

**The Nonaligned Group, Conflict Situations,
and the UN : A Study of Afghanistan
and Kampuchea**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

AMIYA KUMAR JENA

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ORGANISATION & DISARMAMENT
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
1986**

P R E F A C E

The study of the nonaligned movement has assumed a great deal of importance in the Post-Second World War international politics. This movement for the first time, brought about a metamorphic change in the complexion and character of international relations by delegitimising colonialism, imperialism and nationalistic universalism. Besides, this movement transformed the states of Asia, Africa and Caribbean which were once considered as objects of global politics into subjects of international politics. In their roles as active subjects of the world politics they found the UN as an effective instrument of their nonaligned foreign policy. They all sought the membership of the UN which institutionalized as well as legitimized their policy of nonalignment in one way or the other. (The UN's principle of 'sovereign equality'). Later in seventies in view of the importance of the UN to their myriad foreign policy objectives and to larger international peace, they constituted a group. The role of this group has been studied in the Kampuchean and Afghanistan crises which are of equal importance in any study of dynamics and stability of the movement and the UN as well. However, it is regrettable that in India, not much research work commensurate with the importance of this group in the UN has been undertaken. This present study seeks to present a 'Third World Perspective' on the genesis and role of the Nonaligned Group in the UN in the context of Kampuchean and the Afghanistan crises.

I owe a major debt of gratitude to my Supervisor Dr C.S.R. Murthy who thoroughly cooperated and guided me in consummating this work. His rare insights on and irreducible enthusiasm in the subject have, all through, been a propelling force for me. Without his valuable guidance and effective supervision, this work would hardly have materialized.

I am indebted to Professor K.P. Saksena who extended his cooperation and rare guidance during the course of preparation of this paper. Without his supervision of this work for six months, this paper would not have got direction.

I am thankful to Professor T.T. Poulse, Head of the Centre for being considerate in this regard.

I thank all my friends who encouraged me during the course of preparation of this paper. In addition, I am highly grateful to my parents whose succour and constant encouragement have been the constant source of my strength in academic life. Finally, I thank my typist Mr N.K. Pahwa for his painstaking efforts in typing my paper.

New Delhi
18/7/1986

Amiya Kumar Jena
AMIYA KUMAR JENA

C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTORY NOTE	1 - 4
CHAPTER I	THE EVOLUTION OF THE NONALIGNED GROUP AT THE UN		5 - 23
CHAPTER II	AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, THE NONALIGNED AND THE UN		24-44
CHAPTER III	KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT, THE NONALIGNED AND THE UN		45-71
CONCLUSION	72-80
APPENDICES	81-90
BIBLIOGRAPHY	91-98



INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Nonalignment has become a key factor in international politics of the post-Second World War period. Nonalignment has emerged as a viable foreign policy choice - alternative to traditional foreign policy choices, such as balance of power and isolationism. It has evolved in the backdrop of the East-West cold war and the attempts particularly by the USA and the USSR to entangle the new states with their respective blocs. But, in the perception of the newly emergent nations, involvement in bloc-rivalry would neither safeguard their security/developmental interests, nor promote the larger cause of world peace and security. Therefore, as an effective answer to suit the needs of these weak and new nations, pioneered in late 1940s, was the policy of non-alignment which, incidentally, emerged, over the years, as a movement of more than a hundred nations. ✓

It should be noted here that the policy and movement of nonalignment - so does the UN - view the world as a single, interdependent unit for promoting harmonization of interstate relations. Consequently, a basic complementarity is noticeable between the objectives of the UN and of the nonaligned movement: Both work for international peace and security, disarmament, the realization of the right of self-determination and advancement of economic and social objectives.

One important area where collaboration between the nonaligned countries and the UN in 1950s and 1960s has yielded remarkable results is what is called "decolonisation". The culmination of this process has been three-fold increase in the membership of the UN - of which nearly two-thirds are members of the nonaligned movement. But, nevertheless, this positive development has posed some problems too for the nonaligned countries to coordinate their approaches and policies in the UN. As for the UN, the range and nature of issues raised at the forum, as also its concerns, have undergone qualitative change.

With a view to tackling this situation, nonaligned states on their part, since early seventies, initiated steps to institutionalize their movement gradually. One of the landmarks in the process of institutionalization was the formation of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau at the Algiers Summit. This bureau is considered to be one of the means for coordinating the policies of the nonaligned countries at the UN. Partly due to the efforts of the Coordinating Bureau, there has been a broad consensus among nonaligned countries in the UN in matters of decolonization, anti-racism, and, to an extent, in economic and social questions, while their views and responses have been markedly divergent in peace and security and disarmament matters.

It is the latter aspect which will constitute the focus of this dissertation. An attempt is made to examine the manner in, and the extent to, which the nonaligned nations had individually and collectively perceived and responded to major conflicts in the UN. For attempting an intensive analysis, the study is confined to two conflict situations, viz., Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The developments in Afghanistan since December 1979 are significant in view of the fact that for the first time since the UN became operational, the territorial integrity and political independence of a non-aligned state has been violated by one Superpower i.e. the USSR. On the other hand, the Kampuchean question, involving again a nonaligned state, where a sister nonaligned state i.e. Vietnam had intervened by force and thereby violated the sanctity of political independence of Kampuchea. Discussion on them and other aspects have been attempted in this light.

The first chapter attempts a brief survey of historical evolution of the nonaligned movement with particular emphasis on various efforts regarding the gradual institutionalization of the movement. The objectives and activities of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau in the UN also find place in the evaluation. Each of the next two chapters traces developments involving military intervention in Afghanistan and Kampuchea respectively. Then examined the positions held

by parties concerned and also the views and responses of major powers. The chapters focus specially on the reactions and interactions of the nonaligned member countries in the context of consideration of these questions at the UN forums. The last chapter contains an assessment and concluding observations.

The source materials for this descriptive-analytical study have been drawn from UN documents and official records of the UN organs. In addition, secondary sources such as books and articles have been consulted.

....

CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NONALIGNED GROUP
AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Nonalignment has emerged as a new dimension of the post-war international politics. Its evolution as a foreign policy choice could be seen as: (a) a response to the international political climate characterized by competitive policies of certain mighty countries of Europe and North Atlantic; (b) a product of historical experiences of the peoples of Afro-Asian countries, and (c) the manifested perceptions of leaders of these newly emerging countries about the place their respective nations should rightly occupy in world affairs.

At the end of the War, the principal Allied Powers, the USA (with UK among others on its side) and the USSR had started perceiving/projecting threats to respective political systems and also to vital national interests from opponent. This lack of trust had led to what is known as "cold war".¹ The cold war took an important turn with the formation of multilateral military alliances such as NATO and Warsaw Treaty

1 Some authors trace the origin of the cold war far back to the Bolshevik revolution, some to the period of two years between Yalta Conference and Truman Doctrine and others to Winston Churchill's Fulton Speech of March 1946. See John Luckacs, A New History of the Cold War (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 3-39.

Organization. It did not stop there. The two power blocs systematically sought to win over newly independent countries as allies in the cold war rivalry. But in the view of those newly emerged countries, it would militate against their just acquired identity and independence of action. Aligning with one or other great power will only blemish the ideals in pursuance of which countries like India, Indonesia fought for decades against colonialism and had just gained independence. Furthermore, long lasting historical traditions in these countries symbolized the belief in world peace through cooperation rather than division for war.² The Asian philosophers had, even in ancient times nursed a vision of oneness of the world. Naturally therefore, the responses by statesmen, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, were rooted in the traditional wisdom. What Nehru had said, when he took over as Vice-President of the Interim Government in India in September 1946, was indeed a trend-setter. He stated: "We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale."³

2 See Bimal Prasad, "Historical Background of Nonalignment", in K.P. Misra, ed., Nonalignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (New Delhi, 1982), pp. 13-21.

3 India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, September 1946- April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961), p.2.

Despite the misinterpretations some governments as well as scholars in the West had given to the content and relevance of this posture, India and other Afro-Asian countries had elaborated over the years, the broad principles of the policy of nonalignment. Broadly these principles are as follows: (a) Pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; (b) Liberation of the subject peoples, and (c) elimination of want, disease and ignorance. Interestingly, if not importantly, these are broadly the purposes enshrined in the UN Charter, such as maintenance of international peace and security, promotion of international socio-economic cooperation and advancement of the right of self-determination. Naturally, this was ensued by an era of interrelationship between the UN and the policy of nonalignment. In other words, each found the other as a partner working for the purposes of shared interest.

Before elaborating this point, one needs to note the character of the UN as established in 1945. The UN as founded in 1945, was a Eurocentric organization. Out of 51 original members, it is noteworthy that only six represented Africa and Asia - large parts of Asia, Africa and the whole of the Caribbean were under the yoke of colonialism. But this is not to deny the worldwide interest, the making of the UN had caused. On the one hand, the purposes and principles

embodied in the UN Charter gave rise to hopes and expectations among the peoples throughout the globe. But, on the contrary, when it became operational, it was preoccupied heavily with contentious claims and disputes arising out of conflictual policy of Eastern and Western blocs, the USA and the USSR in particular. Matters became much worse with the USA and its Western allies enjoying assured voting support both in the General Assembly and the Security Council as compared to the minority strength of the Soviet bloc.⁴ The UN had increasingly become a forum for furthering American/Western foreign policy objectives at the cost of the USSR's interests. It is of course, logical that the UN, an integral element of the international politics, was affected by the cold war, but cold war by itself could not solely represent the wider spectrum of international politics. That was the reason, perhaps why the newly emergent nonaligned countries considered that the UN belonged neither to East, nor to West alone but to the entire community of nations. Therefore, it was a conception of countries like India, Yugoslavia and others that the UN should not be made an ally to either of the cold war rivals but should rather be an instrument of moderating that rivalry.

4 Nearly three-fourths of the member states of the UN aligned themselves under the leadership of the USA against the Soviet bloc when they constituted one-tenths of the total UN membership. See K.P. Saksena, "Nonalignment and the UN", in K.P. Misra, ed., Nonalignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (New Delhi, 1982), p. 81.

It would indeed be instructive how this outlook has been put to application in the context of several conflict situations. In the Korean conflict, the moderation approach of India, Yugoslavia, Argentina and others being the active members, was manifested in the call for immediate cessation of hostilities, and for withdrawal of armed forces from beyond the 38th Parallel, opposition to designation of People's Republic of China as an aggressor, and resistance to the provisions of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of December 1950.⁵

Again the active participation of nonaligned states in the efforts to defuse, deescalate various conflict situations in 1950s combined with the cooperative role of the Secretary General led to important and mutually supportive patterns of actions: "preventive diplomacy"⁶ and UN peace-

5 The Uniting for Peace Resolution was an attempt to ignore the collective security framework envisaged in the UN Charter and to misuse the UN by the USA-dominated majority against the Soviet bloc.

6 Dag Hammarskjold in his Annual Report for 1960 said what he meant by Preventive Diplomacy:

These efforts (to prevent conflict) must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts out of the sphere of bloc differences, the UN should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solution aiming, at in the first instance, at their strict localisation... Preventive action in such cases must in the first place, aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes lead to counteraction from the other side... The UN enters the picture on the basis of its noncommitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a

keeping operations. These new states supported the UN peace-keeping operations mounted in response to the Suez Crisis (1956) where nonaligned countries endorsed the plan for setting up of the UNEF and actively contributed to the force. The UN Secretary-General made use of the willingness of the nonaligned countries to help containment of conflict activations in Lebanon (1958) and in the Congo (ONUC) 1960.

All these years during late 40s and 1950s, individual nonaligned states' reactions to important questions were governed by pursuit of independent policy. But at the same time, there were informal, though irregular, consultations between the leaders of these countries on various world problems. Alongside periodic exchanges of views between leaders like Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of Indonesia, who were later known as principal founders of the nonaligned movement, larger meetings of Afro-Asian states also took place. The first Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in 1947 marked the beginning of the resurgence of new states of Asia on the world scene. In this conference,

footnote contd.

guarantee in relation to all parts against initiatives from others...

