

**THE UN SYSTEM as an  
INSTRUMENT of DIPLOMACY:  
A CASE—STUDY of UNESCO**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the Degree of  
**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**MIHIRA VARDHAN R**

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067

1987

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deep gratitude to my guide, Professor Satish Kumar, who despite his busy schedule found time to go over my drafts, identify short-comings and accordingly suggest changes. His guidance has greatly enhanced the quality of this dissertation. My special thanks to Dr. Pushpesh Pant, Dr. K. D. Kapur and Mr. V. K. H. Jambholkar of the Diplomatic Studies Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, for their valuable suggestions.

There are several others who helped me in the process of writing this dissertation all of whom it is not possible to mention by name here. However, the names of Mrs. Sondhi, Librarian of the UNESCO, New Delhi and typists, Mr. Chand Narain Sharma and Mrs. Usha Malhotra deserve special mention.

New Delhi

July 1987

  
MIHIRA VARDHAN R.

## CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
PREFACE	i - vi
Chapter I THE UN SYSTEM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY	1 - 50
Chapter II UNESCO : STRUCTURE AND PROCESS	51 - 68
Chapter III UNESCO AS A FORUM OF DIPLOMACY	69 - 113
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION	114-124
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	125-132

## GLOSSARY

CAME	Conference of Allied Ministers of Education.
CDF	Capital Development Fund.
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council.
EPTA	Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation.
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank Group).
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation.
IDA	International Development Association.
IFC	International Finance Corporation.
IICI	International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation.
ILO	International Labour Organisation.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
ITU	International Telecommunication Union.
SPF	Special Projects Fund.
SUNFED	Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Glossary continues...

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly.
UNSF	United Nations Special Fund.
UPU	Universal Postal Union.
WHO	World Health Organisation.
WMO	World Meteorological Organization.

## PREFACE

The UN celebrated its 40th birthday on 24 October, 1985. To use the word 'celebrated,' perhaps, is not appropriate because the achievements of the past four decades have not approximated the expectations of 1945 and because the future, in this respect, is less than encouraging. During these forty years the UN structurally and functionally has had to face many a crisis. At about the time of its 40th anniversary its future was once again in jeopardy with the US and its allies making threatening noises. It spawned fears of a crisis worse than the bad experience of the early 60s. The 40th birthday itself was marred by the US threat to quit and its stubbornness to compromise on a resolution on Palestine in the Final Consensus Declaration.

Neither has the sailing been smooth for the Specialized Agencies, most of which completed 40 years of functioning at around the same time as the UN. Anxiety, tension and gloom have shadowed almost every passing year with the realisation of their constitutional ideals still a remote dream. A year prior to the 40th birthday of UNESCO, the US had withdrawn and cut off about 25% of the funds thereby putting tremendous financial pressure

on the agency. The UNESCO is not an isolated case. As a matter of fact in the post 80s the whole UN System has been under attack from a few Western countries. The US and its faithful allies have expressed dissatisfaction with the work of a number of Specialized Agencies. Not long ago the US threatened to serve notice on WHO, if it did not change its policies and programmes.

However, in the face of crises the UN and Specialized Agencies have shown an amazing capacity for survival. In the words of T.V.Sathyamurthy:

In contrast to the League System, however, the UN System, despite its numerous handicaps, uneven record and its complex organisation has demonstrated its capacity to survive...\*

The budding UN crisis appears to have been nipped with some structural changes that seem to have satisfied the US. When the US withdrew from the ILO in 1979 resulting in the loss of about 25% of its budget, many thought the agency would collapse. But not only did the ILO survive

---

\* T.V.Sathyamurthy, "Twenty Years of UNESCO : An Interpretation", International Organisation (Boston), vol.21, no.2, 1967, pp.614-15.

but it also had the gratification of seeing the US return to its fold in 1980. Despite the financial constraints it is unlikely that the UNESCO will fold up. The UN System while growing like an organism has learnt to adapt and adjust itself to the emerging environment. If there is any cause for celebration it should be for the fact that the UN System has survived.

But a few questions remain to be answered. Why have the achievements of the past four decades woefully fallen short of the expectations of 1945? Why have some countries expressed unhappiness over the UN System? Why have the same countries extended threats and even carried them out? Why have others been steadfast in their support? These are some of the questions this dissertation seeks to answer and in the process show the true nature of the UN System.

A study on any diplomatic aspect carries with it certain inherent limitations. Despite all talk of open or parliamentary diplomacy the fact remains that substantive diplomacy is still conducted in secrecy. It is only in behind-the-scene negotiations that many of the diplomatic techniques can be effectively employed. However, this secrecy results in a loss of material for the research scholar. Governments are notorious for their



reticence on public matters -- national and international. What they reveal is very marginal in comparison to what they keep confidential. It is doubtful whether even the memoirs or interviews of diplomats who have actually participated in the back-channel talks or 'participant observers' reveal the whole secret works of diplomacy. The research scholar therefore has to mainly rely on the press reports and open statements or speeches made by diplomatic representatives presuming that they reflect the inner goings-on.

Here the author has relied both on primary and secondary material. The primary sources are UNESCO documents -- Records and Resolutions of the General Conference, Resolutions of the Executive Board, annual Reports of the Director-General and other official records. It may be noted here that except for short references here and there, a substantive study of diplomacy at the level of the Executive Board has not been made because of the non-availability of records of Executive Board's proceedings from 1946 to 1980. In so far as secondary sources are concerned the author has mostly gone in for books and articles by those who have actually been concerned with the inside work of the UN and UNESCO with the aim of getting a better insight into secret negotiations.

Finally the scheme of development of this dissertation which covers the post World War II period needs some explanation. As the UN System is a mammoth network of organisations it is virtually impossible to cover each and every institution structurally and functionally. A selective study is therefore imperative. In Section I of Chapter I four principal organs of the UN — UNGA, ECOSOC, Secretariat and the Security Council — have been dealt with with an accent on the first three because of their bearing on social and economic activities. In so far as the Specialized Agencies are concerned, three institutions have been selected with a view to broadly represent this Sub-System. The first part of Section II deals with the attitudes of three countries — US, USSR and India — towards the UN system. These three countries broadly represent the three worlds. This is of course a sweeping generalization. But because of space constraints and the need to avoid unwieldiness this selective course has been adopted. The second part keeping in view the diplomatic focus of the study covers some of the diplomatic techniques employed by member-states in pursuit of their objectives. Section III of this chapter is issue-oriented with each issue trying to bring out one or two diplomatic techniques, mentioned earlier, practised by member-states.

The second Chapter follows the lines of the Section I of Chapter I. In this, a comprehensive study has been made of UNESCO's structure and process. Chapter III follows the lines of Sections II and III of Chapter I. The first part of Chapter III deals with the attitude of the three representative countries noted earlier, towards the UNESCO at the time of its creation. Two more — Britain and France — have been included here because of their special interest in UNESCO. The second part deals with issues covering all the primary areas with which UNESCO is concerned with the diplomatic techniques discussed in Chapter I figuring here also. The areas include natural sciences, social sciences, culture, education and communication. In view of the highly conflictive nature of communication greater attention has been given to it with a coverage of up-to-date developments. The fourth Chapter includes the author's evaluation and conclusion.

## Chapter - I

### THE UN SYSTEM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY

International organisations, although established to promote the larger interests of the world community in the areas of maintenance of international peace and security and promotion of general welfare, have emerged as important instruments of national diplomacy. Defining international organisations in terms of their intended purposes, they are generally established to accomplish all or some of the following objectives:

- (1) Regulation of international relations primarily through techniques of peaceful settlement of disputes among nation-states.
- (2) Minimization or, at least, control of international conflict and war.
- (3) Promotion of cooperation, developmental activities among nation-states for the social and economic benefit of certain regions or of humankind in general.
- (4) Collective defense of a group of nation states against external threat.<sup>(1)</sup>

In short international organisations profess to maintain international peace and security and provide for the

---

1      Coulombis and Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations : Power and Justice (New Delhi, 1986), p.276.

well-being of humanity. But in reality, history shows that member-states have used international organisations first and foremost as instruments to preserve and promote their national interests. Consequently the interests of the larger whole have been either neglected or assigned only secondary importance. Joseph Frankel notes:

International organisations serve in the first instance not the purposes of larger communities desirous of incorporating the individual states, but on the contrary, the purposes of the member-states.(2)

For instance, Britain perceived the Holy Alliance, formed after the Napoleonic Wars, as a mechanism to preserve the status quo of 1815 and preclude France from producing another Napoleon; its interests, however, clashed with that of the other great European power, Russia, who perceived it as an instrument to interfere in the affairs of others and gain influence in the European theatre of politics. A similar divergence of interests prevailed between two key European powers during the functioning of

---

2      Quoted in Houshang Ameri, *Politics and Process in the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations* (Aldershot, 1982), p.19.

the League of Nations. While France perceived the League primarily as an instrument to keep Germany permanently disabled, and enable itself to emerge as the strongest power in Europe, Britain saw no harm in granting some capability to Germany, if only to restrain the ambitions of France. The chief purpose of Britain, therefore, was to frustrate the ambitious designs of France and broadly preserve the European balance of power.<sup>3</sup>

The United Nations, born soon after World War II, was originally conceived as an 'extension of war-time alliance' and a mechanism through which the big powers would 'police' the whole world as its guardians. These grand hopes were, however, dashed when the simmering tensions between East and West broke out into the Cold War. Apparent allies turned into enemies. Cooperation turned into conflict. Mutual distrust, tension and hatred developed as the two sides perceived each other as conspiring to overthrow the status-quo of 1945. The chief foreign policy goal of US and USSR, the two most powerful nations at that time, in view of the devastation of Europe, was to counteract each other's perceived

---

3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Calcutta, 1972), pp. 436-450.

expansionist designs. Inevitably the UN came to figure as an instrument in their foreign policy calculations. For about a decade the UN was predominantly a scene of Cold War confrontation between the two superpowers. Subsequently with the advent of new nations the focus mainly shifted to North-South issues with the Soviet Union often supporting the South.

## I

### Legal and Organisational Framework for Diplomacy

#### 1. The United Nations

##### (1) The United Nations General Assembly:

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is a plenary body. It 'may discuss any questions or any matters' within the scope of the UN Charter, with the only exception that it is not supposed to make recommendations with regard to any 'dispute or situation' under active consideration of the Security Council. This means that the UNGA represents the 'will' of the whole UN System. It is not only concerned with political issues but also with the formulation of social and economic policy and the creation of new mechanisms or projects.

After debate and discussion, decisions are taken either on the basis of consensus or voting based on the equality principle of one nation - one vote. While simple resolutions need a simple majority of members present and voting to be passed, substantive ones require a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The political process is governed by rules and procedures and takes place under the glare of world-wide publicity. It is called 'parliamentary diplomacy'. Much of the diplomatic action takes place in the nine committees, two of which are procedural and the other seven substantive in nature.<sup>4</sup>

In view of the universality of its membership; the wide scope of its agenda; its supervisory role and its budget-making powers the UNGA can rightly be called the principal organ of UN. Its powers are, however, limited because its resolutions are only recommendatory. Its regular annual sessions begin in the third week of

---

4      Procedural Committees: General Committee and the Credentials Committee. Substantive Committees: First (Disarmament and Related Matters); Special Political Committee; Second (Economic and Financial) Committee; Third (Social Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee; Fourth (Decolonisation) Committee; Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee; Sixth (Legal) Committee.



September. Special sessions or special emergency sessions may also be held.

(ii) Security Council:

The Security Council is a limited membership body presently composed of 15 members — 5 of whom are permanent members and the rest rotated every two years. The five permanent members are: US, UK, USSR, China and France. This principal body is charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It can take executive action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In view of this cardinal and sensitive function the voting pattern is unequal here. According to Article 27, while procedural matters require any nine votes, substantive ones need "an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring vote of the five permanent members". In other words each permanent member enjoys a veto. An abstention or non-participation in the voting is construed as a form of concurrence. A country which is a member of the UN but not of the Council may take part in its discussions when the Council considers that that country's interests are specially affected. Both members and non-members are invited to take part in the Council's discussions when they are parties to disputes being considered; in the case of a non-member

the Council lays down the conditions under which it may participate. The Council functions continuously, and rightly so, as it is concerned with the vital area of peace and security.

(iii) The Economic and Social Council:

The importance assigned to the social and economic areas in the UN System is evident in the creation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as a 'principal organ'. A limited membership body, it functions 'under the authority of the General Assembly'. It monitors and evaluates strategies, policies and priorities formulated by the General Assembly; undertakes comprehensive reviews of organisational activities in the UN system and recommends or advises the Assembly on major policy matters. The ECOSOC also performs the major vital task of coordinating the maze of social and economic activities of the UN System to minimise duplication and overlapping. It operates through three plenary sessional committees which are the First (Economic) Committee, the Second (Social) Committee and the Third (Policy and Program Coordination) Committee. The Committee meetings are marked by debate and discussion followed by decision-making by consensus or on the basis of voting according to the principle of

one-nation one-vote. The decisions taken at this level are generally accepted at the plenary sessions which are held twice a year. However, a dissenting country may contest the Committee level resolutions at the plenary session. The ECOSOC is assisted in its work by a number of Functional Commissions, Standing Committees and Standing Expert Bodies. It has provided for decentralization by establishing five Regional Commissions on the recommendation of the UNGA in order 'to encourage the regional sharing of experience regarding common problems, the cooperative study of regional economic issues and the preparation of action on the regional level'.<sup>5</sup> Article 63 of the Charter authorises it to enter into agreements with any of the Specialized Agencies subject to the approval of the UNGA.

#### (iv) The Secretariat:

Theoretically the Secretariat represents an international civil service. All its members though drawn from national governments, represent the UN as independent

---

5 Johan Kaufman, United Nations Decision Making (Maryland, 1980), p.59.

and impartial civil servants. The Secretary-General is, 'the Chief Administrative Officer' of the UN. He also occupies a position of primus inter-pares in relation to the Secretariats of other agencies. Article 99 empowers the Secretary-General to take up political functions.<sup>6</sup> He is the pivot around which the whole UN Secretariat revolves very much like but also unlike the Prime Minister of a parliamentary democracy. In the execution of his tasks he is assisted by the Executive Office of the Secretary General. For the sake of efficiency and coordination, the UN Secretariat is divided into a number of departments each headed by an Under-Secretary General.

The restructuring of 1977 was an effort by the developing countries to make 'the system more responsive to the wishes of a majority of Member States especially toward the goal of promoting the requirements of the Declaration and Programme of Action for a New International Economic Order'.<sup>7</sup>

---

6 Article 99: 'The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'.

7 Kaufman, n.5, p.67.

## 2. Specialized Agencies Sub-System

The legal and organisational framework of Specialized Agencies is patterned on the UN Sub-System. Each Specialized Agency has its own constitution laying down its structure and functions. Three main levels may be identified - plenary, executive and secretariat. Given below are the structural organizations of three Specialized Agencies — International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Telecommunications Union (ITU) — each of which represents a distinct category:

<u>Specialized Agencies</u>	<u>Plenary</u>	<u>Executive</u>	<u>Secretariat</u>
(i) ILO	General Conference	Governing Body	Director General
(ii) IMF	Board of Governors	Executive Directors	Managing Director
(iii) ITU	Plenipotentiary Conference	Administrative Council	Secretary General

### (i) International Labour Organization:

The General Conference is the highest policy making body of the ILO. It is a massive organisation, comprising representatives of governments, employers and employees on a 2:1:1 basis. The Conference discusses and debates

general labour and social questions and formulates policy. It elects the Governing Body and adopts the budget. Voting is based on the principle of one nation - one vote while recommendations need only a simple majority, Conventions require a two-thirds majority. The Conference conducts business through a number of Industrial Committees which include representatives of all three groups. It meets once a year at Geneva.

