


**PAKHTUN NATIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF  
AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY, 1986-2011**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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### DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “Pakhtun Nationalism and the Role of Awami National Party, 1986-2011” by me in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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### CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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## Preface

Recent times have witnessed the emergence of ethnic conflicts in a large number of countries spread across the entire contemporary world. In Pakistan, which has been facing the challenge of the ethnic cleavages since its inception, the problem got more aggravated because of the highly centralised state which has suppressed the distinctive and manifold identities of its federating units.

Among the various ethnic groups in Pakistan the problem of Pakhtun nationalism has continuously posed challenges in the consolidation of the Pakistan state. The problem with Pakhtun nationalism is potentially stern because of the fact that it seeks to produce a nationalist sentiment within a culturally distinct ethno-linguistic group that had its own autonomous history and has not changed much under the British rule. The ethnic overlapping with Afghanistan also posed another challenge to Pakhtun nationalism from the very beginning. After independence, Pakhtun nationalism lost much of its strength in the hands of the political parties who claimed to be the leaders of the Pakhtuns. The Pakhtun nationalistic struggle started with Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars before independence and after independence it transformed itself in the political party of the National Awami Party, later forming the Awami National Party. But the ethnic-based political parties who are expected to represent the demands of the ethnic groups and provide them with their due share in the political and socio-economic power structure of the state often use the platform to bargain a position in the hierarchy of power.

This dissertation — “Pakhtun Nationalism and the Role of Awami National Party, 1986-2011” — is an attempt to investigate the politico-historical developments of Pakhtun nationalism, focusing on the role of the Pakhtun-based parties — the National Awami Party and the Awami National Party in carrying forward the movement. The study seeks to throw light on the facts, problems and prospects of the areas of Pakhtun nationalism and the Awami National Party.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Awami National Party
CNICs	Computerised National Identity Cards
CRBC	Chashma Right Bank Canal
DNA	Damage Need Assessment
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HERA	Higher Education Regulatory Authority
HPMC	Hazara Province Movement Committee
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KKM	Khudai Khidmatgar movement
LI	Lashkar-e-Islam
MW	Mega Watt
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MQM	Muttahida Quami Movement
NAP	National Awami Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	National Democratic Party
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NWFP	North West Frontier province
NFCA	National Finance Commission Award
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment

PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PkMAP/PMAP	Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML (Q)	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNDA	Pakhtunkhwa National Democratic Alliance
PPIB	Private Power and Infrastructure Board
PPP (s)	Pakistan People's Party (Sherpao)
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PPIB	Private Power and Infrastructure Board
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
ROZ	Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
SNGPL	Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

Multi-ethnicity is one of the most prominent socio-political phenomena witnessed in almost all civic societies. If the present political scenario of South Asia is considered, it will be seen that inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflicts appear to have acquired a marked intensity in the territory. The South Asian region, which is a constellation of multi-ethnic societies, has been facing this challenge since independence.<sup>1</sup>

The process of ethnic mobilisation has also posed a number of challenges to the South Asian states by various demands of protest against discrimination, struggle for autonomy or secession.<sup>2</sup> This is mainly because the question of identity formation has always been a complex phenomenon. To what extent the primordial ties retain their grip over the process of identity formation has always been the “litmus test of the ontological maturation of the societies”. It appears that in South Asia attempts towards achieving this have not been rigorous enough to withstand the primordial pulls. The essence of civility and civic culture appear to be constantly under attack from different quarters including region, race, ethnicity etc. Confronted by ever changing paradigm of identity formation, the South Asian societies appear to be caught inextricably in the complex process of attaining an equilibrium balancing between the primordial, the political and the universal. Caught between the primordial pulls and demands of universalism, the political frequently determines the priorities.<sup>3</sup>

The critical issue of ethnic groups in South Asia is not the specific set of symbolic objects distinguishing it but the social and political uses of these objects. In the South Asian context, given the historical evolution of these societies, ethnicity can be defined in terms of social collectiveness based on religion, language, culture and so on. When this confluence affects the political thinking and action, ethnicity assumes a political

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<sup>1</sup> Phadnis, Urmila (1990), *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi: Sage Publications India, pp. 11

<sup>2</sup> Haque, Mahfuzul (1998), *Ethnic Insurgency and National Integration: A Study of Selected Ethnic Problems in South Asia*, New Delhi: University Press Limited, pp. 13

<sup>3</sup> Azam, Kousar J. (2001), “Introduction”, in Kausar J. Azam (eds.) *Ethnicity, Identity and The State in South Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, pp. 3

relevance. It is this political relevance that moves ethnic groups from social to political space affecting state formation and state response to ethnic demands.<sup>4</sup>

Likewise Pakistan, marked by ethnic conflicts, stands as a potent example in South Asia. The proposed study — ‘Pakhtun Nationalism and Political Parties: Role of the Awami National Party, 1986-2011’ — is an attempt to analyse the politico-historical developments of Pakhtun nationalism, focusing on the role the Awami National Party in carrying forward the movement. As the study aims to deal specifically with Pakhtun nationalism and the role of ethnic-based political parties like the Awami National Party, it is essential to give a conceptual background in the introduction of the research. So the very first chapter will deal with the concepts of ethno-nationalism and role of political parties in it.

### ***The Conceptual Background***

Before going into the matter of ethno-nationalism, a study of ethnicity and nationalism is a pre-requisite. Therefore it will be wise to discuss first about ethnicity, its contradiction with the modern conception of nation and then to define the concept of ethno-nationalism in that light. Later it will also deal with the politicisation of ethnicity, political parties and the role of the state.

To start with ethnicity, the term ‘ethnic’ refers to the way the individuals and groups characterise themselves on the basis of their language, race, place of origin, shared cultural values and history.<sup>5</sup>

### ***The Definitions***

The word “ethnic”, derived from the Greek word “ethnikos”, refers to a nation not converted to Christianity: heathens, pagans, race or large groups of people having common traits and customs or groups in an exotic primitive culture. Ethnicity on the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid pp. 5-6

<sup>5</sup> Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner, Myron (1986) , “Introduction”, in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds.) *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, USA: Syracuse University Press, pp. 2

other hand as a concept is derived from the Greek word “ethnos” which means nation, people, caste, tribe and such others. Ethnicity, therefore, stands for the ethnic quality or affiliation of a group bearing different meanings in varied situational contexts. Members of an ethnic group may, however, distinguish themselves on the basis of certain common physio-cultural characteristics. According to Fredrick Bath, “ethnic groups are categories of ascription, the identification of which is made by the actors themselves. Thus race, tribe, caste, class, language, dialect, religion, sect, territory, nationality, degree of aristocracy, and at times levels of techno-cultural efficiency have all been used sometimes singularly or in various combinations to delineate ethnicity.”<sup>6</sup>

While explaining the concept of ethnicity, Richard Davies has pointed out, “As with other forms of identity, ethnicity provides a sense of belonging as a way of knowing who we are. This enables identification with other individuals of a similar background, something which it can be argued is essential to the security of individuals. This sense of community may be of increasing importance in an age of bureaucratisation and impersonal mass societies, and a world of political alienation and isolation.”<sup>7</sup>

Smith explained ethnicity by taking help of some symbolism like kinship patterns, physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. He gave special emphasis to the emotional intensity and historical heritage of ethnies. He believed that nationalism also derives its force from “inner” sources like history and culture. Thus both draw from the same sources. Smith defines ethnic community as: “A named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity.”<sup>8</sup>

Thus it is important to note here that ethnicity often provides a sense of community, when there is political alienation. By categorising ethnicity into lateral, vertical and core and periphery, the control of the dominant group over the others can often be found.

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<sup>6</sup> Cited in Haque, Mahfuzul (1998), *Ethnic Insurgency and National Integration: A Study of Selected Ethnic Problems in South Asia*, New Delhi: University Press Limited, pp. 14

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, Delhi: Shipra Press, pp. 10

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, pp. 3

TYPES OF ETHNIES		
Lateral	Vertical	
Lateral ethnies are fairly extensive and diffused in character but their ethnic culture is confined to the upper class.	They are territorially more compact. Their ethnic cultures range from high to low classes.	
	Core	Periphery
	Dominant ethnies whose elites rule the state.	The oppressed and exploited ethnies sideline by the core.

**Table 1.1:** Source: Based on the data, Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publisher, pp. 58.

Thus the major problem of ethnicity lies with the fact that often ethnicity is being categorised, which becomes a major tool of politicisation.

### ***Ethnic Groups and Categories***

The belief in group-affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important consequences especially for the formation of a political community.

Coming to the ethnic groups, it is defined in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences as “distinct category of the population in a larger society, whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be bound together by common ties of race or nationality or culture.”<sup>9</sup>

Thus Schermerhorn also defines ethnic group as “a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood.”<sup>10</sup>

Naroll defines ethnic unit as a comparatively small community with predominantly archaic character. This approach can be used to describe the tribal societies. In contrast, a large number of authors argue that the term includes not only small communities but also those with large members, embracing the primitive, backward people and also those in highly industrialised and developed countries. Often ethnic groups are viewed as a substitute for minority, but rather than the size it is the group distinctiveness or subjective-objective criteria that is a critical factor in ethnic group identification. Thus the Syncretists define ethnic groups as a “historically formed aggregate of people having a real or imaginary association with a specified territory, a shared cluster of beliefs and values connoting its distinctiveness in relation to similar groups and recognised as such by others.”<sup>11</sup>

For the purpose of the study it is important to note that among these various components of ethnicity at a certain time, “one cultural marker may gain pre eminence while the other criteria may operate in subordination or in a muted manner. Thus the situational and relational contexts of the ethnic group symbolise the manner in which it responds to and is affected by its large social milieu. In this respect, migration, conquest, conversion,

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<sup>9</sup> Darity William. A (2008), *The International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan Press,

pp. 167

<sup>10</sup> Cited in Isikal, Huseyin (2002), “Two Perspective on The Relationship of Ethnicity to Nationalism: Comparing Gellner and Smith Alternatives”, *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 1(1), pp. 1 [Online Web] Accessed on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2011, URL: <http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/nation/isiksal.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> Syncretism is the combining of different (often contradictory) beliefs, often while melding practices of various schools of thought. Syncretism may involve the merger and analogising of several originally discrete traditions, especially in the theology and mythology of religion, thus asserting an underlying unity and allowing for an inclusive approach to other faiths. Cited in Phadnis, Urmila (1990), *Ethnicity and*

perceptions and policies of the dominant group, the process of partition, division, and reunification of a political community as well as the imperatives and dynamics of modernisation have serious implications for ethnic group identities, boundaries and relationship.”<sup>12</sup>

In the words of Urmila Phadnis, “The ethnic identity formation is marked by fission as well as fusion. While the former connotes the contraction of the group boundary through division and the creation of new groups, the latter refers to its expansion through assimilation which is brought about by incorporation and amalgamation of some groups with others.”<sup>13</sup>

Max Weber defines ethnic groups as “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration; the belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action.” Thus “ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organised that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. The belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in customs, physical type, or above all, language exist among its members.”<sup>14</sup>

It is important to take note that ethnic category is distinct from ethnic group. An ‘ethnic category’ is a category often set up by outsiders, that is, those who are not themselves members of the category, and whose members are populations that are categorised by outsiders as being distinguished by attributes of a common name or emblem, a shared

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*Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi: Sage Publications India, pp.14

<sup>12</sup> Phadnis, Urmila (1990), *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi: Sage Publications India, pp. 14

<sup>13</sup> Ibid pp. 15

<sup>14</sup> Weber, Max (1996), “The Origin of Ethnic Groups”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 35

cultural element and a connection to a specific territory.<sup>15</sup> Thus the difference lies with the fact that an ethnies is self-defined as a group, whereas ethnic categories are set up by outsiders. So often it also becomes a “Situational Ethnicity” which is chosen for certain time based on the situation.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore ethnicity, which is often perceived as a given concept can be situational also. In this case it should be traced back to the roots of ethnicity to find out whether it is based on the given identity or it is more of a situational concept. The ethnic roots can be traced in the theorisation of two groups: The Primordialists and the Instrumentalists.

### ***Primordialism***

The phenomenon of ethnicity is not only empirically varied; they are also characterised by paradoxes. On one hand there are highly durable ethnies, some trace their origin over several centuries and on the other, the rise of the new ethnies and the dissolution of the old are also seen. There are also many fissures in ethnies and shifts in ethnic identification. So while describing the concept of ethnicity, the problem basically stands with the concept of multi identity which includes not only the many different affiliations of individuals with other kind of groupings such as gender, race, class, religion etc. but also many shifting identities between ethnies and ethnic categories.<sup>17</sup>

Thus to avoid the confusion of shifts in identity formation and for the purpose of the study, it will be wise to categorise the approaches of ethnicity into two broad camps of Primordialism and Instrumentalism. While the Primordialists believe that people are always grouped together on the basis of primordial characters, the Instrumentalists consider ethnic origin as a recent phenomenon.

The Primordialists rely on the fact that there exists in all societies certain primordial, irrational attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc. Primordialist approaches contend that ethnic bonds are “natural”, fixed by the basic experiences that

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<sup>15</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publishers, pp. 12-13

<sup>16</sup> Delanty, Gerard and Kumar, Krishan (2006), *The Sage Handbook of Nations And Nationalism*, London: Sage Publication, pp. 171

human beings undergo within their families and other primary groups. Edward Shils was the first to express this idea when he remarked that in family attachments there is a significant relational quality that can only be called primordial, and this is because there is an ineffable significance attributed to the ties of blood.<sup>18</sup>

They are, in the words of Clifford Geertz, ineffable and yet coercive ties, which are the result of a long process of crystallisation. He also talked of over powering and ineffable quality attached to certain kind of ties, which people tend to mark as given.<sup>19</sup>

He even mentions the two aims of the ethnic groups. First, “it is a search for an identity, and a demand that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self as ‘being somebody in the world.’ The other aim is practical: it is a demand for the progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice” and also of playing a greater role in world politics and among nations.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the prime factor that is coming out is recognition in the world on the basis of identity, and on the basis of these identities one aims to claim a bigger influence in politics. Geertz also opines that modern states, particularly but not exclusively, in the Third World, are superimposed on the primordial realities that are the ethnic groups or communities. The Primordialists believe that ethnic identity is deeply rooted in the historical experience of human beings to the point of being practically a given.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the primordial values can be summarised as follows:

1. Primordial identities are naturally given.
2. Primordial identities are ineffable, that is, cannot be explained or analysed by referring to social interaction, but are coercive.
3. Primordial identities deal essentially with sentiments or affections.

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<sup>17</sup> Hutchinson John and Smith Anthony D. (1996), “Introduction”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 7

<sup>18</sup> Cited in Llobera, Josep R. (1999), “Recent Theories Of Nationalism”, [Online Web] Accessed 20 September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>19</sup> Cited in Llobera, Josep R. (1999), “Recent Theories Of Nationalism”, [Online Web] Accessed 20 September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>20</sup> Geertz, Clifford (1996), “Primordial Ties”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 41

<sup>21</sup> Cited in Llobera, Josep R. (1999), “Recent Theories Of Nationalism”, [Online Web] Accessed 20 September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>



Standing in contrast to the Instrumentalists, the primordial values regard ethnicity drawing from collective pre-modern cultural identities and having deeper roots within human society and history.<sup>22</sup> The Primordialists believe that ethnicity is a natural phenomenon with its foundations in family and kinship ties; ethnicity emerges out of nepotism and reproductive fitness, narrowing down the social concept into biological terms. A model by Isaacs, for example, developed a concept of primordial ties as a means of explaining the power and persistence of ethnic identity that he called “basic group identity.” Isaacs’s basic group identity was linked to ethnic identity, which was argued to be assigned at birth and more fundamental and natural than other social links. An added component of Isaacs’s model is a psychological theory that addresses conflict between inter-tribal or ethnic groups. This latter concept is often tied to nationalist movements in modern societies.<sup>23</sup>

The Primordialists also can be categorised according to their line of thinking.

1. The first line of thinking makes no distinction between nation and ethnies keeping the referent same as cultural values and both are seen as a part of the natural order.
2. The second group of Primordialists believe in the recent revival of socio-biology. According to them “ethnies and nations are natural because they are extensions of kin groups which are selected by genetic evolution for their inclusive fitness.”
3. A third version of Primordialists holds that ethnicity is overwhelming or ‘ineffable’ social bond. It is the members or the participants that attribute a ‘primordial’ quality to their particular ethnie; in their eyes the ethnic tie has logical and temporal priority over other ties.<sup>24</sup>

Thus all the lines of thought believe that every human being is a member of one or the other ethnic community. Ethnicity is essential to our understanding of history and ethnic bonds override other royalties.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Cited in Baumann, Timothy (2004 ), “Defining Ethnicity”, [Online web] Accessed 23 March 2012 URL: <http://gbl.indiana.edu/baumann/Baumann%202004%20-%20Defining%20Ethnicity.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publishers. pp. 30

<sup>25</sup> Ibid pp. 32

But Primordialism has been subjected to extensive criticism, as it is unable to account for the origins, change and dissolution of ethnic groups. They also fail to explain more modern processes of fusion of ethnic groups through intermarriage.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Instrumentalism***

In contrast to the Primordialists, the Instrumentalists believe ethnicity to be a socio-cultural political resource for interest groups. The Instrumentalist viewpoints on ethnicity are necessarily flexible. Anthony D. Smith regards the Instrumentalist approach as an outcome of human beings always living and working in a wide range of groups. As a result, they have a “variety of collective identity” from family, gender, class, religions and ethnic associations.<sup>27</sup> Human beings are continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose and construct their identities according to the situation in which they find themselves. Hence according to the Instrumentalists identity tends to be situational rather than pervasive.<sup>28</sup>

The cultural contents and the meanings of ethnic identity tend to change with cultures, periods, economic and political circumstances according to the perception and attitude of each other. That is why they are never in a static position, rather they are flexible. Thus according to the Instrumentalist each ethnic group is constantly undergoing change. Ethnicity also provides a defined symbolic and organisational sight for individual and elites to mobilise resources in the pursuit of common goals within a state. An ethnic group can be defined with the use of symbol and it can also give shape to its purpose and direction.<sup>29</sup>

Under the label of Instrumentalism one can range a variety of approaches which are based on the idea that ethnicity is the result of economic, social or political processes, and hence it is by definition a flexible and highly adaptable tool. Ethnic groups have no fixed boundaries; they are rather collective entities which change in size according to changing

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<sup>26</sup> Hutchinson John and Smith Anthony D. (1996), “Introduction”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 8

<sup>27</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publishers, pp. 31

<sup>28</sup> Llobera, Josep R. (1999), “Recent Theories Of Nationalism”, [Online Web] Accessed 20 September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

conditions. As for individuals, not only that they are not assigned permanently to an ethnic group, but they can be members of more than one at the same time. Ethnicity is then seen as dynamic. Whereas some Instrumentalists insist that ethnic affiliation is simply a ploy to promote economic interests, and that individuals are ready to change group membership if that suits their sense of security or their economic interests. Marxists have tended to see ethnicity as a false consciousness, as a ruse of the dominant groups to hide class interests of a material kind. Furthermore, the persistence of ethnic ties in modern societies does not quite tally with the expectations of Marxist theorists, who predict that these ties will eventually fade away and be substituted by working class solidarity.<sup>30</sup>

One of the central ideas of Instrumentalism is the socially constructed nature of ethnicity and the ability of individuals to “cut and mix” from a variety of ethnic heritages and cultures to forge their own individual or group identities. This risks divorcing the quest for individual cultural identity from its institutional base. There is also a danger, common to Instrumentalists’ approaches, of neglecting the wider cultural environment in which elite competition and rational preference maximisation take place.<sup>31</sup>

The origins of the Instrumentalist movement have been tied to the work of Fredrik Barth and Abner Cohen. Barth viewed ethnic identity as an “individualistic strategy” in which individuals move from one identity to another to “advance their personal economic and political interests, or to minimise their losses.” According to him, ethnic identity forms through boundary maintenance and interaction between individuals.<sup>32</sup>

Barth’s methodological steps concerning the definition of ethnicity are as follows:

1. “Ethnicity is envisaged not as an expression of a vague culture, but as a form of social organisation. In any case, it referred to culture; it emphasises the cultural differences between groups.
2. The main focus of research is the boundary that defines the group, as well as the process of recruitment of its members, and not the characteristics of the culture of

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Hutchinson John and Smith Anthony D. (1996), “Introduction”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 9

the group. Boundaries have to be understood in the symbolic and social sense of the term.

3. Boundary maintenance is thus essential for the ethnic group and it is not primordial, but rather the outcome of specific ecological, economic, historical or political situations.
4. In terms of identity ethnic groups are characterised by both ascription and self-ascription. Constraint only follows when members accept to form part of the group.
5. The cultural features chosen by the members of a group to differentiate themselves from other groups, that is, to establish a boundary, are to a certain extent arbitrary.
6. Ethnic groups are mobilised, not so much by popular will but to a great extent by ethnic entrepreneurs or leaders.”<sup>33</sup>

Following Barth’s approach, it is possible to distinguish four major levels of ethnicity:

Micro	Median	Macro	Global
It looks into how the identity is formed and experienced by individuals in the context of interacting with other individuals.	It examines the formation and mobilisation of groups. At this level the key focus should be on leadership and entrepreneurship. The median level exerts a constraint on	It considers how the state affects ethnic groups through legal frameworks and specific policies, as well as through the use of force and the threat of force. At the ideological level	It investigates recent developments which are based on the emergence of a global discourse on human rights, the increasing role of the United Nations as a peace keeper

<sup>32</sup> Cited In Baumann, Timothy (2004 ), “Defining Ethnicity”, [Online web] Accessed 23March 2012 URL: <http://gbl.indiana.edu/baumann/Baumann%202004%20-%20Defining%20Ethnicity.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> Barth Fredrik (1996), “Ethnic groups and Boundaries”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 3

	the micro level, shaping the way in which individuals express their identity.	the state has also vast machinery (schools, media, etc.) to control and manipulate information and to imprint particular ethnic/national world views.	and a peace enforcer and of the NGOs. All these elements have added a new dimension to ethnicity.
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**Table 1.2:** Source: Based on Barth's explanation cited in Llobera, Josep R. (1999), "Recent Theories of Nationalism", [Online Web] Accessed 20 September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>

Barth's analysis has been subjected to criticism. His idea of manipulation of ethnicity has been criticised because it is difficult to manipulate the ethnic ties in all situations as in the situation of racial differences choice may be limited. His theory is said to be applied well in the context of the Third World countries. Barth, being an instrumentalist, often neglects the historical depth which can serve the basis of analysis of ethnic fission and fusion.<sup>34</sup>

Despite apparent disagreements on fundamentals, both the Instrumentalist and Primordialist models seek an objective grounding for subjective identity claims; both accept that cultural features and identity claims fail to cover in any predictable fashion; both view the widespread resurgence of ethnic allegiances after World War II as a consequence of sweeping socio-economic changes in the modern world. They differ mainly in the aspects of change they identify as critical to ethnicity. Carter Bentley states that "the Instrumentalist models generally hold that changing political and economic contexts disrupt traditional material orders and create novel constellations of shared

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<sup>34</sup> Cited in Llobera, Josep R. (1999), "Recent Theories Of Nationalism", [Online Web] Accessed 20<sup>th</sup> September 2011, URL: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1300/ICPS164.pdf?sequence=1>

material interests. People with common interests coalesce into groups in pursuit of those interests. While both models possess an appealing simplicity, they also share a critical gap in their explanatory logic. Neither addresses the question of how people recognise the commonalities (of interest or sentiment) underlying claims to common identity.”<sup>35</sup>

### ***Other Theoretical Aspects***

The other aspects of ethnicity can be described in the competition and rational choice theories. Competition theories try to account for the rise and decline of ethnic movements. They are based on the assumption that ethnic identities tend to appear or reappear to become the foundation of collective action when distinct groups compete with each other for the access of relatively scarce resources. The objective of each competing group is to have exclusive access to the resources — a process that Max Weber labelled as “social closure”.<sup>36</sup>

Rational choice theorists like Michael Banton and Michael Hechter insist on the importance of the role played by individual preferences in ethnic affiliation. This school is based on two assumptions: 1. Individuals behave with a view to maximise their benefits (in terms of economic gains, security or prestige), and 2. Present actions restrict future choices.<sup>37</sup>

However, one of the major problems with ethnicity is its uneven diffusion. Some communities are well endowed with rich and fully documented ethno histories while others are bereft of the ethnic past and have few records of their ancestors’ experiences and activities. The major ethnies have been able, by dint of mainly political monopoly, to retain and preserve their ethnic heritages and histories. But the case with the peripheral ethnies is the reverse as they got excluded from the “instrument of political transmission and bereft of institutional support.” Thus they have been unable to transmit their histories

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<sup>35</sup> Bentley, G. Carter (1987), “Ethnicity and Practice”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 29( 1): pp. 25

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, pp. 25

<sup>37</sup> Hechter, Michel (1996), “Ethnicity and Rational Choice Theory” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 92

beyond a few generations.<sup>38</sup>

Such Instrumentalist models can be criticised for taking the ethnic nature of the organisation for granted, and more generally for failing to account for the mass passions evoked by ethnic ties and cultural symbols. Moreover, if the Primordialists fail to account for ethnic change, the Instrumentalists seem unable to cope with ethnic durability. Thus both the approaches have problems.<sup>39</sup>

It is worth mentioning here the conception of Michael Brown who distinguishes between ethnic categories and ethnocentric community. He feels that one of the major tasks of the nationalists is to turn ethnic categories into ethnic communities and ethnic communities into ethnic nations. Therefore it can be deduced that ethnic identity is often both fluid and intermittent, and it is the manipulation and mobilisation of group identity against structure inequalities, induced discriminations or power politics. Henceforth it is one of many possible identities that could become the motivation for political action.<sup>40</sup>

### ***The Concept of Ethno-nationalism***

To comprehend Pakhtun nationalism, it will be wise to discuss the concept of ethno-nationalism, which often becomes a tool for politicisation of ethnicity.

Ethnicity can be defined as one of the key ingredients of nationalism. In the context of nationalism ethnicity becomes a pre-requisite. Smith argued that explanation regarding the formation of nation starts from ethnic ties and identities, which have been formed on cultural basis. Common myths and memories also form the basis of nationalism. In other words, Smith suggests the link between pre-modern ethnies and modern nations, both formed on the line of cultural basis. Smith defined cultural basis as “cohesive power, historic primacy, symbols, myths, memories and values” of the ethnic group that formed the nation. Thus, nationalism which is the basis of the nation has been defined by Smith as: “Population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a

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<sup>38</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publishers, pp. 64

<sup>39</sup> Hutchinson John and Smith Anthony D.(1996), “Introduction”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) *Ethnicity*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 34

mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” Nationalism is marked as a brand of politics that aims at the acquisition of power through control over the state. Often nationalism speaks the language of culture and identity to access power.<sup>41</sup> Similar reflection is found in the Pakistani politics, where ethnic nationalism tries to acquire power on the basis of group identity.

The concept of nationalism has been well defined in the works of the Western scholars, such as Benedict Anderson who examines the creation and global spread of the “imagined communities” of nationality which is done by the decline of antique kinship, the interaction between capitalism and print, the development of secular languages of state, and changing conceptions of time and space.<sup>42</sup> His nation is an imagined community, which is inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the fellow members are connected by the invisible bonds of nationhood. He also describes it as “deep, horizontal comradeship” where he emphasises the feeling of fraternity among millions of people. He says that the linking thread will be print-capitalism, which will bridge the gap between the boundaries. Thus his ideas seem more close to the Constructivists rather than the Primordialists.<sup>43</sup>

However as this study deals with Pakistan, it seems quiet inapplicable in this context. Pakistan is yet to become what Anderson speaks of as the “imagined community” which, as he puts it, is “conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship” that cuts across boundaries and social groups and penetrates, with varying degrees of consciousness, a great variety of social terrains. As Hamza Alavi points out, “More than four decades after the state of Pakistan was created, it is still a country in search of an identity. That is not because the

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<sup>40</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, Delhi: Shipra Press, pp. 22

<sup>41</sup> Cited in Isikal, Huseyin (2002), “Two Perspective on The Relationship of Ethnicity to Nationalism: Comparing Gellner and Smith Alternatives”, *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 1(1), pp. 1 [Online Web] Accessed on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2011, URL: <http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/nation/isikal.pdf>

<sup>42</sup> Anderson, Benedict Richard O’Gorman (1993), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, USA: Verso Press, pp. 11

<sup>43</sup> Cited in Kellas, James G. (1998), *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: Macmillan Press, pp. 56-57



issue of our nationhood has not preoccupied our minds. On the contrary, it is one that we have been obsessed with.”<sup>44</sup>

Gellner opines that nationalism should be understood on the light of industrialisation, competition of newly industrialised classes and about the integrating effects of language and education. He also says economic change requires cultural homogeneity, which is to be fulfilled by the state that also drives nationalism. Often his definition of modernity overlaps with industrialisation. More specifically, a standardised ‘high’ culture becomes the all-pervasive requisite of industrialisation. In the homogenising world of nation states, only statehood can grant protection to small cultures facing constant threats of assimilation. Thus in his view nationalism could be understood in the context of industrialisation and competition of classes. According to him nation exists only in the industrialised era.<sup>45</sup>

Thus the modernist perception of nation opines that the past is largely irrelevant. The nation is a modern phenomenon — the product of nationalist ideologies, which is the expression of modern industrial society. The nationalist is free to use ethnic heritages, but nation building can proceed without the aid of an ethnic past.

However the problem with Pakistan is that it is a unified nation that would be tantamount to what Anderson speaks of as “official nationalism” — a national identity that is not spontaneously generated from below, but is imposed from above by those at the heart of the power structure in the country, in reaction to powerful sub-national movements. In the Western notion, national unification movements by and large preceded formation of nation states so that the resulting states embraced people who, in the course of such movements, developed a sense of common purpose and common identity that brought them together as nations. In the post-colonial societies such processes have tended to be rather tenuous. This was, to a degree, the case with Pakistan. Whereas in Europe nations

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<sup>44</sup> Alavi, Hamza (1989), “Nationhood and the Nationalities in Pakistan” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24 (27):

pp. 1527

<sup>45</sup> Gellner, Ernest (1983), *Nations and nationalism*, London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 51

were constituted into states, in post-colonial societies the problem is inverted: to transform states into nations.<sup>46</sup>

Thus to support the argument for the ethno-nationalism of Pakistan the concept of Anthony D. Smith becomes important. Contradicting the modernist perception of nation, Smith says nation and nationalism are the basic forces and processes of the modern as well as pre-modern epochs, while modernisation and modernity are really the only modes by which nations are realised in the contemporary world. For some this is of primordial natural order, as the member of a given nation may “forget” their nation and history but nature will reassert itself and the nation will be “reborn”.<sup>47</sup>

He also explains the complex relation between nation and nationalism. Nations which he claims are basically modern and “so is nationalism as an ideology and movement. Ethnies have emerged in every era, and many have been durable; many nations are formed on the basis of pre-existing, ethnies and the ethnic model of the nation remains extremely influential today; would-be nations that lack a dominant ethnic base often have great problems in forging national consciousness and cohesion. In other words, the relationship between pre-modern ethnic ties and modern nationalism is the key to a large segment of modern national and international politics.”<sup>48</sup>

He says that ethnic conflict and nationalism have re-emerged as major political forces in the global era where transnational economics and mass communications dominate. Ethnic nationalism poses a threat to the nation states, where the idea of supra-national community seems to be vague, and cosmopolitan culture is utopian, making the triumph of nationalism interpreted on the basis of ethnicity.<sup>49</sup>

Thus the concept of ethno-nationalism comes to dominate the scene. To have a clear idea of ethnicity, modernisation and the role of state in integration, the concept of ethno-

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<sup>46</sup> Alavi, Hamza (1989), “Nationhood and the Nationalities in Pakistan” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24 (27):

pp. 1527

<sup>47</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, London: Oxford Polity Press & Cambridge Blackwell Publishers. pp. 5

<sup>48</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1996), “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism”, *International Affairs*, 72(3): pp. 446

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid* pp. 447

nationalism becomes important to highlight the relevance of ethnicity in the present context of modern nation states.

