THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RESPONSE TO THE ARAB SPRING

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"The European Union's Response to the Arab Spring"** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of **Jawaharlal Nehru University** is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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PREFACE

In Tunisia in December 2010, the world was taken aback by the fact that the self-immolation of an educated street vendor who took the drastic step to voice his frustration against the regime's abuse of rights could trigger a historic event in the Arab history. Soon after, revolts spread like wildfire not just in Tunisia, but throughout North Africa and the Middle East culminating in the implosion of four authoritarian regimes and hastening of political reforms in the other countries. These revolts came to be known in the West by the nomenclature of Arab Spring. The latter ushered in hopes of a new democratic wave which would transform the authoritarian nature of the Arab world. According to the Arab Human Development Report, the Middle East and North Africa region better known as the MENA, has consistently ranked low where human development is concerned. The reason behind this lack of development is ascribed to the region's political, economic and social structures. The restrictions in political participation and freedom have rendered people without an outlet to express their grievance. The situation aggravated with the 2008 financial crisis, food prices soared, growing population of educated youth were finding themselves unemployed and to worsen the plight of the people there was gross violation of human rights committed by the regimes. Therefore, the Arab Spring is significant not only for the pro-democratic movement, but the people also demanded respect for human rights and dignity.

Even though the MENA region forms the southern neighbourhood of the European Union, the supranational entity was also caught by surprise with the outbreak of the revolts that rocked the otherwise stable neighbourhood. The political values that the Arab population was demanding are the norms that the EU not only is founded upon but also projects them in its foreign policy towards its neighbourhood. Hence, the logical reasoning would be for the EU to consolidate the revolutionary movements, however that was not the case. Rather the Union was seen to be hesitant in supporting the Arab Spring. This stems from the EU's penchant for stability in its neighbourhood and especially in the Southern Mediterranean as the region is one of the most volatile and long-term conflict-ridden zone in the world. The region also assumes a strategic visibility for Europe as it is one of the main sources for its increasing energy needs. The MENA is not only important in terms of energy, but also gains importance where trade is concerned. For all these reasons, the Arab region acquires geopolitical

significance in the eye of the EU. To keep its vital interests ensured, the EU and its predecessor, the European Community, have endeavoured to always engage with the southern neighbourhood. With the development of foreign policy competence to deal with international and regional challenges, the EU could enhance its initiatives with the Mediterranean countries.

This research has attempted to analyse which concerns whether normative or realist interests drive the EU's policy formulation towards the MENA region prior and after the Arab Spring. The first chapter locates and defines the MENA region in terms of the EU's southern neighbourhood and introduces the perspective through which the research is being undertaken. The second chapter evaluates the characteristics of the autocratic regimes in the region. It also discusses the issue of democracy deficit that prevails in the region and the challenges that lead to the Arab uprising. It further assesses whether the Arab awakening has lead to any concrete change in the geographic area. The next chapter studies the evolution of the EU's foreign policy and the frameworks it has adopted towards its southern neighbourhood before the Arab Spring, mainly the European Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean. It enquires into which perspective of the EU's actorness has guided the decisions. The fourth chapter deals with the Union's policies after the Arab protests. It evaluates the new policy responses of the Union, and discerns whether they are a continuity of the earlier frameworks or whether they have brought about a paradigm shift in the EU's relation with the southern neighbourhood. The EU's stabilisation-democratisation dilemma is also tackled in this section. Ultimately, the main focus of the study is to analyse what guides EU's action – is it normative or realist aspects of the EU's foreign policy. The last chapter gives the findings of the research and evaluates the hypothesis proposed in the study.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSF	Civil Society Facility
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMAA	Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy

EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EuroMed	Euro-Mediterranean
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Countries
GMP	Global Mediterranean Partnership
HR/VP	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MPC	Mediterranean Partner Countries
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIF	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
NSF	National Science Foundation (US)
NTC	National Transitional Council
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PDSP	Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SEA	Single European Act
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SPRING	Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WVS	World Value Survey

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Where the main achievements of Europe in the past 50 years have been inside Europe, the challenges of the next 50 years will be mainly external. ...increasingly Europe will be judged on what it does in relations with countries that are not going to be members of the union. For its half-century, the European project was mainly about what we did to ourselves. For the next half-century, it will mainly be about Europe in a non-European world."

- (Timothy Garton Ash 2007)

The European Union (EU) is a unique economic and political partnership that has lead to regional integration and cooperation between 28 sovereign countries[1]. The idea to have a peaceful European continent where war would no more be an option was the driving force behind the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) which signalled the development of a process of integration beginning after World War II. The Schuman Declaration in 1950 paved the way to the creation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) where the production and distribution of coal and steel were placed under the control of the founding members[2]. This not only ensured economic development, but also rendered war impossible where resources were concerned. Since then the European Project of integration based on sets of binding treaties, has adopted common policies in economic, social and political fields: the member states share a custom union, a single market where people, goods, and capital and flow freely, a common agricultural policy, a common trade policy and a common currency. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty enabled the EEC to take step towards meaningful political integration and came to be known as the European Union to reflect this change. The treaty created the three pillar system wherein the first pillar was the European Communities, the second pillar consisted of the Common Foreign

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[1] The 28 member states of EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

[2] The founding member states of the of the EU are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar was Justice and Home Affairs (Skordeli 2012; Archick 2013: 150, 1-2).

CFSP enables the member states to form common position and take joint action in the area of foreign policy. The EU's lack of foreign policy tools to deal with the crisis in the Balkans prompted the leaders to enhance the capability to adopt a unified stance in foreign policy issues. Whereas decision-making in realm of economic and social issues is supranational, in the case of foreign policy issues the unanimous agreement of all member states are required and therefore remains inter-governmental in nature which undermines the CFSP's coherence, which in turn brings down the credibility of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 helped improve the CFSP by introducing the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position combines the post of the Council of Ministers' High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. To support the High Representative the treaty also created the European External Action Service (EEAS) which is a diplomatic corps of the EU. This revision has in many ways bolstered the visibility of the EU in international politics (Archick 2013: 3, 6-7).

After the success story of the European Project, the EU's major concern is to sustain and achieve greater heights of progress as one of the most successful regional organisation. This is achieved through ensuring stability around Europe so that no form of insecurity can destabilise the regional organisation. Therefore the most important interaction is with its immediate neighbourhoods: its eastern and southern flanks. Relations with the neighbourhood were always of pivotal interest to the EU's foreign and security policy. The eastern neighbourhood[3] is comprised of the former Soviet Union's satellite states many of which are now integrated within the EU fold. When the EU faced political instability in Central Eastern European (CEE) states with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Union took up the role of milieu shaping and bringing stability back in region by offering its membership based on conditionality to these countries which were earnest to return to Europe. Even with an initiative like Eastern Partnership (EaP), the EU's objective is to bring partner countries closer to its political, social and economic model.

[3] The eastern neighbourhood is now comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These states are part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In the case of Russia which is neither a part of the ENP and the EaP, but nevertheless a significant entity in the neighbourhood, the EU has a strategic partnership with Moscow.

The southern neighbourhood is composed of countries from both North Africa and Middle East which goes by the nomenclature the Middle East and North Africa - MENA. Unlike the eastern neighbourhood, the southern neighbourhood is not directly linked to the mainland of Europe, and is divided by the Mediterranean Sea. But the geographical proximity, its rich natural resources, and known as the world's most volatile region due to its political instability, renders the MENA important to the EU. Here too, the Union is concerned with a similar rationale: to ensure a secure Europe by checking instability from the MENA crossing over to the Union. In this context, the research will analyse the EU's interaction with its southern neighbourhood in terms of its policymaking.

In a layman's understanding, the Middle East and North Africa is the geographical expanse covering the states from Morocco in western North Africa to Iran on the eastern end of the Middle East. The MENA is a terminology that is used by the West, therefore from where it is situated, the Arabian Peninsula is the Middle East whereas South Asia and Southeast Asia are the Far East. From the point of view of Asia, the Middle East is known as West Asia, and therefore the terminology West Asia and North Africa (WANA) which is also the term used by the Government of India. Since this study is undertaken from the European Union's (EU) point of reference, it is but right to use the terminology that is employed by the regional organisation.

1.0 Defining the MENA Region

There is no fixed definition of the MENA region and one finds that international and multilateral organisations assign territorial boundary differently. For the EU, the MENA is comprised of - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. The geographical definition of the Middle East and North Africa region by the World Bank consists of Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. United Nations Human Rights defines the MENA region by adding Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. According to the IMF, the MENA region which is

comprised of twenty two countries[4] covers an extensive area stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Central Asia, and from the Mediterranean coast to the southern boundary of the Sahara Desert. Not only is the region significant for its vast territorial and population size, its importance is heightened by its rich natural resources, and further enhanced by its strategically geographical positioning between Asia, Africa and Europe (Roudi 2001: 1). Inspite of the MENA being defined in various ways, nevertheless what is common is that the region consists of countries which are along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, generally extending from Morocco to Iran including all Middle Eastern and Maghreb countries.

The Middle East and North Africa is called by many the "cradle of civilization", the birthplace of three of the main religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) of the world, playing an important role in history. With a population of 355 million people (World Bank 2015), the MENA region is far from being homogeneous. The countries of the region display diverse cultures and languages. The MENA region is of great strategic importance due to its geographical location and its rich natural resources. In fact several of the MENA countries are strategic partners with the rest of the world for oil and gas supplies (El-Badri 2012). Therefore, repercussion of any upheaval in this region will affect directly or indirectly the entire world and critical for global stability (MEKEI 2013).

The prevalent nature of the Arab states is one of authoritarianism. Greffrath and Duvenhage (2014: 32) observe that during the twentieth century the predominance of war in North Africa and the Middle East and the primary need for national security have helped to render the concerns of having civil liberties and establishing democracy a political hindrance and threat. Consequently, the Arab world has seen restricted advancement towards democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005: 85). According to the Arab Human Development Report (2002: 2, 108) political participation in the Arab world is "heavily regulated and partial" and is not open to all citizens. In most countries of the region, the government is constituted by authoritative executive branch wielding power over other state branches, and most of the time not coming

[4] The countries being Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

under the scanner of institutional checks and balances. Until the fateful year of 2011, the Arab countries have resisted waves of democratic changes that have brought about regime transformation in other regions.

In Freedom House[5] assessment of global political rights and civil liberties (the ratings are from 1 to 7 with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free) only one country (Israel) is featured free, three (Kuwait, Lebanon and Morocco) are partly free, and the rest of the fourteen countries are not free. Without having the political space to express the mounting frustrations related to human development and living standards due to the authoritarian characteristic of the Arab regimes, the uprisings that erupted were "an external political event" spearheading changes in the political arena of the MENA countries (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 29-30).

1.1 The MENA and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring caught the international community by surprise, it was a Black Swan event that shook the conviction of the policymakers and analysts in the West about their stereotypical conception of the Arab world by reinforcing the belief that popular uprisings can overthrow dictatorial regimes. Over the years the accumulated contradictory claims made by the regimes seeking to legitimise themselves in North Africa and the Middle East when challenged were exposed of their inherent weakness and vulnerability (Joffé 2011: 507).

Wouters and Duquet (2013: 19) observe that the uprisings are an outcome of "economic, political and a dignity deficit". A tiny friction could blow up the pent up frustration which was triggered off by the self-immolation of an educated street vendor named Mohammed Ben Bouazizi in Tunisia. This was the start of the Arab revolts which set in motion a chain of protests against the impassive autocratic regimes in the MENA region. The ousting of the long time President Zine el Abidine ben in Tunisia was the start of a domino effect leading to the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and then overthrowing the government of Colonel Muammar el Qaddafi in Libya. Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of Yemen, was replaced. Protest movements were held in Iran, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and to a lesser

[5] According to Freedom House which is an independent watchdog organisation assessing freedom globally, the MENA region is comprised of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara and Yemen.

degree in Algeria, Iraq, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. These revolts brought about a change in six months than the region had seen in the last sixty years (Dadush and Dunne 2011: 131).

Various scholars have used assorted terminologies to describe the uprisings that shook the long standing autocratic regimes in the MENA countries, some of which are “Arab Awakening” (Kenneth Pollack et al. in Davis 2013), “Arab Winter” (Ishaan Tharoor in Davis 2013), “Arab Uprising” (Marc Lynch in Davis 2013) and “Unfinished Finished Revolutions” (Minky Warden in Davis 2013). The nomenclature that is predominantly used to describe the political revolution is the “Arab Spring” which was first used in an article written by Marc Lynch in the Foreign Policy (Massad 2012). Although the term Arab Spring has a popular usage, it carries a history of its own: “Arab Spring” was used momentarily to refer to the Arab revolts in the years 1916-1918 against the Ottoman Empire; another usage[6] was during the 2005 protests particularly in Egypt and Lebanon which began after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the move towards democratisation in Iraq, but the revolts did not culminate into any tangible results (Davis 2013: 1). The reiteration of the term materialised in 2011 when the MENA region witnessed revolts against the set authoritarian governments, starting from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and the movement gradually spreading across the Arab world. The civil strives had their cause embedded in long-standing dissatisfaction in the political, social and economic activity: repression of freedom whether in politics, civil or media, deteriorating economy bringing with it dwindling opportunities, widespread unemployment, corruption, and nepotism. All these accumulated frustration led to popular uprisings that took the world by surprise and altered if not completely but considerably the political landscape of the region (Colombo 2013: 163).

The international community’s response to the Arab Spring has been a mixed one. The initial reaction of the West (US and Europe) was one of uncertainty and hesitation mixed with apprehension (fear of collateral harm to their interests in the process). Since then, the US has taken the opportunity to show enthusiasm for the democratic movement, and the EU on the other hand has admitted its failure to act

[6] This usage was made by the media and political commentators, one such example is the editorial title “The Arab Spring of 2005” by Charles Krauthammer in The Seattle Times, url: http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/the-arab-spring-of-2005/

and launched itself to renew its relationship with the region. One fundamental change that has occurred with the onslaught of the Arab Spring is that the transitioning states are more assertive in formulating independent foreign policies and the West is losing influence on these new authorities (Sasnal 2012: 14).

1.2 The MENA in terms of the EU's Southern Neighbourhood

The MENA region forms the Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU. Linked to Europe through history and culture, it is one of the world's most complex and conflict-ridden regions. Inspite of having cultural, linguistic and historical commonalities, very little cooperation exists between them in the fields of economy and politics, thereby rendering it difficult to come to any agreement over addressing existing conflict. The region's strategic geopolitical positioning helps to understand the EU's urgency to have a stable neighbourhood through various policy instruments (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2015).

To understand the relation between the MENA region and the EU, the latter's interest in the region needs to be determined. As stated above, the MENA region forms the southern neighbourhood of the Union, so the geographical proximity renders the Union to have an abiding interest in the political stability of a volatile neighbourhood. The threat the EU experiences emanating from these Southern Mediterranean countries is not the military kind but non-traditional threat arising due to political instability.

The EU has been formulating policies vis-à-vis this region for decades. There are two aspects to this relationship: one political mostly in the area of security and stability, the other being the economic dimension consisting of trade, finance, energy and also migration (Wouters and Duquet 2013: 20). In the 1960s itself, the EEC, EU's predecessor, formulated a framework for the countries in the southern vicinity. Mostly the frameworks consisted of bilateral trade agreements granting these countries' manufactured goods advantageous access into the EEC. In 1970s, the EEC adopted the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) and formed association agreements with the Mediterranean countries. It was only at the end of the Cold War when the EU developed a foreign policy dimension to deal with international and regional challenges that the EU could then broaden and deepen its neighbourhood initiatives.

Since 1992, the EU's relations with the Southern Mediterranean have become multi-dimensional including security concerns. The Union's first comprehensive policy for the region, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) created in 1995, aimed to achieve peace, stability and growth in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) and thereby tying the region fundamentally closer and conforming politically towards it. By 2010, the EMP aimed at creating a free trade area through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, but by 2005 it was seen as a failure for not fulfilling the promises. To boost the EuroMed relation, the European Commission, the Council, and the Member States have shaped, tested and reshaped various policy frameworks (apart from EMP, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and more recently the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)) culminating into an entanglement of various propositions and attitudes (Wouters and Duquet 2013: 20-21). The dominating issues in these frameworks are energy security, fight against organised crime, terrorism and migration control. To answers these concerns, the Union adopted a strategy which offers some benefits through market access to the EU Single Market and gives these countries financial support to develop economic, political and social modernisation. In return, the regional organisation expects the countries in the southern vicinity to harmonize with its economic and political system and make reforms which suits its security concerns.

The EuroMed is complemented by bilateral instruments such as the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and the ENP Action Plans. The main aspect of the Association Agreements is on trade, development aid and the piecemeal liberalisation of trade. And yet there are provisions for cooperation on migration, organised crime, drug trafficking, resettlement of the repatriate. The Agreements also incorporate stipulation on principles of democracy and respect for human rights, and the failure to implement would warrant appropriate action. Similar to the Association Agreements, the ENP Action Plans are negotiated with each Southern Mediterranean Partners, and to assess their commitment to political and economic reforms an annual progress report is prepared by the Commission resulting in what is called as "differentiated bilateralism". The security aspect is more clearly articulated in the Action Plans delineating cooperation in organised crime, human trafficking, migration, terrorism and money laundering. Akin to the Association Agreements, the clause on democracy and respect for human rights were also interwoven, but were

hardly implemented (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Wouters and Duquet 2013: 23-26, 21).

In the process of cooperating and renewing its policies towards the region, the Union relinquished some of its value laden objectives in return of closer ties with the autocratic regimes making the latter to act like a buttress against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and containment of migration. This in some measure ensured regional stability rendering the EU-Mediterranean relationship into a 'stability-partnership' which served both, the interest of the EU to have a stable western-oriented southern neighbourhood, and the Arab regimes profited from the much needed external legitimacy (Behr 2012: 76). Prior to the Arab Spring, Europe's efforts to reform the region were restricted to economic field. The EU diplomats expressed their hope that a prosperous economy would lead to a peaceful political transformation, that the autocrats' powers would be restrained by the professional class who would have leverage over the government policies.

Inspite of violation of human rights by the Southern Mediterranean partners, the EU has never deferred from the bilateral relations. This stems from the Union's interest of having a secure Europe by avoiding instability in its southern neighbourhood. Colombo and Tocci (2012: 71-72) indicate that the geographical proximity of the European continent to the MENA region has rendered the former increasingly vulnerable to the spill-over of instability across MENA borders arising from spread of terrorist network, migration, disturbances caused in trade and energy. The scholars further state that "Stability and democracy were perceived as incompatible goals and the latter was increasingly sacrificed with a view to securing the former". The lack of institutional development, curbing of civil liberties, and in general poor statehood of the MENA countries have lead the EU to prefer stability rather than democratic transformation. For long though, the EU has been vacillating on the issue of democratisation or stabilisation.

1.3 The EU's Reaction to the Arab Spring

Aliboni (2012: 7) discusses that the common perception of the West in understanding the Arab Spring is a set of domestic developments affecting various countries of the Arab world in different manner intending in replacing autocratic rule with democratic regimes. One would presume that the EU would be forthright in supporting the

dignity revolution which conforms to the values it promulgates in its foreign and neighbourhood policies, but the developments in its southern vicinity were constituted as a security challenge to Europe. The EU wasn't ready to let go of the security arrangements it had with the authoritarian governments, in fact the initials reactions of the Union were to offer help to these regimes (Dias 2014: 46-47).

Despite of the MENA being in such close geographical proximity and furthermore being the EU's southern neighbourhood, the unprecedented uprisings caught the Union off guard. The EU was embroiled with debates in its institutional set-ups and with the ever deepening Eurozone crisis which kept the European leaders busy, thus not much attention was bestowed on its southern neighbourhood's unfolding turmoil. In reality, the EU had abandoned any hope to bring about change in its southern neighbourhood, an example being the 2010 parliamentary election in Egypt which witnessed "voter buying and ballot stuffing" all the while the EU choosing to turn a blind eye. The Union's decision to act in such a manner when it promulgates values of democracy and rule of law demonstrates that the normative actor is indeed realist when it comes to safeguarding its own interest, for Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, is an important partner of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process (Behr 2012: 77-78).

After indecisive reaction to the Arab uprisings, in February 2011 the EU came to an understanding to support the democratic movement in the MENA region. This stems from a realisation that the dictatorial regimes could not continue to assure in a stable neighbourhood, in fact they are the very cause of the present instability. Therefore it was in the EU's interest to assist the southern neighbouring countries with the smooth transitioning of democracy and thereby restores stability (Behr 2012: 81). The EU Commissioner of Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy , Štefan Füle, said that for long the EU was under the misconception that authoritarian rule was a safeguard for maintaining stability in the MENA region . Both, Füle and Catherine Ashton , the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Affairs, promised that the EU would strongly support democracy across the region, and provide more aid, trade and mobility for those countries making democratic reforms (European Commission 2011).

To show its commitment to the pro-democratic transformation, the EU Commission and the EEAS jointly proposed a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean and a renewed ENP strategy which had been prepared since 2010 but reshaped to acknowledge the developments in the MENA and address them in a neighbourhood framework. These policy instruments revolves around the concept of “deep democracy” whereby the EU to encourage reforms takes an approach of “more-for-more”, an incentive-based initiative. In fact this is an old method revisited better known as political conditionality. Another instrument that was launched by the Commission was the Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme. It offers an assistance of 350 million Euro towards democratic transformation, institutional building and economic growth for 2011-2013. This moderate sum is outweighed by the one offered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). (Behr 2012; Wouters and Duquet 2013: 81-84, 26-27)

Some of the new initiatives that are mentioned above demonstrate a similarity with the earlier policies towards the region, policies that are garbed in new wordings but ultimately connoting the same meaning. The revived propositions are about European security concerns than about establishing a concrete partnership between the two regions (Dias 2014: 54). Behr (2012: 84-85) notes that the EU hasn’t comprehended that with the onset of the uprisings the geopolitical reality has changed in the MENA region, it is no longer a Euro-Mediterranean relation that is centred round Europe. When one compares the Arab Spring with the 1989 revolution in Central and Eastern European countries, the latter desired to “rejoin Europe” which is simply not the case with the Southern Mediterranean countries. As a matter of fact, the Arab revolution also wants to do away with post-colonial era and create national autonomy. It rather appears that the EU is still struggling to find a role to play in the events that are transforming its southern neighbourhood.

1.4 The EU’s Security Concerns

The Union regards the European Project as an experience that needs to be adhered to, and in that manner it promotes its liberal economics and democracy in its neighbourhood. In its aspiration to bring forth reforms in the Southern Mediterranean, among the various values such as rule of law, accountable government, freedom of expression and respect for human rights that it advocates, the Union emphasises on

democracy and promotes this central value as an important policy towards southern neighbourhood countries (Hollis, 2012: 81).

