


**GEORGE H.W.BUSH AND THE FIRST GULF
WAR: A STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECISION MAKING**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
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

Akshay Bishnoi 28/07/2014.

CERTIFICATE

We recommend this dissertation to be placed before examiners for evaluation.


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Chairperson


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Supervisor



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INTRODUCTION

George H.W. Bush the 41st President of the United States led a UN backed coalition to war against Iraq in 1991 to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The object of this study is to delineate the decision making of President Bush during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The first Persian Gulf war was the first major conflict in the post Cold War era that had international ramifications primarily because of the disruption it caused in the global crude oil markets, with Iraq's invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait forcing the United Nations Security Council to enforce an economic embargo on Iraq and Kuwait which invariably led to the tripling of international crude oil prices. Bush's inner circle referred to as the "group of eight" with whom he discussed policy options during the Gulf crisis included Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser; Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence; James Baker, Secretary of State; Dan Quayle, Vice President; Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser; and John Sununu, White House chief of staff. Director, Central Intelligence Agency William Webster also occasionally participated in deliberations of the Bush inner circle.

The US did not anticipate the outbreak of the Gulf crisis. It had enjoyed cordial relations with Iraq throughout the 1980s and had administered political and military support to it in order to thwart the growing influence of Iran in the Gulf region following the overthrow of the US backed government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi by Islamic fundamentalists in 1979. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had obtained considerable military support from the United States during the eight year long Iran-Iraq war. Saddam Hussein was considered as a moderate leader by western countries who saw him as the lynchpin who could curb Iranian influence in the Gulf. US President Ronald Reagan had authorized the US government to administer military support to Iraq. Due to the long Iran Iraq war the Iraqi government had to incur massive military expenditures for which it had to take debts from external sources, mostly friendly oil rich Gulf states. By the end of hostilities between Iraq and Iran in 1988 these debts had amounted to \$ 80 billion. In addition to the debts that had added up for Iraq by the end of the Iran Iraq war it was also burdened by reconstruction costs estimated to be in excess of \$ 230 billion.

The refusal of Iraq's neighbours Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to forgive Iraqi debts angered Saddam Hussein because he believed that the Gulf states' refusal to do so highlighted their lack of appreciation for the sacrifices made by Iraq to thwart Shite Iran during the Iran Iraq war. Upon becoming the president in 1989 George Bush signed the National Security Directive 26 which reaffirmed the US government's stance to deepen political and military ties with Iraq. As a measure to broaden its relations with Iraq US Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly travelled to Baghdad on February 12, 1990. Political tensions in the Gulf started escalating in early 1990 due to Iraqi economic woes and because of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's efforts to reassert his leadership in the Arab world. A radio broadcast of Voice of America's (VOA) Arabic language service which condemned Iraq for being a "police state" drew Saddam Hussein's ire.

He summoned US ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie to his presidential palace in order to obtain from her an official apology for VOA's slanderous remarks. During his meeting with Glaspie at his presidential palace in Baghdad Saddam Hussein questioned Glaspie about the US government's stance on Iraq's territorial disputes with its neighbours to which the American ambassador promptly responded by telling Saddam that it was US government policy not to interfere in "Intra Arab" border disputes (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Tensions between Iraq and the US started to mount following Saddam Hussein calling out in a speech to the Arab Cooperation Council that it was pertinent for the Arab states to unite to put an end to plans of the "imperialist" United States in the Gulf. He also threatened the US' closest ally in the Middle East Israel with a chemical attack as he believed that US "imperialist policy" in the region was being directed from behind the scenes by Israel. Saddam's tirade at the US drew an immediate response from the US with President Bush and the State department denouncing the Iraqi dictator's rhetoric.

A US senate delegation led by senate minority leader Bob Dole (R-Ka.) had visited Baghdad ten days following Saddam's inflammatory speech to deliver to him a letter from President Bush that urged the Iraqi leader to work to promote peace in the Gulf. The letter had also expressed US concerns about Iraqi plans to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons. An extremely important cause responsible for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordering the invasion of Kuwait was his anger at the overproduction of oil by fellow Organisation of Petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) members states Kuwait

and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq dispatched 35000 of its troops headed by the elite Republican Guard to the Iraqi Kuwait border in mid July 1990 thus intensifying pressure on Kuwait to forgive its war loans. Iraq also demanded Kuwait to pay \$2.4 billion in compensation for the "stolen oil" that it had extracted from the Rumaila oil field over which Iraq and Kuwait shared a dispute.

The US offered to mediate in the Iraq-Kuwait tensions. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak also came forward on behalf of the Arab League to mediate in the dispute over territory, money and oil between Iraq and Kuwait. To resolve the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, Mubarak travelled to Baghdad on July 24, 1990 and met Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi leader told Mubarak that he was willing to back negotiations with Kuwait to settle the disputes that existed between Iraq and Kuwait but was not willing to sideline the option of military action against that country if bilateral negotiations mediated by the Arab League failed. As part of the Arab League led efforts to resolve the disputes over territory and debt repayments between Iraq and Kuwait Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for a meeting of the two countries negotiators on July 31, 1990 at Jeddah. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti diplomats met at Jeddah but the negotiations failed with the Kuwaiti delegation walking out of the talks. Following the failure of the Jeddah talks Saddam Hussein called a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council where he ordered for the invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait was considered by Iraq to be its renegade province. Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and contrary to Iraqi perceptions the Kuwaiti people did not treat Iraqi forces that had invaded their country as liberators. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait failed to garner support from Arab countries and met with vociferous disapproval from the international community.

To give a befitting response to Iraq escalating political and military tensions in the Gulf in early and mid 1990 the US dispatched two KC-135 aircraft to the United Arab Emirates to participate in military exercises with that country. Furthermore the US government clearly stated that it would protect its Gulf allies against Iraqi aggression. Kuwait had been a close US ally in the Gulf. A salient cause responsible for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had been Kuwait demanding Iraq to pay back the debt it owed to it along with the accrued interest. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Bush approved National Security Directive 26 which highlighted US national security interests, with specific focus being on the Gulf and the Middle East. The Commodity Credit

Corporation (CCC) credits to US exporters for Iraq to import US grains which had been provided to Iraq during the mid 1980s were suspended by the US subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Bush had certain apprehensions regarding Iraq's ambitions in the Gulf. He was of the opinion that with it having invaded and occupied one of the US' most trusted allies in the Gulf Saddam Hussein's unruly ambitions to dominate the Gulf and the Middle East would not be satiated. He was also concerned about Iraq invading the US' other close allies in the region namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Bush had significant foreign policy experience as he had served the US government in numerous capacities on matters pertaining to foreign affairs. Bush's style of functioning was unique as he had the habit of listening to numerous information inputs prior to taking executive decisions. US cabinet and White House officials played an important role in trying to influence the President to agree to implement certain policies regarding the US' response to the Gulf crisis.

Bush was a consummate task master and delegated the responsibility of carrying out US policy to resolve the Gulf crisis to his cabinet chiefs. The breakout of the Iraq crisis provided the US with the opportunity to deploy its troops to the Gulf, a desire that it had long harboured. Bush incessantly monitored each and every move of his subordinate government functionaries when it came to the implementation of his decisions during the crisis in the Gulf following his having opted to resort to the use of force. Highlighting the importance of protecting US energy imports from the Gulf, Bush decided to deploy US forces to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990 following the Saudi government having provided its authorization for the same in order to protect itself from Iraqi aggression. Bush had taken the decision to resort to the use of force in mid-October 1990 and desisted to reveal it in public. Bush intuitively sensed that with Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein continuing to remain haughty and stubborn diplomatic overtures to resolve the crisis in the Gulf would ultimately prove unsuccessful. He was convinced that the use of hard power was essential to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait following the failure of diplomacy to do so.

BUSH'S DECISION MAKING VERIFIED BY THEORETICAL MODELS.

Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis has been tested by making use of three perceptive decision making models. The first decision making model tested on President Bush is the rational actor model. It propounds that the state and its power

wielding authorities, being the sole discretionary entities to formulate and execute policy, are of a rational disposition. This decision making model highlights the rational synthesis of varied information inputs done by an executive prior to opting for a specific alternative, which accrues the maximum benefit to the state. Bush being a rational leader was aware that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had to be reversed by taking bold and decisive measures, whether they be diplomatic or military. The decision making of President Bush during the Gulf conflict invariably highlights that he was willing to take into consideration "facts on the ground" before taking decisions. After assessing the ground realities in the Gulf he decided the course of US response in that region so as to resolve the Gulf crisis as swiftly as possible.

Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis analyzed through the theoretical framework of the Bureaucratic Politics model unambiguously highlights that Bush took information inputs emanating from his subordinates and various options available to him into consideration prior to deciding on the most judicious alternative which yielded the maximum utility. He did so in order to determine the US' response to the Gulf crisis. The Bureaucratic Politics model suggests that the nation state is administered by a labyrinth of administrative structures which are hierarchically organized. It postulates that the dispersion of executive power in the state is at multivaried levels. The model supports the notion that different institutional and administrative structures have their own interests and thus they try to influence the decision making of the executive in order to advance their own institutional interests so as to attain benefit maximization for themselves. Bush during the Gulf crisis patiently listened to the differing views of his "chiefs" in the cabinet and at the White House which made him come to terms with multiple alternative courses of action from which he had to choose one which would accrue the highest advantage so as to advance US national interests in the Gulf. His style of functioning was effective in determining the US' response to the Gulf crisis which was predicated on securing US interests in the economically and strategically vital albeit politically sensitive and volatile Gulf region.

The third theoretical metric tested on Bush in order to analyze his decision making during the Gulf crisis is the "Imperial Presidency" (IP) model which propounds that the president is the sole decision maker, who being endowed with the supreme executive power of the state takes decisions on important issues after taking inputs

from his subordinates usually by bypassing formal institutional structures. The use by the President of institutions that are directly accountable and answerable to him and are not liable to either the Congress or the Judiciary for decision making and policy implementation is one of the characteristic features that distinguishes this model from others. The IP model also furthers the proposition that presidential decision making rests on his personal understanding, knowhow and interpretation of an issue. It aptly sums up the decision making of President Bush during the Gulf crisis because it substantiates that the president took decisions regarding the US' response to the Gulf crisis in a discretionary manner by delegating authority for specific tasks to his "court minstrels" (by which is meant his cabinet and White House staff). Finally as commander-in-chief President Bush took the decision to deploy American forces in the Gulf in order to enforce UN Security Council and congressional resolutions.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature reviewed for the research includes books which provide a detailed analysis of president Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. A book titled "Explaining foreign policy: US decision making in the Gulf Wars" authored by Steve A. Yetiv comprehensively surveys president Bush's decision making during the Gulf War. It does so by utilizing various decision making models. A book edited by Philip Auerswald titled " Iraq 1990-2006: A diplomatic history through documents" has also been relied upon to study official US and Iraqi government documents related to the Gulf crisis.

A book titled "Remaking foreign policy: The organizational connection" authored by Graham Allison and Peter Szanton has been consulted for the purpose of understanding the president's role as the ultimate "decision maker" in foreign policy affairs. Similarly an important work titled "American foreign policy: A framework of analysis" authored by William O. Chittick has been consulted extensively and describes in detail the various theoretical frameworks of presidential decision making. Bush's autobiographical work titled "All the Best: My Life in Letters and other writings" is a seminal source which provides an engrossing description of his experiences in the Oval office with a special focus on decisions taken by him to respond to the Gulf crisis. Bush candidly admits in the aforementioned work the

"tough choices" that he had to make in order to tackle the escalating Gulf crisis while keeping US interests in the oil rich region at the forefront of his decision making.

The autobiography of Marlin Fitzwater, President Bush's press secretary at the White House, titled "Call the Briefing" provides critical references that are useful for understanding Bush's style of functioning and decision making. Fitzwater not being a member of Bush's cabinet or his inner circle was nonetheless present at important National Security Council and informal group meetings during the Gulf crisis where the contours of the US' response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait were determined. Having seen decision making at the highest level from close quarters he provides an eye witness account of the deliberations of Bush's inner circle that decided the US' response to the Gulf crisis. Renowned American investigative journalist Bob Woodward's book titled "Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate" also provides a useful description of Bush's decision making during the Gulf conflict. The autobiographical account of James Baker, Secretary of State during Bush's presidential tenure titled "Diplomacy" provides a thorough explanation of not only the diplomacy related aspects of the Bush administration's handling of the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, but also appealingly describes the "turf wars" and "squabbling" between the varied competing actors within Bush's inner circle during the Gulf conflict. Baker has given a fascinating account of the rivalry between the so called "doves" and "hawks" inside Bush's inner circle. These disparate factions tried to influence President Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis. The rival factions in Bush's main advisory team had mutually antagonistic perspectives on the US' prospective response to the Gulf crisis. He has described meticulously the fierce rivalry that existed between the rival sections of Bush's inner circle, with Secretary of State James Baker leading the group that favoured President Bush giving more time for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis and Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney heading the faction that was in favour of President Bush authorizing the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Baker explains in captivating detail that the competition between the rival factions was premised on their desire to further their individual and departmental interests by influencing President Bush's decision making.

The book titled "The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and the New World Order" jointly authored by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh provides a lucid

and descriptive analysis of US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis which was backed and supported by President Bush. The players who led the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis find a comprehensive mention in this book. An analytical description of their diplomatic work has also been provided forth in the aforementioned work. President Bush's role in US led diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis, his interactions and conversations with world leaders on issues pertaining to the Gulf crisis find a detailed mention in this scholarly work. A book titled "The Presidency of George Bush" authored by John Roberts Green provides a thorough description of the multitudinous facets of Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis. "The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences" authored by James DeFronzo gives a general description of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war of 1991. It gives an excellent outline of the Gulf Conflict and a provides a cogent and succinct narrative of Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis. It also provides a structured description and explanation of the course of events during the Gulf crisis. An extremely useful reference which provides an insight into the impact of the Gulf crisis on global geopolitics and President Bush's decision making in a concise manner is delivered by the book titled "The Gulf Conflict and International Relations" written by Ken Matthews.

Matthews book is a reliable source which furnishes a holistic analysis of the multivariied dimensions of the Persian Gulf crisis. It especially focuses on the diplomatic, political, military, legal, ethical and strategic aspects of the Gulf conflict and there consequent impact on world affairs. A book written by Deborah Amos titled "Lines in the Sand: Desert Storm and the Remaking of the Arab World" has been consulted in order to comprehend the US' military engagement in the Gulf following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis. It also assesses its impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf in addition to describing how the US' political, diplomatic and military efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis resultantly brought about transformative political changes in the Arab world.

A book authored by Rick Atkinson titled "The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War"

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also been referred to. A. Sue Goodman's scholarly work titled "Persian Gulf War 199

Desert Shield Desert Storm" describes in detail the conduct of military operations against Iraq by the UN mandated US led multinational defence coalition. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard Trainor the co-authors of a book titled "The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the conflict in the Gulf." have analyzed the military dimensions of the Persian Gulf War in a structured and wholesome manner. Their work provides an insight into the understanding, thought processes and inclinations of the US military establishment during the Gulf crisis. The views, perspectives and delegated responsibilities of military commanders-Generals Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Michael McPeak and Robert Johnston, who supervised coalition military operations against Iraq have been thoroughly explained in the book . A book titled "Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War" authored by Richard P. Hallion has been consulted and is essential for understanding the air warfare related aspects of the Gulf conflict that preceded coalition ground operations to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH.

The objective of the research is to define the broad contours of President George H.W. Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis through the praxis of three

decision making models namely the rational actor model, the bureaucratic politics model and the "Imperial Presidency" model. The intention of the study is to analyse three prominent themes of the US' response to the Gulf crisis namely (1) diplomacy;(2) the use of force; and (3)the Pursuit of war.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS.

Research questions that the study seeks to address include:

Q1. What was the role of president Bush in decision making during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91?

Q2. Why did President Bush give preference to receiving different views, options and perspectives on an issue in order to make decisions ?

Q3. Why did Bush refuse to take unilateral military action against Iraq in order to evict that country's troops from Kuwait following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis?

Q4. What factors were responsible for Bush giving his assent to a multilateral approach to address the Gulf crisis?

Q5. Did Bush bypass the National Security Council in favour of informal consultative bodies while making decisions during the Gulf crisis?

Q6. Was President overly dependent on informal group settings to arrive at decisions?

Q7. What factors were responsible for Bush being both the "ultimate" and "preeminent" decision maker during the Persian Gulf crisis?

HYPOTHESIS.

President Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 delineates that he was "ultimate" decision maker based on the premises that Bush's decision making was a combination of the salient features of the "rational actor" and "bureaucratic politics" decision making models.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.

The research methodology employed for this study has relied upon primary sources which comprise official government documents, policy papers, reports accessed from

the George H.W. Bush presidential library and National Archives Records Administration (NARA). Secondary sources used for the conduct of the research include books, research articles, international journals, information and data collected through internet sources and print media especially American newspaper dailies: Washington Post and New York Times.

The research undertaken highlights the contours of President George H.W. Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis and provides a descriptive analysis of three themes namely-(1) diplomacy; (2) the use of force; and (3) the pursuit of war, which enumerate Bush's response to the Gulf crisis. American presidential decision making models have been adopted as the basis of analysis of President Bush's decision in response to the Gulf War. The study highlights that Bush's decision making was predicated on the premise that pro and cons of alternatives be assessed in order to select a specific option that would maximize utility and benefit when implemented. It also underlines that Bush's decision making was a "condign synthesis" of the bureaucratic politics and Imperial presidency models with expected final outcomes dependent upon cost analysis and utility maximization assessments of alternatives. The research underscores that Bush's decision making was flexible and open ended, with alterations being made in it in conformity with changes in conditions and causal factors.

Bush's decision making adhered to an incremental and gradualist approach thus giving him the requisite leeway to try out various options, choices and alternatives according to his preference and discretion in order to further national interests. The study also delineates a peculiarity of Bush' decision making that saw him carry out a thorough analysis of the in-built costs, benefits and advantages of available options in accordance with his comprehension, intuition, ideology, and determination in order to deduce alternatives that delivered utility maximization. It postulates that after identifying particular alternatives that yielded the highest expected benefit at the least cost Bush ordered for their judicious implementation.

Chapter 1

BUSH'S DECISION MAKING AND GULF CRISIS.

RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL (RAM).

The traditional approach to the study of international relations is described by some commentators as Rational Actor Model, or the "Black Box Model." Some others call it systemic level of analysis. This model is exemplified by the works of scholars like Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, Thomas Schelling, and Herman Kahn, and in some writings and speeches of Henry Kissinger.

Morgenthau holds, "The First World War had its origins exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power." He explains the behaviour of actors by using a "rational outline." This method, Morgenthau says, "provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen." Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and foreign policy, and Kahn's On Escalation are two other applications of the rational Actor Model. Wolfers, in his essay "The Actors in International Politics," while taking note of two new approaches-"minds of men theory" and the decision-making approach- reverts back to the traditional approach- "states-as-the-sole-actors" approach to international politics. He asserts that the "state-as-the-sole-actor" model would best predict the behaviour of states.

What are the basic ingredients of this model? Who are the units? What is "rationality" about this model? These are some of the questions which call for further examination.

This model assumes that the nation-state is the basic unit.(It would, however, be unfair to state that the writers mentioned above treat the state just as an abstract entity and are oblivious of the fact that decisions are actually made by human beings. It would be reckon with the fact that human actors are decision makers, but they do not attach much significance to the various internal dynamics as influencing the decision-making process). The state is a sub system within an international system. There is continuous interaction between the sub-system, and "balance of power" is the mechanism by which the equilibrium of the system is maintained. As Spykman puts

it, "Equilibrium is balanced power, and balanced power is neutralized power." Thus, each action of a state is in response to some action from outside.

This approach does not take notice of the domestic structure of a state. It is not concerned with any internal variance within a state. In other words, it assumes that whatever happens inside the "box" will not affect the behaviour of the actor. This model, therefore, is known as the "Black Box" Model. To quote McClelland, "... The international system is an expanding version of the notion of two-actors-in-interaction... Interaction analysis focuses on the outputs of national systems. The national systems, themselves, are black boxed" is conceived to be a rational, unitary decision maker. It has certain broad goals like national security and national interest. For realizing its objectives, various courses of action will produce a series of consequences are considered. The state makes a rational choice which is value maximizing. So it has to select the alternative whose consequence ranks highest in terms of realizing the main goal.

Thus, the Rational Actor Model assumes the state as the basic unit. A rational choice is made after recognizing objects, expected implications, alternatives and preferences. Rational preference suppositions are applied to dissimilar actors, which include individuals, and are defined as "rationalist" disagreements. A unitary state is the entity to which they are applied. A state's apparent national interests are drawn from its strategic considerations.

BUSH'S DECISION MAKING AND ENVIRONMENT.

Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis was predicated on him listening to multiple viewpoints of members of his inner circle. Bush's inner circle with whom he consulted on important matters was not a homogeneous entity. Members of consultative bodies, both formal and informal, tried to influence President Bush into selecting a specific course of action which suited their respective departmental interests. Due to the existence of protracted rivalry amongst different members of Bush's inner circle predicated on exercising influence on him to coalesce in favour of a particular response to the Gulf crisis factional conflicts were all too common. Secretary of State James Baker and Defence Secretary Dick Cheney led disparate factions within the National Security Council and the "group of eight" that were in fierce competition with each other to exercise influence Bush's on decision making.

Since the outbreak of the Gulf conflict Cheney favoured the US taking military action against Iraq whereas Secretary Baker along with Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, favoured diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. The factional rivalry between the chiefs of the State and Defence departments provided President Bush with a set of parallel options, which he could peruse and assess in order to arrive at decisions. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Bush felt that taking military action against Iraq in order to evict its forces from Kuwait was the most viable option for the US to exercise in order to resolve the Gulf crisis yet needed preparing the international community for consensus rather unilateral action.

Bush was convinced that non military measures to compel Iraq's belligerent dictator Saddam Hussein to order the removal of his troops from Kuwait were not going to be successful. He felt that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait needed to be replied to by the use of force. In spite of his firm convictions Bush's open mindedness and flexibility caused him to peruse multiple options and alternatives delineated to him by members of his inner circle which assisted him in selecting an option that would accrue the maximum utility and benefit to the state. Being the commander-in-chief Bush considered it to be imperative for him to pay heed to dissimilar viewpoints emanating from his cabinet, White House and military chiefs. He considered listening to mutually exclusive views, perspectives and opinions as beneficial for him to obtain an expansive understanding of the varied dimensions of the an issue. Actors within Bush's inner circle tried to influence Bush to opt for alternatives that promoted their departmental and agency interests.

Members of his inner circle had disparate views on issues and were in competition with each other to exercise influence on him in order to further their parochial interests. Bush laid due emphasis on carrying with him numerous departments and agencies that were in intense competition with each other over a particular policy.

Bush's decision making was influenced by members of his inner circle who presented him with multivaried options from which he had to chose one for implementation in order to secure the fulfilment of state interests and objectives. This particularity of Bush's decision making was highlighted when he was goaded by his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to provide diplomacy the chance and opportunity to resolve the Gulf crisis. Subsequent to the outbreak of the Gulf crisis Scowcroft informed Bush

that in the post Cold War scenario, with the US being incorrectly perceived by many nations around the world as a hegemonic power that had overweening ambitions to dominate international affairs, it would be advantageous for the consolidation of its international credibility to resort to multilateral diplomacy, channelized through the United Nations, to resolve the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Bush's acceptance of Scowcroft's recommendation for diplomacy to be the US' first policy response to the Gulf crisis after having assessed its pro and cons, costs and utility suggested that he was willing to authorize options presented to him by his "chiefs" after carrying out due diligence. His evaluation of alternatives was based on a rational analysis.

APPLICABILITY OF RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL.

The model when tested on Bush's decision making during the Gulf war provides verifiable conclusions. A rationalist analysis of Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq presumes that Iraq and the international community would have favoured a negotiated outcome of the Gulf crisis which would have accrued the same result as the use of force albeit devoid of the human costs.

The decision making of President Bush during the Gulf crisis when tested and verified through the metrics of the rational actor model (RAM) highlights that he took executive decisions after carrying out a judicious review of varied options and alternatives available. The options, choices and alternatives were contrived on a rational basis. Following his appraisal of different alternatives he decided to select the option which would ensure maximum benefit to the state and assist in the advancement of national interests. He was considerate in evaluating the costs and benefits of various options in different settings. Inadequate information, ambiguity about Iraq's intentions, strategic considerations and future consequences of actions were some important aspects which were rationally assessed by President Bush prior to making decisions during the Gulf crisis.

Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis assessed by RAM suggests that he took decisions after rationally measuring the pro and cons of multiple options and alternatives. He subsequently opted for a choice which he believed would garner value maximization for the state. His decision making was predicated on securing maximum expected utility for the state. The furtherance of national security and

national interests were the determinant factors of Bush's decision making. By rationally comprehending the multivaried dimensions of an issue Bush was able to arrive at decisions that delivered outcomes which generated the highest value for the state. The protection and promotion of state interests warranted by a rational appraisal of available options and selection of alternatives that delivered the highest utility was the major element of Bush's decision making.

President Bush after rationally analyzing numerous options to determine the US' response to the Gulf crisis chose options that he expected would yield outcomes that delivered maximum advantage to the state. During the Gulf crisis after rationally assessing two prominent alternatives namely- diplomacy and the use of force Bush decided to try out the alternatives expecting that they would yield results that furthered US interests in the Gulf. His rational outlook and volition were instrumental in determining the US' course of action during the Gulf crisis. His decision making during the Gulf crisis was predicated on securing the US' strategic, economic and military interests in the Gulf. Bush drew rational inferences in accordance with prevalent conditions in order to arrive at decisions.

On August 2, 1991 Bush summoned an emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) where varied options to determine the US' response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were discussed. After consultations with NSC members Bush decided to opt for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. Subsequent to judiciously reviewing numerous alternatives Bush arrived at the decision that diplomacy be given the requisite opportunity to resolve the Gulf crisis. Based on rational valuation, the main reason diplomacy was chosen by President Bush to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis was that it was the least expensive alternative in terms of costs, both economic and military.

