

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGIES OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES
1991-2010**

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
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DECLARATION


This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "A Comparative Study of National Security Strategies of Russia and the United States" (1991-2010) submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.



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CERTIFICATE

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Dedicated

to

My Family

of those who have contributed to build this significant discipline

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
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Mistakes and omissions are, of course, my responsibility.

Date:

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Rajesh Kumar Dija

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The world of twentieth century no longer exists. The nation-states are confronting with a globalized and more unpredictable world with multidimensional threats. The national security concept of the Cold War period has now extended to new dimensions. This does not confine itself only to military threat perceptions. Various new types of dilemma and problems have pushed their way onto the national security agenda. However, this is not the end; many others are bound to arrive in future also.

Hence, the operative definition of security itself must change from an essentially static concept to a dynamic one. As a result, now every nation state requires a strategic policy formulation process for its management of national interests by means of designing a high-quality national security strategy. In view of that, Lord Palmerston's words are still in great currency. In 1848, he stated, "we have no eternal allies or perpetual allies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow". However, interests are not devoid of values that must inspire and unify the whole nation.

Thus, national security strategy (NSS) of a nation-state holds the bedrocks of values and interests; both are complementary. It contains the capacity to define, defend, and advance the interests and values of a state. In fact, much of what questionably qualifies as theory is strategy or more accurately grand strategy that could be defined as the integration of military, political, and economic means to pursue ultimate objectives of states in the international system (Hart 1954; Kennedy 1991). In a way, policy is a product of politics but from a national security perspective, Harry Yarger (2006) opines that strategy comes from policies related to protecting or advancing national interests in an international environment.

During 1980s, a debate was advanced that whether environmental issues come under the security blanket or not. A similar argument emerged with respect to health in late 1990s. The pressure of constantly changing and highly unpredictable security landscape has caused policy makers and analysts to generally accept that the concept of national security has been broadened well beyond the one used by decision makers for most of the Cold War era. It is unlikely that the concept of national security will become more precisely bounded in the near future. Increasingly, new issues will push

their way onto the national security agenda (PNSR 2008:9). The manner in which George Kennan (1948) defined national security as ‘ the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers’ is not sufficient to consider and shape the whole concept of national security in the 21st. century.

As the new problems are pushing their way onto the national security agenda, they could be of amorphous nature. They would become national security subject matter through the interaction of popular opinion. The course of events might be at home or abroad, pandemic and AIDS could be taken as the worst examples to understand the argument. This is not simply a domestic public health concern for any one nation state, but an international security challenge as well. The sovereignty of nation-states is under pressure due to globalization. The fragmentation and failure of some states create the destabilizing effects on the entire region. Space is also a serious concern of national security for many strong states. The advancement in information and biotechnologies are new challenges that have to be addressed with respect to national security. The global economic infrastructure and energy demands are making borders of nation states very ineffective and porous.

In this backdrop, developing a national security policy and strategy require an adequate policy framework. However, the framework should detail the main sectoral priorities, fundamental values, and legal basis in the policy-making process as well as implementation of the national security strategy. The vital subjects of national interests and security priorities, values and their legal basis themselves are being challenged by the new threats. These threats evolved from non-traditional sources. Thus, any framework vis-à-vis national security concept and strategy is not rendering concrete and stable outlines with respect to non-traditional threats and its amorphous character. The globalization is compelling many nation-states to change their core values whereas others are bound to go for ‘value-compromises’. These compulsions have pressed them high to rethink over their national interests and shape their national security strategies accordingly. Therefore, in due course nation-states are making adjustment and modifying their strategic vision to shape their national policy. In the last two decades national objectives, strategic concepts and concept of national power have imbibed new dimensions. Hence, ‘ways’, ‘means’, and ‘ends’ of nation-states have also been significantly transformed.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union relocated the discussion on Russian national security as well as national interests. However, the essence of apprehension remained same, first, relations with the West and second, the notion about immediate neighboring states. Kremlin's search for equilibrium with respect to its neighbors, whether they are being termed as Warsaw Pact, near abroad or more traditional one the Soviet geopolitical legacy of Russia's sphere of influence or sphere of interests has continued since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rumer (1995) argues that balance has yet to be found in many areas of Russian national security and foreign policy interests. They have to reconsider and prefer one between re-expansion and responsible behavior as a stabilizing regional actor, between cooperation with the West and subservience to it, as well as between integration into the community of more industrialized Western democracies or the search for its own independent path of development.

During the time of Gorbachev, relations with the West were frequently gazed through the prism of Warsaw Pact. Its behavior has been judged largely by its dealing with the former Soviet republics along with its western borders. Now the borders have changed however, the issues generally remained same. Mikhail Gorbachev made an effort to consolidate the nation-state with his idea of socialism 'with a human face', Boris Yeltsin roused the people around anti-communism; Vladimir Putin came to power under the unofficial slogan, 'Let's put an end to the Yeltsin-era chaos'. When Gorbachev defined 'socialism as competition', Francis Fukuyama (1989) pronounced 'The End of History?' However, he further clarified that this should not be taken as the termination of history.

The journey that was started by Gorbachev is a tough one. In fact, he challenged the whole authoritarian system. That political structure had undivided political power of the ruling party, the interpenetration of the party and the state, and the suppression of all forces that depart from or oppose the party's policy (Kornai 1992:360). The "[new] class" of party bureaucrats and *nomenklatura* managers with entrenched privileges and authority were like those of Latin American *latifundia*, who can use their traditional authority to subvert electoral processes in their favor (Fukuyama 1992:362).

Now the former elite *Nomenklatura*¹ system (Voslenskii 1984) and *Siloviki* (Former KGB and military officers) have been attempting hard to push the national idea to rally the nation to protect the country [state] from external enemies and establish a new global order to replace the one that humiliated Russia in the 1990s. Putin's 'Russia is back' is playing an important role to shape the national security strategy. The linkages between missile defense system and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or between offensive and defensive systems are new security subjects. Medvedev's notion of new security architecture for Europe focuses on Russian national security perception and new national interests. NATO's 'open door' policy and Obama's efforts to 'reset' relations with Russia are creating dichotomy of relations and understanding.

It is vociferously stated that Russian leadership abandoned the notion of integration 'into the West' first by Boris Yeltsin following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and 'with the West' by Putin following the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attacks. There have been a lot of discussions and debates over isolating Russia or Russia being isolated from the mainstream international system. However, Russian place in the twenty-first century global system is not in isolation. Conversely, the fact of the matter is they are the inseparable part of the global economic as well as security system.

All major powers of current international system have accepted the fact that existing international system has taken a multi-polar shape. The American administration is now looking to turn multi-polar world into a 'multi-partner world' (Clinton 2010). They are seeking partners to pursue their national interest by following a policy of engagement. This is very distinct from geopolitical competition of the first half of twentieth century. These days' competition and struggle for influence over the rules and amorphous boundaries taking place within the framework of the existing world order (Wright 2010). Henry Kissinger (1957) noted this distinction in his book, *A World Restored*:

A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of the 'legitimate,' general consensus.

¹ The **nomenklatura** were a category of people within the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Bloc who held various key administrative positions in all spheres of those countries' activity: government, industry, agriculture, education, etc., whose positions were granted only with approval by the communist party of each country or region.

Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in 'legitimate' international orders.

However, the administration has done little to think through how it might deal with the fact that the member states of the international order have fundamental differences of interest. The National Security Strategy (2010) of the U.S. that addresses this problem states:

When national interests do collide or countries prioritize their interests in different ways those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their sovereign responsibilities will be denied the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration with the international community.

Nevertheless, this formulation is more applicable to a rogue state like North Korea and many African nations than to a major power like China, India, Russia or Brazil.

Now the notion of 'relative-sum' is getting prominence instead of 'zero-sum' in the national security concept and strategies in the international relations. So keeping in mind the emerging world order, Russia and the U.S. have developed their new national security policy and strategy.

ROLE OF NARRATIVES

Generally narratives are a form of linguistic power that 'defines what kinds of social beings actors are' and thereby affects the distribution of capabilities, actor identities, and their visions of the possible (Barnett and Duvall 2005:52-53). This observation is as true of the international arena as it is of the domestic sphere. 'Realists expect nations' narratives on international affairs to converge. Their pronouncements that states must obey the imperatives of the international system, or be punished for ignoring or misreading them, imply that there can be only one real story line consistent with the objective features of the international situation and that reasonable observers would agree on that story line'. A social constructivist observes that nations' narratives might diverge momentarily as well as episodically. Thus, cross-national narrative convergence and divergence require explanations. However, nations dominant narratives (converge or diverge) have real consequences for their interactions. Therefore, by investigating how have Americans or Russians narrated the end of the Cold War and their subsequent roles in the world; how do they narrate their respective futures; why have their national narratives converged or diverged, and with what consequences; we can further understand their policymaking and strategies. In fact, this analysis can provide a better understanding of the root causes and

perceptions behind the policies and national security strategy as well, adopted by these two strong nation-states (Krebs 2010:23-24).

RUSSIA: FROM CRISIS TO COMMAND

The world has experienced four decades of nuclear standoff and brinkmanship that reflected historical bipolarity in international relations. The experience of the Cold War was an epic of various perceptions and realities. With the advent of Gorbachev a new political order and thinking has taken place. The neo-realist spirit of Bush Doctrine has created various problems to the unipolar hegemon. Probably some foreign policy miscalculations following the tragic event of 9/11, paved the way for global harmony. However, Russia has a crucial role to play in every security architecture. The arrogant political approach without prioritizing national interests and sacrificing everything for the sake of ideology brought misfortunes for Russians.

The strongman ruling tradition in Russia is still deeply concerned with the balance of powers approach of national security. Gorbachev's attempt to change the direction of Soviet state is still not entrenched in deep democratic and pluralistic patterns. Celebrating the conversion from socialism-communism to democracy was tentative and short-lived. Even Soviet satellites as well as the republics have rejected the idea of a neo-socialist Union in 1991.

On the heap of countless problems Russia faced, Washington advanced the idea of aide to the democratic experiment in Russia. However, on the other hand they opted a neo-containment policy through the expansion of NATO and subsequent expansion into Central Asia. Thus, a new set of geopolitical and foreign policy problems emerged in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Various domestic issues challenge the Russian state. Gaider's shock therapy caused hostile responses against the establishment. This led to the 1993 confrontation between the Duma forces backed by the neo-communist nationalists known as the Red-Browns and Yeltsin's presidential democratic regime.

The whole world held their breath at the prospect of a Russian internal war. Despite the harsh memories of the Cold War, Russian success at democratic reform was universally hoped for. The problems of Chechnya as well as Islamic terrorism from the former Muslim republics have served a catalyst in ushering in a new Russian-American diplomatic venue of strategic cooperation. Until the American unilateral

invasion of Iraq, that cooperation seemed positive and promising. The Treaty of Moscow served as a milepost for the new relationship between Washington and Moscow addressing long-standing nuclear disarmament issues.

Russian reemergence, catalyzed by economic recovery coupled with Washington's foreign policy problems associated with the invasion of Iraq, have led to a new stridency in Russian foreign policy. Putin has rejected calls for a western-style democracy and put Washington on notice that Russian policy will henceforth be based on independence of action regardless of Washington's objections. This has effectively ended the temporary *détente* precipitated by 9/11. Russia's attack of Georgia on August 6, 2008, in response to the invasions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia served to verify Moscow's new foreign policy independence and nationalistic fervor. Russia will protect its Near Abroad. It is a stern warning to Washington that Medvedev and Putin will not tolerate Washington's meddling in Russia's traditional back yard as well either they 're-set' the relations or engage Russia in any manner.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There are three historical periods and processes: first, when the U.S. was trying to formulate a sustainable strategy for Soviet threats, i.e. the early Cold War (1950-1963). Second, the time of *détente* and arms control when some were even convinced of the need to confront the Soviets, i.e. the mid- to late-1970s. Third, when the nation was still coming to the grips with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, i.e. the late 1990s, and lastly the contemporary and current one when the threat assessment and its combat strategy is to be framed.

Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in 'legitimate' international orders (Kissinger 1957). Only few years back many political pundits had a very different view about Russian upcoming future. They regarded militarily Russia as a second-class power and regarded its come back economically as next to impossible. However, the vital constituents of national power in long-term offer a great deal of corrective, for these components eventually matter over fiscal fluctuations, political upheavals, and looming shift in the military balance. In the light of these objective factors, Russian retreat from international arena was only a time being factor. Its salvage as a global power could be its retrieval as a continuing obstacle to Western interests. Thus, it depends on the West whether they

engage Russia properly or again play the game of containment, preventive defense & defiance, pre-emption and democracy.

Russia takes its prestige and status in the backdrop of the Cold War era and striving to get it again. That is the one most important reason that every time the U.S. and its policies are in its serious consideration either in its national security strategy or in other policies related to geo-economics/politics/strategy. Both nations make moves by keeping one another in their hearts and minds. Reciprocal approach to enhance their national power is beneficial. However, they have opted the policy of national interest, which converge and collide on different issues. For a better understanding of these components, the study will try to trace out significant role of those compulsions, anomalies, stakes, wrong perceptions and decisions.

Dmitri Trenin in his book, *The End of Eurasia, Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, (2001) describes a fractured imperial empire facing harsh geopolitical turbulences accentuated by demographic dislocations and foreign policy pressures on all levels. Putin's efforts served to stabilize and delimit the new Russian state. Following Yeltsin's attempts to calm down Primakov and his Eurasianist thrust, Putin would continue that orientations until he could stabilize and modify Russian foreign policy on his own terms. His task has been to give notice to the international community a clear working definition of what the new Russia is and what it intends to do to secure its traditional near abroad and its borderlands. In fact, Putin was caught on the horns of a security dilemma. Putin and Igor Ivanov failed to convince the international political community that the problem of Chechen independence or reintegration into the Russian Federation has been solved. Trenin highlights the severity and confusion of the new post-cold war Russian regimes.

Gilles Kepel's (2002) *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* focuses on internal insurgency. Following the events of Afghanistan and Iraq, much of the traditional historic harshness and confrontational political posturing have returned to the bilateral relations between these actors. Bush and Putin have tried to resurrect the rapprochement and political accommodations. High-level strategic Russian and American security interests still revolve around a common front against international terrorism and strategic cooperation on WMD (Weapons of mass destruction) and diplomatic unity at the level of high politics.

Bush's global war on terrorism and Putin's war in Chechnya have a clearly identifiable reciprocal element that predisposes both foreign policy establishments to try to repair the damage done in the American-Iraqi war. The unilateralism of the Bush administration and the client relationship between Moscow and Baghdad were symptomatic of the differences in the American and Russian international positions. Both countries acted out of national security interests. However, at the strategic level, diplomatic cooperation still appears to be worth of strategic congruence and tactical cleavages. Strategic security cooperation between Russia and the United States against militant Islam, has prompted commonality of purpose. Ahmed Rashid (2000) *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* presents a comparative study in this sphere.

Without Gorbachev's efforts to modernize socialism and introduce a degree of expressive pluralism to the declining Soviet economy the communist doctrine may have prevailed for much longer period. Though Gorbachev lost control, his legacy served vision for new changes of 21st century. While Yeltsin was a victim of the multiple negative impacts, that Gorbachev could not reverse. Putin have utilized many of the dynamics of Gorbachev. Glasnost opened the possibilities of domestic and foreign dialogue. Yeltsin, though rejecting Gorbachev's socialism, utilized Gorbachev's applications of the *New Thinking* to establish constructive dialogue and business and political channels with the West and particularly the Americans, opening up the opportunities of a newly integrated Russian eco-political age, accentuated, of course, by the strength of the newly dynamic petro-dollar economy. Building upon the legacy of change initiated by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin seems determined to return Russia to ascendancy instead of devolution and a return to xenophobic isolation.

Alexis de Tocqueville advanced the most fêted prophecy in political world in 1835. In the first volume of 'Democracy in America', he explored why America was predestined to develop into the most powerful nation in the world. Beside this, he noted Russia for parallel inevitable prominence for numerous of the identical *raison d'être*. However keeping into profound consideration the marked differences of their political system and approaches, he concluded with a judgment fated to become illustrious: 'Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the

globe' (Porter 1993)². Lord Palmerston³ (1848) described core national interests as the eternal⁴ and ultimate justification for national policy (Webster 1969). After a century of this description, the U.S. has drafted a document known as NSC68 wherein it produced and structured national security policy having deep consideration of national interests as well.

In fact, the U.S. national interest is to promote U.S. values and objectives. To promote these means to protect them by establishing and implementing effective national security policies (Sarkesian et al. 2002). Physical securities, promotion of values, and economic prosperity considered as the fundamental ingredients of national security. Territorial integrity and security of populace are first among all the elements while fundamental values and basic institutions are intrinsically associated with them. James Madison in 'The Federalist Papers' (1788) referred 'security against foreign danger' as the primary reason for shifting power to the central government (Fukuyama 1992).

The concept of promotion of values and economic prosperity were included in national security in the 19th and 20th centuries. During and after World War II, the U.S. extended the concept of national security and used its terminology for the first time to explicate their relationship with others. For most of the time, the physical security of the U.S. had not been at risk. However, by 1945, this immunity was quickly losing ground with the development of long-range missiles etc. The United States had to deal with the critical paradox of national security experienced by the Romans and successive great powers, i.e. *si vis pacem, para bellum* (Renatus 390 A.D.)⁵, mean peace through strength. This started a new concept of preparedness, where national security requires every corner of national power in addition to the military, to be addressed in peace as well as war (Jablonsky 1997).

² For a brilliant and eloquent statement of why the future of the United States could be problematic.

³ British foreign secretary and champion of free trade and gunboat diplomacy.

⁴ 'England has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies; she has permanent interests (Lord Palmerston); 'We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow' (Michael G. Roskin).

⁵ *i vis pacem, para bellum* is a Latin adage translated as, "If you wish for peace, prepare for war" (usually interpreted as meaning peace through strength—a strong society being less likely to be attacked by enemies). The source of this adage remains unknown; however, it is universally believed to be based on a quotation from Roman military writer Publius Vegetius Renatus: *Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum*. The saying is one of many from or based on his work, *Epitoma rei militaris*, thought to be written around the year 390 AD. It is embedded in a passage that stresses the importance of skillful preparation of military actions, as opposed to mere reliance on coincidence or superiority of numbers: "Therefore, he who wishes peace, should prepare war; he who desires victory, should carefully train his soldiers; he who wants favorable results, should fight relying on skill, not on chance."

NATO does not recognize the ‘sphere’ or ‘influence’ as its original guideline and policy framework. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and other NATO platforms regularly made use of this slogan, which reminds us ‘Iron Curtain Speech’ of Winston Churchill (1946) at Fulton Missouri, where he used the following phrases- ‘the Soviet sphere’ and ‘Soviet influence’⁶ in the context of communist expansion; from that speech to this day West has a regular deterioration of that strategy. Either through Truman Doctrine⁷ or by Marshall Plan⁸ (1947), U.S. always tried to limit the expansion of communism following the Second World War. Again, intentions to revive the US Aid program and strengthening of State department are not only simple policy considerations.

