SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE SEVENTIES : A CASE STUDY OF SALT-I & SALT-II

(STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS)

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PREFACE

This is a study of Soviet nuclear disarmament policy during the seventies; it gives particular attention to the first, indeed the trend-setter bilateral negotiations, between the two Super Powers on the problem of nuclear disarmament and arms limitation - namely SALT-I and SALT-II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). The problem of nuclear disarmament has become, ever since the closing stages of the second World War, a burning problem of international politics. As the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons steadily grew, it posed a threat to the very existence of human kind. Our choice of subject may be thus, viewed as the most pressing problems of the international politics, as well as the entire humanity.

The scheme of chapterization of the study seeks to incorporate almost all aspects of the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy. Chapter I deals with the basic framework of the Soviet foreign policy, and as such the very framework of Soviet nuclear disarmament policy. In Chapter II, the Soviet disarmament policy during the seventies has been studied in considerable historical detail. Chapter-III and IV deal with the actual SALT-I and SALT-II Treaty negotiations and it highlights the operative aspects of the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy. Chapter V is devoted to an overview of the SALT process and accesses the successes and failures for the Soviet

nuclear disarmament policy. Finally, we conclude by incorporating the findings of our study.

The study is based on published primary and secondary sources; we have made special efforts to rely upon Soviet source material, difficult as they are to find.

In the end I would like to extend my deep regards to my supervisor Prof. Zafar Imam. He inspired me to take-up such a technical topic and then helped during all stages of my study. I must admit that I was able to learn the art of research, working under him. I am also indebted to my parents and sister who at all times in my career encouraged me to continue studies and later to pursue research. My friends in JNU, Ramu, Sharad, Pallav, Rajeev and Sudhakar as also a friend in Kanpur, Sunil have all been very helpful in getting this work complete and I ~~shall~~ extend my greetings to them. I also would like to thank the library staff of JNU and IDSA for their cooperation, and also to Mrs. Kunjamma Varghese who took pains to type the manuscript in time.

I shall feel rewarded if my study is of any help in understanding the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy.

(ATUL DIKSHIT)

Chapter I

FRAMEWORK OF THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT POLICY OF SOVIET UNION

The humankind has, over the ages, hankered after peace but always used violence and force. Peace has remained illusive, indeed an utopian dream. With the beginning of iron-age, the age of destructive weapon system had begun and through its various stages of development we are now today in the age of nuclear weapons. Thus, the weapon system as an effective and destructive means of force and violence became a threat to human civilization, and peace today is as utopian as ever. It was thus logical that over the ages statesmen of vision and foresight have also sought to limit the weapon system, and in our times, they advanced the concept of disarmament. It was the destructive panorama of the first World War that added urgency to disarmament and soon it became one of the burning problems of international politics of the day. The savage fury of the second World War also led to the actual use of nuclear weapons. With the subsequent development of nuclear weapon system, the very existence of humankind was at stake. Disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, could no longer be delayed.

The rise of the Soviet Union in 1917, introduced a novel element in international politics. Right from

the very first day of its existence (November 7, 1917) it withdrew from war, sought peace and advocated disarmament and peaceful co-existence among nations. Indeed the Soviet State was the only sane voice, though ineffective, raised for the cause of peace and disarmament. As a matter of fact one can easily see that the Soviet policy of nuclear disarmament from 1945 onwards had originated from Soviet policy on General and Complete Disarmament, during the inter-war years. Hence with a view to develop a better understanding of Soviet policy towards nuclear disarmament it is worthwhile for us to examine its historical background, namely, Soviet policy towards General and Complete Disarmament during the inter-war years, and later in post-Second World War years. We propose to undertake this task in the following pages of this chapter.

But before such a probe is made, it will be useful to take note of importance of disarmament for the Soviet foreign policy, in general. The Bolshevik Party came to power, after the October Revolution with a three point programme: all power to Soviets; bread; and peace. All three programmes of the new state were important elements of Marxism and Leninism, which provided the ideological foundation to the new state. Indeed the ideological framework of Soviet policy clearly underscores the significance of disarmament.

Soviet peace policy was wrongly understood to some extent by the Western analysts of that time. They viewed it as a tactical move by a new and weak state to buy time to establish itself and thus to pose a threat to the West eventually. Peace was seen as an antagonastic principle to the theory of socialism which was believed to propound that war was inevitable as long as capitalist system exists. However, for the Soviet Union peace and disarmament was not only a tactical move but also an important principle to which it has sought adherence till the present day.

Peaceful co-existence, according to Soviets, was necessary because war causes terrible suffering and enormous destruction and loss of material and human resources. Besides, peace paves way for the full play of laws of social development to the advantage of socialism and communism. Lenin also held similar views in his writings and speeches on peaceful co-existence. He had stressed that peaceful co-existence of states and social revolutions, though appear to be mutually antagonastic are actually not.

Peaceful co-existence does not mean simply a tactical posture on international relations. It is presented like the lynch-pin of international system as the inevitable simultaneous co-existence, for more or less prolonged period of time of states with different

socio-economic and political systems. All states must co-exist, live and let live in their own interest and thus avoid the use of force as a means of policy. Revolution is, however, a socio-economic process and it can neither be exported nor brought about through war among states.

Disarmament is a logical goal of policy of peaceful-co-existence. More so, after the enormous destruction and suffering the two World Wars had brought about. Disarmament is also necessary because only a few states are strong and thus dominated and determined the course of international relations, forcing wars on the weaker states. Moreover, the nuclear age has clearly underlined the need for peaceful coexistence. The only solution, it is thought, is possible if General and Complete Disarmament including nuclear disarmament takes place.

However, disarmament as the recorded history shows, had never been an easier task. It has always been understood in a negative sense by the stronger. Hence, it was no surprice that repeated appeals by Soviet Union for General and Complete Disarmament in the inter-war years and post-Second World War years, fell on deaf ears. It was only in late 1960s, when the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the 'other' strong power, viz., the USA, that the need for nuclear disarmament was fully

realized and Soviet stand on this burning problem was taken seriously. One of the results of such a development was the successful conclusion of SALT in the 1970s.

The ideological framework of Soviet foreign policy, particularly in relation to nuclear disarmament, needs to be co-related with its application to actual reality of international life. It is known right from the very first days of its existence that the Soviet Union faced extreme hostility from international community including armed intervention by almost all major powers of the day. As a matter of fact the problem of security of the Soviet state became a most urgent one for the Soviet leaders. Pre-occupation with security of Soviet state was thus, one of the facets of international life for the Soviet Union. Therefore, inspite of its pleading and advocacy for disarmament it also continued developing its armed potential, including its own nuclear weapon system. Yet, this reality did not dilute the essential commitment of the Soviet policymakers to nuclear disarmament. It is indeed logical for us to look at the ideological framework of the Soviet foreign policy as an operational exercise of taking concrete measures and postures for nuclear disarmament.

At this stage we shall now focus our attention on the historical background of the Soviet policy towards

nuclear disarmament and its interconnection with the conclusion of the two SALT agreements.

Peaceful Co-existence in the Soviet Foreign Policy

When with the victory of the October Revolution, the relations between socialism and capitalism lay, for the first time at the foundation of all international life. There began to develop in the world arena opposition, antagonism, competition, and the difficulty of attaining peaceful co-existence between states. The first act of the socialist government of Soviet Union, the famous Decree of Peace, called upon:

> all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace... by such a peace the [Soviet] government means an immediate peace without annexations and without indemnities... it [Soviet Government] does not regard the above mentioned peace terms and ultimatum; in other words, it is prepared to consider any other peace terms, and insists only that they be advanced by any belligerent countries as speedily as possible and that in the peace proposals there should be absolute clarity and the complete absence of all ambiguity and secrecy... [Soviet] Government abolishes secret diplomacy... will proceed immediately with full publication of secret treaties.[1]

This appeal appeared as an utopian dream in the warring world where in history, peace was understood as the respite for preparation for another war.

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1. V.I. Lenin, On Peaceful Co-existence (Moscow: Progress 1967), pp.21-25.

It seems, however, that during almost the entire inter-war period, there was a discrepancy between the Soviet theory of peace and peaceful co-existence, and political and diplomatic practice. The theory was based on the assumption that many types of war were inevitable. Revolutions could not be accomplished without armed violence; colonies would fight for independence using military means; imperialist states would continue to compete and wage wars for a redivision of the world.

However, the Soviet State badly needed peace. The Soviet Government, therefore, issued several statements, and submitted a number of drafts to the world body in support of disarmament. For example, in 1922, the Soviet Government supported the principles of disarmament talks and then presented a Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament on 15 February 1928, in the fifth session of the preparatory Commission of the International Disarmament Conference at Geneva.[2] Another Draft Convention on reduction of armaments was submitted by the Soviet delegation on 23 March 1928 to the same body. But, these and all other such disarmament proposals were rejected outrightly on one pretext or the other. The European states and the United States saw these

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2. A.Y.Yefermov, Nuclear Disarmament (Moscow: Progress, 1979), p.114.

attempts of Soviet Union as an encroachment to their hegemony and sphere of influence in world affairs. It was perhaps,one of the reasons that the Soviet Government at this stage was not even recognized by the United States and many other European nations. Also that the Soviet Union at this stage of history was a nacent and weak,and also unstable state. But its policies had an appeal of reason for the oppressed people, which was antagonastic to the established pattern of the capitalist society and polity.

Hence, it was perhaps assumed that by not recognising the Soviet Government and by keeping up the pressure of arms a peaceful demise of the first socialist state would be possible; or at least they would succeed in diluting the Soviet policies to such an extent that they would become harmless to the interests of the capitalist countries. An example of the capitalist designs can be had from the statement by the head of the French delegation to the International Economic Conference of Geneva in April 1922. To a mention of disarmament issue by the Soviet delegation to the Conference, the French chief, Louis Barthou said, "I must give warning that, when, if, the Russian Delegation propose to discuss this [Disarmament] question, they will find themselves faced not only with a reservation and protest, but with

an absolute denial, definite, categorical, final and decisive, on the part of the French delegation."[3]

A change, however, could be noted in 1935 when to meet the growing threat of Nazi war preparations the West and the Soviet Union allied to create a common front against German fascism. This was also the time when the fierce and uncompromising criticism of pacifist ideology was modified into a policy of linkage of the Communist movement with pacifism for a common struggle against war.

During the war itself, the weak bonds of common cause of friendship began to show signs of cracking. The Soviet-American relations began to get sour and the Cold War between the two States began even before the end of the hot war. The US policies regarding abrupt termination of the lend-lease agreement, when the Soviets needed it most; delay in opening of the second front during war, and many other irritants gave a feeling that the US was interested in letting the Germans and the Russians exhaust each other and cause irreparable damage to the socialist state so that after the war the US emerge as the 'only' power in the world.

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3. Ibid., p.115.

Immediately at the end of the war the Soviet Union brought about revolutions in countries of Eastern Europe and established Socialist Governments to create, on the one hand a comity of socialist States as it was destined in the Marxist-Leninist ideology; and on the other to establish a buffer zone around the Soviet Union to meet any attack from the hostile capitalist countries in time. Also the history of Soviet Union is full of invasions from the European borders, including the German invasion during the world war which was a horrifying experience to the Russian people.

However, this sudden drive to establish friendly socialist Governments was an ill-timed and unproportional measure of security which sent shock waves to the war-torn Europe about its future. This gave the much desired opportunity to the US to set firm foot on the European soil to ensure security of the European nations. The Marshall Plan, Truman doctrine and NATO were the immediate consequences, which intensified the cold war in the early post-war period of 1950s.

The nuclear monopoly of the US was lost in last year of 1940s when on 25 September 1949 Tass reported that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of nuclear weapons and now had such weapons at its disposal. The report referred to a statement made by the Soviet Foreign

Minister on 6 November 1947 to the effect that the atomic bomb had long ago ceased to be a secret.[4] Thus, the beginning of one of the deadliest arms races the mankind has witnessed had begun.

This event further aggravated the cold war which was further fuelled by the policies of US, which countered by launching a major offensive against Soviet Communism. The US policy was spelt out by famous 'X' article[5], written by George F.Kennan, and the US Secretary of State J.F.Dulles pursued his 'containment policy' and the policy of 'rolling-back communism'. Several military alliances were formed like CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS Pact etc., besides bilateral treaties, to encircle the Soviet Union. Several military bases were made operational on foreign territories and offensive forces of missiles and bomber aircrafts besides troops were sent to man them. It is now revealed by classified documents, which now have been de-classified, that on several occasions the US leadership contemplated launching a preemptive strike of nuclear weapons to tame Soviet communism.

However, the Soviet Union badly needed peace and disarmament. "Disarmament was dictated by the need for

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4. Izvestia, 25 September 1949, cited in ibid., p.117.

5. George F.Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (written under pseudonym 'X') Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

switching the country's war economy to civilian production as soon as possible, restoring the huge number of factories that were destroyed..."[6]

As early as 1952, Stalin wrote, "that Communist movement is not struggling for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism, but it limits itself to the democratic objectives of the struggle to safeguard peace..."[7]

As the policy of peaceful co-existence gradually began to replace the policy conducted during the Second World War, the theory of inevitability of war was referred to less and less frequently, and at the Twentieth Party Congress held in 1950, it was officially renounced. Of the traditional view of the inevitability of war, all that remained was the orthodox assumption that the socio-economic and political system of capitalism was the source of all wars. It was expressly declared, however, that all wars whatever their type could be avoided. The possibility of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism in particular countries was declared; the inevitability of armed uprising as a means of national liberation was denied.

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6. A. Gromyko and others (ed.), History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-70 (Moscow: Progress Pub.), p.108.

7. J. Stalin, The Economic Problems of the USSR, cited in World Encyclopedea of Peace, Vol.I (Washington, 1986), p.581.

The Soviet Union also took several practical measures to facilitate disarmament process. As early as in 1946 it proposed the world body of United Nations, deep cuts in the conventional armies and a treaty for abolishing nuclear weapon from the arsenal and limiting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. "To ensure the appropriate control of disarmament the Soviet Union declared it was prepared to exchange information on armaments and armed forces with other countries".[8]

The United States, with nuclear monopoly under its belt replied with the ill-famed Baruch Plan of international control of atomic energy; spelling out its verdict that the US would not let away its monopoly. In this regard it is interesting to note a letter to the then US Secretary of State James F.Byrnes, in which Dean Acheson, co-author of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy on which the Baruch Plan was based, wrote that the "plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture of atomic weapons either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the International Agency".[9]

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8. Izvestia, 17 November 1946, cited in History of Soviet Foreign Policy, n.6, p.121.

9. A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Washington, London, 1946), p.vi, cited in ibid., p.113.

On acquiring of the nuclear weapon and the thermo-nuclear weapon, which was tested in 1953 by Soviet Union, the United States took a stand that the nuclear disarmament is not possible as the Soviet Union had large conventional forces which were a threat to European security. The Soviets therefore, in the proposal of 10 May 1955 suggested, that in a course of two years the numerical strength of the armed forces of the USA, USSR and China should be reduced to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men for each country and of Britain and France to 6,500,00 men each. These proposals were same as proposed by Western powers earlier. Further the proposals also called for permanent inspection in the volume required to ensure the fulfilment of disarmament agreements. As a new form of control designed to avert surprise attack the Soviet proposals envisaged a warning system by means of control posts at large ports, railway stations, main highways and aerodromes.[10]

The Soviet Union, in the above proposals had accepted many demands of the Western powers. These proposals were hailed not only by the socialist countries but by the non-aligned countries and also by the prominent people and press of Britain and France.[11] But the US and the British leadership backed out of its own proposals

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10. History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-70, n.6, pp.287-88.

11. Ibid., pp.288-89.

and the arms race continued. In fact, the Western intenable attitude was expressed by Harold Stassen, the US representative in the sub-committee of the UN Disarmament Commission. He declared:

> It is our view that if an effort is made to reduce armaments, armed forces and military expenditures to a level that is too low, to a level that reflects weakness, it would not be conducive to stability in the world, and to the best interest of peace... It is our view that if armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are brought down to a too low level, then... instead of the prospects of peace being improved, the danger of war is increased.[12]

The US position on disarmament was further made clear by US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles, who said:

> Past efforts have usually proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to establish and maintain certain defined levels of military strength and to equate them dependably between the nations. Actually, military potentials are so imponderable that this always has been and always will be a futile pursuit.[13]

To reopen the deadlocked disarmament talks the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced its armed forces by 6,40,000 in 1955. Similar steps were taken by other socialist states. Further, a maratorium on nuclear weapon testing continued. However, the US was still unwilling to abandon nuclear weapons. It laid stress

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12. Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race - A Programme for World Disarmament (London,) p.29.

13. Foreign Affairs, October 1957, p.34.

on a reduction of conventional armaments on the grounds that it was technically difficult to control the stock-piles of nuclear materials. "It is not practicable", Dulles asserted, "to assure the abolition of nuclear weapons... Therefore we must make our plans on the assumption that the nations which now have nuclear weapons would use them in war".[14]

Even with respect to reduction of conventional arms and armed forces the proposals of the US were in fact,'regulating mechanisms'. Their programme envisaged a high manpower level for armed forces: 2,500,000 each for the USA and USSR and 7,50,000 each for Britain and France. In fact, this proposal did not call for any reduction, for at the time their strength did not exceed that figure. On the other hand, their programme remained silent on the issue of nuclear weapons. It called for extensive measures of control which amounted to military intelligence and espionage.

However, when even these proposals were accepted by the Soviet Union, i.e., the high numerical strength of armed forces, and phased manner of removal of nuclear weapons and also a crucial demand of "aerial photography in areas in Europe where the main armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and Warsaw Treaty countries are

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14. Philip Noel Baker, n.12, p.9.

located, up to a depth of 800 km"[15] from the frontiers, the Western powers as usual, disowned their own proposals.

The Soviet Union, however, proceeded with its peace-offensive and adopted a multi-pronged strategy to achieve desired results. On the one hand it made the fullest use of the United Nations and its various agencies to voice its concerns and sincere desire for nuclear disarmament; also, to focus the destructive nature of the nuclear arms race, which was posing a threat to whole mankind. Besides, it also gathered public opinion by a large scale anti-nuclear propaganda in Western countries. The famous Stockholm Appeal for Peace in which a million people signed was one of the such devices used by Soviet Union to arouse the public opinion. These measures certainly boosted the image of Soviet Union, as an apostle of peace, in the minds of third world countries, and to some extent, in Western countries.

Nearly every session of UN General Assembly carried a resolution, or, a statement for the concern of escalating nuclear arms race. In the 14th General Assembly in 1959, the Soviet Union tabled proposals for General and Complete Disarmament. This was yet another "radical" programme for complete disarmament, like the one which was presented to the League of Nations in 1928. The

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15. Izvestia, 20 March 1957, cited in History of Soviet Foreign Policy, n.6, p.295.

Soviet Government proposed the abolition of land armies, navies and air forces and the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear arsenal and all other type of weapons for mass destruction. For internal security, only minimum contingents of militia-police armed with small weapons would be permitted.

This programme was to be carried out in a short period of four years in a phased manner, mutually agreed. There was envisaged, strict measures of international control in the volume required and at the end of process, shall have access to all installations and shall continue to work for unspecified time.[16]

On 20 November 1959, a general resolution was adopted by the General Assembly stating that, "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today" and calling upon the Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem. In fact, the USA also sponsored this Soviet proposal and was thus, adopted unanimously.

During the deliberations in the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC), however, the evasive tactics of the Western countries stalled the progress. Soon it became a fruitless debate without any hope. The Socialist

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16. History of Soviet Foreign Policy, n.6, pp.431-32.

countries ~~members~~, headed by the Soviet Union, decided to suspend the deliberations in June 1960.

With the beginning of the decade of 1960s, there began a thaw in the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. In Soviet-US talks on disarmament, held in Washington, Moscow and New York in June, July and September 1961, there evolved some concensus which led to the adoption of a 'Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations', which reflected to much extent the proposals of Soviet proposal of GCD. However, much of the progress needed never took place.

