

A Soviet Profile of Jawaharlal Nehru: 1947-58

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PREFACE

In this study we are concerned with one significant aspect of the Soviet framework for understanding national liberation movements on developing countries, i.e., the role of leadership. The attention and importance, the Soviet leadership paid to the leaders like Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno in this regard is well-known.

For an understanding of the leadership factor in Soviet policy towards developing countries, we have chosen the Soviet profile of Jawaharlal Nehru. Further, for a purposeful study it is confined to the period 1947-58. These years cover a well-defined period of Nehru's leadership in India, when it was at its glory; moreover, the period can also be regarded as the formative period of Indo-Soviet relationship.

The first chapter deals with the Soviet understanding of national liberation movements with special emphasis on the leadership factor. The second chapter deals with the Soviet view

of Nehru's role in international affairs which drew the attention of the Soviet leadership. In the third chapter the Soviet profile of Nehru as a nation builder and more particularly his socio-economic policies have been analysed. An overall profile of Nehru has been pictured in the conclusive chapter which is followed by an extended bibliography.

I would like to acknowledge my sincere gratitude to Prof. Zafar Imam, who supervised this work.


I remember with particular gratitude my former teacher at University of Jodhpur Dr. Dev Asopa, who gave me the very idea of joining this centre in Jawaharlal Nehru University. I am also thankful to Dr. Shams-Ud-Din for his help and encouragement.

Many of my friends helped me in one way or other. I am particularly thankful to Vinayak, Shahnaz, Pithamber, Jagdishwar and Himmat. I had a very useful discussion with Feroze regarding some of the economic issues involved in this work. I am also highly

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I will be failing in my duty, if I do not gratefully acknowledge the emotional encouragement and help I received from my family members and more particularly from my father.

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(ARIF N. SAMMA).

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CHAPTER I

SOVIET FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS - THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR

History has seen many famous and charismatic personalities who have contributed in the making of history. One can remember a number of such personalities, in our own times. As a matter of fact, scholars and opinion makers have been debating over the role and functions of such personalities - Monarchs, Generals, Social and Political thinkers and leaders of revolution and mass-movement.

Marxism-Leninism has also debated over this question. For the Soviet Union this debate has been of crucial importance. The role of Lenin as the leader of Russian Revolution and the Soviet State and later that of Stalin has further sharpened this debate inside and outside the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that in recent years quite a few leading Soviet Indologists e.g. R. Ulayanovsky have begun to bring in the role and functions of the leaders of developing countries in the national liberation movement.

MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE ROLE OF LEADERS:

In this study we are concerned with investigating a framework for Soviet view of leadership in the

developing countries; hence we propose to confine ourselves to specific aspects of the debate; needless to add that other relevant ideas and concepts will be taken into account as a point of reference.

Let us begin with a quick investigation of some of the essential features of Marxist-Leninist views on the question of leadership in a country or movement; as such an exercise will lead us to an understanding of a Soviet framework applicable to this question.

Marxism rejects the notion that history is made by 'great personalities' - kings, military leaders, statesmen, while the people, the working people, have no role at all to play in the development of society. Marx ridiculed the understanding of the motive forces of history on these lines and analysed this question on the basis of historical materialism. Proceeding from the Marxist understanding that the mode of producing material goods is the foundation of society's life and development and that working people are the main productive force, historical materialism maintains that the working people are the actual makers of history.

This understanding does not mean to ignore the individual's role in history. Masses should not be

viewed in isolation with individuals. The masses consist of millions of people, of concrete individuals. Every person has his individuality, i.e., his own character, temperament, psychology, perception and attitude towards his surroundings. Social quality of a person is more important than his biological or physical, as the "essence of a 'particular personality' is not its beard, its blood, its abstract physical character, but its social quality."¹ A person's individuality, his qualities, his perception depends much on the society and his environment: the totality of diverse social relations is reflected in an individual's qualities. "The essence of man", wrote Marx, "is no abstraction inherent in each single individual, in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."²

Though Marxism gives prominence to the activities of the people in historical development; it has never rejected or denied the role of really outstanding personalities in history. Lenin noted that "the

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1. K. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol.3 (Moscow, 1975), p.21.
 2. K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol.5, p.4.

idea of historical necessity does not in the least undermine the role of the individual in history: all history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures."³

But while recognizing the importance of individual's 'thoughts and feelings' in history, Lenin, like Marx, put the following queries: "But what determines these 'thoughts and feelings'?" Can one seriously support the view that they arise accidentally and do not follow necessarily from the given social environment, which serves as the material, the object of the individual's spiritual life, and is reflected in his "thoughts and feelings" positively or negatively, in the representation of the interest of one social class or another?"⁴

Lenin, while maintaining that masses play the decisive role in history, knew that in order to be successful in class struggle, masses form their organizations and parties which are headed by their most experienced and energetic representatives. This prompted Lenin to say that: "Not a single class in

3. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.I, p.159.

4. Ibid., p.405.

history has achieved power without producing its political leaders, its prominent representatives able to organise a movement and lead it."⁵

No one can deny the role of Marx and Engels who turned socialism from a utopia into a science with profound socio-economic analysis. Lenin, on the other hand, translated socialism into practice and established the first socialist state. Engels very rightly noted about Marx: "Marx stood higher, saw further, and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us - Without him the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name."⁶

While discussing the role of a individual or leader in Marxist framework one cannot ignore Plekhanov's writings about this question. He was one of the leading Marxists who paid great attention to this problem. While reacting to a reply given by N.K. Mikhailovsky to the publication of Kablitz's article in his "Literacy Notes for 1878" - Plekhanov

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5. V.I. Lenin, "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement", Collected Works, vol.4, p.370.
 6. K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, in three volumes, vol.3, p.361.

wrote about his attacks against dialectical materialism, wherein "he (Mikhailovsky) saw a doctrine which sacrificed to the economic 'factor' all the others and reduced to nil the role of individual in history".⁷ Plekhanov noticed the heated controversy among German historians of late on the subject of history's great men. Some considered them as chief and sole driving force of historical development, while others reviewed historical science not only in the context with activities of great men and political history but with the totality of historical life.

Plekhanov after following this debate admitted that individuals can influence the fate of society by virtue of definite traits of theirs. However, like Marx and Lenin, he cautioned that "An individual's character is factor in social development only where, when, and to the extent that social relations permit it to be. He further said that whatever the qualities of a particular individual may be, he cannot eliminate the given economic relation of the latter corresponding

7. G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, (Progress, 1978), pp.283-84.

to a definite state of the productive force. However, "the individuals personal qualities make them more or less fit to meet the social needs which spring from definite economic relations or to present their being met".⁸ He gave the example of France, where, at the end of eighteenth century the replacement of absolute political institutions by new ones was of urgent social need and those public figures were the most outstanding and useful at the time who were more capable than others of helping meet the pressing need.⁹

The essence of his article "Individual and his role in history", can be summarised as that the personal qualities of leaders determine the individual features of historical events and the element of chance always has some part to play in the course of those events, whose direction is ultimately determined by what are termed overall causes, i.e., the productive forces.

Soviet Union itself faced a phase wherein role of a personality, i.e. of Stalin, generated debate.

8. Ibid., p.306.

9. Ibid.

The 20th Congress of CPSU categorically warned against 'personality cult', a tendency noticed during Stalin era. While it admired Stalin's positive role in the building up of socialism in Soviet Union, his negative traits and disregard for collectivity in decision making were denounced. Stalin's case is a unique one. With his extraordinary vision and qualities he fought a successful war with 'Nazism' and later in a remarkably short period rebuild the Soviet economy which was heavily ruined during the war. However, the other side of his personality i.e. desire to exercise excessive rights single handly etc., brought a bad name to the socialist countries.

In brief, one can say that Marxism-Leninism gives no less importance to leadership and role of personalities in history.

Soviet Union's Attitude towards
National Liberation Movements
and its leaders

Let us now attempt and corelate the above essentials with the specific framework which may be relevant for our purpose.

The national liberation movement has always been of the prime interest to the Soviet-Union and its leadership. Since the very establishment of the Soviet state, its leaders had laid the foundation of the Soviet policy of support and encouragement to national liberation movement in the east, then beginning to struggle for its emancipation from colonialism and semi-colonialism.

As the Soviet understanding of national liberation movement has its roots in Marxism, it is logical to begin with, what the founders of Marxism had said, national, colonial questions. The manifesto of the Communist Party written in 1848 set forth general ideas by showing that the concepts "nation" and "national" were products of the era of the rise of capitalism and were closely related to two hostile classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

It is true that Marx's and Engels's study on the question of national liberation movement was primarily Euro-centric, but one can find that they were not unaware of the changes and developments taking place outside Europe and subsequently their influence on the 'European Scene'. The Leninist

concept of unity between the proletariat's struggle in Europe and the liberation struggle of the oppressed people of the East had some roots in Marx's study on India where he clearly wrote "the Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself, the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw-off the English yoke altogether."¹⁰ Similarly, "With the drain of men and bullion which it must cost the English, India is now our best ally", wrote Marx to Engels in 1858."¹¹

Marx and Engels looked at the question of national liberation movement in association with the objective of the class struggle of workers. They regarded the national movements against reaction and absolutism as an aid to the revolutionary proletariat. In their selective approach they upheld only those national movements which were directed against counter revolutionary forces. They had a proletarian class criterion

10. K. Marx and F. Engels, On Colonialism, (Moscow, 1978), p.85.

11. Ibid., p.319.

regarding the proletariat's interests as paramount.

