "the history and fate of rhyme coincide in poetry with the history and fate of the messianic announcement."<sup>314</sup> The analytic of the instant (the temporal), from Aristotle to Hegel, Agamben proposes, is vivacious, with the Voice as "the act of utterance," "the present," and is marked by "negativity."<sup>315</sup> On Heidegger's *Ereignis*, Agamben therein analogously contrasts:

[The] "[v]oice shows itself as that which, remaining unsaid and unsigned in every word and in every historical tradition, consigns humanity to history and signification as the unspeakable tradition that forms the foundation for all tradition and human speech. Only in this way can metaphysics think *ethos*, the habitual dwelling place of man."<sup>316</sup>

Taking a different digression, Catherine Malabou (b. 1959) too illustrates *Ereignis* as Heidegger's *ethical* dimension, in identifying it as the site of possible "exchange," the *ethos*. The question of the "circulation of a new exchange" emerges in Malabou since *Ereignis* ("where the coming itself comes") is also a question of "its innate complicity with withdrawing and giving." The stakes included in this exchange ensure that "nothing escapes" (nothing, not even, "giving"). Malabou finds twofold exchanges<sup>317</sup>—while posing the question:

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"It is the time of the gods who have fled and of the god who is coming, it is the time of need because it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming."

Martin Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>314</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, (tr.) Patricia Dailey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 87.

<sup>315</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Language and Death: The Place of Negativity*, (trs.) Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis; Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 36.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>317</sup> "*Ereignis*, Malabou says, "is only the name given the possibility of an exchange *without violence* between the [fourfold] elements that it appropriates." The first is a "*compensating*

“Where in it, in that event, is the incision of the other?”<sup>318</sup> Or, in other words, whether *Ereignis* changes and exchanges itself or, referring to Jean-Luc Marion, remains as “an ontic agent”? Here, Malabou finds “ontological protoplasm” since the being-event-appropriation in finitude demands its own determination. She therein rejects, confirming along with Marion’s reading, Heidegger’s *Ereignis* as a “new figure of metaphysics, an epochal metamorphosis exactly like the others”—wherein the latter was just pretending to confer upon the giving of time “an irreducible originary.” Malabou calls it a “new ontological convertibility,” reverting to its own “circle [like] all metamorphoses”—since it is merely about “the economy of an originary ontological substitutability that at once institutes and ‘destitutes’ donation by offending against it with the names of its neighbors.”<sup>319</sup>

A recent elliptical reading like the teleological reversals of Malabou therefore brings to audit the post-Heidegger engagements on the immanence of the metaphysical and the ontological, through the poetic, something which Heidegger himself inevitably saw.<sup>320</sup> Metaphysics, instead of being overcome, remained “invested *in situ*.”<sup>321</sup> What new and novel has emerged, between the ardents and detractors? The implications of Heidegger are manifold, although he is not necessarily the ultimate point of departure. To situate therefore the departures, or turns, of poetry, would also mean reopening the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which Gerald Bruns succinctly appraises as

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exchange: essence for being,” which follows triple stakes (i.e., “*contemporaneity, mutability, and a passage into the other*”) that instantly encounters the problematic of “neither this nor that’ and ‘everything at once.’” The second exchange looks at *Ereignis* as a “structure of address and reception,” which remains “unique and mysteriously incomparable.” Catherine Malabou, *The Heidegger Change: On the Fantastic in Philosophy*, (tr.), pp. 127-28.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., pp. 143-48.

<sup>320</sup> Heidegger appears to be warning that we must “cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.” *Being and Time*, find page number. Quoted in Jean Grondin *\*\*Introduction to Metaphysics\** Check out the one on “The Exemplary Ideality of Mathematics”

<sup>321</sup> Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi, *Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought*, op. cit., p. 10.

“reopening [the] question of poetry’s truth.” Which also implies the metaphysical cliché about the “stepping back from the old idea that poetry is ‘beautiful mystical language’ but empty talks just the same [time]”—which Heidegger ultimately “buried” but also blurred the connect—between “poetry and truth in a way that we can recognize or that fits our sense of things.”<sup>322</sup> The stigma and enigma remain the purposeful similar: “Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the becoming-uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world”<sup>323</sup> There is however no misunderstanding here: the poetic is also an undercurrent of “force” and “unforce” that passes, and has come to an inconclusive passé.<sup>324</sup>

Poetry, bestowed to us by Greeks, therefore remains in its allure as a “magical conception of art.”<sup>325</sup> Its resurgence, according to Maurice Blanchot, inasmuch, prompted by its rediscovery by German Romanticism, French Baroques and Symbolists (through Gérard de Nerval (1808-55), Charles Baudelaire (1821-67), Arthur Rimbaud (1854-91), Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-98), etc.). The poetry-language-philosophy connects and disagreements are therefore truncated intersections in western tradition that is mutually influenced and informed by the need, to paraphrase Jean-Luc Nancy, to articulate a sense of

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<sup>322</sup> Gerald L. Bruns, *Heidegger’s Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 3.

<sup>323</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, (tr.) Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 171–72.

<sup>324</sup> “The language of the poets,” McLaughlin assesses, “expresses the capacity and the incapacity to communicate the feeling of the divisive finitude of reason as a force and an unforce. The study of poetic force calls for a capacity to be affected by a ‘privation’ or ‘withdrawal’ of force—a *steresis* of unforce in language.” How these forces and unforces have evolved as a competing discourses, is central to Kevin McLaughlin’s *Poetic Force: Poetry after Kant* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp. xii-xiii.

<sup>325</sup> “A magical art,” describes Blanchot, “poetry is naturally associated with a spiritual activity. It is now a common insight that poetic activity responds to ambitions of the mind that are realized as well in mystical knowledge and he extreme of inner experience.” See Maurice Blanchot, *Faux Pas*, (tr.) Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 129.

the world and the world of sense.<sup>326</sup> This tradition, apart from the many other issues, stems from the conflicting sense of Greek *aletheia* (errant, untenable, illogical) and Roman's *veritas* (logic, system, reason)—and the inseparable “interplay”<sup>327</sup> of the linguistic figural (signification) between them as a relation or process (temporality). Till the French Symbolists, much like the German Idealists or Romantics, Baudelaire also indicated that “the rhythmic structures of both poetry and music provide the veil through which the absolute might be glimpsed, and faith in the illusion of universal meaning restored. Thus, in the absence of a universal Truth, the poetic veil acts as a vehicle of faith, with its rhythmic and harmonic correspondences which reassure the poet in a universe which constantly threatens to tumble into the gouffre [gulf].”<sup>328</sup>

It is also plausible here to briefly recall the Early Romantics and German Romanticism, particularly on the conflicts over the conceptualization of language and, correspondingly, on mimesis and origin. Whereas Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780), Rousseau or Herder advocated for a natural origin of language there was also an attempt by the *Romantiker* to overcome such classical difficulty by adopting “rigorous symbolics.” Between Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schelling, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe inform us, August W. Schlegel's (1767-1845) *Lectures on Art and Literature* tried to reformulate the concept of *mimesis* (by equating it with *poiesis*) through the nature of “hieroglyphic poem” (“beauty as the finite presentation of the infinite, poetry as absolute work”)—whereby “language itself [becomes] the original Poiesy.”<sup>329</sup> Slightly differing, however, Mattias Pirholt finds in Friedrich Schlegel an “intricate dialectics of

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<sup>326</sup> See Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, (tr.) Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

<sup>327</sup> A Derridean term, actually. For the context of its use, see Herman Rapaport, *Is there Truth in Art?* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 29.

<sup>328</sup> David Evans, *Rhythm, Illusion and the Poetic Idea*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>329</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute*, op. cit., p. 93.

naturalism and conventionalism”<sup>330</sup>—leading to the view that the “‘poetic’, the productive nature of language does not exclude mimesis; [but] quite on the contrary, mimetic similarities constitute the natural point of departure for man’s productive faculties.”<sup>331</sup> Whereas, diametrically opposed to the naturalist or hybrid view, Fichte’s “conception of language is strictly antimimetic and underscores the conventionality of the linguistic sign. Language is not the medium of feelings but a [conventional] means to communicate thoughts.”<sup>332</sup>

Similarly, as explored earlier, Kant saw in poetry the—including both the sublime and the aesthetic—meditative interplay that reconciles the objective and the subjective. Like others, including Plato, Kant’s irreconcilable privileging of aesthetic communicability (“dynamically sublime”<sup>333</sup>) through a naturally recurring and an a priori “supersensible” led him to situate poetry as a superior vehicle for transporting—what Heidegger calls as “the fictioning character of reason [*Einbildungskraft*], that is, of its *higher origin* [as Plato envisaged in

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<sup>330</sup> Schlegel’s review of Goethe’s *Herrmann and Dorothea* (1798) elucidates the views on mimesis and, similarly, on language, which is based from a review of Fichte’s 1795 essay, “On the Faculty of Speech and the Origin of Language.”

<sup>331</sup> Mattias Pirholt, *Metamimesis: Imitation in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and Early German Romanticism* (Rochester: Camden House, 2012), p. 19.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid, p. 19. However, on Fichtean language as ‘conventional’, George Moore takes a totally different stand—“What is language? Fichte rejects the dominant Enlightenment view of language as an entirely arbitrary system of signs. Words are not conventional tokens; Fichte holds that a fundamental law governs why a particular sound and no other represents an object or idea in language, for the latter is an elemental force, the spontaneous eruption of human nature. ... Fichte does not stop saying that Germans constitute a nation by virtue of their language and that distinctive mentality manifest therein... German *alone* is an ‘original language’.” See “Introduction,” in George Moore (ed.), *Fichte: Addresses to German Nation*, op. cit. pp. xxiv-v.

<sup>333</sup> “Nature,” says Kant, “considered in an aesthetic judgement as might that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime*. If we are to judge nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear.” See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* [2007], op. cit., p. 90. In another translation, comparing Kant’s two sublimes, the translator, quoting Italian Gioberti, says: “The dynamical sublime creates the beautiful; the mathematical sublime contains it.” See “Translator’s Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* [1951], op. cit., p. xx.



*Pheadrus*],”<sup>334</sup> over the cognitive faculty. Post-Kant, we have Schleiermacher, who, according to Bowie, problematized “how to objectify [in language] that which is inherently subjective” (i.e., “of how to come to knowledge of what is already supposed to be the prior *condition* of knowledge.”)<sup>335</sup> Novalis, too, improvised Fichte, and improved Hölderlin, but ran into a “philosophical struggle,” a deadlock Manfred Frank (b. 1945) calls it as “aesthetic consequences,”<sup>336</sup> but, at the same time, unexpectedly introduces the foresights of Derridean precepts.<sup>337</sup> Then, we have Daniel Dahlstrom arguing Friedrich Schlegel’s overviews on “the transcendental character of Romantic poetry” as directly challenging the transcendental philosophies of Fichte and Kant. This, Dahlstrom underscores, is possible in Schlegel because he [Schlegel] does not see Romantic poetry as the “antipode to philosophy” but, rather, sees it as “integral to philosophy’s *telos*.”<sup>338</sup> Schlegel’s “identification of the poetry with

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<sup>334</sup> Martin Heidegger, quoted, in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

<sup>335</sup> See editor’s “Introduction,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, (ed.) Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. x.

<sup>336</sup> This refers to Novalis’ failure to draw from reflection (i.e., “of judgement, to produce knowledge of the fact of self-consciousness”)—

“Poetics [*Poesie*] must jump into the breach where the air becomes too thin for philosophy to breathe. But this conclusion must be drawn in a completely immanent way through purely philosophical means. The thesis that the Absolute is inaccessible to reflection indeed opens the gates to poetics and invites it to achieve what philosophy was incapable of achieving; but the thesis itself is not a piece of poetic thought, but rather a work of genuine and rigorous philosophical speculation.”

Manfred Frank, quoted, in “Introduction,” in Novalis, *Fichte Studies*, (ed.) Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. xxvi.

<sup>337</sup> O’Brien Novalis-Derrida contrast comes from the former’s anticipation about “the signifier’s lack of motivation and its differential constitution with the signified.” See Wm. Arctander O’Brien, *Novalis: Signs of Revolution* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 80.

<sup>338</sup> Friedrich Schlegel, quoted: “For in philosophy the path to science goes through art alone, just as the poet, by contrast, becomes an artist only through science.” See Daniel Dahlstrom, “Play and Irony: Schiller and Schlegel on the liberating prospects of aesthetics,” in

transcendental self-reflectiveness [therein] challenges the purity of the transcendental self-consciousness, whether it be conceived as the ever-present possibility and this enabling condition of consciousness of objects [Kant] or as the reality that posits itself in the very act of thinking [Fichte].”<sup>339</sup>

The privileging of poetry in the tradition is therefore pertinent to the presumptuous questions on language: man’s relation with language, the finitude of mankind, or in short, language itself as the logos, and the impossible guaranteed—“mimetic perversion”—the phenomenological impossible itself.<sup>340</sup> “The concept of mimesis,” similarly, “lies at the core of the entire history of Western attempts to make sense of representational art and its values.”<sup>341</sup> Language, therefore, as temporality, as the promise, as the borderless, as plastic, as the anarchic, and as non-presentable, serves as “philosophy’s duplicitous twin.”<sup>342</sup> In the plenitude of these vicissitudes, of endless possibilities, we conclude that till the modern the possibility of this creativity was on meaning (and therefore “truth” or “origin”) and, as the conclusion shows, the reversal in the post-modern (and therefore the “event”) is not only a preoccupation with such impossibilities but also with an avowed passivity.<sup>343</sup> The claim for language has found the need for its own destitution, to be once again orphaned, to remove every trace of origin, and to democratize the forgetfulness, without nostalgia. For,

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Thomas Nenon (ed.), *Kant, Kantism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy* (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 107-130, p. 124.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>340</sup> Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of continuities in logocentric philosophemes is central here. On similar lines, Jean-Luc Nancy identifies that “logos” for the Greeks is seen as “the essence of language from the essence of Being” and, whereas, for Martin Heidegger, “logos” is “the name of Being of beings.” Nancy, however bluntly reiterates that “we still do not know what logos means.” See *The Sense of the World*, op. cit., p. 174.

<sup>341</sup> Stephen Halliwell, *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. vii.

<sup>342</sup> David Farrell Krell, *Lunar Voices: Of Tragedy, Poetry, Fiction, and Thought* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. xi.

<sup>343</sup> Thomas C. Wall, *Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot and Agamben* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

the world is tragic. The word too is too tragic. “*Nombre*, therefore, denotes the unpoetic disorder of human existence.”<sup>344</sup> The poetic, however, is not the corollary, or the apparent, but the fatal rhythm (of “death that desires”<sup>345</sup>) that comes from the sense of living, being [bare] life.

Starting with Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) *Geometry*, Jacques Derrida’s own work has been largely premised on the phenomenological reduction of “speech” as but a “practice of an immediate eidetic” and the “transgression of linguistic ideality”<sup>346</sup> and, consequently, shifted to the temporal disjoints pertinent to the logos (metaphysics of presence) and therefore the need for a privileging of the ‘written’ as a neuter, or the need for re-interrogating of the “concept of the sign.”<sup>347</sup> Like Derrida, the written, too, for Nietzsche, is, like words in blood, and for Heidegger, too, articulates a discernment that belongs to philosophy. The written is pathos [*thaumazein*] itself, from its first inception, which Heidegger, as Babich shows, “understood as the key to the attunement [*Stimmung*] of philosophic astonishment, the sustained wonder or amazement that things are, that what is is as it is—and not otherwise.”<sup>348</sup> Derrida’s

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<sup>344</sup> David Evans, *Rhythm, Illusion and the Poetic Idea*, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>345</sup> Responding to the psychological death in Sigmund Freud, Deleuze and Guattari alternately envisage an antithetical antimony (“body without organ”) that radicalizes desires by opening the primacy of the eschatological. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (trs.) R. Hurley et. al (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 332.

<sup>346</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, (tr.) John P. Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), esp. pp. 66-75.

<sup>347</sup> In situating the “sign,” Derrida is perceptive about endangering signification:

“[T]he exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general... there is no linguistic sign before writing. Without that exteriority, the very idea of the sign falls into decay. Since our entire world and language would collapse with it, and since its evidence and value would be silly to conclude from its placement within an epoch that is necessary to ‘move on to something else’, to dispose off the sign, of the term and notion.”

See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, (tr.) Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, [1974] 1997), p. 14.

<sup>348</sup> Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood*, op. cit., p. vii.

neologisms, and notions, like “traces” (or “temporalization of lived experiences”<sup>349</sup>), “arche-writing,” “differance,” “grammatology,” etc., meantime, and also in affirmation of the written over speech, engage not only a critique of logocentric philosophy but also playfully recast the unacknowledged role and need for *literature*, as the momentum of metaphysics par excellence. In a way, as a system of disruptive episteme, Derrida’s connoisseur therein lies similar to the German Romantics, experimenting with the “fragments” as a critique of pure philosophy. Derrida is however cautious of a speculative probability that the idea of “phenomenal writing,” or “writing” as the sign of a sign, needs to withstand the weariness of re-framing an “absolute knowledge” or pre-supposing an “eidetic reduction.”<sup>350</sup> Instead, Derrida returned to Sigmund Freud’s failure, by terming the “labor of writing” as the *ad infinitum* “differance,” the “sign,”<sup>351</sup> perpetually caught in a stateless flux of “psychic energy between the conscious and the unconscious,” but this time without any trace and memory, of bio-history or genealogies.<sup>352</sup> The arrival, to the foreign or as a foreigner, must not remember or recollect that it has arrived to an arrival. And, yet, the paradox, as well as the [law of] aporia, demands that the irreducible sign (“linguistic dispersal”), or the

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<sup>349</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>350</sup> For the most relevant discussion on Hegel and Husserl, see Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, (tr.) Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

<sup>351</sup> Critiquing Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy note that the departures of “differance” as *ad infinitum* is in itself *finitude per se* and, moreover, difference or “spacing, and thus writing, would be the law of the law”—for, the “law is the essence without essence of writing.” This also marks Derrida’s turn towards the ethical, something he has consistently denied as advocacy. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Retreating the Political*, (tr.) Simon Sparks (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), esp. p. 49 and p. 53.

<sup>352</sup> The notes on trace and memory, truncated from a reading of Freud, however remains unsatisfactory in the distinction of temporal difference:

“Trace as memory is not a pure breaching that might be reappropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the ungraspable and invisible difference between the breaches. We thus already know that psychic life is neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of force but the difference within the exertion of forces.”

Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in *Writing and Difference*, (tr.) Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 196-231, esp. p. 212 and p. 200.

“ineluctable,” which Derrida calls “desistance,” must remember the entrapments of maintenance, of “mimesis” and a “double” in the recess of the arrival (instant death), which is at once “the new question of the subject” that must also “calls for another experience of [another] truth.”<sup>353</sup>

The grounding of Derrida’s work can be attested in twofold reactions. First, western philosophy is seen as consistently tied and immanent to the essence of anthropological philosophy. Heidegger’s *Dasein*, Derrida would maintain, remained a “thought of man,” which, actually, “is not man,” and, again, is not “other than man.” For, although Heidegger tried to rupture the Kantian-Husserlian axis (“transcendental anthropologism”) through the ontico-ontological *Dasein*, Derrida faults that the ontic-proximity of presencing in Heidegger “is guided by the motif of Being as presence, understood in a more original sense in the metaphysical and ontic-determination of presence or of presence in the present, and by the motif of the proximity of Being to the essence of man.”<sup>354</sup> This perversion for the historical, at another level, is posited as the discord and deadlock between the “unthinkable” and the “void,” as faced by Claude Lévi-Strauss’ (1829-1902) in his interrogations on “incest” and “taboo” (nature and culture). Lévi-Strauss’ failure (and also contradictory dialectics) therein remain in the luxury of the mythological order to “reflect and criticize itself,” relegating myth as *the* “language of a language,” but one which escapes the “proof of experience,” and by assigning the subject (or, Being) to “privileged references, to an origin, to an absolute archia.”<sup>355</sup> Anthropological philosophy in the Hegel-Husserl-Heidegger tradition thereof, in its “history of concepts,” is also the “history of the concept of man.”<sup>356</sup> Second, Derrida’s attempt to identify a

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<sup>353</sup> See Jacques Derrida, “Desistance,” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, op. cit., pp. 1-42.

<sup>354</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in Paul Kurtz (ed.), *Languages and Human Nature: A French-American Philosopher’s Dialogue* (St. Louis, Missouri: Warren H. Green, Inc., 1971), pp. 180-206, p. 198.

<sup>355</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Structures, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., pp. 278-94.

<sup>356</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” op. cit., p. 184.

notion of temporality, derived from a “spacing”<sup>357</sup> of ‘differing’ and ‘deferring’, however, proposes that the conceptualization of infinitude is in by itself a theoretic corollary that is illustrated as finitude (i.e., “infinite differance is itself finite”<sup>358</sup>). The “economy and strategy” of the “sign” for Derrida, meantime, which exalts itself as surpassing the Nietzschean-Freudian-Heideggerian models, is celebrated as capable of independently working outside/without the “inherent concepts of metaphysics.”<sup>359</sup>

Critiquing Derrida, Giorgio Agamben’s central objection is on the former’s obsession with the origins and foundations of Western metaphysics—supplemented with a messianic fulfillment. Agamben’s suspicion of Derrida remains in the sense of this fulfillment, which is presented as necessary and possible only once the deconstruction of foundations and origins take place, which is but a surreptitious prayer for nihilism: an “empty ‘zero degree’ signification and with history as its infinite deferment.”<sup>360</sup> The attempted opening of “closures” in Derrida’s “differance,” Rodolphe Gasche (b. 1938) too confronts, “does not structurally reduplicate the gestures characteristic of the ontological difference, or of ‘difference as such’, but rather inscribes them within its own grid, the latter, with its tendency to withdraw into the two in the form of which comes forth, and of thus having in itself no itself, has, undoubtedly, been a major simulation to [the] conception of differance as the ‘space’ of cohabitation of a multiplicity of heterogeneous differences.”<sup>361</sup> Further, Gasche notes,

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<sup>357</sup> For Derrida, the concept of “spacing” is crucial to the understanding of “differance”—“Spacing is the simultaneous active and passive (the *a* of difference indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify, would not function.” See Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, (tr.) Aland Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 27.