Quoted in Brian Urganart, Hammarskjold (Great Britain, 1973), p. 256.

Nehru aptly epitomised the mood of Asia in his speech: "A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself. We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with other continents....The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others, they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs."⁷ A related development took place at the UN when India's ambassador B.N. Rau convened an informal meeting of Afro-Asian states in 1950 on the Korean crisis. This development inspired the Afro-Asian states to function at the UN as a caucusing group. The Afro-Asian brotherhood was the theme at the Afro-Asian/Asian-African conference held in Bandung (April 1985), as President Sukarno hoped the conference would "give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay that a new Asia and a new Africa have been born".⁸ The importance of the conference lay in its attempt to extend the cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa in areas of promotion of world peace and security, anti-racialism, anti-colonialism and social and economic cooperation. Later leaders of these states met for the first time at the UN Headquarter during

7 Quoted in N.D. Palmer and H.C. Perkins, International Relations (New Delhi, 1985), p. 463.

8 Ibid.

Fifteenth Session. At this session of the General Assembly, five states--Tito, Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah (of Ghana)--called for, in a draft resolution, establishment of contact and initiation of direct negotiation between the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of the USSR. All these efforts were indicators of the appearance of the nonalignment on the world scene as the harbinger of a new international movement and of the policy of nonalignment. Though these conferences and sporadic meetings were not convened in the name of nonalignment, certainly they contributed to the crystallization of nonalignment as a movement.

More concretely, the foundations of the nonalignment were laid at the Cairo Preparatory Conference (June 1961). The outcome of the meeting was the criteria for issuing invitations to Belgrade Summit: First, the country should have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems; second, the country concerned should be consistently supporting the movement for national independence; Third, the country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflict; Fourth, if the country has a bilateral agreement with a great power, or is a member of a regional alliance or pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of great power conflicts; and fifth, if it has conceded military bases to a

foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of great power conflicts.⁹

The first nonaligned summit held on the basis of above criteria in 1961 at Belgrade was attended by twenty-five states and three observer countries.¹⁰ The significance of the Summit was noticeable in its setting the tone for vigorous efforts to achieve "immediate, unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations".¹¹ That is how one could see the decade of 1960s which showed significant progress towards decolonization. But there was more to it. In early seventies, with the near completion of the process of decolonization, the newly independent countries were "not content with just formal transfer of political power: they wanted to go beyond and shape their destiny in a manner which protected and promoted their national interests which lay essentially in accelerated socio-economic

9 For analysis of weaknesses of the criteria of nonalignment see M.S. Rajan, Studies in Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 80-97.

10 Some states which refused the invitation argued that any grouping of states would inevitably reinforce the traditional feudalistic, hierarchical structure of international society and more seriously, the hegemony of a Great Power - both of which ran counter to the equality and independence envisaged by the policy of nonalignment. M.S. Rajan, *Ibid.*, p. 99.

11 Two Decades of Nonalignment: Documents of the Gatherings of the Nonaligned Countries, 1961-82 (New Delhi, 1983), p. 7.

development of their weak and backward societies".¹² So there occurred a perceptible shift of emphasis from decolonization to development questions by the time the Algiers Summit met (1973).

The Algiers Summit was able on one more count: to place the movement on a continuing footing by means of phased institutionalization. This institutionalization was expected to serve multiple objectives. As a scholar puts it would facilitate "greater effectiveness of cooperation among the nonaligned states and between the nonaligned states vis-a-vis the groups that are aligned, and ... introduce some stability, order and discipline into the functioning of the continuing expanding membership of the nonaligned group".¹³ It may be recalled here, the Third Nonaligned Summit (1970) at Lusaka, for the first time recognized "the pressing need to secure the continuity and increase the effectiveness of the role of nonaligned countries by ensuring implementation, through appropriate machinery, of the decisions, resolutions and directives of the Conference of Nonaligned countries". It established the office of the

12 K.P. Misra, "The Conceptual Profile of Nonalignment", in K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayanan, Nonalignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p. 98.

13 Rajan, n. 9, p. 100.

Chairman which is held by the leader of each Summit until the following summit. The office is entrusted with "taking all necessary steps to maintain contacts among member states, ensure continuity and carry into effect the decisions, resolutions, and directions of the conferences of nonaligned countries".¹⁴

Furthermore, all nonaligned countries in the UN and its Specialized Agencies and in all international bodies were to coordinate and harmonize their efforts and to take all necessary steps to ensure the appropriate implementation of decisions of the nonaligned conferences.

The work of coordination soon had become so heavy and diverse that it could no longer be handled by occasional (if not regular) conferences of foreign ministers. A body that could attend to the job on a more regular basis was needed. It was in this light that the decision to establish a Coordinating

14 O. Jankowitsch and K. Sawant, The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Nonaligned Countries (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1978), vol. 1, p. 106.

In this summit, it was also decided to convene summit every three years. These conferences were to be prepared by foreign ministers' conference. Such foreign ministers' conferences are also convened between the summits to review, coordinate and stimulate the work of the movement.

Bureau had to be seen. The Bureau, which was formed on an ad hoc basis at Algiers Summit, was given a statutory basis at the Colombo Summit (1976). Its membership which initially consisted of 17 members was increased to 74.¹⁵ Its principal functions are to make preparations for the nonaligned Summit conferences and to make preparations on matters of substance for the inter-Summit foreign ministers' conferences. On the whole, this Coordinating Bureau has tended to become the executive organ of the movement.

The meeting place of the Bureau is the UN Headquarters, New York. It meets at two levels--at the level of ministers and at the level of Permanent Representatives on a continuous basis at the UN Headquarters. The meetings take stock of various specific situations and sometimes end up in important initiatives. To cite a couple of examples. In 1978, Sri Lanka as the acting Chairman of the Bureau requested the meeting of the Security Council - which adopted a text sponsored by seven nonaligned states - to consider the Angolan situation.¹⁶ Again, in pursuance of the directive of

15 It comprised of 36 members from Africa, 25 from Asia and 12 from Latin America.

16 See Security Council Resolution 428 (1978), 6 May 1978.

the nonaligned ministerial meeting at New York on 16-18 September, declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was sought and secured in the General Assembly in 1971.¹⁷

Assisting the Nonaligned Bureau at the UN, a member of 'Working Groups' study the individual problems in depth. To mention a few of the working groups such as Working Group on Palestine, and Middle East, Working Group on Southern Africa, and Working Group on Korea which have initiated from time to time important resolutions in the General Assembly.¹⁸

At the UN headquarters, the coordination machinery of the nonaligned countries concerned itself with the business at the two principal political bodies of the UN: the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the General Assembly the nonaligned countries have been playing influential role in view of several factors. The preeminence of the nonaligned states is ensured by one member one vote provision under the

17 GA/Res/2832 (XXVI) of 9 December 1971.

18 According to an informed observer, "these groups have evolved in a formal manner only after the Algiers Summit and have the specific purpose of defining a common position for the nonaligned group as a whole and for suggesting an appropriate course of action in the General Assembly." See K.P. Sawant, "The Nonaligned Movement and the Group of 77", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, January-March 1983, p. 32.

Charter. Again, the UN's political function of collective legitimization has favoured nonaligned states because of their numerical strength in the General Assembly. So the General Assembly has become "a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states".¹⁹

Besides the General Assembly, the nonaligned countries play a decisive role, of late, in the Security Council after the enlargement of the Security Council in 1965. Among the ten non-permanent members, during the years since mid 1970s, nonaligned countries have begun to constitute majority. Their strength has consistently ranged from 6 to 8 which opened the way for active political and diplomatic role in the Security Council. Identified as Group of 7 (G-7), they have become a force to reckon with in the Security Council's political processes.²⁰ One of the factors mainly responsible for this development was that "the cross-section of nonaligned

19 Inis Claude is of the opinion that "the prominence of the UN (General Assembly in particular) in the pattern of international organization and its status as an institution approximating universality gave it obvious advantages for playing the role of the custodian of seals of approval and disapproval. See Inis Claude, "Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the UN", in N. Rosenbaum, ed., Readings on the International Political System (Princeton, N.J., 1970), p. 261.

20 This group initially consisted of seven non-permanent nonaligned members and hence it was known as G-7.

states elected by the Council in 1978 and 1979 proved to be more homogenous and therefore, more organizable than before". Despite the veto power bestowed on permanent members, "in the multipolar world", according to an author, "the outlook and aspirations of the non-permanent members are no less important".²¹ To gain the requirement of nine, the Great Powers are increasingly obliged to seek support from these nonaligned members. For the first time, in the history of the Security Council, non-permanent members -- i.e. nonaligned states -- could secure the adoption of resolutions on a procedural question without concurrent votes from any of the five permanent members.

The nonaligned countries demonstrate their influential role in the Security Council in many ways. They often request for its meeting to consider various international peace and security question. Thereby the nonaligned countries could effectively mobilize the Security Council to uphold the position of the nonaligned to secure the UN stamp of legitimacy. Furthermore, the growing importance of the nonaligned in the Council is evident in yet another way. The permanent members have been wary of resorting frequently to

21 Richard L. Jackson, "The Role of Nonaligned States in the UN Security Council : A Western Perspective", The Nonaligned World, vol. 1, no. 4, October 1983, p. 469.

veto owing to consequent 'diplomatic isolation'. In case of resolutions which permanent members could acquiesce in (because they might not affect their individual national interests) they chose to abstain or might not participate in voting. For example, on Angolan situation (1976), France, UK and the USA abstained from voting on resolution 387(1976) which condemned South Africa. This testifies the influence which the nonaligned countries can wield in the diplomatic processes of the Security Council.

No doubt, on the one hand, the growth of the movement in terms of its membership had led to institutionalization of cooperation at various levels. But on the other hand, the problems created by this growth are equally noteworthy. There have been perceptible shifts of emphasis in its concerns over the past two and half decades. While issues such as East-West rivalry and anti-colonialism remained the central focus of the movement during sixties and early seventies, attention had to be paid to more complex challenges in late seventies and early eighties. Great power rivalry is manifested in the "establishment of new military bases, stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries under one or another pretext, intensification of deliveries of sophisticated arms, deepening of existing and origin of new disputes and their exploitation for provoking crises in one or another part



TH2072

of the world...."²² Adding to this, there are "conflicts in which the direct - but often not the only - parties are the nonaligned countries themselves as is the case with the war between Iraq and Iran, the question of Western Sahara, and the dispute between Vietnam and ASEAN countries over the presence of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea".²³ In other words, threats to unity and solidarity among the nonaligned countries and peaceful resolution of disputes and differences among nonaligned states have emerged as a key preoccupation of the movement. The Havana Summit (1979) noted therefore, that preservation of the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of nonaligned countries and elimination of foreign interference and intervention in the internal and external affairs of states and the use of threat of force, and strengthening of nonalignment as an independent non-bloc factor as the "essential objectives" of the nonalignment.²⁴ In the same vein, the New Delhi Summit (1983) recognized the fact that "unity and solidarity among the nonaligned countries are all the more necessary in the present international relations. They are indispensable to

22 C.S.R. Murthy, "Between the Summits", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 1, January-March 1983, p. 108.

23 Ibid.

24 Peter Willets, The Nonaligned in Havana: Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for the Global Political System (London, 1981), p.81.

TH-2072



the independence and strength of the movement and the realization of its objectives".²⁵ It further emphasized "the importance of devoting special attention to and preserving in, efforts aimed at finding peaceful solutions to the differences and disputes arising among the member-states of the movement".²⁶ This conspicuous shift in the priorities and preoccupations has occurred following the conflicts among the nonaligned countries as the ones mentioned above. In these conflicts, it should be noted, besides nonaligned countries, the great powers are either directly or by proxy involved. The movement which endeavoured to moderate East/West conflict is, of late, forced with the task of resolving the conflicts between its own members. Added to this, there is also a close association of some nonaligned states with great powers so as to affect relative weightages to their own favour in disputes with sister nonaligned nations.²⁷ These developments have posed serious dilemmas for the nonaligned movement as well as for the nonaligned group in the UN.

