


DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled "ARMS AID AND ITS IMPLICATIONS : A STUDY OF THE U.S. ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA (1971-1984)" submitted by Suman Das is for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University, and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. (DR) ASWINI K. RAY

(SUPERVISOR & CHAIRMAN)

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I preserve with special care the love and encouragement I received from all my friends during the course of this work.

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Suman Das
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C O N T E N T S

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INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I	TRENDS IN ARMS AID AND TRADE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS		8
CHAPTER II	THE U.S. ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN 1971-1977		37
CHAPTER III	IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS ON U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN		72
CONCLUSION	109
TABLES	126
APPENDICES	131
BIBLIOGRAPHY	155

INTRODUCTION

With the transfer of power by the British to the National Congress and Muslim League in August 1947, there arose simultaneously a number of problems in India and Pakistan. Some of the problems were of immediate and some of far reaching consequences. The rivalry between the leaders of both the country was nothing but an extension of the pre-partition days conflicts. The ideological conflict between the political parties during the pre-partition days turned into a political conflict between India and Pakistan. As the two parties came to power in their respective countries, the Muslim League's urge for parity with the Congress was transformed into Pakistan's urge for parity with India. Soon after the partition, India and Pakistan were actively interested in safeguarding and promoting their national interest vis-a-vis the national interest of the other country. This ultimately led to the framing of policies from their respective points of view which were contradictory to each other.

Right from its inception, Pakistan followed a policy of confrontation with India through various stages which became manifest in various ways. Despite a common past

and a common heritage with India, Pakistan soon indulged in such acts as created problems for India. These acts added fuel to the already existing tensions and further embittered the relationship between the two countries which could not be harmonised despite bilateral negotiations.

The normalisation of Indo-Pak relations was a major issue for both India and Pakistan, but for the latter country it assumed extraordinary importance in the sense that it was a central factor in the formation of its policy on other issues. Pakistan's relationship with other countries even depended upon their position on Indo-Pak disputes.

Pakistani Leaders had the idea that congress leaders accepted partition with great reservations. These leaders were misled to believe that Indian leaders were expecting that the newly created state of Pakistan would not survive and would consequently re-unite with India.

The Kashmir issue was a major problem but not the only problem in the normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. Kashmir was a symptom of the disease, the disease being fear, mistrust and suspicion of India created by the leaders

of Pakistan in the minds of its people. Kashmir is not the cause of dispute, rather helps the Pakistani leaders to give a rationale to their hostility towards India and channelise their hate-India campaign from within the country and thereby maintaining their hold over the people.

The situation was further aggravated by Pakistan's alliance with the United States of America and subsequently receiving arms from it. Pakistan's arms acquisition from a super power, which has its global and regional implications, increased the subcontinental tensions to a considerable extent. The constant arms supply to Pakistan by the USA since the day both the countries entered into an alliance can never be considered in isolation. Steady flow of weapons, especially sophisticated weapons, to Pakistan is bound to have repercussions which affects India. Dragging a super power into a mutual conflict never helps in solving the problem, rather it escalates tensions. The reasons for supply of arms to Pakistan by the USA has global dimensions from the American point of view, whereas it is purely regional consideration that guides Pakistan to receive more and more arms. Despite many ups and downs Pakistan has maintained its strategic

relations with the U.S.A. In the recent years, with the changed geo-strategic significance of Pakistan due to Afghan crisis, Pakistan has acquired immense importance in the U.S. foreign policy framework. This has resulted in supply of most sophisticated weapons to Pakistan by the U.S.A.

Starting from the day when both the U.S. and Pakistan entered into military alliance, till the present day arms supply to Pakistan has constantly created suspicion and worries in India. Acquisition of weapons by the hostile neighbour, whose hostility has clearly been manifested in two major wars, is bound to have grave implications for the security of India which consequently, has to join the arms race in the subcontinent.

Some pertinent questions arise at this point of discussion. What could be the rationale behind the U.S supply of arms to Pakistan, when the U.S. is clearly aware of India's reaction to it? Why Pakistan is in constant search of arms which is quantitatively and qualitatively much higher than its requirements? What are the implications of such arms supply for the Indian subcontinent in general and India in particular?

The present work makes a modest attempt to analyse these questions. The period under discussion starts with the year 1971 when both India and Pakistan fought bitterly, and there was a clear 'tilt' in the U.S. action favouring Pakistan. This was the time when the U.S. clearly manifested its inclination towards Pakistan and hence it is considered a major landmark in the history of U.S.- India -Pakistan relationship. Starting from this date the discussion stretches upto 1984. In the 1980s, the arms supply to Pakistan by the U.S. has reached a new height and hence needs an analysis.

Though the work aims at analysing the U.S. arms aid to Pakistan, it does not go into the quantitative details. What the work aims at is to analyse the politics that guided the U.S. supply of weapons to Pakistan from 1971 to 1984. The strategic consideration of the U.S. and the political motivation of Pakistan involved in the arms supply is the matter of discussion. Hence, the discussion is more on a theoretical plane than on data level.

As the whole work is more or less on a theoretical level, a start with the theoretical analysis of arms transfer as such seemed imperative. Hence the first chapter deals

with arms transfer as such and its various components. Trends and implications of arms transfer is also discussed in this chapter. Finally a discussion on the history and development of arms transfer has been attempted at.

Due to the said importance of the year 1971, the second chapter deals with a period that begins with 1971. The discussion in this chapter extends till the year 1977, when there was a change in leadership in both the U.S.A. and Pakistan. Starting with a backdrop of U.S. Pakistan strategic relations the discussion extends to the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the oft-criticised U.S. 'tilt' towards Pakistan. Imposition of embargo on arms supply to Pakistan and its subsequent lift and the politics that operated behind it are matters of discussion in this chapter.

The change in the leadership in both the U.S.A. and Pakistan in the year 1977 and the tussle between both the countries over various issues are dealt in the third chapter. The Afghan crisis which revived the declining U.S.-Pak relationship and took it to a maximum height is major point of discussion in this chapter. This chapter deals with the quantitative aspect to a greater extent because to understand the height that the U.S.-Pak relationship has attained, one needs to understand the nature of

sophistication of the weapons supplied to Pakistan by the U.S.A. Once the dangerous effects of these sophisticated weapons are discussed, it would be easier to gauge the grave implications it has for India.

Finally, in the conclusion, a reappraisal of the whole situation is made. The justifiability of the threat perceptions of Pakistan, which seems to be the rationale behind its arms acquisition, is verified. Along with it, the implications, of constant arms supply to Pakistan, for India is discussed.

Innumerable literature has come out on the issue which is dealt in this work. Though a lot of books and articles have been consulted for a general view, concentration has been made mainly on news paper clippings. As the topic is a matter of everyday importance, a consultation with everyday's news seemed necessary.

A last word about the table given. Though they have not been referred to in the dissertation directly, they are not out of context. A study of these tables would help in improving the understanding on this topic.

CHAPTER-I

TRENDS IN ARMS AID AND TRADE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In a thoroughly crisis-ridden world, conflicts occur at global levels and also at local levels. Super-power hegemony also plays a pivotal role in determining the relationship between various nations. The division of the globe into major blocs, hegemonised by super-powers is perpetuating the conflicts between smaller countries, whereby the vested interests of the big powers are served. Many instruments exist by means of which the great powers create allies. Arms transfer has become an important instrument in this context. Arms transfer, no doubt, is now an important and pivotal sub-system in the existing set of multiple relations among nations. It has formed the basis, to a very great extent of the contemporary international power and diplomacy. In the light of the rate at which militarisation of nation-states is taking place, arms industry has become one of the fastest growing sectors of world economy.

While acknowledging the importance^{of} arms transfer one finds it imperative to have a look at the meaning of the term and its historical development. Arms transfer

is a multifaceted phenomena. One can describe, broadly the overall pattern of arms transfer by two terms signifying two types of transactions; arms trade and arms aid. But considering the ambiguous nature of various arms transaction, one certainly finds it difficult to define the exact boundaries of these two terms.

Arms trade as a means of arm transfer

Arms trade, to put it simply, is the process through which manufacturers sell their weapons in the international arms market. There is a strong competition between the different producers of arms for markets in the now-producing regions of the world.

So far as the process of arms trade is concerned, on the interaction level, these may be described as (a) Primary - Producer and Primary-Producer-turned-consumer Relationship; (b) Primary-Producer-Consumer Relationship; (c) Consumer-turned-Secondary-Producer and consumer Relationship.¹ It is useful to distinguish between the trade among developed countries, that comes

1. Harpeet Mahajan, Arms Transfer To India Pakistan and The Third World (New Delhi, 1982), p. 2.

under category 'a' and trade with developing countries that comes under category 'b'. Trade amongst the developing countries, as some of the developing countries have established domestic arms industries and have become suppliers of arms to other less developed countries, comes under the last category. The basis of trade, of the first category, is different from the second. Most of the developed countries have the expertise to develop and produce modern weapons but for various reasons, primarily economic, most of them do not maintain completely independent arms industries. Nevertheless, the development and production of weapons, if only on a small scale and confined to a narrow range of weapons, is widespread. As a result there is a substantial amount of mutual trade. Further, the arms trade between developed countries, like super powers and industrialised nations depends upon alliance system, for example NATO alliance, headed by the United States. Similarly, after World War II, West Germany and Japan were devastated and needed American protection and economic assistance. These countries imported arms initially as it was cheaper. Gradually, they assimilated it with their own production and developed indigenous ones. The pattern here is one

of seeking to develop weapons by one or more dominant countries of a group or region who could exploit the potentialities of a fairly lucrative market bound by treaties and alliances. In this group each country constitutes by itself a relatively small market but cumulatively it is a market of considerable significance, both by reason of its direct arms sale potential as well as by the indirect help that arms transactions can provide in negotiating other lucrative deals such as oil, uranium, iron ore etc.²

In the communist bloc countries also the pattern is almost similar, though among them, considerable disparity exist which renders Soviet Union as the exclusive arms - producing country. In the post-war period the East European countries have developed their arms industries mostly by Soviet help. Soviet Union, in order to keep pace with the United States in the global arms race, has to sell old and obsolete weapons and has to produce more sophisticated and new weapons. The viability of producing sophisticated weapons depends upon the availability of a market. And the East European allies provide a

2. Col. B. Rama Rao, "Arms Transfer", Seminar No. 202, June 1976, p. 28.

convenient market for the sale of Soviet weapons. Arms trade of course is not necessarily confined to allied countries. Countries, acting as clients of super powers, purchase arms to serve the global interests of super powers as well as their own regional interests.

In contrast to the trade in weapons among developed countries, the trade with developing countries is almost exclusively one-way. It is this trade which has attracted most attention both because, to a large extent, it represents an extension of the conflict between East and West and because the weapons supplied have been extensively used.³ When we look back, we find almost all the armed conflicts, that have occurred since World War II, have been in the third World and the weapons that were used in these wars came mostly from the industrialised countries. Of course, one just can't say that all the conflicts were due to supply of arms, but it is equally incorrect to say that such activity has prevented conflict. The developing countries, or the Third World has been a major market for the developed countries to sell arms. Of course, due to worsened economic situation in many Third World countries and the saturation of imports

3. Frank Barnaby and Ronald Huisken, Arms Uncontrolled (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London : SIPRI Publication, 1975), p. 38.

in some client countries, the rate of arms import by the Third World countries has declined remarkably in recent years. Statistics for arms imports reveal among other things, the following facts :

1. About two-thirds of the total trade during 1980-84 consists of arms imports by the Third World.
2. The rate of growth of Third World arms imports has fluctuated considerably. From 1965-69 to 1970-74, the volume rose by 60 percent; it rose by 230 percent during the boom in 1975-79. But from then to the current period, 1980-84, the rate of growth is only about 4-5 percent.
3. During the past few years, the absolute decline in arms imports is most pronounced in Africa and the Far East. In other regions arms imports are fairly constant or slowly rising, depending on the time period chosen.
4. The six highest ranking Third World arms-importing countries -Egypt, Syria, India, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia - account for more than 50 per cent of all Third World arms imports.
5. The NATO countries imported about twice as many weapons, in terms of volume, during 1980-84 than did the WTO countries.⁴

4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Year Book, 1985, pp. 350-1.

While operating at various levels - arms trade takes place in various ways. The ways described below mainly concern the trade within developed and developing countries. Arms trade is conducted by sale of arms which is supposed to be licensed sale. Selling of arms to alliance bloc members, as discussed earlier, to strengthen the friendship is always in use. Further, resale of surplus or obsolete weapons enable the bigger power to produce modern and sophisticated weapons. Private companies, dealing with arms, also operate in the international market. Sometimes the insurgent forces in certain countries get arms through contraband or stolen shipments. During wars, weapons are generally captured and are then sold to the interested parties, such as the sale of ^{Soviet} weapons to the US and so on.

Arms aid as a means of Arms transfer

As mentioned earlier arms aid is also an integral component of arms transfer, though no water tight division can be made between arms aid and arms trade because of the complexities, ambiguities and secrecy that surrounds arms transfer. Still then, one needs to analyse arms aid as such, to get a clear picture of arms transfer. Arms aid, in common parlance, means transfer of

resources - weapons, technology and finances - from the donor country to the recipient. Arms aid as the term signify, is usually associated with developing countries. Needy countries belonging to some alliances also receive arms from other countries on aid basis. In the pre-World War I era, military assistance was mostly commercial and the whole process was taking place through commercial transaction. The concept of arms aid gained prominence at the time of World War II when the United States initiated massive military supply programmes under Lend-Lease agreement. This policy of Land Lease was extended to forty two countries including the UK, the Commonwealth, the USSR and France. During this period, Great Britain, was fast loosing her colonies and due to her inability requested the US to take over her military aid commitments to Greece and Turkey. This was the beginning of military aid programme as we know them today. The advent of cold war and its overwhelming influence on international relations changed the situation. The United States was then the emerging super power trying to get hold of as many countries under the policy of global containment. The only viable sector by which the United States and her allies felt threatened was the

communist block headed by the Soviet Union. This made the United State feel the need of building up the military strength of like minded countries in Europe which could resist communist expansion. Hence various alliance groups was formed under the leadership of the United States. NATO, CENTO, SEATO were the results of such efforts. By these treaties, the U.S. took up the charge of aiding and assisting her treaty partners with military and economic assistance. Thus one may to a great extent, trace the origin of military assistance as now understood and practised, to the needs of U.S. foreign policy.⁵

Arms aid also operates at various levels and through various ways. To enable the recipient country to get military aid, military grants are sanctioned, subsidies or sale of arms at discount prices, or on credits are given. Military equipments are given as gifts also. Supplies on a no-profit no-loss basis or at market rates are also made. Further, the sales could be strictly against cash payment or on a deferred payment arrangement. Military assistance also includes lending or leasing of equipments. Training military personnels of

5. Col. B. Rama Rao, op.cit., p. 27.

the aid-receiving country is another kind of military aid. The donor country may also establish training centres in the recipient country. The donor also helps the recipient country in building military - administrative infrastructures like airfields, ports etc. Military aid also operates among the developed countries where it is mainly in the form of technological assistance, to develop the recipient's arms industries. Sale of designs, process details and manufacturing data, in some case, certain essential scientific material and sub-assemblies helps in the above process. Arms aid, as we have seen, need not always mean transfer of arms as such. A weapon system can be produced in the recipient country under license or can be locally assembled from the parts supplied by the supplier country. If two countries find identification in their political and military requirements, they can embark upon co-development arrangements.⁶ This kind of mutual assistance can also be called arms assistance. Co-production and joint production allows the recipient to enter the foreign market at minimum investment and give his goods the protection of trade mark.

6. This usually takes place among countries belonging to a particular military block. This helps in the enhancement of quality and quantity of weapon production by means of standardisation and avoiding duplication.

Military aid in a comprehensible sense is practised and is affordable only by the super powers. The USA and the USSR supply weapons primarily for political and military reasons : to secure military bases or a measure of influence over the policies of the recipient country. For some lesser powers, but highly industrialised, like the UK, France arms aid means arms sale. The rationale for arms sale for these countries is mainly commercial. The cost of developing and producing weapons has on the whole, increased far more rapidly than the total quantity of resources which these countries have been able to commit to military uses. Hence, commercial gain guide such kind of arms transfers.

Implication of arms transfer

Arms transfer perpetuates the disparity between the donor and the recipient. It is a fact that it is a deficiency in requisite quality and quantity of arms, notwithstanding the purpose of requirement, propels a country to go for arms purchase or grant. This process in due course gives very conveniently an upperhand to the donor country. So, while donating arms, the donor country is guided by multiple motivations and implications. The very process of arms transfer carries with it some serious implications.