<sup>358</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>359</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Structures, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in *Writing and Difference*, op. cit., p. 281.

<sup>360</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, op. cit., p. 104.

<sup>361</sup> Rodolphe Gasché, *Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University press, 1994), p. 268.

Derrida's "indifference to the ontological difference" in Heidegger, where the ontic-ontological determination takes place, by way of circumventing (rather than displacing), exposing "an indifference to difference as the capital unifying and opening 'ground' for all difference (between beings, and between themselves)... [where] thought encounters the very limit of its limitlessness."<sup>362</sup>

Jean-Luc Nancy (b. 1940), toeing the line of Derrida, would similarly attempt to think without *archê* and *telos*,<sup>363</sup> without the 'inherent concepts of metaphysics', which is however not without adumbrated acquiescence: "The coming into presence of being takes place precisely as nonarrival of presence."<sup>364</sup> Derrida's major influence on "writing" has been Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), whose hallmark includes, too, launching tirade against the foundationalism of Jean Paul Sartre's<sup>365</sup> (1905-1980) writer's "commitment."<sup>366</sup> For Sartre, poets are "men who refuse to utilize language," which is partly influenced by the impatience with French Resistance writers, in failing to overtly react politically. Commenting on *telos* as a refrain of memory, mimesis, Gerald Burns captures Blanchot's resistance to language, which Derrida too enthusiastically took up, and at the same time interrupting the ontological sites of Nietzsche-Heidegger:

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<sup>362</sup> Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>363</sup> See Jean-Luc Nancy, "A Finite Thinking," in Simon Sparks (ed.), *A Infinite Thinking*, (trs.) Edward Bullard, Jonathan Derbyshire, and Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-30.

<sup>364</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>365</sup> The summation of Sartre's *forte* is best captured by David Cauter: "A writer, if he is wise, will depict the social class which he knows most intimately; as often as not this class will be his own." See "Introduction," in Jean Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?*, p. xiv.

<sup>366</sup> As opposed to the role of the writer, or the "truth" in literature, Blanchot, speaking against Sartre [Why do I write?], makes it amply clear, for the need to overcome foundational subjectivities:

"[One] can certainly write without asking why one writes. If he happens to ask himself question as he [Sartre] writes, that is his concern; if he is absorbed by what he is writing and indifferent to the possibility of writing it, he is not even thinking about anything, that is his right and his good luck."

See "Literature and the Right to Death," in Maurice Blanchot, *The Work of Fire*, (tr.) Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 300.

“The work of writing belongs to a time outside the terms of *archê* and *telos*—the between-time or *entre-temps* of the pause, the interruption, the interminable, in which the present recedes into a past that never was, and the future, like the messiah, never arrives—a zone of incompleteness, of the fragmentary, of *dé soeuvement*, or ‘worklessness,’ among other Blanchotian concepts. This is the time of dying—the time that Blanchot appeared to have entered in the fragment, *L’instant de ma mort*, and which accounts for so many of his characteristic themes of passivity, affliction, waiting, forgetting. It is also, interestingly, the time of friendship—a relationship that neither begins nor ends, a relation of intimacy and foreignness, an infinite conversation in which nothing is ever determined.”<sup>367</sup>

Alternatively, Derrida has attempted a new reading<sup>368</sup> on how to erase language from the mathematico-arithmetic calculus:

“There is no calculability, since the One of a language, which escapes all arithmetic (ac)countability, is never determined. The One of the mono language of which I speak, and the one I speak, will hence not be an arithmetical identity or, in short, any identity at all. Monolanguage remains incalculable, at least in that characteristic.”<sup>369</sup>

For Derrida, language has “no home and that one cannot appropriate language.”<sup>370</sup> “Language, the word—in a way, the life of the word—is in essence spectral,”<sup>371</sup> a kind [as against the mimetic and mythical] of “spectral errancy of

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<sup>367</sup> Gerald Burns, *On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the Unruly* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), p. xxvii-viii.

<sup>368</sup> Quote Alan Bass

<sup>369</sup> See Jacques Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin*, (tr.) Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 30.

<sup>370</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Sovereignities in Question*, op cit., p. 100.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.



words”<sup>372</sup> On Paul Celan’s (1920-1970) dating of his poems, Derrida painfully (but, also, uselessly) illustrates how the “poem is ‘the language of an individual which has taken on form’. Singularity, but also solitude: the only one, the poem is alone.”<sup>373</sup> Derrida actual imperatives occur in the portrayal that the “poetic writing of a language” is nothing but a *shibboleth*. The erasure of its own subjectivity, or individual experiences of the being [“poem’s genesis”], informing itself as the ultimate language of the shibboleth, against any recrimination, but conditioned by its own autolectic “ciphered access”<sup>374</sup> (“a certain internal necessity of the poem would nonetheless *speak* to us”<sup>375</sup>) “the ciphered mark that one must *be able to partake of* with the other, and this differential capability must be inscribed in oneself, that is, in one’s own body as much as in the body of one’s own language, the one to the same extent as the other... the outside-of-meaning where it holds itself in reserve, the cipher *of* the ciphered, the ciphered manifestation of the cipher as such.”<sup>376</sup> Derrida argues that “the insignificance of

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<sup>372</sup> Derrida observes:

“All words, from their first emergence, partake of revenance. They will always have been phantoms, and this law governs the relationship in them between body and soul. One cannot say that we know this because we experience death and mourning. That experience comes to us from our relation to this revenance of the mark, then of language, then of the word, then of the name. What is called poetry or literature, art itself (let us make no distinction for the moment)—in other words, a certain experience of language, of the mark, or of the trait as such—is perhaps only an intense familiarity with the ineluctable originarity of the specter. One can, naturally, translate it into the ineluctable loss of the origin. Mourning, the experience of mourning, the passage through its limit, too, so that it would be hard to see here a law governing a theme or a genre. It is experience, and as such, for poetry, for literature, for art itself.”

Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>374</sup> Ibid., pp. 21-24.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-27.

language, of the properly linguistic body,” “can take on meaning only in relation to a *place*.”<sup>377</sup>

Before concluding on the spatial turn of the temporal, let us take a digression to Dennis Schmidt who attributes Hegel as the first one to have pointed out that “time is the key to understanding the place of language in the work of art.” Therein Hegel’s “truth of poetic language” is based on the conceptual frame between “kinship of the word and time” (which Plato too was troubled with in his analysis on the nature of poetry).<sup>378</sup> However, we need to note too that for Hegel the concept is still not an idea or, in other words, the *spatio* of the temporal has not yet appeared. Working on similar issues, Jean-Luc Nancy too—by exteriorizing Hegelian dialectics that the “‘language’ of thought is indeed the exhaustion of determined signification”—argues that:

“Thought is not language: it is beyond it, beyond the exteriority of the relation between word and thing. But, at the same time, it is also language: it works like a language... in the play of their differences. ... We must hold that the language of thought is a language, or language itself, just as much as we must hold that it is infinite exhaustion and alteration of language. We must hold to this, not only our of the imperturbable and obstinate seriousness of the philosopher who wants to enunciate the unenunciabile, but also because only language, exposing itself of itself as infinite relation and separation, also exposes this being-of-itself-outside-itself-in-the-other that is manifestation. In a sense, language is

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<sup>377</sup> “By place,” Derrida explains, “I mean just as much the relation to a border... or threshold... any *situation* in general from within which, practically, pragmatically, alliances are formed, contracts, codes, and conventions established that give meaning to the insignificant, institute passwords, bend language to what exceeds it, make of it a moment of gesture, and of step, secundarize or ‘reject’ it in order to find it again.” *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>378</sup> Dennis J. Schmidt, *On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 106.

manifestation: it posits the thing outside of itself... [and yet] manifest nothing."<sup>379</sup>

Similarly, as elsewhere, as earlier, too, we have seen the split between and, consequently, the turn from logical determination to phenomenological determination in Merleau-Ponty: "language, too, says nothing other than itself."<sup>380</sup> A phenomenological turn, visible right from Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenology, then, attempts to demarcate a linguistic shift from mathematical logic. However, the primacy of language, minus the subject or meaning, is constitutive and ends within its very notion, making language-temporality as consequential corpora in radical unities.

For, temporality itself is the aporia, the alterity that is pathologically a tragedy of finitude but also a recess for thinking, with or without the abyss of language. This, however unwillingly, we owe to the Greeks—for, between the good life and *eschaton*, there is no guarantee, no salvation. And, subtract the language, or the poetic, temporality has no ahistorical or historical place—in any or whatever relation or connection to being and existence, and experience. "Man," Agamben warns us, "cannot enter into language as a system of signs without radically transforming it, without constituting it in discourse."<sup>381</sup> The call, therefore, for the "pagan," as Francois Lyotard (1924-1998) proposes, or the "ineffable"<sup>382</sup> (which, primarily, is "infancy," or "wordless experience," according to Agamben), is what is pathologically spectacular, and inscribed within the pathological limits of "philosophical speculation," or "thinking as freedom," where the subject presents to itself, but where presence occurs "only by way of

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<sup>379</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, (trs.) Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 39.

<sup>380</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (tr.) Colin Smith (London and New York, [1962] 2002), p. 219.

<sup>381</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History*, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>382</sup> For Agamben, a "historico-transcendental relation" constitutes "truth and language." Whereas, "infancy" inserts a wedge between "language" and "discourse," which is similar to natural human language. See Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History*, op. cit., p. 47.

and for the sake of this presence of the subject.”<sup>383</sup> The inseparable partnering destinies of language and history, or experience and temporality, therefore, as double genitive readings, remains incomplete and stays as an “unattainable limit.”<sup>384</sup> Only in “literary language” there is a pertinent tension between a “projection into the future and a return to the moment that precedes it.”<sup>385</sup> It is only by way of establishing the metaphysical primacy of language, by segregating the ontology of experience, or even ahistorical, that the direction of situating temporality seem to be getting grounded. Poetry became the recluse of recluses, the subliminal, in the appeal for language-temporality.

“Poems,” Blanchot would remind us, “has no other *raison d’être* than the power from which they came, a power that reveals itself through the particularities of the text in the form of the poems.”<sup>386</sup> Therein poetry has no “objective meaning”—the “tonality” of poetry (which ordinarily presupposes images and words) is in fact a contradiction of relationships between “form and content,” except for the “value of the ‘ideas’ that can be evoked” or “its essential cause” it aspires—and therein the “poet rejects daily language.” Poetry therefore “forces us” to “learn, to see the obvious fact that poetry is possible, although it is inconceivable and terrible to bear, that is what the work, at the height of its effect, reveals to us in its own truth.”<sup>387</sup>

The abjectness of poetry to language is culpable, whether in the temporality of language as a promise, or as empty signifiers, or even as the

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<sup>383</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Birth to Presence*, (tr.) Brian Holmes et. al (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 21.

<sup>384</sup> Gregg’s summation, on reading Blanchot, is based on the comparison that “language and human beings share the same destiny of incompleteness” (p. 35). See, particularly the formulation part, in “Language, History, and Their Destinies of Incompletion,” in John Gregg, *Maurice Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression*, op. cit., pp. 18-34.

<sup>385</sup> “Language,” says John Gregg, “is at war with itself, and it is futile, therefore, to hope to find in it a mediating force that could bring about a fusion of consciousness and matter.” *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>386</sup> Maurice Blanchot, “Poetry and Language,” in *Faux Pas*, op. cit., p. 137.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*

inexperienceable or unlivable, which thereon became a gaze, a power-energy restricted to itself, in its own production, erasure, or non-presence: a Thing. In it is the weightlessness and heaviness of thought's thing; its emptiness as well as its non-material surmount. The "limit of language," Deleuze expounds, "is the Thing in its muteness—vision. The thing is the limit of language, as the sign is the language of the thing... the nth power of language."<sup>388</sup> An "[i]dea of a thing," Agamben also refers, "is the thing itself"—where the "thing" finds its "pure dwelling" in "language" *per se*.<sup>389</sup> Like Herman Melville's *Bartleby*, for both Deleuze and Agamben, the indeterminate and indiscernible reply of "I would prefer not to" represents the "extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives."<sup>390</sup> The power of emptiness, nothing, as is "the power of language," as is what poetry does to retain the disappearance of emptiness, the infinite of language:

"...this power of language is precisely what the poem cannot name. It effectuates this power, by drawing upon the latent song of language, upon its infinite resources, upon the novelty of its assemblage. But poetry cannot fasten this infinite being because it is to the infinite of language that the poem addresses itself in order to direct the power of language towards the retention of a disappearance."<sup>391</sup>

Like Alain Badiou, Derrida's Shibboleth too, emerging from reading the poetics of Paul Celan, momentarily traces the post-phenomenological hazards of "philosophical experiences" and the "experience of language"—as torn, and confounding, the undecidabilities of limits, non-spatial utopianism:

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<sup>388</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays: Critical and Clinical*, (trs.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 98.

<sup>389</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, (tr.) Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 76.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>391</sup> Alain Badiou, *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

“A *shibboleth* also crosses this border: for a poetic date, for a blessed date, the difference between the empirical and the essential, between contingent exteriority and necessary intimacy, no longer has any place. This non-place, this utopia, is the taking place or the event of the poem as blessing, the (perhaps) absolute poem... With this distinction between the empirical and the essential, a limit is blurred, that of the philosophical as such, philosophical distinction itself. Philosophy finds itself, *finds itself again* in the vicinity of poetics, indeed, of literature. It finds itself again there, for the indecision of this limit is perhaps what is most thought provoking. It finds itself again there, it does not necessarily lose itself there, as some believe, those who, in their tranquil credulity, believe they know where this limit runs and timorously keep within it, ingenuously, albeit without innocence, stripped of what one must call *the philosophical experience*: a certain questioning traversal of limits, uncertainty as to the border of the philosophical field—and above all the *experience of language*, always just as poetic, or literary, as it is philosophical.”<sup>392</sup>

In the concluding chapter, we shall examine further this “experience of language” in relation to the work of language and literature.

What we have been dealing insofar is the ontological question and the finitude of language, on the emptiness of language, where language is reduced to a *relation*, as envisaged and initiated in Walter Benjamin. In other words, we have seen how language is situated of its place in the question of subjectivity and ontology (the processes of both formation and accession). We have also evaluated the various attempts to sequence a relation of language-thinking-subjectivity, and the limits of human relation with language. Similarly, we have noted the purges of subjectivity-language, the ontological interrogation of language, and the “intersection between the space of literature and the site of the tribunal.”<sup>393</sup> Consistent to these developments, we have noticed that the issue of

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<sup>392</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Sovereignities in Question*, op cit., p. 44.

<sup>393</sup> On political and social purges (of “identification” and “punishment”) that also saw the “establishing [of] a theory of literature,” a conflict directly questioning the “status of language,” it is appropriate to refer here the conditions in post-War France and Jean Paul Sartre’s dominance.

temporality is stable in the instability involving language. When Derrida proposes experience as an “impossible repetition”<sup>394</sup> but also an “experience of the impossible”<sup>395</sup>—we are gently reminded about the arrival from Heraclitus<sup>396</sup> to Heidegger. Similarly, when Blanchot departs from Heidegger’s attempt to situate the finitude in language, we are careless in seeing poetry treated not only as “logic of language” that “unveils itself as a language *of finitude*” but also spelling an alterity that seeks to transform the task of ontology into an ethics.<sup>397</sup>

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See Philip Watts, *Allegories of the Purge: How Literature Responded to the Postwar Trials of Writers and Intellectuals in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 104-05.

<sup>394</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Sovereignities in Question*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>395</sup> “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” in Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, Vol. I, op cit., p. 15.

<sup>396</sup> In reference here is Heraclitus’ hiatus with spatio-temporality: one does not step in the same river twice.

<sup>397</sup> William S. Allen, *Ellipsis*, op. cit., esp. pp. 20-21.

Chapter Five:  
**Beyond the Ineffable:  
'Where is the Music?'**

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"...and I must despise the world which does not know that music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy."

—Ludwig van Beethoven.<sup>1</sup>

"[I]s there a sense in establishing a 'natural' hierarchy between the sound-imprint, for example, and the visual (graphic) imprint?"

—Jacques Derrida.<sup>2</sup>

"Machining the voice was the first musical operation. ... Machines are always singular keys that open or close an assemblage, a territory."

—Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.<sup>3</sup>

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Let us begin with Derrida's quest posed above. Sense is the casualty here, as always! Apart from that Derrida raises a pertinent question of hierarchy—between music and the arts. Is the hierarchy in question then a question anterior to senses? Immanuel Kant, whom we examined in the previous chapter, is notorious for rigging these kinds of metaphysical hierarchies. Apart from the hierarchies involved in poetry vs. philosophy, Kant has his own opinion on music too. The question here is whether Derrida is attempting to readdress, or indeed to reaffirm Kant's hierarchies of faculty? At first glance Derrida's answer to this hierarchical issue is simple—there are no visible hierarchies and no-sense:

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<sup>1</sup> Ludwig van Beethoven's letters to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (allegedly translated and communicated by Bettina Brentano). See Alexander Wheelock Thayer, Hermann Dieters & Hugo Riemann, *The Life of Ludwig Van Beethoven, Vol. 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, (tr.) Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (tr.) Brian Massumi (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, [1987] 2009), p. 303 & p. 334.



“The graphic image is not seen; and the acoustic music is not heard. The difference between the full unities of the voice remains unheard. And, the difference in the body of the inscription is also invisible.”<sup>4</sup>

Music, then, simply vanishes! No traces, no echoes, of the acoustic. In other words, as Kramer suggests, music “simply does not exist... Where is the music?”<sup>5</sup> The importance of Derrida to music, or to language, remains in the notion of the ineffable (invisible). This discursive emerges from Derrida’s reading of Rousseau’s *Essay* (1781) and *Discourse* (1754), in particular, in *Of Grammatology*,<sup>6</sup> allowing Rousseau’s thinking on language and society, or on music specifically, to ferment into a critique of logocentric tradition and a formulation of the supplementarity. Some critics<sup>7</sup> have derided Derrida’s commentary<sup>8</sup> on Rousseau’s *Essay* as overlooking its central context, namely, that it examines music. To a certain extent such displeasures are also justified because Derrida made the cardinal mistake of judging the book by its size.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, temporal issues of language “origin” were, by then, for Derrida, full preoccupation. Nonetheless, shortly after *Of Grammatology*, Derrida, in a very short comment on Roger Laporte’s (1979) *Fugue musics*—pronounces that the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> Lawrence Kramer, “The Musicology of the Future?,” in *Repercussions*, Vol. 1. No. 1, 1992, pp. 5-18, p. 9, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, esp. “Genesis and Structure of the *Essay on the Origins of Language*,” op. cit., pp. 165-268.

<sup>7</sup> Downing A. Thomas, *Music and the Origins of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> On the question of Rousseau’s music, Derrida says that “a disquiet *seems* to animate all Rousseau’s reflection and to give them their vehemence: they are concerned *at first* with the origin and degeneration of music.” See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>9</sup> In Rousseau’s *Essay*, Derrida comments:

“If one wants to maintain that the destiny of music is the major preoccupation of the *Essay*, it must be explained that the chapters that directly concern that subject occupy hardly a third of the work (a little more if you consider the number of chapter, a little less if you consider the number of pages) and that the rest of the essay does not deal with it at all.”

Ibid., p. 195.

‘fugue’ and ‘supplement’ are the same: the “irreducibility of the musical does not stem from any melocentrism...[it is] inassimilable by any possible discourse.”<sup>10</sup> In general, Derrida’s interest in Laporte remains in the notion of the *force*—of “never letting itself be apprehended.”<sup>11</sup> Music, then, cannot be apprehended. Music is the impossible. The underlying issues here perhaps highlight an ominous problematic, the impossibility of subjective experience, or the experience of music itself, its presentability, and a certain conception of philosophy:

“To write does not lead to a pure signifier, and it could be that Biography differs from philosophy, and on the contrary comes closer to painting and especially music, insofar as it probably never carries a true content...”<sup>12</sup>

Of course, Derrida’s own project on writing still overshadows the context from which he raises these concerns. Still then, and this is the sequence of ideas our investigation shall continue, the premises for interrogating music can be structured either on its peculiarities or its non-distinctiveness [questions of hierarchies] with other arts (poetry, politics, or painting, for instances); the [phenomenological reduction of the] subject of music (either as a perceptive, or receptive, or figurative, or performative, or creative); and, finally, the temporal dimension of arresting music in philosophical practices. Our exercise however should not be construed as constructing a leitmotif or attempting to give a deconstruction reading<sup>13</sup> of music or historical permutations in musical practices

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<sup>10</sup> Jacques Derrida, “What Remains by Force of Music...,” (tr.) Peggy Kamuf, in Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 81-89, p. 88.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>12</sup> Roger Laporte, quoted, in Jacques Derrida. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>13</sup> Like, for instance, the work of Rose Rosengard Subotnik, *Deconstructive Variations Music and Reason in Western Society* (Minneapolis: London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), which proposes a conception (actually social bridge) of going beyond “music itself”—a decline seen both (and) between autonomy of music (post-Adorno) and the cultural challenges faced

or genres.<sup>14</sup> A deconstructive approach to music has more permutative possibilities in Gilles Deleuze, rather than in Jacques Derrida. Given Derrida's ubiquitous statements on music, and despite the theoretical possibilities he has envisaged, an aporetic conclusion is already drawn on any possibilities of music, inasmuch it is for speech too. For what other than an otherwise carries a "true content"? The illustrative, nevertheless, and in conforming to the thread of our investigation, is enfolded in a non-art process of seeing the hearing. The extrapolations between a non-mimetic and non-denotative—and a non-representable indeterminacy concerns us.<sup>15</sup> It is therefore not without a word of caution that Lawrence Kramer remarks: "Music is the last bastion of the ideal in a thoroughly de-idealized world."<sup>16</sup>

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## I

On ancient and medieval age music history, Thomas J. Mathiesen is *also* an authority. Renaissance humanists, who were "intrigued by the legendary powers and quality of the music of ancient Greece," notes Mathiesen, were confronted by a technical problem of translating the musical bequeaths from classical antiquity. Moreover, the initial attempt to rediscover the tradition were "hampered by an absence of notated piece[s] of music, incomplete or imperfect manuscripts of texts they wished to read, and only a limited knowledge of other valuable pieces of evidence, iconographic and archaeological."<sup>17</sup> Conjoining this archival

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from the rapid rise of non-autonomous music—and the redundant epistemological assertion for music autonomy through abstract reason.