At the cost of democracy and human rights and bestowing immense importance to migration control, terrorism and organised crimes, the regional organisation has helped in the perseverance of the authoritarian governments and was unwilling to take action against these regimes for their lack of constructive political reforms, for the EU needs their cooperation to safeguard European security and stability. The outcome of the EU behaviour is a "structured, institutionalized and securitized relationships" with the MENA countries (Hollis, 2012: 93). The Union has foregone the European values, its distinctive normative characteristic for realpolitik diplomacy which enables it to achieve its regional interest of security and stability. To succinctly describe the EU actorness in the Southern Mediterranean in the words of Peter Seeberg (2009) "the EU (is) a realist actor in normative clothes".

Sebastian (2010: 378 in Dias 2014) surmises that the EU regards conditions of poverty and underdevelopment as security concerns because these could cause conflict and lead to insecurities which could destabilise Europe and affect the fundamentals of the EU. The European Security Strategy (2003) clearly articulates that neighbouring countries in which crimes thrive, society is dysfunctional, the states are engaged in conflict present a problem for Europe, and therefore it is in the EU's interest to be surrounded by well-governed states with which it can cooperate. When it comes to the EU's southern vicinity, a region the identity of which is perceived as dangerous, the goal is to integrate the countries with its political and economic systems, and thereby reduce the socio-economic imbalances. This helps to not only promote stability in the region, but ensure European security (Dias 2014: 28-29). However the dust thrown up by the Arab Spring has clouded the 'stability partnership' and posed security challenges to the EU's foreign and neighbourhood policies. The events in the MENA region have called into question the double standard in the Union's southward approach.

This contradiction in the EU's approach arises due to its identity projection as either a civilian or normative actor. The Union first declares its intention to pursue policies defined by its liberal values, but then it actually promotes its political and economic interests. The EU other than being normative actor is also a realist player when it

comes to European interests. All the while the EU's behaviour towards the Southern Mediterranean has been that of a practical actor calculating its vital interests. The EU is still concerned with the non-traditional threats (migration, terrorism, fundamentalism) arising from the other shore of the Mediterranean. The asymmetrical relationship between the Union and its southern neighbourhood aims at addressing the former's security issues and establishing its regional power.

1.5 The EU in a Realist Perspective

After the creation of the CFSP which enabled the EU to assert its views in the international political arena, the EU has been described with concepts such as civilian power (Duchêne, 1971), normative power (Manners, 2002), and Karan Smith (2003) attributes gentle power and postmodern power to the EU. The Union's international behaviour is hardly studied in the light of realism. Although neo-realism is state-centric and occupied with hard power, it can throw some light on the systemic pressure that "shape and shove" the EU's foreign and security policy (Hyde-Price 2006: 219).

The core assumptions of neo-realism guide in understanding the motive behind the interactions between states. The international system is anarchic, and the structure of the system is the cause of conflict, therefore rendering it a self-help system where states have to look after their own survival and security in a competitive environment. There is no escape from this security dilemma, it can be mitigated through balance of power, but it cannot be overcome. This is due to lack of trust and a constant fear making cooperation difficult to achieve, although not impossible (Waltz 1959 and 1987).

Though there are other international actors in this system, states are considered to be the primary actors capable of taking rational calculative action. Ultimate concern of the states is about national security which is achieved through maximising power to ward off rivals thereby establishing regional hegemony. States mostly focus on relative gains, they are concerned about their positioning vis-à-vis other states in the international system. Major Powers are interested in shaping their milieu to establish stability, for they have vested interest in achieving regional stability (Waltz 1979: 195, 198; Kissinger 1957: 144; Keohane 1986: 158).

States are not only motivated with primary set of concerns (security and power maximisation), but strive for secondary set of concerns, a range of political norms such as protecting human rights to promoting democracy. These latter interests are always subordinate to core national interests. When there is systemic pressure and a clash arises between the fundamental national interests and values, the states would forgo the normative agenda (Mearsheimer 2001: 46-47). Structure of the international system constraints states' behaviours, it does not determine the outcome of the behaviour because they choose what action to take (Hyde-Price 2008: 39).

States behave in a rational manner, and consequently the normative agenda is not of primary concern when national interests are at risk, for the actors are aware of the structural distribution of power in the international system. Even though the EU pursues its normative agenda in its foreign policy, it is keenly aware of the power distribution in the international system, and when it comes to achieving its regional interest, the Union does not pursue its normative agenda. The states have an interest to shape the external architecture in favour of their primary interest (survival, security and prosperity), and they try to achieve this goal by using their capabilities (military or material) in influencing the behaviour of other actors. Kenneth Waltz (1979: 194-210) has argued that the great powers take the initiative to shape the external milieu, for they have more at stake in having a stable system, and also have the capabilities to shoulder responsibilities.

When the EU is placed in structural realism framework, the Union may not be a sovereign actor like the other states with hard power, but nonetheless it emulates state behaviour having a CFSP and ESDP, and acting in a rational manner when it concerns its security and its vital economic interests. As of now the lack of hard power is taken care by NATO. In its own right the EU is considered as an international actor. Hyde-Price (2006: 226-227) observes that the EU is a collective hegemonic power shaping it's "near abroad" in a manner that suits the strategic and economic interests of its member states.

Contradiction between the EU's "particularist interest" and ethical intention just does not play out in the MENA, but can be seen towards the policy it follows concerning the Balkans and China. In the Balkans, the EU has worked towards establishing order, condemning gross human rights violations, and politically worked with the regimes in

achieving rule of law (Hyde-Price, 2008: 33). In contrast, the European economic interest is ready to forgo the human rights abuses, the issue of democracy and transparency in China. When diplomats formulate agendas in terms of national interests, David Clinton (1994: 259 in Hyde-Price 2008, 36) writes then they are calculators rather than crusaders.

Neo-realism does not deny that liberal ideas such as human rights, democracy or just war do not shape policies, but these ideas do not continue to influence policies when vital national or common interests are at stake. Hence the EU's foreign policy diplomats seem preoccupied with promoting human rights and democracy only when Europe's security and economic interests are not compromised (Hyde-Price 2008: 39). Waltz (1967: 15-16) argues that when there is no threat posed on state survival, then "national goals easily fluctuate between the grandiose and the frivolous".

1.6 Research Framework

The study analyses the policies of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean region prior and after the Arab Spring in the context of whether the EU's action is guided by normative or realist impulse. The EU has been seen as a force for good in the world, however, that is not the case in its southern neighbourhood. It is an irony that the liberal values on which EU's raison d'être is based, and the same norms which shape its external action cannot take the credit for spearheading the democratic movement in the MENA region. As a normative actor, the Union has lost its face value, but from a realist perspective the EU as acted as any rational state would behave, that is when core national interest are at stake the normative agenda takes a back seat.

The rationale behind this research was that there are few studies that analyse how the EU which project itself as a normative actor, in reality behaves in a realist manner when it comes to safeguarding its interest as in the case of the Southern Neighbourhood where the priority is security and stability compared to achieving democracy, rule of law or human rights. When revolts erupted in its southern vicinity, the initial reaction of the Union was hesitant and slow in coming which shows the dilemma it faces between the goals of stability and democracy. This predicament is surprising coming from a norm driven actor when it should have been at the vanguard supporting the popular uprising against authoritarian regimes. The civilian or the normative power concept has narrowed the scope unable to accommodate the EU's

multi-faceted role and its foreign policy agenda. While structural realism may not be able to answer all aspect of the EU affairs, it can throw some lights on why the EU chooses to be a realist player rather than stick to its normative power.

As the Arab Spring is a recent and ongoing political event which renders the MENA region in a constant flux, the EU's response is developing and re-developing as the events unfold. Hence not much substantial research has been conducted in this area. The current study covers the period from 2010 when the Arab Spring began till the end of 2014.

The study validates the following premise: the EU's policies towards the MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have been shaped by its interest rather than normative concerns to safeguard European security and regional stability.

Following are the prominent research questions that the chapters will undertake to address them: a) what is the characteristic of the regimes in the Middle East and North Africa region? b) why is the Middle East and North Africa region important for the EU? c) what challenges did the Arab Spring bring to the region? d) how is the Arab Spring a challenge to EU security or Neighbourhood Policy? e) why is the EU, known for its normative power, more of a realist actor in its southern neighbourhood? f) how have the various policy-instruments of the EU concerning the MENA region responded to the Arab Spring? g) how has the EU's relationship with the MENA region countries changed with the advent of the Arab Spring? h) to what extent is the EU policy of seeking political reform and liberalisation in the MENA region reconcilable with the EU's desire for stability and security in the region? i) has the Arab Spring lead to a paradigm shift in EU's external relations?

The proposed study will use deductive method of research and will approach it from a realist perspective. It shall be based on both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources will include European Commission's reports and European External Action Service's reports, Council Decisions and Parliament Documents and secondary sources will use books, articles, academic journals, and internet sources.

The present study is divided into the following framework: the first chapter introduces the subject by giving an overview of the study. It briefly discusses the

background of the research by introducing the MENA region, and then puts it in perspective to EU as its southern neighbourhood. The chapter also discusses the perspective through which this research is being undertaken.

The second chapter opens by locating and defining the MENA region. It gives a background history of the region since the colonial times and the forming of modern state. It then analyses the characteristics of the regimes in the region which have put huge restrictions in the political participation and civil liberties of its people. The balance of the study then turns towards the issue of democracy, and deteriorating human development that lead to the Arab Spring which took the international community by surprise and challenged the stereotypical view of the Arab world. The chapter traces the outcome of the Arab uprising on the region, and how the international actors responded and thereby introducing the EU's response.

The third chapter gauges whether the EU's policies towards the southern neighbourhood countries prior to the Arab Spring were guided on normative or realist decision making. This section traces the formation of the Union's foreign policy and the changes that have taken place to strengthen the external policy framework to meet with regional and international challenges. It then outlines the relations between the EC and the Southern Mediterranean countries during the Cold War. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU gained institutional cohesiveness to act on its foreign and security policies towards the region. By creating the CFSP, the EU was better equipped to deal with its neighbourhood. The chapter analyses the various policy-instruments formulated to engage with the strategic geopolitical area.

The fourth chapter appraises the new policy initiatives of the EU towards the countries in its southern vicinity. The previous section argued that the EU's democratic idealism had turned into diplomatic realism, this section gauges whether with the advent of the Arab Spring there was any paradigm shift of the EU's foreign policy towards the region. It also analyses the stabilisation and democratisation dilemma by questioning whether in reality the EU suffers such a perplexing condition. Finally, this section evaluates which actorness – normative or realist – the Union adopts towards its southern neighbourhood.

The last chapter analyses the hypothesis on EU's policies that have been shaped to establish a stable and secure Europe. The policies of the EU towards its southern neighbourhood have normative clauses incorporated, but in reality they are far from being implemented. Inspite of human rights violations the Union has never suspended bilateral relations with the MENA countries. As long as there is a chance of Europe's security being compromised, the EU will forgo normative agenda for its primary interest. The dichotomy in normative or realist EU will persists as long as EU feels the need to hide its intentions behind its values.

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CHAPTER II

THE MENA AND THE ARAB SPRING

Before evaluating the EU's response to the Arab Spring and the policy instruments formulated to deal with the pro-democratic movement in the MENA region, one need to understand the characteristics of the region which is known to suffer from a democracy deficit, and which has been identified as one of the main reasons for the Arab awakening. This chapter gives a background history of the region, then analyses the nature of the authoritarian regimes and the perpetuation of their rule. It further examines as to why every democratisation wave eluded the region while the other world regions experienced democratic transformation. In this study the use of the term the Middle East, the Arab region, the Arab world and the Arab countries are synonymous to the Middle East and North Africa - MENA - region.

2.0 Locating the MENA Region

As mentioned in the first chapter, there is no fixed definition of the MENA region, each actor in the international structure, whether they are states or international or multilateral organisations have their own perception as to what constitutes the MENA region. The first chapter has elaborated on how various multilateral organisations have defined the region, even among scholars the countries that constitute the region vary: Vourgidi (2013:5) notes that the two areas, North Africa and the Middle East, share similar culture, religion and history; both have experienced decolonisation, and are characterised by pan-regional identity. Hence the term MENA denotes an area covering countries from Morocco to Iran and share a boundary through the Sahara desert. Henry and Springborg (2001: 8) define the MENA as extending along the southern and eastern coast of the Mediterranean stretching from Morocco to Turkey as far as east till Iran and south to Sudan and Yemen. Clark (2013: 44) writes that the Arab world spreading from Maghreb in the west to the Arabian Peninsula in the east is not homogeneous region, but rather a patchwork of countries with some features which are common but there exists many differences.

El-Erian and Fischer (1996: 6) describe the MENA as a region covering a land mass spanning from Atlantic Ocean to the west to Arabian Sea in the east. The area is about 15 million square kilometres almost matching up with the EU. The region has a harsh

climate with less rainfall and ground water, but on the other hand it harbours huge quantity of natural resources, and said to have more than 43 percent of the world's reserve in oil. Being rich in energy resources, the region has high strategic visibility. There exist some cultural similarities like Arabic is the primary and official language in all countries except Israel, in fact the similarity of language is greater than in the EU. Islam is the predominant religion in all the countries, excluding Israel. Although the latter also shares a part in the historic heritage of the region, but the Arab-Israeli conflict has rendered it impossible to have a cordial relation with the Arab countries.

Map 1: The MENA Region

Source: Nations Online Project (2015)

After World War II, political relations within the region have been overshadowed by Arab nationalism and Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab nationalism resulted in an Arab League in 1945, but this unity was affected by the Egyptian-Israeli peace in 1979 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The deterioration of the Arab political unity has been followed by tension among some Arab countries and the emergence of sub-region economic organisation like the GCC. Inspite of having cultural links there has been no economic integration (El-Erian and Fischer 1996: 7-8). The MENA remains one of the "least integrated regions in the global economy" (Yousef 2004: 106-107), one of the reasons in the lack of progress to enhance domestic and foreign investment is the political instability in the region. Conflict and wars have negatively affected the economy: fifteen years of cross border conflicts have affected some fourteen

countries, and fourteen years of civil strife affected eight countries. Despite the fact that the MENA countries have so much in common, the region has been one of the world's most long-term conflict zone. As there is little cooperation between the MENA countries, resolving the conflicts become difficult.

The MENA region is dominated by authoritarian regimes, and has known to suffer from democracy deficit. With the rise of pro-democratic movements in 2010, what has been termed as the Arab Spring, there was a surge of optimism that the regimes would transform into democratic ones. It is therefore important to examine the establishment of the autocratic regimes and what characterises their perpetuation.

2.1 Modern Middle East and North Africa

The region of North Africa and the Middle East has known one of the greatest patrimonial empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the successor states today are still based on patrimonial norms although they differ in the extent to which patrimonialism is adhered to. The MENA countries except for Iran, Morocco and the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula formed the Ottoman Empire. And later these countries came under the European rule except for Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Anderson 1987: 2-3). The rulers of the Ottoman Empire were struggling to keep a rising Europe at bay, at first the Empire lost territories comprised of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt to Britain and France. Ultimately in the First World War, the Turkish Empire was defeated by the British and the French armies. The disintegration of the Empire brought in drastic change in the region: new states which were under the ruling control of the colonial powers, were carved out of the Arab land. The French controlled parts of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria; the remaining states were controlled by Britain except for Spanish possessions in Morocco and Italian rule in Libya (Anderson 1987: 4). Although this new order was challenged by anti-British, anti-French and anti-Jewish revolts, nevertheless France and Britain were seen as the rulers of the region. Lewis (1966 in Anderson 1987: 5) described the European colonial reign as "imperialism of interference without responsibility, which would neither create nor permit stable and orderly government". It was they who decided the boundaries, what type of governments should form and who should govern. They along with the Americans determined the allocations of the regions natural resources that were being discovered. In this manner from 1914 to about 1956 the MENA countries' political

structure was formed which are the reasons behind the various boundary disputes, national minorities who were left without a state (i.e. the Kurds or Palestinians) or the badly formed political institutions (Owen 1994: 8-11).

Owen (1994: 13-15) observes that the political system of the post-World War One was known as the "colonial state". The colonial powers were the ones who created in this region the Westphalian model of state with features like having a capital, flag, legal system, borders that were recognised internationally. Emphasis was given on police and security for which two-third of expenditure was dedicated. Although security is important to a state, for the colonial powers, this was one of the means to exercise control. This artificial creation of Arab states with boundaries that were more or less straight, lacked social homogeneity. But these new states theoretically emphasised on equality and homogeneity, rules were made that ought to be applied to all the citizens. This ideal was far from being achieved, not only did the colonial settlers get special rights, but in the context of the Middle Eastern people who defined themselves in religious terms found a place in the political structure.

The policies of the colonial powers were formulated in their capitals by various political parties and pressure groups. This in turn affected the political life of the dominated countries as they had no control over it. These countries were also influenced by conflicting behaviours of the dominating powers: at home they practiced democracy and pluralism, but maintained a dictatorial and arbitrary government in the colonies. One important colonial political practice was 'divide and rule': attention was given in the divisions of tribes, ethnic and sectarian groups. Obviously this strategy undermined the homogeneity and equality approach. To further establish a firm grip on the colonies, the rulers formed alliances with landowners and tribal chiefs who controlled the rural area. They were relied upon to stand as candidates for the parliaments and to garner rural votes to support the colonial position and maintain security in the rural areas. In return they enjoyed special entitlements like exemption from tax and legal powers over their tenants (Owen 1994: 15-19).

An important feature of the colonial political framework was the type of monarchical or republican system of government. The French were for the latter form of government in which it could manage better with a puppet president (Lebanon and

Syria). The British on their part preferred the former, because the king gave a sense of continuity and could be used to do away with elected government with huge majority that threatened British interests. Such was the case in Egypt where King Fuad dismissed popular government. This system rendered monarchs vital political actors with limited veto powers who had leverage over the local politicians and the domestic resources. During the independence, the monarchs had either successfully managed to lead to nationalist movements such as in Morocco and Jordan, or they were too closely associated with the colonial system therefore not lasting long like in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Iraq (Owen 1994: 20-22).

The Second World War brought about the end of colonial rule in the MENA region. The war greatly diminished the power and wealth of the imperial powers, and the rise of US and the Soviet Union as the world's two superpowers undermined the predominant role of Europe. The outcome was Lebanon and Syria gained their independence in 1943 followed by Jordan in 1946. Israel was founded in 1948 by the British when it withdrew from Mandatory Palestine leaving a mess for the Palestinian Arabs. Libya got its independence from the Italians in 1951. In 1956 Sudan was independent and in the same year Egypt saw the withdrawal of British forces from the occupied Suez Canal. The French granted freedom to Tunisia and Morocco also in 1956 and Algeria had to wait until 1962 for its independence. So just over a decade after the World War Two ended the states in the MENA region were all free from external rule (Owen 1994: 23-24).

The new independent MENA countries faced huge problems of illiteracy, poverty social and religious segmentations and the task to obtain the allegiance of all their people. Without the cohesion that the colonial rule provided, state bureaucracies were found to be highly politicised and fragmented. These states had also to worry not just about finding money for development, but also for expanding and equipping the army for external defence (for the Palestinian War of 1948) and ensuring internal security. Given these circumstances there was political instability precipitating in some countries to military coups. A group of urban professionals and nobles formed the initial governments in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, whereas in Sudan the leaders were from three main religious sects and all of them found it a challenge to rule poverty ridden states. They were accused of being insensitive to income distribution and social justice to which they responded by manipulating the votes to prevent their critics from

gaining seats in the parliament. Frustrated the opposition turned towards the military for assistance which was only provided based on its conditions. This transpired in Syria (1949), Egypt (1952), Iraq and Sudan in 1958. The royal family in some states managed to outmanoeuvre the military coups for example in Jordan (in the 1950s) and Morocco (in 1960s and 1970s). Anticipating opposition just prior to and after independence, Tunisia succeeded in creating a one party dominated system. Some scholars explain the initial instability due to religious and historical factors; they are of the opinion that Islam makes any regime illegitimate on the grounds of either secularism or the promise made to accept all believers. Nonetheless, the initial political turbulence was overcome by strengthening the armed forces and bolstering up the central bureaucracy (Owen 1994: 25-28).

2.2 Insight into the Authoritarian Regimes

Once the colonial powers withdrew, there was an urgency to establish control over the national territory and evolve programmes for development. A common component in the post-independent North African and Middle Eastern states was reorganising and revamping of the bureaucracy which increased “the edifice of the state” to become “pervasive, bloated and omnipotent” (Kamrava 1998: 67). The immediate focus was on strengthening the police and army. Spending on education and welfare also saw an increase. In the agricultural sector, the states expropriated larger estates to redistribute the rural land to landless peasant and small farmers (Anderson 1987: 11). The remaining land was under the control of central governments thereby cutting the influence of the landed gentry and the old system was reinstated by direct supervision of ministries, police and the party. The states took the opportunity to amplify its control over large industries by nationalising them (Kamrava 1998: 67). This process of state domination was defended on the grounds of faster development and national income being redistributed in a fair manner. In this way, the regimes gained more legitimacy thereby lessening the chances of being challenged.

Such far reaching authority resulted in extensive powers wielded by individuals at the helm of affairs in each regime. This produced what is known as authoritarian system where power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler, political activity is dominated by the regime and pluralism has no place. The authoritarian states’ workings are shrouded in secrecy, they create this imagery of apparent cohesion, unity and

concentrated power: decisions making was not transparent and divisions were hidden. Bureaucracies are functioning in a murky state apparatus. No polls are conducted for the government to be aware of public feelings, only regulated elections give a vague sense of public sentiments. Inspite of this opaque impression of the authoritarian politics, four major characteristics are observed: organised groups are seen in a suspicious way and not tolerated; second, developing a class consciousness is restrained by prohibiting the formation of free trade unions; third, the citizens are not seen as individuals rather as religious, regional or ethnic entity; and fourth, primacy of political control over economic policies (Owen 1994: 38-39, 43).

The oppositions in the Arab states were constrained by a number of methods like the use of force or terror, monitory incentives, or making use of the personal or ethnic connection. These regimes strategy was to disband what they cannot regulate like organised groups, and remake what it can control. Anderson (1987: 8) observes that when states are unable to carry out the demands of the citizens, they use the strategy to restrict political participation. To keep a check on the workers, memberships were made compulsory in unions and associations that were monitored and outlined the process in which a group could place its demands. For example if the trade unions faced problems, they could not call a strike but had to wait for arbitration. This grouping of the population into various unions and associations was the policy used to delineate the part each citizen played in unified statism.