Rivalries between countries definitely get accelerated by arms trade and aid and produces many consequent reactions. Arms acquisition by a particular country acts as a catalyst in increasing suspicion and tension among its rival countries, and thus makes it imperative for the rival countries to go for arms import and the final result reads to a bitter arms race. Constant arms acquisition keeps alive the anachronistic idea that wars are inevitable.⁷ Rival countries are always constantly desirous of maintaining military balance among themselves and hence competitive arms build-up takes place. Thus, arms transfer as such is quite a destabilising factor and certainly disturbs the equilibrium amongst the countries of a particular region.

The attempt to hegemonise other countries by the super powers gets reinforced by arms transfer. This process of arms supply ultimately gives scope to the donor countries to exercise control over recipients in a variety of ways. The decision of the donor country regarding the quantum of arms that is to be supplied determines indirectly, the size of military set-up of the recipient country.


7. Philip Noet Barker, The Arms Race (London, 1958), p. 74.

Not only the quantum, but the quality as well, is directly proportional to the size and effectiveness of the armed forces of the recipient country. The more sophisticated is the arms flow to the recipient country the more effective its armed force becomes.

The rate at which the recipient country's armed force is to be developed is contingent upon the rate of flow of supplies. The process of making the armed forces more effective also gets accelerated if the arms supply from the foreign country is regular or increases regularly.


The donor country prescribes the scale of replenishment with regard to the recipient country. This determines the degree of utility of imported equipment of the recipient country and would be a determining factor governing the battle worthiness of ^{the} recipient's forces.

The arms imported by a particular country can't be used to the optimum, from the operational stand point, unless there is logistic support, in this regard, from the donor country. By determining the extent of logistic support that a recipient country gets or is allowed to set up in the recipient country itself, the operational effectiveness



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of imported equipment is closely controlled.⁸ This logistic support would include provision of spares for immediate maintenance or replacement, repairs and overhaul of equipment as needed by technology involved in particular items of equipments and facilities for moving equipment from units to the logistic maintenance area.

As mentioned earlier, without the help of the donor country, the recipient country would be in no position to use the acquired arms properly and therefore will be unable to utilise them to the maximum. Training doctrines and material could be considered as "soft ware" in relation to equipment hardware. Denial of former can render the latter infructuous. Constant interaction with the army of the recipient country by means of training enables the donor country to cast its influence on the army and mould its view to a considerable extent. The donor country, in course of time succeeds in converting the views of a section of the elite of the recipient country on international military and political situation towards its desirable direction so that it (the donor) can create a lobby of its own.

The quantity and quality of arms procured by a country is also guided by the terms made regarding the mode of payment

8. Col. B. Rama Rao, op.cit., p. 30.

Developing countries usually go for arms aid or purchase arms on credit basis, both short-term and long-term. The donor country usually dictates the terms of payment taking into consideration the economic, political and strategic importance of the country.

Certain special measures are taken by the supplier of arms so as to control the supplied nations. Very often arms industries in the recipient country act as assembling industries where semi-processed items from foreign countries are assembled and weapons are manufactured. Withholding of key sub-assemblies or certain semi-processed items could freeze production in the recipient country.

Arms transfer, of course, helps the recipient country in maintaining a viable domestic defence industry. Longer production runs reduce the production costs per unit and R&D expenditure. It also allows the development of an industrial base, and helps the supplier countries in getting rid of obsolete arms thereby enhancing their own technological developments. Further, it helps the supplier in maintaining its domestic arms industry when there is inadequate demand for weapons at home.

Thus arms aid and trade are very important factors in foreign policy decisions and are effective levers in regulating recipient's posture towards international affairs. States, totally dependent upon foreign arms aid are totally controlled by the donor who could either escalate or reduce tensions in those areas, according to its own convenience.

One important factor that gets severely retarded by the present day arms trade is economic growth of the recipient country. This is a phenomenon from which almost all the developing countries suffer. Acquisition of arms require large outlays. Hence a considerable amount of expenditure, is diverted towards defence in an otherwise underdeveloped economy. Military expenditures create purchasing power and effective demand but do not create an offsetting increase in immediate consumable output or in productive capacity to meet future requirements. Thus the expenses have an inflationary effect on the economy. Total military expenditure in the post-war period has been roughly equal to the 1975 GNP for the entire World which is greater than 5 times the GNP of all developing countries and which is equal to an investment of

of \$1500 for every man, woman and child, and equal to 15 years income for the average Indian.⁹

Factors guiding arms acquisition

After describing briefly the factors influencing the supply of weapons briefly, a look at the demand side is needed where the picture seems to be more complex owing to the large number of recipients with varying social structures, ethnic divisions, and historical backgrounds. It is however possible to detect some common factors in the requirement of weapons. These requirements often find their source in some form of conflict in its broadest sense. A look at the world history says that nations are created artificially. No state's boundary is fixed strictly, with due regard to the geographical, ethnic or historical considerations. Hence, internal divisions are always prevalent in all states. After decolonisation also we find a sudden change in many newly liberated states which has led to societal, political and economic instability inside the country. While discussing the motivations behind the demands for weapons by developing countries, one need to keep these factors in mind.

9. Harpeet Mahajan, op.cit., p. 109.

Military requirements is the primary reason for arms acquisition. To tackle with the external and internal conflict arms are needed. In case of armed conflict, the demand for weapons is the highest. The six highest ranking Third World arms-importing countries during 1980-84 are Egypt, Syria, Iraq, India, Libya and Saudi Arabia¹⁰ and all of them are conflict ridden.¹¹

Secondly, sometimes acquisition of arms helps in building up nationalism by uniting divisive groups and by affirming national identity. In the days of colonialism the colonies fought for independence led by parties which were usually mass parties. These parties, though united for one purpose, that is struggle for independence, had divisions which cropped up after independence on various lines. Whenever there is a challenge to national unity and integrity the national leaders always refer to nationalism. Because armed forces represent one of the main attributes of independence, the acquisition of arms by the armed force inspires the nationalistic feeling of people and helps cementing the divisions within that state. Of course

10. SIPRI, Year Book 1985, p. 351.

11. Countries in the Middle East are engaged in a war with Israel. So is the case with India, which, though not engaged in war, is constantly endangered by hostile neighbours.

this aspect of arms acquisition is not totally independent of the previous aspect. Often, the appeal to nationalism is associated with an external conflict. For example, the conflict with Israel is one aspect of the commitment to Arab nationalism, and the conflict with the white dominant regimes in Africa is an integral part of the African concept of true independence.

Another important factor behind arms acquisition that needs attention is the role of armed forces. The extent to which arms are required to affirm nationality is dependent upon the role played by the armed forces. The armed forces in some countries, have become the most important element of the new and growing middle class, representing modernity, educational advancement and technical skills. This role is associated with the concept of nationality. The possession of weapons, in a circular fashion can intensify the factors which brought about their acquisition. Thus arms may increase the risk of conflict, strengthen national unity and enhance the political position of the armed forces.

While analysing the trends in the flow of weapons, it becomes clear that the interests of the great powers are the most important single determinant. This explains the big rise in arms supplies at the end of fifties. In fact, the number of conflicts did not increase remarkably.

Several African nations achieved independence, but their arms imports were relatively low. The rise occurred because the USA was sending large quantities of weapons to South Korea, Taiwan, Greece and Turkey and because competition between the two great powers intensified as the USSR entered the market.

Now one can detect five broad interrelated factors as determinants of the flow of weapons : the requirement factors - conflict, nationalism, and the role of the armed forces - and the two resource factors - the size of foreign exchange earning and the interest of the USSR and USA.¹²

Arms trade also has become instrumental in the spread of modern sophisticated weapons to the Third world. In a particular region, the military requirements of different countries are highly interdependent. Hence arms acquisition by a single country compels the adjoining nations to go for acquisition of comparable weapons.

The character of arms trade has undergone tremendous change since World War II. Immediately after World War II, arms trade was predominantly in surplus war materials. This was soon superseded by supply of weapons, rendered obsolete

12. Frank Barnaby and Ronald Huisken, op.cit., p.42.

by the rapid pace of technology in the main producing countries. But now it is the day of sophisticated weaponries. Most up-to-date weapons and equipments are available for export and, indeed, are aggressively marketed.

The sophisticated weapons are available to the recipient countries immediately from the super powers and this on the other hand serves the political interest of the big powers. But economic pressures forces arms producing countries like the UK, France to export every conventional weapon system in production or under development.

So far a conceptual analysis of arms trade and aid and their implications has been attempted. A discussion on the history of arms trade and the gradual involvement of the USA and the USSR as super powers leading to present day arms race seems imperative.

Development of Arms Trade

The development of arms industry can be traced back to 14th century. With the introduction of gun powder new weapons were made in Europe. Iron guns and bronze guns were beginning to be used in the early 14th century.

Iron was cheaper than bronze. Manufacture of bronze guns was dependent upon the availability of copper and tin. By the second half of the 14th century, cannons had developed in Western Europe - Italy, England, France, Germany and Sweden. Initially the artisans were either hired for definite periods of time or they produced guns on specific orders. Later on, governments established permanent arsenals, worked by permanent staff or temporarily hired experts.

Though iron guns were cheaper than the bronze guns, iron guns were more prone to rusting and accidents. With the expansion of armies, navies and overseas exploration, demand for cannons increased rapidly, followed by technological advancement in this field. As war became inevitable with France, the English arms industries started producing developed gun whose demand went up in the continent. The British trade and overseas expansion further increased the demand. But greater state control affected this gun-trade. In other parts of Europe constant effort was being carried out for improvements of guns. Gun foundaries were founded in many parts of Europe like Sweden, Russia, Germany etc. Due to civil war and the disinterest of the nobility

and church, arms and industries progressed in France only in the second half of the 18th century.

By the middle of 17th century, the European armies became quite formidable equipped in the improved muskets, bayonets, guns, grenades and bombards. Even the non-Europeans like the countries in the Middle East and Africa, due to their close vicinity to Europe, absorbed the European artillery technology which was yet in its initial phases. But in contrast to the light field artillery in Western Europe, the non-Europeans, like the Turks used large guns. In India and China metallic guns had been developed before the middle of 14th century, following the use of gun powders, rocket missiles etc.

The contacts with the Europeans made the weapons a highly prized commodity of exchange. The Europeans were at first reluctant to teach the techniques of their weapons. Sometime they taught the non-Europeans such techniques in exchange for pepper, good brass ordnances etc. In the East, though the Chinese made slow progress, the Japanese were more quick at adopting and learning new technology. Nevertheless, the Europeans retained their superiority.

Till 18th century arsenal manufacture remained under state control. Important changes affecting the arms industry

took place in the late 18th and 19th centuries. With the start of Industrial Revolution, quantitative production of weapons increased in order to keep the large armies well-equipped.

The Industrial Revolution brought about a qualitative change in the weapons. Innovations and improvements increased as progress was made in chemistry, in mechanics, metallurgy, optics and associated science which led to the production of refined and sophisticated weapons.¹³

Along with the quantitative and qualitative change of weapons, due to progress in science, the change in the economic system in Europe, by which the principle of "Laissez faire" became dominant, triggered off the arms trade. Private trade flourished during this time. By the end of 19th century most of the arms trade was primarily in the hands of private manufacturers and dealers. Arms industry was amongst the first few industries to acquire an international character, Arms trade was carried out by different industries in collaboration with foreign industries.¹⁴ Towards the end of the 18th century and in 19th century most of the arms trade was with the European powers who were

13. For a detailed discussion on the history of arms trade see J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (New Delhi, 1971), chap. VI-VIII.

14. See George Thayer, War Business : The International Trade in Armaments (New York, 1969) .

either engaged in overseas expansion or involved in European wars.

But gradual intensification of arms trade led different countries to decide about some regulations of arms trade. Under the Brussels Act of 1890, for the first time, thirteen European states, USA, Iran, Zanzibar and Congo free state attempted to regulate the flow of arms and ammunition to the African states to protect the aboriginal population and to put an end to the crimes endangered by slave trade.¹⁵ However the major focus on arms trade came after World War I as public opinion and the major powers became concerned with the problems of peace and world order. The League of Nations as well as different international bodies attempted to regulate the arms trade and remove its evil effects thereby. Different countries started meeting at conferences to discuss the arms trade. The result of these changes was the transformation of the nature of arms trade to some extent. By putting restrictions, the governments got a better control over arms transfer than the private manufacturers and dealers, though the latter retained considerable autonomy in this sphere which is proved by the lack of effectiveness of embargoes put on arms trade during the inter war period. Only after World

15. SIPRI, The Arms Trade With the Third World (Stockholm; Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971), p. 90.

War II, did the arms trade pass into the hands of the states. In fact arms trade received a sharp increase only when decolonisation took place. Decolonisation in Asia and Africa encouraged arms trade. Arms aid became an official policy of the donor countries in the post-war period. Arms trade got a further impetus from the East West rivalry between world capitalism and socialism on the one hand and from the increasing needs of Third World countries on the other.

After decolonisation, the newly liberated countries still depended upon the developed countries in political, economic, administrative and military spheres. They had to depend upon the colonial powers for arms supply. The organisation of the army and its dependence on the West for training and equipment continued the link between the developing and developed countries.

In the post World War II period, along with decolonisation, the power structure in the international scenario changed considerably. Traditional colonial masters like the UK, France lost their control over their colonies. The United States which so far followed a policy of isolationism, now embarked upon a policy of global containment. The United States of America was fast emerging as

the new super power controlling the World economy and politics to a very great extent. The Americans were quite apprehensive about the spread of communism and tried to curb the Soviet influence in the world politics. Further some of the Third World countries went to the folds of the USSR. Thus the policy of containing Soviet influence in Europe and the Third World Countries was the beginning of the US commitment abroad. To widen the strategic options, access to bases on foreign soil became an important consideration for the US foreign policy.

The US policy for the transfer of arms was outlined during the second World War, under the Lend-lease programme. Military assistance later became a basic post-war policy beginning with aid to Greece and Turkey, the NATO alliance with Europe, Iran and the South East Asia - China, Philippines and Korea. Europe alone received 59.68% of the total military aid between 1951 and 1958; thereafter its share declined.¹⁶ Till the early 1960s USA gave away most of the weapons to the Third World countries. Under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) the US helped the Allies to acquire modern and sophisticated

16. Harold A. Hoorey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York; Praeger, 1965) p. 76.

weapons. All the basic principles guiding the US policy of arms transfer stem from its economic, political, ideological and strategic interest. The object of military as well as economic assistance programmes of the US to the Third World have been to create a friendly and anti-communist lobby in the Third World and thereby getting access to foreign military basis and raw materials. Arms supplies have become a part of its policy to achieve these objectives. The US was able to establish an extensive network of bases as a result of its links with the Allies and through aid relationships.

The natural corollary of the US interest in the Third World was its interest in South Asia. Its relationship with Pakistan and the resulting discontent in India are the matters of discussion these days. The reasons behind U.S. interest in Pakistan and its implications for India are discussed in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER II

THE U.S. ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN

(1971 - 1977)

The Backdrop

The US arms policy towards the Indian sub-continent is the outgrowth of the American strategic, military and political interests in the region. The US strategic planner following a policy of global containment, soon realised that American interest would be best served if Pakistan were converted into one of their trustful allies. The importance of Pakistan, as it is today also, to American policy framers in early 1950s derived from the fear of spread of communism and the apprehension that the global balance of power may tilt towards the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Pakistan's geostrategic significance in the fulfilment of US oil interests in the Persian Gulf and the extension of its political interest and influence in ^{South} Asia, South-West Asia, Middle East were important considerations that were taken into account by the American strategic planners while evolving a policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan's strategic location, on the boundary of both USSR and China, made it imperative for the USA to include it (Pakistan) in its policy of global containment. Increase in Pakistan's military capability was seen as a natural corollary of the U.S. global power equation. Being a country in the

right location at the right time, Pakistan thus emerged to have utility for U.S. policy. It was a marriage of convenience but one that both partners sought quite eagerly, at first.¹

A close analysis of the Pak-US relationship reveals that this relationship has been based on different objectives and priorities. Both the countries have come closer but with different objectives. Ever since the state of Pakistan was carved out of the state of India in 1947, relation between the two countries have swung by a set of constant factors that stem from internal dynamics of the region and the great powers making use of the regional actors to further their own interests : the objectives have remained unchanging as also the pattern of repetitive hostile behaviour which persists amidst the changing international environment and the occasional attempts at rapproachment.² After partition both the nations were faced with a set of problems arising out of the conflict over status, image and the identification of the two new states as two new nations. The basic problem that Pakistan suffered from was the divisive pressures from its diverse

1. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, (New York, Praeger, 1982), p. 2.