Bush being a rationally disposed leader was conscious of the fact that in case diplomacy failed to secure the resolution of the Gulf crisis the exercise alternate options like the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait would become viable. The rational basis of his decision making enabled him to try out multiple options in order to secure state interests in the anticipation that one of the alternatives would accrue the desired forth outcomes.

BUSH'S DECISION MAKING AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL (BPM).

EXPLANATORY DESCRIPTION OF BPM.

The proponents of the Government Politics or Bureaucratic Politics Model Richard Neustad and Morton Halperin state that the body charged with the task of making foreign policy is not homogeneous in its composition and nature. It consists of several units and subunits which tend to perceive issues more from the point of view of their parochial interests than that of the national interest. Halperin and Kanter say:

We believe the membership in the bureaucracy substantially determines the participants' perceptions and goals and directs their attention away from the international arena to intra-national, and especially inter-bureaucratic, concerns... The bureaucratic perspective... implies": (1) that change in the international environment is only one of several stimuli to which participants in the foreign policy process are responding (it is possibly among the weakest and least important); and (2) that events involving the actions of two or more nations can be best explained and predicted in terms of the actions of two or more national bureaucracies whose actions affect the domestic interest and objectives of the other bureaucracies involved.

As one of the determinants of foreign policy, "change in the international environment" is accorded the lowest place by Halperin. In other words, he underestimates the role of national interest, as perceived by a state in relation to another state in the formulation of foreign policy. On the other hand, he asserts that the equation between two or more national bureaucracies, that is, bureaucratic politics, would best explain the foreign policy of a country.

Richard E. Neustadt , one of the pioneers of the Bureaucratic Politics Model, says that the President of the United States is not as powerful in making foreign policy as he appears. He has to carry with him several agencies which may be fighting amongst themselves over a particular policy. The President and his advisers may often not see things from the same point of view. The President is of course constitutionally authorized to take a decision he likes in spite of the opposition of any department. But rarely does he do so. He often persuades his advisers to go with him. Neustadt says, "Presidential power is the power to persuade."

According to Neustadt, the policy of a government is the result of the bargaining that goes on amongst the bureaucratic players and political personalities who collectively comprise its working apparatus.

Players differ in defining goals, objectives and means. They organize themselves into groups or blocs with more or less similar viewpoints. Each group wants to prevail upon the other. But, in the context of American situation, total victory may not be possible. Each group will be ready to accommodate the views of others without yielding too much. It will try to reduce its sacrifice to the minimum. What finally emerges is a compromise. Thus policy making involves conflict, alliance-building, bargaining and cooperation. Hilsman aptly observes that policy making is a process of "conflict and consensus building." Huntington is probably right in saying that whereas the "locus" of decision is "executive," the process of decision (even in the executive) is primarily "legislative."

The government politics model highlights that reality can be assessed by making it traverse through differing insights. During the presidency of George H. W. Bush individual decision makers did not get involved in petty bureaucratic politics. This was so because Bush kept a strict vigil over his inner circle in order to prevent the ills of unrestrained factionalism from impeding his administration's effective functioning. The government politics model when tested on President Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis delineates the inner dynamics of the informal group structures like the "group of eight" and the "deputies committee" which he consulted prior to taking decisions.

The most reliable account of the model has been provided by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. The model postulates that decision makers perform their respective tasks as supporters of the bureaucracies over which they preside and in turn are influenced by them. The decision makers are primarily concerned with representing the interests of their respective departments and usually have divergent priorities and interests. The praxis "where an actor stands is determined by where he sits" adequately characterises the bureaucratic politics model. When the inclination and discernment originating from the roles played by the decision maker is understood it becomes relatively easy to accurately predict an individual's position on an expansive

set of issues. The model elucidates that the rank, status and position of an individual decide his behaviour.

The influence of an actor is predominantly the function of the relative bargaining power of players, with players taking positions on particular matters, whose source of origin are insular priorities and observations. The capability of an actor to determine results principally depends on his perception, engagement in bargaining with other players so as to obtain advantages and on his proficiency and determination to avail their use. Political background and circumstances considerably affect the inclination for contact among different players. Bargaining carried out by a player to obtain advantages for the fulfilment of his interests does not take place in a vacuum. In order for actors to take authoritative action on specific matters it is imperative that they are proficient in using action channels and standard processes. An understanding of the ways and means to exploit institutional processes is vital in order to implement decisions. Bureaucratic politics is determined by rules which trace their origin from domestic laws and statutes.

The government politics model propounds that decisions result from conflict, uncertainty, conciliation and bargaining among individuals in an expansive bureaucratic milieu. Every actor uses the discretionary power at his disposal to attain outcomes which will advance national, association, company and private interests in accordance with his perception. The model does not presume that actors act illogically in the games in which they participate. It delineates that the aggregate of games generate results which do not follow options an individual rational actor would have chosen. Bargaining is not restricted to a specific group of individuals. The President engages in bargaining in order to influence the interests of others and get them to accede to his desires. This requires him to have the dexterity to persuade others.

The model states that the results of actors communication fails to highlight the cost-benefit analysis which individual actors with a rational outlook undertake in order to opt for choices that generate maximum value. The government politics model's (GPM) characteristic feature denotes a collage which highlights bargaining between individuals associated with specific organizations in a committee arrangement. It also indicates the influence of principal agents and their subordinates in particular settings, and the decisions and actions of actors and groups of players in several exchanges.

Usually, the concept of a collage recommends that the ultimate result does not indicate the favoured alternative of an individual or chief and is also not an intentional product of a collective assemblage. Thus information pertaining to the President's stance or that of a "chief" is seldom an adequate guide to be relied upon for describing or forecasting political events.

"WHETHER TO" AND "HOW TO" DECISIONS.

The Persian Gulf crisis has been critically analyzed by making use of the government politics model for which two kinds of decisions have been examined carefully and methodically, the first one being "whether to", which were successful in annulling the main options that prevented the US from going to war against Iraq. These decisions comprised President Bush's announcement on August 5, 1990 that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "would not stand", its backing away from providing support to economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, the deployment of more than 200000 troops to Saudi Arabia in November 1990, and his decision to go to war.

Attention has also been given to the "how to" aspects of Bush's decision making (Yetiv, 2011). The "how to" questions refer to in what way or manner and by what means the choices made to respond to the evolving Gulf crisis were implemented. Decisions pertaining to stopping oil tankers headed to Iraq, engaging Iraq diplomatically and the execution of military action against that country fell under the purview of the "how to" decisions. The examination of both types of decisions permits for a comprehensive explanation as to whether model function is impacted by the type of choice made by the decision maker.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL SUPPOSITIONS.

The primary supposition drawn from this model delineates that the actors' function and position determine their respective stance and opinion on a specific matter. The main supposition of this model is that it is the bureaucracy which is responsible for shaping and influencing the actor's point of view thus it would be but natural to anticipate that actor's from different bureaucracies would presuppose dissimilar views and those from the identical ones would have analogous stands. A pertinent question crops up while this model is studied and it pertains to which players are suitable to be compared. An important feature of this model is that it highlights that in committee

settings it is imperative to seek out important players belonging to related and unrelated bureaucracies.

In case of the Gulf crisis the initial testing of the model compares the views of Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney. Both of them played decisive roles during the Gulf crisis in spite of their radical differences which were predicated on the demands and character of their respective positions, as described by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. The stances of Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell have been compared in the second test. Both of them encountered disparate stresses within the echelons of the Department of Defence. As propounded by this model the bureaucracy plays a central role in determining and manipulating opinion. When this supposition is applied to the conduct of a comparative analysis of Cheney and Powell's stands it essentially certifies that they did not have radically divergent positions to those espoused by the bureaucracy.

The third test compares the stands of Secretary of State James Baker and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell. The results of this testing were expected to be similar to those obtained for Secretary of Defence and Chairman, JCS.

The Government Politics Model is premised on a second supposition which states that actors endorse dissimilar advice, bargain on results, produce disagreements and have diverse stands. It elucidates that the important thing is to determine to what degree they would do so and not whether they would do so. The method to investigate that query is to position bargaining on a "continuum" of deeds that symbolize varied stages of government politics. The beginning of the continuum is with clarification and its end with competition (Yetiv, 2011,125).

1. Clarification: The data which originates from the actor's bureaucracy and the attempt to converse knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction.
2. Bargaining: The utilization of cooperation to attain conciliation in a way that actors concur with one alternative on the stipulation of the other.
3. Protagonism : Bureaucracy's quest to vigorously pursue its interests.
4. Contention: Protracted competition.

The third supposition highlights the model's presumption that Presidents, who usually are not considered bargainers, are very much so under certain circumstances. During the Gulf crisis President Bush proposed cooperative measures to resolve the crisis, contended on important policy decisions with his cabinet and White House chiefs and engaged in bargaining after confronting opposition from the bureaucracy.

IMPORTANCE OF COLLAGES IN DECISION MAKING.

Collages generated to symbolize decisions by the decision formulation processes constitute the fourth supposition. The opinions and perspectives of varied actors are denoted by collages which are a mixture of inputs. The model aptly describes the government response on specific issues formulated as a result of varied inputs. When decisions morph into collages it becomes impertinent and illogical to assume that they would describe the ruminations of Bush's countenance, result in inducing surprise amid the decision makers and would be the result of the intentions of an individual. An individual can neither dominate a collage nor predict outcomes.

Bargaining and cooperation cause collages to be generated which denote numerous contending inputs having a specific purpose. Bureaucratic politics determine final results and in case decisions denote a collage it would be unwise to anticipate them to astonish actors on account of the factor of compounding. Actors are generally cognizant of their involvement in bringing into existence a collage. Case-by-case or non commission based decision making is carried out without knowledge of others and generates decisions that astound those who are not aware of intricacies involved in decision making processes.

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.

Similar to the second supposition the government politics model can be tested by researching informal group settings like the group of eight and the deputies committee. The main deputies committee out of the labyrinth of such committees which composed and prepared papers of the group of eight was led by Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser and comprised six indispensable players who were proxies of the group of eight and functioned as its surrogates. Members of the Deputies Committee Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defence for Policy; Bob

Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Richard Kerr of the Central Intelligence Agency; Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Richard Hass, Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs were responsible for handling most of the paperwork of the Bush administration on national security issues (Yetiv, 2011).

Richard Hass worked tirelessly alongside Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser in order to draft most of the policy papers delineating the Bush's administration's response to the Gulf crisis. The committee acquitted its work from the west wing conference room of the White House and worked to amend the coordination of numerous departments and agencies in order to secure national security. A pertinent question asked concerning the applicability of the Government Politics Model to the Gulf crisis surmised as to whether the players comported themselves in a fashion that intimated their position which was contingent upon where they sat, as indicated by the first supposition of the model. The stances of the influential players in the decision making process during the Gulf crisis have been discussed herewith:

POWELL'S VIEWPOINT

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell perceived the Gulf crisis in military terms and put forward military options for Bush's consideration. With the exception of dismissing Powell's proposal to carry out a frontal assault on Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait President Bush did not interfere in the military related aspects of the coalition. Although Powell at times exceeded his authority by calling into question the nature and lucidity of the US' political objectives in the Gulf he desisted from influencing diplomacy carried out by Secretary of State James Baker to resolve the Gulf crisis. He was in favour of resorting to the use of overwhelming force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. He had become worried following President Bush's public announcement on August 5, 1990 that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "would not stand." Powell felt Bush's statement had given a new "direction" and "a new mission" to the US' response to the Gulf crisis (Yetiv, 2011).

On September 24, 1990 Powell met Bush and urged him to provide more time to economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations Security Council to pressurize Iraq to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Bush told Powell

that it was "good to consider all options" but that time was running out for Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait (Yetiv, 2011). With Bush having rejected economic sanctions as unviable Powell extended support to Bush's decision to augment US military presence in Saudi Arabia. He supervised the doubling of US conventional forces to Saudi Arabia in November 1990. The reluctance of Powell to support the use of force to resolve the Gulf crisis made Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser declare retrospectively that the "biggest doves in Washington wear uniforms" (Yetiv, 2011, 128).

Gates remembered Gen. Powell repetitively stressing the point that US led coalition military action against Iraq would invariably cause the US and its allies to suffer significant casualties. Powell had felt an "enormous sense of responsibility for the troops-worried that they were being pushed into conflict" (Yetiv, 2011). Powell explained to Bush during a meeting, which ended up being the last one before the start of coalition military operations against Iraq, that war was tough business and would inevitably cause the US to suffer significant military casualties. With Bush having made up his mind that the use of force was the only viable alternative to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation Powell grudgingly extended his support to it. Powell's personal preference was for President Bush providing more time to the economic sanctions and blockade imposed on Iraq by the United Nations to deliver results. Powell's reluctance to support the use of force option and his belief that diplomatic efforts be given the adequate time to yield expected outcomes made him stand out as a "disinclined soldier."

CHENEY'S VIEWPOINT.

Defence Secretary Dick Cheney was in favour of Bush authorizing the use of military action against Iraq. On numerous occasions he had strongly opposed the use of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis because he felt that it would only end up providing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein the time and space to consolidate his occupation of Kuwait. Cheney was convinced that diplomacy would not be successful in pressurizing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to order the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. He believed that Saddam Hussein only understood the language of force. Cheney was fervently opposed to obtaining congressional approval for the use of force against Iraq. He felt that with Security Council resolution 678 having

authorized the use of "all means necessary" to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait the US had obtained the assent of the international community to proceed forward with military action against Iraq.

Although Secretary of State James Baker and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell were reluctant to support President Bush authorizing the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait they supported the doubling of US troops in the Gulf. They were also in favour of the US giving Iraq a deadline to complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. Baker and Powell had a guarded stand on these decisions.

CONTINUUM AND BARGAINING.

The Government Politics model delineates that it is important to evaluate the stand of actors, and how they perform in group settings. It explains that players' are influenced by their position and do not necessarily try to explicate the viewpoint of their respective department on every occasion. Bargaining, promotion and rivalry constitute the system of the continuum. Clarification is the most benign of the government politics behaviours. An important characteristic feature of this model is that players who represent bureaucracies can convey information pertaining to designs which originate from within the echelons of bureaucracy in order to explicate their stand on matters. The recurrence of fractures in bargaining leads to quarrels, bitterness, and competition.

Provided the position and reactions of third parties bargaining entails strategic communication where actors try to exploit their capabilities to the maximum. The probability of promotion leading to exchanges which garner accommodations, in which both sides make concessions are impelled for the purpose of attaining bureaucratic objectives. Bargaining's concentrated strength and intensity is superseded by promotion. Numerous reasons are responsible for actors opting to substitute promotion for bargaining which include actors conviction that there is no necessity for them to bargain because of the powerful influence wielded by their respective departments and agencies, their lack of inclination to do so and their adherence to departmental instructions not to indulge in bargaining.

The actors in all likelihood are predisposed to engage in government politics in a crude and un sophisticated manner. The interaction among different players in the

veritable game, which seems to be nothing more than a zero sum game involving all its stress and pressures might lead them to develop rivalry. During the Gulf crisis decision makers usually put forward and explained the position of their respective departments and agencies within the echelons of the National Security Council, the group of eight and the deputies committee.

Insufficient corroboration available suggests that bargaining, promotion and competition were not availed use of by decision makers during the Gulf crisis. During the Gulf crisis they asserted the stand, view and perspective of their respective departments and agencies on a less frequent basis. The decision makers were primarily focused on attaining objects which were in consonance with the promotion of state interests as perceived by them and were thus not predisposed to provide more attention to issues that did not concern state interests.

PRINCIPALS OR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.

Through the means of design the actors were encouraged to explicate the position of their departments and agencies. The function of the Principals or Deputies committee was to find out answers to problems that existed between different departments and agencies in order to nullify the possibility of the outbreak of intra agency conflict and misunderstanding. Beyond the purview of departmental intentions numerous other causes influenced the deputies committee's work.

Robert Gates who was the in charge of the committee during the Gulf crisis stated that he had not experienced actors in the committee further the agenda, opinions, views and perspectives of their respective departments; on the contrary they were usually predisposed to push the stand of the principal of their department or agency which conveyed his personal point of view rather than that espoused by the institution. The committee was inclined to further national interests even though sometimes, as easily discernible, it went overboard in favour of the position of a department.

GANG OR GROUP OF EIGHT.

Within the stratum of the group of eight the decision making process was not much different from that of the Principal's committee in terms of intensiveness and extent. The participating members of the bargaining committee freely represented the views, perspectives and opinions of their respective departments and agencies. On August 3,

1990 at the second meeting of the national security council (NSC) Lawrence Eagleburger, deputy Secretary of State sitting in for James Baker, who had been on a visit to the Soviet Union, urged President Bush to provide assent to diplomacy channelled through the United Nations to resolve the Gulf crisis by putting economic and military pressure on Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.

In the interim Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell provided military alternatives to the President following the deployment of Iraqi troops on the Kuwait-Saudi border which indicated that Iraq was revving up to carry out aggression against Saudi Arabia. Although differences existed between the members, which sometimes escalated resulting in bouts of recriminations directed at each other, the core strength of this informal group setting was the unity, cohesion and cooperation between its members on matters of national interest.

At the beginning of their deliberations members of the group usually put forward the views, perspectives and insights of their respective departments and agencies but through the course of the deliberations their personal viewpoints on issues came to the fore. This indicated that their activities were bound by time. The camaraderie between cabinet chiefs and members of the inner circle and their loyalty for Bush were primarily responsible for the effectiveness of decision making during emergency situations

BUSH AND CONSENSUS FORMATION.

Bush's strong leadership assisted in consensus formation and resulted in reducing obstacles vis-avis his stand on issues. The President and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft had primal doubts about the efficacy of the economic sanctions in compelling Iraq to order the withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait . Meanwhile, Secretary Baker , Gen. Powell and Gen. Schwarzkopf favoured the continuation of the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq but were unable to jointly make the case for it before President Bush.

With Bush authorizing the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait the group of eight was left with no alternative but to "fall in line" and carry out their respective duties in spite of mutual disagreements between its members. Important queries

raised at the level of the group were posited amongst important decision makers. Contention was uncommon amongst members of the group as was bargaining and protagonism. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft was close to the President but was circumspect while contending with the State and Defence departments as he was not predisposed to being the focus of public attention. Bush regarded with aversion discords resulting from clashes of ideas or opinions and was inclined to spur argument on matters of domestic import rather than on foreign affairs.

BUSH AND BARGAINING.

Bush was not involved in bargaining as has been substantiated by the lack of evidence available to countenance this supposition. On no grounds can he be regarded as a bargainer because as has been corroborated by available facts neither did he contend with his inner circle on critical decisions nor did he proffer solutions to major problems that were based on reciprocation. Bush's convictions were instrumental in limiting the scope of discussion with his advisers and setting the limits of the order of business on issues pertaining to handling the escalating Gulf crisis. During the course of the Gulf crisis Bush persisted with comparing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler even though his staffers Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates and Merlin Fitzwater were of the view this rhetoric tended to hinder the furtherance of US objectives and tried hard to prevent him from doing so albeit unsuccessfully.

Bush was of the firm conviction that Iraq had to completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Furthermore he favoured US efforts to "contain" Iraqi influence in the Gulf and the Middle East because he wanted to secure US interests by protecting its allies the Gulf states and Israel. Bush was against compromise and persevered with comparing Saddam with the vilest of autocrats.

CONTOURS OF BUSH'S DECISION.

Important decisions arrived at to resolve the Gulf crisis were predicated on the views of President Bush and to a relatively lesser extent on those of national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. The character and scope of presidential engagement in emergency situations varied but nonetheless the president was frequently involved in crisis resolution. Bush was the main decision maker but deliberations with his inner circle

at the NSC and group of eight saw his cabinet chiefs Baker and Cheney clash over the relatively unimportant "how to" aspects (Yetiv, 2011, 134).

Bush's decision to double US forces in the Gulf in November 1990 was a consequence of the mixture of perspectives and actions. The decision to double US forces in the Gulf was taken by Bush and Scowcroft much to the chagrin of Powell and Schwarzkopf who had not been consulted prior to the decision being made. Secretary of State James Baker was also surprised and displeased because of President Bush not take the Congress into confidence before reinforcing US troop strength in the Gulf. Bush's decision to double US troop presence on Saudi soil reflected "top-down" decision making (Yetiv, 2011, 134).

After having deliberations with British Prime minister Margaret Thatcher Bush and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft Bush made the decision to issue a final peremptory demand to the Iraqi government to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face military action. By mid October 1990 a consensus had developed in Bush's inner circle to give an ultimatum to Saddam to pull out his troops from Kuwait. Scowcroft was of the belief that it was imperative for the US to obtain the support and backing of the international community in order to take decisive military action against Iraq.

Bush was of the unswerving opinion that only "a provocation" was needed for the initiation of a coalition military campaign against Iraq and that with "time running out" it was not appropriate to predicate the furtherance of US interests in the Gulf by "waiting for sanctions to work." On November 10 Bush described to Scowcroft that he was ready to "go the extra mile for peace" in order to resolve the Gulf crisis in a non violent manner by inviting to Washington the Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Bush further elaborated that no unwarranted concessions would be given to Iraq in the process. Bush's proposal to invite Aziz to the White House and send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad to meet Saddam Hussein came in the midst of a congressional uproar over his decision to double US troop numbers in the Gulf without having consulted the congress beforehand.

Bush formally announced his plan of bilateral level talks between the representatives of the US and Iraq on November 30, 1990 a day after the United Nations Security Council had authorized the use of force against Iraq by passing resolution 678. During a meeting with the Saudi ambassador to the US Prince Bandar Scowcroft told him that

Bush's urging the Iraqi leadership to come to talks was simply "window dressing" and that Bush was already fully committed to be totally "unyielding" in getting Iraqi troops removed from Kuwait (Yetiv, 2011, 135). Scowcroft described to Bandar that Bush had replied to the apprehensions of some in his inner circle, who had argued against holding talks with Iraq which they thought would signal to Saddam Hussein "weakness" on the part of the US, by stating that "the president felt that to go to war without having a direct meeting with the Iraqis, would not be a good idea."

Scowcroft too was of the belief that the President should have given "more thought" before instigating bilateral talks with Iraq in order to resolve the Gulf crisis without going to war. The decisions taken by Bush were fully in affirmation of his intentions, as was easily discernible, with him coming up with the idea to negotiate at the bilateral level with the Iraqis in order to resolve the Gulf crisis without resorting to the use of force.

To characterize Bush's decision making through the strictures of the government politics model it would be apt to highlight the fact that more often than not he obtained the results which he yearned for by assiduously working to get them realized in spite of the numerous and wide ranging difficulties that came in his way. President Bush's ability to discern the "weed from the chaff" came in handy for decision making purposes especially during his deliberations with his staff. Bush was fully cognizant of what he wanted before going into discussions with his inner circle or the group of eight with several of the decisive decisions being made in the context of these settings.

As diplomacy was failing the President approached the United Nations Security Council to get approval for resolution 678 which authorized the use of force against Iraq. The Security Council voted in favour of the resolution on November 29, 1990 thus permitting UN member states to "use all means necessary" to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

BUSH'S DECISION TO GO TO WAR.

With Bush's last ditch effort to resolve the Gulf Crisis by consenting to Secretary of State James Baker holding talks with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz at Geneva on January 9, 1991 not bearing fruit due to the failure of the Baker-Aziz talks Bush took

measures to take military action against Iraq. He opted to get Congressional approval for war against Iraq. After deliberating on Bush's proposal to take military action against Iraq the congress provided its approval to the measure by majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Subsequent to obtaining congressional approval to go to war against Iraq on January 12, 1991 members of Bush's inner circle especially Secretary of State Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates and CIA director William Webster built up intense pressure on President Bush to pursue war. They told Bush that if Iraq did not abide by the Security Council resolution 678 set dead line of January 15, 1991 to completely withdraw its forces from Kuwait he should immediately announce to the American public that with the US exhausting all conceivable means to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non-violent manner it had no alternative left but to take military action against Iraq. Immediately following congressional assent to authorize the use of force against Iraq Bush formally declared that US was at war with Iraq.

With the lapse of the January 15 deadline and Iraq refusing to remove its troops from Kuwait Bush announced in a televised address to the American people that he had approved the initiation of military operations against Iraq in order to enforce Security council resolution 678 and to protect vital US interests in the Gulf. In the wee hours of January 16, 1991 US bomber aircraft struck Iraqi government and military installations thus commencing an aerial bombing campaign whose objective was to obliterate Iraq capability and will to resist the coalition.

An assessment of Bush's decision making delineates that he was a rational decision maker whose priority was to advance national interests. After examining numerous options and alternatives and taking into consideration the implications of exercising those options Bush arrived at decisions whose object was to promote the interests of the state. Bush's decision making was based on rationality which gave it the flexibility to adapt to the rapidly changing conditions in the Gulf in a seamless manner.

Bush's keenness to deliberate with members of the National Security Council and informal groups such as the "group of eight" on issues in order to acquire new information which would help him make calculated decisions underscored that he was the "ultimate" decision maker, who being influenced by other actors' views, opinions

and outlook took decisions finally that were expected to yield maximum advantage to the state. The study thus hypothesizes that Bush was a rationally disposed decision maker and who wielded "ultimate" decision making authority.

President Bush' "rational assessment" that the Iraqi leadership's aversion to order the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait would invariably leave him with no option but to take military action to liberate Kuwait was primarily responsible for his authorizing the mobilization of US armed forces for deployment to the Gulf. Bush having given his support and backing to diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis sensed that the deployment of US forces to the Gulf would guarantee that non military measures taken to pressurize and compel Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait were backed by force thus reinforcing them. With the end of fall 1990 and diplomacy failing to get the Iraqi troops to pull out from Kuwait in spite of the passage of numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions Bush affirmed that "time was running out" to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non violent manner. He indicated that with the option of the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait becoming viable with the passing of each day and diplomacy failing to resolve the crisis he was willing to authorize the use of force against Iraq after obtaining approval for it from the United Nations Security Council. Bush's decision to avoid interfering in the military aspects of the use of force alternative to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait subsequent to his administration obtaining approval for the same from the Security Council and the US Congress invariably led his military commanders to obtain a free hand to conduct military operations against Iraq in a manner that assured overwhelming success for the coalition against Iraqi troops. Bush's bold decision making which was predicated on rational analysis and comprehension of issues meant to foster the advancement of national security and national interests went a long way in ensuring the coalition's success in overthrowing Iraqi troops from Kuwait without incurring significant losses. The highlight of Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis was his rational evaluation of the conditions prevailing domestically and internationally, with specific focus on the Gulf and his innate ability to willingly listen to a diverse range of voices, opinions, standpoints on issues in order to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the matter at hand prior to making decisions that were to be implemented.

