

**THE UNITED STATES AS A FACTOR IN
INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: THE SHASTRI PERIOD**

Dissertation submitted towards the
partial fulfilment of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

CHARU KAISTHA

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DIVISION
CENTRE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI—110067.

1988



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe my deepest sense of gratitude to my teacher Professor K.P. Misra for his patience, tolerance, constant encouragement and guidance to see my dissertation through.

I extend my profound gratitude to my parents for their guidance, blessings and encouragement throughout the period of my work. I thank all my friends for their cooperation.

New Delhi-67

Charu Kaistha
CHARU KAISTHA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Pages</u> |
|---|--------------|
| CHAPTER ONE | |
| INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND THE US POLICY TOWARDS THE SUBCONTINENT .. | 1 - 33 |
| CHAPTER TWO | |
| THE UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE SUBCONTINENT (1964-1965) .. | 34 - 65 |
| CHAPTER THREE | |
| THE PRELUDE TO KASHMIR CONFLICT, THE KUTCH AFFAIR AND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 1965 .. | 66 - 135 |
| CHAPTER FOUR | |
| THE TASHKENT DECLARATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS .. | 136 - 162 |
| CONCLUSION .. | 163 - 175 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .. | 176 - 182 |
| APPENDIX-I .. | 183 - 184 |
| APPENDIX-II .. | 185 - 188 |

CHAPTER ONE

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND

THE US POLICY TOWARDS THE SUBCONTINENT

The Second World War resulted among other things in an accentuation of nationalism in Asia and Africa and the emergence of India and Pakistan as two sovereign independent states. It also shattered the status quo, greatly altering the balance of power in Asia, and the role of the subcontinent in international affairs.

In the cumulative momentum of international politics, when each foreign policy action merges with the swelling stream of other human relationships and happenings, bilateral relations and diplomacies inevitably fuse with the complex fluids of multilateral events. If there is a single autonomous bilateral relationship in the post war period, it is the relationship of the two super powers. Either's perception of and relations with the rest of the world are determined by the ups and downs of its relationships with the other superpower. Within this bipolar syndrome, the U.S. perceptions and calculations of Pakistan have been determined almost entirely by the U.S. perceptions and its relations with the Soviet Union. The pattern of

Pakistan's relations with the US continues to determine to a large extent the drift and scale of India's relations with Washington.

The cold war in the subcontinent was never conducted in a vacuum. Elements of global politics, particularly those that reached to three dominant sets of conflicts in the international system - viz., the Soviet-American, the Sino-Soviet and Sino-American have indelibly left their mark on the regional conflict.

The post-war role of the US in South Asia emerged from the interaction of a number of factors and trends peculiar to that period. Above all, the cold war competition with the Soviet Union led to a search for Asian allies and friends.¹ The era of American "isolationism" was at an end, the US was now playing a new role as the leader of advanced industrialised countries of the West. But this US supremacy was not universally accepted. The main challenge was from the Socialist countries led by the Soviet Union. The problem before policy makers in the US was which power would fill the power vacuum created in Asia by the withdrawal of the European powers and the destruction of Japan as a Great Power -- whether their country would do so or the Soviet Union. The two superpowers sought to

1 Stephen P. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Pacific Affairs, vol.49, no.1, Spring 1976.

expand their spheres of influence all over the world including the Indian subcontinent.

Among the emerging nations after the Second World War, India occupied a conspicuous position. The reasons for this prominence are obvious -- India is the giant of the developing nations of Asia and Africa, with twice as many people as well as all of states of Asia and Africa and the Middle East. Its geographical and strategic position, its long historical background, experience and traditions, its economic as well as human resources, the quality of its administration and political leadership, its relative stability and its success in laying the foundations of a parliamentary democracy, its active role in international affairs since independence (in spite of its policy of nonalignment) all made India a very untypical and very prominent member of the UN, and the underdeveloped family of nations of the Afro-Asian world.²

India and Pakistan are close neighbours. It is only to be expected that they will affect each other's foreign policy. This natural phenomenon of mutual interaction would not have attracted much attention if these two states had not been persistently unfriendly since emergence into independent state-

2 Palmer, Norman D., "India As^A Factor in United States Foreign Policy", International Studies (Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi), vol.VI, no.1, July 1964-April 1965.

hood. The very process by which India and Pakistan were carved out of the same subcontinent made it impossible that their relations in the future would not be quite neighbourly. Their rulers remained unavoidably suspicious and hostile towards one another.³

During the final stages of British-Indian and Hindu Muslim settlements the US played a part not very clear to the public, but one which seemed on the outside to imply that any settlement at all would be satisfactory. The US viewed with approval the steps leading to the transfer of power in India in 1945-47.

The United States and India

As a Western nation the US could never wholly free itself from the taint of inherited and unchangeable suspicions of Western motives; and the country inevitably became more deeply involved in Asian affairs during and after the war, it was bound to be a suspect in such a sensitive new nation as India.⁴ Nehru declared,

3 Ray, Jayanta Kumar, "India and Pakistan As Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy", *ibid.*, vol.8, July 1966-April 1967, New Delhi.

4 Palmer, Norman D., South Asia and United States Policy (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966).

"The West has too often despised the Asian and African and still, in many places, denies them not only equality of rights but even common humanity and kindness. A new era has dawned, in which the countries of Asia and Africa did not intend to be bypassed, or ignored, or have their decisions made for them by western Powers."^{4a}

On 14 August 1947, President Truman sent a telegram of good wishes to Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India in which he declared:

We welcome India's new and enhanced status in world community of sovereign independent states, assure the new Dominion of our continued friendship and goodwill, and reaffirm our confidence that India, dedicated to the cause of peace and to the advancement of all peoples, will take its place at the forefront of nations of the world in struggle to fashion a world society founded in mutual trust and respect.⁵

Indo-US relations since World War II have been marked by dramatic oscillations, characterised in the main, by tension and suspicion. Behind the various discrete foreign policy actions of the US lies a larger global strategy, a more coherent conceptual framework -- this has been true of US foreign policy during the entire post war period.⁶

4a Nehru, Jawaharlal, "India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches: September 1946-April 1961", New Delhi, 1961, p.73.

5 A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents (1941-49) (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p.782.

6 Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India Seriously", Foreign Policy no.18, Spring 1975, pp.133-34.

US foreign policy toward India is merely the local application of a global strategy which has little to do with India specifically except in so far as India is seen as an available instrument or as an unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy. The application of the US global strategy to India is unaffected by the presence of factors that may have significance for the American elite. The fact that both India and the US are political democracies has been basically irrelevant to the US decision makers in the post war period, despite the frequent innovations of that fact by both the Indians and the Americans.

The American responsibility has extended to the presentation of American socio-political patterns. Thus not surprisingly, the US foreign policy in the post-war period has embraced all manner of political regimes, as long as this has served the US national interests.

The US as an emergent superpower, became absorbed with the cold war with Soviet Union and had little time for India or any of the weak emerging states in the non-Western world. India was involved with the problems of nation-building, especially with trying to repress the violence and bloodshed that accompanied partition and independence and to integrate more than 560 princely states into the Indian Union.

Two major events during 1949 vitally affected US thinking on the subcontinent. One was the detonation of an atomic bomb

by the Soviet Union in September that year and the other was the establishment of a Communist regime in China. This meant that the US faced two giant communist powers -- one of these was already capable enough to challenge its hegemony and the second was a potential Great Power capable of challenging US hegemony in the years to come. US involvement in the Korean war and the confrontation between the US and Communist China in the course of that war had further confirmed the US perception that there was a hostile giant to reckon with on the continent of Asia. This brought about several changes in the US policy towards Asia -- one of these was the renewed interest in the Indian subcontinent. As M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya have put it:

The loss of China forcefully brought to the consciousness of American policy makers the importance of strengthening relations with the two countries of the Indian subcontinent the only states whose combined population and resources could nearly match those of China.

Until the Communist victory in China at the end of 1949, the US had no clear South Asian policy to talk about, and its interest in India was not adequately defined. After the revolution in China, the US turned to India due to India's

7 M.S. Venkataramani and H.C. Arya, "American Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", International Studies (Bombay), vol.8, nos.1-2, July-October 1966, p.76.

strategic location and tremendous manpower and economic resources in formulating South Asian policy.

The Indians looked upon the US as a rich, powerful country, one that was capable of dominating as well as helping other nations. In the Indian view, the US was more attached to Europe than Asia. In the course of a speech on foreign policy, Nehru said in the Indian Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947:

We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend cooperating with the US and we intend cooperating fully with the Soviet Union.⁸

From 1947-55, the US was the dominant superpower -- having the first half of this period a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the second half an overwhelming superiority. Containment was the basic strategy during this period.⁹

In the first half India was preoccupied with the domestic tasks to pay much attention to world affairs. It was both suspicious and favourably inclined towards the US -- suspicious because it perceived the US as the successor to British imperial policy of divide and rule in South Asia. To India US policy on

8 Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After (New Delhi, 1949), p.205.

9 Nayar, n.6, p.138.

Kashmir and other local issues was evidence of this: Nehru saw the US anti-Communist policy as essentially facilitating the extension of the US power throughout the world favourably inclined because it was uncertain of the Soviet Union's and China's intentions.

Nonetheless the outline of a foreign policy of an independent India were already obvious. When the Korean War began, India began to play this role with finesse. As a spill over of the cold war, the crisis in Korea in the early 50s found India and the US taking quite different stands. Even though India went reluctantly along with the first two resolutions of the United Nations Security Council after the sudden shock attack from North Korea in late June 1950, its heart was not in military assistance to the aggression, it rather directed all its efforts to bring a ceasefire in Korea and to avert a widening of war. The Korean crisis was apparently viewed as a regrettable involvement of Asians in a struggle which primarily concerned the Soviet Union and United States of America. Widespread anti-US feeling in India became even more pronounced after the UN forces under US Gen. MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel in Korea, in spite of the warnings relayed by India that such a move would bring Communist China into the war. In January 1951, India was the only non-communist country that voted against a US sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly, condemning the

Chinese invasion of Korea and calling for the immediate cessation by China of hostilities and withdrawal north of Yalu.

This growing anti-Americanism feeling was compounded by many ingredients. In January 1951, A.T. Steele reported that during a two month stay in India he encountered more criticism of the US rather than applause. The main criticism he found, centred, round America's policies towards China and Indo-China, its stand on Kashmir question, its niggardly economic assistance, always extended with "strings", the war talk in the US, the American failure to appreciate the Asian viewpoint and full cognizance of Asian sensibilities, and "inept American propaganda".¹⁰

Admittedly India held a dominant position in South Asia, but its weakness limited it in playing major role in world. India attempted to overcome this by politically mobilising other Asian and African powers and by assuming for a time, the leadership of the non-aligned nations. In the process, it came to be viewed by the US decision-makers not only as a continuous irritant but also as an inveterate claimant to an independent role in international politics. India's policy became objectionable not only because it placed an obstacle

10 Palmer, n.4, pp.14-15.

in the way of US policy towards Soviet Union, but also because it attempted to create an additional world force based not on military capability but on the political mobilisation of national elites in Asia and Africa.

It is easy to see why the US generally took the side of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan disputes, perhaps it regarded India's neutral position as a constant factor and feared that Pakistan would be more inclined to align itself with one of the two power blocs if it found that the other power was supporting India on the Kashmir issue and other Indo-Pak disputes. Whatever its ultimate considerations, the US by its position on various Indo-Pak disputes created suspicion and misunderstanding about its motives on the Indian subcontinent.

By 1953, prior to the greater crisis in 'Indo-American relations' that arose the following year, India and the US had differed on a number of important bilateral and international issues in addition to the differences over the role of the 'New Asia' in world affairs, the independence of Indonesia, the admission of China into the UN, the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 (India did not take part in the San Francisco Conference, and it refused to sign the treaty), the efforts of the Nizam of Hyderabad to prevent the absorption of his state into the Indian Union, Israel (although it had recognised

Israel eventually, she refused to accredit a representative to that new nation and it has been consistently critical of Israel and US policies towards that country) and the US support of French and Bao Dai in Indo China.¹¹

Early in 1951, the US was confronted with a peculiarly favourable moment for a fruitful US venture to cement the friendship of the elusive Indian public opinion at this critical time in Asia. Faced with the prospect of a desperately critical food shortage, Prime Minister Nehru abandoned his standoffish attitude towards the American economic aid and requested substantial shipments of food from the US. In a special message on 12 February 1951, President Truman recommended emergency assistance to India. Three days later a bill to provide this assistance, calling for an immediate shipment of a million tons of American wheat on grant basis to India, was introduced into the Congress by a bipartisan group of 40 Senators and representatives. But as New York Times states: "a small group of men concentrated in that legislative graveyard called the Rules Committee blocked the measure for several weeks until it was rewritten in the form of loan". This was all because they were piqued over a statement by Nehru that he,

11 Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger Special Studies), 1984, pp.21-22.

"would not barter away India's self respect or freedom of action even for something we need so badly". As New York Times declared on 4 May: "What could and should have been a magnanimous humanitarian gesture from one people to another has had all the heart taken out of it". The amount that was allocated \$189.7 million fell considerably short of India's requirement.

Nehru announced the beginning of a Russian shipment of promised 50,000 tons of wheat to India. This was given more publicity. Paradoxically, therefore, although the US responded to India's needs making available the much required wheat, but much of the goodwill that might have accrued was lost.

In October 1949, Nehru visited the US for the first time. He came, he said in an address to a joint session of the American Congress, on a "voyage of discovery". He expressed his belief that "however the voices of India and US may appear to differ, there is much in common between them". His visit attracted much attention and public interest, yet it did not go well. He often seemed to be irritable and out of sorts, perhaps because of his heavy schedule. His meetings with President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were disappointing to both sides. Nehru was proud and suspicious. Truman was indifferent.¹² Acheson later wrote that Nehru came

12 Kunhi Krishnan, The Unfriendly Rivals: India and America (New Delhi: India Book Company, 1974), p.135.

in a prickly mood, annoyed by what he called, "American intervention...he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal".¹³

In the summer of 1951, India experienced a new wave of anti-American and pro-Soviet feeling, accentuated by differences over the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty. India refused to go along with the American plan evolved by Dulles, for a conference of all nations involved in a war against Japan to agree on the terms of peace treaty, and it resulted what it regarded as American indifference and callousness towards Indian and Asian views on this matter. On 1 September 1951, Robert Trumbull reported: "The intermittently poor relations between India and the US have reached the lowest ebb of all time this week through India's rejection of the proposed draft treaty with Japan and her boycott of San Francisco Conference".¹⁴

Six months later the relations showed a remarkable improvement. Trumbull attributed this to a variety of reasons including increasing contacts between Indians and Americans, the favourable impression created by Chester Bowles, the actual shipment of wheat under the Wheat Loan Agreement of 1951 and the

13 Acheson, in Present At the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), pp.75-76.

14 Trumbull, "US-India Relations Go Steadily Worse", New York Times, 2 September 1951.

announcement in January 1952 of a \$52 million programme of direct assistance to India.

Yet this did not last long, the results of American presidential elections in November 1952 were something of a surprise and even shock in India. Almost all the leading Indian newspapers indulged in a somewhat bewildered analysis of what was behind General Eisenhower's victory, and publicly expressed their regret at the decision of US voters.

In addition to the Republican victory at polls, several other developments in late 1952 and early 1953 raised Indian apprehensions about a change for worse in Washington's policies-- among these were US co-sponsorship of a resolution on Kashmir, strongly opposed by India in the Security Council; reports that the US and UK were negotiating with Pakistan concerning the MEDO and a mutual security arrangement, and rumours that the Secretary of State Dulles, would come to South Asia to sound out India and Pakistan about their willingness or unwillingness to align themselves with the Western nations in the cold war.

The first one and half years of Eisenhower's administration were bad years for Indo-American relations. This was particularly marked between the personalities and orientation of Dulles and Nehru and policy divergencies.

Yet the chilling impact of cold war on Indo-US relations became apparent in 1953 when rumours began to circulate that the US was contemplating a programme of military aid to Pakistan and the association of Pakistan with the American alliance structure that was taking shape. Indian apprehensions were aroused by these rumours, which seemed to be confirmed when two top Pakistanis went to US in 1953 - Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and General Ayub Khan, the former presumably for medical treatment and the latter to visit military installations and confer with high ranking US military officials. Both leaders also met President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and other US decision makers. In December Nehru publicly expressed his opposition to American arms aid to Pakistan, and the Indian government officially protested against any such move. Indian suspicions were heightened by a visit from Vice-President Nixon to both India and Pakistan in the same month, as a part of a 73 day official tour of several Asian countries. His very different reception in India and Pakistan apparently made him even more critical of Nehru and India, and more sympathetic to Pakistan.

The relations were plumbed in Spring 1954, when the US announced its decision to extend military aid to Pakistan and entered into mutual security arrangement with that country on 19 May 1954. The US agreed to provide military equipment and

training assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan undertook to use that assistance exclusively to maintain internal security arrangements and that it would not, without prior agreement with the US Government, divert the arms and equipment to any purpose other than the one for it was being furnished.

These reports were received with a sense of shock in India. India could hardly ignore the direct or indirect consequences of such military aid for its national interests. This could prove disastrous for India and whole of the sub-continent. It could bring the cold war to the Indian sub-continent. Many eminent leaders noted the anti-US feeling prevalent in India. George Allen said in the course of his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives:

There is one issue upon which perhaps 95 per cent of Indians are united in opposition to the U.S. That is the only issue upon which there is a strong feeling. It is the question of military aid to Pak, on that question they are all against us.¹⁵

Indians were further offended by Eisenhower's announcement of similar arrangement with India, and by his assurances that military relationship with and assistance to Pakistan were

15 U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Washington, D.C.), p.330.

in no way directed against India, but if the aid was misused and directed against any other country (read India) he would "undertake immediate and...appropriate action both within and without the UN, to thwart such aggression". Nehru scornfully rejected President Eisenhower's offer, in making this suggestion the "President has done less than justice to us or to himself. If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves".

In September 1954, SEATO came into being and by the end of the Eisenhower administration the US and Pakistan were allied in no less than 4 separate military agreements. In addition to SEATO and CENTO, there was a Bilateral Arms Agreement concluded in 1954 and a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation signed in 1959. The US was not actually a formal signatory of CENTO, but it did become a member of its economic and military committees. It is important to realise that once Pakistan became a recipient of military association, Congress contain itself in its generosity. The total obligated in fiscal year in 1955 represented a tremendous increase over the amount proposed by the executives from 26.7 million to 71.36 million obligated--an increase of 167 per cent.

Eisenhower's decision was consistent with the US global

security policies, but there can be no doubt that it adversely affected relations with India.

As for Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan no doubt accepted the US condition that the military hardware given to it was to be used only in case of aggression from a communist country, but in their speeches the leaders made it clear that Pakistan had not entered into a military assistance because of any fear of attack either by the Soviet Union or China. They wanted to build up their country's military strength, for defence against India. Pakistan may not have had any immediate plan to mount an armed aggression against India on various issues, but it did propose to build up its military strength to bargain with India.¹⁶ Pakistan had a notion that it would not be in a position to deal with India diplomatically if it were not militarily strong. It had an eye on Kashmir--it had unsuccessfully tried to grab it by force in 1948, it could do so again.

The military assistance to Pakistan through 1960s amounted from \$390 to \$440 million.

16 Prime Minister of Pakistan (Liaquat Ali Khan) interview published in U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), 15 January 1954, pp.34-35.

Three events in April following the announcement of American decision widened the gulf between India and America. The US formalised its new relationship with Pakistan in mutual security arrangement. In the same month, apparently in an attempted retaliation against India's alleged softness on communism growing criticism of the US, and the specific actions such as refusal to allow US planes to pass through India enroute to Indo-China, some Republican Senators led a fight to reduce economic and technical assistance to India, thus creating the impression that America's economic assistance programme was tied to political considerations, and India signed a Treaty with China regarding Tibet, which included Panchsheel. The pro-Chinese orientation was seen in June, when Chinese Premier Chou En-lai was given a most enthusiastic reception on a visit to New Delhi.

The continuing tensions coincided with a marked improvement in the Indian-Soviet relations and with the beginnings of a major Soviet cultural, economic and political offensive aimed at India, in July 1955 Nehru was given a red carpet welcome during an official visit to the Soviet Union. In November, at Srinagar, Khrushchev publicly endorsed the Indian stand on Kashmir. Both Khrushchev and Bulganin vehemently denounced the Portuguese for hanging on to Goa, and gave complete support to India's claims.




Never was Soviet prestige higher in India than when Bulganin and Khrushchev left after their successful "barnstorming" tour. A tacit coalition was emerging between the Soviet Union and India to counter the US-Pakistan alliance; and this coalition, despite occasional differences would deepen with time.

TH-2465
The Soviet Union quickly jumped over the line of containment and established friendly relations with important Third World countries e.g., India and Egypt, who were eager for them, for the local US military alliances had limited their status in international politics.

As a consequence, the US now placed a major emphasis on economic instruments in winning over Third World countries, while acknowledging the virtues of nationalism and independence among them. Neutralism was no longer considered immoral, instead advantages were seen in genuine independence. The US now entered into a gigantic competition with Soviet Union for influence. Fundamentally, economic aid to Third World countries had a strategic objective in a global competition no different from that in the post-war rehabilitation of Western Europe.¹⁷

Economic aid became an important element in the US foreign policy towards India in later half of the 1950s and in the 60s.

17 Nayar, n.6, pp.140-41.



The US came to the Indian aid in 1957-58 when India was passing through catastrophic financial difficulties--to meet this new crisis the US agreed to loan \$225 million for the support of Second Five Year Plan. Since India was faced with a food crisis, the US entered into 2 agreements with India in 1958 under PL-480 for the provision of large quantities of wheat and other food-grains.¹⁸ Even though on a per capita basis India remained at the bottom of the list of foreign aid recipients in the aggregate the country became largest recipient of US aid among the new nations. On a per capita basis India was provided only half the economic aid given to Pakistan. Half of the US aid given to India consisted of surplus agricultural commodities. The commodity aid programme was originally designed to relieve the US of the accumulating surpluses, not to help the under-developed countries. Of the remaining half little was given for industrial investment and the US refused to have anything to do with building heavy industry, which Indians deemed essential for their economic independence, military security and political sovereignty.

The Chinese moves in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian borders in 1958 led India to undertake a fairly searching reappraisal of the basis of its foreign policy with particular

18 Palmer, n.4, p.21.

reference to its moves on China's motivations and probable behaviour, the value of Panchsheel, defense policies and non-alignment. As the Sino-Indian relations worsened, Indian attitude towards the US changed for the better. Eisenhower visited India in December 1959. He was given one of the most enthusiastic welcomes.

The relations between the two countries seemed to become closer after the election of Kennedy. M.C. Chagla stated, "Today neutrality has become respectable, and the US wants newly emerging countries in South Asia to be neutral...today I am proud to say that our foreign policy has been accepted by the US as the correct policy which India has pursued".¹⁹

When Nehru visited the US for the third time in November 1961, Indo-US relations were at a high point. Yet an event occurred which illustrated once again how susceptible the surface relations of the two countries were to the trends and tides of particular happenings.

