SELF DEFENSE FORCES OF JAPAN:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 2001-2009

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled "**Self Defense Forces of Japan: A Critical Assessment, 2001-2009**" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of the University or any other university.



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CERTIFICATE

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

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

Prof. Srabani Roy Choudhury
Supervisor

To several unknown victims of 3/11 and to the brave SDF soldiers who stood tall to all the natural and man-made challenges

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God Bless

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement
ADF	Australian Defense Force
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institute of Strategy and International Studies
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference
ATSML	Anti Terror Special Measures Law
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CRF	Central Readiness Force
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRI	Defense Policy Review Initiative
EANET	Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
GNP	Gross National Product
GOJ	Government of Japan
GSDF	Ground Self Defense Force
HA/DR	Humanitarian aid and Disaster Relief

IGS	Information Gathering Satellite
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JADSC	Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JDRT	Japan Disaster Response Teams
JSC	Joint Staff Council
JSO	Joint Staff Office
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
METI	Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industries
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industries
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSDF	Maritime Self Defense Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPG	National Defense Policy Guidelines
NDPO	National Defense Policy Outline
NIDS	National Institute for Defense Studies
NPR	National Police Reserve
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability (missile)
PACOM	Pacific Command

PAMS	Pacific Armies Management Seminar
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
ReCAPP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAM	Surface-To-Air Guided Missile
SDF	Self Defense Force
TCOG	Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
TRDI	Technical Research and Development Institute
TSD	Trilateral Security Dialogue
UN	United Nations
UNPKO	United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
USA	United States of America
USS	United States Ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WWII	World War II

Chapter



INTRODUCTION

It is commonly acknowledged that there have been spectacular reversals in the history of Japan's international relations. Three examples of particularly drastic change in the modern era that are frequently cited: Japan's opening up to the world after centuries of isolation following the Meiji Restoration in 1868; the country's embarking on a belligerent path in the 1930's; and the sudden turnaround from fascism to pacifism after the end of World War II.

With the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the rising East Asian economies, especially Japan, was expected to convert their economic strength into military capabilities. Harman Kahn predicted that Japan would inevitably seek to play a major role in its economic power and behave like other historical rising powers. Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz argued that structural incentives in a world of anarchy would induce the capabilities of a great economic power into greater military power for survival. Even stronger is John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism which contends that all great powers tend to behave equally 'aggressively' to maximise their odds of survival in anarchy and thus seek regional hegemony. Christopher Layne has forecasted that Japan will pursue its independent military capabilities and even begin balancing against the American dominance in East Asia. In the recent years, a new interpretation of realism has attempted to refine Waltz's neo realism, in order to explain particular state's behaviours. It embraces the core ideas of neo realism, whereby the nature and scope of the state's behaviour is essentially determined by the country's relative material power, but it also argues further that the pressures in the state system must be filtered through intervening variables, especially the decision makers' perceptions (Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1996; Zakaria 1998).

Constructivism opens up a set of explanations that seem better suited to the question of Japan's disinclination to utilise its Self Defense Forces (SDF) proactively to commensurate with its economic status. Thomas Berger, a leading constructivist on

Japan's national security policy, acknowledges that Japan's experience contradicts a large body of literature on realism, and argues that a pervasive 'culture of anti-militarism', born out of unique historical evolution, accounts for the Japanese anomaly. In his view, the horror of war, caused by the Japanese military, resulted in a new and uncontested norm; Japan's post-war culture of anti militarism. Berger suggests that this emerging norm by itself was compelling and became an informal social expectation. In a similar vein, Glenn Hook describes Japan's anti-militarism as a social norm that grew out of Japanese people's traumatic experience during the Second World War and argues that the norm widely shared at the popular level effectively constraints the government's use of military forces as a legitimate instrument of state policy. Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara have called for social norms which have evolved to reflect Japan's changing public opinion and which have interacted with the legal norms helping shape Japan's military security policies. They argue that these contested norms have created rigid policies, to such an extent that there has been no major change in the defence burden of post-war Japan.

This study essentially looks into the transitions after 9/11 in the defence initiatives of the SDF and Japan government's legitimacy given to these initiatives.

Japan after September, 11, 2001: encounter with realpolitik defence policy

The period following September 11, 2001, marks a turning point in Japan's defence strategy. A sea change has occurred in several elements of Japan's security policy: antiterrorism support, missile defence cooperation, and overseas deployment of the SDF. Constitutional revision, once the "third rail" of Japanese politics, is now an agenda item for all the major political parties. Most scholars and policymakers would agree that these changes are indeed unprecedented. However, the first 50 years of Japan's post-war defence policy were not static: the geographic scope, roles, and capabilities of the SDF increased as constitutional restrictions became less binding.

Comparing recent and past changes in Japan's defence policy leads to three related questions. First, how significant are recent changes in Tokyo's defence posture? Do these developments constitute a major shift in the Japanese government's approach toward national security? Or will they rather conform to the traditional pattern of change in Japan's security policy—that is, incremental expansion of the SDF that lacks strategic consequences? Second, what factors are responsible for Japan's strategic evolution? Are these factors endogenous to Japan or externally imposed? Do they explain Tokyo's behaviour across diverse foreign policy crises? Third, can these factors be generalised to describe strategic change in other national settings?

Although significant, the new Japanese defence policies fall short of a strategic shift. Japan has yet to complete the transition from a norms-based to an interest-based defence policy. Since September 11, elites and the public have increasingly viewed national security through the framework of *realpolitik*. However, both groups are still unprepared to completely dismantle the normative structures that constrain Japan's defence posture. Instead, political circles and the general populace favour, or at least accept, the continued weakening of institutionalised norms. Even so, Tokyo has experienced a distinct turning point in its security strategy, as the erosion of normative restraints has markedly accelerated. Indeed, the years since September 11 have witnessed greater change in Japan's defence policy than the previous 40. In the aftermath of September 11, Tokyo dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to participate in *Operation Enduring Freedom*. This deployment established a new historical precedent: Japanese troops provided logistics support to U.S. forces conducting out-of-area operations.

On December 19, 2003, the Koizumi administration proclaimed its decision to introduce ballistic missile defence (BMD). The Japanese government's announcement heralded a larger adjustment of SDF roles and capabilities to counter extant threats. Moreover, acquiring BMD ensured the further diminution of two legal constraints on Tokyo's defence policy—arms export restrictions and the prohibition on collective defence (see Appendix 2, The Three Principles on Arms Export). Finally, in the run-up to the Iraq War,

Japan constituted one of a handful of major states to endorse U.S. military action. After Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed, Tokyo dispatched SDF personnel to participate in reconstruction. The Iraq deployment signified a major departure from the SDF's previous overseas missions. Japanese forces entered Iraq without the sponsorship of the United Nations and operated in a de facto combat zone. Collectively, September 11, missile defence, and Iraq attest to Japan's growing realism. In all three cases, calculations of national interest motivated Tokyo's security behaviour.

Japan's strategic evolution is the product of four factors: foreign threats, U.S. policy, executive leadership, and generational change. The first variable — foreign threat—has catalysed Tokyo's ever greater *realpolitik* orientation. In the case of BMD, unfavourable changes in the security environment—North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its deployment of medium-range missiles— compelled Japan to acquire a new defence capability. Foreign threats have also indirectly contributed to Tokyo's strategic transition by increasing the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the wake of September 11, Japan dispatched the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to maintain the alliance as a hedge against an uncertain threat environment. With the advent of the Iraq War, strengthening the bilateral security relationship served a more immediate purpose: enhancing U.S. extended deterrence vis-à-vis a nuclear North Korea. Consequently, Tokyo offered political support for the U.S. invasion and later deployed troops to participate in post conflict reconstruction.

The second factor—U.S. policy—has exerted a profound effect over specific Japanese defence initiatives. Indeed, by altering Japan's strategic calculus, U.S. influence engendered policy outcomes that might not have otherwise occurred. Except for deepening the bilateral alliance, Japan derived few immediate security benefits from the MSDF's involvement in *Operation Enduring Freedom* and its support of the Iraq War and reconstruction. In fact, dispatching the MSDF after September 11 and, in particular, deploying troops to Iraq entailed potential costs like terrorist retaliation. To a significant degree then, Tokyo's response to September 11 and the Iraq War reflected the impact of

U.S. policy. However, Washington's influence cannot be described as mere *gaiatsu*. Rather than employ official requests and direct pressure, the United States set two broad expectations for Japan's global conduct— that Tokyo assume both its international and alliance responsibilities. This approach proved remarkably effective. By the outbreak of the Iraq War, Japanese policymakers had fully internalised both expectations.

The third factor in Tokyo's strategic transition is executive leadership—that of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Unlike his predecessors, Koizumi enjoyed sustained public support. By leveraging his popularity, the prime minister decisively intervened in security-related policy debates. Following September 11, Koizumi circumvented the Japanese government's standard policymaking procedures when he publicly outlined Tokyo's role in the war on terror. In doing so, the prime minister risked his domestic and international credibility without any assurance of requisite Diet support. To enable timely MSDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean, Koizumi also shepherded legislation through the Diet in record time. Prime ministerial leadership played an even more critical role in the case of Iraq. At the war's outbreak, Koizumi flouted popular opinion to unequivocally endorse the U.S. invasion. And after the end of formal hostilities, the prime minister again defied his electorate by deploying the SDF to Iraq. Koizumi proved a "Teflon" prime minister. His public opinion ratings rapidly recovered in the wake of implementing unpopular defence initiatives.

The fourth factor behind Japan's evolving defence posture is generational change. Politicians born after 1950 increasingly occupy positions of power. In general, young Diet members across the mainstream parties are unburdened by the legacy of World War II and share a common vision of Japan as a nation that possesses balanced capabilities and actively participates in maintaining global security. With respect to specific security initiatives, however, partisanship has thwarted generational cohesion. MSDF participation in *Operation Enduring Freedom* and Japan's stance on Iraq pitted young lawmakers against one another. Demographic change has widened the scope of

acceptable defence policies, but other variables have determined Japan's actual security behaviour.

Together, foreign threats, U.S. policy, executive leadership, and generational change underlie Japan's transition from a norms-based to a *realpolitik* defence policy. Although applicable to other cases of strategic change, these factors are only relevant across a small subset of national actors—those characterised by a security dependence on the United States. Even so, Japan provides broader theoretical insights into strategic evolution. A state's approach to national security reflects its socialisation into the international system. Strategic change occurs through re-socialisation into a transformed world order. Indeed, Japan's historical experience provides the basis for a new theory of strategic evolution—*transitional realism.*

Review of Literatures

Since the end of Cold War, there have been more literatures available that are preoccupied with Japan's alleged, changing security approach towards remilitarisation. These include rather strong expressions of this interpretation. Pyle, for instance, writes that "there are many indications that Japan is on the verge of another sea change in its international orientation," "moving from a period of single minded pursuit of economic power to a more orthodox international role in which it will be deeply engaged in political-military affairs." Hugo Restall argues that "Japan's foreign policy posture has changed dramatically in the last few years," with its "brittle shell of pacifism . . . now crumbling away." Richard Tanter, moreover, asserts that, "Japan is proceeding toward full normalisation, moving closer to throwing off all the external and self-imposed restraints that for half a century produced a disjuncture between its economic status as the world's second largest national economy and its restricted status in global security activities," – a process which he calls "Heisei militarization." Hironori Sasada, writes that Japanese people of today "favour nationalistic policies more than ever before, and the public is leading Japan away from its post-WWII pacifist tradition."

Daniel M Kliman offers his own variation in this. He uses the term "transitional realism" to explain Japan's move from norms to interest based security policy. Michel J Green in his book, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, argues that after years of cautious international behaviour and paralysing domestic debates about security policy, a broad consensus is being formed that Japan should assert its national interest more forcefully. In summation, the first few years of the twenty-first century has seen many observers starting to voice the opinion that Japan is currently undergoing drastic changes in its foreign security policy.

Yasuo Takao explores the prospect of Japan's going back to its pre World War II times and challenges the preconceived approaches taken by existing theories on Japan's national security. He examines Japan's pacifism since the Second World War, developments in Japanese military build-up since the late 1960s, and Japan's responses to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Controversies between realism and social constructivism continue to dominate Japan's national security debates, but neither is fully able to make pointed predictions. His study tries to bridge the gap between these two rigid approaches and provides an understanding of this vital aspect of Japanese national security.

Decision making bodies and bureaucrats play a pivotal role in the prospects of the SDF. Reinhard Drifte, Joseph P. Kenddell, Takao Sebata have written extensively on this. Joseph P. Kenddell examined how the Japanese government used a series of incremental measures to manage conflicting international and domestic pressure over defence issues within the context of military dependence on the United States. Takao Sebata studies Japan's military expansion and the decision making of her defence policy from 1976 to 2007, focussing on National Defense Program outline and the guidelines for the United States-Japan Defense cooperation. He deals with how bureaucratic politics model applies in the case of Japan's defence policy and demonstrates some similarities and differences between Japanese and United States decision making.

Why is civilian control strong in Japan? The Japan specific authors provide a variety of reasons. In his 1958 article, "Significance of the Military in Post-War Japan," I.I Morris argued that civilian control was solid and the military was kept out of politics because of several reasons. The factors included the attitudes of influential groups against military intervention, the improved position of the farmer in the rural areas where recruits traditionally came from, and the breakdown of the pre-war symbolism, such as the prestige brought by overseas victories (I.I. Morris, 1958: 16-19). Morris acknowledged that the constitution and laws firmly supported civilian control, but because of the pre-war military ability to eclipse civilian authority and the fact that laws can change, he opined that to depend on Japan's legal structure for a continuance of civilian control may be as weak as leaning on a reed (I.I Morris, 1958: 16). This is an important point because strong civilian control involves more than just the laws that enforce it. Moreover, Morris wrote this article when the SDF was in the nascent stage.

James H Buck argued that not only did the defence laws and the SDF oath of office prohibits political activity by uniformed members of the armed forces; Buck also sensed a general acceptance of the principles of the 1947 Constitution among the officers and men (James H Buck, 1967:602). Chief among those principles was the supremacy of the civilian government of Japan.

Ian Gow compared and contrasted the pre and post-war militaries in his chapter, "Civilian Control of the Military in Post-war Japan, from Japan's Military Renaissance?" He argued that civilian control is effective not only because of the laws and constitution, but also because of bureaucratic control (Ian Gow, 1993: 60-61). Because civilians from other elite ministries normally lead the Defense Agency (and now Defense Ministry) and make defence policy, no one with military leaning, connections, or for that matter expertise, is in a position to determine policy. He argues that the filtering of military advice through several layers of civilians may be excessive and "may actually impair

military effectiveness or effective policy making by elected civilian officials responsible (Ian Gow, 1993: 60-61).

In "The Bankruptcy of Civil-Military Relations in Japan," Tsuneo Watanbe says that both the left and right wings of Japanese politics have been irresponsible in their approach to civil-military issues, which has always been in terms of political gain rather than national interest. From the left, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) refused even to discuss SDF issues for so many years because of their refusal to recognise its existence. The Left vehemently opposed increasing military spending or U.S. Japan joint Defense partnership. From the right, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the bureaucracy have failed to explain what they were doing and why with respect to the SDF and defence policy. They have defined civilian control as ensuring that civilian Defence Agency officials have administrative oversight of the SDF. This has resulted in what Watanbe calls a "hollowing out" of the security discussion, in which the public is either misinformed or uninterested in civil-military relations. The implication of these competing views is that the Japanese government and public are unprepared to deal with a crisis or other military issues and are unable to discuss matters straightforward.

A Brief History of SDF and its security relation with the U.S.

The initial form of the SDF was established in 1950 under the authorisation of General Douglas MacArthur, USA, during the Allied occupation of Japan, but it was first known as the National Police Reserve (NPR). The NPR was renamed a Security Force in 1952 and once again changed in 1954 to the Japanese Self-Defense Force. This final naming was authorised under the auspices of the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law; the Japanese Defense Agency was also established through the passage of this law.

After the establishment of the SDF in the 1950s, the awkward military/police institution had limited involvement in either domestic or international operations. Throughout the Cold War, much of Japan, let alone the rest of world, had limited knowledge of the force's existence or purpose. It was during the early periods of its existence of the SDF

that policy decisions were made that still impact the role of the SDF today. These early decisions affected the strategic "pacifist" culture of Japan, causing policymakers often to address a constituency that believes Japan has forever renounced the right of war and that any decision that contradicts this belief is not only politically wrong but also illegal.

The first and most constraining post-World War II decision that still affects Japanese decision making and the SDF was the establishment of the Japanese Constitution. Article Nine of the constitution renounces war, the right of Japan to go to war, and the right to prepare the means to go to war. The constitution was imposed on the Japanese government by the Allied occupation force and was written in such a way as to keep Japan from remilitarising after the war and to keep it a pacifist country for the years to follow. Article Nine has an enormous impact on Japanese national security decision making, including what weapons Japan can procure, who it can sells weapons to, what operations and exercises the SDF can participate in, and how it determines its rules of engagement for every defence action it encounters, among other aspects.

During the years following the end of the Allied occupation, Japan wanted to focus its national efforts on economic recovery and growth, while relying on the U.S. for all of its national security needs. This policy became known as the "Yoshida Doctrine," named after Shigeru Yoshida, the Prime Minister of Japan responsible for leading his country out of the Allied occupation and setting the stage for economic prosperity. The "Yoshida Doctrine" led to one of the greatest economic rises in modern history through a focus on export trade policy and advanced technology. "Japan's exports experienced a 114-fold increase from 1955 to 1987." Economic prosperity changed Japan's place in the international community, but it did not change its desire to remain a pacifist state, a desire that remains even to this day for many Japanese. Instead, Japan used its financial might to help fund international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. Japan also used its financial success to dispense foreign aid at levels that were not equalled by any other nation.

Another institution born out of this era that impacts Japanese security policy today is the U.S. Japan alliance itself. The fundamentals of Japanese security policy are impacted by the constitution, but no other institution or structure from this timeframe impacts decision making today more. The U.S. had three main objectives in signing a security treaty with Japan. The first objective was to keep Japan down militarily and prevent any additional post-war action. The second objective was to build stability in Japan so that it could function without too much support from the U.S. The third objective was a part of the U.S.' overall containment policy towards communism. The U.S. wanted to prevent Japan from aligning with the Soviet Union and endangering markets of strategic interest to the U.S.

Japan hoped the UN could one day provide security for the pacifist state, but, understanding it did not have this capability early in the Cold War, it had to turn to the U.S. to provide it with security umbrella. Japan and the U.S. first signed a security agreement in 1951 while the U.S. was still occupying Japan. This agreement was not popular in Japan because it requested the U.S. to station troops in Japan, but also allowed these troops to use these bases as a launching point to conduct security operations throughout the region. This arrangement was not in the best interest of Japan: a military force residing in Japan and conducting military operations in areas Japan had once attempted to colonise or control did not achieve the level of pacifism or neutrality the Japanese people were looking for. The security treaty was renegotiated in 1960 and a more fair agreement was signed. This agreement, like the original, called for the U.S. military to defend Japan if attacked and only required the SDF to provide basic national defence for Japan in the case of an attack.