Chapter 2

DIPLOMACY AND THE GULF CRISIS

On July 25, 1990 US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie met Iraqi President Saddam Hussein at his Presidential Palace in Baghdad. When asked by him about the US' position on the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute she told Saddam that it was official policy of the US government not to interfere in "Intra Arab" disputes but that the US was still open to playing the role of a mediator in resolving the territorial disputes that Iraq had with its Arab neighbours (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Saddam Hussein took the clarification from Ambassador Glaspie as the green light to invade Kuwait and absorb that tiny but oil rich Gulf Emirate into Iraq as its 19th province. Following his meeting with Glaspie Saddam became convinced that the US would not come to the defence of its Gulf allies Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE if Iraq attacked them and settled its territorial disputes with these states by resorting to the use of force.

Subsequent to Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Hussein she was strongly criticised by some sections in Washington who charged her for having failed to boldly represent US interests in the Gulf. Following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis Glaspie was again criticised by certain reactionary elements of the US political establishment for the vague language she had used to describe the US government's position on Iraq's border disputes with its neighbours during her meeting with Saddam. The reactionaries, mostly jingoistic Republicans, held Glaspie's supposedly weak enumeration of US government policy on territorial disputes between Arab states to Saddam Hussein as being responsible in no small measure for the Iraqi tyrant having ordered Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Bush was goaded by his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to take the route of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis in spite of being fully aware that the chances of diplomacy convincing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to order the pullout of Iraqi troops from Kuwait were meagre. Scowcroft was of the conviction that the use of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis would cause a further increase in the US' political influence globally following the end of the Cold War. Bush himself was conversant of the fact that the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein could not be convinced into ordering the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait by simply resorting to the use of diplomatic means because the Iraqi strongman had utter disregard for international law and

norms. He believed that the Iraqi dictator's ambition and greed to carry out aggression against his neighbours like Saudi Arabia would be fanned further with the US and the international community agreeing to use diplomacy to resolve the crisis in the Gulf. The President intuitively knew although he failed to disclose it in public that the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis would provide Saddam Hussein the opportunity to consolidate Iraqi defence lines in Kuwait in anticipation of US led military action to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Bush nonetheless acceded to Scowcroft's demand and thereafter diplomacy was carried out by the Secretary of State James Baker bilaterally and multilaterally to resolve the crisis in the Gulf. Subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Bush sought consensus both at home and abroad for the implementation of economic sanctions on Iraq and the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 President Bush opted to use diplomacy to resolve the crisis that had erupted in the Gulf on the advice of National Security

Adviser (NSA) Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft believed that by using diplomacy to resolve the

Gulf crisis the United States would enhance its global reputation, credibility and stature

alongside also being recognized as a benign superpower that harboured no ambitions to

establish its hegemony over the world following the end of the Cold War (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Scowcroft was convinced that diplomacy was a relatively inexpensive

means to resolve the Gulf crisis because it did not involve the humungous economic costs

that any probable military action to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait would require. After

considering the pros and cons of different options available to him Bush opted to take the route of multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis and deputed Secretary of State

James Addison Baker III to carry it out (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

Secretary of State Baker did not have any prior experience dealing in matters related to foreign affairs but was imbued with the qualities of persistence and hard work thus making him a fast learner. After receiving the go ahead from President Bush to carry out diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis he visited US allies around the world for having discussions with them on finding a quick, negotiated settlement to the Gulf crisis.

UN RESOLUTION 660.

At the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the US' Permanent Representative to the United Nations Thomas R. Pickering worked diligently to garner the support of member states to condemn the illegal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Auerswald, 2009). He worked closely with the Kuwaiti delegation at the UN (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998) and met the delegate heads of UNSC member states, both permanent and non permanent in order to convince them to vote in favour of UNSC resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Due to Pickering's proactive and deft diplomacy the US obtained the support of the majority of the Security Council member states for the passage of resolution 660 which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded Iraq to withdraw its forces from that country immediately and unconditionally. Resolution 660 saw a few non permanent members of the Security Council like Cuba and Yemen vote against it (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Cuba's vote against the resolution was easily discernible because it had been hostile and unfriendly to the US since the outbreak of the Cuban revolution. Yemen voted against Resolution 660 because it was not in favour of any punitive action against Iraq. President Bush on learning of Yemen's support for Iraq at the UNSC felt disappointed because Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh had previously provided staunch support to the US in the Middle East (Bush and

Scowcroft, 1998). Passage of UNSC-R 660 clearly and unambiguously delineated the stand of the international community on Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

It vociferously condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait completely and unconditionally with immediate effect. The smooth passage of the resolution in the Security Council highlighted in no uncertain terms that the international community was united against Iraq's illegal aggression of Kuwait and would take decisive action to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush was pleased with the swift passage of resolution 660 in the Security Council on 2 August, 1990, the same day that Iraq had invaded Kuwait. He ordered Secretary of State James Baker and US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering to remain proactive in finding a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. Pickering's diplomatic networking at the UN backed by Secretary of State Baker's mobile diplomacy enabled the US to acquire the support of the majority of United Nations member states for UN backed efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis. The Arab League, a multilateral organization of Arab states, passed a resolution on August 10, 1990 condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Member states of the Arab League felt that a belligerent Iraq posed a threat to the stability and security of the Arab world (Auerswald, 2009).

Most Arab countries opposed Iraq's ambitions to politically and militarily dominate the Gulf and the Middle East region. They were suspicious of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's attempts to unite the disparate Arab countries into a united block to take on Israel and were in favour of curbing Iraq's growing military influence in the region (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

US DIPLOMACY WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

After learning of the Arab League's resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait President Bush held telephonic discussions with the Saudi monarch King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz bin Saud on finding a peaceful and non-violent resolution to the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Bush was anxious to deploy US troops on Saudi soil to protect that country from an Iraqi attack. In his conversation with King Fahd Bush requested him to provide authorization for the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ruler was initially hesitant to allow the deployment of US troops to his country because he believed that although Saddam Hussein's forces had invaded neighbouring Kuwait the Iraqi dictator would not order them to attack his country

because Iraq had obtained considerable economic assistance from Saudi Arabia during the Iran- Iraq war. Bush had told King Fahd that it was imperative for the US to defend Saudi Arabia from an external threat because the Gulf kingdom was one of its largest sources of oil imports and that the vitality of the American economy was dependent upon ensuring the stability and security of Saudi Arabia. To Bush's request the Saudi monarch replied that he would carry out consultations on the matter with his government officials and would respond to him shortly. Bush's request was eventually accepted by Saudi authorities thus paving the way for the large scale deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia to defend it from Iraqi aggression.

Bush also sent a delegation headed by Defence Secretary Dick Cheney to the Gulf and North Africa for having talks with leaders of US allies in the region. Cheney's delegation included Deputy Secretary of Defence for Policy Paul Wolfowitz; Deputy National Security Adviser Robert M. Gates; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell; and Richard Hass, Special Assistant to the President on Near East and South Asian Affairs (Yetiv, 2011). The delegation visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco and held talks with the leaders of these countries. The visit of the delegation to the region provided fruitful results to the US which included Morocco's ruler King Hasan II providing his assent to dispatch Moroccan troops to Saudi Arabia to join the multilateral forces gathering there to protect the kingdom and other Gulf states from an attack by Iraq (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). A few days after his conversation with President Bush the Saudi government provided its approval to the deployment of multilateral defence forces on its soil to defend itself against Iraqi adventurism. Throughout the course of the Gulf crisis Secretary of State James Baker visited Brussels and held discussions there with the foreign ministers of NATO member countries and delegate representatives. He urged NATO to take a united stand on the crisis in the Gulf by demanding unequivocally terms the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Auerswald, 2009).

US DIPLOMACY AND NATO.

At Brussels Secretary Baker addressed the NATO Atlantic Council, the main decision making body of the organization, and laid out four key objectives of US diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis which were namely-:

1. The withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally.

2. The restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
3. To secure the release of all American citizens and other foreign nationals from Iraqi captivity.
4. To secure the stability and security of the Gulf region (Auerswald, 2009).

Following his address to the NATO Atlantic Council in order to obtain the support of the Soviet Union for the resolution of the Gulf crisis Secretary Baker met the Soviet liaison to NATO in Brussels and described to him the stance of the US government on the escalating crisis in the Gulf. He requested the Soviet Liaison to NATO to describe the US government's position on the Gulf crisis to the Soviet government and inform it of the diplomatic efforts being made by the US to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful manner (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was carried out not only by Secretary of State James Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger but also by President Bush himself too. Bush exhibited considerable interest on issues pertaining to foreign policy. To satiate his appetite for matters related to foreign policy he spent a considerable amount of time dealing with them during his presidential tenure. Early in his public life he was fortunate to have served as the US' permanent representative to the UN during the Nixon presidency and later on as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under President Gerald Ford.

US DIPLOMACY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Diplomacy carried out by Bush to resolve the Gulf crisis saw him meet British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Aspen, Colorado on August 6, 1990. Bush and Thatcher were invited to Aspen, a popular American ski resort nestled in the Sawatch Mountains, to address the annual meet of the Aspen Institute, a renowned US think tank on international affairs (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). During their meeting Bush and Thatcher exchanged views and perspectives on the aggravating Gulf crisis. At their meeting they decided that the continuation of multilateral diplomacy was essential for a peaceful, non-violent resolution of the Gulf conflict. Following their informal talks at Aspen they flew to Washington and held further discussions on the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Gulf region. Thatcher was initially apprehensive of the use of multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis because she felt that

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait contravened Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and thus needed to be responded to by the use of force.

The aforementioned provision in the UN charter provided approval to the UN to defend fellow UN member states whose territorial sovereignty had been violated. President Bush convinced Thatcher that diplomacy was the most inexpensive and peaceful way to resolve the Gulf crisis. He explained to her that it was therefore necessary for the international community to find a non violent resolution of the Gulf crisis through multilateral diplomacy. Bush requested Thatcher to provide the United States with Britain's complete support and backing for the quick resolution of the Gulf crisis. On her part Thatcher tried hard to convince President Bush that diplomacy alone would not cause Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, to order the removal of his troops from Kuwait. She expressed her fears to Bush by telling him that relying solely on diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis would only cause the Iraqi forces to consolidate their hold over Kuwait. Bush concurred with Thatcher and told her that for diplomacy to be successful in resolving the Gulf crisis in a peaceful manner it needed to be backed up by hard power.

Bush-Thatcher talks was a relief for Bush because Thatcher had assured him that the United Kingdom was committed to extending its full support to US led diplomatic efforts at the UN to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non-violent manner. During the course of the Gulf crisis Secretary of State James Baker visited Britain on multiple occasions and held talks there with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. Since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis Britain stood in full support of the US which had been its traditional ally and with which it had enjoyed a "special relationship".

US AND DIPLOMACY AND ARAB STATES.

Bush's personal involvement in diplomacy was also highlighted by his visit to the Gulf in November 1990 during which he met the heads of state of various Gulf allies and held talks with them on finding a resolution to the Gulf crisis. Bush assured the Gulf states that the United States would provide military support to them in order to protect them from Iraqi aggression. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak told President Bush that it was necessary for the US to remain in regular touch with not only its big Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia but to also closely engage the relatively small Gulf states like the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman because by doing so it would be able to

obtain greater economic and military support from these countries for its troop deployment to the Gulf (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 341). He highlighted to Bush that by having regular interactions with the smaller Gulf states the US military forces would benefit immensely as they would consequently obtain access to the ports, airbases, transport and logistical networks of these countries thus enabling them to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states from likely Iraqi aggression. Bush took Mubarak's advice and during his visit to the Middle East in late 1990 visited small Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Oman. During his visit to these countries he held talks with their leaders on the escalating crisis in the Gulf and requested them to provide support to US forces being deployed to the region.

American diplomatic engagement with these Gulf countries proved advantageous because these countries provided vital logistical support to the multilateral defence coalition. Multilateral diplomacy carried out by Secretary of State James Baker and Assistant to the President on Near East and South Asian Affairs Richard Hass helped maintain open lines of communication with Gulf Cooperation Council member states thus consequently going a long way in assisting US efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis in a non-violent manner. As part of US diplomacy to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis President Bush held talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with the Kuwaiti government-in-exile headed by Sheikh Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). This meeting between Bush and the Kuwaiti monarch was one of the highlights of the Presidential visit to the Gulf in November 1990. The deposed Kuwaiti leader told Bush that he appreciated US efforts to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis through diplomacy but felt that diplomatic overtures alone would have only limited influence on Iraq for it to order the withdrawal its troops from Kuwait. Sheikh al-Sabah conveyed to Bush that the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and amicable manner would leave the international community with no option but to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Bush patiently and attentively listened to the Kuwaiti monarch and assured him that the US was fully committed to the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait preferably through diplomatic means. He eased Kuwaiti nerves by telling the Kuwaiti Emir that if diplomacy was unable to find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis then the US would not hesitate to take military action against Iraq to evict that country's troops from Kuwait. Bush's

experience in foreign policy coupled with his interest in it made him exercise considerable influence on US foreign policy during the Gulf crisis. Although Bush gave formal responsibility to Secretary of State James Baker to obtain the support of major world powers for UN led multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis nonetheless he continued to have a big say in deciding its course during the Gulf crisis.

Bush enjoyed extremely cordial and friendly relations with most of the rulers of Gulf monarchies (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). The main reason behind this was Bush's business experience in the oil industry during his days in Texas following his return from military service in the Second World War. He partly owned the Zapata Petroleum oil company that extracted crude oil from oilfields in Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. It was during his time as the head of Zapata Petroleum that he developed close ties with the ruling authorities of most of the Gulf states primarily because of his company's expansive business interests in those countries.

The close relations that Bush developed with Gulf leaders like King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Zaid Al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates went a long way in garnering Arab and Muslim support for US diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis. President Bush held regular telephonic conversations with rulers of the Gulf states who were staunch allies of the United States. The US State Department maintained regular contact with staunch US allies in the Middle East like Egypt and worked hard to engage formerly hostile Arab states like Syria. For obtaining political and military support from one of Iraq's neighbours Syria, Secretary of State Baker visited Damascus, the Syrian capital on September 14, 1990 and held talks there with the Syrian foreign minister Farouk Al-Shara (Auerswald, 2009, 164). During the talks new vistas of US-Syrian cooperation to defend Gulf states from Iraqi aggression were discussed. The coalition troop build up in the Gulf gathered momentum after President Bush's announcement on August 7, 1990 that US troops would begin deploying to Saudi Arabia to protect that country from Iraqi aggression (Auerswald, 2009). According to Bush the defence of Saudi Arabia was vital for US energy security because it sourced a major share of its crude oil imports from the kingdom. US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis went to great lengths to protect US economic interests in the Gulf region. US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis caused the consolidation of US ties with important Gulf countries like Oman. US diplomacy with

Oman proved beneficial to the US as that country agreed to provide its logistical facilities to the coalition forces. US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was also proactive in asserting US interests in the Gulf region by leveraging its economic and financial muscle.

The US' long time ally in the Middle East Jordan provided its support to Iraq during the Gulf crisis thus causing the US to firmly convey to Jordan that it would cease providing support, both economic and military, to Jordan if it did not recalibrate its hostile stance of supporting Iraq at multilateral forums like the United Nations and the Arab League. Since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in the Gulf the Jordanian government had extended its support to Iraq at the UN. Jordan's support for Iraq during the Gulf crisis was due to its heavy dependence on Iraq for most of its oil imports, which amounted in volume terms to about 85 percent. Jordan being the largest exporter of goods to Iraq suffered acute economic disruption because of the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq by Security Council resolution 661.

US DIPLOMACY AND THE SOVIET UNION.

US diplomacy gave significant emphasis to obtaining the support of the Soviet Union to find a quick resolution of the Gulf crisis.

This was because Bush and Secretary of State Baker believed that with the Soviet Union being a veto power wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council obtaining its support was essential for the passage of UNSC resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally. As part of US diplomatic efforts to woo the Soviets to back UN authorized resolutions to resolve the Gulf crisis the Bush administration promised the Soviet Union economic assistance to withstand the economic upheaval being experienced by it following the initiation of economic reforms by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Bush maintained regular contacts with Gorbachev during the Gulf crisis. Furthermore he managed to obtain support from the Soviet Union at the Security Council and at various other multilateral fora for US diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. The friendly relations that existed between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze assisted the superpowers to cooperate with each other on the Gulf crisis. The friendly rapport between Baker and Shevardnadze helped them

to coordinate their policy and action on the Gulf crisis. Following their meeting in Moscow on August 6, 1990 Baker and Shevardnadze issued a joint statement that condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Incidentally, Baker was in the Soviet Union when the Gulf crisis erupted. After learning of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Baker and Shevardnadze rushed from the Soviet city of Irkutsk to Moscow and held discussions on the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). At the discussions they agreed that the two countries would cooperate with each other on matters concerning the Gulf crisis.

Thereafter a joint statement was issued by them. The joint statement called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and backed United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding Iraqi compliance with international law. The US-Soviet joint statement issued on August 6, 1990 was the first instance in the post World War II era when the two rival superpowers took a united stance on a crisis that had global ramifications (Auerswald, 2009). Baker and Shevardnadze visited each other regularly and worked hard to synchronize the diplomatic efforts of the two countries to resolve the Gulf crisis. To garner the support of the Soviet Union for resolving the Gulf crisis Bush held regular talks with his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev on the hotline connection between the Oval office and the Kremlin. Bush's consistent efforts to obtain the support of the Soviet Union to resolve the Gulf crisis ultimately bore fruit with the Soviet Union withdrawing its support from its long time ally Iraq and ceasing its arms exports to it. During his conversations with Gorbachev Bush urged the Soviet leader to back the United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait immediately, completely and unconditionally.

Bush provided assurances to Gorbachev that Soviet cooperation with the US on the Gulf crisis would enable it to obtain US economic assistance. He also conveyed to Gorbachev that US-Soviet cooperation on the Gulf crisis would exhibit to the international community that both the countries desired a swift resolution to the Gulf crisis. This cooperation between the two superpowers would be the first such instance following the end of the Cold war thus paving the way for the establishment of a "New World Order" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Bush's negotiations and discussions with Soviet Premier Gorbachev were instrumental in both the countries cooperating with each other to resolve the Gulf crisis. US efforts to obtain the support of the Soviet Union to resolve the Gulf crisis saw Secretary of State Baker develop a

friendly relationship with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze (Yetiv, 2011). In order to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression both of them worked diligently to synchronize the policy and execution of their respective governments Baker and Shevardnadze wanted to find a resolution of the Gulf crisis that was in compliance with international law. The State Department officials were directed by Bush to have regular discussions on the Gulf crisis with the Soviet Union in order to obtain that country's support for US backed efforts at the United Nations to find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. Bush was convinced that by taking the Soviets on board a unified platform on the Gulf crisis the pressure on Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to pull out Iraqi troops from Kuwait would mount appreciably. The United States politely requested the Soviets to curb their diplomatic ties with Iraq and provide full support to the international community's efforts to isolate Iraq. The State Department was assigned the task to formulate plans which would create an adequate framework suitable for the two countries to work together to resolve the Gulf crisis, preferably through peaceful means.

It is notable that Secretary of State James Baker worked along with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the multilateral level both at the United Nations and the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis. As part of his diplomatic work to obtain Soviet assistance for US supported UN Security Council resolutions to resolve the Gulf crisis Baker held regular meetings with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. A close and friendly relationship developed between the two of them which proved to be instrumental in getting the Soviets to fully back US diplomatic overtures to resolve the Gulf crisis in spite of the acute apprehensions and misgivings of conservative elements in the Soviet political and military establishment. Bush's meeting with Gorbachev hosted by Finnish President Koivisto at Helsinki on September 9, 1990 helped the two governments to effectively coordinate their policy stances on the escalating Gulf crisis at the highest level (Auerswald, 2009).

At the Helsinki meeting Soviet leader Gorbachev had assured Bush that the Soviet Union would fully support US diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis and called out the Iraqi government to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait as this was the only viable option left for it to avoid confronting military action. The US-Soviet joint statement called out for Iraq to unconditionally withdraw its troops from

Kuwait and registered its support for the continuation of multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis alongside the strict enforcement of the economic blockade imposed on Iraq by United Nations Security Council resolution 661

US DIPLOMACY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

US diplomacy was also focused on garnering the support of the European Commission (EC) and its member states for UN authorized efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis. Baker visited EC leaders and held talks with them on the escalating Gulf crisis and requested them to administer economic assistance to the multilateral defence coalition (Auerswald, 2009). The United States gave a filip to its cooperation with the European Community (EC) in order to find a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis. During his discussions with European Community President Jacques Poos, he delineated the US' object to promote peace in the Gulf region by finding a resolution to the Gulf crisis. The European Commission President Jacques Poos, who was also the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, told Secretary Baker that the European community would provide the multilateral defence coalition in the Gulf with the required and necessary political, economic and logistical support to compel Iraq to withdraw its Iraqi troops from Kuwait as early as possible. Baker in turn thanked the Europeans for cooperating with the US to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis (Auerswald, 2009).

Baker's diplomacy was meant not only to attain international support for UN led efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis but also to obtain economic assistance from countries around the world for the multilateral coalition. The US was experiencing an acute economic slowdown in 1990 and was additionally bearing the financial burden of a large budget deficit. It was thus unable to defray the costs of its troop deployment to Saudi Arabia on its own. Therefore, to obtain the required economic resources to meet the costs of its military deployment in the Gulf US diplomacy was proactive at the bilateral and multilateral level. During the course of the Gulf crisis Secretary of State James Baker remained in regular touch with his counterparts in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. These long standing allies of the US played an important role in assisting US diplomacy find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. Throughout the Gulf crisis Baker met the British foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd

regularly and also held talks on a frequent basis with French foreign minister Roland Dumais (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

US DIPLOMACY AND GERMANY.

As part of diplomatic efforts to garner the support of US allies in Western Europe during the Gulf crisis Secretary Baker visited Bonn, Germany and held talks there with the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (Auerswald, 2009). Following talks on the crisis in the Gulf Baker and Kohl issued a joint declaration condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The US-German joint declaration gave its backing to United Nations Security Council resolution 661 that had imposed an economic blockade on Iraq.

Baker's request to the German government to provide economic assistance to the coalition to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions bore fruit. Germany agreed to provide \$ 2 billion as economic assistance to the coalition. The German economic aid to the coalition was divided into two parts, the first being an allocation of \$ 1 billion for military purposes and the other meant to provide economic support to the frontline states in the Gulf whose economies had been suffering badly because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Gulf (Auerswald, 2009). The frontline states whose economic prospects were negatively impacted due to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait were Turkey, Egypt and Jordan (Auerswald, 2009). Baker thanked Germany for being forthcoming with the delivery of economic assistance to the multinational coalition in the Gulf. Formal assurance had been given by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush that Germany would dispatch its troops to fight Iraq if that country committed military aggression against NATO member state Turkey (Auerswald, 2009).

US DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE.

During his visit to France Secretary Baker met French President Francoise Mitterrand and foreign minister Roland Dumais. They discussed the escalating crisis in the Gulf and the efforts that both the countries were taking to resolve it. French President Mitterrand assured Secretary Baker that France stood united with the US and the

international community to get Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. As a result of the bilateral talks on the crisis in the Gulf between Secretary Baker and French foreign minister Dumais France agreed to provide significant military assistance to the coalition. President Bush held apprehensions initially as to whether France would support US led efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis through diplomacy which was backed by US military might.

In order to partake the views of the French President Francois Mitterrand Bush invited him to his ancestral property at Walker's Point, Kennebunkport (Maine) for informal talks on the aggravating Gulf crisis. Mitterrand met Bush during the fall of 1990 at Kennebunkport and the two leaders held extensive talks on the situation in the Gulf. During his dialogue with Mitterrand Bush realized that the French leader supported the use of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis but was somewhat less favourably disposed to the use of force against Iraq. Mitterrand assured Bush that France fully supported multilateral diplomacy channelized through the United Nations for achieving a just, agreeable and peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

He provided guarantees to President Bush that France would deploy its forces to the Gulf in support of the coalition. After the frank dialogue with Mitterrand Bush was encouraged that French support for US diplomacy backed by the use of force to find a resolution of the Gulf crisis would go a long way in getting other hesitant nations to come forward and extend their full support to the multinational defence coalition. President Bush and Secretary Baker used their personnel goodwill and contacts with world leaders to get international support for multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf conflict. They worked tirelessly to obtain economic support and assistance for the coalition.

US DIPLOMACY AND JAPAN.

Baker was also proactive in obtaining the support of US allies in the Asia Pacific region to resolve the Gulf crisis. He visited Tokyo and Seoul in order to acquire economic assistance for the coalition from Japan and South Korea, respectively. In Tokyo he met the Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and briefed him about the diplomatic efforts being made by the US in cooperation with its coalition partners to resolve the Gulf crisis. Because of Baker's comprehensive dialogue with the Japanese

government at the highest level he was able to garner for the coalition economic assistance amounting to \$ 4 billion from Japan. The economic support extended by Japan during the Gulf crisis was split between a military and non military component. Japan provided \$ 2 billion for defraying the costs of the coalition troops and \$ 2 billion as economic assistance to frontline states (Auerswald, 2009).

Of the economic assistance component provided by Japan to countries whose economies had been negatively impacted due to the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait \$600 million was provided as emergency assistance in the form of soft commodity loans repayable over 30 years at a concessional interest rate of 1% (Auerswald, 2009, 187) Japan provided \$22 million in humanitarian relief assistance for refugees in Jordan. The International Red Cross was allocated \$2 million, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) \$8 million and the International Organization on Migration \$12 million of this financial contribution. Japan also administered medical assistance to coalition forces and displaced refugees fleeing Iraq and Kuwait by dispatching a 100 man medical team to the Gulf (Auerwald, 2009, 187).