The term ethno-nationalism refers to a particular strain of nationalism that is marked by the desire of an ethnic community to have absolute authority over its own political, economic, and social affairs. Therefore, it denotes the pursuit of statehood on the part of an ethnic nation. Ethno-nationalist movements signify the perception among members of a particular ethnic group that the group's interests are not being served under the present political arrangements and they must themselves take up the reign for their own benefits. Ethno-nationalism is defined by Norbu as "the politicised social consciousness centered upon an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilising ethnic-based constituencies."<sup>50</sup>

Carmen Abubakar defines ethno-nationalism as "ethnic groups claiming to be (or to possess) nations and states in the past or that have the potential of becoming (nations or states) are not demanding and asserting these claims as (historic) rights to self determination for local autonomy or independence."<sup>51</sup>

Walker Connor has also defined ethno-nationalism as an interchangeable term with nationalism within the context of ethnicity. Connor has stressed the subjective and psychological quality of this perception, rather than its objective 'substance'. More generally, "identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions, perceptions are as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues."<sup>52</sup>

He also opines ethno-nationalism as "too often superficially discerned as principally predicted upon language, religion, customs, economic inequality or some other tangible elements. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is the basic identity which manifests itself in the syndromes."<sup>53</sup>

Paul Brass also talks of ethnicity and nationalism as the products of modernity. He says that cultures are fabricated by elites who use raw materials from different groups to create

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<sup>50</sup> Norbu, Dawa (1992), *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nation*, London: Routledge, pp. 196

<sup>51</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, Delhi: Shipra Press, pp. 16

<sup>52</sup> Connor, Walker (1972), "Nation Building or Destroying", *World Politics*, 24( 3), pp. 342

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 341

ethnies and nations. By using these elites aim at ensuring their economic and political advantages.<sup>54</sup>

Ethno-nationalism becomes an important aspect along with communal contenders, ethnic classes and indigenous people who pose a threat to nation building. Thus national politics is facing steep challenges because of the above contenders where the ethno-nationalists stand potent.

Stanley Tambian of Harvard University identifies “two models of nationalism that are in interaction and contraction in many parts. One of these is ‘ethno nationalism’ and the other is nationalism. Phasing out the political history of the Third World states he says that these states have down played... internal diversity and cleavages in favour of the nation states.” The suppressive characters of nation building in the second phase came to be challenged by eruption of ethnic conflicts. The phase of ethno-nationalism in these countries is marked by “regional or sub regional reactions and resistances to what is seen as an over centralised and hegemonic state.”<sup>55</sup>

It is essential to point out in this context the difference between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The former belongs to the political sphere, whereas the latter is founded on the sociological basis and it only gets a political colour in the process of the struggle. Another important distinction is that ethnic nationalism arises from below unlike the state nationalism which is imposed from the top. When the ethnic nationalism rises for political power they confront with the state nationalism. Thus ethno-nationalism becomes the tool to achieve political power. Smith says that politics is about capturing and holding power in the state, and ethno-nationalism is an instrument for doing so. Therefore ethnicity often becomes a tool of politicisation, and ethnic-based political parties carry forward the movements.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Brass, Paul (1990), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New Delhi: Sage Publication, pp. 39

<sup>55</sup> Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, Delhi: Shipra Press, pp. 16

### ***Politicisation of Ethnicity: Political Parties***

In the modern societies politicised ethnicity has become the crucial principle of political legitimisation and de-legitimisation of systems, states, regimes and governments. At the same time it has also become an effective instrument for pressing mundane interests in the society's competition for power, status and wealth.

Politicisation of ethnicity can become a mobilisation instrument for politicians. Ethnicity is often a result of intense inter-group action becomes a tool of mobilisation in the struggle for power.<sup>57</sup>

The tilt towards politicised ethnicity has increased with the increasing pace of modernisation and increasing levels of modernity in different countries. Thus politicised ethnicity stresses ideologies, modifies and sometimes virtually re-creates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilises — precisely at the historical moment when these groups are being thoroughly penetrated by the universal culture of science and technology.

Politicisation of ethnicity is thus a dialectical process that preserves ethnic groups by emphasising their singularity and yet also engineers and lubricates their modernisation by transforming them into political conflict groups for the modern political arena, where they must deploy cosmo-political skills and resources.<sup>58</sup>

The politicisation of ethnicity translates the personal quest for meaning and belonging into a group demand for respect and power. Such politicisation of ethnicity may ultimately enhance, retard or nullify the political assimilation of states, may legitimise or de-legitimise their political systems.<sup>59</sup>

Recent studies suggest that it is not ethnicity per se but the role of ethnicity in the political process, i.e. the politicisation of ethnicity, which explains social conflict and democratic breakdowns. Political salience of ethnicity is linked to increased ethnic favouritism and to low inter-ethnic confrontation. So at the local level specific party was

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<sup>56</sup> Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and state in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 29

<sup>57</sup> Rothschild, Joseph (1981), *Ethnopolitics A Conceptual Framework*, USA: Columbia University Press, pp. 2

<sup>58</sup> Ibid pp. 3

created to forward the demand of certain ethnic groups and negotiate with the wider political forces. With this, politicisation of ethnicity came to dominate the scene. Ethno-politics also influences the emergence, direction, success of political activity. Compared to such perennial macro policy issues as the economy and foreign affairs, ethno-politics is an essential circumstance and leadership-sensitive policy.<sup>60</sup>

According to it, the demands of the ethnic groups who are denied their due share are to be placed before the centre and the power structure is to be pressurised for the fulfilment of their rising aspirations and expectations. But the ethnic-based political parties who are expected to represent the demands of the ethnic groups and provide them with their due share in the political and socio-economic power structure of the state often use the ethnic card to bargain power with the centre ignoring their main aim.


### ***Political Parties***

The key ingredient in the politicisation is the role of the political parties. Parties provide a link between the citizens and the government, between the electorate and the representative institutions, so that the demands can be vested and their due share is obtained.

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid pp. 4

<sup>60</sup> Rudolph, Joseph (2006), *Politics of Ethnicity A Comparative Study*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30



**Diagram 1.1:** Source: Based on the model of David Easton cited in Frohock, F. M (1978), “Politics as the Authoritative Allocation of Values”, [Online Web] Accessed 3 January 2012, URL: <http://homepages.udayton.edu/~aherndaw/frocast.html>.

The concept of political parties can be explained by the work of David Easton’s system theory. He talks about authoritative allocation of values in the political system where the political parties share a part. Easton defines a policy as authoritative when “people feel they must or ought to obey it.” Political policy can allocate values in two prominent ways: 1. by rearranging the attitudes of citizens that express values, and 2. by distributing the things that are valued by citizens. Thus the state authoritatively allocates values by the feedback process when demands are vested by the citizens. This is done by the political parties. Thus the value of each group is to be respected. And if it is not, the representatives of the people, i.e. the political parties which act as the link between the government and the people, rise for the fulfilments of the unfulfilled demands.<sup>61</sup>

Political power is more commonly portrayed as an instrument of manipulation and political control. Thus political parties, whose functions are representation, elite formation, recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, often mobilise to serve the

<sup>61</sup> Frohock, F. M (1978), “Politics As the Authoritative Allocation of Values”, [Online Web] Accessed 3 January 2012 URL: <http://homepages.udayton.edu/~aherndaw/frocast.htm>

interest of a specific group.

In case of the politicised ethnies it is the political parties which play the main role of the communicator. As one of the important functions of political parties is aggregation of interests, they serve in taking forward the interest of specific ethnies. Political parties ensure two-way communication process between the government and the people. It is mainly through the parties that the government is constantly kept informed about the general demands of society, about the interests and attitudes of the people in relation to the governing process. Similarly, it is through the parties that people get their political information. Thus political parties can be the bridge between the ruling elites and the demands of the ethnies.<sup>62</sup>

Hence ethnicity is one of many possible identities that could become the motivation for political action. Thus the concept of ethno-national political parties becomes important in this context. Ethnic parties aim to represent an ethnic group in a political system, be it a sovereign state or a sub-national entity. Ethnic identities act as a pole around which group members are mobilised and compete effectively for state-controlled power and economic resources. Under the leadership of the predatory elite, members of the ethnic group are urged to form an organised political action-group in order to maximise their interests. Thus politicisation of ethnicity becomes a pre-requisite for power share.<sup>63</sup>

But the problem with the ethnic parties is that they often fail to attract the support of their target ethnic categories across space and time, even when the ethnic identities they seek to mobilise are politically salient. Ethnic parties can also lay the foundation of worsening of ethnic tension by promoting party politics along cultural lines, which often leads to the marginalisation and exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequence such minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even violent means in order to counter dominance. Further, merely by promoting identity-based politics, ethnic parties can significantly raise the stakes of the political game, reinforcing group identities and thus

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<sup>62</sup> Heywood, Andrew (2007), *Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 275

<sup>63</sup> Webera, Anke, "The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity – A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania", CIS Working Paper, [Online Web] Accessed 3 October 2011  
URL: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1551865](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551865), pp. 2



raising the likelihood of conflict. Therefore ethnic politics enhances the chances of conflict especially in new democracies.<sup>64</sup>

### ***Role of Ethnicity in the Post-colonial States: Case of South Asia***

Ethnicity became one of the key ingredients of nationalism, especially for the developing states whose boundaries were redrawn by the departing colonial powers. The demarcation of these political boundaries left some ethnic groups residing in others' territories in the newly independent multi-ethnic states, while some groups became divided between countries across boundaries in the post-colonial set-up. Because of these issues, the South Asian countries have lately been facing intermittent ethnic cleavages and conflicts of different magnitudes. Ethno-nationalism has, therefore, become the key conception describing the issue.<sup>65</sup>

### ***Role of the State***

It should be mentioned here that in all these conflicts the role of the state comes to dominate the scene. All the ethnic and nationalist struggles centre on the state. They are either by the state or for the state. The state being dominated by the upper strata marks the voice of the dissent as provincial, tribal and disruptive. The ethnic group thus feels more alienated and they struggle either to make their state more responsive to their demand or try to create their own state.<sup>66</sup>

The state moves with three forms of power: economic, ideological and political that serves as a tool for power of production, persuasion and persecution. While dealing with the relationship between the state and ethnicity it is worth mentioning here the two approaches of nationalism. The subjective approach deals with the perception of eternal

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<sup>64</sup> Chandra, Kanchan (2002), "A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties", [Online Web] Accessed 12 February 2012 URL: <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licepl/5/chandra-metz/chandra-metz.pdf>

<sup>65</sup> Gurr, Ted T. (1994) "People against States: Ethno-Political Conflict and the Changing World System", *International Studies Quarterly*, 38 (3): pp. 355

<sup>66</sup> Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 36

reality of nation-ness and nationalism being the reflection of that reality. The objective approach emphasises that nation-ness is the modern phenomenon created by nationalism. Geller says that nationalistic feeling arises either from satisfaction or dissatisfaction from the state, either the values are properly allocated or are deprived.<sup>67</sup>

Ethnic conflicts are generally caused because of the multi play of several factors. Hamza Alavi saw ethnic identity as being reactive and situational because of the interplay of the factors. Thus one of the several factors causing ethnic conflicts circles around the state. That is why often the state also becomes an instrument which escalates ethnic conflict because of the denial of due share to some ethnic groups while others dominate. The other reasons for the conflict are lack of trust and absence of any mediating unit. Thus insecurity dilemma becomes a major source of concern.<sup>68</sup>

When majority captures state power, the insecurity of the minority or weaker groups becomes intense, and when the minority asserts its demands the response of the state becomes harsher giving rise to ethnic conflicts. This is evident in every conflict in South Asia, where the territorially concentrated groups have developed an organisational strength in political and military terms. When governments have tried to suppress these groups, regions have become militarised and the relationships between the conflicting parties came to be defined in coercive terms.<sup>69</sup> Likewise Punjabiisation of Pakistani politics and military gave an impetus for the Pakhtuns to rise against the state.

The states perform three basic functions: equitable distribution of resources, ensuring political order and consolidation of separate cultural entities. But in the developing states, as in the region of South Asia, due to modernisation, discrimination between communities isolates minority ethnic groups. Therefore consolidation of the identities remains undone. As a result the cause of ethnic resurgence gets aggravated. The South Asian states which are made up of multi-ethnic societies are unable to avoid the unequal distribution of resources, against its duty to distribute them evenly. Thus they are always

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<sup>67</sup> Cited in Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 36

<sup>68</sup> Ibid pp. 36

<sup>69</sup> Sahadevan, P. (2002), "Ethnic Conflicts and Militarism in South Asia", *International Studies*, 39( 2): pp. 113

in a system of flux.<sup>70</sup>

Again the relationship between the state and the society is also important in this context, though the state is enjoying the relative autonomy but it is the dominant social strata managing its functioning.

The grievances of some of the conflict groups in this region arose from the post-colonial process of national boundary formation. Also they fear assimilation in the dominant ethnies, a sense of powerlessness, relative deprivation and marginalisation. Thus in this case ethnic reference, being one of the key ingredients in politicisation, has been well used by the political elites for ethnic mobilisation. Thus ethnicity becomes manipulated mobilised group identity against structural inequality. It can also be situational justifying the instrumental character of ethnicity.<sup>71</sup>

### ***Pakistan's Ethnic Crisis: the Case of the Pakhtuns***

Pakistan, which was created on the basis of religion, is marked by ethnic conflicts. The creation of the state of Pakistan was a landmark issue in the politics of South Asia that redefined the whole scenario in a new mould. Since its creation, Pakistan has always faced the ineluctable dilemma of how to weave a viable national identity out of diverse regional and linguistic loyalties. However, religious nationalism, which in the struggle for Pakistan was a unifying force, had outgrown its validity once the country was created. The political culture started representing a forcible hegemony of a minority group over a majority. Now there was a fresh equation of privilege and deprivation to be reckoned with in the new state, thereby giving rise to ethnic conflicts. Further, when the state was initially imagined, a federal structure was envisaged in which the constituent units would have been autonomous and sovereign. But the denial of provincial autonomy acquired urgency in the face of simmering discontent and alienation among the provinces against the monopolisation of power and resources by the centre.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Upreti, B.C. (2001), "Ethnicity, Identity and State in South Asia: An Overview", in Kausar J. Azam (eds.) *Ethnicity, Identity And The State in South Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, pp. 16

<sup>71</sup> Ibid pp. 17

<sup>72</sup> Dixit, Abha (1999), *Ethno-nationalism in Pakistan*, Delhi Papers, New Delhi: IDSA, pp. 6

What Harrison says about the ethnic problem of Pakistan is that it is “not simply a political problem, nor is it simply (or even mainly) a consequence of an erroneous foreign policy. Its origins are to be found, in part, in structural inequalities (in agrarian tenurial relations, for instance, or in patterns of recruitment to the military) that have roots deep in pre-independence history. They are to be found in demographic trends, including the spectacular rate of growth of the country’s urban population. They are also to be found in the paralysis of political institution-building brought on at least in part by long years under military rule and by the characteristic ‘antipolitics’ mind set of Pakistan’s military leaders. Some of the factors that contribute to the country’s ethnic problem can be relieved rather swiftly; for others (the demographic trends, for instance) relief if there is any long way off. To put it another way, Pakistan’s ethnic problem has been long in the making and will be long in the resolving.”<sup>73</sup>

Taking into consideration the realist view that is also applicable for Pakistan, state-centric paradigm serves a pivotal element in the construction of collective identity within definable territorial borders of the state. Though states are still central actors in world politics and nationalism and serves as a unifying factor, they often fail to consolidate societies in which the strongest value of belonging are based on powerful affinities to tribal kins and innate notion of tribal reign.<sup>74</sup>

Before coming to Pakhtun ethno-nationalism, it is important to take note of certain criteria which are common to all the ethnic problems in Pakistan. This has been summarised by Feroz Ahmad in four categories.

1. “Sovereignty: Provincial rights, regional autonomy, and self-determination are the forms in which the ‘elites’ of the dominated ethnic groups have raised grievances against the domination by the ruling class of Punjab. Demands for complete independence, confederation with only residual powers for the centre, greater autonomy within the federal structure, creation of new provinces for the groups not having their own province, and altering the provincial boundaries to create

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<sup>73</sup> Wirsing, Robert G. (1988), “Ethnicity and Political Reform in Pakistan”, *Asian Affairs*, 15( 2): pp. 81


<sup>74</sup> Ram, Meirav Mishali (2011), “When ethnicity and religion meet: Kinship Ties and Cross Border Dynamics in the Afghan-Pakistani Conflict Zone”, *Nationalism and ethnic Politics*, 17( 3), pp. 258

ethnically more homogenous provinces have been voiced from time to time.” This is one of the important aspects of Pakhtun nationalism which voiced for Pakhtuns’ rights against Punjabi domination.

2. Allocation of resources: This is perhaps the most important arena for struggle between the centre and ethnic groups. The resources for which the contending parties struggle include financial resources for development and recurrent expenditures, share of irrigation water, government jobs (the quota system), and opportunities for professional and higher education. The Pakhtuns who inhabit in the naturally rich provinces of Pakistan often feel that their due share was denied and they have been subjected to internal colonialism by the Punjabis.
3. Inter-province migration: There is a great resentment in Sindh and some in Balochistan against the in-migration from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and immigration from other countries. In 1981, the census calculated a net migration-to-total population ratio of 9.6 percent for Sindh. Migration of such magnitude tends to put pressure on their limited resources and change the demographic balance. Because of this a potent challenge is coming against the Pakhtuns as they are being victimised in Karachi.
4. Language and culture: Demands for the protection and promotion of the languages and cultures of ethnic groups against the domination of Urdu and neglect of regional cultural heritage are a constant feature in the struggle of ethnic groups for their identity assertion. Cultural symbols serve as instruments of forging group cohesion and legitimating group demands. Similarly the Pakhtuns also saw that their cultural code of conduct was far different from the others and to protect it they voiced for the protection of their rights.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ahmad, Feroz (1996), “Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National Integration?” *The Pakistan Development Review*, 35(4) pp. 632-633



**Diagram 1.2: The Centre –Periphery Model**

Ethnic conflict can be analysed in terms of “centre-periphery” relations only where ethnic groups are concentrated geographically. It would seem redundant to employ the concept in application to vertical inter-group relations in the same location where social class or “ethnic class” will suffice. “Peripherality” has been defined by Stein Rokkan as the subordination of a group to the authority of a geographical centre or core upon which the periphery is dependent “with little control over its fate and possessing minimal resources for the defence of its distinctiveness against outside pressures.” The key characteristics of peripheries, he summarises, are distance, difference and dependence in at least one of the three domains of behaviour: political decision making, cultural standardisation and economic life. The concept is reminiscent of Jeffrey Ross’ distinction between ‘minority’ and ‘ethnicity’ except that Ross defines the latter as exactly the type of group which controls at least its own naming or definition. Pakistani political conflict would appear to lend itself to centre-periphery interpretation because of the domination of one province — Punjab — both numerically (55% of the population) and militarily (80% of the army) over the smaller provincial ethnic groups: Sindhis (21%), Pathans (13%) and Baluchis (4%).<sup>76</sup>

Thus ethnic problem became a pertinent issue in the state of Pakistan, wherein Pakhtun nationalism finds special mention, primarily because of its historical background and its ethnic overlapping with the neighbouring state of Afghanistan. History says that the Pakhtuns did not willingly join the fledgling State of Pakistan. The state staunchly used the Islamic card under the shadow of the ‘two-nation theory’, which in fact clashed with

<sup>76</sup> Cited in Wright, Theodore P. (1991), “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis”, *Comparative Politics*, 23( 3): pp. 299

the socio-cultural and regional aspirations of the people of the new state.<sup>77</sup>

Traditionally, Pakistan's ethnic diversity has been defined in terms of the existence of four historical 'nationalities' — Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch and several smaller ethno-linguistic groups. Pakhtuns are an East-Iranian ethno-linguistic group with population primarily in Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan, near the Afghan-Pakistan border, which includes Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. This homogenous tribe, residing on both the sides of Durand line, hardly recognises any international boundary. Their ethnic linkages being pastoralist, it is hard to confine them to one national boundary. With the creation of Pakistan, Pakhtun nationalism became much stronger, which already had a firm ground before independence. In this situation, as an ethnic group whose demands were laid unheard, Pakhtuns stood up against the homogenising policy of national authorities. A specific party was then required to negotiate with wider political forces supported by the main population and prevent the conflict from degenerating into civil war. So in order to safeguard and assert a secular Pakhtun nationalistic identity, the National Awami Party (NAP) was formed, espousing a liberal pro-Pakhtun philosophy, regional autonomy and increased cultural expression. With the turn of time the NAP dissolved and formed the Awami National Party (ANP) which is a more pro-Pakhtun party to cope with the new challenges.<sup>78</sup>

The problem with Pakhtun nationalism is potentially serious because of the fact that it seeks to generate a nationalist sentiment within a culturally distinct ethno-linguistic group that had its own autonomous history and has not changed much under the British rule. The politicisation of ethnicity has also become important in this context. According to it, the demands of the ethnic groups who are denied their due share are to be placed before the centre and the power structure is to be pressurised for the fulfilment of their rising aspirations and expectations.<sup>79</sup> But the ethnic-based political parties who are expected to

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<sup>77</sup> Dixit, Abha (1999), *Ethno-nationalism in Pakistan*, Delhi Papers, New Delhi: IDSA, pp. 16

<sup>78</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), "Pushtun Ethno-nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1099

<sup>79</sup> Chandra, Kanchan (2002), "A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties", [Online Web] Accessed 12 February 2012 URL: <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/5/chandra-metz/chandra-metz.pdf>

represent the demands of the ethnic groups and provide them with their due share in the political and socio-economic power structure of the state often use the ethnic card as a bargaining tool with the centre ignoring their main aim. Thus politicisation of ethnicity plays a key role in Pakhtun nationalism. Along with that the instrumental character that is becoming more important because of its dynamism and the ethnic boundary which is overlapping with Afghanistan, are also posing a potent threat to the state.

Therefore the importance of this study is to know the factors and causes leading to the problem of ethnic crisis in the region and also the role of the political parties in this context with special reference to the Awami National Party. At the same time it is important to justify through the study the two hypotheses before coming to a conclusion. They are:

1. The Awami National Party is using Pakhtun nationalism more as a bargaining tool with the centre rather than following party ideology.
2. Pakhtun ethno-nationalism can be explained in terms of Instrumentalism rather than Primordialism.

The above discussion gave an idea of the conceptual background of ethno-nationalism and the role of political parties, which will help to enlighten the facts, problems and prospects of the areas of Pakhtun nationalism and about the politicisation of ethnicity. The subsequent chapters will deal with the case specifically.



## Chapter 2

### Pakhtun Nationalism and Political parties

Ethnically plural societies are not a rare vision in the world of modern state systems. This is because the social fabric of modern state is often stratified and diversified along various dimensions of language, race, culture, religion etc. Thus ethnicity has become a critical variable in the formation and reformation of the state structures in most areas of the world.<sup>1</sup>

Pakistan is not an exception in this regard. Being a state of ethnic diversity Pakistan has witnessed a number of nationalistic movements. With the creation of the country, Pakistan started fighting with “multifarious problems of crucial and intricate nature.” But of them “ethnicity emerged as the most significant and delicate issue. The dilemma before Pakistan has been to create a national identity out of diverse regional and linguistic loyalties.”<sup>2</sup> The issue of ideology in terms of religious nationality was unable to surpass the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan. Thus the problem of ethno-nationalism began to pile up and acted as a hindrance stopping Pakistan from becoming a coherent nation.<sup>3</sup>

Thus when “ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism started posing threats to the whole country then rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality under the constant supervision of bureaucratic-military establishment.”<sup>4</sup> But not surprisingly, the most serious threat to Pakistan since its inception has been from this ethnic front, which is referred to as “provincialism” or “regionalism” that the religious commonality was unable to hold. By dismissing ethnic heterogeneity and demands for provincial autonomy, devolution of power, decentralisation and equitable policies that govern relations with the centre, the ruling elites have sought refuge in administrative, ad hoc

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<sup>1</sup> Upreti, B. C. (2001), “Identity and State in South Asia: An Overview” in Kausar J. Azam (eds.), *Ethnicity, Identity and State in South Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publication, pp. 13

<sup>2</sup> Majeed, Gulshan (2012), “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan”, *Journal of Political Studies*,1(2), pp. 54[Online Web] Accessed 1 March, 2012 URL <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/Gulshan3.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Malik, Iftikar H. (1997), *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin Press, pp.168

<sup>4</sup> Ibid,pp.168

measures and no comprehensive plan has been undertaken to co-opt such plural forces through bargaining and appropriate politico-economic measures.<sup>5</sup>

Being one of the most ethnically and linguistically complex states of the world, Pakistan is a constellation of various ethnic groups and each province of Pakistan is associated with a single ethno-linguistic group. These ethnic and linguistic groups “identify by cultural marks, often claim they are a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’. Some seek independence and want to form an ethnically or linguistically homogeneous state; some seek greater autonomy within a state or province, and others move back and forth between these two goals or remain ambiguous.”<sup>6</sup> The process of self-identification grew in Pakistan because the member of an ethnic group and external ascription by others got strengthened especially in a conflictive or competitive context, which accorded a sense of legitimacy to such political assertion.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistan has also failed to establish a stable policy based on a broadly accepted constitutional consensus due to this ethnic factor. The most sensitive and intractable case has been the built-in conflicts between dominant Punjabi and Mohajir elites and the non-Punjabi ethnic groups indigenous to the areas that have made up Pakistan. It is still the Punjabi-Mohajir domination that was established even after the break away of East Pakistan. Another important aspect that should be brought in this context is that the centralised authoritarian military rule has served to “reinforce the control of the dominant ethnic group” that has aggravated ethnic tension. Even with the coming of the democratic governments the issue of ethnic unrest has not been kept to halt. It is worth mentioning here that while the Baluch, Sindhis and Pakhtuns comprise less than 30 % of the population, they identify themselves historically with ethnic homelands that make up 72 % of Pakistan’s territory. Islamabad has always tried to suppress the aspiration and obliterate regional identities in order to pursue modernisation. Therefore, the ethnic groups other than the dominant ones are having a sense of alienation in their own lands

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pp.168

<sup>6</sup> Cohen, Stephen. P. (2004), *The Idea Of Pakistan*, Washington: Oxford University Press, pp. 201

<sup>7</sup> Behuria, Ashok K (2005), “Myth of the Monolith: The Challenge of Diversity in Pakistan”, *Strategic Analysis*, 29(1), pp. 62

and have been subjected to internal colonialism by the Punjabi-Mohajir domination.<sup>8</sup>

Thus the Pakhtuns, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Pakistan, is posing one of the greatest challenges in terms of their ethno-nationalistic movements. It was well active before and after the creation of Pakistan, and then faded away for some twenty years but is now experiencing resurgence.<sup>9</sup>

“The rise of the Pakhtun nationalism can be explained as a result of the centralised bureaucratic state system’s effort to replace the decentralised agro-illiterate semi tribal system of control.”<sup>10</sup> Even in its indirect form, the colonial state tried to expand its writ through the extension of patronage and burden of revenue. Nationalism thus became the small Khans’ protest against selective patronage on one hand, and the “peasants’ opposition to the burden of revenue” on the other.<sup>11</sup> The discontent of the newly emerged status groups universalised and legitimised the nationalist sentiment. This kind of nationalism rose up because they have historically shown a flair for self-rule or independence. And the autonomy which they used to enjoy was taken from them after the creation of Pakistan. The political and administrative structure of the new state with its highly centralised state power completely failed in providing effective popular governance as it was promised before the creation of Pakistan. Thus since inception the Pakhtun ethnic and regional identities provided a powerful countervailing force creating a sense of deprivation among the masses throughout the country.<sup>12</sup>

This chapter provides a short survey of the origin and growth of Pakhtun nationalism in

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<sup>8</sup> Harrison, Selig S. (1988), “Ethnicity and the Political Stalemate in Pakistan” in Ali Banuazizi, and Myron Weiner, (eds.) *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, USA: Syracuse University Press, pp. 267-270

<sup>9</sup> Cohen, Stephen P. (2004), *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington: Oxford University Press, pp. 201

<sup>10</sup> The word Pakhtun is a northern variant used by the Pakhtuns of Peshwar, Valley and northern part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Pakhtuns of South Afghanistan pronounce it as Pashtun. But in the study the word Pakhtun should be used as here it is dealt with the people of Pakistan residing in Pakhtunkhwa. Cited in Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity, Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 91

<sup>11</sup> Introduction of new market economy in the province by the British gave rise to small propertied class called the Small Khans. To the smaller Khans, it was a movement that demanded political reforms for the province that would enfranchise them and give them a greater role in governance.

<sup>12</sup> Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity, Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 91

Pakistan especially in the area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,<sup>13</sup> followed by the trends of this nationalism and the factors influencing its growth. It will also try to analyze the shift from secessionist to autonomous claims within Pakistan and finally stating the politicization of the ethnicity in it.

### ***Who are the Pakhtuns: History and Origin***

While tracing the origin of the Pakhtun people it is seen that the Pakhtuns are strongly ethnocentric people who take immense pride in their Pakhtunhood from the very beginning. “The very name Pakhtun spells honour and glory,” wrote the warrior poet Khushal Khan Khattak in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the Pakhtuns one meets today say much the same. There are a number of sources stating the different origins but as a whole they tend to show a corresponding degree of contempt for non-Pakhtuns.<sup>14</sup>

There is a lot of ambiguity and lack of consensus among the scholars regarding the origin and the history of the Pakhtuns. Oliver Roy says, “not very much is known... it is clear they embrace a range of people of diverse origin.” They were not mentioned before 18<sup>th</sup> century although “Babur describes them as a community given to plundering who lives in the south of Kabul.”<sup>15</sup>

The Greek historian Herodotus (484–425 BC) traces Pakhtuns’ existence as far back as 2,500 years ago. This fact has since been firmly established by a string of historians, including the British writer and traveller Henry Walter Bellew (1834–1892), who published extensively on various Pakhtun tribes.<sup>16</sup>

There are “irrefutable evidences” also of an early presence of Zoroastrian and Buddhist influences and of Greek generals, in the process of adopting some Buddhist or Hindu

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<sup>13</sup> Pakhtunkhwa means near the Pakhtuns.

<sup>14</sup> Cited in Jasson, Erland (1981) *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan, The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, Stockholm: Uppasala, pp. 33

<sup>15</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2005) *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, pp. 82

<sup>16</sup> Saikal, Amin (2010), “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism”? *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(1): pp. 6

practices in the Pakhtun country.<sup>17</sup>

Encyclopaedia Britannica states that the Pakhtun tradition asserts that they are descendants of Afghana, grandson of King Saul of Israel; though most scholars believe it is more likely that they arose from an intermingling of ancient Aryans from the north or west with subsequent invaders. Often their descent can be marked from an eastern Iranian group because of their language Pashto or Pakhtu, which is classified as an eastern Iranian tongue. Some scholars even trace the origin of the word Pashtun or Pakhtun to the Old Iranian words “parsava parsā” meaning robust men or knights. The term Pakhtun or Pashtun, according to Raverty, is derived from the Persian word “Pusht” meaning “back”. This is because the Pakhtun tribes lived on the back of the mountains.<sup>18</sup>

In a recent study, the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) of majority people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA matched the inhabitants of Central & South Asia and Eastern Europe, while the DNA of Peshawarits is similar to the residents of Kandahar and North Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup>

The Pakhtuns’ “home territory” has historically straddled today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan, stretching from the Indus River running from Kashmir through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, to the Hindu Kush ranges that slice up Afghanistan into north and south, with the Afghan capital Kabul located in the latter. In the past they have identified this area as ‘Pakhtunkhwa’ or ‘Pashtun Quarter’.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Gandhi, Rajmohan (2004), *Ghaffar Khan, Nonviolent Badsha of Pakhtuns*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 14

<sup>18</sup> Pashtun, Britannica encyclopedia, [Online Web] Accessed 1 March, 2012, URL: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445546/Pashtun>

<sup>19</sup>This has been stated by Professor Mohammad Naeem of the department of Computer Science while speaking on a seminar titled Pakhtun Ethnogenesis in light of DNA study, in Area Study Centre of the University of Peshawar. Professor Naeem said that during the year 2011, South Korea taken the DNA of 270 persons of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA for geneses study and they are analyzed on both paternal and maternal lines. In paternal analysis, the DNAs of majority persons were found matching with people of Central Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe while in maternal analysis the majority DNAs were found similar to the people of Euro Asian and some with Eastern and South Asian origin. Reported by Correspondent of Dawn (2012) “KP residents’ DNA match Central Asians, Eastern Europeans”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 15 February 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 23 March 2012  
URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/15/dna-of-kp-residents-match-central-asians-eastern-europeans/a>

<sup>20</sup> Pakhtun, Britannica encyclopedia, [ Online Web] Accessed 1 March, 2012 URL:

Before going in to the nationalism of the Pakhtuns it is important to take note of conducts of the Pakhtuns which is called the Pakhtunwali — a cultural code of ethics and behaviour of Pakhtuns. This code shows a democratic structure of the society along with certain traditions which served in the backdrop of growth of nationalism of the Pakhtuns against any kind of domination.