25 Final Document, Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries (New Delhi), March 1983, p. 9.

26 Ibid.

27 This "bloc penetration" was perceived clearly in Havana Summit (1979) where Cuba and Vietnam had advocated the "natural ally" thesis which did not find favour with the majority. For detailed analysis, see Rajan, n. 9, pp. 61-62.

It is in this framework, an examination of various aspects relating to Afghanistan and Kampuchean situations assumes special relevance. What are the factors that flared up the crises in these areas? What bearing do the Afghanistan and Kampuchean conflicts have on the principles/purposes of the nonaligned movement and of the UN? In what manner, the nonaligned countries tried to respond to both in the forums of the movement and of the UN and to what effect? These questions are the focus of the couple of illustrative chapters that follow.

.....

AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, THE NONALIGNED AND THE UN

Few events have taken place in post-war world politics which are as important and disturbing as the Soviet military intervention/invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 (and the continued Soviet military presence since then). The ramifications of the developments leading to the Soviet action and the implications thereof for international politics are so significant that it would be necessary to briefly record the relevant events.

The beginning of this crisis can be traced back, in a way, to the year 1973 when Mohammad Daud overthrew the monarchy. Communists had supported Daud in the hope of emergence of a democratic Afghanistan.¹ But Daud turned authoritarian tilted to the West, and became friendly with the Shah of Iran. In the meantime, two factions of Communists -- Khalq and Parcham -- had merged in July 1977 to form a United People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. In April 1978 the PDPA led the "Saur" Revolution to topple the Daud Government. This was followed immediately by proclamation of

1 For details of events preceding Soviet military intervention, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power (New Delhi, 1982), pp. 30-38.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with Nur Mohammed Taraki as Chairman of the Afghanistan Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister and Babrak Karmal as the first Deputy Prime Minister. Though the USSR was the first government to accord diplomatic recognition to this government, there is no evidence to suggest that Soviet Union was behind the Communist takeover. But soon there occurred a factional struggle between Khalq and Parcham. In the process Khalq faction succeeded in driving out key figures in the Parcham faction out of Afghanistan. No sooner the interfactional scores were settled in Khalq's favour, did the intra-Khalq struggle begin, particularly between Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. In September 1978, Amin emerged victorious by taking over as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and of the Supreme Defence Council. Later Amin concentrated all levers of power in his hand and allegedly pursued domestic and foreign policies which contravened Saur Revolution. Added to this, Amin regime was secretly seeking to establish liaison with the USA, Pakistan and China.² The situation was serious enough to cause domestic instability in Afghanistan with overlapping repercussions on the security environment of the giant neighbour, the Soviet Union. Hence the Soviet intervention on 27 December 1979 and consequent

2 One of the factors of this intervention was the danger of recrudescence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Central Asia. Anticipating that this emergence of Pan-Islamism would affect the Central Asian Republics, the USSR intervened. See for details, A.K. Damodaran, "Soviet action in Afghanistan", in K.P. Misra, ed., Afghanistan in Crisis (New Delhi, 1981), p. 29.

upon which Amin was deposed. Babrak Karmal who was exiled in Czechoslovakia assumed the leadership of the party and the Revolutionary Council.

From what has been traced above, there can be derived some the politico-strategic implications of different variants. The immediate impact was felt on security perceptions of states in South, South-West and West Asia. Besides, Pakistan and Iran have been facing domestic problems of instability following exodus of Afghan Refugees into their respective territories and its consequent strain on their respective social, political and economic systems. The crisis has a perceptible impact on superpower relations as manifested in the breakdown of US-Soviet detente and onset of a new Cold War. At a much broader level, the Afghanistan developments pose a formidable challenge to the efficacy of the non-aligned movement as this intervention amounts to the gross violation of the basic principles of non-alignment. It is the first case of its kind where a superpower directly intervened in the internal affairs of a founding member of the nonaligned movement. The dilemma was so acute for the nonaligned movement that the Coordinating Bureau failed to issue any communique.

Also, the Afghanistan situation has emerged as "a more serious challenge to the theoretical framework of

the UN security system than any other event in the history of the UN".³ The intervention occurred in utter defiance of some of the basic principles of the UN Charter such as the non-interference in internal affairs of any state, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of any State, and non-use of force in international relations.

Among the options open to all concerned states, near and far to Afghanistan, to give expression to their concern and to seek through diplomatic means - a satisfactory solution it was obvious that UN was an appropriate forum, for it was (i) readily available instrument encompassing nations from all parts of the globe, (ii) a body voicing world opinion on a given issue, and (iii) forum where conflicting claims and policies are set forth with a view to achieving "collective legitimization".

Consideration of the Question and the Deadlock

The Afghanistan question was brought to the Security Council by fifty-two states because the Security Council meets in a continuous session and has the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. One

³ K.P. Saksena, "Afghanistan Crisis and the United Nations", in K.P. Misra, ed., Afghanistan in Crisis (New Delhi, 1981), p. 101.

noticeable fact was that the Security Council met nearly a week after the Soviet intervention.⁴

Despite delay, formal debate at the Security Council could not blunt the sharp differences of views. Participants in the debate, as usual, were divided in their sympathies. Afghanistan took strong exception to convening of the Security Council and contended that discussion on the question violated domestic jurisdiction provision of the UN Charter. Change in the government occurred when the Afghan National Army rose ✓ on 27 December 1979 against Hafizullah Amin's tyrannical rule. As regards the presence of Soviet military contingent, according to Afghan representative, these forces had been sent at Taraki's request made in December 1978 and was renewed by Amin's regime subsequently. The Karmal Government repeated the request for the Soviet armed assistance to ward off the threats from abroad and to repel the armed attack. All this, it was added, was in full conformity with right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

4 This delay might be due to the fact that the President of the Security Council was Czechoslovakia until 31 December 1979. Another factor behind delay was that unlike the previous conflicts such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia where the objective of the Western Powers was not to thwart Soviet aggression but to derive some political propaganda advantage, in Afghanistan conflict, the USA and other Western powers reportedly resorted to informal exchange of views. For details see K.P. Saksena, n. 3, pp. 104-5.†

Buttressing Afghan arguments, the USSR also had to offer justification of its action - which was taken in adherence to the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation.⁵ The USSR saw in the attempts of some states to describe the Soviet presence as a threat to peace and security as a pretext to distract the attention of the world opinion from real facts relating to foreign intervention in internal affairs of Afghanistan.⁶ The Soviet action was imperative following intervention by the USA and certain other powers in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR would not allow Afghanistan to be used as a bridgehead for preparation of imperialist aggression against it taking into account its own security interests. However, the Soviet Union assured that it would withdraw its armed forces, once the causes which motivated the USSR to request were removed.

It was Pakistan - a country with long border with Afghanistan, therefore its high stakes in the situation - which led the band of member countries against Soviet action.

5 This treaty was signed in Moscow on 5 December 1978.

6 The UN Chronicle, vol. 17, no. 5, March 1980, p.10

In the words of Pakistan participant, the Soviet intervened in Afghanistan on "the pretext of protecting Afghanistan from a hypothetical outside interference". It called for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces and creation of conditions which would enable the Afghan people to determine their own government without foreign interference. Pakistan's point of view was elaborated by China and the US combine. China, also a country falling in the affected security perimeters, condemned the aggression of the USSR and at the same time, did not accept the justification by the USSR of its intervention in accordance with Soviet-Afghan Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter. China saw in the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a Southward drive for world hegemony. It urged the Security Council, therefore, to condemn the Soviet aggression in strongest terms, and to demand firmly the withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan.

The USA too did not mince words, for it was a rare opportunity to settle old scores with its ideological rival. It strongly disapproved the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and alleged the USSR of overthrowing Amin Government. It did not accept the Soviet justification of its action under Article 51 which could be invoked only in case of an armed attack. Further it did not accept the intervention of the USSR in accordance with Afghan-Soviet

treaty as the USSR was under obligation by this treaty to respect Afghanistan's national sovereignty and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.⁷

Besides members of the Council, thirty-two nonaligned states also took part in the debate. Among them, Niger, Zambia, Tunisia, Egypt, Democratic Kampuchea, Liberia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire did not approve the intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan. Yugoslavia, for example, supported the call of the nonaligned members of the Security Council for immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.⁸ Egypt, another key nonaligned participant, urged the Security Council to demand the immediate withdrawal of the USSR forces from Afghanistan and termination of its interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. There was a section of nonaligned consisting of Lao People's Democratic Republic and Vietnam and others who supported the Soviet action in accordance with the Soviet-Afghan Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁹ However, when time came to sponsoring of a draft resolution, it should be noted, there was apparent solidarity among the nonaligned. Six nonaligned

7 Ibid., p. 11.

8 Ibid., p. 16.

9 For details, see The UN Chronicle, vol. 17, no. 2, March 1980, pp. 10-17.

members of the Council - Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia -- in a draft resolution, while reaffirming the right of the people of Afghanistan, to determine the form of government and their social, economic and political systems free from outside intervention, coercion or constraint of any kind, "deplored the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan" and called "for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan". The nonaligned draft was expected to be countered by the Soviet veto.¹⁰ To overcome the deadlock, the Philippines and Mexico invoked the provisions of 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution.¹¹ Adoption of this led to the convening of an Emergency Special Session (VI) on 10 January 1980.

Trends in Debates in the General Assembly

In the General Assembly, Afghanistan expressed strong opposition to inclusion of the question in the agenda repeating the points it made in the Security Council debate: the sanctity of Article 2(7), "imperialist" interference in domestic affairs which it described as "undeclared war" by China and the United States.¹²

¹⁰ Voting figure 13-0-2 (GDR & USSR).

¹¹ Resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950. In this case, concurrence of permanent members is not essential.

¹² Later it explained its position as regards resolution of the Afghanistan conflict in its declaration of

Supporting the Afghanistan Government's claims, the USSR did not endorse the framework for political settlement envisaged in the UN resolution. But it favoured "a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, complete and

Footnote 12

24 August 1981. This declaration merits mention here as it embodies the Afghanistan policy towards the situation.

First, "the securing of complete and reliable cessation of armed and any other intervention in the domestic affairs of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and creation of conditions making impossible the occurrence of such interference in future must be the main and basic content of the political settlement". Secondly, it proposes the Government of Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran to hold negotiations to normalize their relations. Thirdly, the Government of Afghanistan does not object to its negotiations, with the Government of Pakistan and Iran whether bilateral or trilateral being attended by the Secretary General, or his representative. Fourthly, the agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Iran must contain universally acknowledged provisions concerning mutual respect, sovereignty, readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs as well as include concrete commitments of the parties on preventing armed and other hostile activities from their own territory against each other. Fifthly, agreements on reliable international guarantees as regards the cessation and noninterference in Afghanistan affairs must be an integral part of a political settlement. As regards guarantor countries, it will include the USA, USSR and other countries which are acceptable to Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. International guarantees must be worked out with the participation of Afghanistan. Sixthly, after the achievement of political settlement, the Afghanistan will decide the terms and time-table for withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent through an accord with the USSR. As regards refugees, the Afghanistan Government will secure full freedom and immunity to all Afghans who have taken shelter in neighbouring states.

For details of the text, see POT Afghanistan Series, vol. 6, pt 57, August 1981, pp. 33-35.

unconditional cessation and guaranteed non-resumption of armed or any forms of interference in its internal affairs and the normalization of its relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours".¹³ The USSR representative said that the Soviet troop withdrawal could occur only when "the reasons that had given rise to the request of the Afghanistan to the USSR and the Soviet action in response to that request no longer existed".