Soviet Union, meanwhile, proposed one of the most radical offer which, if accepted could have removed all difficulties that have arisen at the Three Power talks in Geneva. At a meeting with the US President in Geneva in the summer of 1961, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR proposed, that if, the Western powers accepted the proposal for General and Complete Disarmament, the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept unconditionally any of their proposals on control and also, their proposals on the question of halting nuclear tests.[17]

However, in August of 1962 a major event occured which put the question of disarmament on the back seat. The Cuban missile crises, projected a wrong image of Soviet Union in the minds of world at large. Whatever

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17. Ibid., p.455.

ground was covered by Soviet Union during all these years for the cause of disarmament, slipped at one stroke. It was a policy failure on part of Soviet Union, as we shall see later, which acted as a catalyt for the US to rapidly increase its nuclear weapons, thereby forcing the already hard-pressed Soviet Union to match the US-efforts. The Cuban missile crises might not have had many short term effects, but the long term effects in fuelling arms race and making any dialogue for disarmament cannot be discounted.

Nevertheless, after this crisis, both the powers came to at least one common conclusion. That the danger of a nuclear confrontation was real and horrifying. This precipitated into the realization by both powers that there was a need for a disarmament dialogue. Cuban crisis had revealed that there were large differences in the strategic thinking of the two powers and each was indulging in ghost fighting; making self assertions and taking unilateral steps to counter the other.

The 'atmosphere of trust' thus, began to look more conducive, with the Western powers especially the US, toning down their anti-Communist propaganda. However, both the sides were cautious not to let either to take advantage of its softer stand. This was not unusual as, an overnight switch-over of policies will bring in

opposition from the conservatives at home, and also affect the adversary's stand.

The 'era of negotiation' began by the successful conclusion and their signing of Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963. It was quickly followed by the Outer Space Treaty signed on 27 January 1967. Both these treaties placed ban on testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere, sea bed, space. Second treaty also laid down principles governing the activities of states in exploration and use of, outer space for military purposes.

Negotiations for further limitations were carried upon bilaterally as well as in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Success was to come in the 1970s when a series of new treaties were to be signed, including sea-bed treaty. However, these treaties did not directly affect nuclear arms race, but they certainly generated a necessary 'momentum' and 'atmosphere' wherein the strategic arms limitations talks could be carried in the 1970s. A very important achievement of this period was certainly that despite of tensions of cold war, a dialogue had begun on bilateral as well as multilateral forums.

We have pointed out in the beginning of the chapter that there are two main inputs in the framework of Soviet foreign policy, namely, ideology of Marxism and Leninism

and problems of its actual application to the reality of international politics; hence, this framework is also seen here as, relevent for Soviet policy on General and Complete Disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. The concept of peaceful co-existence as advanced by Lenin, emerged as a key factor in Soviet policy towards peace and non-use of force in international relations. It stressed that, inspite of the war-mongering character of the capitalist system social revolution can and must occur not always with violence; certainly, a Socialist state like the Soviet Union must pursue a policy of peace and mutual existence with other states irrespective of their social system. In other words the concept of disarmament and non-use of force essentially stemmed from this kev Leninist concept of peaceful co-existence of states.

Likewise, we have seen in the preceeding pages, how the realities of international politics made, its imperitive for the Soviet policy makers to pursue a policy of peace and disarmament. The historical pre-occupation of the Soviet State with its own security further emphasised this policy even in this nuclear age. Inspite of its drive for nuclear parity with the Western state system, the Soviet Union therefore, consistently stood for complete nuclear disarmament, as a goal and nuclear arms limitation as a first necessary step.

Our identification of the framework of the Soviet foreign policy towards nuclear disarmament underscores, that the actual conduct and behaviour of Soviet postures on nuclear disarmament must necessarily be understood by taking this framework as our guide indicator. We shall examine these postures accordingly in subsequent chapters.

Chapter II

SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Cuban missile crisis turned out to be a water-mark in the nuclear arms race. Immediately after this crisis,both the powers engaged themselves in increasing their nuclear fire-power. At the same time a need for a comprehensive dialogue for nuclear disarmament was also felt. Hence, even when the modernization of nuclear weapons programmes continued unabated in both the blocs, some important openings were made in the field of disarmament. Especially, in the latter half of the sixties, several important treaties were concluded, including the hotline link and Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. But, the most important development was the beginning of a bilateral US-USSR dialogue concerning the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, in 1969. This dialogue continued till almost the end of seventies, precipitating the two SALT treaties.

In the pages to follow, we shall therefore try to look at the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy with reference to SALT. It will be our aim to probe into the considerations that led the Soviet Union, to join the US, for SALT dialogue. As, in our view, the SALT dialogue marked a very important event for the question of nuclear

disarmament it would be our aim to analyse, the Soviet attitude towards it. We shall also try to understand how and in what way, the Soviet Union acted in order to make SALT a successful dialogue.

As stated in the previous chapter, the two powers viz. the USA and the Soviet Union, differed in their strategic thinking and they were therefore risking a nuclear confrontation. Hence, it will be our concern also to find, in what way the SALT dialogue helped in bringing closer the different thinking of these powers. Finally, we shall try to take a brief look at the success and failures of the SALT negotiations for the Soviet Union.

The idea for strategic arms limitation originated as early as 1964, when US President Johnson called for a mutual 'freeze' of nuclear weapons. It was rejected by the Soviet Union on several grounds discussed in the next chapter.

In November 1966 at a meeting in Texas, USA, Johnson and his aides, while discussing the reports of the Soviet deployment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) around Moscow, came to a conclusion that fresh initiative be taken for a bilateral dialogue. As a result, in December the US Ambassador to Soviet Union, Thompson, proposed a bilateral talks on strategic arms limitation to

the Soviet leadership in private. Interestingly, this overture overlapped with the American escalation in the Vietnam war. However, the initial response of the Soviet Union was mixed. In February 1967, in London, Premier Kosygin defended the Moscow ABM system as "defensive". However, five days later Pravda reported that Kosygin had declared that USSR was "ready to discuss the problem of averting a new arms race both, in offensive and defensive weapons".[1]

The SALT process was, however, not only the result of the realization by the two powers, of the futality of nuclear arms race alone. There were, in fact, several other factors on both sides which precipitated the SALT.

U.S. Considerations for Opening SALT

The Cuban crisis of 1962, as also the deployment of ICBM's by the Soviet Union made clear that the US mainland was no longer protected due to its geographical position. The escalation in the Vietnam war fuelled the public opinion against the US policy-makers. However, the realization of the futality of arms race had started coming even earlier. Speaking in American University on 10 June 1963, Kennedy expressed his feelings. Disowning "Pax-Americana", he said, "We (US & USSR) are both caught up in a vicious and

1. Cited in Chalmers M.Roberts, "The Road to Moscow" in Mason Willrich and J.B.Rhinelander (eds.), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (The Free Press Macmillan, 1974), p.21.

dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other and new weapons beget counter weapons".[2]

As reports revealed, the so-called "missile gap" and the "bomber-gap" fears propagated by the US never existed. It was confirmed by no other than President Johnson.[2] Another important development which influenced the US policy, was the change in the strategic doctrine brought about in the US strategic policy, by the "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) doctrine of McNamara, the Secretary of State of USA. The effectsof MAD are dealt in detail in Chapter III. This change in US strategic doctrine was made evident by the famous Guam declaration by Nixon on 25 July 1969, in which he called for a gradual scaling down of American commitments around the world. All the above and other developments helped as Nixon himself said, to move from "an era of confrontation" to one of "negotiation".

Soviet Considerations for Joining SALT

The Soviet Union also had several advantages in joining the talks. The wide ranging reasons were— economic, technical and technological, political, strategic and propagandistic.

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2. President Johnson remarked in an "off the record" talk that soon became public that American 'space photography' had shown that "our guesses were way off" on the number of Soviet missiles. "We are harbouring fears we didn't need to harbour". Cited in Chalmers M. Roberts, n.1, p.21.

Economic Considerations

The economic content of the decision to enter SALT was very important. The Cold War decade of the fifties and sixties and, in particular the period after the Cuban debacle had stretched the Soviet economic potential to its painful limits. Large economic resources had to be diverted for military purposes at the cost of civil development programmes. As a result many civilian programmes had either to be abandoned, or were being cut down. This had resulted into stagnation in the economic growth and lagging of public services. In 1969 Brezhnev's caustic criticism of the State of Soviet economy is a testimony to this.[3] Moreover, the planned development of Siberia required large funds which were necessary to help stabilize the economic growth. This idea also finds favour in the writing of Thomas Wolfe,[4] Samuel B.Payne Jr.[5] and Marshall Shulman[6] who attribute economic factors as prime cause for Soviet decision to participate in these talks.

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3. Thomas Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT: Political, Economic, Bureaucratic and Strategic, Contributions and Impediments to Arms Control, Rand Corporation, Paper No.P-4702, September 1971, pp.44.

4. Thomas Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT", Problems of Communism, Vol.19, September-October 1971, pp.1-10.

5. Samuel B.Payne, Jr., "Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation", Soviet Studies, Vol.27, January 1975, no.1, pp.27-45.

6. Shulman Marshal, "SALT and the Soviet Union", in SALT: Moscow Agreements and Beyond, n.1, pp.101-102.

Other than the exhorbitant cost of the nuclear arms race another economic consideration, as Shulman observes was "a crystallization of the preference of Party leadership for obtaining long term increases in the flow of grain, technology, management and goods from abroad as a way of dealing with economic shortcomings in the Communist system..."[7]

Technical and Technological Considerations

The Soviet ABM system deployed around Moscow, though an improved version than the Leningrad ABM system of 1962, was capable of providing only a limited protection. Evidently, out of the planned deployment of 100 interceptor missiles only 67 were made operational till the end. This too was possible at an exhorbitant cost, and was still not perfect, and could be easily overwhelmed by US MIRV's and decoys and other evasive techniques which were much cheaper. Hence, a nation-wide ABM deployment was not only technically difficult, but was economically prohibitive. Incidently, the same conclusion had been reached in the US, which prevented the development and the deployment of such system in USA.

The Soviet nuclear missiles were heavier having more megatonnage due to their poor accuracy. The Circular

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7. Ibid., p.102.

Error Probability (CEP) of US missiles was far better than the Soviet missiles which led to a assymmetry in the strategic planning. The Soviet Union, therefore, intended to devote more efforts to research and development in this field as well as in another 'greay-area' the SLBM's where they were again far behind, their rivals.

The successful development and the beginning of deployment by the US of MIRV's also acted as a 'bargaining chip'. The Soviet Union was still testing their MRV's, and MIRV of US acted as a destabilizing factor in the Soviet strategic planning. It was thus, made necessary for the Soviet Union to halt the over deployment of ICBM's in which, by the time talks began, they had 'near parity' with US, and concentrate upon newer technologies. It was perhaps thought, that the ABM system which was not very productive, but destabilizing, like the MIRV, could be bargained for stopping MIRV deployment by the US.

Also, the Soviet Union was encountering many difficulties adapting in its industrial system, the scientific and technical revolution of modern era. In 1968, Kosygin warned that the Soviet Union could be 'left behind' unless it found ways and means to match the West.[8]

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8. Thomas Wolfe, n.3, p.40.

Hence, in SALT the Soviets hoped to find a breathing spell from arms race.

Political Considerations

The political considerations were not less important in the case of Soviet Union. During the Cuban debacle, the Soviets had to bow and turn back which hurt their prestige in the world community. The herculian efforts at a break-neck pace, however, brought the Soviet Union in parity with the US, in the quantitative terms at least. In some cases the Soviets even surpassed their US rivals. This achievement of 'parity', as also, a formal recognition by the US of the 'equal Super Power status' had to be legitimized. SALT presented such an opportunity and the Soviets wasted no time to make use of it.

The Johnson administration was surprised by a quick response by the Soviets. Nixon administration was led to conclude that the Soviets were more in need of SALT; there should, they believed, be leverage to be gained from a 'linkage' of SALT to Soviet concessions in other areas. This misjudgement contributed in part to the delay in starting SALT.

In our opinion, the Czechoslovakian intervention of 1968 was also meant to send signal to the US against any 'linkage', lest the US still doubted the power of the Soviet Union. Our doubt is based upon the fact that the

Czechoslovakian intervention began in August, practically on the eve of public announcement for SALT, although the Dubcek Government in Czechoslovakia had introduced the causationary changes in the spring of 1968.

The political importance of SALT is also reflected in the fact that Brezhnev increasingly identified himself with a policy of detente. Though, being party General Secretary he replaced Premier Kosygin as the chief spokesman of SALT and other foreign policy matters. It is important to note that till May 1971, i.e., a short time after the famous XXIV Congress of CPSU, Kosygin was the chief spokesman on such matters. The Peace Programme adopted in this Congress also finds no precedent, showing the seriousness with which the Soviet Union took SALT. Brezhnev further broke the precedent by signing the SALT-I Treaty and other agreements in capacity of General Secretary of CPSU.

The XXIV Congress report of the CPSU[9] is a very important document in this regard. It gives a useful insight of the Soviet disarmament policy in the seventies and the importance of SALT in the disarmament policy of the Soviet Union. It declares, that the Soviet policy has always "combined firm rebuffs to aggression and the

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9. XXIV CPSU Congress Document: L.I. Brezhnev Report, (Moscow: Progress, 1974), pp.26-37.

and the constructive line of settling pressing international problems". It notes that the "favourable outcome of SALT would make it possible to avoid another round in the missile arms race and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes". But it warns that such negotiations can be productive only if "equal consideration is given to the security interests of the parties, and if no one seeks to obtain unilateral advantages". The report sees the disarmament talks with US in the broader framework of peaceful co-existence of different social systems and warns against any move by US to conduct "a position of strength" policy.

The Peace Programme adopted in this Congress ennumerates six postulates for bringing peace: elimination of hot beds in different parts of the world; recognition of territorial changes of Second World War; concluding treaties for banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and promotion of nuclear weapon free zones; dismantling of foreign military bases and reduction of armed forces and military budgets; abolition of colonies and universal criticism of Racism and Apartheid; and fuller participation and cooperation of States in bringing peace.

Strategic Considerations

In November 1969, when the SALT negotiations opened the Soviet nuclear forces had gained near parity in the

quantitative terms. Moreover, both the powers had reached to a pleateau of technical innovation in missile technology in which, increased number of nuclear missiles did not increase the security. It has thus become necessary to halt the quantitative increase and shift focus on qualitative innovations. This required more funds and respite from one type of arms race. SALT provided this opportunity.

For the Soviet Union one phase of arms race or the 'catch up' race was over and it was advantageous to halt in order to save from exhaustion which the US wanted the Soviets to do.

The Vietnam debacle for the US had also given the Soviet Union an opportunity to score a point in making the US to agree on terms on which US was likely to concede.

SALT also presented an opportunity for delineating the US from Europe, after Nixon announced his "self-help" doctrine, which had displeased its European allies.

Propagandistic Considerations

The history of Soviet foreign policy is the history of its drive towards General and Complete Disarmament. Hence any opportunity to capitalize on any disarmament issue was bound to help in projecting its image as a peace loving state.

Through SALT, the Soviets got a chance to disprove the Western propaganda about the Communist designs of world revolution and armed intervention by Soviet Union.

Also, that the Soviets got an opportunity to renounce the nuclear arms race and the danger of nuclear weapons, and their genuine desire to abolish these weapons.

The SALT negotiations opened through the 'back-channel' as Strobe Talbott wrote in his book End-game: The Inside Story of SALT.[10] The US delegation was led by Gerard Smith who was also the Chairman of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) of USA. The Soviet team was led by the veteran, Victor Semanyov. At the outset the Soviet achieved their primary aim. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the existence and the need to preserve parity, mutual deterrence and strategic stability.

One feature of Soviet nuclear disarmament policy which is even widely appreciated by the US negotiators and which reflects the approach of the Soviet Union on arms control measures is their business-like approach during negotiations. The first thing agreed to, by the two parties was to keep the negotiations secret. The Soviet Union honoured this commitment up to the last, although some 'leaks' of 'informed sources' appeared from the US side. Gerard Smith noted in particular, the "polemics

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10. Strobe Talbott, End-game: The Inside Story of SALT (New York, 1983), pp.380.

free" language of the Soviet team which as he writes, "surprised" him.

This kind of negotiating behaviour led another to write:

> Many people have impression that dealing with the Soviets is like dealing with creatures from another planet. That has not been the experience of this observer. On the whole they have shown much the same personal reactions as the Westerners. Moreover they respect candor about basic conditions which cannot be waived in negotiation - just as they respect those who keep their confidence. Their long tradition of secrecy makes it difficult for them to express their true thoughts early in the game and negotiating with them is correspondingly difficult and slow. But if the negotiator is sure of his ground and can show clearly that there are sufficient elements of mutual interests, it is possible ultimately to reach agreements with them.[11]

Strategic arms limitation talks, however, were not an isolated phenomenon in the arms control process. They affected, and were, in turn being affected by the overall international political environment. Although on several instances the worsening of international situation posed threat and it appeared that the talks could be suspended, both the sides showed mutual restraint and necessary goodwill to prevent any such collapse. For example, during the Israeli attack on Egypt, the Soviets withdrew their war planes from the war territory in Egypt on grounds that it could send wrong signals to the US. Similarly,

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11. William C.Foster, "Prospects for Arms Control", Foreign Affairs, Vol.47, no.3, April 1969, pp.413-21, esp. at p.420.

only fourteen days before the signing of ABM treaty, Nixon ordered the heavy bombing and mining of Haipong harbour in Vietnam. Soviets again did not link this serious development to SALT which, in their view, was more important.

The Soviet Union, on its part gave some very important concessions in Europe, long demanded. On 31 March 1971 in a major policy speech at XXIV Party Congress, General Secretary Brezhnev said in his peace programme, that a Soviet-German treaty should be signed. By May same year, the Soviet officials had agreed to guarantee West German access to West Berlin. In 1975 August, a European Conference was convened as proposed in the XXIV Congress, at Helsinki. 33 European States and US and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference. It envisaged besides other things, the "inviolability of existing frontiers". Agreement also outlined perspectives in the field of "economy, science technology, culture, information and growth of contacts between peoples".

During the course of negotiations, two important subsidiary agreements were signed. The first was regarding technical upgrading of the US-USSR "hot line teletypewriter link". It was now connected by two satellites, one Soviet and another US owned. The second agreement was to take certain measures designed to "reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between them", especially as the

result of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Both agreements were worked out by special negotiating teams within the two SALT-I delegations and signed on 30 September 1971.

Also, during the course of SALT-I negotiations, but, in the forum of multilateral conference of the Committee on Disarmament meeting at Geneva, the two nations,as well as, other powers agreed in 1972 to ban biological weapons; although they would not agree to a similar ban on chemical weapons. This agreement was yet another accomplishment of the peace programme outlined in the XXIV Congress.

The SALT dialogue was, from the outset, very technical negotiation. The primary, though undeclared objective of both the parties, was to bring symmetry in the thinking of two different strategic systems. As a result,on several occasions there developed deadlocks which were opened through "back-channel". Even the positions of the two parties reversed from their original intentions before the beginning of talks and after the beginning of talks. Earlier,the Soviets wanted offensive-defensive agreement and the US wanted defensive agreement. However, after talks opened their positions had reversed.[12] This was again, resolved through back-channel. Finally, after two and one half years of intensive deliberations the SALT-I Treaty was signed on 26 May 1972.

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12. See Chalmers M.Roberts, n.1.

The successful conclusion of SALT-I Treaty provided a much needed conducive atmosphere for further negotiations, both on the bilateral front, as well as on the multilateral front. The treaty was hailed all over the world except in certain quarters of the West. In an important development in United States, the famous Jackson amendment was passed during the hearings in Senate on the ratification of this treaty. Jackson amendment made it mandatory to conclude treaties in future in a manner so as to provide equal numerical ceilings on both parties. This amendment was against the unsymmetrical ceilings agreed upon in Interim Agreement of SALT-I. The SALT-I had provided a numerical advantage to Soviet Union on the grounds that the US had a technological edge in MIRV's and also because of geographical location of the Soviet Union.

The Jackson amendment, however, did not provide any impediment to further negotiations which began in November of the same year. The intervening period between SALT-I and SALT-II was of hope and anxiety. Several developments and subsidiary agreement of this period helped in reaching the successful conclusion of SALT-II in 1979. Trade agreements between Soviet Union and USA and Soviet Union and European countries brought a better understanding of Soviet Union in these countries. The two summits held in this period also helped in removing certain deadlocks which had

slowed the pace of negotiations. During the 1974 summit between Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok, some new understandings were reached which included a protocol regarding mutual renouncement of the construction of second ABM site as negotiated in SALT-I. Further, it was agreed to put a ceiling on nuclear missiles at 2400 each, and to exclude American FBS and the Soviet 'Backfire' bomber from being included in this ceiling. Brezhnev on his part gave assurance not to upgrade the range or increase the production scheduled of this controversial bomber.

