

**INDO—AFRICAN RELATIONS
IN THE POST—NEHRU ERA
(1965—1985)**

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AJAY KUMAR DUBEY

**CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI—110067
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


जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067

CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled,
"Indo-African Relations in the Post Nehru Era" (1965-1985)
which is being submitted by Ajay Kumar Dubey for the
award of Master of Philosophy is his own work based on
secondary sources and may be placed before the examiners
for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted
for the award of any other degree of this University
or of any other university.


(Prof. Anirudha Gupta)
Supervisor

PREFACE

A large amount of work has been done in fragmented ways on different issues and areas of Indo-African relations. This work is a modest attempt to present the dynamics of Indo-African economic relations based on these works. The political and economic diplomacy has been examined in details but the focus is to assess Indo-African economic relations with help of them and in the light of Africa's perceptions and meanings of South-South Cooperation and Collective Self Reliance. The last chapter is on Indo-African emerging relations in the light of facts and inferences of the earlier chapters. The weakness of the observation remains based as it is on secondary sources, but whatever literature has come so far it is an attempt to correlate and analyse them.

It is a matter of immense pleasure for me to express my gratitude to my Supervisor Prof. Anirudh Gupta but for whose illuminating guidance it would have been difficult for me to complete this work. He has been a formidable source of inspiration at intellectual level and a highly compassionate person at personal level. I am specially thankful to him for the patience he showed towards me during the preparation of this work. He always stood by me during my personal stress and strain. I shall ever remain thankful to him.

I must express my thanks to my former teachers especially Prof. Ali Ashraf, Dr. Z.M. Khan, Dr. S.Alam and Prof. P.N. Sharma who helped me in academic as well as in personal life.

I owe my immense gratitude to my father and my elder brother who always encouraged and helped me in whatsoever I decided to do. But for their help my life would not have been so smooth and easy.

I am thankful to my innumerable friends, inside and outside the campus, but it is not possible to list them all here. However, I am highly thankful to Sekhar who helped me a lot in many ways for this work and specially in preparations for the graphs. I am also thankful to Dr. V. Kumar, Hemant, Sanjay and Maruti for helping me in a number of ways.

Finally I express my thanks to Padma who promptly typed my drafts and to Mr. Sharma who prepared the final draft in a very short span of time.


(A.K. DUBEY)

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Background - India and Africa are two shore neighbours and it was this geographical proximity and navigable Indian ocean that had made the people of the two regions known to each other. By colonial days of 18th century and the first half of 19th century the free and voluntary relations of the past had given way to colonial needs and preferences. The present relations one of between independent self respecting regions, was formally established only after both sides got independence. However the modern relations based on equal regards and concern for each other started even before they became independent. The idea of Afro-Asian emergence itself was a sign of emerging new relations between India and Africa. Nehru's visit to Brussel Congress of February 1927 had provided an opportunity to Jawaharlal Nehru to meet many African delegates. Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy had a personal commitment to Afro-Asian resurgence. In Calcutta Session of Indian National Congress (1928), after return from Brussel, he told about Africans that "listening to their harrowing tales of suffering and their present unhappy conditions, one felt that obstacles in their way were far greater than any which other countries struggling peoples had to face and that full freedom would come to them only with the emancipation of all the people of the

world"¹ When India became independent just one month later on in September 1947. He said on a broadcast to nation that,

"We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom must endanger elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in recognition of theory and² practice of equal opportunity for all races".

The experience of discrimination of Mahatama Gandhi in South Africa had left an abiding influence in identification of the Indians with the freedom loving peoples of Africa. During his period Nehru's policy towards Africa was based on Nehru's personal commitment to Afro-Asian Resurgence. India's policy towards Africa demonstrated its support at two fronts - (1) Firstly with decolonisation of African states which India saw as continuum of process of Afro-Asian Resurgence and (2) struggle in South Africa to end the racial demination by white minority - a support which India extended even before its independence. For African countries still under colonial rule during this period, India gave an example of peaceful decolonisation and integration of many princely states, which were relevant to Africa's immediate concern of decolonisation and Pan-

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1. "Calcutta Session of AICC 1928", AICC Background to Indias Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1950). Appendix.
 2. Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sept 1946 - April 1961, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY (Publication Division, New Delhi 1961), p.2.

African unity. The Bandung (1955) and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference of Cairo (1958) demonstrated these Afro-Asian perceptions of each other. By the end of 50s however some problems arose in Indo-African relations. The divergence of views between Nkrumah and Nehru and passing of leadership of India, to Egypt after Cairo Conference of (1957) contributed to it. Also, India's refusal to recognise the nationalist party of Algeria (GPRA) and insistence of peaceful decolonisation; its moderate stand on Congo crisis ✓ which displeased both conservative Brazavellie and militant Casablanca groups; the Anglo-centric view leading not to fix time for colonial withdrawal and gulf caused between India settlers and Africans by colonialist propaganda, that, India attempted to end white domination to replace it by Indian settlers and Africans by colonialist propaganda, brought differences in the open. Moreover since Bandung onward Chinese militancy and advocacy for armed struggle appealed more to Africans.³ Indian isolation in Indo-Chinese war of 1962. Very few African countries supported India and many took openly unhelpful attitudes. The Cairo Conference of Non-aligned countries further exposed the isolation of India in a body which in whose birth it had played a significant role just 3 years back.

3. Foreign Minister Oscar Kanmbona of Tanzania said in early 60s that "He and others were wiling to agree that' Indias leadership of Asia was decandent and while China was an emergent force" quoted in D.Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement Ideology and foreign Policy of the Third World. (Jerusalem, 1973) p. 246.

This dissertation is an attempt to study Indo-African Relations in the Post-Nehru Era (1965-1985). The Choice of this period has been taken because, as we noticed earlier, India as a beacon of decolonisation in Africa, as one of the founder of Non-aligned Movement, and crusader for Afro-Asian Resurgence had been let down by those very people, to whose cause it has identified itself, and worked for. The more alarming and pathetic situation arose before India, as when it observed that even on a just cause and right approach, African countries belonging and professing to Non-aligned groups were ready accept Chinese claim and version which was till yesterday a member of Communist Block. Therefore it was time for retrospection for India towards its relations with Africa who were not only non-aligned but numerically superior with higher sense of solidarity in third world forums.⁴ India under this imperative went for planned policy of long term objectives in Africa which was to be cultivated with consistency and sincerity. This paper therefore chose mid 60s as the period to examine and analyse this relation till now, against the Nehru's period. It was by mid 60s that most of the African country got independence and the Indo-African relations from that period onward was one between two independent and sovereign peoples.

4. In Indian Sub-Continent there never had been a so strong and emotional sense of solidarity as Pan Africanism.

This period saw the complete metamorphosis of India's earlier position over a period of 20 years. From a position of utter diplomatic failures, chaos and isolation India overcame its problems in diplomatic and political fields and established ever growing relations with African countries. A study of this period, therefore would help to understand the relative role of diplomacy in world politics, the identification of causes and style that lead to success of a country from one end to other. This would also provide a understanding as, the direction in which India is proceeding in its relations with Africa, does the experience of past tentatively hints or suggests, the need of some commission or omission in the approach or policy goals itself.

It is under this perspective that it would attempted here to study Indo-African Relations in three major aspects. The first would be to examine Indo-African politico diplomatic relations. Indo-African diplomatic relations by mid 60s had gone to a very low ebb. Nehru, who played a leading role in Afro-Asian Resurgence had become somewhat indifferent to African Affairs. Indian Policy was lacking in depth of its perception for both the role Africa was going to play due to its numerical superiority and sense of solidarity and secondly in perceiving the importance and priority which African attached to issues of their importance like decolonisation and racial equality.

India had failed to realise that any such issue like peaceful co-existence, highly relevant and important though they were for India, had to be integrated with African impatience for decolonisation, in an optimum way. India stuck to its priority of peaceful co-existence, but at its own peril, in group of Afro-Asian countries. Until and unless the priority of both India and Africa was not integrated in a way that made African feel that despite India's own preference and policy, India was a part of their solution, India could not win the Africans. Once it was achieved, it could convince to a certain extent the importance and relevance of its own stand and views on different issues. Circumstances played an important role in India's move to be friend but it was the planned and systematic attempt to its policy goals that look the problems in its stride and exploited to the maximum possible extent if and when favourable circumstances came on its way. This forms the content of our discussion in the second chapter.

The second chapter, is on African Liberation struggle and role of India in that. India, which had ideological and historical identification with African Liberation movements, both for decolonisation and abolition of racial discrimination, had played a significant role in that. During early period India's support was not so strong in material terms as others. Even its qualified diplomatic support was not

persued with tact and care. Result was that it had been branded as one having 'softer' feeling on issues like colonialism which had been always obnoxious to it. Though during the period of our study, material assistance were added to Indian diplomatic efforts but they remain meagre due to India's own limitation to give more in that term. But the diplomatic alertness and initiatives were so vigorously persued, that they bridged the gap of less material assistance in bringing India as a champion and uncompromising fighter against colonialism and racialism. The honour and prestige that India acquired by the end of this period is second to none in third world. The diplomatic offensive and policy were in such a massive way that it needed a separate treatment in a chapter to bring out its role in filling the gap that was apparent by, not supplying arms and army to fight these cause in Africa due to its own limitations and considerations.

Indian diplomacy did succeed in filling the gaps in Indian desires and its effective role in African Liberation struggle but how far did it succeed, in providing a coherence to India's economic relations within emerging South-South concept is the subject matter of the fourth chapter. India had added economic dimension to its diplomacy and policy towards third world for meeting its political imperatives in mid 60s. The ITEC and other programmes it started to

counter Chinese growing economic diplomacy⁵ and as a aggressive posture, for friendship, did help India. Over the years the political urgency had passed away, but this means itself was gainful and worth persuing. Under the umbrella of NAM this became the main policy goal and other diplomatic endeavors became supportive and adjunct to it in Africa. The economic relations which has emerged so far in context of Indian initiatives and Africans response and priority in the Umbrella of South-South, is not very encouraging. Indo-African growing trends in Economic area, demands in the light of our past experiences, that it should be cultivated with care and tact if it is to operate in context of South-South. Once the South-South is emphasised, and growing trend in Indo-African economic relation could not distinguish itself qualitatively from other obnoxious and unwanted relations, then it will prove to be a boomrang for India. The need is, not to put and lump all relation as healthy signs of South-South Cooperation irrespective of the fact whether the this South-South Cooperation demonstrates the positive perception of Africa to their minimum acceptable level or not. The present economic relation

5. Sreedhar, "Chinese Economic Aid Programme in 1974" Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis News Review on China, Mongolia and Korea, July 1974, pp. 464-65.

with Africa is gainful for India but it has not come out with qualitative difference, from non-South-South relations as far as African perception is concerned. This is not to suggest that if India is gainful then it can not be a partner in South-South Cooperation in which India will fit into, along with African countries is a matter of extensive research and would not be attempted here. However what will ^{be} attempted is to analyse Indo-African relations in the South-South perceptions of both India and Africa and then to raise certain issues and questions which any South-South exercise like between relatively developed India and developing Africa has to answer and explain before South-South Cooperation between India and Africa is accepted as a viable framework. It is here that diplomacy faces its toughest task to reconcile the emerging clash of perceptions and interest. But before assessing the capacity of diplomacy in present Indo-African economic relations let us assess its demonstrated success in politico-diplomatic field in the next chapter.

CHAPTER - II

INDIA AND AFRICA POLITICAL - DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In the previous chapter we have seen that by the end of 50s, Indo-African relations were not in area of priority in Indian foreign policy. Due to combination of various factors, which we elaborated in the previous chapter, India's global concerns seemed to extend beyond the limited horizon of Asian-Africanism. The business of cultivating close relations with Africa was left to the Indian diplomatic staff alone. India had taken a 'softer' approach on colonial issues in Africa. For India, enlargement of area of peace amidst the super powers rivalry ^{the} was main concern. On the process of decolonisation in Africa, India always gave diplomatic and moral support to Africans but it was a qualified support. For Indian peaceful and constitutional pathway. It believed that international balance of forces would force the colonial powers to wind up their empire in Africa. The leadership of Afro-Asian Movement had shifted to Africans by early 60s. The increasing number of African countries, with a feeling of African solidarity was becoming an important factor in Afro-Asian meet. China,

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1. Anirudh Gupta, "India and Africa South of the Sahara", ed, in Bimla Prasad, ed., India's Foreign policy (New Delhi 1979).

on the otherhand, was providing a contrasting and radical posture as against India, on African issues.

Chou En - Lai had gone on African safari, which enabled him to develop close rapport with African leaders. and to convince them of Chinese stand. Chinese stand on armed struggle as integral part of freedom struggle and assertion that no ruling power ever left its power voluntarily along with African Chinese material support contrasted against the Indian qualified diplomatic support. Even India's limited support seemed to be hollow² and Indian image as staunch anti-colonial country was compromised. Though India had emphasised the decolonisation, and removal of apartheid was extension of Indians own struggle to freedom.³ Nehru in 1961 hold the view that Goa's liberation was an exclusive-Indian problem similarly Liberation of Mozambique

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2. The limitation of India's moral and diplomatic support to African cause was apparent when Whitehall succeeded in getting Aba Saheb Pant, the first Indian commissioner in East Africa, recalled from Kenya. His home in Kenya was a haven to political leadership of Southern Rhodesia, Uganda, North Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Zambia and Burundi. All these leaders had got a message in early years of Indian independence that the New Delhi could be fully depends on the the support on African cause despite the pressure of colonial masters on India. Therefore recall of Pant from Kenya, exposed the limitation of India for their cause.
 3. K.M. Panikar, "Decolonisation, India as a Beacon", World Focus, No. 58, oct. 1984 p.7.

and Angola was an exclusive African problem.⁴ This was the state of Indo-African diplomatic relations by early 60s. When China attacked in 1962, there were not many friends to believe Indian version of the story. It got diplomatic support from four countries in Africa-Libya, Nigeria, Congo (Leopoldville). Six other expressed sympathy and concern. Ghana, Tanzania and Guinea took an open unhelpful stand towards India.⁵ This happened despite the fact that India had always taken an anti-colonial and pro-liberation stand towards Africa in international forums like U.N.O. It had extended diplomatic and moral support to many of the liberation movements and maintained strict boycott of South Africa. Not only on Chinese issue African stands were unfavourable and embarrassing⁶ but India was totally isolated in Afro-Asian and third world meet after Chinese war. Indian diplomacy was in a state of disarray.

This chapter is an attempt to study the pressure to which Indian diplomacy was put during this period and the level to which its effectiveness had come down. Further it will be tried to trace and analyse the course

4. Anirudha, n.1, p. 269

5. Ibid, p. 269.

6. Guinea supported China's border claim whereas Ghana objected to supply of British military assistance to India.

and nature of Indian political diplomacy from this period till 1985. For this, firstly we would discuss the utter failures of Indian diplomacy during early 60s. Then the element of continuity and change in India's Africa policy, under the impact of regional, global and African imperatives of India, would be examined. Lastly, the operational aspect of Indo-African political and diplomatic relations as against policy goal would be analysed under South-South concept. For this purpose operational aspects of this relation would be taken mainly within third world forums like NAM and Afro-Asian Peoples Organization (AAPO) so that their perceptions, convergence and divergence of their stand on various issues and approach can be analysed. Intranational organizations like U.N.O. and other where developing countries had to present a common front vis-a-vis developed countries on issue of their common interest, their views generally concided. This is not to deny that there, they had differences, but harmony was a predominant element. But in third world forums like NAM, 'Group of 77' etc. their perception and policy towards each other on various issues was a predominant part of their diplomacy. In the discussion of Indian diplomacy, the detail analysis of Indian diplomacy concerned with freedom struggle in Africa and that of Indian economic diplomacy towards Africa;

has been taken up in the chapter three and four respectively. This chapter though mentions them in course of reference but deals with diplomacy specifically concerned with issues like ideology, security, leadership, and factionalism witness Indo-Africa relations.

