Role of Women in Peace-building in Kashmir, 1989-2013

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation entitled, **"Role of Women in Peace-building in Kashmir, 1989-2013"** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of a degree of MASTERS OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. This dissertation has not been submitted to any other degree of this University or any University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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For My Grand-Mother Begum Shams-un-Nisa , who is

bravest among us all....

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Abbreviations

AFSPA : Armed Forces Special Powers Act

ANHAD : Act Now for Harmony and Democracy

APDP : Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons

APHC : All Parties Hurriyat Conference

BSF : Border Security Forces

CBM : Confidence Building Measures

CRPF : Central Reserve Police Force

CDR : Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation

DDR : Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DPG : Delhi Policy Group

HELP : Human Effort for Love and Peace

HRLN : Human Rights Law Network

ICRD : International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy

IGSSS : Indo-Global Social Service Society

IMTD : Institute of Multi-track Diplomacy

IPCS : Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

JKLF : Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JKCCS : Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society

KSG : Kashmir Study Group

LOC : Line of Control

MUF : Muslim United Front

NSA : Non State Actors

NSDC : National Skill Development Council

N.C	**:** National conference
OYK	**:** One Young Kashmir
PCI	**:** Press Council of India
PDP	**:** Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party
PMRP	**:** Prime Ministers Relief Project
PMSS	**:** Prime Ministers Special Scholarship
PUDR	**:** Peoples Union for Democratic Rights
SAARC	**:** South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation
SALAM	: Sustainable Actions for Livelihoods and Mainstream Initiatives (SALAM)
SCR	**:** Security Council Resolution
SII	**:** Special Industry Initiative
SKYE	: Start Up Kashmir Youth Entreprenuership
SSARL	:Saariy Samav Aksey Razi Lamev
UNMOGIP	**:** United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNCIP	**:** United Nations Commission India and Pakistan
UNSCR	**:** United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNIFEM	**:** United Nations Development Fund for Women
VDC	**:** Village Defence Commitees
WIP	**:** Women into Politics Programme
WISCOMP	**:** Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace
WSN	**:** Women Support Network
WRI	**:** War Resisters International
YAKJAH	**:** Yakjah Reconcilation and Development Network
YGEN	**:** Youth Guidance Employment Nodes

Introduction

The Kashmir problem is the most intractable part of the dispute between India and Pakistan. In the past six decades, scholars and statesmen have analysed the political dimensions of the problem extensively and tried to manage it. There has been a dramatic change in the nature of conflict in the 21st century, whose protraction makes it imperative to find a solution.

After the end of the Cold War, the nature of large scale violent conflicts has fundamentally changed to civil wars and complex political emergencies. Since the patterns of the conflict have changed, it is evident that this would bring about a change in conflict resolution techniques as well. In this changed scenario, this study tries to analyse peace-building in its theoretical and institutional terms. There is a context to peace-building in conflict regions. The context is the cyclic violence that curtails people's freedom. Peace-building, therefore, has to cut across multiple layers of conflict and also the divisive agenda of various actors involved in it. It is also critical to analyse the causes of the conflict in order to create constituencies of trust and deliverance. Therefore, in this context, peace becomes an expression of political freedom, justice, inclusion, representation, empowerment and accountability. All of these have to be protected, nurtured and secured for maximum gains. However, a pertinent question remains in the context of war and peace, which are commonly understood as gendered activities. The responses, understanding and experiences of women towards peace tend to be different from what men may have. Therefore for researchers, it becomes imperative to look at peace-building from top-down and bottom-up paradigms, as well as look at how gender works as a co-component of peace-building.

Top-down peace-building follows an outside-in approach and adopts a standardised peace-mechanism where the emphasis is on state-centric conceptualisations. It is a sustained and coordinated external support to peace-building in a territory of conflict. This conceptualisation converges with the concept of state-building in which the effort is on transformation of states and making them more responsive towards the process of reconstruction. The emphasis remains on sustainable economic growth, self-sustaining institutions, inclusive democratic practices, personal security and rule of law. Very often

it turns out to be a donor driven exercise that essentially follows a bureaucratic logic. The non-inclusive participation that ignores local capacities dynamically reproduces technical solutions, which tend to fail to address the core issues of conflict.

In any peace-building process, ending hostility is the primary concern. However, cessation of hostility does not build peace entirely. Much of peace-building work depends on how local needs and capacities are accommodated and a political space is created in which domestic actors can identify, develop and employ resources that are necessary to promote peace. The bottom-up approach to peace does not centre around individuals as objects of intervention. Rather, it provides agency to individuals as subjects and referents of security and ultimately as providers of security. Change doesn't take place because it is imposed from outside, or that it is driven by liberal concerns, but because communities perceive the benefits of change and assess the trade-offs in ways that are meaningful to them at the everyday level. In order to be successful, the peace-building exercise has to emerge from those who have to live with it and a particular sensitivity to the consent of local actors has to be shown. The normative framework followed in peace-building exercises quite often misses the dynamics of local needs, the importance of tradition and social contexts for determining legitimacy. Very often, the flawed balance between institutionalising a post-conflict zone and addressing local needs leads to a relapse of the conflict. This endangers the peace-building process. Observers uphold that bottom-up approaches to peace-building are more participatory and relationship-focussed than the template-style international peace interventions.

With regard to peace-building in Kashmir, the emphasis is on procedural democracy as a pathway to peace and it implicitly resonates in governmental thinking and policy-making. However, the fundamental variance remains in the perception of policy-makers and that of the local population as to the causes of conflict and how it can be resolved. Short-term amelioration strategies that sidestep issues of justice and dignity, focusing exclusively on special economic packages and special legislation, may actually serve to block creative avenues for conflict transformation in the long run. Pacification is not tantamount to peace-building. For the most part, the initiative on peace-building flows with specialist

knowledge, expertise, capacities, norms, actors and institutions that converge in particular forms of conditional and regulative governance.

Much of the scholarship around Kashmir has sought to locate the origins of militancy in the clash of competing nationalist visions, rampant electoral malfeasances or the breakdown of the composite Kashmiri identity. What ends up being missed in the hindsight, is how the practice of peace is built and re-built in various capacities. The results might not be dramatic, but nonetheless analysing the practice of peace-building is essential. Peace-building as an exercise also needs to be understood from the gender perspective so as to place gender as a fundamental category of analysing and understanding peace. Also, to bridge theoretical and practical perspectives, the study aims to unpack peace-building and its central dilemma of reconciling global objectives and local conditions for their realization in the context of Kashmir.

By placing women's subjective experience of peace-building at the centre of the analytical frame, this study seeks to establish the link between the peace-building processes and the gender transformations at the local/societal level. In contrast to dominant approaches that attempt to fit empirical reality into a particular theoretical framework, this research aims to utilize women's experience in Kashmir to both inform and expand theoretical perspectives on peace-building. The epistemic validity of the research, on the other hand, derives from the representation of the category 'women' and, by extension, from the project of reclaiming marginal voices/experiences. Women in Kashmir experience peace-building differentially. While it is essential to acknowledge and accept the diversity of women's experiences and the dangers of generalization, the subjective experience of a small group of Kashmiri women can nevertheless be synthesized towards a larger understanding of gender vis-à-vis peace-building in Kashmir. Accordingly, while it is not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding a diverse group's experience of peace-building, what can be attempted is the production of women in terms of social relations of gender that underpin the peace-building process in Kashmir. The research tries to build our understanding of women's contribution to peace in new and potentially important ways.

This study focuses on three key themes: theoretical approaches to peace-building, role of women in peace-building and the role of women in peace-building in Kashmir. Though distinct, these three themes interact with each other to present a conclusive understanding of the subject.

The theoretical literature on peace-building is extensive and a rich scholarship on peace-building intervention is also available. Thiessen (2012), Avruch (2006) and Barnett (2007) clearly state that prominent features of current peace-building interventions are exposed by labeling them as neo-liberal. This involves the integration of neoliberal economic policy and liberal political structures in the creation of market democracy in the war-torn context. The fundamental aim of liberal political policy is to institutionalise the highest liberal principles of individualism, universalism, egalitarianism, human rights and democracy within democratic state structures and processes. This has perpetuated democratisation schemes, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former insurgent groups or sympathisers.

Richmond (2010) maintains that the fourth generation theory related to peace and conflict studies seeks ways of dealing with the conflict that would not result in its replication in various forms. This approach focuses on consensual and legitimate, discursive and material forms of emancipation. It offers a state-centric world dominated by sovereign constitutional democracies, a world dominated by institutions and a world in which human rights and self -determination are valued. The only way that ensures this peace would be through hierarchy and regulation maintained by hegemons. It is a gradual shift beyond the replication of the Westphalian forms of sovereignty. This generational thought has derived a lot from the works of Jürgen Habermas who worked towards the creation of a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which recognised difference. It also corroborates with Foucault while raising questions of identity, hybridity, boundaries and culture.

Lederach (1997), Richmond and Frank (2009) postulate a particular sensitivity to the consent of local actors, particularly civil society actors, to the construction of a specific version of peace. Lederach proposes three levels of peace-building: the first level is based on an elite 'top-down' approach, which involves intermediaries or mediators backed by a

supporting government or international organization , whose goal is to achieve a negotiated settlement. The second level includes problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions. The third level includes grassroots bottom-up approaches. However, it is noted that peace-building effort has established only a virtual peace, having limited impact on citizens and recognized mainly by the international community. This could partly be due to the liberal propensity for top-down peace processes, all the while giving inadequate attention to grassroots actors. Other commentators are concerned with extensive control the international actors maintain over local populations.

There is one view regarding war that is common to almost all cultures and societies: women are outsiders to war, war is men's business. War is conventionally regarded as a masculine pursuit. Yet, since time immemorial, women have figured centrally in the experience of military conflict. Modern societies have gradually moved towards increasingly deploying women in frontline combat and close support functions, even as women have played critical role as anti-war and anti-militarist activists.

Cockburn (1998) and Jordan (2003) point out that women may not necessarily be directly involved in formal peace-building processes but very much underpin them. The fact that they are not visible does not mean that they are absent. They assert that at first glance, it would appear that despite women's vital participation in peace-making processes, they are for the most part marginalized or belittled. However, moving away from the idea of women as outsiders and/or victims, we find evidence of their involvement in projects initiated and driven by them and/or in activities in which they work in equal terms alongside men. The scale and diversity are largely unacknowledged, but effective grassroots peace efforts worldwide, particularly among women, require much greater recognition by the international community.

Anderlini (2007) and Stanski (2004) explore the efficacy of women in the peace process. They discuss women's peace activism towards conflict prevention, peace negotiation, disarmament and demobilization, post-conflict governance and leadership and transitional justice and reconciliation. Anderlini argues that women's peace activism is a new phenomenon. She links this activism to the changing nature of warfare, which

increasingly blurs the lines between battlefield and community. Furthermore, the proliferation of non-governmental organizations and international agencies has allowed women peace activists to have more of a voice on the international stage than ever before. Stanski suggests that there is range of excuses typically used to rationalize women's exclusion from negotiating tables such as logically embedded gender inequality. And the fact that fewer women are involved in fighting is assumed to mean that fewer women are involved in peacemaking. Other excuses are the notion that peace accords are gender neutral or liberation precedes gender equality. Women often feel insecure about their political skills and they receive insufficient support in developing their underutilized capacities.

Manchanda (2001) and Butalia (2002) assert that structural changes have led to an empowering shift in gender roles. In a highly militarised and masculanised struggle, there is a possibility of creating space for women's agency for resistance and conflict transformation. Butalia maintains that there is enough evidence from research and activist work the world over and specifically in the South Asian region, to show that conflict, whether long-term or sudden, often results in pushing women into the public space, or in their taking the initiative to carve out their own spaces. Manchanda challenges the victimhood discourse and explores many ways in which Kashmiri women confronted politicised violence and in the furtherance of struggle-shaped survival and resistance strategies. The non-recognition in the formal sphere of politics by males has in a way led to the de-politicisation of the informal sphere of politics. As the public sphere for women is highly restricted, women's political mobilisation more often tends to be manifested in the domestic activism. The collapse between the public-private spheres following the societal upheaval attendant on conflict, pushed women in the negotiations of power in the public sphere. But since armed conflict also reinforces sexist roles, militarising masculinity and, thus, shrinking the space for women's contribution, is a possible outcome.

Kazi (2009) and Khan (2010) place women at the centre of the militarization narrative. They explain how militarization has come to be embedded in the social fabric of Kashmir, and how women are grappling with the devastating effects of nationalist and

militant discourses, gender hierarchy issues and the future of peace process involving India, Pakistan and Kashmir. By placing women's subjective experience of militarization at the centre of the analytic framework, Kazi seeks to establish the link between state military processes at a 'national' level and the gender transformations at a local/societal level. A paradox is, thus, produced wherein the nation-state itself has become a significant source of insecurity for its citizens. Kazi, most importantly, acknowledges that in any conflict, women do not constitute a singular, undifferentiated social group, meaning that women's experience with armed conflict cannot be homogenous. Consequently, the experiences recorded in this work are those of a small group of Kashmiri women. But the available literature does not exclusively focus on peace-building role of women, particularly from the standpoint of women being the participant rather than mere beneficiaries.

The study covers the period from 1989 when the militancy broke out in Kashmir and explores the peace-building initiatives in Kashmir through the prism of top-down peace-building and bottom-up peace-building. The main objectives of the study are to critically assess the top-down approach in terms of its contribution to peace-building processes in Kashmir, to analyze the bottom-up approach of peace-building ,and to assess the contributions of women peacemakers to the economic and social reconstruction in Kashmir.

This study has employed a qualitative approach. Ethnography as a research tool has been used to produce a varied understanding about conflict, peace and women's agency for conflict resolution. Importantly, the case study approach has proven to advance our knowledge. An effort has been made to develop conceptual framework for analyzing the varied responses towards peace-building. The study is based on both primary and secondary materials. The primary data was collected from governmental documents, non-governmental reports, speeches and interviews. The secondary sources used include books, articles and newspaper reportage.

The research questions that this study tries to answer are: what has been the role of violence in conceiving the notion of peace among women in Kashmir? How have women peace-builders defined peace? What have been the principles of bottom-up and top-down

peace-building in Kashmir? And, how have women peace-builders been able to build solidarity within and outside of Kashmir?

The research questions are answered by testing the following hypotheses. Firstly, the top-down approach to peace-building has become a tool for political exploitation in the hands of the political elite. Secondly, the bottom-up approach to peace-building corresponds to the idea of participation and justice.

The study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one tries to look at peace-building and draw out its institutional and theoretical paradigms. It attempts to evolve an analytical framework which reflects upon the approaches to peace-building i.e. top-down and bottom-up. It further marks out the intersections between approaches and forms of peace-building i.e. liberal and sustainable peace-building. Additionally, the chapter examines how women in a conflict are relegated to the position of peace-builders ,and studies the role women have played in peace-building. The second chapter discusses the nature and dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir. It tries to map the conflict and identifies the stake-holders and sources of the conflict. It further examines the nature of actors involved and gauges the impact of violence in the society. The third chapter examines how top-down peace-building as an approach has addressed the conflict in Kashmir. It examines the role of the government, army, external civil society and non- governmental organizations as a part of the top-down peace-building exercise. It explores the strategies employed by the top-down peace-builders and documents the strengths and limitations of this approach. The fourth chapter presents local peace-building initiatives and how they deal with the question of justice. The chapter tries to study the success this approach has and what limitations hinder the fuller utilization of this approach. The conclusion summarizes the chapters, and presents the findings of the research and tests the hypotheses.

The study is imperative to understand whether the peace-building measures that are carried out by external actors are successful enough to encompass and cater to the requirements of the people of the conflict zones. It is equally important to understand the outcomes of such initiatives in which appreciable amount of resources have been invested in ensuring sustainable peace, and also to know whether people in conflict zones are able

to appropriate their sensibilities to these exogenous structures. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to analyze the bottom- up peace-building processes.

CHAPTER 1

Women and Peace-building: A Conceptual Framework

Introduction

The end of the Cold War in the past decade has resulted in changes in the patterns of conflict and, consequently, changes in conflict resolution techniques. Internal conflict or conflict originating within accepted state borders, has come to rival inter-state conflict as the main type of conflict experienced globally. The 20th century response to the post-Cold War civil warfare and the burgeoning threat of global terrorism has motivated the support for foreign intervention in conflict zones. The world community has responded to the changing conflict dynamics in a variety of ways including support for peace-building.

In the last two decades, peace-building has become an important dimension of conflict resolution theory and praxis. A corpus of literature has emerged around the disciplinary and institutional usage of the concept of peace-building. But what remains misrepresented in this exercise is how the dominant approaches to peace-building i.e. top-down approach and bottom-up approach have used gender as a co-component of peace-building. In this context, gender not only conveys the role women play in a peace-building exercise but also how other socially marginalised groups are placed in the same.

This chapter tries to understand the institutional and disciplinary usage of the concept of peace-building and traces the trajectory of it through the Cold War era. It further analyses the dominant strands of peace-building which are neo-liberal in its nature and orientations. The next section tries to look at the role women play in peace-building, and to make that role clear, a supporting section on social mechanism of war and peace has been placed.

Peace-building

Peace-building is essentially about the process of achieving peace. All societies from early history onwards have created traditional mechanisms and institutions to build peace at community and societal level in the form of councils of elders or religious leaders or other organised forums. However, the institutionalisation of peace-building in international law only emerged in the late 19th century. This process started with the Hague peace conference in 1898, followed by the foundation of the League of Nations, and resulted in the creation of the United Nations at the end of World War II, with the main objective of monitoring and supporting world peace through mediation, facilitation, good offices and arbitration between states. Cortright (2008) points out that the principle participants involved in this course were nation-states and the organisation of the United Nations (UN).

Galtung (1975) used the term peace-building in an essay titled "Peace: Research, Education, and Action". He defined the term as one of three approaches to peace: peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. However, his understanding of peace-building is based mainly on his conceptual difference between negative peace (end of violence) and positive peace (peaceful society at all levels). While negative peace targets the absence of physical violence through peace-keeping, only positive peace can accomplish the absence of structural violence through peace-making and peace-building. Galtung (1975) explains that peace-building reaches positive peace by building arrangements and institutions of peace based on justice, equity and cooperation, by that permanently addressing underlying causes of conflict and preventing them from turning into violence. The notion of peace-building in the twentieth century was also influenced by the non- violent peace movements and the discipline of peace research.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 defined peace-building as a medium for the long term process of rebuilding war affected communities. At a fundamental level, peace-building involves addressing the root causes of the conflict and enabling warring parties to

continue to find solutions through negotiations, and when necessary, through mediation. At the onset, it was hardly predictable that post-conflict peace-building would become an international growth industry, but over the next decade, operations were deployed to thirteen territories that were emerging from internal conflicts. Paris (2010) asserts that peace-building is conceived as an action to recognize and sustain structures which would strengthen peace and avoid backsliding into conflict. It includes the process of transforming the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. The use of the term "peace-building" proliferated with its rebirth in the 1992 UN Secretary General's Report "An Agenda for Peace"[1]. Heathershaw (2008) explains that peace-building is often referred to as a "new" concept. Subsequently, "An Agenda for Peace" was proposed as an advanced structure to handle international armed conflicts. The original understanding in the "An Agenda for Peace" is basically focused on stabilising negative peace and preventing the re-emergence of violence instantly after armed conflicts and guiding a country to set the specifications for starting the journey towards positive peace.

The activities to achieve this goal are listed in the agenda as: disarming, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections and advancing the protection of human rights. However, drawbacks in the definition were realised in the UN involvements in Somalia and Yugoslavia. The result was a re-conceptualisation of peace-building with a wider understanding of the concept as exemplified in the supplements to the "An Agenda for Peace" [2] in 1995. In the re-

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[1]"An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping", more commonly known simply as "An Agenda for Peace", is a report written for the United Nations by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. In it, Boutros-Ghali responds to a request by the UN Security Council for an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peace-making and for peace-keeping. The changing dynamics called for new ways to overcome crises. This is because of the different world that emerged in the post -Cold War period. The changing face of conflict requires to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities.

[2] The end of the Cold War changed United Nation's activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. One of the facts that emerged was that so many of the conflicts were within states rather than between states. The end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result, new wars within newly independent states were seen, often having

conceptualised understanding, peace-building also implies taking preventative measures and thus not necessarily related to peacekeeping operations.

Peace-Building during the Cold War period

During the Cold War, the United Nation's main security activity was military peace-keeping which involved deployment of armed forces to monitor cease-fire between warring parties and conducting patrol on neutral buffer zones. The mission mandate stated clearly that the United Nations Emergency Force was prohibited from using force and from interfering in internal politics of host countries. The exercise of peace-building started in Egypt and had set a successful precedent to be followed at Cyprus, Lebanon and India-Pakistan borders. Paris (2004) asserts that many of these conditions changed suddenly when the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s.With the decline in the East-West tensions, neither the USSR nor the US were willing to maintain Cold War levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in parts of the world that were strategically inconsequential. This allowed for greater commitment on the part of the international community to resolve the unending conflicts. Gradually, the mandate of the UN and its agencies expanded as the end of the Cold War not only created new opportunities for mediation in countries that had been proxy battlegrounds for the superpowers, but it also set off civil conflicts in many countries. The peace-keeping missions had earlier maintained a position of non-intrusion partly because both the US and USSR were keen on guarding their strategic interests and so it became impossible for the United Nations to transport a governance model to conflicting states.