The compatibility of the U.S. values with the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states is highly debatable in their own academia. Therefore, when values of nation-states are losing its significance; how far is it precisely correct to launch those values and system in other parts of the globe? Most likely this is the fundamental *raison d'être* of criticism about U.S. endeavors in many parts of the world. Having good faith in realist traditions, they perceive Westphalia system as the best ruling vision. However, with the exception of territorial fundamental of sovereignty, other values are losing their credence and gradually becoming objectionable to a big chunk of state and non-state actors; in spite of this widespread mood, the U.S. has an impression that others must follow their values corresponding to the nation-states. Making relations with others or safeguarding from them depends on how ‘we’ conceptualize ‘they’; keeping this in mind, we formulate any policy, strategy or structure to counter challenges of ‘them’.

Recently in between American academia, a debate has taken currency based on Obama’s vision of ‘global zero’. Stanford scholar Prof. Scott D. Sagan has advanced his views in affirmative while distinguished theoretician Kenneth N. Waltz

⁶“...all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the **Soviet sphere**, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to **Soviet influence** but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow”, at: http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/quotations/churchill_iron_curtain.html

⁷ The **Truman Doctrine** was a policy set forth by U.S. President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947 stating that the U.S. would support Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere.

⁸ The **Marshall Plan** (officially the **European Recovery Program, ERP**) was the large-scale American program to aid Europe where the U.S. sent monetary support to help rebuild European economies after the end of World War II in order to combat the spread of Soviet communism.

pronounced a laud ‘No’ in response to the question ‘Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?’(The National Interest: 2010). This in fact depicts a flux in American ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ national security perception. The administration is well aware of these realities but beyond this has an entrenched realist perception of the world system also. In this backdrop, we can have another debate on national security of United States of America and Russian Federation.

George Kennan’s writing shows a historical picture of that time. Harry S. Truman following the Iranian crisis⁹ (1946) announced his Doctrine (1947) which along with Marshall Plan (1947) made an effort to contain communism while National Security Council 68 (NSC 68) established national security as the most important discourse. ‘X article’¹⁰ in Foreign Affairs laid the foundation of ‘containment’, the most important foreign policy instrument and national security tool for Cold War period. However, even today that tool rendering insights to not only U.S. administration but is a lighthouse for NATO establishment and policy makers. This containment policy was heavily dependent upon NSC 68 where this was clearly mentioned that:

“Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass..... has the support of a great and growing center of military power..confront it.....to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world....persevere until our national objectives have been attained”(NSC 68).

As Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*, the U.S. established a Constitution for governance based on ‘reflection and choice,’ rather than ‘on accident and force’ Perhaps that is why they have not developed a tangible policy for several unanticipated actions for both state and non-state actors. To paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, without security, American principles were but words (Owens 2009). Moreover, ‘the world for which the national security system was created no longer exists’ (Locher et al. 2008). There are certain problems that are quite difficult to address only through the prudent exercise of American power, neo-conservatives contend (Fukuyama 2006). Having this notion into analysis this could be understood that why the United States has normally adhered to the principles of foreign policy ‘realism’, a theory based on the idea that the driving force in international politics is

⁹ The **Iran crisis of 1946**, also known as the **Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis**, followed the end of World War II and stemmed from the Soviet’s refusal to relinquish occupied Iranian territory. The Soviets remained in Iran and local pro-Soviet Iranians proclaimed a separatist People’s Republic of Azerbaijan.

¹⁰ The **X Article**, formally titled **The Sources of Soviet Conduct**, was published in July 1947. The article was written by George F. Kennan, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the USSR, from 1944 to 1946, under ambassador W. Averell Harriman.

national security, which can be ensured only by possessing sufficient power relative to other states (Owens 2009).

President Dwight David Eisenhower (1953-1961) had a vision of national security where he thought about 'falling domino' principle (7th Apr. 1954) regarding Indochina. These limitations necessarily forced policy makers to choose where and when to intervene (Preble 2005). He warned in 1961 about 'unwarranted influence' over government of a growing 'military-industrial complex' (Herr 2008). An industry away from democratic controls and humanitarian standards outsold all other nations combined in 1999, selling \$11.4 billion in military hardware to Third World countries while others combined sold \$11.3 billion (Lochhead & Morrell 2000). This strength even today helps America to be the world's most sovereign state (Brzezinski 2005). Therefore, its national security has to be analyzed in that respect.

Currently survival priorities, i.e. 'vital' as well as other interests are significant issues in security discourse and dialogues. The ending of Cold War has bestowed a victorious psychosomatic edge to the U.S. but its national security and interests have started to face various perplexities and ambiguities. A flux in the world order was brought by the lapse and dearth of Soviet power. Apparently, the days of block politics are over. The policy makers are stumbling on a complex state to decide the new survival priorities. Whereas Kissinger wrote more than three decades ago, 'What is it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?' (1969). Indeed, the answers to the dynamics of his questions are more elusive today (Sarkesian et al. 2009).

Democracy in Russia is a national security concern of the United States of America. This is one of the three main visions of U.S. national security strategy since Second World War, thus we will scrutinize the role of democracy promotion in the U.S. national security. The debate on national security focuses economic and political freedom of populace. National security of the U.S. has a deep linkage with free market economy.

Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) highlights cultural and ideological factors, challenges and economically deterministic approaches of Marx and others. His religious and

cultural factors remind Reinhold Niebuhr and his Christian realism¹¹. Fukuyama (2009) in 'Re conceptualizing Democracies and Empowering Them to Deliver' argues five broad dimensions of development one economic, one social and three political, i.e. economic growth, social mobilization/development of civil society, state building, rule of law, and electoral democracy. 'U.S. foreign policy has tended to compartmentalize these different dimensions of development.....and keeping all of them separate from military strategy'.

Colin Powell (1995) recalls a widely quoted statement of Albright (1993) in his 'My American Journey' i.e. 'what's the point of having this superb military...if we can't use it?'¹² This certainly reflects American bureaucratic viewpoint about its hard power. At the same time, this reveals that now America is far away from Eisenhower's concept of limited American power and its 'where and when to intervene, and in what fashion' (Preble 2005). Thus, now some sort of arrogance drives the national security in the context of national interest. Bush and Rice Doctrines also displayed this haughtiness. Therefore, how to use this power is not only a question of national security but contains a conception also, that how to project this surplus power. Richard Haass (2000) argues that 'what to do with a surplus of power and theconsiderable advantages this surplus confers on the United States' (PDA¹³ 2008).

In tandem with this thought, we find that 'national security means more than the capacity to conduct international wars' (Sarkesian et al. 2008). Therefore, the United States was compel bound to take serious steps to counter terrorism by the projection of this surplus power. However, once Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had cautioned the U.S. administration that terrorism is the most important threat the United States and the world face as the 21st century Begins (Eland 1998). She noted the importance of the issue to the Clinton administration: "We have said over and over again that [terrorism] is the biggest threat to our country and the world as we enter the 21st century.

¹¹ **Christian Realism** is a branch of philosophy developed by Reinhold Niebuhr in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Niebuhr argued that the kingdom of heaven can not be realized on earth because of the innately corrupt tendencies of society. Due to the injustices that arise on Earth, a person is therefore forced to compromise the ideal of the kingdom of heaven on Earth. Niebuhr argued that human perfectibility was an illusion.

¹² At the time, Albright was the US representative to the United Nations. Powell was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

¹³ Project on Defense Alternatives.

RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The national security signifies the defense of national interests and values. Moreover, the strength behind this is not only the defense posture but also human values. However, any definition of national security comes only in the light of national power to realize its national interests. When it is an acknowledged and anticipated reality that every nation-state is determined to make best use of its national interests and motivated to get enhanced its national power; comparative study of two actors could develop insights and tendency to understand the behavior of important world players.

For nearly more than four decades, the United States practiced a consistent policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, which had ideological and geopolitical basis simultaneously. After the disintegration of Soviet Union, Russia has emerged a new entity and up to large degree, its successor nation-state that is still a formidable military power and has the standing only next to the United States. On the other hand, Russia in near future may be the biggest energy producer as well as supplier whilst the U.S. is bound to get new favorable energy centers. In the light of securitization of energy resources, their comparative study may produce some threads to understand the puzzle of their future course of actions.

Last two decades have rendered an atypical state of affairs in the history of international relations. Flouting blocks of major powers put together a new opening to see the world in a new-fangled dimension. Therefore, this study will make an effort to place greater analytical value on 'policy-relevant theoretical' approaches to narrow 'the gap between theory and policy'. This might provide some acceptable insights to the policy makers as well. Although, a substantial portion of security literature talks about national security concepts and strategies, this study will first conceptualize national security and then try to frame a definition that could be applicable to the modern day international relation studies.

The study will attempt to search out explanations of some important questions of national security policy and strategies of Russia and the United States as well, e.g. what is national security? How is national security perceived in Russia and the U.S.? What are the regions, issues and areas where their security interests converge and collide? Why do Russia and the U.S. defy the norms and mechanisms of multilateral institutions in the name of national security interest?

Current developments in the new world order and security literature shows that national security postures of Russia and the U.S. have the influence of their Cold War status and rivalries. However, the emergence of China, India and other countries as predominant players in the international system has created a situation where Russia and the U.S. need to reorient their strategies.

METHODOLOGY

This research will do a comparative study to examine how Russia and the United States formulate their national security concepts and implement them as strategies. Both countries have their own methods of decision-making process. This comparative study will fill the gaps of unexplained decision-making process in the national security literature through its historical development and analysis. This work will pursue some new methods to study national security policies and strategies. The study of their historical backdrop and its comparative outcome in the form of their strategy drafts would provide a good understanding of change and transformations with the pace of time. Furthermore, this study will generate new hypotheses and framework for further research in national security arena.

This study is a comparative case study where similar and dissimilar processes are compared. An attempt has been made to follow the famous methodology of John Stuart Mill, which is often referred to as 'Most Similar' and 'Most Different' designs. This comparison provides several sub-units that are identical or completely different in nature. This approach of methodology looks suitable because neither nomothetic nor idiographic¹⁴ epistemologies permit useful analyses of social reality.

This study does not boast of generating any new theory. However, it does employ some of the existing theories on national security. This application on these two cases creates an ideal situation for 'falsification' or 'substantiation' of those theories. The work is both inductive and deductive. Deductively, it seeks to test the existing

¹⁴ This pair of terms was invented in Germany in the late nineteenth century to describe what was called the *Methodenstreit* (battle of methods) among social scientists, one that reflected the division of scholarship into the two cultures. Nomothetic scholars insisted on replicable, "objective" (preferably quantitative) methods and saw their task as arriving at general laws explaining social realities. Idiographic scholars used largely qualitative, narrative data, considered themselves humanists, and preferred hermeneutic methods. Their principal concern was interpretation, not laws, about which they were at the very least skeptical. (Note that idio-graphic is different from ideographic. "Idio-" is a prefix derived from Greek and means specific, individual, one's own; hence idiographic means particular descriptions. "Ideo-" is a prefix derived from Latin and means picture, form, idea; hence ideographic means a non-alphabetic writing system, such as Chinese characters.)

theories while inductively, it endeavors to generate some new ideas and hypothesis which could be helpful for generalization if a large-n comparison is taken by some future researcher.

As usual, it depends on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include National Security Strategy, Defense Posture Review, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, and The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010 etc. Review of literature section depends on secondary sources available in the books, articles, reports, working papers et cetera.

This research work will comprise six chapters. The first chapter provides a broad overview of the study besides discussing the rationale and scope. It also includes review of literature, research questions and methodology. The second chapter narrates the national security concepts, policy and strategies in the realm security studies. The third and fourth chapters deal Russian and the U.S. national security strategies respectively. These two chapters explain their national interests, power and challenges as well. The fifth chapter compares the national security strategies of the Russian federation and the United States. The sixth chapter concludes the study with avenues and suggestions for further research.

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CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT, POLICY AND STRATEGY

The nation-states project their national security according to their acquired prestige and status in the international system. The concept of national security used to define the national interest of a state and military posture. In earlier times, it was seen in the context of state's interaction with the external threats and opportunities. Jim Rolfe (1992) argues that National security today is commonly understood to involve a comprehensive set of factors, all of which need to be in some form of harmony if security is to be achieved. The security involves not only protection of the state against aggressive military actions by other states, but also protection of the economy, environment, and of citizens from threats to their health as well as social well-being—human security (Prins 1992). In the last two decades, the concept of national security has been broadened. The evolution of the concept of national security has been underway for some time (PNSR 2008: 9). We are accustomed to thinking about national security threats as politically motivated behavior by a foreign actor, but increasingly we need to think of them as emanating from multiple sources, not just other states (Ikenberry & Slaughter 2006:14).

WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY

Samuel P. Huntington (1985) argues that national strategy is the effort to put together all of the resources that might be available to a government, i.e. economic, political, diplomatic, technological, as well as military, and direct them to securing the government's objectives in a competition with another government. This perception of strategy finds its way in the constitution of the U.S. Thus, from a national perspective, strategy is concerned with employing all of the elements of national power-diplomatic, informational, economic, and military- to accomplish the ends established in policy (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.).

In spite of many scholarly efforts, there is no agreement on the concept of national security. It is still a contested one. This is ambiguous in content as well as in format and refers to different sets of issues and values. Wolfer (1952: 483) has characterized national security as an 'ambiguous symbol' that, if used without specifications, 'leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford.' However, the practitioners of state policy have compelling reasons for

maintaining its symbolic ambiguity. It seems that this is an elusive term, which resists definition.

The national security is a political tool as well to justify the actions and policies for a large variety of sectional interests in all types of state. Many interest groups in the United States and the Soviet Union benefited from amplifying the level of threat that each posed to the other and the process continues. Cultivation of hostile images abroad can justify intensified political surveillance, shifts of resources to the military, economic protectionism and other policies with deep implications for domestic political life (Buzan 1991: 7-11).

The concept of national security encompasses several important contradictions and subtleties in between means and ends as well as individual and state security. Schultze (1973: 529-530) noted that: “the concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive.”

However, national security was often viewed as a derivative of power; especially military power. Thus, traditionalists regarded the concept in exclusively military and state-centered terms, equating it with military issues and the use of force. This notion of national security is intimately linked to the realist approach. The focus on military threats and the use of force complemented ideas of power and interest and the rather tough-minded approach to foreign policy that seemed a development of the Cold War years. It is perceived as a relative freedom from war as well. Stephen M. Walt defines the concept as the study of the threat, use and control of military force, especially of the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war’. He emphasizes that military power is the central focus of the field, yet he concedes that ‘military power is not the only source of national security, and military threats are not the only dangers that states face’ (1991: 212-13).

Therefore, we can define the National Security Strategy (henceforth NSS) as a composite plan, by which every nation-state reveals its priorities, makes out its ideals and values; settle on its interests, divulges its identity perceptions, and finally putting together an effort to project its power.

UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY

In general, national security policy is related to the administrations analysis and description of the strategic level concerns a country faces. This analysis addresses how the administration plans to deal with these concerns. On the other, hand national security strategy is a government's overarching plan for ensuring the nations security in the form of guidance for implementing a nation's national security policy. It is considered essential for the integration and coordination of activities by different national security actors, which defines the role of each national actor in dealing with national security needs, decides processes and chain of command for making decisions when response to threats or crisis is required. It delineates conditions for using security forces. The national security strategy makes a detail cooperation mechanism between various security actors, rationales for involvement in regional or international peace operations, and justification for intervention in other countries security affairs. Usually, national security strategy is based upon threat assessments, which are provided by the various intelligence collection and analysis actors as well as reviews of the existing state of the country's security sector and agencies.


The strategy cannot be separated from political activity, rather it is an extension of it, and must serve the political purpose (Howard & Paret 1993). Generally, a National Security Council (NSC) determines national security policies. The council may be either advisory or executive in nature (Bearne et al. RAND 2005: 2). Normally, the main actors devising the national security strategy will include the Chief Executive, the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, the National Security Advisor, senior military officials, and senior intelligence officials. The National Security Council, as a developer of security policy and an oversight body, could also help to maintain the integrity of security sector policymaking as well as manage policy accomplishments (Kinzelback and Cole 2006: 66).

The state legislature normally supervise the national security policy and make funds available for financial matters related to the use of security institutions in application of national security policy. However, in post-conflict countries, international agencies including the UN and donor states may support the development of a National Security Strategy and the implementation of national security policies. However, civil society groups are acquiring a greater voice and role in the formulation of national security policy in some countries and this development is taking place despite the

resistance of some governments who consider national security issues to be the domain of security officials and not the public. In fact, in many countries this kind of situation reflects a transitory phase. It would take some time to establish civil institutions. Gradually, national security discussion and debates in civil society would play an important role in the formation of policy and strategy. Hence, we find that the process, policy and strategy all vary by country. (Boucher 2009).

The formation of national security strategy and policies are still focused on western countries. The national security policies of strong and bigger states assume that states are large, wealthy, and have an expansive array of security concerns while weaker or smaller countries view security concerns as global (Chuter 2007). They expect resource-strapped countries to play more than a small role in regional security. In this respect, national security strategies could more productively focus on the tasks that security institutions can perform to contribute to the country's security needs (Chuter 2007). Moreover, a national security strategy can usefully be entrenched into a national development strategy that includes plans for government institutional capacity building and sustained economic development efforts. Thus, designing national security strategy within wider efforts also allows for more realistic financial planning, not just for development of the security sector, which often uses threats outlined in national security strategies to justify military expenditure, but also for broader infrastructure, institutional, and economic development (Boucher 2009).

However, the nations where the UN supports security sector reforms, national security policy determination and implementation mechanisms may not either exist at all or may not be functional. Therefore, it may require external support to build up both their effectiveness and legitimacy. There is a possibility that the existing national security council structures may not be guided by strategic vision so the development of a national security strategy can help generate it. Therefore, an initial national security strategy may also play an important role in determining a comprehensive strategy for security sector. In fact, a competent, transparent, and effective security sector is a fundamental prerequisite for successful implementation of a national security strategy that can be effectively used to assess and redefine the role of the security sector based on a current threat assessment and the hope of the country's common people. Thus, the national security strategy can be a device for building legitimacy of security actors in the eyes of populace (Boucher 2009).



LEGITIMACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NSS DRAFT

Any draft of national security not only requires but also demands its legitimacy that could come through its transparent process of drafting. In addition, the question of accountability of commitments and policies given in the draft is equally significant in otherwise that draft would be a simple piece of paper. Boucher (2009) opines that the legitimacy of a national security document rests on the manner in which it is developed and the degree to which consultations with stakeholders, as well as the concerns of the population concerning security, are integrated into the final document. Its legitimacy can also be affected by the legitimacy of national security decision-making and implementation institutions. Legitimacy can be bolstered by reducing the number of potential blockage points in security decision making. Such blockage points can exist at different levels and with different actors involved either in making national security decisions or in the oversight of national security mechanisms. Avoiding blockage points requires consulting different actors, securing the commitment of targeted groups to policy objectives and in some cases conducting information campaigns to ensure transparency. Ball et al. (2005: 71–79) highlights that the law should mandate civilian control over security forces and the chain of command for policy implementation as well as force employment decisions. It should also mandate separation of civil policing and internal defence, and define the principles on which security actors base their actions, (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ball et al. 2004). For both policy determination and policy implementation, civilian control can assist with transparency and accountability, as does parliamentary oversight and possible involvement in the decision-making of non-governmental specialists. Similarly, the UN and donors in general can support transparency and accountability by requiring that security actors understand the structures and the processes they use to make decisions (Bearne et al. 2005: 22–23).

