

ARMED FORCES IN SRI LANKA

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

V. MURALIDHARAN

CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EAST ASIAN
AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

1989



CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled 'ARMED FORCES IN SRI LANKA' submitted by Mr. V. MURALIDHARAN in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

Prof. S.D. Muni
Supervisor

Prof. J.N. Mukherjee
Chairperson

12th July, 1989

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very thankful to Prof.S.D.Muni, who has been more than a guide to me. He provided me with ample time for discussion, that too at any hour of day. It is the result of his valuable guidance that my dissertation is in the present shape. I will always be obliged to him.

I am very grateful to Prof. Urmila Phadnis for her personal interest in my work and words of encouragement.

The Head of the Department, South and South-East Asian Studies, University of Madras, allowed me the access of his library. It has been very useful for my work. I am very thankful to him.

I must thank the senior members of Tamil Militant Organization and highly placed military officials who have been the primary sources of information.

This work forms a part of the U.G.C. Fellowship awarded to me for my research programme in CSCSEASWPS/ SIS during 1987-92. I am grateful to their funding.

I will always be indebted to Rajesh(Sr.), Kumar and Ravi for their suggestions which enriched my dissertation.

Special thanks to Saravanan who has been a constant source of inspiration for me during my work.

It would not have been possible to submit my dissertation in time without the help of Muruganantham. He typed my dissertation error-free and that too in time. I am thankful to him.

NOTE

By the adoption of a new Constitution in 1972, the name of the country was changed to 'Sri Lanka' from its earlier name 'Ceylon'. For the purpose of clarity and continuity, the country is always referred, in this study, as Sri Lanka, unless otherwise necessary.

It is difficult to arrive at a common expression for the Tamils fighting in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. While the Tamils proclaim them as freedom fighters, the Sri Lankan government terms them as terrorists. Hence to avoid any value loaded interpretation, the term militants is adopted throughout this study.

CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
NOTE	
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 ----- SRI LANKA'S THREAT PERCEPTION AND RESPONSES SINCE INDEPENDENCE	13
CHAPTER 2 ----- SRI LANKA AND ITS ARMED FORCES (1948 TO 1971)	46
CHAPTER 3 ----- GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES SINCE 1972	64
CHAPTER 4 ----- SRI LANKA'S ARMS TRADE	91
CHAPTER 5 ----- ARMED FORCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY	110
CONCLUSION	137
APPENDICES	143
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	156

INTRODUCTION

One of the basic goals of any modern state is the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This can only be achieved through an optimum mix of defence, foreign, and domestic policies. Though they may seem to be independent of each other, in reality they are interlinked and inseparable. Each front influences the other and the balancing of all these factors is the state operation. However, the most predominant factor in the attainment of security needs of a state is its defence policy. And the defence/armed forces are the principal instruments to implement this policy.

The major role of armed forces is to defend its nation from any external aggression or internal troubles. Armed forces are trained and equipped in appropriate measure to perform this function. Inadequacy in any of the measure may cause serious problems in achieving the basic goal of defending the

nation as expected of them. However increasingly in most of the developing countries, armed forces are used by their respective governments to counter mainly the internal threats including the externally fostered internal ones. The use of armed forces is justified when local law and order situation go beyond the control of police force.

The strength and type of armed forces maintained by the modern states is primarily moulded by their threat perception. A threat perceived by a state, reflects in the structuring of its armed forces. Since the international security environment is highly unstable, rapid changes also accordingly occur in the threat perception of each and every state.

Any external threat to a country to a great extent is warded off by the use of its armed forces. Thus the armed forces play the important role in the safety and the security of the country. In most cases, the threat and role expected of armed forces is defined by the political leadership of a country. The armed forces perform any task assigned to them - whether it is to safeguard the country against an

external threat and/or to assist the civil authorities in putting down an internal threat.

At the same time armed forces also have an influence over the decision making process of the nation. Their views cannot be totally ignored by the political leadership of any country. There are many instances as to how the armed forces changed certain policy decisions in their favour by intense lobbying. There is a growing tendency amongst the armed forces of the developing countries to take up the governance of the state itself into their own hands. Under this situation there occurs an amalgamation of the political and military leadership into one, in which the latter tries to sustain their rule by legitimising it through some dubious means of conducting sham elections, or by enacting a new constitution etc.

This study will go into the threat perceptions of Sri Lanka, a small island state in South Asia. There we will see the resultant changes, accompanied on the armed forces both qualitative and quanti-

tative, and also as to how the intensification of the internal threats forced the armed forces acquire an important role in the state policies.

Sri Lanka is a developing country not endowed with rich mineral resources. Its economy is predominantly agro-based and the major foreign exchange earning comes through the export of estate produce and the tourism industry. Its size and resources makes it difficult to spend more on armed forces.

The British, the erstwhile colonial rulers, established military bases in Sri Lanka to protect their interests on the Indian Ocean, from their adversaries, including the USSR. The Sri Lankans continued to share the British perception even after independence and in addition perceived a threat from India too, due to its size and resources.¹ Also the interest shown by India for the Tamils of Indian origin living across the Palk Straits intensified its/suspicion towards India. But Sri Lanka is conscious that it cannot counter any such threat from

1. See Parliamentary Debates Hansard, (Government Publication Bureau) 1 December 1947, col.460 and also, 7 September 1954, cols.51-52.

India by having a formidable armed force due to the constraints of its economy arising out of its relatively small territory.

Similarly, Sri Lanka can do nothing but make or register a meak protest, in case of a Major Power or Super Power threat to its security. The external threats, however remote they are, have been dealt with, through the careful use of foreign policy and other diplomatic initiatives. All these factors reduce the role of armed force to that of a force, basically in charge of dealing with the internal threats.

Besides the external threats, Sri Lanka perceives more the internal threats to its security from certain quarters, like the Tamil militant groups and Sinhalese group like the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

Firstly there was the JVP led insurgency in 1971 which tried unsuccessfully to replace the then Government in power. The JVP was basically a Sinhala movement of unemployed or under employed educated

youth, who wanted to bring about a change in the Sri Lankan political system through armed insurrection.

The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil political party, spearheaded a movement for a separate Tamil State from 1976.² Later Sri Lanka saw the emergence of more and more Tamil militant groups with a common goal "Eelam", an independent Tamil nation.

The difference between the JVP, on the one hand and the Tamil organizations on the other, is that the JVP attempted at fundamental change within the then existing political and social order as a whole; whereas the Tamil organizations threaten the very integrity and unity of the State by asking for the creation of separate Tamil State.

Hence Sri Lanka has geared its armed forces to counter this threat. Whether Sri Lanka has succeeded in its attempt or not is a debatable question, which will be dealt with latter in the study.

2. P.Ramaswamy, New Delhi and Sri Lanka, (New Delhi, 1987), p.19.

To counter the internal threats, Sri Lanka has to equip its armed forces with necessary weapon systems. Since it does not produce any major or minor weapon system of its own, it had to purchase arms from leading arms manufacturing countries. This resulted in certain foreign policy shifts, which was warranted by the domestic security compulsions.

The question as to how the 'Arms Trade' played an important role in changing the foreign policy outlook of Sri Lanka will be studied later.

Internally, since 1972, a significant growth in armed forces has taken place. In 1971, the strength of the armed forces was about 10,000. Soon after the JVP led insurgency, the strength rose upto 16,000 in 1972. Thereafter the strength was almost static, with slight variations. For example in 1980, the armed forces strength was around 18,000³.

However, after the intensification of the Tamil ethnic conflict in 1983, the scene changed drastically. The strength of the armed forces which was

3. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980, (Washington D.C, 1982) p.67.

around 19,000 in 1983, shot upto 38,000 in 1986⁴ - a hundred percent increase in just three years.

The Navy and the Air Force, which were not suitably equipped or trained before, was also paid proper attention to play a decisive role in countering the Tamil militants.

Light patrol boats were acquired for the Navy from Western countries and China⁵. This helped the Navy a great deal in intercepting the supply of arms to the militants from outside.

Likewise the Air Force was equipped with Light Combat Aircrafts to help them to bomb and neutralize the militants' stronghold.

This work attempts to throw light on the growth of the Sri Lankan armed forces from 1948. This period is divided into^{to} two phases for the purpose of this study. Phase-I covers the period from 1948 to 1971 and phase-II from 1972 to 1987.

4. Ibid.

5. SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1975) p.41.

The main reason for studying the growth of the armed forces in two different phases is that, it enables us to understand clearly the growth pattern with relation to the threats perceived. The period before 1971 was not marked by any major violent uprising and hence, the strength of the armed forces remained almost static both in numbers and quality; but after the JVP threat there was a substantial increase in the strength of the armed forces. When the JVP threat fizzled out, the growth pattern showed a 'levelled-out'⁶ trend.

The intensification of the ethnic conflict from 1983 activated the growth process of Sri Lankan armed forces in a way which was not witnessed earlier. This explains the linkages between the threat perception and the growth of the armed forces in dealing with domestic unrest. In our study we have tried to highlight these linkages.

Besides the growth in armed forces the ethnic conflict also led to greater search for arms, for

6. This term means that the growth reached a point where it never went above or below that level significantly.

Sri Lanka and to depend upon different sources of arms supply. The purchase of weapon systems from countries like South Africa and Israel during the period of unrest shows a clear shift in Sri Lanka's foreign policy compared to its earlier positions. The linkages between the internal security compulsion and the foreign policy shifts has also been discussed at length in the study.

Moreover an indepth study of the type of weapon system used, the training procedure of the armed forces in Sri Lanka has been carried out.

The basic assumption in this study is that there is an increase in the numerical strength of the armed forces in Sri Lanka since 1971 and especially after 1983. Along with this, the type of weapons used and also the strategy and tactics employed by the Sri Lankan armed forces have undergone significant changes. The external forces were present only to the extent of aiding the military, but were not having a direct effect on the rise of Sri Lankan military.

The research work has been divided into the following Chapters :

- Chapter-I : Sri Lanka's Threat Perception and Responses since Independence.
- Chapter-II : Sri Lanka and its armed forces (1948 to 1971).
- Chapter-III : Growth of armed forces since 1972.
- Chapter-IV : Sri Lanka's Arms Trade.
- Chapter-V : Armed forces and the challenge of national security.
- Chapter-VI : Conclusion.

Sri Lanka's threat perception and its responses forms the first chapter of the work. In this chapter shifts in the threat perception of Sri Lanka and the measures it took to safeguard its interests have been highlighted.

The second and the third chapter gives a detailed account of Sri Lanka's armed forces from the year 1948 to 1971 and 1972 to 1987 respectively. Basic structural changes taking place in the armed forces have also been discussed. The fourth chapter

deals with Sri Lanka's arms trade, and effects of it, in terms of qualitative improvement in the combat efficiency of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Sources of supply and its relationship with foreign policy have also been discussed.

The fifth chapter, "Armed forces and the Challenge of National Security" discusses at length the role of foreign powers and the outcome of the operations they took to neutralize the internal threats.

The major findings of the study forms the conclusion. In this the relationship between the defence policy, the foreign policy and the domestic policy of Sri Lanka and the way in which one altered the other has been outlined.

METHODOLOGY:

The methodology followed in the study is historical, descriptive and analytical. It is mainly based on mainly on secondary sources available. An exhaustive search through various defence journals, Sri Lankan newspapers and journals has been carried out to get relevant information.

CHAPTER-I

SRI LANKA'S THREAT PERCEPTION AND RESPONSES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Sri Lanka is about 25,232 Square miles in area. It is 270 miles at its longest from north to south and 140 miles at its broadest from west to east.¹ It is a developing country not endowed with much mineral resources. Its economy is predominantly agro-based and major foreign exchange earnings comes through export of estate produce and the tourism industry. Its size and resources make it difficult to spend more resources on armed forces.

Before going into Sri Lanka's threat perception and responses, it is important to get a clear idea of some of the following questions which are pertinent to the issues in hand.

Firstly it is to be understood as to what is a threat perception? While answering this question, it has also to be found out as to what the threat perceived, threaten?

1. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-73, (London, 1974), p. 5.

Secondly who perceives a threat? This question leads to another related question that is, whether the people at large perceive the threat or the ruling elite perceive a threat?

The threat perception can be defined as an intuitive recognition of some event undesirable about to happen.

Firstly, the threat perceived may threaten sovereignty of the nation. This sort of threat generally comes in the form of external threats, where in an outside power may try to take over the control of the State, violate sovereignty, territorial integrity, or constrain independence of action of its citizens.

Secondly, it may attempt to alter the life-style of the population. The values and goals may undergo a change if life-style changes. At this juncture it should be noted that it is not the purpose of the study to judge what are good values and what are not for the Sri Lankan citizens. Every State has got its right to have any life style and basic-values so long it does not curtail the freedom of other States.

Lastly, the threat perceived may reduce the security of the ruling regime. This may be caused by any collusion of some groups acting against the wishes of majority of population, with or without external assistance. Under this category only the regime in power is threatened by actions like coup, insurgency, rebellion etc. However, it should be conceded that replacement of one type of regime by another, may affect life style and basic values of the population in the long run. To illustrate this point let us take the case of the United States. If the present democratic type of regime is replaced by a dictatorial type, it will in all probabilities, threaten the life-style and basic values of the people of USA.

Coming on to the second question as to who perceives the threat, the people or the regime, it should be noted that in most of the cases, it is the regime which perceives a threat. This perception of the regime is transformed into that of people's perception of threat through careful propagandist measures. But it should also be accepted that at times there may exist a convergence in threat perception of

people as well as the regimes. This condition may occur when certain values like democracy, equality and so on are threatened by an external factor that may bring the people and the regime together.

Every State tries its best to guard itself from any threat. It formulates its own security policy, also known as national security policy, weighing carefully its assets and liabilities. To put it in simple terms, national security means the various steps taken by a State/nation to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity from any threat.

Walter Lippmann defines national security on following lines : " A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war "². But it is also difficult to judge as to what are these legitimate interests of a nation and what are not? To Germany under Adolf Hitler, annexation of Poland was a legitimate interest but for other countries opposing the move, it was a naked-aggression against a sovereign State.

2. Walter Lippman, U.S Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic, (Boston, Mass., 1943), p.5.

Morton Berkowitz and Booke defines national security as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat.³ This definition assumes that threat to a nation's security emanates only from external source. If that would be the case how can one explain a threat to nation from political instability, coup, insurgency and other internal turmoils?

The Developmentalist perspective on national security was given by Robert Mc Namara. He defined that security as "not military hardware though it may include it, security is not military force though it may compass it, security is development and without development there is no security".⁴

A set of policy formulated and practiced by a nation to ensure its security is known as its security policy. "By security policy... set of decisions and actions taken by a Government (of a State) to

3. M. Berkowitz and Booke, "National Security", in David L.Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (London, 1968), vol.11, p.41-45.
4. Robert Mc Namara, The Essence of Security, (London, 1968), p.9.

preserve or create an internal or external order congenial to its interest and primarily (although not exclusively) through the threat or use of force".⁵ In the above definition as well as in Lippman's, we find that the interests of a state are emphasized. The interests of a state can be put in as its security aims. The security of one nation could be a security threat of another.⁶ When security aims of two or more countries collide there comes into play the threat or use of force as an instrument of state policy.

There are various measures that can be taken by a state to safeguard itself. Those measures may include re-structuring of armed forces, entering into military alliances, diplomatic manouvers and so on. If a state fails to cope up with the threat depending upon the type of threat it may finally end in dismemberment of the state.

Small states like Sri Lanka by their very nature

-
5. Edward A.Kolodzeij and Robert E.Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries, (Lexington, 1982), p.13.
6. Ibid, p.344.

are weak and vulnerable to major power threat. The size of their territory places a constraint on the development of their armed forces to counter any threat.⁷ They know that they are "weak and fragile and vulnerable and relatively powerless; that they live in a World where the weak are not rewarded for the beauty of their smallness".⁸

The security of the small states mainly rely upon major actors in the international political arena. Major power equations tend to influence the security of small states.⁹ Whenever a change occurs in that equation small states are invariably affected.