Indian leaders were shocked by the Bay of Pigs fiasco and were disturbed by the strained meeting of Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna and flaring up of another Berlin crisis, during which the infamous Berlin wall was erected by the Russians.²⁰

19 As quoted in Nayar, n.6, pp.22-23.

20 Palmer, n.4, p.27.

The Indo-US-Pakistani relations were further exacerbated by the developments involving Goa. India had urged Portugal to transfer its pockets on the Indian subcontinent viz., Goa, Daman and Diu, to the Republic of India peacefully. The Foreign Minister of Portugal however, stated that his country could fight with every means at its command to retain Goa and other enclaves in India.

Regarding this, the position of the US was very delicate. The US desired friendship with Portugal, as it did with India, not only on general policy grounds but also because of their airbases in Azores.

The Goan problem became involved in world politics gradually. Whereas Portugal relied heavily on its membership of NATO and on certain treaties beginning with the Treaty of Windsor which it had concluded with Britain; the Soviet leaders during their visit to India in 1955, made the problem a bone of contention between the two superpowers declaring, "there is no justification for the continued existence of the Portuguese colony of Goa on the territory of India. The sympathies of the Soviet people are always on side fighting colonialism".²¹

The Western bloc retaliated. Dulles in reply to a question said, "As far as I know all the world regards it (Goa) as a Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese for about 400

21 Times of India (New Delhi), 29 November 1955.

years".²²

The Goan problem created a good deal of misunderstanding between the USA and India. The liberation of Goa in 1961 was vehemently opposed by the US. The move was hailed in India, in most of other newly independent countries and in the communist states as a long overdue elimination of a particular obnoxious relic of colonialism. In the US and other Western states it was criticised as a basic violation of India's oft-repeated professions in foreign affairs, and of the provisions of the UN Charter.

The greatest blow to India was the position of Adlai Stevenson (U.S. representative) in the United Nations. He said that unless actions of these kinds could be interdicted they might lead to the beginning of the end of the UN. This reaction has to be understood not in the light of any particular US revulsion to the resort to force or violence. The US had resorted to violence internationally often enough. But what it has found intolerable in its role as an imperial power, is the use of force against its will and without its permission implicit or explicit. While the US was repelled by India's use of force in Goa, it had been quiescent on Portuguese colonialism.²³

22 Ibid., editorial entitled, "Mid Winter Madness",
7 December 1955.

23 Nayar, n.6, p.143.

In creating new tensions and misunderstandings the Goan incident seemed to wash away the cordiality that had prevailed in the preceding months. When the ~~Aid~~ Consortium met in January 1962 and postponed further commitments to India, this was interpreted in India as being dictated by official displeasure with the Goa action. India was in turn highly displeased by the US and UK support of a resolution in the Security Council defeated in June 1962 only because of Soviet veto, requesting India and Pakistan to try anew to solve the Kashmir dispute. In 1962 the annual battle in American Congress over President's request for foreign aid was unusually prolonged and bitter, with many criticisms of India.

After a few months, the difficulties of late 1961 seemed to be placed in some perspective and relations between the two countries began to improve once again as a result of the extraordinary developments of the latter weeks of 1962.

India was ill prepared to meet the unexpected offensive which the Chinese launched in late October 1962, and which within a short time had sliced well into Ladakh and NEFA, threatening the plains of Assam. In this grave national crisis Nehru and his fellow countrymen did not hesitate to drop many of their past illusions and attitudes. They did not allow

their adherence to non-alignment or their aversion to military aid to stand in the way of seeking outside military assistance. In late October Nehru dismissed Krishna Menon and removed a major psychological obstacle from Indo-American relations, and formally requested military equipment and weapons from the US. The US responded swiftly -- US aircrafts loaded with arms and equipments arrived in Calcutta. The US provided small arms and equipment worth \$5,000,000. The first consignment of US arms arrived on 3 November; the pact between the two countries was signed nearly two weeks later, on 14 November 1962.²⁴ Besides arms, US sent twelve C-130 Hercules transport planes with American crew to ferry troops and equipment to the battle regions on the borders. President Kennedy announced on 20 November, that he was sending a US Mission under Assistance Secretary Averell Harriman to India to make an on-the-spot survey of India's long term military requirements.

Pakistan strongly protested against the supply of US arms and equipment to India. Mohammad Ali Bogra asserted that the Sino-Indian conflict was not a 'major' conflict but a 'localised' one restricted to the area under dispute, "and that therefore India did not require any military aid from the U.S."²⁵ The Pakistani leaders argued that India was playing up the 'Chinese bogey' in order to receive more military aid from the United States.

24 D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay, 1962), p.64.

25 Speech in the Pakistani National Assembly on 22 November 1962 in Dawn (Karachi), 23 November 1962.

The US Government in a statement assured Pakistan that the military aid it was extending to India was meant for use purely for defensive purposes against China and that it would take appropriate action to prevent its misuse in any kind of aggression against Pakistan. President Kennedy in a letter to Ayub Khan pointed out that the Chinese attack on India was a threat to the entire Indian subcontinent, including Pakistan. The implication of the letter seemed to be that Pakistan should not resent US aid to India. He advised both the countries to jointly oppose China. He said that the US Government would not change its plans for arms aid even after the ceasefire.²⁶

The Americans were not slow to grasp the significance of the Chinese attack on India. They realised that containment of China depended on the collaboration between India and Pakistan. In a confidential communication Kennedy urged Ayub Khan to make a friendly gesture to India in its hour of great peril - let Ayub inform Nehru privately that Indian troops in Kashmir could be safely withdrawn to fight against the Chinese invaders. Such an offer would win Indian goodwill and probably bring about a settlement of the Kashmir issue. But Ayub brushed

26 New York Times, 21 November 1962.

aside the appeal.²⁷ Being suspicious of the Anglo-American aid to India, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan indicated on 29 October 1962, that if the US insisted on supplying arms to India, Pakistan might think again about its relationship with and membership of the Western military pacts and reassess its alignments.²⁸ Pakistan feared that the arms promised by UK and US may be used against it.

Yet Pakistan informally promised the West that it would not attack India during Chinese attack on Indian frontiers, after the US and the UK were assured by India that the arms supplied by them would not be used against Pakistan.

Between 23 and 29 November 1962, attempts were made by Averell Harriman of the USA and Duncan Sandys of Britain for an Indo-Pak rapprochement. Ultimately Sandys was able to prepare an agreed draft which was issued by Ayub Khan and Nehru as a joint statement simultaneously from Rawalpindi and New Delhi on 30 November 1962. According to it Ayub and Nehru, "agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their countries on Kashmir

27 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (London, 1965), p.664.

28 Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains", Foreign Affairs, vol.42, no.2, January 1964, p.53.

and other related matters and decided to start discussions at an early stage with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlements which would be conducted initially" at the ministerial level and at the appropriate stage directly by Nehru and Ayub.²⁹

The talks began in an atmosphere in which both the sides took an inflexible position from the very beginning. The Chinese declared unilateral ceasefire on 20 November 1962. By the time, Harriman Mission arrived in New Delhi, the invasion was practically over and the Government of India was no longer under pressure of the Chinese advance to be compelled to make a dramatic gesture to Pakistan. Neither could USA succeed in persuading Ayub to make a positive gesture to India. The Pakistani attitude had hardened and the Chinese Government with remarkable alarcity had made a notable diplomatic breakthrough in Pakistan.

The Chinese aggression against India did not help to cement Indo-US ties. The Indians (especially Nehru) felt that the US was exerting undue pressure on him to make concessions on Kashmir. The Americans similarly were irked by his refusal

29 For text, Indian Lok Sabha Secretariat, no.40, p.368.

to make concessions to Pakistan, his reluctance to publicise the US military aid, his lack of enthusiasm for joint air exercises, his repudiation of the VOA deal, and his adherence to the concept of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Kennedy by his inability or unwillingness to revise the US policies towards India and Pakistan sharply enough, failed to extract the maximum benefit from the Chinese attack. In spite of the growing Pakistani friendship with China, the US felt that Pakistan was genuinely a loyal ally of USA. Instead of being annoyed with Pakistan for its pro-Chinese moves, Americans were still prone to believe that once the Kashmir problem is out of the way, Pakistan would join India in the defence of the subcontinent.

In 1963, two other developments caused further estrangement. Much to India's disapproval, President Kennedy began creeping involvement in Vietnam and the murder of Ngo Dinh Diem, allegedly with the knowledge or even the complicity of the US. Shortly before Kennedy himself was assassinated, created a very unfavourable reaction in India. The other much discussed case was of the Bokaro Steel Plant. Because Kennedy and Galbraith reacted favourably, the Indian Government assumed that the requested US assistance would be forthcoming. But opposition to the proposed major assistance to help India build a huge

steel plant in the public sector mounted in the US Congress. A few months later, the Soviet Union agreed to replace the US in Bokaro project, thus gaining more goodwill and support in India at the expense of the United States.

In connection with the dispute of India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, the press and public opinion in each country has charged the United States with favouring the other in the Security Council.³⁰ In each country there has also been suspicion of American and British motives in urging the two nations to settle their quarrel so as to meet better the Chinese threat of 1962.

The assassination of Kennedy was deeply mourned in India, both individually and nationally. To Indians, the change from an administration headed by a good friend who was genuinely interested in India and other developing countries to one headed by a man who was believed to dislike Indians and to be a parochially minded American nationalist was most unwelcome. However, for one and a half year of the Johnson Administration during which Nehru died and India was absorbed in the task of carrying on without its great leader, there were no major difficulties in the Indo-US-Pakistan relations, even though the warmth that had characterised them during the Kennedy years had gone.

The Anglo-American aid continued to flow into both India

³⁰ The Kashmir crisis will be dealt in details in the forthcoming chapter.

and Pakistan, though Pakistan time and again protested to the Americans regarding the military aid to India. The cold war continued to persist in the subcontinent with both the countries gradually aligning themselves with either of the superpowers playing the Chinese card against the other.

The saddest moment of the Indian history dawned in May 1964, when Pandit Nehru died and ~~(Lal)~~ Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India.

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two

THE UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE SUBCONTINENT (1964-1965)

It has been mentioned in the introductory chapter that the United States welcomed the advent of both Pakistan and India in 1947. Americans hoped that since partition had already happened and had been accepted as unavoidable by both the sides, it would help resolve the tensions that had loomed increasingly large as independence approached. The U.S. hoped that after the disturbances were over, the countries would achieve national progress, stability and cooperation.

The postwar role of the United States in South Asia emerged from the interaction of a number of factors and trends peculiar to that period. First of all, the cold war competition with the Soviet Union led to a search for Asian friends and allies. Second, there had always been a genuine desire to pursue humanitarian goals. After 1949, China no longer provided the opportunity for an expression of such feeling. The British control over South Asia had just been relinquished. Finally, Pakistan and (especially) India quickly became relatively open societies in which Americans could freely circulate and gain rather substantial access to

key decision makers.¹

The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial. There has been tension between the two countries for one reason or the other. The gravest discord between any two members of the Commonwealth of Nations is found between both the neighbours. Both have looked at each other as enemies and their relations have been charged with an envenomed load of bigotry, prejudice, religious and nationalistic hostility. There is a bitter disappointment, not only among the people of the two countries, but also among their friends all over the world. The years since independence have brought warfare, vituperation, frustration and fear. As Michael Brecher has observed:

The relations between India and Pakistan since partition of 1947 have been characterised by extreme tensions much of time, tension almost all the time, economic blockade on one occasion, periodic threats of war and continuous ideological and political warfare which have produced, to put it mildly, a shambles in the relationship between the two countries.²

Mutual fear and distrust have warped the whole international outlook of the two nations. The foreign policy of

1 Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Pacific Affairs, December 1975, p.49.

2 Michael Brecher, in Selig P. Harrison, ed., India and United States (New York, 1961), p.53.

both the countries has been perverted by their quarrels. While antipathy to Pakistan has been the pivot of Indian foreign policy, the main aim of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to obtain shield against possible Indian attack and to maintain her territorial integrity.

An analysis of the course of Indo-Pakistan relations reveals that causes of recurrent crises between them fall into two main categories. First, there are specific quarrels, such as Kashmir border incidents, eviction of Muslims from Assam and Tripura, the problems of religious minorities in the two countries and the conflicting aims and purposes of the foreign policies. Serious disputes also arise from the upheaval of partition e.g., diversion of assets of the formerly undivided Indian Government, and the sharing of Indus Valley waters. Secondly, there are different outlooks of the two countries which shape the neutral image that each has found of the other and serve greatly to complicate their relations.³

The United States expressed its desire to help each country to develop and strengthen. Both India and Pakistan received economic help from the U.S. The main instruments

3 Quincy Wright, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: Areas of Conflict", Round Table (London), 1959-60, p.163.

of policy were economic and to some extent military aid programmes as well as more extensive diplomatic relations.

Yet the divergent Indian and American perspectives have found their way into policies which because they touch immediate security interests, have caused intense reactions. Kashmir and American military aid programme in Pakistan are the two prime examples. Pakistan plainly occupies a very different position in the security plans of India due to its position in the security plans of the United States. The United States security is involved to the degree that Pakistan is a part of the "ring of deterrence". The United States neither fears nor regards Pakistan as likely to commit aggression. For India, on the other hand, Pakistan is an immediate neighbour that commands the major traditional routes into India from the northwest and that it is conceived as having been an aggressor in Kashmir.

In accordance with its assessment of the altered strategic situation, the Indian Government undertook a considerably expanded programme of the armed forces, the production base and the operational infrastructure. The blue print for this expansion was five year plan sanctioned in early 1964, which appeared to be a revision of a three year plan hastily drawn up shortly after 1962 border war.

agreed in early March 1964 to make available for defence a minimum of Rs.800 crores a year over the subsequent decade irrespective of a level of foreign economic and military aid or of the domestic or external situations.

Earlier between 1954 and 1965, India purchased over \$50 million worth of military equipments. During 1962-65, after the Sino-Indian border conflict, it received over \$90 million worth of grant military assistance (primarily communications and transport equipment, but including some hardware, plus arms production facilities).

In view of India's shortage of foreign exchange even for non-military purposes, the government was forced to do a complete about-face on the issue of military aid.⁶ India was relying upon friendly countries to make available the desired foreign exchange funds for the military in the form of outright grant aid on long term credits on each terms. At the same time it is also requesting for increased general economic aid on better terms than hitherto and also concessions regarding repayment on previous aid. Aid seeking missions were despatched to various countries but reliance was being placed upon the United States, Britain and the 'Old Commonwealth'

6 Nehru shifted to the view that receipt of military aid was compatible with nonalignment so long as no formal alliance was involved. Cited in Times of India, 12 November 1962.

(Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the Soviet Union.⁷

Shastri took over from Nehru in such difficult circumstances and was faced with the task of sizing up to the challenges at a time when India's international standing had slumped very badly largely as a result of the debacle in the war with China in 1962. While the international environment of India's foreign policy was quite difficult, the domestic environment was equally difficult for the new Prime Minister.

Politically, the vacuum caused by Nehru's death was not easy to fill. Although Shastri had been chosen as leader by consensus, there were forces in the ruling party that would have liked to see him fail. Apart from the domestic crises he had to face, internationally there were also a series of storms. In his first broadcast to the nation on 11 June 1964, Shastri made it clear that he would steer clear of alignments with power blocs and pursue an independent foreign policy. Emphasis was laid on developing closer relations with India's

7 H.R. Vohra reported in the Times of India (8 June 1964) that the Indian Government hoped for about \$500 million in military aid from the United States and \$150 million from Britain and the Commonwealth for 5 years defence plan. He reported in the same paper on 23 May 1964 that during Chavan's visit to Washington in that month, the same had submitted a list of the defence needs totalling \$550 million over a five year period, including \$60 million in grants and \$50 million for each of the 5 years.

neighbours. Shastri believed, that Nehru had been too busy with world problems and major powers to pay more attention to India's small neighbours.

Lacking the charisma and stature of Nehru, and functioning in a setting where India's international stature had been tarnished as a result of the debacle of 1962, he was trying to do what was possible in the circumstances. He realised that the Chinese star had gone up as a result of its victory in the Himalayas.

The operational environment of Pakistan's foreign policy in the years 1964-65 was highly suitable for the promotion of its national interest. Internationally, Pakistan's diplomacy was at its best, it had maintained good relations with the United States and had taken steps to establish cordial relations with China and the Soviet Union. Moscow had begun to take a neutral stand between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. Domestically, President Ayub Khan's regime had achieved a degree of stability unknown to Pakistan since the death of Premier Liaquat Ali Khan. In contrast, India's stature had declined since the debacle of 1962. It was in such a setting that Ayub Khan decided to put pressure on India to secure a settlement on Kashmir on his terms. Shastri had encouraged Jaya Prakash Narayan to explore the

possibilities of rapproachment with Pakistan. Shastri himself believed that he had the capacity to persuade Ayub on the terms for a settlement that would be acceptable to India. When Shastri met Ayub Khan in Karachi on October 1964, both leaders appeared to give each such impressions. The Shastri-Ayub talks at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London the same year also seemed to suggest that Shastri needed improved relations with Pakistan in order to consolidate his domestic position and to face the Chinese challenge. In perspective it appears that both leaders drew up contradictory perceptions of each other as a result of these two encounters. Shastri believed that a conciliatory posture would bring in a desired result, including a settlement on Kashmir that may not be damaging to India's interest and its existing position in Kashmir. Ayub on the contrary concluded that Shastri would give in to a policy of continuous pressure. This is the basis on which he formulated his policy of "leaning on India".

At the end of 1964, the Indian Government took certain measures which tied Kashmir more closely into the Indian federation. On 4 December 1964, the Indian Government announced that Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution, which related to establishment, in certain cases, of presidential rule and to the scope of Indian parliamentary legislation,

would be applied to Kashmir. These measures came at a time when Pakistan's fears of Indian rearmament had reached a zenith.

The taut atmosphere of late 1964 and early 1965 created new political changes and challenges in the subcontinent. It was a period, possibly the last one, for a sober view of the pressures which were driving the neighbours towards collision: the time to suspend the most dangerous contributing policies. In essence, the two nations confronted a common fundamental problem i.e., how to prepare against possible attack from the outside without increasing the dangers of intramural war. The problem had arisen in 1954, and Pakistan's resultant alignment had produced a series of dangerous repercussions. Instead of trying to minimise the influence of the cold war on the subcontinent both nations had sought to expand it for their own advantage in pursuing local objectives.

Throughout 1965, therefore, India and Pakistan waged a diplomatic and political war of nerves. Inflammable initiatives produced sharp counter action. Pakistan generally maintained the offensive seeking to exert pressure on India by every means, ranging from the steady drumfire of the internal hate India propaganda campaign to persistent diplomatic attempts to isolate India internationally. India responded with sufficient spirit to give warning against

propaganda which would precipitate action. But the evidence suggests that Pakistan was not in a mood to be warned. It appeared unplacably determined to face a showdown over the twin issues of Kashmir and Indian rearmament.

Rawalpindi placed great reliance upon the support of China. Ayub paid an eight days state visit to Peking in March 1965, during which the foundations were completed for a two phased use of Chinese weapons. During the Ayub visit, Peking subscribed for the second time to a plebiscite. Marshall Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister used this occasion to make the first of several equivocal statements implying Chinese military support for Pakistan without pledging it. The evident purpose was to intimidate India. The signing of Sino-Pak border protocol and a cultural pact in Rawalpindi on 27 March 1965 was turned into a major propaganda affair. Bhutto, as was quoted by Dawn said: "Asian leadership had found its destiny and had to be respected. If the rest of the world is not reconciled to it, world peace cannot be maintained".^{7a} Again next day in a press conference, he said: "by rushing military assistance to India,

7a As quoted in Brines Russell, The Indo Pakistan Conflict, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p.253.

a country hostile to Pakistan, the U.S. has not merely jeopardised the concept of alliances but has shattered it". This was clearly a bid for offers from Moscow as well as Peking.

Indian authorities were worried by the signs of closer Sino-Pak collaboration. China had exploded its first nuclear device on 6 October 1964 and her military shadow had grown larger over Asia. In the Cairo Conference of the nonaligned nations, Shastri proposed on 7 October 1964 a delegation to visit Peking to "persuade China to desist from making nuclear weapons". The Chinese accused India of "double alignment" in accepting arms from both Russia and America.

The Sino-Pakistan rapprochement was regarded in New Delhi as a threat of new guerrilla attacks on India. Nehru had predicted that Pakistan would follow the strategy of 1947 in a second attempt to conquer Jammu and Kashmir. The danger was intensified by the possibility that Pindi would receive Chinese support and arms and active help in training guerrilla and planning tactics. To many Indians, the Sino-Pakistani agreement was more than a diplomatic double cross by which a neighbour joined the enemy.

India's national interest depended upon perpetuating the Sino-Soviet split. While the split lasted, Russia would maintain India as a bulwark against Chinese expansion, and

Indians hoped that Russia would supply weapons for defence against any further Chinese assault.

By pursuing this policy, New Delhi enlarged the Soviet presence in India. This position appeared more solid, possibly greater than it was, because smooth Indo-Soviet relations contrasted with frequent public US-Indian differences over Vietnam and other issues. At the same time, Moscow undertook a firm, almost overt, effort to build a stronger position in Pakistan, while maintaining its Indian foothold.

Moscow had responded cautiously but definitely to repeated Pakistani overtures for closer relations. On 4 April 1965, President Ayub and Foreign Minister Bhutto began a six day visit to Moscow. In the final communique, issued on 10 April the Soviets clearly moved a step towards the Pakistani position on Kashmir. Both agreed that, "in order to promote universal peace and harmony, international agreements should be implemented". When Shastri paid visit to Moscow in June, he failed to get any mention of Kashmir into the joint communique. Despite another display of Soviet hospitality, Moscow refrained from giving any public indication that it would support India with any vigour in future disputes over Kashmir.

The Indian decision after 1962 to undertake unilateral rearmament, with limited Western help was risky enough by itself, in terms of the probable effect upon suspicious Pakistan. The Indians argued that Pakistan had already been disproportionately strengthened by American weapons, and, India was therefore, entitled to replenish her arsenal without regard for consequences. The argument ran, since India had no intention to attack Pakistan, there was no need to maintain a balance. New Delhi made no attempt to convince Pakistan that she would not be attacked.

The Western Powers, however, clearly recognised the dilemma created by the Chinese attack. The late President Kennedy had outlined the problem at a press conference on 12 September 1963 in terms that also remained valid two years later, "the fact of course, is we want to sustain India, which may be attacked--by China. So we don't want India to be helpless with half-a-billion people. Of course, if that country becomes fragmented and defeated, that would be disastrous blow to the balance of power. On the other hand, everything we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan, which is a much smaller country. So we are dealing with very, very complicated problem because the hostility between them is so deep".^{7b}

7b Quoted in Jain, R.K., US-South Asian Relations, 1947-82, vol.II, p.223. (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983).