In fact, transparency and accountability varies by state. The developing states differ drastically from developed nations in this respect. However, it also depends on political systems. Alix Julia Boucher (2005) emphasized that these two features represent a critical challenge not only for national security policy and strategy but also for corresponding structures. These challenges are in terms of drafting, decision-making as well as implementation. This is particularly in those countries where the public legitimacy of security institutions has not previously been established or where,

because of a history of conflict transparency itself can be perceived by leadership as threatening. However, without some transparency and clear accountability, national security institutions may fail to develop the necessary public legitimacy or rapidly lose whatever temporary legitimacy they acquire by signing a peace agreement. For decision-making, the creation of a centralized national security council can itself be a barrier to transparency because members can make decisions without seeing much need to consult with outsiders, even if the outsiders are part of agreed mechanisms for oversight such as the relevant committees of the legislature, let alone the media and civil society. The countries that need the capacity to respond to emergencies or that face acute, ongoing security threats may find central national security decision making structures helpful (Bearne et al.2005: 28).

Developing and implementing a national security strategy requires adequate administrative and financial support. Donor assistance—financial and technical—may be required initially, but donors should not do the work for the country's authorities (Boucher 2009).

Fluri et al. (2003: 28–29) elucidate that the institutions involved in national security policy-making, implementation, and oversight require support to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of their efforts. The leadership of the armed forces can most legitimately influence national security policy and strategy development by offering accurate assessments of force capabilities and analysis of the force generation, infrastructure, and other implications of proposed policy and strategy. They can also influence the decision-making phase by expressing reservation concerning the likely impact of a proposed policy or strategy on the above variables (Boucher 2009). In post-conflict states where UN peacekeepers are supporting reform of the armed forces, implementation of the national security strategy may require extensive lustration, new recruitment, vetting, and training of the country's forces. Using these tools to build the legitimacy of the new forces will be a key task for peace builders. In countries that use gendarmerie type forces for public safety, the national security policy should clearly delineate the role and chain of command for use of these forces, as it should do for the regular armed forces supported, as necessary, by legislation (Chuter 2009: 17).

DETERMINING THE CONCEPT

The security implied the freedom of a state to develop and improve its position in the future where focus on development is important that means economic, social and political progress (Robert McNamara 1968: 149-150). This reflects a reasonable standard of living. However, there is a strong criticism on the almost exclusive focus on military threat in conventional thinking of security. To define national security merely or even primarily in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality. Richard Ullman (1983) criticizes the almost exclusive focus on military threat in conventional (realist) thinking of security. He argues that:

threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state (123,133).

Haftendorn (1991: 5) laid emphasis on security in specific cultural context. However, wrapping social problems such as environmental degradation in the security blanket in an attempt to make global management problems as a part of national and international security agendas is making confusion in the fundamental understanding of security (Ayoob 1997: 125). On the other hand, many analyses provide useful insights into areas traditionally ignored, or into new challenges that need to be taken account of, they have rarely reflected fully on their own foundations (Krause and Williams 1997: 35).

The emphasis on military threats arising from beyond the borders is doubly misleading. It not only draws attention away from the non-military threats that may undermine the stability of nations but also presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats arise within. The threat to national security is an action or sequence of events. It threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state. It also threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities i.e. persons, groups, corporations; within the state. However, Joseph Nye Jr. (1988: 6) argues that most security policies are designed to insure 'social autonomy as a group, and a degree of political status, not merely to insure the physical survival of individuals within national boundaries' but with 'a certain minimal expected enjoyment of economic welfare.'

Therefore, taking an account of a broad variety of contingencies, along with the question of applicability is important. Of course, these definitions must be seen in their specific cultural context especially the highly industrialized democracies of the West. Others may have very different conceptions of security. Many developing countries appear to emphasize the domestic as well as the economic and social dimensions of security. The security situation in the Third World is unquestionably crucial to the whole security environment where every individual nation-state is attempting to attain its national security. Most of the conflicts are concentrated in the third world countries (Ayoob 1997: 123).

Now it seems that security studies need to overcome the ethnocentricity of traditional approaches to security. There is a requirement for a new and common paradigm for global security. This paradigm represents a program of common security for the global community of humanity (Haftendorn 1991), as proposed in 1982 by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues¹⁵. The Commission argued for replacing the strategy of mutual deterrence with one of common security that rests on a commitment to joint survival and a program for arms control and disarmament (Matthew 2000: 105)¹⁶.

The common security includes the themes of economic as well as environmental security, drug threats and even human rights. All these have been added in attempts to reformulate security policies to encompass many new items on the global political agenda (Dalby 1997: 4). Now there is a risk of creating a conceptual muddle rather than a paradigm or worldview shift; a de-definition rather than a re-definition of security. If we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain them of any meaning. All large-scale evils will become threats to national security (Deudney 1990: 465).

Thus, broadening of the security agenda has been criticized not only in terms of its practical implications, but also because of its theoretical coherence. Against those who want to widen the agenda outside the strictly military domain, Walt (1991: 213)

¹⁵ This Commission was chaired by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.

¹⁶ Cited in Haftendorn, 1991:11.

has argued that ‘defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.’

In feminist critiques of conventional thinking of security, it has been represented in terms of masculinist modes of domination. It is built into masculine definitions of power and includes the modernist assumptions of control, domination and surveillance that premise security in one way or another on violence and spatial control. Security secures patriarchal relations of power and renders women insecure precisely because they are women. The argument undercuts the state-centric rationale of security and raises the question of who is being provided security by the concept and strategy of national security.

NARRATIVE, POWER, AND POLICY

The centrality of realist thought is the distribution of material power and change that drives foreign policy. In his “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, E. H. Carr (1939)¹⁷ warned that the problem of effecting peaceful change lay at the center of international theory. Researchers of international relations have long argued that both declining dominant powers (currently Russia in context with Cold War status and Japan before Chinese rise) and rising challengers (currently China, India, and Brazil etc.) are often destabilizing forces on international stage. The former might launch a preventive war to pre-empt the challenger from assuming its due place in the international hierarchy; while the latter might initiate war prematurely, before the distribution of power was clearly in its favor (Gilpin 1981; Organski and Kugler 1980). Realist writing on such power transitions tends to focus on cases in which the distribution of power actually shifted, e.g. Wilhelmine Germany overtaking Britain, imperial Russia overtaking Germany (in some dimensions), and the United States overtaking all other major powers (Krebs 2010).

From a realist perspective, post–Cold War Russia is less puzzling than it was. Now it is observed as a failed challenger, a nation-state that declined before it surpassed its target. Its prospect for renewal and restoration to great power status appears meager.¹⁸

The dangers from Russia are equally less severe. If Russia’s retreat to regional power

¹⁷ Published in July 1939. At the time the book was published in the summer of 1939, Neville Chamberlain had adopted his “containment” policy towards Germany, leading Carr to later ruefully comment that his book was dated even before it was published.

¹⁸ One might debate the latter point, but Ronald R. Krebs does not find many analysts, realist in orientation or otherwise, who argue that Russia’s prospects are bright.

from erstwhile great power is mismanaged, some needless tension might occur. However, realists would not largely expect an enduring threat to international stability. Though, Russia's influence on the international stage cannot exceed its shrinking material power base, but at the same time the U.S. cannot exert its will without constraint, given Russia's considerable nuclear forces and wealth in natural resources. They have to respect the limits of their power.

Sam Nunn and Adam N. Stulberg (2000) have displayed the many faces of modern Russia and argued on the constraints imposed by the Russian regionalism. More than a few realist critics of post-Cold War American policy toward Russia observe that it was too provocative particularly the cases of NATO expansion and support for Kosovar autonomy. Nevertheless, despite realists' pessimism about the competitive nature of international politics, their accounts also have a more optimistic edge. Realists presume that states in general perceive the distribution of power accurately and are compelled, at least over time, to play the game of world politics within that distribution's limits. However, the traditional approach to power transitions understates the problems associated with managing a failed challenger's decline. Those troubles arise from the fact that leaders and elites in different states do not essentially narrate and lay down the story of their nation's respective rises and declines in an identical manner. These observations go beyond the insight that cognitive and motivational biases shape actors perceptions of the distribution of power, what some realists have argued (Wohlforth 1993).

CONFLICTING THEORIES

Different theories not only influence the discourse of security studies, but they also shape both public discourse and policy analysis (Walt 1998: 29). The influence of these intellectual constructs is very wide (Snyder 2004: 54). Policymakers and public commentators invoke elements of all these theories when articulating solutions to global security dilemmas. The elements of the dominant theoretical traditions entered afresh the political and public debate. Since the end of the Cold War, non-American voices have become more prominent and the security agenda has been ever more broadened to include a range of new issues (Snyder 2004: 55). Each theory helps to explain the assumptions behind political rhetoric of the national security. Three major theoretical approaches can be identified as realism, liberalism and critical theory. These three theoretical traditions are still dominant in security discourses.

SECURITY AND REALISM

This has been the most dominant theoretical tradition in security discourses. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau laid down the philosophical foundation of realism. Their worldview focuses on the struggle for power among strategic, self-interested states. Realists discount any claims to system-wide world order other than that based ultimately on power or force. Their argument is that international society is best described as a condition of international anarchy. There is no central authority to protect states from one another. States act as independent, sovereign political units that focus on their own survival and expansion. Therefore, the objective of national security is the survival of a nation-state rather than the guarantee of international security (Haftendorn 1991: 8). This tradition is not prepared to engage in long-term accommodation or cooperation. They observe that world politics is a jungle, which is characterized by a state of war. This is not a single continuous war or constant wars but the constant possibility of war among all states. Thus, they perceive a period of peace as a state of non-war. In this analysis the possibility of war requires that states follow Realpolitik, i.e. be self-interested, prepare for war and calculate relative balances of power (Doyle 1997: 18). The state constantly seeks relative gains and its behavior is therefore continuously determined to facilitate self-preservation by the actual balance of power between political powers characterized by nation-states.

The presumed uncertainty is the central focal point in realist security discourse. Similarly, security dilemma is a central issue in nearly all the realist theories. Hence, there is a continuous effort of states to guarantee their own security and survival. Thus, states are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, which in turn, constitutes a threat to the security of other states. In fact, conventional Cold War concepts of nuclear strategies and deterrence emphasize this line of thought where striving to attain maximum security from attack therefore inevitably produces new insecurities. Therefore, none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition arises and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is a continuous process (Herz 1976: 10).

This theoretical tradition is generally acknowledged as pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. They share a skeptical approach toward schemes for pacifist security order. Its emphasis on competition and power was consistent with the

central features of the East-West rivalry, therefore, realism dominated in the Cold War years accordingly (Walt 1998: 31). This theoretical approach predicts the continued centrality of military strength and the persistence of conflict in the age of global economic interdependence. As a result, realist theories explain American forceful military response to the international terrorism, as terrorism is countered by the use of force. In spite of the changing configurations of power, realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy must be based on positions of real strength, not on either empty boldness or hopeful illusions about a world without conflict (Snyder 2004: 56).

In fact, realism does not have only one theoretical framework. There are two crosscutting dichotomies, classical realism versus neorealism/structural realism, and offensive realism versus defensive realism (Snyder 2002:150). The classical realist tradition of Hans Morgenthau (1948) and so on believes that states, like human beings, have an innate desire to dominate others that leads them to fight wars. By this viewpoint, state power is an end in itself (Glaser 1994: 53). Morgenthau himself stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous. This pessimistic interpretation of human nature and security affairs is claimed to be an antidote to the naive belief that international institutions and law alone can provide security. In contrast with classical realist thinking, structural realists ignore human nature and focuses on the effects of the international system. They observe the international system consisting of a number of great powers and each seeking to survive. Since the system is anarchic and has no central authority, every state has to survive on its own. Therefore, this driving force of survival is the most important factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures that states develop offensive military force, as a means to increase their relative power. This classical focus on the centrality of power shifts gradually towards a more neorealist view whereby power becomes a means to increase security (Glaser 1994: 53).

The neorealists bring attention to a constant lack of trust between states that requires acting in an openly aggressive manner. They recognize that international democratic structures and liberal economics are imperative to peace. The security stems from balancing strategies based on sound military (Chatterjee 2003: 143-144). Therefore, neorealism could be considered the dominant paradigm in security discourses.

However, the influential variants of neorealism can be distinguished as offensive and defensive realism. Kenneth Waltz a defensive realist and others argue that states merely seek to survive and have little intrinsic interest in military conquest simply because the costs of expansion generally outweigh the benefits. Therefore, the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system (Waltz 1979: 126). In fact, a realist envisages moderate strategies to seek security. Whilst, going for war is more likely when states can conquer each other easily. In other words, when defense is easier than offense, security is more plentiful. On the contrary, offensive realists argue that the search for power and security is insatiable. Thus, the state has an eventual goal to be the hegemon in the system. Whilst, John Mearsheimer (1990; 2001) asserts that the search for power and security is insatiable.

John Mearsheimer (2001: 21) describes the differences between offensive and defensive realism. He opines that for defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead, it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. However, all realists stress the centrality of military threat and the use of force. The referent object of security is the state; states act as strategic, self-interested units that seek to ensure their own security. This approach compels to formulate the self-reliant national security strategy.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

This is a significant and powerful theoretical approach to analyze and comprehend the national security. However, the concept is complex and multifaceted (Deutsch and Singer 1964). Kenneth Waltz acknowledges only this concept as a distinct political theory of international politics (Waltz 1979: 117). The balance of power theory puts forward roughly a just equilibrium doctrine that is intended to avert any one nation from becoming sufficiently strong to enable it to impose its will upon the rest. The international system is seen as made up of rational state actors who do what comes naturally by coming together in alliances or coalitions with one another to respond a

threat. The basic notion of the concept of balance of power in international relations is the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system (Deutsch & Singer 1964: 390). Although, the concept has various meanings, sometimes it is a mere factual description of the distribution of political power in the international scene at any one time (Haas 1953: 446).

Theoretically, alliances are formalized in treaty and go on over the long term like most of the international organizations, whereas coalitions are usually less formal and issue-specific and as well as for the short-term. Although, there is a debate over 'how many nations are necessary to sign on for a coalition to be truly multinational as opposed to unilateral'; Lansford et al. (2006) suggests at least ten. However, other writers on the subject are of the opinion that it takes at least five states to form a practical alliance or coalition (O'Connor 2010). Currently seven great powers control over half the world's GDP and have military power projection capabilities, but only two great alliances exist: first, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization); and second, U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Whilst, it is not widely accepted that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) made up of 12 former Soviet republics is an alliance.

The realist tradition analyzes international relations in terms of power, e.g. Waltz (1979). Thus, when nations join a weak coalition against more powerful enemy, this is the process of balancing, but when they join strong coalition, this is bandwagoning. The process of balancing is possible in both ways internal as well as external. The state could strengthen itself through better mobilization of resources within its own borders as well as by means of forming alliance with partners to pool resources against a common adversary.

Conventionally, O'Connor elucidates that power transitions brought on by the rapid growth of a challenger to a great power have often threatened hegemons or a great power to strike before the challenger becomes too strong. Theoretically, independent as well as non-aligned states could also exist and flourish in a balancing system. However, what is more likely to happen are, first, regional alliances e.g. the struggling African Unity or Union movement; second, informal alliances e.g. the loose alliance between China and Pakistan or the anti-Israel alignment in the Middle East. Hegemony is the third way to make a balance where one state becomes leading actor and makes an effort to provide world stability, but not without its own disadvantages.

This is the quickest way to lessen the anarchic developments. However, the drawbacks for a hegemon state comprise overextension of military and being perceived as unjust in almost everything it does. Wars are not supposed to happen in this process since each state is constantly watchful and paying special attention to each other's alliances. However, its claim about being a peace theory makes the basis for the most fundamental criticism of it excluding the rational actor assumption whilst the power transition theory has led to the findings that wars often result from rather mild shifts in the distribution of power.

CONTAINMENT

George Kennan first conceived the idea. He was disagreed with US policy to deal with the nature of Soviet Union. In the 'X-Article,' Kennan points out the complete strategy, fundamentals and philosophy of this approach. He further noted that the truth is not a constant but is actually created, essentially by the Soviet leaders themselves (Kennan 1947: 573). He was pessimistic about a peaceful relation with Moscow due to the fundamental differences between capitalism and socialism. He explained that the Soviet regime is far weaker than the western world and:

this would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world (1947: 581).

In this, we find the basis of the policy of containment. He also expresses the nature of his idea concerning containment. The emphasis was given on long- term U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies was the fundamental idea:

the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy (1947: 576).

In spite of occasional disagreements in between policy-makers, it became the preferred strategy of US foreign policy from the 1950s onwards, lasting through the Vietnam War and the Cold War (Cumings 1995: 363).

SECURITY AND LIBERALISM

This theoretical approach has its roots in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1795). This is the main contender approach as against the realism. It focuses on a more complex structure of actors within and between states, international actors and even non-

governmental actors, in a non-zero-sum system where social, economic and security issues all play key roles.

It asserts that realism has not that much open and extended vision that could explain the complex progress in relations between nations. It rejects the view of international politics as a jungle. The liberalists observe the world politics as a cultivable garden, which combines a state of war with the possibility of a state of peace (Doyle 1997: 19). Although, liberal states exist under international anarchy yet that anarchy is different from the state of war depicted by realists. The liberalists believe that they understand the intentions of foreign liberal democracies. They see relations between states and their security in a positive- or negative-sum game, rather than a zero-sum game.

Liberalism believes that fundamentally people are better off without war. In fact, costs and dangers of war are elemental for liberals to discard war in principle. Therefore, the fundamental assumption behind the war according to liberals is incremental self-preservation and well-being. This motivation is based on self-interest rather than on what is perceived to be just. Liberalism foresees a slow but inevitable journey that differs from the anarchic world of realist's imagination, as economic interdependence widens and democratic norms spread. They also believe that the rule of law, limitations of state power and transparency of government and democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation and security (Snyder 2004: 56). More effective picture comes when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions. They do not see the state in as a hypothetical single, rational actor in a state of war. Their focus is on a coalition or conglomeration of coalitions. These are the representative of group or individuals interests.

This theoretical approach has a belief that state's interests are determined not by its place in the world system but by the interests, ideals, and activities of its personnel, who in fact run the system and arranges to advance the interests and values of state. Liberals mainly focus on the freedom, the rights and duties of individuals. Their understanding of security differs in part from that of realists. Just to reflect the aims of the individuals, liberals acknowledge security not only in military terms, but also in terms of protection and promotion of individual rights. That is why even in combating terrorism their focus is far more on the application of legal instrumentalities than on the use of military force.

The liberal concept of security tends to include different issues such as migration, environmental degradation and transnational organized crime, the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime and so on. Similarly, it contains different theories. However, all liberal theories imply that cooperation is more pervasive than even the defensive version of realism allows. However, each of them offers a different view of promotion to cooperate (Walt 1998: 32). In one way, they argue that economic inter-dependence would discourage states from using force against each other because warfare would threaten prosperity.