The Governing Body is a limited-membership organ, also based on the tripartite system of representation. A rather contentious election criterion is that states 'of chief industrial importance' must be given a certain proportion of seats. In view of the unwieldy nature of the Conference, much of the policy determination and programme planning is done by the Governing Body. It elects the Director General; approves the budget for adoption by the Conference; supervises the work of the office in Geneva and proposes the agenda for the Conference. For greater efficiency and compact, the Body works through a number of tripartite-structural Committees. It usually meets twice a year.

The secretariat, headed by the Director-General, works in tandem with the Governing Body in the task of programme planning and budgeting. It frequently consults

governments, prepares the many meetings and undertakes research on labour legislation. It also advises governments on the implementation of Conventions and other matters.

The other agencies that may be included in the category of ILO are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

#### (ii) International Monetary Fund:

The structure of the IMF is so marked in difference from the other specialized Agencies that many scholars do not consider it as belonging to the UN System. This is basically due to the fact that decision-making is based on the unequal principle of weighted-voting which gives the institution an 'oligarchic' character. Depending on the size of contributions made to the body each state is allotted a quota of votes. Within the Board each member has 250 votes, plus an additional vote for every \$ 100,000 of its quota. It is needless to add that consequently a few rich countries rule the roost.

The Board is essentially a rubber-stamping body.

It meets once a year. Either the Finance Minister or the Chairman of the Central Bank of a member-state sits on the Board. Most of the decisions can be reached by a simple majority of weighted votes. For certain type of votes, the voting power of each member is adjusted according to the sales of its currency to other members, or its purchases of other currencies.

The most powerful organ is the body called Executive Directors. A considerable degree of powers have been delegated to the Directors by the Board of Governors. While the large subscribers automatically have Directors, the others are elected with some regard for the geographical criterion. The Directors have the same voting power as their Governors plus the votes of all the countries which have elected them. The Executive Board functions almost continuously and is responsible for the operations of the Fund throughout the year.

The Managing Director is an extremely important figure with more personal influence than most of the other Agencies' chief officials. He assists in the powers of decision-making and is responsible for most of the normal running of the Fund and for the appointment of staff.



The other global financial agencies, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA) and International Finance Corporation (IFC), belong to the IMF category.

(iii) International Telecommunications Union:

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the apex policy-making body of ITU. The time-gap between two meetings is unusually long. It meets 'at least' once in five years to broadly decide on future policy. It is also unlike most assemblies of the UN system in that it decides all questions by simple majority except the admission of new members, for which it requires a two-thirds majority. It follows the equality principle of voting.

The Administrative Council, the main Executive Body, is restricted in membership. There are no constitutional conditions for election to this body. It is responsible for the running of the organization between meetings of the Plenipotentiary Conference. It supervises administration, approves the annual budget, arranges conferences and assists the Coordination Committee in coordinating the work of the organization. It meets once a year in Geneva.

The General Secretariat headed by Secretary-General

oversees all administrative arrangements of ITU. It is responsible for relations with national administrations; collecting and disseminating information, including lists of offices and frequencies, preparing conferences and general coordination.

The structural framework would be incomplete without reference to three semi-autonomous units. First are the two subsidiary organs in the form of Consultative Committees — the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT). Each Committee is an inter-governmental organization; each has a specialized secretariat of its own and the official in charge of each is elected by its own Assembly. This leads to a somewhat irregular chain of command and divided authority. Private commercial and scientific organizations, as well as governments, telecommunicative administrations and broadcasting authorities participate on the Committees and contribute to the cost. The Plenary Assemblies of each Committee adopt the recommendations and texts which govern their own sphere of activity and lay down the guidelines for running the global networks in each system. Both have innumerable Specialized Committees and study

groups considering a whole range of technical questions, and both run their own laboratories. The third autonomous body is the International Frequency Registration Board. It also has a secretariat of its own and continuously monitors the use of frequencies by member-states.

The other highly technical agencies that may be listed under this category are International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Universal Postal Union (UPU).

### 3. Permanent Missions and Diplomats

Permanent missions which have evolved over the years are now an accepted part of the UN System. They form the link between the various organs or agencies and member-governments; serve as continuous channels of contact; formulate national policy in times of emergency and perform the function of information collection and reporting, thereby serving as counsels for home-governments. In short they perform the same functions, though complex, as are performed by a traditional diplomat accredited to a national government.

A notable feature of some of the Permanent Missions

of the UN is that they usually comprise a good number of experts, specialists and technicians in social and economic affairs, which constitute the bulk of the UN agenda. The traditional diplomat — one schooled in arts and letters, the generalist — can no longer cope with many of these issues without competent and highly trained experts. The specialists provide the knowledge needed to fathom the complexities of international finance and trade, water pollution, air safety, allocation of broadcast frequencies, nuclear waste disposal and a multitude of other issues. They either serve as members of diplomatic teams or as primary negotiators. In the first capacity they serve as advisors or function as principals in subsidiary levels of diplomatic forums like International Conference Committees. In the second capacity they assume a central role in negotiations on technical matters.

The presence of specialists in diplomatic teams is more marked in the case of Specialized Agencies which deal with subjects such as child welfare, crop generic resources, crystallography, health, communication, civil aviation, education and labour. Consequently doctors, intellectuals, technicians, labour leaders,

industrialists, economists and scientists through the meetings of Specialized Agencies. It is only these knowledgeable specialists who can effectively tackle technical, often esoteric issues. The diplomatic need is met either by having specialists in the professional diplomatic service or by appointing experts to specific diplomatic assignments.

## II

### 1. Attitudes of Member-States towards the UN System

#### (i) United States

The US emerged as a global power at the end of World War II. Its recognition as a great power was evident in the principal role it played in the creation of the UN and the veto power it enjoys as a permanent member of the Security Council. With the outbreak of hostilities between the US and USSR the UN turned into an important instrument in the US policy of combating communism and expanding capitalism. In this regard the UN could provide legitimacy for US foreign policy and

actions. The US objective was also to use the UN as a dumping ground for issues it could not resolve directly or on which it was neutral party and did not wish to antagonise either of the parties.

The US policy of containment of communism and promotion of capitalism operated at both levels of the UN System — UN and the Specialized Agencies. In the UN where the main focus was on sensitive political issues the going was tough for US as the Soviet Union held the power of veto. But in the Specialized Agencies which dealt with economic and social activities it exercised considerable leverage. It either had complete control over the agency by virtue of its financial contribution or was in a position to take favourable decisions provided it had majority support.

The Specialized Agencies occupied an important place in the US strategy of preserving and promoting capitalist values. They were needed to secure legitimacy for free enterprise so that the countless private business enterprises of the US could have free access to markets in the fields of food, health, information, technology, etc. This was essential for not only preserving American monopoly and economic superiority by

creating dependencies but also for expanding US influence. In resolving all social and economic problems, the US policy was to stress on the "market philosophy" approach. Briefly, the US objective was to use Specialized Agencies as vehicles to export 'free societies' and the American 'way of life' to the rest of the world. By moulding the social and economic life of many peoples of the world in the capitalist framework, the US hope to eventually achieve political penetration.

The answer to the initial US euphoria lies in the fact that it had a majority of the member-states on its side. Consequently in all those forums where the equality principle of voting prevailed, the US out-voted the USSR. Sometimes it even managed to circumvent the Russian veto in taking crucial decisions. But with the arrival of new Asian and African states in large numbers whose interests and goals contradicted those of the US, disillusionment slowly crept in. Its influence waned as it got increasingly subjected to the 'tyranny of the majority'. It was not long before it announced that it would not support a system that did not subserve its national interests.

## (ii) Soviet Union:

The US enthusiasm in the early period logically meant a depressing time for the Soviet Union. Isolated it suffered from a minority complex and exhibited a disdain for majoritarianism that is characteristic of permanent minorities. Its behaviour was marked by deep suspicion and distrust of almost everyone including the Secretary-General. On cold war issues it was frequently driven to the wall, and could save itself only by resorting to the veto. It walked out in 1950 but returned shortly when the Korean crisis demonstrated that its absence would only be counter-productive to its interests. It however continued to clutch the veto power in the Security Council as a shield for defending its interests against the hostile capitalist dominated coalition. The only other use that the UN had for the Soviet Union was for propaganda purposes. In the words of Robert Wesson:

Almost the only positive utility the Russian saw in the United Nations was as a rostrum from which to shout their message to the world. They sought to promote and identify themselves with various virtuous causes, such as opposition to the Franco government, to South African racial policies and to



TH-2247

29 W 319 (8D)



117



colonial empires and the manner of their liquidation.(8)

The Soviet fortunes, however, underwent a change with the dramatic increase in the size of the United Nations. The presence of a phenomenal number of new nations, some neutral, some with pronounced leftists tendencies enabled Russia to shed its minority complex and breath more freely. It happily lent its support to the causes of new nations and gleefully watched them turn the tables against the US in the event of majority voting. It was now the turn of the US to increasingly cast the veto to protect itself against the Third World — USSR offensive. As the Soviet policy became more and more cooperative, if not wholly positive, that of the US turned proportionately negative.

Insofar as the Specialized Agencies were concerned, initially they virtually did not exist for the Soviet Union. One reason ironic as it may seem, could be that the Soviet Union perceived international organizations

8 Robert Wesson, "The United Nations in the world outlook of the Soviet Union and of the United States", in Rubinstein and Ginsburgs, eds., Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations (New York, 1971), p.8.

purely from the point of their immediate relevance to peace and security and therefore had no use for Specialized Agencies that only indirectly dealt with this purpose. Another reason could be that the Russians found it pointless to join bodies that were wholly dominated by capitalists and their "lackeys" and were content to subject them to verbal invectives from outside. With the death of Stalin and advent of Khrushchev in 1953, however, the Soviet attitude underwent a marked change. The change in attitude is largely attributable to Khrushchev's strategy of 'peaceful coexistence' or detente. Detente, while signifying the acceptance of a military stalemate in the East-west confrontation, shifted the focus of struggle against capitalism to the economic, cultural, science and technology fields. Viewed in the context of detente, the Specialized Agencies dealing as they were with social and economic areas, served as useful forums to wage a peaceful struggle against capitalism and promote socialism. The strategy of detente included the winning of allies from among the new nations. International gathering afforded good opportunities to rope in the new nations.

(iii) India:

India's wholehearted support to the UN System was governed by three broad objectives: peace, disarmament

and economic development. As a former colony it had inherited a ruined economy at the time of its independence. A host of formidable social and economic problems like poverty, illiteracy, food shortage, etc. confronted it. Its immediate task was to tackle these problems and rehabilitate its impoverished economy. But the road to national development was far from a straight and easy. For it either lacked the resources or the technology to tap them. Foreign aid therefore became imperative. There were only two channels available — bilateral and multilateral. Since the former often meant a subjection to new forms of colonialism, it came to rely increasingly on the UN System to realise its national aspirations without sacrificing much of its hard won independence. Though its immediate objective was to squeeze out maximum developmental aid from the multilateral bodies, its eventual goal was to bring about a global redistribution of economic resources. It legitimized its claims by referring to Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>9</sup> It is evident

---

<sup>9</sup> Article 55: 'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (f/n.cont...n/page)

that its enthusiastic support to the UN System was for reasons that were wholly contradictory to those of the Western capitalist countries, who were reactionary and bent upon preserving the status quo. This inevitably triggered off an acrimonious diplomatic battle.

The stress on economic development, however, did not mean that India did not have any political stakes. Peace and disarmament were essential pre-requisites for economic development. Its crusade against racialism, colonialism and imperialism and the struggle for human rights sprang not only from its own sufferings as a colony, but also from a conviction that these obnoxious phenomena were a threat to peace anywhere in the world.

---

(Previous f/n. continues)

a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b) solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'.

Article 56: 'All Members' pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55'. The Universal Declaration Rights was adopted on 10 December, 1948 by the General Assembly by 48 votes to none, with 8 abstentions. Despite the legal uncertainties of the Declaration the UN is committed to implementing it.

Moreover as a large and independent-minded country among the Third World India saw the UN as offering ample opportunities for an active and constructive role in international politics. With its nonaligned status and decision, "to judge issues on their merits" India sought to increasingly play the role of a mediator or conciliator and thereby expand its influence as an independent power in the comity of nations. The prevailing political environment and the inability of the two super powers to take effective decisions, along with the diplomatic value attached to credible third parties, enabled India especially in the early 50s to frequently assume the above roles and produce creditable results.

## 2. Diplomatic Techniques

### i) Propaganda:

Propaganda may be defined 'as a process involving a communicator whose intention is to change the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of a target population using spoken, written and behavioural symbols and employing media such as books, pamphlets, films, lectures and so forth'.<sup>10</sup> It is an important technique in the diplomatic

---

10 Coulombis and Wolfe, n.1, p.182.

pouches of nations. Debates and solemn speeches, in UN forums, under the full glare of world-wide publicity by delegates or heads of government or state, though hardly contributing to the effecting of agreements through compromise, accommodation or mutual give and take provide ample scope for propaganda. The UN serves the purpose of propaganda in the following ways: Firstly, it acts as a sounding board for publicising a government's views or policy goals. The rhetoric may sometimes be so tailored as to influence a target group. Secondly UN gathering have publicity or prestige value for a political personality who wishes to enhance his political standing in the eyes of his people as well as the world. Thirdly, the UN offers a forum to engage an adversary in negotiations without producing results. Finally, the media advantages may tempt a nation to announce dramatic proposals before the start of negotiations under UN auspices so as to project a good image of itself in the eyes of the world.

ii) "Carrot" and "Stick":

Open debate or discussion or propaganda constitute only the superficial side of parliamentary diplomacy. Often, there is a tendency to gloss over the substantive

side called 'corridor diplomacy'. The adoption of a draft resolution is only the culmination of a long series of behind-the-scene negotiations. The venues of back-stage negotiations or informal talks or lobbying are the Secretary-General's office, permanent missions lounges, corridors, bars, dining-rooms, ante-rooms, cocktail parties or any other meeting ground in the UN headquarters complex. These back-channel negotiations provide ample opportunities for the participants to employ traditional techniques to win votes.

The strong member-states with substantial economic or military resources at their disposal make use of bilateral dealings to 'arm-twist' or pressurize the weaker nations to toe their line. In other words, a warning may be conveyed to the extent that natural consequences in the form of stoppage of bilateral aid, or military assistance will follow in the event of non-compliance. If exploitive bilateral dealings do not already exist the rich countries may offer 'carrots' in the form of aid (not bribe) to the poor countries so as to establish a linkage between bilateral and multilateral behaviour. Later if need be the 'carrots' may

be converted into 'sticks' to coerce the recipient nations. In the face of pressure, or an offer, the target nation may reconsider its stand carefully weighing the benefits and losses accruing from these new moves. It may then change its decision or adhere to its original stand. Apart from the developed powers, the more advanced among the developing or underdeveloping countries also use this technique. The Arabs for instance have often used their oil resources both as a 'carrot' and 'stick'.