Pakhtunwali had several elements. First, it implied obedience to the “jirga” or assembly of elders.<sup>21</sup> Discussions at a “jirga” were frank and democratic, though the village chief, who normally held a quantity of land and was called a Khan was more likely to be more equal than others. It followed a mixture of Islamic laws and Pakhtun customs. Second is the principle of “Melmastia” or hospitality, generally offered in the huja, which is extended in offering protection to the visitors. Third is “Nanawatee”, which is the application of Pakhtunwali when hostility had to give way to peace. Fourth is ‘Badal’ or revenge, a concept linked to honour.<sup>22</sup>

The persistence of the Pathan tribal tradition has produced a society at all levels, starting from the nomad and herdsman, through the articulated tribe and the sponsors of an Asian dynastic principle, to the modern lawyer, engineer, doctor, administrator and politicians.<sup>23</sup>

The area that comes under the present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the homeland of the Pakhtuns in present day Pakistan, was under the suzerainty of various kingdoms at different points of history. Its importance derives from its location on the fringes of the great Empires founded by the Iranians, Indians and Central Asians. Historically, Afghanistan under the ruling dynasty of Kabul had suzerainty over the region which comprises the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Punjab in present Pakistan. The western part of Afghanistan was under Persian influence, traces of which can be found in the language and culture; in the east, they had close contacts with the

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<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445546/Pashtun>.

<sup>21</sup> Pakhtu term for a decision making assembly of male elders.

<sup>22</sup> Gandhi, Rajmohan, and Khan, Ghaffar (2004), *Nonviolent Badsha of Pakhtuns*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 32-33

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pp. 18

Mughal Empire of India.<sup>24</sup>

“Several Pakhtun tribes are known to have moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century. Each tribe, consisting of kinsmen who trace descent in the male bloodline from a common tribal ancestor, is divided into clans, sub clans, and patriarchal families. Tribal genealogies establish rights of succession and inheritance, the right to use tribal lands and to speak in tribal council. Disputes over property, women, and personal injury often result in blood feuds between families and whole clans; these may be inherited unless settled by the intervention of clan chiefs or tribal council.”<sup>25</sup>

In 2007, an estimated 12.5 million Pakhtuns formed 42 percent of the total population of Afghanistan, and some 30 million made up 16 percent of the total citizens of Pakistan, with a concentration in Pakhtunkhwa. Yet, the Pakhtuns have never had an independent state-homeland of their own. As Amin Saikal states that “they have constantly suffered not only from internal divisions, but also from foreign subjugation, which has instilled among them an acute perception of deprivation and victimisation. All this has come to lay the necessary historical foundations for a distinct Pakhtun identity and codes of behaviour, and therefore, for the growth of what can be termed as Pakhtun nationalism in pursuit of self-rule and independence. The Pakhtuns have rarely acted as a coherent collective. They have often been fragmented into various social segments, at times in serious feuds and conflicts with one another. Throughout history, they have been subjected to periodic interventions and occupation by outside forces which have sought to subdue them for geopolitical objectives (although at times they have done the same to others). Attempts by some of their leaders to unite them in pursuit of independence have been futile. But there have been periods during which they have shown nationalist solidarity, especially when they have either been engaged in successful military offensives and territorial conquests, or seriously threatened by an outside force.”<sup>26</sup>

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
<sup>24</sup> Pattanaik, Smruti S. (1998), “Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name”, *Strategic Analysis*, 22(5):

pp. 764

<sup>25</sup> Pakhtuns, Encyclopaedia Britannica, [Online Web] Accessed 1<sup>st</sup> March, 2012 URL:  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445546/Pashtun>

<sup>26</sup> Saikal, Amin (2010), “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(1), pp. 6

The Pakhtuns stand second after the Punjabis in terms of population. But still the due share of the Pakhtuns is denied by the state since its inception. This discrimination acted as a strong force providing an impetus for the rise and strengthening of nationalistic struggle.



**Chart 2.1:** Graph prepared on the basis of data available on World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>)

According to the 1998 census, Sindh is the most urbanised province with 49% of the population living in urban areas. The area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the least urbanised province with only 17 percent of its population living in urban areas.<sup>27</sup> This, in terms of development, is a setback for the Pakhtuns.

<sup>27</sup> By Staff Reporter Daily Times (2007), "Pakistan's Urban Population to Equal Rural by 2030: UNFPA", *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2007 [Online Web] Accessed on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2012 URL:



### *The Beginning of Politicisation of Ethnicity among the Pakhtun people of Pakistan*

The Pakhtun nationalism of Pakistan laid its roots long before the independence of 1947 and has a history of an active ethno-nationalist movement.<sup>28</sup> Thus it is important to note here that the primordial aspect of the Pakhtun nationalism can be seen tracing its roots in the pre-modern societies unlike what has been propounded by the modern nationalists. But politicisation of ethnicity is necessarily a modern instrumental phenomenon where the fluidity of ethnic linkages has been transformed to ethnic consciousness in the hands of the political leaders.

As Adeel Khan points out, what is known of Pakhtun history indicates that the structure of Pakhtun society has been tribal. Most of the Pakhtun land comprises dry mountainous regions close to the Hindukush and even the plains in the region, except for the fertile Peshawar valley, are mostly dry. Thus, the agricultural land has not been able to sustain the populace, and therefore their survival had always been perilously dependent on warfare and adventures. “The Mughal king Babur described the Pakhtuns as people given to plundering, and it is believed that their political influence grew with a sudden increase in their numbers as well as their role as mercenaries in the Persian and Mughal armies.”<sup>29</sup>

The most comprehensive and popular book on Pakhtun history, *The Pathans*, written by British Governor Olaf Caroe says, “The force of Pathan character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the forefathers of this people to high positions of authority outside their own country. So it will be again and the more easily in the light of the renaissance in the home-land, to which in their hearts they return, however far away. They need have no fear that they cannot pull their weight in the larger organism; they are like the Scots in Great Britain. Like other highland men, the Pathans of Pakistan will be found before long to be largely in control of the fortunes of their country.”<sup>30</sup> Thus history shows that the Pakhtuns had

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[http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C06%5C28%5Cstory\\_28-6-2007\\_pg7\\_9](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C06%5C28%5Cstory_28-6-2007_pg7_9)

<sup>28</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen ( 2009) “ Pushtun EthnoNationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1095

<sup>29</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1):

pp. 69

<sup>30</sup> Cited in Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1): pp. 69

developed a political consciousness in the struggle of life and they had to depend on warlike activities for sustenance. As mentioned earlier subjugation was impossible in this situation, rather they stood for their rights.

In 1849, when the British captured the southern part of Afghanistan and made it part of their Indian empire, Pakhtun tribes offered a bloody and protracted resistance to the colonial army. “So overwhelmed were the British by the resistance that they seemed to have found the exact opposite — ‘the Other’ — of their ‘civilized’ self in the shape of the insolent Pakhtuns — the noble savage.” Thus the British then stated claiming “Pakhtun society as a wild land of ‘unruly’ and independent people that could neither be conquered nor tamed by the invading armies and eulogised them as the martial race that would rather die for its *Pukhtunwali* (Pakhtun code of honour) than submit to the will of the alien power.”<sup>31</sup>

Since the breakup of the Mughal Empire the whole region was transformed into a corridor. Durrani and Sikh had passed through it, and finally the British settled in the area.<sup>32</sup> First the Pathans were treated as if they were an “appendage of India” and with the division of the frontier they got back their pride.<sup>33</sup> Thus in 1901 a separate Pathan province was made by the British which was called the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).<sup>34</sup>

Though there were primordial ties among the Pakhtun ethnic groups in the then North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) of Pakistan but with considerable political development in the neighbourhood, a sense of apprehension developed against the dispossession. This, along with certain string of events, started the consciousness of

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pp. 70

<sup>32</sup>The Durrani Empire was a monarchy centered in Afghanistan and included northeastern Iran, the modern state of Pakistan as well as the Punjab region of India. It was established at Kandahar in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, an Afghan military commander under Nader Shah of Persia. With the support of most tribal leaders, Ahmad Shah Durrani extended Afghan control from Meshed to Kashmir and Delhi, from the Amu Darya to the Arabian Sea. The Sikh Empire was an imperial power from the Indian Subcontinent. The empire, based around the Punjab region, existed from 1799 to 1849. Under the leadership of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the 19th century, the empire extended from the Khyber Pass in the west, to Kashmir in the north, to Sindh in the south, and Tibet in the east.

<sup>33</sup> Caroe, Olaf (1965), *The Pathans 550 B.C. - A.D. 1957*, USA: ST Martin’s Press, pp. 420

<sup>34</sup> North West Frontier Province is now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa name changed by 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment in (2010).

nationalist struggle among the Pakhtuns.<sup>35</sup> After the World War I nationalistic cognisance of the Pakhtuns started shaping up because of political developments in India and neighbouring Afghanistan.

Three issues can be stated as the initial eye-opener for the Pakhtuns. The first was the Rowlatt Act which restricted freedom in all parts of India by extending emergency measures and the frontier also rose in struggle along with the other parts of the country. The third Afghan war was another issue in this case which led the sympathetic Pakhtuns of the Indian side to give support to their kinsman on the other side of the border. The Khilafat movement can be cited as another instance which wielded wide response. Several Khilafat committees were formed in the province as a symbol of Khilafat agitation which was for the Khilafat of the Muslim world. The Government of India while investigating the cause of unrest in the province found that the aspiration for reform was awakened into full consciousness. Therefore the Act of 1919 (Montague and Chelmsford reform) was decided to be extended to this province also.<sup>36</sup>

Again tensions started building up in the province as a result of the discrimination that the Pakhtun tribes believed was being directed against them from Delhi. While the rest of British India had been given a reformed local administration and greater local autonomy in 1919, “the North West Frontier district was deemed too sensitive to be given the same status and was thought unable to cope with such change. It was therefore not made a province with its own Governor, nor did it have the other trappings of regional democracy that were being implemented elsewhere. This provoked many Pakhtun Khans and intellectuals into active opposition to British rule and led to a curious alliance between anti-British Muslims and Hindu developers.”<sup>37</sup>

To strike against the discrimination the Pakhtuns first established themselves in the

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<sup>35</sup> Sayeed, Khalid B. (1980), *Politics of Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, USA: Prager Press, pp. 121. Sayeed said that there were no ethnic groups in Pakistan in 1947, which were more conscious of its separate linguistic and cultural identity than the Pakhtuns.

<sup>36</sup> Montague and Chelmsford Reform (1920) aimed at giving constitutional rights and political participation.

Cited in Jasson, Erland (1981), *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, USA: Upassala, pp. 47

<sup>37</sup> Singer, Andre (1984), *Lords of the Khyber: The Story of North-West Frontier*, London: Faber and Faber, pp. 193-194

nationalist movements in 1907 where Ram Chandra Bharadwaj organised a Party called the Provincial Congress but it was suppressed. Another organisation worth mentioning is the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghania or Society of the Reform of Afghans which helped in the growth of Pakhtun consciousness.<sup>38</sup>

But it was in 1931 that the movement or political national consciousness of the Pakhtuns came into being with the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He started the Khudai Khidmatgar (KKM – Servants of God), a social reformist and political resistance movement in 1929. The majority of his followers were peasants and the poor, who felt exploited by the feudal landlords and the imperial revenue system. Politically, Khan believed in Pakhtunwali (a cultural code of ethics and behaviour of Pakhtuns) but wanted to reorganise it along modern democratic principles. The KKM struggled to reform inequalities and social evils, such as “Badal” (the common practice of revenge for settling scores) in Pakhtun society through education and social justice. “Freedom of the individual was an integral part of the code but living a colonised life, according to Ghaffar Khan, was in contradiction to it. Thus the KKM tried to awaken the political consciousness of the Pakhtuns against the British colonial rule, but strictly following the principles of non-violence.”<sup>39</sup>

Talking about this political party Olaf Caroe said that the “British immobility in conceding a measure of responsible government to the frontiers released other forces. There arose a new political party in the villages, a party which in the absence of ballot box or any form of expression by parliamentary means, was necessarily conceived first as a pressure group and subsequently as a mass movement for agitation against established order.”<sup>40</sup>

Mention of another party that can be done here is the organisation of ‘Zalme Pakhtuns’ headed by Ghani Khan. This organisation was not strictly non violent in character, and was said to be an offshoot of KKM. It was exclusively for Pakhtun liberation, but it was

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<sup>38</sup> Rittenberg, Stephen Alan (1977), *The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, 1901-1947*, USA: Columbia Press, pp. 67

<sup>39</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009) “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6), pp. 1095-1096

<sup>40</sup> Caroe, Olaf (1965), *The Pathans 550 BC 1957 A.D.*, USA: ST Martin's Press, pp. 431

unable to prove itself and faded away with time.<sup>41</sup>

Members of the KKM known as Khudai Khidmatagars boycotted the British institutions of law and order and wanted to replace them with Pakhtun institution of 'jirga' for the settling of civil-criminal cases. Ghaffar Khan was interested in educating the people, eradicating poverty and eliminating all sorts of oppression on the Pakhtuns. He also mentioned that the divided Pakhtuns should come together otherwise they would be exploited by the British. But it should be noted in this case that the KKM was unable to penetrate into the tribal areas that served as the physical bridge between Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tribal areas were technically autonomous from British and most of the 'jirga' decided to transfer power to the new state of Pakistan, not favouring the KKM. Thus this buffer zone separating the two Pakhtun areas had minimum socio-political influence of the KKM.<sup>42</sup>

### ***The British Politics***

Another trend of Pakhtun nationalism lies in the politics played by the British in demarcating the boundaries between the Pakhtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan (then British India). The ethnic overlapping between the two countries and imposed border by the colonial rule is still serving as a potent threat in managing relations between the two countries and the Pakhtun people.<sup>43</sup>

The British adopted a "closed border policy" towards the Pakhtun tribal area that lay astride the largely ungoverned frontiers of India and Afghanistan.<sup>44</sup> They initially started with the policy of minimal interference in the Pakhtun-dominated tribal areas that straddled the border of the two countries. But the drive to secure India's frontiers from

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<sup>41</sup> Jasson, Erland (1981), *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, USA: Upassala, pp. 206

<sup>42</sup> Ghufraan, Nasreen (2009) "Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, 49(6), pp. 1095-1096

<sup>43</sup> Harrison, Selig S. (2008), "'Pashtunistan': The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan (ARI)", [Online web] Accessed 12 February 2012, URL:

[http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_eng/Content?WCM\\_GLOBAL\\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\\_in/zonas\\_in/ari37-2008](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari37-2008) pp. 4

<sup>44</sup> Saikal, Amin (2010), "Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(1), pp. 7

the expanding Tsarist Russia led British to opt for a “forward Policy” from 1876. Thus they started pushing their actual area of control in the tribal areas and sought influence in Afghanistan.<sup>45</sup> This gave rise to the second Anglo-Afghan war where Afghanistan agreed to British suzerainty. But to demarcate the limit of the imperial expansion there was a need to demarcate boundary between the two. In 1887 the northern boundary of Afghanistan and Russia was marked along the northern boundary of the Amu Darya (Oxus River). “A reciprocal Durand Line Agreement was drawn between the British Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan in 1893. This line demarcated the outer frontier of British India. Afghanistan also created a narrow land corridor in the north-east to ensure that the Russian empire in Central Asia and British India did not have a common border in Central Asia which can turn into a bone of contention between them. This resulted in the Wakhan Corridor, which separates Pakistan’s northern areas from Tajikistan.”<sup>46</sup>

With this the Durand line also formally split the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and their co-ethnics in India (later became Pakistan). The line indeed has important symbolic and judicial significance. But in real terms the tribes have moved back and forth along the line with ease. Erland Jasson says that “the Afghanistan government always felt that they could handle these tribes better as they have an ethnic linkage. With the end of the British Empire the Pakhtun areas under the British also became independent. Kabul had sought to open negotiations on the issue of return of the territories and dreamt of merger of the Pakhtun areas with Afghanistan. It kept on supporting the Pakhtun nationalists in the hope that those areas would be included in Afghanistan.”<sup>47</sup>

Despite indirect rule under the British, there were some significant developments that caused some far-reaching changes in the region which in turn made new economic relations. This can be counted as a British strategy played to take in confidence of some big Khans. There were the introduction of new land revenue system, recruitment of Pakhtuns to the British army, market economy, modern education, and construction of

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, pp-8

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, pp. 8-9

<sup>47</sup> Jasson, Erland (1981), *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, USA: Uppasal, pp. 206

roads and railway lines. The new revenue system imposed through the local Khans and Pirs, on the one hand, changed the landowner-tenant relationship by introducing permanent landownership, and on the other, led to the landlessness of peasants who were unable to pay the exceedingly high taxes. By the 1930s, over 60 percent of all arable land had been taken over by the landlords. During 1911-31, the proportion of peasant owners dropped from 72.5 % to 42 %. The introduction of market economy gave rise to a class of Pakhtun merchants whose trade was further boosted by the introduction of roads and railways. The capitalist economic relations adversely affected the local artisans who had to compete with the British factory-made articles.<sup>48</sup>

In terms of economic relations, Adeel Khan has mentioned that NWFP was divided in two parts. “In the settled areas, the introduction of new revenue system created few big landlords and a large number of landless peasants; the market economy gave birth to a Pakhtun bourgeoisie and an increasing number of pauperised artisans and other proletariat. In the tribal areas, the old economic relations remained intact.”<sup>49</sup>

The colonial administration soon realised that to maintain the local power relationships there was a need for an active state patronage of the local elite. Thus the colonial rule utilised the big Khans. A conflict of interests between the big Khans and the small Khans ensued. A sense of being left out among the small Khans gave rise to a feeling of resentment against the colonial government that eventually turned into contempt and opposition to the latter.<sup>50</sup>

Another strategy played by the British against the secular nationalists was supporting a religious party to limit the influence of the frontier congress. Thus the British started supporting the Muslim League which could win over the religious minded Pakhtuns and move them away from the secular nationalists.<sup>51</sup>

The British, in fact, supported the Muslim League in the NWFP to weaken the KKM by

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<sup>48</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1):

pp. 71

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, pp. 71

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, pp. 72

<sup>51</sup> Jasson, Erland (1981), *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, USA: Uppasala, pp. 59

patronising the big Khans (rich landlords) of the region through land grants and subsidies. It was a reformist movement that proclaimed to struggle for social justice. Adeel Khan states that “this was consistent with the well-developed British policy of supporting local landed elites in the provinces to maintain peace and order, not to mention loyalty to the British crown. These Khans became active members of the Muslim League, and carried out propaganda against the pro-Congress policy of the Khudai Khidmatagars. The non-Pakhtun Pirs were also granted lands and they too had a wide support for the Muslim League.”<sup>52</sup>

As a reaction, the small Khans were left with no option but to appeal to the popular sentiments. There they found a responsive audience among the peasants resentful of the high taxes that had led to their landlessness, among the traders who were unhappy with the influence of the landlords, among the educated ones searching for jobs, and among the state employees seeking promotions. “The process of social mobility set in motion by the introduction of the market economy, modern education and state employment was accelerated by a conflict of interests between the local elites as the disgruntled small Khans began to translate their sense of alienation into nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually took the shape of a movement.”<sup>53</sup> Thus though the big Khans went against the KKM it was well supported by the small Khans and peasants who fell prey to the British politics.<sup>54</sup>

The peasant base of the movement was understandable in an overwhelmingly tribal and agrarian society that was introduced to modernisation through the expanding system of modern bureaucratic state and market economy rather than through industrialisation or even large-scale rural industry and mechanised agriculture. “Despite the emergence of new status groups and their new interests, aspirations and frustrations, it was initially the minor Khans and peasants who were hit hardest by the colonial policies.”<sup>55</sup>

Syed Waqar Ali Shah aptly analysed the support of different strata of society for the movement led by Bacha Khan, “To the Pakhtun intelligentsia, it was a movement for the

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, pp.60

<sup>53</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1), pp. 71

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, pp.71



revival of Pakhtun culture with its distinct identity. To the smaller Khans, it was a movement that demanded political reforms for the province that would enfranchise them and give them a greater role in governance. Its anti-colonial stand suited the majority of anti-establishment ulema, who always regarded British rule in the subcontinent as a curse. For the peasants and other poor classes it was against their economic oppressors: British imperialism and its agents, the pro-British Nawabs, Khan Bahadurs and the big Khans.<sup>56</sup>

In this situation Ghaffar Khan realised that cooperation with the Muslim League was difficult because of its initial pro-British tilt, though it claimed to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims. When the Muslim League favoured an independent homeland for Indian Muslims to be called ‘Pakistan’, the Pakhtuns became torn between two opposite political forces — one favouring partition and the other a united India.<sup>57</sup>

It is worth mentioning here that KKM was successful throughout 1930s and 1940s in mobilising political support of the Pakhtuns against government-backed interest groups. The British government, through a system of tribal penetration and support of certain tribal leaders, had tried not only to keep the Pakhtuns divided but later, starting in 1930s, had even used Islam and the mullahs to win Pakhtun support against foreign powers and the influence of KKM and Congress.<sup>58</sup>

Ghaffar Khan’s alliance with the Congress doubtlessly was the latter’s avowedly anti-British politics. Another important reason, it seems, was his belief that the Congress could never have a popular support in a province that had the highest percentage of Muslims compared to any province in India, and therefore would have to depend on his support. As Khalid B Sayed says, “he worked tirelessly among the Pakhtun peasants and secured a large following for himself. With the support of his Khudai Khidmatgar, the Congress won 17 out of 50 seats in the 1937 provincial elections. The Congress victory looked all the more impressive with its 15 out of 36 Muslim seats in comparison to the

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, pp. 71

<sup>56</sup> Cited in Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1), pp.72

<sup>57</sup> Ghufraan, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6), pp. 1097

Muslim League, which could not win a single seat.”<sup>59</sup>

Though in the 1946 election the Muslim League was unable to win majority, but being a Muslim majority province the North West Frontier officially became part of Pakistan through a referendum in July 1947. The Khudai Khidmatagars boycotted this referendum because it did not include the option of either an independent Pakhtunistan or joining with Afghanistan. Instead, the only two options were accession to either India or Pakistan upon independence. In contrast, the Muslim League, which participated in the referendum, supported accession to Pakistan.<sup>60</sup>

While giving the interpretation of the Lahore resolution, the KKM leaders had argued that “the referendum options were more than restricted in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. First, it was not held in the centrally administered tribal areas which had a dominantly Pathan population. Secondly, in view of the restricted nature of adult franchise, only about 15 % of the Pathan population qualified as voters. Lastly, even in such a restricted electorate, boycott of the elections by KKM further robbed the legitimacy.”<sup>61</sup>

Congress accepted the result of the referendum, thereby acknowledging the NWFP as part of the new state. The result of the July 1947 referendum gave a major blow to Pakhtun nationalists and their Congress allies who never wanted Pakhtuns to be a part of Pakistan but rather wanted autonomy within the Indian state.<sup>62</sup> Shocked by the decision of the Congress in supporting partition Ghaffar Khan said, “We stood by you and had undergone great sacrifices for attaining freedom, but you have deserted us and thrown us to the wolves.” He also said that he was not in favour of any more referendum with the option of either joining Pakistan or India. He said, “Let it be on Pakhtunistan or

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<sup>58</sup> Sayed, Khalid B. (1980), *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 17

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, pp. 75

<sup>60</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1098

<sup>61</sup> Phadnis, Urmila “Ethnic Movements in Pakistan, society and Politics”, in Pandav Nayak (eds.) *South Asian Studies Series,6*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd., pp. 193

<sup>62</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1098

Pakistan.”<sup>63</sup>

### ***Pakhtun Nationalism after Independence***

After the creation of Pakistan and the Pakhtuns joining it, the nationalists of the KKM, fearing Punjabi domination in the newly formed country, started demanding an independent state to be called “Pushtunistan” (or Pakhtunistan).

What Adeel Khan mentions is that initially a large number of Pakhtuns were sympathetic towards separatist demands. The reason was that geographically and historically the NWFP and Balochistan have not been part of South Asia. Hence physically and culturally Pakhtuns and Baloch are quite different from the rest of the South Asian people. Even their languages have little in common with South Asian languages. Therefore despite the influence of Urdu, Pakhtu and Balochi languages still are unintelligible for the neighbouring Punjabis and Sindhis. “Such cultural and linguistic differences were bound to play a role in shaping the political aspirations of the people contrary to the integrationist policies of the Pakistan government dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs. The sense of a lack of participation became even more jarring due to the absence of electoral politics for more than two decades after the creation of Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the separatist sentiment had the potential to become a serious threat, had there been a strong political organisation behind it. But the ineptitude and ambivalence of the nationalist leadership precluded the possibility of any such eventuality,” states Adeel Khan.<sup>64</sup>

The Pakhtuns also wanted to maintain a distinct identity from the very beginning. They were resentful of Punjabis even before independence and also opposed the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. This line of thinking is well reflected in the declaration of Nawaz Khan, the speaker of the frontier assembly. He said, “Pathans and Punjabis are two major nations by any definition or test of nation. We are a nation of three million, and what is more, we, the frontier Pathans, are body of people with our own distinctive culture,

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<sup>63</sup>Cited in Pande, Savita (2004), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra, pp. 86-87

civilisation, language, literature art and architecture, names and nomenclature, art and sensitive values and proportion, legal and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions and aptitudes and ambition. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and by all canons of international law a Pathan is quite separate from a Punjabi.”<sup>65</sup>

“During the Partition in 1947, Pakistan was too poor to mimic the British policy of tribal subsidies, and its military was too preoccupied with India to permanently pacify the Pakhtuns. So it adopted a less intrusive policy by granting more local autonomy than the British had allowed. In September, one month after Partition, Pakistan’s military evacuated the Pakhtun-populated areas of Waziristan, Ramzak and Wana. Pakistan’s governance of Khyber-Paktunkhwa has since been managed through political agents that are heavily dependent on local tribal support for their effectiveness” states Julian Schofield.<sup>66</sup>

The other reason for the persistence of a sense of deprivation among the Pakhtuns was that Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League had pledged in its Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940 that the Pakistani state would be a confederation under which the main constituent units of East Bengal (which in 1971 broke away from the confederation and established itself as the independent state of Bangladesh), Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan would be “autonomous and sovereign”, and that the central government would be limited to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, communications and currency.<sup>67</sup> But after the creation of Pakistan, the promises faded away and never translated to reality.

Another aspect deserving mention here is that Afghanistan also realised the loss of status of the Pakhtun people and sided by them wanting to include those areas to it. But the nationalists had certain reservations regarding joining to Afghanistan.

With the existence of one Pakhtun dominated state — Afghanistan — demand for

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<sup>64</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “ Pakhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separation to Integration”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1): pp. 80

<sup>65</sup> Cited in Khan, Adeel (2003), “ Pakhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separation to Integration”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1) pp. 86

<sup>66</sup> Schofield, Julian (2011), “Diversionsary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 17(1): pp. 38

<sup>67</sup> Saikal, Amin (2010), “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?” *Journal of*

another shows the acceptance of the British divisions of the Pakhtuns. Again as Adeel Khan points out that “the demand of nationalism would have been convincible if the criteria of nationalism were not history, culture and traditions of people as the nationalist claims, but about gaining political power by appealing to popular support in the name of common history, culture and tradition.”<sup>68</sup> Thus a new national identity was conceived, one that shared a past with Afghanistan but did not want a future with it. This focuses on the point that an independent Pakhtun state was desired because it was visible that in Pakistan, domination of the Punjabis will be there and if they go with Afghanistan they have to give up the politics of Pakhtun nationalism.<sup>69</sup>

After realising that “Pakhtunistan” was an unworkable demand because of the fear of inclusion of the Pakhtun state in Afghanistan, Ghaffar Khan began shifting focus from demanding an independent state to, instead, demanding increased autonomy for the province. The Khudai Khidmatgars expressed their loyalty to Pakistan “18 days after independence” at a meeting at Sardarab and in March 1948 Ghaffar Khan attended the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) where he explained his concept of Pakhtunistan, which means autonomy within Pakistan for the Pakhtuns denying the charge that he never said Pathans were a “separate nationality”.<sup>70</sup>

He opined that he desired the integration of the Pakhtun dominated area of Pakistan side and name it as Pakhtunistan on the basis of ethnicity as with the other provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab etc. One thing can be noted here as said by Adeel Khan that Gaffar Khan was unable to transform anti-colonial nationalism to ethnic-nationalism. This is mainly because he romanticised the past and glorified Pakhtun history in a manner that betrayed incoherent thinking and a moralistic approach. As this was based on trifling ideas so it became politics of contradiction rather than an ideology.<sup>71</sup>

After the creation of Pakistan the Pakhtuns raised the demands of removal of artificial

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*Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(1), pp. 7

<sup>68</sup> Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity, Ethnic Nationalism And the State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 96

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, pp. 97

<sup>70</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2004), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra, pp. 88

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, pp. 88

boundaries and integration of all “Pakhtu Speaking” areas into an integrated state called Pakhtunistan, abolition of traditional feudal sardari system, equal representation of the Pakhtuns in the socio-economic politico administrative fields of national life. But Pakistan overlooked the demands of the Pakhtun regionalists and imposed one unit scheme in order to centralise power mechanism of entire West Pakistan.<sup>72</sup>

### ***One Unit Plan***

Pakhtun nationalism firmly placed itself after moving in Pakistan. Paullada says, “They occupied and governed fairly well defined territory from which they successfully excluded other claims of authority, they displaced the homogeneity of social and political institutions as indices of nation building and in time developed a feeling of political cohesion which gave rise to Pakhtun nationalism.”<sup>73</sup>

After being accommodated in Pakistan, the political arrangement of having one unit scheme restricting representation and devaluation of power once again created uproar all over Pakistan. The one unit scheme was a direct threat to the autonomy they enjoyed in the name of the national integration. Thus the Pakhtuns who also made room in Pakistan once again rose in revolt with the coming of the scheme.<sup>74</sup> To protest, anti-one unit front was established by the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Awami League. This front was later joint by Sindh Hari Committee and the Azad Pakistan Party.