Keeping this guideline under consideration, it was Lenin who further studied this subject and advocated 'the right of self-determination for all nations comprising the state'. Lenin shared the basic hostility of Marxism to nationalism but it did not stop him from recognizing the historical legitimacy of national movements. In an article "The Right of Nations to self-determination", he wrote, "the bourgeoisie nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support".¹² He wrote appreciatively about the Persian revolution of 1905, the Young-Turk Movement of Turkey and the general strike in Bombay in protest against Tilak's imprisonment. He saw the colonial world as a cause of revolutionary upheaval of the whole capitalist system and as a paramount factor in revolutionary strategy during the imperial epoch. He realized the historical progressive nature of rising bourgeoisie in Asian countries and warned against

12. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works (in three volumes), vol.1, (Moscow, 1977), p.581.

equating it to that of western bourgeoisie. This led him to develop and advocate the relationship between the proletariat's struggle in the west and the nationalist movement of former colonies and sub-colonies. Lenin perceptively saw in the national liberation movement a powerful force for revolutionary struggle against capitalism and an objective ally of the revolutionary working class in the advanced capitalist countries. He did not object to the slogan "workers of all countries and all oppressed peoples, united."¹³

After the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin had to face new challenges which, over the course of time reshaped his earlier stance. Immediately after capturing power, the new government recognised the independence of Poland, Finland and other Baltic states, thus implementing the principle of self-determination in action. However, practically speaking, it would have been too harsh to implement this principle in other parts like Central Asia. The new Soviet government had to, first of all, consolidate

13. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.31, p.453.

their power in the light of imperialist's threats of intervention and civil war with counter-revolutionaries. It forced them to rethink and modify their stand and Stalin, as the Commissioner of Nationalities, explained the new policy. "All this pointed to the necessity of implementing the principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the cause of socialism."¹⁴ Later, the Eighth Party Congress approved the principle of self-determination from the class-historical angle which took into consideration the stage of historical development of the given nation, whether it was evolving from medievalism to bourgeois democracy and from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy.

However, the new government continued supporting and encouraging various bourgeois-nationalist movements in the former colonies and sub-colonies. Lenin visualised the idea of a United anti-imperialist front of the Soviet republics, the proletariat in the Western countries and the oppressed peoples of the East, and stressed the need for communists to support

14. J.V. Stalin, Works, vol.IV, (Moscow, 1953), p.33.

the bourgeois democratic national liberation movements in the colonies, at the same time maintaining the independence of the proletarian movement. But here arose debate and questions as to the limits to which communists could support the bourgeois democratic movements, to which Lenin replied, "In so far as the bourgeois of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always, in every case, and more strongly than any one else, in favour, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression. But insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for its own bourgeois nationalism, we stand against. We stand against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation."¹⁵

Soviets revealed increasing interest in revolutionary upsurges in the East as in Europe the working class could not complete its task; Spartacist and Leftist movements in Germany were crushed brutally, dashing the hopes of world revolution. Comintern provided a worthy platform for

15. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.20, pp.411-12.

further debates and discussions on the liberation movements. Lenin maintained a objective and consistent approach to national liberation movements. Lenin warned against speeding up events, against making the socialist revolution an immediate issue, against unrealistic desire of achieving hegemony on a national scale and against such 'weak communist movement' setting themselves in opposition to an anti-imperialist movement led by bourgeois democrats. On the other hand, he urged for an alliance with it, support for its democratic demands, at the same time criticising the limited nature of bourgeois leadership, preserving the class interests of the people.

It is interesting to note that the question of leadership in the national liberation movement began to draw attention from the Soviet leadership since the Second Congress of Comintern held in 1920. For instance, Lenin differed with M.N. Roy on the role of Gandhi in the Indian National Movement. According to Roy, Lenin believed that Gandhi as the inspirer and leader of the anti-imperialist movement objectively, was playing a revolutionary role. In response Roy said that Indian nationalism of the "Gandhi School"

being anti-imperialist, nonetheless was not objectively revolutionary in so far as it denied the inevitability of capitalist development.¹⁶

Further, from the corrections Lenin made in the draft of Roy's supplementary thesis on the National and Colonial questions, it is revealed that Lenin paid importance to bourgeois democratic leadership. He removed the beginning of seventh thesis: "the revolutionary movement in the colonies is essentially an economic struggle. The bourgeois-democratic National Movement is limited to the small intermediate structures which does not reflect popular aspirations. Without active popular support the national emancipation of the colonies will never be attained. But in many countries, especially India, the masses do not follow bourgeois nationalist leaders."¹⁷ Similarly Lenin also crossed out another part of that thesis where it said "...but the Communist International should not seek in them (the bourgeois-democratic elements) means for granting aid to revolutionary

16. A. Reznikov, The Comintern and the East, (Moscow, 1978), p.70.

17. Ibid., p.62.

movement in the colonies... The masses do not put their faith in the political leaders who constantly lead them astray and restrain them from revolutionary action."¹⁸

During the inter-war period the Comintern, in its various Congresses, of course, devoted its attention entirely to analysing the role of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation movements as well as the policies and programmes of the Communist Movement. The specific question of the role of the leaders in the national liberation movements was not really taken into account. However, trends began to appear for looking at the national liberation movements also in terms of leadership.

This trend continued right after the II World War, even when the world colonial system had begun to disintegrate. Although, initially the Soviet leadership was sceptical about the role of the leaders of newly independent countries, later, as the developing countries began organising themselves

18. Ibid.

under the non-aligned movement and their role was felt in international politics, the Soviet leadership began to show interest in their leaders. Some notable leaders of the Non-alignment Movement during the fifties like Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno were especially marked by the Soviet Union.

In the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an old Comintern hand, Otto Kussinnen, expressed satisfaction that Khrushchev and Bulganin acknowledged the prominent role played in the history of the Indian people by Gandhi during their tour to India.¹⁹ He said, "By so doing comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin actually took the initiative in correcting those sectarian errors which have been found reflection in recent years in some of the statements made by Soviet orientalists and in publication of the Communist International solely on the basis of criticism of Gandhi's philosophical views which, as is known, are at

19. Bulganin while speaking at a Public meeting at Bombay on November 24, 1955 said, "You had an outstanding leader who did much for your country. I am speaking of Mahatma Gandhi... We pay due tribute to his memory... We, Lenin's pupils, do not share Gandhi's philosophical views, but we consider him an outstanding leader who did much for the development of peace loving attitude in your people and for the struggle for independence." (Cited in Zafar Imam, op. cit., p.93.)

great variance with the views of Marxism and Leninism. Some of our publicists were so one-sided that they totally denied that Gandhi played a positive role in history".²⁰ Similarly, recalling the evaluation of the role of the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries by the 6th Comintern Congress he declared: "This evaluation had a tinge of sectarianism even when these theses were worked out. Under the changed conditions of the present day and now that the prestige of the Soviet Union has greatly increased, this evaluation does not at all reflect the real situation."²¹

In recent years a number of Soviet scholars and official pronouncements have focussed attention on this question. Admitting the role played by Gandhi in politicising broad masses in a backward country, Rostislav Ulyanovsky writes, "the most dangerous illusion in Afro-Asian societies is that the consciousness of an ordinary worker or any down-trodden person is a blacksheet on which the revolutionary

20. Cited in Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia, (Kalyani, 1975), p.138.

21. Ibid., pp.138-39.

propagandist can put any idea he likes... To draw him into the struggles for radical social transformations, he must be put in a situation of daily struggle for aims and ideals he already understand. This, incidentally, is something to be learned from Gandhi who had a deep understanding of the ideals that were accessible and understandable to the common people."²²

Writing about the Gandhian concepts like Sarvodaya, Satyagraha etc., Ulyanovsky wrote that despite its clearly utopian and archaic character "it (Gandhian) inspired broad section of the rural and urban population with the belief that the struggle for independence from British rule was of vital importance, for it was at the same time the struggle for social justice, for a new society based on principles which they longed to see realized."²³

Similarly the Soviets, right from the beginning and especially after Nehru's role in the league

22. R. Ulyanovsky, Present Day Problems in Asia and Africa, (Moscow, 1980), p.133.

23. Ibid., p.165.

against imperialism, considered him as the leader of the left-wing of Indian National Congress who actively shaped INC's economic and foreign policies. "The formation in the Congress of the left-wing led by Nehru and Subhash Bose, who were in of a more active struggle against imperialism and stood closer to the popular movement, was a great factor in furthering the development of the National Congress and in maintaining its influence on the working masses who were dissatisfied with the policy of the Congress leadership."²⁴

From the above discussion it can easily be seen that the role and function of leaders in the national liberation movements is considered by the Soviets as crucial. These are viewed as interlinked and dependent with the very nature and socio-economic structure of the national liberation movement. The leaders are seen not above and out of national liberation movements, but arising from it. They are deeply influenced by the very nature of national liberation movements and yet they set the pace of its development, progressive or otherwise.


