


**A STUDY OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR
FROM COGNITIVE, LINGUISTIC AND PRAGMATIC
PERSPECTIVES**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of*


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(Jyortirmoy Patowari)

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Introduction

Cognition has varied aspects of representations. Language and number are of these kinds. Previous conceptions about language as an isolated phenomenon were replaced by the conceptualistic approach which was later firmly ascertained on a large scale by different experimental researches. We first experience and then conceptualise them into language and other forms of representations. Language is not just inert or solipsistic rather it depends on knowledge drawn from the world. It is beyond any doubt that only the concept of conceptualization could interpret metaphorical expressions better. Modules of thoughts are processed in the brain which is busy with monitoring other physiological sensory-motor activities of the body which stimulate and are themselves stimulated in turn by the environment.¹ By this manner environment becomes the basis of all human physical and psychological activities which subsumes the unique human faculty of language. Given this nature of cognition as the basis of language, conceptual metaphor (CM) too synchronizes with language as an intrinsic ability of meaning construction. It is to be remembered that metaphorical cognition is not only limited to language alone; in art, music, gesture and scientific reasoning as well metaphors are indispensable.

The conception that language could be treated as a possible resource of investigation to delve deep into the human mind and brain is a comparatively new trend in cognitive linguistics. For cognitive linguists, language has always been a road to the mind. Every little bit of lexical or semantic change encoded in language can reveal the state and functioning of human mind. If we follow proper methodology, we could be able to understand the hidden implication of the workings of language.

The word ‘metaphor’ was actually originated in late 15th century from French ‘*métaphore*’, via Latin from Greek ‘*metaphora*’, from ‘*metapherein*’ meaning “to transfer”. The prevalent metaphor theory was felt to be in need of some upgrade since theories in cognitive science and psychology were finding out new insights into theoretical paradigms of existing theories by readdressing and reevaluating the former dominant theories. There were stages of conspicuous development in the last 35 years of history of conceptual metaphor (CM)

¹ In the outbreak of brain study and MRI scanning in cognitive neuroscience of 90’s, the mapping of concrete and abstract concepts and their resultant ‘aesthetic’ dimensions of meaning are found more deeply grounded in the neurological implications of our sensory-motor system of brain and body.

research due to recent advancement and sophistication in methodology and experiment. The remarkable load of publications in *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* envisaged the range of study conducted in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s foregrounding not only the conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) but also validifying it by showcasing evidences from corpus data.

Comparatively these qualitative and quantitative analyses increased in large scale and in prominent degrees during these full-blown years. Naturally these approaches on different methodologies and experimentations adopted by contemporary scholars give rise to alternative hypotheses. As such there are visible incongruities in the debates and discussions among these scholars which should be resolved thoroughly and methodically from a theoretical point of view.

Conceptual metaphor theory once pioneered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980a) was advanced in favour of this new tradition of research. Since then that had been the ‘common core’ of cognitive linguistics. But possible research in this field is so complex that we have to divide our approaches into different layers including the linguistic one which has its outcome in surface representation of language. In analysing these problems we find *mapping principle*² commonly working in every aspect of meaning formation through reference, reasoning, analogy, presupposition and other discourses. Gilles Fauconnier (1997) once expressed wonder about the ever-eluding nature of language through his iceberg metaphor:

“A recurrent finding has been that visible language is only the top of the iceberg of invisible meaning construction that goes on as we think and talk. This hidden backstage cognition defines our mental and social life.” (*Mappings in Thought and Language*)

Meaning itself is not fixed. It is dynamic. It is not objective; rather it is by nature dependent on the interpreter’s social and cultural background. Meaning constructed by metaphor can be even more dynamic as it can vary every time of its use. Bound to be variable by the context, culture, the individual’s mood and time of its use, metaphorical meaning is forever enigmatic and draws critical attention from the scholars of all period of time. The pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor demands more attention from the philosophers, linguist, neurobiologist, logicians etc as its very presence is supported by the evidences found in cognitive psychology (Norman, 1988), cognitive anthropology (Hutchins, 1995) or in neurobiology (Sereno, 1991;

² A mapping, in the most general mathematical sense, is a correspondence between two sets of elements that assigns to each element of the first a counterpart of the second (Fauconnier, 1997).

Churchland, 1989; Edelman, 1992; Damasio, 1994). Edelman's (1992) account had shown some definite connections between neurobiology and cognitive linguistics. In early 1970s when cognitive linguistics came into the forefront of scientific endeavour, its main tenets were against any formalistic logic that explains phenomena like language mathematically. With the publication of works of Ronald W. Langacker (1987, 1991) together with George Lakoff (1987, 1993) the advent of cognitive linguistics began with systematic and methodical categorization of the concepts under a priori philosophical investigations. It could not be doubted that this holistic enterprise of cognitive aspects of language far surpasses the modular objective approach today so far as language as a part of cognition is concerned. The traditional concept of metaphor also got better explanation in terms of this new science. That metaphor is so basic in our thought and action submerged the earlier concept which regarded it as mere a deviation of language. With the revolutionary publication of classic work *Metaphor We Live By* (1980a) Lakoff and Johnson (L&J) tried to establish this fundamental nature of human conceptualisation in which metaphorical mapping has a very crucial role to play. They typically described the working mechanism of conceptual metaphor which highlights its key features (Xiu Yu, 2011):

- a. Mapping is unidirectional and asymmetric, from concrete to abstract concept.
- b. Mapping is partially projected.
- c. Mapping is not random or arbitrary, rather constrained by our body and its orientation with physical and cultural environment.
- d. Mechanism is systematically performed across different domains.

At some point of time it was misunderstood that metaphor is only a rhetorical device to embellish literary language and sometimes acts as a medium of language full of unnecessary confusion and pretention. Ogden Nash once attacked this type of virtuosity in the application of metaphor through his poetry:

One thing that literature would be greatly the better for
Would be a more restricted employment by authors of simile and
metaphor.

Authors of all races, be they Greeks, Teutons or Celts,
Can't seem just to say that anything is the thing it is, but have to
go out of their way to say that it is like something else.

(‘Very Like a Whale’)

Brilliantly this echoes Nash's animadversion on the use of language of adornment by authors. Basically literal meaning is the basic meaning of the concepts whereas metaphorical meaning depends on the unmatched or odd relation between the basic meanings of two concepts. Rhetorical usage and its consequent creativity may thus bypass the literal use of language by violating it; thereby making it confusing and obscure. But it is a point to be noted that figurative language could also be used as a tool to clarify facts. Moreover, it is the omnipresence of metaphor in language that we can't be devoid of in any expression.

Before we go deep into the analogies of cognitive metaphor theory, the philosophical assumptions of metaphor is to be studied first in order to have idea of the background knowledge. Tracing back to the Western tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, we know that metaphor was conceded as a rhetorical poetic device to convince the reader of what is argued by the philosopher. Acknowledging the importance of metaphor we wonder at how metaphor use was treated in ancient Greek philosophy. The pre-Socratic philosophy limited the definition of metaphor as there was infelicity in Greek lexicon to articulate abstract thoughts. Even the earliest proto-philosophers used to treat metaphor in that particular fashion to explain the myths.³

In philosophy which was all about reasoning, argumentation, precise meaning, metaphors are mostly indulged in convincing the reader in favour of the rhetor. Hence, Timothy Charles Rohrer (1998) declares in his dissertation that we need to drag the classical philosophers to the new light of assumption that metaphors are integral to thought or natural consequences of thought acknowledging the failure of classical philosophers due to their superfluous use of metaphors in their writings. The conception that metaphors are structuring our embodied patterns of reasoning making our experiences explicit is virtually on account of the waking of the pragmatists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of science and their contributions. Metaphor is also very much far from the rhetorical standpoint of allegory often handled by classical writers to underpin their model of underlying meaning. Then writers generally use allegory with a necessary awareness that they are applying metaphorical language in support of their intentional meaning.

Anyway, some objectivist views of metaphor at the early classical tradition explained inconveniences caused by metaphor in our understanding of the absolute objective truth which is independent of human subjectivity and imagination. Therefore any kind of

³ E.g. the nature of 'being' was defined in comparison with one's experience of water, air, fire etc.

psychological aspects like metaphor should be avoided to get the knowledge of a conditional absolute truth. Only categorisation of the concepts can lead us to this reality.⁴ Plato's *The Republic* instantiated the issue of total negation of metaphor in support of having more objectivity in reason (Cameron & Low, 1999). But unlike his master, for Aristotle the use of metaphor in language is unique because it could facilitate us in reflecting and expressing our ideas in terms of figure of speech in rhetorical style. This early rhetorical approach which was started from Aristotelian tradition marked metaphor in a highly prestigious term by calling it as a *trope* which veers its meaning from literal into "one not properly applicable but analogous to it" (Lanham, 1991, p. 188). It is this stylistic genre that Aristotle deemed in *Art of Rhetoric* (1926, p. 1410b) as something from which "we can best get hold of something fresh". This statement from a classical stalwart is responsible for holding such belief for a long time that metaphor is subject in question only in the field of poetry and imagination. In passing, Michel Foucault too understood the value of metaphor to designate nonliteral expressions and essentially appreciated its ornamental purpose in an attempt to catch hold of unreal beings or entities. Following the line of romantic tradition, subjectivists too resisted against Platonic concept of metaphor by calling into attention the value of human feeling and sensibility which is of utmost importance for them. Shelley, Wordsworth and other romantic poets prioritised creativity rather than reflecting or reasoning on action. Hence metaphor as a conducive tool could handle such creative psychological experience successfully.

But, metaphor cannot be bounded within the realm of stylistics alone as we get into its broader range of operations in diverse kinds of occurrences. The limitation of both of those objectivists and subjectivists was their lack of giving a full account by bridging the gap between subjective inner world and neutral objective reality. To this end, *experientialism* proposed an alternative account that reality cannot be absolute and it is always mediated by or relative to subjective phenomena of experiences. It is at this interactive stage of cognitive development that man organises his flow of thought in terms of some physical objects or experiences.

As our thoughts are really being controlled by concrete phenomena of nature, we used to categorize our thought by accumulating or multiplying the primary and secondary metaphors. In its developmental direction some metaphors become unconscious, thereby automatic. Some of these physical features are so fundamental (e.g. relation between container and

⁴ But Lakoff and Johnson argued about the quality of 'imaginative rationality' of metaphor against any existence of absolute and unconditional truth out there in the world.

content or containment and boundedness) that they come into language use without proper conscious understanding of them. For instance, the container metaphor is generally used in following expressions:

E.g.

She *came into* the house.

I think, she is *out of* Australia.

The child scampered *out* and jumped *on* the bike.

We are *engulfed with* sorrow.

He *takes out* a bottle of drink from the fridge.

These sorts of expressions are so common that people are hardly aware of the mechanism of metaphorical transfer in language. It is very evident then that experientialist account of metaphor can better explain the interrelation among thought, language and environment more clearly than any other philosophical doctrine and can show its evidences available at best from representational as well as empirical approaches associated with cognitive science.

This study as a whole tries to fill in some possible gaps in the cognitive modelling of metaphor by verifying it in a critical light of empirical research done in cognitive linguistics and psychology during the last two decades. The complexity of its functioning presents how metaphorical meaning could be generated by cognitive manipulations within and across different domains. These inferences are hypothetical since we have no direct access of how meaning is being constructed. Anyway, given the conceptual metaphorical paradigm, the whole description will study the nature and function of conceptual metaphor dividing the different layers of its realization step-by-step from cognitive configuration in domain mapping through manipulation of linguistic constraints to further understanding of its pragmatic implications in discourse.

This study differs from the previous studies as it includes examination of CMT under the light of recent theoretical and empirical studies in cognitive science as well as psychology. Some problems of this theory have already stood against the test of verifying scrutiny of critical studies of it. Hence I will discuss conceptual metaphor from different perspectives. In the literature of metaphor studies, different disciplinary takes on this subject are so diverse that it is truly difficult to form an all-rounded reasonable picture of how metaphor and mapping play a central decisive role in our language and thought. Different research directions are led by different leading scholars ever since the introduction of Lakoff's

ground-breaking work *Metaphor We Live By*. That's why, throughout this writing I have made an attempt to grasp the essential core of CMT on theoretical basis and to amalgamate different research studies together forming a well-built structure of conceptual metaphorical mapping. In fact, the novelty of this work lies in the attempt to coalesce all the mechanisms performed at the different layers of metaphorical representation together. It will also show what aspects of hidden conceptual framework and procedures are lacking in the linguistic representation. It will also take a look into how the lexical expression differently implicates or is implicated by the pragmatic functioning in a discourse.

The three basic chapters are about three consecutive fields: the cognitive, the linguistic and the pragmatic. I will address the main tenets and facets of this theoretical problematic. Though the chapters often overlap in their approach due to the topic's multi-dimensional nature, it tries to consciously structure in such a way so as to put them in separate chapters. The second chapter on cognitive aspects of metaphor discusses the nature and function of the *domains* responsible for metaphor evocation and what is their origin at all. The third chapter on linguistic analysis of metaphor focuses its partial compositional appearance. Basically, I want to trace the *grammatical organization in metaphor* rather than the *metaphorical nature of grammar*. This study underscores how grammatical compositions of the sentence evoke metaphorical transfer through the event of compatibility between semantic frames. Next chapter on pragmatic character of metaphor elaborates and exemplifies its discursive usages distinguishing its unique identity from other discursive tools as well. Pragmatic stances are problematic and confusing as usual and the theories like Relevance Theoretic model (RT) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) applied to CMT will shed more light on this obscurity in terms of meaning formation and others. These non-linguistic or extralinguistic factors are nonetheless working in this communicative information sharing. Here I will also try a little bit to discern between Metaphorical extension and non-metaphorical or metonymical inference. In the remainder 'Examples from Bangla' the study crosschecks present analysis with the available Bangla sentences and verifies whether or not the English construction patterns are valid for similar Bangla construction and usage patterns. Last but not the least, the final chapter conglomerates the entire discussion session extracting from the detailed account discussed so far and finding out a new integrated approach on this issue.

Cognitive perspective on conceptual metaphor

2.1. Introduction

In a general sense, metaphor seems to be a better instrument to utilise if we want to share the unknown abstract ideas which we could hardly communicate or talk about due to our lack of proper word. Abstract concepts like the emotional states of mind are getting reflected in the metaphorical expressions as one has to have something to be compared with in parallel to account for all these unspeakable cases. But it is also true that metaphorical expressions are only the tip of the whole body of the hidden cognitive operations which is theoretically justified by the concept of conceptual metaphor in the theory of CMT. And also different experiential features are to be added naturally to make it situational.

Under critical light, it will not be an overstatement to say that conceptual metaphor is one of the central tenets of human thought or conceptual system. It is observable for sure that metaphors are linguistic events, but cognitive linguists argue that it is not only language but our whole conceptual world which is structured metaphorically and as this kind of claim is intuitive and inductive there are debates as to how metaphors are active in every expression be it orientational, ontological or structural. Though it is further proved and disapproved in later years, the principles or doctrines of conceptual metaphor are more or less satisfactory in explaining the semantic incongruity often encountered in sentences. Therefore it has been proven to be handy in resolving such paradoxical issues when the given sentence sounds semantically *incorrect*. Moreover, if we accept the account that metaphors are simply the product of the linguistic expressions then we might produce as many metaphors as we see in the variations of linguistic outputs on the same point of expression. Thus, though metaphors are not inherently the property of language, they are affluent of this shared *articulated system* (Lakoff, 1993).

When we engage in language activities like listening, speaking, reading or writing, it is the linguistic form of metaphor or linguistic metaphor. We make use of lexis to linguistically correspond our meaning. But the cognitive status of metaphor cannot be ignored; because it is where meaning comes from. In Lakoff's consideration, metaphor is not solely functioning in the linguistic field. Language is not one and only field of exercise of metaphorical function as even other human thoughts and acts are also fundamentally metaphorical (Lakoff and

Johnson, 2003, p. 3). That's why, it cannot be plausible that metaphors are the product of linguistic expressions only. Some metaphors like orientational or ontological ones are so embedded unconsciously that we don't need to activate them with deliberate consciousness, because the very frequent nature of use enables them to be processed automatically, whereas most of the structural metaphors are thought to be consciously produced or comprehended. Anyway, the 'image-schemata' which are the product of the activities of 'embodiment' and supposed to be 'pre-linguistic' in their essence are fundamentally responsible for producing language and its meaning. As an example, in the conceptualisation of 'in' and 'out' we necessarily use the container schema. That is how the human reasoning works through the conceptual structure of language.

We need some *mapping* actually which efficiently selects the overlapping features of two *domains* and thus capable of expressing that specific sense in a comprehensive manner. The approach that metaphor is not just epiphenomenon of lexical structure, rather a conceptual reality per se is justified in terms of different psycholinguistic evidences which had verified its conceptual status and its projection in language. We have to admit first of all that though metaphorical communication is occurred during linguistic mode of representation, its constructive domain is essentially conceptual and conceptually metaphors are differently processed than metaphor use in language and discourse. Previously it was thought that metaphor is a poetic creation alone and it is only to be understood with careful awareness on the part of the reader or speaker. But metaphor is originally processed internally, a thought expressed in external manifestations. So internalised concepts have substantial role to play in generating the metaphor into externalised forms. It can't be possible by the syntactically independent sentences to process metaphor without taking recourse to the conceptual domain.

To define the 'domains' in the *Metaphor We Live By* (1980a), Lakoff and Johnson only introduced 'concepts' rather than 'domains', but later in their much celebrated collaborative work *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999, p. 45) 'domains' are characterized as 'sensor-motor' (like the source UP in metaphor MORE IS UP) or 'subjective' (like the target MORE in metaphor MORE IS UP). As such, the domains are not separated into simply different areas, they are overlapping and interconnected to each other. This cognitive architectural system reflects the inconceivable neural connectivity among neurons through synaptic bonds. Anyway, major drawback on Lakoff / Johnson's (1980a) part is the lacking of any elaboration of what can constitute these 'domains', i. e. they consist of the semantic frames and their constituent elements. Another point is that the knowledge of what is a source

domain (SD) and what is a target domain (TD) and their differentiation is not inborn, rather it is acquired. As provided by a study by Christopher Johnson (1997) on metaphor acquisition in children, it had been observed that children first come to understand an expression irrespective of the metaphorical meaning and its corresponding specific domains. They first comprehend words or phrases unambiguously interpreting only its literal meaning. As when interpreting the sentence “Let’s see what’s in the box” they stick to literal meaning without caring for its metaphorical meaning, i.e. SEEING IS KNOWING. Since for them at this stage both domains remain conflated into one. In the later stage of metaphor acquisition, they grow the competence of distinguishing the metaphorical from the literal. For example, in “I see what you mean” it is only the metaphorical meaning that one can apply. This fact resembles another non-verbal evidence when children first fail to understand subjective domain of MORE. This is convincingly established by Piaget’s experiment (1972) in which children consistently measure the quantity of the liquid in a bottle by flatly considering its one dimension, i.e. height (as in orientational metaphor MORE IS UP) ignoring other dimensions like the width of the container and the overall size of the bottle (when MORE IS WIDE could be applicable). These observations point out that the signifying source domain is comparatively more dominant than the signified target domain in developing metaphor comprehension and its resultant production. Because sensory-motor domains are more straightforward than the subjective domains which are more complex and varied, have multiple dimensions and understood lately because of their successive processing.

Here are some possible common insights into metaphor formation which this discussion is going to elaborate. The source concept properties should be strong enough to make the speaker capable of establishing a successful correspondence with the target properties. Moreover, whenever an agent shifts his domain from one to another thereby producing metaphorical mapping, the agent unconsciously bypasses the incompatible properties which are not taken in consideration. It is clear that not every bit of source concept properties is to be transferred into properties of another concept. This movement from source to target also requires an inference of representation pattern on the part of the agent. An examination done by Fernandez-Duque and Johnson on the case of attention metaphor (ATTENTION IS SPOTLIGHT) shed some light on metaphor processing. Müsseler’s disanalogical reasoning in understanding attention metaphor is important too.

2.2. Modelling of conceptual space

Before going to further analysis of metaphor, we firstly need to have the knowledge of schematic mapping in cognitive construction. This is responsible for building mental space (Fauconnier, 1994) and accumulating these spaces increasingly by changing their patterns. In Langacker's cognitive grammar framework (1987, 1991) each set of grammatical units in the frame 'calls up' corresponding mental space. In this model, these built up mental spaces are abstract schemata which follow a few processes step by step to be generated. By mental space we say about partial self-sufficient network of units or events focussed in its operation. In saying "Bikash said that Rama is on the top of his position", we get a reported space of what Bikash said about Rama's position itself which is structured here in simple minimal units. For Lakoff (1987, chap. 4), mental space forms Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs) or frames (Fillmore 1982, 1985). If a sentence in discourse matches its identity with any mental space, then the identified 'roles' of distinct elements or units of the mental space will be mapped onto the slots of the ICM. Now the question is how these 'roles' are identified or set up in the mental spaces and then formed into more general default frame. Presumably these frames are constructed in two ways- by only having background knowledge or immediate knowledge of local context. One aspect of this schematic processing is that depending on the sustaining contextual importance or support, ICM could be more specific or broad. The degree of specificity depends on the deeper engagement of our knowledge base with the contextual relevance.

We would try to see how metaphor is conceptually defined. Indeed, metaphor is the medium which carries the *conceptualised content*. These are the devices of conceptualisation which convert the abstract experiential thoughts into language. It is these *imagistic* aspects of language that get imprinted in the language. Concepts are autonomously active in throwing any linguistic output and their features are overlapping as found in encyclopaedic knowledge. If this is so, there would be some complexity in language construction as outputs, but thanks to the syntactic constraints this complexity is minimised. That's why conceptual agency is only partly noticeable or inferable in sentences. Moreover, as mapping is created by conceptualisation, further conceptualistic acts like construals⁵ are necessary to act upon or understand the expression. The meaning then is not the content but the outcome of the

⁵ Langacker coined the term 'construal' to denote speaker's conceptualization of the different dimensions of an object or event.

postconceptualising activity of the construals. Meaning is also indeterminate because of the infinite possible construals which give sense to the information of the content and is responsible for the *indeterminacy* of metaphor. That's how indeterminacy makes the metaphorical meaning realised in the pragmatic level of understanding by letting the reader lingering on possible *alternate* meanings when trying to find out accurate meaning in a given expression and eventually deriving an acceptable meaning by going from *generality* to *specificity*. As in the sentence "the sky is gloomy and pale", the sky is personified as a human being who is saddened by some ongoing or oncoming distress. In this embodied mapping, the features from concrete domain of a saddened human being are incorporated to describe the situation of the abstract domain of sky after looking into the commonality of executable features between the two entities. Here the *immediate scope* for irrelevant features is constrained by the contextual relevance of the utterance.

2.3. Stages of development

Though conceptual network is unconscious in everyday use, mapping is real and must surface in language for both of conventional and creative use of metaphorical expressions. Here are some inferences regarding the stages of its origin through development till death in synchronic construction of meaning and diachronic passage of evolution. To consider any example of metaphor use in a sentence, like any other cognitive system it has various successive stages and follows a systematic undergoing of several non-trivial transitions. According to Fauconnier (1997), this metaphor generation is so straightforward and automatic that it is immediately assimilated by the ever-present undergoing generic system of the native speakers which is working in the very abstract level whenever we produce such meanings. Fauconnier (1997) postulated few consecutive steps of its development into its full-blown features and consequent changes of its properties.

1. Analogy and schema induction: There are some *generic features* of any idea or concept which are alike in another idea or concept. It is very evident that these features are independent of their nature and function in their own specific field and can refer to diverse aspects of phenomena that could be identical with other related fields. Moreover, these properties are tied down to and derived from more basic abstract schemata like 'container and content', 'path', 'force dynamics', 'causal schemata'. These according to Langacker's (1987, 1991) words, are examples of 'archetypes' which are primitive, pervasive and unconscious in

their operation that we hardly conceive. In fact in the deeper level of abstraction there are a few abstract spatio-temporal and body schemata from which other generic abstract schemata are projected in well-organised manner. The broad major schemata consist of subtle minor schemata which have a very *complex* network. In order to have a happy metaphor creation, the analogy has to be established fittingly. And it is to be remembered that the properties shouldn't specify any area of that domain in particular. That's why one needn't to have a deeper understanding of technical complexities of source domain in directing the mapping. Only limited understanding of the concept is necessary for reference which every human naturally used to have. But it is still a question how these universal generic schemata are acquired and formed into a full-fledged conceptual model which are multiplied further with several other models and ultimately built into whole conceptual structure which is extracted occasionally while mapping.

If we take the example of an isolated phrase 'enlightened thinking' which sounds metaphorical (i.e. THOUGHT IS LIGHT), we can find two Domains- one for light (Domain A) and other for thought (Domain B). Now some of the properties of light are seemingly alike with the concept of thinking, i.e. both of them are positive, can illuminate and both are let out of some source. Again in order to understand light we have to understand it in terms of wave, its flow through a path and also its spatial properties. So this metaphor also consists of a primary metaphor of LIGHT IS A WAVE which seems to be archetypal in its essence. And also one needn't go to the details of technicalities like its wavelength, energy, frequency etc to have a successful mapping.

2. Categorization and new conceptual structure: In this mechanism, each category of the coherent set is sorted out for its proper slot in their target domain. The rest of unmapped features ('sub-cases' or 'sub-categories', Lakoff, 1993) could also be mapped later as extensions. Here we are not actively engaging in assigning proper slots for the equivalent categories in the pre-existing structure of the target domain, rather their conceptual needs are satisfied naturally without any conscious reflection. But even if we force to correlate the technical specifications of the two domains together by our own manipulation, the mapping might not be successful as it happens in the very deep schematic level of abstraction. It may fail then to meet the criteria of equivalence at this stage. For the same reason, mapping is conceived subjectively, though in the literal meaning sounds awkward or odd and appears to be meaningless. So, the meaning is not derived in shortcut use of vocabulary; rather we have drawn the meaning by conceptual means.

In the above example, it is clear that the domain of LIGHT is targeted to the domain of THOUGHT. Only the equivalent elements of these two domains are selected by proper categorisation technique. It is needless to say that transfer of these features is strictly automatic despite the fact that in literal sense the expression hardly means anything.

3. Naming and projected structure: Now we are simultaneously projecting our linguistic naming of the concepts. Being used in different context, the literal meaning is extended to another meaning enriching its nonliteral implications. Some controversies over the issues of meaning and naming is that the previous meaning is now ‘dead’, that it may be recognised by this possible new meaning. In fact the original meaning of the source word extends its semantic network so as to suit its new meaning. It is not a ‘like’ or ‘as’ kind of relationship (as in simile), the target word makes itself associated with the new conceptual meaning.

Following the previous example, in this stage the autonomous Domain A (LIGHT) is seen to have the ability to activate Domain B (THOUGHT) in a semantic context which allows the two domains coalesce together. The nature of THOUGHT has now become the extended version of LIGHT.