These points were countered by the USA, China, West European countries broadly following the pattern expressed in the Security Council. In addition, the General Assembly debate in January 1980 and in the regular sessions held since then provided important indications about the nature of nonaligned responses. As it is admittedly difficult to cover the whole membership, analysis here is limited to representative sections within it. Divergent perceptions were striking in the South Asian neighbourhood, as well as in other areas.

Pakistan viewed the foreign military intervention in Afghanistan as "a flagrant violation of principles" enshrined in the Charter of the UN and of the norms of conduct regulating inter-state relations". Pakistan considered, also, the Soviet intervention as an attempt made to determine the outcome of

13 A/36/PV.58, p. 62.

purely indigenous political differences among Afghan people. In sum, Pakistan favoured a political settlement envisaged in the General Assembly resolutions.¹⁴ Iran also was strongly opposed to the Soviet military intervention in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. Iran's concern stemmed from "the common points shared by the peoples of Iran and Afghanistan and in pursuit of Islamic goals and objectives...." It while emphasizing the illegality of the present regime in Afghanistan, castigated those who could not rule a country without the presence of foreign forces cannot have any claim to legitimacy whatsoever. Iran, therefore, called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Russian military forces from Afghanistan within the framework of General Assembly resolutions.

In contrast to these countries, India stood odd for its views expressed in the General Assembly in January 1980. Earlier India did not participate in the deliberations of the Security Council. Its representative's statement in the General Assembly caused an uproar in various sections of the UN membership. It was noted that India's "security and national interests are vitally affected by developments that impinge on the security of our neighbours in the subcontinent". And yet, Indian representative said "the Soviet Government has assured our Government that its troops went to Afghanistan at the

14 A/ES-6/PV-3, p. 67.

request of the Afghanistan Government...we have been assured that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghanistan Government. We have no reason to doubt such assurances, particularly from a friendly country with which we have many ties."¹⁵ To India, the discussions in the General Assembly are counterproductive as "certain outside powers have enmeshed themselves in the dangerous web of international power play, based on outmoded doctrines of confrontation and that the people of Afghanistan are being treated as pawns in this terrible game".¹⁶ India did not condemn the USSR, nor did it name outside powers which have enmeshed themselves "in the dangerous web of international power play". India favours moderating the conflict as India's representative said: "India voice has been consistently in favour of moderation...We shall achieve nothing by confrontationist attitudes or policies."¹⁷ In later sessions, however, India had to say for record, that it was "uncompromisingly opposed to the presence of foreign troops on any soil".¹⁸ Basically, India favoured a political settlement which was laid down at New Delhi Foreign Ministers'

15 A/ES-6/PV.3, p. 7.

16 A/38/PV.68, p. 14.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

meeting and later reaffirmed in New Delhi Nonaligned Summit (1983). Such political settlement can be reached only, in India's view, through the cooperation of the parties concerned.

Besides India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka also strongly opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and favoured the framework for political settlement envisaged in the General Assembly resolutions.

In addition, it is important to elucidate the views of some leading nonaligned states such as Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's concern for Afghanistan crisis stemmed from its adherence to the principles of nonalignment. It did not condemn the USSR. It favoured moderation of the conflict, conforming to General Assembly resolutions.

Egypt favours a framework for political solution envisaged in the General Assembly resolutions. It endorsed the New Delhi Declaration of Foreign Ministers of February 1981 and New Delhi Nonaligned Summit (1983).

Cuba and Vietnam expressed the opposite set of views. Cuba's views are important as it was Chairman of the nonalignment during 1979-83 period. Cuba has always denounced the manoeuvres of imperialism and reaction against Afghan revolution. It was critical of the USA and other Western powers. It perceived external intervention in the

domestic matter of Afghanistan by 'North American imperialists.' Cessation of this intervention was the only solution to the problem. Nevertheless, it hoped that a political settlement of the situation in South-West Asia in accordance with the principles of the Charter (UN) and those of the nonaligned movement could be brought about.

Though it is clear that Cuba was expressing its individual opinion on the question, its stand led to a considerable dilution of the prestige of the chairmanship of the movement not merely among Western nations, but among many nonaligned members.

Like Cuba, Vietnam opined that the Afghanistan conflict emerged following intervention by the USA, China and other reactionary forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Vietnam was highly critical of the involvement of China also, which it alleged, was involved in financing and supporting the subversive activities against Afghanistan.

Resolutions of the General Assembly

An extension of interest of the countries in the General Assembly debates was noticeable in the initiative they consistently took in sponsoring/supporting draft resolutions, that only legitimized the collective concerns

on the question. In January 1980 emergency session, Pakistan introduced a draft resolution on behalf of twenty-four sponsors. Of twenty-four sponsors, fourteen states were nonaligned. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 January 1980 by a recorded vote of 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions.²⁰ This resolution (GA/Res/ES-6/2) strongly deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan as inconsistent with fundamental principles of the Charter. It called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic,

20 The nonaligned states which voted for:

Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Bahrain, Bangladesh, United Arab Emirates, Belize, Bhutan, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Surinam, Malta, Yugoslavia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia.

The nonaligned states which abstained:

Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Cyprus, Guinea, Bissau, India, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Syria, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia.

The nonaligned states which voted against:

Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Laos and Mozambique.

political, and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion, or constraint of any kind whatever. It urged all parties concerned to assist in bringing about conditions necessary for voluntary return of Afghanistan refugees to their homes. It should be noted that this resolution neither named the USSR, nor did it condemn the USSR. Perhaps, it was in pursuance of the wish that by not seeking specific condemnation of the USSR, the nonaligned sponsors hoped to persuade the parties to reach an amicable settlement of the problem. This attitude of restraint continued to guide the sponsors in subsequent sessions. Perhaps that was the reason why year after year, support given to the resolutions which were largely reaffirmation of the earlier ones.

The second draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 111 in favour to 22 against with 12 abstentions (A/35/37). The voting pattern of the nonaligned countries was 58-14-17. The third draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 116 to 23 against with 12 abstention (GA/Res/36/34). The voting pattern of the nonaligned countries was 58-14-20. The fourth draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 114 in favour to 21 against with 13 abstentions (GA/Res/37/37). The voting patterns of nonaligned countries was 58-14-21.

The fifth draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 116 in favour 20 against with 17 abstentions. (GA/Res/38/29). The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 58-14-21. The sixth draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 20 with 14 abstentions (GA/Res/39/13). The voting pattern of the nonaligned countries was 60-14-21.

Related Developments

As is commonly said that the UN processes are a mirror of the political forces operating outside it, in the case of nonaligned countries, their reactions and interactions at the UN cannot be separated from the periodical nonaligned gatherings. The nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting from 9-13 February 1981, took note of the Afghanistan situation. This conference was significant as the communique was adopted after achieving a "consensus" between Afghanistan and Pakistan whereas in the General Assembly, all resolutions were adopted without the consent of Afghanistan. It "urgently called for a political settlement on the basis of withdrawal of foreign troops and respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of intervention and non-interference".²¹ It also called upon

21 For details of the text, see Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 32, 20 February 1981, pp. 19-46.

"all states" to take such steps as would lead to "the creation of condition conducive to stable and harmonious relations among states of region based on nonaligned principle of peaceful coexistence...non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states". This was meant to states which were encouraging and assisting the dissidents to the Babrak Karmal regime.²² They affirmed the right of Afghan people to determine their own form of government. It also affirmed "the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and dignity". The importance of the meeting was further enhanced, when UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim announced the appointment of a special representative to mediate the Afghanistan crisis.

Later, New Delhi Nonaligned Summit (1983), the first summit that took place after the Afghanistan crisis occurred, reiterated the urgent call made at the February 1981 foreign ministers' meeting for a political settlement.²³ In addition, they regarded "the discussions through the intermediary of the Secretary General as a step in the right direction and urged

22 M.S. Rajan, Studies on Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement (New Delhi, 1986), p. 182.

23 For details see Final Documents : Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries (New Delhi), paragraphs 114-15.

their continuation with a view to promoting an early political settlement of the problem in conformity with the ideas and principles of the movement of nonaligned countries".²⁴

The reasons for deliberate omission of the USSR, by name, in nonaligned declarations are obvious. They do not intend to express value judgement so that they can moderate the conflict. Further, expression of value judgement may lead to confrontation as India's representative in the UN said: "We shall achieve nothing by confrontationalist attitudes or policies." Further, the nonaligned countries view the cooperation of all parties involved as essential to reach a political settlement. This can hardly be accomplished by condemning the USSR whose cooperation is central to the political settlement of the Afghanistan problem.

Precisely the lack of cooperation among countries immediately concerned which accounts for continued stalemate. Yet one cannot brush off the value of the role, the UN and the nonaligned played to facilitate early settlement. The quiet continuing efforts by the Secretary General and his Personal Representative at New York, Geneva and other places have contributed to widening of the areas of understanding

24 The efforts of the Secretary-General and his personal representatives have helped in widening the areas of understanding among countries concerned. This provided, in the opinion of the Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar "a good basis for the continuation of negotiations". Further, the "proximity" talks in Geneva - now seventh round on - and consultations in capitals helped in defining the substantive contents and scope of the issues including four components of political settlement.

and in defining the substantive contents of the Afghanistan question which includes four component elements of political settlement. An overwhelming number of nonaligned countries -- 58 out of 101 -- have almost consistently endorsed the need for political settlement of the Afghanistan within the framework of the UN. They have also introduced several draft resolutions envisaging a comprehensive political settlement which have been adopted in the General Assembly. They have also supported the mediating role of the UN Secretary-General -- which incidentally is the only active mediating mechanism in this case -- and his intermediary in seeking a political solution. They view that only active cooperation among the parties concerned can pave the way for a political settlement. Besides, they have refrained from expressing condemnation (which if made would have made the parties concerned more rigid) and yet deplored violation of international norms of state conduct.

....

KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT, THE NONALIGNED AND THE UN

While the preceding chapter highlights the first case of a superpower (the USSR) military intervention against a nonaligned country (Afghanistan), the present chapter seeks to analyse an equally important development: Vietnamese armed intervention in Kampuchea -- in other words, military intervention by a nonaligned state in the internal affairs of a sister nonaligned state.

The immediate background to the crisis in Kampuchea can be traced back to the year 1975 when the Government of Democratic Republic of Kampuchea was formed under the premiership of Pol Pot.¹ During its reign (1975-78), this government was alleged widely to have committed genocide, which transformed into a great humanitarian problem to neighbouring countries, particularly Vietnam and Thailand. Under these circumstances, the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation - formed with Vietnamese blessings - deposed the Pol Pot regime in late December 1978. This act was made

1 For details see, Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Cambodia from 'Democratic Kampuchea' to 'Peoples Republics'", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif), vol. 19, no. 8, August 1981, pp. 732-50. Timothy Carney, "Kampuchea in 1981: Fragile Stalemate", Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1982, pp. 78-87. Milton Osborne, "Can Kampuchea Survive", Asian Pacific Community, no. 5, summer 1979, pp. 45-57.

possible due to the support of 120,000 Vietnamese forces. Soon, on 8 January 1979, the new government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea was installed. These developments caused grave concern not merely to the states of Southeast Asia but bore far-reaching implications, to a varying extent, for Sino-Soviet-American interests in the region. In Southeast Asia, Thailand, for example, had to face a further exodus of refugee from Kampuchea after Vietnamese intervention. Further ASEAN countries as a group perceived this conflict as main impediment to establishment of peace, stability and neutrality in Southeast Asia. Besides, this conflict has emerged as a significant irritant in the relations between two superpowers, as also in Sino-Soviet relations. The USA viewed the Vietnamese intervention as fulfilling strategic objectives of the USSR in Southeast Asia. Similarly, China perceived Vietnamese intervention as an important component of the Soviet strategic plan in its quest for global supremacy. Further, in China's view, this conflict has helped the USSR to come into Cam Ranh Bay, thereby advancing its military base in the far east southwards by more than 4000 kilometers.