On other fronts of disarmament also some progress was made due to steps taken by Soviet Union to ease the tension. In 1973 another important agreement was signed by both countries. This was an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War which provides that "each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party". In 1974, during the Vladivostok summit treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) was also signed which prohibits underground weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. Again in 1976, another treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET) was signed. This treaty for the first time envisaged intensive verification procedures including on site inspection. Similarly, two treaties were also signed separately with France in

1976, and Britain in 1977 for Prevention of an Accidental Outbreak of Nuclear War.

Soviet position on disarmament was further made clear during the 1976 XXV Party Congress of CPSU.[13] Commenting on the arms race, General-Secretary Brezhnev expressed the Soviet fears, "Mankind is tired of sitting upon mountains of arms, yet the arms race spurred on by aggressive imperialist groups is becoming more intense". Further, giving reasons for it he said, "The main motive for the arms-race given by its advocates is a so-called Soviet threat. They invoke this motive when they want to drag through a larger military budget..."

In the same Congress, stressing upon the goal of Soviet Union, Brezhnev said, "General and Complete Disarmament was and reamins our ultimate goal in the field. At the same time, the Soviet Union is doing all it can to achieve progress along separate sections of the road leading to this goal". Suggesting measures for achieving a peaceful world he said, "we have persistently and repeatedly offered the United States not to stop at just limiting the existing types of strategic weapons. We thought it possible to go further. Specifically, we suggested coming to term of banning the development of

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13. XXV CPSU Congress Documents, C.I. Brezhnev's Report (Progress, Moscow, 1980), pp.14-25.

new, still more destructive weapon systems, in particular, the new Trident submarines carrying ballistic missiles and the new strategic B-1 bombers in the United States, and similar systems in the USSR. Deplorably, these proposals were not accepted by the US side".

The SALT-II Treaty negotiation continued in the spirit of SALT-I and finally on 18 June 1979 the treaty was signed in Washington. The ceilings agreed upon by the parties were very close to the one agreed by the parties in the Vladivostok summit. The treaty, unlike the ABM treaty which was of unlimited duration, was valid up to 31 December 1985. SALT-II Treaty for the first time formalized the control of nuclear weapons in different categories. Earlier, an attempt had been made in the Interim Agreement which was a five year agreement signed with ABM Treaty and which was observed by both the parties even after its expiry in 1977, showing growing confidence and the will to control nuclear weapons.

One very important feature of both the SALT treaties was the verification procedures agreed upon by the parties. On the insistence of Soviet Union it was agreed on "National technical means" of verification for both the treaties. The US demand for on site inspection for verification of compliance of treaties was rejected by the Soviet Union

on grounds that it was possible to monitor compliance by "National technical means". This was even confirmed by some independent arms control experts in the US. The Soviet Union argued that the US was pressing for on site inspection to collect information about the Soviet military complexes and other related espionage activities. Now, it has been confirmed, that Soviet Union might be correct in their arguement as in the INF treaty signed recently in December 1987 and which envisages for the first time intensive on site inspection for verification, the US military has expressed apprehensions like the Soviets did during SALT. It, therefore, implies that similar fears must have been in the minds of US military experts during SALT, but they got an opportunity to capitalize on the Soviet denial of on-site inspection.

Another important outcome of SALT treaties was the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which provides a forum for and the presumption of consultation. SCC has up to now done a commendable work by solving the disputes across the table in a business like atmosphere. SCC also served as the forum for the first five-year review conference on the ABM Treaty, held in 1977 as called by the terms of the treaty.

The SALT process, as suggested in the beginning, proved to be a major watershed in the US-USSR relations, and in particular with respect to the nuclear arms race.

Its importance, for both the countries,as well as,for reducing tensions all over the world can be recognised by the fact that, even though SALT-II Treaty was not formally ratified by the US Senate on account of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, both the parties agreed to abide by the ceilings on nuclear weapons agreed upon in the treaty. This shows that a better understanding did develop between the two powers as a result of SALT, and both realized the need of limiting the nuclear weapons to the agreed minimum, irrespective of the 'seasonal' fluctuations of their relations on the international front. This undoubtably was one of the major achievements of the SALT dialogue.

It also appears that during the SALT dialogue the Soviet Union bought some US strategic concepts and doctrine and assimilated them into its strategic thinking. One such nuclear doctrine was, MacNamara's concept of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' or MAD. In fact MAD doctrine found favour as a more realistic doctrine for Soviet Union considering the several statements of Soviet leaders when they accepted partial measures of disarmament as a practical approach.

Looking back on the decade of seventies, the SALT process gives us an useful insight of the Soviet nuclear

disarmament policy - its successes and failures. On the brighter side we find that by engaging in SALT negotiations Soviet Union achieved many desired goals, with which it had earlier joined the negotiations. Among them can be included, recognition by the US of the strategic party; numerical ceilings on nuclear weapons; agreement on principles of the conduct of relations between the Super Powers; limitation of poorly cost-effective ABM programme and thus halting of another spiral of defensive nuclear arms race; gains from the economic and technical agreements which followed this dialogue; respectful solution of Berlin problem and the German problem which was the main cause of tension in Europe; overall easing of tensions in Europe which led to various types of mutual advantages; projecting of a better and reliable image of Soviet Union as a peace-loving state in Europe and third-world and releasing of economic pressure at home.

There were, however, some darker aspects too which cannot be overlooked. The Soviet Union failed to bargain a ban on MIRV's which nullified to a great extent the effect of numerical ceilings on nuclear missiles. In fact, the total number of warheads agreed mutually far exceeded than present before the SALT dialogue began. SALT also failed to check technical advances in newer fields which did not fall into SALT ceilings. This resulted into a

qualitative nuclear arms race in the eighties unlike the quantitative arms race of sixties and seventies. The 'bargaining chips' employed by both US and USSR failed to produce positive results. ABM chip could not abolish ABM completely and the MIRV and cruize missile chip of US crystallized into means to qualitatively invigorate the arms race. It is important to note Kissinger's words with regards to 'cruize-chip'. In 1976 he said, "How do I to know the military would come to love it [the strategic cruize missile]?"[14] He admitted that he himself had pushed the Pentagon to develop cruize missile as a bargaining chip several years earlier.[15] Another failure of SALT was to separate the offensive from defensive limitations in SALT I. It appears as Raymond Gathoff notes, that alternatives were left unexplored. Both sides sidelined more contentious issues which could have been solved after more fuller negotiations, and which later resulted into technical arms race of eighties.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the achievements of SALT were more prominent, than its failures. This can be attributed to the fact that the dialogue was first of its kind, dealt with two altogether different

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14. Raymond L.Garthoff, "SALT-I - An Evaluation", World Politics, 1978, p.22.

15. See, L.H.Gelb, "Another US Compromise Position is Reported Reached on Strategic Arms", New York Times 17 February 1976, cited in ibid., p.22.

types of strategic systems and among strategically differently thinking people. It was bound to be a cautious approach in which neither side wanted to lose its advantage, and "political implications" of failure would have been more disastrous than 'strategic advantages' of its success. It was no less a success that SALT achieved its primary goal of generating mutual confidence and putting some kind of limitation on strategic nuclear weapons.

Thus, we see that the decade of seventies was quite successful for the Soviet disarmament policy. Although, the SALT-I Treaty did not bring about any actual disarmament, it acted as a major stepping stone for future dialogue. It also achieved, as noted above, certain secondary objectives for the Soviet Union as it did for US. But, important in the overall SALT dialogue is the fact, that the Soviet Union did all that was necessary to make the atmosphere more conducive for a disarmament dialogue. The two Congresses of CPSU, provide a useful evidence in this regards. Apart from the Congress of CPSU, the Soviet Union took several steps especially on the European front to make its intentions clear for disarmament. It may be charged against Soviet Union that it did not propose many alternatives during the talks, but as we shall see in the next chapter that this was the way the Soviet negotiated.

But, nevertheless, the Soviets, contrary to their reputation followed their words with actions for cause of disarmament.

The share of the success, of the SALT dialogue and the two SALT Treaties, for the Soviet Union was, therefore, not less. Besides gaining, politically, economically, strategically as well as in propaganda terms, it also took one step forward in the direction of its most cherished goal of General and Complete Disarmament. Successful outcome of SALT dialogue, thus, was the success of Soviet nuclear disarmament policy of the seventies. It increased the hope, as expressed by the Soviet leaders, of 'peaceful co-existence' of the two social systems.

Chapter III

SALT-I TREATY - ITS NEGOTIATION AND ANALYSIS

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the primary aims of the Soviet disarmament policy remained largely unchanged during the seventies. The only change which was brought about during this period was that the Soviet Union pursued its policy more pragmitically and with caution. The aggressive drive towards disarmament, a feature of the fifties and earlier, was absent, and in its place a more cautious approach based on a dual policy of improving and upgrading the nuclear arsenal on the one hand, and peace initiatives on the other hand was marked. It was, perhaps realized, that any move for disarmament from the positions of weakness was doomed to fail. This new change in the application of Soviet policy worked and the US was forced to take the initiative which the Soviets readily accepted.

The essential features of the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy have already been discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, the focus of this chapter shall be mainly on the details of the SALT negotiations and the analysis of the SALT-I Treaty. However, before such an endeavour is made, it shall be a useful exercise to make a comparative assessment of the different weapon systems, and the technological advancement programmes of the two countries. We also intend to take a brief look at the

comparative strategic doctrines of the two powers as this exercise would help in understanding the reasons for the different stands taken by the two powers during SALT negotiations. An attempt is also made for an assessment of the SALT-I Treaty. Besides, we have tried to bring out the features and characteristics of Soviet negotiating behaviour as these unfolded during the negotiations.

The SALT process was an interplay of several factors - national and international. Its origins lay in the security perceptions of the two powers, which coincidently, due to developments discussed in the previous chapter, followed more or less a similar line of thought; referred to as "the golden honeymoon" by some Western analysts.

It might thus be inferred that during the negotiating period, viz., from late 1969 to mid-1972 these two countries would have exercised some measure of restraint in further development of their strategic nuclear forces. There is, however, no evidence of any such restraint; on the contrary, both the USA and the USSR actively continued to improve, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively, their strategic nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union was, in fact, a late starter in the nuclear arms race; economic and technological constraints always acted as impediments to the development of most sophisticated nuclear weapons. Hence, from a purely

technological point of view the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were inferior to the US in almost all aspects of performance. Nevertheless, during the 1960s the 'catching up' exercise had begun after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The momentum however, was generated in 1966.[1] From 1966 to 1968 the Soviet ICBM force rapidly increased from 300 to 800. In comparison, the US ICBM's which already were approximately 900, reached a figure of 1054, the later figure reached in 1967. In fact, after the Cuban missile crisis, it was the US, which rapidly increased its ICBM forces, forcing USSR to follow. In 1962 US ICBM totalled 300 and in two following years, i.e. by 1964 it was increased to 850.[2] The Soviet strategic build-up programme continued after 1968 although the US stopped increasing its ICBM forces. By the end of 1969, when the SALT-I began, the Soviet Union had achieved a near parity at least in numerical terms. Their programme continued during first half of the negotiating period and by 1971 the Soviet Union had more number of ICBMs.[3] Thereafter, the Soviets slowed the strategic build-up and by the end of 1971 it had virtually stopped.

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1. See Chart 1.
2. Ibid.
3. 1520 ICBMs (deployed or under construction) as against 1054 of USA.

However, when comparing the performance of the Soviet ICBMs with the US ICBMs, we find that the numerical superiority was undermined by the technical superiority of the US ICBMs. Soviet ICBMs had lesser ranges though they carried a heavier warhead.[4] Except for Soviet SS-9 (NATO conde name "scarp") which were 300 in number, none of the other Soviet ICBMs had a range exceeding 6,000 nautical miles (n.m.). While most of the US ICBMs had ranges exceeding 6,000 n.m. Moreover, while the Soviet missiles were carrying single warheads, the US Minuteman-III ICBMs carried three warheads which were also independently targetable (MIRVs); Soviet Union by this time had not even tested MIRVs rather it was still mastering the MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles) which were at least one generation older.

In the case of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) the US had both the quantitative as well as qualitative superiority. US had 656 SLBMs as against approximately 400 of Soviet Union. Its performance too was better than the Soviet SLBMs. The US SLBMs had longer ranges and were also MIRVed. The US Polaris A-2 and A-3 SLBMs and Poseidon C-3 SLBMs had range of 1,500 n.m. and 2,500 n.m. respectively. While the Polaris A-3 SLBM carried 3 MIRVs the Poseidon C-3 carried as many as 10 MRVs.[5] Soviet SLBMs on the other hand, were non-MIRVed

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4. See Table 1.

5. Poseidon C-3 had been tested with as many as 14 MIRVs. Also see Table 2 for SLBMs.

Table 1

U.S. AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs)

USA

Name	Titan II	Minuteman I	Minuteman II	Minuteman II
Number	54	350	500	150
Designation	LGM-25 C	LGM-30 B	LGM-30 F	LGM-30 G
Maximum range (nautical miles	6300 +	6300 +	7000 +	8000 +
Warhead	5-10 mt.	1 mt.	1-2 mt.	MIRV 3 x 200 kt.
First in service	1962	1962	1966	1962
Number of stages	2	3	3	3
Type of engine	Liquid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket
Remarks	Retained because of large warhead. Phase-out scheduled after 1973.	To be replaced by Minuteman II and III by 1976	50 to be replaced by Minuteman III. Has penetration aids	Super-hardened silos being developed

Table 1 - Contd.

USSR

Name	Saddler	Sasin	Scarp	-	Savage
Number	- About 200 -		About 300	About 950	60
Designation	SS-7	SS-8	SS-9	SS-11	SS-13
Maximum range (nautical miles)	5700	5700	7000-9000	5500	4500
Warhead	5mt.	5mt.	25 mt.	1-2 mt.	1 mt.
First in service	1961	1963	1965	1966	1968
Type of engine	Storable liquid propellant rocket	Storable liquid propellant rocket	Liquid propellant rocket	Storable liquid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket
Remarks	Some are not deployed in underground silos	Some are not deployed in underground silos	Largest ICBM in existence. These missiles may carry MRV. Also used as FOBS launch vehicle	These missiles may carry MRV. About 100 targeted at Western Europe (and China)in 2-stage version	Deployed near Archangelsk in Soviet Arctic

Source : SIPRI Year Book 1972, p.4-5.

Table 2

U.S. AND SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMs)

	USA			USSR	
Name	Polaris A-2	Polaris A-3	Poseidon C-3	Sark	-
Number	160	384	112	42	400
Designation	UGM-27B	UGM-27C	UGM-73 A	SS-N-4	SS-N-6
Maximum range (nautical miles)	1500	2500	2500	300	1500
Warhead	800 kt.	MRV 3 x 200kt.	MIRV 10x50 kt.	1 mt.	1 mt.
First in Service	1962	1964	1971	1961	1969
Number of stages	2	2	2	2	2
Type of engine	Solid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket	Solid propellant rocket	Storable liquid rocket	Solid propellant rocket
Remarks	Five "608"-class submarines now carrying A-2 will be converted to A-3	Will be retained on five "608" class submarines and five "598" class submarines	Have double Polaris A-3 payload. Will be carried on all 31 of the "616" class submarine (Poseidon)	Launched only from surface from diesel "G" class submarines	Deployed on "Y" class nuclear submarines

Source : SIPRI Year Book 1972, p.7

except some newer types which carried MRVs. With respect to performance too, the Soviet SLBMs were very much inferior - Soviet SS-N-4 had a range of mere 300 n.m. while the newer SS-N-6 was reported to have range of around 1,500 n.m. The Soviet SLBM carrier submarines also were of older generation. While all US submarines were nuclear propelled the Soviets had also diesel propelled submarines. However, a big programme was underway in the production of SLBMs and nuclear propelled 'Y' class (Yankee class) submarines.[6]

The missile accuracy or the Circular Error Probability (CEP)[7] was another area in which the Soviet Union lagged behind. While the US ICBMs had CEPs approaching 1,500 fts, the Soviet ICBMs had CEPs of around 4,500 fts. Hence, the Soviet Union had to depend upon a higher megatonnage warhead for the same damage as lighter but more accurate US ICBMs. This perhaps, was one of the reasons why the Soviet ICBMs had a heavier warhead.

In the case of strategic bombers, both long range and medium range, the US had distinct superiority. While the US B-52 CF had a unrefuelled range of over 11,500

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6. In 1971 the Soviet Union had about 25 'Y' class submarines with a construction rate of 8-10 per year. However, at any given time only about 17 submarines of this class were at station.

7. CEP is the radius of the circle centred on the target in which half of a large number of ICBM warheads fired at the target would fall.

and B-52 G/H, 12,500 miles. The Soviet TU-20 had a range of only 8,000 miles and that of Mya-4 was only 6,000 miles. The numerical advantage was also in favour of USA,[8] which also were equipped with better air-to-surface missiles with longer ranges and better accuracies. The US short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) had no counterpart in the Soviet weaponary.

On Going Weapon Development Programmes

Besides the numerical advantages and the performance superiority of US nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, the US had, in the pipeline, several technological missions to improve the reliability as well as surviability of its weapon systems. The MIRVing of ICBMs had already increased the total number of deliverable nuclear warheads.[9] According to SIPRI estimates,[10]

> if planned programmes are carried through, the number of strategic missile warheads deliverable by the US will increase from just over 2,000 to nearly 8,000 by 1975. Similarly, the US strategic bombers which had a capability of delivering additional 2,000 thermonuclear warheads, by 1975 would be in a position of delivering ten times more, with use of advanced air to surface missiles.

Though, R & D programmes for upgrading the guidance and control systems for ballistic missiles were continuing in both countries, the US again had a big lead in this

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8. 450 B-52s and 72 FB-III as against 140 for USSR. See also Table 3.

9. See Chart I.

10. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, p.13.

Table 3

U.S. AND SOVIET MEDIUM AND LONG-RANGE BOMBERS

Type	USA		USSR		USA	USSR
	B-52 C-F	B-52 G/H	Tu-20	Mya-4	FB-111	Tu-16
Number	195	255	100	40	72	500
Maximum range (miles)	11500	12500	8000	6000	3800	4000
Maximum speed (Mach number)	0.95	0.95	0.78	0.87	2.2	0.8
Weapons (typical)	(4-6 H-Bombs), 60000 lb. bomb load, Hound Dog ASM	(4-6 H-Bombs), 75000 lb. bomb load, 2x Hound Dog and Quail	40000 lb. bomb load, Kangaroo	20000 lb, bomb load	37000 lb. bomb load, SRAM	20000 lb. bomb load, 1 x Kipper and 2 x Kelt
First in service	1955	1958	1956	1956	1970	1955
Remarks		To be modified to carry SRAM	Assigned mission is naval reconnassance (50 aircraft)and aerial refueling (50 aircraft)	Naval reconnaissance and maritime strike aircraft	Variable Sweepwing (Swingwing). Assigned a defined intercontinental role	Was never assumed to have intercontinental role

Source : SIPRI Year Book 1972, p.18.

research. A Manoeuvering Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV) had been developed and tested in the US.[11] Such a warhead is capable of taking evasive action against missile defenses. Terminal guidance[12] programmes for individual warheads were in advanced stages of development. Another programme included Advanced Ballistic Re-entry System (ABRES) to increase the survialibility of warheads, and enhancing their ability to penetrate enemy air-defenses. "Terminal seeker" warheads and laser guided bombs (SMART Bombs) had already been tested during Vietnam war.

New communication systems based on satellite to satellite communication links were also in advanced stages. The development of infra-red sensor early-warning satellite systems, designed to detect an ICBM attack was continuing. Similarly, the air-borne early-warning defense systems known as AWACS; the continental US over the Horizon back-sccater radars (Conus OTH-B) and satellite reconnaissance systems were in various stages of development.[13] Such programmes, it was presumed, were also continuing in Soviet Union but were in very primitive stages of development.

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11. Ibid., p.7.
12. For details see, ibid., p.7.
13. Ibid., p.10.