Now this whole process may have a possible background of many other elements in the construction of the sentence which have been probably inhibited by the contextual constraints. How that particular element of source domain is selected negating the other possible elements of that domain depends to a significant extent on what precedes and follows that domain. This may have certain limitation because of the possibility of being a nonsensical expression instead of a metaphorical one. Therefore it is realised that only that part of the domain is chosen which suits contextual relevance of the utterance. And finally to achieve the desired goal, a *gestalt* structuring⁶ makes the *specificity* of the two domains irrelevant to the occurrence so that people can focus in creating this new meaning out of these seemingly dissimilar and irresolvable domains.⁷ This new meaning has every possibility to enrich or override the meanings of the component parts, the semantic attributes of which couldn’t be traced back as building blocks. Even if it is clear that the source domain is more active and dominant during the process and until its end, it is still underexplored.

⁶ ‘Linguistic Gestalts’ by Lakoff (1977, pp. 236-287). In this paper, Lakoff explicitly demonstrated Gestalt-character as complex structured whole and its role in defining semantic articulation.

⁷ This idea resembles with Recanati’s proposal that the local sense of the lexical relations may be associative, but the meaning of the whole sentence constitutes the global sense comprising the meaning of the constituents. For him, this necessarily depends on the quality of the medium of inference.




Figure 2.1: Dynamics of metaphor generation.

This straightforward projection is actually a set of layers of variable steps. Here comes the notion of ‘middle spaces’ as suggested by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (1994) in their exploration of ‘four-spaced model’ of conceptual projection in the theory of Concept Formation. This is the space where abstract generic space comes into being. Evidences have shown that middle space is not detectable in domain mapping. Middle space is discerned only by analysis and cannot be determined consciously as it is performed in deep level of abstraction and can vary according to different circumstantial situations. During projection, partial structures from both of the source and target domain are built with the additional default structure for local setting. The common roles, frames and schemata construct this generic blended space. According to this view, the import of these necessary parameters into configuration is a must that every mapping should undergo.

Now this extension of semantic network brings with it some modification. In order to be mapped, the target concept may no longer rely on the source concept. Rather unconsciously we could achieve this mapping between concepts. The process starts with the analogical mapping in extending the meaning, then the extended meaning has been identical with the

original literal meaning and hence could be used as an alternative later. This is a case of 'entrenchment' when this alternative meaning is used unconsciously without going back to their original meaning. The degree of entrenchment varies according to its use in practice. Entrenchment could be found at different stages of development and thus automatically structured the grammatical system. Then the source domain needn't to be activated again directly for mapping which it has become inherent part in functioning. It has been easily observed that as a result the target meaning has been extended to more elaborate version with some additional properties. This considerable change in meaning is so dynamic that there is no fix set of meanings in a vocabulary, it loses many existing attributes and in return some whole new properties are attributed to it. The target meaning has thus been enriched in its evolutionary pathway.

4. Blending and conceptual integration: A common umbrella term 'metaphorical blending' or 'conceptual integration' of which metaphor itself is a part is presented by Fauconnier and Turner (1994, 1996, 2002) in their sketch of complex conceptual varieties of meaning construction. If the chosen subcategories of two input spaces or domains merge together into one common third domain or blended space of single category where properties of both of the categories are present, then it is a case of blending. Recently it has been approved that metaphor is a special phenomena and belongs to this more general conceptual process. This new domain has new emergent properties which could not be found in the previous two input domains. But the selection process could not be other way round or totally in reverse way. It projects a purely artificial and 'constructed' domain, free from any limitation set forth by strict logical natural domains of the real world. If we analyse it further in terms of *mental space configuration* (Fauconnier, 1997, Fauconnier and Sweetser, 1996), we could have ample scope of the knowledge of the interface, overlapping and synchronization of the spaces, the interconnectivity of the network in some points of the congruous elements. Each domain's functional status may be partially or fully different. But in some points it is relative. Anyway, mostly we converse in terms of these blended spaces that we hardly consciously employ. Because in language production we cannot render the thought directly into language without the medium of these semantic spaces. On the other hand in comprehension process, we understand it directly from the language (see figure 6.1 and 6.2 respectively at the last chapter). Thought can only be expressed into language through the mediation of this blended space which is not directly associated with language itself. Metaphorical accounts can explore this by going from the communicated blended space to the involved input spaces in

order to reach to the cognitive reality. Thus, language which is essentially metaphorical is ‘imagined’ or conceptually real. Only the emergent properties of conceptual realities are visible and therefore analysable in sentential construction.

By conceptualising, we can apply the blended word in wide range of uses motivated by its earlier uses. Therefore, new domain establishes its existence independently having already qualified the blending criteria. Though this is a product of abstract integrated schema, it has a concrete identity. This newly-formed structure has the capacity to include and elaborate things with extensive details. This emerges from input sources only to generate and therefore define even more specific concepts in other fields.

In generalised four-spaced model, Fauconnier and Turner (1994) allude to this blended space which is working independently of analogy and needs some prerequisite to understand it. It is a richer combination having an apparently ‘impossible’ structure. As it does not necessarily rely on source and target for its meaning to be generated, its meaning could not be predicted. Because, it might have a link with the wide range of knowledge structure involved and reflects it accordingly. And it is also possible sometimes that when we discuss blended words they interpret better those source and target domains from which it has borrowed its inputs and explore new directions.

5. Motivated polysemy: Multiple meanings may be constructed when falling in specific context the concepts of the two domains are consciously motivated to integrate together without losing their original root meanings. Hence, the notion of polysemy may start its course in the common third domain where the meanings of two domains are retained. But we know that at abstract level, they may share counterpart properties which are full of meanings, but still dormant in expression. Thus in this process the concepts are induced with shared properties and have the ability to evoke multiple complex words with diverse meanings.

On this issue, Steen (2008, pp. 213–241) closely scrutinised the *deliberateness* of metaphor in a discourse-analytical framework and stated that deliberate metaphors are processed metaphorically by comparison whereas non-deliberate metaphors are processed non-metaphorically i.e. by *categorization* or *lexical disambiguation*. Taking a moderate position than those previous studies which insisted on the categorization part only, Steen demonstrated that only some metaphorical words or phrases are examples of categorization or simply the results of *metaphorically-motivated polysemy*. Here comes the notion of *conventionality* of linguistic form or conceptual structure which suggests that whereas the

conventional metaphors are processed by comparison or categorization, novel metaphors are processed only by comparison ('Career of Metaphor Theory', Gentner & Bowdle, 2001; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). Along with this, the conventionality related to linguistic forms decides whether given expression is a simile or metaphor. On the basis of these two factors reader or listener attempts to resolve the issue. Steen (2008, p. 219) confirmed this point by showing a corpus study results published by Pragglejaz Group called MIP (2007) which revealed that only 13.5% of all the lexical units from corpora of BNC and other resources is labelled as examples of metaphors which are obviously predictable as structural metaphors. This result is unbelievable in the sense that according to this study expressions which are thought to have a novel form are actually turned out to be conventional expressions. This is due to the fact that most of the metaphors are processed categorically as semantic variants of the same expressions. This psycholinguistic study also suggests that the deliberate metaphors are communicative in essence than linguistic or conceptual. So this once again proves that metaphors seasoned by the entrenchment process are automatic and smoothly produced or understood. For example, we can use two kinds of sentences like:

1. I see the hope.
2. I see the hope like a picture.

In the first sentence we understood the meaning by dint of cracking the ambiguity of the word 'see' only. This is understood categorically. But in understanding the second sentence one needs to conceive the sentence by setting up a comparison between understanding and seeing a picture more expressly. Actually the incorporation of new *perspective* of SEEING A PICTURE is induced deliberately in this scene to better comprehend it from another angle while communicating in a discourse context.

6. Divergence and extinction: Divergence may occur when in the long run of semantic change the vocabulary of the two domains remains but the evoked concept had undergone a certain change or vice versa. Then the linguistic mapping is not obvious.

2.4. Directionality

Every concept in our mental lexicon couldn't be independent entity as metaphorical mappings usually stretch them to further extension making them more or less dependent on other cognitive entities. There is a long debate of how contents of source domain move to

their target domain of meaning or vice versa, how they are directed to their intentional target and how flexible is this directionality. By *unidirectionality*, it means the movement from one domain to another, but not the other way round. Mapping is ‘unidirectional’ according to Lakoff. The starting concrete domain is more dominant over the abstract one and has been the brunt to evoke metaphorical activity in language. As in conceptualising time, domain of space is mapped on the domain of time and it is always a one-way direction as the changes of spatial displacement affects the estimated duration of time too. The empirical evidences shown by Jakel (1999) and Sweetser (1990) in support of L&J’s *unidirectionality* of orientational metaphors threw some light on this issue.

But structural metaphors on another extreme denies the *asymmetry* or *unidirectionality* of metaphor (see next figure 2.2 in the section ‘Types of metaphors’), that any domain can be selected to take the initiative of projecting its own features onto other domain in an arbitrary but structured and systematic manner. An empirical study by Guo et al (2013) provided evidences that contrary to Lakoff’s assumption of ‘unidirectional’ transfer of mappings between different metaphorically related domains, in unconscious knowledge formation some mappings may be bidirectional (e.g. similar to the way when specific determiners get their meaning by unconscious guess). This has an automatic way of understanding and is unconsciously built. The nature of judgment knowledge is evaluated by testing it in empirical light and showing the conscious nature of unidirectional metaphorical transfer and unconscious nature of bidirectional structural knowledge; of course their functions have different properties as well. Before this experiment, several studies by William (2005) and Li et al (2013) provided ample evidences of unconscious learning of form-meaning connection. In this implicit kind of learning, they have tested complex multiple meaning formation of a form, e.g. ‘big’ has a literal meaning (significant size) and a metaphorical meaning (significant authority). The transfer of form to literal meaning is conscious, but in a metaphorically consistent way the transfer of form to metaphorical meaning is unconscious. It supports Reber’s argument (Reber & Lewis, 1977; Reber, 1989) that as usual hidden meaning ‘implicit learning’ can be applied to any domain during meaning formation. The implicit meanings are thus automatic and flexible enough to produce meaning by going in the opposite direction- from abstract to concrete domain.

It could be simply assumed then that there may be a kind of *bi-directionality* (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; Jakel, 1999 & Sweetser, 1990) in the production of metaphor that metaphor

needs not necessarily to be started from concrete source domain to an abstract target domain as in the case of body metaphors in which body is the source, but sometimes the abstract domain could be associated with source domain and acts like a concrete domain entity.

Glucksberg (2001) suggested that target concept can also be active in the selection of its accompanied source, because he considered that the target concept might have some premetaphoric structure to delimit the features in the source and overall to select the source itself. It would be pointless if there is no such clear definition of the target concept. Nelson Goodman (1979) also stated about the infinite similarity between two domains. Therefore, it is necessary to define the nature and function of the target before explaining how a metaphoric activity works.

To grasp the idea of *bi-directionality* of metaphor projection, we can take example of the body domain. The body first becomes the source domain for health and disease, but in its course of development the disease and health themselves become the source domain for, as an example, economy of a country. In this way, though body metaphors take their roots in certain very basic and archetypal image-schemata affected by constant bodily interactions and manipulations with environments, they can also serve as the target domain. But thinking from a broader perspective, directionality identifies first which domain precedes and in this the more dominant domain is chosen generally be it bodily origin or not and the other existing domain is treated to be the abstract domain. But obviously the embodied concepts are liable to prepare the ground for the production of the many metaphors, specially the orientational ones.

Goschler's (2005) claim also supports this argument. He successfully notified the duality of body as source or target domain. The body as target domain is to be found in the special cases of the description of people, machines, plants, manufacturers etc where the body and its different functions are represented in the form of these experiential entities. As this kind of metaphors may happen, one could be bewildered by the status of the domains- which is then source and which target? The feelings and emotions which are being originated from the body or simply physical state of affairs are becoming the target domain themselves. One may get confused by these events, but as the case may be; metaphors describing the body are actually the cases of structural metaphors in the sense that bodily mechanisms are described in terms of different real-world phenomena like technology etc. So in these cases they cannot be termed as examples of orientational metaphors like the body metaphors, rather their

structures follow the structural metaphorical features and directionality. Goschler examined through a few examples collected from a popular science magazine and illustrated the fact that bodily functions can be described in terms of different orientational metaphors, reification as in ontological metaphors, container-content relation, force dynamics, path-goal relations and structural metaphors as well (e.g. DISEASE IS WAR metaphor). Therefore it assures about the body as target domain as well as source domain. In this respect, it is quite obvious that these could be treated as instances of structural metaphors because in these cases body is not yielding the source materials we need to derive from, rather it is drawing words from other supplementary domains. To be more specific about the term 'body' in embodiment, external motor and perceptual parts or activities generally act as source domain in body metaphors where body is the source; but internalised organic or biological activities like disease caused by viruses and bacteria, brain processes and structures etc are often represented or could be better explained when body is viewed as target domain deriving *vehicles* from other suitable domains to explain it, e.g. EYES ARE CAMERAS, PROCESSING PERCEPTIONS IS COMPUTATION etc.

But current studies on the topical areas of grounded cognition theories show increasing evidences of activation of a metaphor by stimulating only one domain, be it abstract or concrete. Therefore, prompting of only single aspect or feature of any of the domains can have the ability to spur such metaphorical transfer their association being so implied and strong. So initially the concrete domain takes the initiative to associate the two domains and with repeated conventional use the correspondence becomes so automatic that they co-occur whenever any part of them is projected. But another point is that some target domain needn't to be always abstract, as in the example 'blind building' or 'wolfish face' the mapping occurs between two concrete domains. Implications of these studies have much to do with Lakoff and Johnson's claim which suggests that metaphor processing is asymmetric and unidirectional.

According to a study (Dienes and Scott, 2005) regarding the conscious status of knowledge formation, there are two types of knowledge- one is structural knowledge (i.e. knowing the underlying form-meaning associations), the other judgmental (i.e. learning grammaticality of a sentence). Generally structural knowledge is conscious and relies on guess and intuition; but judgmental knowledge is unconscious and corresponds with rules and memory. So mappings could be unconscious when it is not structural; in this sense abstract domain is prominent in contributing or serving to intuitive or guessable learning at the very judgmental

level which necessarily serves to subsequent generalization in other domain mappings when they are consciously processed. In that study, without any training or experience the participants were able to guess the meaning by intuition which is thought to be automatically encoded with the object and thus becomes an intrinsic feature of that object⁸. Metaphor is then better predicted by unconscious judgmental knowledge rather than resulted from conscious structural knowledge.

Thus metaphoric transfer is simple, nevertheless which of the two converging domains performs as active mapping booster and thereby the starting point is more complex question and demands more critical attention. Despite this, considering both of the notions of unidirectionality and bi-directionality, it could be assumed that there are variations in this directionality, like it may be from concrete to concrete domain, from concrete to abstract domain, from abstract to concrete domain, or also from abstract to abstract domain (see figure 2.2 for more detail).

2.5. Embodied cognition: Role of experience

To define what consists this ‘body’ in *body metaphors*, we have to characterize it in a more specific way. Are they solely the body and its parts? What is the ‘embodiment’ in *embodiment hypothesis* and *embodied mind or cognition*? As such, it does not solely take the concept of body or bodily experiences as source domain directly and apply it to the target. We know that reason is not devoid of body, though the reason in mapping which comes from body itself is not what traditional knowledge always used to believe. In order to know the truth, we should acknowledge first the role of body which is the vantage point, a place from where we begin to learn by experiencing and understanding our surrounding environment constantly. What Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) earlier insisted in their book is in line with this argument that we believe it or not, reason by its very neutral nature is not totally transcendental, rather our neural and cognitive structure and its interactional relations with its environment shape the core of our observation and knowledge. The sensory-motor system thus is responsible for structuring our everyday life experiences according to the way we perceive or react in certain kind of situations. And this fact is being reflected all the time in anything we do and produce. As a matter of fact, language use is one of them. Langacker

⁸ Guo et al., 2013, op. cit.

assumed that linguistic expressions are conceptualization of experiences which may be novel, conventional or immediate, a part of whole sensory, motor and emotive processes of our body and mind. This ‘embodied cognition’ which is socio-culturally enriched is also the source of linguistic origin.

Metaphor processing is sometimes thought to be the result of the influences that our body system has on our thinking patterns and this is one of the effects that cause our language to be metaphorical. Of course there is no fallibility in this assumption that our body and its intersection with surrounding changing environment play a crucial role in framing our experiences. So body is not the sole cause of experience, rather it is the interaction of body with the environment that truly structures our language and behaviour. ‘Body’ in ‘embodied concept’ is sometimes misunderstood. We have to give the definition of ‘body’ a sharper edge to be more precise and accurate of what really constitutes this ‘body’. L&J (1999) also attributed a biological sense to the term ‘embodiment’. To their view, we cannot negate the embodied nature of every aspect of cognition as the neural mechanism is producing them. Hence this stand rejects every possibility of idealism which states that idea exists separately from human cognition system (Jordon Zlatev, 2003) and in order to catch hold of that idea one has to discover them. Then the concept of embodiment cannot ignore the physical environment. So this is not only the biological sense of understanding the human behaviour, but it also adds value to environmental contribution to input sufficient properties to body only to serve the basis of cognition.

Johnson (1987, p. 29) once postulated the idea of experiential gestalts which contemplates on the importance of *image schemata* or *embodied schemata* which is nothing but the regular patterns of mental images universally found when the bodily movements in space occur. These are recurrent archetypal activities and one could easily observe their behaviour in metaphorical language making. Their functioning patterns are found to be in galore in art and cultural context. Johnson’s *The body in the mind* (1987) discusses in elaborate details the idea of conceptual metaphor theory as an extension of this ever-encompassing model of embodiment on the relation of body and cognition and their successive parallel evolution (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). Embodiment thus has a much bigger area to focus and meditate upon. This idea also gives vent to embodied realism (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) as a theoretical possibility replacing the long-standing ideas of materialism and idealism. But conceptual metaphor theory does not consist of this single embodiment only, because

metaphors are not only embodied in the form of body metaphors but also covers an entire theoretical grounding of blending and analogy. It should be remembered that embodiment is an umbrella term which in its essence covers human cognition including language of which body metaphors are part. So it is an unquestionable fact that our world is body-centric and also it cannot be denied that body mirrors in every possible activities and events performed by a human being. Though there is sufficient dilemma whether or not the embodiment is to be called upon as the chief cause of body metaphors; that source reference from body is found in metaphors does not mean that body is all active in producing metaphor; it might be possible that body metaphors are only taking body parts to support the speaker's abstract claim in favour of his contention.

The sense of 'embodied realism' came into much discussion and debate with the introduction of *Philosophy in the Flesh* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) which states that our constrained neural-cognitive structure and sensori-motor impulses generate meaning in consequence of its constant interaction with unconstrained changing environments and attempted to illustrate with the notions of temporality, causation as well as self itself which are processed in a metaphoric way, as all of them have some spatial characteristics in order to grasp their intangible nature. According to Lakoff (2009), some metaphors have bodily origin as sometimes metaphors are the product of our 'embodied cognition' which dispenses them quite naturally. Mark Johnson (1995) also stated the curious fact about the strange operations of conceptual metaphor in our daily life which has taken its roots in our body and day-to-day life experiences influencing our imagination; yet displaying its little trace in language use. In fact, negotiating with the problematic traditional Cartesian distinction between body and mind where body is treated as counterpart of mind, it seems very difficult to admit the interpretation set forth by new empirical findings of this kind (Johnson, 1990). These findings propose the limitations on language production and comprehension which are laid down by our bodily perceptions and sensations. Thus emotions which have their origin in our mind tend to be embedded in body itself. In fact, they are *situated in bodily resources*.

In the fourth section of the book *Metaphor We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson gave us a fair picture of *Oriental metaphors*. Unlike the *structural metaphors* which are deployed to map one domain in terms of another domain and being arbitrary in many senses differ from culture to culture; orientational metaphors actually have a basis in our body and its relation with environmental and physical events. Naturally they are found uniformly in different

cultural usages, e.g. MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN, CONSCIOUS IS UP and UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN, HEALTH OR LIFE IS UP and SICKNESS OR DEATH IS DOWN, HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP and BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN etc (Lakoff, 1980a).⁹ Certainly all these statements must have a physical basis of explanation to make them meaningful, otherwise such system of expressions might not work. The conditions determined by Lakoff describe their potentiality to be meaningful when they all have overall internal and external systematicity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, p. 18). By *internal systematicity*, he means that the conditions taken from physical basis should be in conformity with similar other expressions to be meaningful. *External systematicity* defines that metaphors should be able to be applied in wider context to add value of systematicity. Thus, up-down orientation is reflected in mapping GOOD IS UP which is assumed to influence and in return to be influenced by the special cases of parallel mappings like HAPPY IS UP or HEALTH IS UP etc. A whole system of features like the spatial-temporal dimension are incorporated from our real world phenomena and could be mapped upon an abstract feature to denote the meaning of the concept of up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral etc. William Negy (1974) intensively and elaborately studied these features of spatial dimensions. He referred to the influences of cultural experiences on the selection of physical basis out of a lot of other bases as this selection process can vary across cultures. The physical dependence which is in proximity with powerful and influential cultural phenomena is generally favoured over other similar bases. Thus experience is very much preferred in creating a connection between concrete bodily domains and abstract phenomena.

Ritchie (2013, pp. 132-133) is found to believe strictly in the fact that abstract thoughts are solely processed by the metaphorical transfer of ‘immediate embodied experience’ (physical and social) and insist on this point by strikingly pointing out that one cannot understand or produce any concept without indulging in invention of a new metaphor and the entailment of a metaphor thus would be the part of that meaning (Ibid., p. 139). Many metaphors if not all are subjected to this embodiment principle. Specifically Ritchie claims that the spatial orientation of our cognition is more direct than the embodied experience of understanding while arguing about ‘embodied cognition’. Now one may question why Ritchie tried to analyse metaphor in terms of spatial cognition. Because, according to Ritchie this can explain

⁹ Following the Lakoff-Johnsonian tradition (1980a) here the letters are written in uppercase to denote the metaphorical use.

better the spatial knowledge of alignment and is more objective and less subjective in approach as it might trigger the very basic *similar procedural sense* in evoking the transfer between domains which is to be understood under interpretation (Ritchie, 2013). And this procedural knowledge works in parallel with the spatial knowledge. Moreover, this knowledge is highly *intersubjective*. Although, in response to this overgeneralized reductionist thought Vervaeke and Kennedy (2004) upheld a strong opposition.

As such there are many scientific and purely theoretical concepts which are being understood by mediating through this spatio-temporal dimension of metaphor, concepts like high-energy particles or low-level phonology are often understood in terms of MORE IS UP metaphor. Better to say, we cannot even comprehend these detaching their metaphorical associations. As a matter of fact, they allow us to comprehend them through the understanding of these metaphors. So, scientists are often required to understand first the metaphors which could better formulate aspects of scientific invention, then to fix them as successfully as possible to fit the intended meaning taking from their own experiences. Thus metaphors are so much entangled with our given conceptual system that we have to construct them when we need to articulate them. Understanding of the concept of happiness is possible in a uniform metaphorical system of HAPPINESS IS UP metaphor.

Fauconnier's (1994) earlier work *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language* and a few other seminal works tried to devise a general embodied theory of metaphor based on cognitive semantics having recognised clearly how bodily assimilation of experiences takes its shape in mental spaces surfacing ultimately through different types of imaginative devices of language. The perceptive experiences which give rise to these metaphors like 'reduce' means DOWN and 'increase' means UP, are always embodied, these are not the special cases in point as every human doing and speaking have bodily correlation. Sweetser (1990) found particular cases of expressions where vision, manipulation and knowledge play interconnectively. To understand and express abstract domain of knowledge we often make use of vocabularies of vision and manipulation like 'see', 'catch sight' etc. Sometimes they are used specifically for understanding of certain abstract concepts like 'perceive' (from Latin- *cipio*, "siege") or 'idea' (from Greek *idein*, "see").

Generally expressions may find some analogy with body structure and function; therefore agree with the speaker's perceived experiences. Once sharing of some common features between two domains is done, then one has scope to infer any attribute from source domain

and apply it to target domain; thereby supplementing and developing a full account of target domain in terms of the available and identifiable relations of entities by ‘inferential generalization’ (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The meanings of these generalizations could be easily producible under specific contexts by the native speaker of that language and as a consequence conventionally established in colloquial language by its frequent use (Emanatian, 1995). These conventionally charged metaphors actually become included in our knowledge system knowingly or unknowingly and psychologically embedded in our memory. One can then easily catch the appropriate intended meaning of the utterance. Naturally native speaker’s confidence in inventing these metaphors is higher than the other speakers (i.e. they are not attested in common); their competence in construing metaphor in characteristic way reflects how these linguistic forms are deeply immersed in their conventional life patterns inextricably.

In psychological terms too, these conceptual metaphors are thought to be embedded in memory as the schematic patterns. This is what Barsalou ((1999, 2005) called as *situated conceptualisation* or *mental re-enactment*. The concept proposes about how our concrete physical experiences are developed into inconcrete conceptual schemata or patterns imprinted into memory. These memory patterns are activated recurrently in the moment of experiencing the identical objects, situations or events, i.e. through analogy the previous experience is revoked again by the present occurring experience. This is how *analogical reasoning* works. Thus, representations of domain mappings are not to be evoked by linguistic expressions only, rather they are just like informations to be availed by *situated* experiences and to be embedded in memory on a long-term basis and exercised thenceforth. Later by *re-enacting* these analogical relations between current and former mapping patterns, these mapping patterns are again established and remodelled reasonably as the speech situations are different each and every time of their use. For this reason, every mapping pattern is unprecedented and therefore unique ensuring its dynamic nature. This reinstantiation caused by frequent uses also makes it easier to strengthen the connectivity between two domains. Suggested by Vega Moreno (2005), this empirically advanced concept appears to be more convincing than L&J’s CM in terms of its accuracy and precision in selecting inferential routes during comprehension as he expressed his doubt in the dominance of metaphor in directing our thinking.

Apart from these, body metaphors are working in every human community resulting in this conspicuous transfer of source domain references from body in dealing with emotions instead

of taking from other working domains like ‘medicine’, ‘life cycle of corn’ or ‘carving implements’ (Emanatian, 1995). They are being adopted in our language use reflecting their functioning in our conceptual life. Thus a close similarity is found in expressing emotions in terms of body as source. Although a lot of our social, ritual and emotional outbursts are getting substantial support from our living body and its daily activities, there may be exceptions too. Because numerous other known or unknown emotions are not directly in touch with working body to be mediated through metaphors. After all, bodily basis serves metaphor with more visual, tangible, and perceptually comprehensive cues. This analytic description shows the prevalent drawbacks of the traditional account of meaning by presenting an alternative account of cognitive meaning as inculcated by physical experiences.

