

**A STUDY OF THE ETHNIC IMMIGRATION POLICY
OF KAZAKHSTAN, 1991-2009**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “A STUDY OF THE ETHNIC IMMIGRATION POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN, 1991-2009” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KR	Kazakhstan Repatriates
KTK	Commercial Television of Kazakhstan
KZT	Kazakhstani tenge
NIS	Newly Independent States
PPK	Party of Patriots
RK	Republic of Kazakhstan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: LAND, PEOPLE AND HISTORY

Kazakhstan began its existence as a fragile state and as a country of paradoxes, a state crippled by history as well as by its geography. Both Kazakhs and Russians claim Kazakhstan as their homeland, and while the current legal system favours the claim of the former, a three-thousand-mile border with Russia creates a not-so-subtle reminder of the risks associated with these potentially conflicting claims.

President Nazarbayev tried to turn the country's demography and geography into a national asset, after referring to his nation as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Not only does the country straddle the two continents, but its history is rooted in the two civilizations and its population is divided between European and Asian peoples. While Kazakhstan claims to be the most multinational of the Soviet successor states, with over hundred nationalities represented in the republic, in reality the history of the past decade had been that of the political empowerment of one national group, the Kazakhs, at the expense of all others. Both Kazakh nationalists and the Kazakh population at large view independence as the restoration of Kazakh statehood.

In Kazakhstan, the ethnic problem is complicated by the fact that there were as many Russians in Kazakhstan as there were Kazakhs at the time of independence. Russian demographer Maqash Tatimov had reported that Russians and Kazakhs were equal at 39.5 percent each of the total population in 1985 and that the Kazakh population would reach 42 percent by 1990 - yet these figures were contested by the Kazakhs (Rashid 1994: 108). The census of 1999 showed that the largest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are the Kazakhs (53% of the total population) and the Russians (30%). Others were the Ukrainians (3.6%), Uzbeks (2.5%), Germans (2.3%), Tatars (1.6%) and Uighurs (1.4%). In the last ten years, the increase in the number of ethnic Kazakhs have occurred due to Kazakh diaspora coming back to the native land and simultaneously other ethnic groups leaving Kazakhstan for a variety of reasons.

1.1: General Background

The Republic of Kazakhstan is situated in Central Asia between the Ural river and the lower courses of the Volga river to the west, the Altai mountains to the east, the West-Siberian plateau to the north and the Tien Shan mountain chain to the South (Vineeth 2001: 12). The territory of

Kazakhstan stretches 1,600 kilometers north to south and more than 2,800 kilometers, west to east occupying an area of 2,717,00 sq. kilometers. In terms of area, the Republic of Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world (Vineeth 2001: 12). The Republic, until December 1991, was the second largest of the former Soviet Republics. Kazakhstan is bordered to the north, northwest and west by Russia, to the southeast by China and to the south and southwest by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. There is a long border in the north with the Russian Federation (6,447km) and a coastline of 2,320km on the Caspian Sea in the southwest. It also borders with the People's Republic of China (1,460km), Kyrgyzstan (980 km), Turkmenistan (380 km) and Uzbekistan(2,300 km).

The north most point in Kazakhstan is 55°26' N and it corresponds to the southern latitude of the central part of the East-European plain and to the southern part of the British Isles. The southernmost point is 40°56' N. It corresponds to the latitudes of the Trans-caucasus and the Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe (Abhishev 2002: 6). Most of the area of Kazakhstan is flat and low lying. In central Kazakhstan, vast plains give way to the isolated low mountainous range of Saryarka, to the south and southeast they melt into the mountainous systems of Altai, Sauyr-Tarbagatai, Dzhungarski Altai and Tien Shan. Steppes occupy approximately 26 percent of the territory of Kazakhstan. Deserts cover 44 percent; 14 percent of the surface is covered with semi- deserts. Forests occupy 21,000,000 hectares.

Nearly all rivers of Kazakhstan discharge into the Caspian and the Aral seas or the Balkhash, Alakol and Tengriz Lakes except for the rivers Irtysh, Ishim and Tobo which flow into the Kara Sea. The biggest river is the Irtysh which stretches for 1, 700 km within the area of Republic (Vineeth 2001: 12).The climate of the Republic is deeply continental and extremely dry. It is severely influenced by the Arctic region and Eastern Siberia. The absence of any natural barriers in the north of the Republic enables cold arctic winds and arctic air masses to come from this direction without restraint. In Kazakhstan, summers are hot and dry with hot winds. Kazakhstan is politically divided into 14 oblasts and five economic regions. They are, Aktiubinsk, Atyrau and WestKazakhstan administrative regions; Kostanai, Northern Kazakhstan(capital Petropavlovsk), Kokchetav, Akmolinsk and Pavlodar regions inNorthern Kazakhstan; Akmola and Karaganda oblasts in Central Kazakhstan, Almaty, Zhambyl, Mangistau, South Kazakhstan(capital Chimkent) and the Kyzylorda regions in SouthernKazakhstan and Semipalatinsk and East Kazakhstan in Eastern Kazakhstan. There are 82 cities and towns in the

Republic. The largest are: Almaty, Chimkent, Karaganda, Zhambyl, Scmpalatinsk, Pavlodar, Astana, Uralsk and Aktyubinsk. On December 10, 1997 the city of Astana was proclaimed as the new capital of Kazakhstan replacing Almaty (earlier Alma Ata).

Despite its vast territory, the population of Kazakhstan is not considerable. According to the 1999 census data, 14.953 million people live in Kazakhstan (Abishev 2002: 7). Population density is as high as 6 persons per square kilometers. Citizens of more than 100 ethnicities live in the country. Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, Tatars, Uzbeks, Byelorussians, Uighurs comprise the majority of the population.

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakh is the official language. However, Russian is the language of business and of inter-ethnic intercourse. Tenge (KZT) is the national currency of Kazakhstan which was introduced on November 15, 1993. Regarding confessional status of Kazakhstan, Islam is the most predominant religion. The Muslims of Kazakhstan are mainly Sunnis of Hanafi-Islam. Due to geopolitical peculiarities (i.e., remoteness from the Islamic centres) the impact of Islam on the society of Kazakhstan as an ideology is minimal. Islam underwent transformation primarily due to the nomadic way of life of Kazakhs. Islam developed its peculiar aspects as original syncretism with the local tradition of Tengrism (Shamanism).The second largest confession in Kazakhstan is the Russian Orthodox church. It has about 220 parishes and a number of cloisters. Over 60 percent of the Slavic population in Kazakhstan practices it. Among other confessions, the prominent ones are the Protestants, Lutherans, Roman Catholics and Jews.

Kazakhstan is rich in minerals. It is especially rich in zinc, tungsten, barite, silver, lead, chromium, nickel and gold. Kazakhstan has considerable oil and gas reserves, which are concentrated mostly in the western part of the country. The discovery of new oil rich fields in the South Turgai hollow and the Caspian offshore has broadened the Republic's perspectives of further oil exploration. In a way, it could well be said that the Republic of Kazakhstan possesses a core geo-political space in Eurasia having tremendous natural resources and maintaining a unique multi-ethnic multi-confessional society. Kazakhstan has all the preconditions to be transformed into a positive integrative, accommodative and stable modernizing state.

1.2: Historical background

The process by which Kazakhs became an ethnic group or a nation involves a long term and complicated historical ethno-genesis. Therefore, three historical phases can be seen in the territory of Kazakhstan: the pre-Turkic (18th century B.C. to 4th century A.D.); the Turkic (4th century A.D. to 13th century) and the Turko-Mongolian period from (13th century to till 15th century) (Otarbaeva 1998: 34)

The pre-Turkic period started in the Bronze Age and includes the period of Andronov tribes and the early nomads. The pre-Turkic time also included the Usun and Kaugli tribes. These societies were essentially nomadic. Archaeological evidence from Neolithic sites in northern Kazakhstan confirmed that the first inhabitants on the territory of Kazakhstan were nomads. Kazakh nomadism and clusters as they existed in the late nineteenth- early twentieth century provides the necessary contextual references for understanding the Kazakh intelligentsia's social and economic programs. Kazakh national identity, both pre- revolutionary and Soviet, was configured by the intelligentsia around the cultural symbols (real and imagined) of a nomadic past. Kazakhs were pastoral nomads whose social, economic, and political structures were tightly interconnected with their specific way of life and to 2,500 years of central Asian nomadic heritage. In 4th and 2nd centuries B.C. the nomads set up their first state with its center in the Semireche Region.

The Turkic period began in the middle of the first millennium A.D. with a mass access of Turks. From that time, Turkic tribes became predominant stretching from north Mongolia to the lower course of Amu-Daria River (Otarbaeva 1998: 35). From 4th century to the beginning of the 13th century, the territory of Kazakhstan was the field of west Turkic, Tyurgesh, Karluks. There were also states formed by the Oguzes, the Karakhanids, the Kimeks and the Kipchaks. These states successively replaced one another up to the very Mongol invasion (Abhishev 2000:10). The year 622 A.D. served as a benchmark in the history of Central Asia. The principal empires at this time were Tang China, Sasanian Iran and Byzantium. The Turks had established their Qaghanate in the, middle of the sixth century. The empire of Kok Turks reigned from 522 to 744 A.D. The empire had two branches. The senior branches ruled northwestern Mongolia and were_ called eastern Turks and the junior branch ruled in the west including the region of Semireche as its principal home and was called western Turks (Paksoy 1994: 33). Later (after 622A.D.), Islam played a substantive role in the history of Inner Asia. During the same period, Muslim armies

under the Arabs entered Central Asia, after the rapid conquest of Persia by 651 A.D. The Arabs were driven by the idea of Jihad (Otarbaeva 1998: 34).

The Samanids are also remembered for the jihad and missionary propagation of Islam in Turkestan, Semireche and west Xinjiang. In this region, many Turkic chieftains chose to adopt the new religion and effected wholesale conversion of their tribes. Contemporaray historiography labels these chieftains as Qarakhanids, a family dynasty whose origins are sought among the tribes of Qarluq of the Kazakh region. The Qarakhanids were Turks, however, and their arrival signaled a definitive shift from Iranian to Turkic predominance in Central Asia. They ruled a confederation of tribes living in Semireche (south, west Kazakhstan), Tianshan (present day Kyrgyzstan) and western Xinjiang (Soucek 2000: 83-84). Central Asia over the centuries became to a considerable degree Turkicized. Seljuks and Ghaznanids also pursued large scale Turkicization of the population. By 1218 A.D. the Qarakhanids and their overlords - the Qarakhitay in Semireche were overthrown by Kuchlug. With the arrival of Mongol generals, Kuchlug later got killed while seeking refuge in the Pamir Mountains. This was the time when Genghis khan marched into Inner Asia. This brought the turning point of Inner Asian history- the rise of Mongol empire.

The effects of Mongol invasion varied from cross- cultural exchange to horrifying massacres and devastation in Central Asia. Temujin was born in 1167 in Mongol region. By 1206, he emerged the leader of growing coalition of clans and tribes of Mongolia and later embraced the little of Genghis Khan meaning "world embracing" (Dawson 1955: 117-118). Mongols who looked like a rescue party to help Qarliq ruler of Almaliq, controlled all of Central Asia by 1223, and then Genghis khan returned to Mongolia. Later the conquered territory was distributed among his four sons Juchi, Chaghatay, Ogedey and Toluy, of which Chagatay received Central Asia region consisting of Transoxania, Semireche and Xinjiang. Chagatay died in 1242 A.D. and was succeeded by his grandson Qarahulcgu and thus begun a new stage in Central's history as Chagatayid dynasty.

The Mongols brought a chain of destruction in Central Asia. The Mongols plundered most of the cities of this area and decimated their population. In the Semireche region, not only cities but settlers were attacked by the forced conversion of a territory with a thriving urban and agricultural civilization into a nomad's steppe land. After a century of Mongol invasion, some Chagatayid Khans began to convert to Islam as they chose to live not in Semireche but in

Transoxania, which was largely under the impact of Islam. In contrast, the Semireche and other adjoining territories had developed a special identity - that of a Mongol homeland (Dawson 1995: 117-118).

After the Mongol interlude, the Timurid period (1370-1507) could be viewed as the glorious period for the history of Central Asia. Timur, founder of this dynasty engaged much of his life in military campaigns and destruction, however spared Central Asia. It is during this period that Islamic culture and art rose to new heights in this area. After Timur's death in 1405, Transoxania and Khwarezm was succeeded by his son Sharukh whose reign witnessed the glory of Islamic civilization and later by Sharukh's own son Ulugh Beg. Zahir ul-din Babur (1483-1530) succeeded Ulugh Begh, and later founded the great empire of Mughals in India (Svat 2000: 126-129).

Although Kazakhstan was not directly ruled by Timur or Timurids, it was during this period that the region witnessed the revival of Islam and its wide propagation under Sufi order. It was the time when the Kazakh region, which had developed a special Mongol identity i.e., Moghulistan under the long devastating Mongol influence, started amalgamating itself into the larger Islamic tradition of Central Asia. The last Timurids were pale personalities owing to which some native nomadic group especially- Uzbeks and Kalmyks started asserting their position in central Asia. AbulKhyar having Genghised ancestry, was a Muslim and linguistically and culturally a Turk (Otarbaeva 1998: 144-147). The tribe under his leadership, most of which spoke the Kipchak form of Turkic had their own lineage, but they were also known by general name of Uzbek, swept down beyond the Syr Darya and captured Urgench and Samarkand (Soucek 2000: 144-147). The Uzbek Khan's move made him the immediate neighbours of Timurid Transoxiana and put him close to Chaghatayid Moghulistan. However, this situation was suddenly thrown into confusion by the interruption of Kalmyks from the east.

The Kalmyks were Mongols but were different from Genghis khan in the dialects and were called the 'Western Mongols'. They rose to supremacy in Mongolia, but it was brief as Great fortunes awaited them farther west in the Kipchak Steppe. In 1456 A.D., the Kalmyk Khans entered Moghulistan and the Kipchak steppe and defeated Chagtayid Khans and later the Uzbek chieftains of Abul khair. These constant wars led to the withdrawal of many Uzbek tribesmen from Abulkhyar's authority and joined one follower of the two other Genghisids Janibeg and Girey, who had recently established the basis of a new Khanate in the territory of White Horde

what is now central Kazakhstan (Otarbaeva 1998: 37). Between, 1465-1466 A.D. they had formed the Kazakh Khanate. By the end of the 15th century, the protracted process of the formation of the Kazakh nation had been completed. These rebel Uzbeks came to be known as Kazakhs for the first time. Later they were called as Kyrghyz by the Russians to be finally reverted to Kazakh in 1925 by the Soviets (Paksoy 1994: 32-34). However, the Timurids dynasty could not survive long. In the fifteenth century, the Shaybanid Khans united the Uzbek clans into the Shaybanid Ulus and defeated the last Timurids and replaced it with Shaybanids, thus restoring Genghisid rule in Central Asia (Soucek 2000: 149). The Shaybanids were Turks like the Timurids, considerably exposed to Arabo-Persian Islamic culture, although they spoke a different dialect Kipchak. This ensured a basic continuity than change in this area.

During this period, the trans-continental Silk Road was losing importance as against the European maritime route. Europe including Russia was undergoing a technological and economic revolution. The Safavids, who were Shia, started a new dynasty in Iran in 1501 and they developed antagonistic relations with Sunni Shaybanids. This deadlock isolated Central Asia from orthodox Iran right up to its conquest by Russia in the 19th century.

Apart from this, a segment of Shaybanid Ulus later split and sought refuge with the Chaghatai tribes on the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan border. These tribes, who lived beyond the Shaybanid control, came to be known by outsiders as 'Kazakhs' possibly from the Arabic word Qazac which means 'outlaws'. They started forming a distinct Kazakh identity which really took shape during the sixteenth century. Political structure in the Dasht-i-Kipchaks of Kazakhs had become much looser than the Mongol empire. The most constant feature was the uneasy ebb and flows of alliances and conflict. Although by the sixteenth century Kazakhs had established their distinct identity, they were yet to establish political structure of a Khanate. Their first chief Burunduk Khan (1488-1509) and later Kasim Khan (1509-18) achieved their distinct identity by resisting Uzbek advances and they could with some legitimacy claim to speak on the behalf of all Kazakhs. For the first time, the Kazakh border with the Uzbeks was strung out along the Syr Darya River, with the Uzbeks to the south of the river and Kazakhs to the north. From the seventeenth century however these nomads only seldom and for brief periods accepted the authority of a single Khan: usually they formed three separate tribal confederations or Hordes, called Orda by the Russians but known as Jhuz(hundred) in Kazakh: the Lesser Horde in western Kazakhstan, the Middle Horde in central Kazakhstan and the Greater Horde in southeastern

Kazakhstan. Each horde was composed of tribal, clan and family units ruled by a Khan. The Kazakh Khanates frequently warred against each other.

It is during this period that the Oirots embraced Buddhism. Oirots (Kalmyks) as early as in the 15th century had also invaded Dasht-i-Kipchak, after the defeat from Altan Khan some of the disordered tribes together known as "Jungar" undertook second wave of raids in Kazakh area. Kalmyk incursion into the Kazakh area produced frequent confrontations such as the defeat of Taoke Khan of Middle Horde in 1698 and his successor Pulat Khan in 1723. The Oirots raided Kazakh territory all the way to the right bank of Syr Darya sacking the city of Sayram, Tashkent and Turkestan.

By 1730, the Kazakhs had asserted themselves as a distinct group of nomadic tribes living in the eastern part of Dasht-i-Kipchak, speaking a distinctive Kipchak Turkic idiom but lacking overall political unity. The tribes had coalesced into three confederations, the Greater, Middle and Lesser Hordes. Except for brief period early in their history the Kazakhs never managed to build a united Khanate in the manner of their medieval Turkic and Mongol predecessors. One of the reasons for this may have been the proliferation of Sultans claiming Genghisid descent- still holding positions of prestige and authority but lacked the rise of a truly charismatic leader able to repeat the exploits of his great ancestor. On the other hand, the prestige enjoyed by the steppe aristocracy of Genghisid ancestry may have been a factor in the peculiar vertical division of Kazakhs society into two layers the so called "white bone" and "black bone". However, certain other credentials such as descent from eminent 'Muslim ancestors could also entitle some individuals to claim "white bone" status (Soucek 2000: 162-164).

The rise of Russia as modern power, which began under Ivan IV (1547-84 A.D.) and was quickened by Peter the great (1682-1725), made Russia overwhelmingly stronger than any of her Asian neighbors (Hiro 1994: 107). In view of this new growing disparity, the Russian penetration of the Kazakh steppe was only a matter of time and determination. The Russians at first contended themselves with accepting offers of vassal status from various Kazakh leaders, without actually acquiring military or administrative control over their territory. This complex process started in 1730 when Abul Khayar Khan of Lesser Horde expressed his wish that the Tsar be his suzerain and the request was granted (Soucek 2000: 196). Later Russia received similar assurances of loyalty from the other Kazakh leaders and by 1740 the Middle Horde and in 1742 the Great Horde signed treaties with Moscow (Rashid 1994: 111).

During the next fifty years, the decline of their nomadic life style caused by the devastation of the wars led to a series of revolts by Kazakh nomads against their own Khans, the most far reaching being the revolt of Batyr Sryn in 1792. These revolts encouraged the Russians to abolish the Khanates and between 1822 and 1848 the entire Kazakh territory was incorporated into the Tsarist Russian empire (Soucek 2000: 200-201). The Russian conquest of Central Asia was completed by 1884 with the acquisition of Merv. The conquest of Central Asia, however, bore all the hallmarks of 19th century Europe's colonial expansion with the motivation of acquiring abundant and cheap raw materials such as cotton for the Russian textile industry and inversely, of gaining a privileged position for Russia's commerce (Jalalzai 1994: 166-167).

Russia devised a new administrative structure for the newly acquired Central Asia region. The entire Central Asian region (except Kazakhstan) was divided into five regions (Syrdarya, Semireche, Fergana, Samarkand and Zukaspie) and two Protectorates (Bukhara and Khiva) and was administered by Governorate-General of Turkestan residing in Tashkent (Soucek 2000: 201). However, owing to geographical and historical linkage with Russia proper and with Siberia, Kazakhstan was divided into three regions (oblasts). The western most part, the area of Lesser Horde became the oblast of Uralsk, whose administrative centre was the city of Uralsk and whose Governor reported directly to Russian ministry of Interior. The area of Middle Horde had become the oblast of Turgai whose governor also reported to the ministry of interior. The oblasts of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblast covered the territory of the Greater Horde. The Russians encouraged the settlement of Cossacks in the Kazakh grazing and farming lands. Along with 1783 to 1870 there were at least eight major revolts by the Kazak tribes against these Russian settlers but they were defeated by the Russian armies (Rashid 1994: 111). However, Central Asia's natives, having lost their political and economic independence retained their religion and remained Muslims in their religion, culture and way of life.

However, on the eve of the First World War, the Tsarist regime had to contend with two dangerous opponents - one its own socialist dissident and revolutionaries of various hues and another strong latent nationalism and bitter resentment persisting against Russia. The policies pursued by the Tsarist regime in Central Asia brought more discontent and clashes between the Russian Tsarist authorities and the Kazakhs and their subsequent revolts against Moscow's policy. The parallel process of massive emigration of peasants from the European part of Russia

to Kazakhstan took place. In 1891, one million Russian peasants were shifted to northern Kazakhstan (Rashid 1994: 112).

The simmering discontent exploded in 1916 when the great revolt of Kazakh nomads against Tsarist regime took place which was brutally crushed by the Russians. This revolt was the first nationalistic protest by native Kazakhs against the Russian empire. In 1905, a handful of Kazakh intellectuals had set up Alash Orda, an informal underground party that was the first nationalist party calling for a free Turkestan in Central Asia. These intellectuals laid the first seeds of Kazakh nationalism and their writings today play a pivotal role in the re-emergence of Kazakh identity.