2. Amit Gupta, "Pakistan's Acquisition of Arms : Rationale, Quest and Implications for India", IDSA Journal (New Delhi), Vol. XIV, No. 3, January-March 1982. pp. 422-42.

ethnic groups. Further, Pakistan lacked any kind of strong and effective political institutions. As it happened in many other African and Latin American newly-liberated countries, in Pakistan also, independence was achieved before some kind of political consciousness developed amongst the people. Pakistan's leadership, faced with secessionist tendencies and lack of popular support, "attributed all kind of tendencies towards disintegration to constant and persistent Indian machination in this regard."³

Such kind of accusations gave the Pakistani leadership sufficient ground to go for arms import to achieve military parity with India. This was only possible by joining hands with a strong power. Pakistan's quest for military parity with India coincided with American attempt to contain communism and its (the US) attempt to link the South Asian countries into Washington's global framework. The open pronouncement by the Indian government to remain non-aligned at that time, disappointed the US government, which moved more close towards Pakistan. Pakistan used its relations with the US to establish a beneficial aid

3. Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan Relations" in Sisir Gupta : India and the International System (ed.) M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, New Delhi, 1981). p. 226.

commitment for needed military and economic assistance, while the US used its relationship to win the top bureaucrat and the newly emerged elites for its specific purposes within its policy of denial interests which refer to the communist countries by the free world for containment of the communism in the region.

Pakistan's perception, so far as its relationship with the US was concerned, was different from that of the US. The fear of communist aggression was only a myth and was the convenient way to divert people's attention from domestic problems. The rationale behind Pakistan's entry into military pacts is explained by Mohammad Ayub Khan. According to him "the crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us ; we had to look for allies to secure our position."⁴ Hence the primary motive behind Pakistan joining military pacts was the illogical and baseless fear of possible Indian aggression. The signing of the U.S Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement on May 19, 1954, soon followed by Pakistan's joining South East Treaty Organisation (SEATO) on September 8, 1954 proves the above fact. (See Appendix I and II for full text).

4. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (Oxford, 1969), p. 154.

The signing of the above treaties with the US and the consequent decision regarding arms supply to Pakistan evoked strong reactions in India. India was definitely against any kind of military pact to the area. India opposed any kind of military pact in the sub-continent on two grounds. (a) It would be detrimental to the goals of India's foreign policy of keeping as great an area as possible free from the cold war; (2) it would create insuperable complications in Indo-Pakistani relations and add to India's security problems.⁵

Unhindered by the criticisms from Indian leaders, public and press and even undeterred by adverse comments at the domestic front the US went on signing pacts with Pakistan. The signing of the US military pact with Pakistan changed the context of the problems existing between India and Pakistan. The impact of this pact was very serious on Indo-Pakistan relations particularly in respect of the Kashmir issue. A third party, the U.S. was brought into the bilateral Indo-Pakistani relations thereby freezing, at least for the time being all efforts to settle Indo-Pakistan disputes. Pakistan thus became a part of the foreign policy of a great power according to the India view point.⁶

5. Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study in India -Pakistan Relations* (London : 1966), pp. 277-8.

6. "India and Her Neighbours : Hostility on Right and Left", *Round Table*, Vol. 46 (1955-56), p. 339.

After joining the western military bloc, Pakistan played its assumed role in the cold war more against its unaligned neighbours rather than against bordering communist nations. The newly established military relationship between the United States and Pakistan fundamentally changed their foreign policy orientation towards each other as well as towards India. This new development had its reflections in the attitude of some other countries also. The most important of them is the Soviet Union, which was hitherto neutral in the sub-continental issues. The Soviet Union came out with its full-fledged support for India on Kashmir issue in the United Nations.

The U.S itself was put to a complex situation by the military pacts with Pakistan. The U.S. did not want to displease either India or Pakistan. The two hostile neighbours were to be satisfied and this was quite a difficult task. Pakistan's sole objective was to rely on the U.S. military aid as a deterrent against India. But the U.S. Administration insisted that such aid was to be used only against communist aggression and not against India. However, the USA very well knew that Pakistan was not faced with any communist threat from within or from outside. Nevertheless, the USA apparently acquiesced in the Pakistani anti-Indian assertions since it served the larger U.S. interests in terms

of military bases which would be used against the Soviet Union or for curbing India's dominant position in South Asia.⁷

Towards the beginning of 1960s there took place a great change in the U.S. -Pak relations. It was the time when Democrat John F. Kennedy became the President of USA. Known for his criticism against massive military aid to Pakistan and for his favourable attitude towards India, so far as arms aid is concerned, Kennedy's election did not make the Pakistanis happy. Even the American Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson along with Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy who came to India and Pakistan on a good will mission, after his return to the U.S. went on to say that "At President Kennedy's request. I had urged Mr. Nehru to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia".⁸ This statement generated strong reactions and criticism from Pakistani front. It was the U.S. military aid in November 1962.to India following the Chinese attack on India in October that year which added fuel to the Pakistani criticism of India and United States. The rush of massive arms aid to India

7. Rajvir Singh, U.S. Pakistan and India - Strategic Relations (Allahabad, 1985), p. 45.

8. R.C. Gupta, U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (Delhi. 1977). p. 16.

during the Chinese aggression was considered by Pakistan as a direct threat to its own security. Mr. Bhutto mentioned in his book 'Myth of Independence' an exaggerated amount of aid given to India and said "it threatened the territorial integrity of Pakistan".⁹ The United States, on the other hand, maintained that military aid to India was given only because of the emergency created by China's invasion of that country. It did not take any notice of Pakistan's vehement protests and continued its arms shipment to India.

Pakistan's period of unqualified alignment was thus coming to a close owing to two new factors, viz. the end of "pactomania" in the U.S. and the emergence of Chinese collaboration with her neighbourhood.¹⁰ Reacting sharply to the U.S. military aid to India, Pakistan became interested in having an alliance with China in 1963. Both Pakistan and China considered India to be their common enemy.

Meanwhile in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the United States did not support any party and imposed an arms embargo on both belligerents. In this war both the conflicting nations accused each other of using the U.S. arms.

9. Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1969) pp. 62-63.

10. Rajvir Singh, op.cit., p.63.

After 1965 war, the Pakistani leadership felt betrayed and drew further away from the United States. The Pak-American relationship received a jolt and came to a near end when Pakistan after 1965 started the process of disengagement from SEATO and CENTO.

It was the time when Moscow felt that a vacuum was being created in Pakistan by the U.S. Policy, the advantage which Peking might take. To avoid this kind of eventuality, perhaps Moscow took the decision to extend its hands towards Pakistan. Whenever Americans retreated then Kremlin began to open the gate of Moscow for Pakistan and even gave military hardware to her. It is estimated that Soviet arms supply to Pakistan was of the order of \$ 10 million upto 1971.¹¹ Of course the Soviet Union promised India that it would not sell any lethal arms to Pakistan. It sold 150 T-54/55 and 20 PT-76 tanks, \$130 million worth artillery guns, spares for MiG aircrafts, ammunition and other miscellaneous stores.¹² The Soviet Union was also seeking refuelling facilities in Pakistan after India had refused a similar request. Shortly before Kosygin's visit to Pakistan, the latter cancelled the U.S. lease on the Peshwar base

11. -Ibid., p. 73.

12. SIPRI, Arms Trade With the Third World (Sweden; Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971), p. 499.

(in July 1968).¹³ However Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were limited due to its insistence that the latter should reduce assistance and supply of weapons to India.

In view of Pakistan's rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union, USA began to review its policy in 1967. Its policy of embargo was dissipating US influence and producing side effects of serious concern. With the entry of Richard Nixon in the White House, the U.S. and Pakistan tried to recapture some of their lost friendship. Perhaps, this move was facilitated by India's continuing criticism of American policies in Indo-China. When President Nixon visited Pakistan in August 1969, he assured Pakistani's that he would again work for friendship between his country and theirs.¹⁴

In October 1970, while the embargo was still in operation, the U.S. decided to make a "one time exception", and authorised the sale of about 20 air-crafts - including B-57 bombers and F-104 interceptors - and 300 armoured personnel carriers to Pakistan.¹⁵ The Government of India took strong exception to this decision.

14. Dawn, 3 August 1969.

15. Ved Vati Chaturshreni, Indo-US Relations (New Delhi, 1980), p. 238.

The U.S. supplied weapons to Pakistan as a symbolic gesture to counter the growing Pakistani dependence on China. Pakistan's importance was seen from political stand point rather than military stand point. It was realised that Pakistan can no longer attains supremacy in the sub-continent. Furthermore Pakistan's links with China and India's links with Soviet Union remained an important consideration in the 1970s.

The 1971 War and the U.S. 'tilt' in action

The year 1971 marks a watershed in the history of the U.S. -Pakistan- India relationship. It is in this year that the traditional rivals, India and Pakistan, clashed bitterly and the result led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and hence the birth of Bangladesh. The role of the U.S. during this Indo-Pak war has been scrutinised time out of number. The part played by the U.S. has been criticised by Indian leaders, public and press who allege of the 'tilt' in the U.S. action, during the war. This aspect of such a complex relationship needs discussion.

The last phase of Ayub's regime was marked by terrible domestic disturbances. Both in West and East Pakistan strikes and agitation took place. Ayub was accused of surrendering and selling-out the nation at Tashkent.

Bhutto clearly manipulated this feeling when in mass gatherings in Lahore and Karachi he graphically contrasted the "massive frame" and the punny brains" of Ayub with the "cunning" of his ailing and physically diminutive adversary, Lal Bahadur Shastri.¹⁶ Bhutto formed his own party (Pakistan People's Party) and rallied opposition elements to a renewed call for participatory government that could guarantee the nation's independence, as well as its security. Of course before Bhutto himself could plan any movement against Ayub's regime the latter himself in a broadcast to the Nation on 25 March, 1969, announced that he was stepping down as President after a decade of rule and was handing over power to the Army Commander in Chief General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan.¹⁷

Despite long-standing personal friendship between Ayub and Nixon, the displacement of Ayub by General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan was not unwelcome in Washington. Unbeknownst to the World at large, Nixon and Kissinger were writing a secret play with a large act for Pakistan.. And Ayub who had so recently played a title role in Tashkent,

16. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, op.cit., p. 30.

17. Asian Recorder, 23-29 April, 1969, p. 8891.

was ill-suited to star in it.¹⁸ Yahya Khan after the assumption of Office tried to be in the good books of both the superpowers. As mentioned earlier, Pakistani government ordered the closing of Peshwar base (which was given on lease to the U.S. in 1959) in 1969 at the Soviet government's directive ; Further Pakistan went on to receive an offer of \$30 million in Soviet military supplies.¹⁹ Despite his closeness with the Soviet Union, Yahya continued to gain favour from the U.S. government because of his continuous pursuit of Nixon's closely guarded mission to Peking. Gen. Yahya played a very important role in the development of Sino-U.S. relationship. Yahya's journey to Peking, preceded by his trip to Washington facilitated the growth of the above friendship.

Meanwhile in the East Pakistan a storm was gathering. The revolt by the East Pakistani's had its roots in cultural antipathies and economic discontent. The grievances expressed by the East Pakistanis led to the inevitable political agitation. Through the results of the first ever general elections held in Pakistan in December 1970, the people of East Pakistan registered their protest. The Awami League literally swept the polls in East Pakistan and

18. Shirin Tahir -Kheli, op.cit., p. 31.

19. Ibid., p. 32.

emerged with a comfortable majority in the constituent-cum-National Assembly. But in the West Pakistan, Bhutto led his party to a comfortable victory. Regarding the formation of the government tussle arose between the two party leaders and Bhutto announced the decision to boycott the National Assembly. All efforts to negotiate broke down as both the leaders struck to their own grounds. Matters were within control to some extent, when Yahya ordered the military to move against the civilians of East Pakistan. The military crackdown came on March 25, 1971.

Throughout the days following the outbreak of civil war on March 25, 1971, the United States Government took Bangladesh crisis as an internal matter of Pakistan. The United States even continued its economic and military aid to Pakistan directly and indirectly without voicing any protest regarding Pakistan's attitude towards East Pakistanis. The State Department continued its military supplies to Yahya regime, knowing the fact that American weapons are being used against East Bengalis.²⁰ This strained the Indo-U.S. relation to a very great extent. India was quite sympathetic towards the East Pakistanis and hence the callous attitude of the U.S. towards the East

20. Hindu (Madras), 26 February, 1971.

Pakistani demand irked India. India concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union on August 9, 1971 for peace, cooperation and friendship. This move by India made the American feel that India has moved more close to the Moscow.

When all efforts by India (now burdened with refugee problem) failed to settle the crisis in East Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister undertook a visit to Western capitals, to persuade the governments of the U.S.A., U.K., France, West Germany and others to prevail upon Yahya Khan to negotiate a settlement with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of Bangladesh. While discussing with the American President Nixon, the Indian Prime Minister made it clear that India did not want a war with Pakistan, but at the same time rejected any suggestion to withdraw Indian troops from the Pakistan border. A major outcome of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the U.S.A. was that, she made the Nixon administration realise that India would not allow itself to be pushed about and that she was determined to safeguard her security against all odds.²¹ During Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the U.S., Joseph Sisco, Asstt. Secretary of State for Near East, was reported to have asked the Indian officials if they wanted to break up Pakistan. This left the Indian officials with the impression that the USA must have a policy of its own to help Pakistan to hold

21. The Times of India, 9 November, 1971.

on to Bangladesh. As one spokesman once categorically put, ".....The American move was to explore Bangladesh leaders' willingness to negotiate for something less than complete independence asked for by the Bangladesh people."²² The Government of India also rejected Nixon's proposal for a meeting of the security council as it would not have helped in easing the tension.

The 'Tilt'

The escalation of tension between India and Pakistan on the East Pakistan issue made the possibility of a war inevitable and hence finally it broke out on December 3, 1971 when Pakistan started war with India by a number of air strikes and made a declaration of war the next day. During the course of the war, the Nixon administration's action definitely 'tilted' in favour of Pakistan. The hard effort of the U.S. Government to refrain India from getting engaged in a war failed principally because the Pakistani air attacks had precipitated the issue.²³ The Pakistanis probably hoped to gain the initiative by a surprise attack and then seek U.S. diplomatic assistance for a ceasefire. But the Pak venture

22. Ibid.

23. R.C. Gupta, op.cit., p. 86.

met failure and the objectives of the Nixon administration at that point were to move the U.N. machinery to obtain a ceasefire thereby preventing the annihilation of Pakistani forces in East and occupation of East Pakistan by Indian military forces. The U.S. government tried simultaneously to exercise diplomatic and other kinds of pressures on India with the objective of moderating India's war aims. The American government also implied its unwillingness to involve itself in direct military confrontation with India over East Pakistan.

The United States requested the Security Council to hold ^{an} emergency meeting on 4 December 1971 to examine the deteriorating situation due to Indo-Pakistan war. On December 5, 1971, the USA ceasefire resolution in the council. But Moscow twice vetoed the resolutions. It was waiting for New Delhi's consent and Mrs. Gandhi wanted Indian troops to secure their objectives, that is, the capture of Dacca. The Indian Government recognised Bangladesh on December 6, 1971 which led the Pakistani government to sever diplomatic ties with India. Further, the Indian government refused to comply with the resolution passed by the General Assembly with regard to the immediate cease-fire.

The U.S. government, determined to tilt in favour of Pakistan, now visibly unhappy over Indian attitude towards General Assembly Resolution withheld \$ 87.6 million economic aid to India as on December 6, 1971. On the same day, the U.S. delegate to the U.N. George Bush, stated in the Security Council that India was the aggressor and the aggression was obviously quite clear.²⁴ The U.S. had earlier that is on December 3, 1971 also announced its decision to cancel all outstanding licences for arms equipment to India as a result of Indian 'incursions' into Pakistan.²⁵

As all diplomatic efforts failed in the U.N. and outside it, the Nixon administration ordered 'Enterprise', a nuclear powered aircraft carrier of the Seventh Fleet to sail towards the Bay of Bengal. This move ordered by Nixon was meant to ensure that both New Delhi and Moscow understood the seriousness of any Indian move into West Pakistan. This move clearly envisage the U.S. open support for the Yahya regime. But the tactic also failed and the Indian armed forces continued their march towards

24. Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, ed., American Foreign Relations 1971, A Documentary Record, p. 233.

25. Washington Post, 4 December, 1971.

Dacca which ultimately led to surrender of 80,000 soldiers under General Niazi of Pakistan to the Indian Army on 16 December, at 4.31 p.m. After the surrender of the Pakistani troops in the Eastern sector, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered on 16 December a unilateral ceasefire on the western front.

Throughout the war, as we have seen the United States took a posture which was definitely inclined towards Pakistan. While analysing below the reasons for US inclination towards Pakistan one can easily affirm the possibility of such a tilt.