Embodied metaphorical expressions are more generalized because of their embodied nature which is more or less similar cross-culturally. They have constraints on metaphor comprehension and production. By analyzing the parallels found in two unrelated languages we can find consistency in metaphors which generally refers body state and its relation with some object, event or situation and maintains the regular perception of the world in common. Nonetheless, sometimes cultural uniqueness are also found there to follow from same inherent homogeneous tradition. So, this physical and psychological ‘isomorphism’ influences the creation of body metaphors though cultural disparity is dividing them into individual and communal specificities (Emanatian, 1995). Contrary to this, *structural metaphors* are unrelated to body and heavily dependent on individual-specific mannerism in a particular community. So in order to grasp meaning of their unique and shared *structural metaphors* their environmental (social, cultural, ecological) experiences are to be understood first. That’s why, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural constraints of universal kind are to be expected only from metaphors which are products of bodily perceptions in general. For the same reason, body related metaphors for eating, seeing, drinking, walking, dancing, having sex etc. where performing body parts are used reflect a universal tendency and could be observed in entire humankind irrespective of any community of the world. For example, Emanatian (1995) studied expressions of lust and passion in Chagga, a Bantu language in Tanzania. He found their parallels in English and showed that same conceptual domains of *eating* and *heat* are consistently used for the passionate feelings of lust and sex in both of these two languages. Though he didn’t induce a general conclusion finally and left for scholars a scope of further research. It had been further noticed that there are some biases in that community to extract references from a particular dominant knowledge domain

frequently for a specific target domain mapping. Indeed this confirms Lakoff's concept of 'Coherence' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980a), a feature of metaphor which occurs when in giving more importance to a particular metaphor over other metaphors users generally give preference to those frequently used metaphors which cover specifically and effectively every analogous or parallel expression in general. For example, height is sometimes preferred to width when anyone wants to convey feelings about being happy. Thus, studying lesser-known languages can better reveal the uniform nature of body metaphor.

As mentioned earlier, it is supposed that conceptual metaphor might have a universal basis whenever its bodily basis comes, but as experiences are different following people's own conventional patterns across cultures, the source domain inputs from experiences are also different, because which part of the experience will be considered as source domain input depends on community's shared experiences. But body metaphors have some universal features which enable us to find some commonality amidst diverse cultural heterogeneity. The new linguistic methodology rigorously can examine metaphorical data to generalize some common source domain features across cultures. As ordinary or rich metaphors are colored with the diverse experiences we could be happy enough to know their inescapable cognitive operations which are very much imbibed in our personal and communal talks. Thus metaphor itself can be an entire arena which is worthy to be examined as a theoretical discipline illuminating philosophical doctrines in its way.

Sometimes there are some problems and confusions determining the exact nature of metaphor. Because we cannot directly specify whether the cases of *emotion metaphors* are orientational or ontological. It appears to be counterintuitive that anger which is itself of bodily origin and expresses some physical states needs some different domain to understand them. Why do they need the help of different domain being the effects of the body themselves? If we exemplify in saying "My head is going to be burst out" which means the speaker is excessively angry now, we can identify this as body metaphor having the head as a metonymical reference of body; because our experience of being angry must associate with it some heavy blood pressure in our head. In that sense, it is an orientational metaphor as suggested by Kövecses (2002, pp. 95-98). But still we can also explain this according to the event of container metaphorical pattern (i.e. one type of ontological mapping) as here the liquid is blood and the container is head. Hence, whether metaphorical orientation is basically inherent or culturally structured is a matter of debate. Our commonsense experience tells us

that these *emotion metaphors* which are often found cross-culturally in different languages are actually orientational metaphors in which container-content relation plays a crucial role the content being the emotion. For example, an extensive study (Kövecses 2002: 165) found the recurrent pattern of metaphor ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER in languages like English, Hungarian, Chinese, Zulu, Polish, Wolof, and Tahitian.

2.6. Types of metaphors

There is classification of conceptual metaphor in respect of its underlying structures.

Language is strewn with metaphorical mappings, be it structural, ontological or orientational. As defined by Lakoff, each type of these metaphors needs some pre-conditions in a specific context to be made sense as something ‘metaphorical’. Traditionally, by the term ‘metaphor’ only the structural metaphor is considered. The usage of structural metaphor is upto the speaker’s conscious effort. In this metaphor the source concept may be thought of as an element to alter or modify the concept of the target domain. The speaker then may have dependency in metaphor which can usually change his meaning as to his satisfaction. In this type, the structural properties of one domain are mapped onto the structural properties of another domain. Generally their operation needs conscious effort. This mapping system between two domains could be exemplified by the conceptualisation of life in terms of a journey in LIFE IS JOURNEY metaphor (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 3) which is of structural as well as conventional type. The various dimensions of a journey like the traveller, destination, routes, impediment, distance, landmark, crossroad etc. could be mapped onto life to embody its abstract features. By the way, it is agreed that structural metaphors are recognised mostly by the open-class categories like nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs etc.

But the ontological and orientational metaphors don’t need any motivation on speaker’s part as they are inherently automatic (Chang, 2005). Ontological metaphor as defined by Lakoff & Johnson can occur when one refers processes, events, activities, emotions, ideas in accordance with the comprehensive entities to relate them uniformly in a concrete world (e.g. the process ‘transitional’ or ‘transitivity’). For instance, abstract concepts are given forms by treating them as physical substances, e.g.-

She *has made* me her deputy. (referring)

It was only a very *little* mistake! (quantifying)

The lamp *spread* its light. (identifying reason)

Another kind of metaphor is the orientational one which orients or structures the features of one domain in relation to some spatio-temporal or bodily dimensions based on influences of physical or cultural experiences. Generally these metaphors are so automatic that one doesn't need any effort on his part to deliver it or understand its meaning. The concepts like happy or sad, positive or negative emotion, strong or weak, having control or not etc. are processed through some spatial aspects like up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral etc. Orientational metaphors are evoked mostly by the form of closed-class items like prepositions in the sentences etc.

So far as frequency of use is concerned, conceptual metaphor could be classified into two types: conventional and novel or creative. Conventional metaphor is so pervasive that one can hardly conceive the existence of it in language. When a certain metaphor is used for long period of time so much so that it stands permanently for a fixed conceptual sense without undergoing any further change, it becomes conventional which is effortlessly automatic and shared by a linguistic community.

But the degree of novelty or familiarity may affect metaphor comprehension to a large extent. Whenever we form novel category for local purposes unlike the already established category we go through this conscious projection actively. This novel cross-domain mapping is nothing else but some extension or elaboration of known meaning in its unique way of referring an experience. So whenever a newly felt experience is to be expressed we need this type of mapping to convey it. But, there is no pre-established schematic structure available for the novel case because this new creative case has to be settled first into a stable form. Further this is also to be frequently deployed in new situations and entrenched consequently since the concepts involved in this kind of mapping process generally appear to be far-fetched. The distance between two concepts reduces as the metaphor turns from novel form to a conventional one.

Conventional metaphors are always less effortful in understanding and less time consuming. On the other hand, novel metaphors demand extra time for comprehension and are therefore special case in point. The more novel a metaphor is, the more it will take time for its online processing whereas in the case of conventional metaphor, the processing in comprehension is naturally much faster making them less metaphorical.

For instance, while signifying metaphorically Shakespeare made use of a novel metaphor DEATH IS SLEEP to describe dreaming in its private domain (Lakoff and Turner, 1989):

“To sleep? Perchance to dream! Ay, there’s the rub;
For in that sleep of death what dream may come?”

William Shakespeare, *Hamlet: Prince of Denmark*, Act III, Scene I.¹⁰

The mechanism here to portray the nature of death has been assisted by novel metaphor of DEATH IS SLEEP. Unlike conventional metaphor, in this extension the general mapping is working visibly instead of functioning underneath.

Thus, poetic or creative metaphor of such kind is a variation of the novel form. Poetic metaphors have been dealt with in broad detail in Lakoff & Turner’s another classic work *More Than Cool Reason* (1989) where they have shown its mapping process as similar to conventional metaphors. Though poetic metaphors are widely available in most literary works of any literary tradition, they actually borne out like the same way of conventional metaphors so far as their underlying cognitive schema is concerned. So far as the realisation of this kind of metaphor is concerned, it has been observed that conventional everyday vocabulary is analogously employed in such constructions though a vast semantic incongruity is found in these cases. Thus we could be assured of the fact that conceptual shift of meaning is comparatively more ‘flexible’ in processing than the linguistic variation in construction. This could be starkly visible and could be apparently distinguished in both of the cases (Sullivan, 2007, p. 13). Literary genres are more prone to handle dramatic strategies which are sometimes obscure, fictive and lengthier in description in a textual narrative. This kind of metaphor utilized in this aesthetic purpose is pretty unlike the case of metaphors in conventional usage. Though they share the common vocabulary in a language, their way of expressions are different. These metaphors present the context of a particular mood of the author to denote the created imaginary world. Thus literary work of art has hands in glove with metaphor. Every artistic innovation welcomes the use of metaphor which is abundantly used in literary style. Sullivan’s (2007) study of some basic corpora of common English illuminates this aspect of metaphor’s association with different genres and the change of metaphoric language according to each genre’s style. In texts of literature or narrative sometimes a metaphorical description is extended throughout the sentences to elaborate a

¹⁰ See Xiu Yu, 2011.

single concept. In this respect, that metaphor is termed as *extended metaphor* (I will elaborate this type later). In *painting* too the artist uses visual metaphor that he needs according to his choice.

The criteria of distinguishing conventional from novel metaphor is out in question, for we cannot determine exactly how much novelty is necessary to be a novel metaphor. The degree of this variation definitely depends on the choice and frequency of the use. Therefore, reconstruction of the trajectory of a metaphor is difficult as how this is produced into real use anonymously. Some have identified conventional metaphors could have undergone a significant period of time to come into familiarisation so much so that people cannot easily go back to the original semantic framework to define the meaning again. It seems to be a continuous process in its course of development of meaning making from a sort of awkwardness to recognition; it is just like treating and negotiating an outsider who is steadily coming into more familiarity, with compromise and meaningful acknowledgement. The whole process rests on some unbeaten continuity or continuum across its steady progression. This is what called as ‘cline of conventionalisation’ (Bednarek, 2005).





Figure 2.1: Types of metaphors and their directionalities.

If we take into consideration the other cases of figures of speech like *simile*, *hyperbole*, *irony*, *paradox* and *oxymoron*, they could also be termed as the special cases of metaphors. Ibáñez

(2014) had studied them in some broad detail where he put forward his contention that all of these figures of speech obey almost the same kind of mapping constraints.

The constructions for metaphor and simile are varied though they are synonymous semantically. Traditionally, metaphor is considered to be the precise form of simile ('elliptical'). But empirically speaking, metaphor functions as more 'deeper form' than simile (Zharikov & Gentner, 2002). Reynolds and Ortony (1980) found in an empirical study that simile comprehension is the prerequisite for metaphor comprehension. In the drawing the *Career of Metaphor Hypothesis*, Gentner and Bowdle (2001) had observed that conventionality is a key factor of understanding a metaphor. As in novel case, figurative languages are processed as comparison between the target and the source concept (base). In the same way, simile which is more explicit linguistically, is more easily understood as comparison between two entities. Metaphor on the other hand, is processed by categorization and as the metaphoric mapping becomes conventionalized, it behaves more likely to be a separate meaningful category as its additional abstract meaning ('ad hoc concept'). Then it becomes familiarized as unique sort of meaning and subsequently lexically fixed ('lexicalised'). Later, it may be used and reused to the extent that it becomes 'stabilised' in the language use of a community. In this way, metaphoric processing for Gentner and Bowdle (2001) could be achieved through two different ways: by comparing the two dissimilar conceptual senses or by deriving a sense from the two original senses categorically. In this way, similes are processed as part of the comparison and metaphors as part of the categorization. Approaches taken by Aisenman (1999) suggest a quite different account for the definition of metaphor and simile. He hypothetically proposed that preferably, similes are *attributional* but metaphors are *relational* in that for similes the items are perceptually alike, whereas to form metaphors the items are likely to be functionally alike. This is true then that metaphors are derived from functional or relational similarity as opposed to similes which are based on similarity in physical appearance and its attributes only. Because function is thought to be crucial to the conceptual processing, when attributes are more visibly found in the physical world.

Similar to simile or resemblance, hyperbole often refers to the *Extreme Case Formulations* (ECFs), a change in degree of expression by means of the use of 'all', 'every', 'always', 'least', 'best', 'perfectly', 'absolutely', 'as good as it gets' etc as in the sentence "Naresh is the best singer ever in this state." Here, Naresh is compared to an imaginary singer who is

thought to be the best superfluously, though in reality he is not. This is extreme in its constructed imagination only, not in its original nature or function. In this way, this kind of metaphor indicates a matter of degree in presentation. In irony too, mapping plays a role so far as incongruity in the form of humour, negative emotion, criticism is concerned. In such case, the unreal or doubtful concepts or things play the source to characterize what the speaker thinks as real in the target concepts or things. In typical metaphorical cases like Paradox and oxymoron, the source concept is apparently the opposite of the target according to the speaker's choice to understand the paradoxical nature of elements. Thus, the phrase "politely cruel man" presents the target concept of cruelty to be reframed in terms of the source concept of politeness. So readers need to reconsider the man's behaviour as a polite person whose way of mannerism is apparently cruel.

2.7. Metaphor-complex

It is to be understood how orientational, ontological and structural metaphors have different kinds of *realisation* in the sentence level. Whereas in the case of structural metaphor identification is easier, in the cases of orientational and ontological metaphor it is difficult since they are deeply embedded in the sentence and unconsciously processed. For example, the sentence "You are wasting my precious time" could be understood from a contextual point of view and explained by the structural metaphor TIME IS MONEY evoked by the expression 'wasting'. But also the concept of TIME which is itself an abstract technical concept is to be understood first as the outcome of the orientational metaphor (TIME IS STRAIGHT LINE) or as the most basic ontological metaphorical concept by comparing it with an object (i.e. TIME IS OBJECT) Therefore, the phrase 'precious time' is actually realised by different metaphors separately: the structural metaphor TIME IS MONEY and the orientational metaphor (TIME IS STRAIGHT LINE) or the ontological one TIME IS OBJECT.

Thus, a metaphor can entail one or two unequal varying *primary metaphors* and a chain of metaphors is formed to present the abstract idea in a well-efficient way. One of the domains of the primary metaphor is concrete or physical in essence and works as a source concept.

This process is not transparent in CMT as admitted by Charles Rohrer¹¹. Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) were also confused by this lack of proper rules when stating its difficulty or problem in metaphor determination and pointing out the possible fundamental weakness that it is still in mystery which conceptual metaphor is the authentic ‘candidate’ to evoke a particular metaphorical expression. But the problem is that the corresponding playing metaphors are not there already active as the pre-existing module to be chosen. This discussion will be more methodically correct if we proceed selecting the specific source domain or both of the source and the target domains in more particular terms instead of just selecting the specific mapping or metaphor for explanation.

Following the Relevance Theoretic stance, Grady (1997) for the first time adopted a more methodical approach and developed his own compositional model by analysing the conceptual complexity of metaphor and distinguishing between general and specific conceptual metaphor. He reviewed on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980a, p. 9) argument on the specific forms of metaphor which do not give any clear-cut definition for them. Grady’s point on the other hand assessed the general or experiential configuration of mapping as well as the specific surface realisation which is actually a congregated form of the constituent general mappings.

It could be assumed that an answer to the difficulty of metaphor determination or better say engaging domains could be resolved by systematic narrowing down from more general to more specific metaphors to reflect the chief characteristics of the mapped frames (in the following diagram the vertical arrow from general to specific shows this). During the *production* or *comprehension* of metaphor the cause of a metaphorical expression is not particularly one metaphor, but the surface-level expression is actually extracted out of the multiple underlying core-level metaphors and has the capacity to cover all the features of these sub-mappings.

¹¹ See T. C. Rohrer’s notion of ‘disanalogical metaphoric inferences’ and Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of ‘counterfactual conceptual blends’ for further references.




Figure 2.3: Hierarchical relationship of metaphors (Based on Grady’s concept of metaphorical compositionality, 1997).

This study shows up how a possible *metaphor-complex* is created by multiple layers of mappings which can reflect some of the problems hypothetically (see the introduced triangle in figure 2.3). Each of these layers presents metaphoric mapping itself. The ontological and orientational metaphors are thought to be more ‘basic’.

As in the following example (figure 2.4) THEORY IS BUILDING, there is no direct experiential evidence of how THEORY could be connected to the concept BUILDING. Apparently, we cannot see any direct relation between domains in this mapping process. But, in the deeper level of analysis this structural model must have a relation with the experiential model in a combinatory fashion. The basic primary metaphors working at the level of experiential plane appear more *schematic* and *pre-propositional*.¹² Though at this level of realisation the metaphors are more general in their nature and function, they could also be easily applied independently. For example, metaphor STRONG IS UP or GOOD IS AN OBJECT could be used or understood separately. Thus, the source concept of a specific metaphorical expression which is usually concrete by nature and function may be essentially a compound metaphor resulted out of many less solid conceptual schema that Grady wanted to show.

¹² Barsalou (2005) also proposed similar kind of structure as endorsed by Grady here.




Figure 2.4: Mapping structure of ‘building’ in THEORY IS BUILDING.

The source domain BUILDING is mapped onto the target domain of THEORY. Now in order to comprehend what the source domain of BUILDING is, we need further construction of more elementary mapping structures. Figure 2.4 shows how the cognitive layers of mappings are arranged together to form a fully-formed structure of BUILDING. To comprehend this, firstly we have to set forth other metaphors like BUILDING IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PHYSICAL STRUCTURE IS STRONG etc. Then BUILDING is the product of these two experiential mappings in which PHYSICAL STRUCTURE is thought to be the source domain. The intermediate mapping structure PHYSICAL STRUCTURE IS STRONG in turn links the former experiential mapping BUILDING IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE with the latter orientational mapping namely STRONG IS UP. Here, BUILDING and STRONG can be shown as indirectly related by the common feature PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. At the very bottom-line of all these mappings is the ontological mapping i.e. GOOD IS AN OBJECT from which all these mappings are thought to be driven. Again the intermediate structure UP IS GOOD connects the orientational mapping (i.e. STRONG IS UP) and the ontological mapping (i.e. GOOD IS AN OBJECT). The orientational sub-mappings STRONG IS UP and UP IS GOOD can be shown as indirectly related by the common feature UP. Likewise, the orientational metaphor UP IS GOOD is indirectly connected with the ontological metaphor GOOD IS AN OBJECT by the common feature GOOD.

This linking and piling of different types of metaphors constitute a *metaphor-complex* and systematically pave the way for the elaborate structural mapping showing a strong inherent interconnectivity among all types and this could only be grasped if explored methodically. Then the mapping properties don't come only from a single source domain but also from other related sub-domains that are unconsciously generated in this process to make the target concept THEORY come into existence. By the way, it should be mentioned that in this case I've shown only the source domain of BUILDING among others in the metaphorical construct of THEORY IS BUILDING.

All of these types of metaphors are actually prompted all at once. The above diagram shows how concepts are unconsciously built and arranged to make a full-blown metaphor. Thus, if minutely scrutinised it is observed astonishingly that though the concept BUILDING itself is the concrete source domain, it is constructed by several other mapping types. Actually the encyclopaedic knowledge of the concept BUILDING is accompanied and compiled by a wide array of features, though only a few selected features are considered here like OBJECT, GOOD, UP, STRONG, PHYSICAL STRUCTURE etc. By conceptual relations they are differently connected via different types of mappings like orientational, ontological or experiential. Thus the metaphor THEORY IS BUILDING which is itself responsible for forming a metaphorical expression is constructed by a bulk of features and their metaphorical relations.

Again, in the adjective phrase 'bright idea', the metaphoric transfer occurs from source domain LIGHT to target domain IDEA. But reversely if we think about 'intelligent light', the phrase becomes more obscure as light is here compared to some living organism. Basically this anthropomorphic phrase is supposed to be processed by the structural metaphor LIGHT IS INTELLIGENCE. But the LIGHT itself is also built up by the ontological metaphor LIGHT IS LIVING BEING. One property of living being, intelligence is thus attributed to light. As we know that intelligence is often structurally thought in terms of light in contrast to darkness.




Figure 2.5: Meaning formation of 'intelligent light'.

The novelty of this study is that it has reviewed Grady's concept of *primary metaphors* which inherently constitute the schematic structure of structural metaphor and suggested that relations among these sub-mappings may fall into any of the three distinct *universal* categories: experiential, orientational and ontological. This means that they are systematically interrelated. These constituent mappings are not identifiably recognised in Grady's writing. All of these are combined together into a complex unit by process of *unification*.¹³ This interrelationship of different types of metaphors in the conceptual level shows how mappings between different domains are hierarchically arranged linking basic lower-level ontological mapping with apparent higher level of structural mapping to form a coherently structured metaphor. The arrow in figure 2.3 and 2.4 indicates this evocation from general to situation-specific stage but not the other way round.

Every metaphor can possibly be reduced down to the basic elementary level where the simplest metaphorical structures we unconsciously create. That's why, to discern the exact metaphor playing behind any metaphorical expression is not an easy identification to do. Though apparently it seems that THEORY IS BUILDING is the only standalone metaphor working underneath, but as a matter of fact, this identification is far more complex, presumably because at the lower level of cognition one cannot be expected to relate directly two far-fetched conceptual constituents. This means that for the sake of systematic understanding we can proceed from higher specific level to lower general level of metaphor identification and verification though this seems to be quite impossible if we consider the developing complexity of all these mappings together.

Grady had also taken into account how these primary metaphors form the base of any metaphorical structure irrespective of the motivations exerted by cultural variations. Because they are here supposed to be *universal* on account of *cultural coherence*, even then the matter of heterogeneity in selecting the use of physical basis makes the bodily basis of metaphor ('embodiment') even more problematic, i.e. how to discern experiential metaphors from culture-specific metaphors.

¹³ This term as elaborated by Grady (1997, p. 275) is originally borrowed from grammar by means of which syntactic categories are combined to form a more specific sense like the combination of a determiner and a nominal structure.

Linguistic perspective on conceptual metaphor

3.1. Introduction

So far we have discussed only about metaphor's original conceptual nature and its processing. Metaphor is but an outcome of a conceptual mapping process. But, in this mapping the selected properties from the source domain which are to be conceptually transferred to the other domain, have no lexical way of representation specifically and separately. That's why, language carries symbolically this cognitive transfer in a very partial basis so much so that we virtually sometimes thrust on literality instead of metaphoricity of metaphor. The trace of this process partially comes into appearance in the surface distribution of sentences. It seems that metaphors find their outlet in the emergent properties of metaphorical expressions strewn in the constructions. It is evident that from small constructions like adjective phrase, adverb phrase etc to big constructions like clause, sentence etc- all carry metaphorical hints which are expressed by possible lexical categories.

It is very difficult to retrieve and reconstruct this conceptual data directly by inference. It is clearly comprehensible that though metaphors have immense flexibility in matter of expressing one's thought in language, its production and comprehension is constrained by certain semantic feature compatibility, otherwise it would probably let the sentences break down from its ideal set of semantic structures or principles. Anyway, it should be remembered that linguistic construction does not process it, rather just constrains it in its surface appearance.

Mapping in formal linguistics is so far diminished in importance as it does not call upon theories of language which ascribe language as set of strings. Rather we need greater precision on the cognitive aspects though mapping is considerably invisible or partly visible in language. The autonomous self-independent compositional structure cannot give rise to such mapping; rather it itself acts on the basis of mapping. This explains how some of the epistemological paradoxes which are badly encountered by formal syntactic structure could be resolved to achieve more precisely the general definition of meaning.

When cognitive linguistics (CL) emerged in late 1970s, it had a definite goal to meet and to deal with complex linguistic issues with a solution which generative semantics couldn't able

to decipher. As such generative semantics couldn't solve the problem of metaphor; we need to incorporate cognitive semantic aspects of construction to define this. Because, the syntax doesn't solely play to process metaphors, it is its semantic value which could better define its origin. It is this cognitive correspondence that conceptual metaphor surfaces in the syntactical order, but what regulates it to the point of restriction is a problematic query.

Again, the never-ending debate of whether content gives rise to meaning or meaning gives rise to content has made the field of metaphor studies problematic. If the first is true then we should give linguistic origin of metaphor a priority over its meaning. But the meaning of metaphor in sentential context is not to be found in sentence itself in straightforward manner, the meaning has to be derived from semantic schema. If we analyse metaphor from linguistic perspectives, we have to start from semantics rather than the lexical items or units. The semantics tries to define metaphor as one of the variations in meaning of the given word. So meanings have different dimensions and these dimensions have different structures: the *congruent* and the *incongruent* (Taverniers, 2003). To determine the congruency of the structure we generally see that the literal meaning has the *congruent* structure and the nonliteral meaning has the *incongruent* structure. Metaphor is well-defined then in terms of the *incongruent* structure. And the sentence in consistent with this *incongruent* structure is called as a *marked* sentence and is a typical example of *realisation* of a given meaning.

3.2. Linguistic constraints of metaphor

In the cognitive grammar, the case of *profiling* (Langacker, 2006, p. 18) explains how a lexical item can evoke or profile one sub-structure of total structure of the object. Each sub-structure belongs to the entire conceptual configuration consisted of all the shared parts of structures. The difference among them is only in the selection of their own parts in the broad arena of *conceptual complex* (Ibid., p. 20). This is what explains the case of metonymy.

In the case of *directionality* of metaphorical correspondence, the concept of profiling can efficiently explain the manner of direction. In this, verbs which contribute to the meaning of metaphorical expressions usually map one concept onto another concept by profiling. In cognitive linguistics, discerning the profile is a useful tool to figure out the flow of concept generation by a lexical item. The profiling differs from word to word according to how they portray specific dimension of each complex relationship. In saying the literal sentence “the

dog is barking” and the metaphorical sentence “The man is barking”, the content of verb ‘barking’ is lexically the same in both of the sentence but the meaning differs between the two cases in terms of profiling. Because in the sentences the semantics of the verbs differs on the level of *construal*. In the second case, there is an additional property of the relationship between primary participant and secondary participant. Here, the example naturally evokes a primary focal participant or the *trajector* (tr) which is the original source concept of dog’s calling. The secondary participant or the *landmark* (lm) is the man on which this dog’s feature has been superimposed. It is this *dynamicity* (Barsalou, 1999; Langacker, 2001) between these two participants which develops through a processing time that one can *conceptualise* this literally odd expression. So this continuous shift of conceptual reference from one domain to another makes this conceptual discourse possible introducing these two discourse participants one after another. Metaphor can then reasonably be called as an *imaginative* structure.

It is important to note in the context of the study on the lexical representation of metaphor that though conceptually it is sensed as metaphoric, the combination of various linguistic items in the construction is bound to be limited by certain grammatical rules and semantics as well, that while behaving conceptually as metaphoric they are not compositionally metaphoric in proper sense of the term, neither they draw on any odd or exceptional structure which is to be identified as implying metaphoric connotation in construction. Thus, it is obvious that metaphorical use of words usually uses the same constructions as non-metaphoric one though the meaning varies between the two. In meaning construction both use the same semantic structure; but their outcome which could not be limited by constructional restrictions differentiate. Fillmore’s notion of semantic frame could be applied to demonstrate this, because so far in linguistic analysis of metaphors this concept had been made use widely as a tool. These component frames are maintained thoroughly and systematically in the *metaphor input domains* (the source domain and the target domain) which is just different from *domains* (Croft, 2003, p. 166) and we will consider next how this occurs in the field of construction. What is new in this reconstruction is that very much like the image-schema structure in the cognitive level, Sullivan revisited the frame-semantic structure of metaphor in the linguistic level integrating with it the concept of *dependency* extracted from dependency grammar. As such, he had extended the prevalent cognitive model of metaphor to a linguistic model of metaphor following the same *Invariance Principle*:

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. (Lakoff, 1993, p. 215)

This method proves to be more appealing and prospective as this opens the scope of judging metaphoricity of a language in the light of some regular constraints.

