


**A STUDY OF THE FRENCH MODEL OF
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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2013



Date: 29/07/2013

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled as “A study of the French Model of Immigrant Integration” submitted by me in a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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To,

My family and friends

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List of Acronyms

ANCSEC	<i>Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances</i>
CAI	<i>Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration</i> (Reception and Integration Contract)
CFCM	<i>Conseil Français du culte musulman</i> (French Council of the Muslim Faith)
CILPI	<i>La commission interministérielle pour le logement des populations immigrées</i> (The Inter-Departmental Commission for Housing Immigrant Populations)
CNHI	<i>La Cite Nationale de l'Histoire de l'Immigration</i> (The National Centre for the History of Immigration)
CNPI	<i>Conseil National des Populations Immigrées</i> (Consultative Body on Immigrants and Minority Ethnic Groups)
DELFI	<i>Diploma in langue Française</i> (Diploma in French language)
DOM	<i>Département d'outre-mer</i> (Overseas Department)
EC	European Commission
ECSC	European Coal and steel community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMN	European Migration Network
EU	European Union
FAS	<i>Fonds d'Action Sociale</i> (Social Action Fund)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLI	<i>Français langue d'intégration</i> (French Language of Integration)
FN	<i>Le Front National</i> (National Front)
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GELD	<i>Groupe d'Etudes et de Lutte Contre les Discrimination</i>
HALDE	<i>Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Discriminations et pour l'Egalité</i> (High Council for Fight Against Discrimination and for Equality)

HCI	<i>Haut Conseil a l'intégration</i> (High Council of Integration)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INED	<i>Institut national d'études démographiques</i> (The National Institute for Demographic Studies)
INSEE	<i>Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques</i> (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFII	<i>L'Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration</i> (French Bureau for Immigration and Integration)
ONI	<i>Office national de l'immigration</i> (National Office of Immigration)
OPEC	<i>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</i>
PRIP	<i>les programmes régionaux d'intégration des populations immigrées</i> (The Regional Integration Programs for Immigrants)
PS	Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)
SIG	<i>Société Générale de l'Immigration</i> (General Immigration Society)
TeO	<i>Trajectoire et Origines</i> (Trajectories and Origins survey)
UMP	<i>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire</i> (Union for a Popular Movement)
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

A simple way to take measure of a country is to look at how many want in...and how many want out. —Tony Blair¹

For the centuries, migration has been the part of human life. But today in the era of globalisation, where everyone and everything is interconnected, it has become a vital phenomenon. Almost every country on earth is and will continue to be affected by migration. It is closely linked with global issues such as development, poverty, human rights etc and global events such as revolutions, wars, colonization, economic expansion, political transformations etc. On the one side, it strengthens economic growth and foster diversity by enriching cultures. On the other, it presents significant challenges. In the phenomenon of migration, push and pull factors are the important components. Immigrants, on the one hand, are always pulled by developed countries because of the factors like job opportunities, rich economy, education, social security system, democracy, technological advancement, liberalism, law and order, quality of life, political stability so and so forth. While, on the other hand emigrants generally pushed from their country of origin because of lack of job opportunities, lack of proper education, instability in economic, political and social system, health, and civic amenities etc. But all these push and pull factors vary from individual to individual and country to country. For instance, for many centuries USA, UK and France have always been the country of immigrants. The general pattern which is observed in immigration is that immigrants usually move from East to West and South to North. Europe is one of the best examples to comprehend this trend. It has always attracted immigrants to its territory from all parts of the world. Europe- a vibrant continent, a strategic region, a political idea, an economic giant, a cultural mosaic so and so forth has been for centuries an attractive land for immigrants. Immigration has always been higher than emigration into European society. East to West or South to North trend is always present in Europe. The reasons to immigrate differ from centuries to centuries- political, economic, historical, social and cultural. People come in the form of asylum seekers, refugees, workers, students and family members- sometimes legal and sometimes illegal. Western European countries such as France, Germany, Britain, Netherlands, and Belgium have always been attractive to immigrants.

¹ Anthony Charles Lynton Blair is a British Labour Party politician who served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007

As far as France is concerned, it has been the country which has always welcomed immigrants. It has experienced the immigration primarily from European countries (such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Poland) and later from many other parts of the world notably from former colonies (like *Maghrebian* countries- Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, sub-Saharan African countries, South-East Asia- Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos etc.), India, China, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Turkey etc. Historically speaking, since 18th century till present, despite of the changes in socio-economic-political spheres, immigration has been the reality. For instance, after the World Wars till 1973 immigration to France was at peak. Because of the worldwide OPEC oil crisis of 1970s, immigration rate affected till 1990's. Later with the fall of Berlin wall, disintegration of USSR and creation of the European Union, all these factors contributed in the rise of immigration to France. As a result, France has become a multicultural society exemplified by the diversity of immigrant people- Black, Blanc, Beur² (see appendix 1.1); different religions- Islam, Protestantism, Buddhism, Sikhism; different culture, traditions and languages. Paris, Lyon, Marseille are some multicultural cities in France inhabited by most of immigrants. In order to unify these diverse groups, some kind of integration is essential so that immigrants can also enjoy constitutional rights like natives French citizens. Thus, our research aims at understanding the patterns of immigration to Europe and France, and analysing the strengths and weaknesses of French model of immigrant integration in social, economic and political spheres. For this, some of the studies pertinent to history of immigration to France, immigrant integration model of France and problems faced by immigrants in the French society have been reviewed here.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is a vast range of literature available on this topic. It deals with the different aspects of immigration, immigrant integration models in Europe, French policy of immigrant integration, issues and challenges faced by immigrants in France and Western Europe, racism in Europe, Islam in European society so on and so forth. For this undertaken study, literature that deals mainly with French society will be studied

² Black (Black African population), Blanc (French native population), Beur (Arabic origin population) used for 1998's multiracial French football team.

along with some texts pertinent to Europe broadly dealing with a) immigration to Europe and France, b) French Republican identity and immigrant integration policy of France- assimilation and c) problems related to immigrant integration in the French society.

A prominent work which examines the debate over immigration in contemporary France is *Immigration and Insecurity in France* by Jane Freedman (2004), looking not only at the development of immigration and national policies, but also at the changing discourse of the integration of immigrants. Freedman studies the insecurities of immigrants in France as a result of these policies. In the chapters pertaining to our study, Freedman talks about concepts of immigration and citizenship in France, where immigration is considered as a threat to national identity and moreover, examines the ongoing debate of integration of immigrants. The importance of the immigration issue in French politics has been highlighted by the success of the far right Front National party of France. The author also examines the development of immigration policy in the context of Europe. He analyses the debate on Islamic headscarf which has challenged the secular values of the French Republican model and revealed the widespread attitude towards Islam and the place of Muslim in French society. The way in which Islam has been framed it is seen as a threat to the French Republican tradition and this debate has further created the conditions of greater exclusion of Muslims from the French society. He also addresses the issue of racism, discrimination and subsequently the failure of anti-racism and how these issues lead to create insecurities for immigrant population in France.

A comprehensive work which analyses politics, economics, social structures and cultural practices in France is *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society* by Alec G. Hargreaves (2007). Immigration is one of the most significant and persistent issues in contemporary France. The central question around which the book is structured is how effectively are recent immigrants and their descendants being incorporated into French society? Hargreaves starts with the overview of the problematic, later he focuses on the experiences and attitudes of minority groups in the socio-economic, cultural and political milieus and finally he talks about majority population attitudes towards immigrants and their descendants. He challenged the opinion that minorities (mainly from Islamic countries of North and West Africa

which were former French colonies) cannot be successfully incorporated into French society because they are unwilling to adapt France's cultural norms. He enumerates that there are evidences which show that the principal barriers come from socio-economic disadvantages and racial and ethnic discrimination by majority population in schools, jobs etc.

A significant work titled as *French National Identity and Integration: Who belongs to the National Community?* by Patrick Simon (2012) talks about the debate over “what it means to be French”, the concept of “dual belonging” which is accepted in multiculturalist countries like USA, Canada, Australia, and New-Zeeland while highly criticized in France because it is regarded as a threat to national cohesion. France being the assimilationist country, retention of the ethnic identity is seen as the sign of incomplete assimilation. This is proven by the fact that the data on the ethnicity, religious faith of immigrants is not collected in the national Census of France. This article analyses a unique data set from the largest survey *Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in France*³ (2008) ever conducted in France on ethnic minorities. Based on the findings of the above mentioned survey author analyses firstly, different trends to acquire the French citizenship- as dual nationality is permitted under French law but it is conflicted with dual loyalty. Secondly, nationality and the sense of belonging- public debates portray multiple allegiances as conflictual, but many immigrants and their descendents see them as complementary. The French assimilationist political model is actively unfavourable to the expression of multiple identities or “Hyphenation”. He points out the difference between “Being” French and “Looking” French. As visible minorities are perceived as not belonging to the French mainstream and are treated as “Others”-facing racism and discrimination. According to the data from the TeO survey (2008: 13), nearly half of the immigrants with French nationality consider that they are not perceived as French. Thus, “Frenchness” is not attributed on the basis of nationality or cultural codes but rather on restricted vision of who “looks French”. This further reinforces the stereotypes and prejudices that

³ The TeO survey was conducted jointly by INED and INSEE. It was closely supervised by the official bodies which oversee the collection and use of public statistics (CNIS; CNIL). It guarantees scrupulous respect for respondents' rights: all participants were surveyed on a voluntary and anonymous basis. Data collection (from 22,000 respondents in metropolitan France) took place between September 2008 and February 2009. Initial results will be published in early 2010.

encourage discrimination. Simon concludes by stating the reason of failure of multiculturalism in France. This model does not work in France because it is relied on the recognition and valorisation of ethnic communities and their cultural differences. Above all, it is seen to be conflicted with Republican values and national cohesion. The *TeO* survey gives a striking fact, 90% of those who mention their ethnicity as a feature of their identity feel at home in France and taking into consideration the findings of this survey, author feels that it is hard to support mainstream discourse and widespread belief that there is the lack of allegiance by immigrants and their descendants to the French national identity who are coming from Islamic countries. The major problem lies with the definition of the national identity.

Piter Reitsma (2007) in the comprehensive paper *Migrant Policy and Muslim Integration in France and the Netherlands: comparing theory with practice* analyses Muslim integration into Western societies mainly French and Dutch. For instance riots in the French *banlieues*, the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the radicalizing of Muslims in several Western European nations etc. clearly demonstrates that a new approach towards integration problem is needed. He gives an outline on the history of French and Dutch immigrant policy and problems that these countries are facing while comparing them with the theory of Francis Fukuyama who argues in his article 'Identity and Migration' that problem begins when people (Muslims) move from traditional societies into other societies (Western-Europe) – their struggle to get their identity affirmed in new surroundings has been in vain. According to Reitsma, extrapolations which are shown in the article 'Europe and Islam', 'can make people in Western Europe more scared, cause more social polarization and tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims and this should not happen. Analyzing French immigrant's integration policy, he says that the French form of integration probably is not the good form of integration anymore because it aims at assimilation of immigrants, the principle of mono-belonging which has proved to be not working. Immigrants nowadays demand a principle of belonging to more than one society.' Further, he talks about the intolerance, mutual misunderstanding, solitude, exclusion between different groups of inhabitants in France which result in the radicalization (riots and bombings in London, Madrid and Amsterdam). He suggests Western-European societies need to find a better way to integrate people coming from more traditional societies into their societies.

Naima Bouteldja (2007) in an article '*Integration, Discrimination and the Left in France: a roundtable discussion* examines 'the dangers of the current 'integration' discourse, discussed at a roundtable held in Paris in May 2007 by French academics and activists. It is argued that the chauvinist, a national and a racist consensus on national identity exists in the political framework of France. This consensus includes prejudices against Muslims and 'immigrant' communities framed in the name of integration which is never precisely defined, led to new restrictions on access to citizenship, residence rights etc. The institutions which represent Muslims or tackle discrimination in France have not been given effective powers.' The discussion is also on assimilationist deficiency and problem with the decision making process. It has been argued that even the French Left (Socialist Party) which was supposed to advocate cultural diversity, has adopted the language of French Right. In France, the problem with the discourse on integration is that it is form in the name of tolerance and human rights which are actually based on stereotypes rather than facts.

A major work which examines as the titles suggests *The Assimilation of Immigrant Groups in France- Myth or Reality?*" written by Eloisa Vladescu (2006). He begins with the history of immigration and integration in France. The author is of the opinion that the immigrants coming from European countries, speaking Latin languages and practicing Christianity are more easily assimilated into French society. Thus, in order to know whether the immigrant assimilation is a reality or a myth in France, it is important to assess the political, economic and social factors. For instance, he analyses integration problems faced by Muslims in France and how this affects political, social and economic scenario there. The article highlights the problem of French government that it doesn't address the political sensitive issues of race, religion and ethnicity. Vladescu is of the opinion that 'Muslims in France do feel marginalized to some extent and bans on cultural and religious symbols fuelled this phenomenon. Moreover, they are underrepresented in the French government which is also the contributing factor to the difficulty in assimilating. He stated that it is difficult to determine the reality as there are so many circular arguments involving in France. Furthermore, economic and political hardships contributed to the difficulties of social and cultural integration of immigrant communities in France.' However, assimilation is a reality for some groups like European immigrants and myth for others like

Maghrebians, Asians, Africans etc. and it is necessary for both French society and immigrant groups to cohabitate in order to prevent the marginalisation of certain groups and promote the inclusion of all immigrants (Vladescu 2006: 5-14).

Amy Zerwick (2006) paper *Racism, Assimilation, and Immigration: A New Culture in France?* notes that the cultural rift in the contemporary France has quite dangerous and serious consequences. While analysing historical background of the immigration to France, author says that the North Africans (who feel excluded and marginalized), many of whom lacked formal education, found the process of assimilation to be very difficult, if not impossible. Zerwick examines the ideology of *le Front National* which says that the presence of large number of immigrants (particularly Arabs) poses a serious risk to cultural integrity of France. Moreover, he talks about the *laïcité* (French secularism) and how it makes the process of assimilation all the more difficult for the Muslim families from France's former North African Colonies. For instance, question of Islamic headscarf. On the marginalization and the exclusion he says, 'if someone feels that he/she is not an equal part of a society, then the person is unlikely to participate and contribute to the culture in a constructive manner, and thus the cycle of exclusion continues.'

The report titled as *The Role of the State in Cultural Integration: Trends, Challenges, and Ways Ahead* by Christian Joppke (2012) addresses the issue of cultural integration of immigrants. As far as trends are concerned, national models of cultural integration of immigrant vary, "multicultural" in Britain, "assimilationist" in France, or "segregationist" in Germany. The biggest difference sees with the harshness of the policy. But the commonality over a decade know is "civic integration" policies ("muscular" variant of liberalism which means accepting liberal host society values and institutions intrinsically and unconditionally) adopted in several European countries, including Netherlands, Germany, France, Britain, Austria and Denmark and meant for narrowing the cultural distance between immigrants and the host society. But these liberal states face many challenges for striking the right balance between aggressive policies and sensitive identity issues of immigrants. As far as challenges are concerned, Joppke talks about two critical issues vis-à-vis cultural differences: language and religion. Religion (especially Islam) is considered Europe's main cultural integration problem because it is difficult for European nations to

maintain striking balance between social cohesion and individual freedom. He states the opinion of Tariq Ramadan that European Muslims can only be integrated by an extreme program of multicultural recognition which in the recent years has been rejected by several European states like Britain, Germany, and France. Further, he argues that the core cause of European integration problem is socio-economic in nature rather than religious. Poverty, unemployment, exclusion etc. fuel the politicization of cultural differences. This report suggests three guiding principles namely to be liberal in the right way, don't repress robust political debate and to recognize limits of policies and further, three policy goals for governments to improve cultural integration of immigrants namely to protect minority culture, to fight discrimination more effectively and to select the "right" immigrants.

Will Kymlicka (2012) in his report *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future* challenges four powerful myths about multiculturalism. He further talks about several factors that can either facilitate or delay the successful implementation of multiculturalism like de-securitisation of ethnic relations (i.e. if the state perceives immigrants to be security threat like Muslims after 9/11, then support and space for minorities in multiculturalism will drop), human rights (if states finds that certain groups in particular Muslims are unwilling to respect human rights norms and embrace liberal-democratic values, then government will not provide them multicultural rights or resources), border control, diversity of immigrants groups, economic contributions (immigrants must contribute to society particularly economically). Kymlicka argues that multiculturalism tends to fail when immigrants are seen as illegal, practicing illiberal practices and as net burden on the welfare state. Thus multiculturalism's success and failure have depended on the nature of the issues at stake and the countries involved. The author discusses the evolution of multiculturalism and its policies. He says multiculturalism is first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, based on human-rights ideals. He also talks about the Canadian success story in details as it is a first country to adopt an official multiculturalism policy toward immigrant origin ethnic groups and this policy is also the part of its constitution. Further, Kymlicka talks about the European experience and the retreat from multiculturalism. He also points out that changes in the public level policies do not mean abandonment of multicultural policies, but rather the accentuation of "civic integration" policies. 'But it should be equally understood

that not all forms of civic integration are compatible with multiculturalism. Some countries (such as Denmark, Germany and Austria) have adopted an anti-multicultural form of civic integration- one that is coercive and assimilationist.’ Their new policies are hardly considered as a retreat from multiculturalism because they never embraced it in the first place.

Dan Rodriguez-Garcia (2010) in his comprehensive article *Beyond Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Managing Diversity* points out that significant approaches to management of immigration and diversity- multiculturalism and assimilation have been called into question in the past few years. This article highlights the problems of assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches to manage diversity. A highly assimilationist (republican) approach of the French model had failed and resulted in the profound marginalization and social exclusion (cases such as Islamic headscarf debate, 2004 law on ban on the religious symbols in public, 2005 *banlieues* riots) and now France has to acknowledge multiculturalism. Similarly, ‘failure of multiculturalist (pluralist) model (based on respect and promotion of cultural diversity within the framework of shared belonging, as in the case of Sweden, the Netherlands, the U.K) because it sometimes lead to “Balkanization” or creation of parallel societies, thus limiting social cohesion (cases such as- Rushdie Affair 1989, 2001 riots in UK, 2004 Murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, 2005 London bombings). Garcia agrees with some researchers who have argued that the basic reasons behind the unsuccessful social incorporation and inequality between majority and minority groups are institutional discrimination and persistent racism rather than ethno-cultural groups to live together. The author also supports the view that management of diversity in multicultural democracies should be a process of mutual accommodation. On the other hand, allowing difference to enter in “civil sphere” results in an enlarged and heterogeneous space leads to greater social cohesiveness. Thus he advocates the Canadian “interculturalist” model of socio-cultural incorporation that is based on cultural diversity and this model is realistic solution for achieving social, political and economic cohesion in the societies which are ethno-cultural in nature.’ He examines “Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s 2008 report which promotes “open secularism” (not the “restrictive” one of France) to combat discrimination and to foster social reconciliation. The author believes that the policies of European countries vis-à-vis

immigrants are highly protectionist. On the contrary, he gives an example of Canadian society where immigrants can develop and fully participate in the economic, political, and social and culture spheres (Garcia 2010: 252-257).

An article titled as *National Models of Integration in Europe: a Comparative and Critical Analysis* by Christophe Bertossi (2011) analyses various concepts of national models of immigrant integration (e.g. French assimilation, Dutch and British multiculturalism) and explains many national differences for comparative research. Author points out that these models should not be considered homogeneous, as they are complex structures. Moreover, National models as independent variables are ineffective in nature because they are preconceived notions. French model is based on the universal principles, the Republican values and the philosophy of French secularism. On the other hand, in Britain and the Netherlands, people are mobilized on the basis of ethnic and racial identities. Bertossi thinks the other problem with the notion of models of integration and citizenship is that it is subjected to stereotypes- commonly held in public and political debates in each country. Also, it has the totalizing tendency because it incorporates together social, institutional, and political facets of citizenship and the migrant's integration as under one umbrella i.e. "cultural totality". Further, he believes that debating republicanism does not explain the republican model i.e. national integration and citizenship model may or may not explain observed reality. On the other side, there is a "multicultural backlash"- retreat from multiculturalism (due to its failure) to a new "civic integration" approach. He also suggests, 'five working propositions to find the models. According to him, national models of the integration are not institutionally consistent, culturally defined or historically stable. The model concepts are used, imagined, negotiated, affirmed, contested and challenged by different types of people.' Models should not be studied in a stable and consistent normative, as well as in cultural, historical and institutional context.

Anja Rudiger and Sarah Spencer (2003), report *Social Integration of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities: Policies to Combat Discrimination* aim to study different approaches to integration, at same time providing indicators of the current situation of migrants based on lessons learnt from Member States' experiences. They also examine successes and failures of integration policies and the role of existing EU

policies. Thus based on these observations, they frame out the lesson for policymakers at EU level.

Natalia Macyra (2012), article *Immigration: an opportunity for the European Union* points out that “increasing unemployment and the euro crisis are fertile grounds for those who support closing the EU borders for migrants...Yet immigration is crucial for European competitiveness and economic growth. Moreover, at least 75 million migrants are needed just to cover declining population in many European countries... Also fixing the euro-crisis will require re-balancing between countries- between the mass youth unemployment in the south, and relatively healthy economies in the north where there is a demand for labour. The economic effects of migration are beneficial; there are more gains than costs. Immigrants also improve entrepreneurship, productivity and investments. They also take up low-paid vacancies rejected by locals. The strength of the European economy in the next decades will be dependent on its ability to attract people to cross borders. ‘EU’s main priorities are the struggle against illegal immigrants, the integration of legal immigrants, the fight against frauds and the denunciation of all the people who are exploiting other human beings’ (Macyra 2012: 1-4).

DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The proposed study shall try to analyse immigrant integration policy of France- assimilation. France has always welcome immigrants to her soil. At first instance, European immigrants have been asked to come to fulfil France’s labour shortages. Later France invited immigrants from her ex-colonies and from there the problem of integration of the ‘Others’ started. These Non-Europeans are very different from European immigrants in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion, languages etc. coming from different economic and social background. Although on one side they are adding diversity to the French society, but on the other side this diversity conflicts with the French Republican model of National identity which is embedded in the Universal and secular values. This study will examine the immigrant integration model of France and the challenges and problems faced by immigrants in the French society. The study will also analyse the strengths and weaknesses pertaining to French model

of integration vis-à-vis much “failed” multicultural model in Europe during the age of globalisation. The present work is pertinent because immigration is a never ending phenomenon in France and effective integration of immigrants is essential to maintain social cohesion in the French society.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What have been the patterns and the history of immigration to Europe and France?
2. What constitutes French national identity?
3. How the immigrant integration policy of France has evolved over the period of time?
4. What are the problems and challenges faced by immigrants in the French assimilationist model?
5. What are strengths and weaknesses of assimilationist model as compared to multicultural model?

HYPOTHESIS

- France has been successful in integrating immigrants of diverse cultural background through policy of assimilation.
- The success of immigrant integration policies is depended upon effective implementation of various measures proposed in the policy.

RESEARCH METHODS

The proposed research aims to assess French model of immigrant’s integration. Reference to all relevant material pertaining to immigration and immigrant integration in France and in Europe shall be made. This study will critically evaluate strengths and weaknesses of French model of immigrant integration and to what degree it has been successful. The data and information shall be classified under the main themes that are to be discussed and comprehended in the study. Therefore, this study will not only be descriptive and analytical in nature but also qualitative and quantitative.

Moreover, it shall be based on both primary and secondary sources of information. For primary sources, official documents, data released by French ministries, embassies, organisations and European institutions will be used. Books, articles, academic journals, newspapers, and internet sources in both French and English language would be reviewed.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is based more on qualitative aspects rather than quantitative aspects as it involves lot of subjective as well as sensitive issues which surely requires a collecting primary data through interviews and interactions. But due to lack of time and resources, the study is mainly based on available secondary data and information. It is very exhaustive in nature as it includes lot of interrelated themes such as immigration, integration models, citizenship, discrimination etc. Moreover, legal policies and laws concerning immigration and integration are mainly in French language and it needs to be translated. The present study will focus only on legal immigration to France, and not on irregular immigration or refugees or asylum seekers.

A STRUCTURAL OUTLINE OF THE RESERCH

The study is divided into following chapters:

The present chapter titled as **Introduction** gives a brief overview of the undertaken research along with the review of literature pertinent to the study. It discusses about aim of the study, research questions, hypothesis, methodology and finally, concludes with the limitations of the study.