As noted at the outset, the developments in Kampuchea are noteworthy in one more angle: it exemplified the case of a nonaligned state that militarily intervened in the internal affairs of another nonaligned state, thereby posing a serious

challenge to the unity and strength of nonalignment. It was a clear violation of the basic principles of nonalignment as also those of the UN Charter, viz. preservation of the political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the external and internal affairs of states and non-use of force in international affairs.

As a mark of concern over the Kampuchean developments, a meeting of the Security Council, as the UN body having primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, was immediately convened.

Consideration by the Council

The Security Council considered the question of Kampuchea in pursuance of the request of Democratic Kampuchea (representing the deposed Pol Pot regime) contained in its letter of 3 January 1979. As usual, the parties involved took divergent positions, while the membership of the Security Council remained divided between the two sides.

Democratic Kampuchea, on the one hand, accused Vietnam of committing an act of flagrant aggression. The war raging in Kampuchea, in its view, was not a civil war. The so-called Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea was only a smokescreen designed to conceal the criminal anti-Kampuchean action undertaken by Vietnam. This was, so it was

argued, a war of aggression, colonization, annexation and regional hegemonism waged by Vietnam against Democratic Kampuchea. It urged the Security Council to condemn Vietnam and to prevail upon Vietnam to withdraw all its armed forces from Kampuchea totally and to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kampuchea.²

On the other hand, Vietnam objected to the Security Council's debate, as it, in its view, violated Art 2(7) of the UN Charter. It characterized the late 1978 Kampuchean events as the "revolutionary war" of the Kampuchean people against the dictatorial rule of Pol Pot clique which was an instrument of reactionary ruling circle of Peking. Besides, accusations were made about the connivance of China which sought to achieve expansion and hegemony as a great power in Southeast Asia.³ As regards the border dispute, Vietnam hoped that direct negotiations with Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council could lead to resolving of the border issue and to strengthening of bilateral relations.

In the Council's debate, the permanent members were divided on the issue. The USA, and China strongly supported the position of the Democratic Kampuchea.⁴ China

2 UN Chronicle, vol. 16, no. 2, 1979, pp. 7-9.

3 Ibid.

4 Besides the USA and China, France and UK supported the position of Democratic Kampuchea.

strongly condemned Vietnamese armed intervention which it viewed as a case of flagrant military aggression. It saw in the Vietnamese action an attempt to establish a colonial empire called Indo-Chinese federation with the backing of the USSR.⁵ It urged the Security Council to condemn Vietnam and to demand the immediate withdrawal of its armed forces from Kampuchea.

Aligned with China, the USA condemned the Vietnamese armed intervention on the grounds of violation of border by Democratic Kampuchea. But this did not grant one nation the right to impose a government on another by military force.⁶ It called for immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea. It, however, urged all states in the region to counsel restraint on parties to the conflict.

On the other hand, one permanent member, the USSR, supported the position of the Vietnam. It asserted that inclusion of Kampuchea question in the agenda amounted to intervention in domestic affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. It accused the former Pol Pot regime of pursuing territorial claims against neighbouring states. This regime, in its view, was a puppet in the hands of outside Powers pursuing the policy of hegemonism and expansionism in

5 UN Chronicle, vol. 16, no. 2, February 1979, p. 8.

6 Ibid.

Indo-China and Asia as a whole. In this regard, the action of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea was justified as it sought to build a peace loving independent, democratic and nonaligned Kampuchean so that peace and stability in Southeast Asia could be strengthened.⁷

Like the Permanent members, the non-permanent members of the Security Council were also divided. Further, among the non-permanent members of the Council, seven were nonaligned states. They, viz., Bangladesh, Jamaica, Zambia, Bolivia, Gabon, Kuwait and Nigeria took broadly identical position. They affirmed relevance of the principles of nonalignment such as non-interference and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states in settlement of Kampuchean problem. But they did not condemn the Vietnam. They urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea. Among the nonaligned countries, particularly Zambia viewed that the conflict in Kampuchea would undermine and destabilize the cohesion of the movement.⁸ Other non-permanent members--Norway and Portugal--took a position similar to that of nonaligned states. Opposed to the stand of the above states was the position of the Czechoslovakia which condemned China as aggressor and strongly approved the Government under Heng Samarin.⁹

7 Ibid., p. 9.

8 Ibid., p. 12.

9 Ibid., p. 11.

Besides the members of the Security Council, ^{twentyone} states including the five members of the ASEAN, participated in the debate in the Security Council. ASEAN states took a uniform position on Kampuchean problem. They condemned Vietnam for its aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. They affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own future free from interference from outside Powers. They urged the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea.¹⁰

Among nonaligned participants in the debate, the positions taken by Cuba and India, former being the Chairman of the NAM and latter being one of the founding members of the NAM, are worth-mentioning. Cuba took a position contrary to the position of the seven nonaligned non-permanent members (G-7) in the Security Council. It strongly supported the new Government under Heng Samrin which, in its view, exercised sovereignty over entire national territory. In its view, the spokesmen of imperialism were voicing concern over the fate of Democratic Kampuchea.¹¹ It appears, as in the case of Afghanistan, that Cuba represented its own national view than that of the nonaligned movement. India, in its intervention, favoured a settlement of Kampuchean question based on observation of ceasefire, vacation of Kampuchean territory

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 10.

occupied during the conflict, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and noninterference in internal affairs of other states.¹² It should be noted that India's position was more or less ambiguous, because by that time, it neither recognized Heng Samrin set up, nor, could it approve of ill-famous Pol Pot regime.

The division among members of the Security Council was reflected in the introduction of divergent resolutions too. It had several draft resolutions before it. China introduced the first draft resolution on 11 January 1979. By this draft resolution, the Council would have emphasized that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Kampuchea must be strictly respected. Further by this resolution, the Council would have condemned Vietnam for its armed aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and called upon Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Kampuchean territory.¹³ This draft resolution was not put to vote. Again, it introduced another draft resolution which besides containing the provisions of the earlier draft resolution, urged Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea to enter into early negotiations for a settlement.¹⁴ Like the earlier one it was not put to vote.

12 UN Chronicle, vol. 16, no. 3, March 1979, p. 14.

13 S/13022 of 11 January 1979.

14 S/13119 of 24 February 1979.

May be, China did not press for a vote in favour of a nonaligned draft. However, Chinese move caused a counter move by the Soviet Union. The USSR had come out with a draft resolution (cosponsored by Czechoslovakia).¹⁵ By this resolution, the Security Council would have strongly condemned the Chinese aggression against Vietnam and called upon all states to cease all supplies of arms to China. It would further have urged China to withdraw its troops from Vietnam immediately and to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Vietnam. Understandably, this too was not put to vote. This resolution was clearly different from the draft resolution submitted by China and nonaligned countries. Unlike the earlier resolutions, it did not urge Vietnam to withdraw its armed forces from Kampuchea. Instead, it took note of aggression of China against Vietnam. Obviously, it was more a tactical move to give suitable response to Chinese text than to seek the Security Council's approval.

The nonaligned countries (G-7) introduced one draft resolution on 14 January 1979.¹⁶ By this resolution, the Security Council would have called upon all foreign forces involved in Kampuchea to observe scrupulously an immediate ceasefire to put an end to hostilities and to withdraw their

15 S/13117 of 23 February 1979.

16 The nonaligned states namely Kuwait, Gabon, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, and Zambia which were the nonpermanent members introduced the draft resolution (S/13027).

forces from Kampuchea. This mild draft resolution was unacceptable to the Soviet Union which vetoed.¹⁷

Despite deadlock, unlike Afghanistan conflict, the Uniting For Peace Resolution was not invoked here for the following reasons: The USA was not eager to invoke as it sought to distinguish Vietnamese intervention from that of the Soviet intervention. To that effect, the US restraint neutralized Chinese rigidity. Further, differences might have arisen among non-permanent members about invoking the Uniting for Peace Resolution against a sister nonaligned country.

The latent differences among nonaligned countries in the Security Council soon came to surface when the Havana Nonaligned Summit was held in September 1979. It could not resolve the question of representation of Kampuchea as there was division among the nonaligned countries into three factions such as one faction favouring to keep the seat of Kampuchea vacant, the other upholding the representation of People's Republic of Kampuchea while the third supporting the representation of the Democratic Republic of

17 The USSR reasoned out that the nonaligned resolution was based on distorted information about the actual situation in Kampuchea. Besides in its view, in the absence of genuine representatives of the Kampuchean people, adoption of any resolution could only be regarded as an intervention in the internal affairs of that state.

Kampuchea.¹⁸ So it was decided that "as long as there is no decision on which one of the parties has the right to the vacant seat, neither of the parties can claim to its alleged rights in any organ or movement". The decision to keep the seat of Kampuchea vacant was taken to forestall the possibility of the division in the nonaligned movement. This means that the cohesion and future of the movement was considered more important than the Kampuchean question (in the context of Burmese withdrawal from the movement).

Representation Question

Havana nonaligned Summit was followed by the General Assembly thirty-fourth session which took up the question of Kampuchea's representation. It adopted the report of the Credentials Committee on 21 September 1979 by a recorded vote of 71 in favour, to 35 against with thirty-four abstentions. Here, in contrast to the Havana Summit "consensus" the division

18 The Political Declaration of this Conference took note of three different positions of three factions of nonaligned countries. As regards reasons behind the cleavage among nonaligned countries, Peter Willetts is of the opinion that "the nonaligned movement divided not because it was split between East and West but because there were powerful and appealing arguments for each side." The argument of supporters of Pol Pot regime was the opposition to foreign interference. The argument of supporters of the Heng Samrin's was that of general reaction against previous regime's violation of human rights. Other non-aligned states were used to recognizing whichever party had de facto control over a country. Peter Willetts, The Nonaligned in Havana (Great Britain, 1981), p. 17.

among the nonaligned countries surfaced clearly as out of 91, 35 nonaligned countries voted for Democratic Kampuchea, 25 for People's Republic of Kampuchea and 24 countries abstained.

Prior to vote on the report of the Credentials Committee, a proposal by India was submitted to request the General Assembly to suspend the consideration of the report of the Credential Committee and to keep the seat of Kampuchea vacant.¹⁹ This proposal was apparently in conformity with the decision of the Havana nonaligned Summit. But the proposal was not voted upon as it did not constitute an amendment to the draft resolution submitted in its report by the Credentials Committee for approval of the General Assembly. This Indian draft even failed to secure the support of majority of non-aligned states, as is evident by the General Assembly decision by a vote of 39 in favour to 76 against with 23 abstentions not to accord priority to India's proposal in voting.²⁰ There was another draft resolution submitted by 11 states.²¹ By this draft resolution, the Assembly would have considered that Credentials Committee had failed to examine the

19 India's proposal was sponsored by seven nonaligned states namely Benin, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascare, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sierra Leone.

20 UN Chronicle, vol. 16, no. 6, July-October 1979, p. 7.

21 Bulgaria, Bylorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Laos, Vietnam, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Ukranian SSR.

representation question and resolved that Kampuchea should be represented by People's Republic of Kampuchea. But later, the sponsors decided not to insist vote on it and to support the seven-power resolution.

However, unlike the Havana nonaligned summit which could not resolve the representation question, the General Assembly resolved the question by recognizing the People's Republic of Kampuchea as the authentic representative of the Kampuchean people.

General Assembly's Consideration of the Kampuchea

The Kampuchean question was brought to the General Assembly by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand which requested inclusion of an item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea" in the agenda of the General Assembly's thirty-fourth session (1979) by a letter of 17 August 1979.²² The General Assembly considered the situation in Kampuchea at plenary meetings held between 12 and 14 November 1979.