During the Chinese campaign, the emergency Anglo-American arms programme to India totalled \$1200 million. The two nations provided equipment of primary usefulness in the mountain terrain where the Sino-Indian confrontation was concentrated. The US assistance consisted of transport aircraft and spare parts, light infantry weapons for mountain divisions, ammunitions, communications equipment and engineers and medical equipment to meet the emergency. This formed the basis of subsequent American assistance totalling around \$800 million by the autumn of 1965. In addition, India was able to purchase an unspecified amount of US equipment, "primarily for modernisation and expansion of defense production facilities". This assistance included a factory for the production of ammunition for small arms and the promise of second such factory, which was suspended during the military conflict.

General Robert J. Wood, the Director of U.S. Military Assistance told a U.S. Congressional Committee in April 1965:

The objective of the United States is to minimise tensions between India and Pakistan and ultimately to secure their cooperation on the matter of defense of the subcontinent. We recognise that their disputes stem from old and violent antagonisms which are not easily overcome. Our military aid programs to these nations, however, are in no way intended to aggravate those old problems. Instead, their purpose is to prevent the incursion of communism on their borders from the north.⁸

8 "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966", Hearings before a Sub-committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, session 1.

Further the U.S. authorities obtained stronger guarantees from India on the use of American supplied equipment than they had secured a decade earlier when arming Pakistan.

The Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan confirmed the outline of Anglo-American assistance in a speech before the Lok Sabha on 29 November 1965. He said American assistance between October 1962 and September 1965 had totalled about \$76 million (Rs.36.13 crores). Deliveries amounted to about 45 per cent of U.S. pledges. The British had delivered arms amounting to about \$47 million (Rs.22.41 crores) in deliveries, out of a total commitment of Rs.36 crores.

This relatively modest assistance, when added to the equipment India obtained through her own resources disrupted the Indo-Pakistani balance to some extent.

The Indians had begun rearming against Pakistan before the Chinese assault and continued this phase of their programme along with the construction of distinctly anti-Chinese defences. Indians had sought supersonic military aircraft to match those supplied by the United States to Pakistan. New Delhi was relatively disturbed when Pakistan received slow F-86 sabre jet fighters and was aroused when modern F-104A starfighters were delivered.

Supersonic planes and heavy tanks were essential for both sides in the Indo-Pakistan confrontation. For military

as well as political reasons, India sought modernised equipment with increased intensity. The army quite possibly demanded these weapons under any circumstances in the efforts to revitalise itself after the shock of the Chinese attack.

The Soviets capitalised on this situation. Of the \$500 million in military assistance which they are believed to have promised India by the end of 1965, some \$300 million were earmarked for the construction of an Indian manned factory to build MiG fighters. Moscow installed two surface to air missiles (SAM) facilities to protect major Indian cities, a purely defensive measure which produced considerable effect. By the autumn of 1965, India had 12 MiG-21s. They were comparable to the latest American built 120 F-86s, 26 B-57 Canberras and 12 F-104s as well as Sidewinder air-to-air missiles delivered to Pakistan.

The most substantial U.S. military aid programme to Pakistan was between 1964 to 1965. The military assistance to Pakistan mounted from \$390 million to \$440 million. In this period Pakistan received over \$630 million in grant military assistance for weapons, \$619 million for defence support assistance and some \$55 million worth of equipment purchased on cash or concessional basis.

Pakistan made little attempt to avoid dependence on outside sources. It was a member of both CENTO and SEATO, and between 1954-65, it was almost entirely dependent on the United States for military equipment, spares and support. The broad objective of the military assistance was to create a multi-source capability to resist external attack.

For some years, as 'America's most allied ally' in Asia, this country placed great reliance on the American connection, which brought it a powerful friend, economic and military aid and enhanced its international status. But the alliance was an unnatural one at best, since the two states had different positions, interests and objectives. These differences became more apparent in the yearly 1960s, as preoccupation with military alliances -- "a pactomania" and the Cold War generally disillusioned by the limitations and reservations of the US policy towards its "most allied ally" especially because Americans were at the same time giving an even greater amount of aid and attention to its huge rival in the subcontinent, India.⁹

Pakistan's commitment to the U.S. and its reservations concerning US policies and motivations were frankly expressed

9 Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and Great Powers", Orbis (A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs), vol.XVII, no.3, Fall 1973, p.993.

by Ayooob Khan in a memorable address to the joint session of the US Congress in July 1961. Thereafter US-Pakistani relations became noticeably better. Consequently, it turned towards China, while trying at all times to retain some contacts with both super powers. The process of decline in US-Pak relations began in 1962 with the start of the US military assistance to India after the outbreak of Sino-Indian conflict. That the U.S., which had been the main support for Pakistan's military development, should begin to assist Pakistan's enemy was the cause for precipitation to China and a growing resentment toward Americans. Yet the economic assistance reached a peak in 1962. In that year, US assistance ran to some \$400 million a year.

The Chinese presence began to grow. Military assistance from China brought T-59 tanks and perhaps 40 MiG-19 jet interceptors; a number of high level state visits were also exchanged.

In this period, the Pakistanis sought to walk a three cornered tightrope -- they wanted to dramatise a Chinese 'presence' in order, as they saw it, to improve their position vis-a-vis their immediate and massive neighbour, India. At the same time they needed continued American and Western economic assistance, and sought to retain access to American and Western spares and replacements for their depleted army and airforce.

The United States and Western economic assistance to India

were less concentrated and were more concerned with the economy as a whole rather than with specific projects. The more sophisticated became consortium's understanding of development economies (always working closely with Indian counterparts), the more precise became the criteria for assistance. Eventually this led to increased charges of aid with strings, undue dependence and the like; commitments of American aid to India amounted to some \$740 million in 1962, averaged \$670 million from 1963-65. To be sure, PL-480 requirements declined towards the end of this period as Indian agricultural performance improved. But increasing budgetary pressure in the US Congress, and disenchantment with providing economic resources of two countries which persisted in struggling against each other, led to a rapid fall off of Congressional support for economic assistance.

In 1962, there was a brief moment when events and relationships might have turned differently. When India faced China alone and without useful support from either Soviet Union or nonaligned countries, India appeared to have been prepared for a substantial American military presence in the form of military assistance and joint air and naval exercises. But the presence of China on Indian soil was brief. American assistance, though prompt, was not great, it was confined largely to mountain warfare material and radar equipment. India's official caution

about too close association with American military after China so promptly withdrew vitiated the utility of joint exercises.

Hoping to build on a common Indo-American concern about China in 1962, India requested Washington for advanced supersonic aircraft to match Pakistan's American F-104s and Chinese MiG-21s, the latter to protect their open and highly concentrated cities. After serious consideration the request was rejected by Washington.

The Military Balance, 1964-65

At the outbreak of hostilities, the Indian army was estimated at slightly more than 800,000 men plus an estimated 47,000 reserves. They were grouped in 17 operational divisions between 16,000 and 18,000 men. The regular Pakistani army totalled about 230,000 men in 8 divisions. The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) of London, in its reports for 1965-66, placed Indian authorised strength at 825,000 in 16 divisions, but this had not been fully realised. Pakistan's regular army was set at between 180,000 and 208,000 men, in 6 infantry divisions, with only 70,000 irregulars in addition.

In terms of manpower, the realistic maximum figures for the two sides, then was 8.47:5.1 in terms of manpower, in favour of India.

Pakistan was in a more favourable position for a quick limited offensive. The bulk of her regular forces was concentrated in the Kashmir-Lahore section of Punjab. Her supply lines were shorter and more effective, she had no worries about the second front.

In terms of overall manpower and particularly in industrial capacity, the Pakistanis could not match India's potential staying power in a long war.

Both sides tended to consider the tank with undue awe and to assign disproportionate significance to supersonic planes. India at that time possessed an estimated total of 1,450 heavy and light tanks and Pakistan had around 1,100. India was credited with a division of British Centurian heavy tanks and a brigade of US built Shermans, as well as two regiments of light tanks. Pakistan had a division of Pattons and an incomplete second division, along with other forces of Shermans and the French light tank, the Chaffee. President Ayub openly taunted Shastri with boast that his tanks could reach New Delhi along the Grand Trunk Road in a matter of hours, and the refrain was printed in press. The distance from the border to the Indian capital is some 200 miles only.

In the air, India had numerical superiority with what she regarded as tactical inferiority. The Indian Air Force

included more than 500 fighters and bombers, compared with about 200 Pakistani combat aircraft. Pakistani equipment again was more modern and the F-104s were more powerful than the limited numbers of supersonic aircrafts mostly Soviet make, possessed by India. The Indians were determined to acquire a supersonic.

By early 1965, the Indian military budget therefore arose steadily. It was estimated at \$1.8 billion for 1964-65, and \$2.1 billion including war costs, for the following year, compared in the latter year to \$289 million for Pakistan.

The only restrictions placed on India's use of foreign weapons applied to light equipment furnished by Washington and London. Pakistan, on the other hand, was hobbled by alignments to a single source of arms which were supplied under strict limitations on their use against India. The Pakistanis moved close to China, their only immediate potential source of additional arms.

Pakistan undertook a series of interacting initiatives which placed it on a collision course before 1965, and which required resolute diplomacy in order to prevent an explosion. By the end of 1964, the situation was delicate. India and Pakistan quite clearly attempted to use political and military

pressures to intimidate the other into inaction. The seemingly unrestrained aggressiveness of Pakistan's hate India campaign and Indian build-up merely solidified the other's determination and led to a renewed search for power to counteract it. Neither capital seemed to comprehend the potential consequences of their escalating conflict of power politics.

Both countries attempted to use the Anglo-American powers primarily as a means of reducing the other's strength. Pakistan consistently attempted to get Kashmir in return for Anglo-American arms aid to India. New Delhi sought to wreck the US-Pak alliance, Pakistan's constant complaints against massive "Anglo-American" arms created disproportionate fear of Indian strength and intent. The Indians on their part, continued to foster the misconception that, without the weapons, Pakistan would have remained militarily weak and therefore inoffensive from Indian point of view.

In the spring of 1965, President Johnson abruptly postponed the scheduled visit of Ayub Khan to stress his disapproval of the Sino-Pak rapprochement; disapproval, which had been expressed in many ways, including postponement of the consideration of new development loans. As an afterthought, the postponement was also applied to Shastri, who was due to visit Washington at about the same time. The blunt announcement shocked both the countries and they cancelled the visits.

The consequence, however, was that both India and Pakistan cut themselves off from the two major powers most interested in preventing armed conflict in the subcontinent.

Pakistan's strident anti-Indian propaganda campaign constituted the most consistently explosive element in the political preludes to war. At the beginning of 1964, the Indian representative told the United Nations Security Council that "the threats of violence which have emanated from Pakistan from time to time -- must cease". Then he added, "Once a better atmosphere prevails, it will be possible -- and we are prepared to discuss with Pakistan all our outstanding differences". But the atmosphere far from clearing had grown darker by the time of Shastri-Ayub meeting and Pakistani press campaign grew more thunderously anti-Indian.

In these circumstances, Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda announced the political measures of December 1964, which equalised Kashmir with other Indian states under the Constitution and thereby completely integrated Kashmir with India. As a result, New Delhi could exercise more direct authority over Kashmir without foreign criticism to which New Delhi was sensitive.

What New Delhi had done, in essence was to place Pakistan in an untenable legal position over Kashmir at a moment when

its official and popular fears about Indian rearmament had reached a zenith.

Under the circumstances it was to India's advantage to cushion the impact of her rearmament by avoiding unnecessary political incitement. The situation might have been contained indefinitely on a level of political acrimony and low level military pressure -- annoying enough for the Indians, but better than active war. By adding the new policy over Kashmir to the accumulated concern over rearmament, New Delhi made military action almost inevitable. It is still not clear whether, as Shastri suggested, Ayub Khan definitely decided on military measures by October 1964. But the circumstances indicate that this policy was determined relatively soon after Nanda's Kashmir moves and that the military episodes of early 1965 were in preparation for war.

Military and Political Consequences of Weapons Transfers

Unlike arms transfer to many other nations, those to India and Pakistan have always had a direct and immediate impact on the regional military balance.

Supplies of major weapons to the Indian subcontinent have shown much the same rising trend as supplies to the third world as a whole; they increased four and half times between

the first half of the 1950s and the second half of the 1960s. There was a peak in 1958 of over \$300 million which has never been surpassed. The average yearly level of supplies during the second half of the 60s was not substantially higher than the average during the second half of the 50s. Throughout the period India has accounted for about three quarters of the total supplies.¹⁰

The military importance of weapons transfer from the United States has been historically crucial for both nations. Pakistan would have become a serious military power without U.S. equipment. Virtually her entire army and airforce was equipped with relatively modern U.S. weapons. At one point, about 80 per cent of Pakistan's modern weapons were supplied by the United States. These transfers led directly to Indian purchases (largely from the U.S. and U.K. but later from France and the Soviet Union) of equivalent weapons and a very heavy Indian investment in a domestic arms industry.¹¹

Until 1962, U.S. weapons were largely a Pakistani asset and an Indian problem. However, after India's conflict with

10 SIPRI, The Arms Trade with Third World (September, 1971), p.468.

11 K. Subramanyam, "Military and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), vol.XVII, 11 November 1968, p.118.

Chinese they were given and sold to India for the explicit purpose of defense against Chinese incursions. For the Indians, the military value of U.S. equipment was timely but, in the long run, marginal. The weapons supplied by the U.S. had been useful only against the Chinese, and each U.S. weapon supplied to Pakistan had to be matched from local or foreign sources.

The military benefits that the U.S. received from these arms programmes were many. The main one seems to have been the use of an airfield at Peshawar for intelligence gathering missions and the erection of a massive electronic observation post also at Peshawar. Ancillary benefits probably included transit rights in Pakistan and a limited pooling of data (concerning the Soviet Union and China) with Pakistan and India.

The political significance of arms aid programmes differs from that of other kinds of aid. They commit the donors prestige to a greater degree, they cannot be easily terminated, and they lead to identifications and expectations which the donor may not have intended. Finally, they drag the donor into local disputes which may have nothing to do with the original purpose of the aid programme. The U.S. aid to

Pakistan had such political effects. They never were balanced by the much larger quantities of economic assistance given to India, and were only temporarily offset by the U.S. military assistance to that country.¹²

For Pakistan, the U.S. military tie was thought to be vital. Until the early 1960s, Pakistan's foreign policy was based on friendship with this single and strong outside power. Pakistan was perfectly willing to exchange base rights treaty commitments, and her vote for a reliable flow of weapons and political support against India. A true dependency relationship was established -- one which reinforced the favourable image of Pakistan among U.S. military and political leaders.

The U.S. military assistance programme enabled Pakistan to deal with the Indian Government on a near equal basis -- at least that was the perception in Pakistan. Despite the size and resources of their nation, many Pakistani leaders -- including those with a military background -- had a pervasive sense of national inferiority and weakness. Undivided Pakistan may have been the world's fifth most populous nation, but it was unluckily surrounded by the world's first, second and third

12 Cohen, n.1, p.53.

most populous countries. The sense of disadvantage was acute in dealings with India, and Pakistani leaders felt that they must be able partly to balance with India militarily in order to negotiate political and economic disputes satisfactorily.

Finally, the U.S. military aid programme had a profound impact upon the domestic politics of Pakistan. One effect was to strengthen the political position of the Pakistani military. Defence expenditures in Pakistan increased rather than decrease because of U.S. assistance and the military never had to justify -- as they did in India, -- the amount and use of the defense budget. This had a desirable payoff for U.S. officials, as the Pakistan army was thought to be decidedly pro-American and anti-Soviet.

The effect on India of U.S. support of the Pakistani military was predictable: It forced the Indians to turn to both Western and Eastern countries for matching weaponry, paying the necessary political advantage to the U.S. -- allowing for India's reaction was probably negative. The U.S. programme to Pakistan was a major disruptive factor in Indo-US relations (with the exception of a brief periods when the US assisted India militarily or provided critically needed economic or food assistance).

Because of the low level of American interests in South Asia, a regional balance is hard to justify. Two somewhat

contradictory arguments can be produced in support of this policy. First, one of the regional powers might someday present a direct or indirect threat to U.S. interests. India, for example either by nuclear or conventional means may attempt to expand its sphere of influence. Similarly a Pakistan backed by the U.S. would provide at least limited restraint on her ambitions. Second, the justification for maintaining a balance between India and Pakistan rests on the assumption that both need to be strengthened in order to defend the subcontinent from external threats emanating from China or USSR. Ideally, India and Pakistan could cooperate in their joint defence, however, as this is highly improbable, it would make sense for an outside power to attempt to use the dominant regional power (India) to balance major external threat and use the minor regional power (Pakistan) to keep pressure on India.

Arming both India and Pakistan made sense if: (1) The region was regarded as a crucial battleground in the cold war; and (2) One could not be certain whether India or Pakistan was the better strategic bet.

In the end, we can say, the most important 'official' American interests in South Asia were not based on a direct relationship between regional states and the United States. While the U.S. Government may have derived very little from its ties with the states of South Asia, these ties have had

a profound impact on India and Pakistan. There is a substantial disproportion both between the issues at stake for each side and between the amount of influence each side can bring to bear upon the other. Arms programmes are the prime example. The one act of creating a modern army in Pakistan had a lasting impact upon the international relations of the region and upon the expectations of India and Pakistan towards the United States.

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter Three

THE PRELUDE TO KASHMIR CONFLICT:

THE KUTCH AFFAIR AND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT OF 1965

The situation when Nehru died in 1964 was bad -- the economic momentum had slowed down, agriculture production stagnated, inflation became serious, debt repayment obligations steadily mounted and there was a growth of communal violence. The smooth election of Shastri as the Prime Minister was perhaps the best tribute to Nehru's memory and his labours to implant democratic institutions in India. But the country Nehru had led was also troubled and in a difficult situation.

At the beginning of 1965, both India and Pakistan faced formidable problems in their separate, but parallel processes of nation building. Each had made a considerable progress but the immediate challenges were immense. Both had survived the first test of political viability, yet they still had to achieve more growth. The future was promising but precarious. After nearly twenty years of independence, the two nations in reality were striving to be born. War was the last luxury both could afford.¹

1 Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (Pall Mall Press, London, 1968), p.214.

India had still not recovered from its two recent grievous losses -- the loss of face during the Chinese attack, and the loss of Nehru's commanding personality. His death had sobered the subcontinent and for a brief period, had brought the two neighbours together in one of their memorable periods of goodwill. The mood for reconciliation soon vanished, leaving deeper uncertainty over Kashmir.

Prime Minister Shastri had not established a position for himself, nor had he attempted to do so. He was well known nationally but not internationally -- he had to create a popular public image for himself. His government attempted to perpetuate Nehru's policies on major foreign and domestic affairs and this created the illusion that India was marking time. The economy was expanding slowly to match the population increase. India had to depend upon the import of some 6 million tons of American wheat to sustain its population. The country's influence in foreign affairs which once had been impressive under Nehru was diminishing; partly because the Indians believed that they had been deprived of a chance to strike back at China. The politicians and the army burned with a desire to re-establish the nation's prestige for India's influence had been diminished due to the debacle with China in 1962.

Western arms aid and the Indian defense buildup following the Sino-Indian war foreshadowed for Pakistan a seriously adverse shift in the balance of power in the Indian sub-continent. Seeking ways to offset India's growing strength Ayub and his colleagues changed the orientation of their foreign policy. Formally, Pakistan remained aligned to the West, even though unenthusiastically, just as India remained formally non-aligned, despite changes in the substances of the foreign policies of both the countries. During these years, Pakistan took the initiative in altering power relationships affecting South Asia, and its moves culminated in the second Indo-Pakistani war of 1965.

Pakistan's reaction to India's defeat by China was a complex mixture of pleasure, fear, frustration. "The first reactions to Indian reverses in Pakistan were both sweet and sour. The sweet part, and it was savored, and was the enjoyment one gets from seeing a neighbourhood bully meeting a bigger bully. The sour part was in knowing that there was an even bigger bully in the neighbourhood".²

Ayub's efforts to improve relations with Communist China and to put pressure on India were to be undertaken without

2 Wayne Wilcox, India-Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York, Walker and Company, 1964), p.75.

cutting Pakistan's ties to the United States, as distinct from playing a less active or even a perfunctory role in SEATO and CENTO.

Sino-Pakistan Relations

When the United States and India began to move closer after the conflict of 1962, there was no residue of hostility in Sino-Pakistan relations. In the years of friendly relations with New Delhi, Peking had never endorsed the Indian position that Kashmir was a part of India.

Before new links could be formed, old problems had to be solved in Sino-Pakistani relations -- Chinese and Pakistani maps showed both countries claiming the same small areas along the frontier between Pakistani controlled Kashmir and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. On 26 December 1962, a Sino-Pak communique announced that complete agreement in principle had been reached on border alignment. The agreement was signed on 2 March 1963.

These moves infuriated India which claimed that since all of Kashmir was legally India's, Pakistan had no boundary with China. New Delhi also charged that Pakistan had surrendered some 2,500 sq. miles of India's ^{Kashmir} in Kashmir to China.

India's real apprehension was not about cultural or air agreements. New Delhi feared that Pakistan and China had formed a secret military alliance, a fear that Pakistani officials -- especially Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto cultivated both for domestic ^{and} political reasons to increase India's apprehension. Speaking in the Pakistan Assembly on 17 July 1963, Bhutto said:

Any attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia.³

After 1964, Ayub had decided that friendship was likely, than pressure, to induce India to compromise on Kashmir. He had also been encouraged by the restiveness in Kashmir, taking this as an indication that the Kashmiris were no longer willing to accept Indian rule meekly. He therefore embarked upon the policy of "leaning on India".

Part of Ayub's policy of leaning on India was using Pakistan's new ties with China and Afro-Asian states to pressurise India. But its most direct and aggressive aspect was Pakistan's resumption of more aggressive patrolling along

3 As quoted in William J. Barnds, India Pakistan and the Great Powers (Council on Foreign Relations, London, Pall Mall Press, 1972), p.190.

the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The presence of UN forces and the disinclination of either India or Pakistan to challenge the status quo by force had kept the trouble limited. After the Sino-Indian war, clashes occurred more often, involving more soldiers because of stepped up Pakistani activity; India, in turn, pursued a more active policy.

Shastri's talk of reconciliation created a temporary change in this atmosphere. He emphasised the need for time to get on top of the situation in India before more meaningful moves could be made toward Pakistan. Ayub, acknowledging the reasonableness of this position, reduced his pressure and tension eased for several months. Ayub and Shastri met at Karachi in October 1964, and the lack of measurable progress did not dampen the hopes of those in favour of reconciliation.

But Shastri was under pressure from right wing Hindu elements, who were growing stronger and demanding Indian hegemony rather than reconciliation with Pakistan. He was also faced with various other domestic troubles, and Indians generally remained resentful of Pakistan's growing friendship with China. The Indian Government, apparently concluding that a tough line was the only way to deal with the Kashmiris, announced in December 1964 that the state would be more closely integrated into India. In January 1965, the ruling party in Kashmir - the National Conference - merged with the

Congress Party. These moves infuriated Pakistan. Indians in turn were roused by Ayub's visits to Peking (in March) and Moscow in April. They also saw Pakistan's machinations behind Sheikh Abdullah's meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers in January and rearrested Abdullah as soon as he returned to India in April.