<sup>14</sup> Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music* (London & New York: Continuum, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> For a reading that examines this problem as a communicative indeterminacy, see Christopher Hasty, "The Image of Thought and Ideas of Music," in Brian Hulse and Nick Nesbitt (eds.), *Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), pp. 1-22.

<sup>16</sup> Lawrence Kramer, *Interpreting Music* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), p. 97.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo's Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), pp. 1-2.

frustration,<sup>18</sup> observes Mathiesen, is also the “evanescent” state of music, unlike other tangible forms of inheritance like architecture, literature or sculpture, and given its base as entirely structured on “sounding medium.” Music, therefore, “can [only] be described, it can be made the subject of theory, but it remains elusive.”<sup>19</sup> Mathiesen’s comments presented an entirety of a problematic on the nature of music and sound.

What musical charm was driving the Renaissance humanist to rediscover the ancients? There is no single answer, of course. Nonetheless, one can safely conclude now that the intersections of language-music-poetry were chiefly contributing to this thirsty venture for the elusive. Mathiesen mentions the need for going back as primarily guided by a desire to solve three complications, which became central to the middle ages’ own questions on subjectivity and language. First, the transcendental order in musicality as an object or subject; second, the functional role of music as a social conjunction to both reception and perception; and, third, the figurative as a temporal disorder. Accordingly, on the profit of a return, we shall see whether it was answered or not in the next section. The importance of this continuity, as Daniel Heller-Roazen (b. 1974) has univocally stated, remains in the fact that the “doctrine of modern harmony began as the imitation of the ancient.”<sup>20</sup> We shall now quickly survey the worthiness of the inheritance.

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<sup>18</sup> Hagel points out the synchronic and diachronic complexity involved amongst contemporary scholars dealing with “classical music archeology and archaeomusicology,” with the many instances of generalizing “assumptions” and the pervasive association of an “evolutionary” methodology that is essentially flawed and non-technical. See Stefan Hagel, *Ancient Greek Music: A New Technical History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For an extensive and critical book review critique of Hagel, see Alison Laywine’s “*Ancient Greek Music: A New Technical History* by Stefan Hagel,” in *Aestimatio: Critical Reviews in the History of Sciences*, Vol. 9, 2012, pp. 124-170.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo’s Lyre*, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Heller-Roazen, *The Fifth Hammer: Pythagoras and the Disharmony of the World* (New York: Zone Books, 2011), p. 61.

A highly sophisticated musical typology was already developed and existing in ancient Greek. This finds enumerated in the classifications of Proclus (412-485 A.D.)—music meant for the gods and music designated for human events.<sup>21</sup> Music, for the Greeks, simply put, is a “performed” collective (chorus), or a solo, or even instrumental. This topology has not changed much. Moreover, music played a specific role in the religious and devotional, the literary and narrative, and the civic and social life, with each abiding a particular purpose based on its own form.<sup>22</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades comments that Ancient Greeks’ “musical rhythm was contained within language itself. The musical-rhythmic structure was completely determined by the language. There was no room for an independent musical-rhythmic setting; nothing could be added or changed.”<sup>23</sup> Flora Levin also comments that ancient Greek language “was itself a form of melodious expression” and the “melodious patterns of the ancient tongue were the products of the pitch-accents that were integral to the meanings of the words.”<sup>24</sup> Two key elements of the Greeks are therefore a language-dependent rhythm or language-centric musicality and the rhythmization of language.

Here, we may refer, amongst the many, to two musical forms: Hymns and Nomos:<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> An example:

“All day long they propitiated the god with singing,  
chanting a splendid hymn to Apollo, these young Achaians,  
singing to the one who works from afar, who listened in gladness.”

See Homer, *The Iliad*, (tr.) Richmond Lattimore (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, [1951] 2011), § 1.474.

<sup>22</sup> West identifies two widely used legacies of forms: the *paean* and the *dithyramb*. See M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially Chapter One, “Music in Greek Life,” pp. 13-38.

<sup>23</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language: The Rise of Western Music as Exemplified in the Settings*, (tr.) Marie Louise Göllner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Flora R. Levin, *Greek Reflections on the Nature of Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. xiii-iv.

<sup>25</sup> The concept of “nomos” is taken up politically by Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, (tr.) G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press

The popular metric compositions of hymns (notably but wrongly attributed as Homeric<sup>26</sup>), dated eight to sixth centuries B.C.E., were part of an aristocratic tradition. Professionals, who, probably, were supplanted by amateurish citizen-musicians during festivals, usually sing it chorally.<sup>27</sup> Hymns may pay prayerful tributes and “provide description of the deeds of the gods, and these may include the discovery or invention of musical instruments,” and, also, didactically maintaining “the unity of music, text, and movement that is so important to the musical culture of the Greeks.”<sup>28</sup> Hymns “also explore the relationship between the divine and human words, and they emphasise both the gulf between gods and men, and also their closeness in some ways.”<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, “nomos” is the other musico-poetic form, and is described as rather complex and often suggested as being the precursor to modern virtuoso performance. Literally it is translated as “law,” “custom” or “convention,” and, therefore, Plato’s statement: “our songs have become our laws.”<sup>30</sup> The four

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Publishing, [2003] 2006) and Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari’s formulation of Nomadology. Hymns, meanwhile, articulates the singular intersection and mediation between humans and metaphysics.

<sup>26</sup> For a range of ancient hymns, see T.W. Allen et. al (eds.), *The Homeric Hymns* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936).

<sup>27</sup> The four main festivals being Olympia and Nemea (in honour of Zeus), Isthmia (in honour of Poseidon), and Pythia (in honour of Apollo).

<sup>28</sup> Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo’s Lyre*, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

<sup>29</sup> See the excellent introduction in Nicholas Richardson (ed.), *Three Homeric Hymns: To Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 7.

<sup>30</sup> Plato, *The Laws of Plato*, (tr.) Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, [1980] 1988), § 7.799e, p. 188.

Aristotle, however, offers a different version wherein “the nomoi were so called because the pre-literate people set their laws to music for mnemonic purposes.” Similarly, Aristides Quintilianus holds the view that the “nomoi were certain mele established by law for use in specific festivities and public sacred feasts.” Whereas, Plutarchean Lysias maintained that the term “nomoi” simply refers to “certain pieces” that were “based on a particular tuning that had to be maintained throughout.” “In any case,” Mathiesen argues by referring to Ennamuel Laroche,

identified types of *nomos* include the earlier development of two types of singing, which are accompanied by a “kithara” (*kitharoedic*) or an “aulos” (*auloedic nomoi*),<sup>31</sup> and the other two include later developments, which are performed, either as a soloist “kitharist” or “aulete.”<sup>32</sup> The “nomoi” (named after Apollo, who is also called *Nomimos*) is therefore supposed to mean “something like ‘the Law-giver’,” given Apollo’s association with the codes of law in Herodotus’s [*Naturalis*] *Historia*.<sup>33</sup> Fortunately, Proclus is able to give us a detailed explanation:

“The *nomos*, on the other hand [i.e., in contrast to the dithyramb], because of the god [i.e., Apollo], is relaxed in an orderly and magnificent manner in its rhythms, and it uses double phrases. Moreover, each uses suitable harmoniai. The dithyramb is arranged in the Phrygian and Hypophrygian, while the *nomos* seems to be derived from the paean (the paean is the more general type, written for dismissal of ills, while the *nomos* is distinctly for Apollo). The *nomos* is not ecstatic like the dithyramb: the dithyramb is drunkenness and sports, while the *nomos* is prayers of

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the *nomoi* “conveys the sense of a piece of music fixed and unalterable.” See Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo’s Lyre*, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>31</sup> On the musical instruments of kithara and aulos (which also goes to say other instruments too), accompanied by its contextual explanation and figures, Landels’ book remain far the most excellent and comprehensive. See John G. Landels, *Music in Ancient Greece and Rome* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), esp. Chapters 2(a) and 2(b), pp. 24-68.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo’s Lyre*, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

John G. Landels’s version of Herodotus however enjoys a greater and specific range:

“A famous aulos player called Sakadas from Argos was said to have composed the ‘Pythian *nomos*’, an aulos solo celebrating the victory of Apollo over the Python, a snakelike monster, by which he gained possession of the shrine at Delphi. Sakadas was the first aulos-player to perform during the Pythian games at Delphi (in about 586 BC) and the hatred of Apollo for aulos-players, dating from his contest with Marsyas, was thus symbolically brought to an end.”

See *Music in Ancient Greece and Rome*, op. cit., p. 157.

supplication and great order, for the god himself comprises musical sound in calm order and scale.”<sup>34</sup>

A survey of ancient Greek music forms shows certain discontinuities. One difference is the nowadays not so widely given importance about the ancients—the distinction between ordinary speech and the harmony embedded in speech, be it lyrical or poetic or musical, and the notions of melody and rhythm.<sup>35</sup> As Plato-Socrates conversation highlights: “rhythm and the harmony of music should conform to language, not vice versa.”<sup>36</sup> The “speaking style” and “good use of language, harmony, grace, and rhythm,” therein, “all depend on goodness of character,” an essential for the community, and that is required of training amongst the youngsters.<sup>37</sup> One should however note here that prior to sixth century B.C.E., which saw the appearance of harmony and number, i.e., *harmonia* (origin, i.e., ‘instrument tuning’), Greek music then was entirely “monophonic.”<sup>38</sup> For the Greeks, then, “music was considered by them to be as necessary as language and as rational as thought itself. As such, it was regarded as powerfully paideutic, and productive of knowledge”<sup>39</sup>—privileged along with other pursuits like mathematics, history, philosophy, cosmology, or art and science, or civil life. Greek harmonics were therein conceived as “the study of elements out of which melody is built, of the relations in which they can legitimately stand to one another, of the organised (e.g., scalar systems) formed by complexes of these

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<sup>34</sup> Proclus, quoted, in Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo’s Lyre*, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>35</sup> Of course, the exception being the stress on “diction,” often conflated with the structural and figurative of language.

<sup>36</sup> Plato, *Republic*, (tr.) Robin Waterfield (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), § 400d, p. 98. M.L. West notes the occasional presence of girl choruses and singers (*partheneia*) to provide “public spectacle” and “girlish feelings.” See M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music*, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, § 400d-e, pp. 98-99.

<sup>38</sup> Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, op. cit., p. 16

<sup>39</sup> Flora R. Levin, *Greek Reflections*, op. cit., p. xvi.



relations and the ways in which different structures are generated by combinations or transformations of others.”<sup>40</sup>

Significant to this brief about Greek traditions is also the invariable attributes prescribed to music as both a science (Aristoxenian) and art (Pythagorean). Andrew Barker, in fact, classifies Greek “harmonic writing” on the basis of these two “fairly distinct traditions”—Aristoxenian and Pythagorean.<sup>41</sup> Aristides Quintilianus in his *De musica* sums up:

Music is a science, certainly, in which exists sure and infallible knowledge, for whether we speak of it in terms of problems or effects, it would never demonstrate any change or alteration. And indeed, we might also with reason call it an art, for it is both a composition of perceptions... and is not useless to life.”<sup>42</sup>

The scientific Aristoxenian (*Elementa Harmonica*) tradition hinges on three imperative arguments: first, the establishment of the notion of musical on the basis of relating the method of processing data and auditory perception; second, the description of harmonics as a “phenomena” vis-à-vis on the conditions of how the notion of meaning and melody is created through auditory reception and, third, the “coordinating principles of the science must themselves be found by abstraction from the perceived musical data.”<sup>43</sup> Similarly, Pythagoras of Samos (570 B.C.-495 B.C.), whose contributions amongst the many including *Fundamentals of Music*, is said to have introduced acoustical theory (harmonics) which stresses on geometrical experiencing of music, and therefore loses the dynamic. The influence<sup>44</sup> of Pythagorean harmonics to western music

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<sup>40</sup> Andrew Barker (ed.), *Greek Musical Writings Volume II: Harmonic and Acoustic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Theory, 1989), p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted, in Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo's Lyre*, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>43</sup> Andrew Barker (ed.), *Greek Musical Writings*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> From the Classical period throughout Enlightenment and Romanticism, Pythagorean or mathematical influence has been strongly felt. See Joscelyn Godwin (ed.), *The Harmony of*

theory (via the conceptualization of “scale” during Middle Ages) is completely premised on the universe of numbers, through expressive intervals of ratios derived from the lyre.<sup>45</sup> Pythagoras attribute number as the wisest thing and harmony as the most beautiful thing.<sup>46</sup> Knowing the truth was essentially mediated through music,<sup>47</sup> with truth linked to divinity and mathematics. Whereas, taking a departure around fourth century B.C., Aristoxenus, a peripatetic philosopher and student of Aristotle, developed a non-geometrical but dynamic method, based on deductive reasoning, through the creative formulates of physics and mathematics (“by being rooted in the continuity of infinite number”<sup>48</sup>), which is seen as the original precursor as well as the “main tenets” for musicology even of today’s, i.e., harmonics and rythmics.<sup>49</sup>

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*Spheres: A Sourcebook of the Pythagorean Tradition in Music* (Rochester: Inner Traditions International, Ltd., 1993). Also, see Daniel Heller-Roazen, *The Fifth Hammer*, op. cit.

<sup>45</sup> Ruth Katz however argues that “such mathematical thinking did not strongly manifest itself in the practice of music as an art.” See *The Powers of Music: Aesthetic Theory and the Invention of Opera* (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, [1986] 1994), p. 4.

<sup>46</sup> Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier, *Measuring Heaven: Pythagoras and His Influence on Thought and Art in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 109.

<sup>47</sup> Pythagorean first natural law: “all things known have number—for without this, nothing could be thought of or known,” Ferguson highlights, “was made in music.” See Kitty Ferguson, *The Music of Pythagoras: How an Ancient Brotherhood Cracked the Code of the Universe and Lit the Path from Antiquity to Outer Space* (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), p. 68.

<sup>48</sup> Flora R. Levin, *Greek Reflections*, op. cit., p. xvi.

<sup>49</sup> See Sophie Gibson, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the Birth of Musicology* (New York & London: Routledge, 2005), esp. Chapter Five, “Musical Theory after Aritoxenus,” pp. 129-68.



Figure: "Pythagoras," in Guy Murchie, *Music of the Spheres Vol. II* (Source: Commons).

Greeks concepts of music, Mathiesen highlights, are different from Modern western concept of the same. Music was not only employed as a tool for "relaxation and entertainment"<sup>50</sup> but also played "a central role in the civic and religious life of the people."<sup>51</sup> It was a "culture permeated with music."<sup>52</sup> "There is certainly no action among men," says Quintilianus (*On Music*), "that is carried out without music."<sup>53</sup> Andy Hamilton too points out that music is integrated with all "social issues" as a "seamless whole," which is a conflation of art and craft, as Paul Oskar Kristeller (1950) pointed out.<sup>54</sup> Another pertinent difference stemming from the conception of "order" found in music, where the stress on community order comes foremost, which is the disposition value (*ethos*) for a "mathematical order," and, therefore, exhibits mathematical principles of "coherence of a coordinated harmonic system"—which, in turn, is about system organization "that underlie the admirable order of the cosmos, and the order to

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<sup>50</sup> This aspect, one can safely note, is not different aside from the changes and continuity involved in utilizing music as a therapy, even in contemporary times.

<sup>51</sup> Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo's Lyre*, op. cit., p. 6. This view is generally corroborated in almost all recent works on ancient Greek music.

<sup>52</sup> M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music*, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Arustides Quintilianus, quoted, in Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

which the human soul can aspire.”<sup>55</sup> On the subversive character of music as an expression of mathematical orderliness of the community, Socrates warns—“caution must be taken in adopting an unfamiliar type of music: it is an extremely risky venture, since any change in the musical modes affect the most important laws of a community.”<sup>56</sup> Mathematical properties, or, significantly, the mathematization of music existed since the Greeks. Finally, the summative difference is the etymological derivative of “music,” which is itself a misnomer with its current parlance, but having little relevance for debate:

“It is well known that the meaning of the ancient Greek word [...] (*mousikê*) cannot be reduced *sic et simpliciter* either to ‘music’ nor to any parallel word in other modern languages (*‘Musik’, ‘musique’, ‘musica,’* etc.). The Greek concept of *mousikê* covers indeed a remarkably wide range of aspects regarding religion, education, politics, and even the art of war. As a consequence, it is unlikely that a comprehensive view of such a multifarious subject can be provided by any single scholar today.”<sup>57</sup>

It is therefore “inaccurate,” as Georgiades further says, “to translate *musiké* as *music*, for these two terms designate two different things. *Musiké* cannot be translated.”<sup>58</sup> Hamilton says that there are three intertwining issues to be noted in this regard: “the concepts of music or *mousikê*, of art in general or *technê*, and the domain of the beautiful or *kalos*.”<sup>59</sup> Together with *gumnastikê* (physical school), *mousikê* (cultural and intellectual school) therefore forms the two skill development agencies in Greek education system. Music, for the Greeks, “existed primarily as verse.”<sup>60</sup> Language was the word. The word gives music. Or, rather, the word can be made into music, the rhythmization of music, which in

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<sup>55</sup> Andrew Barker (ed.), *Greek Musical Writings*, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>56</sup> Plato, *Republic*, op. cit., § 424b-c, p. 128.

<sup>57</sup> Massimo Raffa, book review on *Music and the Muses: The Culture of ‘Mousike’ in the Classical Athenian City*, (eds.) Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, in *Aestimatio*, Volume 2, 2005, pp. 108-18, p. 108.

<sup>58</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>60</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, op. cit., p. 4.

turn pervades life. Even the Greek alphabet system is musically notational.<sup>61</sup> “The Greek verse line was a linguistic and simultaneously musical reality,” notes Goergiadès.<sup>62</sup> Rhythmic-metric (syllabic) structures were however casually forgotten when “poetic texts” were copied without music, or where rhythms were established without musical notations, or when rhythms reduplicated from vowels or diphthongs. This also exposes the vulnerability of language and music relation.

From the ancients, their biggest contribution is the scientific-mathematical basis of founding a music theory, which gave a mathematically structured and ordered feature to its elements. This is apart from, particularly through Aristotle, a description of musical representation as an attempt to formulate a theory of expression within the conceptual framework of *aesthetics* and *mimesis*.<sup>63</sup> Aristoxenus, for one, rejected the Pythagorean-Platonic usage of numerical ratios to represent intervals. Sophie Gibson features Aristoxenus (*Harmonics*) as independently charting a scientific methodology for the field of harmonics, by “dividing musical knowledge into distinct subjects.”<sup>64</sup> Musicology, Gibson reiterates, “cannot really be said to have been born until Aristoxenus’ harmonic treatise took it out of a cosmological context and examined it independently and systematically.”<sup>65</sup> Aristoxenus’ contributions to musicology include rejection of the consonance phenomenon, as we mentioned above, and privileging of continuous sound as perceptive art. He also introduced both string relaxation and tension by rejecting string-length dependent formulation of

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<sup>61</sup> Susan Wollenberg, “Music and mathematics: an overview,” in John Fauvel, Raymond Flood and Robin Wilson (eds.), *Music and Mathematics: From Pythagoras to Fractals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-10, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>63</sup> Göran Sörbom, “Aristotle on Music as Representation,” in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1994, pp. 37-46, p. 46.

<sup>64</sup> See Sophie Gibson, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the Birth of Musicology* (New York & London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 4-5.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

relative pitch.<sup>66</sup> Therein, unbeknownst, a conflict was created unconsciously. There was not attempt to resolve either, since Aristoxenus himself did not understand the uncharted waters he had stepped in. The conflict rests on the temporal representation of music, the ontological reproduction of music, which, till then, is solely seen as a structural conflict of within and without its modes of production. We shall now turn to the next section where Greek/Roman music found a new legacy.

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## II

Labeled as the ‘golden age of symphonies’—although other genres such as operas and other vocal traditions were still very much in popularity—the radicalization of music in the eighteenth century provides the most extensive recorded problem, up to the point, on the aesthetic category and “listening.” Two contributions marked this era. First, the continuity from the ancients who viewed music as both a science and an art till the eighteenth-century was furthered of its position but by removing the linguistic element in music as an art. Evan Bonds observes: “music without words had long been viewed as a lesser art, capable of moving the passions but vague and imprecise.”<sup>67</sup> Second, it gave priority to instrumental music and the notion of music without words emerged.