Also, under development in both the countries were means of defenses against ballistic missiles. Extremely sophisticated high powered solid state phased-array radars and very large capability highly complex data-handling equipments for ABM systems were some of the areas in which work was being done.

The Soviet Union had been testing an improved ABM missile which could loiter - that is, once fired, it can coast out to a general intercept area, select its target, restart its engine and manoeuvre to destroy the enemy warhead.[14]

The US was also trying to improve its safeguard ABM system by hard-site - based on large number of smaller radars and a use of a variant of SPRINT Surface to Air Missile (SAM) for terminal defense of Minuteman silos.[15]

In the anti-Satellite warfare, i.e. killer satellites, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), significant advances had been made by both countries. The Soviet Union had successfully tested its first, two altitude satellite interception involving a target at an altitude of less than 160 miles.[16] The Soviet Union had thus developed the capability to destroy low altitude reconnaissance satellites, as well as high altitude communication satellites.

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14. Ibid., p.11.

15. Ibid., p.9.

16. Ibid., p.13.

In US development work was continuing on Under Sea Long Range Missile System (ULMS) built around missiles with ICBM capabilities and also on new large "quiet" submarines.[17]

The Soviet Union was also developing a new SLBM with a range of 3,000 n.m. to replace SS-N-6 (range 1,500 n.m.), It also was developing Fractional-Orbital-Bombardment System (FOBS) designed to despatch warheads against US on a south Polar Orbit[18] to complicate detection by defense systems. A new Soviet land based ICBM with a mobile launcher to increase invulnerability was also under development.

Comparisons of Strategic Doctrines of USA and USSR

After going through the various strategic nuclear weapon development programmes of the two countries it becomes clear that the strategic doctrines of the two major powers differ considerably. The reason for this is not far to seek. The strategic doctrines are products of the economic, political and technological capabilities of the country. The strategic doctrines of USA and USSR is no exception to this rule. Consequently, the armament and disarmament postures and policies of the two countries are very much influenced by their strategic doctrines.

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17. Ibid., p.8.

18. Ibid.

Thus, in order to understand the various stands taken by the two countries during the SALT negotiations it would be a useful exercise to review the Soviet strategic doctrine and its comparison with the US strategic doctrine.

During the period 1946-53, the Soviet strategy had seemingly two main aims: to maintain large conventional forces as a deterrent against Western nations and to break the US monopoly of nuclear weapons.[19] Several programmes were taken up in this regard with considerable amount of success. In the next eleven year period, from 1953 to 1964, there appeared a shift in the Soviet strategic doctrine. More emphasis was being given in directing resources into supplying the armed forces first with strategic and subsequently, with tactical nuclear weapons. This was also the period when the US strategic doctrine adopted the approach of "massive retalliation" (1954-60). In Soviet Union a formidable technological and economic base had been made and the shift was seen as increased capabilities of Soviet Union to counter the US approach of massive retalliation. Evidently, no disarmament dialogue could be possible in such an explosive doctrine period. At the political level also this shift

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19. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p.83.

was noted: at the XX Congress (1956) of CPSU it was concluded that "since the world socialist camp has become converted to a powerful political, economic and military force and since the forces of peace have gained world-wide strength war is no longer a fatal inevitability".[20]

The military strategy of this period is best described in a book "Soviet Military Strategy"[21] first published in Moscow in 1962. The authors recognize a broad shift in Soviet strategic outlook from primary pre-occupation with conventional land warfare to a central focus on the problem of global strategic war.[22] This shift was accompanied by an appreciable re-allocation of resources from theatre to strategic forces.[23]

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20. XX CPSU Congress Documents, cited in ibid., p.83.

21. Sokolovskii, V.D., ed., Soviet Military Strategy (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1963). A translation of the book published by Moscow, VIMO, SSR, 1962.

22. In addition of the possibility of a global war they mention the possibility of an escalation from a local war, of "accidental outbreak" and of retaliation by Soviet Union in the event of an attack on another WTO member. Conventional arms will find broad application in both local and world wars and their development is, therefore important, but the leading role in any conflict is given to missiles.

23. To rally socialist countries in a joint effort WTO was signed in 1955, and in 1960 the importance of WTO to common defense began to be stressed. The armed forces of the WTO members were reorganized on the patterns of Soviet Union. Air defense system development was undertaken and tactical weapons were deployed in WTO member countries.

During the mid-sixties till the signing of SALT-I i.e. from 1964-73, another shift was noticeable in the Soviet strategic doctrine. The New Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership gradually introduced what was called "flexibility with caution".[24] In comparison, during the similar period the US doctrine had also changed. In the period 1961-68 US approach was of "flexible-response"[25] and in the period from 1968 to 1973 and beyond the strategy became more pragmatic,of "realistic deterrence". The US doctrines of this period had similar policy objectives as that of the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union, during this period emphasis was given to modernizing the strategic naval forces. A re-emphasis was also given to the modernization of conventional weapons. Several military theorists[26] stated that a possibly of non-nuclear war cannot be "excluded" nor of warfare restricted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. These theorists debated the proper mix of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons required to make Soviet deterrent more credible.[27] In the late

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24. For details see SIPRY Yearbook, 1974, p.89.

25. Flexible Response: McNamara defined it thus: "Our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack. Or we may use our forces to limit damage done to ourselves and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate war using our forces as a bargaining weapon."

26. See for details SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, pp.89-92.

27. Ibid., p.91.

1960s, in another shift, more emphasis was laid to the study of local wars and consequently,the modernization of conventional forces. This was basically due to the fact that threat of possible nuclear attack had reduced due to the increased retaliatory capability of Soviet Union.

Thus we see that the strategic doctrine of the two countries became more pragmatic and reconciliatory. Nuclear war was started being seen as an evil which should be tamed. This was the setting required for a proper disarmament dialogue. SALT was not the only dialogue which took place thus; but it was the culmination of the several other bilateral and multilateral dialogues which resulted into the signing of various treaties which ultimately acted as confidence building measures for a dialogue of a larger scope - the SALT.

The initiative for such a dialogue was, however, taken by the US when the idea of SALT was secretly floated to the Soviet leadership in December 1966. After an initial hesitation due to the existing fears and tensions, the Soviet Union responded favourably. However, the time did not seem to be most suitable for it yet. The Soviet Union presumably did not want to negotiate from positions of weakness. Hence, a delay was there, apparently on grounds of certain international

events,[28] but ultimately the talks began on 17 November 1969. Seven rounds of official meetings with more than 127 reported sessions were held, with rounds taking place alternatively in Helsinki and Vienna. These were supplemented by unreported, informal discussions which played a vital role in resolving contentious issues in a frank and informal discussion. Normally the two sides met two to three times a week in official working sessions. The sessions lasted about an hour and half but with the talks apparently moving into stage of intensive negotiations, the final sessions often lasted as long as three hours.

The main aspects of SALT negotiations were, firstly they were held in tight secrecy. Only a few leaks, particularly from Western sources were the exception. Both sides had formally pledged not to reveal the contents of the talks. Secondly, both governments stressed the business-like nature of the SALT negotiations and the US negotiators in particular, praised the absence of polemics on the Soviet side.

The organisational aspects of SALT-I negotiations evolved along lines initially established by the American side. Negotiations were in general carried out at four levels. In plenary and informal meetings on the negotiating front in Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva; often in "back-

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8. See Chapter II.

channel" parallel negotiations between Soviet Ambassador to US, A.Dobrynin and National Security Advisor H. Kissinger in Washington and with Brezhnev in Moscow. For SALT-I, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Director of ACDA headed the US negotiating team while Deputy Foreign Minister Valdimir S.Semenyov headed the Soviet negotiating team. At first the meetings took place in plenary sessions but in due course of time a strong tendency developed,to shift the bulk of negotiating business from the rigidly formal pleanry sessions to small informal meetings, "mini-plenaries", and working groups. Important informal probings and exchanges often took place over long luncheons and dinners preceding private meetings of the principals. Such informal,intimate social gatherings proved to be a real asset in the negotiations. Eventually, informal meetings became a principal channel for negotiating many of the most difficult provisions in the SALT-I agreement. Careful records were kept on the various types of negotiations.

The Soviet negotiating team, though roughly similar in size (up to 100 people) had somewhat different composition in comparison to the US team. There was a greater emphasis on the military presence.[29]

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29. During the first three rounds up to the end of 1970, Col.Gen.N.V.Ogarkov, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of USSR Armed Forces was the second ranking delegate. He was succeeded by Lt.Gen.K.A. Trusov a senior General Staff Officer with a background of overseeing advanced weapons development. Cited in J.Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT I (New York; Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p.83.

Another characteristic of this staff was the extremely tight control Moscow maintained over the proceedings. That the military's role was preeminent if not decisive at SALT negotiations was evident by the fact, that Semenyov and other Foreign Ministry civilian representatives did not have access to classified information on Soviet weapon systems.[30] Evidence of military's role in SALT was further apparent during the Moscow and Vladivostok summit meetings. Senior military representatives participated directly in the negotiations and were closely consulted by Brezhnev.[31] At the Moscow Summit Deputy Prime Minister L.V. Simirnov who was also Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) which coordinated the Defense production, played an important role in the summit negotiations.

In Washington, the USSR's Ambassador Dobrynin though not formally a member of SALT delegations, was nonetheless a principal in the negotiations. He became the key man with Kissinger in the "back-channel", both in Washington and in Moscow, and among his represental functions as Ambassador was to "lobby Congress strenously on behalf of SALT-I".[32]

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30. Igor S.Glagolve, "The Soviet Decision Making Process in Arms Control Negotiations", Orbis, Vol.21, Winter 1978, pp.769-70.

31. R.L.Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military", Problems of Communism, Vol.24, January-February 1975, p.29.

32. Soviet diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour: Emerging New Contexts for US Diplomacy,(Congressional Research Service,) Vol.1, 1979, p.450.

Process of Negotiations

The immediate pre-SALT positions of the two parties was thus: The US had proposed a purely defensive agreement which was to center on control of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs). Clearly, the US perceived that these defensive systems gave false impression of defensive capabilities to the possessor which could provoke a first strike by it. The Soviets, however, accepting the US thesis, took the position that the agreement should be on both, offensive as well as defensive systems. Here, the idea was to put some kind of restraint on the further development of technically superior US strategic nuclear weapons.

But when the talks opened in Helsinki on 17 November 1969, the positions of both countries had reversed. Now, the US insisted on a comprehensive offensive-defensive treaty, while the Soviet Union showed interest in defensive treaty only. The earlier rounds of negotiations, though exploratory in nature centred around on this disagreement and also on some other definitional issues, e.g. the concept of strategic weapons. On this issue the US roughly defined "strategic" weapons as those which had intercontinental ranges and held that at SALT "priority should go to those (offensive systems) that form the core of offensive threats, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy strategic bombers". The Soviets on the other hand

gave a different definition to "strategic" weapons. According to them the "strategic" weapons are those which can strike each other's territory. This definition thus included what the Soviets called the Forward Base Svstems (FBS) i.e. the US nuclear forces stationed in Europe, as well as armed bombers on US aircraft carriers; these had been excluded from the US definition.[33]

In the second round,though,the disagreement persisted, the US presented a proposal dealing with "all" offensive and defensive strategic weapon systems including ABMs and MIRVs, involving both numerical and qualitative limitations ("All"did not include Bombers). An alternative approach also was presented at about same time, would not have limited MIRVs.[34] Again on 24 July 1970 the US proposal was modified to include bombers. An overall numerical quota was proposed, which would not have been greater than the total weapons then existing with either powers. The mix of various weapon svstems could be varied at will with one important exception - there had to be a specific limitation on the quantitv of "large" missiles of Soviet SS-9 class.

Although less is known about Soviet Union's earlv proposals but what little evidence is available, primarily

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33. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, p.25.

34. Ibid.

from Western sources, indicates that in the early stages of negotiations the Soviet Union did not propose many specific proposals like the US. It generally responded to the US proposals, accepting some, rejecting others or amending some proposals.

Soviet Union though had rejected a comprehensive agreement reportedly accepted in principle, the concept of an aggregate ceiling on strategic weapons, but did not respond in specific terms to the proposed sub-ceiling on "large" and "heavy" missiles. On the issue of MIRVs the US had proposed a ban on testing coupled with on-site inspections. The Soviets outrightly rejected this proposal, presumably on two grounds: it would have had left Soviet Union behind US in MIRV technology, and it called for on-site inspections which the Soviets were unwilling to permit on many grounds, and there was no other way for verifying the deployment of MIRVs. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union showed interest in an agreement on zero ABM, or a low level of deployment apparently around National Capital Authority (NCA), just like their Moscow ABM system.

But, sharp disagreements prevailed on the question of US-FBS. Each side wanted to exclude her weapons deployed in Europe giving own definitions and arguments on strategic weapons. The US argued, that its European

forces (FBS) are "essential components of integrated theatre defenses created under alliance commitments", and they are not a proper subject for bilateral SALT negotiations. Instead, they should be discussed in the context of Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks between the NATO and WTO pact countries.[35] According to the US argument, these weapons did not come within the scope of "strategic" weapons as per the US definition. The US also drew attention to the Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) targeted on Western Europe - for which the Soviets argued that they did not come under the definition of "strategic" weapons provided by them. Also, that they had to take the nuclear weapons of France, England and also China into account.

Disagreement on these basic issues resulted into a deadlock at the third round of SALT in the late 1970s. It was here the "back-channel" was opened. Without the knowledge of the US SALT delegation and presumably, also the Soviet delegation, President Nixon in January 1971 opened secret "back-channel" with Prime Minister A. Kosygin. This correspondence was supplemented by a series of secret meetings between Dobrynin and Kissinger. In the course of these exchanges and meetings, agreement

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35. Ibid., p.27.

was reached on seeking a separate ABM Treaty as well as certain but not clearly defined interim measures, to restrict offensive strategic weapons. This was made public as late as on 20 May 1971.[36]

However, the 'back-channel' was not the only responsible for removing the impasse in the negotiations. Progress on several unrealted, though important, contentious international issues on the European front played their part in bringing about the compromise.[37]

At the beginning of the fourth round in March 1971 the positions were still not clear as the "back-channel" negotiations were going in secrecy without the knowledge of the SALT delegations. In this round, the Soviet Union specified that they would like an 'ABM-only' agreement with an initial five year duration and limiting each side to around 100 ABMs around NCA. It also showed interest to consider the US demand on limitation on ABM-radar installations.

In this round the US proposed a comprehensive "freeze" of construction of both, the land based ICBMs and as also the sea based SLBMs as well as submarines. This interim agreement was to be for a period of two

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36. Soviet Diplomacy, n.32, p.456.

37. In the Peace Programme of XXIV Congress of 1971 Brezhnev gave several concessions regarding solving the Berlin question; European Security, Defense Budget Cuts etc. For details see Chapter II.

years, while a more comprehensive agreement was being negotiated. An accompanying proposal would have permitted each nation to chose between no more than 100 ABMs to defend NCA or up to 300 AMBs to protect offensive missile silo sites.

The Soviet Union objected to including submarine based missiles in the proposed freeze, as evidently their SLBMs were very inferior to US and they had a major programme underway for the modernization of naval strategic forces. To meet this Soviet objection the US revived their previous proposals for an overall ceiling on offensive weapons which would permit any mix of weapons. The Soviets in turn demanded that nuclear-armed carrier aircrafts be included if they are based close enough to strike Soviet Union.

On ABM issue, initially the Soviets favoured a zero ABM agreement but later agreed to a low level ABM deployment. Both sides agreed that type of deployment would be optional. But, disagreement once again arose on the number of ABM complexes for missile silo-site defenses and the assymmetry of the number of ABMs permitted in the US proposal. Soviets insisted on absolute equality in the number of ABMs. Later an agreement was reached allowing Soviet Union to deploy 100 ABMs for one missile site and 100 for Moscow capital

region to match 200 of US, around missile silo-site. There was apparently some disagreement that the ABM Treaty should include ban on testing and development of ABM warheads as well as actual deployment.

By the time the fifth round began in July 1971 an agreement on "ABM-only" had been reached through "back channel". Negotiations, there-fore once again came to a lively and interesting phase of intensive deliberations.

By early 1972 the two parties had reached a broad agreement on three issues: (1) each side would be limited to two ABM sites, one for NCA and the other for the protection of an ICBM silo-site; (2) the interim freeze would include ICBMs on both sides; but (3) it would not include bombers of the so-called FBS.

In the next rounds the delegations began to draft the language for a joint text on both defensive and offensive agreement, but still many minor issues had to be settled. This created a second deadlock, this time on the crucial question of whether the freeze (in the interim agreement) would also extend to SLBMs.[38] In the spring of 1974 the "back-channel" was thus, opened again involving this time, a secret trip to Moscow by Kissinger

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38. Soviet Diplomacy..., n.32, p.463.

accompanied by Dobrynin. Semenyov was also recalled to the Moscow meeting. This round of "back-channel" talks produced high level endorsement for the ABM agreement that had been worked out in April by the two delegations, and an interim agreement on offensive arms to include SLBMs. A number of other issues, however, were left for the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit of 1972.[39]

However, when the President Nixon reached Moscow on 22 May 1972, for the Summit, he described the atmosphere as "cool" and "tense".[40] The reason was the May 8 bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbour in Vietnam.[41] Nevertheless, to the credit of Soviet Union as Nixon has noted in his memoirs, that till the ABM treaty was signed the Vietnam issue did not surface,[42] indicating thereby, the businesslike approach of the Soviet Union. Even though, some fears had earlier been expressed in the US, that the Summit could be called off by the Soviet Union for the time being.

In the American team for the Summit, besides Kissinger were, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, his advisor on Soviet

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39. R.L.Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT", The Wilson Quarterly, Vol.1, autumn 1977, pp.80-87.

40. Nixon, Richard, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlop), p.609.

41. For details see Chapter II and Soviet Diplomacy, n.32, p.468.

42. Soviet Diplomacy..., n.32, p.469.

Affairs, and William F.Hyland another member of National Security Council (NSC). A third member took notes of the discussions.[43]

The Soviet team included Foreign Minister A. Gromyko, Ambassador A.Dobrynin and L.V.Simirnov, A.Aleksandrov, a very able and knowledgeable on foreign policy was also at Brezhnev's side as his advisor.[44]

From the Soviet point of view only one major issue remained unresolved, namely to reach agreement on SLBM replacement. But from the US point of view there were two additional major issues for the summit; mobile land based missiles and the missile size (particularly for heavy missiles). US wanted a ban on mobile missiles and a more restrictive and precise language on missile size than the one agreed in Helsinki.[45] One another issue common to both and which was still unresolved was an understanding on ABM radars.

The radar issue was the first to be resolved. On the first day, the principals agreed to set an arbitrary line separating "heavy" from "light" radars.[46] Ultimately

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43. Newhouse, J., Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p.251.

44. Nixon Memoirs, n.40, p.611.

45. The Cold Dawn..., n.43, p.251.

46. "Heavy" phased array radar was defined as one having potential i.e. the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters, more than 3 million.

they agreed to establish a ceiling of two heavy and eighteen light radars around an ICBM field in each country, and six modern ABM radar complexes within 90 miles of their capitals.

On the issue of restricting mobile ICBMs, a specific understanding could not be reached and the US agreed to set forth its own understanding of the ban in a separate declaration.[47] However, on the question of missile size the Soviet Union agreed on US demand as not to increase the size of their missile silos by more than 10 to 15 per cent.

The SLBM problem was more vexed, and after several rounds the matter still could not be resolved. The two problems in it were: the number of SLBMs the Soviets actually had, and the number of old missiles they would be obliged to retire in order to reach the agreed total of 62 submarines and 950 SLBM tubes. At one stage, Nixon made a "last-offer" granting 62 submarines and 950 tubes to the Soviet Union and accepting 44 submarines and 710 tubes for the US. But included in this offer was the fact, that the Soviets would have had to retire approximately 240 "old" missiles of the SS-7 and SS-8 class and the H-class submarines to replace with new ones. President

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47. USA agreed to deffer the question of mobile ICBMs for subsequent negotiations but stated that it would consider the deployment of mobile ICBMs during Agreement period as inconsistent.

stated that if the Soviets did not accept this offer there would be no treaty.[48] Finally after discussions within the Soviet Politbureau, Brezhnev accepted the Nixon's offer and thus the last hurdle was crossed.

Messages were flashed at Helsinki where the two delegations started work on putting agreements in diplomatic treaty language and into formal instruments of agreement.[49] The delegations then flew to Moscow the same day and the drafts of the treaty and interim agreement were finalized, texts being English and Russian, both authentic.