With time peace operations emerged as a generic term for a wide variety of operations that were being conducted by the UN around this time as the mandate of the operations had widened considerably. In 1992, the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his policy statement, differentiated between peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. Murithi (2009) comprehends peace-

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a religious or ethnic character. Peace-keeping in such contexts becomes far more complex and more expensive than before.

building as a process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. Primarily, peace-building involves providing technical assistance in war torn countries and overseeing the process of de-mobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) as well as providing security-sector reform. However, building peace remained a simultaneous activity along with the promotion of socio-economic justice and establishment of reformed political structures of governance.

The distinctive feature that emerged from the current form of peace-building is that the process is equated with state-building, and that it is focused almost entirely on the period after large-scale armed violence has ended. Peace-building came to entail the fast establishment of security, democratic political structures and economic reforms. In this understanding, peace-building ends when a post-conflict country is perceived by the international community as being able to guarantee minimum security to its people as well as to establish working democratic structures.

The United Nations (2004) explains that in the past sixty years there has been a massive change in political geography. In recognition of the changed security needs, the renewed challenges are collective security, sustainable development and security and conflict prevention. Preventing wars within states and between them is in the collective interest of all and for this, preventive diplomacy and mediation are the tools. Regional organisations would facilitate strong norms to protect governments from unconstitutional overthrow and protection of minority rights.

Yet, with time, the working definition of peace-building has been expanded to refer to the integrated approaches to address conflict at the various stages of a conflict cycle. At the basic premise, peace-building involves dealing with the root causes of the conflict and enabling the parties involved to find solutions through negotiations. In other words, one can argue that peace-building includes the process of reconstructing the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. Murithi (2009) writes that reconciliation, however, is not sustainable without socio-economic reconstruction and development, neither of which can be done without the mobilisation

of resources. Peace-building is effectively a political activity but one that seeks to unify the social and economic spheres.

The two dominant features of current peace-building interventions have been rapid liberalisation and establishing liberal political structures and liberal peace policies while building peace in war-torn areas .This peace-building policy aims at institutionalising principles of liberalism, egalitarianism, human rights and democracy within the state structures .Richmond (2010)argues that the(neo)liberal peace-building project has concentrated on upper level reconciliation strategies, "outside-in" official processes, directed by international experts and thus duplicating more a system of governance as opposed to reconciliatory process. However, mostly the strategies aimed at creating peace have suffered from local legitimacy and continued local resistance. Jabri and Williams (1996) maintain that the peace-building project is centrally projected as a "rescue" mission, primarily using the tools of security to manipulate developing populations to secure the security of the West. The recurrent themes that one finds in peace-building experiences is promoting stable and lasting peace in war shattered states through democratisation and marketisation.

In transition to democracy, international agencies and mediators come across deep dilemmas–horizontal, vertical, systemic and temporal. Understanding and addressing these dilemmas is significant as some of them originate from the initial choices such as who is included or who is excluded in the peace process. Jarstad (2008) dissects the dilemmas carefully and declares that horizontal dilemmas are very much about inclusion or exclusion of spoilers; how electoral processes affect the inclusion or exclusion in governing coalitions, or the involvement of civil society in the negotiating process. Vertical dilemmas, on the other hand, arise in relation to what can be accurately be described as an elite-mass nexus. Here, the dilemmas arise between efficacy and efficiency and the equally desirable pursuit of legitimacy. Elites make peace deals but for peace to sustain, masses need to be involved cutting across the horizontal inequalities. Systemic dilemmas relate to the civil wars that can cause spill-overs and, consequently, these conflicts gain international attention and intervention by external forces, from

neighbouring states that perceive threats from conflict environment. The transition from war to democracy can collapse as legitimacy of power-sharing can be questioned when such arrangements are imposed by third parties.

The critique of peace-building is an ever growing body of literature, which ranges from un-inclusive dimensions of peace-building to ethical bankruptcy and the gendered nature of the project. Peace-building experiences have relied more on quick fixes such as rapid elections or economic liberalisation while the institutional foundations for post-war governments have been grossly neglected. It goes without saying that one cannot conduct peace-building without including local populations in the design, planning and implementation of peace-building initiatives. It is, therefore, important for local actors to take ownership of peace-building initiatives and to identify priorities which external factors can assist with.

Despite the formation of the UN Peace-building Commission, peace-building is not something that governments and inter-governmental organisations can do to their people. Rather, it is something that governments and their people have to do together. Peace-building is an ethical process that requires a close partnership, respect and dialogue among all the actors. In a very real sense, then, there is a need to emphasize the fact that peace-building can ultimately only succeed if it is conducted on the basis of an ethical framework. Anderlini (2000) suggests that people build peace utilising processes that are meaningful within the contexts of their own culture. Additionally, women may have distinct issues and processes distinct from men. Though the scholarship on peace-building is dense, the essential question of women's views on peace-building within their own cultural context has not been adequately answered. Mazurana and McKay (1999) examine gender and meanings of peace-building at the UN, NGO, and grassroots levels and conclude that women's peace-building is culturally and contextually based and usually located at community and regional levels. Women's peace-building interests are likely to be shaped by local and regional concerns.

Liberal Peace-Building and Sustainable Peace-Building

Primarily, discussions on peace-building have two dimensions: liberal peace-building and sustainable peace-building. Paffenholz (2009)maintains that liberal peace-building is assumed to be for a short-term to medium-term activity, aimed at establishing institutions as a precondition for (re)-building states and societies after wars and creating the preconditions for a liberal, democratic peace, and sustainable peace-building seeks to establish positive peace. The understanding of liberal peace-building can be traced to the liberal tradition, which goes back to the works of Immanuel Kant. Bohman and Bachmann (1997) argue that Kant lays the foundation of an understanding of peace-building between states based on their democratic values. The underlying argument in the Kantian vision is that the democratic constitution of states correlates with the relatively peaceful behaviour vis-à-vis other states.

The liberal peace-building project is a structure with specific reform methodology depending on viability and legitimacy with its recipients at both social and state levels. It is constructed through methodologies where the like-minded liberal states come together in a western oriented international society and prioritize democracy, human rights, free market development, vibrant civil society and multilateralism. There is consensus among states, donors, international organisations and regional organisations on a particular understanding of peace, which has antecedents in four popular strands of peace – the victor's peace the institutional peace, the constitutional peace and the civil peace. Richmond (2006) remarks that these different strands of peace evolved separately over a period of time. The victor's peace has evolved from the age-old realist argument that peace that rests on a military victory, hegemony or domination of a victor is more likely to survive. The institutional peace rests upon idealist, liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist attempts to anchor states in a normative and legal context in which states multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behaviour. This also informs the thinking of the English School. It can be traced from the Treaty of Westphalia, to the founding of the UN and beyond. The constitutional peace rests upon the liberal Kantian argument that peace rests upon democracy, free trade, and a set of

cosmopolitan values that stem from the notion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. The civil peace is derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilisation, from the attainment or defence of basic human rights and values, spanning the ending of the slave trade to the inclusion of civil society in international relations today. The liberal peace-building also suggests a possible correlation between democracy, economic liberalisation and peace, i.e. the higher the level of a free market economy in combination with a democratic political system, the higher the chances for peace.

The understanding of sustainable peace-building can be traced to the ideas of Jean Paul Lederach, who has developed a widely discussed peace-building framework based on an understanding of peace-building that centered on sustainable reconciliation within societies. For Lederach (1997) peace-building can be achieved through the establishment of structures, processes and training of people within a generation-long time-frame. In this understanding the long-term antagonists not merely lay down their arms but also achieve profound reconciliation that endures because it is sustained by a society wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before regeneration of destabilising tensions. This paradigmatic shift engages with the middle range actors rather than the actors located at the top and aims to address not only immediate issues in a conflict but also broader systemic and sub-systemic concerns that conflict is a progression through stages and peace-building is an ongoing process of interdependent roles, functions and activities. In sustainable peace-building, the conflict responsive peace-building infrastructure utilizes resources that are socio-cultural as well as socio-economic in nature and that the redefinition and restoration of relationships depend on creating a dynamic, conflict responsive atmosphere. Lederach (1997) explains that peace-building does not start and stop with, say, the launch and termination of a UN operation, or with the establishment of political parties or holding of elections. Rather, peace-building is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships.

The sustainable peace model suggests that there is a hierarchical approach to peace-building instead of an organic approach. It is presented through a three tier pyramid. At the top level, politicians, the military police and appointed officials/advisors engage in high-level negotiations with the aim of reaching some kind of political 'solution' or compromise. At the middle level, there is input from sectoral leaders, for example, the business community, trade unions, religious leaders, academics and think-tanks. At the grassroots level, NGOs, the voluntary and community sectors and local activists are involved. Lederach's thesis is that the causes of conflict are myriad at the grassroots level. Added to it, there exists an inverse relationship in any conflict between the ones who are at the top and those at the bottom. The ones at the top have greatest capacity to influence the wider peace-building process, but are least affected by its consequences on day to day bases. On the other hand, those at the bottom of the pyramid are directly influenced by the outcomes of macro-developments but have limited access to the decision-making process and may perceive the narrower version of the whole agenda. It can be assumed that Lederach's basic thesis is that no one level is capable of delivering and sustaining peace on its own. The recognition of interdependence of people and activities across the levels is one point that can facilitate effective peace-building. In this way the peace-building process would concede to the expectations of people from parallel domains.

The shortcomings in this approach were realised in the interference of development agencies in conflict zones. As this model did not clearly lay out what sustainable reconciliation meant, it was largely associated with the intervention of donor agencies in conflict zones. Orjuela (2004) describes that the development community's involvement in peace-building discourse had several serious implications. First, many peace-building approaches and tools, such as conflict analysis frameworks, were imported into the development field. Second, development actors started to fund or implement interventions that were directly aimed at peace-building. This contributed to an increase in peace-building activities and the involvement of new actors, mainly NGOs which also gave rise to the professionalisation and commercialisation of peace work.

Approaches to Peace-Building

The two popular approaches to peace-building are top-down and bottom-up peace-building. The top-down approach to peace-building is the elite level, outside in process that constructs peace in conflict zones through various international organisations that represent the multilateral state consensus. It is the dominant dimension of peace-building consensus and this form of peace-building effectively represents the continuation of constitutional and institutional strands of thinking about peace. It significantly bears resemblance to the victor's peace and the militarised version of peace that stems from this conceptualisation .The conceptualisation of peace from above is derived through a problem solving model that initially aims to stabilize the existing order and then endeavours to restructure it according to the liberal peace framework. In practice, the top-down intervention has often been proved very ambitious, based on contested attempts to import liberal democratic models via military intervention and political, social, and economic institution building and reconstruction. The external peace-builders often enter conflict zones to facilitate a breathing space in which outside actors can construct peace and remove the sources of trouble and install a democratic process, rule of law, free market, development, nurturing security for state and society and stimulating a more active civil society. Harland (2004) probes the legitimacy of the top-down peace-building approach where government is controlled by external actors until they deem it to be sustainably constituted. This returns the discussion of peace-building to the question of consent. Tajbaksh (2011) mentions that despite the resources invested in helping the established precepts of this type of peace, the outcomes have left much to be desired. The top-down structure of peace has been accompanied by the ideas of liberal democracy, free market economy and human rights, but the people in conflict zones fail to appropriate this to their sensibilities, resulting in deterioration of the peace-building module.

The top-down approach to peace-building incorporates the traditional state centric approach whereby the efforts made by the government or efforts made by the army are the primary contributors. However, increasing reliance on Track Two diplomacy and Non

-Government capacities is utilised as a path towards peace-building. The induction of track two medium and non-governmental capacities is beneficial on certain grounds as these mediums have the capacity to conduct negotiations outside the official channels and to build long-term commitments in a peace-building process. Building peace cannot be a single track effort, and in ethnically divided societies, a specific change of attitude and flexibility of political structures are required. As formal peace-building intervention runs a risk of getting into psychological obstacles – hindrances in terms of confidence building among disputants, track two is better at responding to these challenges. Montville (1990) explains that Track Two diplomacy involves unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations, aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in ways that might help in resolution of their conflicts. Track Two does not work as a substitute for conventional diplomacy but acts as a facilitative channel to assist official leaders. The process is designed to help leaders to resolve conflict and explore solutions out of public glare without negotiating or bargaining openly. On a more general level, it seeks to promote a cordial environment in the political community that makes it safer for political leaders to take risks. For Montville (1990), Track Two diplomacy operates in three phases that are inter-dependent. The first consists of small facilitated workshops or seminars that bring together the representatives of leaders of conflicting groups or nations to develop workable personal relations and to understand dimensions of the conflict from the point of view of an adversary. The second step is to influence public opinion. As the group of people who undergo the workshop re-enter the political scenario and interact with the people who had not been there, they try to create a political environment feasible for resolving conflict. The third step is to develop joint strategies that for dealing with conflict as a shared problem with cooperation and reciprocity. In a way track two is a strategy for preparing the ground for a possible solution.

During the past decade and continuing today, NGOs throughout the world have played a significant role in conflict resolution and peace-building. Other than providing humanitarian assistance, the non-governmental organisations have intervened in peace-building activities in conflict zones. Orjuela (2003) asserts that the scope and impact of

NGOs have broadened to encompass such areas as advocacy work, awareness raising and peace-education; organisation of peace marches, rallies and other manifestations for peace; bringing together persons from different ethnic groups, research and information; informal diplomacy; reconstruction of war torn areas; and mobilisation of people to satisfy their own basic needs.

NGOs work as conduits through which services are provided according to the neoliberal terms set by international donors and also within a framework offered by liberal understandings of civil society. As a result, a mixture of westernisation, modernisation, regulation and intervention gets spilled into a conflict zone as developmental assistance from NGOs flows in. Peace-building agendas are conveniently built to fit in the controversial developmental and neo-liberal architecture. The neo-liberal peace-building, which flows through NGO-ised development agenda, is also an internationally sanctioned model for legitimate domestic governance. The war shattered states are expected to follow this model to gain full rights and recognition in the international community. Paris (2002) chooses to call the phenomenon as updated version of *mission civilisatrice,* which is the colonial era notion that the advanced states of Europe had a moral responsibility to civilize the indigenous societies that they were colonising. A careful analysis of NGOs relationship with war-making and peace-building determines the ideological assumptions of these operations. The donor led peace-building operations are not merely exercises in conflict management but examples of a much larger phenomenon i.e. globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance from the core to the periphery of the international system. There is no denial to the fact that this kind of exercise is necessarily undesirable but the core argument is that operational details of these missions tend to disregard the role that peace operations play in diffusion of norms and institutional models from one part of the international system to another. Peace-builders with the help of NGOs attempt to build war shattered states in conformity with the prevailing standards of domestic governance or standards, that states should define themselves internally. The other remarkable characteristic that emerges from the NGO-ised exercise is the donor agencies as providers of financial assistance and sponsors of specific development programmes have made their aid contingent on recipient states undertaking economic

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liberalisation, political liberalisation and democratisation. Williams and Young (1994) write that most non-governmental development organisations share a 'common vision of what development means which is rooted in Western notions of the state and civil society. The most radical part of the NGO discourse is their emphasis on "grassroots" participation. This terminology is always to be understood entirely within Western conceptions' of political, social and economic organisation.

NGOs have to be analysed as an outcome of complicated processes where factors like international ideological trends, donor policies and agendas interact with the national, historical and cultural conditions in complex ways. Escobar (1995) contends that since the Second World War, a global language has emerged that creates development, under-development and the subjects of development. From this language a whole body of practices has followed, centered on planned development interventions. Studies around developmental discourse explain the rise of NGOs as important to neo-liberal policies because they offer services that declining states are not able to offer. As states responsibilities are franchised to NGOs, mediation occurs considerably as per the ideological considerations of donors. Putnam (1993) explains that NGOs are also considered to contribute to neo-liberalism because they strengthen civil society, which is essential for achieving democracy. Although many celebrate the role of NGOs in advancing human rights and development, it also evokes critical view as NGOs advance neo-liberal project and collaborate in the de-politicisation of a conflict zone.

Another area of crucial concern is NGOs involvement with youngsters in the name of development. Children and young people are of immense importance in peace-building partly owing to their importance as development assets and as agents of change. Analysing the ever increasing stakes of children and young people in a conflict, it becomes important to understand the desirability of practicing ethical peace-building. Brocklehurst (2006),in case studies of youth in Nazi Germany, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and South Africa, argues that children's bodies have a political function and that children are a political body or group. Children are used as an emotional factor against legitimisation of violence. They are kept separate from adults, but they can be brought

into political spheres at the time of peace-building. Brocklehurst also notes that children are embodiments or potential vessels of national security or strength and also conveniently mobile collective bodies.

Critical enquiry into top-down peace-building brings out its authoritarian character and its reliance on path dependency, where the peace-building exercise is guided by a fixed path measures. The basic parameters of a peace-settlement are already established and the local political forces and institutions have no authority to reorganize it according to local needs and perceptions. As time-frame based peace-building operations are also guided by the donor considerations, any successful peace-building attempt gets terminated owing to the time considerations. Subsequently, the growing critiques give way to a number of alternative conceptualisations, which transgress the restrictive norms of the top-down design on peace-building.

The other approach to peace-building is the bottom-up approach. The short-comings of the top-down approach have paved way for an alternate model of peace-building, which envisages individuals affected by violence as the main actors in the peace-building exercise. The individuals would voice their own problems and, hence, come up with strategies to deal with violence or threats they faced. Murithi (2009) explains that the macro-level peace-building, epitomised by the institution-building projects of the UN and bilateral aid agencies, was deemed to be imbued with self-interest. Furthermore, in contrast to the promised goal of building peace, these operations were increasingly seen to involve activities that would prolong the conflict. Accordingly, a greater need of local ownership of contemporary peace-building emerged and outlined a vision that peace cannot be imposed by external factors, militarily or diplomatically but it must be nurtured through flexible strategies which are in conformity with the domestic political order. Donais (2009) suggests that local ownership refers to the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of political processes. If a peace process does not emerge from those who have to live with it, it is most likely to fail.

A sustained effort at building peace in a war torn society is to nurture and create the political space which indigenous actors can identify and develop, and employ the resources necessary to promote peace. Rather than the reliance on a universal template of building peace, the bottom-up approach to peace-building looks at the importance of tradition and social contexts to determine the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of order. In this way peace-building upholds the right of societies to make their choices regardless of the pressure for following a normative frame. As the external peace-building interventions follow a donor driven and bureaucratic institutional logic, the local perspectives are often viewed as hurdles in creating a sustainable situation. Within this narrative, locals are typically relegated to the role of grateful recipients, and deviation from the script simply reinforces outsider perceptions that the locals lack maturity to exercise real political authority.

Whereas the externally based peace-building action reinforces frameworks and hierarchies of exclusion, the bottom-up peace-building is seen to herald new forms of emancipatory political action that recognizes and includes diversity to build newer forms of peace. Bottom-up approach to peace expands the sphere of inclusiveness and tries to restore the corrosive social engagement that accompanies the top-down approach. It foregrounds newer forms of autonomous political action outside any governance mechanism of formalised rights and international law .The approach that sees peace-building from below locates radical ethics of civil society by its refusal to play by the rules laid by the external peace-builders. It is morally progressive also as it does not seek to change the epicentre of violence from one ground to another but, instead, has the objective of whittling down the concentrated centres of power.

Role of women in Peace-building

Drawing from the 19th and early 20th century feminist tradition, some feminists in the 1970s and 1980s proposed that women were, by nature or by upbringing, or by virtue of being mothers and caretakers, morally superior to and more peaceful than men. To validate and testify such claims, one has to look at the role of women in the context of war and peace historically. Grant (1993) writes that by the end of World War I, women were beginning to change their relationship to the state. Before the war, the activities of suffragists in Britain reached their peak. The Asquith government was far from indifferent to the often spectacular activities of these women. During the World War 1, women served at the frontlines in prominent roles. For women in the United States and Europe, the cause of peace was one of the great organising forces of feminism after the battle for women's suffrage had been won. While women had begun to assert their political views on an unprecedented level, yet it was escaping the dominant political landscape. Through the years in the 1920s and 1930s, the number of organisations of women went on growing.

To analyse the contemporary dilemma of women and peace, one needs to go back to the ancient Greek polity where most of the theoretical underpinnings are derived from. Elshatin (1998) comments that for the Greeks, war was a natural state of beingas well as the basis of society. The Athenian society saw women as producers of males who would defend the city states and simultaneously women were excluded from any political rights well. However, accounts referring to Thucydides acknowledge woman warriors –the Amazons. The Amazonian women dominated their men folk in the same way as Athenians dominated their women. Conversely, the participation of women was alien to the idea of state structure and citizenship in ancient Greece. History is replete with incidents where women participated in wars as combatants but most of the war accounts reproduce the image of woman as a 'beautiful soul'³ ,who inspires civic pride and thus

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³ The locution, "beautiful soul", is originally coined by Hegel. It is used in Phenomenology of Spirit as being defined by a mode of consciousness which allows him or her to protect the appearance of purity by cultivating innocence about the historical course of world. Elshatin uses it in the context of women in

can be kept away from war and combat. Prominent accounts of women who have participated in combat roles are negotiated towards presenting a different picture, which out the women's role as peace-builders and pacifists. Grant (1998:92) explains this phenomenon very aptly

> 'She explains story of a medic in Ukraine. As the bombs started to fall, Sophia dug the ground immediately. She had dug only a few shovels and flung herself down when the bombing stopped. She heard the wounded crying and began to bandage him, then another. A new wave of bombing started, but by now she was occupied so it was not as frightening'.

The movements to end war or to resist war are as old as the idea of war itself. But the paradox one finds in the literature regarding women and peace-building is the deliberate absence of female actors in chronicling of peace movements. War Resisters International (WRI) is a notable exemplary example of a movement that was focused on eradication of war and determined towards finding nonviolent ways of eradicating war. It arose out of the war of 1914-1918.WRI was not merely a support group for conscientious objectors to military service but aimed at launching non-violent revolution in society.