The “setting of language to music,” which was previously the “great historical tradition of music,”<sup>68</sup> which also survived till seventeenth-century’s Heinrich Schütz (1585-1672), the greatest German music composer before Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750), suddenly lost its prominence. Through Bach, by mid-eighteenth century, the respectability for ‘the’ instrumentality of music was conceived. This nouveau niche however cannot be simply restricted

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<sup>66</sup> Manuel Pedro Ferreira, “Propositions in Ancient and Medieval Music,” in Gerard Assayag, Hans Georg Feichtinger, Jose Francisco Rodrigues (eds.), *Mathematics and Music: A Diderot Mathematical Forum* (Berlin; Heidelberg; New York: Springer, 2002), pp. 1-25, p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, op. cit., p. 7.

to a case of regimented social reception. New shifts to instrumentality by 1800 meant that the status of the symphony “rose enormously”<sup>69</sup>—thus becoming the “most prestigious of all musical genres, vocal or instrumental.” This, in turn, helped “promulgate the new-found aesthetic prestige in instrumental music.”<sup>70</sup> Evan Bonds remarks thus:

“The power of instrumental music to move the passions had long been acknowledged, but without words, music’s perceived ability to convey ideas had always remained suspect. Yet within the span of less than a generation, this new attitude toward instrumental music won increasing legitimacy, and its adherents would grow steadily in numbers throughout the nineteenth century.”<sup>71</sup>

These developments in the musical world, without doubt, did not go unnoticed in the philosophical world. It further precipitated the intensity of debates between the arts and philosophy. Immanuel Kant, for one, received instrumental music with utter coldness, a total “abdication.”<sup>72</sup> In his 1790 hierarchies of arts, Kant classified instrumental music as those that were “agreeable” or, as Evan Bonds (interpreting Kant) suggests, was “pleasing (*angenehm*) but incapable of transmitting concepts. Like wallpaper, instrumental music was an abstract art that gave pleasure through its form but lacked content and was therefore inferior to vocal music.”<sup>73</sup> He was moreover not alone—“Kant’s German compatriots were equally unwilling to hear instrumental music

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<sup>69</sup> “Listeners in Beethoven’s lifetime were incline to hear he symphony,” observes Mark Evan Bonds, “as the expression of a communal voice, and many were inclined to hear it as a distinctively national genre at the very moment when German nationalism first began to emerge.” See Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought*, op. cit., p. xv.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-4.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>72</sup> See “Kant’s Abdication,” in John T. Hamilton, *Music, Madness, and the Unworking of Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 109-115.

<sup>73</sup> Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought*, op. cit., p. 7.

as a vehicle of ideas.”<sup>74</sup> However, Kant’s contemporary, E.T.A. Hoffmann,<sup>75</sup> did not share this organized opinion. In 1810, having reviewed Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony (written between 1804-08), Hoffmann declared instrumental music to be supreme of all art forms—“a world that has nothing in common with the external world of senses. ...[For, it] sets in motion the level of horror, fear, revulsion, pain, and it awakens that infinite longing which is the essence of Romanticism.”<sup>76</sup> Hoffmann, further, questions: “Is not music the mysterious language of a more distant spiritual realm whose wonderful accents strike a responsive chord within us, and awaken a higher and more intense life?”<sup>77</sup> Music, then, in itself, became a language, definable (‘sayable’, for Hegel) in its own expressivity. Andrew Bowie puts Hoffmann’s contributions as not only restricted to Kantian context but even in Hegelian perspective:

“For Hegel the truth of music is eminently sayable in the form of philosophy. As we saw, in discussing the signifier ‘I,’ Hegel maintained that the ‘*Unsayable*, emotion, feeling is not the most excellent, the most true, but rather the most insignificant, most untrue.’ For Hoffmann music can articulate the ‘unsayable,’ which is *not* representable by concepts or verbal language.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Writing in the 1770s, the mathematician Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779), better known for his popular encyclopedia, for instance, remarked that musical instrument is “not a disagreeable sound, even a pleasant and entertaining chatter, but nothing that would engage the heart.” *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>75</sup> E.T.A. Hoffmann, notes Jeanne Riou, “is one of the least theoretically motivated of the Romantic authors and would have little interest in using music to challenge the framework of Enlightenment reason.” See Jeanne Riou, “Music and Non-Verbal Reason in E.T.A. Hoffmann,” in Siobhán Donovan and Robin Elliott (eds.), *Music and Literature in German Romanticism* (Rochester & Suffolk: Camden House, 2004), pp. 43-55, esp. p. 43.

<sup>76</sup> E.T.A. Hoffmann, quoted, in Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> Quoted in Raymond Monelle, *Linguistics and Semiotics in Music* (Victoria; Tokyo; Paris; Amsterdam; Berlin; Pennsylvania; Berkshire: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992), p. 7.

<sup>78</sup> Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1990), p. 184.



The scathing review of Kant's corpora however came from Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) *The World as Will and Representation*<sup>79</sup> (for which Schopenhauer himself wrote prefaces for the various editions: first edition 1818; second edition 1844; and third edition 1859). Schopenhauer's influence, more than Hoffmann, became more visible in the later years—particularly in relation to composer Richard Wagner<sup>80</sup> (1813-1883) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).<sup>81</sup> Hierarchically and art-wise, Schopenhauer established a totally divergent view on music:

“Far from being a mere aid to poetry, music is certainly an independent art; in fact, it is the most powerful of all the arts, and therefore attains its ends entirely from its own resources. ... Music as such knows only the tones or notes, not the causes that produce them. ... For [...] the musical art [...] shows its power and superior capacity, since it gives the most profound, ultimate, and secret information on the feeling expressed in words, or the action presented in the opera.”<sup>82</sup>

By confronting that all arts—except music—is but an objectification of the will, Schopenhauer's response is a rejection of a tradition that spans from Platonic Ideas to Kant's Ideas. “Music,” for Schopenhauer, is “essentially nonrepresentational.” It “stands apart from the other arts, independent of the world of appearance. Instead of reflecting or objectifying the Will secondhand,

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<sup>79</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, (tr.) E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966/1969) and *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, (tr.) E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966/1969).

<sup>80</sup> Kropfingher points out that among Wagner's reception of other composers, which include Mozart, Weber, Marschner, Spontini, and Liszt, Beethoven topped the list, not least in “veneration” but as “evidenced by his own works.” See Klaus Kropfingher, *Wagner and Beethoven: Richard Wagner's Reception of Beethoven*, (tr.) Peter Palmer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>81</sup> Schopenhauer remained Nietzsche's “principal educator.” See Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, (trs.) David Pellauer and Graham Parkes (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 2.

<sup>82</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, (tr.) E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966/1969), p. 448.

through ideas, it does so directly, without mediation.”<sup>83</sup> Therein, music becomes an idea that is “independent of the phenomenal world,” whose manifest of the *principium individuationis*<sup>84</sup> is a “copy of the Will itself”<sup>85</sup>—

“[Music] stands quite apart from all others. In it we do not recognize the copy, the repetition, of an Idea of the inner nature of the world. Yet it is such a great and exceedingly fine art, its effect on man’s innermost nature is so powerful, and it is so completely and profoundly understood by him in his innermost being as an entirely universal language, whose distinctness surpass[es] even that of the world of perception itself.”<sup>86</sup>

Kant’s reference to music, or what he calls as the “art of tone,”<sup>87</sup> may be critically evaluated on two fronts: its derivative and functional expanses. Music, for Kant, has no sense, but just an affect. In speaking on behalf of the spectator, Kant failed to understand the aesthetic dilemma. Music, again, is “without concepts,” and, therefore, leaves not trail of sense for “reflection.”<sup>88</sup> The value of music, Kant says, is “judged by reason,” and is therefore less valuable than “any other of the beautiful arts.”<sup>89</sup> In other words, Kant’s remorse is an epochal response—a reaction to the soft comforts that stands to be radically ruptured by breaking the linguistic connotation of music. In it, Kant was defending the value of language as representable, its correlate with sense (intuition) and

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<sup>83</sup> Stephen McClatchie, *Analyzing Wagner’s Operas: Alfred Lorenz and German Nationalist Ideology* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998), p. 29.

<sup>84</sup> The form of knowledge ascertained or accessed by the individual, which is either through phenomenon or appearance.

<sup>85</sup> Schopenhauer’s copy-of-the-will-itself—as contrasted with Kant’s thing-in-itself. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>87</sup> Cambridge Press has retained this same phrase in its translated version. See, also, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* (tr.) James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952/2007), p. 156.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

expressiveness. Kant, however, proposes a complicating and non-resolving view on music:

“Its charm, which can be communicated so universally, seems to rest on this: that every expression of language has, in context, a tone that is appropriate to its sense; that this tone more or less designates an affect of the speaker and conversely also produces one in the hearer, which then in turn arouses in the latter the idea that is expressed in the language by means of such a tone; and that, just as modulation is as it were a language of sensations universally comprehensible to every human being, the art of tone puts that language into practice for itself alone, in all its force, namely as a language of the affects, and so, in accordance with the law of association, universally communicates the aesthetic ideas that are naturally combined with it; however, since those aesthetic ideas are not concepts nor determinate thoughts, the form of the composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) serves only, instead of the form of a language, to express, by means of a proportionate disposition of them (which, since in the case of tones it rests on the relation of the number of the vibrations of the air in the same time, insofar as the tones are combined at the same time or successively, can be mathematically subsumed under certain rules), the aesthetic ideas of a coherent whole of an unutterable fullness of thought, corresponding to a certain theme, which constitutes the dominant affect in the piece.”<sup>90</sup>

By illustrating language and music as interconnected through “tone,” Kant’s impoverished view of music as “unutterable fullness of thought” is further compounded by his inordinate attempts to describe the composition of “sensations” and “affect.” Arresting melody and harmony became the casualty. On this count, Schopenhauer has been at least smarter—he corners harmony as one of the two elements that constitute “melody” (the other one being rhythm), rather than subjecting them at par with each other.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., pp. 205-06.

<sup>91</sup> “Melody,” says Schopenhauer, “consists of two elements”:

What however brings Kant's and Schopenhauer's disparate views together is their conceptualization of music, both modeled on the mathematical idea. Kant gave a vague description of the mathematical order of music—"it is only the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of that proportion of the impressions, in their combination as well as in their alternation, by means of which it becomes possible to grasp them together and to prevent them from destroying one another, so that they instead agree in a continuous movement and animation of the mind by means of consonant affects and hereby in a comfortable self-enjoyment."<sup>92</sup> Schopenhauer's descriptions or justifications are even worse, never lucid. Instead, he turned to Leibniz, the mathematician par excellence of the day. Schopenhauer's indebtedness to Leibniz comes in two quotes (in his *World as Will*)—

*exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi* ("An unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know it is counting.")<sup>93</sup>

and

*Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi* ("Music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophizing.")<sup>94</sup>

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"a rhythmical and a harmonious; the former can also be described as the quantitative element, the latter as the qualitative, since the first concerns the duration of the notes, the second their pitch and depth. In writing music, the former belongs to the perpendicular lines, the latter to the horizontal."

Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 452.

<sup>92</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trs.) Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [2000] 2002), p. 206.

<sup>93</sup> Leibniz, quoted, in Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 256.

<sup>94</sup> Leibniz, quoted. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

—which, consequently, was developed into a “physical theory” of music—through two key concepts: *discord* and *reconciliation*.<sup>95</sup> Ernst Kurth (1886-1946), who in turn sourced his inspiration from Schopenhauer, will resonate these mathematical perspectives on music more methodologically and articulately. “Melody,” for Kurth, “is not a collection of tones but rather a primal continuity from which the tones are released.”<sup>96</sup> It reaffirms Schopenhauer’s statement that “all harmony of the tones rests on the coincidence of the vibrations.”<sup>97</sup> Lee Rithfarb stresses that Kurth translates “psychological genesis of music into psychological mode of analysis”—

“[T]he whole aural phenomenal form in music, with which the laws of physical sound and physiological perception of tones begins, is already a conclusion of primal process of interior *psychic* growth... The forces activated in us are projected from within onto the surface, where they take shape. The sonic impressions are nothing but the intermediary form in which psychological processes manifest themselves... Musical activity merely expresses itself in tones, but it does not reside in them.”<sup>98</sup>

The mathematization of music has a salient feature: it reaffirms the receptive structures and linguistic framing in western tradition.<sup>99</sup> Thereby, it also betrays the confluence and proximity of logic, the linguistic, and thinking, which, until recently, shall we add, before it was divided into analytical and continental.<sup>100</sup> The mathematical integration of music, which we saw its development through Aristoxenus and Pythagoras, then, began to have shaky

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<sup>95</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. II, op. cit., esp. “On the Metaphysics of Music,” pp. 447-57.

<sup>96</sup> Ernst Kurth, echoing Schopenhauerian Idealism, in Ernst Kurth, *Ernst Kurth: Selected Writings*, (tr. and ed.) Lee A. Rithfarb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-33, esp. p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 450.

<sup>98</sup> Ernst Kurth, quoted, in Ernst Kurth, *Ernst Kurth*, op. cit., pp. 1-33, esp. p. 28.

<sup>99</sup> The pervasiveness of mathematics in philosophy, as in the works of Alain Badiou, comes to mind. On this issue, see Chapter Two, “The Mathematics of Being(s).”

<sup>100</sup> See Chapter One, “The Logico-Linguistic Confluences.”

implications by the close of seventeenth-century. First is the delineation between the temporal reflex in human subjectivity (consciousness) and the machination of music. Paraphrasing Schopenhauer, Kurth declares: “Sound is dead; what lives within it is the *Will to sound*.”<sup>101</sup> Second, a feeble attempt was aimed at rusticating the word from the machination of music. Commenting on the Italian composer Gioachino Antonio Rossini (1792-1868), Schopenhauer declares that “[Rossini’s] music speaks its *own* language so distinctly and purely that it requires no words at all, and therefore produces its full effect even when rendered by instruments alone.”<sup>102</sup> Music-word relation therefore runs the risk of “endeavouring to speak a language not its own.”<sup>103</sup> Third, the status of music in the arts failed to surpass its own metaphysical intent. Schopenhauer fatally commits a hierarchical fascination by attributing the ideality of music as the “true philosophy”—

“Supposing we succeeded in giving a perfectly accurate and complete explanation of music which goes into detail, and thus a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses, this would also be at once a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or one wholly corresponding thereto, and hence the true philosophy.”<sup>104</sup>

Of immediate interest to us here, then, is the first point—the machination of music on senses.

Let us recall an event: the extraordinary Beethoven-Goethe letters!<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Ernst Kurth, *Ernst Kurth*, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>102</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 262.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>105</sup> “One of the most extraordinary books in world-literature,” comments Oscar George Theodore Sonneck in 1926, is Goethe’s *Correspondence with a Child*. This child in reference alludes to Bettina Brentano, latter married to the poet Achim von Arnim, 1811. Beethoven scholars have, at times, doubted the “authenticity” of the “letters.” See Oscar George Theodore Sonneck (ed.), *Beethoven: Impressions of Contemporaries* (New York, N.Y: Dover Publications, Inc., [1926] 1967), pp. 75-76.

Having been introduced to the musical prodigy, Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827)—the “young beautiful woman,” Bettina Brentano (1785-1859)—wrote letters<sup>106</sup> to the then towering figure Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Prince Hermann von Pückler-Muskau (1785-1871). Bettina’s self-inflicted job, besides the newly found infatuation, was to translate and articulate Beethoven’s thoughts about music. To Goethe—which is most probably dated May 28, 1810—Bettina wrote, supposedly quoting Beethoven:

“Music, verily, is the mediator between intellectual and sensuous life. ... [M]usic is the one incorporeal entrance into the higher world of knowledge which comprehends mankind but which mankind cannot comprehend... We do not know what knowledge brings us. The encased itself. Music is the electrical soil in which the mind thinks, lives, feels. Philosophy is a precipitate of the mind’s electrical essence; its needs which seek a basin in a primeval principle are elevated by it, and although the mind is not supreme over what it generates through it, it is yet happy in the process. Thus every real creation of art is independent, more powerful than the artist himself and returns to the divine through its manifestation.”<sup>107</sup>

This letter—if we are to believe (not that it is necessary either)—exposes musicality’s finest thoughts in entirety, Enlightenment period onward through Romanticism.

June 6, 1810, Goethe replied:

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<sup>106</sup> The authenticity of the letter being another case, this widespread practice of exchanging letters to complete stranger however conform as a normal practice to a period ascribed as “The Republic of Letter,” which “founded its legitimacy on the production of new knowledge” and sharing the same through letters between 1500-1800. See Ian F. McNeely with Lisa Wolverton, *Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), pp. 121-59.

<sup>107</sup> Alexander Wheelock Thayer, Hermann Dieters & Hugo Riemann, *The Life of Ludwig Van Beethoven*, op. cit., pp. 188-89.

“Give Beethoven my heartiest greetings and tell him that I would willingly make sacrifices to have his acquaintances when an exchange of thoughts and feelings would surely be beautifully profitable... To think of teaching him would be an insolence even in one with greater insight than mind, since he has the guiding light of his genius which frequently illumines his mind like a stroke of lightning while we sit in darkness and scarcely suspect the direction from which daylight will break upon us.”<sup>108</sup>

Music as supremely first philosophy, remember (?), as are feelings and philosophy—of Fichte and Novalis—which we discussed in our “Introduction.” Of music as “incorporeal,” as transcending knowledge! The manifest divinity of the arts, greater than its humble creator! Music—the *illumines* of the mind; its electrical cathodes! Music itself as “independent.” Music as a resistance to philosophy:<sup>109</sup> this will be the new challenge that finds confrontation in contemporary debates. Post-Beethoven, the wedge between poetry and music also becomes clearer as separate ‘cultural artifacts’.

Second point—music/word quotidian—

Or,

Post-Schopenhauerean Sound Eschatology:

Music lives in us,

Music is Autonomy.

In his *Nineteenth-Century Music*, church music, explains Carl Dahlhaus’ (1928-1989), “used to partake of religion as revealed in the ‘Word,’” which, as it is now, has become an “autonomous music capable of conveying the ‘inexpressible’ has become religion itself.”<sup>110</sup> Recall, here, Theodor Adorno’s (1903-1969) earlier warnings:

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>109</sup> Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Bowie’s survey of music-philosophy history is premised on this line of conflict.

<sup>110</sup> Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, (tr.) J. Bradford Robinson (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), p. 94.



“The language of music is quite different from the language of intentionality. It contains a theological dimension. What it has to say is simultaneously revealed and concealed. Its Idea is the divine Name which has been given shape. It is a demythologized prayer, rid of efficacious magic. It is the human attempt, doomed as ever, to name the Name, not to communicate meanings.”<sup>111</sup>

The incommunicable or inexpressible in music, as such, and its attempt to ornate itself as sensible or expressive through language/the word comes from a long tradition. It is thus pertinent to discuss the inheritance of language theory. John Hamilton insightfully points out that Bernd Heinrich von Kleist’s (1777-1811) reflection-immediacy writings on music greatly influenced Hoffmann’s *Kreisleriana*, or the designative and disclosive functions of language.<sup>112</sup> It is modeled either on linguistic *a priori* as a determinant (disclosive) or linguistic *a posteriori*, which is the pre-giveness of a constituted world/sense (designative).<sup>113</sup> Hamilton shows that these two “paradigms of language” greatly influenced the conception and history of music into two thoughts: the *Affenkenlehre* (of the Baroque period) views musical materials as canonically representing emotions and feelings— whereas the *Ausdrucksästhetik* promotes individual aesthetic expressions (either as individual taste of musical preference). The “designative view [therefore] subordinates music to words, insofar as words can denote general emotions in a way much less vague and ambiguous than a melody.”<sup>114</sup> This discord, Hamilton reiterates, highlights that “if one admits that language constitutes the world as something meaningful, then music indeed can be taken as a language, revealing aspects or dimensions of the

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<sup>111</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music* (tr.) Rodney Livingstone (London; New York: Verso, 1998 [2002]), p. 2.

<sup>112</sup> John T. Hamilton, *Music, Madness*, op. cit. Esp. Chapter 5: “With Arts Unknown Before: Kleist and the Power of Music,” pp. 134-58.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

world that are new, neither pregiven nor preconstituted.”<sup>115</sup> Therein, before we conclude on this issue, let us examine three movements that can be identified in this regard—the first two revolve around the word-music autonomy and the third is tied to ‘listening’ to this music autonomy.

First, the “constant confrontation between music and the word,” Georgiades points out, was “already present in the early Christian liturgy.” Further, on the tangent principle of musicality-linguistic:

“The linguistic form is prose; it is defined, however, by the necessity to speak in terms of the Cult, in the language of the Christian—sacred community. The Word must sound forth. For within the community of *the Word exists only in its sounded* and not in its written form. As the sacred Word it cannot, however, be made to sound in its natural form as subjectively colored speech. It demands a musically fixed performance. And this is the moment at which music enters into the cultural history of the Western Christian world.”<sup>116</sup>

Only through—what Georgiades wildly calls “new prose”—“did it become possible in European history to differentiate between the poetic—[i.e., the] perceptible reality of art on the one hand and religious content as truth on the other, to point to truths which are beyond the reach of sensory perception.”<sup>117</sup> Early German Baroque music attempt to define the “figure” of music but, given its stress on *musica poetica*, retains the tradition of privileging the value of “affects.”<sup>118</sup> It conforms to what Eyolf Østrem identifies it as “that particular human activity which objectifies experience in some form or other, in order to ‘point to’ the experience and relate it to a wider range of experiences—

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>116</sup> Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, op. cit., p. 7. *Italics mine.*

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>118</sup> Dietrich Bartel, *Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

ultimately the range called [religious or Christian] ‘life’.”<sup>119</sup> Giorgio Agamben also comments that “the hymn is the radical deactivation of signifying language, the word rendered completely inoperative and, nevertheless, retained as such in the form of liturgy.”<sup>120</sup> Methodologically, the inimical plethora of engendering or privileging a particular art form therefore, in western tradition, comes, therein, with a simple explanation—of establishing or upholding the truth of its own philosophizing as philosophy. Privileging a certain hierarchy, which we saw in Kant, too, in the previous chapter, therefore, is a quotidian validation. It is not necessary to have a class category of ideological inclination; it is anterior to its intuitive synthesis, in Kant; impossible undecidability, in Derrida; or, in Badiou, intrinsic discernibility, etc.