1.3: Population, Life and Culture

There was no such thing as a unified and stable Kazakh state. The Kazakhs were a pastoral, nomadic people of Turko-Mongol stock who began to consolidate in the fifteenth century by organizing themselves into three groups, or Zhuzes commonly termed hordes, the Greater, Middle and Lesser Hordes. The Lesser Horde had its territory on what is now western Kazakhstan, the Middle Horde in north-central Kazakhstan, and the Great Horde in southern and southeastern Kazakh. Territorial domination was a relative concept for the Kazakhs, given the nature of the nomadic livestock breeding economy, although each Kazakh aul (the migratory unit) had fixed routes and pasturage during their annual migratory cycle. The three hordes were loosely unified. The first steps taken to unite Kazakhstan with Russia date from the 30's of the 18th century. When Kalmyk Mongol tribesmen began moving west and started taking control of Kazakh pasturelands, the Khans (chieftains) who ruled the Small and Middle Hordes sought protection from Russia's ruler, swearing allegiance to the Russian Tsars. The Khans however did not anticipate that this allegiance would ultimately lead to the colonization of their land and to the blurring of geographical boundaries between their people and Russians. The Kazakhs understood it as an alliance of a weak ruler to a stronger one, but Russians viewed it as a prelude to a fuller control, which was exercised by the forcible conquest of the Kazakh lands in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Unification with Russia created new conditions for development. An end was put to the tyranny of the Khiva and Kokand khans, the arbitrary rule of the feudal beys restricted and the bloody internecine wars ended, all of which facilitated normal economic life on the territory of

Kazakhstan. Unification with Russia marked the beginning of the end of the stagnation and isolation of the Kazakh tribes who were an entire historical epoch behind Russia. Russian settlers began to cultivate the steppes. Settlement of the expanses of Kazakhstan, chiefly by Russians and Ukrainians dates from the 16th century when Cossacks began to settle in Northern Kazakhstan. Thereafter Kazakhstan became of the main settlement areas for peasants from the southern gubernias of European Russia. Settlers increased after 1905. Northern area was transformed into a crop-raising area. Several million acres of virgin land were turned into fields of wheat and millet. Many Kazakhs maintain that from time to time their ancestors suffered at Russian hands, continuing up to the Alma Ata uprising of 1986. In honour of this event, December 16 was chosen as Kazakhstan's independence day. Kazakh nationalist go so far as to accuse the Russians of making three separate attempts at genocide of the Kazakh people. The first was the famine of 1890's when after several hard winters the Kazakhs were turned away from traditional pastures to make way for Russian settlers. The second began with the deportation of hundred and thousands of Kazakhs in the aftermath of the failed anti-Russian uprising of 1916, which was then quickly followed by the famine and epidemics of the Civil War from 1918-1922. The worst Russian treatment of the Kazakhs resulted from the policies of collectivization in the 1930's which shattered the traditional pastoral livestock based culture of the Kazakhs. During World War II Soviet authorities once again drove Kazakhs from traditional lands in the northern part of the republic to make way for future European settlers during the Virgin Lands drive of 1950's. Right until the October Revolution the Kazakhs suffered from a two-fold oppression: on the one hand Russian Tsarism, Russian landlords, Russian and foreign capitalists, and on the other, the local beys, owners of larger flocks and herds. Exploitation of the peasant poor by their kinsmen was concealed by the relics of patriarchal relations. By degrees Kazakhstan began to be drawn into the Russian market and became the colony of the Tsars. It was adapted to the economy of the central areas of Russia as a raw material appendage. The slight development of industry in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan did not change the general picture of the economic and culture which, as before, remained exceedingly backward. Ninety percent of the population could neither read nor write. It was left to the Great October Socialist Revolution to launch an offensive against this ignorance and backwardness.

1.4: Kazakhstan as a Multi-ethnic Society

It is quite manifest that there has been an ethnic component to virtually every major sphere of state activity in Kazakhstan. However, real or likely the threat to the country's territorial integrity, the spectre of secession and possible annexation of Northern Kazakhstan to Russia, preeminence of Russians in the core economic sectors, their competing numerical strength, to disengage the new Republic from possible inter-ethnic strife and finally to establish the new Republic as plural, democratic and poly-cultural society among the comity of nations remain ever present factors shaping Kazakhstan's state policy and its nationalizing practices in particular. Realization of negative consequences of ethno-nationalism has forced the state to move away from it and turn to the politics of formation of the multi-ethnic state in Kazakhstan.

The new constitution of Kazakhstan is dedicated to "We ... the people of Kazakhstan". The republic is made a democratic, secular, law-based unitary state with a presidential system of rule (The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995: 127-129). The rights and liberties of the individual are recognized and guaranteed in the Constitution. No one may be subjected to discrimination on grounds of origin, sex, race, language, religion or place of residence. Freedom of speech and creativity are guaranteed. All are entitled to use their native language and culture. Censorship is prohibited. Any action capable of disrupting inter-ethnic accord is deemed unconstitutional. Any form of restriction to civil rights and liberties on political grounds is not permitted. Human and civil rights and liberties may be curtailed only by law and only to the extent that is necessary to defend the constitutional system and to safeguard public order and peace. Civil and political solidarity of all citizens, residing in a particular state is assumed as a basis of that state. Legal basis for providing equal rights and freedom to all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious identity has been created.

National policy of Kazakhstan is based on the clear and distinct principles like: search for inter-ethnic interaction, social stability as a basis for fair solution to the question of nationality, supremacy of law and strengthening of national independence and active policy of integration (Abhishev 2002: 45-46).

Kazakhstan is the home to many nationalities. Apart from the two huge populations of Kazakhs and Russians some of these groups are Belarusians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, etc. The country's Uzbek population is located primarily in southern Kazakhstan and also in Zhambyl oblast. This population is largely trilingual (Uzbek, Kazakh and Russian).

Kazakhstan also has Jewish population. Kazakhstan's Jews are small but disproportionately influential group, composed of the descendants of wartime evacuees or of people who sought quieter backwaters in Soviet times.

Kazakhstan Census on January 12, 1989 showed that Germans constituted 5.8 percent of Kazakhstan population. They are the descendants of settlers originally enticed to the Volga region in the eighteenth century by fellow German Catherine the Great. Their ancestors were exiled to Kazakhstan by Stalin during World War II. They began leaving the country for repatriation in Germany in the late 1980's, and by 1992 they accounted for only 4.7 percent of Kazakhstan's population. According to *OMRI Daily Digest* (1996) the size of Kazakhstan's German population has dropped to roughly one-third the 1989 figure owing to the continual reabsorption assistance provided by the German Government.

There are large numbers of Chechens and Tatars (about 1 percent in 1992, including both Volga and Crimean Tatars) in Kazakhstan. Both the Crimean Tatars and the Chechens are the descendants of peoples expelled from their homelands by Stalin after World War II. Kazakhstan's Volga Tatars are often descendants of families who have lived on the Kazakh steppe for centuries.

The Uighurs in Kazakhstan though not numerically strong (1.1 percent in 1989) are significant owing to the fact that Kazakhstan's border with China is the longest in Central Asia. While better assimilated into their places of residence, the Uighurs nevertheless resemble the Kurds in that they see themselves as the heirs of a historical nation that now lies buried beneath several other states. Since the largest group of Uighurs live in China, where they press for greater autonomy, this population worries all the leaders of Central Asia.

In short, Kazakhstan is going to face problems created by the multi-national nature of its population. Long after Kazakhs have emerged as the dominant majority in the country, Kazakhstan will remain the home of a huge minority community. Coping with the large Russian population has tended to present the discussion of multi-ethnicity in Kazakhstan as a kind of zero-sum problem. While Kazakhstan is certain to become a state in which the Kazakh language and culture predominate, its leaders must still find ways to stimulate a sense of belonging and citizenship among the enormous minority of its people who are not Kazakhs but who live and work in the republic.

The Assembly of Nations of Kazakhstan, which was established in 1995 under the initiative of President Nazarbayev plays an important role in the maintenance of inter-ethnic harmony in the country. The Assembly is comprised of all the national and cultural centres and all the representatives of the ethnic minorities living in the country. It has a status of consulting and advisory body to the President of the Republic. The Assembly has the following objectives: assistance in maintenance of the inter-ethnic harmony, development of proposals on state policy promoting development of friendly relations in Kazakhstan, assistance in their religious and cultural revival and concern for the diverse national interests in the national policy.

Today over 300 Republican, regional, district and city national and cultural centres are running across the Republic. In principle, the centres are designed as the basic units of ethno-cultural self-government. According to Nazarbayev, "they constitute the hearts of preserving national self consciousness, the organizational mechanism for supporting and developing national traditions, cultures and the original spirituality of the nations and national groups. These national-cultural centres must take initiative in achieving harmony among people not only of different nationalities but also religious confessions." (Schatz 2000: 81).

It is often been maintained that inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan have been stable. For instance in 1992-94, the inter-ethnic relations ranked the fifth among the most important problems in Kazakhstan. At present, people in Kazakhstan believe that the issue takes the 13th position (Abhishev 2002: 49-51). All the ethnic groups seem to be tolerant and willing to work in the multi-ethnic teams and are ready to cooperate and interact with other ethnic groups. Nevertheless despite the positive factors in multi-ethnic relations, one should keep in mind that the balance that reached in the multi-ethnic relations is not constant. The relations change all the time. In late 1999 many questions remained about the viability of state institutions, but the view that Kazakhstan would experience ethnic strife has withered even as the state-led coercion of cultural minorities are weakly employed (Schatz 2000: 72).

Rather, the new Republic of Kazakhstan has chosen the gradual incremental process of Kazakhisation. They have devised strategies to adopt the formal legal requirements of a civil society while simultaneously pursuing extra-legal measures that run counter to the intentions of institutional state crafters. The institutional protections are genuinely minimum as the real politics of ethnic divisions lies beyond the scope of the legally 'civic' designations. The political elites offer minimal forms of institutional accommodation for its ethnic minorities. Preferential

treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in practical quest for building a Kazakh identity for the Republic by reinterpreting history and popularizing the call 'Kazakhstan for Kazakhs' etc. have definitely contributed to a large scale out-migration of ethnic Russians in 1990s. Likewise, the politics of language preference was eventually settled with a compromise in which Russian was upgraded to the level of 'official' language, yet coercive elements of Kazakh language promotion (such as the requirements that all state officials pass proficiency exams in Kazakh by 2005) are still continuing. Despite formulations in the constitution and other legislative acts guaranteeing the equality of all citizens, nationalizing policies and practices are manifest in the iconography of the new regimes, the privileged status according to local languages, newly revised histories and the exclusion of non-eponymous groups from the echelons of power (Smith 1990: 139). There has been an ethnic component to virtually every major sphere of state activity. The state as a whole is being perceived as nationalizing by representative of the national minority and, therefore, exercises a real effect on relations between titular and non-titular groups.

The establishment is looking for different ways to ensure both the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and the success of its strategies of building a nationalizing regime, i.e., they are trying to combine discursive policies that in practice are difficult to reconcile. Apparently, the multi-ethnic composition of Kazakhstan is one of the reasons why President Nazarbayev argues for civil accord and inter-ethnic accommodation in the Republic. He constantly emphasizes that no one ethnic group should have privileges in the Republic.

So far, Nazarbayev has proved to be a very skilful politician who is capable, if not to defuse inter-ethnic tension, then to keep it under control. His authoritarian regime remains the only effective instrument to prevent ethno-political polarization and instability in the region (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 65). However, it is unlikely to be durable guarantor of social stability. The question of power sharing between different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan still remains unresolved. A virtual absence of consociational structures makes developing a bargaining political culture a particularly difficult task. Indeed, the central challenge of cultural pluralism has not disappeared in Kazakhstan (Schatz 2000: 90). Under such conditions, the ethnic Russian northern regions could be the site of autonomy or separatist movements that could provoke tensions.

The competition for political participation, economic opportunities and cultural status virtually ensures that ethnicity will remain an important criterion for political organization and that

ethnically based claims will maintain a prominent place on the agenda of the state. Devoid of plural democratic traditions and institutions in the new Republic, the authoritarian type of regime in Kazakhstan could only ensure stability in the region and exercise sufficient control over the ethno-political situation to avoid inter-ethnic clashes while the new nation-state is in the making.

Research Objectives

1. To study the strategic ambiguity between civic and ethnic nationalism.
2. To analyze the Consequences of quota system in ethnic immigration policy of Kazakhstan
3. To analyze how the nation building process has created tensions between Oralman Kazakhs and native residents over jobs, degrees of 'Kazakhness' and other matters.
4. To analyze how the nation building policy of Kazakhstan has been be able to construct ethnic, supra-ethnic, and sub-national identities.
5. To study how the different ethnic identities have intersected, reinforced or undermined one another.
6. To study how social and political cohesiveness of the collectivity imaged as "Kazakh" has been successful.
7. To analyze the issues involved in Oralman programme.

Research Questions

1. What is a “nation building policy” and what are its constituent parts?
2. Has the primary goal of the nationhood policy of Kazakhstan been met?
3. Has the nation building process of Kazakhstan been a one sided process in favor of the titular group?
4. How has Kazakhstan’s nation building policy affected the Russian population?
5. What are the main Challenges to intra group cohesion to ethnic Kazakhs?
6. How much Kazakhstan’s nation building process has been successful?
7. How the migration and migration policy has affected the socio-economic development of Kazakhstan?
8. Is Kazakhstan heading to a civic nation unified by ethnic Kazakhs, or a civic nation of tri-lingual Kazakhstanis, or a multi-cultural mosaic of the nationalities of Kazakhstan, or a binational state?

Hypothesis

The following hypothesis will be tested in this research:

1. Kazakhstan’s policy of encouraging immigration of ethnic Kazakhs from outside is a continuation of Soviet ‘korenizatsiia’ or indigenisation programme.

2. Kazakh government has followed a nuanced policy of, on the one hand, giving primacy to 'Kazakhness' and on the other trying to build a multi-ethnic civic nation.

Research Methodology

The research intends to use historical, cultural insight to contemporary developments and events. The study is interdisciplinary in nature as the entire discourse is based and contextualized in qualitative, cultural insight to contemporary developments and events. The research intends to use qualitative method of social research that would require both theoretical and empirical analysis. The theoretical includes nations and nationalism that seeks to understand the nation building of Kazakhstan in a general context. It takes into account the nation and nationalism theories which are extremely useful for this research.

This study will try to understand the context of the immigration policy of Kazakhstan. These theories will be used to understand the context following a deductive approach, but at the same time the context will also illuminate on the relevance of existing theories, following an inductive or verification method.

A substantial part of this discussion would be empirical as it tries to deal with the Oralman programme. It also seeks to investigate the impediments in the immigration policy. A layered analysis of various aspects of migration policy will be also done.

This study like any other study, involves both descriptive and casual methods of inferences regarding the impediments in Nation building of Kazakhstan. Both structural and agency factors would be taken into account like migration policies, Government Orders in building a civic nation.

This study is based on both primary and as well as the secondary sources. The primary sources of information include government documents, interviews, reports, and surveys conducted by various national and international organizations. Secondary sources will include the existing literature on the subject in the forms of books and articles and web reports.

Chapterisation

Chapter 1:

Introduction: Land, People and History

This chapter will discuss about the demography of Kazakhstan. It will give a detailed account of Kazakh history, culture and civilization.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnicity and Nation-building

This chapter will discuss about the theories on ethnicity, nation and nationalism.

Chapter 3

Building a Civic Nation

This chapter will give an account of the various policies which the Kazakh Government is promoting towards building a multi-ethnic civic nation. The chapter will also highlight the powerful role played by the Kazakh President in the nation building approach and in identifying the true Kazakh identity.

Chapter 4

Immigration policy and Oralman programme

This chapter will discuss the definition of Oralman and will also discuss the Oralman programme. It will also focus on the condition of Oralman after their return in Kazakhstan. This chapter will also discuss the migration policy of Kazakhstan over the years. And will also discuss how the demography of Kazakhstan has been impacted by the migration.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This chapter will summarize the findings of the study.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNICITY AND NATION BUILDING

The rapid political transformation and economic liberalization unleashed in the former Soviet Union since mid-1980s set the stage for the re-emergence of ethnic identity, ethnic dissensions and conflicts in this part of the world. The culmination of the first phase of this process was the dissolution of Soviet Union and second, the creation of 15 independent states in December 1991 (Tolipov 2001: 183-185). Ethnic issues like ethnic identity, ethnic dissensions, ethnic conflicts etc. are definitely not new phenomena, yet they are being regarded as most pressing problems facing many countries of the world in modern times.

They concern basically with the question of relationship between diverse groups of people often characterized by distinct race, culture and religions living within the political boundaries of a state. The state of relationship between various groups varies in each country depending upon such variables as its historicity, political process and the many socio-economic configuration in it. The relationship ranges from a relatively harmonious form to one of antagonism and open hostility of conflictual type.

It was long felt among political discussions and theories that along with the onset of modernization all the primordial identities including ethnic and confessional categories will wither away. However, ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the developed world including post-Soviet Republics have become crucial variables in the formation, reformation and consolidation of state structures in all Soviet successor states including Kazakhstan. Inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflict appear to have acquired a marked intensity.

The rise of ethnic nationalism and formation of ethnic political movements in many of the states can largely be attributed to the legacy of European colonization and de-colonization which created sovereign states incorporating many ethnic groups by ignoring existing ethnic and cultural divisions and popular political aspirations (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 16-17). In their post-colonial political history, it was often assumed that the process of modernization, development of modern communication technologies and nation-building would gradually and over a period of time undermine all kinds of sub-sectarian and primordial identities and replace them with common state centred identities.

However, this optimism was quite unwarranted. The rise of ethno-nationalistic feelings are growing hand in hand along with the process of nation-building and modernization. Lack of internal cohesion, ethnic polarization, social fragmentation, civil disharmony are making excess of problems in the task of nation-building and governing in such states. The demand for recognition as 'nations' on the basis of ethnic self-determination has symbolised revolt against state and its power structure. The post-Soviet Central Asian region is a kaleidoscope of latent, overt and explosive ethnicity.

Thus, despite several theoretical assumptions, it is tough to distance the concepts of ethnicity and nation building as both are closely intertwined in the evolutionary process of a political community (Nayak 2001: 2). At present, all Soviet successor states including Kazakhstan are in the grip of hectic nation building amidst rising ethnic assertions.

Against this background, an attempt is be made here to examine the role of ethnicity in the nation-building process in the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics (especially Kazakhstan) in theoretical perspective. It will try to assess: Under what conditions does ethnicity impede or facilitate the process of state-building and state-centric nation building? Under what situation does an ethnic community assert its status as a 'nation' and what are the requirements for its success? Under what situation ethnicity of a particular group progressively becomes demanding competitive and conflictual? What are various approaches pursued by the power wielders to cope with the challenge of plurality? Why theoretical formulations on nation-building have failed to comply with the challenge of ethnic plurality?

In a way, this chapter tries to concentrate on the relational pattern of ethnicity and nation building. It does not cover all the aspects of nation-building, rather it would deal with ethnic obstacles in the nation-building process. This chapter seeks to analyze the conceptual framework of concepts like Ethnic group, ethnicity, ethno-nationalism, nation and nationalism, different approaches of nation-building, to trace the difference between state-building and nation-building process and to identify the reasons for ethnicity that has compelled it to assume the burden of nation-building. A critical survey of the historical background of the nationality policy of former Soviet Union for its Republics would be made. It also assesses the nation-building trends in post-Soviet Kazakhstan under contested theoretical domain and fore see its vitality. Finally, an attempt is made to reach to any formidable approach regarding nation-building in the post-Soviet

Kazakhstan. Before we discuss relational pattern between ethnicity and nation-building, it is quite imperative to address the terminological problems regarding the study.

2.1: Ethnicity:

The term 'ethnicity' used to be acknowledged as "the positive feelings of belonging to a cultural group" (Spoonley 1988), has since the collapse of communist regimes come to disrepute containing negative aspects. After gaining their independence unexpectedly and with little if any, preparation, the states of the Central Asian region, have entered a transitional period in their histories. All these states are now searching for new formulae and socio-political foundations of national development in the hope to find their own niche in the new geopolitical space.

In as much as the disintegration of the USSR took place under the banner of ethnic nationalism, it is only natural that ethnification or even racialization of identity politics has become an important ingredient in Central Asian politics (Smith et al. 1998: 1). The post-Soviet Central Asian society is largely shaping their identity much by ethnic politics of 'exclusion and division' rather than 'inclusion and coexistence'.

There is a wide divergence among scholars regarding the meaning and interpretation of the term 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic community'. Keeping in view the growing importance of the concept 'ethnic' in plural modernizing society like Kazakhstan, it is quite imperative to address the terminological problematique in this regard.

The term 'ethnicity' is etymologically derived from the Greek word 'ethnos' which means 'nation'. This concept has undergone several modifications. In the contemporary social science, ethnicity refers to a combination of both biological and cultural attributes (Nayak 2001: 24). Scholars like Shibulani Warner and Kwan consider ethnic characteristics as derived from common descent and denied role of culture in it. On the other, scholars like Gluckman, Mitchel and Epstein put emphasis on culture as the basis of ethnicity. According to Parsons, "Ethnicity is a primary focus of group identity, that is, the organization of plural person into distinctive groups and of solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups. The members of the ethnic group have a distinctive identity of their own which is rooted in a distinctive sense of its history- this identity is basic to the idea of ethnicity" (Nayak 2001: 25). Max Weber called ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of

similarities of physical type or of customs or of both or because of memories of colonization or migration” (Nayak 2001: 25).

The Soviet tradition of interpreting ethnicity is heavily dominated by primordial approach. Shirokogorov, Lev Gumilev, Yulian Bromley and others gave 'Soviet theory of ethnos' which remained a dominant theoretical paradigm for the study of ethnicity in former Soviet Union (Tishkov 1997: 1-4). For some, ethnos are a group of people, speaking a common language, who recognize their shared heritage and have a shared complex of social conventions, mode of life, preserved and sanctified traditions which differentiate them from other groups. For others, ethnos is a historically stable entity of people developed on a certain territory and possessing shared relatively stable features of culture (including language) and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity and of their difference from other similar entities. Ethnicity was considered natural, innate and inescapable and ethnos as an 'ethno-social organism (ESO). ESO is the basic category, with its highest manifestations expressed through being a nation.