There are major constraints under which a small state operates. They generally lack resources to

-
7. See George Quester, "Defending the Micro-States", International Security, vol. 8, no .2, Fall, 1983, p.167.
 8. Shridath Ramphal, "Security of Small Sates : Small is beautiful but Vulnerable, Round Table, no .292, October 1984, p.372.
 9. This point of view is put forward by Olav F.Khudsen in his article "Of Lambs and Lions : Relations Between Great powers and their Smaller neighbours", Co-opeartion and Conflict, vol. 23, no . 3, 1988, p. 111-112.

"adequately train their own security forces, whether police, Para-military or Military".¹⁰ It follows that they will have to look for outside assistance for arms and training to boost their defence preparedness. Since most of small states are economically weak, with an exception of some oil-rich states, they are compelled to join alliances or certain other arrangements, which may be military in character. This may lead to the presence of foreign personnel stationed in that particular country.

As far as threat perception of Sri Lanka and its responses to those threats are concerned it is essential to understand that it is a small island state with poor economic potential. The internal socio-political fabric is also not of a cohesive one. This lack of cohesiveness among its ethnic groups has resulted in development of internal threat.

The threat perception of Sri Lanka has been classified into two categories for a methodical understanding. The first category deals with external

10. Jonathan Alford, "Security Dilemmas of Small States", Round table, no. 292, October 1984, p.379.


threats and second, internal threats.

The external threats can further be classified into two types. Type one deals with threats from super and/or major powers and other from its neighbours.

Sri Lanka does not perceive any direct threat to its security from any super and/or major power. What it perceives is an indirect threat to its security arising out of a global war resulting from cold war conditions.¹¹ It was one of the strong supporters for global disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also mooted the "Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" in the United Nations General Assembly in October, 1971.¹² Since it found it difficult in initial stages to maintain a strong professional armed force it took recourse to peace proposals proposed by a number of countries.

Sri Lanka's strategic location in the Indian

-
11. Wilson, n.1, p. 276.
 12. H.S.S. Nissanka, Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy : A Study in Non-Alignment, (New Delhi , 1984), p. 221.



Ocean has attracted the attention of many major powers. But it should be noted that, no super and/or major power has ever tried to threaten Sri Lanka's security by directly threatening to take their territory into their possession. They only tried to win confidence of the government in power to avail or enjoy certain facilities.

Sri Lanka perceives a threat from India, its neighbour. Fear of India stems from the presence of Indian Tamil Workers in the heart-land of Sri Lanka. They are sometimes equated to the Sudetan Germans of Czechoslovakia and on other occasions viewed as a potential 'Fifth Column'.¹³

The mere presence of India as a powerful neighbour, gives uncomfortable suspicion to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's suspicion is based on Indian action in Kashmir, Hyderabad, Goa and Bangladesh.¹⁴ Sir John Kotelawala had openly declared his suspicion about India. While addressing the Sri Lankan Parliament on the 7 September, 1954, he said :

13. Wilson, n.1, p.274.

14. Ibid, p.275.

"What I am worried about is that Mr. Pannikar has made several statements in one of his books that India must also heard that Mr. Pannikar is supposed to speak for Pandit Nehru. He is supposed to know Pandit Nehru's thoughts and has said that India, Ceylon and Burma must have a Monroe Doctrine, that India will be the father of the two children, Burma and Ceylon. We do not want fatherly advice nor their protection... We respect Pandit Nehru, we love him, we accept him as an honourable and honest man who wants to have peace in the World. But suppose he is no more - human beings must die - and if South India goes communist as it is going now, and invades us, can we defend ourselves with the 3,00,000 people we have to fight for us against these South India?"¹⁵

Kotelawala's speech highlighted his apprehension about the role of India in the sub-continent and at the same time his anti-communist attitude. He has openly declared his anti-communist attitude in "An Asian Prime Minister's Story" in which he writes "I am an uncompromising opponent of Communism. This I am not through some cussedness in me, but because I am convinced that communism is a wrong thing"¹⁶

15. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 7 September 1954, cols. 51-52.

16. John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister's Story, (London, 1956) P. 184.

Apart from India, Sri Lanka does not perceive any threat from any of its neighbours. May be the geographical distance between Sri Lanka and its other neighbours is one of the reasons for it. Also India factor, can be termed as one of the uniting factors between Sri Lanka and its neighbours (other than India), which has so far resulted in a friendly atmosphere.

The internal threats are the most important threat to Sri Lanka's security. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna tried unsuccessfully in April, 1971 to topple the Government in an insurgent attempt. The movement though subdued for a long time, has surfaced again, after the accord, with greater vigour and vengeance.

Externally fostered internal threats also comes under the category of internal threats. Sri Lanka puts the threat by Tamil Militants under the category of externally fostered internal threats. It points out the finger at India for all problems caused by the militants.

17

The President of Sri Lanka speaking at a Banquet hosted in honour of the British Prime Minister on 12 April, 1985 said :

" The terrorists say they are seeking to change the elected democratic Government of the whole of Sri Lanka and not only to create a separate state of Eelam. They say so publically in statements appearing in the Indian press, they are interviewed by journalists and move freely in Tamil Nadu and the rest of India, appearing on platforms with members of the TULF and other Indian leaders. At the same time they openly admit murdering citizens of Sri Lanka of all races, religions, castes and sexes.

What is the nature of the friendship that permits a human being or people to associate with criminals who openly admit murder of and plan to commit further crimes on, one's friends. I adopt a different attitude to my friends whether they be nations or individuals." 18

The increasing involvement of armed forces in civilian administration may pose a threat to Sri Lanka in long run. The unsuccessful coup attempt by some officers of the armed forces in 1962 is a clas-

18. S.P Senadhira (ed.), President J.R. Jayewardane on National and International Affairs, (Delhi, 1985), p.91.

19
 sic example, which indicates the trend. The President has even accused armed forces of Sri Lanka for
 20
 the riot in August, 1983 which indicates the lack of control even by the highest civilian authority on armed forces.

The JVP was formed sometime during the year 1966
 21
 by Rohana Wijeweera and Karunaratne. It attracted a considerable amount of following amongst educated but un-employed Sinhala youth. About 75 percent of its members belonged to age group of 18-20, 15 percent in the 20-25 age group and only 10 percent
 22
 were older than 25 years. About eighty percent of the insurgents were reasonably educated but, they re-

-
19. See Donald L. Horowitz's book on Coup Theories and Officer's Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative perspective, (Princeton, 1980), in which he has cited the misuse of armed forces as one of the grievances of coup respondents in page - 148.
20. Asia Week, 19 August 1983.
21. Swaroop Rani Dubey, One Day Revolution in Sri Lanka, (Jaipur, 1988), p - 55.
22. Urmila Phadnis, " Insurgency in Ceylon-Hard Challenge and Grim Warning," Economic and Political Weekly; vol.6, no.19, May 8 1971; P.967.

²³
 remained unemployed or under-employed. According to a leading Sri Lankan anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere, "they were products of mass free education (all of them were young persons born after independence). The schools they were attending were the recruiting grounds and leaders of the movement surreptitiously held lectures and discussions in these schools".²⁴ This was how the JVP was able to recruit more and more of students into their organization.

The competitive examinations which were held to select suitable candidates for various appointments became a virtual farce, after 1970 due to excessive political interference.²⁵ This state of affairs frustrated the educated youth and they looked forward for a change in the system. Wijeweera was able to exploit this ill feeling which prevailed amongst the youth, that resulted in the insurgency attempt.

23. Gananath Obeyesekere, "Some comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)", Journal of Asian Studies, vol.33, no.3, May 1974, p.378.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid, p.381.

The movement gathered momentum and it tried unsuccessfully in April 1971 to topple the Government in an insurgent attempt. The movement, though subdued for a longtime, has from 1987 started to pose a serious internal security threat to Sri Lanka.

Thus, by far JVP and Tamil militant groups are the most important factors which threaten Sri Lanka's security. It should be noted at this point that, the Tamil militant groups threaten unity and integrity of Sri Lanka whereas, JVP threatens the government and the political system in power.²⁶ The JVP, in the long run, may threaten Sri Lanka's unity and integrity with its policy of Sinhala domination. This policy in turn may encourage Tamil militants to intensify their struggle to breakway from the Sinhalese.

The violent movement by Tamil militants was the result of failure of the Sri Lankan government. The successive Sinhala majority regimes failed to fulfill some of the basic demands of the Tamils. The Tamils

26. Anton Muttukumar, The Military History of Ceylon: An outline, (New Delhi, 1987), p.192.

were represented in all the negotiations by the Tamil United Front (Later TULF)²⁷ but it failed to achieve their demands.

This forced radical young Tamil groups to take arms and to form themselves into a separatist guerrilla organization called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The first major killing was that of the Mayor of Jaffna on 27 July 1975. The Mayor who was a Tamil, was accused of collaborating with the Sinhalese in activities detrimental to the interests of Tamils.²⁸ On 5 May 1976, the TNT changed its name into Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Velu Pillai Pirabakaran assumed the leadership of the organization. Till about early 1983 there was some sort of an understanding between militants who were fighting against the Government. They committed bank

27. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) as it is known to-day was known as Tamil United Front (TUF) till the year 1976. The change in the name was warranted because of the shift in their political stand with the call for a separate Tamil State.

28. Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Tamil 'Tigers' in Northern Sri Lanka: Origin, Factions, Programmes", Internationales Asienforum, vol.17, no.1/2, 1986, p.66.

robberies to fund their Cause. With this money, supplemented by the expatriates' contribution, they were able to buy arms to engage the Sri Lankan armed force.²⁹ After early 1983, the group split into various organizations due to the expulsion of Uma Maheswaran, who was second-in-command of the LTTE from the organization and also, due to ideological differences. The five major militant organizations along with a short description of each group is given below:³⁰

(a) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) :

This group is led by Velupillai Pirabakaran, who hails from Vadamarachi. This group, well trained and well armed was highly successful in its operations against armed forces. Their links with the Palestine Liberation Organization did enhance their military tactics. Members of this group carry a cyanide capsule tied around their neck, with which they commit

29. Ibid, p.167.

30. Informations about militant groups were gathered in interviews with Senior Members of LTTE, EPRLF, PLOT and EROS.

suicide in case of capture by the Government forces. But the backbone of LTTE was broken during the "Operation Liberation" conducted by the Sri Lankan armed forces.

b) Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF):

The EPRLF is another active militant group particularly in the Eastern Provinces. It came into limelight in July, 1984 when it kidnapped an American couple Stanley and Mary Elizabeth Allen, who were working in Jaffna on a water project for USAID. Since then the group led by K.Pathmanabha had grown in its strength and capabilities. It has captured power in the Provincial Council elections held in 1988. It is branded as 'stooge of India' by LTTE due to its close co-operation in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

c) People's Liberation Organization of Thamilleelam (PLOT) :

Led by Uma Maheswaran, this group was the most active one organizing raids on armed forces till the later part of 1986. It had good connections with some

sources which helped it immensely to become operationally efficient. Due to some unknown factors it was alleged by members of this Organization, an Indian agency wrecked the Organization around 1987. It is also alleged that members of this Organization are currently engaged in smuggling of contrabands. Today it is more or less a defunct Organization.

d) Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO):

This Organization achieved prominence during the July 1983 riots when most of its leadership was massacred by fellow Sinhalese prisoners on their Tamil counterparts being held at Welikade prison. On the eve of it Sri Sabaratnam assumed the leadership and from then onwards major assaults on isolated government positions were conducted. Due to political differences, he was also killed by LTTE some time during May 1986, along with hundreds of other TELO members.

e) Eelam Revolutionay Organization (EROS):

Led by Balakumar, this group was quite popular among students. Started as a mere band of like-minded

radicals creating, favourable public opinions in various countries for their cause 'Eelam', initially stayed away from military operations. However it was also forced into the militant struggle over a period of time.

Apart from the five major Organisations discussed above there are 37 small groups which are not very active. Till 1987 the singular goal of all these Organizations was establishment of a Tamil State — 'Eelam'.

SRI LANKA'S RESPONSES TO THREATS

Here again, the responses to threats are classified into two parts. The first part contains responses to external threats and the second part deals with responses to internal and externally fostered internal threats.

RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL THREATS

As stated earlier Sri Lanka is a small island state without much of economic resources to develop. It had to depend upon foreign trade and assistance to

attain certain standard of development. Under these circumstances it is unviable for Sri Lanka to spend more for defending itself from any possible external intervention. This factor has to be clearly understood when the responses of Sri Lanka to external threats are analysed.

Sri Lanka has followed two approaches to the question of its responses to any external threat. One approach was that of Don Stephen Senanayake, which was stretched to its utmost limits by Sir John Kotelawala. This approach was a tilt towards Britain and United States with a defence agreement with the former. The other option pursued by the Bandaranaiques was "friendship and non-aggression pacts with the
31
neighbouring states.

Sri Lanka's security was safeguarded by the British before independence since it formed a part of the British Empire. However, after independence responsibility for the national security devolved on the Government of Sri Lanka. The armed forces of Sri

31. Wilson n.1, p. 274.

Lanka at that point of time was quite incapable of taking care of the country's security.³² The government also felt that it will take some time to develop the country's defence needs. Hence it was on the look out for some sort of a power which could provide Sri Lanka with a defence shield.

Sri Lanka chose Britain for providing the defence shield. Senanayake, who signed "Defence Agreement" with Britain on behalf of Sri Lanka was accused of being pro-British in the Sri Lankan Parliament.³³ He replied to a charge in the Parliament as to why Sri Lanka chose Britain for 'Defence Agreement' which is quoted below :

"We had not sat in the war Council for three years without learning the implications of Ceylons strategic position. We were also aware that it was or might be a position of danger to ourselves. We should be ready and anxious to give all assistance and all facilities that His majesty's Government might require provided that we were also given the control of our country..."

-
32. Refer to the statement made by Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Leader of the Senate, which appeared in Ceylon Daily News on 8 January 1952, which explains the armed forces inability to defend the State.
33. Haj Hulugalle, Sri Lanka's First Prime Minister Don Stephen Senanayake, (Colombo, 1975), p.202.

I went to the length of preparing the draft of such an agreement to govern the relations between Ceylon and the United Kingdom, particularly in the matters of defence and external affairs on lines which would be acceptable to the State Council. This method would, I suggested, assure the Government of Britain of a friendly people and a friendly Government, another dominion on the sea and air routes to Australia and New Zealand. It will assure the Government of naval and airbases that would dominate the Indian Ocean.

The only satisfactory arrangement would be one in which the Ceylon Government was collaborating with the Imperial Government.....it would be, in short, a defence alliance between the United Kingdom and the self governing Ceylon..."³⁴

These factors brought Sri Lanka and Britain together to sign the "Defence Agreement" on 11 November 1947. This agreement gave Britain the right to maintain its pre-independent situation in military spheres of Sri Lanka. The agreement contained five articles and according to the second, British got the right to run their military establishments as they had been run during colonial days.³⁵ This agreement was to take effect from the day Sri Lanka³⁶ became independent.

34. See Parliamentary Debates Hansard,
1 December 1947, col .460.

35. Nissanka, n.12, p.9.

36. The text of the Defence Agreement is reproduced in Appendix-I.

Thus Sri Lanka was able to safeguard its sovereignty from any external attack. At this juncture it should be analysed from which quarter Sri Lanka perceived a threat. Excepting for India, it can be said that, Sri Lanka never perceived threat from any other country. Of course, in case of a global war Sri Lanka might be attacked by countries, other than India.³⁷ But under normal circumstances Sri Lanka perceived a threat from India only. This was due to the presence of Tamils of Indian Origin and India's power potential.

When the regime changed in Sri Lanka after successive elections there was certain amount of change in its stand on "Defence Agreement". When the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) came to power, it tried to adopt a non-aligned stand from power blocs and to have a friendly relationship with the neighbouring countries. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike stated in the Parliament, " We have reversed that policy to the extent

37. Dr. Perera, a Member of the House of Representatives said " I do not think we need envisage the prospect of any Country invading us unless, of course, there is general World war". See Hansard, House of Representatives, vol . 29, no.1, 30 July 1957, p. 104.

that we do not wish to entrust our defences to any foreign country in that way." ³⁸ This was a major change in Sri Lanka's policy of aligning itself with a foreign power for its defence. The policy reversal statement outlined a policy of non-alignment in Sri Lanka's conduct in international affairs.