The second movement on the music-word disjunction is most coherently reflected in the Frankfurt School, particularly in Theodor Adorno, via Walter Benjamin via Beethoven.<sup>121</sup> “Music is similar to language,” says Adorno, “but music is not language.”<sup>122</sup> But, for its genesis, we need to go back a little further. Hector Berlioz (1803-1869), a contemporary of E.T.A. Hoffmann, highlights Andrea Hübener, had already started to toy with the definition of music as “the heightened language of fantasy, a language beyond everyday speech—a meta-language.”<sup>123</sup> Berlioz’s *Symphonie fantastique* (1830), a derivative from Thomas

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<sup>119</sup> Eyolf Østrem, “Music and the Ineffable,” in Siglind Bruhn (ed.), *Voicing the Ineffable: Mystical Representations of Religious Experience*, Interplay Series No. 3 (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 2002), pp. 287-312, esp. p. 309.

<sup>120</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, (trs.) Lorenzo Chiesa (with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 237

<sup>121</sup> Berthold Hoeckner, *Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music and the Hermeneutic of the Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 12.

<sup>122</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition,” (tr.) Susan Gillispie, *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 401-14.

<sup>123</sup> Andrea Hübener, “Stages of Imagination in Music and Literature: E.T.A. Hoffmann and Hector Berlioz” in Siobhán Donovan and Robin Elliott (eds.), *Music and Literature*, op. cit., pp. 123-141.

Moore's (1779-1852) "melologue"<sup>124</sup> (also, out of context, but relevant to what Lawrence Kramer (b. 1946) too calls as "melopoetics"<sup>125</sup>), encompasses the seductive effect of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Faust* (1808) music drama and the symphony of Beethoven—thereafter underscoring "the absolutist demands of art: art as the irrevocable pact between artist and art, [which] can transform its liberating knowledge into a threat to life itself."<sup>126</sup>

Commenting on music from Romantic till nineteenth century, Raymond Monelle (1937-2010) relegates the legacy as marred by "an art of emotion" and trapped in its own transcendental order, which is a "sort of obscurantism."<sup>127</sup> While Monelle attempts to offer a semiological departure on "how music functions as a language," as forwarded by Deryck Cooke (1919-1976) in his 1959 seminal work *The Language of Music*, it succeeded only in venting out against the "fashionable" "ugly and self-important bratspeak" of deconstructive theory.<sup>128</sup> The radical departure from positivist and formalist musicology is therefore not without courting misgivings, long established in paramount works like Joseph Kerman's (1924-2014) *Contemplating Music* (1985).<sup>129</sup> David Evans, wary of the overarching influences of the French Symbolists, qualifies the need for *musicopoetics* (the "interaction between text and score") to go further by tracing the often-ignored Romantics and post-Romantics writers.<sup>130</sup> The dual question

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<sup>124</sup> Which translates into a mixture of language and music. This term was renamed as *monodrame lyrique*, circa 1855.

<sup>125</sup> Lawrence Kramer, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Literary Text in Musical Criticism," in *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989, pp. 159-67.

<sup>126</sup> Andrea Hübener, "Stages of Imagination in Music," op. cit., , p. 138.

<sup>127</sup> Refer "Introduction: Music and Meaning," in Raymond Monelle, *Linguistics and Semiotics in Music*, op. cit., pp. 1-31.

<sup>128</sup> Especially Chapter 10 and "Epilogue." Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>129</sup> Joseph Kerman, *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

<sup>130</sup> David Evans's insightful article on the recent historical debates between music and word is helpful, which also greatly contributes to the development of my argument. See "État Present: Word and Music Studies: The Nineteenth Century," *French Studies*, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, pp. 443-452.

between music and language and the experience of music remains central. Lawrence Kramer is perhaps the most unapologetic about this discord:

“Language cannot capture musical experience because it cannot capture any experience whatever, including the experience of language. Language always alienates what it makes accessible.”<sup>131</sup>

Lastly, if the traditional experience of music is premised on what Kramer identifies as the problematic of “[l]anguage on the outside, music on the inside”<sup>132</sup> duality, the character of “listening” is objective in the debate. Both Monelle and Kramer allude to listening, not that they share the same heritage.<sup>133</sup> In defending that semiotics is “essentially neutral,” Monelle refers to Jean Molino’s *Semiology of Music*<sup>134</sup> and, particularly, Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s (b. 1945) concept of the “neutral level,” which attempt to create distinction between the tripartite division (“poietic-aesthetic-neutral”) and further democratize the disparity between “the composers ‘intentions’ and the accidents of listening,” where it is seen as veered toward the acculturated sophistication of the listener.<sup>135</sup> Kramer too identifies that “[L]istening not just *to* but *into* the music is a social act, even when performed in solitude.”<sup>136</sup> “Is listening to music,” Kramer even posits, “performative?”<sup>137</sup> However, for Kramer, limits were established: “Listening is not the sum total of musical experience, just its indispensable

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<sup>131</sup> Lawrence Kramer, “The Musicology of the Future,” op. cit., esp. p. 10.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Raymond Monelle, *The Sense of Music*, op. cit.

<sup>134</sup> On Jean Molino’s work, Monelle comments:

“It is for us to turn to the neutral level, for only thereby can a universal metalanguage be worked out, enabling us to analyse world music without cultural bias or normative intentions—without favouring our own culture at the expense of others, or imposing a view of ‘right’ or ‘good’ music—and without embodying ideologies in our description.”

Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>136</sup> Lawrence Kramer, *Interpreting Music*, op.cit., p. 244.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

core.”<sup>138</sup> What Kramer proposes as inter-subjectivity, as opposed to Monelle’s objective, is based on a model that “listening is not an immediacy alienated from a later reflection, but a mode of dialogue.”<sup>139</sup> On the philosophical history of listening, Mark Evan Bonds’s *Music as Thought*<sup>140</sup> presents an insightful account.<sup>141</sup> The notion of “listening gaze,” or, to extend the list, “structural listening,” or “submissive listening,” or “performative listening,” etc.,<sup>142</sup> is tidily constructed on a subjective agency working on it, while admitting the infallible autonomy of music. Its limitations are underlined in what Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht calls a “language of reception” competing with understanding, pertinent throughout German Romanticism.<sup>143</sup> Again, Kramer has highlighted the issue accurately:

“Music adds something to other things by adding itself, but loses nothing when it takes itself away. By reason of this limitless subtractability, music has often formed the paradigm of autonomy not only in the modern

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<sup>138</sup> Lawrence Kramer, *Musical Meaning*, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>139</sup> Lawrence Kramer, *Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 32.

<sup>140</sup> Mark Evan Bonds’ *Music as Thought*, op cit.

<sup>141</sup> The following works are also helpful: Lawrence Kramer, “The Politics and Poetics of Listening,” *Current Musicology*, 50 (1992): 62-67; David Schwarz, *Listening Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Julian Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995); Theodor Adorno, “On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening,” in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, (eds.) Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 270–99; Jean-Luc Nancy, *Listening*, (tr.) Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007); Eric Prieto, *Listening In: Music, Mind, and the Modernist Narrative* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

<sup>142</sup> The list is not exhaustive, as Karmer points out: “Interpretive language about music does not reproduce meaning but actualizes it. The meaning is neither in nor not in the music. Instead it arises from a complex confluence of activities that include listening, performing, remembering, visualizing, imagining, and commenting. The list is not exhaustive.”

Lawrence Kramer, *Interpreting Music*, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>143</sup> Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, *Understanding Music: The Nature and Limits of Musical Cognition*, (tr.) Richard Evans (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010).

system of the arts but also in the construction of subjectivity. This is the ground of pure or structural listening, the rapture of being wholly absorbed or deeply moved or touched by musical experience, revealed to oneself in the ineffability of music.”<sup>144</sup>

This closes our tracking of a background that opens to our next examination of recent debates. The span of development concerning these debates on the pervasiveness of music and the word may also appear to be short in history: from the German Romantics via Neo-Romantics to post-Wagnerian (particularly French) Symbolists and Later Formalists, till contemporary and recent juxtapositions. Whether a resolve has been interjected is a different trajectory.<sup>145</sup> What is however pertinent to the shifts in these debates on music ontology is the attempt to arrest language and subsequently sequence not only a structural hierarchy but also ground the very structures of its knowability or indiscernability—through notions like the “ineffable” or “ineluctable,” which is composite to recent discourses. These views are largely informed by positions on language. For instance, Julia Kristeva (b. 1941) notes that music does not exhibit the same binary differences that structure verbal language: “while the two signifying systems are organized according to the principle of the *difference* of their components, this difference is not of the same order in verbal language as it is in music. Binary phonematic differences are not pertinent in music.”<sup>146</sup> And, as we have examined in the previous chapters, the conflicting nature of temporality heralds a totally different interpretation on the status of language today. Our

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<sup>144</sup> Lawrence Kramer, *Musical Meaning*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>145</sup> As early as 1799 there has been a resistance against absolute music, especially in the likes of Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and Ludwig Tiech although Wagner (influenced by Feuerbach) coined the term in 1846 to describe the death of symphony and thereon the need to “overcome the inchoate utterances of instrumental music through word and deed.” See Daniel Chua, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 3 & p. 224. Also, for a structural analysis of absolute music in the German tradition, see Berthold Hoeckner, *Programming the Absolute*, op. cit.

<sup>146</sup> Quoted in Downing A. Thomas, *Music and the Origins of Language*, op. cit., p. 13.

next course therefore explores whether these seemingly influential developments are consistent with the radical thinking on music as well.<sup>147</sup>

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### III

#### Time in Music:

“The term ‘time’ covers a surprising range of concepts. Think only of the classical Greek distinction between *kairos* (‘occasion’) and *chronos* (‘time-as-passage’), between the contrasted senses of Italian tempo as ‘rhythm of action’, ‘weather’, or ‘time-as-passage’, and between English uses of the term to mean ‘occasion’, ‘duration’, ‘period’, and — again — ‘time-as-passage’. In a bureaucratic age dominated by unilinear national historiographies, however, time-as-passage has come to dominate the entire complex of ideas about temporality, from the seasons defined (*rubato*) durations of classical and romantic Western music.”<sup>148</sup>

The above description is a rather conventional way of saying it. It purely refers to a physical and mathematized time. The example’s highlight is only to give an important note for us to begin this section—which is also a reminder on how the Greeks initiated a theory of music, namely, on the basis of the then existing notions of time. Another note why the above example is good is the way it highlights the established linkage between a socio-cultural arrest of physical

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<sup>147</sup> In this regard, it is important to note the previous work of Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood, Like flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). Whereas Babette Babich’s work stresses on what she considers as “the metaphorical and literal expression of philosophy as music” (p. xi). Accordingly the lineage she traces and questions the resonance of the musical from Plato-Heraclitus to the triad of Nietzsche-Adorno-Hölderlin.

<sup>148</sup> Michael Herzfeld, “Rhythm, Tempo, and Historical time: Experiencing Temporality in the Neoliberal Age,” in *Public Archaeology: Archeological Ethnographies*, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, 2009, pp. 108-123, pp. 108-09.



time and the conceptualization of music. Aristotelian notion(s) of time are basic: the existence of time is possible only as a predicate of the existence of motion. Moreover, there is only one sense of time: the continuous flux (i.e., “time is infinitely divisible but not infinitely divided”).<sup>149</sup> Aristoxenus’s departure from Pythagoras is a conflict over succession (between the temporalities of dissonance and resonance)—a notion of time for which even Aristoxenus himself does not know (or, for which he knows but is unable to explain why there should be a contradiction).<sup>150</sup> In 1905, Edmund Husserl will revisit this tradition of a temporal problem by attempting to understand temporality through music, by way of looking at the phenomena of succession in protention and retention.<sup>151</sup> Similarly, the question of time as ‘passage’ is a very old debate, as old as Zeno’s paradox,<sup>152</sup> because time has always been perceived as ‘change’ and ‘disjunctive’. In short, “time without passage wouldn’t be time at all.”<sup>153</sup> In other words, music, like time, is a coextension of time, and there wouldn’t be music at all if there were no time. There are however many types of time. Does this imply that the understanding of music has also changed with the different notion of time? In our previous two sections we have focused on the discussions centered around language-music. We shall add the dimension of time in this section.

As a matter of perspective, it is important to note the increasing detachment of communication and language from the body in the latter half of

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<sup>149</sup> Frederick M. Kronz, “Theory and Experience of Time: Philosophical Aspects,” in Harol Armanspacher et. al. (eds.), *Time, Temporality, Now* (Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1997), pp. 7-22, p. 9.

<sup>150</sup> Or, to give example, it tantamount to Martin Heidegger’s description of how the Greeks’ discovered geometry without having a sense of spatiality! Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, (tr.) Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 171.

<sup>151</sup> Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, (tr.) John Barnett Brough (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

<sup>152</sup> Victor J. Crome, *Zeno’s Paradoxes and the Passage of Time*, unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, City University of New York, 2007.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

the nineteenth century, which Christian Emden calls a “paradox,”<sup>154</sup> caused by the unsettling issue of time and space. This is, also, articulated by Nietzsche:

“Consequently, what is a law of nature? It is not known to us in itself but only in its effects, that is, in its relations to other laws of nature which are in turn known to us only as relations. Thus, all these relations refer only to one another, and they are utterly incomprehensible to us in their essential nature; the only things we really know about them are things which we bring to bear on them: time and space, in other words, relations of succession and number.”<sup>155</sup>

Nietzsche’s disenchantment with the law of nature is strictly Kantian delusion. Kant left a powerful legacy by taking away the keys after permanently locking the doors of experience to access the dialectics between reason-nature.<sup>156</sup> And, to top it up, Kant took away “time,” too, as “something that would [not] subsist in itself.”<sup>157</sup> Time, for Kant, is a “form of inner sense,” and it cannot

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<sup>154</sup> Christian Emden, *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 109.

<sup>155</sup> Under the section “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, (eds.) Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, (tr.) Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 149.

<sup>156</sup> As Beiser aptly puts it:

“[R]eason and nature reappeared even within the realm of experience. Two reasons were cited for Kant’s failure to close this gap. First, his noumenal-phenomenal dualism forbids any interaction between understanding and sensibility. If the understanding is noumenal and beyond space and time, then how can it impose its order upon appearances, which are phenomenal and within space and time? It does not seem possible for such heterogeneous domains to interact. Second, it is impossible to determine when, and consequently whether, a category applies to experience”

Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 12.

<sup>157</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trs. & eds.) Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1998] 2002), § A33/B49, p. 180.

be “determined by outer appearance.”<sup>158</sup> We just saw the rudderless exasperation in the post-Kantian phase in section two of this chapter. Our interest however is in Nietzsche’s desperateness to comprehend the nature of things by relating it with a notion of time. The frustration with Kant is therefore understandable. From the Parmenides-Heraclitus duo till Hegel-Kant, Nietzsche too inherited the abysmal Aristotelian notion of “flux.”<sup>159</sup> Nietzsche’s notion of time is complex and contestably many,<sup>160</sup> which is accrued and vitiated through his metaphorical style,<sup>161</sup> but the popular notion rests with the eternal return.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> “Time,” says Kant, “is the *a priori* formal condition of all appearances in general... and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby mediate condition of outer appearance.” Ibid., pp. 180-81.

<sup>159</sup> Unable to find an answer to his doctrine of being, regarding “the concept of the negative quality, the concept of non-existence,” the visibly agitated Parmenides unfortunately meets Heraclitus on his way: “Can something which is not be a quality? Or, more basically, can something which is not, be?” asks Parmenides. “Everything is in a flux and with them,” Parmenides seems to accuse his own lack of answer, “including their thinking.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, (tr.) Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1962), pp. 76-77.

<sup>160</sup> For a detail study, see Joan Stambaugh, *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*, (tr.) John F. Humphrey (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1987) and, for an excellent introduction, see the edited essays in Manuel Dries (ed.), *Nietzsche on Time and History* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008).

<sup>161</sup> As Sarah Kofman beautifully puts it:

“But to be faithful to Nietzsche must one adopt a metaphorical ‘style’ which would signify that philosophy and poetry are not contradictory and that ‘mathematical expression is not a part of the essence of philosophy?’”

See *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, (tr.) Duncan Large (London: Athlone Press, 1993).

<sup>162</sup> Alexander Nehamas comments, “the eternal recurrence is not a theory of the world but a view of the self” [*Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 150]; the only full scale but concise study on this theme insofar is Joan Stambaugh’s *Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972). Otherwise, this is the most contended reference to Nietzsche. Elizabeth Grosz points out that Nietzsche’s eternal return has two levels of time: “physical and ontological doctrine” (built on thermodynamics and cosmology) and “ethical and transvaluative process” (which is an “impossible ideal”). See Elizabeth Grosz, *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004), esp. “The Eternal Return and the Overman,” pp. 135-153.

Basing on Nietzsche's statement that "*knowledge and becoming* exclude each other," Robin Small too provides a vast range of diverse thinking regarding Nietzsche's conceptions on time.<sup>163</sup> Apart from time, much has been said about the importance of music to Nietzsche as well. Recall Nietzsche's invocation of the "phoenix of music," at the tag end of his intellectual career, wherein "Zarathustra as a whole may perhaps be counted as music."<sup>164</sup> Or, earlier, his excitement, in *The Birth of Tragedy*—the "process of a discharge of music in images to... get some notion of the way in which the strophic folk song originates, and the whole linguistic capacity is excited by this new principle of imitation of music."<sup>165</sup> Georges Liébert (b. 1943) says that music for Nietzsche "is the metaphor of life itself, of life as it ought to be."<sup>166</sup> That 'ought to be' is a reflective extension of Nietzsche's cultural, political, social, and intellectual predispositions.

Nietzsche's views on music are largely affected by the developments and debates centered on language during his time, especially on language origin, which was also at its peak. Nietzsche places a fundamental difference between music and image: "what does music *appear* in the mirror of images and concept?"<sup>167</sup> Music has "absolute sovereignty," says Nietzsche, unlike "lyric poetry," which is co-dependent on the "spirit of music." Music therefore "does not *need* the image and the concept, but merely *endures* them as accompaniments."<sup>168</sup> Wayne Klein argues that Nietzschean "music can be the language and truth and being because its object is the will, the thing-in-itself, and

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<sup>163</sup> See Robin Small, *Time and Becoming* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010).

<sup>164</sup> "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How To Become What You Are*, (tr.) Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 67. Nietzsche's works on music are chiefly reflected in *The Birth of Tragedy*, *The Case of Wagner*, *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, and *The Antichrist*.

<sup>165</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, (tr.) Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), §6, p. 54.

<sup>166</sup> Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> The content of Dionysian music, according to Nietzsche, "have no distinctive value of their own beside other images" (p. 54). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, op. cit., §6, p. 55.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, §6, p. 55. Italics, original.

because the ecstatic structure of Dionysian rapture allows music to imitate the will's formlessness. Dionysian art is truth-preserving, in that it allows music to reveal the truth of being by making it possible for music to be isomorphic with the will... [but] what is preserved is not truth, but lie, appearance."<sup>169</sup> In other words, language is the symbol and organ of appearance whereas music is the symbol of will, a proper language, of truth.<sup>170</sup> Nietzsche himself poorly opines language as incapable of adequately rendering "the cosmic symbolism of music"—"*language*, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the innermost heart of music."<sup>171</sup> By privileging the primal unity in music, Nietzsche valorizes "the language of the *dithyramb*"<sup>172</sup>—"sounds [as] allow[ing] him to say certain things that words were incapable of expressing."<sup>173</sup> Our understanding of Nietzsche's views on music are greatly influence by his association and quarrel with Richard Wagner,<sup>174</sup> although recent studies have shown indifference or belittled its importance.<sup>175</sup> We will stick with the first case. The attack on Richard Wagner's opera *Tristan and Isolde* (1859) is premised on its "endless melody" or "infinite melody," which is neither harmonic nor rhythmic. Jonathan Cohen illustrates this as central to Nietzsche's concept of time, on two counts. First, basing on Nietzsche's "brief habits,"<sup>176</sup> Cohen

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<sup>169</sup> Wayne Klein, *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 114.

<sup>170</sup> As Klein concludes on Nietzsche:

"Music, as the symbol of the primal unity, is this pure anteriority in respect to which both appearance and the realm of images and concepts must remain arbitrary, external and improper."

*Ibid.*, pp. 111-16.

<sup>171</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, op. cit., §6, p. 55.

<sup>172</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>173</sup> Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>174</sup> For their correspondences, see Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche (ed.), *The Nietzsche-Wagner Correspondence*, (tr.) Caroline V. Kerr (London: Duckworth & Co., 1922).

<sup>175</sup> As the case of departure is for Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, op. cit.

<sup>176</sup> Here, Nietzsche gives the importance of "brief habits"—

"I love brief habits and consider them an inestimable means of getting to know *many* things and states... My nature is designed only for brief habits, even in

highlights Nietzsche's hatred for "enduring habits," which is reflected in Wagner's repulse for formulaic cadences, whose "music leads us to an abandonment of ourselves."<sup>177</sup> Second, technically, given that time signatures describe rhythms, Wagner's "prelude" in *Tristan* "does *not* use a jumble of time signatures."<sup>178</sup> Cohen confirms that Wagnerian music therein creates an 'anachronistic confusion' where the 'measures' of melodies 'overflow', which ultimately "destroy the listener's sense of time."<sup>179</sup> Cohen's sympathetic defense of Nietzsche remains in the disruption accrued onto his "jumble of the soul" by Wagner's jumble of rhythm:

[O]ur perceptions of time is to resort to the realm and language of music. Each musical piece sets its own tempo—that is, it *determines its own temporal reality*. There is no time-in-itself against which to compare these various tempos—they *establish* temporal reality for the world of that piece of music. We too live, think, and function at our own tempo—we establish the reality of time *for us*... the experience of music can be a tonic for us, giving our souls rest, or perhaps a new rhythm to live by."<sup>180</sup>

In the experience of music, which also hopes to reveal a nature of an experience of time, recall Nietzsche's "physiological objections" to Wagner's music—"And so I ask myself: What is it that my whole body really expects of music? I believe, its own *ease*... the hiding places and abysses of *perfection*."<sup>181</sup> Cohen, above, is only reaffirming Nietzsche's subjective response not only to an absolute music but also within an absolute time of an instant, a now. Nietzsche's

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the needs of my physical health... I always believe [it] gives lasting satisfaction...  
faith of passion... faith in eternity."