The regimes control was simply not limited to bureaucracy, agriculture and large-scale industry, but they extended their control over the legal system, education and religious establishment. This was another strategy applied to control the space the political opponents might use to foster resentment against the regimes. As far as religious establishment was concerned, it did not prove to be an impediment: they practiced the Ottoman policy of paying the clergy an official salary and a ministry which handled its property. They also employed the predominant Sunni Islam for legitimising state policy. None of the authoritarian regimes could forgo of Islam as this was the one ideological and cultural element that connected the population with the governments. But they were eager to have the political supremacy over the religious component. In the field of education, the regimes formulated national curriculum and prohibited student political activity instead providing youth organisations controlled by the state. The judges in the legal system were replaced and

the functioning of the system was limited by bringing in extra-legal jurisdiction like the military, police or village level councils. The scope of the system was furthered constrained by the notion that there were higher legalities which overruled the existing laws. The crux of the matter was that the citizens confronted the state at every turn (Owen 1994; Mouawad 2013: 40-42; 327).

The highly concentrated power in a one-party dictatorial regime style meant that the president is the main political actor. He is the party chairman, the head of the state and commander in chief of the army. He is not subordinate to any institution but stands above them, and even adjudicates between them. He does not have to ask for advice and can make the major decisions on what he believes to be in the interest of the public all the while ensuring that no one in the system poses a challenge to his authority. Mostly the president governs until his death, but there have been cases where in Algeria President Ben Bella was ousted, in Iraq and Tunisia presidents (Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Habib Bourguiba respectively) were eased out of power by younger men, and more recently the Arab Spring which will be shortly discussed ousted four presidents. Nevertheless, inspite of possessing such unchecked power, the president was dependent on important groups for extensive political and social support, and he has also to ascribe enough power to individuals to get the state apparatus to function (Owen 1994: 44-50).

2.3 Classification of the Non-democratic States in the MENA

To understand the characteristics of the non-democratic states in the MENA region, Kamrava (1998) classifies them into exclusionary which is divided into military and mukhaberat, inclusionary, and sultanistic states branching out into oil monarchies and civic myth (see Table 1). The outlines are ideal types, and no one state conforms completely to a single category, in fact the characteristics can match another group.

2.3.0 The Exclusionary States

Kamrava (1998: 64) calls the exclusionary states as “praetorian dictatorships”. Their behaviour is repressive, safeguarding their survival through policies that curb social actors’ political opinions and suppress any kind of oppositions. The exclusionary states are further subcategorised into mukhaberat[7] states which rely on technocrats

[7] Domestic intelligence agencies known in Arabic as mukhabarat.

Table 1: Categorisation of the MENA's Non-democratic States

Non-democratic states				
Exclusionary		**Inclusionary**	**Sultanistic**	
Military	**Mukhaberat**		**Oil Monarchies**	**Civic Myth**
Algeria	Egypt	Iran	Bahrain	Jordan
Sudan	Syria	Iraq	Kuwait	Morocco
	Tunisia	Libya	Oman	
			Qatar	
			Saudi Arabia	
			United Arab Emirates	

Source: Kamrava (1998: 65)

and intelligence service to maintain the authoritarian government and the military assuming a background role. While in the other group of states, the military subcategory, the reliance is on the armed forces taking on a central role in state rule. Due to these characteristics of the exclusionary states when they are faced with structural change (for example the global economic crisis) they are unable to undertake liberalisation as a survival mechanism, rather they further tighten their authoritarian control.

Egypt, Syria and Tunisia fall under the mukhaberat state type. In this subdivision, the states appear to be civilian where the institutional power has veered from Defence Ministry to Interior Ministry (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 34), although nearly all the head of the states in this grouping have served in the military. Inspite of there being a decline in the presence of the military in the higher state levels, it is nonetheless used by the governments for non-political purpose, mostly to incapacitate their people. These states take a lot of trouble to pretend to be democracies where presidential elections are held as decreed in the constitution, parliamentary meetings are conducted and dependable opposition parties have permission to operate. There is constant fear especially of the middle class that some plot is being devised to topple the rulers. Hence state agents (or mukhaberat) permeate in public and even private

sphere surveying for any dissident to upset the status-quo, this induces fear in the citizens afraid that one of the mukhaberat is lurking amidst them. The intelligence agencies are steadfast towards the regimes, they investigate the generals and judges, assign university deans and newspaper editors, control the unions and political parties, and manipulate the elections. Under the democratic facade of these regimes runs a more astute version of authoritarianism which maintains their power. Fear then becomes the political stabiliser (Kamrava 1998: 69-70).

Algeria and the then Sudan are part of the military subcategory of exclusionary states. There is no pretence of democracy, as a matter of fact the state together with its military are battling for survival against the armed enemies[8]. Whereas in the mukhaberat states the political adversaries are small and mostly underground, the military states' opposition is actively engaged in fighting the states. Algeria and Sudan aim is to completely wipe out the armed enemies, as opposed to the mukhaberat states which want to simply demobilise their citizens by dousing their political spirit.

2.3.1 The Inclusionary States

Kamrava (1998: 71-73) categorises Iran, Iraq and Libya under the model of inclusionary states. They survive on populism, striving to give their citizens a feeling of political participation through youth groups, street plays, neighbourhood committees and other such instruments devised to give a sense of belonging in the political process. Between the inclusionary and exclusionary states there are fundamental differences: the first is the institutional framework. The exclusionary states have an expansive bureaucracy with mukhaberat agencies backing a president who tries to uphold a civilian appearance. In the case of the inclusionary states the leader symbolises the state, through him the will of the people is transmuted into the power of the state. This kind of centralisation of power in a person, the charisma of the leader becomes important. By the virtue of his personification and glorifications of his accomplishments, the citizens are mobilised and encouraged to approve state projects. Thus the impression is provided to the masses that they are essential in the political process hoping to seal the emotional bindings between the people and their

[8] According to Algeria and the then Sudan the armed enemies are the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Sudanese Liberation Army.

leader. Although the institutions acquire little significance in this kind of dynamic rule as the population are made to feel that they express themselves through their ruler (i.e. Saddam Hussein or Qaddafi), three main institutions support the leader: the military, the bureaucracy and the organisations mobilising the population (Kamrava 1998: 71-73).

The other distinction between the exclusionary and inclusionary states is the latter's zealous practice of pointedly manipulating culture for political motives to the extent of inventing or revamping existing cultural values. These states assign on themselves the responsibility to protect their heritage, even though they need to craft an ideology overnight. The familiarisation of the new cultural norm is transmitted through street play. The exclusionary regimes' policy has been generally to comply with their cultural rules, though in the case of the inclusionary states the contrivance of adjusting the culture ensures leverage over their political stability. As far as the sultanistic states are concerned, they enlarge specific existing cultures for political benefits (Kamrava 1998: 74).

2.3.2 The Sultanistic States

The monarchies of the MENA region – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Morocco – are the sultanistic states. To retain their power, these states count on bureaucracy and coercive measures. A key component in holding such power is the legitimacy of the ruling family which is based on heritage, history and traditional fables. This legitimacy helps to discern between the monarchies: oil and the civic myth monarchies. In the case of the oil monarchies' – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – legitimacy is derived from their strong cultural heritage and history, and further fortified by means of petrodollars rendering the royal family generous towards their people thereby successfully pacifying any demand for political change. Apart from this appeasement policy, these states have developed a style of ruling that limits the susceptibility to political challenges. There are three chief constituents through which the state governs: the first is the royal family controlling important posts at every echelon of the state structure: be it the prime minister, interior minister, defence minister, foreign minister and so on, thereby the royal family is synonymous to the state. Furthermore, the family's control over the real estate market and the practice of

gifting lands to important individuals is another tool to entrench legitimacy and hegemony. The functioning of the welfare state is managed by the second constituent, the civil service. Third, the army and the intelligent agency which are controlled by the royal family, protect the state from foreign and domestic challenges. Without any real threat to their survival, the oil monarchies do not have any motive to liberalise (Kamrava 1998: 75-78).

On the other hand the civic myth monarchies', Jordan and Morocco, legitimacy is established through historical myth as they neither have at their disposal the rich heritage or the oil riches of the Arabian Peninsula monarchies. Not only do the two states face economic troubles of relying on rent revenues and thereby unable to finance a welfare state, but also have the task of establishing legitimacy through common cultural history. Similar three pillars that support the oil monarchies to rule also exist in these two regimes: the royal family depends on a tradition crafted by the state, in other words monarchy is not natural to these states and therefore they are labelled as civic myth monarchies. In this type of monarchy the civil service simply works to provide jobs for the middle classes, and assist the intelligence agencies to permeate into adversary groups. Unlike the royal families in the oil monarchies that monopolise the state system, the counterpart in Jordan and Morocco are smaller in size therefore lacking a complete domination in the armed forces. The outcome is that the monarchies are fragile and vulnerable to internal threats. When challenged the regimes have either suppressed the adversaries or liberalised (Kamrava 1998: 65, 79-80).

2.4 Democracy Deficit in the MENA

Huntington (1991: 15) talks of three waves of democratisation: the first long wave occurring in 1774 to 1926, the second was after the Second World War from 1945 to 1962, and the third wave commenced in 1974 reaching the peak in mid the 1990s after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Third Wave of Democratisation saw many countries around the world transform their regimes to that of democracy. But the MENA region remained an anomaly in this case. Although the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s when the regimes in this region faced with popular ire due to deteriorating economic conditions, rampant corruption and increasing human rights violations, took some initiatives towards democratisation mainly by adopting certain

measures of liberalisation in the economic field (Tessler and Gao 2005: 83; Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 33). Brumberg (2002: 56-57) calls them as liberalised autocracy (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait) where the trademark is an amalgamation of "guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression" (Brumberg 2002: 56-57). He explains that this survival strategy is in response to economic, social or political challenges posed before the regimes, and the reforms were also a way to increase regime legitimacy as the leaders are reluctant to relinquish their power. After a decade of what little semblance of liberalisation existed, the process was stalled or abandoned. Another writer observes that:

"the prospects for democracy seem exceptionally bleak as we survey the remnants of so many of the democratic experiments, from the spectacular crash and burn of Algeria's liberalization to Tunisia's more subtle but no less profound transformation into a police state, from Egypt's backsliding into electoral manipulation to the obvious reluctance of Palestinian authorities to embrace human rights" (Anderson 1999: 6).

Before the 2011 revolution took hold in the Arab land, according to Freedom House when one looks at the freedom records in terms of political rights, civil liberties and how free the MENA countries are on the whole, only Israel is free whereas the rest are either partly free or not free (see Table 2). These results affirm that the region exhibits democracy deficit. If by mid 1990s major regions in the world could count at least a few democratic regimes, the MENA region remains an exception (barring Israel). The question then asked is why are there no democracies in the Arab world? Diamond (2010: 93) observes that the typical belief about the lack of democratisation in the region is linked with religion, namely Islam. The fact remains that Islam does have a prominent impact on Arab cultural and political life, and that none of the MENA countries can escape its influential outreach as it is one of the important factor that binds the people together. Consequently, many observers, especially western scholars, have concluded that Islam and democracy are not compatible. They are of the view that Islam is undemocratic because it attributes sovereignty to God whose law must govern the believers, and the authority should be accepted without questions (Tessler 2002: 339-340). Therefore, Choueiri (1996: in Tessler 2002: 340) concludes that Islam "has to be ultimately embodied in a totalitarian state". On the other hand

Table 2: Freedom in the MENA Region

	2008			2009			2010		
Country	**Status**	**Civil Liberties**	**Political Rights**	**Status**	**Civil Liberties**	**Political Rights**	**Status**	**Civil Liberties**	**Political Rights**
Algeria	NF	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	6
Bahrain	PF	5	5	PF	5	5	NF	5	6
Egypt	NF	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	6
Iran	NF	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	6	6
Iraq	NF	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	6	5
Israel	F	2	1	F	2	1	F	2	1
Jordan	PF	4	5	PF	5	5	NF	5	6
Kuwait	PF	4	4	PF	4	4	PF	4	4
Lebanon	PF	4	5	PF	4	5	PF	3	5
Libya	NF	7	7	NF	7	7	NF	7	7
Morocco	PF	4	5	PF	4	5	PF	4	5
Oman	NF	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	6
PA**	NF	6	5	NF	6	5	NF	6	6
Qatar	NF	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	6
Saudi Arabia	NF	6	7	NF	6	7	NF	6	7
Syria	NF	6	7	NF	6	7	NF	6	7
Tunisia	NF	5	7	NF	5	7	NF	5	7
UAE	NF	5	6	NF	5	6	NF	5	6
Yemen	PF	5	5	PF	5	5	NF	5	6

Source: Freedom House (2015)
*Free (F), Partly Free (PF), Not Free (NF). Civil Liberties: 1=Best, 7=Worst. Political Rights: 1=Best, 7=Worst.
**PA stands for Palestinian Authority

Kedourie (1994: 5-6) asserts that democracy rests on:

"popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state ... all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition."

Stepan and Robertson (2003: 30, 32) indicate that although there is a democracy gap in the Arab countries which are predominantly Muslim, it is more of an Arab problem than a Muslim one. They arrive at this conclusion by comparing the electoral competitiveness and political rights of Arab countries and the non-Arab-Muslim majority countries. Out of the twenty-nine non-Arab-Muslim-majority countries evaluated through the data provided by Polity Project[9], eleven[10] of them have substantial political rights. On the other hand, only Lebanon from the Arab countries experienced some kind of political rights before the civil war began in 1975. This study makes it clear that Islam and democracy can co-exist. The possibility then arises is that the Arab people themselves do not desire democracy as Kedourie (1994: 103) writes that they have been "accustomed to [was] autocracy and passive obedience". But this premise is also negated by two surveys[11] conducted by World Values Survey (WVS) in 1999 to 2000 and the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2003 to 2004 in which Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Iraq, and Palestine support for democracy was over 80 percent: they agreed that "democratic system, despite its limits, is superior to other political systems" and believed that "democracy is a very good or fairly good way of ruling their country" (Tessler and Gao 2005: 85-88).

Another argument advanced by some scholars concerning the ailment to democracy promotion in the Arab world is the absence of any prior experience to democracy. The reasoning put forth is that countries that have already experienced a democratic system prove to democratise successfully, like in the case of Central Europe. This is hardly an essential requirement to transit to a democratic system, for most of the democratic countries have emerged from non-democratic systems. Furthermore, the

[9] The measuring scale ranges from minus 10 standing for strongly autocratic and plus 10 for strongly democratic, so countries scoring plus 4 have electoral competitiveness.
[10] The countries are Albania, Bangladesh, Comoros, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey.
[11]Both surveys were conducted using an interview schedule, in the case of U.S. NSF the samples numbered 1446 in Algeria, 1000 in Jordan, 2700 in Iraq and 1320 in Palestine.

people of Arab countries are at least acquainted with the elections and political parties than the Eastern Europeans at the end of the Cold War, although whatever little democracy measures taken up by the Arab countries were just a sham (Gambill 2003).

The other factor for the region's lack of democracy is the economic development. According to modernisation theory, the argument is that economic development will lead society to adopt participatory forms of governance: mass education will equip the community with skills of communication and organisation, increased specialised professionals will help tip the power equation against the elites, and progress towards greater income equality with providing basic health care needs will allow the people to espouse for self-expression and freedom. For Third World standards the socio-economic status indicators in the MENA have been comparatively high (Gambill 2003). In 2007, the per capita income index showed that Saudi Arabia was on par with South Korea, Kuwait with Norway, Oman with Portugal, Bahrain with France, although Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Yemen find themselves at the lower levels, nonetheless their per capita income is similar to that of Indonesia or India where democracy functions despite "a lack of broad prosperity". The per capita income levels can be misleading giving the impression of widespread development as is the case in the oil countries that rank lower in the human development index. Still in human development terms, the oil states rank with Portugal or Hungary, and the non-oil states like Morocco matches with South Africa, and Egypt with Indonesia. No matter in what terms of development one looks at, several democracies that are at similar levels of development as the Arab countries, still function on participatory forms of governance (Diamond 2010: 97).

Diamond (2010: 98-99) is of the opinion that the problem lies not at the economic development, but the economic structure. He explains that many of these Arab countries are rentier states meaning that large rent revenues are derived from foreign actors and amassed by the governments to keep the states afloat. This implies that majority of their citizens are not involved in generating state wealth, only a few are involved and the rest of the population are concerned in the distribution and utilisation of the income. The oil and gas exporting Arab states derive over 70 percent and some over 90 percent revenues. Consequently they are flush with so much cash that they do not require the need to tax their people. Here ensues the crux of the democracy

problem: the states by not taxing their citizens are not accountable to them. Samuel P. Huntington (1991: 65) remarks that "the lower the level of taxation, the less reason for publics to demand representation". In these oil states the money that comes from the export earnings go directly in central-state coffers where it is highly policed. Since the money is not the taxpayers, and not answerable, it is in a way "nobody's money" making these regimes corrupt and supporting any kind of programmes to "buy political peace". Their people are into business that either assists the oil sector or the state, into government contracts or foreign companies; there exist no real entrepreneurial spirit. This so called oil curse won't be lifted soon as the Arab countries account for 46 percent of the world's reserve (Diamond 2010: 98-99).

In the case of non-oil states like Jordan, Morocco or Egypt, the foreign aid that flows in acts like oil, meaning another source of rent. This aid goes directly to the centre governments' coffers and gives them another means to ensure their survival. They use on public jobs and do not levy huge taxes. Lot of the aid comes from Europe and US providing these autocratic regimes not only economic assistance, but security and political legitimacy (Diamond 2010: 101). This is also known as "strategic rent" which also incorporates loans on low conditionality and debt write-offs (Gambill 2003).

Diamond (2010: 100-101) adds two other factors that help perpetuate the democracy gap that the MENA region experiences: the first is the Arab-Israeli conflict which is an available excuse to draw the public's attention away from human rights abuse and corruption, and instead focusing on the atrocities committed by the Israelis on Palestinians then cleverly extending to the rest of the Arab people. The second factor that impedes democratisation is the Arab states themselves: they bolster each other's authoritarianism and method of repressing and monitoring. The anomaly in the political development of the MENA region is not simply because of endogenous factors, but exogenous determinants too have help to foster the conditions.

2.5 The Arab Spring

2.5.0 Human Development in the MENA Region

The Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) brought out by the United Nations Development Programme, analyses the challenges and opportunities of human

development in the MENA region and has identified perpetuating problems plaguing the Arab world. The AHDR 2002 notes that the lack of progress in human development emanates in the shortcomings of the Arab political structure. Human development as defined by AHDR (2002: 15-18) is a "process of enlarging choices", if people are at the centre of development then the effort is to broaden the plethora of choices (be it political, economic, social, cultural or religious). Human development stresses on the importance of enlarging human capabilities which implies the freedom to pursue various things. This freedom cannot be used if the opportunities do not exist to exercise it, and this is provided by human rights that are supported by institutions like state or society. Thus human development and human rights complement each other, and freedom is the common denominator. In other words, human development is "development of the people, development for the people, and development by the people" (AHDR 2002: 16): development of the people signifies enhancing human capabilities by means of developing human resources; development for the people is achieved by transferring the profit of growth in the lives of the people; and the development by the people implies that the citizens should be an active part in the decision-making processes that affect their lives.

The AHDR (2002: 27-29) has identified three key deficits in the Arab socio-economic systems: freedom, empowerment of women, knowledge deficit. The report concluded that out of the seven[12] world regions, the MENA region had the lowest freedom score (in terms of civil liberties, political rights and independence of the media); as for women empowerment (in economic, professional and political activities), the region ranks little higher than Sub-Saharan Africa which is the lowest; and knowledge acquisition and production in the Arab countries is seriously poor (it ranks last along with Sub-Saharan Africa). The 2009 Report has identified seven dimensions of threat to human security that the Arab region faces: (1) people and their insecure environment, (2) the state and its insecure people, (3) the vulnerability of those lost from sight, (4) volatile growth, high unemployment and persisting poverty, (5) hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, (6) health security challenges, and (7) occupation and military intervention. One observes that the fault lines found in the region since the 2002 Report have aggravated. The 2009 Report surmises that the

[12] According to AHDR 2002 the seven world regions are North America, Oceania, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, South and East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Arab countries.

obstacles to human development that have proved to be stubborn are due to the region's fragile political, economic, social and environmental structures, the absent of development centred on the people, and vulnerability to external intervention (AHDR 2009: 1-2).

The multidimensional feature of development argues for an inclusive and pluralist nature of the states. But what prevails in the MENA region is a pattern of governance in which high concentration of power is centred on an individual (the president or the monarch) who exercises control on all branches of the state. The absent of a representative democracy has restricted political participation and liberties of the people. With education and flow of information, citizens' desire to be part of the decision-making process and access to more freedom have grown, but the growing gap between their aspiration and fulfilment of their desire have led to dissatisfaction. There are two processes that are taking place in some of the Arab countries: a shift in the position of the state as a patron because of the reduced privileges that the state can offer (guarantee of employment, subsidies), and the states' growing dependence on the citizen for tax or investing in private sector has ever slightly tipped the power towards the people (AHDR 2002: 2, 9).

2.5.1 The Arab Revolts

Even though successive AHDR have determined various problems plaguing the MENA region, the world was caught by surprise when in 2011 revolts erupted in the region. The might that these authoritarian regimes demonstrated was illusory as they were losing legitimacy at home, they depended on external generated revenues, and the region faced growing instability (Anderson, 1987: 12). The surge of political protest which started in Tunisia spread rapidly across the region, drawing out a number of problems that were smouldering underneath repressive regimes (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 29). Clark (2013: 44) explains that the series of revolts that have swept across the region have been called in the West as the Arab Spring correlating it with the Prague Spring of 1968 when revolts took place in erstwhile communist Czechoslovakia for more democratisation. Whereas in the MENA countries, the political upheavals were called *Sahwat al-Arab* or *Nahdat al-Arab* meaning the Arab Awakening or Arab Renaissance.

Burnell (2013: 839) is of the opinion that the Arab Spring phenomenon happened despite any effective external support for democracy. The Arab people took on the initiative to bring about political change as they had lost faith in the foreign powers that they believed were interested in keeping with the status quo. In the past sixty years the revolutionary movements in the Arab region were driven by the brand of "Muslim *umma*, or the Arab nation", but this time the demonstrators were asking for elections, good governance, human rights and dignity. They did not praise any opposition parties, nor wish for any Islamic state or burn any US flag, they were occupied with "individual citizenship". The media highlighted the protests' young spokespersons, but no charismatic leaders were produced. The demonstrators only wanted to change the old political structure with a new democratic one that provides a decent existence; they did not take power onto themselves (Roy 2012: 5).

For decades now the people have put up with political suppression and economic stagnation, and with the 2008 global economic recession matters took a turn for the worst (Clark 2013: 46). Large parts of the population were exhausted by the increasing gap between the false promises for better days made by uncompromising regimes on the one hand, and the reality of facing the actual living condition on the other hand. On top of that the freedom to express the grievance that these people experienced was curtailed by the regimes, and change was virtually impossible to bring about as political participation too was restricted. In this light, the uprisings emphasised on the "patronizing and infantilizing" nature of the autocratic regimes that refused to respect the political and universal standards of human rights. The frustrated subjects turned into confident citizens, a revolution did take place in their minds irrespective of whether it translated into the political sense of the term (Kienle 2012: 533).