While participating in debates of the General Assembly, Democratic Kampuchea accused Vietnam as aiming at "regional expansion". This invasion, in its view, was an attempt to establish Indochinese Federation. It drew a parallel between Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Vietnamese intervention when its representative said "the invasion of Kampuchea and the invasion of Afghanistan are part and parcel of the same,

22 A/34/19 of 17 August 1979.

single plan for global expansion which threatens the independence of all states, particularly small and medium sized ones and at the same time imperils world peace."²³ As regards humanitarian problems, it viewed that these problems could not be solved "without a just and lasting solution of the conflict which is the result of Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea and the basic factor in that is the total and unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea."²⁴ Further, for a just and lasting solution, it made a three-point proposal such as first, unconditional withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, secondly, after withdrawal, free and general elections in Kampuchea under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General, and third Kampuchea would not harbour, nor would they require any compensation from Vietnam.²⁵ It favoured a comprehensive political settlement in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions.

The member states of ASEAN supported the position of Democratic Kampuchea. They viewed Vietnamese armed invasion as a great road-block to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. They did not consider the question of Kampuchea as a matter of confrontation between Vietnam and ASEAN. What they

23 A/35/PV.36 of 15 October 1980, p. 26.

24 A/25/PV.36, 5 October 1980, p. 16.

25 Ibid., p. 31.

considered important was the establishment of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia. They urged the immediate and total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. Recognizing the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, the ASEAN nations affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny without foreign interference. There is a, however, subtle difference of emphasis in the positions of ASEAN countries as regards this conflict. On the one hand, Singapore favours a firm stand of ASEAN against Vietnam as, in its view, "if we do not do so, there is a very real danger that after Vietnam has digested its conquest of Cambodia and its domination over Laos, it will begin to cast an avaricious eye upon other states of Southeast Asia".²⁶

On the other hand Indonesia takes a moderate stance. It did not condemn Vietnam nor for that matter any outside power. Its representative said "in participating in this debate on Kampuchea, we do not propose to focus the blame for the present situation on any state or group of states such an approach could only lead to recriminations and make the effort to find a solution more difficult".²⁷ All in all, ASEAN states favoured a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

26 A/37/PV.486, 30 October 1982, p. 31.

27 A/35/PV.38, 16 October 1982, p. 37.

Besides ASEAN states, the USA, China, US allies in the region, viz. Australia and Japan, leading nonaligned countries (like Egypt and Yugoslavia) supported the position of Democratic Kampuchea. The United States favoured a comprehensive political settlement of Kampuchea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions. Though the USA viewed Vietnamese intervention as violation of important principles of the UN Charter, it drew a parallel between the Soviet 'invasion' in Afghanistan and Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. It viewed Vietnamese intervention as interwoven with the Soviet strategic goals in the region at the expense of Vietnam's own freedom and independence.²⁸ This statement implies that the US wanted to distance Vietnam from the USSR. China had a tough stand to adopt, mainly for reasons of its politico-strategic compulsions in the sub-region. Therefore, China perceived Vietnamese aggression as an important step in Vietnam's quest for regional hegemony and the Soviet strategy of a southward drive. Also, it accused the USSR of being involved in southward drive, which, in its view, represented "an important component of its global strategic plan in its quest for world hegemony".²⁹ Broadly, China favoured a political settlement of Kampuchea based on three basic principles: first, foreign aggressors must withdraw all their forces immediately and unconditionally from Kampuchea in

28 A/35/PV.38, 16 October 1980, p. 31.

29 A/35/PV.37, 15 October 1980, p. 12.

compliance with the UN resolutions. Secondly, after the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Kampuchean people should be free to decide their own destiny without any outside interference. Thirdly, Kampuchea should be restored to its status as an independent and nonaligned state.³⁰ Once political settlement was arrived at, China promised to enter into negotiations to normalize its relations with Vietnam. The nonaligned Yugoslavia and Egypt urged total and immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese intervention as it amounted, in their view, to a violation of important principles of UN Charter and of the nonaligned.

On the other side of the divide at the Assembly, Vietnam accused China and Thailand mainly responsible for the situation in Kampuchea. It alleged Thailand of "allowing China and the USA to use its territory as a base for recruiting, training, equipping and supplying the armed gangs of Pol Pot and other Khmer reactionaries".³¹ It perceived, therefore, that Kampuchean problem could be solved by putting an end to "the policies of aggression and intervention pursued by China against Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam".

As regards presence of its forces in Kampuchea, Vietnam explained, they were deployed to defend Kampuchea's independence and sovereignty against "threats from China in

30 A/35/PV.37, 15 October 1980, p. 17.

31 A/36/PV.37, 20 October 1980, p. 11.

collusion with imperialist and other reactionaries".³² These forces would be withdrawn as soon as the threat of Chinese aggression against and intervention, in these Indo-Chinese countries no longer exists".³³ On its part, Vietnam too, offered a framework for political settlement, different from that of ASEAN. First, the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces would be carried out with termination of threat from China and its use of Thai territory against Indo-Chinese countries. Secondly, Indochinese countries and China would sign a treaty of non-aggression and noninterference in internal affairs of Indo-China. Thirdly, all countries must respect the sovereignty of Kampuchea and its people's right of self-determination. Fourthly, all sides would discuss international guarantees to ensure implementation of agreements reached. A number of states such as the USSR, Laos, Cuba, Nicaragua and India supported the position of Kampuchea. The USSR viewed the inclusion of Kampuchea in the agenda of the General Assembly as direct interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. It accused China and the USA of intervening in internal affairs of Kampuchea. It viewed that "the attempts by the USA, China and those in certain circles in ASEAN countries to use the UN to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea have complicated the normalization of situation in ASEAN and

32 A/36/PV.37, 20 October 1981, p. 11.

33 Ibid., p. 16.

contrary to the fundamental interests of the people of the region".³⁴ It did not endorse the framework for political settlement of Kampuchea as envisaged in the General Assembly Resolution. It favours a settlement which imply the recognition of the present Government in Kampuchea as its representative said: "The solution of the problem of Southeast Asia can and should be brought about by developing dialogue between those states (of Southeast Asia) on the basis of noninterference in their internal affairs, mutual respect and renunciation of attempts to force their will on others."³⁵

India, a nonaligned state, was opposed to the presence of foreign troops on any country. It emphasized that all states in the region must realize "that any position which sought to reverse the process of normalisation within Kampuchea and to restore the status quo ante, would not be altogether productive".³⁶ To India, representation of Democratic Kampuchea at the General Assembly, was "bizarre inversion of the principles of the Charter", because it, in its view, represented "the ramnants of the despicable Pol Pot regime". Laos, an Indo-Chinese state, also supported Vietnamese claims.³⁷ In addition, Cuba and Nicaragua supported the

34 A/37/PV.46, 28 October 1982, pp. 53-55.

35 Ibid., p. 57.

36 Ibid., p. 62.

37 A/35/PV.40, 17 October 1980, p. 62.

framework for political settlement envisaged by Vietnam. The
opposed the political settlement as envisaged in the General
Assembly resolutions. Cuba viewed that "it is only the
imperialists, the reactionaries and hegemonistic clique in
Peking that are engaged in sowing discord rejecting the
reasonable offers made by the peoples of Indochina of negotiated
and peaceful solutions."³⁸ Unlike other nonaligned states
such as Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, it was highly
critical of involvement of the USA and China. It opposed
International Conference on Kampuchea (1982) which was held
without the participation of People's Republic of Kampuchea.³⁹
An analysis of the formal debate has demonstrated two trends.
The first was that the General Assembly debate was influenced
by East-West considerations. This trend was not very
unusual to the UN political processes. However the second
one was the sharp divide in the nonaligned group. This
divide became quite quantifiable when the General Assembly
adopted a 30-power draft resolution on 14 November 1979 by a
recorded vote of 91 to 21 with 29 abstentions. Sixty-two

38 Ibid.

39 A/38/PV.36, 31 October 1983, pp. 43-45.

nonaligned voted for, thriteen against, while fourteen abstained.⁴⁰ The nonaligned voting pattern on the resolutions passed during subsequent years only underline this observation. The 1979 resolution called for immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea and urged all states "to refrain from all acts or threats of aggression and all forms of interference in the internal affairs of states in Southeast Asia."⁴¹ It urged "all parties to the conflict to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter". It

40 Nonaligned states which voted for the resolution were: Jamaica, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, Uruguay, Austria, Malta, Yugoslavia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Upper Volta, Zaire, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Indonesia, Democratic Kampuchea, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka and United Arab Emirates.

The thirteen nonaligned member states which voted against were: Democratic Yemen, Laos, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Guyana and Vietnam.

Fourteen nonaligned member states which abstained were: Panama, Algeria, Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Uganda, Zambia, India, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

41 The General Assembly in the preambular part of this resolution, noted with "great concern that the armed conflict in Kampuchea has escalated and is threatening peace and stability in Southeast Asia".

appealed to "all states to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea in order to enable its people to decide their own future and destiny free from outside interference, subversion or coercion and to respect scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Kampuchea". It resolved that "people of Kampuchea should be enabled to choose democratically their own government without outside interference, subversion or coercion."⁴² Evidently the wording of the resolution took care to be soft to Vietnam. There was no specific naming of its military intervention nor was its action "deplored". A mere "call" for withdrawal of "all" foreign forces was given. One may ask how far the nonaligned sponsors were responsible for the toning down. It is a different matter that the tactic failed

42 The Resolution GA/Res/35/6 was adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 23 with 22 abstentions on 22 October 1980. The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 59-13-16. Next year, the third draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 100 to 25 with 19 abstentions on 21 October 1981. The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 61-11-16. In 1982 a resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 23 with 20 abstentions (GA/Res/37/6). The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 63-11-10. The 183 resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 23 with 19 abstentions. On 29 October 1983 (GA/Res/38/3). The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 65-10-16. The 1984 resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 22 with 18 abstentions on 2 November 1984 (GA/Res/39/5). The voting pattern of nonaligned countries was 66-10-16.

to yield positive results. That was perhaps why in the thirty-fifth session the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution, deciding to convene an international conference on Kampuchea. In the thirty-sixth session again, the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution which endorsed the Declaration and Resolution (1) adopted by the International Conference. Moreover this resolution for the first time, deplored the continuing foreign armed intervention. Apparently there was toughening of stand on Kampuchea. In this toughening stand what role the nonaligned played remains a moot point.

Related Developments

To find a suitable answer, it is necessary to know whether various nonaligned gatherings changed their tone. After Havana Summit, the question was discussed at the New Delhi Ministerial meeting (February 1981). In accordance with the decision of the Havana Summit, the seat of Kampuchea remained vacant. This New Delhi Ministerial Meeting "reaffirmed the right of the people of Kampuchea to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion and coercion and expressed the hope that through a process of negotiation and mutual understanding, a climate conducive to the exercise of the right would be created". They further called upon "all states in the region to undertake a dialogue which would lead to resolution of differences among themselves

and establishment of durable peace and stability in the area as well as the elimination of involvement and threats of intervention of outside powers". They reaffirmed the need to deescalate tensions through a comprehensive political solution which would provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, thus ensuring full respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states in the region including Kampuchea".⁴³ It is important to note here that unlike GA resolutions, nonaligned delegations did not emphasize the need for immediate withdrawal. They called for political settlement. Secondly, despite General Assembly's decision to seat Democratic Kampuchea continued to be at variance with the stand of nonaligned New Delhi meeting (1981).

At the seventh Nonaligned Summit (March 1983) the seat of Kampuchea was kept vacant and the Foreign Ministers' stand was reaffirmed.⁴⁴

43 For details of the text, see Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 32, 20 February 1981, pp. 19-46.

44 Besides an International Conference on Kampuchea was convened (13-17 July 1981). Of the 79 members attended, 36 countries were full members of the nonaligned movement, and 5 were nonaligned observer countries.