After Chinese aggression of 1962, India and African countries met in 3rd plenary Assembly of A.A.P.O. at Moshi in Tanganyika on 4-10 February 1963. Though A.A.P.O. was a non-governmental organization where part, delegates from different Afro-Asian countries used to participate but its participant profile shows that all countries took it seriously and it witnessed the diplomatic acrobatics of different countries which was just an extension of their respective government's policies. India was being represented by two Congress M.Ps. They lost no time in presenting their proposal calling the Conference to approve the 'Colombo Proposal'⁷ for setting the conflict without reservation. They let it be known that Indians would, if necessary, quit the organisation altogether if the resolution was not passed. Chinese objected to it very strongly as 'why to bring up family quarrel when there was much more important business of changing

7. David Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (Jerusalem, 1973) p.99.

imperialist out of Africa at hand'⁸ and Africans agreed to it. Political committee ruled against Indian proposal, the Indian walked out in disgust. The Chinese carried the day and the final resolution did not contain the Indian proposal.

By this time the Sino-Soviet dispute had already come out in the open. In any Afro-Asian meet or any other international meet, their diplomacy was always to gain diplomatic support of the other countries against each other. India naturally, in Afro-Asian meet was in Soviet faction countering all Chinese move to the extent possible. Like Moshi meet of April - 1966, the Conference of AAPO Executive Committee in Nicosia, Cyprus, held seven month later, was dominated by Sino-Soviet and Sino Indian disputes. The important development in this conference was that African delegates many of whom had supported Chinese delegates at Moshi now moved over to the Soviet camp. They could not understand the Chinese attack on Test Ban Treaty, which they had heartily approved, nor were they willing to accept blindly the fury of Chinese onslaught⁹, which they felt was endangering the solidarity of Afro-Asian Movement in which they had been the leaders.

8. Ibid p. 165.

9. N. Krumah, in his message to conference, had written that "It should be our concern that this conference appeal to China and Soviet Union most strongly to eliminate their differences and to come together without any delay. Afro-Asian solidarity should also not lose its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist force".

For Indians, three points were significant in this conference. Firstly by accident or by design, Africans, Indians and Russia came in the same camp. The second was that, Indian called for the endorsement of the Colombo proposals on Indian-Chinese disputes and the chairman Dr. Varsos - took a pronounced pro Indian stand.¹⁰ Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali declared to the extent that if Sino-Indian difference were not resolved Afro-Asian solidarity would remain seriously weakened and incomplete".¹¹ Though no mention was made of Sino-Indian dispute in the final declaration but Indians were not given an impatient hearing as happened with Chinese in this conference. The third and most important point for Indians was demonstration of African importance in any Afro-Asian conclave and a potential diplomatic edge it can provide to contain Chinese.¹² In Moshi meet Indian were completely ignored

10. Kimche, n.7, p. 183.

11. Times of India (Delhi), 11.9.1963.

12. Indian Express (Delhi), 24.9.1963, wrote about it "The outcome of the executive meeting of the AAPSO in Cyprus last week had driven home an important moral to India-the importance of African opinion in Afro-Asian conclaves. The discomfiture of and isolation of China at this meeting was mainly because of the hesitant African opinion crystallising into a solid block behind India and Soviet Union"... Impatient African leaders shouted down the Chinese leaders for too much speech, making and also accused the Chinese of introducing racialism in Afro-Asian Movement when the latter asked for the inclusion of an "Asian" into three member drafting committee composed only of Africans. The Pangyhika delegate pointed out that the demand was an expression of lack of confidence in the Africans"

and trickled.¹³ In Nicosia they were heard sympathetically by Africans, and Chinese were shouted down, though their proposals were not included in final drafts. But this last thing too happened in Havana, Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America held in 1966. The experience of Nicosia conference must have left its bearing on Africa Policy when 22 Indian head of missions in Africa and West Asia met three months later in December 1963 at New Delhi to consider the case of falling of Indian influence in Africa.

In Havana meet of Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on 3rd January, 1961, all delegates proclaimed solidarity. But it was the Indian resolution on 'peaceful coexistence' put in the political committee that brought all the inner diplomacy into play. The Indian proposal was sharply opposed by Chinese.¹⁴ They objected to any mention of the word 'co-existence' They flatly refused to agree to the final conference declaration if it included that term. Basutoland and South West Africa were among those who backed Chinese to the hilt.

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13. The Indians later claimed they had been tricked. They had been assured by the Egyptians that the Chinese had agreed to slightly watered-down the resolution. On the basis of this compromise the Indian delegation continued to take part in this conference without further demands.
14. The wordings of the resolution was so written as to put Chinese at receiving end. Peaceful co-existence it stated, "is related exclusively to the sphere of relations between states with different social and political systems. It can not refer to co-existence among exploited social classes and their exploiters within a country it can neither refer to struggle of peoples victimised by imperialism against their aggressors".

India received its support from Chile, Mauritius U.A.R. and others. The impasse appeared complete. Nor was India to be ignored or lie down as in Moshi. The host, Cuban, anxious as they were to the success of conference, sought a way by means of compromise. They proposed that Indian resolution should be amended and instead of becoming part of General Declaration, as the Indian had wanted, it should be accepted as a separate resolution. The Chinese opposed this proposal again but when put to vote it was accepted by thirty one vote to nine. Indian diplomacy succeeded by getting the support of all Arab delegates (except Oman) and some-Africans, by promising to support for U.A.R. claims of establishing permanent secretariat in Cairo for this type of meet. The diplomatic failure of Chinese was apparent but the worse for them was still to come. In A.A.P.S.O. Council meeting of Nicosia in 1967 Chinese and their supporters had to walk out from it, after the majority voted to rescind the previous decision to hold the following AAPSO plenary in Peking. The ouster of China, from a militant, organisation like AAPO, was no small success of Indian diplomacy. Though the main contributory reason for it was Sino-Soviet split but Indian diplomacy exploited this split to the best against its adversary. Nor less was Indian diplomacy successful in exploiting the persistent anti-soviet stands which Chinese adopted in successive conferences, even on issues which annoyed its Chinese supporters in Africa. But it

was not the negative element alone, the exploitation of which gave edge to Indian diplomacy, but equally important were the aggressive posture of friendship which India adopted to numerically superior Africans, the association with whom went a long way in giving India its legitimate position in World Affairs.

But that was the case of Indian diplomacy in a non-governmental organisation, though no less important, and obsession with Chinese whose presence in the organisation, added more to Indian urgency to contain China. Indian diplomacy towards Africa in above Afro-sian context should be assessed in these two limitation-priority to contain China and the non-governmental nature of the organization. Before examining evolution of India's policy over the years, let us examine the state of Indian diplomacy in the early 60's in NAM Summit of Cairo in 1964. This would provide some understanding of India's diplomatic level in organisation where government diplomacy was to be used overtly and China, the main determinant of India's policy during this period towards any area, was not a member.

In second conference of Non-aligned countries in October 1964 at Cairo, the moderates were largely in disarray. Indian, without Nehru were reduced to importance. Krishna-menon had some very ^{harsh} things to say about Indian performance at Cairo. He said "We became camp follower there", "Our personality did not make an impace on the conference or

on the delegates"¹⁵ This was the state of Indian diplomacy during the Conference. Africans and Indians were at two ends. In contrast to speech of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who said "First and foremost we believe in peace, in the settlements of all disputes with peaceful means," there was statement of Kwame Nkrumah, who stated flatly "as long as oppressed classes exists there can be no such things as peaceful co-existence between opposing ideologies". In contrast to India's view that cold war was the root of all tension, for Africans the root was not cold war but colonialism. Against Indian view of non-alignment as 'respect for peace and active co-existence among peoples and states', Sekou Toure hold that non-alignment perfectly expressed the wishes of states to free themselves from the domination of centuries. This conference represented 'combative' view of non-alignment and projected Sino-Soviet rivalry within the movement".¹⁶ Shastri introduced a proposal to send a mission to China to try to persuade her to desist from developing nuclear weapons.¹⁷ Except Cyprus no other country gave any support to it and many thought it inappropriate even to

15. M. Brecher, India and World Politics-Krishna Menon's view of the world (London 1968), p.226.

16. Santi Sadique Ali, "Varying concept of Non-Alignment in Africa South of Sahara", African Studies Society of India, News Letter (Vol. 3 No. 1 Bombay 1987) p.10.

17. C.H. Heimsath and Man Singh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (New York 1971), p.173.

introduce such^a proposal. Hence when Jhakarta preparatory meet for Algier-Bandung-type-conference was being held, Egypt put the proposal that no dispute like Sino-Indian should be considered¹⁸ as a pre condition for it. India's isolation vis-a-vis China among Africans inside NAM was clear. In content it was a metamorphosis of Bandung spirit if not of Belgrade. But what was more important and in contrast to Bandung, it was Africa which took pride of place at Cairo Conference and African delegates who set the tone. Further it was a success of Chinese approach as 'Combatants' succeeded in pushing peaceful co-existence from first to fourth in the list of items of Agenda.¹⁹ The Cairo meet showed India beyond doubts the importance African had gained in NAM, the influence which China had over them, isolation which India faced among African countries and the sorry stage which Indian diplomacy had come to.

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It was in above set of circumstances and imperatives that India's policy towards Africa had to be framed. Because it was not the simple failure of Indian diplomacy but these developments showed the lack of depth in Indian perceptions on various issues of African importance. The head of missions in Africa and West Asia met in November 1963 in New Delhi. The task before India was to fix

18. Kimche, n. 7, p.119.

19. Sadique Ali, n.16, p.10.

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national priority with determined level of urgency. These policy goals had to be adopted with suitable approach and style along with the importance that Africa enjoyed under the changed circumstances and execution of policy goals. Viewing from retrospect, the first priority of Indian policy goals in Africa was to isolate China and Pakistan, which had signed "Boundary Agreement" with China ceding Indian territory of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The second priority was to arrest and enhance the falling influence of India in Africa who enjoyed greater importance in NAM and other third world forums. The strategy adopted was to be selective in approach to African countries and to make reliable friends there. Further each Chinese move was to be countered, Economic diplomacy, militant stand etc. and all other further leverage (Sino-Soviet rift, Indian settlers in Africa etc.) which India had exclusively, was to be exploited to the optimum use. These were some of the main considerations which guided India's Africa policy both for short and long term perspectives from mid 60s onwards.

In move to make reliable friends in Africa Indian policy became selective during this period. The policy of treating African countries as a block, which satisfied neither the conservatives nor the radicals, was abandoned. The anti-Chinese country got more favour from India. Strong economic ties were to be developed with these favoured countries. This was not only essential to consolidate the bonds and to reciprocate the favourable gestures during

Indo-Pak war of country like Ethiopia and to bring into fold of Indian friendship a country like Kenya, which was anti-Chinese, but also to counter the Chinese economic diplomacy which started operating in Africa by mid 60s.²⁰ Indian economic diplomacy, though launched it was under political imperatives, was conceived and successful due to relative strength of Indian economy and to some extent due to support of Indian settlers in Africa.

Instead of relying solely on diplomatic channel, as was the case during late 50s, Africa got special attention from Indian Political leaders. "When is Pandit Nehru going to visit us" was a persistent question during those days to Ajit S. Gopal an Indian journalist on African Affair. Chou Eu-Lai had gone on African Safari and this gave him a chance to establish a closer rapport with African leaders and to convince them of Chinese stand on various issues and to know the exact feelings of African leaders on various issues of their importance. Making amend to earlier dependence on diplomats, Mrs. Gandhi went with a high power delegation to an African Safari in 1963-64. The main task of this Safari was to (1) assess China's influence in Africa (2) explaining the factors behind Indids reverse in border war (3) assessing the future 420,000 people of Indian origin settled in Africa, and (4) effecting technical and economic collaboration with

20. Sridhar, "Chinese Economic Aid Programme in 1974," Institute of Defence Studies and News Analysis News Review on China, Mongolia and Korea, July 1974, pp.464-65.

African countries.²¹ India was not only countering all important Chinese move in Africa, as in case of support to militant nationalist, economic diplomacy; both of which had been discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively; and visit of political leaders as in this case, but was also trying to use all other exclusive leaverages available to it. Large number of Indian settlers were important from this angle. Indian move was to include them in larger Africa Policy of India. In 1963 Africa Safari, "Apart from her other engagements, including calling on head of State, Mrs. Gandhi never missed an opportunity to meet the Indian leaders and members of the community, even their number in certain small location was not exceeding even 50."²² (emphasis added), writes Ajit S. Gopal the Indian journalist who covered her entire Safari. He further wrote, "The constant refrain in her speeches was that Indian settled in Africa must identify themselves completely with African People and make their fullest contribution to the society in which they lived". This was the continuation of Nehru stand but its importance has changed under the changed circumstances. Nehru was somewhat impatient with settlers in Africa. He refused to accept the thesis that they were entitled by virtue of their Indian origin to protection.²³ But Mrs. Gandhi described them as "Ambassador of India" a subtle contrast from Nehru's view which sounded out right dissociation

21. Anirudh, n.1, p.270.

22. Ajit S. Gopal, "Indians in Africa Ambassadors for India", World Focus, 58, Oct. 1984.

23. Anirudh, n.1, p.266.

of Indian settlers from Policy considerations of India. Not only this exhortion to Indian settlers, even to those in remote areas by an Indian politician pleased African Leaders but gave a chance to Indian leaders to establish close rapport with leaders of Indian settlers in Africa.

The report of the delegation, presented to government, emphasised two points that Africa's new leaders were not pro-Chinese and that there was abundant good-will for India which ought to be made use of.²⁴ Later throughout her Prime Ministership, Mrs Gandhi continued to take interest in African Affairs and there was stream of African dignitaries who visited New Delhi just to see her and seek her counsel.²⁵ The inclusion of 'Indian settlers' in Africa, in policy frame of India was more apparent in Kenya when India initiated with government of Kenya the plan for formation for Africa-India Development Association(Africendo) with a long term objective to seek the integration of Indian community numbering about 15,000 in the economic life of Kenya".²⁶

Though ultimately it could not materialise , due to reasons other than disinterest of India, but it did show the inclusion of settlers in Indian policy and the contrast which it provided along with other economic initiative in Kenya to the pro-Chinese Tanzanian which also had Indian

24. Ibid, p.270.

25. Gopal, n.22, p.12.

26. Anirudh,n.1, p.272.

settlers.²⁷

Though priority of India's diplomacy till late 60s was to counter Chinese influence in Africa and make reliable friends there, but at the same time India had started a determined move to develop strong economic relations with African countries. Though this helped India in meeting its priority, in Africa policy, the economic consideration was also not minimal. The relative higher level of Indian development and umbrella of South-South Cooperation under NAM gave India incentives in economic field to fulfil its political end. The next area where Indian policy change was noticeable was on issue of Indian support to liberation struggle in Africa. India from mid 60s became more militant in its support. The details of Indian policy in this regard has been taken up in the next chapter.

Or The Bangladesh war of 1971 demonstrated that India was capable of meeting combined threats of China, Pakistan and U.S.A. "If one war caused major reverse in India's foreign policy, another enabled India to triumph over the crippling effects of this reverse."²⁸ The self sufficiency of food by mid 70s showed the dynamism and buoyancy that Indian economy had. India exploded its first peaceful nuclear device in 1974.

27. The reason for failure of Africendo was the exodus of Asian which began after passing of British Immigration Bill of 1968 and hesitation of Indian settlers to contribute money due to lack of political security. The other economic initiatives in Kenya was the government encouragement to Indian industrialist in investing to build twenty two industrial units in Nairobi.