### iii) Multilateral Threats:

A multilateral threat is a threat to the institution itself. In this case a member-state threatens to withdraw from an agency if the latter does not fulfill its demands. A member-state usually resorts to this extreme step only when it feels that the agency is not only no longer serving its national aspirations but also working in a manner detrimental to its national interest. It therefore demands changes in the institutions ostensibly to serve the larger interests of the world. A member-state will be in a position to extend this threat and expect results only if it is indispensable to the legal functioning of the organization or if it exercises



a financial veto. In the former case the member state knows that its absence would render the institution untenable. In the latter case, the member state believes that the fear of financial pain will compel the agency to reform itself. If the organization remains indifferent to the threat or responds with changes that do not satisfy the threatening party then the latter may prefer to carry out its threat. For not to make good on its threat would mean not only losing prestige but also establishing a reputation for retreating and encouraging its adversaries to 'call its bluff' in future.

iv) Filibustering:

Filibustering is a technique that is commonly practised in all democracies having parliaments. It is a tactic used by a member to defer or postpone consent to a bill under consideration through the astute use (or abuse) of rules and procedures. If the member succeeds it may even result in the bill dying a natural death as it may no longer be relevant under changed circumstances. Time is thus the essence of filibustering. At the UN a member-state may try to delay the adoption of a resolution on a certain issue either by prolonging the debate or dragging extraneous issues until the

the session ends inconclusively or it may try to tie up the matter under consideration to another issue by establishing relationship between the two. In the case of a "tie-in" a final agreement on the former will be made contingent upon a decision to be arrived at on the latter, the time of which may or may not be specified. The time gained may be used by a member-state to design new strategies or equip itself better for the next session.

v) Trade-offs:

Fred Charles Ikle says, "... in the United Nations... one delegate may induce another to vote for his favoured resolution, by promising to vote for some resolution favoured by his colleague".<sup>11</sup> The stream of issues appearing on the UN agenda combined with the huge number of participants provide plenty of scope for this kind of a package-deal. The trade-off may take place between two individual nations or between two blocs.

---

11 F.C.Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964), p.69.

#### vi) Legislative Manipulations:

Manipulation of UN rules and procedures is a tactic typical of the UN system. For instance if any of the permanent members feels that its opponent is going to cast a veto in the Security Council, in order to kill decision-making on an issue in which it is interested, then it may try to circumvent the veto by converting the issue from a substantive into a procedural one as in the latter case consent of all the five members is not mandatory.

The above are some of the diplomatic techniques employed by member-states in the parliamentary process - open and secret. A lot will depend upon the ability of the diplomat to skillfully use these tactics to realise the objectives of his government. The UN diplomat should not only be an adept practitioner of traditional diplomacy but should also be a 'gifted legislative politician who has mastery over the rules of procedure relating to debate'. The chief aim here is to convert a national policy decision into one of 'collective legitimisation'. The hallmark of a UN diplomat lies in his ability to transform an issue affecting the interests of his state into a UN decision with the least of compromise.

## III

Issues1. Suez Canal Crisis

The Suez Canal crisis illustrates how the Soviet Union activated its propaganda machinery to realise certain objectives. At that time the propaganda role in Soviet foreign policy had markedly magnified. The Middle East crisis was triggered off by the nationalisation of the Suez canal by President Nasseer of Egypt in 1956. Shortly Israel invaded Egypt followed closely by the landing of British and French troops on Egyptian soil. These aggressive moves deeply hurt the African and Asian countries. The crisis, as such presented a meaty opportunity for the Soviet Union to engage in cold war rhetoric and project itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and defender of national freedom.

When the issue came up before the UN the Soviet Union introduced two strongly worded draft resolutions on successive days in the Security Council preceded by long verbal tirade against Israel, France and Britain. Soviet press statements condemning the 'aggressors' and 'imperialists' received world-wide publicity. It continued the propaganda offensive when the issue shifted over to

the UNGA. A few days later, in keeping with Khrushchev's open vigorous and assertive style of diplomacy, the Soviets published a note that threatened to use force 'to crush the aggressors and restore peace.... There is still time to use prudence to stop and prevent the bellicose forces from gaining the upper hand."<sup>12</sup> Wesson says, "Maximum propagandistic use was made of the affair, both within the UN and outside it with denunciation of imperialism vague threats of rocket-reprisals and offers (made when the need had passed) to send volunteers to Egypt".<sup>13</sup> When a ceasefire did result newspapers in the Arab Middle East attributed it to the tough Soviet threat and expressed gratitude for the Soviet action. The well-orchestrated propaganda drive of the Soviet Union at the UN achieved the two-fold objective of influencing the target-group (Afro-Asian bloc) and temporarily turning the heat away from the Hungarian crisis that had broken out at the same time.

## 2. Laos Crisis

The manipulation of UN rules and procedures to

---

12 Richard Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New York, 1961), p.84.

13 Wesson, n.8, p.15.

suit the interests of a member-state was most evident during the Laos crisis of 1959. As in most crises the US and USSR were pitched on opposite sides of the fence in the Laos crisis. While the US directly supported the ruling conservative forces, the USSR indirectly backed the communist insurgents through Vietnam and China. The immediate issue was the involvement of the UN in the crisis through the despatch of a "fact-finding" subcommittee to Laos.

When the issue came up before the Security Council a wrangle broke out over the highly technical question of whether setting up a subcommittee was a procedural or a substantive matter. Realising that if the matter was assigned substantive status the Soviet Union would veto it, Ambassador Lodge of US in introducing his draft resolution said it was "squarely within the provisions of Article 29 of the Charter". By longstanding council practice, items within the purview of Article 29, which provides for establishment of "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary" have been considered to be procedural. This longstanding practice was however unacceptable to the Soviet Union which had always maintained that a decision to establish a subcommittee for the elucidation of facts was a decision "about an investigation" and

therefore subject to the voting procedure that is required on substantive items. This argument in fact received support from a sizeable number of American specialists in international law. The US however with the help of the Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and the President of the Council won its viewpoint. This clever American manoeuvre came in for criticism from an American scholar who said:

In the Laos case, it was not merely the statement (the Four-power declaration of 7 June 1945) but the Charter itself that suffered a setback. It is not by disregarding the law of the Charter that the Security Council will promote the rule of law in international relations. What the Laos case demonstrated is the persistent attempt of members of the UN to substitute rule by majority for the rule by law.(14)

### 3. Apartheid and Human Rights

The apartheid issue received an impetus, when in the 50s, the UN System due to decolonisation underwent a dramatic compositional change with the advent of new Asian and African states. Deeply committed to rooting out apartheid in South Africa and upholding human rights,

---

14 Miller, n.12, p.245.

these new nations, constituting a solid and substantial bloc, utilized all UN forums to pile pressure on South Africa. Following are some examples:

At the 1961 annual Conference of the ILO, a resolution on the initiative of the Nigerian government was adopted calling upon South Africa to withdraw from the ILO. South Africa, however, simply brushed aside the resolution. At the 1963 Conference the African, Arab and Communist representatives all walked out in protest. Fearing a complete breakdown of the Conference and in order to avoid political trouble in the long run, the Director-General David Morse persuaded South Africa to withdraw. The apartheid regime resigned from the ILO in 1964.

Even a highly technical body like the ITU was not spared. The ITU at the opening of its 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference voted to exclude South Africa and Portugal because of their respective 'racial and colonial policies'. The collective efforts of the Afro Asian bloc touched a zenith, when in a sensational move in 1974 in the UNGA, they succeeded in expelling the South African delegation to the UN. The US which had all along been protecting the apartheid regime due to economic interests



in South Africa castigated the move as 'tyranny of the majority'.

The US had another bitter taste of 'tyranny' when in the same session of the UNGA in what looked like a trade-off the Arab bloc passionately committed to the Palestinian cause succeeded in inviting the PLO to address and participate in the UNGA proceedings. The next year was again a momentous one for the Arab as they managed to pass a highly controversial resolution in the UNGA that equated 'Zionism' with 'racialism' and in effect branded Israel as 'racist'. The Arabs were active in the Specialized Agencies also. For instance, at the 1974 General Conference of the ILO, they passed a resolution that condemned Israel for 'discrimination against Arab workers in occupied territories'. At the next annual session, they pushed through a resolution that granted observer status to the PLO, over protests from the US and other western countries. This was the immediate provocation for the US to serve notice to withdraw from the ILO if it did not shape up within two years. The oil crisis plaguing the world economy and the extraordinary economic clout that the Arabs enjoyed at that time had a definite bearing on their capacity to win

votes. It is an open secret that the Arab bloc used its oil power and petro-dollars to bulldoze its way through.

Despite the shower of brickbats from the Arabs, Israel, with the backing of US, has tenaciously clung onto the UN if only to retain its legitimacy as a state. During the May 1982 WHO Assembly an Arab effort spearheaded by Cuba to suspend Israel's voting rights was dropped only in the face of a threatened walk out by the US. In 1985 the US again successfully scuttled a move by the Third World to introduce a resolution on Palestine in the Final Consensus Declaration by stubbornly refusing to compromise. This was reported to have marred the 40th birthday of UN.

#### 4. Development

##### 1) CDF, EPTA, SUNFED, SPF & UNSF:

Dissatisfied with the Bretton Wood twins, the 'have-nots' clamoured for the formation of a Capital Development Fund (CDF) to help them build social and economic infrastructure. Through their numbers they hoped to exercise political control over the Fund unlike the IMF and IBRD. The developed countries who would be the major contributors to such a fund, strongly

opposed the idea as it would mean routing bilateral aid through multilateral channels thereby resulting in a loss of many of the advantages that accrue from the former.

In 1949 India took the initiative of demanding the creation of a CDF. The US answer to this demand was the setting up of Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). However, India continued to keep the idea of a CDF alive through Secretariat studies, expert group studies, personal investigations by the President of the ECOSOC, question-answer analysis and reports of special Ad-hoc Committees to provide material for thought and discussion. The US and UK, the two principle dissenters now adopted dilatory tactics by tying up the establishment of a CDF with disarmament. They argued that a CDF could materialise only when a decision on disarmament, that would release substantial funds for development, took place.

However, in the event of the impasse over arms control talks, the 'disarmament argument' lost much of its strength. Pressure mounted on the US and UK, when France, USSR and Albania expressed their readiness to

contribute to the Fund in 1956. The Soviet move was aimed at winning the support of the poor countries and embarrassing its opponents. In 1957, in response to the Indian proposal for Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), the US agreed to create a Special Projects Fund (SPF) as an expansion of the existing EPTA or 'technical assistance in depth', while remaining firmly opposed on the CDF issue. It is quite likely that the US gave the impression that if the opposite side bargained further it may harden its terms or even withdraw its proposals. Realising the importance of US participation in the Fund without whom it would be still-born (a two-third majority was pointless in this regard), India considered the US proposal and included it in its revised version of SUNFED, in a bid to establish a link between SPF and SUNFED. The objective behind this changed tactic was to have the SPF recognised as the first step towards the eventual formation of SUNFED. Careful not to be trapped, the US categorically announced that the SPF will have nothing to do with SUNFED. A linguistic wrangle broke out in the Second Committee of the ECOSOC. India insisted on the retainence of the words, 'technical assistance and development programme', as its whole strategy hinged on

this phrase. The US, on the other hand, insisted on the substitution of this phrase by 'technical assistance and development'. Finally a compromise was arrived at with the acceptance of 'as an expansion of the existing technical assistance and development activities of the UN and Specialized Agencies' in place of 'as part of the technical assistance and development activities of the UN and Specialized Agencies'. This draft resolution was unanimously accepted, though both sides continued to interpret it differently according to their needs.<sup>15</sup>

India criticised the report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee as having distorted the consensus resolution. No longer a member of the ECOSOC, it decided to take up the struggle in the General Assembly in 1958. Old issues once again came to the fore. India piloted a 17-power draft resolution that departed from the ECOSOC one and put the UN Special Fund (different from the SUNFED or Economic Development Fund proposed by India and the SPF proposed by US) in the specific context of SUNFED. To win its own point

---

15 For a detailed study of this issue, See S.N. Tawale, "India's Role in the Development and Promotion of International Cooperation: A Case Study of International Economic Diplomacy", (Ph.D. thesis, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1972).

in view, the US countered it with a 27-power draft resolution. By now the US working hard behind-the-scenes had managed to secure the support of some under-developed nations. India lost the diplomatic battle as its resolution was defeated. But she never gave up the idea of a CDF. Her persistent efforts produced a side-effect in the form of the creation of IDA as a soft-lending affiliate of the IMF and IBRD in 1959.

ii) Communications & Information:

Communications are simply the channel, or the medium; information is the message that is fed into that medium.<sup>16</sup> For the super powers communications were primarily another avenue for the pursual of foreign policy objectives. A race between the two for advanced communication systems was due to the perception of communications as an instrument of propaganda and cultural conquest and a means of expanding their influence. The information transmitted through or fed into the channels was aimed at moulding the minds of men and guiding their thinking along desired lines. The potency of information

---

16 C.R.Irani, "A Critique : UNESCO Meddling", World Focus, (New Delhi), vol.3, no.1, January 1982, p.28.

to "soften" up the minds of men made it virtually synonymous with power. Mr. Amadou Mahtar M'Bow the current Director General of UNESCO says that the mass media are increasingly turning into power, and he who controls the media often holds the key to power.<sup>17</sup> The importance of information for the successful effectuation of foreign policy is evident in the statement of the former Secretary of State of US, John Foster Dulles:

If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information.(18)

Needless to say the perception of the developing countries differed. For them the media were yet another means by which they could resolve their developmental problems. For instance, the press, radio, films, TV and satellites, if carefully harnessed, had immense value in combating the problem of illiteracy. The Indian Satellite Institutional Experiment (SITE) programme conducted by India in 1975 eloquently demonstrated

---

17 Yermoshkin Grachev, New World Information Order or Psychological Warfare (Moscow, 1984), p.130.

18 Herbert Schiller, "The Diplomacy of Cultural Domination and the Free Flow of Information" in Jaswant Yadava ed., Politics of News: Third World Perspectives (New Delhi, 1984), p.1.

the tremendous educative potential of satellite communications. Using a US ATS-F satellite and community receivers, SITE broadcast television programmes to hundreds of remote Indian villages previously cut off from civilization. Thus the efforts of the developing countries to bring about global redistribution of communications resources.

The ITU initially followed the 'first-come first-served' principle in the allocation of radio frequencies on the electro-magnetic spectrum. As a result the US and USSR as technologically advanced nations, along with the other western industrialized countries occupied much of the spectrum. The tumultous revolution in the 60s in satellite technology added a new dimension to the communications controversy. A struggle broke out for slots in the geostationary orbit. The object of the developing countries was two-fold. Firstly, they wanted to replace the inequitous 'first-come first-served' principle with the just principle of 'equal access'. They argued that if the former principle were to remain they would be left with no available space in the geostationary orbit by the time they had developed capabilities. They, therefore, demanded the advance allocation of slots. Equatorial countries like Columbia



demanding that space above the geographical territory of a nation up to a certain limit be declared part of its sovereign rights. Secondly, the developing countries wanted to restructure the ITU so as to directly involve it in the administration of satellite communications presently in the hands of a separate body, INTELSAT. The achievement of these two objectives was important in the movement towards a New International Information and Communication Order. Since voting in ITU and World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) held under the auspices of ITU was based on one-nation one-vote the developing countries were in a good position to have their own way.