This conference stressed that "the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration of and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and commitment by all states to noninterference and nonintervention in internal

Summary Observation

From the foregoing discussion, it was clear that the nonaligned countries were divided. In the Security Council though they (seven) commanded a comfortable position, they could not act effectively due to lack of unanimity among the permanent members (not to mention disagreement between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam). The nonaligned acted cohesively but their draft resolution failed of adoption due to the veto of the USSR which viewed the nonaligned draft resolution as one-sided based on distorted information about the actual situation in Kampuchea. Other nonaligned member countries, which participated in the debate in the Security Council were largely divided. Notably, Cuba, then chairperson of the NAM, took a position similar to that of the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The causes of cleavage among nonaligned countries may be owing to the volatility of the Kampuchean problem. Moreover, adequate arguments could be offered in favour of Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam - both of which were part of the nonaligned movement and ^{could} muster support despite merits of their case.

affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting solution of Kampuchean problem". This conference decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea. This Committee is to act as an advisory body to the Secretary General between the sessions of the conference and to assist the conference in seeking a comprehensive political settlement. For details, see Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea, New York, 13-17 June 1981, A/CONF.10915.

It is in this context that the Havana Nonaligned Summit (September 1979) could not resolve the controversy as regards representation of Kampuchea in view of division of the nonaligned countries into three groups. The question of representation figured in the General Assembly where nonaligned states were greatly divided. The General Assembly finally resolved the question of representation of Kampuchea by recognizing People's Republic of Kampuchea. By recognizing this government, the General Assembly split the member states into three different groups. Unlike the Havana Nonaligned Summit, which decided to keep the seat of Kampuchea vacant keeping in view the unity of the nonaligned movement, the General Assembly recognized the position of ASEAN supported by majority of states. It must be noted that the decision making procedures at the UN and the nonaligned are not identical. The nonaligned go by "consensus". Moreover, the representation had put the very solidarity and future of the nonaligned in precarious balance whether it was Heng Samrin or Pol Pot, was the smaller question when compared to preserving the unity and integrity of the movement.

In the General Assembly, nonaligned countries played a considerable role. They introduced several draft resolutions which were adopted by the General Assembly. A majority of nonaligned states supported a comprehensive political settlement

of the Kampuchean question in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions. But a number of them either opposed or struck a balanced note. The positions of Cuba and India exemplify the point. Could the divergence have been avoided? And how? What has one to say about the effectiveness of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau? These questions are loaded enough to be tackled in the concluding chapter.

...

CONCLUSION

From what has been traced in the preceding chapters, it is clear that nonalignment which initially emerged as a foreign policy choice for the new states in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was later transformed into a movement for more than hundred nations. This policy of nonalignment has been an adequate foreign policy choice for the new states of Africa, Asia as an alternative to traditional foreign policy choices such as neutrality and balance of power. The new states pursued the policy of nonalignment to keep themselves aloof from the power blocs with a view to accelerating their socio-economic development. In the perceptions of these new states, only a peaceful international environment can be conducive to their socio-economic development. In striving to attain their foreign policy objectives, they found the objectives of the UN compatible with the objectives of the nonalignment. Consequently the UN has emerged as a viable forum for attainment of their foreign policy objectives. In addition, their approach to international conflicts free of influence of power blocs helped to strengthen the UN and resulted in its increasing acceptance by all states regardless of ideology and resources. Since then, the role of the nonaligned countries

in the UN has gradually increased. Now they constitute two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. By virtue of their numerical strength, they have been able to play increasingly influential role in UN forums. Especially in the Security Council since by mid-seventies, the nonaligned have maintained their strength between 6-8, improving their value in all aspects of formal/informal interactions. These developments have synchronized with the gradual institutionalization of the movement of nonaligned.

The process of institutionalization has started since the Cairo Preparatory Nonaligned Conference where, for the first time, the criteria of nonaligned policy were laid down. As a result of institutionalization the nonaligned countries, which acted individually in the UN in fifties and sixties, later formed a group in the UN. Factors responsible for crystallization of this group are manifold. First, the process of decolonization brought about an increase in the membership of the movement and the increased membership resulted in problems of coordination for the nonaligned countries. In addition, emergence of commonality of concerns ranging from matters of international peace and security to various socio-economic issues, required a concerted action on the part of the nonaligned countries. Further, institutionalization was necessary to maintain continuity and stability in the movement.

The Lusaka Summit (1970), for the first time, recognized the need for an institutional machinery for the nonaligned movement. It established the office of the chairman of the nonaligned movement. Later at Algiers Nonaligned Summit (1973), the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau was formed to coordinate and harmonize the policies of the nonaligned countries in the General Assembly. The Bureau meets at the level of foreign ministers once a year and at the level of permanent representatives at the UN Headquarter at least once a month.

Notwithstanding this institutionalization, the nonaligned countries were not able to act cohesively. The unity and solidarity which the nonaligned had demonstrated in the UN in fifties and sixties is no longer possible in recent years. It is noteworthy that this cleavage among the non-aligned countries was found more in political and security matters and less in socio-economic matter. This division among nonaligned countries was due to several factors. First, in late seventies and eighties, there has been a steady increase in the number of interventions by the superpowers in the Third World. Besides there have occurred a number of conflicts in which either two parties or one party belongs to the nonaligned movement. In these conflict situations, the nonaligned countries in order to secure strategic advantages vis-a-vis rival nonaligned countries have tended to develop

controversial linkages with one super-power or the other. These problems made the movement recognize the need for unity and solidarity of the movement as of primary concern which the Havana Nonaligned Summit took note of.

It is in this background that the role of the nonaligned countries in the UN particularly on Kampuchean and Afghanistan questions needs to be analysed. Kampuchea conflict (1978) is a case of flagrant violation of the basic principles of the nonalignment and the UN by a nonaligned state i.e. Vietnam, such as respect for territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty of another state, non-interference and non-use of force in international relations. This conflict presented representation question, question of human rights of Kampuchean people, right of self-determination of Kampuchean people and withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea. To these problems, the nonaligned countries have sought a comprehensive political settlement in the UN. This question was first brought to the Security Council. In the Security Council, though they constitute majority (constituting 7 out of 10 non-permanent members), they could not succeed owing to lack of unanimity among the permanent members. In the General Assembly, the nonaligned countries sought a comprehensive political settlement which would include, inter-alia, immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, non-interference in the internal affairs of

Kampuchea, right of self-determination of Kampuchean people, and voluntary return of Kampuchean refugees to their homes. These nonaligned countries introduced several draft resolutions envisaging a framework for political settlement which were adopted by the General Assembly. But on deeper examination it is clear that the nonaligned countries failed to take a uniform position on this issue. Though a large majority supported the UN General Assembly resolutions, a significant number either stoutly opposed or abstained. Again, there is a clear divergence between the stands of the nonaligned countries and the UN on Kampuchea. The Havana Nonaligned Summit decided to keep the seat of Kampuchea vacant until the representation question was decided. This decision was significant as it was taken to preclude the possibility of division among the nonaligned countries. On the contrary, the General Assembly recognized the Democratic Kampuchea as the authentic representative of the Kampuchean people. The cleavage was due to several factors such as volatility of the Kampuchean problem, conflicting perceptions of the nonaligned countries and impact of East/West division.

Equally disquieting is the Afghanistan crisis which occurred following the Soviet intervention in December 1979. It is significant for the nonaligned countries and the UN where a Great Power/Permanent member of the Security Council intervened militarily in the domestic affairs of

a nonaligned member-state of the UN. Like the Kampuchean conflict, this conflict has clearly transgressed the sacrosanct principles of the UN and nonalignment. Like the Kampuchean problem, this question was first brought to the Security Council where the nonaligned members played a key role. Unlike the Kampuchean conflict where besides nonaligned countries, great powers introduced draft resolutions, in Afghanistan conflict, only nonaligned countries introduced draft resolution. They were unanimous in deploring the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. To this effect, they introduced a mild draft resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Following deadlock in the Security Council, the Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted which led to the convening of the Sixth Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly on 10 January 1980. In this count also, a different attitude was shown to the Kampuchean conflict, the Uniting for Peace Resolution was not invoked. The reluctant aligned exercised restraint to invoke in the context of essentially an intra-nonaligned clash.

In the General Assembly, nonaligned countries played a considerable role. They more or less overwhelmingly deplored the Soviet intervention barring a few nonaligned states such as Angola, Nicaragua, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Laos, Vietnam, etc. The nonaligned sought a

comprehensive political settlement which includes inter alia immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of the Soviet forces, right of self-determination of the people of Afghanistan, non-interference and voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes.

Unlike the Kampuchean illustration again, strikingly there is hardly any difference between the stand of the nonaligned countries and the position of the General Assembly. This is due to the fact that in the Kampuchean conflict, both the parties are nonaligned, and on the other hand, in Afghanistan conflict, where a superpower intervened in the internal affairs of a nonaligned member. In this context, the division among the nonaligned countries was wider and more distinct in Kampuchean crisis than in the case with Afghanistan conflict. In other words, there was broad convergence of views among the nonaligned countries as regards their stands against a superpower allegedly involved with a member nonaligned country, Afghanistan. On the other hand, on Kampuchean issue, they were sharply divided, the victim as well as the alleged aggressor belonged to the nonaligned group.

One may ask, if lack of coordination (or for that matter lack of effective/active coordination machinery) is responsible for the open divisions among the nonaligned on

Kampuchean problem. It is an arguably pertinent question. But it could be submitted that effective coordination would not have made much differences to the situation. For the issues at stake are much more basic.

In the nonaligned movement there has been increasing dilution of the ideological bases as the criteria of non-alignment (laid down at Cairo Preparatory Conference) were not strictly adhered to. Otherwise how could one justify admission of country like Pakistan or Philippines? The threat to ideological foundations arose more strongly at the Havana Nonaligned Summit where some nonaligned countries such as Vietnam and Cuba endorsed the view that the USSR and other socialist countries were the natural allies of the nonaligned movement.

Secondly, there is a clear alignment of some non-aligned countries with one or other superpower to accomplish strategic advantages vis-a-vis the other nonaligned state. In this regard, some nonaligned countries identify themselves with one or other Great Power. This division among the nonaligned countries along bloc lines is also responsible for their divided stance on Kampuchean and Afghanistan crises. These aforementioned and other factors largely impinge on the effectiveness of the nonaligned countries inside and outside the UN. It should be stated in no uncertain terms that the effectiveness of the UN and the effectiveness of the

nonaligned policy/movement are inextricably intertwined.
(Of course, if effectiveness of both is subjected to the
shifting balance of forces in great power relations.) No
doubt, due appreciation of this linkage is most timely.

...