Cockburn (2012) says that throughout the first half of the century, WRI emerged as a platform for self-confident and sometimes self-important male leaders like de Ligt and Herbert Runham Brown. But the movement has been chronicled in a way that we find only rare glimpses of females here and there .The only time when a female pronoun (her) is used is in the context of nation-state. Gender was mainstreamed in WRI only after writings of post-war feminists like Betty Friedan and Simone de Beauvoir shook the world with their ground-breaking outlook. Prasad (2005:125) uses a banal commentary from Triennial Conference of 1928 succinctly: "We and the War resisters are merely an outpost of all other men who do not possess the power of theoretical exposition, and the sacrificial courage of the martyr; of the humble and the dumb, who cannot speak for themselves".

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western culture, who have served collectively and culturally as beautiful souls serving to recreate and secure women's social position as non-combatants and men's identity as warriors.

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) 1325[4] formally acknowledged the changing nature of warfare in which civilians are targeted and women continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes. The resolution addresses not only the inordinate impact of war on women but also the pivotal role women should play in conflict management, conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It marks the first effort taken by the Security Council to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. It recognised the under-valued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building. It also stresses the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.

The resolution is binding upon all UN member states and its adoption marked an important international political recognition that women and gender are relevant to international peace and security. While UNSCR 1325 is recognised as a historic and unprecedented document, it has led to similar landmark changes within the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and forms a foundation and an integral part of the women, peace and security policy framework. These developments show that gender is a salient concern in global governance. Anderlini (2000) suggests that additionally, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Women Waging Peace, International Alert, and International Fellowship for Reconciliation, and Women's Peacemakers Program have promoted the critical importance of women's peace-building and advocated that women must be included in all aspects of peace-building. The basic argument is women must be central actors in developing peace-building initiatives; their influence must not be confined within local and regional women's organisations, and women must be equal participants in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation programmes.

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[4]United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000, after recalling resolutions 1261 (1999), 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000) and 1314 (2000), called for the adoption of a gender perspective that includes the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.

In a more recent development, Security Council Resolution 1820 (SCR 1820) was unanimously adopted on June 19, 2008 after years of advocacy by civil society and later by UN entities and some member states. With the adoption of SCR 1820, the Security Council's recognised   that addressing sexual violence in conflict is a matter of international peace and security and, therefore, within the purview of the Security Council. It recognised sexual violence as a tactic of war. Significantly, the resolution calls for attention to the link between sexual violence and women's participation and empowerment.

These resolutions provide a critical legal and political framework through which, for the first time in history, women worldwide can claim their space and voice their views on peace and security matters. While the passing of resolutions itself is a significant achievement, the real test of the international community's commitment to women is in translating the promise of the resolution into effective policy and practice.

The problem with the conventional security paradigm is that it is gender neutral and renders women virtually invisible and denies them the distinctiveness in which women experience the war. It also ignores the unique perspectives that women develop on peace-building. Instead the emphasis is on a horizon beyond the conflagration, where women often take the lead in turning away from war to resurrect and reconstitute civil society. Added to this, one should not lose sight of women's special agency in mitigating the passionate or hysterical call to arms. Women are often among the first to publicly denounce the march to war. This type of anti-war activism has been profoundly chronicled by for example, Women for Peace that was formed in Sri Lanka in October 1984 and the anti-war group Women in Black that, in October 1991, protested against the escalation of the war in the Balkans. The results of such activism have not been enormous due to two major reasons. Firstly, the disinclination of many of these women activists to sacrifice the 'personal' to assume the public roles of political leadership and, secondly, the gender neutrality in security studies that often limits the impact that women can have. Despite this, women's voices are the first voices that are raised in support of peace and often work as a catalyst towards public opinion. But historical accounts testify that

women's voices don't traverse the distance between the public rallies and the negotiating table. Anderlini (2007) lists a number of reasons for women's lack of representation in formal negotiations: (1) lack of women leaders in the government and non-state groups, (2) reluctance of women to be active in civil society or engage in formal politics, and (3) flaws in the way peace negotiations are conducted, with a myopic focus on ending the fighting and a lack of attention to rebuilding peace.

Women's peace movements have a plethora of information and experience to share about the relationship of gender, war and peace, but it often gets neglected in an academic study because the emphasis is on the empirical issues. They touch upon specific set of assumptions and negate the role of potential feminist epistemology within the subfield of peace studies. And, it is mainly the feminist practitioners in non-government organisations operating in post- conflict environment that produce reports based on their experiences in the field, resulting in the production of little academic work in the area under discussion. Chinkin (2003) argues that not only is the use of post-conflict problematic, but also the notion of 'reconstruction' may be a misnomer for women (and other marginalised groups) in implying the restoration of a previously existing position which did not exist prior to violence. The goal for peace-builders is not to reconstruct a time before conflict but to reach an enhanced social position that accords full citizenship, social justice and empowerment based on respect for women's dignity and rights. The issue of equal participation by women in post-conflict societies is not simply an issue of gender equality and human rights but can also work as a decisive factor in maintaining peaceful developments in a troubled region. Jordan (2003) points out that women may not necessarily be directly involved in formal peace-building processes but very much underpin them. The fact that they are not visible does not mean that they are absent. They assert that at first glance, it would appear that despite women's vital participation in peace-making processes, they are for the most part marginalised or belittled. However, moving away from the idea of women as outsiders and/or victims, we find evidence of their involvement in projects initiated and driven by them and/or in activities in which they work in equal roles alongside men. The scale and diversity are largely unacknowledged, but effective grassroots peace efforts

worldwide, particularly among women, require much greater recognition by the international community.

Generally speaking, there is a failure to grant women due recognition for their active mediation at all stage of peace process. Anderlini and Stanski (2004) suggest that there are a range of excuses typically used to rationalize women's exclusion from negotiating tables, such as locally embedded gender inequality and the fact that fewer women are involved in fighting is assumed to mean that fewer women need to be involved in peace-making. Another important question that needs to be addressed is not the question of where women are but where are the combatant women during the peace-building process. It is an important intervention as combatant women are a violent constituency that are capable of disrupting the peace process if they are not taken along. Moreover, these women are connected to grassroots and, hence, have a better insight on the hidden elements of conflict – like the class or ethnic character of a conflict or some other hidden nuances. In case of divided societies, women can ensure conflict resolution which accommodates negotiation shaped by ethnic, national identities and experiences and draws out a conclusive reason of a conflict .Gaary and Leary (1995) reason out in their understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict that ethnic conflict is characterised by multiple differences over what kind of a conflict it is and as to whether it is 'one' or 'many'. To simplify, one can assume that there is a meta conflict or general conflict over the consensus for the reason of a conflict. Women though would not stand outside this meta conflict, they would like to reflect it albeit in ways which are different from men. Studies in conflicts in Guatemala, Liberia and Northern Ireland suggest that women included in peace processes introduced issues of education, health care, employment, human rights, and land rights as integral to debates on peace and security. For example, how women in the Northern Ireland asserted their influence on the ceasefire between Irish Republican Army and the Loyalist paramilitary. Throughout the conflict women played a key role in civil society by holding communities together and in particular in forging initiatives which took them across political divisions and eventually into networking through formal and informal coalitions. Women met to promote common agendas around social and economic wellbeing. Paradoxically, the governmental funding

seldom targeted inter-community work. Cockburn (1998) notes that Women Support Network (WSN) provided a forum for women's groups to work together on common issues with moral support. Bell (2004) adds that another group that has worked across the communal divide in the Irish Conflict is Women into Politics Programme (WIP), which is a classic example of an initiative aimed at enabling women with regard to political processes. It aimed at providing political education around political terms, issues and institutions so as to enable greater roles of women to politics. The programme provided trainings to women from both the Catholic and the Protestant communities. The resulting Belfast Agreement saw crucial elements of the strategies women peace-builders had adopted.

Generally, the peace agreements are negotiated predominantly in ways that have fewer implications for women. The negotiations are mainly held by men. They are the protagonists and the mediators of conflict. Goldstein(2001) writes that the male nature of peace processes holds true for both internationally driven and domestically driven processes. Another area of prime concern is that post-conflict peace-building can itself be a misnomer, particularly for women whose experience of 'conflict' may be a broad, continuous and inter-locking one, not served by distinctions between conflict in and outside the home or community.

Social Mechanisms of Peace and War

This section intends to explore inter-sectionality in contexts of war, peace-building and feminism. It attempts to merge insights from feminist and international relations theory and think through inter-sectionality to apply the insights gained to the problematics of peace and war. It is done so by discussing "feminisation as devalorisation" and, hence, the natural consequence of devalorised women as peace-builders. This entails a corollary privileging of masculinisation that is paradigmatic in militarism and war. To make the argument clear, I am not trying to take a position based on predominance of "women's oppression" or the reduction of oppression by providing women a significant place in the

aftermath of war. Rather, the attempt is to analyse how different forms of subjection are produced and naturalised by feminisation.

Further, the section intends to develop a framework that can be used to analyse the interaction between role of women and liberal peace-building. If wars are fundamental in human history, how was women's role was relegated to a process of pacifism? How gendered is the idea that women are essentially peace loving pacifists? Many of the interesting arguments in the recent literature on international relations and peace-building in general perceive women as passive by nature and promote a much gendered understanding of the subject. The extent to which this specific subject has remained impervious to almost any other critique gives some indication of how essential it is to explore the gendered binaries. Further, as Elshtain (1987) discusses, the idea of women's inherent or natural orientation to peace and pacifism needs to be cross-examined as a product of a gender system that serves to retains men as strong warriors and women as weak and passive peacemakers, thereby prolonging war rather than bringing peace.

It is important to understand gender as both an empirical and an analytical category. Peterson (1993) refers to the embodied and ostensibly biological binary of male–female sex difference. In the empirical terms, gender can be deployed as a variable to investigate, for example, how women and men are differently affected by, and differently participate in, political and economic practices. This is the more familiar use of gender in contemporary research, especially in social sciences. In the analytical terms, gender is less familiar; it refers to the signifying system of masculine–feminine differentiations that constitutes a governing code. The claim he makes is that gender pervades language and culture, systemically shaping not only who we are but also how we think and what we do.

Women have been conventionally excluded from participating in war. War has been considered as an exclusive a male enterprise: fought by men, with and against other men, for male-defined purposes and ends. Culturally, traditional ideas about gender roles identify men with war and soldiering, and women with peace and mothering. Women remain largely absent from ethical and policy debates regarding when to go to war, how

to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable. In our gendered societies, war-ism is dominantly seen as a male trait and presumably a correct view. Popular conception and actual practice alike align women with peace and pacifism, not with a position that accepts war as potentially moral. In recent years, several feminists have challenged this traditional genderised dichotomy between war and peace. For example, women have been and continue to be more actively involved than men in peace movements.

Ruddick(1989) asserts that women's social protest movements have attained significant political leverage from their recognition as "naturally" more peaceful than men, based on their relationship to child-bearing and child-rearing. A closer look at the popular understanding of pacifism and women reveals the confusion over the failure of distinguishing between physiological sex and culturally defined and sanctioned, sex-related but not genetically determined behaviours and attitudes. Such culturally defined characteristics serve as a kind of gender ethos for each sex that roughly parallels notions of masculinity and feminity. In light of the popular debates about man as a war-maker and woman as a peace-maker, we can analyse the gendered ethos that informs our understanding of war and peace. And, to understand the gendered ethos, one needs to understand the connections between political behaviour and the underlying psychology of an individual who is simultaneously member of a particular gender.

Reardon(1985) articulates that the male ethos define a highly individuated, autonomous, unemotional, rational and powerful human being; the war ethos promote competition, authoritarianism, and the use of coercive force to maintain or promote a social system often deemed self-evidently good. Added to the male gender ethos and war ethos is an emphasis on a well-defined sense of self, individual, autonomy and self-reliance. Masculinity as well as 'warism' promote a "we-they" understanding of relations, competition and the idea of difference and otherness. Masculinity depends on distinctions between men and women and the superiority males have over women. Similarly, war mentality promotes the idea of 'the other' with whom a warring party has nothing in common and, hence, yielding victory over the 'other' is morally justifiable. The specifics

of 'othering' vary by history and context, but invariably involve some form of objectification so that "they" become objects to which norms of respect and non-violation need not be extended.

Historical 'othering' ranges from early Greeks, characterising Persians as effeminate to Christians, casting non-believers as immoral, and Europeans depicting "natives" as uncivilised. Colonial accounts represent colonised as feminine, weak, chaotic, unpredictable, lacking self-control, and economically and politically incompetent. As Eisenstein (2004) observes, although they extolled the virtues of reason as a progressive force, Europeans positioned rationality against savagery (natives), emotionality (women), and sexuality (racialised) others. Simultaneously, an idealised model of feminity, which had pure, dutiful and maternal traits, and their services were relegated to domesticity and performing the tasks which were not masculine.

Kitch (1991) suggests that to be "different from" and to subordinate the other is the apparent norm in both systems of thought, i.e. war and masculinity. On the other hand, the female gender ethos contribute towards women's nurturing role and the lack of social status that role has historically entailed. Ruddick(1989) calls attention to the fact that female gender ethos highlight self-sacrifice, putting other's needs before one's own, the maintenance of human relationships, and the safeguarding of fragile life in a hostile world. Hence, on the public level, these personal ethos get translated into non-violence, conciliation and attention to issues concerning human life. It is pertinent to mention that the process involved in the internalisation of particular gender ethos is sufficiently complex and is often confused with biological determinism.

The learning of gender ethos is embedded in complex psychosexual issues that are, in turn, culturally determined. Also, historically, the dichotomisation of gender codes value masculine qualities over the feminine qualities. Peterson (2010) reviews understanding of gender analytically and initiates a crucial and transformative feminist insight: the (symbolic, discursive) *cultural* privileging of what is identified with masculinity which is

key to naturalising the (symbolic, discursive, cultural, corporeal, material, economic) *power* relations that constitute multiple forms of subjection.

Feminist research looks at the underlying fact that the contingent and historical "normalisation" of gender as a systemic code valorises and characterizes traits privileged as masculine (such as reason, agency, control, objectivity, etc.) over traits perceived as feminine (such as emotion, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity, etc.) Kitch (1986) asserts that the gender differences that parallel the psychosexual concerns of male and female children are manifested in their play, because both individual needs and cultural expectations determine for each sex the appropriateness of games and toys for children of each sex. So the patterns of play determine the performative roles that gender ethos inculcate in a child's behaviour. She uses Janet Lever's studies of children's games to reveal that boys are more likely to indulge in team sports wherein emphasis is on winning. Girls, on the other hand, play games that require taking turns and are de-emphasised on victory.

Since gender is systemic, the manifestation of gender is more of an institutional choice than an individual choice. If women's experiences are understood as an epistemological starting point, it is easier to deconstruct the archetypal male image as a warrior.

Conclusion

The crux of the feminist challenge to the neo-liberal peace-building is essentially found in an analysis that demonstrates that while peace-building promises amelioration of conflict-ridden societies, in actuality, it pushes an important segment of society i.e. women to the margins and stereotypical roles. In this way, peace-building ends up as a statist exercise, which is run by hierarchies deployed to protect the privileges of elites for the most part that in this case, is male. The political power can significantly disrupt gender and class hierarchies. However, the deliberate absence of women at the negotiating table raises many questions regarding the peace-building model that is being used. This way the politically and economically atavistic groups cling to negotiations that

suit them best, while ignoring others as if they were not present. The very structure of this conflict resolution design does not erase the oldest dividing line of gender.

This study tries to juxtapose the question of identity vis-a-vis hegemony. Rather than engaging with the problem-solving pre-occupation of the peace-building theory, a necessary intervention is required to analyse state, conflict amelioration structures and status quo complex. Peace-building is to be understood as a part of social power in a political as well as social sense. A task of researchers is to focus on interactions between dialectical possibilities of relegating a particular identity, in this case women, towards an emancipatory role and in this social process of production, finding a route to world hegemony. In this pattern, peace-building becomes not only a mechanism of hegemony in economic and military way but also manufactures consent by moulding of opinion rather than brute force. And, quite crucially, this hegemony filters through structures of economy, society, culture, gender, class and ethnicity.

Within the peace-building complex, a neo-liberal state uses a particular identity i.e. women, which is also a marginalised identity, to enforce a certain model of hegemony and status quo. Women again come from a 'particular social base' (elite) voicing class interests which many of their counterparts don't agree to. Within this politics of representation, the representative woman as a peace-builder is grossly under representative of her gender continuum .As pointed earlier, neo-liberal and sustainable peace-building modules also draw criticism owing to their non-inclusive and unrepresentative nature. Building on these points, one finds that peace-building is a statist strategy for a mechanised control. The act of misrepresentation that a state ensures through a particular identity has the power to unleash violence on those it claims to represent.

CHAPTER 2
Nature and Dimensions of Conflict in Kashmir

Introduction

Kashmir has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan ever since the two gained independence in 1947.The region has been caught in a vortex of competing ideologies – Indian nationalism and Pakistani nationalism. Give the changed nature of global politics, it appears that the conflict will prolong unless serious attempts are made to resolve it. Due to the emergence of new political actors in global politics, there is a possibility that the Kashmir conundrum might get more complicated if left unattended. As Kashmir is strategically located, it has also become a conduit through which the turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan spills into India.

One of the essential features of the conflict in Kashmir is that it has both exogenous sources in the form of broader regional conflict between India and Pakistan and endogenous sources in the form of several fundamentally different political allegiances and preferences among Kashmir's socially heterogeneous population. To understand the nature and dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir, this chapter tries to look at the Kashmir conflict in its historical context. It tries to give an idea about the multifarious identities that exist within the Valley and how any attempt at peace-building should be based on accommodation and not assimilation of identities. The chapter additionally tries to figure out the position of India and Pakistan on Kashmir and briefly explores the wars these two countries fought over Kashmir. Furthermore, the chapter examines the vicissitudes in the state's relations with the Indian government, leading to the resurgence of militancy in 1989. It also includes sections on official mediation and the ever growing need for building peace in the Valley.

Jammu and Kashmir: A Demographic Profile

The ethnic composition in Jammu and Kashmir is quite diverse. It has been influenced by the fluctuating political history of the state and influx of populations from the territories of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. The diverse population occupies different areas of the Jammu and Kashmir. The pre-partition history of Kashmir can be divided into four significant phases: Hindu and the Buddhist rule, Muslim rule, Sikh rule and Dogra rule. Subsequently, these phases made a substantial change in the demography of Kashmir from time to time. British Census of 1941 listed that the state subjects were approximately 77 per-cent Muslims, 20 per-cent Hindus, 1.5 per-cent Sikhs and 1 per-cent Buddhists.

Conflict Background

The roots of the conflict can be traced to two dramatic events in the 19th and 20th centuries. The first event being the treaty of Amritsar which was signed between the British Government and the Dogra rulers in 1846. The defeat of the Sikh army at the hands of the British in the battle of Subraon led to the fall of the Lahore Durbar. Considering the complex geography of the province of Kashmir and the services rendered by Gulab Singh, the British decided to hand over Kashmir to the Dogras under the Treaty of Amritsar. The Treaty of Amritsar stipulated that the British government transfers would be forever in independent possession of Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs.

Panikkar (1953) writes that the treaty transferred to Gulab Singh all the hilly or mountainous country with the dependencies situated in the eastward of River Indus and the westward of River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahaul. They formed part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State. In return, the Dogra king agreed to pay a substantial tribute and to lend his military forces to the British when required .The Dogra king also acknowledged the supremacy of the British government and annually presented one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved

breed and three pairs of Kashmir shawls as a token. The pact that was signed between the British and Gulab Singh gave birth to the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This pact lasted for an entire century and Jammu and Kashmir remained an independent principality until partition was announced in 1947. Wani (1993) states that the present-day anxiety for the preservation of Kashmiri identity can be traced back to 1586 and 1846, when Kashmir came under the control of the Mughals and the Dogras respectively.

The second dramatic event that tangled the political dynamics of Kashmir forever was the Partition of India and Pakistan. The imminent end of British paramountcy in the subcontinent raised difficult questions for the princely states. The Cripps Mission's assurances to the native rulers in 1942 that their treaties with the British would be protected after the lapse of paramountcy were failing as the Cabinet Mission did not specify anything with regard to the princely states. The British government gave all the princely states under its dominion the option of joining either India or Pakistan or remaining independent. Kashmir, however, was unique in its complexity. It was a Muslim majority state, yet ruled by a Hindu king – Maharaja Hari Singh. The state was a divided house, religiously as well as linguistically.

In the run-up to India's freedom in 1947, Kashmir was in turmoil. It was a princely state troubled by political dissension and ruled by a government which barely represented by the population. To add to this was the larger context of India in which the nationalist movement was determined to gain independence at all costs.

Pakistan and India's Position on Kashmir

The position of India and Pakistan can be understood and analysed through the degrees of ideological cohesion and conflict between the competing visions of nationhood in the two countries. The political differences and diverse set of demands between the Congress and the Muslim League have to be explored in a perspective to get an idea of structural claims to Kashmir by India and Pakistan. The position can be best understood through the competing nationalist versions that emerged in the 20th century. Pakistan was keenly

aware of the significance of including Kashmir in its domain as it confirmed the ideological legitimacy of the two-nation theory.

Besides the strategic significance of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian position has been fundamentally driven from two sources. Its integration into the Indian Union was vital because it validated India's claims of being a secular and democratic state, a state that had successfully accommodated its substantial Muslim minority.

