THE SECURITY PROBLEM OF MICROSTATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS : A CASE STUDY OF SRI LANKA IN ITS GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SUBHRANSU SEKHAR MISRA

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ORGANISATION & DISARMAMENT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

Centre for International Politics, Organisation & Disarmament School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Mehrauli Road, New Delhi-110067.

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled THE SECURITY PROBLEM OF MICROSTATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF SRI LANKA IN ITS GEOFOLITICAL DIMENSIONS, submitted by Mr. SUBHRANSU SEKHAR MISRA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge, this is a bona-fide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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PREFACE

The present work is an attempt to examine the security problem of microstates in contemporary international politics. Much work has been done in the field of research, pertaining to the Super Powers and their security and strategic interests in a global perspective. But in a changing world, it is the smaller states or microstates which need the serious v attention of the researchers, for its peculiar geographical nature and socio-economic, political and military problems which beset the security and stability of these small states.

To examine the magnitude and nature of the security problem of microstates, the Sri Lankan case has been taken up in the light of the recent developments in South Asian Region. The Sri Lankan security problem has been assessed in the dight of domestic conflict in Sri Lanka, which has assumed much importance in the security and stability in the Sri Lankan perspective.

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Professor R.C. Sharma, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies for the valuable guidance and encouragement that enabled me to complete the work. I am also grateful to Professor T.T. Poulose, who helped me to submit my dissertation well in time. I thank all my friends, especially Mr. Amiya Kumar Jena who helped me with his ideas and suggestions in course of my research work. Last but not the least, I am highly grateful to all my family members who encouraged me to complete this work.

28 May 1986.

SUBHRANSU SEKHAR MISRA

Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studie Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi-110067. INTRODUCTION

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One of the striking features of contemporary international politics, has been the conspicuousness of microstates in an era, marked by increasing military, strategic and security concerns of all states. The microstates, small in geographical size and population, are weak in economic resources and military capability, for which their security problem assumes much importance in independence and stability of the state.

The problem of security is common to all the states, big or small, strong or weak; in the world of conflict and domination. For the microstates, 'security' is a multifaceted problem in a varied nature of issues, ranging from physical, military through the political and economic to ideological ones, which determine the strength and viability of these Internationally, it is the Major Powers or Super states. Powers, who have the sufficient military, political and economic strength to hold their sway over these microstates, and influence the security problem of these small states in their external settings. The regional conflict between the Major Powers, arising out of their clash of economic, political and military interests, threatens the position of the small states in a particular region. In international sphere, the Super Powers, find these microstates as significant areas, for their military strength in organising their global

strategies and penetrating their interests into these "areas of conflict"in international politics.

On the otherhand, the microstates in their internal setting, possess peculiar domestic milieu in which the states are socially divided, politically fragile and economically backward in nature. In these states, some divisive tendencies arise due to the lack of unity and homogenity in the society which creates internal confusion within the state. So, the nature and magnitude of the security problem of the microstates are closely related to the structural performance of these lesser states.

The security problem of the microstates can be viewed in the patterns of their internal and external settings in the context of international politics. There is a close'linkage' between these two patterns which determines the internal stability and external security of the state. Primarily, it is the internal domestic setting in the microstates, which holds the key to the security question. Broadly, it is the national security problem which lies at the root of conflict and cooperation among the nations in the domain of international politics.

To study the nature of the microstates in international politics, there may be various categorisation

from different angles. But briefly defined the microstates can be taken as sovereign states, too small in territory and population, with a very weak economic, political and military structure for which its security is vulnerable in the broader international system. From external standpoint its geo-strategic inplications and small defence and technical backwardness; all account for the penetration of Major Powers, which jeopardises the security and stability of these small states. For example, from certain geo-political dimensions, the states like Cyprus, Sri Lanka Malaysia, have perennial security problem. Apart from these, there are many small independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America for whom there is an impending danger to their security and stability in the region. So, in this light the security problem of the microstates is preponderant in nature, which is beset with many internal socio-political and cultural factors that determine the efficacy of these states in the broader international system.

In the study of security problem, it is found that there is a large and flourishing literature that exists on the empirical side, dealing with the contemporary security problems and issues. Most of this comes out of the sub-field of strategic studies, for which security is the core concept. But, when we search for a matching

conceptual literature on security of the microstates, very littile come to hand. In this context, one finds some dearth of materials for a clear and conceptual analysis of the security problem. Here, the security problem has been studied in the light of geo-political dimensions of the microstates in broader regional and international context.

The present study of security problem of microstates emphasises the national security problem in the complex area of international politics which is influenced by the national and regional factors. In this context, the Sri Lankan case has been taken up in the light of its security problem in its continuous nature in the process of internal conflict within the society. Again, with the recent upheavals in the internal developments of Sri Lanka and in the South Asian Region, it carry deeper implications for India in matters of security and stability in the region. The Sri Lankan Case, presents a clear picture of security problem in a Third World microstate in geo-political dimensions. The Sri Lankan society since ducient times, has felt the threats of Security and stability in its internal setting, which has continued till today.

In this work, the first chapter deals with the security problem of the microstates in analysing the

security-perception of these microstates in presence of conflicts and confusion in the system of the states as a It helps one to assess the status and problems whole. of these states pertaining to their magnitude of security problem in broader regional context. In its security perspective, the security problem of microstates is determined by a 'linkage' between its internal and external settings which involve a host of socio-economic, political and geo-political factors. In this chapter, the nature of the microstates and their security concern and behaviour have been studied in the light of their security dilemma in international politics. The national security which is impending and determining for the efficacy of the states as a whole, has been studied in greater geo-political dimensions.

The second chapter takes up the Sri Lankan case for its security problem which deals with the domestic and geo-political aspects of Sri Lanka, which play a vital role in its search for order and security. The domestic socio-political milieu of Sri Lanka involving the factors of resources, socio-economic development, ethnicity, and nationalism, has been studied in their degree and nature.

The third chapter deals with the regional and international framework of Sri Lanka which focussion the

Sri Lankan geo-political configuration in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. In the light of growing conflict of Super Powers in the region and the consequent international environment of Sri Lanka, it occupies a strategic position in Indian Ocean which has serious military implications. After this, the fourth chapter examines the magnitude and nature of the security problem on basis of long history of Sri Lanka and the security arrangement in different times. In this context, the concern for security has become a continuous one since independence. So, this chapter deals with the security-management of Sri Lanka since its inception as an independent nation.

The fifth chapter deals with the Sri Lankan national security problem which is the main element of its security question. In the internal setting, the conflict of nationalities, arising out of socio-economic and racialethnic divergences, poses a serious threat to the internal stability and security of the state. Thus, it calls for a socio-political study of the security problem in Sri Lankan perspective in the light of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in the society. This chapter takes up the historical details dating back to the ancient divisions in the society and it examines the internal threats in socio-economic-political nature in greater details. Finally, the sixth chapter deals with the regional dimensions of Sri Lankan security

which calls for the examination of India's role and stand in Sri Lankan affairs. It is seen, India has played an important role in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka, which is vital to its security.

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Apart from these six chapters and conclusion, there are some maps at the end in appendice which help to study the geographical nature of Sri Lankan state and the socio-political milieu in the society.

Hence, the case study of Sri Lanka, with makes up the security problem of a microstate, dependent on a host of variables in socio-political phenomena that determine the security and stability of the society. In the world of Super Powers, the microstates' security problem assumes much importance in security and strategic perspective. So, a clear and analytical study of the security problem in historical and geo-political dimensions help the researcher to examine the security problem in greater details.

CHAPTER I

SECURITY PERCEPTION OF MICROSTATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The international political system is a highly complex phenomenon which centres around the 'states' and their interaction in the system. In present times, with a varied nature of 'actors' in the international arena. the states continue to be the principal 'actors' in a global perspective. The modern states and modern international society are recent phenomenon, beginning with the emergence of new states in the aftermath of Second World War. In this context one significant development took place in form of decolonisation which transformed the whole of international system. There emerged a cluster of states which attained a new statehood in the regions of Asia and Africa. One characteristic feature of these states was their weak position in terms of military and economic strength and political power. The immediate problems which these states faced were purely those of national security and stability in view of the bipolarisation of the international system into two irreconcilable and antagonistic power blocks.

The present international system is hierarchical in order, beginning with two Super Powers at the top, great powers in the intermediate position and the 'Third World' countries at the base. In a changed environment, the Super Powers find the emergence of the microstate in

'Third World', as vital to their interests in economic, political and military matters. (The Third World countries with necessary geo-political import, have become the focus of Super Power attention in terms of their security and strategic importance. In the light of this shift of the Super Power conflict to the Third World, the nature and behaviour of small or microstates have assumed much importance in the broader international context. The state, however small it may be in geographical and political context, it draws the attention of Major Powers for its strategic and geo-political importance in the overall international situation. So, the study of the small states, particularly the microstates, in its security perspective has become significant in international politics.)

The international political system is characterised by a multitude of states with diverse socio-economic and political systems. The interactions among the states and their individual positions in the international arena are determined by different social, cultural and political factors operating within the state system. A study of international system is taken to be a study of the international society as a whole, constituting the states as different units. But the study of the states involves

its domestic socio-political-economic milieu which determines its security, military and strategic considerations. The emergence of the states, has seen a growing phenomenon of 'nationalism' and 'power' which have consolidated the system.

The state system comprising of certain categories have a common identity as a collective and organised group involving self-concious and national communities. Throughout its history, the human race, has been faced by certain problems resulting from its divisions into more or less self concious and organised groups. These groups have been and remain racial, religious, economic, social and political and they have tended to overlap in nature. In a nationalist fervour, race conciousness may and often does cut across national boundaries and surpasses economic solidarities of interests or feelings of class cohesion, which may transcend loyalities based upon religious beliefs. Moreover, intergroup relations between individual families to relations between the nuclear Super Powers of the present day, have almost invariably been characterised by friction and disputes and the desire to mitigate or eliminate, these have provided one of the strongest motives for the academic study of inter-group relations.¹ Such frictions and disputes have many sources, all groups tend to generate among their

^{1.} F.S. Northedge, <u>International Political System</u>, (London, 1976), pp.4-7.

members certain common interests, habits of thought, customs and internal loyalties, which may lead to antagonism with other similar groups. It has indeed been argued that the very existence of feeling of group conclousness demands and depends upon a degree of hostility towards the outsider or the out-group. If that's so, it is perhaps open to doubt, whether mankind will ever be free from intergroup tensions and conflict, no matter how effectively this may be contained within tolerable limits. Thus, one of the dominant forms of inter-group relationship in the twentieth century gives rise to continuous and universal concern that the sense of loyalties very between the organised groups resulting in inter-state conflict and insecurity in the state.

The social tensions within the state become so great as to prevent that state acting as a member of the world political system. In the part of the microstates of Asia and Africa the domestic socio-political milieu plays an important role in the process of nation-building in these lesser states. So, a macro-sociological study of these small states is widely concerned with its political apparatus and the corresponding socio-sconomic differences influence the political system within the state. The presence of multitude of states in contemporary international system, is the focus of enquiry is the same

age-old problem of organising relations between the dominant social units of the day in all its complex and heterogeneous phenomenon.

States constitute major components of the international political system. Collusion and collision among states determine the international order. State's response to the international milieu is conditioned by its striving to further its security interests. So. national security has become central to the states in view of the fact that international politics represents "struggle for power" and where power of a state determines its security. Security implies broadly the \checkmark maintenance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. It denotes the sum total of the vital interests of the states for which the states are continually striving in international politics, either to pave the way for successful wars or attempting to arrange their affairs in such a way that their potential enemies will be determined from war in the name of security.

The concept of security in international politics can be formulated in a paradigm nature, interpreting in terms of 'anarchy' and 'order' as two constant factors in international system. The international political system is the most important part of the environment of

states for the obvious reason that states are essentially political constructs which determine the anarchy and order in the system. The position of sovereign states in international system with no overarching government presents a picture of anarchy where the states are conceded to be the prime source of threat to each other. Here, the use of 'anarchy' implies an absence of structural condition, where all the states live in peace and amity. So, the study of security problem in a pradigmatic formulationinvolves basic structure of relations among these states which have many varieties and styles of systems within it. So, the security problem from a structural analysis can be expressed in certain levels pertaining to the magnitude of social phenomenon in the state. Broadly, the levels-of-analysis in security can be broadly categorised into three levels, i.e. individual level, state level and international system level. These three level of analyses which make up the study of international security regime, are convenient shorting device but not strict categorisation from any point.

Extensive grey areas exist in the universe of sub-state and transnational organisations which lie between the individual and the state and in the universe of multistate and non-state collectivities which lie

between states and the international system as a whole.² Broadly, the three levels of individual, state and international system provide a set of analysis for the nature of international political system. In this light, the studies by Kenneth Waltz, John Ruggie, Robert Giplin and Barry Buzan have taken up the security problem in a system level analysis. Broadly, all theorists on national security, reach at a conclusion that the idea of the state comprising its territory and its institutions would have to be well-developed and stable, regardless of its relative power as a state in the international system.

Coming to the nature of the state, a certain distinction is found between the types of states in nation-state category. So, to distinguish between a nation and a state, the state can be widely defined as an organisation of people for the purpose of participation in international system. But the nation is a more exclusive association of people, united by a common social, cultural and psychological interests which are expressed in homogenous and collective identities. Since the French Revolution and adoption of principle of national self-

Barry Buzan, <u>People, States and Fear</u> (Brighton, 1983), p.14.

determination, there is a tendency for state boundaries to be identical with national boundaries or to put it another way for the political map of the world to correspond to the national and ethnical map. Thus, the system of states as it has been affected by the principle of national self-determination it is a pertinent paint to study the nature of the inter state political system which determines the international system as a whole.

The nature of the states in the international system can be divided into various categories in terms of geographical, political, military and economic settings. But for a more clear analysis, a general classification in the degree of power which aggregates the state interests, can be taken into consideration and thus the states can be classified into big, small or intermediate in nature. In the international order, it is pertinent to point to the fact that how f**A**r and in what way a state's membership of a particular class or category affects its position and behaviour in the international order. The study of states can be taken up in various typologies like geographical location magnitude of political and military power, economic pattern and so on. The simplest and popular method of classification is by geographical regions, which is the

basis of area-expertise for the international and strategic analysis. For example, a range of common problems and behavioural similarities peculiar to the states in a region exist in the E.E.C. area, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Central America, the Middle East or Africa and although to a lesser extent also in the Far East of South-East Asia. The regional similarities can be found in different forms like economic and political associations like EEC, OAU, SAARC and others. Such area-similarities apply, however, primarily to area-politics and in application to global politics, other sources of similarity are generally sought. The traditional division used to be into the 'Great Powers' and other states, occasionaly subdivided into Small and Middle Powers. After the Second World War, with the process of decolonisation, the additional category of small states have come into the picture as these undeveloped colonial states emerged independent and the smallest units became known as microstate in international politics.

There is no general agreement on the criteria to define a microstate and hence, there is a considerable amount of confusion about the definition of different classes of states.³ But roughly speaking, from geographical,

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For details, see Jacques Rapport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Theratil, <u>Small States & Territories: Status & Problems</u>, MUNITAR Study (New York, 1971), pp. 183-202.

socio-economic and political reasons and inconsideration of the corresponding military power and security, the states can be broadly divided into big, intermediary and small or microstates. In this category, the set of small states has a range of common problems for their miniature' position which makes them vulnerable to Big Power domination. In this perspective, the microstates with lesser degree of socio-economic and political stability, have become the "areas of influence" for the Big Powers in their expansionist and aggressive military policies.

In the classification of states, it is not easy to define a state as a microstate with a legal and political set-up, however small it may be considered from spatial and agrial domination. In the process of deconomisation, and break-up of empires, many small territories and segmented states were born and represented in the august body of UN. The existence of the United Nations and the constructive role of these microstates in the UN agencies have made them, the focus of attention. The small states of Asia, Africa and Latin America distinct in character, constitute the underdeveloped and weak states of the world in terms of military, political and economic strength in international sphere. For example, states like Indonesia, Malayasia, Singapore, Laos, Sri Lanka,

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Gyprus, Ghad, Mali, Niger, Ivory Goast, Madgascar, Upper Volta, Lebanon, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Osta Rica, Honduras, Trinidad and Jamaica etc. may roughly be considered as microstates with lesser degree of political, military, and economic strength, compared to other states of the world.

From a geo-political perspective the microstates have a tiny geographical region and least of politicomilitary strength in the context of military and strategic set-up in regional setting. Smallness is a comparative not absolute idea. It's a kind of variable other variables are population, area, GNP, energy consumption, legal status etc. and the use of certain techniques such as hierarchical clustering and analysis of variance in systems. A study taken by UNITAR finds out the nature of these microstates and its status and problems in international politics.4 It finds the microstates having a degree of international individuality in their interaction with regional or Super These states play an important role in the Powers. international system, in matters of socio-economic affairs and political security patterns in a global perspective. In this context, the principle of self-determination and the right to independence among the states clashes with

4. Ibid.,

the principle of territorial integrity and affects the behaviour of the nation. The problem of security and stability being the main concern of these microstates they are confronted with an uphill task of nation-building and consolidating the external position by adaptation to the overall system.

The set of problems faced by the microstates are largely characterised by socio-economic, political, cultural and military concerns which make-up the infrastructural basis of the state. In a changing order, the shift from the status of a colonial society to a nation independent state, carries the attendent colonial features of political fragmentation, economic destitution, sociocultural differentation and military destabilisation. In this context, there is a linkage of 'internal' and 'external' systems of the state which determines its security and stability in broader international sphere.

In a changing geo-political scene, the new independent microstates have assumed much importance in the context of Super Power rivalry shifting to these strategic areas in Third World. The onset of 'Oold War' and Super Powerssearch for "areas of influence" in their regional penetration, have exacerbated the process of intraregional divergences and conflicts. The microstates, for

their lack of manpower and resources to create a strong defence system of their own, have become the clients of Big Powers in regional power equations. Again, the systemic regional divergences and internal conflicts within these small territoral segmented societies, have helped the Big Powers to pump their arms and ammunitions to the region in escalating the intraregional conflict. In this light, the position of small states vis-a-vis the Big Powers, has a veritable importance in the international politics which calls for a serious study of the security problem of these microstates.

To examine the literature on microstates, one is confronted with the serious problem of typology or classification of the states in international politics. The classification according to to the status and power in traditional sense, falls into broadly categories like Super Powers, Big Powers, Medium Powers, Small Powers and a variety of others overlapping in nature. The different typologies have been adopted by different writers in dividing the states like core and peripheral, strong and weak, developed and undeveloped and so on in the context of international system. From a geographical point of view the states being geographically disadvan-

taged in character with overlapping EEZ can be taken to be a set of small states in its 'marginal' character provided they are adjacent in their location. Otherwise, some landlocked states and islands with insular position which are too small in area can be considered as microstates in the international system. The examples of Brunei, Cyprus, Nepal, Guatemala, El Salvador, Uganda, Maladives and above all Sri Lanka roughly correspond to the idea of a microstate in its geographical configuration. So, roughly speaking, states having a 'small' geographical area with a small population, negligible GNP and lacking in a full fledged national self defence, may be classified as micro-states in military and strategic dimensions.

In the literature, on microstates it is found that the role of microstates has assumed much importance in international politics since the end of 1950s. Though, during the 18th and 19th century, there was some good research in this field which took a formal shape with the starting of the geo-political school led by Frederich Ratzel. During the 18th and 19th century, the interest in microstates was manifested through the 50-year old dissertation by Oscar Bernhard Capis and Eduard Siber who had put a lot of labour in their research of microstates. In this period, many authors find the microstates, absolute and territorial sound in character. But they have not

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focussed on the security and military concerns of the small states. Montesquieu saw the 'viability problem' of the microstates solved by a confederation between the small states, whereas Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren pointed to the balance of powers as a means of protecting these small states. But it is the geo-political school of Frederich Ratzel coming to existence at the end of 19th century, defined the nature of the states through the establishment of laws of growth. The Swedish political scientist and political geographer,Kijellen noted that the old states will continue to exist and furthermore new ones will continue and it will still generate the state system.