The second chapter is titled as **Understanding Migration: Immigration to France**. This chapter is divided into three sections. First section talks about the migration trends in the age of globalisation. Further, advantages and disadvantages of immigration will be discussed. Second section examines the major trends in the European history of immigration and major pull and push factors of migration to Europe. The third section deals with the history, pattern and type of immigration to

France in which we will explain the complex interplay of politics and economics of immigration to the French society.

The third chapter is titled as **French Model of Immigrant Integration: Assimilation**. This chapter is divided into three sections. First section focuses on the concepts of French national identity such as Universalism and *laïcité*. Second section conceptualises different models of immigrant integration such as multiculturalism, assimilation and social cohesion. Third section analyses the immigrant integration policy of France.

The fourth chapter is titled as **Problems of Immigrant Integration in the French society**. This chapter is divided into three sections. First section examines the problems faced by immigrants as a whole in French society. Second section deals with the challenges faced by Muslim community in particular. Third section will briefly discuss the multicultural model in Europe and analyse its strengths and weaknesses as compared to assimilation.

The **Conclusion** would provide the summary of findings of the study and the verification of the hypotheses. Moreover, the research concludes by discussing intercultural model of immigrant integration which is seen as an alternative to other models of integration for French as well as other European multicultural societies.

CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION:
IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE

INTRODUCTION:

Immigration is crucial as well as complex in nature. Today in the 21st century, France is after Germany in Europe, with the largest community of foreigners, in absolute numbers and in relation to its total population. Thus, migration continues to matter. This chapter is divided into three sections. First section talks about the general global trends of migration in the age of globalisation. Second section examines the major trends in the European history of immigration and major pull and push factors of migration to Europe. The third section deals with the history, pattern and type of immigration to France in which we will explain the complex interplay of politics and economics of immigration to the French society.

SECTION 1: MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

Before analysing the general trends, let us first define the important concepts entailed with the phenomenon of immigration such as:

MIGRATION:

According to International Organization for Migration (IOM), it is the “movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border (international migration), or within a State (internal migration). It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.”⁴

According to European Migration Network (EMN), “migration is defined by the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘emigration’. Immigration is the action by which a person either: establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least twelve months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country; while emigration is having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to

⁴ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Migration>

have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected be, of at least twelve months.”⁵

MIGRANT:

According to International Organization for Migration (IOM), “at the international level, no universally accepted definition for "migrant" exists. The term migrant was usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of "personal convenience" and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore applied to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family. The United Nations (UN) defines migrant as “an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes (voluntary or involuntary) and the means (regular or irregular) used to migrate. Under such a definition, those travelling for shorter periods as tourists and businesspersons would not be considered migrants. However, common usage includes certain kinds of shorter-term migrants, such as seasonal farm-workers who travel for short periods to work planting or harvesting farm products.”⁶ One in thirty five people in the world is an international migrant today or 3.1%⁷ of the world population are migrants. The total number of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from an estimated 150 million in 2000 to 214 million persons in the world today in 2010.⁸

European Commission (EC 2010) defines migrant as a, “broader-term of an immigrant and emigrant that refers to a person who leaves from one country or region to settle in another, often in search of a better life.”⁹

In general, there are different types of migrants such as ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migrants; ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants; ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled migrants’. The most voluntary migrants are economic migrants or labour migrants who move to find work or better job opportunities; fill gaps in the national labour market and many forced

⁵ <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTermByName.do?name=Migration>

⁶ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Migrant>

⁷ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/facts--figures-1.html>

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ [http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary.do?language=7\\$en](http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary.do?language=7$en)

migrants are political migrants or refugees (Koser 2007: 18). Today, temporary migration has become a vital event while labour “economic” migration has been the most popular type of migration.

Table 1

Percentage of female migrants among the total number of international migrants, by major area, 1960-2000					
Major area	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
World	46.6	47.2	47.4	47.9	48.8
More developed regions	47.9	48.2	49.4	50.8	50.9
Less developed regions	45.7	46.3	45.5	44.7	45.7
Europe	48.5	48.0	48.5	51.7	52.4
Northern America	49.8	51.1	52.6	51.0	51.0
Caribbean	45.3	46.1	46.5	47.7	48.9
Latin America	44.7	46.9	48.4	50.2	50.5
Northern Africa	49.5	47.7	45.8	44.9	42.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	40.6	42.1	43.8	46.0	47.2
Southern Asia	46.3	46.9	45.9	44.4	44.4
Eastern and South-eastern Asia	46.1	47.6	47.0	48.5	50.1
Western Asia	45.2	46.6	47.2	47.9	48.3
Oceania	44.4	46.5	47.9	49.1	50.5

Source: United Nations, 2002.

From the above table 1 of United Nations, we can determine that percentage of female migrants among the total number of international migrants in the span of 40 years is increasing at a slow but at consistent rate. It has reached to 48.8% as on average in the world. Europe has experienced the most percentage of female migrants i.e. 52.4%. Moreover, they have equally outnumbered the male migrants in Northern America, Latin America, and Oceania.

IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT:

International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines immigration “a process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement.”¹⁰

According to European Migration Network (EMN), immigration is “the action by which a person either: establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least twelve months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country.”¹¹

¹⁰ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Immigration>

¹¹ <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTermByName.do?name=Immigration>

According to Institut national d'études démographiques (INED), “an immigrant is a person who settles in a country other than their country of origin. In France, a person who has acquired French nationality since arriving in France is still counted as an immigrant, though not a person born as a French national abroad. Immigrants are qualified by their country of origin and not their nationality.”¹²

According to National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) under the terms of the definition adopted by the High Council for Integration, “an immigrant is a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France. Persons who were born abroad and of French nationality and live in France are therefore not counted. Conversely, certain immigrants may have become French while others remain foreign. The foreigner and immigrant populations are therefore not quite the same: an immigrant is not necessarily foreigner. Immigrant status is permanent: an individual will continue to belong to the immigrant population even if he/she acquires French nationality. It is the country of birth, and not nationality at birth, which defines the geographical origin of an immigrant. The quality of an immigrant is permanent: an individual continues to belong to the immigrant population even if it becomes French by acquisition.”¹³

Whereas according to INSEE, “a foreigner is a person who resides in France and does not possess French nationality, either because they possess another nationality (exclusively) or because they do not have one at all (this is the case of stateless persons). However, unlike that of immigrant, the status of foreigner does not always remain throughout the lifetime of a foreigner: it is possible to become French by acquisition of nationality.”¹⁴

We have observed that distinction between an immigrant and a foreigner is quite confusing. Generally speaking immigrants are non-Europeans or ‘coloured people’ coming from ‘Third world’, often known as ‘visible migrants’ distinguish on the basis of colour of skin and ethnic practices. According to Bertossi (2011: 1575) the term immigrant is, “used in public discourse and debated in France to refer to people who are not immigrants at all but French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants” while on the other hand, a foreigner ‘White’ is considered to be a person immigrating

¹² <http://www.ined.fr/en/lexicon/bdd/mot/immigrant/popup/1/motid/55/>


¹³ <http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/immigre.htm>

¹⁴ <http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/etranger.htm>

to one European country from another. Immigrants and their descendents irrespective of attaining nationality always termed as an immigrant.

In the below figure 1, we can see the complex interplay of immigrants and foreigners in the French society because of which sometimes definitions, statistics, type of immigrants in general varies from organisation to organisation. Moreover, this is aggravated by the fact that National census of France does not record any details about the ethnicity of immigrants.

Figure1



Note - For the sake of simplicity, this chart does not include specific cases which concern very small numbers of individuals (persons born in metropolitan France or in a DOM without French nationality, individuals with at least one overseas parent, etc.). These specific cases are presented in an appendix.

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

According to the United Nations (UN 2009), the United States has the highest number of immigrants, with the total of 43 million in 2010, six times more than Canada 7.2

million. However, proportionally to their population size, Canada has twice as many immigrants versus 13% in the USA. In 2010, world highest proportions of immigrants were found in Qatar (86%), United Arab Emirates (70%), Monaco (72%), Singapore (41%), Australia (22%), Canada (21%), Austria (16%), Spain (14%), United States (13%), Germany (13%), France¹⁵ (11%), the Netherlands (10%) etc. There were total 214 million immigrants in 2010, representing just 3.1% of the world population.

ADVANTAGES OF IMMIGRATION TO THE HOST COUNTRY¹⁶:

Immigrants have been amongst the most vibrant section of the society. Today in the age of modernization, digital and transportation revolution has made immigration more feasible and practical. By immigrating, people try to protect themselves from the weak economy, political crises and other so many risks and problems. In developed countries, there is a division of labour market. Native workers are not willing to do low-paying jobs of less secure in nature. Thus immigrant workers undertake these kinds of jobs often described as dirty, dangerous and difficult which lead host society to remain competitive in an industry that would otherwise loose out to international competition (Koser 2007: 92). Let take the case of the Europe where immigration is essential for European competitiveness, economic growth (immigrants improve entrepreneurship and productivity as they take up low-paid jobs rejected by natives) and birth rate (Macyra 2012). Moreover, apart from economic benefits, immigrants are needed to maintain demographic growth rate in shrinking population countries such as in Europe, Japan, U.S.A. etc. There are low birth rates that have combined with increasing life expectancies because of constant progress in healthcare. Moreover, apart from the economic growth, immigrants contribute to social-cultural aspects of the host society, making it more dynamic and diverse. For instance, USA, Canada, Britain, Australia, France etc. are some of the diverse countries in terms of ethnic-immigrant population and examples such as music styles jazz, *bhangra*; world

¹⁵ The proportion of immigrants is higher than that published by INSEE, which, unlike the United Nations, does not consider foreign-born French Nationals as immigrants. If only foreigners born abroad are counted, the proportion of immigrants in France is just 8%.

¹⁶ Receiving country - Country of destination or a third country. In the case of return or repatriation, also the country of origin. Country that has accepted to receive a certain number of refugees and migrants on a yearly basis by presidential, ministerial or parliamentary decision (International Organisation for Migration) <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Receiving-country>.

renowned migrant authors- Salman Rushdie, Ben Okri; varied cuisines like Chinese, *Mughlai*, Indian, Thai etc have contributed immensely to the cultural diversity of the world. As our research is primarily on French society, so let us see some famous French people of immigrant origin (at least one great-grandparent) who have contributed to the French society in diverse ways are: Algeria: Isabelle Adjani (actress), Albert Camus (Nobel Prize winning author), Amin Maalouf (author), Zinedine Zidane (football player), Jacques Derrida (philosopher), Jean Daniel BenSaïd (director of French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*), Rachida Dati (Minister of Justice 18 May 2007 – 23 June 2010); Belgium: Johnny Hallyday (singer); Hungary: Nicolas Sarkozy (former French president); Iran: Yasmina Reza (filmmaker); Italy: Émile Zola (writer); Carla Bruni (singer and wife of Nicolas Sarkozy), Yves Montand (actor and singer); Morocco: Gad Elmaleh (humorist and actor); Poland: Guillaume Apollinaire (writer), Marie Curie (physicist); Jean-Jacques Goldman (singer); Georges Pérec (writer); Senegal: MC Solaar (rap and hip hop artist); Spain: Manuel Valls (French Socialist Party politician, Minister of the Interior); Turkey: Édouard Balladur (Prime Minister of France from 29 March 1993 to 10 May 1995). However there are also some contrary arguments in relation to immigration, which are mentioned below.

DISADVANTAGES OF IMMIGRATION TO THE HOST SOCIETY:

Usually immigrants indicate higher levels of unemployment¹⁷, low level of education, poverty, large family sizes (in the case of North-African migrants), and different socio-cultural background. Because of these factors, they usually get benefitted largely from the social security system of a host country such as in Western Europe and subsequently, they sent their home countries huge amount of remittances¹⁸ which further weakens the economy of the host society. For example: in European Commission's (EC 2012) Eurostat report (176/2012) titled *Workers' remittances in the EU27* states that nearly 40 billion euro transferred by migrants to their country of origin in 2011. This total amount includes both intra-EU27 and extra-EU27 flows.

¹⁷ The general perception among the natives is that immigrants take up their jobs and consequently unemployment rate rises in the society.

¹⁸ Remittances - Money earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin (International Organisation for Migration) <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Remittances>.

The outflow of worker's remittances in 2011 was highest in France (9.7 billion euro or 25% of total EU27 remittances).

SECTION 2: IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE


Immigration is an important phenomenon for European countries. Today immigration is among the most significant issues facing EU member states. As patterns of migration flows are changing, it imposes the impact on socio-cultural, economic and political spheres. Simultaneously, laws of European countries are changing over the period of time. Therefore, in order to understand the recent immigration patterns, it is essential to know the changing nature and scale of migration over the past decades.

KEY TRENDS OF IMMIGRATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF EUROPE

There have been many phases in history of immigration to Europe. a) Immigration in 18th and 19th centuries: slavery was the part of migration, when slaves were forcefully transported. Later, European expansion by great powers like Britain, France, Netherlands and Spain etc. which came to an end with the anti-colonial movements towards the end of 19th and mid 20th century. b) The next crucial period for immigration was after the First World War (1914-1918) and Second World War (1939-1945), when labour was needed to strengthen the European economies. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 provided a high economic growth in Western Europe, by eliminating the chances of war. Moreover, European Economic Community (EEC) was created by the Treaty of Rome of 14 January 1958. According to this treaty, principle of free movement among the member states, particularly Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands came into force. Thus, this fostered the flow of people and goods from one country to another and at the same time enhancing the socio-economic ties among the Member states. c) In the 1950s and 1960s, France, Germany and United Kingdom, on one side, experienced significant labour immigration and on the other side, Ireland, Italy and Spain experienced emigration. During this period, Turkish immigrants came to work in Germany and North Africans in France and Belgium etc. In the late 1960s and 1970s, due to economic problems like the OPEC Oil Crisis of 1973, many

European governments put tighter restrictions on their immigration policies. However, these restrictions were imposed on labour migration, while immigration for family reunification was still being allowed. e) The fall of Berlin Wall (1989), disintegration of USSR (1991), the deepening and widening of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, all these factors contributed to the immigration to the Western and Northern European countries from Eastern and Southern European countries. Later during the Euro-debt crisis, immigration is mainly from Southern Europe to Northern Europe. The most important event was the signing of the Maastricht Treaty which led to the creation of European Union in 1992. It was a progressive attempt to control European migration flows. It aimed to create a common admission policy and reassessed the status of non-European citizens (Hargreaves 2007). They have also improved the legal status of its citizens and extended the voting rights in local and European elections to European immigrants. Thus, there was a shift from economics of migration to its politics in the EU. The European Union has been making Europe more attractive to foreigners by introducing anti-discrimination laws and at the same time demanding its member states to accept a common immigration policy. Moreover, in 1992 Treaty of Maastricht implemented the Schengen Agreement. Under this agreement, it was decided to have common European policy on the movement of foreigners where EU citizens are allowed to travel as well as to work in any other member state with the effect of opening of internal borders, thus changing the concept of French boundaries and the way in which the French government would approach future immigration policies (Giquel n.d.). Today, the Schengen area consists of 26 EU Member States, including 4 which are not members of the European Union (EU). Vladescu (2006) states that until the 1990s at the European level a common immigration policy was not created. However, the European Union allowed members to handle migration flows independently and therefore final decisions concerning immigration lay with members only, as they had their own immigration agenda.

Figure 2: Distribution of citizens from other EU countries and from non-EU countries, 2008



Source: EUROSTAT, 2009.

The Economic recession in the last couple of years had an important impact on migration. Immigration levels have slowed while emigration has increased in some EU countries. Ireland, Spain, Italy and the UK all registered falling net migration but still remained positive indicating that these countries continue to receive immigrants. Employers did not stop recruiting migrant workers altogether. There is still demand, especially for skilled migrant labour in certain sectors such as health and education in many EU countries.

‘Before the economic crisis hit the European economy in mid-2008, the population of foreign nationals in the EU-27 Member States grew by 9.5 million, from 4.5 per cent to 6.2 per cent of the total EU population between 2001 and 2008. As shown above in figure 2, the majority of the foreign citizens living in the EU are from non-EU states, although their share of the total EU foreign population declined from 66 per cent in 2001 to 63 per cent in 2008. In 2008, 37 per cent of the foreign citizens living in the EU-27 were citizens of other EU Member States. 75 per cent of all foreigners in the EU-27 live in five countries: Germany, Spain, the UK, France, and Italy’ (Koehler 2010: 12). There is some evidence that migrants from other EU countries emigrated in larger numbers than non-EU foreigners during the economic recession. In general, the employment situation of migrant workers (nationals of non-EU countries) deteriorated more rapidly than that of natives during the economic crisis. The main reasons for this

difference are firstly, large number of migrant workers (nationals of non-EU) is in construction, retail and hospitality sectors and secondly, EU migrants usually return to their home when they are jobless. More women than men in some EU countries immigrated during the economic crisis because of rising unemployment in male-dominated areas such as construction while female-dominated sectors like care work seek continuing demand. As far as data on 2009 remittances are available, remittance outflows seem to have declined in some EU countries during the crisis (Koehler 2010: 5). As unemployment among the general population increased and job competition became more fierce during the economic downturn, it was expected that public attitudes towards migration would become more negative compared to what they had been before the crisis, and that xenophobic and racist incidents would increase in this period. The case studies and the IOM survey, however, suggest that, in general, while public xenophobia remains high in many countries, it did not dramatically worsen between 2008 and 2009 (Koehler 2010: 23). Some of the EU Member States have introduced restrictions on family reunification and access of dependants to the labour market (Koehler 2010: 30).

Return policy: countries such as Spain and the Czech Republic have developed new voluntary return or “pay-to-go” schemes targeted at third country nationals which include various incentives to encourage return, though the response to such schemes has been varied (Koehler 2010: 23).

Integration and anti-discrimination policies: Integration policy has gained more importance after the signing and ratification of the Lisbon treaty. While there is some evidence that EU Member States have adjusted their integration policies in response to the crisis, they did not fundamentally change or even abandon certain policies. For example, language programmes within the framework of the Reception and Integration Contract in France were not affected by the crisis (IOM survey). The same scenario also seems to apply to anti-discrimination measures which some governments had initiated before and continued to implement during the economic crisis (Koehler 2010: 34)

Despite of severe economic crisis in Europe since 2008, most of the European Union states are still attractive for migration and foreign economic investments. For instance, western and southern Europe are far more attractive than other parts of the Europe in terms of job opportunities for migrants. Macyra (2012) says, “Trade is

increasingly dependent on people, not only goods crossing borders. The capacity for trade success in this century will be a factor of a country's openness and attractiveness to people from other countries. The strength of the European economy in the next decades will be dependent on its ability to attract people to cross borders.”

So far, it is clear from above analysis that immigration is always higher than emigration in the context of Western European countries. Generally because there are more number of pull rather than push factors. Let us first understand briefly about push and pull factors: International Organization for Migration (IOM) analyses migration in terms of the “push-pull model, on one side, push factors drive people to leave their country (due to economic, social, or political problems), on other side, the pull factors attract them to the country of destination.”¹⁹

Some examples of pull factors that we have mentioned while discussing history of immigration to Europe are during the World Wars, Western Europe was in the urgent need of work force leading to pro-immigration policies where immigrants were pulled by the economic factors. Moreover, despite of Euro-Debt crisis as mentioned above, Europe (especially Western and Northern Europe) is still been attracted as a continent of opportunities. Apart from the economic factors, immigrants in the form of refugees are attracted to Western European democracies like France who is supporting human rights since the French Revolution of 1789. The examples of human rights in France are: the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen, the abolition of monarchy, the separation of religion from the public sphere, the abolition of slavery, democracy, rule of law, Republican values, efficient social security structure, same-sex marriage and LGBT adoption etc. While, some of the push factors are rise of unemployment, economic recession or rise in inter-ethnic tensions in a host country, during this period migratory flow is halted or reversed. For instance, in 1970's worldwide OPEC oil crisis, Euro zone crisis since 2008.


¹⁹ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Push-pull-factors>

SECTION 3: HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE

For many centuries, immigration has been one of the most significant and persistent issue in France. It has a long history of immigration originated mainly from Europe and Africa. This is because of long tradition of recruiting foreign workers as well as legacy of colonialism of earlier centuries. Immigration to France has two main dimensions: one is an economic dimension, and other is a demographic dimension. The economic dimension uses immigrants as a workforce while demographic dimension boosts the French population. Overall, there has been a steady increase in immigration over the last century, and this has a strong impact on the nature of the French society. “Although immigration has been regarded as a success story in economic terms, but in the past three decades it has increasingly been perceived as the root of social problems” (Engler, n.d.) which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. To better understand the situation of immigration in France, we must now take a look at recent history of immigration to France.

“The use of the word ‘immigration’ to encompass what in many respects were post-migratory processes was symptomatic of the difficulties experienced by the French in coming to terms- both literally and ontologically- with the settlement of immigrant minorities, especially those originating in former colonies in Africa and elsewhere. In the English speaking world, such people are commonly referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘minority ethnic groups’ and large part of what in France is called ‘immigration’ is commonly known as ‘race relations’. Terms such as ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ were at that time almost completely rejected in France and are still largely eschewed. New buzz words such as ‘diversity’, ‘visible minorities’ and ‘equal opportunities’ have now made it possible to speak in a politically correct fashion by French standards about issues such as multiculturalism, ethnic minorities and anti-discrimination without directly using these words” (Hargreaves 1995: 1-2).

Figure 3: from 1850 to 1999, from Belgians to Chinese, 150 years of immigration to France



FIRST PHASE OF IMMIGRATION: FROM FRENCH REVOLUTION (1789) TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

From 1850's, France was concerned about in building its empire. After the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, the French empire continued to experience political instability until the end of Franco-Prussian war in 1871. But the industrial revolution had already begun and France faced labour shortages in order to operate machines. Industries began offering incentives for workers from other countries to move to France and run their factories. Further, due to the decline in birth rate in 19th century, immigrants were desperately needed in order to stabilise the French economy. The situation was later worsened by the decline in population due to the First World War 1914-18.




Figure 4: Foreigners as percentage of the total population of France, (1851-1999)
 Source: INSEE, 1992a: tables R2, R3; 2005: table 1.6).

In the above figure, between 1870 and 1880 began the first mass immigration in France, when foreign population rose to almost 3% in 1880s from 1% in 1851²⁰ and France became land of immigrants which was a “secondary destination” for European immigrants, after the United States of America (Barrach 2008: 25). The above figure remained fairly stable until 1918, then quickly doubled to more than 6% by the time of the 1931 census and finally saw a significant fall due to 1930’s economic depression (Hargreaves 2007: 16). During the First World War (1914-1918) Blaise Diaigne²¹ promised full French citizenship to Africans during a recruitment campaign as there was an immense need of soldiers (Barrach 2008: 26). Later devastation brought by First World War and rapid expansion of industry, *Société Générale de l’Immigration* (SGI) (General Immigration Society) was created in 1924 which recruited economic migrants and also political refugees (such as Italian, Armenians, Russians, Germans, Austrians, Czechoslovakians and Spanish) who arrived in France. As far as origin of immigrants are concerned, firstly immigrants originated mainly from European continent Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and thereafter Poland, Czechoslovakia, Portugal and Spain to meet the demand of French industries. This can be examined by the fact that French state signed labour recruitment agreements

²⁰ Census data on foreign population first collected in 1851.

²¹ Blaise Diaigne was a French political leader

with Italy (1904, 1906, 1919), Belgium (1906), Poland (1906) and Czechoslovakia (1920) (Engler: n.d.). Between 1911 and 1931, the number of Italians doubled (28 percent of the foreign population), Poles became the second largest group (17.5% of the total), Spanish taking third place and the Belgians the fourth (Fysh and Wolfreys 1998: 15). Belgians usually worked in the coal, steel and textile industries, Italians did unskilled jobs in south-eastern France and Spaniards worked as agricultural labours. In brief, since the mid-19th century, French immigration policy had two aims, first is to fulfil the needs of the labour market by introducing immigrant workers, and second is to balance French demographic deficits by favouring the incorporation of foreign families into French society.