Ayub resumed his policy of "leaning on India" and tension mounted. In the first five months of 1965 the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) reported 2,231 complaints by India and Pakistan. UNMOGIP confirmed 377 violations during this period, 218 of which were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India.⁴

The American Position

The trend of events in the subcontinent was making it increasingly difficult for the West to maintain satisfactory ties with India and Pakistan while countering the Chinese and Soviet influence in South Asia. Some U.S. and British officials believed that the arguments for military aid to India were not as strong as they had once thought. The Chinese military

4 United Nations Security Council, Report by Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the Ceasefire Agreement, The Ceasefire Line and the Functioning of UNMOGIP, S/6651, 3 September 1965.

danger seemed to be declining; those who had hoped to draw India into closer relationship as a means of containing Chinese power in Asia saw less chance of this. India had been dubious of U.S. policies in South East Asia; and while it was unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. as an anti-communist policy that would bring dissension with USSR. Furthermore, the aim of limiting the Soviet role in Indian military picture was not being satisfactorily realised. Western officials had hoped that Indian armed forces would retain their Western orientation, but increasing amount of Soviet arms kept flowing into India.

These concerns paralleled other and earlier doubts in some quarters about the validity of the reasons for the alliance with Pakistan. The U.S. concluded that there was little choice but to continue moderate arms aid to both the countries, trying its best to balance its interests in South Asia despite renewed tension. As Gen. Wood said:

"The objective of the U.S. is to minimise tensions between India and Pakistan and ultimately to serve/secure their cooperation on the matter of defense of the subcontinent. We recognise that their disputes stem from old and violent antagonisms which are not easily overcome. Our military aid programs to these nations, however are in no way intended to aggravate those old problems. Instead, their purpose is to prevent the incursion of Communism on their border from the north".

The American Government became increasingly unhappy, as Pakistan expanded its ties with China and began its policy of leaning on India. According to the American assessment, Pakistan should have followed an exactly opposite course, trying to settle its disputes with India and keeping distance from China. In Pakistani view, of course, the U.S. should have made its military and even economic assistance to India conditional on India's willingness to agree to what Pakistan regarded as a fair settlement on Kashmir.

With divergent views, neither Pakistan's interpretation of its interests nor the American interpretation was convincing to the other party. American arguments that the 1964 agreement to provide long term arms assistance was made in part to keep India ^{away} from importing large amount of arms from the Soviet Union; and that such aid also enabled the U.S. to influence India against spending even larger sums for defense were of no avail in Pakistan. The anxious Indian defence building was being aided by the West and arguments that halting aid would harm Pakistan in the long run seemed ludicrous as well as self-serving to Pakistanis.

Nor was either ally able or willing to exert adequate pressure to cause the other to change its course. The U.S.

expressed its displeasure and hinted that it might curtail its assistance if Pakistan went too far. But it was difficult to say just what, "too far" was, although clearly a Chinese-Pakistani military alliance would have fallen under this heading.

Pakistan had certain assets in this context. It had special U.S. facilities in its country, and was aware of the American hesitancy to take any action that might cause Pakistan to demand the removal of these installations. Pakistan was still a member of the Western military alliance system and while Washington was no longer enamoured with these alliances, it thought that their breakup would be worse than having them quietly continue.

Thus an uneasy compromise developed which was periodically upset by specific acts or words on the part of one country or the other. In particular Foreign Minister Bhutto and Pakistani press created considerable annoyance for some US officials.

In April 1965, the US cancelled an invitation to President Ayub to visit Washington -- officially it was postponed, but the effect was much the same. Since the US did not feel it would be able to receive Shastri after cancelling Ayub's visit, his visit was also postponed, which annoyed the Indians. President Johnson's reasoning being a legislative workload of

175 pending bills; he had to bone up on 25-35 Presidential appointments. Vietnam was draining a lot of his time. Another factor could have been his irritation at Ayub's and Shastri's criticism of the US role in Vietnam.

So the President, it seems got out a statement postponing the visits, adding that both Asian leaders had "graciously agreed to the postponement". The reaction in India was enormous, and newspapers from one end of the political spectrum to the other protested against the 'insult'. The mild Shastri cancelled his visit altogether and many Indians were convinced that President Johnson was really engaged in trying to "pressure India into backing US policies in Vietnam". Shastri in Parliament said, "Our policy in Vietnam will not change because of the annoyance it may caust to anyone".⁵

The Pakistani officials privately complained that the US had acted in "ill-grace". Washington, of course, denied that arms twisting had been intended. But the whole affair for a time-being--cast a decided pall over US relations with India and Pakistan. As events developed, this probably helped India.

5 As quoted in Newsweek, 3 May 1965, p.41.

The consequence, however, was that both India and Pakistan cut themselves off from the two major powers most interested in preventing armed conflict on the subcontinent, as distinct from the Soviet role of encouraging hostilities, their helping to stop them after they had begun. In the mood of the subcontinent, the Western officials found themselves and their advice not popular.

With the UN discredited and Anglo-American capitals rebuffered, the available channels for restraining diplomacy shifted to the Commonwealth, the Afro-Asian nations and small countries bordering the subcontinent.

On his return, to New Delhi from the Cairo Conference in October 1964, Shastri stopped in Karachi for a brief meeting with Ayub. They discussed Kashmir, Shastri voiced a sincere desire to solve the problem but made no commitment. As a result New Delhi fixed two dates for meetings of their Home Ministers to discuss refugee problems and military tensions in Kashmir. But no effective action was taken.

In these circumstances Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda, announced the political measure on 4th December 1964, which equalised Kashmir with other Indian states under the Indian Constitution. The Central government extended two articles of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir. The extension:

(1) empowered the Indian President to assume the state's administration in the event of a breakdown in its Charter; and (2) provided for the Indian parliament to enact laws for Kashmir during that period. What New Delhi had done was to place Pakistan in an untenable legal position over Kashmir at a moment when its official and popular fears about Indian rearmament had reached a zenith. Two powerful forces merged to press Pakistan into a new and more impressive initiative over Kashmir. On the national level, this move paralleled the situation under which nearly 20 years earlier Jinnah had turned to the policy of direct action. Ayub responded as had Jinnah by political means for force.

The Conflict Over the Rann of Kutch


The conflict in the Rann of Kutch provided the first test of Pakistan's course of direct action. The Rann of Kutch is one of the trivial areas in the world. The Rann was certainly an unimportant area in British days before prospects of oil had any interest.⁶ Since this area was flooded during the monsoon period and sometime after, it formed the natural border between the Princely State of Kutch and British Indian province, Sind. There was no dispute as regards the fact that the State

6 In neighbouring Gujarat, oil has been found and there may still be oil in the Rann, even if it has not proved.

of Kutch went to India because its Prince acceded to her in 1947, but only as to whether the entire Rann belonged to state, as India maintained, or the northern parts of Sind, because this province historically had held some influence in those border areas, as Pakistan argued.

Tensions turned to shooting with the clash that took place in the Rann. It started on a small scale on 8 April 1965 over a disputed border claim that the two countries had been unable to settle during the 1959 negotiations.

History of Kutch Conflict

The Rann of Kutch comprises nearly one-half of Kutch and covers an area of over 7,000 square miles. It is a characteristic feature of geography that at its northern end it has a rather straight border line, because Sind, lying north of it, here rises above the ground level of the Rann in east ^{an} ^{west} ^{line} ^{whereas} ^{to} ^{the} ^{South} ^{and} ^{east}, ^{the} ^{Rann's} ^{borderline} is more diffuse since yearly inundations depend on the strength of the monsoon. Therefore, the northern end of the Rann  is the more natural border changing little from year to year. India argued the fact that the border of Kutch ran along the northern side of the Rann had been confirmed several times by the British when they ruled India; this could be verified from most encyclopaedias⁷ and political maps published by the Survey of India, it was

7 e.g. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1962 edition in its Atlas, vol.24, pp.904-5, describes the Kutch as including 8,424 miles of the Rann of Kutch.

argued.

Already in July 1948, Pakistan raised the matter with India saying that the 'Sind-Kutch' border was still in dispute and must be settled before the fixation of boundary pillars could be considered or taken in hand.⁸ Pakistani maps were now indicating the border as running along the 24th parallel, and Pakistan later argued that since the Rann was a dead sea, the boundary should be drawn through the middle of it i.e., along the 24th parallel. India in its reply of August 1949 denied that there was any dispute which should necessitate a joint Boundary Commission for which a suggestion had been put forward. Pakistan apparently had no urgent need to press this matter and it was taken up in September 1954, after a lapse of five years. In her new note, Pakistan repeated the same arguments and suggested a conference between the two governments or failing that, arbitration. India again insisted that there was no dispute, and it therefore repudiated all Pakistani claims in May 1955.⁹ In 1956 both countries pretended that the other party illegally occupied Chhad Bet (in the northern half of the Rann) and there was a

8 H.R. Gupta, The Kutch Affair (U.C. Kapur and Sons, Delhi, 1969), p.85.

9 Ibid., p.86 says that Pakistan put forward her claims after such a long delay, only when it could dictate to India from a position of strength.

minor shooting episode. A permanent police post was set up there and parties of Rajkot Rangers patrolled the border twice a month.¹⁰ A joint communique by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, also known as the Nehru-Noon Accord, was issued on 12 September 1958. It made no mention of Sind-Kutch sector. There were three areas of dispute -- the first relating to a small area of three villages in the Lahore-Amritsar border, the second concerned Chak Ladheke and the third being Chhad Bet in Kutch.¹¹ In 1959, India committed herself to arbitration as regards all boundaries if they could not be settled by negotiation. At the same time many minor border problems along the East Pakistan/India border were in fact solved. The two countries again studied the Sind-Kutch border question in January 1960 and "both countries agreed to collect further data in respect of the dispute regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and discussions will be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute. Further both governments stipulated in the West Pakistan-India Border Ground Rules in para 9 that "in areas regarding which disputes of title are already pending with the respective Governments for a decision the status quo inclusive of defence

10 Pakistan's Wanton Attack in Kutch (Publications Division), p.9 and Mainstream, 15 May 1965, p.11.

11 Gupta, n.8, p.88.

and security measures will be strictly maintained until such time as the de jure boundary is finalised and the return of territories in adverse possession of the two countries takes place".¹²

For the first time, India now admitted that there was a dispute regarding the boundary and that further discussions would be required. It did not mean, however, that India had acknowledged the argument behind Pakistan's claims to the area north of the 24th Parallel.

Besides her argument that the Rann was a dead sea, Pakistan also referred to several historical facts and old maps which in her opinion confirmed her claim to the area north of the 24th Parallel or at least that the area was in dispute. Outside observers believed that India's claims were basically correct.

In 1965, both countries were moving their forces forward to make good on their border claims and each country naturally blamed the other for initial clash. Ayub quickly recognised the inherent advantages Pakistan enjoyed in the situation and a strong stand fitted in with his general policy of leaning on India.

12 Indian Journal of International Law, vol.I, pp.147-53; The Kutch-Sind Border Question, 1965, pp.130-31.

No further discussions and negotiations between the governments took place till early 1965. Pakistan had thus not pressed the issue on the diplomatic level. Here the parties have again completely different approach towards the solution of the problem. Indian sources ^{say} that Gujarat border police (there were no army contingents there) in January 1965, discovered that Pakistani border forces were using new tracks inside Indian territory in the northern part of the Rann. India protested to Pakistan that these Pakistani intrusions went against the ground rules of 1960 guaranteeing the maintenance of status quo. Despite this, Pakistan set up two posts inside the area which, according to India, was legally in her possession. In March 1965, Minister for External Affairs informed Parliament that Pakistan had disturbed the status quo and both he and the Home Minister affirmed that the government would continue to take effective measures to remove intrusions. In several notes to Pakistan, India proposed meetings between border officials of both sides but they did not materialise. Pakistan, on her side, argued that the Indian forces in January 1965 began to hinder Pakistani border controls from moving between their normal posts, and she also asserted that the established ground rules had been violated. Pakistan further alleged that an Indian build up in the disputed areas continued and that finally, in early April, an

Indian force company strength infiltrated behind Pakistani posts. Since the local Indian commander declined to meet his Pakistani counterpart with a view to avoid armed clashes, fighting broke out.

Thus there is a conflict of evidence but outside observers have mostly believed that Pakistan wanted to exploit the unsettled conditions in India to her advantage. Here, as in Kashmir, only Pakistan could have enough motives to press her claims through military means. Ayub quickly recognised the inherent advantages Pakistan enjoyed in the situation, and a strong stand fitted Ayub's general policy of leaning on India. Pakistani forces outmanoeuvred and outfought Indian troops during the next several weeks in battles involving artillery and tanks as well as infantry. With the onset of summer monsoon India's position would become untenable as its forces would have to retreat many miles to the south while the Pakistani forces need pull back only a short distance to the higher ground in the north.

As the full advantage of Pakistan's position was brought home to Indian officials and public, some people began to talk about hitting Pakistan elsewhere. To be defeated by China was one thing but to be outfought (even on a small scale) by Pakistan was something else, which many Indians were determined

not to accept. There was a fear in the West and throughout the subcontinent that the conflict would go out of hand and might lead to full scale war between the two countries. "It was barely credible in 1962 that two great countries should be at the brink of full scale war, as China and India were, over an almost inaccessible stretch of barren and snowbound track. It is no more credible today that India and Pakistan should fight over a piece of barren land that spends half its life under water, yet it has happened."¹³

The more cautious Alastair Lamb only states that the real nature of the Rann of Kutch crises is still not clear.¹⁴

When Pakistan started her attack on 9 April 1965 (both parties agree on this fact), northern part of the Rann was only defended by Gujarat police forces, and according to India her army only moved in when police force had been overwhelmed by the much larger Pakistani military force. There were further violent clashes throughout the month of April but it never became a real war, both parties seeming to agree that there was no point in escalating hostilities beyond what had already

13 Economist, 1 May 1965, pp.502-3.

14 Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir (London, 1966), p.116. Sunday Times on 2 May 1965 had a long article, the conclusion of which is as follows: "This whole affair has flowered out of an accidental local border patrol clash, partly spontaneous and partly because certain members of the Indian Government have decided to make a maximum song and dance".

happened. Casualties were apparently light. D.R. Mankekar gave the number of Indians dead and wounded as 93, with an estimated 350 casualties for Pakistan.¹⁵

Politically, there was a quick escalation. The Indian Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda on 10 April 1965, told Parliament that the people must rise as one man and the Education Minister, M.C. Chagla, on 16 April 1965 said that "there were people and countries who only understood the language of force, strength and toughness. Pakistan was one of them".¹⁶ Pakistan's President, on the other hand, warned India of grave consequences in a speech at Dacca on 26 April 1965, if it "failed to understand the language of reason and continues to pursue a policy of browbeating its neighbours".¹⁷ Ayub also gave an outline of the background of the conflict in which he incorrectly stated, "We are now told for the first time that this is not a disputed territory at all. It is amazing how some people can deny the facts of history with impunity."¹⁸ The Pakistani President in the same speech referred to a statement by Shastri on 28 April in which the Prime Minister had said that he had asked the army to work out its own

15 D.R. Mankekar, Twenty Two Fateful Days - Pakistan Cut to Size (Manaktalas, Bombay, 1966), p.33.

16 As quoted in Blinkenberg Lars, "India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts", Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut 1972, Munksgaard, p.247.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p.248.

strategy and deploy its force as it deemed necessary. Ayub Khan asked: "Does India realise that this will mean a general and total war between India and Pakistan with all its unpredictable consequences?"¹⁹

The heaviest Pakistani attack came on 24 April at a place called Point 84, 30 miles east of Kanjarkot, and 6 miles south of the border. The Pakistanis for the first time used tanks and 100 pound guns in support.

Sardar Post, 3 miles south-west of Kanjarkot, Vigokot south-east of Kanjarkot and Bier Bet 45 miles south east of Kanjarkot were the 3 points simultaneously attacked by Pakistani forces.

Widespread Indian indignation left Shastri with little room for manoeuvre. The few voices urging caution such as the Times of India and Hindustan Times were for a time drowned out by more chauvinistic clamour. At the outset, Shastri had told Parliament that India would not "allow" Pakistan to retain the positions it had won, and that if there were ceasefire talks India would insist on Pakistani withdrawal as its first order of business. Pakistan always sensitive to what it felt was India's bullying tendency, rejected talks under such

19 Ibid.

conditions. It suggested that both sides pull back from the disputed area. New Delhi would have no part of that proposal, it would be an admission that there was a border dispute and India insisted that the location of the border was clear and no dispute existed. But the Indian army was careful not to send units into areas where they could have been cut off and destroyed, and the absence of any dramatic Indian defeats kept public opinion from demanding even more vigorous and dangerous measures.

The predictability of Peking's support for Pakistan's position did not temper an irate Indian reaction. Many Indians feared that concerted Chinese and Pakistani moves were likely since the Rann of Kutch fighting followed so closely upon Ayub's visit to Peking and visits by Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Pakistan. Equally worrisome was Moscow's expressed hope that India and Pakistan would exercise restraint and settle the dispute in a manner safeguarding the interests of both sides. The Soviet position not only seemed to equate the two countries -- something India always resented when done by the West -- but raised doubts about India's ability to retain the Soviet support on Kashmir.

The U.S. could not escape India's criticism during this period. As soon as fighting began charges were made that Pakistani forces were using American equipment, of which India

soon claimed to have photographic evidence. Some Western observers who managed to get close to the fighting apparently agreed. Opposition leaders cited the U.S. assurances that Pakistan would not use the arms supplied by America against India and now the U.S. apparently was unwillingly even, to reprimand Pakistan immediately and publicly, much less prevent or take positive steps to halt the Pakistani action. India was caught in the middle; it obviously wanted the U.S. to reprimand or restrain Pakistan, but saw much danger and little value in its critics' suggestions that denounced the U.S. as an enemy.

India's anger over Pakistan's use of American arms and the US unwillingness to restrain Pakistan came just after the postponement of Shastri's visit to Washington and his domestic opponents argued that this showed how little stature and influence he had in the U.S. The whole affair brought to surface once again the underlying Indian annoyance at being equated with Pakistan.

Even though American inaction was damaging to relations with India, Washington believed there were strong reasons for hesitation. First of all, it was far from clear who was to be blamed for the fighting. Second, Washington wanted clear evidence that Pakistani forces were using the US supplied equip-

ment before taking a stand on the issue. More important was that the U.S. wanted to avoid choosing between India and Pakistan in view of its extensive interests in each country. The US Administration was also running into trouble with Congress. Many members were irritated that the two recipients of US military aid were now fighting each other. The US in the meantime postponed delivery of key items to Pakistan. Finally, the administration did not want to disrupt the efforts then underway for ceasefire talks.

Shortly after the fighting began, Britain had called for ceasefire with restoration of the positions occupied by the two countries on 1 January 1965. Initially both countries took a tough public position on the procedural as well as substantive issues in dispute. India had agreed to a ceasefire at an early date, well aware that she had no means of continuing a fight for long in that area. The difficult position and problem was to establish a status quo since disagreement prevailed as regards the positions before the armed conflict. Negotiations were held between London, New Delhi and Karachi, with Washington content to let Prime Minister Wilson play the leading role.

The American position was made clear by Secretary of State Dean Rusk when he replied to a question asked at a news

conference on May 26, 1965, "We, of course, fully support the efforts made by the British Government. It is in touch with both sides to try to arrange a ceasefire and a resumption of political discussions of differences that divide these two countries of the sub-continent. We are in touch with both the Governments frequently on this matter, and we would hope very much that these discussions could come to a good conclusion".²⁰

As weeks passed with no agreement, Indian troops were sent to the border in Punjab, putting additional pressure on Pakistan to agree to a settlement. This complicated negotiations for Pakistan wanted the Indian troops pulled back as part of the agreement. It also wanted to link settlement of Kutch dispute with a Kashmir settlement something India adamantly opposed. It was not until 30 June, before both countries, agreed on terms of a ceasefire, a mutual withdrawal of forces, direct negotiations to settle the dispute, and arbitration in the event direct negotiations were not fruitful.

Terms of the Ceasefire Agreement

The agreement was signed on 30 June 1965 between India and Pakistan, who thanked Britain formally for its mediation.

20 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, Department of State Publication 8372 (Released April 1968). Document IX-61, p.795.

The ceasefire came into force on 1 July 1965. The withdrawal of troops from the Rann was completed on 8th July.

The agreement reached contained the following elements: Both governments accepted an immediate ceasefire and the restoration of status quo as on 1 January 1965, in the conference that this would contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border. The agreement allowed India to reoccupy certain posts which she had been compelled to abandon (at Chhad Bet) but also permitted Pakistan to continue patrolling in the same rather limited border and which had been really in dispute. Both governments would send officials to discuss practical problems in connection with the re-establishment of the old status quo and later ministers would meet to try to reach a final settlement. In the event of no agreement between the ministers on the determination of the border, the two governments should have recourse to a Tribunal composed of 3 persons, none of whom would be nationals of either India or Pakistan. Each government should nominate one member, and failing an agreement on the third, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would be requested to nominate a Chairman. The Tribunal should determine the border in the light of respective claims and evidence produced and its decision should be final and binding.

The agreement was welcomed in both countries. In Pakistan with an emphasis on the prospect of arbitration which, it was found constituted a model for the manner in which all Indo-Pakistan disputes could be settled, as Ayub Khan underlined in his statement of 30 June 1965. In India, the leading Congress politicians, and the majority of the press commended the agreement, whereas the nationalist parties went against it, finding it derogatory to the honour of the country.

It is appropriate here to give a brief account of the final solution to the Rann of Kutch conflict.

India and Pakistan could not agree ~~on~~ bilateral settlement through negotiations (the meeting of the two ministers to be held on 20 August 1965 was cancelled because of the renewed open conflict in Kashmir) or as regards the nomination of chairman. The persons chosen to the tribunal were an Iranian diplomat (Pakistan's choice), a Yugoslav judge (India's choice) and finally a Swedish chairman - Gunnar Lagengren, a judge. After a prolonged and careful study of the large amount of material put forward by the parties, the tribunal gave an award on 19 February 1968 on the following lines: "India's claim was upheld, except in respect of those sectors where a continuous and for the region intensive Sind activity, meeting with no effective opposition from the Kutch

side, had been established. Pakistan's main claim was thus rejected, but her claim to those areas around which most of the fighting had taken place, was upheld. In a minority, the Yugoslav member supported India's claim, the Iranian member who originally had supported Pakistan's main claim now endorsed the judgement of the chairman.

Pakistan accepted the award with satisfaction and this was also the case with India, where leading press articles underlined that Pakistan got only 300 sq.miles out of 3,500 sq.miles claimed. The boundary line was finally demarcated.²¹

THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, 1965

As with the case regarding the first Kashmir war, none of the parties accepted responsibility for commencing the armed conflict in 1965. Both India and Pakistan have asserted that the opponent started hostilities and both have suggested the enemy's aim of expansion as sufficient explanation for the renewed conflict. Pakistan has added that the real background was a resistance movement (among the Kashmiris) against the alien and unpopular government which they had not freely chosen.