During the first world war, the belligerent power coming to plead the microstates and subsequently, the League of Nations representing the third world small states; it focussed on the study of microstates in international context. In this light Rappord's study in comparative analysis and Harre's study of differentiated state-system have added to the work and research on microstates. During the cold war, few if any studies on microstates were carried out and a renewed interest did not manifest itself until the end of 1950s with the studies of Annet Baker Fox which will be discussed in the following.

There are different approaches toward the definition of the microstates which has been interpreted in a varied nature by many authors. There is no satisfactory definition in this context for two reasons, first the vagueness about the size and second the nature of the behaviour of the state which is an independent variable.⁵ It is one of the most striking features of contemporary international politics that the conspicuousness of microstates has been marked by increasingly military /disparity between Great and Small Power. Using the UN as a forum and force and claiming non-alignment as an important distinction and diplomatic innovation, microstates have risen to prominence if not power. Annet Baker Fox's pioneering work on five small states during the Second World War, has focused on the small states problems in general. On the other hand, a group of authors avoid the entire problem of definition either because it seems irrelevent to them or because it seems impossible to solve. For certain reasons, Annet Baker Fox and David Vital find a strict definition unnecessary and irrelevant. Others have found the problem of size so complex that they argue that a common definition should not be sought in the context.

Niels Armsstrup, "The Perennial Problem of Small States, A Survey of Research Efforts", <u>Cooperation and Conflict</u>, no.3, 1976, pp-163-179.

The seminar on smaller territories run by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in 1962-64 concluded that it proved impossible for the seminar to decide what smallness means with any precision. It is a comparative not absolute idea, whatever scales of magnitude are employed, seem arbitrary and it is difficult to pick out on them where smallness begins or ends. Similar observations can be found in the report from Conference of International Economic Association in 1957. As it is already discussed, the UNITAR study of microstates, meaning small states and territories measured by three variables of area, population and GNP in a quantitive approach. Another group of authors explains that the relationship involving the microstates and great powers can not be explained by the size variable but it depends on the other variables like structure of international system, the geographic position and the domestic political system of the microstates.

In this context, the definition by Rothstein is concerned with a limited category of small states and powers those feel that they are potentially or actually threatened by policies of great power. For these states, he establishes one important factor that

the small powers are something more than or different from Great Powers writ small. Rothstein develops a definition with a psychological as well as material dimension which he writes, "A small power is a state which recognises that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states. institutions, processes or development to do so; the small powers belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states. involved in international politics."⁶ Bothstein points to three unique aspects of small power situation i.e. i) outside help is required ii) the state has a narrow margin of safety with little time ofor correcting mistakes, iii) the state's leaders see its weakness as essentially unalterable.

After Rothstein's 'security-capability' approach, David Vital takes up this approach in his book, "The Inequality of States." With apparent diffidence, he argues, "We recognise or find it convenient to posit that the world community is divided into certain nations, admittedly loose groups.⁷ He then distinguishes three

^{6.} R.L. Rothstein, <u>Alliances and Small Power's</u> (New York, 1964), pp.13-27.

^{7.} David Vital, <u>The Inequality of States: A Study of the</u> <u>Small Power in International Relations (Oxford, 1967)</u>, pp. 35-56.

groups, i.e. great, middle and small states drawing upon the lines of population. Vital concludes that it should perhaps be stressed that these definitions are put forward to make clear the identity of the subject of this study not with a view to the creation y of a precise concept for manipulative analytical purposes. Vital finds the weakness as the most common. natural and pervasive view of self in small states. He spares no effort to show the great disparities in political, economic and military power and potential The security dilemma which between the great and small. is conditioned by the systemic role played by the states in international system, thus making security systemdominent and sub-system dominent. In the exercise of power of small and great powers, the non-aligned states are seen as an aberration to Rothstein and it is a paradigm to vital. In a brief comment, Liska also argues that small state sub-system would enjoy a maximum of practically attainable autonomy in a multipolar global system, combining conflict with concert.⁸

The 'under-developed' nature of micro-states and its associated problems can be taken into consideration in terms of its national interest. Generally, the

^{8.} George Liska, <u>International Equilibrium</u>: A Theoritical <u>Essay on the Politics and Organisation of Security</u> (Mass., 1957), p.232.

state interests fall into three categories like security, trade and normative interests. Of all the problems in a microstate, the security problem is of utmost importance. determining the stability and strength of the state in international system. In the international system today, no central authority exists that can enforce order and provide security. In the power constellation that instead exists, nations must be concerned about their security from being dominated, attacked or annihilated by other nations or groups. To attain security from such attacks. they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the powers of others. This process in turn renders others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since, no one can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power rivalry ensures and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation begins.

The states in their drive for power and security, face certain challenges within and from outside the system. Much of the dilemma is that states can never be sure that the security measures of others are intended only for security and not for aggression. However, power accumulation can not achieve security because in such a race the states get both too much and too little power.

They get too much power in the sense that they gain the ability to carry out aggression but too little power because others being menaced, will increase their own arms and again reduce these states' security. Thus the process illustrates that a misperception of others intentions and behaviour leads to false definition of the situation, whereby it exacerbate the prevailing tension and discord. The state being pushed to organise its military capability, it finds the security dilemma, whereby it looks up at the other external factor that may consolidate its position. Thus from regional conflict, it escalates into an international one, involving Big Powers in the process. Another aspect of this security dilemma is the competition between defence and development spending, by which it weakens the national development and progress. The rising military expenditure and the intensive security preparation, destabilise the socio-economic development of the country, paving the way for internal division and instability.

While studying the importance of security in the international relations, it is found that the underdevelopment of security as a concept in international relations is to be found in its use in the corresponding literature. By way of comparison, the literature on power

contains not only a mass of empirical work, also a well-developed body of theoritical writing. But when we turn to security, however a rather different situation obtains. While the term itself is in wide use, and appears to be accepted as a central organising concept by both practitioners and academics, the literature on it is very unbalanced. 'A large and flourishing literature exists on the empirical side dealing with the contemporary security problems and issues. Most of this comes out of the sub-field of Strategic Studies for which security is the core concept. The foreign, military, economic policies of states, the intersection of these policies in areas of change or dispute, and the general structure of relations which they create are all analysed in terms of national and international security. But the concept of security is seldom addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular actors and groups and the discussion has a heavy military emphasis. Many disputes arise regarding the particularities of the security policy both within The discussion is normally set and between the states. within very limited temporal and conceptual frameworks and general motions like 'dominance' and 'stability' mark the limits of attempts to give enduring meaning to the idea of security.

But when we search for a matching conceptual literature on security, relatively little comes to hand and there is certainly nothing equivalent to a coherent school of thought like the Realists on power. The enthusiasm for collective security after First World War had some promise in this direction, but the failure of both the League of Nations and the United Nations to measure up to the task, has not surprisingly lessened interest in this whole approach. John Hertz was the first to introduce the idea of security dilemma in the early Hertz's 'security dilemma' is a structural notion 1950 s. in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend automatically to lead to rising insecurity for others, as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening.⁹

The security dilemma idea is widely acknowledged in the literature but aside from some notable recent work by Robert Jervis, there has been almost no attempt to build on it. This is surprising because, as we shall see, the

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John H. Hertz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", <u>World Politics</u>, vol.2, 1950, pp.157-80.

idea offers a weighty and sophisticated alternative to the power struggle model of the Realists as a way of interpreting the basic dynamics of international politics. Probably, the best known conceptual piece on security is Arnold Wolfers's chapter on national security in his book 'Discord and Collaboration'. Wolfers's emphasis on national security certainly reflected the dominant orientation in the empirical literature and his essay is a masterly introduction to the many-dimensioned complexities of the concept.¹⁰

In addition to these core works, one can find only a few other conceptual discussions of security. Hedley Bull, Bernard Brodie, Frank Trager and Frank Simonie make brief but useful contributions on the difficulties of applying it. Hugh Macdonald attempts to tackle the ambiguity of the concept but ends of defeated by his own categories and withdraws from the struggle by dismissing security as an 'inadequate' concept.¹¹ Robert Jervits introduces the interesting idea of security regimes, which draws attention from the state to the system level of analysis. Gret Krell attempts a broad critique of excess-

^{10.} For details, see Arnold Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', <u>Discord and Collaboration</u>, (Baltimore, 1962), Ch. 10.

^{11.} Hugh Macdonald, "The Place of Strategy and the Idea of Security" <u>Millenium</u>, 10:3, (1981), pp. 65-74.

ively military conceptions of security from a peace research perspective and the literature on strategic studies add to the definition of security. In contrast with the strategic studies, Rechard Ashley takes up a more holistic, linkage oriented, systemic view of the security concept. He argues that technical rationality is itself a principal factor exacerbating the security dilemma. Ken Booth argues convincingly that the statebound, ethnocentric confines, within which Strategic Studies pursues its analysis is seriously deficient in relation to the character of the problem. Despite their wholly different premises, both Ashley and Booth come to similar conclusions, in Booth's words "those strategists who do not attempt to be part of the solution will undoubtedly become an increasingly important part of the problem."12

Other authors like Leonard Beaton, Stanley Hoffmann, L.B. Krause, Joseph Nye etc. have taken up the 'security' issue in their study of state power and interest. Though, initially the development of the 'security' concept was not much significant, gradually it has grown in its nature and study. The subject of security involves many topics

^{12.} Ken Booth, <u>Strategy and Ethnocentrism</u> (London, 1979), pp.2-22.

such as deterrence, arms control and disarmament, crisis management, alliances, military technology, strategic build-up, arms racing and contemporary national security problem and principles, which do not constitute its principal focus. Instead, the whole of the concept 'security'revolves around its principal referent object, 'the state'. Since the state is an amorphous, multifaceted, collective object; there are certain levels in the state system as well as international system, which make-up the security regime. So, the phenomenon of 'security' can be studied on several levels, but broadly it is centred on individuals, states and the international political system. These three levels should be treated as a convenient sorting device since extensive grey areas exists in the domain of international politics.

The security problem in its traditional sense, is concerned with the maintenance of national power and independence in the international system. In modern times, the problem of national security has assumed much importance in the structural performance of the developing nations which has a certain 'linkage' with the broader framework in international system. So in this context, there is a certain'linkage' between the internal and external settings of a microstate in its geo-political configuration. The

security problem of microstates is determined by internal stability within the society which influences its external security. For these small states, with no significant economic or military power, there is not much interaction at the international level, whereas the national security has been the dominent concern of the state in its regional and international environment. Going back to the emergence of the nation states in world system, there is a host of factors that determine the security concern of a nation state.

The small states or microstates in the postcolonial phase, are beset with many internal problems of socio-economic political and cultural nature which impinges the unity and stability in the society. Because of the diverse character of the society, the nature of security as a problem differs substantially from state to state. But all states are to some extent vulnerable to military and economic threats in external character. Moreover, the internal components of the national security can be attributed to different kinds of threats in domestic socio-political milieu of the state. The multilayered nature of the state opens it to threats on many levels, particular vulnerabilities depending upon the unique structure and circumstances of the state concerned.

As it is already discussed, the national security of a small state is beset with a host of interstate factors which affect the viability and strength of the state in regional set-up. From national perspective, the diverse political society within the state, with multiethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural differences poses an impending threat to the overall security of the state. The fragile socio-economic system and lack of stable political institutions; the absence of integrative revolution in society, results in domestically generated threats to the security of the state. In these small states, the integration problem as manifested in social and political divisions threatens the large-scale political net-work of the state. The integration problem is not just concerning some social homogeneity but it is the ability of a political unit to conduct the import and necessary business without disaffecting larger bodies of its constituents.

The focus then is upon the role of various internal institutions such as government, economy, educational system and religion which play an important role in alignating or accomodating important parts of the population; and it has an impact on international events and forces, in the process. To examine the integrative process in

society, it is seen that the members of a social system develop certain 'linkage' and cohesion, so that the boundaries of the state-system persists over time and the boundaries of subsystems become less consequential in affecting the behaviour of members in a system. In this process, members of the social system develop an escalating sequence of contact, co-operation and consensus and community. Hence, the racial ethnic groups in the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the postcolonial period, develop loyalty to primordial attachments and assert their separate socio-cultural identity. It is this crystallisation of a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments that gives to the problems variously called tribalism, parochialism, communialism and so on, threatening the sovereignty and independence of the state. Security and development are two sides of the coin of nation-building and one cannot be had without the other. Again, the leadership in developing societies have to carry out their nation-building in an international environment which is getting increasedly integrated. So, the political adaptation of these small states to the international system, is determined by the domestic socio-political set-up of the state.

Nationalism has an important role to play in integrating the segmented societies of the small states. The post-colonial societies strive towards civil political community with various nationalities existing as disparate political groups. The division of society in racial-ethnic groups and socio-economic, political disaffection among these various groups, result in civil discontent and disorder in the society, as a whole. In this context, the cases of Cyprus, Phillipines, Zaire, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and many others provide the picture of typical segmented societies where the intra-state ethnic conflict has affected and endangered the security of the state.

The nationalist approach to the problem of socialcommunication within the state, can ensure unity and stability of the society. In this context, the interpretation of Karl Deutsch provide the basic tenets of security of a small state. He says that the patterns of socio-political changes that take place in the internal mechanism of the small state; indirectly determines the security perspective in a regional and broader specific interests.¹³ Others like Singer, Kaus Knorr, Sidney Verba analyse the nature of nationalist and transnationalist phenomena in a global perspective. The states with a serious domestic security problem, are vulnerable to the 'external' domination where the perception

^{13.} Karl W. Deutsch, <u>Tides Among Nations</u> (New York; 1979), pp.35-66

of security becomes ambiguous, contradictory and confused in nature. Thus the question of national security depends on the creation of a national consensus around national basic values in a society which is coherent, united and enjoys equilibrium among its forces.

There is a certain 'linkage' between the national security and the external position of the state in the international system. Because the co-operation on both the internal and international levels is the sine quanon of national security in a system dominated by nation-states. The position of state in the international system is determined by its sovereignty, territorial status and national power. The national security problem stressing the 'stability' and 'law and order' in domestic phenomenon, extends to the international system involving the relationship of states to one another. The international co-operation has always been an object of foreign policy of the developing countries, while a system's stability has been the concern of the national security theory.

Broadly speaking, the 'external' security is determine by the geographical configuration of the state. Again the nature of international milieu and the role of Big Powers in the area, contribute to the understanding

of the security dimensions of the state. In the hierachical state-system, the military and security position of the states can be determined in consideration of the membership ind military alliances and their participation in the regional political associations. The integration and international organisations in nature of alliances communities in the international sphere make-up the security regimes in international relations. The various organisations like UN and its allied organisations and other political movements like NATO, WARSAW PACT, Non-alignment, etc. present a picture of pluralistic security communities in international sphere.

The microstates at the lowest level of hierarchical order need to assert their independence and autonomy in external affairs. The world being split by the bipolar power politics, the newly independent states have seen their individual collective, political stature, lying in a separate identity of organisation, whether it is non-aligned status or a client status for a big power. Now, after studying the security problem in international politics in greater details, we come to the conclusion that it is theoretically untenable and practically naive to dissociate any region from the global security environment. Again, it is seen that the regional security

is threatened by inter-state conflicts, tensions, wars which are further exacerbated in the presence of interstate conflicts. In this light, the systemic divergences in South Asia, coupled with its peculiar socio-cultural disparities present a picture of regional insecurity and domestic instability. In the South Asian system, the strategic discord, discernible in the region as a characterstic feature, has a very strong parallel in the systemic divergences obtaining in the region.

In this context, the study of Sri Lankan security problem provides a good case for the analysis of the security problem of microstates in geo-political dimensions. Sri Lanka has a significant geographical configuration as a microstate in South Asia which is relevant to the study of its security problem. In the study of Sri Lankan security, the following factors can be taken into consideration, i.e. ethnic strife, Indo-Sri Lankan relations, the Super Powers in 'nexus' and emerging power struggle in Sri Lanka and the shattered economy etc. mūst be taken into reckoning. In this light, the study of Sri Lankan security problem assumes much importance in external and internal dimensions.

CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK AND GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka is endowed with a natural geographical unity and historical events that have produced a composite of heterogeneous cultures and people dating back to the ancient times. The geographical fact that Sri Lanka is a small island of some 65,000 square kilometers in extent has tended to encourage among peoples who have inhabited it for centuries, a sense of identification with the island and of the separation from the nearby Indian subcontinent from which the island's peoples and culture emerged. This island-nation situated in the vast waters Indian Ocean, has certain geo-political significance in its peculiar domestic and international character.

Sri Lanka, a pear-shaped island with an area of 65,000 sq. kilometers is a compact land mass lying off the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent extending between latitudes 5°55' and 9°50' North and longitudes 79°42' and 81°52' East. It is separated from the subcontinent by a narrow strip of water, the Palk Straits which is just 30 kilometers wide between the narrowest points of Indo-Sri Lankan coastlines. This resplendent island of some 430 kilometers at its longest from North to South and 220 kilometers at its broadest from East to West has a total land area of 65,610 square kilometers including inland waters. Here the waters of Bay of Bengal, meet the Arabian Sea and both of them meet the vast waters of Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka

at this juncture of sea routes have become important for the sea powers of Indian Ocean. The geographical insularity of the island and its 'miniature' status have accounted for its security and strategic concern in matters, domestic and external as well.

The island's position in the Indian Ocean area gives it a focal importance of sea-borne trade routes and strategic naval calculations. The Indian subcontinent thrusts down into the centre of the Indian Ocean for more than a thousand miles from the northern shores of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka stands at a strategic speck in the Indian Ocean. During the 18th and 19th century it was an important place as a naval port and had served the purpose of artificial harbour. It has the most spacious natural protected harbour in the Central Indian Ocean area. On the east coast, Trincomalee harbour runs inland some thirteen kilometers and the anchorage is large enough to shelter the full fleet of any of world's great powers. In air routes, it serves as a connecting point between continents. It's central position in geo-political significance attributes to its future development as a strategic point for the Super Powers. After Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, no single Power commanded in the area without any unified security in the Indian Ocean. Instead of a single empire there were a congeries of succession states each with weak defense and several with possibly competing interests.

Gradually, with the balkanization of the strategic area in the Indian Ocean, the future role and needs of any one Power in the area became commensurately uncertain.

At the focal point of sea and air routes, traversing the Indian Ocean, gri Lanka is a centre of attention, a magnet of risks. For military build-up, Sri Lanka is a necessary base for the Super Power's influence in the Indian Ocean region. Its existence as an independent country of great strategic worth has considerable liabilities towards its neighbours, specifically India, which broadly comes under the overall strategic defence area in the Indian Ocean region. The security in the sub-continent is threatened by any military build-up in the Indian Ocean region whether it to Trincomalee or whatsoever inside Sri Lanka. The littoral states concern for security and stability in the region is a determinant factor in the military and strategic equation of the countries.

From colonial period, the British Power has consolidated its position in the area through its vast Asian empire and subsequently through the institution of Commonwealth after independence of the colonial countries. In case of Sri Lanka, the British entered into a defense arrangement to continue its influence in the area. Subsequently the military buildup in Diego Garcia and the American presence in the Indian

Ocean area has filled the power-vaccum after the withdrawal of the British Power from the area. In this changing scenario, the military presence and strategic build-up of Big Powers have seriously undermined the regional security and stability in the area which is vital to the interests of the sub-continent. For Sri Lanka its tiny nature as a small island and its separation from a massive continental power, i.e. India, with a great potentiality and having a sizeable population of Tamil inhabitants with common racial-ethnic ties with those of the island; hold the key to its security perspective. In its regional setting, Sri Lankan geo-politics can be attributed to its strategic position in the Indian Ocean, corresponding with its Asian Position in the region.

From geographical considerations, the island conforming a southern continuation of the Deccan Plateau in India comprises a varied landscope of low and high lands, costal plains and a plateau of vast tracts. Relief of the land may generally be said to comprise a mountainous area in the South-Central part surrounded by an upland belt while the coastal plains cover the rest of the island. Though, narrower on the west-south and east, the coastal plain widens out to a vast tract towards north.¹ The high central massif is the main feature of the island's physical structure influencing the climate, fertility and population on the lower step of the central massif.

^{1.} A.J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973, (Macmillan, London, 1974) pp.16-18.