SECOND PHASE OF IMMIGRATION: FROM 1930 TO 1970

At the commencement of the 1930s, France was the second most important immigrated country in the world after the U.S.A. The total number of foreigners in France in 1931 was over 400,000 i.e. 6.59 % of the population (see figure 4). But in 1936 the foreign population in France dropped to 5.34% of the total population. Hence, France launched the policy of mass naturalizations thanks to which 73,000 foreigners (mainly Italians) in 1939 and 43,000 foreigners in first half of 1940 obtained French citizenship. Moreover, at that time there were around 120,000 North Africans workers present in France and mostly were present in Paris region. French government was uncertain to tackle this new diverse population group from Africa (Fysh and Wolfreys (1998: 21-24). Furthermore, during the Second World War, France has called upon about 178,000 Africans and Madagascans, 320,000 *Maghrebians* to fight (Barrach 2008: 27). But it is pity that their role in liberation is no more remembered by the general public. Unlike European migrants many of whom settled permanently in France with their families, the majority of *maghrebians* came to France alone, worked there for years and then returned to their families in their country of origin (Hargreaves 2007). But after the Second World War, France first started limiting the immigration, as it was in no position to give up domestic jobs to foreign workers (foreign population reduced to 4.38 % in 1946 of total French population: see figure 4).

However, the French state had the mission to rebuild the economy. This was not at all possible without the help of foreign work force, which had a crucial role in overcoming the obstacles at the time of Industrial Revolution and First World War. Thus in order to reconstruct the post WWII economy and to increase population growth, France has decided to open again the doors to immigrants (colonial labour mainly from Algeria and foreign labour mainly from southern Europe -Italy, Spain and Portugal). To accommodate these needs, the government passed two very important ordinances in the autumn of 1945. According to Hargreaves (2007: 166), “the 1945 ordinance empowered the state to control the overall level of recruitment according to economic and demographic needs, but did not set out any formal ethnic preferences. However, in implementing these formal regulations, successive governments preferred as far as possible European rather than African or Asian immigrants.” This ordinance has also established a state run agency National Office of Immigration (ONI) in November 1945. According to Fysh and Wolfreys (1998: 31), “ONI coordinated selection, medical screening and the rationing of permits according to the predicted needs of each sector of activity, obliged the employers to share control of the recruitment process with representatives of the trade unions and the state-around.” It immediately opened recruiting offices in Italy while leaving other countries untouched. But Europeans mainly Italians were less attracted to France than expected.

It is worth noting that post-war years in France followed by “*trente glorieuses*” (“Glorious Thirty” period) referred to thirty years from 1945-1975 when the growth rates figures brought back to above 6% and nation rebuilding was high on agenda after hardships, huge loss of French life, and devastation brought about by the Second World War. During the period 1956 to 1973, there was a spectacular rise in communities of European immigrants all over France, one of the factors was the creation of The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 as mentioned above. By the mid-1950s, during the period of economic growth, France recruited primarily male workers from Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Russia. Simultaneously, immigration from the French former colonies accelerated due to the process of decolonization especially from Algeria which got independence in 1962. Between 1949 and 1955, 160,000 new European immigrants and 180,000 Algerians arrived in France. The fastest growing groups were *Maghrebians*. Their

share of the population rose from just 2 percent in 1946 to 39 % in 1982 (Hargreaves 2007: 20). Algerians were 212,000 in 1954 (their number rose to 800,000 in 1982), Moroccans were 33,000 in 1962 (by 1982 their number rose to 400,000) and Tunisians were 34,000 in 1962 (in the early 1980s the number touched to 200,000). Later we will see from the mid-1970s onwards, other non-Europeans mainly South East Asians, Turks and Sub-Saharan Africans immigrate to France in large numbers which will further diminish the share of Europeans (Barrach 2008). However, immigrants (especially *Maghrebians*) in France faced housing shortage, poor housing facilities and discrimination after the Second World War. The problems and issues faced by immigrants will be discussed in our fourth chapter. In 1958, The *Fonds d'Action Sociale* (Social Action Fund) a public agency was created. Initially it was designed for Algerians; soon after in 1964 it was extended to all immigrants (Hargreaves 2007: 166).

As mentioned earlier, another development in 1958 was the creation of European Economic Community (EEC) which increased the flow of immigrants from its European Member states. Moreover, there were several agreements signed under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s in France. On one hand, the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1961 has increased Spanish immigration and decreased Italian immigration. After the independence of Algeria from France with the signing of the Evian Agreement²² in 1962, a large number of pro-French Algerians moved to France. Hamilton et al. (2004) The Franco- Portuguese agreement of 1963 has created an increase in Portuguese immigration (Espinal 2012). Thus, by the end of the 1960s, there were about 600,000 Spanish immigrants; while by 1970, 700,000 Portuguese immigrants were there. In addition, many political refugees came to France during the period of Cold war (Barrach 2008: 28). Beginning in 1968, a series of measures such as restricting 'regularization' procedures and imposing quotas were taken to reduce inflows of non-European immigrants especially Algerians, and at the same time European immigration was encouraged (Hargreaves 2007: 167-210). In 1968, foreigners were 5.28 % of the total population of France as compared to 6.58% in 1931 (see figure 4).

²² accords between the government of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which was formed during the National Democratic Revolution in Algeria; Signed on Mar. 18, 1962

THIRD PHASE OF IMMIGRATION: FROM 1970 TO 2000

In 1969, Georges Pompidou was elected President (centre-right government). The late 1960s and early 1970s, one saw tremendous economic and social changes. On one side, Middle East war followed by worldwide OPEC oil crisis and international economic slowdown of 1973 affected the economic performance, and led to a long period of high unemployment (Hamilton et al. 2004). On the other side, concerning social changes, during the early 1970s rising Algerian population were often targeted of racial violence. For instance, anti-Algerian attacks took place in 1971. On 1st July 1972, Parliament passed the law prohibiting racial discrimination and incitement to racial violence (Hargreaves 2007: 169, 212). Later in 1974, under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in France, more strict immigration regulations were laid. He suspended all new immigration and decided to officially stop all labour migration programs 'zero immigration policy' as France no longer sustain the previous levels of immigration. Immigrants were asked to return to their countries of origin. In 1974, French government adopted 25-point package for tighter immigration control and improved social provisions (Hargreaves 2007: 212). Conversely, this leads to neither returning of immigrants to their home countries, nor decreasing in their number. The foreign population which was 5.28% in 1968 accelerated to 6.54% in 1975 (see Figure 4). The family reunification²³ which was ban in 1974, re-initiated in 1976 after the order of French Supreme court, resulted in an increase of number of immigrants (Reitsma 2007: 9). This reunification had a noteworthy impact on immigration flows- the feminisation of immigrant population. More women started immigrating than men. "They are coming from diverse regions like Sub-Saharan Africa- Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and Zaire, Balkans- Turks and Serbs in the 1980s, Indo-China and after the Cold War, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria to settle in France" (Barrach 2008: 28). Now France had a new challenge in front of her 'how to integrate socially and economically these ethnic immigrant groups.' Gradually, the conception that all immigrants are people of colour (Africans, Asians) and for those who come from Europe are known to be 'foreigners' reinforced among the public (Hargreaves 2007: 25). In addition, on 26 April 1977 Estaing's government created *aide au retour*

²³ European Commission defines family reunification: entry into and residence in an EU country by family members of a non-EU citizen residing lawfully in that EU country, whether the family relationship arose before or after the resident's entry. [http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary.do?language=7\\$en](http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary.do?language=7$en)

(repatriation assistance) which aimed at voluntary return of migrants to their country of origin by giving immigrants the financial incentive of 10,000 francs. This program was meant for North African immigrants, but the people who benefited most were the Portuguese and Spaniards. North-African population which were predominantly Muslim continued to rise. The main contributing factors to these were: its high birth rates, illegal entrants and family reunification. At this point of time, French government policy realised that it has to legitimise the Muslim population groups and try to integrate them into French society. Therefore, in 1975, an integration policy was established (Vladescu 2006). Throughout the 1980s, French immigrant policy underwent considerable changes. On 10 January 1980 rigid immigration law known to be Bonnet law²⁴ came into force under the presidency of Estaing which tightened the conditions to enter France, the rights of residence, and specified the conditions of deportation of illegal immigrants (Espinal 2012). Moreover, Bonnet law initiated a policy of foreigner selection while suspending family immigration (Barrach 2008: 28).

In 1981, Francois Mitterrand was elected the President of France who belongs to the French socialist party. He brought reforms in strict Bonnet law. On 29 May 1981, most expulsions halted. In August 1981 family reunification was made easier, foreigners were granted free right of association and aide au retour was finally abolished. But during the early 1980's, rise of le Front National (far-right French political party) started to fuel up anti-immigrants and racist sentiments among public realm. In 1984 two main events happened, firstly *Conseil National des Populations Immigrées* (CNPI) (Consultative Body on Immigrants and minority ethnic groups) was created and other was, ten year combined work and residence permit for most immigrants was approved by the parliament.

In 1986, government was changed and the centre-right government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac came into power. Charles Pasqua was appointed as a new Interior Minister and later, 'Pasqua' laws toughened entry and residence regulations for foreigners by implementing "zero immigration" policy. This policy was not easy to execute, as 60% of the entries were linked to family reunification which was later restricted in the same year (Barrach 2008: 29).


²⁴ Bonnet law named after Christian Bonnet (Interior minister of centre-right government of France)

In 1988, Francois Mitterrand was re-elected President. Michel Rocard became the new Socialist Prime Minister on 10 May 1988. In August 1989, Interior Minister of socialist party softened the 'Pasqua' laws. On 19 December 1989, *Haut Conseil a l'integration* (HCI) (High Council for Integration) was created which will be discussed in subsequent chapter (Hargreaves 2007: 216). In 1990s, there was a concern about overpopulation and restrictions on immigration, which resulted to forced deportation of immigrants to their country of origin (Reitsma 2007: 9). In 1993, centre-right wing government came to power in France. Under the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, Charles Pasqua was again appointed as an Interior Minister. The 'Pasqua' Laws in 1993 created a terrible situation for immigrants in France and faced several protests. These laws in effect made the immigrants and their families without French citizenship more susceptible to deportation by force hence creating humanitarian crisis. According to (Mung 2003), there was nothing new in these laws as they were just the continuation of projects initiated by the previous government.

In 1995, Jacques Chirac was elected the President of France of centre-right party. Alain Juppé was nominated as a Prime Minister of centre-right government while Jean Louis Debré appointed as an Interior Minister. On 26 March 1997, Debré reform of 'Pasqua' laws was passed by French parliament. But with the change of government in June 1997, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin of Socialist Party (Jean Pierre Chevènement as Interior Minister) withdrew many of the restrictive 'Pasqua' regulations and laws have been revised from 1997 onwards. The administrative deportations were stopped, while establishing the need for a court order for most evictions. In doing so, young *Maghrebians* who have spent most of their lives in France and who were most troubled by the Bonnet Act were protected from the deportation. In December 1997, parliament passed 'Chevènement' laws partially reversing 'Paqua' and 'Debre' laws.

On the contrary, Mung (2003) argues that after the socialist government came in power in 1997, 'Chevènement' laws have modified them slightly while keeping to the same original spirit. He further adds that "Pasqua laws are not only the result of internal development in France, but also the effect of recommendations made by the European authorities within the framework of the Schengen Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty."

Figure 5: Main nationality groups as percentage of France's foreign population, 1946-99



Source: INSEE 1992a: table R6; 2002a; table P6B.

Note: As defined by INSEE, Asians include Turks.

From the figure 5 given above, we have examined that in 1991 majority of immigrant population coming to France were Europeans 41.3%, followed by Africans (34.8% *Maghrebians* and other Africans 8.7%), Asians 12.5% and others 2.7%. Among Europeans, Portuguese outnumbered (13.3%), while Algerians (13.3%) and Moroccans (12.1%) from Africa who were predominantly Muslims. Moreover, from the figure 5, we have deduced that the percentage of foreigners of the total population of France in 1991 was 5.56 which immensely reduced from 6.54% in 1975. Another significant shift is in the continuous decline of the percentage of European immigrants from 88.7% in 1946 to 40.6% in 1990 despite of French government ceaseless efforts to foster European immigration to France. On the contrary, *Maghrebian* immigrant population consistently rose at higher rate from 2.3% in 1946 to 38.7% in 1990. However, from 1990's there was a slight increase in percentage of European migrants (probable reasons are influx of Europeans after the fall of Berlin wall and

disintegration of USSR; opening of European borders under Schengen Agreement) while *Maghrebian* population in France, for the first time in fifty years since 1946, fall to 34.8% (because of restrictive policies and regulations as discussed above).

FOURTH PHASE OF IMMIGRATION: FROM 2000 TO 2011

The Socialist government did not stay for a long period and the government changed in 2002. Moreover, Jacques Chirac was re-elected as the President of France in 2002. Since 2000, immigration was no longer a taboo in France. In the 2000s, new developments such as increased coordination on the European level, Islamist terrorism in politics, Europe's aging population and lack of workers had an important impact on the French immigration policy. For instance, 'in October 2000, Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry appealed to resume the immigration because of the shortage of 200,000 workers in the sectors of construction, catering and clothing in the Paris region. After this announcement, political class (except far Right wing party Le Front National) seemed to acknowledge the significance of immigration to France which was since long a taboo- "zero immigration" policy has then been discarded' (Mung 2003). Under the presidency of Jacques Chirac and prime ministership of J.P. Raffarin (centre right government), Nicolas Sarkozy as interior minister (2002- 30 March 2004) presented his immigration policy which (Mung 2003) writes that, "it consists of three main themes: a policy of accepted immigration, a project of renewed integration and a reworked campaign against discrimination". On 26 November 2003, law on immigration control, the residence of immigrants in France and nationality aims to ensure

"generous welcome of immigrants" and "to strengthen the fight against illegal immigrants." This law reformed in particular the "double penalty system" and made it a requirement to take account of immigrant's real integration into French society. The principal measures for combating illegal immigration include the creation of database of fingerprints and photographs of aliens applying for a residence permit or a visa and impose penalties for marriages and paternity of convenience." Law provides stricter regulations to combat illegal immigration and to regulate the admission and stay of foreigners in France" (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2007).²⁵

²⁵ http://www.ambafrance-eau.org/IMG/immigration_policy.pdf.

On 30 March 2004, Dominique de Villepin was appointed interior minister. On 31 May, 2005 he became the Prime Minister and Nicolas Sarkozy as an Interior Minister (Hargreaves, 2007). In November 2005 riots took place in the different Parisian suburbs, government declared state of emergency and thus it questioned the French immigrant integration model. Aftermath of these riots which shaken the French society, on 31 March 2006, New Equal Opportunities law and on 24 July 2006, law on immigration and integration came into force, which provides

“for selective immigration”, i.e. for the possibility of choosing labour to meet the needs of the French economy and welcoming aliens “ with an economic, scientific, cultural or humanitarian project”. This law also promotes the programmes for foreign students. Concerning private immigration, the law strengthens the fight against marriages of convenience and changes conditions for family reunification. Concerning integration, the law makes it a requirement to sign a “Reception and Integration Contract” (*Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration- CAI*) instituted under the 2005 Social Cohesion Plan. Finally, concerning regularization and the fight against illegal immigration, the law abolishes de facto regularization after ten years of illegal residence on French territory and combines the refusal of residence and deportation order into a single decision. The law also created a co-development savings account to enable persons from developing countries who are living in France and holders of a resident permit to save money by giving them a tax break when they invest this money in their countries of origin” (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2007).²⁶

The opening of *Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration* (Museum of the History of Immigration) in April 2007 in Paris helped to bring about a change in the public opinion vis-à-vis immigration while stressing its positive aspects. Since Nicolas Sarkozy elected President in 2007, the French immigration policy carried out by the *Ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire* (Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity development) which was created on 18 May 2007 for the tasks such as:

1. “Control the migration flows by fight against illegal immigration, frauds etc. and integrating legal immigrants. This control is based on three principles which are firstly, France has the right to choose who it wants and who it can accept within its borders. Secondly, foreign nationals arriving legally in France should have, in principle, the same economic and social rights as French citizens. Finally, other than in exceptional human situations, any foreign national in an illegal situation will be sent back to their country of origin, where possible voluntarily, or by force if necessary.

²⁶ http://www.ambafrance-eau.org/IMG/immigration_policy.pdf.

2. Facilitate the legal immigrant's social and professional integration (school, accommodation and culture).
3. Promote the French national identity i.e. historical heritage and the future of national community. There is inter-connectedness between immigration, integration and national identity. Immigrants who respect the French republican values are the key to successful integration.
4. Encourage the solidarity development in the countries of origin²⁷

According to Brice Hortefeux (Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity development),

“France is a state of law and in a state of law everyone must comply with the rules. We require them to respect our republican principles and learn the French language. However, while foreign nationals have duties, the state also has duties towards them. That's why we are working to improve access for legal immigrants to housing, education and work.”²⁸

Another important law which came in to force on 20 November 2007 was Law 2007-1637 on immigration control, integration and asylum which aims

“to fight illegal immigration, limit entry and residence requirements in France, control family integration and encourage immigration for professional reasons. As regards family immigration, the law added four principles to the existing system. The Future immigrant must have a certain level of income, which will be laid down by law, to be considered eligible for family reunification; pass a test on the French language level and values of the Republic, or if not, have had enough training to be able to join his/her family in France; ensure the integration of his or her children under the “Reception and Integration Contract for Families”; undergo genetic testing (DNA test) for citizens of countries where there are serious doubts as to whether birth and marriage certificates are authentic, for foreign applicants for family reunification, on a trial basis for 18 months” (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2007).²⁹

Since 2008, as we have already discussed that France has been severely affected by Euro zone crisis. This has resulted in the implementation of strict immigration policies in France. For instance, as per International Labour Organisation (ILO), the average unemployment rate in metropolitan France and overseas departments stood was 10.6% of the active population in the fourth quarter of 2012. In metropolitan

²⁷ <http://www.readbag.com/immigration-gouv-fr-img-pdf-plaquette-iminidco-en>.

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ http://www.ambafrance-eau.org/IMG/immigration_policy.pdf.

France, 10.2% of the active population was unemployed (INSEE 2012). OECD report *International Migration Outlook 2012* mentions some of the significant changes in French policy of immigration and integration as follows:

“The worsening employment situation led the government to set an objective of reduced immigration for employment, except for temporary and seasonal workers, the highly qualified and intra-corporate transfers. In light of that objective, the government issued instructions to the prefectures on 31 May 2011, indicating strict controls when evaluating applications for work permits, especially for status changes, less qualified employment, and from students offered their first job. A new set of instructions issued on 12 January 2012 loosened the criteria for issuing work permits to students who have successfully completed at least a masters-level degree programme. Expulsion orders issued to students under the previous instructions were suspended pending re-examination of their applications. A new immigration law was adopted on 16 June 2011, transposing three European directives into French law (the so-called “**Return Directive**”, the **European Blue Card Directive** and the directive providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals). In addition, the new law directly conditions stay and acquisition of nationality on respect of the Reception and Integration Contract. The residence requirement for naturalisation may be reduced to two years for those who clearly meet the criterion of assimilation. A “**Charter of Rights and Duties of the French Citizen**” must be signed at the moment of naturalisation. Some of the rules for acquiring a residence permit, especially the temporary permit of stay for health reasons, have been made stricter. On 11 August 2011, the list of shortage occupations applied to those outside of the free movement zone was cut back, from 30 to 14 occupations. A single list, which provides exemption from the labour market test, is valid for all of France (OECD 2012: 230).”

In order to know about the current political scenario about immigration and immigrant integration in France, let us analyse 2012 Presidential Debate³⁰ between Francois Hollande (current President of France) of French Socialist Party and Nicolas Sarkozy (former President of France) of Centre Right government.

According to Nicolas Sarkozy (who was responsible for immigration for the last ten years earlier as being the Interior Minister (2002 to 2004; 2005 to 2007) and later President of France from 2007 to 2012)

“wants to reduce the flow of immigrants to France. In his opinion, the annual migration flow today is 180,000 on average, and wishes to reduce it to 90,000 in the next five years. He insists that though France is an open country,

³⁰ Politiques Publiques : Le magazine de l'intérêt général et des affaires publiques.

immigrants are always welcome here but today too much of immigration has paralysed the French system of integration. He highlighted that there are not enough jobs, schools and housing facilities. He even proposed, for family reunification, French language and values test, given before entering the territory. As far as immigrant's right to vote in municipal elections is concerned, he condemns it. As in the present scenario of France, there are extensively rising communal tensions, Muslim radicalization and thus it is irresponsible to propose a communal vote and a community vote in municipal elections in which there are more participants than in presidential elections. When asked, why he assumes non-Europeans as Muslims? He replied that on one side, Europeans citizenship is a political project, where Europeans can vote in France; on the other hand, voting rights to immigrants, in the French context, means right given to immigrants from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (Muslims, Blacks who are responsible for communal violence) who are the dominant part of immigrant's composition. Once given right, they may demand separate public amenities like hospitals, schools, canteens etc. for men and women. France has always made considerable efforts to treat everyone with equal rights and duties and Republican values that's why Islamic headscarf is banned on this soil."³¹

While, according to Francois Hollande (current President of France),

“France, on one hand, must limit its economic migration because of the current economic depression which has resulted in unemployment, low growth; on the other hand, France must encourage student migration. As far as family reunification is concerned, a sort of minimum level of income and fluency of French language must be the criteria. For municipal elections, he believes that it is the right of immigrants to vote as they are paying local taxes. It even happens in most European countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. He added that there are immigrants and their descendents (who are born on French soil and are French citizens) from the *Maghreb* who have been here for years, which can be Muslim or not, practicing or not, and may not necessarily make community pressure once they have the right to vote. So, why they don't have the right to vote?”³²

From the table 2 below, it is clear that in the 21st century, the top four immigrant population groups in France are from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mali. When analysed meticulously, the striking feature came out is that these are all Islamic countries and their demographic number in France is constantly rising. It is important to note that most of the immigrants coming to France are Muslims. In our subsequent chapter, we will see how this community face lot of challenges in the French and

³¹ http://www.politiques-publiques.com/IMG/pdf/debat_complet_2_mai_2012.pdf.

³² http://www.politiques-publiques.com/IMG/pdf/debat_complet_2_mai_2012.pdf.

European society and in return how Muslims are considered to be a threat to national and European security. As Current demographic composition of Europe shows that there are estimated 72.1 million international migrants in 2010 in Europe (UN DESA 2010). In totality, these international migrants make up 8.7 percent of Europe's population. Countries with the most migrants are Russian Federation 12.3 million, Germany 10.8 million, United Kingdom 6.4 million, France 6.6 million (10.7 per cent of the population) and estimated number of refugees in Europe at the end of 2010 is 1.6 million. European Countries hosting the most refugees are Germany (594,000), United Kingdom (238,000), and France (201,000). As far as gender ratio is concerned, around half i.e. 52.4 percent of the international migrants in Europe are women. There were estimated 1.6 million refugees in Europe at the end of 2010 (UNHCR 2010). Despite the economic crisis, net migration remains positive in the major migrant destination countries.

Table 2: inflow of foreign population by nationality

	Thousands											Of which: Women 2010 (%)
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Algeria	12.4	15.0	23.4	28.5	27.9	24.8	25.4	23.1	22.3	20.0	19.1	..
Morocco	17.4	19.1	21.8	22.6	22.2	20.0	19.2	17.9	19.2	15.5	18.0	..
Tunisia	5.6	6.6	7.8	9.4	8.9	8.0	8.2	7.8	7.9	7.5	9.5	..
Turkey	6.6	6.9	8.5	8.6	9.1	8.9	8.3	7.6	7.7	6.2	5.6	..
Mali	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.9	2.8	4.6	5.8	5.0	..
Haiti	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.3	4.7	..
China	1.8	2.9	1.9	2.4	2.9	2.8	4.3	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.6	..
Senegal	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.1	3.2	3.8	..
Cameroun	1.8	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.1	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.6	..
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1.1	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.4	1.8	2.0	2.4	3.4	3.5	..
Côte d'Ivoire	1.8	2.2	2.8	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	..
Russian Federation	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.3	3.0	2.9	3.2	..
Romania	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.4	3.7	2.5	2.7	..
United States	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.7	..
Sri Lanka	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.4	..
Other countries	31.8	37.1	39.4	40.7	43.6	44.0	43.7	43.1	44.1	41.0	44.3	..
Total	91.9	106.9	124.2	136.4	141.6	135.9	135.1	128.9	136.0	126.2	136.8	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1781/888932617512>

CONCLUSION:

To conclude, it is evident that immigration is a product of globalisation and this cannot be avoided. Since many ages, it has been observed that immigration tends to move from East to West, South to North and here, Europe is not the exception. Europe and France has always encourage the phenomenon of immigration firstly to sustain their economies- need of labour force, and secondly, to maintain the demographic growth rate. There has been a steady flow of immigrants in Western Europe after the Second World War, later it was accelerated during the process the decolonisation when many immigrants from ex-colonies immigrated to the Western European countries like France, Britain, Germany, Netherlands etc. but at times during the crisis, European nations tends to close their economies and restrict immigration. As far as France is concerned, France has seen the influx of immigrants since many centuries on its soil. Initially, Europeans coming from Italy, Spain, Poland, Belgium etc. to France and later their proportion reduced after the decolonization, many immigrants from ex-colonies started immigrating as an economic work force to France. Immigrants and their descendents coming from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Africa and South East Asia were diverse in terms of religion, skin colour, language, ethnicity as compared to the European immigrants which shared the same civilisation. Thus, from the historical patterns and flows studied in this chapter, we can conclude that today's French society is multicultural and cultural diversity is its present reality.