Due to the confusion over meaning and interpretation, a working definition refers to an ethnic group as “either a large or small groups of people, in either backward or advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited culture, racial similarity, common religion and belief in common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group” (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 18-19). This feeling of group solidarity and together sharing common symbols and a structure of discourse, are understood to provide the intimate cohesion so much essential for a distinct ethnic identity. In recent years, the concept of ethnicity has been advanced as a generic term covering conflict and tension arising out of the cultural diversity in a territorial state.

2.2: Nation:

The contemporary political usage of the term ethnic group has been primarily restricted to a 'quasi-national kind of minority group' within the state which has somehow not achieved the status of a nation. The term nation has been used in many different senses and to denote many different things by scholars. A useful and holistic definition has been provided by Ernest Barker, according to which, a nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races but possesses a shared descent of thought and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of shared history, hold a shared descent of religious belief, who

generally and as a rule use a shared language as the vehicle of their thought and feelings and who besides shared thoughts and feelings also cherish a common will and accordingly form or tend to form, a separate state for the expression and realization of that will. From this definition, it follows that an important characteristic necessary for a nation to exist is the desire among its members to be either politically independent or autonomous.

Stalin described nation as a historically evolved stable community. It is characterized by four main features: it was a community of language, of territory, of economic life and of a psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture (Tishkov 1997: 12-13).

All definitions of nation emphasize its essentially political nature. A conceptual distinction between nation and state is in place. Whilst the nation is a cultural entity identifiable by its "character," the state is judicial-political-legal entity identifiable by its sovereign right over a territory (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 20). The two often coincide and the term 'nation-state' captures this relationship. This is an ideal typical concept that refers to the presence of the combination of a common culture and common territory. As long as an ethnic nation is coterminous with the state, it can be termed as nation-state. The popular tendency to equate nation with the state is not tenable. The overwhelming majority of states in the world today including Kazakhstan are multi-national or multi-ethnic. In many parts of Asia and Africa, multi-ethnic administrative entities were converted to sovereign statehood during decolonization without ascertaining the element of 'nation' within the constituent ethnic groups. State building occurred first in these states, to be followed by the more difficult task of building a political nation that would supersede hundreds of ethnic nations within their borders.

2.3: Nationalism:

Attached to the notion of 'nation' is the term 'nationalism' which made its first appearance after the French Revolution. The term nationalism, has come to symbolize different things to different people, whose earliest mention was found in the works of German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder in 1774 (Shafer 1972: 16).

Carlton Hayes, one of the pioneers in the study of nationalism, understood it in four senses in modern times (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 21). First, nationalism signifies the actual historical process which established nationality. Second, it must be understood as principle or ideal behind

the actual historical process. Third, it must also denote political activities of particular political parties thereby combining historical process with political theory. Finally, nationalism is a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loyalties and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and its mission are integral parts.

To Hans Kohn, "Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness." He pointed out that in our complex modern civilization, the number of groups to which an individual may belong has greatly increased, nevertheless, within these pluralistic and conflicting kinds of group-consciousness there is one which is recognized as the supreme and most important to which each group adhere. This supreme group is the nation and one's consciousness for and loyalty to this group is nationalism (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 21). Weber and Smith asserted the fact that nations are distinguished by the fact that the objective of their social action can only be the 'autonomous polity', a sovereign state of their own and they derive their sense of community from historically specific political actions (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 22). In accordance with this definition, nationalism exists whenever individuals feel they belong primarily to the nation and whenever affective attachment and loyalty to that nation overrides all the other attachment and loyalties.

2.4: Ethnicity-Nation State Linkage:

Nation-state in principle demands congruence of cultural nation as well as political nation and insist that in an ideal state the national community will not split into cultural and political spheres. The nationalist can exploit this perpetual ambiguity. Indeed, ambiguity is a strong card in the hands of nationalists. They can build up the nation from different materials and feed it from different sources (Guibernau and John 1997: 4-7). The one could be ethnic component as it is evident in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

The relationship between nation-state and ethnicity is made clear by Oomen (Nayak 2001: 29-30). According to him, ethnicity is due to the rupture between territory and other primordial attributes. The process through which a nation is transformed into an ethnic group and an 'ethnic' takes the shape of a nation, is an important subject of analysis because an 'ethnic' having legitimate authority over a territory gives rise to a nation-state. A nation undergoes the process of 'ethnification' when it lacks the territory and legitimate claim to political authority over it. To

Oomen, ethnic nation and state have a processual relationship with the legitimate claim over a specific region, an ethnic takes the form of a nation and with the possession of political rights, a nation becomes a political entity called state (Nayak 2001: 30).

An ethnic group can remain within a nation-state or be spread over more than one nation-state. However, with the interaction and co-existence of various ethnic groups and nations certain new attributes may spring up that will give a "collective self-definition" and a new meaning to them. The concept of 'pluralism' is based on the multi-national or poly-ethnic character of a social system (Kook 2000: 43-48). The ethnic groups in a plural society mix but do not combine as they exist separately within the same political unit. Vander Berghe defines plural society as a compartmentalization into quasi-independent sub-systems on the basis of cultural and social segmentation. In addition, he listed down some more characteristics frequently associated with pluralism such as (Nayak 2001:30-31):

a) Relative absence of value consensus b) Relative presence of cultural heterogeneity c) Relative presence of conflict between the significant corporate groups d) Relative autonomy between parts of the social system e) Relative importance of coercion and economic interdependence as basis of social integration and f) Political domination by one of the corporate groups over others.

Many a times the notion of 'culture' and 'ethnic' are intensively reconstructed by political elites, to legitimize their power and to strengthen statecraft. Thus, attempts to recall archaic, primordial history to describe modern nationalism and to predict its future can be limited, irrational and even misleading.

2.5: Ethnic Identity: Primordial or Constructed?

A further problem for the theory of ethnicity is posed by the use of term 'ethnic identity'. As Anthony Cohen put it 'ethnicity has come to be regarded as a mode of action and of representation, it refers to a decision people make to depict themselves or others symbolically as bearers of certain cultural identity (Guibernau and John 1997: 4-5). Scholars are divided in their opinion regarding how ethnic identity is formed and why it persists. To some ethnic identity is part of the archaic and primordial history and to some it is purposely constructed in its effort to gain material or political advantage. Even in post Soviet Central Asian Republics, ethnic identities are reoriented so as to help them in state and nation building.

From the perspective of the primordialist school, ethnic identity is a biologically 'given' or 'natural' phenomenon (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 23). To them, it is a subjectively held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criteria. Anthony Smith exemplifies this approach by referring to six bases or foundations of ethnic identity. A distinct group name in order to be recognized as a distinct community must have a shared belief by group members in the myth of common ancestry and descent, the presence of historical memories among group members, a shared culture, an attachment to a specific territory and a sense of common solidarity (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 23).

On the other, the constructivist school categorically rejected the primordial argument that ethnic identity is a biologically natural phenomenon. For them ethnic identity is something that is socially constructed. Max Weber viewed ethnic groups as human groups whose belief in a common ancestry is so strong that it leads to the creation of community (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 24). Paul Brass asserts that ethnicity should be viewed as the social and political creation of elites, who draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well being or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves (Brass 1991: 20-23).

Ethnicity is seen as part of the repertoire that is calculated and chosen consciously by an individual or a group in order to satisfy certain interests and to achieve certain goals. It is a modern phenomenon. It can emerge or re-emerge as a result of changing power structures. For the social constructivists, cultural markers can even be manipulated to rationalize the identity and organization of the ethnic group. Ethnic sentiment is seen as the result of purposeful efforts of elites who are professional producers of subjective visions of the social world. They pay special attention to mentalities and language as key symbols around which a perception of ethnic distinctiveness crystallizes (Guibernau and John 1997: 4-5). As evident in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, elements of culture like language, religious belief systems, historical monuments and heroes and history are being consciously articulated and rewritten in an attempt to satisfy certain interests and politically legitimize the newly gained independence and nationhood. The ethnic identity, is thus constructed to match the doctrine of nationalism in post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

2.6: From Ethnic Group to Nationality

Normally ethnic groups use ethnicity for their civil rights, economic well being and educational opportunities. Sometime, they demand a major say for the group in the political system as a whole or control a piece of territory within the country. In so far as it succeeds by its own efforts in achieving any one of these goals either within an existing state or in a state of its own, it becomes a nationality or a nation. Nations may be created by the transformation of an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic state into self-conscious political entity or by the amalgamation of diverse groups and the formation of an inter-ethnic composite national culture through the agency of the modern state (Brass 1991: 20). In both cases, the effort is made to give subjective and symbolic meanings to merely objective distinctions between peoples and to increase the number of symbolic referents that they have in common with each other and that distinguish them from other groups (Brass 1991: 20).

There are two stages in the development of nationality. The first involves the movement from ethnic category to community (Brass 1991: 22). This sees the selection of particular dialects, language or religious practices or historical symbols from a variety of available alternatives. Depending on the context, at this stage one may notice such changes as the creation of a self-conscious language community, the formation of caste association from a caste category or a community of believers. The subjective meanings of symbols of identity are intensified and become more relational than personal. Language becomes not merely a means of communication but a priceless heritage or group culture, historical sites become sacred shrines (Brass 1991: 22). This stage also involves effort to bring multiple symbols in congruence. For example, where both religious and linguistic symbols are potential bases for differentiating one group from another, it is easy to understand the process of promoting multi-symbol congruence. Religious elites will usually select the group's religion as the leading symbol and language will be used as a secondary reinforcing symbol of unity. Moreover, the religious elites will attempt to promote the congruence of language with religion by promoting education and literature in the same language. As evident in Kazakhstan, Islamic rival and promotion of Kazakh language are seen congruent to build distinct Kazakh identity after independence.

The process of development of communities from ethnic categories is particularly associated with the early stages of modernization in multi-ethnic societies. The second stage in the transformation of ethnic groups from communities to nationalities involves the articulation and

acquisition of social, economic and political rights for the members of the group or for the groups as a whole or for recognition of the group's corporate existence as a political body or nationality (Brass 1991: 41-65). However, realization of their demands or politicization of ethnicity depends primarily on inequality in the distribution of available resources, social benefits and opportunities between distinct ethnic groups and perceived relative deprivation. High degree of ethnic nationalism exists when there is a system of ethnic stratification in which one ethnic group is dominant over another. It also depends upon the degree to which the process of building communal consciousness has involved the creation of organizational resources necessary to build political movements. Government policies may be critical factors in influencing a group's capacity to survive as nationality. Government may choose to follow clearly, pluralist policies by establishing political structures such as federalism or by conceding to different ethnic groups the right to receive education through the medium of their mother tongue to protect, preserve and promote their culture in variety of ways (Brass 1991: 50-55). Government on the other, may also indirectly influence the development of ethnic conflict through policies that distribute state resources for government employment. Russification policy and promotion of Russian language in Central Asian Republics (including Kazakhstan) during Soviet regime stimulated ethnic feelings among the natives. The movement from community to nationality usually involves an inevitable struggle for power between competing ethnic groups that may range from competing more successfully on economic grounds for the members of the ethnic group to willingness of elites from dominate ethnic groups to share political power, to shifting to an alternative political arena and finally to secessionism.

It is through these two stages, an ethnic category transforms itself into nationality and thereby create a new kind of nationalism i.e., ethno nationalism - which has given a new kind of indigenous challenge to the process of nation building in post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

2.7: Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

The last century has seen a debate held amid scholars of nationalism on the probable existence of two types of nations (and nationalisms): the first is civic and political, and the other is ethnic and cultural. Hans Kohn was among the first to observe this and coined the terms in his book, *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944). According to Kohn, the whole world, except for the West, has experienced transformation of nationalism not into 'people's states'. On the contrary, while

drawing the new boundaries, 'ethnographic' specifications dominated and states were constructed on the basis of ethnicity and on 'history, monuments and graveyards', while in Western countries nationalism emerged out of political interests and 'rights of man' (Kohn 1944: 329, 574).

In contrast to civic nationalism that brings people of various backgrounds under one umbrella by emphasizing a common fate, ethnic nationalism accentuates the need for similarity between the homogenous ethnic group, the nation and the state that belongs to this nation (Gledhill 2005). Civic nationalism is often referred to as 'good' nationalism, whereas ethnic nationalism is often described as 'a term of abuse' (Brubaker 1999: 64). Although A.D. Smith (1991) accepts that Western and Eastern models of nationhood have different historical roots, he finds a crude classification of nations to reciprocally exclusive civic and ethnic sets to be improper. From the beginning of the mid-1990s, a growing body of literature began to question both conceptual and empirical soundness of the ethnic-East/civic- West framework. Some features of Eastern nationalism as designated by Kohn (1944) can be found in the nature of a few European nationalisms, such as Irish or French nationalisms of the later nineteenth century, whereas some Eastern-European nationalisms, such as Czech and Hungarian tend to have more Western characteristics (Sekulic 2004). For Sekulic (2004), the reason for such a dilemma is that ideas and propositions are easily accessible and adoptable in the modern world, and therefore it is reasonable to think about the arrival of civic nationalism from the West and about its successful establishment in some Eastern-European countries. In other words, Sekulic (2004) argues that, subsequent to the Cold War era, a new phase of human history began. This post-Cold War era is marked by the 'domination of Western models of thought – human rights, democracy, open society, market, and individualism', which have replaced other ways of thinking (Sekulic 2004: 461). By the same token, one may draw a parallel between the expansion of Western values and the entrenchment of the civic nature of national identity in places where ethnic identity has dominated.

Both these concepts have clashed for their predominance. If the right of self determination - a key element of civic nationalism - is given to people as members of different ethnic nations, it would be difficult to assume the existence of a nation. No matter how adroitly political maps were drawn, dissatisfied ethnic nationalities would emerge in most states. Even United Nations used the right of self determination in territorial and political context rather than the ethnic one.

Championing the cause of civic nationalism, liberals assumed that increasing advancement in communication, industrialization and urbanization would create a common political identity and eliminate the sources of ethnic nationhood. Marxists did not recognize ethnic identities in fundamental category and predicted their disappearance with the success of socialism. Due to which Soviet Union, despite maintaining this right, did not show interest in genuinely upholding the right of ethno-national self-determination. According to Durkheim, division of labour replaces primordial identity in a modernizing society and society becomes organically integrated, consequently ethnic identification loses its significance (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 36-36). However, these theoretical formulations fail to explain as to why despite the process of modernization and breaking down of traditional society, ethnic nationalism is persisting in developing as well as developed states. As evident, ethnicity and nationalism lying dormant for years suddenly re-emerged with unexpected vigour in the former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. It is difficult to find a state based on purely civic values, as each country's stance is determined by its unique political or cultural features. According to Kuzio (2001), only through the implementation of democratic principles may one oversee what factors dominate in several societies: civic or ethnic nationalism. While 'pure' examples of civic or ethnic nation-building policies are non-existent, it is yet conceivable to locate diverse practices 'at different points on a civic-ethnic continuum' (Koning 2011: 1981). If types of nationalism can be positioned on a uni-dimensional continuum starting from ethnic to civic nationalism, Janmaat (2007) argues that every nation could be placed somewhere on this continuum, as some occupy a position closer to the ethnic end and some remained closer to the civic end (Janmaat2007: 53).

The difference between civic and ethnic nation-building practices largely stems from their degree of inclusivity (Day and Thompson 2004: 132). Ethnic nationalism assumes that the nation should consist of those people who share preceding features, which include 'language, religion, customs and traditions'; in contrast, civic nationalism embraces people who merely abide by the political order in the society.

2.8: Functionalist View of Ethno-Nationalism

The functionalist view of civic nationalism, which saw its growth as a result of the breakdown of traditional society undergoing modernization, failed to explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in many developing and developed societies (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 39). Huntington referred

to the tension between the 'revolution of rising expectations' and 'revolution of rising frustration' caused by modernization, in accounting for the rise of ethnic-nationalism in states. Clifford Geertz explained the rise of ethnic-nationalism by referring to the disorienting process. According to him the strain of modernization and the failure of the state to draw ethnic groups into the national mainstream often lead to political divergence of the ethnic group from the rest of the state (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 41). Walker Connor (1993) is of the view that modernization helps to sharpen ethnic identity by enhancing social communications and contact among ethnic groups; it does so by increasing cultural awareness along with widely disseminating the message of national self determination which plays a key role in the formation and justification of ethno-nationalist consciousness. Michael Hecter stated that under modernization, there develops an 'exploitative' relationship between members of the dominant cultural groups and members of peripheral ethnic groups, which in turn leads to 'cultural division of labour.' This further creates resentment among the ethnic minority and heightens their ethnic consciousness (Phadnis and Ganguly 1989: 42-43). This theory could be used to explain political and nationalist mobilization among peripheral ethnic minorities in many parts of the world such as post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

The resource competition approach posits that large scale ethnic identity formation is promoted in multi-ethnic societies when various ethnic groups are forced to compete with each other for scarce opportunities. They may develop a perception of relative deprivation i.e., the perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value expectancies in a society. Relative deprivation and its cognition by ethnic groups regarding inequitable sharing of political and economic resources, motivates the groups to take political action. States like Kazakhstan often lack the capabilities and resources to cope with the pace of social mobilization and to satisfy the increased hopes and desires which mobilization creates. Hence, such states are particularly vulnerable to intense competition and conflict between elites.

The failure of modernization paradigm and various theories of assimilation offering ideas regarding different ways ethnic groups could be politically incorporated and accommodated in a multi-ethnic state has put forth an immense challenge before the nation-builders in a multi-ethnic state. However, some formulations have been set forth to build plural society to incorporate different ethnic groups under nation-state system.

M.G. Smith (1969) argued that in a multi-ethnic state, different ethnic groups could be incorporated in one of the three ways. First, members of different ethnic groups could be 'uniformly' incorporated as equal citizens with equal civil and political rights irrespective of ethnic affiliation. Second, different ethnic groups could be equivalently incorporated with equal or complementary public rights, thereby creating a consociation democratic polity. Finally, ethnic groups could be differentially incorporated to create a system in which a dominant ethnic group exercises power and maintains its superior position by excluding other groups from power. However, it was maintained that none of the sets are guarantor of stability and democracy in such states.

One is drawn to the conclusion that the maintenance of cohesion and stability in a multi-ethnic state is a difficult task, if maintained is always precarious. Ethnicity is a modernizing phenomenon. Any attempts to address ethnicity or ethno-nationalism has to deal essentially with 'instrumental' or constructivist' ethnicity. The body-politic of a multi-ethnic state must not allow the ethnic notion of nationalism to dominate over the civic one. The challenges of ethnicity and nation-building in a highly complex nexus of society, economy and polity hinge on the issues of access and stakes in the power structure and the sincerity by which state promotes civic and democratic values.

2.9: Nation-Building

As a concept nation-building developed with modernization theory. It emerged in the mid 1950s' as a response to the dilemmas posed by newly established states of the third world. Not really a theory in itself, the concept promoted the idea of an integrated political community as both a precondition for the development of modern democratic politics and as its outcome. Much has been talked about the issue of nation-building so far very little substantive literature has been developed so far. The concept of nation building still suffers from a single and clear cut approach free of criticism and universally acceptable (Connor 2000: 26-28). Nation building though not possible without state-building is viewed as cultural or psychological aspect of political development.

State-building though closely associated with nation-building is generally viewed as an institutional or structural development such as the creation and concentration of authority and emphasis on the role of government in the social process. To Almond and Powell, the state

building function may arise out of a threat from external environment as well as from internal revolutionary pressures challenging the stability and survival of the existing political system (Nayak 2001: 34). State building occurs when the political elite create new structures designed to penetrate society in order to regulate the behaviour and extract a larger share of resources with the development of a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy.

Nation-building, on the other, is defined as a process through which people transfer their petty commitments and loyalties from groups, tribes, village, regions to a larger single national system (Nayak 2001: 35). Though complimentary to each other, there are a number of cases in which in spite of the centralized and penetrative bureaucracies, commitment and loyalties have not emerged. The sub-national feelings are not integrated into the national mainstream. So the new states have to establish a structure of loyalty which transcends other emotional bonds to which individuals are tied-family, tribe, religion and soon.

Nation-building, therefore, refers to both conscious ideological propaganda and political policy as well as more general efforts at economic and political development which are expected to create conditions facilitating the expansion of equal opportunities to all citizens (Nayak 2001: 36). However, this process proceeds in the context of existing social composition, cultural heritage and internal power distribution among various groups. This unevenness may actually be even most noticeable in the ideological sphere of nation-building. The ruling elites, therefore, must be very sensitive in the selection of emotional symbols which can be shared by the nation-information.

Though state and nation-building are the different processes they are complimentary to each other. In order to achieve the objective of both, a careful balance is needed. Therefore, the newly independent states like Kazakhstan should be aware of this bitter fact and try to maintain this rather delicate balance. Unless carefully balanced, they work at cross-purposes and undermine each other. Many a times, in multi-ethnic societies, the state uses ethnicity to maintain political order by exploiting ethnic divisions to its advantage. This undermines the stability of the state (Nayak 2001: 36).

Rather, the state system should generate a broad range of economic and political interests to which people may attach greater importance than to abstract unity based on culture. The preservation of their interests may entail the sustenance of the state. A direction towards greater

integration and assimilation, however, may be taken by a state as it embarks upon a programme of development and modernization.

In a culturally homogenous society, nation-building may not be problematic. In a heterogeneous society like Kazakhstan, the need to build strong socio-political base may become imperative. Conscious nation building, in some form, therefore, becomes imperative for the state. However, as Hettne correctly points out, the nation-building process carries with it the possibility of failure (Nayak 2001: 37). The emergence of separatism among sections of the indigenous population, therefore, is reflective, more of a serious crisis of the state, rather than of some innate tendency of cultural minorities to seek exit from it (Nayak 2001: 37).

As already stated nation building developed within modernization theory. It rested on two basic presumptions. A shared national identity and an integrated nation to be a natural choice for a framework from which this common basis was to be generated and then maintained. It was this equation which generated the hypothesis that any other sub-national identity (ethnic, tribal, religious) is incompatible with modernity and democracy. Second, a common national identity was seen as an inevitable outcome of modernization as it led to increased mobilization and industrialization (Connor 2000: 26-36). These two processes in turn were perceived as promoting the creation of an integrated state-bound community through the extension of communication networks and educational facilities. Such a community would, it was argued, eventually lead to the disintegration of sub-national identities on the one hand and to the promotion of all national identity on the other. Thus, this national identity was seen to be not merely integrative but assimilating, in as much as former identities would eventually become obsolete and blend almost naturally into the new identity (Atter 1993: 14).