The US strategy of keeping ITU leashed to purely technical matters in a bid to perpetuate its dominance failed in the face of consistent pressure from the overwhelming majority of new nations. Threats of walkouts and financial veto could not work here "as unlike other agencies where the threat of walkout and loss of financial budgetary contributions serve to weaken the Third World position and enables the Secretariat to lobby for the Western viewpoint, membership in ITU and signature to the final act protects every country in usage of

frequencies without interference by others".<sup>19</sup>

At WARC-79 the Indian proposal for advanced allocation of space for telecommunication was accepted amidst stiff opposition from the developed countries led by the US. The Conference also decided to hold a full scale planning conference in the mid-80s to guarantee in practice equitable access to all countries of geo-stationary orbit. A newspaper editorial commented:

The success achieved by the developing countries towards getting a fair distribution of the radio spectrum... was only because for the first time they were in an overwhelming majority and for the most part stuck together on key issues.(20)

### iii) Health:

The relationship between health and development is too obvious to be stressed. Suffice it to say that any nation genuinely interested in its economic advancement would assign high priority to health in its developmental strategy. However, for an outward looking

---

19 Patriot (New Delhi) 11 December, 1979.

20 Indian Express, 17 December, 1979.

capitalist country like US, health, apart from fulfilling domestic requirements had the purpose of serving foreign policy objectives like the promotion of "market philosophy" and creation of dependency relationships. Commercially there was a lot at stake for the multinational pharmaceuticals which thrived on unrestricted access to drug markets in the rest of the world. This was, however, resented by the 'have-nots' who were governed by their own prejudices and priorities. Restriction and regulations were part of their development strategy. Their objective was not only to use the WHO as a means of securing technical assistance and financial aid to build health infrastructure and research facilities but also as a shield to protect themselves from the onslaught of western drug cartels.

At the 34th session of the World Health Assembly in 1981 the developing countries amidst protests from the US had the WHO promulgate the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes to curb the growing spread of bottle-feeding in preference to breast-feeding as part of its strategy for health for all by 2000 AD. The Code was passed by an overwhelming majority of 93 votes in favour, 3 against and 9 abstaining. Only two Third World countries Bangladesh and Chad voted along with

the US against the Code. Significantly the opening session was addressed by Mrs. Gandhi who in the course of her speech had pointed out that publicity by the drug industry (western) 'make us victims of habits and practices which are economically wasteful or wholly contrary to good health.'<sup>21</sup> This Code which restricted marketing of powdered milks by pharmaceuticals was the immediate provocation for US pressures against the WHO. The Heritage Foundation, the ultra-rightist "think-tank", that monitors US interests in the UN System stated that WHO activities were a threat to the Free world and advised the US government to take retaliatory action. The US has since threatened to serve notice of withdrawal if the WHO does not change its policies.

The preceding short references to issues of conflict and cooperation show how member states, individually or collectively, have used the UN System to further their national interests. The ideological divide is most conspicuous in the above conflicts. The capitalists have clashed with socialists. The former have also clashed with developing nations, though for

---

21 Times of India, 7 May 1981.

different reasons. Consequently on many occasions, the socialist and developing worlds have acted in coalition. In the following pages a case-study of UNESCO is made with an effort to broadly reflect the process, politics, and diplomacy in the UN System.

## Chapter - II

### UNESCO : STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

Like most other international agencies, the UNESCO too had its roots in older organisations. Its early ancestors were the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation based in Paris, the League of Nations' Committee for Intellectual Cooperation and the International Bureau of Education in Geneva. Its immediate precursor, however, was the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) convened in November, 1942 against the gloomy background of World War II raging between the so-called democratic and anti-democratic forces. The CAME was the initiative of a farsighted Englishman, Mr. Butler, who realising the devastation already wrought by the war, planned for the material and spiritual reconstruction of education in the post World War period. The CAME which deliberated for nearly three years was followed by the London Conference jointly sponsored by France and Britain in November, 1945 for the creation of UNESCO. Earlier the San Francisco Conference held in April, 1945 to approve the UN Charter had given prominence to cooperation in the social and

economic fields.<sup>1</sup> The first General Conference of UNESCO took place in November, 1946 at Paris, heralding its official establishment. It was attended by representatives from 44 states.

The political objective of the UNESCO is explicitly stated at the very outset of the constitution. The preamble begins with the words of the former British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee: 'Since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace, must be constructed'. The defences of peace here refers to the education, culture and science. For it was widely believed that 'ignorance of each other's ways and lives had led to mutual suspicion and mistrust' and that the terrible wars were 'made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the inequality of men and races'.<sup>2</sup>

---

1 According to Article 1, para 3 of the Charter, it would be one of the purposes of the United Nations 'to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion'. This is further vindicated in Article 55.

2 Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO.

A meeting of minds was therefore sought to be brought about through cooperation in the areas of culture, science and education. The political purpose is further amplified in Article I of the Constitution which says:

To contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

It is thus apparent that though the immediate concern of UNESCO is cooperation in the fields of science, education and culture its ultimate objective is the realisation of international peace and security.

To realise the above purpose, the organisation through collaboration with its member states performs the following functions: (1) Advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples through all the means of mass communication and obtain international agreements necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image; (2) giving fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of knowledge; (3) furthering the cause of equal educational opportunity for all people and suggesting methods best suited to prepare the



the children of the world for the responsibility of freedom; (4) maintaining, increasing and diffusing knowledge by safeguarding the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, encouraging intellectual cooperation including the international exchange of persons and of publications and objects of artistic and scientific interest; and initiating ways of giving the peoples of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.<sup>3</sup>

### General Conference

The plenary session of UNESCO is called the General Conference.<sup>4</sup> It meets once in two years to 'determine the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization'. Decisions are made either by consensus or by voting on the basis of the equality principle of

---

3 Christine Arscott, "The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization", in Wortley, ed., The UN : The First Ten Years (Manchester, 1957), p.190.

4 According to the Report of the Director-General, (1984-85), the General Conference had, as on 31st December 1985, 158 voting members and two Associate members. The reduced number was the consequence of US, UK and Singapore withdrawing.

one-nation one-vote. In the case of 'recommendations' a simple majority is sufficient while 'international conventions' require a two-third majority for approval. Observer-groups, associate members, UN bodies, NGO's and non-member states also participate in the debate and discussion though they have no voting powers. The Conference elects the members of the Executive Board and appoints the Director-General for a tenure of seven years on the recommendation of the Executive Board. The constitution provides for extraordinary sessions either decided by the Executive Board or on the request of at least one-third of the member-states.<sup>5</sup>

The Conference conducts most of its business through various Committees and Commissions. The Committees are the Credentials Committee (9 members), Nominations Committee (heads of delegations of all voting members), Legal Committee (21 members), and the General Committee consisting of the President, Vice-President and Chairmen

---

5 Upto now four extraordinary sessions have been held in 1948, 1953, 1973 and 1982.

of the Committees and Commissions of the Conference. There are five Commissions, each dealing with a core area, apart from the Administrative Commission that includes one representative from each delegation.

Diplomats attending the Conference are a motley lot. Intellectuals, cultural personalities, scientists, journalists as well as professional diplomats converge at the conference. Diplomatic teams generally comprise a blend of professionals and specialists. If an academician is the leader of the delegation, with professionals as advisors it may indicate a conciliatory posture by a member-state. Vice-versa may well mean a tough stand. In either case the purpose is to balance the idealism of the latter with the realism of the former. Governments fear that specialists in their zeal for international cooperation may exceed their directive and compromise on national interests. Sometimes, ironically, there is a reversal of roles with the professionals feeling that the specialists are taking too rigid a stand. Not few Western journalists have accused their governments of acquiescing to resolutions that were inimical to press freedom and consequently bartering away their interests. Writing about the 20th General Conference

in 1978, Mankekar notes,

the mediamen (Western, particularly American) appear to be most dogmatic and obdurate in their opposition and hostilities... in contrast the US governmental representatives involved in the debate seemed more flexible and accommodating in their attitude....(6)

The Conference is usually a scene of intense diplomatic activity. It is a huge gathering, much bigger than the UNGA, as many Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and interested bodies participate in the debate and discussion. A lot of time is consumed by the opening speeches of member-states in the glare of publicity. Though these public statements hardly contribute to effective diplomacy, they are given an attentive ear as they usually reflect the policies of a member-states, towards current issues or the UNESCO in general. The Director-General, especially pays great heed to the speeches of those powers who substantially fund the organisation as their attitude to a large extent will determine the budget and programme planning.

---

6 D.R.Mankekar, Whose Freedom ? Whose Order? A Plea for a New International Information Order by the Third World (New Delhi, 1981), p.120.

The budget is invariably an issue of avid discussion, debate and controversy. While the developed countries, who contribute fat sums strongly resist budgetary expansion, the developing countries try hard to increase the budget so as to match the growing activities of UNESCO. Another issue of primary interest to member-states is the election of members to the Executive Board. The Conference also becomes a diplomatic beehive, when highly controversial issues come up for discussion, or when a crisis develops as it happened when US announced its decision to withdraw. It is to be noted that diplomacy at the Conference level is characterised by bloc-politics though it is difficult to rigidly categorise the lobbying groups.

#### Executive Board

The Executive Board is a limited-membership body, presently made up of 51 members elected by the General Conference for a term of four years, with one-third retiring every two years. The constitution states that the Conference should elect those persons who have distinguished themselves in the fields of arts, humanities, the services, education and diffusion of ideas and qualified by their experience and capacity to fulfil the administrative and executive duties of the Board.

Archibald Macleish, Librarian of the US Congress and UNESCO representative, in 1951 had said that UNESCO held 'the responsibility for civilisation itself and hence that its Executive Board members should serve as 'individual human beings' rather than as instruments within a split world'.<sup>7</sup> Initially members sat on the Board in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective governments. However, in 1954, on account of pressure from the US, the constitution was amended so as to make the members, represent their governments also. T.N.Kaul, India's former Permanent Ambassador to UNESCO, says that the present situation is quite anomalous as the members wear three caps simultaneously representing: 1) the General Conference of all the member states which elect them; 2) their respective governments who nominate them for election and 3) their individual selves as eminent people in various fields.<sup>8</sup>

---

7 James P.Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics : Engaging in International Relations (Princeton, 1975), p.169.

8 T.N.Kaul, "UNESCO: Problems and Prospects", India Quarterly (New Delhi), April-June 1985, p.200.

While electing members, the geographical and cultural criterion is also taken into consideration. In this connection, six general groups have been identified. They are: (1) Western countries (2) Socialist countries in Eastern Europe (3) Latin American and Caribbean countries (4) Asia-Pacific states (5) African states and (6) Arab countries.<sup>9</sup> A quota of seats is thus fixed for each group on the Executive Board. Among the developing countries India holds the unique distinction of having retained its seat ever since the inception of the UNESCO. Members of the Board are called Permanent Representatives and stay at the Permanent Missions in Geneva.

The Board performs both advisory and supervisory functions. It advises the Conference on all important policy decisions and supervises the execution or implementation of programmes by the Secretariat. It also recommends the admission of new members to the Organization and the appointment of the Director-General. The Board's regular sessions are held at least twice a year. There is provision for special sessions also.

---

9 Ibid., p.198.

The Executive Board works through its five permanent subsidiary bodies. The Programme and External Relations Commission and the Finance and Administrative Commission have all members of the Board as representatives. The Committee on International NGO's, Committee on Conventions and Recommendations and the Special Committees, however, are restricted membership bodies. Ad-hoc Committees may also be established. In 1984, for instance, the Board set-up a Temporary Committee to suggest reforms in the UNESCO.

Despite the delegation of some of its powers to the Secretariat and its growth into an unwieldy deliberative body, the Executive Board still exercises considerable influence on the formation and execution of UNESCO policy. It is, therefore, not surprising that a seat on the Board is coveted by member-states. As the geographical criterion restricts the number of seats belonging to a particular region, member-states jockey hard to secure a place. The present size of the Board, which is more than the size of the first General Conference, is not exactly a compact one, though it is about three times less than the current total membership. Many of the issues on the Board agenda are therefore thrashed



out at subsidiary levels and informal gatherings. The Board has always laid emphasis on the effectiveness of consensus as a method of decision-making. On several occasions it arrived at a consensus as a result of difficult and often protracted negotiations entailing concessions on all sides.

### Secretariat

The UNESCO Secretariat is a massive and complex organisation comprising about 4,000 employees both at the Central and Regional levels. It is headed by the Director General who is 'the chief administrative officer of the Organization'. The Director-General, now wields considerable authority. Both personality and pragmatic factors have contributed to the investing of more and more powers in the office of the Director General. It is he who actually performs the crucial task of programme-formulation and budget-estimation. The controversy surrounding the current incumbent Mr. M' Bow is a measure of 'the strategic position that this office occupies in the UNESCO structure'. In carrying out his work, the Director-General is assisted by a Deputy Director-General and a number of Assistant Directors-General.

The Director-General is in constant interaction with member-states, Board members, advisory committees and Non-governmental groups. He participates in various meetings and assembles ideas from diverse sources. In deciding which to support, and to what extent and which to oppose in the formulation of programmes, he uses his own discretion and here it is almost certain that his prejudices or proclivities will come to obtain a place in the draft proposals. A prudent Director-General would exercise great tact and caution in discarding or regarding ideas or proposals. Any scope for future controversy would jeopardise his position. In order to secure maximum support for his draft proposals, he consults all member-states either individually or collectively, soliciting their views and clarifying issues. Every member state has at least two chances to state its views before the General Conference assemblies. The Conference, of course, presents another chance to participate in the development of the UNESCO programme, though important changes become increasingly difficult as time passes. A consensus decision represents a significant victory for the Director-General. However, he faces his most critical test of judgement 'in deciding when to insist that the General Conference go further toward what he thinks is the ideal goal than the consensus

of the moment would allow'.<sup>10</sup>

In view of the considerable influence that the Secretariat exercises in policy-formulation and the growth of UNESCO activities, election to the top Secretariat posts as well as appointment of staff members assumes significance for the member-states. They eagerly seek to put as many of their nationals as possible in the Secretariat with the obvious purpose of influencing decision-making to serve national interests. This means that a staff member primarily acts not as an impartial international civil servant but as a national official representing his country and its ideology. The view of the Soviet government is 'that there can be no such thing as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of civil servant calls for, is in international affairs a fiction'.<sup>11</sup> In practice, the Soviet Union does not appoint its nationals

---

10 Luther Evans, "Some Management Problems of UNESCO", International Organization, vol.17, no.1, 1963, p.87.

11 Dag Hammarskjold, "The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact" in Kay ed. , The UN Political System (New York, 1967), p.142.

on a long term basis but rotates them every two or three years thereby undermining the chances of its citizens developing international loyalty. In so far as the UN is concerned, the witch-hunting of all UN employees suspected of communist links and being disloyal US citizens during the Mc Carthy era is still fresh in the minds of many US nationals who fear exercising any objective judgement that would be contrary to American interests. Similar parochial attitudes are prevalent among other member-states and their nationals. Needless to add that this has done grave damage to the emergence of an international civil service.