On either side of high plateau are two distinct areas of relatively low elevation and the south-western side is the wet zone of Sri Lanka with a growing plantation economy of coconut, rubber and tea. It is in the southwest that western urban influences are strongest. From here Colombo, with over half a million people exerts its irrestible pull on the rest of the island. Over half of Sri Lanka's population lives within seventy five miles of the capital. It is here that the pulse of the nation beats fastest and where the tides of ancient civilization and modern urban society mingle and flow.² The great low lands which lie to the north and the east in the Dry Zone are vast plains in which members of all religious communities are found among the inhabitants of its model settlements. In the coastal lands of east and west, the undulating low lands have extensive cultivation of rice, rubber and bamboo. Still further north in Jaffna peninsula, the scene gets changed with a cultivation of rice, tobbacco and a whole range of The northern and eastern part of the island is vegetables. densely populated by Tamil minority who are indigenous in character. But in the western and central areas the Indian Tamils occupy the tea and rubber plantations in the region.

^{2.} Zeylanicus, <u>Ceylon between Orient and Occident</u> (Colombo, 1967), pp.14-15.

Sri Lanka is a multi-racial country of different peoples, cultures and religions where the majority Sinhalese form the main ethnic group with 10.9 million or 74 per cent of the total population. Sinhalese is their mother tongue, the official language of the country. The majority of the Sinhalese are Buddhists by religion and are mainly concentrated in the South West and Central parts of the island. The Tamils form the next major ethnic group with a population of 2.7 million or 18 per cent is enumerated at the 1981 population Census. This ethnic group comprises Sri Lanka Tamils and Indian Tamils. Both these sub-groups speak Tamil. The Sri Lanka Tamils numbered 1.9 million in 1981, while their Indian counterparts accounted for 0.8 million. About 80 per cent of the Tamils are Hindus by faith. There is a heavy concentration of Sri Lanka Tamils in the Jaffna Dist-Indian Tamils are descendants of those who worked in rict. Tea and Rubber plantations, during the early years of the British occupation. Heavy concentrations of Indian Tamils occur in Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Kegalle districts.

Sri Lanka Moors constitute the third major ethnic group with a population of approximately one million or 7.0 per cent of the total population. The Moors are descendants of early Arabs. With a business acumen the Moors have developed themselves as skilful traders dominating a fair proportion of the country's internal trade. A vast majority of Sri Lanka Moors have been concentrated in Colombo, Kandy,

Batticaloa, Amparai, Trincomalee, Kalutera, Galle, Kurunegala, Puttalam and Kegalle districts. The Indian Moors numbering a little over 27,000 are sparsely scattered with a major concentration in Colombo District.

Apart from these major communities there are other small groups with distinctive ethnic identities, though insignificant in their number. Burghers and Eurasians descendants of the Europeans who intermarried and settled here, constitute 0.26 per cent of the total population. Many of them however, have since migrated to other countries specially to Australia. The Malays form another 0.32 per cent, while the heterogeneous group 'other' comprise a mere 29,000 or 0.19 per cent of the island's population.

Sri Lanka is predominantly an agricultural country with 28% of GDP accounting from agriculture. It can be broadly divided into two major sectors of plantation agriculture and subsistence or peasant economy. The peasant agriculture is meant for home consumption and characterised by small holdings. The plantation factor is meant for export market and concentrated on large holdings for commercial purposes. In this economy, the cash crops like tea, rubbér and coconut form the major exports for foreign exchange. The gradual fluctuating prices of these products and the vast imports of industrial goods for domestic market have created

serious strains in the economy. Of its total 16.23 million acres of land in use 7.8% are used for paddy cultivation, 44.2% are woodlands, 12% are under tea and 45% under rubber; the rest land is used for coconuts etc. Agriculture and fishing are the primary sources of income for the coastal and wetland inhabitants. In minerals quartz, feldspar, mica, monozite, graphite and industries like cement, rubber, cotton, salt, copra contribute a moderate amount to the economy. Fishing and tourism are the two main sectors of the profitable business in the island. The "scarce," economy and the competing group interests within it have resulted in the detrioration of social order and cohesion within the state.

According to the Sri Lankan history, the ancient civilization of Sri Lanka was a Sinhalese Buddhist civilization who settled the Dry Zone area of the island first and accepted Buddh**isim** as their religion which datedback to its Indian origin. In the passage of time, the declining medieval kingdom re-established itself within the hill country in the sixteenth century and during the period of British rule, there occured a division of Sinhalese into up-country and lowcountry categories. These differences are now fast disappearing in the wake of efficient transportation and centralisation of administration in the independent Sri Lanka.

On the other hand the Sri Lankan Tamils are thickly populated in Jaffna peninsula, in the far northern extremity of the island in close proximity to the Indian mainland, separated by a stretch of water. The Tamils of Sri Lanka who have inhabited the island from ancient times have flourished in the wake of the British colonial administration. Though minority' in character, it has enjoyed the equal facilities in education and employment under the colonial administration. Setting a high premium on education, the Tamils have established fine schools and with good education, they have gone into all parts of the country as successful professional men, businessmen, officials and administrators of the government. They have accupied some of the top-positions in government departments and commercial establishments with a good amount of power and prestige. But in the aftermath of independence, the majority Sinhalese have started a major campaign of 'Sinhalese only' to uplift the Sinhalese masses for their relatives backwardness in socioeconomic and societal positions.

In the change of time, the Tamil minority has been alienated from the mainstream by the governments implementation of one-sided policies favouring the Sinhalese in matters of education, language and employment. The language policy of government which has emphasised 'Sinhalese' as the sole official language, has created tension in the society. In

this context, the Tamil insistence on parity of status for Tamil with Sinhala, as the official language of Sri Lanka has further aggravated the communal antagonism between the two major communities of Sinhalese and Tamil. This linguistic rivalries between the two groups are really an expansion of more deep-seated economic fears sharpened by historical memories.

Historically seen. Sri Lanka had to undergo a longer colonial experience than any other country in Asia. The British attacked the country in 1795 and established a communication network in 1848, to make the Sri Lankan uplands more accessible. It also laid the military and political conditions for an economic transmutation of the island. The gradual introduction of coffee plantation and its flourishing business attracted entreprenurs from England who purchased land and vast forest tracts in Kandyan valley at minimal prices and converted it into large coffee plantations. So after the British occupation of lowlands and Kandyan valley area the native Sinhalese population found living difficult and it became frustrated with the British government for its occupation of the native land. Despite the pressure exerted by the British, the Kandyan Sinhalese refused to work in the British plantations for which the British had to draw the Tamil labourers from India as an alternative to solve the

labour problem. The export of Tamils from India and the creation of vast 'immeserized' Sinhalese masses divided the nation, allowing the British to manipulate and exacerbate the ethnic antagonism between the Tamil and Sinhalese in a classical strategy of 'divide and rule'. Such socioeconomic disparity in social and ethnic pattern has fundamentally determined the subsequent character of political activity in Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan society presents a varied nature of political and social distinctions through a regid stratification in matters like ethnic, religious and cultural behaviour of the people in the society. As religious traditions and values are closer to source of behaviour in Asia the primordial loyalties and its impact determine the process of modernisation and nation-building in the post colonial societies of the region. In this paralance, India and Sri Lanka have certain historical legacies dating back to ancient times. The historical connections betweeing India and Sri Lanka go back to some 2500 years or more, not taking the pre-historic connections into account. As historical anectdotes speak its first the people of Indian origin, who colonised Sri Lanka and ruled over It was the arrival of Prince Vijaya with his followers in it. 543 B.C. from some part of India that settled in the island

and became known as the Sinhalese people. The successive Tamil invasions from South-India which began in the thirteenth century led to the decay of the Sinhalese civilization. The Sinhalese were driven back to the Southern and Southwestern parts of the island, while the north and northeastern region were settled by the Tamils. On the basis of these historical anecdotes and epics, the Sinhalas claim themselves to be the original settlers in the island. They view the Tamils as the desendants from the Tamil invaders who had come from India and inhabited the island.

The Tamils on the other hand, view history in an entirely different perspective. They believe that North India is far away from Sri Lanka. The inflow of peoples, as the Sinhalas claim, from places like Bengal, Orissa and even Madhya Pradesh to Sri Lanka would have been extremely cumbersome apart from the fact that it could not have taken place in one go. It would have been easier and more natural for the South Indians to cross over to the island from the Indian mainland. The Tamils claim that they were the first to inhabit Sri Lanka and King Vijaya and the so-called Sinhalas came much later. The Tamil name for Sri Lanka, 'Eelam', is mentioned even in the pre-christian era of Tamil classics. Otherwise, the Tamil 'minority' claims that as the descendants from the Yakkhas and Nagas, they are the original settlers of the island. It completely discounts the Sinhalese charge that the present

Sri Lanka Tamils are the descendants of the Tamil invaders. Therefore, to call the Tamil outsiders as invaders and latecomers is nothing but a travesty of the facts, the Tamils of Sri Lanka argue. ³

Sri Lanka has a plural society, a mosaic of self-aware communities, distinguished from one another along ethnic, In the wake of Independence religious or linguistic grounds. the absence of strong parties derived from disciplined organisation from clear-cut economic or revolutionary differences or from an intense struggle for Independence has made the Sri Lankan political life, closely bound up with communal and traditional differentiations. After the Independence as the local political leaders have responded to the imperatives of representative politics, the social differences have often been played upon and accentuated under racial, ethnic divisions, It'll well be realised that in a plural society, like that of contemporary Sri Lanka with solidarity patterns based upon religion, language, ethnic identity, Itis hard to establish a national consensus on basic social and political goals. But an overwhelming number of middle-class Sri Lanka Tamils in the north and east look towards the Sinhalese south and the capital city of Colombo for economic gains and political ferment. This

3. V.P. Vaidik, <u>Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka, India's</u> <u>Options</u> (National, 1986), p.7. inhibits the development of a separatism, that looks to South-India as an alternate focus of loyalty.

On the other hand, the Sinhalas are socially and politically divided and are not sure of their strength and cohasion. they tend to regard the non-Buddhist minorities especially the Tamils as a greater threat than they actually are. Again, the imaginary fear about India is the presence of Tamil multitudes in South-India sharing a common race and culture with the Sri Lanka Tamils is viewed as an external threat to the existence of Sinhalas in the island. The Sinhalas feel that they have no other place to go except Sri Lanka while the Tamils, with their 12.6 per cent of the Sri Lankan population who appear to be in minority are really a dominant community if one takes into account the 50 million people of Tamil Nadu, just thirty kilometers away, with whom they have special relationship and on whom they can fall back in an hour of History, as perceived by the Sinhalas, has helped crisis. bread a minority complex in them though they are the overwhelming majority in Sri Lanka with 74 per cent of the total population.

The concept of the 'nation-state' employees a homogneity, a unity of sentiments and a way of life that do not yet exist.⁴

^{4.} W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton, 1960), pp.17-19.

In South-Asia, there are plural societies made up of a congeries of distinctive and self-aware groups who are differentiated by race, religion and language. In every country there are large numbers of men and women who speak different languages and live within different cultural traditions. Racial conciousness is widespread and alert awareness of racial differences adds to the divisions in the society. In certain countries, caste stratification and foreign immigrant communities provide other diversities.⁵ The principle of majority rule suggests that more numerous have the right to have everything as they wish, but democratic values emphasise the rights of minorities. This is complicated when a growing group awareness encourages each ethnic or cultural community to seek in its own past its unique qualities - a search that only accentuates the separateness of each country. In case of Sri Lanka the racial ethnic conflict that has given rise to the Tamil demand for separatism, has undermined the unity and stability of the nation. It has also created conditions for the interference of regional and extra-regional powers who have intensified their arms build-up in the region.

Thus in the case of Sri Lanka, its internal domestic setting determines its external behaviour and position in matters

5. Ibid.

of military, strategic and security concerns. But in matters of foreign policies and external behaviour, its geographical configurations set limits to what its statesman can do. So the domestic socio-economic and cultural factors and the strategic, security considerations mutually reinforce each For a microstate like Sri Lanka, there is no need for other. a monolith pattern in divergence to attain greater security but rather the emphasis should be on a rational, common sociopolitical identification underlying the unity of all communities and all people. In a broader international framework Sri Lanka's regional Asian position and its world setting serve as the dud balancing force, which seeks a 'middle path' as an independent non-aligned nation. After the perusal of the above factors, it is seen that there is a close linkage between Sri Lanka's domestic and external milieu which determines the security problem in its geo-political dimensions.

For Sri Lanka, its internal domestic politics holds the key to its security problem in its peculiar geographical configurations. The waried nature of socio-economic, political and other factors in the society determine the efficacy and stability of the state. In a plural society like Sri Lanka, with too many divisions in society, the security problem is beset with a host of internal threats in a varied nature.

CHAPTER III

SRI LANKA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

N.

In a geographical configuration, the South Asian Region constituting the states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives presents a sub-system of states in the broader consideration of the international state-system. All these states are tied to the South Asian sub-system on the grounds of a common civilisational heritage, ethnic, religious and linguistic affinities and existence of a common level of interaction determined by the very fact of geographical contiguity. There is another characteristic feature in the sub-system that lends a special Indo-centric attribute to the region. In this set-up there is a certain infra-structural linkages within the states that manifest in a systemic divergence and heterogeneous character.

The states of South Asian region have common sociopolitical phenomena in a peculiar domestic and international setting for which there is some degree of insecurity and instability in the region. Regional security in the Third World is becoming increasingly vulnerable and it's theoretically untenable and practically naive to dissociate any region of the Third World from the overall global security environment.¹ Again, the regional security is threatened by inter-state conflicts, tensions and wars in the region. These conflicts may be due to differing boundary claims, ideological incompatibility or irreconcilability of political and economic interests.

^{1.} S.D. Muni, "Systemic Divergence and Regional Insecurity in South Asia", vol.3, no.1, <u>Problems of Non-alignment</u>, April-Sept. 1985, pp.

Further, the security of the individual states is threatened from the internal conflicts that arise from within the "national" set-up as a result of turnoil and disruption in the socio-political order of the state.

If one looks closely at the South Asian scene, one finds that the strategic discord discernible in the region as a characteristic feature has a very strong parallel in the systemic divergences obtaining in the region. In view of the region's geographical contiguity and socio-cultural identities existing across national boundaries, it is inevitable that its strategic discord and systemic divergence should mutually be related.

The South Asian states have a common colonial heritage due to the past dominance of British colonialism in direct or indirect nature. In the colonial period, the British had calculated the geo-strategic imperatives of the region in consideration of the Indian defence area as a significant strategic environment. The defence area, embracing the whole sub-continent and extending to the waters of Indian Ocean was the focal point of the British power in the region. The British naval power in its bid for supremacy in the Indian Ocean region took over the strategic points in the ocean and consolidated its position in the area. In its grand naval military strategy, Sri Lanka was a pivotal area, in terms of greater political, economic and strategic interests.

Before its independence, the British signed the Sri Lánka-UK Defence Agreement in 1947 in connection with the taking over of bases in Sri Lanka and harbour and airport transit facilities for British power, even it had been extended to Soviet and American ships. Thus the fear of big power rivalry, with its attendant consequences exposed the Sri Lanka's nodal position in the Indian Ocean. Another fundamental geographical fact which confronts the tiny state is its separation by only a few kilometers from a massive continental power, India. In the changed context of international relations, the strategic dilemmas in South Asia was that India conceived of her neighbouring countries as lying within its defence perimeter and being integral to the security interests of India, while India's neighbours themselves regard India as the source of their own insecurity against whom it is necessary to organise their own security interests, sometimes even on extra-regional basis. Thus the strategic position of India in this South-Asian subsystem has a veritable importance in its broader regional implications. For Sri Lanka, the quest for overseas market for its export-import economy, was the compelling factor behind the general political and military interests in the Indian Ocean.

Under the British commonwealth the defence agreement with U.K. had obligated the British to provide such military assistance for the defence of Sri Lanka's territory, defence against

aggression and protection of essential communications in a 'mutual' defence plan. The Sri Lankan history provides the fact that in the wake of independence, the country was in a state of chaos and disorder and the country was in search of a balance in the matters of its foreign policy. The continuation of alliance with the British guaranteed its security in the region. Gradually with the onset of cold war and super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka found itself in the maritime penetration of foreign powers extending to this 'third' geo-strategic area in the world. Again the grand oceanic designs of Super Powers and its competing strategic, commercial interests have led to a rapid arms build-up of both conventional and nuclear arsenals threatening the peace and stability of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. After long years as a 'peaceful British lake', the ocean came to be an arena of confrontation in sixties and early seventies. Several developments in the area have contributed to this transformation. According to the western analysts, the British withdrawal from East of Suez, created a 'power vaccum' in the area, necessitating other powers to full the void in the region. The US policy of economic interests in the Persian Gulf and its diplomatic manoeuvring in Middle-East in its strategic designs against Soviet Union, sought to pursue an aggressive military strategy in deploying arms and ammunitions from the Middle-East to the Indian Ocean region.

The strategic significance of the ocean became more important to the west, particularly to USA after weapon system based on nuclear propulsion and SLBM was tested in developing the first and second strike capability for USA. The Soviet Union on the other hand, sought to neutralise the threat from the area, with its strong support to the nationalist and non-aligned states in the region. For US. its presence in North-sea, Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific and Mediterranean faced certain challenges from the Soviet power, but in the Indian Ocean, it was in a more favourable strategic position to counter any Soviet threat in the area. Other powers like China, France and Japan sought to substantiate their position and make their presence felt in the last decades. It has thus intensified the local conflict through the interference of the big powers in the region.

Local conflicts and regional rivalaries are used by the Big Powers to spread their presence to suit their strategic and local interests as well. In the case of USA, the loss of security in Persian Gulf, Middle-East, Afghanistan and Horn of Africa (Ethiopia), compelled it to consider the whole region as an 'Arc of Crisis' for its vital importance in matters of security and strategy in the region.² With this the American Administration called for a 'Rapid Deployment Force' and the theatre of operations shifted to Asia, embracing most of the areas of tensions in the Indian Ocean region.

^{2.} Fred Holiday, <u>Threat from the East?</u> (Penguin, 1981), pp.13-32.

Gradually, the Super Powers got seriously engaged in establishing bases, acquiring naval, military power and constituting regional military pacts in the South Asian These powers went to the extent of pressure tactics region. including financial inducements, offers of arms and equipments and veiled threats to gain their military and political objectives in the region. The gradual arms build-up in the Indian Ocean region has unleashed a fierce arms race in the littoral countries and in Some countries the insurgency of some groups has been manipulated by the outside powers in ousting the unco-operative regimes. Little concern is shown for the susceptibilities, sensitivities and aspirations of these sovereign mini-, micro states, most of whom simply want the power blocs to quit the area and leave them alone. These littoral countries, relatively defenceless against the Super Power encroachments have fallen prey to one power or the other.

In addition to strategic and military interests, the economic interests bound the Big Powers to establish their military bases. The Indian Ocean area, with its valuable resources for imports and markets, account for the Big Power rivalry in economic matters. The western states and the U.S. view the entire gamut of Soviet activity - military, political, economic and diplomatic as a danger to its own interest and it calls for an accompanying western build-up in the region.

The U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean region is seen as tangible evidence of western interests in the area, as well as an expression of its determination to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming predominant in the region. The Joint-US-British venture converting the islands of Diego Garcia into American bases for strategic and military build-up, has resulted in a theatre for nuclear rivalry in South Asia. Politically, the littoral states constituting the Non-aligned movement have seriously opposed the nuclear build-up in the region, calling for a 'Zone of Peace' in South Asia. In this context, a brief spell in the process of Cold War saw the advent of 'Detente' in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the USA and the Soviet Union. Again with the onset of New Cold War the Soviet Union was found to possess enough naval capability in the Indian Ocean at a par with the United States. This action-reaction cycle has created an extremely unstable situation, where the regional powers like India, Sri Lanka and Pakistar are threatened by its destabilising effect.

The intensive military build-up by US in Diego Garcia matched by the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has posed serious threats to the Non-aligned countries in the region. In this context, Sri Lanka has taken the lead in a call for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, free from the Super Powers rivalry in the region.