21 The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award,
pp.3-155.

What did Ayub gain from the Kutch adventure?²² He wanted to test his theory that Pakistan's quality of armed forces could make up for India's quantity and beat the latter. At the end Ayub thought that he had proved his theory.

The outcome of the Rann of Kutch episode left Pakistan dangerously overconfident and India dangerously frustrated. Public pressures within India to take a stronger line with Pakistan were mounting and a growing body of opinion felt it would be wrong to go to any great lengths to avoid a conflict.

After seventeen years of pent-up hatred, India and Pakistan were again locked in combat over Kashmir. But this time, the fighting did not stop there, it spread swiftly from the valley of Kashmir to the dusty plains of the Punjab and reached across the subcontinent from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea. Asia, it became evident, had spawned another full blown war.

Before the agreement on Kutch was reached, Sheikh Abdullah, since the death of Nehru had reverted to the political erraticism, which New Delhi had previously found unacceptable. In February 1965 he had been allowed to go abroad in order, among other things, to visit Mecca and in Algiers, he had a meeting on

22 Mankekar, n.15, p.52.

30 March 1965, with the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. He received an invitation to visit Peking and was assured on his Kashmir policy. This combined with his frequent visits to Pakistan embassies was regarded as outrageous by many in India. On his return, he was arrested in May 1965 and put under house arrest in South India. This created a stir in Kashmir; demonstrations were held; police firing took place and the latent unsettled conditions which had prevailed since the theft of the holy relic, now in many places turned into open conflict between the population of the Valley and the authorities.

Infiltrators in Kashmir

The Kashmir issue had become an active issue during Ayub's campaign for re-election early in 1965 and he was under some pressure to react in India's moves to merge Kashmir more tightly to India. Convinced that his policy of "leaning on India" was working, Ayub made the fateful decision to play for larger stakes by sending Pakistani trained guerrillas into Kashmir.

The move may have seemed desirable to Ayub Khan and his colleagues on several grounds: (1) Perhaps the guerrillas could trigger a large scale uprising and greatly weaken if not completely undermine Indian control of Kashmir. If this happened,

India would be forced to negotiate a settlement. In any case, disruption in Kashmir would bring the issue to world attention and concern whereas leaving quiescent would make world's acceptance of India's control more likely. (2) The time also seemed appropriate to execute such a strategy over the long term, India's defense build-up would leave Pakistan in a weaker position on the subcontinent, and few Pakistanis thought India could deal fairly from a position of strength. Indeed, as India's indigenous defense production capability grew and as it acquired the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, New Delhi would be even less susceptible to the influence of the world community. (3) Moreover, Indian leadership looked weak and uncertain to Pakistanis. Ayub had been an admirer of Nehru, but he recognised him as a leader of stature, it is unlikely that he regarded the diminutive Shastri as a dangerous opponent. Ayub Khan believed that if India did respond militarily, Pakistan could at least defend itself -- and this too might bring outside powers into the dispute. (4) Finally he probably calculated that Indian fear of China would deter it from a vigorous move against Pakistan.²³

On the night of 5 August 1965, several thousand Pakistani and Azad Kashmir freedom fighters crossed the Ceasefire Line and headed for Srinagar with orders to foment a rebellion against

23 Barnds, n.3, p.201.

India among the Moslem population.²⁴ The group had seemed innocent enough as the Indian police patrol approached them. They were described thus: "Clad in traditional skullcaps and flowing grey brown woollen ~~pones~~ ~~pones~~, the herdsmen stared blankly until the police drew near enough to ask them a question: "Had they seen anyone suspicious in the vicinity? In reply one of the herdsmen whipped a stengun from under his voluminous robe, within seconds 4 Indians lay dead".²⁵

With this clandestine movement began a shortlived confrontation between India and Pakistan which neither could afford to sustain and which if carried to its ultimate conclusion would lead to the destruction of both India and Pakistan and possibly lead to wider confrontation.

Though many guerrillas were picked up by the Indian police or troops in the mountains but others reached Kashmir and even Srinagar. Some managed to blow up bridges and buildings, and the damage was great. The guerrillas had little success in stirring up active opposition to Indian rule: traditional Kashmiri timidity and stern Indian measures against infiltrators and their sympathisers -- whether real -- or suspected worked against the guerrillas.

24 "War Over Kashmir", Newsweek, 20 September 1965, p.33.

25 "Violence in the Vale", Time, 20 August 1965, p.31.

The infiltrators had eight commands with names like Gibraltar, Ghaznani and Salahuddin, each of eight companies with 110 men trained in guerrilla warfare and commanded by regular army officers. Their red letter day was 9 August, as Abdullah was arrested 12 years earlier on this day. The day previous was to be a hartal when a procession in the memory of Pir Dastagir was to be taken out in Srinagar. Pakistani infiltrators had planned to mingle with this procession and later capture the radio station and airfield. They were then to form a new government.

When provoked by Pakistani infiltrators, who attempted to cut the strategic road between Sri Nagar and Leh, the Indian forces crossed the Ceasefire Line in Kargil area on 16 August and captured 3 Pakistani posts. There had been similar clashes in this area in May, when the Indians had crossed the Ceasefire Line and relieved serious pressure on a vital road, a military objective of the undoubted validity. Politically, the Kargil episode was also significant. News of the attack electrified India and raised the country's spirits.

Military pressures along the Ceasefire Line had intensified with both sides ready for action. New Delhi reported a total of 339 incidents. In mid-June Gen. R.H. Nimmo, Chief of

UNMOGIP reported an aggregate of 2,231 complaints from both sides.²⁶

Impartial eye witnesses who were in Srinagar during the period when the infiltrators had penetrated into Kashmir confirmed Shastri's contention that "the whole world knows there was no revolt". General J.N. Chaudhary, the Army Chief of Staff during that period in his book Arms, Aims and Aspects that the guerrilla movement had failed in the valley because none of the infiltrators were Kashmiris. This broke the first principle for guerrillas.

The failure of the "revolt" marked the end of first phase of the conflict, but the guerrilla threat continued throughout the war. Shastri informed the nation on 3 September that "Some bands of raiders are however still attempting to come in with full backing of the Pakistan army".

The Pakistani Press covered the Srinagar uprising in detail -- and reported among other things the establishment of the Revolutionary Council of Patriots as the new Government which issued a proclamation appealing for world support for, "this freedom movement and announced the abrogation of all alleged treaties and agreement between Imperialist Government

26 Report by UN Secretary General U-Thant to Security Council, 3 September 1965.

of India and Kashmir".²⁷ Shastri said:

On one hand Pakistan sought to deny its complicity and, on the other, she has put herself forward as the Chief spokesman for the infiltrators. The world will recall that Pakistan created the same situation in 1947 and then also she had initially pleaded innocence. Later she had admitted that her own regular forces were involved in the fighting. The parallel between the two conflicts was remarkable.²⁸

Pakistan maintained that until 1 September only freedom fighters were involved in the struggle and this remained the official position.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare as indirectly confirmed by the Pakistani press clearly conformed to a type of communist patented national liberation war. The Indians were fully convinced on this point. Shastri said that the techniques and methods were of Chinese pattern and claimed that the Chinese officers located in Azad Kashmir were instructing the Pakistanis.

On 19 August, a large force of Pakistani artillery moved closer to the Ceasefire Line and began shelling villages and Indian troop concentrations ~~in~~ the Tithwal sector, on the north western bulge of the line, and captured two strategic

27 Brines Russell, "The Indo-Pakistani Conflict", Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p.310.

28 Ibid (as quoted).

Pakistani positions, including the important peak Pir Saheba. Eventually the Indians consolidated points dominating a key road in Azad Kashmir enabling them to seal off the main invasion route to Kargil and to Gurais another important northern gateway. Other Indian units on 25 August advanced across the line in Uri Sector, on the west central front. They captured a number of strategic Pakistani mountain positions and finally took the important 3,600 foot Haji Pir Pass, 5 miles on the Pakistani side of the line. The pass was taken from the rear against light opposition by an outflanking movement across steep mountains. A link up of these forces with another Indian column from the south on 10 September enabled the Indians to cut off a bulge of some 150 square miles which had been left protruding into Indian Kashmir when the Ceasefire Line was accepted. The bulge provided the main springboard for infiltrators bound for the Srinagar area. Indian military officials long resented the loss of Haji Pir pass through 1949 armistice and were anxious to retain it. The captured positions were eventually evacuated.

Pakistani armoured column crossed the Ceasefire Line on 1 September, far to the south in the Bhimbar Chhamb area of south western front. Pakistani forces after heavy preparatory artillery fire and three infantry probing attacks drove into

Indian territory with a column of seventy tanks and two brigades of between 3,000 and 4,000 infantry troops. Rather, than limit the penetration to a tactical crossing to offset the Indian thrust to the north, however the column continued to advance eastward until it took Akhnoor, 20 miles inside India where a key bridge spans the Chenab river. This bridge is vital to communications along the main supply road serving Indian forces in the northwest. Pakistan gave the operation the code name, "Operation Grand Slam".

The Pakistani attack clearly marked the first major escalation of the conflict, a shift from limited infantry action across the Ceasefire line to tank operations across new and more vulnerable terrain.

Gulzar Ahmed, a Pakistani writer affirms "India was much less prepared for an offensive in Chhamb and Jorian (than in Kashmir itself). They may have felt that Pakistan could take the offensive in this sector, and that may be the reason for the unusually strong defences in this sector."²⁹ But when it happened it came like a bolt from the blue and completely put the Indians off-balance -- they saw its implications rather belatedly, not until Akhnoor was really threatened.³⁰

29 This emphasis of India's strong defensive tactics/position does not seem to confirm Brines version of the Indian plan to annihilate India. B.M. Kaul in Confrontation with Pakistan affirms that "we did not anticipate an attack there", p.31.
Vikas Publications, New Delhi 1970.

30 Gulzar Ahmad, Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge, p.76.

Pakistan used its huge Patton tanks in large numbers in this sector, whereas India had only a limited number of smaller tanks there.³¹ India had always been fearing an onslaught of these heavy tanks, which had more sophisticated equipment than the Indian tanks and President Ayub Khan had openly taunted Shastri with the boast that his tanks could reach New Delhi along the grand Trunk Road in a matter of hours. For a short term war, Pakistan had both better weapons and no worries about a second front.

On 5 September, the Pakistanis captured the village of Jaurian which lies 14 miles east of ceasefire line and five miles north of the Pakistan-Jammu border. It is linked by road to Akhnoor, and soon the head of the armoured column was six miles from the strategic bulge city. The column eventually reached a point four miles distant. The drive was slowed by the small Munarvarwali river and by dilatory tactics. The Indians quickly established new reinforced defensive positions.

India felt compelled to call in her airforce to assist the army fighting against heavy odds in Chhamb-Akhnoor sector, and thereby added a new dimension to the conflict according to

31 B.M. Kaul, n.22. "Pak attacked with 80 tanks whereas India had only 15 there", p.31.

G.W. Chaudhary.³² Pakistan consequently also put her airforce in action, but the fighting in the air never became an essential element of the war and serious bombing of civil targets never took place.

Meanwhile New Delhi had been stirred by a parallel development. The Pakistani Commander-in-Chief General Mohammad Musa on 5 September sent his troops with the message: "You have got your teeth into him. Bite deeper and deeper, until he is destroyed. And destroy him you will God willing".³³ Three days earlier Pakistan had rejected U Thant's appeal for peace.

On 4 September, China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a brief stop in Karachi into six hour conference with Bhutto. The Chinese official gave oblique support but no concrete reassurance to Pakistan in a statement backing the "just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provocation". Finally, the Indian military leaders were aroused by an attack on 5 September, by a single Pakistani F-86 Sabrejet, on an anti-aircraft installation near Amritsar.

Says Mankekar, "This sequence of events was enough to make up New Delhi's mind. The Army Headquarter in New Delhi now decided that serious diversionary moves directed at Pakistani

32 G.W. Chaudhary, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-66 (London, 1968), p.295.

33 Brines, op.cit., p.326.

territory itself was the only remedy for the dangerous military situation developing around Akhnoor".³⁴ One logical response was a thrust into Pakistan Punjab, where Pakistan would be forced to consolidate its forces to defend vital objectives. This was the counter attack that Nehru and Shastri had warned Rawalpindi to expect as a result of unacceptable pressure on Kashmir.

What was the real aim of the violent Indian attack in the Punjab? In Pakistan, an extreme thesis was put forward that India wanted a complete victory over and annihilation of Pakistan. All evidence, seems to indicate a more limited Indian objective: retaliation against fierce onslaught of 1 September in a dangerous area to relieve the pressure there. India had always maintained that any attack on Kashmir would be considered an attack on India. Nehru had declared this on various occasions and it was therefore surprising if general plans to invade Pakistan in a vulnerable area had been worked out long before.

If India's objective was only to relieve Akhnoor as alleged, which also most outside observers have believed, it was soon gained.

34 Mankekar D.R., "Twenty Two Fateful Days", Mankatadas, Bombay, 1966.

The Indians launched a major attack on 6 September, across international border towards Lahore, lying 15 miles from India. A second offensive began the next day against Sialkot, 50 miles to the north. In the effort to reduce pressure against Akhnoor, Sialkot was militarily the vital target. The diversionary device worked and Pakistan withdrew the bulk of her armoured strength from Akhnoor sector to meet the new challenge.

The Lahore offensive was a three pronged attack across the 30 mile front. The northern column drove towards Lahore along the Grand Trunk Road across the Wagah border crossing southern force struck from the Khem Karan in India towards Kasur in Pakistan. Roughly in the centre, a third column advanced from the Indian village of Khalra on the north westward axis towards the fortified Pakistan village of Burki. The immediate military objective according to Indians was to establish control over the east bank of a long irrigation canal which also serves as a defensive moat for Lahore. This feature is known both as Bambansala -- Ravi Bedian and the Ichhogil Canal.

This canal was built in the period from 1957-65 and is 140 feet wide and 15 feet deep and deliberately constructed as a major defence moat and anti-tank obstacle facing the open Indian border, three miles at its closest and nine miles

at its widest. Both the banks of the canal bristle with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun emplacements.

The Indian action was severely criticised in many parts of the world and India was accused of aggression across an international border. The Security Council a couple of days earlier had unanimously adopted a resolution demanding a ceasefire and return to 1949 ceasefire line. The Indian action appeared to demonstrate blunt defiance of the international organisation.

The Indian Infantry Division, heading for Ichhogil Canal, along the Khalri-Burki-Lahore axis, overnight flexed its muscles and prepared the ground for the main operation by eliminating two enemy strong points, Theh Sarja Marja and Rakh Hardit Singh. The main attack began on 6 September.

Pakistan responded to the assault with predictable vigour. Ayub Khan announced in a nationwide broadcast, "we are at war adding that he was invoking the self-defence provisions of the UN Charter. Our soldiers have gone forward to repel the enemy and the Pakistani people will not rest until India's guns are silenced for ever". He again insisted, "the Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan homeland of our own. All their

military preparations during the past 18 years have been against us. They exploited the Chinese bogey to secure massive arms assistance from some of our friends in the west who never understood the mind of the Indian rulers, and permitted themselves to be taken in by Indians profession that once they fully armed they would fight these Chinese. We always knew these arms would be raised against us. Time has proved this".³⁵

The war soon spread over a front described as 1,200 miles long and even longer, if the extreme flank areas of periodic confrontation were included. The main fighting, however, remained in the Punjab. On 8 September, India began to advance westward in the desert along the border between Pakistani Sind and Rajasthan, some 400 miles southwest of the central Combat Area. General Chaudhari explained that this was a diversionary thrust.

On the Lahore front, Indian forces achieved initial tactical gain when they moved forward at 5.30 a.m. on 6 September. The Pakistanis had deployed their Tenth Division in defensive positions forward of the city only a few hours before the attack and there was no Pakistani armour east of BRB canal. The Indian offensive involved three armoured supported divisions but eventually it involved five divisions.

35 New York Times, 7 September 1965.

Initially the assault proceeded with relative speed. By nightfall the Centre column had captured two key villages. Infantry units of the northern columns proceeding along the G.T. Road, reached the outskirts of Lahore and were driven back with heavy opposition. Thereafter, the campaign in this sector settled down to hard and continuous fighting for strategic waterways, bridges and fortified villages. Combat was continual from D-day until the ceasefire on 23 September swirling from the border to the canal and involving all types of border weapons.

On 7 September in the morning, the Indian forces struck in the direction of Burki. On 9 September the attack was mounted on the well defended Burki village situated on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal. Phase one of the Burki operation comprised the capture of Burki village by one battalion, and phase two aimed at securing lodgement by another battalion on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal.

In one of the key battles, Indian forces after a full day's battle captured the village of Burki on 10 September. The battle of Burki began at 8 p.m., both sides used tanks, even though it was night time. In addition, the Pakistanis put across one of the heaviest artillery barrages ever experienced by an artillery force. They fired 120 mm mortars,

8 inch guns, 105 and 150 mm guns as well as radar equipped super-heavy guns. The control and command over this village gave the Indians command of a considerable stretch of Icchogil canal in the Central area, although they remained under Pakistani artillery fire. This position was some 12 miles from the airport, so the Indians reported with some pride that the American authorities asked for their cooperation in suspending fire while US residents of the Pakistani city were evacuated by air.

In a determined counter offensive that opened on 7 September, the Pakistanis put in their Pattons, Chaffes and Shermans, and their powerful American gifted artillery thundered. The counter offensive rose in intensity on 8, 9 and 10 September and then tapered off to spend itself out by 11 September. On 12 September, the Indians counter attacked. The Indian military played havoc with the enemy positions.

A second major battle was waged simultaneously for Dogai village and lasted six hours. The village, 7 miles inside Pakistan, west of Amritsar along the G.T. road was a part of the outer defenses of Lahore, 8 miles distant Dogai changed hands at least three times, in some of the fiercest fighting of this campaign before the Indians captured it a few hours in advance of the ceasefire.

Pakistan launched its major counter thrust on Indian left flank to the south. The Indian column, advancing from Ferozepur through Khem Karan towards Pakistani Kasur, took its initial objectives easily.

The Pakistanis sought unsuccessfully to implement an operational plan to trap Indian forces -- the plan which the Indians later obtained. It called for an armoured conquest of a substantial segment of the territory between the border and the Beas River extending North West from the Khem Karan sector to the G.T. Road. At the road, the Beas with its vital bridge lies 27 miles east of Amritsar. One armoured column was to capture Amritsar. A second column was to take this position after a thrust through a parallel with the river. The western attacking column was to capture Amritsar, and least to put it out of action. A third column in the centre was ordered to reach G.T. Road. If successful, the operation would have cut off Indian forces between the Beas and border, exposing them to piecemeal destruction.

Indian armour and infantry, by the Indian accounts, fell back from the Khem Karan sector to draw the Pakistanis into a huge horseshoe shaped trap near the village of Assal Uttar, a short distance away. On 10 September, the Pakistanis threw the main force of their armoured division, with supporting

infantry, into vigorous outflanking efforts to get behind Indian positions. The manoeuvrability of the armour was hampered by irrigation ditches and flooded areas. The principal tanks were then diverted into fields of sugarcane, left standing some 9 feet high, behind which a force of Indian centurions couched in ambush.

The Indians profitably used the Canadian designed 76mm high velocity tank guns, the tanks were supported by jeep mounted 106 mm recoilless rifles. Two Pakistani outflanking attempts were blocked on this general pattern by Indian tanks, artillery, aircraft and infantry. The Pakistanis fell back to Khem Karan where they dug in and at the ceasefire held a strip of Indian territory 3 miles deep and 10 miles long. There is no doubt that the Indian's was a significant victory.

The Wagah sector perhaps saw the fiercest fighting of the entire Lahore front. The Indian Division in this sector inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Thirty-three per cent of the total number of prisoners on the entire front were captured by this division. It also captured 21 tanks, one squadron of which it put to use.

The battle for Sialkot, 50 miles north-east of Lahore, was developing as the biggest tank engagement since World War II.

The war reached its climax here and Patton met its Waterloo. The Indians attacked on 7 September. Sialkot was heavily defended, with powerful artillery guarding the city all-round -- three field regiments (18 guns each): one medium gun regiment, one heavy mortar regiment and one 155 heavy battery. The range of 155 gun being 22,000 yards. In addition, 3 infantry brigades manned the city's defences, and the villages at the approaches to Sialkot bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun emplacements.

During a fifteen day battle with relatively continuous armoured action, the Indians say about 400 tanks were involved, while Ayub Khan placed the figure around 600. Impartial sources during the engagement say that there was no doubt of its ferocity and extensiveness. Ayub Khan maintained that "as the enemy withdrew from Lahore sector, he hastened to build up an offensive in direction of Sialkot. It is here that the enemy exhausted all his offensive power".³⁶

General Chaudhary daringly manoeuvred his army to mount the Sialkot offensive. He left one force in the Lahore Sector and sent the other mainly the newest equipment into action

36 Broadcast Speech, 22 September 1965, as quoted in Brines, op.cit., p.340.

around Sialkot. This required the movement of some 3,000 vehicles along a single road and into the enemy camp (terrain) under the potential aerial threat of considerable proportion. The gamble was too fold: (1) the forces defending the road to Delhi would not be disproportionately weakened; and (2) that the movement towards Sialkot could be accomplished without devastating loss to enemy action. The gamble succeeded.

Major fighting occurred along the main line of Indian advance, on a southward axis from the Indian village of Samba, midway between Jammu and Pathankot. Heavy tank and infantry battles were fought around Pakistani villages of Phillora and Chawinda, south east of Sialkot. The main objective was the Lahore-Sialkot railroad, which runs through Chawinda. The action around Phillora was a tank to tank conflict with little air participation, involving India's First Armoured Division and elements of Pakistan's newly formed Sixth Armoured Division. Indian forces captured Phillora on 12 September. A third major battle was fought between 14 and 17 September. On 15 September, the Indians cut the railroad at Chhawinda but the Pakistanis fought back to secure and maintain control over part of the station. At the ceasefire the opposing sides held positions only 30 yards apart at some points along the railroad track.

When the fighting ended, the Indians claimed possession of 180 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Sialkot sector, most of it lying between the border and the principal battle zone of Phillora. Pakistan agreed generally with the depth claimed by India.

The Role of the United States

India continued to be favourably inclined towards the United States for her military and economic aid. But this did not last long. In the summer of 1965 Pakistan committed aggression in Kutch in which US arms were employed. This proved true the fears which India entertained since the conclusion of the military aid pact between Pakistan and the United States. India protested to the USA and sent photographs of the equipment to the State Department. The U.S. protested to Pakistan against the use of US arms in violation of the mutual defence agreement but was unable to prevent the fighting. Although the U.S. fully supported the efforts to reach ceasefire between the two countries it conveyed to both its anxiety to avoid disputes like this which might lead to more serious trouble. Peaceful negotiations were the only answer to the problems like this.³⁷ The United States, however, did not show any guts in dealing with its CENTO and SEATO ally.