Additionally, it was equally necessary for suspending the Balkanising tendency within other Indian states. Ganguly (1986) argues that since the arrangement for accession of the state to India or Pakistan was based on geographical location and the predominant faith within the state Kashmir presented an interesting dilemma because it was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. Kashmir's ideological, psychological and strategic significance to the Pakistani leadership was such that it insisted that the will of people should prevail in the decision to accede to either of the two dominions. Hence, it can be said that for both countries, Kashmir was significant, owing to the existence of other competing ideological forces in the subcontinent: Pakistani irredentism against Indian secularism and finally, the strategic location that was a security imperative for both the states. Gwyer and Appadorai (1957) write that Nehru expressed India's vital interest in the state of Kashmir owing to its geographical position with its frontiers bordering three countries – the USSR, China and Afghanistan. The Kashmir question was intimately linked to the security and economic imperative too.

Wars Fought over Kashmir

Since 1947, Kashmir has led India and Pakistan to war on two occasions: 1947-48 and 1965 respectively. The effects of the 1971 war were noticed in Kashmir, but Kashmir was not the cause behind the war. Added to his there have been regular skirmishes and sporadic exchange of fire between the two neighbours. Tens of thousands of people have become victims of violence and many are displaced in this continued cycle of violence and repression. Gupta (1966) notes that the Kashmir war of 1947-1948 was the first of

three wars that took place between India and Pakistan. In the 1947 war, since neither side made a formal declaration of the war, it is difficult to locate when it started. It is commonly thought to have begun after Pathan tribesman crossed the Kashmir-West Pakistan border. Within three days, the Maharaja of Kashmir acceded to India. And soon after accession, Indian troops were airlifted into the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Ganguly (1986) explains that the introduction of Indian troops in the state quickly expanded the scope of the conflict as the Pakistani government explicitly committed itself to the cause of 'liberating' Kashmir.

Kashmir was a princely state and the Cripps Mission had assured the native rulers in 1942 that their treaties with the British would be protected after the lapse of paramountcy. However, the Cabinet Mission in 1946 maintained silence over the status of princely states. Lamb (1991) explains that with the lapsing of paramountcy, the rights of the states which were drawn from their relationship to the crown no longer existed and that all rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power were returned to the state. This position was confusing for princely states, but at the same time the powers for making this choice were relegated to autocratic rulers of the princely states and not to the natives. On 15 August 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir ratified a Standstill Agreement with the government of Pakistan which stipulated that the Pakistan government assumed charge of the state's post and telegraph system and supply the state with essential commodities. There is a contestation regarding the events that led to Kashmir's accession to India. The Pakistani and the some of the emerging Kashmiri scholarship on the subject maintain that the Poonch Revolt[5] and Jammu Massacre provided vital reasons and conditions for Pakistan to venture into Kashmir. However, the predominant Indian position claims that the tribal invasion pushed the Maharaja of Kashmir for accession.

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[5] In 1947, opposition against the Maharajas authority was spreading across the territory of Poonch. The Maharaja had earlier usurped the throne from his cousin who was the de-jure ruler of Poonch. Poonchis were a martial race and the rebellion had taken place without a centralised command structure. At this point the main concern of the Azad Kashmir movement was to keep the Poonch revolt alive; the Standstill Agreement between the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was breaking down because Maharajas court reckoned that the rebels were getting support from Pakistan. It was followed by the large scale massacre of Muslims in the districts of Jammu, Reasi and Mirpur. The Poonch revolt and Jammu Massacre provided reasons for the tribal incursion.

Subsequently, on 26October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession and officially ceded with the Union of India. The accession between Kashmir and India was a blow to the Pakistan's irredentialist claims to Kashmir. The accession of J&K was accepted by Lord Mountbatten with a provision that once political stability was established in the region, a referendum would be held in which the people of the state would either validate or veto the accession. Subsequently, on 2 November 1947, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated his government's pledge not only to people of Kashmir but also to the international community to hold a referendum in Indian and Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir under the auspices of a world body like the UN in order to determine whether the populace preferred to be affiliated to India or Pakistan. Bose(2003) observes that on 27 October 1947, Sheikh Abdullah told a correspondent of a popular newspaper that the tribal invasion was an attempt to terrorise the people of the state and, therefore, needed to be strongly rebuffed.

By 1948, Kashmir had become a bone of contention for the two post-colonial states of India and Pakistan. The much promised plebiscite never happened and the Pakistanis and pro-independence sections in the Valley claimed that it was an act of sabotage. Korbel (2002) mentions that the Indian government's claim of non-feasibility of holding a plebiscite in a militarised zone was answered by Liaqat Ali Khan by agreeing on demilitarising the area under Pakistan. But this request, which would have threatened the law and order situation, was denied by India.

Like the Fist Kashmir War, the second war also started without a formal declaration of war. Series of attacks and counter attacks were followed by incursions into each other's territories. After the takeover of power by the military in 1958, Pakistan re-assessed its military policy towards Kashmir. With the Soviet Union backing India, Pakistan could hardly expect the UN Security Council to resolve the Kashmir . India also appeared vulnerable militarily after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Before getting involved in a wider military confrontation, Pakistan tested India's military resolve in border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in western Gujarat in January 1965. India sought a quick

cease-fire and referred the issue to the International Court of Justice since it wanted to avoid a major war. Immediately after the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan tried to enter into a strategically important village in the province of Jammu. India retaliated by launching a powerful attack directed towards the city of Lahore. The war reached a stalemate by mid-September when the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution for ceasefire. Brines (1968) writes that the Indian government accepted the cease-fire resolution on September 21 and Pakistanis on September 22.

The United Nations and the superpowers viewed the development with alarm and made every effort to work out a quick cease-fire between the warring sides. The superpowers also imposed arms embargo on India and Pakistan. The Soviet premier Kosygin persuaded Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to meet in Tashkent to work out a peace agreement, which was finally signed in January 1966. Both India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their forces back to the international boundaries in the Punjab. In the second war for Kashmir the motivational reasons were more or less similar that of the first war i.e. ideology and irredentism. In addition to the superpower rivalry, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and the domestic politics of each nation were the situational factors that shaped the war.

The last war between India and Pakistan occurred in 1971. Though Kashmir was not the cause for the two countries to go to war, the effects of war were felt in Kashmir as well. The war ended in Pakistan suffering a huge military defeat and losing the entire East Pakistan, which became an independent nation of Bangladesh. Ganguly (1998) opines that India won a diplomatic victory against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The post-war peace agreement that was signed between prime ministers of the two countries in 1972 at Shimla stated that India and Pakistan resolved to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.[6]

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[6]In the years following the Shimla Agreement, India has insisted on a strict interpretation of Paragraph Two – that both states have agreed to settle the Kashmir dispute bilaterally, without outside intervention in order to prevent the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute. On its part, Pakistan has contended that a strict reading of this particular paragraph, is tantamount to violation of its national sovereignty and therefore, it has continued its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir dispute.

Political Turmoil within Jammu and Kashmir

The post-partition years witnessed turbulent relations between the Indian government and the state of Jammu and Kashmir, largely due to the high-handed and insensitive policies of successive central governments towards Kashmir. Anderson's (1983) framework of official nationalism can be employed to understand the situation in Kashmir. He explains that when revolutionaries take control of the new system, they end up inheriting the state from the fallen regime. Kashmir was acceded to India, which represented the democratic and secular visions, but in effect, the treatment meted out to Kashmir often followed the same pattern as autocratic Dogra monarchs.

Sheikh Abdullah was elected as Jammu and Kashmir's Prime Minister, a position he held from March 1948 to August 1953. His achievements during these years were the implementation of land reform, abolishing feudal system in agrarian Kashmir and abolition of hereditary monarchy. In October 1949, the Constituent Assembly of India reinforced a stipulation that New Delhi's jurisdiction in the state would remain limited to the categories of defence, foreign affairs and communications, as underlined in the Instrument of Accession. This stipulation was provisional and its final status was to be decided upon the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Subsequent to India acquiring a republic status in 1950, these provisions were incorporated in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Puri (1993) writes that the special constitutional status of the Jammu and Kashmir state was thus not granted by the Government of India, but was sanctioned by the relevant portions of the Government of India Act of 1935, the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the Indian Constitutional Order of 1947 and the Instrument of Accession. The Constituent Assembly of India or its successive parliament had no constitutional right to abrogate or modify Article 370. The right solely belonged to the Constituent Assembly of the State.

After the accession, many in Kashmir felt that the National Conference regime represented the Indian government rather than the interests of the people of Kashmir, a fact made apparent by the huge militarisation the Valley. National Conference had lost its

popular mandate within Kashmir and it was never very popular in Jammu. Zutshi (2003) remarks that the regime was caught between preserving its own power in the face of multifarious challenges to its authority, pressure from the Indian government to maintain the security of the newly founded Indian state by suppressing dissident elements within the territory, and its own ideological platform that had promised far-reaching reforms in the political and economic structures of the state.

The regime had suppressed every voice of dissent. There was a strict clampdown on newspapers and press that did not agree with Abdullah, particularly in matter of Kashmir's accession to India. Bazaz (1965) records that the state government promulgated an ordinance entitled the Enemy Agents Ordinance, allowing for the arrest and summary trials of those suspected of pro-Pakistan leanings. Despite the assurance of Article 370, the government of India continued to persuade and pressurise the State Government to accept more provisions of the Indian Constitution and, after hard bargaining by both sides, Nehru and Abdullah entered into what became known as the Delhi Agreement on Centre-State constitutional relations in July 1952. It was decided that under the Agreement, autonomy of the state would be retained, the Union flag will occupy the supremely distinctive place in the State, which otherwise had its own flag as well. The fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution were applied to the State and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was extended to the State in regard to the fundamental rights as well as with respect to disputes between states and between the state and the Centre. Earlier on, the framers of the Indian Constitution had created Article 370 as a temporary provision that would eventually bring the state into the ambit of the Indian Union.

In the early 1950s Jammu Dogra Hindus founded the Praja Parishad with a view of demanding the final and irrevocable settlement of the issue of Kashmir's accession to India. The autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir under Abdullah's government provoked the ire of Hindu nationalist parties within and outside the state. These parties sought the unconditional merger of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian union. The Praja Parishad was against the idea of plebiscite for deciding on the Kashmir issue. Bose

(2003) points out that unequivocal claim of the supporters of the integration of Jammu and Kashmir into Indian Union was to expunge the political autonomy endowed on the state by India's constitutional provisions. In 1953, Abdullah tried to defuse the complicated situation by proposing a plan for devolution of authority to the provinces within the state through the constituent Assembly's basic principles committee. According to this plan, the Kashmir Valley and Jammu regions were entitled to elected assemblies and separate council of ministers with the authority to debate and legislate on certain affairs of local and regional importance. This devolution strategy was conceived to maintain the autonomy of J&K while assuaging regional and sectarian opposition in Jammu and Ladakh regions. Subsequently, in 1953, Abdullah appointed a subcommittee which propounded four options for Kashmir's future. Some members of the subcommittee recommended that independence for Kashmir should also be a part of referendum proposal; acceding with India or Pakistan was the other option. Abdullah widely popularised the third option leading to a rift among the top leaders of the National Conference. The fallout of the rift was the dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as prime minister by the titular head of the state, Karan Singh. The coup was authorised by Jawaharlal Nehru under the Public Safety Act. Abdullah was shuttled from one jail to another for the next twenty two years until 1975.

The Central government and Jawaharlal Nehru did a political volte face by removing Abdullah, who had served as a link between New Delhi and Kashmir till then. Subsequently, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed as the prime minister of Kashmir and under his regime the Valley plunged into utter political and ethnic turbulence, which reverberated in the years to come. The autonomy of the state was rescinded soon and the central government began to intrude in state issues more frequently. Khan (2009) notes that the state was financially and fiscally integrated into the Indian union, the Supreme court had been given the authority to become the chief arbitrator in J&K, the fundamental rights that were promised in the Indian Constitution were made applicable to the state as well, but with a discretion that those civil liberties were discretionary and could be revoked in the interest of national security. Regarding the questions of self-determination and plebiscite, the Bakshi government had declared

that the accession to India was final. Korbel (2002) reports that Bakshi declared in the Constituent Assembly that Kashmir's accession to India was irrevocable and the bond which had been forged between the Indian Union and J&K was unbreakable. The heightened political turbulence and corruption in the Valley paved way for the formation of J&K Plebiscite Front in 1955. The front was headed by Abdullah's trusted colleague, Mirza Afzal Beg. Dasgupta (1968) informs that the credo of Plebiscite Front was self-determination through plebiscite under the UN auspices, withdrawal of the armed forces of both nations from Kashmir and restoration of civil liberties and free elections. The seditious goals of the organisation provoked an aggressive state crackdown against its members and supporters, creating a repressive atmosphere against the dissenters.

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's incarceration and the clampdown on his supporters had another effect: it gave Abdullah a larger than life political status. In 1956, the Constitution Assembly validated a draft constitution for the state built on the premise that the state of J&K would remain an integral part of Union of India. The state's new constitution was finally applied on 26 January 1957. Bakshi's unpopularity, rampant deployment of illegal methods and malpractices led to his replacement by Khwaja Shamsuddin. In December 1963, the theft of the sacred relic at Hazratbal mosque shook the Valley but it also led to the resurgence of Abdullah. As the Muslim populace was deeply hurt, it was a politically expedient tactic to release Abdullah to diffuse the anger. In the coming years, the Union government went on making amendments to the Constitution of J&K to erode the autonomy that had been provided to the state by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. However, in a significant turn of events, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah signed Delhi/Kashmir Accord with the Indian prime minister in 1975. Puri (1981) narrates how Indira Gandhi's government condescended to allow Abdullah's state government to legislate on issues of culture, religion and Muslim personal law. The Kashmir accord caused grievous disappointment in Kashmir for it eroded the state's autonomy drastically. In these turbulent years, two significant international agreements were signed between India and Pakistan: the Tashkent Agreement and the Shimla Agreement. The Tashkent Agreement brought the 1965 war to

a close and under the Shimla Accord, the two countries agreed to put an end to the conflict and resolve the crucial issues bilaterally.

Rebirth of Militancy

Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982 and he was succeeded by his son Farooq Abdullah. A year later in 1983, Farooq won the state election and emerged as a leader in his own right. The National Conference under his leadership had a sizeable victory, defeating the Congress Party in the state. Paradoxically, Indira Gandhi herself campaigned for the Congress against the National Conference. She expressed her sympathy with the Hindus of Jammu who, according to her, lived in a Muslim-majority state. Congress is perceived to have manipulated the campaign by using the communal card in search of votes, a trend that was to deepen later in Congress party's electoral politics in the state. This was happening parallel to Indira Gandhi's well-documented centralising political drive as she sought to undermine several state governments ruled by non-Congress parties. Khan (2009) informs that Indira Gandhi was attempting to bolster her political platform by making overt and covert appeals to Hindu majoritarianism against the grossly exaggerated secessionist threats from Sikhs and Muslims. Subsequently, in the run-up to the 1984 parliamentary elections, non-Congress parties began to rally together under a single banner and Farooq became part of the emerging resistance. To deal with the opposition unity, Indira Gandhi used defections to dislodge duly elected state governments run by opposition parties, and J&K was given a Governor known to be close to her: Jagmohan. One of his controversial decisions was to dismiss the Farooq government on the ground that it had lost majority support in the Assembly. Farooq was not given a chance to test his majority in the Lower House, which was a standard procedure. Farooq was simply given a list of legislators who, according to the Governor, had defected from his party. In this awkward display of power, Delhi thus violated the federal principle. The simmering discontent Kashmiris had against New Delhi got translated into considerable grassroots support for Farooq and his allies.

During his tenure as Governor, Jagmohan carried out repressive policies, with the Centre's backing. It was during this period that Maqbool Bhat, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front leader, was incarcerated and hanged in Tihar Jail. Mishra (2000) explains that Jagmohan's pro-Hindu policies in Kashmir, and the lack of economic opportunities for educated Muslim Kashmiris, drove many Kashmiri youth to support Islamist parties that were gaining influence in the state. During Jagmohan's tenure, the elected government of Kashmir was dismissed twice; the number of Muslims being recruited in government service went down. The hanging of Maqbool Bhat had already provoked the Kashmiri masses and the repressive policies of Jagmohan added fuel to the fire. Ali (2003) writes that physical brutality began to be frequently employed by the security forces. Young Kashmiri men were arrested on suspicion, and often tortured and killed by the Indian soldiers. Kashmiri women irrespective of age were humiliated. In reaction to this brutality, many young men subscribing to a form of militant nationalism took up arms to fight the Indian state.

However, in a virtual repeat of 1975, Farooq ended up signing a deal with the Congress. Under the agreement, Rajiv Gandhi's Congress and Farooq's National Conference undertook to contest the 1987 state elections together and form the government if they won. The creation of this political alliance created a deep rift between the NC and its supporters. By 1987, the NC was opposed by an unmanageable coalition of non-mainstream, anti-establishment groups known as the Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF represented a new face to Kashmir politics. Its emergence indicated that the Valley was heading towards a new phase of politics. Myriad people entered politics for the first time under the umbrella provided by the MUF. Verma (1994) opines that the MUF underlined its ultimate objective of working towards Islamic unity and disallowing political interference from the central Indian government.

Realising the surge in the MUF's support, the NC-Congress alliance rigged the 1987 elections. Not only was the vote rigged, reports indicate that several electoral candidates of the MUF were beaten up. Some of those who were targeted crossed the ever-porous Indo-Pak border and joined extremist groups. The insurgent leadership came back to

Kashmir after two years. . Later that year, riots against Farooq's government broke out; the Indian flag was rejected and Farooq was called a traitor to the Kashmiri cause. As people were killed in riots, the anti-Farooq sentiment intensified. Farooq and the Congress managed to get a huge majority, but they ruled without legitimacy. The sanctity of the electoral process and Kashmiri trust in Farooq, which was already declining after the agreement with the Congress, collapsed after these elections. By 1987, the disillusionment created by the Congress and the National Conference led to a large number of men crossing the LOC. Schofield (2002) informs that the JKLF was singled out by the Indian authorities as being mainly responsible for the upsurge in internal disorder. The guerrilla war in the state has gone through a series of phases since 1990, with many other outfits proliferating and adding to the turmoil. Another brutal reality in the state has been the use of repressive military and political force, which cannot be superseded by seemingly abstract democratic aspirations. Though it cannot be denied that some of the guerrilla groups derive logistical support from Pakistan, the retaliatory violence by the Indian state cannot be justified either. Ali (2003) writes that long searches, night-long house-to-house raids became order of the day. Arbitrary arrests, torture and custodial killings have also been common. In January 1990, Farooq Abdullah's government was dismissed by New Delhi and J&K was brought under the Central control.

This break from democratic processes and institutions worked to the advantage of the Congress party, which otherwise has been unable to form a mass base in Kashmir. It appears that the Congress always wanted to install a government which suited its interests. Pakistan, on its part, tried to capitalise on the resentment in the Valley. It was a conflict driven by nationalistic and religious fervour, with violence and injustice perpetrated by the Indian government becoming a rationale for resistance. The state sponsored violence increased during Jagmohan's tenure. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Disturbed Areas Act were passed. Huge demonstrations in support of independence surfaced in across the Valley. Hoffman and Duschinski (2014)write that in January 1990 the Indian state responded by classifying the region as a 'disturbed area' through special emergency legal provisions such as the Disturbed Areas Act and the

Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) that authorised the deployment of a massive apparatus of over 500,000 police, military and paramilitary personnel. The desire for self-rule and self-determination was crystallising into a political demand. However, New Delhi presented this as fanatical terrorist activity. In 1993, over thirty political organisations joined hands to form a coalition group known as the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The Hurriyat Conference gave the militants a united platform through which they could voice their grievances, but their demands did not permit them to consider a solution that lay within the existing framework of the Indian Union.

After the elections of 1996, the mainstream rhetoric was shifted to the declining trends of militancy and increased participation of Kashmiri Muslims in the official electoral political process. However, the Jammu & Kashmir government's decision to transfer 99 acres of land to a Hindu shrine in 2008 reignited the Kashmiri nationalist movement. The subsequent summers of 2009 and 2010 proved that the Kashmiri people's struggle for political, economic and social rights is very much alive. Separatists in Kashmir indicate that over a 100,000 people have been killed in twenty five years of conflict and more than 10,000 have disappeared[7], while as the state data reports that 43,460 people have been killed in Kashmir.[8]

Official Reconciliation

The Kashmir question was taken to the United Nations when India lodged a complaint in the Security Council on 1 January 1948. Gupta (1966) writes that the United Nations Security Council was formally called upon to deal with the Kashmir situation on 1 January 1948, when the Indian representative at the United Nations transmitted to the President of the Council a complaint from the Government of India. The Security Council, after having called on India and Pakistan to return to normalcy, appointed the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the facts and to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The United Nations Commission for India and

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[7]http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main49.asp?filename=Ws190311Geelani.asp
[Online:Web]Accessed:20July 2014
[8]http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/21/idINIndia-36624520081121 [Online:Web]Accessed:20July2014

Pakistan (UNCIP) was created to assist India and Pakistan in reaching an accord over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. On 14 March 1950, with the ceasefire holding along the Line of Control, the Security Council passed a Resolution, which terminated the UNCIP and, instead, appointed a UN Special Representative to assist the two nations in demilitarising Kashmir as a prelude to finding a permanent solution to the territorial dispute. The independent organisation came to be known as the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).Thereafter, the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan has continued to patrol the ceasefire line, but as a mediator, the role of the UN was progressively minimised after the 1950s. An interim constitution for the state came into effect in November 1951.An agreement was arrived at on 24 July 1952 between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India, which provided for the special autonomous status within the Indian Union. The agreement said that the J&K Constitution would be drafted in accordance with the Article 370 of the Constitution of India. The dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his replacement with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had created considerable chaos in the state. Subsequently, the governments of India and Pakistan agreed to appoint a plebiscite administrator by the end of April 1954. However in the coming years, Indian opinion towards plebiscite had changed.