Other policies coming out of this time that affect the SDF include its prohibition against collective defence and the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. The debate over collective self defence began with the creation of the SDF in the 1950s. With Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution renouncing war and military build-up as a right of the state, how

could the SDF be authorised? It was decided that although the constitution denied Japan the right of military force, it was not denied the right to defend itself if attacked by an external aggressor. This provided the justification for the existence of the SDF. But the constitution does outlaw the right of Japan to use military force as a means to resolve international disputes, and this forbids Japan from engaging in collective self-defence. This determination has remained within Japan since the 1950s and affects policy decisions today. The most contentious issue today is related to Ballistic Missile Defense.

The U.S.-Japan Cooperative Agreement on Nuclear Power in 1955 established that Japan would not seek nuclear power for military means, but would only use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This policy stance has been renewed by prime ministers and political leaders in Japan since 1955 and is unlikely to change. Japan has the benefit of being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and is therefore able to abide by its antimilitaristic principles and place its often-pacifist citizens.

Only in the 1970s, when the U.S. began to alter its overseas military commitment, was the Japanese security apparatus forced to increase its capabilities, as well as its potential involvement in international security affairs. The U.S., reeling from the Vietnam War and experiencing a lull in Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union, began to draw down its military presence in Asia and the other parts of the globe. The U.S. also insisted that its allies maintain a certain level of self-defence capability and not rely solely on the U.S. military for their national security. This policy change would affect the SDF, its future force structure, and even the Japanese government's attitude toward the force overall.

The objectives of the original security treaty still impact the relationship today. Even after the end of the Cold War, with the threat from communism gone, the U.S. has used its presence in Japan to protect its economic and security interests in the region. The U.S. presence impacts the development of the SDF and the need to develop its capabilities. The first of objective, keeping Japan militarily pacified, created a strategic culture in Japan that has been pervasive in Japanese decision making throughout the last 60 years.

The long-term pacifist nature of Japan may not have been the objective during this time, but it certainly impacts the role the Japanese people feel the SDF should play internationally.

SDF Build-Up

Starting in 1976, first with the Basic Defense Capability and then the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), the posture and purpose of the Japanese security apparatus and the SDF began to shift. During the 1980s, the Japanese government began to expand the SDF and increase defence spending in order to support U.S. efforts in the region and take on some of the burden for security as the U.S. began to focus on other regions of the world. The 1976 NDPO altered the future course of the SDF and what role it would play in international and domestic security affairs. The outline describes a SDF that is

> equipped with various functions that are necessary for defense, well balanced in its organization and deployment including its logistical support system, and [...] capable of providing sufficient defense during peacetime, responding effectively to limited and small-scale invasion, and being deployable for disaster relief and other missions that could contribute to the stability of public livelihood.

"The NDPO initiated the build-up in SDF personnel and equipment that occurred during the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to 200,000 plus self-defence force with specific state of the art equipment."

Japan's defensive and even pacifist posture was the norm from the end of the occupation until the late 1970s. During this time, the SDF was an emergency response organisation, only called to act during an invasion or times of severe crisis. The U.S. military would handle any national security threat for Japan and the SDF would stay out of the way. Japan resisted even designating any potential enemies during this time. "It was not until

1980 that the Soviet Union was officially named a threat to Japan in official Japanese documents." The following table shows the landmark events of SDF and establishment from JDA to MOD.

1.1 History of SDF

1950.7.8	General Macarthur authorises the establishment of the National Police
1951.9.8	49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan.
1952.8.1	National Safety Agency established.
1952.8.1	National Safety College (predecessor of the National Institute for Defense
1952.8.1	Technical Research and Development Institute established.
1952.10.15	National Safety Force inaugurated.
1953.4.1	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy)
1954.7.1	Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense
1954.7.1	Central Procurement Office (predecessor of Central Contract Office)
1962.11.1	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established.
1974.4.25	National Defense Medical College established.
1997.1.20	Defense Intelligence Headquarters established.
2000.5.8	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya buildings.
2007.1.9	Transition to the Ministry of Defense.

Source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/history.html

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The period from 2001 till 2009 witnessed Japan taking strident steps towards security followed by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Under the charismatic leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, Japan was able to concentrate its forces towards anti terrorism, missile defence and deployment abroad. This period also witnessed Japan showing greater interest in securing permanent seat in the UN Security Council, for which it had to show the world its genuine seriousness towards world peace. In the neighbourhood there was rising security concern as a result of assertive China and North Korean nuclear threat.

Domestically, Japan was able to pass important legislations as Anti Terror Special Measures Law (ATSML) to facilitate military cooperation with the United States in war on terror and Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy to enable the MSDF to protect the vessels at the Gulf of Aden from acts of piracy regardless of their nationality.

Tokyo's military capabilities, though not commensurate with its economic resources, are still relatively formidable. In particular, the MSDF constitutes the most powerful navy in the world behind the U.S. Navy. Although quantitatively inferior to most East Asian militaries, the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF and ASDF, respectively) possess a qualitative advantage over their potential adversaries in the region. Finally, Japan's sophisticated technological-industrial base allows for a host of latent military capabilities including the production of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile politically, from the time Koizumi stepped down from power in 2006, no Prime Minister was able to hold on to their office for more than two years. In 2007, the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) dominance started to fade away when Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the election for the upper house and later won the lower house in 2009.

This dissertation concentrates on steps taken by Japan in transition from norms based to an interest based defence policy since 2001 till DPJ's victory in the lower house in 2009.

Objectives

a. To track the changes made by SDF, voluntarily or by compulsion, in becoming a modern dynamic force.
b. To study the relation between the civilian and military in a self imposed pacifist nation.
c. To observe the bilateral and multilateral steps taken by Japan in ensuring safe Asia-Pacific area.

Research Question and Hypothesis

This study tries to assess three essential research questions; it focuses on **direction**, **constitutional validity**, and **impact** of the growth of SDF in and out of Japan.

- In what direction is the SDF mobilisation heading since 2001?
- Is the existence of Ministry of Defense against the pacifist constitution?
- What will be the strategic impact in the Asia Pacific region because of SDF's expansion?

Therefore the **hypotheses** are:

- H1 Japan in order to be more assertive in the coming years will be expanding the scope of its SDF.
- H2 Authority of civilian bureaucracy over uniformed officers has still persisted despite Japan's remilitarisation hedging.
- H3 Incremental expansion of SDF will lead to strategic consequences in the Asia Pacific region.

The study will be double variant analysis, here the independent variable will be various domestic and international security issues concerning Japan from 2001 till 2009 and in response Self Defense Forces will be the dependant variable.

Research Methodology

This study is qualitative in nature; here inductive study of the SDF since 2001-2009 is observed. The study is carried out through perusal of literatures such as books, articles, policy documents, public speeches, and government releases (white papers, blue books etc.) and commentaries in the media. Opinions of the strategic analysts and experts about the latest developments are also sought in the process. Intensive use of libraries and archives in India has been made to answer research questions and test hypothesis perceived at the outset of this research work.

Chapterisation

The topic of *Self Defense Forces of Japan: A Critical Assessment 2001-2009* is dwelt in five chapters. The first chapter entails the background of the topic, a brief history of SDF and it's relation with the U.S. Japan's incremental changes in security sphere since September 11, 2001 is highlighted in this chapter. Literature review, hypothesis, research objectives and questions are also mentioned.

Chapter two discusses in detail the incremental changes made in security sphere by the SDF. Here the non combatant missions as international humanitarian aid/disaster relief, Peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean, counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and missions in combat zones in Iraq are addressed. The second half of this chapter analyses each of the SDF wings, GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF, and the defence budget as well.

Chapter three takes into consideration the changing civil military relation in Japan. Here the role of Foreign Ministry (MOFA), Finance Ministry and METI in forming the defence policy is addressed. At the end the formation of Defense Agency to a full fledged Ministry of Defence in 2007 is reviewed and tries to understand the implications of this change thereof.

Chapter four seeks to find Japan's changing security role in Asia Pacific. This chapter is divided into two parts – one which deals with Japan's bilateral security links with countries in Asia Pacific and second which deals into Japan's multilateral security in Asia Pacific.

And finally, in chapter five, in the light of the above findings, conclusions are drawn. This chapter tests the stated hypothesis and fins some possible research area for future research as well.

Limitations

Two main problems characterise academic research previously conducted on the SDF. The first and most significant is that existing research fails to analyse the SDF at a detailed level that gives a true indication of the actual capability of the force. When scholars and policymakers make assessments and predictions concerning the future actions of the SDF, it is important that a complete understanding of the force be available for them. The second issue regarding capabilities of the SDF or any military force is the frequency in which they can change. Jennifer Lind's assessment was conducted almost ten years ago and Glenn Hook's research was done over twenty-five years ago. Not only has the SDF changed enormously during this time, but so have the international security environment and the requirements necessary to have a fully capable military.

This research thoroughly analyses the current capabilities and history of the SDF, there are certainly other factors important in understanding the SDF and making predictions about its future behaviour. Outside the scope of this dissertation were the now-evolving political relationship between the new ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan, and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Liberal Democratic Party controlled Japan for most of the post-WWII era, and with a shift in leadership, changes in national defence will certainly occur. This is an area in which further research is needed to better understand the future of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Finally, the economic and financial success of Japan in the post-WWII era has enabled it to pursue a more normal and independent national security structure. This implies that recent economic and financial woes in Japan could have an impact on national security and the future capabilities of the SDF. A deeper understanding of all these issues would further contribute to a more complete understanding of the capabilities of the SDF and the future of Japan in the international security community.

Although this study was constructed in a time bound framework, from 2001-2009, in certain chapters this time frame is not considered. This has been purposely done to bring forth the arguments more effectively. Due to lack of Japanese language proficiency, predominantly English literature is being utilised for the research

Chapter

SELF DEFENSE FORCES SINCE 2001: TAKING RELUCTANT STEPS TOWARDS NORMALCY

The Self Defense Forces of Japan has made incremental changes in their legal stance towards normalcy since 1990-91 Gulf War by introducing several laws. But it was after the September 11, 2001, when Japan was forced to mobilise their forces to put their boots on the ground. The characteristics of the SDF have changed in the two decades, now it aspires to play proactive role in the international affairs. Japan defence and security goals set forth in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines says:

> *To improve the international security environment and to reduce potential threats to Japan...Japan shall cooperate with nations of the world in order to cooperatively undertake enhancement of the international security environment, or in other words, international peace cooperation activities (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2004).*

Thus in order to pursue a peaceful international security environment, Japan had to rework on its existing security structures proactively. In the period from 2001- 2009, Japan was able to send its defence forces to international humanitarian aid and disaster relief activities, international peace keeping operations, counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean and operation Iraqi Freedom (see Appendix 4 for SDF record in these missions). Moreover, this chapter analyses the three wings of the SDF and the defence budget as well.

International Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief

With the enactment of the International Disaster Relief Law in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organisations.

In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and

equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster operations with self sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organisations, and the benefits of regular training (Figure 2.1).

2.1 Flow Chart of Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team and Emergency



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website

Since the end of Cold War, the operations of the SDF show changing trends and its enhanced capabilities. And although significant changes have occurred, deeper analysis of SDF participation in Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations must be conducted. SDF began participating in international HA/DR operations from September to December 1994 with its relief of Rwandan refugees (Figure 2.2).

2.2 Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief by SDF (1994- Sep 2009)

Duration	Type of activities	Region
Sep-Dec 1994	International humanitarian assistance	Rwanda
Nov-Dec 1998	Disaster relief operations in response to hurricane.	Honduras
Sep-Nov 1999	Disaster relief operations in response to	Turkey
Nov 1999-Feb	International humanitarian assistance	Timor-Leste
Feb 2001	Disaster relief operations in response to	India
Oct 2001	International humanitarian assistance	Afghanistan
Mar 2003-Apr	International humanitarian assistance	Iraq
Jul 2003-Aug	International humanitarian assistance	Iraq
Dec 2003-Jan	Disaster relief operations in response to	Iran
Dec 2004-	Disaster relief operations in response to tsunami	Indian Ocean
Aug 2005	Disaster relief operations in response to submarine	Kamchatka
Oct-Dec 2005	Disaster relief operations in response to	Pakistan
Jun 2006	Disaster relief operations in response to tsunami	Java Islands,

The international disaster relief operations encompass a) medical services, such as first aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention, b) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and c) ensuring water supplies using water purifying devices. Also, SDF uses transport ships to carry relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.

The Central Readiness Forces and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime need arises. The MSDF and ASDF maintain their readiness to dispatch fleet and air support units, respectively, to transport supplies to units participating in international disaster relief operations, including their own, as the need for disaster arises.

United Nations Peace Keeping Operations

The greatest change in the Japan's peacekeeping policy came in the post cold war period; Japan's participation within UNPKO was a smouldering issue from the moment of Japan's admission to the UN. In 1958, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to solicit the despatch of the newly created SDF to Lebanon. During the Cold War, Japan's support for UNPKO was purely financial.

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

However, with the relaxation of East-West tensions in the late 1980s, human (civilian) contributions by Japan to UNPKO began: twenty seven civilians were sent to Namibia in October 1989 as part of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group. Thereafter, six Japanese civilians joined UNPKO overseeing the Nicaraguan and Haiti elections 1989-90. Yet, owing to the legacy of the World War II and constitutional restrictions on Japan's right to belligerency, backed by the norm of anti-militarism embedded in domestic society, these were purely non-military operations arousing little controversy over remilitarising within Japan or among its East Asian neighbours (Glen D hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W Hughes, Hugo Dobson, 334) .

The Persian Gulf War became a major turning point for Japan to recognise the need to provide military personnel contribution for international cooperation. Before the hostilities have even begun the government presented the short lived United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet in October 1990. The bill failed to pass the Diet not only because of the lack of public and political support both inside and outside the government, but also because of the haste with which it was prepared in response to outside (chiefly U.S.) pressure (*gaiatsu*) arising from Japan's dedication to bilateralism (Glen D hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W Hughes, Hugo Dobson,336). In June 1992, the governing Liberal Democratic Party of Japan pushed through the Upper House of the Diet a law enabling the SDF to participate in the peacekeeping operations (PKO) known as PKO Law in the Japanese media.

The PKO Law facilitated the participation of Japanese personnel in a number of peacekeeping duties, including: observing and supervising elections and ensuring fair balloting; providing bureaucratic advice and guidance, such as police administration; medical care; transportation, communications and construction work; and humanitarian work including the assistance, rescue and repatriation of war refugees. Also, out of respect for the constitution of Japan and the domestic norm of anti-militarism, the bill froze Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations involving the monitoring of ceasefires; stationing troops in and patrolling demilitarised zones; controlling the influx

of weapons; collecting storing and disposing of abandoned weapons; assisting disputants in settling borders; and assisting with the exchange of prisoners of war (Glen D hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W Hughes, Hugo Dobson, 336). Moreover, five conditions, influenced by the anti-militarist norm, were introduced in respect of any use of the SDF: a ceasefire between all parties involved in the conflict must be in place; each party's consent to the deployment of Japanese forces is required; the deployed force must remain impartial; the use of weapons is limited to self-defence; and the Japanese government may remove its forces if any of the previous conditions are not met.

Henceforth, Japan dispatched GSDF engineer units to Cambodia in September 1992 as the country's first participation in the UN peacekeeping operations (Figure 2.3). Since then, the ministry of Defence and the SDF have participated in various international peace cooperation activities.

2.3 International Peace Keeping Operations conducted by SDF

Duration	**Region**
September 1992 - September 1993	Cambodia
May 1993 – January 1995	Mozambique
February 1996 -	The Golan Heights
February 2002 – June 2004	Timor-Leste
March 2007	Nepal
October 2008	Sudan

After fulfilling its Cambodian duties, Japan found domestic and regional opposition to its peacekeeping role weakened (Figure 2.4 and see Appendix 5, for detailed survey). However, despite sending SDF forced on various occasions, Japan's contribution is still modest in number, especially in contrast to other relative newcomers to peacekeeping like China (Figure 2.5), and certain obstacles need to be tackled before Japan can shoulder greater responsibilities including the use of force within UNPKO.

2.4 Japanese public opinion on Japan's role in UN peacekeeping operation



Source: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbo Seifu Kokoshitsu 2009.

2.5 Top 15 contributors of uniformed personnel's to UN peacekeeping operations vis-à-vis Japan (as on August 2009)



Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

Counter Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden

As the acts of piracy in the region of Gulf of Aden rose since 2007, maritime country as Japan has felt the pinch of the effects of piracy. The UN Security Council had adopted five resolutions since 2008, calling on member states to dispatch ships as anti-piracy measures. Against this background, a number of countries have dispatched their ships to the coastal areas surrounding Somalia to undertake anti-piracy missions. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) started the escort operation on March 13, 2009, under an order from the Minister of Defence, in accordance with the "maritime security operation" stipulated in Article 82 of the Self-Defence Forces Law (Act No. 165 of 1954). New legislation called "The Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy" (Act No. 55 of 2009) was approved in the Japanese Diet on June 19, 2009, and enabled the Government to protect vessels from acts of piracy regardless of their nationality. Accordingly, the Japan Self Defence Force intends to promptly begin the "anti-piracy operation" in accordance with the new legislation, in order to fight piracy more appropriately.

Upon the issue of this order MSDF dispatched its two destroyers, *Sazanami* and *Samidare.* Moreover, 2 P-3C fixed wing patrol aircraft was also added to the force to cover large area. To guard the P-3Cs and other equipments, the help of GSDF was utilised. This was the first time that a force dispatched abroad had been formed as a joint task force combining the MSDF with GSDF. Furthermore, in order to support these activities the ASDF had organised an air transport unit composed of the C-130H and U-4 aircraft.

The basic task of the operation is to escort commercial ship from one prescribed point to another. To effectively protect the commercial ships from pirates, an appropriate formation is arranged. When the convoy navigates across the Gulf of Aden, the destroyers defend in front and behind the escorted ships, while patrol helicopters belonging to the destroyers observe the area surrounding the convoy from the sky.

Refuelling Mission in the Indian Ocean

Following 9/11, the self imposed constitutional constraints of Article 9 were loosened further and as a result Japanese government provided legal framework to facilitate military cooperation with the United States in the war on terror. To start with, in October 2001, immediately after the terrorist attacks on the U.S., the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), building on the precedence already set earlier legislation in order to expand the SDF's non combat operations. Whilst the opposition succeeded in attaching time a time limit of two years to the legislations, when the bill came up for renewal, a draft of seven security related bills aimed at strengthening the 2001 legislation and combating the possibility of terrorism at home was passed by the Lower House of the Diet in 2003 and became law after passing the Upper House in June 2004. The legislation has enabled the SDF to offer logistical support to the U.S. and other members of the 'coalition of the willing' in Iraq, despite popular opposition (Eldridge, Robert D and Midford, Paul).