Some important characteristics of this summit were: (a) No complete transcripts were made of the plenary sessions at the Moscow Summit.[50] (b) To avoid "leaks" and maintain secrecy Nixon refrained from using American translator during his talks with Brezhnev and instead, used Brezhnev's translator Viktor Sukhodrev. This was an unprecedented step which was later criticized by several Western commentators.[51]

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48. Soviet Diplomacy, n.32, p.466.

49. Ibid., p.468.

50. Ibid., p.469.

51. Ibid.

SALT-I Treaty Analysis

(1) ABM Treaty

The treaty defines an ABM system[52] and includes in it interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, ABM radars which are operational, under construction, under-going testing, undergoing repair or mothballed.

It goes on to give specific details regarding the deployment of the two agreed ABM systems around the National Capital Authority (NCA), and one to protect a missile silo site.[53] It was agreed, that the distance between the centre of NCA ABM system, and the ABM system around missile site, would not be less than 1300 kms.[54] Also that both the systems should have areas not exceeding a radius of 150 km each, and should contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 interceptor missiles. Type and quantity of radars were also fixed for both systems.[55] It was provided, that neither the lannchers would be provided neither with arrangements to launch more than one interceptor missile nor arrangements for rapid firing of ABM missiles.[56] It was prohibited to upgrade any other non-ABM radar or non-ABM missile to function in ABM mode.[57]

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52. ABM Treaty text, Article II. For the text of SALT-I Treaty see SIPRI Year Book 1973.
53. Ibid., Article III.
54. SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, p.6.
55. For details see SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, p.3-5
56. ABM Treaty Text, Article IV and V.
57. This provision was specifically provided to prohibit the use of Soviet 'Hen House' radars which functioned as ballistic missile early warning radars and which could detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances.

However, the Article IV clarified that the provisions of Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for developing or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. The current contorversy regarding the re-interpretation of the ABM Treaty by the US for developing SDI, is based on the "new-interpretation" of this Article. But if Article IV is read along with Article V, para 1, no ambiguity whatsoever,remains as this para explicitly provides that "each party (USA & USSR) undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea based, air-based, space based or mobile land based." It therefore implies that all types of ABM systems are covered in this treaty and these should also include ABM systems based upon "other physical principles" i.e. laser beams, particle beams etc. Though,there is an ambiguous clause in the treaty that parties agree to discuss the specific limitation on future ABM systems based on "other physical principles" in accordance with the amendment procedure.[58] The amendment article in this regard,is important. It says "Each party may propose amendments to this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force..."[59] But above all it is also made clear in the beginning of the treaty that "Each party undertakes

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58. SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.3.

59. ABM Treaty text, Article XIV.

not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for, in Article III of this treaty."[60]

Verification of compliance with the treaty was a major problem with the negotiators. The US wanted on-site inspections while Soviet Union insisted on verification by "national technical means" only. The Soviet view, however, prevailed and the ABM treaty provided for verification by "national technical means." But both the parties agreed that either party would not interfere in such verification by the other party operating in accordance with the verification provisions.[61] Use of "deliberate concealment measures which impede verification" were specifically prohibited.

One important achievement of this treaty which would go a long way and act as confidence building measure was the agreement on the forming of a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for aiding, monitoring and resolving disputes regarding the implementation of the treaty.[62] Another responsibility of SCC was to review the treaty after every five years,[63] a responsibility which it

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60. Ibid., Art.I, para 2.

61. Ibid., Art.XII, paras 1, 2 and 3.

62. Ibid., Art. XIII.

63. Ibid., Art. XIV, para 2.

performed to the satisfaction of both parties. The overall working of SCC was satisfying to both parties, and as we shall see in the next chapter that for SALT-II SCC was entrusted with more powers and responsibilities.

(2) Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

This Agreement which was signed alongwith the ABM Treaty was only for a period of five years unlike the ABM Treaty which was for unlimited duration. It put a temporary freeze on the deployment of ICBMs and other offensive systems.

The Agreement provided that the parties would not construct additional ICBM launchers[64] after July 1, 1972,[65] nor convert launchers for "light" ICBMs or "old" ICBMs[66] into "new" or "heavy" ICBMs.[67] Specific restriction on Soviet heavy missiles reflected the US fears about Soviet SS-9 "heavy" missiles which were supposed to be endangering their Minute-man missiles. It was feared that during a

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64. ICBM launcher was defined as strategic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the North Western border of continental USSR and the North Eastern borders of continental USA. Launchers for FOBS are considered to be ICBM launchers.

65. Interim Agreement, Art.I. For the text see SIPRI Yearbook 1973.

66. "Heavy" missiles were not specifically defined but it was understood that they belong to the Soviet SS-9 class.

67. Interim Agreement, Art. II.

Soviet first strike US Minuteman's can be destroyed in their silos. The threat from SS-9 had been primarily responsible for the US decision for construction of initial 12-site "safeguard" ABM system.

Though, a broad agreement on the SLBMs and the number of submarines was incorporated in this agreement,[68] but the numerical limitations agreed upon were provided in the separate Protocol to this agreement.

The Agreement permitted the modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers.[69]

The verification procedure provided for, in the Agreement were the same as that in the ABM Treaty.[70] The National technical means of verification were considered to be sufficient for the purpose. Another feature of this Agreement was that the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which was created for the ABM Treaty monitoring was also entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring of the implementation of this Agreement.[71]

Another feature of the Interim Agreement was that, it dealt with only selected categories of strategic offensive weapons - land based inter-continental ballistic

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68. Ibid., Art. III.

69. Ibid., Art. IV.

70. Ibid., Art. V, same as Art.XII of ABM Treaty.

71. Ibid., Art. XIII.

missiles and SLBMs. Their aggregate number was forzen at approximately, then existing levels with a certain freedom to choose the composition within the aggregate limit. However, it excludes the US FBS and Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs targetted on Europe. This Agreement called for a asymmetrical ceiling between the two parties. Therefore instead of providing equal vulnerability for the two which was the goal in the beginning, this agreement provided unequal mutual vulnerability. As it was, the Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs targetted on Europe could not strike the US territory because of their lesser range, but on the other hand the US carrier based nuclear armed aircrafts and other FBS forces bases in Europe could strike deep into Soviet territory. Thus the quantitative advantage of Soviet Union was only on surface. The strategic advantage and the technological advantage (US had started MIRVing its ICBMs and other advantages) which the US had, diluted the numerical advantage of the Soviet Union.

As regards the specific numerical limits in this Agreement, the US was permitted 1054 ICBMs (1000 Minuteman and 54 "heavy" Titan II missiles), all operational and none under construction. The Soviet Union was allowed 1408 ICBMs (210 less than what it possessed at the time of signing of this Agreement). Interestingly, the figures for the ICBMs which the Soviety Union possessed (1618) were provided by US, as the Soviet Union did not disclose their figures throughout the talks. Also that, they never

denied nor confirmed the US figure. A sub-ceiling was imposed on "heavy" ICBMs. Their number was "freezed" at the number possessed by each party. The Soviet Union reportedly had 313 SS-9 ICBMs while the US had 54 Titan-II ICBMs. Any conversion of "light" ICBMs into "heavy" ICBMs was specifically prohibited. The only achievement of the numerical ceiling was that the US succeeded in arresting the Soviet ICBM construction programme. But this achievement too was negligible as the Soviet ICBM deployment programme had already slowed down in 1970-71 and had virtually stopped before the treaty was signed, indicating thereby that a predetermined level had been reached.

With regards to submarines and the SLBMs, the US at the time of signing of the Agreement possessed 41 modern nuclear propelled submarines, with 656 launchers on board. The corresponding figure for the Soviet Union (from Western sources) was 48 submarines which included 'Y'-class modern nuclear propelled submarines as well as old 'H'-class diesel propelled submarines. The number of SLBMs with Soviet Union was 740. Like their ICBM modernization programme, the Soviet Union also had a major programme for the modernization of its strategic naval forces. Reportedly, 8 modern submarines and approximately 100 SLBMs were being added yearly. As against this the US had no such programme on hand except they were developing a new submarine-Trident.

Under this Agreement, 710 launchers on 44 submarines were permitted for US, and the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union was 950 SLBMs and 62 submarines. However, it was provided that the figure of more than 656 SLBMs for US and 740 for Soviet Union could only be reached through replacement of equal numbers of ballistic missiles launchers deployed prior to 1964. This provision once again was specifically incorporated to take into account the older SLBMs of Soviet Union.

In a separate statement the Soviet Union reserved its right to an approximate increase in the number of their modern submarines to exceed the permitted figure of 62, in case the US NATO allies should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the number of submarines they had operational or under construction on the date of signature of agreement. The Soviet Union permitted a total of 50 submarines and 800 launchers for the US and NATO allies[72] combined.[73]

The only achievement in the qualitative aspect of restrictions in this Agreement was regarding the size of the ICBM launchers. It was agreed by the Soviet Union during the summit negotiations that it would not increase the size of their ICBM silos by more than 10-15 per cent.

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72. The two NATO allies which had nuclear submarines were Britain and France.

73. SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, pp.10-11.

The US had expressed fears regarding the greater throw-weight of the Soviet ICBMs and the threat to the US Minuteman missiles.

Apart from the several achievements of this Agreement there were also a few failures to its credit. The two major failures of this treaty which diluted the achievements of this Agreement in the long run and helped in fueling the nuclear arms race were, that the parties could not agree to ban or limit mobile ICBMs, and there was no agreement to ban or limit the MIRVs. The mobile ICBMs which the Soviet Union at that time was developing and was very close to deployment increased the invulnerability of the ICBMs, which was harmful to the mutual balance of terror, which they had agreed to stabilize.

In the case of MIRVs though the US had initially proposed a ban, but the Soviet Union did not accept the condition of ban on development and testing also. Clearly, the Soviet Union did not want to be left behind in this area of technology and hence, an agreement could not be reached to limit MIRVs. This failure was to prove very costly as by MIRVing of ICBMs and SLBMs the two parties could increase the total number of deliverable nuclear warheads manifold,[74] thus undercutting whatever little achievement was made in limiting the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers in the Agreement.

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74. The US had more than twice nuclear warheads than USSR-5700 as against 2500. This advantage increased further by MIRVing.

A twelve point Joint Declaration on Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and USSR was also signed in the SALT-I Treaty. In this the two sides agreed that in the nuclear age there was no alternative to conducting their relations with each other on the basis of peaceful coexistence; they attached "major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations"; they would therefore do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war; they would always exercise restraint in their relations with each other and would be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means; efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of other, directly or indirectly, were inconsistent with these objectives; and the prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR were "the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or the threat of force.

This declaration achieved some political aims for the Soviet Union as far as legitimizing of its disarmament policy is concerned. The principles of equal security and the reducing of threat of nuclear weapons and work towards disarmament was recognized as basic aims of the two countries.

Assessment of SALT-I Treaty

A retrospective assessment of SALT-I Treaty does not provide evidence of any kind of encouraging achievement in itself, except that, it marked a small step towards a more open and concrete dialogue for disarmament. It acted more as a confidence building measure than a disarmament treaty.

It appears that reduction of nuclear weapons was not intended except, as a part of replacement procedure.[75] The aggregate limits agreed upon were more or less same as the total number of weapons possessed by each country. However, for Soviet Union, it was supposed to dismantle about 210 ICBMs from its existing stock. Considering the number of older and not very effective ICBMs it chose to dismantle, this was no major achievement.

Another feature which emerges is that, the treaty failed to control more effectively, the strategic naval forces. The number of SLBMs and the submarines permitted was higher than the number possessed by either party. Thus, the total was supposed to rise, thereby, increasing the invulnerability of the nuclear missiles. As the Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) was not in a very developed stage it was easy to hide the submarines without detection. Moreover, the modern SLBMs were becoming more effective

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75. SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, pp. 14-15.

with the improvement in their ranges, accuracy and their heavy MIRVing. On the other hand, the importance of ICBMs had already started decreasing by the increasing accuracy of missiles which increased their vulnerability to a first strike. Also, the bombers were not limited in this Agreement which had a major role in a modern warfare. The US had a distinct advantage both quantitative as well as qualitative in this field.

It is important to note the views expressed by the leaders of the two countries after the conclusion of SALT-I Treaty. Both declared separately that they would continue developing weapon systems, not specifically prohibited by the treaty. The US leaders stated their determination to maintain US technological lead. The Soviet Union said, that it would take all necessary measures in defense of principles of equal security.[76]

Failure to agree on any qualitative restrictions (except on missile size) was an indication that quantitative plateau having been reached, the emphasis now would be on qualitative arms race, in which the US, thought itself to be having a clear edge over Soviet Union. The agreements indicate that the technological arms race has been encouraged and even legitimized.[77]

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76. Ibid., p.15.

77. Ibid., p.16.

The ABM Treaty also failed to achieve much. Though, a ban was agreed for not deploying more than two ABM systems, the history shows that both the parties were not eager to deploy even the two site ABM system. The USSR did not even complete the Moscow ABM system to 100 ABM launchers and the US moth-balled its only one ABM system. Both the parties later agreed (in 1974) not to deploy the second ABM system permitted in the treaty.

Soviet Negotiating Behaviour during SALT

SALT was the first major post-war confrontation across the table between the two major powers. Prior to SALT, it was presumed by all western nations, that Soviet disarmament rhetoric was only a propaganda, and only one point policy which the Soviet Union had, was bringing about communist revolutions and establishment of Socialist puppet regimes. SALT presented a unique opportunity to the West to closely observe the so-called "evil empire".

The features of the Soviet negotiating behaviour during SALT negotiations contradict the premonitions of the West. The Soviet Union was praised by none other than the US negotiating team, in particular by Gerard C.Smith, the leader of US delegation, as well as Kissinger and President Nixon. However, there are several unique features which the western analysts have pointed out about the Soviet negotiating behaviour.

(1) Seriousness of Negotiations

When asked to comment on the Soviet style and characteristics of negotiations US Ambassador to Soviet Union A. Johnson who led the US team for SALT-II replied, "you must compare it to the matter of how a procupine makes love: very, very carefully. Soviet negotiators negotiate very, very carefully."[78]

It has been attested by other members of US negotiating team, Garthoff, Johnson, Smith etc. that to their surprise there was absence of abusive skin-kicking treatment of the adversary; extraneous ideologizing ad-nauseam; propaganda hectoring; and irrelevant political discussion which labelled the Russians with. "The Russians were tough negotiators at SALT but they were tough with a difference: they wanted to negotiate; they wanted an agreement."[79]

The seriousness of the Soviet Union was also reflected during summit negotiations when it was feared by US, that the summit may be called off due to the Vietnam bombing just 14 days before the summit. The Soviet leaders, however, did not raise this issue till the SALT-I Treaty had been signed.

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78. Whelan notebook No.6, 4 October 1977, p.46. Cited in Soviet Diplomacy, n.32, p.458.

79. Ibid., p.459.

(2) Difference in Approaches

The approaches of the two parties were markedly different. The Soviet Union approached generally from general aspects of the problem; the Americans on the other hand were more specific in their proposals.[80]

The Soviets wanted a general politically meaningful accord. They sought "agreement in principle" prior to "agreement on specifics." Their approach was directed at a general American acceptance of a rough parity already achieved and a more general restraint in military build-up while emphasizing political detente.[81]

(3) On Taking Initiative

The Soviets generally refrained from taking initiative and liked to restrict themselves to responding to the initiatives of other party. This approach gave a distinct advantage to Soviet Union: they succeeded in knowing the adversary's designs and keeping their actions secret to extract maximum bargain. Also, the adversary ran into a risk of negotiating with himself, as Ambassador Johnson had noted.[82] But this kind of restrictive approach was to a large extent an attribute of the binding Soviet bureaucracy

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80. Garthoff, R., "Negotiating with Russians : Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol.1, Spring 1977, p.6.

81. Ibid., pp.5-6.

82. Soviet Diplomacy, n.32, p.460.

coupled with the inflexibility of Soviet negotiators who were obliged to adhere strictly to Moscow's rigid instructions.

(4) Secrecy, Suspicion and Control

Soviet Union's penchant for secrecy was the most distinctive characteristic of the Soviet negotiating behaviour. A most remarkable manifestation of this penchant towards secrecy was the Soviet insistence on not disclosing information on the number and specific types of their nuclear weapons but rather negotiating on the figures provided by the American intelligence estimates of them - estimates which the Soviets never confirmed.

Suspicion, as Newhouse notes[83] is conditioned partly by history. "Suspicion is fed by the anxieties of people whose land lacking frontiers has been overrun countless times." Soviet negotiators were therefore, suspicious from the start, of possible American fishing expeditions for intelligence information. Garthoff notes another feature:[84] "Since in their own eyes, they were in a weaker strategic military positions they were hesitant to disclose their strategic worries by being the first to propose limitations on specific weaponary."

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83. Cold Dawn, n.43, pp.56-57.

84. R. Garthoff, "Negotiating Salt", The Wilson Quarterly, Vol.1, Autumn 1977m p.82.

As regards to their sensitivty to on site inspections, Newhouse noted:[85]

> The Soviets strenously oppose on site inspection, partly because it is intrusive; partly because of an understandable aversion to parading their technological inferiority vis-a-vis the US; partly because they suspect Americans of seeking targetting information not otherwise available or of just wanting to pry; and perhaps partly because of a concern that to disclose one thing could mean disclosing other things they prefer to keep secret.

The Soviet leaders held a very tight control over their negotiators. Semenyov was in particular so cautions that even in informal discussions as Johnson noted, that he read from prepared notes which he kept in his pockets.[86]

Nixon also has thrown some light on the Soviet negotiating behaviour during the Summit meeting in 1972, in his memoirs.[87] He in particular reveals the negotiating behaviour of Brezhnev, his opposite number in Soviet Union. He writes that he had a healthy respect for Brezhnev as a negotiator. He notes that Brezhnev was very "shrewd" and had "ability to move off a point in the event that he is not winning it". He says, that Brezhnev's "gestures were extremely expressive. He stands up and walks around."

Nixon rejected the thesis of Robert Conquest the British specialist on Soviet Affairs, that the Soviet leaders were "intellectually third-rate". He wrote,

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85. Cold Dawn, n.43, pp.179-80.

86. R.L. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT", Wilson Quarterly, p. 84.

87. Nixon Memoirs, n.40, p.1120.

"Americans constantly misjudge the Russians because we judge them by their manners, and so forth, and we do not look beyond to see what kind of character and strength they really have."[88]

Summarizing the critical characteristics of both American and Soviet negotiating behaviour during SALT, Newhouse notes: "Impatience, inconsistency and negotiating against a deadline forms the behaviour of Americans; suspicion and hardening defensism in the fact of unconventional tactics forms the characteristics of the Soviet Union." Further he wrote, "Negotiating with Russians require patience and consistency."[89]

Our analysis and assessment of the SALT negotiations and the treaty, above, shows that the Soviets went into the negotiations with inferior nuclear capabilities but their determination to improve upon their weak-nesses rapidly, helped them to negotiate from positions of equality. We also found that as the different negotiations started in the sixties, the strategic doctrines of both the super-powers ran almost parallel; so much so that the time when the SALT dialogue started both the strategic doctries aimed for similar goals. This was possible, evidently due to the success achieved at different negotiating fronts as well as on the SALT front.

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88. Nixon Memoirs, n.40, p.618.

89. Cold Dawn, n.43, p.270.

The SALT Treaty as noted above could not bring about any substantial disarmament. However, as stated earlier, disarmament was never the primary goal of the SALT-I negotiations. The goal which was successfully achieved, was streamlining the two strategic weapon systems as well as the strategic doctrines. Nevertheless, SALT-I succeeded in arresting some weapon development programmes as also the increase in the number of offensive weapons.

The Soviet negotiating behaviour as discussed above gave some important insights into the intentions of the Soviet policy makers and the techniques employed by them during negotiations. This confrontation dispelled doubts about the Soviets, and from then negotiating with them was never a horrifying experience, as feared prior to SALT. There were no doubt, differences in the negotiating techniques of the two super-powers as pointed out by negotiators, but appreciable was the fact, that the Soviets unlike their counterparts, never lost sight of their goal in the negotiations.