CHAPTER THREE:
FRENCH MODEL OF INTEGRATION:
ASSIMILATION

INTRODUCTION:

In the previous chapter, we have analysed that immigration is never ending and unavoidable phenomenon, crucial for global economy. Europe too can't escape from this reality. Immigration to Europe is essential to sustain its economy and to maintain the demographic growth rate in Europe. We have also discussed in details about the history of immigration to France. It can be deduced that France is the country of immigration since 19th century and because of the influx of immigrants from European and non-European background, it is now multicultural in nature. One must understand that immigrants are not simply economic workers, but also bearers of the cultural baggage which they bring along with them. This creates cultural diversity, which fosters European diversity at larger level in terms of people, languages, religion, culture, traditions etc. As said by Max Frisch (Swiss novelist), 'we asked for workers and we got the people.' This multiculturalism must be understood in terms of diverse demographic composition in the French society, not in the terms of multicultural policies as France always follows its Republican assimilationist model of immigrant integration. Today, most of the immigrants coming to France are from North-Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa who are predominantly Muslims and Blacks, at the same time new waves of immigrants coming from Asia (India, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh etc.). Before analysing the nature, intent and content of this French model, we primarily need to understand few concepts such as Universalism and *laïcité* which form the core of the policies and the different models of immigrant integration in Europe like multiculturalism, assimilation, social cohesion so that we can easily relate the particularities of each model. This chapter is divided into three sections: first section conceptualises different notions of French national identity. Second section talks about different models of immigrant integration in Europe, while the third section analyse the policy of immigrant integration in France-assimilation.

SECTION 1: CONCEPTUALISING NOTIONS OF FRENCH NATIONAL IDENTITY

“As far as France is concerned, its national identity is based on a philosophy of universalism. In addition, France is a Republic which organizes the separation between public and private spheres (through a strict colour blind approach to ethnicity and race) and between the state and the church (notion of

French secularism— *laïcité*). By contrast, in Britain and the Netherlands, different idealistic structures are viewed as enabling people to mobilize on the basis of ethnic or racial identities, whereas integration policies aim at promoting group-based identities instead of a common citizenship” (Bertossi 2011: 1562)

PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALISM

Idea of assimilationist approach to integration in France is embedded in the historical concept of Universalism. Schor (2001) defines French universalism as “the converse of particularism—ethnic, religious, national. It is grounded in the belief that rational human nature is universal, impervious to cultural and historical differences. Trans-cultural, trans-historical human nature was posited as identical, beyond particularisms” (Schor 2001 quoted in Webster 2007: 8). It is one of the key elements of French political thought which assumes that human beings are same everywhere in the world. Everyone must be treated as an equal and universal person regardless of his/her origins, religion, caste, creed, sex, and race. French universalism is an output of the 18th century enlightenment movement and 1789 French revolution. It is based on the Republican values which are universal in nature like human liberty, equality, fraternity, reason etc. and are always deemed to be superior to one’s specific culture, language, ethnicity etc. So since than in France, universal values are strongly encourage. In order that universalism works properly, it is essential that public sphere must be neutral i.e. citizens despite of being different in cultural, religious or ethnic terms must ready to share same core values and equal rights in public space while private space is meant for exercising their personal beliefs and religion. Thus, French citizenship is clearly based on Universalism notion which clearly dictates secular rights and duties of citizens.

Another aspect of universalism is one need not required to be tolerant because if immigrants are able to maintain their cultural differences and personal beliefs only in private spheres, then in that case there will be no conflicts and hence social cohesion, unity and peace will prevail in the ‘neutral French society’. Moreover, “universalism is not so much a matter of excluding the ‘Other’, but of including it to the extent that one renders it like oneself” (Schor 2001 quoted in Webster 2007: 8). But is ‘Frenchness’ universal? As French identity, French language, French culture are the symbols which foster nothing but French national identity, and hence the idea of

universalism is a paradox on its ground that French try to maintain neutrality and homogenise immigrant's culture so that they can emphasise on their culture. Perhaps that is the reason of their incapability to understand 'others' religion, culture and distinctiveness, especially in the case of North African immigrants, who practice different religion and have different culture.

LAICITE: FRENCH SECULARISM

« La république assure la liberté de conscience. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. Chacun est libre de croire, de ne pas croire, de changer de religion. La république garantit le libre exercice de cultes mais n'en reconnaît, n'en salarie ni n'en subventionne aucun. L'état et les religions sont séparés » (Charte des droits *et des devoirs* du citoyen français)³³

(The Republic guarantees freedom of conscience. It respects all the beliefs. Everyone is free to believe, not to believe, to change religion. The Republic guarantees the free exercise of worship, but not recognized nor subsidizes any. The state and religion are separated) (Charter of Rights and Duties of French Citizen)³⁴.

Another pertinent notion of French national identity is *laïcité* or French secularism. As we have already mentioned above that secularism is closely interrelated to French universalism. Secularism helps to ensure the equality in the public realm vis-à-vis religion: by removing all religious symbols and references from public institutions, by allowing people to practice their religion or faith in private, and by enforcing French republican values. The reason behind why the French or Europeans are very particular about secularism is that since the 18th century, existence of God and culture of religious community of all faiths were challenged by the rational foundations of Western Modernity under the Enlightenment movement. They did their long struggle to minimize the church dominant role and separate it from the state affairs as they have faced religious wars for so many centuries. It has been observed that Christianity as religion is far more compatible with French or European secularism than other religions like Islam or Sikhism as they require public rituals and demonstration of symbols of faith in public sphere. Custom of men with beard and women in veil for

³³ http://circulaire.legifrance.gouv.fr/pdf/2012/10/cir_35947.pdf

³⁴ English translation of above

Muslims and turban and beard for Sikhs are some of the visible religious symbols which are for Europeans, exotic and barbarous in nature (see appendix 1.5). If we talk about cuisine: for French wine and pork are something from which they can't distant themselves, similarly, alcohol and pork are prohibited in Islam, and they prefer *halal* meat. Here it is significant to draw attention towards the remarks of Joppke (2012) according to him, "religion is exclusive: one cannot adhere to more than one religion at one time. In addition, it comes with a moral script that bears no compromise. Just because religion is so tightly connected, its practice is strongly protected in terms of individual rights to liberty in liberal-state constitutions" Jopkpe (2012: 5). But it seems that French or European constitutions are incompatible with this notion due to their historical legacy.

Moreover, secularism as a principle has been a key part of French state education system. The idea is to up bring secular children right from the first stage by providing secular education while incorporating them into French society and maintain neutrality of the state with respect to religion. State schools have always been considered as key site of integration which must inspire a sense of national belonging and shared civic values. They aim to separate individuals from their particular community and to assimilate them to the majority group i.e. French nation (Freedman: 2004). As Brubaker (1992: 11) argues, "the political, assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France was reinforced in the late 19th century by the internal *mission civilisatrice* (civilising mission) carried out by the Third Republic's army of school teachers- the institutors, whose mission was to *institute* the nation." This secularism in education was re-strengthened by the formal separation between church and the state, public affairs and private affairs, in particular "the Republic does not recognize, pay or subsidise any religion, the freedom of exercise of religion in private or within the walls of buildings only, tolerance to any form of religious practice that does not affect the public order, freedom and integrity is the rule and further state neutrality is implemented in the religious matters" (Law of 9 December 1905 as quoted in Espinal 2012).

It has been argued that French secularism is not neutral; it is not simply a separation of church and state, or division between public and private. For example, French calendar includes national and religious holidays associated to French heritage and religion (as shown below). Is this a neutral secular state or it is just demanding on the

behalf of the immigrants ethnic groups to dissociate themselves from all the cultural particularities from the public space? Bader (1997) writes that “no society can therefore totally avoid being biased against some of the practices of, and thus discriminating against, its cultural minorities” (Bader quoted in Webster 2007: 13). Though it is true that some kind of collective identity is definitely required for social cohesion in the French society, that identity in practice is not ‘universal’ but it is a ‘French national identity’.

French Holiday Calendar- 2013		
Month	Day	Holiday
January	Tuesday	New Year's Day
01		
March 31	Sunday	Easter
April 01	Monday	Easter Monday
May 01	Wednesday	Labour Day
May 08	Wednesday	V-E Day
May 09	Thursday	Ascension Day
May 19	Sunday	Pentecost
May 20	Monday	Whit Monday
July 14	Sunday	Bastille Day
August 15	Thursday	Assumption of Mary
November	Friday	All Saints Day
01		
November	Monday	Armistice Day
11		
December	Wednesday	Christmas Day
25		


PANORAMA OF RELIGION IN FRANCE:

Immigration as a global phenomenon has changed the religious landscape in France. Before the rise of Islam in France, the Catholicism of the Italian and Polish immigrants who arrived between the two World Wars and the Judaism of the Jewish communities of North America could be seen. Today, after Catholicism which is the principal religion of France with 11.5 million people aged 18-50 reporting being Catholic (43% of the population), Islam is the second religion as well as the largest minority religion in France with 2.1 million followers, followed by Protestantism (500,000 Protestants), Judaism (125,000 Jews) and Buddhism (150,000 Buddhists) as minority religions. But the question arises is that how the religiosity of immigrants is evolving and does it differ from that of the mainstream population? (Simon et al 2010)

- **Religions and denominations:**

As shown below in figure 6, in the population aged 18-50 residing in metropolitan France, nearly 45% of individuals claim to be agnostic or atheist. The highest proportion of religious detachment can be seen among the French mainstream population, Spanish immigrants, Italian immigrants and descendants of Southeast Asian immigrants. More than three quarters of immigrants and their descendants reported having a religion (Simon et al 2010: 121). Most groups had a dominant religion. Southern European immigrants and their descendants are Catholic, majority of North-African immigrants are Muslim. Most immigrants from Southeast Asia are either Catholic or Buddhist (Simon et al 2010: 122).

Figure 6: Religious denominations (including no religion) by origin and link to migration.



- **Religiosity:**

Table 2 - Importance of religion by denomination				
	Little or no importance	Strong or moderate importance	Total	Unweighted numbers
Catholic	76	24	100	6,301
Orthodox Christian	52	48	100	214
Protestant	53	47	100	456
Muslim	22	78	100	5,046
Jewish	24	76	100	143
Buddhist				

Source - Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.
Population - Persons aged 18-50 who reported having a religion.
Interpretation - For 76% of persons who reported being Catholics, religion has little or no importance in their life, and for 24% it has a strong or moderate importance.

Religiosity varies significantly according to origin. For instance, on one side European and Southeast Asian immigrants and their descendants have contributed to the secularisation of France (reporting relatively low religiosity), on the other side, religion is still important for North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants and their descendants. In other words, level of religiosity of those who have Muslim or Jewish faith, have not changed despite being born and socialized in France this is because of the importance placed on religion by parents (Simon et al 2010: 124). On one hand, we can see the mainstream population and descendants of mixed parentage give little importance to religion (75% and 66% respectively) while on the other hand, two thirds among immigrants and descendants of two immigrant parents stated that religion played an important role in their lives. The clearest difference was between Catholics (76% of whom reported that religion was not important) and Muslims and Jews (who reported in equal proportions that religion was important) as shown in above table 3. Gender wise, women reported greater religiosity than men.

- **Transmission:**

Religion before becoming a personal choice is generally transmitted by parents to their children. When growing up in a religious family, this leads to the formation of religious sentiment and hence transmission took place.

Table 4: importance of religion by sex and origin (%)

	Males	Females	Overall	Unweighted numbers
Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns				
DOM	50	63	58	410
Algeria	72	82	77	565
Morocco and Tunisia	72	82	77	817
Sahelian Africa	77	89	84	507
West and Central Africa	76	78	77	548
Southeast Asia	50	59	55	343
Turkey	67	79	73	634
Portugal	38	51	45	451
Spain and Italy	29	30	30	144
Other EU-27 countries	33	41	38	364
Other countries	61	66	64	774
All immigrants	62	70	66	5,127
Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns				
DOM	43	49	46	414
Algeria	71	75	73	825
Morocco and Tunisia	71	81	77	864
Sahelian Africa	90	85	88	392
West and Central Africa	67	61	64	242
Southeast Asia	49	45	47	251
Turkey	71	76	73	390
Portugal	30	44	37	617
Spain and Italy	24	27	26	868
Other EU-27 countries	22	31	26	372
Other countries	51	53	52	333
All descendants of immigrants	49	57	53	5,324
Mainstream population	20	27	24	1,635
All metropolitan population	31	38	34	12,910

Source : Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO) INED-INSEE 2008
Population : Persons aged 18-50 who reported having a religion
Interpretation : For 73% of male immigrants and 82% of female immigrants from Algeria who reported having a religion, this religion has a strong or moderate importance in their lives.

As shown in above table, there is a decrease in religious intensity from one generation to the other, for example people growing up in Buddhists, Christians families more frequently give up their religion than those who grew up in a Muslim family. The startling fact is that just over one quarter of 18-50 year-olds, living in metropolitan France, have become secularized and feel less attached to religion than their parents, while two thirds are in continuity with their family's religious attachment, and nearly 7% participate more in religion than the previous generation. French have been becoming less and less religious over time; on the contrary France's Muslims regularly practice their religion.

SECTION 2: CONCEPTUALISING DIFFERENT MODELS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Amidst the diversity and multiculturalism, the French identity in fact is wrapped up with French values. Now, after we have discussed essence of French Republican identity in the terms of Universalism and *laïcité*, let us focus on different models of immigrant social integration. Though there are different models of immigrants' integration but dominant models of incorporation of immigrants are Multiculturalism and Assimilation. Garcia (2010) argues that immigrants are incorporated into host societies based on historical (colonial history), demographic, political (emergence of nation-states), and social particularities (citizenship norms) of country. The European Commission considers that it is essential to facilitate the "successful integration of third country nationals to maintain economic and social cohesion." To implement rights-based policies, an understanding of their necessity and benefits must be generated at national level. Political leaders need to create the environment necessary for the acceptance of diversity within which integration policies must be anchored (Rudiger and Spencer 2003: 9). However, under European Union policy framework, there is no shared definition of integration and further, there is a lack of coordination and coherency in the immigrant integration policy at both the levels: European as well as national.

Bertossi (2011: 1562) writes national model of integration and citizenship is usually defined as, "a public philosophy, a policy paradigm, an institutional and discursive opportunity structure, or a national cultural idiom. All these concepts attempt to show how social reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation's self understanding." According to this definition, France is considered as an assimilationist country, Britain and Netherlands are multiculturalist countries, while Germany is segregationist which is based on ethno-cultural national identity.

Moreover, Bertossi (2011) explains that,

"analytical ideal types of French Republicanism or British and Dutch multiculturalism are akin to political stereotypes, commonly held in public and political debates in each country; Research on the integration of immigrants in Europe has turned into discussions about the success and failure of traditional integration policies on one hand, and on the legitimacy of claims made by ethnic minorities on the other, particularly when these claims are made by Muslims; the notion of an integration and citizenship model has a totalizing

tendency: It tends to bundle together social, institutional, and political facets of citizenship and the integration of migrants, treating these different aspects as a “cultural totality” even when scholarly discussions of models are nuanced. For instance, scholars commonly point to the contradictions, inconsistencies, and limits of the republican model in France or of multiculturalism in the Netherlands and Britain” (Bertossi 2011: 1563)

INTEGRATION:

The Global Commission on International Migration considered integration to be “a long term and a multi-dimensional process, requiring a commitment on the part of both immigrants and non-migrants members of the society to respect and adapt each other, thereby enabling them to interact in a positive and peaceful manner” (Migration in an Interconnected World: GCIM 2005 quoted in Koser 2007: 24). This mutual commitment is absent in the French immigrant integration model.

While according to one of the OECD reports, integration is defined as “there are many definitions of integration vis-à-vis migration, as it varies from nation to nation. In the broadest sense, integration means the process by which people who are relatively new to country (i.e. whose roots do not reach deeper than two or three generations) became the part of the society” (Rudiger and Spencer 2003).

According to the European Migration Network (EMN), integration is a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.”³⁵

High Council of Integration (HCI 1993) defines

“Integration is a way to obtain the active participation to society as a whole of all women and men who are lastingly going to live on our land while overtly accepting that specific, mostly cultural, features will be preserved and nevertheless insisting on the similarities and the convergence, with equal rights and duties for all in order to preserve the cohesion of our social fabric. [...] Integration considers that differences are a part of a common project unlike either assimilation which aims at suppressing differences, or indeed insertion which establishes that their perpetuation is a guarantee for protection” (HCI quoted in Pala and Simon 2005).

³⁵ <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTerm.do?startingWith=I&id=154>

Gallagher (2003) proposes that, “the degree of social integration and socio-economic mobility of immigrants is generally assessed by looking at a variety of variables, including the following:

—**Linguistic Integration:** Language used in public interactions, competency in the new language, language used at home, language used among family members.

—**Labour Market Integration:** Education level, labour force participation of men and women, unemployment rate, socio-professional mobility, individual or household income.

—**Civic/Political Integration:** Participation in political parties, unions, neighbourhood associations, religious institutions and/or community groups.

—**Educational Integration:** School performance, school drop-out rates, choice of school, post-secondary education attainment, parent-teacher communication.

—**Residential Integration:** Degree of residential concentration/ segregation, residential mobility, homeownership rates, dwelling size/crowding, discrimination in rental markets” Gallagher (2003: 34-35).

MULTICULTURALISM:

Multiculturalism is a phenomenon in which multiple cultures coexist in a given society and influence each other. It celebrates cultural diversity which includes the symbols of identity such as caste, race, religion, ethnicity, language etc. In this age of globalization, contemporary societies are multicultural in nature.

Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology (1991) defines multiculturalism as “the acknowledgement and promotion of cultural pluralism as the feature of many societies (.....) Multiculturalism celebrates and seeks to promote cultural variety, for example minority languages. At the same time it focuses on the unequal relationship of minority to mainstream cultures (quoted in Wiewiorka 1998: 881).

“putting people into ethnic boxes”, multiculturalism is a “fusion in which a culture borrows bits of others and creatively transforms both itself and them”- (Bhikhu Parekh quoted in BBC News Magazine³⁶)

“Multiculturalism has many meanings, but the minimum is the need to politically identify groups, typically by ethnicity, and to work to remove stigmatisation, exclusion and domination in relation to such groups”- (Tariq Modood quoted in BBC News Magazine³⁷)

³⁶ BBC News Magazine 2011, URL : <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12381027>

³⁷ ibid

According to the OECD,

“This approach to integration, guided by the principles of reciprocity, equality, diversity and cohesion is compatible with a multicultural understanding of the functioning of modern democracies. While over the course of the 1990s some EU Member States had explicitly adopted the concept of multiculturalism to understand relations between population groups within their country, over the past couple of years, and especially since 11 September 2001, an emphasis on loyalty to a particular national identity has returned. This retreat from the fragile multicultural terrain is linked to concerns about economic and military security, which the idea of a single collective identity is seen to assuage.

Throughout Europe the ongoing harmonisation and reform of migration policies has been influenced by this new scepticism about multicultural approaches. Multiculturalism entails the recognition of an ever-present cultural plurality in modern societies and the regulation of this plurality through the principle of equality. This is the most important thought to mean that cultural groups should be able to exercise their cultural and religious rights while being protected from discrimination. It is crucial to understand, though, that these ‘groups’ are not totalities of fixed, clearly delineated identity, which compete with each other and produce social divisions along cultural lines. These are the fears of policymakers who see multiculturalism as an enemy of social cohesion, and feel vindicated by conflicts between communities. Rather a multicultural approach recognises the plurality and diversity exist only between but within such groups and communities.

Multicultural integration policies support neither the crossing of boundaries from one culture to another, as do assimilation policies, nor the preservation of those boundaries, as does the segregation, but aim to foster their permeability. By facilitating participation of all groups in all social, economic and political spheres, such policies encourage the continual development and cross-fertilisation of cultures and identities and can therefore help overcome divisions and segregations” (Rudiger and Spencer 2003: 7)

According to (Koser 2007: 24), multiculturalism refers to “the development of immigrant populations into ethnic communities that remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture, and social behaviour.” Australia, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA all follow variation of these models.

While, Garcia 2010: 254) sees multiculturalist or pluralist model based on the respect for and protection of cultural diversity within a framework of shared belonging and the acknowledgment and protection of cultural diversity.

SOCIAL COHESION:

OECD defines social cohesion as,

“The role of social interaction is crucial in the process of integration. It is through social contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social space. This is one of the reasons why racism and xenophobia are major obstacles to any integration effort, as they produce a context of insecurity, isolation and hostility. These effects can also appear when overt racism is replaced by indirect discrimination, which pushes migrants and ethnic minorities to the margins of the society. In such situations, social disintegration occurs, which pushes migrants and ethnic minorities to the margins of the society. In such situations social disintegration occurs, with interaction non-existent. The opposite of this negative state is one in which interaction among the people, and between people and institutions, is constructive and respect for differences. This can foster integration and lead to a cohesive society.

Social cohesion does not require communities to merge into a homogeneous entity populated by individualists, devoid of differences and governed by a set of hegemonic norms. On the contrary, cohesion can be achieved in a pluralist society through the interaction of different communities that build a bond through the recognition of both difference and interdependence. Multi dimensional notions of identity, multiple senses of belonging and attachment often add self confidence and thus stability to social networks. Far from hampering the process of integration, they can add a layer of respect and recognition to social interaction, thus deepening the cohesion of communities” (Rudiger and Spencer 2003: 6).

ASSIMILATION:

International Organization for Migration (IOM) describes assimilation as – “Adaptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour or even fundamental vital interests. Although the traditional cultural practices of the group are unlikely to be completely abandoned, on the whole assimilation will lead one group to be socially indistinguishable from other members of the society. Assimilation is the most extreme form of acculturation.”³⁸ Assimilation is often related to French model of integration.

³⁸ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Assimilation>.

According to the OECD

“In many European countries, the integration of migrants means their assimilation to a pre-existing unified social order, with a homogeneous culture and set of values. It is perceived as a one-way process, placing the onus for change solely on migrants. They are expected to undergo a unilateral process of change, particularly in the public sphere, so that they can fit into a given order. As differences cannot be tolerated, they are required to disappear.

A migrant’s racial origin may make complete assimilation impossible, if a residual difference will always be visible. Religious beliefs entail specific practices and symbols which cannot be entirely contained in the private sphere. But even if such remaining differences could be accommodated, it remains unclear how migrants could identify what exactly they should assimilate to. They should choose between assimilating to working class culture, metropolitan lifestyles or, in some areas, to pre-existing minority communities.

There is in fact no monolithic culture or social order to assimilate to, as democratic societies contain many different lifestyles, values and institutional processes, which are constantly changing. The conformity applied by assimilation is spurious, as it is not shared by the wider society. This means that there can be no fixed point of integration and no set trajectory for integration processes. In many societies, however, social and political pressures to assimilate persist...The forced concealment of differences can lead to their accentuation.