Lexical item is supposed to evoke the semantic frame of the conceptual roles and relations between objects, events, situations, the participants or the means of a deed. To define, this framework works symbolically as ‘a script-like conceptual structure’ (Ruppenhofer et al., 2005) and only the words or sentences are being emerged as result of these relations and the rest is kept hidden from objectivity. Then the product called meaning being context-sensitive is left to the subjective understanding of its implications since only prospective extra-linguistic analysis could unearth the intentional phenomenon of meaning. For example, the verb *insist* evokes the INSIST frame which involves roles and their activities: the DOER, the person who insists, the OBJECT on which he insists, some force or effort as a MEANS by the insisting agent and a PURPOSE for this very act etc. Necessarily all of these conceptual parts are evoked in the formation of meaning of it. In the sentence “Shuvo insists on punctuality”, the subject, Shuvo is the DOER who insists, the OBJECT, punctuality is the entity on which he insists on, his effort is the MEANS and his PURPOSE here is to make someone punctual. This entire system of roles (Sullivan, 2007), namely DOER, OBJECT, MEANS, PURPOSE and their relations are active there only to be filled in by the more specific values like ‘Shuvo’, ‘punctuality’ etc. These are operating there in a particular context. The elements of this semantic frame are the ‘semantic dependents’ of the verb ‘insist’ and thus mark the *valence* of this verb. These elements are also connected to each other in a shared relationship to the extent that they are correspondingly overlapping by nature. The co-occurrence of compatible frames between domains allows them to build an easy access in their way to the formation of metaphor. This is to be remembered that a frame is only a subset (‘low-level frames’, Sullivan, 2007) and belongs to an entire frame structure (‘scenario’, Ruppenhofer et al., 2005 or ‘super-frame’, Sullivan, 2007). Only some of the sub-frames engage in information sharing concurrently in the given point of time in an evocation process.




Figure 3.1: Relationship between semantic frames and metaphorical expression.

Anyway, better communication expects the speaker and the listener to comprehend each potential element of the given frame. But how semantic frames are communicated by the speaker and acquired by the listener’s own effort and knowledge of the same frame structure is more enigmatic. Their successful functioning ensures the listener’s own conceptual knowledge about these frames that in turn also expect him to have undergone some experiences in real life which are also responsible for evocation of such frames. The fact is that these frames essentially are nothing but the product of the conceptual schemata. These conceptual schemata are represented by the simplified and recordable form of linguistic materialization which is only a small part of those total conceptual schemata. Needless to say, the conceptual schemata are simply speaking ungraspable to our best representation.




Figure 3.2: Role of semantic frame structure in the generation of metaphor.

Infact, the frame structure of a domain includes multiple frames. Only those frames which are responsible for mapping are selected. As in above figure 3.2, an intermediate-level frame is assumed in order to understand its close association with the mapped frames in this domain. In next diagram (figure 3.3), the mapping between two *metaphor input domains* LIGHT and KNOWLEDGE (shown by rounded rectangles) takes into account sub-mappings of frames (shown by rectangles inside), such as, sub-mapping between LIGHT_EMISSION and IDEA frames, SEEING and KNOWING frames etc. Now, domains can stand out with the unique identity of *metaphor input domains* when the frames of them are bound together by establishing a common identity link and their roles could be filled in by common fillers, such as lexical items. Sometimes, an item can evoke pointedly a particular frame in *direct evocation*; but an item can also evoke all the frames of the concerned domain taken all at once in *indirect evocation* (Sullivan, 2007, p. 38). When the frames are evoked by a lexical expression, they are called the *profiled frames* whereas the non-profiled frames can serve as the background or *base* of all the features of mapped frames (Langacker, 2002), e.g. in figure 3.3, other frames like PHYSICAL_PROPETIES of LIGHT domain and ENCYCLOPAEDIC_KNOWLEDGE of KNOWLEDGE domain are not considered and their components are not given; because they are not *metaphor input frames* as such and thereby are not *proper* frames to be accounted here. These frames are too far-fetched to be included in this mapping due to their inherent incompatibility with this particular mapping situation. Though these frames may be relevant in other domain mappings, they are not permitted here

to be mapped. Thus, metaphorical examples are the result of a filtration process of these frames to have an ideal form by removing the irrelevant frames so that it becomes ‘sanitized’.




Figure 3.3: Frame compatibility in domain mapping KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT (based on Sullivan’s account, 2007).

So far we have understood frame semantics within the reach of both the metaphorical and easily recognisable non-metaphorical one. Both have similar structural nature and function, but in meaning construction they are different. Because, in metaphorical context the independent element of the phrase or clause has to identify its dependant element. This will indicate whether or not the expression is metaphorical or something else. For example, in ‘brilliant man’ the predicating modifier ‘brilliant’ is clearly the dependant element. As also we can see in figure 3.3, frames from different domains are made compatible via a metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT, otherwise elements of frames could not be mingled together coherently in a straightforward way. Semantically it may seem that the element SOURCE OF LIGHT is not directly related with the element SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE, that there is no such element in the knowledge domain which could be better associated with current

elements in the light domain, so they could not be fixed in natural way. Therefore, metaphorical agency is needed in this respect.

Another fact is that some source domain elements are more dominant or more frequently used to map a target domain. These have some overwhelming capacity to include other source domains also. For example, the source domain element ‘brilliant’ in ‘brilliant idea’ in mapping no. 1 (see following figure 3.4) meaning intelligent idea semantically entails the mapping coverage of other source domain element ‘sunny’ in mapping no. 2. Along with ‘sunny mood’, ‘brilliant mood’ meaning cheerful mood also makes sense. But ‘sunny idea’ does not. That’s how it is found that ‘brilliant’ has the ability to refer both to the ‘idea’ and ‘mood’ in ‘brilliant idea’ and ‘brilliant mood’. On the other hand, we cannot say ‘sunny idea’ in that it sounds odd to the ear. Thus, this example shows that a broader semantic domain may overlap the other domain too.




Figure 3.4: Domain coverage of LIGHT.

3.3. Grammar in metaphor

Sullivan (2007) took an insightful look into the aspects of metaphor appearance and evocation as the interplay of relations of different grammatical categories. Not only the choice of vocabulary is sufficient to evoke this nuance of phenomena in language construction, the mapping also needs the precondition of certain distribution of grammatical categories. He argued about the constraints on the source-target domains by the sentential constructions. More specifically he wanted to show this inter-dependency in the component elements of the construction by showing that subtle minute changes in the component may cause the meaning to fall into literality or metaphoricity. Which component bears the source and which component is responsible for the target in a construction are clearly stated in this study. Which construction allows us to formulate the idea of a metaphor in sentence and

which does not are analysed using formal linguistic methodology. The grammatical constructions of metaphorical sentences, according to him follow the same pattern.

A more general explanation can be found in Langacker's concept of *conceptual dependence* and *conceptual autonomy* in the grammatical components (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2002). It is also clear from the *dependency grammatical structure* in syntactic analysis that some lexical category is more reliant to some other category or categories in evoking the meaning. Langacker (2002, p. 122) clarifies:

When two component structures combine (via a grammatical construction), normally an asymmetry exists between them More precisely, one structure, D, is said to be dependent on another structure, A, to the extent that a sub-structure (of type A) figures saliently in the internal composition of D, and is put in correspondence with A.

It is to be remembered that this semantic understanding of this dependency and autonomy is drawn in the light of the perspectives taken from construction grammar which claims that each grammatical unit is symbolically allied or paired with meaning, though constructional meaning is often discarded in traditional formal semantics.

Sullivan had reinterpreted in detail this relationship of conceptual independence and dependence in the light of frame semantics which he had incorporated from the ideas of William Croft (2003) who had first introduced these in the grammatical and semantic context. According to Croft (2003, p. 192), "...domain mapping (metaphor) occurs with dependant predications", that dependant elements are those lexical items which stands for the source domain. This behaviour of the lexical items is a more general, uniform and regular in the compositional structure of metaphor because this is the underlying emergent property of every possible specific construction in a language. Sullivan hypothesized this wonderful working connection between source domain and dependant elements and between target domain and autonomous elements in more general terms. Here some grammatical categories are found to be more dependent on some other independent categories. The source domain concept is indebted to target domain concept thereby becoming dependant to it. Likewise in semantic level of meaning construction, the autonomous elements are target concepts and the elements which are dependant to them are generally source concepts. The source domain enjoys a *dependent* existence and acts as a 'vehicle' during the course of metaphor processing. This suggests that without the presence of source concept metaphorical meaning couldn't be achieved. Sullivan did not deny the indulgence of contextual relevance in

constructing the meaning. Keeping the composition apart from these environmental influences, the study proposes this result in a limited linguistic set up. Eventually after this association is established due to frequent usages, the target domain behaves to the source domain in a way as if it has some internal resemblance and resultant correspondence with the source (Langacker, 2002, p. 122).

Moreover, Sullivan had shown how *semantic frames* could be compatible with each other to instantiate a metaphor in a sentence. He argued that it is necessary for a metaphor to maintain the semantic structure of the language, that language constrains the appearance of metaphor in sentence so much so that only some specific syntactic contexts favour metaphors to be represented in a mutually complementary way. But it is also true that it is not bound to any certain construction or class of constructions in biased manner. For example, most of the time adjective in predicating modifier construction is found to carry some metaphorical connection in the sentence.

The originality of Sullivan's work is that he had analysed metaphorical structure incorporating Langacker's *autonomy and dependency model* within his framework of frame semantics to highlight how metaphorical meaning is represented through the conceptualisation of linguistic items. In this model, the dependant frame here is termed as the elaboration site (Ibid., p. 41) of the autonomous frame, because the dependent element already could be found internally in the independent element or sub-structure (determined by *sub-structure test*) and is later elaborated by the independent element (determined by *elaboration test*). We know that each frame has a frame role which employs a value to be filled in by a filler, a lexical item. All the frames are evoked by the lexical items and in this regard some lexical items and their evoked frames rely more or less on other lexical items and their evoked frames. So there are two types of groups: dependent frame and its items and autonomous frame and its items. It is to be noted that this *dependency* or *autonomy* is a matter of degree that it should not be treated as the notion of grammatical valence. As an example, in the non-metaphorical phrase 'beautiful lady', the referent noun 'lady' is an autonomous element as it could work out alone meaning a lady without referring to her beauty, but the modifier 'beautiful' needs the assistance of the noun 'lady' to have a specific meaning. Then it is to be referred as the dependent element.

Sullivan to some positive extent introduced the reason behind some of these problematic issues and became successful in doing so favourably. To initiate the study, he had drawn

some variety of specific grammatical constructions which are markedly found to rule out the way metaphors are produced and the lexical choice to limit the number of constructions by which metaphors are to be represented (cf. Fillmore, 1982). He also showed the degree of compatibility and incompatibility of these lexical items' frame structure with the metaphorical frame structure and how to differ metaphoric frame from the non-metaphoric frame in his description.

It has been observed that metaphoric uses are not dependant on specific lexical or grammatical categories, they can occur to any category which faithfully evokes mapping process. Thus, adjectives and adverbs which share the common root mostly tend to be used alternatively in generating same metaphorical frame for same purpose of use, as in English 'bright' and 'brightly' share common metaphorical reference of INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS. Here, adverb 'brightly' appears to be sharing same metaphorical frame with adjective 'bright'. For the purpose of metaphoric function, they are not to be separated into two distinct categories. This observation suggests category-independent metaphoric realization in construction. Sullivan insisted another fact in support of this phenomenon that this frame structure-centric metaphor model sometimes prefers a certain category over another category. As it is not category-dependent, this preference varies from category to category. For example, it is observed that in English, roots of lexical items tend to use adjectives in order to evoke the frame structure of INTELLIGENCE of KNOWLEDGE domain (e.g. 'intelligent'), but in the case of frame structure of CHEERFULNESS of HAPPINESS domain, roots prefer to use adverbs (e.g. 'cheerfully') instead. 'Intelligent' occurs in most of the cases than 'intelligently' (as in "The man does it intelligently") which is less frequently used. These results come out of a close study of the British National Corpus (BNC) by Sullivan (2007) who assessed the metaphoric and non-metaphoric senses in constructions according to his findings of the collocational nouns and verbs and their occurrences in the textual context. Therefore, in lexical choice of metaphoric language a domain has its natural (or conventional?) preference in considering particular category as its output.

Therefore, there seems to play certain logic in item's representation of the frame. Sullivan confidently hypothesised in his model that these constructions are "regular and surprisingly compositional". He had detailed over the metaphorical construction in English language and explained that some selective constructions reflect most of the metaphors in that language. As we know that metaphors are category or construction independent cross-linguistically, it can

take any category or construction of a language, though it is still worthy to be investigated across languages. It also means that source domain can take any category to be represented in grammatical or constructional terms. Langackerian terms of *dependence* of a grammatical component is actually conceptually applied here, i.e. *dependence* on something with an objective to form a metaphor in conceptual sense of the term. Naturally, the source domain of a metaphor which is responsible for metaphor construction is the dependent component represented mostly by the head N, V, Adj or Adv, i.e. it cannot be used independently if one has to construct a metaphor. This dependant element is just incorporated into this process to find similarity with the autonomous component. Hence, the conceptually (not linguistically) dependant element is found as the source domain which carries metaphoric sense. On the other hand, conceptually autonomous element corresponds to the target domain, the sense of which is non-metaphoric or literal. Sullivan handled the English constructions only responsible for metaphor by surveying precisely the BNC mini-corpus.

That metaphor can be communicated through different grammatical constructions is brilliantly explored by Sullivan. This *interaction* between grammar and metaphor was previously discussed in a one-sided way- mostly *metaphor in grammar* overlooking the part of *grammar in metaphor*. This kind of discussion is important in showing how formal linguistic study can serve to the metaphor study influentially. The richness of using metaphor in various fields with its almost infinitely diverse mapping relations based on prerequisite similarities is such that it can express any abstract meaning involved ranging overwhelmingly from basic or general ontological or orientational metaphors to the creative structural metaphors. Notwithstanding that, metaphor is surprisingly constrained and thereby regular by its compositional principles, as shown by Sullivan. These constructions while keeping these metaphorical meanings intact codify them according to the speaker's choice. These likely constructions used to communicate metaphors are classified into a few substantial classes, namely,

- i) Domain construction,
- ii) Predicating modifier construction,
- iii) Compound,
- iv) Predicate-argument construction, and
- v) PP/ Possessive NP construction.

So far as the frequency of used metaphorical expressions in BNC is concerned, these constructions have been most commonly used. Other than this, copular constructions, i.e. X is Y could be found in the form of expressions of nominal metaphors (such as, the equation “Movement is the engine of social change”). There are also rarer constructions like resultative construction and additional constructions like raising and anaphora construction etc. He concluded that around 98% of the 2415 uses of constructions follow above primary five types.

It had been observed that in domain construction, the head is the metaphor-evoking source and the adjective, adverb or compounded nominal the target. Such as in ‘political war’ in which metaphor POLITICS IS GAME is active, the head *GAME* is the source and adjective POLITICAL is the target.

In predicating modifier construction (as in ‘flowing life’), the pattern is the reverse of domain construction. Here the head noun, verb or adjective is the target and the corresponding adjective or adverb is the source.

In compound type (such as ‘labour machine’), the noun head is the source and the noun modifier is the target like the pattern we can find in domain construction. It is to be noted that in meaning construction, compounds are capable of making varied sense of meanings. By the first modifier element, one can affect meaning of any noun in the head position in the same way the predicating modifier constructions do.

In predicate-argument construction, much like the predicating modifier constructions, the structure allows the head verb to be the source domain and the verb’s one or more complements or arguments to be the related target domain. In the example “his income rises”, the verb evokes the UP in MORE IS UP metaphor. Interestingly, this type scores the top among all other types in its number of uses in BNC.

In the last construction which is the preposition phrase construction, the head noun or verb is the source and the subordinate nominal within the preposition phrase complement is the target, as in ‘attack by an argument’ or ‘to attack by an argument’, the noun ‘attack’ or the verb ‘to attack’ is the source and the nominal ‘argument’ in the PP ‘by an argument’ is the target. In this type, following Croft’s (2003) suggestion Sullivan defined the position of the head as the dependent source in connection with the NP-PP; otherwise in linguistic or compositional sense it could be treated as an autonomous element relative to the reference of

complement PP, since the concept of conceptual dependence should not be confused with the linguistic or compositional dependence.

Preposition phrase construction is supposed to be known for its *flexibility* so far as its conversion to other types of constructions is concerned. It is due to its element of preposition that makes it so much flexible. It can be rendered into domain construction or predicate-argument construction, such as, ‘attack by an argument’ can be written as ‘argumentative attack’ or ‘an argument attacks’ respectively keeping the semantics of the expression intact.

Metaphorical constructions could thus be found ranging from short constructions like compounds, phrases to the long constructions, such as predicate-argument construction which treats verb as the source domain. But often an expression could be found involved in more than one construction in a combinatorial fashion which as a result generates *complex* structure of metaphors.

Looking closely into the variety of the constructions laid down by Sullivan, it may seem that we can even comprehend the small constructions of metaphor indicating phrases and clauses separately from the syntactic as well as discourse context where they take place without affecting their metaphorical value. That phrase could be taken apart from the sentence, but it can still behave like metaphor. Obviously then, the sentence equipped with the metaphorical phrase could also be understood as a metaphorical sentence when taken as a whole. Anyway, we need to test Sullivan’s arguments further in other languages to examine its delicacy or strength. Other issues like the major stylistic concerns also need to be considered.

3.4. Metaphor in grammar

Meaning may be literal or metaphorical. Conceptual metaphor takes place when there is shift in meaning but not in structure. So linguistically saying, metaphor always occurs on semantic basis. This change is not morphological, rather semantic. Now we all know what exactly the conceptual metaphor is as we have discussed it so far. But what about the metaphorical structure in grammar in the sentence level *realisation*.

It is reasonable that I will be primarily discussing more on the *grammar in metaphor* rather than the *metaphor in grammar*. Therefore, I have accounted mainly the grammatical features of metaphorical sentences in this chapter so far as the *linguistic perspective* is concerned. But

linguistic perspective on conceptual metaphor could be applicable to the metaphorical structure of grammar too. To talk a little about the *metaphor in grammar*, it can be said that it explains how abstract conceptual categories are turning into lexical categories like nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs etc through the fundamental engine of metaphorical mapping. We know the *realisation* of ontological metaphor. Ravelli (1988) took the notion of ontological metaphor one step forward by structuring them categorically in his classification of grammatical metaphors, namely *ideational* and *interpersonal*. He also divided ideational metaphors into nine general types, e.g. the word ‘appointment’ in the phrase ‘the appointment of an ambassador’ functions as a thing and belongs to the nominal group. After Ravelli, nominalisation is the first type in the categorisation of ideational metaphors and pertains to almost 35% of the examples. Thus in the grammatical studies it can be suggested that there are interdependencies among the categories so far as their realisation in the sentences is concerned. So whenever one common category is changed to another common category by objectifying the meaning it undergoes a metaphorical shift to be realised, e.g. some grammatical categories like adjective, adverb have some *reificatory* effect in the sentential context. All these categories in the micro level are piled together to form a full-length sentence in the macro level, e.g. if we consider the phrase ‘politically motivated persons’, each of the three categories of adverb, adjective and noun realises the person in the micro level by objectifying him and forms this phrase metaphorically in the macro level.

In ideational type most of the processes which originally have verbal qualities (i.e. verbal group) in them are treated as things and realised as things (i.e. nominal group). Ravelli treated all these metaphorical issues under the label of grammar that metaphorical alternatives are not only semantic alternatives but grammatical alternative or choices as well. Now it is to be remembered that though different semantic meanings have their *realisations* through different grammatical categories, in sentential level metaphor works on the level of semantics first and on the level of grammatical categories in the second.

To understand the functions of metaphor in grammar we have to look back to Halliday’s (1985) *Introduction to Functional Grammar* in which he pursued a deeper analysis of how metaphor in lexical distribution occurs. He actually pioneered this concept breaking the notion that metaphor is to be found only as figure of speech. Since then metaphor had been an all-inclusive concept which does not only support broader *structural* realm of its *realisation* but also predicts or identifies its deeper level workings through *ontological* one. For him, it is the “variation in the expression of meanings”. This semantic variation is expressive in

incongruent metaphorical meanings. According to Halliday, this incongruent structure has a ‘feedback’ effect (Ravelli, 1988; 1999) onto the semantic structure because in the course of alignment action the two expressions select common features and omit odd features to make a ‘semantic compound’ (Ravelli, 1988, p. 137). In this respect, Ravelli accepts Halliday’s ‘from above’ view that the process starts from semantic meaning to different lexical level realisations.

Following Fawcett’s (1980) general cognitive-functional theory of language, Ravelli’s (1985, 1988) intuition about the system network in his framework of ideational grammatical metaphor also supports the notion that semantics structure of expression (i.e. “observable system of semiotics”) is just the reflection of the speaker’s cognitive processing (i.e. his “knowledge of the world”). He wanted to find out the metaphorical relations in grammar. Complexities in meaning which is found abundantly strewn in a text become more *complex* because of these metaphorical shifts.

For the mapping principles of metaphors used in grammar where distinct source and target domains are not available, Langacker introduced the terms like ‘vantage point’ (V) to refer to the directionality between the immediate scopes of two schemata. The strong schema is actually the source or vantage point to start with. Abstract categories like verbs, adjectives, adverbs (verbs profile processes and adjectives or adverbs profile non-processual relationships) seem to be derived from concrete or abstract categories like nouns (which profile things) in the *grammaticalisation* process. This once again ensures the underlying ontological metaphorical processes when in their making concrete things gives rise to abstract entities. It is remarkable that verbs and the other categories can be more abstract if arisen out of the abstract nouns, though these dependant categories are to be comprehended holistically rather than separately along with other co-existing dependent or independent categories. Above all, these processes need ontological transfer to make them really exist. In this sense grammatical evolution could be thought as more inherently indebted to metaphorical transfers. That’s why, grammatical functions can be more easily designated in terms of ontological or orientational metaphors. In other words, each grammatical category needs metaphorical processing in order to be defined as a grammatical category. As in the expression of ‘the day after tomorrow’, days are counted as objects and the directionality takes place from the vantage point of objectified idea of ‘today’ to ‘tomorrow’. So the Lakoffian kind of *directionality* is also present here in this account of grammatical metaphor

by Langacker where the source is termed as ‘vantage point’. Actually in cognitive sphere, mental spaces are structured like the continuum coalescing together to form coherent and speculative distribution which serves to make senses through the metaphorical constructions in the linguistic level.

How metaphorical mapping is getting reflected in syntactic level of representation can be better answered by the linguistic analysis of the sentences. There are particular and specific kinds of ‘determinacy’ (Langacker, 2004) of how metaphorical words are connected together. As we can see in the cognitive linguistic framework that language is neither fully compositional nor fully defined by semantic constraints, it has features of both of them. In the same vein, we can analyse the mapping principles better if we admit that only by drawing an overview of the syntactic properties we cannot fully apprehend what mapping is, as metaphor is cognitively recognisable.

Cognitive semantics explores metaphor in a very different light. In order to conceive a metaphor in sentential level we generally construe each category, e.g. subject, verb etc. We have to identify metaphorical relations among different categories in a sentence which works on different spatial and temporal dimensions (e.g. ‘vantage point’, ‘local or global perspectives’). That’s how we form the idea of grammatical concepts. Langacker called this conceptual process as ‘construal’.

Metaphor maintains the principle of ‘reference’. The concept of reference is important, because like the conceptual plane, on the lexical plane also the ‘focus of attention’ falls partially on the particular feature of the object or event. Therefore in mapping lexical reference is also partial like the conceptual reference. Although conceptually it has immense flexibility to implicitly evoke all possible features of the total object or entire scenario of event. Thus it starts with the part but ends in trying to cover the whole. According to Reddy (1979), an expression is not the container of meaning as such; rather it serves as a ‘prompt’ in conceptualising the whole content and thereby constructing a sound idea of it. Sometimes proper and sufficient lexical elements may not be compositionally derivable as in the case of ‘covert imagined scenarios’ in which meaning is embedded in contextual sense. As in the sentence “There was a house every now and then through the valley” (Talmy, 1988, p. 189), there is lacking of proper verbs to denote motion which is indirectly triggered by the prepositional phrase ‘through the valley’. This mental dynamics of suggested path makes the meaning possible and also the other adverbial phrase ‘every now and then’ suggests

recurrence of the viewing experience of the house as the viewer is passing by. This entire scene gives rise to the sense of a virtual image of a house not really observable. The imaginary implicature is also denoted by the use of past tense in the sentence which sounds like a report from the past. It is thus a liberal, free and flexible access to elicit the evoked meaning. The expression is only a chief focus of activation point. It can be compared with a single touch on the surface of the water creating ripples. The words in this sense do not contain the meaning in themselves, meaning isn't to be found in them as content, but it is what the words actually *refer* in a broad context.

Likewise, there are also the conceptualization of caused-motion construction in the semantic properties of the motion verbs like 'kick', 'hurry', 'speed' etc and their predicate-argument conditioning. Many of them get metaphorical connotation by accompanying prepositions with them like 'off', 'out', 'up', 'down', 'in' etc. After all, closed-class items like prepositions etc had broadly been discussed by many (cf. Rice et al., 1999; Beitel et al., 1997). These items have different constructions involved than the discussed open-class items. As Bowerman (1996, p. 422) and Talmy (2000) suggested, prepositions have only a few image-schematic concepts of meanings as this limited range is due to the restriction of usages. Preposition can work also as metaphors in almost any sentential context not depending on any of the open-class types to function for them.

That prepositions carry conceptual structures based on metaphorical transfer was more evidently established by an empirical study (Dirven et. al., 2008) which advanced a second language teaching technique based on CMT. It assured that learning the prepositions of a new language may need necessary reorganisation of conceptual structure required for their conceptualisation.

Lakoff (1987) also had elaborately studied on the spatial property of 'over' which had different mapping patterns under different meaningful situations. The idea of metaphor SEEING IS KNOWING forms the metaphorical meaning of 'look'. Now if we add prefix 'over' to it to form 'overlook' ('to miss'), it literally suggests that something is not seen as the sight cannot catch the thing. But in sentence like "Heat the milk and pour it over", 'over' is meant to be used in another spatial sense which covers an entire surface altogether. Thus, we come to construct and deconstruct the notion of 'over' accordingly venting more preference for the immediate local setting rather than lexical use of language.