#### National Commissions and NGOs

The rejection of the French proposal to have voluntary bodies or Non-governmental Organizations as voting members of the General Conference did not mean that they had no role to play in UNESCO activities. The founding fathers realised that the nature of UNESCO activities was such that Non-governmental bodies could play an important role, perhaps more significant than that of the governments. It for this reason Article 7 says that

each member-state shall make such arrangements as suits its particular conditions

for the purpose of associating its principal bodies interested in educational, scientific and cultural matters with the work of the Organization preferably by the formation of a National Commission broadly representative of the Government and such bodies.

To give effect to the above provision, almost all member-states have established National Commissions through which voluntary bodies in education, culture and science maintain liaison with UNESCO. National Commission members are drawn from many voluntary associations and from varied professional sectors of a nation's life such as arts, humanities, natural sciences, technology, social services and the media all 'representative of the national genius'. Thus, through the Commission the UNESCO can reach out to the national communities and individual citizens. Over the years the Commissions have come to play an indispensable role, not only as consultative, information and liaison bodies but also in the execution and evaluation of UNESCO programmes at the national and regional levels. National Commissions are functioning actively in France, Cuba, Morocco, India, Japan and some of the East European countries while their role is declining in US, UK and Brazil.<sup>12</sup> In India, the National Commission for Cooperation

---

12 Sewell, n.6, p.316.

with UNESCO is attached to the Ministry for Education. Its constitution makes provision for the sitting of members of voluntary bodies on its five sub-Commissions. The Indian National Commission is playing a significant role in understanding and promoting the objectives of UNESCO among the people of India.

Apart from national voluntary agencies, trans-national associations of a Non-governmental character also maintain liaison with the UNESCO.<sup>13</sup> Such NGOs are divided into three categories: A (Consultative and Associate Relations), B (Information and Consultative Relations) and C (Mutual Information Relationship). Some examples are: Amnesty International (B), Inter-American Press Association(B), International Council of Scientific Unions (B), International Association of Art(A), the International Political Science Association (B), Council on Jewish Social and Economic Welfare (B), World Jewish Congress(B), Aurobindo Society (B), League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies(B), International Federation for Human Rights(B) and Salvation Army (C).

Collaboration with these diverse kinds of NGOs

---

13 According to the Report of the Director General (1984-85), currently there are more than 500 NGOs associated with UNESCO.

provides UNESCO with a vast network of specialists throughout whose aims, ideals and activities are closely linked with the UNESCO.

Luther Evans says that

some of the functions which the Secretariat would otherwise perform have been delegated to NGO's like the International Theatre Institute International Council of Museums and International Music Council.(14)

Representatives of NGO's also serve on a number of Expert Advisory Committees and participate in the numerous studies, surveys, seminars and conferences that UNESCO organises periodically. Some of these groups not only present advice to the Secretariat but also speak to the Organization on behalf of political forces in particular fields of work. Evans points out that when one of the Science Advisory Committees decides that UNESCO ought to take particular actions in science, the Director-General usually takes the recommendation seriously, because he knows that the scientists concerned are likely to have enough delegate votes in the next General Conference to defeat him if he opposes the recommendation.<sup>15</sup>

---

14 Evans, n.8, p.84.

15 Ibid., p.85.

## Chapter - III

### UNESCO AS A FORUM OF DIPLOMACY

#### Attitudes of Member-States:

##### 1. Britain

Britain was the initiator and one of the pioneers of UNESCO. Its attitude was governed by the immediate needs of post-war reconstruction of European education. With the horrors of Nazism and Fascism still fresh in its mind, its specific objective was to preserve and promote the democratic values of freedom and human dignity. It planned a new education system oriented towards democracy with the hope of preventing further wars. In so far as natural sciences were concerned, Britain was eager to share the fruits of scientific cooperation, especially after the discovery of atomic energy. It deprecated American secrecy over the means to release nuclear energy. Non-governmental circles in Britain described the American monopoly of nuclear weapons as a 'scientific conspiracy' and urged Britain to include science as a third dimension of UNESCO 'for sharing the beneficent results of scientific discovery'. Britain also underlined the importance of linking natural sciences with humanities so that scientists would feel that they have a sense of responsibility to mankind for the result of their labours.



## 2. India

India's colonial experience largely influenced its attitude towards UNESCO. It did not subscribe to the Western perception that only Nazism and Fascism were responsible for World War II. At the London Conference and subsequent meetings, India asserted that colonialism and imperialism were also causes of the war. Consequently India stressed the need to re-educate the whole world and not merely Germany and Italy. Implicit in this argument was the Indian view that UNESCO had an important role in fighting against all kind of colonialism and imperialism.

With British colonialism having taken a heavy toll of Indian society reducing it to poverty and illiteracy, international cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology was calculated to have considerable value in its task of social and economic reconstruction. This view was implicit in Nehru's words: "UNESCO can help in our efforts to educate our people, to rouse them to life. If that succeeds we need nothing else".<sup>1</sup> Further India extended enthusiastic support as

---

1 Malcolm Adiseshiah, Let My Country Awake : The Human Role in Development (Paris, 1970), p.14.

she was interested in projecting her glorious and proud heritage to the world. In this regard UNESCO was perceived to be a useful vehicle in creating a sense of awareness about oriental values.

### 3. United States

The United States, which officially joined the pre-creation negotiations only in 1944, initially evinced keen interest in the creation of UNESCO as it was an opportunity to channelise aid for educational purposes and win allies in Europe. Subsequently, however, it seemed to modify its policy, considering it 'more effective to develop and execute its European aid program directly and bilaterally instead of channeling it through the rehabilitation fund of an international organisation'.<sup>2</sup> But having committed itself, it continued to support the creation of UNESCO, through now, it envisaged only a limited role for UNESCO in education as 'a clearing house of information'.

Culturally, however, UNESCO was important to the US. For by 1945, the cultural component in US foreign

---

2 Knill de Capello, "The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation", International Organisation, vol.24, no.1, 1970, pp.12-13.

policy had crystallised. To effectuate the promotion of American culture, the issue of communication was pushed to the fore. At the London Conference a US resolution acclaimed the 'paramount importance' of the press, radio and cinema in spreading the knowledge and common understanding necessary for international security. In January 1946, William Benton, the Assistant Secretary of State, outlined the government's position on the meaning of freedom of communications:

The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures and other media of communications throughout the world... Freedom of the press and freedom of exchange of information generally is an integral part of our foreign policy.(3)

The US succeeded in establishing a legal basis for communications and raising it to a position beside culture, science and education. With a legal sanction, backed by substantial resources, the US felt free to export its capitalist values.

---

3 Herbert Schiller, "The Diplomacy of Cultural Domination and Free Flow of Information", in Jaswant Yadava, ed., Politics of News: Third World Perspectives (New Delhi, 1984), p.6.

#### 4. USSR

The Soviet Union never officially participated in the pre-establishment efforts, except as an observer. The active presence of a large number of capitalist countries prompted it to look upon this emerging body with suspicion and distrust. Moreover, education was too sensitive a matter for the Russians to open-up to the eyes of others. They made it clear that the USSR would be extremely reluctant to participate if UNESCO involved in the inspection of schools and scrutiny of text-books as that would mean interfering in its internal affairs. Despite emphasis on the 'clearing house' role of UNESCO and the inclusion of the constitutional provision that prohibited UNESCO 'from interfering in matter which are essentially within their (member-states) jurisdiction' the Soviet attitude remained negative. When UNESCO was created, the Russians attacked it from outside as a body dominated by Western capitalists. They maintained this position until the Stalin era was over and Khrushchev came forward with his policy of 'detente'. The Soviet Union joined the UNESCO in 1954 to peacefully combat capitalism from within and promote socialism.

## 5. France

Cultural expansion has always been an important facet of French foreign policy. With its military and economic power considerably weakened and influence waning in its colonies, France had to increasingly rely on the cultural strategy to reassert its control in old areas and infiltrate new ones. In the creation of UNESCO, France, with its traditional self image of cultural universality, intellectual generation, liberalism and rich experience in intellectual cooperation saw an opportunity to pursue French cultural policies, apart from sharing the benefits of educational and scientific exchanges. France strongly contended for the location of UNESCO in Paris, believing that an international cultural organisation at home with the use of French language would be of immense utility in promoting French culture abroad. Internally, it would provide an outlet for the numerous restive artistic and intellectual groups that honey-combed French society. France had to bargain hard before it succeeded in securing the location of UNESCO in Paris.

The issues discussed in the following pages try to bring out the diplomatic efforts made by these countries,

individually or collectively, to realise their objectives.

## II

### Issues

#### 1. CERN and Atomic Energy

At the end of the second World War, America held the monopoly in the field of nuclear science. While the Russians were pouring resources for research on atoms, Europe, due to financial bankruptcy was in no position to conduct research even though it had competent scientists. European scientists particularly were sore over their exclusion from research facilities and findings since the advent of war-time secrecy over means to release atomic energy. Turning to the UN for help, some scientists proposed to the ECOSOC that international laboratories be constructed under UN auspices. Their efforts bore fruit when the ECOSOC in 1950 passed a resolution requesting Specialized Agencies to explore possibilities of establishing research centres in sciences. Pierre Auger, a Frenchman, who headed the Department of National Sciences in UNESCO, then, seized the initiative. Support from the UNESCO would give an impetus to the establishment of an International Research Institute proposed by European scientists.

At the Florence General Conference in 1950, Auger consulted representatives of European governments and NGOs. Since the approval of the US was important, he held talks with Professor Rabi, Nobel Laureate of Columbia University, and a member of the US delegation, Professor Rabi, who genuinely desired to 'preserve the international fellowship of science' and to 'help remove a sense of frustration growing among scientists of countries which (did) not have the material means'.<sup>4</sup> He responded enthusiastically and in turn held discussions with fellow US delegates. He found it tough convincing his colleagues, some of whom 'expressed misgivings about left-wing European scientists'. He had to resort to a trade-off to finally secure their assent. In exchange, for permission to make a gesture of support for a European laboratory, he agreed not to oppose them on the official proposal to institute cultural facilities in West Germany, a scheme he did not like. Later, in the Programme and Budget Commission, the US piloted a draft resolution entitled 'Assistance to Research for the Improvement of the Living conditions of Mankind'. The last part was obviously meant to allay the misgiving of those delegates who felt the research may forward

---

4 Laves and Thomson, UNESCO: Purpose, Progress and Prospects (London, 1958), p.195.

destructive rather than constructive work. The Indian delegate, Dr. Krishnan, suggested an amendment to read 'Assistance to Scientific Research especially research for the improvement of the living conditions of mankind', so as to explicitly include the encouragement of research in the basic sciences.<sup>5</sup> It was accepted, followed by the US proposal being unanimously adopted in the Commission. The resulting Conference resolution authorized the Director-General to assist the creation of regional research centres and laboratories, though it promised no financial help. The UNESCO would only serve as a 'catalyst for the science of the world'. As a follow-up, the Director-General called a European member-states conference in 1951 which set up an interim council to carry out further work.

As the idea of a European Nuclear Research Centre moved closer to becoming a reality, apprehensions continued to be expressed at UNESCO forums over its actual purpose. It was these misgivings that partly prompted India, along with France and Japan to introduce a draft resolution at the 1954 General Conference for the 'peaceful

---

5 Records of the General Conference Proceedings  
(Florence, 1950), p.284.



uses of atomic energy' -- earlier passed by a UN Committee. The Indian delegate Dr. Mudaliar in the course of discussion in the Programme and Budget Commission said:

the Indian Government and National Commission believed (sic) that the only way to secure peace and happiness in the world was (sic) to divert the efforts and resources at present expended on the production of armaments to the more humanitarian task of using the momentous discoveries of atomic energy in the service of mankind.(6)

The resolution adopted by the General Conference

invite(d) all members to join together in devoting their efforts and resources in an increasing measure to the utilisation of atomic energy for education, science and culture and other peaceful purposes, with a view to raising the standard of life of the people in all parts of the world and especially in the underdeveloped areas.(7)

## 2. Reduction of Tensions Project

From the beginning India maintained that UNESCO could not be blind to the Cold War, even though it was a highly political problem. It pointed out that removal

---

6 Records of the General Conference Proceedings (Montevideo, 1954), p.378.

7 Records of the General Conference Resolutions (Montevideo, 1954), p.28.

of fear and suspicion from the minds of men was one of the main objectives of UNESCO and therefore well within its domain. Moreover the fear and suspicion characterising the Cold War, presented a serious obstacle to the operation of UNESCO's activities and programmes. It pleaded the recognition of the emergence of two world systems and the need to bring about mutual understanding and reconciliation in order to realise lasting peace. It fully encouraged the undertaking of studies and holding of seminars, aimed at reducing tensions.

When the Soviet Union joined UNESCO in 1954, a way was opened for organised contact between the social scientists of the two great power blocs. Dr. Radhakrishnan, opening the eighth General Conference at Montevideo said:

I venture to hope that their (Russians) presence here will contribute towards dissipating the mists of misunderstanding, towards dissolving, so to speak, the frozen attitudes and rigid postures of fear, suspicion and distrust and towards development of world understanding, one of the main objectives of this great organisation.(8)

India introduced a draft resolution on 'peaceful co-existence' in the Advisory Committee on Programme and

---

8 Records of the General Conference Proceedings  
(Montevideo, 1954), p.35.

Budget. It ran into rough weather as Western delegates felt that the idea of 'peaceful coexistence' rests on the promise that antagonism is inevitable between the two economic systems and that it merely applied to a period of temporary equilibrium between the two camps. The Indian resolution was therefore defeated in the Committee. However, feeling the necessity of finding a modus vivendi in the interests of peace India held informal talks with other member states and produced an acceptable draft resolution. Introducing the joint draft resolution (India, US and Czechoslovakia) in the Programme and Budget Commission, Mr. Mujeeb happily said:

The whole world now wished to move in the direction of peaceful coexistence. The current session of the Conference, which was (sic) more widely representative than any previous one, was (sic) the proper occasion for the adoption of such a resolution.(9)

It was unanimously adopted. The General Conference under the title of 'Social Science and Problem of International Understanding and Tensions' authorised the Director General 'to undertake study of the means of promoting peaceful cooperation in accordance with the

---

9 Records of the General Conference Proceedings  
(Montevideo, 1954), p. 430.

aims expressed in the UNESCO constitution'. The Director-General, consequently, consulted NGOs in Social Sciences on measures to effect the resolution. UNESCO then convened a number of meetings of social scientists.

### 3. East-West Project

The East-West project was the result of a major initiative by the Asian countries. India especially, eager to popularise its culture, repeatedly urged that UNESCO should help present to the Occident, the culture of the Orient. Accordingly it played a leading role in securing the assent of the East-West project. In order to build up substantial world public opinion for the project it organised a number of seminars and symposiums. A symposium, chaired by Dr. Radhakrishnan held in New Delhi late in 1951 on the concept of man and the philosophies of education in East and West provided early impetus. Many prominent cultural personalities who participated evinced keen interest in Eastern cultures and called for the exploration and recognition of originality and worth in all cultures.