There is the model of political assimilation of individuals into a national unity based on substantive values and rights which are binding for all. Through citizenship, the individual enters into a relation with the state, which cannot be mediated by groups, thus ruling out any ethnic, religious or cultural belonging which exceeds the immediate private sphere. This model best describes the republican approach pursued by France. France does not officially recognise ethnic minorities as groups with distinct needs and rights which state action would have to take into account. There are no policy relevant differences between individuals once they have become French citizens. The identity of the individual is determined by the national political order, not by their racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds. The emergence of minority groups or group interests would constitute a failure of integration. In practice, this means that France has been reluctant to operate targeted integration policies as these would amount to recognising specific group needs and experiences. This has been particularly problematic with regard to Muslim migrants, who now form the largest migrant group in France. The issue of religion as a marker of identity has revealed the limits of the assimilation model. Together with continuing evidence of discrimination, this has led to many policy adjustments in practice” (Rudiger and Spencer 2003: 4).

In the words of Hargreaves (2007), “if the notion of integration convey the meaning of acceptance of immigrants and their descendents, but actually here in France commonly used to imply immigrants would be absorbed into French society in such a way as to make them virtually indistinct from the majority ethnic population.”

Assimilationist model is based on the idea that “equality can be achieved through the full adoption of the rules and values of the dominant society and through the avoidance of any considerations of diversity, as in the case of France); It is based on the need to respect common legal values and principles that are shared by all in order to foster a cohesive and inclusive society. Assimilation is based on the idea of monoculturality and of the full adoption (whether by submission or absorption) of the rules and values of the dominant society so that the minority group becomes culturally indistinguishable from the dominant society” (Garcia 2010: 253-254).

Zylberstein (1993) says French model of integration is inspired by a system of thought which rejects the determinisms of ethnicity, class and religion and is based on a collective desire to live up to the past and especially to work together for common aims and ambitions (Zylberstein quoted in Fysh and Wolfreys 1998: 9). The chief project of the French Republic is the disappearance of differences of diverse identities through the principle of assimilation which leads to one ‘homogeneous’ culture and creates equality through sameness by sharing common project and common values.

It is one model, which is a one-sided process whereby migrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural, and social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. France follows this model (Koser 2007: 24).

SECTION 3: IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY OF FRANCE: ASSIMILATION

From the above models of incorporation of immigrants, France’s follows the model of assimilation which is often termed as the counterpart of the multicultural model. In this chapter, we will be discussing assimilation policy of France. We have already analysed that during the space of time, as soon as governments are changing in France, immigration policy is changing accordingly. As, each party keeps a different

perspective to this policy. In addition, criteria of citizenship i.e. how to become a French citizen transformed throughout the years. To get the idea how the French notion of assimilation and assimilation policy of France has evolved over the time; it is significant to examine the historical background in which we will see French Republican notions of Universalism and *laïcité* are deep rooted in the creation of this assimilationist model that we have already explained above.

BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY OF FRANCE:

Long ago, at the time of monarchy in France, foreigners who settled in there were asked to adopt Christianity as a religion and accept the king's rules as norms for their assimilation (Vladescu, 2006). Later, 1789 French Revolution led to the collapse of the French monarchy and the power of clergy. As for many centuries, the French territory was populated by people of different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. After the 1789 French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte tried to unify these diverse groups to achieve the vision of "*la République Française*" (French Republic) by the means of homogenising the French culture. He nationalized the education system, implemented "*Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*" (Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen) and allowed foreigners (immigrants) to become citizens of the French civic nation. Since 19th century, assimilation has been the official integration policy of France. During this period, natives of French colonies began to arrive in France looking for better opportunities (Vladescu 2006).

As we have already discussed, France has experienced more than one century the waves of mass immigration. Since Second World War, large groups of immigrants as guest workers came mainly from Southern Europe, but with the span of time guest workers began to come from the North African countries also known to be *Maghrebian* countries mainly Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco which practice Islam as religion. According to Reitsma (2007: 3), initially not lot of attention was paid to these immigrants because they were supposed to leave as soon as they finished their temporary work. Later, French government realised that they must do something in order to integrate these immigrant's group that are diverse in nature, having different demographic and cultural backgrounds. After the decolonization of French colonies in 1960s, assimilation as a concept was associated with French imperialism; it has been argued that assimilation has already started to lose its legitimacy after the Second

World War, because it presupposed the superiority of the French culture, which recalled uncomfortable aspects of fascism (Regout 2011). Although during 1960s and 1970s, France had the policy of assimilation toward immigrants but gradually, this policy was abandoned when it became visible that most immigrants were refusing to either return home or adopt these values. In 1974 labour migration was stopped but family reunification was allowed. It resulted in ‘visibility’ factor of immigrants in French society. As a result of family reunification, children of immigrants were enrolled in French schools, interaction of immigrants (men and women) increased with the mainstream French society. Africans (Sub-Saharan and *Maghrebian*) were instantly recognizable because of their skin colour and somatic features (Hargreaves 2007: 25). When the Left came into power in 1981, they emphasised on ‘*le droit a la différence*’ (the right to be different) which is the part of *insertion*³⁹ approach which means immigrants can retain their identity of origin, and moreover, their cultural differences will be recognized. These were not considered as obstacles to integration, but immigrants have to comply with the rules and values of the host society. The Left believed that immigrants should not be assimilated and had the right to be different i.e. immigrants can retain their distinctive cultures and traditions. Later, Islamic headscarf controversy in 1989 in France shows how ‘right to be different’ policy which is in some sense ‘a kind of multicultural approach’ is incompatible with the French Republican tradition (Hargreaves 1997: 184). Furthermore, *Le Front National* was against the idea of ‘right to be different’ for immigrants and even suggested that French equally had the right to be different from the non-Europeans and they should not be allowed to stay in France. According to far Right political party, immigrants are inassimilable as they never leave their culture behind and their cultural differences are threatening the very foundations of national cohesion (Hargreaves 1997: 197). During this period only, “the socio-economic situation of migrants also started to change. For the next decades, the migrants and their children were to face rising unemployment, segregation in low quality housing of the large cities suburbs, and a crisis of the school system which was to affect young migrants disproportionately” (Regout 2011). But *insertion* policy did not survive for a longer period. Eventually from the 1990s onwards, the political debate shifted to integration. On 19 December 1989, *Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI)* (High Council of Integration)

³⁹ <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/immigration/definition.shtml>

was established whose mission was to put forward proposals to favour integration (Mung 2003). But since then, there has been a debate about the integration of immigrants especially those from *Maghrebian* origin and limits of the French Republican integration model. By the late 1990s politicians on both Left and Right had understood that if they were to stop such communal disturbances as happened in July-October 1995, 10 killed and 130 injured in attacks by Islamic militants in major French cities, then they would have to take steps to curb discrimination (Hargreaves 2007). So in this regard, the 1990s saw a noteworthy shift in integration policy with the focus switching to issue of discrimination, and hence the creation of "*Le Groupe d'Etudes et de Lutte Contre les Discriminations*" (GELD) - organisation was state financed and its task was to identify and analyse signs of discrimination in milieu of work, housing etc. and put forward proposals to fight against it. On 13 July 1991, Parliament passes 'anti-ghetto law' requiring more even distribution of social housing. In July 1998, National French football team "tricolour team" (multi-ethnic soccer team composed of players of an immigrant background) won the Football World Cup, manifesting the unity in diversity. This achievement has demonstrated that unity can be achieved in the diversity too and immigrants and their descendents are not the burden on French society. Later, French Integration Act, 1998 came into force on the 1st September 1998. The main aim of the act is to integrate foreign nationals into French culture.

It was around the year 1999 when François Mitterrand of French socialist party was re-elected President. Now the subject of integration (in the sense of immigrant incorporation into the nation) grew in the public mind and the media. Family reunification was encouraged, so that French government can encourage the integration of immigrants who had already settled on the French soil. Furthermore, on 13 December 2000, new law strengthened the promotion of more even distribution of social housing. Later, in 2001 an anti-discrimination law was passed. According to Mung (2003) this shift is imperative as it aimed at groups rather than individuals. Though we know that discrimination is faced by person as individual, but because they belong to an ethnic or religious group, it would be better to work on these groups for fighting against the discrimination so that they can easily assimilate in the French society. On 3 March 2003, *Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Discriminations et pour l'Egalité* (HALDE) (High Council for fight against discrimination and for equality) was established which was asked by the EU directive of 2000. French government

tried to move away from simple concept of integration to the recognition of diversity and equal opportunity as important public objectives. That's why on 28 May 2003, *Conseil Français du culte musulman* (CFCM) (French Council of the Muslim Faith) was created by the efforts of then interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy.

Moreover, during the year 2000's, far right-wing (Le Front National) started spreading the idea in public that immigrants were responsible for increased crime and violence. These kinds of affirmations made French government reassert a previously abandoned assimilationist policy to integrate its immigrants.

According to the new law of 26 November 2003, foreigner (or an immigrant) must prove his "assimilation" to French community in a personal interview which will evaluate his knowledge of French language as well as of rights and duties confer by French nationality (Mung 2003). The most important objective of the reform is to limit the entry of immigrants from North-Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) and at the same time, encourage the entry of foreigners from European community (Zappi 2003). The law of equal opportunities (*loi pour l'égalité des chances*) of the 31st March 2006 was came into force: after 1991 disorders in Sartrouville and in Mantes-la-Jolie, 2004 ban on wearing of conspicuous religious signs in state schools, 2005 *banlieues* riots, the French government analysed the real drawbacks of its integration model which leads to exclusion and marginalization of immigrants. Colour-blind approach and equality are required in the employment sector vis-à-vis multi-ethnic immigrants (Regout 2011). Thus this law which just came after the French *banlieues* riots 2005 was a significant in the area of integration policy. This law contains four important points: firstly, a large number of measures to prevent discrimination which will help immigrants and descendents to better integrate in the labour market. Secondly, programs of education are promoted and labour markets in suburbs are open for employment of young immigrant youth. Thirdly, "the law also requires companies with more than 50 employees to use anonymous CV's when recruiting new staff. The application documents will not include any photographs, personal information- name, origins, gender, address, religion etc. of applicants." And lastly, "the legal measures provide further for the establishment of an Office for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunity (Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances, ANCSEC)" (Engler n.d.). On the 24 July 2006, under the conservative government (UMP) a new immigration and integration law (*loi relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration*) was adopted in France that we have already

mentioned in our first chapter. Concerning integration, this law contains tougher conditions for family reunification, a newly created residence permit, moreover a compulsory “Reception and integration Contract” (Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration, CAI) for foreigners who wish to take up permanent residence in the country (Engler n.d.). Moreover, French government gave more preference to highly skilled immigrants which are considered as easier to integrate rather than low skilled immigrants.

INTEGRATION AND ACQUISITION OF FRENCH NATIONALITY- CIVIC INTEGRATION MODEL

Above mentioned contract (CAI) clearly conveys the idea that France has adopted a kind of civic integration approach along with their assimilationist model. The main objective of civic integration⁴⁰ as Jopkke (2012) defines that, “it narrows the culture distance between immigrants and the host society, and to make immigrants to understand societal norms, principles and institutions” which will help him/her to integrate in the host society. Further, the model of civic integration apart from Netherlands has afterwards been adopted in several European countries, including Germany, France, Britain, Austria and Denmark. Jopkke (2012) states that though there are variations exist in managing cultural integration in Europe, but all policies work within the dominant civic integration model. Thus, here we are going to study briefly about the civic integration policy and the organisations which are involved in its implementation process. The integration of immigrants commences since their arrival in France. The French integration policy supports not only newcomers but also already established immigrants or their descendants. It is characterised by learning of French language and values of French society. This would facilitate immigrant’s access to the employment and suited career. Moreover, this policy also includes a more targeted support for specific public: youth, migrated women, aged migrants, refugees. After a successful course of integration, immigrant can apply, if desires, asks for French nationality. Therefore, integration policy aims to give immigrants the means to fully participate in the economic, social and cultural life of France and help them to confront any difficulties in future.

⁴⁰ ‘Civic integration’ originated in the Netherlands in the late 1990s.

French immigration and integration policy, since 2007, has been assigned under the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National identity and Co-development created by Nicolas Sarkozy as discussed in previous chapter. The main task of framework of integration policy is assigned to High Council for Integration (HCI). It is established in 1989, its mission is “to advice and make any proposals on all issues relating to the integration of foreign residents or foreign origin. It defines the principles of the integration policy in its annual report to Prime Minister: state of knowledge available, legal and cultural conditions of integration, employment of foreigners, “weakening social ties and confinement in particularism”, discrimination etc” (Vie publique 2004).⁴¹ According to the HCI, “the right reception is essential to a migrant’s successful integration” (Abranches et al. 2008)

However, the integration policy of France is implemented by Ministry of Interior through the:

1. *L’Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (OFII)* (French Bureau for Immigration and Integration): earlier known as *L’Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des Migrations* (ANAEM), OFII was created in March 2009, placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The OFII has been given four responsibilities by the state:

- I. “The management of the procedures for legal immigration, alongside on behalf of the Prefectures and diplomatic or consular departments;
- II. The reception and integration of immigrants who have applied for permanent residence in France and therefore by signing Reception and Integration Contract (CAI) with the state, immigrant subscribes to the ideals of the French State and the French State vows to help the new immigrant (Abranches et al 2008)
- III. The initial reception of asylum seekers;
- IV. Aid for repatriation and reinsertion of foreigners in their country of origin.

It also has a mission to "participate in all administrative, social and health actions related to:

- a) the entry and stay of less than or equal to three months of foreigners;
- b) the reception of asylum seekers;

⁴¹ <http://www.vie-publique.fr/politiques-publiques/politique-immigration/glossaire-definitions/>.

- c) the medical checks on foreigners who are allowed to stay in France for more than three months;
- d) the return and reintegration of foreigners in their country of origin” (OFII⁴²)

Thus, OFII participated in the engagement of immigrant’s integration into French society. Its action on integration is embodied in the Reception and Integration Contract between the state and the immigrant. OFII bears responsibility for general training in the French language and imparting values of the Republic.

The **Reception and Integration contract (CAI)** (see figure 8 below): law of July 24 2006 provides that the integration of foreigner/immigrant in French society is measured according to his/her knowledge but also commitment to the French Republican values, principles and an adequate knowledge of French language. In this perspective, the signing of the Reception and Integration contract was made compulsory with effect from 1st January 2007. Here, OFII welcomes immigrant on his/ her arrival in France. During a half day session, the immigrant shall receive an individual meeting, where he/she enters into a relationship of confidence and mutual obligation with France by signing the Reception and Integration Contract (CAI) with the Prefect or the Prefect’s representative. This contract is presented to the foreigner “in a language which he/she understands”. By signing it, foreigner will get the opportunity to attend a collective meeting to welcome newcomers as well as an individual interview to access his/her French language level and receive information on access to employment and professional training and if in the case it is not sufficient, he/she is obliged to undergo civic training including language and other sessions provided by the state:

- ✓ **Civic training** if necessary with the involvement of interpreters: this one day long training includes the presentation of French institutions and principals and values of the French Republic, namely equality between men and women, *laïcité* (French secularism), rule of law, fundamental rights, safety of people and goods;
- ✓ **Language training:** If an immigrant does not know how to write or speak French, then he/she is entitled to an assessment of linguistic level and language training course adopted to his/her needs. As knowledge of French is a vital part in the integration of immigrants whether newly arrived or not. With the implementation of the Law of 16 June 2011, there is a construction of a

⁴² http://www.ofii.fr/qui_sommes-nous_46/nos_missions_2.html

complete language integration courses for immigrants wishing to reside in France and it has been decided to set the language reference level as B1 of the Common European Framework of References of languages in order to access French nationality. It is necessary to master the everyday language. Proof of the required level must provide either by: Diploma in French language (DELF) of level B1, an approved certificate issued within the last two years by an organization having label “French language integration” (FLI) or certified by Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer, des Collectivités territoriales et de l'Immigration.

- ✓ **Information session** about life in France is intended to educate newcomers about the main public services, including health and social welfare, school and childcare, training and employment, housing, the rights and duties of parents.
- ✓ **Professional skills assessment** to allow signatories of the Reception and Integration Contract to enhance their qualifications, experience and professional skills in order to find suitable work.
- ✓ **Social support** if the personal or family situation of the signatory warrants.
- ✓ A **medical examination** necessary for the issuing of a residence permit (OFIIa⁴³)

On the completion of these training courses, immigrant will get a certificate of presence. These services or training are the foundation which will help in the integration into French society. In the event that a person fails to respect the training obligations, the Préfet may terminate his/her contract; refuse to renew his/her residence permit or to issue his/her first residence permit (Zappi 2003). In addition to training for the Reception and Integration Contracts, the OFII also finances language training for migrants who did not have the opportunity to sign a Reception and Integration Contract when they arrived in France and now they can undergo the training which enable them to access jobs and French citizenship. In 2011, 102 254 Reception and integration contracts (CAI) were signed against 101,355 in 2010. Overall 701,319 people have benefited since 2003.⁴⁴

⁴³ http://www.ofii.fr/article.php3?id_article=466

⁴⁴ *ibid*

Table 5: Acquisition of French citizenship by the first 15 nationalities- 2011

Nationalité	Acquisitions par décret		Acquisitions par déclaration	TOTAL	%
	Naturalisations	Réintégrations			
Maroc	9688	24	3864	13576	20,2
Algérie	4852	2978	4088	11918	17,7
Tunisie	2998	9	1255	4262	6,3
Turquie	2001	-	572	2573	3,8
Russie	1926	-	554	2480	3,7
Portugal	1485	-	420	1905	2,8
Sénégal	1037	140	566	1743	2,6
Cameroun	1106	1	592	1699	2,5
Côte d'Ivoire	883	77	472	1432	2,1
Madagascar	522	91	667	1280	1,9
Serbie	1132	-	147	1279	1,9
Liban	815	-	277	1092	1,6
Congo	856	65	163	1084	1,6
Roumanie	662	-	263	925	1,4
Cambodge	638	-	173	811	1,2
Total pour les quinze premières nationalités	30 601	3 385	14 073	48 059	71,5
Total toutes nationalités	42 588	3 891	20 719	67 198	

Le nombre des quinze premières nationalités sur les dix dernières années fait apparaître une constante

Main characteristics of the signatories of CAI in 2011:

- Main nationality: Algeria: 16.6%, Morocco: 13.3%, Tunisia: 7.4%, Turkey: 4.6%, Congo: 4.6% (as shown in table 5)
- Sex: Men: 47%, Women: 53%
- Age: Mean age: 32 years
- Status: French families: 49.5% of which: Spouses: 37.5%, Child Parents French: 11.1%, Children or ascendants: 0.9%
- Beneficiaries of family reunification: 8.7%, Refugees and their family members: 10.6%, Personal and family ties: 14.4%, Workers permanent employees: 6.2% and Other: 10.7% (Source: OFII)

Figure 7: Offices of OFFI in France and other countries.

OFFI

172,5 million

The OFFI has an annual budget of 172.5 million euros, which is financed, to the tune of 141 million euros, by its own resources: taxes on employment of foreign labour and stamp duties paid by foreigners; the remainder is provided by means of a subsidies from the State and Europe.

In 2011,

59.7 millions

euro were allocated to training foreigners as part of the Reception and Integration Contract.


Almost

26,6 millions

euro have been used as aid for repatriation and reinsertion.

849

OFFICERS WORK FOR THE OFFI IN FRANCE, AT THE PARIS OFFICE AND IN OVER FIFTY REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS, DELEGATIONS OR CENTRES THAT ENABLE COVERAGE OF ALL OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY.



THE OFFI IS REPRESENTED IN 6 COUNTRIES ABROAD: MOROCCO, TUNISIA, TURKEY, ROMANIA, MALI, SENEGAL, CANADA AND CAMEROON.



OFFI
44, rue Burgue
75732 Paris cedex 15
Tél : 01 53 69 53 76
Fax : 01 53 69 53 69
www.offi.fr



OFFI

Figure 8: RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION CONTRACT



CONTRAT D'ACCUEIL ET D'INTÉGRATION

Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité Nationale et du Développement Solidaire
Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration



Bienvenue en France,

Vous avez été admis à résider sur le territoire de la République française, Etat membre de l'Union européenne. Chaque année, plus de 100 000 étrangers s'installent en France venant de pays, de cultures différents. Comme vous, depuis plus de cent ans, d'autres y sont venus et y ont construit leur vie. Ils ont participé à son développement et à sa modernisation. Certains, parfois au prix de leur liberté ou de leur vie, ont défendu son sol par les armes.

La France et les Français sont attachés à une histoire, à une culture et à certaines valeurs fondamentales. Pour vivre ensemble, il est nécessaire de les connaître et de les respecter. C'est pourquoi, dans le cadre d'un contrat d'accueil et d'intégration, nous vous demandons de suivre une journée de formation civique pour mieux comprendre le pays dans lequel vous allez vivre.

La France, une démocratie

- La France est une république indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.
- Le pouvoir repose sur la souveraineté du peuple, exprimée par le suffrage universel ouvert à tous les citoyens français âgés de plus de 18 ans.
- Sur de nombreux bâtiments publics, vous verrez gravée l'inscription «Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité». Cette devise est celle de la République française.

La France, un pays de droits et de devoirs

La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 proclame que tous les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits, quelles que soient leur origine, leur condition et leur fortune. La France garantit le respect des droits fondamentaux, qui sont notamment :

- La liberté, qui s'exprime sous plusieurs formes : liberté d'opinion, liberté d'expression, liberté de réunion, liberté de circulation,
- La sûreté, qui garantit la protection par les pouvoirs publics des personnes et des biens.
- Le droit personnel à la propriété.

Les étrangers en situation régulière ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que les Français, sauf le droit de vote qui reste attaché à la nationalité, et doivent respecter les lois et principes de la République française. Qu'elle sanctionne ou qu'elle protège, la loi est la même pour tous, sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.

La France, un pays laïc

- En France, la religion relève du domaine privé.

- Chacun peut avoir les croyances religieuses de son choix ou ne pas en avoir. Tant qu'elles ne troublent pas l'ordre public, l'État respecte toutes les croyances et la liberté de culte.
- L'État est indépendant des religions et veille à l'application des principes de tolérance et de liberté.

La France, un pays d'égalité

Égalité entre les hommes et les femmes est un principe fondamental de la société française. Les femmes ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que les hommes. Les parents sont conjointement responsables de leurs enfants. Ce principe s'applique à tous, Français et étrangers. Les femmes ne sont soumises ni à l'autorité du mari, ni à celle du père ou du frère pour, par exemple, travailler, sortir ou ouvrir un compte bancaire. Les mariages forcés et la polygamie sont interdits, tandis que l'intégrité du corps est protégée par la loi.

Connaître le français, une nécessité

- La langue française est un des fondements de l'unité nationale. La connaissance du français est donc indispensable à votre intégration et favorisera le contact avec l'ensemble de la population.
- C'est pourquoi vous devez avoir un niveau de connaissance de la langue française qui vous permette, par exemple, d'entreprendre des démarches administratives, d'inscrire vos enfants à l'école, de trouver un travail et de participer à part entière à la vie de la cité. Si vous n'avez pas ce niveau à votre arrivée en France, vous devez l'acquérir en suivant une formation sanctionnée par un diplôme reconnu par l'État. L'inscription à cette formation gratuite est faite par l'Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration.
- L'école est la base de la réussite professionnelle de vos enfants. En France, l'école publique est gratuite. La scolarité est obligatoire de 6 à 16 ans. Garçons et filles étudient ensemble dans toutes les classes.



2. « **Le réseau déconcentré des directions régionales de la jeunesse, des sports et de la cohésion sociale, par les programmes régionaux d'intégration des populations immigrées (PRIPI)** (the decentralized network of regional offices of youth, sports and social cohesion by the regional integration programs for immigrants) (PRIPI).
3. **La Cite Nationale de l'Histoire de l'Immigration (CNHI)** : The National Centre for the History of Immigration (CNHI) is a public administrative building set up by decree of 16 November 2006, under the supervision of Ministry of Culture, Integration, National Education and Research. It is a Cultural and educational institution to promote the memory of immigration as a factor of integration.
4. **La commission interministérielle pour le logement des populations immigrées (CILPI)**. (The inter-departmental commission for housing immigrant populations (CILPI)).”⁴⁵

Major national programs for Integration are:

- **The Professional Integration:** Access to employment is a major component of the immigrant's Professional integration, in that it allows the economic autonomy and facilitates socialization. Department promotes all the possibilities facilitating job search from the time of immigrants arrival in France while encouraging employers to be more open to diversity (Page 142)
- **Charter of rights and duties of French citizens**⁴⁶: it contains essential Republican principals and values, rights and duties of citizen which are the part of the French constitution. (see figure 9 below)

⁴⁵ <http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Integration>.