The liberal approach assumed that plural societies based on ethnic and tribal consciousness were liable to face problems in the process of nation-building. It emphasized that tribal society was traditional and was characterized by certain cultural variables-traditions, institutions, customs, values etc and predominance of kinship relations. Such 'discrete collectives' created imbalance between spheres and systems resulting in multiple affiliation, cross cutting loyalties, social disorder and political instability, making nation-building a difficult task. Such traditional consciousness should be channelized in the direction of national consciousness, according to liberals, otherwise it might act as an impediment in the process of nation building (Brass 1991: 10-11).

Huntington and Bendix, advocates of liberal tradition, maintain that main problem of developing societies like post-Soviet Kazakhstan is related to lack of political order and public authority (Brass 1991: 13). They believe that irrespective of the form of government, political order and public authority are basic for the development of state system into a national system. Political order depends on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces (ethnic, religious, tribal etc.) into politics and removal of problems like poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. According to this tradition, lack of political order in such society is due to narrow support base of its institutions, organizations and procedures. The main problem is the lack of development of state behind the development of society (Brass 1991: 14). As social forces become more variegated, political institutions fail to become complex and authoritative. This new politico-socio-economic environment becomes conducive for turmoil, disorder and tension.

The modernization perspective offered a model of development which was based on "close options and compulsive sequences" (Brass 1991: 14). It viewed that once the socio-economic development had been achieved; the necessary political development would follow automatically. It viewed that society ought to be modernized before state and nations could be built. Almond, in his system analysis assumed that once a political system developed, it would increasingly seek inputs from a wider variety of groups and that these groups would be increasingly integrated into the decision-making and nation building process, once this task was done (Brass 1991: 14).

However, the modernization school of analysis ignores some social trends. It makes no attempts to study the social class and social relations based on production system. This approach is purely mechanical and everything flows in a mechanical manner. They also completely ignore the social change and the role of ideologies and ethno-cultural perceptions in societies like Kazakhstan. The fundamental drawback of modernization theory, according to Rajni Kothari is its historicist and sequential pattern.

It sees history as repetitions, following a known development pattern. In the context of developing societies, Kothari considered the major obstacles to the problems of nation-building as colonization (both internal and external), metropolitization of the elite structure of society, authoritarian rule, collectivization of social democracy, non-development of national political culture (Kothari 1977: 19-47). The Kazakh state, in order to consolidate its independence should

institutionalize itself in terms of a national community, the establishment of a national centre which should handle the problems of legitimacy through the process of democratic participation and intellectual dissent and placating the peripheral response. This viewpoint stresses more on the political aspect and fails to analyze the infirmities of democratic and secular structures in developing states like Kazakhstan. These problems are more acute in heterogeneously conglomerated and developing state of Kazakhstan.

In contradiction to liberal modernization viewpoints, Marxist Leninists theorists like Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Miliband, A.G. Frank, Cardoso, Samir Amin etc. visualized concepts like nation and nationalities as product of capitalist development (Nayak 2001: 17-18). They considered nation and national communities as historically transient. To Marx, the state has as its purpose the institutionalization of bourgeois power while nationality function as ideological core around which the bourgeoisie both consolidates its domestic power over the working classes and solidifies and regiments a nation vis-à-vis other capitalist nations. To him, in a class society, the interests of the nation were being determined by the dominant class. For Marx, national problems like national disunity or strife would continue to prevail so long as the bourgeois economic, political, military, and ideological hegemonies are not destroyed. The consolidation of national development required the removal of all these threats.

The resolution of national problems, according to Lenin, required the removal of internal as well as external national inequalities, recognition of the right of self determination of each national units and the formation of a federation of autonomous national unit within a nation. By recognising the social basis of a nation, Lenin reduced the importance of the roles of ethnic religious and tribal forces in society (Nayak 2001: 18). He viewed that national state was a derivative of economic requirements and the recognizable elements of nation were economic, community, language, territory and history.

Stalin, sharing the Leninist tradition, considered that economic, political, and cultural conditions of a given nation constituted the only key to the questions how a particular nation ought to arrange the life and what form its future constitution ought to take. He viewed that the key to the solution of national problems were the removal of economic, political and cultural inequalities (Tishkov 1997: 10-13).

For Miliband, identification of national problems involved the identification of classes and sub-classes that made a society, demonstration of the precise structure and mechanisms of

domination and exploitation and identification of conflicts between classes (Nayak 2001: 19). All these radical view points dealt the problems of nation-building in a class perspective and failed to give reasons for resurgence of ethnic and religious identities and their sustenance even under the socialist regimes.

Some theorists believe that inconsistencies in nation building or inability in building common political culture depends upon the centre's inequitable policy decisions towards the peripheral parts of the state and they called it as "internal colonialism" (Rudolf 1997: 29-34). As a result, the metropolitan centres expropriate surplus resources from the peripheral satellites thus promoting its own development and pushing the satellites to future underdevelopment. This leads to sectoral regimentation of the nation state into developed and undeveloped state and this regional relative deprivation lead to greater socio-political dissensions and conflicts in a nation-state working as stumbling block to the process of nation-building. Soviet Kazakhstan had been a glaring example of internal colonialism. Under Soviet Union, this region was grossly utilized to furnish raw materials for the industries running in Moscow and other metropolitan centres. Kazakhstan became a cotton producing zone and was used as a market place for the metropolitan goods. Owing to which, despite the pious wishes of Lenin giving right to self-determination to the Republics, they failed to evolve "Soviet Man" in seventy years which at last saw the fragmentation of the Soviet State System in 1991. However, this theory too gives partial explanation to the problems of nation building. These theorists overlook the cultural dimensions of inequalities between regions and within a particular region in Kazakhstan. They also do not believe that dimensions of inequality and exploitation is not only confined to unequal production relation but also unequal power relations (Nayak 2001: 21), eg. domination of one group over another in bureaucracy, military and civil areas and in political power equation which is broadly being manifested in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. These approaches neglected the role of ethnicity, religion, languages etc in Kazakh State system.

It could well be maintained that the concept of nation-building still suffers from a single and clear cut approach free of criticism and universally acceptable. None of the theories provide their analysis on the problems of nation-building from an integrated perspective (Nayak 2001: 22). Their approaches to the problems were fragmental, while the radicals emphasize on the aspect of social and production relations, the liberals on the other stress more on political and economic aspects of the problems of the nation. The inscrutable process of nation-building, engineered by

intellectual minorities but directed at the social group as a whole, is generally an extremely drawn out process of social and political integration. It can never be deemed complete even after a nation has gained its own independence.

The aim of nation-building is to integrate and harmonize socially, regionally or even politically and institutionally divided sections of people. The motives underlying nation-building are various and shaped by different historical and political environment. Its success always depends primarily on the establishment of a consciousness that can bind the special characters of a value or political cause to a particular 'national' group and define its uniqueness as the substance of a national ideology (Atter 1993: 14). This can be promoted by a determined state whose general modes are centralization, uniformity and efficiency. Nation building then proceeds within a framework identical with states frontiers. Shared language and culture underlay this process, the goal of which is the cohesion of the cultural nation in a single state i.e. political, linguistic and cultural congruence (Atter 1993: 14).

Therefore, an integrated perspective is very much required to study the problems of nation-building in Kazakhstan. It must acknowledge that the state system is the basic unit through which the nation-building task has to be carried out. The state is the final arbiter of conflict and cooperation among various social classes and groups (Nayak 2001: 22-23). Thus, the major duty of the state is to organize its members within a broader framework of socio-economic and political activity and make them true and conscious participants on the affairs of the State. The challenges of nation-building in Kazakhstan are of wider ramifications. The problems are related to certain crucial issues such as social, political, economic and finally its ethnic configurations. These issues are to be studied in the context of the interplay of the inherited colonial social relations and the state apparatus of post-independent state system of Kazakhstan.

The state system in Kazakhstan could be organized into a national state system through the forces of democratization and secularization as secularization will challenge the very basis of the patterns of inter-linkages between modern state-structure and primordial state structure and democratization will overlook the dimensions of primordial groupings through the recognition of human values, rights and democratic institutions and processes.

Failure of Soviet model of nation-building, i.e. to co-exist unified amidst divergent and plural nationalities put renewed pressure on new post-Soviet Republics especially Kazakhstan so as to evolve strategies to build their new nation - state system. Therefore, the exercise of nation-

building in a plural society like Kazakhstan has been the greatest challenge before Kazakhstan State as the vitality of this new state depends much more on this exercise.

The Soviet experience of programmed attempts since 1917 of assimilation and conscious attempt to build a Soviet identity failed to find solutions to the national question. It showed that an individual can shed all of the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic group and yet maintain his fundamental identity as member of that nation. It also let us to believe that the existence of a single national consciousness that is shared by all segments of the population of a state cannot be decided simply from the absence of overt ethnic conflict. Such a conclusion could be always dangerous. By the experience of multi-ethnic Soviet State it could be maintained that if there are means of transferring primary identification and allegiance from nationalities to the State or if there are ways of satisfying national aspirations within a multi-ethnic state, the nation-building process could be a successful exercise.

In the communist period, the Soviet Republics could be regarded as a kind of pseudo-states or proto-states lacking essentials such as control of their own territory and economy. Today, the state authorities in the successor states are striving to transform these political contraptions into real, modern states. At present, all Soviet successor states are in the grip of hectic nation building and Kazakhstan is not the exception. Classical literature on nation-building assuming that development of modern communication and standardized education system would undermine all parochial identities and build a common national identity, has proved to be unwarranted. Nation building seems to be a very protracted process at the best, perhaps even an ever ending process. In order to understand and to forecast what kind of nation will take shape in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is important to focus on the express objectives and actual strategies of nation builders.

CHAPTER III

BUILDING A CIVIC NATION

3.1: Commitment to civic form of nation-building-

Is Kazakhstan going to build an ethnic Kazakh state or a civic nation-state, the members of which will feel themselves to be equal citizens of the republic, or will it build something in between? Has its government been successful in integrating people with different ethnic backgrounds, or has it failed? There are a variety of opinions on these issues in Kazakhstan, which is quite natural in a multi-ethnic state.

“Kazakhstantsy” (Kazakhstanis) is the widely used Russian expression. But does it mean anything more than the people of Kazakhstan? Is there anything that integrates these people into a nation with a common identity? The Concept for the Formation of State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1996), an official document prepared by the National Committee on State Politics under the President, says, “Kazakhstan is the ethnic center of Kazakhs. Nowhere else in the world do they possess a form of statehood that would demonstrate concern about the preservation and development of Kazakhs as an ethnic group, about their culture, way of life, language, and traditions. The definition of Kazakhstan as a national state [natsional’noe gosudarstvo (in Russian), ulttyq memleket (in Kazakh)] should identify it first of all in this capacity”. At the same time, the document presupposes that “the definition of Kazakhstan as a national state regards the strategic tendency in the development of a state identity to be the creation in the future of a nation-state [gosudarstvo natsii (in Russian), ult memleketi (in Kazakh)]. The citizens of such a state, regardless of ethnic affiliation, comprise a single people; their belonging to this state serves as their main identifying characteristic.”

The last part of this definition appears to correspond to the idea of civic nation-building. For all practical purposes, however, no concrete measures are being taken to build such a nation. The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, which was founded to strengthen interethnic accord, is being used instead by the president to legitimize his power, as well as to control ethnic movements by accepting or refusing their membership to the Assembly. Nevertheless, the official announcement of a civic nation-building strategy itself sends an important message, in light of other countries’ neglect of minorities or acts of ethnic cleansing. What is being done in

Kazakhstan in the framework of nationalities policy is to realize the first idea: to make Kazakhstan an ethnic center for Kazakhs. The important areas in this respect are policies concerning history, migration, and languages. As Edward Schatz puts it, ‘state efforts to shape patterns of language use, rewrite histories, alter demographic balances and promote ethnic cadres were routinely justified as stability-enhancing mechanisms,’ but in reality these efforts generally attempted to strengthen the position of ethnic Kazakhs.

History is being mobilized to support the idea that only Kazakhs have rights to claim the status of an indigenous people in Kazakhstan. According to the Concept for the Formation of State Identity (1996), mentioned above, “Historically, the state [Kazakh Khanate that was formed in the fifteenth century] defended the interests of Kazakhs exclusively, as at that time there were no other ethnic groups in this territory.” Although it admits that Kazakhstan’s current borders were formed under Soviet rule, it maintains that they “correspond completely to the historically formed area of habitation of the Kazakh people.”

These views are reflected in the official interpretation of the history of Kazakhstan and in the curricula of schools and universities. The preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1995) also contains a phrase stating that the people of Kazakhstan build their statehood “on ancient Kazakh land.” As a part of a project to reinforce this theory, Soviet and Russian names of cities, villages, streets, schools, universities, and various organizations are being changed to Kazakh names. In Almaty, for example, Karl Marx Street is now called Kunaev Street, after the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; Mir (“peace” in Russian) Street has become Zheltoksan (“December” in Kazakh) Street.

Of the fifteen national republics that constituted the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan qualified as the most multi-ethnic republic, with a substantial share of Slavs and many other nationalities in its population. From the 1950s, Kazakhs did not make up a majority of constituency in their own state (Dave, 2003: 2). Only in 1989, did they achieve the upper hand by outnumbering Russians by two percent. The next five years saw Kazakhs reach 44 percent of the whole populace, with the share of Russians reducing to 36 percent (Davis and Sabol 1998).

Although political representation of many ethnicities materialised from the early days of independence, to speak of Kazakhstan as a multicultural state was analytically problematic. A close look revealed a rather bi-cultural society, consisting of Russians with their culture tinted

with communist ethos, and of indigenous Kazakhs. Ethnic groups of European origin, due to the possibility of obtaining privileges by identifying themselves as Russians, declared themselves to be Russians during the Soviet period.

Therefore in the early 1990s, mainly two ethnic groups needed to be housed first, Kazakhs and Russians. In 1989, Russians made up 70-80 percent of the populace in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan. Such a geographic concentration gave them a majority in a few regional constituencies (Peyrouse 2007) and duly engendered a 'Russian question' (Iglicka 1998; Kolsto 1998; Peyrouse 2007). The relevance of the 'Russian question' also arose from the nature of Russians' backgrounds. Of all Russians inhabiting Kazakhstan, two thirds were local-born (the highest number of all the republics, including Ukraine), and more than 37 percent of them had lived in Kazakhstan for more than 20 years (Peyrouse 2007). As a result, the prospect of Russian mobilisation was high. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's ideas, which centred on the assumption that Russian-dominated regions of Kazakhstan should be integrated into Russia, were also reverberating across the borders (Dave 2003).

Several organizations defending Russian interests in the country proliferated in the 1990s. Set up in 1990 in the northern city of Pavlodar, the Society for Slavic culture Slaviya targeted the promotion of Slavic values. In the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration however, the members of the organization began to express unconcealed nationalist feelings. In 1992, they opposed the withdrawal of Cossack Ermak's statue from Pavlodar's city centre and pressed for the adoption of Russian as the state language. One more group that protested about the issues touching Russian people were the Cossacks. In the long run, seeing that Russian people were less committed to their own cause, the Cossacks followed suit and stayed outside politics (Peyrouse 2007).

The factors that led to the weakening of the 'Russian question' are diverse. The emigration of highly-skilled Russians is among the influential ones. They abandoned Kazakhstan at a time of economic problems; not as a consequence of ethnic discrimination (Davis and Sabol 1998). Besides, Russians, despite constituting the majority in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan between 1950s and 1990s, were not a cohesive ethnic group. Some identified themselves more thoroughly with the Russians inhabiting the Far Eastern regions of Siberia, rather than the 'mainland' Russians. By contrast, the Russians of southern Kazakhstan were more integrated into Kazakh culture and had some degree of familiarity with the Kazakh

language. Above and beyond, the nascent Russian government was not in a position to influence the lives of millions of Russians now living in different states (Dave 2003). For instance, in 2000 local Russian leaders submitted three propositions to the Russian president during his visit to Kazakhstan. They demanded either 'a form of cultural autonomy that would encourage Russians to stay in Kazakhstan, or a territorial unification of the northern regions with Russia, or a massive emigration to Russia'. The head of the Russian state welcomed only the last of these prospects (Peyrouse 2007: 494-495).

Nonetheless, the most important factor that diminished the power of Russian organizations in Kazakhstan was the fact that Kazakhstan's government has in time brought minority ethnicities inside a political nation on fair terms. A new constitution of 1995 introduced the term 'Kazakhstani' demonstrating the government's determination to consolidate diverse communities under one umbrella, irrespective of ethnic peculiarities (Kusainova and Gleason 1998). Along with special rights of the Kazakh diaspora to hold dual citizenship, the phrase defining Kazakhstan as 'the form of statehood of the self-determining Kazakh nation' was also removed from the new fangled constitution (Polsto and Malkova 1997). The constitutional reforms were then bolstered by other documents, such as: *Ideological Consolidation of Society* (1993); *Towards Kazakhstan's Renewal through a deepening of reform and supranational understanding* (1994); *For Peace and Understanding in our Common Home* (1995), and *The Concept of State Formation* (1996) (Cummings 2006: 182). From that period on, few western-based scholars referred to ethnic minorities inhabiting Kazakhstan as 'Kazakhs of' a specific ethnic origin for example, 'of Polish descent', as suggested by Iglicka (1998: 995).

Kazakhstan's government stayed loyal to civic values in its nation-building policies, as is evident. Brubaker also finds no traces of ethnic and linguistic nationalism in the government's policies. Still, the civic orientation of nation-building policy was mostly demonstrated in the support of the Russian language. The language law of 1995 nominated Kazakh as a state language and Russian was granted the position of 'language of interethnic communication'. The following year an amendment designated it as the 'official language', to be applied on a par with Kazakh. Despite passionate appeals of nationalist pressure groups, no language proficiency test for government workers was introduced and state officials were not obliged to have fluency in Kazakh (Dave, 2003). Indeed, although only Kazakh was ranked as a state language, Russian had its glorious past and was much more preferable in many aspects. That is why the law that obliged

all media outlets to broadcast 50 percent of their program in Kazakh has never been implemented fully (O'Callaghan, 2005). Ironically, this was a general retreat from the Soviet policies designed to strengthen the status of the Kazakh language. The reformist spirit of the Gorbachev era, introduced under the banner of glasnost (Bova, 1991), also targeted the revival of national languages in the Soviet republics. The first step in the name of revitalizing the Kazakh language was taken a few years before independence, in 1987. The government decree 'On Improving the Study of the Kazakh Language in the Republic' allowed Kazakh students to learn their native tongue at school. In 1989, a second document known as 'Kazakhstan's Language Law' came into being at a time when a parade of language legislations has been taking place across the Soviet Union.

In relation to the decree adopted in 1987, this bill pledged to enhance the scope of the usage of Kazakh, guaranteeing that education in Kazakh would be available in all educational institutions (Fierman, 2006: 104-105). The Language Law of 1989, amid other changes especially in the education system, also obliged government officials to use Kazakh in their workplace (Rivers 2002: 160). Fierman (2006) argued that if the decree of 1987 and the law of 1989 had enjoyed a wide and strict enforcement from above, a great many Kazakh nationalists would have been content with the situation.

The principle division between Kazakhs was linguistic that cut across tribal and residential alliances. In the 1989 census, 64 percent of the titular group expressed fluency in Russian; while 98.5 percent stated Kazakh as their mother tongue. Not all Kazakhs however used Kazakh as their first language (Dave, 2003). Therefore a more realistic classification is that of Sarsembayev, who says that:

"Rural Kazakh's are typically Kazakh speaking and have some knowledge of Russian. On the other hand, almost all urban Kazakh's have a good command of Russian, and the majority of them are Russian-speaking having no or very poor knowledge of Kazakh" (Sarsembayev, 1999: 327-328).

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, however rural Kazakhs began to pour into urban areas in their thousands. Although the rural-Kazakh and urban-Russian polarisation paled into insignificance as a result of the steady urbanisation process in the late 1990s, the linguistic

segregation of Kazakhs was still underpinned by geographical division. By the end of the Soviet rule, Kazakhs outnumbered other ethnic groups in the western and southern regions. Although Kazakhs' profound language split has endured as a result of the constitutional amendments of the 1990s that allowed Russian to function on a par with the state language (Dave 2003), aided by the euphoria of independence, the usage area of Kazakh language has significantly enhanced. Kolsto predicted that the following dilemma would continue for many years:

"As long as no final solution to the language puzzle is clear not only the elites, but also the common people must make some important choices on behalf of their children. If they decide to send them to Kazakh-language schools and then, ten to twenty years on, Russian remains the dominant language in Kazakhstan, then their children will lose out in the labour market" (Kolsto 2003: 125).

A similar trend could be traced in the cities where Kazakhs predominantly preferred schools with Russian language instruction for their children. Despite a number of factors working against the swift retrieval of the status of Kazakh language, Fierman (2005: 398) predicts an expansion of its domain over the coming decades, resulting in it becoming a 'more important component of Kazakh commonality as well as groupness'. In the early 2000s, only about 50 per cent of Kazakhs spoke their mother tongue (O'Callaghan 2005: 210). A couple of years later, Sultan Akimbekov (2012), a renowned scholar in Kazakhstan, revealed a vast increase in Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs, which now comprises 75 percent of all Kazakhs. The rise of the population in the Kazakh-dominated southern and western cities of Kazakhstan coupled with a decrease in the population of eastern, northern and central cities (Nyussupova and Sarsenova 2012), also contributed to the numerical growth of Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs in general. Although many experts in the field expected Russian to dominate in Kazakhstan, O'Callaghan (2005) put his faith in the ascendancy of Kazakh if the right conditions were provided.

One of the main transformations that O'Callaghan (2005) and Huttenbach (1998) believed would tip the linguistic balance in favour of the Kazakh language was the relocation of the capital city from the south to the north. This was a dramatic episode in the history of Kazakhstan yet the motives for the movement of the main city were quite diverse. One highly important explanation was the demographic segregation of the two dominant ethnic groups, Kazakhs and Russians.