Both Nixon and Kissinger had tilted towards Pakistan and had a deep-rooted dislike and suspicion for India well before the Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1970-71. Further, the U.S. attitude to the crisis was dictated by the self interest, that is, the preservation of the Chinese link. Gen. Yahya drew much favour from the Nixon administration for his role in generating Sino-US relationship. The U.S. was profoundly grateful to Pakistan's military dictator - President Yahya Khan for performing this great service for her.²⁶

26. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979), p. 862.

The Nixon administration did not want to destabilise the power-balance in the sub-continent. Since the days of military pacts with Pakistan, the U.S. was eager to see an undivided Pakistan that would resist all kinds of communist expansion. Washington policy maker felt that the birth of Bangladesh would mean the birth of another country which would be non-aligned and would be more inclined towards India and Soviet Union.

The condition in the sub-continent gradually become worse due to unconcealed support of Washington and Peking to Pakistan for its quiet diplomatic assistance in restoring US-China link. India at this moment, that is on 9 August, 1971 decided to accept a two year old standing offer of the Soviet Union to enter into a Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, friendship and cooperation. This was interpreted as India moving too close to the Soviet Union. It was also seen that the Soviet Union had seized the strategic opportunity to demonstrate Chinese importance, and to humiliate a friend of both China and U.S. proved too tempting.²⁷ These developments were disturbing the balance of power to the disadvantage of the U.S. and to avert this, the U.S. needed an undivided Pakistan.

27. Ibid., p.867.

The U.S., in all its international affairs received constant support from Pakistan, though there were occasions of frictions also, where as India under Nehru and his successors followed the path of non-alignment which led her to take an attitude which was considered in Washington as hostile to its interest. So there was a general feeling, in America, regarding the continuance of united and sovereign Pakistan.

It is of course difficult to say which of the above reasons was plausible enough to make the U.S. incline towards Pakistan. But on the whole there was sufficient grounds for the U.S. to tilt in favour of Pakistan which was manifested in all its action throughout the course of 1971 war.

The U.S. Pakistan Strategic Ties under Bhutto

When the War ended, Pakistan was territorially dismembered. The internal situation was also in a great flux. The close ally, the U.S. had put an arms embargo on the supply of lethal weapons. There was a great amount of discontentment, as New Delhi held 59,000 Pakistani troops as prisoner of war and there was a constant demand

to get them back. India had undoubtedly proved her superiority in the sub-continent. Bhutto inherited a country which had been stripped of its pretensions of having a regional status.²⁸

After 1971, a great change also took place in the U.S. Foreign Policy-making. During this period the U.S. diverted its attention away from the South Asian crisis. The period 1969-72 marked a process of the U.S. disengagement with a prior motive and objective to reduce involvement in South Asian crisis. The frustrating experience in Vietnam was one of the factors that prevented the U.S. from indulging any more in the Asian crises. The growing detente with the Soviet Union and China rendered SEATO and CENTO (supposed to be the alliances against communist expansionism) invalid to a great extent. Apparently, the U.S. had lost its interest in Pakistan also. Pakistan, once considered as a first line of defence in the days of domino theory had lost much of its significance.²⁹ It was the time when America had shifted its attention to West Asia. The oil crisis due to Arab-Israel war of 1973 was proving more worrisome to the U.S. and hence it was Iran

28. Amit Gupta, op.cit., p.424.

29. Ibid.

which became a more important country for security of American oil interest in the Gulf Region. Therefore Persian Gulf Region became vitally strategic area for the United States.³⁰

Pakistan, whose main supplier of arms was the U.S., now under Bhutto's leadership turned towards the Muslim World for help. Though Pakistan had, as early as in 1948, tried to bring the Islamic states of the West Asia together, it could not succeed in her effort very much. There was a gradual emergence of secularism in the Islamic World in the early days. Along that, there existed a strong anti-West feeling owing to the Arab-Israel conflict and Pakistan traditionally known as pro-West was not in a position to gain favour. But by 1972, this had changed. All the above tendencies had given way to a new emphasis on Islamic unity.

Bhutto known for his pro-Islamic and his anti-Indian or anti-Hindu sentiments reaped enormous benefits, from the Islamic connection, both in economic and political front. Further, Bhutto was successful in gaining Islamic favour because he spoke of the Third World and identified the oil rich Muslim countries with the rest of the Third World and spoke of the possibilities and opportunities of

30. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Foreign Policy of New Pakistan", Orbis, Fall 1976, p. 755.

these countries helping other economically backward countries. The concept implicit in this approach is not that of aid as a forum of charity from one developing country to another. The concept is that of mutually supportive economic activity in countries of the Third World which would complement their individual resources and give them collective strength.³¹

Statistics regarding the assistance Pakistan received from the Muslim countries shows the extent of friendship Bhutto had built with them. Foreign assistance from West Asian states which was minimal before 1973-74 went up to \$1,776.80 million by March 1980.³²

During the 70s, Pakistan also retained its harmonious relationship with China. China has proved to be a steadfast ally of Pakistan. This is proved from the generous border settlement it made with Pakistan and its help to Pakistan during 1965 and 1971 war. Chinese willingness to give arms mostly as gift pleased the Pakistani's. During the 70s, considerable number of fighter aircraft, Patrol boats and tanks were supplied by China-Pakistan procured arms worth \$ 1 billion from China.³³

31. Z.A. Bhutto, The Third World : New Directions (London, 1977). p. 86.

32. O.N. Mehrotra, "Pakistan and the Islamic World", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), April-May, 1981, p.35.

33. Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 166 and 173.

Resumption of the U.S. arms supply*

Despite arms from the Islamic countries, Pakistan did not feel satisfied enough, regarding its military strength, without arms from the United States. Bhutto sent his envoy G.M. Kher to Washington early in 1973 to get the embargo relaxed. Nixon's administration also decided to supply arms and equipments to Pakistan whose delivery has been suspended in 1971. So, in March, 1973 the U.S. decided to supply arms to Pakistan and this decision provided for the release of approximately \$ 1.1 million in miscellaneous spare parts, parachutes, and air-craft engines previously ordered, but barred from shipment by the '71 embargo. The delivery of 300 M 113 A1 armoured personnel carriers which was previously contracted during October 1970 (when the US government supplied arms to Pakistan considering that as 'one time exception') was also permitted on March 14, 1973.³⁴ Simultaneously, the US also announced that India would get \$83 million worth of economic assistance previously suspended.³⁵ The arms supply to Pakistan was resumed by the US under the pretext of fulfilling commitment undertaken

34. President Nixon's News Conference, 15 March 1973, in Department of State Bulletin, 9 April 1973, p. 417.

35. Ibid.

* See Appendix III and IV for India's reaction against resumption of the U.S. Arms Supply to Pakistan.

long before 1971 war. Such a decision also came under a broader policy under which Iran, Pakistan and other gulf countries were given massive arms aid. In this context President Nixon's emphasis on selling but not 'giving' arms to Pakistan gained importance,³⁶ and this made clear that the US was not going to give up its option of selling arms to Pakistan. The figures provided by the American sources claimed that only arms of defensive nature was being supplied. But in February 1975 when the US Defence Department made the "first full public listing of its technological assistance contracts with foreign countries" it revealed that in 1974 the Pentagon had contracted to provide aid to Pakistan for the modification of HH-43-B to HH-43-F (conversion of bombers into fighter Planes) valued at \$47,509.³⁷ The Prime Minister of Pakistan not satisfied with the arms received, visited Washington in September 1973, but could not achieve much, though the visit was considered to be a success as it created a favourable climate and reaffirmed the relationship between Pakistan and the US.

36. Times of India (New Delhi), 16 March 1973.

37. New York Times, 20 February, 1975.

After the explosion of nuclear device by India in May 1974, Pakistan constantly pressurised the US government to help it (Pakistan) in gaining nuclear power. This led the US government to think in terms of reconsidering its embargo on arms supply to Pakistan. The Americans, in reconsideration of their view thought that limited supplies of military equipments to Pakistan would not go against the declared American objective of supporting the cause of peace and stability in the region. Prime Minister Bhutto again visited the United States of America in early 75 to pressurise the then Ford Administration to lift the embargo. Bhutto even went to the extent of declaring that, "If the USA met his requirements for conventional weapons, he would be prepared to place all his nuclear reactors under international inspection to prevent secret production of nuclear weapons."³⁸

After reassessment of its own need and Pakistan's policy of pressure and persuasion the US government finally lifted the embargo on 25 February, 1975 under the rationale that India was receiving weapons from Soviet Union whereas Pakistan, an ally, had been denied this.³⁹ The State

38. Times of India, 20 February 1975.

39. B.K. Srivastava, "U.S. military arms assistance to Pakistan", India Quarterly, 52(1) Jan-Mar 1976. pp. 26-41.

Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that by lifting the embargo, the US was bringing its policy in the line with that of Britain and France.⁴⁰ The State Department also gave a clarification regarding lifting the embargo and indicated that this (lift of embargo) step is taken not to intensify the arms race nor to destabilise the balance of power in the sub-continent. Secretary of state Kissinger declared a couple of days later that the embargo has been ended because it was "morally, politically and symbolically improper".⁴¹

The Ford Administration, of course, reiterated the earlier stand regarding the increase in the sale and subsequent decrease in arms supply on grant basis. The US government managed to convince that Americans regarding the justification of resumption of arms supply by saying that such supply was purely on sale basis and its quantum depended on the cash which Pakistan can afford. Except for few congressmen wlike Fortney S. Stark (Democrat) who criticised the decision and accused the Ford Administration of assuming role of a "merchant of death, selling guns and playing super-power games",⁴² most of the Americans seems to have been convinced by the rationale provided by the Ford Administration.

40. New York Times, 24 February, 1975.

41. Ibid., 26 February 1975.

42. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 25 March 1975.

The reasons for the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan was given by senator Nelson as, it helps the allies who are unable to supply required arms to themselves, helps maintaining influence over recipient state; helps the US in improving its balance of payment position and pay for oil; and helps in maintaining balance of power in the region and internal security in the recipient countries.⁴³

The decision to supply of arms to Pakistan in the face of congressional displeasure as well as at the cost of jeopardising the improving Indo-US relation definitely implies an elevation of Pakistan's position in the US foreign policy. Further after the war, Pakistan managed to improve its economic situation as well as foreign relations. By building close contact with the oil rich countries Pakistan secured huge economic assistance. The oil countries purchased a lot of sophisticated weapons and needed Pakistan's help in servicing and training facilities and supply of military personnels to serve as pilot. With the oil crisis, the US interest in West Asia had increased several fold. In such a context Pakistan's position as a centre for servicing these weapons and equipments was recognised. In addition, both Iran and Saudi Arabia, which had emerged as important actors in this area

43. B.K. Srivastava, op.cit., p. 26-41.

pleaded the case of Pakistan, at the latter's request, in Washington, and this had a great effect on the U.S. decision to lift embargo.

Further, despite detente, super-power rivalry has never ceased to exist. During 1971 Indo-Pak war the U.S. expressed concern over the possibility of India allowing the Soviets to build naval base or servicing facilities, inside its own territory. Also the US decision to construct naval base at Diego Garcia despite opposition from littoral states, made Pakistan's position very important and it is evident from the U.S. source, which said, as quoted in Washington Post, that it was no longer in American interests to leave Pakistan defenceless.⁴⁴ Regarding the vital importance of oil Mr. James Schlesinger, U.S. Secretary of Defence said on ABC News Programme 'Issues and Answers' that given a hypothetical circumstances where oil is to be received, the possibility of the U.S. intervention in Middle East to secure an oil pipeline for the Western World can't be ruled out.⁴⁵ For such an action under the given hypothetical circumstances the US needed Pakistan which would have well served as a military base.

44. Times of India, 11 March, 1975.

45. Congressional Record, Vol. 121, 27 February 1975. PP. 2795-9.

U.S. Pak tussle over nuclear issue

Pakistan's relation with the U.S. again got into trouble on the question of its acquisition of a nuclear bomb. Since the day, India exploded nuclear device, Bhutto was determined to achieve nuclear capabilities. Despite Ford Administration's repeated attempt to refrain Pakistan from going nuclear, Bhutto was adamant to gain nuclear parity with India at any cost. Bhutto described the Indian explosion as a "fateful development" for Pakistan's security, saying : "The explosion has introduced a qualitative change in the situation prevalent in the subcontinent".⁴⁶ Bhutto sent his foreign minister Aziz Ahmed, to various Western capitals. Aziz Ahmed's charge was to explain that consistency in western concerns for non-proliferation demanded a positive response to Pakistan's request for protection against possible nuclear blackmail from India. Aziz's effort did not meet any results and returned empty handed because the U.S. as well as other western nuclear countries wished not to get physically involved in matters that, according to their judgement, did not directly impinge on their national interests.⁴⁷

Against this backdrop, on March 18, 1976, Pakistan signed an agreement with France for the sale of a fuel reprocessing plan to be erected in Pakistan. The next day,

46. Foreign Affairs Records (New Delhi : Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Vol. XX, No. 6 (June 1974), p. 195.

47. Shirin Tahir - Kheli, op.cit., p. 120.

a bilateral agreement on the application of safeguards on the plant was signed at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.⁴⁸ The agreement worth \$150 million,⁴⁹ became a subject of considerable controversy between Pakistan and the United States and a major irritant factor in their relations, while the U.S. was exerting pressure on both Pakistan and France to abandon the contract.⁵⁰ The United States tried to put diplomatic pressures on Pakistan on the one hand and tried to pursue France to cancel the agreement unilaterally. These were two complementary routes along which U.S. policy attempted to influence events. The Ford Administration was under more pressure when during the Presidential elections, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter strongly critical of the Republican Administration's loose policy towards World nuclear issues.

Despite the coaxing and cajoling, on the one hand, and the application of severe pressure on the other, years of Pakistani frustration over arms embargoes and the collective perception, on the part of the political as well as military elite, that the United States had

48. An official announcement regarding the agreement, Dawn, 20 March, 1976.

49. Bhutto's press conference at Bonn, 20 February, 1976, Dawn 26 February, 1976.

50. Rajvir Singh, op.cit., p. 130.

long ago abdicated its responsibility towards Pakistan's security heavily militated against the U.S. ability to dissuade Pakistan from its chosen course.⁵¹ When Kissinger visited Islamabad in August, 1976 he warned the Pakistani rulers either to abandon the nuclear plan or to be prepared for the stop of military and economic aid.⁵² When threats and pleadings did not have any effect, the U.S. government agreed to provide Pakistan with 110 A-73 corsair strike air craft worth \$500 million along with 200,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan under PL 480 programme.⁵³ But Kissinger failed in his mission, the decision to sale corsairs was left to the next Administration.

Due to the above hurdles, no major arms supply was made to Pakistan after the embargo was lifted. The first major one was negotiated in 1976 only Pakistan purchased self-propelled howitzers and two surplus destroyers. The destroyers were bought at their junk value of \$225,000.

51. Shirin Tahir-Kuehli, op.cit., p. 126.

52. Kissinger repeatedly told Pakistan's then Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed that the US would make a "horrible example" of Pakistan should be latter persist in its efforts to set up a nuclear processing plant. Pakistan apparently had rejected the US offer of economic aid as a quid pro quo for abandoning the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. See News Report in Statesman, 10 November 1977.

53. Rajvir Singh, op.cit., p. 131.

Originally Pakistan had asked for six destroyers of the same make, which would have enabled the Pakistan Navy to retire the WW-II vintage ships it operated. But Islamabad was unable to secure the additional four because of the congressional ban on naval transfers.⁵⁴

So, the period 1971-1977 saw a up and down in the Pak-US relationship. Despite friendly relationship which led to the lifting of the embargo and the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan, both the countries did not agree on the nuclear issue. The attempt by Bhutto to gain nuclear parity with India emerged from a false sense of fear of possible nuclear blackmail by India. The factor of achieving a equal status from the stand point of prestige, was also equally a motivating factor.

With the assumption of office by Democrat Carter in the White House the relationship took a harder turn. At this point of time there was a dramatic change of leadership in Pakistan also. Military, under General Zia-ul-Haq took over the charge of administration. Along with this change some cataclysmic changes took place in the international scenario which had a vast magnitude of effects. These are proposed to be discussed in the next chapter.

54. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, op.cit., p. 91.

C H A P T E R - I I I

IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS ON U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

The cataclysmic changes that took place during the period 1977-1984, which is proposed to be discussed in the present chapter, bears for reaching implications. The Pak-U.S. relationship, undertook a completely new turn due to the occurrence of new situations in both the countries as well as at the international level. The initial phase of the period, proposed to be discussed, marked a strained relationship between the two countries. But after 1979, a completely new phase, with new directives and implications, of the Pak-U.S. relationship has begun where Pakistan has again acquired a position of strategically important nation in the U.S. foreign policy framework. Hence this crucial phase in the U.S.-Pak relationship, which has a definite bearing on India, needs a careful discussion.