Maj.Gen. Anton Muttukumar, the first Sri Lankan Commander of the Army explains how Sri Lanka protects itself from external threats.

" Our [Sri Lanka's] defence shield against external aggression lies in the nature and character of our [Sri Lanka's] external relations which are so conducted as to be friendly with all nations and hostile to none. Prima facie therefore we [Sri Lankans] face no external threat. It follows that if our [Sri Lanka's] security is threatened, it will be for reasons beyond our [Sri Lanka's] control and for which we [Sri Lankans] would have no responsibility. In such an eventuality, it would not be unreasonable to expect other powers to come to Sri Lanka's assistance. Such a move would be the outcome, as much of friendliness to Sri Lanka, as hostility to our [Sri Lanka's] assailant." 39

38. Parliamentary Debates Hansard,
10 August 1956, col 198.

39. Maj.Gen.Anton Muttukumar, "View from the Strategic Island of Sri Lanka in Afro-Asian Ocean, of the strategy for peace and security in South-Asia," Strategic Studies, vol. 4, Winter & Spring 1982-83, no.2&3, p.120.

RESPONSES TO INTERNAL THREATS

Like any other developing country, Sri Lanka also faces serious internal security threats due to its fragile social structure.⁴⁰ With the intensification of ethnic conflict from 1983, the situation has worsened.

There was an abortive coup attempt carried out by the officers of the armed forces in 1962. The coup, attempted to topple the Government in power. The main factor behind the attempt was that 'the country was in a state of decline, threatened by unrest, irrationality, a loss of civility, and a danger of authoritarian rule; its leadership was in the hands of wrong people acting for wrong motives'.⁴¹

The response of the Government was quite predictable. The coup attempt convinced the politicians that they needed to become more closely involved with

40. There has been considerable amount of tension between the Sinhalese and the Tamils from historical times which has led to the formation of a fragile social structure.

41. Horowitz, n.19, p.149.

army personnel and organizational matters. Since then, both the SLFP and UNP regimes, which have alternated in office, have seen fit to tinker with the process of appointments of officers in key positions.⁴²

In 1966, the UNP regime obtained the resignation of the Inspector-General of Police and the Army Commander. Even special political scrutiny of personal background was undertaken in military recruitment.⁴³

The meddling in the affairs of armed forces by politicians resulted in the lowering of operational efficiency of the armed forces, as it was witnessed later. The politicians, at best, should have stopped with giving policy directives and should not have involved themselves with the day to day functioning of the armed forces. However the government was able to quell the coup in time.

The internal security of Sri Lanka was seriously

42. A highly placed army source who could not be identified, disclosed this information in a personal interview with the author. Hereafter referred as 'Army Source'.

43. Horowitz, n.19, p.213.

threatened in April 1971 by the JVP insurgents. They had planned to seize control of all important offices to paralyse the government and ultimately to remove it. The administration was not prepared for the contingency. Initially it was not able to control the movement. Whatever little force the government was able to mobilize was inadequate to deal with the exigency of the situation.

To prevent the insurgents from capturing the government, Sri Lanka appealed to all the friendly countries. Assistance came from India, Pakistan, China, Britain, the United States, the USSR and Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ The movement was quelled by the joint efforts of friendly countries.

Sri Lanka paid least attention to development of armed forces since its independence and was unable to control the threat on its own. It had to appeal to outside powers for military assistance. This clearly indicates inadequacies of a small state to control even an internal threat.

44. Muttukumaru, n.26, p.189.

After the insurgency attempt armed forces were paid proper attention and the strength of it rose significantly, which will be dealt with later. However even this build up of armed forces was proved insufficient when the country was threatened by a more serious threat in years to come.

The externally fostered internal threat to Sri Lanka, as it views the threat, by Tamil militants in recent years can be termed as the most serious threat it has faced in its independent history. The intensification of the ethnic struggle since 1983 has caused moments of anxiety for Sri Lanka. The country was threatened by Tamil militant groups, who even took control of certain parts of Sri Lanka for a considerable period.⁴⁵

Faced with such serious threat Sri Lanka was not in a position to react in a swift manner. It tried 'the carrot and the stick' policy in dealing with the Tamils but, it failed. The armed forces were ordered

45. For example, the LTTE claimed to have taken control of Jaffna Peninsula from the Sri Lankan Government as early as in 1986. This information was disclosed to the author by a senior LTTE leader in January 1987.

to eliminate the threat. But they were not armed and trained properly to fight with well-equipped militants.

The Sri Lankan Government started grooming armed forces with arms purchased from other countries. But even this proved insufficient against the militants. The armed forces were confined to their barracks by the militants and they had to resort to air operations.

In early 1987 the armed forces virtually, laid a siege of Jaffna Peninsula which led to acute shortage of essential commodities. This forced India, who so far played the role of a mediator in the conflict, to air-drop supplies. The beseiged Jaffna city population received the supplies air dropped by India on 4 June 1987.⁴⁶

Viewed from Sri Lankan perspective the Indian action was a clear violation of the sovereign airspace of Sri Lanka. But Sri Lanka was not able to confront the air-violation by force. It expressed

46. The Hindu, 5 June 1987.

it's concern in the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) meeting and also lodged a protest with the Secretary General of the United Nations.⁴⁷ In a hard hitting statement issued to the press, Premadasa, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka described it, " an immoral act possible only because Sri Lanka is a small and physically weak country and can be bullied by a bigger country such as India".⁴⁸

After a series of events Sri Lanka signed an accord⁴⁹ with India, the country which allegedly helped the militants and also, an 'aggressor' due to the air violation, on 29 July 1987. India actively got involved in peace-keeping operations. It assisted the Sri Lankan government in bringing about peace and normalcy in the North-Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

47. Daily News , 6 June 1987.

48. Daily News, 21 July 1987.

49. Text of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord is reproduced in Appendix- II.

The responses of Sri Lanka to the threat posed by militants are interesting to note. When the threat was at its early stages, it thought that it can contain the threat by the then existing armed forces. But, when the situation started worsening, it started buying arms from outside. Even this proved inadequate, hence foreign personnel were asked to train the armed forces in Sri Lanka. But when it became eminent that without India it can never neutralize the threat, it tactfully brought in India and was able to contain out the threat successfully.

Sri Lanka clearly understood real politik and never hesitated to ask for the assistance of India, though it was not interested in it in the initial stages. Flexibility, one of the characteristics of principles of war, can be cited as the most important factor in Sri Lanka's response to its threat. So far that has helped Sri Lanka to retain its unity and integrity.

CHAPTER - II

SRI LANKA AND ITS ARMED FORCES(1948 to 1971)

When the British decided to grant independence to Sri Lanka, preparations were made for the institution of an independent armed force in Sri Lanka. Even before independence, it should be observed, Sri Lanka entered into a 'Defence Agreement' with Britain on 11 November, 1947. This clearly indicates the pattern in which armed forces were to be developed.

When the growth of armed forces is analysed from the year 1948 to 1971, one can find a clear pattern arising out of it. It is the position of Army vis-a-vis Navy and Air Force. It can be observed that Navy was merely a service with practically no potential vessel or weapon system. It was more like a ceremonial force. This was so because under the defence agreement British Naval and Air presence was allowed to continue.

The same is also the case with air force. It

had in its fold a few hundreds of men¹. With the aircrafts at its disposal it was flying fortnightly charter flights to Maldives². The airmen were ordered to assist civil authorities, time and again.

The Army Act was passed by the House of Representatives in Sri Lanka on 10 October, 1949 which marked the building-up of armed forces of Sri Lanka in real sense³. It was followed by a flurry of activities to create basic conditions like building of additional installations, training centres and housing facilities.

The natives were not given important postings in armed forces by the British, as practised by them in all their colonies. This meant that there was not much of Sri Lankan Officers with adequate experience and knowledge to attend to the creation and building up of armed forces. Hence a British Senior Officer,

-
1. Exact figures are not available.
 2. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-73, (London, 1974), p.274.
 3. Anton Muttukumar, The Military History of Ceylon-An Outline, (New Delhi, 1987), p.148.

Brigadier the Earl of Caithness DSO was appointed by the Sri Lankan Government to head army ⁴.

The Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst was thrown open to Officer-Cadets from Sri Lanka ⁵. These Officers after their training, formed back-bone of the Officer corps of the Sri Lankan Army.

Recruiting centres for army were set-up in Colombo, Kandy, Galle, Jaffna, Kurunegala and Ratnapu-
ra ⁶. Proper attention was paid to family or community background of the recruits besides educational qualifications. These recruits were trained in Recruit Training Depot at Diyatalawa, which catered to the needs of the Regular Units which were created. ⁷

The Army had its Head Quarters at Colombo. This

4. Ibid., p.142.

5. Ibid., p.148.

6. Ibid., p.149.

7. Ibid.

was a static formation which contained officers to look after the day to day administration and planning of army.

Under the army Head Quarters came field formations, as well as some static formations, which was directed to safeguard the country from threats. The formations which were established after the independence with their functions are given below.

The Formations :

- (a) 1 Anti-Aircraft/Coast Artillery Regiment.
- (b) 1 Works Services Unit Ceylon Engineers.
- (c) 1 Sqn Ceylon Light Infantry.
- (d) 1 Bn Ceylon Light Infantry.
- (e) The Ceylon Army Medical Corps.
- (f) 1 Coy Ceylon Army Service Corps.

-
8. There are two types of formations in the army. One is the static and the other is the field formation. The static formation as the name implies, remains at a particular place and takes care of the administration of the Unit. For example the army Head Quarters is a static formation. On the other hand field formations are the one formed on the basis of requirements and they keep moving from place to place. Corps Hq, div Hq, Bde HQ comes under this category.
9. Muttukumar, n.3, p.151.

- (g) 1 Coy Ceylon Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps.
- (h) The Ceylon Army Police.
- (i) The Ceylon Army Recruit Training Depot.

Functions:

(a) This regiment was to provide protection to the shores and air-space of Sri Lanka from any attack from seas or from air-space.

(b) The main function of this Unit was to look after the constructional requirements of army. For example, housing facilities for various army establishments and roads were built by the men from this Unit.

(c) The Signal Unit looked after the communication network between various Units and to Army Head Quarters.

(d) The soldiers belonging to this units were trained in handling of light arms. They were assigned to fulfil holding-out operations, in case of a threat. This unit formed the back-bone of army.

(e) The physical fitness of troops was looked after by this unit. They also helped the Recruits Selection Centre in the medical examination of recruits.

(f) Commodities like food-grains, fuel and other essential items which are required by army was managed by this unit. They were also in-charge of the procurement of materials for the army.

(g) Problems arising from the electrical and mechanical systems of the machine used by the army, was sorted out by this unit.

(h) The Army Police was functioning as a police force within army set-up. Arrests of deserters, close working with the civil authorities in case of emergency were some of their major functions.

(i) This depot had the responsibility of selecting and training the recruits as required by army. They provided needed input, in terms of men, for the smooth functioning of army.

Apart from Regular Units under the command of

Army Head Quarters there were irregular units known¹⁰ as the "Ceylon Volunteer Force".

Under the Volunteer Force functioned the following :

- (a) 2 (v) Anti-Aircraft/Coast Artillery Regiment.
- (b) 2 (v) Ceylon Army Signal Corps.
- (c) 2 (v) Ceylon Army Engineer Corps.
- (d) 2 (v) Ceylon Army Light Infantry.
- (e) 2 (v) Ceylon Army Service Corps.
- (f) 2 (v) Ceylon Army Medical Corps.

The army arranged for vocational training for its members. This was felt necessary by the army for it served those members getting out of service to get a job in civilian spheres. Training was made available¹¹ in the following trades.

- (a) Engineer Cost Accounts Clerk
- (b) Time keepers
- (c) Engineer Stock Accounts Clerk
- (d) Storemen

10. Ibid.

11. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 17 May 1956, col. 487.

- (e) Engineer Ledger Clerk
- (f) Engineer Works Clerk
- (g) Carpenter
- (h) Mason
- (i) Blacksmith
- (j) Plumber
- (k) Tinsmith
- (l) Painter
- (m) Sign Writer
- (n) Wiremen
- (o) Engine Driver
- (p) Engine Fitter
- (q) Driving and Maintenance of Motor Vehicles
- (r) Vehicle Mechanics

The Unit Commanders were given a free-hand in training of their units. There was no centralized training centre. Of course, there was a broad guideline from the Head Quarters but, Commanders were entrusted with the actualities on the ground.

Though the British maintained naval and air presence in Sri Lanka it was paid for by the latter.

Sri Lanka spent about Rs. 3,871,886 for the maintenance of the Royal Ceylon Navy in the year 1950-51.¹² However, there was no clear-cut policy directive from the Government as to what is expected of it. This prompted a Member of Parliament to comment that the 'navy can fish',¹³ so that it may not remain idle.

In 1955 two units of the Ceylon Volunteer Force were created. One Unit was in Kandy and other was in Matara. These Units were formed out of the men from two outstation companies of the Ceylon Light Infantry stationed in Kandy, Galle and Matara.¹⁴ They were named as "Rajarata Rifles" and "Ruhunu Regiment".

In pursuance of a policy decided by the Government two other units were formed with personnel from departments carrying out essential services such as the Railways, the Post and Telegraphs, the Public Works and the ports operating organization.

12. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 4 August 1951, col. 1861.

13. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 2 August 1952, col. 1847.

14. Mutukumaru, n.3, p.163.

The necessity for the formation of above mentioned Units was felt when "Exercise Tyro" was conducted in 1954. This exercise was devoted to the movement of Battalion Group from the Diyatalawa area to contain a force which had landed in the Tissamaharama region and to the conduct of a withdrawal operation from Tissamaharama to Diyatalawa, by way of Wellawaya.¹⁵

During the exercise the need for close co-operation between armed forces and civil bodies were felt. Yet another factor for the formation of these Units was the trade union activities by members of the forestated essential services. The Government felt that the formation of the Units would ensure smooth functioning of services essential for the country, which might otherwise be interfered with, by irresponsible trade union action. However when the Government changed hands in 1956, the "Rajarata Rifles" and the "Ruhuna Regiment" were dissolved. In its place the "Singha Regiment" was formed by the Government.¹⁶

15. Ibid., p.162.

16. Ibid., p.166.

Now the Government argued that the formation of Units which were done on a regional basis would lead to undesirable results. The Government, obviously, had the Tamils of North Eastern provinces in its calculation and perceived that Tamils may ask for a regional unit.¹⁷

In 1958 Army Training Centre was established for training of officer-cadets. This Centre was set-up so as to minimise the number of officer-cadets going to Sandhurst for training course. Also, the vacancies at Sandhurst was restricted to a few seats, which did not serve the purpose for the Sri Lankan Army.

There was an expansion in the regular units of army in 1959. Factors for the expansion were not stated by the Government, though it can be assumed as a fall out of the ethnic tension in 1958. Some of the Units were upgraded into Regiments and officers of senior rank were posted as Commanding Officers.

17. Ibid.

The expanded regular Units are as follows.

- (a) Recce Regiment Ceylon Armoured Corps,
- (b) 1st Regiment Coast/Anti-Aircraft Artillery,
- (c) 3rd Regiment Field Artillery,
- (d) 1st Field Engineer Regiment,
- (e) 3rd Works Services Ceylon Engineers,
- (f) 1st Battalion Ceylon Light Infantry,
- (g) 1st Battalion Ceylon Sinha Regiment,
- (h) The Ceylon Army Medical Corps,
- (i) The Ceylon Army Service Corps,
- (j) The Ceylon Army Ordinance Corps,
- (k) The Ceylon Army Electrical and Mechanical Corps,
- (l) The Ceylon Army General Service Corps,
- (m) The Army Training Centre and
- (n) The Ceylon Army Police Corps.