In 1954, the Indian National Commission, held a Conference attended besides many distinguished personalities by the Director-General, Luther Evans. Here

Maulana Azad pointed out that the East can make available to the west 'the abiding values of Eastern culture'. The Regional Conference of Asian National Commissions held in Tokyo further contributed to popularising oriental cultures. The approval of New Delhi as the venue of the ninth General Conference was also of great significance to this project. As the Indian representative, Mr. Mudaliar revealed at the New Delhi Conference:

One of his Governments' intentions in extending its invitation to UNESCO to hold the ninth session of its General Conference in India had been precisely to provide the means for many people to see something of Indian cultural values.(10)

Among the Western countries, France enthusiastically supported the East-West project. From the beginning France had stressed on a large role for UNESCO in cultural activities with commensurate funds. Such an emphasis was consistent with the French cultural policy of using UNESCO to serve a large cultural elite in France. The transformation of UNESCO into a primarily technical assistance agency was, therefore, a major set-back for French cultural policy. France reacted

---

10 Records of the General Conference (New Delhi, 1956), p.425.

strongly against this trend. Professor Henri Laugier condemned a 'policy tending to restrict general activities concerned with intellectual cooperation and to convert UNESCO into an organisation principally concerned with providing experts for member-states'.<sup>11</sup> Viewed against this 'adverse' development the East-West project presented a welcome opportunity for France to pursue its cultural objectives through international exchanges, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions and stimulation of artistic creativity. French intellectuals eagerly participated in the above seminars and symposiums and urged the UNESCO to accept the project. Jean Thomas, the then Assistant Director-General, helped in assiduously cultivating the project.

By 1956, India along with other countries had garnered enough support to push through the proposal. Under pressure of public opinion, Evans designated the proposal as a major project and submitted it for approval before the 44th Session of the Executive Board. The Indian delegate Sir Arcot L. Mudaliar, Chairman of the

---

11 William Pendergast, "UNESCO and French Cultural Relations, 1945-70", International Organization, vol.30, no.3, Summer 1976, p.458.

44th Session and the French delegate, Professor Henri Laugier played an active role in pushing the major project through. The resolution as passed by the General Conference was entitled, "Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values". Its objective was to promote among the peoples of East and the West a better understanding of one another's culture with a view to laying firm foundations for wider international understanding and cooperation. It was for ten years starting from 1 January, 1957. Follow-up action on the resolution was left to the Executive Board, Director-General and an International Advisory Committee. The creation of a sense of awareness about the greatness of the Orient followed by the execution of the East-West Project under UNESCO auspices marked a major diplomatic victory for the Asian countries, especially India.

#### 4. Convention and Recommendations Against Discrimination in Education

Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the words, "Everyone has the right to education". It further states, "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms'. Reality, however, is starkly contrary to this great ideal. While the affluent countries enjoy a high level of literacy, illiteracy and ignorance abound in many of the Asian, African and Latin American countries. More than half of India's huge population is still unlettered. Racial bias and the inferior status of women who were denied equal access to education were two other problems of education.

Financial constraints prevented UNESCO from effectively tackling these formidable problems. During its initial years, UNESCO helped only in the realm of ideas leaving the implementation to member-states. The big donors were extremely reluctant to contribute funds for developmental purposes. In 1952, Director-General Torres Bodet, a Mexican who nursed great hopes of eradicating illiteracy in the poor countries, resigned over the refusal of some member-states to increase the budget. As more and more Asian and African countries flocked to the UNESCO, a feeling grew among these less privileged countries that UNESCO should allocate more resources to combat this grave problem. A legal basis had to be found. Thus began deliberations for the formulation of a draft Convention and Recommendations against Discrimination in Education. Women's organizations



and other voluntary bodies actively participated in its shaping. For a Convention signed by their governments would provide them with a lever to exert pressure at home.

At the 1960 General Conference held in Paris, various member-states submitted draft amendments on the report of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts held in June 1960 in Paris. In order to reconcile differences between member-states and the draft of the Special Committee, the Programme Commission set up a Working Party to produce an acceptable document. The Working Party submitted a report which was discussed by the Programme Commission. The amendments suggested by the former were incorporated by the latter. The draft Convention, then, was approved in its entirety by 37-0 with two abstentions, Guinea and Venezuela. The former felt that the draft was not positive enough in relation to the special needs of African countries, while the latter expressed reservation over Article 8 which meant that 'if a given state found that discriminatory practices of a kind anathema to it were being condoned in another, it could bring suit before the Court'.<sup>12</sup> As it suggested a form of sanction, it

---

12 George Shuster, UNESCO : Assessment and Promise (New York, 1963), p.80.

naturally aroused a feeling of uneasiness. The draft included provisions that reflected the experiences and aspirations of the free world. For instance, Article 2 justified private education and defended the right of parents to choose the kind of education for their children. The draft on Recommendations was approved unanimously with one abstention.

When the draft Convention came up for final adoption at the thirtieth plenary session, it encountered resistance from some states. In the debate, the Venezuelan delegate, while generally favouring the draft, repeated his reservation over Article 8 as it meant that 'governments will be bound to appear before the court at the request of only one of the parties,<sup>13</sup> and requested the exclusion of the words 'of any one'. The President acceded to this request, as he did not want three words to mar the passage of the Convention. The proposal to delete the words 'of anyone' was accepted by 24-20 with 1 abstention. A French proposal to institute a Conciliation and Good Offices Committee concerning the application or interpretation of the Convention

---

13 Records of the General Conference Proceedings  
(Paris, 1960), p.476.

was accepted. This was followed by the adoption of the Convention and Recommendations against Discrimination in Education by the General Conference.

##### 5. Guiding Principles on Satellite Broadcasting

In the beginning the main complaint of Third World countries was that the Western press was creating a bad image by picturing them as countries of earthquakes, coups, famines, ethnic bloodshed and other bizarre happenings while keeping silent on their valiant efforts to overcome problems like poverty, illiteracy, rapid population growth and the lack of investment resources. When the communications revolution broke out in the 60's it unleashed a phenomenal quantity of information. This led to a sharp conflict over the 'free flow' of information. For the developing countries realised with alarm that 'free flow' actually meant one-way and unbalanced flow of news from the developed to developing countries to the disadvantage and prejudice of latter. The Direct Broadcasting Satellite, Remote Sensing Satellite and computerised trans-border data flows, while enabling cultural penetration of peoples over the heads of governments, increased the economic and political power of countries in command of

these devices. They posed a grave threat to the sovereignty of their states. Thus began the demand for a "free and balanced" flow and the need to enforce regulations on the uncontrolled flow of information. The Guiding Principles on Satellite Broadcasting was the first step in the efforts of the Third World working in tandem with the Socialist countries to regulate information.

In 1971, the UNGA called upon UNESCO to coordinate its activities with those of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Subsequently the First Committee of the UNGA requested the Outer Space Committee to undertake as soon as possible the elaboration of principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting with a view to concluding an international agreement. Taking this hint, the UNESCO undertook the task of preparing a draft Declaration of Guiding Principles.

At the 1972, General Conference, the Assistant Director General for Communications presented the draft Declaration to the Communications Commission. It triggered off a long and heated debate and intense behind-the-scene negotiations. The US passionately led

the fight against the draft Declaration. It argued that it would be many years before Direct Broadcasting via satellites would be operating under conditions envisaged by the draft and that it would be preferable to await practical experience of the problems that may arise and that in any event there was ample time for further consultation to improve the text. It further pointed out that adequate protection was provided by the regulations adopted by the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST) under the auspices of ITU last year, together with the voluntary cooperative arrangements of the Regional Unions of Broadcasting.

The proponents of the draft, however, stated that the matter was already urgent; that a Declaration proclaimed at the session could always be revised if necessary in the light of experience and that the establishment of codes and principles should precede the realisation of the situation they were intended to cover. One delegate significantly drew attention to the fact that the delegations which were not in favour of the draft were the same countries which had rejected the move for consideration of a Convention in the UN Outer Space Committee.

The Soviet Union strongly backed the draft Declaration as it held that no broadcast should be sent into a country without the consent of its government and that a national government should be free to use any means available to counteract such broadcasts. A head-on collision reviving the old East-West controversy, took place during the discussion on paragraph one of Article IX. Paragraph I of Article IX reads:

In order to further the objectives set out in the preceding articles, it is necessary that States, taking into account the principle of freedom of information, reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of origin of transmission.

The Soviet Union view was that Direct Satellite Broadcasting amounted to a violation of the rights of sovereign and independent states to devise for themselves what programmes their people should be exposed to. The US considered the Article an infringement of the right of the individual to have access to information and argued against any restrictions on the 'free flow of information'. The former, however, won its point. Interestingly France supported Russia on this count.

Realising that it was losing the battle the US sought to at least defer the approval of the draft by raising 'legal' and 'coordination' issues. The US representative maintaining that certain elements of the Declaration carry legal implications stated that adoption of the draft by UNESCO without coordination with the Legal sub-Committee of the Outer Space Committee would flout the 1971 resolution of the UNGA. The resolution had clearly stated that UNESCO should coordinate its satellite broadcasting activities with the Legal sub-Committee. Since the Legal sub-Committee had adjourned its 1972 session prior to the preparation of the UNESCO draft, there had been no chance for the 'coordination' expressly called for by the UNGA. Moreover the Outer Space Committee was to reconvene its working group on Direct Broadcast Satellite in June next year to consider recent developments in the field including specifically the UNESCO draft. The representative therefore concluded that it would be proper for the UNESCO to await comments of the Working Group as well as the Legal sub-Committee before hastily adopting the draft. This filibustering case, however, did not cut ice on the proponents of the draft. They astutely

counter-argued by saying that the UNESCO draft would positively contribute to the deliberations of the UN bodies. The US proposal that a final decision on the draft be deferred to the next session was defeated. The Commission recommended its adoption at the current session by a vote of 47-9, with 13 abstentions.

When the draft Declaration came up for final approval before the thirtieth plenary session of General Conference, the US made a last attempt to stall it. The US delegate strongly defended the freedom of information and made another fervent plea not to adopt the Declaration, repeating the 'coordination' and 'legal' arguments. He further said:

Diverse ethical codes and standards related to the use of communication media in different countries are a complex product of cultural, social and legal institutions and as such are deeply rooted in the political process itself.... The resolution adopted by the communication commission moves UNESCO into an area which breaches the principle of national sovereignty..., puts UNESCO squarely into the regulatory field, with respect to the free flow of information and ideas freedom of expression.... These are principles with respect to which we shall not compromise.(14)



Such rhetoric, however, could hardly change the minds of those who were determined to have their way. The Declaration was adopted by 68-16 with 6 abstentions. It represented a major triumph for its supporters, especially the Soviet Union and a major set-back for the US. The UNGA upheld this Declaration in its 1972 session by a vote of 102 to 1 - the US casting the single dissenting vote.

#### 6. Declaration on Mass Media

The next momentous event in the evolution of the New World Information and Communication Order took place at the 1978 General Conference. This was the adoption of the Declaration on Mass Media by acclamation. The diplomatic origins of this declaration go back to 1972. Here the General Conference, on the basis of a draft resolution originally proposed by Byelorussia, requested the Director-General to prepare and submit to the next session a draft Declaration concerning the Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media with a view to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and Combating War Propaganda, Racialism and Apartheid, a pet topic of the Soviet Union.

In conformity with the above resolution, Rene Maheu, the then Director-General, formulated a draft Declaration. Many countries, however, expressed reservations and consequently submitted various amendments at the 1974 session. The General Conference referred both the draft Declaration and the amendments suggested to an Inter-Governmental body of experts for study in depth and reconciling conflicting views.

A notable event occurred at the 1974 session that was going to significantly affect the policies of UNESCO. This was the election of Mr. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow as Director General. He was the second man to be elected to this high post from the Third World after Torres Bodet of Mexico. A former Education Minister of Senegal, he had vast diplomatic experience both as a politician at home and as a senior member of UNESCO Secretariat. He viewed with great empathy the problems of the Third World. Inevitably he came to design policies in such a manner as to be more responsive to the needs of the developing world.

The Inter-Governmental meetings of experts in Paris got embroiled in a controversy. The Western countries withdrew from it, protesting against two passages in the draft Declaration. The first was a paragraph

in the preamble which spoke of 'elimination of all forms of racialism and racial discrimination' in which was made a reference to Zionism. The other Western objection was to article XII which stated 'states are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media under their jurisdiction'. This was interpreted as a license to states to muzzle press freedom. The withdrawal was a diplomatic blunder for subsequently the meeting passed the two passages.

At the 1976 session in Nairobi, an ideological confrontation occurred between the two blocs over the draft Declaration. The Western countries tabled a resolution expressing their strong objection to both the passages and particularly to the Soviet sponsored Article XII, which they contended would suppress press freedom. The Soviet delegate vehemently denied the charge and insisted that the draft in its present form be approved as it had been approved by the Inter-Governmental meeting of experts. In order to avoid an open show down and avert a straight vote, the General Conference referred the matter to a Special Negotiating Committee, including the US and USSR. This, Committee was, however, unable to resolve the deadlock. Consequently, it decided to defer the consideration of the draft for two years.

On this issue the Soviet Union was isolated for two reasons. Firstly, the US acknowledging that the third world had some legitimate claims regarding information imbalance, offered 'carrots' in the form of various aid schemes and technical assistance to them to build their communications infrastructure. John E. Reinhardt, Chief of the US delegation announced a 'more effective programme of action' which included 'American assistance, both public and private, to centers of professional education and training in broadcasting and journalism in the developing world' as well as 'a major effort to apply the benefits of advanced communication technology, specifically communications satellites to economic and social needs in the rural areas of the developing nations'.<sup>15</sup> Not prepared to defend their militant stand at the high price of losing the lucrative offers, the developing countries appear to have acquiesced. Secondly, Mankekar says:

It is to be noted that the African countries maintained a low profile throughout the Nairobi Conference so as to avoid

---

15 Manjunath Pendukar, "NWICO : An International Powerplay between the Core and Periphery Countries", in Jaswant Yadava ed., Politics of News : Third World Perspective (New Delhi, 1984), p.44.

any possible confrontation or crisis at the first UNESCO session held in an African country.(16)

India, careful to respect the sentiments of its African friends, toed their cautious stance and extended support to the US in deferring the matter.

This postponement, however, provided further time to sort out differences and reach a consensus. In 1977 M'Bow, in accordance with a Conference directive, appointed a high-powered representative Commission, headed by the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prize winner, Sean Mac Bride, 'to undertake a review of all the problems of communication in the contemporary society seen against the background of technological progress and recent developments in international relations with due regard to their complexity and magnitude.'<sup>17</sup> This was part of M'Bow's strategy to build up support for the Declaration and strengthen his hands at the next session. While the Commission went about its work,

---

16 D.R.Mankekar, One Way Free Flow : Neo-Colonialism Via News Media (New Delhi, 1978), p.100.

17 MacBride Commission Report : Many Voices, One World (Paris, 1980), p.XIV.

M'Bow and his deputies engaged in intensive consultations with member-states and other interested bodies to resolve differences, over the draft. Side by side, seminars and conferences were organized to keep the issue alive, identify differences and clarify matters.

In September 1978, before the opening of the general conferences, the revised draft Declaration on Mass Media was published. The MacBride Commission also submitted an interim report favouring the progress towards a New World Information and Communication Order. It recognised the fact of imbalances in the current information structure and suggested rectifications. Both the documents came under severe attack from the Western press. Some cynical commentators painted a gloomy scenario for the 20th session. Some thought that this conflict may sound the death-knell of UNESCO. However, these Western critics were proved wrong. For diplomacy found its day.