In another important study of projection mapping, Sweetser (1990) found that use of modals (e.g.- ‘may’, ‘must’, ‘can’ etc.) can indicate a force (‘force dynamics’) in the sentence reflecting the speaker’s thrust on possibility, conventionality, social constraints, giving permissions etc. But it also indicates speaker’s metaphorical shifts of meaning like in the sentence “The seminar is *going to* be ended now”. Here the concept of motion and space is used in terms of going ahead. These diverse uses of modals actually force the expressions drive their thoughts. Here Sweetser indebted from L. Talmy’s works pointing out three domains, i.e. ‘content’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘speech act’. Reasoning is also constructed by force dynamics which carries our sense from concrete domain (‘content’) to abstract domain (‘epistemic’). In the above instance, the concrete feature of motion is mapped onto the abstract feature of reasoning of the situation in that context. These senses vary according to the range of applications:

The elephants *must* go back to their forest.

You *must* stop when the light is red.

That *would* happen if he comes tonight.

In the case of these modals, metaphorical projection is due to some force which could be defined to be another form of motion and spatio-temporal dimension.

Steen (2004) observed that particular word classes of nouns, verbs, adjectives indicate their metaphorical orientation. The results of an examination carried out by Steen gave strength to the hypotheses confirming that verbal metaphors are usually more explicit than the nominal metaphors. Because in verbal structure the stark difference between references of figurative domain and literal domain is distinguished by the verb. But then he claimed that adjective and adverbs could be fallen into the class of verbal metaphors rather than nominal one because of their explicit metaphorical affinity with the source referent. He had also given priority over looking for the immediate constituent (IC) in the clause to locate the metaphor *focus*. For this, the grammatical categories like the nominal phrase, verbal phrase, adjectival phrase, adverbial phrase, prepositional phrase etc are to be recognized. And among these categories, NP and PP should be taken in one group the reason being that prepositional phrases usually have a preposition as its head and a NP as its complement.

3.5. Metaphor identification in discourse

Steen (1994) in his project on *spontaneous metaphor recognition* in a textual discourse and its different factors like reading goal, reading properties and properties of metaphor, revealed that people are capable of identifying metaphors in literary reading mode more often than in the journalistic reading mode. Moreover, metaphor becomes more appealing and catchy evoking attention when it is unclear and hazy than the explicit metaphors. Apart from these, positive metaphors attract more attention than the negative metaphor except in the case of journalistic reading. Steen (1999) also raised question against Lakoff's (1993) denial of propositional nature of metaphor and advanced the analysis of the identification of metaphor in the light of propositional point of view which he promised to be a new approach to the discourse aspects of it.

Interestingly, Steen (1994, 2004) who is influenced by Reinhart's (1976) systematic alignment in some of the classic theories of metaphor proposed the method of propositional analysis for metaphor identification. In this approach, metaphorical structure is fragmented into basic conceptual structure showing its literal concepts. In semantics as well as pragmatics, propositional analysis is originally meant for revealing the conceptualization of sentence's discourse properties when placed in a text base. This method is indebted very much particularly to Bovair & Kieras's method of 'propositionalization' (1985). In this, each proposition (P) as a sequence of minimal idea units generally consists of one predicate (PRED) and one or more arguments (ARG). And metaphorical concepts are more reflected in the predicates rather than the arguments. The conceptualization of different entities in a sentence can be established by such structure. Propositional analysis lays bare the presence of the literal content called the *topic* in the propositional statement containing the complex metaphor *focus*.

Equipped with this tool, Steen analyzed some of the metaphorical sentences in discourse, such as copular construction like X IS Y can be dealt with by this procedure:

P (PRED ARG1 ARG2)

In this structure, the literal element (ARG1) is accompanied by a nonliteral element (ARG2) which is shown by the underlined element.

Again, nominal metaphor can be illustrated by an oft-quoted line from the song 'Hurricane' (1976) by Bob Dylan:

While Arthur Dexter Bradley's still in the robbery game

The game as appraised here is a source which is applied to the target robbery. This line can be rendered in the following representation:

- a. P1 (BE-IN ARTHUR-DEXTER-BRADLEY GAME)
- b. P2 (MOD GAME ROBBERY)

Apart from this, verbal metaphors are illustrated in the form of predicate-argument structure like:

- P (PRED ARG1 ARG2)

In this representation, the underlined predicate (PRED) is the verb used to indicate a metaphor. As in the sentence- "Marry exploded with anger", we have propositional structures like:

- a. P1 EXPLOSION (MARRY)
- b. P2 WITH (P1, ANGER)

Here EXPLOSION and WITH are predicates, but MARRY and ANGER are arguments. The connection between linguistic construction and literal concept (e.g. exploded- EXPLOSION) is termed as 'Canonical Semantic Alignment' (CSA) and the connection between linguistic construction and metaphorical concept (e.g. exploded- BECOME ANGRY) 'Metaphorical Conceptual Semantic Alignment' (MCSA). When we move from linguistic structure to conceptual structure, we could explain easily the language specific and cross-linguistic generalizations. Now in this analysis, we need to extend this propositional level further to the perceptual level which is actually the result of recurrent patterns of experiences. It is at this ontological and image-schematic level that the elements of target and source domains are linked together. They are represented by the arguments and predicates respectively.

- 1. LS a. P1 EXPLOSION (Marry)
- ↓ b. P2 WITH (P1, Anger)
- 2. CS a. P1 EXPLOSION (Person)
- ↓ b. P2 WITH (P1, Emotion)
- 3. PS a. P1 EXPLOSION (Container)
- b. P2 WITH (P1, Content)

Sometimes, the high-level structure (P1) usually helps to refer to the earlier discussed co-text or context in a coherent manner reminding the concepts of earlier sentences which may not be available in the current sentence. So, in this sense it is more detailed in representation and keeps us more abreast to those concepts. The resultant second structure is derived by the inferential operation from a nonliteral structure to a possible literal structure. This represented structure is called as 'projected text world' or 'situation model'. Thus, the implicit thought is made explicit in the level of 'text base' by its propositional structure so that underlying structure of the surface linguistic structure gets revealed. Anyway, in this propositional approach Steen had reconstructed all these inferential constructions which make the analysis of propositional nature of metaphor possible. But whether or not these medium structures actually get involved in understanding a metaphor by the language user is an empirical question in this regard and is to be further investigated by the future researchers.

Thus, Steen (1999) found novel insight to the logical reconstruction of possible conceptual structure from the surface linguistic structure in discourse and attempted a procedure which takes five consecutive steps to explore its conceptual counterpart, namely,

- (1) Metaphor focus identification
- (2) Metaphorical idea identification
- (3) Nonliteral comparison identification
- (4) Nonliteral analogy identification
- (5) Nonliteral mapping identification

So far it has been the intuitive and persuasive approach or 'an act of belief' by which one has to infer the particular conceptual structure behind the linguistic expression. Therefore, a systematic procedure we need to have to be successful in such attempt. Lakoff (1987, 1993) and others had tried to put forward a list of conceptual metaphors which are thought to be responsible for the understanding or comprehension of linguistic expressions. Steen rather tried to account in a reverse way i.e. from linguistic to the conceptual structure in a more convincing manner. Steen strictly started from the linguistic realm. But to fix a particular conceptual abstraction by just looking at its apparent linguistic structure is also problematic.

The first step which is the 'metaphor focus identification' is actually the identification of the nonliteral sense of the referent in a textual discourse. It concerns about the conceivable conceptual irregularities of the entities which may be or may not be associated with their

literal counterparts. The next step of ‘metaphorical idea formation’ is about the recognition of the nonliteral idea or *focus* and literal idea or *topic* and framing a metaphorical relationship between these ideas. The third step of this process, ‘nonliteral comparison identification’ is naturally to have knowledge of the comparative similarity or dissimilarity of the literal and nonliteral concepts. We should start from the nonliteral concept first because it demands more attention than the literal. The later stage of ‘nonliteral analogy identification’ forms an overview of the complete conceptual structure of both of the domains where one can come across some missed conceptual elements which are indirectly stated or implied by the linguistic pattern and fill those empty slots in the conceptual structure. This stage is entirely dependent on interpretative analogy to find out the underlying guiding structure. Hence, Miller (1993, p. 384) commented that finding out the complete comparative structure may not be possible always because it depends on interpretation:

“The search for suitable values to convert an incomplete comparison statement to a nonliteral analogy is, strictly speaking, a matter of interpretation.”

For instance, to cite from Reinhart’s (1976, p. 391) own example of a sentence:

The yellow frog that rubs its back upon the window panes (‘Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ by T.S. Eliot, 1915)

According to Reinhart, here ‘rubs’ indicates the *focus*, but the sentence could possibly have other literal alternative options like ‘touches’, ‘swirls against’ etc to be replaced in the place of ‘rubs’ to make it more understandable. Now the question is how we can insert an alternative into the right place of the sentence. Then we have to reconstruct the consecutive propositions following the second step like:

- a. P1 (RUB FROG BACK)
- b. P2 (UPON P1 PANES)
- c. P3 (MOD PANES WINDOW)

Now if we say like “The yellow frog that touches its back upon the window panes”, then probably it would not sound like a metaphorical expression, though ‘touches’ can be used as a metaphor, but then we have taken this as literal in this context. By this literal expression we can now fill in the gap created by the ‘rubs’. So in this sense, the sentence misses this obvious vital literal meaning of ‘touches’ to make the unfulfilled meaning complete. Anyway,

according to Steen, finding the non-literal analogy after interpretation of the focus is difficult to handle and challenges the interpreter to perform such tasks appropriately.

Now coming to the last step, by the 'nonliteral mapping identification' we can fixedly figure out the possibly engaging concepts- literal and nonliteral and their possible counterparts to project the inter-concepts mapping to make the metaphorical meaning fulfilled.

Unlike the Lakoffian account which just confusingly stated that "Mappings should not be thought of as processes, or as algorithms that mechanically take source domain inputs and produce target domain outputs" (1993, p. 210), these propositional frames appears to be much systematic. It definitely throws some valuable light on the identification of metaphor in discourse context and this analysis is more or less taken for granted and followed generally in discourse psychology. However, Steen's identification is not conceptual in the proper sense of the term as he didn't discuss about the *mapping* between *conceptual domains*. Infact, the last two steps so far have been the subject of much debate and confusion on account of their weak theorization of these stages. Therefore, simplification of these stages could bridge the CM with its representation in language.

Pragmatic perspective on conceptual metaphor

4.1. Introduction

The value for pragmatic understanding comes not only in the time when there is an uncertain semantic confusion or when the semantic representation is largely undervalued, rather pragmatics is very much implied in every instances of metaphor use. Its role is then not only limited to the repairing the meaning through *interpretation*. When unspecified semantically, it is a question of enquiry how the meaning of linguistic elements is affected by it.

The cognitive-semantic layer of metaphor is not only reflected by the expression but this expression also has to address the context. Metaphor is not only a cognitive tool, but also an interpretative tool to be utilized while communicating with others. Cognitive properties of metaphor aren't emergent themselves, we ourselves have to explore their cognitive nature. On account of this, literary theoreticians can sometimes find metaphor as valuable accessory in interpreting the intention of the writer. Meanings of metaphors may be wholly or partly dependent upon the contextual setting in the text. In a textual context their meanings may sound more precisely. But it is also true that in general setting meanings of metaphorical phrases or clauses can also vary depending on the context.

According to Carston, the reader or listener may be dependant in most part on the lexical meaning from where they can infer meaning. But, only the lexical distribution or arrangement of metaphorical words or phrases in a sentence would be inadequate in performance if not comprehended adequately with some context. It is the interpretative property of the given lexical words in a sentence which truly makes it a metaphorical sentence. Metaphor production is so automatic that we don't consciously know about such domain transferring of meaning and when we know it we become astonished generally. In this sense metaphor could construct discourse unconsciously. The *offline metaphor* comprehension is thought to be an 'extension' (Fouconnier, 1997, p. 153) of lexically held *online metaphor* and not to be linked with language alone, rather its meaning is embedded in that specific local context, situation or negotiated conversation.

A more recent emerging trend in linguistics had been the 'social turn' of language pronounced in the works of Croft (2009), Harder (2010) and Geeraerts (2005). From a much

broader point of view these cognitive linguists were trying to explain the problem of language in terms of experientialism and conceptualisation or abstraction of concepts. This local but dynamic process has definitely a social viewpoint. Now the role of pragmatics is to reveal these social implications of the utterance because meaning is not only linguistic but also social (Harder, 2010). So in order to have a sound understanding of the utterance as well as context we need to know the role of environment in the formation of coherent set of meanings and how it serves to build a successful interaction.

Metaphors also play a prominent part in socio-cognitive nuances of thought and not to be constrained only by rhetorical understanding of certain expressions. Eubanks (1999a) figured out an array of explanations saying that current metaphor theory lacks endorsement from scholars of writing studies. In his opinion, what scholars of metaphor studies learnt in course of their truthful investigation about nature of metaphor, fails to find out possible connection between functioning of metaphor and how writing works. Metaphors which are fully charged with socio-historic implications are not used only for rhetorical purposes as pointed out by Eubanks by illustrating the example of the ‘mouse’ which implies a computer device and is not essentially used in a figurative or decorative sense. Swarms of metaphorical assumptions and their interplay always enrich our complex conversations and indexes of sharing in a society. By this, it could be shown that metaphor use without a context has no value at all. They are so merged into our cultural repertoire that they would lose their weight if used without any socio-cognitive setting. Then if one thinks that metaphors are privileged enough to be chosen for use more often because often they have socio-cultural support and individual’s biological and cultural experiences along with the premapped natural similarities of the domains, he would virtually come to understand that the similarities are not just *objective*.

Hence I think that contextual relation of metaphor formation is more important than two other factors of metaphor origin- conceptual and linguistic because of the fact that context finally determines what will be the accurate or exact meaning (though meaning is not at all a fixed or static phenomenon) or what one can derive resultantly from the expression.¹⁴ After all, metaphor production in a relevant context is not arbitrary at all. Although, eventually we may fall into dilemma of what the meaning would be if we just apply a mapping principle to a novel case of metaphor. While discussing the role of contextual elements as input into

¹⁴ Also the discussion on this chap. will be comparatively lengthy than the other chaps. signifying its importance.

metaphorical meaning, Kövecses (2010) defined the creativity of metaphors pointing out its five types of factors, namely,

- (1) Immediate linguistic context,
- (2) Knowledge of the major entities in the discourse,
- (3) Physical setting,
- (4) Social setting, and
- (5) Immediate cultural context.

Metaphor can explain novel thought by modifying the pre-existing source or target domains. In ‘source-induced creativity’, the unused features of the source domains are used to meet the contextual demand, whereas in ‘target-induced creativity’ the mapped target forces the source domain to modify its range (“connects back”) and to include other featured knowledge into it thereby creating a whole new meaning never expressed before. Thus, it describes most of the unconventional cases as compared to the ‘source-induced creativity’. Other than these, ‘context-induced creativity’ describes the novel use of a metaphor only when posited in a particular context.

As considered by Kövecses, among the profound influencing factors, the first type is the ‘immediate linguistic context’ which determines what metaphor is to be used in a linguistic context. He had drawn examples from Jean Aitchison’s (1987, p. 143) study of the sports issues reported in some American newspapers like “Cougars drown Beavers”, “Cowboys corral Buffaloes”, “Air Force torpedoes the Navy” etc. In all of these expressions, metaphors are used mentioning the names of some football teams. Actually all the verbs here which are denoting the metaphors involve the same domain of use, i.e. SEA throughout the sentences in the text and another interesting fact is that if we try to analyse them literally even then we can construct a literal meaning (e.g. the sentence “Clemson cooks Rice”).

The second type that he figured out is the ‘knowledge of the major entities’ engaging in sharing and communicating in a discourse. Here, the three entities are the two conceptualisers, i.e. the addresser and the addressee and the one topic of discussion. The third type is almost crucial so far as the selection of a particular metaphor to express an event is concerned.

The third type is the ‘physical setting’ like environment, events and consequences etc which is the resource of discussion and influences the selection process amidst the sea of metaphors

to best express the desired meaning. Natural phenomena also lead to such selection such as winter or summer season etc.

The fourth influencing aspect of metaphor which is responsible for its activation during its production and comprehension is the 'social setting'. If a metaphor is found suitable for its expression it will definitely choose an appropriate source domain involved. Though, as Kövecses stated, it is extremely variable according to the social roles, social relations and social power insinuating or intimating the speaker's social identity and orientation to it, his affiliation and gender among others are most decisive elements which need to be considered. It will necessarily incorporate other assisting metaphors to be more precise in a context. For example, in the sentence, "The rock 'n' roll pioneer rebuilds his life ...", the metaphor LIFE IS A BUILDING concomitantly brings into life other metaphors like LIFE IS JOURNEY and LIFE IS A MACHINE etc. to be more precise in understanding. And last but not the least the effect of 'immediate cultural context' influences metaphor more distinguishably than the effect of 'social setting'.

4.2. Philosophical views

It is pretty obvious that it was the fertile philosophical discussions on metaphor which fruitfully paved the way for the analysis of conceptual metaphor in later years of research. But what traditionally 'metaphor' is meant for is quite different from 'cognitive' account of metaphor. It is true that metaphors are sometimes used for ornamental purpose, but it is also epistemological. This is how knowledge can be acquired, stored and transferred. Metaphor or better say 'conceptual metaphor' is not what language makes use of; instead it is what language itself concerns about. After analysing conceptual metaphor in the varied cognitive and linguistic senses of meaning, one can easily grasp that though all the analytic studies were emerged out of the philosophical investigations firstly, the philosophical concept of 'metaphor' is different from the cognitive concept of 'conceptual metaphor'. In fact, it seems that traditionally philosophical questions about metaphor and its meaning are weighted on its pragmatic value. Now the reason why most of the contextualist or pragmatic theorists always laid emphasis on comprehension of metaphor alone rather than the production of metaphor is, I observe, due to their basic assumption of linguistic origin of metaphor. In contrast, cognitive linguists solely recommended its conceptual origin or origin in thought and generation into language.

The philosophical account of metaphor treats how metaphor is made use in the poetry, science and philosophy; it also does accept its orientational account which later cognitive philosophers pronounced. As in science, the descriptions abound with the appliances which are supposed to make understanding in a metaphorical way. The more systematized, precise and reasonably un-figurative stance of scientific language is pretty comprehensive universally. Following their tradition of writing in a strictly informative way, one may think that language may be a bundle of information to be communicated, but typically saying, even if there is necessity to transfer consciously scientific knowledge by informative language as literally as possible, science also needs some figurative language and cannot be totally devoid of this, e.g. the theory of metaphor accounts for the spatial sense of centre in describing the ‘nucleus’ of an atom and also the spatial nature of ‘time’. Richards (1936) also pointed out this indispensability of metaphorical language in science stating “Metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language...Even in the rigid language of the settled sciences we do not eliminate or prevent it with great difficulty.”

In prominent philosophical treatises, the structure of thought in speech acts is compared to a ‘force’ (e.g. every speech is supposed to have an illocutionary force in its essence). The basic model of semantics is understood by bringing the analogy of ‘content’. In the same vein, accounts like the usage of ‘tool’ metaphor in Herder and Buhler, the ‘organism’ metaphor in Humboldt and linguistic writings of the 19th century, the ‘house of being’ metaphor in Heidegger and lastly the ‘game’ metaphor and the metaphor of ‘picture’ in early *Tractatus* account of Wittgenstein, are some of the metaphors to remember. The concept of ‘valency’ or ‘valence’ in chemistry as well as in the study of verbs in linguistics is derived from the same notion of ‘force’ between two or more particles or objects to combine together.

Humboldtian account assumes that we perceive real world better by putting the metaphor between us and the concept or the object. But essentially speaking, metaphor is the only way one could understand any phenomenon in language. Thus metaphor is not what Kant believed as ‘transcendental’ in its way of apprehending the world; rather it is to be defined as essentially a form of ‘immanence’.

In 1930s the history of metaphor studies took a new turn with the pioneering work executed by I. A. Richards who first recognised the critical importance of metaphor in the philosophy of thought. This climactic phase blew a storm of thought waves among following generations of philosophers and thinkers to penetrate deep into that matter, to contribute actively and to

find out new principles underlying it. Richards for the first time recognised its implicative power which might be worthy to be a full theory. At that time, he himself had been persuaded to review his previous writings on metaphor which pushed the next generation of ‘use’ theorists to think about that tensile problem. To his view, metaphor is not only for ornamental purpose, there is a greater significance in its emergence from our abstract ideas and capability of pictorial image-processing. This is what came to be known later as ‘interactionist’ view of metaphor. In his ‘context theorem of meaning’ metaphorical meaning is thought to be a result of the connection of words with other words in a discourse. An isolated word does not have a meaning which is only possible if it is made out of its corresponding cognitive network with others. These ideas obviously surpassed the so-called semantic functions and realisation of words. As Jerry L. Morgan (1979) observed in his ‘Pragmatics of metaphor’ that some ‘semantic feature’ change may occur in a sentence while it loses its original literal meaning and rather selects a metaphorical one. The selection of new meaning of such kind may also be resulted from pragmatic approach to a sentence. It means that even a sensible sentence could be used metaphorically under certain circumstances. Richards’ novelty in his writing is that he first formulated the idea of ‘large and flexible structure of thought’ which corresponds to our use of words. If this is so, then meaning of words is not fixed or static; it is bound to be dynamic and creative in fertile context. No atomic schemata for the static units of meaning actually exist. This theory had overthrown naturally other standard semantic procedure to be accounted for by declaring that metaphorical meaning is only possible in interactive context, it is not one-sided ‘verbal displacement’, instead the two conversing parties are jointly exchanging and developing their meanings in contexts (what Richards called as ‘interanimation of words’) during the ‘interaction’ by borrowing and lending words. True to Richards’ proposed conversational context, any metaphorical statement is all literal if we accept this theory. There may seem to be an overemphasised importance on interaction and communication where context plays a vital role. This excessive insistence on contextual influence cannot make a balanced account of metaphor. Indeed if we accept this to be true for sure for the comprehension of metaphor, how far it can be true for the production of metaphor, how can we explain then the other cognitive faculties of human being which is also thought of working metaphorically? Hence Richards identified this as problematic in finding out the conflict between the cognitive and the communicative meanings in conversational contexts between interlocutors. This disparity in meaning is like speaking something literally but meaning metaphorically in which one thing is said with an anticipation of affecting another meaning, namely metaphorical or it may be the other way round that the information

is thought of in metaphorical way but communicated literally. But, both Searle and Donald Davidson claimed as opposed to semantic interaction theory that there is no modification of the literal meaning in a metaphorical expression as a consequence of “interaction”; that its meaning is what it literally says.

When Celan says that metaphors are the “iron bars of language”, we recognise that metaphors blur and also clear the knowledge of the speaker at the same time. Now how can a metaphor blur the sense of the utterance? We know that metaphor is not totally grounded in the lexical meaning. The meaning is also indebted to the speaker’s intentional as well as contextual complexity. Searle’s (1979) paper on metaphor makes it clear that the reader or listener wants to grasp the meaning of what is left directly uninformed by the writer or speaker through the words or sentential utterance. We can also classify processing of meaning into two kinds: the conceptual and the pragmatic or interpretative, because first a cognitive thought is expressed into lexical expression which is then open to varied sorts of contexts and a paraphernalia of meanings and exists as an object of interpretation by the reader. Hence, it is noteworthy that Searle did not take into consideration cognitive processing of metaphor which is obvious in his writings. He noted how it is possible to coincide the sentence meaning with the speaker’s intended meaning. It appears that Searle thrust on the theme of utterance of the speaker and how it is understood at all. Overall, his stance is to be considered as ‘holistic’, that his assumption cannot explain the origin and production of metaphor at the cognitive level, rather how it is comprehended by the hearer at the pragmatic level of understanding becomes his chief issue of philosophical discussion.

Searle being one of the prominent contemporaries in the history of metaphor literature is influential in the sense that he had taken a stance quite different from his predecessors so far as the chief characteristics of metaphor are concerned. As such, Searle ascribed to the metaphor theory a totally seminal view, the trace of which could be found in the *substitution view* of metaphor. Though his theory on metaphor was drawn from the historical resources of precedent and contemporary philosophers, his tribute to the metaphor theory was immense. There are also many critiques of the weaknesses as well as feats of his theoretical claims or propositions, but his whole theory is grounded on his assertion that metaphor is ‘not a performance of indirect speech act’, for this reason this is not to be justified as valid or invalid in terms of truth-conditions. His discussion also takes into its domain the problems of how metaphor violates the norms of ‘expressible’ by trespassing into the realm of odds and

unknowns. Anyway, he advanced his own approach on the importance of three sets of General views, namely, 'comparison', 'interaction' and last but not the least 'substitution'. Searle's view is considered to be a variation of substitutive view (Burkhardt, 1990) which in turn is supposed to be another variation of comparison view which for Searle is not a proper view. On the other hand, interaction view is also not a correct view either. The overall estimation suggests that his attributions to these views are what Wittgenstein (1953, p. 593) calls as 'one-sided diet' to assess metaphor at all. Primarily, Searle (1979) stated that metaphor is 'a special case' in point. He wanted to figure out the difference between the meaning of what is said and what the speaker intends the listener to understand it to be and also how much intended meaning is reflected in the uttered expression. Metaphor is special because by such use of semantically odd words, speaker derives a meaning which is supposed to be something else. He insisted that problem of deriving metaphorical meaning is in contrast with the problem of deriving literal meaning from normal uses of expression. When speaker generally utters something but intends to mean something else, one could face problem in understanding literal meaning without any assistance of metaphor. So he treated such cases differently. The stark implicative difference between general literal uses and metaphorical uses is due to that fact that unlike metaphorical uses, literal uses are found in irony and indirect speech acts. Searle advanced that meaning in metaphorical sentence is not limited by the sentence, rather we have to be attentive to the speaker's intention, that 'langue' does not play a role in indicating that the given expression is a metaphor. That's why, Searle negated any embeddedness of metaphorical meaning evoked by the uttered expression, Uttered expression carries nothing but the literal conventional meaning and to find metaphorically valid meaning in expression one has to look into the intention of the speaker if he has any. Therefore, the logicity of metaphor lies in intentionality only. The sentence works only as a 'guide' to probe into speaker's intention. Anyway, another facet of novelty in his argument is that both the speaker and hearer who must have a pre-existing knowledge of the 'set of principles' regarding metaphor, actively engage in constructing the metaphorical meaning.

This two-fold argument of Searle which on the one hand proposes the lack of metaphoricity in the literal meaning of the sentence and on the other hand the decisive presence of the context is quite clear from his discussion which in part supports recent revelation of the cognitive structure of metaphor. It supports the cognitive structure partially because though the intentionality or the contextuality of the utterance was truthfully established by the

evidences of later cognitive and psychological examinations¹⁵, Searle's proposal lacks any cognitive account of metaphorical meaning. Well-equipped with the backing of his previous knowledge of the meaning of literal language, he drove his investigation towards the meaning of metaphorical one and assured that from literal meaning one has to go further to the metaphorical meaning via the inference of the speaker's intention.