Chapter IV

SALT-II TREATY - ITS NEGOTIATION AND ANALYSIS

Soviet nuclear disarmament policy, as we studied in the previous chapter, registered major successes during the first round of SALT dialogue. As stated earlier, though, no major disarmament come about, but certainly more confidence was generated in these delibrations. Hence, our focus in this chapter would be on making a detailed study of the second round of SALT dialogue.

As we shall see in the following pages, the SALT dialogue became more and more technical in nature. The primary objective of each party was to gain whatever little leverage it could, but excluding its weapon systems from being subjected to restrictions. But before such a deal with these aspects is made, it would be a useful exercise to study briefly, the technological factor of new developments in weapon systems, which made negotiations increasingly complex and difficult. An attempt is also made to make an objective assessment of the treaty as well as the treaty analysis.

The SALT-I treaty, when it was signed, was projected as a major success in solving the mystery of nuclear disarmament. Ambitious goals were set for negotiating the SALT-II treaty by the end of 1974. It seemed that total abolition of nuclear weapons was just a matter of time. But, that was not to be. As time passed and the SALT-II

negotiations became more technical, it became clear that SALT-II shall not be a 'cake-walk'. The reason lay in the fact that SALT-I though a harbinger of the nuclear disarmament dialogue, was not in itself a disarmament treaty. In retrospect, it can be said, that ABM-defenses were no more than a 'practical bargaining-chip'. The prohibitive costs as well as technological hurdles which it posed for a nation-wide and reliable missile defense had already killed whatever interests each side was initially having in its deployment. However, when perfected the ABM-defense would have certainly posed the dangers which were expressed during negotiations. In this respect, an early limitation on ABM defenses was necessary, and was timely negotiated.

The Interim Agreement too achieved little as regards the nuclear disarmament; its achievements were restricted to freezing the offensive nuclear weapons at more or less existing levels, even at higher levels in some cases, for a limited period of time. Considering the fact that the US had stopped increasing its number of ICBMs and SLBMs since 1967, and the Soviets had also slowed down since 1970 and had virtually stopped construction of ICBMs, in particular, since 1971, the Interim Agreement was not a disarmament agreement.

In fact, the SALT-I Treaty finally left both the parties with more number of total deliverable nuclear

warheads. This was due to the fact, that no agreement was reached on MIRVs and also the Soviet Union was permitted under the agreement to increase the number of submarines and SLBMs. At most SALT-I Treaty can be classified as a arms-control treaty which formalized the reaching of pleateau of quantitative arms-race. However, the achievements of SALT-I Treaty cannot be, and should not be underestimated considering that it was the first major disarmament dialogue which succeeded in clearing the clouds of mistrust to some extent from the relations of two powers.

One very important change, however, was brought about in the nuclear arms race after SALT-I which though, was not primarily responsible for it, it certainly added a factor of urgency for further agreements. The quantitative climax having been reached and formalized through SALT-I, the qualitative improvement in the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems presented with a new area of interest to start afresh with another round of nuclear arms race. This change in the emphasis from quantitative to qualitative aspect not only gave a new dynamism to arms race, but also affected the negotiations for SALT-II, making them more complicated and technical in nature.

The seriousness of this change was greater than it appeared from outside. The large differences between the technological advancement between the two powers in this

area; the US being very much in lead, and committed not to let this advantage slip and the Soviet Union on the other hand committed not to bargain from positions of weakness, made the problem of nuclear disarmament mind-boggeling for the SALT-II negotiators when they began their formal negotiations in November 1972.

Since, SALT negotiations were very much influenced by the technological advancements of the two power, it would be a useful exercise to take a broad look at some important developments in this field in the intervening period between 1972 and 1979 when SALT-II Treaty was finally signed.

Developments in Strategic Nuclear Weapons since SALT-I

Although the United States had an overall lead in the technological field, but for the purpose of this study, seven major areas can be classified. First: The US had mastered the MIRV technology and had started deploying MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs even before the SALT-I Treaty was signed. The Soviet Union on the other hand, was still perfecting the MRV technology which was at least one generation older, and in which the warheads were not independently targetable as in MIRV. Apart from being a qualitative advantage which MIRVing gave to the US missiles, the MIRVing also increased the total number of deliverable nuclear warheads by many folds. It was presumed then, that the US would be having 10,000 warheads

by 1977 as against 2000 in 1972, by MIRVing of ICBMs and SLBMs even when the number of launchers would remain constant as per the Interim Agreement.

Second: In the field of missile accuracy, measured in terms of CEP the US was ahead of Soviet Union considerably. The US Minuteman-III and Poseidon missiles had CEP's of about one quarter of a mile (some reports say it is 0.15 n.m.) while the best Soviet ICBMs had a CEP of about one mile.[1] Missile accuracy is an important ingredient of a successful first strike. Especially, when the missiles silos are hardened. Programmes were underway in both the countries to improve further the CEP.

Third: All 1000 modern US ICBM silos were "hardened" to withstand nuclear blasts over pressure of about 300 pounds per square inch (psi). These silos were further being hardened to a level of 900 psi (some reports say 1200 psi). While in Soviet Union only two thirds of the silos were hardened up to a level of 300 psi, rest were of the order of 100 psi; some older ones of SS-7s and SS-8s as little as 5 psi. However, some new silos had been built (90 approx) which were believed to be hardened up to 600 psi.[2]

Fourth: Another US advantage was a new development in "remote targetting" of missiles from launcher control

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1. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p.110.

2. Ibid., p.111.

facilities. Earlier, the US Minuteman-II ICBMs had capabilities to be "pre-programmed" for eight alternative targets. New Minuteman-III could carry unlimited number of pre-programmed targets. By this new development it was to be possible to retarget the missiles which are observed to fail. The Soviet Union was celarly two generations behind, as the Soviet missiles carried only two preprogrammed alternative targets, like older US ICBMs, and work in this field was in primitive stage.

Fifth: The advances being made in the strategic bomber range and pay load, as also, avionics placed US in a superior position vis-a-vis Soviet Union. US B-I Bomber which was under development, was an ambitious US programme to replace vintage B-52s which were subsonic, with the supersonic B-I. Other advances were in the areas of "escape time" and electronic counter-counter measures and resistance of installed equipment to the effects of electromagnetic pulses, which increased the survivalibility of the bomber fleet in the event of an attack by Soviet nuclear forces.[3] Soviets, on the other hand, did not even have any genuine intercontinental long range bomber comparable to US B-52. However, the Soviet Union was progressing fast in this research, and three new long range bombers were under various stages of development.

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3. Ibid., p.111

Sixth: In the cruize missile technology the US was far ahead of Soviet Union. The range, accuracy and survivalibility of the US cruize missiles was considerably higher than the Soviet cruize missiles. Also, that the cruize missile technology, important as modern cruize missiles, which could be launched from ground, air, ship or submarine, flew at very low altitudes and could not be detected by radars. Cruize missiles could also follow a zig-zag path which made them more useful than ICBMs.

Seventh: US also led in the quietness and reliability of its strategic submarine forces. US submarines were therefore more invulnerable to Soviet Anti-Submarine-Warfare (ASW) efforts, which again were not very advanced. Moreover, the US SLBMs had longer ranges and better accuracies and were also MIRVed. Soviet missiles on the other hand, were inferior in performance and also carried single warheads. Only Soviet SS-N-8 SLBM was reported to have better range than US Polaris A-3 or Poseidon C-3 SLBMs (4200 n.m. as against 2500 n.m.). However, the Soviet naval warfare programme was moving at a fast pace and the Soviet Union was deploying new 'D' class submarines at the rate of 6 submarines per year.[4]

US however had certain high-tech programmes in naval warfare too. One programme for improving the missile accuracy (CEP) of existing SLBMs and another

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4. Ibid., p.117

project to develop a Manoeuvering Re-entry Vehicle (MARV), capable of undertaking evasive measures for new Trident SLBMs. In addition a new navigation satellite system called Global Positioning System was under development to provide "a continuous, world-wide, all weather positioning capability with an accuracy of tens of feet in three dimensions."[5]

The Soviet Union had several programmes on hand with regard to improvements in their ICBMs. Not surprisingly since ICBMs formed a major part of the Soviet nuclear force. At least four new Soviet ICBMs were being tested. The US designations for them were "SS-X-16 to SS-X-19". SS-X-18 was reportedly tested with 5-6 MIRVs of about 1 megaton warhead each. SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 had about 4 and 6 MIRV respectively, but of lesser megatonnage. SS-X-16 was powered by solid propellent which was considered to be a better propellant, if perfected. All the new missiles had larger dimensions and were therefore considered to be having larger throw-weights.

The Soviet Union was also engaged in developing MARV but its programme was in the not so advanced stage. The "cold-launch" technique was also being developed in Soviet Union. In this the missile is "popped-up" from their silos prior to the ignition of their rocket motors.

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5. Ibid., p.117.

The use of this technique would facilitate the emplacement of larger missile in silos of given size; and it appears that the additional volume that could be gained would be more than sufficient to allow back-fitting of the new larger ICBMs into existing silos.

Thus we see that the main emphasis of the ongoing development programmes in offensive strategic weapons was to increase the invulnerabilities of the forces of each other and to build a second strike capability. However, unlike the US programme the Soviet programmes were at-least a generation behind but nevertheless, there were indications that they were picking up very fast. As early as, late 1973, there were un-confirmed reports that Soviet Union had tested MIRV. Soviet MIRVed missiles could mean more warheads than US since Soviet ICBMs had greater throw-weights. But Soviet MIRVs were still in early stages of development.

The SALT-II negotiations thus, began with a new set of problems. Although, great enthusiasm was shown by both countries in the early stages and in the June 1973 Washington Summit the two leaders went, as far as, to set the target date of conclusion of the treaty as end of 1974, but the negotiating teams got stuck on several technical issues. Earlier, it was planned to have SALT-II Treaty of unlimited duration but due to problems, by the end of 1974 it was decided that the treaty would be of a limited duration; valid up to the end of 1985 only.

On 3 July 1974, the USA and USSR signed a protocol to the ABM Treaty, introducing further restrictions on ABM defense. Under Article-I of this Protocol the two parties undertook to forego the deployment of ABM system or its components on any one of the two permitted areas in the ABM Treaty. They however, agreed to change, but once, the site of ABM deployment after giving a notification of the same. This agreement further proved the declining importance of ABM defense in their strategic planning. This view is further strengthened by the fact, that even the one permitted area of ABM-defence was not made fully operational. The USSR did not complete Moscow ABM system by deploying permitted 100 ABM interceptors (it had only 64 operational missiles) while the US decided to keep the Grand Folks ABM system mothballed after completion.

Meanwhile the famous Jackson Amendment which was passed by the US Senate while ratifying SALT-I Treaty prohibited unequal ceiling for future disarmament treaties. Though, the amendment was criticized by the Soviets, they accepted the principle of equal ceiling for SALT-II, Treaty during the Vladivostok summit of 1974. Strobe Talbott in his book: Endgame: The Story of SALT-II, gives a possible reason for the Russians to agree to give up numerical advantage. He writes, "the new ceiling and sub-ceiling for SALT-II were high enough to leave intact

the weapons they most cared about - and high enough to enable them to MIRVing their ICBMs."[6]

During the Vladivostok summit two more contentious issues were resolved. The Soviets left their demand of restricting, or, including the Forward Base System (FBS) of the US in Europe. Notably, on this issue no agreement could be reached in the previous SALT negotiations. The US on the other hand, agreed to allow Soviet Union to keep "heavy" missiles at the level agreed during SALT-I. On this issue the US had earlier taken a position that they were a threat to their Minuteman ICBMs. Yet another concession given by the US was that it agreed to include, US long range strategic bombers in the 2400 missile ceiling agreed upon at the summit.

However, the Vladivostok summit failed to resolve some other technical issues which, as they stood in 1975 were: (1) The sub ceiling of Vladivostok agreement, which provided for 1320 MIRVed missiles, created two problems. There was no method to monitor this ceiling by "National technical means" which had been explicitly emphasized by Soviet Union. From ariel-photography the non-MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed ICBMs looked alike, and in particular case of Soviet Union, they were being deployed alongwith non-MIRVed ICBMs; also, the same type of missile was sometimes partially MIRVed and partially non-MIRVed. Other problem was regarding the different weapon systems that would be included in

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6. Strobe Talbott, Endgame : The Story of SALT, p.32.

this sub ceiling of 1,320. The Soviet Union considered the US B-52 bombers as MIRVed since they carried more than one missile. However, the US rejected this claim.

(2) Another issue was regarding the Soviet ICBM modernization programme; the missile pay load drew maximum attention. There was also differences of opinion on the definition of "heavy" ICBM. In the SALT-I Treaty a "heavy" ICBM was not defined but was understood to be of Soviet SS-9 class and US Tital-II class. This problem arose as a Soviet programme was underway for replacing the Soviet SS-11 ICBMs with SS-19 ICBMs which the US considered to be "heavy" ICBMs.

(3) Another issue which was carried over from SALT-I was the status of Soviet "back fire" bomber. Even in the US defence circles there was a debate regarding the range of this bomber. Department of Defence (DoD) contended that its unrefuelled range did not exceed 4000 n.m. while the CIA sources put the range about 5200 n.m.[7] The Soviets however argued that "Back-fire" was a medium range bomber basically built for naval operations and hence, could not be included in the 2400 ceiling of Valadivostok agreement.

(4) Yet another disputed issue on which no ground could be covered was the US cruize missile. Though,both sides had been deploying these missiles,but a new guidance,

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7. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p.119.

warhead and propulsion technologies promised to give the US a new strategic superiority, an area in which Soviets were lagging; but were determined to fight.

Interestingly, in the Vladivostok aide-memoire, cruize missile were not specifically designed for inclusion within the launcher ceiling of 2400, but it was mentioned that air launched missile with ranges exceeding 600 kms (375 miles) were to be counted within overall limit. However, later the US officials argued that this provision applied to ballistic stand-off missiles like the US Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM)[8] and not to cruize missiles.

But apart from the technical problems outlined above there was a political problem also which inhibited the progress in negotiations. The US had charged the Soviet Union with SALT-I violations. Over ten separate violations were alleged - the most important being the development and testing of new mobile ABM radars; the construction of new ICBM silos; the concealment of work on ICBM silos and ballistic missiles submarines; and the retro-fitting of "heavy" ICBM (SS-19) into launchers built for "light" missiles (SS-11). Similarly, the Soviet Union also charged US of violating the threaty on some of the similar grounds. However, both the sides could not provide

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8. Strategic Survey, 1975, p.108.

any conclusive evidence and these problems were resolved in the SCC.[9]

In one of the meetings, the Soviets agreed to resolve the "pay-load" problem in defining the "heavy" and "light" ICBMs. It was thus, agreed to limit the payload or throw-weight of largest "light" Soviet ICBM the SS-19 to about 7000 lbs. and their largest "heavy" ICBM the SS-18 to about 15,000 lbs.[10]

In January 1976, another major proposal was put forward by Kissinger to the Soviet leaders. He proposed a limit of 275 "Back fire" bombers for a five year period on Soviet Union, during which US would be allowed cruize missiles on surface ships while accepting restrictions on submarine launched cruize missiles. Another accompanying US proposal which interested the Soviets was that strategic bombers armed with air launched cruize missiles (ALCMs) would count against the Vladivostok sub-ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed launchers.

However, with the change of administration in US in 1976, several fundamental changes came in the US SALT strategy. The new President Carter who was very critical of the "back channel" form of negotiations, announced that henceforth the dialogue would be more open. In contrast to

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9. SIPRI Year Book, 1975, p.364, also Strategic Survey, p.109.

10. Strobe Talbott, n.6, p.36

the rather political approach of Kissinger, the new team of Cyrus Vance adopted a much more technical approach.[11]

This change in the US understanding and the resulting change in tactics of negotiations on the US side had certain impeding effects on the Soviet negotiating behaviour. The Soviets, who are generally known as very cautious negotiators and who like secret negotiations, adopted a policy of 'watch and see.' They were reluctant and apprehensive of the so-called, opening of the dialogue to public by the Americans. This was reflected in several statements which Gromyko and Brezhnev gave regarding the US trying to gain unilateral advantages.

However, on the US side the dialogue was not so open. The opennes was confined to revealing the Soviet positions on US proposals,the purpose clearly to gain public support for their proposals. The US proposals, however, were prepared in absolute secrecy. Even the US negotiating team was kept in dark uptil the last.[12]

The March 1977 "comprehensive proposals" also reflected the changed emphasis of the US. In these proposals the US proposed to reduce the ceilings agreed

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11. Strategic Survey, 1977, p.93.

12. Cited in Strobe Talbott, n.6 p.69. During 1977 when a "comprehensive proposal" was prepared to be presented during Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow, the proposal alongwith the "Deferral Proposal" which was the alternative to the first proposal, was kept out of bounds for the members of the delegation even when Vance had arrived in Moscow. Only a briefing was made on certain broad aspects in the plane enroute to Moscow.

in Vladivostok: total number of strategic bombers, ICBMs and SCBMs should be limited to between 1800 to 2000 rather than earlier ceiling of 2400. Similarly, the total number of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs should be between 1100 to 1200 instead of 1320. A sub-ceiling of MIRVed ICBMs was to be 550. The number of so-called "heavy" ICBMs deployed should not exceed 54 Titans-IIs for the USA and 150 SS-9s and/or SS-18s for the USSR.

It was also supposedly proposed, that no cruize missiles with ranges over 2500kms should be deployed and that cruize missiles launched from aircraft other than strategic bombers should have range limited to 600 kms. The Backfire bomber, seemingly, was to be excluded from an agreement, subject to some unspecified conditions. The modifications of existing ICBMs and the deployment of new types, including mobile ICBMs was apparently not to be allowed. The number of flight tests of existing ICBMs and SLBMs was to be limited to six per year.

The 'Deferral-option' on the other hand accepted the ceiling of 2400 on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and deferred to a later round of talks the difficult question of whether and how limits should be placed on the Soviet Backfire bomber and the US cruize missile.[13]

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13. Strategic Survey, 1977, p.70.

The Soviet Union rejected both the proposals outrightly, Although, it was not made clear why, the analysis of above proposals give possible reasons. Firstly, it was more a political reason than the technical reason. The Soviet Union considered Vladivostok accord as the final basis on which SALT-II should be based. Strobe Talbott outlines the atmosphere of this meeting and says that even before the US delegation had presented their proposals, in the welcome address Brezhnev stressed the importance of Vladivostok agreement stating clearly that it should be the basis for any future agreement. Some members of US delegation, Strobe Talbott mentions, said to Vance that the Soviets have given their response to the proposals which were yet to be presented. Again during the course of meeting some members of the Soviet delegation revealed how difficult it had been for Brezhnev to get approval on equal ceilings at home and so any deviation would be impossible.

Secondly, the US proposals were unacceptably favourable to the USA and unfavourable to USSR on almost all aspects. Numerical limit on ICBMs was very low considering the fact that Soviet Union laid main emphasis on ICBMs in her strategic policy and the US had major advantage of strategic bombers, and better and more reliable SLBMs, the areas in which the USSR lacked. Similarly, the sub-ceiling of 550 on ICBMs was unacceptable to USSR as their SLBMs were inferior in performance and unsuitable to be MIRVed

with similar accuracies and ranges as that of USA. The proposed reduction in the number of "heavy" ICBMs of Soviet Union was also unacceptable, The US viewed these missiles as a major threat to their Minuteman Missiles as well as their potential to carry more MIRVs due to greater throw-weight. The restriction on the testing of ICBMs to six per year was seen as US plan to restrict Soviet missile modernization programme to improve accuracy reliability and invulnerability of the ICBMs. Coupled with this was the objection on the deployment of new ICBMs including mobile ICBMs, the only area in which the Soviet Union had slight lead.

On the other hand, the restrictions on cruize missiles were seen as insufficient. Soviets apparently wanted more restrictions as they lagged in cruize missile technology and also since they did not have any strategic bombers to deliver long range cruize missiles on US, which were permitted on only such bombers.

The Soviets rejected the "Deferrel option" also, as they argued that a similar plan had already been rejected by them, when it was first proposed in January 1976 by Kissinger.

The Soviets, as usual did not make any counter proposal, though during the deliberations they suggested, accepting a ceiling of 2200 as against 2400 in bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs. But they insisted, that US cruize missile

should be counted against the new ceilings. On the question of mobile SS-16 ICBM, the Soviets showed interest on restriction. However, not much materialized due to the persisting differences on exclusion and inclusions of some systems or other.