28. Anirudh, n.1, p.272.

This showed Indian capability and advancement in science and technology. India had succeeded in securing the support of one power against the possible danger from other by 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty without compromising its non-aligned status.

The two major implications of these developments were that India **out** grew her inferiority complex which she was suffering since Indo-Chinese War of 1962. Now Indian policy and diplomacy became positive, including towards African countries, compared to 60s when it's major concern was to contain China and Pakistan. Secondly for Africa, India again became a power to turn to, for help and assistance."²⁹ Indian diplomacy during this period changed its priority. In Africa India's major concern was to foster economic cooperation under the umbrella of south-south cooperation. India utilised all its diplomatic strength under all international forums like U.N.O. NAM to develop South-South Cooperation. In 1974 U.N. resolution was passed on New International Economic order. Government of India made it very clear to its diplomats that they have to act as salesman to the country of their accreditation and their career and future fortune prospects will depend on their performance in this field only.³⁰ Policy to make friends in Africa and gain their deplomatic support on various issues, shifted to creation and cultivation of

29. Ibid, p.273.

30. Foreign Affairs Record, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, April 1972, p.161-62.

gainful economic links. In any third world cooperation India will not only gain like other partners but because of its relative advancement in economy and technology it always had chances of gaining more than other. The economic diplomacy of India in Africa has been elaborated and discussed in the fourth chapter in details.

The China factor which had been obsessing India by early 70s was also over by mid 70s. Mrs. Gandhi had taken personal interest in Africa since her China Safari of 1963-64. During Lusak and Algier Non-Aligned Summit she took personal interest in meeting and interacting with African leaders. During the period of Janta Party government and Rajiv Gandhis government there has not been any qualitative policy departure or addition. Over the years Indias stand on issue of Nambian independence and abolition of apartheid in South Africa had become more and more stronger. Economic diplomacy came to have greater thrust, though, as we would discuss in the fourth chapter, the result had not been very encouraging.

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Having discussed the compulsions of Indian policy change towards Africa in 60s, and India's Africa policy over the years, now we would examine the operational style, response and effectiveness when the policy interacted with African countries. The most suitable field for study of Indo-African diplomacy will be NAM as in this third world forum both have a free play of diplomatic and policy projections

directed towards each other, in contrast to organisations like U.N.O. where their maximum effort is to act in union vis-a-vis developed countries. In this exercise different issues important for both India and Africa would be taken up. It will be attempted to gauge the differences on issues and the role which diplomacy of India played in bridging the perception or interest gaps, and to what extent it was successful in fulfilling its job under broader policy perspective of India.

The NAM Summit of Cairo (1964), we discussed in the beginning. The first Summit of NAM after the policy modification of mid 60s, was Lusaka Summit of 1970. Since Lusaka to New Delhi meet to 1983, the main running issues in all these Summits were (1) The changing concepts of NAM (2) support to national liberation and (3) the case of South-South Cooperation. The 2nd and 3rd issue in the present context have been discussed in chapter three on 'African Liberation Struggles and India's Role' and in chapter four on 'Indo-African Economic Relations' respectively. The question related to definition and purpose of NAM had always surfaced in one way or other. We had noticed that during Cairo Summit the difference between India and Africa was on NAM's priority, for peaceful co-existence, or, for national liberation. To India NAM as a movement, equidistant from super power rivalry, 'was the main source of its power'.³¹

31. Heimsath, n.17, p.61.

However, as Heismath and Man Singh had observed "the power derived from Non-alignment existed only in relations to those states, whose peculiar interests were attacked when that posture was assumed by another state."³² This explains the Indian adherence to its earlier philosophy for NAM. In operation it accepted and encouraged economic dimension also but it never changed from position which was very close to provide the peculiar gain India was having by that position. In Cairo when the tone was of militancy, 'combative' view was the predominant style, India never changed its stand on that count. In Lusaka Summit most of the militant leaders were absent notably Nkrumah from sub-sahara, Ben Bella from Algeria and, Nasser of Egypt who had vigorously championed the case of liberation struggle.³³ Lusaka Manifest on Southern Africa had toned down the appeal for armed struggle. This Manifesto emphasised peaceful and non-violent change as a method to liberate the oppressed Black majority. However, the issue was not left untouched. African concern for liberation struggle did have its impact in the Final Declaration. Though stating that there was no need to redefine NAM there were nuances of these leaders perceptions in the final charter: in words of Shanti Sadique Ali "It no longer defined non-alignment as an 'irreplacable instrument for solution of contemporary world and establishment

32: Ibid. p.61.

33. Sadiqu Ali, n. 16, p.11.

of international relations based upon principle of active and peaceful co-existence' but rather as 'an integral part of the changes in the present structure of international community in its entirety, and production of anti-colonialist revolution."³⁴ At Algier Conference again super powers Cuba projected the opinion of Soviet Union that as NAM is anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, Soviet Union is its natural ally. This time the change in definition of NAM was based on different element. Despite India's reservation, in Economic Declaration it observed that detent so longer sought by non-aligned nation, "did not have any beneficial effect on developing countries and international cooperation". At Colombo the Cuba and Cuban thesis of Natural Ally was not accepted. It was at Havana Summit that controversy over the concept of natural ally became very sharp. Senegalese Foreign Minister M. Moustapha accused Castro of exploiting his position as a host "to favour his interest and his political opinions"³⁵ It was Nyrere of Tanzania who restored the balance. Expressing his doubt whether the movement had permanent enemies and permanent friends, let alone natural ones" he warned that natural alliance between non-alignment and Soviet Block would cause the movement to "cease to be an influence on the world and fall apart". It was due to Indian help along with Nigerian and host delegation that final draft was prepared. Which was a compromise but underlined the primacy of the unity

34. Ibid. p.14.

35. Ibid. p.17.

of the movement. It was in New Delhi that this controversy was completely side tracked. The main thrust and focus of Non-alignment shifted to and for the cause of economic cooperation. In the changed circumstances of 80s, NAM's earlier relevance for India had given way to more tangible concept of South-South Cooperation in economic matter. This was the first in item of Agenda as well as in Final Declaration. In the earlier successive Summits India had yielded slightly here and there to make more dent on more relevant useful concept of South-South economic cooperation, the case of which would be examined in the fourth chapter. But it was on issue of support to Liberation movement in Africa that India had been consistent after mid 60s policy initiative and it had extended more and more diplomatic and material support to it. The detail examination and assessment of India role in this regard forms the subject matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER - III

LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN AFRICA - ROLE OF INDIA

From its own experience of 200 years of colonialism in India, it considered its own freedom struggle to be part of a world wide movement ^{against} colonialism and imperialism. The father of India, Mahatama Gandhi, had himself suffered racial discrimination in South Africa before he spearheaded freedom struggle of India. Indian attitude towards freedom struggles was influenced by its history; long colonial experience had taught it that colonialism is an evil in itself and it is an obstacle in development of human personality. Therefore for India, African decolonisation was a continuation of its own struggle.

The moral support and ideological identification with the cause of African Liberation movement, against colonial and racial segregation, had always been a part of India's policy towards Africa. However as freedom can not be attained just by this alone, African nationalist expected, more than this from India and others. It will be attempted here first to fix the parameter under which different considerations determined the nature and intensity of the Indian role in liberation struggle of Africa. Further in that broader framework it will be tried to analyse Indian role in the post-Nehru era with an attempt to locate and account for the shift that took place either in magnitude or in direction against the background of Nehru era.

The independence of India itself was perceived as a threat to European possessions in Africa.¹ Naturally the infant nation-state of India was under direct and indirect pressure of colonial powers during the early years of independence. The susceptibility and vulnerability of India due to those pressure can be understood in terms of its weak economy, the fear of Indian ocean being militarised, the possession of foreign enclaves like Goa and Pondichery inside the country, and its position in U.N.O. on issues like Kashmir.

India's approach towards colonial powers in Africa, to some extent was shaped by the above considerations and the relative position they hold in these considerations.²

Secondly, the attitude of India in 50s towards African liberation movements had been, to certain extent, based on its own recent experience and approach for Indian freedom struggle. Indian ideological and moral commitment to African Liberation was absolute but it had its reservation

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1. In 1948 the Kenyan governor sent a message to London in which he articulated the potential threat an independent Indian possessed to European possessions in Africa. The evidence of letter has been cited by Prof. Anirudha Gupta, in "Indias struggle against Aparthied" "India and Foreign Review" March 1979.
 2. India had softer attitude towards Britain. Vice-President Radha Krishnan during his visit to East Africa in 1965 said "Britain had been more humane and civilized in their methods in Africa". Partially this softer attitude towards Britian was due to India's experience in commonwealth where it felt that Britian was more sincere than any other colonial power for advancement of African countries towards self-government and independence.

on strategy for it, under its own experience, like that of non-violent path, and that determined its responses to various paths of liberation struggle in Africa.

Thirdly, the relative importance which Africa had for India in pursuit of its own legitimate and enlightened national interests and imperatives; internal as well as external, despite its total commitment to Africa from racial and colonial situation, is equally important to understand the change in dimensions and intensity of Indian role for African liberation struggles.

Now it will be attempted here to examine the nature and level of Indian support to Africa and the change and continuity in its dimensions and intensity, under the above considerations and under responses and expectations of Africans, from India and other countries in the post Nehru era. As against the Nehru era certain important developments took place by early 60s which had its own bearing in Indian role in African liberation movements. The first was the liberation of Goa Daman and Diu by military of Indian government. The failure of non-violent method like dialogue and negotiation had prompted India to adopt armed approach for liberation of Goa. And now in India's own conviction and logic, armed struggle was not totally undesirable means for liberation and it was an imperative for India to justify and legitimise its armed action in Goa. Secondly the consideration for appeasing the masters of foreign enclaves in India was

no longer there, once they got merged with main land of India. Thirdly, by mid 60s, India's role in Afro-Asian movement and for third world initiatives, had been overtaken by Africans who had higher numerical strength and greater sense of solidarity.

The contrast policy of China with higher material support and militant approach exposed the limitation of Indian role in African movement. Though China's open support with arms and ammunition should not be compared with India as China had an umbrella of communist block,³ where as a non-aligned India had to take into account considerations other than China had to. But by early 60s Sino-Soviet split came into open and after Indo-Pak war of 1965 Soviet entry into Indian subcontinent provided India chance to be assured at home and to operate at wider world settings.⁴ But since Indo-Chinese war India's isolation in third world and Afro-Asia, the cause of whom it had aggregated, articulated and nurtured, was total. In Africa, Indian position, during Indo-Asian peoples Solidarity Organisation, was deplorable.⁵ India had to reassess its policy and approach if it wanted to get the position, which it legitimately deserved, in third

3. China was a member of Communist Block and Sino-Soviet split came in Open in early 60s only.

4. Heemsath and Man Singh, Diplomatic History of India (New York 1971) p.179.

5. It has been discussed in earlier chapter in details.

world on account of its history, geography, demography and economic strength. This position was not the one of dominance but to be recognised as a friend, as a nation not to be totally ignored.⁶

In terms of its international constraints, Kashmir issues by now had been pushed to background and Russia veto for this case, in aftermath of Sino-Soviet split and Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement of 1962, could be depended upon. Most of British colonies had become independent by mid 60 and Britain was the most influential colonial power in Indian considerations. The urgency was to counter Chinese influence and Africans were the important for India for two reasons. Firstly numerically superior African strength provided a leavaraage to dilute Chinese influence in third world forms like NAM⁷ and A.A.P.O. etc and secondly Africans were not pro-Chinese and anti-Indian but the open, full support to African cause of decolonisation, had made them popular in Africa.⁸ Under these changed circumstances and priority of

6. Krishna Minon observed about Indian position in Cair Meet of NAM "We became a camp followers there, Our personality did not make an impact on the conference or on delegates" etc. quoted in M. Brecher, India and World Politic - Krishnan Menon's View of the World (London 1968) p.226.

7. Indian Express (Delhi) 24.9.1968. It elaborated the importance of African states for India the role they played in countering Chinese influence at executive committee meeting of AAPSO in Cyprus. Please see chapter two foot note no. 11.

8. In Bandung they had agreed with Nehru on peaceful co-existence; 'panchsheel'. But later on when Sino-Soviet split come into open 'Peaceful co-existence' became totally unacceptable to Chinese.

Indian policy, the role of India in African freedom struggle grew in dimensions and increased in intensity.

The main ingredients of Indian policy of Africa in regards to liberation struggle during Nehru period were (1) to emphasise on decolonisation (2) apposition to racial domination and discrimination and advice to Indian settlers to integrate themselves into indigenous population.⁹ The understanding of India was that African should follow a peaceful constitutional path for their freedom struggle as India had done. Indian existence and preference for non-violence had eliminated many of African leaders who had great expectations from India. As against this Chinese and demonstrated much more militancy and this led them to get many more friends in Africa. Indian response was not late in mending its way. About 1965-66 India also made a determined effort to revive its original image as anti-colonial, anti-racial power. Tactically this became necessary to counter Chinese propoganda that India had gone over to the camp of imperialist."¹⁰ The changed circumstances and urgency of mid 60s, along with Indias commitment against racial discrimination and colonial holding, found expression in stronger stand which India took on Rhodesian

9. Anirudha Gupta, "India and Africa South of Sahara" in Bimla Prasad ed., Indias Foreign Policy (New Delhi 1979) p.266.

10. Ibid. p.271.

issues. India had always considered it as a non-self governing territory. But on 7th May 1985 it became the first in the world to break off its diplomatic relation with Rhodesia and was one of the first to impose total embargo after proclamation of Unilateral Declaration of Independence. (UDI) The decision to break of diplomatic relation was done even five months before the declaration of UDI when Ian Smith regime ordered for election based on restricted frenchies indicating positive development towards proclamation of UDI.¹¹ Where as earlier under white hall pressure India had recalled Aba Sahab Pant its Commissioner to East Africa, whose home was haven for African nationalist from different colonial territories¹² Indian move to break ties with Rhodesia was a sign, that India was no longer certain of Britains ability to effectively intervene in Rhodesian Affairs".¹³ When the nationalist of Guinea Bissau set up a government in exile, Indian did not waste time to ponder over the legality of the government. This exile government got Indian recognition as soon as it was constituted. Similarly when in Angola Civil war was in progress and entire Angola was parcelled among FLNA, MPLA and UNITA

11. Shanti Sadiq Ali, "Indias Support to African Liberation Movements" ed. R.R. Ramchandano, India and Africa (New Delhi 1980) p.62.

12. Ajit S. Gopal "Indians in Africa Ambassador for India" World Focus, 58, Oct. 1984, p.13.

13. Sadiq Ali, n.11 p.62.

factions of nationalist and even OAU has not made up its mind as whom to recognise as legitimate representative of Angolan people, Indian government announced its decision to recognise Movimentos Populares de Libertação de Angola (MLA) in Angola. This showed the India's initiative and the close watch it was keeping in African development. Chinese on the other hand supported UNITA, the faction which was, later on disclosed, supported and aided by South African government and CIA of America. This proved to be highly embarrassing for Chinese and they had to suffer in African affair due to this type of policy of aiding and abetting all anti-Moscow factions in Africa.¹⁴ This change in Indian stand is in sharp contrast to position which India took during Nehru period. During Nehru period India did not give recognition to provisional government of Algeria (GPRA) on the ground that it had been set up in exile and it was against international law. The support of India to African liberation did not change even with the change of government in New Delhi. In fact this support always kept on intensifying. Chinese factor, for becoming more active in Africa had gone by early 70s and the isolation of New Delhi in NAM and third world had changed into friendship with many countries. But Indian diplomatic support always remained more strong and more supportive as it was in late 60s. The reasons for this was the Indian role in NAM and its desire for South-South Corporation

14. Anirudha, n.9, p.274.

again provided an umbrella and incentive to pursue strongly the cause of African liberation, a cause which India always stood for ideologically also. The accreditation of SWAPO as a legitimate representative of Namibian people and opening of its diplomatic offensive which started in mid 60s to counter Chinese but now for different cause. The attack on Libiya by USA in 1986 and the immediate and sharp reaction of India alongwith other NAM's foreign minister not only reciprocated the 1962 gesture of Libiya, when China attacked India, but also showed the solidarity which India wants to demonstrate with African and other third world countries even at the cost of openly challenging the super powers.