It seems that Searle didn't acknowledge any cognitive activity of language that language is the product of metaphorical transfer in the broader sense. His sole motive is thus supposed to uphold the language part only. Apart from this, speaker's intention is set forth by this suggested utterance. Taking the simple assertive sentences, he justified the intentionality and contextuality of the sentence meaning which makes the truth-conditions of the sentence relative to it in terms of meaning, but not in terms of substance which plays the pivotal role in determining the meaning. The sentence is then thought to be consisted of 'indexical elements' (Burkhardt, 1990) and their truth-conditions the meaning of which is fixed by the relevant context, and cannot be explored by the semantic structure.

Davidsonian account on metaphorical utterance and understanding also limited his understanding on the comprehension part only and did not account for any cognitive model. Obviously it is apparent that Davidson maintained a gap between the literal and the metaphorical, the distance between them is to be filled by skilful attempt of the reader, given a specific context which is required to fuse the two kinds of meanings together. It sounds like Davidson is giving preference more to the speaker's intended meaning which is meant to work in the immediate context. So metaphor evocation is actually a matter of speech-acts. Therefore in Davidsonian terms, intention and context are all crucial in determining the metaphor communicated by the literal expression. Davidson seems to contend for such a model where it seems that the two compared concepts remain in the opposite poles, only standing for what they literally mean, they will never merge unless and until one actively engages in explaining. According to him, this is not a metaphorical meaning at all in its very first appearance and needs special attention for explanation as this is not a straightforward meaning. The two interlocutors come forward to devise the meaning through an expected negotiation. The context plays as the connector between two colliding concepts (the Tenor and the Vehicle) the reconciliation of which is achieved by proper positioning of concepts within an occurrence setting. This observation could be rendered into the following sketch:

¹⁵ Current research findings of text linguistics have been found to be in line with these concepts (cf. e.g. de Beaugrande/ Dressler, 1981, p. 88 ff.).




Figure 4.1: Metaphor comprehension (based on Davidson's account, 1978).

The traditional line of philosophical thought on contextual expression believed in the idea that literal meaning of the sentence which is fully-formed proposition is primarily processed before any further interpretative stage of sentence meaning. Recanati's view did not tread this line of thought. Instead his contention led us to the belief that literal meaning is actually activated firstly and also independently of the proposition. He took Davidson's take on metaphor one step forward that in comprehending metaphor we come to know firstly the literal meaning. In the later stage of meaning construction, we proceed to explore the metaphorical implication of that literal one. Hence, other representational frameworks of the constituents and their relational functions like the derived interpretative meanings work in parallel with the literal meaning. Of course in this environment, 'contextual clues' accelerate or moderate all the representational frameworks thereby favouring the 'derived meaning' in opposition to the literal. Thus, literal meaning is to be dropped by 'loosening' and further extended to suit the particularities of the situation by 'transfer'. Recanati called this event of acceptance of the derived meaning as comparatively favourable candidate as "temporal shift in accessibility" (2004, p. 30). Thus, eventually the literal succumbs in the hands of the derived meaning as in the case of metaphor. Then if this contention is true, we may conclude that literal meaning is a part in the emergence of the metaphorical meaning.

4.3.Literality

In general sense, one can understand an expression in a context literally or metaphorically. But in understanding the meaning of a metaphorical sentence, literality is thought to be one of

the 'unwanted obstruents' which makes the metaphoricity of the sentence impossible. Because, metaphors are not straightforwardly created; it takes the medium of literal meaning first. Hence a metaphor produced by the source and target domains is actually indirectly recognized. On this issue, Davidson (1978) suggested in conclusive terms that metaphor has meaning only in contextual 'use' which later Black (1979) denied. For him, literal meaning of metaphor is be all and end all, therefore self-contented. The metaphorical model that Davidson always believed in ignores totally the functional operation of 'cognitive content' in metaphor creation; instead it opens up the door of whole discursive play of meanings. In his opinion, it seems to be embarrassing really in trying to figure out a meaningful meaning out of the apparently awkward literal expression.

McGlone (1996) pointed out the correspondence of literal meaning with metaphorical meaning by inferring from a collective study of thirty-two Princeton undergraduates who were given to interpret the meaning of the metaphorical sentence- "Dr. Moreland's lecture was a three-course meal for the mind". In reply, most of the participants said in favour of this sense of the sentence that "Dr. M's lecture touched on a variety of topics, but was well-integrated, thorough and intellectually stimulating". Interestingly it negates the intended metaphorical one "The lecture satisfied mind's intellectual hunger thoroughly". This suggests that the participants were likely to comprehend the literal meaning instead of the intended one (i.e. IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor); that they were more likely to follow the word-by word literal understanding of the sentence. The given sentence might stir up mapping correspondence with its preconceived interpretation which participants were not immediately exposed to. As this case might happen, the contextual information which was not given there was avoided unconsciously. When asked for alternative sentence as the above one, they tended to translate the 'three course meal' into different food or odd items. This might provoke McGlone to conclude according to the 'attributive categorical theory' rather than domain-to-domain mapping resisting entire Lakoff-Johnsonian model of meaning shift. Here McGlone might be misguided by the result he found in his single experiment. But as a matter of fact, this should be remembered that there were choices on the part of the participants to interpret that sentence.

Other than this, understanding the literal meaning and expanding it to the metaphorical meaning are not mutually exclusive or could not be produced as a preference between two strategies occasionally. Rather they are laid out in different stages of development into full-fledged metaphor. Literal odd meaning comes first and foremostly to the people's mind and

eventually it amounts to be a metaphorical phenomenon. Feldman's mental theory of language also supports this conviction clearly. In this sense, McGlone's argument does not essentially give flesh to the theory.

Possible psycholinguistic evidences are also there to support the hypothesis that literal meaning necessarily precedes the metaphorical meaning. In a cross-modal priming study (Swinney, 1979) on polysemous words (words which have multiple meanings or more than one meaning), a lexical decision task was introduced among the participants to choose the accurate meaning. Swinney had fixed various onset times to separately analyse each of the successive stages of its processing development. It had been observed that in the early step the ambiguous meanings get activated during the first course of comprehension and the participants want to focus solely upon the duality of meaning without recognising the contextually proper meaning. But in later stage of development, falling into a contextual situation, they dropped the irrelevant meanings out from consideration. In this respect it is still worth-investigating whether or not other associative meanings along with the polysemous meanings are also activated. But relevance theorists don't seem to indulge such idea as this may beget complexity in negating the more basis semantic features and establishing the contextual influence taken as a whole.

Sometimes, the figurative meaning happens to become encoded contextually as one of the polysemous literal meaning in a semantic shift. But in opposition, Wilson and Carston (2007) rightfully declared that in the case of polysemous meaning, one selects proper meaning via disambiguation whereas for figurative expression, one needs *ad hoc* concept construction to reach to the desired meaning. Because in this case, the concepts are too unrelated to be processed exclusively by disambiguation.

Anyway, we can see that the literality of only 'structural' type of metaphor is discussed and proposed so far. If this concept of literality is true then it is worth-investigating how it can explain the literality of the ontological and orientational types. The concept of literality is hardly found to work at all for these two types of metaphors which are found to be involved in almost every expression.

4.4. Metaphoricity

Metaphor is not only fixed in lexical utterance, but its users also have to go beyond the usual sense of reference to decode the meaning in its different dimensions of features. For literal meaning, context is not so much necessary, but for metaphorical meaning, context is important as it provides more suitable meaning for consideration whereas in unsuitable circumstances where context is not sufficiently contributing or one doesn't have enough contextual knowledge to crack the meaning, metaphor processing becomes slow ('Direct Access model', Gibbs, 1994, p. 421). Then at the very first step he could understand that there is something discrete in the meaning and therefore it is to be interpreted with good discretion. So, contextual background knowledge is expected to understand the intended or communicated meaning.

There is also substantial overall similarity among all the nonliteral devices of language that they rely definitely on the literal lexical meaning from where they take their precedence. Byrne and Kolbel in their introduction in *Arguing about language* pointed out this plausible emergence of metaphorical meaning from literal meaning of language though they were in doubt enough to confirm their statement i.e. there seems to be a whole-part relation between literal and metaphorical meaning at this 'metarepresentational' stage of interpretation (Carston, 2010) in which metaphorical meaning is thought to be derived from the literal one. It is a 'special case of ambiguity' of words and specific context chooses which one is to be applied- the literal meaning or the perfect meaning stretched out of the literal. In contrast to Lakoff's later arguments in which he considered that every metaphor surfaces first at conceptual level, Byrne and Kolbel developed their argument on the basis of differences between dead and live metaphors. Live metaphors get their model from dead metaphors which are so often exploited that they lose their strength of creativity in context. Now these live metaphors have nothing but the literal meaning and the context to establish their new meanings. Thus it is clear that unlike Lakoff who analyzed origin of metaphor in terms of real-time events on the conceptual plane, Byrne and Kolbel were more likely to discuss the potentiality of its meaning on the contextual plane.

4.5. Relevance theoretic model (RT)

In *entailment* process, aspects of one domain should be consistent with their referred aspects of another domain. This is one of the criteria of successful domain mapping. The absence of this quality or the violation of this condition could lead to broken illustration. Because there may be situations when entailment of source domain could not properly relate to the target domain. As an example, the metaphor NATION IS A BODY in “The Tory leader’s ambition, on current evidence, is to make Britain the ingrowing toenail of Europe” (The Daily Telegraph, 26 October, 2009). Here, body entails the Europe, toenail the Britain. But then what the ‘toe’ is all about in this point of reference. Undoubtedly the above example is another form of word-play in the discourse of political scenario.

In Lakoff’s (1993) ‘Invariance Principle’ (IP) too, the structural consistency between the elements of two domains is the precondition for being mapped. In this sense, the mapping principle expects the speaker to remain faithful to the original image-schematic structure (Johnson, 1987) which is to be mapped onto the target. So, one cannot map anything onto other to get a mapped structure. On the other hand, this is a kind of over-generalisation in the face of diverse contextual influence. Even if we take this technical notion to be granted we cannot assure of the intended communicated meaning by only applying this principle. This principle though rooted in the cognitive idealistic position, may thus turn to be impractical when it directly comes to identifying practical implicatures. Ruiz de Mendoza (1998) observed that if we follow preserving this principle some creative structural metaphors cannot be executed. On this basis, IP calls for an extended version of this. The ‘Extended Invariance Principle’ (EIP) can solve many problems by introducing generic-level structure and also adhering to the previous model of image-schematic structure. Because, it can now give value to the implicative power of any domain in its abstraction.

Strictly speaking, an utterance may beget diverse meanings in diverse situations. Then it is not a single mapping case, instead it is open to multiple mappings in endless kinds of situations. This is more evident when cross-linguistic and cross-cultural data are considered (Charteris-Black, 2004; Kövecses, 2009). That’s why sometimes reader or listener may fail to grasp the intended vague idea.

Therefore, some problematic and confusing questions arise about how to determine the source of meaning, or where this meaning lies in general. Is this to be found in the source or

the target or the context? This section will show how CMT is merged with the discursive model of Relevance theory (RT) and assimilated it into its realm. Relevance theory which is guided by the principle of 'relevance' talks about exclusively on the contextual side that the communicative relevance of meaning is the result of the construction of an *ad hoc concept*, an extra meaning. But the problem is that the meaning could not be decoded unless the context is properly informed to evoke the meaning. Moreover this may indicate the implausibility of its successful communication anyway, i.e. the possible meaning is neither in the source nor in the target. It could not be found out simply in the 'paraphrasable' ordinary language expression (Sperber & Wilson, 2008, p. 102). Though definition of meaning of such kind does not go in parallel with the cognitive relevance of meaning as such, it has nevertheless different inferential connotations coming out of interactive sessions of dialogues. But how successfully we could deflate the gap between the cognitive and the communicative in need of an integrated meaning of metaphor is a sole theoretical concern. How one could infuse CMT into the framework of RT had confused generations of philosophers down the decades. Hence the parallelism in which they share a common ground is the point that metaphorical meaning could not be resolved by assuming the literary meaning first and then the metaphorical meaning in the second (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006, p. 380). Because cognitive account of language cannot explain how meaning comes out of context or how meaning is influenced considerably by context. As meaning is not predetermined, it is yet to be decided and varies according to relevance of context. Indeed, it is dependent on complex argument relations, interlocutors' expectations and fulfilments which are intensively active in enforcing the listener or reader to pursue a meaning by exploring the situation. The speaker's utterance is not then concerned about meaning formation; it is not in that sense accountable for the metaphorical statement. Then the 'use' theory of metaphor can only explain why some metaphors create discourses which have a far-reaching effect on the reader's mind.

So we have to see how efficiently we can point out the accurate cognitive meaning detaching it from its contextual implication. But the question is: can we determine the cognitive meaning without any communicative interpretation perspective which as a whole covers the cognitive meaning as well? On the other hand, in cognitive perspective Lakoff's 'invariance principle' specified the preservation of 'cognitive topology' (i.e. image-schemata structure) of source domain content as long as it is compatible with the target domain in understanding a metaphor. The source domain schema predominates over the target domain knowledge by

interfering it. But the cognitive dominance over the target domain of meaning is supposed to be expected from the situation. Anyway, the meaning is more or less shaped by the ‘constraining power’ of the context which by itself creates the case-specific principle and varies accordingly. Possibly this relation between cognitive and communicative may be ‘circular’ when the principle itself becomes the result of contextual discourse. The chief limitation of this ready-made principle is that the meaning output cannot be verified by this.

I believe this event to be dependent on the speaker’s attempt to draw a conclusion from a compromise between the two unbalanced poles of cognitive and communicative and eventually negotiating into a meaning where the source demands more from cognitive input and the target from pragmatic input. Then ‘conceptual metaphor’ is also ‘pragmatic metaphor’. Though it takes its root in concepts or is built upon conceptual foundation, it is not totally conceptual rather it turns out to be finalised by contextual demand. Anyway, pragmatic metaphorical meaning is more accurate and precise in its circumstantial decision making. This new pragmatic approach is stronger than the traditional approach which generally follows a deductive approach and insists on the idea that if literality could not decode the meaning, metaphoricity will make it possible.

For an illustration, in the sentence “The cleric is revolving around his own stupidity” the source domain is the relationship between a rotating object and a corresponding object in the centre. We experience the same schema in understanding the movement pattern of celestial bodies like the earth’s revolution around sun or proton’s movement around electron in a circular fashion. It is certain that this common spatial image-schema is mapped onto the stupid behaviour of the cleric here though the aspects of this domain are not consistently alike with the aspects of stupidity-cleric relation. What accounts here is the context of this metaphor use which actually speaks the last word to determine the exact mapping of the aspects of two domains.

Relevance theoretical framework recognises the relevance of any expression which considers the relation of expression with its immediate context. In the course it is discernible that there is the degree of implicature of a metaphorical meaning in discourse. Depending on the vagueness of target meaning the context takes the scope of extending or loosening up the meaning. There may be different connotative *distances* of reference. *Distance* means the apparent similarity between source and target domain and also between their mapping and the context. In the case of polemical or argumentative reasoning, sometimes the strength of

metaphorical impact entirely depends on context which forces reader or listener to extract more from contextuality of the expression. Actually ‘implicated’ meaning is acquired through the sufficient response from the context. These *dialogic* metaphors are more often found in conversational usages (Sperber & Wilson, 2008, pp. 98-99). Another type of metaphor which RT takes into its realm is *literary* metaphor which is found in creations of literary genres and actually has its command over the readers. This metaphor lets any meaning to play because there is no contextual stability or fixity in this type. Rich in meaningfulness, this is open for interpretation. Considerably this metaphor may have loose connection with context in its way of referencing. This is so ‘weak’ in its contextual relevance of the utterance that its literal meaning retains the same in different circumstances being *metarepresented* in reader’s understanding and its beauty lies in the fact that it could be discovered and rediscovered throughout the text changing its colour steadily from one paragraph to another paragraph in a reflective and interpretative manner (Carston & Wearing, 2011, p. 310). This enables the writer to hide the explicit meaning in the text and does not let the reader drive home a conclusion. In consequence this may often fall into severe criticism in tactical scenario though mostly in some cases the statements are made keeping a safe geo-political and historical distance.

To distinguish between RT and CMT, it can be said that the first lets the meaning undergo an inferential process following deductive methods, but CMT is mostly assumed on the basis of comparison and association. Now, so far as directionality from input mapping to output meaning is concerned, mapping via association cannot lead us to the exact target meaning due to emphasis on generalisation of the compatible features. In contrast, mapping via logical inference being not constrained by associative principles generally, but governed by contextual relevance, is accurate in meaning construction.

In this respect, propositionality of knowledge comes into play. So far as meaning construction is concerned, it is a key point of enquiry that how much meaningfulness we could have from the proposition itself without any inference and how much meaningfulness is pragmatically added after inference. When assessing the pragmatic function, Recanati divided this into two steps: primary pragmatic processes and secondary pragmatic processes. To start with the first step, he introduced the concept of linguistically encoded meaning (LEM) which is nothing but sentence meaning or better said, linguistically encoded meaning and is thought to be *pre-propositional* or *non-truth-conditional*. This LEM is an independent

entity which precedes the pragmatic effects in the context. After LEM, other processes like *saturation*, *free enrichment*, *loosening*- all come into play to turn LEM into fully-formed propositions which contain what the interlocutors claim as ‘*what is said*’. Then to initialise the second step, completely established propositions are made use as inputs. So this step is *post-propositional* and amply hinted as *implicature* in the work of Grice (1989). This whole process goes against the traditional minimalist conception that the function of pragmatics happens only after the proposition is finally established.




Figure 4.2: Cycle of pragmatic processes in language.

Wilson and Carston (2010) preferred this newly introduced concept to better understand the interface between semantics and pragmatics. Traditional perspectives on semantics which talks about the truth-conditional orientation of language is essentially devoid of the idea which proposes that the linguistic codes are just the indication of their cognitive resources in thought (Carston, 2010; Pietroski, 2005). By means of these codes, one could derive full propositional status of meaning only by inference. Then this event could maintain the concept of ‘inferential fitness’ which proposes that inference needs to rely on propositions as its premises. As it is clear that linguistic item itself which is supposed to represent the thought precedes any pragmatic function which is to be applied to it when explicated to make it perfectly propositional along with its implicatures. Therefore, semantics is always pre-propositional and language carries only the *schema* or *template* to be exploited by the pragmatic activities.

Markus Tendahl (2006) introduced into practice the association of cognitive linguistic approaches with the model of Relevance Theory. This merging actually allows us to think

about metaphor as a result of domain mapping as well as inference. Thus, this is directly in opposition with the modularity of mental architecture, i.e. the idea that it is the outcome of the cognitive thought processes in an amodal language. Therefore, image-schemata in connection with the propositional representations could be able to capture the expressivity of metaphor. Because cognitive linguistic stance on metaphor cannot explain alone how the necessary features are selected in a constrained way during interpretation or comprehension.

This can be contended by Tendahl's (2006, p. 201) model of Relevance Theoretic view of CM that CM function firstly as items of the 'extended knowledge structure'. But after a considerable amount of use in context over time they become included into our 'internal knowledge structure' as encyclopaedic entry of concepts. Thus depending on the nature of mapping, the domains are selected for mapping and the intended meaning is conveyed through these conjugated domains. In this sense, for Tendahl they are by nature stuck in an intermediate position between the relevant assumption and the established knowledge of the concept. But how this shift is taken place is also postulated by Tendahl. He introduced the concept of *ad hoc* and its necessary concept of *free slot*. *Ad hoc* concept construction allows the free slot to be filled in partially or completely. Free slot which is a specific part in the *conceptual region*, acts as the gateway to other conceptual structures. This empty free slot which is non-entrenched is thought to be the *gap* in meaning and to be filled in by *connector*. Then the free slot becomes an *entrenched* free slot and is embedded in long-term memory. This could have little possibility to be part of lexical concept, because they are only to be realised in connection with some contextual structure. As compared to Tendahl's explanation, Relevance Theory just calls this contextual orientation as *broadening* and *narrowing* and doesn't introduce any concept like *free slot* or *connector* etc.

It is to be noted that *ad hoc* concept in Relevance Theory unlike conceptual domains in CMT is very temporary by nature and dependant on contextual relevance for their filling in. Moreover, if established by *entrenchment* process, *ad hoc* concepts can eventually amount to be lexicalised forms. This is in this respect different from conceptual domains which are thought of coming out of the mental spaces but cannot ever turn into lexical concepts.

Stöver (2010) also attempted to commingle the aspects of Cognitive Linguistic account of metaphor with Relevance Theory framework. This venture is undoubtedly suggestive of queries regarding figurative language comprehension. In Stöver's (2010) account, we see how Conceptual Metaphor Theory could be aligned with Relevance Theory considering its

association with cognitive linguistics. Influenced by his understanding of the ideas of Relevance Theory as defined by Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) and Carston (2002), he was in the opinion that metaphor is a special case in point because of the fact that it is bereft of ‘propositional effect’. Actually metaphor entails all the basic imagistic-experiential materials along with the mental simulation techniques (Barsalou, 1999; 2005). Following Carston’s analysis (2010), he also hypothesized that there is also a literal meaning over a metaphorical meaning in the metarepresentational level of representation working over the vast body of metaphor realisation. His is a modified account of Wilson (2009) which suggests that metaphor is the product of both of the language and the thought that it is not exclusively language which is solely responsible for its origin. But he proposed clearly that either it is experientially originated or propositionally manifested, because he believed that each layer of representation has its own domain-specific inputs. And surely he convinced his readers by confirming the initiatives of experiential inputs to contribute to the formation of propositional functions. So the metarepresentational layer changes the experiential stage into propositional one in which literal meaning of the represented expression is understood. Literal meaning as a specific case can be better understood in the light of propositional context.

Stöver (2010) treated how *situated conceptualisation* (Barsalou, 1999; 2005) affects metaphor processing in a non-propositional way. We know that propositional features of metaphor deal with its literal expression directly. According to Wilson (2009), previously it had been thought that metaphor is the direct product of language itself. Anyway, Stöver’s contention is that though metaphor embarks first on the level of propositional stage, it has been further modified by individual’s experiential and imagistic influences when at more comprehension level the meaning is inferred and assumed. This approach was amply supported by Carston’s (2010) metarepresentational approach to metaphorical meaning. In his discussion and reformulation of CMT, Stöver also incorporated Tendahl’s (2006) Hybrid theory of Metaphor. Being largely influenced by Tendahl, he accounted for a hybrid model which summarises the distinction clearly between propositional and non-propositional accounts and their pragmatic understanding.

Stöver’s study of Conceptual metaphor under the model of Relevance Theory is noteworthy as he proposed that metaphorical meaning comes out in the form of an implicature among other plausible implicatures. This choice is born out of the incorporation of *ad hoc* concept¹⁶

¹⁶ See also Barsalou’s (1983) work on *ad hoc* concept construction in categories.

which is entertained by a proper context made by the meaning of the words or sentences preceding or following it. Then, Relevance Theory certainly contributes to the idea of making of the meaning through inference and other means to discover it despite the fact that there are other approaches to be considered.

Relevance theoretical stance of metaphor theory is imbued with the communicative implication of metaphor comprehension. It is this power of having infinite number of ways of implications of metaphor that allows the hearer to derive meaning as the speaker lets him break the communicated code. One has to choose then one suitable meaning out of many weak meanings. More recent account supports *ad hoc* concept construction in which meaning is to be inferred taking its ground from the preceding account. Barsalou's work on categories has enriched this concept to a greater extent. This process consists of choosing the most relevant constituents from a set of encyclopaedic informations encoded in a given content of the lexical items and then constructing a different concept altogether. But critique on *ad hoc* concept is owing to the fact that it fails to explain the reason behind the complex and extended metaphors noticeably.

Anyway, it is evident without any doubt that meaning is not solely encoded in language but also in context. The pragmatic problem still raises the question of how language as the carrier of meaning can take us to the accurate meaning. This medium requires the inferential ability of the individual which supposedly judges whether or not a metaphorical proposition is 'fit' to the context (the problem of 'inferential fitness').

The main assumptions of Relevance Theory propound that an act of communication comprises of two kinds of intentions, namely *informative intention* and *communicative intention*. Informative intention is something a speaker speaks to the hearer; whereas communicative intention is something which the speaker intends to say implicitly. Needless to say, such implied kind of communication is so much permeated with possibilities, doubts, suspensions which every interlocutor undergoes that the relevance of the utterance is confused or challenging to discover. So an utterance always presupposes a belief on what the speaker has said. This presumption is prominent necessity to deconstruct the meaning. It is also a balancing and collaborative act to be performed between two parties, an act which is to be confirmed by the speaker and derived by the hearer. Better communication skill is always presumed to be more precise and thereby effective to the target audience or the hearer.

Relevance theory is also useful in approaching anew the *extended metaphor* in an elongated textual narrative. Not only in literary practices but also in political discourses extended metaphor is used to assert the same underlying core construal with an objective to impress the minds of the readers. We can find there a chain of novel metaphors related to each other throughout the text in such a way that they could form a defragmented complex whole which itself appears to be a distinct metaphor though formed out of sub-metaphors. In such a case, understanding metaphors is not as simple as that of straightforward single use of metaphor like 'X is Y' and they also provide some contextual clues to disentangle the intended meaning of the author. Therefore, extended metaphor consists of same semantic thread of different sub-mappings in a textual imagery. This is how semantically dissimilar but cognitively similar mappings are used. This is what is called the *primary effect* on comprehension process (Stöver, 2006). These interrelated metaphors could be in the form of entailment which can sometimes explain some cases of metaphors how they are interconnected cognitively. Actually they use same mapping domains and one or more frames of these domains to *reinforce* on the same point of comparison in a long-stretched text. Each metaphor hence follows a principle of coherence with the preceding and following metaphors so that an internal consistency could be achieved. Thus, the overall impression from a text full with extended mappings seems to have shared the same source domain. The encyclopaedic features of a domain are thus exploited to get the full benefit. These metaphors are so overlapped together that they could hardly be separated without proper methods or techniques.

Extended metaphorical account could be better handled by relevance theoretic application which suggests that in such case several *activation levels* are generated depending on the degree of relevance. The comparison between entities would appear to be more striking if novel kind of mapping is used frequently showing more than one mapping between features. The standard model of Relevance Theory cannot explain this kind of account of complex metaphor. At this, Carston's model of dual processing (2009, 2010) is relevant here as it suggests one of the processing routes *metarepresents* the literal meaning of the whole account.

In both of prose and verse, these metaphors could be found in galore. Sometimes the following metaphors are applied in support of establishing the preceding prominent metaphor in a persuasive appreciation. In this, the author may express his feelings in the form of simile

rather. Anyway, we can analyse here a piece of extended metaphorical instance from Shakespeare. Following is the most-quoted extract from ‘As You like It’:

“All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts.”