US DIPLOMACY AND SOUTH KOREA.

Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady travelled to South Korea on September 7,1990 and met Korean President Roh who readily agreed to provide \$ 425 million as economic assistance to the coalition (Auerswald, 2009). Much of this economic aid was meant to administer economic support to frontline states whose economies had been negatively impacted due to the outbreak of the Gulf crisis of 1990-91.

US DIPLOMACY AND ASEAN.

US diplomacy during the crisis in the Gulf was also proactive in obtaining the support of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries for the peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis. Secretary Baker invited his Malaysian counterpart to Los Angeles for bilateral talks on the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Malaysia which had been a non permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the Gulf crisis and had co-sponsored the original Security Council resolution 660 that had condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded

it Iraq to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait (Auerswald, 2009, pg.186).

Nonetheless it developed differences with the US over some of the UNSC resolutions pertaining to the Gulf crisis. Baker invited his Malaysian counterpart to Los Angeles for talks in order to remove differences but unfortunately the proposed talks failed to materialize (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). As part of US diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis the State Department held bilateral negotiations with South East Asian countries like Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines. It requested them to support the coalition in the Gulf. Baker's effort to diplomatically resolve the Gulf crisis led to the creation of a veritable coalition of 48 countries which undertook the responsibility to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq. A salient feature of US diplomacy conducted by the White House and the State Department during the Gulf crisis was the consanguinity between traditional diplomacy and hardcore military power. Its efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis made the State Department realize that it was necessary that the international community continue to exert unremitting pressure on Iraq to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The US State Department worked alongside various multilateral organizations to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis. Diplomacy carried out by Secretary of State James Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger led to the consolidation of US influence in the Gulf region following the end of Soviet support to Arab states with the end of the Cold War. Secretary Baker's diplomatic efforts were instrumental in facilitating international cooperation to resolve the Gulf crisis. Bush ordered Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady to support efforts of the State Department to resolve the Gulf crisis by facilitating the delivery of economic assistance to the coalition and frontline allies.

The Middle East was witness to regional conflicts since the start of human civilization in Mesopotamia. The Persian Gulf conflict was a modern day regional war which unlike other regional conflicts had a global impact. This was so because of the acute dependence of developed and developing countries on Gulf oil imports. US diplomacy at the Security Council led to the passage of resolution 678 which authorized the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait on November 29, 1990.

Secretary of State Baker and his Deputy Lawrence Eagleburger wanted diplomacy to be given more time to resolve the Gulf crisis. The Department of Defence headed by

Defence Secretary Dick Cheney was annoyed with the State Department's incessant demands before President Bush for diplomacy to be given more time to resolve the Gulf crisis. Tensions prevailed between Secretary of State James Baker and Defence Secretary Dick Cheney on matters related to the handling of the Gulf crisis with Baker being in favour of Bush giving more time for diplomacy to pressurize Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait whereas Cheney and other "hawks" in the Bush administrations like Brent Scowcroft, Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Gates wanted the US to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The differences within the administration over means to resolve the Gulf crisis between those who favoured giving more time to diplomacy led by Secretary of State James Baker and those who supported the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait headed by Defence Secretary Dick Cheney were most apparent during meetings of the National Security Council.

Secretary of State Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger worked tirelessly to extend US political and diplomatic influence in the Gulf region. They tried hard to obtain the support of Muslim majority countries for diplomatically resolving the crisis in the Gulf. President Bush tried to garner the support of the Arab American and American Muslim community for building up support at home for US diplomatic efforts to find a resolution to the Gulf crisis. US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was proactive in acquiring the support of Latin American and African countries at the United Nations. Secretary Baker also held regular talks with his Scandinavian and Chinese counterparts during the Gulf crisis. He wanted to garner political, diplomatic and economic support for the coalition from wealthy nordic countries- Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

US DIPLOMACY AND CHINA.

US bilateral diplomacy with China during the Gulf crisis proved quite effective as it resulted in China ending its arms exports to Iraq and strongly registering its condemnation for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Secretary Baker regularly held discussions with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen during the Gulf crisis in order to coordinate the efforts of the two governments on finding a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis through diplomacy at the UN. China gave its full support to US backed Security Council resolutions on Iraq with the exception of resolution 678, that

authorized UN member states to "use all means necessary" to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. China abstained from voting in the Security Council on resolution 678. During Baker's visit to China he met Chinese President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng. In his discussions with the Chinese leadership he described to them the position of the US government on the Gulf crisis.

US DIPLOMACY AND IRAN.

To obtain the support of Iraq's rival Iran during the Gulf crisis, a country with whom the US did not have good bilateral relations since the 1979 Islamic revolution had swept that country, the US State Department made incessant efforts. The US resumed communications with Iran in order to get that country to support the international community find a resolution to the Gulf crisis. State Department officials felt that it was anathema for US interests in the Gulf to continue recriminating the Iranian regime at a time when the situation in the Gulf was aggravating following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the meantime Iran and Iraq signed a bilateral border agreement on August 15, 1990 which settled the boundary dispute between them because of which they had fought a bloody war from 1980-1988 (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). The border agreement between Iran and Iraq saw significant territorial concessions being provided by Saddam Hussein to Iran especially in the Shatt Al Arab waterway, which Iran had long claimed but over which Iraq had administered control prior to the border settlement. The US State Department became extremely concerned after the border agreement between Iran and Iraq. It feared that with Iraq luring Iran with territorial concessions in the border dispute between the two countries Iran would most likely provide support to Iraq during the Gulf crisis if no measures to prevent such a scenario from materializing were taken by the US. The US also wanted Iranian support to prevent Iraq from removing thousands of its troops from its eastern border with Iran and redeploying them to Kuwait but got no definite commitment. Iran remained neutral.

FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION OF US DEPARTMENTS.

Functional cooperation between the Treasury and State departments which shared a chequered history replete with suspicion and mistrust of each other was brought about by President Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Bush believed that it would be beneficial for US diplomacy to combine the capacities and

competencies of the **State** and Treasury Departments for not only obtaining political support from countries around the world for a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis but also to garner economic support for coalition military deployments in the Gulf from them. President Bush ordered Secretaries Baker and Brady to proceed on "tin cup " visits to world powers to acquire economic and financial assistance for coalition troops deployed in the Persian Gulf region (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). The trips made by Brady and Baker to the US' wealthy allies proved to be successful as they provided the coalition with much needed economic assistance which was meant to defray the costs of military operations against Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

President Bush's continuous encouragement for the State and Treasury departments to work in tandem so as to raise support throughout the world for US diplomacy at the UN went a long way in strengthening US demands for Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. The spread of economic upheaval because of the dramatic rise in crude oil prices following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait negatively impacted the global economy. To alleviate the negative economic effects of the dramatic increase in crude oil prices President Bush urged the world's major oil producers to increase crude oil output in order to meet global oil demand. The US government also tried hard to calm the jitters of corporate America. US based multinational corporations had suffered considerable commercial losses since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis as a result of having lost a large number of contracts in Kuwait following Iraq's occupation of that country.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND'S SUPPORT FOR US DIPLOMACY.

US diplomatic engagement with Australia and New Zealand resulted in those two countries providing significant military and non military assistance to the multilateral defence coalition.

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke was quick to provide support to the US led coalition during the Gulf crisis by ordering the Royal Australian Navy to enforce economic blockade on Iraq as per the directive of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661. Just one week following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Hawke announced the deployment of two guided missile frigates and a support ship to the Gulf in support of the multinational coalition. Furthermore, Australia announced its support for the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq by the United Nations Security

Council in spite of foregoing a loss of revenue to the tune of \$ 340 million because of the end of its grain exports to Iraq. The government of Australia also donated \$ 1.6 million to multiple relief agencies in order to assist those stranded in the Gulf. It diverted 60,000 tons of grain originally meant for Iraq to Egypt to assist that frontline state in its refugee relief efforts.

New Zealand also provided support to the multilateral coalition during the Persian Gulf crisis by imposing mandatory sanctions on Iraq following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It suffered losses to the tune of \$40-60 million due to the end of its dairy and live sheep exports following the imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions on Iraq. A 40 person civilian medical team to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was offered by New Zealand for use in Saudi Arabia alongside two fully crewed civilian aircraft to the United Nations Secretary General. Three flights made by Royal New Zealand aircraft ferried Pakistani and Philippino refugees from Jordan to their native countries and the same aircraft also delivered 16 tons of donated milk for administering relief to refugees in Egypt (Auerswald, 2009, 190). Secretary Baker's global diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was also fruitful in providing the US the opportunity to engage with countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece in order to get the respective governments of those countries to provide air base and port facilities to the transiting US forces.

PROGRESS AND RESULT OF DIPOMACY.

James Baker held extensive consultations with US partners and allies around the world with the sine qua non of these consultations being the synchronization of diplomatic efforts of the US and its allies to resolve the crisis in the Gulf at varied multilateral forums, with the United Nations taking the precedence. Baker kept in regular contact with the US' major allies like Britain, France, Canada and others during the Gulf crisis. Baker asserted during his discussions with the US' NATO allies that the military alliance considered Iraqi aggression against Kuwait to be the harbinger of further instability in the Gulf and Middle East region. He further acknowledged that the US was committed to the defence of its NATO ally Turkey in case Iraq carried out military aggression against Turkey. Baker was steadfast and sure-footed while interacting with the Soviet and Chinese leadership on the Gulf

crisis. Baker consistently prodded Bush to provide more time to diplomacy to find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. He was convinced that the use of diplomacy would render the US in a better position to secure its vital interests in the Gulf region.

Baker in close coordination with other important State department and White House officials like Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H. Solomon and Assistant to the President on Near East and South Asian Affairs Richard Hass lead US diplomatic efforts to gather global support against Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defence for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy National Security Adviser Robert M. Gates were not supportive of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis.

They constantly urged the President to take military action against Iraq so as to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. They felt that diplomacy would not be successful in convincing the Iraqi leadership to pull back its troops from Kuwait because Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had already committed himself in full measure to create a pan-Arab state led by Iraq and thus military action was the only viable option left for President Bush to exercise. Inner circle deliberations presided over by Bush for dealing with the escalating crisis in the Gulf saw Secretaries Cheney and Baker clash on numerous occasions, with Baker insisting that Bush continue to support diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis and Cheney advising him to take military action against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.

The objective of both the policy options competing to influence Presidential decision making during the Gulf crisis namely- diplomacy and the use of force was similar as to further US interests in the Gulf region. Diplomacy proved to be helpful for the US to establish a broad consensus with the majority of the nations at the United Nations on finding a non-violent and peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. The Bush administration got significant diplomatic support from the Arab League and the European Community to resolve the Gulf crisis through the means of peaceful negotiations. Baker's assiduous and persistent diplomatic activity was instrumental in

the US obtaining the support of world powers like China at the Security Council for the passage of resolutions demanding Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait.

In order to end supply shortages in the global oil market and bring down international crude prices that had incidentally tripled following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Bush held talks with leaders of large oil producing states such as Mexico. During his discussions with the Mexican President Carlos Salinas he urged the Mexican government, which controlled that country biggest oil producing company Pemex, to raise its oil production and exports in order to end shortages of oil in the global oil market and thus contribute to the lessening of international crude prices (Auerswald, 2009). Baker's diplomacy was instrumental in the US obtaining overwhelming political and diplomatic support from various multilateral organizations for its efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully. Multilateral organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic Conferences (OIC) provided full support to US backed diplomatic efforts at the UN to resolve the Gulf crisis (Auerswald, 2009).

Another important responsibility that Baker defrayed during the Gulf crisis at the orders of President Bush was to secure the safety of US diplomats in Kuwait and Iraq. For Bush the safety of American citizens in the Gulf was of paramount concern. As part of his diplomatic efforts to garner the support of even relatively small European and Muslim states on the Gulf crisis Bush held talks with the leaders of Greece, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He discussed the Gulf crisis with the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, the Amir of Bahrain Sultan Isa bin Khalifa, the ruler of Oman Sultan Qaboos bin Said , the ruler of the UAE Sheikh Zayed al-Nahayan and urged them to provide political, economic and military support to the US led multilateral coalition that had deployed troops to the Gulf to protect Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states from Iraqi aggression.

Bush's personnel involvement in diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis saw him urge the US Congress to forgive the debt owed by Egypt to the US. The objective of Bush's proposal to the Congress to wipe off the foreign military sales (FMS) debt of Egypt that amounted to \$6.4 billion was to provide economic assistance to that country so

that it could successfully deal with the economic distress it had been experiencing since the advent of the Gulf crisis. For Bush this measure held considerable significance because for the US to resolve the Gulf crisis in a manner which would further its interests in the strategically and economically vital Gulf and Middle East region it was important to have the political, diplomatic and military support of Egypt, which was one of the frontline states during the Gulf crisis and had also been one of the US' staunchest allies in the Middle East since the 1970s.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who wielded considerable influence in the Middle East, had tried in vain to resolve the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait by facilitating bilateral negotiations between the two countries in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in July 1990 (Auerswald, 2009). But Saddam Hussein's belligerent attitude had caused the failure of the Egyptian dispute resolution overtures. The foreign military sales (FMS) debt that Egypt owed the US was principally a result of its large procurement of advanced US weapon systems and had thus left it to pay hefty annual debt instalments which bore substantial interest charges thereby causing it to suffer acute economic distress.

Egypt was forced to pay its debts to the US on time in compliance with the strict rules of the Brooke/Alexander Act which mandated states owing military debt to the US to make annual debt payments prior to year end to avoid paying heavy penalties (Auerswald, 2009). Egyptian debt obligations had rendered its weak economy further imperilled. Bush's desire to have Egypt, the largest and militarily most powerful Arab state, to be the bulwark of US security interests in the Middle East was an important reason for his proposal to the Congress to administer speedy economic relief to Egypt. A large number of Democratic Congressmen and Senators were initially opposed to Bush's proposed bill in the Congress to forgive the outstanding debt of Egypt but because of the incessant pressure exerted on them by the White House they eventually conceded to provide approval to the measure.

US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was instrumental in creating a multilateral coalition whose purpose was to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from Iraqi aggression and to enforce Security Council resolutions against Iraq. Baker's globetrotting diplomacy led the coalition to garner significant economic and financial assistance from countries around the world. Baker's deft diplomacy and Bush's regular

conversations with the leaders of US allies like Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Italy and South Korea. caused these countries to contribute a sum total of \$50 billion in economic assistance to the multilateral defence coalition (Auerswald, 2009). This financial contribution was meant to defray the costs of coalition military expenditures in the Gulf. These countries also provided \$14 billion in financial assistance to frontline states whose economies had been severely impacted since the eruption of the Gulf crisis.

By the end of December 1990 Saudi Arabia had contributed \$ 13.5 billion, Kuwait \$ 13.5 billion, the UAE \$ 9 billion, Japan \$ 4 billion and Germany \$ 2 billion in economic assistance to the coalition. Bush held frequent talks with Congressional representatives and senators during the crisis in the Gulf. He exhorted them to back his administration's efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis and thus protect US interests in the oil rich region by providing approval to legislation authorizing the allocation of a \$ 15 billion funding component for the deployment of US armed forces to the Gulf.

UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

On November 29, 1990 the United Nations Security Council provided approval to resolution 678 which authorized UN member states to use "all means necessary" to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The resolution set 15 January, 1991 as the deadline before which Iraq had to completely and unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait in order to avoid military action being taken against it. Following the passage of Security Council resolution 678 the last round of US diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis in a non violent and peaceful manner began. President Bush offered a set of 15 dates to the Iraqi government from which it could choose one that suited it to send over its foreign minister Tariq Aziz to Washington to have bilateral negotiations with Bush. The set of dates presented to the Iraqi government encompassed the period from the first week of December 1990 to the first week of January 1991.

Bush's proposal to have bilateral negotiations with Iraq to put an end to the crisis in the Gulf incorporated sending Secretary of State James Baker to Baghdad to meet Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. With the end of the first week of January and the Iraqi government displaying no interest in sending its foreign minister to Washington or reciprocally receiving Secretary Baker in Baghdad Bush came to the realization that the opportunity for a negotiated settlement of the Gulf crisis had passed and that a

full scale military attack by the coalition forces to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait was the only appropriate option left for him to exercise. Bush was annoyed that Saddam Hussein met several emissaries like Edward Heath, John Connolly, Muhammad Ali and Ramsay Clark who had travelled to Baghdad to secure the release of foreign citizens held in captivity by Iraq authorities in Iraq and Kuwait but had not been willing to spare just two hours to meet Secretary Baker in Baghdad to work towards a negotiated settlement of the Gulf crisis (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998).

Bush rejected the Iraqi government's call to send over its foreign minister to Washington in the second week of January because this was too close to the deadline of January 15 set by Security Council resolution 678 for Iraq to complete the pullout of its troops from Kuwait and thus avoid facing military attack from the multilateral defence coalition. Bush condemned the Iraqi government for making unviable scheduling proposals for holding bilateral negotiations to resolve the Gulf crisis and considered them be deferment tactics employed by Iraq to see through the lapse of the January 15 deadline.

As a last ditch diplomatic effort to resolve the Gulf crisis Bush gave his assent to Secretary Baker to meet his Iraqi counterpart Tariq Aziz for bilateral negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. Baker and Aziz met at the Salon de la International hotel in Geneva on January 9, 1991 (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). Their negotiations on the crisis in the Gulf lasted 6 1/2 hours. Following the end of the meeting between Baker and Aziz it became clear that the bilateral negotiations had failed primarily because of the Iraqi government's refusal to unconditionally comply with UNSC resolution 678. During his meeting with Aziz Baker delivered a letter to him written by President Bush and that was addressed to the Iraqi dictator. Baker urged Aziz to deliver the letter to Saddam. Aziz read the letter and thereafter refused to accept it.

Baker retorted to Aziz's refusal to deliver the letter to Saddam Hussein. Aziz replied by telling Baker that he considered the "language" used by Bush in the letter addressed to the Iraqi leader to be " unacceptable" (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). The Iraqi foreign minister's refusal to deliver Bush's letter to Saddam saw the US government hand over a copy of the letter to the Iraqi counsel in Washington. He too rejected the delivery of the letter to the Iraqi dictator (Auerswald, 2009). The numerous conditionality's made by the Iraqi government to resolve the Gulf crisis

were unacceptable to the US government. Iraq had tried to "link" the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait with the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Any "linkage" of the Gulf crisis with the Israeli Palestinian dispute was unacceptable to the US and it refused to slacken its military preparations in the Gulf (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). US diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis ceased after the failure of the Geneva talks.

Nonetheless, President Bush extended his support to the last ditch diplomatic efforts of United Nations Secretary General Perez De Cuellar to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful manner. Cuellar travelled to Baghdad on January 12, 1990 and met Saddam Hussein but failed to convince the Iraqi leader to unconditionally pull out Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). Thus the credible efforts of the Secretary General to foster peace and prevent the break out of full scale military conflict between Iraq and the coalition in the Gulf went in vain. A leadership change in Britain during November 1990 saw the incumbent Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher forced out of office by the Conservative Party and replaced by John Major.

Bush invited Major to Camp David in December and held discussions with him on the Gulf crisis. Both the leaders agreed to continue to coordinate the efforts of their governments to find a swift resolution to the Gulf crisis (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). December 1990 also saw the resignation of Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The conservative elements in the Soviet political and military establishment had been responsible for Shevardnadze's resignation as they harboured acute resentment against him for his support to the US during the Gulf crisis and his encouragement for democratic reform in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's efforts to align with the US during the Gulf crisis received a shattering blow because of Shevardnadze's resignation. Bush and Secretary Baker believed that hard line elements in the Soviet establishment were incessantly pushing Gorbachev to cease providing support to US backed diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis. Following Shevardnadze's resignation Bush continued to converse regularly with Gorbachev and encouraged the Soviet leader to continue liberal reform policies at home and support US led diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. After taking over the reins of the Soviet foreign ministry Shevardnadze's replacement Alexander Bessmertnykh held extensive talks on the Gulf crisis with Secretary Baker in Washington from January 26-29, 1991 and expressed his agreement with the US

government's stand that time was running out for Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait with the January 15 deadline approaching fast (Auerswald, 2009).

Bessmertnykh assured Baker that the Soviet Union was committed to continue its support for US led diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Gulf crisis (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). Baker felt relieved to learn from Soviet foreign minister Bessmertnykh that the Soviet government's stance on the Gulf crisis had not changed and continued to remain supportive of US backed multilateral diplomacy to settle the Gulf imbroglio.

Much to the dismay of the US Colombia, a non permanent member of the UN Security Council had voted against some of the Security Council resolutions directed at pressurizing the Iraqi government to order the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). The US government consequently made strenuous efforts to get Colombia to cease voting against Security Council resolutions meant to isolate Iraq. Soviet premier Gorbachev deputed the prominent Arabist Yevgeny Primakov as special envoy to Iraq as part of Soviet efforts to obtain a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Gulf crisis. Primakov held talks with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and tried his level best to convince the Iraqi strongman to order the withdrawal his forces from Kuwait. Bush and Secretary Baker viewed Gorbachev's deputation of Primakov with suspicion as they perceived Primakov of harbouring a soft corner for the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.

The US also considered the Soviet government's dispatch of Primakov to Iraq as an attempt by the Soviet Union to highlight to the world that in spite of its economic woes at home it was still capable of exercising significant political and diplomatic influence in the Gulf region primarily due to its long running ties with Iraq. On February 15, 1990 prior to the beginning of the coalition ground offensive to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation the Iraqi government released a statement proposing that it would order the withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait subsequent to receiving assurances and guarantees from the US that genuine steps would be taken by it to resolve the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Auerswald, 2009). The Bush administration rejected the Iraqi proposal as it established a " linkage" between the Gulf crisis and the Israeli Palestinian dispute in addition to having many conditionality's attached to it .

The US firmly told the Iraqi government to contact the US Charge de Affaires in Baghdad Charles Wilson IV and carry out negotiations on the Gulf crisis with him (Auerswald, 2009). Saddam Hussein's refusal to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait was an important factor responsible for the US rejecting the repeated calls of the Iraqi government to engage in bilateral talks with the US to find a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. On January 3, 1991 the State department appointed a new ambassador to Kuwait Edward W. Gnehm Jr. He replaced Ambassador Nathaniel Howell following Howell's return to the US in December 1990 with hostages and diplomatic staff that had been held up inside Iraq and Kuwait since the breakout of the Gulf crisis in August 1990. A significant feature of US diplomacy during the Gulf crisis was its effectiveness in pressurizing the Iraqi government to release American and foreign nationals held captive in Iraqi custody.

Diplomatic overtures directed by Bush to resolve the Gulf crisis highlighted in unambiguous terms that he was a through bread realist whose decision making was predicated on rationality, open mindedness and adaptability. His willingness to listen to and try out multiple policy options and alternatives enabled him to take tough decisions thus making him the "ultimate" decision maker during the Gulf crisis.

Chapter 3

THE USE OF FORCE

BACKGROUND

Iraq invaded its neighbour Kuwait on August 2, 1990. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait President Bush summoned an emergency meeting of the National Security Council in order to discuss with his cabinet, White House and military chiefs the varied options to determine the US' course of action in the Gulf. In order to protect its Gulf ally Saudi Arabia from being threatened by Iraqi military aggression Bush decided after deliberating with his inner circle to deploy US conventional forces to the kingdom. He held a telephonic conversation with the Saudi monarch King Fahd and urged him to authorize the deployment of US troops on Saudi soil. Fahd responded to Bush's plea by telling him that he would take a decision on the matter after consulting his government officials. The Saudi government eventually gave its approval for US troop deployments to Saudi Arabia. Thereafter President Bush authorized the deployment of more than 200000 US troops to the kingdom on August 7, 1990 in order to protect that country from Iraqi transgression and to protect its strategic, economic interests in the Gulf. Bush addressed the American people on August 8, 1990 and described to them how Iraq's brutal, tyrannical and stubborn dictator Saddam Hussein had caused economic stability around the world to be jeopardize because of his overweening ambition to dominate the Gulf and the Middle East. In response to the US and the international community's condemnation of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait the Iraqi government announced the official annexation of Kuwait on August 9, 1990 and declared that hapless country to be its nineteenth province.

ARAB LEAGUE'S CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

An Arab League plan to resolve the Gulf crisis through negotiations ran into trouble because of Iraqi intransigence. Differences existed between Arab League member states over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Arab league held an emergency summit at Cairo on August 10, 1990 where twelve of its twenty one member states voted in favour of a joint Egyptian-Gulf Cooperation Council resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The resolution censured Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait

and gave formal approval to the Arab League's support for United Nations Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662, that had called for the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq, declared Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as illegal, respectively. Arab League member states Iraq, Libya and Palestine voted against the resolution, Algeria and Yemen sat on the fence and Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania articulated their unwillingness to support the resolution.

Following the Arab League summit Iraq responded to it and Security Council resolutions on August 12, 1990 by "linking" the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait to Syria pulling out its troops from Lebanon and Israel removing its forces from the Golan heights and the occupied Palestinian territories (Yetiv, 2011, 40). The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem had been occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War after it had launched a pre-emptive military offensive against Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Iraq appended many conditionality's for the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait which made many Arab heads of government believe that it desired to occupy Kuwait permanently. On August 15, 1990 Iraq and Iran settled their territorial disputes by signing a border agreement which saw Iraq give large territorial concessions to Iran. The purpose of Iraq granting territorial concessions to Iran was to persuade that country to exercise neutrality during the Gulf crisis.

IRAQ'S EFFORTS TO GET IRANIAN SUPPORT.

The terms of the territorial concessions included the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory which it had occupied during the Iran-Iraq war, repatriation of Iraqi prisoners of war, agreement that the mid-point of the Shatt al Arab waterway would be the border between the two countries.