Concerned about possible irredentist activities in the north due to the seclusion of the Russians and the absence of Russian assimilation, the government attempted to nip secessionism in the bud by settling the northern frontier with people from other regions of the country. According to Wolfel (2002), although the new capital has the potential to uphold a unified Kazakhstani state, much will depend not only on 'the success of the national development programs' but also on how successfully Kazakhstan's government redistributes the population and creates 'a fairly even balance of Russians and Kazakhs in each region' (Wolfel 2002: 502). Known as Aqmola previously, the city was named 'Astana' in 1998, which in Kazakh means 'capital'. Not only the name, but the demography of the city has undergone profound changes in subsequent years. This has resulted in northern Kazakhstan, which used to be settled largely by Russians and ethnic minorities of European extraction, seeing the influx of thousands of Kazakhs. A rapid shift of the main city to the Russian-dominated region was also an attempt to convince other actors in the region that the northern provinces are part of independent Kazakhstan. Considering that Almaty played a central role in the Soviet period and thus symbolized the colonial past, the construction of a new capital allowed the bolstering of people's commitment to the new state (Wolfel 2002). Thus, behind the construction of the new city from scratch the intention and necessity to solidify political independence and national unity dominated which was aided by economic growth. Kazakhstan's government could simply have done this in Almaty (Anacker 2004: 523). Considering that moving the capital city is one of the more advanced and expensive enterprises for building states and national identification, and that few actors even intend 'taking on the financial, logistical, and political costs of such a move', it is also Schatz's conviction that the relocation of the capital 'was designed to address pressing nation and state building challenges' in the first place (Schatz 2004: 122). If in 1989 ethnic Kazakhs constituted only 17 percent of the population of Aqmola, estimates in 2007 suggested Kazakhs' outright dominance, as they reached to some 60 percent (Lillis 2007). Even in the changeable context of the former Soviet Union, demographic transfers of that scale were quite uncommon. In fact, the rapid numerical advance of Kazakhs in the new capital was unparalleled in any other city or province in Kazakhstan. While many Kazakhs were seduced by Astana, very few Russians followed suit, which 'cannot be explained by economic models of migration' (Anacker 2004: 528). The reason for this is that since many jobs in Astana are more or less related to the central state apparatus and Russians have literally viewed this establishment as belonging to Kazakh people. The

numerical and political progress of the Kazakh people, reinforced by the relocation of the capital city, did not change the government's nation-building policies, as was seen in the above section, particularly on the linguistic front. Even if the proportion of Kazakhs became significantly greater among the younger generation (Smagulova 2006), they were officially notified not to 'demand members of other ethnic groups speak Kazakh until they use it themselves' (Fierman 2006: 103). So the Kazakh language revival and strengthening of national consciousness was expected to come from the bottom up. In other words, 'whether they knowingly accept responsibility for it or not', after all it was the Kazakh people who had to decide 'the fate of the Kazakh language' (O'Callaghan 2005: 214) and the general course of nation-building in the future.

Although political and ideological inclusivity of state policies have helped to avoid inter-ethnic conflicts, some help also came from economic difficulties on the ground. The fall of the Soviet Union had devastating economic consequences and people were more concerned with the problems of subsistence than politics. Although there was an abundance of Kazakh nationalist pressure groups in the early years of independence, they suffered from low attendance and scarcity of general support. By the end of the 1990s, they virtually ceased to exist (Edmunds 1998), for the reason that Kazakhs experienced material hardships more than any other group. To quote Edmunds:

"While the Slavic community has often been the focus point for conflict potential in Kazakstan, it must be remembered that the poorest section of Kazakstani society, and that which has perhaps suffered most from independence, are agricultural workers in the overwhelmingly Kazak rural regions" (Edmunds 1998: 469-470)

In the light of this, the government introduced a novel strategy "Kazakhstan-2030" in 1998. Thus, the drive to cultivate collective identities through particular emotional issues was transformed into the realization of other more tangible tasks. The list included seven main areas, such as, territorial integrity and stability; political stability and consolidated society; economic growth; health, education and welfare of 'Kazakhstanis'; energy resources, infrastructure and professional state (Cummings 2006: 185-186).

At the end of the 1990s, akin to the idea of Homo Sovieticus which pursued the ultimate fusion of Soviet nationalities, the government named the people of Kazakhstan Eurasians, notwithstanding their ethnic background. Although many perceived it as another government's attempt to fortify interethnic stability (Schatz 2000), it was part of a set of factors designated to facilitate the unity of the people of Kazakhstan. The notion of Homo-Sovieticus, by changing to Kazakhstani and then Eurasian identity, also helped enormously to pacify ethnic grievances.

The main memorials of the city reflect the government's support for civic 'Kazakhstani' nationalism. In the late 2000s, the government was on the road toward the creation of a 'Kazakhstani nation'; the idea surfaced in the 'National Unity Doctrine'. This was a powerful state attempt to give non-titular ethnic groups an equal stake in the emerging community. Some nationalist intellectuals forcefully opposed the use of the term in public (Fierman 2005), epitomising the initiative as the last nail in the coffin of an indigenous 'Kazakh nation'. Due to criticism from Kazakh nationalists, who fought tooth and nail on the details, the document underwent more than a few corrections. In its final version, to underline the commonality of destiny of all people living in Kazakhstan, the first part of the doctrine was entitled –'One land, one fate'. The second section stressed an unequivocal equality of economic and political rights through-'Different origins equality of chances'. The last one-'Development of the national spirit', emphasized the need to strengthen the sense of belonging and commitment to the existing state (Kesici 2011).

Moreover, the numerical growth of Kazakhs was not accompanied by the maturity of linguistic and cultural cohesiveness and was not hostile to the Russian-speaking non-titular groups. Since Kazakhs possessed their own republic in the Soviet Union and benefitted amply from the nationalisation policies of Moscow, they duly expected to be privileged further after the acquisition of independence in 1991. However, this proved a problematic prospect, as the nascent government had to keep the political stability and mediate ethnic relations, seeking conciliation between titular group and the rest. Many scholars therefore, were inclined to believe that the Kazakh people received the state's patronage covertly. Dave argues that:

"In contrast to states such as Malaysia where indigenous ethnic entitlements are clearly specified in the constitution, or in India, where an elaborate structure of "reservations" based on caste and economic backwardness exists, Kazakhstan's constitution or laws make virtually no mention of

any ethnic entitlements. The structure of ethnic entitlements, available to Kazakhs, is ad hoc and extra constitutional and is executed informally" (Dave 2003: 16)

In a similar vein, Schatz notes:

"If in Malaysia preferences were more explicit and given legal grounding (even if the implementation was uneven and the subject of ongoing political debate), in Kazakhstan these policies were ad hoc and extra-legal from the start" (Schatz 2000: 498)

Indeed, if the number of Kazakhs increased in the government, it was only proportionately to their share in the whole population. For instance, in 1994, 48 percent of governmental workers were ethnic Kazakhs, while their share in the population was 44 percent, not a significant gap. Moreover, their rise began in Brezhnev's time, consistent with the policy of expanding the indigenous population's role in the local administration (Davis and Sabol 1998: 481). The presence of Kazakhs was limited in top government jobs as well. For example, in 1996 the governor of North Kazakhstan oblast was ethnic German. Although mayors were often Kazakhs, other functionaries were free from discrimination on ethnic basis (Edmunds 1998: 466). In 2014, 21 out of 107 members of the lower house of the parliament are ethnic Russians. Given that Russians constitute 23.7 per cent of the population, they are fairly well represented in the parliament. This degree of representation can be found in many fields, including, academia and sports (Kirbassov 2014). What is more, Russians have overly dominated skilled industrial professional occupations. In the late 1990s, 58.8 per cent of industrial workers were Russians and 21.3 percent were Kazakhs; while Kazakhs made up only 14.3 percent of engineers, technical personnel and office workers, 67 percent of these jobs went to Russians. If 68.1 per cent of chief specialists and 60 percent of top leaders and managers were Russians, Kazakhs' share was 15.1 and 18 percent. Although Kazakhs were increasing their presence in skilled professions, it started in the mid- 1970s, so long before the arrival of independence (Davis and Sabol 1998: 481-482).

On the whole, Kazakhification as an idea of creating the dominance of ethnic Kazakhs in the economic, cultural and educational spheres was 'bound to remain just an aspiration' (Sarsembayev 1999: 331) and 'Kazakhification was often more discursive than immediately

material' (Schatz 2000: 498). In the political field as well, 'ethnicity as such has not been the main criterion for the replacement of many Russian-speakers by Kazakhs' (Edmund 1998: 464). On one of the monuments the text makes no mention of the pre-Soviet Russian colonization of Kazakh land. If the government had wanted to whip up nationalism by highlighting the sufferings of the Kazakh people, it could also have addressed events before the Bolshevik revolution. In a similar vein, the inscription avoids assigning an explicit ethnic identity to either the victims or the persecutors of the Soviet period. Even the word 'homeland' (otan) does not specifically address ethnic Kazakhs, as it is a generic term referring to other ethnic groups as well. This implies that Russians speaking Kazakh are able to 'read the sentences about expelled peoples and barren lands and easily assume that the monument was referring to their own ancestors' (Anacker 2004: 521-522).

Nonetheless, this does not imply that ethnic nationalism was not at all the government's priority. The state ethnic program for Kazakhs' cultural revival included celebrations and renaming of streets after Kazakh historical figures (Cummings 2006). Still, these were Kazakhs who either endorsed the adoption of Russian culture during their lifetime or received education in Russia. In 1995, the 150th anniversary of the birth of Abay Kunanbai, known for his translations of Pushkin and Goethe into Kazakh, was honoured across the country. Similarly, the commemorations of Chokhan Valikhanov, the Russified Kazakh ethnographer, and Dzhambul who dedicated poems to Joseph Stalin, also implied that cautiousness was present in the selection of prominent names (Schatz 2000).

Moreover, it was also argued that the government's purported attempt to mobilize Kazakhs resulted in the reinvigoration of ancestral identities and underpinned the main subdivisions among the titular group. So the networks providing access to desired state positions and resources in the country came to be structured not along ethno-national but lineage, clan or patron-client lines (Schatz 2004; Dave 2007). Considering that trust is the most significant asset on the road to success everywhere in the world, for people need to 'share similar interests and objectives once positions had been obtained', it is not surprising that in Kazakhstan zhuz associations frequently overlap with these goals (Edmunds 1998: 466). Another policy, interpreted as a shift towards creating a Kazakh-dominated Kazakhstan as it could enhance ethnic nationalism, was the government's patronage of the return of ethnic Kazakhs from the neighbouring states. But this policy has failed.

In migration policy, the government encourages ethnic Kazakhs living abroad (from elsewhere in the CIS as well as from other foreign countries) to come to Kazakhstan. Repatriates are called Oralmans in Kazakh, which means ‘people who came back.’ This is because many, if not all, Oralmans are descendants of those Kazakhs who fled Kazakhstan during forceful collectivization in the 1930s. But it is the number of those who left Kazakhstan after the independence, not repatriated Kazakhs that has greatly changed the national composition in recent years. Because of Slavic immigration that began under the Tsarist regime and continued during Soviet times, forceful sedentarization of Kazakh nomads, starvation, and purges in the 1930s that claimed lives of nearly 40 percent of Kazakhs at that time, as well as deportations of peoples to the territory of Kazakhstan in the 1930s and 40s, Kazakhs became a minority in their own homeland. In recent years, however, the overall ethnic composition has been shifting in their favor. This change is largely the result of the huge emigration of Europeans, the majority of whom are Russians and Germans. Why are they leaving? This is a debatable question. Some explain their departure as a result of Kazakhstan’s poor economic conditions as well as a desire to live in their historical homeland. Others blame the government’s discriminatory policy against non-titular nationalities. Another factor contributing to the increase of the Kazakh population in the republic is its relatively higher growth rate.

The language policy defines Kazakh as the only language of the republic, according to the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakh is the state language (Article 7[1]): “In state organizations and organs of local self-government the Russian language is officially used on an equal basis with Kazakh” (Article 7[2]). Thus Russian, which is spoken by almost the entire population to a greater or lesser degree, has acquired de facto official status, although the Constitution carefully avoids declaring it an official language. According to the language law adopted in July 1997, “The state language is the language of state administration, legislation, and legal proceedings, functioning in all spheres of public relations throughout the entire territory of the state” (Article 4). Article 4 also states that in reality, the Kazakh language is far from operative in all spheres of public relations. Russian still prevails in society, in particular among the urban population. What really matters is not the elimination of the Russian language itself but the possible manipulation of language. According to the language law, “[the] list of professions, specialties and posts for which knowledge of the state language is necessary... is determined

according to the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (Article 23). Here it should be noted that Russian-speakers include a significant proportion of urban Kazakhs.

Theoretically, a person who does not speak the state language faces difficulty in pursuing a career irrespective of nationality. But in reality it appears that those Kazakhs who are not fluent in Kazakh are not necessarily barred from the state apparatus. What is most obvious (and the most worrisome for non-Kazakhs) is something that is apparently not included in the government’s nationalities policy: Russians (and some Kazakhs, too) tend to blame the government’s deliberate yet secret policy, as well as nepotism among Kazakhs; others deny such intentions and explain Kazakhs’ predominance by the increase of Kazakhs’ share among the whole population as well as Russians’ preference for the private over the public sector.

3.2: Nationalities Policies From Lenin To Gorbachev

The motives underlying nation building are various and shaped by different historical and political environment. It is quite pertinent to examine the nature of nationalities question in the former Soviet Union as to how they grounded their historical nation building exercise in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society within a Marxist-Leninist tradition, by focusing on the evolution of nationalities policy from Lenin to Gorbachev. It is also to be examined as to what went wrong in this exercise which led to growing disjuncture between nationality demands and state's ability to convince the nationalities of the validity of its policies and finally culminating into the disintegration of the Soviet-State system.

Classical Marxism has little to say about the national question as they considered the national questions as peripheral and ethnic division as purely bourgeois phenomena (Bailer 1989: 149-173). Cultural differences between societies tended to be treated as complicating factors that were both methodological and programmatic distractions from ensuring the establishment of socialism (Smith 1990: 1-2).

For the politically important working class, nationality differences were seen to be losing their meaning and would not outlive capitalism. However, the multi-ethnic character and growing political salience of ethnic divisions made the role of nations in the establishment of socialism and their future position in a socialist society a more problematic affair. It is due to this that the

issue of granting cultural autonomy and the issue of national self-determination came to prominence within Marxist - Leninist thinking (Smith 1990: 3-4).

Leninist notion of national-self determination began to take shape. For Lenin, however what actually constituted a nation was of trivial importance, yet his urge to unite forces against capitalism and other retrogressive forces to build socialism led his interpretation of national self determination to develop. Lenin was adopting a political strategy for resolving Russia's national question. By granting Russia's minority nations the right to statehood, he opined that if nations were not given this right, then amongst people whose national consciousness was emerging as a political force, it would encourage a combative nationalism which would run counter to the establishment of socialism in Russia (Smith 1990: 4). But although endorsing the right of nations to secession, for Lenin, this did not mean that any separatist movement should be supported. To him, the right to divorce is not an invitation for all wives to leave their husbands. Such a viewpoint was reflected in the resolution passed at the April 1917 conference of the Russian Communist Party which asserted the right to all nations forming part of Russia to separation and be independent (Smith 1990: 4-5).

After 1917, Lenin's position of federalism underwent a complete change: from regarding 'the right to federation' as meaningless to an acceptance of it as the most suitable form of organization for a multi-ethnic state like Soviet Union. Constitutionally, the large non-Russian nationality groupings were offered equality of union republic status within a Soviet federation which would honour their right to secession and would grant their major nationalities considerable cultural and administrative autonomy (Smith 1990: 5-6). In return for these guarantees the nationalists would give up their present form of state sovereignty and become part of a socialist federation of states. With their incorporation into the Soviet federation, the national oppression of the nationalities were deemed to have been automatically eliminated, they were now acknowledged to be free to develop towards fulfillment of their national aspirations. Other policies were designed to promote the local language, education and culture and generally to de-russify the non-Russian cities. Moscow also began purposely to link the economic development of the less developed regions like Central Asia to the national core. Never far from the surface of this attempt to incorporate a cultural pluralism into Soviet state-building was what Lenin had referred to as his fear of 'Great Russian chauvinism' (Smith 1990: 6). The support and cooperation of the non-Russians in the building of socialism could only proceed, he argued,

through suppressing Russian nationalism. Yet for Stalin, it was minority nationalism which posed the greater threat (Smith 1990: 6). In referring to the non-Russian nationalities, he noted in 1934 speech that 'survival of capitalism in the minds of men are much more long lived in the realm of the national question than in any other area.' Thus he began the exercise of the Russification of the non-Russian Republics, which included the Russification of the native languages and by late 1930s the Russian language was being vigorously promoted and by purging the nationalist leaders thereby crushing the nationalist sentiments in non-Russian nationalities (Smith 1990: 6-7).

However, in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, the new General Secretary, publicly criticised Stalin and his practices. He exposed and denounced the forced mass resettlement of several nationalities who had moved during World War II from their homelands and fully restored their nationality rights (Smith 1990: 7-8). Accusations of Stalin deviating from Lenin's nationality policy were followed by a clear endorsement by the Congress of committing the Party to the flourishing of nations. Nationalities policy was linked to improving the socio-economic development of the non-Russian Republics, with a commitment to bringing the least developed up to the level of more advanced. It was, however, at the 22nd party congress in 1961 that Khrushchev spoke of his commitment to the dialectics of nationality development providing the basis for an official policy which was to remain largely unchallenged for the next 25 years (Smith 1990: 8). Separate national cultures were to flourish alongside their 'drawing together' until their final merger (*sliyanie*) was realised. So, while supporting the notion of *siliyane*, he considered to be a long way off, preferring in the short term the more politically pragmatic commitment, to achieving the unity (*edinstvo*) of nations (). His political notion was no more than the brotherly alliance of Soviet nations ensured by the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

In contrast to Khrushchev, who had attempted to enact far reaching economic and administrative reforms and who had committed that regime to achieving rapid economic growth, the Brezhnev leadership pursued an increasingly cautious conservative and pragmatic approach. Relations between Moscow and the nationality Republics began to take on an increasingly corporatist character (). Moscow allowed Republics greater flexibility in native appointments to local positions and some de-facto administrative leeway. Brezhnev's policy by putting greater thrust in native and local cadres certainly made party and state life in the Republics less turbulent. While

occasions did arise when regions expressed nationalist views exceeding the bounds permitted by Moscow, they were subject to dismissal and repression.

The more socially pragmatic thrust to the Brezhnev administration was reflected in official policy towards the national question. He referred to the emergence of a new historical community, that of the Soviet people-this new human community sharing a common territory, state, economic system, culture, the goal of building communism and a common language (Smith 1990: 9-10). He also made it clear that the further coming together of nations was an objective process and that the party was against forcing integration (Smith 1990: 10). Official policy throughout 1970s and 1980s continued to accept tacitly the existence of a multi-ethnic society of culturally distinct yet integrated nationalities.

At his last party congress in 1981, Brezhnev reiterated the success of *sovetski narod* (Soviet Man) and of a multi-ethnic state more united than ever. But although, Soviet people were united more than ever, for the General Secretary, this did not imply that all the problems of the relations between the nationalities have been resolved. While declaring that there are no backward ethnic outskirts today, he did make it clear that one of the Party's objective was to increase the material and cultural potential of each republic, which would at the same time, make the maximum use of this potential for this balanced development of the country as a whole.

Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev in 1982 also reiterated concern about cadre policy and the past nativisation policies. Although supporting the need for fairer representation of all nationalities within the Union Republics, he rejected the notion of formal quotas for an arithmetic approach to the solutions of such problems was found inappropriate. He appeared to take a more integrationist approach by stating that the goal of nationalities policy was not only the *sblizhenie* of nations but also their *sliyanie* (Smith 1990: 11). Yuri Andropov reiterated his commitment to federalism, to the free development of each Republic and each nationality within the boundary of the fraternal union. He also made it clear that national differences would exist for a long time, 'much longer than class differences' (Smith 1990: 11)

Under the new leadership of Gorbachev, there was little departure from the Brezhnevite line: no reference was made to *sliyanie* of nations while much was again made of a united Soviet people, cemented by the same economic interests, ideology and political goals. He did, however, note that such achievements must not create an impression that there are no problems in the national process. While fully aware that there existed a problematic side to ethnic relations, no concrete

proposals were made. It was only when the reform programme triggered off growing ethnic discontent, the Gorbachev regime began to revise its attitude towards the nationalities (Smith 1990: 12-13).

The Kazakh riots of mid-December 1986 in Alma Ata were the first major blow from the ethnic periphery to the reform programme. The riots were triggered off by the replacement of a Kazakh first party secretary with a Russian, which broke with the hitherto universal practice of appointing a native to such a post. Bringing in an outsider in order to reassert control over a Republic economically crippled by elite corruption and mismanagement may have made national sense, but for many Kazakhs feeling deprived in their own homeland, it showed the new regime as being totally insensitive to national sensibilities (Smith 1990: 13). The illusion of a society having secured cultural coexistence and moving steadily towards rapprochement was shattered. The ethnic unrest gradually spread to territories like Georgia, Lithuanian, Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine Azerbaijan and Transcaucasia.

Rather than formulating a coherent nationalities policy, Gorbachev's handling of the nationalities question was to treat each distraction as a deviation from the central task of economic restructuring, glasnost and democratisation, by which the ethnic unrest be largely resolved. No consistent policy response occurred whenever demands from or events in the nationality republics seemed to be getting out of Moscow's control (Smith 1990: 14-15). However by 1989, Gorbachev felt the urgent need to reformulate nationalities policy within the Leninist framework of Soviet federation, in effect, to restore the original Soviet federation - a union of republics possessing real sovereignty in all spheres of state life.