Though somewhat decontextualised, this piece of artwork refers to a metaphorical connection between the stage of play and the entire world, i.e. the metaphor WORLD IS A STAGE in which some sub-metaphors are brought along to extend the concept of theatrical existence of human life by entailment process. These sub-metaphors are likely to be HUMAN LIFE IS A PLAY, PEOPLE ARE PLAYERS, BIRTH IS ENTRANCE DOOR, DEATH IS EXIT DOOR and INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE IS ROLE TO BE PLAYED. As in a play the players are thought to be acting as players, in real world as well the people could be thought of as players acting since the time of their birth until they end up with the death moments which are symbolised here as their crossing of the gate of death. The *ad hoc* concept of play is here denoted with its wider signification through other features and resultantly characterizing the non-material human life as a whole. But if one extends this inference upto the concrete details of the play, then the concept of life can no longer be compared to the concept of play. Obviously one can also include other features into comparison like the acting skills of the players with the capabilities of the individuals to deal with life, the stage prop used to decorate the stage with the background to be put up and grown up with, the applause or blame of the audience of the play with the support or rejection from the friends and family, kith and kin etc. But we cannot go much further to compare human life with other concrete details of ‘play’ (which is a real event, “a dramatic composition written to be performed”) and the other features like makeup, cosmetics used, the backlight of the stage and its colour which are sometimes irrelevant to be compared with the human life which may lose its contextual significance at this. But it is noteworthy that in other contextual situations these features may emerge as meaningful or appropriate. The utterance situation determines this result. Such narrowing down of the relevant features is necessary to be more specific. It is this flexible balancing act between explicature and implicature that makes the exposing or broadening and narrowing down possible features in a context. Thus extensions to different facets of an opera or play evoked by this single but complex metaphor are handled properly in order to mark an ultimate effect on the reader’s mind. Shakespeare had truly been ingenious in making such universal theme to be more meaningful by such metaphorical ornamentation.

Another interesting fact about extended metaphorical illustrations is that the entailment process of all the features which runs in the underlying cognitive domains becomes explicit in this extended format. It seems that the author himself or herself is letting all the sub-mappings to be delivered leaving no confusion during interpretation. Because even if the author simply says “All the world’s a stage...” without explaining immediately in the successive lines (“...all the men and women merely players;/ They have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts.”), people could still comprehend its meaning effortlessly.

Thus in contextual relations of discourse, this theory will prove to be handy at best in understanding the lines during comprehension. We need supposition and inference which let the metaphorically logical meaning to come out. The most plausible inference is to be sorted out among others. Such unique pragmatic use of understanding allows us to transcend the limited boundary set forth by the concept of Play and Life and leads us to experience the virtual meaning only possible by metaphoric reality.

In this literary stretching of metaphor, another fact is that different metaphorical source domains can allude to the same target domain though they are not found to be connected semantically. How this is possible when writers use different source domains to map the same target domain at once is not answered by the concept of *ad hoc* concept construction. It is this beauty of extended metaphor that attracts attention. As such, seemingly all these mappings may be the sub-mappings of a super-mapping and the super-structure may entail all the other sub-structures. For example, two metaphors like LIFE IS BATTLE and LIFE IS WAR may act as two parallel metaphors which are boiled down to denote the same target domain of reference, i.e. LIFE.

CMT on the other hand can successfully handle such issues and suggest a different explanation for this phenomenon, i.e. every metaphor has an ‘underlying schematic pattern’ (Stöver, 2010) which is based on experience and is not to be defined as structural but functional or processual. This is rather creatively forwarded to the reader. This can also be compared to the entailment process in which all the sub-mappings are connected together by a single thread of a super-mapping and try to share their roles manageably by mapping the elements unconsciously in the target domain. It is notable that in this process of elaboration, analogical resemblance in the mapped association of the domains is the only apparent firsthand prerequisite to look forward to the extensive domain mapping.

4.6. Metonymy

Gilles Fauconnier (1997) showed how meaning is structured through an array of cognitive phenomena namely conceptual projection, conceptual integration, blending, analogy, reference, counterfactuals, coreference, presupposition and so on in natural language semantics. These different figurative uses of language are treated distinctly so as to account their diverse operational frameworks. In pragmatic function mapping (Fauconnier, 1997) as studied by Nunberg (1978), the two corresponding domains are mapped together to build up new meaning in presence of a pragmatic function structuring a rich knowledge base. But in the cases of metonymy and synecdoche, some part of the concept behaves as a complementary of the whole concept in that same domain or vice-versa. Rhetorical studies now considered in the light of pragmatic function lists out few (a dozen or so) metonymical expressions. Interestingly, one study done in the field of experimental pragmatics had shown us differences between metaphor and metonymy so far as underlying metaphorical operations are concerned. In the Relevance Theory framework Bambini et al. (2013) addressed this issue in their operational distinction from one another through timed sensicality judgements. That metaphor processing needs more time and difficulty in gradual interpretation than metonymy is clear from their results. And how metonymy is much closer to the literal expression was also under careful scrutiny in that study. Earlier Grecian account failed to make any distinction between metaphor and metonymy discussing their general functions only as cases of flouting the first Maxim of Quality (“Don’t say what you believe to be false”) and adhering to the Maxim of Manner (Egg, 2004). Bambini et al. (2013) looked for the *ad hoc* concept of lexical items when it is exposed to a contextual place. The Study of Relevance Theory brought forth this inferential process of *ad hoc* concept in new specific circumstance rather than the literal meaning of the word. This process may broaden up (more inclusively) or narrow down (less inclusively) the literal meaning to the intended meaning. Unlike the concepts of approximation¹⁷ and hyperbole¹⁸, metaphor permits the meaning of the lexical item to broaden and go beyond their limited set of meanings to derive meanings from other domains. In this sense, it is more dynamic and mobile in its approach. Carston and Wearing (2011) while experimenting on relevance-theoretic account taking metaphor and hyperbole into consideration insisted on the idea of broadening in the case of metaphor by instantiating sentences like “Writing a thesis was a marathon Jane didn’t want to repeat”. When expressed

¹⁷ “a variety of broadening that includes a relatively marginal adjustment of the encoded concept [...] outside the linguistically-specified denotation” (Bambini et al., 2013).

¹⁸ “a more substantial adjustment of the encoded concepts” (Ibid.).

metaphorically, *marathon* is extended to include tiresome activities. But they also noticed that narrowing down of lexical meaning of *marathon* by excluding the professional marathon is necessary at its first stage of development based on associative relation of resemblance. Unlike metaphor, metonymy is formed out of contiguity between objects of same domain. Carston and Wearing studied through a rating procedure by a set of tightly controlled metaphorical, metonymic and approximate uses as opposed to anomalous uses providing a range of features between meaningfulness and difficulty and suggesting to be perceived neither as fully conventionalised nor fully creative. They measured the accuracy rates or latencies in interpretation which revealed that metaphor costs much higher than the literal interpretation during reaction response time. This temporal dynamics proves the difficulty of metaphor in the adjustment of linguistically encoded concept with immediate context (as when it becomes relatively a little bit slower in a minimal context than a conventionalised context). Though these data evoked controversy, the result always supports the same assumption that for metaphor, it is greater cognitive distance to transfer its intended meaning which needs longer time and greater difficulty than metonymy and approximation (Rundblad & Annaz, 2009). Therefore it is successfully assumed that metaphors are stored in our metalinguistic awareness in contrast with metonymy which is supposed to be a part of our lexical knowledge. A developmental study (Annaz et al., 2009) also confirmed this. Naturally metonymies are less arbitrary than metaphor and creative sometimes as well (consider “The Room No.-209 has gone to take a bath”). But it should be remembered that metaphors and metonymies are not processed by different conceptual framework, rather their conceptual relevancies differ accordingly.

4.7.Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

Cognitive linguistics was influenced in its way by a number of different other disciplines. CDA¹⁹ which had been developed nearly at the same time with Cognitive Linguistics and CMT was expected to influence and in return to be influenced by this discipline as well. Here

¹⁹ As such, CDA is much indebted to Halliday’s systemic functional grammar, a usage-based approach to grammar which paved the way of the theoretical part of critical linguistics (Fowler 1996, p. 5) and was supposed to be working like a backbone of the CDA. It is apparently clear that functional theories are more in line with the CDA than the formalist theories. Here, grammatical devices are used to codify the discursive situations via some *construal operations* (Croft and Cruse, 2004). *Construal* happens when a particular situation is conceptualized and then expressed by means of language structures which in turn make the text-consumers involved in the textual construction.

in this discourse part I like to discuss in brief the coalition between these two disciplines of CDA and CMT.

It is said that blending operation of metaphor is more acceptable in CDA context than the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. Figurative language analysis in general and conceptual metaphor theory in particular can be more precisely examined in the light of Critical discourse analysis (CDA). To have a full understanding of the theory of metaphor-building from an all-encompassing point of view we should care of taking into account the discursive-pragmatic aspects and the change of meaning by sociolinguistic variation as well. This discusses about how metaphorical concepts constitute the arguments in a language given the different theoretical frameworks at work. Mussolff (2012) in a paper wanted to verify this recent theory of metaphor with the traditional critical theories in order to judge its explanatory ability to exert influence. According to him, cognitive metaphorical research could assist CDA in an unconventional or better to say, revolutionary way to make it more analytic by dealing with new empirical data and supporting its *relevance-oriented* approach.

Literary studies view metaphor from a completely different perspective than what cognitive psychology and linguistics generally do. Scholars of Prague School and French Structuralism had worked heavily on the 'literature as language' paradigm and shaped some of the ideas of metaphor which had been considered later as one of the essential features of language. They found in metaphor the possibility of diverse kind of expressions through proper manipulation of functionings identifiable in language. Later, with the advancement of postmodern literature, the idea of linguistic model of metaphor as the possible interpreter in language was downplayed as it apprehended the heterogeneous nature of cultural impacts. With this, the analytical school of thought began to grow. Sobolev (2008) argued about the importance of metaphor in the deterministic culture which is assumed to be heterogeneous yet a synthetic place. His contention is that metaphor being the operating tool for synthesis should emerge as a philosophical paradigm which believes culture to be space for synthesis. Because it has long been an enterprise in conceptual metaphor research to account how cultural input at a larger level affects in metaphor processing. Metaphor forms "category structure for the language and culture" (Fauconier, 1997, p. 9) when a specific mapping principle for an expression becomes widespread in a particular cultural setting with an established vocabulary available for that expression. Thus metaphor had been the chief problem to study, since there

seemed to be complexity in this apparently simple synthesis. Though it lacks the formulation into a generalized account, there exists a unanimous structural model of metaphor.

Linzey (1998) proposed four usages of metaphors, namely, paradoxical metaphors, comparative metaphors, metaphoric models and finally metaphoric ontologies. For him, a metaphor is to be exposed to some conversational discursive context in order to get its meaning realized without which it has no specific meaning at all. According to him, the long or short 'life-span' of metaphors requires three illocutionary processes, namely explanatory, heuristic and fiduciary import to exploit them successfully by the participants in a conversational community. Most of the time, we are not sure about the initial stages of metaphor formation, because we are always halfway to fathom out its position in the changing phases of development throughout its total life-span. Naturally we cannot get that nascent stage when it had originally started its course. Then we hardly grasp the total developmental model of metaphor as such.

Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*, little known for its treatment of metaphor as distinct from that in *Poetics* acknowledged the prominence of metaphor in literary writing from the very start. Later metaphor had been the centre of rhetorical training as an appealing *trope* of investigation which later attracted much attention and criticised in the hands of Johnson (1981), Stuttereim (1941, pp. 60-162). Modern mainstream semantics and pragmatics in their respective new analytic philosophy of rhetoric forwarded only the phenomenological theories describing the nature of non-formal argumentation in the making of analogy. They further explained the possibility of this new non-conventional meaning by the truthful and honest expectation of the violation in the meaning of structured conversational maxims (Grice, 1989, p. 34). In this sense, Lakoff and Johnson were the first to introduce metaphor as an 'extraordinary phenomenon' which is the central theme of the programmatically entitled book *Metaphor We Live By*.

Anyway, the new cognitively oriented quality of CDA has a *self-fulfilling aspect* in itself by means of which a speaker can virtually afford to criticise others with much effectiveness making the expressions coherent as per his wishfullness and also without much harm on his part! Thus the political leaders tend to exercise metaphorical statements in their lectures to safeguard their powerful existence. But by these hidden agenda they could not be found guilty though the statements are taken as facts describing real incidents. Because metaphors used in political discourse equip them to persuade people in such a way as to handle matters

very carefully without any legal obligation. Political statements act like sweet-coated pill which hardly face any consequent threat of legal interference. To take an example to demonstrate this, more often than not the NATION is compared to the HUMAN BODY²⁰. Its certain implications ('entailments') are:

- i) The nation's corruption or maladies could be treated as diseases as an ill health could be treated by proper remedies or medicines,
- ii) The poor state of the nation could also be mended by fair policy making through reforms to its implementation.
- iii) The living parasites in the body which are contaminating the body by infecting the disease could be embodied by the corrupted agents of that nation. (Musolff, 2012)

A nation's economy is also seen frequently as body and its upward trend is described in terms of the language of 'growth rate'. Racist discourse also follows the same stance. These metaphors are oft-cited by Lakoff too. So there are swarms of political metaphors. The privileged position of the speaker finds an echo in the words of Charteris-Black who dubbed it as CMA or Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 197).

Though both of CDA and CMT cannot be discussed at once together, some scholars and philosophers tried to merge them together forcefully and sometimes misleadingly in order to equate them at a point where both acts for the same purpose. CDA which is covered with the aspects of social inequality seldom address metaphor analysis. Naturally there is a striking lack of proper treatment of the question of how CMT could help CDA to form a uniform and coherent structure of analysis with some cognitive point of view in mind. Though some scholars think that conceptual blending theory is suitable to take up this issue, I will explain here what the challenges to the integration of CDA and metaphor analysis are.

Chilton (2005, p. 21) had once commented on the contribution of Halliday to the CDA who identified how the machinery of power is linguistically constructed while showing linguistic evidences of agentless passive construction or nominalisation in his systematic functional grammar. Theory of argumentation is also incorporated to CDA analysis to make it more objective and systematic. As CDA is known for its ideological nature of considering and presenting a topic, metaphor is one of the tools to present the reality in terms of a particular ideology vested with interests. Metaphorical nature of language is so persuasive in its way of

²⁰ See the concept of 'body politic' in which a nation as a corporate entity is compared to a human body.

making one understand the fact that it can create an ideational belief system effortlessly (Chilton, 1996, p. 74). Cognitive structure of understanding discourse since a long time has been neglected by mainstream scholars. Though cognitive linguistics is mainly necessary for understanding the origin and nature of meaning in a comprehensive way, meaning is also a property of discourse which is interactive by nature.

In favour of Blending Theory (BT), Hart (2008) demonstrated CDA's close proximity with the long-standing BT rather than comparatively new CMT. As there may be compatibility problem of theoretical frameworks in the cases of 'focus', 'motivation' and 'relation' between CDA (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) and more recent CMT (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), critical metaphor studies is often discussed separately from CDA and can be applied on a wide range of discourse studies. Hart opined that BT is better accommodated in the macro-level analysis of CDA, for BT is an all-encompassing theory of blends which involves not only language but also our conceptual world and discourse. This explains blends which are more than the mapping between two concepts and unlike the predictable nature of directionality principle in CMT. As it be the case, Hart assumed that a given discourse may use a fixed set of metaphors or blending network and by quantitative or qualitative analysis of texts of a particular discourse genre, we could be able to explore this.

Hart (2008, pp. 91-106) wanted to link 'social discourse', 'social cognition' and 'social structure' in one common line. Though there is no such direct relation between discourse and social structure, there is certainly a dialectical relation between discourse and social cognition, again between social cognition and social structure. Language bridges the gap between cognition and speaker's *intention* in discourse and that is how metaphor is an outlet of one's cognition or bodily and experiential knowledge. Language thus connects cognition in the super micro level with the *intention* of the speaker in super-macro level. To explain how the element of *motivation* of an intention works in metaphor generation in discourse, Hart (Ibid., p. 94) exemplified the influx of people in an account on migration discourse comparing it with the flow of water. He wanted to show that such metaphor conventionalised by frequent use cannot be totally 'automatic' (in cognitive sense of the term), rather it is guided by the speaker's motivational impulses, that impulsive force are driven from outside discursive world only to play with the cognitive resources. Though incongruent with CMT, mainstream CDA always supports the idea of origin of metaphor in discourse. But Charteris-Black (2004) had also tried to resolve this friction between CDA's pragmatic approach and CMT cognitive approach in his analysis of metaphor formation.

Again, it is assumable that if we have to connect these two different realms together, we can take for granted that structural metaphors are more communicatively 'intentional' by way of depicting the social dimension of in-situ cognition through metaphorical choice of words, whereas the orientational one is almost predetermined and solely driven by the reflexes of 'cognitive unconscious' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 56). Therefore it is also possible that each gamut of discourses of every community has a particular set of structural metaphors which being arbitrary vary from other cultures presumably because each culture is supposed to have a unique set of behavioural intentions and its unique way of producing them through the structural metaphors. But in general sense, orientational metaphors have no place in discursive genres because of its exclusively cognitive nature of existence and operation.

In a shared linguistic network, intentional compatibility is also necessary to make someone understand what the speaker is saying by that hint of metaphorical expression. Generally the native interactant's competence is such that they share the identical source concept to map the particular target concept in order to reach some common construal ground. Therefore, a kind of intersubjective cooperation is essential to get a negotiated conclusive meaning. But how metaphors are organised in an interaction may raise broad questions to think upon.

One may ask: when are metaphors used in our practical life? Some metaphors are motivated, some are not. The motivated metaphors are often used in media presentations. Many people like literary theoreticians or political critics thrust their dependence on metaphorical expressions as their sole way to persuade their opponents or to defend their own opinions or to provoke their displeasure to someone. In the discursive field, practitioners of metaphor widely use this to argue logically and argumentatively since a long time ago. For, metaphor is such an instrument one can wish to utilize it as he or she likes by creating the imaginary reality at best. In this approach, one can actually do this by taking their initial 'backing' (Santibáñez, 2010, p. 985) from a favourable source domain which can function according to his intention providing base for his own critical thought. Then he can design this throughout his 'created' narrative in a smarter way.

To discuss about the functions of metaphor in building up a textual environment, metaphors could be interestingly studied in the context of a text and its interpretations, in the matter of how a discourse could be formed out of a specific event and how this specific event could be described in a text to make the reader understand the way the writer allows a reader to understand. This could be successfully performed via textualisation. In constructing an event

construal one sometimes needs to carry his viewpoint forward by using creative stylistic or rhetorical tropes which appear to be unexpected or shocking. In this sense, conceptual metaphoric approach to strategically devising a text could equip a writer to perform his best. Hence, the novel or creative metaphor can play an efficacious role in forming meaning through dramatisation and evaluation of a text. Therefore, a writer might undertake contributing event construals to a body of the text conforming to the theme to lay emphasis on his intended meaning in the text.

Earlier metaphor studies are found to be reliably depended too much on the decontextualised fragments of expressions and ostensible results found by intuition. New approach to such studies broadens it by taking into account the corpus evidences of metaphor in corpus linguistics, translation studies and studies in TESL (Teaching English as a Second Language). In order to grasp the fullest understanding of the nature of metaphor (as studied theoretically by Lakoff/ Johnson, 1980a; Reddy, 1993; Kövecses, 1990), we should also approach it with some of the functions it generally does in real life. For example, Lenk (2002) had studied widely on metaphorical style in his text-linguistic research.

So whenever one produces metaphor to delineate his specific topic, others could understand it well that the speaker may be ‘consciously’ attempting to utilise metaphor. In such a case it is very clear then that naturally one may try to take the help of creative metaphor instead of conventional one to structure readers’ thoughts in text. This is how the news reporters are actually manipulating us by forming the reality whenever we read some news in newspaper, as according to Lakoff, Metaphors are not only constructing our thoughts but also making us believe the constructed reality itself.²¹

Santibáñez (2010) recognised the value of metaphor theory in dealing with the argumentation theory where he claimed that argumentation strategies in discussions, debates, polemics, controversies and many others are performed through syllogisms, particularly spacious arguments and tried to show metaphor in the context of continuous but interconnected flow of arguments. Showcasing the contemporary parliamentary discourse, the author evaluate the current perspectives of how some metaphors are being frequently used and hold some particular belief attaching favour to some dominant ideological positions. And this is sometimes practiced to support some fallacious move on their part. In such endeavour, they used to use conventional metaphors instead of a new one to influence the public mindset

²¹ See Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativism for further elaboration.

vividly by presenting them in the form of graphic imageries so that the general people could easily understand them. They are basically catchy, simple and precise so that laymen could easily digest them. It has also the objective of clarifying or withdrawing an issue. Every media representation follows a certain kind of stylistic requirement in its propaganda to attain the ultimate goal as expected.

A study initiated by Bednarek (2005) about the role of metaphor to the formation of newsworthy events or stories in news reports, records event-construals in news texts through the metaphorisation of events and also telling news in a coherent manner to the reader. Hence the textual narrative may sound reasonable and motivating to a certain extent and confirms the persuasive approach taken by the news agents. For instance,

PM: "I still have a lot to do"

By GEORGE PASCOE-WATSON

Deputy Political Editor

DEFIANT Tony Blair last night torpedoed Gordon Brown's dreams by insisting he wants to stay in power for years to come. (The Sun, 1.8.2003)

Taking a serious political debate in this text about the line of arguments of a CM (Tony Blair), Bednarek had made explicit Blair's exchange of statements with Gordon Brown. It reveals that metaphorically he is engaging in a battle by taking his initial position, attacking, defending, retreating, counterattacking and finally winning over his opponent in his successive stages of dialogue-making in such a way as if he is fighting against his rival enemy. Anyway, the whole passage of description makes the metaphor ARGUMENT IS BATTLE explicit.

Espíndola (2010, pp. 571-585) took a very bold stance stating that different genres have their unique way to apply metaphor in their own semantic-discursive domains. Though the study was conducted taking into account only a small data of corpora, the paper hypothetically found it evident and proved successfully. This was claimed to be a novel investigation into the reading of different genres. His contention is that as each genre discusses only a specific socio-communicative aspect in its descriptive work, it may employ certain specific metaphors too. So every genre has its own way of articulating the conceptual metaphors into metaphorical expressions. Linguistic metaphors which are materialised in lexical terms do not

depend entirely on it; rather they take non-verbal communication and context as the essential tools to decode meaning. That means metaphorical meaning is also grounded in speaker's mood and the modal functions of it.

Now the question arises naturally what is the point of using metaphors in discourse. Espíndola (2010) had put this into question under a broad investigation of buyer-seller relationship in advertisement propaganda with an interest and introspection to know how metaphor actually works in discourse context. The reported evidences amply showed the use of metaphors in the conversation with an implicit commercial intention of the seller which was often provocative. There was a degree of personification in using metaphors as personified metaphors are more effective in comparing an object, event or experience with a living human being. This human entity has a phenomenal existence to be identified or to talk about easily. Personification occurs when metaphorical concepts generally share the same semantic domain with humans, their behavioural features and manners. This close semantic proximity with the human being indirectly pushes the buyer to buy the object which is being sold. So this kind of machination on the part of seller of advertisement community has been a general tendency where the buyers are persuaded to think the way the seller's party wants them to do. In this way it is quite explicit that metaphor is not just an apparatus to communicate abstract thoughts in conversation, but also a conducive devise to attract the public to convince according to the wish of the propaganda party who are empowered with this powerful equipment in this economic exchange. Notwithstanding they are expected to be creative in this representation. In this metaphorical function of mediation in the usages of popular media, the virtual seller-buyer relationship is tactfully controlled by upperhand propagandist self. Metaphor has become a possible resource to make the marketing company flourish in this way. After some time they are so deeply embedded that they are used naturally without any deliberate production on the company's part and also to the pathetic ignorance of the individuals and the public folk. The dominant seller party consciously or unconsciously indulges in such activities which for the moments create illusions in the target folk. Knowingly or unknowingly this has become one of the common practices in this genre.

For example, in the tempting statement of a biased merchandising, "Fashion goes from catwalk to the streets. But first, it pays a short visit at GNT" (GNT advertisement, Canal Glosat, Revista Veja), 'fashion' is skilfully treated as a human being, a lady who does a favour to GNT by visiting it. In this, the metaphor FASHION IS HUMAN BEING is introduced. It has been imported to draw favour of the public minds despite the fact that all

the human characteristics cannot be found in the ‘fashion’ discussed here. In the same study, it had also been observed that sometimes human features are imposed on some products. Such as, electronic items are often referred to as ‘slim’, ‘smart’ or ‘lean’ according to the demands of the modern cult of the body (Espíndola, 2010, p. 583).

Thus, similar to the cost-benefit dynamics, use of metaphor sets some goal of getting some benefit in exchange. The advantage of using metaphor is that it expects some cognitive improvement on the part of the reader in effect of the cognitive effort of the input processing. It is agreed that metaphors are able to motivate positive acceptance of the knowledge in the form of informations in the reader or audience directly or indirectly. Very often metaphorical statements are used in galore to make the arguments appear more convincing. Hence, Relevance Theory can be more helpful in sketching out the speaker’s intentional outlook while making such statement. Relevance affords the audience to invite into that meaning, to incline to that belief that the speaker himself sticks to. This persuasive discourse provokes the reader to adhere and follow the same thereby establishing the same point of *legitimate* meaning the speaker himself makes. The speaker establishes his own belief with some argumentative connotation. This then also reflects the author’s competence in using metaphors.

4.8. Analogy

Metaphor is sometimes compared to analogy so far as theories in discourse analysis are concerned. In argumentative discourse both metaphor and analogy are used. Analogy here is none other than the reasoning of factual logic by which one case is compared to another case in some specific aspect since both of the cases share same properties. Following this similarity it is concluded that the given standpoint is true. There are many sub-types of analogy argumentation. Johnson et. al. (2006) weighted on the *a priori* analogy to judge whether a statement is valid or not, like in the following scheme (Walton, 2006, p. 96):

Similarity premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2

Base premise: A is true (false) in case C1

Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2

It is strictly necessary at least for the two domains of metaphor to have partial 'similarity' as a basis like in analogy. Their 'similar' features may not be their own unique qualities; rather these may be functional 'similarities' which are likely to be extendable to other domains. But, Lakoff and Turner (1989, p. 198) defied this Similarity Theory in favour of Metaphor Theory exemplifying the statement "Achilles is a lion". In this sentence, the character of Achilles is defined in terms of the animal instinct. Though they are not similar in nature, they have some similar functional characteristics. Thus it is to be noted that 'comparison' in terms of function, not of original inherent nature is the key to the working metaphor. But how far metaphor could be designated as a special case of analogical deviation is still questionable. It could still be argued out that linking of two or more domains is performed not on the analogical reference solely if we speak from conceptual perspective.

Another point is that analogy is true or applicable only to the case of structural metaphor, because apparently there is no need of compatibility of specific features between two domains in the case of orientational metaphor. Likewise in some ontological metaphors where only abstract things are turning into concrete things keeping the same features, analogical resemblance is not necessary. In this sense, only structural metaphors depend on arbitrary and imagined analogy.