On 17 December 2010, the self-immolation of Mohammed Ben Bouazizi was the symbolic start of the Arab Spring. Bouazizi, a graduate street vendor, set himself ablaze in a final protest against the state corruption and repression. This set in motion a series of demonstration that spread to other cities in Tunisia where the mobilisation of the people were mostly spontaneous. Initially the police tried to quell the uprisings but by January 2011 it back down as the army decided not to suppress the protest. Within twenty days of protestation against the regime, President Ben Ali fled to Saudi

Arabia, and a temporary government was put in place. After the Tunisian success of overthrowing the government, popular revolts against the presiding regimes escalated rapidly to other parts of North Africa and the Middle East. In Egypt on 25 January 2001, civil society and opposition groups organised demonstration bringing out thousands of people to take part in a “day of rage” against the President Mubarak’s regime. At the end of January, President Mubarak announced to form a new government, but the demonstrators wanted nothing less than his resignation. Mubarak regime then launched counter-demonstrations, but that did not cow down the people. He then declared that he would not contest in the coming presidential elections, but by then the people were in no mood to relent resulting in wildcat strikes. Finally on 11 February 2011, Mubarak stepped down from his post, and relinquished his powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Initially the SCAF was praised, but then the political situation was not any more democratic than the earlier one. End of 2011 and beginning 2012 after the elections to the lower house were held, protests erupted to voice the dissatisfaction against SCAF which were met with violence (Allansson et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012: 47, 63-64).

After the fall of Mubarak, in February 2011 revolts broke out in Libya against President Qaddafi, and spread across the country bringing more and more people out onto the streets. The opposition was particularly active in the east of Libya making Benghazi the centre of the rebellion. Qaddafi directed the army to use violent method to restrain the protests resulting in widespread condemnation from the international community. As repression continued and Libyan security service was ordered to launch “an offensive against the rebellious towns”, civilian fatalities increased. On 17 March 2011, a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was sanctioned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Supported by NATO, the rebels gained the upper hand in the conflict and took control of Tripoli. The Qaddafi regime collapsed and he was killed in the fighting, and the National Transitional Council (NTC), the rebel organisation, took control of Libya and tried to bring in democratisation (Allansson et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012: 48-49, 65).

In January 2011 President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen announced that he would remove the restriction on the presidential terms which sparked off a defiance movement by the Yeminis as they feared that Saleh would remain in power for life.

The resistance gained impetus when Mubarak was deposed as president of Egypt. The demonstrations were peaceful, but the government used violence to repress the protesters, and a growing number of casualties which resulted in the withdrawal of support to the regime by the powerful tribes. Injured by a rocket attack, Saleh fled to Saudi Arabia but returned to Yemen where he retained his position till February 2012, and relinquished his power following the election (Allansson et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012: 51-52, 65-66).

In Bahrain protests started on 14 February 2011 for greater respect of human rights and granting more political freedom, they were not aimed at threatening the monarchy. There was a deep-seated political conflict between the Shiite majority and Sunni monarchy which was the main root of the problem. The protests were mainly peaceful until the police raided the city square to clear the demonstrators killing seven of them. This angered the people who now expanded their demands and called for a republic. On 14 March, King Hamad requested the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) force to quell the rebellion to which the opposition termed the intervention of Saudi and UAE troops as occupation. On 15 March, the King declared a state of emergency and ordered the military to continue to assert control. Bahrain was not successful in ousting its ruler like the countries mentioned above, as of today political unrest continue between the majority Shiite and Sunni government which has decided to term the various protests organisations as terrorists groups (Allansson et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012: 45-47, 65).

Another country where protests are ongoing is the case of Syria. At first unrest erupted in February 2011, but they were quickly brought under control. In March, the arrest and torture of young boys triggered revolts that could not be suppressed by the government. From then on the protests spread to other cities where civilian fatalities increased. Initially the demonstrators were calling for political and economic reforms, but as government resorted to torturing the detainees, depriving medical care to the wounded, and using snipers to kill the protesting people, the rebels called for the resignation of President Assad. The government began shelling entire cities that were considered to be hostile towards the regime. Assad lifted the state of emergency which the country was under for about forty seven years, and repeatedly promised reforms, but they were too little or just cosmetic. Many of the Syrian soldiers defected

to the other side some of which have organised themselves to fight along with the protesters. One such officer created the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011. The FSA fights the government in Aleppo, Hamah and Homs governorates. By late 2012, despite a ceasefire, fighting between the government forces and the opposition has continued. On 12 June 2012, the UN peacekeeping chief in Syria declared that the country has entered into civil war (Allansson et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012: 49-50, 66).

The six countries mentioned above that have either ousted their autocrats or where serious internal uprisings still continues, differ from the rest of the countries in the region in the sense that the events had more intensity and violence than the minor unrest that was experienced by others. In anticipation of potential unrest, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared that he would not contest for a third term in 2014 election, nonetheless Iraqis gathered in major cities to demand the government for establishing a transparent manner of acquiring public services, investigate into corruption cases. In response Nouri al-Maliki subsidised electricity cost, and warned the various ministries to improve their work. The unrest in Algeria which had experienced a civil war in the 1990s, did not consolidate to any kind of development. Like Algeria, no significant movement of change came over from the protests that took place in Lebanon. Except for Bahrain, the GCC states experienced sporadic protests for which the countering responses were an increase in the welfare spending, cash handouts, and revived sets of repression. In the case of Morocco and Jordan, the monarchs dissipated the uprisings by taking up reform measures (Delacoura 2012: 66).

Although the uprisings in various countries had similar attributes like the use of central squares in cities to hold the demonstrations, the large scale of protesters, and lack of overall leaders, they also differed in several aspects: the demand for change varied spanning from regime change to political reform to better economic conditions, and also the level of violence differed. Highest level of violence was witnessed in Libya and Syria where a civil war continues, to a lesser extent although still intense violence was reported in Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, and in the case of Algeria and Morocco there were fewer casualties (Allansson et al. 2012: 45).

2.5.2 The Causes for the Arab Spring

The social protests that toppled long-standing authoritarian regimes had their cause embedded in various socio-economic grievances, the uprisings were not the result of just the meltdown of the world financial system, instead as Joffé (2011: 508) adds that contradictory claims for gradual reforms made by the leaders who were interested to legitimise their rule and continuous repression and disregard towards the need of the people formed the ground out of which emerged the dissent shaking the Arab world. There are several other reasons behind the uprisings:

Economic Issues

The economic situation in the MENA region was certainly one of the main causes of the Arab Spring. The effect of the 2008 global economic crisis led to an increase in global food and energy price. In 2010, according to Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), food and cereal prices rose drastically: sugar went up by 77 percent, oil and fats by 57 percent, wheat by 84 percent, and maize by 74 percent. Oil price which was 75 dollar per barrel shot up to 91 dollar per barrel in mid 2010, and by March 2011 it was 109 dollar per barrel. This steep rise in turn affected the food and energy cost in the region impacting the population directly. However the question arises as to why the population of the region were so vulnerable to the global price rise since the 1980s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and since 1995 the EU were all concerned about the economic development in the MENA and prescribed policies that were supported by neoliberal economic doctrines. While this kind of neoliberal prescription may have helped improve the macroeconomic indicators, in the case of microeconomic conditions it has not been so. The absence of highly performing independent private sector has left the region without any flexible job markets to cater to a rising demographic change. Failures of microeconomic policies have had a major social impact prompting unrest across the Arab region (Joffé 2011; Aissa 2012: 509-510, 3).

Demographic change

From 1970 to 2010, the population in the Arab world tripled going from 128 million to 359 million. Of these about 41 percent live below the poverty line and 30 percent are between the ages of 20 to 35 years. Although the current generation of the youth

are better educated and skilled than the previous one, many of them remain unemployed. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the youth unemployment rate in 2010 was 23.4 percent, the highest in the world. The university graduates find limited job prospects in the labour market. Frustrated from the lack of job opportunities, they had to not only face the rising expense of living standard, but also the corrupt and suppressive rule of their governments. An educated and unemployed youth is a force to reckon with as the two characteristics are a volatile combination, and so the pent up anger propelled them to rise against the repressive system (Beck and Hüser 2012: 4).

Social Media

Howard and Hussain (2011: 36-40) point out the importance of digital media that helped galvanise the youth to revolt against the system, specially the social media like Twitter, Facebook and You Tube. They clarify that long before the internet became a phenomenon, the discord between the people and the regimes existed. However, digital media exposed to the tech savvy youth the freedom and prosperity enjoyed by others in the world. The access to online media got more people to question their political structure. After the self-immolation of Bouazizi, the virtual social forums enabled the people to communicate their solidarity and share their resentment of the political condition with others. In addition to bringing the Arab people closer, the social media helped the people to organise demonstration against their governments. A simple post on the media pages informed the demonstrators the location and next strategy of the protests.

Human Dignity

Asseburg (2011 in Beck and Hüser 2012: 8) remarks that the protests in the Arab states may differ from one another, however they had at their base the demand for human dignity, freedom and social justice. Dalacoura (2012: 67) writes that after decades of humiliation by unaccountable and marauding dictators, the uprisings were a call for dignity. In one of the mass protest in Egypt the people's slogan was "bread, freedom and human dignity" (Human Rights Watch 2012). The slogan in Tunisia was "We can live on bread and water alone but not with RCD" (Ben Ali's party) (Larbi 2011 in Dalacoura 2012: 67).

2.5.3 The Outcome of the Arab Spring

Many scholars are now convinced that the democratic movement has failed leading to what they call a Winter of Discontent (Clark 2013: 48). The revolution that had taken hold of the MENA region did not translate the popular power into politically institutionalised system where participation is ensured. De Jouvenel (1993: 218) notes that the function of a revolution is to strengthen and revamp power. Hence the revolution's political task is to generate new political order to systemise and stabilise power. In states where regime change took place, the formation of new political structure escaped most countries as instability and unrest still continue. In many cases the violence is the outcome of the clash between anti and pro Islamist groups. According to Huntington (1968: 226) complete revolutions are mostly uncommon, and often they are turned into civil wars, coup d'état, or prolonged periods of violence ensues. This is what mostly transpired in the MENA region where the wave of democratic movement did not culminate into viable democracies. Huntington (1991: 15) specifies that a wave of democratisation is "a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period".

The outcomes of the democratic movement in the Arab states indicate that it is not a fourth wave of democratisation. The post-revolutionary political systems have diverse forms and do not resemble the multiparty democracies in the West as the latter expected it would at the end of the revolution (Behr and Sasnal 2012: 47). In assessing the effect of the Arab Spring on the regimes, the exclusionary regimes turned out to be less tenacious than the sultanistic ones (see Table 3.). The exclusionary regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen were overthrown, whereas the regime in Syria is locked in a civil war with the opposition and is now facing the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The exclusionary regime of the Algeria has remained in power by adopting concession measures. In the case of Libya, the regime change started not with popular mobilisation but with civil war resulting in the imploding of the regime (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 39).

Table 3: Evaluating the Outcome of the Arab Spring

State	Regime Type	Regime Change	Outcome
Algeria	Exclusionary	No	Government concessions
Egypt	Exclusionary	Yes	Mubarak deposed
Syria	Exclusionary	No	Civil war
Tunisia	Exclusionary	Yes	Ben Ali deposed
Yemen	Exclusionary	Yes	Saleh deposed
Libya	Inclusionary	Yes	Gaddafi deposed
Bahrain	Sultanistic	No	Government concessions
Jordan	Sultanistic	No	Government concessions
Kuwait	Sultanistic	No	Government concessions
Morocco	Sultanistic	No	Government concessions
Oman	Sultanistic	No	Government concessions
Qatar	Sultanistic	No	Minor protests
Saudi Arabia	Sultanistic	No	Minor protests
UAE	Sultanistic	No	Negligible protests

Source: (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 39)

The sultanistic regimes have survived the Arab spring without any regime change and barely any rebellion, except for Bahrain. The oil monarchies instituted reforms like electoral, expelling intelligence agents, spending more on welfare schemes, and economic development. The civic myth monarchies too initiated government reforms such as election of the president by the parliament instead of the monarch selecting and thereby preserved their regimes. Although all the regimes in the MENA region have some form of authoritarian rule, the type and characteristics of regime throw light on why some states had their autocrats deposed while others preserved their regimes (Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 40-41).

The MENA region has been known to suffer from democracy deficit, after the Arab Spring which ushered in hopes of a democratic wave culminated in producing just one democracy, Tunisia (see Table 4). According to Freedom House's assessment of

freedom in the MENA region in 2015, only two countries - Israel and Tunisia - are free; the rest still remain partly free or not free. The study observes that the Arab

Table 4: Freedom in the MENA, year 2015

Country	Status	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Change in Value 2010-2015
Algeria	NF	5	6	▬
Bahrain	NF	6	7	▼
Egypt	NF	5	6	▬
Iran	NF	6	6	▬
Iraq	NF	6	6	▼
Israel	F	2	1	▬
Jordan	NF	5	6	▬
Kuwait	PF	5	5	▼
Lebanon	PF	4	5	▼
Libya	NF	6	6	▲
Morocco	PF	4	5	▬
Oman	NF	5	6	▬
Palestine	NF	6	7	▼
Qatar	NF	5	6	▬
Saudi Arabia	NF	7	7	▼
Syria	NF	7	7	▼
Tunisia	F	3	1	▲
UAE	NF	6	6	▼
Yemen	NF	6	6	▼

Source: Freedom House 2015
*Free (F), Partly Free (PF), Not Free (NF). Civil Liberties: 1=Best, 7=Worst. Political Rights: 1=Best, 7=Worst.
▬ indicates no change since 2010; ▼▲ up/down indicates improvement or decline in ratings since 2010.

Spring did not transform into a democratic wave, rather there has been a shrink in the political space of the countries. In fact, the leaders have tightened their political

control. The region has a long road away to transform to a democratic system which may not be similar to the Western democratic model.

2.6 Conclusion

There is no one single response of the international community to the Arab Spring, indeed it has been rather a mixed one. The revolutionary wave just did not catch the Arab autocrats by surprise, but also caught the democratic leaders unaware. In the case of the US and the EU, their first reaction was that of uncertainty and hesitation. For decades now both the Western powers had established an understanding with the authoritarian regimes in the MENA whereby they would tolerate the dictatorial practices in return for safeguarding their strategic interest in the region. The basic reasoning behind US and EU policy was that they would encourage democracy only if it did not compromise their interest in the region such as flow of oil and gas, counter terrorism, migration control, infrastructure construction contracts and the access to Suez Canal, for all of which the cooperation of the regimes are required. (Sasnal 2012; Santini and Hassan 2012; Metawe 2013; Byman 2013: 14, 66, 141, 289)

The EU which has been called a normative power and promotes democracy, rule of law and human rights through its foreign policy, failed to swiftly act when pro-democracy movements spread across its southern neighbourhood. A clear conflict of interest arises in its policy formulation towards the region. To understand the EU's response of the Arab Spring, the next chapter will study the policies of the EU towards its southern neighbourhood before the 2011 wave of protests swept across the region.

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CHAPTER III

THE EU'S POLICIES TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING

The European Economic Community (ECC) and later the EU's relations with its southern neighbourhood fall into the following frameworks: Global Mediterranean Policy, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The number of policies indicates the importance the southern neighbourhood is for the EU, for it is Europe's "first frontier" (Khader, 2013: 11). Hence geographical proximity plays a vital part in the Euro-Mediterranean relations (see Map 2). Khader (2013: 11) remarks that Europe views the Southern

Map 2: The EU and Its Neighbourhood

Source: European Commission (2015)

Mediterranean as its "nearest difference" and itself as the "nearest reference". The proximity also renders the EU to be the major trading partner of its neighbourhood.

The latter is indispensible to EU when it comes to energy needs: the EU imports 50 percent of oil and 18 percent of gas from the MENA region. But the region due to its unstable regimes, also poses problems for the EU as they can spill-over into Europe and thereby undermine its stability and security. Therefore one sees that the EU through its policy frameworks endeavours to tie the region closer to its economic and political system.

This chapter locates the EU as a foreign policy actor and analyses the various policy instruments it has evolved over the years to engage with its southern neighbourhood prior to the Arab Spring.

3.0 The EU’s Foreign Policy

The EU is a relatively new player in the international political arena, although the ECC pursued external activities, it was not until the 1993 Maastricht Treaty that the EU could decisively establish a foreign policy of its own. Fifteen years into the 21st century, the EU is seen to be active in a range of issues on the global stage. The Union’s foreign policy deals not only with its neighbourhood, but also extends to other regions and international organisations (European Commission, 2014 a). Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 1) define the EU foreign policy as “the areas of European policies that is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, value and goals”. They further describe the EU foreign policy with three attributes: multifaceted which encompasses areas such as trade, enlargement, CFSP, CSDP etc.; multi-method is the amalgamation of different policy-making mechanisms, some are with the supranational institutions or with the member states; the third attribute is multilevel – the European or national levels. Since the beginning of European integration, although the preoccupation was with internal matters, there was also focus on external relations, especially with the Treaty of Rome (1957): the establishment of external trade policy and international agreements with other regions in the world, and development cooperation. After six decades of supranational integration with founding the ECSC, the EU has grown from six member states to twenty-eight member states, and developed over the years a political system that has power over various policy areas one of which is the foreign policy arena. Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 3) remark that the European integration of member states is

foreign policy, whether it is the incorporation of the Central and Eastern European countries which were part of the communist bloc into the EU, or reconstructing the war-torn Balkan countries and endeavouring to transform them which resulted in Croatia becoming the twenty-eighth member of the EU in 2013. The EU uses political and economic tools in conducting its foreign policy, and is considered in some instances as an influential international actor.

The EU has delegations in about 140 countries and even in some multilateral organisations (i.e. the UN) (European Commission, 2014c: 3). The Union also forms

Map 3: The Ongoing Missions

Source: EEAS (2015)

relations with non-governmental agencies and engages in Track II diplomacy. Although the EU was not involved in important combats like Afghanistan and Iraq, it

has nonetheless since 2003 held over thirty civilian and military missions (see Map 3) such as military operation in Bosnian and Herzegovina[13], anti-piracy operations on the coast of Somalia[14], or the police training mission in Afghanistan[15] etc (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 3).

The EU is the world's largest trading bloc: it accounts for 16 percent of the world's exports and imports. It is not only the biggest exporter of goods and services, but also the largest export market for eighty countries (European Commission, 2014 b). This renders the EU one of the major economic powers in the world (see Figure 1). In terms of development aid, the EU and its member states are the largest donors of official development assistance (ODA): in 2013, together they donated 52% of the global ODA (European Commission, 2014 c: 3). Environment is another such area where the EU has ambition for global leadership. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty which established the EU and its new political system, the Union has evolved as an international actor and foreign policy is an integral part of the EU (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 3).

Figure 1: Trade in Goods and Commercial Services, 2013



Source: European Commission (2015)

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[13] The operation goes by the name of EUFOR Althea: it saw the transfer of authority from NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) to EUFOR.
[14] The mission is named European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta).
[15] European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan).

3.0.0 Evolution of the EU's Foreign Policy

The outcome of the Pleven Plan (1950) which called for an European army was the European Defense Community (EDC) agreement. The treaty was ratified by Germany and the Benelux[16] counties, but failed to pass in France. As a consequence, the question of having a defence community in Europe had become a sensitive issue and was not pursued for many years. The unsuccessful attempt at establishing EDC inhibited the Treaties of Rome from including any foreign policy concerns. It was the treaty of the EEC which endorsed competence for external relations and from thence grew the involvement of the EEC with other countries. Some of the initiatives were common external trade and tariff, the possibility of European states to be part of EEC, the founding of a European Fund for Development, and commercial policy towards third countries and international organisations (Bindi 2010: 13-15).

When De Gaulle became president of France, he came up with the proposition of holding regular foreign ministerial meetings of the EEC member states. He then further proposed meetings at the level of heads of government and the first of its kind took place in Paris in 1961. This is considered as the antecedent to the European Council. However, the Dutch foreign minister did not take to the idea of regular meetings or an ad hoc secretariat. The EEC leaders then came up with the Fouchet Committee which suggested the creation of a common foreign and defence policy, but many of the member states rejected such a notion. The Hague summit in 1969 approved the ideas of the French President Pompidou which were based on deepening, enlargement and completion. As far as deepening was concerned, the director of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, Etienne Davignon, was given the responsibility to come with measures for further integration. The result was the Davignon Report which was an important boost towards European foreign policymaking. It delineated the possibility of discussing foreign policy matters, convene meetings of EEC foreign ministers and eventually among head of the states. All these were institutionalised in what is known as the European Political Cooperation (EPC): the member states could raise any political issue for consultation. The Copenhagen Report of 1973 additionally defined the mechanisms of the EPC: the foreign ministers would meet up four times a year and whenever they deemed it

[16] Benelux countries are Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

necessary; the Political Committee would prepare ministerial meetings and carry out the responsibility assigned by the Ministers; the Report created the Group of Correspondants which would have to carry out the work as instructed by the Political Committee; the setting up of working parties to provide in-depth consultation on specific issue; the Report also emphasised on the close participation of the member states' embassies on political cooperation (Bindi 2010; CVCE 2013 a: 16, 18-19, 3-4).

Another important component of the European foreign policy emerged in 1974: the European Council. The latter was comprised of the heads of government of the EEC and their foreign ministers, and also including the president of the European Commission. The European Council was to convene meeting three times a year and whenever necessary. In the 1970s, there was pressure from the international community for the ECC to be more involved in international affairs, and a need for European response in events like Arab-Israeli wars, the oil crisis, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the martial law imposed in Poland. The EEC approved a Declaration on European Identity which better defined "their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs" (CVCE 2013 b: 2). After the second enlargement, the EEC expanded to twelve member states and attention was geared towards internal reforms which saw the member states press for improving the EPC and thereby increase the EEC's participation in world affairs. The London Report of 1981 added more outlines in the functioning of the EPC such as consultation of the member states' ambassadors in third states on a regular basis. The Genscher-Colombo Plan endeavoured to raise the issue of a defence area by creating a council for defence ministers, but it proved to be too optimistic. The idea of collaborating action on international law and order (which was later formed the third pillar of Maastricht Treaty) was also proposed, but the member states had problems with the Genscher-Colombo provisions. The purview of the EPC was expanded to encompass "the economic and political aspects of security" in the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration (1983: 8) which also called for "identification of common interests in order to strengthen the possibilities of joint action in the field of foreign policy". The declaration also emphasised on cohesive action between the Community and EPC which is also one of the provisions in the Single European Act (Hill and Smith 2000; Bindi 2010: 120, 124, 21, 24).