37 President Johnson's statement in the Department of State Bulletin, vol.LIII, no.1369, 20 September 1965. He said "We are naturally greatly concerned over any flare up involving India and Pakistan. Our long standing and consistent stance has been that Kashmir issue must and should be solved by peaceful means".

Indeed the State Department was more anxious that India should emulate Pakistan and seize some Pakistani territory to hold it as "hostage" for the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan than to tell Pakistan it should withdraw from the illegally occupied territory.³⁸

Not long after this incident, a critical point was reached among the 3 countries -- India, Pakistan and U.S. -- during the undeclared war of 1965. The Indian contention was that the responsibility for the twin Pakistani aggression of 1965 rests wholly on the USA. The U.S. cannot simply say that it had been misled by Pakistan's false talk. It was only too prone to be misled. Referring to President Eisenhower's assurance in March 1954 that the U.S. would take action if anyone misused American arms, Prime Minister Nehru had made a blunt statement which was not heeded, "I have no doubt the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done about it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six-and-a-half years ago and thus far the United States has not only not condemned it, but we have been asked not to press it in the interest of peace. Aggression may well follow in

38 As quoted in Sultan, Tanvir, "Indo-US Relations", Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi 1982, p.92. Also see Indian Express, May 1, 1965.

spite of the best intentions of the President and then a long argument will ensure on what exactly is aggression".³⁹ But the U.S. must have been eager to get facility of certain air and espionage bases in the northern part of West Pakistan which were at that time i.e. before the development of the most modern missiles and satellites -- useful to its concept of security. That was the temptation and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that if the U.S. had not provided Pakistan with a large arsenal of arms, she would not have attempted this adventure. This was once again stated by Shastri during the Kutch crisis.

Starting from this premise it may well be suspected that the U.S. might have encouraged the Kutch crisis as a diversionary move to divert the focus of world opinion from the Vietnam crisis. Instead of making a gain in terms of political advantage, the U.S. prestige in India had been badly mauled as a result of the Kutch crisis. Washington was caught in a quandary of its making: the arms belong to the U.S.; actually given to Pakistan as a military ally, and it found itself unable to prevent the use of arms against India.

39 Ibid., p.93.

Encouraged by his success in the Kutch and US policy of appeasement, Pakistan was emboldened in its view that aggression pays. Therefore, in August 1965, it embarked on the course of wrenching Kashmir from India by force. An unspecified number of infiltrators crossed into Kashmir from the Pakistani side, with the hope of igniting revolt among the people of Kashmir. But their calculations went wrong and many infiltrators were rounded up. In the beginning Pakistan continued to deny its complicity with the infiltrators but reports of impartial sources, especially General R.H. Nimmo of UNMOGIP confirmed that infiltrators had come into India from Azad Kashmir. India's repeated warnings to Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators fell on deaf ears. Left with no other alternative, she (India) crossed the ceasefire line and occupied three posts in Kargil to defend her supply routes. Pakistan then declared open hostilities towards India. The war was finally brought to an end due to efforts of the UN Secretary-General, U Thant and the willing co-operation of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The war left the Indians completely disillusioned with the United States. A general feeling prevalent among Indians was that the U.S. was responsible for the war. Had the U.S. not supplied arms to Pakistan this war would never have taken place. Even some Americans held their Government responsible

for the conflict. Speaking in the Senate Committee on Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966, Senator Frank Church remarked:

The arms we supplied under this policy caused, and I underlie that word, the war last autumn between India and Pakistan -- But if we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought one thing we wanted all to avoid, viz., a military solution. That beyond, the slightest possibility of doubt was the price of Dulles policy. And of the policy of his disciples continuing it.⁴⁰

The Indian Ambassador in Washington, B.K. Nehru, lodged a strong protest with Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, on 3 September 1965 against the use of U.S. equipment including Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre jets and F-104 supersonic fighters, by Pakistan in Kashmir and pointed towards the assurances given to India by Eisenhower. Sardar Swaran Singh observed in Lok Sabha on 20 September 1965 that the US Government had more or less confessed its inability to do anything about its assurance by stopping military and economic aid to both countries.⁴¹

America did not intervene in this armed conflict for over three weeks. The U.S. did not vote against India in the

40 The Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966, speech in the Senate by Church on India-Pakistan debate, Congressional Records, Proceedings and Debates, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, vol.112, Part 13, July 27, 1966, p.1734.

41 Chakravarty, B.N., "India Speaks to America", New York, Orient Longmans, 1966, pp.139-40.

United Nations, nor did it apportion blame to Pakistan; it preferred to remain quiet. The impact of long drawn proceedings at UN was that of wasting time over investigation as to who started the conflict, it was necessary and desirable to achieve a ceasefire. The UN Secretary General's appeal for a ceasefire evoked a warm response from the U.S. and U.K. The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a cable to India appealing for an immediate ceasefire. The US delegation to the UN asserted that the immediate task was the cessation of the conflict. It was only when the two countries had almost exhausted and paralysed their military potential that the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson stopped both the arms and economic aid to the two countries.⁴² The statement made by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, US Representative to the UN Security Council on 17 September 1965 stated:

The US enjoys and hopes to continue to enjoy friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. I would like to emphasise that we have suspended arms shipments to both countries since we want in support of the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire, to help bring about an end to this conflict and not to escalate it. It is the sense of the Security Council's resolutions that there be a prompt end and not an intensification of hostilities.⁴³

42 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1965.

43 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, op.cit., Document IX-69, pp.804-805.

Although the U.S. did not play any active role in bringing the two belligerents to the conference table, it was keenly desirous of a ceasefire and peace in the sub-continent. The United States was partly responsible for the agreement between India and Pakistan. Initially Pakistan had cold shouldered the Soviet offer of help partly due to suspicion of the Soviets partiality for India and partly due to the hope of gaining US goodwill for Pakistan. In fact on 15 September, Ayub appealed in vain for a US or Commonwealth intervention to bring about a ceasefire. However, on 15 November, he told the Pakistan National Assembly that he accepted the ceasefire, "because we were given an assurance by the Big Powers -- particularly the US, the Soviet Union and the UK, that they would use their good offices to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir dispute".⁴⁴ To Pakistan's disappointment, however, President Johnson was no longer willing to play the Pakistani game and advised him to seek settlement through the UN Security Council Resolution of 20 September, which the U.S. had supported.⁴⁵ President Johnson even welcomed and blessed the Soviet initiative to arrange the Tashkent meeting. Since the U.S. supported the Soviet initiative, President Ayub was ultimately forced in November to

44 The Dawn (Pakistan), 16 November 1965.

45 See Appendix-I

accept the Soviet good offices to arrange a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister in order to iron out their differences on the negotiating table. The U.S. on its part, was content to see the Soviet Union playing the role of the mediator and successfully bringing the hostilities to an end through the famous Tashkent Declaration.

In fact America applauded and praised the Tashkent Declaration as beneficial not only for India and Pakistan but also for Indo-American relations. This step towards peace and amity was in the US interest. As President Johnson said, "The US values deeply the friendship of both India and Pakistan. Nothing we know is more painful or more costly to all concerned than a falling out between one's friends".⁴⁶

War between India and Pakistan was all the more undesirable to U.S. because of the Chinese designs on the subcontinent. Addressing the National Press Club at Washington on 19 April 1966, Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to UN said, "It (the 65 war) was of course all the more alarming to the US because India and Pakistan are two very important nations whose friendship and progress we highly value because

46 Department of State Bulletin, vol.L, no.1291, March 23, 1966, p.442.

just over the Himalayas Red China was sitting eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up pieces.⁴⁷ Further the U.S. believed that it was due to India's intransigence and harsh attitude that Pakistan had been driven to seek refuge in the arms of the Chinese. Once the Kashmir problem was solved India and Pakistan would be good neighbours again and act as bulwark against Chinese aggression. America seems to be mistaken in this view -- experience shows that even if the Kashmir problem was solved, Pakistan may still continue her anti-Indian policy as it was inherent in the very nature of her creation and past history.

Analysis of the War

In their warlike attitudes India and Pakistan had overlooked one noteworthy fact. Neither country had any prospect of winning anything like a victory. Military analysis indicates that in a short war though well trained Pakistani troops would have had an edge. But in a prolonged struggle India's numerical strength and superiority would be a telling factor. Neither Pakistan nor India had the military hardware, home-front industry or logistical strength to the war indefinitely.

47 Department of State Bulletin, vol.LIV, No.1402, May 9, 1966, p.750. The United Nations: A Progress Report, Address by Arthur J. Goddberg before the National Press Club at Washington on April 19, 1965.

Land battles constituted the main and the most significant operations of the conflict and because of mutual fears the outcome of tank engagements was of prime importance. Although both sides claimed victory, the consensus among informed foreign opinion was that the conflict ended in a draw.

In terms of equipment, the military circles in Washington concluded, on the basis of postwar information, that Pakistan lost 200 tanks with another 250 put out of action (but recoverable) and that this constituted 32 per cent of her 1,110 pre-war tanks. India by the same assessment lost between 175-190, with another 200 temporarily out of commission, and this indicated India was deprived of 27 per cent of her tank force of 1,450.⁴⁸ In the air, Indian losses were only 20 whereas Pakistan 65-70 planes. The sea warfare was extremely limited and there were hardly any losses.

Foreign experts have generally agreed that the striking power of Pakistan's armoured forces was blunted at least temporarily on the battlefield -- one reason was that Pakistan's armour was running short of spare parts, which were in short supply due to American restrictions and this factor eventually made Pakistan's acceptance of the ceasefire a necessity.

48 John Norris, Washington Post, 17 October 1965.

Tactically the judgement of impartial experts is that the Indians demonstrated somewhat greater skill and better strategy in the use of armour.

The Pakistanis encountered difficulties with both the complexity of their primary weapons and the organisation required to maintain it; the Indians on their part also encountered battlefield deficiencies which handicapped their offensives and resulted in a less effective campaign than many foreign observers believed they could have conducted.

The even score was further indicated, in general terms, by the positions held by the two armies at the ceasefire. India claimed control over 720 square miles of Pakistani territory, including an area of 150 square miles of relatively worthless desert in Sind around Gadra. Pakistan claimed 1,617 sq.miles of Indian territory of which were 1,200 sq.miles in the desert of Rajasthan. India acknowledged that Pakistan dominated 220 sq.miles of her territory and Washington placed the figure at 310-20 sq.miles. The positions were clear. India held the Uri Poonch bulge and territory around Tithwal, as well as positions around Sialkot and a strip of land in the Punjab between BRB canal and border. Pakistan controlled the territory taken in her Chhamb-Akhnoor offensive and farther south, a narrow wedge around Khem Karan.

Though both countries applied thrust to capture each other's vital areas could not do so. Neither side was capable fully of exploiting a major offensive while simultaneously resisting the outflanking attacks on the opponents.

The atmosphere in both the countries was explosive mixture of self-righteousness and hatred. Despite the emotional frenzy, the Muslim minority in India and the Hindu minority in Pakistan were well protected.

Both countries directed their bitterness at the United States and Britain as well as at each other. Having argued that arms for its neighbour would someday be used against itself each now felt that its judgement had proven right and the United States was wrong in thinking it could prevent a recipient from using the arms aggressively. Pakistanis were furious that the U.S. not only refused to support an ally after the Indian attack, but cut off arms shipments to the subcontinent. This hurt Pakistan more than India, for the former was entirely dependent upon the US arms and ammunition. India received arms from many sources recognising its advantages from the embargo, nevertheless berated the US failure to condemn Pakistan for having started the war, and thought of Pakistan's status as an ally merited no consideration in view of its initiation of the fighting and its close relations with China.

The outbreak of the war signalled an important failure of the US policy in the subcontinent. Even those US officials to whom the goal of Indo-Pakistani reconciliation had seemed too ambitious to be realistic had predicted aid to each country on the belief that the two would not go to war. Some diversion of effort and resources had been accepted as inevitable because of the mutual antagonism, but their willingness to go to war raised fundamental questions about the seriousness of their interest in development and defense of the subcontinent, and about the US interest and ability to help them. In telling the Senate Appropriations Committee on 8 September that the U.S. had suspended military aid to both countries, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that no new commitments of economic assistance were being made and only those shipments already underway were allowed to go forward.

The immediate task for the U.S. and the U.K. and for the world community generally was to try to limit the war to the areas involved and to bring about a ceasefire as soon as possible. Particular attention was devoted to preventing an outbreak of fighting involving East Pakistan, which Western Governments felt would result in events getting completely out of control. Yet the anger of both the countries (India and Pakistan) at the U.S. limited its ability to exercise much

influence. In contrast to the Rann of Kutch conflict, the U.K. was unable to exercise much influence earlier. The aroused emotions in both countries also made the initial attempts of the UN to obtain ceasefire unsuccessful. On his trip to the subcontinent early in September, Secretary General U Thant found their positions inflexible.

Once the fighting began, the likely behaviour of China posed a particular problem for which Peking gave ample reason. A Chinese statement on 7 September, pledged full support for Pakistan and condemned India for "criminal aggression" stating that it probably believed it could bully its neighbours because it had the support of U.S. and Soviet Union. China also sent notes to New Delhi on 27 August and 8 September charging India with border violations. On 17 September Peking issued another statement which accused India of many offences including intruding into Chinese territory from Sikkim and erecting fortifications on Chinese territory demanded that India pull back within three days or face grave consequences. This ultimatum raised fears that another Chinese military intervention was about to take place.

Both the US and the Soviet Union publicly warned against any Chinese intervention and these warnings probably were supplemented by private messages. Peking reacted furiously

to the U.S. and the Soviet Union moves. It accused the two countries of adding fuel to the fire and of collusion in their support of India and opposition to China, an obvious effort in Peking's general campaign to depict Moscow as revisionist power hand in glove with Washington.

India responded to the Chinese ultimatum skillfully despite the tensions and fears prevailing in New Delhi that a conflict might be in store. In any case, potential Chinese involvement spurred both the Soviet Union and the U.S. to the new efforts in the Security Council to bring about a ceasefire. But during the early weeks of the conflict neither country was inclined to pay heed to the unanimous Security Council calls for ceasefire. Pakistan resisted any resolution that did not also provide for negotiations on Kashmir.

As the fighting continued, however, first India and then Pakistan became more amenable to a ceasefire. Pakistan was unsuccessful in obtaining either the British or the US support for moves outside the Security Council. Moreover its military position was becoming steadily weaker; its forces were unable to break through Indian lines, and supplies were dwindling. The U.S. had never provided Pakistan with enough military supplies for an extended conflict and shortages were affecting operations.

Indians likewise began to see more reason for cease-fire. If they continued to wear down Pakistan and take additional Pakistani territory and its Muslim population they would create serious complications for themselves. Yet to give back the territory won at the cost of Indian blood would be politically difficult. Indian leaders were also feeling international pressure to show some flexibility on Kashmir and were not confident that China would allow Pakistan to go down completely defeated.

Despite the growing receptivity towards the UN efforts to arrange a ceasefire the process of working out one was not easy. But the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union all insisted that stopping the war was the first order of business and cooperated in working out acceptable terms. By mid-September, the Security Council succeeded in drawing up a resolution that was clear on the call for a ceasefire but vague enough on what was to follow so that India and Pakistan could each interpret it to suit themselves. India accepted the ceasefire and the demand for withdrawal the next day but made it clear that she did not accept proposals to reconsider a political settlement. Shastri reiterated that Kashmir is an integral part of India and there was hardly any case for the exercise of the right self-determination again.

On 22 September before the UN deadline expired at 3 a.m. New York Times, Bhutto sent a telegram to the UN Security Council on behalf of Ayub Khan that ceasefire had been ordered in the interest of international peace. At 3.30 a.m. 23 September, South Asian time, the guns were silenced and hostile troops stared curiously at each other across their narrow battlefields.

The similarity of the United States and the Soviet Union's policies towards India and Pakistan originated in the common fear of Chinese expansion. The Indo-Pakistani dispute appeared futile to them because it was creating ⁱⁿ the subcontinent instability and disunity which the Chinese had continued to exploit.

The Kashmir conflict gave opportunity to the U.S. to reassess its foreign aid policies. The U.S. cut off assistance and then re-examined what use was made of its money. The U.S. began to tie strings to her foreign aid as a result of reassessment. The Dollar diplomacy was reinitiated.

The Kashmir war also gave rise to a new detachment on the part of the U.S. toward the Kashmir situation and the petty quarrels between India and Pakistan. The U.S. preferred to adopt a policy of neutralism between them.

The impact of the US neutralism was compounded by the Soviet Union's swift decision not only to continue military aid to India but to increase it. This assistance included four Soviet submarines to counter two US submarines in the hands of Pakistan, as well as the Soviet planes to meet the US jets attacking from Pakistan. The result was an increase in the Soviet prestige and influence in India.

Analysis

A change was noticeable in Washington's attitude this time in contrast to its reaction at the time of the Kutch crisis. The attitude of Washington had deeply hurt India because it had treated the Kutch affair as an annoying side issue although Pakistan was an American ally which had committed aggression. Further B.K. Nehru had found Philip Talbot very stiff towards India during the Kutch conflict -- threatening to come out in open support of Pakistan in case of any counter attack by India. This time he found in Dean Rusk a different frame of mind, expression concern, and not refuting the Indian charge of Pakistan's complicity in the Kashmir clashes. Chester Bowles also reported the participation of outside elements in Kashmir, thereby in effect, confirming the Indian case of Pakistanis infiltration. Indeed according to the US Congressman, Frank Church, from

the beginning President Johnson himself directed American policy in an astute and skillful manner. His decision to refrain from provocative declarations, his insistence that the U.S. observe a neutral posture, and his refusal to intervene directly in the war, were welcome indications that our diplomacy was tempered with discretion and restraint. The closest pronouncement on plebiscite in Kashmir was made by Dean Rusk,

"We have expressed our views on that subject over the years. That is part of a general problem of solution of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. We believe that these matters should be taken up and resolved by peaceful means. We do not believe they should be solved by force".⁴⁹

Not only did the war change the US attitude towards Kashmir but it also brought into focus the American helplessness not to do anything more effective in the matter of preventing them than the lodging of verbal protests, (and that too in diplomatic privacy) has exposed the hollowness of American assurances to India, and the utter independability of Pakistan as a military ally, and the remarkably insignificant influence that the U.S. has acquired with Pakistan in spite of years of pampering with unduly large military and economic

49 Joseph Craft, Peace Making in Asia, Washington Post, September 22, 1965. See also Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 89th Congress, 1st Session, vol.III, part-18, September 14-23, 1965, September 22, 1965, p.24732.

aid".⁵⁰

In the aftermath of 1965 conflict, the need to reconstruct their economies forced India and Pakistan to concentrate their efforts on obtaining the resumption of foreign aid. On India's part, this meant an endeavour to woo the U.S. into resuming aid. Pakistan on the other hand adopted the policy of playing upon fears of China. As America had made the resumption of full scale foreign aid contingent on the confidence that India and Pakistan would not go to war again, India was able to point out at Pakistani intransigence as a proof that it was not India's fault that the "Tashkent spirit" had not carried the two countries further towards reconciliation and friendship.⁵¹

The U.S. it became clear was in no mood to take sides in the Indo-Pak dispute. As the US Ambassador Keating made explicit at a press conference at Lucknow that it would keep hands off the 'dispute' and it desired that the parties involved should settle their issues between themselves. "We want to see harmonious relations between India and Pakistan; we do not want to intervene", he said.⁵²

50 M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.8, nos.1-2, July-October 1966, p.6.

51 Michael Edwards, "Tashkent and After", International Affairs, vol.42, no.3, July 1966, p.384.

52 Statesman, 8 March 1970.

CHAPTER FOUR

.....

Chapter Four

THE TASHKENT DECLARATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After the ceasefire at 3.30 a.m. on 23 September 1965, the overall military picture was: (1) Indian troops controlled strategic areas in Pakistan occupied Kashmir from where Pakistan sent out trained infiltrators into Kashmir. (2) Indian forces were in possession of vital areas in Lahore and Sialkot areas. They controlled at least 30 miles of the 45 mile long Ichogil Canal on the eastern side from Ranian in the north to Chhatanwala 18 miles from Burki. The salient made in Pakistani territory in Lahore Sector varied between one mile at the narrowest point to 10 miles at Burki. (3) The Dera Baba Nanak Bridge was held by Indian troops on eastern side, while the Pakistanis were on the other side. The Pakistani enclave across the Ravi river was with the Indian army. (4) Indian troops had penetrated 10-12 miles deep into Sind across the Rajasthan border. (5) The Pakistanis held a salient of 10-11 miles in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector, and 2-3 miles in Khem Karan sector. The only area in Rajasthan occupied by Pakistan at the time of the ceasefire coming in effect was the border outpost of Munnabao.

Area in Pakistan under Indian Occupation

| | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Jammu Sialkot Sector | .. | 180 sq.miles |
| Lahore Sector | .. | 140 sq.miles |
| Rajasthan Sind Sector | .. | 150 sq.miles |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>..</u> | <u>470 sq.miles</u> |

Areas Occupied by Indian Troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Uri Poonch Bulge and Tithwal Sector | .. | 250 sq.miles |
| Kargil Sector | .. | 20 sq.miles |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>..</u> | <u>270 sq.miles</u> |

Indian Territory Occupied by Pakistan

| | | |
|--|-----------|---------------------------------|
| Chhamb Sector | .. | 190 sq.miles |
| Khem Karan area in Lahore Sector and one post close to border in Rajasthan | .. | 20 sq.miles |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>..</u> | <u>210 sq.miles¹</u> |

The ceasefire did not end the difficulties. It provided a breathing space for Pakistan, India as well as U.N. and world Powers to survey the situation and examine their thinking. The two armies still faced each other, occupying territory of the other. Emotions remained at a high pitch, and there was an urgent need for military disengagement and

1 H.R. Gupta, India-Pakistan War 1965, vol.II, (Haryana Publications).

for passions to subside.

The next step after the ceasefire was beyond the capacity of the two countries acting alone, for in the prevailing tense atmosphere they could not themselves initiate the unpalatable compromises that were necessary. This step was far from difficult for the Security Council. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto while addressing the Security Council charged India with conducting a reign of terror in Kashmir. Swaran Singh led India's delegation out of the Security Council during Bhutto's attack. Bhutto hooted, "the Indian dogs have gone home, not from Kashmir but from the Security Council".² Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom was in a position to influence both India and Pakistan at this juncture, but an opening was there, if the Soviet Union wanted to seize it.

China could not mediate because it had openly favoured Pakistan and even threatened to intervene.³ It came closer to Pakistan after the war of 1965, as the latter became almost solely dependent upon China for military supplies

2 "A Ceasefire of Sorts", Time, 5 November 1965.