Some misunderstandings also occurred during their press briefings and each side blamed other issuing contradictory claims about the deliberations. The open diplomacy thus, misfired on the US and in particular Vance realized the limitation of open diplomacy in negotiating with Soviets. He, from then "became a more assertive adviser to the President... (he said) the negotiations (with Soviet Union) could no longer take place in an atmosphere of high drama and intense publicity."[14]

It was thus decided to reopen the "back channel." During one of the such back channel meetings between Dobrynin and Vance, the former, stating the reasons why Moscow meeting failed said, "the comprehensive proposal would have required the USSR to make drastic cuts in existing systems, "while you (US) would give-up nothing" except postponing some technological innovations.[15]

Nevertheless, the SALT survived; Brezhnev and Carter traded encouraging words in public in April 1977. The Soviet leader said "a reasonable accommodation is possible"

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14. Strobe Talbott, n. 6, p.71.

15. Ibid., p.82.

if the US abandoned its "one sided position". Carter replied three days later that while the comprehensive proposal as a whole was fair, he would be very eager to change "any provisions that Moscow could prove were in-equitable."[16] Soon after in June, Carter took another major decision: he cancelled the prestigeous B-1 bomber programme.

In the meantime, in May 1977 another major US proposal, named as three-tier proposal was put forward. This proposal consisted of :

(1) An eight year treaty that would place an overall ceiling on launchers as well as sub-ceiling on MIRV system.

(2) A three year protocol under which both sides would limit the development of new systems.

(3) A statement of principles, in which they would agree to commit themselves to seeking more substantial reduction and test restrictions.

Soviets readily accepted this framework, but they objected to the demand that deployment of SS-18, like that of cruize missile, should be halted during the period of protocol. They wanted cruize missiles to be included in the eight year treaty to which the US objected.

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16. Ibid., p.82.

Later, a compromise solution was agreed upon during the Gromyko's visit to Washington. The US agreed to let Soviets continue modernize her force of "heavy" missiles with SS-18 up to a limit of 313 missiles set in the SALT-I Treaty, in return, the Soviet Union agreed that the cruize missile be limited for the protocol period.

During 1977, the five year period of the Interim Agreement on offensive nuclear arms expired. However, both sides formally agreed to abide by the agreement till the SALT-II was not signed. This was a sign of mutual trust which was growing, slowly but definetely.

Another reflection of growing mutual trust was the fact that for the first time in the negotiating history of SALT and other disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union agreed to release some important data about its missile systems. In 1977, after being pressed very hard by Americans on the question of establishing a data bank which would help in verifying and monitoring the SALT Treaty, the Soviets yielded to the US demands. However, important data regarding the number of MIRVed missiles and on heavy missiles was kept secret.[17]

During 1978, negotiating teams of both sides engaged in giving final shape to the SALT-II Treaty. Problems of verification of compliance with the treaty were of major political and technical concerns and formed the agenda of

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17. Strobe Talbott, n. 6, pp.96-97.

negotiations during this period. These concerns were clearly reflected in the provisions of the treaty. In fact, verification problem had been a major impediment in all post-war disarmament negotiations. The underlying problem had been a lack of political will and mutual mistrust. However, another factor added to this during SALT, was the technical complexities of the various weapon systems on both sides. But the major cause of agreement during SALT was the development of verification by "national technical means", mainly with the help of photo-reconnaissance satellites.

Finally on 18 June 1979, in Vienna, Presidents Carter and Brezhnev signed a series of documents that represent the outcome of the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the USA and the USSR. The SALT-II document include: A treaty which imposes limits on strategic nuclear offensive weapons until 31 December 1985. A protocol - an integral part of the treaty - which sets forth certain limitations until 31 December 1981 and a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms (that is for SALT-III).

The treaty and the protocol are accompanied by an extensive list of agreed statements and common understandings designed to clarify the provisions of these agreements. A memorandum of understanding established an agreed data base

on numbers of strategic offensive arms. Also, two days before the signing of SALT-II documents, President Brezhnev handed President Carter, a written statement of Soviet intentions concerning the capabilities and rate of production of the Soviet TU-22M (backfire) bomber.

Analysis of the Treaty

The numerical restrictions under SALT-II Treaty apply to the following weapon systems: (a) Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), (b) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), (c) Heavy bombers, (d) long range Air to Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), (e) long range Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), (f) Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVs).

Article II defines the different offensive weapon systems. The ICBM as one capable of a "a range in excess of the shortest distance between the N.E. border of continental part of USA and the N.W. border of continental part of USSR, i.e., a range in excess of 5,500 km.

Heavy bombers are the type B-52 and B-1 of USA or TU-95 and Myasishchev type of USSR; also future bombers of equal range or better range would be included in this category. Also included are, the bombers capable of launching ALCMs of range in excess of 600 km or launching ASBMs, having range in excess of 600 km. MIRV launchers are those which have been flight tested with MIRVs.

Overall ceilings on an ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and ASBMs are imposed at an aggregate number of 2400 as agreed in Vladivstok.[18] It is also stated that the above ceiling would be reduced to 2,250 from 1 January 1981. Dismantling of the excess number was to be completed during one year of the date for lower ceiling.[19]

Though the parties were allowed to determine the mix of their forces,[20] a sub-ceiling was provided for in another Article. Accordingly: "ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kms to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320. ICBMs and SLBMs and ASBMs (MIRVed) to an aggregate of 1,200. MIRVed ICBMs were restricted to an aggregate number of 820.[21]

The construction, relocation and conversion of "light" ICBMs or of "older" type into launchers of "heavy" or "new" types, was prohibited. Also prohibited was "increase (of) the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty two per cent."[22]

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18. Article III. For the Text of Salt-II Treaty, see SIPRI Yearbook, 1980.
19. Article III, para 2.
20. Article V, para 5, Art. III, para 3.
21. Article V, para 2 & 3.
22. Article IV.

Other prohibitions included were, regarding storage, development, testing or deployment of systems for rapid reloading of ICBM launchers. It was also agreed, in the common understanding to follow a normal construction schedule present at the time of signing.

The limit of the number of re-entry vehicles was fixed at the number at which the respective ICBMs and SLBMs and ASBMs had been already flight tested.[23]

In an agreed statement to this article, the parties agreed not to equip their heavy bombers with more than 20 cruise missiles, capable of a range in excess of 600 kms.[24]

Flight testing of cruize missiles of ranges exceeding 600 kms or ASBMs from aircrafts other than bombers or to convert such aircrafts to perform such a role was prohibited.[25]

Parties were prohibited from developing testing or deploying;

(a) ballistic missiles of range in excess of 600 km on "water borne" vehicles other than submarines;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the sea bed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters

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23. Article IV, Paras 10, 12 and 13.

24. Second agreed statement to para 14, Art. IV. For the text see SIPRI Yearbook, 1980.

25. Article VIII, Paras 1 and 2.

or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missile, which move only in contact with such floors,

(c) systems for placing in earth's orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction including Fractional Orbital Missiles (FOBS),

(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs,

(e) SLBMs having throw weight in excess of the throw-weight of light ICBMs, ASBMs with throw-weight greater than throw-weight of light ICBMs.[26]

Also prohibited was flight testing of cruise missiles with MIRVs capable of ranges in excess of 600 kms.[27]

Provision was made for modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms.[28]

However, specific periods were provided in which all missiles, in excess to the aggregate numbers allowed, would be dismantled.[29]

Art XV, provided for the means of verification[30] by "national technical means". It was also agreed as in the case of SALT-I treaty that the parties would refrain from obstructing by any means, the verification by national technical means of the other party.

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26. Article IX.

27. Article IX, para 2.

28. Article X.

29. Article XI

30. Details of this part are discussed later in this chapter.

As in the SALT-I Treaty, a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was provided for to resolve disputes in compliance with the terms of the treaty;[31] its functions and powers were similar as in the SALT-I Treaty except that in this case it was also agreed that "parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding... of 18 June 79."[32]

The force levels of the two parties as it stood at the time of signing of the SALT-II treaty gives useful insight as to what each party gained or lost from this treaty.

The US statement of data at the time of signing, shows that USA possessed 2,283 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and the Soviet Data shows 2,504 delivery vehicles were possessed by USSR.

Table 1

TOTAL STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES POSSESSED BY USA AND USSR

	USA	USSR
ICBMs	1,054	1,398
SLBMs	656	950
Heavy Bombers	573	156
TOTAL	2,283	2,504
Shall be required to dismantle	- 33	-254
On 31 December 1981	2,250	2,250

31. Article XVII.

32. Article XVII, para 3.

Table 2

TOTAL MIRVed MISSILES POSSESSED BY USA AND USSR

	USA	USSR
ICBMs	550	608
SLBMs	496	144
	1,046	752
Allowed to add	+154	+448
As on 31 December 1981	1,200	1,200

Table 1 shows, that by 31 Decembr 1981 the USSR would have to dismantle 254 missiles as against 33 to be dismantled by USA. Not a substantial reduction considering that USSR chose to dismantle older SS-7s, SS-8s, and older unMIRVed SLBMs. Similarly, the US chose to dismantle the moth-balled B-52 bombers and older Polaris A-3 missiles.

As against a little reduction in the overall number of strategic offensive missiles the number of MIRVed missiles increased considerably.

Table 2 shows, that USA was allowed an increase of 154 and USSR a large increase of 448, to come under the sub-ceiling of 1,200 MIRVed weapons. This increase becomes a more important concern to the question of strategic stability, when coupled with the improved accuracy of each

warhead, which improves the effectivity but reduces the invulnerability of the ICBMs in silos which perhaps was the major concern of US at the time of the beginning of SALT-II.

Thus, there is only a marginal attempt to inhibit the growth of MIRVed ICBM forces. The allowing of increasing the number of warheads to the maximum of the number, with which the missile had been tested,[33] permits a quantum increase in the number of warheads. Also, the limit set for "new" types of missiles for MIRVing at 10 warheads, was also not dampening to the already "overkill" capability possessed by the two sides.

However the treaty resolves one very contentious issue. For the verification purposes,it was agreed[34] that a launcher tested with a MIRV, shall be counted as a MIRV launcher whether or not it actually contains a MIRVed missile.[35] Similarly, if a ICBM or SLBM has been flight tested with MIRV, all missiles of such type would be counted as MIRVed.[36]

Also agreed, was a method to prevent clandestine increases in the number of warheads. A ban was placed on the flight testing, or deployment of an ICBM with a re-entry

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33. Article IV, para 10.

34. Article II.

35. First Agreed Statement, Article II, para 5. For text see SIPRI Year Book, 1980.

36. Second Agreed Statement, Article II, para 5.

vehicle lighter than the lightest re-entry vehicle that had previously been tested on an ICBM of that type.[37]

Important consequence of such restrictions for the USSR was that it could not deploy higher number of re-entry vehicles which their missiles with greater throw weight were actually capable of. However, USA agreed not to increase the number of warheads on its Minuteman-III from the existing three to seven, the maximum it has been tested with.[38]

On the other hand, the treaty allows the USSR to maintain its 308 "heavy" ICBMs, while the USA which has none, is barred from deploying any.[39] Also, neither side can deploy an ICBM "heavier" than the Soviet SS-18 ICBM. However, the restrictions on warhead fractionation reduced the utility of "heavy" ICBMs. Each side was allowed to flight test and deploy one "new type" of ICBM.[40] The line between a modernized current type of ICBM and a "new" type of ICBM is drawn by an elaborate constellation of provisions.[41] It states that, an ICBM would be considered to be of "new type" if it is different from previously flight-tested

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37. Agreed Statement 3(a) to Article IV, para 10.

38. Common Understanding to the First agreed Statement to Art. IV, para 10. For Text see SIPRI Year Book, 1980.

39. Article IV, para 3.

40. Article IV, para 9.

41. Article IV, para 9.

types of ICBMs in any one of the following respects, the number of stages; the type of propellant (liquid or solid) of any of the stages; or a 5 per cent or greater change in dimensions - length, largest diameter, launch weight or throw-weight of the missile.

Another provision is made to prevent the testing of several different types of new ICBMs under the guise of test of a new type ICBM. After the twenty fifth launch of an ICBM of the new type, or after the last launch before the deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier, the sides are prohibited from altering the dimensions by more than 5 per cent.[42]

Another provision, which directly affected the Soviet weapons was the ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM, suitable for mobile launchers.[43] The USSR also agreed not to produce the SS-16's third stage; the re-entry vehicle of that missile; or the device for targeting the re-entry vehicle, as these can be used for converting the mobile SS-20 IRBM into SS-16.[44] However, this ban did not affect much the Soviet programme, as the SS-16 had a very poor accuracy (CEP).

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42. Second Agreed Statement to Article IV, para 9.

43. Article IV, para 8.

44. Common Understanding to Article IV, para 8.

One interesting feature of the treaty was that unlike SALT-I, the SALT-II contained no specific ceilings on numbers of missile launching submarines or their missiles. The only two indirect restrictions imposed were: first that the SLBMs were indirectly constrained by the overall ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles (2,400 to be reduced to 2,250) and the sub-ceiling on MIRVed ballistic missiles launchers (1,200).

The second restriction, more direct, states that both sides are permitted to deploy up to 14 re-entry vehicles on SLBMs. This is maximum number, with which US Poseidon C-3 SLBM had been previously tested. In this regard the Soviet SLBM having MIRVs is SS-N-18, which carried only three re-entry vehicles, though it had been flight-tested with a maximum of seven MIRVs.[45]

Almost no restrictions in the number of missile launching submarines, or the SLBMs, shows the increasing importance of the SLBMs due to their mobility. The increasing range of SLBMs, their better accuracy, and the quietness of new submarines as also the primitive nature of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) efforts have made this area, as a potential area for deploying more reliable intercontinental missile forces. However, the SLBM had not, developed into an effective counterforce weapon because of its still relatively poor accuracy.

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45. First Agreed Statement to Art. IV, para 12.

Unlike SALT-I, the SALT-II agreement provided that, the "heavy-bombers"[46] would be included in the SALT-II overall aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However, this was one of the most contentious issues on which the Soviet Union succeeded in making the USA agree to this inclusion. This issue was dealt with in the treaty very elaborately. It was provided that all aircrafts of a type considered to be 'heavy bombers' will be included in the overall aggregate, unless such aircrafts have "functionally related observable differences" which prove, that the aircraft cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber.[47] However, some reconnaissance variants of the Soviet TU-95 aircraft (known by NATO codename "Bear") and all the Soviet Tu-142 ASW aircrafts, it was agreed were to be excluded only on the basis of "observable differences."[48] Similarly, it was agreed that Soviet Myasishchev (known as "Bison" by NATO) tanker airplanes would be provided with "functionally related observable differences", to distinguish them with the heavy bomber variant of this airplane.[49]

The long range cruize missile (of range exceeding 600 km) were also included in the SALT-II Treaty unlike

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46. Defined in Art. II, para 3.

47. Fourth Agreed Statement, (a) to Art.II, para 3.

48. Fifth agreed statement to Art.II,para 3.

49. Second Common Understanding to Art.II, para 3.

SALT-I, where these were excluded. From the Soviet point of view the question of cruise missiles was an equally important issue as the Soviet Union lagged behind in this technology, more since, the "heavy bombers" of USA were in a position to deliver long range air launched cruize missiles (ALCMs) in large areas of Soviet territory while neither the Soviets had enough long range heavy bombers nor equally superior cruize missiles.

However, the provisions of the treaty failed to arrest the US programmes as the maximum limits on the number of ALCMs that could be deployed on heavy bombers was still quite high - 28 ALCMs per carrier.[50] They also agreed not to deploy more than 20 ALCMs (this concerned basically with US B-52s).[51] Strategically, the US did not plan to mount such large number of ALCMs on a single carrier to maintain the invulnerability of the carrier and missiles. Also provided was,that only heavy bombers would be converted into cruize missile carriers.[52]

Only the ALCMs were covered in the main treaty. The Ground Launched (GLCMs) and Sea Launched (SLCMs) versions of cruize missiles were covered in the short-term protocol. There was no upper range restriction on ALCMs, as it would have been very difficult to verify externally.

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50. Article IV, para 14.

51. Second Agreed Statement to Article IV, para 14.

52. Article VIII, para 1.

As stated above, the Soviet Backfire bomber (TU-22M) was excluded from the treaty. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union gave a written statement saying that Backfire is a medium range bomber and shall not be converted into a long range heavy bomber by increasing its striking radious or in any other manner including in-flight refuelling. USSR also stated not to increase the production rates of this aircraft.

However, there were reports that USSR was,then developing three types of aircrafts, which would be classified as heavy bombers under the SALT-II Treaty. One was Tu-160, a low level penetrating bomber.[53]

The two also agreed not to include in the treaty's aggregate ceilings, ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, or space vehicle launchers.[54] To prevent any clandestine increase of ICBMs and SLBMs on the grounds of test and training, it was agreed that the number of test and training launchers cannot be increased by more than 15 per cent.[55]

Other minor limitations agreed upon were agreement to notify the other, "well in advance" of all launches of ICBMs that are planned to extend beyond national territory.[56]

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53. Discussed above.

54. Article VII, para 1.

55. Art.VII 2(a) and First Agreed Statement to Art.VII.

56. Article XVI, para 1.

Development of certain "unconventional" types of nuclear weapons and their deployment was banned.[57]

A four article, short term Protocol for a period up to 31 December was also signed alongwith the main treaty. It banned the deployment of mobile ICBM for each party.[58] Also banned was the deployment of cruize missiles, capable of ranges in excess of 600 km on sea based launchers or on land based launchers.[59] The flight-testing of MIRVed cruize missiles having range more than 600 kms was banned,[60] as was the flight testing and deployment of ASBMs.[61]

A joint Statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, signed alongwith provided :

First: agreement to "continue to pursue negotiations in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security."

Second, "further limitations must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means using additionally, as appropriate co-operative measures";

Third, the objectives for further negotiations would be (1) significant and substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenal, (2) qualitative limitations, (3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol,

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57. Art.XI, Discussed above.

58. Protocol Art.I, For text see SIPRI Year Book, 1980.

59. Protocol Art.II, para 1.

60. Protocol Art.II, para 2.

61. Protocol Art.III.

Fourth, parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability.

Verification of the Treaty

Verification of compliance with the provisions of treaty as stated above was a major problem throughout the negotiations, for both the SALT-I Treaty as well as SalT-II Treaty. Nevertheless, the SALT-II Treaty retains a number of verification provisions from the SALT-I Treaty. In particular, the provisions regarding the "National technical means" to be used for verification.[62]

However, the verification of compliance has been greatly facilitated by elaborative nature of the treaty itself. The agreed statements; common understandings; definitions of weapon systems and counting methods provided for, in all articles throughout the treaty have been very helpful in making the verification a not so difficult task.

Another factor was the experience gained from the SALT-I Treaty, helped in surmounting many problems in advance to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. It is notable, that as much as 14 separate complaints of non-compliance of SALT-I Treaty had been brought into the notice of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) by both sides. To the credit of SCC, all issues were resolved

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62. Art. XV.

to the satisfaction of both parties. The success of SCC and the satisfaction of both parties, on its work is reflected in the fact that SCC has been retained in SALT-II and has been accorded with increased responsibilities.

The provision for creation of a data base was a major achievement in helping the compliance of the treaty. It was to be updated semi-annually. It was for the first time, in the negotiating history of Soviet Union that it had agreed to releasing official figures of the nuclear weapons, in possession with it. Even during the SALT-I, the Soviet Union made use of the figures given by USA and did not reveal her own figures.

The Soviet Union also made another concession to facilitate the verification. It agreed, not to encrypt the telemetry - signals sent back, recording the performance of various aspects of a missile during the testing. The Soviet Union had started encrypting the telemetry for the testing of SS-18 ICBMs. Telemetry, in fact, is the major source of getting information by "National technical means" of the other's missiles. However, this provision does not state that all encryption is banned. Either side may encrypt telemetry concerning, for example, guidance and control systems which are not limited by the treaty.[63]

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63. Strategic Survey, 1978, p.107.

The USA in a similar gesture, agreed that restrictions on cruize missiles would apply to those, armed with conventional warheads, as well as nuclear ones, since it would be virtually impossible to distinguish between the two types of warheads externally.