The SDF's task now includes the protection of U.S. bases against terrorist attacks as well as non-combat logistical support through the provision of supplies, medical assistance, repair and maintenance of U.S. equipment, search and rescue operations and so on. Unlike the despatch of the SDF at the time of 1990-91 Gulf War, when tight restrictions were placed on their use of military equipment, the new legislation provides for them to be able to use their weapons to protect not only themselves, but also persons and property under their care. In addition, with the passage of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as part of the package, which aims at permitting humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, including medical services, water supply, transportation of materials and so on, the groundwork was laid for the GSDF as the ASDF and MSDF to be deployed in number of new roles.

The first deployment of the SDF came in the wake of the passage of 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, where Taliban government was charged with offering sustenance to Al-Qaeda. Whilst the Koizumi government was keen to demonstrate support for the U.S., it also remained mindful of the constitutional constraints on the role of the SDF and public concern over the possibility of Japanese ground forces becoming embroiled in a war of U.S. making. With this as background, a number of MSDF vessels were despatched to the Indian Ocean in order to offer logistical support such as refuelling and water supply to the U.S. (and other countries' ships) in support of the war in Afghanistan.

Logistical support lasted from 2001 until January 2010, when the Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama government called an end to the mission. During this period, a range of MSDF vessels were despatched, such as the destroyers *Karuma* and *Kirisame* and the supply vessel *Hamana,* on an information gathering mission to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; another supply vessel, the *Kure,* a minesweeper, the *Uraga,* and a helicopter carrying destroyer, the *Sawagiri,* on a mission to Karachi to offer humanitarian assistance and supplies to afghan refugees; and the *Kirishima* in particular as further eroding the constitutional interpretation banning collective self defence, due to ship's Aegis radar capabilities and the need for real time responses in order to coordinate activities with U.S. forces. The *Kirishima* has the ability to track up to 200 aircraft and missiles simultaneously as well as to simultaneously launch attacks against up to ten targets.

Whilst this contribution to the 'war on terror' is representative of the closer military cooperation between Japan and the U.S., these deployments did not go ahead simply as a result of U.S. pressure (Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi.). Reflecting the long term goal of playing a more proactive military role in the world, the SDF has on occasion asked the U.S. for a helping hand, suggesting ho the policy making is influenced by the U.S.. This is illustrated by the way MSDF officials used American pressure (*beiatsu*) as a means to garner support for the despatch of the *Kirishima*. Deputy Defence secretary Paul

Wolfwitz was reported to have called for the despatch of an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Indian Ocean in a 2002 Washington meeting with the LDP Secretary General Yamasaki Taku. But as was revealed by the *Asahi Shimbum* (7 May 2002), the MSDF had in fact called on the commander of U.S. naval staff to urge the Japanese government to despatch Aegis equipped destroyers and P-3C patrol aircraft.

With the end of Japan's logistical support of the war through the refuelling mission in early 2010, the DPJ has shifted to focus on the rebuilding of Afghanistan through the provision of civilian assistance, as illustrated by the Hatoyama administration's decision to contribute an additional U.S. $5 billion in aid to Afghanistan.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Whist the support of the war in Afghanistan had demonstrated the willingness of the Japanese government to fly the flag, calls for boots on the ground could only be answered by the GSDF. To this end, the Koizumi government offered the support of ground troops in the U.S. war against Iraq and eventually a total of around 6,000 GSDF personnel were despatched , starting in early 2004, to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah in order to help with reconstruction and provide humanitarian aid. Not only was the GSDF despatch the first time that SDF ground troops had been abroad during hostilities and without UN sanction, they were despatched despite the deteriorating security situation, as illustrated by the killing of two Japanese diplomats in Northern Iraq: Inoue Masamori, a third secretary and Oku Katsuhiko, a counsellor, as well as the killing of other Japanese nationals. In this sense, the deployment of ground troops represents a watershed in the government's efforts to gain legitimacy for SDF activities outside Japan.

The troops were involved in humanitarian activities until July 2006 before heading back to Japan. Thereafter, Japan has taken a range of measures to assist Iraq in the intervening years, including the 2009 despatch of election monitors. The main task carried out by the GSDF were to purify water and arrange for its delivery to local inhabitants, although local contractors hired by the Japanese have taken on tasks such as improving roads and public buildings. Although the government insisted that the troops would be despatched

to a 'non combat zone', in line with the Diet legislation, distinguishing combat and non combat zones in the ongoing war in Iraq has always been difficult, as mortar attacks on the SDF base in Samawah on April 2004 testify.

As far as ASDF is concerned, these forces finally pulled out of the Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait in July 2006, following their duty of offering logistical support for the war in Iraq. ASDF C-130 transporters were used to deliver supplies to the forces around Iraq. In April 2004, moreover, ASDF Chief of Staff General Tsumagari Yoshimitsu for the first time admitted that, in addition to supplies, the transporters had been used to carry U.S. armed military personnel and civilians from Kuwait to Iraq, thereby extending the role of the ASDF beyond the simple transport of materiel (Japan Times, 2004).

Analysis on SDF and Defence Budget

The Ground Self-Defense Force

The current size of the GSDF is approximately 151,640 personnel, with an additional 8,470 in reserve (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010). The GSDF is in size comparable to the armies of Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, and ranks 43rd in the world (Military Balance, 2010).

The force is broken down into eleven divisions, ten infantry divisions and one armoured division. The GSDF also has a total of sixteen brigades: two composite brigades, one airborne brigade, one artillery brigade, two low-level air defence brigades, four training brigades, one heliborne brigade, and five engineer brigades. In addition to the various units, the GSDF has two artillery groups, four low-level air defence groups, and anti-tank helicopter squadrons. A typical GSDF division consists of 6,000 to 9,000 troops, while a typical GSDF brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 troops. In comparison, a United States Army division includes between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers, while a brigade includes between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).

The force layout of the GSDF is of regional Armies, consisting of between two and four divisions per Army, in five different regional commands throughout Japan. The largest Army is the Northern Army located in Hokkaido, the northernmost main Japanese island. Hokkaido is able to maintain the presence of the largest army because of limited population and expensive terrain not found in the densely populated areas remainder of the country. The Northern Army is a relic of the Cold War, and its current structure and layout does not reinforce the GSDF's ability to most efficiently defend the homeland. During the Cold War, Japan's greatest fears were focused on the Soviet Union, and therefore Japan's major defences were placed in the most likely location of an offensive course of action from the Soviets. With the Cold War over and the Soviet Union nonexistent, the greatest threats to Japan are no longer to the north, but to the west and southwest or from terrorist threats that could come from any location. With Japan's most likely threats coming from North Korea, China or a potential clash between powers in the area of Taiwan, the GSDF would began moving its forces south to Honshu, Kyushu or even to Okinawa. The Ministry of Defence appears to understand this change in threat and how changing its regional layout would counter its emerging threats to the west. In the most recent National Defence Program Guidelines, it states, "While reducing Cold War-style equipment and organizations, priority functions, including those in Japan's south western region, will be enhanced" (Japan's National Defence Program Guidelines, 2010). Recognition is the first step toward making the appropriate security adjustments; only time will tell if Japan follows through on this security alteration. The 2nd and 7th Divisions of the GSDF make up the Northern Army, along with five additional support Brigades. The other Armies within the GSDF include the North Eastern Army, headquartered in Sendai, which includes the 6th and 9th Divisions, and three additional Brigades; the Eastern Army, headquartered in Nerima (suburban Tokyo), where the 1st Division and four Brigades are located; the Middle Army, composed of the 3rd and 10th Divisions and four Brigades and headquartered in Itami, outside of Osaka; and the Western Army, headquartered in Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture and consisting of the 4th and 8th Divisions and four additional Brigades (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010). There are various smaller units and MOD facilities scattered throughout Japan.

The GSDF is responsible for the defence of the Japanese homeland in case of an aggressive external attack. The configuration of the regional force made sense during the Cold War, with its focus on the north and defence of the capital city. With new threats emerging, mainly from North Korea and potentially China to the west, it is curious that no major GSDF force resides on the Western side of the Japanese homeland.

In the post-September 11, 2001, environment, Japan created the Central Readiness Force (CRF) to act as a military first responder in times of crisis. "The Central Readiness Force Regiment conducts both domestic mission[s], as reinforcement for Regional Armies, and Overseas mission[s], as advance troop[s]. [The] International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit continuously provides education for international peace cooperation activities" (Japan Ministry of Defence). The 4,200 personnel unit was created in March 2007 as a part of the overall GSDF, but the unit reports directly to the Minister of Defence because of its unique skill sets and responsibilities. Although the unit was developed in response to the international terrorism threat and the need for more timely response in times of crisis, the unit has seen action only in UN missions in Nepal, Sudan, and the Golan Heights. The unit is currently headquartered at the Asaka Garrison in Tokyo's Nerima Ward, but is scheduled to move to U.S. Army Camp Zama in Japan in 2012 in order to promote stronger ties between the U.S. and Japan (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).

The CRF is training to be the elite ground fighting force in the SDF, but it is still in its very early developmental stages. Its primary missions to this point have been in UN peacekeeping operations, not crisis responses or hostile special operations. Without a significant event occurring within Japan to test the capabilities of the CRF, the unit must plan and execute training opportunities alongside elite ground force units within the U.S. military (for example, its special operations-capable units). Only then will the GSDF have an elite rapid reaction unit with elite capabilities, not an additional ground force with an elite title. As the capabilities of the CRF are enhanced, the overall readiness of the GSDF will be greatly improved from its current state.

Though the CRF was one of the more significant GSDF changes that came out of the 2005 National Defence Program Guidelines, there were other force structure changes that have enormous impact on both the current capability of the GSDF and the long-term capabilities of the force. In the 2005 National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG), Japan lays out the future role it believes the SDF should play in the international community in order to maintain stability and security in the region and the world. The stance of the GOJ is that an aggressive, offensive, active military in Japan would create instability in Asia, but that with increased global threats, Japan can no longer isolate itself from international security affairs. It must change its force in a way that lets it commit more fully to international peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts.

The 2005–2009 Mid-Term Defence Program, approved by the Japanese Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004, outlines changes that must be made to the GSDF in order to achieve this new role outlined in the NDPG. Along with establishing the CRF, the GSDF was to "transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two Combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing the number of tanks and artillery" (Mid Term Defence Program, 2005-09). The GSDF made many of the structural changes outlined in 2004, while at the same time an overall reduction of the conventional forces has been made. The current layout of forces with nine division and six brigades is what the 2005-2009 Mid - Term Defence Program had called for (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010). The reduction in Cold War defence capabilities such as tanks and artillery has been a contentious debate within the MOD, as procurement of these weapons is a major financial boom for companies like Mitsubishi, but the MOD has committed to the reduction of these weapons systems for more modern and mobile platforms. The planned reduction of the main battle tank and artillery platforms in the GSDF is from its current level of 900 to 600 (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010). While reducing the number of Cold War-era heavy equipment like tanks and artillery, the GSDF has been "equipment that allows great agility and mobility,

including helicopters (combat, transport, and multi-purpose) and light armoured vehicles (Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, 53). The acquisition of more mobile equipment and the reduction in heavier equipment is an example of Japan's altered security philosophy in the post-Cold War age: it is beginning to utilise the appropriate technology to enhance its ground forces.

Training and operational experience are the areas in which the GSDF is lacking most. Although the official training pipeline toward becoming a member or officer in the SDF is standardised in ways similar to those of most other modern militaries, the follow-on training and operation time GSDF units receive is extremely limited. The GSDF has an enlisted basic training course, specialised enlisted schools, Non- Commissioned Officer candidate courses, Officer Candidate courses, the National Defence Academy, and specialised flight, medical, and technical training. The official training and education of SDF personnel is modelled on the U.S. military training and education command system. Where the GSDF differs from most modern militaries is in the follow-on training exercises and subsequent operations GSDF personnel are able to experience. The MOD is, at best, apprehensive about having GSDF personnel participate in international training exercises that involve any form of combat exercise. GSDF personnel have not participated in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Cobra Gold exercise as more than military observers. Cobra Gold is a joint military exercise that focuses on enhancing military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and many of its Asian allies, including Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia. SDF forces from the MSDF participate in the exercise, while GSDF personnel only participate as observers. It is a unique, large-scale military training exercise that includes multinational amphibious assault, combined arms live-fire training, and other civil and humanitarian assistance exercises, in which the GSDF has limited experience as participants (U.S. army Pacific, Cobra Gold 2010).

Although the GSDF is sending personnel to receive specialised training with the U.S. military, their numbers are extremely insignificant and can only have a limited impact on

the overall capability of the GSDF. After September 11th, 2001, the GSDF began participating in more training opportunities with the U.S. military. For example, in 2002, twenty GSDF personnel completed a U.S. support operations course. From 2001-04, the GSDF has had four officers graduate from the U.S. Army Special Forces Officer Qualification Course. This is an outstanding accomplishment, but the number "four" will do little to impact the overall GSDF. Also in 2002, the U.S. and GSDF conducted their first company level joint Military Operations in Urban Terrain exercise in Hawaii. Although this training is exactly what the GSDF needs to enhance its tactical capabilities, the fact that until this time in 2002 the GSDF did not have an urban training facility of its own is another example of the often-misunderstood capabilities of the force. The SDF has since built an urban training facility in Kyushu, but one facility for a force of over 150,000 personnel spread across a country the size of Japan is neglectful. In comparison, almost every ground component military installation in the U.S. has an urban training facility, while major installations have multiple facilities (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).

Air Self-Defense Force

The size and strength of the ASDF gives some indication of the overall capability of the Japanese Air Force but does not tell the entire story. It is important to understand what the ASDF can currently do, what it intends to be able to do in the future, and what it cannot or does not have a desire to do in order to fully understand its capabilities and how it compares to other forces in the international community.

The mission of the ASDF is to provide early warning surveillance and rapid reaction in defence of Japanese airspace. The ASDF is currently composed of approximately 47,128 personnel, eight aircraft warning groups, twenty warning squadrons, one airborne warning squadron, twelve fighter squadrons, one air reconnaissance squadron, three air transport squadrons, one air refuelling/transport squadron, and six surface-to-air guided missile (SAM) groups. In total, there are approximately 350 combat aircrafts in the ASDF, with approximately 260 fighter aircrafts (Japan Defence White Papers, 2010). The

ASDF is structured in a regional defensive layout much like the GSDF's, with four regional forces protecting the homeland from outside attack. The three forces residing within mainland Japan are the Northern, Central, and Western Air Defence commands. The fourth command is responsible for the protection of Okinawa and is known as the South-Western Composite Air Division. Each force contains elements of reconnaissance, transport, SAM, and interceptor assets (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010). The regional layout of the ASDF allows it to rapidly defend against outside aggression on the Japanese homeland. The ASDF is accomplishing this area of its mission, but its ability to provide for future missions is what is causing the changes currently being made to the overall force.

The current capabilities of the ASDF that give the overall force credibility internationally focus on air-to-air and surface-to-air defences over the Japanese homeland. As Lind wrote in 2004, the ASDF is "arguably the fourth most powerful air force, after the United States, Great Britain, and France...measured by number of modern fighter aircraft, by airborne early warning assets, and by pilot training (one measure of pilot skill)" (Jennifer M Lind, 97-98). Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi would now argue that the air forces of China and Russia stand in front of the ASDF, but that still puts the Japanese force at an elite status in the international security environment (Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, 50). These measures focus specifically on the defence of the homeland. The ASDF has a fighter force with superior training in operations conducted within this defined area. The surface-to-air capability the ASDF holds is credited to its ties with the U.S. military. The U.S.-developed Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system gives Japan this capability. The ASDF is currently integrating the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 System, replacing the second-generation PAC-2 system originally provided by the U.S. military. The necessity of these weapons defence systems is rooted in the potential North Korea offensive missile system, most noticeably its Nodong (Rodong) Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).

The strengths of the ASDF reside in its air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities, but the force's limitations are glaring and create a gap that the MOD is currently working to solve. Where the ASDF has limited capability is in power projection outside the immediate surrounding areas of Japan. The ASDF is attempting to address three main gaps in its air defence program: transport capability, refuelling, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) (Andre L Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, 50). In order to address the first two areas of weakness, the ASDF has acquired the Boeing KC-767 tanker aircraft, which will be used not only as a transport aircraft, but also for its in-flight refuelling capability. This aircraft will give the ASDF an expanded power projection capability it has not had since the end of World War II. The acquisition of the KC-767 has been an extremely slow process: Japan first agreed to add the aircraft to its arsenal in 2001, but the final tanker of the four originally ordered arrived 8 January 2010. It is the intention of the ASDF to acquire four additional tankers to increase its international operation capability, officially for humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations (Jane's All the World's Aircraft).

The acquisition of the KC-767 will increase ASDF transportation capability, but the increase will be limited. The ASDF is still developing its medium-range cargo aircraft (C-X), which will address some of the transport gaps that currently exist. The ASDF is attempting to improve areas in its air defence where it is lacking, but as the previous examples show, this takes not only desire, but also time. And once the capability has been acquired, it takes even longer to become expert or even proficient at it.

Another major area of concern for the ASDF is that it does not currently have a long-term solution as to what its future fighter aircraft will be. It was the intention of the Japanese to procure the F-22 from the U.S., but the deal for the F-22 is no longer on the table because of budget restrictions in the U.S.. The ASDF is currently using F-2s, F-15s, and F-4s, but these aircraft are older generations that need to be replaced. The F-22 was the right aircraft for the future desires of the ASDF, but without that option, no solution has yet been determined (Andrew L Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, 50). Maintenance and enhancement

to these aircrafts are short term solutions to the fighter fleet problem, but a long-term solution is needed, and soon.

Maritime Self-Defense Force

The MSDF is the most capable and experienced branch of the SDF. The force has been gaining prestige in the international security environment for the last two decades through consistent operational tours of duty in various areas of the sea. Why is the MSDF the most capable of the three major branches of the SDF? There are several reasons that explain how advanced the MSDF has become and continues to be. First and most obvious are the geographic location of Japan and the series of islands that combine make up the nation. In order to actively defend its homeland and ensure the protection of the resources entering Japan from the seas, a capable Navy has always been a necessity for Japan. Less obvious or known is the role the MSDF provided in security operations during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The MSDF was an effective deterrent against the Soviet submarine fleet in East Asia during the latter years of the Cold War. An additional reason for the advanced capabilities of the MSDF has everything to do with the factors that have led to diminish the capabilities for the GSDF and ASDF: training and operational experience. The MSDF has been conducting various surveillance, minesweeping, and anti-submarine warfare activities for the past four decades, while the experience of the other forces has been limited mainly to the last fifteen years at most.