After the second war between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Security Council, brokered the ceasefire on 22 September 1965, and Soviet premier Kosygin, thereafter, persuaded both parties to send representatives to Tashkent. Outside mediation resulted in an agreement between India and Pakistan. This was one of the instances in which outside mediation was accepted by India and Pakistan in order to ameliorate their seemingly intransigent positions regarding the conflict and confrontation. However, in recent years, India has consistently refused to have a third party involved in its dealings with Pakistan. Babu (2005) explains that the offer by the UN to send international observers to Kashmir at the time of the Kargil war was summarily rejected by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Incidentally, the offer by Pakistan to refer the militant attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 to the UN was equally dismissed by the

Government of India. The Indian insistence on the bilateral approach has reduced the possible role of the UN, but also countries like the U.S.

The bilateral talks between the two countries have only succeeded in issuing joint statements and expressing their commitment to resolve the issue through dialogue. But outside conference rooms, the stances of both sides have hardened. The stalemate between both countries has prevented the stimulation of processes that could have built a higher level of mutual confidence and a healthier interaction between the populations of both countries and between the population of Kashmir and the rest of the population within both countries.

In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto met amidst high expectations. Nanda (1989) writes that it was the first summit between the leaders of Pakistan and India since the Shimla Agreement. In a joint communiqué both the leaders expressed their desire to work towards a comprehensive settlement to reduce the chances of conflict and the use of force, but no tangible solutions were proposed. The next meeting, between Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, on 21-23 November 1990, did not come much further than establishing a hot line between the countries, and resuming the Foreign Secretary-level talks on issues of bilateral importance between the two countries. Meetings were also held on the sidelines of various international summits where leaders from both countries happened to be present, but, as a consequence of the increase in militancy, the opposition of the two countries grew even became entrenched. The promise of a breakthrough came when the Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the SAARC meeting in Maldives in May 1997. They decided to reactivate the hot line, and to constitute working groups on various -issues as part of 'an integrated approach,' instead of focusing merely on Kashmir. Joint working groups were to discuss issues such as Kashmir, peace and security, the Sir Creek contested territory near the coastal area, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges. The BJP government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1998 initially led to a dramatic deterioration in the relationship especially with both countries conducting nuclear tests. However, the

leaders from both the countries met in 1999 at Lahore to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues including Jammu and Kashmir. Both governments agreed to refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs and condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Schofield(2002) marks that at Lahore, Sharif and Vajpayee had also agreed 'to continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions, unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

The follow-up, however, was disappointing. Barely three months after the Lahore declaration, the two countries found themselves closer to war .The Indian and Pakistani armies adopted their forward positions, artillery exchanges between the two forces along the LOC increased; villages were evacuated. In August 1998, nearly 100 people were reported as being killed during shelling and artillery fire long the Line of Control.

When the military took over from the civil government in Pakistan in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf appeared to make a number of conciliatory measures and proposed bilateral talks to solve all the issues. He, however, made it also clear that the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute should form the central point of the discussions. Nanda (1991) writes that the Government of India thereupon invited the Pakistani leader for a peace summit, but the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit at Agra (14-16 July 2001) again failed in its objectives, because the Indian government continued to insist that Jammu and Kashmir was a bilateral problem, and that the joint attack on terrorism should be the major point on the agenda.

Need for Peace-building

Since January 1990, the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been the site of a brutal conflict between the Indian security forces and armed militants demanding independence or accession to Pakistan. In its efforts to crush militancy, the Indian central government has pursued a policy of repression in Kashmir which has resulted in massive human rights violations by the Indian army and paramilitary forces. Mathur (2014) writes throughout

the conflict, the security forces have targeted civilians, many of whom are believed to sympathise with the militants. The Indian security forces, which include the army and two paramilitary forces, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF) have assaulted civilians during search operations, tortured and killed detainees in custody and killed civilians in reprisal attacks. Human Rights Watch (2006) reports said that about 700,000 Indian military and paramilitary personnel are stationed in the region besides around 70,000 state policemen. The soldier to civilian ratio is roughly one soldier for every 20 Kashmiris, which is the highest in the world. The troops function under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 (AFSPA), which allows them to arrest without a warrant, with use of force against any person who has committed a certain offence or is suspected of the same. The act authorises the officers to enter and search any premise to make arrests. Subsequently, the AFSPA gives army officers legal immunity for their actions. Since it has been virtually impossible to identify the militants, especially if they have local support, civilians are subjected to terrible abuses by state security forces. Around 70,000 Kashmiris have been killed. Independent surveys reveal that the number of dead could be higher and that there are over 32,000 widows and more than 97,000 orphans in the valley. Choudhury and Puangsuwan (2007) report there have been between 8,000 and 10,000 cases of politically-motivated disappearances including combatants and non-combatant Kashmiris. In the year 2010, nearly 110 people were killed by the Indian Security forces and more than 2000 were injured.

The war costs for both countries have been enormous, the local Kashmiri economy has been damaged and the tourism industry is wrecked. Mahapatra and Shekhawat (2008) estimate that the state lost 27 million tourists from 1989-2002, leading to tourism revenue loss of $3.6 billion. The state has also felt the direct impact of the conflict in terms of huge damage caused by violent incidents, taking its toll on both public as well as private properties.

The enormity of economic damage due to militancy can be gauged by the fact that the estimates of damage till December 1996 were approximately 4 billion. The violence in

the state has led to sharp increase in unemployment. The unemployment rate in the state is 4.21 per cent, compared with the national average of 3.09 per cent. Dabla (2011) notes that the Kashmiri economy became entirely dependent on the Indian economy during the years of militancy. The dependence increased further when neither Indian nor private sector could invest in Kashmir mainly because of its disputed status and consequently no economic infrastructure could be developed. The historic trade routes i.e. Jehlum Valley road and Silk road stand closed and Kashmiri products don't find a way to Central Asian markets. The militancy also led to the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley. Though there have been attempts from the government to rehabilitate Kashmiri Pandits back in valley, these efforts have not been successful. Peace in the Valley has to be restored to re-establish inter-faith harmony and enable that the estranged communities to live in peace .The socio-psychological costs of the prolonged violence have been enormous. Each year there has been marked increase in the number of patients suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

The structural changes have made impact on the gender roles in the valley. The culture of militarisation has got enmeshed into the social fabric of Kashmir. Women are additionally grappling with the devastating effects of nationalist and militant discourses and gender hierarchy issues.

Conclusion

There are two parallel aspects to the Kashmir problem. The first is the disputed state of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The second is the failure of the Indian Union to accommodate state's differential claims that has pushed the state into the peripheries of alienation.

The nature of the conflict in Kashmir cannot be completely understood without proper reflection on political culture of Kashmir. A connection is to made to the pre-partition state of Kashmir and the dialogue between the religious, regional and community identity has to be studied .The outcome of 1947 and its aftermath was determined not

only by a complex conciliation between religious and regional identities, but as much by the inability of the main Kashmiri political organisations to successfully incorporate the ideas of national identity and citizenship rights into the political fabric of the Kashmir Valley their and unwillingness to allow dissent. The Kashmir crisis has been, from time to time explained, in different variants by different authors. The dominant reasons for the prolonged conflict that come across in the available literature are Pakistan's hidden agenda for provoking the insurgency in the Valley, India's denial of self-determination to the people of Kashmir, and the presence of ethno-nationalism within the Valley. Kashmir has also witnessed rapid and deep political mobilisation and the failure of Indian democracy to gain ground has been another cause of disquiet. The dichotomy of increased political mobilisation against a background of political decay best explains the resurgence of militancy in Kashmir. In the preceding years, there was a dearth of institutional channels for the expression of political discontent and dissent. Apprehensive of being questioned about the accession, the mainstream parties adopted populist policies rather than enhancing democratic participation. As secular platforms failed to offer adequate channels for the expression of discontent, the only viable means that remained available was political mobilisation along ethno – religious lines.

Another important analysis towards understanding the nature of the Kashmir dispute is that Sheikh Abdullah was evicted from the prime ministership as he had begun to disaffirm his political, cultural and social ideologies in obeisance to the Indian state. Given the factual evidence, one can safely assert that the government in New Delhi never allowed a strong leadership to emerge in the Valley.

In the 1990s, Kashmir turned into a playground for the Indian military and paramilitary forces, as well as for the militant outfits that had sprung up, adhering to different ideologies. The erosion of political opposition in J&K has delegitimised voices of dissent and radicalised antagonism towards state-sponsored institutions and organisations. The resentment against New Delhi's policies created dissatisfaction towards Indian democratic procedures and institutions in the state.

CHAPTER 3

Peace-building in Kashmir: Understanding the Top-Down Approach

"To build peace requires visioning what constitutes peace and security across cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, and between genders."[9]

Introduction

Peace-building in Kashmir has been a persistent activity for some time .But looking at the nature of the violent conflict and multiple presences of actors in this conflict zone, peace-building efforts seem to have failed to produce much of an impact on the ground. In fact, the unpredictable nature of political events in and across this territory quite often abort the possibilities of peace-building at the preliminary stage itself. This chapter analyses the efforts taken by the government authorities to build peace in the valley. If peace-building strategies are examined vigilantly, a growing trend of Track two involvements has also been observed. Additionally, non-governmental organisations have also intervened and interacted with the violent conflict in forms of developmental projects, humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation work. None the less, peace-building in Kashmir cannot be a singular effort as the Kashmir dispute has multiple stake holders and the issue has international relevance as well. This chapter tries to look at the peace-building measures that are top-down in nature and seeks to bring out the inherent lacunae by highlighting the entangled complexities that surround the top-down peace-building. One of the important questions that the chapter tries to understand is how the idea of cosmetic peace is sustained in Kashmir despite its detachment from the lived experiences of people.

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[9] Dyan Mazurana and Susa McKay, Women and Peace-building (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999).

Efforts by the Government

The governmental efforts at peace-building in Kashmir are visible in the relief packages that are given to Kashmir from time to time. Some broad areas where the governmental intervention has been maximal are:

i. Poverty alleviation and improvement in quality of life for the people who have been directly or indirectly affected by the militancy. There is an underlying thrust on increasing employment opportunities

ii. Infrastructural development for improved economy, for example opening of trade routes and linking the valley to international markets.

iii. Bridging the gender disparity by prioritising women's education, training and employment; providing special support for education of girls.

iv. Putting in place effective local governmental structures with responsibility for design, formulation and implementation of locally led developmental programmes and projects with active participation of local population.

v. De-escalating conflict by initiating round table meetings and working groups towards building peace.

Broadly, governmental work is concentrated on three strategies – security, development and relief. The first strategy is the increased reliance on human security. Realising the immense human security deficit, compounded by inter-state and intra-state tensions, the human security graph within the state was disappointing. The bulk of the budget spending was on security. But gradually the budget curve was diverted towards employment generation schemes whereby employment fairs were held and vocational trainings for employment generation were held regularly. The changed approach is visible from time to time in the special reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes announced for Jammu and Kashmir.

The Prime Minister during his visit to Jammu and Kashmir in 2004, announced a reconstruction programme for Jammu and Kashmir involving an outlay of approximately

Rs. 24,000 crore, which broadly includes the projects/schemes aimed at expanding economic infrastructure and the provision of the basic services, imparting a thrust to employment and income generation and providing relief and rehabilitation to the dislocated and the families of the victims of militancy.[10]The reconstruction programme includes 67 projects/schemes covering 11 sectors of economy. Out of the aforesaid 67 projects/schemes, action in respect of 34 projects/schemes has been completed. Out of the remaining 33 projects/schemes, 28 projects are at various stages of implementation and three are in the preparatory stages and two projects have been dropped.

At present, approximate total outlay for Prime Ministers Relief Programme projects is Rs.36439.32 crore.[11] The projects are broadly aimed at expanding economic infrastructure, increasing basic services, providing thrust to employment and income generation and providing relief & rehabilitation to the dislocated and families of victims of militancy.

Funds for Prime Ministers Relief Programme under State Plan for J&K during 2004-2013.

Year	PMRP (in crores)
2004-05	-
2005-06	771.72
2006-07	553.90
2007-08	576.00
2008-09	1012.97
2009-10	1200.00
2010-2011	1200.00
2011-2012	1200.00
2012-2013	700.00
Total	7214.59

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs –Jammu and Kashmir Update

[10]http://www.mha.nic.in/more3#e [Online:Web]Accessed:15June 2014
[11]http://www.mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/PMRP-300614.pdf [Online:Web]:15 June 2014

Additionally, there have been packages for return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandit migrants. In the early phase of militancy, bulk of the Kashmiri Pandit population migrated out of the valley. A variety of measures have been taken over the years by way of financial assistance/relief and other initiatives to provide support to the affected families, within a broad policy framework that those who have migrated will eventually return to the Valley. Assistance is provided for reconstruction of properties and supporting education of children. Another area for government intervention has been the Special Industry Initiative (SII J&K) 'UDAAN'. An expert group constituted by the Prime Minister's office formulated a job plan for the Jammu & Kashmir and recommended the Special Industry Initiative scheme for the state. The scheme provides skills to enhance employability of youth and is implemented by the National Skill Development Council (NSDC) .The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved a special scholarship scheme for Jammu & Kashmir to encourage the youth of J&K to pursue higher studies outside their State. The total cost of the scheme is Rs.1200 crore of which Rs.88 crore was incurred in the first financial year i.e. 2011-2012.[12]

Formation of five working groups is another important activity pursued by the state to build peace in Kashmir[13]. In February 2006, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government invited the whole spectrum of political parties, separatist leadership and political groups for a roundtable conference to collectively deliberate on the political future of the state. The first working group focused on confidence-building across all segments of society in the state, the second on strengthening relations with Pakistan-administered Kashmir which included people to people contact and facilitating and increasing trade and commerce, and the third on economic development of the state promoting inclusive growth and balanced economic development/reconstruction and maintenance of existing physical assets, investments in social infrastructure and creation

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[12]http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73951[Online:Web]Accessed 18 June 2014

[5]http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/5-working-groups-for-jammu-kashmir/article3138375.ece[Online:Web]Accessed 18 June 2014

of favourable atmosphere for private investment. The fourth working group focused on implementation of the Right to Information Act (RTA) and e-governance. The fifth working group suggested measures to ensure the autonomous status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Analysing Government Efforts

The efforts at building peace by the state have been manifold and lot of money has been pumped into re-construction and rehabilitation of the state. Evidently, these schemes garner lot of beneficiaries but, at the same time, they have not been very beneficial towards altering political realities in the state. The Prime Ministers Special Scholarship Scheme(PMSSS),which has a budget of Rs 12000 crore, was announced in 2012 after more than 110 young boys were killed in the state action against prolong unrest and stone stone-pelting in the valley. In the local perception, the state offers these concessions to diffuse the political crisis in the valley and quieten the international community over the issue of human rights violations.

The efforts of the state to reconstruct the economy and introduce sustainable employment generation schemes have found many takers in the past years. The motivating idea behind such endeavours is to keep the youth away from militancy. But, as violence has not completely faded, the unpredictable political unrest which is accompanied by long curfews and suspended internet connectivity cuts away the valley from rest of the world. Attempts at boosting the economy are razed to ground as the commercial activity is suspended infinitely till normalcy returns. In the last six years, this pattern of imposed long curfews has been used from time to time to diffuse unrest. However this pattern is dangerous as it disturbs the economy which is the thrust area for restoration of peace in the valley. To deal with this problem, the state has to ensure a mechanism that deals with the unrest and simultaneously does not halt the economic activities.

The state also needs to ensure that there is no retrogression to militancy once a particular section of society is rehabilitated. Moving on to the formation of working groups, the biggest flaw that is visible in the working groups is the non-representation of women.

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None of the working groups was headed by a female; neither the groups had the mandate to review issues related to women. None of the participants were keen on locating the position of women in the whole exercise or proposing a rehabilitative framework for the militancy affected women of Kashmir. The overall dismal scenario testifies that women have not been active stakeholders in the peace process and the limited space women enjoy is the space of the victim. This reflects the gender insensitive nature of the peace process conducted by the state.

Efforts by the Army

The Indian Army has undertaken a number of Military Civic Action programmes, aimed at building peace in the valley. The counter-insurgency measures undertaken by the defence agencies were criticised for their harsh and degrading tactics and over utilisation of the law and order approach. Subsequently, this approach was corresponded with principle of minimal use of forces and recognition of people as the central focus in any counter-insurgency operation. The principle of minimal use of force led to the Indian Army undertaking welfare activities with the aim of building peace.

In Jammu and Kashmir, the peace-building practice by the Army evolved over the years. The most popular operation that the Army carried out for building peace in the valley is 'Operation Sadbhavna' which was launched in 1998. Prior to the formal adoption of the Sadbhavna mission, the Army had discreet involvement in peace-building through small developmental projects and creation of *Ikhwan*. However, Operation Sadbhavna was the logical culmination of the discrete peace-building activity. Anand (2011) explains that the goals of Sadbhavna are to wrest the initiative from the terrorists and to reintegrate the population in the national mainstream. The principal aim of the activities like Sadbhavna is human security, which is best ensured through human and infrastructural development Some broad areas of intervention through Sadbhavna missions are

i. Poverty alleviation schemes

ii. Development and relief work

iii. Moulding public opinion for peace and development.

The defence strategies to achieve these goals spread across the spectrum of various development activities, which have included investment in infrastructure, relief work, health care, human resource development, and national integration. The allotment of funds for Jammu and Kashmir for the year 2010-2011 was 42.8256 crore and for 2011-2012, it was 36.9141 crore.[14] Another activity undertaken by the army for building peace in the valley was the clandestine creation of *Ikhwan*-a special counter-insurgency force. *Ikhwan* was the dreaded state sponsored militia launched to weed out the militancy. Largely drawn from surrendered militants, the *Ikhwanis* acted as informers and led the army to the militant hideouts.*Ikhwani's* inside knowledge was utilised to gain the upper hand in the battle against militancy. Human Rights Watch (1999) reports that although the Indian government routinely denies any responsibility for the actions of these groups, they are organised and armed by the Indian Army and other security forces and operated under their command and structure, primarily targeting the pro-*azaadi* and pro-Pakistani militant groups and their sympathizers. Several cases of human rights violations and illegal activities have also been recorded against the *Ikhwan.* Since 2004, however, the *Ikhwanis* have been made part of Home and Hearth Territorial Army. The *Ikhwanis* were the pivotal group used to contain the most powerful indigenous Kashmiri militant group, the Hizbul Mujahideen. Ganguly (2009) writes that the rise of India's secret army in Kashmir fundamentally altered the balance of power between the state and its foes. Moreover, Village Defence Committees (VDCs) too have been criticised by the human rights organisations for misusing the weapons and power they enjoy, often to address personal animosities.

Strategies used by the Defence Forces

i. High impact projects were introduced which were based on popular demand.

ii.The operation has centralised planning, but the execution is decentralised. Local participative model of intervention has been used.

iii. Mostly the projects work towards self-empowerment of people.

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[14] Source: HQ Northern Command. OP Sadbhavna :Brochure2010-2011 and 2011-2012

iv. Non-interference in the domains of religion, culture and tradition.

The budget for Operation Sadbhavna has been Rs 276.08 crores in the last sixteen years.[15] Funding for the projects comes from the Ministry of Defence. Sensing that education has been a prime causality during militancy years, the Army established 53 modern English medium schools. These schools remain highly subsidised and have also provided employment to locals in form of employment in the schools. The schools are set up in rural areas where the civil administration has not been very successful in making changes. Added to this, the Army has successfully established computer literacy centres, which provide computer training to children, youth and women. Women and youth empowerment projects were taken up to create vocational training centres for women. Apart from this, women were provided information regarding health and employment opportunities too. For youth, numerous Youth Guidance Employment Nodes (YGENs) were established across the state to wean away youngsters from militancy and, consequently, controlling political unrest. Operation Sadhbhavna trains youth and guides them to become self-sufficient and integrate in the local economy. Other than this, exposure -cum -integration trips have been organised to facilitate integration.

Under infrastructure development, the army has provided assistance by undertaking a number of small and large infrastructural projects. The rampant destruction of infrastructure in the years of militancy and inability of the civil administration to restore normalcy led to problems for locals. Under Operation Sadbhavna, an appreciable number of projects were taken up to improve connectivity in rural areas.

Other than this, the security apparatus established Village Defence Committees (VDCs) in the mid -1990s, following the increased violence on local villagers in the far-flung areas. As there were no police or army pockets near these villages, the Indian security forces provided military training to locals, and equipped them with weapons and wireless sets to counter militant attacks. At least 450 such VDCs are now functional in Jammu and Kashmir. All women brigades of VDCs were also set up.

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[15]HQ Northern Command, *Op Sadbhavana*: Brochure 2008-09

Sadbhavna includes interactions between army and civil administration on one hand and army and local population on other. It is observed that the army has been responsive to the local needs and has taken care of the developmental concerns in an effective manner. With greater cooperation from civilian administration, the development projects can be implemented more smoothly. Similarly, the contribution of good will schools in the education sector cannot escape appreciation. The army has taken a lead in addressing the humanitarian and developmental needs, but the political strategy remains unchanged. The experiment of Sadhbhavna was carried out in the frontier districts of Kashmir but ironically, the human rights violations committed by the security forces also remain highest in these districts. Secondly, conducting exposure trips for youngsters have done more harm than good for the army in some years. After getting the first hand idea of political freedom in rest of India, the resentment against India has increased amongst youngsters many a times.