The establishment of the one unit plan organisationally activated the Khan Brothers on the issue. Dr. Khan Sahib became the first Chief Minister of the one unit plan. Ghaffar Khan joined hands with G.M. Syed and Mian Iftikharuddin to form the National League, which later transformed into the National Awami Party (NAP). East Pakistan’s Ganatantric Dal and elements of the banned Communist Party also joined the NAP.<sup>75</sup> Though there were various perceptions of the members of NAP regarding the issue of

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<sup>72</sup> Singh, Surendra (2003), *Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, pp. 48

<sup>73</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2004), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra, pp. 90

<sup>74</sup> Kukreja, Veena (2003), *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 20

<sup>75</sup> Ahmed, Feroz (1998), *Ethnicity And Politics In Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 219

provincial autonomy, one unit scheme etc. but the thing which tied them up was the fear of the central government. Thus voicing for provincial autonomy, opposing for SEATO and CENTO (anti imperialism) and anti-feudalism became the agenda of NAP.<sup>76</sup>

During the Ayub Khan era, though he himself was a Pakhtun but Khan never talked of Pakhtun autonomy but rather wanted to incorporate them in the central governing system. Again the issue of one unit scheme had a negative impact on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations as Afghans were against the suffering of their fellow brethren. Thus the matter of Pakhtunistan once again came to the fore and the support of the Afghans in the internal matter of Pakistan saw closing of all consulates of both the countries.<sup>77</sup>

But the coming of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government, the area saw some considerable changes. The army camps concerning with the jobs of the tribes were withdrawn. However this isolationist policy ended once there was regime change in Afghanistan. Bhutto was apprehensive about the support of Pakhtunistan issue and started the policy of economic integration.<sup>78</sup>

Bhutto's handling of political affairs in the province by appointing a non-representative person as the Governor without consulting the democratically elected party brought him in confrontation with the NAP. He imposed central rule in the NWFP in 1973 on the pretext of a threat to the national security and in 1975 installed a puppet government and banned the NAP. This further strengthened the grievances of the Pakhtuns and they felt that they would never get any legitimate and rational deal from the government.<sup>79</sup>

Again during the Zia-ul-Haq period, there was a campaign for Islamic consciousness which gave rise to Jamaat-i-islami since 1979. Ghafar Khan was against this religion-based party but was himself allied with Jamial-ul-Ulema of late Mufti Mahmud that was a Pakhtun-based religious party which ably articulated and supported the demands of Pakhtuns.<sup>80</sup> Thus the successive regimes saw a shift in the orientation of the Pakhtun

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<sup>76</sup> Rashiduzzaman, M. (1970), "The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis," *Pacific Affairs*, 43(3), pp. 396

<sup>77</sup> Pande, Savita (2004), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra, pp. 90

<sup>78</sup> Pattanaik, Smruti S. (1998), "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(5), pp. 774

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, pp. 774

<sup>80</sup> Pande, Savita (2004), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra, pp. 92

nationalism.

***An Analysis of the Pakhtun Nationalism: From Secession to Integration***

Pakhtun nationalism is often criticised as being a nationalistic struggle with a number of loopholes. From the very beginning, it remained divided between the feudal lords, the tribes, the communists and the religious groups. As is the case with the other nationalist movements the Pakhtuns never had to face such a sense of deprivation as faced by the other ethnic groups.

To start with, the Pakhtuns who were called as the martial race by the British were recruited in the Army in large numbers. Even after partition, 19.5 % recruitment in the army was from the Pakhtun-dominated area of the North West Frontier. The political system of Pakistan which moves with a considerable influence of the army, naturally gave the Pakhtuns a considerable position in the power hierarchy on the virtue of being well represented in the Army.

The Pakhtuns were not only concentrated to one area. They have migrated to various areas in search of a better life. The concentration of the economic activities in the southern part of Punjab and Sindh has often attracted the Pakhtuns to work there and have a good life. Therefore concentrating and rising for the nationalist struggles were not seen among the middle and higher classes who were motivated for a better life.<sup>81</sup>

The next thing which can be brought to notice is that as compared to the other nationalisms in Pakistan, the Pakhtuns had no problem with the other community taking the resources meant for them, unlike the Mohajirs versus the Sindhis who are in a constant tug of war in respect to the resources in Sindh. Administratively too, unlike Sindh and Balochistan where there is Mohajir and Punjabi domination, no such domination in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can be found. Even the Pakhtun educated youth had a considerable number of representations in the civil-bureaucracy.<sup>82</sup>

Again as pointed out by Feroz Ahmed the struggle against the suppression of national

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<sup>81</sup> Khan, Adeel (2005), *Politics of Identity, Ethnic Nationalism and State in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 100

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, pp. 101



language and culture serves as a legitimising cover to redress the real economic political deprivation as is the case with the Bengalis whose fight for their rights was attached to the language struggle in this regard. But the Pakhtun petty bourgeoisie trained in Aligarh or Punjab never had affinity for the Pakhtu language.<sup>83</sup>

Region/Province	Language						
	Urdu	Punjabi	Pushto	Sindhi	Baluchi	Seraiki	Others
Pakistan	7.6	44.1	15.4	14.1	3.6	10.5	4.7
Islamabad	10.1	71.7	9.5	0.6	0	1.1	7
Punjab	4.5	75.2	1.2	0.1	0.7	17.4	0.9
Sindh	21.1	7	4.2	59.7	2.1	1	4.9
NWFP	0.8	1	73.9	-	-	3.9	20.4
Baluchistan	1	2.5	29.6	5.6	54.8	2.4	4.1
FATA	0.2	0.2	99.1	-	-	-	0.5

**Table 2.1:** Source: Ashok K. Behuria, (2005), “Myth of the Monolith: The Challenge of Diversity in Pakistan” *Strategic Analysis*, 29(1), pp. 68 as per 1998 census.

Pakhtu language was given highest status during the Mughal period and was widely used in the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. But it never got the status of national language and was also never fought for to make it so.<sup>84</sup>

Criticising and distinguishing Pakhtun nationalism from the others, Feroz Ahmed said that the desire of the Pakhtuns was to be the master of their own territory and resources and that no outsider should use their resources. Thus in absence of a coherent whole voicing the demand of Pakhtunistan, it is felt that there is an absence of a strong nationalism as compared to other nationalisms in Pakistan.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Ahmed, Feroz (1998), *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 199

<sup>84</sup> Shariff, K. M. (2004), *Pakistan ALMANAC, 2003-2004, Essential Data on Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, pp. 436

<sup>85</sup> Ahmed, Feroz (1998), *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 200

The Pakhtun ethnic movement became resilient after a period of time because the Pathans have been accommodated in the military bureaucratic structure. The maintenance of status quo in the tribal areas after British withdrawal had been a significant factor that nullified any significant threat in the form of a separatist movement.

It was in the late 1970s that integration of the economy of the NWFP had caused the erosion of Pakhtun nationalism, as increasing economic interest within Pakistan had taken away its material basis. This was further intensified by Pakhtun migration to Punjab and Karachi in search of jobs. Besides the mammoth movement of labour, Pakhtun entrepreneurs started dominating certain sectors like transportation in most big cities of Pakistan. Thus they never felt the need to voice against the state and call for separation. There was a massive decline in the secular aspiration of the Pakhtun nationalism. The rise of the Taliban and other extremist religious forces and the ensuing destruction further accelerated the migration of secular-minded Pakhtuns to other cities of Pakistan or abroad. However, a closer look reveals that successful secular parties in the NWFP hardly have any inclination towards Pakhtun nationalism beyond renaming the province. There is a small section of intelligentsia that still carries the nationalistic aspirations and sees an opening for redrawing the boundaries on the basis of ethnicity.<sup>86</sup>

Most of the time, secular Pakhtun nationalists have highlighted their economic deprivation. But if the Pakhtuns' share in the army, the bureaucracy and the economy in Pakistan is higher than the proportion of their population, such an argument becomes a very hard sell. If the common Pakhtun finds it more profitable to stay within Pakistan, the secular nationalist elite will remain an ineffective marginalised force.<sup>87</sup>

The Pakhtun movement went into slow decline and became virtually non-existent even before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979. Thus Pakhtun nationalism which suffered from certain problems can be criticised on several grounds which are described in the following points. National Awami Party, which was said to be the sole representation of the Pakhtuns, was prominent in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa not in FATA

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, pp. 210

<sup>87</sup> Dr Ejaz Manzur, (2009), "Washington Diary : Pashtun nationalism" ,*Daily Times* , August 19<sup>th</sup> 2009 [Online Web] URL [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C08%5C19%5Cstory\\_19-8-2009\\_pg3\\_5](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C08%5C19%5Cstory_19-8-2009_pg3_5) Accessed 2 February 2012.

and therefore was unable to gain popularity like the KKM. Again as Cohen states that “the demand for Pakhtunistan did not have significant middle class support in urban areas. Lower middle class Pakhtuns in rural areas were tied to the Pakistani state through a long history of military services. Some prominent officials were also Pakhtuns and the economy of NWFP (KP) was integrated with Punjab.” After the Soviet invasion Afghanistan too stopped playing the Pakhtunistan card on Pakistan.<sup>88</sup>

The Pathans, due to their commercial interest, became very outward looking which is evident from their presence in large numbers in Karachi. All this diluted the rigid Pathan identity, and they started looking beyond the boundary of the Frontiers.

After Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan tried to install a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can silence the issue of Pakhtunistan. During the time of Benazir Bhutto, the Awami National Party (ANP) formed an alliance with her party which was broken after 1989, and thus popularity of the party remained restricted to NWFP.<sup>89</sup> Pakhtun nationalism was seen more to be restricted in the province except in the issue of Kalabagh Dam where Pakhtuns opposed it as they thought this will give more water resources to the dominant province of Punjab.

During the 1990s the issue that was in focus was the renaming of the province of NWFP to Pakhtunkhwa. Thus nationalism was raised for autonomy and not for secession, to unite the Pakhtun areas under one head. The ANP has been consistent in its demand for Pakhtunkhwa. In 1990, it was defeated by 20 votes when the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) refused to vote for the resolution; in 1997, it could not push through the resolution because of the lack of majority.<sup>90</sup> The 1981 census data reveals that Pakhtuns constitute 94% of the population in the twelve Pakhtun-dominated districts located in the Peshawar Valley, in the southern plains excluding Dera Ismail Khan and in Malakand division excluding Chitral. There are only two districts where the Pakhtuns’ presence is negligible. These are Abbottabad (4%) in Menshera and Dera Ismail Khan (30%).

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<sup>88</sup> Cohen, Stephen P. (2004), *The Idea Of Pakistan*, Washington: Oxford University Press, pp. 218

<sup>89</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1109

<sup>90</sup> This time the resolution was fully supported by the ANP, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Jamiat-e-Ulemae Islam (Fazlur)—JUI(F)—and two members of the Pakistan Muslim League-Junejo (PML(J)) voted against the resolution.

According to the Frontier Government Bureau of Statistics, out of the 17.387 million population, 70% are Pukhtu-speaking while the rest speak a number of local languages such as Hindko (in parts of Peshawar, Nowshera and Kohat), Hazarawal and Kohistani (in Hazara division), Khwar (in Chitral) and Seraiki (in Dera Ismail Khan). However this demand got fulfilled in 2008 after ANP formed coalition government in the centre and the province.<sup>91</sup>

In the early 2000s ANP was not in the fore and various religious parties came up. Thus Pakhtun nationalism seemed to get sidelined though it again got resurgence after 2008, and especially with the issue of Taliban who were ethnically Pakhtuns. But that will be dealt in details in the fourth chapter.

### ***The Pakhtun Politics and Fraction of Political Parties***

The Pakhtun politics started with the KKM, and later was joined with other socialist parties forming the National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP, which was the representation of the secular Pakhtuns and other deprived people of Pakistan, saw a subsequent split in 1967 into the pro-Soviet NAP headed by Muzaffar Ahmed along with Wali Khan and the pro-Chinese NAP led by Maulana Bashani, a Bengali leader. But gradually it began to lose its earlier support and dynamism as its followers became actively involved in conventional politics of Pakistan and a split in the party occurred along the Soviet and Chinese line of communism. This resulted in the increased integration of the Pakhtuns into the Pakistani political and administrative systems through the 1960s. In 1972, the NAP formed a coalition government with Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) in NWFP, reflecting its growing political pragmatism. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had dissolved the provincial government in Balochistan in 1975 that led to a nationwide campaign by the NAP against the central government. The NAP was banned in 1975 by Bhutto for destabilising the country, and Wali Khan eventually took up the leadership of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1984. Finally in 1986, the National Democratic Party merged with several other progressive political and ethnic nationalist groups to

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<sup>91</sup> Pattanaik, Smruti S. (1998), "Pakistan's North West frontier: Under a New Name", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(5), pp. 778

form the Awami National Party (ANP). The ANP having a Pakhtun backing is becoming popular and gaining support after the 2008 election. The functioning and future prospect of these parties will be analysed in the next chapter.<sup>92</sup>

Mention of another Pakhtun-based party should be done here. Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) is a Pakhtun democratic political party in Pakistan. The motto of PKMAP is to unite the Pakhtuns of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces of Pakistan. It was born out of the NAP, following a dispute between the Pakhtun and Baluch leadership. This party has never got a national colour due to its ethnic posture. It is mostly dragged into tribal feuds. It serves as bridge between the PPP and the PML(N). Thus, unlike the ANP, it has failed to generate dominant support and has remained restricted to one province of Baluchistan.<sup>93</sup>

### ***The Afghan Influences and Shift in the Pakhtun Nationalism***

One of the important aspects of the Pakhtun nationalism is the external influences. Right from the beginning the external powers has impacted a considerable influence in shaping the Pakhtun nationalism. The Afghan governments on the basis of the Pakhtun ethnic ties have tried to absorb Peshawar because of its strategic position by giving support to the Pakhtunistan issue. There is still controversy regarding the Durand Line, as the Afghan governments rarely pay respect to it.<sup>94</sup> Thus the influx of Pakhtun people and Afghan refugees are challenging the security of Pakistan in the name of Pakhtun nationalism.

The Pakhtunistan policy very much affected the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In retaliation against Afghan refusals to diplomatically recognise Pakistan and Afghan repudiation of earlier Afghan-British treaties, “Pakistan imposed an unofficial trade embargo that was in effect until 2009, denying Afghan access to its natural markets in India, with all its concomitant drag effects on socio-economic development.

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<sup>92</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2000), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 147

<sup>93</sup> Shahid, Saleem (2002), “Pashtun Milli Awami Pary”, in ABS Jaffri, *The Political Parties of Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, pp. 77

<sup>94</sup> Kheli, Shirin Tahir (1974), “Pakhtoonistan and its International Implications”, *World Affairs*, 137(3), pp. 238

Furthermore, in December 1947 Pakistan denied Afghan requests for sea access to the Indian Ocean. As relations worsened, Kabul dispatched a series of military patrols to infiltrate and harass Pakistani interests in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, beginning first in 1951. The policy was accelerated by Pakhtun nationalist and the new Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud in 1953.”<sup>95</sup>

In reality, the problem of Pakhtunistan is inextricably enmeshed with Afghanistan’s domestic politics. This is why Kabul’s stand on the issue is so confused and sometimes even contradictory. While at the official level the Afghan government has stated that its interest in the Pakhtunistan problem is limited to securing self-determination for the Pathans and Baluchis living in Pakistan, at the popular level the concept of Pakhtunistan is defined as the annexation or merger with Afghanistan of the predominantly Pathan and Baluchi areas of Pakistan. The geographical boundaries of Pakhtunistan are drawn at the Indus and include, in addition to the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan, certain areas of Punjab and Sindh as well as parts of northern and north-western Kashmir now under Pakistan.<sup>96</sup>

Daoud began by supporting the Pakistan Pakhtun in their protest in March 1955 against a Pakistani plan to incorporate the NWFP into a single electoral unit, as part of the One Unit Plan. Though the tribal agencies were not included, it was believed that they would ultimately be denied their autonomy. “Following violent protests on both sides of the Durand Line and a demand by the Afghan Loya Jirgah for a plebiscite on the future of the Pakhtun in Pakistan (in both the tribal and the settled areas), Afghanistan called up 70,000 reserves and a standoff ensued until Egyptian and Saudi mediation de-escalated the confrontation in September 1955.”<sup>97</sup>

In 1975, Afghanistan offered to compromise on the issue of the Pakhtun in exchange for a comprehensive peace with Pakistan, but discussions failed as there was also a competitive diversion between “Afghan-sponsored Pakhtun separatists” and “Pakistan-

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<sup>95</sup> Schofield, Julian (2011), “Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 17(1), pp. 40

<sup>96</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed (1973), “Pakhtunistan: A Ghost Resurrected”, *Economic And Political Weekly*, 8(39): pp. 1758

<sup>97</sup> Schofield, Julian (2011), “Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 17(1): pp. 39

supported Pakhtun Islamists”. The movement got suppressed after Soviet intervention.<sup>98</sup> Pakistan played certain strategies to stop the nationalistic struggle of the Pakhtuns by promoting radical Islamism as a counter-balance to Pakhtun nationalism.<sup>99</sup>

But during the time of Soviet intervention a considerable shift of the Pakhtun society was visible. The major shift was in the relationship between the tribal Pakhtun areas and the central government. The simultaneous peaceful existence of both was no longer the case there. The activities of the Soviet fractured their traditional socio-economic and power structures, resulting in an imbalance that was utilised by the Jihadis for gaining influence in these areas.

Nasreen Ghufuran states, “They also disrupted the tribal system as massive funding and weapon supplies from external sources and locals began to change the structure. Mullahs who had earlier lacked much power in traditional Pakhtun society became the new actors and allies to wage jihad. Maliks lost their power to conservative mullahs who opened up many madrasas in the tribal areas, thereby contributing to the change. The area had also received huge influxes of Afghan refugees, which began to affect the tribal economy. During this process, the Pakistani Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative source of leadership to the traditional tribal elders.”<sup>100</sup>

During this time there was a call for Pakhtunistan, but Wali Khan had stated categorically that his brand of Pakhtunistan, which he called the “Utmanzai brand”, was distinct from the Kabul brand of Pakhtunistan. “The NAP and its allies, at least in their public postures, stood not for the secession of the Pathan and Baluchi areas from Pakistan but for greater provincial autonomy for these regions.”<sup>101</sup>

Further the Pakistani government supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviets and the Pakistani soil was used by the Mujahedeen against the Afghan regime. This can be marked as another strategy to stop the growth of Pakhtun nationalist struggle in Pakistan

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, pp. 40

<sup>99</sup> Saikal, Amin (2010), “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pakhtun Nationalism?”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(1): pp. 8

<sup>100</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1106

<sup>101</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed (1973), “ Pakhtunistan: A Ghost Resurrected”, *Economic And Political Weekly*, 8(39): pp.1759

and upset the socialist NAP. Wali Khan criticised the General Zia's regime for allowing the Mujahedeen to use Pakistani soil to operate against the socialist regime of Babrak Karmal and its Soviet supporters. In contrast, the left-leaning ANP wanted to have friendly ties with Karmal's government. The Jihadis penetrated in the underdeveloped areas of Pakistan and claimed a considerable control over them. Again, the flux of the Afghan refugees and the Afghan war further deteriorated the condition of the Pakhtuns who had ethnic ties with them. The support of the Taliban in Afghanistan also opened a new puzzled situation for the Pakhtun nationalists as their struggle was being equated with the Taliban insurgency.

Thus Pakhtun nationalism stands at the crossroads with numerous challenges looming up the horizon. It is important now to explore the problems and challenges of the Pakhtun nationalism and a way of solving it especially in the hands of the Awami National Party.



### Chapter 3

#### From National Awami Party to Awami National Party: A Symbol of Pakhtun Nationalism

Pakistan is a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual society like most of the developing countries in South Asia. Since its inception, the aspirations of the people of Pakistan to live in peace and harmony and to have a modicum of material security have been unfulfilled. One of the main reasons behind this is the ethnic problem of Pakistan, which is posing a constant threat to the process of building a coherent nation. Thus to fulfill the basic aspiration and to voice for their due share, people started leaning towards ethnic-based parties in the absence of any mass-based party. They also started extending support to the ethno-political leaders who formed the ethno-political organisations in the hope that the demands posed by them will be fulfilled. Thus the relationship between ethnicity and political system became more important in Pakistan because ethnicity is essentially a continuous, dynamic process that occurs between two or more ethnic populations and influences social life of humans.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise the Pakhtun ethnic aspirations were never fulfilled by the state and thus they politicised ethnicity in the form of ethnic parties to make their demands heard. Pakhtuns are said to have a “more developed political and ethnic consciousness compared to other ethnic groups in Pakistan” because of its role in the freedom movement and its glorious historic past.<sup>2</sup> Pakhtun nationalists were regarded as the most serious threat to the new state, and until the 1970s every government persecuted them. But during the last three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Pakhtun politics underwent a sea of change. Presently, Pakhtuns, who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and had demanded an independent state of their own, have become one of the most powerful partners in the

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<sup>1</sup> Khan, Muhammad Shahid (2009), “The Politics of Identity: Ethno-Political Identity in Local Political Structure with emphasis on the Role of Ethnic Groups”, *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 30(2), pp. 149. [Online: web] Accessed 10<sup>th</sup> March 2012, URL: [http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest\\_English\\_Journal/7.%20The%20Politics%20of%20Identity,%20shahid%20khan.pdf](http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/7.%20The%20Politics%20of%20Identity,%20shahid%20khan.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1), pp. 67

state hierarchy.<sup>3</sup>

The Pakhtun politics came by holding the hands of Khudai Khidmatgars and made its struggle felt with National Awami Party and finally established itself with the coming of the specifically Pakhtun-based Awami National Party.

The Awami National Party, which was formed in July 1986, is basically an ethnic Pathan party based in the Pakhtun dominated areas and is now led by Asfandiyar Wali Khan. When the party was formed again after the dissolution of the National Awami Party, it came with a socialist orientation and became the emblem for Pakhtun nationalism. Its initial support to Russia on the issue of Afghanistan and its proclivity to India never gave it national colour and it remained restricted to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally known as North West Frontier Province).<sup>4</sup> But with the turn of time, the Awami National Party started gaining considerable influence especially in the 2008 elections.

The party contested on its own and won a plurality of votes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with seats in Karachi and Balochistan. It subsequently formed a government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is supporting the PPP government in the centre, Sindh and Balochistan. In Sindh it won two seats because of the Pakhtun population in Karachi.<sup>5</sup>

Now the question that is coming to the fore is whether ANP is a true vanguard of the Pakhtun nationalism. To examine this it is necessary to discuss about a conceptual background of the ethnic politics, political background of Pakistan and finally the formation, objective and function of the Pakhtun-based parties — Awami National Party and its predecessor National Awami Party.

### ***Ethnic Politics***

The growth of ethnic politics with the revival of ethnic consciousness came as a surprise as it was thought to have been diluted because of the liberal democratic values and

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, pp. 68

<sup>4</sup> Verma, Monika (2005), *Political Parties and Party System in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., pp.27

<sup>5</sup> Staff Reporter(2012), Awami National Party , *AIK News*, Pakistan, [Online: web] Accessed 23 April 2012, URL:

<http://www.aiknews.com/2012/01/02/awami-national-party/>

abandonment of atavistic rivalries and communal solidarity. According to Andrew Heywood, “Thus the rise of ethnic politics is linked to the capacity of ethnicity to generate a sense of ‘organic’ identity that is stronger than the civic loyalties and ties that have been typically associated with national consciousness.” He also states, “The causes of political decentralisation and, in extreme cases, the phenomenon of state collapse have increasingly been fuelled by the emergence of a new style of politics: the politics of ethnic loyalty and regional identity. In some respects, the rise of ethnic politics in the latest century paralleled the emergence of nationalist politics in the nineteenth century, and may have similarly wide ranging consequences. Whereas nationalism brought about a period of nation building and the destruction of multinational empires, ethnic politics may call the long term survival of the nation itself into question.”<sup>6</sup>

It is worth mentioning here the views of Fredrick Barth who says, “Ethnic behaviour results from the self-identification of the members of a population whereby they distinguish themselves from members of another cultural or ethnic group with whom they have contact.”<sup>7</sup> Thus the emergence of ethnic politics was the consequence of this behaviour.

Consequently, the ethnic organisations and ethnic leadership, called as ‘social engineers’, deliberately stirred up the atavistic emotions of the masses and evoked language, culture and myths of racial origin in support of their aspirations and objectives. Cartwright indicated that “ethnic leadership appealed and influenced the community in ‘direct contact’ for the collective or group benefits, which can be either of a material or of an intangible nature. Particularly, in the event of the political structure being in the hands of a particular ethnic group, the dominant-subordinate group tussles for power sharing, societal rewards and goods manifests itself in ethnic terms. The identities formed on common language base (primordial) and taking political forms (instrumental) caused

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<sup>6</sup> Heywood, Andrew (2007), *Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 180

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Khan, Muhammad Shahid, (2009), “The Politics of Identity: Ethno-Political Identity in Local Political Structure with Emphasis on the Role of Ethnic Groups in Pakistan” *Journal of History and Culture*, 30(2): pp. 149. [Online: web] Accessed 10 March 2012, URL: [http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest\\_English\\_Journal/7.%20The%20Politics%20of%20Identity,%20shahid%20khan.pdf](http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/7.%20The%20Politics%20of%20Identity,%20shahid%20khan.pdf)

ethnic competition and conflict.”<sup>8</sup>

Thus ethnicity becomes a tool in the hands of the political powers who on the virtue of the insecurity of the people tried to mould and organise the people to win the power struggle. In the case of a multicultural society like Pakistan, “the national as well as local political power structure often manifests the ethnic consciousness; sometimes this ethnic consciousness is even influenced by both political structures in reciprocal fashion.”<sup>9</sup> Thus to win the struggle ethnic political parties are formed.

### ***Ethnic Parties***

According to Kanchan Chandra’s definition, “An ethnic party is a party that overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation central to its strategy of mobilising voters. The key distinguishing principles of this definition are those of ascription, exclusion, and centrality: The categories that such a party mobilises are defined according to ascriptive characteristics; the mobilisation of the ‘insider’ ethnic categories is always accompanied by the exclusion of ethnic ‘outsiders’ and, while the party may also highlight other issues, the championing of the cause of an ethnic category or categories is central to its mobilising efforts.”<sup>10</sup>

As Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond note, “The electoral logic of the ethnic party is to harden and mobilise its ethnic base with exclusive, often polarising appeals to ethnic group opportunity and threat...the ethnic party’s particularistic, exclusivist, and often polarising political appeals make its overall contribution to the society divisive and even disintegrative.”<sup>11</sup>

Herbert Kitschelt argues that the defining feature of ethnic political parties is that they “limit their appeal to a particular ethnic or regional constituency and ‘explicitly seek to draw boundaries’ between ethnic ‘friends and foes.’” For him “ethnic party does not

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, pp. 150

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, pp. 151

<sup>10</sup> Chandra, Kanchan (2004), *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed? Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3

pursue a universalistic programme but rather seeks to secure material and political benefits for the ethnic group. Thus unlike other types of political parties, electoral mobilisation is not intended to attract additional voters outside the group to support the party. As a result, the potential electoral base of the party is defined and limited by ethnicity.”<sup>12</sup>

The ethnic party, according to Brass, in essence strives to become “that one political organisation dominant in representing the demands of the ethnic group against its rivals.” But it is important here to note the problems in defining a party as ethnic party as put forward by Chandra and Metz, “An ethnic party is identified as the first party to either (a) proclaim itself as the primary representative of the ethnic group and only that group. Or (b) is widely regarded as the first party to represent the interest of that group and only that group. Thus this definition would include parties that identify themselves as the representative of a particular group as well as parties that are widely regarded as ethnic despite proclaiming themselves as nonethnic.”<sup>13</sup>

The question that is important for driving the study is that sometimes the same party that champions the cause of one ethnic category in one election may redefine its target ethnic category, or reinvent itself as a “multiethnic” or “non-ethnic” party in subsequent elections. In such cases ethnic parties and the politicisation of ethnic differences more generally are presumed to constitute a major threat to democratic stability.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Ethnic Political Parties of Pakistan***

The politics of Pakistan is best understood by examining the role of political parties. A large number of people in Pakistan are critical of the role the parties have played and hold them responsible for internal dissonance and political uncertainty. Military governments have generally described the political parties as the sole cause of political degeneration

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<sup>11</sup> Cited in Ishiyama, John (2009), “Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict?” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15(1): pp. 58

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, pp. 58

<sup>13</sup> Cited in Ishiyama, John (2009), “Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict?” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15(1): pp. 59

<sup>14</sup> Chandra, Kanchan (2004), *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed? Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1

and view political leaders as inherently fraudulent and self-centred.<sup>15</sup>

The role of an ethnic-based political party is significant in this context. But for that an examination of the background of political parties in Pakistan and the conditions that indulged the growth of ethnic-based political parties are important.

In the words of Hasan Askari Rizvi, “A political party organises people as an identifiable political configuration based on a political agenda or programme. Each political configuration based on a political party is a ‘purveyor of ideas’ that either represents the articulation and aggregation of interests and concerns of a society in general or a particular class, religion or social-political formation. The party may identify with an abstract ideological formulation and advocate the solution of societal problems within the framework of its ideology. These ideological parties may be less inclined to cooperate with political players that don’t fully share their ideology. However, the post cold war era suggests that such ideological parties are more inclined to work with other political parties on a minimum common agenda and adopt a pluralistic perspective in the political domain without formally abandoning their ideological, class and ethnic-regional identification.”<sup>16</sup>

Political parties’ aggregate interests and issues into a broad policy option, mobilise and organise people and public opinion, recruit people to their fold and seek to acquire political power through electoral process within the limits set out by the constitution and law. “Political parties are also supposed to constantly review the performance of the government and suggest remedial measures within and without Parliament.”<sup>17</sup>

The origin of political parties in Pakistan was different from the process in European and American countries. In the latter countries, emergence and expansion of political parties was linked with the development of representative government and in the initial stages political parties only comprised the members of elected assemblies. But such was not the case with Pakistan. As a result the growth of the parties and their functioning in this

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<sup>15</sup> Aziz, Khursheed Kamal (1976), *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Lahore: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, pp. 179

<sup>16</sup> Rizvi, Hasan Askari (2010), “The History of Political Parties in Pakistan”, *South Asian Journal*, (30), pp. 81

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 81

country always lack a democratic culture.<sup>18</sup>

Tracing back the history it is found that the absence of a mass-based party in Pakistan gave rise to regional politics based on ethnicity. The Muslim League, which developed, as a part of the nationalist struggle was never able to fulfill the aspirations of the multicultural masses of Pakistan. In the initial stages it was “an advocacy group” and had nothing to do with the introduction of elected assemblies. It developed outside the legislatures. Later, the party contested elections and entered the legislatures in pursuit of its political agenda. As a nationalist movement, its role in popular mobilisation outside the legislature was more significant for shaping the nature and dynamics of political parties. “As the party that led the independence movement, the Muslim League enjoyed support of the Muslims across social and economic divides. After independence, the Muslim League could not successfully transform itself from a nationalistic movement to a nationwide political party that commanded the loyalty of people across regional and political divides. It was unable to recognise the imperatives of nation state building in the context of an independent state. It could not articulate a credible platform to this end and thus lost momentum.”<sup>19</sup> Another thing should be pointed here is that the lack of a strong democratic culture and dominance of one party gave rise to ethnic and regional politics.

The Muslim League never encouraged growth of any political party. This resulted in political polarisation and adversely affected the prospects of democracy in Pakistan. The Muslim League lost its dominant political position in Pakistani politics within seven years of independence because “it failed to inspire the socio-economic agenda”. Again the internal weakness of the League contributed much to it. It also suffered factionalism that gave rise to different political parties. The provinces also came up with specific demands and on the basis of different sections of the society, birth of ethnic and religious political parties took place.<sup>20</sup>

Regional rivalries in Pakistan constituted an added complication and gave birth to ethnic

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<sup>18</sup> Wollack, Kenneth (2002), *Political Parties in Developing and Developed Countries*, Beijing: pp. 3 [Online web] Accessed 5 May 2012, URL

[http://www.ndi.org/files/1801\\_carnegiechinaspeech\\_121702.pdf](http://www.ndi.org/files/1801_carnegiechinaspeech_121702.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Rizvi, Hasan Askari (2001), “The History of Political Parties in Pakistan”, *South Asian Journal*, (30): pp. 81

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 81-82

and region-specific political parties. But the system in which they operated was not a familiar one. In this context Hasan.A.Rizvi states that “Party discipline was almost non-existent, with the obvious result that every major shift in party loyalty produced a veritable crisis. These crises appeared so frequently that The Times, London cited the provinces of Pakistan as an almost classic example of what Aristotle called as Stasis — the factional unrest which is the most dangerous enemy of constitutional and orderly government. It was caused by factors like fundamental cleavages in social structure, differences in religion, culture and classes, and the fact of the political revolution not coinciding with social alteration. Thus initially ethnic-based parties weren’t there in concrete shape, they came more as a symbol of regional representation against the domination of the Muslim League and martial regimes.”<sup>21</sup>

### ***The National Awami Party (NAP)***

Ethnic relations have left a sizeable imprint on Pakistani politics, as state policies have suppressed, rather than accommodated, the country’s ethnic and regional groups. Most regional parties reflect these concerns, highlighting ethnic discontent and alienation arising from inequitable distribution of power and authority between the centre and the four federating units.<sup>22</sup> Among these Pakhtun-based regional parties like the Awami National Party (ANP) stand as potent.