Restrictions On Arms Supply to Pakistan Under Carter Administration

With the assumption of the office of the President, by Jimmy Carter, the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan became more tough. The Carter administration was to take a sterner stance on both nuclear proliferation and arms transfers. Through out his election campaign Mr. Carter

had pledged that the United States could not simultaneously claim to be the world's leading peacemaker and remain the world's largest arms merchant.¹ So, after assuming charge, President Carter was determined to implement his promises. Carter administration enumerated series of restriction, through various means, on the sale of arms to all countries except the fourteen NATO allies. Though few countries in Asia like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey received arms supply from the U.S., Pakistan, was not considered for the same. Pakistan's importance had faded in the U.S. foreign policy framework. Faced with the Pakistani obstinancy on the nuclear issues and new found fervour of human rights. Washington decided to take a tougher stand against Pakistan. Further, Pakistani's geographic location was of dwindling interest to the United States since Iran had become the U.S. listening post along with Saudi Arabia, the principal support of U.S. interests in West Asia. The United States was seeking to negotiate itself and the Soviets out of the Indian ocean power race. Pakistanis other key asset in its relations with the United States in the Nixon years had disappeared since Washington now had direct access to

1. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 91.

China.²

Pakistan and the United States deferred on various issues when Carter took charge several global issues as well as regional issues were the determining factors in the Pak-U.S. relationship.

The first global issue on which both the nations came into conflict was the issue on arms supply. Carter announced a comprehensive U.S. policy on arms transfers to its military allies on 19 May 1977. It had two basic ingredients :

1. The Administration would view "arms transfer" as an exceptional foreign policy implement..... that the transfer contributes to our national security interest.
2. It would "utilise arms transfer to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in future, the burden of persuasion will be on those who favour a particular arms sale, rather than who oppose it."³

Though the U.S. arms supply still continued to many countries, the Pakistani request for 110 A-7 ground attack air-craft was turned down by the Carter Administration

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2. Thomas Parry Thornton, "Between the Stools? : U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during Carter Administration", Asian Survey, October, 1982, p. 959.
 3. "Implications of President Carter's conventional Arms Transfer Policy", Congressional Research Service (CRS) (Washington, D.C. : US Library of Congress), 22 September, 1977. p. 11.

on the ground that it represented the introduction of significantly higher technology into the sub-continent. The offer of the A-7 was made by the Ford Administration which was promptly turned down by the Carter Administration. The U.S. was not willing to supply arms on the basis of credit whereas Pakistani government did not have sufficient fund to purchase arms. Moreover the U.S. -Pak relationship, from Pakistani point of view, was based primarily on arms supply. So, the negative U. S. attitude established a sharp limitation to the U.S. Pak relationship in a very important dimension. The US government made an alternative offer of arms which included A-4s or limited range F-5s which were not accepted by the Pakistani government. The inability by the Bhutto administration to acquire A-7s created a belief in the Pakistani military that they might not get their required weapons. The fact that the military finally moved to oust Bhutto within a month of the U.S. decision to cancel the offer of A-7s made Bhutto's inner circle convinced about the "fact" that the United States was behind the army's move against them.⁴ Despite such strained background, Lucy Benson, Under Secretary of State for security assistance, Science and Technology in the Carter Administration during her Islamabad trip in 1978, proposed an American

4. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, op.cit., p. 93.

sale of 70 F-5s and weapons consisting of Hawk ground-to-air missiles, armed helicopters and anti-tank weapons at a total cost of \$500 million.⁵ The Pakistanis considered this offer as an instrument to influence Pakistan's nuclear policy. The Pakistani desire for acquisition of F-15 was of course not entertained in Washington.

Severe difference between Pakistan and the USA was on nuclear issue which became a matter of great debate during Ford-Kissinger Administration. During Ford Administration, Islamabad could not be persuaded to abandon Nuclear plans. When attempts to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear did not meet any results, the U.S. tried to pressurise France to cancel the agreement it had made with Pakistan regarding the plutonium reprocessing plant. France under the premiership of Jacques Chirac did not bow to the U.S. desire and declared that there was no question of accepting U.S. pressure in an affair that concerned only France and Pakistan.⁶ But after Chirac resigned, Giscard immediately put direct control over all nuclear exports through the council of Foreign Nuclear policy. On December 16, 1976, the French government issued an order discontinuing, till further notice, the export of reprocessing facilities.

5. Ibid., p. 96.

6. Pakistan Times, 7 August, 1976.

By the time Carter assumed office, Giscard had basically come around to the U.S. point of view on the export of sensitive nuclear technology. The Carter Administration on the other hand, with the support of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission launched a massive campaign against proliferation in general and in South Asia in particular. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977 and the Glenn and Symington amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act provided powerful weapons to be used against nations about to go nuclear. Constant pressure from the U.S. Administration on the French government left the French in a politically untenable position. Parallel forces were exerted on Pakistan. After the ouster of Bhutto (which, it is believed, was masterminded by the U.S.) General Zia reiterated Pakistani determination to go ahead with the deal and he hoped France would similarly maintain its principled stand on the issue.⁷ Paris tried to placate Zia by offering an alternate non-proliferating technology which was not accepted. Under Glenn Amendment, aid to Pakistan was terminated by the U.S.A. in August 1978. When all efforts failed, on August 24, 1978 the announcement regarding the termination of French aided project was made.

7. Pakistan Times, 29 June, 1978.

Both the countries, that is Pakistan and the U.S. got into trouble when the U.S. learned in the spring of 1979 that Pakistan was beginning to attempt to put together a clandestine plant for enrichment plant and scrutinise all exports to Pakistan. In addition, there was cut in the military and economic assistance under the Symington-Glenn amendment in April, 1979. Despite U.S. pressure, General Zia reiterated Pakistan's stand on peaceful nuclear programme.

Another key element of the Carter agenda was human rights. The overthrow of Bhutto (whose poor human rights record had never become an issue because he did not last long enough) by General Zia, was not very much welcome by the Americans because Bhutto was a freely and democratically elected leader. But this view by some American writers and politicians, regarding the passionate love for democracy by the Americans is strongly doubted.

In addition to the global burden, there were several regional concerns that weighted down U.S. Pakistanities. The most salient of them was Pakistan's rivalry with India. While the Carter administration was generally fair as between two regional rivals, the Carter visit to India -
not
but/to Pakistan - and the much publicised Carter-Desai correspondence led the Pakistanis to fear the worst.

The Afghan Crisis and Change in the U.S. attitude

The year 1979 began with a major set-back for U.S. global policy. In January 1979, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the coming into power of a revolutionary regime under Ayatullah Khomeini resulted in the loss of a strong American ally in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. The new regime in Iran had taken a pronounced anti-American line; the idea of building up the Shah as a regional surrogate had collapsed. It also meant the loss of 5 per cent of American total oil import⁸ 9,20,000 billions a day from Iran alone. With the Soviet action in Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, things changed overnight. The Soviet action in Afthanistan compounded the problem for the U.S.A. and left Moscow seemingly perched to swoop down on a defenceless Gulf. In the light of these development in the subcontinent in general and Pakistan in particular assumed special importance. By now the U.S.-Pak relations entered an important phase and Pakistan became much more important for obvious reasons in American calculations for playing important role in the gulf region.⁹

To check the Soviet expansion in the Gulf and to arm Pakistan for this purpose, the USA offered Pakistan

8. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome, How to Live with Soviet Power (New Delhi, 1982) p. 58.

9. A.K. Damodaran, "Soviet Action in Afthanistan", International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 14, Oct-Dec, 1980, p. 589.

broad support in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. The earlier global concerns lost their relevance and seemed now more like matters to be circumvented in a new cooperative relationship. After a great deal of consultation within the state Department and the White House, the immediate military response by the Carter administration was to declare two annual doses of aid, each consisting of \$ 100 million in economic aid plus \$ 100 million in military hardware, which included 230 armoured personnel carriers, air combat and the anti-tank missiles, 105 mm artillery pieces, communications equipment and spare parts,¹⁰ which were previously bought for cash and were not barred by the U.S. embargo on direct military aid on easy terms credit sales to Pakistan.¹¹ Carter reaffirmed U.S. support for Pakistan in his state of the Union message declaring that the United States would meet any threat to Pakistan from outside aggression with military force if necessary.¹² Of course the Pakistanis were still still sceptical about the U.S. intention. While the "Carter Doctrine" declared the

10. Department of State Bulletin, February, 1980.

11. International Herald Tribune, 31 December, 1979.

12. New York Times, 24 January 1980.

Persian Gulf area to be of vital interest to the United States, the Pakistanis never got a clear answer to their question of whether they were included in this definition. And, of course, it was clear that the guarantee did not extend to a Pakistani conflict with India. Thus the President's declaration raised as many problems for the Pakistani as it solved.¹³

In the light of the renewed U.S. interest in Pakistan, Zia wanted to convert the 1959 agreement into a bilateral treaty in which the integrity and freedom of Pakistan would be guaranteed. Washington however refused a blanket security guarantee which could be interpreted as anti-Indian in both New Delhi and Moscow. Difference crept up regarding the amount of aid to be given to Pakistan. The American proposal of \$400 million aid was described by General Zia as peanuts¹⁴ and Zia demanded an aid package of \$ 4 billion to create a credible deterrent against possible Soviet attacks across the border. The Brzezinski - Christopher mission to Islamabad also did not yield much result. This mission was undertaken to Islamabad to set the amount of aid as well as to take Pakistan into confidence. Regarding the

13. Thomas Perry Thornton, op.cit., p. 970.

14. Washington Post 18 January 1980.

amount of the aid no decision could be taken conclusively. Both sides misjudged the whole situation badly. The American overestimated the extent to which Pakistan had rethought its role following the Soviet attack. The Pakistanis on the other hand considered their position to be very important so that they can bargain the U.S. offer upward. The Pakistani demand for a totality of commitment from the United States was not reciprocated by the latter. Thus Pakistan rejected the aid offer. The Carter Administration also did not revise it. So, the matter was left to the next administration. However, Washington and Islamabad continued to discuss regional security arrangements and the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf contributed substantially to the relief efforts for the growing number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. American agreement to a \$1.6 billion IMF facility for Pakistan was achieved more easily and there was no trouble in getting substantial assistance for Pakistan in handling the rapidly growing Afghan refugee population.¹⁵

Zia's visit to Washington in October 1980 resulted in Carter acceding to Zia's main demand and agreed to supply F-16's for the Pakistan air force. Zia, however,

15. Thomas Perry Thornton, op.cit., 0. 973.

left the F-16 offer in abeyance and following the elections, the Pakistanis turned their full attention to the new administration. The F-16s would be most useful as the symbol of a new stage in U.S. Pakistani relationship.

New Dimension to the U.S. -Pak
Relationship Under Reagan Administration

The change in the Administration in the White House brought in a significant change in the Pak-U.S. relationship. The replacement of democrat Carter by Republican Ronald Reagan marked a shift in the U.S. attitude which became more close to Pakistan. The current administration relied on military-oriented strategy to contain Soviet Russia in South West Asia. To attain this objective the American made Pakistan a pillar of the new policy. The U.S. strategists have devised the so-called 'four-pillar policy' where Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would be part of the U.S. military plan to encircle the Gulf. The Reagan Administration has attached to Pakistan the importance of a front-line state. This can be gauged from the statement of the then Secretary of state Alexander Haig who said that Pakistan's security was a matter of special concern to the United States and that the Reagan Administration would try to develop a strategic "consensus" to counter

Soviet influence in the area stretching from Pakistan to Egypt.¹⁶

The motivating factor behind this change of U.S. attitude towards Pakistan lies in the report submitted by Francis Fukuyama for the Rand Corporation. Fukuyama, who was supposed to be the architect of U.S. policy towards Pakistan, dealt in his report the threat perceptions of Pakistan, the arms required by Pakistan to counter such threats as well as with the advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. in arming Pakistan. Four military contingencies, as listed by Fukuyama, that Pakistan might face are as follows:

Contingency I:

The Soviets and Afghans use artillery and aircraft to attack refugee camps within Pakistan on the pretext of hitting Mujahdeen escaping across the border from Afghanistan. The purpose of such an operation would be to demoralise the Mujahdeen; to push the refugee camps back away from the border to make them less accessible from Afghanistan; and to show the refugees that the Pakistani Government cannot provide them with adequate protection. In addition the Soviets might hope to physically interdict Afghans moving through the passes and trails crossing the border.

16. Pakistan Affairs, 16 December 1981, p. 122.

Contingency II

With air and artillery cover the Soviets and Afghans seize salients of Pakistani territory within their SAM environment and hold it, forcing the Pakistani's to counter-attack. The Durand Line follows an irregular course along the watershed and there are numerous points at which a salient of Pakistani territory juts into Afghanistan. None of these salients is at present defended. If properly chosen, they could be very easy to take from the West and to recapture from the east. The Soviet objective here would be to demoralise the Pakistanis and to teach them a lesson in the event Moscow believed they were giving substantial support to the Afghans. The Soviets could also use similar tactics to seize several vital mountain passes.

Contingency III

India acting as a Soviet proxy, attacks Pakistan in the east. Pakistani forces in the West are contained under the assumption that the 1959 executive arrangement with the U.S. would not hold. India's objective would be the destruction of Pakistani armed forces or the seizure of a sizeable portion of terrain. Its political goal would be the assertion of hegemony over South Asia and the achievement of dominant power status in the region.

Contingency IV

India and the Soviet Union could launch a coordinated attack from the east and West with the purpose of totally dismembering Pakistan. Moscow's goal would be to achieve access to the sea and to control Afghanistan's Southern border. India's goal would be to undo the partition once and for all.¹⁷

These are the contingencies that were cited by the Pakistani military which found their place in the Fukuyama's report. What Pakistan wanted was the increase in her military strength with the help of increased aid from the Reagan Administration. General Zia also claimed that there were threats to Pakistan's Security and Sovereignty and hence without sufficient help from abroad Pakistan won't be in a position to defend itself. Hence, after long discussions and bargaining, Pakistan agreed to accept an economic and military aid package of \$3.2 billion. The agreement was entered into on June 15, 1981.

This aid package, extending over a period of six years, calls for the rapid restoration of U.S. military aid to Pakistan.¹⁸ The U.S. plan to supply arms and equipments for

17. Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan : A Trip Report, Rand Note N-1514-RC (October 1980) pp. 18-19.

18. The New York Time, 16 september, 1981.

Pakistan includes TOW missile equipped Cobra helicopters, 24 missile launchers, 2,000 anti-tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, SAMs, Self-propelled guns, 200 tanks including M-60s, M-113 armoured personnel carriers, automatic radars and night vision equipments.¹⁹ The most significant aspect of the aid package is the US offer to sell 40 F-16 highly sophisticated long range, counter air mission fighter bombers. The decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan has generated enormous confidence among the Pakistani rulers regarding their friendship with the USA which prompted the Pakistani foreign minister, Agha Shahi to say that that, "we do believe in the determination of the new U.S. administration to strongly support the independence of Pakistan".²⁰ The reason, for economic and military assistance to Pakistan, given by the U.S.A. was that the sale programme was designed to meet Pakistan's legitimate defence modernization needs and that the F-16s would help Pakistan in maintaining her unity and sovereignty against the aggression of Soviet designs. It was also maintained that by providing sophisticated weapons, Pakistan can be made aware of the U.S. concern for her (Pakistan's) security which in turn would restrict Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The fact that the nuclear option was not acceptable to the U.S.A. would inhibit Pakistan in exploding a nuclear device.²¹ The selling of

19. Rajvir Singh, U.S. Pakistan and India (Allahabad, 1985) p. 168.

20. The New York Times, 22 April, 1981.

21. The Times of India, 6 April, 1984.

F-16s will also, from the American point of view, help removing doubts from the Pakistani mind regarding the credibility of U.S. friendship. The Pakistanis had always a doubt regarding the viability of the U.S. friendship, especially when Pakistan's nuclear options are concerned. So, the Reagan Administration viewed that supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan would prevent it from going nuclear. The spokesman of the state Department David Passage said, "The administration believes that by addressing those security concerns which have motivated Pakistan's nuclear programmes and reestablishing a relationship of confidence with it offer the best opportunity in the long run for effectively dealing with its nuclear programme."²² It was also clarified by the U.S. Government that the assistance to Pakistan was not meant for the Zia's regime as such but for the security requirements at a time when it faced real threats from the Soviets on the north and India in the South.²³

The proposed sell of F-16s and other sophisticated weapons to Pakistan generated strong reactions in India. A government spokesman in a press release said "the Government of India has noted with concern the agreement/ ^{announced} in

22. The New York Times, 15 June, 1981.

23. Statement by USAID administrator, M. Peter McPherson, 16 September 1981, "Security and Economic Assistant to Pakistan", (Washington, 1982) in Rajvir Singh, op.cit., p. 170.