Till 1959 the emphasis of training in army had been on Conventional warfare in open country. This was due to the fact that the British felt that in case of any emergency, troops could be used against their enemy, elsewhere in their Colonies. The Army realised the need to familiarize themselves with

guerrilla operations which might arise from the jungle conditions in Sri Lanka.¹⁹

Hence a directive was issued in 1959 that there would be an army exercise designed to ascertain the operational efficiency of troops in guerrilla warfare. The exercise was a success to the extent that troops had been introduced to problems of deployment in jungle, handling of guerrilla type operations and administration in jungles.²⁰

The excessive proportion of Roman Catholics in armed forces was a subject of serious debate in the Parliament. They were highly suspicious of loyalty factor of those officers. One Member of the Parliament said "It is no secret that the whole country is quite alarmed at the undue proportion of officers in the armed forces who happen to be Roman Catholics."²¹

Their apprehension was proved right following the coup attempt in 1962 by a majority of Roman

19. Ibid., p.175.

20. Ibid.

21. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 7 November 1960, col. 699.

22

Catholic officers. The Government took prompt action by arresting the conspirators. A text of the statement released by the Government on the coup attempt is quoted below :

"On the night of Saturday the 27th January (1962), the Government received reliable information that certain senior officers of the Police and armed forces had conspired to arrest some Ministers and other political leaders and overthrow the Government. The arrests were scheduled to be made shortly after midnight on Saturday.

On receipt of the information the Government took immediate action and plots of the conspirators were completely foiled. Several officers were questioned in this connection and the investigations made have revealed a carefully planned Coup d'etat". 23

Following the Coup attempt certain specific changes were made in the armed forces. The first was disbandment of two regular artillery units and utilization of loyal personnel from them for creation of a new artillery unit. The second was disbandment of the Volunteer Artillery Regiment. The third was disbandment of the plant Regiment of the Engineers and the

22. Ceylon Daily News, 31 January 1962.

23. Ceylon Daily News, 29 January 1962.

Volunteer squadron of the Signals. The following units were raised to compensate for the loss of manpower with the disbandment of three units.²⁴

- (a) One Volunteer Battalion of the Gemunu Regiment,
- (b) Two Volunteer Battalions of the National Guard and
- (c) One Regiment (Development and Construction) of the Engineers.

By the year 1970 army was relatively better organized compared to what existed during 1949. However this did not lead to any significant improvement in the Combat effectiveness, as it became evident in the following engagement in 1971.

The Navy when compared to army was in a stage of infancy. Not much is known about their formation or the line of functioning. It had about 32 vessels, almost all of them patrol boats with a displacement of less than 100 tons. Only two "River" class frigates and one "Algerine" class escort mine sweeper

24. Muttukumar, n.3, p. 184.

had a displacement of more than 1000 tons.²⁵

The Air Force, was helping the civil authorities and flying air taxis to Maldives. It did not have any aircraft which can be of use in combat. The assortment of aircrafts included DH Chipmunk T.21, Boulton paul Balliol and BAC Jet provost T.51 all of them from the United Kingdom.²⁶

Some Members of the Parliament requested time and again the Government to increase the strength of the air force, however it was always rejected. For instance, when a similar demand was made, Sir John Kotelawala, the then Prime Minister said, "I am thinking of reducing the Air Force as it is doing nothing practical. There is no value carrying an Air Force in this country....We are not going to expand it because I do not think any useful purpose will be served".²⁷

25. SIPRI, Arms Trade Register : The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm , 1975). p.41.

26. Ibid.

27. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 10 June 1955, col. 53.

Till about 1971, there was no proper attention paid to armed forces by the Governemnt. The need for a professional force was not at all appreciated. The debates that took place in the Parliament clearly indicate this fact. Often Members of the Parliament stated in the Parliament that there was 'no need for
28
armed forces'.

Defence spending was considered a non-productive expenditure. At times there was even demands from some quarters that "Army should work, Air Force should carry passengers and Navy can even join fishing boats to catch fish".
29
These sort of statements revealed the level of strategic thinking in Sri Lanka.

Due to all these factors armed forces did not experience any significant growth during this period. Accurate strength of armed forces could not be made because of lack of authentic data. The Government

28. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 5 August 1954, col. 674.

29. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 17 January 1956, col. 832.

time and again stated, when questioned on this topic, that "it has been the custom not to give the numbers of armed forces"³⁰. However, the strength of all the three services put together can be placed somewhere between 6,000 to 10,000 active combatants from 1949 to 1971 which is arrived after consulting other sources.³¹

This docile state of affairs in the armed forces underwent a radical change after 1971, which is dealt with in the next Chapter.

-
30. Quoted from the statement made in the House of the Representatives by Sir John Kotelawala on 5 August 1954. See Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 5 August 1954, col. 667.
31. The strength is put around 6,000 by Jeyeratnam Wilson. Refer Wilson, n.1, p.272. Whereas ACDA estimate the strength around 10,000 in 1970. Refer ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979, (Washington D.C, 1982), p.77.

CHAPTER - III

GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES SINCE 1972

The strength of armed forces underwent a radical change in Sri Lanka after the unsuccessful insurgency attempt in 1971. Compared to the earlier period, (1948-1971), the period between 1972 to 1987 witnessed rapid increase of armed forces in certain time intervals.

The rise in strength of armed forces can be categorized into two parts. The first part includes the period from 1972 to 1983, and the second part includes the period from 1984 to 1987.

In the first part its strength was almost static with minor variation^{of} two thousand more. But in the second part (1984 - 1987) the changes have been quite drastic, and it went up quite phenomenally.

In the aftermath of insurgency attempt of 1971-72, strength of armed forces rose from 10,000 to 16,000 men.¹ The circumstances explain themselves for

1. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers : 1970-79, (Washington DC ,1982) p.77.

the sudden spurt of growth in the size of armed forces.

The inability of armed forces to deal with internal threat of a considerable magnitude forced the government to look for outside assistance. About 92 police stations were attacked leaving a casualty of 37 policemen along with 26 army personnel during 1971 crisis.²

This casualty figure as well as the attacks on the police stations indicate the inadequacy of armed forces to neutralize the insurgents. It exposed the inability of armed forces to deal with the challenge. This led the Government to have a review of its policy on armed forces which resulted in restructuring of the army.³

In the year 1972-73 strength of army alone was estimated around 8,500 men. The army was divided

2. See Swaroop Rani Dubey, One Day Revolution in Sri Lanka (Jaipur, 1988), p.136, and also G.Jacobs, "Israelis to help Sri Lankans in Anti-terrorist Campaign", James Defence Weekly, vol . 2, no.4, 28 July 1984, P.107.

3. Army source.

into two Brigades(Bde) each consisting of 3 Battalions (Bns). Their armoury included 6 Saladin Armoured cars and 12 Ferret Scout cars, apart from small and light arms. It also had a reserve force of about 12,000 men.⁴

The Navy had about 2,300 men in its ranks. It did not have any vessel of high calibre, but it had one Frigate, twenty seven small patrol crafts and one Hydrofoil.⁵

The Air Force was estimated to be the smallest of the three services. It had 1,700 men on roll. Its armoury included five combat aircrafts (MiG-17), one MiG-15 trainer and six Jet provost, seven Bell 206, six Bell 6-47 and two KA-26 helicopters.⁶

There was no significant increase in the size of armed forces in the following year 1973-74.

4. IISS, Military Balance 1972-73, (London, 1973), p.54.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Only two small patrol crafts were added to the naval strength. The rest of the services remained the same.⁷

This state of affairs indicates one significant point. There should be a gradual expansion in armed forces and not a tremendous push once in five years as it happened in the case of Sri Lanka. This phenomenon is also prevalent in most of the developing countries.

The Army was organized in a much better way in 1974-75. Departing from the age-old practise followed by Sri Lanka that of dividing the army, into Brigades and Battalion, without any specific duty or role, it started to infuse operational aspect into the division of the army.

The strength of the army rose from 8,500 in 1972-73 to 8,900 in 1974-75. It was structured along the following divisions : 2 Bdes - Each with 3 Bns.

1 Recce Regiment (Regt).

1 Artillery Regt.

7. IISS, Military Balance 1973-74, (London, 1974) p.54.

The Army had in its possession six Saladin Armoured cars, twelve Ferret Scout car, ten BTR 152 Armoured Personnel Car(APC). The artillery was updated with 76mm Howitzer, 25 pounder Mortors and 105 mm Guns.⁸

The strength of navy also went up and it stood around 2,400 men as against 2,300 men in the year 1972-73. It had one Frigate, five Shanghai class Fast Gun Boats and twenty one small patrol crafts.⁹

The air force was not lagging behind in growth compared to army and navy. About 2,300 men were there in the airforce. It also had 12 combat aircrafts and other aircrafts listed below:

- 1 Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) Squadron(SQN) with 5 MiG-17, 1 MiG-25 UTI & 6 Jet Provost MK 51.
- 1 Transport (TPT) Sqn with 2 Riley, 2 Heron, 2 Dove 1 CV-440.
- 1 Helicopter (HEL) Sqn with 7 Jet Ranger, 2 KA-26 6 Bell 47-G, 2 Gunships.

The reserve strength of air force was about 1,100 men divided into 4 Sqns Air Force Regt and 1

8. IISS, Military Balance 1974-75, (London, 1975) p.54.

9. Ibid.

Sqn Air Force Construction Regiment.

The same strength was maintained in armed forces with slight variation till the year 1978-79. In that particular year armed forces strength went down instead of going up further. This was quite surprising to note in the context of widespread disturbances created by the Tamil militants in 1977-78.

Though there was no change in strength and formations of army and to a certain extent in navy, air force was pruned to a greater extent.

The Air Force had only 2,300 and twelve Combat aircrafts in 1978-79. The squadron wise break-up of air force was as follows:

- 1 FGA Sqn with - 4 MiG-17, 1 MiG-15 UTI, 3 Jet Provost MK 51.
- 1 TPT Sqn with - 1 CV 440, 2 DC-3, 2 Riley, 1 HS Heron.
- 1 Communications (Comm) Sqn with - 3 Cessna 337.
- 1 Hel Sqn with - 7 AB-206, 6 BELL 47G, 2 SA 365, Dauphin 2, 4 Cessna 150, 7 Chipmunk, 5 Dove Trainers.

10. Ibid.

The reserve force of air force was also¹¹ reduced from 1,100 in 1974-75 to 1,000 in 1978-79.

When the Squadron wise break-up of air force in the year 1978-79 is compared to the one that existed in 1974-75, it can be seen that air force had a setback in the FGA Sqn. There were five MiG-17s in 1974-75, but no attempt was made by the Government to atleast bring back the same strength when one MiG-17¹² went out of service.

Similarly strength of the Jet Provost MK-51 went down to three aircrafts from six, when three aircrafts were condemned. The Government never took any interest in maintaining a proper force level which proved costly in later years.

The men behind the machines form the most important factor of any armed force. The input into armed force has to be of good standard. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, over the years selection into armed

11. IISS, Military Balance 1978-79, (London ,1979) p.67.

12. Ibid.

forces were based on factors other than efficiency. Thousands of unemployed youth joined armed force, with educational qualification of dubious standard.

Their only qualification was the chits from Members of Parliament ordering the Recruitment Officer to enroll them into the force.¹³ This led to lowering of soldiering standards. The successive regimes tried to infiltrate the armed forces with their loyal members, similarly.

Instead of being a non-political force it soon became a highly politicized and ineffective one. Whenever armed forces were directed to put down a threat they were not able to do so partly due to this factor.

The Government realised this problem. It decided to constitute a board to handle recruitment. The appointments into armed forces were preceded by a security check made by the CID to ascertain as to the characters of persons chosen for jobs and whether

13. Mervyn de Silva, "Things Fall Apart...But some into Place", Lanka Guardian; vol . 10, no .17, 1 January 1988; p.5.

they were involved in any criminal or subversive activity.¹⁴

The militant's subversive activities in 1977-78 were viewed seriously by the government. It decided to train armed services in Guerrilla warfare, which was considered essential to combat terrorism.¹⁵ Earlier the troops were trained in conventional warfare and emphasis was laid on infantry to a large extent.¹⁶

But these measures by the government were not very successful when the events which took place in later years are analysed. When subversive activities of the Tamil militants went on a low ebb, all these factors, once considered very important by the government, were lost sight of.

The strength of armed forces did not undergo any significant change from 1978-79 to 1982-83. There

14. Ceylon Daily News, 9 September 1977.

15. Ceylon Daily News, 21 September 1977.

16. Army source.

was a marginal increase in the strength of troops and by 1982-83 there was a marked emphasis on "Functional Formations". This aspect can be understood easily when the formations, that existed in 1982-83, is compared to the ones in 1978-79.

The "Functional Formations" of army in 1982-83 was, as follows:

5 Infantry Bdes - Each with 1 regular + 2 reserve Bns.	
2 Armoured Recce Regts.) Each with
1 Field Artillery, 1 Anti-Aircraft(AA) Regt.) one regular and one
1 Engineer Regt.) reserve Unit.
1 Signal Bn.)

The new additions into army formations were Engineer Regt, AA Regt and Signals Bn. Though these elements were present in army for a longtime, it was not categorized into a separate group in the earlier period.

The army's inventory also make an interesting study. It had eighteen Saladin Armoured cars; fifteen Ferret Scout cars; ten BTR-152 APC; fourteen

17. IISS, Military Balance 1982-83, (London, 1983) p.93.

76mm and twelve 85mm guns; twelve 82mm and eight 107mm mortars; twenty four 40mm and twenty four 94mm
18
AA guns.

Mortars and AA guns were new additions in the weapon inventory of army in the year 1982-83. Mortor shells when fired travels in a parabolic trajectory and hits the target. This weapon system is very useful in mountain warfare but not so when the fighting is done over a plain or in a jungle.

As the name indicates AA-Guns are used as a last resort to destroy the intruding enemy aircraft. This weapon system is deployed around vital targets to protect it from being hit by the enemy aircraft.

It is very strange to note that the Sri Lankan army possessed these weapon system with obviously no definite use in the conventional sense. It can be used only when it is modified to perform a different role. The AA Guns can be mounted on an aircraft to supplement other guns on board for neutralizing and strafing targets.

18. Ibid.

The Navy was paid more attention by the government in the year 1982-83, to make it more effective in preventing any illegal traffic across the Palk Straits. Its strength stood around 2,960 men in 1983-84, with seven Sooraya (Ch-Shnghai-II), one SOV Mol Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and thirty one Coastal Patrol Crafts (CPC). They operated from Trincomalee, Karainagar, Colombo, Tangalla and Kalpitiya.

The threat posed by the Tamil militants was considered a grave threat to the national security of Sri Lanka. There was a rethinking on the mechanisms of Higher Defence Organization (HDO). Till 1983, the HDO was headed by the President under whom the Defence Ministry and the respective Head Quarters of army, navy and air force functioned. The Para-military forces functioned under the Department of Law Enforcement, Public order and State Security. This department mainly dealt with internal security and law enforcement problems.

19. Ibid.

20. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Government Publication Bureau), 28 November 1973.

The formation of National Security Ministry in 1983 helped the Government to effectively coordinate the activities of armed forces and para-military forces. The Minister of National Security was made responsible for the security of the country from external and internal threats. The National Security Minister was given Cabinet Minister status and a Minister of State of Defence was also appointed. There are areas in which both the ministries operated jointly.²¹

Attacks on Government installations and armed forces were on the rise and this led the Government to take new measures. The first measure was the re-organization of military Commands into four districts, known as "Task Forces". Numbered 1-4, located in the northern districts with head quarters at Anuradhapura; each zone contained 2 Volunteer Force Infantry battalions and 1 Regular Force battalion,²² plus assorted supporting arms unit, as required.

21. Clear-cut demarcation of authority between the two ministries were not available to the author from any authentic source.

22. Jacobs, n.2, p.107.

The second measure was the formation of Counter Insurgency (COIN) Force. It took over security duties from regular army sometime during late 1984, in provincial areas where Tamil militants were active.²³ This unit was to function under the overall command of "Task force", which was trained by foreign personnel, which included Israeli Mossad and former members of the British Special Air Services (SAS) Regiment.²⁴ Reliable sources revealed to the author that all the foreign assistances were paid for in terms of money by the Sri Lankan government.²⁵ But it is not quite clear whether Sri Lanka actually paid for the assistance rendered on government to government basis.

The involvement of Mossad in training the COIN force had evoked considerable interest amongst the observers on Sri Lanka. The Israeli agency is very famous for its ruthless efficiency and that might have been the primary factor responsible for

23. Janes Defence Weekly, 27 October 1984.

24. Ibid, and also Jerusalem Post, 26 June 1984.

25. Army source.

seeking its assistance. However, Mossad's operation in Sri Lanka and the subsequent opening of the Israeli Interest Section in the United States Embassy had raised some doubts as to whether or not the Israeli agency operated on behalf of the United States on which the Sri Lankan President banked heavily to control the militants.