Although the proposals recommended in this new policy contained the most radical reshaping of the Soviet federation since Lenin, however, the centralised role of the Party remained, which Lenin envisaged as fundamental to the building of socialism. This vision of a multi-ethnic society based on a federation of more equal nations but running short of federalisation of the party itself, failed to receive the supportive responses from the Republics (Smith 1990: 17). It was followed by the Lithuanian Party's unilateral decision in December 1989 to separate from the CPSU. Four months later, they declared independence from the USSR. This was subsequently followed by Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and lastly by the Central Asian Republics (Smith 1990: 16-17). By December 1991, the entire edifice of resurrecting a Soviet model of nation building and evolving a new Soviet Man crumbled. Nationalism emerged to take

various Janus-like forms, resurrecting long held national beliefs and prejudices rooted in the collective imagination and projected on to the reality of past and current inequities.

Failure of Soviet model of nation-building, i.e. to co-exist unified amidst divergent and plural nationalities put renewed pressure on new post-Soviet Republics especially Kazakhstan so as to evolve strategies to build their new nation - state system. Therefore, the exercise of nation-building in a plural society like Kazakhstan has been the greatest challenge before Kazakhstan State as the vitality of this new state depends much more on this exercise.

The Soviet experience of programmed attempts since 1917 of assimilation and conscious attempt to build a Soviet identity failed to find solutions to the national question. It showed that an individual can shed all of the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic group and yet maintain his fundamental identity as member of that nation. It also led us to believe that the existence of a single national consciousness that is shared by all segments of the population of a state cannot be decided simply from the absence of overt ethnic conflict. Such a conclusion could be always dangerous. By the experience of multi-ethnic Soviet State it could be maintained that if there are means of transferring primary identification and allegiance from nationalities to the State or if there are ways of satisfying national aspirations within a multi-ethnic state, the nation-building process could be a successful exercise.

In the communist period, the Soviet Republics could be regarded as a kind of pseudo-states or proto-states lacking essential such as control of their own territory and economy. Today, the state authorities in the successor states are striving to transform these political contraptions into real, modern states (Kolsto 1998: 51). At present, all Soviet successor states are in the grip of hectic nation building and Kazakhstan is not the exception. Classical literature on nation-building assuming that development of modern communication and standardized education system would undermine all parochial identities and build a common national identity, has proved to be unwarranted. Nation-building seems to be a very protracted process at the best, perhaps even a never ending process. In order to understand and to forecast what kind of nation will take shape in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is important to focus on the express objectives and actual strategies of nation builders.

3.3: The role of Nazarbayev's Regime continuity and moderation

Throughout the ups and downs of post independence governance in Kazakhstan, one thing has remained constant – the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev. During the 1970s and 1980s, Nazarbayev was one of the bright young stars of the Kazakhstan communist elite and enjoyed a steady rise through the party ranks. By 1984, he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Kazakhstan thanks to the patronage of Kunaev. When Gorbachev came to power in Moscow, Nazarbayev began to distance himself from Kunaev. With an audacity and opportunism that have become defining political traits, Nazarbayev, employing the new language of perestroika, made a speech highly critical of his erstwhile patron. These moves proved ineffective, however, when Gorbachev chose as leader an outsider from Russia, Genadi Kolbin, who was authorized to root out incompetence and corruption in the republic. Being devoid of any connections to local clans or cliques, Kolbin seemed ideally suited for such a mission. However, his outsider status (and to a lesser extent the fact that he was a Slav - a Kazakhstani Slav might have been more acceptable) threatened patronage networks and was portrayed as a national insult. Demonstrations in opposition to the change were held in Almaty (the then capital of the autonomous republic) on the 16th December 1986 but were suppressed by government forces. Depending on which report one believes, between one and two hundred people were killed in what was the first of many nationalist demonstrations that Gorbachev would be confronted with during his time as Communist First Secretary of the USSR. While the motives of these demonstrators have been the subject to some dispute (Stefany 2004), there is little doubt that at least a sizable minority were inspired by nationalist sentiment – “Every people deserves their own leader” was one banner held up by demonstrators, for example. Whether through good fortune or otherwise, Nazarbayev ultimately benefitted from this ethnic tilt, and was appointed as Kolbin's replacement by Gorbachev after the latter stepped down in 1989. He has remained in power in Kazakhstan since.

Since then, however, Nazarbayev has been quite successful in painting himself as a moderate and moderating figure, albeit perhaps somewhat less credibly in more recent years as his unwillingness to cede power has become ever more apparent. This has been accompanied by a growing focus on the ‘great man’ aspects of his legacy without concomitant attention to the practical question of who will actually succeed him and whether the political institutions of the state are robust enough to survive without him at the helm. In the post independence period Nazarbayev has produced a number of written works which have been promoted in an effort to

establish a national ideology. While this ideology is liberal, secular, progressive, and inclusive in the main it has reinforced the link between President and State. The best-known document attributed to the President is “Kazakhstan 2030”, a long-term development plan in which Nazarbayev appeals to the people of Kazakhstan ‘to share my vision of the future of our society and the mission of our state’.

Natural security, material well-being, political stability, consolidation of the state, foreign investment, and the development of infrastructure, are all afforded consideration. The document contains no plan for the democratization of society. Eyeing the experience of Asian Tigers like Singapore and Malaysia, Nazarbayev states his wish that Kazakhstan become a ‘Central Asian snow leopard’ (Nazarbayev 1997) . Rather than being an obscure development blueprint gathering dust on the desks of officialdom, “Kazakhstan 2030” is heavily advertised throughout Kazakhstan with the words emblazoned on innumerable banners, posters, billboards and more permanent fixtures.

3.4: Nazarbayev- Understanding the Journey

Kazakhstan is colossal in size, complicated in its history, colourful in its culture and has a more compelling narrative as a modern nation state than most outsiders know. Much of that narrative revolves around the country’s first President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, but his life can be understood in the context of the land where he was born, raised and became a leader.

His journey began in a shepherd’s yurt on the mountain meadows of the steppes. He grew up in a poverty-stricken nomad family which had been scarred by Stalin’s terror but were shrewd enough to secure a good Russian education for their son. Nazarbayev’s first job was a blast-furnace worker in a steel plant which trained him as a metallurgist. His early career as a young Communist Party official ran through the eras of Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Suslov, Leonid Breznev and Yuri Andropov. At the age of 44 Nazarbayev was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan by the ailing Konstantin Chernenko. Nazarbayev was the only Soviet party leader simultaneously to enjoy the strong support of his population, the respect of his fellow leaders and the trust of Gorbachev.

As one of the leading figures in Soviet hierarchy after Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Nazarbaev knew that the end of Communist domination was coming. Although he played a vital role in supporting Boris Yeltsin’s stand against failed Moscow coup plotters in 1991, those days were

the harbingers of political extinction for Gorbachev and for the Soviet Union, which broke up five months later. Without a drop of blood being shed in his own country during these upheavals, Nazarbayev emerged from the wreckage as the President of the new nation state of Kazakhstan.

What kept Nazarbayev going through the darkest days of Kazakhstan's dramas was a combination of steel worker's stamina and a reformer's vision. He never faltered in his ancestral man of the steppes belief that his people would yet again weather the storm. Given the centralized nature of power in Kazakhstan, any consideration of future directions in this respect must consider the likely impact of Presidential succession, though Nazarbayev has played an important role as a mediator between civic and ethnic tendencies in Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER IV

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ORALMAN PROGRAMME

The economic and social transformation together with the massive emigration flows that characterized the early 1990s played a decisive role in determining Kazakhstan's ethnic immigration policy. Seen as a way to correct past injustices of exile and repression, ethnic immigration policies were also critical in countering significant population loss. In this way, the promotion of ethnic Kazakh immigration is closely linked to the process of nation building, preservation of national identity and culture as well as internal stability.

Article 1 of the 1997 Migration Law stated that a repatriate (repatriant in Russian, Oralman in Kazakh) is “a person of native ethnicity (litso korennoi natsional'nosti) who was expelled from the historic homeland, deprived of citizenship due to the acts of mass political repressions, unlawful requisition, forced collectivization, and other inhumane acts, and voluntarily moves to the Republic of Kazakhstan for permanent residency, and his descendants.”

An Oralman is an ethnic Kazakh who was permanently residing outside the Republic of Kazakhstan at the moment when it acquired its sovereignty and his children of Kazakh ethnicity who were born and permanently residing outside the Republic of Kazakhstan after it acquired its sovereignty, which arrived in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the purpose of permanent residence in the historical motherland and received a relevant status according to the procedure set forth by the Law on Migration of the Population amended in 2002.

Thus, the amended definition does not take into account whether an immigrant had lived in Kazakhstan in the past. We should note, however, that the change in the definition of Oralman in the 2002 amendment did not affect migration trends, as the amendment did not so much change the migration policy itself as conform the law to actual practices. Even before 2002, Kazakh “repatriates” immigrating to Kazakhstan were not asked whether they or their ancestors had been deported from Kazakhstan.

Not all ethnic Kazakhs currently residing beyond the borders of the contemporary territory of Kazakhstan are former refugees (or their descendants) who fled homeland to avoid political turmoil, repression, and famine under the Tsarist or Soviet regime. There are also Kazakhs who had lived on their land outside of the current borders of Kazakhstan for generations, long before Soviet times. If the government had limited the right to “return” to only those who had had lived

in Kazakhstan (if technically possible at all), a substantial number of ethnic Kazakhs abroad would have been denied such opportunity.

4.1: Historical background

It is estimated that roughly five million ethnic Kazakhs live outside Kazakhstan, in more than 40 countries. Of this figure, it is estimated that roughly 1.5 million Kazakhs are in Uzbekistan, 1.5 million in China, 1 million in Russia, 100,000 in Turkmenistan, 80,000 in Mongolia and 45,000 in Kyrgyzstan. Other countries with significant Kazakh diaspora populations are Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran (President Nazarbayev speech at the Third World Summit of Kazakhs held in Astana on September 25, 2005). Kazakhs have also settled in other countries in Western Europe, Asia and North and South America.


The largest percentage of ethnic Kazakhs abroad are descendants of those who were forced out of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s or who fled political turmoil, repression, forced collectivization, and hunger crises that effected a large segment of the Kazakh population (official figures of the census 1926 and 1939). It is estimated that some 200,000 Kazakhs left the Soviet Union, primarily to China, Mongolia, India, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, whereas the number of Kazakhs in neighbouring Soviet republics increased by 2.5 times from 1926 to 1939, totaling over 794,000 persons.

With Slavic immigration that began in the 18th and 19th centuries and continued into the Soviet period, and with mass expulsions and forced migration, Kazakhs gradually became a minority in their own homeland. By 1959, Russians outnumbered Kazakhs in the republic. While the trend reversed to some degree in the following years, by 1989 Kazakhs exceeded Russians only by a small margin (official figures of the census 1989).

4.2: The post-Soviet period

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan experienced significant population loss resulting from the massive emigration of ethnic Russians and Germans. Between 1991 and 2004, more than 3,158,400 people emigrated from the country. With large flows of emigrants leaving the country, Kazakhstan also faced a significant decline in fertility and a reduction in immigration. Estimates suggest that Kazakhstan's population shrank from 16.5 million to under 15 million between 1989 and 1999 (Agency for Statistics).

Figure 1



Source: Agency for Statistics, Kazakhstan 2005

On 18 November 1991, a month before Kazakhstan gained independence, Kazakhstan passed the Resolution On the Procedures and Conditions of the Relocation to Kazakh SSR for Persons of Kazakh Ethnicity from Other Republics and Abroad Willing to Work in Rural Areas aimed not only to regulate the immigration of Kazakhs to Kazakhstan, but also to develop the Kazakh *aul* (village) and agricultural industry complex, which was then facing a deep crisis. As a result, 61,609 ethnic Kazakhs arrived in Kazakhstan between 1991 and 1992.

This was followed by the Law on Immigration, adopted in June 1992. According to Article 1 of the law, ethnic Kazakhs were given the right to return to their “historic homeland”. In order to regulate the expected large flow of Oralmans, the law also provided for the establishment of a special immigration quota and the creation of a dedicated agency to deal with the issue of ethnic immigration.

For economic and historic reasons, the return of ethnic Kazakhs aims to preserve the national identity of the country and promote internal stability. During the Soviet period, many Kazakh customs declined; particularly usage of the Kazakh language, which was reduced not only in formal but also in informal settings.

Because of this the Kazakh language and many elements of Kazakh culture were in danger of dying out. Thus the return of Kazakh Oralmans is one of the major elements of government migration policies that aims to preserve and develop Kazakh culture.

4.3 A dilemma of ethnic migration policy

Immigrants of Kazakh descent were expected to become politically and culturally ideal citizens of their ancestral homeland following Soviet rule. In practice, however, integration of Kazakh immigrants into the local community has not been easy, and their repatriation has created new divisions and exacerbated social problems in Kazakhstani society.

Migration policy that encourages the return of co-ethnics, in particular, policies that provides citizenship and financial assistance to make repatriates a full-fledged member of the state (the Europe-Israel model noted above), typically encounter the following challenges from the receiving community. First, the local population often considers these immigrants as the “other” and “not authentic” co-ethnics, as those who have lived under the influence of different cultures for generations naturally adopt the dominant language and culture of the receiving community. Second, local residents tend to complain that they are treated unfairly in relation to immigrants, as the latter are allocated government funds for their needs. In the eyes of the locals, immigrants enjoy too many privileges that are not available to local taxpayers, and this feeling of unfairness is further strengthened by the belief that immigrants share ethnicity in name only. The third criticism comes from the point of view of minorities, non-co-ethnic immigrants, and civil liberty advocates who argue that the state should guarantee equal rights to all people irrespective of ethnicity, and thus should not privilege co-ethnic immigrants at the expense of others (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009).

The complexity of the issue of cultural assimilation in Kazakhstan lies in the fact that both the Kazakh diaspora in foreign lands and also Kazakhs in their homeland during the 70 years of Soviet rule experienced linguistic and cultural transformation. For some Kazakhs, primarily in urban areas, Russian became their first language as they received education almost exclusively in Russian. This shift led to a linguistic and cultural cleavage between Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs (Dave 2007).¹⁷ For the former, co-ethnic immigrants, in particular those from outside of the former Soviet Union, are the cultural “other,” and it is not easy to accept them as “us” on the ground of the shared ancestry. However, in the eyes of immigrants, even the rural Kazakh-speaking brethren are quite russified as they still cherish classic Soviet values such as “the friendship of peoples” and the “approach to the civilized world through the Russian language” (Sancak 2007). After encounters with such co-ethnics in their ancestral homeland, immigrants often boast that it is they who managed to sustain “genuine” Kazakhness

(Diener 2009: 272-286). Such self-identification by immigrants, in turn, serves as a factor that alienates repatriates from the locals.

In addition to the conflict over Kazakhness, the sense of unfairness in the local population as to the allocation of government funds for repatriation also draws antipathy toward Kazakh immigrants. With the backdrop of the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the opinion that the interests of locals should be given preference over those of immigrants may continue to grow in the future. The amount of financial assistance to repatriates in Kazakhstan is rather modest in comparison with those given by the governments of Germany and Israel. Nevertheless, many locals feel that it is not fair that those who just arrived enjoy privileges not available for the local population who, they argue, remained in Kazakhstan even in difficult times and have contributed to the motherland for generations.

Discontent with the state-sponsored ethnic return migration project notwithstanding, public protest against this policy has rarely occurred in Kazakhstan to date. This is because the invitation of co-ethnics from abroad was authorized within the framework of a decolonization project aimed at redressing the wrongs of the past and at reviving the Kazakh nation. Also, in the course of Kazakh-oriented state building process, non-Kazakh minorities in Kazakhstan rarely objected to the repatriation policy of the state. In the early 1990s there was strong criticism against the allowance of dual citizenship for Kazakh immigrants, but this criticism focused not on the return migration of Kazakhs per se, but on the fact that only ethnic Kazakhs were allowed to hold two passports (this dispute ended when the 1995 Constitution banned dual citizenship). Indeed, many minorities themselves left Kazakhstan for their ancestral homeland, if such opportunities were available.

The absence of political forces against repatriation provides the ideal condition for its continuation and promotion. However, the invitation of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad lost its priority in the political agenda after the majority status of the titular ethnicity in Kazakhstan was regained. In recent years, the assistance to immigrants has become a social and economic burden to the government. It is unlikely, however, that the Kazakhstan government will completely abandon its ethnic return migration policy. Having defined itself as the state for all Kazakhs of the world, Kazakhstan has entitled co-ethnics with the right of return to their ancestral homeland to become full-fledged citizens. If the government declares that the state cannot accept ethnic brethren any more, such a decision will surely invite severe criticism from Kazakh nationalists as

well as immigrants, who will readily cast the ruling elites as traitors to the Kazakh nation. On the other hand, instability in the society will only grow worse if new immigrants continue to arrive while the integration of those who already have settled barely proceeds, and their social problems remain unsolved. Kazakhstan finds itself caught in a dilemma: because of its ethnic roots and de-colonization agenda, Kazakh repatriation policy cannot be easily abandoned even if it creates more problems than benefits.

4.4: Oralman quota

The Oralman quota is determined on an annual basis and reflects population, economic and budgetary considerations. It is established each year by Presidential decree. The first annual quota was set in 1993 and provided for the arrival or repatriation of 10,000 families (or approximately 40,000 persons). During the 1990s, the quota level fluctuated dramatically, falling to 500 households in 1999 and 2000. With the improved economic conditions in Kazakhstan beginning in 2002, the quota was gradually increased, reaching 15,000 families in 2005. The legal criteria for including immigrant families into the quota were not clearly fixed in the Law on Population Migration, nor have they been clearly elaborated in supplementary legal acts. This has made the quota system less transparent and predictable and therefore more susceptible to favoritism and corruption.

The quota system aims to control arrivals to some degree. However, unlike quota policies in other countries, such as Germany, the quota system in Kazakhstan is not the only avenue for ethnic Kazakhs to enter or remain in Kazakhstan. In recent years, there has been an intensification of immigration of ethnic Kazakhs outside of the quota system, largely as a result of ethnic Kazakhs moving from neighbouring Uzbekistan, particularly from disaster areas south of the Aral Sea (Karakalpakistan and Navoy regions). This creates a situation in which two groups of Oralman exist: those included in the quota and those arriving independently.

Originally tasked to the Department of Migration under the Ministry of Labour, the implementation of the quota system and responsibility for Oralman return and integration was transferred to a special governmental body in 1997, the Agency for Migration and Demography (AMD). The AMD, with headquarters in Astana and 16 local departments in 14 regions, was supervised directly by the Presidential Administration.


In November 2004, the AMD became the Committee on Migration under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. This transfer also shifted the supervision of the AMD from the President to the Minister of Labour; however additional agencies still remained active in the area of Oralman immigration and integration.

There are a number of state agencies active in the area of Oralman arrival and resettlement. Procedures relating to registering, being included in the quota system and obtaining residence permits or citizenship are often highly bureaucratic and are not in the mandate of only one agency. The complexity of the legal procedures generated by each agency and a general lack of interagency coordination represent a considerable obstacle in the integration process.

Table 1

Quota for repatriation of Ethnic Kazakhs	
Year	Households
1993	10,000
1994	7,000
1995	5,000
1996	4,000
1997	2,200
1998	3,000
1999	500
2000	500
2001	600
2002	2,655
2003	5,000
2004	10,000
2005	15,000

Figure 2 Oralman returns, 1993-2004



Source: Official Statistics of the Committee on Migration

The figure above details the large gap between the quota and total ethnic Kazakh immigration. As can be seen from the above graph, the number of Oralmans arriving in the country before

1995 did not even fill the quota. However, starting in 1996, the number of Oralman arrivals surpassed quota allowances and, by 2001, the total number of returnees exceeded the quota by a factor of 15. In 2002, despite an increase to the quota of more than 2,000 families, total immigration exceeded the quota by almost four times. Even in 2004, when the quota had been raised to 10,000 families, total immigration still exceeded the quota by 86 percent.

The gap between quota and non-quota arrivals can be attributed to rapid economic growth and rising standards of living in Kazakhstan (particularly in comparison with neighbouring countries) and an increased awareness of Oralman policies by ethnic Kazakhs living outside of Kazakhstan.

4.5: Government assistance to Oralman

The legal framework supporting Oralman integration is based on the 1997 Law on Population Migration, which provides for a series of integration measures intended for all Oralman returning to Kazakhstan. The Law on Population Migration has been completed with several legal acts. Rules on targeted spending of the funds allocated from budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Oralman (approved by Governmental Decree); Rules on distribution of land plots to Oralman for the construction of housing (approved by Governmental Decree); Regulations on adaptation centers for Oralman and other migrants in the RK (approved by Decree of the Head of the Agency for Migration and Demography); and Instruction on procedures for determining the Oralman status and inclusion into the Oralman's immigration quota (approved by Decree of the Head of the Agency for Migration and Demography).

An annual budget is dedicated to Oralman integration, which in 2005 amounted to KZT 8 billion. This constitutes a progressive increase in government allotments to Oralman. For example, in 2002 the state budget for integration was fixed at KZT 375 million. In 2003 this rose to approximately KZT 2.0 billion, while in 2004 the budget allocation was as much as 5 billion tenge. In 2006, the expected budget is estimated at KZT 11.1 billion⁸. Budgetary expenditures go in large part to housing and reintegration allowances for those included in the quota.


In addition to housing and reintegration allowances, Oralman included in the quota can benefit from additional benefits including transportation subsidies or free travel and an exception from custom duties. Those not included can still apply for Kazakhstani citizenship in order to receive a more limited number of benefits; however, these are clearly not comparable to those received by immigrants under the quota system.

Although legislation provides for employment assistance, vocational training and language acquisition, no specific integration programmes such as language courses, information and referral services, employment assistance or vocational training exist. Current legislation also provides for the establishment of adaptation centers for oralmans. However, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the majority of these centers do not fulfill their mandate.

4.6: Demographic characteristics

As of October 2005, the total number of oralmans living in Kazakhstan was 464,426 individuals representing 117,698 households (the Agency for Statistics). A breakdown by age reveals that roughly 43 percent are younger than the active working age, 52 percent are of active working age (between 16 and pension age according to national legislation) and five percent are counted as pensioners.