24. V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, A Contemporary History of India, (New Delhi, 1964), p.166.

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CHAPTER II

SOVIET VIEW OF NEHRU'S FOREIGN POLICY

A study of Soviet view of Nehru's foreign policy becomes important because it was primarily Nehru's foreign policy and his role in international affairs which attracted Soviet leadership. This study is useful for some other reasons. Firstly, it will lead us to see how Soviet understanding of a newly liberated country's foreign policy developed. Secondly, it will lead us to investigate how Soviet attitude developed and changed towards non-aligned policy, in general, which Nehru effectively pursued after independence. Finally, it will lead us to see how Nehru's role in world affairs, his position on various issues like colonialism, racism and disarmament etc. played a crucial role in shaping the overall Soviet perception of developing countries' role in world arena which was earlier grossly ignored.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEHRU'S WORLD VIEW:

Before analysing the Soviet view of Nehru's foreign policy it will be proper to see how Nehru's

world-view developed. As a matter of fact, the development of Nehru's world outlook coincided with the mutual admiration of and sympathy for each other. His stay, in Europe during 1926-27, provided enough opportunities to meet many revolutionaries, non-communists and other statesmen. His participation in the Brussels Conference of the League against Imperialism, further widened his world outlook. It helped him to come out from strong nationalistic feelings and see events in the global perspective. He realised that India's struggle cannot be viewed in isolation with other powerful forces who were determined to make changes in the world arena. Brussels Congress provided him an opportunity to understand various dimensions of imperialism. Nehru spoke in no uncertain terms about the dangers of imperialism. He declared that India's problem was "not only a national problem but it directly affects a great number of other countries, and... is of world-wide interest because it is directly affected by the greatest and most influential imperialism of our time..."

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1. Cited in Vinod Bhatia, Jawaharlal Nehru and the making of Indo-Soviet Relations 1917-47, (New Delhi, 1981), p.54.

Another important aspect of his stay in Europe and participation in Brussels Conference was that he became more and more convinced of 'socialism' and an admirer of Soviet Union. Many of his doubts disappeared as he talked to people who had been to Soviet Union.²

Inconsistency on the part of the European Socialists on various issues of imperialism and colonialism, especially in relation to India, generated strong anti-imperialist current in his mental outlook and admiration for Soviet Union.³ Later he strongly urged the Indian National Congress to associate with the league against Imperialism as it would help INC to maintain relation with other 'fighting people' and imperial forces. It is, indeed, interesting to note that whereas Lenin found 'nationalism' of colonies and semi-colonies as a powerful ally of communist movement in general

2. Special mention may be made of one Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, called simply Chatto, with whom Nehru discussed various problems of the national liberation. Chatto gave him the 'true story' of Soviet Russia. See A. Gorev and V. Zimyanin, Jawaharlal Nehru, (Moscow, 1982), pp.103-6.

3. For details, see Vinod Bhatia, op. cit., pp.56-57.

and Soviet Union in particular, Nehru recognized Soviet Union and working movements all over the world as forces needed for liberating people in their fight against colonial masters.

After attending 'Brussels Congress' he visited Soviet Union along with his father in connection with celebrations for the Tenth Anniversary of 'October Revolution'. The newspaper 'Pravda', on 5 November 1927, announcing the forthcoming visit of Nehru's to the Soviet Union, addressed Jawaharlal Nehru as the leader of the left wing of Indian National Congress.⁴ He was highly impressed by what he saw in Soviet Union; "I must confess", he wrote, "that the impressions I carried back with me from Moscow were very favourable and all my reading has confirmed those impressions although there is much that I do not understand and much that I do not like or admire."⁵

His favourable impressions of Soviet Union led him to study more about Marxism and back at

4. A. Gorev, V. Zimyanin, op. cit., p.109.

5. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and Impressions, (Bombay, 1949), p.34.

home, he constantly nurtured friendly postures towards Soviet Union, which quite frequently agitated some of the top most leaders of Congress. Even Gandhi never encouraged his 'developing socialist outlook'. During the Second World War, Nehru consistently campaigned against the Nazi and Fascist threat to the entire humanity of the world and voiced his concern, particularly about the fate of Soviet Union. In a letter to Maulana Azad he wrote: "It would be a tragedy if Soviet Russia was crippled and weakened by a war against her, for then the only powerful opponent of imperialism would be removed."

Nehru's positive role during the war and the overall sympathy of Indian people with Soviet Russia, brought in turn, Soviet sympathy for the cause of India's freedom struggle. Even while the war was still on, the Soviet Foreign Minister announced the Soviet position at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations in April 1945 "We have at this conference", he said, "an Indian delegation, but India is not an independent state. We all know that the time will come when the voice of an independent

India will be heard too."⁶

On the other hand, it was mainly Nehru's role in world affairs and his guidance to Indian National Congress regarding imperialism, colonialism etc. which shaped Soviet understanding of national liberation movement in India and its anti-imperialist approach.

Let us see how against such an extremely favourable record, critical and negative Soviet view prevailed immediately before and after India's achievement of independence. Here it is worthwhile to take notice of the circumstances and constraints which influenced Soviet attitudes and policies towards colonies, semi-colonies and subsequently new countries. After fighting successfully in the Second World War, Soviet Russia faced new challenges internally as well as externally. Soviet economy had to rebuild so that it could advance once again the process of building 'socialism' in one country;

6. Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-1972: A Documentary History, (Delhi, 1973), p.24.

and meet the defence challenges. But more important was the beginning of the cold war. In response to Churchill's call to fight the 'growing challenges of communism', the American President, Truman, proclaimed 'Truman Doctrine' and put forward Marshall plan for Western Europe. These events led Stalin to consolidate the gains in Eastern Europe which had been brought about after the war in favour of Soviet Russia. The formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization further intensified the cold war. A process of encirclement of Soviet Union began with the US military bases in Pacific, Japanese islands, Philippines and even in South and South East islands. Soviet Union found herself surrounded by an extremely hostile environment - as if "it was almost a return to the situation of 1917-1921 when the new Soviet state tenaciously fought the 'capitalist encirclement' single hand, the same psychosis prevailed upon the Soviet leadership in 1947-49.⁷ This psychosis led Stalin to proceed very carefully

7. Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia, (Kalyani, 1975), p.24.

and cautiously in his internal and external policies. With the establishment of Comintern he tried to get support from the other communist parties. In that crucial period he did not try to enlist the support of emerging nationalism of the colonies and semi-colonies. He totally rejected this emergent nationalism which had been termed by Lenin as historically progressive. That is why the Soviet leadership failed to grasp the historical significance of the emergence of India as a free country and made critical remarks about its leaders, Nehru and Gandhi.

Soviet Union's mistrust of the Indian independence and its leadership should be seen in respect of India's early foreign policy, when Nehru joined the interim government. Although immediately after joining the interim government he showed keen interest in establishing relations with the Soviet Union and directed Krishna Menon to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Molostov despite "British Government's efforts to persuade Nehru against such meeting",⁸

8. Zafar Imam, "Sidelights on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between India and the USSR: 1946-47", in Vinod Bhatia, ed., Indo-Soviet Relations - Problems & Prospects, (New Delhi, 1984), pp.26-27.

Britain was still formally controlling India. There was direct links between all the Departments of the Government of India and India Office in London and Viceroy in Delhi. The cold treatment given by Soviet Union to India to its leader Nehru's policies during 1945-47 was due to, apart from other reasons, the deliberate attempt of British diplomacy towards the USSR until August 1947, to create the impression in Moscow and elsewhere that India, notwithstanding its promised freedom, was and would continue to be in Britain's sphere of interest and influence and the Soviets had no business to challenge them in Asia.⁹ The attitude of Indian delegation in the 1946 U.N. General Assembly Session increased Soviet-mistrust as it took sides with western countries on all important issues; however in September-October on Nehru's initiatives on 'racist discriminatory policy in South Asia' which received Soviet support. Similarly, the top British bureaucracy in the Foreign Department of the Government of India played a negative role by "creating an extremely

9. Ibid., pp.29-30.

hostile environment to Nehru's emerging policy towards the USSR".¹⁰ However, despite all this, a press communique issued in New Delhi on April 13, 1947, announced the agreement of the countries to establish diplomatic ties at ambassadorial level. A favourable response came in the form of interpreting it as "a sign that India was moving towards a independent policy".¹¹

However, soon this favourable response lost its importance as Soviet mistrust of Indian leadership gained a new momentum in the light of the heightened cold war. Nehru's decision to continue with the Commonwealth and his approval of Mountbatten as the first Governor-General of India further hardened Soviet attitude towards India and its leader Nehru. Critical remarks were made on these issues until 1948.¹² By the end of 1947, Balabushevik wrote a article in which India, along with Pakistan, was

10. Ibid., p.32.

11. New Times, April 18, 1947.

12. For example, see New Times, August 4, 1948.

regarded as an integral part of Anglo-American-machinations against the Soviet Union.¹³ This attitude more or less continued till 1950-51.

Nehru's reaction to the Soviet Policy towards India during this phase can best be seen in a letter he wrote to Krishna Menon on 26 June 1948, "We want friendship and cooperation with Russia in many fields but we are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down. The whole basis of Russian policy appears to be that no essential change has taken place in India and that we still continue to be camp-followers of the British. That of course is complete non-sense and if a policy is based on non-sensical premises it is apt to go wrong."¹⁴ Nehru was correct, as later in early fifties and more especially after Stalin's death a marked change entered into the Soviet view of India.