The 20th session opened in Paris amid much excitement and tension. The barrage of brickbats from the Western press and critical comments made by the Western countries during the general policy debate set an ominous tone for the session. M'Bow, nevertheless,

remained undeterred. Noting objections raised or reservations expressed by different parties, he plunged into 'very extensive consultations with the delegations of member-states and with representatives of various regional groupings and of international non-governmental organizations'.<sup>18</sup> His aim was to achieve the difficult task of consensus through the principle of mutual give-and-take.

The main bone of contention was the word 'state'. The two sides held diametrically opposite views. For the West the word 'state' instantly conjured up visions of tyranny, autocracy and suppression of human rights. The Western press dubbed most of Third World governments as 'unrepresentative, anti-democratic, illiberal and authoritarian'. In the current context, media in the hands of the state meant regulation, restriction and censorship to which they were bitterly opposed. In short the 'state' was an anathema. Freedom was considered an end in itself.

For the Third World (supported by the Socialist countries), the 'state' had a central role to play in

---

18 Report of the Director-General 1977-78 (UNESCO, Paris), p. XIV.

the task of modernization and development. They felt that in facing this formidable challenge, often compounded by fissiparous tendencies, the 'state' may have to impose restrictions and regulations. In the quest for a viable political and economic system, the state would harness all available means including the media. Conceived in this manner, it meant that the media were 'development tools' or social assets'. The first duty of the media, therefore, was to help in the high priority task of nation-building. This position is lucidly outlined by an African journalist working in London in the following words:

We must have planned development, and the role of the media has to be planned too. It's role must be strictly defined for maximum contribution to development. A nation in a hurry to develop is like a nation in a state of emergency; freedom to criticize must be restricted by government according to its priorities. And our priorities are collective rights and the well-being of the nation as a whole, not the individual human rights you cherish so much here.(19)

Such conflicting perceptions could hardly be expected to provide a meeting point. But thanks to the flexible attitude of both sides, a consensus emerged.

---

19 Quoted in Rosemary Righter, "Battle of the Bias", Foreign Policy (Washington), No.34, Spring 1979, p.125.



Describing the course of secret negotiations Mankakar says:

The hectic, prolonged, behind-the-scene parleys went through many ups and downs and anxious moments, as each hurdle demolished was replaced by another. On the thirteenth day of the negotiations, it came to be known that a miracle had occurred and an agreed draft had emerged. (20)

The Third World negotiators had accepted to delete all references that could be construed as authorising the state to interfere with the media. All mention of the 'state' was deleted from the Declarations except for one reference in Article X, paras 3 and 4 which spoke of the 'states facilitating the procurement by the mass media in the developing countries, of adequate conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand...' Article XI guaranteed 'the existence of favourable conditions for operation of the mass media in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'. The much-cherished phrase 'human rights' was liberally sprinkled all over the Declaration. In return, the Western countries recognised

the fact that there was imbalance in the global information system and that there was a need for change. They insisted on the use of the phrase 'The establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order', rather than 'the new world information order'. The Third World countries obviously opposed it. But M'Bow cajoled them into acquiescing in the interest of consensus.

Rosemary Righter sums up the diplomatic trade-off in the following words:

The essential bargain in Paris was that Western negotiators acknowledged the need for change and pledged their cooperation in exchange for non-aligned group's acquiescence in a new text that repudiated the concept of state control and emphasised human rights, the principle of a free flow of information, and open access to diverse new sources.(21)

The Soviets, it seems, misjudged the situation in Paris. Until the last minute they were convinced that the several formal and informal drafts drifting around could not be resolved into a compromise by any of the negotiating teams in the basement rooms. Their

---

21 Righter, n.20, p.135.

strategy, it seems, was to sit back and re-introduce M'Bow's original text for a vote when everybody was exhausted. But as the settlement of all outstanding differences followed by the formulation of an agreeable draft became a reality, the Soviets came up with 'last minute' demands realizing their miscalculation. This tactic worked as the other parties, anxious to preserve and conclude the agreement reached after guelling negotiations, felt forced to give in. The Soviet Union got a reference made to the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights in the final para of the Declaration. The other Soviet gains were the inclusion of the following provisions in the preamble:

- (i) Freedom of information requires as an indispensable element the willingness and the capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent.
- (ii) A reference to the UNGA resolution adopted in 1947 condemning 'all forms of propaganda which are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.

In the final analysis everybody had gained something and lost something. The final draft undoubtedly symbolised 'the triumph of reason and a patient willingness to conciliate'. Submitting the consensus document

to the Programme Commission, the Director General said:

Nobody can expect to find in it, word for word, the exact draft he would like to see on the other hand, nobody can say that it runs counter in any profound sense, to the principles to which he is deeply attached. (22)

The Declaration was adopted by acclamation.

The US and other Western delegations regarded the Declaration as not only preserving the freedom and free flow of information but also marking a significant step in the promotion of the free flow of ideas by word and image. For the Third World the Declaration was a major step forward in the establishment of a New World Information Order though they regretted that the responsibilities and duties of the media were not more explicitly laid out in it.

The achievement of consensus was primarily due to the tireless efforts of M<sup>r</sup> Bow who went about the task of negotiations with great skill and finesse. This was universally acknowledged at a General Conference. However tribute must also be paid to the member states without

---

22 Records of the General Conference Proceedings  
(Paris, 1978), p. 1070.

whose cooperation it would have been impossible to reach a settlement. A truly diplomatic spirit prevailed in the sense that everybody was willing to consider the matter on the basis of mutual give-and-take. This spirit was well summed by the Indian delegate who said: "The essence of compromise is the willingness of all parties not to insist on their own individual points of view which are unacceptable to others".<sup>23</sup> That the flexibility of professionals prevailed over the dogmatism of amateurs is evident in Gerald Long's castigation of 'diplomats and public servants' in the following words: "Diplomats make deals, they operate by such means as consensus and acclamation; they make trade-offs."<sup>24</sup> Whatever may be the criticism by those whose interests were affected, the consensus Declaration on Mass Media marks a milestone in the history of multilateral diplomacy.

#### 7. International Programme for Development of Communication

At the 1980 session in Belgrade, a formal call for the attainment of a New World Information and

---

23 Ibid., p.1070.

24 Mankekar, n.20, p.121.

Communication was made, thus fulfilling a long-standing desire of the Third World countries. The session also approved by consensus the final report of the MacBride Commission and established the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) to assist developing countries in the task of building communication infrastructure. The IPDC was to be administered by an Inter-Governmental Council whose 35 members were to be elected by the General Conference and whose Secretariat was to be headed by a Director appointed by the Director-General on the recommendation of the Council. It was to be funded by voluntary state contributions and other diverse sources. Though it remained under the UNESCO umbrella, the latter in actuality had no control over it.

The US working closely with its western allies and some "moderates" in the Non-Aligned group had fought hard to separate the IPDC from UNESCO as it did not want the former to be 'subject to control by the third-world countries in a majority in UNESCO'. At an Inter-Governmental meeting of 35 member-states of UNESCO in Washington in 1979, the US proposed a communications development consultative group independent of UNESCO, to promote

technical cooperation, funded by voluntary contributions from governments, international agencies and private sources. The Third World countries opposed this proposal and supported a Tunisian counter-proposal for the setting up within UNESCO of an autonomous centre to be called the International Institute for Information and Communication Planning, with an international fund.

There was no agreement over either of these proposals. The Tunisian member of the MacBride Commission, Ambassador Mustapha Masmoudi, managed to get the above proposal adopted as a recommendation of the Commission in the face of stiff resistance from the US, France and Canada. But, while the recommendation remained only a recommendation at the 1980 General Conference, the US succeeded in creating the IPDC and Inter-Governmental Council. In the words of a US official:

The establishment of the IPDC marks the successful realisation of a US initiative first announced at the 20th General Conference in 1978. It expresses in concrete form an active sympathy for the communication and information disabilities of the developing world and a desire to turn UNESCO's attention away from divisive rhetoric towards unifying works of practical construction.(25)

- 
25. G.S.Bhargava, "Western View : Prejudices Die Hard", World Focus, vol.3, No.1, January 1982, p.14.

At the 1981 Inter-Governmental Council meeting, the US argued for the principle of consensus and successfully had it accepted as a procedure for IPDC operation. It was intended primarily to weaken the Third World majority in the Council and thus avoid any confrontation. Part of the US policy towards IPDC was to ensure access to US corporations of Third World communications markets; to ensure access to IPDC funds for capitalists in the Third World to build privately held media as opposed to government monopolies, and to fund bilateral 'aid' projects which can be directly under the control of the US government in contrast to the IPDC projects which are multi-lateral. The Non-aligned countries strongly opposed this policy and proposed that only special account projects be considered for IPDC sponsorship. The indifferent attitude of the West towards the Special Accounts projects has predictably caused financial problems. The funds are meagre when compared to the demands of the developing countries. Many Third World representatives of the IPDC Inter-governmental Council expressed disappointment over the West's lack of commitment to the IPDC.

Meanwhile the almost hysterical denunciation of the MacBride Commission Report by the Western press



continued. The Inter-American Press Association and the International Press Council were in the forefront of the strident attack. Sean MacBride rebutted the press attacks as 'unfair and ill-informed' because the Commission had not only opposed the framing of a code setting out the rights and responsibilities of journalists but also strongly defended the abolition of all censorship. It is evident that this veritable information war on UNESCO was part of a strategy to put pressure on Western governments to withdraw from UNESCO. For the Western press feared that the continued participation of their governments would mean bartering away their interests. The commercial interests in the preservation of the status quo is well brought out by the Soviet scholar, Yermoshkin Grachev who says that,

information is both politics and economics  
... the fabulous profits reaped by the  
manufacturers of computers and other elec-  
tronic devices, by television and motion  
pictures companies, by airlines, banks and  
other financial agencies dealing in infor-  
mation and by the gaint advertising industry  
... the information industry is now the  
second largest export enterprise in the US  
and made approximately 75 billion dollars  
in foreign sales last year.(26)

The sustained Western press tirade produced results when Reagan came to power in 1981. The answer to the flexible attitude adopted by the US delegations at the 1978 and 1980 sessions lies in the liberal policy of Carter towards the UN system. Reagan, however, was a different kettle of fish. His tough posture is evident in a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives which said,

we do not feel we have to continue to support a UNESCO that turns its back on the high purpose this organisation was originally intended to serve.(27)

The letter also endorsed the Declaration of Talloires made by a group of passionate Western journalists in May 1981 who upheld absolute freedom of press. The Talloires Conference had produced a toughly worded declaration pledging cooperation in all genuine efforts to expand the free flow of information and called on the UNESCO, to abandon attempts to regulate news content and formulate rules for the press. The strident and unabated criticism of the Western press, perhaps, forced the US to take stern measures, earlier than

---

27 N.L.Chawla, "An Overview", World Focus, vol.3, No.1, January 1982, p.6.

expected. In 1983, it announced its withdrawal, charging the UNESCO with 'politicisation', 'mismanagement' and 'ineffectiveness'.<sup>28</sup> In the letter of withdrawal, addressed to the Director-General in December 1983, the US Secretary of State George Schultz said,

that for a number of years the organisation had been moving away from the original principles of its constitution, that it had served the political purposes of the Member States rather than its own international vocation and that it had not fully demonstrated the effectiveness which had been hoped for.(29)

---

28 The 1970 resolution of the General Conference directing the Executive Board to break off relations with NGOs whose local affiliates were found to practise racial discrimination in South Africa, Rhodesia or Portuguese territories; the banning of Portugal to Conferences under UNESCO auspices; the expulsion of Israel (subsequently re-admitted) and the invitation to PLO in 1974 to participate in certain UNESCO activities were all described by the American Academy of Arts and Science as 'the political misuse of UNESCO' by the Third World. The West was also sore over 'the urging in 1973 by the Executive Board at the instance of the Peoples' Republic of China that Non-governmental Organizations associated with UNESCO, sever relations with their affiliates in Taiwan.' Briefly UNESCO's history has been marked by protracted, heated debates and discussions over this controversial issue. Needless to say, the long, often bitter hours spent over debating and discussing 'politicisation' have impeded the consideration of important programmes in the fields of science, education, culture and communication.

29 Report of the Director-General, 1984-85 (UNESCO, Paris), p.XXXII.

The withdrawal of US followed by Britain has had its impact on the communications issue. At its last general session, UNESCO had to drastically prune down its budget by about \$ 43 million. The IPDC is virtually grounded due to the lack of financial resources. Further the decision of M' Bow to step down at the end of the year will mean a definite loss to the Third world.

In short the action of US and UK has put the developing countries on the defensive. The current cool and cautious stance of the Third world is, however, only a tactic to lure back the US and UK. These two countries will try to squeeze out as many concessions as possible before they decide to join again. But they cannot reverse the trend towards a New World Information Order. For the road to the New Order is firmly paved. In the years to come, the communication issue promises to be a lively battle of diplomatic wits.

## EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

There are two ways of evaluating the work of international organizations — idealistic and realistic. The idealistic approach means measuring the performance of international organizations vis-a-vis their constitutional provisions whereas the realistic approach means assessing them in the light of how they actually work. The advocates of the former approach are bound to be disillusioned. For instance, one of the fundamental duties of the UN is to prevent the scourge of war and maintain international peace and security. But in the post World War II period, though no global war has broken out, about 150 regional wars have been fought with each threatening any moment to escalate into a major crisis. Nations have impunitively violated the principles of the Charter and then contemptuously dismissed UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution of the dispute. The Middle East imbroglio and the raging Iran-Iraq war are two standing examples of the UN's inability to prevent war and bring about a peaceful settlement.

The UN is committed to the implementation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But even here there are glaring failures. In the sphere of political

rights South Africa presents a notorious example of a brutal regime that has deprived the majority black population of the basic right to self-determination. It continues to repress the blacks and practise the odious doctrine of apartheid defying all the UN resolutions and international public opinion. In so far as social and economic rights are concerned a major part of the world still remains plagued by death, disease, want and hunger. The global economic system continues to be marked by gross disparities and inequity.

However, the idealistic approach is not the correct way of evaluating international organizations. It means turning a blind eye to reality. For in actuality they hardly work in accordance with constitutional principles. The burden of the first Chapter was to show that the UN System primarily operates as an instrument of national diplomacy. It operates in that manner because it is predominantly inter-governmental in character. Consequently it is just another forum for the pursual of national interests. One may even go further and say that the UN System is finally composed of human beings. With the nature of man being "selfish and self-centred", to use Hobbesian terms, the institutions he walks can hardly

be expected to be marked by traits other than parochial.

The UN is not an alien entity, separate from world politics. It is very much involved in it. It cannot act without the consent of member states, especially the big powers in matters of international peace and security. But member states guided as they are by their national advantages have either withheld consent or extended support to non-substantive resolutions that hardly mean anything. Ambiguous resolutions have also been passed. If the UN has failed to resolve the South African problem it is because the US sometimes joined by Britain and France has been casting the veto in the Security Council. The US has refused to cooperate because economically it has much at stake in South Africa. To extend support to the UN would mean upholding the principles of the UN Charter at the cost of national advantages — a sacrifice the US has not been prepared to make. Ambiguous resolutions have an advantage for the implementor in the sense that they may provide room for flexible interpretation. But even this has been fraught with pit-falls. When the Secretary General who is the executor of UN resolutions has tried to interpret ambiguous resolutions in a liberal fashion, he has invariably run into rough

weather. Dag Hammarskjold who had a dynamic conception of UN often interpreted vague resolutions in a broad manner in order to uphold the principles of the Charter. But during his last years, he became the target of severe Soviet attacks. The Soviet uproar cut down to size both the role of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly reducing the UN once again to a position of virtual ineffectiveness.