26

With the conflict between armed forces and Tamil militants reaching new heights, the government went all out to strengthen armed forces to counter the threat in 1986.

The total armed forces strength stood around 37,660 including reserve force. The regular force alone was 21,560. The increase in strength is phenomenal when the strength that existed in 1970 is compared. There is almost three fold increase in the strength.

27

The following year (1987) saw an even more

26. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Sri Lanka and Israel Connection", Lanka Gaurdian, vol.11, no.2,15 May 1988, p.10.

27. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87, (London, 1987) p. 168.

alarming increase in the strength. The total armed forces strength was around 48,000 out of which 40,000 belonged to army. Details of armed forces break-up along with type of weapon used is as follows:

ARMY

Strength - 40,000 (including Active Reserves)
 5 Task Forces (infantry Bdes: with 5 regular & 6 Reserve Bns)
 2 Recce Regt (Bns) (1 Reserve)
 2 Field Artillery (including 1 Reserve)
 1 AA Regt.
 1 Field Engineer, 1 Engineer plant Regt.
 1 Signals Bn.

Support services : Logistics Units.

Equipment : Armoured Fighting Vehicle :
 Recce : 45 : 18 Saladin, 15 Ferret, 12 Damiler Dingo.
 APC : 160 : 10 BTR-152, 6 Samil 100, 144 other.
 Arty : Guns : 76mm : 16 yug m-48;
 85mm : 30 type-56;
 Mortors : 82mm:
 107mm : 12
 120mm : 12 (Reported).
 Anti-Tank (ATK) : Rocket Launchers (RCL) :
 82mm : M-60; 106mm: M-40.
 Air-Defence (AD): Guns: 40mm :24 L-60;
 94mm :24 3.7 in.

NAVY:

Strength - 4,000 (including Active Reserve).

Bases - Trincomalee (HQ), Karainagar, Colombo, Tangalla Kalpitiya.

28. IISS, Military Balance 1987-88, (London, 1987), p.171.

Command - 8 : 3 amphibious,
5 ex-cargo Ships.

Patrol Craft Large : 2 Jayesagara 40-m;

Costal patrol craft: 38 : 11 Paradeepa 40 ton,
06 Dabur class 35 ton,
10 Cougar Marine CAT-900 32ft.
02 Light 36 ton,
05 Cheverton 36 ton,
04 21 tons.

Harbour craft : 4 Thorny craft 13 ton.

Fast Attack Craft : 12 : 6 Israeli 'Super Dvora'
6 Sooraya (Ch Shanghai-II)

Amphibious crafts : 02 Vosper 33 ton.

AIR FORCE :

Strength - 3,700 (including Active Reserve).
Combat aircrafts 6, Armed Helicopters 23,
COIN : 6 SF-260 TP.

TPT : 1 Sqn : HS -748, 2 C-47 (DC)
2 Riley Heron, 1 DH Heron
3 Cessna 337, 1 King Air 2000,
1 Cessna 421 C.

Hel : 1 Sqn : 24 Bell (12 206, 9 212 Attack, 4 412
Armoured)

Training : Including 6 Cessna 150/152,
8 DH (5 Chipmunk, 3 Dove).

The men and officers of armed forces were trained in Sri Lanka for assuming various responsibilities in armed forces. In some cases officers were

sent to India, Pakistan, Britain and the United States for higher military education.

In total analysis, it can be seen that armed forces grew in strength, in a steady pace and at times by leaps and bounds, in response to the growing dimensions of threat.

Likewise armed forces started using more and more sophisticated weapons, when Tamil militants started using RPG-7²⁹RL and SA-7 surface-to-air-missiles. It has been an 'action- reaction' syndrome between armed forces and opposing force.

EXPENDITURE ON ARMED FORCES

The expenditure on armed forces were also on the increase in tune with threat. From about \$8 million in 1970 it went upto \$14 million in 1977.³⁰ With the outburst of Tamil militants activities from 1983-84, the expenditure shot-up to about \$73 mil-

29. Ibid.

30. ACDA, n.1, p.77.

lion.³¹ Sri Lanka was looking out for loan from
 outside sources to enable it to spend more on armed
 forces. But it did not succeed in its attempts.³²
 This state of affair, forced the Minister of National
 Security to declare that the Government would utilize
 the funds meant for development activities on armed
 forces, to fight the militants.³³ The Government was
 able to secure the assistance of some foreign agen-
 cies to train its troops. However, the Government had
 to pay for these assistances which was probably done
 by diverting funds meant for development activi-
 ties.³⁴

PARA-MILITARY FORCES

Para-military forces hold a vital place in Sri
 Lanka's defence set-up. It has helped the government
 to put down internal security threats to a limited
 extent. The police force was used during the JVP led

31. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington DC, 1985), p.81.

32. Army source.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

insurgency in 1971.³⁵ "In isolated areas away from any assistance, they stood the brunt of the insurgent attack".³⁶ The police force was highly commended by the government in the handling of such threats.

When the Tamil militants launched an all out offensive against the Sri Lankan government, it was again the police force which helped the authorities to neutralize the threat to a considerable extent. Well trained policemen formed a part of Special Task Force (STF) [?] ~~{ also known as the "Black Cats" }~~ in Sri Lanka.³⁷ This elite group was armed with Colt M 16 A2 rifles and trained by instructors from Keeny Meeny Services (KMS).³⁸ It earned a reputation for ruthless efficiency.³⁹

35. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 30 November 1971, col.186.

36. Quoted from the speech made by M.D.S. Jeyawardena in the Sri Lankan Parliament on 30 November 1971. Refer Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 30 November 1971, col.186.

37. Army source.

38. Rohan Gunasekara, "Sri Lankan Armed Forces Switch Focus", International Defence Review, vol.21, no.5, May 1988, p.512.

39. Ibid.

STRENGTH

The police force has grown from 8,400 men in 1971⁴⁰ to 21,000 men in 1987.⁴¹ The growth factor largely depended upon internal threat to Sri Lanka. After the insurgency attempt in 1971, the government raised the strength of police force drastically. When some Opposition Members of Parliament criticised the government for sudden increase, Mrs. Bandaranaike, the then Prime Minister stated:


"During the insurgency We discovered that We did not have sufficient personnel either in the police or in the armed services to deal with a situation of that type which came on us unexpectedly. We had to ask them to close down some of the police stations to save their lives because they did not have sufficient weaponry either. Therefore, we decided to increase the strength of the three services and the police. The strength of police was increased from about 9,000 to 16,000. In the armed services too we increased the strength considerably, in order to deal with any situation like the one that arose to be ready in 1971 if it does arise. Therefore we have to be ready ."42

40. Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 30 November 1971, col.186.

41. IISS, n.22, p.171.

42. Quoted from the statement made by Mrs. Bandaranaike in the Parliament on 24 November 1976. Refer Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 24 November 1976, col.410.

RISE OF POLICE FORCE FROM 1972 TO 1987



Source : Military Balance.

The large scale recruitment drive which followed immediately after the insurgency resulted in sub-standard input into the police force. The Deputy Minister of Defence, accepted that there was a decline in the standards of police efficiency:

"I attribute it mainly to the Emergency regulations under which we lived for so many years. The wide powers under those laws, the cessation of democratic principles, political patronage, and the unchecked and unbridled power of the uniform turned the heads of ordinary police officers and made them instruments of abuse of power and misrule. They became a law unto themselves. They lost the sense of right and wrong. When you loose your sense of justice and fairplay you cease to be a good police officer and become a menace to society and the state. This is what happened to the police service."⁴³

DUTIES OF POLICE MEN

Section 56 of the Police Ordinance defines the duty of police men in Sri Lanka as follows:

- (a) to use his endeavours and ability to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisance,
- (b) to preserve the peace,

43. Quoted from the speech made by T.B.Werapitiya, Deputy Minister of defence in the Parliament on 6 december 1977. Refer Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 6 December 1977, cols.312-13.

- (c) to apprehend disorderly and suspicious characters,
- (d) to detect and bring offenders to justice,
- (e) to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace ; and
- (f) promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued and directed to him by competent authority.⁴⁴

CRITICISMS AGAINST POLICE FORCE

There were lots of criticisms levelled against police force by many people including Members of Parliament. It ran on the following lines:

"Bad recruitment, inadequate training, dilapidated police buildings, poor accommodation for married and bachelor officers, poor salaries, lack of furniture and equipment, lack of vehicles and fuel, addiction to liquor by certain police officers, corruption, lack of dialogue between higher and subordinate ranks, lack of welfare facilities, lack of discipline and supervision, poor public relations, contemptuous attitude towards the public^{by} police." ⁴⁵

The government was accused by Members of

44. See Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 28 November 1973, cols. 369-70.

45. Quoted from the charges summed up by the Deputy Minister of Defence while replying to the queries raised by members of Parliament. See Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 6 December 1977, col . 313.

Parliament from Tamil provinces for not recruiting adequate Tamil speaking people into the police force.⁴⁶ There was hardly 500 Tamils in police out of a total strength of 27,000.⁴⁷ This according to them, led to a lack of confidence in police by Tamils. But there seems to be no discrimination made against Tamils while recruitment was done for police.⁴⁸ The Tamils generally preferred 'white collar' jobs which may explain the reasons for such low representation of Tamils in police force.⁴⁹

EXPENDITURE ON POLICE FORCE

As the strength increased, with growing dimensions of internal threat, the expenditure incurred on police force also increased. The budget allocation for police force in the year 1973-74 was Rs.100,016,000.⁵⁰ This fund allocation amounts twice the allocation made for navy and air force put-

46. See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 15 December 1972, col.281.

47. Puthiya Kannotam, 14 May 1989.

48. Army source.

49. Ibid.

50. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 28 December 1973, col. 603.

together during the same period.⁵¹ This indicates the predominant position bestowed upon police by the government.

In the year 1980-81, the Sri Lankan government spent Rs.394,080,996.81 on police force.⁵² During the same period Rs.141,059,733.27⁵³ was spent on navy and air force. This amounts to about fifty per cent of the amount spent on police force. Thus, in the final analysis, it can be taken that police force was considered more important than navy and air force by the Sri Lankan government. It may^{be} due_A to the nature of threat perceived by the government.

The functions performed by para-military forces and armed forces are almost similar in Sri Lanka. Whenever there was any large scale riot, armed forces were pressed into service. Moreover, Sri Lanka's armed forces are mainly organized for

51. Ibid.


52. State Accounts of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the financial Year, 1981, (Colombo, 1983), pp.136-37.

53. Ibid.

purposes of domestic peace-keeping.

However, para-military forces cannot be grouped together with armed forces in the same category as the two are technically different. The rise in strength of para-military forces, might have helped armed forces in performing their functions.

On reaching an accord with India regarding the Tamil issue, things have started to change. But this cannot be construed as an end to all the threats Sri Lanka faced. As per the present indications, there are no likelihood of Sri Lanka reducing the strength of armed forces drastically, as it perceives a threat from southern part of Sri Lanka.



-
54. A.Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-73, (London, 1974), p.272.
55. A table is appended at the end of the text which gives further statistics on armed forces.

CHAPTER IV
SRI LANKA'S ARMS TRADE

Arms are an integral part of armed forces. The men in uniform cannot think of fighting a war without the help of adequate arms. Better the standard of arms, higher the rate of success. This seems to be the dictum followed in modern wars.

The rapid progress of science and technology has made changes in every sphere of life. This phenomenon is even more applicable in military sphere. The two World Wars brought in tremendous change in the art of warfare, which till that time was subjected to very limited changes, and revolutionized the whole concept. Any new weapon system introduced into a scene, becomes obsolete within a short period because of development of counter measures to that particular weapon system. This starts an unending qualitative arms race which goes on a vicious cycle.

To design and produce any new weapon system certain factors are essential, viz. the level of science and technology, industrial infrastructure and

resources and above all the political will to produce are some of the important factors in arms production.

Not every country can stand upto the rigours of indigenous weapon production. Those countries which are not in a position to go in for indigenous production adopt a measure known as manufacturing under license with a bare minimum infrastructure. Thus the designs are bought from the original producer and manufactured by the recipient country.

There are some countries which cannot also afford to manufacture arms under license due to various constraints. These countries are left with two options to safeguard themselves against threat of any aggressor.

The first option is that these countries can have security alliance with any strong power. Under this arrangement the arms requirements are mostly met by the senior partner. This has been practiced by a large number of countries to avoid excessive spending on military, which in their perspective is not feasible. But the main drawback in this option is the

chance of the country getting entangled in a war, when it's protector is attacked. Also this option may seem to infringe upon the sovereignty of a country.

The second option is the outright purchase of weapon systems or popularly known as the 'Arms Trade'. It is not an alternate to the first option and at times both the options may be utilized. If a country has got the resource for buying a particular weapon system it can be bought from the producer in most of the cases. The arms trade, also takes place amongst the security allies as well.

The arms trade is carried out between the developed countries and the developing countries in majority of the cases. There are many developing countries like, China, Brazil and Argentina, producing arms for export, as a major foreign exchange earner.

In the case of Sri Lanka it has carried out a combination of the two options. Immediately after its independence, it followed the first option namely, security alliance and later due to some con-

straints it shifted to the second option.

When the British left Sri Lanka they did leave a considerable amount of arms and ammunition. But by no stretch of imagination it can be classified into weapons of considerable firepower. Whatever weapon system the British found unimportant were handed over to the Sri Lankans. There is no reliable information on how much of weapon systems the Sri Lankans came to inherit by this process.

Whenever a decision is made to produce or buy a weapon system, it is backed by a proper analysis of the need for that system. In the initial stages there was not much of a threat to Sri Lanka. Hence the low key activity in arms trade. Also its size and resources were some of the constraints for any major spending on arms acquisition.

MAJOR TRENDS

Sri Lanka acquired twenty one aircrafts from Britain in 1953. It included nine Boulton Paul Bal-

liols and twelve DH Chipmunk T. 21.¹ These aircrafts were used for traffic within the country and also for maritime reconnaissance.

About five naval vessels were acquired in 1955 from two countries Britain and Italy. Britain sold one Ford Class Seaward defence boat, with a displacement capacity of 120 tons. Italy sold four "Seruwa" Class small Patrol Boats, estimated to be about \$ 40,000 to Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka also bought four aircrafts from Britain for its air force. It comprised of two Westland Dragonfly and two Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer CCMK2 aircrafts. The new acquisitions no doubt, helped Sri Lanka to carry out reconnaissance activities on its territorial waters to check illegal operations.

Though the strength of armed forces were static, the year 1959 proved to be quite eventful for them. It added a good amount of new weapon systems in its

1. Facts and figures of this Chapter regarding arms trade are quoted from SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, (Stockholm, 1975), unless footnoted otherwise.

inventory. There is no reliable information available on rationale behind the sudden spurt in arms trade when there was no major crisis. The decision might have been an adhoc one with no particular reason attached. Twelve BAC Jet Protost T. 51 and four DH Heron aircrafts were purchased from Britain for the airforce. The navy received one "Algerine" Class Escort Minesweeper, with a displacement capacity of 1040 tons, from British and two "River" Class Frigate from Israel.

Smuggling activities in Sri Lankan territorial waters created too much of a problem and hence, Sri Lanka decided to increase its navy patrolling strength. From 1966 to 1968, it acquired twenty one patrol boats, with a displacement capacity of 15 tonnes each, in Singapore arms market sold by Britain.

Sri Lanka had arms trade only with the Western World till 1971. It never bought any system from the Eastern Block. But in 1971, there was a shift in its position. It started buying arms from USSR and China. This shift can be explained in terms of the friendly relationship between Sri Lanka Freedom Party

and the Communist countries.

The Sri Lankan air force got five MiG 17, one MiG 15 UTI and two KA 26 from USSR under long term credit arrangement. It also received six Bell 206 A Jet Ranger and six Bell 47 as military aid from Britain.

About twenty BTR 152 armoured cars were purchased from USSR by Sri Lanka. It also purchased about thirty five Ferret and eighteen Saladin armoured cars from Britain.