Tracing back the history of the Awami National Party, it is seen that it gets its origin from the National Awami Party (NAP), where the Pakhtun nationalists joined with the other leftist groups to fight for their provincial rights. An examination in this context is required to show how NAP differed from ANP, what was the environment in which both the parties were born and the differences of objectives between them.

The National Awami Party, which is marked as a leftist progressive political party, was founded in 1957 in Dhaka with the integration of several progressive political parties. It

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, pp. 82

<sup>22</sup> International Crisis Group (2005), Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, Asia Report (102), 2005, Published by International Crisis Group: Pakistan, pp.12 [Online: web] Accessed 5 May, 2012 URL: <http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/politicalpartyreforminpakistan.pdf>.



was regarded as the “only opposition party to Ayub Khan’s pro-US regime in 1960s” and was also believed by some as the front organisation of the Communist Party of Pakistan.<sup>23</sup>

Wali Khan while describing the National Awami Party said, “There was a get-together of the democratic forces in 1948 in Karachi when the need for forming a Party was. Soon after wards there were wholesale arrests in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It was in 1956 when the threads were picked up again and the actual party took a concrete shape where several political organisations from the western wing combined to form the National Party of Pakistan. The constituent units were the Khudai Khidmatgars from NWFP led by Ghaffar Khan, from Baluchistan Wrore Pakhtoon Party led by Abdus Samad, Asthman Gal with Prince Abdul Karim at its head, from Sind, Sind Hari Committee and from Punjab came the Azad Pakistan Party. This party assumed a truly national colour within a year in 1957 when it was joined by the Awami league of East Pakistan lead by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and other organisations like Ganatrantic dal, the Pakistan National Awami Party then came in to existence.”<sup>24</sup>

Thus the first leftist organisation, the National Awami Party until the promulgation of martial law in October 1958, held the balance of power in the East and West Pakistan legislatures. In the National Assembly it provided a small but articulate opposition that constantly harped upon anti-Western policy and dismemberment of “One Unit” in West Pakistan. This strategy had been pursued both at the centre and in the provinces to avoid holding office. Off the floors of the Houses, the NAP was determined to make the “down-trodden” of society more conscious of their problems. Its declared objective had been to launch an uncompromising struggle against imperialism and feudalism.<sup>25</sup>

Significantly the NAP acted according to the need of the time. Instead of putting specific demands it voiced for provincial autonomy and decentralisation of power. Thus the NAP initially, instead of taking any ethnic colour, worked for restoration of regional

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<sup>23</sup>. Cited in Rafique Afzal M. (1987), *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1958-1969*, Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, pp. 110

<sup>24</sup>. Cited in Khan, Hameed (1971), *Political Parties: Their Policies and Programmes*, Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., pp. 104

<sup>25</sup> Rashiduzzaman, M. (1970), “The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis”, *Pacific Affairs*, 43(3), pp. 394

autonomy, land reforms and independent foreign policy. Another fact that is worth mentioning here is that the politicians who were the members of the NAP were never subscribed to Muslim League and in fact opposed the demands of Pakistan. “As they worked actively for finding a role in united India, they naturally had problems finding a role in Pakistan’s politics. They enjoyed some support in their respective areas and over the time found a role for themselves in the post-independence era of politics by championing the cause of provincial autonomy, and at a time clamoured for the establishment of “Pakhtunistan” for the Pathans, “Sindhu Desh” for the Sindhis and Baluchistan for the Baluchis. Thus the NAP became a forum of regionalists and socialists and was rightly described as a ‘union of malcounters’ who were always in opposition. It stood for abolition of feudalism, better peasant-proprietor relationship, withdrawal from the defence pact and reconstruction of the economy through encouragement of national enterprise and securing the rights of working class through state intervention.”<sup>26</sup>

Thus the National Awami Party came up with the colour of national representation where the party worked together to end military domination and one unit plan.

### ***The Party Manifesto***

The National Awami Party gave emphasis on the formation of nation on linguistic and ethnic basics rather than on religion and they said the provinces must be reorganised on linguistic basis.

The NAP urged that the foreign policy of the state must be Non-Aligned and Pakistan should withdraw itself from the SEATO and CENTO agreement as it was an act of Pakistan’s bandwagoning for the United States.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2000), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, pp. 147

<sup>27</sup> The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, signed in September 1954 in Manila, Philippines. These treaties and agreements were intended to create alliances that would contain communist powers (Communist China, in SEATO's case) during the cold war era. This policy was considered to have been largely developed by American diplomat and Soviet expert George F. Kennan. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953–1959) is considered to be the primary force behind the creation of SEATO. But it failed and got dissolved in 1977. The Central Treaty Organization also referred to as CENTO (original name was Middle East Treaty

The party advocated the confederal structure of the government and held the necessity to give supreme authority to the provinces. Only defence and foreign policy were to be controlled by the federal government. It supported the state ideology on the basis of socialism.<sup>28</sup>

Basically the NAP desired a strong central government of a kind that will hold Pakistan together and foster national unity on the basis of socio-economic reforms. It also aimed to reduce the “authority of the centre”.<sup>29</sup>

Being a coalition of so many parties, different groups in it felt more strongly about one or the other item of its programme, which often led to serious tension. Again the process of breeding tension inside the group started with Ayub Khan’s foreign policy and international rifts in the communist world. The frontier people of the National Awami Party did not like the close relation of Pakistan with People’s Republic of China. But the east wing fraction of the NAP sided with Khan’s policy and was not vocal about the pro-China foreign policy issues taken by the President.<sup>30</sup>

Other factors contributing to fragmentation was Maulana Bhashani’s emphasis on the rights of the labour and peasants and Ghaffar Khan’s enthusiasm about the dissolution of one unit. As a result, “the patch work” could not continue for long and saw a split between Maulana Bhashani and Khan Wali Khan ostensibly over Bhashani’s siding with China and Professor Muzaffar Ahmed along with Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s siding with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet split.<sup>31</sup>

### ***From National Awami Party to Awami National Party: Representative of the Pakhtuns***

After the disintegration of the party into two fractions, the western wing of the NAP

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Organization or METO); also known as the Baghdad Pact was formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979. It was a cold war alliance. U.S. pressure and promises of military and economic aid were important in the negotiations leading to the agreement.

Bandwagoning is alignment with a dominant power, either to appease it or in the hope of profiting from its victory.

<sup>28</sup> Khan, Hameed (1971), *Political Parties: Their Policies and Programmes*, Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., pp. 105

<sup>29</sup> William Rushbook L.F.(1975), *Pakistan Under Challenge*, USA:Stacey International,pp. 85

<sup>30</sup> Afzal, M. Rafique (1987), *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969 Vol II*, Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, pp. 108

headed by Wali Khan had only substantial support in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the Pakhtun-dominated areas. But it was neither properly organised nor enjoyed popular support in other areas of Pakistan. The 1970 manifesto called for socialism, democracy, nationalisation of industries, a welfare state and an independent foreign policy. During campaigning, Wali Khan tried to mobilise the landowning class and petty bourgeoisie, particularly in Peshawar and Mardan divisions by stressing NWFP's "underdevelopment at the hands of Punjabi dominated centre." His appeal was on the basis of Pakhtun culture. But initially the party was unable to get good support from the people and apart from Peshawar and Mardan it failed to establish as a majority party. The party was known for its regional approach in politics and concentrated on the problems of their respective areas while conspicuously ignoring the national issues.<sup>32</sup>

Another problem with the National Awami Party was that it was dominated by those landowning interests and petty bourgeoisie who believed in a strategy of capitalist development and aspired to become industrial capitalist themselves. As Feroz Ahmed pointed out, there were people in NAP who aspired to control capitalist means of production and not who held them.<sup>33</sup>

But the National Awami Party leaders often gave the reason that because of their constant confinement and restriction placed on their political activities they had not been able to translate Pakhtun ethnic consciousness into widespread support for their political party throughout the province.<sup>34</sup>

The general elections held in 1970 brought the NAP to the forefront as the opposition party. "It contested 64 seats for the National Assembly election from both the wings at the national and provincial levels and 6 of its candidates were elected including Wali Khan. In the Provincial Assembly it got 13 seats in NWFP and 8 seats in Balochistan."<sup>35</sup> Wali Khan tried to mobilise support from the landowning classes and the petty

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pp. 108

<sup>32</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2000), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 147

<sup>33</sup> Cited in Sayeed, Khalib B. (1980), *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, USA: Preager Publishers, pp. 130

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, pp. 126

<sup>35</sup> Verma, Monika (2006), *Political Parties and Party System in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, pp. 24

bourgeoisie by stressing the underdevelopment of the province in the hands of the Punjabi-dominated centre.<sup>36</sup>

Likewise in the 1971 election NAP and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in spite of having a similar kind of ideology failed to work together because of the clash of personality between Wali Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Wali Khan was in the opposition after the election. He formed the United Democratic Front with the right wing parties and became its leader during this time. He also became the leader of the opposition.<sup>37</sup>

In 1972 the NAP and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) formed a coalition and a government in NWFP and Baluchistan. The central government accused Wali Khan of engaging in anti-Pakistan activities through an alleged 'London Plan', which he was accused to have charted in London for disintegration of Pakistan. Meanwhile the Baluchistan crisis gave another push to the politics of NAP after the discovery of arms in the Iraqi Embassy allegedly for transfer to Baluchistan. Finally the Liaquat Bagh Massacre that saw firing on the NAP supporters also gave a blow to the party.<sup>38</sup>

In the face of an increasingly strong national campaign led by the NAP against the government, "Bhutto banned the party on February 8, 1975 after the murder of his close colleague Hayat Khan Sherpao, throwing thousands of its workers and leaders, including party President Khan Abdul Wali Khan, in jail. Invoking the first amendment of the 1973 Constitution, the government charged Wali Khan and his colleagues under the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case in 1976. Although they were acquitted of the charge of the murder of PPP stalwart Hayat Khan Sherpao, the decision to ban the NAP was upheld by the courts."<sup>39</sup>

With the NAP leadership largely imprisoned, Sherbaz Khan Mazari formed a new political party named the National Democratic Party (NDP) on the "wreckage of the NAP" in 1976. Sherbaz Khan Mazari led the NDP into joining the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The Hyderabad case was withdrawn after General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in July 1977. Wali Khan left party

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, pp. 24

<sup>37</sup> Ahmed, Feroz (1998), *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 224

<sup>38</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2000), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 147

affairs to Sher Baz Mazari after his release from jail in 1979. The party faced a split at that time between far left elements led by Khair Bakhsh Marri advocating outright separation and armed struggle and those advocating political struggle led by Sherbaz Khan Mazari. The split ended the alliance between Pakhtun Nationalists and Baloch Nationalists that Wali Khan had formed in 1969 and led to the formation of the Pakistan National Party. During the 1977 election, the National Democratic Party formed a part of the great alliance against Bhutto known as Pakistan National Alliance. It was a coalition of NDP and JUI that own 17 out of 26 seats in the National Assembly. The NDP walked out of PNA when the latter joined the Zia government.<sup>40</sup>

The NDP was merged with other nationalist parties from Balochistan and Sindh in 1986 in Karachi to launch a new political party named the Awami National Party with Wali Khan as its president and Rasul Bux Palejo as its General Secretary.<sup>41</sup>

### ***The Awami National Party (ANP)***

In Pakistan two mainstream parties have basically dominated the political landscape: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the more conservative and pro business Pakistan Muslim League (PML). But ethnic relations also influence Pakistan's political scene. So with the mainstream parties, regional parties started dominating the scene like the Pakhtun-based Awami National Party.<sup>42</sup>

After the election following General Zia's death in 1988, "the Awami National Party won with a majority in the NWFP, but fell short of forming a government in the province. It soon failed over the issue of the appointment of the Provincial Governor. The Awami National Party (Awami means "people's"), which depends on the Pakhtuns of the NWFP and northern Balochistan as its political base, won 6 seats in the National Assembly in the 1990 elections. In the 1993 national elections, the party won 3 seats in the National

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, pp. 148

<sup>40</sup> Verma, Monika (2006), *Political Parties and Party System in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, pp. 25

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, pp.25

<sup>42</sup> Grare, Frederic (2007), "Bangladesh and Pakistan: From Secession to Convergence?" in Ashley J. Tellis, and Michael Wills (eds.) *Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy*, Canada: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 216

Assembly.”<sup>43</sup>

But by the end of 1994, the NWFP inhabitants had seemingly become fully integrated into the political process. The ANP joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) coalition and after joining, it almost gave up its strong Pakhtun identity. The ANP was in coalition with the IJI irrespective of the fact that the former was opposed to Kalabag dam construction which flooded the areas of Peshawar and Noshahra and also opposed the withdrawal of tax concession to Gadoon Amanzai industrial estate in the NWFP which the other members supported.<sup>44</sup>

The birth of the ANP was in a situation of stark contrast with that of the NAP. It took place in the period of Cold War, when a proxy war was going on between the United States of America and Soviet Union in Afghanistan. That period saw the martial law of Zia-ul-Haq and witnessed his policy of Islamisation and Afghan Jihad. The ANP started with the agenda of ending of martial law, restoration of democracy and friendly relation with Afghanistan. But again it saw breakup with some of the members forming Qaumi Inqilabi Party. The ANP then took specifically the colour of a Pakhtun party that wanted to end the Punjabi domination in Pakistan and also to apply a policy of non-interference in the internal matter of Afghanistan by the state.<sup>45</sup>

Thus soon after the formation of the party, Wali Khan’s support for Moscow on the Afghan Issue and his leanings towards India thwarted his attempts to extend his party’s influence towards Punjab. It remained limited to the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The ANP actively participated in the 1988 elections. Its manifesto promised full provincial autonomy to all the constituent units of the federation, except in matters of defence, foreign affairs, currency and communication. It promised not to legislate against Qur’an and Sunnah. It advocated revolutionary changes in the agricultural system, establishment of heavy industries in the private sector, protection of the tenants’ rights,

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<sup>43</sup> Becker, Mary Louise (1995), “Government and Politics”, In Peter R. Blood (eds.) *Pakistan a Country Side*, USA: Federal Research Division of Library of Congress, pp. 222

<sup>44</sup> Shah, Mehtab Ali (1997), *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-1994*, USA: I.B. Tauris Publication, pp. 174

<sup>45</sup> Data collected on the basis of news reading on BBC Urdu, “Awami National Party Pukhtoon”, BBC Urdu, [Online: web] Accessed 10 April 2012, URL: [http://www.pashtovideos.com/pukhtoon/history-of-pukhtoon-nationalist-awami-national-party-video\\_8c80a4b5c.html](http://www.pashtovideos.com/pukhtoon/history-of-pukhtoon-nationalist-awami-national-party-video_8c80a4b5c.html)

and an independent foreign policy.<sup>46</sup>

### ***The Awami National Party and Alliance Politics***

“Forming political alliances is a process of organising parties collectively in pursuit of a common goal or objective. The elements or actions that entail this process include among others the pooling of resources, forming binding commitments and an agreement on the distribution arrangement of the product that may result from achieving this goal.” A political alliance is a “temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through joint action.” In other words, it is “the union of different political parties or groups for a particular purpose, usually for a limited time. In multi-party systems no single party can win a majority of seats. Party alliances may be forged either by giving serious considerations to ideological positions of respective parties on political chessboard or by ignoring them altogether.”<sup>47</sup> Sometimes forming alliance with parties ideologically completely different may lead to breakup of the alliance.

After coming to power the ANP has formed alliance with different parties to stay in power. Though differences on certain issues broke them, but after the 2008 election it is going with the coalition partners more or less well.

Tracing the line from 1988, it is seen that the ANP has maintained a significant presence in the legislatures. Of the 80 seats in the KP assembly, it won ten in the 1988 election where it formed a coalition with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).<sup>48</sup> However the cooperation with the PPP did not last long. The two parties soon developed differences on the appointment of the NWFP Governor and the powers of the ANP ministers. The difference turned into open hostilities that brought to an end the alliance between the two. The ANP then joined hands with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz [PML(N)] and put up candidates in the 1990 elections by mutual adjustments with the PML(N). The ANP

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<sup>46</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2004), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 151

<sup>47</sup> Mustafa, Ghulam (2010), “Alliance Politics in Pakistan: A Study of the United Front”, Pakistan: *Journal of History and Culture*, 31(1) : pp. 104

<sup>48</sup> Syed, Anwar (2008), “ANP and its Antecedents”, *Dawn*, Islamabad, 12 January 2008,[Online: web] Accessed 7<sup>th</sup> April 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/31693>



benefitted from this co-operation. It secured 7 seats in the National Assembly and 22 seats in the NWFP Assembly. Besides it won 4 seats in the Senate. The PML (N)-ANP coalition government, headed by Mir Afzal Khan, remained in power in the NWFP till the removal of Nawaz Sharif government and the dissolution of the Assemblies in 1993. The ANP again co-operated with the PML (N) in the 1993 elections. It secured 3 seats in the National Assembly and 21 seats in the NWFP, but that ministry could stay in power for just two months.<sup>49</sup>

The ANP participated in the opposition movement against the Benazir government that led to its dismissal. “In 1997 elections, it won 9 seats in the National Assembly and 27 seats in the NWFP Assembly. When the representatives were installed it got its share in the federal and the NWFP government. Its repeated success revived its parochial tendencies. When Sharif government was besieged in its conflict with the judiciary, the party thought it fit to pressurise the beleaguered Prime Minister to change the name to Pakhtunkhwa. But because of pressure from within the PML (N), Nawaz Sharif refused to accept this demand; this led to a breakup of the nine year old PML (N)-ANP cooperation. The party joined the Grand Alliance and campaigned against Sharif. After Pervez Musharraf came to power, it remained an active member of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy till the 9/11 incident when it supported the United States in the ousting of the Taliban. Taking advantage of this the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), riding on a wave of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, was able to buy the sentiments of the people.”<sup>50</sup>

Though its number of seats in the Assembly increased to 124 just before the 2002 election but that year the Islamic parties had a clear sweep.<sup>51</sup> Before the 2008 election the key Pakhtun nationalist forces in the province, consisting of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) and the Awami National Party (ANP) joined hands to fight the problems being faced by the Pakhtuns and also to contest the elections from a single platform. Sinking their differences, they formed the Pakhtunkhwa National Democratic

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<sup>49</sup> Mahmood, Safdar (2004), *Pakistan Political Roots and Development*, Karachi: Oxford Press, pp. 151

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, pp.152

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, pp. 152

Alliance (PNDA).<sup>52</sup> But in the 2008 election it emerged as the largest party in the house of NWFP and formed the government in coalition with the PPP in the centre. The party has all along shown a bias in favour of socialism, but more as a political theory than a controlling framework for policymaking. In any case it stands to the left of centre in its policy preferences.<sup>53</sup>

### ***The 2008 Election: ANP's coming to the Fore***

A new journey took place for the Awami National Party from 2008, and since then there is no looking back. The ANP managed to make a position in the political hierarchy, having a majority government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and being in the coalition government of Pakistan.

In the 2008 election the party contested on its own and won a plurality of votes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as winning seats in Balochistan for the first time in 15 years and in Karachi for the first time. It subsequently formed a government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is supporting the PPP government in the centre as well as in Sindh and Balochistan. The strongholds of the ANP are in the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan except in Punjab, particularly in the Peshawar valley of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while Karachi hosts one of the largest Pakhtun populations in the world with 7.0 million Pakhtuns. In the 2008 election, the ANP won 2 Sindh Assembly seats in Karachi.<sup>54</sup>


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<sup>52</sup> Ahmed, Jamil (2007), "Gearing up for the Elections", Dawn, Islamabad, 15 March 2007[Online: web] Accessed 13 May 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/2007/11/26/op.htm>, November 26, 2007

<sup>53</sup> Syed, Anwar (2008), "ANP and its Antecedents", Dawn, Islamabad, 12 January 2008,[Online: web] Accessed 7 April 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/31693>

<sup>54</sup> "Awami National Party", The Free Dictionary, [Online Web], Accessed on 22 February 2012, URL <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/awami+national+party>


**Major Political Parties : Number of seats won for 272 general seats in the National Assembly**



**Chart 3.1:** Source: Graph prepared based on data, Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi, (2008), “Return of the Democrats Pakistan After Elections”, Issue Brief, March (61), New Delhi :IPCS.

In the KP, the ANP had a clear sweep and the MMA, which secured 48 provincial seats in 2002, managed to win only 10 seats in 2008. The ANP waltzed its way to a comeback in the province securing 31 seats and so did the PPP winning 17 Assembly seats.

**NWFP Provincial Assembly**



**Chart 3.2:** Source: Graph prepared based on data, Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi, (2008), “Return of the Democrats Pakistan After Elections”, Issue Brief, March (61), New Delhi :IPCS.

The Pakhtun-dominated area KP where the ANP has its maximum support set forth certain demands that KP should get provincial, national and international attention. The presence of domestic actors in terms of Pakhtuns of Pakistan, international actors in terms of the US and Afghanistan and non-state actors in terms of al-Qaeda and Taliban should be balanced in a way that they will not pose challenge for the government.<sup>55</sup> After winning the elections the ANP was successfully able to change the name of the province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The manifesto of the Awami National Party gives a detail of the goals and objective of the party. It seems that in some cases it is in contrast with the NAP. With time the ANP has changed and broadened its goals and objectives. It has tried to accommodate the issues that are of most concern now. But though it works for the Pakhtuns, it nowhere mentions about it. Rather it tries to work for the overall development of the people of the neglected provinces emphasising on the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

### ***Objective of the Party as in the Manifesto***

To understand the working of the party it is very necessary to look at the objectives put forward by the party. This will give a clear picture about how the ANP has changed with time and broadened its goal to survive. But can the party particularly be called a Pakhtun ethnic party? A proper analysis will show how far the ANP is the vanguard of Pakhtun nationalism.

The preamble of the party states, “The ANP, like its predecessors, the NAP (National Awami Party) and the NDP (National Democratic Party), looks upon politics primarily as a public service, particularly to the poor and the disadvantaged. Hence the Party is dedicated to the promotion of democracy and freedom, the eradication of poverty, the protection of human rights, the combating of extremism in all its forms and the creation of equal opportunities for all citizens. It firmly believes in peace and non-violence as the best way to resolve all issues. It is committed to secure for all the federating units of

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<sup>55</sup> Chandran, Suba and Chakravarthi, Rekha (2008), “Return of the Democrats Pakistan After Elections”, *Issue Brief*, March (61), New Delhi: IPCS, pp. 2

Pakistan their full political, social and economic rights as equal partners in the federation and their fair share in national progress and prosperity. In the pursuit of these goals, the ANP is ready to work together with like-minded forces in Pakistan and to subscribe to partnerships with all peace loving countries of the world.”<sup>56</sup>

### ***Political Agendas***

The ANP is far more specific in its promise to revolutionise the structure of the state and the government. According to a report by Shamim-ur-Rahman, “The party plans for each federating unit to be autonomous in its regional matters with the federal government retaining control over currency, external affairs, communication and defence only. Furthermore, each federating unit will have the right to utilise its resources to its own advantage as long as the interests of another federating unit are not harmed. The federal legislature shall be bicameral, the House of Representatives shall be chosen on the basis of adult franchise and equal representation shall be given to all the federating units. Meanwhile, the party pledges to ensure the rights of each nationality on the basis of equality, and every nationality will have equal opportunity to take part in state affairs.” These issues are likely to enhance the position of the ANP.<sup>57</sup>

Along with that the party in its manifesto states that the preservation of democracy and the rule of law, protection of the rights and identities of the peoples of all provinces of Pakistan and unrestricted freedom for the development of their cultures and languages. It will stand for the fundamental rights of the people and will tolerate no discrimination of any kind based on race, creed or gender. The ANP will emphasise the maintenance of law and order so as to protect the security of citizens, which has been considerably endangered of late. It talks for the independent role of judiciary and non-interference in the politics by the armed forces. It favours that the federal legislature shall continue to be bicameral as at present, but the powers of the Senate shall be enhanced so as to include

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<sup>56</sup> “Party Manifesto of Awami National Party”, [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL:

[http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)

<sup>57</sup> Shamim-ur-Rahman (2008), “The issues at Stake on Feb 18”, *Dawn*, Karachi, 15 February 2008, [Online: web] Accessed 22 February 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/2008/02/15/local5.html>.

initiation of money bills and approval of higher appointments.<sup>58</sup>

### ***Separation of Military from Politics***

The ANP is the only political party to address the issue of Pakistan's armed forces and the expense incurred by them. Shamim-ur-Rahman reports, "The party believes that Pakistan cannot afford to maintain such an unwieldy army and proposes that the forces be not only downsized, but that army personnel be trained to take part in productive processes. It promises that defence expenditure will be reduced to an affordable level and the country's defence will become the joint responsibility of the federation and its units, with the latter having the power to raise militias. The ANP also guarantees that the civil and military bureaucracy will not be allowed to interfere in politics and that all past military intervention in political processes shall be accounted for."<sup>59</sup>

### ***The Awami National Party and Human Security***


Human Security debunks the question of security from its traditional conception of the safety of states from military threats to concentrate on the safety of people and communities. Thus the referent object of security is changed to individuals; it also proposed the notion of safety to a condition beyond mere survival — to a life worth living. Hence the question of well being and dignity of human beings gets prominence.<sup>60</sup> Most of the provinces in Pakistan are marked with high levels of poverty, income inequality, illiteracy and poor health. Pakistanis — based on gender, geographic location, income level, class and social status — face extreme disparities in access to basic infrastructure, health and education services, and even in access to justice. Thus the ANP has widened the objective to fit in the issue of human security in its manifesto.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Shamim-ur-Rahman (2008), "The issues at Stake on Feb 18", *Dawn*, 15 February 2008, Karachi, [Online: web] Accessed 22 February 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/2008/02/15/local5.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Human Development Centre, (1999), *Human Development Report for South Asia: 1999: The Crisis of Governance*, The Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Oxford University Press: Karachi, pp. 11



**Diagram 3.1:** Source: Figure drawn based on the data of *Human Development Report for South Asia: 1999: The Crisis of Governance*, the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Oxford University Press: Karachi.

The ANP believes that the political rights and freedoms of the people have to be accompanied by advancement in the social and economic spheres. Poverty, disease and illiteracy have to be eliminated and social justice needs to be ensured.

### ***Labour Rights***

Workers’ representatives and leading political parties along with the ANP have mutually agreed on the importance of including labour rights in the election manifestos in order to ensure strict implementation of the same in the country.

Sindh Labour Minister Ameer Nawab Khan said that the ANP believes the labourers should be educated to create awareness of their rights. He claimed that there were labour laws in place but no political will.

Reportedly he said, “Though majority of workers do not have access to basic rights, the government is doing well to provide them facilities. For the informal sector, including agriculture and construction industry, the government is implementing a planned strategy to ensure social security to these workers.” It also states, “The government has made Sukkur a child-labour free district and is planning to expand the program in two to three more districts. The government is also convincing workers to enroll their children in

schools by supporting their education expenses.”<sup>61</sup>

### ***Fiscal Issues***

Fiscal issues are important for any country to develop economically. The ANP states that it will ensure that the 1991 decision of the Council of Common Interests in respect to hydel power profits accruing to the province is implemented in letter and spirit. The ANP has developed various demands for the development of the Pakhtunkhwa province.

The ANP will shift the emphasis from public sector development towards a market approach and will involve the private sector in the overall process of economic development of the province. At the same time it will seek to ensure safety nets for low income groups. The ANP will encourage and protect foreign investment and offer special incentives in this regard. New oil and gas discoveries have been made in Pukhtunkhwa, so new royalty rates will be negotiated to generate more resources for the development of the province. The Gungari North Western Gas Company, with its headquarters in Pakhtunkhwa, shall be established on the lines of SSGPL and SNGPL.<sup>62</sup>

The ravages of the Afghan wars and the presence of Afghan refugees for more than two decades have damaged the entire Pukhtunkhwa’s natural resource base and infrastructure. The ANP will strive for additional resources to offset these reverses. It will pursue the development of irrigation projects at the federal and provincial level to utilise about 2 MAF of water that is still available to it for development and will work to make power a provincial subject.<sup>63</sup>

While discussing about the economy, the Party President Asfandiyar Wali Khan said, “The toughest task in front of the government is to handle the economic problems. The soaring prices of essential commodities have already broken the backbone of the people.

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<sup>61</sup> Staff report, (2012), “Labour rights to be incorporated in election manifestoes”, *The News International*, Karachi, 5 May 2012.

[Online: web] Accessed 5 June 2012, URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-106582-Labour-rights-to-be-incorporated-in-election-manifestoes>.

<sup>62</sup> Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) is the largest integrated natural gas company in Pakistan. The company's transmission system extends over 7300 km from Sui, Balochistan to Peshawar, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

<sup>63</sup> “Party Manifesto of Awami National Party”, [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL:



They are not satisfied with the state of the economy. An economy is strong when the benefits reach the people.”<sup>64</sup>

### ***Regional Trade***

According to the party manifesto, “ANP believes the natural market for Pukhtunkhwa is Afghanistan & the Central Asian Republics. Every measure will be taken to increase bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade links with them. ANP welcomes the concept of the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) and hopes for its early implementation as it will promote regional trade.”<sup>65</sup>

### ***Women’s Rights and Empowerment***

The ANP manifesto states, “Pakistani women are trapped in a web of dependency and subordination due to their low social, economic, and political status. The majority of women suffer from all forms of poverty, discrimination and violence. There are inherent structural impediments that prevent and discourage women from participating in the decision making process and this perpetuates their disadvantaged status. Although Pakistan has made commitments at the National and International levels to ensure women’s rights, there is a wide gap between commitment and implementation. ANP aims at the emancipation of Women.”<sup>66</sup> Along with that the ANP is also against the degradation of climate and poor health condition of the people, so it works for environmental and health security also.

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[http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)

<sup>64</sup> Khan Muqaddam (2008), “Interview — Asfandyar Wali Khan, President, Awami National Party”, Herald Elections 2008, *Dawn Archives*, [Online Web] Accessed on 5 April 2012  
URL <http://archives.dawn.com/weekly/herald/herald10.htm>.

<sup>65</sup> Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act. would establish a unilateral U.S. trade preference program for Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. In an effort to promote economic development in both countries, the legislation would permit certain goods produced in designated geographic areas called Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) to be imported into the United States duty-free. ROZs would be a specific type of export processing zone, and thus part of a world-wide network of free trade zones.

“Party Manifesto of Awami National Party”, [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL: [http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)

<sup>66</sup> Ibid

### ***The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA)***

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) have an area of 27,000 square kilometres and a population of about 4 million. This region is administered by the President under Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution. Pakistani laws are not applicable, the jurisdiction of the superior courts has not been extended and the inhabitants do not enjoy fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The tribes remain the victim of poverty and area has the lowest social indices in the country. The literacy rate is only 17% versus the national average of 45 percent. Female literacy is an abject 3 % versus 32 % for the rest of the country.