A second strand sees the spread of democracy as the key to world peace. Their base of thinking is on the claim that democratic states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. It rests on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, but they rarely fight one another. This is commonly known as the democratic peace theory, which could be seen as a contemporary version of Immanuel Kant's (1795) theory of perpetual peace. There is a fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify the use of force against non-democratic regimes in order to bring peace in a democratic crusade (Chan 1997: 59). The belief that democracies do not fight each other was an important justification of American efforts to enlarge the sphere of democratic rule (Walt 1998: 39). However, some claim that this theory is merely valid for democracies of the right kind i.e. liberal democracies, and even then, history has proved differently already. A third strand of liberal theory argues that international institutions such as the International Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund could help overcome selfish state behavior. They may encourage states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation (Waltz 2000:7, 32). This is known as institutional liberalism or neo-institutionalism, which draws on elements from Wilsonian idealism. It has had a considerable impact on politics and political theory in general.

Idealism of liberal theory focuses on domestic dimension on foreign policy. It holds that a state should concentrate on its internal political philosophy. There is an argument that foreign policy should be guided by legal and ethical standards. Following the collapse of internationalism, international law and the League of Nations during the Great Depression of the 1930s, this was sought to separate international theory from its supposed interwar idealism (Doyle 1997: 27). In fact, the idealistic view of international politics was seriously criticized for ignoring the

role of power in which E.H. Carr (1939) was in forefront. Neorealists were focusing on world government therefore; they warned that without that structure, no state would be able to trust other one. No one would be assured of peaceful intentions of others. Furthermore, during the Cold War, idealism became unpopular due to its supposed naivety and Utopian thinking (Snyder 2004: 60). In fact, this was the time, when real tension was growing in between two blocks and no other institution was in that capacities to control or even guide them. There was only one fact and that was balance of power in a zero-sum-game.

Another version of liberalism is liberal institutionalism that advocates international cooperation as a means to softening antagonism in the international security environment. This is also known as functionalism or international functionalism. This is connected to both, first liberalism and second idealism. This shares similar principles of peace and freedom as well. However, it differs when focuses on the function of a system rather than on the actors within it. Instead of self-interest of the nation-state, followers of this approach put common interests and needs of states first. Therefore, functionalism has been leading the way in the globalization process. However, interestingly globalization has increased the volume and interdependence of issues facing lawmakers, thus expanding the workload (King 2010).

The functionalist mostly aims to establish a balanced and likely pattern of growth as well as development in the international system by means of building a number of essential and sufficient international organizations. These institutions address vital needs and significant tasks that need to be carried out in certain sectors or regions of the world in the name of human welfare. Common needs unite people across boundaries. Mitrany elaborate functionalism as a global peace theory (1966; 1976). The thoughts that form follows function or scale to function' are also included in some fundamental theoretical ideas. In fact, the function is more significant than how. However, the concept of functional spillover¹⁹ describes the social or psychological implications. It comes when a heavily interdependent system regulates action in one sector that carries over to easier regulation in another. Spillover effects are a kind of feedback loops that can be affirmative or negative; furthermore, a functionalist often talks about equilibrium like the one balance of power theorists do, no less than, in the sense, that sanctions at times shape nation-state behavior (Goertz 2003).

¹⁹ An international economics term sometimes referred to as interpenetration or ramification.

As far as dilution of state power is concerned functionalists along with federalists' hope that one-day nation-states will wither away and people will come to recognize that their essential requirements are better taken care of by international organizations. Thus, nation-states will come to cooperate with such organizations, i.e. economic cooperation will lead to political cooperation. In this sense, this approach is entrenched in the politics of pluralism in which a framework of interaction among people of different kinds leads to mutual respect, tolerance, and cooperation instead of competition²⁰. In this framework, people have been believed as shifting loyalties to agencies and institutions that best help and enrich their lives, realize human dignity, or look for higher values. In fact, implementation does not take place by judge, police officers, or soldier, but by ethical and efficient civil servants operating in the global bureaucracy that makes up the series of required and adequate international organizations for functionalism to work. The bureaucratic emphasis generates one of the major criticisms of functionalism i.e. the theory lends itself to the likelihood of rule by technocratic elites. There have been many attempts to model functionalism and test for integrative effects (Munch 1987).

O'Connor (1994) opines that the functionalist approach may be confused with regional integration theory that exists in international economics and is the assumed basis for organizations like the EU. The neofunctionalism in sociological criminology may also generate confusion that is based primarily upon the social systems ideas of Talcott Parsons though the connection between Parsonian sociology and international relations is evidently attributable to the work of the founding father of Integration Studies, Karl Deutsch (1966).

They argue that form follows function in the process of integration. The function of an international organization becomes the type of authority that determines its direction within the specific area. This process promotes collective governance and creates interdependence. Thus, this results in widespread acceptance of principles of the international system and thereby meeting human needs rather than the need of national subjects. Consequently, it contributes for collective welfare. Their belief is that this process would eventually reduce all kinds of global conflicts and poverty as

²⁰ The unfettered striving for, certainly, is the cardinal root of all evils in anomie-strain-functionalist theories.

well. This approach has a good voice in the integration through cooperation on shared areas of interest.

The neo-functionalism too comes into the periphery of liberalism. The neo-functional thoughts rest upon the idea of synergy i.e. the whole being greater than the sum of parts, where specific, well-designed institutions and organizations function in carefully-crafted and interlinked mode to accomplish vital jobs that a state needs to assume responsibility for. This theory argues that certain prerequisites are needed before integration can proceed. However, once these changes take place there will be an expansion of integration caused by spillover (Archer 2001: 14). Whilst Ernst Haas (1968: 283) believes that follower of this approach, have an expansive logic of sector integration. Haas is a big critique of the neo-functional school. The neo-functional observes in general two forms of spillover, functional and political. The functional represents the interconnection of sectors, whereby one affects the other. The political signifies the creation of supranational models of governance because of integrated functional sectors. This comes when neo-functional focuses specifically on regional integration. However, it is disputed whether integration leads to a better understanding and if it reduces sovereign power over time. In addition, it is unlikely that states will become the reduced player in a functional system. Moreover, it is difficult to prove that international cooperation would certainly result in the reduction of poverty and conflict. In fact, the results might be in contrary as well.

In contemporary world, liberalism has a wide range appeal as a response to contemporary security dilemmas. However, great powers do not follow theoretical approaches in its totality. They use it according to their requirements either in parts or completely.

SECURITY AND CRITICAL THEORY

This is the critique of traditional security discourses. Here we find two broad approaches. First, is related with the work of Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1997). They popularized the distinction between broadening and deepening security (1996: 229-254). They want to question the focus of traditional security discourses on the state and to re-examine prevailing claims about security. The stress is on the need to move from a focus on the military dimension of state behavior under anarchy to a focus on individuals, community and identity. While, on the other hand, Welsh

School focuses on the goal of human emancipation. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Only a process of emancipation can make the prospect of security more likely. However, this approach does not observe human emancipation as synonymous with the westernization. They have the opinion that emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order as well. Here the meaning of emancipation is as the freeing of people from the physical and human constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do as individuals or groups.

The security in terms of war and the threat of war are those constraints together with poverty, political oppression, poor education etc. The quest for emancipation and not power or order therefore produces genuine security.

Barry Buzan (1983: 91) stressed to broaden the security agenda so as to involve five sectors rather than deal only with one of the five that was the traditional focus on military security. He added political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors. He focuses on individual as the irreducible base unit but individual could not be the referent object for the international security. In this context, there is no option other than the state. It is simply because the state had to cope with the sub-state, state, and international security problematic. The state was the primary agent for the alleviation of insecurity. Moreover, the state was the dominant actor in the international political system. Thus, Buzan sought to widen the definition of security to encompass five sectors and to focus security on three levels, i.e. sub-state, the state and the international system.

The state is the referent object that stands at the interface between security dynamics at the sub-state level and the security dynamics operating at the level of the international system. The state security focuses on sovereignty as the core value, while the societal security focused instead on identity, as represented in the ability of a society to maintain its traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and national identity and customs. Migration like issues could not be fitted into the state security discourses.

The most important move towards societal security has been work on the idea of securitization. Therefore, labeling something as a security issue imbues it with a sense of importance and urgency that legitimizes the use of special measures outside of the

usual political process to deal with it. However, this results in a militarized and confrontational mind-set that defines security questions in and us versus them mode. On the contrary, this approach proposes de-securitizing issues, which is to remove them from the security agenda.

ASSESSMENT AND DESIGNING OF THREAT

The concept of securitization goes back to late 1980s when Ole Wæver initially offered it. It was developed to move security studies beyond Waltzian neorealism and the critique offered by poststructuralist critics above all Richard Ashley (Floyd & Croft 2010). The fundamental idea is that in international relations, a subject becomes a matter of emergency politics or a security issue not simply because something constitutes an objective threat to the state. It becomes rather a security concern when a powerful securitizing actor, often, but not necessarily the state, argues that something constitutes an existential threat to some object, which needs to be dealt with immediately if the object is to survive (Buzan et al. 1998). In the process the language of security performative speech act (Austin 1962) is also crucial. It does not simply come into being when one actor declares an existential threat; this is merely the securitizing move. In addition, a designated audience should accept the speech act. Thus, securitization is both a performative speech and an inter-subjective process between the securitizing actor and audience (Balzacq 2005)²¹. Once that audience has accepted a subject, the securitizing actor becomes in a position to evoke emergency measures and go beyond established rules and norms in an effort to address the threat. Securitization is fulfilled by the cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules (Buzan et al. 1998).

However, neither rule breaking nor emergency measures are required conditions for a securitization; they are in fact, what follows on from a securitization, and what eventually defines a securitizations success. Buzan et al express a successful securitization has three components or steps: existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al. 1998).

Securitization as a concept and theory has been developed as an analytical tool meant to help analysts establish who securitized, by what means and to what effects (Wæver 1997). It allows no conceptual room for what ought to be securitized. Notably, the

²¹ Quoted in Rita Floyd & Stuart Croft's "European non-traditional security theory", Feb. 2010, pp. 3-5.

securitizing actor and the security analyst are two functionally distinct entities²², with the analyst in no position to enter the security equation in order to make recommendations. Buzan et al (1998) advocate:

The designation of what constitutes a security issue comes from political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political actors' actions and sort out when these actions fulfill the security criteria. It is, further, the analyst who judges whether the actor is effective in mobilizing support around the security reference [i.e. the attempted securitizes are 'judged' first by other social actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then interpreted and measured by us]. Finally, to assess the significance of an instance of securitization, analysts study its effects on other units. The actor commands at only one very crucial step: the performance of a political act in a security mode.

They have expressed a normative preference for desecuritization over securitization. Desecuritization is the process whereby issues that were formerly securitized are downgraded and moved back into the normal political realm where they can be dealt with by the normal rules and regulations of [democratic] politics. Achieving security is not an end; rather, the end is to remove an issue from the security agenda altogether (Floyd & Croft 2010).

Securitization thus in effect denotes political actors' efforts, most often, though not exclusively, through speech or discourse, to take an issue out of normal politics and bring it into the realm of security. This process subordinates the issue to the competence of security organs, removes it from the public realm, substitutes secret bureaucratic decisions for open politics, and often contravenes human or civil rights (Bacon, Renz and Cooper 2006).

The aim of a securitizing move is typically to enable emergency measures that can secure the survival of a referent object. When a significant audience acknowledges the content of the security speech act as legitimate it turns successfully securitized. It comes out of the sphere of normal politics to the sphere of emergency politics; where it can be dealt with in an urgent manner and with fewer, formal and informal restraints (Atland and Pedersen 2008).

²² It needs explanation simply because Americans, especially defense analysts normally do not follow en toto the process according to Wæver and Buzan et al. who virtually established the concept in theory. Contrary to this, American analysts use desecuritization in general for their own purpose to help desecuritize issues of other nation-states. In addition, whenever and wherever they use the concept accordingly, they again try to securitize issues of a competitor or targeted states and rarely of their own. However, desecuritization connects clearly to peacemaking along with peace building agendas (Wæver 2008). Both seek (amongst other elements) to find ways to reduce tensions and fears of violence; both are seeking to restore or develop political processes that are regular and not subject to emergency measures. In short, both are committed to that which Wæver describes as desecuritization.

Actors make securitizing moves not just to place an item on the agenda, but also to claim that their agency alone has the capability either to define or resolve the problem or to implement the appropriate solution. In the Russian context, this all-encompassing securitization aimed at wide-ranging threat assessment of enemies and pervasive threats to Russian government, identity, territory, and economy. By 2006, Gareyev presented a comprehensive threat assessment. However, the government rejected to militarize the country and enforced mobilization of economy. In fact, policy-makers have refused to give the military control over the country or something close to it in peacetime, let alone in wartime. This highlights that military is successful in embedding its threat perception among key elites only to the degree they are receptive to it. In this respect, the fate of securitizing moves is to an extent determined by external factors or lack of in social relations of power (Atland and Bruusgaard 2009).

In 2006, Sergei Ivanov speaks out that the armed forces must be capable of operating in several regional and local conflicts simultaneously. This paved the way for military's threat assessment of 2006-08 to get a stand in the new security strategy (Sieca-Kozlowski 2009). However, there is no desire or perhaps capability to return completely to a Soviet mobilization state. The state is in doldrums between high ends and perceived threats. It has not developed sufficient means to meet existing notional threats. As a result, its political and economic demands upon its own society and the world cannot be sustained easily. The threat assessment that has prevailed looks to wars with the United States and NATO, however the current defense reform clearly points to an army capable of waging the smaller wars, which prevail in current situations, and becoming more of an expeditionary force for Russia and the CIS regions. Anatoly Tsyganok argued that,

We believe that in the 21st century, a guerilla war is more likely than a war launched by a modern army of, shall we say, the European or Asian type. . . . Therefore the arms and equipment must be prepared for that type of war. Unfortunately our military hardware that currently exists is last-century hardware (Litovkin 2007)²³.

Gareyev (2007) talks about the priority and preparation for defense, determines the types of wars that Russia might fight and then proceeds to organize the armed forces and country accordingly. He forecasts the possibility of wars of the 'spectrum of conflict'. In 2007, Baluyevsky reports that there had to be an integrated form of operational planning for the conduct of hostilities that might ensue. Certainly, the

²³ Quoted in Blank, 2010.

government, while admittedly engrossed in taking more aspects of national security under consideration could not formulate or implement a coherent program attuned to the goal of enhancing national security under one definition. Baluyevsky's advocacy to a NSS that would be fully observed by all government agencies, including the 'power departments'(Felgenhauer 2008)²⁴ underscores that institutional rivalry and obstruction should not come in the process, which even the U.S. have experienced and struggling to get rid of. However, it appears that despite Medvedev's elevation to the presidency; he himself, Kudrin, and Chubais could not come forward confidently to define the threat assessment and the ensuing policy requirements (Blank 2010).

Western defense analysts project that the evident trend under Putin to securitize ever more issues of Russian socio-economic and political life continues to be in the ascendancy with noteworthy consequences for both domestic and foreign policies. This trend has led to a hard line military campaign to seize the idea in defining the threats confronting Russia and the policies it should consequently adopt. These policy conclusions preceded the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, thus they are not completely attributable to that war and its consequences. In fact, the war not only can be traced to developments within the Russian policy process but also far beyond Moscow's problems with Tbilisi. All together, the importance of economics has reasserted itself vigorously not just in real life but in the national security strategy as well and making economic issues subject to securitization. Therefore, Putin and Medvedev brought more areas of national policy under securitization. This allowed defense establishment to take an aggressive stance on defining threats and recommended policy responses to them. They used the new strategy to try to impose coherence on the government and policy (Blank 2010).

SECURITY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

The constructivists approach to security involves the statement of Alexander Wendt (1992) that 'anarchy is what states make of it'. In security discourse, therefore security is what we make of it. This approach recognizes the significance of knowledge for transforming international structures and security politics. The state actors might see security as attainable through community rather than through power.

²⁴ Quoted in Blank, 2010.

Insecurity is not simply the given condition to the world system and security is something that can be constructed.

As a more contemporary strand of idealism, constructivism obtained a prominent place in theoretical debates. Constructivist theory emphasizes the impact of ideas and identities, but does not offer a unified set of predictions. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly soft product of specific historical processes. They emphasize how ideas are created, how they evolve and how they shape the way; states understand and respond to their situation. Constructivists pay close attention to the prevailing discourses in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior. Debates about ideas are viewed as the fundamental building blocks of international life. Individuals and groups become powerful if they can convince others to adopt their ideas. People's understanding of their interests depends on the ideas they hold and, to that extent, actors in the international system understand different actors differently. Alexander Wendt (1999) argues that the realist conception of anarchy does not adequately explain why conflict occurs between states. The real issue, he contends, is how anarchy is understood, so anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt 1992). States claim that anarchy is a concept mutually constituted by actors sharing the same constitutive rules and practices. Constructivism provides an understanding of, or gives meaning to, situations and intentions. Moreover, constructivism does not resolve the security dilemma, but they opines that certainty is not a source of security, it reduces uncertainty however (Hopf 1998: 174; 188).

This theoretical approach is particularly attentive to the sources of change. For them, international change results from the work of intellectual entrepreneurs whose behavior deviates from accepted standards. Therefore, constructivists often study the role of transnational activist networks in promoting change (Snyder 2004: 60). The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate the event and had some trouble explaining it. Constructivists had an explanation, arguing that former president Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as common security. From this perspective, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities and interests and

how others perceive these. Obviously, this is particularly appealing in the study of terrorism. Thus, recent events seem to justify the resurgence of constructivist theory.

According to Snyder (2004: 59-60), a theory that emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world. Echoes of the constructivist approach can be found in recent studies of globalization, social movements and terrorism. The past two decades have also witnessed an explosion of interest in the concepts of culture and identity. This development overlaps with the constructivist emphasis on the importance of ideas and norms (Walt 1998: 42). From this perspective, security and insecurity are essentially related to the competition and perceived incongruity between social identities. In this context, Appadurai has introduced the concept of predatory identities. Predatory are those identities whose social construction and mobilization require the extinction of other, proximate social categories, defined as threats to the very existence of some group, defined as we (Appadurai 2006: 51). Thus, in a post-Cold War era, security has developed many dimensions but conventional approaches are still laying down the rules of the game.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Today the impact of globalization on the international system and national security strategies of states is a central question in the study of international relations. It is an emerging global security paradigm. Analysis of sources and forms of state power in the light of welfare and security makes clear not only the impact of globalization but existential situation of the state too. The concepts of globalization, security, and the authority of the nation state, are interlinked. The security as well as global transformations resulting changes in the nature of state and to some extent its structure too. Many transnational and regional institutions are reshaping national security policies throughout the world but facing new intellectual challenges as well. In spite of many discussions and discourses regarding globalization the importance and role of the sovereign nation-states in world affairs has been established repeatedly. The fundamental question is, whether has globalization forever undermined the state as the mighty guarantor of public welfare and security? In the 1990s, the prevailing and even hopeful view was that it had. However, today the "return of the state" is increasingly being discussed as a desirable reality (Paul, Ikenberry, & Hall 2003).

The globalization has economic, political, military, and cultural dimensions, as noted by political scientists T.V. Paul and Norrin Ripsman (2010) in their useful operationalization of the concept:

“...the operation of businesses on a global, rather than a national level; the ease with which individuals and groups can communicate and organize across national frontiers; the global transmission of ideas, norms, and values that might erode national cultures in favor of a broader global culture; the increasing participation of states in international political, economic, and military organizations; the spread of particular forms of political institutions, such as representative democracy, to vast areas of the globe; and the increasing participation of individuals from multiple countries in INGOs. Globalization, therefore, is a vast and multi-faceted enterprise.”