Before we make a further study of Soviet-view of Nehru's foreign policy postures and his role in

13. Zafar Imam, op. cit., n.7, p.39.

14. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol.I, (New Delhi, 1984), p.45.

world-affairs, it will be proper to highlight India's foreign policy as pursued by Nehru after independence. As a matter of fact, Indian foreign policy was formulated and developed primarily by Nehru himself, who was also in-charge of External Affairs ministry. Whereas in domestic field he faced many objections and differed with other Congressmen like Sardar Patel, the Indian foreign policy was 'Nehru's private monopoly'.¹⁵ However, Gandhi and Patel tried to influence Nehru and interfered in the carrying out of foreign policy in some practical issues like Pakistan or Kashmir or any other major foreign policy issue.¹⁶

Nehru had made it clear at the very outset that India would pursue an independent policy in foreign affairs. This policy which is now known as 'non-aligned', was designed to suit India's own interest. Foreign policy for Nehru was also a way

15. Y. Nasenko, Jawaharlal Nehru and India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1977), pp.12-13; also see M. Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, (London, 1961), abridged edition, p.216.

16. Y. Nasenko, op. cit., p.13.

of safeguarding India's newly won freedom, "what does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hands into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent".¹⁷

As the head of a newly liberated country, he was primarily concerned as to how to consolidate the newly won political freedom. He wanted to build the economy which was ruined by the Britishers. For that purpose, political stability and safe boundaries were needed. India was facing problem over Kashmir with Pakistan. Nehru needed assistance from all countries, be it western or socialist. So logically she had to avoid joining any military bloc. Thus, this policy of non-alignment was the best possible alternative and was favourable for any country emerging free from colonial enslavement. As S. Gopal writes, non-alignment was not a "product of

17. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, (Delhi, 1961), p.240.

Nehru's whims but the expression of the state of mind, prevalent among the newly free countries of Asia after the Second World War".¹⁸ Similarly, while writing about the historical background of Non-alignment, another Indian scholar wrote that non-aligned policy "was generally the result of the experience of the Asian and African countries during the period of their struggle for freedom and not something contrived suddenly on the morrow of independence in order to meet the contingency created by the cold war."¹⁹

India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development provided "powerful inducements to the policy of non-alignment."²⁰ Nehru knew very well that unless India becomes a strong country, its voice will not be heard in the world, "Indeed it is the internal state of affairs of a country that enables it to speak with some strength, force

18. S. Gopal, The Mind of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Madras, 1980), p.35.

19. Bimal Prasad, "Historical Background of Non-Alignment", International Studies, (New Delhi), vol.20, Number 1-2, Jan-June 1981, p.13.

20. M. Brecher, op. cit., p.213.

and authority in the international sphere."²¹

Adherence to Non-alignment did not mean that India could not cooperate with or be more friendly to some countries more than others in regard to her own interests. One example of this was Nehru's decision to retain the membership of Commonwealth, which "was not the result of Nehru's liking for all things British".²² He realised the political advantage of continuing link with the Commonwealth. Neighbouring Soviet Union showed complete apathy towards free India. Immediately after independence, Nehru faced serious problems inside and outside the borders; added to it was the rebellious attitude of Communist Party of India with the Soviet encouragement. This, taken with Jinnah's efforts to tease India out of the Commonwealth"²³ and India's military weakness and economic dependence, convinced Nehru of the efficacy of remaining in the organisation.

21. Jawaharlal Nehru, n.17, p.65.

22. S. Gopal, The Mind of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Madras, 1980), pp.36-37.

23. Ibid., p.37.

Though India's membership of Commonwealth aroused much criticism in Soviet Union,²⁴ it is important to see how Nehru was able to utilise this platform, while maintaining India's non-aligned policy, he "converted it into one of the great junctions of world affairs and harnessed it in support of his China and Korea policies."²⁵ His analysis of the world affairs used to be heard with respect in the Commonwealth. He stressed the need for a clearer understanding of the new situation in Asia and Africa. He expressed his conviction that death of Stalin had changed Soviet policies, and reminded the other Prime Ministers that their distrust of the Soviet Union and China was matched by the distrust in those two countries of the United States. When Nehru criticized the

24. T.N. Kaul recalls how he along with Chandralekha, eldest daughter of Mrs. Vijaylakshmi Pandit drafted a telegram to the Prime Minister to get out of the Commonwealth with various reasons. Mrs. Pandit (who was then, Indian ambassador to Soviet Union) approved and sent it off, but Nehru had to keep wider consideration in mind than mere reaction of the Soviet Government and rejected the recommendation. T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi, 1979), p.11.

25. S. Gopal, n.18, p.38.

British government's policy in East Africa and assured the people of Kenya of India's sympathy, Lord Swinton, the British Commonwealth Secretary objected that it was interference in British domestic interests. Nehru wrote a strong worded letter, "Our Government is not used to being addressed in this way by any Government and I can only conclude that he has for the moment forgotten that he is addressing the independent Republic of India, ...we are not prepared to change these principles and policies because of any pressure exercised on us by an outside authority."²⁶

Nehru kept this basic spirit of non-aligned policy alive and pressure could never prevent him from putting India's position in clear-cut terms. After his visit to the United States where he was given a very warm friendly welcome, and some of his speeches were interpreted as anti-Soviet, relations with that country became worse. The attitude of the United States and Britain towards Kashmir irked

26. S. Gopal, op. cit., vol.II, p.168.

him and he believed that Pakistan was given encouragement by these two countries. When Americans welcomed Liaqat Ali Khan effusively in May 1950 Nehru got irritated and wrote to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, "I must say that the Americans are either very naive or singularly lacking in intelligence. They go through the identical routine whether it is Nehru or the Shah of Iran or Liaqat Ali... All this lessens the value of their fervent ^{te}pro_^stations and the superlatives they use. A superlative used too often ceases to have any meaning. Having been trained in a school of more restrained language and action, I am afraid I do not appreciate this kind of thing."²⁷

By the end of 1950 he had become the most respected leader from Asia in world affairs. He tried his best to unite Asian countries. One of the major attentions Nehru paid in his foreign policy was to develop and maintain good relations with China. He supported People's Republic of China's entry into security council. He thought that China and India could play a significant role

27. Ibid., p.63.

in world affairs. It was due to Nehru's firmness that China was invited in the Bandung Conference even when Britain and the United States did not like it." For us to be told, therefore, that the United States and the United Kingdom will not like the inclusion of China in the Afro-Asian Conference is not very helpful. In fact, it is somewhat irritating. There are many things that the United States and the United Kingdom have done which we do not like at all."²⁸

In brief, the basic features of Nehru foreign policy - it was primarily for India's self-interest; and non-aligned was not to be confused with passivity. On the other hand, Nehru wanted a greater role for India in world affairs and non-aligned policy was considered to be fit for that.

Soviet View of Nehru's
Foreign Policy

"The writing of contemporary history is at best a tentative and uncertain task. But the writing

28. Ibid., p.233.

of current history in the Soviet Union, as exemplified by Russian studies of Indian political history, has revealed itself as extremely more hazardous, not because of the unearthing of new documents or memoirs, but because of the frequent shifts in the Soviet political line",²⁹ writes Donaldson. He, as a matter of fact, is right, especially when we analyse Soviet view of India's foreign policy. However, it is disagreeable that 'shifts' are something inherent in Soviet understanding. There is a need to understand why a shift came in Soviet understanding of Nehru's foreign policy in early fifties and what were the factors responsible for their earlier negative attitude during 1947-51. It has already been discussed, India also shared responsibility with Nehru's early foreign policy moves for the misunderstanding and passive phase between the two countries immediately after India gained independence.

After the Second World War, Soviet Union paid primary importance to economic restoration

29. R.H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy towards India: Ideology and Strategy, (Cambridge, 1974), p.101.

of the country and strengthening the East European countries. Later, she could not pay adequate attention to the newly independent nations because of her preoccupation with the Cold War. Two camp theory was followed: imperialist and anti-imperialist. The non-aligned stature of newly independent countries was given no importance. Fear psychosis prevalent in the Soviet Union "precluded an understanding of the finesse of Nehru's emotionally surcharged verbal exposition of India's embryonic policy of non-alignment."³⁰

However, in the following years, the newly free countries and more especially India, demonstrated their importance in the international relations. They showed desire to work for peace, anti-colonialism anti-racialism etc. Soviet Union could not remain blind to their importance in contrast to some other newly free countries, joining the western sponsored military blocs.

30. Zafar Imam, "Soviet of Non-Alignment", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.20, No.1-2, Jan-June 1981, p.445.