In the sub-continent, the Indian security concerns are linked to the other littoral countries as India has strong ethnic, cultural and economic ties with the regional micro- and mini-states which look to India for assistance not only in economic and technical but also in security matters. India is the largest country in the region and as the leading nation of the Non-aligned movement, is quite anxious to assume an important role in the region. But the regional differences and the major powers' interference has denied it opportunity to play a constructive role in the region. India feels very strongly that the menacing military and naval presence of the Super Powers and their calculated interference in the internal affairs of the littoral and hinterland states has a highly disruptive and destabilising effect on the over-all peace and security in the region.

On the other hand, the Sri Lankan endeavour in this respect is highly commendable for its leading role in propounding the idea of "Zone of Peace" at the very beginning and initiating it in UN and other international forums. The basic objective of Sri Lankan effort is manifested in its call for an end to imperialism and neo-colonialism and a complete disarmament in the area preventing the Big Power clash in the Indian Ocean region. It has called for the Afro-Asian solidarity and above all, to make it a movement by the Non-aligned nations. Sri Lanka feels that it can provide the necessary leadership for the Non-aligned nations, in this context. In this posture, as a Non-aligned country Sri Lanka raised the issue of the Indian Ocean in the Non-aligned Meetings in Cairo and Lusaka and in Commonwealth Meetings and General Assembly of United Nations. First of all, in 1964, an idea of Nuclear Free Zone in Indian Ocean was mooted in the Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Nations who expressed their anxiety over Indian Ocean issue. Subsequently in 1970, Lusaka conference of Non-aligned states, the summit called upon all states to respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In 1971, a Sri Lankan motion in the General Assembly of the United Nations was adopted and in Resolution 2832 (XXVI) the Assembly stated that 'the Indian Ocean within limits to be determined together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all times as a Zone of Peace ??

The resolution was intended to eliminate, reduce, restrict or halt the further expansion of military presence and eliminating from the Indian Ocean, all bases, military installations and logistic supply facilities; the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry. Again

^{3.} Resolution 2823 (XXVI), General Assembly Bocuments, United Nations.

in 1974, the General Assembly called upon the great powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean region and requested the littoral and hinterland states to consult with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and invited all states, especially the great powers to co-operate with the Committee (Resolution 4259-A (XXIX).

The basic aims and objectives in these resolutions reflect the Sri Lankan wish to strengthen the sovereighty and independence of the Indian Ocean region states against the hegemonic drives and struggles of the major military powers in South-Asia. A Peace Zone could within its limit, eliminate those manifestation and correspondingly enhance the sovereignty and political independence of states therein. The growing dissatisfaction with the concept of balance of power, as a basis of international peace and security and therefore the wish to opt designated parts of the world out of this application of the concept and its imperatives has guided the declaration. More so, in the name of 'detente' and 'disarmament' for international security, the Non-aligned nations' political slogan materialised in the Peace Zone concept. The littoral and hinterland states held a meeting in July, 1979 and adopted without a vote, principles of agreement for implementing the 1971 Declaration dealing with the limitations of the Zone, the elimination of the great powers' military presence there, the

denuclearisation of the ocean, the non-use of force, regional co-operation and the free use of the ocean by vessels of all nations. Another significant step forward was taken when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 34/80-B of 11 December, 1979, containing the decision to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean which had been under discussion for several years.

The Assembly selected Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka as the venue of the conference to be held in 1981. The resolution also contained a provision for the enlargement of the membership of the adhoc committee from twenty-three to forty-six to include those permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that were not already members. The enlarged Committee was entrusted with the task of undertaking the preparatory work for the Indian Ocean conference. But contrary to all expectations the US and its western allies have not taken any initiative for this conference in the wake of Afghanistan crisis. They maintained that the situation changed drastically with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that there could be no meaningful progress untill that invasion has been reversed. On the other hand, the Soviets have consistently supported the "Zone of Peace" proposal and expressed its readiness to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States on the reduction of military forces including nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean region.

The Non-aligned states have consistently extended their unanimous support for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace. During the seventh conference of Heads of Governments of Non-aligned countries in New Delhi in March '83, the meeting afformed its full support towards the attainment of objectives of 1971 Declaration and urged all great powers and major mari-time users to participate in conference in a constructive spirit and to start reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean region. Subsequently, Sri Lanka introduced a draft resolution on behalf of Nonaligned nations for the holding of Colombo Conference in 1984. But this move in UN was opposed by US and its allies for which it was postponed for the next year amidst a lot of confusion.

Thus the attempts and moves for a 'Peace Zone' in the area have been met with opposition from the Big Powers in their bid for expansionist and acquisitive designs in the area. But in such state of affairs, S ri Lanka stands for peace and security in the region and it has expressed it through bilateral and multilateral dialogues and conferences. As one with the Non-aligned Nations, it has championed the aims and objectives of peace and security in the area in an attempt to reduce the tensions and conflicts in the international waters of Indian Ocean. It has taken note of the measure to resolve the security problem in the Indian Ocean. by the closer interaction of the regional states in a political and military prespective.

It has been suggested that the major powers have never taken the idea of Zone of Peace seriously and that so long as they have the power to enforce their wishes, they will not be willing to relinquish the bases, facilities, assumed supplies of oil and other vital materials and markets for their lucrative arms industry which they have established in the region. To whatever extent, this is in fact the case, the states of the Indian Ocean area spould do well to try to establish greater unity and co-operation among themselves and devise ways and means for achieving collective self-reliance. The security of the region presupposes a constant effort to bring about mutual understanding among the littoral countries to solve their intraregional political problems and any sort of ethnic, linguistic conflicts in the region.

In the light of the above analysis, the role of Sri Lanka in this South Asian region asumes a veritable importance. The recent diplomatic moves to bring about a South-Asian Regional Cooperation may be taken as a good beginning for the regional states. It calls for the greater co-operation among the regional states in common pursuit of socio-economic, political and cultural interests. In this context, Sri Lanka has an important role in the matters of security and stability in the area.

CHAPTER IV

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SRI LANKA AND ITS SECURITY_MANAGEMENT

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In all the nascent independent states of Asia and Africa, the concern for 'security' and 'stability' is a common one, varying in the degree of socio-economic and political structure of the states. In this context, the micro-states of Asia and Africa share certain common phenomena like post colonial societies, low political culture and a fragile internal system that determine the external position of the states in the international arena. In these states there is a close linkage' between the internal and external settings which holds the key to the security and stability of the state. In such a perspective, the Sri Lankan quest for'security'and'order' is a recurrent one, dating back to the ancient times. Its very nature of geographical insularity and miniature phenomenon makes it wary of its 'independence' and 'stability' in times of crisis and change.

To view the security question from a specific structural point, the overwhelming view of the majority holds good in this context. The 'majority' group or community who dominates the political scene takes up the nationalists slogans to raise its interests in terms of socio-economic and political rights and previleges in proportion to their number in the society. Thus it calls for the awakening of the primordial sentiments in a nationalist fervour. Such reflections in the Sri Lankan Society are obvious, as the long history of colonial rule resulted in the benign neglect of the majority in proportion to their

demographic concentration in the society. The majority demand for more previliges and concessions in socioeconomic and cultural matters, has alienated the minority in the society who has looked upto some other society of similar racial, ethnic nature. In case of Sri Lanka, the deep-seated socio-economic rivalries among the Sinhalas and the Tamils culminating in violent Sinhalese nationalism have seriously affected the stability in the society.

The Tamil-Sinhala conflict can be viewed in a broader historical and sociological perspective. The major cause of the mutual distrust and conflict among these racial-ethnic groups is that the Sinhalas though majority in number, have never been allowed to avail the opportunities in proportion to their population. They complain that the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils who constitute a 'majority' among the 'minorities' look to the neighbouring mainland, India for their socio-political fostering and thus pose a serious threat to the Sinhalas in their existence in the island.

In this domestic socio-political milieu, the nature and magnitude of the security question can be examined in reference to the historical heritage in the society. Dating back to the historical legends it brings home the point that the first population drawn from the Indian main land settled in the island in successive waves. Subsequently, the Tamil

invasion saw the exodus of Tamil masses from the South India particularly Tamil Nadu. Gradually, the Tamils became known as the minority people in Sri Lanka compared to its presence in India.

Historically seen, the Tamil invaders successive invasions generated unity and solidarity among the Sinhalas who tried to maintain a conflict with the Tamils in the society. The Chola conquest of Northern Sinhalese kingdom and its subsequent domination over the natives for a long time, left an impact of racial discrimination and distrust of Indians. Gradually the idea of an all-island sovereignty with a notion that Sri Lanka is for the Sinhalese was emphasised and the minority Tamils were discriminated in society. In changing times, with the spread of Buddhism and presence of other races, beliefs etc., it called for group solidarity and racial unity among the Sinhalas. It gave rise to a multiethnic society distilled into a plural category of social differences where tension became a common feature. Broadly seen the interaction of varied ethnic groups and different culture did arouse some divisive tendancies with the clash of interests and it weakened the central power as a result of the 'weak defence' and 'parochialism' among the Sinhalas. The British empire took over Sri Lanka for its geographical and strategic implications.

The security problem, however complex and critical it may be, the determinant factors can be denoted by a host of socio-economic, cultural and political variants The Sri Lankan internal pattern of poliwithin the state. tics and populace are closely linked with the 'external setting' which determines the degree of security and stability in the region. Its a common feature that in the South-Asian sub-system the states tend to look their positions of security and 'peace' from a global and regional point of view, ignoring the important domestic factors which play a crucial role in shaping the destiny of the nation. Because the internal as well as external settings are determined by certain domestic compulsions, socio-economic and cultural divergences and other less stable factors of political regimes, policies and national defence of the state. Broadly, these elements of 'security' aspect may be categorised under the domestic factors i.e. socio-economic differentiation, nationalism, ethnic-cultural divergences and character of political regimes and policies which make up the structural matrix of the state.

But in its external phenomenon, the security problem is governed by the factors of geographical situation, regional and international framework and the military build-up with related foreign policies, all account for the external position of a country in the international framework. So the

Sri Lankan quest for security and stability is governed by certain geo-political compulsions, of military and strategic nature in the external setting of the country. For Sri Lanka, the Indian Ocean Region as a major strategic area, has an important role to play in its military and security affairs. To study the magnitude and nature of the security problem, the internal domestic milieu of Sri Lankan should be taken into consideration in the light of sociopolitical structure within the society.

The microstates of Asia and Africa, attaining Independence from the colonial rule, face the problem of 'nation-building' in its varied character. The national security question is associated with the problem of 'nationbuilding' in the society which is conditioned by a host of socio-economic and political factors within the society. The society beset with myriad groups or communities of ethnic, cultural distinctions give a picture of 'flux' in the domestic politics of a country. The presence of racial, ethnic groups in the society is marked by an awakening of primordial sentiments. The groups call for the primordial loyalties to their indigenous culture and tradition which tend to conflict with the general civic life in the society. The society lacking a common identity and unity, is crystallised into serious divisions and there develops a fissiparous tendency among the heterogeneous elements in the society.

Again the lack of an 'integration' in terms of socioeconomic and cultural cohesim in the society results in strong divergences which weaken its unity and stability encouraging external interference from outside forces.

The socio-economic disparities in the Sri Lankan society are seen on the lines of groups and communities in majority and minority character. The majority' group of Sinhalas claim that their neglect during the long British period resulted in their backward status in the society compared to the minority groups. They claim that they are entitled to have more privileges and rights in proportionate to their number in the society. So they demand a proportionate share in the industry and employment sectors.¹ It is argued that the economic cause of the Tamils in Sri Lanka holding a large share in jobs and economy, disproportionate to their population, might lead to their consolidation in the society. at the expense of majority. So the 'majority' call for 'Sinhalas only' as put forward by Buddhist elites, entertain certain fears among the minority Tamils. The political styles and patterns of government conduct are influenced by the pressures from the Sinhalese Buddhists. The populist slogans afford a short-cut to electoral success and in its implimentation it is faced with stiff resistance from the minority Tamils.

^{1.} V.P. Vaidik, <u>Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka, India's Options</u>, (New Delhi, 1986), pp.68-85.

From economic standpoint, there are some internal constraints in the society like the pattern of 'dual economy' which affects a large number of people in general. The existence of plantation agriculture based on export crops like tea, rubber and coconuts constitutes the chief source of foreign exchange from British times. But the neglect of traditional sector of cultivation, has made it a 'dependent' economy, following a pattern of western oriented policies in the first decade of its independence. Another noticeable feature of the economy after independence is the increasing dependence on foreign sources of finance for economic development which has seen serious social and political problems at home. The 'scarce' economy and strong competition among the groups in the society has exacerbated the social conflict. On the other hand, the country's close ties with the western capitalist countries and its dependence from international monetory institutions like World Bank, IMF etc. has subjected it to complete western influence, time and again. During the 60's the economy confronted with a serious foreign exchange crises, felt a high rate of un-employment, rising cost of living and acute food shortages in the country.

For all these economic problems, the country severely dependent upon the foreign western countries, followed an 'open-door' economic policy where the western multinational companies dominated the economy and had their share in it.

In this context, the pattern of capitalist economy of Sri Lanka has resulted in gross inequalities among the people in the society. Closely, related with these economic disparities, the social and ethnic rivalries are the outcome of disparities in education and employment, religion and culture, language and tradition. For the lack of nationalist sentiments like political movements or Independence struggle, the society is divided in racial linguistic divergences. The new nationalism after 'Independence' was a divided one with majority Sinhalese 'chauvinism' overriding the Tamil communalism reflected on the basis of language and race. The Sinhalese insistence on 'Sinhalas only' as monopolised by militant Buddhists, het launched a. virulent attack on Christians, and Tamils and criticised the English educated political elites for not taking coercive action against the minorities. All these bickerings in socio-economic and political spheres have percolated into serious divisions in the society and the heterogeneous character of society has increased by the political groupings of the different communities. The prominent internal problem of Sri Lanka has a direct bearing on mutual understanding and peace between the countries of the region. The future of the large Indian minorities in the island and the Sinhalese resentment towards these people, arises partly from the fear of tangible development, viz. the lowering of the living standards of the majority people by an alien community. Otherwise it arises from the intangible and imaginary fears about India which is a large power, situated nearby.

Now coming to the political aspect of the national security, it's found that in the formulation of foreign policy and defence arrangements, the role of different parties has played a major role in the security management of the state. The Sri Lankan Independence was one of the "smooth transition of power", a negotiated one after which the British economic holdings continued under the westernised United National Party (UNP). In the Commonwealth status, the country's foreign powers were brought into the executive power of the Prime Minister; so the personal character of Prime Minister played an important role in the making of the foreign policy. Despite some divergences among the political parties, there was a fundamental agreement on the issues of colonialism, disarmament and 'neutrality' in foreign policy matters. But the difference of opinion was in the case of relationship with the western and communist countries and nationalisation of foreign companies. But a pertinent problem exists as to the definition of national interests in terms of The UNP and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) foreign policies. broadly differ on the issue of mutual defence agreement with ... the United Kingdom.

After Independence, Sri Lanka joined the Commonwealth of nations in an independent manner and the UNP-led government followed a policy of alliance with the British Power in all matters. But the SLFP government on the other hand, reversed

the policy of 'till' towards the British Power. In this context, the security perception is viewed in different perspectives under different political regimes. But there is a common perception that the Sri Lankan security problem is viewed in a regional and external setting, taking note of the geo-political compulsions of the state in the regional set-up. As it is already discussed in the previous chapters, the geographical setting of Sri Lanka, assumes serious strategic dimensions, the concern for security becomes a national problem. For its key position in the vast waters of Indian Ocean, completely detached from the land mass of the sub-continent, it has serious strategic interests in terms of its external security and order in the region. In its bid for security, it is governed by a policy of alliance with some Big Power like British, as its guardian of securityinterests in the region. The objective as reflected in the speech of D.S. Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of Independent Sri Lanka in a broadcast over the BBC in 1951 is in the following words :

"My own country (Ceylon) Sri Lanka is the smallest single entity in the vast region of South-East Asia ... A world of peace is therefore her first and foremost need, the world's goodwill next and then some timely and appropriate assistance"²

^{2.} D.S. Senanayake, ('Speech delivered over the BBC", <u>the</u> <u>Ceylon Historical Journal</u>, vol.5, 1957, p.114.

The Sri Lankan security perspective in strategic and political imperatives has been expressed by a Minister, J.R. Jayawardene in his address to the International Law Association on December, 1954, In the course of his address, he said that, "....there has never been absent also the realism which arises from our geographical and strategic position in the Indian Ocean..... A realistic appreciation of our position in South-East Asia, has made us enter into a military alliance with the United Kingdom."

The national security problem in its magnitude and character is beset by the regional and external interaction of Big Power military and strategic calculations. The cold war phenamenon largely prevalent in Asia and Africa with division of the world into two camps, have aroused fears of national security and sovereignty in the mini-microstates of the South Asian region. In Sri Lankan context, it is seen that it was free from the influence of Big Powers in the first decade of its independence, but gradually, the presence of Super Powers in the region corresponding to their military build-up, has made Sri Lanka wary of its security and stability.

After the withdrawal of the British Power from the sub-continent the independent states of India and Pakistan were in turmoil of partition and in case of Burma insurrection had destabilised the nation. In such a tense period of

regional in security, Sri Lankan quest for a 'balanced foreign policy' coincided with its British commonwealth status and the policy of 'alliance' with the British was taken as a guarantee of security. As there was no strife and struggle during the Sri Lankan Independence period, the power elite sought to embrace the British power as their guardion of regional security in matters of military and strategic interests. Again, the common experiences during the second World War, like the Japanese invasion and British shielding of Sri Lanka and the subsequent British commitment to transfer of power and the belief in parliamentary institutions, democratic culture, other ideals reinforced the Sri Lankan faith in the British power. In order to have more allies in economic, political spares, the Sri Lankans saw the British as the guarantee of all facilities.

But in the regional context the fear of India, was a major consideration in Sri Lanka's foreign policy which had seen the foreboding presence of Indian Tamils as portents of danger for the country. Otherwise, if a chauvinist government comes to power in New Delhi and seeks to buttress a weak domestic position by engaging in foreign war, the imminent threat for Sri Lanka is obvious, in the nature of external threat. Sri Lanka, the island of great significance for rival powers in search of air and naval facilities, acquires immense strategic importance as a focal point in the Indian Ocean area. After the American arms build-up in Diego Garcia, and the

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subsequent Russian presence in the area with fleets of supply ships for their fighting vessels, capable of staying in the area has intensified the military build-up in the China, on the other hand after losing its influence in region. Indo-China it has sought to have access to this Indian Ocean The search for military bases in Sri Lanka was the region. major cause of security concern for the independent government which considered the Big Power presence and military build-up as a threat to its security in the region. Despite repeated governmental affirmation that bases in the island, would not be leased to foreign powers, there had been reports that the Chinese in March, 1971 for instance, and the Soviets in May of the same year had made requests for base facilities in the great natural harbour of Trincomalee.3 The government had to issue a categorical denial against any such requests and it reiterated its non-alignment policy and denial of bases to foreign powers.

From a geographical stand point, the situation of the island is unique for a distance of nine thousand miles south of Sri Lanka, there is no patch of land until one hits the Antarctic. The sea distances between land are also very great. From Capetown to Singapore, it is 5,631 nautical miles and

3. A.J. Wilson, <u>Politics in Sri Lanka</u>, 1947-1973, **Marithm**, (London, 1974) p.270.

from Capetown to Calcutta 5,480 nautical miles and from Suez to Jakarta 5,510 nautical miles. The scarcity of natural harbours like a few good harbours in this ocean area, makes the Sri Lankan harbours of Trincomalee, Galle and Colombo, vital to the search for military power.

In its strategic position in Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka chose to follow a 'middle path' in its foreign policies as a compromise in regional and international framework. The 'Defence Treaty' with the British government brought mutual obligations of defence and security with the British installations in Trincomalee harbour and there was an increase in the numerical strength of Sri Lankan army, naval and The Indian power was viewed either as an aerial forces. alternative defence associate or a veritable threat to its There was little choice for an independent line security. of action, for Sri Lanka since it had serious economic and military compulsions in the nature of domestic discord and disorder in the society. The country's defence preparedness and nature of security was not serious enough in anticipation of any danger.