⁴⁶ http://circulaire.legifrance.gouv.fr/pdf/2012/10/cir_35947.pdf.

Figure 9: CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FRENCH CITIZEN

CHARTRE DES DROITS ET DEVOIRS DU CITOYEN FRANÇAIS

En application de l'article 21-24 du code civil, la présente charte rappelle les principes et valeurs essentiels de la République et énonce les droits et devoirs du citoyen, résultant de la Constitution ou de la loi.

Principes, valeurs et symboles de la République française

Le peuple français se reconnaît dans la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789 et dans les principes démocratiques hérités de son histoire.

Il respecte les symboles républicains.

L'emblème national est le drapeau tricolore, bleu, blanc, rouge.

L'hymne national est La Marseillaise.

La devise de la République est « Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité ».

La fête nationale est le 14 juillet.

« Marianne » est la représentation symbolique de la République.

La langue de la République est le français.

La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale dont les principes sont fixés par la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958.

Indivisible : la souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui l'exerce par ses représentants élus et par la voie du référendum. Aucune partie du peuple, ni aucun individu, ne peut s'en attribuer l'exercice.

Laïque : la République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. Chacun est libre de croire, de ne pas croire, de changer de religion. La République garantit le libre exercice des cultes mais n'en reconnaît, n'en salarie ni n'en subventionne aucun. L'État et les religions sont séparés.

Démocratique : le principe de la République est : gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple. Direct ou indirect, le suffrage est toujours universel, égal et secret. La loi étant l'expression de la volonté générale, tout citoyen doit la respecter. Nul ne peut être contraint à faire ce que la loi n'ordonne pas. Rendue au nom du peuple français, la justice est indépendante. La force publique garantit le respect de la loi et des décisions de justice.

Sociale : la Nation assure à l'individu et à la famille les conditions nécessaires à leur développement.

La République garantit à tous la sécurité des personnes et des biens.

La République participe à l'Union européenne constituée d'États qui ont choisi librement d'exercer en commun certaines de leurs compétences.



LIBERTÉ ÉGALITÉ FRATERNITÉ

Les droits et les devoirs du citoyen français

Tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de croyance, possède des droits inaliénables. Sur le territoire de la République, ces droits sont garantis à chacun et chacun a le devoir de les respecter. A la qualité de citoyen français s'attachent en outre des droits et devoirs particuliers, tels que le droit de participer à l'élection des représentants du peuple et le devoir de concours à la défense nationale ou de participer aux jurys d'assises.

Liberté

Les êtres humains naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits.

La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui.

Le respect dû à la personne interdit toute atteinte à sa dignité. Le corps humain est inviolable.

Nul ne peut être inquiété pour ses opinions pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l'ordre public.

Tout citoyen peut parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre de l'abus de cette liberté dans les cas prévus par la loi.

Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privée.

Nul ne peut être accusé, arrêté ni détenu que dans les cas et dans les formes déterminés par la loi. Chacun est présumé innocent tant qu'il n'a pas été jugé coupable.

Chacun a la liberté de créer une association ou de participer à celles de son choix. Il peut adhérer librement aux partis ou groupements politiques et défendre ses droits et ses intérêts par l'action syndicale.

Tout citoyen français âgé de dix-huit ans et jouissant de ses droits civiques est électeur. Chaque citoyen ayant la qualité d'électeur peut faire acte de candidature dans les conditions prévues par la loi. Voter est un droit, c'est aussi un devoir civique.

Chacun a droit au respect des biens dont il a la propriété.

Egalité

Tous les citoyens sont égaux devant la loi, sans distinction de sexe, d'origine, de race ou de religion. La loi est la même pour tous, soit qu'elle protège, soit qu'elle punisse.

L'homme et la femme ont dans tous les domaines les mêmes droits.

La République favorise l'égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et fonctions électives, ainsi qu'aux responsabilités professionnelles et sociales.

Chacun des conjoints peut librement exercer une profession, percevoir ses revenus et en disposer comme il l'entend après avoir contribué aux charges communes.

Les parents exercent en commun l'autorité parentale. Ils pourvoient à l'éducation des enfants et préparent leur avenir.

L'instruction est obligatoire pour les enfants des deux sexes jusqu'à seize ans. L'organisation de l'enseignement public gratuit et laïque à tous les degrés est un devoir de l'Etat.

Les citoyens français étant égaux, ils peuvent accéder à tout emploi public selon leurs capacités.

Fraternité

Tout citoyen français concourt à la défense et à la cohésion de la Nation.

Une personne qui a acquis la qualité de Français peut être déchu de la nationalité française si elle s'est soustraite à ses obligations de défense, ou si elle s'est livrée à des actes contraires aux intérêts fondamentaux de la France.

Chacun a le devoir de contribuer, selon ses capacités financières, aux dépenses de la Nation par le paiement d'impôts et de cotisations sociales.

La Nation garantit à tous la protection de la santé, la sécurité matérielle et le droit à des congés. Toute personne qui, en raison de son âge, de son état physique ou mental, de la situation économique, se trouve dans l'incapacité de travailler a le droit d'obtenir de la collectivité des moyens convenables d'existence.

CONCLUSION:

In this chapter, we have discussed about the strengths of French Republican identity notably Universalism and *laïcité* and at the same time, tried to conceptualise different models of immigrant integration in Europe like multiculturalism, assimilation, social cohesion. In order to know about the French immigrant integration policy- assimilation, we have tried to analyse it historically. We concluded that this assimilation model has anchored with the universal and secular values. We have established the fact that with the passage of time, model of integration in France also changed. For instance since 19th century France has been implementing its assimilation policy, and then it switched to approaches like integration, insertion and finally came back to assimilation policy. The demographic and ethnic changes after the Second World War and decolonization resulted in making France a multicultural society. Here immigrants from the diverse ethnic background have added a new identity to French Republican society. So France attempted to integrate these cultural and social differences of immigrants but was not successful. Later, assimilation policy was reinitiated along with civic integration approach- asking immigrants to acquire French language, Republican values and norms. Moreover, a lot of attention has been made to curtail racial discrimination vis-à-vis immigrants since late 1990s in the French society as it proved to be the root cause of socio-economic inequality, rising crimes and violence. In brief, France has always tried through its assimilation policy to maintain peace, cohesion, and integrity but due to tug and war situation between the values of French Republican model and ethnic differences of immigrants, this model faced several challenges. So it is essential for us to study in details some problems and issues faced by immigrants in France, in order to access immigrant integration policy from both the sides.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS OF IMMIGRANT

INTEGRATION INTO FRENCH SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION:

In the era of globalisation, immigration is a common phenomenon due to which societies have been structurally transforming i.e. socially, politically and economically. Consequently, European countries are facing the challenges related to integration of immigrants and their descendents i.e. how to manage and accommodate ethno-cultural diversity. Koser (2007: 121) states that societies will keep on facing challenges of integration because of the following factors namely rise in degree and diversity of immigration, change in political, economic, social, security and demographic landscapes. As we have already discussed in our previous chapter that in order to integrate immigrants there are different strategies of incorporation. For instance, some countries prefer multiculturalism while others assimilation, however both these approaches are in question in contemporary Europe (Garcia 2010). Moreover, we have already examined *laïcité* (French secularism) and Universalism, conceptualised different models of immigrant integration and analysed French policy of immigrant integration in our previous chapter.

In this chapter, we attend to analyse the problems that France is facing in the path of her attempt to integrate immigrants into French society and find out whether French model of integration is compatible or not with the actual diverse French society. But before this it is essential to note that integration on cultural and social level varies for immigrants groups. Let us compare two groups: European and non-European immigrants. For European immigrants and their descendents (“foreigners”) particularly those from South and West Europe notably Italy, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, the assimilation into French society is relatively unproblematic and smooth. They are similar to French in several aspects: firstly, they often speak Latin languages. Secondly, they practice Christianity as religion, and finally they can easily adopt many of the customs and to some extent share a common history. On the other hand, non-European immigrants i.e. especially those from North-African and Sub-Saharan African countries have completely different experience with assimilation which is difficult and complex. As their language, religion and culture are totally different. Therefore, they face many difficulties in the process of assimilation. Despite these differences, immigrants in France shared some things in common: their experiences, difficulties, challenges and benefits. Thus, we can say immigrants of

certain groups are assimilating far more successfully than others. Reasons behind this phenomenon are race, ethnicity, religion, educational opportunities etc. (Vladescu 2006).

Now several questions arise: why for some immigrants the experience of integration is harsh and complicated? Why some immigrants groups assimilated more easily than others? According to Hargreaves, the central question is how effectively are immigrants and their descendents being incorporated into French society? This is a complex issue, which includes politics, culture, economic and social structures. For this, he stated three main dynamics as follows: the attitudes and aspirations of the majority population, those of immigrants and their descendents and the empirically observable pattern of social intercourse between majority and minority groups (Hargreaves 2007: 2). This chapter is divided into three sections: In the first section examines the problems faced by immigrants in French society. Second section deals with the issues faced by Muslim community in particular and third section discusses the multicultural model in Europe and analyses its strengths and weaknesses.

SECTION 1: PROBLEMS FACED BY IMMIGRANTS IN FRENCH SOCIETY

Despite all the rhetoric and policies aimed at fostering integration, immigrants are vulnerable to the everyday experiences of racial discrimination, exclusion which leads to their marginalisation in the host society. It is a paradox in the French society on one side, French claim that all are equal before law, they talk about social justice, equal recognition, equal rights while on the other side, prejudices, racial discrimination systematic racism vis-à-vis non European immigrants are widespread in all the realms of immigrants life in French society for example starting from the first stage of life i.e. education and schooling, then social housing, employment, other civic amenities (like police, public health services), religion, cultural practices so on and so forth. So before discussing the problems, let us first define racism and different forms of discrimination.

Racism:

According to European Migration Network (EMN)⁴⁷, racism is ideas or theories of superiority of one race colour or ethnic origin. Electoral successes of Le Front National since 1980s lead to the emergence of debate of racism which entails discrimination, violence, prejudices, racist doctrines etc. At the European level, there is a plethora of data which suggests that racism exists in Europe. Moreover, there has been continuous rise in racially motivated incidents in Europe, which includes violent attacks against visible minorities' notably African and Asian origin.

Weiviorka as quoted in Amiraux and Simon (2006), "identifies four potential sources of racism which cover the four axis of racism and indicate different points of tension between modernity and identities: a 'universalist' racism of which colonialism would be an example (race authorising domination); the racism of social exclusion (racism of social proximity in situations of decline; populism); identity based racism (attacks on targeted groups which change depending on the time and the circumstances); and the intercommunity racism (interethnic relations with or without contact)."

Another form of racism is xenophobia. International organisation for migration defines Xenophobia as "attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity. There is a close link between racism and xenophobia, two terms that can be hard to differentiate from each other" (IOM⁴⁸).


European Migration Network defines racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on a equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life" (EMN⁴⁹)

⁴⁷ <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTerm.do?startingWith=R&id=238>

⁴⁸ <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#xenophobia>

⁴⁹ <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTerm.do?startingWith=D&id=77>

Figure 10: Self-reported experience of discrimination:



Source: Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008
 Age group: 18-50 years old

The above figure 10 shows that immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, French overseas department Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey have large number of self-reported experience than other immigrants to France. It has been observed that second generation from immigrant parents reported more experiences than immigrants.

Table 6: Reported reasons for discrimination by detailed origin (%)

	Age	Sex	Skin colour	Origins	Neighbourhood	Accent	Religion	Look	Family situation	Unweighted numbers
Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns										
DOM	11	5	78	34	6	14	6	8	3	168
Algeria	6	2	14	95	8	10	8	4	3	192
Morocco and Tunisia	6	5	34	87	3	8	12	3	1	273
Sahelian Africa	7	3	81	57	3	16	3	1	7	240
West and Central Africa	2	2	86	44	3	9	1	1	3	310
Southeast Asia	3	6	25	73	5	20	0	0	3	95
Turkey	3	3	6	77	7	20	13	7	1	156
Portugal	4	8	2	57	3	14	5	9	18	37
Other EU-27 countries	4	18	3	72	12	20	1	9	5	97
Other countries	3	3	36	64	3	22	2	3	1	236
All immigrants	4	5	34	70	5	14	6	4	3	1,658
Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns										
DOM	14	9	81	28	12	3	1	10	2	243
Algeria	7	6	20	83	11	4	15	6	3	304
Morocco and Tunisia	9	7	31	80	18	3	23	8	3	423
Sahelian Africa	10	7	87	43	16	10	6	11	1	310
West and Central Africa	11	6	89	44	18	3	4	6	1	193
Southeast Asia	22	14	38	64	12	6	1	8	5	159
Turkey	15	4	5	75	14	4	14	6	0	143
Portugal	13	18	14	44	6	7	3	10	6	105
Spain and Italy	15	24	9	26	11	4	2	6	7	155
Other EU-27 countries	12	24	7	76	7	6	17	8	3	64
Other countries	12	12	44	54	15	3	6	11	6	156
All descendants of immigrants	10	10	28	65	13	4	13	8	4	2,502
Mainstream population	16	24	8	18.5	6	4	2	1.1	9	256
All metropolitan population	12	17	20	39	8	6	3	9	7	4,487

SOURCE: Trajectories and Origins survey (TEO), INED-INSEE, 2008.
 Population: 1 individuals aged 18-50 who reported experience of discrimination over the 5 previous years.
 (In parentheses: When asked about the reasons for discrimination, 78% of DOM native-borns mention skin colour, 34% origins, and 11% age.
 Notes: As several answers are possible, the percentages are above 100. The reason cited most often by each of the sub-populations is given in red. The results for immigrants from Spain are not given because the numbers were too small.
 The figures in *italics* were calculated on fewer than 50 persons and are not robust.


In the above table 6, several discriminatory experiences are reported by respondents. Discrimination related to origin and skin colour has been more documented than reasons like gender, age or religion. Mainly discrimination is constructed on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes, worsening the image of “other”. Origin and skin colour play a key role in racism and the main victims are the immigrants and descendants from North-Africa, sub-Saharan African immigrants, Turkey, Southeast Asia and of DOM native-borns (also referred to ‘visible’ minorities), while European immigrants are less exposed to comments about their origins or skin colour. Moreover, the role of visibility, in terms of appearance or name/surname matters. Apart from origins, poor levels of education and occupational category make some people to feel “less French” than others. Religion as a reason for discrimination is mentioned by immigrants from Islamic countries (Simon et al 2010: 129). These reasons of discrimination are the main sources of stigmatization that expose people to racism in French society and the

daily reminders of “otherness” add to perceptions of being foreign despite immigrants having French nationality (Simon et al 2010: 132).

Social exclusion: the European Commission defines social exclusion as follows:

“Social exclusion refers to the multiple and changing factors resulting in people being excluded from the normal exchanges, practices and rights of modern society. Poverty is one of the most obvious factors, but social exclusion also refers to inadequate rights in housing, education, health and access to services. It affects individuals and groups, particularly in urban and rural areas, who are in some way subject to discrimination or segregation; and to emphasise the weakness in the social infrastructure and the risk of allowing a two-tier society to become established by default. The Commission believes that a fatalistic acceptance of social exclusion must be rejected and all Community citizens have a right to respect of human dignity” (Commission of the European Communities 1993 as quoted in Smith 2000: 1)

Figure 11: Living in High concentration immigrant neighbourhoods



SOURCE: Patrik Simon, TeO 2009

Segregation patterns are different for European immigrants (mostly less segregated) while Maghrebians, sub-Saharan African (highly segregated in social housing and deprived neighbourhoods). As shown in above figure 11, mostly immigrants from

Sahelian Africa, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Central Africa, and Turkey are living in high concentration immigrant neighbourhood. However, second generations of immigrants are less segregated than immigrants from the same ethnic background.

Here are some quotes of existing racial discrimination and xenophobia in France:

According to the conservative Senator, Alain Griotteray, “The Italians, the Spaniards, the Belgians or the Portuguese who have crossed or are still crossing our frontiers have never been completely disoriented; they are European and they still in Europe: they find the Catholic churches of their own religion, and the men and women who welcome them are after all quite close to their cultures of origin” (Fysh and Wolfreys 1998: 8).

“...those foreigners of European origin, who are easy to integrate, and those who come from the third world who are difficult to assimilate both because of their specific cultural-religious characteristics which incite them to refuse assimilation...” (Le Pen 1985) (Fysh and Wolfreys 1998).

Jacques Chirac’s reference to the French man “who sees his next door neighbour—a family where there is one father, three or four wives and twenty-odd kids, getting fifty thousand francs in social security payments without going to work: add to the noise and the smell and it drives the French worker crazy. It’s not racist to say we can no longer afford to reunite families” (Freedman 2004: 7).

IMMIGRANTS AND EDUCATION:

Education has these days become an important factor influencing decision to immigrate. Student immigration for educational opportunities is visible in many parts of the European Union. “Although student migration may be seen as essentially temporary in nature, large numbers remain within the destination country after the end of their studies either as labour migrants or following family formation with a native in the destination country (EC a 2011).

Table 7: educational levels of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-50 who have completed their education, by country/département of birth.

Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	No qualification	Primary or lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary (Baccalauréat or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted number
LUHM	16	10	28	16	30	100	512
Males	19	10	35	14	23	100	244
Females	14	10	21	19	36	100	268
Algeria	27	16	18	16	24	100	647
Males	25	14	18	18	25	100	316
Females	30	19	17	13	22	100	331
Morocco and Tunisia	33	12	17	13	23	100	818
Males	29	9	20	14	27	100	424
Females	37	15	14	11	22	100	444
Sahelian Africa	44	21	8	9	18	100	905
Males	32	14	10	13	30	100	224
Females	52	26	7	6	10	100	281
West and Central Africa	15	18	15	22	30	100	575
Males	9	10	16	22	42	100	224
Females	19	24	15	21	27	100	351
Southeast Asia	25	11	16	19	30	100	519
Males	24	9	17	19	31	100	261
Females	26	13	15	18	28	100	258
Turkey	34	26	15	15	9	100	704
Males	33	21	18	18	10	100	381
Females	34	32	11	12	4	100	323
Portugal	37	20	28	9	7	100	540
Males	39	18	29	8	5	100	263
Females	34	22	26	10	9	100	277
Spain and Italy	17	9	27	15	32	100	216
Males	14	11	32	20	23	100	97
Females	19	8	22	11	39	100	119
Other EU-27 countries	7	6	10	23	54	100	515
Males	12	10	16	23	40	100	171
Females	5	4	6	23	62	100	344
Other countries	19	10	9	21	42	100	928
Males	17	8	11	22	42	100	387
Females	20	12	7	20	41	100	541
All immigrants	25	14	16	16	29	100	6,017
Males	24	12	18	17	28	100	2,748
Females	26	16	13	16	29	100	3,269
Mainstream population	9	8	29	19	34	100	2,820
Males	10	8	33	17	32	100	1,337
Females	9	8	25	21	37	100	1,483
All metropolitan population	12	9	27	18	34	100	16,721
Males	13	9	31	17	30	100	7,674
Females	11	9	24	20	36	100	8,647

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008

Table 8: Educational levels of persons aged 18-50, descendants of one or two immigrants or of DOM native-borns, by parents' country/ département of birth.


Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	No qualification	Primary/lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Vocational lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary (baccalauréat or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted numbers
DOM	10	7	27	22	33	100	502
Males	12	7	35	19	27	100	237
Females	7	8	19	26	40	100	265
Algeria	22	11	28	18	20	100	1.119
Males	25	12	29	16	18	100	563
Females	19	11	27	21	22	100	616
Morocco and Tunisia	16	10	23	20	31	100	849
Males	20	12	26	16	27	100	376
Females	12	9	20	25	34	100	473
Sahelian Africa	15	12	26	22	25	100	334
Males	19	14	27	20	30	100	162
Females	10	10	25	24	31	100	172
West and Central Africa	16	8	14	22	41	100	186
Males	21	5	18	16	39	100	84
Females	12	10	11	26	41	100	102
Southeast Asia	10	9	18	16	48	100	337
Males	13	4	22	15	47	100	172
Females	7	14	13	17	49	100	165
Turkey	25	11	30	18	15	100	349
Males	25	7	36	16	17	100	165
Females	26	14	24	22	14	100	175
Portugal	13	7	35	17	28	100	792
Males	16	8	39	17	20	100	426
Females	9	6	30	17	38	100	386
Spain and Italy	14	11	32	13	26	100	1.576
Males	16	9	34	17	23	100	772
Females	11	13	29	18	30	100	804
Other EU-27 countries	11	10	22	18	39	100	562
Males	8	10	28	19	35	100	277
Females	14	10	16	18	42	100	285
Other countries	11	5	21	21	42	100	375
Males	8	5	13	19	56	100	191
Females	9	5	17	20	49	100	184
All descendants of immigrants	15	10	28	18	29	100	6.470
Males	17	10	31	17	25	100	3.108
Females	13	10	24	20	33	100	3.362
Mainstream population	9	8	29	19	34	100	2.820
Males	10	8	33	17	32	100	1.337
Females	9	8	25	21	37	100	1.483
All metropolitan population	12	9	27	18	35	100	16.321
Males	13	9	31	17	30	100	7.674
Females	11	9	24	20	36	100	8.647

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

The study TeO reveals that 10% of the population of metropolitan France aged 18-50 are students. This is the case for 7% of immigrants, 16% of descendants of

immigrants and 20% of descendants of French Overseas Territories. These differences partly reflect the considerable differences in age between sub-populations, resulting from the history of migration flows into metropolitan France (Simon et al 2010: 38). Moreover, educational levels in France differ widely according to origin of immigrant groups. The difference of education levels between the mainstream population and the immigrant population are greater than those between the mainstream population and immigrants' descendants (see table 7 & 8 above). The section of men with low or no qualifications among descendants of immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey is almost twice as high as for the mainstream population (Simon et al 2010: 37).

Figure 12: Percentage of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns who reported being less well treated when decisions were taken concerning their future school career.



Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.
Population: Persons aged 18-35 who attended school in France.

School segregation: according to Vladescu (2006), even though there are measures in place to avoid the complete separation of school children based on economic or ethnic background, but the reality is that immigrant's children generally attend poor schools with lower level of academic performance. These children do not go to the same schools as the children of the mainstream population. They are less likely to continue

with the education system either because of the lack of funds to do so or their families want them to work in order to contribute to the household. According to the study TeO, the rate of discontinuing with education varies according to the parents' country of birth. For instance, it is particularly high for descendants of immigrants from Turkey (27%), Algeria (18%), Morocco and Tunisia (15%), West and Central Africa (16%), Portugal (11%) and South-east Asia (7%). One of the reasons for this is over 70% immigrant's descendants from North Africa, Turkey and Portugal their fathers are manual worker, so the need to help financially a family is since childhood. The gender difference is more marked among descendants of immigrants. Girls perform better at school and normally do not leave without qualifications. Nevertheless, overall immigrant's descendants' access to higher education has increased, but many leave education without a qualification. Thus, the gap between immigrants and native French population is often created in the early stages of education and socialisation. As we have discussed about poor schools in the poor neighbourhood, this kind of scenario leads to prevent complete assimilation of immigrants and their descendants into French society (especially for children of North-Africa and sub-Saharan Africa but not for European and Asian children who have been able to incorporate effectively into education system) (Vladescu 2006).

As far as cultural and academic challenges are concerned, though immigrants work hard in a way to push their children to follow the French model of incorporation right from the stage of education so that it will help in their fast and complete cultural and social assimilation, but immigrant's children face lot of problems while going through the process of assimilation because on the one hand, they are partially accepting their parent's culture, on the other hand, they are accepting French culture which they consider their own. There are certain aspects of French culture which they wish to adopt but at the same time their parents do not allow them.

There is an ongoing struggle to assimilate exists not only among people of various ethnic groups, but within different generations of immigrants as well. For instance, *Maghrebian* immigrant groups usually have different educational experiences, as they are closely linked with religious elements, which would result in many problems related to adjustment and ban on religious symbols in state schools is one of them. Moreover, children of immigrants also face ethnic or racial discrimination, xenophobia, racism etc in educational premises which demonstrates the attitudes of

large part of French population towards immigration (Vladescu 2006). Furthermore according to the same study TeO (see above figure 12) on average 14% of descendants of immigrants report “having been less well treated” when decisions were taken concerning their future school career. The sense of injustice is particularly marked among descendants of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia (23%), Turkey (22%), Sahelian Africa (24%), West and Central Africa (20%) and Algeria (20%). The primary reasons behind this treatment are “origin” and “skin colour”. These trajectories affect children’s subjective experience of school and subsequently have an impact on their access to the labour market (Simon et al. 2010: 50). Even the 2011 report of the High Council for Integration (HCI) denounced “the inability of the French school to integrate children of immigrants (Girard 2011).

IMMIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT:

We know that the economic immigration has been, for many decades, the prime reason for immigrants as we have already discussed in our first chapter. But the reality is immigrants are facing lots of issues in employment sector. Even a large number of studies establish the same fact. Moreover, these studies always concluded with the fact that *Maghrebians* (Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans) are in inferior position than any other immigrant group. Their situation is not getting any better in finding the suitable jobs (Vladescu 2006)

Table 9: Economic activity of persons⁵⁰ age 18-50 by origin

	Males						Females					
	In employment	Unemployed	In education	Other inactive	Unemployment rate	Un-weighted numbers	In employment	Unemployed	In education	Other inactive	Unemployment rate	Un-weighted numbers
Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOMI native-borns												
DOM	85	6	6	2	7	259	81	6	6	7	7	286
Algeria	77	15	5	4	16	327	48	13	6	33	21	346
Morocco and Tunisia	81	11	4	3	12	442	49	13	6	31	21	466
Sub-Saharan Africa	75	15	8	3	17	514	58	12	11	19	18	695
Southeast Asia	83	11	1	5	12	267	66	10	3	21	13	262
Turkey	81	10	3	6	11	389	34	7	6	53	18	338
Portugal	93	4	2	1	4	268	76	9	1	14	11	279
Spain and Italy	95	3	0	2	3	97	81	5	2	12	6	122
Other EU-27 countries	83	11	5	2	12	185	71	7	4	18	9	357
Other countries	79	9	9	3	10	434	58	11	9	22	16	585
All immigrants	81	10	5	3	11	2,923	58	11	6	25	16	3,450
Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns												
DOM	74	9	15	2	10	307	71	8	15	5	10	343
Algeria	69	17	9	5	20	582	56	14	13	17	20	724
Morocco and Tunisia	61	17	16	5	22	487	56	12	20	12	18	635
Sub-Saharan Africa	53	21	23	3	21	370	55	10	29	7	15	443
Southeast Asia	60	11	27	2	16	299	66	5	25	3	8	274
Turkey	67	19	13	1	22	213	35	18	30	27	34	234
Portugal	82	7	7	4	8	469	78	4	11	6	5	464
Spain and Italy	86	6	4	4	7	829	77	7	6	11	8	863
Other EU-27 countries	81	6	9	4	7	317	71	6	10	13	8	332
Other countries	67	6	25	1	9	300	62	5	24	9	8	275
All descendants of immigrants	74	11	11	4	13	3,866	65	9	14	12	12	4,244
Mainstream population	82	7	8	3	8	1,522	75	8	7	10	10	1,664
All metropolitan population	81	8	8	3	9	8,877	72	9	8	11	11	9,987

Source - Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

According to the above table 9, the employment rate (of general population group) among men is average 81% while among women is 72%. As far as origins are concerned, the highest employment rates for men are among immigrant's descendants from Southern Europe notably Portugal (82%), Spain (86%), Italy(86%), other countries of the European Union (81%) and mainstream population (81%); while lowest employment rates for same category from sub-Saharan Africa (53%),

⁵⁰ Population: persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France.

Southeast Asia (60%), Morocco and Tunisia (61%), Turkey (67%) and Algeria (69%) (Simon et al. 2010: 54). For women, highest employment rates are among immigrant's descendents from Southern Europe and other EU countries, while lowest unemployment rates for same category from Turkey (over 33%), Algeria (48%), Morocco and Tunisia (49%). The above differences in unemployment rates according to origin are somewhat due to sub-population composition, particularly differences between groups as regards age structure, levels of qualification, family situation and geographical location ((Simon et al. 2010: 56). These figures are indeed high especially for immigrants and their descendents from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or sub-Saharan Africa who have risk of unemployment more than twice that of the mainstream population. Vladescu (2006) says "such figures only strengthen the argument that ethnicity is directly associated with the ability to perform economically in France and these groups continue to represent the ethnic group with the most challenges." There have been several reasons for this: on the one hand, as compared to European workers who are well educated and better trained, *Maghrebian* (Muslims) workers had limited access to the higher education and job training skills. Muslims are facing huge obstacles in employment and equal pay for the same job as a French worker. On the contrary, Western European immigrants and their descendents have been able to find jobs in the government, public and private sector. Similarly, immigrants from Asia have so far been assimilated into French society both in economic and cultural terms. They face fewer challenges than immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa who are not fully assimilated under French economic norms (Vladescu: 2006)


Table 10: Percentage of respondents reporting unfair rejection of a job application

	Age 18-50			Persons exposed to the risk*		
	Males	Females	Unweighted numbers	Males	Females	Unweighted numbers
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns						
DOM	13	10	545	18	15	307
Algeria	24	19	673	31	28	405
Morocco and Tunisia	19	15	908	23	20	538
Sub-Saharan Africa	22	24	1,209	26	29	858
Southeast Asia	6	7	529	11	12	255
Turkey	9	5	727	11	8	443
Portugal	3	6	547	6	11	219
Spain and Italy	1	5	219	3	9	85
Other EU-27 countries	5	10	542	7	14	301
Other countries	13	11	1 019	16	14	643
All immigrants	14	13	6,373	19	18	4,054
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns						
DOM	16	14	650	19	17	493
Algeria	21	19	1,306	29	24	878
Morocco and Tunisia	27	19	1,122	32	23	869
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	17	813	27	20	708
Southeast Asia	10	9	573	12	11	489
Turkey	17	14	447	19	15	360
Portugal	8	6	933	11	9	585
Spain and Italy	4	8	1,692	6	14	835
Other EU-27 countries	3	6	649	6	9	332
Other countries	14	4	575	16	6	441
All descendants of immigrants	13	12	8,110	18	17	5,497
Mainstream population	5	7	3,186	8.3	12.0	1,703
All metropolitan population	7	9	18,864	11	13	12,054
<p>* Persons who have been in a position to seek work over the last five years. Source - Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008. Population - Persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France. Interpretation - 13% of men born in a DOM and aged 18-50 reported unfair rejection of a job application in the last five years. Among those who had been unemployed in the last five years, 18% felt that a job application had been unfairly rejected.</p>						

In the table 10 above, we have noticed that both men and women as immigrants and their descendents from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa equally faced discrimination as unfair rejection of job applications (Simon et al. 2010: 60). They are simply discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity or religion. There have been

several instances when French companies avoid recruiting immigrants from North African and sub-Saharan countries by secretly asking employment agencies not to send their applications because of fears associated with crime and work ethics. The fact is that in reality crime is a serious problem in *banlieues* and it is directly linked to poverty, insecurity and inability to find a job. This leads to a kind of situation which is in the form of 2005 French *banlieues* riots, which we will about to discuss. Therefore, it results in a vicious circle in which *Maghrebian* immigrants commit crime because they are unemployed and the reason for this unemployment is that employers think that immigrants will commit crimes. Hence, companies are not willing to open their set up in the *banlieues* where for instance poor work environment and high crime rates (Vladescu 2006). So in this part, we concluded that immigrants are facing economic and cultural discrimination in the labour market; especially if immigrants are Blacks and *Maghrebian* Muslims, they face far more challenges in getting the same job as compared to other. This trend is further aggravated by economic unrest in the job market. So, how is it possible after analysing above, that immigrants are taking jobs of the natives as many argued; this argument is irrational, as immigrants themselves are the victims of unemployment more than natives (see figure 13 below) and the jobs offered to them in most cases are low profile jobs which French do not want to undertake. Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, sub-Saharan Africans and Turkish immigrants are worse affected.

Figure 13: Unemployment rate among immigrants



SOURCE: Patrik Simon, TeO 2009

2005 BANLIEUES RIOTS:

The riots of 2005 took place in French *banlieues* (suburban areas of French cities for minority ethnic settlement), beginning in suburbs north-east of Paris and later spreading across the country, where working class and immigrant-origin youth of *banlieues* rebelling against police harassment (see appendix 1.8). According to Hargreaves (2007: 1) These riots happened because over the long period of time, governments (Left or Right) had utterly failed to solve the long-standing problems mainly socio-economic inequalities, poor housing, lack of good education, denial of equal opportunities, racial and ethnic discrimination by majority ethnic population against immigrant minorities, large unemployment rate, police brutal behaviour towards them; this has been the persistent case since the mid-1970s reconstructing of French labour which lead them to stigmatization. The urban violence was, therefore, a reaction born out of frustration with social, and de-culturalised marginalization, but it mistakenly became mired in culturalist interpretations (Garcia 2010: 255).

But the argument of French government is that there is a failure of minority group's incorporation into French society as they are unwilling to adapt its cultural norms. It is true that immigrants and descendents are unwilling to abandon their culture immediately. For example, was this possible when Europeans migrated to colonial Africa and Asia and abandon their cultural heritage? This had not happened because they were politically and economically strong. Today, immigrants from these colonised countries are economically weak and politically excluded and hence, have to assimilate as per French government norms (Hargreaves 2007: 5). Thus, French government has to understand that leaving cultural baggage behind is a gradual and not a spontaneous process.

“As denied by philosopher Alain Finkielkraut (2005) that the disturbances were a reaction to poverty or racism and claimed instead: the problem is that most of these youths are Blacks or Arabs; with a Muslim identity... it is clear that this is a revolt with an ethno-religious character.” In the opinion of Safran (1986), “Muslims of North-African origin as immigrants were less socio-economically adaptable and far more resistant to cultural change than were earlier waves of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe” (Hargreaves 2007: 4). On this Hargreaves (2007: 8) pointed out that “rioters in 2005 did not have any desire to build an Islamic substitute to French

consumer society but rather by anger at their exclusion from that society, whose secular values they largely share.” He (2007: 5) argued that after 2005 riots, not a single statement is on record of the rioters saying the disturbances were motivated by an Islamic agenda and contrary to the French government argument, huge body of researchers shows that the generation of rioters have culturally assimilated into French society. ‘Dominique Moisi described the rioting youth as a product of the integration policy of France. This policy has led to solitude and exclusion and marginalisation and this solitude has been broken by these riots’ (Reitsma 2007: 11). ‘Thus, it is clear that the 2005 events in the French *banlieues* (and even mill town’ disturbances of 2001 in England) that “the ethnic minority youth involved were not asking for group cultural rights or the preservation of ‘traditions’ from their parents’ homeland or doubting the French integration or assimilationist Republican model of citizenship. They were actually demanding full inclusion in the French and British nation states as citizens with equal opportunities and rights to participate and contribute to the nation. Even all the interviews with them conducted by sociologists and cited by Duprez, Hargreaves, Muchielli, and others confirmed that what they were demanding was a fulfilment of the promises of equal treatment promised in the French idea of citizenship but which they were being denied by blatant discrimination in the labour market and provocative police harassment. The youth involved were not militant multiculturalists or Islamist *jihadists* angered by non-recognition of their cultural identities. Indeed, research on these French young people had consistently confirmed that they identify themselves as French, first and foremost, with little allegiance to the countries from which their parents and grandparents had migrated (only a small proportion of those of North African origin actually speak Arabic, although public and everyday discourse refers to them as ‘Arabs’ and refuses to acknowledge their Frenchness)’ (Rattansi 2007)

IMMIGRANTS AND BIRTH RATE:

At one point, particularly during the 1980s, the French government had adopted policies that would provide funding for those families that contributed to the French birth rate and population. Since birth rates were highest among immigrant groups, particularly *Maghrebians* (Muslim origin) drew the most benefits from the

government program to stop the ageing of the French population. Even, there is always a fear in the minds of native Frenchmen losing his job to immigrants. But the reality is that they take up low-profile jobs that the French were not willing to do themselves. Because of many circular arguments surrounding immigration issues in France it is not easy to find out what the actual reality is. French society fears that there is a cultural and social invasion by immigrant communities, yet the immigrant communities are encouraged to maintain birth rate of the French population (Vladescu 2006). Today, thanks to immigrant's high birth rate and their continuous flow into French society, its demographic ageing is less marked as compared to the European average (Engler n.d.)

IMMIGRANTS IN FRENCH POLITICS:

Some believe that the real problem with immigrants in France has nothing to do with race, religion or culture, but it is legal and political in nature. The rise of *le Front National*⁵¹ (National Front) in France after the economic difficulties *insécurité* (the breakdown of law and order and unemployment) of 1970's, its agenda revolved around French nationalism, patriotism and stopping immigrants to come to France, since then Vladescu (2006) says immigration, assimilation of immigrants, racism etc. became the major issues of French political debate. The recent success of Marine Le Pen, leader of le Front National gaining third most votes in 2012 Presidential elections clearly reflects anti-immigrant sentiments among French. As far as immigrants' representation in French politics is in the question, it is very low or negligible at times. Because they are blamed for, particularly North-Africans, the rising unemployment rate, crimes, violence, insecurity and poor functioning of French society. Leaders like Jean Mari Le Pen, Marine le Pen of *Le Front National* use them as scapegoats for gaining votes from French mainstream population by fuelling up anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentiments and hatred (Reitsma 2007). Statements by Le Pen like "massive immigration has only just begun. It is the biggest problem facing France, European and probably the world. We risk being submerged." These statements will definitely not encourage immigrants to integrate in French society. Furthermore, because of the association of the local and national representatives of

⁵¹ Le Front National party is an extreme right wing political party (inception in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen)

French Muslims with religious organizations, their situation to enter in the mainstream politics has worsened. The principal explanation behind this is the France's commitment to the *laïcité* (French secularism) as discussed in previous chapter. The fact that Muslims are also underrepresented in the French government might also be one of the contributing factors to the difficulty in assimilating (Vladescu 2006: 10). For this academics, intellectuals and political activists, such as Tariq Ramadan fight for Muslim rights and anti discriminatory policies.

It is clearly evident from the above discussion that among ethnic immigrant groups North-Africans (Muslims) are the ones who suffered the most. So in next section, we are going to discuss problems faced by Muslim community in particular.

SECTION 2: ISSUES FACED BY MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN FRANCE

ISLAM IN FRANCE:

After the Second World War, Muslim population in France grew rapidly. This primarily happened because of the process of decolonization when more and more Muslim immigrants began to arrive from French colonies in Africa predominantly from the North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) and West Africa and also from Turkey and the Indian Subcontinent. Though France had always a preference for immigrants from European countries, but in order to sustain birth rate and overcome shortage of labour lead to the recruitment from her ex-colonies. Today France is the home of the EU's largest Islamic community as Islam is now second-largest religion after Catholicism. There are around five million Muslims, almost 10% of the population and Muslims from North Africa is the largest immigration group in France, having the highest birth-rate. Islam is a way of life for Muslims similarly to Europeans who cherished their Christian heritage.

ISSUES RELATED TO ISLAM AND INTEGRATION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY:

It is a challenge for France to integrate its rising Muslim population because of her age-old commitment to the notion of secularism as well as majority of French practising Roman Catholicism. Simultaneously, there is huge burden on Muslims to confront the pressure of adopting French Republican values and secularism. Thus the problem of adjustment confronts on both the sides, French and Muslim community. There exists always a predominant political and public opinion that the minority groups from Islamic countries especially *Maghrebians* posed a threat on French national identity and social cohesion as they are not ready to adapt French cultural norms and assimilate accordingly. It is almost same situation in Western European countries where Muslim immigrants and their descendents face many difficulties while incorporating in the society.

Several issues associated to Muslim community are: construction of minarets, wearing of Islamic headscarves, preference to *halal* meat, permission to do street prayers on Fridays (see appendix 1.2) etc. There are around 1,554 mosques (see appendix 1.3) in France which is quite low as compared to Muslim population. As France being the secular state does not subsidize religious institutions, but it does subsidize historical monuments like Catholic Churches. Lack of enough religious institutions or a place for them in a secular society eventually leads to the problems for example: Muslims praying on streets of Paris on Fridays', for French it is a complete outbreak of law and order and a threat to secularism, while for Muslims it's their religious right. So right to religion as a fundamental human right is conflicting with French 'universal' right of secularism. Similarly, there are very few schools of the Islamic faith compared to Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. There is also a question of regulation of many illegal slaughterhouses. The slaughter of animals according to Muslim rites: this practice raises problems each year at the traditional sacrifices for the Eid festival. Such practices have created frictions with people staying in vicinity over the issues of hygiene and culture (Simon 2003). Moreover, there are many stereotypes, prejudices related to Muslim community in France, which further worsen the integration of them in French society. Islam is perceived as a threat in minds of French people as Islam is linked with fundamentalism and religious fanaticism. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism has created tensions within French society.

Immigrants of Islamic origin are often stereotyped as ‘fundamentalists’ or ‘terrorists’ due to events such as the Gulf War, 1979 Iranian Revolution, uprisings in Algeria, 11/9 attacks in US, bombings in Madrid and London, riots in French *banlieues* which fuelled the feeling of fear among French and other Western European countries vis-à-vis Islam. It is now seen as a link to terrorism and threat to the security of Western countries where France is not the exception. For example, one of the leading French management company had issued a confidential internal memo stating that in order to fight against terrorism, they would not be recruiting any employees of Arab or Muslim origin (Freedman 2004: 130). These linkages create further exclusion for Muslim communities in France. As variations of Muslim community is never been understood by France. For her Muslims from all parts of the world are alike and even Muslims who are born in France and have French nationality are some way or another linked to their foreign origins. Despite of being French citizens, they are the victims of discrimination and racism and often classified as ‘second class citizens’ (Freedman 2004: 129).

‘According to an opinion poll of 1989, respondents characterised Islam by women’s submission, fanaticism, anti-modernism and violence. Furthermore, according to extrapolations by Savage in the next twenty years, on one side, the Muslim population is expected to double; on the other hand, the Non-Muslim population in Europe is expected to fall by 3.5 percent. This implies that ‘if same trend continue’, Muslim population would be 20 percent of the total population in 2050, whilst other predictions point out that, in 2025 Muslims might outnumber non-Muslims in France and perhaps even in the whole of Western-Europe by 2050’ (Savage quoted in Reitsma 2007: 5). European countries have fear that one day European Christendom will be Islamised and Muslims will invade who Europe. These kinds of fears are accentuated by similar statements like by Muammar al-Gadaffi once said, “There are signs that Allah will grant victory to Islam in Europe without swords, without guns, without conquests. We don’t need terrorists, or homicide suicide bombers. The 50 million plus Muslims in Europe will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades” (McLaughlin 2010).

While on the contrary, Fukuyama (1992) perceived that:

“the appeal of Islam was potentially, reaching out to all men as men... And Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, [posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries where it has not achieved the political power directly...Despite the power demonstrated by Islam in its current revival, however, it remains the case that this religion has virtually no appeal outside those areas that were culturally Islamic to begin with. The days of Islam’s cultural conquests, it would seem, are over. It can win back lapsed adherents, but has no resonance for the young people of Berlin, Tokyo or Moscow. And while nearly a billion are culturally Islamic – one fifth of the world population- they cannot challenge liberal-democracy on its own territory on the level of ideas. Indeed, the Islamic world would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse” Fukuyama (1992: 45-46)

Here the key point is that the idea of extrapolations, irrational viewpoints make Europeans more scared and cause more social polarization and stigmatization which eventually creates tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, this should not be happening (Reitsma 2007: 14). According to Francis Fukuyama, the problems begin when people from the traditional societies move into other societies, for instance, when Muslims from their traditional societies move to Western-Europe (Reitsma 2007: 6). He further adds that it is very difficult for first generation immigrants to leave their culture, as they are very much closer to their native culture. On the contrary, their descendents stuck between the two cultures, parent’s culture and host culture and often attracted towards path of fundamentalism and radicalization (Fukuyama quoted in Reitsma 2007: 7). Since many decades, these issues have been highly politicised and the consequences are the emergence of far right-wing parties like Front National in France which are racist, anti-immigrant in nature.

ISLAMIC HEADSCARF CONTROVERSY:

One issue which has received a particularly large amount of attention from politicians, media and public, is the controversy over *foulard islamique* (Islamic headscarf⁵²).

⁵² The term foulard or voile is widely used in dominant French discourse to describe all the different types of headscarf worn by Muslim women. The burqa covers the entire face and body of a woman, and allows her to see through a mesh screen; The niqab is a veil that leaves the area around the eyes clear, and is worn with a head scarf; The hijab, which is more commonly used, is a scarf worn to cover

Earlier, this controversy was particular to French society because secularism plays a key role in French Republican identity especially as a principle in French education system (Freedman 2004); gradually, apart from France, it has fuelled up in Britain, Denmark, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium where now Islamic headscarf is banned. According to Koser (2007), 'Islamic headscarf is a challenge for French society to accommodate it with its historic national principles. On larger level it is about integrating religious populations in a secular society.'

The first incident of foulard or Islamic headscarf dated back in October 1989 when the Ernest Cherniere, a headmaster in Creil, a suburb of Paris, refused to allow three *Maghrebi* girls to come to school wearing their headscarves because this would break the notion of *laïcité* (secularism) as religious symbolism conflicted with the secular environment of French schools. For some people, headmaster's action is seen as racist decision against the Muslim community, for others he was seen as a hero who is defending secularism of a French school against multi-racial society (Freedman 2004).

This affair faced many criticisms from intellectuals and Muslim organizations. Many reactions came out from the political parties, according to Le Front National, wearing of headscarf to school was a clear sign of Islamic invasion of France. But for socialist party, the opinion was divided because on one side, they wanted to stay loyal to the French republican values and on other side; they wanted a policy in favour of immigrants in France (Freedman 2004: 133). Immigration had become an important issue after this affair in the political scenario. In 1994, the debate over the issue of girls wearing headscarves to school was resumed, when François Bayrou (the minister of education in a centre right-wing government) published a circular stating that 'ostentatious' religious symbols should not be allowed in schools. This happened because he perceived a growing fear about the influence of Islam in French schools. For him, the wearing of a crucifix or a Jewish kippa were 'unostentatious'. Thus it was clear that the attack was specifically on Islamic headscarf and was linked to the debate over immigration, nationality and citizenship. In a speech justifying his reforms, the minister of interior in that period, Charles Pasqua clearly stated that in order to become French an immigrant must reject any kind of religious

the head and neck. The refusal of the French to use the Arabic term such as hijab can be seen as another indication of their opposition to multiculturalism in France.

fundamentalism. He was in some way pointing towards Islamic fundamentalism. He argued that headscarves to school are responsible for raising racist and xenophobic feelings and thus in order to escape from these kinds of racist acts, it is essential for Muslims to get assimilated with the French Republican values (Freedman 2004: 135). But on the other side of the situation, it is difficult to accept the idea of wearing headscarf as a threat to French Republican tradition if the actual number of girls wearing are about 15,000⁵³ out of 350,000 Muslim girls were attending public schools. In a goal to defend the secular values of the Republic as laid down by law in 1905 (strict separation between church and the state) while managing the “complex” diversity and also to solve the problem of Islamic headscarf Jacques Chirac, in 2003 appointed Stasi commission. The two important legislations came out in 2004 were: first law was passed in February 2004 that banned wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. For example, prohibiting Muslim’s headscarf, Jewish’s yarmulke, Christian’s cross, Sikh’s turban and other “conspicuous” religious symbols in state schools. “The importance of the commission's resulting report is on the need to respect constitutional secularist and republican values in the public sphere as a unifying factor in a diverse society. The commission's report argued that the French educational system should be a neutral environment where the principles of secularism, republicanism, and citizenship are taught and reflected” (Hamilton et al. 2004). Another law was introduced to combat religious fundamentalism i.e. those immigrants who incite violence against any individual will be deported (Engler n.d.). The report also supported developing other policies to fight against discrimination in the public sphere, responding to mounting concerns that discrimination is on the rise (Hamilton et al 2004). According to Jaques Chirac, ‘we cannot accept that some people are hiding an aberrant conception of religious freedom in order to defy the laws of the Republic and to put into question of the fundamental principles of a modern society, namely sexual equality and women’s dignity’ and even socialist party general secretary, Francois Hollande, supported the idea that they were committed to ‘fighting for secularism’... (Freedman 2004: 136). As per one newspaper article: is it a few dozen girls wearing headscarves in schools who are threatening the Republican pact? Or is it the inequalities, discrimination, ghettos and unemployment that are so

⁵³ (Source: Ministry of Interior, 1994)

often ignored when it comes to reform? (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 2002 quoted in Freedman 2004: 137)

As per many media reports, the young women who chose to wear headscarves in schools are mere victims of dominating fathers or tools of Islamic organisations who manipulated them for their own purposes. According to Vladescu (2006) some feminists, scholars and government officials consider the Islamic headscarf to be a repressive symbol which intended to subjugate women. But, for some Muslim women, wearing of the headscarf is a personal decision, a key part of their identity, not as a result of pressure from a patriarchal social order (see appendix 1.4). Shada Islam⁵⁴ believes that “French officials should concentrate on integrating the country’s Muslim population, a group which has been marginalized economically, socially and politically. Feelings of discrimination have pushed many younger Muslims to embrace a more radicalized Islam that is difficult to reconcile with many European values. Until France and other nations learn to embrace their growing Muslim populace, she concludes, this divide will only deepen” (Islam 2004). Reitsma (2007: 10) says ‘this ban supposedly was meant to protect the universal rights of women and to encourage gender equality. But it seems that output is not the same as expected. This ban will further exclude Muslim women from European societies in the name of “universal” (Eurocentric conceptions) women’s rights. This law only reinforced the exclusion and marginalisation of Muslims in socio-cultural-economic milieus and spread the climate of hostility towards Islam by fuelling anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiments in French society.’ Moreover, bans on cultural and religious symbols of immigrants add insecurities about their identities while providing a momentum to Far Right wing parties and widespread nationalist sentiment (Vladescu 2006). According to some critics, this was a political game to relieve concerns of mainstream population. The act was rather anti-Islam rather than pro-secularism, resulting in rise of racism instead of preventing it (Hamilton et al. 2004). Koser (2007) adds by saying this law is discriminatory and fuelled anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment in France.