Apart from an objective analysis of the role of these countries in the changed international relations; the internal stability of Soviet system, its gaining of nuclear-technology favoured a more 'fearless' approach to developing countries. The ignoring of these countries by the Soviet Union was forcing them to the western-bloc which alarmed the Soviet policy makers. They "realized that to dub Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno as mere tools of imperialism was to ignore good opportunities to undermine western influence and outflank western diplomacy in the Third World."³¹

Korean crisis provided Nehru an opportunity to show his 'active' non-aligned policy. After, initially supporting the U.N. General Assembly resolution terming North Korea an aggressor later, "Nehru disliked the hustling which was then attempted and which hindered his effort to persuade Russia and China to help in localizing the conflict in

31. V.S. Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent, (Bombay, 1973), p.82.

Korea."³² Nehru's personal message to Stalin about his peace plans for ending the Korean conflict was welcomed and Stalin sent a quick reply to Nehru, "I welcome your peaceful initiative. I fully share your point of view as regards the expediency of peaceful settlement of the Korean question..."³³ Nehru also sent messages to America and Britain. "One must stress that", Nasenko wrote, "these messages, just as the previous decision of the Indian Government to recognize the Chinese People's Republic, "were significant evidence of India's increasingly independent role in world politics."³⁴

Official recognition for Nehru's efforts came when, in a speech to the supreme Soviet Premier, Malenkov, praised India's contribution to peace: "In the efforts of the peace-loving countries directed towards ending the Korean war India made a significant contribution".³⁵ Soviets

32. S. Gopal, op. cit., vol.II, p.101.

33. Zafar Imam, n.7, p.48.

34. Y. Nasenko, op. cit., p.107.

35. Pravda, August 9, 1953.

got yet one more occasion to realize India's strength when in the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, Molotov was highly impressed by Indian representative Krishna Menon and his backstage negotiations. Molotov proposed India's name for the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Commission to supervise the ceasefire in Indo-China.

One of the hallmarks of Nehru's non-aligned policy was the adoption of Panchsheel (Five Principles), which were to govern mutual relations between two states.³⁶ These five Principles were:

- i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- ii) Mutual non-aggression;
- iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and
- v) Peaceful coexistence.

36. They were first adopted in April 1954, when a treaty was signed between India and China at New Delhi.

These 'Five Principles' received favourable response from Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet recommended adoption of the Panchsheela (as agreed between India and China) by the rest of the world; "as the observance of these principles on which a number of states such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and India already based their relation with other countries would guarantee the peaceful coexistence of states with different social and political system".³⁷ On the other hand, Nehru's condemnation of colonialism, support given to reactionary regimes by the western powers and the United States' proposal to give military aid to Pakistan were given prominence in the press.³⁸

By the end of 1954, Soviet Union accepted Nehru as the most potential spokesman of the 'Third World', actively participating in world affairs.³⁹ Nehru's role in Bandung Conference heightened

37. New Times, no.7, 1955, Supplement, p.13.

38. For example, see "Address by Nehru in Kalyani", CDSP, March 10, 1954 (vol.VI, No.4), p.15.

39. Y. Nosenko titled the chapter in his book, Jawaharlal Nehru and India's Foreign Policy, covering the period 1954-1955 as "Emergence of India's Positive Neutrality policy".

India's prestige at large. Though Nehru spoke against Cominform in that conference, it could not stop the Soviets from showering praise on him. One particular problem was solved only because of Nehru; the definition of colonialism. India and the other co-sponsors had desired a mild condemnation of Western colonialism. But the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelewala called for "opposition to all forms of colonialism, to Soviet colonialism as well as to western imperialism". After Nehru's arguments and efforts' "colonialism in all its manifestation" was condemned. China's participation in Bandung Conference further pleased the Soviets and later one commentator wrote that it (Bandung Conference) made possible Lenin's conviction of close cooperation between Communist and nationalist against the common imperialist enemy.⁴⁰

The exchange of visits by the Heads of the two nations in 1955 further brought wider mutual

40. E. Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian countries and its Historic Significance", International Affairs (Moscow, May 1955), p.28.

understanding. Nehru was given a welcome, unprecedented in scale and warmth from that given to any Head of nation from outside the 'Socialist bloc'. Khrushchev and Bulganin in India spoke very highly of India's ability to shape her destiny and Nehru's non-aligned policy.

In the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, Khrushchev referred to India as a great power and praised its role in the preservation and consolidation of universal peace. "The great Indian Republic had made a big contribution to strengthening peace in Asia and the whole world."⁴¹

There were two other important issues during the remaining period of 1956-57; the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Crisis. Suez Crisis revealed the common approach of India and Soviet Union towards the predatory character of western colonialism.⁴² Nehru initially hoped to solve this problem

41. N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 20th Congress, (Moscow, 1956), p.31.

42. D. Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1971), p.62.

by negotiations and did not come openly in support of Nasser. But "fierce reactions in Britain to the nationalisation of the Canal led Nehru to advise the British Government against any attempts at coercion."⁴³ But when Egypt was attacked, Nehru condemned it in no uncertain terms, "I cannot imagine a worse case of aggression. If this aggression continues and succeeds, all faith in international commitments and the United Nations will fade away, and the old spectre of colonialism will haunt us again".⁴⁴ During the whole crisis, he had correspondence with Bulganin more than once.

The restrained reaction of Jawaharlal Nehru towards the Hungarian crisis was received without any comment in Soviet Union. In United Nations, Menon remained absent on most of the resolutions condemning the Soviet Union. Whenever he criticized Soviet Union, it was balanced by his criticism of other powers elsewhere. "Even the representatives of Yugoslavia and Poland had been more vigorous

43. S. Gopal, op. cit., vol.II, p.278.

44. Ibid., p.285.

and forthright in their criticism of the Soviet action than Menon had been."⁴⁵ However, later, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his dislike of Soviet action in suppressing a popular nationalist uprising. Despite this, a leading article in 'Pravda' on the 7th anniversary of India's Republic Day commented, "India has become a great power now playing an important role in the international arena. Pursuing their peace-loving policy the great Indian peoples are striving for friendship with all countries. During the troubled days of the imperialist aggression against Egypt, India consistently came out on the side of the Egyptian people."⁴⁶

Nehru's constant moves against colonialism, racism and his sincere efforts for disarmament received favourable response from Soviet leadership. Soviet views regarding colonialism were very much influenced by the Cold War. On the

45. Ibid., p.293.

46. Pravda, Jan. 25, 1957.

other hand, India's anti-colonial views, were careful to western sentiments. Due to the western opposition, India could not join the Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indo-China problems, but the Indian delegation was constantly consulted by Soviet and Chinese delegates. Due to Soviet initiatives India was elected Chairman of the Neutral National Commission which was to supervise the cease-fire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Nehru's position in Bandung Conference that the problem of East European countries was not of colonialism, was appreciated by Soviet Union. In 1955 when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India, they expressed their support to India in her anti-colonialism efforts, "we are the sincerest friends of those who fight against colonial slavery and colonial dependence."⁴⁷ Similarly, India's policy regarding racial discrimination in general and in South Africa in particular was also supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union.

47. Report by N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev on visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan to the Supreme Soviet of USSR, 1955, p.38.

Soviet leadership also paid attention to the efforts of the developing countries on the issue of disarmament and supported their efforts in general and India in particular. Soviet Union proposed the inclusion of India in its talks with Big Powers on disarmament in May 1956.

The overall Soviet view of Nehru's foreign policy during 1947-58 was extremely favourable and as a matter of fact it was Nehru's foreign policy and his international role that impressed the Soviet leadership. The initial criticism of Nehru's foreign policy was just a simple manifestation of overall misunderstanding of Soviet leadership of the developing countries and their policy. Preoccupation with Cold War also prevented Soviet leadership from paying enough attention to and understanding India and her foreign policy. However India, too, with certain aspects of her foreign policy, led to doubts regarding her non-aligned stature.

Nehru's role in Korean crisis in 1950-51 drew attention from Soviet leadership and a phase of mutual understanding set in till

1954-55. After, Bandung Conference and exchange of visits by the Heads of the two nations in 1955-56, Soviet Union continuously praised and encouraged Nehru's efforts in solving the various international problems. Soviets realised the importance of Nehru's non-aligned policy when a number of other developing countries were joining military blocs of western countries. Since then Soviet Union has followed a consistent policy of support and encouragement to Non-Aligned Movement in general and India's role in it, in particular.

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET PROFILE OF NEHRU AS A NATION-BUILDER

The title of this chapter requires little explanation as one may not agree that a Head of the nation must necessarily be called as the nation-builder of that particular country. However, Jawaharlal Nehru was much more than simply a head of the Indian nation. Firstly, and obviously, because he was the first Prime Minister of India and remained on that post for 17 years. Secondly, because he was one of the leading figures (after Mahatma Gandhi) in the Indian Nationalist Movement. Lastly and more importantly, he was the most important instrumental person in formulating and shaping the policies and programmes of the Indian National Congress before and after India's gaining of independence. After the death of Gandhi and Sardar Patel, he emerged as the unchallengeable leader of the INC as well as of the country as a whole. Thus in building India, he as the first head of the nation and chief

architect of the INC's policies, rightly deserves lion's share. This is not to say that one must necessarily accept or admire his policies and programmes.

Nation-building of a newly independent country means first and foremost, the consolidation of newly achieved political independence. This task of consolidation again involved multidimensional complexities. One important aspect of this task, i.e. India's foreign policy, has been discussed with Soviet perspectives in the previous chapter. Other major problem of nation-building can primarily be studied in Nehru's socio-economic policies. In this chapter it is proposed to study Nehru's socio-economic policies in general and his handling of specific problems in particular; needless to say as viewed through Soviet eyes.

NEHRU'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC
THOUGHTS:

A proper understanding of Nehru's domestic policies during the period 1947-58 can only be done if they are analysed in the light of his attitudes and approaches towards various socio-

economic problem during his active participation in the Indian Nationalist Movement. It is widely known that he attached importance to socialist ideas yet it is important to see what exactly he meant by socialism.