The Single European Act (SEA) codified the EPC and the European Council, and delineated the intergovernmental process of cooperation in foreign policy. The SEA directed the “High Contracting Parties” (member states) to “inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters...to ensure that their combined influence is exercised...through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action” (SEA 1986: 20, Article 30 (2a)). The SEA in Article 30, clause 7(a) instructed the member states to “adopt common positions” in international organisations and conferences. It also established that “the external policies of the European community and the policies agreed in European Political Co-operation must be consistent” (SEA 1986: 21, Article 30 (5)). The SEA in Article 30, clause 6(a) mentioned of cooperating on issues of European security and coordinate the member states positions on “the political and economic aspects of security”. It also outlined the position the European Council, Commission and Parliament had in the EPC: the Council played a leading role, the Commission assisted on all matters, and the Parliament had the right to be informed. A secretariat was established in Brussels to help the EPC Presidency in its workings. The next major change to the European foreign policy came in the form of the Maastricht Treaty.

The end of 1980s brought about dramatic changes in Europe. The Central and Eastern European countries were in a flux with the crumbling of the Iron Curtain, and the climax was the fall of the Berlin Wall which culminated in the reunification of Germany. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries were eager to disassociate with the erstwhile Soviet Union and reunite with Europe. To be able to cope with the new developments, Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, announced for a need to overhaul the EEC. François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, the French President and German Chancellor respectively, called for a political union that would safeguard the unity and values that the EEC stands for, improve the institutional structure, achieve consistency in policymaking and implementation in economic and political fields, and finally establish a common foreign and security policy. This vision resulted into the Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1992 which shaped the institutional set up known as the European Union. The new treaty created a three pillar structure in which one pillar comprised of the European Community was supranational, and the other two pillars based on intergovernmentalism, consisted of

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Replacing the former external policy institution of the EPC, the CFSP became the new foreign policy framework of the EU (Bindi 2010: 25-26, 28).

3.0.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The aims of the CFSP were to:

> "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union...preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with principles of the United Nations Charter as well as...the Helsinki Final Act...to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (TEU 1992: Article J.1.2).

The member states were to achieve these objectives by collaborating and implementing joint action. They were to assist with "mutual solidarity" in "the Union's external and security policy" and abstain from pursuing activities which undermine "its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations" (TEU 1992: Article J.1.4). The TEU stipulates in Article J.2.2 that when the Council takes a common stand, the member states should formulate their domestic policies accordingly and harmonise actions in international forums and organisations. The CFSP was to deal with all aspects of the Union's security leading to someday shaping of a "common defence policy" (Article J.4.1). For matters concerning the CFSP, the Presidency would represent the EU, but the European Council "define(s) the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy" (Article J.8.1). Article J.9 of the TEU directs the Commission to wholly engage with the CFSP, and as for the Parliament, its opinion should be taken into consideration and informed on a regular basis (Article J.7). The European Communities' budget would fund the CFSP's bureaucratic expense. The funding of the CFSP's operational expenditure was left to the Council to decide whether it would levy from the EC budget (Article J.11.2).

Before the TEU came into force, the European Council in Lisbon identified geographical areas where join action could be worked out: Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and the former Soviet satellite countries, the Balkans, the Maghreb

and the Middle East; pertaining to the North-South relations, the Union would develop relations with Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. The Union would maintain its important relations with the US, Canada and Japan (European Council 1992: 33-38). The Council also delineated "domains within the security dimension" (European Council 1992: 40): "the policy of disarmament and arms control in Europe, including confidence-building measures; nuclear non-proliferation issues; the economic aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms exports".

The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam made quite a few changes to the CFSP. The most significant change was the introduction of a "Secretary-General of the Council" who would "exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy" (Article J.8.2). The High Representative of CFSP along with a European Commission representative and the Foreign Affairs minister of the country holding the presidency of the Council, formed the new troika. The High Representative was responsible for the functioning of the new structures of Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Maganza 1998: 178). The EU foreign policy finally had a face and a name that of Javier Solana. The voting requirements mostly remained the same, needing unanimity for major CFSP decisions, but "abstentions by members" would not "prevent the adoption of such decisions" (Article J.13.1). As for the defence aspect, the treaty did not introduce any amendments, but mentioned of "progressive framing of a common defence policy" (Article J.7.1). The "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" were referred as features of the security policy of the EU (Article J.7.2).

A further strengthening of the CFSP came in the form of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which was established after the St. Malo Declaration of 1998. With the EU being unable to deal with the crisis in the Balkans especially in the case of Kosovo, the British Prime Minister Blair and the French President Chirac felt it was imperative for the EU to be equipped with a credible military force which was capable of undertaking missions and thus the ESDP was created to cope with international crisis. The 1999 Helsinki Summit asked the member states to set up a force of 50,000 to 60,000 persons who can be deployed in sixty days and competent in executing the Petersburg Tasks by 2003. Along with this, the EU also agreed to

build up a civilian crisis management tools capable of carrying out civilian missions. The Summit emphasised that these measures were to be achieved in the line of the CFSP and help to bolster the EU's external relations. The 2000 Nice Summit defined the EU capabilities in the military and civilian crisis management aspect in the ESDP. It also established the following permanent structures to empower the EU to assume a fully crisis management actor: the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee of the European Union and the Military Staff of the European Union. The Summit delineated clearly that the ESDP did not establish an European army (Rutten 2001: 8-9, 82-83, 170-171).

In 2003, the European Council approved the European Security Strategy (ESS) which "provides the conceptual framework" for the CFSP (EEAS). The divergence among the member states over the issue of US invasion in Iraq called for a need to cooperate on creating a strategic vision that will reinforce cohesiveness in the EU. Thus the ESS determines the "security environment" (EEAS) of the EU and outlines keys threats posed to Europe: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime (ESS 2003: 3-4). The ESS (2003: 7-8) acknowledges the imperative need of Europe to be surrounded by countries that are well-governed, and in this context its neighbourhood – Balkans, Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean – gains importance and by promoting good governance, the EU can "enjoy close and cooperative relations". Although the EU has made progress in forming a coherent foreign policy, but it does not match up to what is expected of the EU, and therefore the Union "need(s) to be more active, more coherent and more capable" (ESS 2003: 11). The document also emphasises on international cooperation and partnerships to tackle the threats identified as they are shared by all. The 2008 review of the ESS (2008: 5, 9) added new issues to be considered: cyber security, energy security, and climate change. With a changing security environment, the review stresses for a more effective EU with better capabilities.

For the EU to gain more political weight in the international sphere, a major change to the CFSP was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The treaty abolished the three pillars system. The European community was replaced by the EU which takes on a legal attribute. This bestows on the EU with rights in the international arena, such as it can enter into international agreements and organisations (European Commission 2010). The legal personality of the EU certainly bolsters its functioning as an

international actor. To further strengthen its coherence at the international level, the treaty created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which combines the two posts of the Council of Ministers' High Representative of CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations (Staab 2011: 157). The High Representative (HR) is double hat: he/she not only officiates the Foreign Affairs Council, but also holds the position of Vice-President of the Commission (TEU, Article 18.3 and 18.4). The HR "shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences" (TEU, Article 27.2). The HR is assisted by a new institution called as the European External Action Service (EEAS). The operation of the EEAS "shall be established by a decision of the Council" who "shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission" (TEU Article 27.3). The Treaty did not significantly alter the decision-making process which is still based on "the European Council and the Council acting unanimously" unless the European Council allows the Council to act by a qualified majority on certain grounds (TEU Article 31.1 and 31.2). The treaty introduces the change of the ESDP into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and gradually progress towards a common European defence. The Lisbon Treaty's objective was to enable the EU to speak with one voice in the international forum (Staab 2011: 158).

3.0.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Foreign Policy Tool

As the study deals with EU's relation with its southern neighbourhood, it is important to understand one of the main foreign policy instruments that govern the relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The various enlargement phases of the EEC/EU, especially the 2004 enlargement, resulted in the regional organisation edging closer to volatile and unstable neighbouring countries. With each new enlargement, the EU wanted to avoid new dividing lines between the expanding Union and its neighbours, instead encourage prosperity and stability in the new borders (European Commission 2003; EEAS: 4). A new foreign policy initiative took the shape of the Wider Europe spearheaded by the EU HR Javier Solana and Chirs Pattern, member of European Commission. The Wider Europe narrative fledged into a policy named the Neighbourhood Policy and later changed to the European

Neighbourhood Policy (Casier 2010: 99). Casier (2010: 100) describes the ENP as a "regional foreign policy" directed towards enhancing relations with the neighbours of the EU without granting membership of the EU. The European Commission (2004 a: 3) states that the:

"objectives of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned...and offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation".

It further asserts that the ENP's aim is to be surrounded by a ring of countries that adheres to values of the EU, and progressively integrating the countries' economic and political structure based on that of the Union. The Action Plans of the ENP precisely endeavour to realise this vision (European Commission 2004 a: 5). The ENP is targeted to sixteen countries: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan form the eastern neighbourhood; Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine Authority and Syria comprise the southern neighbourhood. The ENP provides financial assistance to the ENP countries if they comply with transformative reforms in the areas identified by the ENP (Staab 2011: 156-157).

The ENP provided for the EU a framework to pursue its structural foreign policy (Casier 2010: 102). Keukeleire and Delreux (2015: 44-45) explain that structural foreign policy influences structures which could be at the level of society, region or international. The goal behind shaping of the structure is to have an enduring effect, so that it can persist even without external support. In this context, the EU through the ENP attempts to shape the immediate external environment in accordance to its values and image. The EU equipped itself with the toolbox such as the Action Plan with each ENP country, financial assistance through the incentive based approach of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and other multilateral initiatives like Eastern Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean – all these are to assist the ENP countries to mould according to EU's influence.

The sections in the chapter upto now have shown the development of the EU foreign policy and the various changes that have taken place to enhance the foreign policy capabilities and render the Union an effective international actor. The ENP being a

foreign policy tool helps the EU deal with its external relations concerning the neighbourhood. The next sections analyse the EU's engagement with its southern neighbourhood prior to the Arab Spring, and how effective the policy instruments are in dealing with the Mediterranean countries.

3.1 The EEC Policies towards the Southern Mediterranean

In the case of the MENA region which has "serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts" (ESS 2003: 8) the EU's interest lies in constantly engaging with the region. The geographical proximity of the MENA region to the EU, has earned it a nomenclature of "backyard" of Europe, therefore instability in the region has a direct impact on the EU (Dagci 2007: 179). Hence it is crucial for the Union to build a constructive relation with its southern neighbourhood. Even before the EU came about, the EEC had established relations with the Southern Mediterranean. The Declaration of Intend which was annexed to the Rome Treaty was the start of the relations between MENA region and the EC. The said declaration stated to give Morocco, Tunisia and Libya special engagement. It was not until 1969 that cooperation agreements were signed with Morocco and Tunisia, and trade agreements were concluded with Israel in 1964, Lebanon in 1965 and Egypt in 1972. In 1972, a meaningful policy was drawn where the Mediterranean countries were concerned: the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). The objectives of the GMP were to a limited opening of the European market to the agricultural and industrial products of the Mediterranean, and it was also aimed to boost trade from Europe to the MENA. From 1972 to 1990, the GMP did not enhance to any regional cooperation in the Mediterranean (the countries themselves lacked such an interest) and did not overcome the economic disparity between the two regions (Dagci 2007; Khader 2013: 180, 14).

The Euro-Arab Dialogue (1973-1989) came about with Yom Kippur War and oil crisis in 1973. This was an initiative taken by the Arabs, and the Europeans gladly welcomed it as they were concerned over oil supply at moderate pricing. With the oil crisis, Europe realised the extent to which they were dependent on the MENA countries for meeting their energy demands. The objectives perceived by both sides in this dialogue were different: whereas the Europeans were looking for profits in economic and energy sectors, the Arab countries on the other hand were preoccupied

with having a consistent European policy concerning Palestine. Both their objectives were met: Europe got uninterrupted oil supplies and the opening of Arab markets for European exports; the Venice Declaration of 1980 by the EEC acknowledged the right of self-government of the Palestinians. The Dialogue took a backseat with the unfolding of other events[17] in the 1980s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, French President Mitterrand to counter Germany's role in the east, tried to revive the Dialogue and thereby increase the role of France in the south, but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait permanently defunct the Dialogue. By dealing with the Arab regimes in this multilateral forum, the Europeans were indirectly supporting the authoritarian regimes. Although issues on human rights and democracy surfaced, they were always put aside as the regime did not welcome foreign interference, and the Europeans were busy with commercial interests (Khader 2013: 12-13).

In the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990-1996), the EEC increased funds accessible to the region, and an amount was kept for regional project such as courses in training, studies, environmental protection etc. There was further opening of access to the European market. Earlier the civil society was sidelined, but in this initiative there was an attempt to establish people-to-people contact and thereby engage with societal actors. It also covered questions of human rights, democracy promotion and environment. As the policy did not bring about any significant development, it was merely perceived as a continuation of previous initiatives, and a need was felt for overhauling the EuroMed relations. Spain suggested of forming a Euro-Maghreb free trade area and this was agreed by the European Council, but crisis in Algeria and the EU-Libya problem stalled the progress. Later the EC proposed to extend this initiative to the rest of the region. The European Council asked the Commission to inspect the current framework for the region, and accordingly draw up a policy that will revitalise the EU-Mediterranean relationship. The Commission came up with a Euro-Mediterranean Association. In 1994, Spain along with France and Italy were authorised to convene a meeting of the Mediterranean countries and the EU member states. In 1995, a conference between twelve Mediterranean countries[18] and the then

[17] Events such as the Arab countries isolating Egypt, invasion of Israel in Lebanon, dip in oil price, internal concerns of the EEC with second and third enlargements and setting up of Single Market Treaty.

[18] The twelve Mediterranean countries in the Barcelona Process: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and plus Malta, Cyprus and Turkey which later joined the EU.

fifteen EU members culminated into adopting the Barcelona Declaration which established the Barcelona Process or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Khader 2013; Salama 2005: 58-59).

3.2 The EU's Policies towards the Southern Mediterranean

3.2.0 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

From the general pattern of bilateral relation between the Mediterranean countries and the EU, the EMP was different in the sense that it incorporated a multilateral cooperation in areas such as energy, agriculture, tourism and encouraged a bilateral cooperation in the form of association agreements. It further signified 'partnership' between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) (Dagci 2007; Hollis 2012: 181, 82). The EMP was based on "joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity" (EEAS). This partnership chartered out three dimensions: the political and security dialogue envisaged to create an area of peace and stability based on democracy, human rights and sustainable development; economic and financial partnership aimed at establishing a free trade area by 2010 and shared economic prosperity; and the objective of social, cultural and human partnership was to promote intercultural ties and assist in the interaction with civil society (EEAS).

The end of the Cold War called for the EU to re-evaluate its relationship with the southern neighbourhood which mostly experienced political instability and therefore posed threat to security of Europe. The threat perceived was not the military kind, but non-traditional threats such as organised crime, religious extremism, terrorism and migration arising from feeble economic performance. To achieve stability, the political and security dialogue was created and it consisted of three aspects: state commitments, bilateral relations and security cooperation. As regarding the first aspect, states are expected to behave in certain normative manners such as respect human rights, rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms, pluralism etc. A new agenda was included in the EU's relation with the MPC: certain normative clauses, especially human rights and democracy have been placed as a fundamental factor in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA). Portugal had challenged the EU's competence to insert such clauses, but the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled by stating that human rights make up one of the goals of the Union's

development policy. Even in the CFSP, these values are mentioned as one of the aims, and the norms are also objectives that the member states are asked to pursue by the Treaty of Nice when dealing with third states. By projecting the principles that it is based upon in its external relations, the EU has come to be known as a normative actor. Bilateral relations, the second aspect, which deals with relations between individual states, asks the countries to refrain from interfering in internal matters of other states, not to use force against another, and respect a state's territorial integrity. Security Cooperation, the third aspect, concerns with tackling terrorism, organised crime, drugs and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Migration problems are dealt in the third basket of the EMP in which better cooperation with MPC is facilitated. The political dialogue is considered important because it enables the EMP members to express their concerns and provides the MPC with a voice. However, critics argue that there is no two-way dialogue taking place, but rather the EU is the only one speaking. The MPC on the other hand are just interest to avail of the financial assistance (Salama 2005; Vourgidi 2013: 62-66, 13).

The CFSP adopts policy instruments such as joint actions, common positions and common strategies. The latter has to outline the time frame, objectives and means used in member states common interest area. A Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region was adopted in 2000 by the European Council. The said strategy delineates the objectives pursued by the EU in the various baskets of the Barcelona Process. The EU covers a broad set of objectives dealing with democracy, rule of law and human rights; political and security elements; economy; social aspects, environment and justice and home affairs. Apart from the policy reasserts the EU's commitment to the Partnership, and bringing issues of migration under the JHA, the strategy adds no new input to the EMP (Salama 2005: 68-69).

The objectives outlined in the economic basket of the EMP follow as "acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the EuroMediterranean region; encouragement of regional cooperation and integration" (Barcelona Declaration 1995). The means to achieve them is by "the progressive establishment of a free-trade area; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas; and a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners"

(Barcelona Declaration 1995). For the MPC, the EU has been the principle trading partner (see Figure 2) and occupies the first place in MPC's imports and exports (European Commission 2004 b: 2). This economic relations is based on market principles, and the Declaration links "promotion of free trade with institutional adjustment"

Figure 2: MPC Merchandise Trade with the EU and the World (EUR bn)



Source: European Commission (2015)

(Salama 2005). The bilateral EMAA worked out the details to negotiate a free trade (FTA) wherein tariff barriers were eliminated from manufactured goods so that there are no custom duties on MPC's export to EU market. But in the case of agricultural products for which the MPC enjoy a comparative advantage gradual liberalisation was the tactic as southern member states were against the competition they would face (Hollis 2012: 83). Since the 1970s many of the Mediterranean countries' industrial products had free access to the EU market, but their opening up of the domestic market posed grave problems as they are unable to face the competitiveness of the EU products. This resulted in eroding the small sized business and subsequently leading to unemployment which was one of the reasons for the Arab Spring. What is observed is that the EU is the one to benefit in the EMAA (Salama 2005: 74). The EU's financial support to the region is through the MEDA which is an instrument providing technical and financial assistance to the region (European Commission 2007 a). The financial aid is tied with conditionality "as regards structural reforms, macroeconomic

stabilisation, industrial development and social advancement, or the outcome of cooperation under the new Association Agreements" and human rights (MEDA Regulation 2000: Article 5.3). From 1995 to 1999 the money allocated in MEDA was 3435 Euro, and there was a marginal increase to 5350 Euro for the period 2000 to 2006. This was seen as inadequate amount for developing the MPC.

Although the EMP was believed to be a comprehensive framework that professed to transform the Mediterranean "into a shared geopolitical strategic and economic space" by tackling the social and economic problems that renders the region unstable (Hollis 2012: 82). However, the EMP did not take into cognisance the asymmetric institutional set-up: on the one hand the EU was a successful regional organisation based on common values and interests, and on the other hand no such integration remotely existed in its southern neighbourhood. Therefore the EMP was not really a partnership, rather two groups of state trying to cooperate with the Union at the helm of affairs. The EU aspired that the southern neighbourhood would emulate its Project and gradually integrate as a region. While one of the reason for the EU's prosperity resulted from the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, yet that logic lacked in the EMP: the Europeans held on to their comparative advantages as seen in the agricultural sector, and restricted movement of labour from the neighbourhood (Hollis 2012: 83). What one observes is that the EU is covertly concerned with restricting the flow of migration which has been an issue since Europe had closed migration in the 1970s. Unwanted migration is also one of the destabilising factors, so by improving the economy of the MPC, and thereby increasing prosperity, EU hoped to stem the migration flow. This is where the cooperation of the Mediterranean regimes was required. For being able to pursue its security interest, the EU has repeatedly ignored the gross abuse of human rights and restriction on political participation by the Mediterranean regimes inspite of stipulating the need to respect such norms (Dias 2014: 39). The EU has never stalled the bilateral relations despite it being an essential element in the EMP and conditionality required in the EMAA. Khader (2013: 26) points out that what was a "cooperative security strategy" was turning into "policies of security cooperation". This shift was noticeable with the onslaught of Algerian crisis, but became more pronounced with the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood garnering substantial votes, and the ultimately the Hamas' victory in Palestine in 2006. The fear of Islamic

parties gaining power, lead the EU to prioritise its security interests over democracy promotion. In this regard, the EU putting aside its normative characteristics takes on a more realist perspective when it comes to safeguarding Europe's security and stability which are its primary interests. The authoritarian regimes took advantage of this fear by portraying themselves as a defence against the rise of fundamentalism and keeping irregular immigrants off the northern shore of the Mediterranean. These regimes benefitted on two accounts: access to financial aid and the external legitimacy they badly needed.

3.2.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy

After 9/11, there was an enhancement of the security discourse towards the Mediterranean taking the shape of the ESS in 2003 and ENP in 2004. The ESS (2003: 7) talks of geography being important and that "neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourished, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders" present troubles for Europe. The EU enlargement brought it closer to the volatile countries in its neighbourhood, and as pointed out by the ESS, they pose "soft security" problems for the Union, therefore the EU's "borders...cannot be separated from questions regarding the Union's security" (Aliboni 2005; Browning and Joenniemi 2008: 1, 520). Earlier, to maintain stability along its frontiers the EU had used the carrot of future membership, but since the enlargement fatigue the Union's faced the dilemma of how to promote stability and security in its neighbourhood without the promise of membership. Consequently the ENP, a foreign policy instrument, was established to achieve these goals and develop "a ring of friends" (European Commission 2003: 4). The ENP is: "buil(t) on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development." (European Commission 2004 a: 3)

While the EMP is a multilateral partnership, the ENP is an EU-centric policy focusing on bilateral relations with the Mediterranean Partners[19] (Vourgidi 2013: 14). Aliboni (2009: 16-17) observes that with a view to reinforce Europe's security, the objective

[19] The ENP Mediterranean Partners are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine Authority and Syria.

of the ENP is to shape the political and economic structure closer to the EU line in return for increased resources and cooperation. He further explains that the ENP endeavours to shape the Mediterranean region in the context of EMP security concepts. In other words the EU is developing policies aimed to maintain as Wolfers (1962) called "milieu goals" – shaping the environment. Apart from the latter, Wolfers adds the "possession goals": goals which affirm a country's interest, such as in the case of EU the restriction of illegal immigration, cooperation with the authoritarian governments for readmission agreements. Where it concerns political reform, the ENP assumes that the two shores of the Mediterranean share values such as respect for human rights and democracy, therefore by setting a common ground to negotiate reforms that are adjusted to each partner through bilateral talks. Reforms then take place through the Action Plans. There is a problem that arises where the assumption of shared values are concerned, for the regimes of the Mediterranean Partners do not support ideologically the principles of democracy or respect human rights. In the EMP framework, the regimes opposed reforms that challenged their power, and the attitude is similar in the ENP framework (Aliboni 2009: 18-22). The EU leaders would assess the progress of each partner and redistribute the resources to those who took up reforms and political liberalisation. Thus they hoped that just like the way Central and Eastern European countries had hastened to reform, the incentive would lead to competition among the Mediterranean countries and thereby expedite political change, but that logic did not work (Youngs 2006: 2). After the US invasion in Iraq, the authoritarian governments in the Southern Mediterranean have become stubborn about reforms. Reforms can only be successful if the MPC is willing which they are not, therefore the ENP has not seen any major success on that front. Apart from encouraging political change to have well-governed neighbours surrounding the EU, conflict resolution is another objective to safeguard EU security. Tocci (2007: 126) analysed five neighbourhood conflicts and concludes that conflict resolution of the ENP is poor, and this is due to the weakness in the CFSP. The MPC went along with EU's new policy initiative, because the ENP assured more aid and access to its market which are too vital to ignore (Aliboni 2009; Hollis 2012: 23, 86).