The MSDF is the smallest branch of the SDF, but its number of personnel does not reflect its capability compared to the other forces. There are currently approximately 45,500 sailors in the MSDF. This number includes both naval aviation and the naval reserve (the reserves are insignificant, totalling approximately 1,100 in 2009). The MSDF is comprised of four escort flotillas. Each flotilla has up to six destroyers or frigates, an amphibious ship, anti-mine ships, patrol crafts, a destroyer flagship, two air defence destroyers, and five anti-submarine warfare escorts (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).The MSDF overall has approximately 148 vessels, including 52 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 30 minesweepers. It also contains 195 aircraft, of which 185 are used for

surveillance purposes and include P-3Cs, UH-60Js, and SH-50Js (Andrew L Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, 54).

Like the GSDF and ASDF, the MSDF is divided into five regional commands with separate areas of operation for each unit. The JMSDF is headquartered in Yokosuka, as are the following major commands under the flag of the Yokosuka District Fleet: 1st Escort Flotilla, the 2nd Submarine Flotilla, the Mine Warfare Force, Fleet Research Development Command, Oceanographic Command, and the Fleet Intelligence Command. This command's area of responsibility is the north eastern to eastern part of Japan on the Pacific Ocean side. The Sasebo District Fleet is home to the 2nd Escort Flotilla with the southern part of Japan as its area of responsibility. The Ominato District is responsible for the northern tip of mainland Japan and the Hokkaido island area. The Maizuru District is responsible for the north eastern to central-west part of Japan facing the Sea of Japan; this district contains the 3rd Escort Flotilla. The fifth regional command is the Kure District, which is responsible for the south eastern area of Japan and contains the 4th Escort Flotilla (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2010).

The capabilities of the MSDF are directly related to the potential threats Japan may encounter in the immediate future, but this does not explain exactly why the MSDF has its particular current capabilities. The MSDF developed a highly sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare capability during the Cold War because one of the primary threats facing Japan was Soviet submarines. As an island nation with limited resources, Japan is convinced its greatest threats will come via the sea and that protection of its sea-lanes and lines of communication are vital to Japan's national interest. Japan's ability to deter Soviet submarines during the Cold War has translated into the post-Cold War environment.

Japan has proven its ability to protect the sea environment on two separate occasions in recent years. In 1999, an MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft spotted a North Korean spy vessel during a routine surveillance and patrol operation off the Noto Peninsula. The Japanese

Coast Guard tracked the vessel until MSDF destroyers were ordered to relieve them. The MSDF was ordered to stop the vessel and even fired warning shots toward the fleeing vessel. The vessel was forced out of Japanese territorial waters and the MSDF stood down. This operation was the first of its kind for the MSDF and showed its capability to survey, track, and deter dangerous vessels in Japanese areas of influence. The second incident occurred in 2005, when another P-3C patrol aircraft spotted an unidentified submarine in Japanese territorial waters near Sakishima. The MSDF was once again called upon to conduct maritime security operations on the submarine until it was no longer in Japanese territorial waters. Once the submarine was out of the MSDF's area of interest, the MSDF destroyers were ordered to stand down. The unidentified vessel was later reported to be a Chinese nuclear submarine (Japan's Ministry of Defence). These two incidents are recent examples of the capability of the MSDF to conduct maritime security operations to protect areas of interest for Japan. The MSDF has the ability, through its surveillance and reconnaissance patrols, to identify, track, and deter unwanted vessels threatening Japanese territorial waters or areas of interest.

The previously noted operations of the MSDF represent the core mission of the force as directed by the government of Japan. These identify, track, and deter operations are not the only areas of expertise in which the MSDF has proven itself in recent years. While these other niche areas in which the MSDF has gained influence are the areas the U.S. wants the MSDF to pursue. Just as the U.S. depended on the MSDF's antisubmarine capability during the Cold War when the U.S. was reducing its naval presence in East Asia, the U.S. now calls on the MSDF to carry the international load in humanitarian aid/disaster relief operations, as well as in other operations in the Global War against Terrorism. The MSDF's taking on these additional roles frees the U.S. Navy to conduct direct combat operations and other more aggressive operations (for example, counter-piracy operations) around the globe. The MSDF has also been involved in support operations to the U.S. in the Global War against Terrorism, as well as disaster relief operations. MSDF refuelling ships dispatched to the Indian Ocean for eight years between 2001 and 2009 in support of the U.S. and other nations' naval vessels

conducting maritime security interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean. These operations showed remarkable success with the interdiction of ships carrying large quantities of narcotics, small arms, and anti-tank rockets (Japan's Ministry of Defense). The MSDF was also requested by the Thai government to support disaster relief operations in 2004 after a tsunami hit Sumatra in Indonesia. In all, three Destroyers, two Supply ships, and a Transport ship were deployed to Sumatra for Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief support. The MSDF conducted search and rescue operations, recovering fifty-seven bodies and returning them to Thai authorities. The MSDF also conducted supply and transport operations as necessary in the affected areas (Japan's Ministry of Defense).

The U.S. desires active participation from the SDF in these various areas of international operations for three reasons. 1) Participation by other nations such as Japan in security operations puts an international face rather than an American face on missions. The American military is not as widely accepted in all areas of the world as international coalitions. 2) The financial expense of the operations is shared by the international community and not exclusively paid for by the American taxpayer. 3) When U.S. allies' gain experience in international operations and can eventually take the lead, the American military is freed to operate in other areas where its specific skills may be required. The MSDF has proven its capabilities in maritime security, defence of Japan's territorial waters, humanitarian aid/disaster relief, and counterterrorism operations during the past two decades. Throughout this time the stature of the MSDF has continued to grow; this is exactly what the U.S. wants to see from the SDF.

In order to protect Japan in the territorial waters surrounding the island nation, according to Japan's 2010 Defence White Papers, the MSDF is focusing its future efforts on three specific operational areas. The MSDF is first changing the posture of its eight destroyer divisions to increase security around Japan at all times. The five regional districts will alter the deployment rotations of their destroyers, so that one unit from each region is deployed at all times. This change will ensure that all five regions of Japan will be

protected from the sea at all times via capabilities provided by a deployed destroyer unit. This change is one that recognises the dangerous neighbourhood in which Japan resides and that potential threats from its enemies and terrorist actors could come from any location and at any time.

The second operational area change the MSDF will employ is to re-focus its submarine units. The MSDF will focus the deployments of its submarines to the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan to conduct surveillance and information gathering missions. This change recognises the potential threat coming from North Korea, but also focuses on the military challenges posed by China, specifically in the East China Sea and around Taiwan. Japan's Defence White Papers do not explicitly state what threat these changes are meant to mitigate, but it is obvious Japan is interested in China's activities around Japan and is altering its defence posture as a first step.

The third focus of the MSDF is as much a change in priority as it is a necessary change because of budget constraints. The MSDF is reducing fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and patrol helicopter units from eight each to four each. This change has been introduced to allow "improvement in efficiency," but this is bureaucratic code for "do more with less." The MSDF is reducing the number of patrol aircrafts from approximately 170 to 150. Japan cannot spend freely on defence, especially given its unofficial 1% cap on defence spending and its costly BMD system. The reduction in patrol aircrafts will be felt, but unit consolidation and utilisation of the new P-3C aircraft should ease the burden of these cuts (Japan's Defence White Papers, 2010).

Defense Budget

Japan's large (in terms of total dollars) defence budget is often cited as one factor that makes the SDF an extremely capable military. The ironic aspect of defence spending in Japan is that the *percentage* of spending is also used to express Japan's limited willingness to normalise their military. Japan's defence budget ranks 148th in the world as in GDP (CIA World Factbook). This only tells part of the story; Japan's defence

budget is also the sixth largest in the world (SIPRI, 2009). Japan spent $51 billion on defence in 2009, placing it behind only the U.S., China, France, Great Britain, and Russia. Its defence budget has been kept at just below 1% of GDP since 1967, when the government placed an unofficial cap on defence spending (Akira Kawasaki, 131).

Even if one holds that Japan spends a great deal of money on defence, where the money is going and how effectively it is being used are separate questions. Recent trends in overall defence spending give an indication of what Japan is not willing to do in order to answer to potential threats from North Korea and a rising military power in China: it is not willing to outspend its adversaries or get into an arms race. Japan's FY 2011 defence budget will drop for the ninth consecutive year and is at an eighteen-year low. The 2011 budget is $242 million less than it was in 2010, a .4% decrease in overall defence spending (Kosuke Takahashi). This may not seem like a significant reduction, but one must take into account the number of years Japan has continued to reduce its defence spending and the fact that over the last decade the threat from North Korea has increased and military modernisation in China has not slowed. Japan is quietly saying it will not keep up with its adversaries on its own and that it still plans to keep its defence budget low even in the face of legitimate security threats.

How does Japan spend its defence money? In Japan's defence spending for FY 2010, the SDF spends the most on its approximately 240,000 personnel, including expenses for salaries, food, and lodging. Food and provision spending was 44.5% of Japan's total defence spending in FY 2010. The next largest portion of spending is on general maintenance of equipment, accounting for 21.8% of the FY 2010 budget. The third largest portion of defence spending is for equipment procurement and research and development, at 19.9% of overall defence spending. The remaining portion, accounting for less than 20%, is spent on base measures, facility development, research and development, and other minor expenses. Included in this portion is the money spent on basing American forces in Japan, at 9% of the overall defence budget (Akira Kawasaki,

132). This is an expense very few countries experience (see Appendix 3 for composition ratio from 2001-2009 of Defence related Expenditures).

When the percentages are examined as absolute amounts, one realises Japan spends less on equipment procurement and R&D that one might have thought. At 19.9% of their $51 billion defence budget, this category accounts for approximately $9.7 billion. This may be a very large sum of money by itself, but in defence weapons and equipment procurement circles, this much money vanishes very quickly. By comparison, the U.S. is projecting it will spend approximately $203.77 billion on procurement and research and development in FY 2011 (which is a reduction from 2010), or approximately 30% of its defence budget (The New York Times). For example, the Boeing 767 Tanker the ASDF has purchased runs between $150 million to $225 billion, and the ASDF had four of them come on line in the past decade, for just under a billion dollars. Furthermore, a ballistic missile defence system, which the SDF has been developing, is even more costly. It was reported in 2003 that the U.S. would spend approximately $62 billion on its ballistic missile defence system between 2002 and 2009(Centre for Defence Information, Missile Defence Updates: Cost). If Japan were developing a similar system, that amount would account for its entire weapons and equipment budget during that period. Japan is not developing a BMD system as elaborate as the U.S. is, but this is an example of how expensive defence spending can be (Japan Defence White Papers 2010).

How Japan divides its defence spending among the three branches of the SDF can be as misleading as the overall numbers. In FY 2010, the defence budget was divided between the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF at 37.2%, 23.2%, and 22.5% respectively, with the remaining 17.1% going to other costs within the Ministry of Defence (Japan Defence White Papers 2010). One might look at these numbers and assume that since the GSDF receives the most investment, it should be the most capable force. But the assumption that the GSDF receives the highest amount of money is in real terms false, and the notion that they are subsequently the most capable force is even more incorrect. The GSDF is three times the actual size of the ASDF or MSDF, but its budget allocation is only

approximately one and a half times that of the other two forces. With 44.5% of defence spending going towards personnel costs and provisions, the ASDF and MSDF are receiving an even greater amount of money per individual self-defence force member than the GSDF. This discrepancy in budget allocation between the different branches can be attributed to the cost of high-technology weapons, equipment, and maintenance. The ASDF and MSDF, with their various aircrafts, vessels, weapons systems, and training requirements, naturally have greater budget needs than the GSDF. The budget allocation information supports this explanation and develops a better understanding of how defence spending can impact the capabilities of an overall force.

A detailed examination of defence budgets can also give explicit indications of the direction a particular military is moving, what its priorities are, and what capabilities are lacking or need improvement. The Japan FY 2010 defence budget is no different. A number of the stated priorities of the FY 2010 budget are "the development of the Type 10 Main Battle Tank, introduction of the 22DDH Destroyers to replace the Shirane class destroyer, improv[ing] the ballistic missile defence system, and improv[ing] the F-2 and F-15 fighter capabilities" (Japan Defence White Papers 2010). This one sentence from Japan's Defense White Papers on the FY 2010 budget describes four areas of major concern for the MOD and gives indications of the status of the overall force and its capabilities. The GSDF is currently reducing the number of battle tanks in its arsenal. Tanks are often seen as a relic of the Cold War era: a means to deter an invading Soviet force, but not a legitimate need in the post Cold War, post-9/11 security environment. Even with this mentality, Japan is struggling to eliminate its main battle tank and is even spending money to procure the latest version of this defence mechanism, even though it hardly responds to Japan's current or projected future threat. The replacement of the Shirane class destroyers with 22DDH destroyers will give the MSDF destroyers helicopter landing capability and increase their capability in surveillance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue operations, as well as potential combat operations if this were ever necessary. This procurement will surely enhance the MSDF's already advanced capability to conduct maritime operations in Japan's territorial waters, sea-lanes, and sea

lines of communication. Ballistic missile defence gets constant attention throughout Japan's defence budget; it is a main priority of its defence spending, if not the main priority. With the attention these systems are receiving from the MOD, it will be no surprise if Japan's BMD system is one of the premier systems globally in the near future. Improving fighter capability may not seem like an unusual statement in a defence budget or among future priorities, but in the case of the ASDF, it says a great deal. The ASDF F-2 and F-15 fighters are outdated, need extensive maintenance, and eventually need to be replaced. Japan's plan was to replace them with the F-22 from the United States, but with the U.S. cancelling the F-22 program, the future fighter aircraft from the ASDF is unknown. The ASDF can only maintain the F-2 and F-15 for so long—it needs a long-term solution to its fighter aircraft problem. One sentence about future priorities of the SDF gives enormous insight into the future capabilities and problems facing Japan over its security needs. The good news for Japan is that it recognises its deficiencies and is attempting to do something about them, but making major changes to defence systems is not always easy and certainly not simple.

Japan has no doubt made positive steps in the security sphere after September 11. As compared to the Asian countries as China, and India, Japan's growth is found to be substantial and does not evoke any fears of remilitarisation or going to the past history of militarism (see also Appendix 1 for comparison of SDF with militaries of major countries). Despite growth in the security forces there has been reluctance on the part of the institutions i.e. the bureaucracy and other related institutions, so in the next chapter civil military structure and the defence decision making process will be studied.

Chapter

CIVIL MILITARY RELATION IN JAPAN: EMERGENCE OF A NEW CHAPTER?

Civil–military relation describes the relationship between the civil authority of a society and its military authority. Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state. The principal problem, however, is empirical: to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained.

According to Samuel Huntington, civilian control means that there is a distinctive difference between political responsibility and military responsibility, and that the latter is institutionally subordinate to the former. He emphasises officers' professionalism and civilian control (objective and subjective). Subjective civilian control involves the exercise of power over military by one civilian group as a means to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian groups (Samuel P Huntington, 1957: 80). While the objective control relies on civilian government granting the military autonomy to exercise control within its national defence sphere and relying on the professionalism of the military to be the guarantor of military subordination to the civilian leaders (Samuel P Huntington, 1957: 80). According to Huntington, civilians must respect the military's professional expertise and independence and accept the military both socially and politically. It is necessary to establish "objective civilian control" and democratic politics that the people could check and control.

In the case of Japan, however, one can see "subjective civilian control". Civilians do not respect the military's professional expertise or accept independence of the ministry. In the post-war Japan, the military has not been accepted as a social or political either, and the military absolutely follows civilians while SDF maintains professionalism. This is the "subjective civilian control", but today, the military demands "objective civilian control." Japan maintains unique civil supremacy, which is mainly based on a multilayered

bureaucratic scrutiny within the internal bureaus, and Article 9 of the Constitution in checking the military.

Discussing civil military relations in Japan is important for two reasons. First Japan does not technically possess a military. While technically not a military, the SDF possess all the qualities of one-uniformed officers and troops under arms, a hierarchical chain of command, and a mission to defend the nation. By interpreting the constitution in a way that allowed to field forces to defend itself and using euphemistic names and terms, Japan justified the creation and formation of its armed forces.

Secondly, the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the United States is often described as the linchpin for security and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. Just as the NATO Alliance in Europe is described as having kept the Soviets out, the Germans down, and the United States in, it can probably be said to some extent that the U.S.-Japan Alliance in Asia kept Soviets out, Japan down, and U.S. in. for Japan specifically, the treaty gave responsibility for its external defence to the U.S. and allowed Japan to concentrate on other matters, especially economic expansion. Even though the SDF has steadily grown into a formidable force, military matters have been a small part of the pursuit of rebuilding the nation and a very sensitive political subject.

This chapter seeks to answer - What is the existing civil military structure? What are the discontents in the existing structure? Apart from Ministry of Defence, do other ministries have any role in framing its defence policy? And finally, what are the implications of transformation from Defence Agency to Ministry of Defence?

Civil-Military Structure in Japan

The relationship between civilian and military officials has always been a controversial issue in post-war Japan. In pre-war Japan, the military overshadowed the civilian leaders. As a result of this situation, the status of military officials in post-war Japan is intentionally lower than their status in other countries. In the past, the Japanese people were extremely sensitive about any issues related to the military, and military officials

still do not use the old names for ranks used by the Imperial Army and Navy. The Defense Agency and *Kokubozuku* (so-called National Defense Tribe in the Liberal Democratic Party) Diet members tried to change the status of the Defense Agency from that of a second-class government office to one with first-class status. In October 1997, the LDP's National Defense Division attempted to upgrade the Defense Agency to the status of the Ministry of Defense.[1] Such an attempt did not succeed until 2007.

Since 1954, when the SDF was created, civilian officials within the internal bureaus of the Defense Agency have maintained strong control over military officials of the SDF. The internal bureaus were given greater authority than the military, especially in terms of providing advice to the director general of the Defense Agency. The Chief Secretary and each Bureau Chief assist the Director General of the Defense Agency in formulating his directives and give approval to each chief of staff concerning general policy as well as preparation of the basic annual operational plan for each service, i.e. the Ground, the Maritime, and the Air. Civilian officials also assist the director general with respect to matters under the jurisdiction of the JSC (Joint Staff Council, since 2006 the Joint Staff Office-JSO) and his general supervision of each service (Kooki Miyazaki, 1979: 83). The JSC comprised of a chairman and three chiefs of staff, is given authority to assist the Director General of the Defense Agency concerning the basis and integral adjustment of directives and orders given to the SDF in times of emergency. However, until recently the chairman of the JSC had only authority to preside over the affairs of the SDF.