Islamabad yesterday of the immediate sale by the U.S. of F-16 aircraft and other advanced military hardware to Pakistan over and above a five year package of arms sales and economic aid commencing in October 1982 and said to be of the value of US \$ 3000 million."

"The Government of India acknowledges that every country has a right to acquire weapons for self defence. It has not commented in any way while Pakistan has been steadily increasing and modernising its military strength over the past decade. The agreement announced yesterday is however, qualitatively and quantitatively different. It could introduce immediately a new level of weapons sophistication into the region which would affect the existing balance."²⁴

The sell of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan would definitely escalate arms race ⁱⁿ /the sub-continent forcing both India as well as Pakistan to go for acquisition of more sophisticated arms. The pretext that Pakistan is acquiring of more arms to protect itself from Soviet invasion does not hold good. The real threat in the Pakistani perception lies in India and that is why three-fourth of the Pakistan army was still on the Indian border. The sale of these

24. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1981, p. 179.

sophisticated air craft, which could penetrate deep into Indian territory and reach sensitive Indian targets, would increase the likelihood of another war between India and Pakistan.²⁵ Such sale would definitely reverse the limited but encouraging trend towards more cordial United States-India relations and would on the other hand strengthen Indo-Soviet friendship. The sale of F-16s to Pakistan is also generally perceived as^a mark of the US support for the military regime of President Zia. This would probably prompt the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani army to take a hardline vis-a-vis political opponents of the regime as well the provinces of Sind and Baluchistan. This would, alienate these provinces still further, thereby providing a target for foreign subversions.²⁶ Further, the Reagan Administration's belief that arms aid to Pakistan would forestall its nuclear programme does not seem quite reasonable. There was every reason to believe that Pakistan was seeking to develop a nuclear explosive capability. There was also reports of Pakistan-Libyan collusion to manufacture an "Islamic Bomb". These developments carried with them the danger of a pre emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear installations by India,

25. Sleig Harrison "India and Regan's Tilt Towards Pakistan", New York Times, 15 July, 1981.

26. K. Subramanyum, "Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities and Indian Response", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. VII, 12 March, 1984.

leading to regional holocaust.²⁷

The acquisition of arms by Pakistan is mainly to acquire military parity with India which might serve as a precondition for asserting itself (Pakistan) perhaps aggressively in the sub-continent. The arms aid by the U.S. helps Pakistan in achieving this objective. The U.S. on the other hand, by supplying sophisticated weapons wants to acquire bases for its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in ports and airfields of Pakistan. Hence it has shown a great interest in the military build-up of Pakistan. Pakistan's contribution to the U.S. military plan in the Gulf would be to serve as a pillar, in the four-pillar policy of the U.S., and to provide first entrepot facilities for the RDF and pater sea or airbase facilities at either Karachi or Gwader. A close military cooperation is planned between the armed forces of the two countries and the American military planners are interested in a very specific agenda which places Pakistan within the context of a broader regional vision.²⁸ Such military cooperation between the two armed forces does not limit to access facilities alone. Pakistan is also allowed to act as an American proxy in the region by which it can intervene where use of the US troops proves disadvantageous to the interests of Washington.

27. M. Shankar, "Pakistan and the U.S. Congress", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. V, No. 10, January 1982, p. 509.

28. Lawrence Lifschultz "Ring Around the Gulf", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 December, 1981, p. 17.

Saudi Arabia, the other pillar, in the four-pillar policy, also gives sufficient arms aid to Pakistan so that the latter can well deny the fact that it acts as the pawn of the U.S. in the sub-continent. Zia is also bound to reciprocate by guarding the House of Sand. Thus the U.S.A. calculates that its policy of arming these two states will lead to an inter linking set of interests capable of containing instability in the region, an instability which American intervention would almost certainly aggravate.²⁹ Despite the Reagan Administration's awareness regarding the motive behind Pakistan's acquisition of arms, what the U.S. expects of Pakistan is her broad consensus that the American presence in the region is a 'Sina qua non' for her own defence and for the preservation of oil resources of Persian Gulf from Soviet challenge. Hence the U.S. is impressing upon Zia regime that it should make available all sorts of facilities to America without any further misgivings.

Americans consider the Gulf region vital for their interest and they have perceived threat from the Soviet Union due to its political control over the West oil supply. Taking into consideration the strategic importance of West and the South-West Asia the USA on 1st January, 1983

29. Amit Gupta, "Pakistan's Acquisition of Arms : Rationale, Quest and Implications for India", IDSJ Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 3, Jan-March, 1982, p. 434.

established a separate unified command for this region, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), with its area of jurisdiction stretching from Egypt to Pakistan and from Kenya to Iran but excluding Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Its headquarters are located at Macdill Air Force base, Tampa, Florida. An Advance Headquarter of the Centcom in the Indian Ocean area is also envisaged, the likely locations being Diego-Garcia and Masirah Islam (Oman). The Centom will be able to draw upwards of 220,000 personnel from units of the US Army, Navy, Air Foce and Marines based in the USA. It is also planned to increase this strength to 404,000 personnel over next five years.³⁰

Central Command is the out product of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) based in Diego-Garcia.³¹ The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has given a chance to theUS to give a concrete shape to its plan of RDF leading to the establishment of Centcom. Through RDF, US brought under plan of militarisation of the Indian Ocean region to serve its own interest. Further RDF became a crucial and credible US force which provides the U.S. dominance in Asia and Africa. The US strategic military objectives in the Indian Ocean includes protection of U.S. economic interest in the Persian Gulf

30. R.G. Shawney, "Focus on U.S.-Pak Security Relationship", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. VII, 8 November, 1983, p. 579.

31. R. Singh, op.cit., p. 177.

region; Employment or threatenings of force in support of U.S. diplomatic objectives in the Middle East : to balance Soviet forces in the region.

In the light of such developed U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan has become a state of crucial strategic importance. Despite Pakistan's repeated denial about allowing the U.S. Sixth fleet to have naval base facilities at Pakistan Ports the official and academic literature in the USA is full of proposals for the development of the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, as well as base facilities in Peshwar.³² Further, Pakistan's growing military presence in the Gulf helps from US standpoint, maintaining stability there. This serves the American interest of saving the Gulf from Soviet invasion. Hence both the US and Pakistan work in a complementary way serving each other's objectives.

Against the backdrop of continuing reports about the supply of more and more sophisticated military hardware by the US to Pakistan, the disclosure by Jack Anderson about the security link-up between them and the latest proposal of the U.S. Administration seeking congressional authorisation to station U.S. military personnel in Pakistan "on a regular assignment" to "enable Pakistan to make effective use of U.S.

32. Ibid., p. 183.

arms" necessitates careful examination.³³

After lots of investigations, Jack Anderson has revealed that (a) President Zia has promised "to allow U.S. planes to use pak airfields should the Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan"; (b) in return for the above facility, in addition to the \$ 3.2 billion in aid already announced, the U.S. will share intelligence information, with Pakistan; (c) Gen. Zia has agreed to let U.S. weapons to be sent to the Afghan rebels through his special forces and (d) the U.S. has agreed to train the Pakistan presidential body guards.³⁴

While presenting his annual report to congress for fiscal year 1985, the U.S. Secretary of defence, Mr. Caspar Weinburger, made the following significant points relating to South-West Asia; (a) Although South-West Asia is the focus of rapid deployment force planning, presently the U.S. has no agreements to station combat troops in the area and maintains only a limited sea-based presence there. Therefore, the U.S. must be able to project additional forces very rapidly to this region and sustain them adequately in combat, (b) Political conditions and agreements with friends and allies near the region, in Europe and elsewhere

33. R.G. Shawney, "U.S.-Pak Security Relations - Possible Problem for India", The Times of India, 16 April, 1984.

34. Ibid.

along vital lines of communication, influence availability of transit facilities needed to support the rapid deployment strategy. Some of the U.S. programmes for South-West Asia have been completed and many more are beginning to take effect. The programmes for the region must offer capabilities across a wide spectrum of potential conflicts

(c) Formal agreements have already been reached with several nations and negotiations are being pursued with others, for permission to preposition material, to use regional facilities during crisis and to conduct training exercises during peace time. In some cases, existing facilities and other infra-structure have been improved, (d) while new U.S. bases are not being created perse, in South-West Asia existing host nation facilities that the U.S. might use to support its forces in the region are being improved and arrangements are being made for prompt access when needed.³⁵

Mr. Anderson's disclosure regarding General Zia's promise to allow U.S. planes to use Pakistani airfields in the event of a Soviet threat to the Gulf from Afthanistan, is fully in consonance with Mr. Fukuyama's report.³⁶ In this connection the statement issued by the movement for restoration of democracy in Karachi on March 4, 1983 is significant.

35. Ibid.

36. Fukuyama's Report regarding Security of Pakistan.

It is alleged, among other things, that during the visit of Admiral Holcomb, commander of the seventh fleet to Karachi on February 24, 1983, General Zia had offered unconditional support to plans for upgrading naval facilities for RDE in Baluchistani ports and the construction of air bases in Southern Baluchistan as part of U.S. "forward strategy" in the region. Similar allegations have also been voiced recently by Mr. Ataulan Mengal from his exile in London and some other Baluchi leaders. Pakistani airfields could also be used by AWACS, SR-71 and RC 135 for intelligence gathering over India. The U.S. may agree to pay this price for Pakistan's participation in its "strategic consensus" plan against the Soviets. There is little doubt that the U.S. ^{is} in a position to provide intelligence about India to Pakistan based largely on Satellites, high level air reconnaissance (SR 71) AWACS and electronic monitoring (including operation with RC 135). The sort of intelligence which Pakistan would require from the U.S., both strategic and tactical, would broadly relate to force levels, operational readiness, status, deployment and mobilisation status, electronic intelligence for electronic warfare, maritime surveillance, including location of fleets and ships, tactical intelligence pertaining mainly

to the location, deployment and movement of armoured formations and major political and economic trends relating to defence preparedness.³⁷

In this context Pakistanis plan to launch communication satellites in the next few years for quick transmission of information is relevant. But ^{it} would be most disconcerting if the U.S. decided to supply digital maps to be fed into the navigation computer, of F-16 for air strikes against Indian targets. The position would be even more serious if Pakistan becomes a beneficiary of the IANTIRN system which will bestow an all weather (including night) low level navigation capability.³⁸

Further, the U.S. also agreed to help Pakistan's armed forces by supplying highly sophisticated equipments which can be used for information gathering. The sophisticated weapons supplied can not be utilised to the maximum unless adequate intelligence is available. Pakistan's own present and potential capability in this field can be broadly classified into tactical fighter reconnaissance (racee), strategic/photo recce, maritime recce, battlefield surveillance, electronics intelligence (Elint) and AWACS. While tactical fighter recce can be carried out by Mirage III, F-6 and T33 R/T 37 R aircraft,

37. The Times of India, 16 April, 1984.

38. Ibid.

strategic/photo recce can be undertaken by Mirage III R, and B 57 R; and maritime recce by Atlantic and F-27 air craft.³⁹

For electronic warfare including Elint, Pakistan got the assurance for getting.

- (i) RC-135 and RC-135 V aircraft : For electronic intelligence gathering and radio-communication gathering.
- (ii) EC-130 aircraft (PAF also operates C-130 Hercules) EC-130 E (coronet Solo II) : Electronics surveillance aircraft operated by 193rd electronic combat group EC-130 G/Q : U.S. Navy's communication platform for relaying strategic message to submerged submarines.
EC-13 OH (compass call : operated by 41st electronic combat squadron, USAF for jamming of hostile command, control and communication system. The air borne system also works in conjunction with ground based electronic counter measures systems against hostile C³ systems.
- (iii) EA-6 B 'Prowler' aircraft : Four-seater carrier borne advanced electronic warfare integral to U.S. seventh Fleet deployed in the Arabian sea. (Total 10 squadrons in U.S. navy). Automatic detection, identification, direction-finding and jammer-Set-on sequence against radar/radio emissions. Equipment includes AN/AIQ-99 tactical jamming system with 10 jamming transmitters

39. R.G.Shawney, "U.S. Electronic Eyes for Pakistan", The Times of India, 17 April, 1984.

in five integrated pods; sensitive surveillance receivers in the fin-tip pod for long-range detection of radars.

- iv) Ground based signal/electronic intelligence and monitoring facilities. As for AWACS there will be : 1) E 3 A sentry aircraft with inbuilt elint/ECM capabilities, ex-Saudi Arabia or USAF.
- v) E-2C Hawkeys carrier borne aircraft, ex-US seventh fleet in Arabian sea.

P-3 C and EP-3E Orion aircraft of the U.S. navy to be used for maritime patrol. ⁴⁰

During October, 1983 amidst mounting public agitation for a return to democracy, the C9A had reportedly stepped up operations in Pakistan to keep "tabs on and props under the Pro-American military regime of President Zia-ul-Haq". Apparently, it wanted to make sure that he does not become another Shah of Iran. In view of this, the reported U.S. agreement to train Pakistani presidential bodyguards is a further step towards ensuring the survival of military regime. Training of the body guards could also prove useful to the U.S. if the need arises for Zia's replacement by another general favourably inclined towards U.S. interest.⁴¹

40. Ibid.

41. R.G. Shawney, "U.S. Military Men on Pak Soil", The Times of India, 18 April, 1984.

There can be various possible purpose of stationing U.S. military personnel in Pakistan, which are as follows:

- (a) The likely installation of highly sensitive intelligence gathering and monitoring system which the U.S. may not like to hand over to Pakistan but would like to retain control over information output and share intelligence only on a selective basis.
- (b) Establishment of a Logistic/command centre on Pakistani soil related to the RDF/Central Command like the positioning of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Vietnam prior to direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
- (c) Setting up a U.S. military filtering agency for coordinating and conducting military recon around Pakistan, especially if systems like SR 71 and TRIA are to be used.
- (d) Hook-up of the Pak Air Defence Command and Control system with that of the U.S. 7th Fleet as the U.S. has done with its AWACS in Saudi Arabia which are linked with surface fleet operations in the Gulf area and provide target data. The use of U.S. AWAC's in Pakistan will greatly enhance this crucial role. This would assume even greater importance when Pakistan acquires the Mohawks and the Hawkeys. Even in peace time these aerial platforms would enable Pakistan to look upto 300 nm into Indian territory and gather information in flight profile, rate of flying etc. of all aircraft in Indian air space.

(e) The U.S. might propose to instal some high value special weapon systems. Any such system is bound to be of very high technology and could have serious security implications in the region.⁴²

One of the major objectives of the U.S. behind the grant of \$ 3.2 billion economic and military aid package to Pakistan is to prevent the latter from going nuclear. In the light of Pakistani declaration regarding success in enrichment of uranium, one feels that such delcaration to was/reduce congressional resistance to the proposal for stationing the U.S. military personnel in Pakistan.

Despite the over-proclaimed sanctified purpose of \$3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan, the U.S. has failed in preventing Pakistan from attempting to acquire nuclear capabilities. President Zia's indications clearly testifies to Pakistan's desire of acquiring the so called 'Islamic Bomb'. With the strategic status of Pakistan improved, the U.S. is not in a position to sever contacts with Pakistan nor to cut the amount of aid. Ever since it became clear to the Americans that their policy of arming Pakistan had failed to stop the Zia government's plans to make the bomb, they began to apprehend that India would perhaps follow the Israeli example⁴³

42. Ibid.

43. Israel made a preemptive attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1982.

and attack the Pakistani nuclear facility before it was too late. Some of them privately expressed the hope that India would launch such a pre-emptive attack on the Pakistani facility, because they saw an Indian raid as the only effective way of preventing Pakistan from making the bomb. And this belief propelled the strategic analysts in Washington to create a scare when a cloud formation over a part of India blocked the view of an American satellite that could not spot two Indian squadrons of Jaguars where it had expected to see them. It sent a signal to Washington where analysts thought that Jaguars had been redeployed and that perhaps the Indian Air Force was planning to launch a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear facility at Kahuta.⁴⁴ Pakistan was alerted. It was later found that the Jaguars were very much where they had to be and it was clouds that had blocked the satellite's view.

It was later learnt from authoritative sources that the U.S. intelligence agencies had deliberately circulated a report that India had moved two squadrons of Jaguar fighter aircraft to a forward base for a pre-emptive strike on Pakistani nuclear installations. This had been done to create favourable public opinion in the U.S. for

44. The Times of India, (New Delhi) 18 September, 1984.

arms sales to Pakistan.⁴⁵ The Pentagon knew that the 'false alarm story' was incorrect and that it was intended to soften the criticism from U.S. Senators and congressmen who were opposed to the \$3.2 billion aid to Pakistan, on the plea that it had embarked on a nuclear-weapons programme.