Figure 3



Source: Agency for Statistics, Kazakhstan 2005

The sex ratio of Oralman is similar to the Kazakh population with males accounting for 48 and females accounting for 52 percent (Committee on Migration, October 2005). This is compared to the 49 percent male and 51 percent female ratio found in the general population (UNDP Kazakhstan). According to the Committee on Migration, 163,376 or 35 percent are married. Roughly 76 percent of all Oralman who have arrived since 1992 have obtained citizenship. Another 21 percent of Oralman are awaiting citizenship or in the process of applying for


citizenship. The remaining three percent are either those who have permanent resident status or who do not wish to gain citizenship.

As a share of the total immigrant population, Oralman represent approximately 33 percent of all immigrants in Kazakhstan. In 2005, Oralman arrivals constituted nearly 80 percent of all immigrants to the country.

4.7: Main source countries

The major source countries of Oralman are varied and extend from East Asia to the Middle East and Western Europe. During the period 1991-2005, the main countries of origin for Oralman were Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, China and Russia. Other significant countries of origin are Tajikistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Afghanistan and Pakistan with marginal numbers from other CIS and Eastern European countries, Denmark and Israel.

Figure 4 Main Countries of Origin of Oralman



Source: Official Statistics of the Committee on Migration

While limited data exists on annual arrivals by country over the past ten years. The largely unpredictable nature of arrivals can be attributed primarily to push factors, such as unstable economic conditions in source countries compared with growth in Kazakhstan.

4.8: Oralman settlement patterns

Oralman are found in all regions in Kazakhstan. The region with the highest number of Oralman is South Kazakhstan oblast with a total of 122,131 individuals (UNDP, Kazakhstan).

This represents approximately 26 percent of all Oralman currently settled in Kazakhstan. Mangistau oblast is the second largest with 61,737 people or 13 percent of the Oralman population, followed by Almaty and Zhambyl oblasts with 60,770 and 49,365 Oralman respectively. Among regions with fewer Oralman are Western Kazakhstan and Atyrau oblasts and the cities of Almaty and Astana. Settlement patterns are determined by a number of factors. Firstly, the quota serves to structure regional distribution of Oralman and therefore inclusion under the quota system limits individual choice of residence.

In the early 1990s, the quota was primarily allocated in northern Kazakhstan. This was done in order to counter massive emigration flows resulting in significant population loss in the northern and central regions. Reflecting changing migration patterns, the quota more recently has focused on southern regions in order to reflect the actual settlement patterns of arriving Oralman. For instance, in 2005, nearly 73 percent of Oralman included in the quota (10,885 out of 15,000 families) were from Uzbekistan and resettled in South Kazakhstan oblast (Official Statistics of the Committee on Migration).

While applicants to the quota system can specify their preferred region, regional committees responsible for the selection make the final decision on applications, taking into consideration quota limitations. However, an Oralman who has applied to be included in the quota of a particular region cannot then be settled under the quota in another region. If he is not included in one region, he is left out of quota altogether that year. In such cases, those who are not successful in being included in the quota must wait until the subsequent year to make another request.

Variables affecting geographic resettlement for Oralman not included in the quota include: proximity to country of origin, language, climate and employment opportunities. For example, many Oralman in southern Kazakhstan arrive from bordering areas in Uzbekistan. Similarly, southern Kazakhstan receives Oralman from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey, due in part to a warmer climate and nearness to previous communities. Non-Russian speaking Oralman may also prefer areas where the Kazakh language is widespread, such as southern Kazakhstan. Additional reasons for settlement are also found in historical linkages and the presence of relatives.

Mangistau oblast with the second largest Oralman population mostly attracts populations from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, particularly from the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan. Oralman from these two countries account for nearly 95 percent of all Oralman living in the

oblast (UNDP, Kazakhstan). The main reasons for such settlement patterns are proximity to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and historical roots. Mangistau oblast also attracts a higher number of Oralman as a result of higher salary levels. In 2002, average monthly salaries in Mangistau exceeded the national average by 91.1 percent (Committee on Migration 2005).

4.9: Language issues

Language is fundamental for any interaction to occur and therefore language integration is among the first deemed to be necessary. The proficiency of migrants in the language of the receiving country, in oral and written form, is an important indicator of their successful integration. A sufficient knowledge of the language of the receiving country is also an essential precondition for integration into labour, social and cultural domains.

All migrant receiving states make language a central focus of their integration agendas, although states have different views on the level of choice granted to immigrants in their process of language acquisition. One of the main motivations of individuals choosing to immigrate to Kazakhstan is the desire to preserve Kazakh identity, language, culture and traditions. Once in Kazakhstan, they often face difficulties adapting to the public use of both Kazakh and Russian. Given the status of Russian as an officially recognized language and its wide use throughout the country, Oralman may have difficulty in successfully integrating into the labour market. The integration into social and cultural domains is also hampered by insufficient Russian language skills, which still prevails since the country is multiethnic and is needed for everyday communication.

Differences in written Kazakh can also be major obstacle. Currently three Kazakh alphabets are in use around the world: Cyrillic in Kazakhstan, Russia and some other CIS countries; Latin in Turkey and Western Europe; and Ancient Kazakh (based on on the Arabic alphabet) in China, Iran and Pakistan. As result Oralman from China, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey cannot read or write Kazakh once in Kazakhstan. Upon their arrival they almost immediately face problems in not being able to complete needed processes, for example, to apply for oralman status.

Despite the above-mentioned challenges, there are no measures currently in place to provide Oralman with language training. School and university administrations usually organise Kazakh and Russian language courses independently since no government programmes are in operation.

4.10: Cultural adaptation

As part of the Kazakh diaspora, Oralmen for the most part have conserved traditional aspects of Kazakh culture, traditions and lifestyle. This situation may or may not foster cultural integration. Two variables are particularly noteworthy in this respect: country of origin and region of resettlement. This is evident for example in southern Kazakhstan (South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, Kyzylorda and Manghystau oblasts), which demonstrates a greater adherence to national Kazakh culture and traditions. In these regions, Oralmen's socio-cultural adaptation appears to occur more easily than in northern and central regions.

Oralmen are found to face greater difficulties integrating into northern and central regions. This can be explained by the more pluralistic cultural landscape. Dating from the Soviet period, Kazakh culture in these areas was significantly impacted by the presence of other cultural and ethnic groups. In particular, the prevalence of the Russian language and culture in these regions means that Oralmen who are settled there in general require more time to adapt to the local environment.

While Oralmen do share the same cultural roots as Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, differences in cultural practices and norms do exist. This stems from the fact that Oralmen have conserved the traditional Kazakh culture and lifestyle whereas Kazakhs in Kazakhstan have adapted, first to influences brought about during the Soviet period, and more recently to changes occurring through the transition to a market economy. Oralmen, particularly those coming from non-CIS countries, are for the most part more religious than local Kazakhs.

Another important variable affecting the level of cultural adaptation among Oralmen is country of origin. This is clearly observed with regard to clothing and practices in the home. Oralman women, particularly in southern regions, wear traditional clothes, including a long high-necked dress covered with a camisole and a kerchief to cover their heads. Most Kazakh women coming from Turkmenistan, Iran, and Afghanistan do not adopt the clothing styles of local Kazakh women, as they consider such styles to be too loud or immodest.

Men often hold a similar view. Men who came from Uzbekistan wear a skull-cap (*tuybeteika*), while men who came from Iran and Pakistan (mainly seen among old people) usually wear a turban (*chalma*).

The culture of Oralmans has changed and has modernized substantially. Cultural differences were not found to be a source of tension between Oralmans and the general population. The attitude of the local population towards Oralmans is however not always so tolerable. According to a survey conducted by the independent analytical Center for Social Technologies (CST) in 2005, The perception of Oralmans by the Kazakhstani population is found to be controversial. On the one hand, considerable respect is expressed for Oralmans wishing to return to their ethnic roots, and benefits brought to the receiving country are recognized. However, suspicion is also high, particularly with regard to abuses of social welfare programmes and targeted benefits. Kazakhs and representative of other non-Russian ethnic groups expressed a more or less supportive attitude towards Oralmans. However, a negative attitude among Russians (the second largest ethnic group in the country) was expressed by 15%, or every sixth respondent. The survey also showed, however, that this negative attitude is not necessarily an expression of complete disapproval, but rather of caution towards potential threats in terms of employment and housing.

4.11: Oralman' Problems

Although legislation contains provisions on assistance in job placement, advanced training, and language adaptation of Oralmans, there are no special integration programmes in the republic for Oralmans such as language courses, information and directory services, assistance in job placement, or advanced training courses. The current legislation also includes provisions on the establishment of Oralman adaptation and integration centres. However, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), at present most of these centres, unfortunately, fail to perform the tasks assigned thereto.

One of the key aspects of the problem with new settlers in Kazakhstan is ineffectiveness of state policy concerning their resettlement. Official bodies are not able to provide exact data on number of Kazakh migrants. In the opinion of International Legal Initiative, the key problem for Oralmans consists of their integration into the Kazakhstan society. Upon moving to Kazakhstan, some Oralmans are exposed to discrimination by local residents because of their ignorance of the Russian language. This makes them less competitive in Kazakhstan's labour market, which spawns grievance against authorities and generates accusations of being unable to address the Oralmans' problems. Besides, practices of NGOs working with Oralmans show that most Oralmans face corruption both before and after resettlement, which aggravates negative opinion

about their situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan, even more. Another serious problem consists of Oralman's ignorance of the national legislation of RK and even their failure to understand it because of their specific mentality established in the country of departure and due to differences in the legal systems.

More recently, the State has advanced greatly in addressing the Oralman's problems, however they face such challenges as unemployment or lack of funds to buy housing upon removal, which forces them to leave the regions they were distributed to and search for employment opportunities in Almaty, Astana, or oil regions of the country. Hence, Oralman turn from external migrants into internal ones.

Most Oralman are dissatisfied with their situation upon resettlement to the Republic of Kazakhstan, which makes their community attractive for various political influence groups and groups of extremist nature aiming to de-stabilise the situation in Kazakhstan. It could be clearly seen in the events in Shanyrak and Bakai, in Almaty, and in Zhanaozen (Mangistau oblast). According to the press, among the striking oilmen in Zhanaozen, 25% were Oralman, i.e. every fourth striker was a repatriate. Besides, discontent is engendering among the Oralman living in Kyzylagash settlement, Almaty oblast, because, according to them, the flood victims included many Oralman who were not registered in Kyzylagash and were not mentioned among the dead. They seem to be declared missing. All these protest moods among the people who do not see ways of addressing their problem are amassing and can lead to a social outburst. High unemployment levels among Oralman can be explained by a number of reasons.

A language barrier is the most significant factor behind the low level of economic integration. Oralman poorly speaking Russian or not speaking it all can encounter serious challenges in job search, especially in Kazakhstan's northern areas. In southern oblasts where the Kazakh language is common, the language barrier is less problematic although language difficulties can exist there as well. For example, Oralman from China, Afghanistan and Pakistan write in the old Kazakh alphabet (based on the Arabic alphabet) whereas the Roman graphics are used for the Kazakh language in Turkey. Some Oralman coming from these countries face difficulties because they cannot read and write in Kazakh. Hence, their insufficient knowledge of both languages results in a situation when an Oralman is actually not able to find a job. Secondly, education system differences also affect job placement. An Oralman having a higher education degree can face problems in job search unless his degree has been recognised. In some cases,

Oralmans cannot find a job according to their specialties. This is also true for Oralmans with higher education (engineers, technologists, physicians, economists) and for those having no education as such (traders).

According to the Law on Migration of the Population, the State should help Oralmans in job placement, skills development, and new occupation training. Local authorities charged with rendering assistance to Oralmans mainly can advise them to get registered with local employment bodies or offer temporary employment in so called ‘public works’.

Another not unimportant factor complicating job placement of Oralmans is that settlement distribution of the ethnic immigrants into regions takes place without consideration of territorial deployment of productive forces, and there is secondary migration. A considerable percentage of Oralmans live now in labour-abundant regions – South Kazakhstan, Mangistau, Almaty and Zhambyl oblasts, whereas northern regions face shortage of skilled human resources. Upon coming to Kazakhstan, Oralman families usually encounter great problems with school enrolment of their children. Generally, they prefer Kazakh-medium schools. Although most Oralmans speak Kazakh, they have difficulties with spelling and reading because they don’t know Cyrillic. Both in Russian-speaking and Kazakh speaking schools, Oralmans feel huge differences between Kazakhstan’s education system and the one they studied in when they lived in their previous countries of residence.

The situation is aggravated by spontaneous movement of internal migrants that creates social tension worsening the unbalanced domestic labour market as it is. Secondary migration and desire for living in South Kazakhstan, Mangistau, Almaty and Zhambyl oblasts, regarded as labour-abundant regions, strengthens the tendency of treating Oralmans adversely. According to the Centre for Sociological Studies, the tendency exists among low-income people.

The system of social support for Oralmans requires further improvement. A main share of social benefits is used for housing support and removal of the families included in the immigration quota. The housing arrangement mechanism fails to meet modern requirements, due to which about a half of Oralman families have no housing at all.

There is neither a comprehensive approach nor coordination among public administration bodies engaged in addressing migration-related issues. Efficiency of image-building and awareness-raising activities among representatives of the Kazakh diasporas in foreign countries is low. Unfortunately, there are some people among Oralmans who, having timely executed documents

for pecuniary aid as per quota and received it, do not hurry to have their Kazakhstan citizenship formalised.

Examination of Kazakhstan's immigration policy by experts of the Kazakhstan Institute of Social and Economic Information and Forecasting, in cooperation with the Soros Kazakhstan Foundation, using Oralmans mainly from non-CIS countries as an example, clearly revealed that they have a number of substantial problems:

- the fact that most Oralmans have no housing as a result of the rural privatisation process in which the repatriates could not take part because their civil rights are reduced;
- high unemployment rates caused by crisis occurrences in regional economy and by unavailability of loans because of having no Kazakhstan citizenship or collaterals;
- some aspects of repatriates' adaptation to the contemporary conditions in Kazakhstan, among which the main points include a language barrier (ignorance of Russian), unfamiliarity with the Republic of Kazakhstan legislation, and facts of neglectful treatment of Oralmans by some local residents.

The problems typical for the policy of Oralmans' return to their historical homeland call for establishment and improvement of extensive state and interstate regulation in the context of the global labour market and integration in the country. As a result, our country's demographic situation has been developing improperly; there is still no system of legal and economic guarantees stimulating, for example, attraction of immigrants to under-populated areas. Indeed, mass Oralman movements to heavily populated places with favourable natural and climatic conditions or a relatively high level of socioeconomic development constitute a factor promoting social tension in such areas, which can prevent political and economic transformations in the country.

One of the key directions in dealing with this issue is to secure optimal re-distribution of skilled labour among regions in order to provide necessary labour resources for the national economy.

4.12: The Right To Social Protection

According to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Migration of the Population, social protection is granted to Oralmans on equal terms with citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Oralman enjoy the following benefits:

1. Pension provision in the Republic of Kazakhstan is implemented in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Pension Provision in the Republic of Kazakhstan of 20 June 1997 (here-in after referred to as the Law).

According to Article 2(2) of the Law, foreigners and stateless persons permanently residing in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be entitled to pension provision on equal terms with citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan unless otherwise specified in laws and international treaties. Hence, in accordance with the legislation in force, oralman status holders, as foreigners permanently residing in the country's territory, have the same pension entitlements as citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The current legislation envisages no compensating addition to oralmans' pension payments. The law is based on the principles of granting equal rights to pension provision to all citizens, hence there is no ground to pay pension in the amount established in the person's previous place of residence.

2. Besides, the following benefits are paid to Oralmans and their family members:

- state social benefits, namely disability benefits, survivor's benefits, and old age benefits in --accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on State Social Disability Benefits, Survivor's Benefits and Old-Age Benefits in the Republic of Kazakhstan;
- special state benefits in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Special State Benefit;
- benefits to families having children in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on State Benefits to Families Having Children.

Besides, Oralmans are granted state targeted social assistance from local budgets in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on State Targeted Social Assistance.

3. According to Article 5, Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Employment of the Population, the State takes measures to promote employment of target population groups, including Oralmans. Citizens in target groups are entitled to engage in public works and undergo vocational training, advanced training and re-training on a priority basis. The Law provides for a simplified procedure for registration of Oralmans as unemployed with employment bodies based on the Oralman's certificate issued by territorial services of the authorised body for migration of the population.

4. According to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Migration of the Population, Oralman and their family members included in the Oralman immigration quota receive the following additional benefits alongside the privileges, compensations, benefits and other types of social assistance, according to the procedure specified by the Republic of Kazakhstan Government:

a) payment of lump-sum benefits differentiated depending on the region of settlement and including costs of initial adaptation, travel to a permanent place of residence and transport of possessions;

b) disbursement of funds for purchase of housing, or provision of a preferential loan for construction, reconstruction or purchase of housing.

The lump-sum benefits and funds for purchase of housing are paid to the persons included in the Oralman immigration quota even in case of the Oralman's death or acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The lump-sum benefits and funds for purchase of housing are paid by the Central Pension Centre upon receipt of an abstract on their assignment for territorial migration police units. In accordance with the Resolution of the Republic of Kazakhstan Government No. 296 of 28 March 2008 On approval of the admission quota for entering educational organisations that implement professional training programmes of technical and vocational, post-secondary and higher education, an admission quota for persons of Kazakh ethnicity not being citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan is established. Studying Oralman are provided, on the mandatory basis, with space in the educational organisation's hostel, grants and hot meals. Analysis of Oralman's appeals to the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as of findings of the inspections carried out by prosecution authorities shows that some territorial branches of the authorized state body for migration often violate requirements of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Procedure of Processing of Appeals from Natural and Legal Persons as well as those of the Instruction on Oralman Status Determination and on Inclusion in the Oralman Immigration Quota. Besides, some Oralman drew the Commission's attention to violation of their rights to receive pension payments prior to their acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Analysis of the current legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the matters related to assignment of housing assistance, payment of pensions and benefits to Oralman showed that, according to Article 2, Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Pension Provision in the Republic

of Kazakhstan, foreigners and stateless persons permanently residing in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan are entitled to pension provision on equal terms with citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan unless otherwise specified by law and international treaties. One of the measures to encourage repatriation of Kazakhs to their historical homeland consists of providing them, free of charge, with land plots for individual housing construction.

In this process, there are frequent breaches of requirements of Tax Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to which Oralmans are exempted from state duties when registering their immovable property rights and transactions as well as when acquiring citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

4.13: Russians Exodus from Kazakhstan

Apart from the 'in-gathering' of Kazakh populace in their new motherland, one more ethno-demographic phenomenon is discernable. Despite the efforts of new regime, the process of ethno-political polarization is going on. Many Russians are insecure of their future in the republic and are leaving for Russia. According to the available data 58.8% of the Russians and 7.4% of the Germans have left the country (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 65). The number of persons who have left Kazakhstan has increased from 23,600 in 1988 to 306,000 in 1991 and over 400,000 in 1994 (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 65). According to the opinion poll conducted by the Hiller Institute, 447% of non-Kazakhs prefer to migrate (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 65). It can be expected that in a few years Kazakhs will constitute an absolute majority of the population and the trend of ethnic homogenization is likely to grow.

At present, the Russians living in the region are concerned about restrictions to their social and professional opportunities, the chance to advance their national culture and the problem of security in the event of inter-ethnic conflicts. The Russians organized action in defence of their civil rights and security is negligible. They are getting politically passive because they have lost all hope of becoming rooted in the region, have in fact accepted their "non-indigenous" inferior status and are afraid to come up against uncontrollable pressure from the local majority (Tishkov 1997: 129-131). It is owing to this, the Russians are set upon leaving Kazakhstan. Yet their total emigration is as unlikely as their rapid assimilation in Kazakhstan.

According to the 1989 census, the Russian population in Kazakhstan was 37.8 percent of the overall population (Tishkov 1997: 116). Kazakhstan had been subjected to intensive Russian

settlement from the nineteenth century which stopped growing in the 1970s. A Soviet specialist in inter-Republic migration, Viktor Perevedentsev noted this sudden break in migration patterns. Now the balance of migration is negative in Kazakhstan as it was + 431000 during 1961-70 and now is -789000 in 1979-89 (Tishkov 1997: 118). Yuri Arutyunyan of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow believes that this dramatic outmigration from the periphery was because the "socio-professional" status of Russians in Kazakhstan was steadily declining (Sengupta 1997: 276). Since 1989, the number of Russians leaving Kazakhstan has sharply increased, with nearly as many emigrating from the states between 1989 and 1991 as had left during the preceding decade. This division between the European and Kazakh community also has a clear geopolitical expression. While the Slavs constitute large majorities in the northern oblasts, the Kazaks dominate the southern parts of the country. The north-south divide is further complicated by a town-country dimension with many Kazakhs living in the countryside in the north and many Russians residing in southern Kazakh towns. Occupationally, the Russians are employed mainly in industry, trade and services whereas Kazakhs are predominantly employed in agriculture.

According to the 1989 data, 22.4 percent of the Kazakh population and 52.6 percent of the Russian population of Kazakhstan were engaged in industry (Tishkov 1997: 117-121). With the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991, the spirit of 'Kazakhstan for Kazakhs' is gaining momentum. In a new situation, the Kazakhs want to do away with the predominance of Russian values, language and culture over their polity, economy and education. In Kazakhstan, the non-indigenous population is being systematically forced out of government, industries, education and the higher echelons of the army. The Russians have been faced with the serious problem of finding a new niche in the changing economic and socio-cultural situation.

Insufficient knowledge of the language of the titular nationality is a formidable obstacle for Russians working in public health, education and administrative work and principal argument in favour of their dismissal (Tishkov 1997: 123).

In the former USSR, Russians enjoyed for decades the comfortable status of a people dominating all the major socio-cultural areas. The Russian language and culture were reference points for all cultures that was transmitted, from the centre to the periphery via educational system, the mass media, party and government structures (Tishkov 1997: 125). Under new circumstances, Russians residing in the Union Republics have no overwhelming motivation to learn the

languages of the titular nationalities and integrate into the Kazakh ethno-cultural environment. It is advantageous today to look upon Russians increasingly as colonizers particularly because of their unwillingness to learn the language and traditions of ethnic Kazakhs. The percentage of local Russians, with a working knowledge of Kazakh language is less than 1 percent in the Republic (Sengupta 1997: 274). Such "lack of desire" and "cultural distancing" of the Russians from the titular population has resulted in the emergence of "Russians-as aliens" concept in Kazakhstan. The Russian language is being consistently forced out. It is also worth mentioning that teachers teaching in Kazakh receive an extra 15-20% to their salary (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 95).