In 1981, military officials tried in vain to increase the authority of the JSC chairman so that basic directives and orders from the Director General of the Defense Agency would be given to the SDF through the Chairman in times of emergency. The intention of military officials was to limit the role of the internal bureaus of the Defense Agency regarding military administrative matters and to monopolise issues concerning operations

[1] The Ministry of Foreign affairs was fully aware of this attempt, and decided to set up the Security Policy committee within the Foreign Ministry in order to keep the leadership in Japan's security policy. The Foreign Ministry was strongly concerned about the situation in which only defence officials would decide security policies. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry intended to appeal its raison d être by showing its strong support toward comprehensive security policies. Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 22 October 1997.

and directives so that military officials would be able to directly advise the director general of the Defense Agency and the Prime Minister. While the status of the military officials in the SDF has increased vis-à-vis the status of the civilian officials in the internal bureaus in the 1980s and the 1990s, the influence and power of the military officials in the SDF are still marginal compared with military officials in the SDF are still marginal compared with military officials in the United States.

Existing Civil-Military Structure

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF consist of a number of organs in order to fulfil their mission of defending Japan. These organs include the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), as well as the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General's office of Legal Compliance. The Minister of Defense manages the affairs related to the defence of Japan as the head of the Ministry of Defense and is in charge of the overall control of the SDF in accordance with the provisions of the Self Defense Forces Law. The Minister is supported by the Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Vice Ministers of Defense. The Senior Vice Minister of Defense can be authorised by the order of the Minister of Defense in advance to carry out the task of the Minister when the Minister is not present. There is also Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense who advise the Minister of Defense and the Defense Council to discuss basic policies of the affairs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. Further there is an Administrative Vice Minister of Defense who assists the Minister of Defense, organises ministerial affairs, and supervises operations.

Moreover the internal bureau, joint staff and ground staff office, maritime staff office, and air staff office are established as organisations to support the Minister of Defense. The internal bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Director-General of the Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorisation to the

Chief of Joint staff and the Chiefs of Ground staff, Maritime staff, and Air staff. The Joint Staff is a staff organisation for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organisations for the Minster of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.

3.1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense



Source: Defense of Japan 2010

Civil-Military Relations and its Discontents

Military officials are generally not satisfied with any situation that lacks understanding of defence issues among the politicians. They also regard their own status in the government as extraordinarily low. In the past, civilian officials doubted military official's viewpoints on military issues and put military officials under their control.

The former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (JSC), Tsugio Yata points out the Japanese characteristic of civilian control. He states that in the past, officials in the internal bureaus thought that civilian control meant the internal bureaus' dominance over military officials of the SDF rather than supremacy in politics over the military. Yata explains three basic differences between civilian and military officials in the Defense Agency, the first being a difference between political soundness and military rationality. The civilian thinks about Japan's defence policy from the viewpoint of political consideration while the military seeks the best military means to defend Japan. The civilian and the military also differ in their perception of threat. The civilian thinks that there is little threat to Japan while the military perceives that there is a potential threat, which might become a real threat. The third difference is that the civilian feels that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has been functioning effectively, whereas the military believes that it has not (Takeo Sebata, 2010: 80-81).

Unlike civilian officials of the Defense Department in the United States, Japanese civilian officials' knowledge regarding military affairs and weapons technology is very limited since many of them majored in law in university. Some of the high ranking officials come from other ministries/agencies rather than the Defense Agency and return to the original ministries/agencies after their respective tours of duties. Therefore, those officials have difficulty in accumulating expertise on military affairs or weapons technology. Moreover, there are no universities except the Military Academy of Japan that offer course on military affairs, military strategy, or weapons technology.

There are obvious fundamental differences between the civilian and the military. Since the civilian and the military have different roles and missions, it is natural that there are confrontations over specific defence policies, different organisational interests, and different perceptions of potential threats to Japan. Since the 1980s the status of the military is gradually increasing as compared to the status of the civilian within the internal bureaus. It is in the field of military technology that the military particularly increased its influence. Actually, military officials in the SDF have played a central role and taken the initiative in preparation of policy drafts since the late 1980s. Today, the civilian tends to yield to the military in decision making.

The above fact shows that Japan has been under "subjective civilian control". Since the 1980s, however, the relationship between civilian and military officials has been less antagonistic than before. Civilian officials in the 1980s began to study hard and to skilfully combine military rationality with political consideration. Now, both civilians and the military are able to talk freely, share their view, cooperate with each other, and negotiate as a team with the Finance Ministry. There are certain noticeable areas where control of the military has increased over their civilian counterparts; they are Budget Compilation, Personnel Management, and the 1976, 1995, and 2004 National Defense Program Outline.

Budget Compilation

The budget is compiled and submitted to the Finance Ministry by the civilian officials in the internal bureaus, now they have become keen advocated of the SDF. Moreover, some officials within the internal bureaus even echoed the hawkish line of the military.

Osuma Kaihara, former Secretary General of the National Defense Council and former cabinet secretary of the Defense Agency, criticises that internal bureaus saying that at most, the internal bureaus modify words of the draft and stamp their seals mechanically without reading the contents (Osuma Kaihara, 1983: 193). Former

administrative vice minister of the Defense Agency, Ko Muruyama also states that due to lack of knowledge on the side of the internal bureaus, the bureaus are useless concerning budget compilation, and staff offices depend on the Budget Bureaus rather that the internal bureaus to make the budget (Ko Murayama, 1979: 27-28).

It may be argued that the role of the internal bureaus until the late 1970s was primarily to cut the defence budget submitted by each service of the SDF. Unlike the military, the internal bureaus are partially comprised of officials from other ministries and agencies. Some of them return to their home ministry/agency after a couple of years. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for civilians to effectively command the military.

On the one hand, officials sent from the Ministry of Finance still often occupy such important posts as Administrative Vice Minister and Director of the Defense Policy Bureau. Military officials, on the other hand, have increased their influence over the budget making process and budget negotiations with the Ministry of Finance because of their superior knowledge of the advance military technology and specialisation among combat troops of the SDF. Since those officials in the internal bureaus sent from the Ministry of Finance do not have military expertise, they tend to rely on the decision making opinions of the military officials within the SDF. As a result, civilians input in the decision making process has been greatly reduced.The military has greatly increased its influence because military official's expertise is necessary in order to explain the defence budget to the Finance Ministry. During the defence budget making process, military officials can explain the role an importance of the particular weapons in defence policy. As a result, civilian officials become less important that military officials in the budget making process. Therefore, officials of the Budget Bureau began to speak highly of military officials and to listen to them rather than civilian officials. In this way, influence and power of military officials have further enhanced in the late 1980s and 1990s.

Personnel Management and the Organisation

In the past, the internal bureaus checked any promotion above the rank of colonel, but since the late 1980s personnel matters became an exclusive right of the military. Furthermore, the military, in many cases, has conducted briefings on important issues directly to the Prime Minister. This trend has become noticeable since the Ryotaro Hashimoto administration in 1996. Moreover, the military has begun to disregard the internal bureaus by intentionally not reporting important matters to civilians or by allowing lower-ranking officers (officers whose rank is twice lower than the rank in the past) to brief the internal bureaus (Katsuro Kawabe, 2000: 138-147).

Another example of the increased status of military officials is that in January 1997, the Information Headquarters was formed within the Defense Agency. For the first time, civilian officials of the internal bureaus worked under a general of the SDF who is the director of the Information Headquarters, and military and civilian officials work side by side.

The Defense Agency also intended to increase its position toward the Foreign Ministry. Under the 1955 agreement with the Foreign Ministry, SDF military attachés were under total control of the Foreign Minster and not allowed to directly communicate with the Defense Agency. In May 2003, the Defense Agency was able to change this agreement so that now military attachés could report to the Defense Agency.

The military officials run the entire procurement process of major equipment due to the rapid development of military technology.

The military proposed in June 2004 the elimination of the post of councillors in the internal bureaus. Upon the proposal made by the Chief of Staff of the Maritime SDF, the director general instructed to the key officials of the agency the review of the councillors system. The military also demanded the transfer of supervisory authority

over the SDF that the administration vice minister had, to the chief of the JSO. In this way, the military requested that the Chief of the JSO be equal to the Administrative Vice Minister in supporting the director general and the Prime Minister. Some military officials even argued for the elimination of internal bureaus including the Administrative Vice Minister. In other words, military wanted to establish a system that would directly advice the director general and the Prime Minister without being controlled by internal bureaus. As a result of these efforts, the military was able to eliminate the councillors system in May 2009.

The 1976, 1995, and 2004 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)

Whereas the 1976 NDPO was overwhelmed by civilian officials over military officials, but for the 1995 military officials worked together with civilians from the beginning throughout the review process of the 1976.

By 1995, the SDF had been focusing on its national defence mission for almost 20 years, and for the past three years had been deploying for United Nation peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Also, by 1995, the Socialist Party had dropped its categorical denial of the SDF's existence. In the mid-1990s, Japanese politicians were generally in favour of continuing Japan's involvement in international peacekeeping (Auelia George Mulgan, 1995: 1101-1117), and the U.S. continued to press Japan for continued participation. Here, SDF established a clear mandate to adopt possible countermeasures in the event of an emergency in the areas surrounding Japan in the 1995 NDPO. In this respect, military officials were able to not only defend their own interests, but also expand the roles and missions of the SDF in response to an emergency in the areas surrounding Japan. The 1995 NDPO was also a result of an interaction of officials in both the United Sates and Japan. In particular, military officials of both countries played an important role as a result, the United States spoke highly of the 1995 NDPO (Takeo Sebata, 2008:213).

The 1995 NDPO was revised in 2004. During the decision-making process of the 2004 NDPO, the Finance Ministry tried to cut the defence budget and reduce manpower and equipment of the SDF as it tried in the past. However, three services of the SDF disagreed with and strongly resisted the Finance Ministry plan regarding the size and degree in reduction of the defence budget, equipment, and manpower. The Finance Ministry proposed a huge reduction in the SDF including the reduction of 40,000 Ground SDF personnel. After long negotiations with Finance Ministry officials, military officials finally agreed to carry out the quantitative reduction of equipment, but three services were able to maintain the quality of defence capability, and the reduction of the Ground SDF was limited to only 5,000 personnel.

Role of other Ministries in framing Defence Policy: Look into Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance Ministry, and Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industries

The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for forming and implementing foreign policy and maintaining Japan's relations with other countries. Since the conclusion of the Security Treaty of 1951, the MOFA has been playing an important role in Japan's defence policy formation. This was especially true in the 1950s and 1960s when defence debates were related to Article 9 of the Constitution and the unconstitutionality of the SDF, as well as to the United States involvement in Vietnam and the presence of Unites States bases in Japan. Peter J Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara state that although the Foreign Ministry did not have a domestic political constituency, it was the primary authority in coordinating and conducting all aspects of foreign policy including economic and security issues. It has also maintained greater access to top political leaders (Katzenstein and Okawara, 23-24). Although, the influence and power of the Foreign Ministry have declined in the 1980s and the 1990s as compared with the 1960s and 1970s, during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 the Foreign Ministry was able to maintain the status of the leading authority among the ministries and agencies concerned.

In the area of defence and security, the MOFA had been a competent and leading authority for a long time. As the defence argument became more technical and concrete in the 1980s and 1990s, the status of the Defense Agency increased compared to the MOFA.

Hirofumi Iseri analyses Foreign Ministry officials in the 1970s and the 1980s as belonging to the "Security Faction" or the "Economic and Diplomatic Faction". Until 1980 the "Economic and Diplomatic Faction" occupied the mainstream of the Foreign Ministry, but since the early 1980s the "Security Faction" has increased its influence within the Foreign Ministry. The view of the "Security Faction" is, in face, the view of the military realists. In 1979, an ad hoc committee called the Security Policy Planning Committee was created with in the Foreign Ministry and chaired by Councillor Masao Takashima. The view of the "Security Faction" was clearly represented in the report produced by his committee, and emphasised the need to rapidly achieve the defence capability level set out in the 1976 NDPO and in the Midterm Operation Estimate for 1980-1984. It also suggested the future use of SDF officials in the UNPKO. One can argue that an attempt by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in 1990 to dispatch SDF officials to the Middle East was made along with these lines and advocated by the "Security Faction" of the Foreign Ministry.

Until the late 1970s, the Foreign Ministry emphasised Japan's economic position with regard to the country's role within the international community, although the basis of Japan's foreign policy lay in close cooperation with the United States in large part through the Security Treaty System. The majority of the Foreign Ministry held the view that the supremacy of diplomacy and civilian control over military matters should be maintained in Japan's foreign policy.

In 1980, however, the Foreign Ministry seems to have shifted it's emphasised from economic to military and political affairs. The blue paper of Foreign Ministry, stated that "... for securing Japan's security... it is natural that Japan firmly keep the Security Treaty System and continually make an independent effort to equip herself with an adequate self defence capability. In the same year it favourably appraised the 1978 Guidelines, the

practice of joint manoeuvres between Japanese and United Sates troops, and the supply of weapons technology to the United States.

As Japan's status in the world becomes more important, many Foreign Ministry officials appear to have regained confidence in their country and view security issues more from a military rationale perspective that they did in the past.

The Ministry Of Finance

The Ministry of Finance is in charge of macroeconomic policy and the government budget. Finance Ministry officials are the elites of the elite among the Japanese bureaucrats. Within the Finance Ministry, the Bureau of Budget is regarded as the most prestigious and perhaps the most powerful bureau. Under the director there are three deputy director and nine budget examiners. The Defense Section of the Budget Bureau is responsible for the defence budget. Within this section there are fourteen officials including one budget examiner and four inspectors. In the past the Finance Ministry was regarded as more internationalist that MITI, and its relations with the MOFA was generally cooperative. Up until the late 1970s, the Finance Ministry cooperated against the Defense agency in opposing a sharp increase in the defence budget and supporting the opening up of the Japanese domestic market against the opposition of MITI. However, in the 1980s and 1990s the unchallenged power of the Finance Ministry seems to have declined. John C Campbell argues that because of the complicated and technical aspects of numerous issues since the 1980s, budgeters have come to defer to the expertise of other ministries' officials. It might be difficult for a budget examiner to counter-argue with a military official of the SDF about the necessity of purchasing sophisticated weapons since the military officials has extensive knowledge about military technology.

The Finance Ministry's guiding principles and organisational basis are to retain the right to dictate budget compilation, keep the nation's budget in good condition, and evenly allocate funds to each ministry/agency. This last principle, a sense of balance or *baransu,* is particularly important when the Finance Ministry examines the defence budget. In the past, the Finance Ministry strove to keep the balance between the defence budget and

other budgets, particularly in the social welfare area. In general, the Finance Ministry believed that the annual increase in the defence budget should be equal to or lesser than the annual increase of the social welfare budget and that it would be better to keep the entire amount of defence budget to half the amount of social welfare (Kazuo Yasuhara, 124). The Finance Ministry stated that the government should consider the defence budget by taking into consideration the fiscal as well as economic conditions of each year as mentioned in the 1976 NDPO. It also mentioned that the government should neither decide the defence budget in advance nor dramatically increase the defence budget in relation to other budgets. It opposed the view that the defence budget should be increased in proportion to an increase in the GNP. The Finance Ministry concluded that the government could decide on an adequate size of the defence budget by considering the balance between the defence budget and other budgets (Okurasho Shukeikyoku, 203).

The Ministry of Finance appears not to possess its own view of defence. The Finance Ministry has always played an effective role in checking rapid defence build-up on its fundamental economic principles. The Ministry has also tried to maintain a rational distribution of the budget by preventing unnecessary spending and keeping a balance among different items. The principles mentioned above have been gradually loosing their validity. As Japan attained economic prosperity and put more money towards social welfare spending, which had been neglected for a long time, the defence budget also inevitably and rapidly increased according to the balance argument in the 1980s.

The Ministry Of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Earlier The Ministry Of International Trade And Industry)

METI is a powerful ministry in economic policy in both domestic and international areas. Through its administrative guidance, the right to grant licence and approval, and industrial policy determination, METI's has exercised its strong influence over the business world in Japan (Chalmers Johnson). METI's roles and missions are to promote Japan's foreign trade and industrial development. Its power base lies in the right to grant licence and approval and administrative guidance. It may be difficult for a new firm that does not have METI's support to penetrate the Japanese domestic market.

METI's attitude towards defence issues is ambivalent. While METI accepts the necessity of Japan's independent defence build-up effort in general, it is not willing to promote a strong defence industry. The mainstream of METI officials, on one hand, maintained in the 1960s and 1970s that Japan's priority should lie in promoting industrial development rather than defence capability. While there are sections of young officials, on the other hand, favour reconsidering an embargo on the export of weapons of the 1960s. Although Japan has exported military related technology to the United States since 1983, those who supported reconsideration of weapons embargo do not represent the majority of METI.

While the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency were willing to export military technology to the United States, METI was reluctant to do so. After 1983, however, METI became responsible for overseeing the flow of military technology toward the United States. As a result, from the late 1980s, METI has increased its influence with regard to security policy through the issue of dual-use technologies and weapons related technology export to the United States. Since military related technology transfer is a politically sensitive issue, officials in the Export Division in the International Trade Administration Bureau are generally cautious about approving such technology transfer. MITI also reviews, along with the Ministry of Finance, procurement plans submitted by the Defense Agency, taking into consideration their impact on industrial development. As a result, METI's views lacked a military perspective (Katzenstein and Okawara, 31, 33-6). In any case, METI retains certain influence over defence issues including weapons procurement and dual use technology transfer although the final decision is in the hands of the Defense Agency.

METI officials tend to actively support spin-off effects, i.e. the commercial use of technology developed in the military area and to view defence issues from a position of foreign economic policy, although some of these officials oppose the enlargement of the defence industry. These views are slightly different from those of Finance Ministry officials who regard defence matters from those of Finance Ministry officials who regard defence matters from the standpoint of finance. Economic bureaucrats from both MITI and the Finance Ministry are, however, cautious about the formation of a military-

industrial complex and criticise military officials thinking, which tends to put too much emphasis on military capability. By sending their own officials to the internal bureaus of the Defense Agency, the Finance Ministry and MITI exercised influence over the defence policy.

From Defense Agency to Defense Ministry

Since 2007 when the Defense Agency was elevated into a full fledged ministry, it gained a higher status within the Japanese bureaucracy. However, expanded roles and missions of the SDF and increasing power of the military are not equivalent to the resurgence of militarism in Japan, which is a return to the situation in the 1930s. Japan is a democracy with civilian control, and Article 9 does not allow resurgence of militarism. Rather, military officials try to be equal to civilian officials.

Military officials are not empowered to make defence policy by themselves or decide the SDF's overseas dispatch on their own, but increased their influence due to expanded roles and missions such as overseas dispatch and defence cooperation with United States troops. As a result, the SDF became an important player in defence policy decision-making, which in turn enhanced the status of the Defense Agency within a domestic context.

The military is not dictating to civilians, but it is increasing its voice, influence, and power. In other words, the military has become proud and more confident of its missions and demand "objective civilian control." The military is simply asking equal access to the Director General and the Prime Minister on military advice as the military in other states does. The military also aims to establish "armed forces" (which are different from the SDF) as other states have.