There was quite strong opposition from some Senate members regarding the continuance of the aid package to Pakistan. Senator Allan Cranston announced that he would move an amendment to the budgetary resolution (called continuing resolution) to amend that further supply of F-16s should be suspended till Pakistan convinces the U.S. that it has abandoned its plan to make the bomb and that it does not already possess such a bomb.⁴⁶

The Cranston move, though supported by large number of Senate members, was opposed by Reagan Administration. With Mr. Reagan then emerging as a certainty for a second term, there was least possibility of his administration getting viable opposition from the non-proliferation lobby in the Senate.

45. The Times of India (New Delhi), 6 October, 1984.

46. The Times of India (New Delhi), 18 September, 1984.

The scare created by the Press Leaks was believed to create an atmosphere of imminent Indo-Pakistan conflict and thus help the Republicans to justify their views against the demand for cut in the aid to Pakistan. Of course some analysts say that the scare may have been created to warn the Reagan policy makers that their complacency over the continued military supplies to Pakistan and their assumption that such supplies would ^{not} have ultimately a destabilising effect on the region is unjustified.

The validity of the first version can be judged from the later U.S. moves to give highly offensive arms to Pakistan. Experts said that after attempting to soften public opinion the American administration prepared itself to supply Pakistan the surveillance plane, Grumman, E-2C, popularly known as Hawkeye. It is a two engine turboprop aircraft equipped with radar facilities that can detect targets 300 miles away. It is used over both land and sea. These planes operate in conjunction with fighter jets which it can direct towards targets. Pakistan needed the surveillance plane to help its F-16s track the targets. Pakistan had also the alternative plan of purchasing the transport planes C-130s, in case of non-availability of Hawkeyes planes, and converting them into surveillance planes by fitting them with the radar equipment. The

Pakistani foreign Minister, Sahebzada Yakub Khan visited Washington in October 1984 to get these purchases sanctioned.⁴⁷

The supply to Pakistan first of the Harpoons and then the initiative to supply surveillance planes was interpreted by Indian sources as proof of earlier Indian apprehension that the \$ 3.2 billion aid package might just be the first instalment of the U.S. - Pakistan military alliance, an alliance which most Indian see as aimed against their country and not Afghanistan.

Further, any intelligence sharing arrangements between the U.S. and Pakistan will have serious and manifold security implications for India which must be analysed now and counter-measures planned and implemented expeditiously. Not enough attention has been paid to intelligence sharing possibilities. When references are made to sophisticated arms supplies to Pakistan it should not be interpreted narrowly with reference to the weapons platforms only but all supporting systems that could contribute to target information and effective use of those systems. In this respect, what should cause concern to India more than the hardware is the nature of U.S. Pakistan strategic relationship and its content.⁴⁸

47. The Times of India, (New Delhi) 14 October, 1984.

48. The Times of India (New Delhi) 18 April, 1984.

With the assumption of the office of the President by Reagan for a second term and his pledge to continue U.S. support to Pakistan closely signify that the U.S. is not going to give up its arms aid policy to Pakistan in recent future.

CONCLUSION

The continuous arms supply to Pakistan by the Reagan Administration is the result of a thorough reappraisal by the latter, of the relationship between the two countries in the wake of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan's geostrategic significance as relatively a stable factor, has cast her again into the main focus of the United States South Asia policy. The Reagan Administration's perceptions have largely been shaped by its attempt to give sufficient military aid to its allies thereby enabling them to regain their confidence in the U.S. as a reliable military partner. After 1971 there was no such encouraging relationship between the two countries. The arms embargo had generated great deal of dissatisfaction in both India and Pakistan. Subsequent lift of embargo also did not help Pakistan to acquire sufficient arms because both the countries had difference of opinions regarding Pakistan's nuclear policy. But the change in the international scenario also had a great deal of impact on the U.S.-Pak relationship. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to acquire a status of 'front-line' state in the U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. felt the need of safeguarding Pakistan by supplying it sophisticated weapons, so that

it can serve as a check to the Soviet expansionism. Pakistan, ever eager to play this role assigned by the U.S., readily accepted the U.S. plan. President Zia described Pakistan as the "backdoor" to the Persian Gulf and noted "unless the backdoor is safe, the Gulf is not safe". The United States also came round to the view that building up of Pakistan military should be an essential part of the plan to strengthen the security of the Gulf. The Reagan Administration assured Pakistan of military, economic and diplomatic help and pledged to make the security alliances more viable and more effective.

The Reagan Administration is employing arms aid more as a weapon of its global strategy to transform the region into a zone of its strategic gains and political influence rather than building up Pakistan as a strong deterrence against the Soviet incursions. The implications of such a strategy appear to be quite grave so far as the security of the region is concerned. On the other hand it helps the military ruling elites of Pakistan to pursue their activities to serve their own vested interest. This process of arming Pakistan leads to intensification of Soviet presence in Afghanistan instead of reducing it. Constant supply of arms to Pakistan naturally generates

suspicious among the Indians as to the purpose of such acquisition. Consequently both the Indo-U.S. as well as the Indo-Pakistan rivalry and hostility deepens.

From the Pakistani point of view,, Pakistan needs more arms to maintain her sovereignty and territorial integrity. As discussed earlier, the Pakistani top military brass cited four possible military contingencies which Pakistan might face in the future. They apprehend an attack by the Soviet Union or a combined attack by Soviet Union and India, the latter acting as former's proxy. Pakistan, from the very beginning and especially after her frustrating experience in 1971 Indo-Pak war, is in the constant pursuit of acquiring military parity with India. To achieve this purpose it needs a super power's help and the U.S. fulfils the functions to this regard. On the pretext of threat perception to its territory, Pakistan goes for constant arms acquisition which raises certain pertinent questions. Is this threat perception real and justified? What are the motives behind such acquisition of arms? What are its implications for India? These are the points that needs to be discussed.

Are Pakistan's threat perception justified?

While analysing the justifiability of the threats perceived by Pakistan one finds they do not have any viable logic. The long presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and its non-intervention in Pakistani territory clearly

indicates Moscow's intention of not extending the conflict in the region. Though there is occasional attacks on Pakistani territory, the air crafts involved are Afghan and not Russian Pakistan also is very much aware of its military inferiority as compared to that of the Soviet Union and hence it would not embark upon any step that would immediately invite the Soviet Wrath. Rather, Pakistan has limited the supply of weapons passing through its territory to the Afghan freedom fighters. What Pakistan wants is to make political capital out of this situation by which it can demand more arms from the U.S.A.

Pakistan's apprehension regarding India acting as a proxy of Soviet Union and a combined attack by India and Soviet Union, on its territory seems unrealistic. If India would have been nourishing the idea of undoing the partition, it could have done so when it won decisively in the 1971 war. India has repeatedly claimed its desire to maintain peace and stability in the subcontinent. If at all India tries to hegemonise its neighbour, it will lead to the escalation of tensions in the sub-continent as well as inside the Indian territory. Taking into account the cultural diversities existing inside the country, any kind of patronising attitude will have its repercussions inside India.

Further India's leading position in the non-aligned world makes it imperative on her part to respect the territorial integrity of her neighbours. The very fact that India remained non-aligned from the very beginning testifies to the fact that India wants a peaceful and harmonious relationship with her neighbours. Any indications of patronising neighbours, on the part of India, will bring in strong reactions from other countries of the World.

In any case any kind of combined attack on Pakistan would not be of any help either to Soviet Union or to India. Soviet Union does not need Pakistani territory to enter into the Gulf. Similarly it would be foolish on the part of India to annex Pakistani territory and to pursue a continuous anti-insurgent campaign.

Pakistan's claim regarding the lack of sufficient arms to counter Soviet attack seems ridiculous. As such in the event of any war between Pakistan and Soviet Union, the former can not stand up to the occasion alone. Such kind of conflict will definitely form part of a bigger conflict where the United States will get involved. So far as military parity with India is concerned, the recent acquisitions, as discussed earlier, of sophisticated weapons, including the F-16s and Hawkey Planes, by Pakistan,

clearly indicates that Pakistan is militarily almost at par with India.

Similar is the case regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme. Ever since India exploded the nuclear bomb, Pakistan is in constant quest to achieve nuclear capabilities. Pakistani nuclear programme, due to the hard-headed determination of Z.A. Bhutto and aided by the clandestine activities of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the purchases of nuclear equipment by 'Project 706' a special works organisation, which operated in Europe, the supply of 'Yellow cake' from Niger, and nuclear cooperation in the initial stages with Canada and France and later with China, has progressed a great deal. Today Pakistan's nuclear facilities comprise six main units, namely, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, a pilot reprocessing plant at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, a centrifuge facility at Kahuta, a heavy water plant at Multani. It is also supposed to have received sensitive know how from China regarding nuclear weapon design. Thus, so far as technical infrastructure and resources are concerned, Pakistan has already acquired the nuclear weapon state status.

The acquisition of nuclear power by Pakistan will create a serious security problem for India. With the nuclear capability, Pakistan might attempt to seize Kashmir. Banihal tunnel is regarded as an ideal target for a nuclear

weapon, since, it will cause 'minimum collateral damage' and will cut off the Kashmir Valley from India thus making it totally vulnerable to a Pakistani attack. Pakistan has always been determined to wrest Kashmir from India, and twice it had tried to settle the issue by force of arms. On both the occasions, Pakistan has been prevented from doing so because of the threat India poses to Pakistan in West Punjab and Sind. Once Pakistan acquires nuclear capability this strategic situation would change.

Pakistan could declare that it intended to use its nuclear weapons in a defensive capacity only, that is, as a deterrent to an Indian attack on Pakistani territory. This declaration of nuclear intent would enable it to de-emphasise the conventional defence posture, thin out the divisions at present defending the Lahore-Multani fronts and the Southern Sector and concentrate the division thus made available for the coup de grace in Kashmir.

There are only two defence options for India to maintain national security deterrence and detente. There must be a degree of deterrence sufficient to force any enemy to think twice before committing aggression and not to avoid reasonability of nuclear deterrence (the nuclear bombs are not meant to be used; the reasons usually advanced

are the nuclear bombs would be self deterred).

The altered strategic environment has forced the Reagan Administration to sanction \$3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan, despite the latter's nuclear quest. As discussed earlier, such aid enable the U.S. to acquire base facilities in Pakistan. The advantages to Pakistan from this arrangement, on the other hand relate to its domestic political scene and Pakistan's world view. It is Zia's contention that the arms serve no other purpose than that of a deterrent against potential enemies. But the implications behind such acquisition is far-reaching.

Motivating Factor Behind Pakistan's Arms Acquisition

Acquisition of arms by Zia's regime helped it in legitimising its position Zia, being a military dictator, does not command the support of his people. His position is quite shaky and he might be thrown out any time. Though initially Zia lacked support from within as well from outside, Afthanistan has changed the situation Zia, is shrewed enough to sense his new found worth and he has explicated the situation to the maximum. Being loyal to the Americans, Zia has convinced them of his utility in checking the Soviet expansion in the Gulf. On the other hand he has secured from the Americans the security of his position as the supreme ruler of the country.

Pakistan, with the assurance of the U.S. support, might feel tempted to take a more aggressive stand against India. The U.S., to bolster its self-image and to build confidence among the Gulf countries (who are disillusioned by the fall of Shah of Iran), might feel forced to help Pakistan against India.

Arms supply by the U.S. also encourages Pakistan to attain military parity with India. Military parity with India is seen as a must in any Pakistani defence consideration by the military establishment. In the wake of a war, Pakistan being a small country does not have space to retreat. Pakistani military deterrent therefore requires the ability to push into enemy territories so as to secure defensible salients. So in defence it has to attack in some places. The American arms acquired, can be used in this regard and India can be held to a stalemate.

The ambition to achieve military parity with India on the part of the Pakistani military rulers can serve two objectives. Pakistan is heavily dependent upon the Gulf states for political and economic support. In reciprocity it has to serve their security interest. With military aid from the U.S.A., Pakistan would be in a position to demonstrate to the Gulf countries, its strength and military capabilities. Further a war with India will also give scope to Pakistan to affirm its military strength and hence get the continuous support from the Gulf countries as well as the United States.

The military regime in Pakistan, is faced with tremendous domestic problems at present. The Baluchi problem is a continuous one. After the execution of Bhutto, there was a strong protest all over the country against the military rule, led by a combined opposition, named Movement for Restoration of Democracy (M.R.D.). General Zia is currently facing stiff opposition from Pakistan, Peoples' Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the executed Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. When the domestic crises will go out control, the military rule might embark upon a war with India which would, atleast temporarily, divert the attention of the Pakistanis away from the domestic problems. Though Pakistan claims to have returned to democracy, the power still continuous to remain with the military rulers.

Implications for India

India expressed her grave concern about the impact of U.S. arms supply to Pakistan. What the Indian leaders felt was large scale induction of arms to Pakistan will disturb the detente in Indo-Pak relationship and would create regional imbalances. The attempt by the Reagan Administration to amend the Symington Amendment which prohibits the U.S. from supplying arms to the countries who


pursue nuclear activities created concern among the Indian leadership. India therefore seriously questioned the rationale behind the application of U.S. "Waiver" in the case of Pakistan. Pakistan with sophisticated weapon in hand, might, with the lack of self-restraint, use them against India and that might have grave consequences for both the countries. The use of F-16 by Pakistan might cause huge loss to India. Similarly the acquisition of E-2C Hawke Air-borne warning and control system Aircraft by Pakistan will enable her to frustrate any surprise Indian attack. In the light of such "unilateral acquisition" of the latest defence weaponry by Pakistan, there is every reason for India to worry about.

In order to counter Pakistani acquisition of arms India proposes to go for weapons from U.S.S.R. and other sources. India intended to purchase Mirage-2000 from France and Mig 31 and MiG 33 from Soviet Union. This leads to a continuous arms race which has a lot of ominous effect.

From the U.S. point of view, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan calls for a cautious and realistic assessment of the security problems of Pakistan and the strategic environment of the sub-continent. The U.S. approach regarding meeting the Soviet challenge

does not seem congruous and relevant. The U.S. adhoc "tactical gimmicks" won't help in reducing the tension in the sub-continent, rather escalating it. Questions regarding the extent of U.S. involvement in case of an Indo-Pak war always arise in the minds of analysts. The viability of U.S.-China-Pakistan axis as against Soviet pressure in the region is also a matter to be scrutinized. The real question at this point is whether the Reagan Administration will stay out of the sub-continental tensions or will provide total support to Pakistan.

The relationship of the Reagan Administration with the Indian government is quite strained. This can be seen from the U.S. disregard to Indian opposition regarding the sale of F-16 to Pakistan. In case of I.M.F. loan of \$5 billion to India, the U.S. did not support India's cause wholeheartedly. Policy makers in Washington feel that India is too close to Moscow. But in case of a Indo-Pakistan War, the U.S. might not intervene physically. The collapse of the U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1975 had convinced the U.S. strategists that regional affairs should not be globalised by the way of direct intervention. What the U.S. can do in such an event is to provide Pakistan with more arms and spare parts at throw away prices. This can be done with the help of a third party. The Pakistani leaders had expressed their strong dissatisfaction regarding the lack of the U.S. initiative during



the wars with India. This has been so far, a major point of difference between both the countries. But with renewed friendship and changed strategic environment, it is quite possible that the U.S. must have guaranteed full support to Pakistan in case of a War.

Both the U.S.A. and Pakistan are well aware of each other's need and both try to achieve their own objectives by fostering friendship between them. Pakistan is no more a passive ally providing facilities and intelligence to the USA but has become a proxy state, armed sufficiently to guard the U.S. interest. But this new role of Pakistan has serious implications for India.

Pakistan acquires arms from the U.S.A. because its security is threatened. One finds contradiction in Pakistan's security needs because for defence purpose Pakistan needs offensive first-strike capability. Further after dismemberment in the 1971 war, Pakistan has been reduced territorially but its defence needs have become much more. Further, the arms, are acquired by a regime which does not have popular base and which quite alienated from the people of the country.

With the arms acquisition from the U.S. Pakistan also goes for arms from other countries and this is not discouraged by the U.S. France and China are major arms supplier to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helps Pakistan economically. This helps Pakistan in following her cherished goal of acquiring military parity with India. In the U.S.

Pak relationship, Pakistan is no more in a sub-servient stage. With the increased U.S. interest in the Gulf and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan is in a position atleast to demand more aid from the U.S.A. The USA is also readily willing to support Pakistan. The U.S. unlike on previous occasions has refused to give "public or private assurance to New Delhi that Washington would not let U.S. weaponry be used in an Indo-Pakistan conflict". Thus an armed Pakistan will feel quite encouraged, with the tacit U.S. support, to demonstrate its power in the sub-continent and establish its supremacy over the arch rival India. This will, consequently force India to join the arms race to maintain the balance in the region.