Much of the resentment is also focused on Russians' domination of managerial and technical jobs. According to Robert Lewis, this rapid increase in expectations among young indigenous Kazakhs can only be satisfied by restructuring the economy towards job creation, since many of these positions are now held by Russians or by the replacement of Russians by Kazakhs (Sengupta 1997: 276).

The fact that a large number of Kazakhs had either perished or had been forced into exile during the Soviet period, leads to a sense of historic injustice today. Information propaganda in Almaty increasingly portrays Russians as aggressors (Sengupta 1997: 282). Even after independence, the worsening economic situation and political instability are often blamed on the Kremlin's pernicious legacy which serves to keep anti-Russian sentiments alive. The enactment of the laws on language and citizenship, shrinking job opportunities and anti-Russian nationalistic rhetoric have evoked a painful psychological reaction among the Russians. One of the concrete manifestations of the negative turn in inter-ethnic relations is that people feel that their national pride is being affronted. Even the more moderate sections are being increasingly alienated by such moves as the renaming of Russian towns and streets, the denigration of Russian culture by the Kazakh names etc. Rallies have also been organized in Petro Pavlovsk in support of a free economic zone with Russia and introduction of Russian as the second state language. There were also threats of the creation of a Trans-Irtysh Republic modelled on the lines of the Trans Dniestr Republic in Moldova, if their demands were not acceded to.

The process of privatization in Central Asia also has a distinctly ethnic feature, when the authorities through various manipulations have made sure that the local population get hold of assets and properties. Here, factory workers are practically forbidden to privatize their factories,

as the majority of factory workers are Slavs (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 96). At the same time, the rural population, which is mainly Kazakh receives larger share than urban population.

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, all taxes are paid to the central Government with the major part of the taxes coming from Russian speaking North. But when distributed, most allocations go to the South (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 96). The 105,000 Kazakhs who returned from Mongolia were settled in the North and the government provided full financial backing for the settlement (Zhang and Azizian 1998: 96). The overwhelmingly majority of the Russians living in Kazakhstan are unprepared and unwilling to accept the status of an ethnic minority.

While ethnic divisions could well become a potential source of conflict, both sides have reasons for restraint. The Russians very well understand that demography is not on their side. Russians in Kazakhstan feel different from Russians on the other side of the Urals. The government realizes fully well that the exodus of Russians will lead to tangible decline in their manufacturing and extraction industries. In Moscow too, there is pragmatic commitment to Kazakh-Russian relations since hostility with Kazakhstan could well act as catalyst for deterioration of relations with Turkic Central Asians, many of whom live within the borders of the Russian federation.

The attitude of ethnic Russians in Central Asia is "complex and tense" because of their gradual drift in their political or economic positions in the Republic (Sengupta 1997: 292). The ethnic identity of Russians and their attitudes to ethnic relations have changed significantly. To Leokadia Drobizheva, three factors played a role in this: (a) the shock of losing their status as the ruling nation (b) the political struggle in which leading groups want to rely on ethnic patriotism and (c) the sharp rise in ethnic competition in the social and working sphere (Sengupta 1997: 291). The abrupt end of Russian dominance means that they are now having to think hard about their Russian identity, something they always took for granted. Emigration sentiments are preponderant everywhere and the political inertia of the Russians in Kazakhstan is largely a result of their loss of hope regarding the prospects of their continued presence in the region (Tishkov 1997: 134).

The national discord and ethnic tussles in present day Kazakhstan have brought into question Soviet claims of a unique homogenous entity called the "Soviet Man" living in a single nationhood. As new "majorities" and "minorities" have emerged, the leadership of the new Republic shall have to maintain balance between their respective aspirations. By now, President Nazarbayev has been able to capitalize on this underlying spirit of inter-ethnic moderation to

pursue policies which generally satisfy both the Kazakh and Russian-speaking communities (Sengupta 1997: 284). These are evident from various provisions of the constitution adopted in 1993 and 1995. The estimate for the 1990s was one million people, most of whom were expected to move to Russia (Tishkov 1997: 133-134). Much in this respect will depend on the policies of the new Republic and their utmost sincerity in evolving Kazakhstan as a multicultural plural society.

CONCLUSION

Each of the Soviet successor states has struggled to define just who exactly are 'the people,' but in Kazakhstan such efforts were highly contentious. The country's leaders including its President, Nazarbayev, boast that Kazakhstan is the most multi-national of all Soviet successor states, but few of its citizens seem to agree to its advantages. Instead it appears as a source of stress for many. Outside observers are of the view that for Kazakhstan to survive its population should develop a civic-based patriotism rather than an ethnic based loyalty to the land of the Kazakhs (or for that matter that of the Russians). This seems difficult for the country's leaders to accept and adopt. The present day nation builders have set out to mould the nation in a new state. Kazakhstan is faced with the formidable task of relating the two entities 'the titular nation' and the 'civic nation' to each other in such a way that the entire population will identify with and be loyal to the state.

Brubaker (1995) describes civic nations forming when the state insists that both its minority and majority cultural groups belong fundamentally to the dominant nation. It is precisely this form of civic nation building that early Soviet leaders selected to consolidate non-Russians into the new socialist multiethnic state and subsequently serves as a model for Kazakhstan's leaders as they attempt to establish a statewide national identity.

Soviet authorities designated this program as an indigenization, or in Russian a 'korenizatsiia'. The term 'korenizatsiia', which literally means "rooting" in Russian, implied the attempt to rediscover and utilize local culture. 'Korenizatsiia' functioned as an affirmative action policy for non-Russians in the Soviet Union emphasizing the use of local languages and cultural traditions, empowering native cadres as regional political leaders, and filling government administrations with members of the regional ethnic nations the cultures of the populations. Soviet leaders employed ethnographers to survey the entire population and fashion it into groups of ethnic nations. In this way, Soviet authorities asserted the right to determine the size and number of the state's ethnic nations and tightly control the nature of their national character and expression. 'Korenizatsiia' trained the non-Russian population to identify themselves as members of officially designated ethnic nations. A adherence to ethnic nations served to standardize identity by replacing former localized identities with ways of thinking about oneself that political authorities could easily quantify and manipulate. Using socialism in a consolidating role,

therefore, the state subjugated national ethnic identity to the preeminence of a Soviet socialist identity, which Stalin expressed through the slogan “national in form, socialist in content”. This reduced ethnic nationalism to the level of form through the usage of ethnic languages and the performance of cultural traditions.

Ethnic differences that were latent in the Soviet era became suddenly apparent with the collapse of communist ideology. The Soviet system required that the individuals preserve their nationality, the term used to denote ethnic identity, which was indicated in line five of the passport that each adult was obliged to carry and on most other official documents. Simultaneously, though, the totalitarian structure of the government demanded allegiance to the artificial socio-political construct of the Soviet Union rather than to an ethnic or territorial nation. The infrastructure of terror – the remains of the old Stalinist security system decayed along with the ideology of communism, which allowed people more freedom to define their own loyalties. Many leaders felt that elevating national identity from an indicator of ethnicity to an ideological bond would facilitate new state allegiances.

The emergence of nationalism as the basis of state ideology in most of the neighbouring states intensified the problem of identity formation for Kazakhstan, whose boundaries are more a product of administrative choices made during the Soviet period. Kazakhstan was deliberately developed as a showcase of Soviet economic and social theories, and Kazakhstan’s demographic situation was a product of those policies.

The omnipresent ideology of the Soviet Union rigidly fixed a person’s ethnic identity while propagating and rewarding internationalism. As a result, people with strong ethnic loyalties from all the country’s ethnic communities, including the Russians felt discriminated against during the Soviet era. Nationality was a given, but nationalism, believing that your ethnic community was somehow superior to all others, was a crime and for which you could be jailed and, under Stalin could be executed. Such conditions served to leave people hypersensitised to the importance of advancing the cause of their ethnic communities, and it is this hypersensitivity that has locked the people of Kazakhstan in a kind of political zero-sum game in which the advances of one ethnic group are understood as losses by the other.

Kazakhstan’s leaders were aware of their country’s fractured nature since at least the mid-1970’s and have made repeated efforts to elaborate policies to incorporate the identities of both Russians and Kazakhs.

At the time of independence the country's two largest majorities, the Russians and the Kazakhs, each had a different worldview, leaving government with the challenge of mitigating these differences. Government also sought to accommodate the worldviews of other ethnic minorities, so that all these people could share a common goal. Kazakhstan government has managed to keep the peace but has given real meaning to country's multi-ethnicity. While claiming to speak for all it has favoured the ethnic Kazakhs over other communities living in the country.

The census of 1999 showed that the largest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are the Kazakhs (53% of the total population) and the Russians (30%). Kazakh nation-building policies are further conditioned by this demographic composition. Kazakhstan is the only post-Soviet state in which the titular ethnic group was not a majority at the time of independence. This split is further exacerbated by a skewed geographic

distribution. Kazakhs are concentrated mostly in rural areas and in the central and southern parts of the country, while Russians are predominantly urban-dwellers and constitute a majority in the north. The ethnic issue is more acute as many Russians are unwilling to accept their new minority status. Kazakhstan has never existed as a consolidated independent state, nor has Kazakh national identity had the chance to develop. The cherished Soviet desire of building 'Soviet Man' – a monolithic doctrinal experiment - further frustrated the Kazakhs to build their exclusive identity.

After independence, the ruling elites of Kazakhstan are making efforts, through reinterpreting history, locating events so as to prove their continuous existence as rulers of this land-right from the days of 'Sakas' and Andronov tribes to the present day Kazakhs - so as to delink their identity from their Soviet past and building of their own. With a weak national identity and passive political culture on the part of Kazakhstan's titular population and a minority population intent on maintaining the former status quo, nation-building is an arduous task in this Republic.

Although the same elite have dominated the country for more than a decade, its understanding of how to balance the interests of Kazakhstan's two principal ethnic majorities has changed. While continuing to embrace the notion of ethnic tolerance that stresses the multi-national nature of the state, the government now actively pursues policy which favour Kazakh claim over territory and other cultural and economic fronts. These policies are geared to a future in which Kazakhs will be a large enough majority to dominate the country.

President Nazarbayev and his close associates initially expected that a change in demographic balance would be gradual. The expectation was that the high growth rate of Kazakh population would be augmented by some in-migration of the Kazakhs living elsewhere and an out-migration of those Russians who are unable to see their future in Kazakhstan. Although the government sponsored the in-migration of Kazakhs while also encouraging the Russians who could accommodate themselves to the changed political circumstances of the republic and regularly reaffirmed this goal. One can only speculate on what factors motivated the Kazakh leadership, because few of these policies were well articulated. Though there was a fear that the Russians living in ethnically consolidated enclaves, would opt for secession rather than out-migration. There was also a concern that Russia would not tolerate the out-migration of millions of Russians. It is believed that when Russians initially began to leave the country, the Kazakh leadership denied that they were leaving.

The demographic change has been a rapid one, caused largely by the departure of nearly one in four Russians. The population of Kazakhstan undergoing changes, the Kazakh government began to rethink its strategy. Although the Kazakh government has never targeted the Russians, their departure was viewed as a good thing and slowly the policies of the government changed to make most of the departure.

It may be said that over time Kazakhstan has become a more conspicuous, both in its composition and in its ideology. About the language issue, Russian language still remains in wide use, its legal status only being slowly eroded. One may only say that the state cannot to lose its technologically advanced population that functions in Russian, regardless of ethnic origin. The Kazakh government's long-range plans call for English to become the international language of the next generation. The English language instruction was mandated for all schools by the end of 2000. But languages are not introduced by legislation as much as by large expenditures on education, which has been lacking in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhs are of the view that they suffered at the hands of the Russians for more than two centuries and that the reestablishment of the Kazakh state must compensate for that. For them Kazakh is their homeland, even though there is considerable variation among the Kazakh population as to what this means precisely.

Given the deep-seated differences in political values between the country's two principal nationalities, it is testament to the population's apathy that the country's social and political

atmosphere has been so calm. The strategy that the government is pursuing remains potentially dangerous. By reducing the scope of individual political action and stressing on the spiritual and cultural needs of the Kazakhs, the government is trying to prevent the economically and socially affected population from mobilizing itself on ethnic lines. While the risk of ethnic discord seems in no way imminent, for all the talk of foreign threats, the greatest source of instability for Kazakhstan lies within the state itself.

Multilayered debate in Kazakhstan on the possible models of nation-building is happening and several trends in this regard are discernable in the Republic. In the Kazakh language press, the nationality debate seems to be premised on the view that Kazakhstan is or ought to become a national state of Kazakh nation.

The official pronouncement conveyed by President Nazarbayev and through the Constitutions of Kazakhsan (1993 and 1995) is quite distinct from the rhetoric used in Kazakh language press. Kazakhstan is accepted as a multi-ethnic society. The preamble opens with a reference to 'We, the people of Kazakhstan' - clearly a non-ethnic entity. Kazakh constitution accepts Russian - as the language of communication and Kazakh being the state language. However, they have made some positive measures for the advancement of native Kazakhs - their languages, culture, education, tradition and life style. Nazarbayev through his pronouncements has tried to avoid confrontation on the ethnic issue by asserting that Kazakhstan is both a 'multinational society' and a homeland for ethnic Kazakhs at the same time. In a sense, he has tried to avoid making a choice between an 'ethnic' and a 'civic' nation concept.

Kazakhstan's yet to evolve 'national identity' is putting stumbling block before the onset of nation-building process in Kazakhstan. Therefore, nation-building exercise in the Republic is widely reflecting these indigenous limitations, and trying to do away with most of them. The efforts to build a Kazakh identity, nationalizing policies and practices, process of Kazakhisation etc. adopted in the new Republic are the subsequent manifestations of this exercise. Given the nature of state formation in the Republic, the leadership of Kazakhstan is now facing three principal domestic challenges. First, how do they create a national identity? Do they use a civic or ethnic strategy? Second, how do they create robust political institutions? Third, how do they engage in the process of nation building and modernization?

The Republic of Kazakhstan is fraught between as how to induce sub-national, ethnic, clan and groups into modern nation-state framework. It must thus be analysed under the unique

conditionalities and limitations posed before it in its past. First, sovereign territoriality in Kazakhstan has been imposed by external agents and events. In order to weaken peripheral resistance and Pan-Islamic threats, Stalin crafted state boundary of Kazakhstan which lacked correspondence to the ethnic composition. Later, under the impact of Russification and collectivization, the ethnic Kazakhs were reduced to minority in their own homeland. Owing to which, post-Soviet Kazakhstan received their sovereign territoriality from the former Soviet Union in which they lack their numerical preponderance and Russians competing them in numerical strength.

Second, in the post-Soviet period, sovereign state of Kazakhstan emerged due to the collapse of the Soviet system rather than as the result of strong independence movement. Kazakhstan was last among the Soviet states to leave the federation. Due to this, they lack strong sense of national identity and national cohesion, which they are trying hard to construct.

Third, like other Central Asian States, Kazakhstan emerged on the scene as late developers. It had to face other states which had a well established political structure, bureaucracy and modern national armies. It is this precondition, for late economic developers in order to compete effectively with earlier developers, the Republic of Kazakhstan is heading towards strong totalitarian government under Nazarbayev.

Fourth, Kazakhstan, also faces lack of national cohesion, without which social stability and nation-building exercises appear to be gravely at odds. Remaining unorganized on an 'all Kazakh' level for centuries before the Russian conquest, the highest identity to which Kazakhs ascribed was their *zhus* (Horde) - Great, Middle and Small. Their primary attachment was closer to hereditary links- their family-based clans and *auls* - through which their ability to allocate land, control warriors and collect taxes, commanded even greater loyalty.

Fifth, as backlash reaction to the Russo-centric version of education and culture, an opposite version of history and culture is seen in the public discourse in Kazakhstan, The Kazakhs more often blame the Russians for their great misfortunes in the past and visualize the Soviet past as 'colonial past'. A rigid and closed interpretation of one's own group as a victim at the hands of the other group has produced intolerance and inter-ethnic tensions. On the contrary, the ruling elites of Kazakhstan simply cannot do away with the Russian factor. Their competing numerical strength as well as their spatial concentration in the north of the Republic bordering Russia, has created fear in minds of the Kazakhs.

Under this broader pretext and conditionalities, the nation-building exercises in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan should be understood. 'hidden' informal practices and the 'unwritten rules' for nationalization often contradict and in certain instances directly contravene the civic principles enshrined in the constitution and other normative acts. Rather than viewing this phenomenon as a product of post-independence period, such 'nationalization by stealth' is more properly regarded as the logical outcome of Leninist indigenization (Korenizatsiia) policies.

By showing the trends of 'nationalization by stealth' or 'internationalism with a Kazakh face,' state authorities in Kazakhstan have sought to combine discursive policies of nation building that in practice are more difficult to achieve. Ethno-nationalists remain convinced that the new Kazakhstan is first and foremost home to the Kazakh and the efforts made by the new state authorities to meet their long cherished grievances are still insufficient. For Russians, these trends seem to represent a constraining influence on the processes of emergence of 'civic nationhood'. The regime's rhetorical commitment is thus viewed with suspicion. Thus it can be held that the central challenges of cultural pluralism have not disappeared in Kazakhstan.

In order to address the deficiencies of not having any formidable national identity, lack of numerical preponderance and to maintain titular Kazakhs' supremacy in their own native land in post-Soviet space, Nazarbayev's nation-building scheme has had at its core a policy of 'Kazakhisation' - reviving the Kazakh language, restoring traditional names to cities and landmarks, revising history to reflect Kazakhs' national perspective. Most successful has been its extensive drive to popularize the Kazakh language and culture. Place names have been changed from Russian to Kazakh, Kazakh language books, newspapers, radio programs and television are being actively promoted. Kazakh has been introduced in all schools and new Kazakh language schools have been opened. Forgotten Kazakh heroes and places of worship have been valorized to induce exclusive nationalist feelings among the native Kazakhs. Keeping this in view, the *Alash Orda* - first Kazakh nationalists are being praised for their nationalism.

The state is even encouraging the construction of mosques - a most visible symbol of Kazakh sovereignty - in the north and throughout the country. The government officials regularly refer to northern territories as original Kazakh lands when questioned as to Kazakhstan's right to continued possession of its territory.

The Kazakhs' right of return is another area in which the government has taken an active role. Kazakhstan is also a unique case, as it has embraced an ethnic return-migration policy directly

after the fall of the Soviet Union and during a perilous transition period. Moreover, at the time of independence the titular nationality was in the minority in multi-ethnic Kazakhstan. On the basis of this fact it is possible to argue that the government looked at the diaspora abroad as an important source, not only for nation building but also for the legitimization of territorial sovereignty with the help of a demographic increase of ethnic Kazakhs.

Policy of repatriation is intimately tied to the legitimizing claims of the political elites involved in promoting ambiguous often contradictory and broadly formulated notions and policies of Kazakh national revival. ‘Hospitality’, as a defining characteristic of ‘Kazakhness’ and an essential part of Kazakh nomadic ‘heritage’ was often used to explain the reason for harmonious interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. However, it also serves to reiterate the position of all non-Kazakhs who live in Kazakhstan as “guests” and Kazakhs as “hosts”. Moreover, a “guest”, (Andrew Shryock 2001) is a deeply ambivalent category, often loaded with fear and a sense of burden. A sense of an “honored guest” could be quickly turned into that of “uninvited guest” or the one who has transgressed the unspoken norms of hospitality by overstaying. A telling example of the complex interplay among the notions of blood, family, ethnicity, nation, and state is the following passage from a Russian language textbook for 4th grade students: “In our republic, sons and daughters of one hundred and twenty peoples and nationalities work together in friendship. We are not of the same blood but we are from one family, Republic of Kazakhstan – our beloved and common Motherland!” Such understandings of nationhood and statehood, ambiguously employed by various actors within and outside Kazakhstan, allow for the notions of national belonging and membership both to overflow state boundaries and to exclude large segments of the populations residing within state borders. As other studies of return migration and transmigration suggest, processes of globalization are not necessarily erasing national identity but are, in many cases, catalyzing new re-conceptions of homeland and de- and re-territorialisation of ethnic and national identifications.

Despite facing economic difficulties, it has encouraged the immigration of Kazakhs not only from other CIS states but also from Mongolia, Turkey, Iran and China. Additionally, it has attempted to entice these new immigrants, along with Kazakhs living in the south of Kazakhstan, to settle in the north of the country with offers of subsidized housing and work. Absorption efforts have cooled as the expense and lack of ability to emigrate on the part of Kazakh diaspora became apparent but official enthusiasm for the policy remains strong.

The most assertive of the government's nationalizing measures has been to move the capital. The state is making every effort to improve the status of native Kazakhs. The primacy of nationalization in Kazakh nation-building policy has been clearly visible in the government's efforts to transform constitutional ideals into concrete shape on the ground. Almost every state policy has an ethnic face either explicitly or implicitly in the post-Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. Yet Kazakhisation is not enough to secure the success of Kazakh nation-building as it threatened to provoke a backlash from the state's substantial Russian minority, facing political disempowerment and social disorientation.

Nazarbayev in his address in the 8th session of Assembly of Kazakhstan's Nations under 'Ten Years of Independence-Peace, Progress and Social Harmony,' 2001, he stated, "Interethnic and spiritual accord is our strategic resource, the basis for progress of our society and state. We have created legal basis of providing equity of rights and freedom of all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious identity, civil and political solidarity of all citizens is assumed as a basis of the state. We have proved in practice that multiethnic nation is not a defect but the society's advantage. Thus, strengthening of confiding interethnic, cultural and intern-confessional relationship in the country, preservation and strengthening of succession in spiritual accord of Kazakhstan's society is our main task."

It can thus be concluded that the country's leaders are as much trapped by the vestiges of the Soviet understanding of nationality as are the country's citizens. Therefore, the ruling elites of Kazakhs have to strike a balance in their nation-building process while dealing with the multi-national character of the Republic.

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Annexure-I

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