The decline of nation-state is commonly argued by globalization thesis, though it is debatable. However, its advocates and the realm of national security have argued that the power of states has diminished in relation to international NGOs (INGOs), interstate international organizations (IOs), transnational governmental institutions, and transnational capitalism. It is a fact that “there has been a tremendous expansion in what was termed ‘global civil society’. Whereas in 1956 there were 973 International NGOs (INGOs) and 132 interstate International Organizations (IOs), by 1999 there were 5825 INGOs while the number of IOs had increased only to 251(Waschuk 2001). However, the extent to which international social forces affect the existence depends on the strength of that nation-state, i.e. all kinds and dimensions of power.

Initially, Paul and Ripsman (2010) point to declines in both global military spending and interstate war; though it has risen dramatically in recent years. However, are these trends indicative of the decline of nation state’s role as a guarantor of national security? They argue that the globalization school has largely gotten it wrong. The decline in interstate warfare could mostly be attributed to the end of the Cold War. Moreover, great powers, e.g. the US, China, and Russia keep on pursuing traditional nation-state strategies. Regional security arrangements, e.g. the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. have not realized something substantial. The weak states that are ones most impacted by the turmoil of globalization have far more traditional approaches in their national security perception and strategies. They prefer to rely on their own resources rather than those of regional and transnational institutions. They argue persuasively too, that states are the masters rather than victims of the process of globalization and it has not radically transformed the international and regional security environments as well. The states have

continued to be pivotal in various areas, e.g. nationalism, national security, multiculturalism, taxation, and industrial relations. Nevertheless, this is correct beyond every doubt that the existence of nation-states depends on the circumstances or security environment, capacity i.e. strength/power, and the way to adapt in specific issue areas and situations.

Patrick M. Wood (2006) writes, 'Global elite want money, not national security'. He quotes Zbigniew Brzezinski, the principal architect of modern globalization who wrote in 1972 the 'nation state as a fundamental unit of man's organized life has ceased to be the principal creative force :International banks and multinational corporations are acting and planning in terms that are far in advance of the political concepts of the nation-state.' Brzezinski was a co-founder of the global elitist Trilateral Commission in 1973. Recently in 2004, he wrote, "The notion of total national security is now a myth. Total security and total defense in the age of globalization are not attainable. The real issue is: with how much insecurity can America live while promoting its interests in an increasingly interactive, interdependent world?"

On the one hand, globalization has thrown up non-traditional security challenges with no respect for national frontiers, while on other hand; Kirshner (1995, 2006) asks how globalization is changing national security. It acknowledges that there are myriad schools of thought on this issue, from the realist that believes that globalization is a fad or zeitgeist to the cosmopolitan thinker who sees it fundamentally changing the nature of the world. Kirshner (2006) argues that globalization, even if we completely retain the state-centered view of international relations, changes the rules of the game. The bifurcation of economy, widening gap of wealth and migration are crucial issues in the globalization thesis. However, the overall objective of the game has not changed, but the context in which actors must operate is fundamentally different. The Post-Colonialism, Neo-Marxist and Feminist theories also posit some serious dimensions of national security.

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CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

If a state fails to acknowledge its own decline, does not see its decline as enduring, or attributes it to constructed or treacherous forces at home or abroad, the state has no reason to accept without contest its consignment to secondary status. In fact, it may promote just the opposite, especially if the state is aware that others narrate its past, present, and future in terms of an enduring decline. It may seek prospects to demonstrate its continued relevance beyond its borders. It may be abnormally sensitive to its segregation from various forums, interpreting such exclusion as an insignificant, and it may undermine international cooperation to prove its exclusion to be a mistake. A state whose future is dim may fatalistically accept international cooperation that disproportionately benefits others in the short run, as long as it makes some gains. However, a state convinced that renewal is possible, may be more sensitive to unbalanced or relative gains, and international cooperation may suffer (Krebs 2010). In fact, this perspective is important to analyze the Russian retreat from the Cold War status.

THE NEW EMERGENCE

The end of Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union are synonyms in contemporary international relations. On February 7, 1990, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has renounced its legitimate power and rights conferred on its shoulders through the Article VI of the Soviet Constitution. Party made a rough consensus to amend the focal Article with clear intension to open the political life and process of the newly born nation. In the previous years because of doldrums, contingency and indecisiveness of the party leaders, decisions either were taken half-heartedly or were not implemented seriously. In both cases, dissatisfaction prevailed not only in the proponents and in opponents of the reforms but also in general masses. After more than seven decades of 'an absolute constitutional monopoly', CPSU allowed effectively political multilateralism where ideological differences were acknowledged as strength not the weakness of society and state. People have been bestowed the right and psychological promotion to form their political parties, institutions, associations and organizations. Rumer (1995) explains the situation as "parties and movements have ranged from the notorious, rabidly nationalist and xenophobic Pamyat'(which

seeks to protect Russia from a conspiracy of Zionists and Freemasons) and the misnamed Liberal-Democratic Party (which advocates restoration of the Russian Empire to its pre-1917 boundaries) to the democratic and market-oriented Russian Republican Party and the Universalist Party (whose principal goals include abolition of the death penalty and protection of abortion rights).”

However, these parties have generated only a little wave in the political arena and no one has made a successful attempt to create a base at the grass-root level. Even then, it is a fact that they made a difference in the completely political environment of the country. Different political and policy subjects came under the open social and political discussion. In western thought, a free marketplace of ideas was taking place, which creates a situation where monolith of national interest could be replaced by multidimensional thoughts and visions of public intellectuals in general.

The new relationship with the West or free market democracies or rather economies, focus on post-Soviet space, transformation in a pluralistic democratic political system and most importantly, its strategic orientation about national security and national interest were significant questions in consideration at the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union.

However, national security, national interest and foreign policy of the new Russian state were not completely in different and watertight compartments. In fact, these are entwined in one another. The domestic economic reforms as well as political transformation had their dependence on these three pillars. They had to reorganize their army with a fresh and economical budget allocation. Their relation with the west and rest was in question. Having national security and the Cold War status in consideration, they had to formulate and decide their visionary approach to advance the country and to prepare for the coming twenty first century. They felt the importance of openness and encouraged people to make their voices on national security and national interest without using the Aesopian language of the Soviet era. This reflects their quest for frog-jump and stable vision to achieve all that what has been lost in the near past. However, this was the only way to emerge from the Soviet past. Warsaw Pact prism had been broken, territorial border realities changed but many issues remained unresolved, rather many new one came into existence. These issues were related to economy, politics- domestic and international both, social and

very crucial psychological one. The lost status in the international political arena was a huge setback in the minds of the Russian people.

The journey from dominance to equality and sometimes below the dignity was not easy to consume. However, Russia attempted its best to reorganize and establish relations in near abroad, distant democratic or industrialized as well as with other third world countries. Acquiring the status of a stabilizing regional actor in competition with economically robust China was (is) a new challenge before Russian policy makers. In fact, cooperation was the only prescription but modus operandi was the most difficult job to employ. The whole of Europe, America and Commonwealth of Independent states were in the new panorama. Thinking on Monroe-like doctrine and great power ambition along with pragmatic financial and economic question with management of force structure, are difficult to manage.

ANALYZING THE ROOTS

Mikhail Gorbachev, from the day first in his office in 1985, was conscious about the deteriorating condition of the Soviet economy and restlessness of not only the Russian people but about the citizenry of the whole union as well. The abolition of Article VI in February 1990 was not the reason of a new dawn but was the outcome of a long drawn deliberation and a symbol of the end of old Soviet system. The old stakeholders of national security policy were making strong opposition stand against Gorbachev. Defense establishment was the biggest soaking system (of finance) and obstacle against any economic reform. Defense institutions apparently dominated national security policy. Therefore, Gorbachev attempted to involve civil as well as academic community to contribute actively in the national security debate and planning rather putting them passively to show as the Russian intellectual face before the rest and especially the western world.

Gorbachev advocated in 1986, at the 27th Party Congress, “Guaranteeing security appears more and more as a political problem which can be solved only through political means.” He emphasized a better active role of civilian in the formulation of defense policies. He made an effort to make use of political instruments of security, which has been given secondary or tertiary status or consideration in the national security process. Political means had to play a crucial role in civil-military relation and was a big blow to national security establishment. This “now included civilian

analysts as well as the military, to fill with meaning his new doctrine of 'reasonable sufficiency,' which was to guide Soviet security policy. The race to fill the shell of 'reasonable sufficiency' with meaning began between civilian proponents of downsizing the Soviet military burden and military advocates of the status quo" (Rumer 1995). People started making voices to extend better peaceful relationship with the West and reduction in defense establishment. This demand for cooperation and additional role for civil society in defense and political decision-making has prompted to think for foreign investment and technology cooperation with the west. This was creating a situation to restructure and convert the offensive defense posture into defensive one.

On the other hand, status-quoists projected the threat of NATO alliance, the U.S. defense (numerical) posture and attempted to consolidate the policy of 'offense is the best defense'. However, in its contrary Gorbachev announced the reduction of 500,000 troops in Eastern Europe in December 1988. This move of Gorbachev naturally changed the whole security environment and created a new motion to raise other left out issues, like opening of the Berlin Wall, participation in NATO, Soviet integration into Common European Home etc. The unification and withdrawal has shattered the whole European military operation theater, which was the central ground for more than four decades. However, it created many social problems in Russia. Focusing these problem men in uniform and conservative opposition along with few reactionary political parties made an effort to oppose the reform moves. Gorbachev-Shevardnadze policy was opposed through the projection of containment by the hostile states. The question of 'sphere of influence' and national interest was raised as a pre-condition for being a great power. The right wing Communist Party and weak nationalists have played dominant role against the pro-Western approach that to an extent resulted in the resignation of Shevardnadze in the winter of 1990.

The 'Democratic Russia' movement a staunch opposition of Gorbachev led by Boris Yeltsin also supported the reforms. In fact, he had more radical and popular reform agenda. He was in favor of the dismantling of Soviet empire and converting it in a union of equal partners by the treaty. His program was known as 'Little Russia' to float the message 'back to internal reconstruction' rather wasting energy to retain the previous structure. People in general and even on the grass-root level acknowledged this thought. On the other hand, right wing thought wanted to establish old Soviet

days without popular support, which was a herculean task for any one. However, the danger of a reactionary crackdown was not completely over; what the August 1991 coup has shown is a failure. Advisors of Gorbachev changed their allegiance toward Yeltsin by the 1991. Yeltsin was clear about the cooperation with the West. The choice of Yegor Gaydar, a Chicago-school monetarist brand of economist, made the intentions clear. The economic integration into world economy, privatization and substantial slash in defense budget were the initial prime agenda. Therefore, mutual profitability became the fundamental formula of new establishment. The transfer and subsidy obligations ceased to exist to the republics. Although, a crucial question was in deep consideration among policy makers as well as in academe; whether integration should be 'with the West' or 'into the West'; Gaydar along with Kozyrev preferred the second one.

SECURITIZATION UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

Under Putin's and Medvedev's presidencies, debates over Russian security have become more delicate; attempts have been made to securitize more aspects of domestic, defense, and foreign policy to supervise those domains (Bacon, Renz, & Cooper 2006). Kristian Atland and Pedersen (2008) find securitizing process like a display of continuity from the Soviet period that suggests an unreformed mindset regarding security. For this, they highlight Gareyev's threat assessments. Therefore, regarding the Svalbard Archipelago (Spitzbergen) in the Arctic they conclude, "There seems to be a high degree of continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War Russian interpretations of space-related activities on the Svalbard Archipelago". They find that current pattern of securitization is in reality not very different from the Cold War pattern and it seems fair to assume that the historic baggage of Soviet/Russian mistrust and suspicion still serves as a 'facilitating condition' for securitization (Atland and Pedersen 2008). Many of the securitizing actors like Gareyev held high positions in the Soviet period and had a natural bend and influence to a Soviet, rather than Western, mindset. Atland and Pedersen moreover argue in the case of Russia's overall national security concept and defense doctrine (as in the lesser case of a region like the Svalbard Archipelago) that:

. . . the 'audiences' that the 'securitizing actors' were playing up to, such as the Russian Security council, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry, shared many of their concerns. These 'audiences' were generally receptive to the calls for extraordinary measures on and around the archipelago at the time (Atland & Pedersen 2008).

Blank & Weitz (2010) observe, “The receptivity of these audiences to such enormous securitizing moves owes much to the unwillingness or inability of both the Yeltsin and Putin regimes to reform any or all of Russia’s agencies concerned with national security policies. Of course, Yeltsin started and Putin completed the process. The securitization process shows the complexities and specter of future in Russian politics and policy making that might have to an extent the Soviet military mentality. Even if not all of these securitizing moves are successful, the scope of the effort, as well as its failures and successes, are noteworthy (Bacon, Renz, & Cooper 2006). This process has led to the securitization of diverse areas of domestic policy that were hitherto excluded from the debate, e.g., culture and health. Now they too have been quite overtly securitized in an effort to impose the coordination (FBIS SOV 2009). Defense analysts Blank & Weitz opine that:

“the regime’s ambition for a population that is, to use a German term of the Nazi period, ‘Gleichgeschaltet’; that is to say, coordinated around the state... this ‘coordination’ reflected in Putin’s policies and the new strategy... it is instrumental in removing many areas of policy from public control or scrutiny and in politicizing others that normally might not be thought to fall within the realm or competence of the Russian power structures [silovye struktury]. Moreover, it is continuing. For example, President Medvedev has called for a new law on defense that would supplement Clause 10 of the Federal Law On Defence with paragraph 21, specifying that in line with the generally accepted principles and provisions of international law, the Russian Federation’s international treaties, and the Federal Law On Defence, Russian Armed Forces can be used in operations beyond Russia’s borders for the following purposes:

- To counter an attack against Russian Armed Forces or other troops deployed beyond Russia’s borders;
- To counter or prevent an aggression against another country;
- To protect Russian citizens abroad;
- To combat piracy and ensure safe passage of shipping” (2010).

Kremlin published draft suggests that the Federal Law on Defence be supplemented with Clause 101, setting, in accordance with Russia’s Constitution, the procedures for decisions on use of Russian Armed Forces beyond the country’s borders. All together the Deputy Chief of the General Staff²⁵, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, announced on August 11 that:

The new military doctrine, which is being drawn up under the guidance of the Russian Federation Security Council, will be different from the current text. It will consist of two parts—the public one, which will include mostly military-political aspects, and the classified one, where the issues of the right to use the army and navy, including the use of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent, will be clearly defined (FBIS SOV 2009).

Bacon et al. (2006) reveal that since the war (August 2008) with Georgia, without any legislative sanction for military action, a threatening trend towards a minimization of

²⁵ Russian military intelligence—the GRU (*Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye*), as big in size as the former KGB [*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (Committee of State Security)] and spread over all continents—is an integral part of the General Staff.

civilian and democratic accountability in military defense occurring on surface. For example, the ‘hierarchy and politicians’ of the Orthodox Church increasingly invoke the spiritual security (Dukhovnaya Bezopasnost) of the nation and the threats to it (Bacon, Renz, and Cooper 2006). They in fact, allied to the authorities today, seek a status akin to that of the official state religion. Thus a double securitization has occurred, with religion being politicized and with its politics being intimately connected with the power structures. Similarly, the Russian Ministry of Emergency-Situations has declared that the possibility of an epidemic from avian flu represents a threat to Russia’s national security, thus equating it to terrorism or nuclear arms races (Interfax 2006).

Russian officials like to say that the major security documents e.g. the new strategy arise out of the state’s commitment to the security of individual citizens and the state. This securitizing process therefore suggests that for Russian officialdom the individual is getting importance as the western model of state-function desires and requires. Commenting on this approach as “a long-standing Russian belief that grows out of the tradition of the service state” is not understandable and saying that “Putin has arguably restored key elements of that pre-modern service state” is not justifiable (Blank 2009). They even write to validate their observations found in a study of Russian domestic politics, namely that,

The securitization approach illuminates one of the overarching self-conceptualizations of the Putin government. If the Yeltsin regime defined itself in terms of democratization; then much that has been done since that time is defined in terms of security. Analysis of discourse, which is central to the methodological approach employed [here], reveals repeatedly the power of the key signifier “security” and the frequency of its adoption by the forces seeking hegemony within Russia’s political elite (Bacon, Benz, & Cooper 2006).

However, this is also considerable that the extension of the term security to wider fields of non-military governmental operations and the desire to internationalize both the accompanying threat perceptions and responses to these perceptions brings about undesirable threat inflation. These calls place ever-greater pressures on governments to do and be more, even if the establishment lacks the resources for sufficient actions to existing threats. Such calls to action, though morally laudable, are intellectually incoherent and highly problematic (Buzan, Ole Waever, & Wilde 1998). Therefore, similar process of securitization involves risks for every state in regards to both democracy as well as state’s governing capacity. What has been argued that:

In a world where “security” seems to be overwhelming all other normative frameworks, to treat all these important issues as security concerns has actually come to cloud justifications

for action and risks undermining important mechanisms of legal constraint (Bruneel & Toope 2004).

Likewise, the failure to subject defense policy and the institutions responsible for it to authentic civilian democratic control creates a temptation for confrontation. Russia is also vulnerable of this trend²⁶ (Blank 2006). However, this is true in general; that an unchecked process of securitization of organized social life generates an unending spiral of politicization that may make it harder to deal with these threats (Blank & Weitz 2010). This securitization process has maximum concern for the national interest above any other consideration (Golts & Putnam 2004; Golts 2004). In addition, it allows the power structures to seek their own autonomous sphere of decision-making. This trend by the Siloviki to usurp the civilian control was started by the end of Yeltsin's presidency where the Chief of Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, could launch an intervention in Kosovo without coordination from other ministries because he had obtained presidential approval (Blank 2000).

Russia during Putin and the U.S. under Bush focused on heavy securitization. The effort to militarize security definitions finds its way in both the countries. However, in Russia their process has inflated threat assessments to the extent that political and military threats are conflated and as a result trying to restrict democratic control over the relevant power structures. The process of securitization puts the state at unintended threat perception as well. It tempts the government to overextend themselves and take on tasks for which they are either ill suited or those goals are beyond their capacity. Perhaps this was what happened to the Soviet Union. They defined themselves as being in a state of continuous conflict, thus under permanent threat (both within and without) from the imperialist West. Hence, the Soviet Union was permanently organized either as a war economy, which eventually could not compete economically or militarily with its rival demands. Now not only Russia, many other nation-states as well, because of their elite's perceptions tempt to believe that they can use force to solve internal as well as external problems with impunity and not reckon the costs of doing so. However, Russia in last two decades has fought three wars and been vulnerable to coups. Since Putin, and probably the elite, regards the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, [t]he[y] should be away from many Soviet legacies especially those that are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

²⁶ The coups of 1991, 1993; two Chechen wars in 1994-96, 1999, and with Georgia-2008.

THE LAST STAGE OF DEBATE

In fact, the Security Council was supposed to accept the National Security Strategy (NSS) in February 2009. However, the continuing aggravation of the current economic crisis has worsened to the point where the overall economy shrunk by 10.1 percent from January-June 2009. Therefore, the importance of economic factors as a part of security was irrefutable. On March 24, 2009, Medvedev explicitly stated that economic security is a part of national security and insisted that the NSS must be considered in the light of the need of the time. He referred to the strategy's purpose of coordinating the state, saying that:

We have had departmental priorities dominate us for a long time, which does not always facilitate effective attainment of common strategic objectives. Such fragmentation hinders the country in moving forward. . . . The state intends to get rid of fragmentation with a common procedure for preparing documents and with close coordination among the federal center, the regions, and municipalities, as well as civilian society. In fact, we are talking about forming a strategic planning vertical under the direction of the head of state. . . . It unquestionably must rest on a precise regulatory base (Kuzmin; Novikova & Telmanov; kremlin.ru 2009).