The transformation of Pakistan into a strategic base of the U.S.-China sponsored security frame work for the subcontinent is bound to have impact upon India's security and political affair which might eventually undergo a critical change.

The continuous and excessive military aid to Pakistan and to the Afghan rebels by the U.S. might provoke U.S.S.R. which being a strategically favourable position might resort to serious reprisals. One can also visualise the possibility of the Soviet Union helping the secessionists

in Pakistan which can create difficulties for the otherwise highly unstable Pakistani government. Further if the arms supply to Pakistan by the U.S. remains unabated, in due course of time, all other countries in the region will be entangled in a war. Due to the changes in the security environment and because of the highly sophisticated arms collected by both the countries in the region, the possible involvement of other countries can also be visualised.

The past thirty years of history bears the testimony of two Indo-Paki wars, leaving aside the bid to infiltrate Indian territory by the Pakistanis. Pakistan has been a constant recipient of arms from the U.S. since 1954. Itself being in an economically backward position, Pakistan can not go for weapon production all alone. With the required help of the USA it has dared to attack India earlier. So, it is but natural that with the recent acquisition of sophisticated arms from the U.S. Pakistan won't hesitate to embark upon a more drastic step against India. The F-16s which Pakistan has acquired will not be useful in Afghanistan and Pakistan would not dare to use them against the Soviet Union. So consequently these are meant against India. These planes are quite dangerous in the sense they have the capability to strike at far away cities in India. Similar is the case with E-2C airborne early warning system, that can keep an eye on not only any Indian plane within a range of 600 kms but can also vector Pakistan attacking aircraft. Simultaneously in three different configurations, each independent of

the other. Though India is trying to match Pakistani capability, it is doing so at the cost of its own economy.

While analysing the above conditions existing in the sub-continent one can not become hopeful about a healthy Indo-U.S. relationship, especially in the face of latter's determination to induce massive arms into Pakistan. The only way to reduce tension in the sub-continent is the disengagement of the U.S. which seems to be a wishful thinking. But this seems to be the only solution. Both the super powers should exercise considerable restraint on their activities. Only a tension free Indian subcontinent (which is dependent upon the super power disengagement from the area) will enable both India and Pakistan to develop bilateral relationship and to solve all conflicts strictly in accordance with the Simla agreement of 1972. Further India and Pakistan, both being developing countries, can divert their resources away from defence expenditure and towards developmental programmes. Though the U.S. disengagement from the area seems to be a distant dream, one hopes U.S. realizes here follies of straining her own as well/^{as} other country's economies by military and political engagements.

T A B L E S

ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN1971-84

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1	2	3	4	5
1971	3	Northrof F-5 Freedom fighter	Libya	Believed to have been resumed after 1971 war.
1971	2	Aerospatiale Alouette II	Saudi Arabia	
1971	10	DHC-2 Beaner	Saudi Arabia	
1972	60	F-6 (MiG-19)	China	
1972	10	Alouettee III	France/ Pakistan	Produced under licence in Pakistan
1972	28	Dassault Mirage V fighrer	France	24 previously purchased
1972	2	Dassault Mirage III trainer	France	
1974	47	Saab MFI-17	Sweden	
1972	6	Seaking helicopters	UK	
1973	40	F-5 fighter	Iran	
1974	1 squadam	MiG-19 fighter	China	Brings total to 120.
1975	10	Mirage III fighter	France	
1977	10	Mirage V fighter	France	
1976-77	60	F-6 fighter	China	
1978	35	Puma helicopters	France	
1979	32	Mirrage III E fighter/bomber	France	

1	2	3	4	5
1979	32	Mirrage V fighter	China	
1980	65	F-6 fighter	France	
1980	18	Mirrage V fighter	France	
1980		SM-1019E Light Plane	Italy	
1981		F-16A Fighter/Strike	U.S.A.	1981 (2) 1983 (10) 1984 (20)
1982-		SA-316 B Helicopter	Italy	
1982-84		Q-5 Fantan-A Fighter/Ground Attack	China	
1984		E-2C Hawkey AEW	U.S.A.	
1983-84		Model 209 AH-1S Helicopter	U.S.A.	
1983-84		OV-10A, Bronco Trainer/COIN	U.S.A.	
<u>Missiles:</u>				
1973		SAM-6 SA-missiles	China	
1976	24	AM-39 Exocet ASM	France	
1975-77	120	R-550 Magic AAM	France	
1976	840	AAM	U.S.A.	
1976	200	TOW ATM	U.S.A.	
1978	350	AIM-IP AAM	U.S.A.	
1979	20	CSA-1 SAM	China	
1980	192	R-550 Magic AAM	France	
1980-83		R-550 Magic AAM	France	
1981-83		R-530 AAM	France	
1982-83		AM-39 Exocet/AshM	France	
1983-84		BGM-71A TOW ATM	U.S.A.	
1984		RGM 84 A Harpoon Sh Sh M	U.S.A.	

 1 2 3 4 5

Naval Vessels:

1970-71	3	Submarine "Daphne" class	France
1971-72	9	Motor boats "Sanghai" class	China
1972	2	Frigate "Whitby" class	UK
1973	1	Submarine "Daphne" class	France
1974	2	Destroyer "Whitby" class	UK
1979	2	Submarine "Agosta" class	France
1980	2	"Romeo" class Submarine	China
1980	2	Destroyer "Gearing" class	France
1983		Destroyer "Arcadia" class Tender	U.S.A.
1984		Destroyer "Gearing" class	U.S.A.

Armoured Fighting Vehicles:

1970-71	110	T-59 MBT	China
1971-72	100	T-59 MBT	China
1973	300	M-113 APC	U.S.A.
1974	150	T-59 MBT	China
1975	100	M-48 MBT	Iran
1980	1000	T-59 MBT	China
1983-84		M-109 A2 155mm SPH	U.S.A.
1984-85		M-109 A2 155mm SPH	U.S.A.
1984		M-198 155mm TH	U.S.A.
1984		M-88 AR ARV	U.S.A.
1984		M-901 TOW APC	U.S.A.

Source: Arms Trade Registers, Arms Trade with the Third World, (SIPRI 1975)
SIPRI Yearbook 1971 to 1985.

TOTAL ARMS TRANSFER OF MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1976 - 1980

(in million current US \$)

Recipients	Total	Suppliers										
		USA	USSR	France	UK	West Germany	Czecho- slovakia	Italy	Poland	Swit- zerland	Yogosla- via	Others.
India	2800	50	2300	50	160	10	70	40	30	-	10	30
Pakistan	1100	220	20	390	20	50	-	10	-	-	-	350
Total :	3900	270	2320	440	180	60	70	50	30	-	10	380

Source : ACDA, Table III, p. 120.

A P P E N D I C E S

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY
THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN AT KARCHI,
May 19, 1954.

The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Pakistan.

Desiring to foster international peace and
security within the framework of the Charter of the
United Nations through measures which will further the
ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter to participate effectively in
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense
in support of these purposes and principles.;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full
cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations
with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to
participate in United Nations collective defense arrange-
ments and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal
regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate guar-
antee against violation or evasion;

Taking into consideration the support which the
Government of the United States has brought to these
principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949 as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of
1951, as amended;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed :

Article I

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory of supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder, or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this

assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area, or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or services received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregator assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, arm, agency, corporation, organisation or government.

Article II

The two governments will, upon request of either of them negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards.

Article III

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use

the later Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.

2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.

3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditure in Pakistan by, or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defense effort, including expenditures will be net of taxes.

Article IV

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be

accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan, operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective immediate deputies.

2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

Article V

1. The Government of Pakistan will:
 - (a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;
 - (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
 - (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
 - (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities; and
 - (e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other governments as the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

Article VI

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will co-operate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article I, paragraphs

3, 5 and 7, and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th day of May one thousand nine hundred and fifty four.

For the Government
of the
United States of America

For the Government
of Pakistan.

JOHN K. EMERSON
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the
United States of America

ZAFRULLAH KHAN
Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations

Source : Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. 379-83.

APPENDIX IITEXT OF 1959 MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN - COOPERATION

Agreement signed at Ankara March 5, 1959;

Entered into force March 5, 1959.

Agreement of cooperation between the Government of United States of America and the Government of Pakistan.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan.

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defense, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace, agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defense;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation making

that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the major committees of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955.

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan;

Recognising the authorisation of to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and

Considering that similar agreements are being entered

into by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran and Turkey, respectively,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as in envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.

Article II

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended and related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish

the Government of Pakistan such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

Article III

The Government of Pakistan undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Pakistan and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

Article IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the other Government associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

Article V

The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

Article VI

This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

For the Government of the United States of America:

SEAL

FLETCHER WARREN.

For the Government of Pakistan:

SEAL

SAYID M. HASSAN

Source: "Proposed US Assistance and Arms Transfer to Pakistan : An Assessment", Report of a Staff Study Mission to Pakistan and India, submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative (Washington : 20 November 1981).

Reported Resumption of Arms supply by USA to Pakistan
Statement of External Affairs Minister Sh. Y.B. Chavan
in Lok Sabha.

Government of India has received reports that the United States is considering the possibility of resuming arms supplies to Pakistan. Press despatches from Washington and Islamabad have also hinted that the 10-year old American arms embargo may be lifted and that the United States may supply sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. According to our information, this question was also discussed during Prime Minister Bhutto's official visit to Washington on 5th and 6th February although no decision has been announced.

The Government of India views the supply of American weapons to Pakistan with grave concern as it will have serious repercussions on the peace and stability of the sub-continent. We have taken up this matter with the U.S. Government at the highest level and have brought to its attention the consequences of the reversal of their present policy on the process of normalisation on the sub-continent. On 28th January, I addressed a letter to the Secretary of State on this subject and conveyed to him our deep concern about the harmful effects of arms supplies to Pakistan on the peace of this region well as on Indo-American relations

particularly emphasised that Pakistan fears about a military threat from India are wholly fanciful and unwarranted as both India and Pakistan are committed in the Simla Agreement to work for friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent and to settle all their differences through peaceful means.

It has always been India's policy to promote peace, stability, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations among the countries of this area on the basis of equality, sovereignty and respect for independence and territorial integrity of all States. Despite the unfortunate past, we have made special efforts to bring about normalisation and reconciliation with Pakistan. Thanks to these efforts, we have succeeded to some extent in improving relations between the two countries in spite of the slow progress in the implementation of the Simla Agreement. These hopeful trends will be jeopardised - and the promise of cooperation replaced by the spectre of confrontation - by an American decision to induct sophisticated weapons into the sub-continent. It will not only create new tensions between India and Pakistan but also revive old misgivings about the United States role in the region.

In recent months, both India and the United States have made sincere efforts to improve their relations. The Secretary of State himself stated while in India last year that the United States does not wish to encourage an arms race in the sub-continent. In view of the past history of the Indo-American relations, it is our earnest hope that the United States will carefully consider all implications its decision to supply weapons to Pakistan will have on the relations between our two countries. We also trust that the United States Government will not reverse its present policy of non-induction of weapons into the sub-continent as this could not be in the interests of the United States, India, Pakistan, or peace of this region.

Source: India, Lok Sabha Debates, 18th February, 1975.

Reported Resumption of Arms supply by USA to Pakistan

Statement of External Affairs Minister Sh. Y.E. Chavan in Rajya Sabha.

Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I am indeed grateful to hon. Members for giving me this second opportunity to discuss and express my views on this very important debate that is going on in the country about the arms supply to Pakistan by the U.S.A. Many Members have participated in it and different shades of national opinion from anxiety, concern, disappointment and regret to resentment, have been expressed. I see all shades of opinion expressed in this debate. And it is very heartening to see shades - Right, Centre and Left - are completely united in rejecting this policy, in disapproving of the policy decision taken by the United States in supplying arms - or in lifting the embargo on arms supply to Pakistan. I would not like to repeat the whole thing but I would like to give some background as to how it is that the whole situation came about. We know the history of the last few years, nearly ten years. At one time, America on its own decided that giving this sort of lethal arms either to India or Pakistan was not going to help peaceful conditions in the sub-continent; it was not that they completely stopped the supply of arms. Some are non-lethal and some lethal weapons. The

decision was that they would not give lethal weapons. But there was something in that system of arms supply by the imperial powers. Sometimes there are some compulsions which force them to make some sort of an exception because in 1970, they made some "one time exception" which ultimately resulted, as we know, in further belligerency and militant attitude which resulted in Pakistan's armed aggression against India. Admittedly, there was that tilt. Admittedly, there were certain positive results of what happened on the sub-continent. India emerged as a country which stood for justice, for the liberation of the oppressed people. Justice was on its side and the cause it supported was so just that it got victory. And having achieved a military victory, we took a series of initiatives and started a new process, on our own, of detente on the sub-continent, of understanding that without the interference of any of the big powers, it is better that we take our own initiatives, be liberal, be very generous, and try to remove the tensions in this area, because that is the only way of bringing about peace in the world. What exactly is detente process? Detente process is a position which would remove areas of tension, understanding the necessity and the compulsions of co-existence between two powers. This was exactly what was happening. and actually it was our intention. It was, I think,

the necessity of the time to see that the forces which interfered with this process of normalisation of relationship should also be neutralised, that they should also be encouraged to support this process, that powers which by interference always created this sort of an imbalance should be encouraged to support this policy. So, the genesis of the discussion with Dr Kissinger, really speaking arose out of this objective condition and of certain historical necessity, to which there was some response from the other side. That does not mean that we were deceived or somebody was trying to work out the theory of deception I am saying, at least we were not deceived;

I can assure not only Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, but also every other Member of this House that none of us was deceived. We know, I am not disclosing the discussions because that is not done. But I would like to tell this honourable House and the country that when we decided to sit down and discuss with them, we really wanted to find out what are the perceptions, intentions, of the Americans in Asia, in the sub-continent, in South East Asia, in the Gulf countries. What are their intentions about certain positive processes that they have started in this part of the world? What exactly is the significance

of the understanding of the new type of relationship that was built in Asia with China? Is it an understanding between U.S. and China? If it is then it is well and good because we wanted their relations to be good. But we certainly wanted to know whether it is going to be at the cost of any other nation, particularly we in this country. So we started those discussions. We wanted to understand as to what exactly is the position. Now I think it is a known fact that what Mr. Kissinger told us what he made in his public statements, we have also let it known. Anyhow, it seems that they are taking wrong decisions at wrong times or possibly right decisions at wrong times. I do not know what it is. But they decided, and I think it is a good thing that they decided before I went there; otherwise my going to Washington, immediately after the decision was taken, would have given a greater sense of disappointment or greater sense of being cheated-- I am glad to use a wrong word rather that way. Therefore, in that sense we are not deceived.

The point is what are we to do. We still want mature relationship with all the countries. We want mature relationship with the all countries. What we are trying to say is not merely a verbal protest, as my

hon'ble friend, Mr. Subramanian Swamy, is afraid to say. What we are trying to show is the fallacies of the policies that have been followed by these big powers. The arguments that they have given in support of what they have done are untenable, invalid....

Well, this is the way we use a word, and their incredibility is likely to be accepted in this country. And this is what Mr. T.N. Kaul says. Now let us take it argument by argument. They say, "Here is our ally. And we are in a very curious position. Here is our ally to whom the other countries are giving weapons". And then he saw that they did not give weapons. This is a rather very absurd argument that has been made for the last so many years by American statesmen, from President Eisen hower down to Mr. Kissinger, the present admin-
us
trator. Then they say that they wanted/to be their friends. Well these two things look rather contradictory.

They are also having friendship with China and they are also having detente. They want friendship with Russia and they also want friendship with India. Thus they want Pakistan as an ally. Ally against whom? They are very intelligent people and I am entitled to ask them the question. You want Pakistan as your ally, but ally

against whom.

The other point is that he openly said that they are not interested and they will not encourage arms race. Now they lift the embargo and tell us that they would like to supply arms to Pakistan in the interest of security to keep the strategic balance. Is it not encouraging the arm race? If not, what is it? Either your words have no meaning or those people who say and those people who listen do not understand. I really do not understand, it is very difficult. They said Pakistan feels insecure. Well, that is the subjective feeling of a country. But you must put some objective test for it. As a matter of fact, after the liberation of Bangladesh Pakistan may have contracted in its territory, but Pakistan has become more compact from the security point of view. From the point of view of arms strength from the point of view of man-power Pakistan is more powerful today than it was in 1971. It is a fact.

Source: India, Rajya Sabha, Debates Vol. 91, Nos. 11 & 20
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