The region has suffered the most serious dislocation due to conditions in Afghanistan ever since 1979. Extremist elements have sought refuge in parts of the FATA and have, unfortunately, succeeded in imposing themselves on the tribes in certain areas. Development work has virtually ceased, the administration has collapsed and the normal method of mediation through the 'jirga' is not being utilised properly. The ANP claims that it wants to extend political socio-economic reform to these underdeveloped tribal areas by giving seats in Provincial Assembly and extending political party act to this area. The ANP also wants a merger of the FATA to KP.<sup>67</sup>

### ***Foreign Affairs***

Muqarrab Akbar writes, "Pakistan has one of the most complex threat analyses of any state in the world. So a comprehensive foreign policy action should be taken to minimise the possibilities of making Pakistan vulnerable internally and externally. The geostrategic position of Pakistan comes as a mixed blessing. In the north is China, an emerging economic giant; in the east India, a state with vastly superior industrial resources and a much larger human base and intense conflicts with Pakistan over many issues particularly Kashmir issue; in the west lies Iran and Afghanistan, never friendly and source of internal tension and domestic instability; to the south positioned Arabian sea, a gateway to

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<sup>67</sup> "Party Manifesto of Awami National Party", [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL:

Central Asian States through Gwadar Port. Further, two of Pakistani provinces with vast population have strong ethnic and tribal ties across the border in Afghanistan while on the Indian frontier there is unresolved dispute over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's domestic politics remains intimately linked to political relations with Pakistan's neighbours. Any analysis of threats to Pakistan's security must emphasis on this overlapping phenomenon between external and internal problem. The geographical shape of Pakistan and the distribution of its population complicate the defence problem. In its northern end there is cease-fire line controlled by UN Peace Keepers (UNMOGIP)."<sup>68</sup> In addition, Pakistan is the only nuclear power in the Islamic world. Given the present tensions in the world, this nuclear capability can present a grave threat to the country's security rather than guarantee that security, which was the reason for going nuclear in the first place. The country's foreign policy has, therefore, to be finely adjusted to guard against these dangers while, at the same time, it must serve to further the national interest in terms of economic and commercial progress.<sup>69</sup>

The idea of Wali Khan regarding foreign affairs was that a peaceful Afghanistan was a must for Pakistan's own stability and prosperity. If the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan was sought, Pakistan would also have to eject foreign militants like the Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks from its territory for establishing peace in the region. Replying to a reporter's question about relations with India, Asfandiyar Wali Khan, who is also the chairman of National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, said there was trust-deficit between the two neighbouring countries. Unless steps were taken to improve the atmosphere, the relations between India and Pakistan won't improve.<sup>70</sup>

Keeping this in view, the ANP will work for a foreign policy which contains the following elements:

The Awami National Party wants to keep friendly and peaceful relations with all

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[http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)  
<sup>68</sup> Akbar, Muqarrab (2011), "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Internal Challenges in New Millennium", Berkeley: *Journal of Social Sciences*, 1(2), pp. 4 [online Web] Accessed 14 April 2012, <http://berkeleyjournalofsocialsciences.com/Feb%204.pdf>

<sup>69</sup> "Party Manifesto of Awami National Party", [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL:

[http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)  
<sup>70</sup> Staff Reporter (2010), "Asfandiyar Calls for Separation", *The Nation*, Peshawar, 17 May 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english->

countries, particularly with neighbours. Along with that it aims for compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and full participation in all its developmental and peace-keeping activities.

Its Pakhtun colour comes to the fore while dealing with the issue of Afghanistan. It wants special attention in case of relations with Afghanistan. ANP states that in view of the commonalities in culture, faith, language and history between the people of Pukhtunkhwa and those of Afghanistan, determined efforts should be made to promote cooperation in every field including economic, commercial, educational and cultural. Bilateral relations should be conducted strictly on the basis of sovereign equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Along with that the party aims for peaceful dealings with India, especially on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The traditional close relation with China should be maintained. A clear shift in the attitude of the party from its predecessors, who followed an anti-West policy, is visible while dealing with the United States. The ANP wants a cordial relation between the two because Pakistan has much to gain from this. These relations will be characterised by dignity and self respect and must result in mutual benefit. For the same reasons, relations with the European Union will be further developed. The ANP also desires that Pakistan should play a leading and constructive role in the Organization of Islamic Conference, SAARC and ECO.<sup>71</sup>

Thus while dealing with external affairs the Awami National Party wants a friendly approach towards other countries and wants to drive the policy in such a manner which will come as a benefit for Pakistan in general and the Pakhtuns in particular.

### ***The Ups and Downs of Pakhtun Politics and Political Parties***

The initial support for the parties of the Pakhtuns specially the National Awami Party (NAP) showed a decline in the 1960s. By late 1960s, the Pakhtuns were well integrated in the state system of Pakistan. They were well represented in the army and civil bureaucracy. Thus when the process of integration started gradually the support for the NAP decreased. When “the first free elections were held in 1970, the Pakistan Muslim

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online/politics/17- May-2010/Asfandyar-calls-for-separation.

<sup>71</sup> “Party Manifesto of Awami National Party”, [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2011, URL:

League (PML) with its 7 seats emerged as the main winner, whereas the National Awami Party, headed by Ghaffar Khan's son Wali Khan, won only 3 seats and 18.4 percent votes. Even in the 1993-97 elections the Awami National Party was unable to hold its grip. Throughout these years the NAP, now ANP (Awami National Party) had won only in the prosperous region of Peshawar and Mardan. This region is not only the most fertile in the NWFP but also the most educated and thus has a larger share in power. As a real beneficiary of power and privileges its support for the ANP obviously means not a desire for separation but for a bigger chunk in power and privileges.”<sup>72</sup> The ANP's politics of ethnicity represent these desires very well.

Even when Ghaffar Khan was leading the party it was not clear what exactly was the nationalists' plan for the future of Pakhtuns. The main issues that were raised were either the establishment of an independent state or a share in the existing one. Adeel Khan states that “despite being a social reformer and peasant leader, Ghaffar Khan never favoured any radical social or agrarian reforms that would have broken the hold of the landowners and benefited the peasantry. In fact, the Congress ministry's action to strip the landed gentry of its privileges was not to his likings, as he thought it would antagonise the big Khans. Under Wali Khan, the party lost its populist aura and ended up becoming an elitist pressure group whose politics is to enter into or withdraw from one alliance or another to make or break a government.”<sup>73</sup>

However, after the 2008 election it got back much of its fame and worked mostly according to its manifesto. But still the ANP has a long way to go as it is encircled with persisting problems and challenges.

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[http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27](http://awaminationalparty.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27)

<sup>72</sup> Khan, Adeel (2003), “ Pakhtun Ethnic Nationalism : From Separation to Integration”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(1):

pp. 82

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, pp.72

## Chapter 4

### Awami National Party and the New Challenges

The legislative elections held on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2008 have radically transformed Pakistan's political landscape, ushering in a new era of democratic government after almost nine years of military rule under President Pervez Musharraf.<sup>1</sup>

Once again after the 2008 elections, the Awami National Party (ANP) came to power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and as a coalition partner at the centre. They were welcomed in the province as a breath of fresh air after the suppressive and orthodox regime of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).<sup>2</sup> This achievement lies in the way of functioning of the ANP, which considers "politics as an outlet to reach out to the masses and serve them. Eradication of poverty, protection of human rights, wiping out terrorism and education remain the core issues that top the party's mandate."<sup>3</sup>

But the area where the party enjoys the majority, the North West Frontier has been facing potent security threats for long. Pakistan's northwest frontier, encompassing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) that was previously known as NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), together constitute the most volatile and troubled regions of the country. This ethnically Pakhtun-dominated frontier has a long history of agitational politics and anti-state Jihadi movements.<sup>4</sup> In the recent years, the area has

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<sup>1</sup> Shada Islam, (2008), "Building democracy and fighting extremism in Pakistan: a role for the EU", [Online Web] Accessed 5 February 2012

URL: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Policy-Briefs/Detail/?lng=en&id=55181>, pp. 1

<sup>2</sup> Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal was a coalition of far-right Islamist parties that was formed in 2002 to electorally challenge the Pakistan Parliament's incumbent parties. The MMA garnered the second-largest majority in the National Assembly Majlis-e-Shoora with 58 out of 342 seats, as well as a provincial majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and a provincial minority in Sindh and Balochistan in 2002 elections.

<sup>3</sup> Pakistan's Profiles, "Awami National Party", [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2012

URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/01/17/awami-national-party-anp/>

<sup>4</sup> Jihad is an Islamic term. It is a religious duty of the Muslims. In Arabic, the word jihad translates as a noun meaning "struggle". According to the authoritative Dictionary of Islam jihad is defined as: "A religious war with those who are unbelievers in the mission of Muhammad ... enjoined especially for the purpose of advancing Islam and repelling evil from Muslims." It also focuses on armed jihad in radical Islamic fundamentalism.

become associated with safe havens for al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups.<sup>5</sup>

Another problem is that the volatile regions of the tribal areas have posed many security threats to the region as the social and political dynamics in KP and FATA are inextricably linked to each other. Despite comparatively progressive forces taking control of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) after the success of the February 2008 provincial elections, stability remains elusive and the law and order situation has gradually deteriorated, raising important questions about the correlation between politics in the province and the nature and extent of militancy there.<sup>6</sup>

The Awami National Party, said to be the vanguard of the Pakhtuns, is a leftist party like its predecessor National Awami Party (NAP) though the NAP had a broader national support base than the ANP and it garnered support from other provinces as well. Although the ANP was a part of coalition governments in KP as well as in Islamabad during the late 1980s and 1990s, but it was not until 2008 that it was able to install a Chief Minister in KP. Also for the first time in the 2008 elections the ANP captured a couple of seats in the Sindh Provincial Assembly from Karachi, where large Pakhtun pockets exist.<sup>7</sup> But after coming to power the party had to face a range of challenges like the issues of militancy, trafficking and also matters relating to traditional and non-traditional security.

Though the country's overall political situation took a turn as a democratically elected government came to the fore after a nine year long military dictatorship, but the security threats and elitist politics of the ANP could hardly come up with a total progress in the provinces. However it should be mentioned here that one of the milestone measures that the ANP was successful in taking was the change in name of the province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Attaining a separate identity for the Pakhtuns and their province had long been on their agenda, which was finally achieved through the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment. However

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<sup>5</sup> Paris, Jonathan (2010), *Prospects for Pakistan*, London: Legatum Limited, pp. 34

<sup>6</sup> Abbas, Hassan ( 2010 ), "Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province The Political Landscape of the Insurgency", [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF\\_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf), pp. 1

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pp. 3

when examining their role it appears that politically and economically their performance has been quite dismal and the Pakhtun-dominated areas still stand at the crossroads.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Challenges ahead of the Awami National Party***

The Awami National Party's predecessors have fought a long battle against the state. The area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the potent area of support for the Awami National Party, wants to establish itself among the provinces of Pakistan by holding the hand of the Pakhtun-based political party. But the areas dominated by the Pakhtuns specially KP and FATA are long under the threat of traffickers and militants which has grown after 9/11. Along with that underdevelopment and unemployment have added to the problems of the Pakhtuns.

The ethnic overlapping with Afghanistan, which called for the creation of Pakhtunistan posing another challenge for the state and the people, is not in the cards for the Pakhtuns of Pakistan now. This is because the provincial government of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where the Pakistani Pakhtuns are concentrated, is economically dependent on Islamabad for over 90 % of its operating budget. They do not want to become a part of Pakhtunistan with their brethren across the Afghan border, who have a lower standard of living. But that does not mean Pakhtun ethno-nationalism is going to disappear. They are now more vocal for provincial autonomy for KP and greater use of Pakhtu language in schools and other places.<sup>9</sup>

Political dynamics in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have changed rapidly since the 2002 general election that was won by the MMA. The ANP's 2008 success in Kohat, Hangu, Nowshera and Peshawar, and the PPP's similar gains in Nowshera, Dera Ismail Khan, Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Swat were very significant because these regions were considered strongholds of religious parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).<sup>10</sup> However, voters rejected the JUI and JI because they linked signs

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<sup>8</sup> Wilkinson, Isambard (2008), "Pakistan renames North West Frontier Province to End Colonial Anachronism", *The Telegraph*, Islamabad, 26 May 2008

<sup>9</sup> Paris, Jonathan (2010), *Prospects for Pakistan*, London: Legatum Limited, pp. 34

<sup>10</sup> The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam is a far-right-wing and religious conservative political party in State of Pakistan. It formed a combined government in national elections in 2002 and 2008. The Jamaat-e-Islami is



of Talibanisation to the religious parties in power. The MMA's defeat can also be attributed to the coalition's perceived failures in its education, health, and anti-corruption policies and to an anti-incumbency trend in Pakistani politics. The issues of bureaucratic corruption and incompetence were widely covered by the local media during the MMA rule. Public expectations were high when the ANP-PPP alliance took power in March 2008 and thus with power came the duties of the parties to overcome the long list of challenges.<sup>11</sup>

### *Listing the challenges*

#### *The Problem of Militancy*

The roots of the Taliban problem in Pakistan can be traced in the post Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and it gradually took a concrete shape in the 1990s. "In 1996, the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan after defeating the Mujahideen with the political support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban renamed their country as 'Amarate- Islami Afghanistan' (Islamic State of Afghanistan). The Taliban were mostly created in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in madrasas with an emphasis on a strict version of Islam particularly in KP and Balochistan, and learned fighting skills from the Mujahideen. The Pakistani government never officially admitted to having housed and trained the Taliban, but its support was based on a couple of primary reasons. First, Pakistan believed that the Taliban would recognise the Durand Line. Second, the Taliban's anti-Shia and anti-India stance gave Pakistan an edge over other regional powers to achieve its long desired objective of 'strategic depth'."<sup>12</sup>

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also a right and Islamist political party, advocating for the religious fundamentalism and the Theocratic-based government system in Pakistan.

<sup>11</sup> Abbas, Hassan ( 2010 ), "Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province The Political Landscape of the Insurgency", [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF\\_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf), pp. 1

<sup>12</sup> Strategic depth is a term in military literature that broadly refers to the distances between the front lines or battle sectors and the combatants' industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key centres of population or military production. The key precepts any military commander must consider when dealing with strategic depth are how vulnerable these assets are to a quick, pre-emptive attack or to a methodical offensive and whether a country can withdraw into its own territory, absorb an initial thrust, and allow the

The problem faced by Pakistan today is the game played by its political leaders to curb Pakhtun nationalism. Nasreen Ghufuran said, “Links between the Afghan Taliban and Sunni extremists in Pakistan deepened with the tacit support of the Pakistani government, which calculated that the Taliban would help curb Pakhtun nationalism in KP (NWFP) and provide an outlet for Pakistan’s Islamic radicals, thus preventing a radical Islamist movement at home.” But this calculation proved misplaced as extremist groups started to grow across the Pakhtun tribal areas of KP and Balochistan. They eventually began targeting the secular Pakistani establishment.<sup>13</sup>

It is worth mentioning here that in the period from 1994 to 1996 the US through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also politically supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, because Washington viewed the Taliban as being anti-Iranian and pro-Western. This was mainly because the US was interested in seeing the “materialisation of the Unocal project, in which the American company proposed to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan”.<sup>14</sup> For these reasons, it was willing to tolerate, if not support, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But the US policy towards the Taliban began to change in 1998 after the latter continued to protect Osama Bin Laden and refused to go ahead with the Unocal venture. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks completely altered the US relationship with the Taliban regime and also affected its relationship with Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

Though Pakistan initially provided support to Taliban and provided them a safe haven in the country, it later became an ally in the war on terror, to get material support from the US and make the US a key ally of Pakistan.

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subsequent offensive to culminate short of its goal and far from its source of power. The term “strategic depth” has been used in reference to Pakistan’s utilization and contact with Afghanistan following the neighbouring country’s Soviet invasion, to prevent encirclement from a hostile India and a USSR-supported Afghanistan.

Cited in Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1103

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, pp. 1103

<sup>14</sup> Union Oil Company of California, (Unocal) is a defunct company that was a major petroleum explorer and marketer in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, through the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and into the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Unocal was one of the key players in the Cent Gas consortium; US wanted to build the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline to run from the Caspian area, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean.

The MMA's unwillingness to foster support for counter-terrorism during the Musharraf Presidency, especially between 2004 and 2007, allowed the Taliban to establish networks in KP. The KP government did not listen to political and social groups that favoured strong action against extremism. As the Taliban groups strengthened, they attacked military and government infrastructure in FATA. But in KP, "the Taliban did not directly confront the government initially, instead focused on ideological targets, such as girls' schools, ancient Buddhist shrines, women's rights activists, video and music shops, and barbershops (which shave beards against Islamist wishes). In KP, militants began warning women from 2005 not to appear in public without a veil. The movement started in the southern areas of KP — Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, and Bannu — that bordered South and North Waziristan, hotbeds of Taliban activity in FATA. Later the activity spread north into Kohat, Charsadda, Mardan, Dir, Swat and the provincial capital Peshawar — areas bordering Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, and Mohmand agencies in FATA. The MMA government did not adopt defensive measures to monitor the movement of militants from FATA to KP. The militants and the Islamist political parties in Pakistan share same ideas and social support. Component parties of the MMA, especially Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (both the Sami and Fazlur factions), run madrasas that provide recruits for militant training camps in FATA."<sup>16</sup> Analysing the situation in 2009, journalist Talat Farooq argued, "After 9/11 the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements, supported by their Pakistani sympathisers, crossed over into FATA as a result of Musharraf's two-faced policy that strengthened the Pakistani Taliban. This particular policy was never criticised by either the religious or the conservative parties... with the result that the militants have grown in power with the help of local criminals, drug mafia, arms dealers and foreign 'hands' that have joined them along the way."<sup>17</sup>

Another factor that possibly contributed to the growth of Taliban insurgency in the area is the Soviet factor. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the tribes in FATA and the Pakistani government had coexisted peacefully, but the Soviet invasion splintered

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<sup>15</sup> Ghufraan, Nasreen (2009), "Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1104

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, pp. 1104

<sup>17</sup> Farooq, Talat (2009), "Politicians and Rah-e-Raast," *The News International*, Islamabad, 13 July 2009, also available at <http://www.thenews.com.pk>

their traditional socio-economic and power structures, resulting in an imbalance that was utilised by the jihadis for gaining influence in these areas. These jihadis (Afghan Mujahideen and non-Afghans including Arabs, Central Asians, Pakistanis etc.) disrupted the tribal system as massive funding and weapon supplies from external sources and locals began to alter the structure. Mullahs who had earlier lacked much power in traditional Pakhtun society became the new actors and allies to wage jihad. Maliks lost their power to conservative mullahs who opened up many madrasas in the tribal areas, thereby contributing to the change. The area had also received huge influxes of Afghan refugees, which began to affect the tribal economy. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, these jihadi elements kept a low profile and gained the sympathy of the locals until they became strong enough to threaten the existing traditional power structure. FATA has been one of the most neglected regions of Pakistan. “The Pakistani government’s failure to provide the desperately needed socio-economic resources, including basic facilities in health, education and communications to the people of FATA made it easier for Taliban militants to gain a foothold in the area”. Furthermore, “the government’s inability to initiate both political and administrative reforms contributed to a vacuum in vital services that was filled by the Taliban and their supporters.”<sup>18</sup>

It is worth mentioning here that in 2007 there was growth of a new brand of Pakistani Taliban in the area known as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is an alliance of militant groups in Pakistan formed in 2007 to unify groups fighting against the Pakistani military in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP in 2011 claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in Pakistan in the aftermath of Osama Bin Laden’s death, including bombing of a Frontier Constabulary training centre, assault on a Pakistani naval base in Karachi, bombing of a Criminal Investigation Division building in Peshawar and bombing of a police station.<sup>19</sup>

Thus the central and the provincial governments were unable to put a halt on the attacks by the militants in Pakistan. “Bureaucrats in the six transitional areas wedged between

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<sup>18</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1104

<sup>19</sup> “Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)”, Terrorist Groups National Counter Terrorism Center, [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2012 URL: <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html>

FATA and KP districts — collectively known as the Frontier Regions — also failed to alert national authorities about the growing militancy. Both incompetence and sympathy with militants were at play. The most serious problems in KP today are occurring in Peshawar and its suburbs, where the Taliban and associated militant groups target government buildings, law enforcement officials, and ANP and PPP officials at will. Attacks on schools in Peshawar and its suburbs are a disturbing new trend.”<sup>20</sup>

The growing extremism in the area have also crippled the economy in KP, which borders Afghanistan and Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, though it is rich in agriculture, minerals and have stunning mountain scenery which was once popular with tourists and multiple local industries. The main industries in KP and FATA include marble, chemicals, rubber, plastic, food, tobacco, handicrafts, paper, leather and furniture, all of which have got a jolt. The match industry, the only export-oriented sector in KP that once employed around 5,000 people, has hit difficulties as a substantial quantity of the required wood comes from the conflict-torn districts. Banks have reduced their lending to local industry because of the growing instability and element of risk and which in turn have bred unemployment in the areas. These jobless youths are then put under the mercy of militants.<sup>21</sup>

However, on analysing the major trends of armed conflict between the security and the militants in FATA and KP in 2011, it can be seen that the number of attacks have come down as compared to the previous year. Mapping the conflicts three observations can be made. First, the areas of Muhammad and Khurram agencies are becoming the most violent regions because of the presence of the TTP and the anti-militancy operation. North and South Waziristan, which used to be the most violent region, witnessed only about a hundred attacks.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, the attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkwa are concentrated

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<sup>20</sup> Abbas, Hassan ( 2010 ), “Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province The Political Landscape of the Insurgency”, [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF\\_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_InsidePakistansNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf), pp. 7

<sup>21</sup> Correspondent (2009), “Pakistan’s economy falling prey to militancy”, *Dawn*, Karachi, 24 May 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 13 Jan 2012 URL: [archives.dawn.com/archives/18402](http://archives.dawn.com/archives/18402)

<sup>22</sup> Pak Institute for Peace Studies (2012), *Pakistan Security Report February 2012*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies: Islamabad, [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: <http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=253>

more on Peshawar because it is the central power hub of KP. Third, though there is a substantial decrease in drone attacks by the US, but the drone strikes are concentrated mostly on North and South Waziristan (70 out of 75 drone attacks).<sup>23</sup>

Though there were reports of lessening of the conflict and negotiation of cease fire, the security officials continued their struggle in the area. They, however, admitted that tough times awaited the military and its operational offshoots engaged in battling the militants on account of expected reconciliation between Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) after a series of violent feuds. The occurrence of such a scenario suggested consolidated militant build-up against the security forces.<sup>24</sup>

The growth of militancy can also be a reason for the growing religious fanaticism in the Pakhtun society. This problem of Peshawar's drift towards religious conservatism was caused by over a million Afghan Refugees who settled in camps surrounding the city during 1980s. During 1990s, the policies pursued by the country's intelligence apparatus did not allow the liberal political forces to find a firm ground in the province. There was also a mass-contact campaign by religious forces at a time when military regime of Musharraf had banned political activities enabling the MMA to sweep the 2002 elections in the province.<sup>25</sup>

### ***Pakhtun Nationalism and Taliban Insurgency***

Following the above discussion it is seen that basically the Taliban insurgency has strengthened its roots in the frontiers where the Pakhtun population inhabits. This has resulted in a misconception among the people, that Pakhtun nationalism has taken the form of Taliban insurgency, given the fact that the Talibans are ethnically Pakhtuns. This has been utilised by other political parties and people to deprive the Pakhtun people of their due share. Thus apart from combating militancy this challenge also stands potent for

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<sup>23</sup> Report by Dutta Chowdhury, Priyanka (2012), Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2012 Sixth Annual Conference, Issue brief, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: New Delhi

<sup>24</sup> Sikander, Shaheen (2012), "Military, militants deny ceasefire in Khyber", *The Nation*, Islamabad, 1 April 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 2 May 2012 URL: <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/islamabad/01-Apr-2012/military-militants-deny-ceasefire-in-khyber>

<sup>25</sup> Intikhab, Amir (2006), "Flash Point Frontier", *Herald*, 37(6): pp. 67

both the innocent Pakhtun people and their vanguard the Awami National Party.

Pakhtun ethnic identity has become highly fractionalised as a result of the rise of the Taliban and their ideology. According to one prominent scholar, the political/religious orientation of the Pakhtuns can be placed in the following categories: nationalists, traditionalists and Islamists (which is further subdivided into Islamized Pakhtuns and Pakhtunized Islamists).<sup>26</sup> Islamised Pakhtuns are pro-Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), whose ideology is more in line with pan-Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hizbut Tehrir, etc. “The JI is a party of urban middle class Islamists, which made some inroads into the rural Pakhtun areas during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. Pakhtunised Islamists refer to the local, rural-based religious leaders graduating mainly from madrasas. They are pro-Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The so-called ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakhtun culture and society has been resented by the secular nationalist Pakhtuns, including the left-leaning ANP, which points out that Taliban are not the outgrowths of traditional Pakhtun ethno-nationalism. The ANP has, in fact, openly condemned the Pakistani security services for nurturing the Taliban movement over the past few decades.” In the words of the present head of the ANP Asfandiyar Wali, “Pakhtuns [i.e., Pushtuns] stand united for peace, but the fire of war is burning our land and we have to find the means to extinguish it. We are caught in the middle of warmongers, extremists, and militants. Pakhtun ethnic identity has become highly fractionalized as a result of the rise of the Taliban and their ideology.”<sup>27</sup>

Though Talibans are ethnically Pakhtuns, Pakhtun nationalism can never be equated with the Taliban movement because of the following reasons.

First, the KKM that was marked as the vanguard of Pakhtun nationalism in Pakistan was more clearly a Pakhtun ethno-nationalist movement, whereas the Taliban movement, even though it has significant support within the Pakhtun community, is based more on religious ideology. Talibans have never themselves equated Pakhtun nationalism with their movements. The strategies or method used by Talibans is completely different,

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<sup>26</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1101

<sup>27</sup> Ghufuran, Nasreen (2009), “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, 49(6): pp. 1101

being more violent and using brutal tactics including bombing, beheadings unlike the ethnic movements by the KKM and other vanguards of Pakhtun nationalism.<sup>28</sup>

Second, “the KKM was a progressive movement favouring female education as a vehicle for social progress within the Pakhtun community. In contrast, the Taliban movement is a reactionary one, known for its opposition to the participation of women in public life and for destroying female schools. The Taliban prefer only Islamic education for both girls and boys and do not approve the present Western system of education in Pakistan. The differences aside, some scholars have opined that the Taliban may have begun co-opting their own brand of Pakhtun ethno-nationalism, but this is a view with which secular Pakhtun nationalists, such as the ANP, vehemently disagree. At minimum, the Taliban insurgency has disguised the simmering dissatisfaction of Pakhtuns with the poor delivery of public goods, the inequitable distribution of resources, and the general lack of provincial autonomy under the garb of religious fanaticism in Pakistan.”<sup>29</sup>

Again what Farhat Taj explains is that in between 2003 to 2007, over 200 political activists, including tribal leaders in South Waziristan were target killed under mysterious circumstances and was never investigated by the government of Pakistan. The common denominator among them is that they all were anti-Taliban. Many of the eliminated anti-Taliban people were local activists of Pakhtun nationalist political parties like the Pukhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) and the ANP, and were ethnically Pakhtuns.<sup>30</sup> Taj has also rejected the idea of equating Pakhtun nationalists with Taliban. She explains, “Those who insist that Taliban are Pakhtun nationalists claim that Pakhtun tribes have historically preferred to be led by religious figures (mullahs) rather than their traditional tribal leaders in the event of a foreign invasion. They specifically refer to the Pakhtun tribal resistance in FATA led by religious leaders against the colonial British-Indian government, and conclude that the present-day Taliban terrorism rooted in religious discourse is an indigenous and popular Pakhtun resistance to a foreign

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pp. 1102

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, pp. 1102

<sup>30</sup> Taj, Farhat (2012), “Taliban are Pak Army Proxies, not Pashtun Nationalists – III”, *Friday Times*, Lahore, 20 April 2012, 24(10) [Online Web] Accessed 2 May 2012  
URL: <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120420&page=6>



invasion.”<sup>31</sup>

Providing explanation she says, “The towering symbol of Pakhtun nationalism, Samad Khan Achakzai was not a mullah. The secular and democratic Pakhtun nationalist movement led by him was linked with the Indian National Congress party’s struggle against the British. The universal symbol of Pakhtun nationalism, Bacha Khan, was not a mullah. He resisted the British colonial invasion of the Pakhtun land in league with Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent movement against the British in India. Even the mullahs or religious leaders in FATA who put forward armed resistance to the British were basically Pakhtun nationalists with religious orientations.”<sup>32</sup>

Thus from nowhere it can be proved that the religious orientation which was the base for the Taliban movement had its foundation in Pakhtun nationalism. To see Pakhtun nationalism in a wider sense it can be perceived generally; the term ‘Pakhtun nationalist’ can also be loosely applied to include all people who disagree with Taliban’s action, conduct, attitude and policy, although they may not have directly suffered any Taliban atrocities for their anti-Taliban views. In other words, these are the people who concur with the anti-Taliban stance adopted by the ANP and the PkMAP even though many of them may not be directly linked with the parties.<sup>33</sup>

### ***Suggestive Action by the Awami National Party***

After coming to power the ANP is standing in the line of fire of the militants. The potent security challenge is coming from the militants to the Awami National Party and Pakhtuns.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister for Information (ANP), Mian Iftikhar Hussain has said that they wanted resolution to all problems through peaceful means and the language of love. Therefore if the terrorists openly announce and bring forward their negotiation teams, recognise the writ of the government and promise not to use their soil for

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Ibid

<sup>33</sup> Taj, Farhat (2012), “Taliban are Pak Army Proxies, not Pashtun Nationalists – V”, *Friday Times*, Lahore, 5 May 2012, 24(12) [Online Web] Accessed 20 May 2012

terrorism, they would hold talks with them. Otherwise, he warned that those not listening to the language of love and peace would be dealt with iron hand as action against them becomes unavoidable.<sup>34</sup>

The provincial cabinet would also review a new strategy compiled by a group of multilateral financial institutions for eliminating militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the adjoining tribal belt. The provincial cabinet, a meeting of which was held with the Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti in the chair, would take up Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) as one of the agenda item. If approved, it would require subsequent strategies for implementation. Consultants of the Asian Development Bank, European Union, United Nations, World Bank and officials of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government had compiled the PCNA, which looked into the causes of militancy and suggested remedial steps. Moreover, the socio-economic situation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA had not been developed because of locational disadvantages and the impact of geo-political situation. Besides, limited investment has been made for the people. The report further argued that instability and conflict related to Afghanistan has resulted in a flow of militants into Pakistan's border areas, bringing with them extremist ideologies and practices. The PCNA spoke about peace-building priorities grouped into four overarching strategic objectives including enhance responsiveness and effectiveness of the state to restore citizen trust, stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities, provisioning of basic services and counter radicalisation and reconciliation. The PCNA asked the government to be flexible while prioritising its projects aiming at peace-building initiatives, ensure quick take-off of activities and limited timeframe of the projects should be higher than 30 months by involving multiple agencies.<sup>35</sup>

While tracing the cause of the rise of militancy both the political parties and scholars have pointed towards poverty and under development. But a recent survey, 'Poverty and

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URL: <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120504&page=4>

<sup>34</sup> Staff Reporter (2012), "Ready for Talks if Militants Accept Govt Writ: Iftikhar", *The Nation*, Peshawar, 3 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 4 February 2012, URL: <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/03-Jan-2012/ready-for-talks-if-militants-accept-govt-writ-iftikhar>

<sup>35</sup> Khan, Mohammad Ali (2010), "New strategy on the anvil to counter militancy", *Dawn*, 5 October 2010, Peshawar, [Online Web] Accessed 3 October 2011 URL: <http://dawn.com/2010/10/05/universities->

support for militant politics — evidence from Pakistan’, conducted by senior US researchers concludes that poverty in Pakistan does not feed religious extremism and terrorism. Reportedly the survey, “conducted on 6,000 people sampled from all four provinces of Pakistan, finds that poor people in Pakistan are much less likely to support militant groups than richer Pakistanis. The survey also says that out of all the four federating units of Pakistan, people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa dislike militant organisations the most. The reason, according to the survey, is that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has suffered many more terror acts than the other provinces of Pakistan. This survey provides a better and clearer picture of the ground reality in Pakistan, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Pakhtun tribal leaders and political activists in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been arguing for years that poverty does not drive terrorism and extremism. This survey vindicates their point of view. Besides the survey’s finding that poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups because the poor often become the target of terror acts, the other reason why poor people dislike militant groups is that the militants force the poor families to become a part of their terror plans. There is enough empirical evidence of this happening, as produced in the media.”<sup>36</sup>

This sets a challenge for the ANP, which is devising strategies to eradicate poverty to curb extremism. This survey can be marked as an eye opener for the people and political parties to devise new methods to curb terrorism. It is worth mentioning here that the provincial government has made a deal with Talibans of Swat valley. The Swat deal between the government and Talibans sees some prospect of peace in the valley.<sup>37</sup> Presently Swat is recovering day by day from the trauma of the Taliban insurgency though after a bit of resiliency of the violence, FATA is once again witnessing insurgency.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Taj, Farhat (2011), “Poverty and extremism”, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 11 June 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 18 January 2012 URL: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C11%5Cstory\\_11-6-2011\\_pg3\\_4](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C11%5Cstory_11-6-2011_pg3_4)

<sup>37</sup> Bakhtiar, Idrees (2009), “The Price of Peace”, *The Herald*, 40(4): pp. 22

<sup>38</sup> Aziz, Khalid (2011), “Back to square one”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 18 March 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 3 January 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/03/18/back-to-square-one/>

### *The Influx of Afghan refugees*

The Afghan refugees are also posing a problem in these areas. They are not only causing crisis of food and other resources but also posing threats in terms of security. They can be one reason why the spread of militancy has been enhanced in this area.