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, (tr.) Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), § 295, pp. 236-37.

<sup>177</sup> Jonathan R. Cohen, "Nietzsche's Musical Conception of Time," in Manuel Dries (ed.), *Nietzsche on Time and History*, op. cit., pp. 291-307, p. 295.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 307.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., pp. 306-07.

<sup>181</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, op. cit., § 368, pp. 324-25.

musical logic therein is restricted to reader-listener effects, with the place of music as an expression of passion or emotion. Curt Paul Janz (1911-2011) however concedes that Nietzsche went beyond the reader-listener content, by integrating a formal language into music that is not necessarily a form of words.<sup>182</sup> This form-giving to music nonetheless remains “thoroughly Romantic,” an “organicist one.”<sup>183</sup> Babette Babich (b. 1956) reads the concluding remark in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* as an attempt by Dionysian Art seeking to “harmonize dissonance, resolving it by transfiguration—not by elimination but by way of musical incorporation: ‘a becoming-human of dissonance’.”<sup>184</sup> Such a discussion will however require us to re-appropriate Nietzsche’s *ressentiment*, eternal [return] recurrence, *amor fiat*, or the question of science, which nonetheless return the issues we have raised above. The value of reading Nietzsche’s music, which but reaffirms the “ineffable residue,”<sup>185</sup> remains in setting a metaphorical tone as an “experimental philosophy”<sup>186</sup> that disrupts language (and not just attempting the autonomy of music itself) through a radical call on *music* that “liberates the spirit,” “gives wings to thought”—“that one become more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician.”<sup>187</sup> Cristoph Cox insists that Nietzsche was offering an ‘ontology’ of ‘natural becoming’ (as opposed to positivistic science)—“guided by music.”<sup>188</sup> The energies (*Mächte*) bursting forth in both of Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian

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<sup>182</sup> Curt Paul Janz, “The Form-Content Problem in Nietzsche’s Conception of Music,” (tr.) Thomas Heilke, in Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (eds.), *Nietzsche’s New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, [1988] 1991), pp. 97-115.

<sup>183</sup> Aaron Ridley, “Nietzsche and Music,” in Daniel Came (ed.), *Nietzsche on Art and Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 218-35, p. 226.

<sup>184</sup> Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood*, op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>186</sup> Borrowed term, of course, from Éric Alliez, “Nietzsche, or, The Parting of the Waters,” in *Pli*, Vo. 11, 2001, pp. 32-35, p. 33.

<sup>187</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Case of Wagner*, op. cit., §1, p. 158.

<sup>188</sup> Christoph Cox, “Nietzsche, Dionysus, and the Ontology of Music,” in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), pp. 495-513. Cox’s argument is premised on an essentialist reading of § 373, *The Gay Science*.

artistic modes are however, by the end of the day, mere reflexes and impulses of nature (*Triebe*).<sup>189</sup> Claudia Crawford's argument rightly directs that where Wagner "increased music's capacity for language," Nietzsche's attempt "increased language's capacity for music."<sup>190</sup> Friedrich Hölderlin, however, was already a step further than Nietzsche, by escaping from "the spell cast by domination of nature," or what David Krell calls, the suspension of "the traditional logic of synthesis"—"The transformation of language into a serial order whose elements are linked differently than in the judgment is reminiscent of music."<sup>191</sup> Despite their personal touches, the Wagenerian-Nietzschean tradition invites us to an important review of two parallel enthusiasms—an attempt to mimetically bring language (vocal music) closer to music in Wagner<sup>192</sup>—and an attempt to distance language through an ontological path of 'pure music' in Nietzsche.

Written between 1937-38, *In Search of Wagner*<sup>193</sup> is a collection of essays, which forms some of Adorno's early writings on music. Our attention is however drawn to a 1941 essay, "On Popular Music,"<sup>194</sup> where Adorno views this new

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<sup>189</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Case of Wagner*, op. cit., §2, pp. 38-41.

<sup>190</sup> Claudia Crawford, *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, op. cit., p. xii.

<sup>191</sup> David Farrell Krell, "Twelve Anacoluthic Theses on Adorno's 'Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry,'" in Gerhard Richter (ed.), *Language Without Soil: Adorno and Late Philosophical Modernity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 196-99.

<sup>192</sup> Adorno finds this Wagenerian "stamp on musical form" as solely contributing to the retention of an "idea of great music" in nineteenth-century. Theodor W. Adorno, "Music, Language, and Composition," op. cit., p. 411.

<sup>193</sup> With a preface by Slavoj Žižek (pp. viii-xxvii), see Theodor Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, (tr.) Rodney Livingstone (London; New York: Verso, [1952] 2005).

<sup>194</sup> T.W. Adorno with the assistance of George Simpson, "On Popular Music," in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, Vol. 9 (New York: Institute of Social Research, 1941), pp. 17-48. Also, for earlier comments—on a connect between logical positivism and Jazz, see (1936) "Perennial Fashion: Jazz," republished in Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms*, (trs.) Samuel Shierry Weber (Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, [1981] 1997), pp. 119-132—(1932) "On the Social Situation of Music," (tr.) Wes Blomster and revised by Richard Leppert, reprinted in Theodor W.



genre as “fortuitous,” with non-permissible “musical detail,” homegrown for mass appeal purely as an entertainment “distraction,” but, nonetheless, “commanding its own [individuated] listening-habits.”<sup>195</sup> Clearly, an annoyance is visible in Adorno: “In order to become a jitterbug or simply to ‘like’ popular music, it does not by any mean suffice to give oneself up and to fall in line passively. To become transformed into an insect, man needs that energy which might possibly achieve his transformation into a man.”<sup>196</sup> On becoming-insect music,<sup>197</sup> it will take another half-a-century for Deleuze and Guattari to comment, although in a different context. Nevertheless, Adorno’s wide range of discussions<sup>198</sup> specifically on music is epochal <sup>199</sup> (and, that is besides his other primary works on philosophy and aesthetics), which includes the sociology of music<sup>200</sup> and the technical point of views on music. Our brief mention of Adorno here, however, shall be on the latter; especially on a 1953 influential essay on music-language that has been severally revised (twice in 1956), “Music, Language, Composition,”<sup>201</sup> where he passionately engages that music is

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Adorno, *Essays on Music*, (ed.) Richard Leppert, (tr.) Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 391-436.

<sup>195</sup> T.W. Adorno with the assistance of George Simpson, “On Popular Music,” op. cit., esp. p. 21, p. 26, p. 37.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>197</sup> “Birds are vocal, but insects are instrumental,” says Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 308.

<sup>198</sup> For a biography, see Detlev Claussen, *Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius*, (tr.) Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

<sup>199</sup> Including Radio Theory. See Theodor W. Adorno, *Currents of Music: Element of a Radio Theory*, (ed.) Robert-Hullot-Kentor (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2009).

<sup>200</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, (tr.) E.B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1988).

<sup>201</sup> This is the second (and final) revised edition. See Theodor W. Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition,” op. cit., pp. 401-414.

“similar” to (or “resembles”<sup>202</sup>) language—and (1969) “Problem of Musical Analysis.”<sup>203</sup> Adorno says:

“Music is similar to language. Expressions like musical idiom or musical accent are not metaphors. But music is not language. Its similarity to language points to its innermost nature, but also toward something vague. The person who takes music literally as language will be led astray by it.”<sup>204</sup>

Although Adorno’s final conclusion rests on the claim that, despite the “extreme disassociation” between language and music, they “may once more merge with one another,” it is interesting to highlight some of his key comments. Adorno surveys some common notions that music has “no concepts” nor is it a “form” of a sign system; it is “intention-less language,” without any “signification.” Music creates an internalized tension with language, despite its irreducible “being-in-itself” or “being for the subject.”<sup>205</sup> Nonetheless, Adorno upholds that “no music exists without expressive elements: in music even expressionlessness becomes an expression”—which also reiterates its “similarity to language is fulfilled as it distances itself from language.”<sup>206</sup> On this last note, which also presupposes an “immanent motion,” Adorno proposes two divergences in objectivism that seek to remove the subjectivity. First, Igor Stravinsky’s (1882-1971) intention-less pure music premises the parodistic element as natural to “musical hostility to language,” which Adorno cites as “mere ideology,” given the “substitution of parodistic negation as absolute positivity,” which is likened to “prisoners shaking the bars of their cells or people

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<sup>202</sup> As in the 1953 essay (1956 translation), see “Music and Language: A Fragment,” in Theodor W. Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia*, op. cit., pp. 1-6.

<sup>203</sup> T.W. Adorno, “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” (tr.) Max Paddison, in *Musical Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1982, pp. 169-87.

<sup>204</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition,” op. cit., p. 401.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 405.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 405.

robbed of language driven mad by the memory of speech.”<sup>207</sup> Second, Ernst Krnek’s (1900-1991) eruption movements in his *Second Symphony* (1923), which attempt to “liquidate the element of musical language in music,” by mathematically establishing tonal relationships, says Adorno, reflect a *tabula rasa*, a “cosmically superhuman essence of music.”<sup>208</sup> Also, the constructivists attempt to find its own form, a “*musical language sui generis*,” similarly, finds reflection in the creative works of Pierre Boulez [1925-2016] (influenced by Claude Debussy and Arnold Schoenberg) and Anton Webern (1883-1945)—by reorganizing the musical structure in accordance with the “immanent laws of [musical] materials.” Adorno however finds that such experimental exercises existed in Beethoven—which is but a “free disposition over the means of composition” or “nothing less than the mediation of subject and object”—in the attempt to contradistinct material-language or materialize language with self-reliance.<sup>209</sup> Lastly, our interest on Adorno here is Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht* (1899) “shocking” subversion of the rules of harmony by seeking a prime to the ninth chord by inverting major chord into the bass. Technically this is not permissible, especially by the Vienna Music Society, since an ‘inverted ninth’ was an impossibility! Adorno sees that it creates “caesuras in the idiom”—i.e., music’s expressive powers and similarity with language therein is relegated to the “context itself.”<sup>210</sup> Chromatic music materials, Adorno intervenes, are not equipped to handle “the strong opposing forces of articulation require[d] for plasticity of form and constructive ‘logic’.”<sup>211</sup> These will be a bygone dogmatism for an image of thought in Deleuzean analysis but, before that, let us briefly visit a comment on this.

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1940-2007) returns to Wagner, or, rather Wagnerian effects, and locates opera as “the freest of the arts,” the “restitution of tragedy,” and the “*figuration* that is in essence written into the philosophical

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 408.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 409.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p. 409.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 405.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 413.

program.”<sup>212</sup> Heidegger’s closure of philosophy is Wagner’s closure of opera.<sup>213</sup> In the section under Adorno,<sup>214</sup> Lacoue-Labarthe picks up on him based on his 1963 essay, “A Sacred Fragment: On Schönberg’s *Moses and Aaron*,” where Adorno praises the expressionist Schönberg’s (1874-1951) “metaphysical ingenuity,” for an “new language of music,” and for elucidating that “the ineffable can manifest without usurpation.”<sup>215</sup> This, that Lacoue-Labarthe clings on to, is but an “end of art,”<sup>216</sup> a caesura (*Rettung*, for Adorno), the failure of figuration, or a fortiori sublime presentation, very much in the Kant-Schiller tradition. Thereby, Lacoue-Labarthe condemns—where Adorno himself allowed to be carried twice—the Wagnero-Nietzschean determination of music drama (“new tragedy” or “modern tragedy”) and Hegelian determination of tragedy.<sup>217</sup> Likewise, Eric Prieto has scathingly reviewed Lacoue-Labarthe’s *Musica Ficta* as a “musical ignorance” that nonetheless attempts to theorize “a post-ontological subject.”<sup>218</sup> Prieto’s comments are largely guided by a definition of mimetology, the deconstructive model from which Lacoue-Labarthe launches his critiques and interest in “identifying modes of self-knowledge to escape from the limitations of mimesis.” The alluring bait for such trappings are ready-made, highlights Prieto:

“Music, which operates primarily in the aural domain, has no codified relationship between signifier and signified, seems to provide a ready-made alternative to the textual and scopic modes of thought that

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<sup>212</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Musica-Ficta: Figures of Wagner*, (tr.) Felicia McCarren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. xx.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, “Adorno,” pp. 117-146.

<sup>215</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, quoted. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>218</sup> Starting with the Lacoue-Labarthe’s book title itself, Prieto says it is misleading definition. Eric Prieto, “Musical Imprints and Mimetic Echoes in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe,” in *L’Esprit Créateur*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2007, pp. 17-32.

underlie all traditional theories of mimesis and, more generally, of mimetologism.”<sup>219</sup>

Prieto finds it hard to countenance the attempt to “link music to writing and subjectivity on the basis” of an “onto-topology”<sup>220</sup> epistemological argument—since it is a paradoxical claim that there is “no such thing as truly original or absolutely originary model” because what is originary is “mimesis itself”<sup>221</sup>—and concludes by arguing that *musica ficta* rather implies “the liberation of the performing subject from the (literally) typographical constraint of having to passively reproduce what is printed in the score.”<sup>222</sup>

What may be observed now is that all major thought on music-language (word) presupposes that language is capable of what music cannot, which is, the transmission or translation of meaning and knowledge, or experience and expression itself. Vladimir Jankélévitch (1903-85) points out that a pragmatic prejudice exists which insists that “music must transmit thoughts.”<sup>223</sup> Jankélévitch’s *Music and the Ineffable* (1961) is a landmark intervention in music philosophy and thoughts, written with the shadow of Claude Debussy (1862-1918) looming largely overhead. Jankélévitch’s claim that “music is incapable of expressing,”<sup>224</sup> which simply reiterates Debussy, which is also the centrepiece of his whole argument. Music is inexpressive, says Jankélévitch, not “because [it] expresses nothing but because it does not express this or that privileged

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>220</sup> Eric Prieto’s understanding of onto-topology is “the idea of the human subject as preexisting ‘type’ or ‘character’ or ‘seal’ that is pre-imprinted on the mind/soul/consciousness if the individual” (p. 22). This led Lacoue-Labarthe to “deconstruct onto-topological paradigms of the self, which theorize subjectivity and collective identity in the typographical terms of immutable imprints, universal types, and essential character traits” (p. 27). Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>223</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, (tr.) Carolyn Abbate (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 67.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p. 25 & p. 71.

landscape, this or that setting to the exclusion of all others.”<sup>225</sup> [The ineffable, one should note here, is long ago discussed by Damascius in *De Principiis*. Stephen Gersh translates it as “signifying something which one is neither able nor permitted to speak—to that ultimate referent.”<sup>226</sup>] Jankélévitch says, again echoing Debussy, that the “other voice,” or “Nonbeing,” “the voice that silence allows us to hear, is named Music.”<sup>227</sup> “Charm,” argues Jankélévitch, “is proper to music.”<sup>228</sup> It is an “inexpressible perfume”—“like a smile or a look—is *cosa mentale*.”<sup>229</sup> Everything depends on its contextual moment; Adorno elsewhere describes such moments as “motivic-thematic”<sup>230</sup>! Jankélévitch also makes a startling statement: “music is inexpressive in that it implies innumerable possibilities of interpretation, because it allows us to choose them.”<sup>231</sup> In privileging the subjective experience and interpretation, music is objectified despite its givenness of non-meaning. Moreover, the lifelessness of music finds its life through the immanent power it possesses, which is mediated and forced through an active listener. This presupposes that the ineffable (music alone is simply not the only one) has anteriorized hierarchical percepts:

“If the untellable, petrifying, all-poetic impulse induces something similar to a hypnotic trance, then the ineffable, thanks to its properties of fecundity and inspiration, acts like a form of enchantment: it differs from the untellable as much as enchantment differs from bewitchment.

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>226</sup> Stephen Gersh, *Being Different: More Neoplatism after Derrida* (Leiden; Boston: 2014), p. 126. Also, see, p. 125, footnote 51, for an incisive discussion on the “inherent difficulties of the subject matter” on the ineffable. For our general information, Stephen Gersh finds the “performative enactment of the Ineffable in Damascius [as having] many affinities with the performative enactment of the ‘Secret’ in Derrida” (p. 152).

<sup>227</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, op. cit., p. 144, p. 154.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>230</sup> Where, as Adorno says, “dynamic development reveals itself in many ways to be merely a contrived appearance.” T.W. Adorno, “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>231</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, op. cit., p. 74.

Ineffability provokes bewilderment... The ineffable unleashes a state of verse."<sup>232</sup>

In perspective, it will be appropriate to remind us how the ancients too felt about poetic furor, the affects (madness) unleashed from the proceeds of songs or poems. Here, inasmuch as sources and inspirations are all together a different matter, our concern is on affects. Commenting on the translations of Plato by Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Claude Palisca (1921-2001) notes:

“[The] divine origin of harmony tended to have faith as well in the divine nature of artistic creativity, in the creative force of the ‘poetic furor.’ ... Plato’s *Phaedrus* and *Ion* present the theory that poets create their verses while in a state of frenzy (*enthousiasmos*) or poetic madness (in later Latin, *furor poeticus*), in which a divine influence guides their thought. ... Any madness, therefore, whether the prophetic, hieratic, or amatory, justly seems to be released as poetic furor when it proceeds to songs and poems.”<sup>233</sup>

The allure of music has been indeed time-tested. Lawrence Kramer recalls a 1988 meeting of musicologists at Baltimore, U.S., which generally led to an agreement that musical scholarship is at a “crossroad”—given the “music-theoretical resistance against postmodernist thinking”—as compared to the “long since shaken up” progressiveness in social theories and philosophy.<sup>234</sup> Positivism and formalism have long dominated music thinking, on the “supposition that music represents a non-linguistic immediacy.”<sup>235</sup> Music autonomy, or even Carl Dahlhaus’s ‘relative autonomy’, says Kramer, is a “chimera.”<sup>236</sup> “The cardinal point here,” Kramer strongly reiterates, “is the insistence that music and language

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>233</sup> Claude V. Palisca, *Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), p. 23.

<sup>234</sup> Lawrence Kramer, “The Musicology of the Future?,” op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

cannot (or is it *must* not?) mix. Language is denied access to music, it cannot represent musical reality.”<sup>237</sup> While challenging that “musical experience needs to be rethought, our musical pleasure need to be redrawn more broadly,” Kramer inevitably reduces “immediacy as a performative effect,” but knowingly defended that “immediacy cannot be the authorizing locus of a discipline.”<sup>238</sup> Jankélévitch, for instance, looks at the conceptual formulation of “doing” as a technique to address music’s ineffable quality and the limits of languages—“Music, like the divine nightingales, answers with the deed, by Doing.”<sup>239</sup> Adorno, meantime, much before Deleuze and Guattari, was developing a negative dialectic into a “material theory of form in music,” as opposed to the architectonic-schematic type of theory, and was already tossing around with the notion of “Becoming.” Adorno’s concrete definition of musical categories is worth revisiting:

“statement [*Setzung*], continuation [*Fortsetzung*],  
contrast [*Kontrast*] dissolution [*Auflösung*], succession  
[*Reihung*], development [*Entwicklung*], recurrence  
[*Wiederkehr*], modified recurrence [*modifizierter*  
*Wiederkehr*].”<sup>240</sup>

Adorno’s musical motif, while establishing a ‘social mediation of the autonomous’, as different from bourgeoisie form of ‘conceptless cognition’, still has its own problems with “form.” Form is seen as “force-field [*Kraftfeld*] of dynamic tensions”—and “it exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodate[s].”<sup>241</sup> Elsewhere, Adorno detects a common feature in both music

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>238</sup> Kramer substantiates his defence by arguing that “listening is not an immediacy alienated from a later reflection, but a mode of dialogue. [T]he aim of musicology is to continue the dialogue of listening” (p. 17). Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>239</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>240</sup> T.W. Adorno, “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” op. cit., p. 185.

<sup>241</sup> Max Paddison, “The Language-character of Music: Some Motifs in Adorno,” in *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, Vol 116, No. 2, 1991, pp. 267-79, p. 274, 279.



and language, that is, the “temporal succession of articulated sounds that are more than just sound,”<sup>242</sup> although he does not elaborate. Besides the old debates centered on the *figurative*, what has not been discussed in perspective is the temporal issue. Nonetheless, to give a conjecture on this, “Becoming” is central. Adorno uses the term on two levels: first, Becoming [*Aspekt des Werdens*] is described as an *illusion* and seen as “mechanicalness,” since music is only a *coherence* [*Zusammenhang*], and, second, *becoming* [*Werdendes*], to describe the unfolding *moments* (“something *evolving* about them”) of time in music.<sup>243</sup> On the becoming-time, Adorno gives two variances: a spatial and a temporal. This is not found in the anachronistic music of Beethoven since it was not built on motifs and themes and therefore they “adapt themselves to become part of the pervading idea of the [Hegelian] whole.”<sup>244</sup> Whereas, in Gustave Mahler’s (1860-1911) *Fourth Symphony* (1892), which employs progressive tonal scheme, Adorno suggests a full attention from the very beginning since it perturbs *the direction it wants to go*. Likewise, on his teacher Alban Johannes Berg (1885-1935), Adorno finds the becoming purest form of music is through a *permanent dissolution*—a “*permanent re-absorption* back into itself”—like the autonomous negation of splitting atoms (or, “germinal cells”). In Mahler’s case Adorno is more concerned with the composition of chromatic modulation, whereas in Berg’s case it brings out an interesting case of non-dialectical compositional concept of difference.<sup>245</sup> Adorno’s conception of temporality in music however remains restricted to descriptions on compositional and tonal expression layers. Aden Evens sees Adorno as allegorically taking tonality to represent a harmonious culture and a tonal departure is seen as representing the individual’s alienation

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<sup>242</sup> See Theodor W. Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition,” op. cit., p. 401.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>245</sup> On this exit line, Nick Nesbitt makes an interesting comparison it with Deleuze’s “internal difference.” See Nick Nesbitt, “Deleuze, Adorno, and the Composition of Musical Multiplicity,” in Ian Buchanan and Marcel Swiboda (eds.), *Deleuze and Music* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. pp. 54-75.

from culture.<sup>246</sup> In upholding that the “reproduction of sound is not a matter of physics,” Evens take a Deleuzian position by arguing it a product “but of affect and percept.”<sup>247</sup> On musical expression, Evens remarks:

“Expression is a delicate balance between implication and explication, a mixture of the clear and the obscure. If the absolute sound is a matter of repetition, the repetition of the musical event, then we should look not so much to fidelity, which is only ever an objective standard, but to the implicated, which repeats entire events in expression.”<sup>248</sup>

For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “musical expression is inseparable from becoming.”<sup>249</sup> The second important feature they raised on music is the *refrain* as “indissociable from sound expression,” where the “refrain” is the *musical content*.<sup>250</sup> We shall now conclude by focusing on these two elements of music and see what it forebode on the status of reading music today. Prior to that one can note how the notion of “becoming” has taken a totally different turn today, given the practices and the purpose it conveys, as inebriated and limitless license for improvisation. In the first place becoming is not a dialectical process, although it illustrates a radicalization of property-element movements. It is rather a transfiguration of new images of corporeal or phenomenological thoughts. In the previous chapter on Deleuzian and Guattarian concepts we described the categories of actualization; the same actualization is also seen in music. The becoming virtual, nonetheless, is not a virtue representative of the real, literally.