After attending the League Against Imperialism in 1927 Nehru began to talk about economic freedom in addition to political freedom. "My outlook was wider and nationalism", Nehru wrote about his thoughts of those days, "by itself seemed to me definitely a narrow and insufficient creed. Political freedom, independence, were no doubt essential, but they were steps only in the right direction; without social freedom and a socialistic structure of society and the state; neither the country nor the individual could develop much".¹

Nehru formed the 'Independence for India League' in August 1928, with Subhas Chandra Bose and S.S. Iyenger. While demanding for the reconstruction of the Indian society to ensure

1. Vinod Bhatia, Jawaharlal Nehru and Making of Indo-Soviet Relations, (New Delhi), p.76.

economic justice for all, the League adopted a radical socio-economic programme, at Nehru's initiatives. He wanted the state to control the means of production and distribution, obviously "a recommendation based on his observation of the Soviet economic system."² During his visit to Soviet Union in 1927 he was impressed; the way a new civilization was being advanced. While comparing India's situation with that of the Soviet Union he noticed "Russia thus interests us because it may help us to find some solutions for the great problems which face the world today. It interests us especially because conditions there have not been, and are not even now, very much dissimilar to conditions in India. Both are vast agricultural countries with only the beginning of industrialization; and both have to face poverty and illiteracy. If Russia finds a satisfactory solution for them, our work in India is made easier."³

2. Ibid.

3. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia, (Bombay, 1929), p.3.

Nehru further studied some books on Marxism and began to analyze India's problems in the context of role of capitalism and more especially of imperialism. In 1929 as the President of the Indian National Congress he openly declared at its Lahore session: "I must frankly confess that I am a socialist and a republican and am no believer in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modern kings of industry, who have greater power over the lives and fortunes of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory as those of the old feudal aristocracy".⁴ However, knowing the limitations of the Congress he did not expect it to adopt a full socialistic programme, but the philosophy of socialism had permeated the entire structure of society the world over, and India too, would have to go that way; though she might involve her own methods and adapt the ideal to her own genius.

4. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol.I, (Delhi, 1984), p.135.

A more elaborate scheme regarding India's future socio-economic plans was adopted in a resolution passed on "fundamental Rights and Economic Policy" at the Indian National Congress's Karachi session in 1931. This resolution advocated state ownership and control of key industries and services, and efforts to eliminate the feudal and semi-feudal conditions in the economic and social life of the Indian people.

Nehru's socio-economic views can best be viewed from the report given by the National Planning Committee which was set up in 1938, headed by Nehru himself. It is worthwhile to recall here that Nehru was impressed by what Soviets had done by planning their economy. In a letter to Indira, his daughter, he wrote, "The argument about the success or otherwise of the Five Year Plan is rather a pointless one. The answer to it is really the present state of the Soviet Union. And a fuller answer is the fact that this Plan has impressed itself on the imagination of the world. Everybody talks of planning now, and of Five Year and Ten Year and

Three Year Plans. The Soviets have put magic into the word."⁵ This committee recognised the need for planning economic development, with industrialization being the most important part of this planning, because "the problems of poverty and unemployment, of national defence and of economic regeneration in general cannot be solved without industrialisation."⁶ While he had agreed on the need of regulation and coordination by state, he did not rule out the possibility of operation of free enterprises. "The very essence of this planning was a large reason of regulation and coordination. This, while free enterprise, was not ruled out as such, its scope was sincerely restricted."⁷ However regarding key sectors like "Agricultural Law, mines, quarries, rivers, and forests are forms of national wealth, ownership of which must rest absolutely in the people of

5. Ibid., p.245.

6. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, (Delhi, 1982), p.396.

7. Ibid., p.398.

India collectively."⁸ All these plans were to be achieved "in the context of democratic freedom and with a large measure of cooperation of some at least of the groups who were normally opposed to Socialistic doctrines. That cooperation seemed to be worthwhile even if it involved toning down or weakening the plan in some respects."⁹ According to one Soviet writer, "this was one of Nehru's Basic ideas which was subsequently to develop into the conception of mixed economy and cooperation with private capital."¹⁰

It is true that during those years of his formative ideology he attached more and more importance to Socialistic ideas and was responsible for a number of resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress; but "his efforts at formulating a coherent body of thought and practice seem weak,

8. Ibid., p.399.

9. Ibid., p.400.

10. A. Chicherov, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress, (New Delhi, 1985), p.16.

halting, incomplete and as Nehru himself thought, perhaps circumscribed by his class background."¹¹ He was influenced by the writings of Marx and Lenin as he admitted they "produced a powerful effect on my mind and helped him to see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social development appeared to have some meaning, sequence and the future lost some of its obscurity."¹² However, he never accepted Marxism in its completeness, "for him Marxism was not a logical construction but primarily an intellectual impulse based to a considerable extent on emotional sympathy."¹³ Influence of Gandhi and his ideas of 'Satyagraha' and 'non-violence' were a serious barrier to his developing socialist outlook. Although Gandhi's idea of attaining 'Swaraj' through non-violent 'satyagraha' and 'non-cooperation' were completely in contrast to Communist philosophy of class struggle, yet they had a powerful impact on

11. S. Gopal, The Mind of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Madras, 1980), p.4.

12. Jawaharlal Nehru, n.6, p.29.

13. S. Gopal, n.10, p.16.

Nehru. Later, whenever he talked about socialism he made it clear that the means for achieving socialism in India will be of non-violent. The eclectic tendency in Nehru, prevented him from developing a clear ideological perspective. Writing about this contradiction R. Ulyanovsky writes, "Nehru strove to know and assimilates as much as possible of the experience accumulated by mankind and to select the best of it. Sometimes in the political struggle he used isolated premises from various philosophical systems, and this, of course, prevented him from seeing their irreconcilability, their antagonism. And then he inevitably tended towards eclecticism, which he wanted at all costs to avoid."¹⁴ The contradiction in theory and practice became more acute when he faced various problems after independence.

Nation Building in India,
1947-58

Independence for India had brought along with it many difficult problems for the new

14. R. Ulyanovsky, Present Day Problems in Asia and Africa, (Moscow, 1980), p.200.

leadership. According to Mountbatten plan India was divided between India and Pakistan. Again geographically, Pakistan was divided in western and eastern Pakistan. Partition on the basis of religion sparked off communal riots. Migration of non-Muslims from West Pakistan had started as early as in March 1947. It was followed by emigration of Muslims to Pakistan. On 14 August this problem took a sharp turn and large scale riots started in Lahore and Amritsar which spread out to West and East Punjab and even to Delhi. In the following weeks, a large number of people were killed.

Nehru tried to stop riots with restless vigour, personally taking interest in protecting the frightened Muslim families and at times "frequently jumped into mobs of fanatic rioters to scold even to smite in order to quell."¹⁵ One important factor to be considered while looking at his efforts to stop this 'human earthquake' was that he did not get unqualified support from his cabinet. Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel with

15. S. Gopal, op. cit., vol.II, p.15.

the backing of the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, "believed not so much in a theocratic state as in a state which symbolised the interests of the Hindu majority."¹⁶ Patel doubted the loyalty of Muslim officials and demanded their dismissal and to him "the Muslims in India were hostages to be held in security for the fair treatment of Hindus in Pakistan."¹⁷ However he received help from some other members like Maulana Azad, John Mathai, R.A. Kidwai and Amrit Kaur.

Nehru hoped that the division of India was a temporary political solution which could not remove cultural affinities and economic compulsions. However in February 1950 a rapid increase of migration of Hindus from East Bengal created panic among Muslims in Calcutta and Pakistan was at the verge of war. Nehru in his effort to avoid escalation of already worsened situation suggested Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan that the two Prime Ministers should

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p.16.

together tour the two Bengals. Liaquat Ali rejected the proposal. The migration of Hindus from the East Bengal continued and Nehru, "instead of being a messenger of peace, was forced to think in terms of even war being better than a tame submission to fate and tragedy."¹⁸

However, finally Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in Delhi and a agreement was signed which "reiterated the policy of both governments to ensure complete equality of citizenship of minorities."¹⁹ Further it was resolved that facilities would be given to all migrants and they would not be deprived of their immovable property. Commission of inquiry would be established to report on the disturbances and, to prevent their continuation, each government would depute a minister to the affected areas."²⁰

The whole approach of Nehru towards communal problem was extremely secular, especially when some of his leading cabinet members were carried

18. Ibid., p.84.

19. Ibid., p.88.

20. Ibid.

away by communal fever. He had serious differences with P.D. Tandon who as the U.P. Congress President appealed to Indian Muslims to adopt Hindu culture and wrote him strongly worded letters. Later when he could not prevent Tandon from becoming Congress President he showed his inability to run the government but finally he won the battle and Tandon resigned giving way to Nehru to implement his policies in easier way.

Organization of provinces on a linguistic basis was another problem which Nehru had to face. The Britishers had formed composite units, consisting of people speaking different languages to suppress the forces of nationalism. In response to it, Congress, long before independence, had pledged to the creation of provinces on a linguistic basis.