The ENP's main instrument is the Action Plans. The European Commission (2007: 3) emphasises that "the bilateral frameworks of the ENP are better suited to promoting internal reforms, while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework provides the

regional context”. The Action Plans aim at tying down the Mediterranean Partners closer to the EU. There are six reform areas identified in the Action Plan: political, economic, market regulation, justice and home affairs, infrastructure, and civil society. The ENP also talks of realising a deeper free trade area (DFTA) but still denies advantages over agricultural trade and labour movement. When implementing the Action Plans, the EU is caught between realising its interest and promoting values: while the Union advocates democracy and respecting human rights, at the same time it wants to secure its economic and energy interest and cooperate to tackle non-traditional threats with the very regimes towards which it aims political reforms. Hence the Union appears reluctant to apply negative conditionality when the Mediterranean regimes violet human rights (Pace, 2009: 32-35). The EU remained trapped in what is known as democratisation-stabilisation dilemma (Khader 2013: 28). In fact, the EU has often collaborated with the authoritarian regimes and side stepped the reformist forces in the Arab societies (Young 2006: 5). The ENP is far from being altruistic, although the terms like “common interest”, “mutual interest”, “shared neighbourhood” are couched in the documents, it adheres to the geopolitical logic (Marchetti 2006: 16).

3.2.2 The Union for the Mediterranean

When the ENP was launched, there was confusion as to how it would affect and correspond with the EMP, whether it will replace the initiative. The relations with the Southern Mediterranean got even more convoluted with the introduction of another policy-instrument known as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (Pace 2009: 32). The UfM was the brainchild of President Sarkozy. Initially Sarkozy had proposed that only those European partners that had direct stake in the Mediterranean affairs due to their geographical proximity and historical links were to be involved in the project. Spain perceived it as a move by France to undermine its role in the creation of the EMP; Germany was furious with France for undermining European solidarity; Britain and Sweden who had propelled the first steps towards creating the ENP were sceptic concerning this initiative in which there would be an increased EU spending without them having a say; and Turkey was suspicious that it was a stratagem devised by France to keep it out of the EU. After the Franco-German summit in March 2008, the UfM was Europeanised and it was the re-launch of the EMP which was recognised to be a failure in meeting its goals (Hollis 2011 and 2012: 38, 87). Bicchi (2011: 4)

explains that the UfM is supposed to "relate to an already well-established set of practices and roles" and it incorporates both change and continuity. She further elucidates on why the actors are motivated to join such a process the answer of which lies in the age long reasons of security, migration, energy, Arab-Israeli conflict and development; they remained the top priorities in whichever initiative launched.

The UfM comprised all EMP member plus more[20] and after some tough negotiation with Israel, the Arab League become a permanent observer in the new framework. Co-presidency was introduced whereby a state from both the EU and the Mediterranean would preside over the UfM thereby establishing greater balance between the two regions. The first two years of co-presidency was held by President Sarkozy and Mubarak who later became an embarrassment when he was ousted during the Arab Spring. A new secretariat located in Spain would deal with projects that the UfM has set in areas of economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture (EEAS). These new dimensions were meant to endow the UfM with a higher profile than its predecessor by shifting from partnership to intergovernmental level, but they simply proved to increase bureaucratic work, cost, and focused more on "state-to-state diplomacy" (Hollis 2012: 88) rather than encouraging business and civil society engagement. Although the EMP saw little success in transforming the region as its normative agenda aspired to, the UfM virtually had no reform goals and was more centred around politics of stability (Balfour 2009; Hollis 2012: 99-104, 89).

The UfM did not turn out to be the "project of projects" as expected, it was not founded on "a collective analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Barcelona Process, but was a product of bluster and horse-trading" (Emerson 2008; Schumacher 2009: 2, 7). The first year of the UfM saw the framework paralysed by the Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2008. The initiative was designed in such a manner as to keep sensitive matters away from the EuroMed relation, focused on projects such as water management, solar energy, education and small business. The sense of regionalism it endeavoured to create hardly had any sense in terms of geography, for by including the Balkan countries with the Mediterranean ones in the UfM did not amount to a coherent policy as the former was not part of the EMP. The very raison d'être of the

[20] The EMP which was comprised of the 27 member states of EU plus Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Turkey, and additions were Mauritania and Albania. The UfM includes all of them in addition to Monaco, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

UfM is to deal with issues that have a trans-Mediterranean characterisation like the problem of illegal migration which takes a security dimension. One observes that the European policy towards its southern neighbourhood takes on an "exclusionist approach to security". The Frontex, EU's borders agency, has been negotiating agreements on the subject of returning migrants back to the Mediterranean countries. The Justice and Home Affairs of EU has taken up the task of bolstering the security capacity of the Mediterranean regimes, and has encouraged a "surveillance and control approach of security". The objective of democracy promotion and human rights that was found in the EMP was rolled back by the UfM. The EU is found to be reluctant in engaging with the Islamist opposition in Southern Mediterranean countries due to the securitisation of fundamentalism. The EU is seen to drift away from the objective of being surrounded by well-governed states, and is now seeking to be hemmed by a "ring of firmly governed states" (Kausch and Youngs 2009: 963-967).

3.3 Conclusion

The European security agenda has been preoccupied with issues such as instability, migration, ethnic conflicts, terrorism etc. The ESS 2003 clearly states that unstable countries in the periphery of the EU pose threat for the Union. Hence, policies towards the Mediterranean are driven by threat perception in the EU (Kienzle 2013: 41) as the southern neighbourhood is one of the most volatile regions of the world. Europe perceives the Arab region on the one hand as a source of energy and huge market, and on the other hand as a dangerous and unstable area. Therefore, the policies pursued by the EU towards the region were mostly driven by energy, access to a larger market and security concerns since the last few decades, be it the Global Mediterranean Policy, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy or the Union for the Mediterranean. In addition, many of these policies were conducted simultaneously. Although the other value laden objectives such as rule of law, democracy promotion, human rights on which the EU is based upon, find themselves in the Union's official documents, there exists an inconsistency between practice and rhetoric. One observes that these values are set aside for more realpolitik issues. The Europeans value the crucial stabilisation offered by the authoritarian regimes in the

MENA region, and therefore are hesitant to risk this for normative values like democracy or human rights (Khader, 2013; Kausch and Youngs 2009: 9, 974).

This stabilisation-democratisation dilemma that the EU faces stems from the dichotomy of projecting normative values and at the same time pursuing realist interest. The EU behaves in a realist manner when its core interest – security – is at stake, and as the southern neighbourhood poses non-traditional threats which can destabilise Europe and compromise its security, the Union forgoes the normative agenda and acts in a rational manner. As Cavatorta and Rivetti (2014: 621) point out that "much greater evidence suggesting that goals and instruments of the EU respond to traditional realist interests" for the Union's perception of the Southern Mediterranean is driven by threats.

This was the approach of the EU towards its policy formulation in the Southern Mediterranean prior to the Arab Spring. Security of Europe and stability in its southern neighbourhood were the major concerns behind the EU policies, therefore the study gathers that political reforms were encouraged as long as they did not hinder the stability of the region. The outbreak of the Arab Spring destabilised the MENA which has rendered the region in a flux. The next chapter gauges the Union's policy response to the uprising and whether there has been any paradigm shift in the EU's approach to the region.

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CHAPTER IV

THE EU'S POLICIES TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

The EU has time and again stressed for having a ring of well-governed countries in its neighbourhood which would ensure stability in the MENA region and security for Europe. But as Kausch and Youngs (2009: 967) pointed out that the southern neighbourhood regimes were characterised by tight control over the system rather than making democratic reforms which was to the interest of the EU as it provided the stability that the regional organisation was seeking. Before the Arab Spring, the EU's policies towards the region that only saw further authoritarian entrenchment were based on the notion of achieving stability by endorsing the status quo. This approach was due to the fact that the geographical proximity between the two regions rendered the EU vulnerable to the spill-over-effects of volatility arising from networks of organised criminal activity, terrorism, migration, disruption of energy and merchandise trade and other such non-traditional threats leading to instability. Therefore, the twin goals of achieving democratisation and stabilisation were considered incompatible, and the former was increasingly relinquished to ensure the latter. However, the onslaught of the Arab Spring has called into question the EU's policies towards the MENA region. With the fall of its long standing allies and the popular protests gaining ground throughout North Africa and the Middle East, the EU needed to re-evaluate its approach towards the region.

This chapter analyses the various policy-instruments the Union has created to increase its competence in responding to the changing configuration in the Southern Mediterranean brought about by the Arab Spring, and how it has managed to bridge the gap between democratisation and stabilisation.

4.0 The EU's Initial Reaction to the Arab Spring

With the unfolding of the Arab Spring in the MENA region the traditional authoritarian allies of the EU imploded. Inspite of being in such close geographical proximity of the Southern Mediterranean, the decades of dealing with the region and being aware of the socio-economic conditions, the uprisings caught the EU by

surprise. The regional organisation was preoccupied not only with the revamping of the EU that was taking place with the coming in force of the Lisbon Treaty, but also with the Eurozone crisis which kept it embroiled with internal matters and thus overlooked the bubble of frustration that was simmering for long in the Mediterranean region. Hollis (2012: 81) argues that since the EU policies toward its southern neighbourhood have persisted in featuring the normative values of democracy promotion, rule of law, pluralism and respecting human rights in its effort to reform the region, therefore when the revolts broke out in the MENA region where the people were demanding for dignity, justice and freedom, the logical conclusion would have been for the EU to welcome the pro-democracy movement which would have helped attain its goal. On the contrary, the EU perceived the protest as Dias (2014: 46) points out to be a security challenge where there was a threat from massive illegal migration, an increase risk of terrorism and destabilisation of energy supplies (Przybylska-Maszner 2011:124). Hence the initial reaction of the Union was one of hesitation, uncertainty (Sasnal 2012: 14), “frustratingly slow” (Echagüe et al . 2011: 329), “too weak, too divided and essentially incoherent” (Koenig 2012: 12-13). These reactions should be understood in the context of EU’s propensity for regional stability and also the division of interest the member states exhibited towards the region, and therefore the EU institutions were side lined, being incapable to formulate a common policy (Behr 2012a: 78-79).

While the US took the “case-by-case” approach, the EU resorted to the “wait and see” approach in addressing the revolts. In the case of Tunisia, after the self-immolation of Bouazizi, when uprisings spread across the country, in a weak statement dated 10 January 2011, the EU merely “call(ed) for restraint in the use of force...release of detained people who peacefully demonstrated in Tunisia” (European Union 2011a). France specifically was supportive of the Tunisian regime till the extent of the French Foreign Minister suggesting dispatching Special Forces to help the Tunisian government to reinforce order. The French Agriculture Minister maintained that President Ben Ali to be “someone who is often misjudged...it’s not a country that has known any real difficulties” (Phillips 2011). Only when France renounced its support to the regime, the EU responded to the violence perpetuated by the Ben Ali’s regime and that too after nearly a month from the start of the revolts. The EU was cautious in its dealings with the situation until it realised that the protest was turning into a

revolution, after which the Union backed the Tunisians fight for dignity and democracy and showed the "willingness to help find lasting democratic solutions to the ongoing crisis" (European Union 2011b). Europe certainly did not expect President Mubarak's regime to collapse like Ben Ali's regime. In the case of Egypt too, the Europeans did not immediately support the people's aspiration, only when the US declared that Mubarak should resign then immediately Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain issued a statement for transition of power in Egypt. Again Europe was divided when it came to Libya where a NATO intervention was sanctioned in 2011 by a UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 which was mainly led by France and Britain. Germany abstained from the UNSC 1973 and did not contribute to the military intervention. Out of the twenty-seven member states, only eleven contributed to the mission. The EU took some measures to tackle the Syrian crisis: it stopped all forms of cooperation from Association Agreements which were to be ratified to freezing assistance from the European Investment Bank, and it recognised the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as representing the people of Syria. The EU did not take up any measures in Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen and Iraq, but articulated the need for reforms in Morocco and Jordan (Metawe 2013; Behr 2012a: 143-146, 99).

The impotence of the EU to act coherently made Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament, to remark that the EU has failed to take the opportunity offered by the Arab Spring to be a relevant actor in its neighbourhood. The inability of the EU to act quickly and coherently where the Arab uprisings were concerned, is due to the fact that its member states have their own interests in the MENA region which do not always conform to the Union's approach (Viilup 2011). Even though the prevailing approach of the EU was to "wait and see", some countries, in particular the southern EU member states took to asserting their interest as they are the ones likely to face the flow of illegal migrants from the Southern Mediterranean and were against strong statements by the EU (Metawe 2013: 150). There were already disagreements between Italy, France and other member states concerning the entry of twenty-thousand Tunisian migrants in the Italian island of Lampedusa. In fact southern member states like Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Greece that were affected by large number of migrant influx demanded support from the EU, but got no concrete response. So the Italian government issued visas to the migrants which allowed them

to travel to other EU countries in the Schengen zone, the nearest being France. These countries pressured the EU to re-evaluate the Schengen system following Arab migrant crisis (Euronews 2011).

When revolts broke out and violence erupted between the people and their regimes, the EU was concerned about the potential influx of migrants. In a European Council Declaration (2011a: 1-3) the first nine points were about the Union's apprehensions and aspirations concerning the revolutionary changes taking place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, but the next points are dedicated to migration problems in which the EU "will continue to monitor closely the impact of events on migratory movements" and it also calls upon the member states to increase "financial and technical support to improve the control and management of borders and measures to facilitate the return of migrants to their countries of origin" (European Council 2011: 4). Barrinha (2013: 209) remarks that the EU's mindset remains the same as was characterised in the EuroMed relations after the Cold War.

However, when the uprisings were gaining ground across the MENA region, the European Council issued a declaration in which it iterated the EU's "full support to the transition processes towards democratic governance, pluralism, improved opportunities for economic prosperity and social inclusion, and strengthened regional stability" (European Council 2011: 1). It further promised a new partnership that would involve concrete support to those states that take up political and economic reforms. The European Council (2011: 2) called on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) to formulate measures to help the EU in bolstering the transitioning process in the Southern Mediterranean countries by "strengthening democratic institutions, promoting democratic governance and social justice, and assisting... (in) free and fair elections". The HR/VP highlighted that events in the Mediterranean showed that the notion of "old stability" had not worked and that a new "stainable stability" was needed along with "deep democracy: political reform, elections, institution building, fight against corruption, independent judiciary and support to civil society" (EU High Representative 2011: 2). In his speech, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, talks of showing humility about the past, and that "Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many...fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes

were guarantee of stability in the region". He also advised to avoid "a blanket approach" at all cost as each of the MENA countries was different. The Commissioner points out that fifteen years since start of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the European leaders have to do more "to address long-standing frustrations in essential areas including the most sensitive ones, such as migration, mobility or market access" (European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy 2011: 2, 4).

Despite these declarations paving the way for the EU to revise its policies towards its southern neighbourhood, divisions among the member-states persisted pertaining to the funding of the ENP. While the southern EU member states – Spain, France, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia – proposed to shift resources from the eastern neighbourhood to the southern neighbourhood, the northern EU member states opposed the geographical redistribution and instead supported the idea of Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister, who recommended to divert funds within the ENP framework for democracy promotion and human rights. Disagreements also persisted concerning the funding of the UfM, because the member states were not keen to finance an institution that showed signs of failing. Finally a temporary compromise was worked out where Germany, France and Spain combined would finance half the money, and the rest of the funding would be provided by the EU. Finally the EU member states managed to arrive on a broad agreement over assisting in the democratic developments taking place in Southern Mediterranean. This stems from an understanding that the autocratic regimes could no longer generate stability; as a matter of fact they were the cause of the instability shaking the MENA region. Hence, it was in the EU's interest to support the democratic transitioning process (Behr 2012a: 80-82 and 2012b: 2).

4.1 The EU's New and Renewed Policies

The Arab Spring posed as a litmus test for the post-Lisbon foreign policy capabilities of the EU. For the European External Action Service (EEAS) which had just about started being operational in January 2011, the first foreign policy test was the Arab uprisings. It had in the Arab Spring a daunting task to coordinate policies without actually having appointed officials or prior experiences to rely upon (Wouters and Duquet, 2013: 19). The protests in the Arab region have revealed the shortcoming and

double-standard in the EU policies towards the area, notably how the policies have prioritised economic gains, containing migration and in general ensure Europe's security at the expense of the fundamental values the Union espouses for. As the HR/VP (2011: 2) indicates that it is in the EU's interest to have a democratic transformation in the Mediterranean and it needs to act on that interest through the means of sustainable stability. Therefore the revised initiatives towards the EU's southern neighbourhood are built upon four dimensions: new policy-instruments to enhance democracy-building, conditionality which is more refined, recognising differentiated approach towards the Mediterranean countries, and emphasising on the need for sustainable socio-economic development (Balfour 2012a: 29-30). Following sections will analyse the introduction of various policy-instruments the EU has formulated in response to the Arab Spring.

4.1.0 Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity

In March 2011, the EU's first response came in the form of Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PDSP) which was jointly proposed by the European Commission and the EEAS. The PDSP portrays itself as an innovative and "qualitative step forward" (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 2) not only in the EU's relations with its southern neighbourhood, but also as a paradigm shift in "the EU's strategic policy objectives for its external relations are conceived and pursued" (Teti 2012: 267). The PDSP is built on three elements: the first one is democratic transformation and institution-building which focuses on fundamental freedoms, reforming the constitution and judiciary, and tackling corruption; the second element consist of stronger partnership with the people emphasising support to civil society; and the third element is about sustainable and inclusive growth aiming to support economic development and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The communication stresses the need for political and economic reform which must work together and "help deliver political rights and freedoms, accountability and participation". The PDSP is an incentive-based approach which is founded on differentiation known as "more for more": those states which reform faster get more support from the EU; for those states that stall on reforms "support will be relocated". It also emphasises on "a commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections" which should be "the entry qualification for the Partnership" (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 3, 5).

The communication presents policy changes under five headings:

- The first heading “democracy and institutional building” deals with “democratic and constitutional reform processes” like public administration reforms, improving the judiciary, fighting corruption and enhancing transparency which would help to increase foreign and domestic economic investments. It further aims to increase support to civil society, for it can contribute on building democracy and be a major instrument to check on government excesses (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 5-6).
- The second heading “tackling the challenges of mobility” centres on capacity building and increasing funding for the southern neighbourhood countries to manage their borders, preventing illegal migration and human trafficking, readmission of the irregular migrants, fights cross-border organised crimes, and in general to ameliorate security throughout the region. In return the EU will facilitate visa for legal migration to students, researchers and business people (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 6-7).
- The third point “promoting inclusive economic development” focuses on boosting SMEs which play an important role in creating jobs (unemployment of youths being one of the main reasons behind the Arab Spring) and training systems. The PDSP offers funding through the European Investment Bank (EIB) which is to increase to one billion Euro and if the member states agree, funding will also be channelled through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which was not earlier active in the southern region (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 7-8).
- The fourth section is “ensuring maximum impact of trade and investment”. The EU which already grants free market access to the Mediterranean Partner Countries’ industrial products, proposes in this Partnership to “upgrade preferential market access for agricultural and fisheries products”. Additionally, it desires to conclude an agreement on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules, and further negotiate a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) which should focus on closer integration between the EU single market and the MPC’s economies, and not merely eliminating import duties (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 8-9).

- The fifth heading suggests for "enhancing sectoral co-operation". The document points out the strategic importance of the southern neighbourhood in terms of energy supplies, and therefore desires "to open a credible perspective for the integration of the Southern Mediterranean in the EU's internal energy market based on differentiated...approach". In the distant future, it aspires to form an "EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community". Apart from the energy sector, enhancement of cooperation is chalked out in the areas of agriculture and rural development, education, tourism, transport and electronic communications technologies (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 10).

After enumerating various measures to be taken into account, under the "regional and sub-regional implications" section the communication deals with political issues. It draws attention to the importance of regional cooperation to check negative spillovers, and that the EU should collaborate closely with the MPC to assist in political and social change. The UfM was a positive step towards that direction, but the EU recognises that it "did not deliver the results we expected" and needs to reform in turn to be a "catalyst" to bring around countries, private sectors and financial institutions together to generate jobs and growth. The UfM framework should create the right conditions in the progress of the Middle East Peace Process which is vital to change the region's dynamics. The HR/VP and the Commission are given a bigger role to play in the UfM in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty. The document concludes with promising more funds to the tune of 4 billion EUR which is available from 2011 till the end of 2013 under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The Commission will maintain to "leverage loans" from EIB and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) through the medium of Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) which arranges for the necessary funds for investment in infrastructure and private sector development (European Commission and HR/VP 2011: 11-12).

4.1.1 Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy

In May 2011, soon after the PDSP was presented, the HR/VP and the Commission introduced another document titled *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European Neighbourhood Policy*. This was a revised approach of the 2004 ENP taking into account the changes that have occurred in the last few years in

the neighbourhoods. The EU not known to be an actor for rapid response and action, was fortunate to have been reviewing its ENP since the summer of 2010. So when the protests broke out in the Southern Mediterranean region , Commissioner for enlargement and ENP Štefan Füle recognised the need to review the ENP to be able to respond to the political changes occurring in the region (Colombo and Tocci 2012: 84). The renewed ENP admits that its efforts in bringing about political reforms have met with "limited results" and highlights the need of the EU to "rise to the historical challenges in (its) neighbourhood". The ENP's new approach is founded on "mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law". It proposes closer integration in political and economic fields with the MPC focusing on "governance reforms, security, conflict-resolution matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on issues of common interest" (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 1-2).