Sri Lanka does not have any military tradition, worth speaking up, in the sense of her armed forces being battlehungry or anxious to meet external aggression or domestic in surrection.⁴ But the abortive coup attempt of 1962 and the

4. Ibid . p. 2. 22

suspected coup of Buddhist army officers in 1966-67 had no serious designs of full-fledged seizure of power or army takeover. In effect, the island's armed forces are mainly organised for purposes of domestic force-working such as controlling communal unrest or industrial turbulence in times of crises, curbing the influx of illicit immigrants from the South Indian coast and other snuggling activities. In these operations, the role of army and police is important in maintaining the internal security order in the country. The attitude of political statesman in their formulation of policies in matters of external concern, reflects in a sense their involvement in domestic politics. The domestic politics is inter-linked with its domestic milieu which determines the external position. The preponderant position of regional powers and extra-regional powers has an important place in the security aspect of Sri Lanka.

In this context, the Indian question occupies a significant place in the security dimensions of the Indian Ocean region. The Indian concept of 'subcontinental strategic area' involving Sri Lanka makes it (Sri Lanka) distrustful of India and it asserts its military strength through some alliance with the foreign power. On the other hand, practically as it is, India plays an important role in the security of Sri Lanka in the geographical configuration of the region. To dispel all doubts from India's side, Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had expressed : "The difficulty of a place like (Ceylon) Sri Lanka more than others," he said is the fear that Ceylon has of India Here's a great big continent lying astride north of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and they are, I'm sorry, I think unreasonably, just afraid of being swamped or swallowed by India or the Indian people."

In such an impending nature of its security, the Sri Lankan quest for peace and order in the region ends up with some political alliance with some Big Powers for economic and military gains. So the real politik in Sri Lanka's foreign policy is determined by its economic circumstances, coupled with military requirements. The attitude of the government towards membership of the Commonwealth, UN and its related agencies to other western countries are all in the last analysis manifested in terms of national interest.

For a more comprehensive view of security perspective the security management from British time provides the pattern of defence and foreign policites adopted in the post-Independenc phase. In the light of its close relations with British power, the magnitude and character of security has assumed much importance since the colonial period. During the British period the Crown colony was under the direct administration of Britain like India and there was a centralised administ-

ration in the island under the office of a Governor. So the power of the alien administration was "entrenched' in a despotic manner, very little control by the distant authority of the Queen. The British who brought the whole island under their colonial administration in 1815 in a full-fledged manner, continued to rule over it till 1947. During these long decades of colonial rule, the British had designed a good communication network and extensive roads and railroads were constructed to facilitate the economy and transport. The port-cities and main trading centres were well-connected for a smooth economic and political administration. The ports of Colombo, Trincomalee, Jaffna and Mannar had good communication facilities and the railway system covering the principal towns of Kandy, Jaffna, Matana, Kurunegala, Negembo, Ratnapura and Kalutara had served the economic as well the strategic interests of the British Power. Trincomalee was considered to be a major strategic point, where the British had consolidated their position during the inter-war period.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, Sri Lanka was brought into the war by the British Power and as a result, the country was affected as partial black-out was imposed and other military measures were taken by the British. Naval activity at Colombo and Trincomalee was considerable and the British had strengthened its military preparedness in the area. The entry of Japan into the war and the subsequent fall of Burma, Malayasia, Singapore and Dutch East Indies, was a signal to Sri Lanka in its strategic implications. In such an emergency, the British took some active military measures by bringing some weak divisions of the Indian Army and some other Australian divisions to the region. The Royal Airforce Units were sent to the island to reenforce the British strength. Simultaneously, the Sri Lankan Defence Force was mobilised and doubled in strength. The hasty construction of air-fields and air-strips and other prompt military measures were in tune with the war-time arrangements which were intended for the security of the island.

During the war, the Japanese had launched two aerial attacks on Colombo harbour and Trincomalee which did little damage to some British ships in the area. But gradually, the danger of Japanese invasion disappeared as the American naval presence in Pacific proved a victory for the Allies and a defeat for Japan. The British stationing of some 100,000 soldiers and airmen in Sri Lanka in addition to coming and going of many thousands of naval personnel, had consolidated the military position of the island. The British garrison in small units had swelled into a strong force in the period of war and the British policies during the war had the over-all support of the Sri Lankans for

the security and stability of the island. In 1944, the headquarters of Lord Louis Mountbatten South-East Asia Command was established in Kandy, and in this respect, Sri Lanka's strategic importance in the Allies war effort was underscored. It served as the bridgehead for the destruction of Japanese power and a vital link in the supply line to the Soviet Union via the Persian Gulf. In this period of war and turmoil of Sri Lankan support for the British and the Allied Powers was in tune with its call for Independence and self-determination in the political affairs of the country. The British power, in order to placate the nationalist elements and to show some kind of recognition of the co-operation and support given by Sri Lanka: it ordered for the institution of a commission to recommend the Independence and administrative reforms for the island. The commission as it is known as Soulbury Commission recommended for no early Independence and rather prescribed a constitution under which the foreign policies were retained by the British power.

In the gradual stages of granting Independence, the British tried to woo the Sri Lankan elites who had sought for Independence and national self-determination. So, well before the Independence, the British had ensured its defence interests with an agreement with the interim government. Finally, it granted full Independence when it found a favourable'

national elite to take over in Colombo from the colonial Thus prior to formal Independence the government power. of Sri Lanka under a dominion status had reached an agreement concerning its defence and security interests which had called upon the British power to guarantee the same, in exchange for some powers in military and strategic terms. Because the island had lacked the power to manage its foreign affairs in defence and military interests, it entered into an alliance with the British in this context. The main political party, United National Party under D.S. Senanayake who became the Prime Minister in the Independent Sri Lanka, collaborated with the British idea of "mutual defence agreements'. So the British signed three agreements on 11 November 1947 which explicitly give recognition to Sri Lanka's Independence. The agreements also contain certain defence and military clauses which contained the pro-British attitude of the Senanayake government. The agreements, signed by the government of Sri Lanka and United Kingdom, was in a Defence and External Affairs Agreement which read as follows:

... "Whereas (Ceylon) Sri Lanka has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any respect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegianc to the crown."⁵

^{5.} Lucy M. Jacob, <u>Sri Lanka: From Dominion to Republic</u> (New Delhi, 1973), pp.68-85.

The Defence Agreement contained five articles and according to the second of these, Sri Lanka had to provide all the necessary facilities to the government of United Kingdom to maintain British naval, air and land forces in Sri Lanka as required for "mutual defence". This article gave the British the right to run their military establishments in the island as they had been run during the colonial The wording of the second article is as follows: days. "The Government of (Ceylon) Sri Lanka will grant to the government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually These facilities will include the use of naval and ag reed. air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said forces as they exercise at present."6

The UNP policy of agreements with British was under attack from many political quarters and D.S. Senanayake was dubbed as the traitor of Asia. Some Sri Lankan leaders argued that there was no need for Sri Lanka to enter into a defence agreement because she had no enemy to be afraid of and that

6. Ibid.

the Defence Agreement was mostly in the interest of British. But from all security and defence considerations, the Defence Agreement though 'voluntary' in nature, it rightly served the interests of Sri Lankan security after Independence. The faith in Commonwealth system and British power, as the guaranter of defence and security, had made Sri Lanka to toe the western line and the foreign policies were directed in the same line.

Under the UNP rule from 1948 to 1956, the government had followed the western line of political and military interests in its foreign policy. From 1950 onwards, Sri Lanka became closer to USA; and the British installations in Trincomalee and Katunayake reenforced the western presence in the island. But gradually under Dudley Senanayake and other leaders, Sri Lanka was interested in a policy of 'nonalignment and friendship with all the neighbouring countries in the region. The Regional meetings of Bandung and Colombo created a new sense of solidarity among the weak states of Asia and Africa with whom Sri Lanka expressed its unity and integrity. During this period from 1948 to 1956, it did not join any military organisation such as the NATO or SEATO, but its foreign policy was tilted towards the west. The strong belief in British power and the military presence in the area, had dispelled all the fears from Sri Lankan people. Under the UNP administration, the leaders like D.S. Senanayake and

others had realised that the British power as the guardian of Sri Lanka's security, could continue after independence without any shift in its relations.

The UNP rule till 1955 saw no drastic change in the foreign policy of Sri Lanka, different from the pre-Independence period. But in 1956, with coming of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) into power, the island followed a new The SLFP. policy in its military and strategic affairs. laid by S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike, first proclaimed the policy of 'Non-alignment' and for the best interests of security and peace, it considered neutralism as the chief cornerstone of its foreign policy. He vociferously pleaded for noninvolvement with the Big Powers and emphasised on the regional unity and stability in a mutual interaction with the neighbours. In reviewing the past policies of UNP government, the SLFP government found fault with all the Defence Agreements and called for its re-examination. So Bandarnaike pleaded for a 'preventive diplomacy' to bridge the gap between the power blocks and he believed in neutrality in foreign policies with a view to promoting the national interests of Sri Lanka. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, the British power was given a raw deal by the Bandarnaike government which curtailed the British position in the island. It is in this context, the British had to transfer its military and naval bases in the island to the Sri Lankan government in 1957. It was

considered as a symbolic gesture in completing the island's independence from British rule in defence and military matters. On the other hand, the Sri Lanka's policy of 'Non-alignment' and cordial relations with its neighbours strengthemedtits independence and security in the region.

In matter of defence and security, the Bandamaike Government saw the danger of 'cold war' to the Indian Ocean region and a policy of 'non-involvement' in Big Power conflict was construed as a safe policy in military and security matter. The government argued that the British Defence Agreement had not afforded the country any credible assurance of security nor had it ensured her neutrality in potential confrontation between the rival powers in the cold war. Rather it felt that, the Srilankan involvement could lead to a disaster for its wishes and interest in the region. But regarding the commonwealth status, Bandarnaike Government asserted its ties with the British power and chose to emphasise the commonwealth's potential for development into a 'viable third force' distinct from the two main power blocks. Bandarnaike repeatedly emphasise the point that is neutralism should not be construed as being directed against the west, more than once he declared that their shared democratic way of life drew Sri Lanka closer to United States and other western countries.

After the SLFP rule, the UNP Government has followed a pro-western line in its foreign policies and defence and economic policies. The westward tilt in Sri Lankan foreign policy began to show up right from the beginning of the laissez faire economic policy adopted by the Jayewardene Government in 1977. But in recent years, the Jayewardene Government has sought the help of Major Powers to ensure the security of the island against the Tamil militants' insurgency.

The policies like revival of the Defence Agreement of 1947 with Great Britain, the Trincomalee Tank Farm Deal, an agreement to expand the scope of Voice of America (VOA) in Sri Lanka, collaboration with the Mossad and the SAS and galloping defence expenditure are some of the major steps and trends that have affected the security environment in South Asian Region, in general and India in particular. The Indian Government has been emestly advocating the cause for making in the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. But lately the Sri Lankan policies towards the western countries have been soft and its opposition to the Indian view, has serious security implication for South Asia.

NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM OF SRI LANKA

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CHAPTER V

As it is discussed in the previous chapters. the security problem of microstates like Sri Lanka has many facets in its 'internal' and 'external' character, of which the internal security is set by the combination of social, ethnic and political factor that make up the The domestic sociostructural matrix of the state. political milieu determines the magnitude and nature of security problem corresponding to the degree of internal stability and cohesion in society. The internal setting in its socio-political pattern within the society, has a necessary 'linkage' with its 'external' setting in regional and international environment. In this context, the geo-political dimensions of a state in broader security complex, determine its efficacy in its regional and international framework in a common security and strategic perspective.

Primarily, it is the national security problem in its internal setting which determines the overall strength and position of a state. Presently, the national security phenomenon has been taken up in social science research, which has been tightly linked to both the properties of the international system and attributes of the national actors, within the state. National security problem varies in its nature from the conflictive events like crisis, war or their threat on the international level, to domestic

crises that challenge the behaviour of the states and the status of its ruling elites. However, although the decision makers' concern about security of the state goes back to the emergence of the nation-state, the analysts concern and investigation into national security is more recent. From a non-strategic point of view, the security can be defined as the preservation of 'vital national values' as the core of the national security policy. It is that part of government policy, having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection and extension of vital values against existing and potential adversaries.

One of the problems in the security concern is the definition of 'vital values' in the context of national security policy of the state. If the objective of national security policy is the creation of national consensus around the national basic values, there is an implicit assumption that the society is coherent, united, and enjoys equilibrium among its forces. But in a highly stratified society dominated by a ruling elite, consensus In this light, the conflict of values may be unattainable. in society on racial ethnic divergences affect the national cohesion, resulting in the majority minority complex which undermines the unity and stability of the state. In this paralance, the Sri Lankan security problem can be studied in an analytical manner, taking note of the historical and

socio-political developments in the society.

In the South Asian region, it is widely marked that the presence of plural societies with serious racial-ethnic divisions transcend the national frontiers blurring the picture of a contiguous and homogeneous society at home. In these post-colonial societies, with the emergent nationalism, the racial, ethnic divergences are sharpened to a point and it tend to have 'conflictual loyalties' from the masses. Such racial, ethnic group conflict is a direct result of the exploitative colonialism in the nature of uneven development, relative deprivation of certain groups converging with ethnic diversities. In the colonial phase, the group-conflict remains submerged due to the elite system in politics and absence of a common pursuit in socio-economic affairs.¹ But in the later phase with advent of mass politics and the political process, the various groups adopt and use linguistic and religious motives in racial-ethnic fervour. In its independent status, these post colonial societies tend to have a conflict of interests among the majority group and others, for the majority dominance in the society. On the other hand, the minority groups in society are coerced, who express their group solidarity on racialethnic lines.

^{1.} Glifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York, 1963), (P. 109.57

The solidarity within the ethnic groups is based on bonds of common language beliefs and notions of common descent, and religion in the geographic space. In a pluralistic society, where many such groups co-exist, competition for resources usually lead to conflict. Indeed many researchers claim that ethnicity is the most prominent factor is what Dahl identified as "conflictive pluralism"². In Sri Lanka, the separate ethnic identity between the two groups in conflict, i.e. the majority Sinhala group and the minority Tamil group, is based on certain linguistic, religious and cultural The geographic dimension of the ethnic conflict differences. in Sri Lanka is of singular importance since the demand for separation by the S ri Lankan Tamil group, explicitly threatens the unity of the multi-ethnic state and calls for the need of a stable society without any social cleavages on geographical The spatial dimension in any ethnic conflict is rooted lines. in the phenomenon of geographic concentration of distinct There is an increasing tendency for such groups ethnic groups. to cling to common neighbourhood, cities, rural areas or Saul B. Cohen, an eminent political geographer has regions. in fact argued that race, religion and culture are more important operational forces in the politics of space at all geographic scales than economics and that it forms an essential

^{2.} R. Dahl, 'Pluralism Revisited' in S. Ehrlich and G. Wootton (eds.) <u>Three Faces</u>, (Despres, 1980), pp.20-23.

basis for linking people with territory. This ethnospatial aspect brings into focus, a new dimension to the study of spatial inequalities resulting from an unequal distribution of resources, especially in the Less Developed countries (LDCs) where resources are more limited. Equity issues both in terms of class and space have become increasingly important in formulating plans and strategies for resource allocations. The introduction of an ethno-spatial dimension in the political economy of a country may lead to alternative situation of imbalance or dissatisfaction. In Sri Lankan society, the economic disparities among the communities have resulted in political polarisation along the racial-ethnic lines and the 'minority' groups have been threatened in the process.

The Sri Lankan society, like any other Asian political society, with diverse socio-economic and cultural patterns saw the smooth transition of power from colonial rule to the nationalist elite. In the wake of its independence, there was a serious communal and political upheaval in the nighbouring states of India, Burma & Pakistan. But Sri Lanka did not see any partition, insurrection or instability in the newly independent status. But gradually, with the rapid socioeconomic changes and cumulative challenges of participation, di/stribution and integration in the society resulted in the rise of racial-ethnic nationalism which brought inter-group

cleavages into the open. At the same time, the political mobilisation, articulation and aggregation of group interests have resulted in the group demand for more autonomy and rights in the society. Due to the gap between governmental policies and performances in the socio-economic area, it is perceived 'critical' for the sustenance of group autonomy. The minority ethnic leaderships demand for autonomy exacerbated the tensions within the society.

In this light, a striking religious and linguistic congruence has been the hallmark of group differentiation amongst the two largest ethnic groups of Sri Lanka, i.e. the Sinhalas and Tamils. More than ninety per cent of the Sinhala-speaking people are Buddhist whereas most of the Tamil-speaking people are Hindus. The Moors, the second largest minority after the Tamil Hindus, are all Muslims with Tamil as their language.

Notwithstanding, such distinctiveness in linguistic and religious terms, Sinhalese and Tamil social structures do have certain areas of religio-cultural commonality. This can be seen in the similarities of their respective caste-systems. In the Sinhalese Buddhist pantheon, its the Hindu gods which hold significant position and the Hindu goddess, Pattini at Katarguma has national recognition. These features reflect the process of integration and combination underlying the two-way interaction between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the genesis of which can be traced back to the period preceding the advent of the western colonial powers. During the colonial period, religio cultural revivalist movements strengthened the group solidarities among the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. However, such assertions and manifestations of group distinctiveness though operating as parallel streams, had converged in its attack against the Christian Missionaries.

Significantly enough, though the revivalist movements were initiated by learned religious dignitaries, they were supported and financed by the English-educated non-Christian middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals who perceived themselves as discriminated against compared with the Christian Sri Lankans in the process of government.³ Thus it was this stratum of the Sri Lankan middle class which dominated the reformist movement from the beginning of the twentieth century. It was multi-communal in its composition and relatively cosmopolitan in outlook, with English forming a common bond between the leaders of various ethnic groups. The high water mark of Sinhalese-Tamil elite cohesiveness was the election of a Tamil, Sir Ponnambalam Rammathan from the constituency of

3. V. Kumart, Jayawardene, <u>The Rise of the Labour Movement</u> <u>in Ceylon</u> (Durnhaim, N. C. 1972), pp. 39-64.

the western educated Sri Lankans in 1912 elections.

Prior to independence, such Sinhalese Tamil elite cohesion, however, seems to have come under heavy strain in the 1920s when universal adult franchise was introduced in the island. Underlining the implications of majoritarian rule, it was detrimental to the interests of the minority group elites to whom the arithmetic of numbers was far too clear. On the other hand, the controversy concerning the grant of the electoral franchise to the 'Indian Tamils' and the statements of some of the Sinhalese leaders reflected not only Sinhalese doubts about the national loyalty of the Tamil segment of the population but was also indicative of their resentment towards the Tamils in economic terms⁴. On the other hand, the boycott of the first State Council elections by a major segment of the Tamils and their demand for equal representation through petition and memoranda to colonial office manifested the gradual political mobilisation of the Tamils.

However, after independence inter -ethnic rivalry remained limited mainly to the domain of the political 'notables', who while espousing the cause of their respective ethnic groups seemed to have a close affinity for each other

^{4.} Ceylon State Council, <u>Indo-Ceylon Relations Exploratory</u> <u>Conference</u>, December 1940, sessional paper 8 of 1941, (Colombo, 1941) pp.8-9.

and some sort of mutual understanding due to their similar educational background, social status and mode of living. Despite certain disputes, the minority elite continued to have an adequate share in power alongwith the political notables of the majority community due to their eminent position in the bureaucratic and other professional services. The continued use of English in official matters and the convergence of their economic interests facilitated an equilibrium which helped in managing inter-ethnic rivalry. Again, this was reflected in the constitution which was modelled on the recommendations of the Soulbury Commission and included certain provisions to safeguard the special interests of minorities. But gradually, with the introduction of mass politics and the demise of English as the official language, inter-ethnic competition moved from the phase of rivalry to that of overt conflict, the sources of which were religio-political but with strong economic undertones.