However the diplomatic role of India was more used inside the UNO : From Late 40s to late 50s, UNO was dominated by west, and till beginning of 60s there were very few countries from Africa who were members of UNO.¹⁵ It was India that represented and articulated the cause of Africans there. However with the rapid expansion of Afro-Asian members in U.N.O., India took a quieter role as the African group took the role to represent African problems.¹⁶ However this group always enjoyed stronger backing of India, for African liberation from colonial

15. K.M. Panikar "Decolonisation: India as a Beacon", World Focus, 58, Oct 1984, p.8.

16. Sadiq Ali, n. 11, p.63.

rule, as well as for abolition of apartheid. India gave its active support in many of U.N. resolutions against apartheid and colonial rules. In 1967 U.N. General Assembly condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity. In 1970 General Assembly adopted the resolution on right of the people of South Africa to end colonialism by "all means at their disposal", including armed struggle. The racist regime of South Africa was declared illegitimate, which had no right to represent peoples of South Africa. In 1977 U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on a mandatory armed embargo against South Africa. In all these resolutions India had worked for years in unison with Afro-Asian delegates to end apartheid.

India's diplomatic initiative at world forums against apartheid in South Africa had been appreciated by all. On October 5, 1976, the UN Committee Against Apartheid was convened in New York specially to pay tribute to India. Delegates from all over the world hurled praise on role of India since last 30 years. It was for the first time that the Committee during 12 years of its existence had honoured a member state. Ambassador Leslie O Harriman of Nigeria and chairman of the Special Committee said on the occasion,

We in this Special Committee was particular appreciation to India for its consistent cooperation. When this Committee began its work on April 2, 1963 the very first document before it was a letter from India offering full cooperation. When this committee appealed in 1964 for assistance to Political prisoners the very first contribution came from India. We found a response from India for every request.

1964 for assistance to Political prisoners the very first contribution came from India. We found a response from India for every request. We made in the cause of the liberation of South Africa¹⁷ (emphasis added).

On Namibian issue also India had worked consistently and aggressively in U.N.O. When World Court of Justice deferred its decision in 1971, with regard to terminating South Africa's illegal occupation in Namibia, India's then Minister of External Affairs told the court in February 1971, that, "It is a political question which has to be dealt with by conscience of mankind. It is incumbent on national community to close this ugly chapter in history of international relations."¹⁸ In December 1982 the Indian representative to UNO moved a proposal for global meet on Namibia to be held in 1983. It was adopted by overwhelming 130-0 votes."¹⁹ When India broke all its relations with South Africa, U.N.O. has been the main channel through which India exercised its diplomatic pressure on the white minority regime of South Africa.

Other forums for use of Indian diplomacy for African freedom struggles have been NAM and Commonwealth.

17. Cited in Harisharan Chhabra, "Indias struggle Against Apartheid" Struggle Against Apartheid (International Youth Conference Against Apartheid 8th & 9th January 1987 New Delhi, organised by and in booklet issued by Indian Youth Congress IO.

18. Quoted in Veena Sharma "India and African Liberation Movement" Pamphlet.

19. Ibid. p.7.

During successive NAM Summit it had joined its African friends and others in protest against South Africa's minority regime and colonial rules. In Lusaka Summit of 1970, out of 6 major resolutions 3 were on apartheid arm supplies to Portugal and Zimbabwe in addition to a general resolution on decolonisation.²⁰ It proposed that economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa should be broken up. Indian position can be judged from the fact that, it had broken its diplomatic relations and economic sanction against South Africa way back in 1954 where the 7% of its export used to be absorbed there. In the case of Portugal it had announced, after Goa action, that it would not resume its diplomatic ties unless Portuguese colonies in Africa got freedom. What was being suggested to be done; India had done, it much in advance though the additional reasons were there for that. In the 1976 Non-aligned Summit of Colombo pledged " increasing practical support to liberation movement, since any delay in effective action is bound to encourage the minority racist regim (in South Africa) to precipitate wider conflict and resort to massive violence".²¹ Delhi Sumit of NAM condemned the US policy of 'constructive engagement' aimed at countering the inter-

20. Shanti Sadiq Ali "Varying Concepts of Non-alignment in Africa South of the Sahara" Africa News Letter Journal of African Studies Society of India Vol. 111, No. 1, Jan-June 1987, p.12.

21. Anirudha Gupta, "India's Struggle Against Apartheid" India and Foreign Review Ist March, 1979.

national campaign for total isolation of apartheid south Africa. It noted that 'persistent effort of Apartheid regime to acquire a nuclear weapon was yet another indication of its determination to maintain its dominance.' India accorded full diplomatic recognition to SWAPO representative on New Delhi on April 19, 1985 while commemorating the 25th Anniversary of SWAPO at an extra ordinary meeting of NAM in New Delhi. This was done just when South Africa on its side, had announced the setting up of a puppet interim government in Namibia. The meeting also committed all possible diplomatic, military and material supports stressing the need for greater political as well as "more tangible material assistance" to SWAPO. Rajiv Gandhi announced that "India would make a further contribution to the Non-aligned Solidarity Fund for the liberation of Namibia."²² The other forum had been Commonwealth, through which India has tried to mobilise public opinion and support from the member countries for African liberation movement. In Commonwealth Conference at Nassua, India alongwith other leaders insisted to the point of near break in organisation for the immediate enforcement of nine economic measures by U.K. A group of seven eminent persons from the Commonwealth including one from India was to monitor and submit a report on development in South Africa within six months.

22. Veena Sharma, n. 18, p.12.

We discussed the case of increased and strong diplomatic support of India to African freedom struggle through various forums like U.N.O. NAM and Commonwealth. This was the support India extended even before 60s through not so strongly except in case of South Africa. But what added additional dimension to Indian role was the other material military and financial support to freedom fighters in Africa. By 1969 India had spent more than one and quarter million of rupees to assist the African liberation movement;"²³ India's total assistance by 1977 had been up to Rs. 5 million. The enormous increase during Janata period in this amount showed that whoever may come India's commitment to African liberation is based on solid ground not for rhetoric or personal commitment of any leader. India allotted Rs. 31 million in one financial year of 1977-78,"²⁴ as reported by Tanzanian Shihata News Agency to add strength to its diplomatic move. India had pledged a million of Rupees to Lesotho and half a million rupees to Botswana to be used at their discretion for Indian goods and services."²⁵ India has provided SWAPO and ANC with facilities to man their respective missions in New Delhi. Material and technical assistance have been given over the years for South Africa and Namibian liberation struggles. India had made modest contribution to U.N. fund for Namibia, U.N. Institute for Namibia, U.N. Education and Training Programme for South Africa, UN Trust

23. Sadiq Ali, n.11, p.65.

24. The Statesman, 4 August 1977.

25. Patriot 5th August 1977.

Fund for South Africa and to International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa. A number of South African and Namibian are given free education in Indian Institutions of higher learning. India has regularly contributed to UN Fund for Namibia and it sent a number of experts and scholars from India to U.N. Institute of Namibia in Lusaka. Foreign Minister of India Vaj Payee at Foreign Minister Conference of Commonwealth had declared that India would definitely consider any request for arms made by guirillas fighting against white minority rule in southern Africa."

In our discussion on India's diplomatic and other supports to African liberation movement we noticed certain elements of changes against Nehru period. The hesitation in recognising a provisional government of freedom fighter on any ground had disappeared. India always worked for an opportunity to find a representative body to whom it can extend all the support as we noticed in case of, SWAPO, Guenea Bassau's exile government, MPLA, SADAR of Western Sahara etc. The marked aggressive approach of India as against Nehru period for supporting liberation movement is clear. Secondly, India's financial and diplomatic crusade against problem of African liberation in late 60s till now was also shift from Nehru period. For Nehru, African liberation was African problem as Goa's

liberation was Goa's problem."²⁶ Not only India provided financial contribution to front-line-states in their fight against apartheid but the creation of Africa Fund to compensate and defend these movement shows the level of Indian involvement in Africa fund. In creation of it, not only it became its chairman but also the first, substantial contributor. The commendation of all military struggle and financial aid to them along with training in military tactics for them is again a substantial departure from Nehru period's which recommended peaceful path for struggle. However the commitment that India made in Nehru period remained the same. It is only in intensity and dimension that changes are noticeable. In addition to it there are certain other aspects of Indian role which are worth noting. Firstly, the special attention which India gave for South African cause has been always maintained. Secondly the contribution of Indian support to these liberation movements, since 1965 onward itself had been through O.A.U. or other multi-lateral agency so that it does not smack of Indian design in Africa to breed its puppets."²⁷ Thirdly, Indian contribution in military training

26. Economic Weekly (Bombay) 6th Sept. 1961 Reprinted in Anirudha n. 9, p.269.

27. Sadique Ali, n.11, p.64.

and in arms and ammunition is nil but the biggest contribution of India was in area of creating favourable public opinion world wide against apartheid. Fourthly India always gave a top priority to UNO and OAU and other organisation articulating aiding and abating the cause of freedom struggle."²⁸ Fifthly, once China, the catalyst in on going policy of Indian active role, was out by 1974 as an incentive, to increased the role of Indian in freedom struggle of Africa,²⁹ then that sustained and even accelerated Indian involvement in Africa, in freedom struggle, and desire to win more and more African friends, by siding with their cause even after 1974? Is it the ideological identification or some newly emerging areas of mutually gainful economic cooperation with African countries? This is the aspect we would examine in the next chapter.

28. Ibid. p.63.

29. Anirudha, n.9., p.274.

CHAPTER IV

INDO - AFRICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Indo-African Relations acquired a new economic dimension from mid 60s onwards. India had trade and commercial links with Africa. During Jawaharlal Nehru time it continued without any special attention. But by mid. 60s this economic element was cultivated by India with deliberate attempts for gains other than economic also. Though these attempts did not result in developing a constantly growing economic bonds, as we would discuss later, it did prove to be an exercise for India and Africa in context of South-South Cooperation. It would be tried here to study this exercise in two broader aspects. Firstly, the area of economic diplomacy would be discussed to know as what were the purpose and policy goals of India's economic diplomacy between mid 60s to mid 80s? What were the factors that shaped these long or short term goals. Further what were the elements of change and continuity in these policies and what effected those change if any. In the last it would be tried to examine that besides the perceived goal of economic diplomay, is there any, intrusion, deviation or imputs in policy formulation itself due to autonomy and structure of Indian decision making process in foreign policy bureaucracy, which at times affect Indo-African relations. But this role of foreign policy bureaucrats would be examined in the last, once the operational analysis of Indo-African relations in context of

South-South Cooperation is over. This would enable us to locate the place and process where deviation from professed goal of south-south cooperation is possible, due to bureaucratic procedures and structures. The second aspect would be to examine the operational aspect of Indo-African economic relations. This relation has been broadly divided here, for sake of analysis, into three areas (1) trade (2) production cooperation and (3) other economic linkages.

An attempt would be made to discuss these three areas with perspective of South-South Cooperation so that problems in and prospects of this framework can be assessed. This would be done in the light of last 20 years of its working and in reference to various overt and covert policy goals and preferences of India and African countries. In addition to this, an attempt would be made along with the discussion to identify areas and policy options for stronger and mutually beneficial economic ties irrespective of the fact that whether it fits into concept of collective Self-Reliance or not.

The emergence of many African states by mid. 60s, crystallisation of Non-aligned Movement and India's own desire and compulsions to cooperate with other developing countries, placed Indo-African relations on a new footing. During this time India started following a policy of long term objectives in Africa which continue till today. This policy aims at creation and consolidation of stronger economic bonds between countries of South and to use India's relative economic strength for development of these countries on mutually

beneficial basis. The manifestation of these cooperative effort was visible by mid 70s onward in different economic areas, like trade, joint ventures, training, project execution and consultancy.

In 1963, Organisation of African Unity was established. It expressed the determination to "provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among all states."¹

The two successive non-aligned summits of Belgrade 1961 and Cairo 1964 had started injecting self-confidence among newly independently countries. Cairo Declaration made an special mention of O.A.U. and decided to coordinate and concert its effort with O.A.U. "With a view to safeguard their joint interest in economic, social and culturaleal Development and in international cooperation"² Indo-Africa relations got a conceptual unbrella of NAM for economic cooperation. The forum of developing countries, Group of 77 was established in 1964 and India took an active part in it. This Group was to look together at major international economic issues mainly being discussed under the framework of UNCTAD, to work out common stand on that and thus, to speak with one voice vis-a-vis developed countries as

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1. "Charter of the O.A.U.," Given in A.Ajala Pan Africanism, evolution, Progress and prospects (London-1973), Apendix 5, p. 369.
 2. Shanti Sadiq Ali, "Varying concept of Non-Alignment in Africa South of Sahara", African Studies Society of Indo-Afirca News Letter (vol.3 no.1 Bombay 1987) p.11.

a whole.³ On the other side, in India sub-continent, Chinese attack of 1962 had humbled Indian position in third world. We discussed in the earlier chapter as ^{to} low [^] India was obsessed with the task to counter Chinese influence in third world, NAM and especially in Africa in the aftermath of Indo-Chinese war. China was gaining influence in third world due to its large economic support to these countries who were badly needing fund and material assistance than mere rhetoric or moral support.⁴

As a sequel to it india reoriented and step ^{ped} [^] up its economic diplomacy with higher degree of thrust and urgency. The head of Indian missions in South and South Asia gathered in New Delhi in June 1963 and that of Africa and West Asia in November 1963 for giving intensive thought to the question of improving our existing arrangement for technical and economic cooperation"⁵ After the discussions government of India decided "to provide technical and economic assistance to other developing countries to the maximum extent possible within the limits of financial and man power

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3. Adebyo Adedeji, "Africa and the South : Forging Truly Interdependent Economic and Technical Links", Africa Quarterly, Vol.XX; No. 1-2, 1980, p. 22.
 4. Sreedhar, "Chines Economic Aid Programme in 1974" Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis News Review on China, Mongolia and Korea, July 1974 pp. 464-65.
 5. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 1964. 65, p. 84.

resources"⁶ (emphasis added). In 1963 a high power delegation led by Mrs Indira Gandhi visited a number of African countries. Besides other things to assess chinese influence in Africa and possibilities of effecting technical and economic cooperation there. It recommended that there was abundant good will for India and it ought to made use of⁷ Government of India as a follow up action consulted various ministries, drew major plans to be taken up and devised various financial and administrative support for them. These plans were approved by Cabinet on 15th September 1964.⁸ The Annual Report of External Affairs Ministry Government of India for the first time systematically rationalised the need for forgoing economic linkages and economic cooperation among developing countries. The report under chapter of technical and economic cooperation stressed the need for "a cooperative effort by developing countries themselves on the other."⁹

It was under these considerations and imperatives that India launched her Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC Programme). This plan made her join the rank of aid-doner in third world. This programme put India on wider economic setting so that she can counter Chinese

6. Ibid, p. 85.

7. Anirudha Gupta, "India and Africa South of the Sahara" in Bimal Prashad, ed., India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi 1979) p. 270.

8. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 1964-65, pp. 86-87.