Peace-building through Track-two Activities

One of the prominent features of the Kashmir dispute has been a surge in the numbers of non-state actors (NSA's) and their growing involvement in peace-building. This poses challenges to the traditional peace-building approaches. Some observers, recognize the importance of non-state actors in peace-building for creating conducive environment for negotiations outside official channels, making commitments in a conciliatory process, building peace constituencies, mediation and humanitarian assistance .

NSAs in Kashmir have established multiple links amongst the parties involved in the conflict, the most important being the establishment of interpersonal acquaintances and contacts among people in the society. A popular and effective strategy by NSAs for building peace in Kashmir has been Track two diplomacy, since building peace cannot be a single track effort .For building peace in ethnically divided societies, a specific change of attitude, and flexibility of political structures is required. As formal peace-building intervention runs a risk of getting into psychological obstacles and hindrances in terms of confidence-building among disputants, Track two has been better at responding to these

challenges. Track two diplomacy has played an immensely important role when traditional instruments of negotiations, mediation and conflict management become ineffective .They are to be supplemented with something substantial. In this case, since the causes of the conflict are so deep- rooted, negotiations often turn futile. Added to this is the divided nature of the society where a careless initiative for de-escalation runs the risk of intensifying the conflict. In a place like Jammu and Kashmir where the identity question is a dominant reason for the conflict, it becomes necessary to have mechanisms that can influence the alternative imaginations with regard to building peace.

Track two interventions for building peace in Kashmir developed at the time when international focus on Jammu and Kashmir increased in the 1990s as the militancy erupted in the valley. US based American, Kashmiri Farooq Kathwari, launched a Kashmir Study Group (KSG) and included prominent American and Pakistani diplomats in this endeavour; India was represented by former Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh and former Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Nayyar. Wirsing (2003) notes that the result of one of the elaborate conference held by KSG is the Livingston Proposal which later was converted into a document-*Kashmir: A Way Forward* .This proposal though gained enough attention, but involved US as a major player in the resolution of Kashmir .Subsequently, the effort could make a little headway, as its thrust was seen as being insensitive to Indian concerns. The improved scenario for bilateral relations in the post-2004 period led to the Nobel Prize winning Pugwash International organising an important Track two meeting in Kathmandu in December 2004. This meeting brought together politicians, journalists and civil society representatives from both sides of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, together with former diplomats, military officials and journalists from across India and Pakistan. The Pugwash Report issued after the December 2004 meeting notes that although no consensus was reached in identifying the starting point for evolving peace-building mechanisms, all participants acknowledged that the human dimension of the conflict should take priority over geo-strategic considerations. The objective was to engage in fact-finding and the analysis of possible steps towards a solution, that is, unofficial initiatives by private citizens. The KSG members have listened to the parties to this conflict, shared ideas, looked for common

ground, explored recommendations and urged actions that might bring the Kashmir conflict to a settlement.[16]

A number of other Track two initiatives also substantively increased civil society interaction with Kashmir is in various forms. One of the institutes that intervened for peace-building in many parts of South Asia and particularly Kashmir for 15 years is the Institute of Multi Track Diplomacy (IMTD).IMTD's involvement in Kashmir goes back to 1995 when two retired lieutenants from India and Pakistan approached Ambassador McDonald for resolving the Kashmir conflict. Looking at the dynamics of Kashmir conflict, the resolution was not an easy task. The vision which IMTD charted out was to bring the business leaders together. Mc Donald (2008) explains that IMTD tried to work separately in two countries first and then to bring on some people from the two countries to discuss the positive aspects of business in Kashmir. Consequently, business trainings were held to train business leaders in India and Pakistan. Further, a weeklong training programme was organised for parliamentarians and professors of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and suggestion for a 'peoples bus' between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar was made. The idea was later taken up by the Track One negotiators between the two countries. Following the systems approach to peace-building and conflict resolution, IMTD identified nine tracks for successful peace-building in Kashmir – government, professional conflict resolution, business, private citizens, research training and education, peace-activism, religion and funding.

Another proto- type of top-down peace-building in Kashmir has been Wiscomp (Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace) .The Wiscomp manifesto explains itself as a research and training initiative which would facilitate leadership in the areas of peace, security and international affairs. Ever since its inception in 1999, Wiscomp has held problem-solving seminars and workshops to bring together women from conflicting groups. Its involvement in the Kashmir conflict has been to develop an inclusive

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[16] http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/sep/15pmus9.htm[Online:Web]Accessed 18 June 2014

discourse on security, but the foregrounding principle to security is the diversity and bringing out perspectives of women. It tried to employing problem solving techniques which would empower a new generation of women with expert skills to engage in peace activism through educational and training programmes on peace-building. Over the years Wiscomp has tried to focus on multi-track diplomacy, peace advocacy, and active co-existence and cross border networks.

The year 2000 witnessed an increased activity of seminars, workshops and symposia on Kashmir issue, indicating perhaps the extent to which the unfolding tragedy in Kashmir was beginning to make an inroad into the consciousness of people from outside the valley. The nature of discussions also indicated that the subject of Kashmir had moved out of the exclusive domain of the state and security paradigm, and it was also being looked at as a human tragedy that demanded the attention of civil society as well. Around this time Wiscomp organised a roundtable titled 'Breaking the Silence: Women and Kashmir'(2001).The report of the roundtable mentions that it was thematically designed to bring to the fore voices of women of Jammu and Kashmir ,which had been relegated to the footnotes of the political history of the region. It is also significant that the timing of the roundtable coincided with the passing of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. Out of the roundtable another important thing came up and that was *Athwaas.* Though lot of meetings preceded the roundtable but the earlier meetings on Kashmir had seldom made Kashmiri women, the centre of attention. It was felt that an initial roundtable on women's perspectives on the Kashmir issue might help to illuminate hitherto unexplored facets of the conflict and examine the possibilities of women working towards a common vocabulary of peace.

Wiscomp's peace-building initiative in Kashmir was launched in 2001 and named *Athwaas, meaning* handshake. *Athwaas* was aimed to build peace constituencies in the state to bring people from diverse backgrounds together. *Athwaas* as a space was considered to build the bridges between communities that transcended religious, regional and political divides. It engaged in an array of activities that ranged from active listening, trauma counselling, and workshops in conflict transformation to conducting programmes

that helped in healing, reconciliation and building local capacity. *Athwaas* tried to intervene at multiple forums; they carried out a listening project and a research project simultaneously. The listening project documented the narratives of Kashmiri Hindu, Muslims, Sikh women affected by the conflict. It tried to voice out their idea of peace, their experiences of conflict and the vision they have for Kashmir. The methodology followed by *Athwaas* was multi-track peace-building, which focused on horizontal and vertical relationship within the communities, income generation activities that empowered women economically. Workshops that would deal with trauma healing, conflict resolution, women narratives of conflict and peace education were held regularly. The research findings of these workshops indicate that experiences of women are couched in essentialist frameworks where women's stake in the conflict is only as a victim and they feel equally unsafe and insecure with militants or Indian security forces.

Athwaas tried to use a three-fold strategy; where it would split its operations in the core group, the community and the civil society. The focus at the core group was that peace begins with the self so that the members have to achieve a sense of peace within themselves by addressing personal trauma, accept truth and realities from an adversary's view point and dilute the conflict within the core group. The secondary focus was community and the community centres were named *Samanbals* (meeting place). Each *Samanbal* was conceived as a space where dialogue would be centredon an income-generation activity. In total five *Samanbals* were created that would cater to at least 300 women.

Initiators create a space	→	The space creates leaders for change	→	The leaders change their community

Model derived from Harold Saunders (2002)

The *Samanbals* additionally organised psycho-social counselling's and provided a platform for youth to dialogue on political and social issues. Additionally, women were encouraged to take loans from Women Development Corporations and to set up self-help employment groups. Additionally, *Athwaas* organised a dialogue convention for Women in August 2006, where an effort was made to place women's agenda on the dialogue table. Deliberations between the policy-makers and women were held to give women an opportunity for peaceful negotiations in peace-building. Wiscomp further made recommendations on issues of politics, law, governance, alternate pathways to women, development and economic empowerment, health, psycho-social healing and cultural initiatives for peace and healing. *Athwaas* followed the work performed in constituencies through regular meetings and engagements. The regular meetings broadened the work and it broadly adopted four strategies that defined its work in the Valley. These were Networking, Awareness, Reconciliation and Advocacy.

Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is another example of pro-active involvement of external actors in facilitating a process of peace in Kashmir. Its agenda for Kashmir was launched in 1998.The group strived to start a civil society dialogue between leaders of the three regions of Jammu and Kashmir as well as to hold a parallel inter- Kashmiri dialogue.

Kumar and Parthasarthi (2006) explain that as the dialogue between Indians and Pakistanis continues, it is necessary to bring in communities and sectors on both sides of the Line of Control in an engagement for bringing out possible solutions to the Kashmir question. On reviewing reports that DPG has produced over a period of time, a consensus is observed on the issues of promoting cooperation and making borders irrelevant and for a suitable framework on self-governance in Kashmir. DPG has effectively observed the changing situation on ground, cultural roots of political mobilisation that cuts across development and demography, reviewing CBMs with regard to travel, trade and economy, security reforms with regard to rolling back the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), and reviewing status of migrants and refugees. Among many other activities DPG keeps on organising problem solving workshops to diffuse the growing tendencies of polarisation within Kashmir. In an Intra-Kashmir seminar (2005), peace process and CBMs were evaluated. Its recommendations were to make the borders irrelevant on two sides of Kashmir and to allow unregulated travel for Kashmiris living on both sides of the LOC. The second recommendation was to devolve powers to the three regions of the state – Jammu, Ladakh, Srinagar – so as to avoid the fragmentation within the valley. The third recommendation was to end the violence. Pakistan should end its support to the militants and Kashmiris should stop providing local support.\

Faith-based reconciliation is another experiment conducted by the top-down peace-builders in the recent past. The International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) made inroads in to the Kashmir valley in 2000 to create faith-based reconciliation amongst the estranged communities for a successful peace-building exercise. Johnston (2003) explains that peace-making tenets of key religions can be brought together to build peace. This shows the importance of acknowledging religion as a crucial element in international security. Subsequently, untapped potential of a new form of diplomacy called faith-based diplomacy can be utilised to end the gridlock. Faith-based diplomacy tries to speak to the hearts, mind and spirit of combatants, but not in a conventional realpolitik manner. ICRD conducted reconciliatory workshops and seminars between the Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims for a conciliation based on transformation of human hearts .The historical vengeance was sought to be eliminated by a collective faith

based effort. Faith based conciliation in Kashmir was pegged on eight principles or core values: pluralism, inclusion, peace-making, justice, forgiveness, healing deep wounds, sovereignty and atonement. It was designed to enhance the trustworthiness and avert mutually unfavourable outcomes as a result of misunderstanding and poor communications .It was also aimed to work at improving the political climate between conflicting parties by strengthening the belief that the other side would not nurture hostile intentions notwithstanding the conflictual relations. In the case of Kashmir, faith-based peace-building was intended to work as 'psychological healing' between the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs who are all afraid of each other's malicious intentions. The underlying intention was that initiatives like faith-based peace-building are less prone to disruption by shifts in the political landscape. Since the behaviour of government is inevitably held hostage to political developments, this initiative ensures that the progress is not derailed. Johnston (2005) contends that the faith-based reconciliation conducted by the International Center of Religion and Diplomacy falls in the domain of Track two. Because this work involves a significant religious component, it represents a form of Track two diplomacy that is largely insulated from political setbacks.

Peace-Building and Non-Governmental Organisations

In Kashmir many NGOs have proliferated in the last twenty five years and have extensively worked with youth and in the development areas aimed at creating sustainable peace. The focus on youth was due to the recognition of the challenges that young people face when returning from a conflict and the need to integrate them into the mainstream. The urgency to work with youth also stems from the global phenomenon of youth bulge and political violence. Urdal (2006) propounded that in societies where youth make 35 per-cent of the adult population, which they do in many developing countries, the risk of armed conflict is 150 per-cent higher than the age structure similar to most developed countries. Accordingly, youth bulge frame has been used by the development practitioners and peace-building practitioners in the form of perceiving youth as a threat. Hence, the need of disciplining them and employing them as potential hope for peace.

The prolonged conflict in Kashmir has provided a favourable ecosystem for NGOs to flourish in. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2004) reveals a dramatic increase in the sprouting of NGOs during the mid-nineties. The study points out that most of these NGOs were sponsored by the government or one of the many governmental agencies working in J&K. These NGOs, which have come to be called GONGOs or Governmental NGOs, sprang up in large numbers over a short span of time and exist till date. To get a more objective picture of non-governmental intervention for peace-building, we use case studies of various NGOs operating in the valley.

One of the classic examples of controlling the youth bulge is Anhad (Act Now for harmony and Democracy). Anhad is a Delhi based non- governmental organisation and has been working in Kashmir since October 2005. Though initially it got involved with post-earthquake relief work, later it has expanded its base to include education, livelihood, and community work. It also intervened in the issues of human right violations, creating democratic spaces and engaging with youth. It opened a youth centre in Srinagar which conducted regular discussions, managed a library and a film club. The youth centre also organised exposure trips for Kashmiri students to various other states of India. The exchange of ideas and the problems faced by young people in different states was shared with each other. Other than this it also imparted legal assistance to the destitute with the help of HRLN (Human Rights Law Network), and extended financial assistance to fight the legal battle. In particular Anhad expanded its work base in frontline districts of Uri and Tanghdar for creating a vibrant youth platform. It opened computer and youth activity centres in these remote villages. The youth centres provided counselling to students about career choices, and helped them to mobilize youth and engage them in social, creative and sports activities. Special focus was laid on the formation of pressure groups within the villages. Additionally, women empowerment centres were opened in different villages to facilitate economic emancipation of women. Anhad intervened in the employment area by opening a media institute in Kashmir which sought to combine the need for employment with the expansion of democratic spaces in

the valley and provide an outlet for the creative energies of youth to become a new idea. The idea was imagined as a potential instrument of change in the valley.

Mercy Corps is an international development agency that helps people in the world's toughest places to turn the crisis of natural disasters, poverty and conflicts into opportunities for progress. Driven by the local needs, it facilitated the Kashmiri community with the tools and support they needed to transform their lives. Given the demographic youth bulge worldwide, Mercy Corps recognised the importance of investment in youth towards building secure, productive and just communities. It tried to facilitate young people's successful transition to adulthood by increasing economic opportunities and financial independence. Realising that young people required tailored and innovative solutions, Mercy Corps took an initiative to support dynamic, cross-cutting youth economic development interventions. The project sought to help young people across the globe to develop useful skills and access opportunities to engage in social and economic development.

Mercy Corps in Kashmir supports programmes that have catalysed community-led and market-driven development in the Kashmir Valley. From promotion of information and communication, to youth programming, a range of activities were conducted to create peace in the valley. In October 2010, Mercy Corps launched the Start-up Kashmir Youth Entrepreneur (SKYE) development project. The overall aim of the project was to reduce poverty and foster inclusive economic growth through increased youth entrepreneurship in the Kashmir Valley. The specific objective was to reduce barriers, improve support and strengthen a culture of youth entrepreneurship that stimulates the start-up and growth of 200 youth enterprises across the 10 districts of the Kashmir Valley. The key activities included catalysing a cross sector network to foster knowledge, sharing, co-operation. Youth entrepreneurship has a crucial role to play in the creation of enduring peace. Mercy Corps Start up Kashmir Youth Entrepreneur (SKY) Development Project (2011) explains Kashmir's demographics that the dependency ratio has continuously decreased over the last thirty years. Kashmir's youth population is an untapped asset and represents a potential opportunity for positive economic and social change. So improving the

enabling conditions for entrepreneurship in Kashmir promotes local economic recovery, curtails unemployment and enables the youth to participate in economic and social rebuilding of strife-torn Kashmir

Another area in to which Mercy Corps forayed was organising youth summit called One Young Kashmir (OYK) that dealt with issues like culture, rights and economic recovery in Kashmir. The methodology followed was participatory problem solving technique and as many as 800 young people were part of the project. The One Young Kashmir Youth Leadership Summit was a youth-led initiative aimed at enabling fruitful, focused and rewarding discussions among youth, pursuing a novel participatory planning process that harnessed the combined value of youth Imagination and expert knowledge.

The goal of this summit was to mobilize youth to develop an effective voice, and initiate and share processes of leadership, responsibility and action to build a better understanding of Kashmir. Its aim was to increase the stakes of youth in the peace-building process by strengthening their leadership skills and ensuring effective communication for successful results. The overall aim of the summit was to create the idea of individual and collective leadership and inculcate the responsibility of developing taking skills among Kashmiri youth to address the issues that concerned them most.

Indo-Global Social Service Society (IGSSS) has a mandate for a humane social order based on truth, justice, freedom and equity. Established in 1960, IGSSS works for development, capacity-building and enlightenment of the vulnerable communities across the country for their effective participation in development. The key intervention area for IGSSS has been lessening conflict through strengthened local governance and promoting affirmative civil society action for development and relief. It sought to conduct training programmes for youth on livelihood options, personality developments, career guidance and linkages with schemes for youth of the state and central government. It also promotes multi-stakeholder dialogue between youth, activists, intellectuals, government officials and representatives from civil society organisations on peace, democracy, human rights and entitlements. Currently, IGSSS is holding a number of Kashmir-centric programmes.

The important on-going   programmes under IGSSS are Sustainable Actions for Livelihoods and Mainstream Initiatives (SALAM), which empowers women and youth to be independent, Youth Action for Peace, which aims for positive change among vulnerable youth who do not find any platform to participate in the critical issues of the state. This programme seeks to help youth towards becoming active stakeholders in the transition to peace[17].

Strengths of Top-Down Peace-building

The top-down approach has actively engaged with the conflict and its biggest contribution has been reconstruction in the form of relief and development assistance in far flung areas. Since this approach has an appreciable amount of logistic support, it is very easy to permeate the areas and sections of society which are otherwise difficult to approach. It is also observed that the protracted nature of the conflict has hindered the process of understanding this approach in totality. The credibility of the top-down approach would have increased manifold if the state did not use it as an easy shortcut for creating normalcy on ground. The top-down approach can address the development concerns of people but it cannot work as a strategy for political settlement of the conflict.

Structural Deficiencies in Top-Down Peace-building in Kashmir

The armed insurgency in Kashmir coincides with the end of the Cold War, so the broad international dynamic has got replicated in the context of Kashmir too. Despite the resources invested in helping establish the precepts of peace, the outcomes have left much to be desired. Experiences from across the world confirm that liberal institutions have not taken root as they are exogenously installed, resulting in undermining of the traditional indigenous structures.

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[17]http://igsss.org/yap[Online:Web]Accessed 18 July 2014

As evident, the top-down model of peace-building has been dominated by the non -local community. It can be said that these interventions, apart from planting 'peace' in the valley superficially, have tried to create a normative discourse on humanitarian and developmental aspects. But the political questions that pertain to identity and conflict are left untouched. The Kashmir conflict is essentially not the conflict about equitable distribution of resources or for developmental demands. The conflict has sensitive characteristics ranging from religion, ethnicity and misgovernance to lack of trust building. Peace in such situations can be built through trickledown effect, for it is very necessary to involve aspirations of each community.

The second feature of the top-down peace-building is that whatever local capacities are utilised, they are from the local elite. In many instances, the local elite have already been at a distance from the grassroots and misrepresent the local needs. It offers resources to predatory elite but not to the general population. In this form, the political elite are more accountable to the external actors, but less to domestic audiences. The fact that participants in the peace-building exercise are hand-picked raises questions on the legitimacy of the political elites. In addition, the external actors owe an allegiance to the donor agencies, but not to the Kashmiri population. Transnational elites have increasingly collaborated with the state in myriad ways to facilitate hegemony. The global elite comprise transnational executives, state bureaucrats, consumerist elites and capitalist-inspired politicians etc.

Another challenge which comes in the way is that civil society directed interventions take place only in constituencies which are not infested by dissent .and hence the work can be performed easily. For example, involvement of *Athwaas* is limited to geographical areas which are totally under the military governance. Taking example of Dardpora, which is 130 kms north of Srinagar, the village suffered maximum causalities through these years due to its geographical proximity to the Line of Control. It became a favourite destination for NGOs all through the years because operating there was easy in terms of militarised control and minimal dissent from the locals. Developmental work by Anhad has also been done in Tangdhar, Kupwara and Uri, but again these areas are highly militarised

with militancy almost weeded out from there. So it is almost entering the safest territories which are already hegemonised by the military. The next complexity that emerges is the decision-making process and the dispersion of power. The decision-making power within these structures is non-transparent and complex; most observers cannot easily identify the location of power. This strategy has condemned the violence meted out to Kashmiris for the last twenty five years, but remained silent on the question of justice. Neither has kind of mechanism been created to ensure that justice is delivered to the victims of conflict.

The involvement of NGOs and track-two in Kashmir explains the idea that rights and human security should not only be provided for people but also claimed by people. Efforts from the outside are not only hard to measure but raise questions about the interventionist and intrusive nature of involvement. One has to acknowledge that local peace-building also refers to a range of contextual actors with fluid and multiple identities–rural, urban, Kashmiri Muslim, Kashmiri Pandit, Paharis,Dogri,Gujjar, etc. Some of the identities may aspire for liberal peace-building, while others may be aiming at peace which is a promotion of custom, history and ideology. Top-down peace-building also undermines the fact that democracy can evolve from the will of the people. Democratisation by nature is a long-term process while the donor-led developmental change insists on evidence of immediate and visible accomplishments to provide continuous support. One can also explain that since the humanitarian and relief work has been conducted in particular communities. At times these particular communities are different from the rest ethnically or there are identifiable markers of difference between the communities according to the benefit they achieve. So relief and developmental work polarizes identity within the valley. This has led to augmentation of identity-based interest groups. This augmentation makes the peace-building process all the more complex. Likewise, faith-based peace-building has done more harm than good. It presents the situation as dispute between faiths and seeks mutual forgiveness. However, religion does not form the core of the direct causes of the conflict. So a reconciliation based entirely on religion is somewhat flawed and does not answer the structural problems. Similarly, IMTD miscalculated Kashmir as a bilateral issue and in the first phase, the

parties to the peace-building were only India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri leadership rejected the intervention as it was only prolonging the status quo.