3 G.W. Chaudhary, Pakistan's Relations with India (Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1971).

after the United States had cut off military supplies to Pakistan. On 7 September 1965, when both armies were locked in grim struggle in the Punjab, China sent a note to India, accusing it of violating the Sikkim-Tibet border on several occasions during the months of July and August 1965. The note warned that "India must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom".⁴ Peking intervened again on 16 September. In a note the Chinese accused India for maintaining military installations on the Tibetan side of the border and demanded that these installations be dismantled within 3 days. The Chinese radio and press supported the "freedom of the Kashmiri people", when the infiltrators started their activities in Kashmir and supported Pakistan's thrust in Chhambb on September 1965. During his visit to Pakistan Marshal Chen Yi characterised the Pakistani attack on Chhamb as "joint struggle of Kashmir people against tyrannical domination of India".⁵ Bhutto gratefully acknowledged the support rendered by China and called it as "a matter of great significance". Thus China had the least locus standi to play the peacemaker's role in the sub-continent in the aftermath of the war.

4 Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China, January 1965-66, White Paper No. XII, pp.38-39 and 42-43.

5 Dawn (Pakistan), 5 September 1965.

The Commonwealth could not play a mediator's role because the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had denounced India's move on 6 September 1965 in Lahore-Sialkot sector of Pakistan, across the international frontier.⁶

Only the Soviet Union could command confidence of both India and Pakistan as of late it was trying to observe strict neutrality in Indo-Pakistani relations and conflicts. Ayub Khan had also made it clear that no direct meeting between India and Pakistan would be possible without Soviet intervention. A change in the policy of the Soviet Union could be seen from early 1960s, when the Soviet Union began to normalise its relations with Pakistan. Two factors contributed to this move -- the Pakistani disenchantment with the US which had since the late 1950s and more specifically since 1960s started taking interest in India in view of China's growing menace to this country. The Soviet Union wanted to seize this opportunity. The second was the Soviet Union's growing conflict with China as a result of which it was in need of more and more friendly neighbours to isolate China.

The Soviet Union and Pakistan had started cooperating with each other in several ways since the beginning of the

6 The Times (London), 7 September 1965. Abdul Majid's Weekly Commentary in Pakistan Times, 23 June 1966.

1960s. The Soviet Union was thus in a position to act as a middleman to bring India and Pakistan to a conference table to make peace in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War of September 1965. The Soviet Union was thus in a position to act as a middleman to bring India and Pakistan to a conference table to make peace in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War of September 1965. The Soviet Premier had already sent messages to Prime Minister Shastri and President Khan on 4 September urging them "to enter into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of their differences" in which he promised his Government's cooperation and good offices. A similar statement had been issued by Tass on 7 September 1965. In a second identical letter to Prime Minister Shastri and President Khan, Prime Minister Kosygin of the Soviet Union reiterated on 17 September, the Soviet offer for a meeting at Tashkent or any other city in the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on the restoration of peace and himself offered to take part in the meeting, "if both parties so desire".⁷ The Soviet Union also lent its support to pressures from the West and the UN for a ceasefire and withdrawal of the Indo-Pakistani troops to pre-war positions. After the acceptance on 22 September by both India and Pakistan of ceasefire resolution of the Security Council of 20 September, the Soviet Premier sent his

7 Pravda, 20 September 1965.

third communication to the Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President on 23 September in which he repeated his offer for a meeting of the Indo-Pakistani leaders in Tashkent to discuss for issues underlying the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The Soviets were pursuing specific goals in their complex and bold diplomacy over the Indo-Pakistan War. In the words of Professor William J. Griffith:

Moscow wanted to increase its influence in India to maintain at least its newly won rapprochement with Pakistan; to prevent China from profiting from the conflict, to prevent or at least limit Washington from profiting as well, and finally to maintain good relations with China's neighbours and former allies but now increasingly 'neutralist'. Moscow's minimal objective was the containment of both Peking and Washington, its maximum aim was to detach India from Washington and Pakistan from Peking while moving both closer to Moscow, and finally to improve relations between Indians and Pakistanis so that together they might devote their energies to containing China rather than fighting each other. This final objective is shared by Moscow and Washington and it is sufficiently important for both to make each other willing to settle for Indian and Pakistani neutrality vis-a-vis themselves - the more so because this is what India and Pakistan want.⁸

These purposes were clearly of sufficient importance for Moscow to underwrite the gamble of sponsoring the Tashkent Conference. By proposing Head of State level meeting to be held in the Soviet Union, the Kashmir question was taken out of the UN temporarily.

8 William J. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65", China Quarterly, no.25, January-March 1966, p.117.

This was the first meeting initiated by the Soviet Union between the two non-communist countries. As the New York Times put it on 20 September 1965, this was the first time that USSR has proposed direct mediation in an international dispute. So far the Soviet Union had not physically involved its role as peacemaker and it was necessary to get its role as peacemaker institutionalised in the area of the Indian subcontinent which was in a very easy approach to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wanted to create trust and confidence for itself in this area. The possibility of Chinese intervention in the conflict loomed large in the mind of the great powers particularly the US and the Soviet Union.⁹ By offering its good offices to both India and Pakistan the Soviet Union challenged the Chinese claim to Asian leadership¹⁰ and tried to establish itself as an Asian Power. On the above considerations the Soviet role was not only welcome but also imperative. K. Neelkant contended that it was the first instance in international diplomacy when a big Power tried its utmost to bring peace between two comparatively weaker nations instead of exploiting their discord to further its own interests.¹¹

9 "Tashkent and After", a student of India-Pakistan Relations, India Quarterly (New Delhi), a vol.XII, no.1, January-March 1966, pp.3-17.

10 M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.8, nos.1-2, July-October 1966, pp.1-8.

11 K. Neelkant, Partners in Peace (Delhi, 1972), p.19.

Pakistan's Need for Peace

Such peace talk under the aegis of a superpower was welcome to Pakistan. This was because the Pakistani armed forces had sustained heavy losses during the 1965 war and its economic resources had also been severely strained. A three year drought, grain shortage, strikes and unending agitation against steep rising prices had already crippled Pakistani economy. Pakistan was already nursing a grievance against the West for the support which the latter had given to India during the Sino-Indian conflict. The Soviet vetoes on the Kashmir problem were still vivid in Pakistani thinking. Pakistan was looking to befriend the USSR as well. And when Pakistan found that even the US was favourably disposed towards the Soviet proposal, it had no option but to accept the Soviet peace move. This Pakistan did by the end of November 1965.

The Indian Desire

India, too was in search of peace. It wanted to meet its immediate neighbour Pakistan at the Conference table. The conflict of September 1965, had given it an opportunity to show its capacity to defend its sovereignty. The army reputation had been restored. The Government of India knew

well that it was not possible for it to dislodge the Pakistanis from the Chhamb Jūrian sector. The economic condition of the country was bad. The Indian Prime Minister therefore accepted the Soviet peace offer.¹² K.C. Pant said "We accepted the Soviet mediation because the Soviet Union had been our consistent supporter in Security Council and outside on Kashmir Question".¹³ Besides, India accepted the Soviet invitation for peace talks at Tashkent because the Indian ambassador T.N. Kaul put the Russian invitation, "is one of good offices, not mediation, arbitration and judication or the imposition of decisions".¹⁴ The Indian Prime Minister was very clear that although he would certainly be prepared to talk on Kashmir, he would not accept any imposition from any quarter.

The Tashkent meeting it was hoped would provide a new signpost to international goodwill. Its significance would lie in the fact that the representatives of the two nations whose relations had not been cordial since the beginning of their independence, might rescind in the presence of a third party. Tashkent was a unique international conference. For the first time representatives of Pakistan and India met out-

12 New York Times, 23 September 1965.

13 Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol.50, 16 February 1966, col.980.

14 Statesman, 29 December, 1965, Delhi.

side the subcontinent for bilateral negotiations with minimum interference from the third party. For the Soviet Union it was a landmark in its history without losing respect in India, it enhanced respect in Pakistan also.

Although the Russians declined a formal mediation role, such meeting on the Soviet soil was considered a significant event in the evolution of Soviet diplomacy. The Tashkent meeting aimed at resolving the differences that flared into open warfare over Kashmir, was believed to be the first time the Soviets had used their good offices. It was a major step in the Kremlin's campaign to gain status among non-communist Asian and African countries.

The Tashkent Conference

The Conference opened on 4 January 1966, amid growing doubts that a peaceful Indo-Pakistani accommodation was possible. The battle areas were still unpacified, economic relations were suspended and diplomatic contacts were negligible. For several weeks before the meeting Ayub and Shastri insisted that Kashmir would not be discussed at all, but relented later to discuss it. Ayub insisted that political settlement of Kashmir was the fundamental necessity and made this prerequisite to a, "no war agreement" which the Indians

greatly hoped to obtain. In short, Indian hopes from the meeting were to clear up the aftermath of war, by agreeing on such matters as withdrawal of forces, without touching the central problems. Pakistan's purpose was its desire to keep the Kashmir question alive.

The pressures for peace were mounting. The belligerents quite obviously could not afford to maintain indefinitely even the ceasefire. Pakistan had invoked a drastic austerity programme to shore up the war weakened economy.

Both the leaders went to Tashkent under severe domestic pressures which they believed required implacability, as has been true so often in the past. "Neither Mr. Shastri nor President Ayub have the political will and strength in their respective countries any solution which may even remotely look like a compromise".¹⁵ The mood within India, strongly favoured permanent Indian occupation of the territories in Kashmir which had been won during the fighting and this had been impediment against re-establishment of 5 August positions. Bhatia continued, "The coveted valley a part of the Tithiwal and Haji Pir pass posts, Mr. Shastri would have no option but to reject it immediately. Finally the new fears created by the

15 Krishnan Bhatia, Hindustan Times, 26 November 1965 (Delhi).

war remained strong".¹⁶

Despite its acceptance, India went to Tashkent with a notable lack of enthusiasm. The Soviet leaders probably gave private assurances that they would not abandon India but a certain unease was nonetheless apparent in New Delhi. Pakistan's acceptance also was a delicate matter for Peking did not approve of the Soviet move. Yet while Peking denounced the Tashkent meeting as a joint US-Soviet plot to support the Indian reactionaries, it did not attack Pakistan for participating -- one of the few examples of Chinese verbal restraint in those years. There was, however, a sharp rise in the Sino-Indian tension in November when the Chinese border troops began to patrol more aggressively along the NEFA and on the Tibetan-Sikkimese border. Several clashes occurred and there was a fear that Peking was trying to torpedo the Tashkent meeting. The clashes soon ended and Ayub and Shastri proceeded to Tashkent in January 1966. The comment of the Times (London) on 3 January, was appropriately ironical: "How strange it would have seemed to Curzon that the affairs of the sub-continent he ruled should be taken to Tashkent to be discussed under the patronage of a Russian".

16 Ibid.

The negotiations went forward by fits and starts, with Ayub and Shastri sometimes dealing directly and sometimes through Kosygin. The Conference had no agenda and no time-limit. The Indian and Pakistani leaders stated that they were prepared to stay as long as necessary so that talks would be able to progress as far as the speakers would permit.

Prime Minister Shastri who addressed the Conference called for a no war pact saying it "would open a new chapter in Indo-Pakistani relationship". He said that the two countries' assurances not to use force against each other could mean that each would agree to respect the territorial integrity of the other.

Pakistan did not accept this idea of a no war pact. Pakistani spokesman Altaf Gauhar termed India's position on Kashmir as hypothetical.¹⁷ Pakistan had announced that it would refuse to sign the no war pact with India until there was a final settlement on Kashmir.

This statement and subsequent deadlock coincided with the receipt by India of a strongly worded note from China, warning that China would strike back unless alleged Indian intrusion into Chinese territory ceased. For several months

17 New York Times (City Edition), 5 January 1966.

Chinese military activity had been increasing sharply along the Indian border. India charged China with intrusions into Sikkim, NEFA and Ladakh.

China appeared to be building up tension in an effort to prevent rapprochement between India and Pakistan at Tashkent. Observers at Tashkent noted that Pakistani position had hardened noticeably after the Indian receipt of Chinese warning. Pakistan seemed to take on a very hard line on Indo-Pakistani differences particularly the Kashmir dispute. It appeared that the Chinese note encouraged Pakistan to take an intransigent position at the Conference.

China's note to India was timed to spoil the Soviet Union's effort at mediation between other countries and to halt growing Soviet influence on the Indian subcontinent. The Chinese moves also seemed designed to strengthen the hardliners in Pakistan led by Bhutto.

The speeches in Tashkent showed the basic differences between their approach to peace. While Shastri called for an agreement unconditionally renouncing the use of force for settling differences between the two countries, President Ayub Khan said that lasting peace between the two countries was contingent upon the resolution of the differences. He spoke in general terms and refrained from mentioning Kashmir

in his initial presentation. All the three leaders made the point that the eyes of the world were on Tashkent. The basic cleavage between India and Pakistan threatened to disintegrate the Tashkent talks.

The talks came to a standstill after two days. While the officials wrangled on the inclusion of Kashmir in the formal agenda for serious Shastri-Ayub talks. Kosygin was forced to mediate. He attended the conference as host with the understanding that he would participate only to the extent requested by the principals. On the third working day, he spent eight hours travelling between the widely separated villas assigned to Shastri and Ayub and holding separate talks with them. On 7 January, the two leaders resumed their personal discussions, which had been suspended for a day and met twice. The conference again came to a standstill by the 9th over the question of including Kashmir in any final joint statement to be issued. The Indian delegation made plans to leave on 11 January and it appeared that the meeting would end without a formal communique.

Kosygin initiated last minute discussions. For fourteen hours he shuttled back and forth between Ayub and Shastri carrying messages and doubtless making his own overtures. At long last the agreement was signed on 10 January. Kosygin had

succeeded in having the two leaders temporarily bypass their deadlock over Kashmir and move on to the discussion of other problems which plagued them. These included exchange of prisoners, return of ships and cargo seized during the war, the withdrawal of troops and a treaty of peace and amity between the two countries.

The Tashkent Declaration¹⁸

On 10 January 1966, the so called spirit of Tashkent was envisaged in Tashkent Declaration.

The Declaration represented a diplomatic victory for the host, Soviet Premier Kosygin who had worked far into the night of 9 January trying to persuade his guests to end their week long conference on a positive note even if they could not agree on major issues.

When the Declaration was signed on 10 January, by Shastri and Ayub, they made no public statement beyond the declaration. Shastri died suddenly of heart attack a few hours after signing the Declaration.

Indian Foreign Secretary C.S. Jha, who had been acting as the India's spokesman during the talks said after signing of Declaration "this ⁿreⁿunciation of the use of force fulfilled India's purpose in coming to the talks". He called the

18 For full text refer to Appendix-III.

Declaration, "a major turning point in Indo-Pakistani relations".

The Pakistani spokesman, Altaf Gauhar also was optimistic. He called the Declaration a "major step towards peace, but only a first step".¹⁹

Premier Kosygin called the meeting and subsequent declaration "a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan".²⁰

The Tashkent Declaration reaffirmed India's and Pakistan's resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between them and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples.

The crucial clause of the Declaration was Clause I. It was this clause that must be fully understood in its phrasing as well as its intent. It reads:

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and India in accordance with the UN Charter...put its respective position.

19 Lukas Anthony, "India Pakistan to Remove Troops", New York Times, 11 January 1966, p.15.

20 Ibid.

Both India and Pakistan talked at Tashkent about Kashmir. They not only talked of the Kashmir dispute but also its possible solution, and it was in the light of those 7 days of negotiations that one reads Clause I of the declaration that "the interests of the people of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of the tension between the two countries, and that it was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed. The Tashkent Declaration offers an opening for the solution of the problem.

Clause II of the Tashkent Declaration offers outline for a direct procedure to be adopted by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. They agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on ceasefire line.

The two important phrases of this clause are: "On the Ceasefire Line" and "armed personnel". In the past, there had been controversy about what the term "armed personnel" means. Armed personnel are those men under the control of Defense Services according to Pakistani interpretation. India maintains that all armed individuals and irregular forces are armed personnel.

The clause treated the ceasefire line as no more than a temporary arrangement. It did not deal with what might happen on either side of the ceasefire line. The ceasefire terms were laid down by the UN observers. What happens on either side of the ceasefire line did not come within the purview.

Clause III of the Declaration must be read with Clause I. It is clear that the Kashmir dispute was the pivotal problem throughout the negotiations. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was still negotiable according to the terms of the Tashkent Declaration. This was primarily the Pakistani viewpoint and interpretation. India staunchly maintained that Kashmir was an integral part of Indian Union and thereby not subject to international discourse.

Clause IV dealt about propaganda and friendly relations - Pakistan was adamant about accusing India of atrocities carried out upon the Kashmiri people.

Restoration of diplomatic relations were treated in Clause V, while Clause VI aimed at restoration of economic trade and other relations. Clause VI also dealt with implementation of Declaration open so that hopefully India and Pakistan would make vital attempts to fully implement the Declaration and make it more than just an empty document.

Clause VII related to the repatriation of prisoners, and Clause VIII talked of refugees and evictions. An important provision was that both countries had agreed to "create conditions which will prevent the exodus of the people".

The final clause IX provided machinery to ensure that the disputed items between India and Pakistan would continue to receive attention.

Both India and Pakistan hailed the pact as an important step towards improving their relations, although some elements in India, both in the Congress Party and among the Opposition, denounced it because of the clause on troop withdrawal. Yet Shastri's untimely death at Tashkent made it certain that India would not repudiate his last official act. In Pakistan there was a much greater anguish and criticism of Ayub's agreement to return to the status quo ante without any tangible prospects for progress on the Kashmir issue.

The Tashkent Agreement was a triumph for the Soviet Union, and for Kosygin personally. As Edward Crankshaw commented during the meetings:

Mr. Kosygin whose ideology demands the fostering of chaos and disruption in the non-Communist lands, finds himself doing his level best to calm down a Hindu under direct threat from China and a Muslim supposed to be on friendly terms with Peking, embroiled in a quarrel over the possession of the mountain playground of the late British Raj. And except for China, nobody minds.²¹

21 The London Observer, 9 January 1966, p.11.

Indeed, the British and the American governments were pleased if vaguely uneasy, with Russian initiative and the outcome of the meeting. The US knew it was in no position at that point of time to wield decisive influence in the sub-continent. Progress towards reducing tensions was so important to Western interests that the West gained if the USSR succeeded, and Western leaders showed their satisfaction publicly when agreement was reached.

The Tashkent meeting clearly established stronger relations between the Soviet Union and both India and Pakistan. Ayub predicted that the conference would result in closer Soviet-Pakistan ties and hinted that he expected more Soviet help in solving the Kashmir question on terms acceptable to Pakistan.

The strain of the conference and particularly final negotiations showed on all the participants. Shastri died after his third heart attack on 11 January. His death saddened the diplomats and brought genuine condolences from Ayub.

The circumstances forced Indian officials to deny repeatedly that Shastri was under strong Soviet pressure. The Foreign Minister categorically denied that the Soviet Union had exercised any direct or indirect pressure on the Indian leader. Swaran Singh said: "It is wrong to suggest this, the Soviet attitude was of full understanding and objective.

We are grateful to them".²²

The Tashkent Conference became another phase in the complex struggle in which the subcontinent was involved.

The Tashkent Declaration is a positive document and by no means an end in itself, but a hopeful beginning. The sudden death of Shastri at Tashkent in January 1966 seemed to convert the agreement he had signed with Ayub Khan in a funerary monument to the dead Prime Minister.

The interim Prime Minister of India, Gulzari Lal Nanda upon taking office, promised to carry through the agreement Shastri had signed. Prime Minister Nanda in a nationwide broadcast said "Shastri died after successfully concluding a 'mighty effort for peace'. We shall honour the agreement he made and implement it faithfully".

President Ayub Khan said: "The Tashkent Declaration is the first step. Any step toward peace is a good step". By the end of February 1966, the Tashkent Agreement had achieved all that either India or Pakistan had really expected from it the withdrawal of armed forces from territories occupied or otherwise penetrated during the September war.

22 Hindustan Times, 22 February 1966.

The success of the Tashkent talks is obvious. It will perhaps be no exaggeration to say that the last day of the talks was the beginning of a new stage of relations between India and Pakistan. The armed conflict had been ended and the way shown to overcome obstacles to normal relations between two Big Asian states.²³ There was a considerable political fall out from the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965:

1. India's determination to strengthen its defence capacity to an extent which would deter any Pakistani adventure in the future, was reinforced.
2. The arms embargo imposed by the United States on India and Pakistan hit the latter more for it was solely dependent on arms from the U.S.
3. Pakistan's unsuccessful military adventure, irreparably weakened Ayub Khan's position. It brought about a rift between him and Bhutto and paved the way for Ayub Khan's eventual downfall three years later.
4. It widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan, the former was not involved emotionally in the Pakistani military misadventure which further underscored the non-identity of interests and motivations between East and West Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, indeed speeded up the disintegration of Pakistan which came about in 1971.

The Implementation of the Tashkent Declaration

The first phase of the Tashkent Declaration went into effect on 25 February 1966. That was the re-establishment of

23 Kryukov, P., "Result of Tashkent Talks", International Affairs (Moscow), February 1966, no.2, pp.3-4.

a ceasefire line and withdrawal of troops of both countries to the pre-September position. The ceasefire and troops withdrawal were perhaps the easiest to implement.

In conjunction with the implementation of the Tashkent Declaration UN Secretary General U Thant announced the dissolution of the UN peacemaking force in India and Pakistan. The UNCIP and UNMOGIP consisted of about 150 observers with vehicles and small aircraft provided by member countries. The withdrawal of armed forces of India and Pakistan based upon Tashkent Declaration proceeded so smoothly that the Secretary General was able to inform the Security Council of his intention of withdrawing UN troops by 28 February 1966.

The next step of establishing peace and friendly relations between India and Pakistan proved to be more difficult and more strained. The sticking point was still the 20 years dispute over Kashmir. Despite some progress, a good deal of time was taken up restating each side's position on Kashmir issue. Meetings at Ministerial level continued to be held between Pakistan and India throughout the spring of 1966.

In May 1966, the Indian Government announced that it was going to implement the Tashkent Declaration by lifting

the ban on trade with Pakistan. This was a unilateral action which the Indian Government hoped Pakistan would also implement. The possibility of India using it as a propaganda move remained. Both India and Pakistan were continually being pressurised to implement the Tashkent Agreement and maintain peaceful relations.

India and Pakistan continued to make some effort to maintain the "Spirit of Tashkent". At first only four elements: the withdrawal of troops, the exchange of prisoners, the return of High Commissioners to their respective posts and the restoration of telegraph, telephone and postal communications were carried out. These aspects were completed at the ministerial meeting at Rawalpindi, held on 1 and 2 March 1966.

However, many clauses remained to be implemented -- the restoration of full trade, economic relations, cultural exchanges, resumption of air, train, ship traffic between the two countries and return of assets seized during the 1965 war.

It is difficult for both sides to meet to discuss issues. Pakistan continued to insist that the prickly Kashmir issue be considered at a ministerial meeting. India refused to discuss Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for trying all further steps under the Tashkent Declaration to progress on Kashmir, while Pakistan blames India for refusing to accede to Pakistan's demands for self-determination for the disputed Himalayan

State.