APPENDIX

AFGHAN QUESTION : VOTING PATTERN OF NONALIGNED
COUNTRIES

Country	E.S.	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Afghanistan	N	N	N	N	N	N
3 Algeria	A	A	A	A	A	A
4 Angola	N	N	N	N	N	N
5 Benin	A	A	A	A	A	A
6 Botswana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7 Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8 Bahamas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9 Barbados('0')	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
10 Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
11 Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12 Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
13 Bhutan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
14 Burma(later left)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
15 Belize	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
16 Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
17 Cape Verde	NP	A	A	A	A	A

-/-

Y = In favour; N = Against; A = Abstention; NP = Not participated

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
18	Central African Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
19	Chad	NP	A	A	Y	Y	Y
20	Congo	A		A	A	A	A
21	Comoros	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
22	Cuba	N	N	N	N	N	N
23	Cyprus	A	A	A	A	A	A
24	Djibouti	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
25	Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
26	Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
27	Equatorial Guinea	A	Y	NP	A	Y	Y
28	Ethiopia	N	N	N	N	N	N
29	Finland	NP	NP	A	A	A	Y
30	Grenada	N	N	N	N	N	N
31	Guyana	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
32	Gabon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
33	Gambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
34	Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
35	Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
36	Guinea Bissau	A	A	A	A	A	A
37	India	A	A	A	A	A	A
38	Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
39	Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
40	Iraq	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41 Ivory Coast	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
42 Jamaica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
43 Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
44 Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
45 Kenya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
46 Lesotho	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
47 Liberia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
48 Libya	N	N	N	N	N	N
49 Laos	N	N	N	N	N	N
50 Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Madagascar	N	N	N	N	N	N
52 Malawi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
53 Mali	A	A	A	A	A	A
54 Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
55 Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
56 Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
57 Mozambique	N	N	N	N	N	N
58 Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
59 Maldives	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
60 Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Nicaragua	A	N	N	N	N	N
62 Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
63 Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
64	Nepal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
65	Oman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
66	Panama	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
67	Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
68	Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
69	Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
70	Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
71	Sao Tome & Principe	N	N	N	N	N	N
72	Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
73	Seychelles	NP	N	N	N	N	N
74	Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
75	Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
76	Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
77	Swaziland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
78	Singapore	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
79	Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
80	Syria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
81	Suriname	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
82	Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
83	Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
84	Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
85	Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
86	Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
87	Uganda	A	NP	A	A	A	A
88	Upper Volta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
89	United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
90	Vanvatu	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
91	Vietnam	N	N	N	N	N	N
92	Yemen A.R.	A	NP	NP	A	A	NP
93	Yemen, P.D.R.	N	N	N	N	N	N
94	Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
95	Zaire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
96	Zambia	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
97	Zimbabwe	NP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y

APPENDIX II

KAMPUCHEA QUESTION : VOTING PATTERN OF NONALIGNED COUNTRIES

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Algeria	A	A	A	A	A	A
3 Angola	N	N	N	A	A	N
4 Afghanistan	N	N	N	N	N	N
5 Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6 Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7 Benin	A	A	A	A	A	A
8 Botswana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9 Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
10 Barbados	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
11 Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12 Bahamas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
+ 13 Cuba	N	N	N	N	N	N
14 Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
15 Cape Verde	NP	A	A	A	A	A
16 Central African Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
						-/-

Y = In favour; N = Against; A = Abstention; NP = Not participated

+ Bhutan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burma	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belize	A	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17 Chad	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y
18 Congo	N	N	N	N	N	N
19 Comoros	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
20 Cyprus	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
21 Djibouti	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
22 Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
23 Equatorial Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
24 Ethiopia	N	N	N	N	N	N
25 Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
26 Finland	A	A	A	A	A	A
27 Grenada	N	N	N	N	N	N
28 Guyana	N	N	NP	A	NP	A
29 Gabon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
30 Gambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
31 Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
32 Guinea	A	A	A	Y	Y	NP
33 Guinea Bissau	A	A	A	NP	A	NP
34 Ivory Coast	Y	A	NP	Y	Y	Y
35 India	A	A	A	A	A	A
36 Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
37 Iran	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
38 Iraq	NP	NP	NP	NP	A	A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
39	Jordan	A	A	NP	NP	NP	Y
40	Jamaica	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
41	Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
42	Kenya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
43	Lesotho	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
44	Liberia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
45	Libya	N	N	N	N	N	N
46	Lebanon	A	A	A	A	A	A
47	Laos	N	N	N	N	N	N
48	Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
49	Maldives	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
50	Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51	Madagascar	A	A	A	A	A	A
52	Malawi	A	A	A	A	A	A
53	Mali	A	A	A	A	A	A
54	Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
55	Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
56	Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
57	Mozambique	N	N	N	N	N	N
58	Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
59	Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
60	Nepal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
61	Nicaragua	N	N	N	N	N	N
62	Oman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
63	Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
64	Panama	A	A	A	A	A	A
65	Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
66	Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
67	Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
68	Sao Tome & Principe	A	A	A	A	A	A
69	Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
70	Seychelles	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
71	Sierra Leone	A	A	A	A	A	A
72	Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
73	Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
74	Swaziland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
75	Singapore	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
76	Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
77	Syria	A	N	N	N	N	N
78	Suriname	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
79	Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
80	Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
81	Tanzania	Y	A	A	A	A	Y

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
82	Trinidad & Tobago	A	Y	NP	A	A	A
83	Uganda	A	A	A	A	A	A
84	Upper Volta	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A
85	United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
86	Vietnam	N	N	N	N	N	N
87	Vanuatu	NP	NP	N	A	NP	Y
88	Yugoslavia						
89	Yemen, A.R.	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
90	Yemen, P.D.R.	NP	N	N	N	N	N
91	Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
92	Zaire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
93	Zambia	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
94	Zimbabwe	NP	Y	Y	Y	A	A

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

General Assembly Official Records, Sessions 35-36, 1979-1983.

Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea,
New York, 13-17 July 1981, A/CONF.109/5.

Reports of the Secretary General to the General Assembly,
A/37/82, A/35/501, A/36/583, A/38/513, and
A/37/496.

Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council,
S/14745, and S/16005.

India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1946-
April 1961 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1961).

Jankowitsch O. and Sauvat, K.P., The Third World without
Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the
nonaligned Countries (New York, Oceana Publications 1978)

Government Documents

Final Documents : Seventh Conference of Heads of State
or Government of Nonaligned Countries, New
Delhi, March 1983 (New Delhi, 1983).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

- Bandyopadhyaya, J., North Over South : A Nonwestern Perspective of International Relations (Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd., 1982).
- _____, "Nehru and Nonalignment", in B.R. Nanda, ed., Indian Foreign Policy : The Nehru Years (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1976).
- _____, The Making of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt Ltd., 1979).
- Bajpai, U.S., ed., Nonalignment (Delhi: Lancers, 1983).
- Chandler, David P., and Kiernan, Ben, eds., Revolution and its aftermath in Kampuchea (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Council, 1983).
- Goyal, D.R., Afghanistan : Behind the Smokescreen (Delhi: Ajanta Publishers, 1984).
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen, The Afghan Syndrome : How to live with the Soviet Power (Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1982).
- Jaipal, R., Nonalignment : Origins, Growth and Potential for World Power (New Delhi: Allied, 1983).
- Jankowitsch, O. and Sauvart, K.P., "The Initiating Role of the Nonaligned Countries", in K.P. Sauvart, ed., Changing Priorities on the International Agenda (New York: Pergner Press, 1981), pp. 41-77.
- Kauffman, Johan, United Nations Decision Making (Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980).

Misra, K.P. and Narayanan, K.R., eds, Nonalignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1982).

Misra, K.P., ed., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969).

_____, Nonalignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1982).

_____, ed., Afghanistan in Crisis (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd., 1981).

Osborne, Milton, Before Kampuchea (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1979).

Rajan, M.S., Nonalignment: India and the Future (Mysore: The Wesley Press, 1970).

_____, Studies on Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement - Theory and Practice (Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1986).

_____, ed., India's Foreign Relations during the Nehru Era (New Delhi: Asian Publishing House, 1976).

Rana, A.P., The Imperatives of Nonalignment (Meerut: The Macmillan Company of India Ltd., 1976).

Vickery, Michael, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Sydney, George Allen and Unwin in Association with Southend Press, 1984).

Willetts, Peter, The Nonaligned in Havana: Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an analysis of their significance for the Global Political System (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1979).

Zacher, Mark W., Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

Periodicals

Assisi, Asobie H., "Nonalignment : The Problems of a Political Concept in a Changing International System", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 11, no. 4, October-December 1984, pp. 493-518.

Becker, Elizabeth, "Kampuchea in 1983 : Further from Peace", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 24, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 37-48.

Carney, Timothy, "Kampuchea in 1982 : Political and Military Escalation", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 23, no. 1, January 1983, pp. 73-83.

Carney, David, "Conditions and Perils of nonalignment : An Interpretation of events since Bandung", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 2, no. 4, October-December 1984, pp. 609-17.

Colbert, Evelyn, "Southeast Asia : Stand Pat", Foreign Policy (New York), no. 54, spring 1984, pp. 139-55.

Damodaran, A.K., "Jawaharlal Nehru and Nonalignment", India Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 47-49.

Dupree, Louis, "Afghanistan in 1982 : Still no Solution", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 23, no. 2, February 1983, pp. 133-42.

_____, "Afghanistan in 1983 : And Still no Solution", Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 2, February 1984, pp. 228-39.

- Eiland, Michael, "Kampuchea in 1984 : Yet further from Peace", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 25, no. 1, January 1985, pp. 106-13.
- Harrison, Selig S., "Breakthrough in Afghanistan?" Foreign Policy (New York), vol. 51, summer 1983, pp. 3-26.
- Hyman, Anthony, "Struggle for Afghanistan", World Today vol. 40, no. 7, July 1984, pp. 276-85.
- Jackson, Karl D., "Cambodia 1978 : War Pillage and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 19, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 72-84.
- Jackson, Richard L., "Role of the Nonaligned States in the UN Security Council : A Western Perspective", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 4, October-December 1983, pp. 464-82.
- Komatina, M., "Nonalignment : Differences and Disputes", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 33, 5 April 1982, pp. 5-8.
- _____, "Nonalignment : Doctrine of International Relations", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 33, 5 March 1982, pp. 9-12.
- _____, "Seventh Nonaligned Summit II : New Avenues for International Cooperation", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 13, July-September 1983, pp. 299-306.
- Keleman, Paul, "Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia : The Vietnam Factor", Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 3, March 1984, pp. 335-48.
- Muni, S.D., "Nonalignment from Bandung (1955) to Colombo (1976)", Political Science Review (Jaipur), vol. 21, no. 2-3, April-September 1982, pp. 149-64.

- Mates, Leo, "Concept of Nonalignment", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 39, no. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 6-22.
- Murthy, C.S.R., "Between the Summits", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 108-22.
- _____, "India's Participation in the UN : Patterns and Problems", India Quarterly (New Delhi), October-December 1983, pp. 408-20.
- _____, "India at the UN : From Raj to Rajiv", World Focus (New Delhi), pp. 22-25.
- Mishra, K.P., "Seventh Nonaligned Summit - I : An Overview", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 3, July-September 1983, pp. 283-98.
- Malhuret, Claude, "Report from Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 62, no. 2, winter 1983/84, pp. 426-35.
- Nicol, Davidson, "The Nonaligned Group in the Security Council", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 21, 20 February 1980, pp. 9-17.
- Osborne, Milton, "Can Kampuchea Survive", Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), no. 5, summer 1979, pp. 45-57.
- Petric, Ernest, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among Nonaligned Countries", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 4, October-December 1983, pp. 456-63.
- Rajan, M.S., "The Question of Unity/Solidarity", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 31, 5 April 1980, pp. 12-14.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Soviet Union and Afghanistan", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 82, no. 486, October 1983, pp. 318-27.

Remington, Robin Alison, "The Functions of nonalignment in Post-Tito Yugoslavia : Domestic/Foreign Policy Linkages", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 2, no. 2, April-June 1984, pp. 243-59.

Saksena, K.P., "Nonalignment and the UN", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 20, nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 81-102.

_____, "Afghanistan Crisis and the UN", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 19, no. 4, 1980, pp. 661-80.

Satish Kumar, "Nonalignment : International Goals and National Interests", Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 4, April 1983, pp. 445-62.

Simon, Sheldon W., "Cambodia : Barbarism in a Small State under Seige", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 74, no. 442, December 1978, pp. 197-201, 227-8.

Soedjatnoko, "Nonalignment and Beyond", The Nonaligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 5-21.

Van Der Kroef Justus M., "Kampuchea : The Diplomatic Labyrinth", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 22, no. 10, October 1982, pp. 1009-33.

_____, "Kampuchea : Diplomatic Gambits and Political Realities", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 28, no. 1, spring 1984, pp. 145-62.

_____, "Kampuchea : Protracted Conflict, Suspended Compromise", Asian Survey (Berkley, Calif.), vol. 24, no. 2, February 1984, pp. 187-94.

Van Der Kroef, Justus M., "Cambodia : From 'Democratic Kampuchea' to 'People's Republic'", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol. 19, no. 8, August 1979, pp. 731-50.

The UN Chronicles (New York: Department of Public Information, UN).

...