Another dilemma that emerges is the creation of dependency in the realms of civil society and economy, which limits the redressal of the Kashmir conflict according to the aspirations of Kashmiri people i.e. self-determination. Outside assistance for transition has largely disregarded structural violence and silences local knowledge and local struggles and promotes an economic order fostered from outside. Taking clue from Turners(2009), in the Palestinian conflict ,the international donors have formed a shadow administration that directs the Palestinian authority from the outside while side-stepping the problems created by Israel's occupation and, at the same time, relinquishing the responsibility for implementing policies that increase poverty and instability.

It would be thus flawed to identify one 'solution' to the dilemmas. Instead, a more effective policy will have to address multiple issues. Most importantly, intervention has to be limited and careful not to foster political and social dependency. In an attempt to undermine sub-nationalism, it has to take it into account of the structural reasons. In Kashmir, fear has been reduced, but trust is yet to be built amongst its citizens.

Conclusion

The top-down approach to peace-building has led to a prolonged political status quo. The top-down narratives represent Kashmir as traumatised and dysfunctional society, thereby legitimising a shift towards therapeutic involvement whereby the external actors take over the responsibility for building peace within the territory. Peace-building has followed a donor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that lay emphasis on policies that can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives. The top-down peace-building approach does not promote women's role. Additionally, top-down peace-building utilizes a particular marginalised identity i.e. women to enforce a certain model of hegemony and status quo. Yet, most of the women representatives come from a particular class base, so the representation of

women as   peace-builders is under representative of the demands and expectations of women .In this way, the non -inclusive and un-representative nature of the top-down peace-building gets reflected. By equipping particular identities, the state dormantly unleashes violence on those whom it claims to represent.

Chapter 4
Peace-Building in Kashmir: Understanding the Bottom -Up Approach

Introduction

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is administered in an intensely militarised environment. The prevalence of political conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has provided a pretext for intensive militarisation. In such a context, top-down approaches of peace-building are seen as little more than attempts towards legitimising processes of containment that is largely punitive in nature. In effect, they work towards maintaining the status quo, rather than addressing the causes of conflict. Instead of building sustainable peace, top-down approaches have only facilitated the sedimentation of conflict. Furthermore, in some cases such approaches have ended up deepening the inequalities that exist within Kashmiri society. Part of the reason why such approaches have failed to achieve the desired success is that they have been used largely as a tool to contain conflict.

As such, it becomes important to understand how the logic of Top-down peace-building is countered through the bottom-up vision of peace-building. There has been little analysis of bottom-up peace and relatively little examination of the forms and strategies of the bottom-up approach to peace-building in Kashmir. An interesting feature of the bottom-up peace-building remains that mainstream political parties, parts of civil society and women groups have also made their contributions to peace-building.

This chapter intends to look at the bottom-up approach to peace in Kashmir. One of the sections tries to look at the mainstream vision of bottom-up to peace-building. Then, the chapter moves on to trace the civil society initiatives. It maps their activities, strategies, strengths and limitations.

Mainstream Bottom-up Peace-Building

The protracted Kashmir conflict is too complex, which can be seen at two levels. First the grievances arise from the demand for complete autonomy informed by the historical reality. Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (2010) asserts that J&K has enjoyed considerable autonomy in the past, which has been systematically eroded over the years. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is essentially a throwback to the past rather than a programme of the future. Second, the demand for Azadi or the merger with Pakistan has emerged as a different narrative all together. The experience J&K has had vis-à-vis India is marked by erosions of basic political and human rights, manipulated elections, systematic misgovernance, economic disempowerment and oppression by the police and security forces. This experience has created a huge disconnect between India and the common people of J&K, thereby creating a state of affairs wherein there is a focus on alienation and rhetoric, rather than on attempts to find solutions.

The mainstream parties have, from time to time, tried to intervene with a framework of alternate solution. The oldest political party of Kashmir – the National Conference launched the Naya Kashmir report in 1944. However, it was amended and later reproduced in 1977. The Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference presented its Achievable Nationhood document under Sajjad Gani Lone in 2006.In 2008, another mainstream political party, the People's Democratic Party conceived the idea of sustainable peace in the region under the name of Self-rule framework for resolution.

The Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference (2006) envisions a sovereign state with single political authority viz the government representing the state internally and externally. The government would have complete internal independence to deal with internal affairs and external independence to deal with external affairs. Accordingly, J&K shall be a democracy and would have a right to independence. It shall have an independent election commission, a separate flag and a right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory. It shall have a right and the capacity to enter into relations with other states and maintain its economy, external affairs, and foreign exchange reserves. This vision is termed as Independent Homeland Model. The document makes provisions to

accommodate Indian and Pakistani claims, thereby creating achievable overlaps for the sustainable peace in the region.

Jacob (2008) explains that the document talks about shared sovereignty between India and J&K and Pakistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir. The following are the most important aspects of this plan. First, Indian and Pakistani governments will have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and currency in J&K and Pakistan administered Kashmir respectively. Secondly, both sides of the J&K state (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other, making it a neutral, peace zone. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a J&K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for Movement of Residents in the state, Joint Management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities – India, Pakistan, J&K and Pakistan administered Jammu &Kashmir.

Self Rule Framework for Resolution by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) perceives that the J&K issue cannot be resolved on the basis of exclusively intra-state level initiatives. It requires a combination of intra-state measures with inter-state and supra-state measures. The Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (2008) explains that the underlying argument in the concept of self-rule. It is a practical way that eliminates the sources of ethno-territorial conflicts, entrenched in the traditional notions of sovereignty, self-determination, national and ethnic borders. This formulation tries to build peace without disturbing the extant sovereign authority over delimited territorial space. It doesn't impair the significance of the line of control as territorial divisions but negates its acquired and imputed manifestations of state competition for power, prestige, or an imagined historical identity. PDP's intervention in building peace between the two Kashmiris is based on the creation of innovative international institutional arrangements that have a political, economic and security character. Self-rule encompasses the society, the state, and the economy.

These documents represent a new vision and courage that Kashmiri mainstream political parties have suggested for building peace in the valley when the popular resolution strategies are fixated with the older strategies. Most of New Delhi based political parties have seen and interpreted Kashmir from a strict security paradigm. However, any attempt from the local political parties is a welcome change as they tend to know and understand the local dynamics in a better sense.

Achievable nationhood accords utmost importance to the sentiments of the people. It theorises extensively on the psychological aspect of the Kashmir issue. In its opinion, the sentiments of the people should weigh above and over everything else and people of J&K should be recognised as active political players. In this way the internal aspect of peace-building will be dealt with. The process of accommodating Indian and Pakistani claims would deal with the external aspect of building and maintenance of peace. The document strongly believes that improvement in cross-LoC relationships, particularly trade, can be a vital aspect of peace-building. An economic union of the two parts of J&K, which the document sees as the next logical step, will only help in strengthening peace and stability.

The self-rule framework for resolution considers de-militarisation and other related efforts, like the rolling back of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act), as the first steps towards peace-building. In convergence with the Achievable Nationhood document, the self-rule document proposes the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the South African model. The document also hopes for peace through the application of its concept of self-rule which has four components: autonomy, control, legitimacy and identity. Through these documents, there is a strong current of opinion that seeks to nurture a sense of empowerment among people of the state. This is the most imperative step necessary for creation of a better, more peaceful society and for preservation of peace and stability.

Civil Society Measures for Bottom-up Peace-building

The ongoing conflict has exposed women to violence in direct as well as indirect ways. Direct violence has led to killings and rape and indirect violence has made women widows, or waiting family members of the people who disappeared in the militancy. In this way women have been boxed in the human rights discourse of victimhood. None the less, the lived experiences of violence have shaped women's responses and subsequently, they forged survival strategies and new modes of building peace around them.

Bottom-Up Peace-Building and Justice

In the 2013 spring, a group of women came together to file a public interest litigation to reinvestigate the atrocities unleashed on women of villages of Kunan-Poshpora who were raped by the Rajputana Rifle Soldiers in 1991. In June 2013, a Public Interest Litigation filed in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, by 50 Srinagar- based women, supported by a human rights group, Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil society (JKCCS), had resulted in a Magisterial order for further investigations of the mass gang rape by the Indian army personnel of women of Kunan and neighbouring hamlet Poshpora. The events happened in Kupwara District of North Kashmir on the night of February 23rd-24th 1991.

In the night of February 23, at least 23 and perhaps as many as 100 women in the village of Kunan Poshpora were raped by the soldiers of the Fourth Rajputana Rifles. The incident provides a telling example of the government's failure to ensure that charges of human rights violations committed by armed forces are properly investigated. The rapes occurred during a search operation in the village conducted by the army unit on the night of February 23 in which the men were taken away from their homes and interrogated. The village headman and other village reported the rapes to army officials on February 27, and that the officials denied the charges and took no further action. Publicity about the incident in the national press provoked strong denials from army officials. A local

fact-finding committee found negligence with the primary investigation.[18] The First Information Report was filed two weeks after the gang rape and the divisional commissioner of Kashmir, Wajahat Habibullah, termed the mass rape allegation as bogus. However this report was not the only one to shake the trust of the Kashmiris. It was followed by the Defence Ministry's Fact Finding Mission headed by BG Varghese, terming the mass rape a massive hoax orchestrated by the militant groups and sympathisers and termed the women of Kunan Poshpora shameless. Verghese (2014) writes that the Press Council of India (PCI) team found the Kunan story to be at best a gross exaggeration but more probably a massive hoax, an act of psychological warfare to keep the Army, newly inducted to deal with militant-jihadi-*azaadi* uprising, at bay. The medical examination was only conducted three or four weeks later. The evidence cited was anecdotal not medical. No medico-legal report was filed as required.

The Support Group for the Kunan-Poshpora Survivors was formed after joint consensus emerged among motley group of women regarding the pending status of the Kunan Poshpora case. The closure report had not been filed for 22 years and the victims awaited justice endlessly. The only solace victims received from the state authorities had been undue delay and misrepresentations in the case. Though there had been intervention of Indian civil society with regard to Kunan-Poshpora but the results made little difference to the plight of victims. Amnesty (2014) urged authorities in J&K to conduct a thorough, impartial and effective investigation into the alleged rapes, and where sufficient admissible evidence is found, prosecute the suspects in a competent, independent and impartial civilian court.[19]

The formation of the Support Group for the Kunan-Poshpora Survivors remains important as it challenges the patterns of impunity that the army and paramilitary forces have enjoyed over the years. Secondly, the support group has offered much needed solidarity to the victims. The Indian feminist groups too tried to build bonds of solidarity but their inability to understand the local subjectivities always impaired the relation. The most important development after the support group was formed in the case was the

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[18] http://www.kashmirlife.net/kunan-the-case-reopening-order-38144/[Online:web] Accessed 20 July 2014
[19] http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/ASA20/035/2013/en/c965a2ab-f4c7-49c2-b6f1-73259bde5b06/asa200352013en.pdf [Online:Web] Accessed :23 June 2014

public presence and public testimonies by the victims, which did not happen in the last 22 years. As a strategy towards helping the victims with justice, the support group members attend all the court hearings with the victims. This support group remains essential in terms of politics of representation too. Any misrepresentation of a group of people who have been historically marginalised has the potential of enacting violence on the group in indirect forms. Visweswaran (1994) admits that in the process of research, there will specially be complications for those with hyphenated identities. It is easy to fall into and add to the dominant representations of a group. Yet, she argues, those who fall into these identities are situated in a place "to be moved by different sets of questions concerning power, domination and representation…how we may ourselves be positioned (and not always by choice in opposition to dominant discourses and structures of power)". In this case the victims of Kunan and Poshpora have been relegated to the peripheries while the discourse around them was created in a top-down fashion. For media and human rights groups Kunan and Poshpora was an attention-grabbing news story. However, no efforts were made to rescue the victims from the social trauma and helping them towards justice. The support group not only encouraged the victims to seek justice but it also helped build their capacity which is evident from the public testimonies victims have been giving. It did not perpetuate domination but allowed the voices to emerge from the ground. The vision of the support group and sisterhood emerged from the commonality of oppression and the need for structural changes to building peace has been underlined.

Another proto-type of bottom-up peace-building is the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP). On the tenth of every month, a group of people gather in a central Srinagar Park since the year 1996.They carry pictures of their relatives who went missing in the twenty five years of turmoil. The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) has been formed in 1994 by Parveen Ahanagar whose son was picked up by the security forces in 1991 and ever since has not been heard off. Parveena's search took her to various police stations, hospitals and jails in and outside Kashmir. Her search yielded little results in terms of finding her son but, at the same time, she developed network with many such Kashmiri's who have similar stories to share. As her story circulated, she became a well known figure in Srinagar and throughout Kashmir. Subsequently, lawyers of the security forces tried asserting pressure on her through

various mechanisms and APDP received threats to stop its activism based on restorative justice. The group members began meeting at Parveena's house from time to time to decide its plan of action. After two or three years they began a program of public demonstrations at Sher Kashmir Park which gathered huge attention from local and national support groups. Subsequently, Parveena travelled across the world for galvanising support against the enforced disappearances in the valley. In 2005, Parveena was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize too. In 2008, she travelled to Geneva to meet the United Nations Working Group on enforced and involuntary disappearances.

APDP (2011) notes that mothers, sisters, and wives of the disappeared have organised under the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) towards bringing peace and justice. APDP now has members from over 150 families. Women constitute over 60 per-cent of the membership, have 50 per-cent representation on the executive board and at least 5 per-cent representation during monthly public protests. Many women members have faced indirect or even direct threats against such activism, which is seen as 'shaming' the government, and at times even antithetical to militant groups' interests. But they have continued to actively participate in APDP activities. This involvement towards building peace and aiming towards justice can be further understood with APDP's delicate handling of the issues of half widows[20]. APDP makes a conservative estimate that at least there are 1,500 half widows in Kashmir. The estimate is borne by extrapolation after a pilot study in some districts as the observational range remains huge.

Half widows face the brunt of the socio, political and economic hardships. They are deemed ineligible for pensions and other governmental relief, and the current legal remedies are all vague about the position of half widows. Other than forming bonds of solidarity, APDP devised key recommendations that would enhance momentum inclusive peace.

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[20] Women are labeled 'half widows' when their husbands have been disappeared but not yet been declared dead. Such disappearances have been carried out by the government forces—police, paramilitary, or military—or by militants. However, the number of disappearances carried out by militants is significantly lower.

APDP's intervention can be paralleled with the a powerful mothers movement called *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) .It is a long-established and well- known group of human rights activists formed by mothers of people "disappeared" as a result of state-sponsored terrorism in Argentina from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. The group's origins can be traced to the gathering in Buenos Aires in 1977 of a small group of middle-aged women who were demanding the return of their disappeared sons and daughters through innovative public displays of civil disobedience. Bosco (2006) deems over the years, the Madres' mobilisation expanded beyond their demands for truth and justice regarding the disappearances of their sons and daughters. Today, the Madres are involved in the struggle for human, civil, and political rights in Argentina, Latin America, and beyond. Among the distinguishing, well-known features of this social movement are the weekly silent walks and marches in plazas around the country that they continue performing after almost thirty years of activism.

Following a very similar plan of action APDP has become a site through which social memories are transmitted and connected to Kashmir's present. Direct and indirect memories from the past are juxtaposed with the official history and subsequently it becomes a prism for seeing how power and resistance have to be interpreted in the local parlance for an effective and long-standing peace. By giving testimony and re-contextualising the events on monthly basis, these women challenge the impunity of the armed forces and lackadaisical response of the state towards enforced disappearances. Brysk (1994) writes that the mother's movement is an ethical reference to the society in Argentina. They symbolically support other human rights organisations. In a similar fashion, APDP has become moral location which bears testimony to the individual acts of disappearance and refute claims that all disappeared were involved in guerilla warfare. The members lecture at schools, universities and conferences in order to testify against state violence. In addition, in the last several years, APDP has symbolically supported social movements that take on the issues of unemployment, poverty and state sponsored violence. APDP's peace initiative turns to the moral authority of survivors of the disappeared and socially sanctioned space available with the Kashmiri tradition of women's activism for peace in the informal sphere of politics. Manchanda (2001) opines

that APDP's initiative represents the use of motherhood for political mobilisation and peace activism. The example of APDP is an example where women stretch their conventional roles to innovate within their traditional identities.

Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) is another organisation that has actively worked towards peace-building in the valley. It is an informal and broad collective of people from diverse background using coordinated actions and flexible techniques. But they have a clear coherence in their activities and alternate vision for peace. The organisation tries to maintain a local network between lawyers, journalists, students and others concerned. Over the last two decades, JKCCS has led fact-finding teams to remote corners of the valley and published alternative reports that reject the governmental claims of normalcy and peace. In the recent years, JKCCS has conducted important research on issues related to impunity in Kashmir, presence of fake graves in the valley, Shopian double murder and rape case. In the recent controversy over the Zubin Mehta's concert titled Ehsaas-e-Kashmir, JKCCS countered it with a local concert called Haqeeqat-e-Kashmir. The local perception was that the Bavarian Orchestra was held in Kashmir so as to send out the message that normalcy has returned to valley. However, the reality was far different. As part of the protest, a rival concert, Haqeeqat-e-Kashmir, was also staged on the streets of Srinagar, bringing the spotlight back on music as an effective cultural weapon in zones of conflict.[21] Such initiatives have motivated similar events, which would question the prevailing order in certain ways and, at the same time, bring different identities in the valley together. A group of artists from the valley send a huge blank canvas across 18 cities in 12 different countries and 200 artists came together to create visual interpretations of Kashmir. In each city, a group of artists worked on the canvas creating giant kaleidoscopic vision of Kashmir.[22]

It is also been observed that in a number of situations, individuals have been active in building peace and structures that would ensure that peace sustains regardless of challenges. Masooda Parveen is similarly fighting to set precedence. Like many women

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[21] http://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/making-music-in-place-of-war/[Online:Web] Accessed:18 July 2014
[22] http://www.thekashmirwalla.com/2014/07/canvas-kashmir/[Online:Web] Accessed:18 July 2014

in Kashmir, her husband was killed in custody. She fought to punish the perpetrators for ten long years. But the apex court of India turned down her arguments and asserted that her dead husband was a militant. Masooda had filed the case in the Supreme Court of India, fearing that the case might get politicised in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir

Peoples Union for Democratic Rights (2007) mentions in a judgment of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of *Masooda Parveen versus Union of India*, rejected a writ petition under Articles 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) and 21 (Protection of life and personal liberty) filed by the wife of one Ghulam Mohiud-din Regoo who died in Army custody, on the ground that the deceased was a militant. The judgment was an example of the unwillingness of the legal system to deal with the excesses committed by the armed forces in the disturbed areas. Mathur (2012) maintains that like thousands of other victims, Masooda Parveen is also a survivor as she struggles to bring up her children alone and continues to seek justice for her husband's murder. Alongside the legal impunity provided by laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act is the de-facto impunity provided by the willingness of the international community to turn a blind eye to these abuses. Though the judgment has been disappointing for Masooda, it could not deter her from striving for justice for her deceased husband. Masooda uses her knowledge and experience of the legal system with many others who are in similar situations. She collaborates with human rights groups, and grass-roots development and social movements to enforce the rights of marginalised people and to challenge oppression.[23]

Restoration of Community Relations

An important challenge in places where peace is to build is the lack of social cohesion and the need to restore confidence among civilians for a dialogue. Much more than physical infrastructures, conflict destroys trust and relationships, as well as weakens capacity and will of people to work together. These intangible qualities must be rebuilt if peace is to be sustained. Restoring confidence between civilians and government actors is needed to create forms of cooperation designed to address issues of conflict together.

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[23] Based on an interview with Masooda Parveen, dated 25 December 2013

Hayman(2014) notes that the importance of local peace-building organisations is emphasised in complexity theory, which argues that as conflict is inherently unpredictable, it should be a high priority to strengthen the ability of local organisations and networks to respond quickly to an emerging conflict.

Yakjah Reconciliation and Development Network is one platform which has emerged to respond to the challenges of violence that has affected inter-personal and community relations. It engages with children and youth from the Jammu and Kashmir region and also collaborates with like-minded organisations in order to involve young people with deep ideological, political, ethnic and religious differences in the state. After 20 years of violence, today the armed conflict is not limited just to the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley, but has heavily affected relationships with other parts of Kashmir region, including Hindu-majority Jammu and Buddhist-majority Ladakh. Ashima and her organisation, Yakjah Reconciliation and Development Network (Yakjah), work to counter violence and build relationships between different religious and ethnic communities of Kashmiris, Ladakhis and Dogras. Divisions between these groups are often made worse by divisive identity-based politics of various political parties and religious organisations, and also by violence perpetrated by the state and terrorist organisations. Yakjah believes that by promoting social harmony between the different communities and regions, they can lessen the incidents of fighting and create a more peaceful Kashmir. They bring together young people from across Jammu and Kashmir to learn about each other's cultures, share their experiences and perspectives and work together as peace-builders in their communities.