Civilians since the 1990s have also come to share views with the military. They have become more assertive on the defence issues, and many of those who originally come from the Defense Agency have begun to think that Japan should actively use the SDF in conducting its foreign policy. In fact, the Defense Ministry emphasises the SDF's

overseas dispatch as a main task in the 2004 NDPO, which would bring about a problem of the exercise of the right to collective self-defence.

The fundamental change of power balance between the military and civilian officials is related to two factors. First, a generational change of the Japanese people including civilian officials and politicians is taking place. Today's Japanese people in general, young people in particular, are getting more conservative, and nationalism in Japan is rising as Japan's economic malaise continues and people face rising Chinese economic power. The generational change and nationalism created a Japanese society that respects professionalism of the military and emphasises "objective civilian control." Secondly, expanded roles and missions of the SDF led to more influence and power of the military. As a result, the military became more confident and proud of national defence.

In 2007, the Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense. Now the Ministry of Defense can independently submit a budget proposal without direct control of the Prime Minister's Office. In this respect, the ministry is also equal to other ministries in the Japanese bureaucracy. Implications of transition from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense are as follows. First, the Japanese Government and people recognised the status of the Defense Agency as a full bureaucratic organisation. It means that the Japanese society accepted the Defense Agency and the SDF. This is the beginning of Japan acknowledging "objective civilian control." In other words, the Japanese society approved the military as a professional organisation. Secondly, the fact that Japan established the Defense Ministry as an official ministry further erodes Article 9. Therefore, the transition further accelerates a contradiction between the Defense Ministry, on the one hand, and Article 9, on the other hand. Finally, the transition symbolises the enhanced status of the military as compared with that of the military under the Defense Agency. Transition is also a result of expanded roles and missions of the SDF since the early 1990s. In other words, the Japanese society acknowledged such activities as SDF's participation in the UNPKO and dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq although the latter dispatch might lead to the exercise of the collective self-defence.

Overall, the establishment of the Defense Ministry will make the military proud of its job. In facing growing Chinese economic and military power, Japan's nationalism is growing. The establishment of the Ministry of Defense might further accelerate this momentum and symbolises the beginning of a new Japan with "objective civilian control."

Chapter

JAPAN'S CHANGING SECURITY ROLE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Structure, agency and norms in Japan's security role

Japan's security links in Asia Pacific region in the post-war era, both during and after the Cold War have been determined predominantly by the international structural factors of the legacy of colonialism and bipolarity, and their associated norms of anti-militarism and bilateralism. By contrast, the norms of internationalism, developmentalism and Asianism have recently played only a minor part in Japan's regional security policy.

Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, the driving of its forces from its colonies on the Asia Pacific continent and elsewhere, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the state's total demilitarisation planned during initial period of the Occupation meant that Japan was removed, physically and psychologically, from Asia Pacific as a major security actor in the immediate aftermath of the war. Defeat in Asia Pacific, and the bitter process of the rapid acquisition and loss of colonies, engendered fear of Japanese militarism in the Asia Pacific states, and raised once again the international structural barrier of the legacy of colonialism to security interactions between Japan and the newly independent states of the region. In turn, structural barrier of the colonial past was reinforced by the emergent norms of anti-militarism, and, to a certain extent, internationalism. Accordingly, the initial intention following World War II was that Japan's defence and security policy would be centred on the principles of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution and the UN Charter, precluding a significant role for Japan in either Asia Pacific regional or global security. Nevertheless, the onset of Cold War pressures in the late Occupation period, and then the twin crisis of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55, meant that both U.S. and conservative Japanese policy makers become convinced that the security of Japan and Asia Pacific, and the containment of a potential communist threat, could best be served by Japanese integration into the U.S. half of the bipolar divide and U.S. bilateral alliance system. As a consequence, Japan's security policy towards, and links with Asia Pacific Region were to be determined not only by the structural factor of the legacy of colonialism and the norm

of anti militarism, but also, and often more powerfully, by the international structural factor of bipolarity and the norm of bilateralism.

The mix of these international structural barriers and norms produced a distinctive pattern to Japan's military security policy in Asia Pacific during the Cold War. The memory of the disastrous end to Japan's colonial and military exploits in Asia Pacific during the Cold War. The memory of the cognisance of the legacy of colonialism, and anti-militarism norms and constitutional prohibitions convinced conservative LDP politicians and government officials that Japan should avoid further damaging military entanglements and direct intervention on the Asia Pacific region, and rely instead for military security upon the U.S.. Likewise, the East Asian states themselves, fearful of Japanese militarism, were wary of any direct Japanese and viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means with which actually to suppress or act as a 'cork in the bottle' of Japanese militarism . Thus, it can be seen that the legacy of colonialism and anti-militarist norms combined to restrain Japanese policy making agent from attempts to establish direct military contact with, and make a direct contribution to, East Asia military security during Cold War.

Changes in the post Cold War international structure

The gradual winding down of Cold War tensions in East Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s – marked by reduction of the Soviet military presence in the region, normalisation of USSR-China relations in 1989 and the perceived decline of U.S. military commitment to the region following its withdrawal from military bases in Philippines in 1991-92 – removed many of the bipolar structural barriers to interaction amongst the region's states. At the same time, the imperatives for regional cooperation on security matters increased as the reduction of U.S. and Soviet power reactivated a series of bilateral and multilateral disputes between states of East Asia, which has previously been suppressed under the weight of their competing military blocs during the Cold War. In particular, receding Cold War ideological confrontation gave way to the re-emergence of disputes centred on national divides and territorial sovereignty, which could spark a military conflict and require security approaches on the bilateral and multilateral levels for a successful

resolution. In Northeast Asia, these issues included the competition for legitimacy and survival between divided states of North and South Korea, and between China and Taiwan; and the territorial disputes amongst China, Taiwan and Japan over Senkaku Islands, between South Korea and Japan over Takeshima Islands, and between Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories. In Southeast Asia, disputes re-emerged concerning competitive claims in South China Sea between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands and amongst China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines over the Spartly Islands. China is involved in nearly all these bilateral and multilateral disputes. The perceived increase in its military capabilities, and its willingness to deploy force in the service of its national aims since the end of the Cold War, have also convinced many states, especially Japan, various forms of bilateral and multilateral security frameworks so as to prevent it from becoming a destabilising factor in regional security.

Japan's bilateral security links with Asia Pacific

Japan's response to the weakening of the bipolar barriers to security interaction with the rest of the states of Asia Pacific, and the new security challenges and growing economic interdependency have engendered in the post-Cold War period, has been to pursue limited bilateral and multilateral security dialogue across the region. As examined in more detail below in the discussion of its participation in multilateral security, Japan's extension of bilateral security linkages during this period has been viewed as a means to supplement rather than supplant the existing bilateral security relationship with the U.S., and indeed, has in many cases really only been made possible and initiated in conjunction with the U.S. policy on regional security.

The Japanese government announced officially for the first time in 1995 that it would exploit the new opportunities offered to it by the ending of the Cold War to begin to overcome the legacy of colonialism in the region and to augment security dialogue and confidence building measures with the states of the region.

ASEAN states, anti-piracy cooperation and intra-state security

In fact, MoD (then JDA) and MOFA had already begun to extend these links in the late 1980s to the ASEAN states, with exchange visits since 1988 of defence ministers, senior defence officials, military officers and training ships. Japan in these moves has made remarkable progress towards dispelling suspicion in Southeast Asia concerning its militaristic past. This progress has been further boosted with the SDF's participation in UNPKO in Cambodia in 1993 and in East Timor in 2002-4, which represented the first direct contribution that Japan's military had made to East Asian security since the end of the Pacific War. Japan has further expanded its bilateral ties with ASEAN through anti-piracy cooperation. Japanese policy makers have become increasingly concerned about the rising number of incidents of piracy in Malacca Strait since the end of Cold War, attributing this to the end of the Cold War and reduced U.S. and Soviet patrolling, and the financial crisis which increased the incentives for crime in the region (Hughes 2004a:222-6). They are also particularly disturbed by the number of incidents involving Japanese shipping and the risks to its SLOCs through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits. Japan has responded proactively at the regional level with a variety of anti-piracy initiatives. At the November 1999 Japan-ASEAN summit, it proposed the initiation of a meeting of coastguard representatives to discuss the issue of piracy. In April 2000, Japan hosted the first Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. In September 2000, Japan dispatched survey teams to Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. A meeting of piracy experts was held in Malaysia in November of the same year; and from April 2001, Japan has accepted foreign students at the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) Academy. In November 2001, Japan proposed at the ASEAN+3 summit the formation of a working experts group on anti-piracy measures. Japan has since conducted bilateral operations to combat piracy, with JCG (rather than MSDF) ships since 2001 visiting Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia for joint training drills and patrols. Japan's then JDA Director General (Minister of State for Defense), Ishiba Shigeru also proposed at the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2003 and 2004, that Japan would look to

increase the role in anti-piracy cooperation in what he termed as 'Ocean Peacekeeping Operations'. How far Japan can expand its cooperation with ASEAN and its maritime security role through anti-piracy cooperation is doubtful, though, given that China clearly suspects that the ASEAN states are using this as a device to entice Japan into eventually expanding its naval presence in the region to counter China's military rise and its assertion of its territorial claims over the Spratly Islands (Hughes 2004b: 119-21).

Japan has also worked with the ASEAN states to address a number of post-Cold War and post-9/11 issues that affect inter-and intra-state security in Southeast Asia. Japan has been apprehensive at the potential breakup of Indonesia's territorial integrity following the financial crisis, and was especially concerned when the Aceh independence movement targeted liquefied natural gas facilities in Indonesia and disrupted supplies to Japan in 2001. Japan's response was to sponsor in conjunction with the U.S. and World Bank a Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh in December 2002 which briefly succeeded in brokering a ceasefire between the Indonesian government and Achenese independence movement. Japan also moved to assist ASEAN states on the issue of terrorism, following the events of 9/11, the Bali bombing of 19 October 2002, and Jakarta in September 2004. The Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action of December 2003 contained a number of officials from ASEAN and technical assistance to strengthen port and border controls. Japan and ASEAN then announced the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in November 2004.

South Korea

Progress in Japan-South Korea bilateral security relations has also been remarkable, with various personnel exchanges and training exercises since 1992. These have taken place in spite of the fact that the South Korean government continued to warn against renewed Japanese militarism up until 1991. Japan-South Korea bilateral dialogue has been pushed along in the main by mutual concerns about the North Korean security threat, and in conjunction with the U.S., which has looked to build up a pattern of

triangular U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation in order to counter any military contingency on the Korean Peninsula (Yamaguchi 1999:3-24). In October 1998 following the North Korean missile launch, the Japan-ROK joint declaration pledged increased defence exchanges and consultations. Japan-South Korea defence diplomacy has not been entirely immune to resurgence of historical tensions: for instance, South Korea cancelled military exchanges to be held in June 2011 in protest at the new textbook controversy.

The exigencies of responding to North Korea's military provocations affect both Japan and South Korea, and with the constant encouragement from the U.S., Japan-South Korea military cooperation has remained on the agenda and gradually made progress. Japanese Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with their South Korean counterpart Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee at the Shangri-la Dialogue in May 2009- the first ever trilateral meeting of these officials- and pledged a unified stance against North Korean provocations. MSDF officers for the first time observed U.S.-South Korea military exercises in July 2010 as a demonstration of trilateral unity in the wake of the *Cheonan* incident. South Korea Navy officers then participated as observers for the first time in U.S.-Japan large scale military exercises in December, again following in the wake of North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. In early 2011, Japan and South Korea considered signing an Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement (ACSA) along the lines of Japan's existing ACSAs with the U.S. and Australia, thus potentially deepening further security cooperation to the point of exchanging logistical supplies in UNPKO and humanitarian operations.

China

By contrast, Sino-Japanese security dialogue has not progressed so smoothly, even though the Japanese government has been attempting to engage China on a number of security concerns since the mid-1980s (Whiting 1989:132). In particular, bilateral security dialogue has been hampered by Japan's concern that China should increase the transparency of its military budget and capabilities and cease nuclear weapon

testing. Foreign Minister Aso openly referred to China as a potential threat in December 2005, and Japan's NDPG have progressively shifted from describing China in 2004 as an area of regional security which Japan 'should remain attentive', to in 2010 describing China's military modernisation as an 'issue of concern for regional and global society'.

Bilateral dialogue was interrupted in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square incident, and again following China's nuclear tests in 1995. Dialogue then restarted, but was again interrupted in January 2004, when China refused a Japanese proposal for exchange visits between the MSDF, and the People's Liberation army Navy due to tension over Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Japan-China military exchange resumed after Koizumi left office, with port calls by destroyers; and at one point in 2008 Japanese and Chinese governments even agreed that the ASDF might transport aid supplies to assist victims of the Sichuan earthquake – although nationalist popular sentiment in China forced this mission to be aborted, it would have been the first despatch of the Japanese military to the Chinese interior since the 1940s.

Japan-China security ties have been affected by territorial issues and maritime security. Japan noted with concern China's adoption of its 1992 Law on Territorial Waters that reasserted its claim to the Senkaku Islands. Japan and China have attempted to play down bilateral tensions over the Senkakus, but it has proved to be a sensitive issue, with highly publicised incidents of domestic groups on both sides attempting to demonstrate sovereignty over the islands in 1996 and 2004. Japan has also been concerned over the large number of survey missions that the Chinese government has sent into the Senkaku Islands area and Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to search for gas.

In November 2004, the potential for maritime security to exacerbate tensions was evidenced by Japan's detection of the incursions into its waters of a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine. Japan's protest to China drew an apology that the submarine had

accidently veered off course, though concerns remained in Japan regarding whether this was an 'accident'. MSDF P-3C surveillance aircraft in September 2005 spotted five Chinese vessels, including one of its most advanced Soveremenny-class destroyers designed to attack aircraft carriers, sailing near the disputed gas fields in the East China Sea. A Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced close to the aircraft carrier USS *Kitty Hawk* in international waters close to Okinawa in October 2006. Four Chinese naval ships, including a Soveremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido in October 2008, before heading into the Pacific and returning to China via the route between Okinawa and Miyako. In April 2010, China sent a squadron of ten ships deep into the East China Sea, passing in international waters between Okinawa and Miyako and conducting helicopter and refuelling exercises west of Okinotorishima. The MSDF revealed that in the course of observing the Chinese squadron its destroyers were buzzed by Chinese naval helicopters. Then Japan-China maritime tensions intensified with the trawler incident around the Senkakus. Hence, even though Japan has a vital interest in the engagement of China, there are a number of security tensions building in the bilateral relationship.

Strategic Partnership with U.S, Australia and India

Japan has also begun to forge security links to complement its alliance with the U.S.. Japan and Australia have been engaged in low-key security cooperation since the 1970s, but stepped up bilateral ties in the late 1990s, and especially in the wake of 9/11 with the deployment of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to protect GSDF in Iraq (Ball, 2006). Japan's intention has been both to strengthen bilateral links with Australia and also to embed them within the wider structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. regional security ties. In May 2005 Japan, the U.S. and Australia established an annual Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD), running in parallel with efforts to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) process. Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe appeared to see the TSD as an important means of mobilising the three key democracies in the region in order

to counter China's rise. The two were also keen to forge a 'Strategic and Global Partnership' with India, including cooperation on maritime security, and Abe was receptive to attempts by the Bush administration to develop quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, U.S., Australia and India (Tanaka, 2008:35-37). The four plus Singapore held joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. Four-way cooperation has not advanced as rapidly since 2007 due to Fukuda's caution, lest Japan be seen as trying to contain China. However, bilateral security ties between Japan and Australia have progressed with the signing in March 2007 of a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JADSC). The JADSC stresses broad cooperation on issues such as WMD proliferation, as well as more direct military cooperation, including in peacekeeping, defence exchanges, search and rescue and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In June 2007, Japan and Australia established their own '2+2' foreign-and defence ministers dialogue to mirror the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), and concluded a 'Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership' in June the following year. Military cooperation is limited, however, by Japan's constitutional restrictions, and because the ASEAN Defence Forum (ADF) is over stretched in meeting its commitments (Bisley, 2008:38-52). Nevertheless, Japan and Australia have scope for building cooperation through sharing intelligence in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, PSI and anti-piracy activities, and Australia's provision of a satellite ground station at Lansdale, Western Australia, to support Japanese Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) capabilities. Japan and Australia are also bound together through their integration into U.S. global and regional strategy for missile defence, with Australia providing relay ground stations at Pine Gap in the Northern Territory to feed launch-detection data from U.S. satellites to Japan.

On October 22 2008, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Taro Aso signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. This is a historic document in that Japan has such arrangements only with Australia and the U.S. (Kesavan, 2010:14-15). One significant aspect of the Declaration is the emphasis placed on the need for bilateral policy coordination in regional affairs, as well as

bilateral cooperation within multilateral fora in Asia such as the EAS, ARF and ReCAPP. The Declaration essentially seeks to build on the existing tempo in defence ties, while attempting to broaden the framework with a view to influencing the emerging security architecture.

Japan and multilateral security in Asia Pacific

During the Cold War period the East Asia region was characterised predominantly by bilateral security arrangements, but in the post Cold War period the necessary conditions have begun to emerge for the initiation of multilateral security dialogue. Gorbachev's 1988 proposal and followed by separate proposals from the foreign ministers of Canada and Australia in 1990 for the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, modelled on the example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The major military powers in East Asia were at first against any proposals for multilateral security arrangements. The U.S. viewed multilateral security arrangements as ineffective in the region, preferring its bilaterally based 'hubs and spokes system'; and China was concerned that multilateral discussion of issues such as Spratly Islands in the South China Sea might undermine its claims to exclusive territorial sovereignty. ASEAN was also concerned that any region wide multilateral security arrangement might weaken its legitimacy and overshadow it. Japan's position was similar to that of the U.S.: namely, it was concerned that any multilateral arrangement might undermine the bilateral security frameworks in the region which had seemingly been so successful in ensuring stability in the past (Leifer 1996:16-20, 23-4, 37-8; Nishihara 1994:63-5). Thus, in July 1990 Prime Minister Kaifu stated that it was too early for any type of multilateral security arrangement in the region.