The objectives of the reviewed ENP are to: a) to engage with the partner countries in "building deep democracy" that last; b) assist in developing an inclusive economy; c) strengthen the ENP's two regions to better cooperate with the EU on identified areas; d) facilitate instruments for achieving theses aims. The renewed approach does not present a pre-modelled political reform, but asks the partner countries to reform in accordance to the universal values that the ENP stands for. The EU support to these countries will be modified accordingly on what is known as the differentiated approach. The support is conditional based on the concept of 'more-for-more': meaning the faster a partner country takes to reforms, it benefits increased funding, greater market access and mobility. In countries where reforms are limited or have not taken place, the EU will re-evaluate its relation with the concern country and "even reduce funding". States that degrade democracy and violate human rights, the EU "will uphold its policy of curtailing relations" and use sanctions and other targeted measures. However, the Union will keep channels open for discussion with various actors of the country (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 2-3).

The refreshed ENP identified four areas of renewed cooperation:

- The first consist of support for "progress towards deep democracy". The document espouses for building "deep and sustainable democracy" based just not a regular free and fair elections, but other elements such as freedom of expression and

association, rule of law governed by an independent judiciary, and security and armed forces under democratic control, all of which strengthens democracy which lasts. Civil society is an important component of democracy, for it becomes a necessary medium through which society can express their concern and hold the government accountable. In this context, the ENP introduces two new democratisation tools: a European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and Civil Society Facility (CSF). The former endeavours to support local actors such as trade unions, non-registered Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other social actors engaged in democratic change. The latter instrument seeks to help civil society organisations (CSOs) "to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes". The CSF will fund projects led by civil society in the ENP context. The communication turns its attention to political and security cooperation by outlining that conflicts in the partner countries pose a "serious security challenge to the whole region" affecting large populations, breeding radicalisation and a major problem to constructive reforms and that "EU geopolitical, economic and security interests are directly affected by continuing instability". The EU intends to enhance its role in solving conflicts. Other than conflict resolution, the Union also addresses other security concerns like energy and resources security, fighting organised crime, terrorism and drugs, for which it proposes to involve the partner countries to "undertake joint actions" in international forums (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 4-6).

- The second area deals with "sustainable economic and social development". The communication will continue to reinforce the MPC to adopt policies that cater to inclusive growth. To create jobs and boost growth, important factor is to create conducive business environment and promote SMEs. The Macro-Financial Assistance tool will help the neighbours to tackle short-term balance of payment problems specially those countries facing political turmoil. The DCFTA will work towards "gradual dismantling of trade barriers" and piecemeal economic integration. Based on the more-for-more approach, collaboration and exchange will be intensified in the areas of knowledge and innovation space, climate change, renewable energy, transport, maritime affairs and information and communication technologies. Although the document agrees that labour mobility is important for economic development and as the European society is aging, a labour shortage will

develop which can be filled by the educated and talented workers from the neighbourhood. However, it also takes into account huge problem that irregular migrants pose, therefore tackling "irregular migration is essential to reduce the human suffering and diminished security that is generated". Mobility Partnerships frameworks endeavours to assure that migration is well-managed through facilitating legal migration, increasing capacity for border controls, handle irregular migration, and return of migrants to their homeland. Such agreements would require on the part of the two regions' countries to cooperate with the EU on migration, mobility and security (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 7-12).

- The third area is about building "effective regional partnerships" in the ENP framework. For the eastern dimension of the ENP, the communication reiterates strengthening of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), while for the southern dimension it reaffirms the commitments espoused in the PDSP, and also talks of the need to revitalise the UfM (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 13, 17).
- The last section with the ENP Action Plans which is the framework for cooperation. The EU recommends the partner countries to "focus on limited number of short and medium-term priorities, incorporating more precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions". With the establishment of a new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the EU will fund these initiatives (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 18).

The communication concludes by highlighting the opportunities that the EU neighbourhood offers in terms of markets, energy security and large educated and working population. Cooperation and integration is mutually beneficial between both the neighbourhoods and the EU. It stresses on how cooperation helps to tackle threats such as terrorism and irregular migration which are sources of instability in the region. The aim is to have a "democratic, prosperous and stable region" (European Commission and HR/VP 2011b: 21).

4.1.2 The Three Ms: Money, Mobility and Market

The two communications outlined above have three main policy goals known as HR/VP Catherine Ashton's '3 Ms': money, mobility and market:

Money: the EU was trying to offer more financial aid and thereby "cushion the socio-economic repercussions of the upheavals" (Asseburg 2013:56). One such financial

instrument was the Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) committing a budget of 350 million EUR during the period of 2011-2012. The creation of another tool, the CSF in the reviewed ENP which aims to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations, has a package of 26.4 million EUR for 2011. Another commitment of 30 million EUR is promised through the Erasmus Mundus for the academic year 2011-2012 for financing researchers and students wishing to study in the EU. Apart from establishing these new tools of funding, the EU has added 1.2 billion EUR which is available through ENPI to an existing budget of 5.7 billion EUR for its neighbourhood for the period of 2011-2013. The EIB provides additional lending capacity upto 1 billion EUR to the southern region, besides a 4 billion EUR that was made available before the Arab Spring. As mentioned in the above sections, the mandate of the EBRD was extended to the southern neighbourhood and was to provide 2.5 billion EUR annually for financing infrastructure projects and establishing business (European Commission 2011a; Asseburg 2013; Dennison 2013: 2, 123-124, 56-57).

Mobility: package concerns with facilitating movement of certain category of people from the Mediterranean partner countries. Mobility Partnerships which were to be concurred at the political level between the concerned Southern Mediterranean partner country, the EU and the member states, increased legal migration for professional groups and enhanced support for border control and migration management. In return, the partner countries have to cooperate in tackling human trafficking and irregular migration. Further, mobility was facilitated by the expansion of Erasmus Mundus scholarships and exchanges (European Commission 2011a; Wouters and Duquet 2013: 2, 37-38).

Market: package dealt with increasing access to EU single market for the partner countries. The emphasis is given to the DCFTA, objective of that which is to go beyond removing trade barriers to focus on progressive integration of economies and regulatory convergence. Effort is also being made in trade liberalisation on fisheries and agricultural products for which the southern partner countries hold a comparative advantage. The EU to move forward on this issue, it would need the support of member states that are not keen on having those sectors liberalised. In August 2011, along with Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau , a German bank, a new scheme called

SANAD[21] was launched for a total of 20 million EUR targeting SMEs in the MENA region. The G8 Deauville Partnership, in which the EU is a major player, has endeavoured to stabilise the southern neighbouring countries' economies by pledging 20 billion EUR (European Commission 2011a; Ghoneim et al. 2012; Wouters and Duquet 2013: 3-4, 35-37).

4.2 The EU's Policy to the MENA: Continuity or Change

These various policy-instruments are meant to show a paradigm shift in the EU's policies towards its southern neighbourhood and thereby define a new role for the Union in the MENA region after the Arab Spring. The question is whether these policy changes have brought about the qualitative shift much needed in the relations between the two regions. Khader (2013: 37) is of the opinion that the two communications policy goals of 3 Ms do not constitute a "real new response". Heydemann (2012) is of the view that the stress on money, mobility and market access which are not very substantial, demonstrates that the EU has not fully comprehended the degree of change taking place in the region. The principle of more-for-more which is a "carrot policy" means more reforms will result in more rewards, and this "shift to carrots rather than sticks" observes Oxfam Report (2011: 5) is not really new as in 2003 Commissioner Chris Patten had launched the Democracy Facility which also incentivised reform, but the initiative was less than successful. Although a step forward is taken by the policies which talk of more conditionality and benefits, and better engagement with civil society which was completely neglected in EMP, missing in ENP and altogether left out in UfM; the communications also emphasise on dealing with the Southern Mediterranean countries based on differentiation, encouraging inclusive growth and sustainable democracy, but they are also trapped in security concerns just like in previous policies.

The ENP, Colombo and Tocci (2012: 90) observe is "trapped in the logic of enlargement and of security" impeding the benefits that is available. The Commission and the HR/VP have proposed to implement DCFTA which required the trade standards of the partner countries to harmonise with that of the EU. Although there might be a slim chance of EU membership for the eastern partners, there exists no such prospect for the southern partners, therefore to pay such a heavy price for

[21] Arabic for support

harmonisation is not worth the pains when the ultimate carrot of membership is absent, plus the southern neighbours have no such desire to be members of the EU. If the EU is serious about reforms then it should contemplate on liberalising the agricultural and fishery products, facilitating entry of the southern neighbours' vegetable, fruit, wine and oil, then the EU is actually putting forth appealing carrots. Concerning the mobility partnerships incentive which is supposed to be a "valuable offer", yet the rationale behind the proposal is security driven. Only if the southern partner countries adhere to security requisites concerning readmission and beefing up border controls, the EU then offers limited mobility to professional people. To conjoin the legal movement of people with cooperation on readmission reveals the EU's underlying priority concerning the immigration policy which largely remains unaltered. Tocci and Cassarino (2011: 16) also point out that mobility partnerships benefit the EU more than its southern neighbours as visa facilitation is aimed at professional groups that cater to the labour requirements of the EU and does little for the development of those countries. Furthermore, the member states engage in mobility partnerships in their bilateral relations with the Mediterranean countries, therefore these partnerships at the EU level do not increase the incentives.

Colombo and Tocci (2012: 91) point out that there is a "logic of vagueness" that hampers the effectiveness of conditionality. There are hardly any indications provided as to how the EU will benchmark and monitor the conditionality. They press their argument further by stating that benchmarking to the EU standards will not necessarily match the "needs and expectations" of the southern neighbourhood countries. Balfour (2012b: 25) notes that there lies a paradox in the mechanism of positive conditionality that is to be implemented in countries that are making significant efforts at reform like Tunisia, and also demands reform from status-quo countries like Algeria. This implies that policy of conditionality is pertinent only to the extent the southern partner countries are interested in the incentives that are offered and prepared to implement the required reforms. Tunisia has been more open to EU involvement than say Egypt or Syria. To gain from the incentives, they need to be delivered and the EU member states have been reluctant in lifting protectionist barriers in sectors that matters most to the Southern Mediterranean countries. Even when incentives are handed, not all countries of the region are interested in them, such as Algeria and Libya that are energy exporting countries to the EU and trade relations

weigh in their favour. As a matter of fact, the policy documents do not tackle the issue of how to involve countries that are not interest in engaging in a relation with the EU. While accession countries efforts are rewarded with granting of the EU membership and the developing countries rely greatly on the Union's aid package, the EU has no insignificant incentive to offer to the MENA countries. In fact, the regional organisation is "often demandeurs from the region" concerning curbing of irregular migrants or energy exports (Balfour 2012b: 19, 25-27).

Mutual accountability is another guiding principle to bring in equal footing in the two regions relationship, and its purpose is also to induce the EU to stick to its promises. Whereas the regional organisation has the mechanisms to apply negative conditionality to goad the MENA region countries to reform, there are no such procedures for the partner countries to hold the EU accountable for its actions. This shows who is at the driving seat in the relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean (Balfour 2012b; Khader 2013: 26, 37).

Another area of contestation is the new policy tools: EED and CSF. In the case of the former which is meant to support emergence of civil society along with trade unions, political parties, and non-registered NGOs. The question arises as to how it will be an added value to an already existing instrument like the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Another point of enquiry is how will it collaborate and coordinate with prevailing actors in the field like American National Democratic Institute or German political foundations. As for the latter, the EU had earlier frameworks promised to hold dialogue with the MENA region's civil society, but there emerged no real impact as the issue was mostly sidelined giving priority to security concerns. The EED and CSF aim is to support the principle of 'deep demcoracy', but it raises the questions as to which groups to support, whether to support faith based parties, and what is to be done when electoral results in the MENA countries do not meet up to the EU expectation specially concerning its key priorities such as when Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian election. As the southern neighbours become more democratic, they are going to be more assertive about their identity, the relations with the EU and the position they take up in the world affairs which might go against European interest (Oxfam 2011; Colombo and Tocci 2012; Balfour 2012a: 8-9, 92, 33-34).

The EU re-emphasis on civil society is good news, but remains insufficient as the Union, remarks Colombo and Tocci (2012: 92) is entrapped in a "logic of insularity". The Barcelona Process days are no more when the EU aspired to create a "common Euro-Med home". The EU is not the sole actor in the region, new and old actors now permeate the Arab world, which the EU has to take into account. These are the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and China. The Union continues to function as if it acts in a vacuum without weighing the moves of the actors engaged in the region. The EU needs to synergise with the other external actors, specially the US and Turkey, to have an effective policy towards the southern neighbourhood (Tocci and Cassarino 2011: 21).

After comparing the EU policies towards its southern neighbourhood of two eras before and after the Arab Spring, the impression is one of repetitiveness: the old policies have been worded anew and the illusion of change has been prepped up by creating tools that have overlapping functions with prior ones. Teti (2012: 279) remarks that the new policies that document the EU's reaction to the Arab Spring "suggest considerable scepticism regarding the claims to a qualitative break with earlier policy strategy". The reviewed ENP and the PDSP articulate "rhetorical variation on themes" that are found in pre-Arab Spring policy documents (Teti 2012; Teti et al. 2013: 279, 75). Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 134) are of the view that "there is not much change in how the EU is attempting to prescribe the future direction of these Arab revolts" and that there is no real "serious reflections on lessons learnt from past mistakes of supporting authoritarian regimes in the name of stability at the expense of the protection of human rights and civil liberties". Teti et al. (2013) have analysed the EU's policies pre- and post-Arab Spring and found that there is no significant difference between the two periods. When one looks at Figure 3, there is a marked gap between the Expected Outcome vector and the Actual Policy Outcome vector – this shows that there has been no real change in the EU policies after the Arab Spring impact. There will always be a gap between the vision laid out in the documents and the outcome of that vision as is shown between the Actual Policy vector and Expected Outcome vector. Since there is already a lowering of expectation of the policies stated in the documents, when the Actual Policy Outcome vector does not match up with Expected Outcome vector, it clearly indicated that there has been

no shift in the way the EU perceives the Southern Mediterranean – perception is security driven.

Figure 3: The EU’s Degree of Policy Change

Source: Self-made Graphic Representation (Bava 2015)

The EU readjusted policies rather than doing a complete revision. What the EU is trying to do is revamp its relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries by tweaking the policy-instruments rather than reassessing the nature of relations between the two regions (Balfour 2012b: 8). Teti (2012: 280) affirms that the common perception of the EU is of an entity that is ever ready to support the autocratic regimes making cosmetic reforms, therefore such policy continuations will “likely erode the EU’s claims to be a normative actor, a wholehearted supporter of democracy...in the Mediterranean region”. Although the revision depicts the EU’s good intention, it however does not “reconcile with the reality of pragmatism” that the Union continues to demonstrate towards the Southern Mediterranean, thereby exhibiting “a strong degree of continuity with pre-Arab Spring policies” (Balfour 2012a: 33).

4.3 Stabilisation-Democratisation Dilemma

The EU has been trapped in between two contradictory requirements of security concerning the southern neighbourhood: the first is the need of encouraging good governance which is seen as a long-term solution to deal with soft security threats, and the second one is the need for political stability of the regimes to cooperate with the EU in combating organised crime, terrorism, tackling irregular migration and importantly to ensure secure energy trade to prevent oil and gas prices from rising (Issac 2011: 5). Since the EMP days, due to varying interest the goals of democratisation and security have been conflict-ridden. The lack of democracy in the MENA region was identified as one of the main causes of instability, therefore the EU concluded that promoting democracy was to its own interest. Many activists were disappointed in the inconsistency that the EU exhibited when implementing the human rights and democratisation policies . Jünemann (2003: 7) indicates that this inconsistency arises because the EU's democracy promotion is not a goal by itself but rather a means to attain stability objectives. This becomes evident when democratisation goal comes in conflict with security interests. "Rapid process of democratisation" in the region can lead to violent conflicts, and since the EU's main objective is stability, it does not want any upheavals that destabilises the southern neighbourhood. Therefore, Jünemann (2003: 7, 18) is of the view that democratisation-stabilisation dilemma is not something new, but only a "structural deficit" of the EMP. The author further explains that since September 11, the democratisation-stabilisation dilemma has come to favour stability.

While the EU's normative agenda has favoured for advocating values of democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights, its security and economic interests have instead preferred stability. The authoritarian regimes of MENA region played on the EU's dilemma by asserting that the Union had an option of either supporting "gradual regime-led reforms" or face the rise of Islamic parties and regional instability. Apprehensive about strengthening Islamic fundamentalism, the European leaders chose to support western oriented autocratic regimes which would be a bulwark against Islamic forces and other non-traditional threats (Behr and Genugten 2011: 95-96). The extent to which conditionality has corresponded with the EU's objectives and priorities in the MENA region have been debatable, creating the problem of harmonising stability aims and transformative aims, the contraposition of which was

highlighted with the onslaught of the Arab uprising (Balfour 2012b: 19). The MENA region has known to be and continues to be one of the most authoritarian regions in the world. The lack of democratic reforms in the region has not restrained the EU from cooperating with the regimes so long as security and stability were assured . For decades, inspite of security and stability prevailing over the region , when the protests erupted they could not withstand the outbreak that spilled across North Africa and the Middle East (Börzel et al. 2014: 4).

Grimm and Leininger (2012: 392) note that an actor in international politics can at the same time pursue "competing objectives". As there is no prototype of pursuing successful democracy promotion, the actors have addressed democratisation from the perspective of "all good things go together". The actors incorporate in their democratisation foreign policy an amalgamation of objectives such as stability, prosperity, peace, rule of law, freedom which they believe could be contributive to democracy promotion. Many of them have presumed that security building and economic assistance will only supplement to democratisation. However, that has not been the case as "not all good things do necessarily go together" (Grimm and Leininger 2012: 392). The EU has been one such actor that has integrated a mixture of objectives that are security driven and simultaneous endeavours to achieve democratisation in its southern neighbourhood

How has the EU perceived the Arab Spring? Whether it has regarded the events as risks or opportunities? As mentioned in the above sections, the EU first perceived the Arab uprisings as a challenge to its security concerns, only later it welcomed the pro-democracy movements when it realised they were gearing towards revolution. The EU has been vacillating as regards the question of opportunity and risk, for the Arab Spring has not put an end to the "strategic and security considerations" in the EuroMed relations (Issac 2011: 5). The Union did perceive the uprisings as an opportunity for democratic transformation and has taken the initiative to revise and renew its earlier policies, thereby promoting its model of good governance and extending its sphere of influence in its southern neighbourhood. However, the EU is also concerned about the risks that has arisen causing political instability, rise of Islamic parties, increased migration flow, and threat to trade and accessing energy resources. Hence, even after the Arab Spring there has not been any shift in the EU's democratisation-stabilisation dilemma. Grimm and Leininger (2012: 405-406)

enumerative four ways to deal with when conflict of objectives arise: one way is to take no action and simply go on with policy-making; the second option is to prioritise the goals; the third way is to sequence the objectives that are most important to the least important; the last option is to compromise whereby the actor balances out the goals and combines them in the policy. The study observes that the Union is aware of its conflict of goals, and it covertly prioritises the objective of achieving stability in the region. According to observers and academics, there exists a dichotomy in the EU's foreign policy actorness, but the dilemma is resolved when core interests are at stake as the EU is seen to focus on interests rather than norms.

Although the EU sees promotion of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights as long term strategies for ensuring peace and prosperity. Any dramatic effort or rapid initiative on behalf of the EU for democratic transformation in the region will necessitate instability involving violent conflict of which the outcomes remain uncertain, and this exactly the opposite of what the ENP attempts to achieve. This democratisation-stabilisation dilemma requires the EU to prioritise its goal , and thereby putting security first (Börzel et al . 2014:7). An actor's foreign policy in the international political arena is driven by the pressures of the external environment, but the outcome of the behaviour is not determined by the structure, rather the actor makes a rational choice of what action to pursue. In this context, instability arising from its southern neighbourhood poses non-traditional threats to the EU security. Therefore when there is a threat to security, all other foreign policy goals become secondary and security concerns take over as the primary interest of the EU. As the non-traditional threats have further increased after the Arab Spring and aggravated with the rise of ISIS threat, the EU's democracy-stability dilemma will prioritise the latter when the question of Europe's security is at stake. This behaviour of the EU is also seen in its policy formulation in response to the Arab Spring: the core interests are not compromised. In conclusion the policies in the MENA region have been shaped by the EU's primary interest to ensure Europe's security and stability rather than normative concerns of democracy promotion.

4.4 A Realist or Normative EU in the Southern Mediterranean

While initially the EU viewed the Arab Spring event in the MENA region as an opportunity to take up democracy reforms, soon concerns for stability and security

replaced the Union's enthusiasm. With chaos unfolding in Libya and Egypt, a raging civil war in Syria, and suppressing revolution in Bahrain, the EU veered towards giving priority to issues of security and stability (Dandashly 2014: 39). Massive numbers of irregular migrants arriving at the other shore of the Mediterranean "worrying both EU officials fearing political consequences in forthcoming elections[22] and human rights advocates concerned about deaths at sea and other abuses of vulnerable migrants" (Daragahi and Spiegel 2013).

The EU's low profile in the Arab Spring raises many questions about its normative image. Its initial response to the uprising has been weak, and its reviewed policies have not significantly bolstered its profile in the southern neighbourhood as they do not translate differently from pre-Arab Spring policies. Part of the answer lies in the financial crisis that the EU has to deal with and additionally the deepening process that was taking place with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force. All of this required the Union to focus internally. Another reason is the individual interest of the member states in the various Arab countries which lead to a confused and incoherent reaction on the part of the EU. However, security and strategic considerations were the major part of the EU's weak response. Since last two decades, these considerations have shaped much of the EU's Mediterranean policies. With the outbreak of revolts in the region, the security concerns did not diminish, but rather prevail strongly in the EuroMed relations and appear to persist in the EU's renewed policies being evident in three ways: flow of irregular migrants, energy concerns and rise of political Islam (Isaac 2011: 13-14).