Yakjah uses creative forms like theatre, films and art to open spaces for children and youth to express them, listen to each other, understand differences and learn to accept the reality and experiences of the other. Yakjah's aim is not to resolve the conflict but to transform attitudes, change perceptions, rebuild relationships, invoke critical thinking, explore alternatives for responding to the conflict non-violently and learn to engage with diversity in the region so as to build pluralistic structures.

Yakjah believes that the conflict has an ability to be dormant and ignite suddenly. The ignition of conflict could be related to a number of factors—inequality, lack of trust in government, predatory behaviour by security services, lack of livelihoods—and these can to a greater or lesser extent be measured.[24]Twenty years of violence have not only been valley centric, but it has affected relationships with other parts of Kashmir region including Hindu-majority Jammu and Buddhist-majority Ladakh. The strategy Yakjah uses to build peace is helping different religious and ethnic communities of Kashmiris, Ladakhis and Dogras to counter violence.

In the similar way, Saariy Samav Aksey Razi Lamav (SSARL), which loosely translates into 'Let us together pull a single rope', or 'Let us work together towards single goal,' was developed out of social networking interactions among some Kashmiris. In the aftermath of the political turmoil of 2010, Kashmir had found a place on prominent social networking sites and here these Kashmiris realised that a common ground between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits is the only way to restore peace in the valley. Soon the group membership reached around 1000 people and the group intends to find common ground between all groups sharing their experiences and plight in and out of Kashmir.[25]The activities of the group are widespread, which include organising home stays for Kashmiri Pandits within the valley. Since the onset of militancy in 1989, the forthcoming generations of Kashmir Muslims and Kashmir Pandits grew up in complete estrangement. Despite sharing the same language and culture, there has not been any positive interaction between the youngsters of two communities. So these home-trips facilitated necessary cordial atmosphere before the dialogue between two communities could be restored. For the maximum part in the years of militancy, the communities could not move beyond the conflicting narratives. It was rare that the attempts for reconciliation were not flown from outside, but people were owning the initiatives.[26]

This group has managed to get involved in other interesting activities as well such as organising trips and painting competitions for children who have been direct victims of

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[24] http://www.leapconfrontingconflict.org.uk/assetsuploaded/
documents/pwf-nov2011_1315914192.pdf [Online:Web] Accessed:15 June 2014.
[25] http://www.kashmirdispatch.com/conflict/06042666-kashmir-calling.htm
   [Online:Web] Accessed:18July2014
[26] http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?271891[Online:Web] Accessed:18 July2014

the conflict. They use creative mediums, so that children can vent their anger and frustration about the conflict. And, this gives them an assurance that someone is listening to them.[27]

Bottom-up Peace-building and Rehabilitation of Orphans

The prolonged conflict in Kashmir has produced a generation of orphans. A study conducted by the an INGO, Save the Children, reported that estimated population of orphans in Jammu and Kashmir is 2,14,000 and 37 per-cent of them were orphaned due to the armed conflict.[28]In such circumstances, peace cannot be conceived unless there is a proper rehabilitation of the orphans. Earlier on, the problem of orphans was solved with the community -based model where the Mohalla Masjid communities would take care of the orphans. However, with the dramatic increase in the number of orphans the existing model faced shortcomings.

Subsequently, voluntary humanitarian networks were established for the protection of orphans and widows. Some of the organisations that work in rehabilitation of orphans are J&K Yateem Trust, J&K Yateem Foundation, J&K Yateem Khan, Shehjaar etc. And these organisations have crafted special programmes to cater to the diverse needs of the orphans. Jammu and Kashmir Yateem Foundation has spent Rs 19,473279 in 2012-2013.[29]

Other than the humanitarian and relief activities, these orphanages facilitate proper political channelisation of the beneficiaries. Since there are multiple dimensions to the conflict, it becomes necessary to empower those sections of the society who otherwise are left to the peripheries. Additionally, the feeling of non-inclusiveness may lead to destructive tendencies among these young children[30].

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[27] http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=1440[Online:Web] Accessed:18 July 2014
[28] http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/may/9/kashmir-has-2-14-lakh-orphans-reportAccessed 90.asp[Online:Web] Accessed:18 July 2014
[29] Source:Jammu and Yateem Foundation:Brochure 2012-2013.
[30] Personal Conversations with Yateem Foundation Administration in December 2013

Another such example of bottom-up approach to peace-building remains Shehjaar. Shaukat Apa started an NGO with the help of donations from some friends. The area she was living in was entirely infected with militants and the government was not ready to do any work there. Gradually, Shehjaar opened a school for children of labor class. In December 1998 they started an orphanage and selected some 25 boys up to the age of nine. They didn't ask them about their past but made sure that these were the deserving cases –making sure they were directly hit by militancy. The idea to work on education came since it has been affected significantly by militancy. The rich could afford to send their wards out of the valley but, for the poor, it was becoming impossible to ensure education for their children. So teaching for peace was the launch pad for Shehjaar. The later activities centered on helping widows in their rehabilitation and recovery. They provided loans to women for setting up self help units and eke out a dignified earning for them. Shehjaar was renamed HELP (Human Effort for Love and Peace) soon after . HELP (2012) explains that it runs Shah Anwar Memorial School in Kupwara district along with a vocational training center for young women, the Shehjaar Home for Special Children, based in Inderhama, which also houses a food processing and tailoring unit run by women and the Mariam Poly Clinic. It works on issues of juvenile justice, carries out capacity-building workshops, and relief and rehabilitation programmes for the physically disabled as well as economically deprived. It also conducts a number of programmes and projects through the year for the benefit of its target groups. In 2011, in partnership with Childline India Foundation it set up the first child help line in Srinagar.[31]

Analysis of Bottom-up Peace-building

Bottom-up peace-building displays much variety and changeability. The only fixed variable remains mobilisation through a sense of morality and (in)justice against deprivation for survival and identity. The various organisations working towards bottom-up peace-building might differ in their activities but share moral motivation and social

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[31] http://www.jkhf.in/Annual_Reports.aspx . [Online:Web] Accessed 23 June 2014

power. Bottom-up peace-builders in Kashmir have mobilised their members in a defensive against prolonged injustice meted out to them. The bottom-up peace-building initiatives appear cyclical and related to long political-economic and ideological cycles. When the conditions that give rise to local concerns would change (through the action of the bottom-up peace-building or more usually due to changing circumstances), the movement of the bottom-up peace-builders would reinvent in a different form. The membership and mobilisation is also cyclical as the bottom-up peace builders mobilise people in response to circumstances.

Another characteristic feature of bottom-up peace-building is that sometimes membership is drawn from the erstwhile top- down peace-builders. It is because of the disillusionment with the approach that many of them adopt this approach. At times the organisational patterns and capacities are inherited from the top-down peace-builders.

There is a specific class composition to bottom-up peace-building in Kashmir. The bottom-up peace -builders are predominantly with middle class and lower middle class background. The rich could afford to send out their children. The middle class and poor became the victims. Here, the grievances are not economically based but largely motivated by the violent excesses the state and its military apparatus committed .Elites have been beneficiaries of the upward social mobility so the conflict couldn't perturb them. Bottom-up peace-building is more like a community movement. The community movements mobilise and organise their members in pursuit of material and non-material ends, which they often regard unjustly denied to them by the state and its institutions, including political parties. Similarly, in the bottom-up peace-building, the non-material aims and methods target at bottom-up self-determination and participatory mechanisms for building peace.

Bottom-up peace-building has also served as an important agent of social transformation and new vision. Bottom-up peace-builders don't seek to gain state power but fill important voids where the state and other institutions are unable or unwilling to act. In Kashmir they invoke both the sanctity of traditional ways and values and are equally

utilising creative outlets. It is observed that they create coalitions to target at specific goals. Often, various bottom-up peace-builders have serious internal conflicts over ends or means. But whenever there has been a coalition among them, the results are appreciable.

An appreciable number of women are active members or initiators of the various bottom-up peace-building movements. As the public sphere for women is highly restricted, women's political mobilisation more often tends to be manifested in the domestic activism. The collapse between the public-private spheres following the societal upheaval pushes women in the negotiations of power in the public sphere. But since armed conflict also reinforces sexist roles, militarising masculinity and, thus, shrinking the space for women's contribution is a possible outcome. But the bottom-up approach to peace-building has utilised capacities of women to full. Often these movements are initiated by women themselves.

Strengths of Bottom-up Peace-building Approach

The bottom-up approach to peace-building makes people stakeholders in peace in more effective ways. The movement comprises of people who have dissimilar identities, but share a commonality of vision in terms of peace. It has been proven better at negotiating competing narratives that have emerged out of various identities within the state. The differing narratives are very often ignored by the top-down approaches. With its multi-community appeal this approach does not polarise the identities within the state Moreover, it enjoys more credibility owing to its inclusive nature and the emotional attachment of people to issues it raised from time to time. In the case of APDP or Support Group for Kunan-Poshpora Survivors, the commonality that members share is common oppression and it is an emotional issue for most of them. There is a favourable pre-condition for the bottom-up peace-building as the other approach has not been able to do much good on ground. And, bottom-up peace-building has a moral legitimacy that years of protracted violence and conflict provide it.

Bottom-up peace-builders have an added advantage of grass root mobilisation. As the movement is cyclic, even little amount of communication can bring the members together. Since it understands the local nuances and cultural subjectivities, it is easier to mobilise people at the grass-root level .There is also presence of cross -cutting solidarity that supports and promotes the bottom-up peace-building. From diasporas to researchers or members of the similar movements in rest of the world, the movement has expanded its solidarity base.

Since it does not follow the developmental framework, it tries to look at the questions that pertain to identity and conflict in Kashmir. In other words, one can say that it answer questions that are raised by people. Another strength of bottom-up peace-building is its non-dependence on state facilities, which makes it is less vulnerable to change in policies due to the changing governments.

Limitations of Bottom-up Peace-Building

Paucity of human and material resources is the biggest deficiency in the bottom-up peace-building paradigm in Kashmir. As the exercise is not donor -driven and is based entirely on local capacities, a financial limitation is observed most of the time. With so much ground to cover, the limited finance blocks the avenues where bottom-up peace-building could have intervened .Like in the case of APDP, the members complained that due to the financial shortcomings lot many times they have to decide on the most needful matters. The members unanimously decide on what is the most needful of all. Secondly, there has been a serious clampdown on such activities from the state and its institutions. Any activity that does not follow the normative framework of the accepted peace-building or questions the legitimacy of the top-down approach is rejected and discouraged. Thirdly, political actors in the valley i.e. the separatists or the mainstream leaders have not supported this approach fully. The mainstream parties have come up with proposals regarding creating peace in the valley. But at the level of implementation, the claims are not fulfilled. Whereas the separatist leadership neither completely promotes this approach, nor do they condemn it. Separatists have been passively involved

in the bottom -up peace-building sometimes, but their active call of cooperation could have worked wonders for this approach owing to the legitimacy that the separatist leadership enjoys in the valley.

One also observers that since there are no tangible goals that the bottom-up peace-building offers unlike the top-down peace-building, lot of time the members withdraw out of fatigue. Similarly, there is an extensive focus on multiple objectives, leading to the non-fulfillment of most of the goals.

It is also observed that the bottom-up peace-building in Kashmir has been mostly reactive. Most of the activities are initiated in reaction to the state-sponsored state-building or army sponsored peace-building. Hence, there is the lack of objectivity. It is emotionally driven and skips out many essential questions from the larger picture.

Conclusion

Bottom-up peace-building has strategically focused on the issues of justice, restoration of community relations and rehabilitation of widows and orphans. It has anchored itself around community -based justice which is reflected in the everyday strategies of building peace. It is observed that justice is used as a facilitator of bottom-up peace-building, both for individuals within the community and between communities and the state too. Violence-supporting norms have been replaced by non-violent approaches to conflict and its resolution. In other words, one can say that the bottom-up interventions make the ground ready for successful peace-building. The bottom-up peace-building exercises have tried to build bridges between historically estranged communities too.

Bottom-up peace-builders understand conflict through the local subjectivities, and hence, understand the nuances and cultural specificities around peace. They have followed range of strategies from the popular models used in theory to the organic practices that emerged locally. The problem with top- down peace-building is that it assumes monolithic collectivity of sufferers of a conflict who can speak for themselves in the way the

international community understands. Conflicts leave heterogeneous impact on the different segments of population and, hence, inclusion of local experiences and local knowledge is necessary to built inclusive peace. If the local experience is not utilised the peace-building remains a form of imperialist subject that renders the locals as mute spectators. Moreover, gender has been an important dimension to the bottom -up peace-building. Unlike top-down peace-building, where the onus of building peace rests with elite, English speaking women, here women from diverse social cleavages are getting together to facilitate peace. It is pertinent to mention that the definition of peace with bottom -up peace-builders is different from the developmental or humanitarian approach to peace. The focus of peace for bottom -up peace-builders is justice and subsequently, long- term political resolution. At the same time, it has made the marginal identities – half-widows and orphans -stakeholders in the whole exercise.

Conclusion

The present study has tried to identify the increasing importance of peace-building and explore whether the peace-building efforts achieve the desired results. The United Nations Report on 'Agenda of Peace' emerged as a framework for managing armed conflicts. However, the measures that are being implemented to promote lasting and sustainable peace in the conflict areas reinforce global templates and hierarchies of exclusion. Many a times, the global template for restoring peace reproduces the corrosive social engagement and changes the epicenter of violence from one area to another.

This study has identified that peace-building is not a simple process. The process is even tougher in a place like Kashmir, where the conflict has not been resolved. There are significant limitations and complications that would affect the peace-building process in this context. A peace-building exercise can be derailed owing to the episodic violence. So it becomes essential for the peace-builders to mould their approach and act in strategic ways that may not necessarily correspond with the global experience of peace-building.

Peace-building as a category has a number of dimensions. The top -down approach to peace-building shares structural features with a colonising discourse. It becomes a corporate institution for ensuring peace in zones where the locals have not been able to preserve peace themselves. The external peace-builder takes the form of the modern day leviathan and chooses to manage and build peace through the available western neo-liberal templates. The nascent hierarchy of peace-building relies on wars and conflict to turn the population in the conflict zones into objects of knowledge and management. This practice of peace-building has paid little attention to the politics of representation, as the practical and tangible challenges to peace appear far too urgent to allow for a nuanced understanding that peace can be different for different people. This understanding would be shaped by the multifarious identities among people and the differing interpretations of politico-historical subjectivities. This pattern reminds one of the knowledge –power nexus. A powerful entity in the global game exercises its power and creates appropriated and codified scholarship regarding the ways in which peace can be built and sustained.

The challenge to top-down peace-building in Kashmir comes from the fact that it is employed to ameliorate conflict on the surface level. It seeks to build negative peace where the only concrete goal is the cessation of hostilities. However, hostility can be suspended by armed measures, leaving little mandate for building peace and creating constituencies of trust and deliverance. The peace-building work conducted by government and army is strategically alike and has been used to stub out any sense of resentment amongst the local populations. It encompasses developmental and relief work to counter the after-effects of violence and hostility. But as such no concrete attempts are taken to deal with the sources of violence.

The top-down peace-building experiment with women has been limited. It misses out on the heterogeneity of the subject and produces 'woman' as a single monolithic subject. The diversity among women as a category is not represented sufficiently and prescriptive experiments are conducted with women as a whole. This is also evident in the prioritisation of issues around which all women are expected to organise. The assumption of women as an already constituted, coherent group with identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial implies that the model of peace-building that is being used, is flawed. In this case, Top-down peace-builders try to impose an emancipatory role over a particular identity: woman. The top-down peace-building has followed a status quo-ist nature and worked as a politico-military strategy and a mechanism of institutionalised control, subjugation and disempowerment of women. It has focused on a target group and created political fragmentation within, which finds little or no resonance with the lived political and social realities within Kashmir.

By examining the working of top-down as well as bottom-up approaches of peace-building in Kashmir, this study has identified that top-down approach has largely failed to build sustainable peace as reflected in the first hypothesis of the study. It has attached excessive focus on developmental and welfare measures, ignoring the fundamental issue of justice. Furthermore, the top-down approach has failed to acknowledge the agency of the people and have largely been unable to take into account the diversity in the local population. In the absence of any effort to provide justice to those affected by the conflict, the top-down approach have only ended up serving the interests of the political

elite. This is also because the various goal-posts of peace-building have been defined by this very elite.

The study has examined how the alienation of the top-down approach is particularly evident in the case of women, who seldom had a say in peace-building efforts under such approach. However, even though women weren't included in top-down peace-building efforts, the never-ending cycle of violence in the Valley compelled Kashmiri women to explore the possibilities of alternative peace-building strategies. The cycle of violence claims hundreds of innocent lives each year. The advent of militancy and the continuing conflict between the militants and the security forces have affected almost every family in Kashmir in some way or the other. Women additionally bore the brunt of the sexualised violence meted by the armed forces. The protracted conflict has affected the lives of women in various other ways, restricting their mobility, freedom and choices in everyday life, etc. Therefore, the need for peace is felt not just in terms of cessation of conflict, but in different other ways.

Violence itself became a vehicle through which consensus about peace has emerged. One aspect of peace, therefore, has been the need to safeguard people from violence by security forces and militants as well as political violence. The failure of top-down approach of peace-building was another reason why women felt the need to become part of the peace-building process on their own terms. The non-inclusive dimensions of top-down peace-building keep the majority of women away from the negotiation table or any process of peace-building. This also became a cause for resentment among women. The top-down model of peace-building passively tends to passively inflict violence on those it claims to have represented. The conflict in Kashmir has been accompanied by a process of aggressive militarisation in the public sphere, a process that has been marked by significant violence. The social corollary of this process was its intrusion into the private space, in which gender hierarchies became more rigid and were characterised by a greater degree of oppression. Subsequently, the private sphere also shrunk for Kashmiri women and became more violent. For women, this experience of violence at multiple levels has made the urge for peace much stronger.

Bottom-up peace-building in Kashmir has expanded its sphere of inclusiveness and tried to restore the corrosive social engagement that top-down approach has created. It is fore-grounded on newer forms of autonomous political activity outside the governance mechanism of formalised rights and international law. Peace-building from below locates radical ethics of civil society from their refusal to play by the rules laid by the external peace-builders. It does not change the epicenter of violence from one point to another but instead, works on whittling down the concentrated centers of power. Bottom-up peace-builders in Kashmir have organised themselves around the need for community based justice and the strategies through which they pursue peace are located in the everyday activities. They have established a relationship between justice and memory and, hence, the passions of attachment and loss are turned into political action. The commemorative practices that the bottom-up peace builders follow establish connections between a how any 'experience' can be utilised for mobilisation for justice. The other positive end that the bottom-up peace-building in Kashmir has held to is an absolute reliance on non-violent strategies. In any armed conflict, it is an act of courage and conscience to stand up for non-violent means. Hence, it proves the second hypothesis of the study.

The study located that the bottom-up approach is better than the other approach and corresponds to the idea of participation and justice. The understanding of peace amongst the bottom-up peace-builders is also different from the normative understanding. Peace in this parlance is the structural resolution of the conflict and enabling peace through peaceful means. Bottom-up peace-builders comprehend the prevailing conflict through local particularities. Subsequently, the prescriptive aspect with the conflict utilises local knowledge, organic practices as well as essential theoretical tools to deal with the conflict. Conflicts affect the local population in heterogenous patterns so the bottom-up peace-building models use local experience and local knowledge as a resource. Moreover bottom-up women peace-builders have been very important in correlating peace with social and political justice. Unlike top-down peace-building where the onus of building peace rests with elite, English-speaking women, here the women from diverse social backgrounds are getting together to facilitate peace.

However most of the bottom-up peace-building initiatives suffer from chronic lack of resources, inadequate human resources and budget constraints. Additionally, there is a clampdown from the state against these initiatives because they passively condemn the political malfeasances, human rights violations and question the status quo. This has a crippling effect on the potential of bottom-up peace-building.

One of the possible alternatives for peace-building in Kashmir can be an efficient partnership between the top-down and bottom-up peace-builders to promote and support peace in Kashmir. There is an opportunity for positive, people-centric communication between the two groups. However both groups will need to be flexible on certain issues. Top-down peace builders will have to accept the reality of political status quo and equally acknowledge that humanitarian relief and development cannot compensate for justice. In any event of violence perpetrated by the state, the state machinery has to be accountable and facilitate justice. Efforts cannot be reduced to artificial relief packages which are announced every now and then. Similarly the bottom-up peace-builders can utilise their knowledge and understanding of grassroot structures to facilitate and coordinate peace with the top-down peace-builders. If the top-down show interest in reconciliation based on justice, there is no reason why bottom-up peace-builders can't effectively join them. In any social system, replacing structures can cause outright mayhem. Political wisdom lies in the fact that structures should be negotiated, with a mutual give and take between the parties involved. Overthrowing any system creates an atmosphere of unpredictability. The system that emerges as a consequence of this uncertainty could be equally oppressive and hierarchal like the one which it has replaced. The joint model of peace-building can facilitate that the issues of representation, central-periphery hierarchies, accommodation of hierarchies in a more competitive manner. In a place like Kashmir where there are multifarious socio-political identities sustainable peace can only be built and preserved if these identities are accommodated.

Some other issues that have emerged out of this study are that there are no accessible records or accounts based on the peace-building experience in Kashmir. The existing records are often in the files of the organizations and in reports to the donors. Additionally, the top-down peace-builders don't share the records on the pretext of

security and confidentiality that is to be preserved in the conflict zones. The bottom -up peace-builders are reluctant to share their records owing to the culture of mistrust that the conflict has created. Moreover community ownership of peace-building can be facilitated when the state is providing adequate climate for the restoration of peace. The first initiative for the state remains to make visible political changes like the demilitarization, end the human rights abuses etc. Peace cannot be sustainable if there is a continuing sense of grievance on the part of nay stake-holder.

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