Viewed in the context of real socio-economic issues, the majority Sinhalese had the Symbols of Buddhism, The Sinhala language and historical traditions enshrined mainly in the chronicles written by the Buddhist monks. In the first few years of independence, however certain Buddhist religious organizations and monks were deeply concerned with the onslaught of an alien Christian religion and its values

on Buddhist cultural traditions and sought the support of government to rectify the situation by appointing a commission to go into the causes of erosion of Buddhism and suggest remedies. So the emergence of Buddhist nationalism through the revival of cultural traditions etc. provided an explanation for the socio-economic backwardness of the majority community in contrast to the minority people. It insisted on giving the Sinhala language and tradition an exclusive status in the society. As it is discussed in earlier chapters the historical facts say that there has been a mutual conflict among the Sinhalese and Tamils from ancient times which continued even after Independence and it resulted in serious conflict in the socio-economic affairs of the state. In the Independent state, the majority communities deep-seated socio-economic anxieties were expressed through the emergence of Sinhalese nationalism which emphasised the majority rights and privileges at the expense of the Tamil minority in the society. In this context, the political parties tried to promote the interests of the majority and gradually, it took a realistic shape with the birth of Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

In the religious context, the major target of the Sinhalese Buddhist revivalists was catholicism. However, they insisted equally on giving the Sinhala language an exclusive official status. It was in this respect that the

Sinhalese and Tamil group interests clashed with each other for a variety of reasons, subjective as well as objective. Subjectively the selectivity of historical myths and symbols tended to turn the hero of one group into the foe of another, their victories and defeats overlapped in similar fashion. Coupled with this, was the factor of the similarity and close linguistic interaction of Sri Lanka Tamils with those of Tamil Nadu. leading to the self perception of the Sinhaleseas a linguistic minority 'in the shadow of India'.⁵ Further. the preponderance of Tamil minority in public services and economic sectors, had aroused resentment among the Sinhalese who pleaded for 'Sinhala only'. 'The fact', argued Bandamaike in 1955m 'that in the towns and villages in business houses and boutiques most of the work is in the hands of Tamil speaking people will inevitably result in a fear and I don't think an unjustified fear, of the inexorable shrinking of the Sinhalese language.⁶ Since 1955, though Buddhism has been an important symbol for the Sinhalese assertion of its group differentiation, it has been around the issue of language that the Sinhala Tamil

^{5.} W. Howard Wriggins, <u>Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation</u> (Princeton, 1960), p.252.

Ceylon Deptt. of Information, <u>Towards a New Era: Selected</u> <u>speeches of S.W.R.D. Bandamaike Made in the Legislature</u> <u>of Ceylon,(1931-59</u>),(Colombo, 1961)p.42.

confrontations have concentrated. It was this language issue which sparked off the major conflict among the Sinhalas & Tamils. Previously the Tamils were divided into two groups of Sri Lanka Tamils and Indian Tamils due to the promulgation of Citizenship Act just after Independence. The disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils was a major issue for the Tamils and Tamil Congress split into groups and thus the Federal Party was born, in the interests of the estate workers. The Tamils as divided they were further alienated by the Sinhalese government which was carried on the wave of ethnic chauvinism. The citizenship Act of 1948 which had made the procedure of acquiring citizenship cumbersome, divided the Tamils into two groups of Sri Lanka Tamils and the Indian Tamils. The Tamils' political party, the Tamil Congress split and the Federal Party was born and this drifted away the Indian Tamils from the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The grant of official status to the Sinhala language alone, was obvious which held the prospect of providing a steadily increasing number of Sinhalese educated middleclass better chances for employment and promotion in public and other governmental services. In a scarce-resource economy like that of Sri Lanka, with the state the largest employer, the language issue was infused with hard rationale, political and economic calculations. Thus the slogan of

'Sinhala only' was first raised in 1952 elections by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) which really meant for the change of language medium from English to Sinhala. Although the official position of the party was to give near priority to Tamil language, subsequently it reversed its earlier stand and espoused Sinhala as the sole official language. The demand started picking up real momentum in 1954. This was the year when preparation for celebrations of the 25th Centenary of Buddha Jayanti were in full swing and the Sinhala-Buddhist resurgence was at its zenith. Ina cultural fervour, the government had reached the conclusion that 'Sinhala' should be made the sole language of the nation. The extent to which the considerations of popular support and the introduction of mass-politics gave this issue centrality was evident from the reversal of SLFP's stand on it and the chain of events that followed.

In the background, the Swabhasa movement created an 'uproar' among the Tamils and their reaction to it was very harsh. The Tamils under the leadership of the Federal Party raised the banner of 'T amil only' and pleaded for the total boycott of 'Sinhala' language in the Tamil area. They demanded for the full official status of their language as they had no sympathy on Sinhalese argument for doing away with English and replacing it with 'Sinhala' as the sole official language. The SLFP and UNP's adoption of 'Sinhala' as only official language saw an awakening of Sinhalese chauvinism for the general elections of 1956 showed the cleavages clearly. The Sinhalese people voted for the new party, SLFP which swept the elections and roused the aspirations of the Sinhalese on a good Similarly with the landslide victory of the scale. Federal Party, the Tamils announced their intention to fight for a federal system and their rejection of all kinds of possible domination by the Sinhalas. The Tamil Congress was eclipsed by the thumping victory of Federal Party which became the chief spokesman of the Tamils. Armed with this massive popular backing, the Federal Party held a convention demanding certain rights for the Tamils.

At its convention at Trincomalee in August, 1956, The Federal Party made four specific demands on the Bandamaike Government: (1) replacement of the Soulbury Constitution by one which guaranteed the federal system, (2) parity in status between the Sinhala and Tamil languages, (3) restoration of citizen ship to the Indian Tamils and (4) immediate cessation of the colonisation of the traditional Tamil homeland with Sinhalas. The Trincomalee convention threatened to launch direct action

by non-violent means if the above demands were not met within a year.⁷ The government was threatened with direct action because the protestations and even riots in the months of May and June 1956, had not persuaded it to withdraw or tone down the 'Sinhala only', Act. The Bandarnaike government to fulfill its election promise its language policy was interpreted as a safe choice in lieu of English in official matters. But the language issue resulted in mutual boycott and it culminated in serious communal clashes in Gal Oya Valley and Batticaloa and spread to other parts of the country.

Language thus assumed centrality in Sinhalese Tamil politics, presumably because it was as effective as a symbol of tradition for assertion of group-distinctiveness as it was a harbinger for socio-economic benefits in modern times. The use of language as a core symbol of political identity had much potential as a factor integrating the community but it had its own limits, particularly in situations where there was non-congruence of language symbols with other religions. This is evident from the pattern of political interaction between the Tamil speaking but religiously different groups of Tamils and Moors. Besides even amongst these groups which had religio-lingui-

A. Jeyratnam Wilson, <u>Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1973</u>, (London, 1974) pp.165-470.

stic congruence, horizontal and vertical cleavages based on caste and class minimized its effectiveness. This is manifested in the intermittent character of the alliance pattern between the leadership of the Sri Lanka Tamils and the Indian Tamils. The basic referent for such alliances when they did take place, was not the religiolinguistic affinity but the common politico-economic grievances of both in relation to the majority group dominated Colombo government. That such alliances were for a limited purpose only was also evident from the nonendorsement of the secessionist demand by the Indian Tamil leadership, which owing to its close and intertwined demographic and economic linkages with the majority community could not afford to subscribe to the Tamil nationalism which envisaged the partition of the country.

The 'language issue' thus sparked a violent upheaval in the society with the Tamils vehemently opposing it. To diffuse the ethnic tension, the then Prime Minister Bandarnaike signed a pact with the Federal Party leader, Mr. Chelvanayakam granting concessions to Tamils. The Prime Minister, though expressed his inability to discuss for federal system, agreed to the recognition of 'Tamil' as the language of national minority of Sri Lanka and it be made the language of administration in the Northern and

Eastern provinces. The Prime Minister conceded the demand for establishing regional councils in the North and East which would have "powers over specified subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, lands and development colonisation, education, health, industries and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water schemes and roads. The most remarkable feature of this agreement was over the colonisation schemes. It was agreed that in the matter of colonisation schemes, the powers of the regional councils should include the power to select allottees to whom lands within their area of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to be employed for work on such schemes.

The Bandamaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (B-C Pact) was an ideal solution to the problem, but it could not succeed due to the violent opposition by the rightwing Sinhalas in the SLFP. The various Sinhalese sects and organizations termed this Pact as 'an act of treachery against the Sinhala nation' and the first step towards setting up of a separate state. In the face of such violent pressure from the Sinhalese majority, the Bandamaike gov emment abrogated the Pact unilaterally to get rid of demonstrations and oppositions from all sides. An ethnic riot followed in this breach of agreement and there was communal violent in many parts leading to the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency in 1958.

The government under the cover of Emergency passed an Act which legalised the reasonable use of Tamil for prescribed purposes like educational instruction and public service examination. The concessions were no doubt substantial but the bill was passed when the Tamil Members of Parliament were absent. So the Act did not carry on an air of legitimacy. Moreover to implement the act, it was necessary for the Prime Minister to promulgate regulations. The Tamils pointed out that the major issues like regional forming of councils and stopping of colonisation were not in the Act.

Thus the unabating communal conflict after 1956, created the potential for a growth of separatist sentiment among the Tamils and many Sinhalas have been apprehensive that the real Tamil political objective is separation. After the promulgation of Language Act, there was a degree of political instability for some time, and gradually the Tamils felt by passed and elienated in society and started leaving Sri Lanka in search of better pastures at this time. Such an intereggnum made a Sinhala diplomat-author to express his views in the following words:

> "During the S.W.R.D. Bandamaike Administration, not only was the official Language Act of 1956 enacted and implemented but all manners of discriminations were directed at the Tamil people. Many public servants were deprived of their promotions and many more were discriminated against, in the process of recruitment. In the Sirimavo Bandamaike Administration

which followed such discrimination, was even more pronounced. This resulted in the Tamil community suffering from an acute sense of insecurity and made to feel unwanted in the land of their birth. The human reaction to the naked discrimination directed against the Tamil people was indeed tragic from the viewpoint of Sri Lanka."⁸

Subsequently, in the General Elections of 1965, with no party getting an absolute majority: the UNP's emergence of single largest party, rallied for the support from the Tamil Federal Party. The Federal Party as the third party, entered into an agreement with the Dudley Senanayake Government, and collaborated with it. The UNP's earlier anti-Tamil stand was taken as a counter-measure to offset the popularity of SLFP among the Sinhala voters. Since, the UNP was more sympathetic to the Tamil problem than the SLFP, it was expected that it would resolve the Tamil problem in a co-operative manner. Again, the dialogue between the UNP and the Federal Party was going on even before the elections. Immediately after the elections, a pact was signed between D.S. Senanayake and This pact, better known as S-C Pact was Chelvanayakam. another landmark in the Sri Lankan history and ironically its basis was provided by the earlier B-C Pact. Though the pact ommitted any reference to provincial or regional councils, it did assure the Tamils about the formation of the District Councils, giving concrete shape to the Tamil language special provision Act and restricting the colonisation of Tamil areas

^{8.} T.D.S.A. Dissanayaka, <u>The Agony of Sri Lanka</u>, (Colombo, 1984) p.9.

by Sinhalese. In no way, did the S-C Pact challenge the basis of the Sinhala only Act of 1958, but it passed the regulations to grant special status to Tamil in 1966. The only complaint of Chelvanayakam was that those regulations did not confer on the Tamil-speaking people in the seven Sinhala provinces, their full language rights.

The 1966 regulations made Tamil virtually the official language of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The D.S. Senanayake Government appeared to be keen to implement its assurance regarding the devolution of powers to the District Councils. Of course, there was no provision for provincial or regional councils but the proposed district councils were to operate under the direct control and supervision of the Central Government. The Sinhalese chauvinist elements in the government put up a strong opposition to all the concessions and priveleges to the Tamils and finally Senanayake Government was forced to abrogate the pact with Chelvanayakam. The Federal Party pulled out of the coalition though it continued to support the government from outside. Despite the formal breaking of links between the Sinhala and Tamil collaborative politics, the overall atmosphere of goodwill and ethnic relaxation was too evident to be overlooked.9

^{9.} V.P. Vaidik, <u>Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka</u> India's Options (New Delhi, 1986) p.33.

In the subsequent 1970 Elections, the SLFP and its leftist allies came to power and in the meantime, there was no ethnic tension in the political process. There was a proposal to evolve a new constitution and the Federal Party voted in favour to benefit their constituency. Though they co-operated first, they found to their chargin that the SLFP was determined to incorporate in the Republican Constitution, many measures that were meant to take away from Tamils even the rights they already had. Moreover, the Indian Tamils had no representation in the Constituent Assembly, a political anomaly that was protested against by the Ceylon Workers Congress, the main organisation of the upcountry plantation Tamil workers.

The members of the Federal Party in its opposition to official language and state religion moved certain amendments to the new constitution. The Tamil organizations demanded that (i) Tamil should be recognized by the constitution as an official language along with Sinhala (ii) Buddhism should not be declared as the sole state religion and that Sri Lanka should be a secular state (iii) there should be a specific provision in the constitution to outlow the caste-system and (iv) that the traditionally maintained distinction between the Sri Lanka Tamils and the plantation Tamils of Indian origin should be dispensed with. But the 1972 Constitution, disregarding the Tamil demands did not provide any parity between the two languages and all alternative proposals by the Federal Party were rejected. Now, in opposition to the new Constitution all the Tamil parties like the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, the Ceylon Workers' Congress and the United Front of Eelan Tamils formed a Tamil United Front (TUF) to fight for the freedom, dignity and rights of the Tamil people.

The Constitution of 1972 introduced a new and jarring religious factor to widen the already existing linguistic schism. The prominent position given to Buddhism and citizenship issue, had caused a sense of insecurity among the Tamils. The Tamils saw the new constitutional provisions as decrees to turn them into second class citizens in their own land. Hinduism which is another common factor uniting the Indian and indigenous Tamils, was thought to have been relegated to second place in Sri Lanka. The Tamils of Indian origin were specially sour about the way they were sidetracked in the matter of protecting their citizenship rights by a stipulation which makes a subtle distinction between citizens by descent and citizens by registration. By declaring that no law of the National State Assembly should deprive a citizen by descent of the status of citizen of Sri Lanka

the 1972 constitution cast a shadow on all those Indian Tamils who had or were trying to acquire citizenship by registration.¹⁰

The Tamil United Front challenged the new constitution from outside and made six demands on the government. The Federal Party leader, Mr. Chelvanayakam resigned his parliamentary seat in an effort to challenge government allegations that his party did not truely represent the aspirations of the Tamil people. The Tamil leaders subsequent election to the Parliament vindicated the Tamil demand for constitutional changes. In October 1972, the Tamil United Front launched a non-violent struggle to achieve its objectives and coinciding with the first anniversary of the new constitution in May 1973 decided that the rights of the T amils could not be regained except within the framework of a separate Tamil state. Subsequently, the Tamil United Front in its Vaddukodai Conference passed the resolution as follows -

> "We are hereby committed to the restoration and reconstitution of the free, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation. This has become inevitable to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka."11

10. Ibid., p.37.

11. Ibid., p.39.

With the passing of this resolution, the Tamil United Front turned into Tamil United Liberation Front and it carved out the plan for creation of the Tamil Eelam. The demand for a separate nation enjoyed popular support in the North and East but almost a million plantation workers represented by the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) were hardly interested in it. However, the proud Tamils of Jaffna who had considered themselves as the most authentic repository of Tamil culture for several centuries, now started looking to their northern brothers in Tamil Nadu for sympathy and help. The Eelam resolution imparted an international dimension to the Tamil problem of Sri Lanka.

The idea of a separate state for Tamils had not entered into the minds of the Tamil leaders until the Kankasanthurai by-election. It was during the emotive election compaign itself that the audiences raised the question of a separate state. Though, C. Suntheralingam had been advocating the cause of Eelam since 1956, his party was too inconsequential to attract the people's attention to this slogan. But when the people themselves raised the cry for Eelam, the TULF leadership had to articulate it into a resolution.

The strategy of peaceful collision and collusion pursued by the Tamil leadership seemed to have paid little dividend to the Tamils in concrete terms. The Tamils not only had to face the wrath of the Sinhala mobs, but also the increasing state terrorism, perpetrated by the government. The government policy of restrictive admission to the university, discrimination in recruitment to government jobs and Sinhala colonisation of Tamil areas has created an army of unemployed and frustrated Tamil young men. "Plunged into the despair of unemployed existence, frustrated with the possibility of higher education, angered by the imposition of an alien language the Tamil youth realised that the redemption to their plight lay in revolutionary politics¹²

The political violence of the Tamil youth began to explode on the political scene in the early seventies but it took organised forms of revolutionary resistance in the later stages. It became a frightening political reality to both the peace-loving conservative Tamil leadership and to the oppressive Sinhala regimes. The Tamil people's sympathy for the violent activities of the terrorists and the governments security measures were in contrast to each other which had destabilized the situation in the country. The Tamil terrorists had started attacks on some prominent

^{12.} A.S. Balsingham, <u>Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam</u> Freedom Struggle (Madras, 1983) p.23.

pro-government politicians. The demand for Tamil Eelam was taking shape at various levels with the popular support. As the police swooped down mercilessly on the terrorists and their supposed supporters, the people's anger against the government and its security policies as a whole grew stronger day-by-day. In the wake of police brutality towards Tamil terrorists, the Tamils were driven to regard a separate Tamil State as the only solution to the ethnic problem. By the mid-seventies, the Tamil guerilla movements started taking formal shape like Prabhakaran's 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) and the adoration of Tamil terrorists in the northerm area left no option for the Tamil political parties but to a resolution for establishing the Tamil Eelam.

An atmosphere of extremism and intolerance had also intruded into Sri Lankan politics in the early years of seventies, with the JVP insurrection and governmental harsh measures against it. Like the Sinhala youth of JVP, the Tamil youth also took recourse to violence and the government believed it could tackle the Tamil violence as swiftly as it had the Sinhala violence. The introduction of the 1972 constitution, saw the widespread disenchantment among the Tamils who held huge demonstrations and destroyed the government properties. The stringent attitude of government

towards the expression of dissent in general compelled the TULF Party and other organisations to demand for a separate state.

The Tamil demand for separatism from mere regional autonomy was a result of 'confrontationist' politics in Sri Lanka. The ethnic Tamil minorities concentration in the north of the country and its geographical proximity to the Indian mainland, made the internal tensions more acute. In this context it is found that certain ingredients like ethnic cohesion and a common identity in the Tamil community helped generate a separatist movement. The perceived threat to the Tamils' ethnic identity from political, economic, social and cultural matters and a sense of relative deprivation aroused a sense of 'insecurity' which culminated in the demand for 'a separate state'.

From Sri Lankan national security aspect, it poses a serious threat to their polity of majority Sinhalese who looks the existence of a great resorvoir of Tamils across the narrowseas, having common racial-ethnic ties with their brethern in the island. It is the powerful sense of Tamil ethnic identity and a deep sense of sympathy from the Indian Tamils in the neighbouring country, has fostered and nurtured the Tamil separatist ideas.



Separatist agitation, whether in Sri Lanka or in the Basque country in Spain, in Corsica or Ogaden in Ethiopia, or Uster in U.K. and in Phillipines or nearer home in Indian Punjab; leads to a radicalisation of the political process in the affected region or regions. In all these states, the minorities grivances and demands are seen as a serious threat to the unity and stability of the country where the government is backed by the force of majority political support and carry out its repressive measures by terrorising and alienating the minorities from the national mainstream. In order to counter the political and military struggle of the separatists, the government takes to the path of 'state terrorism'. When the state resorts to such activity consequently it proves self-defeating and instead of eliminating the menace, it unwittingly feeds terrorism. In Sri Lankan case, the government repressive measures towards the Tamils, have resulted in militancy and terrorism from the minority.

In Sri Lankan society, the majority minority complex developed in the socio-economic setting, aligned with the fears of racial ethnic domination resulted in the mutual distrust and antagonism in the society. This could have been curbed in the early years of uprising, but the 'scarce' economy and the competing group interests in society and the character of electoral politics obstructed the evolution of a free, equal and secular society. The majority 'upsurge'in society on the lines of racial ethnic differences created fears among the Tamils who had no other means except political violence to achieve their objectives. Thus the Sinhala chauvinism was met with the Tamil communalism which called for an idea of 'separatism'. In this context, an external factor that counted for the minority upsurge, is the presence of Tamil multitudes in the Indian mainland which emboldened the forces of separation and liberation in the island.