The Tashkent Declaration could only "declare" the sentiments of India and Pakistan. The most important aspect of the agreement was to implement the ideas embodied in the Declaration and make them an integral part of Indian-Pakistani relations. As long as Kashmir issue continued to disturb and disrupt the relations between India and Pakistan it would continue to be a card in the hands of the extra-regional powers. The world powers: The Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China are involved in the outcome of the dispute and are apt to find themselves in a struggle because of each country's commitments to the combatants. It is in the interest of each of them and the combatants that the Kashmir issue be settled quickly and equitably.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Britain's post war withdrawal from the sub-continent left South Asia weakened and vulnerable to divisive pressures. Pakistan and India fought over residual princely State fragments of the Imperial puzzle that refused to fall neatly into place in the dominions. Foremost among these states was Kashmir, the jewel of contention of 1965. Geographically, contiguous to both new dominions, Kashmir could have joined either Pakistan or India. Kashmir remained a dormant volcano, the major point of diplomatic contention between India and Pakistan erupting into actual war in 1965.

Tensions between India and Pakistan have undoubtedly been made more abrasive by the persistent pressures of the cold war and the active involvement of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the sub-continent. In South Asia the three powers most directly and extensively involved in situations of confrontation and conflict - with some variations in the direction of co-operation are the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. Among the significant characteristics underlying the problems of the sub-continental security are the linkages between and the dynamics of the two triangular relationships. One is the regional and the

other is the global. At the regional level, the security triangle involves India, Pakistan and China. At the global level, the security is affected by triangular relationship and the three covered arms race between the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. The only link between the global and regional levels of security being China.

During the Dulles era, the United States became involved in military aid and alliance programmes with Pakistan. This fitted in nicely with global objectives of Secretary Dulles but created special complications for the U.S. in its relations with India which under its nonalignment policy indignantly spurned U.S. offers of military aid and other associations - and was of course strongly criticised by the Soviet Union.

The ups and downs in Indo-American relations have roughly paralleled these in Indo-Pakistani relations, in reverse order, and to some extent the same can be said of India's relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The Kashmir dispute and the continued Indo-Pakistani tensions motivated Pakistan to join SEATO and CENTO defence pacts apart from the 1954 Mutual Defence pact with the United States, thus drawing India involuntarily into the

cold war. The Sino-Indian border dispute and ensuing conflict in 1962 prompted India initially to turn to the United States, and when this failed, (for Pakistan strongly objected to the United States Arms sales and aid to India) to turn to the Soviet Union for military sales and assistance. The ensuing nature of global politics had prompted great power efforts to influence the regional power relationship. Thus the United States efforts to ^{contain} Communism in the fifties produced attempts to draw in both India and Pakistan into its anti-communist military alliance net-work. Similarly, the intensifying Sino-Soviet rift from 1963 onwards prompted Soviet attempts to befriend both India and Pakistan, simultaneously.

The quarrel over Kashmir has been the most critical of all contentions between India and Pakistan. It led to undeclared war, which three times - in December 1947, May 1948 and August 1951, threatened to become overt and in 1965 actually did become so. The stakes are of major economic, political and strategic significance to Pakistan, while to India, Kashmir has become a symbol of national prestige and international justice.

Powerful states outside the subcontinent were by 1961 so deeply involved or committed in the Indo-Pakistan antagonisms that a truly bilateral dialogue such as that between Mohammad

Ali and Pt. Nehru in 1953, could no longer have reflected the existing political and military configuration. Alignments in South Asia were shifting. India became preoccupied with China's hostile policy, and the new American administration of President Kennedy indicated greater awareness of India's importance. Pakistan sought to utilise its own strategic position and secure new sources of external support in addition to the United States alliance.

Indian-Pakistani hostility, nourished by Kashmir dispute, reached a self-sustaining point by the 1960s. Both governments stopped trusting each other, trust on all major issues was absent. The Kashmir dispute itself became a symbol of enmity for which it was in a major way responsible, and the two states could not overcome the distrust and fear of each other long enough to make use of opportunities for solving the underlying problem.

The Kashmir question has passed through 4 phases. First from the commencement of the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 to the Security Council resolution of 5 January 1949. This was a period of discussions in the Security Council and mediation by the UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) securing an agreement to the resolution of 13 August 1948 and a ceasefire on 1 January 1949. The

second phase, was during 1949-57 when the Security Council through a number of mediators sent to the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent, made futile attempts to bring about an agreed interpretation of the second part of the 13 August 1948 resolution and to this end the mediators and many members of the Council made proposals which had the effect of changing the meaning and concept of the 13 August 1948 resolution and of the Security Council Resolution of January 1949 which was a follow-up of the former. During this period there was also a meeting between the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan which failed to resolve the differences. Cold war entered the sub-continent after Pakistan entered into a mutual defence Pact with America in 1954. The third phase covered 1958-65. The year saw the advent to power of General Ayub Khan in Pakistan. The military dictatorship of Pakistan embarked on a systematic hate India campaign. This period was in many ways the darkest and most negative period in Indo-Pakistan relations. A kind of war psychosis was built up in the region. The military balance of the sub-continent was tipped highly in favour of Pakistan due to the pumping of U.S. arms and ammunition into Pakistan. It is only in this period, particularly after the defeat of the ill-equipped and unprepared Indian army at the hands of China in 1962 that the morale of Pakistani army was raised.

The change of Prime Ministership from Nehru to Shastri provided in the eyes of Pakistani military rulers a favourable opportunity for putting into action their plans against India for the liberation of Kashmir. Pakistan's military action first in the Rann of Kutch (a kind of rehearsal for the final show down) took place in April 1965 and then the Indo-Pakistan war in August-September 1965.

The Pakistani military solution to the Kashmir question proved a fiasco. The United States imposed an embargo on the supply of arms to the belligerent nations. The ban hit Pakistan much harder than India which had in the past purchased only small quantities of military equipment from the United States.

The meeting of late Prime Minister Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, held in Tashkent at the Soviet Union's initiative, caused broad repercussions throughout the world. Its great importance for normalising Indo-Pakistan relations and for strengthening peace in South Asia is beyond doubt.

The war in Kashmir and the Tashkent meeting marked a turning point in American attitudes and involvement in the sub-continent. The most dramatic and immediate action was the

halt in military aid but the further effects were much wider. The United States did not enforce assurances given to India by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles that the arms would not be used against India. It was not merely a question of their inability to enforce it; in fact even when Pakistan launched its trial aggression in Kutch in April 1965 and India took up the issue of the use of American arms by Pakistan against India, the U.S. reaction was not strong enough to dissuade Pakistan from using them on a large scale four months later. If the United States had taken up adequate steps to warn Pakistan in May 1965, the Indo-Pakistan war of September could have been avoided. Even during the hostilities, the action taken up by the United States specifically did not disapprove of Pakistan's use of arms against India. The United States suspended its military aid to Pakistan as a consequence. Not only that, the United States also suspended the economic aid to India and Pakistan. If the suspension of the United States aid to Pakistan was specific without taking similar action against India, the United States in one sense would have honoured the Eisenhower pledge. But unfortunately this was not done so.

The United States could have exerted tremendous pressure on both India and Pakistan because of its massive economic aid to them; yet American prestige was low in both the countries

because of President Johnson's abrupt cancellation of the visits of President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri to Washington in the spring of 1965.

The United States remained cool and indifferent when the frontier of her erstwhile ally in Asia was crossed by Indian armed forces. American attitude seemed to be wholly governed by her anger at Ayub Khan's policy of normalising relations with the communist countries, particularly with China.

It is an irony that the weapons of the United States, which has a justified reputation of being a democracy have so far been used against only one democracy in the world - namely India. Many Americans now saw no reason to regard Pakistan as an ally against the communist powers. Similarly India's domestic problems and regional struggles diminished its international role. Less concern was now being shown towards the sub-continent - it reflected the American pre-occupation with Vietnam. This was due to a realisation that if India and Pakistan were going to focus on their animosities, it made little sense for the United States to pour in resources for the defence of the sub-continent. There was in America a serious doubt regarding the use of military aid as an instrument of American foreign policy.

The Soviet Union not only successfully mediated in the India-Pakistani conflict of 1965, but also tried to lure Pakistan closer to itself by the offer of military hardware. It was the Soviet Russia's first major diplomatic initiative towards South Asia as a whole and it proved remarkably successful. The Soviet policy appeared to aim at enhancing its own influence on the sub-continent. Though the United States and the Soviet Union held similar views, publicly, on the disastrous effects of conflict between India and Pakistan and though both brought pressure to bear for a ceasefire, the prestige of the United States was badly damaged in both New Delhi and Rawalpindi by its stand on the war, whereas that of Soviet Union improved. The Tashkent agreement marked the triumph of Soviet diplomacy.

The war with Pakistan in 1965 exposed the Peking-Islamabad axis. In securing an agreement to a meeting the Soviet Government secured a notable diplomatic victory. But in relinquishing this particular negotiation to the Soviets, President Johnson was distinctly shrewed. It may be true that the conference at Tashkent underlined the Soviet presence in the sub-continent, added something to its stature as world power and perhaps, was intended to increase Soviet influence in Pakistan to offset that of China.

With all the major problems - including that of Kashmir, remaining unsolved, it is unrealistic to expect a dramatic change in Indo-Pakistani relations just by one declaration. As has been stressed, the roots of present day, Indo-Pakistani tensions lie in the distant past - they are also coloured by the unhappy experiences of the new states since they attained independence. Dynamic and imaginative approaches must be made to overcome the age old prejudices, hatred, bigotry and fears. The mental images that one has formed of the other are grim, one considering the other a proven aggressor and a potential enemy. The corrosive quarrel over Kashmir must be solved, then the two countries must sincerely and whole-heartedly apply themselves to change the outlook of the two peoples toward each other.

Continuous preoccupation with the Kashmir issue some times adds a touch of unreality to the foreign relations of India and Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani borders are unsettled in many places, and perhaps destined to remain unquiet for a long time. Mutual friendliness of a very high order only can ensure peace along our sensitive borders. Chances of such friendliness seem more and more to recede into back ground because China is egging on Pakistan's aggressiveness and this had been revealed in the Rann of Kutch incident as also the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965.

Though difficulties abound in India and Pakistan relations, yet there is a scope for improvement in the long run. The improvement of relations between the two countries depends not only upon their leadership and the improvement of mutual understanding but also upon the attitude of the extra regional powers who have inadvertently been pushed into the regional disputes. The problem is to find equilibrium in conflicting drives for nationalism, security and development between the two countries. Deep running nationalism in India and Pakistan hungers for psychological self sufficiency but also fuels the continuing confrontations between the two countries. To add to the complexity of the problem the rivalries between them are components of their relationship with the Soviet Union, China and the United States.

Since it is not possible for the United States to remain really neutral on major Indo-Pakistan issues, it would perhaps be helpful if it could atleast avoid equating India and Pakistan on every occasion. The United States military entanglement with Pakistan can also be seen as an important factor contributing towards regional division between India and Pakistan and initiating an arms race between them which goes unabated even today.

The roots of Indo-Pakistani conflict are indeed deep and complex but if allowed to deal with each other on their own,

they will hopefully learn to live with each other, if not in perfect amity and harmony, perhaps in a reasonably stable and working relationship. The main factor guiding their behaviour vis-a-vis each other has been the question of their respective military capabilities and power status. In this drive for status India being naturally big and more powerful, seeks to preserve stability in bilateral relations. Pakistan, on the other hand being comparatively smaller and less powerful neighbour seeks to disturb status-quo in search of equality.

Indo-Pakistani peace and understanding is key to regional security. Several proposals towards achieving this include mutual force reduction, exchange of information on deployment, solving disputes bilaterally, peace and friendship treaty.

The Kashmir issue is not the reason for conflict between India and Pakistan but the symptom of the conflict rooted in the two-nation theory. Since Pakistan feels it cannot give-up the two-nation theory without calling into question the basis of its national identity and India cannot accept the thesis without jeopardising its national identity, we cannot have a negotiated finite solution to the issue. All that we can do is to freeze the conflict.

India must negotiate on all issues which Pakistan desires to discuss and settle, be generous, yet the basic interests of

the Indian people must be kept in mind. The ultimate keys to peaceful co-existence are:

1. India should grow in economic and technological terms, so that Pakistan will adjust itself to the Indian reality and stop thinking in terms of invoking China and the United States card.
2. Let the Pakistanis develop their national identity, formulate appropriate strategies for nation building and come to terms with India.

Yet there is the ever present mutual suspicion between the two countries. In this direction both the countries should pledge not to alter the boundaries between them by force. Both countries should pledge to honour and respect the unity and integrity of each. This will contribute to removing the suspicions harboured in each nation regarding the intention of the other.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

(i) U.N. Documents

United Nations Security Council, Report by Secretary-General on Current Situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the ceasefire agreement: The Ceasefire line and the functioning of UNMOGIP.S/6651, 3 September 1965.

(ii) U.S. Government Documents

A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents (1941-49) (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office).

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1954), p.330.

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1966. Hearings before a Sub-committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Session 1 (Washington, D.C.).

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965. Department of State Publication 8372. Released April 1968, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966--Congressional Records, Proceedings and Debates. 89th Congress, 2nd Session, vol.112, part-13, July 27, 1966, p.1734 (Washington, D.C.).

U.S. Department of Bulletin, vol.L.No.1291, March 23, 1966, p.442 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966) and others.

Government of India Documents

Parliamentary Sources

Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, vol.50, col.980, 16 February, 1966.

Bowles, Chester, Ambassador's Report, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1954.

_____, Promises to Keep, New York, Harper and Row, 1971.

Khan, Ayub Mohammad, Friends, not Masters. London, 1967. Pakistan Branch University Press.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi, The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India).

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Selected Speeches (New Delhi, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), August 1984.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: The Arms Trade with Third World (Stockholm, September 1971).

Secondary Sources

Acheson, Dean, Present at Creation, Norton, New York, 1969.

Ahmad, Gulzar, Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge.

Bains, J.S., India's International Disputes, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962.

Barnds, William, J., India, Pakistan and Great Powers Published for Council on Foreign Relations by Pall Mall Press, London, 1972.

Bindra, S.S., India and her Neighbours: A Study of Political, Economic and Cultural Relations and Interactions, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi.

Blinkenberg, Lars., "Indo-Pakistan: A History of Unsolved Conflicts", Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Instituts Skrifter 4, 1972, Munkgaard.

Brecher, Michael, in Selig P. Harrison (ed.), India and the United States, New York, 1961.

Brines, Russell. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968.

- Brown, Norman W., The United States and India and Pakistan. Revised and Enlarged edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963.
- Chakravarti, B.N., India Speaks to America, New York: Orient Longmans, 1966.
- Chaudhary, G.W., Pakistan's Relations With India, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1971.
- George T., Litwak R., and Chubin, S., "Security in Southern Asia: India and Great Powers", IISS, 1984.
- Gupta, H.R., "India-Pakistan War 1965", vol.I and II, Haryana Prakashan, Delhi, 1968.
- _____, "The Kutch Affair", 1969, U.C. Kapur and Sons, New Delhi.
- Gupta, Karunakar, "India in World Politics: A Period of Transition, Fall 1956 to Spring 1960", Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1969.
- Gupta, Sisir, "Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations", Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1966.
- Heinrichs, Charles H., and Mansingh, Surjit, "A Diplomatic History of Modern India", Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1971.
- Jain, R.K., U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947-82, vol.II, Radiant Publishers New Delhi, 1983.
- Kaul, B.M., Confrontation With Pakistan, Vikas Publications 1970, New Delhi.
- Kaul, T.N., "The Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations", Arnold Heinemann, 1980.
- Kunhi, Krishnan T.V., "The Unfriendly Rivals: India and America", India Book Company, New Delhi, 1974.
- Mankekar, D.R., Twenty-two Fateful days: Pakistan Cut to Size, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1966.
- _____, The Guilty Men of 1962, Bombay 1962.
- Madhumbai, Srinivas, C., United States Foreign Policy Towards India, 1947-54, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1980.

- Multam, John. The United States, Pakistan and India: A Study of U.S. Role in the India, Pakistan Arms Race, Sidhu Ram Publishers Ltd., New Delhi, 1974.
- Natarajan, L., American Shadow Over India, Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1952.
- Neelkant, K., Partners in Peace, New Delhi 1972.
- Palmer, N.D., South Asia and United States Policy: Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966.
- _____, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence, Praeger Special Studies, New York, 1984.
- Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs, 1954-56, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964.
- Ram, Raghunath, Super Powers and Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent, Perceptions and Policies, Raaj Prakashan, New Delhi, 1980.
- Rose, Leo E., "A United States Foreign Policy for Asia, the 1980s and Beyond" (ed.), Ramon H. Myers, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California, 1982.
- Sharma, Dev, "Tashkent: A Study in Foreign Relations With Documents", Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi, 1966.
- Sen Gupta, Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and Soviet Union", New York, Macmillan, 1970.
- Singh, Mahendra, Indo-US Relations 1961-64, Sidhu Ram Publications, New Delhi, 1982.
- Sorensan, Theodore, Kennedy (London), 1965.
- Stebbins, Richard P., "The American Policy in Asia", From the U.S. in World Affairs, published for Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Row.
- Sultan, T., "Indo-U.S. Relations", Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1982.
- Talbot Philips and Poplai, S.L., India and America: A Study of Their Relations, Published for the Council on Foreign relations, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958.
- Vats, Bhagat, "Foreign Intrigue Against India", Amar Publishers, New Delhi, 1967.
- Venkataramani, M.S., "The American Role in Pakistan 1947-58", Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1982.

Wilcon, Wayne, "India, Pakistan and the Rise of China", New York, Walker and Company, 1964.

Wolpert, Stanley, "Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Super Powers". Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.

Ziring, Lawrence (ed.), "The Sub-continent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbours and the Great Powers", 2nd revised edition, Praeger, New York 1982.

Articles

Barnds, William J., "U.S. Policy Towards South Asia Shifting Perceptions and Policy Choices", Pacific Community, 8 July 1977, p.47.

Beaut, "Postponement of Scheduled Visits by Ayub Khan and Shastri", Newsweek, 1965, 48, May 3, 1965.

Borodkin, E.I., "United States and to India and Pakistan", International Affairs, October 1967, London, pp.664-76.

Chakravarti, P.C., "Indian Nonalignment and U.S. Policy", Current History, March 1963, No.44, pp.129-34.

Cohen, Stephen P., "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Pacific Affairs, Spring 1976, vol.49, no.1, pp.49-69.

_____, "American Security Interests in South Asia", Strategic Studies, April-June, 1978.

Edwardes, Michael, "Tashkent and After", International Affairs, July 1966 (London).

Gandhi, Indira, "India and the World", Foreign Affairs 51, October 1972, pp.65-77.

Griffith, William J., "Sino-Soviet Relations", 1964-65, China Quarterly, no.25, January-March 1966.

Gupta, Sisir, "The Great Powers and the Sub-continent: A New Phase", The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, April 1972, pp.447-63.

_____, "The Kashmir Question Today", International Studies, vol.VI, no.3, January 1965.

Harrison, S.H., "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs

30th January, 1965, No.2, vol.43, pp.312-30.

_____, "India-Pakistan and the United States: Cost of a Mistake", The New Republic, Washington, D.C., vol.141, 24 August 1959, p.25.

Hussain, Noor A., "American Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan", International Relations, Autumn 77, Winter 78.

Johal, Sarabjeet, "Americans' Arming of Pakistan: Indian View in 1950s and 80s", Strategic Studies, Winter 1986, p.69.

Khan, Mohammad Ayub, "Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains", Foreign Affairs, vol.42, no.2, pp.195-205, January 1964.

Khan, Rais, A., "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: An Appraisal", American Studies International, vol.XXIII, no.1, April 1965.

Kryukov, P., "Result of Tashkent Talks", International Affairs (Moscow) February 1966, no.2.

Mansingh, Surjit, "US-India Relations: Problems and Prospects", India Quarterly, vol.36, July-December 1980, pp.263-284.

Misra, K.P., "Regional Peace and Security: Coalescence and Clash in Indo-Pakistan Relations", India Quarterly, July-December 1984.

Nayar, Baldev R., "Treat India Seriously", Foreign Policy, no.18, Spring 1975, pp.133-54.

Palmer, N.D., "South Asia and Great Powers", Orbis 17 (Fall 1973), no.3, pp.989-1009.

_____, "The United States and Pakistan: A Tortured Relationship", Paper read at the First Bilateral Conference on Pak-US Relations, Arlington, June 7-10, 1981.

_____, "India as a Factor in United States Foreign Policy", International Studies (Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies), vol.VI, no.1, July 1964-April 1965.

Rajan, M.S., "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.VIII, nos 1-2, July-October, 1966, pp.1-13.

- Raj, Jayanta, K., India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy, International Studies, vol.VIII, July 1966-April 1967.
- Rose, Leo E., "The Super Powers in South Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis", Orbis, vol.22, no.2, Summer 1978, pp.395-413.
- Subramanyam, K., "United States Arms Aid to Pakistan" in a paper presented in IDSA, November 8, 1970.
- _____, "India and Security of the Sub-continent", India Quarterly, vol.36, July-December 1980, pp.296-308.
- _____, "Military and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), vol.XVIII, 11 November 1968.
- Subramanian, C., "India's Defence Strategy in the Next Decade", Mainstream, November 17, 1979, pp.26-33.
- Sweat, Approaching Visits of Harold Urbon and Ayub Khan, New Republic, no.153, vol.8, December 11, 1985.
- Thomas, Raju, G.C., "Security Relationships in Southern Asia", Asian Survey, 21st July 1981, vol.XXI, no.7, pp.689-709.
- Trager, Frank N., "The U.S. and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy" Orbis, Fall, 1966.
- Venkataramani, M.S., and Arya, H.C., "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Cause of an Uneasy Partnership", International Studies (Bombay), vol.8, no.1-2, July-October 1966.
- Wright, Quincy, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: Areas of Conflict", Round Table (London), 1959-60.

Newspapers

Dawn (Pakistan)
The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)
Indian Express (New Delhi)
The Times of India (New Delhi)
The Times (London)
New York Times
Sunday Times (of New York Times)
Statesman (New Delhi)
Pravda (Moscow)
Pakistan Times
The London Observer

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Resolution of the Security Council of 20 September 1965

The Security Council,

Having considered the Reports of the Secretary-General his consultations with the Governments of India and Pakistan,

Commending the Secretary-General for his relenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the Security Council's resolutions of 4 and 6 September,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the Report of the Secretary-General, but noting further with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being,

Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

I. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

II. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

III. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

IV. Besides to consider as soon as operative, paragraph one of the Council's resolution 210 of 6 September has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter to this end;

V. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council thereon.

The Tashkent Declaration

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relationship between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

I. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

They reaffirm their obligations under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indian-Pakistani sub-continent, and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan, were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.

It was against this background that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

II. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn no later than February 26, 1966, to the positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the cease-fire line.

III. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

IV. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

VI. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures toward the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

VII. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give the instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of prisoners of war.

VIII. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions of illegal immigrants.

They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognised the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results.

They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere gratitude for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to witness this declaration.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN



RANN OF KUTCH.

KASHMIR AND JAMMU





CONFLICT OF 1965.