The two Gulf neighbours resumed diplomatic relations, that had ceased following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, on September 9, 1990 thus opening the way for bilateral cooperation during the Persian Gulf crisis. In spite of Iraq's attempts to obtain the neutrality of Iran during the Gulf crisis by providing it with substantive territorial concessions Iran ultimately went on to acknowledge the illegitimacy of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, gave its support to UN Security Council resolutions targeted at Iraq to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait. The theocratic Iranian government considered Iraq to be a greater threat to its security than

the US although it was uncomfortable with US military presence in the Gulf. Iran was concerned that in case "infidel forces" were to continue their military presence in the region it would become imperative for them to be expelled by Arab and Muslim nations. By late August 1990 Iran had agreed to provide support to the US led coalition to carry out military strikes against Iraq provided coalition forces withdrew from the region immediately following the end of hostilities.

Although Iraq was isolated on the international and regional front following its invasion of Kuwait it nonetheless had obtained the support of some countries. Jordan, Yemen, Libya and Palestine provided political support to Saddam during the Gulf crisis and avoided taking any untoward measures that would cause disruption in their relations with important member states of the coalition. At the same time they were in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis

BUSH'S DISPLEASURE AT JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

Jordan's ruler King Hussein proposed, in spite of resolute US opposition, that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait in return of it being given an assurance from the international community that all its unresolved disputes with Kuwait would be examined by a UN authorized entity. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein enjoyed considerable popularity in Jordan especially amongst its Palestinian population as he was identified as the guardian of the rights of the Palestinian people, who had been living under Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories since 1967.

The support extended by Jordan to Iraq following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis was mostly because of its extensive dependence on Iraqi crude oil imports. Jordan understood in no uncertain terms that a belligerent Iraq might pose an acute threat to its security but if mollified could act as a bulwark against Israeli aggression. King Hussein's support for Iraq came at a significant cost. It resulted in the estrangement of wealthy Gulf states and the US with Jordan. President Bush expressed his surprise and anguish at Jordanian ruler King Hussein's, who had been a staunch US ally, support for Iraq during the Gulf crisis. Following the failure of diplomatic efforts of the Arab League member states to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully the US had a strong incentive to take a tough stand against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S PASSAGE OF RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

International diplomatic and economic pressure exerted on Iraq following its invasion and occupation of Kuwait was considerable. The UN Security Council passed numerous resolutions in order to secure the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Resolution 660 which was passed by the Security Council on August 2, 1990 demanded Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait unconditionally and completely at the earliest. On August 6 Security Council resolution 661 saw the light of day. It imposed economic and financial sanctions on Iraq along with an air, sea and land economic blockade of that country. In the meantime, the US was busy formulating an anti- Iraq coalition by influencing UN Security Council member states, both permanent and non-permanent, to approve additional resolutions meant to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Prior to voting on resolution 678 Secretary of State James Baker visited many countries to make the case of the US government's position on the Gulf crisis and to obtain their support and cooperation on issues pertaining to the escalating crisis. He was also involved in carrying out diplomacy at the United Nations before resolution 678 was put to vote. The stated resolution was of the utmost importance for the US because it permitted UN member states to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Bush was informed by Baker that coercive diplomacy was being used to further the US' stance on the Gulf crisis at various multilateral forums.

COALITION TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

The coalition that had come into existence to enforce UN Security Council resolutions was made up of a diverse range of countries. The coalition was primarily a US led multilateral entity whose object was to effectively enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq. Although it nominally adhered to multilateralism the reality was that influential world powers like the US wielded overwhelming influence on its functions as confirmed by Secretary of State James Baker when he had asserted that it did not operate in accordance with the principles of "multilateralism as widely believed". The multilateral defence coalition was administered economic and financial support from wealthy American allies like Japan, Germany and the oil rich Gulf states. US allies like Britain, Canada and Australia extended considerable military support to the coalition. US diplomacy was also able to acquire political, diplomatic and military support for the coalition from Arab states- Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

US-SYRIAN MILITARY COOPERATION AGAINST IRAQ.

Following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis the US sought the participation of Syria in coalition military operations. In order to do so the US government removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Bush and his administration officials knew that the participation of Syria in the coalition would provide legitimacy to it in the Arab world. Syrian President Hafiz al Assad after meeting Secretary Baker and President Bush decided to deploy Syrian troops to defend Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from Iraqi aggression. He had done so because he was hopeful that in return for Syria deploying its troops to defend Gulf Cooperation Council states it would obtain considerable economic benefits from those countries. Other reasons which caused Syria to agree to participate in the coalition primarily centred on obtaining support from Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the return of Israeli occupied Golan Heights, to weaken its long time opponent Iraq. Syria's intention was to strengthen its influence in the Levant region by giving political and military support to the multinational coalition.

EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF CRISIS.

Egypt, militarily the most powerful Arab country and a staunch US ally was open to providing concessions to Iraq in order to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non violent manner through means of Arab League mediated negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq had previously given assurances to it that it would not invade Kuwait. Unlike Syria Egypt was supportive of the use of force option against Iraq as a last resort. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made it realize that Iraq posed a considerable risk to the safety and security of Saudi Arabia and that bold measures were needed to prevent Iraq from "imposing its will" in the Gulf region.

Egypt's ambitions to consolidate its influence in the Gulf and the Middle East, its appetite, like that of Syria, to balance Iraq's might in the region and the massive military and financial aid that it received from the US on an annual basis were important factors in it agreeing to play a key role during the Gulf crisis. The US' proclivity to strongly respond to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait was given a boost by the extension of support from its long term and interim allies like Egypt and Syria, respectively which consequently influenced its course of action in the Gulf.

A provisional government was installed by Iraq in Kuwait on August 2 which was constituted by nine Iraqi military officers who were specially selected for the purpose. Iraq had tried to capture Kuwait's royal family after having initiated its military offensive against Kuwait but as the Iraqi forces approached Kuwait City members of the Kuwaiti royal family fled to Saudi Arabia. After having crushed the relatively feeble Kuwaiti resistance Iraqi troops completed the occupation of that country. Iraq wanted to give the impression to the international community that its invasion and occupation of Kuwait was a *fait accompli*. Following Bush's return to the White House from Camp David, the US President's official retreat, where he had held meetings with his inner circle on the Gulf crisis, he learnt that Arab diplomacy had not proven fruitful in resolving the Gulf crisis with Iraq continuing to consolidate its defences in Kuwait to the detriment of US interests in the Gulf region.

BUSH'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE GULF CRISIS.

On being asked by reporters at the White House about his views on the Gulf crisis President Bush stated that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait " will not stand" (Hess, 2001; Bush and Scowcroft, 1998; Yetiv, 2011). He drew a " line in the sand" by declaring that the US would take all measures necessary to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait, ensure the protection of its ally Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression (Yetiv, 2011). President Bush's decision to deploy US troops to the Gulf can be described in disparate ways. It is implied that it was an intentional attempt on Bush's part to indicate the US' commitment to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to convince Saudi Arabia and others of the its determination to do so and to secure the protection of Saudi Arabia from Iraqi belligerence. He also wanted that proposals to mollify Iraq were prevented from diluting multilateral cooperation to resolve the Gulf crisis.

Bush's response to the Gulf crisis was predicated on reversing Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and on ensuring the effective implementation of the Carter and Reagan doctrines, which had outlined the US' commitment to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf from being threatened by an external powers.

The US was in a veritable race to provide more time to UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq to start delivering results. The unremitting efforts of Iraq to consolidate its occupation of Kuwait were highlighted by its policy of resettling Iraqi civilians en mass in Kuwait. The Iraqi efforts to annihilate the identity of Kuwait by

resorting to means like declaring that country to be its 19th province and resettling Iraqi citizens on an expansive scale in Kuwait had left the US with no option but to use force to liberate Kuwait as diplomacy had not yielded the desired forth results to resolve the Gulf crisis.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

After receiving approval from the Saudi government to deploy its troops to Saudi Arabia President Bush authorized the deployment of conventional US troops to the kingdom on August 7, 1990. The US Army's 82nd Airborne division was the first to land on Saudi soil followed by fighter aircraft squadrons of the US air force.

The coalition military's code for the deployment of US and coalition troops to Saudi Arabia to defend that country from Iraqi aggression and to enforce UN Security Council resolutions to reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait was Operation Desert Shield. Incidentally it became one of the largest military deployments in history. The multinational coalition acquired the support of twenty eight member states who provided military and non military support for the enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq. At the end of its military operations against Iraq the coalition's strength had multiplied and stood at thirty seven.

The multinational defence coalition fielded more than half a million troops, with Gulf states deploying a 10000 man brigade, Kuwait contributing 7000 soldiers, and Syria dispatching 15000 troops to fight Iraqi troops in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (KTO) (Hess, 2001). The US' European allies the United Kingdom and France sent 43000 and 16000 troops, respectively to Saudi Arabia backed up by a significant amount of military equipment (Yetiv, 2011). The US led coalition military operations against Iraq and its allies Japan, Germany, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates bore the economic costs of the coalition's military expenditures. The US military had completed the deployment of more than 240000 of its troops to Saudi Arabia by late October 1990 which was subsequently reinforced by 1600 advanced fighter aircraft.

By January 1991 half of the US military's combat forces had deployed to the Gulf. Following the initiation of military operations against Iraq subsequent to the lapse of the January 15, 1991 deadline set by UN Security Council resolution 678, for Iraq to

voluntarily and unconditionally complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait in order to avoid facing military action, last ditch appeals made at home and abroad by those who were opposed to war fell on deaf ears. President Bush while describing the stance of the US on the rapidly changing scenario in the Gulf stated that because of the failure of economic sanctions to pressurize Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait the coalition had reached the conclusion that sanctions alone would not prove to be helpful in resolving the Gulf crisis and that the use of force was necessary to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Following the lapse of UNSC-R 678 mandated deadline of January 15, 1990 for Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait it was confronted by a full scale coalition aerial bombing campaign that lasted five weeks and resulted in the obliteration of its command and control infrastructure. The coalition air campaign also caused extensive damage to Iraq's transport, public utility and petrochemical assets. Following the end of the air campaign by the second week of February ground operations to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait were initiated by the coalition on February 24, 1991. Within 100 hours of the commencement of the coalition ground offensive Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait had been routed and Iraq forced to implore a ceasefire. Hostilities in the Gulf ended with the announcement of a cease fire agreement reached at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border town of Safwan between Iraqi and coalition military authorities on February 28, 1991.

BUSH'S CONCERNS ABOUT COALITION'S UNITY; SADDAM'S INVOCATION OF ISLAM TO CONJURE UP ARAB SUPPORT.

An important matter of concern for President Bush throughout the course of the Gulf crisis was that the US led coalition could unravel at any point in time because of Iraq's vile attempts to foment antagonism between the coalition's western and Arab members. Bush held the conviction that it was necessary for the United States to prevent such a possibility from materializing. Sensing that it was not long before the coalition began military strikes against Iraq Saddam Hussein began invoking Islam by resorting to the use of Islamic themes, and drawing on famous figures and battles in Islamic history in order to generate support against US led military action in the

Arab and Muslim world. Iraqi efforts to usher a split in the multinational defence coalition were unsuccessful.

SADDAM'S USE OF ARAB ISRAELI DISPUTE TO SPLIT THE COALITION.

The best chance for Iraq to divide the coalition came on October 8, 1990 when twenty two Palestinians were killed by Israel in Jerusalem. The incident had occurred after Israeli forces tried to occupy the holy premises of Bait ul Maqsad by resorting to the use of force. Palestinian resistance against the condemnable and unjustifiable strong arm tactics of the Israeli authorities to occupy the third holiest shrine in Islam resulted in the killing of the Palestinians. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein condemned the incident and lambasted Israel's perpetration of atrocities on the Palestinian people. He wanted to drum up support for Iraq in the Arab world. Saddam perceived that this would prove effective in pressurizing governments of Arab and Muslim countries to withdraw their support and cooperation with the US led coalition that had been threatening it with military action.

The incident at Jerusalem increased Bush's concern about the unity of the coalition and forced him to order his administration officials to table a resolution in the Security Council which would give Iraq an ultimatum to complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait or face military action. Bush was also alarmed by the prospects of Iraq partially withdrawing from Kuwait while continuing to maintain control over the lucrative Rumaila oil field; succeeding in its efforts to usher a split in the multilateral defence coalition by forcing Arab and Muslim states that were members of the coalition to oppose the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait and subsequently return to conquer Kuwait.

CIA DIRECTOR WEBSTER'S REMARKS ON IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMME.

September 17 to 28, 1990 saw a flurry of cables and reports on Iraq's fledgling chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme reached the White House. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Webster described in a speech given by him in mid September 1990 that Iraq possessed "a sizable stockpile of chemical and biological weapons", which it had deployed for use by its military thus

consequently endangering the security of its neighbours. Bush was concerned that with the passage of time Iraq was continuing to strengthen its WMD capability and its ballistic missile programme. Following Congressman Les Aspin's bombastic publicising of the threat posed to US interests in the Gulf by a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capable Iraq the American media went into a mad frenzy.

It informed the American public that Iraqi efforts to consolidate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme posed serious risks to US interests in the Gulf and that it was imperative for the US government to take necessary measures to deal with this aggravating threat. Iraq's quest to acquire nuclear weapons posed an acute threat to the safety of hundreds of thousands of US troops deployed in the Gulf. Another problem facing the international community regarding Iraq' expanding WMD programme was the absence of an institutionalised weapons inspection and verification programme that could take measures to stop Iraq from producing WMD's which it could use to threaten its neighbours.

BUSH'S CONCERNS ON IRAQ INFLUENCING GLOBAL OIL MARKETS.

President Bush was apprehensive of Iraq succeeding in determining the contours of the global oil markets. Bush was convinced that Iraq would further "aggression, terror and blackmail" in the Gulf and beyond by using its oil generated wealth.

It was relatively difficult for any single player to determine the shape of the international oil markets but the prospect of a militarily and economically powerful Iraq posing an acute threat to the safety and security of its neighbours and to US interests in the Gulf was an alarming one for President Bush and his administration officials to reckon with. Bush's persistence with diplomacy and economic sanctions to resolve the Gulf crisis prior to him authorizing the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait resulted in an increase in the costs of expected outcomes.

BUSH'S LETTER TO CONGRESS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR USE OF FORCE.

Through a letter addressed to the Congress on January 8, 1990 Bush sought to obtain the support of the American legislature for a resolution that would authorise the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. In the letter he had clarified his stance on the use of force alternative to resolve the Gulf crisis by stating that peace on Iraq's terms would invariably nourish Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's appetite for territorial expansion and would cause the US to incur great sacrifices and endure considerable suffering in order to attain its objectives in the Gulf. In a radio broadcast on the Voice of America addressed to the Iraqi people President Bush stated that the position of the Iraqi government on the Gulf crisis was inflexible and obdurate to the detriment of the Iraqi peoples welfare. He further described in his speech that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had misjudged international opinion and resolve which stood firmly against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

After obtaining the approval from the Congress for the use of force against Iraq President Bush affirmed that he had been sluggish in expressing outrage at Iraq's illegal and unjustified invasion of Kuwait and had initially opted to use peaceful means to resolve the Gulf crisis hoping that Iraq would be compelled to withdraw its troops from Kuwait without going to war against it. He further added that with him and his administration having exhausted all options to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully the US was ready to go to war with Iraq in order to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush came across numerous obstacles while facing opposition from the congress and sections in the country that were opposed to the use of force. Contrarily he did not encounter significant challenges within the echelons of his inner circle. Bush's bold stance coupled with open and covert pressure to find homogeneity caused a reduction in prospective obstacles.

BUSH'S DECISION TO USE FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.

President George H.W. Bush's decision to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was the result of the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non violent manner. It must be noted that although President Bush had authorized the use of diplomatic means to resolve the Gulf crisis immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he being a realist and pragmatist leader ensured that the US on the request of its Gulf allies, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council states, deployed significantly large number of conventional US troops to the Gulf so as to protect US

national interests in that strategically, tactically and economically vital region, which in addition being the largest source of US oil imports was also home to the headquarters of the US military's Central Command. President Bush, being a biased leader, favoured the use of force alternative following diplomacy's failure to resolve the Gulf crisis.

The prevalent ground realities in the Gulf were an influential factor responsible for the rise in the expected utility of the use of force option against Iraq. With Iraq having weak allies, if any, who supported its belligerence against Kuwait the coalition saw to it that diplomatic pressure backed by the use of force was kept on it in order to compel it to pull out its forces from Kuwait. Bush's support for the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was also boosted by the fact that the US did not have to consider the possibility of third parties extending military support to it. With diplomatic means to resolve the Gulf crisis not yielding tangible results through the end of fall 1990 Bush and his administration officials, with the exception of Secretary of State James Baker, became convinced that the use of force was the only concrete exercisable option left so as to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Bush had ordered the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990 after authorization for it had been granted by the Saudi government. Troops from the 82nd Airborne division and two tactical divisions were the first to land on Saudi soil subsequently followed by aircrafts of the US Air Force. Bush's decision to use force to resolve the Gulf crisis might seem relatively straightforward to many following the failure of diplomacy to do so but the reality was far from it being so.

Different actors within the echelons of the National Security Council and the informal group structures like the "group of eight" and the "deputies committees" fiercely competed with each other to influence President Bush to convince him to authorize the use of military action to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait or to provide diplomacy the chance to obtain a peaceful and non violent resolution to the Gulf crisis. Important members of the Bush "court" like Defence Secretary Dick Cheney; Undersecretary of defence for policy Paul Wolfowitz; National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; Deputy National Security Adviser Robert M. Gates; Director, Central Intelligence Agency William Webster goaded President Bush during meetings of the National Security Council and informal group settings like the "Group of eight" to authorize the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. They were convinced that

conflict resolution measures like diplomacy would not be effective in pressurizing Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. On the other hand Secretary of State James Baker, deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell continued to urge President Bush to persevere with diplomatic means to resolve the Gulf crisis.

Bush took into consideration the different viewpoints of his cabinet and White House staff and after processing the varied views, options and perspectives he authorized the use of force against Iraq. The passage by the United Nations Security Council of resolution 678 on August 29, 1990 was pivotal in clearing the way for the US and its allies to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The aforementioned resolution gave the United Nations member states the authorization to "use all means necessary" to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. It provided approval to UN member states to use force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

CHENEY 'S SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE.

Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney was instrumental in urging leaders of Gulf states to request President Bush to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. With a background in the lucrative oil industry Secretary Cheney enjoyed long standing ties with most Gulf monarchs and during his visit to the Middle East subsequent to the outbreak of the Gulf crisis he communicated to them that in order to thwart Iraq from threatening their countries with military aggression they had to put pressure on President Bush in order to convince him to authorize military action against Iraq. He told Gulf leaders like King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Ziyad al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates that as diplomacy was not likely to succeed in compelling Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait it was essential for them to urge President Bush to authorize the use of force against Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait and put an end to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's vile ambitions to dominate the Gulf and the Middle East. US armed forces deployed to Saudi Arabia following the outbreak of the Gulf war used that country as a base to launch military operations against Iraq in order to secure the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and to ensure the protection of the kingdom from Iraqi aggression. Furthermore Bush had delegated the responsibility to the US military to preserve, maintain and advance US interests in the region a vital component of which was the protection of the US' Arab allies from Iraqi

belligerence. Bush had ordered the deployment of US troops to the Gulf to enforce resolutions of the United Nations Security Council directed at pressurizing Iraq to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Cheney told Gulf leaders that by urging Bush to use force against Iraq they would contribute substantively in assisting their "friends" in the cabinet to get the President to provide approval to it and thus guarantee their security from Iraqi hostility.

BAKER, EAGLEBURGER AND POWELL'S SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMACY.

Contrary to Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney's support for the use of force against Iraq Secretary of State James Baker, his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell consistently urged President Bush to give more time to diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. They were convinced that other alternatives to resolve the Gulf crisis, of which the use of force was one, were imbued with considerable risks for the US in terms of blood and treasure. Prior to the passage of Security Council resolution 678 the patience of President Bush and "hawkish" elements in his cabinet and at the White House for persistence with diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis had started to run perilously low. Secretary Baker and General Powell's requests to President Bush to provide diplomacy more time to deliver a peaceful and non-violent resolution to the Gulf crisis were instrumental in keeping the "hawkish" elements amongst the "chiefs" at bay from goading Bush to take the US to war against Iraq without having given adequate time for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. They told Bush that the historical context of US military involvement in the Middle East was strewn with tragedy and forgettable instances like the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon that had killed hundreds of US Marines deployed to that country to enforce a ceasefire meant to end a bloody civil war there.

Although, Baker and Powell were hesitant in providing support to the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait they understood that time for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis was running short with Iraq continuing to defy UN Security Council resolutions while consolidating its defences in Kuwait. Baker and Powell had tangible reasons to favour diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. Baker being the Secretary of State naturally desired that diplomacy be given preference and favour by the Commander-in-Chief President Bush over other discernible options and alternatives

meant to resolve the Gulf crisis so as to ensure greater influence in the administration for the State Department and thus guarantee that other federal government departments and agencies with which it had traditionally been in competition with for exercising influence over Presidential decision making in foreign policy affairs were kept at bay. Baker had also been angered by the virulently hostile objections of Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney for the State Department's efforts to influence President Bush to provide more time to diplomacy to resolve the crisis in the Gulf in a peaceful and non violent manner.

Secretary Cheney's opposition to the State Department's efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis in his typical combative style saw him make personalized on Secretary Baker especially during meetings of the National Security Council and the " Group of Eight", to which Baker justifiably took offence. Thus the mutual difference of opinion and perspective between the heads of the State and Defence departments unfortunately took a vicious personal turn to the detriment of the administration's objective to act in cooperation and coordination to swiftly and successfully resolve the aggravating Gulf crisis. Baker's taking offense to Cheney's reactionary outbursts opposing his requests for the President to provide diplomacy with more time to resolve the Gulf crisis caused him to fervently oppose calls made by the "hawkish elements" led by Secretary Cheney for Bush to authorize the use of force.

General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff was hesitant to support the use of force option to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait because he knew and understood the acute risks that US led military action against Iraq posed to the lives of US military personnel. Having fought in the gruelling Vietnam War and being a "soldier scholar" general Powell was fully aware of the brutality and inhumaneness of war and thus was naturally against sending young US service men and women to war. An additional but nonetheless important factor that contributed in influencing General Powell to oppose the use of force against Iraq was his know how and understanding of the fighting capabilities of the million man strong Iraqi army. Powell was convinced that military action against Iraq, especially ground operations would cause US and coalition forces to suffer significant casualties. Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world and was militarily the most formidable Arab state which possessed a large air force that was equipped with advanced Soviet built Sukhoi and MIG fighter aircraft. Powell was aware of the fighting capabilities of the elite Republican

Guards of the Iraqi army and had estimated that an outbreak of military hostilities with Iraq would cause the US led multinational defence coalition to suffer considerable losses in spite of their overwhelmingly superior technological edge and professionalism. Therefore, General Powell's opposition to the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was based strictly on military considerations and not on extraneous factors.

BUSH'S QUEST TO GET CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR USE OF FORCE.

Bush's decision to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was predicated on obtaining Congressional approval. With the passage of United Nations Security Council resolution 678 UN member states obtained the authorization to use military force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Secretary of State James Baker and the US' permanent representative to the United Nations Thomas Pickering worked hard to garner support at the UN Security Council and the General Assembly for the US sponsored resolution. Bush had taken the route of multilateral diplomacy channelled through the United Nations and following the passage of resolution 678 ordered his military commanders to make final preparations to undertake military action against Iraq if that country did not completely withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Having obtained the support of the international community for US led coalition military action against Iraq Bush decided to acquire Congressional approval for the use of force against Iraq. To obtain the approval of the Congress for the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was a relatively tricky proposition for Bush as the Congress was controlled by the opposition Democrats.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR USE OF FORCE.

The proposed resolution tabled in the House of representatives by Congressmen Michel and Solarz to obtain authorisation for the use of force passed with a voting margin of 250-183 whereas its equivalent in the Senate worked up by Senators John Warner and Joseph Lieberman secured passage with a margin of 52-47, which incidentally was the smallest margin giving approval to a President to take the nation to war (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998,446). Following voting in the Congress on the proposed bill requesting approval for the authorization of military action against Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait on January 12, 1990 the uncertainty prevalent as to whether

the Congress would approve the sending of US troops into harms way for the fulfilment of US objectives in the Gulf, which namely were:

1. The liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation
2. The restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait
3. The safety and security of American citizens and foreign nationals in the Gulf
4. The restoration of peace, safety and security in the Gulf,

or not ended, much to the relief of Bush and his "courtiers", especially the "hawks"- Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates.

Thus by the end of the middle of the second week of January 1991 the use force against Iraq had become the only viable exercisable option because of diplomacy's failure to resolve the Gulf crisis. President Bush has vividly mentioned in his autobiography that the decision to use force against Iraq was one of the most challenging decisions that he had to take in office as it involved sending America's bravest young men and women to war in order to enforce United Nations Security Council and Congressional resolutions. For Bush the decision to use force was an affirmation of his belief, which he had not made public, that in spite of his having given extensive support and backing to diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis when the "push came to shove" figuratively speaking military action against Iraq, was the only suitable alternative left that could ensure the liberation of Kuwait and the protection of vital US interests in the Gulf.

On January 16, 1991 while addressing the American people about his decision to use force against

Iraq President Bush stated that any further delay in taking decisive action against Iraq would prove costly to the multinational coalition, to fledgling democracies and to the Kuwaiti people who had suffered immeasurably due to Iraq's occupation of their country. With diplomacy failing to resolve the Gulf crisis Bush's decision to use force was premised on his analysis that expected benefits of going to war outweighed the costs associated with such action. Bush's decision to use force was also predicated on the fact that the expected utility of going to war outweighed the costs of taking military action against Iraq. President Bush believed that Iraq was prepared to

confront the coalition because it assumed that if it managed to inflict significant casualties on Coalition forces during the Gulf conflict then invariably the US would be forced to retract its military commitment in the Gulf. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein believed that Iraq could come out of the war politically unscathed.