The original order for rewriting the national security strategy was (2004) delayed for various reasons. The worsening economic situation and on March 23, the EU's announcement to help Ukraine reform its gas infrastructure created jerks into Russian strategy²⁷. Many new and at times diametrically opposite proposals were set forth on the floor. The proposals for new amendments to the strategy were put forward in the closed part of the session. Therefore, a decision was taken to add new clauses to the strategy. However, its basis remains unchanged.

The priority was placed on achieving coordination and perfection of the existing power vertical. Medvedev insisted on the need for strategic planning and tied the new strategy to the classified 'List of Criteria and Indicators of the Level of National Security' (2009). However, the economic crisis was not the only factor that led to delay. By March 24, it was clear that a serious change in U.S. policies was underway. Medvedev had to meet Obama in London on April 1. Therefore, there was a chance for further development in understanding.

²⁷ "Beginning of Meeting with the Security Council on National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Through 2020 and Measures Necessary to Implement It."

THE SECURITY STRATEGY

The NSS begins with the assertion that they have overcome the economic-political crisis of the last century and proceeds to say that due to this success, government is moving to a new state policy in the national security sphere based on previous documents like the long-term socio-economic advancement plan until 2020. The strategy places Russia in a framework of globalization and interdependence that increase the vulnerability of all members of the global community to new challenges and threats. Russia too faces new and augmented threats. The process of strategy formulation coincides with a new geopolitical situation where new centers of economic growth and political influence are becoming stronger, e.g. Russia, Brazil, India, and China. The situation promotes a trend, "Toward searching for the resolution of existing problems and the settlement of crisis situations on a regional basis, without the participation of non-regional forces" (NSS, FBIS SOV 2005)²⁸.

Accordingly, three themes have been presented: (a) Russian recovering capability, (b) increase of new threats, and (c) the decline of old centers of power like the U. S. as Russia rises, a situation that should advance sphere of influence crises and security management trends in the world. Moreover, the strategy argues that Russia has enough potential to count upon being considered amongst the leading states in the world economy. The strategy outlines some negative trends. This includes the implicit reference to U.S. unilateralism and use of force, contradictions amid primary participants in world politics, WMD proliferation and the possibility of proliferation to terrorists. While more sophisticated forms of illegal cybernetic and growing information confrontation along with biological activities are other serious issues. Religious radicalism, ethnic and national hatreds, worsening demographic situations globally, increased drug trafficking, and organized transnational crime are no less important.

The strategy suggests that long-term focus will "be concentrated on the possession of sources of energy resources, notably in the Middle East, on the Barents Sea shelf and in other areas of the Arctic, in the Caspian Sea Basin, and in Central Asia." The issues of proliferation in North Korea and Iran, conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa will have a negative impact on world politics in the middle term. Energy is

²⁸ Quoted in "No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves," *Russia's Blueprint for a Police State; The New Security Strategy*, by Stephen J. Blank, 2010.

Russia's most important economic asset on a grand scale, which imbues the self-belief and confidence that Russia, "sees itself as a country that is self-sufficient" (Ivanov 2007).

The ideas that the struggle for resources will be the driving force in future clashes and the West want to exploit Russia's resources generate new long-term concerns in political as well as defense arena as well. A periodical *Voyennaya Mysl* (Military Thought) explicitly argues that the foreseeable wars of the next decade are going to grow out of the rivalry for control over energy resources that leads to spheres of influence and rivalries in between hostile military blocs (Blank 2010). Russia intends to control not only the natural wealth of the territory, but overturn its system of values, outlooks, and replace them from outside the uniqueness and self-identity of the people in particular. Moreover, the strategy makes it clear that the resolution of emerging problems is not excluded "under the conditions of the competitive struggle for resources." In addition, NATO's expansion, the advance of U.S. military power to Russia's borders, and the attribution of global military powers to NATO without UN sanction are objectionable to Russia, which demands the equal treatment. Moscow seeks equal relations with Washington with a view to resolving outstanding arms control, proliferation, and regional issues as well. The strategy outlines Russia's national interests i.e. 'sovereign democracy' and competitive economy. These interests come before ensuring Russia's territorial integrity and constitutional order. Their major interest of turning the Russian Federation into a world power aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a multipolar world.

The NSS puts forward the goal of preventing global and regional wars and conflicts as well as conducting strategic deterrence to ensure Russia's security. This deterrence goes beyond nuclear deterrence to include the armed forces, economy, and further development of military-patriotic education of the citizenry. The strategy reveals a list of threats to military security that seriously makes concerns about its real and perceived rivals. The official statements refuse to acknowledge a Chinese threat, a sign of policy guidance because Russian nuclear forces in Asia are configured for deterring China too (Blank 2008). The lesser focus is made on asymmetric or unconventional threats. There are no serious concerns about the Asia-Pacific and

North-Caucasus dimensions. However, it focuses on military threats that are related to high-tech large-scale conflicts. Paragraph 30 & 31 explain that:

The threat to military security are: the policy of a number of leading foreign countries aimed at achieving overwhelming supremacy in the military sphere, especially in strategic nuclear forces, through the development of high-precision, information and other high-tech means of warfare, strategic weapons in non-nuclear, the formation of a global missile defense system on a unilateral basis, and the militarization of near-earth space—developments capable of resulting in a new spiral of the arms race – as well as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies and the production of weapons of mass destruction or their components and delivery systems.

The negative impact on the state of the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies is aggravated by the withdrawal from international understandings in the weapons limitation and reduction sphere, and also by actions at the destabilization of state and military command and control, missile attack warning, and outer space monitoring systems, the functioning of the strategic nuclear forces, nuclear munitions storage facilities, the atomic energy industry, atomic and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous facilities (NSS 2009).

The document talks of the need to reform Russia's armed forces and defense industrial sector, however the key emphasis resides on nuclear weapons and the maintenance of deterrence through them (NSS 2009). The Western defense analysts who focus and magnify even little concerns have highlighted this theme. They underline Russian conventional defense mode to make them strong and to safeguard their own interests. They are not hesitant even in presenting the danger of World War III (Bellamy 2004) by focusing a strong sign given by American government to make serious reforms in the defense infrastructure, training and strategy after 9/11.

Medvedev (2009) opines that the first mission is to improve the troops' permanent readiness, their quality, and Strategic Nuclear Forces. He emphasizes the need for "optimizing" structure and numbers in addition to equipping them with the newest arms as well. He also emphasized the urgency of creating rapid reaction forces for the CSTO, a task that is now underway. Putin (2007) expresses concerns about preserving nuclear force capability and increasing its combat readiness, optimizing the General Purpose Forces' capability to neutralize threats to Russia's security early in the cycle of their appearance, and only then technical re-equipping of the army, navy and air forces. Still the share of modern armaments in the armed forces only makes up 10 percent of the Russian arsenal, and only 19 percent of defense spending was earmarked for reequipping the army and navy in 2008. This makes a third priority to organizational reform and maintenance of the nuclear forces. This ostensibly clarifies compulsions of Russian government to reform its defense sector. Moreover, the ongoing reform of the Russian army that began in 2008 is intended to make army more

capable of fighting the smaller wars. Therefore, they have rendered a threat assessment that is in the direction of defense reforms. In addition, Russia pursues a policy having a serious consideration of collapsing strength of the conventional forces in the navy's case, which is now thinking of buying foreign ships to gain self-sufficiency. The threat assessment corresponds very much with both the preceding speeches.

The U.S. is striving to achieve global leadership. It is interested in building up military presence in regions contiguous with Russia. They are inspired to get access to raw material, energy, and other resources of CIS countries. Processes aimed at crowding Russia (out) from the area of its traditional interests. International terrorism, religious extremism, and the illegal arms trade seriously influenced the military-political situation. They have been manifested more and more often in countries bordering on Russia. Georgia's attack on South Ossetia was a direct threat to Russian national interests and military security. Therefore, they attempted to settle the conflict by force. Overall, the analysis of the military-political situation permits a conclusion about the growing likelihood of armed conflicts and their potential danger (Blank 2010).

A SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS: RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The NSS is a confident public statement of Russian government in the name of strategy. However, some western defense analysts find many fundamental issues unresolved. Stephen J. Blank finds its overall approach very contentious. Of course, many inherent defects are historically developed in Russia's political structure and are unresolved, which repeatedly created contradictions. In this backdrop, the document provides us a window of opportunity to get a better acquaintance of Russian decision-making and political process as well as its new vision to the 'others'. Though, in addition, we should not forget that after all this is a political document.

The concept of security lacks a universal definition at all. Of course, it is a difficult task to define the nature and scope of security anywhere in the world and Russia is not an exception at all. It is a contested concept among academicians, decision makers as well as political practitioners. However, certain conditions are unique to Russia. Its enormous physical strength and global scope offers them to play a crucial role. The issues that require securitization are more or less politically defined. Politics also

defines the nature of threat to Russian Federation. Many stakeholders make an effort to gain a large advantage over rivals in defining the state's policy and structure. The process of securitization per se is a matter of contestation in the New Russia. "David Easton's claim that politics amounts to a struggle for the authoritative allocation of tangible and/or intangible values" (Blank 2010) getting currency in the system. Like anywhere else including democracies, those factions get hold of tangible and intangible political resources with which they enrich their constituents and execute premeditated missions. The struggle over defining security and its environment depends on political power either in the U.S. or in Russia. Growing absence of bipartisan spirit in the U.S. and legacy of the authoritarian spirit in Russian political structure makes a little difference in a struggle for the authoritative/budgetary allocations'.

Vladimir Putin was determined to formulate a new security strategy from day first. However, there was a lack of common understanding on methodology and mechanism for evaluating the condition of national security for shaping the concept. In fact, the dynamics of national security and policymaking in Russia was a tough deal in the new security environment. There was an open discord among the main players. Consensus on securitizing issues was absent but its resolution was a much-needed task through the proper or legitimate process. However, strategy crafters were trying to assess the threats as well as recommended policies to counter them. The content of military reforms and doctrine was also a crucial issue. Resolving the struggle over determining both the threats to Russia and the policies to counter them was not an easy job. Russian civil-military relations were also in a sensitive phase. Sometimes policymaking remained personalized too. Dmitry Trenin focused on the inadequacy of means and formation of a strategic policy of the Russian state (2009).

On securitization, i.e., the definition of what constitutes national security, numerous analysts, especially western, e.g. Blank & Weitz (2010) charge that it is essentially as an instrument for the pursuit of private, departmental, or factional aims. In a changed security environment, it was also difficult to chart out a new concept of national interest. However, Putin personally articulated a threat assessment and definition of security in 2006-07 through his speeches, statements, and press conferences. This outlined the threat assessment and definition of Russian national security. However, 'normally a national security strategy should precede'- according to western

methodology- 'both a defense and a foreign policy doctrine/concept. Instead, the foreign policy concept appeared in July 2008 and was followed in 2009 by the national security strategy' (Giles 2009: 3-4)²⁹. Blank acknowledges this process as unusual procedure. These political events reflect the systemic complications of national security strategy as well as the defense doctrine formulation in the new Russian state.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The new National Security Strategy is not just aimed at domestic audiences for domestic political purposes but also for external threats to Russia. Western strategic analysts feel that the military-intelligence bloc's assessment was largely accepted since it coincided with the political leadership's outlook; the response to that assessment tendered by the Siloviki was rejected in favor of a civilian-led program of action. Yet, the net result is the securitization and politicization of new aspects of domestic politics. As a result, the national security strategy serves primarily domestic political and strategic purposes. Thus, analysts find the following developments taking place with regard to Russian national security policy.

Of course, as elsewhere the status and stature of Security Council, the body that is supposed to have coordinated the national security strategy and the defense doctrine, has been enhanced. Council's Secretary is to supervise the Council's coordinating role that covers all elements of the national security system and beyond those organs of state government, state organizations, and social organizations (Stephen J. Blank 2010). This security strategy points to the diffusion of the Soviet mode of thinking throughout the government especially in the case of defense industry. It is conforming to the Russian tradition that an effort to root out ineffectiveness often involves more centralization. Sergei Ivanov (2006) had created an 'audit pyramid' under his supervision in the military industrial complex (MIC). Such monitoring is justified by the idea that without it, rampant corruption would ensue and the market cannot be trusted. The new strategy introduced a new provision that all documents on domestic and foreign policy should be referred to the Security Council for an appraisal. The Council will measure progress of all concerned parties and reporting annually to the President (Giles 2009).

²⁹ Quoted in Stephen J. Blank's "*No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves,*" *Russia's Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy*", 2010.

Through this draft, President Medvedev has explicitly stated his intention to use the strategy or strategic planning as an instrument to overcome the dominance of departmentalism and departmental priorities over national interest. This determination indicates that this is a real priority for its authors. Therefore, Patrushev stated in December 2008 that, overall, the country's leadership has already mapped out the first priority aspects of the national security strategy, which are the perfection of the political system, optimization of state governance and the enhancement of the state's defense and security capabilities.

It is visible in the fact that while the Ministry of Defense is vigorously pushing a new reform, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is generally acknowledged not to be the main source of foreign policy initiatives, while the Ministry of Trade and Development has long been disinclined to engage in independent thinking (Giles 2009). The Security Council's Press Office reiterated Patrushev's point, i.e. the strategy is aimed at increasing the quality of public administration and is intended to coordinate the efforts of the authorities and governmental and public organizations to protect Russia's national interests and to ensure, individual, public, and national security on March 24, 2009.

According to Ivanov's account, the National Security Strategy is a fundamental, system-forming document, which is aimed at the enhancement of the quality of state control. It links together the activities of the executive organs of the government and the state, corporative, and social organizations in the protection of the national interests of Russia and the provision of security for the individual, the public, and the state (Ivanov 2009). This and other documents represent an attempt to coordinate the state and the strategy is really a part of complex of diverse but interrelated state programs. It specifies actual numerical values for measuring the condition of security, formulating bases for strategic forecasting, and for foundation documents for implementing strategic goals through legislation. other documents include the Foreign Policy Concept, the Defense Doctrine, the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development Concept of the Russian Federation to 2020, and of course the President's speeches to the Duma (Giles 2009).

In fact, the new strategy is an attempt to provide the basis for building a system of national interests and corresponding priorities moreover it presupposes the preparation of predictive documents and statutory acts (Rogov 2009). This is a part of

state tradition, which claims that doctrinal statements possess juridical significance as well. As Patrushev (2009) informed to an interviewer that most importantly, it is aimed at improving the quality of state management and is designed to coordinate the activities of organs of state power and of the state and public organizations in defending Russia's national interests and ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state. Thus for systematizing the state and unifying it under a centralized system the new strategy is supposed to produce coherent policy and its implementation. Russian policy makers had a challenge to formulate a document of policies that truly instill the entire state system of its tasks and goals from top to bottom. Putin and Medvedev both have to confront the new situations along with old menaces that apparently remain entrenched in the official mind and ethos of Russia. Although some have the opinion that "after all this is what the concept of a power vertical is all about...they vainly try to impose systematic government by autocratic methods. ...incoherence and the absence of system are inherent in the nature of their power... this incoherence guarantees their autocratic power" (Blank 2010). "... Putin's defense and institutional reforms underscores his aspiration to unify the so-called "power vertical" into a single machine functioning to enhance the state's unity and interests and supposedly guarantee the people's rights even though there is no rule of law or challenge to autocracy"(Isakova 2004).

THE SECURITY STRATEGY: OTHER DOMESTIC ASPECTS

The strategy draft lists the threats to state and public. The usual kinds of intelligence threats, terrorist activities, extremist actions by nationalist, religious, or other ethnic organizations and structures, and transnational organized crime are of conventional nature (NSS 2009); along with conventional listings of the actions undertaken by the state to prevent those threats, including countering corruption, enhanced interagency coordination, and improvement of their quality. The strategy proclaims that, "the social responsibility of the agencies that provide state and public security is being increased" (NSS 2009).

Blank (2010) analyzes that the climate stimulated by the unrest in Xinjiang, Iran, and Moldova amid the current economic crisis is of administrative concern in Russia. On July 6, 2009, Ministry of Communications released an order that necessitates the postal services to make available all private mail and data on senders and addressees to the Federal Security Service (FSB) on demand and obliges operators to grant the

FSB access to their electronic databases. Although apparently “this order duly contravenes the UN’s 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Article 23 of the Russian constitution that proclaims the full privacy of telephone, postal, and other communications, and states unequivocally that only a court can remove this right”. This is similar to the Ministry of the Interior’s (MVD) efforts to monitor public attitudes to forestall public protests over worsening economic conditions etc. Moreover, MVD is shaping a task force called ‘avant-garde’ as well, which will specialize in maintaining public order during large-scale demonstrations and can be deployed across the Russian territories at short notice (Blank 2009).

The national security strategy advocates the strengthening of the state border, mentioning the possibility of escalation of existing conflicts and the incompleteness of legal registration of Russian state borders with adjacent states. This concern appears into the dialogues of inadequacies of border security organizations in relation to threats of terrorism, drug running, and organized crime. Of course, because of the nonlinear nature of the problem it requires multi-functional and high-tech teamwork of border forces with neighbors like Ukraine, Kazakhstan etc. The document then advocates enhancing the ability of the government to respond to emergencies, upgrading of equipments, and developing technologies for informing and warning the people along with taking preventive measures.

The section on enhancing citizens’ quality of life is not very much different from the section on ‘prosperity’ of the American national security strategy. Although Blank and many other pro western defense analysts express their concern of securitization dynamic at work regarding this section but do not agree with its analogy with the U.S. strategy. It demands greater social and property equality, radical improvement of the demographic situation over the long-term, housing, good jobs, regulation of the financial banking system, and efforts to combat organized crime. It also focuses on the struggle for energy resources and Russia’s tardive technological development that increases the strategic risks of dependence on change from external factors. The strategy does not leave the issues like food security, preservation and development of cultural institutions in all alone but takes responsibility to involve in this sphere (NSS 2009).

The strategy in the section namely 'Growth' expresses concern of the need for economic growth and aspiring to be in five leading countries in gross domestic product. It calls, *inter alia*, for multilateral energy cooperation. In the following chapters, strategy speaks out of science, education, health care, and the overall national economy for which state is making efforts (NSS 2009).

NUCLEAR AND OTHER MILITARY ISSUES

Norris and Kristensen (2007) articulate that on 10 January 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin signed the new National Security Concept (NSC) of the Russian Federation, an updated version of the NSC signed by President Boris Yeltsin in 1997. The broad guidelines outlined in the NSC were elaborated in the Military Doctrine, approved in May 2000. There are three main articles in the NSC that focus on nuclear weapons. First, "The most important task of the Russian Federation is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression on any scale, including with the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its allies." Second, "The Russian Federation should possess nuclear weapons capable of guaranteed infliction of a predetermined damage to any aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances." In addition, by the third, it upholds the right to "the use of all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective." This implies a provision of use of nuclear weapons to deter smaller-scale wars that do not necessarily threaten Russia's existence and sovereignty; a revision from the previous concept outlined in 1997. The new mission also implies a limited use of nuclear weapons in contrast to an all-out nuclear strike in response to a massive attack (Sokov 2000; 2004). Of course, the cornerstone of current Russian nuclear policy focuses on defending the country from a nuclear attack by NATO.

COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE VI OF NPT

The 2000 NSC validates Russia's intention to realize arms control agreements, in particular noting its objective to "adapt the existing arms control and disarmament agreements to the new conditions in international relations, as well as develop, as necessary, new agreements, first of all with respect to confidence and security

building measures³⁰.” On March 25, 2004, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that Russia is bearing in mind to revise its nuclear policy in light of NATO expansion and its “current offensive military doctrine”.

Therefore, in May 2006, Putin explained to Russian Federal Assembly that nuclear deterrence and the ‘strategic balance of forces’ is still vital to Russian nuclear policy. On the other hand, in November, he clarified that balance means the capability to destroy ‘any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapon systems this aggressor possesses,’ and not necessarily numeric parity. At a conference on maintaining stable operation of the nuclear weapons industry in Novo-Ogarevo, 30 March 2006, he made it clear that Russia ‘view(s) its nuclear deterrent as a fundamental element guaranteeing its security’ and ‘maintaining the minimum level of nuclear armaments required for nuclear deterrence remains one of the top priorities of Russian Federation policy’ as well. Yet, in June 2006, they published a white paper on non-proliferation that pronounces terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction as the ‘greatest threat faced by Russia’.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION/ VERTICAL PROLIFERATION/ MISSILE UPGRADES

While reducing its nuclear stockpile, Russia has been developing new land and sea based defense system along with modernizing its air forces. This is part of a doctrinal shift from a ‘substantially redundant’ to a ‘minimally sufficient’ deterrence posture, which maintains all three legs (land, sea, & air) of its nuclear triad for the near future.

In June 2006, Putin suggested that the US and Russia replace START I by a new treaty when it expires in December 2009, expressing specific concern about the ‘stagnation we see today in the area of disarmament’. While START I prohibits increasing the current number of warheads per missile, Russia declared in December 2006 that it would be putting multiple warheads on its single-warhead Topol-M ICBMs. Russia had withdrawn from the provisions of START II so it could retain MIRVed ICBMs, and may MIRV its SLBMs. By increasing the number of warheads on its missiles, Russia can save money and maintain strategic parity with the rapidly modernizing U.S. defense establishment. The ‘National Security of the Russian Federation until 2020’ reveals that:

³⁰ <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm>

In the interest of ensuring strategic stability and equitable multilateral cooperation in the international arena Russia during the implementation of this Strategy will make every effort at the least cost level to maintain parity with the United States in the field of strategic offensive weapons in the deployment of a global missile defense system and implement the global lightning strike using strategic media in nuclear and conventional equipment.

The strategic parity with the United States is required in Russian threat perception that makes the path clear for Russia's secure development. Russia's arms control posture stands for its continuing claim for substantive, if not quantitative, parity, as well as for deterrence with a perceived adversarial United States in order to prevent Washington from breaking free of the Russian embrace and following policies that Russia deems hostile to its interests (Reuters December 7, 2007). Moreover, that parity is intended to global and regional balances as well and most prominently in Europe. Russia's demand for restoring parity at both levels entails not an unreachable numerical parity, but rather a strategic stability or equilibrium wherein both sides' forces are held hostage by each other in a deterrent relationship and where the United States cannot break free to pursue its global or regional interests unilaterally. "Russia in its relations with the international community based on the principles of stability and predictability in strategic offensive weapons, attaches special importance to the achievement of the new flagship of bilateral agreements on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons". Furthermore, Russia will promote the involvement of other nuclear states to maintain the strategic stability globally as the document says, "Russia will facilitate the involvement of other states, primarily possess nuclear weapons, but also interested in joint actions to ensure overall security, in the process of ensuring strategic stability" (NSS 2009).

Russia justifies its military presence in the CIS and in other states on the basis of international law as a means of promoting conflict resolution and maintaining "strategic stability and equal strategic partnership" (NSS 2009). Russia pledges its determination to enforce existing arms control agreements, both nuclear and conventional. The document reaffirms participation in UN-sponsored peace support operations and states that Russia will undertake all necessary efforts at the lowest level of expenditure to maintain parity with the United States in strategic offensive weapons and under conditions of the deployment of U.S. missile defenses and implementation of the global strike concept (NSS 2009).

CONCLUDING POINTS OF THE SECURITY STRATEGY

The fifth part of the current NSS is on 'Organizational regulations and information on the implementation of this strategy' that calls public policy of the Russian Federation's national security. This is ensured by the concerted action of all elements of national security under the coordination of the Russian Security Council through the implementation of measures of institutional, regulatory and informational character. The NSS draft explains about document system of strategic planning and the concept of long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation. There is an outline of many programs of the social and economic development for the short-term prospect. The strategies (program) of the development of the separate sectors of the economy as well as strategy (concept) of the development of federal regions are also explained in the draft. The intergovernmental programs in which the Russian Federation participates are in focus. There are federal (departmental) special-purpose programs, state defense order and concepts, doctrine and basis (basic directions) of state policy in the spheres of providing national security are of especial concern to the state. However, separate directions of the domestic and external policy of state have been explained. The federal laws and other normative lawful reports of the Russian Federation have played an important role in the formation of the draft (NSS 2009).

The draft emphasized that it is necessary to overcome technological delay in the areas of importance, e.g. tele-communications and connection, which determine the state of national security. The information technology is crucial for the systems of state and Arms Forces as well (NSS 2009).

Finally, the strategy concludes the 'fundamental characteristics of the state of national security' that 'are intended for evaluating the state of national security'. They include various variables that are:

- Rate of unemployment (a share from economically active population);
 - Income factor (a parity of incomes of 10 % most and 10 % of the least provided population);
 - Level of growth of consumer prices;
 - Level of the state external and internal duty in percentage terms from a total internal product;
 - Level of security resources of public health services, culture, formation and a science in percentage terms from a total internal product;
 - Level of annual updating of arms, military and special techniques;
 - Level of security the military and nonproduction staff.
- The list of the basic characteristics of a condition of national safety can be specified by results of monitoring a condition of national safety.

The national security strategy calls for mobilizing factors of development of national economy, improvement of quality of life of populace, maintenance of political stability, strengthening of national defense, state security and law and order. The NSS particularly focuses on the increase of competitiveness and international prestige of the Russian Federation (NSS 2009). These indices reflect a welcome appreciation of key economic factors as being important measurements of the state's development.

TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH

As soon as the strategy came in public domain, critics have started to evaluate its letter and spirit. These analyses and critiques reveal the document's tendencies, direction, and, in some cases, failings. Some have called this a 'liberal' document due to its stress on economics. However, Tatyana Stanovaya wrote, the liberalism in economics is also conditional. The preferred economic model actually is strictly coordinated (the policy of import substitution and support for the physical production sector), presupposing the continued national control of resources, the development of innovation, and the modernization of the economy. There is no mention of the protection of private property rights, fair competition, decreased monopolism, and lower administrative barriers, and not one word about free enterprise (Giles; Stanovaya 2009). Another report observed, "The main food threat is from the seizing of the national grain market by foreign companies and the uncontrolled spread of food products obtained from genetically modified vegetation" (Kalinina 2009). The same applies to the takeover of pharmaceuticals industry by foreign firms (Giles 2009).

Its stress on human rights, "life, security, labor, housing, health and a healthy lifestyle, accessible education, and cultural development" is worth looking (Giles; Stanovaya 2009). This should be acknowledged in the continuation of the national security concept 2000, which talks about the rights of the individual, society, and the state. However, this time those rights are to some extent in conjunction with the rights of society and state. This shows a broader growing concept of nation-state; in other words, it reflects the 'nation in making'.

In fact, we could find a developing nation perspective as well as European or completely western thought process on security and development in a complex mix, i.e. all in one in the New Russia. The notions of superpower status or in view of some western critiques the specter of Cold War status, is neither absent nor going to be in

oblivion in near future from Russian minds . Although a new young generation has taken place in the post-Cold War era that has no firsthand experience of that equation and rivalry. They get its picture from a chapter in history. However, still that glory is being valued by the populace in spite of the fact that they love western culture and approach towards life, but not the old generation overall. That is why the pervasive sense of threat at least the assessment was silently endorsed by a major section of society that makes an optimism of Russia becoming one of the five top economies by 2020. Of course, their energy resources will make a difference. However, given the nature of overall economy and its boom or bust character, many critics have their strong doubt that such an outcome (becoming one of the five top economies) is likely to get place. They argue that even if it occurs in terms of GDP, it will only represent an unbalanced economy and inflated energy sector. They concentrate on multiple indices for tracking overall economic development that are illustrated in the strategy and take interests in their inclusion or exclusion, e.g. their concern about specific benchmarks for measuring poverty and food costs that were removed to reduce the liability of the government for their performance (McDermott 2009). Russian historian Vasily Kliuchevsky observes, “The state grew fat while the people grew thin” (Giles 2009).

Keir Giles (2009) exhibits that ‘culture’ plays a prominent role in the document. The recently declared struggle with the ‘falsifiers of history’, the program to roll back views of history to the Soviet cult of victory, is referred to with “attempts to re-examine views on Russia’s history” noted as a threat. Social cohesion can be improved by fostering the “spiritual unity of the Russian Federation’s multiethnic people”. Culture is to be directed abroad, too, with “use of Russia’s cultural potential in support of multilateral international cooperation”.

Military reforms have been given a very different color in western minds, which is not very much different from the provocations of previous color revolutions. Russian move to allow corporate forces has been seen as a required move to develop a separate departmental security system, which reduces the burden of regular security personnel. In the light of asymmetric threats to the state, it is brilliant to form some new corps rather to depend on the old one. Thus, in Russia a new special elite police unit called Avangard (Avant Garde) is being established in the Moscow region to

ensure law and order during mass rallies and relieve the police of some of their burden.

Critics of the strategy's provisions for defense and security were no less caustic. Even though the strategy calls for the development of the military infrastructure, improving the system of the state's military organization, and transition to qualitatively new armed forces, nothing is said as to how this will be achieved or paid for. In fact, given the delusional quality of the document's assessment of Russia's economic position, it is already acknowledged the case that defense reform is running into serious problems and that the defense industry cannot meet its new requirements (Giles 2009).

The document does not specify as well that how Russia's goals of energy security are to be met without a call for multilateral coordination on energy policies, which is quite unlikely given Russia's energy policies (McDermott 2009).

Finally, Golts (2009) criticizes the document, though he thought it was not as bad as it could have been, since it removed the specific name of the United States and NATO in advance of the summit from all of the sections detailing foreign threats. Golts easily discerned the factional fighting, which was in the formulation of strategy. He clearly stated that the winner was the FSB since the section on threats from foreign intelligence agencies specified "reconnaissance and other activities of special services and organizations of foreign states," singling out the word "other" as giving the FSB the right to declare any activity they dislike as subversion or the work of foreign intelligence agencies. Furthermore, he claims that the battle over defense reform is ongoing with no winners yet. All these are signs that the document was written with extremely general definitions of the conceivable threats but gave no answer as to how to meet them.

Yevgeny Primakov observed that, "The unlikely possibility of future world wars is not the same as the advancement of world security. Only the nature and scale of the threat has changed" (Primakov 2008)³¹. The elite, led by Putin, saw Russia's weakness as being, first, economic and geo-economic as opposed to the older view represented by Tyushkevich. As a result, the government has with conviction held to the view that the overall economy must first be repaired. In prioritizing the economy as an area that must be addressed first and the quality of Russian governance Putin

³¹ Primakov quoted in Andrei Davydov, "USA-PRC-Russia: The 'Triangle' 35 Years On," *Far Eastern Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 2008, p. 25.

and Medvedev concentrating to compete with the west and the rest (of the world) as well (Blank 2009). After current world economic crisis, if the national economy is not a proper subject of securitization, that at least must be a subject of national security strategy, which requires to an extent state regulation, control, and some sort of centralization. In fact, this trend is getting currency everywhere. Therefore, the primacy of economy in Russian security policy is a natural development not an anomaly.

CHAPTER 4

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

There is a simple question before every nation-state that how do they intend to protect and promote or defend and demonstrate the national security interests (NSI). Having this thought into consideration the state attempts to formulate a National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS defines the capabilities of a nation and their potential realization. It reflects the core identity in terms of value, vision and vestige for/of her past, present and potential. The safety, security, sovereignty and territorial integrity are important concerns of every NSS. In case of super or major powers, they do have concern of their 'power position' in world system. They would have structural concerns and priorities as well. The threat assessment and remedies for those threats are also crucial. The scarcity of resources, problem of coordination and communication, issue of credibility are supposed to come along the way. The policy crafters frequently confront with existing potential interests that are in fact decisive and significant questions. However, the central theme is 'logic', which has to put forward behind the administrative priorities. The logic establishes itself through narratives. Thus, the U.S. national security narratives from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers, and after that going through Iraq, Afghanistan and economic crisis to the end of the first decade of the twenty first century has taken many drifts and shifts.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: OFFICIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Every strategist perceive a strategy that articulates prioritized ends and then links means or resources and ways i.e. approaches in a plan of action to achieve ends in a given context (Collins 2001). The strategy theoretically provides some distinct purposes. It offers prioritized objectives and indicates which elements of national power i.e. ways and means' are to be used to meet those objectives. It provides guidance to departments and agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and organizing, training, and equipping personnel. It clearly links goals and the approaches designed to meet them. It provides the executive branch a key tool for justifying requested resources to Congress by laying out a detailed strategic vision; it helps inform public audiences both at home and abroad about American intent. However, there is a growing debate over the need to reform

the national security system. The pro-reformists argue that the current architecture was designed to meet the global security challenges of the Cold War especially and for the post-World War II in general. Therefore, it may not be proper for addressing the post-Cold War challenges. The existing architecture includes the organizations, structures, and processes, which govern decision-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities. The key components of this system are the strategic guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms of guidance.

There are many critiques about strategy, e.g. executive branch processes for developing strategy are faulty due to their failure to establish priorities, consider fiscal constraints, or assign responsibilities to specific agencies or the issuance of strategic guidance does not always fully comply with legislative mandates. Thus, the mandates themselves could be improved, e.g. by better synchronizing requirements for related documents. Congress can continue to shape the role that strategy documents play in the national security system through legislative requirements regarding the types of strategic documents required, their primary and contributing authors, their contents, their relationships with other strategic documents, their deadlines for delivery, and their form of delivery , i.e. classified or unclassified.

THE KEY NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

The national security strategy is not an independent document. In fact, in traditional defense perspective, the core national security strategic documents today are- the national security strategy, the national defense strategy together with the Quadrennial Defense Review report, and the national military strategy. The ‘military strategy’ written by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes how the military will operationalize the ‘defense strategy’ written by the Secretary of Defense that in turn covers those aspects of the security strategy for which the Department of Defense is responsible. Law mandates all of the strategies. Its contents are prescribed in some detail. However, so far, execution has not always exactly matched the letter of the law.

RELATIONSHIP AMONG STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

Apparently, the distinctions among the mandates of national security strategic documents, and mainly those for the defense and military strategies, are not entirely

clear. The security, defense, military all are mandated to provide objectives and strategies to meet identified security challenges or opportunities, and to describe the capabilities required to meet those objectives. The security strategy includes all elements of national power and all relevant agencies, civilian and military. Therefore, it is an umbrella for the DOD centric defense and military strategies. The intended relationship between the defense and military strategies is less clear. The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) stated that it implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NMS added that it derives objectives, missions and capability requirements from an analysis of the national security strategy, the NDS, and the security environment. Its own contribution, in turn, is providing a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts that help identify required capabilities. It is not completely clear conceptually what further refinement or additions defense objectives might require to become military objectives (Dale 2008).

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In some ways, this is the initial documents that propels, disclose and advocates for others. The national security strategies are issued by the President and pertain to the U.S. government as a whole. The current mandate for the President to deliver to Congress a comprehensive, annual national security strategy report derives from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The legislation requires that a strategy report be submitted to Congress annually, on the date the President submits the budget for the following fiscal year. In addition to the regular report for that year, a newly elected President is required to submit a strategy report not less than 150 days after taking office. Each report is to be submitted in both classified and unclassified format. The legislation stresses that each report must address five points:

- The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States;
- The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States;
- The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph;
- The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy;

- Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States. However, in practice, ever since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, administrations have submitted national security strategies fair regularly although not always precisely on schedule.

The Reagan Administration submitted two (1987/88); the first Bush Administration submitted three (1990/91/93); and the Clinton Administration submitted seven (1994-2000). However, the second Bush Administration twice submitted a document entitled National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in September 2002 and March 2006. The 2002 Strategy described the global strategic context, named broad goals, i.e. political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity; and described eight broad areas of effort designed to meet those goals. For each area, the Strategy listed subset initiatives but did not describe how they are to be achieved and did not assign responsibility for achieving them to specific agencies. The problem of designating agencies has taken an acute difficulty in the U.S. administration. Neither the eight major areas, nor the subsets within any area, were prioritized. The national security strategy 2006 maintained the same basic format, though it added an additional area of effort ‘challenges and opportunities of globalization’ for a total of nine, and it included, in each area, a discussion of successes since 2002. Finally, the new Administration is required by law to submit a national security strategy 150 days after the Inauguration in 2009.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The existing legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a quadrennial defense review (QDR) and to submit a report on the QDR to Congress every four years³². The National Defense Authorization Act introduced the original QDR requirement, for a one-time review (NDAA) for FY1997. The permanent requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the NDAA for FY2000, which amended Title 10 of U.S. Code to that effect. The requirement for a national defense strategy is derived from this legislation, which mandates that the QDR include a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States. The national defense strategies and reports of the quadrennial defense review process are Department of Defense (DOD) documents. These are intended to elaborate on DOD’s support to the larger NSS. The QDR is to be conducted during the first year of every. The QDR

³² The QDR itself is a review process, while the QDR report is a written product produced by that process.

report is to be submitted to Congress the following year, not later than the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year. The Secretary of Defense is to conduct the review in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the review is to look out 20 years into the future. The legislation does not specify the classification level for the report (Dale 2008).

The QDR report is intended to be nested in a subordinate part of the broader national strategic framework. As the legislation points out, it will delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent national security strategy. The legislation also describes in detail 15 items that the QDR report to Congress must contain. This will include overall national defense strategy, national interests, threats, assumptions, and requirements:

- The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
- The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.
- The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats. The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation of allies, mission sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.
- The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.
- The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days.
- The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.
- The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the tooth-to-tail ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
- The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.
- The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
- The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
- The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.
- The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
- The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
- Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate (Dale, 2008).

The 1997 QDR has been conducted based on the one-time legislative requirement and in 2001 as well as 2006 based on the permanent mandate³³. These three QDR reports were submitted to Congress on time³⁴. The first two QDR reports included a defense strategy, as mandated by legislation. Section III of the 1997 QDR Report was entitled ‘Defense Strategy,’ and it began with a summary of national security strategy, including national interests. That summary was based on the February 1996 White House document ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.’ Section II of the 2001 QDR Report was entitled ‘Defense Strategy.’ At the time the review was conducted and the Report written, the NSS December 2000, ‘A National Security Strategy for a Global Age’, written by the Clinton Administration. The 2001 QDR Report described broad national objectives ‘peace, freedom and prosperity’, but did not refer specifically to national strategy³⁵.