9. Ibid, pp. 64-65.

aid diplomacy, which was earlier confined to socialist countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.¹⁰

It was under this broader regional and international perspective that Africa came under the plan policy goals of Indian economic diplomacy, with a difference in approach, being followed so far. The geographical proximity between India and Africa, and sizable affluent population of Indian settlers in Africa, were favourable factors to this end. Further, Indian mixed path of development suited for both inward and outward looking governments of Africa. Indian economic initiative in Africa was multi-pronged. The selective approach of friendship came into being. In country like Ethiopia who supported India during Indo-Chinese war, Indian capital poured in to construct large scale textile mills, even at the cost of adversely affecting Indian textile export, and in 60s India became third largest source of source of Ethiopian imports.¹¹ In countries like Kenya who were anti-Chinese but did not support India openly in 1962 war, India encouraged Indian industrialists to invest in building of an Industrial estate of twenty two units in Nairobi to win Kenyan good will.¹²

10. Sreedhar, n.4, p. 464.

11. Anirudha Gupta, n.7, p. 270

12. Ibid, p. 270.

As most of technical and economic assistance went to Kenya and Ethiopia in East Africa, China, to counter Indian influence in those areas extended assistance to Somalia in 1963-64 as Somalia had border disputes also with Ethiopia and Kenya. The very next year India allotted Rs. 2,60,000/- for assistance to Somalia and more than doubled this amount in 1965-66.¹³ Another element of economic diplomacy was the allotment of loan. After 1962, the study of Report of Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Government of India shows that there has been a sprut in grant of loans in which Africa had a large share. By 1966-67, five countries of Africa, Sudan Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana and two of Asia, Srilanka and Nepal have received offer of loans aggregating 285,000,00 for purpose of Indian goods. Joint Venture also formed a part of Indian economic diplomacy. In such collaboration Indian share consisted of capital investment in form of Indian personnel and machinery. The first joint venture ever established by India was in Ethiopia in 1958. During 1958-63 only six joint ventures were established by India in third world countries. But under impact of new economic diplomacy in 1964 twelve new proposals were approved followed by fifteen more in 1965 and again twelve more in 1966. The policy aim, besides the economic gain was to establish strong ties with third world

13. Chen and Uppal, India and China, Studies in comparative Economic Development, (Hong Kong 1970) p. 308

countries demonstrating Indian participation in their endeavour for development.¹⁴ To distinguish it from developed countries multinationals, and not to create an impression of any domination over the host country's industry or in any way, to create domestic problem for local government or industry, India announced guide lines in 1969 for Indian collaborators. This demonstrated India's sincere commitment to help developing countries and helped in increasing confidence among developing nations, in Asia and Africa, in genuiness of Indian interest in their growth. This guide line permits Indian firms a minority participation only, unless the host country desires otherwise, Second-hand or reconditioned machiner's exports against equity participation, is not permitted. Government of India prefers that Indian firms should go for turnkey projects. Training facilities have to be provided to local people and association of local banks and financial institutions is appreciated.

Driving force for Indian economic initiatives in Africa during mid 60s, as we discussed above, was political. However it was in itself a beneficial drive that was used for political urgency, not that it was first done to counter Chinese even at the cost of economic loss. This element of economic gain, based on India's relative economic strength, enabled her to keep on pursuing her economic

14. Ibid, p. 312.

diplomatic goal along with its ideological commitment to NAM and Afro-Asian resurgence, in Africa. By the late 60s Africans response was not very strong for call of South-South cooperations. In 60s the call for South-South Cooperation could not become popular in Africa, because of the prevalent belief that massive injection of capital from developed countries to Africa would lead to success like Marshal Plan.¹⁵

By early 70s Africans also started questioning the wisdom of dependent development. The increasing realisation for need of South-South Cooperation both in India and Africa, for their own separate reasons got articulated in various conferences. It was in Lusaka Summit of NAM in 1970 that both African and Indian underlined the need for its implementation. The resolutions "On Non alignment and Economic Progress" were separated from conference's other 14 resolutions, which for the first time dealt with a working programme and a preliminary negotiations among non-aligned nations. Speaking at the conference Julius Nyrere of Tanzania pointed to the unfounding hope of developing countries in developing through the ideas of developed countries. Nyrere stressed that "For in seeking to overcome our poverty we each inevitably run the risk of being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the Great

15. Adedeji, n.3, p. 9.

Powers"¹⁶ And "It is through these questions of trade and aid that our action in world obtain can be influenced, it not controlled". He, therefore, asked the Lusaka conference to consider "the question of how we can strengthen Non-alignment by economic cooperations". Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi elaborated the details, at the same conference, the potential areas and logic behind South-South Cooperation. She assured the conference that "If we decide and, I hope we shall, India will be glad to play her modest part."¹⁷

After Bangladesh War of 1971, detonation of peaceful nuclear device in 1974 and outer of chinese itself from African scene, political imperative of economic diplomacy which began in after-math of Indo Chinese War (1962) and Indo-Pak War of 1965, subsided. But the economic gains from past economic offensive were increasing and it always had a brighter prospect in Third World. The economic diplomacy, which supported the political imperatives in 1960s, became primary by early 70s, and political diplomacy started encouraging and supporting it under the umbrella of NAM and South-South Cooperation. Explaining India's new policy shift during early 70s the then Minister of External Affairs said in Lok Sabha on 25th April 1972.

16. Sadiqu Ali, n.2, p.12.

17. Selected speeches of Indira Gandhi 1969-72, Publication Division, pp. 629-97.

Proper training and orientation in economic work is given to all I.G.S. officers at all levels and the idea is to change them from being diplomatic agents to trade agents as far as possible. All our foreign service officers have also been told very clearly that their promotion in future would depend on their performance in this field.

Our heads of missions have also been told that they have to keep watch over the economic needs of the countries of their accreditation... they should act like commercial salesman on behalf of a private firm and they should not consider this work as inferior or below their dignity.¹⁸

The same Minister assessing the result of economic diplomacy told in parliament on 23rd April 1973 that "there is now growing visible, a growing awareness among people of Asia and Africa about the competence and stability of this country to be provider of technical know-how and expertise."¹⁹

The ever growing industries and need to balance trade kept Indian economic diplomacy on fore front of its foreign policy. However in Africa even during 70s the response for cooperating under the umbrella of South-South Cooperation was not encouraging. This happened as the African hope of west aided development was not completely shattered. Secondly India's offer of technological cooperation based on intermediate range technology and unlike western aid, with out significant financial support, did not appeal to new leaderships of Africa who were impatient achieve rapid economic and industrial development. Thirdly, through out 60s and 70s the Asian question in East Africa adversely influenced economic relations between India and Africa

19. Ibid., 1973 p. 163-69.

The Asian expulsion in Uganda in 1972 convincingly brought out to the fore the complimentary aspects of Asian's Economic role in the African countries.²⁰ Nevertheless, some of the African leaders had started appreciating the cause of South-South Cooperation inside their country as against providing rhetorical complements to this concept in international forum Kenyan Finance Minister, while speaking at Annual Diner of Kenyan Institute of Management said in 1972 that "It was time that poorer nations realised that unless they took measures in the right direction to improve things for themselves they would for a long time remain the victims of big power decisions."²¹

The demand for the product of African countries continued to fall as a result of combination of factors like invention of substitutes, more efficient use of resources, lower growth in population etc.

Suffering under the recessionary pressure which started in the 70s, Western countries stiffened their protectionist measure which in turn resulted in growing market rigidity, declining soft aid prospect and mounting debt burden. Africa came to realise more and more under such situation that together through technical and economic co-

20. R.R.Ramchandani, ed. India and Africa (New Delhi, 1980) p. 171.

21. "Kenya : Kibaki Commends Self Help to Poor Nations", Indo-African Trade Journal, vol. 8, no.1, 4 May 1972, p. 27.

operation, countries of south can pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Tanzanian Finance Minister during his visit to India in July 1977 said that solution of our problem lies in cooperation among developing countries. He told, "It is by collective action on the part of the poor that we can either confront those who had exploited our weakness to their advantage or maximise the mobilisation of the limited resources at our disposal."²²

The Non-aligned Summit of Algier in 1973 had reaffirmed the resolve for South-South Cooperation. In 1974 U.N. General Assembly adopted the resolution on New International Economic Order. The major milestone in policy of Africa regarding South-South Cooperation was adoption of Lagos Plan of Action by O.A.U. in its extra-ordinary session held at Lagos on 28 and 29 April 1980. It was collective African expression of their inclination and resolve for collective self-reliance. This plan under that it was specially necessary to find ways of restricting or neutralising the present dominating influence in Africa of the developed countries, industrial and commercial powers. It sought intra-regional economic cooperation among themselves and greater economic linkages with other developing countries. E.C.D.C. and T.C.D.C. idea receive a further boost at Havana and at Group of 77 high level meet at Caracas in 1983. The Caracas conference adopted

22. Renu C. Bhatia, "Indo-African Joint Ventures", ed. in R.R. Ramchandani, India and Africa (New Delhi 1980) p. 228.

'Carcas Programme of Action' to monitor the level of implementation of E.C.D.C. and T.C.D. Non Aligned Summit at Delhi in 1983 made the issue of economic cooperation as the number one item in agenda of proceedings and Declarations.

The above study in evolution of Indian economic diplomacy towards Africa under the umbrella of South-South Cooperation; African responses and initiatives in this direction, along with other attempt going at global level, shows that there existed a strong desire both on parts of Indian and African for adopting South-South Cooperation. Though both recognised its urgency and imperatives, this itself does not mean that they have switched over the this framework. The effectiveness and feasibility of policy goals and its further prospects in this regard depends on operational aspects of the policy. How far South-South concept is visible in present relations between India and Africa? Or on basis of operational experience and policy goals what policy options are to be made either for changing the operational style of economic relations or for modifying the concept itself. The answer of all these questions, needs an analysis of working of Indo-African relations in more tangible areas like trade, production cooperatiion and other areas over-the past years and bureaucrats role in its implementation.

Trade - The detail study of Indo-African trade taken up here, expands over a period of twenty years. It will be attempted here to bring out the element of change and continuity in Indo-African trade in terms of commodity composition, country and region wise distribution of trade, the balance of trade position and in the growth pattern of the trade. Further it would be also be attempt to identify the problems in enhancement of trade and with certain viable propositions for its improvement.

As Africa is a large continent comprising more than 50 countries India's trade relations with Africa varies in terms of region and intensity over the period of our study. The continent of Africa is enormously rich in mineral resources and agricultural products. Till early 70s, Indo-African trade was mostly in traditional items. Table 1 and Table 2 shows that in India's export non-traditional items (manufacture or semi-processed, value added items) were below 50 percent as imports from Africa during the same period constituted of primary goods. Further it is evident from Table - 1 that structure of India's export to Africa changed from mid 70's onward. The non traditional items, viz, engineering goods iron and steel and chemical allied products (including pharamaceuti-cals and consmetics) have occupied the place gradually lost by traditional items like jute manufacture textiles and

clothing from beginning of 70's. Engineering goods have been the leading item in India's export to Africa (Table 1). Exports of Engineering goods increased from 34 crores in 1970-71 to Rs. 172 crores in 1982-83 and still continue to maintain this trend. The percentage share went up from 24.60 in 1970-71 to 44.2 in 1978-79. India's export of chemical and other related products including pharamaceuticals and cosmetics showed continuous increase from 1970-71 to 1980-81. There is no established industry for pharamaceuticals and cosmetics in African countries. Eighty to Ninety percent of requirements are imported from western countries. Since Indian products match the quality and packaging of those from west there is enough potential for developing and divesifying Indian pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to countries like Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia, Ghana and Uganda.²³

Among traditional items tea, spices, cotton manufactures, cotton yarn, thread and clothing are leading items in Indian export. The share of cotton yarn thread and related materials which had shown declining trend after 1977-78, picked up well and transactions worth Rs. 67 crores were carried out by India during 1980-81 as against Rs. 14 crores during 1978-79. This happened because India was successful in finding new

23. M. J. Mathew, "Indo-Africa Trade (1970-82) An Analysis," Foreign Trade Review, vol. 18(3), Oct-Dec. '83, p. 337.

African market for this category of goods in countries like Benin (Dahomy) Liberia, Seychelles, Mozambique, Swaziland and Mauritania. In addition to this Indias export to existing market also increased as is evident from table - 3.

The composition of Indian export neither reflects Indian progress, nor its capability, nor the demand pattern of African continent. Just four groups of commodities constitute about for fifth of our exports. These are engineering goods, tea, cotton manufactures and chemicals. India can be most promising supplier of Engineering goods as African import right from nut-bolt to electrical and electronic goods. Even in this sector where we can easily complete with other countries our share in African marke is just 2-3 percent.²⁴

India's imports from African country consists mainly of raw cotton; raw cashew nuts, non ferous metals(copper, zinc and lead); pearls, semi-precious stones; rock phosphate, dying, tanning and coloring materials. Raw cotton and cashew-nuts started disappearing from our import list from 1978 because these items have been increasingly been processed in the producing countries like Tanzania, Egypt and Kenya.

24. J.C.Srivastava, "Trade Declining Trend",
World Focus, Oct. 1984.


Indias imports of non-ferous metal increased throughout in 70s. There has been a shift in composition of imports from Africa by late 80s. Apart from raw materials and inputs many other items are figuring in the import list such as aluminium, watches and cloacks from Egypt, non-metalic mineral manufacturers, electric and non-electric machinery and certain types of food stuff and vegetable from Kenya; oil seeds, nut Kernels and Cocoa from Nigeria and Kenya. Phosphoric acid and fertilisers from Morocco, alcohoh and phenon from Libya and some petrolium products from Algeria. In value and volume they are very small but the beginning has been made in importing value added products.²⁵

The above analysis shows that commodity pattern of Indo-African trade has changed since early 70s. In value term the export of non-traditional items between 1970-71 to 1980-81 (Table-I) recorded increase of 42.3 % where as traditional items rose by just 86 % (Graph I) In terms of percentage, where as non-traditional item were 48 % in 1970-71 to the total of Indian export to Africa, in 1980-81 they constituted 72%²⁶ As table - 2 shows imports from Africa constitute basic raw materials for Indian manufacturing industry. Recently some valuable items and manufactured goodshad been

25. Mathew, n.22- pp. 333 - 34

26. R.R.Ramchandani, "Rationalising India-Africa Economic Relations: The Role of Production Cooperation," India Quarterly, (XII. No. 4 Oct- Dec. 1986), p. 252.

EXPORT OF INDIAN TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL
ITEMS TO AFRICA
(1970-1981)



added to India's import from North African countries but in value term they are still not significant.

The second important aspect of Indo-African trade relation is the geographical spread of the trade. Though India has trade relation with more than 40 African countries, eleven countries constitute 78 percent (1982-84) of India's export (Table - 3). They are Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The other countries who have absorbed some of our industrial produce are Ivory coast, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Botswana, Mozambique, Senegal, Zimbabwe and Canary Islands. However countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia, Libya and Malawi which used to be important market long time ago have been relegated back ground. A large number of countries are still outside India's trading arrangement. With French speaking country such as Chad, Gabon, upper volta and Malawi, our trade is next to nil. Some is the case with several Central and West African countries.²⁷ On import, only eight countries constitute 70 percent of India's import from Africa. They are Egypt, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Morocco, Kenya and Ghana. Table 4 shows that share of these countries in India's global import which was 9.2 % in 1970-71 (as against 10.9 % from whole of Africa) come down to 1.2% in 1980-81 (as against 2.0 % from whole of Africa). There

27. Srivastava, n. 24, p. 24.

has been improvement in India's imports from African countries, especially from Botswana, Congo, Madagascar Mozambique, Senegal and Algeria.²⁸

The regionwise analysis of Africa for Indo-African trade, shows that India does not have strong trade link with Central African countries. The percentage of Central Africa in Indo-African trade, is very low. For instance India's export to Congo were just about Rs. 3 million in 1981-82, Cameroon around Rs. 8m. and Togo about Rs. 5 million in same year.²⁹ Table 4 shows that, besides Central Africa West Africa too has smaller percentage in Indo-African trade. West African countries are not only economically better off but also more accessible unlike Central Africa. They are potential market for Indian goods and an enhanced trade with this region will increase Indo-African trade. As the Graph-2 shows, India's export to West Africa significantly increased from 16 % in 1978-79 to 26 % in 1981-82 while her imports from the regions have varied between 1978-79 to 1981-82. However the trade remained largely confined to

28. India imported in 1980-81 goods worth Rs.53.29 crores from Algeria, Rs. 3.98 crores from Madagascar, Rs. 85 crores from Botswana and Rs. 89 crores from Congo. Algeria is only African country from which India had imported Petroleum and Petroleum products in recent years. In 1981-82 India imported petroleum worth 234.11 crores which is a record.