However after independence in the context of various other urgent problems Nehru drafted a report which postponed the organisation of state on linguistic basis for 10 years. However individual cases could be solved with agreement between the parties - Nehru, giving primary

importance to economic problems, argued even after election, that time was not ripe for linguistic division. The formation of Andhra state in 1952, encouraged similar demands all over the country. Nehru's whole approach was to form provinces on the basis of language not by force but by consensus, "he could not comprehend the intense passion which the issue of linguistic states aroused; and, faced with such strong feelings, his idea of a solution was not the search for merits; which did not to him exist in any sharply defined sense, but producing the largest consensus and avoiding as far as possible, compulsion."²¹

While writing about Nehru's role in nation-building: his limitations, domestic pressures etc., require due consideration. After the death of Gandhi, he had to work and share his responsibility with Sardar Patel with whom he differed on many issues. Similarly Rajendra Prasad first as cabinet member and then as President had a different outlook unsuitable to Nehru. Rajendra Prasad

21. Ibid., p.257.

was opposed to Hindu Code Bill²² and he showed much hesitation in signing a law reform bill.²³ Nehru was not in favour of granting privy purses to the Princes as the price for accession for perpetuity. But Patel was keen to sponsor this clause, and this commitment was formally made in the summer of 1950 when Nehru was away in Indonesia.²⁴

Inside the Congress also the quality of its members in terms of moral values was deteriorating and Nehru sometimes got disillusioned with the petty money-making mentality in the Congress ranks. "It is terrible to think", Nehru wrote to Krishna Menon, "that we may be losing all our values and sinking into the sordidness of opportunist politics."²⁵ He was worried about the increasing non-cooperative attitude of the left wing elements and the weakening of radical forces within the Congress itself. He

22. Ibid., p.77.

23. Ibid., p.94.

24. Ibid., pp.78-9.

25. Ibid., p.74.

tried, on a number of times to acquire the support of socialists like Jayprakash Narain, Acharya Kriplani etc.

As regards Nehru's economic policy, his primary concern was to raise production so that the rates of accumulation of national wealth could be increased. In the historic Avadi Session of the INC in 1955 he said, "We cannot have a Welfare State in India with all the socialism or even communism in the world unless one national income goes up greatly. Socialism or communism might help you to divide your existing wealth; if you like, but in India, there is no existing wealth for you to divide; there is only poverty to divide... our economic policy must therefore aim at plenty. Until very recently economic policies have often been based on scarcity. But the economics of scarcity has no meaning in the world of today."²⁶

Planning, industrialization and the leading role of the public sector were basic components

26. Address at the 60th session of the Indian National Congress at Avadi, January 22, 1955, in Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, vol.3, (March 1953-August 1957), (Delhi, 1970), pp.17-18.

of Nehru's overall strategy for increasing national wealth. Industrialization is one of the fundamental principles for independent economics. He was firmly convinced that the only way to improve the well-being of India was possible through industrialization. Further, he focussed particular attention on industrializing some key industries; "...if we wish to industrialise this country we are not going to industrialise it by having a multitude of industrial supplying consumer goods. They are useful, no doubt, but if we industrialise we have to have certain basic, key, mother industries in the country, the machine making industry, the steel industry and so on, out of which other industries grow. If we do not do that we shall remain dependent on others."²⁷ Therefore, Nehru accepted establishment of heavy industry as a strategy for industrialization.

Nehru was fully aware that it was impossible to industrialise the country with the help of private capitalist appropriation. He believed

27. Address to the Associated Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, December 14, 1953, in ibid., p.61.

that if the principal means of production are in private hands they were bound to lead to private exploitation. So in order to take steps towards introducing a socialist structure of society he inevitably sought state control of the major means of production. However he believed that private capitalists, too, had a role to play in building Indian economy. This policy of building economy with public as well as private sector came to be known as mixed economy.

The economic modernisation and industrialisation as key objectives remain unattainable, as Nehru thought, without the introduction of elements of planning. That is why after independence Nehru appeared as an outright propagator of construction of a planned economy. For him planning was essential because "without it there would be anarchy in our economic development."²⁸ Planning was to work for balancing

28. Address at the 60th Session of the Indian National Congress at Avadi, op. cit., p.17.

the development processes in the economy and to bring in sectoral and subsectoral equilibria for long-run and sustained growth.

The First Five Year Plan should have been to "increase of both production and purchasing power and this should be the purchasing power of not merely a handful of the rich but of large numbers of the relatively poor. Widespread development in production, providing employment for many was the chief requirement; and bulgctary and financial restrictions which stood in the way should be surmounted by an unorthodox New Deal approach."²⁹ But in terms of concrete exposition, the plan was far removed from such ideal objectives. It functioned as an preparatory work to stabilise the economy of a newly independent country. No comprehensive move towards building of the nation's economy within a long-term objective framework was in sight.

Nehru was faced with serious criticism from certain corners for his emphatic intentions to

29 S. Gopal, op. cit., vol.II, p.197.

develop a state sector controlling major *strings* of the economy. Such criticisms had borne in their background a definite fear of the country developing in the 'communist' line with priorities in the development of the state sector and heavy industries. But Nehru could mobilise opinion in his support from different sections of the society and went ahead with his Second Five Year Plan. The second plan, as proved later on, was in no way in violation of the basic bourgeois democratic structure of the nation. The private capital was not weakened. In fact, encouragement was provided to the bourgeoisie of the country to invest in consumer goods and machine-building sector.

Given the nature and the level of capitalist development in India, at the time of and immediately after the independence, Nehru's Second Plan and its implementation could in no way be considered as antagonistic to the interests of the big-bourgeoisie of the country. The economic strength of the big-bourgeoisie, at that time, was not enough to open avenues for them to invest on heavy and low-profit industries, requiring high capital investment with even larger risk so the launching of the Second Plan did not generate

so much of fear among the big-business houses in the country. Rather, it was very much in tune with what they had desired as is evident from 1944 Bombay Plan. But that was not the whole story. A fear among certain sections of the Indian big-business, emerged quite on genuine ground of the possibility of the newly developed state sector engulfing the major proportions of the economy in the course of time and leaving the private sector to play a residual role. But this fear soon disappeared with the increased encouragement which kept pouring from the government on the private sector, starting with the cut in the level of public investment from 1960 onward.

Nehru's economic policy, although, did not go against the basic interests of the Indian big-bourgeoisie, reveals progressive elements in its capacity to make the economy self-reliant and released it from the clutches of imperialism. A proper assessment of Nehru's economic policies can be made only in the context of the development world over, taking into account the position of a newly independent country with vast potential

of development in the economic domain of the imperialist countries.

Though Nehru later accepted that he could not stop monopoly capitalism to grow and was not very satisfied with the pace of development, he did not agree to change his approach. In an article "The Basic Approach"³⁰ he reiterated that "India has to do its own thinking, profiting by the example of others, but essentially trying to find a path for ourselves suited to our own conditions." He pointed out the growing contradictions within the framework of communism. While lauding certain aspects of Soviet system he deplored the fact that communism had become associated with practices of violence and that the means employed often distorted the ends.

While replying back to 'the Basic Approach' Pavel Yudin, the Russian ambassador to China, at

30. For the debate between Jawaharlal Nehru and Pavel Yudin, see Jawaharlal Nehru and Academician Yudin on the Basic Approach, (New Delhi: CPI, 1958).

that time, regretted that Nehru did not discuss contemporary problems, the way he used to discuss historical forces that shaped Indian and world history prior to Indian independence. In regard to Nehru's associating of communist philosophy with violence, he posed a question whether in the free democratic India - police, courts, prisons and the army were in no way associated with exerting violence in respect to the people? He further said that the path for real socialism is something different from what Nehru had understood.

The Soviet Profile of
Nehru, 1947-58

Before drawing a Soviet Profile of Nehru we cannot ignore the essentials of the theoretical framework of Soviet view of India's position or for that matter any developing country like India. Firstly, India as an integral part of the socio-economic processes operating worldwide, has a stream of problems characteristic of all the former colonial and semi-colonial countries in the world. Secondly, she is drawn into the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. At the same time, her general features of development,

arising out of a colonial heritage are in common with other such countries of the Third World, not to neglect her own cultural, social and ethnic specificities.³¹

It is only in the context of this 'general framework' a proper Soviet assessment of Nehru's role in building India can be done. This framework was, however, not followed immediately after India achieved independence. As discussed in last chapter, following 'the two camps' theory the Soviet Union paid little attention to problems of newly independent countries. During the period of 1947-51 the essence of Soviet understanding of India was that it was still serving the interests of her former colonial masters; that no fundamental changes had occurred in India. Critical remarks were made about Nehru's two cabinet Ministers Sardar Patel and John Mathai who were considered as 'very friendly' to Birla and Tata Business Houses, respectively.³² Even the Indian

31. Zafar Imam, ed., Soviet View of India 1957-1975, (Introduction), (Delhi, 1977), p.xi.

32. New Times, no.32, 1948, p.10.

Constitution was viewed as a fine example of bourgeois constitution, which proclaimed Private ownership of the land, forests, factories, mills and other means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of the exploiters and the exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority and luxury for the idle but secure minority, etc.³³ So much so that, the launching of the First Five Year Plan was viewed as "nothing more than the imperialistic plan of Mountbatten. This plan does not aim at industrialising India, nor does it want to free India in distant future from its dependency on imperialist states in agrarian matters."³⁴

One important factor while understanding this hostile attitude was their over-optimism about the prospects of proletarian revolution in India. During this period, the Communist Party of India was portrayed as a growing powerful force

33. New Times, no.11, 1950, p.3.

34. Pravda, 21 June, 1951, p.4.

aspiring to overthrow the bourgeois government. When in March 1948 the Indian Government banned the Communist Party of India, followed by large scale arrest of Communists, the Soviet press started reporting about the "massive arrest of democratic workers in India."³⁵