The Tamil idea of 'separatism' started in the wake of 1977 elections and its outcome reinforced the idea of the Tamil demand for a separate state. The TULF manifesto sought a mandate from the northern and eastern provinces to set up 'an independent sovereign state of Tamil Eelam'. After the victory in elections, the TULF defined the boundaries of Tamil Eelam in terms of territory consisting the Northern and Eastern provinces. Despite its overwhelming Tamil vote for a separate state, the TULF did not precipitate the struggle to attain its declared objective. It was only meant for a starting point in the prolonged negotiations with the Sinhalas. The TULF used it to blunt the criticism from the Tamil militants. The UNP government in

power under Jayawerdene tried to co-opt the Tamils into a broad Sinhala-Buddhist system. But the Bandamaike government during its last phase had also tried to assuage the TULF by initiating serious discussions for mutual co-operation with Chelvanayakam which had failed ultimately. With Chelvanayakam's demise and the SLFP's defeat in the elections, a new opportunity backoned to the UNP to pik up the old threads. On the other hand the TULF in its newly acquired status of largest opposition party appeared to have realised the need for a sagacious attitude towards the Jayawardene government and sought to achieve its objectives through negotiations. But following the serious communal riots and conflict, the TULF concluded that the right to self determination is the only solution to their problem. It brought the Tamil issue to international focus and appealed to India for political intervention in this matter. The TULF chief, A. Amirthaling am approached and conveyed the Tamil grievances to many European nations and international organizations. On the other hand, the Jayawardene government took to strong military measures to counter the growing militancy among the minority Tamils.

The Jayawardene government embarked upon a threepronged strategy to face the Tamil challenge. First whatever concession it could be stow upon the Tamils, it tried tried to enshrine them partly in the constitution and a part of them were granted through parliamentary resolutions and executive orders without bothering to seek the support of the TULF. Secondly, a 'wedge' was successfully introduced between the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils and Thirdly, the government unleashed a reign of terror against the Tamils. Among the concessions granted to the Tamils. the provision of some kind of parity to the Tamil language in education and administration alleviated the fears of the Tamils. The other important dispensation was concerned with the law of citizenship which made it very simple for the 'stateless people' in allowing them certain concessions. In response to these measures the leader of the Indian Tamil Estate workers, Mr. Thondman accepted a post in the cabinet and thus extracted the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) from the TULF. Thus Jayawardene gave a serious blow to the Tamil unity and its demand for Eelam, by dividing the Tamils through his political machinations.

In the meantime, the Tamil militant organizations started taking a 'confrontationist' policy to face the military repression of the government. The presence of ruthless army in Jaffna and the promulgation of Frevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) resulted in arrest and torture of many Tamil youths. The terrorists act of violence was aimed at three kinds of people, namely leaders of the ruling party and Tamil leaders who sided with the government in

opposing their demands, army and police personnel and informers. Again the hostility of the Tamil people towards the government increased with the unrestrained use of the powers to search, detain and interrogate. The atrocities committed by the army and police have been investigated by the representatives of Amnesty International and International Commission of Jurists and have been criticised severely.¹³ In this context there was an important link of the security forces in the government repression and genocide of Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula, for the Sri Lankan army being dominated by communal Sinhalas. In the process the security forces were sucked into the vortex of Jaffna's turbulent politics and they were seen to be the part of the Sinhalese chauvinists to keep the Tamils down.

Once the phenomenon of youth unrest and violence came to dominate the political scene in the north, the police force found that the boundary between the routine business of maintaining law and order on the one hand and political activity on the other became increasingly blurred.

^{13.} Virginia A. Leary, <u>Ethnic Conflict</u> and Violence in <u>Sri Lanka: Report of a Mission to Sri Lanka in</u> July-August 1981 on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists; <u>Report of an Ammesty</u>, <u>International Mission to Sri-Lanka - 31 January-</u> <u>9 February 1982</u>.

The Tamil officers in the police force faced an impossibly difficult conflict of loyalties between their commitment to their duties and their own ethnic identity. The result was that more Sinhalese officers were sent to the north for the government regarded Tamil officers as either unreliable or ineffective. Thus the police force in the north and the security forces in general became overwhelmingly Sinhalese in ethnic composition which widened the gulf between the army and the people. The security forces were perceived as a Sinhalese army of occupation because they turned violent in their frustration at their inability to control the situation.

By the time, the activities of the terrorests were taken to be that of well-trained and well organized groups fighting for the Tamil Eelam. Instead of one broad front, half a dozen separate organisations had sprung up like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by V. Prabhakaran, the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) by Uma Maheswaran, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) by Thangadorai and Kuttimani, the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of students (EROS) by Eliatharby Ratnasabhapathy and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Lib eration Front (EPRLF) by K. Padmanabha under the overall leadership of General Union of Eelam Students (GUES).

All these Tamil militant organizations vied with each other in undertaking daring missions to avenge the humiliations suffered by the Tamil people. Subsequently, in the 1981 DDC elections, there was a lot of violence and rioting from the terrorists and the Sri Lankan police carried out strong military operations against the Tamils. But after 1977, the year of 1981 was an important year of ethnic violence and its outcome proved to be a cementing force between the Jaffna T amils and the plantation Tamils of Indian origin. The Sinhala mobs made no distinction among the Tamils while unleashing their reign of terror. The National Council of the CWC issued a long statement condemning the atrocities perpetrated on the helpless workers in the plantation and it made serious aspersions on the government. In the following elections of 1983, the terrorists disrupted the elections in Jaffna Peninsula and there was widespread violence and mayhem. Despite a state of emergency, the situation worsened and finally it culminated in the bloody riots of July.

The July Riots resulted in the serious divisions and communal clashes between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and which took a heavy toll of life and property. It was for the first time felt that Buddhism and Hinduism cannot co-exist in Sri Lanka. What marked off the riots of July 1983 from those of the 1958 violence, was the role of the

security forces in creating violence and terror against the Tamils. The breakdown in law enforcement in the early days of the riots had no precedent in the past; it took the government nearly a week to reestablish its authority to quell the violence. The security forces were totally indifferent and sided with the Sinhalas and attacked upon the Tamils. Thus the country's political struc ture was shaken to its foundations and there was a widespread reaction to the upheaval in Sri Lanka. The Indian government expressed its deep shock and concern over the developments in Sri Lanka and it intensified its efforts for a mediation to end the conflict. Though, previously India had played a 'mediatry' role in the ethnic issue of Sri Lanka,, now it came out with a constructive role to put an end to the ethnic conflict in the island-nation. Às. it will be discussed in the next chapter, India's role in the region and its relations with the neighbours, have an important role to play in its mediation efforts in the regional conflicts. In this light, it has played a constructive role in the mediation efforts after the events of 1983 violence.

From the discussion above, the problem of national security of Sri Lanka, is to be perceived in structuralpolitical matrix of the society. The search for new identities in society and the resulting political polari-

sation on distinct racial ethnic lines, presents a confusing picture of national unity and solidarity within the state. The impending threats in nature of sociopolitical, commual and racial divisions exacerbate the conflict within the society, which weakens the security and strength of the state.

Thus the security problem can not be considered apart from the internal structure of the state.Because the view from within explodes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. A strong state defines itself from within and fills the gap between its neighbours with a solid presence. But a microstate like Sri Lanka for its weak military power, may be defined more as a gap between its neighbours, with little of political substance underlying the facade of internationally recognised statehood. Hence, behaviour within the state can be understood better in terms of individual and sub-group security than in terms of policies relating to national security. In case of Sri Lanka, the national security question can be viewed in the relationship existing in the society where the lack of unity and homogenity has threatened its internal security.

CHAPTER VI

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SRI LANKAN SECURITY AND ITS REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

In the geo-political configuration of South Asia, India occupies a preponderant position in economic. political and strategic matters of the region. The South Asian Region in compact nature, the states of the region share a common racial, ethnic character which provides a certain nexus' between India and its regional neighbours. In the regional power equation, India has substantial leverage to influence the domestic developments taking place in its neighbouring countries and these countries too have a considerable influence in Indian political developments. So, there is some sort of 'linkage' between what happens in Bangladesh and the happenings in Assam or Tripura or for that matter between Pakistan and Punjab or Kashmir, so also Nepal in its contiguous Indian states and Sri Lanka in T amil Nadu. Besides another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration in managing the intra-regional security is the imparative to retain the political stability of the region instead of allowing it to drift to a situation where it will be dominated by the Major Powers. The linkages between internal political processes and external conflictual behaviour of states offer interesting insights in the study of international conflict. So. in this context one has to evaluate the

^{1.} S. D. Muni, "South Asia," in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, (with by) Monaged (mob), (London, 1980), p.42.

Indian attitude to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and the Sri Lankan responses to the compulsions underlying the Indian approach.

India has a very important role in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka, for the close racial, ethnic ties of its own people with those of Sri Lanka. Again in terms of security and defence, the overall region in the subcontinent is considered to be the Indian defence area where India presents a monolith pattern in the subcontinent. For Sri Lanka, its miniature existence and dependence status put some limitation on its search for an independent and secured position in the region.

In the matters of domestic politics, the continuing racial-ethnic conflict between the Sinhalas and Tamils, has destabilised the situation in Sri Lanka. The Tamil connection with India in its security perspective, the 'Indian Factor' assumed much importance as a political variable thwarting the stability of the island-nation. On the other hand, with a continuous influx of Sri Lankan refugees into Tamil Nadu since the 1983 July violence, it has created problems for the Indian government. The Government of India has voiced its concern, time and again over the ethnic conflict in a humanitarian gesture and called for a peaceful solution to the problem. The presence of Tamil multitude in South India with close ethnic ties in Sri Lanka has contributed to the pressure under which the Indian government is made to act and voice its concern for the ethnic tension in Sri Lanka. In this context, India's role has been one of peaceful and constructive in its search for a solution to the ethnic problem.

As it has been discussed in the last chapter, after the July 1983 riots, the situation became so violent that it called upon a process of reconciliation to ease the internal crisis and bring peace and stability in the island. When the government representing the 'majority' Sinhalas was condemned as authoritarian and Chauvinist by the minority Tamils. Because the relations between the Tamils and Sinhalas was so acrimonious in nature, there was no hope for a resumption of a dialogue between the two. It was only the Indian government's move that initiated a dialogue between the warring parties in the conflict. Though. India has been a part and parcel of the Sri Lankan political developments for a long time, it assumed an important role in its direct mediation in the present ethnic conflict. In the past, India has signed some agreements and pacts with Sri Lanka in relation to the granting of citizen ship to the Indian Tamils working in the tea plantations and other areas. The pact, better known as Sastri-Sirimavo Pact

provided for the repartiation over a fifteen year period of 525,000 Indian residents in Sri Lanka to India, along with their natural increase and the absorption of 300,000 as citizens of Sri Lanka, the future of the remaining 150,000 was to be negotiated later by the two countries. Since then, India has kept a close eye on the developements in Sri Lanka, particularly the conditions of Tamils in socio-political affairs in society. In its effort to diffuse the situation, India has always taken a constructive role in the terms of mediation and rapport between the conflecting groups.

In the aftermath of July, 1983 riots, the events took a new turn with a serious deterioration in social order resulting from the violent ethnic riots and clashes in Society. In such a climate of hostility and violence, India's mediatory role helped for the initiation of new dialogue between the Tamils and Sinhalas. It is the effort of the Indian government that the Indian special envoy, Mr. G. Parthasarathy visited Sri Lanka in the months of August and November. The Indian mission brought some new hopes and changes in the attitude of the Jayewerdene government.

The leaders of the TULF started saying by November 1983 that they were ready to negotiate with the Government if it promised to provide at least two fundamental guarantees, one to secure "the safety of the lives and properties of

Tamils in the island", the other to maintain "the integrity of our territory."² On the other hand, Jayewardene presented his own framework to solve the Tamil problem by asking the TULF to renounce their demand for Eelam and assuring it in turn of further devolution of power to Zonal concils which were to be constituted by the merger of the District Development Councils into the Provincial Councils. He suggested that this scheme be applied to the entire island after a referendum. Trincomalee was to be administered by the Centre.³

During the Commonwealth Conference in November 1983, Jayewardene met Indira Gandhi twice, revised his earlier proposals and expressed his willingness to invite the TULF to the All Party Conference.⁴ The TULF leader Amirthalingam appreciated the mediatory role played by India and the acceptance of the good offices of India by the Government of Sri Lanka. It was because of the India factor, which had "brought about a fundamental change in the whole situation", he said that the TULF had decided to enter into negotiations with the Colombo Government.⁵ With Parthasarathi's third visit the remaining obstacles were cleared at the beginning of January 1984. Almost all the major political parties, including the SLFP and the representatives of the Buddhist

^{2.} Indian Express, 25 November 1983.

^{3.} Hindustan Times, 11 November 1983.

^{4. &}lt;u>Hindu</u>, 1 December 1983.

^{5. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>, 3 December 1983.

Mahasangha, Hindus, Christians and Muslims, attended the All Party Conference in Colombo on 10 January 1984. But in the wake of the All Party Conference, the Sinhala chauvinism manifested in its anti-Tamil propaganda and the APC meetings in January, February and March bore no results except that they discussed the modalities for conducting the discussions.

The points of discussion on the basis of Annexure' C' where the devolution of powers can be obtained by constructing regional councils with administrative powers was agreed upon at the mediation of India. In the meanwhile, there started an anti-India tirade and compaign which got into a full swing with allegations of terrorist training camps in Tamil Nadu. Though the All Party meetings resulted in a dead lock, the dialogue did not breakdown completely because the TULF continued to be associated with the APC The visits of National Security Minister, Lalith meeting s. Athulathamudali, in April and of Jayewardene in June-July to New Delhi paved the way for new proposals which replaced the discredited Annexure C with an offer for the institution of a second chamber in Parliament. This proposed offer was discussed at length with Indira Gandhi by Jayewardene during his stay in New Delhi.

Jayewardene's visit to New Delhi, instead of bringing any reconciliation between the Sinhala and Tamil opinions gave a mild jolt to Indo-Sri Lanka relations. In his press conference, Jayewardene said that the "Tamil problem is not a problem, it is a national disaster as you have in India of Kashmir, of Punjab and of Ulster in Britain. We will have to live with it for the decades to come."⁶

The All Party Conferences held its meetings and it discussed about the provision of a second chamber to which the TULF made its objections. In the escalating violence and army excesses there was no accord on any The TULF leader Mr. A. Amrithlingam specific matter. made it clear that his party was not asking for any council, regional or provincial; what it was looking for was a viable alternative to the mandate for a separate state at the 1977 elections. It was the responsibility of the Government and Sinhala leadership to discuss this alternative seriously. He warned of a Cyprus-like situation if the talkes dragged on indefinitely.⁷ With the talks dragging on endlessly, the TULF's popularity and political standing has steadily declined with the 'guerillas' of the Tamil militants, gaining more sympathy and support among the Tamils. The Tamil militants have taken to strong terrorist tactice like attacking police stations, looting banks and blowing up army

7. Times of India, 31 August 1984.

^{6.} V.P. Vaidik, "Sri Lanka: Travails of a Divided Nation", <u>Strategic Analysis</u>, August, 1984, p.417.

convoys and tried to gain international publicity.

The Government of Sri Lanka complained of military training being imparted to the militants in Tamilnadu by some retired officers of the Indian Army. A restricted zone was also created in the territorial waters of Sri Lanka in April 1984 to keep a strict vigil on the militant's movements from across the Gulf of Mannar. Almost two dozen ships were deployed to cover the 140 miles of the zone of surveillance.⁸ The Government recruited through the Americans, agents of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, to train the S ri Lankans to combat the militants. The Army also hired mercenaries from the British commando organisation, the SAS, to tackle the 'Tigers'.⁹

By the middle of 1984, the militants had become a political force to be reckoned with. Though they were not associated with any Sinhala-Tamil negotiations, they were in a position to decide the fate of any solution from outside. As a government publication put it:

> "Their militant methods have cost scores of lives and millions of rupees. It almost seems that their role is to block any settlement of the island's major problems than to assist

9. <u>Times of India</u>, 25 June, 1984.

^{8. &}lt;u>Statesman</u>, 27 April, 1984.

in their solution, and to perpetuation (sic) disputes than in their settlement. The movement's very existence as a favoured ally of the TULF puts every Tamil offer or posture of peace in doubt, under suspicion. "10

How the problem of terrorism has affected the Sinhala - Tamil relationship as a whole has been described by the National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, who added an implict warning. While reporting to Parliament on his visit to India, he said:

> "In dealing with a security problem created in Jaffna, we must not forget the Tamil people, who live elsewhere. The terrorist would like this to be forgotton and his course of action is in total disregard of the fate of those Tamils who live amongst us. "11

Meanwhile, India preferred a more constructive role in acting as a restraint on Tamilnadu, quite apart from being a source of reassurance to the TULF at a moment of acute distress to that political group. The Indian initiative was partly responsible for commencement of discussions between the government of Sri Lanka and the TULF and in pursuading the latter to participate in the

^{10.} For a detailed government version of the activities of the militants, see, <u>Tamil Terrorists: A Record of</u> <u>Murder and Robbdry</u> and <u>Mission of Violence</u> (both pamphlets published by the Ministry of State, publication undated)

^{11.} Lalith Athulathmudali, <u>My Recent Visit to India</u> (Colombo, 1984), p.9.

All Party Conferences which began sittings in January, 1984. The proposals for devolution which emerged at the All Party Conferences had the support of the Indian Government who took up the position that something wider in scope and territorial limits than the District Development Councils (DDCs) was required to get the more moderate sections of Tamil opinion. Particularly, the TULF had to move decisively away from separatism as a political goal. As we have seen before this Conference made little headway in regard to the crucial issue of devolution although much progress was made in regard to other issues.

India's own political problems were saturated to a point in the wake of Sikh terrorism in Punjab and the rise of a political movement in Assam. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her party was embroiled in a political turmoil at home, so she could not be able to manoeuvre on the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka. The pressure from Tamil Nadu and the elections in offing, made the government to act in a positive manner. Thus, India expressed its deep concern and hope for an early settlement of the issue. The Sri Lanka government, on the other hand, carried out a campaign of villification by proclaiming the Tamil Nadu connection in the Jaffna terrorism by the Tamil

militants. It stated that the existence of military training camps, if not bases for Sri Lankan Tamil separatists, had encouraged the Tamils to operate from Tamil Nadu in regular incursions to the island. It said that Tamil Nadu government had generally turned a blind eye to these activities. In reaction, the Tamil Nadu and Indian government consistently denied the existence of terrorist gamps and sought to meet the Sri Lankan protests with the charges of human 🐜 rights violations in Sri Lanka attributing these quite emphatically to the lack of discipline in the security forces. The international magazines and journals were quoted by Indian authorities, in expressing the Sri Lankan Army as one of the most indisciplined armies of the world.

For Sri Lanka, the problem of security was a continuous one with the pressure from the terrorists mounting and their attacks becaming more daring. In scope and effectiveness, the Sri Lankan government responded with a new institutional structure as well as new policies of which the most significant were the establishment of National security in March 1984, to co-ordinate the activities of the security forces and the police in organizing counter-insurgency measures and the concept

of a surveillance zone covering most of the north and north-western coastal region introduced by this Ministry in the last week of November, 1984.

With stringent security measures, the security forces carried out a big operation against the Tamil 'guerillas' operating from the Jaffna and Mannar areas. In these operations, the civillian population was subjected to attack and violence. The attacks and murder of civillians made the Tamils in north to flee to India. So many Tamils entered into India as refugees from the island. At the plight of Tamils, the Indian government was urged to intervene in the ethnic conflict: in Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile, there was some sort of a political instability in India, with the death of Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi and the ensuing Sikh violence in the state of Punjab. Subsequently, the new government under Mr. Rajiv Gandhi made some good gestures by initiating some diplomatic moves in the negotiations between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government. The visit of Lalith Athulathmudali to New Delhi in February, 1985 was taken as a good response from the Sri Lankan side. In all the forthcoming All Party Conferences in 1985 and thereafter, differences still remained on whether the northern and eastern provinces should be joined together as sought by TULF, on whether Provincial Ministers should be drawn only

from the proposed upper chamber, whether law and order should be a provincial subject and whether land settlement policy should be dealt with at the national and provincial level.