29. Annual Statistics of Foreign Trade of India 1981-82, (DGCI & S, Calcutta).

INDIA'S TRADE WITH AFRICA REGION WISE

EXPORT


IMPORT

SCALE - 1 CM = 10%



TOTAL TRADE

SCALE - 1 CM = 10%



Nigeria and Ivory coast. Over the period of time the relative importance of North Africa has declined for Indian exports. However, North Africa's share in Indian import has been continuously increasing. In terms of India's total trade to Africa, North Africa changed to a buying source from a market. This happens due to import of oil from Algeria in large quantity in 1981-82 and value added imports from Egypt. Further in terms of India's total trade with Africa, the East and Southern Africa share in Indian import has been continuously declining from 1978-79 onwards. As shown in Table - 4 from 53 % in 1978-79 it reduced to 33.5% in 1981.82. This happened because items like cashew nuts, raw cotton etc. started getting processed inside the country itself.³⁰ From Southern Africa, Zambia has been a large trading partner in import of copper cobalt and alloys. It had always a large percentage in total India's imports from Africa. Of late Zimbabwe has emerged as major trading partner of India. In 1981-82 it exported to India value product worth Rs. 50 million but imported goods only worth Rs. 12 million.³¹

In terms of balance of trade position, from 1965 to 1985 there has been a complete turn. From early 60s to mid 70s when Indo-African trade was mainly in primary goods Africa always had a favourable balance of trade. But after India's determined thrust of Economic diplomacy, the change in


30. The decline in import of these items has been shown in Table 2 A.

31. Yearwise break up has been given in table no. 3.

composition of Indian export goods started surfacing. With increase of value added goods in Indian exports to Africa the balance of trade started shifting in favour of India. (Table 5) In 1973-74 India had an adverse balance of trade to the tune of Rs. 66 crores which in 1974-75 turned to Rs. 87 crores surplus (Graph-3). This did not happen because of major slide in import but because of 1000% increase in export. In 1973-74 and 1974-75 India's import from Africa was Rs. 167 and Rs. 151 crores respectively but export which was Rs. 101 crore in 1973-74 jumped to Rs. 238 crores in 1974-75. Once this favourable balance was achieved the export went on increasing, with a higher percentage compared to percentage increase in import over the same period.

However in 1981-82 when India imported a very large quantity of petroleum products from Algeria the balance of trade reduced sharply in favour of India. And it is after that balance of trade shifted in favour of Africa by a small margin. In 1983-84 India has a deficit of Rs. 50 crores. In this year export declined from Rs. 410 of 1982-83 to Rs. 371 crores in 1983-84. On the other hand import increased from Rs. 197 crores in 1982-83 to Rs. 422 crores in 1983-84. The import in this year increased due to large increase in import from Zambia (from Rs. 58 crores to 110 crores) Zaire (from Rs. 17 crores to Rs. 64 crores).

INDIA AND AFRICA: TRADE BALANCE (1966 TO 1985)




and Morocco (from 29 to 52 crores). All these countries are major suppliers of Indian raw materials (Table-2A). However deficit is not large for India and it has been able to sell its value added non traditional goods in Africa. An analysis of growth pattern of Indo-African trade over the recent years would help us to appreciate the emerging trend in its growth, the trend in relative strength of Indo-African trade against over all trade of India as well as Africa and the urgency of policy measures it demands due to its relative importance in economy of both regions.


Indo-African trade since early 60s has been rising continuously in absolute term till early 80s. Table-5 shows that though this trade has always grown but the rate of growth has been uneven (Graph-4). The decline in this trade in absolute term with uneven rate appeared only in first half of 80s. The growth before 80s, in Indo-African trade, has been smooth except in year 1974-75 when Indian export increased by more than 100 % and as a result trade also increased by more than 40 % (Graph-5). The share of African countries in global trade of India also declined over years (Graph-6). The share of Africa, in India's global trade never rose above 10 % still it was better placed in 60s when African share rose from 7.73 % in India's export and 6.8 % in India's import in 1960-61 to 9 % of Indian export and 10.4 % of its import in 1970-71.

However in 70s the percentage of Africa (Table - 6)


INDO-AFRICAN TRADE (1966-1985)



INDIA'S TRADE WITH AFRICA
(1966 to 1985)



AFRICA'S PERCENTAGE SHARE IN GLOBAL
TRADE OF INDIA
(1970-84)




in India's global trade declined significantly. Africa's share in India's global export declined from 9% in 1970-71 to 6.5 % in 1980-81, a decline of 30 % over ten year period. Over the same period, Africa's share in India's total import declined from 10.4 % to meagure 2 % a decline by around 80 % in ten years. This trend furdher continued in 80s and Africa's share in Indias total export and import was further reduced to 3.76 % and 2.67 % and 2.67 % in 1983 - 84. However, in decades of 70s (1970-79) Indian export to Africa in absolute term rose by more than 300 % where as its import from Africa during the same period increased by around 50% only. (Table - 7).

The decline of Indo-African trade share is not confined to in terms of India's global trade alone, abut same is the case with Indo-African trade in terms of Africa's total trade (Table - 7). Though India's share in global trade of Africa did not rise beyond 1.5 % over the years since 1970 it has shown a declining trend. India's share in Africa total export was 1.23 % in 1970 which reduced to 0.91 % by 1980 a decline by 27 % over ten years. Same way India's share in Africas total impo^ydt which was 1.45 % in 1970 got reduced to 47 more than 65 % decrease over ten years. (G.R.7).

During 80s also there has not been any halt in decling process of India's share in Africas global trade. Indian share in total import of Indian partner in Africa also has

INDIA'S PERCENTAGE SHARE IN GLOBAL
TRADE OF AFRICA
(1970-84)



not been very high (Table-8). Out of the 13 countries selected in the table who are India's major partner imports from India accounts for less than 5 % of their global imports. Therefore even by late 80, India's market share among its major trade partner, is very low.

For effecting South-South Cooperation between India & Africa Indo-African trade should demonstrate growing share of each other in their respective global trade. But the above analysis shows that not only this share itself is very meagure but it is always showing declining trend. This decline is due to many reasons. Broadly these reasons can be grouped in their broad categories. First arising out of unfavourable situations in Africa. Secondly, infra-structural or informational inadequacies. Finally, due to lapse and short coming on part of Indian side. In the first category we find that most of African countries are passing through a phase of economic crisis. The G.D.P. growth rates in African countries have been constantly decreasing from an average 4.8 % in 1960-70 to 3.5 % in 1960-73 and 2.1 in 1973-79. In 1982 it was .5% which further decline in negative 0.1 % ³².

The over all imports and exports too have suffered a great deal. The imports of sub Saharan Africa diminished from \$ 58 billion in 1981 to \$ 49 billion in 1982 and \$46 billion in 1983. Export earnings also fell from \$ 55 billion in 1980 to 37 \$ billion in 1983. ³³ The value of

32. Srivastava, n. 24, p. 25

33. Ibid p. 25.

entire developing Africa's export declined to 64.6 billion by 1983, a 32% decline from 1980, when it was 95 billion³⁴. Further term of trade also declined for Africa's export. This happened partly due to recession in industrial country where less raw materials were needed, as a result prices of primary commodities being exported from Africa stagnated. Along with this, the external debt of Africa kept on increasing. From \$ 15 billion in 1974 it had gone to staggering \$ 175 billion in 1975.³⁵ Therefore lower growth rate, lower export at declined term of trade, high debt servicing ratio and lower inflow of capital from outside, substantially reduced the payments position of African countries. They have entered into a vicious circle of low export earning, lower imports, slower economic growth, further reduction in export-earning, still small volume of imports and so on. This economic crisis hampers Indo-African trade in two-ways. Firstly, in relative term the imports into Africa are mostly from those developed countries who give tied aid to these countries. Most of their aids are coming in form Lome Convention and Scandinavian countries. Secondly, it reduced the import capacity of African countries in absolute term. Due to weak payment position, remittance get delayed. In Nigeria payment had been completely locked. Those who had already exported find it extremely difficult to get the proceeds. It is therefore not surprising that in Nigeria Indian export of Rs. 72 crores

34. Africa Development Bank and ECA, Economic Report on Africa, 1984.

35. Ramchandani, n. 26, 265.

in 1981-82 fell to Rs. 60 crores in 1982.83 and again just to Rs. 40 crores in 1983-84. This holds good for many countries.

The infrastructural problems^{are} also responsible for low level Indo-African trade. The irregular and delayed shipping services has been affecting Indian delivery schedules which too has been tarnishing India's image as a prompt supplier. Heavy freight and high insurance is also hampering India's export competitiveness. The present incidence is estimated about 40-45 % of F.O.B. value which render Indian commodities uncompetitive.³⁶ The indifferent attitude and strong hold of intermediaries in this trade is in no less way responsible for it. It is for this reason - that Indian importers have been preferring to buy African diamonds from Belgium, Zambian and Zairian copper from London Metal Exchange, rather than getting them directly from producer countries. This dominance of Marketing agency is because of their erstwhile colonial linkages which has been cultivated among the elite of African society. Language also become a barrier in increasing Indo-African trade.³⁷ Most of Indian trade is with former British colonies.

Language is impediment in Indian trade with French West and Central Africa who have very high potential of trade.

36. Mathew, n. 23. p. 339

37. Ibid. p. 339.

Despite the Economic crisis in Africa and infrastructural problems, many countries like Taiwan, Hongkong, South Korea and China have made greater inroads and expanded their business notwithstanding these difficulties and constraints. This speaks of some lacuna and lapses on part of India which has been affecting the Indo-African trade. Firstly, India's purchase from Africa is not showing any marked increase. No determined effort is made by India to import the primary products from African countries. India does have an export target plan for Africa based on market research for commodity profile and demand pattern. There is no such equivalent plan for imports from Africa. An increase ⁱⁿ imports from Africa not only meets African adverse balance of trade but also infuses the feeling that India's interest in Africa is only in dumping its goods. Not only imports from Africa gives only a nearer source of Indian supply but India would be meeting its requirements on assured basis. For example India's imports in edible oil and seeds has been to the tune of Rs. 1,000 crores but Africa's share in this, despite of its capacity to supply has been very small. Apart from regular supply it would provide a very strong base for India's export. Secondly, the members of countries in supplier and importer list of India's are not diversified. 74 percent of Indian imports originate only from new countries where as 78 % of India's export goes to only 11 countries (Table 3). The poor salesmanship and marketing strategy of Indian enterprises are no less responsible. India

hardly cultivate African markets systematically keeping in view the consumer preferences. Indian exporters have a wrong feeling that the continent would absorb any sub-standard goods. Indian financial aid is very low compared to other developed countries which enable them to export goods on tied aids. Finally India has not been able to bridge the informational gap. Indian missions, especially the commercial wing are not well organized and strong.³⁸ The visit of Indian trade delegations to these countries have been very few and far between. The trade fairs and exhibitions which India organises are also infrequent and poorly planned. The products selected for display are not always chosen in accordance with requirements of the countries concerned. India has not taken enough trouble to acquire proper knowledge of non-English speaking countries or to present its image in proper way. The cumulative effects of all these have been to widen the information gap.³⁹

Any solution of problems between Indo-African trade has to take two things into account. Firstly the relative value of the present trade of emerging trend in that, in national economy of either side, and secondly cost-benefit analysis of any proposed change, in light of past experiences, either for short or long term goal. If India wants to increase its trade with Africa, the other side can not ignore the above two facts, before going for a change in trading policy in which Indian trade will have a much higher proportion for

38. Srivastava, n. 24, p.25

39. Ibid. p. 25.

them. However, leaving aside the question of policy change, which we would discuss in the last along with other economic variables. There are certain measures which can be taken to improve the trade between two regions, even before providing any conceptual framework or rationale to its, which Africans will accept on a loss-benefit consideration. We identified the three broad categories of problems in Indo-African trade, India can make certain adjustment and change in the last two i.e. infrastructures and intermediaries; and in lapses occurring on part of India. Taking the last problem first India must plan import from Africa if it wants to increase its export. India have export plan on basis of reasearch, plans of 'export targets' with high figures, but there does not exist any plan for imports target.⁴⁰ Any such ambitious export targets are bound to fail, as it has, for simple reasons that if African goods are not imported against export, because of financial crisis they cannot pay in hard currency for the imports. Further if this can not be done due to any other overriding consideration, an offer of soft loan or credit facilities over long term period would make Indian goods attractive for Africans. India have counter trade deal with five countries of socialist block. Such

40 Africa, for purpose of export, has been divided in three categories. First who are politically stable and can pay for their imports. Second those who offer good export opportunity but payment position is not good. Third who are not in thrust list. In group one export target was Rs. 494 crores in 1984-85 and Rs. 845 crore in 1985-86. For group two it was Rs. 428 crores in 1983-84 and Rs.596 crores in 1985-86.

types of deal substantially minimise the balance of trade factor. It may be done by bilateral or multilateral arrangement. This arrangement may be on tie-up trade arrangement or any back arrangement. Thirdly, India has to diversify the number of its trade partner both for exports and import. Central Africa and West Africa need special attention in this aspect. For the Indian trade arrangement should also take into account the different regional economic groupings Trade with South African Development Coordination conference (SADCC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would enhance the quantum of Indian export. India's agreement with these groups or on bilateral basis for preferential trading, where special favourable tariff is fixed, will help in trade. Egypt and Yugoslavia and India have similar arrangements. Other than this India has to bridge the informational gap about by acquiring knowledge of market in non-English speaking countries and by projecting India's capability and Industiral image through various trade delegations and fairs. By trading directly, the role of intermdiary can be minimised and this will prove very economical for import without any loss a supplier country. By cultivating African market with full care for quality control and after-sale-services, India can prove competitive in many areas in Africa. An aggressive and organized publicity and opening up of trade centres would help to this end. A more organized commercial mission of India would lead to more share to Indian trade in Africa,

Countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong are making deeper inroads into market despite the fact that India enjoys freight advantage in this trade.

However, above measures have been suggested just for boosting India's trade with Africa. How far this type of trade serves to the purpose of and fits into the concept of South-South Cooperation. This issue would be examined in the last along with other areas for south-south cooperation.