With regard to the Afghan refugees the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government is likely to seek the federal government's permission to go after the Afghan nationals residing illegally in the province. Data compiled by the Home and Tribal Affairs department revealed that around 400,000 Afghans have been staying in the province without legal documents but the Federal Investigation Agency and the police have not taken any action against them under the Foreigners Act. The Home department has briefed the provincial cabinet about the presence of refugees and unregistered and illegal Afghans in the province. The issues relating to the refugees were discussed in a meeting and it was proposed that the illegal Afghans would be deported from the province with the prior permission of the federal government. But the adoption of a vague policy by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the federal government has facilitated legal and illegal Afghans to prolong their stay in Pakistan. The prolonged stay of the Afghans has resulted in multiple socio-economic problems in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Zulfiqar Ali said, "The tripartite commission, which comprises Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR, takes decisions regarding stay of refugees and illegal Afghans in the country. The commission has extended stay of registered Afghans till December 2012. The departmental report said that the province was hosting 1.58 million Afghans in and off camps out of which 400,000 did not have legal documents. It said that approximately one million Afghans were residing in Islamabad and other parts of the country. They were also running their businesses, it added. The report said that 929 Afghan refugees were employed in Afghanistan as majority of them had jobs in Afghan National Army. In addition, the report said that Afghans had obtained computerised national identity cards, purchased immovable property and vehicles. Many Afghans used fake CNICs in illegal transactions, it said. According to official data, over 14,000 Afghan students were studying in various public and private sector education institutions, while 470 Afghan

prayer leaders had been identified. Sources said that only 164 prayer leaders had been removed from their jobs.”<sup>39</sup> Action against Afghan prayer leaders was launched in 2010 in the wake of reports that they were involved in promoting extremism and religious disharmony among various sects. The official report said that influx of Afghans through unfrequented routes was a major source of concern and despite the presence of the Border Management Force illegal movement continued unchecked. It has been proposed that Border Management Force should devise a mechanism to regulate the movement of Afghans across the border. It has been observed that there was only one exit and entry point at Torkham which was not sufficient. It was proposed that interior ministry should open four additional entry and exit points at the Afghan border to regulate cross border movement.<sup>40</sup>

The ANP also wanted to give back the 800,000 illegal Afghans to Afghanistan by May 2012, but the Afghan Ambassador Mohammad Umar Daudzai held a meeting with Engineer Shaukatullah Khan, the Federal Minister for States and Frontier Regions and asked him to direct the provincial government to withdraw its decision. Thus the centre has sought help from the provinces regarding the issue and said that till the condition of Afghanistan improves it cannot expel the refugees.<sup>41</sup>

### ***Drug Trafficking***

Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan, but it got hiked after 1989, with the developments in Afghanistan. “The Punjab Opium Smoking Act of 1923, which was later adopted by KP, did not prohibit the smoking of Opium ab initio. The act only outlawed opium smoking when three or more persons were assembled.”<sup>42</sup> These kinds of traditions have deepened in the roots of KP. Sudhir Sawant says that KP represents an

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<sup>39</sup> Ali, Zulfiqar (2012), “If centre permits: KP would expel illegal Afghans”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 10 February 2012, [Online web] Accessed 24 April 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/10/if-centre-permits-kp-would-expel-illegal-afghans/>

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ali, Zulfiqar (2010), “Return of illegal Afghan refugees: Kabul not ready yet”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 16 May 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 20 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/05/16/return-of-illegal-afghan-refugees-kabul-not-ready-yet/>

<sup>42</sup> Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, pp. 98- 99

ideal situation and location in terms of drug trade. This trade involves not only the local chiefs but also the political parties, army, bureaucrats etc. Sawant also says that though the government of Pakistan is committed in the eradication of the trade but it is hardly successful in doing so.<sup>43</sup> Thus the ANP could hardly fight with this historic evil. Though initiatives have been taken by the province and the centre to curb the trafficking, but it is a long drawn process.

President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani have said that “drug trafficking is a major social evil that is threatening societies in more than one ways. The President said that the Drug Control Master Plan 2010-2014 has also been developed in accordance with the best international practices. The government has also been working closely with the UN and other international partners to strive towards a drug-free Pakistan and a drug-free world. Pakistan is also a signatory to all the UN and SAARC Conventions on Narcotics.”<sup>44</sup>

Therefore the ANP is facing the challenge of eradicating drug trafficking along with the potent challenge of militancy. Along with that another problem to be countered in the region is arms trafficking. The Pakhtuns are thriving on illegal arms trade and by making cheaper products than the Chinese.<sup>45</sup>

The causes of narco-terrorism and arms trafficking are all interrelated issues. The lethal terrorism needs support of all these for the accumulation of fund. Thus the Frontiers, which are the best place from where illegal trafficking can be made and exported to the neighbouring and other countries, has become a haven for this whole racket of militancy and trafficking, threatening the innocent lives of the Pakhtuns in the area. It should be noted here that not only the poor but the upper class people are also involved in the racket. Thus it is very difficult to curb the whole circle of traffickers and militants.

Another potent challenge faced by the Awami National Party and the Pakhtuns are the

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<sup>43</sup> Cited in Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, pp. 98-99

<sup>44</sup> Correspondent (2011), “Drug trafficking threatening societies”, *The News International*, Islamabad, 27 June 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 7 February 2012  
URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=54637&Cat=6>

<sup>45</sup> Pande, Savita (2005), *Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Shipra Publications,

violence faced by them in Karachi. Often the Pakhtuns are killed because of having an ethnic linkage with the Talibans. The political rivalry stands also potent in this case.

### ***Pakhtuns and Karachi Violence***

The port city of Karachi, once the commercial hub of Pakistan, has plunged to a city of darkness by becoming a heartland of ethnic conflicts. Karachi, being the home for many ethnic groups, is the miniature version of Pakistan. But since long, it has been engulfed in ethnic and political violence, which again saw resurgence in recent times. In spite of various angles to the violence, the main focus of the conflict is between the Pakhtuns and the non-Pakhtuns.<sup>46</sup>

The journey of translating the metropolis into a warring ground started way back in 1986, when a Mohajir young girl was crushed by a Pakhtun bus driver. This led to a clash, especially after the Mohajirs torched several buses and taxis owned by the Pakhtuns and the Pakhtuns in return burnt the properties of the Mohajirs. This case led the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) to strengthen their foot in the soil of Karachi and was able to gain a considerable support among the Mohajirs. After a bit of lull, violence re-emerged on 12<sup>th</sup> May 2007 when dozens of Pakhtuns were killed as they wanted to welcome the then-deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The support for ethnic-based Awami National Party (ANP) increased after that.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Reasons behind the Violence in Karachi***

#### ***Pakhtun Migration***

Karachi hosts the largest urban Pakhtun population that surpasses Peshawar, Quetta and Kandahar. Migration of the Pakhtuns from the north-west to Karachi began during Ayub Khan's regime. The pull factor then was the economic boom and rapid industrialisation

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<sup>46</sup> Rehman, Zia Ur (2011), "No Space For Pashtuns?", *Friday Times*, Lahore, 2 September 2011, 23(3), [Online Web] Accessed 2 February 2012 URL: <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20110902&page=4>

which created new opportunities of employment, especially in the construction, textile and transport sectors. The hardworking Pakhtuns were ready to take the low-wage jobs that the locals did not want. The push factor was lack of economic opportunities in their own province. The Pakhtun contributed significantly to the economy of Karachi through labour, petty jobs and small trade. But the demography changed as new Pakhtun migrants arrived from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas in the 2000s, particularly because of the 2005 earthquake and counter-insurgency operations from 2007 to 2011. The other reason is the presence of a large number of madrasas in Karachi. These madrasas cater to the educational needs of hundreds of thousands of students. Majority of these madrasas belong to the Deobandi school of thought, which is the dominant school of thought among the Pakhtuns. According to new estimates, the Pakhtuns are now 22 percent of Karachi's population. The changes in demography also changed the political realities in the city.<sup>48</sup>

### ***The Politicisation of Ethnicity***

The ethnic factor started dominating the scenario specifically after the second generation of the Pakhtuns were denied their due share in the resources of Karachi. Karachi's Pakhtuns have traditionally aligned themselves with religious parties, but in the last few years the ethnic-based ANP has successfully projected itself as the sole representative of the community. This happened basically after the 2007 incident and the violence evoked on the second generation of the Pakhtuns on ethnic ground.<sup>49</sup>

After these incidents the ANP, for the first time, won 2 Sindh Provincial Assembly seats in 2008 — a tantalising result which encouraged the ANP to aspire to expand their

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<sup>47</sup> Correspondent (2011), "Karach Violence", *Dawn*, Karachi, 3 August 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 13 February 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/08/03/karachi-violence-4/>

<sup>48</sup> Zaffar, Salma (2011), "Karachi politics: Make space for the Pakhtuns", *Express Tribune*, Karachi, 26 July 2011, [Online web] Accessed 24 February 2012 URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/7034/karachi-politics-make-space-for-the-pashtuns/>

<sup>49</sup> Center for Research and Security Studies (2011), "Karachi Seething under Violence and Terror", Center for Research and Security Studies Publication: Islamabad [Online Web] Accessed 13 December 2012 URL: <http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/Special-Posts/Karachi%20Seething%20under%20Violence%20and%20Terror.pdf>



political gains. For the MQM, however, the results were an alarm bell which raised the possibility of Karachi slipping out of their dominance completely. As the two sides were determined to pursue and preserve their interests at all costs, the result was deadly violence becoming a part of Karachi's everyday life. This basically started after the MQM launched an anti-Talibanisation (who are ethnically mostly Pakhtuns) campaign across the city. This angered the Pakhtuns, who felt they were being singled out for victimisation.<sup>50</sup> Thus curbing this problem became one of the potent challenges in front of the ANP.

### ***The Economic Factors***

One of the potent factors in this case is the economic reasons which lie underneath. Karachi remains a major industrial and financial centre because of its geo-strategic location. Thus the fight to get the maximum access to the resources and the government lands by the political parties in the areas where they are strong is being carried out. This fight has led to brutal killings, mainly by the armed wings of the two parties. Many shops were burnt and many people were killed as a result of the violence. Because of the recent wave of violence, Karachi's economic potential has been seriously jeopardised as it has resulted in a flight of capital from the city.<sup>51</sup> Thus the Awami National Party has to fight the odds not only in KP but in Karachi too. The basic problem that the ANP has to deal in Karachi is the misperception among the non-Pakhtuns that Pakhtun influx is a curse for Karachi which gave rise to terrorism, drug and arms trade, and they cannot be culturally assimilated.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Correspondent (2011), "Karach Violence", *Dawn*, Karachi, 4 May 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 13 December 2011 URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/05/04/karachi-violence-2/>

<sup>51</sup> Center for Research and Security Studies (2011), *Karachi Seething under Violence and Terror*, Center for Research and Security Studies Publication: Islamabad [Online Web] Accessed 28 December 2011 URL: <http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/SpecialPosts/Karachi%20Seething%20under%20Violence%20and%20Terror.pdf>.

<sup>52</sup> Khan, Imran (2011), "Karachi's Pashtun Problem," *Pakistan Today*, Karachi, 16 July 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 14 Jan 2012 URL: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/07/19/comment/karachi%E2%80%99s-pashtun%E2%80%9Cproblem%E2%80%9D/>

### ***The Problem of Creation of New Provinces***

A recent challenge which came up with the general election round the corner is the debate on the creation of new provinces in Pakistan. The issue is gaining momentum among the political parties and the media. The prominent demands include the creation of Hazara (dividing KP), Seriaki and/or Bahawalpur subas (provinces). There have been references to partitioning the Pakhtun areas of Balochistan and merging them with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.<sup>53</sup>

But the question that is coming to the forefront is whether “the debate is a serious attempt at resolving a contentious issue or an exercise in point-scoring and obtaining political mileage.”<sup>54</sup>

### ***Pakhtun versus Hazaras***

The concern of the Awami National Party is basically in regard to the division of KP into Hazara province. “The movement for the creation of the Hazara province is carried forward by the Hazara Province Movement Committee (HPMC) in the hope that the long struggle of the Hazaras should not go waste and that they should also have due share of the resources which goes for the Pakhtun-dominated areas. The creation of Hazara province in the Hindko-speaking areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which is supported by MQM has led to a drift among the ANP and the MQM. The reason lies in the fact that the members of the ANP feel this to be nothing but a political stunt by the MQM, which enjoys zero representation in the Provincial Assembly of either Pakhtunkhwa or Hazara. Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf is also supporting the issue of the creation of Hazara province and has given it topmost priority in the agenda of the party after coming to power. But the Awami National Party adds to it in a negative way saying that the division of KP is not

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<sup>53</sup> Dutta Chowdhury, Priyanka (2012), “Creating New Provinces in Pakistan: A Print Media Analysis” , [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: <http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/creating-new-provinces-in-pakistan-a-print-media-analysis-3581.html>

<sup>54</sup> Kazi Abrar and Halepoto Zulfiqar (2012), “The debate on new provinces”, *Dawn*, Islamabad ,10 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 3 February 2012 URL: [http://epaper.dawn.com/~epaper/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=10\\_01\\_2012\\_007\\_005](http://epaper.dawn.com/~epaper/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=10_01_2012_007_005)

feasible with regard to its resources and size though it is not against the division of provinces. The ANP, like the PML (N) is of the opinion that they are in support of the creation of new provinces done in a constitutional and democratic way on administrative basis, having an equal formula (based on population, area, resources, sources of income etc.) that will be applicable to all parts of the country. However they are against the division of the federating units on the basis of ethnic or linguistic terms which, they fear, may bifurcate the unity further.”<sup>55</sup>

The ANP also opines that the creation of new provinces must take into consideration the concerns of the people rather than being just a political stunt for election. The proponents for the creation of provinces should also pay respect to the Constitution’s Article 239 (4) which “lays down that no bill to amend the constitution that would have the effect of altering the limits of a province can be presented to the president for assent unless it has been passed by the provincial assembly of that province by a two-thirds majority. It then also requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament in order to pass muster.”<sup>56</sup>

Thus it seems that the ANP is having a new challenge to deal with as it does not want KP to be divided keeping in mind its size and population. Because of this stand the ANP is facing challenges from the Hazaras and other political parties.

### ***Problem of Flood and Flood Reliefs***

The floods of 2010 submerged and inundated vast areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and destroyed properties, livelihood and infrastructure. After almost two years of the flood, the central and the provincial governments of the ANP are still facing challenges regarding this. To cater to the relief and rehabilitation of the flood-affected areas, the provincial government was compelled to make adjustments in its budget. The Annual

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<sup>55</sup> Dutta Chowdhury, Priyanka (2012), “Creating New Provinces in Pakistan: A Print Media Analysis”, [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2012 URL: <http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/creating-new-provinces-in-pakistan-a-print-media-analysis-3581.html>

<sup>56</sup> Editorial (2012), “The issue of new provinces”, *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 5 January 2012 [Online Web] Accessed 4 February 2012 URL: [http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C01%5C05%5Cstory\\_5-1-2012\\_pg3\\_1](http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C01%5C05%5Cstory_5-1-2012_pg3_1)

Development Plan portfolio for new projects was frozen and funds were diverted towards floods compensation and infrastructure development.<sup>57</sup>

The Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti said that the failure to meet the immediate needs of flood victims in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could fuel the militancy and pose a major regional security threat. The government had planned to spend billions of dollars on development projects in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to win popular support and undermine the militants, who often recruit Pakistanis disillusioned with the state. The cost of immediate flood relief would delay those efforts. Mr. Hoti said, “We have compromised on our annual development plan and I have suspended the entire new portfolio for our development plan for this province worth about Rs. 17 billion because of the floods.” The floods have wiped out villages, roads, bridges, jobs and will inflict long-term economic pain on the government, which has been widely criticised for what is seen as a sluggish response to the worst disaster in Pakistan’s history.<sup>58</sup> Thus the government is still struggling with the areas where extension of help is needed.

The extension of relief was slow in the area as was the rehabilitation process in the flood-affected areas across the country. It depicts a grim picture as yet. “Only 1 million households received shelters, 12 million people could get essential medication while 4-5 million received food facilities out of the total 18 million displaced people. According to the statistics of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), less than 10 percent of the total 18 million affected people received safe water facilities after the floods. 1.2 million people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh were benefitted from the food-for-work scheme, but 16.8 million people were left out.”<sup>59</sup>

The government can be criticised on the ground of being reluctant. The main problem is that there has been very little investment in water storage that can reduce the vulnerability

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<sup>57</sup> Government of Pakhtunkhwa (2012), *White Papers 2011-2012*, Ministry of Finance, Peshawar, [Online Web] Accessed 3 April URL: [http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper\\_2011-12.pdf](http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper_2011-12.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> Correspondent (2010), “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa facing a dilemma, says Hoti”, *Dawn*, Islamabad, 25 August 2010, [Online Web] Accessed 4 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2010/08/25/khyber-pakhtunkhwa-facing-a-dilemma-says-hoti/>

<sup>59</sup> Correspondent (2011), “Rehabilitation Process in Flood-affected Areas Depicts Grim Picture”, *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 8 June 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 2 January 2012 URL: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C08%5Cstory\\_8-6-2011\\_pg12\\_2](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C08%5Cstory_8-6-2011_pg12_2)

of floods and also contribute to the conservation of water for crops. This storage capacity has further been undermined by massive silting that naturally reduces their flood impact mitigation capacities. There are only two reservoirs in KP, Warsak and Tarbela. The former has lost its storage capacity long ago, while the live storage capacity of the latter has gone down to 6.77 MAF from its original capacity of 9.68 MAF — a 30 percent decrease during the last 36 years.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Construction of Dams***

The Awami National Party is working for the construction of many dams. The flood came as an eye opener for the ministers. Though there are promises of construction of dams, but due to political and economic reasons they have remained far from completion.

Recently the Chief Minister of KP inaugurated the Dral Khawar project and said that the project would prove to be the commencement of development and prosperity in the area. Reportedly “the project with a capacity of 36.6 MW, costing Rs. 7 billion would be completed in three years and the water would be provided to the people by freezing the unit in case of shortage of water in winter. The Chief Minister said that the province has the capacity to generate 30,000 MW electricity and 24 areas have been identified for utilising this capacity under public and private partnership. He added that 11 projects were ready for construction process and work on them would commence in near future while 13 projects were feasible.”<sup>61</sup>

Another project which is delayed is the Munda Dam multi-purpose project which will create economic opportunities for farm families in central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by expanding cultivable area and curtailing flood risks to the agriculture sector. The execution of the project has been started after a delay of several years. First, feasibility study on it was completed in March 2000. Later, in view of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s reservations, a review of the feasibility was conducted that was submitted to the Private

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<sup>60</sup> Khan Mohammad Ali (2011), “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Vulnerability to Floods”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 1 August 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 4 December 2011 URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/08/01/khyber-pakhtunkhwas-vulnerability-to-floods/>

<sup>61</sup> “Pakhtunkhwa launches Hydro Power Action Plan”, [Online Web] Accessed 16 May 2012 URL: <http://awaminationalparty.org/main/?p=3431>

Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) in 2006 upon completion. The province, according to the development planner, “was suffering from scarcity of water due to lack of storage projects and an inadequate irrigation network. It had not been able to utilise full share of its water allocated under the water accord of 1991. The project upon completion would expand cultivable area by bringing an additional 15,300 acres under irrigation in Charsadda and Peshawar districts”, said a provincial development planner. “The \$1.4 billion project”, he added, “would augment some 108,900 cultivated acres through improved irrigation, thereby improving per acre yield. Besides, the project is imperative for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because of its projected utility to mitigate flood risks in Charsadda, Nowshera, Mardan and Peshawar districts. According to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Development Statistics of 2010, the four districts jointly house over 378,000 cultivable hectares and 556,887 reported hectares (suitable for cultivation).”<sup>62</sup>

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has also prepared a strategy to manage an early implementation of the vital Chashma right bank canal lift-cum-gravity scheme. “The province will request the federal government to release funds for the project as promised by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and other federal dignitaries on numerous occasions. It will also seek donors’ support for financing the project. If these initiatives fail, the provincial government would allocate funds from its own resources to initiate the project,” an official quoted the Chief Minister at a meeting on the project recently, to the correspondent of Dawn. “The provincial government had initially entered into an agreement with the World Bank to finance the project. As the implementation of the agreement has been delayed, KP intends to approach other donors,” he added. But the cost of it is enhancing day by day and no foreign donor is ready to help because of the deteriorating security scenario there.<sup>63</sup>

One good initiative taken by the ANP is in case of Chashma right bank canal. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government plans to carry out the Chashma right bank canal (lift-

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<sup>62</sup> Amir, Intikhab (2012), “Munda Dam to curtail flood risk in KP”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 24 February 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 4 May 2012, URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/24/munda-dam-to-curtail-flood-risk-in-kp/>

<sup>63</sup> Ali, Tahir (2012), “KP to Expedite Chashma irrigation project”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 20 February 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 6 March 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/20/kp-to-expedite-chashma-irrigation-project/>

cum-gravity-1) project on its own due to the federal government's reluctance to fund it. Israrullah Gandapur, a Dera Ismail Khan member of the Provincial Assembly, told Dawn that the government had established contacts with the World Bank to get a funding line for the Chashma right bank canal (lift-cum-gravity-1) project, while the Awami National Party Senator and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's member in National Finance Commission Haji Adeel said, "Chief Minister (Ameer Haider Khan Hoti) has given (us) assurance that work on CRBC (Lift-1) project will start before June 30, 2012." According to the relevant officials, the government is increasingly frustrated at the centre's failure to begin work on Chashma right bank canal (lift-cum-gravity-1) project despite repeated assurances.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly another project which is delayed is the construction of Gomal Zam dam project's irrigation system. The project, according to concerned officials, was most likely to miss its scheduled completion date of February 2013. Funds for the irrigation component could not be arranged in time, rendering the execution of irrigation system at a slow pace.<sup>65</sup> Thus most of these projects started for the well being of the people but are in a stagnant position due to lack of funds.

Certain work which is in progress should be mentioned here. The Bazai Irrigation scheme located in District Mardan and Malakand Agency, an area of about 25200 acres, would be brought under irrigation upon the completion of the project. The survey, investigation and detail design of the project have been completed. Physical progress on the project is 20%. This project was started to increase the life span of small dams and to protect them from siltation.

The Irrigation department also carries out and maintains flood protection works throughout the province. "The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province being the upper riparian of the Indus basin is always the first victim of floods and due to its peculiar geography it experiences flash floods. The flood of July 2010 brought havoc in the province. To

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<sup>64</sup> Amir, Intikhab (2012), "KP to execute Chashma canal project", *Dawn*, Peshawar, 4 February 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 15 March 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/04/kp-to-execute-chashma-canal-project-2/>

<sup>65</sup> Amir, Intikhab (2012), "Gomal Zam dam's irrigation system far from completion", *Dawn*, Peshawar, 7 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 5 February 2012, URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/01/07/gomal-zam-dam-s-irrigation-system-far-from-completion/>

address the aforementioned flood, the Flood Damages Restoration Directorate has been established. To look into flood damages, a Damage Need Assessment (DNA) report has also been prepared by the government.”<sup>66</sup>

Reportedly the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has decided to bring millions of acres of barren land from Nizampur to Dera Ismail Khan under cultivation by introducing solar system to ensure electricity supply for irrigation. “Besides, the government will also initially import 500 saplings of different fruits like apricot, grapes, almond and pomegranate from Afghanistan so that fine quality products could be introduced in the market.”<sup>67</sup>

### *Some Positive Aspects*

#### *Education*

Higher education has scaled new achievements during the year 2010-11. A number of new colleges were established, especially for the female and charters were granted to 16 universities. The establishment of the Higher Education Regulatory Authority (HERA) has created a positive impact on the “regulatory avenues for higher education in the private sector”. Liberal grants are being provided to cadet colleges and public schools. Sizeable allocation has also been made for science laboratories and libraries.<sup>68</sup>

Education of the people in this area was in a critical position before. The **Chief Minister** Ameer Haider Khan Hoti and the Awami National Party veteran Begum Naseem Wali Khan inaugurated work on the construction of a degree college for girls in Sawaldher area. Speaking on the occasion, Begum Naseem Wali Khan said that the Pakhtun nation could not progress without education. She said that Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan had stressed on the Pakhtuns to get education at all costs, adding that he had set up the chain of Azaad Madrasas in different Pakhtun areas with the purpose to impart education to the

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<sup>66</sup> Government of Pakhtunkhwa (2012), *White Papers 2011-2012*, Ministry of Finance, Peshawar, [Online Web] Accessed 3 April URL: [http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper\\_2011-12.pdf](http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper_2011-12.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Bureau Report (2012), “Solar-powered irrigation system being planned”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 3 February 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 15 April 2012, URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/03/solar-powered-irrigation-system-being-planned/>



local populations. She praised the Chief Minister for establishing educational institutions in different parts of the province.<sup>69</sup> Though there is progress in terms of education but still the party has to walk a long way to fulfill the challenge of disseminating education.

### ***Health***

The Health Department is mandated by the government to ensure provision of quality health services to the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at an affordable cost. “The Department has employed 4,316 doctors, 11,363 paramedics and 3,554 nurses to provide health services to the population of the province. Moreover the province has taken lead in the creation of Health Management Cadre. The allocation for health department in the Budget of 2011-12 has been increased from Rs. 5,940.685 million to Rs. 7,837.251 million, which shows an increase of 31.92 percent. The Budget of the health department also includes regular Grants-in-Aid to various autonomous health institutions.”<sup>70</sup>

Thus the deteriorating health issues saw signs of improvement, but still as compared to the developed provinces it is far from satisfaction.

For evaluating the importance of the Awami National Party and coming to a conclusion it is important to note the achievements and failure of the ANP and also take note of the persisting problems.

### ***The Awami National Party: Listing Achievements***

While assessing the achievements and failures of the Awami National Party, it is to be seen that the party has claimed that the benefits of provincial autonomy have started trickling down to the mass owing to which the popularity graph of the party has risen. Speaking at the provincial cabinet meeting of the party, the ANP Provincial President

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<sup>68</sup> Government of Pakhtunkhwa (2012), *White Papers 2011-2012*, Ministry of Finance, Peshawar, [Online Web] Accessed 3 April URL: [http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper\\_2011-12.pdf](http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper_2011-12.pdf)

<sup>69</sup> Correspondent, “CM inaugurates work on girls degree college in Mardan”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 3 January 2011, [Online Web] Accessed February 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/01/03/cm-inaugurates-work-on-girls-degree-college-in-mardan/>

<sup>70</sup> Government of Pakhtunkhwa (2012), *White Papers 2011-2012*, Ministry of Finance, Peshawar, [Online Web] Accessed 3 April URL: [http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper\\_2011-12.pdf](http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/WhitePaper_2011-12.pdf)

Afrasiab Khattak said that they had rendered sacrifices for strengthening the democracy and supremacy of the Parliament. “Ours is the only political party that has implemented its election manifesto,” he claimed. He blamed the previous governments for energy crisis and load shedding, claiming that not a single project of power generation was launched by them owing to which the crisis became serious. Khattak said that government was launching three mega power projects with the amount it had received from centre. “It will not only meet our electricity requirements but the province will be able to sell electricity to other provinces,” he added.<sup>71</sup>

Regarding the achievements listed by the Awami National Party, Asfandyar Wali said that the government had restored the Parliament’s powers through the 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment that had been usurped during the dictatorship. He said the country was facing a host of problems and any undemocratic move could aggravate the miseries of the masses. The ANP chief said that the provincial government continued development work in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa despite the militancy and floods. According to him, the renaming of the province and winning provincial autonomy were the major achievements of the ruling ANP. The nationalist leader said that the ANP also held talks with the militants to restore peace in the province. “We are still ready to talks to the militants if they accept the state’s writ, give up violence and promise not to use our land against any other country”, he added. He said that everyone was criticizing the US drone attacks but no one talked about the presence of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Arabs in the country for the last several decades. He welcomed reforms in FATA and demanded further measures to take the tribal people into confidence.<sup>72</sup>

In terms of achievements, Khattak said that 57 % of the country’s resources had been allocated to provinces in the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award and that the province would get a better

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<sup>71</sup> Bureau Report (2012), “Fruits of provincial autonomy reaching masses, claims ANP”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 23 April 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 14 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/04/23/fruits-of-provincial-autonomy-reaching-masses-claims-anp/>

<sup>72</sup> Correspondent (2012), “Parliament to complete tenure, elections as per schedule: Asfandyar”, *The News International*, Mardan, 1 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 4 May 2012 URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-11418-Parliament-to-complete-tenureelections-as-per-schedule-Asfandyar>

share in future. “By now, 80% of the total federal budget is being spent on debt services, administration and defence. Only 20% is left for the rest of the sectors which is indeed a great dilemma leaving small portion of budget to the most important sectors like education and health. This is the main reason that over the years, Pakistan has remained a national security state than becoming a welfare state,” he said.<sup>73</sup>

Because of the enhanced popularity, many workers of different parties from Buner and Mardan announced joining the ANP. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti enumerated various achievements of his government, saying that they succeeded on many fronts where previous governments had failed. Referring to the NFC Award, he said that they had Rs. 40 billion in their exchequer that would be spent on the welfare of people. The ANP government succeeded in increasing its share in oil and gas royalty from Rs. 330 million to Rs. 16 billion. He said, “The provincial government has set up its own Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Oil and Gas Development Company.” He sanctioned the extension of the Pehur High Level Canal, which was a longstanding demand of the people. He said that government allocated Rs. 30 million for its survey, which was expected to be completed within three months. “After the survey, government will start work on the mega project, which will irrigate thousands canals land in the district,” he added. The Chief Minister said that he also sanctioned Rs. 580 million for the construction of 30 kilometres Topi-Utla Road. “The government has also provided Rs. 460 million for construction of Swabi Police Lines, which was attacked by the suicide bomber on November 1, 2010,” he said. Hoti added that Rs. 140 million were allocated for construction and repairing of the Swabi-Mardan Road. About Razaar tehsil, he said that they had allocated Rs. 220 million for the building of the new tehsil.<sup>74</sup> The construction of the building was delayed because the fund was diverted to help flood survivors. He allocated Rs. 600 million for uplift schemes in six provincial assembly

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<sup>73</sup> Bureau Report, “Post-18th Amendment regime: Only provinces to blame if they fail to deliver, says Afrasiab”

*Dawn*, Peshawar, 7 February 2012, [Online web] Accessed 14 March 2012

URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/07/post-18th-amendment-regime-only-provinces-to-blame-if-they-fail-to-deliver-says-afrasiab/>

<sup>74</sup> A tehsil is a unit of government in Pakistan. Tehsils are the second administrative division. They are further subdivided into Union Councils.

constituencies in the district.<sup>75</sup>

Irrespective of these achievements the party had failed to face the longstanding challenges successfully. In the four years since 2008, the ANP has failed miserably to achieve the various commitments. This has degraded its popularity and it has been constantly criticised by the other parties.