Nevertheless, by June 1991 the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) had begun to consider proposals that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) be used as forum for multilateral dialogue in the region, concerned as they were to consider some security framework in the region

which could hedge against any possible decline in U.S. military commitment to the region, or the growing military assertiveness of China. Japanese policy makers also moved towards acceptance of the principle of multilateral dialogue following Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 and then the eventual breakup of the USSR in December 1991, both of which indicated the possibility of an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations and signalled that the USSR and Russia no longer posed an effective threat to the bilateral alliance with the U.S.. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro launched an initiative at the July 1991 ASEAN-PMC, proposing that in future the meeting should become 'a forum for political dialogue... designed to improve the sense of mutual security' amongst East Asian states. Nakayama's proposal was at first greeted coolly by the ASEAN states, but it succeeded in helping to move the U.S. towards first official acceptance of the principle of multilateral dialogue by 1993, and, along with the 1991 ASEAN-ISIS proposals, became the basis for the agreement to create the ARF in July 1993. Since 1994, the ARF has met annually after each ASEAN-PMC. It is committed to a three stage evolution: from confidence-building measures, to preventive diplomacy, to conflict resolution; it also takes an evolutionary approach, stating that progress from one stage to the next is dependent upon securing the consensus of all ARF members. The ARF inter-governmental process is also supported by a track two process (that is, involving non-governmental as well as governmental representatives) of contacts between academics and government officials from across the region in bodies such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). By 2004, membership had grown to encompass the ASEAN-10, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, Russia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the U.S. China dropped its objection to the ARF in order to influence the process from within and has attended all the ARF meetings since 1994. As of 2004, the stage of preventive diplomacy had not blocked by China's reluctance to accept the working definitions of preventive diplomacy.

Japan has taken a full role in both the inception and the running of the ARF since the Nakayama proposal in 1991. The concept of the ARF is an attractive one for Japan

because it espouses cooperative security based on attempts to build up a structure of peaceful relations amongst its members that are neither confrontational nor coercive, and does not designate any specific threat. Cooperative security emphasises security with rather than against other members, and political and diplomatic more than military means (Kamiya 1997: 23-4). In addition, it does not demand any type of formal commitment to defend other members as with a collective security arrangement. Thus, Japan's participation in the ARF does not clash with its anti militarist norms and constitutional prohibitions, or with its attachment to bilateralism and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, yet it provides a political and diplomatic multilateral avenue for it to contribute to the region's security. As a consequence, MOFA and JDA officials have taken part in ARF senior officials meetings and inter-sessional meetings on peacekeeping held prior to the ARF working sessions themselves, and co-chaired with Indonesia in 1997 inter- sessional support groups on confidence building measures. Japanese academic and policy makers have also taken part and heavily funded the CSCAP process (Dobson 1999a; Hughes 2004a: 197-8).

Meanwhile, in a separate process from the ARF, the JDA since 1996 has hosted the Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia Pacific Region, involving bureau chief level officials from across East Asia. The SDF has hosted a number of seminars for military officers since the mid 1990s, including the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), held in Japan in 2000 and 2002 respectively. The National Defense Academy has hosted an international cadets' conference since 1998, and the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) has held the Asia Pacific Security Seminar since 1994. In 1997, the Japanese government first put forward the concept of six-party dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, later realised by U.S. initiatives in 2003, with Japan as a full participant. Since 2002, Japan has actively backed the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)'s Asia Security Conference, or 'Shangri-la Dialogue'. This provides a new venue for defence minister level discussions; in 2002, then JDA Director General, Nakatani Gen even suggested that it be converted into a formal Asia Pacific Defense Ministerial Meeting to compliment the largely foreign ministry

centred ARF. Japan has backed multilateral security cooperation in a number of other frameworks with less traditional security or border functions. From 1995, Japan has been a key partner, alongside the U.S., South Korea, the EU and a number of ASEAN and Asia Pacific states, in Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), pledging up to U.S.$ 1 billion for the construction of light water reactors to help eliminate North Korea's nuclear crisis. In addition, Japan has utilised Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a forum not originally designed for security purposes, as a forum to discuss issues such as North Korea's missiles.

Japan's support for the ARF and other multilateral security dialogue bodies is certainly an important development in its security policy within the region, but nevertheless clear limits exist as to how far it is prepared to commit itself to multilateral security frameworks and to depart from its adherence to the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance (Hughes and Fukushima 2003). The first consideration is that, even though Japan has been influential in persuading the U.S. to back multilateral security dialogue in the region and has taken a rare diplomatic lead over the U.S. in the instance of the ARF, it has only ever been able to contemplate multilateral security dialogue in the knowledge that the ARF and other multilateral dialogue processes in no way function to supplant but only to supplement the existing bilateral relationship with the U.S. (Hook 1998:182). The second consideration is that Japanese policy makers in the JDA and MOFA perceive the ARF to have only a limited use in ensuring security in the region. This is because the ARF is purely a forum for cooperative dialogue rather than any type of collective security action, and owing to Chinese objections has a limited mandate to discuss such pressing security issues as the Spratly Islands and Taiwan (Yamakage 1997: 302, Yuzawa 2005). The third and related consideration is that Japanese policy making agents remain wedded to the norm of bilateralism and the U.S.-Japan security treaty as the foundation of Japan's security. In part, this is due to U.S. pressure on Japan not to expand its role in multilateral security bodies: the attempts by the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense in 1994 to prioritise multilateral security arrangements over the U.S.-Japan alliance were quashed U.S. objections. More importantly, however, security concerns

surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have reaffirmed for Japanese policy makers the indispensability of the bilateral security treaty for Japan's security. Their principal diplomatic efforts and contribution to Asia Pacific security have thus been devoted to shoring up the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. military presence in the region.

United States-Japan alliance and regional security

Japan's initial integration into the U.S. bilateral alliance system in East Asia was occasioned by the twin crisis of the Korean War and the Taiwan Straits. In the mid 1990s, the re-emergence of crisis situations on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits once again led to Japan's further integration into the U.S. alliance system in the region. In the early post-Cold War period the U.S. commitment to the bilateral alliance with Japan was seen to be threatened by disputes over trade, Japan's perceived reluctance to make a 'human contribution' to the 1990-91 Gulf War and uncertainty over the future status of U.S. bases in Okinawa – all of which seemed to augur for Japan's possible move away from exclusive dependence upon the U.S. in matters of security. In turn, the events of the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 were to compound the concerns in the minds of Japanese policy makers about the future viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Under Article VI of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan is obligated, after prior consultation with the U.S., to provide to it bases to be used for the maintenance of security in the region, which according to the Japanese government's own 1960 definition included South Korea. In the run-up to the nuclear crisis in mid 1994, the U.S.'s natural expectations was that in a new Korean conflict it would be able to reinforce its military presence in South Korea with the despatch of military forces from bases in Japan. The Japanese government was uncomfortable with the prospect of even this indirect involvement in another Korean War, but as the nuclear crisis escalated it also began to receive U.S. requests for more active and direct support for the U.S. military position in South Korea. Specifically, the U.S. asked the Japanese government to provide various forms of rear-end logistical support such as intelligence gathering, facilities for the repair of U.S. warships in Japan and the use by the U.S. military of Japanese civilian harbours and

airports. In addition, the U.S. military appealed for SDF participation in a naval blockade of North Korea and for the despatch of MSDF minesweepers to Korean waters (Hughes 1999:93-6; George Mulgan 1997: 148).

The Japanese government, however, was unable to respond effectively to U.S. requests for assistance. The 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation had not produced sufficient research on plans for Japan to support the U.S. in the event of an emergency situation in East Asia, and concerns were raised among policy makers that any direct involvement in Korean Peninsula security could contravene constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of the right of collective self defence. Therefore, the Japanese government was forced to communicate to the U.S. government that, although it was prepared to allow U.S. forces to use bases in Japan to support or participate in blockade and minesweeping operations. Japanese policy makers were aware that their response would appear inadequate to their U.S. counterparts, and feared that, as in the Gulf War, U.S. opinion would begin to question the value of an alliance under which Japan enjoyed the benefits of U.S. protection, but in return was seemingly unable even to contribute to rear end logistical operations to support its ally's forces engaged in a conflict close to Japan and with implications for Japan's own security (Hughes 1999:94-5). Fortunately, the North Korea nuclear crisis was averted by the diplomatic intervention of ex-U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and Japan's resolve to support its ally during a military contingency in the East Asia region was not fully tested. Nevertheless, the crisis did induce considerable political trauma in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and raised questions in the minds of U.S. and Japanese policy makers to this Korean Peninsula crisis, informed by their bilateral norms, was to look to restore confidence in the alliance as the foundation of Japan's security in much the same way as the time of the Korean War in 1950. This was carried out by the issuing of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, and then the conduct of research into and the passing of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in May 1999.

In conjunction with the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the other crisis which worked to reintegrate Japan into the U.S. bilateral alliance system in East Asia was that of the Taiwan Straits in March 1996. As noted above, Japanese policy makers along with those of many other states in the region have become increasingly concerned in the post-Cold War period by the rising military power of China. In particular, Japan has been concerned about China's nuclear testing and export of missile technology and the fact that the modernisation of its military forces means that with even a small blue water naval capacity it can disrupt Japan's SLOCs in the South China Sea. To some extend, Japanese concerns about China's military intentions were confirmed by its military intimidation of Taiwan with missile tests and military exercises in the run up to the presidential elections on the island in March 1996, which drew the response from the U.S. of the despatch of the aircraft carrier USS *Independence* based in Japan to the Taiwan. This crisis demonstrated to Japanese policy making agents the potential threat that China's expanding military power could pose to East Asian security, and the possibility of renewed Sino-U.S. conflict over the Taiwan issue in the post-Cold War period. Japanese policy makers have remained conscious of the risks of being dragged into a Sino-U.S. conflict owing to Japan's position as the provider of bases for the U.S. employ in the defence of Taiwan. Above all, however, the crisis in 1996 reinforced for them the continuing need to hedge against any future Chinese military threat by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region, thus creating further momentum for the review of the Guidelines.

The impact of the North Korean and Taiwan Straits security crisis was, then, to persuade Japanese policy makers in MOFA, the JDA and political parties to prioritise the strengthening of Japan's bilateral security links with the U.S. rather than the development of its multilateral links with the other states of the region. The subsequent effect of Japan's reconfirmation and redefinition of its bilateral links with the U.S. was to create new triangular patters of security interaction amongst Japan, South Korea and the U.S., as well as amongst Japan, China and the U.S., which have made for cooperation and conflict respectively. In tandem with the strengthening of

the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deal with any security contingency involving North Korea, Japan and South Korea stepped up their bilateral cooperation and U.S.-Japan-South Korea interaction has also created new frameworks for security cooperation. The degree of actual Japan-South Korea security cooperation even within a trilateral forum involving the U.S., necessarily continues to be limited by the legacy of colonialism, South Korean opposition to Japan playing any direct role in Korean Peninsula security such as the despatch of the SDF, and Japanese constitutional prohibitions on collective self defence. Still, as well as diplomatic consultation between the three states at trilateral summits and at international summits such as APEC, since 1997 quite regular JDA-ROK Ministry of Defense - U.S. Department of Defense discussions have taken place, and since 1999 the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) was initiated. This Japan-U.S.-South Korea interaction was further reinforced by the second nuclear crisis in 2002, which again reminded Japan of the need for tightened diplomatic and military cooperation with the U.S. and its allies.

With regard to Sino-Japanese security interaction, the outcome of the revised Guidelines was to increase security tension to some degree. The most controversial item in the revised Guidelines bill passed in May 1999 was the definition of *shuhen*, or the range of action of U.S.-Japan security cooperation under the Guidelines, as situational rather than geographical in nature. This represented an attempt by the Japanese government to move away from its 1960 definition of the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty as broadly geographical in nature and including the area north of the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. This shift in emphasis from geographical to situational carried to apparent advantages for Japanese security planners. First, it allowed the government, when required (based on the concept of situational need), to expand the range of action of the U.S.-Japan alliance beyond the traditional geographical limits of East Asia and the security treaty as defined in 1960, and to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region as envisaged in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration. Second, the concept of situational need introduced for Japanese policy makers a valuable element of strategic ambiguity into the coverage of the U.S.-Japan

security treaty. If offered the particular advantage of leaving vague the position of China as an object of Guidelines. In line with the 1960 definition of the Far East, Taiwan is covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and the events of 1996 demonstrated that China-Taiwan tensions are still a major concern for U.S.-Japan alliance. However, the policy of the U.S. and Japan appears to be hedge against possible military contingency involving China as a threat for fear of antagonising it and endangering the general policy of engagement. The concept of situational need seems to be ideally designed for this policy as it enables the U.S. and Japan to de-emphasise the clear-cut geographical specification of Taiwan as part of *shuhen* and a concern of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the Guidelines, but at the same time retains for the alliance the option to operate in the Taiwan Straits if necessary. However, China was clearly not convinced by the obfuscating language of the revised Guidelines and continually denounced them as an attempt to interfere in internal Chinese politics between the mainland and Taiwan. Moreover, the Chinese government became concerned that Japan's participation in the BMD programme was designed as a means to negate China's nuclear deterrent and ballistic missiles in any further conflict over the Taiwan Straits, further raising Chinese suspicions that Japan might assist the U.S. to enable Taiwan to declare its independence. The result was a general rise in Sino-Japanese security tensions following the initiation of the Guidelines review, although both sides worked to alleviate tensions by cooperating on political and economic issues, and other non-traditional security issues.

Japan and the U.S. have continued to quietly strengthen their alliance to deal with China in the new century. The DPRI process in February 2005, much to China's dissatisfaction, identified Taiwan as a common strategic objective of the alliance. Japan in September 2010 was successful in extracting guarantees from the U.S. that the bilateral security treaty covered the Senkaku Islands, and as early 2011it appears that Japanese and the U.S. policy makers may be preparing to embark on a new revision of the Defense Guidelines to concentrate on maritime security, clearly triggered by Japan-China tensions at the end of 2010.

Japanese economic power and security policy moves

It is not the case that Japan's only contribution to Asia Pacific security has been and continues to be via military means. Japan's conception of security in region also extends to include non-military and economic aspects, as derived from the norm of developmentalism and the belief that economic progress and interdependence can become ultimate guarantors of peace and security. Consequently, it is in this area of security that it is possible to view Japan as more directly engaged with the region. In particular, the East Asian financial crisis and the problems of social degradation and environmental destruction that it has triggered have produced a 'human security' agenda, which can only be addressed effectively by the extension of economic power. Japanese policy makers were criticised for their slow response to the economic problems arising from the East Asian financial crisis, but responded to the security problems it engendered with the announcement by Prime Minister Obuchi at the Japan-ASEAN summit in Hanoi in December 1998 of its first initiative on human security. Under this initiative Japan emphasised that its financial aid to the region would be devoted not just to economic restructuring but also to meeting the food and medical needs of the crisis hit populations of the region (JCIE and ISEAS 1998). Hence in contrast to the IMF austerity packages imposed on the region, the New Miyazawa Initiative allocated U.S.$ 150 million for assistance to the poverty relief in Indonesia and 750,000 tons of food aid. Japan's human security concerns have also extended to the problem of dealing with narcotics production in the region, providing from its Trust Fund for Human Security for public health care and drug demand reduction in the Wa Special Region of Burma. Japan's economic power approach to security in the region extends to conflict prevention and resolution. In December 2002 the Japanese government unveiled a Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao, designed to address the insurgency issue in this part of the Philippines by tackling the poverty that generates terrorism.

Japan's non traditional security agenda in the region further stretches into the issues of water resources, energy security, health and the environment. Japan in 1999 disbursed a total of U.S. $ 794 million to drinking water projects in East Asia and

Africa, concentrating on water management in China and the Mekong Basin. Since 2002 METI has sponsored regional discussions on energy stockpiling to prevent disruption in the case of oil price rises. Japan in addition to its financial support for measures to deal with HIV/AIDS via the mechanism of the G8 has provided support from its Trust Fund for Human Security for the treatment of these diseases in Thailand. Japan furthermore used the fund to dispatch Japan Disaster Response Teams (JDRT) and medical assistance to Vietnam, China and Taiwan to deal with the SARS outbreak in 2003. Japan has also contributed strongly to ad hoc multilateral humanitarian efforts, such as the relief operations following the 2004 Asian Tsunami. Japan's despatch of the GSDF operating from MSDF ships was actually its largest military overseas despatch in terms of numbers of personnel in the post-war period. Japan is additionally working closely with the U.S. on its Pacific Partnership programme, with the MSDF in 2010 cooperating with NGOs to provide medical treatment in Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, despite the gloomy picture of Japan-China interaction in the military sphere, there have been more hopeful signs of cooperation in the non-traditional security area of Environmental Protection Agreement and METI began the transfer of clean coal technologies to China. Japan established the U.S.$100 million Centre for Sino-Japanese Friendship and Environmental Protection in Beijing in 1996, and in 1997 the Japan-China summit produced an agreement on Environmental Cooperation towards the Twenty First Century, both designed to expand bilateral exchanges of experts and technology to deal with environmental pollution. Japan in March 1998 hosted the meeting which then agreed to establish the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), with the Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Centre in Niigata designed as the Network Centre for EANET (Hughes 2004a: 226-33).

Even though Japan has made major progress in overcoming the structural barriers-of the colonial past, national division and bipolarity- to interaction with the states of Asia Pacific in the post cold war era, its military security ties remain predominantly

with the U.S. as in 1952. However, the continuing lack of multilateral military security links with Asia Pacific has, at the same time, obliged Japan to pursue an innovative and often highly effective security policy based on economic power and oriented to the new post Cold War challenges of human security.

Chapter

CONCLUSION

Japan since the end of Cold War, more precisely from 2001 onwards, changed its approach towards military and strategic affairs. Although the economy had to be remodelled since the bubble burst, but its strategic power had to be organised from ground up. Step by step, Japan began undoing its Cold War strategy and constructing a new one to fit the still emerging geopolitical order in the region and the world. First, it ended the Yoshida Doctrine's prohibition against overseas dispatch of Japanese forces. Sending its SDF in peacekeeping operations became accepted practice, causing little stir at home. In 2002, restrictions on the scope of these missions were quietly eased to permit more dangerous functions, including patrol of cease fire zones and disposal of weapons.

Second, the narrow interpretation of the constitution banning participation in collective self-defence was steadily eased to accommodate a greater cooperative role within the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Japan moved to closer bilateral military cooperation with the United States, deployment of Japanese forces to Afghanistan and Iraq was handled legislatively on a case by case basis, but there was growing support in the Diet for a reinterpretation of Article 9 to give participation in collective self-defence explicit legal justification.

Third, a readiness to acquire power projection capability marked a further change from its self proclaimed defence restrictions. Japan purchased Boeing 767 in flight refuelling tanker and acquired proto-type aircraft carriers, in this case to carry helicopters. The Japanese had not possessed aircraft carriers since 1945. In the interim, defence capability had been limited to the minimum necessary to defend the home islands. Now, a new interest in precision guided munitions and long range air transports to carry rapid reaction forces for overseas operations provided further evidence of an impending end to the long standing limit on military power. The steadfast avoidance of any commitment to regional security was replaced by a broadened geographical range of cooperation with the United States. This was dramatised by Japan's 2005 statement of strategic concern for peace and security of Taiwan (MOFA, Japan-U.S. Joint Statement, 2005).