✓ Another area that needs examination in South-south concept of cooperation is production of goods and services. Joint ventures and project prospecting are of higher significance in this area. ✓ Joint ventures help to secure developing countries much needed capital resources and technical know how for their industrialisation. By this sort of arrangement among developing countries make them partners in progress. Though both countries accrue benefit from this, it is different question that which partner gets more benefit than other. Certain other questions also arises in this connection. As, does the host country gets some benefit over and above what it would have got by entering into collaboration with more professional and advance partner of developed country than from a third world. In what way does a partner from third world differ from the developed country if not in term of economic gain for host country, then in term of structural nature of joint ventures itself. These are some of the questions which have to be answered or explained in context of rationalising south-south

production cooperation. India, in 40 years of post-independent era, gained a different level of industrialisation compared to Africa. Though it is a developing country, it is ~~the~~ third largest in technical and skilled man power and one of the ten largest industrialised countries of the world. The experience and expertise gained by it, is more useful for developing countries. We have seen it has the interest and will affecting south-south cooperation. African countries on the other hand richly endowed with agricultural and natural resources, are lagging behind in industrialisation. There are many areas in this field where India and Africa can cooperate in joint ventures. The political leanings and paths of development being different among these countries, the identification of such areas should be common to all. Government of all countries welcome joint ventures in such industries which help them in, import substitution, export promotion agricultural production and employment generation. The equity participation criteria are different in different countries. Ivory coast allows 100 % foreign equity and Mauritius also does not insist on local participation, Nigeria allows 40 % upto a maximum of 60% in foreign equity share. In African countries like Algeria, Ethiopia and Libiya who restrict foreign investment, there is immense possibility of construction and turnkey projects, as well as of transfer of technology through know-how-agreements. Another area is the field of consultancy. These services are intimately related to preliminary stage

in setting up an industrial project, undertaking the study of feasibility and there upon assisting in design, construction and execution of it. India firms are also competent in economic consultancy services, management services, for construction and operation. Any joint venture in consultancy services with local partner and locally registered, qualify it to bid in projects of African Development banks also. As due to scarcity of fund many Indian Joint Ventures are not able to repatriate their profit, in that case it would be worth exploring the possibilities of Joint Ventures of the sort India has done in case of Senegal from where India imports phosphoric acid or help in promoting exports to other countries.

Let us now examine the past profiles of Indian Joint Venture in Africa. India had established its first joint venture in 1958 in Ethiopia. After establishment of ITEC plan in 1964, Government of India adopted a more positive policy towards it. In 1964 Indian Industrialist, goodwill mission, visited Africa and reported that "we must actively participate in setting up joint Industrial ventures in as large measure as possible."⁴¹ By 1985 there were total 44 Indian Joint Ventures in Africa - 25 in operation and 19 under implementation. In Africa, Indian Joint Ventures are confined to 10 countries only. Further this number is

41. Ram Gopal Agarwal "Joint Venture as an Instrument of Export Promotion" Foreign Trade Review Jan-March 1967, p. 353.

much lesser to Indian Joint Ventures in Asia.⁴² The distribution of India's Joint Ventures inside Africa shows that (Table 9) Nigeria and Kenya alone have 80 % of total operational Indian Joint Ventures in Africa. These ventures encompass wide spectrum of industries e.g., textiles, metalurgical, electrical, drug and pharmaceuticals, paper, machine tools, hotels, industrial machinery, agricultural implements, steel product synthetic yarn, asbestos trading, consultancy and industry etc. The total Indian equity share in these Joint Ventures is 488 million. Some of these joint ventures are highly successful. The Pan African-Paper Mill in Kenya is the largest project set up in the continent. Established in 1974, it has earned considerable foreign exchange for country. As a result of its success Indian collaborator has been offered another turnkey project in Nigeria for paper plant, Another project in Kenya for textile mill has provided considerable saving in imports and added to foreign exchange earnings. Yet another project in Nigeria for producing light Engineering good has been earning profits. Most of the successful projects ploughed back the profits earned during the initial years for expansion and diversification of units; e.g. African paper Mill in Kenya has diversified into manufacturing of Caustic Soda and Chloride.

42. This shift in emphasis on Asia was due to political decisions. In Asia, South East Asia and West Asia got special attention in this regard. In former, it was largely to counter Chinese move of trade offensive in this area after a decade of slumber and in later case due to petroleum shortage, India wanted to strengthen its relations with West Asia. This issue has been elaborated in the Economic Times, 10 June 1978.

Indo-African Joint Ventures have shown a stagnant tendency. The main reason is the financial crisis in African countries. India too can not meet entire financial needs. Its participation has been mainly in form of export of capital goods, manpower and project construction against equity participation. In the international finance available to African countries through World Bank, Lome convention or Nordic countries, India has opportunity to participate as subcontractor in the project. By trilateral arrangement India can meet the financial requirement in this regard.⁴³ However, Indian participation in such projects would not help India to distinguish its relationship vis-à-vis developed countries in regard to african countries.

In other area like in food and agriculture India has technology suitable for developing countries and developed research facility to develop suitable variety of seeds and fertilisers for these countries. India has developed technology for small scale industries. Irrespective of ideological leaning all country prefer to integrate industries with agriculture and in this case Indian expertise is relevant for them. Countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have in recent years increasingly turned to India to have joint ventures in these fields.⁴⁴ National Small scale Industries Corporation of India has helped many African

43. Ramchandani, n. 26, p. 267.

44. Ibid, p. 260.

countries in setting up organizations for small scale industries e.g. Small Scale Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) in Mauritius, Small Enterprise and Development organisation (SEDO) in Zimbabwe and Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) in Zambia.

The above discussion establishes that there is vast scope for production cooperation between India and Africa. Though number of African countries involved in this and the money value is very small compared to vast potential in Africa. Indian Ventures in Africa has been successful both in production as well as project construction or implementation. In the production area most of the firms are from private area where as in construction and project propection it is public sector enterprise like Rail India Technical and Engineering Services (RITES), Hindustan Machine Tools, metallurgy and Engineering Consultants (MECON) have been active. The Paucity of fund has been the main obstacle in these fields. The prospect of India acting in a Tringular alliance of developed countries, African countries and India itself, needs a careful move on part of India so as not to be dubbed as a partner of north. The cheaper manpower and developed expertise of India would provide a more economical alternative to African countries for their projection is ignorance about each other potential needs, and relative advantage. This information gap has to be narrowed down for increased cooperation. Indian Joint Ventures in

Africa are concentrated in manufacturing sector as against investment by developed countries. At times India has gone for joint ventures in Africa inspite of its anticipated adverse effects on volume of Indian exports to Africa as in case of textiles. However due to differential growth level, increasing production cooperation in Africa is not counter productive to India. As African countries have paucity of foreign exchange, India, by way of cooperation through joint ventures and buy back arrangement, can import raw materials and save the foreign exchange in purchasing them. The role of production cooperation in promotion of trade and vis-versa where each reinforces other, will be examined in the last chapter. Further it will be also attempted to, in the light of foregoing discussions, as, how far India's African policy, trade and production cooperation in goods and serves the purposes of and fits into the concept of South-South Cooperation. However here we would examine the operational aspect involved in implementation of Economic policy goal of government of India. In India's effort to develop economic cooperation with Africa, for that matter with any developing country, it appears that despite the forceful plea for South-south cooperation there is no smooth and clear cut bureaucratic procedure at government level. No single authority in bureaucracy at foreign economic relations exist and as a result over all direction at policy level is absent. Infact, India's growing link with developing countries have grown through their own initiative and volition irrespective of government machinery

which given the mechanism and infrastructure at its disposal, has been disappointing. Illustrating the case of red tapism and bureaucratic hurdles, Dewan C. Vohra in his case studies gives the example of a case where India aid to developing countries was channelled through 13 government departments, half of these aids programmes were not even in the knowledge of supposed to be apex aid giving body-Economic Division of M.E.A.⁴⁵ Economic Division of MEA was set up in 1964 under Indias new economic offensive to tie together "Indias all economic relations." Beyond repeating the cliché regarding India's potential in regard to economic cooperation, the division apparently work on adhoc basis, preparing papers for meeting at short notice without appreciating their long term policy implication.⁴⁶ As a result that we find that all types of economic links and connections with developing countries are put under fashionable concept of south-south cooperation, without assesing the different kind of links that are operating and potential gain or loss India is going to have on long term. Three main ministries are responsible for foreign economic relations - Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of External Affairs. The entire coordination in government of India is unorganized. Economic Division of M.E.A. over laps and duplicates the work of other Ministries. Ministry of Finance has its own Economic Division, administering important aspect of Indian economic relations

45. Dewan C. Vohra, India's aid diplomacy in third world (Delhi 1980)

46. Srikant Dutt, India and Third World Alteruism or Hegemony (London 1984) P. 48.

with other countries granting government loans and credits, some aid programmes and monitoring banking and insurance abroad. Bureaucrats from Commerce ministry chair the Interministerial Committee concerned with Indian investment abroad. Economic Division of MEA has the task to execute India's commitment of TCDS and ECDS but as we have noticed earlier, it fails to get even information from various concerned Ministries. Within the ministry entire geographical area has been divided into various officers who work on rotation. For example entire West Africa is given to a person who may be replaced by any one on rotation. Further we have discussed earlier, government have taken a policy decision that the promotion of all officers of MEA will depend on economic interest they develop for India in foreign countries.⁴⁷ These incentives provide chances to these officers, where there is a possibility of exploiting the confusion and anarchy in the procedure to implement ECDC & TCDS and develop all sorts of economic ties, and brand it and present it in form of E.C.D.C. If MEA's Economic Division of all these economic relations of India with third world countries then it will develop in its own way as it is now, and officials and their patrons would brand it as E.C.D.C. Case of Indo-African relation is no exception. It is for this reason that Dewan C. Vohra points out, "that India does not lack either the will or capacity to conduct an aid programme commensurate with her size and resources but has its weakest spot in

47. Foreign Affairs Record, Ministry of External Affairs
April 1972, pp. 161-62.

present bureaucratic labyrinthic Administrative structure"⁴⁸
(emphasis added).

Therefore when we study Indo-African economic relations. in the context of South-South, we must include these operational aspect with inspired goals of Indian economic diplomacy to analyse the result of whole Indian exercise in South-South cooperation. It is on this basis that an attempt has been made in the next chapter to examine the result of Indo-African relations in South - South Context.

48. Vohra n. 1, p. 286.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

After political independence the urge for newly born countries was to gain economic freedom. Their economic development got inexorably attached with developed countries. When developed countries faced recession, developing countries in Africa attained negative growth rate very soon. Their export based economy was thrown out of gear. The idea of Co-operation among third world countries came not to bridge the historical gap of horizontal cooperation which was negligible during colonial period but as an alternative to meet the growing disillusionment from the faith in North-led development strategy adopted by South. India and Africa both being from the third world, witnessed these significant developments. During 50s the decolonisation was main urge for Africa, and India played a significant but not a distinguished role. However the emergence of a number of African countries with a sense of solidarity, however, weak it may be internally, and India's experience of early 60s in Indo-Chinese war and Indian position in international forums had made it realised more the importance of third world countries like Africa with whom it can cooperate in more than one way. During 60s and early 70s the political considerations were primary for India but African were more interested in decolonisation. In the late 60s the addition and drive of

economic deplomacy, was to meet the political urgency. When political urgency subsided economic imperatives became more important. For Africans also, besides South Africa and Namibia, all other colonies achieved independence. By the end of second U.N. development decade their entire hope iⁿ North-South cooperation got a big question mark. South-South Cooperation as a result of stiffening of economics links with North became compulsions. In Afro-Asian Movement and third world forums like NAM India improved its political image considerably from mid 60s. It integrated African's perceptions of common problems into its own imperatives and preferences. Result was that in both political field, both as one of the leader of Non-aligned group and an uncompromising fighter of freedom movement, its credibility was established and grew on over the years. It was in economic field that despite India's wish and Africans strategy for South-South cooperations the relation which had emerged gives a mixed impression. We have inferred and noted in the end of the chapter II and III that the alert and planned policy of determined objectives with care to integrate the perceptions and priority of African on different issues of common interest had led to success of Indian politico-deplomatic objectives in Africa. On the question of role of India we have inferred and noted at the end of chapter III that a diplomatic offensive on part of India where it had total identification with African cause of complete liberation from colonial and racial dominance,

has strongly defended India's inability on other counts. The material and arms support to African Liberation from India is not of very high order and many more provided more than India. But the diplomatic assault for their cause had completely redeemed African misgivings for India on material count. The role of India had been of immense value in providing moral strength and creating worldwide public opinion for their cause. These two had been achieved by giving depth to the Indian perception of their cause and integrating of them to India's policy objectives. The concession given at one front in diplomacy had provided leverage to India on many other fronts without any complaint and misgivings from Africans.

But it is on economic front that India and Africa had not proceeded more than a verbal repetition of this cause. No planned and systematic attempt seemed to be made either from the part of India also, to effect this cause of South-South Cooperation which is of lasting nature.

It is this problematic and relatively relevant area that had been presented in an analysis of facts and figures in the fourth chapter. No single framework was kept in perspective as there are very diversified opinions on it. However, the factual position, which remain same for all those diverse interpretations has been discussed and analysed. Opinions on the nature and prospects of Indo-

African relations differs because many of them differ in their methodology. In the modest work like this no final remark can be given on these works. However based exclusively on the 'factual aspect's certain observations that emerges from co-relation of the 'matter of the fact' analysis and conceptual frameworks needs to be made.

One of the common methodology in analysing Indo-African economic relations is to put the factual aspect in a pre-conceived and determined framework to the extent it suits the framework. Very few attempts have been made to study and analyse the Indo-African relations with different concepts, as a tool to understand and then to decide where does this relation rest. This primacy attached to the reality will not only overcome the apparent hollowness and bias of the entire interpretation and make it more credible but more importantly serves the very causes better for whom, some time, this sort of defective approach is adopted. To have inspiration and objectives for a cause, for example to promote the growing economic interest of India in Africa is understandable, and for that matter any exercise of analysing a foreign relations of this type would be undersirable if it serves no purpose to any one, but even then the question arises is it appropriate to serve ones objective by subordinating facts to the inspirations and will that serve the purpose? There is no attempt here to enter into subject of facts and value or facts and

subjectivity. It is an observation based on our study in the early chapters which shows that whenever in diplomatic field the differences in Indo-African relations had been, which were bound to be on many a grounds, what worked was to relate and accomodate the Indian objectives with reality, and as we noticed, it worked well. We have also seen that whenever a approach was taken which suited India but ignored the priority and preferences of other side to be intergrated in an optimum way it had failed. In area of international relations between India and Africa the interpretation of facts from pre-conceived inspired framework is defective at two counts. Firstly it does disservice to the very cause for whom it is resorted to. Any strategy for a cause based on partial reality will be certainly misleading. Secondly, the framework free analysis would help one side or the other to take policy decisions to adjust and accomodate oneself for a cause which is desirable but a forcible imposition of it does the opposite. Therefore the primary of reality to conceptual framework would not only lead to either side moulding itself for the better strategy of cooperation but it would give both side a chance to assess to what extent one can go into that strategy and what further modification is needed in policy and practice of either side and also whether a step towards that strategy is worth going or not. For illustration if India has to go for South-South cooperation, there are certain important aspects which have to be considered even for advancing

the Indian cause of South-South Cooperation. Firstly, can one call Indo-African economic relations a structurally different relation from North South only because in structure both Africa and India are of South, without taking into consideration the functional part of the relation as whether India is also acting or not as a buyer of primary goods from Africa and evergrowing pusher of value added items and manufacture as happens in North South. Secondly, can we call that relatively developed stage of Indian economy, with higher industrialisation and relatively developed technology is showing with a Low Developed countries like Africa a 'production complimentarity' if yes, then how do we differentiate this complimentarity in quality and nature with North-South complimentarity. Or is it the one which is available in South when North is not trying to utilise its complimentarity with South. Further if it is qualitatively different from North because relatively advanced country had will and gain in promoting South-South ^{cooperation} then, what does the low developed countries get either in terms of trade, joint venture, of in other areas like consultancy and finance over and above the North. If not then that other non-economic advantage they get, or do they get that over long term India will be also dependent on them and a Collectively Self Reliance would emerge. Further what is Indian involvement with African economy in concrete quantified form which demands a policy

restructuring? Again will Indian recommendation; like development of intermediate range industry, cottage industry, agriculture, good they are from point of view of Indian assessment to African situation and its own capability; for policy change in their government not the one provided by west to developing countries, including India to prescribe this or that in internal policy so that the help they give, provides better result. And lastly, before prescribing Indo-African relation, as exhibiting good signs of South-South relations, has the concept and idea of Africans been taken into account.