Iraq was at a disadvantage when it came to assessing the US' proclivity to undertake military action against it because of insufficient information and ended up wrongly deducing US designs thus consequently hastening war. It had also suggested in public that it could bear massive losses in a military confrontation with the coalition.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR BUSH'S ASSENT TO USE OF FORCE.

Bush had made the decision to use force against Iraq in order to not only secure Kuwait's liberation and protect the US' Gulf allies from Iraqi aggression but to also protect its strategic and economic interests in the oil rich Gulf region. Bush was also certain that the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait would invariably give out the message to all and sundry in the post Cold War world that the international community would not tolerate the violation of international law by any country. He confidently asserted that a country found in contravention of international legal statutes would invariably have to face serious consequences.

The decision taken by Bush to use force was also predicated to a considerable extent on the advice and support given to him by the US' staunch allies- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who were convinced that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein only understood the language of brute, crushing force and that it was unwise for the US and the international community to literally put all eggs in one basket, that too in one as vile and unpredictable as diplomacy.

Throughout the course of the conduct of multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis Bush was proactive in discussing with world leaders the use of military force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. He was forthcoming in keeping the option to use force against Iraq open if diplomacy was not successful in obtaining a peaceful and non violent resolution to the Gulf crisis.

BUSH'S NETWORKING WITH WORLD LEADERS ON THE USE OF FORCE.

Bush garnered inputs on the prospective use of force from world leaders like French President Françoise Mitterrand, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and others. By conversing, interacting and deliberating with these leaders Bush wanted to absorb their respective views on the Gulf crisis and to implore them to administer military and non-military assistance to the multinational defence coalition that had assumed the responsibility of implementing UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq. President Bush's networking with world leaders on the Gulf crisis had been instrumental in the assembly of a veritable "coalition of the willing", also referred to as the multinational defence coalition, in the Gulf.

Bush took the decision to use force against Iraq after his deliberations with his National Security Council staff. His deferment to the National Security Council (NSC) on defence and national security matters while simultaneously having consultations with members of informal group settings like the group of eight clearly highlighted that he did not bypass formal institutions like the NSC in favour of informal ones while making decisions. He in relied on the NSC for delineating to him the multifarious contours of an issue that had national security ramifications in order for him to make decisions which delivered expected outcomes.

BUSH BRIEFED BY POWELL AND SCHWARZKOPF ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF USE OF FORCE.

Before taking the decision to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation Bush obtained extensive briefings on the military related aspects associated with it from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell and Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of US and Coalition forces in the Gulf General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. The generals described to President Bush the military and non-military requirements of the coalition that were essential to be fulfilled in order for military action against Iraq to be undertaken effectively. Furthermore Bush was also informed by Powell and Schwarzkopf of the risks associated with the conduct of military operations against Iraq. They provided Bush with estimates of potential coalition losses during a military campaign against Iraq. After being briefed on the military related dimensions of the use of force option Bush directed his cabinet chiefs to facilitate the delivery of the required financial and military resources essential for the effective operationalisation of a military campaign against Iraq.

BUSH'S DEMAND TO WORLD LEADERS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COALITION.

Bush strongly believed that for the use of force option to be successful in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation it was critical that UN member states contributed financial and economic resources to the coalition. Bush urged world leaders to deliver military and non military support and assistance to the coalition which was indispensable for ensuring the effective and efficient implementation of Security Council resolutions. He held discussions at the White House with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Manfred Woerner on the Gulf crisis. During his parleys with Woerner the NATO chief assured him that the collective security alliance would administer full political support to US military and non-military efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis.

Bush's conversations and interactions with his counterparts- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (following Thatcher's resignation in November 1990 with new PM John Major); Japanese Prime minister Toshiki Kaifu; German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti; Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney; French President Francoise Mitterrand; Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev; the Chinese leadership headed by "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping, President Yang Shangkun, premier Li Peng; South Korean President Roh; Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis; Jordan's ruler King Hussein; Syrian President Hafez al Assad; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; Turkish President Turgut Ozal; ruler of Oman Sultan Qaboos; ruler of Bahrain Sultan Isa bin Khalifa; ruler of Qatar Emir al-Thani; Algerian President Chadli Benjedid and others were primarily meant to obtain formal commitments from these leaders that their respective governments would extend support and assistance to US led diplomatic and military efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis (Auerswald, 2009). He also urged them to administer economic and military assistance to the coalition.

BUSH'S PERSONAL VIEW ON DECISION TO USE FORCE.

Bush saw the decision to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in terms of a fight between good versus evil, right versus wrong (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). Bush's decision to use force against Iraq was not predicated on him having any

personal grudge against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein but was primarily premised on his conviction that the Iraqi invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait was unethical and morally unjustifiable (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 375). Bush had given his assent to the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait because of his disgust and revulsion for human rights violations carried out by Iraqi troops against Kuwaiti citizens. With diplomacy failing to resolve the Gulf crisis Bush became convinced that the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was the only substantive alternative left to put an end to Iraqi atrocities against innocent Kuwaiti civilians and foreign nationals including Americans left stranded in Kuwait.

In his public statements Bush characterised Iraq's occupation of Kuwait as unjust. He equated US efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis as a "moral crusade"(Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 374).

BUSH'S DECISION TO SUPPLY US WEAPONS TO SAUDI ARABIA.

In order to beef up the defence capability of its closest ally in the Gulf Saudi Arabia Bush authorized the supply of US weapons to it in August 1990. Bush was convinced that with the US having permanent interests in the oil rich Gulf region and diplomacy failing to resolve the Gulf crisis it was imperative for him to provide approval to the use of force against Iraq "as time was running out" and that Saudi military and economic support would prove to be useful in guaranteeing rapid success of coalition military operations against Iraq. He was certain that a swift end to the Gulf crisis was crucial for the promotion of US political and economic interests in the Gulf.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR BUSH'S HANDLING OF GULF CRISIS.

An important factor which influenced Bush to provide approval to the use of force was the support of the majority of the American people for his handling of the Gulf crisis highlighted by public opinion polls. As per the ABC-WP poll 66% of Americans approved of Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis, 29% disapproved with 70% agreeing that the Congress should support Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 439). Bush's decision to use force was also influenced by a proposal that was the brainchild of the Assistant to the President on Near East Affairs Richard Haas and Robert Kimmit, Assistant Secretary of State that had called for military action to be taken against Iraq in order to reverse its aggression against

Kuwait after consulting Arab states and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 356).

BUSH' S DESIRE FOR BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS ON USE OF FORCE.

Bush was convinced that bipartisan support and consensus at home were the pillars on which hinged the success of the use of force option. Before taking the decision to use force Bush consulted his national security adviser and military commanders to sort out certain apprehensions he had related to military operations in the Gulf. Bush had been unsure as to how the US was going to proceed with the implementation of the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, how air power would be used during military operations against Iraq, and how Iraqi air force and armour would be neutralized.

Bush's decision to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was supported by US allies Britain and Canada but France had certain reservations for it. Although President Bush had met his French counterpart Françoise Mitterrand at his ancestral property at Kennebunkport and discussed with him the deteriorating Gulf crisis and measures which both governments could take to resolve it as quickly as possible at the multilateral level, the speech given by the French leader at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1990 whereby he had called for the resumption of international efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as soon as Iraq withdrew its troops from Kuwait annoyed Bush.

BUSH'S REJECTION OF "LINKAGE" OF GULF CRISIS AND ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

The French President's "linkage" of the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with the recommencement of international efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict was unacceptable to Bush because he felt that it would unwarrantedly lead Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to browbeat publically that Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait had been justified as it had caused the Palestinian issue to come to the forefront of international political discourse. It was not only France that had misgivings and apprehensions with Bush's push for the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Countries like the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which were permanent members of the Security Council were cautious in providing support to US

backed efforts at the UN to obtain authorization for the use of military action against Iraq. These countries favoured the resolution of the Gulf crisis through the means of diplomacy.

It had become apparent to Bush after having had extensive consultations with leaders of these countries in the months following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis that they were hesitant to back US efforts at the UN to get approval for the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. To put an end to the apprehensions of these countries with regard to the prospective use of force against Iraq Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker assured their leaders that any military action against Iraq would be carried out under the mandate of the United Nations. Bush and Baker communicated on a regular basis with the leaders of countries that were not supportive of the use of force against Iraq and their tireless and diligent efforts ultimately bore fruit as they succeeded in convincing them to provide support in the Security Council for US sponsored resolution 678 that sanctioned the "use of all means necessary" to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Secretary Baker's diplomacy and the hard work done at the United Nations by the US' permanent representative there Thomas Pickering to get the representative delegates of the permanent and non permanent members of the Security Council to vote in favour of resolution 678 bore fruit as the resolution passed through the Security Council by an overwhelming majority.

President Bush's conversations with the French President, the Soviet premier and the Chinese leadership were pivotal in getting these countries to provide their support for the use of force against Iraq albeit under the mandate of the United Nations following the failure of diplomacy to yield effective results in finding a peaceful, non-violent resolution to the Gulf crisis. Bush was thoroughly pleased following the passage of UN Security Council resolution 678 by a majority vote of 12-2 on November 29, 1990, with only two non permanent members namely Cuba and Yemen voting against it and China a permanent member of the Security Council abstaining (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). The Soviet Union and France which had certain apprehensions regarding to the prospective use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait voted in favour of the resolution, to the relief of the US.

BUSH'S UNSC PROPOSAL TO USE FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.

It was Bush who had directed his administration officials to table a resolution in the United Nations Security Council which would allow for the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait subsequent to the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. Resolution 678 had given Iraq a deadline until January 15, 1990 to complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. Bush's support for the resolution was based on his conviction that its passage would invariably provide the US with UN mandated authorization to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Bush knew that the US would lead UN authorized military action against Iraq and thus it was vital for it to obtain assistance from countries that were willing to deliver military and non military assistance to its forces and those of its coalition allies deployed in the Gulf. Bush understood in no uncertain terms that the United States was in no position to unilaterally proceed ahead with the use of force against Iraq and thus required the assistance of countries that were willing to administer the necessary and required military and economic resources to the multinational defence coalition that had been effectively carrying out the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions in the Gulf.

BUSH'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR COALITION.

Bush wanted to secure economic and financial support for coalition operations from wealthy countries like Japan and Germany and from its oil rich Arab allies Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait. The reason for Bush's desperation in doing so was because the US was unable to defray the hefty costs of military operations of coalition forces deployed to the Gulf as it had been suffering a severe economic slowdown during the raging Gulf crisis, which was projected to deepen further going into 1991. The use of force against Iraq was also predicated on ensuring the avoidance of Israeli involvement in military hostilities against Iraq. Refusing to withdraw its troops from Kuwait after multilateral diplomacy had done all it could to convince and pressurize it to do so Iraq had braced itself to confront US led military action.

Indicating its military capability to inflict damage on his enemies Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had threatened that US led military action against Iraq would compel its forces to fire thousands of Scud ballistic missiles at US allies Israel and Saudi Arabia. Following Saddam Hussein's repeated pronouncements that Iraq would carry

out missile strikes against Israel in case military action was taken against it the Israeli government ordered its defence forces to make preparations to respond to Iraqi belligerence thus consequently jeopardizing US politico-military strategy in the Gulf. Bush instinctively knew that the involvement of Israel in a military confrontation with Iraq would be completely unacceptable to the US' Arab and Muslim allies. He feared that Saddam Hussein's deliberate ploy to provoke Israel into a military confrontation with Iraq would cause the coalition's Arab and Muslim members to immediately withdraw their participation from coalition military operations. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein believed that by threatening Israel with grave consequences Arab states like Egypt and Syria, which had agreed to provide military support to the coalition, would realize that the US and its western allies were using the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation as a pretext in order further the hegemonic designs of Israel in the Gulf and would thus reassess their political and military support to the coalition and come around in support of Iraq.

The use of force option to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait was also based on US fears that if Iraq was allowed to further commit military aggression in the Gulf without the US and the international community taking substantive preventive military action against it then the probability of Arab states compromising with Iraqi belligerence would be considerably enhanced to the detriment of US interests in the Gulf.

POWELL AND SCHWARZKOPF'S MILITARY PLANNING.

An important facet of the use of force option against Iraq was the difficulties faced by US military commanders in choosing forth military plans that would yield the most beneficial outcomes. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in charge of the US military's Central Command considered two alternative military plans meant to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait, with the first one being centred around the carrying out of air strikes against Iraqi military targets from American air craft carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf and the second being a large scale deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia. After considering the two options Schwarzkopf and General Powell rejected the first one because they felt that it yielded "negligible effects" to force the eviction of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The tactical ground offensive planning of the US military was based on the Central Command's Plan 1102-90 which was premised entirely on

defending Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression and required the deployment of about 200000 troops to the Gulf (Hess, 2001).

Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told President Bush that the US "draw the line in the sand" by accepting Iraq's takeover of Kuwait and thus initiate the mobilization of its troops to secure the defence of Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression. Gen. Powell although hesitant to use force against Iraq had been of the opinion that US military engagement in the Gulf was meant to protect Saudi Arabia, the US' staunchest ally in the Gulf region from Iraqi aggression and not to liberate Kuwait.

OBJECTIVES OF USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.

President Bush was convinced that with diplomacy failing to obtain the resolution of the Gulf crisis US interests in Gulf were being hurt immeasurably and therefore the option to use force against Iraq was the only practical and rational alternative left for the US to protect its interests which were predominantly three namely

1. Economic interests
2. Security of the US' closest ally in the Middle East, the Jewish state Israel
3. Protection of the New World Order that had come to the fore following the end of the Cold War.

During deliberations in the National Security Council over the probable response of the US to the Gulf crisis Gen. Powell suggested that any prospective US military engagement in the Gulf meant to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait had to be more than a mere "showing of the flag", by which he insinuated that it had to be substantive.

MUTED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.

With diplomacy failing to make headway in finding a resolution to the Gulf crisis and the use of military action against Iraq becoming more plausible the support of the American people for the use of hard power to liberate Kuwait diminished considerably. This was so because they did not want to see the loss of US service men and women in a military confrontation in the Gulf.

With memories of acute losses incurred in blood and treasure by the United States during the Vietnam war fresh in the minds of the majority of the American public it

was all but natural for them to disapprove of their country going to war in the Gulf. General Powell had repeatedly told President Bush that Iraq, with its battle hardened army, had the military wherewithal to inflict considerable military losses on the US led multinational coalition forces in case hostilities broke out. With the use of force option replacing diplomacy as the most pertinent exercisable option to resolve the Gulf crisis public support for such a policy response of the US government declined considerably thereby resultantly highlighting to President Bush that it would be necessary for him to take Congressional approval in order take military action against Iraq.

BUSH'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE.

The use of force to resolve the Gulf crisis was not to the liking of certain liberal anti war elements in the US. To build up support amongst the US public for the stated alternative President Bush repeatedly addressed the American public via the media and gave speeches at public forums like the Aspen Institute and Veterans Affairs Conference. Bush wanted that the perpetration of gross human rights violations by Iraqi troops against innocent Kuwaiti civilians be highlighted in the American media so as to convey to the American people that with US efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non violent manner through the means of diplomacy proving to be unfruitful and the atrocities of the Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait against the hapless Kuwaiti civilians mounting it was all but necessary to use force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Bush's perception management strategy meant to convince public opinion in the US to back US led military action against Iraq yielded beneficial results for him as it was instrumental in highlighting to the American public that Iraqi brutalities inflicted on Kuwaiti civilians- men, women, elderly and the disabled could only be put to an end by the US and its coalition partners exercising the use of force against Iraq under the jurisdictional mandate of the United Nations. Bush's authorization of the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was necessary for him to convey to the American people and the international community that the US would leave no stone unturned to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions meant to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

BUSH'S QUEST TO OBTAIN ARAB SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE.

Bush was convinced that the US had to obtain the support of Arab countries like Jordan, Syria and Yemen before pushing ahead with the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush worked proactively to consolidate the multinational coalition. He communicated regularly with Gulf rulers, with whom he shared friendly relations since his days as a career professional in the oil industry, in order to obtain military and non military assistance from them for coalition operations in the Gulf. Bush wanted that financial and military support for the coalition be extended by the US' wealthy allies and the oil rich Gulf states in order to guarantee the effective implementation of UN Security Council resolutions demanding an end to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

With UN resolutions isolating Iraq politically and economically there arose a requirement for their effective enforcement to which Bush and his administration officials responded proactively. They favoured a diverse range of policy options and kept them in play. Bush kept the use of force option to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait open while multilateral diplomacy was being carried out to resolve the Gulf crisis. Bush's style of functioning was predicated on absorbing multivaried information inputs from diverse sources which assisted him to learn about the pros and cons of prospective military action against Iraq. Bush addressed a joint session of the US Congress on September 11, 1990 and unambiguously stated that the US was committed to the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq with preference being given to diplomacy to find a swift, peaceful and non violent resolution to the Gulf crisis, with contingent alternatives like the use of force remaining on the standby.

BUSH'S NON INTERFERENCE IN CONDUCT OF WAR.

He believed that for the use of force option against Iraq to deliver the expected outcomes it was essential that the military establishment be given a free hand. His stance of not interfering in the military related aspects of coalition operations in the Gulf proved advantageous to him as consequently he was able to provide adequate attention and time to convince sceptics of the use of force option to come around to

support the continuation of coalition military operations in the Gulf. The UN Security Council's authorization for the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait was followed by Bush travelling to the Gulf in November 1990. During his visit to the region he met rulers of Gulf states and urged them to provide logistical assistance for the unobstructed movement of coalition troops and military equipment to the Gulf.

Bush's orders to the US military to make final preparations for carrying out military action against Iraq following the Security Council providing approval to resolution 678 caused the US military's commander in the Gulf general Norman Schwarzkopf to send his deputy General Robert Johnston to Washington to brief President Bush on military plans that were to be carried out to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. After being briefed by General Johnston Bush questioned him as to whether the US military was prepared in advance for meeting contingencies during military operations in the Gulf. Bush had directed Secretary of State James Baker to lead the charge at the Security Council for obtaining approval for resolution 678. The deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia by the coalition made it relatively easy for it to initiate military action against Iraq following authorization for the same being given by the Security Council. Bush was concerned about some military related aspects of the use of force alternative against Iraq and in order to alleviate his apprehensions regarding the same he consulted his military commanders.

Following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis Bush had doubts as to whether Arab nations would deploy troops to participate in a ground campaign against Iraq. He was also concerned as to whether the Egyptians and Syrians had reservations to use force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Bush asked his military commanders how long it would take to dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait and what follow up action would be taken in the Gulf by the coalition (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). During National Security Council meetings presided over by Bush deliberations were carried out on matters regarding the continuation or not of US troop presence in the Gulf following the end of hostilities, the strength of US military presence and the equipment to be left behind in the region following the end of military hostilities. The biggest concern that the President had with regard to providing authorization for the use of force was for US military losses during military operations against Iraqi forces in the Gulf.

During his discussions with National Security Council members on the morning of Christmas eve Bush was briefed about the State Department's decision to close down the American embassy in Baghdad and measures being taken by the US government to sever diplomatic relations with Iraq. The objective of the use of force was not only to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation but to reduce Iraq's military capability to prevent it from posing a risk to the security of the Middle East. The US wanted to ensure that its closest ally in the Middle East Israel was secured from external threats and the regional balance of power was preserved. Bush patiently listened to the views of his NSC officials as to whether US air strikes would be extended beyond the Kuwaiti theatre of operations and include targets inside Iraq. President Bush decided following deliberations with his national security and cabinet chiefs that the focus of US and coalition military operations against Iraq would remain on destroying divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard, which were that country's best trained and armed. Bush was told by his NSC staffers that the defeat of Iraq's military in the battlefield would give a shattering blow to the Iraqi military establishment's support for Saddam Hussein and would result in his overthrow from power by the Iraqi military.

There existed doubts within the Bush administration as to how the US would be able to get rid of Saddam Hussein quickly, with targeting him personally being the only option available to the administration. Bush was in favour of an uprising of the Iraqi people against Saddam Hussein which would topple him from power. He was against the physical involvement of the US inside Iraq as he did not have the appetite for "nation building" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

It was decided in NSC and "Group of eight" discussions that the primary objectives of the use of force against Iraq were to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and to inflict maximum damage on the Iraqi military. Bush and his "chiefs" were of the opinion that the destruction of the Iraqi military's fighting capabilities by the coalition would consequently cause Saddam Hussein's regime, which relied on its military prowess to govern Iraq, to crumble from the inside. Bush favoured the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the Gulf following the cessation of military hostilities. The formal directive for the use of force against Iraq was given by President Bush in January 1991. Prior to Congress providing approval for the use of force against Iraq some congressmen led by Majority leader Dick Gephardt threatened to cut funding for

US military operations in the Gulf if the Bush administration failed to secure congressional approval for it. Bush was jittery prior to the end of the January 15 deadline for Iraq to complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. He was apprehensive as to how the military campaign against Iraq would play out.

Bush was concerned about the US troops suffering large number of casualties following the commencement of military operations against Iraq. He feared that in case the US suffered large military casualties in the war with Iraq his political leadership and credibility would take a severe hit thus consequently hurting his re election prospects in the presidential campaign of 1992. Bush had apprehensions as to how the US would carry out the military campaign against Iraq. Bush was aware of the fact that irrespective of the immaculate military planning carried out by the US military and the allocation of huge military and non military resources for the military campaign against Iraq the uncertain and unpredictable nature of war posed significant dangers for US and coalition troops.

Bush was concerned about the intensity and magnitude of Iraqi resistance against the coalition. He was also worried that the US would not be able to control Iraq's development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in case hard power was not used to implement UN Security Council resolutions. Bush was of the view that United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq if not implemented effectively by using military action would invariably lead Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction which it would inevitably use to threaten the security of its neighbours and its enemy Israel. Bush was influenced to opt for the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait by Christian evangelicals who considered Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as the beginning of Saddam Hussein's campaign to dominate the Gulf and the Middle East thereby threatening the sanctity of the holy land Israel. The use of force option was analyzed thoroughly by President Bush. After having paid due attention to all the specific aspects related to the use of force option Bush concurred that with diplomacy having been unable to deliver the requisite outcomes it was necessary for the international community to jointly take military action against Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait. Bush was also troubled by the prospect of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction against its neighbours and coalition forces when confronted by coalition military attack.

This apprehension of his was put to rest by his military commanders who informed him that although the probability of Iraq using chemical and biological weapons to counter coalition offensive was relatively high but the coalition forces and its neighbours had taken the necessary measures to protect themselves from such a threat. Bush's decision to use force against Iraq was also predicated on the fact that his military commanders had described to him that military action against Iraq be undertaken before the onset of the gruelling summer in order to ensure its quick success.

Chapter 4

OVERVIEW

PURSUIT OF WAR

By September 1990 coalition troop build up in the Gulf region had been completed to a significant extent. During the fall of 1990 US military force presence in the region included four carrier battle groups which had 74 aircraft each, a guided missile cruiser, four or five US navy destroyers or frigates, two supply ships and an aircraft carrier. The United States navy had also deployed six to eight nuclear submarines in the Persian Gulf waters by that time. By September 2 the United States Air force had deployed 400 combat aircraft in the region. The United States Army and the Marine Corps had deployed 210,000 troops, supported by 65,000 troops from coalition allies, in the Gulf by the end of October 1990. By mid January 1991 the second phase of the US troop deployments to the Gulf was complete. 450,000 US troops had been deployed to the region by the time the January 15 deadline approached. They confronted 530,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The coalition enjoyed considerable military superiority in the region with the exception of troop numbers. It had around 170 ships in the area backed up by six aircraft carriers and two battleships. Coalition air power in the theatre was at 2200 aircraft. Following the lapse of five months since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis and the passage of the January 15 deadline the coalition troop mobilization and deployment phase that had been termed Operation Desert Shield came to an end and coalition forces unleashed a massive air campaign against Iraqi forces inside Iraq and Kuwait on January 16 as part of Operation Desert Storm. The coalition air campaign continued for five weeks during which coalition aircraft flew 88,000 missions. 22 American aircraft and nine aircraft of other coalition countries were lost during the air war. The Coalition confronted almost no resistance from the Iraqi Air force. Iraqi forces used anti-aircraft fire and surface-to-air missiles to bring down coalition war planes but attained no considerable success. Most of the Iraqi air force aircraft were flown to Iran to escape being destroyed in air-to-air combat with the coalition forces and the remaining Iraqi aircraft were hidden in reinforced revetments by the Iraqi forces. Iraq fired Scud missiles during the war at Israel and Saudi Arabia. The modus operandi of Iraq firing its Scud missiles at Israel was to incite that country to enter the war. It believed that this would cause the Arab

countries that were members of the coalition to withdraw their participation in the war against Iraq and to come to the defence of Iraq against Israel. Tactful US diplomacy was able to prevent Israel from entering the war in spite of Iraqi military provocations. The US ordered the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to Israel to intercept Scud missiles fired by Iraq at Israel. Most of the Scud missiles targeted at Israel were successfully intercepted by the mobile patriot missiles but the coalition forces were less successful in destroying Iraqi mobile Scud missile launchers. The Iraqi forces were good at providing camouflage protection to the mobile Scud launchers and to move them to new sites relatively quickly. The coalition air campaign against Iraq met considerable success thus fulfilling its main purpose which was to make way for the coalition ground offensive commanded by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. The air superiority enjoyed by the coalition during the war did not allow the Iraqi reconnaissance aircraft to acquire any tangible information about coalition troop deployments in the Gulf region. Iraq initiated the ground war against the coalition by attacking the Saudi border town of Khafji on January 29. The Iraqi objective behind attacking Khafji was to use it as a head for ground offensives deep into Saudi territory especially towards Saudi oil fields that were at a distance of 200 miles. Three Iraqi tank brigades attacked Khafji and swiftly neutralized the town's relatively feeble defences. A Saudi counterattack backed by US marines the next day led to the route of the Iraqi forces. The battle of Khafji was the biggest tank battle in the history of modern warfare and surpassed in magnitude and intensity the tank battle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union at Kursk during the Second World War. The Battle of Khafji substantiated to the US military establishment that the Iraqi forces were no match for the modern mobile warfare tactics employed by the US armed forces. On February 24, 1991 at 0400 hours the coalition ground offensive against Iraq began. The US Army's 18th Airborne Corps took its position alongside the coalition's left *flank*. It moved towards Iraq from the far west and cut off Iraqi troops in Kuwait from receiving reinforcements and supplies from the north. The 18th Airborne Corps left flank was protected by the French Sixth Light Armoured Division. The US Seventh Corps, the US Second Armoured Corps and the British First Armoured Division called the "Desert Rats", who had an illustrious history of having fought Nazi Germany's Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel during the Second World War made up the central core of the coalition ground force. The military strategy of the coalition during the ground offensive against Iraqi troops

occupying Kuwait was based on getting the central core units to head north towards Iraq after having secured the left and right flanks to be followed by them taking a right turn and moving into Kuwait to attack the Iraqi forces including its elite Republican Guard from the west. Moreover the coalition's right flank which was mostly made up of units of the US Marines was delegated the responsibility to break Iraqi defences in Kuwait. The coalition forces' initial ground attacks against Iraqi troops in Kuwait were meant for the most part to conceal the main attack so as to mislead the Iraqis into believing that the main offensive would come from the Kuwaiti shoreline. Relatively little resistance was encountered by the coalition forces and scores of Iraqis were taken captive considering the fact that Iraqi defences in Kuwait were formidable. French forces had managed to secure the left flank of the coalition forces by the second day of the ground offensive and the US forces had also succeeded in eliminating every possibility of the Iraqi troops to run away from the war theatre or to receive reinforcements. The charge of the US Army's 24th division ended with its capture of Basra thus eliminating the prospects of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait to retreat to Iraq. The 8th Airborne Corps carried out a surprise attack on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the left thus compounding the problems of the Iraqi forces which had already been struggling to defend themselves on the right in the West. The Eight Airborne Corps made its way into Kuwait from the east on February 25 well ahead of the time it had initially planned for. During its advance it encountered the Iraqi Republican Guard units which rather than resisting fled so as to save themselves from being annihilated by the superior US force. The Republican Guard forces were trapped on all sides by February 27 following the 24th Infantry having succeeded in securing the southern Iraqi town of Basra.