Apart from five Shanghai class patrol crafts from China and six model 150 light aircrafts from United States in 1972, there was not any significant arms trade by Sri Lanka from 1972 till about late 1983. Even the widespread riots by Tamils in 1977 did not prompt the government to plan for new arms purchases.

But the scene changed from mid 1983. The armed forces were confronted by the Tamil 'militants' who were using sophisticated arms like RPG-7 rocket laun-

chers and SA-7 SAM.² The armed forces found themselves on the receiving end. The government reviewed the situation and embarked upon a major arms purchase to qualitatively equip its forces.

In the year 1984, Sri Lanka bought three 'Abheetha' class and three 'Mahawele' class support ships from Singapore. It also bought a four Model 206-B Helicopters from an unconfirmed seller. Apart from this the Sri Lankan Parliament voted Rs.168.2 million for the purchase of three patrol boats. The boats were of 330 ton capacity, 40 M type built at the Colombo Dockyard.³

The naval vessels were to be used to check illegal traffic which was going on across the Palk Straits.

Sri Lanka time and again expressed its view that Tamil militants were getting trained in South India and later crossing over to Sri Lanka to create problems. In order to curb the activities of

2. Janes Defence Weekly, 1 August 1987.

3. Janes Defence Weekly, 8 September 1985.

militants in Sri Lanka, the Government felt it necessary to patrol the Palk Straits, across which supplies were allegedly flowing in.

In 1985, Sri Lanka improved upon its naval strength by adding two 'Dvora' class fast attack crafts bought from Israel. It also bought six Samil 100 APC from South Africa diverted through a third country. Six model 212 helicopters were bought from Bell Asia, Singapore, by Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka bought two Type 30 M landing crafts capable of carrying mechanised infantry, four model 21 helicopters from Singapore and one Super King Air helicopter from the United States in 1986.

It also decided to purchase an undisclosed quantity of type fifty six assault rifles, the Chinese version of the Soviet built AK 47, and Patrol crafts from China.⁴

The APC's were used to go into the militants strongholds, the routes of which were heavily mined. Due to its armoured protection, the APC was immune to

4. Janes Defence Weekly, 2 February 1985.

small arms firing. This helped army to carry out attacks on militants well inside the latter's area.

The Model 212 helicopters were used extensively to shell and strafe the militants strongholds from the sky. The helicopters has a remarkable advantage of hovering over a place for a good amount of time and low level flying. This was very useful Counter-Insurgency (COIN) role played by air force.

SUPPLIER PATTERNS

Till about 1970 the Western world was dominant supplier of arms to Sri Lanka with Britain leading the list, as seen earlier. After 1971, Sri Lanka started purchasing arms from the socialist countries also. This process was initiated by the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) regime which wanted to diversify the sources and also probably due to a tilt towards the socialist countries. The ideology of SLFP was based on socialist principles, which might have resulted in arms trade with socialist countries.

When the heat of conflict picked up in Sri Lanka the government was forced to resort to heavy arms

trade to counter the better equipped militants. As noted earlier, the militants had in their possession sophisticated weapon systems like RPG-7 rocket launchers and SA-7 SAM.⁵ In order to match them the government had to look for arms supplies from countries with which it had no trade earlier. It started procuring arms from South Africa, stepped up its arms trade with China, and renewed its arms trade with Israel.

Though Sri Lanka was critical of Israel and South Africa on some issues it bought arms from them. The decision was made by Sri Lanka mainly due to the easy availability of arms from the source without any conditions attached to the sale.⁶ The same factor was responsible for the arms purchase from China, too.

On the whole till about 1980, the arms supply to Sri Lanka was mainly from Western source, with a little bit of supply from China, particularly after 1970. The compulsion to fight militants effectively,

5. Janes Defence Weekly, 1 August 1987

6. Army source.

resulted in the diversification of source in 1980's. It is at this stage where Israel and South Africa entered in with valuable arms supplies to Sri Lanka.

IMPACT OF SYSTEM PURCHASES

The initial purchases made by Sri Lanka, were basically conventional weapon systems. Specialized weapons like anti-guerrilla weapon systems, were not procured. This may be due to the absense of any serious threat of that sort. But after the insurgency attempt, the government started procuring patrol vessels for navy. The purchases helped navy to interdict supplies to militants to a limited extent.

The weapons added to arms inventory after 1977 were mainly counter-insurgency systems. External aid was sought for training troops in anti-guerrilla operation. But the need for conventional weapon system was prevalent throughout. For example though the militants were using guerrilla warfare techniques, the armed forces launched 'Operation Liberation', which was planned and fought more like a conventional

7. Ibid.

systems. On the whole mixed needs and mixed purchases are evident from Sri Lanka's arms purchases.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

The Sri Lankan government was forced to look for external assistance when it became clear that armed forces were not able to neutralize the threat from Tamil militants. The armed forces were able to gain the specialized training and weapons from external sources which resulted in their better performance against militants. Operation Liberation is an example for the improved fighting calibre of armed forces. But the policy of accepting "help from the devil himself, if necessary to fight terrorism",⁸ resulted in some shifts in Sri Lanka's foreign relations.

Sri Lanka was very vocal in its support for the Palestinian movement. The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister A.C.S.Hameed condemned Israel of "flagrant violation of all internationally accepted cannon of

8. Quoted from the statement made by the President of Sri Lanka which appeared in Times of India on 3 May 1987.

social Justice".⁹ But the condemnation was proved to be non-serious by the events which occurred later. Sri Lanka permitted Israelis to open an Interest Section in the US Embassy in Colombo in the summer of 1984- the first time the United States had acted in such a capacity for Israel.¹⁰ Not only that, Sri Lanka has purchased arms from Israel and also has allegedly taken up the help of Mossad and Shin-Bet,¹¹ Israel agencies to combat militants.

South Africa, is yet another country which was the target of international condemnation including Sri Lanka. In the United Nations General Assembly, Sri Lanka criticised the White minority Government in South Africa.¹² But it had to forget all those utterances and buy arms from the same country to deal with its militants.

-
9. Ceylon Daily News, 31 August 1977.
 10. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Sri Lanka and Israel Connection", Lanka Gaurdian, vol.11, no.2,15 May 1988, p.10.
 11. Tribune, 20 August 1984.
 12. Ceylon Daily News, 22 September 1977.

The use of helicopters in jungles for COIN role needed reasonable amount of training. This was not found in Sri Lankan air force. Hence it was reported that the government took the help of American mercenaries trained in Vietnam operations to fly the helicopters.¹³

Likewise it was also reported that, Pakistanis and Britons were used to man the helicopter gunships.¹⁴ The help rendered by the Israeli agencies has already been mentioned.

Sri Lanka has sent large number of men and officers to various countries to be trained in various roles for armed forces. In March 1985, following a request made by Sri Lanka, Pakistan agreed to train 38 military instructors under an enhanced programme.¹⁵ The instructors were to be deployed in new training camps, which were training men to fight the militants.

13. The Hindu, 6 March 1987.

14. Janes Defence Weekly, 18 January 1986.

15. Janes Defence Weekly, 8 January 1985.

Sri Lanka also sends Officers to be trained in the United States.¹⁶ There is no reliable information as to the exact number being sent. Considering the intake of Officers from armed forces all parts of the globe by the United States for a course, it is generally presumed to be quite low.¹⁷

India was also training some Sri Lankan Officers at the National Defence College, New Delhi¹⁸ and Defence Services Staff College, Wellington¹⁹ for a long time. When the tension was increasing between the two countries from 1983, Sri Lanka was contemplating a move to stop officers going to India for training.²⁰ But the move failed to materialize and the training still continues in India.

-
16. Janes Defence Weekly, 23 January 1985.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Janes Defence Weekly, 15 December 1984.
 19. Ceylon Daily News, 15 December 1977.
 20. Janes Defence Weekly, 15 December 1984.

ARMS TRADE EXPENDITURE

Expenditure on arms import by Sri Lanka has been on the rise from 1971 onwards with a purchase of \$ 10 million at the beginning.²¹ However, there was no sustained expenditure on arms trade annually.

Following the intensification of the ethnic struggle in 1983 the arms import went upto \$10 million in 1984.²²

In 1985, the arms imports of Sri Lanka increased by 300% over the previous year. It reached an all time high of \$ 30 million.²³ But again in 1986, the arms imports dropped to zero.²⁴

To summarize, Sri Lankan arms trade does not follow any definite pattern. It reflects the adhoc attitude of the government, which had no long term planning in this sphere. It may be because of certain domestic developments which led to this sort of

21. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, 1970-79 (Washington DC, 1982), p. 119.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

attitude. Hard pressed for resources Sri Lanka imported arms in a significant way, only after the rise of serious internal threats. On the whole, Sri Lanka has conducted its arms trade in a low-key and it is likely that this trend may continue.

25

-
25. Two tables are appended at end of the text for more information on the type of weapon system imported by Sri Lanka.

VALUE OF ARMS IMPORTS, 1971 - 1986



Source : ACDA.

CHAPTER - V

ARMED FORCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The armed forces of Sri Lanka for all practical purposes is oriented toward neutralising any internal security threat. As pointed out earlier, Sri Lanka with its limited resources and small armed force, can never think of holding any major power at bay for more than a day or two. There are ethnic tensions within the state which at times threaten the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka.

COUP ATTEMPTS :

The first internal threat to Sri Lanka, though of a minor nature, was from the unsuccessful coup attempt led by some of the officers of armed forces in 1962. But the coup was neutralized by the precautionary measures taken by armed forces. About 30 members of armed forces were arrested and an inquiry was instituted.¹

-
1. Donald L. Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers motives : Sri Lanka in comparative Perspective , (Princeton, 1980) p. 21.

The coup attempt was successfully prevented by armed forces because of non-involvement of senior officers of navy and air force.² Had Officers of these two services also involved in the attempt, it might have been very difficult for armed forces to control.

Since the coup attempt was made by a section of Roman Catholics officers,³ the government thought that increasing the percentage of Sinhalese-Buddhist officers will ensure a non-repetition of the event.⁴ Top military appointments were made on officers who were loyal to the political party in power.⁵ Thus right from lower ranks to top, armed forces became politicized, which adversely affected its performance.⁶

In 1965, another abortive coup was attempted. Major participants in the attempt were senior non-

-
2. Ibid. p.22.
 3. Ceylon Daily News, 31 January 1962.
 4. Horowitz, n.1, p.211
 5. Ibid., p. 213
 6. Army source.

commissioned officers.⁷ But this attempt was quelled by arresting the participants.

THREAT FROM INSURGENCY ATTEMPT :

The efficiency of armed forces was tested in 1971, in the insurgency attempt made by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The movement was led by Rohana Wijeweera, who had his higher education in USSR. There he was greatly influenced by the virtues of collective farming and the vices of private property system.⁸

After he returned to Colombo he felt that the political institutions, which existed at that time, were to be changed for the benefit of the working class. The movement grew in strength with the entry of students from universities and schools.⁹ The movement also infiltrated into armed forces and there were a good number of sympathizers.¹⁰

-
7. Anton Muttukumar, The Military History of Ceylon: An Outline, (New Delhi, 1987) p. 185.
 8. Swarup Rani Dubey, One Day Revolution in Sri Lanka, (Jaipur, 1988) p. 49.
 9. Ibid., p. 67.
 10. Ibid., p. 68.

The movement was trained in guerrilla warfare and was militarily skilled. The members of movement were also trained in use of fire arms, minor tactics in jungles, administration and getting themselves ready for operations against armed forces. It was funded by sympathizers and additional funds were raised by robberies and hold-ups of banks and other institutions.¹¹

When the movement blew out into an insurgency attempt, the administration was caught napping, with the result armed forces were not at all prepared for an encounter. The level of callousness which prevailed in armed forces can be best described by quoting Air Commodore P.H Mendis, Commander of the Air Force. "No one believed, even at noon of the 5th April, that the day of reckoning had come".¹²

The air force which could have played an important role by airlifting men and material, was ill-equipped. It was meant to be an organization for

11. Muttukumar, n.7, p 188.

12. Air Commodore P. H.Mendis, "The Air force in Counter insurgency, 1971", Ceylon Today, May-June, 1971, p 13.

13

reconnaissance and rescue duties.

The government decided to train its troops in guerrilla warfare, and some officers were trained in Yugoslavia and Malaysia. The Command of army at the time of insurgency was in the hands of a General who had undergone guerrilla training under Yugoslav ex-

14
perts. But a few guerrilla warfare trained soldiers were not in a position to tackle the attacks by JVP which was reported from Colombo and almost all the

15
Southern districts. Limited men and material, was a handicap for armed forces to bring the situation back to normalcy.

The inability of armed forces forced the government to approach its friendly countries for assistance in the provision of military hardware. Military assistance came from India, Pakistan, Britain, the

13. Ibid, p. 13.

14. Muttukumar, n.7, p 189.

15. Swarup Rani, n.8, p 99.

United States, the USSR, China and Yugoslavia.¹⁶
Then, the armed forces were able to put down the
violence and arrested about 14,000 men.¹⁷

Action against the JVP was the first serious operation armed forces had to undertake. It had to deal with armed insurgents capable of exploiting skill in guerrilla tactics in the jungle from which they operated.¹⁸ The armed forces did not prove to be very efficient in the whole operation though they were severely handicapped by limited men and material. Intelligence gathering about movements which may have a potential to threaten the country, was quite dismal. On the whole a professional approach was lacking in the armed forces operation.¹⁹ It seems adequate lessons were not drawn from the dismal performance.

16. Muttukumar, n.7, p 189.

17. Swarup Rani, n.8, p 134.

18. Muttukumar, n.7, p.190.

19. Army source.

RE-EMERGENCE OF THREAT FROM JVP :

After a period of nearly sixteen years JVP has started posing internal threat to Sri Lanka since 1987. The signing of an accord with India helped Sri Lanka to solve the internal threat from the Tamil 'militants' who were fighting for a separate State. But on the same day, 29 July 1987, a security threat re-emerged from the south from some Sinhala elements owing allegiance to JVP.

"The intensification of the ethnic conflict and the brutal reach of Tamil separatism together with the reappearance of the old-spectre of the Dravidian horde, the invader from the North, (Jaffna, Tamil Nadu, India) created the climate for the dramatic rise of Sinhala militancy" as explained by one Sri Lankan Journalist.

Now the Government was able to send in more troops to the south due to the presence of Indian

20. Mervyn de Silva, "Indemnity Law-'Militarisation' Advances" Lanka Guardian; vol.11, no.5, 1 July 1988, p.3.

21. Mervyn de Silva, "The Roots of Southern Revolt", Lanka Guardian; vol.11, no.3, 1 June 1988, p.4.

troops in the North, which arrived in Sri Lanka after the accord. It responded to the threat with a heavy military crackdown on the JVP, but it has not been able to neutralize it due to its widespread support.²²

The JVP in its ranks has a considerable number of members who deserted from the army. Members of units which have disbanded on disciplinary grounds joined the movement, which continues to pose a threat to the Sri Lankan Government.²³

THREATS FROM THE TAMIL MILITANT GROUPS :

With the declaration of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to achieve a "separate, free, secular, sovereign, socialist state of Tamil Eelam" in 1976²⁴ the peace and tranquility of Sri Lanka was disturbed. A radical youth of the TULF got disillusioned with

22. Ibid, p.21.

23. Mervyn de Silva, "Things Fall Apart...But Some Into Place", Lanka Guardian; vol.10, no.17, 1 January 1988, p.5.

24. Muttukumar, n.7, p. 191.

the politics of negotiation and founded a militant group.

The militants opened their account of violence with a bomb attack directed against the police superintendent who led police attack on the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974. This was followed by the killing of the Tamil Mayor of Jaffna, who was accused of colloborating with the Government.²⁵

When the ethnic riots broke out in 1977, armed forces were ordered to assist the civil authorities to restore normalcy. They were instrumental in controlling the situation to a very great extent.²⁶

The activities of Tamil militants went on unabated. With the support they achieved from local population they were able to creat disturbances in the Northern districts. The Government decided to check the activities of militants with a firm hand.