Though, the Indian initiative eased the negotiation process to some extent, there was no concrete agreement as to the above issues of political importance. With the escalation of violence and gradual Sinhala colonisation of the Tamil areas, the Tamil civillians were made the target of Army attacks and brutalities. The proposal of settlement of some 30,000 Sinhalas of armed civilians in Tamil areas to alter the strategic situation, worsened the situation. The presence of some 5,000 strong Sinhalese army with arms and ammunitions created a havoc in the social life of Tamils. The atrocities of security forces were committed upon the innocent civillians and there was a virtual state of continuous massacre of Tamils. The Tamils driven from the island in shock and terror reached India with untold sufferings in their plight from their land. They expressed the inhuman and bruatal activities of the Sri Lankan Army in committing violence and terror against the Tamils.

Such barbaric acts were condemned in the large international forums like United Nations and International Court of Justice. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UN CHR) condemned the Sri Lanka government's killing of Tamils and violation of human rights. In this context, India drew attention to the fact that a climate of confrontation had been built up following the repture in the dialogue between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamils; it urged the Sri Lankan government to resume the negotiations with the Tamils for a peaceful solution to the ethnic problem. The UN CHR and ICI condemning the Sri Lanka government's action, took note of the Indian stand and urged the Sri Lankan government for an early solution.

Gradually, there was more violence in the island, with summary executions, murders, arson and rapes; there was a large flow of refugees to Tamil Nadu from the northern areas of Sri Lanka. Since June, 1983, some 60,000 Tamils have crossed the border and arrived in Tamil Nadu till the end of December, 1984. After the colonisation programme in Mannar, Jaffna, Talaimannar and Kankesanturai and the intensified army operations in these areas made the civilian Tamil population unsafe and they started leaving for India. The innocent Tamil youths were captured and tortured by the Sinhalese army on the pretext of complicity with Tamil militants, the Tigers and they were brutally killed by the security forces. The Tamil people found the Sinhalese army ruthless in its

attitude to exterminate the Tamils, in reprisals against the terrorist attacks. The terrorist bombings and mining of the army concys had resulted in the security forces reprisal through the massacre of innocent Tamil people, old and young. The Jayewardene government unleashed a reign of terror on the Jaffna Tamils to liquidate their racial, ethnic identity in the island. It sought arms and annunitions from countries like Britain, China, Pakistan and Jordan in its drive against the Tamils. It appealed to the western countries for their military support to Sri Lanka.¹³

In such a tense situation, India felt the brunt of the situation in Sri Lanka with the large influx of refugees from the island. It was shocked and provoked by the state of affairs in Sri Lanka and it sought to initiate fresh discussions to ease the situation. It appealed both sides to reach an agreement for a peaceful solution to the Tamil problem. The Indian envoy, Mr. Ramesh Bhandari visited Colombo and had talks with the Sri Lankan President for an early settlement of the issue of Tamil problem. So, a process of bilateral discussion was suggested to be the best way for mutual expression of views for an early settlement. Thereafter the Tamil political groups and the Sri Lankan government decided to meet in the capital of Bhutan, Thimpu to seek a solution to the conflict.

13. <u>Times</u>, published from London 23 June, 1985.

The Thimpu Talks began with the participation of TULF and other Tamil militant organisations and the Sri Lankan government, in which India played a mediatory role to bring an accord between these parties. The Sri Lankan government was represented by the delegation led by the President's brother and personal advisor. Hector W. Jayewardene. On the other hand, all the six Tamil militant organisations were represented by the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) and the TULF also participated in the discussions. The Tamils put forth their four-principles of demand for the consideration of the Sri Lankan government. It included the recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as distinct nationality, respect for the traditional homeland, right to selfdetermination and citizenship rights for all Tamils including those of Indian origin.¹⁴

In this first round of Thimpu Talks in July, certain improvements were seen from the both sides in the perception and approach to the problem and issues. The two sides agreed once again to meet for a second round of talks in August, 1985. Meanwhile, the Tamils' four-point demand was not taken seriously by the Sri

14. Hindu, 14 July, 1985.

Lanka government who rejected the demand with some explanations. It pointed out that the demands are wholly unacceptable to the government because it is the negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. On the other hand, it forwarded certain proposals and hoped for an exchange of views on the matter. Subsequently, in the second round of Thinpu Talks the Tamils maintained their same four demands and finally called off their talks in violation of the ceasefire agreement by the Sri Lanka government. So, the second round of Thimpu Talks came to an abrupt end with the Tamil side staging a walk-out against the massacre of Tamils in Vanuviya and Trincomalee. India also expressed its concern over the violation of the ceasefire agreement and it asked the Sri Lankan government to create the climate for a mutual dialogue and agreement between the Tamils and the government.

After the failure of Thimpu Talks, the Sri Lankan government put the blame squarely on the Tamils for its hard line approach and demand for separation. On the other hand, the Tamil militants viewed the Thimpu Talks as a tactical exercise by the Sri Lankan government and they found that Sri Lankan government had made political capital out of it. Meanwhile, Jayewardene made the best use of this situation by getting time for military preparations against the Tamils. The Indian involvement in the so-called peace process was distanced from its traditional areas of goodwill in Sri Lankan domestic politics, namely the Tamils and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). So, the Indian government's enthusiasm to display its sincereity in the negotiation process was curtailed and it got trapped into the Sri Lankan game. Because the attitude of Sri Lankan government in response to the Indian position, has been one of a mixed feelings with a greater degree of disbelief and discord.

In the regional power-equation, Sri Lanka has become more close to the western allies in the region like Pakistan, in questioning the Indian political stand and diplomatic moves in the regional political developments. Taking exception of a factual statement by an Indian Minister, the Jayewardene government even tried to sabotage the third SAARC Ministerial meeting, held in Thimpu.

Coming to the problem of regional security in South Asia, the Sri Lankan search for western support in military and strategic terms and its international political mobilisation, have adversely affected the

peace and stability in the region. The Sri Lankan government tried to mobilise western and others' support in military and political terms to confront and meet the terrorism and violence of the Tamil militants. So, it sent its Ministers to seek arms and ammunitions and military help from the western countries like U.K., U.S., West Germany, Italy and Portugal. The U.S. Administration allowed the purchase of arms by Sri Lanka and it was perhaps on the suggestions of the US Government that President Jayewardene had enlisted the cooperation of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, for training armed forces and containing the activities of the militants. The western support to the Jayewardene government was also clearly evident in the United Nations where an adverse resolution on Human Rights issue in Sri Lanka was being discouraged. Again the American arms build-up in Pakistan and the US Defence Secretary, Mr. Weinberger's visit were matters of serious concern to India as it saw the complicity of Big Powers in Sri Lankan politics.

All these political developments take us to India's present predicament in the Sri Lankan conflict. Since India had sought for a 'political solution to the ethnic T amil problem, the changing tone of Jayewardene Government created doubts and uncertainities for India over the matter.

The Javewardene Government has made it clear that the problem could be solved when the Tamils are agreed to soften their stand and follow a moderate policy in consonance with the Sri Lanka Government's proposals. In actual terms, the Jayewardene Government has sought for a military solution to the Tamil problem in the island. Because the pattern of violence in Sri Lanka clearly suggest that state terror has been let loose The Jayewardene gov ernment sounds on the Tamils. confident that it would completely erodicate Tamil terrorism which is their synonym for 'ethnic problem'. The Jayewardene Government can do so with impunity because it has the effective support of the west, particularly USA and UK and other countries like Pakistan and China. It's not too for off the mark to say that a lingering internal war in the strategically located Indian Ocean island is not incompatible with the perceived strategic interests of US, Pakistan and China. It keeps India disturbed and Sri Lanka dependent upon them.

As long as this internal war continues, the extra regional powers can consolidate their strategic interests in the area. It may be recalled here that US had objected to the possibility of District Councils combining themselves into a larger Provincial Council as proposed in Annexure 'C' (Howard Shaffer's statement in US Congressional Subcommittees in August, 1984).¹⁵ Any such larger units would have the prospects of Trincomalee being incorporated in the Eastern Provincial Council and if Tamils are given police and administrative control of it, strategic use of the harbour town may create problems. This consideration is prominent even behind the Security Minister, Athulathmudali's plan to settle some 200,000 Sinhalese well trained in arms, in the Tamil dominated eastern region. Who knows if there is any link between the external strategic interests in Trincomalee and the regid official Sri Lankan position not to accept the merging of the eastern and north-eastern regions of the island as Tamil homelands.

In this context, India has deep stakes in the peaceful settlement of the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. Economic burden imposed by the refugees is only one aspect of the adverse consequences of the Sri Lankan crisis on India. Again, the political repercussions of Tamil issue inside Tamil Nadu and also on the federal polity of India are no less significant. Above all, the consolidation of adverse extra-regional strategic interests in Sri Lanka is a matter of grave concern. But what can India do to

^{15.} Indian Express, 16 March1985.

bring about a cessation of hostilities and instill in the Jayewardene Government a sincerity of purpose for political solution? Hard options are certainly ruled out because the creation of a Tamil state is not in India's perceived interests. Sri Lanka's territorial integrity, political independence and non-alignment are absolutely essential for a stable and peaceful subcontinent.

President Jayewardene and his close advisers know well that an interventionist option is out for India. That's why they can conveniently accuse India of harbouring interventionist motives and get away with it. Jayewardene even branded a phoney counter-threat recently that the exercise of any military option by India would automatically result in the elimination of Tamils living in Sinhala areas.

There are not many viable economic options either for India to work upon. Our bilateral economic relations with Sri Lanka are not such that President Jayewardene would be persuaded to take Indian suggestions seriously. The use of economic diplomacy in the ethnic issue by India can even invite reprisals on considerable Indian investment in the island. At the international level, the solid western support is a powerful deterrent against even the human rights issue to be raised in the United Nations Commission. The Sri Lankan case can not be compared with Afghanistan or Kampuchea type of a take-over by Indian initiative. Again, the Bangladesh issue was markedly different and India has very little option in the present context. Though the Tamils have often been tempted to invite the Indian intervention in the island-republic, practically it is not that easy as it seems to be.

In view of these adverse realities, use of strong words alone would do no good for India, if it's not prepared to take follow-up action. There's an urgent need for the Indian government to evolve an effective consensus on Sri Lankan policy which sadly stands scattered and eroded due to conflecting perceptions and competing personalities. India should move fast to restore its credibility with Tamil groups and other Sri Lanka political parties like SLFP in the search ofor a solution to the ethnic problem. And unless some effective option is in sight, let us disengage outselves from any peace move which has been turned into a force by the Jayewardene Government.

This would at least liberate us from the position of being an unwilling and unwitting agent of Sinhala chauvinism against the Tamil militant groups. India's declared disengagement from the peace moves would also be an unambiguous voice of evidence for the international community which can decide for itself whether it wants to continue to support the Jayewardene Government in the face of internal ethnic war, If not, let President Jayewardene use his rich political experience to create a camouflage of political settlements to cover his state terrorism to ease the conscience of its western mentors and their allies.

CONCLUSION

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In the present international system, states are excedingly dissimilar as objects of security. Because of the diversity of states, the nature of security as a problem necessarily differs from state to state. All states are to some degree vulnerable to military and economic threats and many also suffer from a fundamental, political insecurity. The different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat which makes the security problem in many dimensions rather just a matter of military defence. The multi-layered nature of the state opens it to threats on many levels, particular vulnerabilities depending on the unique structure and circumstances of the state concerned. In this context, the security problem of microstates assumes much importance for the states' high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the state in a broader geo-political dimension. In the contemporary world, all the states are in search of military build-up and strategic advantages to strengthen their power and security in international sphere. Hence, the microstates' concern for security has been much more from the fear of being dominated, attack or annihilated by states or groups. So, the microstates, weak in political and military strength, are wary of their independence and security in a world dominated by greater powers.

As it is discussed in the previous chapters, the security problem of microstates like Sri Lanka has a host of domestic and external factors which determine the magnitude and degree of the threats to the security of a small state. There is no doubt that cooperation on both the internal and international level is the sine quanon of security in a system dominated by nation states. While the internal setting or the domestic socio-political milieu determines the states' stability, its external setting influences the security and foreign policies of a microstate like Sri Lanka. Primarily, it is the internal setting in the process of nation-building in a microstate, which accounts for the problem of national security in socio-political perspective.

It is the internal cohesion and cooperation within the society which form the basis of national security in a microstate, determined by the varied socio-political factors in society. In case of Sri Lanka, the security problem arises out of inter-state conflict of nationalities which affects the overall stability of the state. The conflict in broader racial-ethnic terms, is sharpened to regional dimensions for the impending external factors within the society. So, the Sri Lankan security perception can be viewed on the lines of racial-ethnic divisions which beget the majorityminority conflict in the society, weakening the fundamental structure of the state. In this context, the internal conflict among the Sinhalas and Tamils in Sri Lankan Society and its spill-over effect of the ethnic problem correspond to the Indian factor in the Sri Lankan politics, which holds the key to its security question.

Sri Lankan case study provides the fact that its domestic socio-economic framework plays an important role in determining the nature and magnitude of its security problem. As it is discussed in the preceding chapters, the regional and international framework of Sri Lanka, have an important role to play in the context of security and stability in the region. For Sri Lanka. the security problem can be viewed in its policy perspective in matters of military and defence which determine the security of the small island. Since independence, the security problem has become a continuous one for which the country has entered into defence agreements and military alliances with foreign governments. In recent times, the Sri Lankan foreign policies have manifested itspro-western line which has resulted in concern and

and apprehension for the nighbouring countries, especially India. For its lack of manpower and resources, the weak defence of Sri Lanka and its small security forces, help determine the security problem. But it is the weakening of the internal socio-political structure, in the conflict of nationalities within society; the security problem can be viewed in the serious internal problem where the Sinhalas and Tamils are locked in a serious conflict.

For Sri Lanka, it is the Tamil problem which poses a serious threat to its security in matters of sociopolitical and cultural unity in the society. In the present ethnic crisis, it is seen that the Sri Lanka government has followed aggressive policies against the Tamils who are demanding for more autonomy and more powers in the society. But, the government backed by the majority Sinhalas has carried out a compaign to alienate the Tamils from the national main stream. In this context, the government policies in socio-economic and cultural matters espouse the Sinhala chauvinism which has intensified the group divisions in society. The Tamils on the other hand, being alienated and deprived in society, have taken to political violence to claim their rights and privileges in society. So, the mutual distrust and antagonism among the Sinhalas and Tamils, have percolated into

serious divisions in society which has resulted in the minority Tamil demand for separatism and selfdetermination in Sri Lankan society.

These fissiparous tendencies within the state, are due to the lack of common consensus on basic socio-economic and political issues in the society, which undermines the security and stability of the state. The Tamil problem has become serious with the Tamils demanding for a separate state and the gov ernment inturn has unleashed its military force The Tamil militants and terror on the minority tamils. have taken to warpath and escalated violence in responsecto the attack, the Sri Lankan government has unleashed in its drive against the Tamil militants. To curve the violence and attacks of the Tamil militants, the government has asked foreigh military powers to help it solve the ethnic problem through the use of force and terror.

Separatism has an ugly face and even the Tamil extremists are aware of this. The government of Sri Lanka will never concede the demand for a separate state. The only way in which it can be achieved is by an armed struggle and it is doubtful whether even the extremists are prepared to pay such a heavy price. They do possess arms and the source from which they get arms are also known. The encouragement and support which they get from the Tamils in Tamilnadu have deepened the Sri Lanka crisis. India's efforts to bring about an amicable settlement of the ethnic conflict have been misunderstood in Colombo mainly because of the Tamilnadu politicians' overenthusiasm to help the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Colombo is unhappy because it has proof that terrorists are being trained in Tamilnadu. It is not difficult to send arms from Tamilnadu. It is not difficult to send arms from Tamilnadu to terrorists in Sri Lanka.

The Jayewardene Government has sought western military help from countries like United Kingdom, Israel, South Africa, China, and above all U.S.A., to crush the Tamil militants in the ethnic monflicts in Sri Lanka. It has stockpiled arms and ammunition from the western countries and has started a massive compaign against the Tamils. As it is reported, the presence of British Intellengence Group, SAS and the Israeli Intelligence, Mossad in the island has marked the government's terrorist policies towards the Tamils. It has formulated the programme of 'colonisation' for the northern and eastern provinces where the government wants to settle armed Sinhalas to outnumber the Tamils in those areas. In this operation, it has carried out extensive army operations in

Jaffna peninsula, by aerial bombings, strafing and shooting from the naval gunboats.

On the other hand, the Tamil militants have raised a guerilla warfare against the government which has broken the security system and law and order situation in northern areas of Sri Lanka. The Tamils have repulsed the attacks by the Sri Lankan security forces and have carried out extensive attacks, jail breaks and terrorist violence in northern and eastern provinces. They have carried out massacre of Sinhalas in retalistion to Government attacks on civilian Tamils. Though the Tamil militants are divided into many groups and organisations, they are all against the Sri Lankan government in the military conflict in north.

To examine the Indian stand on Sri Lankan problem, Indian Government has rightly voiced its concern and anguish over the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. It has called for a peaceful solution to the ethnic problem, in the basic framework of the Sri Lankan constitution. India feels that political instability in Sri Lanka could lead to outside interference and military presence in the region which has necessary implications for India's security and stability in the region. So, India has vociferously supported the cause for a united and stable Sri Lanka. It does not support the Tamil idea of a separate state and it has maintained its position for a political solution to the ethnic problem. The Indian Government has offered its good offices in mediating between the Tamils and Government of Sri Lanka, to find out ways and means to solve the ethnic problem within the Sri Lankan perspective.

To examine the Tamil Demand for regional autonomy in Northern and Eastern provinces, which is the crux of the problem; should be studied carefully in the light of the political developments in the recent past. In this context, the policy of 'colonisation' of Tamil areas by Sinhala peasants, has been a focal point in the ethnic tension in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese call it a simple policy of distribution of land and land settlement while the Tamils smell a conspiracy in it to swamp their homeland with Sinhala settlers and to reduce their position ultimately into that of a 'minority' in their own homeland.

The edge of Tamil problems regarding language, university admissions, employment and colonisation could have been blunted if successive governments in Colombo had genuinely worked for the devolution of power granting certain rights to the Tamils in their areas. The journey from B-C Pact of 1957 to the idea of district development councils of the 1980s, has seen many broken promises, constitutional deceptions and racial ethnic shauvinism and

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Bolitical expediency. The DDC Act itself was an exercise The structure, powers and functions of the in deception. DDCs and their financial viability were framed in such a way that decentralisation turned out to be a mere facade. The DDCs have been exclusively in the hands of the President. After the failure of inadequacy of the DDCs as a means of devolving power was realised even by the Jayewardene Government with the proposal for a second chamber in the interest of minorities in devolution of power. But, the proposal for a second chamber is very vague for the confusion of powers exists with different set-up. The government has come up with new proposal in changing times, after the failure of Thimpu Talks. Lately it has proposed for the establishment of autonomous areas on the lines of Indian union territories with devolution of power from the centre. But the Tamils have not agreed to any kind of these proposals for the reason that it lacks the basic aims and objectives of the Tamil community.

The recent Sri Lankan foreign policy postures directly impinges upon the security environment of South Asia in general and India in particular. The revival of the Defence agreement of 1947 with Great Britain, the Trincomalee Tank Farm, Deal, an agreement to expond the scope of Voice of America (VOA) in Sri Lanka, collaboration with the Mossad and the SAS and galloping defence expenditure are some of the major steps and trends which have been creating disharmony between the Indian and Sri Lankan perspectives on the security of the South Asia.

The security problem of Sri Lanka which is viewed in the context of national unity and stability, depends on the mutual cooperation and participation among the Sinhalas and Tamils. The Government should take a realistic view of the problem associated with the Tamil separatism which threatens the security and stability of the island. So, the government should take resort to a political solution to the ethnic question, giving a fair deal to the Tamils. Thus, the security problem in Sri Lanka depends on the internal unity and stability which has larger geo-political dimensions.

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
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
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
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
ETHNO SPATIAL CLUSTERS SRI-LANKA TAMIL GROUP


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
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






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