In order to allow most of the Iraqi Republican Guard units to retreat back to Iraq the Hammurabi division, which was the most formidable fighting unit of the Republican Guard, confronted the US Eight Airborne Corps only to be completely destroyed. The US led military action to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait was witnessed by the majority of Americans with much consternation because of them being haunted by the bad memories of the US military debacle in Vietnam. Contrary to the horrors of the US military engagement in Vietnam the air and ground military operations carried out by the US forces and its coalition partners to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait proved to be the most successful military campaigns in the history of modern warfare. Multiple

factors were responsible for the success of the coalition military campaign against Iraq of which the superior force and technology of the US and its coalition allies was one followed by the meticulous planning carried out by the US military prior to the breaking out of hostilities attributable to General Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf. Other important factors that led to the resounding victory of the coalition were the ineptness of the Iraqi response to the coalition military action against it and the incompetence of the Iraqi military leadership to effectively command its troops in battle-- for which Saddam Hussein was to blame as he had taken personal command of Iraqi forces during the war. Iraq fired Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia thus causing significant damage to lives and property in those countries. For Iraq firing Scud missiles at its enemies in the region was the only measure of resistance against the coalition which caused US allies in the region to suffer significant casualties. The Iraqi air force and navy did not resist the coalition forces to the extent that had been expected of them by the Iraqi leadership in spite of their considerable military capabilities.

COALITION MILITARY STRATEGY.

The US military strategy devised by Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf was based on carrying out an aerial assault campaign against Iraq which was to be followed by a ground assault to evict the "dug in" Iraqi forces inside Kuwait. After "softening" up the Iraqi military through the continuous 5 week aerial bombing campaign the coalition forces led by the US prepared to launch a ground assault on the Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait. The tactical and strategic supervision of the ground assault campaign led by the United States armed forces, especially the US army units and Marine Corps was carried out by Schwarzkopf. He used classic military deception tactics to carry out the ground assault against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.

The four fundamentals associated with the use of deception tactics in war against the enemy as employed by General Schwarzkopf during the coalition ground offensive against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait were namely (1) Objective; (2) Enemy Assumptions; (3) Method Selection and Execution; and (4) Exploitation. These rudiments of the deception plan formulated by Schwarzkopf were implemented effectively in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (KTO). The one major objective of the

coalition's military strategy during its war with Iraq was to deceive Iraqi forces into believing that an amphibious landing of coalition ground forces at Kuwaiti beach heads would be followed by a ground assault against Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait.

Schwarzkopf was convinced that the military deception tactics employed by the coalition in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations would cause the Iraqi forces to deploy most of their troop strength along Kuwait's shoreline in the north east thus enabling the coalition ground forces to swiftly charge across the western desert during the cover of night and entrap Iraqi Republican Guard units close by. Deception and "flanking manoeuvre" tactics exploited by the coalition against Iraqi forces proved to be major successes as they resulted in the entrapment and extermination of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The flanking manoeuvre referred to as the "Hail Mary Play" which was employed by the coalition to corner and destroy Iraqi forces on the right flank of the Kuwaiti battle front was a stupendous success primarily because of the coordinated action of the coalition forces. It saw coalition tank and artillery assaults backed by close air support inflict severe losses on the Iraqi troops. Incidentally, the "Hail Mary Play" flanking manoeuvre exercised in the Kuwaiti battlefield by coalition forces was named after a play move employed in the sport of American football.

The entrapped and destroyed Iraqi forces included those belonging to the elite Republican Guard. These had been the most professional and well equipped troops fielded by Iraq. As the majority of the Republican Guard units had been ordered by the Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein to remain in Iraq to protect him and his senior government officials from the coalition a relatively less number of them were destroyed during the coalition ground offensive in Kuwait.

The second element of the deception plan utilized by the coalition to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait was the "enemy assumption" aspect. This component of the deception plan of the US led coalition forces was hinged on making the Iraqi military authorities falsely believe that the coalition ground assault against Iraqi forces in Kuwait would come from the east and not from the west. The US deployed landing craft in the Persian Gulf waters along the Kuwaiti coast in order to deceive Iraqi reconnaissance into believing that the coalition was preparing for a full scale amphibious assault on Iraqi forces stationed nearby.

The Iraqi military fell prey to the deception tactics employed by General Schwarzkopf and consequently suffered massive losses from which it could not recover. After destroying the Iraqi troops along the porous Iraq-Kuwait border the coalition forces pushed towards the south from the north and the west to liberate Kuwait City from Iraqi occupation.

The third factor of the "deception" strategy employed by General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of US forces in the Gulf, was that of "method selection and execution". During the Gulf conflict the US forces used standard "method selection and execution" procedures to deceive the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (KTO). Subterfuge tactics like the transmission of false radio broadcasts and communications which the Iraqi military could easily intercept were used by the coalition in order to lure them into falsely believing that the coalition forces were prepared to carry out an amphibious assault against them.

As part of operational minutiae General Schwarzkopf had instructed the US forces to move through the western desert during night time and to desist using radio communications while advancing towards the Iraq-Kuwait border. He did so because he recognized that war theatre military communications ran the risk of being intercepted by the enemy which could consequentially ruin the deception military strategy employed by the coalition in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (KTO). Schwarzkopf's deception tactics fully exploited the infirmities and weaknesses of the centralized Iraqi military command structure thus causing it to suffer huge losses in the Kuwaiti. Within 100 hours of the initiation of the coalition's ground campaign, which had begun on 24 February 1991, the Iraqi troops had been completely routed and Kuwait was liberated.

CAUSES OF IRAQ'S DEFEAT.

Reasons attributed to the swift collapse of the Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti battlefield ranged from the relatively less advanced and sophisticated Soviet origin weapons fielded by them when compared to the advanced weaponry employed by the multinational coalition, to the incompetent Iraqi military leadership which had failed to effectively channelize Iraqi resistance against the coalition. Another significant cause for the route of the Iraqi forces at the hands of the coalition during the Gulf conflict was Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's purge of the experienced Iraqi military

leadership following Iraq's victory over Iran in the eight year Iran-Iraq war. Saddam had removed, dismissed, exiled or killed most of the competent Iraqi army generals who had led Iraq to victory in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war because he considered them to be a threat to the continuation of his hold over the reins of power inside Iraq. Saddam had been apprehensive that the Iraqi generals who had led Iraq to victory in the war against Iran would close ranks with each other and carry out a coup to remove him from power.

Saddam Hussein's interference in Iraqi military planning and his refusal to heed the advice and recommendations of his military commanders also proved to be major contributory reasons for Iraq losing thousands of its troops in battle against the coalition forces. The US led coalition forces achieved their objective to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait promptly because they judiciously implemented their military plans in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (KTO) and thus suffered minimal losses in the process. After trouncing Iraqi troops in Kuwait thus liberating that country from foreign occupation President Bush announced the end of major combat operations on February 27, 1991.

COALITION AND IRAQI LOSSES.

Estimates for Iraqi and coalition casualties during the conflict vary and are dependent to a large extent on the source from which they have been derived. A source used heretofore describes that by the end of hostilities coalition forces had suffered casualties that amounted to 98 killed in action (KIA), 368 wounded and 20 missing in action (MIA). Most of the coalition military fatalities had been due to friendly fire incidents. The US suffered the largest number of casualties in the military campaign against Iraq. Other members of the coalition like Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, UAE, Syria etc. suffered relatively minor military casualties. On the Iraqi side military losses in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations by the end of major combat operations in late February 1991 ranged from 50000-100000.

Losses incurred by the Iraqi military as a result of its confrontation with the multinational coalition included thousands of Iraqi Soviet built T-72 main battle

tanks, artillery pieces, armoured personnel carriers (APCs). Iraqi surface to air missile (SAM) sites which posed a threat to coalition aircraft were destroyed by coalition air and ground strikes.

USE OF ADVANCE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

A salient highlight of the Gulf conflict was the deployment of the most advanced war fighting systems by the US and its coalition allies. During the ground operations the US M1A1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT), which was technologically the most advanced tank in the world, successfully targeted and destroyed hundreds of Iraqi T-72 tanks. The M1A1 MBT fielded by the US Army in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations had remarkable war fighting capabilities some of which included a higher shell firing range as compared to the technologically inferior Iraqi T-72 tank, thermal imaging detection technology which enabled it to find and destroy enemy tanks during night time and nuclear, chemical and biological warfare survival capabilities. The T-72 tanks that Iraq had acquired in large numbers from the Soviets were efficient war machines but one of their deficiencies was their armour. The armour on the Iraqi T-72 tanks was not the strengthened armour that the Soviet Union's own T-72 inventory was equipped with. This deficiency resulted in their failure to withstand coalition air and tank assaults during the Gulf conflict.

The Royal Air Force deployed Tornado aircraft to carry out bombing raids on the Iraqi military installations in close coordination with the US Air Force. The US Army's Apache helicopter gunship played an important role in the destruction of Iraqi tanks and APC units. Apache helicopter gunship fired Hellfire missiles proved to be the bane of the Iraqi armoured forces inside Kuwait. Hundreds of Iraqi armoured units were destroyed by the US Army's UH-64 Apache helicopter whose lethality in military operations was further beefed up by the laser guided 'Gatling gun' on board which had the capacity to fire large range heavy projectile ammunition rounds at the enemy at the speed of thousands per minute. Schwarzkopf coordinated the coalition military effort in the Gulf with immaculate competence, perseverance and effectiveness thereby ensuring that Bush's desire to see a relatively quick end to the coalition military effort to evict Iraq troops from Kuwait materialized. Powell, Schwarzkopf and Defence Secretary Cheney remained in regular contact with Bush

throughout the phase of military operations and provided the President with up-to-date information on US led coalition military operations in the Gulf.

Bush had full confidence in the US military establishment's handling of coalition military operations in the Gulf. Bush was wise not to interfere in the military aspects and tactical planning of the US led coalition as he knew that any political interference in military operational matters and conduct was to be avoided in order to warrant the success of coalition military operations.

The United States during the initial phase of military operations against Iraq subsequent to the lapse of the 15 January 1991 UN Security Council resolution 678 deadline for Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iraqi military facilities from US naval ships and submarines in the Persian Gulf. The cruise missile strikes along with the use of laser guided precision weapons by the US armed forces during the air campaign which began on January 16, 1991 were instrumental in destroying Iraqi command- control facilities and thus were helpful in preventing Baghdad from providing real-time military directives to the Iraqi forces inside Kuwait.

COALITION'S TARGETTING OF IRAQI SUPPLY LINES.

As part of the coalition military strategy to annihilate Iraqi fighting capability the coalition forces targeted the long and overextended Iraqi supply lines which provided Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait with food, ammunition, clothing and spare part supplies essential for Iraqi troops to consolidate control over Kuwait. US Air Force bomber aircrafts like F 117 Night Hawk, B 52 Stratofortress, A-10, F-15 Eagle, F-14 Tomcat, F-16 Fighting Falcon targeted Iraqi supply lines originating from Baghdad and heading towards Kuwait.

US air power destroyed Iraqi logistical supply lines by carrying out widespread bombing of major arterial roads and transport lines used by Iraq to resupply its forces in Kuwait.

DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI AIR FORCE BY COALITION BOMBING.

The coalition forces were also fully aware that Iraq possessed a large air force which was equipped with some advanced fighters like the MIG-29 Flanker. Therefore it was

the objective of the coalition to destroy the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) capacity in order to attain complete coalition air superiority over Iraqi airspace. Iraq had hundreds of hardened aircraft hangers which provided storage facilities to the Iraqi aircraft inventory. Yugoslavian contract firms had constructed the major share of the Iraqi aircraft hangers and storage facilities. Most of these were built of hardened reinforced concrete to protect Iraqi fighter aircraft from being damaged or destroyed by enemy air attacks.

IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRANIAN SUPPORT.

The US used laser guided bombs to destroy and damage the hardened Iraqi aircraft hangers and bunkers that housed Iraqi Air Force inventory. The Iraqi Air Force lost 100 fighter aircraft as a result of coalition bombing raids over Iraqi airfields. This compelled the Iraqi authorities to order the remaining Iraqi fighter aircraft to fly from Iraqi airbases that had not been targeted by the coalition to Iran so as to escape being targeted and destroyed by coalition airstrikes. Eventually more than 100 Iraqi Air Force aircraft flew to Iran to escape from being targeted and destroyed by coalition airstrikes. Iraq hoped that with it having placated Iran to some extent after the signing of the bilateral border agreement on August 15, 1991, whereby Iraq had formally agreed to hand back to Iran all the Iranian territory that it had won in the Iran-Iraq war, Iran would be accommodative of the Iraqi government's request to provide landing rights to Iraqi Air Force aircraft.

Eventually Iran gave the fleeing Iraqi aircraft passage to fly into Iranian air space and land at airbases in the country but because of significant pressure exerted on it by the coalition it had to reverse its decision. Iran refused to let the Iraqi aircraft that had landed in Iranian territory take back to the air thus terminating any possibility that remnants of the Iraqi air force could regroup in Iran and subsequently confront coalition aircraft in air-to-air combat. The Iranian government continued to remain neutral during the Gulf crisis despite allurements given to it by Iraq. The US government remained in close touch with Iran during the Gulf crisis. US authorities were assured by Iran that it was not going to provide support or assistance to Iraq.

BATTLE OF KHAFJI.

The coalition forces' first big confrontation on the ground against Iraqi forces took place at the Saudi border town of Khafji on January 30, 1991. Iraqi troops stationed along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border had violated Saudi territorial integrity on January 29, 1991 by attacking and subsequently occupying the weakly defended Saudi border town of Khafji. The light Saudi defence forces stationed at Khafji were not able to withstand the attack of the Iraqi armoured columns and were compromised quickly. On January 30, 1991 the United States Marine Corps assisted by the US Air Force and Saudi forces counter attacked Iraqi troops in Khafji. The Iraqi forces were routed by them in the battle and the strategically important town was liberated. The Iraqi forces had attacked Khafji because they knew that its capture would provide them with the best location head from which to move deeper into Saudi territory in order to take over the Saudi oil wells that were just 200 miles away.

GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL.

With air warfare going on in the Gulf the Soviets made harangued efforts to prevent the coalition from initiating a full scale ground operations to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced on February 22, 1991 plan which urged the Iraqi government to unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait and thus avoid confronting the imminent coalition ground offensive inside Kuwait.

Gorbachev's plan provided one week's time for Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. It called for the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Bush rejected the Soviet plan because he felt that enough diplomatic leeway had been given to Iraq to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully. Bush believed that the US and its coalition partners had made numerous efforts to convince Saddam Hussein to pullback his forces from Kuwait but without success. He felt that it was too late for the coalition to provide ascent to any settlement proposal to the Gulf dispute when Saddam Hussein had already rejected such proposals in the past. On February 24, 1991 Bush ordered the US and coalition forces to commence the ground assault to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Coalition military thrusts into Kuwaiti city emanating from the north were successful in crushing the resistance put up by Iraqi troops occupying the Kuwaiti capital. The overwhelming military and technological

superiority of the coalition forces resulted in the swift collapse of Iraqi lines in Kuwait city.

The coalition ground assault backed up by air support was a resounding success. Thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered to the coalition. Television pictures showing lines of Iraqi army troops holding White flags in their hands surrendering en masse to coalition forces became etched in the minds of the American and international public that had witnessed the war on their television sets in the confines of their living rooms. The Persian Gulf conflict was the first modern war to be telecast real time on satellite television. The success of the US led coalition forces in the war went a long way to re-established the credibility of the US armed forces that had suffered a blow due to the Vietnam War debacle during the 1960s.

After the lapse of the United Nations Security Council resolution 678 set deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait Bush ordered US military attacks on Iraq. After authorizing US led coalition military attack on Iraq Bush constantly reviewed the information being provided to him by his military commanders at the Pentagon and on the ground in the Gulf. Bush had delegated the full responsibility of military operations against Iraq to the US military establishment. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Luther Powell and Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM) General H. Norman Schwarzkopf directed the US led coalition military campaign against Iraq. The initial phase of the military campaign against Iraq saw Iraqi command and control infrastructure and facilities inside Iraq being targeted by coalition air strikes. These targets were bombed and destroyed.

The coalition forces during the first five weeks of the military campaign against Iraq deployed advanced bombers like the US Air Force's F-117 A Night Hawk, the B-52 Stratofortress to target Iraqi military and infrastructure facilities. The coalition aerial bombing campaign against Iraq was the first instance in the history of modern warfare when laser guided weapons systems were used extensively. The US Air Force deployed the A-10 aircraft to destroy Iraqi radar installations, logistical infrastructural facilities like aircraft hangers, ammunition depots and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The coalition aerial bombing campaign was led by General Charles Horner, the commander of the US Air Force at the US Central Command.

The objective of the aerial assault against Iraq was to destroy the Iraqi military's fighting capability inside Iraq and Kuwait. The headquarters of the Iraqi military located at Baghdad were targeted and destroyed by coalition bombing subsequent to the commencement of the coalition military campaign. The Iraqi military supply lines to Kuwait were extremely long and overextended. They stretched from Baghdad to Kuwait. The coalition military authorities knew that by targeting Iraqi supply lines the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait would be rendered devoid of receiving military supplies and directions from Iraq thus jeopardizing their occupation of Kuwait. Coalition aircraft from Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates ably assisted the US Air Force in destroying Iraqi military capability and will to resist. Laser guided precision weapons like the GBU (Guided Bomb Unit) were deployed and used by the US military for the first time on a large scale during the war in order to target Iraqi military facilities.

IRAQ'S USE OF CIVILIANS AS "HUMAN SHIELDS."

An unfortunate occurrence that came to light during the coalition bombing campaign against Iraq was the Iraqi authorities forcing Iraqi civilians inside Iraqi military installations in order to prevent multinational coalition forces from targeting those facilities. The Iraqi government tried to take advantage of the coalition's military policy of not targeting Iraqi civilians. It did so in order to protect the interests of the Iraqi ruling political and military elite at the cost of the Iraqi peoples safety and wellbeing. The Iraqi government used its own citizens as "human shields" behind the backs of whom it tried to avoid being targeted by the coalition's firepower. The unwarrantable conduct of the Iraqi forces was strongly condemned by the international community.

COALITION BOMBING OF AMIRIYA COMPOUND.

Following US airstrikes on the Amiriya compound that killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians the coalition was criticised by various human rights organizations for not carrying out due diligence prior to proceeding ahead with targeted military operations thus consequently leading to significant collateral damage. The coalition response to the Iraqi civilian casualties at the Amiriya compound was quick. The US military announced that it had targeted the aforementioned facility because it had obtained information that it had been a major Iraqi military command and control centre. The

US military further clarified that it had no information that the Iraqi authorities had forced hundreds of Iraqi civilians to be bundled into it facility so as to avoid it from being targeted by coalition aerial strikes.

BUSH'S DIRECTIVE TO COALITION TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE.

The US and coalition military authorities were extremely careful in avoiding any collateral damage during the air campaign against Iraq. Bush prior to the commencement of the US led coalition military campaign had ordered Defence Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell to avoid the targeting of Iraqi civilian and public utility infrastructure like electricity generation plants, hospitals, educational institutions and residential facilities. He did this so as to keep his word to the Iraqi people which he had given them in his radio address to them prior to the beginning of coalition military operations. He had assured the Iraqi people that the US did not have any quarrel with them Iraqi people and was against Saddam Hussein not ordering the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

General Norman Schwarzkopf had also directed coalition forces in the Gulf to avoid causing harm to Iraqi civilians. He had given strict orders to coalition forces to target and destroy only Iraqi military infrastructure so as to break the will of the Iraqi forces to resist the coalition offensive. The US military establishment was concerned about the significant threat posed to the coalition forces during the ground operations by Iraqi Republican Guard units. Incidentally, Iraqi troops that had invaded Kuwait lacked military experience and were mostly young Kurdish and Shiite recruits who were considered "expendables" by the Saddam Hussein led Iraqi military elite (De Fronzo, 2010).

The coalition led by the US had formulated detailed military plans prior to beginning military operations against Iraq. Schwarzkopf along with other senior US military officers like General Robert Johnston, General Waller and Brigadier General Buster Glosson implemented the formulated US military plans whose object was to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation by effectively implementing Un Security Council resolution 678. Military plans to target and destroy the Iraqi military capability to fight against coalition forces were formulated by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell with inputs from CNIC (commander-in-chief) of US forces in

the Gulf General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. In military terms Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world and was the strongest Arab military power. It had spend about \$ 80 billion dollars in the 1980s to build up its military force. At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990 it had about one million active troops a 5700 tank strong inventory, 10000 armoured units and thousands of artillery units deployed in Kuwait (Yetiv, 2011). Incidentally Iraq possessed more tanks in its force than Germany, Britain and France combined.

US RESPONSE TO IRAQ FIRING SCUD MISSILES AT ISRAEL.

In a televised speech to the nation on January 16, 1991 Bush informed the American people that he had authorized the initiation of coalition military operations against Iraq following the lapse of the January 15, 1991 deadline. In response to the coalition bombing campaign Iraq fired Scud missiles on Israel on January 18. Subsequent to Iraq firing Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia coalition aircraft targeted Iraqi Scud missile launchers. Following Israeli cities, including its capital Tel Aviv being hit by Scud missiles rumours were rife that the missiles being tipped with chemical weapons had caused significant Israeli casualties.

The Scud attack was a ploy of Iraq to split the multinational defence coalition. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator had been a staunch enemy of Israel and had on numerous occasions urged "the Arab street" to extend full support to his plans to take military action against Israel in order to liberate the long suffering Palestinian people, who had been living under Israeli occupation since 1967 following Israel's invasion and occupation of Palestinian territories. By firing Scud missiles at Israel Saddam Hussein wanted to provoke Israel into retaliating. He was fully aware that an Israeli military response would get Arab countries, that had provided support to the coalition to immediately pullout from coalition military operations and thus splitting the US led coalition to Iraq's advantage. Consequent to Israel being hit by Iraqi Scud missiles Israeli Defence Minister Michel Arens called Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and requested him to urge President Bush to authorize the delivery of patriot missile batteries to Israel (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

Secretary of State James Baker travelled to Israel immediately after Israel had suffered Iraqi Scud missiles strikes and met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. He told the Israeli leader to exercise restraint and desist from taking

retaliatory action against Iraq in order to avoid falling into the trap set by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, which was premised on provoking Israel to retaliate against the Iraqi provocation in order to cause Arab countries to withdraw their participation from the coalition. Secretary Baker upon his return back to Washington told President Bush that it was imperative for him to have regular conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir in order to prevent the Israeli government from ordering military retaliation against Iraq. He explained to Bush that an Israeli retaliation against Iraq would consequently lead to the break up of the multinational defence coalition. Bush thereafter held regular telephonic conversations with Prime Minister Shamir and persuaded him to avoid taking retaliatory military action against Iraq. He urged Shamir to abstain from attacking Iraq and thus avoid providing Saddam Hussein the opportunity to engineer a split in the coalition which would invariably be detrimental to coalition military operations to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and would only lead Iraq to consolidate its political and military influence in the Middle East. During his talks with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir Bush assured him that the US was fully committed to securing the safety and security of Israel and in order to do so would deliver Patriot missile batteries to it soon thus giving a much needed boost to Israel's defence capabilities. After obtaining swift approval from President Bush and the Congress the Patriot anti-missile batteries were shipped to Israel accompanied by manned crews who were to operate them. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and defence minister Arens' support for retaliation against Iraq because of political compulsions and vagaries of Israeli national pride caused President Bush and Secretary of State James to Baker work proactively in order to ensure that Israel exercised restraint. The US ordered its air force to conduct sorties specifically directed at finding and destroying Iraqi Scud missile launchers. President Bush and Baker's tireless efforts were successful in convincing Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir to exercise restraint and avoid responding to Iraqi provocations during the course of the coalition air campaign against Iraq in mid January and early February, 1991.

WAR TO MANIPULATE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS.