4.9. Evolution of metaphor

As metaphor plays a major role in meaning formation, it is also responsible for meaning change. It is indeed immeasurable how in its radical pathway a certain model of metaphor is originated and passes through its various stages of development to its fullest growth. Tim Linzey (1998) illustrated an account of the metaphor deployed in conversations in various phases of time (1992-1997) by the political leaders of New Zealand in a scenario of socio-political rigmarole. He noticed a particular characteristic of metaphor change that creative metaphors are coined and then they evolve to the extent of informality so much so that they cease to be used and start to decline. Some metaphors strive their way through different versions of use, keeping the meaningful forms same altogether throughout their frequent use. But some exceptions are always there.

Traditionally metaphor played a crucial role in the coinage of new terms in mythology. Mythological repertoires are rich and abundant with these newly coined words for the

purpose of defining new reality. They have the tendency to shape or view our world through the eyes of metaphor. Harris and Jarret (1956) in accounting the role of metaphor in the genesis of language showed that among primitive people there had been a tendency to symbolically relate and extend their vocabulary to mythical objects after finding out the overlapping qualities between them. The analogical finding in the case of resemblance between natural raining and sprinkling the ground in drought with water in order to have rain is also a kind of expansion. In the same way he observed how the new words are coined etymologically and meanings are mostly the result of the metaphorical extension. Most of them are highly implausible creative extensions, e.g. the original meaning of the term 'tragedy' which was supposed to be formed out of song and goat²².

²² Certainly there might be a relation of performing serious plays at religious ceremonies and the sacrifice of goats executed there (Harris & Jarrett, 1956).

Examples from Bangla

The discussion and analysis here will be more self-evident if we crosscheck them with languages other than English. Cross-linguistic study could facilitate us strengthen the idea of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural universality and pervasiveness of metaphorical language. Even in different languages we can notice the use of same source domain expression to express the intended meaning. Undoubtedly such study will lighten up our understanding of metaphorical mapping in construction other than English and show up in this process the conceptual similarity of that language in parallel or contrast with English.

This study has taken some non-English constructions to support this extended study following Lakoff's argument. It has taken into consideration some expressions from Bangla which belongs to the Indic group of Indo-Aryan (IA) branch of Indo-European family of languages. Before going into detail it is noteworthy to keep in mind that overall linguistic structures of these two languages are not similar so far as the typological aspects are concerned, they both are also dissimilar in cultural and environmental or ecological scenarios. Apart from these, even in the conceptual choice of domains they vary a lot. In this kind of situation, if we begin to find similarities in conceptualization by deriving the resources from a same source concept (which is 'body' here) during metaphor processing, then the similarities in conceptual schema of metaphorical construction would be found as partial as such. But, we know that cross-linguistic metaphor studies have given the source domain of bodily references the first place in priority over other metaphorical domains. Because these source domains reflect the "near-universal aspects of the human body" (Kövecses, 2002, p. 165).

Anyway, though typologically languages differ from one another, structurally languages could be acceptably classified into three basic categories, namely isolating, agglutinating and inflecting or fusional (Lyons, 1968, p. 187). Bengali or Bangla (bangla) is more or less an inflected type of language whereas English can be displayed as a 'fairly' mixed kind of language which shows features of all the three types of languages. Lyons suggested this to be "a matter of degree" in his typological classification of languages which has been usually done according to the status of morphological structure of words and their syntactic relations, the degree of variability in usages, use of inflections etc. Features of inflected type of word structure could be marked easily by exemplifying from English like variation in regular plural

forms of nouns (e.g. ‘men’) or variation in regular tense forms of verbs (e.g. ‘sang’ and ‘sung’) etc.

In using the metaphor EMOTION IS LIQUID or EMOTION IS VERTICAL ENTITY, both of English and Bangla have common conceptual resources to organize their thoughts categorically. This kind of comparative or contrastive analysis will show further the growing importance of cross-linguistic metaphor study to ascertain about authenticity of CMT by suggesting more corpora study of unrelated languages in future. Lakoff primarily focused upon the metaphor used in English language, now it is the high time to verify its strength by considering the other languages. The concern here will rest on metaphorical expressions generally found in Bangla. I will limit my investigation only on *emotion metaphor* (a kind of orientational metaphor) as in the case of structural metaphors there are differences in terms of their origin or invention on account of ‘cultural situatedness’. I like to show the near universality of the emotion metaphors in these two languages by exemplifying from two sub-domains of emotion, i.e. happiness and sadness as formally categorized by Kövecses (2000) in his *Metaphor and Emotion*. Kövecses originally introduced the concept of universality of metaphor across cultural diversity. Now this little effort is to find out whether there is any striking consistency between Bangla and English in the particular expressions of emotions.

This study looks into the issues which suggest sharing of same compatible domains in creation of a particular metaphor in both of the language of English and Bangla. Keeping this objective in mind, though we can notice some incongruities in domain sharing we can conclude that by sharing some of the common grounds in construals they both shape their speakers’ reality in understanding the world in the same way. For this I will focus on the universal metaphorical schema shared by the body-based emotion metaphors in English and Bangla not considering the structural metaphorical differences between these two languages. As discussed earlier, the ‘embodiment’ phenomenon is the sole cause of similarities in the case of orientational metaphors. Opposed to this is the ecological factors of influences which structure the structural or epistemological metaphors on the other hand. Although, there are certain structural metaphors in one language which are found to be keenly equivalent to expressions in another language.

It is to be noted that the translation here from source English sentences to target Bangla sentences are possibly close to the source as I have tried to avoid the oddly translated sentences, given the accepted characteristic limitation that a source language could not be

fully translatable into target language. Naturally there may be some ‘oddity’ in translated expressions which are to be understood with careful consideration.

In Bangla theory of literature, metaphor is formally termed as *rupok* which is mostly known for its rhetorical use. As such, Bangla usages have not been taken primarily into serious account in the light of CMT so far if compared with much researched language of English. This study could then find out possible parallelism between these two languages so far as metaphorical expression is concerned. Knowing this similarity or dissimilarity may have an additional benefit to the field of language teaching and learning process as researches showed that second language acquisition through similar conceptual metaphors available in both of the languages can enhance a learner’s ability to understand new language in faster and effective way. In this discussion, a shared mapping model is found in both languages for expressions of emotions.

It is to be noted that this is not a discussion on emotions or emotion concepts; rather the metaphorical mapping found in the emotional expressions is only discussed. But it is sure that this study of emotional language will serve to understand the origin and comprehension of emotion in general. I have taken into discussion essentially the highly-schematic and generic-level universal structure across two languages which is supported by the experientialists. Although, considering the culture-specific variations, we can simply expect that there might be some dissimilarities in metaphor constructions regarding emotions. But, this study will highlight the similarities only between the expressions of these two languages avoiding the possible dissimilarities. In this context, I have not gone into much detail of the evidences of dissimilarities caused by the specific-level cultural construal in these two languages by which we can come to know cultural specificities, their characteristics and uniqueness thoroughly propagated by social constructionists. But, the embodied cognition can also make a rapport with the socio-cultural constructions and this is led to the extended version of the *embodied cultural prototype view* (Kövecses, 2000) in which both of the universal embodied view of the concepts as well as their cultural constructs are synthesised together in harmony. That means that different cultures define these near universal concepts of metaphor in their own relative terms, since metaphors are found to be universal in the conceptual domains only, not in the diverse linguistic fields in which concepts are lexicalised.

A. EMOTION IS LIQUID:

Firstly I present here a limited set of sentences generally following from the source-to-target domain mapping of EMOTION IS LIQUID metaphor in English as well as in Bangla:

<u>LIQUID</u>	→ <u>EMOTION</u>
1. container of the liquid	→ body as container of the anger
2. act to take the liquid into the container	→ act to fill the happiness into the mind
3. feeling the need of the liquid	→thirsty for love
4. physical state of liquid	→burning in anger
5. amount of liquid	→amount of emotion

Mapping 1: “Ram *burst out* in anger”- ram rage p^heṭe porlo

Mapping 2: “His mind was *filled with* happiness”- ṭar mən anonḍe b^hore gelo

Mapping 3: “He is *thirsty* for love”- je b^halobafar kaṅk^hi

Mapping 4: “He was *burning* in anger”- je rage jolc^hilo

Mapping 5: “He hasn’t a *drop* of compassion in his mind”- ṭar mone ek binḍu mōmōṭa nei

In the above examples, verbs like p^heṭe porlo (‘burst out’), b^hore gelo (‘filled with’), jolc^hilo (‘burning’) specially denote the formation of emotional states of the person. Noticeably here Bangla makes use of postpositions -e (‘in’), -ar or -er (‘of’) etc as in rag-e (‘in anger’), anonḍ-e (‘in happiness’), b^halobafa-r (‘of love’), mən-e (‘in mind’) to imply the containment of the emotions. Thus, emotion metaphors are sometimes thought to be oriented in the form of container-content relationship, i.e. it is motivated by the three-dimensional space of an open or closed container which is nothing but the orientation of the body with the outer space itself. The container contains the content liquid or substance like emotion and the top of the container is the top of the body or its outlet part. This concept of containment can evoke other types of orientational structures too like activities or events. It is notable that in Bangla postpositions in association with the emotion words serve to the orientational makeup of the metaphors. In the following examples, these metaphors get expressed:

- a. ṭar mən janṭiṭe b^hore gelo (“His mind was *filled up* with peace.”)
- b. ṭar cok^hgulo jole b^hore gelo (“His eyes are *welled up* with tears.”)

- c. ma-ke dek^{he} ʈar b^halobafa ut^hle ut^hlo (“He is *brimmed with* love at the sight of mother.”)
- d. ʃe ʈar anonḍoke r d^hore rak^hte parlo na (“He couldn’t *hold* his joy anymore.”)

In the first sentence, the word ʃanṭi (‘peace’) denotes the content and ʈar mən (‘her mind’) indicates the container as if his mind is fairly compared to a three-dimensional container filled with peace.

Emotions follow the features of liquid like flowing, overflowing or rising in volume, welling up, bursting out etc which can be mapped to the same reference points of the emotion in someone’s mind. But there is descriptive difference also in the way of expressing emotions as we can see that Bangla native expressions usually tend to use the eyes, heart, bosom, chest or other body parts as the container of the good emotions like happiness or joy. These body parts seem to have metonymical connection with the body, thus representing the whole body itself. In the following examples, hriḍoy (‘heart’) and buk (‘chest’) are considered to be the seat of all good emotions. We can find partial similarities in English translations:

- a. prar^hona ʃonḡiṭṭi ʈar hriḍoyke anonḍe uḍbeliṭo korlo (“The prayer song makes his heart *overwhelmed* with joy.”)
- b. ʃe ʈake buk-b^hṛa b^halobafa janalo, Lit. “He conveyed *love filled in the chest* to her.” (i.e. “He conveyed his utmost love to her.”)

To clarify this with one of Tagore’s poems ḍui big^ha jomi (‘Two bighas of land’), we can also see that bosom of the lady is imagined as the container which is full of content mod^hu (‘honey’ denoting the lady’s affection):

buk-b^hṛa mod^hu bṅger bod^hu jḷ loye jay g^hṛe

In literal rendering this means “The belles of Bengal whose *bosom* is *full of honey* used to carry water to home”. So, it is obviously understood that comparatively Bangla tends to use more body parts in expressing emotions unlike its English counterpart.

It is an interesting fact to point out that speakers of both languages tend to use BLOOD essentially as the major flowing liquid in the body to denote the emotion of ANGER unlike the cases of positive or negative emotions like HAPPINESS OR SADNESS for which no specific liquid is mentioned.

B. EMOTION IS VERTICAL ENTITY:

In grammatical structure English and Bangla are to a large extent different. But at the basic conceptual level of forming emotion metaphor, Bangla can be seen as identical to English. We know from the previous discussion that metaphorical entailment of the master mapping EMOTION IS VERTICAL ENTITY can generate specific contrastive metaphors like HAPPINESS IS UP or SADNESS IS DOWN. These metaphors explain the orientation of vertical domain with the domain of being in a happy or sad state of mind. Actually in real life we don't take care of these metaphors as they have been so conventionalised to be termed as 'metaphor' in traditional sense of the term. These are 'universal' because we have an upright body posture and this bodily uprightness has favourably an effect on both of the physical and mental or emotional state. Now, this section will focus mainly on the comparative study of expressions of two basic emotion concepts in the concerned languages, namely HAPPINESS and SADNESS for a systematic investigation.

a. HAPPINESS:

We can derive following expressions from the HAPPINESS IS UP metaphor:

- a. *je k^hufiṭe ujǰol hoe ut^hlo* ("He is brightened up with *joy*.")
- b. *je k^hub b^halo mejaje ac^he* ("He is in a *good mood*.")
- c. *ganṭi juṇe je caṅga holo* ("He became *fresh* hearing the song.")

In above examples, the emotion words or phrases like *k^hufiṭe* ('in joy'), *b^halo mejaj-e* ('in good mood'), *caṅga* ('fresh') are orientationally meant for indicating some upward movement and therefore they have positive connotation in their meanings, These emotional states have to be synchronised with some of the spatial dimensions to be successfully communicated.

Apart from these, HAPPINESS could also be expressed by the more specific metaphorical structure HAPPINESS IS OFF THE GROUND:

- a. *je k^hufiṭe nece ut^hlo* ("He *danced up* with joy.")
- b. *je anonḍe akaf c^hulo* ("He *touched the sky* with joyfulness.")
- c. *je ṭok^hon haoay b^hafc^he* ("He is then *floating in the air*.")

But unlike English, in Bangla the concept of being OFF THE GROUND may also convey the superior or snobbish behaviour of the person concerned. This is rarely used or not so much elaborately available in English expressions. Instances of such kind can be:

ṭar pa maṭiṭe porc^{he} na, Lit. “His feet are *not touching the ground.*” (i.e. “He has become snobbish.”)

Other than this, feeling HAPPINESS may be expressed in terms of blooming FLOWERS in Bangla:

k^hṅborṭi juṇe ṭar mṅne ekṭi aṣar p^hul p^huṭlo, Lit. “Hearing the news a *flower of hope blossoms* in his mind.” (i.e. “Hearing the news he has found a new hope.”)

a. SADNESS:

In the case of negative emotion, sadness comes first. Now we know that most of the time, sadness appears to be the opposite of happiness. Then we may surmise that it is also processed in the same vertical relationship in contrast with happiness. Often we make use of it to indicate someone’s sad mood. Naturally a wide range of conventional expressions could be derived from the metaphor SADNESS IS DOWN:

- a. ṣe hoṭṭaṣay nimojṭito holo (“He had *sunk into* depression.”)
- b. ṣe ḍukk^he b^heṅge porlo (“He was *broken down* with sorrow.”)
- c. k^harap k^hṅborṭi juṇe ṣe aṣahṅto bod^h korlo. (“Hearing the bad news he felt *disappointed.*”)

Words or phrases like hoṭṭaṣa-y (‘in depression’), ḍukk^h-e (‘in sorrow’), aṣahṅto (‘disappointed’) are orientationally mapped with downward movement and thereby denote negative connotations. By looking closely into the words used here like nimojṭito (‘sunk’), b^heṅge (‘broken down’) we can crucially point out the related negative situation or state of affairs aroused by sadness. This is borne out of our physical positioning. The straight erected posture of the body is linked with the positive emotions like happiness or health and the drooping posture is simply targeted to produce our negative attitudes, emotions and perspectives.

But sometimes metaphor like INTENSE SADNESS IS TOP may happen to both of the languages when the direction of being sad is the reverse, e.g.

ত্ৰাৰ দুক্ক^হো সোৰ ফিমা চ^হাৰালো (“His sorrow *crossed all limit.*”)

SADNESS is sometimes compared to DARKNESS in both languages, e.g.

- a. ami k^hub *bifonno* bod^h korc^hi (“I am feeling *gloomy.*”)
- b. ত্ৰাৰ মুক^হতা দুক্ক^হে ঞ^দহ^হোক[া]ৰ হোৱে গেলো (“His face turned *dark* in grief.”)
- c. ত্ৰাৰ ব^হোবি^জত *nifprob^ho* dek^hacc^he (“His future looks *dim.*”)

Words like *bifonno* (‘gloomy’), *and^hokar* (‘dark’) or *nifprob^ho* (‘dim’) in the above sentences amply specify the mood of sadness.

But there are also dissimilarities between expressions of two languages when sadness is reflected by the metaphor SADNESS IS PAIN IN THE BODY PART in Bangla expressions, e.g.

- a. *je t^{ra}ar buke bet^ha d^{ilo}*, Lit. “He *hurt his chest.*” (i.e. “He made him feel saddened.”)
- b. *je t^{ra}ar hrid^oye ag^hat^h korlo*, Lit. “He *struck his heart.*” (i.e. “He disheartened him.”)

Words like *buk* (‘chest’), *hrid^o* (‘heart’) act like the container which holds the pain inside it. Since sadness caused by pain is commonly kept hidden by most people, it cannot be communicated unless people express them through metaphors.

Therefore, the metaphors dealing with HAPPINESS and SADNESS are easily observable in English and Bangla expressions and more or less obvious in occasional uses. They show cross-linguistic similarities in conceptualising the emotions through the same source domain elements. In short, comparing these languages on the basis of orientational emotion metaphors, this section corroborates once again that emotion metaphors are universal or near universal and could be found uniformly in two languages which are markedly differentiated by two distinct social, cultural and ecological salience or scenarios. There is no doubt that some emotion metaphors which are of orientational kind are truly common at least for these two languages. It is sufficient to believe that these metaphors happen to co-exist in both of the languages. This also provides strong support for the conceptual nature of fundamental human thought regarding certain metaphors, that they are not arbitrarily selected or originated in linguistic or pragmatic context. Though it could not be denied that language faithfully reflects the related culture and metaphorical structure of a language stands for linguistic and cultural richness, bodily correspondence is dominant in any language whether or not they belong to same language group.

Conclusion

To sum up, the present study in its totality has tried to capture and foreground a three-dimensional approach on ‘processing’ of metaphor phenomena, i.e. from the viewpoint of three different perspectives, i.e. the Cognitive, the Linguistic and the Pragmatic.²³ The necessary principles and parameters are discussed to present a broad overview. Drawing from these perspectives the study eventually has formulated its own proposed assumptions and provided possible findings on-

- (a) the constraints of what features of concepts or domains get mapped and what do not in non-literal structure, how concepts interconnect, synthesize, overlap, interface and differ reasonably on conceptual plane;
- (b) what constitutes metaphors in words or phrases in the linguistic level of representation defining apparent systematicity among a given set of sentences referring to a specific abstract target domain;
- (c) how to infer a specific conceptual metaphor as opposed to other conceptual metaphor in discursive level of interpretation.

Finally, the cross-linguistic study of the data from Bengali also supports the stance of partial metaphorical universality across cultural diversity.

As such, this study does not concentrate on principles of a single theory; rather incorporating major theoretical constructs and schools of thought, it has drawn a conclusively richer framework regarding metaphor production and comprehension. To this end, this study has let the theoretical ideas regarding metaphor converge or question each other and secured at best a firmer explanation. Ideas of different theories are not treated antagonistically but harmonisingly to the possible extent in this approach. By this way, this account has managed to arrange the processing patterns of metaphor at several distinct layers of its development the culmination which we can find in the outcome of metaphorical expression. Metaphorical phenomena are not the result of single layer-specific processing. These layers of

²³ Infact, this three-layered study is indebted to Gerard Steen’s considerably integrated approach of a three-dimensional model of metaphor processing assuming its three elements of conceptual framing (by conventional and novel framework), linguistic naming (by metaphor and simile) and communicative function (by perspective changing).

representation as such are distributed as a continuum that their boundaries are indistinct and blurred by their dynamic nature of functions. I have tried to show how these expressive layers could be brought under single model to find uniformity among all these layers. We know that layers of cognitive as well as linguistic kinds form the basis of pragmatic level by providing sufficient inputs to it. Once the cognitive processing exerts its projection onto the linguistic expressions, it does not finalise the meaning fixedly as a stable content as the contextuality of the utterance ultimately determines the proper meaning intended by the speaker.

On the conceptual plane, we could now easily visualize the omnipresence of orientational and ontological metaphors whereas structural metaphors are comparatively less frequently put into use and special cases in point which are truly ‘metaphor’ in traditional sense of the term. Structural metaphors in other words may also consist of one or more orientational or ontological metaphors which function as primary metaphors and are built into a complex structural one (see figure 2.3). Metaphoricity is supposed to be found inherently in almost every known language, yet cross-culturally the complexity of the structural metaphors may vary to a large extent.

Finally, the present study has addressed the different successive levels of the modular mental architecture more distinctively. This argues for an account which suggests that metaphor is exactly processed level-wise and direction-specifically, i.e. in the case of production the processing is from contextual stage via conceptual stage to ultimate linguistic stage and in the case of comprehension the processing pattern is the reverse, i.e. it starts from the linguistic stage to discourse stage. Further to make it more complicated each processing has its own different levels of input and output structure. The diagrams below (figure 6.1 and 6.2 respectively) show this more elaborately bringing the obscure processing stages into an analytic light. Here, I have represented the consecutive fields of metaphor realisation as circles. The normal arrow and the dotted arrow indicate the direction of production and comprehension respectively. Whereas in production mode of metaphor speaker goes straight to the utterance level where no role is played by the listener or reader, i.e. it is only one-sided or one-directional. But, metaphorical comprehension is bi-directional. In this mode, reader or listener’s first step of comprehension is to acquire or sense the speaker’s code of statement and the next step is to decode what is said by the speaker (This is diagrammatically presented in figure 6.2. in which the curved arrow first goes into the linguistic code, then bounces back to the contextual meaning by inference). Davidson in ‘What Metaphors Mean’ (1978) seems to follow such a framework of metaphor processing that needs feedback from the relevant

working context. This generalised account of metaphor comprehension simply states that though the ultimate goal is to assume the metaphorical intent of the conceptual content, we cannot confirm the meaning without understanding the context. As declared by Davidson, metaphor needs active role of the context which calls into attention more frequently its relevance and in this kind of situation the processing also takes its ‘feedback’ from the context and transform the present literal meaning into something metaphorical.




Figure 6.1: A generalised account of metaphor production.




Figure 6.2: A generalised account of metaphor comprehension.

This generalised understanding gives us insight into this phenomenon that in production it is as direct as reaching to a point where we can express a metaphor and for this reason, production is simpler than the comprehension process. Because during metaphor production there is no variation caused by context-shifting, a single context is necessary as a starting point. But in comprehension, we don't only have to reach to the cognitive point where we can reconstruct X IS Y, but also on account of contextual shift of understanding, an extra implicature relevant to that particular context is added. And this added implicature due to the context-shifting is also mandatory one (Recanati, 2003, p. 109). So in comprehension processing of metaphor, insight into the cognitive structure of X IS Y plus some pragmatic interventions are to be reconciled to comprehend what one intends to say 'metaphorically'.

On the whole, language is not a context-independent phenomenon. The specialty of this all-inclusive generalised account is that it does not negate the assumption on the role of working context in the course of metaphor production and comprehension. Therefore, the conceptual origin and nature of metaphor should be studied as a part of its pragmatic nature and function, because while metaphor is being processed conceptually it is actually being controlled by pragmatic discourse making. For example, in the time of speaking and writing which are thought of as the outcome of production of language, the non-propositional aspects of discourse materials will come first, overpowering and as such manipulating the conceptual and linguistic materials. This contextual superiority is what guides metaphor to be born out through the cognitive schema of language. The account makes it clear that in both of the cases of production and comprehension of the language, the resultant literal expression itself does not hold a much solid ground in meaning making process as meaning is constituted by contextual factors as well.

Every theory has its own drawbacks of becoming narrower or partial in its account. Metaphor theory too suffers from some drawbacks so far as its theoretical assumptions and suggestions are concerned. CMT is often under critical light due to the dearth of formidable evidences on the argumentative and empirical ground. The arguments for how metaphor structure language and knowledge is not 'elaborated' in full detail by the authors of *Metaphor We Live By* as claimed by Burkhardt (1990). A strong critique of the classic stature of CMT is that it cannot shake off the much discussed 'Circularity Theory' that appears to overthrow its long-standing tradition. The criticism is that the linguistic representation of metaphor is both the evidence as well as the output of the conceptual metaphor (McGlone). Another fervent attack on it is from the methodological point of view that cognitive linguists mostly use unilateral

introspection to draw examples rather than the real life corpus data. It often takes decontextualised illustrations as its primary data with many *post hoc* performances. Anthropologists also defy its over-stated validity pointing out that the realization of cultural context could not be solely achieved by conceptual metaphorical enterprises. Invasion from the discourse analyst's point of view is also relevant because it points out that CMT should be more considerate in keeping a balanced view when dealing with the communicative and contextual understanding by means of studying deep underlying metaphors. There are also some basic problems of how the analysts can choose the cases in which metaphor theory could be applied, how far metaphorical entailments between domains could be established. Is it totally the case of arbitrariness in selecting the domains in structural metaphors other than orientational and ontological ones? The fact is that conceptually we are assuming the mapping between similar features that we can also distinguish but questions and queries still remain open to consider upon whether those features actually belong to two fixed domains we can plausibly identify or there are multiple domains to play a role in this mapping game. Indeed, to discern the active domains is a very difficult job to identify. It is also not easy to determine how to figure out the most relevant metaphor for a particular expression or how we could be able to distinguish the exact working metaphor (as in case of ARGUMENT IS WAR, an ARGUMENT may also be BATTLE or CONFLICT). It is necessary to work out this problem by exploring firstly the utterance situation. Different contextual relevance may evoke different CM. Successful decoding is possible only when we choose the right CM out of possible alternative CMs.

Conceptual metaphor is not solely 'conceptual', it is also influenced by vast contextual system of which it is a part. The future agenda on this issue should clarify the role of contextuality in performing metaphor. Hence the current study suggests a general stratification of all the types of metaphors because it is quite impossible to find out the exact working metaphor in particular for an expression. Hence a hierarchical schema can be drawn up to show the link between the metaphors. Though it is supposed that metaphorical activation is by nature constantly ever-changing, this could be an interesting topic to be tested and experimented under empirical light. Which metaphor is to choose over the others and is it further divisible? What is the most atomic minimal type of metaphor which is not further composed of sub-element and its properties?

To fill in these gaps in CMT, some critical questions still remain unresolved. In these particular points of enquiry, Conceptual Metaphor Theory falls short. Such lacking in interpretative back up in CMT makes it somewhat vulnerable in the face hardcore criticisms. Actually metaphor theory may depend upon the other cognitive phenomena as a whole to make it a fully fledged working theory, such as the nature of force-dynamics, classifications of concepts etc. The immense conceptual flexibility in deciding the exact metaphor type often makes it difficult to constrain and formulate defining rules by even proper methodological reasoning and intuition. Moreover, the limitation in handling such theories by insight and abstract inference could only be overcome by proving it in testable manner. All these explorations are subject to further empirical accuracies provided by psychological testing and if possible the finer approach of neural testing which could solve at best some of the ambiguities of mapping system in our brain. After all, to be refined in its theoretical grounding the theory has yet a long way to go in order to have a final version of it hopefully.

Anyway, given both the incomplete nature of all scientific inquiry and the limited time I have, this piece of writing does not claim to propose complete and final solutions to all the problems. But, this surely contributes some insights into the understanding of metaphorical expression, though the ostensibly suggested arguments so far presented here may be overthrown or embraced by further research.

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