In September 1977 the armed forces were ordered to launch a search for all militants, estimated to be

25. Ibid, p.192.

26. Ceylon Daily News, 25 August 1977.

350 in strength, and to arrest them. It was also decided by the government to set up a CID team in Jaffna under the proposed Anti-Insurgent Bureau. ²⁷

The Government received intelligence reports of militants illegal traffic in between the Palk Straits. It ordered the air force to set up a base at Palaly airport, Jaffna from the early part of October, 1977. The air force decided to operate four aircrafts from Jaffna equipped with Gun pods for .303 ²⁸ ammunition.

When reports of militants activities from the jungles of Northern provinces, were received by the government it ordered the armed forces to clear militants. In a Joint Services meeting it was decided that the disused airstrips were to be renovated to form an efficient security network. The airstrip at Puttalam, Matale, Sigiriya, Dambulla, Weerawila and ²⁹ airstrips at other places were put into operation.

27. Ceylon Daily News, 19 September 1977.

28. Ceylon Daily News, 28 September 1977.

29. Ceylon Daily News, 13 October 1977.

In the year 1978 there was an escalation in the activities of militants. They started attacking personnel belonging to armed forces and politicians. Bank robbery by militants were also reported from many places.³⁰

It was also reported that militants were getting training facilities from international terrorist groups such as Irish Republic Army and George Habbash's group of PLO.³¹ Government investigations also revealed plans by militants to purchase arms from international arms market and smuggle them into Sri Lanka.³²

In order to control the activities of Tamil militants the government enacted the "Prevention of Terrorism Act" on July 19, 1978, which gave sweeping powers to armed forces in respect of arrest and detention of persons indulging in "unlawful

30. Muttukumaru, n.7, p.194.

31. Daily News, 22 March 1984.

32. Ceylon Daily News, 15 May 1978.

activity", such as murder, kidnapping and abduction.³³

The President also issued a directive to the Chief of Staff of Army to "eliminate the menace of terrorism in all its forms from the Island and more specifically from the Jaffna District".³⁴



Based on this directive armed forces took firm action against militants which led to retaliatory strike by the latter. There was widespread violence in the Northern provinces due to armed forces action.

When the situation got out of hand for the government, it re-defined the role of the Army, in 1979, as follows:

- (a) the defence of Sri Lanka against an external or internal threat
- (b) maintenance of law and order in aid of civil authorities

33. Thomas A Marks, "Peoples War in Sri Lanka : Insurgency and Counter Insurgency", Issues and Studies. vol.22, no.8, August 1986, p.68.

34. Muthukumar, n.7, p.194.

- (c) maintenance of essential services when ordered to do so
- (d) participating in National Development Projects.³⁵

To perform the above stated role army was reorganized into "Task Forces". Each task force was composed of one regular battalion and two volunteer battalions. The "task forces" were deployed in the North, North-Central, and Southern regions. The Western region was to be manned by the specialist forces - armour, artillery and engineers.³⁶

Confrontation between the Tamil militants and armed forces went on without any result. The level of violence was not very high and there was always an uneasy calm in the atmosphere. In 1983 the government decided to take more positive action. The armed forces were ordered to get tough with militants. In an engagement between armed forces and militants, a militant leader was killed and the armed forces elated by the success, decided to move

35. Ibid, p.195.

36. Ibid.

along a known route. This route was mined heavily by militants and the troops suffered heavy casualty. About thirteen soldiers were killed and this provoked the soldiers who went on a rampage. Much property was destroyed and thirty-five innocent civilians were killed.³⁷

The militants were able to recruit more and more members mainly due to the over-reaction of armed forces. Whenever armed forces killed innocent civilians, the cause of militants became more popular.

The government branded the riot as a "revolution" and justified the "counter-revolutionary methods" adopted by armed forces. Accepting that some soldiers acted in a way which was not in tune with the discipline of armed forces, the government announced that it will court martial those soldiers who indulged in anti-social activities.³⁸

A virtual blockade was maintained by navy along its maritime boundary with India, around May 1984, to

37. Ibid, p.200.

38. Asia Week, 19 August 1983.

prevent illegal traffic across the Palk Straits.³⁹ But militants managed to sneak across the naval blockade frequently due to Sri Lanka's poor naval strength.

In 1985 Tamil militants attacked Anuradhapura, a sacred city of the Buddhists. They were reported to have killed some 150 civilians.⁴⁰ This gave a severe blow to the government and it was accused of inaction by the Sinhalese.

A new Counter Insurgency Force (COIN) was formed in October 1984. It took over security duties from army in provincial areas where Tamil militants were creating disturbances. The Unit came under the control of the Special Task Force.⁴¹

The Tamil militants struck wherever they wanted and the government was caught napping. This reflected poor intelligence gathering.⁴² Hence the government decided to set up a National Intelligence

39. Janes Defence Weekly, 19 May 1984.

40. Muttukumaru, n.7, p.202.

41. Janes Defence Weekly, 27 October 1984.

42. Army source.

Bureau (NIB) in late 1984, to function as its premier
43
intelligence gathering agency. The NIB had personnel from the intelligence units of the army, the navy and the airforce. It received large financial allocation and greater freedom of action to operate both
44
in Sri Lanka and abroad.

The movement of armed forces were highly restricted due to heavy mining done by militants. The armed forces were not in possession of mine-sweeping equipment. Because of this, they lost a number of soldiers when the mines blew up. In one such incident the Northern Command Commander of the army, was killed and four soldiers travelling with him
45
wounded.

The armed forces were allowed to use guns upto 37 mm calibre, rockets upto 7.62 cm and bombs upto 50 kgs in the wake of use of heavy arms by militants. A gazette notification to this effect was issued in

43. Janes Defence Weekly, 15 December, 1984.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46

February 1985.

India was involved in the ethnic conflict due to the wider implications, other than the Tamils living in South India. It suggested to the Sri Lanka government to have a negotiated settlement with Tamils. The Sri Lankan government offered to restrict military activities in the North and to resume negotiations, if India joins in it's fight against militants.⁴⁷ When India refused to take up side, the Sri Lanka government continued its military solution to a military question.⁴⁸

The militants, particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), were understood to have connections with certain elements in the south of Sri Lanka. In an interview Dr. Balasingham, the spokesman of LTTE said, " The entire Sri Lankan army will not be able to be used against us because we can

46. Asian Defence Journal, February 1985.

47. Janes Defence Weekly, 2 March 1985.

48. Cited from the statement made by the President of Sri Lanka published by Hindustan Times, 27 January 1986.

create conditions in the south which will tie down the Sri Lankan army".⁴⁹ 'Create conditions' obviously meant that the LTTE had definite links with the JVP in the south. Such was the magnitude of threat which the Sri Lankan government had to face.

A Joint Operations Council (JOC) was established in early 1985 to decide and direct armed forces operation against militants. The government promulgated special regulations under the state of emergency to create the JOC. The President of Sri Lanka was to be the chairman of JOC. Other members included the Prime Minister; Minister for National Security; Cabinet Secretary; Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Secretary, Ministry of National Security; General Officer Commanding, Security Operations; Commanders of Army, Navy and Air force; Director General of Security and Intelligence; and Security Advisor to the President. Besides military operations, the JOC was also given the task of supervising all aspects of civilian administration in North-Eastern provinces.⁵⁰

49. Daily News, 23 March, 1984.

50. Janes Defence Weekly, 2 March 1985.

When the activities of militants spread in the Hill provinces it started adversely affecting Sri Lanka economically. The militants were reported to have destroyed tea plantations, which was the single biggest revenue earner. A new rifle corps was formed in March 1985 to provide security to the plantations. It was raised out of volunteers from the state-owned Janatha Estates Development Board and State Plantation Corporation.⁵¹

The condition deteriorated beyond control with the armed forces going all out to get militants. Both the sides suffered heavy casualties. The armed forces suffered casualties from mine blasts and ambushes. In one such incident on 11 January, 1986 seven armed forces personnel died and nine seriously injured in Udayarkadu of Mullaithivu district.⁵² The militants and to a certain extent the civil population, suffered the "indiscriminate bombing, strafing and shelling" inflicted by the use of Siai Marchettei

51. Janes Defence Weekly, 9 March 1985.

52. Janes Defence Weekly, 1 February 1986.

SF 260 TP trainer/light attack aircraft and SL bell
 53
 214 choppers.

The militants were able to siege Jaffna in mid 1986. The entire civil administration was taken over by them and the government had no authority over the city. This was an open challenge thrown by militants which the government had to accept.

The armed forces were ordered by the government to restore Jaffna to law of the land. The troops advanced in a three pronged attack formation. They achieved limited objectives but they were beaten back by militants. The main blow was the failure of 1,000 men column to fight its way up the Jaffna Peninsula's trunk road from Elephant pass to Jaffna. They advanced within 30 miles of Jaffna with heavy weapons and APCs before started retreating. The other two columns which were to link up with troops advancing towards the town from the Jaffna fort failed to break-out. This led to the temporary
 54
 suspension of the operations.

53. Thinapathi (Tamil), 17 May 1986.

54. Asian Defence Journal, July 1986.

The Government was not in a position to achieve a military solution to the ethnic problem. It was due to India's role as a negotiator between militants and the Sri Lankan Government and also adverse world opinion in letting the Government to settle the problem militarily.⁵⁵ Temporary ceasefires were declared time and again to facilitate the negotiation process. But nothing succeeded.

A new offensive was launched around May 1987 with the sole objective of getting rid of militants from the Northern provinces. The government described the offensive as "fight to the finish".⁵⁶ Vadamarachi, a town which allegedly had illegal arms industry was the main target of the attack. Incidentally it also happened to be the home town of Velupillai Pirabakaran, leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The troops were able to achieve considerable success due to the use of heavy weapons.

55. Army source.

56. India Today, 30 June 1987.

The economic blockade enforced on Jaffna peninsula by the government, though was able to reduce the efficiency of militants, invited widespread criticism. India was forced to act on the basis of humanitarian conditions.

On June 3rd, 1987, India sent a flotilla of 20 boats which sailed out of Rameswaram in a bid to reach relief supplies to the Jaffna peninsula. It was stopped by Sri Lankan Naval ships which refused to allow it to enter its territorial waters.⁵⁷

Determined to send relief supplies to Jaffna, India decided to air-drop supplies. A mission was carried out by the Indian Air Force on 4 June 1987. AN-32 transport aircrafts of air force escorted by Mirage fighters accomplished the mission successfully. There was no military resistance to India's entry into Sri Lanka's airspace.⁵⁸

After a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, an accord was concluded between India and Sri Lanka on 29 July.

57. Ibid.,

58. The Hindu, 5 June, 1987.

1987. India took up the task of assisting Sri Lanka in disarming militants and also act as a guarantor for Tamils in fulfilling the provisions of the accord.⁵⁹

COMBAT TACTICS OF ARMED FORCES :

So far as the combat tactics of the Sri Lankan armed forces are concerned nothing much is known except from reports in news papers. A force formed not for combat, 'but for parade ground ceremonies',⁶⁰ in the earlier period, generally cannot be expected to follow classic combat tactics. But with the intensification of internal threat, the armed forces started adopting themselves to the changed environment.

The Tamil militants started using landmines to restrict the speed of army in early April, 1984.⁶¹ The army started deploying more foot patrols to

59. The Hindu, 30 July 1987.

60. Deccan Herald, 23 August 1986.

61. Deccan Herald, 16 August 1986.

locate land mines. Inter-service operations were carried out to neutralize militants. The armed force relied upon extensive use of aircrafts to search and destroy militant's strongholds. They achieved significant gains by the Joint Operations as it was evident from 'Operation Liberation'.

EVALUATION OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY ARMED FORCES IN NEUTRALIZING TAMIL MILITANTS :

To evaluate the role of armed forces in fighting the Tamil militants is not an easy thing to perform. There are wide ranging views on the performance of the armed forces. The wide spectrum of views cover two extremes, with one side describing it as total failure and the other as total success. However the real thing falls somewhere in between the two extremes.

Before coming to any conclusion on the success or failure of armed forces, certain factors had to be

62. Times of India, 12 September, 1984.

63. Hindustan Times, 13 June, 1986.

64. An assessment of the gains achieved by the armed forces was arrived at after consulting a highly placed army source and newspaper reports from Sri Lanka. Refer Daily News, 21 January, 1987.

given a serious thought. Firstly armed forces were fighting a guerrilla force which was well trained and well equipped with weapons like AK-47s, M-16S, RCLs.⁶⁵ At one stage even armed forces were not in possession of these weapons. Hence they lacked the cutting edge in weaponry.

Secondly armed forces were fighting with militants who enjoyed local support. Information as to the movement of militants were hard to gather and local population never helped armed forces. In fact armed forces were considered "as an army of occupation".⁶⁶ This was due to the Sinhalese character of armed forces.

Thirdly the international media was observing the happenings in Sri Lanka keenly. Any over-reaction on the part of troops were given widespread adverse publicity. This affected the troops morale to a considerable extent from operating freely with all their potential against militants.

65. Janes Defence Weekly, 1 August 1987.

66. Dennis Austin & Anirutha Gupta, "Lions and Tigers The Crisis in Sri Lanka", Conflict Studies (211), May 1988, p.6.

Fourthly armed forces were fighting a defensive war in which the initiative was always with militants. They were only reacting to actions. With the initiative lost they could hardly dictate the course of the battle.

Fifthly frequent 'ceasefire' announced by the government helped militants to regroup themselves and launch a fresh attack on armed forces. The militants always used the ceasefire to their advantage and continuity of the battle was lost. The armed forces might have succeeded more, if not for the ceasefire, because they would have pressed home their initial thrust.

Lastly lack of factors like proper arms and ammunition, trained soldiers, experienced commanders and committed political directive are also to be considered in evaluating the performance of armed forces. It is not possible to arrive at a conclusion without considering the points raised in the above paragraphs.

To conclude, the performance of armed forces in fighting the internal security threats may be termed broadly, as a success considering the constraints, within which it had to function. Had the political leadership taken more interest and seriousness in the dynamics of armed forces, the success rate of the latter would have been definitely at a higher level.⁶⁷

67. Similar views were expressed by a highly placed army source, when the researcher interviewed the former.

CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION

The defence policy, the foreign policy and the domestic policy are framed carefully by any country to make utmost use of them to achieve its objective of maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Every country struggles to find an optimum mix of the three policies and Sri Lanka is no exception to it.

To maintain a strong defence policy, the country should have a strong defence force. But if it cannot afford to maintain a strong defence force, it has to seek remedy in its foreign policy. The art of diplomacy is utilized to offset the handicap, in the form of a weak defence policy, as in the case of Sri Lanka.

The formation of the foreign policy is determined to a great extent by a country's social set-up. The prevalence of social values and other cultural ethos influence the foreign policy. No doubt, the ruling elites also play an important role in the

framing of foreign policy but, they cannot afford to hurt the sentiments of the people who elect them in a democracy.

In Sri Lanka, the defence policy has not been successful in containing the external and internal threats. Hence the foreign policy has come to the rescue of the defence policy, in the form of getting foreign assistance to neutralize both the threat.

The request of Sri Lanka, made to India, in helping it to fight the Tamil militants, is primarily a success of its foreign policy. But the foreign policy has failed to take note of the domestic policy, which now causes serious concern in the domestic scene.

Till about July 1987, the domestic policy of Sri Lanka, towards its Tamils, have been a matter of debate. It was generally observed to be anti-Tamil. The anti-Tamil character of the domestic policy was transformed into anti-India or hate-India attitude. That was mainly due to the Tamils living in India,

who are considered to be the main supporters of Sri Lankan Tamil militants.

But when the foreign policy of Sri Lanka sought and successfully got the assistance of India, it went against the domestic policy. This has resulted in serious internal turmoil, with a section of pro-Sinhalese people directing against the government. The failure of the foreign policy to take note of the domestic policy orientations has proved to be costly. This explains the linkages or dependence of the defence policy, the foreign policy and the domestic policy on each other.

To conclude, the major findings of the work are, firstly a sustained growth in the strength of the armed forces is found to be lacking in Sri Lanka. This may be because of the magnitude of external threat in the form of India which cannot be countered by the armed forces due to its inadequate size and India's power potential. And also, in the initial stages there was no serious threat to Sri Lanka from internal sources. Hence till 1971 strength of the armed forces remained almost static. But after the

JVP threat the strength increased and then 'levelled-out'. The intensification of the ethnic struggle led to the increase in the strength of armed forces again.