However in following years Soviet attitude towards India showed a shift and a more sober and objective analysis began to appear. Later in the course of time, and in recent years a number of Soviet Writers had admitted mistakes, committed in assessing India's emergence as a new independent country. A more favourable and positive analysis of Nehru's policies and programmes began to appear. R. Ulyanovsky while crystallising Nehru's role wrote that under his guidance, "India was reorganised into states according to national, ethnic and language factors, thus putting an end to the British administration system, based on the principle

35. Pravda, 8 April, 1948.

of divide and rule... Nehru led the restructuring of the economy along the lines of a planned economy, and started the policy of industrialisation which was decisive for the country's economic growth. Nehru's initiative led to the creation of a powerful, and strengthening state action. He was a through going democrat, a fighter for equality, an opponent of caste-vestiges and religion tribal reaction and supporter of lasting national unity in India, based on a combination of the principles of democracy and centralism."³⁶ Ulyanovsky agrees that Nehru recognised the importance of socialist ideas in building society. But his ideas on means of establishing socialism "betrayed his own specific, mainly subjectivistic, idealist notions that came about as a result of the complex interplay of the class contradictions in modern India."³⁷ He wrote further that, "Nehru's underestimation of the special historic role of the working class as the

36. R.V. Ulyanovsky, Present Problems in Asia and Africa, (Moscow, 1980), p.197.

37. Ibid., p.203.

bearer of the ideology of scientific socialism... restricted his chances of realising his subjective ideals in practice".³⁸ In his analysis of Indian society, "he was unwilling to go beyond the general democratic stage of the revolution, unwilling to admit that the struggle for socialism required a radically different class orientation and that in passing from general democratic to socialist goals the extent, make-up and correlation of the components of the United national front of the period of the anti-imperialist movement must change radically."³⁹

However, in general there is agreement that Nehru's principal socio-economic and political views were in the given circumstances after India's independence were "progressive and democratic... (but)... the ideological and political principles and his practical activity as a statesman showed sign of serious contradictions."⁴⁰ As regards,

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p.204.

40. A. Chicherov, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress, (New Delhi, 1985), p.42.

the abandoning of some of Nehru's former radical and democratic ideas after independence, the contradictory ambiguous and eclectic nature of the stand he took were apart from other reasons due to the "growing predominance of the national bourgeoisie in the complex conglomeration of socio-class forces which, at the new historical stage, were advocating different ways of the country's development."⁴¹ Nehru's progressive ideas also faced resistance from "powerful conservative groups - the bourgeoisie, the landowner, the monopolists, the small owners, the bureaucrats and so on."⁴²

Soviets were particularly interested in Jawaharlal Nehru's policies on industrialization, planning and the state sector. But in a country like India simply establishing some heavy industries was not an ideal solution and it had some weak points. In this regard two Soviet scholars

41. Ibid., p.43.

42. Ibid.

supported what Myrdal wrote in his book, Asian Drama, "South Asian Countries now run the risk of creating petty islands of highly organized Western type industries that will remain surrounded by a sea of stagnation. If this fate is to be averted, industrialisation must be so directed, and so complemented by policies in other fields, as to permit simultaneous developments outside the sphere of modern large scale industry".⁴³ In fact, Nehru himself realized this problem and did not want industrialisation at the cost of a sea of stagnation.

The pace of industrialisation was very slow in the First Five Year Plan but the Second Five Year Plan envisaged a steep rise in the rate of building heavy industry and also an improvement with respect to the food and raw materials supply. The fulfilment of this programme was to be an "important step towards India's economic self-sufficiency; it was, moreover, to provide more

43. R. Ulyanovsky, V. Pavlov, Asian Dilema, (Moscow, 1975), p.58.

favourable condition for state-sponsored and private capitalist enterprise."⁴⁴

It was held that the First Five Year Plan did not "incorporate the principles of country's industrialisation as the decisive and predominant element in the economic policy of state and had the objective effect of stressing the importance of private capitalist investment and private capitalist production in general."⁴⁵

The experience of socialist countries suggested the need for industrialisation with priority development of department are in the public and not the private capitalist sector. This is a law recognised in all democratic circles of India and "the National Congress won support of the opposite parties on this count at least. The Second Five Year Plan introduced this very principle."⁴⁶ In sum, it has been accepted that

44. V.I. Pavlov, India: Economic Freedom Versus Imperialism, (New Delhi, 1963), p.57.

45. R. Ulyanovsky and V. Pavlov, op. cit., p.128.

46. Ibid., p.129.

although many decisive sections of the Second Five Year Plan were based on experience of Socialist planning, "India was not able to adopt the class methods of industrialisation employed in socialist countries."⁴⁷

The essence of Soviet understanding is that though Nehru wanted to follow certain key elements of socialistic theory, his methods were not effective. He wanted to build socialism in a 'bourgeois democratic' framework with "compromises and consensus" which "invariably resulted in the emasculation and actually even in the repudiation of some of the most progressive, socialist principles (of Nehru)."⁴⁸ However, in general Soviet assessment of Nehru remained extremely favourable and they regarded him as a thorough democrat, progressive and secular leader.

47. Ibid.

48. A. Chicherov, op. cit., p.44.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

While supporting and encouraging the national liberation movements, the Soviet Union and its leadership have always given a primary importance to the movements themselves. The historical background of a national liberation movement, its programme and policy vis-a-vis imperialism, and above all, its socio-economic structure - all these, comprised basic criteria in Soviet policy of support and encouragement to it. However, in the post-Second World War period, when the process of liquidation of the colonial and semi-colonial system began to gain momentum, another component in this traditional framework gradually emerged - the personality and the role of the prominent leaders in a national liberation movement.

Jawaharlal Nehru first came on the Soviet scene in 1927, when he visited Moscow. Nehru's contact with the League Against Imperialism with its headquarters at Brussels further brought Nehru to the notice of the Soviet leaders.

These initial contacts were favourably viewed in the Soviet Union. In thirties' Nehru emerged in the Indian National Congress as leaders and spokesman of its young radical wing. During the war, Nehru's outspoken stand against facism and open sympathy for the Soviet Union, further, created a favourable image in the Soviet Union.

When India became independent in 1947, the Soviet Union was critical of Indian National Liberation Movement, as well as of Nehru. However, by 1951, Soviet policy towards India began to change and a new era of friendship and cooperation between both the countries began with Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in 1955.

Simultaneously, a re-assessment of the very framework of undeerstanding and analysing of the national liberation movement also set in. The personality and the role of prominent leaders of the national liberation movement were gradually brought into focus.

There were many factors behind this new trend. The Post-War period came with

isolation of the Soviet Union by her wartime allies, whereas she needed their cooperation to rebuild her crippled economy. The Soviet dream that Chinese revolution would trigger off a series of revolutions in the other colonies had not materialised. On the other hand, imperialist countries were still having a considerable control over their former colonies, whereas, the national liberation movements themselves had their own complex and diverse problems of development. In such a situation, a more objective analysis replaced the 'two-camp theory' in relation to developing countries.

In their assessment of the leadership of the national liberation movements, the Soviets found, broadly speaking, two categories. The one, they were those leaders who gave importance to heavy industrialisation, radical socio-economic reforms and pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment. The other, there were leaders who were still guided by the former colonial masters in their domestic policy and were following a policy of alignment with imperialist

powers.

During the initial formative period of India's independence, 1947-51, Nehru was put in the second category, while later, he was gradually put in the first category, by mid-1955 when the Cold War was at its height and Indo-Soviet relations had begun to be closer, Nehru was definitely viewed in the Soviet Union as a progressive radical nation-builder and a moving spirit behind non-alignment.

It was mainly Nehru's foreign policy and his international role that impressed the Soviet leadership. As a matter of fact, the first sign of shift in Soviet policy towards India appeared during the Korean crisis. Nehru's efforts to find out a peaceful solution were lauded by Soviet leadership. Subsequently, his views on colonialism, racism and India's almost similar position as of Soviet Union on these issues in the U.N.O., convinced Soviet leadership of the importance of non-aligned voice. Nehru's 'Panchsheel'

or 'Five-Principles' were received favourably in Soviet Union and they seemed to them suitable to their policy of peaceful co-existence. Soviet leadership could not help, but accept the significance of the role which Nehru was playing especially when number of other Afro-Asian countries were joining western-sponsored military blocs.

Soviet understanding of Nehru's economic policy and his building of the society on socialistic lines, can be summarised like this -

- i) Nehru's thinking on how to build a society on socialistic pattern was in no way common with that of Soviet understanding of 'scientific socialism';
- ii) Soviet leadership took interest in and admired certain aspects of Nehru's economic policy like - heavy industrialisation, planning and the lead role of public sector;

iii) Under Nehru's leadership, India took the path of capitalist development, inspite of seemingly socialistic pattern. Existence of public sector was essentially meant to provide infra-structural facilities to Indian capitalists, who, as weak they were, could not have been able to build up by themselves.

iv) However Nehru's economic policy, revealed progressive elements in its capacity which made the economy self-reliant and released it from the clutches of imperialism.

Beside Nehru's economic policy other aspects of his domestic policies received encouragement and support from Soviet Union. His democratic and secular outlook was highlighted by the Soviet leadership. Thus our study shows that the overall Soviet profile of Nehru during the period 1947-58 was extremely favourable.

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