While, those who are against the wearing of headscarves or so called proponents of this law argued that they were protecting Muslim girls from a patriarchal order while

⁵⁴ Born in Pakistan, Shada Islam is a Senior Program Executive with the European Policy Centre think tank in Brussels, where she is an expert on immigration.

liberating them from Islamic pressure and patriarchal power within their families and communities. Further, secular education would have an emancipatory effect on these girls (Freedman 2004: 139). According to the French government state schools must have neutral environment where the principles of secularism, republicanism, and citizenship are taught and reflected (Koser 2007). Through this French government promotes national uniformity and cohesion, but “by keeping girls who wear the scarf out of school, Tariq Ramadan says, the state pushes them toward Koranic schools—thus separating them and their families from public schools and the mainstream. The result could be insularity and ultimately, perhaps, radicalism” (Ramadan 2003 quoted in Vladescu 2006: 16). Whatever the reason one may give in favour or against the ban, but for France the headscarf issue served to hide many real important issues like inequality of gender, class and race (Freedman 2004: 140).

MEASURES TAKEN BY FRANCE TO INTEGRATE MUSLIM COMMUNITY:

Though, France perceives difficulties in integrating Muslim community, but the French government has taken tentative steps in a more multiculturalist direction, although multiculturalism remains a taboo in French public discourse. The obstacle that Islam is seen to represent to integration is as much political as religious because Islam refuses secularism, one of the principles at the heart of French republicanism (Freedman 2004: 130). Especially after 2001 terror attacks in the U.S, the French government has been trying to encourage a kind of Islam which must be compatible with the modern France and its constitution. It continues to state its willingness to incorporate into French society a type of Islam that would be independent of its roots in any one country of origin (Simon 2003). “Although France’s Muslim community is probably the first in history that has contemplated integration into a Christian society. But its proclaimed objective is to become French while keeping faith with Islam while the reality is France’s Muslims find few precedents for cultural adaptation” (Viorst quoted in Vladescu 2006). For this several measures have been taken by the French government. Before the beginning of the 20th century, no single organization has ever been recognised by the state as the formal representative of the Muslim community, capable of representing all of the country's Muslims. But with the efforts of Nicolas

Sarkozy (Minister of the Interior at that time), French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM)⁵⁵ was created on 28 May 2003 (Engler n.d.). The other principal Muslim organisations are National Federation of Muslims of France (FNMF) and Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF). French Council of the Muslim Faith is an Islamic representative body that would address socio-cultural, economic, religious and political issues of Muslims community in France. For example according to Simon (2003) it facilitates the dialogue on the social and public practice of Islam, such as the month-long Ramadan fasting holiday, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the training of imams, the construction of mosques etc. Vladescu (2006) pointed out that one of the aims of the organization is to eventually integrate Islam into French society in much the same way as Protestantism was integrated centuries ago. Thus it clearly shows “a fundamental desire of French government and Islamic organizations to cooperate and compromise on issues that will allow both sides to tolerate and learn from each other”. Hamilton et al (2004) argues that the creation of a “Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration” (National Center for Immigration History) in Paris is an apparent example of French government recognizing heritage of different immigrant groups and their contributions to French society. According to Modood, the social inclusion of Muslims will not be achieved until the Muslim immigrant group (an ethno-religious group) is not involved in the discussions with the French government in deciding the policies for protecting their rights. Moreover, Muslims should not be given freedom to practice ‘illiberal practices’ and live with their own set of laws. However, it is not at all possible that these differences will disappear in short span of time and Muslims as individuals can easily give away their identity (Modood quoted in Garcia 2010).

SECTION 3: MULTICULTURALISM MODEL IN EUROPE: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Multiculturalism entered public discourse in the late 1960's and early 1970's, started as public movement at first in Australia and Canada, and then to the U.S.A. and U.K. Under this model immigrants could adapt to country's norms and values but at the

⁵⁵ This is intended to provide united representation before the government of all Muslims living in France and also to be responsible for the training of imams (Muslim religious leaders)

same time maintain their culture and traditions. Parekh (1999) states, “Multiculturalism is best understood neither as a political doctrine with a programmatic content nor a philosophical school with a distinct theory of man’s place in the world but as a perspective on or a way of viewing human life.” Multiculturalism celebrates cultural diversity amongst different groups irrespective of their race, region, religion, gender, ethnicity, language etc. According to Bloemard (2011), there are two forms of multiculturalism, ‘one is demographic multiculturalism and other is multiculturalism as a public policy. Demographic multiculturalism as the name suggests shows actual pluralism in the society because of immigrants’ different cultures, religions, languages etc. while multiculturalism as a public policy recognises the pluralism and celebrates diversity in the society through government policies.’

Kymlicka (2012) has suggested several factors that can either facilitate or impede the successful implementation of multiculturalism: de-securitisation of ethnic relations, human rights, border control, diversity of immigrant groups and economic contributions.

STRENGTHS OF MULTICULTURALISM MODEL:

Multiculturalism reflects the actual pluralism exist in the society because of immigrants and minorities groups. Further, this pluralism is recognised, accommodated and supported by public policy. Parekh (1999) underlines three central insights of multiculturalism:

“First, human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations in terms of a culturally derived system of meaning and significance.

Second, different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life. Since each realises a limited range of human capacities and emotions and grasps only a part of the totality of human existence, it needs other cultures to help it understand itself better, expand its intellectual and moral horizon, stretch its imagination, save it from narcissism to guard it against the obvious temptation to absolutise itself, and so on.

Third, every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought. This does not mean that it is devoid of coherence and identity, but that its identity is plural, fluid and open. Cultures grow out of conscious and unconscious interactions with each other, define their identity in terms of what they take to be their significant

other, and are at least partially multicultural in their origins and constitution. Each carries bits of the other within itself.”

WEAKNESSES OF MULTICULTURAL MODEL:

‘Some critics assert that multiculturalism views cultures and ethnic groups in static terms, which strengthens ethnic cleavages and at the same time give rise to separatism, segregation, and ghettoisation and even the danger that the recognition of cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity may lead to “Balkanization” or to the creation of parallel societies, thereby limiting social cohesion. Another pertinent issue is under this model, some certain groups can enjoy more institutional resources because of their good relationship with the state as compared to others-which are the clear signs of inequality. This is even true for multilingual countries where some languages may enjoy privileged positions compared to other languages. For example, Italian language in Switzerland does not have the same status as compared to other official languages like French and German’ (Garcia 2010: 255-256).

Because of the weaknesses of this model, a fear has been developed among the majority group of countries that the accommodation of diversity has “gone too far” and is threatening their way of life, national unity and cohesion. That’s why since the mid-1990’s western European countries have started retreating from multiculturalism and reasserting the ideas of nation building, common values and identity. Furthermore, anti-immigrants, anti-discrimination and nationalist sentiments are simultaneously fuelled by far right groups such as National Front in France, Geert Wilders's Freedom Party in the Netherlands etc. in European countries. Even, over the past few years, integration discourse has been shifted to “civic integration”, “social cohesion” and “common values” (Kymlicka 2012: 3-14). Moreover, multicultural societies generally experience conflicts which are mostly cultural in nature because one group imposes its culture on others based on the notion that their culture is superior to the other and the consequences are for instance rise of *Islamophobia*-sentiments of hatred and insecurity towards Muslim community or a kind of fear developed towards immigrants among natives (see appendix 1.6). Jopkke (2012) argues in Europe, religion particularly Islam is deemed to be problematic when striking balance between cohesion and individual freedom and it is considered Europe’s main cultural integration problem. However, the core cause of European

integration problems is socio-economic in nature rather than religious. Several events that have occurred in the recent past in the multicultural European societies such as the Rushdie Affair of 1989, 2001 UK riots, 9/11 terrorist attack on U.S.A., murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands, 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 London bombings, 2005 French *banlieues* riots, mass killing by Norwegian Anders Breivik in 2011, Frankfurt Airport shooting in 2011, the murder of British and French soldier in London and Paris respectively in 2013 and other such incidents etc. lead big European Leaders to state recently that multiculturalism is failed in European society and a kind of backlash against integration has emerged (see appendix 1.7). Bertossi (2011) asserts that,

“the difference between multiculturalism and republicanism, a difference that was long considered a major element in citizenship policies, is less sharp than it used to be (Joppke, 2007). A “backlash” seems to have emerged against multiculturalism in the Netherlands and Britain (for a critique of backlash arguments, see Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009). Some authors, arguing against the conception of strongly path dependent models, have addressed this multicultural backlash by describing a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship, and a retreat from multiculturalism in favor of a new “civic integration” approach” Bertossi (2011: 1567).

In the United Kingdom, David Cameron said multiculturalism had failed to promote common identity and encouraged Muslim segregation and radicalisation. In Germany, Chancellor Merkel has also said multiculturalism is dead, as the Germany is threatened by the immigration from Muslim countries. In France, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared multiculturalism a failed concept and called for a renewed focus on France's “identity” (Bloemard 2011). Similarly, “former Australian Prime Minister John Howard and former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar have also in recent months said multicultural policies have not successfully integrated immigrants” (France24 2011).

However, Kymlicka (2012: 3-14) argues that multiculturalism is still working in some countries though it has been declared failure. For this he and his co-authors have constructed a Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) which is useful for identifying which countries are multicultural in nature i.e. in the sense of having adopted multicultural policies. This index measures the extent to which eight types of


policies appear in 21 Western nations at three distinct points — 1980, 2000, and 2010 — thus capturing policy changes over time. (see figure 14).

“The countries were each evaluated for:

1. Constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/ or regional and municipal levels
2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum
3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing
4. Exemptions from dress codes, either by statute or by court cases
5. Allowing of dual citizenship
6. The funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities
7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups” (Kymlicka 2012: 7)

and the result shows that multiculturalism is strong in Australia and Canada; modest in Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and USA and weak in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. Thus, if it is working, then why has there been such a retreat from it and why political leaders have declared the failure of multiculturalism. Kymlicka (2012: 3-14) says that, “part of the answer is that reports of the death of multiculturalism are exaggerated. Politicians in Britain and Australia, for example, have decided not to use the “*m* word” — instead favoring terms like *diversity*, *pluralism*, *intercultural dialogue*, or *community cohesion* — but these changes in wording have not necessarily affected actual policies and programs on the ground. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s announcement that multiculturalism has “utterly failed” is puzzling, since the approach has not actually been tried in a significant way in Germany.”

Figure 14: Multiculturalism Policy Index Scores for Selected Countries, 1989-2010



CONCLUSION

The purpose of the research was to study the model of immigrant integration in France which is generally known as assimilationist model. More specifically we tried to analyse strengths and weaknesses of this model- by examining French immigrant integration policy and problems faced by immigrants in the French society.

The study began by conceptualising key concepts related to migration and examining the global trends of immigration affected by push and pull factors of migration. Subsequently this chapter moved to contemporary history of immigration in Europe and France.⁵⁶ After examining the immigration trends at global, European as well as at French level, we have inferred two most important points: firstly, most of the immigrants are immigrating to the West and North of Europe, and secondly, cultural diversity and pluralism are the elements of today's French society- enriched by European and non-European immigrant's culture where Asians, African and Europeans cohabited.

In the subsequent chapter we have attempted to acquaint ourselves with French Republican notions such as Universalism and Secularism which are the strengths of assimilationist model and the different models of immigrant integration, so that it would be easier for us to comprehend French policy of immigrant integration which is based on these Republican notions and is different from other models of integration.⁵⁷

Later, we discussed about the problems of immigrant integration into French society. We have deduced that European immigrants can easily assimilate into French society as compared to non-Europeans- more specifically North-Africans and sub-Saharan Africans who are mostly the victims of racial discrimination, segregation, exclusion and inequalities in social sectors such as education, employment, housing etc. The issues pertaining to these groups are not taken seriously and on the contrary, they are made scapegoat by far right political parties who are infusing the ideology of 'Othering', anti-immigrant agenda, racism and are even major impediments in the achievement of immigrant integration in the European nations. According to Beaman (2012), "even those immigrants and descendents who are successful in terms of educational qualifications and professional status are frequently denied to full inclusion in the French society. By traditional means, one may say they are

⁵⁶ Refer to chapter 2

⁵⁷ Refer chapter 3

assimilated: their native tongue is French, they are educated at French schools and universities, and they are French citizens. But immigrant population, in reality, is continued to experience marginalisation”. Further, after examining carefully these non-European immigrant groups, we came to know that though social and economic challenges are faced by all non-European immigrants but Muslim immigrants particularly from Africa are the worst affected, who even face lots of issues with their cultural integration into French society. The apt example is 2005 French *banlieues* riots which have clearly revealed the limitations of French immigrant integration model. Even, we have tried to briefly examine strengths and weaknesses of model of multiculturalism in Europe.

The analysis shows that there exists negative attitudes towards immigrants and socio-cultural, economic and political inequalities reflect that immigrant integration policies are far from being successful in addressing the problems of immigrants. Western models of immigrant integration like multiculturalism and assimilation are incompatible for integrating ‘Third world countries’ migrants specially Muslims immigrants. However, Islamic doctrinaires such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi or Tariq Ramadan, envisage that European Muslims can be integrated only by an extreme program of multicultural recognition (Jopkke 2012: 6), while Koser (2007) argues by focussing on less abstract and more practical issues, especially education, labour market and economic incorporation, healthcare and social services, and participation in civil and political life integration can be achieved. To manage diversity in these multicultural societies, mutual efforts are required (Garcia 2010). In order to improve the cultural integration of immigrants, Jopkke (2012: 1-2) recommends, “three guiding principles and three policy stances for governments. These are

- States must be liberal in the right way- establishing a procedural framework.
- Freedom of expression is critical- stifling public debates only feeds extremism.
- Policy is not a cure-all
- Policy must protect the majority culture- states should practice “gentle pluralism”
- Societies must fight discrimination more effectively
- Governments must select the ‘right immigrants’- selection should be based on skill rather than ethnicity.”

According to the European Commission Staff Working Paper,

“Integration is a multidimensional process of interactions between immigrants and the receiving society. Member States are primarily responsible for developing and implementing integration policies but measures taken at EU level provide support to actions in Member States to promote the integration of third-country nationals. Effective integration of migrants into the receiving societies is essential for the success of any migration policy...Migrants' integration may be hindered by the lack of knowledge of language, institutions, culture and traditions of the receiving country. In addition, formal or de facto discrimination may create obstacles to an inclusive society. To overcome such barriers, efforts are needed to support migrants' language learning, to assist them in their introduction, to facilitate their access to employment and education, to ensure decent living conditions, to improve recognition of skills and qualifications, to promote diversity at work places, and to raise awareness among the general public of the contribution of migration and migrants to European societies. The EU must engage in a two-way process of mutual accommodation, requiring both the strong commitment on the side of the receiving society and the active participation of migrants. In this process, everyone has to respect fundamental rights, as laid down in the European treaties and national constitutions. And a fair balance between rights and obligations must be ensured” EC (2011: 2-3)

The study advocates the intercultural model of social integration as an alternative to the other models namely assimilation and multiculturalism. According to the European Commission (2009),

“as European societies are moving away from previous models of multiculturalism and assimilation, where different cultures tend to co-exist without interacting and where migrants are expected to adopt the majority culture. To make the most of the diversity which characterises Europe, communities need to make a strong commitment to intercultural dialogue. The concept of interculturalism embraces the idea of a fruitful exchange between different cultural groups that will enrich the whole society. As a result, intercultural dialogue has an increasingly important role to play in fostering European identity and citizenship” (EC 2009: 3).

Many scholars such as Modood, Shachar defines interculturalism as

“an interactive process of living together in diversity, with the full participation and social exchange between all members of society which lead to form a cohesive and plural civic community. Moreover, this model acknowledges that all societies are composed of different groups and that minority culture groups also deserve the right to propose changes to the society, provided that these changes can be demonstrated to be in the best interests of the cultural group at large and that they do not violate the rights of

any other group. This invites the possibility of mutual criticism between groups and mutual learning across difference. This approach, therefore, goes beyond the notion of recognition and open dialogue in that it offers the possibility of actual structural change in the society. This approach is the most probable and realistic solution for achieving social, political, and economic cohesion in ethno-culturally diverse societies” Garcia (2010: 261).

Both the Council of Europe and UNESCO have in past promoted multiculturalism, but since 2008 both have proposed the need to shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism. “In Europe, in the wake of militant Islam and the moral panic over Muslim immigration and integration, interculturalism or ‘intercultural dialogue’ is being advocated as an alternative to multiculturalism, offering a more acceptable set of principles and arrangements for the state management of cultural diversity” (Levey 2012: 218).

To foster intercultural dialogue at the European level a large number of activities have been initiated. Some of these are discussed below.

- **Intercultural Cities** is a joint project of the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

“In an intercultural city:

- diversity is a source of dynamism, innovation, creativity and growth
- diversity is accepted as the norm and heritage and identity of all people is affirmed
- public spaces, schools, homes, workplaces and cultural forums are designed to enable people from different cultural backgrounds to mix, exchange and interact productively and creatively.
- public consultation, debate and decision making reflect the community’s cultural mix - cultural conflict is accepted and dealt with - often at the grassroots level
- politicians and the media encourage citizens' participation in creating a shared identity

To make this vision a reality, cities must develop an intercultural strategy to transform their policies, public spaces, institutions and the relationships between communities” (EC 2013)

- **European Neighbours get Together**

“Ever since its creation in Paris in 1999, European Neighbours’ Day has become increasingly popular. On 27 May 2008 it was celebrated in 29

countries, 20 of which belong to the European Union. Over 9 million people in about 1,000 towns hosted “neighbour” gatherings, and in spite of bad weather in many countries, the enthusiasm of European citizens showed that solidarity is a shared goal and that people are prepared to pull together for a simple and generous project, regardless of their social background or cultural origins” (EC 2009: 49) (see appendix 1.9)

➤ **The European Federation for Intercultural Learning (EFIL)**

“EFIL and its AFS member organisations (formerly American Field Service) were particularly active during the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. EFIL is a leading European voluntary organization in the field of educational exchanges for secondary school pupils, through which thousands of volunteers promote the idea of mobility for the sake of intercultural dialogue.” (EC 2009: 49)

As far as France is concerned, model of interculturalism has already implemented. For instance,

“in cooperation with the French National Agency for Equality and Social Cohesion, a campaign was set up which allowed for the evaluation of more than 500 projects promoting intercultural dialogue, many of which received the official label “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008”. (EC 2009: 51)

Now, the main question arises is that how interculturalism is different from multiculturalism?

Firstly, interculturalism is supposedly more geared toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism. Second, that interculturalism is conceived as something less ‘groupist’ or more yielding of synthesis than multiculturalism. Third, that interculturalism is something more committed to a stronger sense of the whole, for example in terms of social cohesion and national citizenship. Finally, multiculturalism can be illiberal (mainly illiberal practices such as Muslim practices such as veiling of Muslim women, forced marriages, female genital mutilation, among Muslim immigrant groups) while interculturalism is more likely to lead to criticism of illiberal cultural practices (as part of the process of intercultural dialogue) (Meer and Modood 2012: 177)

Moreover according to Sze and Powell, “Multiculturalism tends to preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism acknowledges and enables cultures to have currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, to be modified and evolve” (Sze and Powell as quoted in Meer and Modood 2012:185)

As compared to other models of social integration, interculturalism seems to be more yielding and suitable for European society as it has been predicted so far. Some of the advantages of interculturalism are: “it is a better term than multiculturalism. It emphasises interaction and participation of citizens in a common society, rather than cultural differences and different cultures existing next to each other without necessarily much contact or participative interaction. It is therefore equivalent to mutual integration. While multiculturalism boils down to celebrating difference, interculturalism is about understanding each other’s cultures, sharing them and finding common ground on which people can become more integrated.” (NewStart Magazine 7 June, 2006 as quoted in Meer and Modood 2012:188).

Thus in brief the key message of interculturalism is:

- ❖ Intercultural dialogue is a process through which all those living in the EU can improve their ability to deal with a more open, but also more complex, cultural environment. Different cultural identities and beliefs coexist in different Member States, as well as within each Member State.
- ❖ Intercultural dialogue is an opportunity to contribute to and benefit from a diverse and dynamic society, not only in Europe but also in the world.
- ❖ Intercultural dialogue is a fundamental part of active European citizenship which is open to the world. It respects cultural diversity and is based on common values in the EU, as laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
- ❖ Intercultural dialogue contributes to social cohesion and is a means to promote flexibility and adaptation to the changes in human resources brought about by the success of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs.
- ❖ Intercultural dialogue should be an important part of European policies towards neighbouring countries and external relations further afield (EC 2009: 3).

To conclude, one may say that migration is going to rise further in future. With its social, economic, political, cultural causes and consequences the complexity of situation will grow. The issue of social integration of immigrants will be confronted by all societies receiving the “others”. Time has proved some models of social integration of “others” as less effective. The new models are considered to be more yielding, practical and effective. But no matter what policy or practice may be prevalent the goal is to integrate the “other” in the host society.

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
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APPENDIX 1




Source: <http://www.asso-france-algerie.fr/visuels-exposition/>.



SOURCE: <http://www.myfrenchliflife.org/2012/05/25/toward-a-new-french-identity/>.

1.1 IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE





SOURCE: <http://toonsonline.net/news/674/Sarkozy-nixes-halal-meat-in-schools-for-Muslims>


1.2 FRIDAY PRAYER ON FRENCH STREETS & 'NO' TO HALLAL MEAT



1.3 MOSQUE IN PARIS



1.4 SOURCE: PARIS JE T'AIME (French Movie)



• Burqa




• Niqab



• Hijab



• Jilbab





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
Source: <http://www.theipinionsjournal.com/2010/07/burqa-banned-in-france/>

1.5 RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN FRANCE V/S REPUBLICAN VALUES OF FRANCE



Source: <http://kebunketereh.com/?p=3923>

1.6 RISING ISLAMPHOBIA IN EUROPE



"Stop or more? You can choose: Vote Campaign poster of the Front National



Anders Behring Breivik



Bombings and Riots in Madrid, London and Paris

Source: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Terrorism%20threatens%20Europe_101784

1.7 FAILURE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE



© AFP/Getty Images

Posted: Nov. 9, 2005

Carlson — CWS
MURPHY'S JOURNAL SENTINEL



1.8 FRENCH BANLIEUES RIOTS IN 2005



Source: <http://www.looktothestars.org/news/10279-duchess-of-cornwall-takes-part-in-big-lunch-event>

‘BIG LUNCH’ - to foster inter-cultural dialogue



**1.9 INTERCULTURALISM: A NEW MODEL OF
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION FOR EUROPE**