Secondly, the arms trade of Sri Lanka does not follow any definite pattern. The arms purchasing trend has generally been erratic. This phenomenon is basically due to the following factors :

- a) the absence of a serious threat from internal source till 1971,
- b) low order of priority the Government assigned to the development of armed forces,
- c) lack of adequate economic structure which could bear the arms trade expenditure and,
- d) in the absence of a long term planning for armed forces.

Thirdly the armed forces operations against the internal threats can be broadly defined as a success.

No doubt, the armed forces were not able to cope up with the threat posed by JVP in 1971. But the operations against the Tamils has been, by and large, successful. 'Operation Liberation', though involved in the ruthless bombing of civilian targets by the air force, it did force the militants to flee from their strongholds. From early 1987 the 'economic blockade' of Jaffna, hampered the activities of the militants. If India had not intervened in the form of 'humanitarian air-dropping' armed forces might have neutralized the threats to a great extent.

Fourthly, the growth of armed forces are likely to be more in the years to come. Sri Lankan government has realised the need for a strong armed force after its engagements with the militants. Also, the Government faces threats from the south in the form of JVP. This factor will certainly weigh in the mind of the government against any drastic reduction in the strength of the armed forces, if not maintaining or increasing the present size. It is also likely that the government may procure weapon systems mainly meant for anti guerrilla operations, due to the na-

ture of the threat.

Lastly, the defence policy of Sri Lanka in respect to external threats, is likely to perform a low-key function when compared to the foreign policy. It is due to the magnitude of the external threat which cannot be contained by Sri Lanka even if it equips its armed forces to a significant extent. As in the past, the foreign policy of Sri Lanka might continue to be more active than the defence policy, in terms of external threats.

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF THE DEFENCE AGREEMENT

"Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown;

And whereas it is the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for the defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdom may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed.

(2) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunication facilities and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said forces as they exercise at present.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed forces.

(4) The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to coordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments.

(5) This agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on

Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations, shall come into force.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this eleventh day of November, 1947. Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

HENRY MOORE

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

D.S. SENANAYAKE

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF INDO-SRI LANKAN ACCORD

The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the President of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardena, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka,

Having this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this objective.

In this context,

1.1 desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;

1.2 acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and Burghers;

1.3 recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;

1.4 also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens prosper and fulfil their aspirations;

2. Resolve that:

2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining Provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period, (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31 December, 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

(a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Provinces as specified in para 2.2, or

(b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.

2.5 The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice; a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.

2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.

2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31st December 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with

an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.

Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bring them back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.

2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.

2.13 If the framework for the resolution is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

2.14 The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.

2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely.

(a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure

that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.

(b) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.

(c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will Co-operate by giving to assistance as and when requested.

(d) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.

(e) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement. The Government of India will extend full co-operation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.

2.18 The Official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

3. This Agreement and the Annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have set our hands and seals hereunto.

DONE IN COLOMBO, SRI LANKA, on this the Twenty Ninth day of July of the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Seven in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of the
Republic of India

Junius Richard Jayewardene
President of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka

ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT

1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its subparagraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.

2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by the President of Sri Lanka.

3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all para-military personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.

The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para-military forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.

4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.

5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a Joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July, 1987.

6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.

Excellency,

Please refer to your letter dated the 29th July, 1987 which reads as follows:-

Excellency,

Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millenia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:-

(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

(iv) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

3. In the same spirit, India will;

(i) deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

(ii) provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely,
sd/-
(Rajiv Gandhi)

His Excellency
Mr. J.R. Jayewardene,
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka.
Colombo.

This is to confirm that the above correctly sets
out the understanding reached between us.

Please, accept, Excellency, the assurances of my
highest consideration.

(J.R. Jayewardene)

His Excellency
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi.

Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and
Population of Sri Lanka 1971 - '85.

Year	Military Expenditures Million dollars.	Armed Forces Thousand	Gross National Product Million dollars	Central Government expenditures(CGE) Million Dollars	People Million	M E GNP %	M E CGE %	M E Per Capita	Armed Forces per 1000 people	GNP per Capita
1971	17	10	1355	600	12.8	1.3	4.9	2	0.8	181
1972	15	16	1470	624	13.0	1.1	4.2	2	1.2	185
1973	12	18	1602	649	13.2	0.8	3.1	1	1.4	188
1974	13	18	1803	602	13.4	0.7	3.1	1	1.3	191
1975	33	18	2074	969	13.7	1.6	6.2	4	1.3	276
1976	32	18	2276	1071	13.9	1.4	5.1	4	1.3	280
1977	29	18	2558	957	14.1	1.1	4.8	3	1.3	290
1978	37	13	2905	1757	14.4	1.3	3.2	4	0.9	302
1979	52	18	3366	1756	14.6	1.5	4.1	5	1.2	315
1980	57	18	3880	2082	14.9	1.5	3.4	5	1.2	327
1981	56	18	4425	1746	15.2	1.3	3.7	4	1.2	335
1982	62	18	4912	1869	15.4	1.3	3.6	4	1.2	344
1983	80	19	5360	1908	15.6	1.5	4.4	5	1.2	356
1984	92	21	5909	1938	15.8	1.5	4.7	6	1.3	374
1985	167	21	6267	2110	16.0	2.7	7.7	10	1.3	380

Source : Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES FROM
1972 TO 1987, AS GIVEN IN MILITARY
BALANCE AND ACDA

YEAR	<u>MILITARY BALANCE</u>				<u>ACDA</u>
	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL	ARMED FORCES
1972	8,500	2,300	1,700	12,500	16,000
1973	8,500	2,300	1,700	12,500	18,000
1974	8,900	2,400	2,300	13,600	18,000
1975	8,900	2,400	2,300	13,600	18,000
1976	8,900	2,400	2,300	13,600	18,000
1977	8,900	2,400	2,000	13,300	18,000
1978	8,900	2,400	2,000	13,300	13,000
1979	8,900	2,600	2,200	13,700	18,000
1980	10,000	2,740	2,200	14,940	18,000
1981	11,000	2,740	2,100	15,840	18,000
1982	11,000	2,825	2,600	16,425	18,000
1983	11,000	2,960	2,600	16,540	19,000
1984	11,000	2,960	2,600	16,540	21,000
1985	16,000	3,960	3,700	23,660	21,000
1986	16,000	3,960	3,700	23,660	N.A.
1987	40,000	4,000	3,700	47,700	N.A.

Source : Military Balance and Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

Note : The strength of army indicated in the table given above, for the year 1987 includes active reserves also.

Table 1

ARMS IMPORTS BY SRI LANKA (1948-71)

Year	Number	Item	Supplier
Aircrafts			
1953	9	Boulton Paul Balliol	UK
1953	12	DH Chipmunk T 21	UK
1955	2	Westland Dragonfly	UK
1955	2	Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer CCMK 2	UK
1955-58	6	DH Dove	UK
1958	2	Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer CCMK 2	UK
1959	12	BAC Jet Provost T.51	UK
1959-60	4	DH Heron	UK
1969	3	Bell 206A Jet Ranger	USA
1971	6	Bell 206A Jet Ranger	USA/UK
1971	6	Bell 47	USA/UK
1971	5	MiG-17	USSR
1971	1	MiG-15 UTI	USSR
1971	2	Ka-26	USSR
1971	6	Model 476 Hel	USA
Naval Vessels			
1955	1	Seaward defence boat, "Ford" class	UK
1955	4	Small patrol boat, "Seruwa" class	Italy
1956	2	Patrol boat, "Hansaya" class	Italy
1959	1	Escort minesweeper, "Algerine" class	UK
1959	2	Frigate, "River" class	Israel
1964	1	Hydrofol Patrol boat	(UK)
1966	2	Patrol Boat	UK/Singapore
1967	7	Patrol boat	UK/Singapore
1968	12	Patrol boat	UK/Singapore
Armoured fighting vehicles			
1971	20	BTR 152 AC	USSR
1971	35	Ferret	UK
1971	18	Saladin	UK

Source : SIPRI.

Table. 2

ARMS IMPORTS BY SRI LANKA FROM 1972-87

Supplier	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Years of Delivery	Total delivered
China	Shanghai class	PC	1972	5
	Shanghai class	PC	1980	2
	Shanghai class	PC	1985	6
France	2 AS-365	Hel	1978	2
Italy	SF-260TP	Trainer		
Singapore	Abheeta Class	Support ship	1984	3
	Mahawele Class	Support ship	1984	3
	Model 212	Hel	1985	4
	2 Type 30M	LC	1986	2
South Africa	Samil-100	APC	1985	6
USA	Model 150	Lightplane	1972	6
	Model 206 B	Hel	1983	2
	Model 206 B	Hel	1984	4
	Model 212	Hel	1983	2
	Model 212	Hel	1985	6
	Model 212	Hel	1985-86	4
	Model 337	Trainer	1972	4
	Model 412	Hel	1986	4
	Super King Air	Transport	1986	1
USSR	Mol class	FAC	1975	1
ISRAEL	Dvora class	FAC	1985	2
	Dvora class	FAC	1987	1

Source : SIPRI and Janes Defence Weekly.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Sri Lanka Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 1948-87.

Sri Lanka, State Accounts of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Financial Year - 1981.

Jayawardene, J.R., National and International Affairs: Biography and Selected Speeches ed., and compiled by Sugeeswara P. Senadhira, (Delhi : Sri Sat Guru Pub., 1985).

Kotelawala, John., Asian Prime Minister's Story (London : Harrap, 1956).

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Alagappan, M.V.M., (ed.), Tears in Tear-Drop Island (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1985).

Bahadur, Kalim., (ed.), South Asia in Transition - Conflicts and Tensions (New Delhi : Patriot Publication, 1986).

Baxter, Craig and etal, Government and Politics in South Asia, (Lahore : Vanguard Books, 1988).

Brzoska, Michael., and Ohlson, Thomas., Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Coelho, Vincent., Across the Palk Straits : India - Sri Lanka Relations (Dehradun : Palit and Palit, 1976).

Dissanayake, T.D.S.A., The Agony of Sri Lanka (Colombo : Swastika Pvt. Ltd., 1983).

Finer, Samuel, E., The Man on Horseback (London : Pall Mall, 1962).

Horowitz, Donald, L., Coup Theories and Officer's Motives : Sri Lanka in comparative Perspective (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1980).

Hulugalle, Haj., Sri Lanka's First Prime Minister Don Stephen Senanayake (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena and Co., 1975).

Janowitz, Morris., Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977).

Khanna, D.D., (ed.), Strategic Environment in South Asia (Allahabad : University of Allahabad, 1979).

Kodikara, Shelton., Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence (Delhi : Chanakya Publishers, 1965).

..... Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka (Delhi: Chanakya Publishers, 1982).

Kolodziej, Edward, A., and Harkavy, Robe, E., (ed.), Security Policies of Developing Countries (Lexington : D.C. Heath, 1982).

MC Namara, Robert S., The Essence of Security - Reflections in Office, (New York : Harper & Row, (1968).

Muttukumaru, Anton., The Military History of Ceylon - An Outline (New Delhi : Navrang Publishers, 1987).

Nissanka, H.S.S., Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy : A Study in Non-Alignment (New Delhi : Vikas Publishers, 1984).

Ramaswamy, P., New Delhi and Sri Lanka-Four Decades of Politics and Diplomacy (New Delhi : Allied Publishers, 1987).

SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm : Almquist and Wiksell, 1971).

....., Arms Trade with the Third World, (Cambridge : MIT Press, 1975).

Scott, Andrew, M., Insurgency, (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1970).

Seevaratnam, N. (ed.), The Tamil National Question and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (Delhi : Konark Pub. Pvt., Ltd., 1989).

Swaroop Rani Dubey, One Day Revolution in Sri Lanka (Jaipur : Aalekh Publishers, 1988).

Urmila Phadnis, Muni, S.D., and Bahadur, Kalim., Domestic Conflicts in South Asia (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers 1986), Vol. 1 & 2.

Wilson, Jeyaratnam, A., Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-73 (London : MacMillan, 1974).

ARTICLES IN JOURNALS

Alford, Jonathan., "Security of Small States : Security Dilemmas of Small States," Round Table (London), no.292, October 1984, pp. 377-82.

Austin, Dennis., and Gupta, Anirudha., "Lions and Tigers : The Crisis in Sri Lanka", Conflict Studies (London), no.211, May 1988, pp.1-25.

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin, "Sri Lanka and Israel Connection", Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.11, no.2, 15 May 1988, p.10.

Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Tamil 'Tigers' in Northern Sri Lanka : Origins, Factions, Programmes", Internationales Asienforum, (Cologne) vol.17, no.1/2, 1986, pp.63-85.

deSilva, Mervyn., "Army's Character and Role in Changing Society", Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.7, no.11, 1 October, 1984, pp.3-11.

....., "Indemnity Law- 'Militarisation' Advances" Lanka Guardian, vol:11, no.5, 1 July 1988, pp.3-4.

Gunasekera, Rohan, "Sri Lankan Armed Forces Switch Focus", International Defense Review, (Geneva) vol.21, no.5, 5 May 1988, pp.509-12.

Jacobs, G., "Israelis to Help Sri Lankans in Anti-Terrorist Campaign", Janes Defence Weekly, (London), vol. 2, no.4, 28 July 1984, p.107.

....., "Armed Forces of Sri Lanka", Reproduced in Strategic Digest (New Delhi) vol. 15, no.9, September 1985, pp. 1117-27.

Kaniyalil, John., "Pak-Lanka Connection", Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi) vol.9, no.11, February 1986, pp.1069-75.

Knudsen, Olav, F., "Of Lambs and Lions : Relations Between Great Powers and their Smaller Neighbours" Co-operation and Conflict, (Oslo), vol.23, no.3, 1988, pp.111-122.

Kumarasamy, P.R., "The Israeli Connections of Sri Lanka", Strategic Analysis, vol.II, no.11, February 1987, pp.1341-55.

Marks, Thomas, A., " 'People's War' in Sri Lanka : Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency", Issues and Studies, vol.22, no.8, August 1986, pp.63-100.

Muni, S.D., "Sri Lanka : The August Outrage", Strategic Analysis, vol. 8, no.6, September 1984, pp.500-10.

Muttukumar, Anton., "View from the Strategic Island of Sri Lanka in Afro-Asian Ocean of the Strategy for Peace and Security in South Asia", Strategic Studies, (Islamabad), vol: 6, no.2 & 3, Winter & Spring 1982-83, pp.119-124.

Pfafferberger, Bryan., " Sri Lanka in 1986 : A Nation at the Cross Roads", Asian Survey, (Berkeley, Calif), vol.27, no.2, February 1987, pp.155-62.

Quester, George., "Defending the Micro States", International Security (Cambridge, Mass.) vol.8, no.2, Fall 1983, pp.162-7.

Ramphal, Shridath., "Security of Small States : Small is Beautiful but Vulnerable", Round Table, no.292, October 1984, pp.367-71.

Rao, Vikram Simha, K., "Militarisation of Sri Lanka: A Tabular Study", strategic Analysis vol.11, no.12, March 1987, pp.1447-60.

Somasundaram, Jayantha, "The Armed Forces in Sri Lanka's Politics", Lanka Guardian, vol.3, no.11, 15 October, 1980, pp.7-8.

....., "The Army's Expanding Role", Lanka Gaurdian, vol.3, no.13, 15 November, 1980, pp.6-7.

Urmila Phadnis, "Insurgency in Ceylon Hard Challenge and Grim Warning", Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay) vol.6, no.19, 8 May, 1971, pp.965-8.

PERIODICALS AND NEWS PAPERS.

Asian Defence Journal (Kaulalumpur).

Asia Week (Hong Kong).

International Defense Review (Geneva).

Janes Defence Weekly (London).

Lanka Guardian (Colombo).

Daily News (Colombo).
(Earlier Known as Ceylon Daily News).

Military Balance (IISS) 1972-87.

SIPRI Year Book (SIPRI), 1972-87.

The Hindu (Madras).

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi).

Thinakaran (Jaffna).

Thinapathi (Jaffna).

Udayan (Jaffna).

World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers (ACDA) - 1970 - 87.