The war between Iraq and the coalition was not confined to the realm of the conventional battlefield. The importance of perception management of the general public for both the Iraqi and US governments in order to garner support from the masses for their respective stance and course of action, was responsible for the war

being fought on the television screen and radio, with each side vying to come out triumphant. On January 20, 1991 Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein paraded crews of captured allied airmen. He took CNN reporter Peter Arnett to cover the orchestrated events. Arnett was publically condemned by the US government for covering events taking place in the Gulf from the perspective of the Iraqi government. In response to the US government and conservative media circles in America vociferously condemning Arnett for having covered the Gulf war with a viewpoint that resembled Iraqi government propaganda Arnett responded in turn by condemning the widespread "censorship" prevalent in the American media especially during the Reagan administration. The Bush administration also distrusted him.

This controversy continued to hog the limelight in the American media for a considerable period of time during the Gulf crisis (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 457-58). Head of the UN Special commission (UNSOM) Rolf Ekens put an end to speculation in media circles as to whether the coalition had deliberately targeted non military facilities and caused large scale civilian casualties by clarifying that the sites bombed by the US, which CNN's Arnett had claimed and reported to be non military and which saw the loss of hundreds of innocent Iraqi civilians, were indeed weapons of mass destruction facilities inspected by it previously (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 459).

Hostilities between Iraq and the coalition saw Iraqi forces dumping oil shipments on board oil tankers afloat in the Persian Gulf thus causing the worst oil slick in history which consequently disrupted the functioning of Saudi desalination plants and caused acute harm to marine life. In reaction to the route of Iraqi troops by coalition forces in the Kuwait the retreating Iraqi troops were ordered by the Iraqi military authorities to blow up hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells. The blowing of more than 700 Kuwaiti oil wells by Iraqi forces resultantly caused instability in the global oil markets and acute damage to the environment. Secretary of State James Baker and the newly appointed Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh; who had replaced Eduard Shevardnadze (who had tendered his resignation to Soviet leader Gorbachev in December 1990) held talks in Washington in January 26-28, 1991. The Soviet Union wanted that another resolution be put forth in the United Nations Security Council to obtain authorization for a ground offensive against Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait. A hue and cry was raised in US and international media, with war in the Gulf raging,

over a comment made by Secretary of State James Baker's during a press conference whereby he had stated that it was necessary for the US to go to war against Iraq in order to create "jobs" at home (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

Bush believed the Iraqi troops were over rated and that they would be crushed by a US led military attack. Bush was in favour of authorizing the initiation of ground operations against Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait after getting the green light from his military commanders in the Gulf. The coalition air campaign against the Iraqi military inside Iraq and Kuwait had been very effective. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted Bush to provide approval to ground operations against Iraq following the five week long bombing campaign against Iraq having had succeeded in destroying the Iraqi military's supply and command and control networks. Secretary of State James Baker thought that an air campaign might force Saddam Hussein to pullback his troops from Kuwait therefore providing no need for ground operations. On January 31, 1991 a core group meeting was held. Bush thought that leaving Saddam Hussein in power would make him a "hero." He wanted Saddam Hussein killed but it was difficult to target him. Bush thought that the pounding received by the Iraqi forces from the coalition would compel them and the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Bush was against marching into Baghdad to carry out "regime change" as this was not part of the US objectives and those delineated by United Nations Security Council resolutions. Bush visited three military bases during his visit to the Gulf on February 1, 1991. Bush met family members of the United States Marine Corps who had been killed during military operations against Iraqi troops and who had went missing or had been taken prisoner of war by Iraqi troops. With military plans for a ground offensive already drawn and the five week aerial bombing campaign coming to an end Bush was content in taking a backseat and witness his military commanders carryout coalition ground operations to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

President Bush's and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft's anxiety had risen following the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis and prior to them arriving at the decision to initiate a ground assault. Bush wanted no delay in ground operations because he felt that it would provide Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein the opportunity to call a ceasefire. Bush was perturbed that the American press was highlighting instances of the US military's assault on non military targets inside Iraq. Tactical

military planning for ground assault was premised around a flanking manoeuvre which meant to entrap Iraqi forces thus consequently making it easier for US and coalition forces to destroy a large number of Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait.

US military commanders believed that the military plans for the ground offensive could be operationalized quickly and that Iraqi forces in Kuwait, which included the elite Republican Guard troops, could be prevented from escaping to Iraq by blocking the northern escape routes (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 469). Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell were confident that the US and coalition forces would suffer minimal casualties during military hostilities against Iraqi troops in Kuwait.

Important Iraqi military installations, command and control headquarters, ammunition storage depots, electric power generating plants, petroleum refineries had been destroyed by coalition bombing thus resultantly annihilating Iraq's capacity to resist the imminent ground offensive. In order to prevent Iraqi military communications from being destroyed by coalition air bombing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had forced Iraqi civilians inside command and control facilities (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 471). The Iraqi government's use of Iraqi and foreign nationals as "human shields" was strongly condemned by the international community and it made repeated calls to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to stop Iraqi forces from engaging in tactics that threatened the lives of non combatants.

BUSH'S REJECTION OF SOVIET ENVOY PRIMAKOV'S PROPOSAL.

In order to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid confronting a ground offensive Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev sent his special envoy to the Middle East Yevgeny Primakov to Baghdad. Primakov's objective in visiting the Iraqi capital to meet Saddam was to convince the Iraqi leader to withdraw his troops from Kuwait in order to avoid confronting a coalition ground offensive. Soviet leader Gorbachev had sent Primakov to Baghdad in order to accomplish a diplomatic coup on Iraq which he thought would help beef up his standing at home favour Primakov's diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis because he considered Primakov, an Arabist, to be a supporter of the Saddam Hussein led Iraqi regime. Following Primakov's discussions with Saddam in Baghdad he proposed that Iraq would pull out its troops from Kuwait if the US guaranteed to fulfil certain conditionality's. The Iraqi conditionality's

included finding a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the withdrawal of US troops from the Gulf. Bush rejected Primakov's proposal as he thought that the Soviet effort to resolve the Gulf crisis through diplomacy meant to provide a boost to sagging Soviet prestige, credibility and influence at home and abroad. The primary reason for Bush's dismissal of Primakov's proposal to secure a resolution of the Gulf crises was it not being in conformity with US objectives in the Gulf.

IRAQI PROPOSAL TO AVOID CONFRONTING COALITION GROUND ATTACKS.

In mid February 1991 prior to the coalition initiating ground operations to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait Iraq proposed to pull back its troops from Kuwait. The Iraqi offer suggested that it would completely withdraw its troops from Kuwait if the US agreed to provide economic assistance to rebuild Iraq, withdrew its troops from the Gulf, mediated to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, impose economic sanctions on Israel because of its violation of international rules and mediate to resolve the Lebanese civil war. After receiving the Iraqi proposal the US government dismissed it because of numerous conditionality's attached to it. With the commencement of coalition ground operations against Iraq calls started emanating from within the US political establishment as to whether President Bush was favour of overthrowing Saddam Hussein from power inside Iraq by permitting US led coalition forces to march towards Baghdad after having liberated Kuwait (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 472). Prior to the coalition ground offensive against Iraq the Soviet Union made another attempt to get Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. The Soviet proposal was based on conditions that ranged from Iraq making an official announcement that it would withdraw its troops from Kuwait within a specific time period that would commence the day following the operationalisation of cease fire to the coalition providing guarantees that the Iraqi troops withdrawing from Kuwait would not be targeted and fired upon by the coalition. Soviet premier Gorbachev called President Bush to describe to him the details of the Soviet proposal. The US did not agree with the proposal because it did not have any mention of war reparations, exchange of prisoners of war and what would happen to the remaining Iraqi troops. The Soviet proposal had suggested that economic sanctions imposed on Iraq following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis be lifted following that country

completing the withdrawal of two-third of its forces from Kuwait. This proposition was unacceptable to the US because it was premised on conditions which were unacceptable to it. Before making a public announcement to authorize ground operations against Iraqi troops in the Gulf . President Bush talked with French President Francoise Mitterrand on Iraq's proposal to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. President Bush rejected the condition based Iraqi proposal which he thought was a last minute ploy by the Iraqi leader to delay the coalition ground offensive.

THE US' FOUR CRITERION TO MILITARILY DISENGAGE FROM GULF.

On its part the US came up with a set of four criterion in order for it to withdraw its forces from the Gulf following the end of military operations against Iraq. These principles included firstly no ceasefire until the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait; secondly, cessation of Iraqi Scud missiles attacks; thirdly, no use of Scud missiles; fourthly, an exchange of prisoners of war (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, 474)

BUSH INFORMED GORBACHEV OF COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE.

Following the US rejecting Iraqi and Soviet proposals to prevent the coalition from beginning ground operations against Iraq President Bush rang Soviet Premier Gorbachev. He wanted to inform the Soviet leader that after having duly considered all perspectives and options regarding the viability of the ground offensive to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait he had decided to go ahead with carrying out military action against Iraq. The US had given Iraq an ultimatum to complete the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait on an unconditional basis by noon Washington time on February 23 and publically acknowledge its acceptance of the same in order to avoid confronting coalition ground offensive (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998,475). The Iraqi response to the US ultimatum that it would pull out its troops from Kuwait within three weeks beginning February 23 did not please President Bush because he perceived this proclamation of Iraq to be nothing but a delaying tactic meant to consolidate its defences in Kuwait against the impending coalition ground assault (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). During his conversation with Soviet leader Gorbachev President Bush urged him to support coalition ground operations against Iraq. He told Gorbachev that if the Soviets could not provide support to it then they might as well not oppose it (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 477). Bush wanted to maintain status quo that

had existed in the Gulf prior to the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He wanted coalition prisoners of war freed and an end to atrocities committed by Iraqi troops on Kuwaiti citizens. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell had repeatedly warned President Bush before the commencement of the coalition military campaign against Iraq that it would result in the US and coalition troops suffering significant casualties.

Bush's national security adviser Brent Scowcroft was of the view that it was important to completely destroy Iraqi military capabilities in order to not only remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait but to also ensure that Iraq could not threaten its neighbours in the future as well. He felt that coalition ground operations against Iraq should commence subsequent to the February 23 ultimatum given to Iraq by the US. Deadline compulsions forced President Bush to reject last ditch efforts of Soviet leader Gorbachev to negotiate with Saddam Hussein the pull out of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). With the deadline of noon February 23, 1991 given by the US to Iraq to begin the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait having passed and with over 500000 US troops stationed on Saudi soil and the US air force having carried out more than 94000 campaign related sorties the ground campaign began at 0800 hours Washington time and 0400 hours Saudi time (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). Bush briefed congressional leaders on his having authorised the initiation of military operations against Iraq from the presidential retreat at Camp David prior to returning to the Oval Office.

He was deeply concerned about probable casualties and fatalities of US servicemen and women in the war theatre and how the ground operations against Iraq would play out (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). Bush was of the conviction that with him wielding the authority to make the decision to approve the initiation of ground operations in the Gulf it was imperative for him to announce the same to the American people. He was determined to do whatever was required to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and was convinced of the appropriateness of his decision to permit ground operations against Iraq in order to liberate that country from Iraqi occupation. He was relieved after having had taken the decision to use force against Iraq and felt that it was time for him to sit back and review the ground offensive.

BEGINNING OF GROUND OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

Bush's address to the American people on February 23, 1991 was clear and direct. He stated that with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein having intensified his attempts to obliterate Kuwait he had directed the commander in chief of US forces in the Gulf General Norman Schwarzkopf to use all forces available to him to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 480). President Bush and his wife Barbara attended a special church service at the historic Church of the Presidents with his cabinet and White House staff following the initiation of ground operations in the Gulf. Subsequently Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell briefed Bush that ground operations against Iraq were going very well and the predictions that had been made earlier, which had projected that ground operations against Iraq would cause significant casualties to US and coalition forces had proven erroneous. Bush thanked the US military personnel for their sacrifices in battle and assured them that his administration would provide them with the best military equipment in order to secure a comprehensive US victory over Iraq . During the war the single largest loss of coalition troops on a day occurred when a Scud missile hit a billet near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on February 25, 1991 killing twenty eight US soldiers and wounding more than hundred (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998; Hess, 2001; Rodman, 2008).

BUSH'S REACTION TO IRAQI PLEAS FOR CEASEFIRE.

Following the route of Iraqi troops in Kuwait by the coalition forces Iraqi attempts to establish a ceasefire became frenetic. Radio Baghdad announced that Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz had called the Soviet ambassador to Iraq to facilitate a UN monitored ceasefire (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 481). President Bush was not in favour of a ceasefire because Saddam Hussein had not complied with all United Nations Security Council resolutions. Bush wanted the retreating Iraqi troops to leave behind their heavy equipment in Kuwait (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 481). Bush was worried about the public reaction to a ceasefire agreement with Iraq. On being asked by Secretary Baker as to what would happen if Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces from Kuwait without having fully abided by its UN mandated obligations Bush replied that the coalition would continue to fight against Iraq. The Bush administration stated that it would continue to persecute the war because of no tangible effort on the part of the Iraqi government to agree to the terms of the US' proposal forwarded to it on February 22 and the provisions of the United Nations

resolutions (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 482). Bush was adamant to avoid the US led military campaign against Iraq from having a "sloppy ending" (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 483). Bush did not want the US led coalition military operations to resemble Vietnam. Bush was sure he would not let go Saddam Hussein without making him accountable for his actions in the Gulf (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 483). General Powell briefed Bush of the scramble amongst Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait after coalition forces had routed them in Kuwait. Bush wanted Egyptian and Saudi troops to liberate Kuwait City from Iraqi forces because he thought that this would highlight to the "Arab street" that Arab nations had participated comprehensively in the military operations against Iraq and that the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was not Iraq versus the US but Iraq versus the international community, which included Arab and Muslim nations (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 483).

LIBERATION OF KUWAIT CITY.

Arab troops entered Kuwait City with the sky filled with dense smoke billowing from the burning oil wells which the retreating Iraq forces had set on fire in reaction to the drubbing they had received from coalition forces. Coalition fighter aircraft intercepted and strafed Iraqi troop convoys retreating en masse from Kuwait thus resulting in hundreds of thousands of Iraqi casualties. The US military's targeting of the retreating Iraqi military convoys on the so called "highway of death" was broadcast on television and became etched in the conscious memory of Americans (Hess, 2001). Hundreds of Iraqi tanks and armoured personnel carriers were destroyed by the bombing carried out by US and coalition fighter aircraft along the route headed north towards the Iraqi border (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 480).

By the end of the last week of February 1991 things on the military side were working according to the coalition's plan. The coalition's efforts to entrap and completely annihilate Iraqi Republican Guard troops in Kuwait were the only exception to the general smooth flow of coalition military operations in the Gulf (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 480). After meeting British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd Bush's advisers held deliberations on how the war in the Gulf was proceeding. Ultimately President Bush asked his military commanders as to whether the time had come to end the war. General Powell in response to President Bush's question told him that it would be appropriate to avail the views of General Schwarzkopf on this matter as he would be

able to delineate the situation on the ground in the Kuwait in a better manner. On being contacted General Schwarzkopf stated that he would first consult his commanders in order to establish the feasibility of the US military and coalition forces commencing their withdrawal from the Gulf.

BUSH'S CONFIRMATION OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 28 February 1991, between Iraq and Kuwait, Bush announced the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf. The cessation of coalition military operations had come within 100 hours of the initiation of ground operations against Iraq.

BUSH'S DECLARED COALITION SUCCESS A CONCERTED EFFORT.

Bush affirmed that the coalition's victory against Iraqi troops could not be justifiably claimed by one country. He stated that the coalition's victory was for the United Nations, for what was true and for all of humanity (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 486). Coalition aircraft flew 110000 combat missions, 79 US military personnel were killed in action, the count of servicemen wounded stood at 212, with 45 missing in action at the time the ceasefire was announced (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 486). Following the announcement of the ceasefire between Iraq and Kuwait, the coalition at Safwan, where their respective military representatives had met and signed the ceasefire agreement President Bush became concerned that the end of coalition military operations against Iraq would be interpreted by the Arab world as a sign that Saddam Hussein had won the war (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 486).

After the end of hostilities Bush felt that the bombastic and over the top pronouncements of the coalition's victory were "nice to look at" and that television coverage of the Gulf crisis had correctly revealed the embarrassment of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to the American people. He felt that press coverage of the Gulf crisis internationally and in the Arab world had failed to present an unbiased, non discriminatory and unprejudiced view of the diverse mosaic of insights and perspectives. According to him this was indicated by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein continuing to enjoy widespread support in the Arab world primarily due to his anti-American stand (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 487). Bush was of the view that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to be removed from power by the Iraqi people. He believed

that the Iraqi people who had suffered immeasurably under the repressive rule of Saddam Hussein would have their miseries compounded after receiving back home Iraqi troops that lacked armour; were battered, with 50000 of them having been killed in combat (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 487). Bush mentions in his autobiography the emotions of the important members of his inner circle subsequent to the coalition's comprehensive military victory that led to the end of the Gulf crisis (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 487). Bush has described that Powell characterized the Gulf crisis in the correct context- by terming it to be momentous and unprecedented.

Deputy national security adviser Robert Gates informed President Bush that one thing which made the US engagement in the crisis historic was that it saw the US stop its military operations at its own discretion after having crushed 43 Iraqi military divisions. Gates felt that history would judge President Bush's decision to cease military operations against Iraq after having succeeded in evicting Iraqi troops from Kuwait justly because he had done so in order to avoid the perpetuation of killing for killing's sake. Gates was of the view that he had not been witness to such a scenario in his four decade long public service career having been associated with four administrations. Bush dismissed the acclaim that he had received from all and sundry following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. He was of the opinion that the success of the US led coalition in the Gulf was primarily due to the outstanding work of his team and could not be attributed to a single individual. Bush praised his cabinet, White House and military staff for helping him lead the US to triumph in the Gulf conflict. He commended the vigour of General Powell; the steadiness and reliability of General Schwarzkopf; Secretary Cheney's fidelity; and the diplomatic skill of Secretary Baker (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 487). President Bush points out in his autobiography that he was not pleased at hearing criticism of Secretary Baker.

He credited Baker's proactive diplomacy for getting resolutions against Iraq approved by the UN Security Council (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, 498). He admired Baker for having carried out diplomacy in an excellent manner. He felt that the intricate and complex nature of diplomacy had been rated too low. To sum up, the theme of the pursuit of war clearly delineates that President Bush, being the consummate task master that he was had delegated the responsibility for the carrying out of military operations to his military commanders and himself watched the coalition military campaign unfold from the situation room at the White House. Bush knew perfectly

well that in order for the US and the coalition to obtain swift success in its military campaign to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait it was necessary for him to give complete freedom of action to his military commanders. He trusted Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell's command of coalition military operations and was confident that General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of coalition forces in the Gulf, would lead the coalition to a comprehensive victory over the Iraqi forces. Bush, who himself had been a naval aviator during the Second World War was aware of the importance of clearly defined military objectives and the means to attain those objects. He was convinced that the professionalism of his military commanders would ensure the protection of US interests in the Gulf. The pursuit of war was a coordinated and synchronized undertaking on the part of the coalition. The object of the military campaign was to enforce United Nations Security Council resolution 678 effectively and protect US strategic and economic interests in the Gulf. Bush's repeated pronouncements to the US military and the American people that he would ensure that US servicemen and women were provided the best war fighting equipment to fight Iraqi forces in the Gulf made him obtain from the congress a supplemental allocation of a \$ 15 billion for defray costs of coalition military operations in the Gulf.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

An assessment of President Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis highlights that it was a combination of the rational actor and bureaucratic or government politics models. Bush was instrumental in manoeuvring the templates of the conduct of military and non military related aspects of the United States' response to the Gulf crisis. Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 was predicated on two fundamental components one of which was the rational basis of his decision making and the other being his willingness to listen to a diverse range of views, insights and perspectives and peruse a wide range of options and alternatives on issues that demanded executive action in order to make a choice which would yield the maximum expected utility. Bush's decision making and his response to the Gulf crisis clearly delineates that he was a rationally disposed decision maker who wielded the "ultimate" decision making authority. This is so because he decided the course and nature of the US' response to the Gulf crisis by rationally considering its varied dimensions and taking the views, insights, perspectives and opinions of his cabinet, White House and military staff prior to choosing a specific option which according to his estimation would accrue the maximum utility and benefit to US interests in the Gulf.

He did so after having considered the relevant costs of such a choice. Bush's lack of bargaining, which refers to obtaining solutions through means of give and take ensured that his decision making was not a "perfect mirror" of the bureaucratic politics model. Three motifs of the US' reaction to the Gulf crisis namely-diplomacy, the use of force and the pursuit of war highlight that President Bush being the commander in chief and the "ultimate" decision maker determined the US' course of action during the Gulf crisis. Bush was personally in favour of taking military action against Iraq subsequent to that country's invasion of Kuwait but he opted at the outset for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis primarily because he wanted to underscore the point that with the emergence of the US as the sole superpower following the end of the Cold War it was not the hegemonic power that had been perceived by many and was willing to be supportive and accommodative of "multilateralism" so as to find solutions to problems of global concern and relevance. The rational, open ended and

flexible style of Bush's functioning ensured that he paid due consideration to different variables and metrics in order to find solutions to seemingly intractable problems. His focus directed at obtaining utility maximization for the state and to secure national security and national interests. Bush's assent to provide diplomacy the chance and opportunity to resolve the Gulf crisis in spite of having reservations for it highlighted the rational basis of his decision making which ensured that he exercised flexibility in determining the US' response to the rapidly evolving situation in the Gulf and was eager to try out various options in order to secure US objectives in the region. The outbreak of the Gulf crisis not only gave Bush an opening to augment the US' physical presence in the oil rich Gulf but also confront head on Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's ambitions to dominate the region. Bush believed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait posed a "veritable threat" to the emerging "new world order. " His support for diplomacy was pivotal for the US' engagement in "multilateral diplomacy" to resolve the Gulf crisis. In the backdrop of the post Cold War international scenario Bush's decision to take an incremental approach to resolve the Gulf crisis that was rooted in accordance with rational and consultative discourse ensured that the international community acted in unison and availed the use of multiple alternatives for engendering conflict resolution. Bush delegated his Secretary of State James Baker the task to carry out multilateral diplomacy in order to find a peaceful and non-violent resolution of the Gulf crisis. Baker along with his subordinates at the State department worked tirelessly to resolve the Gulf crisis in a manner that would guarantee the protection of US interests in the Gulf. President Bush's backing for routing US led multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis through the United Nations guaranteed it credibility. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's obstinate attitude and his unwillingness to abide by international norms obstructed the materialisation of a non violent resolution to the Gulf crisis.

President Bush' "rational assessment" that the Iraqi leadership's aversion to order the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait would invariably leave him with no option but to take military action to liberate Kuwait was primarily responsible for his authorizing the mobilization of US armed forces for deployment to the Gulf. Bush having given his support and backing to diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis sensed that the deployment of US forces to the Gulf would guarantee that non military measures taken to pressurize and compel Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait

were backed by force thus reinforcing them. With the end of fall 1990 and diplomacy failing to get the Iraqi troops to pull out from Kuwait in spite of the passage of numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions Bush affirmed that "time was running out" to resolve the Gulf crisis in a peaceful and non violent manner. He indicated that with the option of the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait becoming viable with the passing of each day and diplomacy failing to resolve the crisis he was willing to authorize the use of force against Iraq after obtaining approval for it from the United Nations Security Council. Bush's decision to avoid interfering in the military aspects of the use of force alternative to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait subsequent to his administration obtaining approval for the same from the Security Council and the US Congress invariably led his military commanders to obtain a free hand to conduct military operations against Iraq in a manner that assured overwhelming success for the coalition against Iraqi troops. Bush's bold decision making which was predicated on rational analysis and comprehension of issues meant to foster the advancement of national security and national interests went a long way in ensuring the coalition's success in overthrowing Iraqi troops from Kuwait without incurring significant losses. The highlight of Bush's decision making during the Gulf crisis was his rational evaluation of the conditions prevailing domestically and internationally, with specific focus on the Gulf and his innate ability to willingly listen to a diverse range of voices, opinions, standpoints on issues in order to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the matter at hand prior to making decisions that were to be implemented.

Bush's decision making fits the purview of the rational actor and bureaucratic politics models because he was a rational decision maker, who exercised "ultimate" decision making power, as substantiated forth by his rationally examining multivaried contours of the Gulf crisis in addition to taking into consideration multiple viewpoints emanating from his cabinet , White House and military staff and before choosing an alternative that would secure maximum advantage to state. The decision making of President Bush clearly exhibits that he construed his response to the Gulf crisis on the basis of rationality. Apart from his inner circle varied external actors exercised influence on President Bush. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Canadian premier Brian Mulroney, staunch allies of the US enjoyed close rapport with Bush and were two such external actors. During their meetings and conversations with

Bush during the Gulf crisis they were able to convey to the President the respective positions of their governments which were broadly in line with the stand of the US.

Thatcher and Mulroney were from the outset of the Gulf crisis in favour of using military action to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. They constantly goaded Bush to keep the alternative of the use of force open being aware of the fact that Bush had opted at first for diplomacy to resolve the Gulf crisis. Bush paid due regard to their views. Bush's decision making is discerned from the fact that he held extensive consultations with his inner circle which included National Security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Secretary of State James Baker. Bush's decisions during the Gulf crises were primary based on his deliberations with members of informal groups namely- the inner circle and the group of eight although he did not sidestep the National Security Council (NSC). Regular meetings of the NSC were chaired by President Bush during the Gulf crisis but he preferred to take decisions after having conferred with members of informal bodies. The gang or group of eight was one of the most prominent of such informal groups with which he consulted on matters specific to national security. It was presided over by him and its members included National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; Vice President Dan Quayle; Secretary of State James Baker; Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell; Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates; and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu. On certain occasions Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and Director, Central Intelligence Agency William Webster also participated in the consultations of the group of eight. He held extensive discussions in informal group settings in order to learn about various options. After carrying out a rational assessment of the alternatives and existent conditions he chose one that would deliver maximum utility and value to the state. His rationality based decision making was predicated on ensuring the furtherance of national interests. It was supportive of taking into consideration varied perspectives emanating from within his inner circle and from external agents. These inputs invariably influenced him to select options that delivered outcomes which advanced the interests of the state.

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