### ***Challenges in FATA***

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is the most vulnerable region in terms of militancy and deteriorating situations of security aspects. Thus to stabilise FATA, the Awami National Party initially talked about the merger of FATA to KP. But Farhat Taj says that merger with KP will not solve the problem of FATA.<sup>76</sup>

So now the major ‘players’ of the ANP are reaching a consensus to let the people of FATA decide whether the region becomes a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or a separate province, rather than imposing their own will on them. The government and other stakeholders might seek opinion of tribal people through referendum, regarding merger with the province or giving status of a separate province to FATA. The ANP has also softened its stance about the status of FATA and decided to allow tribal people to determine their future. Earlier, the party was insisting on merger of the 27,220 square kilometres stretch along the Afghan border, comprising 7 administrative agencies and 6 frontier regions, with the adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

The ANP also declared 2012 as the FATA year. Senator Haji Mohammad Adeel told that the ANP could offer constitutional and economic packages to tribal people for the merger of FATA with the province. “Like the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, FATA can also get the same package if it is merged with the province,” he said, adding it could

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<sup>75</sup> Khan, Muqaddam (2011), “Pakhtuns know how to defend their land, says Asfandyar”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 29 November 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 30 January 2012, URL: <http://dawn.com/2011/11/29/pakhtuns-know-how-to-defend-their-land-says-asfandyar/>

<sup>76</sup> Taj, Farhat (2012), “Voices from FATA and the panic II”, *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 21 January 2012, [Online web] Accessed 4 May 2012, URL: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C01%5C21%5Cstory\\_21-1-2012\\_pg3\\_4](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C01%5C21%5Cstory_21-1-2012_pg3_4)

be discussed with the genuine representatives and elders of tribal areas.<sup>77</sup>

The ANP Provincial President Senator Afrasiab Khattak said that his party would continue the struggle to restore fundamental rights of the tribal people. He said that without merger of FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would remain incomplete. He said that the ANP claimed ownership of the motherland and its people. That was why the party workers were being targeted. He declared 2012 as “the year of FATA” and said that the party would hold conferences and public meetings to highlight the problems of the tribal people.<sup>78</sup>

### ***Failures of the Awami National Party***

Failures of the Awami National Party as pointed out by the Pakistan People’s Party (Sherpao) (PPP-S) Central Chairman Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, states that, “The champions of Pakhtuns have disappointed the people and thus they are joining our party in different parts of the country.” He added that the national party, failing to mitigate the problems being faced by the Pakhtuns, appears increasingly frustrated in the present situation. Sherpao said that the decade-long wars in the region and now the war on terror has multiplied the people’s problems in the country in general and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular, but the ANP-led provincial government has badly failed to voice the rights of the exploited Pakhtuns.

He said that the Pakhtuns had always supported the ANP but its leadership had failed even to suggest to the federal government to participate in the Bonn conference in Afghanistan to highlight the miseries of the Pakhtuns. “The Bonn conference has meant peace in the region, mainly in Afghanistan, and it was duty of the (federal) government to participate for presenting its own viewpoint. But the rulers (including the ANP) did not deem it necessary to portray the Pakhtuns as major sufferers of the war on terror,” the PPP-S Central Chairman lamented.

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<sup>77</sup> Ali, Zulfiqar (2002), “Referendum likely to decide Fata future”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 30 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 7 April 2012, URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/01/30/referendum-likely-to-decide-fata-future-2/>

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

Sherpao said that his party has launched a movement for the rights of the Pakhtuns and now all the people has understood the message to take a unified stand for their usurped rights and that was why people from Swabi, once a stronghold of the ANP, were joining hands with him. No one single-handedly could solve these problems being faced by the Pakhtuns. He stated that these problems can only be solved through collective efforts and constant struggle, adding that it was extremely unfortunate the federal cabinet in its first ever meeting in Peshawar did not allocate any funds for the flood-wrecked Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The PPP-S central leader condemned the NATO attack at military check posts in Mohmand Agency saying that it proved the hollowness of the government's relations with the United States and it was need of the hour to change the foreign policy.<sup>79</sup>

Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid Khyber Pakhtunkhwa President Amir Muqam said that the PML had constructed the development schemes, but now the ANP leaders were busy renaming these old schemes after their leaders. He said that “four-year stint of the ruling parties had given the masses the gifts of price hike, joblessness and load shedding. The lucrative national institutions like Pakistan Steel Mills, PIA and Pakistan Railways were at the verge of collapse” due to excessive corruption of the rulers. He said that as a coalition partner the ANP was responsible for destroying the country's institutions and the people should reject it in the next general elections.<sup>80</sup>

Most of the projects either were not completed because of funds or not started because of the lack of consensus among the ruling parties. Again the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) is also making inroads in these areas and sympathizing with the Pakhtuns for their deprivation. They have also condemned the failure of Awami National Party thus challenging the ANP's popularity among the Pakhtuns.

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<sup>79</sup> Staff Reporter (2011), “ANP failed to resolve problems of Pakhtuns, Says Sherpao”, *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 17 December 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2012  
URL: [http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C12%5C17%5Cstory\\_17-12-2011\\_pg7\\_13](http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C12%5C17%5Cstory_17-12-2011_pg7_13)

### *The Awami National Party's stand on the relation with the United States*

Like the NAP, its predecessor, the ANP is not against cooperation with the United States as it views the necessity of US help regarding the improvement of the condition of Pakistan. The Awami National Party's leader and the federal Minister for Railways Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour has called for the reopening of NATO supply routes with some conditions "in the larger national interest." The nation was not in a position to take on the United States and face its wrath, he said while talking to Dawn.<sup>81</sup>

But it should be kept in mind that the Awami National Party has always stood for independent foreign policy. It has consistently opposed to become part of any military alliances to fight proxy wars and allow the country to be used as a front line state. It does not want the outside world to take advantage of the vulnerable Pakistan thereby hampering its sovereignty and integrity.

But in case of the US, the ANP thinks that having certain interests in common like combating terrorism they can work together. The US administration has realised that without democracy, economic prosperity and efficient local civil armed forces, it will not be possible to defeat terrorism and armed insurgency. It has therefore, recognised the need for extending unconditional support for strengthening the democratic institutions in Pakistan and investing in human development and improved infrastructure including healthcare, education, water management and energy generation. Thus the ANP is supporting the non-military aid given to Pakistan by the United States for the improvement of the country. The Kerry Linger Bill makes particular mention of the development and support of legal and political reforms in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), rehabilitation and sustainable development of areas affected by counter insurgency operations.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Bureau Report (2012), "Renaming of projects shows ANP failure: Muqam", Dawn, Peshawar, 11 February 2012, [Online web] Accessed 1 June 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/11/renaming-of-projects-shows-anp-failure-muqam/>

<sup>81</sup> Khalid Hasnain (2012), "Pakistan Can't Afford to Invite US Wrath, Says Bilour", *Dawn*, Lahore, 24 March 2012 [Online Web] Accessed 13 June 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/03/24/pakistan-can-t-afford-to-invite-us-wrath-says-bilour/>

<sup>82</sup> The bill authorizes the release of 1.5 billion USD per year to the Government of Pakistan from the United States as non-military aid from the period of 2010 to 2014. It was proposed by Senators John Kerry and

With regard to NATO supplies, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister for Information, Mian Iftikhar Hussain, said that his party (Awami National Party) would support whatever decisions the federal government takes regarding the resumption of NATO supplies. Speaking to media representatives, the Provincial Minister said that the decision taken by the federal government with regard to NATO supplies would be in the best interest of the country. However, he hoped that the recommencement of the supplies would come with certain conditions. Replying to a question regarding the fresh wave of terror attacks, the minister said that it was a temporary situation and hoped that the government would soon overcome the crisis. He categorically stated that stern action would be taken against “terrorists no matter wherever they are.” The security forces have successfully carried out operations against terrorists in different parts of the province, he said, adding that actions against militants would continue.<sup>83</sup>

However, the support of the ANP to the US in case of certain issues gave it a tag of being an American agent which is also curtailing its popularity.

### ***Developmental Aids***

The provincial government is also working to get the developmental aids from foreign donors as it would help in enhancing the developmental procedure in the area. A World Bank-funded project valuing \$20 million was launched for economic revitalisation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).<sup>84</sup> The United States Agency for International Development will continue its support for economic and social development of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.<sup>85</sup> But although

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Richard Lugar. It is considered a major shift in foreign aid to Pakistan, as it significantly increases the civil aid given to the country as compared to previous aid given.

Ibid

<sup>83</sup> Iftikhar Hussain (2012), “ANP to Support Govt on Nato Supply Resumption”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 16<sup>th</sup> May 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 18 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/05/16/anp-to-support-govt-on-nato-supply-resumption-iftikhar-hussain/>

<sup>84</sup> Bureau Report (2012), “World Bank to help revive KP, Fata businesses”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 10 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 4 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/01/10/world-bank-to-help-revive-kp-fata-businesses-2/>

<sup>85</sup> Bureau Report (2012), “USAID promises continued support to KP, Fata uplift”, *Dawn*, Peshawar, 25 January 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 12 May 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/01/25/usaid-promises-continued-support-to-kp-fata-uplift/>



there is substantial aid received in the areas but no proper utilisation and development has been seen as yet.

### ***Loss of Honour of the ANP***

Setbacks are suffered by major political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because of the above challenges and it is thus making inroads for other political parties like Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) which has a good public image and is also vocal for some crucial issues.<sup>86</sup>

### ***The Awami National Party and the Centre***

Presently the Awami National Party holds its position in the Centre firmly. It is not only the senior partner in the coalition government with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), but also dominates the policy-making in the province. Thus the issues of development and improvements in the province take the sway of the ANP. Again the recent senate election tells the story of the ANP's improvement in the position. The Awami National Party doubled its strength to 12 with the victory of 7 candidates. The ANP is the third largest party after the PPP and the MQM.<sup>87</sup>

But recently the ANP appears to be annoyed at the fresh inductions of 11 ministers in the federal cabinet. It called for a review of it, saying that the cabinet expansion will be a burden on the national kitty that is already under pressure. Thus the ANP opines that they have joined hands with the PPP on principles and it would continue to back it on good initiatives and criticise its unwise measures and the cabinet expansion was one of them.<sup>88</sup>

But it is less likely that the ANP will break the coalition on such trivial matters, which is giving it power both in the centre and in the province.

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<sup>86</sup> Amir, Intikhab (2012), "The rise of PTI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa", *Dawn*, Peshawar, 14 January 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/01/14/the-rise-of-pti-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-2/>

<sup>87</sup> Khan, Iftikhar A. (2012), "Ruling Coalition Gains a Foothold in Senate", *Dawn*, Islamabad, 3 March 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 4 April 2012 URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/03/03/ppp-bags-19-seats-ruling-coalition-gains-a-foothold-in-senate/>

<sup>88</sup> Alvi, Mumtaz (2012), "ANP Calls for Review of Cabinet Expansion", *The News International*, Islamabad, 16 April 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 3 May 2012 URL:

### ***The Persisting Challenges***

When the Awami National Party came to power, it ushered a new era of hope among the people. But in many cases it has failed to provide what it had promised. It ranges from various issues commencing from militancy to flood relief. The government had to take help of the military in providing resources and in saving thousands of lives. Further the fund received by the party has not been channelised well for the benefit of the people. In regard to curb militancy it has failed miserably. The government was also unable to find a solution to the deteriorating health condition and problem of unemployment of the people. Thus the ANP has to play the Pakhtun card to win in the politics of pragmatism instead of eradicating the challenges for the Pakhtun people.

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<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-103213-ANP-calls-for-review-of-cabinet-expansion>

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

Like many of the plural countries of the world, Pakistan is a country with unique ethnic diversity. But the ethnic problem of Pakistan has plagued it since its inception. Presently, Pakistan is going through a crucial era of multifarious ethnic problems. These inter ethnic group conflicts have destabilised the political system of the country and have seriously undermined the foundations of the state.

The main problem with countries like Pakistan lies in the process of decolonisation as the critical factors like religion, ethnic composition of population and local power structures were not taken into account. Ethnic cleavages had already been drawn either along economic or political lines. The independent nations decided upon crucial questions relating to the respective rights and roles within the new environment that was determined by state formation post decolonisation. It produced the ethnic block which has burdened the states with conflicts. In many cases the conflicts that were submerged, once again came to dominate the scene.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly the politics of ethnicity has also hampered national integration and solidarity of the nation. As politics has mainly remained the domain of the elite, the jingle of ethnicity has been raised time and again to perpetuate the existing political structure and class inequality. The case of the Pakhtuns is no different.

#### *Pakhtun Nationalism and its Politics*

Pakhtun nationalism which is posing one of the potent threats to Pakistani nationhood emerged in the scene as an anti-colonial movement of the small Khans.<sup>2</sup> The Pakhtuns are historic races who are conceited for their bravery, hospitality and heroism. The Pakhtun's sense of separate ethnic identity within the bounds and framework of Islam

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<sup>1</sup> Dixit, Abha (1996), *Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) pp.2

was an acknowledged fact. They were against the subjugation of the British and the Muslim League. More than religious aspiration they believed in the preservation of their ethnic culture. So instead of joining Pakistan they wanted to form a state of their own called Pakhtunistan. This was led by Ghaffar Khan, who with the help of the KKM, wedged a struggle for the Pakhtun homeland. But the Muslim League and the Congress never gave KKM the opportunity to form their own homeland. The only option available during the time of independence was either India or Pakistan. After much deliberation, the Pakhtuns decided to join Pakistan on the basis of religion by a majority vote, though KKM boycotted the referendum.

Historically, secular Pakhtun nationalism was much stronger in the first two decades of Pakistan's existence with the KKM and Ghaffar Khan. After the creation of Pakistan, over time the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (known as NWFP before 2010), dominated by the Pakhtuns, began its own nationalist struggle on the grounds that for the Pakhtun race Pakistan was a lesser identity and that their ethnicity was the foremost source of identity and affiliation.

This led to the formation of the National Awami Party (NAP), which was an assortment of individuals from various political and ideological orientations all of whom demanded provincial autonomy and representation. But as noted earlier, after partition Pakhtun nationalism lost its vigour in the hands of the political parties. The National Awami Party became the vanguard of the Pakhtuns and worked with the other fractions on certain common agendas. Initially the party shifted its demands from secession to autonomy within Pakistan and wanted to enjoy considerable hold in the provincial politics. Later the political foundation of Pakhtun nationalism became a platform for the civil servants, army personnel and local investors and was only left with satisfying the demands of the political leaders.

Basically Pakhtun nationalism rose out of the conflict of interest between the small and big Khans. Since the British period the big Khans were given the privilege which was against the interests of the small Khans. Thus they rose up against the British and the big

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<sup>2</sup> Dr Ejaz, Manzoor (2009), "Washington Diary : Pashtun nationalism" ,*Daily Times* , August 19<sup>th</sup> 2009 [Online Web] URL [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C08%5C19%5Cstory\\_19-8-2009\\_pg3\\_5](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C08%5C19%5Cstory_19-8-2009_pg3_5) Accessed 2 February 2012

Khans by taking the peasants on board. But after partition the peasants realised that the concept of 'Pakhtunistan' would have entailed total control of the landlords over all means of production, hence depriving the peasantry of any chances of education, employment etc. They also realised that tendencies towards national integration were in their best interest. Thus assimilation would be the best option for them as in this way they could be absorbed with the rest of the country and acceptance towards the social setup of other provinces would help them achieve economic progress and development. At the same time they would not have to abandon their culture.

Again after partition, the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the urban middle class of Pakhtuns have always been in contour with integration with the rest of the country's economy. The Pakhtuns have dominated the transport business in the country especially in Punjab and Sindh. The migration of Pakhtun workers to these urban centres has provided them with employment opportunities. That is why the demands shifted from autonomy to secession.

This also led to the shift in the demands of the NAP. The NAP failed to get popularity as the Pakhtun people aligned itself with the main political parties, keeping their economic and political priorities in mind. It is also a known fact that the democratic culture of Pakistan is very vague, so earlier the NAP was unable to get its recognition as a regional party. It only had considerable influence in some parts of the country and mostly acted as the opposition to the ruling regime. It formed coalition with many parties to stay in power. Though it had a national colour, the NAP was unable to satisfy the masses and finally was banned by the Bhutto government. It reappeared as the National Democratic Party, which again after its failure, was reformed as the Awami National Party (ANP).

However, after its formation the ANP's Baloch and Sindhi leaders broke away and formed their own nationalist groups. The ANP watered down the old NAP's hard Marxist idiom and became exclusively a secular and left-liberal Pakhtun nationalist party. As an electoral entity, the ANP's performance was mixed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Throughout the 1990s it got into various alliances with the PPP and PML-N, but none of them were successful. In the 1997 elections, the ANP won 8 out of its 10 National Assembly seats from Peshawar and Mardan region, which was not only its traditional

support base but also the one with the largest number of local investors, civil servants and army personnel.

Even though KP's Pakhtun-dominated areas have been electoral strongholds of the ANP, JUI and PPP, the Pakhtuns in Karachi had mostly been electorally aligned with NAP and then the ANP. All this changed in the 2002 elections when the ANP was almost wiped out by religious parties like the MMA in KP. Nevertheless, during the discrediting of the Musharraf dictatorship in 2007 and rising unpopularity of the right-wing MMA government in KP, the ANP bounced back in the 2008 elections, bagging the majority of seats in KP.<sup>3</sup>

### ***New era of Pakhtun Nationalism: Success of the Awami National Party***

With the turn of time, Pakistan once again saw the revival of democratic government after the 2008 elections. The political scenario started to change as the larger parties formed coalition with the regional parties to sustain themselves. The democracy showed signs of improvement once the regional realities came to the fore and the army went back to the barracks. But new problems started to dominate the scene and once again revival of the regional ethnic identities was witnessed with the growth of regional parties. In this scenario the Awami National Party came as a vanguard for the Pakhtuns, who were constantly being targeted in Karachi and were being equated with the Taliban as a post 9/11 phenomenon, apart from facing the problem of economic or political deprivation. Thus after the 2008 election the ANP came up with new manifesto and strategies and firmly worked as a Pakhtun party, which is not only giving it leverages in the Pakhtun-dominated provinces but also their due share of power in the decision making at the centre. After the MQM it is the third largest coalition partner of the PPP.


### ***Lessons learnt from the National Awami Party***

The Awami National Party, unlike its predecessor the National Awami Party, has shifted much of its focus to new areas for its sustenance. Thus to maintain itself in the position of

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid

power the ANP has devised various strategies.



*Diagram 5.1: National Awami Party and Awami National Party*

The National Awami Party as stated earlier was more national in character than the Awami National Party. The NAP stood against and fought a protracted political battle against successive military regimes, bearing the brunt of the staunchly pro-American establishment then. It was against any kind of military alliances (like CENTO, SEATO). The NAP instead of taking a Pakhtun colour voiced for the rights of the provinces as a nationalist party. But after the breakup of the Bhashani group it lost its national colour. The National Awami Party preferred to sit in the opposition in spite of having a similar kind of ideology with the ruling PPP government. Again it was never enthusiastic to extend its hands towards Punjab and always voiced against the Punjabi-dominated centre. Thus when the achievements of the NAP are summed up, there is hardly any positive development for the Pakhtuns apart from that it was a strong opposition to the establishment.

With the establishment of the Awami National Party, the scenario has undergone a sea of change. The Awami National Party also saw splits in the party. But it was branded as a Pakhtun-based party. The ANP unlike the NAP was not against the establishment. Though it kept its basic agenda similar but in certain cases it went for key changes. For instance, it came up as a Pakhtun-based party and tried to build its base as a regional

party. It formed coalition to be in power both with the PPP and the PML (N) irrespective of the ideologies. The ANP has also extended its friendly hands towards Punjab in contrast to the NAP. Again the ANP differentiated itself from the NAP by keeping good relations with the United States as it feels that it is necessary for Pakistan to support the US in its operation against the Taliban. Thus the ANP has learnt a good lesson from its predecessor and has applied a different strategy to come and stay in power. It also works for the issues of human security in Pakistan as it is the need of the time and with due course of time it has become one of the popular regional parties in the politics of Pakistan.

Before the election was held Asfandyar Wali Khan, in an interview regarding the priorities of the ANP, said, “ANP leadership has been advocating for provincial autonomy since the creation of Pakistan. We should have rights over our own resources and the other provinces should enjoy the same rights. Pakistan is not the Punjab and the Punjab is not Pakistan. We know that ‘Big Brother’ should have the lion’s share but he must refrain from devouring all the vitals at the cost of the small provinces. If this practice continues we invite more disorder. Provincial autonomy under the 1973 Constitution is not enough. It should be reopened.”<sup>4</sup>


### ***Redefined Role of Pakhtun Nationalism and the Awami National Party***

The Awami National Party, the Pakhtun nationalist party with pacifist origins, was out of power for decades before the February 2008 elections swept it in. The party came to handle the new realities with the help of new strategies. Asfandyar Wali Khan, the President of the party said in an interview that Pakhtun nationalism is to be understood on the basis of the structure of the society. Presently three entities prevail in the society which has complicated the issue of a secular coherent Pakhtun nationalism.

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<sup>4</sup> Khan Muqaddam (2008), “Interview — Asfandyar Wali Khan, President, Awami National Party”, Herald Elections 2008, *Dawn Archives*, [Online Web] Accessed on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2012 URL <http://archives.dawn.com/weekly/herald/herald10.htm>





*Diagram 5.2: The Forces of Pakhtun Society*

These three forces are making the growth of a strong unified Pakhtun nationalism more complicated. The Pakhtuns are often equated with the Taliban because all the three sections are ethnically Pakhtuns. Also the religious political entities are jeopardizing the growth of secular nationalism. The Afghan jihad did not bring any significant change in the life of the average Pakhtuns initially, but the society started changing once the preachers started going to these areas. They were peaceful, polite and non-coercive, and they were able to persuade the older Pakhtuns to lay down some restrictions on the younger ones. Music, which was a regular feature of hujras and weddings, was banned in some areas because of the growth of religious fundamentalists.

Similarly presence of the Taliban in the Pakhtun society is coming as a big challenge. The areas affected by this challenge are in North and South Waziristan, Bajour and Madan. Wali Khan mentioned that the military action in these areas to keep away the Taliban has not brought their influences down. Pakhtun nationalism is also facing a great threat in Karachi, as they are being equated with the Taliban. This is because the Mohajirs are unable to accept the Pakhtuns as a “reality in Karachi.”

While talking about new aspects of the Awami National Party, it can be said that the ANP has lost its national colour because of the “concept of Interest” of the regions which is

also resulting in the splits.<sup>5</sup> The regional realities that are coming up are forcing the Baluch and Pakhtun parties not to merge, but of course they can form an alliance. Thus basically because of the resurgence of regional realities the regional political parties are gaining prominence in Pakistan.

### ***Present Situation and Additional Problems***

The complex dynamics of the present violence in the Pakhtun belt has confused the Pakistani and Western intellectuals. In the absence of fieldwork data and authentic evidence, perhaps due to the inaccessibility of the region, analysts usually find themselves at a loss in identifying diverse factors that contribute to terrorism and religious militancy in the Pakhtun belt. It is this lack of clarity that usually leads analysts in Pakistan and elsewhere to term the present insurgency in the Pakhtun belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan as a class war, a war of liberation, an expression of nationalistic sentiments, culture and identity of the Pakhtuns, and a war against the US imperialism. As a result the core issues are usually ignored. They are: the Pakhtun-dominated regions are unstable economically, politically and socially which is also turning fast into a never-ending war zone; the interplay of different forces in the region has led to continuous tension; the conflict is resulting in mass killing of the non-combatants caught in the crossfire between the state and non-state forces in the area; the disintegration and deterioration of the social structures of the Pakhtun belt is taking place; the resources are also not being used in a proper manner.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the ANP needs to handle these challenges to be a proper vanguard of the Pakhtuns.

### ***Is the ANP a Symbol of Pakhtun Nationalism?***

The ANP came as a Pakhtun-based party after the collapse of its predecessors the NAP and the NDP. But it has actually abandoned the idea and has entered a new phase of

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<sup>5</sup> Abbas, Mazhar (2011), "Interview with Asfandyar Wali Khan", ARY News , Do Tok, 9 January 2011, Available at You Tube, [Online Web] Accessed 24 April 2012, URL <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cj5zc6vUDI>

<sup>6</sup> Hussain, Khadim (2008), "Role for Pashtun intelligentsia", *Dawn*, Peshawar, 26<sup>th</sup> November 2008, [Online web] Accessed 5 June 2012, URL <http://archives.dawn.com/2008/11/26/op.htm>

power play.

The strategy applied by the ANP can be compared to the materialist approach to ethnic mobilization, exemplified by the early works of Robert Bates, Michael Hechter, Albert Breton, and more recently, Russell Hardin and Daniel Posner. It argues that individuals support ethnic parties out of a desire for the material “benefits of modernity” such as land, jobs and markets. The materialist approach belongs to that early category of “rational choice” which made the strict assumption that individuals are motivated by economic interests. The alternative to the materialist approach is the social psychological approach, which suggests that individuals support ethnic parties out of a desire for psychic gratification rather than a desire for material goods. These two approaches give a similar kind of a result. As soon as political entrepreneurs step in with ethnic parties, the search either for material goods or for self-esteem should ensure that the success of ethnic parties is a predetermined conclusion.<sup>7</sup>

Thus the ANP has managed to get the support from the Pakhtun people after the recent regional realities came to the fore, both psychologically and economically. On the virtue of this it has extended its influence in the regions of Sindh and Baluchistan apart from KP. But the question that comes here is whether the ANP can be regarded as a vanguard of the Pakhtuns. The party manifesto talks more about the general aspect of Pakistan with some specification on the issues of the Pakhtuns. So far except for the change of the name of the province, a considerable enhancement of the status of the Pakhtuns was not seen especially in the less politically powerful areas of Pakistan. At the same time it is true that there are a number of challenges which is in front of the ANP and proper progress of these areas is a time consuming process. Though the ANP claims that a lot of improvements were made but hardly the results are visible except in a few cases.

The ANP so far has not been able to curtail the challenges of extremism nor worked for the development of the underprivileged areas. Rather, in spite of its manifestation, the ANP appears to be reduced to the level of family club. It seems that often it is held up for self promotion instead of development and welfare.

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<sup>7</sup> Cited in Chandra, Kanchan (2002), “A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties”, [Online Web] Accessed 14 April 2012 URL <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/5/chandra-metz/chandra-metz.pdf>

It will be worth mentioning here that the strategic changes done by the ANP and its overall approach has set a position for itself in the political power hierarchy of Pakistan which the NAP failed to get. It can be justified that the ANP's position which it enjoys today is because of branding itself as a specific Pakhtun-based party. Thus the ANP is using Pakhtun nationalism more as a bargaining tool with the centre rather than following the party ideology, since it was seen that irrespective of the party ideology the ANP has formed coalition with different parties to stay in power. This was the first hypothesis of the study.

### ***Triumph of Instrumentalism of Pakhtun Ethnicity***

The very basis of Pakhtun nationalism is that they are intolerant of any kind of subjugation. This was the reason why they voiced for their own homeland. When they saw it as impossibility they started demanding autonomy within the state.

In the present situation the Pakhtuns are faced with huge number of challenges. Initially Pakhtun nationalism was a potent threat for the state of Pakistan. Thus the issue of Pakhtunistan — creation of a separate state for the Pakhtuns — has not only created rift between the two states of Afghanistan and Pakistan but was also used as a bargaining tool by Afghanistan against Pakistan. But with time this aspect of the issue started fading away and new problems started coming up challenging the Pakhtun and diminishing its secular character.

The ethnic connection with Afghanistan brought drug barons not only among the Pakhtun tribes but also among the army men during the Afghan war. Thus it further deteriorated the sacrosanct notion of Pakhtun nationalism.

The Talibans who are ethnically Pakhtuns have further brought down the status of Pakhtun nationalist ideologies whose struggle is often being equated with the Talibans. The Pakistani Pakhtun Talibans have acted quite differently from their Afghan brethren. While the Afghan Talibans adopted a policy of non-intervention in Pakistan or even in Northern Afghanistan, the Pakistani Pakhtun Talibans manifested their aspiration to change the state and indeed the entire ideological make-up of Pakistan. In other words, the Pakistani Pakhtun Talibans have acted as a centralist rather than a separatist

ideological force, notwithstanding their temporary takeover of certain tribal areas. This shows how much Pakhtun nationalism has weakened over the last thirty years.

Again there is an absence of consciousness of the Pakhtun people about the status of their language unlike other nationalists which can be regarded as lack of interest among the people to take forward the movement. Also when talking about the redefined dimensions of Pakhtun nationalism certain facts come to dominate the scene. Though the Pakhtuns are extremely conscious of their identity, however, their grouse against the Pakistani state is less convincing. They have better representation and influence in the Pakistan Army. They also dominate the religious and political matrix in Pakistan after the Punjabis. Thus the argument of Punjabi domination in certain cases can also be outlived. What is left for the political parties is their due share of power, for which they will fight until the suitable place in the power hierarchy is secured. Therefore the socio-economic factors and the struggle for power never gave the Pakhtuns a chance to have a consolidated nationalism.

Adding with it, Pakhtun migration to other parts of Pakistan in search of a better standard of living never led Pakhtun nationalism to be sturdy. Further the secular aspect of the nationalism is being undermined by religious political parties and their supporters. Thus the division among the people restricted the growth of the nationalism.

Hence Pakhtun nationalism remained only as a tool in the hands of the political parties. What Urmila Phadnis says about the politicisation of the ethnic struggle of the Pathans in the hands of the Frontier Congress is, “It was less a political party, and more an organisation of local political protest, committed to winning political recognition of the pathans.”<sup>8</sup>

These aspects highlight the instrumental character of Pakhtun nationalism. Though having the Primordial value, politicisation of Pakhtun ethnicity in the hands of the political leaders has truly become instrumental in nature showing its fluidity and flux. Further the above challenges of Pakhtun nationalism has also shown how the identity and basically the colour of the nationalism of the Pakhtuns have been changed and moulded in the hands of the politicians, religious groups and the Talibans. This was the second

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<sup>8</sup> Phadnis, Urmila (1984), “Ethnic movements in Pakistan’s Society and Politics” in Pandav Nayak (eds.) *South Asian Studies Series*, New Delhi :South Asian Publishers. pp196

hypothesis for this study.

In the end, it is worth mentioning that the recent surge in the nationalist feeling comes from the fact that the Pakhtuns still want a better place in the power structure of the Pakistani state and also wants their due share in the distribution of resources. The Pakhtun nationalists feel that without increased autonomy resentment among the smaller provinces will grow thereby putting at risk the very survival of the state. Punjab, the largest populated province, has the major share in the resources and services of the country, which the other provinces consider discriminatory. So they are raising their voice for more provincial autonomy as stated in the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan. There is a cry of dividing more and more provinces in Pakistan on administrative basis which the Pakhtun Awami National Party is supporting. After renaming of the province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa they feel that they are ably taking the struggle to the next level.

But with the ethnic clashes between the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs in Karachi, equating the Pakhtun nationalism with the Taliban movement, the challenges before Pakhtun nationalism are enhancing. Though the Awami national Party has used the Pakhtun identity for power but certain developments cannot be ignored like the work for human development in the region. In the end, it will be good for both the Pakhtuns and the party if it works for the development of the Pakhtuns and focus more in the less developed and more vulnerable areas of Pakhtun domination. This will give the Awami national Party the cherished popularity and share in power.

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