Fourth, although the prohibition on possession of nuclear weapons which the Prime Minister Sato enunciated in 1967 remained in place, it was no longer a restricted to discuss. In addition to keeping a close eye on North Korea's nuclear capability, Japan viewed Chinese nuclear weapons as threatening. Japan's conservative leaders have made no secret of the fact that they continue to study the nuclear option. It is speculated that Japan is likely to exercise this option only in the breakdown of U.S. alliance and credibility of its nuclear umbrella in future (Jithin S George, 73-74).

Fifth, the self binding prohibition on the sharing of military technology and the export of arms that had been in place since 1976 was set to be breached. In a 2003 decision, Japan announced it would procure a BMD from the United States and explore joint development of more advanced BMD technology. This decision was momentous because it would require tighter alliance cooperation, including the two-way sharing of information and technology, to develop the system. North Korean nuclear and missile development, concern for China's military advances, and Japanese business interests all played a role in prodding the allies to take this unusual step. In 2004, Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Business) urged Japan's leaders to lay aside the self imposed restraint on the exports of arms and the sharing of military technology so that Japan could keep abreast of technological progress and open up new markets. Nakasone had allowed sharing of technology with the United States in 1983, but the agreement had never worked well and had never been expanded. Japan's defence industries were also poised to join with their U.S. counterparts in the development of airborne lasers and other ambitious technologies.

Sixth, Japan's defence budget remained officially at less than 1 percent of GDP, but it has long been recognised that the way in which the government organises its budget and reports its defence spending masks the actual level of expenditures. The budget leaves out items that in Europe, for example, would have been included, increasing the percentage. Furthermore, Japan's practice of deferring payment for major arms procurement over a five year period, and the long lead-in times for new weapons systems, helped Japan

manage the costs of its military spending (Christopher Hughes(2004b) 78-79). In any case, Japan's military spending is actually estimated to be the sixth in the world (SIPRI, 2009). The extent of public debt in Japan will for the time being militate against sharp increases, but spending in being directed more and more toward new technologies and away from the hardware of the Cold War period.

Keeping these trends in focus, following hypothesis was formulated:

- H1 Japan in order to be more forceful in the coming years will be expanding the scope of its SDF.
- H2 Authority of civilian bureaucracy over uniformed officers has still persisted despite Japan's remilitarisation hedging.
- H3 Incremental expansion of SDF will lead to strategic consequences in the Asia Pacific region.

In the course of this study, the above mentioned hypotheses have been used as tools to critically asses the SDF from 2001 to 2009. Moreover, in the latter part of this chapter the veracity of a 'normal' SDF is made. After taking into consideration the factual data and compilation of facts and figures, this work concludes by proving each hypothesis in the following arguments.

H1 Japan in order to be more forceful in the coming years will be expanding the scope of its SDF.

It is clear that the areas of high capability include the MSDF, and areas of the ASDF. The GSDF does not have the high level of capability of the other services, but the Ministry of Defense is certainly working to improve the ability of the GSDF to defend the homeland and to improve its overall readiness through training and limited participation in international operations. The MSDF is as capable as any other militaries in the world (outside the U.S.), and the focus of the MOD on increasing their capabilities will continue this trend in the future. The ASDF is attempting to address some of its technological issues with the acquisition of future generation fight aircraft, but obviously faces obstacles. The ASDF has also acquired the capability to improve its power

projection capability through logistical and personnel transport and aerial refueling. As these systems come online and are proven, the ASDF's level of capability should increase. So thus, Japan in order to be more forceful in the coming years, will be expanding the scope and capabilities of its SDF.

H2 Authority of civilian bureaucracy over uniformed officers has still persisted despite Japan's remilitarisation hedging.

While in Civil Military relations since 2007, when Defense Ministry came into existence, people have given legitimacy in the use of SDF as an instrument of Japan's foreign policy. Although military officials are not empowered to make defence policy by themselves or decide the SDF's overseas dispatch on their own, but they have increased their influence due to expanded roles and missions such as overseas dispatch and defence cooperation with United States troops. As a result, the SDF became an important player in defence policy decision-making, which in turn enhanced the status of the Defense Agency within a domestic context. In other words, the military has become proud and more confident of its missions and demand "objective civilian control." As seen in this study, the influence of military over civilian decision making structure has been observed in Budget Compilation, Personnel Management, and the 1976, 1995, and 2004 National Defense Program Outline. Given the remilitarising Asia, the influence of military will certainly grow in the times to come.

H3 Incremental expansion of SDF will lead to strategic consequences in the Asia Pacific region.

Japan has managed largely to overcome post war international structural barriers-bipolarity, legacy of colonialism, national division, fragmented political economy-to interaction with China, the Korean Peninsula and the ASEAN states. Japanese policy-making agents have been motivated in this regionalist project by a mix of norms. Bilateralism and anti-militarism have played a significant role, but it has been developmentalism and Asianism which have most consistently driven Japan's policy forward. These have emerged as the dominant norms in its Asia Pacific region. Japan's pursuit of these developmental and Asianist norms has been instrumentalised by a

process of long term and quiet diplomacy–probing the limits of U.S. bipolarity and the international structure-and characterised by the application of economic power, with a greater degree of pro-activity at the beginning of the twenty first century. As a result of Japan's policy, the groundwork has been laid for improved bilateral relations between Japan and its Asia Pacific neighbours; to promote the integration of all the Asia Pacific states in such a way that it is now possible for them to consider the construction of region-wide political, economic and security frameworks in the post-Cold War period; and for Japan to reach the point where it is now considered by some states as an appropriate leader or one of the leaders of the region. Hence in this period, Japan has assumed a pivotal role, whether behind the scene or by more overt diplomatic initiatives, in the creation of nascent regional institutions.

Is the SDF a normal military?

The reason this question is frequently debated in Asian security affairs is that it has no simple answer. National security issues in Japan are complex by nature because of Japan's imperialist history, the effect of World War II, its pacifist constitution and society, and its strategic alliance with the U.S. The role the SDF plays in international affairs is not normal, but it is slowly changing. The restrictions and constraints the SDF faces in defending its homeland are not normal, but its ability to conduct this defence (with the aid of the U.S.) certainly can be considered normal. The capabilities of the SDF are normal in many areas or even exceptional, but their combination of limitations and potential capabilities is quite abnormal. These three areas give a better understanding of what the SDF is, but whether it is normal or not will continue to be up for debate.

The SDF has taken part in many peacekeeping and humanitarian aid/disaster relief operations over the last two decades. Its participation may have been limited in number at times, but the support it provided was as necessary to the missions as that provided by any other military. Whether the support took the form of electoral or military observers, engineering, transportation, minesweeping, or staff officers, the SDF's participation was in line with what militaries from other nations were providing at the time. Since United Nations operations are by design post conflict, the restrictions the SDF would have in a

combat environment did not apply. The SDF could participate fully and equally with its counterparts from other nations. This support will undoubtedly continue in the future and will most likely increase as Japan seeks to gain prestige in international security operations commensurate with its economic status.

SDF participation in UN operations may lead one to believe it is a completely normal military. But its participation in Samawah, Iraq, suggests that the GSDF is very abnormal. What other military in a combat environment has rules of engagement and constraints on its actions so strict that it must be provided physical security by another international security force? Of course, simply participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom was a major step for the GSDF, but it was certainly not the action of a normal military. The GSDF has evolved greatly in the last two decades. Are the limitations imposed on it during Operation Iraqi Freedom part of this evolution, and will they eventually participate in future combat operations side-by-side with other militaries? The answer to that is unknown, but it is found that this prospect unlikely in the immediate future. Taking part in international security operations satisfies the needs of Japan's leadership, while also producing pride in its society as whole. Participating in combat operations is still very contentious and unlikely to become less so soon. As a member of the UN, Japan will not be called on to participate in combat operations like Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. Japan is on the outside looking in at other international institutions that might request this type of participation from SDF in the future that is, institutions like NATO, or, potentially, ASEAN.

The SDF has the ability to defend its homeland from external threats. Its ability to conduct this defence varies just like it does for any other military in the world. When combining all of its capabilities with its limitations, the SDF is quite normal—but some of its methods of defence are abnormal. For example, the MSDF has proven its capability in surveillance, detection, tracking, and deterrence missions in Japanese territorial waters, as described in the 2nd chapter. It has the naval structure, capacity, and experience to challenge any enemy naval force that enters its area of influence. This is not to say the

MSDF will conduct all-out naval battles with China or the U.S, but it does have the capability to deter China or North Korea from probing too aggressively in the areas surrounding Japan. The ASDF has the capability to detect and deter enemy aircraft from probing Japanese airspace, as Lind details in her description of the ASDF. The future capability of the ASDF is deteriorating as its aging F-2 and F-15 fighters fall further behind technologically superior potential enemy aircraft. Japan recognises this future limitation, but is struggling to find a solution. If it fails to remedy this problem, Japan may face a troubling capability gap. The GSDF is not as prepared to defend Japan's homeland as it needs to be. For example, the geographic layout of the overall force is still structured to respond to Cold War era threats. Also, the CRF within the GSDF is young, inexperienced, and still developing, and would most likely not respond well to a ground invasion of Japan. Although the GSDF is lacking in both these areas, the MOD recognises these limitations and is working on solutions. And when the MOD recognises changes that need to be made, as with the need for a BMD system or to restructure the GSDF, it finds a way to enact policy change to better respond to Japan's current and future threats. In its ability to defend the homeland, Japan is quite normal. Japan also has its strategic relationship with the U.S. as an additional layer of defence. Japan does not feel the need to develop a nuclear capability because it falls under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. Some may find this to be an abnormal quality of Japan and the SDF, but Japan is certainly not alone in receiving protection from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Western Europe, South Korea, Taiwan, to name a few, fall under U.S. nuclear protection, and the normalcy of the French, German, ROK, or British militaries are never questioned.

Another area where the SDF is abnormal is in its power projection capability. With the money it spends on defence, combined with its overall technological capacity, its limitations in projecting power are abnormal. But this inability to project power outside Japanese territorial is perfectly in line with its pacifist nature. Even though limited power projection compliments the pacifist nature of Japan, the leadership in Japan recognises this security gap and is finding ways to alleviate the issue. As described earlier, the ASDF has acquired Boeing 767 Tanker, which will provide long-range transport for personnel and equipment, as well as in-air refuelling for ASDF aircraft. Even where the

SDF's abnormalities are logical for Japan, its defence leadership has recognised this and is attempting eliminate the issue.

The SDF will likely be considered abnormal for the foreseeable future, as long as Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution remains and strict limitations are placed on various SDF operations. But many aspects of the SDF are reputable defence forces and further capabilities are being developed and enhanced. Even if the SDF is not normal now, it is becoming more normal every day.

Constant speculations and fears are palpable when Japan takes step towards augmenting its security forces. Sometimes it is euphemistically termed as Japan Remilitarising, but if one widens the focus from Japan to Asia, it can be observed that Asian countries as India and China are augmenting their security forces too and Japan's growth in those terms are miniscule qualitatively and quantitatively.

The scope of SDF will widen in future, so will the profile of military personnel in policy matters; this will further erode the impediments of article 9 and may result in amendment of the same.

The threat of ageing and population decline looms large on SDF as well. This will result in dearth of human resources and finally decline in the number of personnel. Although scope for robotic innovation and research will surge but still threats of ageing will bring ominous signs to the future of SDF.

SDF has evolved despite the constraints imposed upon Japan because of realities that confronted the international politics post second world war. Today, SDF is poised in an interesting junction. With end of Cold War, Japan has been forging newer partnerships and emerging a strong voice for Asia. Given these developments a stronger and robust role for SDF can be envisaged in the coming decades.

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APPENDIXES

(Appendix 1)

Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
China	160	United States	602.7	1,009	United States	3,470
India	113	Russia	210.9	986	Russia	2,160
North Korea	95	China	134.2	951	China	1,950
United States	66	United Kingdom	78.7	240	India	670
Republic of Korea	56	France	39.9	255	North Korea	590
Pakistan	55	India	35.0	158	Syria	560
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	25.4	205	Turkey	540
Turkey	40	Turkey	21.9	197	Republic of Korea	530
Russia	40	Germany	21.2	128	Taiwan	530
Myanmar	38	Taiwan	20.7	327	Egypt	530
Iran	35	Spain	19.6	110	Israel	470
Egypt	34	Republic of Korea	18.0	191	France	450
Colombia	24	Italy	17.7	173	Pakistan	400
Indonesia	23	Brazil	16.8	93	Brazil	390
Taiwan	20	Australia	15.9	82	Libya	380
Japan	14.1	Japan	44.9	14.9	Japan	430

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2009 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2009–2010 and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2009, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).

3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

(Appendix 2)
The Three Principles on Arms Export

The export of arms needs a licence from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)* and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

* Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' audit committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

(1) Communist Block countries
(2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolution
(3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' budget Committee meeting.

(Full Text)

(1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

(i) The export of "arms" to the area subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.

(ii) The export of "arms" to the area other that the area subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.

(iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109. etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms".

(2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

(i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No.205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.

(ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle". Such equipments as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc., for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms." Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No. 109" in (3) and "the items from No. 197 to No. 205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "Item No. 1"

(Appendix 3)

Changes in composition ratio of Defence related Expenditures (Original Budget basis)

Item	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Personnel and provisions	44.9	44.9	44.8	44.2	44.4	44.3	43.8	43.8	43.5
Materials	55.1	55.1	55.2	55.8	55.6	55.7	56.2	56.2	56.5
• **Equipment acquisition**	18.5	18.6	18.2	18.0	18.5	17.9	18.0	17.0	17.3
• **R&D**	2.7	2.6	3.0	3.5	2.7	3.6	3.0	3.6	2.5
• **Facility improvement**	3.2	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.8
• **Maintenance**	17.9	18.3	18.3	18.7	18.9	19.5	21.3	21.7	21.7
• **Base countermeasures**	10.7	10.5	10.4	10.4	10.2	10.1	9.6	9.5	9.2
• **The cost for SACO related** • **projects**	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.2
• **U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)**	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.4	1.3
• **Others**	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes:

1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010).
9. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

(Appendix 4)

The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(As of June 30, 2010)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	January 2004 –July 2006	About 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	June–September 2006	About 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	February 20 –April 8, 2004	About 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	December 2003 –February 2009	About 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	November 2001 –November 2007	About 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		—	• Transportation of materials

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	January 2008 –January 2010	About 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(4) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	September 1992 – September 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992 –September 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 –January 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 –January 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September–December 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September–December 1994	118		• Airlift member of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996 –February 2009	2	32	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
		February 2009–	3		
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	1,247	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance

[illegible]		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	November 1999 –February 2000	113		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001	138		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	February 2002 –June 2004	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
	Engineering unit	March 2002 –June 2004	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations • Civic assistance
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April 2003	50		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August 2003	98		• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	March 2007–	6	24	• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	October 2008–	2	8	• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	February 2010–	2		• Facilities related administrative planning coordination including deciding priorities for engineering activities for military and civilian departments in the MINUSTAH headquarters, and overall logistical planning for acquisition and shipping of materials for military departments
	Engineering unit	February 2010–	Approx. 350		• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).
2. And advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(5) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

[illegible]		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	Nov. 13–Dec. 9, 1998	80		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105		• Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc., between Japan and Honduras • Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of Materials for International Disaster Relief Activities Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	Sep.23–Nov. 22, 1999	426		• Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g., temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	Feb. 5–11, 2001	16		• Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		• Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake, tsunami)	Air transport unit	Dec. 30, 2003 –Jan. 6, 2004	31		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 28, 2004 –Jan. 1, 2005	590		• Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan. 6–Mar. 23, 2005	22		• Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with relevant organizations and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		• Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		• Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport and aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 5–10, 2005	346		• Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	Oct. 12–Dec. 2, 2005	147		• Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical support unit	Jun. 1–22, 2006	149		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Oct. 5–17, 2009	12		• Medical treatment
	Joint liaison office		21		• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Jan. 18–Feb. 16, 2010	104		• Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		97		• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Joint liaison office		33		• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Results of the Replenishment Activities

This report is being made based on the provisions of Article 7 of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, and the report to the Diet pertaining to replenishment activities based on the provisions of Article 3 of the same law. A summary of the report follows below.

1. Result of replenishment activities
    - MSDF vessels replenished military vessels of 8 foreign nations engaged in maritime anti-terrorist activities in the Indian Ocean from January 17, 2008 to January 15, 2010, providing fuel for ships, for helicopters based on those ships, and water. In all, 14 ships (including ships to escort the replenishment vessels) and approximately 2,400 crewmembers were assigned to the task.
      Ship fuel: Replenished 145 times, providing approximately 27,005 kiloliters
      Helicopter fuel: 18 times, approximately 210 kiloliters
      Water: 67 times, approximately 4,195 tons
    - Areas where replenishment was conducted
      Replenishment was conducted 122 times in Sea of Oman, 19 times in the North Arabian Sea, 3 times in the Gulf of Aden, once in Persian Gulf
    - Expenses of the activities
      The total expenses incurred for the replenishment were approximately ¥ 10.5 billion.
2. Evaluation of the replenishment activities
   (1) Evaluation of the replenishment activities
    - Confirmed the reliability of MSDF replenishment technology.
    - Know-how and understanding of all types of tasks were accumulated and shared, improving capability to conduct maritime replenishment over the long term.

   (2) Note for the future
    - When implementing international peace cooperation activities in the future, it is necessary to examine constancy and appropriate response pertaining to international cooperation, while utilising JSDF capabilities and technology.
    - Full implementation of information collection capabilities pertaining to local situations, etc., and fundamental training and equipments are necessary.
    - It is necessary to consider measure for the welfare and mental health of the crew members and their families left behind.

GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (expired July 31, 2009), and Their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities From February 2004–July 2006	○ Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital • Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy • Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ○ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ○ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses	Medical technique support provided a total of 277 times	★ Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★ Improved ability of emergency medical services
Water Supply Activities From March 2004 –July 2006	○ Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp Water supply activities by GSDF completed with start-up of water purification facilities installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people	★ Stable access to clean water made possible
Public Facility Restoration and Construction From March 2004 –July 2006	○ Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits, and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province	Completion of 36 facilities	★ Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improved educational environment
	○ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life
	○ Repair works for other facilities • Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) • Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah • Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha • Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium, and other cultural facilities	Completion of 66 facilities	★ Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local Employment	○ Local business mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ○ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

(Appendix 5)

"Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues" (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009)

Outline of the survey: Period: January 15–25, 2009
Respondents: 3,000 people aged 20 years or over throughout Japan
Valid responses (rate): 1,781 (59.4%)
Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel
For details, refer to <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-bouei/index.html>

1. Interest in the SDF and defense issues



Note 1: Total of "very interested" and "somewhat interested" until the survey of November 1984.

2. Impression about the SDF



Notes: 1. Total of "good impression" and "not bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.
2. Total of "not good impression" and "bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.

3. Anti-piracy measures



4. Necessity of education to nurture feelings of defending the country