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<sup>246</sup> Aden Even, *Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 55.

<sup>247</sup> Aden Evens, “Sound Ideas,” in Brian Massumi (ed.), *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 171-87, p. 185.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>249</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.

First, we look at the indissociability of the refrain from sound expression. Or, to paraphrase the equivalence of their reference, the musical content cannot be disassociated from the sound expression. In other words, music is essentially created and it originates from somewhere, since it is a question of sufficient reason. Or, to give a varied example, it has a composer inasmuch it has listeners too. If it is creative, it is performative too. In other words, Guattarezean sense of music is not different from the conventional understanding. And, as a matter of fact, it is not even there as an interest in Guattareze. What, however, sets them apart is their attempt to eradicate the eternal return,<sup>251</sup> (forget) the past,<sup>252</sup> the repetition, the dogmatic image of thought, which are associated with issues of representation, presentability, or other casuistic attempt to understand the effable (this time). We discussed the refrain in the previous chapter centred on geophilosophy as their first philosophy. The same modulation can also be applied here. Guattareuze uses lots of examples in this account to elucidate the refrain. The bird-becoming becoming-music is our most important reference. Guattareuzean philosophy of music (if at all that is something they were actually proposing!) owes a lot to the French composer, ornithologist and organist, Olivier Messiaen (1908-92). Why does the bird sing? Through Messiaen,

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<sup>251</sup> On a departure from Nietzschean eternal reading, Deleuze says:

“The eternal return is neither qualitative nor extensive but intensive, purely intensive. In other words, it is said of difference. This is the fundamental connection between the eternal return and the will to power. The one does not hold without the other. The will to power is the flashing world of metamorphoses, of communicating intensities, differences of differences, of *breaths*, insinuations or exhalations . . . Eternal return is the being of this world, the only Same which is said of this world and excludes any prior identity therein.”

Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>252</sup> As Quaglia says, “forgetting of the past is the becoming intense of the present, and it is the opening to the proliferating virtual of the future.” Virtual future is however an erroneous understanding of the temporality promoted in Guattareuzean philosophy. The relegation of future as possibilities or opening of possibilities is the right reference. See Bruce Quaglia, “Transformation and Becoming Other in the Music and Poetics of Luciano Berio,” in Brian Hulse and Nick Nesbitt (eds.), *Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music* (Farham; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), pp. 227-48, p. 248.

Guattareuzean “magic bird or bird of the opera” finds its place—because “the bird sings to mark its territory.”<sup>253</sup> Why does the bird sing can also be problematized! This is something which Guattareuze hardly discusses. We saw in the previous chapter a brief discussion on what *force* concepts (formation!), which is not necessarily a Guattareuzean morphing of Bergsonian *élan vital*. What *forces* the bird to sing?—to re-paraphrase our initial question—is given a new explanation in music. It is inconclusive, which we shall see in the following paragraphs. Nonetheless, we have an answer as to why the bird sings! The marking of territory in the singing bird is important because it pulsates the formation of milieus and rhythms. Becoming-bird is becoming-music, to repeat. But territory is not a milieu, as Guattareuze warns us. “The territory is in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them. The territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus and rhythms.”<sup>254</sup> The bird singing territorializes milieus and rhythms. We were also informed that milieus and rhythms are in themselves formed from chaos. In this sense we have either the bird singing to mark its territory as signaling of chaos becoming a reality of milieus and rhythms, or there is a two-directional approach in the pulsation of milieus and rhythms formation. If they are different, or differently identically as same, they are still both conduit vectors of a movement. The territory and sonic motif of the bird singing is a refrain for becoming, which leads to territorialization. “Territorialization is an act of rhythm that has become expressive, or of milieu components that have become qualitative.”<sup>255</sup> Whether we want to call it empowerment or giving life to, the diffusion of subjective invariations into heterogeneity takes place. This takes us to the second question of why *musical expression is inseparable from becoming*.

Like Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari also revisited Rousseau’s (*Essay*) voice-music. While acknowledging that “the voice in music has always been a privileged axis of experimentation, playing simultaneously on language and

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<sup>253</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 312.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 314.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315.

sound,” Guattareuze asserts that so long as the *voice is song* it cannot be truly called music because the voice-song is simply the functioning of holding sound.<sup>256</sup> Guattareuzean definition of voice-song is therefore simple and, likewise, has the same bearings as ordinary (or ‘secret’) languages: always in a state of “immanent continuous variation: neither synchrony nor diachrony, but asynchrony, chromaticism as a variable and continuous state of language.”<sup>257</sup> The becoming-music of voice-song (territorial refrain or chaos to milieus and rhythms) therein actualizes only when it is tied to timbre to uncover a tessitura, which then “renders its heterogeneous to itself and gives it a power of continuous variation.”<sup>258</sup> In other words, the voice-song has to be “machined.” How does it happen? Let us refer back to the epigraph above by Deleuze and Guattari—the originary *machining the voice* and the singularity of *machines as the keys*. The machine therein is instrumental in facilitating the becoming-music of tonality. The voice is transformed into music through the machine. Guattareuze describes the machine in the context of music as “a set of cutting edges that insert themselves into the assemblage undergoing deterritorialization, and draws variation and mutations of it.”<sup>259</sup> The machine is to music what conceptual personae are to thinking, then. The machine is the Friend and its task is to *enter matters of expression*—and its work lies in its “real value of passage or relay.”<sup>260</sup> The Deleuzian machine is the key that contradistinct voice-song as music or facilitates into becoming matters of expression. Matters of expression here are equal to voice-song becoming music. Guattareuze takes matters of expression (of the voice-song) as having an “aptitude of form” to become music, to be “melodic and rhythmic.”<sup>261</sup> That is one power to illustrate and justify that *musical expression is inseparable from*

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<sup>256</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., p. 333.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., p. 333.

<sup>261</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 334.

*becoming*. The other one is the “power of the natal.”<sup>262</sup> Power, here, assumes the role of *force*, which we earlier referred. Together, these two powers—aptitude of form and natal-power—bring music to life. Matters of expression, Guattareuze explains, “imply that expression has a primary relation to matter. As matters of expression take on consistency [becoming music] they constitute semiotic systems, but the *semiotic* components are inseparable from *material* components and are in exceptionally close contact with molecular levels.”<sup>263</sup> This statement, by and large, elucidates the work of the *refrain*.<sup>264</sup> It also illustrates the web-segmentation of movements in the becoming, its impetus and process, and transfiguration of the corporeal. But this explains only the *refrain* of a becoming-music version, whereas the *rhizome* belongs to another level of segmented movement through appropriation. Current enthusiasts approaching music thoughts by employing Deleuzian approach fails to negotiate this distinction.<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> “The natal,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “consists in a decoding of innateness and a territorialization of learning, one atop the other, one alongside the other [diagonal and transversal].” However, Guattareuze explains that natal consistency “cannot be explained as a mixture of the innate and the acquired, because it is instead what accounts for such mixtures in territorial assemblage and interassemblages. In short the notion of behaviour proves inadequate, too linear, in comparison with that of the assemblage” (pp. 332-33. Here, a quasi-psychologism is indicated but at the same time denied. Whereas, in a preceding page, Guattareuze notes:

“From the standpoint of consistency, matters of expression must be considered not only in relation to their aptitude to form motifs and counterpoints but also in relation to the inhibitors and releasers that act on them, and the mechanisms of innateness or learning, hereditary or acquisition, that modulate them” (p. 331).

Ibid., p. 334.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., p. 334.

<sup>264</sup> A *refrain* is “any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes.” Ibid., p. 323.

<sup>265</sup> Jeremy Gilbert, “Becoming-Music: The Rhizomatic Moment of Improvisation,” Ian Buchanan and Marcel Swiboda (eds.), *Deleuze and Music*, op. cit., pp. 118-39.




Figure: "Diagrams for Deleuze & Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*."<sup>266</sup>

["Semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding... that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. *Collective assemblages of enunciation* function directly within *machinic assemblages*; it is not impossible to make a radical break between regiments regimes of signs and their objects. ... A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles."<sup>267</sup>]

Let us return to what happens between the voice-song and the singing bird. Earlier we asked the question: 'What forces the bird to sing?' Or, to put it in another, but Leibnizian, sense, the bird might as well as not sing at all! Similarly, we are told that the voice is song *is* not music. Although Guattareuze did not give an extended explanation on what is otherwise not music if just the voice is song (which could be anything other than music but associative values of voice or song, say, a tonality, or a powerful narration, for example)—they however

<sup>266</sup> Marc Ngui, "Diagrams for Deleuze & Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*," INFLeXions No. 1- How is Research-Creation? (May 2008). Available at: <<http://www.inflexions.org/1000platos-intro-6.gif>> <accessed on 23 September 2013>

<sup>267</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 7.

mentioned that voice-song's "main role is to 'hold' sound."<sup>268</sup> The release of this sound in hold, through the 'machinic', will then become music, that is, logically. But that cannot be the case. Carolyn Abbate narrates the "Tale of the Pariah's Daughter," which was the background for Léo Delibes' virtuoso *Lakmé* (1883), about how a Hindu priestess comes to tell the tale. The refrain is an interesting trajectory to Guattareuzean—or, shall we say—problematic, or generalization, or paradox:

"[Nilakantha (with great emotion):  
 If this villain has penetrated my domain,  
 if he has defied death to come near you,  
 forgive my blasphemy,  
 but it is because he loves you,  
 my Lakmé, you! You, the child of the gods!  
 He's passing in triumph through the town,  
 so let us gather this wandering crowd,  
 and, if he sees you Lakmé, I shall read it in his eyes!  
*Now steady your voice! Smile as you sing!*  
 Sing, Lakmé! Sing! Vengeance is near!

(The crowd of Hindus gathers slowly around.)

Inspired by the gods,  
 this child will tell you  
 the sacred legend  
 of the pariah's daughter.

The Crowd: Let's listen to the legend! Listen!

Lakmé: Where does the young Hindu girl wander?  
 This daughter of pariahs? (etc.)"<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>269</sup> Quoted, in Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 3. Line rendition and italics, mine.



Carolyn Abbate also picks up the same [my] italicized line above: *steady your voice*. Voices, in opera, Abbate reminds us, “are the individual contrapuntal lines of a polyphonic composition. ... The sound of the singing voice becomes, as it were, a ‘voice-object’ and the sole center for the listener’s attention... The membrane between the pure voice-object and the voice that we assign consciously to the virtuoso, as performance, is thus thin, and permeable.”<sup>270</sup> To return to Guattareuze, Lakmé was asked to steady her singing voice—as compared to the voice is song that is (not music) but the holding of sound. Unlike birds, free or subjectivized, human can be asked to steady their voice. And, technically, the machinic rigging of the voice-song is either a tonal conflict or a descriptive of the composer’s task Guattareuze had in mind. Abbate highlights that “music is animated by voices, and these voices do not evaporate [even] when music” is confronted by any discipline, including music theory or philosophy.<sup>271</sup> The song or the voice, or least to say, the singing voice, therein confronts the limits of Guattareuzean thoughts. To battle this discord, they had to turn to the animality of nature: “The question is more what is not musical in human beings, and what already is musical in nature.”<sup>272</sup> Musicians and artist don’t imitate the animal but rather the become-animal. Guattareuzean philosophy of becoming is linked to this focal point of deepest level: becoming as a concordance with Nature.<sup>273</sup> The integration of the bird-becoming is integral to the refrain of nature, which is integral to their embedded and immanent philosophy. Ronald Bogue has rightfully pointed out that “the refrain leads to a vision of nature itself as music” and, here, music “is the refrain composing itself.”<sup>274</sup> Meanwhile, on Lakmé, this is what Abbate says:

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<sup>270</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>272</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 309.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>274</sup> Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and Arts* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 31, p. 76

“The song, as phenomenal performance, exists separated from the musical fabric surrounding it... A musical voice sounds unlike the music that constitutes its encircling milieu. Though it does not shadow in any sense the activities of the pariah’s daughter, the music of Lakmé’s performance (and not her voice alone) may be understood as a narrating voice; it is defined not by what it narrates, but rather by its audible flight from the continuum that embeds it. That voice need not remain unheard, despite the fact that it is unsung.”<sup>275</sup>

In the neighbourhood of Deleuze and Guattari, one not only hears but also feels lots of *vibrations*<sup>276</sup>—as compared to Henri Lefebvre’s surround of *rhythmias*.<sup>277</sup> Yes, the Guattareuze and Lefebvre seem to live much apart.<sup>278</sup> On

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<sup>275</sup> Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices*, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>276</sup> See, *event as vibration*:

“The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration. For space and time are not limits but abstract coordinates of all series that are themselves in extension: the minute, the second, the tenth of a second.”

Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold*, op. cit., p. 77.

*Origin of sound as vibration*:

“The origins of the sounds are monads or prehensions that are filled with joy in themselves, with an intense satisfaction, as they fill up with their perceptions and move from one perception to another. And the notes of the scale are eternal objects, pure Virtualities that are actualized in the origins, but also pure Possibilities that are attained in vibrations or flux.”

Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold*, op. cit., p. 80.

*Milieu as vibration*:

“Every milieu is vibratory, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component.”

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 313.

<sup>277</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, (tr.) Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London; New York, 2004), p. 16.

<sup>278</sup> Not that we are proposing a comparison, but their works are aligned on the rhythms and movements, so also their deep entrenchment to contextualize a biophilosophy. Birth has sharply introduced us to Lefebvre’s work:

the other side, the question of living-speech as a self-presence, which Derrida successfully raises as a complicity of pure presence, as a temporal impossibility, is well situated within the premise of language, speech included. The immediacy that confronts us in music, notwithstanding the ineffable in music, or the ineffable in language too, are still incongruent with the respectability accorded to music as equitable with language on the same plane. Immediacy in language is indeterminate. Immediacy in music is however, still largely indefinable. Between a concept and an event—"the moment when the disjunction between thinking and knowing becomes crucial"—as Derrida mentions, the *law of aporia* takes its place, "undecidability."<sup>279</sup> This Derridean enigma of a question, a question that is translated into its own undecidability, however, can also summon a question of what laws of aporia apply to music? Derrida enthusiastically answered, which we saw in the introduction of this chapter. Perhaps Deleuze was too afraid to answer. It is well outside the scope of our present study to define the inconsistencies of Deleuzian or Guattareuzian thoughts on music, except the one discord we enumerated above on the singing bird. What Deleuze has engaged with (especially on the rhizome), without putting a closure on the possibilities of variations, is perhaps not even musical thoughts. Music cannot be rhizomic; its possibilities are however rhizomic. Music has always been plastic—a groove, for

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"Lefebvre adopted Bachelard's concept of rhythmanalysis to analyze the 'bundle' of rhythms associated with physical, biological, psychological, social, and cultural processes. Rhythmanalysis for Lefebvre does not separate the rhythms in this bundle to study them in isolation, but instead he identifies them and studies them in relation to one another. Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis is a methodological approach to study communities of practice in relationship to timescapes—to recognize and relate multiple cycles within an environment. This emphasis on relationships between rhythms forms the basis of his vocabulary of polyrhythmia, eurhythmia, and arrhythmia. Polyrhythmia is the existence of multiple rhythms; eurhythmia is the consonance of these rhythms; arrhythmia is the conflict of these rhythms."

Kevin K. Birth, *Objects of Time: How Things Shape Temporality* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 100-101.

<sup>279</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, (tr.) George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997), p. 39.

instance, still operates within the materiality of improvisation. Rhizomes have no laws; it is sheer mutation that escapes any given expressive content. Finally, music will not bring peace in the world or end a life-enduring situation;<sup>280</sup> perhaps language (not specifying written or speech) can. Music is yet to find its place, because its place cannot be define, as of yet. Evanescence sounds bad for philosophy, but that best describes the “souls or soul-like substances which act, and thus *have* ideas. Monads *are* not ideas.”<sup>281</sup> The monadic Deleuze & Guattari were elsewhere:

“There is no machinic assemblage that is not a social assemblage of desire, no social assemblage of desire that is not a collective assemblage of enunciation.”<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> Although some hope for, that the “‘becoming’ intensities merge music’s relational dynamics and the social voices of its sonic materiality.” Marianne Kielian-Gilbert, “Music and the Difference in Becoming,” in Brian Hulse and Nick Nesbitt (eds.), *Sounding the Virtual*, op. cit., pp. 199-225, p. 225.

<sup>281</sup> Mogens Lørke, “Four Things Deleuze Learned from Leibniz,” in Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.), *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 25-45, p. 38.

<sup>282</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature*, (tr.) Dana Polan (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 81.

Conclusion:  
**After Language & Literature:  
Three Quick Comments**

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“...the limits of language are to be found not outside language, in the direction of its referent, but in an experience of language as such, in its pure self-reference.”

—Giorgio Agamben.<sup>1</sup>

“To be an artisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become cosmic...”

—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.<sup>2</sup>

“What would be at stake in the fact that something like art or literature exists?”

—Maurice Blanchot.<sup>3</sup>

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Hardly anybody cares about Jean-Paul Sartre anymore, these days. Hardly a footnote even recalls him! That is not sadness; the time of the subject is over! That is being and nothingness, perhaps! Or, maybe, even cosmic! He once wrote, “it is not true that one writes for oneself,” in a book entitled *What is Literature?* (1948).<sup>4</sup> Also, Sartre wrote, on questions, ranging from ‘what is writing’?—to ‘why write’?—to ‘for whom does one write’? Such enthusiasm for interiority and intentionality! Or, questions that are, as Jacques Derrida remarks, “linked to the act of a literary performativity and a critical performativity (or even a performativity in crisis).”<sup>5</sup> The book, yes, the one mentioned just now, concludes with:

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<sup>1</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience*, (tr.) Liz Heron (London; New York: Verso, 1993), p. 5)

<sup>2</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (tr.) Brian Massumi (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, [1987] 2009), p. 345.

<sup>3</sup> Maurice Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, (tr.) Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1993] 2003), p. xi.

<sup>4</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?*, (tr.) Bernard Frechtman (\_\_\_\_: Methuen & Co. Ltd., [1967] 1983), p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Jacques Derrida, “‘This Strange Institution Called Literature,’” in *Acts of Literature*, (ed.) Derek Attridge (New York & London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75, p. 42.

“We stand for an ethics and art of the finite.”

Finite art—mortal art—art that dies too, in Sartre. In the “Epilogue” to “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Martin Heidegger adds that ‘experience’ dies too in the death of art:

“Almost from the time when specialized thinking about art and the artist began, this thought was called aesthetic. Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of *aisthesis*, of sensuous apprehension in the wide sense. Today we call this apprehension experience... Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps *experience is the element in which art dies.*”<sup>6</sup>

After Sartre, after Heidegger, whom shall we add? By the last quarter of twentieth-century, the institution of literature has been thrown into disarray or, should we say, put into proper perspective? It stabilizes two levels of a tradition: the ontological limits of language (which, inasmuch is previously seen as a priority problematic for interiority) and the very question of literature as an institutional practice. As a practice, the institutional issue is again tied to the developments of the former.<sup>7</sup> Citing Derrida, Kronick, for instance, argues that “there is no natural essence of literature; literature is ‘inscribed on the side of the

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<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Basic Writings*, (ed.) David Farrell Krell (New York: HarpersCollins Publishers, [1977] 1993), p. 204. Italics, mine.

<sup>7</sup> As Derrida remarks:

“[T]he paradoxical structure of this thing called literature, its beginning *is* its end. It began with a certain relation to its own institutionality, i.e., its fragility, its absence of specificity, its absence of object. The question of its origin was immediately the question of its end. Its history *is constructed* like the ruin of a monument which basically never existed. It is the history of a ruin, the narrative of a memory which produces the event to be told and which will never have, been present.”

Jacques Derrida, “This Strange Institution Called Literature,” *op. cit.*, p. 42.

intentional object, in its noematic structure’.”<sup>8</sup> The literature-language distinction is hardly a concern nowadays; it belongs to the same side of the coin insofar as the question of representation or intentionality is foregrounded. It will be difficult to recap in brief but—simultaneous with the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment obsession with the origin of language (in the likes of Rousseau, Herder, Humboldt, etc.), there was also a consistent resistance to intentionality in language or, if not, doubt for its claims to represent truth (in the likes of German romantics like the Schlegel brothers, Schelling and, later, Nietzsche). It then spilled over to late German Romanticism, and the French Baroque and Symbolist movements, which resisted, too, the meaning-language conjunctions. The ontology of language is in fact the main preoccupation of almost all thinkers till its restitution in recent times. If the post-modern shift from language-centric discourse is a marker for us to relocate the privileged place of literature, inasmuch as the works Husserl or Heidegger that make language as the final problem to their corpuses, it will nonetheless require a juridical reading of post-modernity as also post-holocaust.<sup>9</sup>

This brings us back to post-war France and Jean-Paul Sartre—the seeking-figure for a public intellectual—with its implicit political and social overtones in the task of commitment, in a “truth” of literature that “*utilizes* language.”<sup>10</sup> Philip Watts’ monumental work revisits these defining moments in recent times, which takes into account the social and political purges on the pure substance of what should be the *status of language* and the interiorized commitments of literature.<sup>11</sup> We are also reminded of the attritions between Sartre and Albert Camus; over the encoding of the self either into a literature as

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<sup>8</sup> Joseph G. Kronick, *Derrida and the Future of Literature* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 34-35.