Two points are important in regard to the above questions. Firstly it is not to deny the feasibility and suitability of Indo-African economic relation that these questions are being raised. But these are the questions which should be as important as identifying the potential areas of cooperation and justification of Indo-African relation which had shown 'promising beginning' in South-South direction. Any invasion or ignorance of this questions would not serve any purpose to any cause. It is the acceptance of facts as they are and then to include them into ones strategy will be realistic enough to succeed. For example if India wants to conduct its cooperation under equation and relation of South-South with Africans, it has to establish its relation on qualitatively different footing by taking into account the way the things

are going. Otherwise under umbrella of South-South, a operation relation of a equation of North-South will boomrang India's own drive sooner or later. Therefore here attempt is not to deny the possibility of South-South trade and other links but if it is to be put into a south-south conceptual framework, the hard facts, the qualitative differences from other relations must be answered and explained. Secondly the answer to all the above questions is a matter of extensive research and no general solution can be even tentively suggested without that, but some of the answers are of factual nature and they should be kept into consideration. Of foremost imporance in inter-national relation is the perception and expectation of other side on concerned issues. What African mean from South-South and expects from it has been articulated by Adebyo Adedeji, U.N. Under Secretary and Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa, he says:

....One of the crucial problems hampering the rapid expansion of horizontal cooperation stems from the feeling that the benefits deriving from such cooperation are not equally shared and, worse still, that the traditional scenario that obtain in our trade with the developed world whereby our country supplies the former with commodities and import therefrom manufactured products including capital goods is being reproduced deliberately or not in our Inta-Third World Trade. Since from the hard facts and figure, I referred to earlier on, it is Africans trade situation that seems to bear greatest likeness to this scenario. I feel compelled to say that such a situation is totally unacceptable to us on a long and even on a medium term basis. There is in fact no doubt that if such a situation were allowed to continue it is not just the African regim's interest

that would be jeopardised, it is also the entire fabric of South-South that would be seriously damaged to the extent that less than optimum advantages would be taken of our regions real potential(1)(emphasis added.)

This has been the perception of Africans in regard to South-South Cooperation and their experience in past has led to formulate the above view point. African country does warn in advance again in world of Adebaya Adedji.

" The extent to which we shall be able to exploit the vast potential of South-South cooperation will depend on two basic factors. First and foremost on acceptance by all third world countries, their governments and peoples, that the cardinal principle of South South cooperation is its interdependence and mutuality that is to say, that South-South cooperation must be based on the full recognition of the principle that each country is both a donor and recipient. We must avoid a class of donor and a group of recipient countries within the third world. Because if we do so we simply have succeeded in extending the present dependence and exploitative arrangements between the North and South to South South cooperation. This is totally unacceptable to us in Africa. We do not wish to replace the age old economic and technical domination of the countries of the north by any other one..."²

As we had noticed in the last three chapters the perceptions of Africans on common issues should not be ignored if any positive response ^{to} it is to be accepted, the percentage of India's trade and other economic involvement in

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1. Adebaya Adedji "Africa and the South: Forging Truly Interdependent-Economic and Technical Links," Africa Quarterly Vol. XX, No. 1-2, 1980, p.20.
 2. Ibid. p.25.

Africa should be assessed before the hard decisions to diversify and divert the economic relations are taken. This is not to suggest that there is no potentiality of Cooperation between India and Africa but if a context of South-South is to be opted the question raised above world give more depth to the attempts and response from each other for South-South cooperation. Otherwise the blind categorization of all types of economic relation as South_^^{South} cooperation instead of heralding a new economic order would have the chance to be branded as new 'Pecking Order'.

TABLE 1
INDIA'S EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES TO AFRICA
(1970-71 to 1980-81)

(Values Rs.crores)

Commodity	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1980-81
Major non-traditional items										
1. Engineering goods of which	34	34	26	22	49	66	69	121	150	164
a) Machinery, non-electric	12	7	6	7	9	18	13	11	-	44
b) Machinery, electric	4	5	4	4	14	10	10	NA	123	22
c) Transport, equipment (Incl road vehicles)	14	9	7	9	19	27	28	75	-	98
2. Iron & steel	3	2	2	Neg.	5	10	7	12	10	8
3. Chemicals and Allied Products	4	2	1	4	6	8	9	12	14	21
4. Metal manufactures	2	4	4	4	8	7	9	20	26	25
Major Traditional items										
1) Spices	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	4	6
2) Tea	16	22	17	12	18	19	Neg.	31	51	71
3) Cotton manufacture excl, yarn, thread & clothing	18	28	15	8	13	22	26	44	12	51
4) Cotton yarn & thread	4	2	1	5	3	3	4	4	2	16
5) Clothing incl. ready-made garments	1	1	2	1	2	2	6	2	8	9
6) Jute manufactures	41	24	33	16	44	15	11	27	Neg.	Neg

SOURCE- Foreign Trade Review, Vol.18(3)Oct-Dec. 1983, p.336.

TABLE 2

INDIA'S IMPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES(1970-1 to 1980-81)
(Value: Rs. crores)

Commodity	1970- 71	1971- 72	1972- 73	1973- 74	1974- 75	1975- 76	1976- 77	1977- 78	1978- 79	1980- 81
Cashewnut, raw	29	28	23	33	19	33	18	8	9	-
Cotton, raw	67	70	78	48	24	6	14	51	10	-
Rock phos- phates	4	2	1	9	19	11	1	NA	23	NA
Pearls, precious and semi-pre- cious stones	15	1	1	11	15	23	57	79	55	6
Dyeing, tanning & coluring materials	3	2	1	2	3	4	7	4	6	3
Non-ferrous materials										
a) Copper	33	26	34	34	31	12	38	35	43	82
b) Zinc	3	4	2	3	4	2	9	19	10	8

Source - Foreign Trade Review, Vol. 18(3), Oct-Dec. 1983, p.334.

INDIA'S IMPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES FROM AFRICA

Products	Countries	(Value in Rs. million)	
		1970-71	1980-81
Fruits and Vegetables.	Kenya	39.90	-
Cashew nuts	Tanzania	143.50	-
	Madagascar	1.40	-
Vegetables - fresh and chilled.	Kenya	-	21.80
Non-ferrous base metal, copper waste scrap, waste scrap nickel and alloys.	Kenya	-	4.10
	Tanzania	-	0.50
Other mineral phosphates	Senegal	4.50	49.30
	Morocco	30.70	197.06
Vegetable textile fibre	Kenya	7.17	1.30
	Tanzania	6.52	2.30
Crude vegetable materials, gum and other resins	Kenya	1.04	1.71
	Tanzania	2.55	3.60
	Sudan	7.50	11.87
	Morocco	-	0.74
Raw cotton	Sudan	201.70	0.66
	Kenya	27.63	-
	Tanzania	0.65	-
	Uganda	77.11	-
	Morocco	42.40	-
Dyeing and tanning materials	Kenya	19.30	28.26
	Tanzania	2.10	13.19
	Morocco	-	99.40
Phosphoric acid, pearls, precious semi-precious stones, worked or unworked diamonds, rough unsorted	Kenya	-	2.03
	Tanzania	-	126.18
	Ghana	-	125.70
	Congo	114.32	-
	Sierra Leone	3.40	2.21
	Ivory Coast	0.85	21.72
Non-ferrous metal.	Zambia	3876.80	124.48
Copper wire		62.30	312.96
Zinc		9.18	668.60
Electrotype copper base	Tanzania	-	21.00
	Mauritius	-	0.38

SOURCE. INDIA QUARTERLY, (Vol. XLII, No(4), Oct.-Dec. 1986) p.253.

INDIA'S TRADE (IN PERCENTAGE OF ITS TOTAL AFRICAN TRADE)
WITH MAJOR PARTNERS IN AFRICA

Year	Benin	Sudan	Egypt	Kenya	Uganda	Ghana	Algeria	Morocco	Mauritius	Zaire	Swaziland	Zimbabwe	Tanzania	Zambia	Nigeria
Ex. % 1970-71	-	-	3.6	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.2	0.6
Im. %	-	-	2.4	0.6	-	0.2	-	0.4	-	1.2	-	-	1.6	1.6	-
Ex. % 1975-76	-	-	2.5	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.4	0.1	0.9
Im. %	-	-	0.3	0.2	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	0.2	0.2	-
Ex. % 1980-81	-	-	11.6	7.6	-	-	3.3	-	2.6	-	0.9	-	5.3	6.8	12.1
Im. %	-	-	11.1	4.6	-	-	20.0	-	-	0.4	-	-	10.3	25.6	2.8
Ex. % 1981-82	-	-	17.5	7.1	-	-	6.9	0.2	3.4	-	2.5	0.2	5.5	14.4	13.7
Im. %	-	-	1.3	2.2	-	-	56.0	-	-	-	0.3	1.8	12.8	16.0	2.0
Ex. % 1982-83	6.4	7.6	0.2	4.5	6.5	-	-	-	2.9	-	2.5	-	1.1	4.1	0.1
Im. %	-	-	1.9	3.1	-	-	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	10.5	-	0.2
Ex. % 1983-84	2.7	7.3	3.2	4.3	5.5	-	2.6	-	2.8	-	3.3	-	5.2	-	10.7
Im. %	-	-	3.6	2.6	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-	0.1

Source: DGCIS Annual statistics of the Foreign Trade of India, various issues from 1978-79 to 1981-82

TABLE 4

INDIAS TRADE WITH AFRICA
(Regionwise)

	Africa	Central Africa	West Africa	East & Southern Africa	North Africa
Ex. value as(%) 1978-79	3378.67 (100)	151.20 (4.47)	547.39 (16.17)	1223.0 (36.20)	1457.05 (43.12)
Im. Value as(%)	1524.70 (100)	110.07 (7.21)	14.82 (0.97)	796.96 (52.26)	541.93 (35.54)
Ex. value as(%) 1979-80	3469.33 (100)	28.50 (0.82)	674.54 (19.44)	1302.26 (37.53)	1447.93 (41.72)
Im. value as(%)	2070.03 (100)	329.59 (15.22)	263.56 (12.73)	1034.42 (49.97)	453.60 (21.19)
Ex. value as(%) 1980-81	4351.50 (100)	153.94 (3.51)	1116.58 (25.65)	1436.42 (33.01)	1644.54 (37.29)
Im. value as(%)	2653.80 (100)	238.50 (8.97)	170.39 (6.45)	1121.98 (42.27)	1122.93 (42.31)
Ex value as(%) 1981-82	4739.30 (100)	261.00 (5.50)	1239.60 (26.15)	1539.50 (32.47)	1699.20 (35.85)
Im. value as(%)	4181.21 (100)	81.15 (1.93)	156.62 (3.74)	1202.65 (23.74)	2741.41 (65.56)

Source: - DGCIS Annual Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India, various Issues from 1978-79 to 1981-82.

TABLE 5

INDIA'S TRADE WITH AFRICA (1965-85)

Rs. in crores

Year	Total	Export	Import	Balance
1965-66	118	62	56	+ 6
1966-67	20+140*	9+63	11+77	(-2)+(-14)*
1967-68	164	70	95	- 24
1968-69	221	73	148	- 75
1969-70	230	88	141	- 53
1970-71	309	139	170	- 30
1971-72	276	132	144	- 11
1972-73	266	101	165	- 64
1973-74	268	101	167	- 66
1974-75	389	238	151	+ 87
1975-76	386	272	114	+158
1976-77	530	313	217	+ 96
1977-78	628	346	282	+ 64
1978-79	491	338	153	+185
1979-80	555	348	207	+141
1980-81	700	435	265	+170
1981-82	891	473	418	+55
1982-83	607	410	197	+212
1983-84	792	371	421	-51
1984-85	761	361	400	-40

* In June 1966 Rs. was devalued, hence two values.

SOURCE - D.G.C.I.S., Calcutta, Annual Statistics of Foreign
Of India, various issues.

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF AFRICA IN INDIA'S
GLOBAL TRADE

Year	Rs. in crores	
	Percentage to India's total trade Import	Export
1960-61	6.8	7.33
1970-71	10.4	9.0
1971-72	7.3	8.2
1972-73	8.8	5.1
1973-74	5.6	4.0
1974-75	3.3	7.1
1975-76	2.1	6.7
1976-77	4.3	6.1
1977-78	4.7	6.4
1978-79	2.3	5.9
1979-80	2.3	5.4
1980-81	2.0	6.5
1981-82	3.0	6.0
1982-83	1.4	4.4
1983-84	2.7	3.8

Source (1) Foreign Trade Review, Vol.18(3) Oct.-Dec. 1983 p.329

(ii) Annual Statistics of Foreign Trade of India 1986.

TABLE 7

INDIA'S SHARE IN GLOBAL TRADE OF AFRICA

Years	Percentage in Export	Percentage in Import Rs. in crores
1970	1.23	1.45
1973	0.68	0.38
1974	0.49	0.36
1975	0.30	0.35
1976	0.69	0.66
1977	0.80	0.70
1978	0.97	0.75
1979	0.96	0.57
1980	0.91	0.47
1981	0.74	0.39
1982	0.43	0.42
1983	0.39	0.46
1984	-	0.43

SOURCE (i) Foreign Trade Review, vol.18(3), Oct-Dec. 1983, p.331.
(ii) IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, year book,
various issues.

TABLE 8

INDIA'S PERCENTAGE SHARE IN GLOBAL IMPORTS OF
MAJOR AFRICAN PARTNERS

Rs. in crores

Country	India's share in total imports during		
	1970*	1979	1980
Egypt	1.7(1975)	1.7(1977)	-
Ghana	1.4	1.1	-
Ethiopia	1.0(1974)	1.2	3.0
Mauritius	2.0(1974)	4.8	5.0
Morocco	0.8	1.8	-
Libya	0.4	0.7	9.0
Nigeria	0.9	0.4	1.0
Kenya	2.0	2.7	2.0
Sudan	13.2	2.9	6.0
Tanzania	1.2(1974)	4.0	4.0
Zambia	1.2(1974)	1.2	3.0
Zaire	Neg	Neg.	-
Uganda	2.4(1974)	8.7	5.0

Source (i) Foreign Trade Review, vol.18(3)
Oct-Dec. 1983, P.338

(ii) The Economic Times,
(Bombay), 15 March 1985

INDIAN JOINT VENTURES IN AFRICA (AS ON SEPTEMBER 1985)

Country	No.	In Production Indian Equity (in Rs. '000)	No.	Under impleme- ntation Indian Equity (in Rs. '000)	Total Indian Equity (in Rs. '000)	Area covered
a) PTA*						
Botswana	1	500	-	-	500	Packaging material. Textiles, pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals auto ancillaries, iron foundry, electric wire, machine tools, sulphuric acid, insurance business
Mauritius	2	1,197	2	5,124	6,321	Garments, power driven pumps, hotels, etc.
Zambia	-	-	1	15,000	15,000	Infant foods
Seychelles	-	-	1	13,450	13,450	Hotels.
Uganda	1	2,807	-	-	2,807	Jute goods
b) ECOWAS **						
Nigeria	12	1,15,483	9	52,540	1,68,023	Engineering goods, transmission line towers, diesel sets for drilling machine tools, pharmaceuticals, cement, soft drink, consultancy etc.
Liberia	-	-	1	6,800	6,800	Glass products.
Senegal	1	1,69,600	-	-	1,69,600	Fertilizers and phosphoric acid
c) North Africa						
Egypt	-	-	2	980	980	Blending and packaging of tea

* PTA stands for Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African countries

**ECOWAS stands for Economic Community of West African States

Source. India Quarterly. (Vol. XL11, No(4), Oct. Dec. 1986) P. 264

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