The counting rules agreed by the two parties were the best, and only possible rules which could be verified by "National technical means". In case of both, the launchers as well as missiles of a type, if once been tested for, with MIRVs then all missiles or launchers of that type would be considered MIRVed. Similar provisions were agreed regarding the counting of the long range ALCMs and their carriers.

The expanded functions of SCC, were a sign of confidence generated from its working for SALT-I. Besides functions similar to SALT-I Treaty, the new responsibilities entrusted to it; and helpful in verification were: It was to establish procedures for replacement, conversion, dismantling and distruction of strategic arms within the provisions of the treaty; it was to decide upon criteria for the determination of which future types of bombers will be considered as "heavy bombers"; it would furthermore, settle upon procedures for the removal from the aggregate limitations of bombers convered to airplanes not subject to treaty limitations; the replacement or conversion of cruize missile test airplanes; the dismantling of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) launchers; and the removal from sub limits of launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, converted to launchers of non-MIRVed missiles.

Other provisions included the various notification provisions and the setting up of standards and criterions for comparison between two weapons. It was agreed upon by each party to notify other, of replacement, coversions, dismantling or destructions of arms; designations of new types of missiles and other weapons; flight testing of ICBMs extending beyond national territory; establishment of new test ranges; dates of first test launch of "new" ICBM, last launch before deployment etc; and number of airplanes (not exceeding 16 as agreed) used for testing cruize missiles.

For distinguishing different weapons, the treaty establishes two basic categories of external standards to be used. "Functionally related observable differences" and where these are absent, the "externally observable design features". Besides, several standard and criterions were agreed to, on other minor but, nevertheless, important verification issues.

Assessment of the Treaty

In the retrospective assessment of SALT-II Treaty, we find that it was the most complex disarmament negotiation carried out in history. The complex technical nature of this was basically due to different levels of technological developments in both countries; different types of weapon systems; different requirements and emphasis of either country which was due to the geographical location of each country; different nuclear strategies and to some extent the

different goals of the two parties in the overall political strategic relationship of the two countries. All these were deeply affected by the underlying factor of secrecy of information about weapon systems from the Soviet sources. Taking into account, all these and certain other constrains under which the two negotiating teams worked, the final outcome of years of deliberations leaves no doubt about several broad objectives, which both parties achieved. Nevertheless, there were certain shortcomings too, to their credit.

Considering the achievements first, the SALT-II Treaty set equal limits to strategic offensive missiles for both parties, unlike the earlier SALT-I Treaty, wherein, the Soviet Union was given numerical advantage to balance technological lead of the US. However, freedom to determine the composition of nuclear forces was given to the parties considering their different requirements, in accordance with individual strategies.

As a carry over from SALT-I, the SALT-II Treaty also prohibited the construction of additional launchers for ICBMs and "heavy ICBMS".

Another achievement lay in the fact that a data base was established for different weapon systems of the two sides. This proved to be a confidence building measure in the overall US-Soviet relationship.

However, the most important achievement of SALT-II was that, for the first time an arms-control treaty required dismantling of existing weapons by two sides. Howsoever small this reduction being, its importance cannot be underscored.

More than 100 "agreed statements" and common understandings" reflected the great detail to which negotiations were made. Various "common understandings" in particular showed, that if the political will existed then proper adjustments could be made on disputed issues.

From the Soviet point of view, the most important achievements were, that first, it gained an "equal-power" status. Second, that Soviet Union was able to make USA agree for verification by "national technical means". Third, although a minor, but nevertheless, important arrest was made of several nuclear weapon development programmes, in particular the long range ALCMs, and a modest ceiling on MIRVed missiles.

The failures of the SALT-II Treaty are also important to note. SALT-II Treaty failed to arrest the increasing number of nuclear warheads. As we find the total number of deliverable warheads have increased considerably since SALT-I.

Hence, the treaty was a disarmament treaty only so far as, we take note of the fact that some ICBMs and SLBMs were dismantled. However, if we also take into account that, the dismantled weapons had nevertheless become obsolete and were to be in any case replaced by the modern weapons, we find that, this treaty also did not succeed to bring about any true disarmament. It was more an exercise to legalize weapon replacement programmes in which the parties never agreed, to not to deploy, more modern and more lethal nuclear weapons.

Again, the treaty also failed to arrest the pace of technological improvement in the nuclear weapons. The present Star Wars programme of USA is a leading example of this failure.

Due to several political reasons, one being Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US refused to ratify the treaty. Hence the momentum which was generated, could not produce another treaty in the series, indeed the political climate had worsened. However, as a last mark of the goodwill generated in all these years, both the parties agreed to observe the limitations of the SALT-II Treaty, which was perhaps the only and the greatest success of this treaty and the overall SALT process.

Thus, after a decade of intensive deliberations of such a complex nature, there came a showdown which once again put the question of nuclear disarmament on the backseat. However, from a purely Soviet point of view, this dialogue did not go waste. The Soviet Union might not have succeeded in bringing about any substantial disarmament, but it once again gained politically, economically as well as strategically. The intervention in Afghanistan, was a policy failure as in the case of Cuban missile crisis. May be if this intervention had not taken place, the future of disarmament would not have been so dark, as it was when the US refused to ratify the SALT-II treaty. But the US was equally responsible for the non-ratification of the Treaty.

Chapter V

AN OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

SALT marked the culmination of a brief detente in the super power relations. Although, the process could not continue and subsequent SALT treaties could not be negotiated, the two treaties which were signed, fulfilled their broad purposes, though, these did not succeed in bringing about any substantial disarmament. While making an overall review of the SALT process since 1969, when the first SALT began in Helsinki, and the aims with which the two powers went into these negotiations, it appears that nuclear disarmament was perhaps not the primary issue; it was but secondary to certain other aims, strategic as well as political. Hence, the success or failure of SALT process, from the Soviet point of view can be determined when SALT is seen in the framework of overall Soviet disarmament policy.

An attempt was made in the Chapter I of this study to find the roots of the Soviet disarmament policy in the Marxist-Leninist theory of peace and peaceful co-existence in a historical perspective. It was found, that although overthrow of capitalism formed the main plank of the Marxist-Leninist policy of Communism, disarmament and peaceful co-existence found a prominent place in it. Lenin, in particular, emphasized the policy of peaceful co-existence, not because as some of the Western authors call it, fear of

survival of the nacent Soviet State, but because peaceful co-existence paves way "for the operation of the laws of social development to the advantage of socialism and communism". Peaceful co-existence is not an automatically emerging state of international system, but it must be pursued 'consciously', 'systematically', and 'continuously' by active policy based on certain principles, of inviolability of frontiers renunciation of use of force, non-interference, etc.

However, co-existence of two antagonastic social systems was not deemed logical. The seemingly antagonastic doctrines of revolution and peaceful co-existence were incompatible to many analysts. The Soviet Union was thus characterized as an 'evil empire' which pursued the peaceful co-existence rhetoric to befool the world. Thus when an aggressive peace policy was pursued by Soviet state in the post second World War period, it was doomed to fail. In fact the world had never witnessed such a peace policy at any time in the history, and peace was thought to be a respite from war and time to prepare and equip for another war.

The Soviet Union, as we saw, was forced for an arms race and the nuclear dimension added to the seriousness of rivalry. This nuclear arms race reached its climax in the early sixties, and in these conditions any kind of disarmament dialogue was not possible. The USA, propounded various strategic doctrines viz. 'massive-retalliation', "flexible

response", "counterforce policy", etc. The Soviet Union too, did not remain behind in following these doctrines and incorporated them into its strategic policies. Nevertheless, it did not leave its efforts to bring about disarmament, and in the mid-sixties, some kind of disarmament dialogue was also possible. The initial confrontations across the table, although, did not achieve much, they paved the way for a bigger dialogue of SALT. SALT turned out to be a grand dialogue primarily because of more or less similar aims with which the two powers went into it.

Five factors were essential to the successful outcome of SALT-I,. the mutual interests of the US and Soviet Union in preventing nuclear war; the relationship of rough equality or parity between their strategic nuclear forces; the capability of verification of force levels on both sides; the movement that had occurred toward settlement of the German question; and the determination of strong political leaders on both sides to reach agreement.[1] Though each of them was necessary, none would have been sufficient by itself to bring about SALT-I.

SALT-I as pointed in Chapter III was not a disarmament treaty, but it achieved many other more useful and important purposes. It imposed a freeze on nuclear

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1. Willrich Mason, "SALT-I: An Appraisal", in (ed.), SALT : Implications for Arms Control in 1970s, (Pittsburg University Press, 1973), p.256.

weapons, which again, was not only because of SALT-I, but nevertheless, got a formal and legal approval by both sides. Brezhnev commented on freeze thus: "We must strive... to achieve a halt to arms race, and then to pass on to make practical steps to get an actual reduction in arms race".[2] The freeze, thus was an intended goal of Soviet policy which it successfully achieved.

It is a different matter that even after the freeze the arms race could not be contained, due to the qualitative improvements which were made in the nuclear weapons after SALT-I. Disarmament negotiations, thus were considered to be a process to legitimize the new type of arms race. In this regard, the two American scientists have noted:[3] "Disarmament negotiations are in brief, one form of the arms race itself, the aim of each nation being an increase in its relative power position".

Nevertheless, the ABM Treaty implied recognition by both the US and Soviet Union, that nuclear deterrence by means of an assured destruction capability was, vital to the security of both sides. In the same spirit,

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2. Collection of Brezhnev's Speeches, Speech delivered on 15 August 1973.

3. John W.Spainer and Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New York, 1962).

negotiations started for SALT II. The second round of SALT process was tougher as it involved technical complexities. Commenting on the SALT negotiations Shulman wrote:[4]

> Eventhough it became clear that the pursuit of strategic superiority cannot yield a significant military advantage to either side, the belief persist-ed that marginal advantages in one weapon system or another may nevertheless have psychological consequences upon the political behaviour of adversaries or their allies.

Negotiations, however, succeeded, though the SALT-II Treaty could not be signed in 1974 as planned earlier, nor it could of unlimited duration, but valid up to end of 1985. Nevertheless, SALT-II did bring some kind of disarmament, howsoever little. Perhaps if the process had continued SALT-III or IV might have brought about more disarmament.

The significance of SALT process can be best appraised by exploring the consequences if the SALT talks had failed. Their immediate effects towards disarmament may have been not very significant, but as Wolfe notes:[5] "SALT gradually creat-ed a new imperative to design strategic forces increasingly responsive to

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4. Marshal D.Shulman, "Arms Control in an International Context", DAEDALUS, Vol.104, no.3, Summer 1975, pp.53-61.

5. Wolfe, Thomas W (ed.), The SALT Experience (Cambridge, 1979), pp.243-63.

SALT sanctioned criteria, rather than to unilateral preferences". This process over time has resulted in narrowing the scope of "autonomous planning" and substituting for it a degree of joint Soviet American strategic planning within the SALT framework which has then resulted creating further common ground for more equitable limitations. This is evident from the fact, that SALT-I imposed unequal ceilings, while, SALT-II imposed equal ceilings on two parties. It may be said that this was due to the Jackson amendment. But it cannot be ignored that the Soviet Union also agreed to it readily, thereby showing that a proper understanding was developing about each other weapon systems and strategic doctrines. Further, as a result of the dialogue the Soviets developed more confidence in their weapons. The negotiating process also led to common understandings on quantitative, qualitative, and geographic constraints which could not have been duplicated in effect, by unilateral statements of intentions or expectations.

For the Soviet Union, the SALT experience was a much sought after opportunity to show by deeds what it had been saying in words for so many years. In fact, SALT legitimized the nuclear disarmament policy of the Soviet Union, as it was agreed during negotiations, that

there was no alternative to peace and disarmament. Once disarmament was agreed to be the common goal, the mutual tensions began to lessen, though gradually, and this in turn helped in bringing about successful conclusion of two SALT Treaties.

The Soviet disarmament policy may be viewed as very simple. The four reasons advancedin support of such a view are:[6] First the Soviet Union continues to be the defensive, revisionist Super Power; its goal is to deny the US strategic superiority, and it has by and large achieved its goal. Second, Soviet nuclear arms policies have been generally reactive to American achievements. Even the strategic doctrines have followed the American lead. Third, unlike the US, Soviet nuclear arms control and limitation policies have not been buffeted by domestic political convulsions. Finally, like the Soviet foreign policy itself, the Soviet disarmament strategies have enjoyed a remarkable continuity. This is not to suggest, that there are no debates in the Soviet Union, regarding the strategic doctrine, or, on the disarmament strategy of the country. But these remain below the surface of the policy and the final policy pursued is always a unanimous decision. However, the Soviet disarmament policy was very much influenced by SALT.

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6. Gupta, B.S., "The Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms Control" in T.T.Poulose (ed.), The Future of Nuclear Arms Control (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1986), pp.55-56.

As we noted in Chapter I, the interwar and the post Second World War disarmament policy of Soviet Union was very aggressive policy of peace. Coupled with the fact, that Soviet Union was a weak state, it was argued that this peace policy was due to its weakness. This aggressive policy continued in the fifties and early sixties. But with the approaching of parity, the aggressiveness of the Soviet peace-policy was transformed into a more reasonable and realistic policy of disarmament. SALT further made it realistic, when the Soviet Union confronted the US, directly across the table. Both the powers realized the constraints under which, each others policies were acting and hence, made mutual adjustments in their respective stands about nuclear disarmament. This change brought them closer for a more closer and fruitful dialogue.

Before the SALT began, each power drew its autonomous strategic policy, based upon unilateral interpretations of other's policies, and all this made disarmament a difficult proposition. Especially, in the case of Soviet Union, it was difficult to understand its policies due to excessive secrecy of the system, and the very little discussion which took place in the academic circles and the media, about its policies. Mutual mistrust and suspicion also acted as an impediment to the

success of any kind of disarmament dialogue. However, with the advent of SALT, the atmosphere became more conducive. Although, everything in the Soviet Union did not change, but enough change could be noticed and some conclusions could be made, from the discussion which sometimes took place in media and other academic circles. The propaganda rhetoric died and the polemical language gave way to more specific business like talk. As observed in Chapter II these changes have also been noticed and referred to by the American negotiators who participated in SALT.

SALT also succeeded to some extent in putting a brake to nuclear armament, and thereby fulfilled another aim of Soviet disarmament policy. It allowed a respite from arms race and also released some resources which could be diverted to civilian purposes. The Soviet Union, thus, was able to pay more attention in putting technological development to civilian uses, which the Soviet Union badly needed. Siberia needed huge funds for the proposed development, and the Soviet Union could put resources in this direction too. However, it must not be understood that, SALT brought about a very large release of resources, but whatever little was released, was made use off.

SALT also served another purpose of Soviet foreign policy. The formal recognition of parity and equality

of two powers was a cherished dream of Soviet Union. SALT succeeded in achieving this for Soviet Union, even before the formal talks had begun. The Soviet Union was thus able to project an image of an equally powerful, but peace loving state.

The SALT process also made clear that nuclear disarmament is a very difficult and complicated task and it is first necessary to generate confidence in each other, about the genuine intentions of the other. Hence, no major disarmament is possible, also that disarmament can only be brought about when overall relations of the two powers improve. That is, disarmament cannot be pursued as an isolated policy and has to be linked with improvements in other areas; not necessarily the bilateral relations but also relations and policies with other countries not directly concerned with nuclear disarmament.

It is ironical that in spite of so many successes of the SALT, it could not bring about any major disarmament. Western analysts have once again blamed the Soviet Union for the failure of SALT process. But in our opinion the USA was equally responsible for the failure. US was responsible for not ratifying SALT-II Treaty and interrupting the disarmament dialogue on account of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This

intervention was a tactical mistake of Soviet Union, as it was later realized, but a bigger mistake was committed by USA. If the SALT dialogue had continued, as it did during the Vietnam bombing by the USA, perhaps both the problems - of Afghanistan as well as disarmament could have been resolved earlier.

Also, the American decision not to ratify SALT-II Treaty was not only due to Afghanistan crisis. In fact, later studies have revealed that a shift in the US policy had been coming and the military-industrial complex lobby was putting pressure against any major success of disarmament process.

After the decision not to ratify the SALT-II Treaty, the positions of each country were once again back to the positions of late 1960s. The brief 'honeymoon', as it was called, was over and new phase of cold war began which continued until very recently.

The nuclear disarmament once again became an illusive concept. But this time the cold war was qualitatively of different kind. Now each side was in a position to assess each other's political moves, and this was possible, once again, due to the experience gained from SALT.

C O N C L U S I O N

The SALT-I and II Treaties were in fact, the path-finders to the ultimate goal of making the world free from nuclear arms. These were in fact, the first bilateral treaties on nuclear weapons between the two Super Powers and as such, they paved way for the historic developments in nuclear disarmament later in 1980s. Further, the very policy goal of the Soviet Union registered a drastic change from nuclear disarmament and arms limitation to complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the turn of the century.

Our study has brought out the essential features of Soviet nuclear policy. Further, by examining the SALT negotiations, deligently, we have also covered the necessary details regarding the actual implementation of such a policy. It is thus, may not be out of place to focus attention on the findings of our study.

It becomes clear that Soviet policy of nuclear disarmament cannot be seen as an isolated phenomenon. It certainly did not stem only out of the technical inferiority of the Soviet Union, or, because of domestic economic pressures, as it is sometimes understood in the West. Instead, the Soviet nuclear disarmament policy should be viewed as an integral component of the overall Soviet foreign policy posture. As we noted in the Chapter I,

peace and peaceful co-existence were essential elements of Soviet policy. Peace, in fact, was one of the three basic elements of the programme of the Bolsheviks, when they came to power after October Revolution, while the other two being - all powers to the Soviets and bread. Soviet Government followed this up by calling for General and Complete Disarmament, and since then it has remained the most cherished goal of the Soviet foreign policy.

However, the road to General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) was not easy. Total disarmament has still illuded the world. But this realization of difficulties of G.C.D. at one stroke, came after almost four decades of unilateral efforts by the Soviet Union. During all these years the Soviet Union learned one lesson; that peace can come only when one is not weak. Efforts in this direction bore fruits as also the change in the emphasis for G.C.D. Partial disarmament was stressed upon as more practicable. Hence, from this change of strategy, the nuclear disarmament policy took shape.

One more thing becomes clear from this; that Soviet nuclear disarmament policy has shown remarkable continuity. The Soviet Union has always upheld the cause of peace. Although, many dis-information campaigns have been carried on against it; it never lost sight of

its goal for G.C.D. The Soviet Union has been treated by the West as the only one responsible for the arms-race.

Our study shows that arms-race and its anti-thesis, the nuclear disarmament, are both interrelated phenomenans.. As regards the escalation of arms-race the factors responsible are many. The most important being the lack of information about the strategy and tactical designs of the adversary. Also responsible are the domestic policies and this applies in particular to the Western nations, where expensive weapon develop-ment programmes are taken-up, under pressure from the military-industrial complex lobbies. Hence, in most of the cases, escalation of arms race is due to the action-reaction phenomenon.

The Soviet Union, has also been charged for concealing information about its weapon systems. Parti-cularly during the SALT-I negotiations the Soviets did not disclose their strategic data. However, a welcome change was noticed during the SALT-II negotiations, when the Soviet Union disclosed much of the strategic information. This trend has continued since then. In fact, the situation is seen as soon reversing; the Soviets are now calling for more information while the US showing reluctance, and this happened during the recently concluded INF Treaty negotiations.

On site inspections was another issue over which the Soviet reluctance was played upon by the West. But the fears of the Soviet Union regarding the malified intentions of the West for episonage, cannot be discounted. The history also proves this, as also our study in the preceeding pages. However, a welcome change has come in this area too. Now, the positions are once again reversed. During the negotiations for the INF Treaty, the US showed reservations for extensive on-site inspections proposed by the Soviet Union.

Thus, we see that the Soviet Union has become more realistic in its approach to nuclear disarmament. The responsible factors for this change are many. But the most important ones are: first, the experience gained from the negotiation and implementation of various treaties concerning disarmament, second, the growth in the power and capabilities of the Soviet Union as a second Super Power, equal in status with USA, third, a welcome change in the attitude of the Western nations who have now realized that the Soviet Union and the other socialist states are here to stay, and there is, therefore, no alternative to peaceful co-existence. The SALT negotiations have thus, brought out the essential features of the Soviet nuclear policy and thus paved the way for later development in its policy goals. We are, therefore, certainly in a better position to understand the Soviet foreign policy itself.

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