<sup>9</sup> Sarah Hammerschlag, *The Figural Jew: Politics and Identity in Postwar French Thought* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Literature and Existentialism*, (tr.) Bernard Frechtman (Secaucus: Citadel Press, [1947] 1949), p. 12.

<sup>11</sup> Philip Watts, *Allegories of the Purge: How Literature Responded to the Postwar Trials of Writers and Intellectuals in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

dynamic or as the essence of a prose that is utilitarian.<sup>12</sup> In this regard, the works of Maurice Blanchot, which also played a major influence on Jacques Derrida, can be situated as a radical departure that inasmuch is also accelerated by the event of the day—powerlessness as a resistance to politics and the question of humanity.<sup>13</sup> But this sense of powerlessness is also the politics of “refusal,”<sup>14</sup> a thematic transgression that also finds integrated into Blanchot’s writings.<sup>15</sup> In Blanchotian terms, literature is about the powerlessness of the author or the writer (which resonates strong anti-Sartrean positions<sup>16</sup>)—which also “allies with the reality of language, it makes language into matter without contour,

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<sup>12</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Literature and Existentialism*, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>13</sup> In “The Writer and the Public,” Blanchot writes:

“The artist is powerless not to feel the wish to create a finished work, in which his own figure and his own existence are modified so as to fit the form that will render them essential.”

Maurice Blanchot, *Into Disaster: Chronicles of Intellectual Life, 1941*, (tr.) Michael Holland (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), p. 108.

<sup>14</sup> Citing Jeffrey Mehlman’s political writings, Ann Smock points out that between 1930-1940 Blanchot’s writings were mostly for right-wing journals and, subsequently after the war, the “surprising” but expected “reputation” took a roundabout to leftist leanings, which were facilitated by the events of 1958 Algerian war and 1968 student movements. Blanchot was one of the main organizers for *Le Manifeste des 121* (1960), which called for refusal to conscription during the Algerian war or refusal to serve in the army for the operation, as a ‘right to insubordination’. See “Translator’s Introduction,” in Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, (tr.) Ann Smock (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, [1982] 1989), p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Gerald L. Burns, *Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997); John Gregg, *Maurice Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

<sup>16</sup> In “Literature and the Right to Death,” Blanchot says:

“An author who is writing specifically for a public is not really writing: it is the public that is writing, and for this reason the public can no longer be a reader; reading only appears to exist, actually it is nothing. This is why works created to be read are meaningless: no one reads them. This is why it is dangerous to write for other people, in order to evoke the speech of others and reveal them to themselves: the fact is that other people do not want to hear their own voices; they want to hear someone else’s voice, a voice that is real, profound, troubling like the truth.”

Maurice Blanchot, “Literature and the Right to Death,” (tr.) Lydia Davis, in *The Work of Fire*, (tr.) Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 300-344, p. 307.



content without form, a force that is capricious and impersonal and says nothing, reveals nothing, simply announces—through its refusal to say anything.”<sup>17</sup> By purging the intentional, Blanchot positions *language* as “*the life that endures death and maintains itself in it*”<sup>18</sup> and “Literature is language turning into ambiguity.”<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the fragmentary style, Leslie Hill contends, is a refusal to realize the “fullness of the present.”<sup>20</sup> While Blanchot places language qua literature as the place of death, which also gives life, the primacy of the text is still maintained through the *récit* as its own timeless preservation and its self-perpetuating mechanism.<sup>21</sup> If language is the catacomb of life that *reveals nothing* in Blanchot, it is the *secret of literature that is the secret itself* for Derrida. The secret of literature remains in “the infinite power to keep undecidable and forever sealed the secret of what it says.”<sup>22</sup> Ornate language has never seen worst times but in the Blanchot-Derrida duo. Given its resistance to presencing, the label “exhausted literature” aptly describes the post-modern lifelessness, worldlessness, timelessness, worklessness, powerlessness, and wordlessness of language and literature.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341.

<sup>20</sup> Hill notes: “The time of the fragment is never the fullness of the present. It is the time of between-times: between remembering and forgetting, continuity and discontinuity... between time past and time still to come.” Leslie Hill, *Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing: A Change of Epoch* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> Ann Smock, “Conversation,” in Carolyn Bailey Gil (ed.), *Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 123-136, p. 133.

<sup>22</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Genesis, Genealogies, Genres, and Genius: The Secrets of the Archive*, (tr.) Beverley Bie Brahic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 17.

<sup>23</sup> See, esp. Chapter 1: “Postmodernism or ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’,” in Bouchra Belgaid, *John Irving and Cultural Mourning* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 5-50; and Daniel Just, *Literature, Ethics, and Decolonization in Postwar France: The Politics of Disengagement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), esp. conclusion chapter, “The Literature of exhaustion, weakness, and blankness,” pp. 153-170. Just’s observations are incisively argued with the notion of labour and work—but Belgaid’s work (which also refers to John Barht’s 1967 essay, “Literature of Exhaustion”) is actually pioneering in the direction of the study.

Jean-Luc Nancy also recasts Sartre in line with his other contemporary Georges Bataille—who were both exposed to an “era” of “a voiceless souvenir of Western history,” *nausea and exasperation, painful memory, contraction and convulsion*, “the terrifying insufficiency of all the various assurances of knowing, believing, and thinking, and the necessity of confronting the lasting failure of accomplishment, the impossibility of ending, and even the responsibility of not ending.”<sup>24</sup> Why, then, did Nancy “oppose” Sartre to Bataille over this ‘apprehension of a vertiginous disassociation of experience itself’?<sup>25</sup> Two stakes, Nancy proposes, which puts Sartre in poor light—implicating him as situating “himself on the side of history and language”—a) “what stops thinking from being a thinking of crisis or distress without being itself a thinking that is *in* crisis or *in* distress” as seen in “the modern tradition of the liberation of humanity” and b) the inability to satisfy “propositions without indicating the excess” wherein *thinking* secures no “sense,” “nothing outside its own freedom,” except to “conceal itself as thinking in the very act of thinking.”<sup>26</sup> Whereas, Bataille, on the other hand, understood “the *praxis* of subjects of sense and of truth.”<sup>27</sup> Sartre’s cardinal mistake, therein, as Nancy quotes him, is “thinking the fact that ‘truth is action, my free act. Truth is not *true* if it is not lived and done.”<sup>28</sup> The aversion to a notion of *lived experience*—“murky category,” as Nancy labels it—is a hallmark in deconstructionistic philosophizing now, particularly Derrida.<sup>29</sup> In a way,

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<sup>24</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, “Concealed Thinking,” (tr.) James Gilbert-Walsh, pp. 31-47, in *A Finite Thinking*, (ed.) Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 31.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>29</sup> Derrida’s critique of Husserl is premised on the latter providing a *form* “which connects lived experiences to lived experiences.” Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*, (tr.) Marian Hobson (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), esp. pp. 162-64.

Derrida complements Nancy in his attack on Husserl or lived experience.<sup>30</sup> There is however no consensus on this: Jean-Luc Marion, for instance, correlates lived experience with love, thereby complicating the double-edged encounters of an experience without “recognizing an object in that experience.”<sup>31</sup> We also find a debatable range on the same—Alain Badiou finds Deleuzian “lived experience” as one of the two types of *simulacrum* (the other being “state of affairs.”)<sup>32</sup> Deleuze’s convergences on “real experience,”<sup>33</sup> however, should be noted as a categorical subversion aimed with affirmation for life, although it is astutely developed using metaphors of genetic biophilosophy.<sup>34</sup> It is also on this discord of the lived experience that Daniel Smith insists Deleuze’s approach to literature and language must be “distinguished from Derrida’s deconstructive approach.”<sup>35</sup> With this we conclude our first assessment on post-ontology of language—a strict Derridean deconstructive approach is not at par, despite the erasure of being, in contemporary thinkers.

Our second comment then is on the problematic of “contemporary,” where the *present* itself is a question of “nothing other than [the] unlived element in everything that is lived.”<sup>36</sup> The notion of contemporary that Giorgio

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<sup>30</sup> See, also, particularly on the discussion on Husserl’s Ego and lived experience in Jacques Derrida, *On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy*, (tr.) Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 164-66.

<sup>31</sup> Jean-Luc Marion, *Prolegomena to Charity*, (tr.) Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), p. 88.

<sup>32</sup> Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, (tr.) Louise Burchill (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 80-81.

<sup>33</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (tr.) Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p. 69.

<sup>34</sup> For an engaging discussion in this regard, see John Protevi, “Larval Subjects, Autonomous Systems and *E. Coli* Chemotaxis,” in Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes (eds.), *Deleuze and the Body* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 29-52.

<sup>35</sup> Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 192

<sup>36</sup> Giorgio Agamben, “What Is the Contemporary?,” in *What is an Apparatus? and Other Essays*, (trs.) David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 39-54, p. 51.

Agamben develops is therefore in sync with the temporal questions interlining the place of language—the *condition* of “disconnection” and “anachronism” (in language or in the philosopher) that allows a capacity to perceive or grasp “their own time,” more than anyone else.<sup>37</sup> Drawing from Roland Barthes’ the “contemporary is the untimely,” which in turn is drawn from Nietzsche’s famous phrase, ‘this meditation is itself untimely’—Agamben problematizes the “ungraspable threshold” of contemporariness, which is caught in a “not yet” and a “no more.” This is however not purgatorial disenchantment but rather a play of “distancing and nearness, which define contemporariness, [which] have their foundation in this proximity to the origin that nowhere pulses with more force than in the present.”<sup>38</sup> For, a lived experience, least to mention, compared with the “present,” the *time of the now*, which in itself, is also “absolutely incapable of living,” and, therein, the “attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary,” a “return to a present where we have never been.”<sup>39</sup> Like Walter Benjamin’s historical index or Michel Foucault’s historical investigations, the presencing of figures or typos, or “also of its figures in the texts and documents of the past,”<sup>40</sup> is reshaped by the subversion of the unlivable present.

The *contemporary* as untimely—which also implies that it does *not belong to the present*—also finds echoes in the works of Deleuze/Guattari, Lacan, or Badiou.<sup>41</sup> We shall limit ourselves to Deleuze and Guattari here. Deleuze and Guattari link “creation” as symmetrical to the resistance of the present<sup>42</sup>—which gives the impression that the “present itself is what must be resisted in order to

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 51-52.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>41</sup> For an enlivening discussion on the “Contemporary,” see A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 9-47.

<sup>42</sup> As Deleuze and Guattari remark: “We lack creation. *We lack resistance to the present.*” See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, (trs.) Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Verso, 1994), p. 108.

be contemporary.”<sup>43</sup> The resistance to time is a becoming-other, which we have discussed earlier, and it rests its case on “becoming-inessential of time” as “the entrance to the present.”<sup>44</sup> This resistance is important for Deleuze and Guattari since, like Kant’s, “time not only conditions experience but literally corrupts the subject.”<sup>45</sup> By modeling philosophy’s resistance against time from Nietzsche’s “untimely,” Deleuze, too, therein give the contemporary as an object of affirmation, of life.<sup>46</sup> This “end of times,” as Bartlett et. al. propose, is the fusion of time and non-knowledge—the contemporary that is also the virtual, the contingent, the current, the innovative, the creative, the erasure of the disjunction between history and becoming.<sup>47</sup> By importing Nietzsche’s affirmation of the untimely<sup>48</sup> and merging it with Bergsonian duration and Proustian time (as “intermediary *in the search*”<sup>49</sup>), Deleuze re-clothes the philosopher with a new look that confidently seeks innovative creation of concepts “that are neither eternal nor historical but untimely and not of the present world,”<sup>50</sup> an untimely contemporary that is otherwise a “haecceity, [a] becoming, the innocence of becoming.”<sup>51</sup> In short, it envisages a new reading, a new life, without the old concords of images of thought that have otherwise subjectivized the reading of knowledge or restricted philosophizing to breathe new life. Similarly, *writing*, for Deleuze, “is a question of becoming. ... To become is not to attain a form... but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or

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<sup>43</sup> A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe, *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 9.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>48</sup> “True philosophy, says Deleuze, “is no more historical than eternal: it must be untimely, always untimely.” Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, (tr.) Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), p. 72.

<sup>49</sup> Julia Kristeva, *Proust and the Sense of Time*, (tr.) Stephen Bann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 23.

<sup>50</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, (tr.) Hugh Tomlinson (London; New York: Continuum, [1983] 2002), p. 100.

<sup>51</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 295.

indifferentiation.”<sup>52</sup> “Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come.”<sup>53</sup>

Last, is on the ethical; reading as undecidability, which is also the most contentious. This motif of an ethical, or a responsibility, is often associated with Derrida although he has consistently rejected such labeling. Undecidability proposes to remark the territory of literature, although language in itself does not represent anything, which is the space of literature, to borrow Blanchotian phrase.<sup>54</sup> From now on, the text as literature must follow, as Elizabeth Grosz provides the lead:

“It is thus no longer appropriate to ask what a text means, what it says, what is the structure of its interiority, how to interpret or decipher it. Instead, one must ask what it does, how it connects with other things (including its reader, its author, its literary and nonliterary context).”<sup>55</sup>

This statement is however implicit with the role of the reader. In the practice of literature, Roland Barthes, earlier, while projecting the “unreal reality of language,” brings to task the unavoidable turnabout of the “the very consciousness of the unreality of language.”<sup>56</sup> For Barthes, therefore, “there is no literature without an ethic of language.”<sup>57</sup> Even Emmanuel Levinas admits to this

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<sup>52</sup> Gilles Deleuze, “Literature and Life,” *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (tr.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 1-6.

<sup>53</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>54</sup> Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, op. cit.

<sup>55</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, “A thousand tiny sexes: feminism and rhizomatics,” in Gary Genosko (ed.), *Deleuze and Guattari: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Volume III* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1440-1463, p. 1451.

<sup>56</sup> Roland Barthes, “Literature Today” (1961), in *Critical Essays*, (tr.) Richard Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, [1964] 1972), p. 160

<sup>57</sup> Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, (trs.) Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, [1953] 1967), p. 6.

limit about the “inverse of language.”<sup>58</sup> However, Derrida, despite invoking and employing Levinas’ radical alterity other (*autrui*), or *there is* language, takes a radical approach on “literature and truth”<sup>59</sup> and, in fact, even the entire facet of what is literature (*literarity*).<sup>60</sup> David Krell designates Derrida’s call to inhabit “imperfect world” as “an *arche-limbo*,” where there is no hope for “ecstasy or affirmation.”<sup>61</sup> The experience of literature, by whichever means, is central to his articulation of literature. Otherwise, Derrida employs the “space of literature,” much like Blanchotian political oeuvre, as “not only that of an instituted fiction but also a fictive institution which in principle allows one to say everything. To say everything [which] is also to break out of prohibitions.”<sup>62</sup> But such

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<sup>58</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, (tr.) Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, [1969] 1991), p. 90-91.

<sup>59</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, (tr.) Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 173-286, p. 177.

<sup>60</sup> The statement below occupies some of the most elementary positions by Derrida on literature by his interlocutors:

“Literarity is not a natural essence, an intrinsic property of the text. It is the correlative of an intentional relation to the text, an intentional relation which integrates in itself, as a component or an intentional layer, the more or less implicit consciousness of rules which are conventional or institutional-social, in any case. Of course, this does not mean that literarity is merely projective or subjective-in the sense of the empirical subjectivity or caprice of each reader. The literary character of the text is inscribed on the side of the intentional object, in its noematic structure? one could say, and not only on the subjective side of the noetic act. There are ‘in’ the text features which call for the literary reading and recall the convention, institution, or history of literature. This *noematic* structure is included (as ‘nonreal’, in Husserl’s terms) in subjectivity, but asubjectivity which is non-empirical and linked to an intersubjective and transcendental community. I believe this phenomenological type language to be necessary, even if at a certain point it must yield... There is therefore a literary *functioning* and a literary *intentionality*, an experience rather than an essence of literature.”

Jacques Derrida, ““This Strange Institution Called Literature,” op. cit., pp. 44-45.

<sup>61</sup> David Farrell Krell, *The Purest Bastards: Works of Mourning and Art and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 117

<sup>62</sup> Jacques Derrida, ““This Strange Institution Called Literature,” op. cit., p. 36.

affirmations are not taken as possibilities, as Taminiaux refers to a non-responsive alterity: “If the otherness of the Other infinitely transcends all thematization, an ultimate transparency no longer makes sense.”<sup>63</sup> Derrida’s apologetics have however defended “the very notion of literature as ungoverned rhetoricity, as a practice safely ‘outside’ philosophy, [as] a philosophical notion *par excellence*,”<sup>64</sup> whereby deconstruction “strategy” is to allow the *text* to “proffer a temporary reference mark,”<sup>65</sup> where the *re-mark* is but “a permanent possibility of all texts.”<sup>66</sup>

That the post-ontological status of language as incapable of communicating anything anymore takes us back to Hölderlin’s *caesura*,<sup>67</sup> the “pure word” that, as Peter Fenves eloquently puts it, not only interrupts representation but also enfolds the language into it.<sup>68</sup> “‘The living meaning,’ as

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<sup>63</sup> Jacques Taminiaux, *The Aquinas Lecture 2004: The Metamorphoses of Phenomenological Reduction* (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2004), p. 56. This is also the central argument of Kas Saghafi, “‘An Almost Unheard-of Analogy,’” *op. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> Derek Attridge, “Introduction: Derrida and the Questioning of Literature,” in Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-29, p. 13.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>67</sup> Reference is to Friedrich Hölderlin, “Remarks on *Oedipus*,” in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, (tr. & ed.) Thomas Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 101-108, esp. p. 102:

“[I]n the rhythmic sequence of the representations wherein *transport* presents itself, there becomes necessary *what in poetic meter is called cesura*, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic rupture; namely, in order to meet the onrushing change of representations at its highest point in such a manner that very soon there does not appear the change of representation but the representation itself.”

The “tragic *transport* is actually empty and the least restrained” (p. 101) and therein it defies the law of calculation.

<sup>68</sup> On an elaborate note, Fenves highlights:

“The caesura, as ‘pure word’, does not simply mark an interruption; it carries the interruption out. Such is the decisive character of this word: although it cannot be experienced within a continuum of representations, it structures this continuum by interrupting it and dividing it into unequal parts. Language not only arrests the succession of representations, moreover; language is arrested in turn.



the incalculable moment for which a 'lawful calculus' is invented," Peter Fenves continues, "can make itself known only in the radical disruption of life and the suspension of its meaning. ... The radical interruption of a continuous succession of representations cannot be accomplished by a civil power. ... Nor does it have divine sanction either. The figure in whom the arresting of language takes place can be determined and identified as such only from a *linkeish* or awkward perspective."<sup>69</sup> Similarly, Lacoue-Labarthe also contends that the *caesura* is premised on the assumption that "the structure of tragedy possesses an order and, for that reason, is calculable." It "means that the moment of the caesura is the moment at which the truth of the conflict of representations appears as such: representation then appears 'in itself.'"<sup>70</sup> "A caesura would be that which, within history, interrupts history and opens up another possibility of history, or else closes off all possibility of history."<sup>71</sup> The caesura therein is the anarchic

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This double-sided arrest would be altogether paradoxical if language that arrests the succession of representations were the same language that was arrested; but it is not—or not quite: the arresting language is the pure word', whereas the arrested language is the empirical word, which is to say, the word through which appearances are represented. The 'pure word', by contrast, says nothing. For this reason, it is by no means certain that the 'pure word' is even *a* word—one among others. Rather, the 'pure word' even interrupts the process of judgment through which words are separated from, and connected to, one another. The arresting of empirically verifiable language by the 'pure word' renders all accounts based on language—including the calculation that one 'has' a language—unreliable. Only one thing is certain about the 'pure word' from Hölderlin's dense delineation of its form and function: the arresting agent is without any legal authority or governing power."

Peter Fenves, *Arresting Language: From Leibniz to Benjamin* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-4.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>70</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "The Caesura," in *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, (tr.) Chris Turner (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 41-46, esp. p. 42.

<sup>71</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's comment here is targeted at Heidegger's complicit association with National Socialism and, more urgently, complete silence:

"Heidegger, who knew a good deal about the caesura (what else, after all, is the *Ereignis*?) and Heidegger alone can enable us to understand, he who obstinately refused, however, to acknowledge Auschwitz as the caesura of our times."

character of language; the total exhaustion of language. The *question* of literature, or language, given its “unstable grounding, its own porous limits,”<sup>72</sup> as William Allen argues, “implicates our own existence: the nature of human being.”<sup>73</sup>

Commenting on Kierkegaard’s *de Silentio* that communication is still universalization, Geoffrey Hale asserts that “Language cannot account for its own rule”—

“[Language] is simply never reducible to or generalizable as universalization alone. Language must remain silent about the only thing of which it would continually speak; it must remain silent about the secret rule of its comprehensibility. Language itself, in every act of speech, communicates nothing other than its own fundamental incomprehensibility. Every language, that is, calls Abraham to mind. For this reason, then, there must be interpretation.”<sup>74</sup>

For do we actually have any other choice,  
but to interpret,  
to *philosophize*?

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See “The Caesura,” in *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, (tr.) Chris Turner (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 41-46, esp. pp. 45-46.

<sup>72</sup> William S. Allen, *Ellipsis: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language After Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Blanchot* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 4.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>74</sup> Geoffrey A. Hale, *Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 182.

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