The Arab Spring has seen a massive displacement of people, many whom have fled to neighbouring states, but thousands have landed on the shore of Europe. In 2011, there was a substantial increase from 2010 of irregular migrants fleeing from the region and coming to Europe (see Figure 4). Around 20,000 Tunisians reached the Italian island of Lampedusa from 2011 January to March. In the second quarter of the year, the numbers of illegal migrants dropped to 75 percent as Tunisia and Italy signed repatriation agreement. The pressure of migration dropped when the Gaddafi regime collapsed and in 2012 detection of migrants remained low. Again there was a rise of migratory pressure in 2013, but it reached a staggering number in 2014 when more

[22] The 2014 European Parliamentary elections

than 170,000 irregular migrants arrived in Europe many whom were Syrians, Eritreans, Libyans and a number of them coming from sub-Saharan region (Frontex 2015). The European Commission (2011b: 3) remarks that while the EU must continue with the tradition of granting asylum, it must also create the appropriate instruments to prevent crossing over of irregular migrants along with effective EU

Figure 4: Illegal Border Crossings on the Central Mediterranean Route

Source: Frontex (2015)

border management. It also stresses the need to cooperate with the countries of MENA region to

"build on the principle of conditionality applied to migration issues in order to encourage effective commitment by [EU] partners in preventing irregular migration flows, in managing their borders efficiently and in cooperating on the return and readmission of irregular migrants." (European Commission 2011b: 3-4)

The period before the Arab Spring, a big amount of aid funding had gone into tackling migration and combating terrorism. The EU and its member states are seen to be taking action that are detrimental to democracy promotion. The regimes in the Arab region with no democratic reform credibility are perceived to be assisted by the EU for cooperation in migration control and counter-terrorism activities (Ziadeh 2009: 7). One such example is the 2008 Treaty of Friendship that concluded between Libya and

Italy which Ana Gomes, a Member of European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence and of the Foreign Affairs Committee, describes as "a sad example of the effectiveness of this closed-doors and push-back policy: in exchange for $5 billion over 20 years, the Gaddafi regime ensured – almost overnight – that immigrants stopped arriving on Italian shores" (Gomes 2011: 27).

Energy concern of the EU is another indicator that security interest prevails in the reviewed policies. The EU imports around 30.36 percent of oil from the MENA region (see Figure 5). The southern EU member states are very much dependent on the gas reserves of Libya, Algeria and Egypt. Italy's largest supplier of gas and oil is Libya and that is why it was alarmed when there was disruption of the supply due to the revolts. Half of non-European gas to Europe is provided by Algeria, a country that has largely remained unperturbed by the revolts, through the pipelines Maghreb-Europe and Trans-Med (Isaac 2011: 17). Algeria is the third largest foreign gas supplier after Russia and Norway (see Figure 6). In Germany, gas prices rose from 1.49 EUR per litre to 1.57 EUR per litre in 2011 when production slowed down in Libya (Dohmen et al. 2011). It has always been in the EU's interest to ensure safe energy flow to Europe whereby the prices would remain stable. Therefore energy security has been a crucial factor in the EuroMed relations (see Figure 7). The conditionality principle of the EU did not work with the Arab countries that played a major role in supplying energy to the Union. Cooperation with the MENA countries after the Arab Spring has been securitised (Youngs 2015: 8).

Figure 5: The EU's Oil Imports from the World (2011)

Source: Isaac (2011: 19)

Figure 6: Natural Gas Imports of the EU, 2013 (% of total imports)



Source: Youngs (2015: 3)

Figure 7: Crude Oil Imports of the EU, 2013 (% of total imports)



Source: Youngs (2015: 3)

Concern for access to energy sources explains why across Europe there was the fear that protests would breakout in Algeria and even in the Middle East, hence "oil prices could reach new all-time highs, which could have disastrous effects on growth and employment in Europe" (Dohmen et al. 2011). Energy related sanctions are detrimental to the EU interest which relies on the MENA region for its oil and gas

supply. The EU's foreign policy places the neighbourhood as a priority area where its external energy policy is concerned (Balfour 2012a: 35).

The third indicator of persisting security concern in the renewed policy is the rise of political Islam. Issac (2011: 18) notes that "the Arab Spring turned out to be an Islamic winter". The authoritarian regimes were trying to suppress the Islamic parties prior to the Arab uprising. The surge of moderate and radical forms of political Islam irrespective of how democratic they are, sent alarm bells ringing in the EU in concern to what their external orientation is going to be. In pre-Arab Spring period when Hamas and Hezbollah came to power through legislative election in Gaza and Lebanon respectively, the EU was not ready to accept their victory. Tocci and Cassarino (2011: 6) observe that

> "these Islamist inroads through democratic processes triggered the abandonment of what had been a rather superficial and ill-thought out embrace of democracy by the West in the post-9/11 world, reverting back to comfortable notion of cooperation with authoritarian (but pro-Western) regimes."

As long as these concerns remain, security and strategic considerations will dominate the EU agenda for the Southern Mediterranean. The prevailing instability in the MENA region and plus its strategic location renders the EU vulnerable to spill-over effects across the borders and hence adopts a realist perspective vis-à-vis its southern neighbourhood.

The EU promotes the values that the European Project is founded upon in its foreign policy, and that has lead to the interpretation of what Manners has attributed the EU to be a normative power. No doubt the EU incorporates values in its external relations as is observed in its Mediterranean policies, even through its normative dealings the Union is pursuing its own security interests: the interest behind democracy promotion is not simply based for the larger good of the MENA region, but because democratisation in the long-term will usher in stability in a most conflict prone region thereby reducing non-traditional threats and spill over of instability from the southern neighbourhood borders . Tömmel (2012: 34-35) points out two motives of the EU behind the democratic norms in the Mediterranean policy: first, democratisation is a preferred choice around which to build consensus among the member states, and secondly, it gives legitimacy to the EU's action in the eyes of the world. The EU on

this basis seeks realist policy goals like checking irregular migration, controlling borders, securing trade routes and energy supply and other security interest. On the whole, the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean is based on a composite of normative and realist elements: all the three majors policies – EMP, ENP, UfM – have a combination of both normative and realist objectives, although what is observed is that over the years and specially after 9/11 the normative agenda is relegated in the background as security concerns take over the EuroMed relations . Tömmel further continues that the new responses of the EU have elements of both the perspectives, but that does not entail that the EU is affirming its normative power in the region; rather it is being "more assertive" towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbours.

4.5 Conclusion

After analysing the new policies of the EU in response to the Arab Spring, the outcome is that they do not drastically differ from the previous policies. They are just more EU jargons which are couched in new packaging. The incentives offered are more about the EU's security interest rather than about building a constructive partnership. This approach poses a contradiction to the EU's normative identity projection. In the context of the southern neighbourhood, the EU can be better understood as a realist actor aiming to safeguard its security interest either through milieu shaping its southern neighbourhood through values which is a long-term solution to instability or by the means of its soft power, cooperate with the authoritarian regimes to prevent non-traditional threats like irregular migration, terrorism or organised crime from spilling across the southern neighbourhood borders into Europe and thereby undermining security of Europe. What is observed is that conditions laid out in the policies reflect on how the region should be based on the EU's vision. The Union should make out the difference that whereas in the late 1980s and early 1990s the political transformation in the Central and Eastern European countries meant a return to Europe, but for the Arabs, the ouster of the dictatorial regimes did not imply that notion. In fact, they do not want Western concept enforced on them. Hence, the EU needs to understand that the Arab Spring is just not about demanding democracy, dignity and human rights, but also a shift away from post-colonial era where the new regimes establish national autonomy and pursue their national interests. This is somehow not reflected in the new policies which have

altogether not succeeded in making a paradigm shift in the Union's relations with the southern neighbourhood. As Colombo and Tocci (2012: 71) aptly describe the new policies as "old wine in new bottles".

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The popular uprising known as the Arab Spring that unleashed across North Africa and the Middle East was unprecedented both in magnitude and scale. While other regions around the world experienced democratic transition, the MENA region remained an anomaly when it came to democratic reforms. The Arab world has been dominated by authoritarian regimes that control all branches of the state and curb all kinds of freedom, from expression and association to political participation. Various scholars have attributed the region's democracy deficit to Islam which in their opinion is incompatible with democracy. But this logic is rejected as there are examples of Muslim countries practicing democracy. The other reason for the region's lack of democracy has been ascribed to the paucity in economic development. Modernisation theory argues that economic advancement results in participatory form of government as increased number of specialised professionals tilt the power equation against the elites, bring about greater income equality in addition to meeting basic medical needs. All of these provide the citizens with the necessary frame of mind to advocate for freedom and self-expression. However, this argument too is discredited as countries with similar level of development as the Arab countries, function on the principles of democracy. Thus the central problem lies in the economic structure of the MENA countries. These states are rentier states implying that large revenues are amassed from foreign aid or actors to keep the states functioning. The Arab states that export oil and gas derive over 70 percent of revenues which go directly to central state coffers. For the non-resource rich Arab countries, the foreign aid acts like oil meaning it is a source of rent income. Many of the Arab states do not levy taxes from their citizens who are not involved in generating their countries' wealth, and hence these regimes do not feel answerable to their people. Although in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, the autocratic regimes did make some cosmetic changes, primarily in liberalising to a certain measure the economy. This was done as a survival strategy to pacify the frustration of the people due to economic deterioration, and violation of human rights.

With the flow of information and education, there was a growing desire among the people of the MENA region to have access to more freedom and be part of the decision-making process. The gap that existed between their aspiration and fulfilment of their desire had lead to a growing dissatisfaction against the regime. This was additionally aggravated by the false promises made by the regimes that assured better days when in reality human security was being compromised by the very governments and it further plummeted with the 2008 global financial crisis. In December 2010, the situation in the MENA region took a dramatic turn when a street vendor set himself ablaze in a final protest against the autocratic regimes. This inflamed the mounting frustration of the people resulting in a rapid spread of revolts across the region. The revolts culminated into the implosion of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan and Yemenis regimes, while other states took to announcing reforms, increasing welfare spending and giving cash handouts. The Arab uprising uncovered the fragility of the authoritarian states which were not backed by the legitimacy of the people, and it also exposed the socio-economic problems that were simmering under the coercive regimes.

The enthusiasm that was expressed in the backdrop of the Arab Spring which saw pro-democracy movements sweeping across the MENA region, has now turned into what many scholars call the Arab Winter. The case of Tunisia is not a norm, but an exception. Infact, the study has found that the Arab Spring has resulted in mixed outcomes: while some countries like Morocco and Jordan have stepped up political, economic and social reforms, protests in Algeria and Lebanon have not consolidated to any change, and as for the GCC countries, the aftermath of the Arab Spring has seen a tightening of political control. Five years since the beginning of the uprisings in 2010, the Mediterranean region can only count for two democracies, Tunisia and Israel, otherwise according to the Freedom House findings, the rest of the countries are either “not free” or “partly free”. This indicates a shrinking of the political space. With the ongoing civil war between the Syrian regime and the opposition, the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region, the extremists group of ISIS controlling large swaths of Iraqi and Syrian lands, on the whole there prevails uncertainty that presides over the political development in the Arab region, and this reinforces the view that democratisation of the region has a long way to go.

Inspite of the Arab Human Development Report 2009 indicating the regressive human security condition in the MENA region, the entire international community was caught by surprise at the societal awakening in the Arab region. Even though the MENA happens to be the EU's southern neighbourhood, the Union was also among the other international actor that was caught unawares of the momentous event. This was due to the fact that it was embroiled with internal matters like the Eurozone crisis and the overhauling of the institutions that were taking place with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, combined with the fact that it had abandoned any hope to bring about democratic change in the region. Although the EU, which is known for its normative power, it was conspicuously absent from spearheading the pro-democracy movement in its southern neighbourhood. This behaviour of the EU arises due to several factors of which the main concern is that of security. In the EU's foreign and security policy, the immediate neighbourhood is assigned as its top priority. This stems from an understanding that the EU's security begins outside its border and by progressively integration the neighbouring countries with its political and economic systems, it promotes stability in the region. Hence, the Southern Mediterranean has emerged as an important region for the EU. The Union having a close historical, geographical and cultural links with the Mediterranean region, has been formulating policies towards the region for decades. In this context, the research examined the EU's policies towards the Southern Mediterranean before and after the Arab Spring taking into account whether the Union's action was propelled by value or interest base. The focus of the study is small as it deals with a broad policy area, rather than the EU's relation with a specific MENA country.

5.0 The EU and the MENA Region: Engaging the Neighbourhood

The research showed that the EU's main geopolitical interests in the MENA region are: economic and its total trade with the MENA is more than €450,000 million; access to energy resources, the EU is dependent on the region's natural resources to meet its energy needs and it imports 30.36 percent of oil from the MENA; and regional stability, due to the region's geographical positioning that makes it the Union's southern neighbourhood, therefore the proximity renders Europe vulnerable to spill over of non-traditional threats such as irregular migration, international terrorism, organised crime, drug, and human trafficking Taking all these factors into account, the MENA region takes on a high degree of geopolitical importance for the

EU. The unstable regions at the EU borders were referred to as area of instability and crisis. It was only with the ENP that the outlook of the Union shifted to seeing the regions as neighbourhood and as stated in the policy document as “ring of friends”. The 2003 ESS clearly states that the Southern Mediterranean is a conflict ridden zone and that this geographic area is economically stagnant and a region of social unrest. It therefore prescribes to engage in a comprehensive manner to deal with the challenges arising from the region.

During the Cold War period, the concept of security focused on the state and for providing in military terms. Consequently, the states tended to increase their military capabilities against a possible attack by the enemy and more importantly, the actors in the international arena could identify the threats. But after the end of the Cold War, there was a change in the nature of security, it become more multidimensional. Threat was not merely perceived in militarised term which is a more traditional view, rather a whole gamut of non-traditional threats arose such as international terrorism, organised crime, drug and human trafficking, and even irregular migration which can lead to ethnic and religious conflict. The concept of security has expanded since to encompass political, military, economic, societal and environmental aspects. In this context, economic, social and domestic stability questions have gained importance where state survival is concerned. For the European Project to survive and flourish, soft-security issues have become a priority concern for the EU. Considering the Southern Mediterranean’s identity thrust as one of the world’s most complex and conflict-ridden region, it is seen as a source of insecurity and instability that threatens European peace and prosperity; the EU since the 1990s, has put in place various initiatives to address these security concerns.

The study finds that although the EU identified the lack of democracy as the main cause of instability in the MENA region and has taken up to promoting values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights in its policy documents to achieve stability in the southern neighbourhood, in reality there is a yawning gap between policy design and implementation. Prior to the Arab Spring, the southern neighbourhood policies be it the EMP, ENP or the UfM – all of them had normative agenda embedded in them, but as threat to security increased, especially after 9/11, the value laden objectives took a backseat while security goals increasingly governed the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

There was an inherent fear in Europe that Muslim migrant communities which had links to the MENA region could shelter elements of Islamic fundamentalism. In fact in the 1990s, France witnessed bombings that were connected to extremism coming from the southern neighbourhood. Therefore when the EMP was signed in 1995, cooperation of the partner countries in controlling illegal migration and combating terrorism was high on the agenda of the member states. Even though normative clauses were a fundamental element in the Association Agreements, the latter was never stalled inspite of the partner countries committing gross human rights violation. The Union believed that economic reforms would lead to political transition as the authoritarian regimes' power would be restrained by professionals who would have a hand in the government policies. The EU also focused on reducing migratory pressure by assuming that economic development would generate the required jobs and thereby stem the flow of irregular migrants. Even in the economic aspect, the EU had more to gain than the Mediterranean Partner Countries as it had access to a huge market, while the latter's agricultural and fishery products were restricted in the EU single market due to the comparative advantage they had over similar products of the southern EU member states. In sum, the EMP was a policy that was used in milieu shaping the EU's southern neighbourhood closer to the regional organisation's economic and political system. As long as stability in the Southern Mediterranean prevailed, political reforms were accepted.

9/11 triggered a shift in the EU policy from multilateral to a bilateral approach by formulating the ENP. There was an effort in the Action Plans to emphasise more on democracy and human rights, but the repercussions of the war on terror lead to securitisation of terrorism. The cooperation of the dictatorial regimes was imperative to fight international terrorism. The 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings spurred an increase in collaboration on issues of security, border control and intelligence-gathering between the partner countries and the EU. The research finds that the EU by cooperating with the very regimes that have come under criticism from the population of the MENA region during the Arab Spring, has helped in perpetuating the authoritarian states at the price of human rights and democracy for their citizens. The EU's fear of Islamic fundamentalism helped to further perpetuate regimes when Hamas and Hezbollah which are regarded as terrorist organisations came to power through electoral process. The EU then seemed to retract on its engagement of

political reforms in its southern neighbourhood and return to the assured cooperation with the dictatorial regimes.

Whereas the ENP at least theoretically talked of conditions being attached to aid and market access which are linked to the credentials of reform taken up by the partner countries, the UfM sidelined political developments, conflict resolutions, democracy and human rights only to focus on promoting economic cooperation between the two regions. The key initiatives of the UfM in de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, creating maritime and land highways, civil protection to prepare and respond to disasters, alternative energy, education and supporting SMEs – all of which remain an ambition, rather than translating to reality. The UfM has failed to be projects of projects, although the framework as managed to defer the issue of political reforms. No matter what initiative is launched security, migration and energy remain the top concerns of the EU. As a result, the value laden objectives in the policy-instruments simply assume a subservient position to the security component.

While the normative aspect of the Union's actorness is for promoting the principles that it is founded upon, the realist aspect pulls the EU to focus on security, economic and energy interests and therefore the focus rests on the stability of the MENA region. The autocratic regimes of the MENA play on this dichotomy that arises from the EU's policies towards its southern neighbourhood. They allege that they are the buttress against extremism and other threats from crossing over to the European continent. And the EU chooses the lesser of evil by supporting and cooperating with these governments which are at least western oriented. It thereby gives them the much needed external legitimacy. The study shows that this dilemma of the EU between democratisation and stabilisation appears to be a structural deficit of the Union's Mediterranean policies, for its objective has always been to achieve stability in its southern neighbourhood and democracy is a long-term means to achieve that goal, while cooperating with the southern neighbours on security issues gives it an immediate result of stability. But with the Arab Spring this current stability came crumbling down, forcing the EU to re-examine its existing policies and to renew them to the changing dynamics of the region.

5.1 The EU's Response to the Arab Spring: Balancing Between Norms and Interests

Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union states that the Union has been founded on the norms of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity, and freedom which are based in a society characterised by justice, pluralism, tolerance, non-discrimination and equality of sexes. In the Article 3 of the treaty, the Union also promotes its values and interests in its external relations to protect its citizens. The people of the Arab region were fighting for the very principle that the regional organisation endorses in its treaty which gives it its identity. And yet the Union which projects itself as a normative actor failed to spearhead the pro-democratic political movement which could have consolidated its democratic promotion and respect for human rights only if it had been sincere towards those objectives. The Arab uprising did certainly impair the paradigm of stability that existed in the MENA region to the detriment of the EU. Initially the Union's reaction was one of hesitation as the protests undermined the stability of the region which in turn resulted into security challenge for Europe as non-traditional threats aggravated into massive irregular migration, destabilisation of trade and energy supplies, and augmenting the risk of terrorist activities. Even after it supported the Arab Spring, the EU's main concerned centred on the vulnerability of Europe to the increased threats emanating from a region that was in a flux. It called upon its member states to expand on the control of borders and to expedite the return of the immigrants to their homeland.

Although the EU accepted its past mistakes of supporting "old stability" and has since revised its policies towards the region, its fundamental ethos has not changed. The study found that the new policy documents of the Union rest on similar rationale as the ones in pre-Arab Spring period. After analysing the PDSP and the reviewed ENP, both these documents are entrapped in security concerns just like the earlier policies. Even though, the communications talked of positive conditionality which gives more benefits in the 3 Ms, relations with the partner countries being based on differential treatment, and increased engagement with civil society organisations – these points are not something new. Infact, these existed in the previous policies too, only they became complementary to the security issues instead of assuming priority. Security

concerns are still of primary importance in the new policies as threats have only increased with the onslaught of the Arab Spring.

The mobility partnerships between the MPC and the EU are meant to tackle migratory pressure by bolstering effective border management and cooperating in the readmission of the migrants. This is achieved through the incentive of facilitating visas for the identified professional groups. This profit the EU more than the MPC as the groups will provide the required labour to an ageing European society. Even where DCFTA is concerned, liberalisation of agricultural and fishery sectors are limited for the partner countries, and labour movement from the concerned region still remains a debatable issue. When the EU functions on the logic of free movement of goods, money, and labour, somehow this logic is lost when it comes to the southern neighbourhood. The other point which demonstrates the persisting security concern of the EU is securitising its cooperation: for example with Jordan, it has modified conditions rendering it easier for Jordan to access the EU funding, not giving much priority to political and economic reforms. With the inflow of displaced Syrians and Iraqis into Jordan, the EU has also diverted its money to help the country stabilise its frontier. The Union also risks of fortifying states that are accused of committing abuses like the military regime in Egypt with which it is contemplating on concluding an aid programme. And finally energy remains a crucial security component in the EuroMed relations for which the tool of conditionality simply becomes rhetoric as the EU depends on the region for a major supply of its energy requirements. Even the new instruments to engage with civil society, do not add value to existing ones like the EIDHR and land up with overlapping functions with prior tools. In sum, these new policies are simply repackaging of prevailing frameworks, only that they have an increased semblance of normative components, but in reality the Union has ensured its pragmatic approach to the Mediterranean region. Therefore the study concludes the following deduction that the new policies of the EU towards its southern neighbourhood is shaped by its interest rather than normative agenda to safeguard its primary concerns of Europe's security and regional stability as the Arab Spring has only heightened the instability in the region.

The EU's pragmatic response to the Arab Spring is based on the rationale that when it comes to the core interests, survival and security, of an actor there is no compromise. These primary interests will supersede the secondary sets of concerns like various

political norms when there is a conflict between interests and values. Even though the EU is most often attributed with normative characteristics, it is far from moving away from realpolitik diplomacy when its fundamental interests are at stake. This is also demonstrated in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union which stipulates the EU's intention to strive towards cooperating in the international arena for "safeguarding its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity". The European leaders pursue in their foreign policy a normative agenda such as to "consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law" and to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security" (TEU, Article 21) only when Europe's security and economic interests are not threatened. Even in its value laden foreign policy the EU is interested in shaping its external milieu to establish stability in its neighbourhood. What appears as a benign intention to project its liberal values in its neighbourhood can be taken as a hegemonic behaviour couching its interest in universalist language by proclaiming what is good for itself is also good for the rest of the world. It is nothing new as E.H. Carr (2001: 71) remarked that one's interest is disguised as universal interest. In other words the EU often uses the arguments of liberal democracy and norms to enforce behaviour change in neighbouring countries.

For long now the EU's identity projection as an international actor has either been that of a civilian or a normative power, but they are just two facets of EU's actorness and as such are not enough to understand the Union's multifaceted role as an international actor. The EU also assumes a realist perspective when systemic pressures such as in this case the Arab Spring threatens its primary interests, then it makes a calculated rational choice of pursuing diplomatic realism rather than democratic idealism. The trajectory of the EU's Mediterranean policies has shown that realist actions were couched in normative language. The EU has formulated various policies towards the Southern Mediterranean which are all seen to overlap one another culminating into concentric circles. The study, after measuring across the parameter of norms and interests, concludes that the southern neighbourhood policies are build up of normative discourse, but the EU implements policies from a pragmatic space. Thus the Arab Spring has not lead to a paradigm shift in the EU's relations with its neighbourhood, for the new policies harbour the similar mindset that existed in the earlier policies.

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