Given the above political environment, it is unrealistic to examine the UN from an idealistic point of view. In fact the marginal success of the UN in realising the principles of the Charter, appears magnified when perceived in the light of constraints. The UN may not have been able to prevent the break-out of war. But at least it has prevented the war from escalating into a major conflict. In other words it has precluded a bad situation from getting worse. Though it has not succeeded in bringing about a permanent solution, it has often managed to keep the warring factions apart and helped in the 'peaceful perpetuation of the dispute'. This it has done through the despatch of UN peace-keeping forces and innovations like 'preventive diplomacy' and 'quiet



diplomacy'. The Suez Canal, Laos and Congo crises may be cited in this regard.

In the field of political rights with the exception of South Africa the UN has been largely responsible for decolonisation in the rest of the world. Social and economic problems in view of their magnitude are no less difficult to resolve than problems of war and peace. Moreover the rapidly multiplying population and lack of funds have served to compound socio-economic problems. But despite these constraints the UN through the creation of agencies like UNDP, UNCTAD and UNIDO, has in its own small way been contributing to improving the social and economic life of humankind.


The UNESCO being structured on the lines of the UN works no differently from the latter though it deals with social and economic activities. The founding fathers envisaged only a 'clearing house' role for UNESCO with very little emphasis on the implementation part at the time of its creation. In other words, UNESCO was to serve primarily as a forum for the exchange of ideas in the fields of education, science and culture with the

ultimate aim of realising international understanding and the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind and consequently the goal of international peace and security. For the western democracies had a strong conviction that the second world war was the result of a lack of understanding of democratic values by the peoples of Italy and Germany. The accent was obviously on the preservation and dissemination of democratic principles. That UNESCO was assigned mainly a 'clearing-house' role is evident in its small regular budget during its initial years of functioning. Bodets efforts to increase the size of the budget and give UNESCO a developmental role failed as the big donors refused to cooperate.

However when UNESCO underwent a dramatic compositional change due to the winds of decolonisation that drove in a large number of poor and uncommitted countries, it was no longer possible to keep UNESCO confined to a limited role. The new nations with their host of social and economic problems demanded technical and financial assistance to resolve problems like illiteracy or lack of developmental infrastructure. Even culture acquired a developmental tone in the sense that aid was demanded for the restoration of ancient monuments on the ground

that it would contribute to the growth of tourism. With their numerical strength the developing countries virtually "hijacked" UNESCO in a direction that was mundane and astray from its original abstract route. The extra-budgetary funds from UN developmental agencies, like EPTA and UN Special Fund helped in this direction. The total UNESCO budget— regular annual plus extrabudgetary funds (Technical Assistance and Special Fund) — increased from a modest amount of \$ 8 million in 1949 to about \$ 100 million in 1965. The rich countries naturally resisted this material tendency as it meant contributing more funds from their pockets. But the US due to the Cold War and compulsions of competition with the Soviet Union was forced to submit to the new demands though it made vigorous efforts to prune down the expenditure. Moreover, as long as UNESCO conferred sanction on democratic ideas like 'free flow' of information, the US was not wholly averse to extending support to UNESCO policies and programmes. However, when such ideas came under strong attack from the developing countries, the US attitude gradually turned negative until it finally quit in 1984.

The concept of 'free flow' of information finds a place in the UNESCO constitution. But with the break-



out of the communications revolution in the 60s the existing imbalances and inequities marking the global information system aggravated extremely. The new countries repudiated the 'free flow' concept as it adversely affected their national interests. They demanded the democratisation of the information order with the right to communicate to all countries. They not only interpreted 'free flow' as meaning a two-way flow of information that also demanded that the 'free-flow' be regulated in order to protect their sovereign rights. Freedom with responsibility became the new slogan. The US in its withdrawal note pointed out that UNESCO support to such demand was contrary to the original purposes of the Charter. However, 'free flow' despite its constitutional validity was unacceptable to the developing countries under the changed circumstances. This controversy is also reflective of the conflict between political and social and economic rights with the western democracies stressing on precedence to the former and the Third World seeking priority for the latter.

The evolution of UNESCO along developmental lines and the sharp controversy over the 'free-flow' of information are indicative of new trends not wholly in accordance with its original purposes. This is once again attributable to the primarily inter-governmental character

of UNESCO. Efforts to increase the participation and influence of NGOs have so far not borne much fruit. The constitutional amendment brought about by the US in 1954 significantly reduced the non-governmental role. Herein lies the difficulty of the functional approach. The main aim of functionalism is to transfer the loyalties of peoples from the government to the international bodies devoted to the welfare of mankind. But with governments still prominently participating in these bodies and acting as intermediaries between their people and the body it is hard to expect a transcension of national frontiers in the near future.

It is apparent that the participation of member states in the UNESCO is governed by their selfish interests. America's attitudinal change from enthusiastic cooperation to hostility and Soviet Union's from hostility to tactical cooperation has nothing to do with the functionalism. For the developing countries functionalism is advantageous from a national point of view. The functional approach is based on the premise that the resolving of social and economic problems in the long-run will have a positive bearing on international peace and security. Since most of the socio-economic problems in terms of

intensity and magnitude are concentrated in the developing world, they are in a strong position to demand attention and assistance to resolve them. However, it is a moot question whether they are really committed to realising the long-term goals of functionalism; it could well be that they are using it to legitimise their material aspirations. In short, it is not far from the truth to say that member-states are more concerned with achieving their immediate objectives rather than the long-term goals of international organisations.

The UNESCO, thus, is not a non-political organization with a special air of purity, immune from the harshness of politics and working in an untrammelled manner towards achieving its lofty ideals. In reality, it is primarily a forum for the pursuit of national objectives. As a result it is a forum for hard bargaining. This is evident in the Mass Media Declaration of 1978 which was the result of six years of tough negotiations with member states individually and collectively fighting hard to preserve and promote their interests. The diplomatic struggle in UNESCO constitutes but a small part of the overall scramble for power and superiority in international politics. In this clash of interest constitutional

principles have been used expediently by member states to legalise their objectives.

In short, the constitutional ideals of international organizations have remained as ideals with no immediate possibility of fulfillment. They have been over-shadowed by the partisan interests of member states or personal interests of human beings who have been the creators and participants of international organisations and whose abiding past time has been to safeguard and promote their selfish interests. Only a moral change of unprecedented dimensions can enable man and his institutions to transcend narrow frontiers. With such a moral change no where in sight the parochial factor of national interest or personal interest will continue to reign supreme. It would therefore be appropriate to end with the axiomatic words of George Washington:

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us that with far the greatest part of mankind interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence...  
(f)ew men are capable of making a continuous sacrifice of private interests or advantage to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure change the constitution of man before we can make it otherwise.

## SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 1. Primary Sources

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Fifth Session, Florence, 1950 (Paris: UNESCO, 1950).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954 (Paris: UNESCO, 1955).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Ninth Session, New Delhi, 1956 (Paris: UNESCO, 1958).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Eleventh Session, Paris, 1960 (Paris: UNESCO, 1962).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Seventeenth Session, Paris, 1972, vol.3, (Paris : UNESCO, 1974).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Proceedings, Twentieth Session, Paris, 1978, vol.3 (Paris: UNESCO, 1980).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Resolutions, Fifth Session, Florence, 1950 (Paris : UNESCO, 1950).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Resolutions, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954 (Paris : UNESCO, 1955).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Resolutions, Ninth Session, New Delhi, 1956 (Paris : UNESCO, 1957).



Records of the General Conference of UNESCO, Resolutions, Eleventh Session, Paris, 1960 (Paris : UNESCO, 1961).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Resolutions Recommendations, Seventeenth Session, Paris, 1972, vol.1 (Paris : UNESCO, 1973).

Records of the General Conference of the UNESCO, Resolutions, Twentieth Session, Paris, 1978, vol.1, (Paris: UNESCO, 1979).

Report of the Director General, UNESCO, 1977-78, 21 C/3, (Paris : UNESCO, 1979).

Report of the Director-General, UNESCO, 1984-85, 24 C/3 (Paris : UNESCO, 1986).

Approved Programme and Budget for 1965-66, 13 C/5, Paris, January 1965.

Approved Programme and Budget for 1986-87, 23 C/5, Paris January 1986.

Report by the International Commission (MacBride) for the Study of Communication Problems, Many Voices, One World : Towards a New, more just and more efficient world information and Communication Order (Paris : UNESCO, 1980).

## 2. Secondary Sources

### (i) Books:

Adiseshiah, Malcolm, Let My Country Awake : The Human Role in Development (Paris : UNESCO, 1970).

Ameri, Houshang, Politics and Process in the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations (Aldershot : Gower Publishing Company, 1982).

- Bajpai and Viswam, (eds.), UNESCO : In Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986).
- Berridge and Jennings, (eds.), Diplomacy at the UN (London: Macmillan, 1985).
- Claude, Inis, Swords into Plowshares : The Problems and Progress of International (New York : Random House, 1964).
- Corea, Gamani, Need for Change : Towards the New International Economic Order (London : Pergamon Press, 1980).
- Coulombis and Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (New Delhi : Prentice Hall of India, 1986).
- Elmandjra, Mahdi, The UN System : An Analysis (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).
- Fisher, Roger, Basic Negotiating Strategy : International Conflict for Beginners (New York : Harper and Row, 1969).
- Galenson, Walter, The ILO : An American View (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Press, 1981).
- Gordenkar, Leon, (ed.), The United Nations in International Politics (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1971).
- Grachev, Yermoshkin, New World Information Order or Psychological Warfare (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1984).
- Hagras, Kamal, UN Conference on Trade and Development : A Case-Study in UN Diplomacy (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1965).
- Heggart, Richard, An Idea and its Servants : UNESCO From Within (London : Chatto and Windus, 1978).

- Ikle, F.C., How Nations Negotiate (New York : Harper and Row, 1964).
- Jackson, Richard, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1983).
- Kaufman, Johan, United Nations Decision-Making (Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980).
- Kay, David A., (ed.), The United Nations Political System (New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1967).
- Kumar, Mahendra, India and UNESCO (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1974).
- Lall, Arthur, Modern International Negotiation : Principles and Practice (New York : Columbia University Press, 1966).
- Laves and Thomson, UNESCO : Purpose, Progress and Prospects (Bloomington : University of Indiana Press, 1957).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1963).
- Luard, Evan, International Agencies : The Emerging Framework of Interdependence (London: Macmillan, 1977).
- Mankekar, D.R., One Way Free Flow : Neo-Colonialism Via News-media (New Delhi : Clarion Books, 1978).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Whose Freedom ? Whose Order? A Plea for a New International Information Order by the Third World (New Delhi : Clarion Books, 1981).
- Morganthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace (Calcutta : Scientific Book Agency, 1972).

Nicholas, H.G., UN as a Political Institution (London: Oxford, 1975).

Ninkovich, Frank A., The Diplomacy of Ideas : US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Plischke, Elmer, ed. , Modern Diplomacy : The Art and the Artisans (Washington : American Enterprise Institute, 1979).

Prasad, Bimal, ed. , India's Foreign Policy : Studies in Continuity and Change (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979).

Robinson, Nehemiah, Universal Declaration of Human Rights: It's Origins, Significance and Interpretation (New York : Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1950).

Rubinstein and Ginsburg, eds. , Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations : A Twenty-Five Year Perspective (New York : New York University Press, 1971).

Sewell, James, UNESCO and World Politics : Engaging in International Relations (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1975).

Shuster, George, UNESCO : Assessment and Promise (New York : Harper and Row, 1963).

Smith, Anthony, The Geopolitics of Information : How Western Culture Dominates the World (London : Faber and Faber, 1980).

U Thant, View from the UN (London : David and Charles, 1978).

Wortley, B.A. ed. , UN: The First Ten Years (Manchester: University Press, 1957).

Yadava, Jaswant, Politics of News : Third World Perspectives (New Delhi : Concept Publishing Company, 1984).

Zacher, Mark W., Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations (New York : Columbia University Press, 1970).

(ii) Articles

Adiseshiah, Malcolm, "UNESCO's Contribution to Education and Science", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol.XLI, April-June 1985, pp.215-19.

Bhargava, G.S., "Western View : Prejudices Die Hard", World Focus (New Delhi), vol.3, no.1, January 1982, pp.13-16.

Branscomb, Anne W., "Waves of the Future : Making WARC Work", Foreign Policy (Washington), no.34, Spring 1979, pp.121-38.

Chawla, N.L., "An Overview", World Focus, vol.3, No.1, January 1982, pp.3-6.

Capello Knill de, "The Creation of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization", International Organisation (Boston), vol.24, no.1, 1970, pp.1-30.

Dixit, J.N., "Culture as an Instrument of Diplomacy", India Quarterly, vol.35, no.4, October-December 1979, pp.453-65.

Evans, Luther, "Some Management Problems of UNESCO", International Organization, vol.17, no.1, Winter 1963, pp.76-90.

Howkins, John, "What is the World Administrative Radio Conference?", Journal of Communication (Philadelphia), vol.29, no.1, Winter 1979, pp.144-9.

- Irani, C.R., "A Critique : UNESCO Meddling", World Focus, vol.3, no.1, January 1982, pp.28-30.
- Kaul, T.N., "UNESCO : Problems and Prospects", India Quarterly, vol.XLI, no.2, April-June 1985, pp.197-207.
- Kripal, Prem, "UNESCO and India : Fruitful Cooperation and Abiding Friendship", India Quarterly, vol.XLI, no.2, April-June 1985, pp.208-214.
- Mankekar, D.R., "Third world Role : Decolonisation of Information", World Focus, vol.3, no.1, January 1982, pp.9-12.
- McWhinney, Edward, "The Antinomy of Policy and Function in the Law of International Communications", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (New York), vol.13, no.1, 1974, pp.3-27.
- Murthy, C.S.R., "India's Participation in the UN : Patterns and Problems", India Quarterly, October-December 1983, pp.408-20.
- Pendergast, William, "UNESCO and French Cultural Relations, 1945-70", International Organization, vol.30, no.3, Summer 1976, pp.453-78.
- Righter, Rosemary, "Battle of the Bias", Foreign Policy, no.34, Spring 1979, pp.121-38.
- Ronalds, Francis, "Voices of America", Foreign Policy, no.34, Spring 1979, pp.154-60.
- Verghese, B.G., "MacBride Commission : Correcting Imbalances", World Focus, vol.3, no.1, January 1982, pp.7-8.
- Whittaker, Philip N., "To Beat the Band", Foreign Policy, no.34, Spring 1979, pp.160-64.

White, Curtis T., "Uprooting the Squatters", Foreign Policy, no.34, Spring 1979, pp.148-153.

(iii) Newspapers:

Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

Indian Express (New Delhi)

International Herald Tribune (Singapore)

Patriot (New Delhi)

The Statesman (New Delhi)

The Hindu (Madras and New Delhi)

Times of India (New Delhi)

••••  
••  
•