However, in a departure from past practice, DOD issued the March 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) separately from and prior to its partner QDR Report that was issued in February 2006. The NDS repeatedly cited the most recent national security strategy at the time, from September 2002. The 2005 NDS was notable for introducing a new, quadripartite categorization of global security challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive. The 2006 QDR Report emphasized its direct link with the 2005 NDS. It stated that the foundation of this QDR is the National Defense Strategy, published in March 2005, and it echoed the four global security challenges introduced by the NDS. The 2006 Report also established four focus areas, i.e. defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, and shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD. Though, these areas were not assigned relative priority, but they were labeled priority areas in comparison with

³³ Substantively, the requirements for the 1997 QDR were quite similar to the current requirements, including 13 of the 15 current items; the items not included were U.S. national security interests, and the defense mission of the U.S. Coast Guard. A key precursor to the QDRs was the DOD “Bottom-Up Review,” launched in early 1993 by newly confirmed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and directed by Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner.

³⁴ The 1997 QDR report, of May 1997, was submitted on time; the FY1997 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress the QDR report by May 15, 1997; see §923(d). The 2001 QDR report was submitted early. The 2006 QDR report was submitted on time, at the time of the February 2006 budget submission.

³⁵ The defense strategy discussion in the 2001 *QDR Report* introduced the quadripartite “assure, dissuade, deter, defeat” description of defense policy goals. These refer to “assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.”

other possible issues. The Report described each area and the capabilities it required; provided a refined version of the force planning construct (the guidance used for sizing and shaping the force); discussed 10 portfolios of capabilities, including implied tasks; and addressed three sets of institutional and organizational concerns - the defense enterprise, DOD personnel, and coordination with other agencies and with international partners. Following the separate document model established by the 2005-2006 QDR Report and NDS, in 2008, DOD issued a separate 2008 National Defense Strategy. The new NDS identified an even broader array of security challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The legislation provides the mandate for a national military strategy that includes a biennial review of national military strategy, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commanders. A written report based on that review is to be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives by February 15 of even-numbered years. The report is required to be consistent with national security strategy and the most recent QDR. Legislation prescribes specific contents for the national military strategy report, including the strategy itself, the strategic environment, threats, military objectives, means for meeting those objectives, and required resources:

- Delineation of a national military strategy.
- A description of the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect United States national interests and United States national security.
- A description of the regional threats to United States national interests and United States national security.
- A description of the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges to United States national security.
- Identification of United States national military objectives and the relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment, regional, and international threats.
- Identification of the strategy, underlying concepts, and component elements that contribute to the achievement of United States national military objectives.
- Assessment of the capabilities and adequacy of United States forces (including both active and reserve components) to successfully execute the national military strategy.
- Assessment of the capabilities, adequacy, and interoperability of regional allies of the United States and or other friendly nations to support United States forces in combat operations and other operations for extended periods of time (Dale 2008).

The first report was the 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today, a Vision for Tomorrow. The document stated its purpose and its relationships to other strategic guidance: The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS). It described the Armed Forces plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.

The 2004 national military strategy cites key concepts of the 2005 National Defense Strategy, including the four strategic challenges- traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. In fact, there was a general need for military strategy in both law and practice. Prior to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, Title 10 U.S. Code described the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as including preparing strategic plans and providing the strategic direction of the armed forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act amended Title 10³⁶. The 1997 National Military Strategy stated that it was based on the May 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century and the 1997 QDR Report. The 1995 National Military Strategy explained that the 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement had described the relevant national security objectives and provided the Armed Forces the guidance to shape our military strategy. Both military strategy documents addressed the strategic environment, national military objectives, military tasks to meet those objectives, and capabilities and forces required to accomplish those tasks (1997)³⁷.

³⁶ Amendment included a new Section 153 that assigns responsibility to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for assisting the President and secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces, as well as preparing strategic plans, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective. National military strategies have also been required in the past on a limited basis. The NDAA for FY1991 required the submission of a military strategy report to Congress during fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994. In contrast to the current mandate, the responsible party was the Secretary of Defense, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to participate fully in the development of the report. The report was to be submitted in both classified and unclassified formats; to cover a period of at least 10 years; to be fiscally constrained; and to address a series of specified topics including threats, military plans for meeting them, risks, missions for various components, and acquisition priorities. While no explicit legislative mandate was in effect at the time, in both 1995 and 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a national military strategy. Both documents clearly stated their supporting relationships to higher-level strategic documents.

³⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, February 1995; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era*, 1997.

Catherine Dale (2008:11) explains that the security/defense/military pillars of national security strategic guidance are only part of a veritable wealth of national strategic documents broadly related to security concerns³⁸. As a rule, most formal strategies are unclassified, and they require or imply participation from more than one department or agency. Their scope ranges from multi-faceted concerns, such as national security and intelligence, to specific topics, such as national security personnel development.

Typically, written strategies state their relationships to other strategic guidance documents. In the constellation of strategies, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) is one of those whose relationships with other strategies are most clearly defined. Bush second, first issued the NSCT in February 2003. It explained that it was a subordinate document to the 2002 National Security Strategy, addressing one of the security strategy's eight major areas, counter-terrorism (NSS 2002). The NSS (2006) maintained the same basic format, though it added an additional area of effort i.e. challenges and opportunities of globalization, for a total of nine, and it included, in each area, a discussion of successes since 2002.

The division of labor between the NSCT and the National Strategy for Homeland Security was that the homeland strategy addressed preventing terrorist attacks within the U.S., while the NSCT was responsible for identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders. The two sets of strategies most similar to the security/defense/military pillar of strategies are those concerning homeland security and intelligence (Dale 2008:11).

SYNCHRONIZATION OF TIMELINES

The submissions of strategic documents to Congress have not always been met according to the given timelines for the specific purposes. However, the deadlines are

³⁸ To help illustrate the depth and variety of legislative mandates for strategy, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (December 17, 2004, P.L. 108-458) alone includes the following requirements for strategies: from the Secretary of Homeland Security, a National Strategy for Transportation Security (§4001); from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a strategy for improving the conduct of analysis by the CIA, and a strategy for improving human intelligence and other capabilities (§1011); from the Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center, a "strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility domestically and internationally" (§7201); from the President, a strategy for addressing and eliminating terrorist sanctuaries, including, as subsets, a strategy for U.S. engagement with Pakistan, a strategy for U.S. collaboration with the Government of Saudi Arabia, a strategy to "help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world," a strategy to expand outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media, and a strategy to promote free universal basic education in the countries of the Middle East" (§7120); also from the President, a five-year strategy for Afghanistan (§7104). The Secretary of State was also advised to "make every effort" to develop a comprehensive strategy for public diplomacy (§7109).

quite specifically articulated in law. An example is the submission by the Bush Administration of only two national security strategies, rather than meeting the annual submission requirement in the 1947 National Security Act as amended by Goldwater-Nichols (Murdock & Flournoy 2005:16). Although, theoretically agency-based and specific-issue strategies would derive guidance from, and chronologically follow the national security strategy, e.g. national security strategy would be followed by national defense strategy, which in turn would be followed by national military strategy. However, this pattern and timeline has not quite worked that way³⁹.

GOAL PRIORITIZATION AND EFFORTS

The prioritization of objectives and activities by leadership can help leaders more appropriately shape their own strategies and target their efforts and resources. The national security strategy could provide such guidance to DOD and its QDR and defense strategy. These DOD efforts could provide corresponding guidance to the Joint Staff for its military strategy. As a rule, current strategic documents do not prioritize the objectives or missions they prescribe, nor are they required to do so by law. The most recent national security strategies include eight or nine focus areas, but all of the areas are implicitly equal in weight. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) names four focus areas, all exclusively of equal importance. Subordinate agencies or offices to justify budgeting to achieve a very wide spectrum

³⁹As far as defense is concerned, current requirements for submission timelines are fairly well-suited for logical, sequential development of these nested strategies. The QDR report and its accompanying defense strategy are due to Congress by the date the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year, at the beginning of an Administration's second calendar year in office.

The national security strategy for that year is due to Congress on the same day. In theory, the QDR report and defense strategy could draw on the previous year's national security strategy. This requires 150 days after an Administration takes office and perhaps on the concurrent development process for the second-year national security strategy. The national military strategy, in turn, requires its submission to Congress by February 15 of even-numbered years. This is just several days after the submission of the national security strategy and either several days, or two years and several days, after the submission of the QDR report and defense strategy. By these timelines, development of the military strategy could draw on the defense strategy from two or four years earlier, and perhaps on the concurrent defense strategy development process.

This timeline marks a change from the original permanent QDR mandate, which required submission of the QDR report "not later than September 30 of the year in which the review is conducted," Title 10 U.S. Code §118(d) as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, P.L. 106-65 §901. The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, P.L. 107-314 §922, amended Title 10 U.S. Code §118(d) to require a QDR report submission date of "not later than the date on which the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year."

The 2001 QDR Report with its embedded national defense strategy was issued in September 2001, before the Bush Administration issued its first National Security Strategy in September 2002. The first National Military Strategy did not follow until 2004, and it almost immediately preceded the next National Defense Strategy, issued in March 2005, a year ahead of its accompanying QDR Report in February 2006. This was just ahead of a new National Security Strategy in March 2006.

of capabilities could at least in theory use this guidance. Although, fiscal constraints related to national security strategy, national defense strategy and QDR, and the national military strategy are also crucial subjects in the minds of policy makers as well as American populace⁴⁰. This way of implementation makes the whole structure entwined.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The security strategy generally addresses areas of effort that may require contribution by various departments and agencies at national level. Therefore, it requires several agencies that accomplish the mission like strengthening international partnerships. The mission could include military exercises, development assistance programs, and participation in multi-lateral organizations as instruments. Yet, recent national strategies have seldom assigned responsibility for specific tasks to specific agencies. Using strategic documents to assign responsibilities might also help agencies focus their efforts, and might help conserve resources by preventing duplication of effort. Although, this is a complex problem the U.S. has experienced repeatedly in its different missions (Dale 2008:18).

COMPETITION OF IDEAS

Historically, this can be found in when President Eisenhower's top secret Project Solarium, established shortly after Stalin's death in 1953, to reassess U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union. The methodology included the formation of three teams of seasoned experts and practitioners, both military and civilian. Each team was assigned a strategy to elaborate and defend. They worked for six weeks at the National War College and presented the strongest cases before the

⁴⁰The national security strategy, the national defense strategy and QDR, and the national military strategy are not required by legislation to be fiscally constrained. At the Department of Defense, processes have long been in place, under the broad heading "planning, programming, budgeting and execution cycle (PPBE)," to use strategy to inform budget decisions. The PPBE cycle includes the development of classified internal strategic guidance documents that assign responsibilities and set priorities, which are used in turn to inform programming and budgeting. There is no close analog for translating strategy into budget at the national level.

One historical exception was the early 1990s temporary national military strategy requirement, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, November 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, §1032. That legislation required that the Secretary of Defense's national military strategy report to Congress include the Secretary's recommendations "for a national military strategy that is both coherent and fiscally constrained" §1032(a)(2)(B). The Secretary was to base his recommendation on a "strategic military plan" by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In that plan, the CJCS was to lay out the best plan possible for each of "three alternative sets of assumptions about future world conditions and defense funding levels," in which each set presumed a defense budget decline by a specified amount, over a specified period. See §1032(b)(1); and (e)(2), (f)(2), and (g)(2).

President (Flournoy & Brimley 2006). However, recently, Congress, when mandating the first quadrennial defense review, also required the Secretary of Defense to establish a nonpartisan, independent panel including the National Defense Panel to assess the review process itself. The legislative mandate, and public voice including congressional testimony, gave the panel an opportunity to shape the review process and its outcomes. The 2006 QDR process was also assisted by the work of an independent panel of defense experts and retired flag officers, although they did not have a legislative mandate, and their assessments were not made publicly available. No legislative requirement is in place for the use of a competitive mechanism to aid the development of national security strategy (Dale 2008:20).

FOCUSED AUDIENCE AND LANGUAGE

The strategies that necessitated unclassified form may be nominally intended to inform multiple audiences simultaneously like the executive branch, Congress, the American people, and foreign audiences. While in practice, it also seems that national strategies have typically emphasized the public diplomacy function over the mandate to provide guidance within the executive branch. Sometimes the strategies e.g. the national security strategy and national defense strategy are heavy on themes and messages and light on detail (Freier 2008). Referring to the requirement for a national security strategy, the ‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols’ project based at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argued “... each Administration from President Reagan on has chosen to treat this statute primarily as a requirement to publicly explain and sell its policies rather than an opportunity to undertake a rigorous internal strategic planning process. The result has consistently been a glossy document that serves a public affairs function, but does little to guide U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation”(Murdock & Flournoy 2005).

Possibly there are irreconcilable tensions, in terms of classification level, between the need to provide detailed guidance to subordinates who will implement it, and the need to explain—and sell—a strategic vision to broader, potentially skeptical, public audiences⁴¹. Though as a rule, security strategies are present-tense documents and

⁴¹ At the Department of Defense, for example, the usual practice is to complement the public, unclassified QDR report and military strategy with internal classified guidance documents that assign specific tasks to offices of primary responsibility. The names, formats, and timelines for delivery of these internal classified guidance documents have evolved over time. For example, the 2006 QDR process directly informed Strategic Planning Guidance and Joint Planning Guidance. Subsequently, as

they describe security challenges and opportunities in the present tense, rather than specifically addressing how those security conditions might be expected to evolve over time. A key exception is the QDR, which is congressionally mandated to anticipate conditions and requirements 20 years into the future⁴². However, a deliberate, longer-term outlook can play an important role by informing preparations that require time, like developing and building sophisticated platforms, or recruiting, educating, and training specialized forces or categories of civilian personnel.

BEYOND THE PROCESS: STRATEGY AND ITS APPLICATION

BACKDROP OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

The overriding economic national interests primarily govern the national security strategy of the United States of America. Therefore, national interests, national security and military strategy of the U.S. are those three pillars on which every policy and decision-making finally rests upon. Thus, their business interests need security. From that point of view, the term national interests can be translated to business interests and national security to corporate security.

The outcomes of the World War II are many for the whole world but America has some special effects. The bipartisan efforts across the executive and legislative branches reformed the national security system. The President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 that marked a defining moment in the organization of the contemporary U.S. national security system. For more than six decades, the National Security Act proved its value, supporting a system that matched and defeated the Soviet threat during the Cold War. However, the U.S. has experienced some tragic national security failures during this period, e.g. in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Iran-Contra Affair, which is often attributable to insufficient integration of diverse elements of national power. This was a serious problem, which the act was intended to resolve but unfortunately still existing as a big problem in between scholarly suggestions and policy makers (Locher et al. 2008).

part of a comprehensive effort to rationalize and synchronize internal strategic documents, DOD established Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Guidance for the Development of the Force.

⁴² Two earlier products by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, issued in 1996, and *Joint Vision 2020*, issued in 2000, were intended to provide “conceptual templates” for developing the force and its capabilities, and each looked out to its target year “and beyond.” See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 2006, available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/history/jv2010.pdf>, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, May 2000, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm>.

The world has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Now the country is facing many challenges of rapid change in many sectors, i.e. political and military, economic and financial, energy and environmental, scientific and technological, demographic and social, cultural and intellectual, in fact everywhere. This is a constant feature of the security environment. Moreover, there are a growing number and variety of actors who both affect and are affected by these changes. Such changes are characterized by interconnections, exchanges, and flows of goods and resources, information and knowledge, science and technology, money and services, and people and ideas between and among many actors, state and nonstate. In fact, all these are often subsumed under the term globalization. These dynamics are notable not only by their worldwide scope but also by their speed, magnitude, density, and complexity. All these are making a difficult compelling situation before every administration (PNSR 2008).

The new threats and their assessment not only changed the threat perception of everyone but in fact, the security environment continues to change. The limitations of the national security system become more glaring. Still there is a lack of preparedness to meet the threat of pandemics, cyber attacks, and possible terrorist strikes with weapons of mass destruction. All these difficult and complex security challenges demand more extensive, skillful, and willing interagency collaboration. They require coordination not only in Washington but also at regional, national, multilateral, and state and local levels as well (Locher et al. 2008). At present, the system is not capable of effectively organizing and integrating resources within and across federal agencies to meet such critical national security objectives. In comparison to many other nations, the U.S. policy makers feel that the national security system is not swift and responsive enough. The lapses revealed by the terror attacks on 9/11, the confused national and local coordination during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and the slow recognition and response to insurgency in Iraq highlight the system's scantiness and insufficient approaches to meet the challenges (PNSR 2008).

With the new challenges, the need for change is becoming more apparent. However, the fundamental causes of the systems failure or scantiness are not new. They can be traced back to a basic shortfall of the national security system. It cannot assimilate and put together the elements of power well enough to conduct the full range of national security missions necessary to protect the nation. The current arrangement

and the method in which Congress governs and funds it do not allow the timely, efficient integration of the various departmental proficiency and abilities required to protect the country. In fact, American interests and citizens both are in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. Therefore, there is a need to recognize the gravity of the situation (Locher et al. 2008).

However, the need for such integration has long been recognized. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his national security advisor, Robert Cutler, agreed on a set of guidelines for the national security structures and processes. Cutler explained the rationale for the guidelines in terms of how the president struggled to meet the demands of a changing security environment. He stressed that in a world shrunk in size by supersonic speeds, loomed over by ominous atomic clouds, fragmenting into new political entities, living in uneasy peace or scourged—as in Korea—by war, it was no longer possible for a President himself to integrate the intelligence and opinions flooding in from all sides. Eisenhower sought an integration of views that would be the product of continuous association between skilled representatives of all elements of Government interests and relevant to the national security (Cutler 1966: 296).

Most significantly, what President Eisenhower sought for policy integration, subsequent presidents desired as well, and not only for policy development but for its implementation too. In spite of that, the national security system cannot routinely provide such unity of purpose and effort. The president has only a narrow range of options for effectively managing the system. Using an outmoded set of structures and processes has eroded the American competency and robustus image of security in the world. To some extent, it has undermined the trust and confidence of the American people in their government. moreover, ultimately it has jeopardized the nation's security. Thus, there is a requirement to remodel and restructure the security overall in the 21st century (Locher et al. 2008).

THE NEW HORIZON--ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In the contemporary world, economics enters into national security considerations through a variety of ways. It plays a dual role of providing the resources to help ensure the physical security of Americans and of generating employment, revenue and income to help ensure the economic security of households and government as well.

The economy also provides a model, culture, and other elements of soft power helpful in winning the hearts and minds of people throughout the globe. There is hardly an economic policy issue, which does not affect American national security. Similarly, roughly every national security policy issue does affect the economy (Nanto et al. 2011:11).

Contrary to the Cold War period, national security strategy has not had a consistent support of allies as well as of the American people in general. In the Cold War period America “had a clear, coherent, widely supported strategy that focused on containing and deterring Soviet communist expansion” (Gelb 2003). The new threats have compelled them to formulate a new national security strategy to make safe the United States.

The security environment has been changed rapidly in the last two decades. The world enters the second decade of this century. America holds what should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. Even then, policy makers are in dilemma of the national security. The debate over national security seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The trouble appears not only in the problem of finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic restraints that loom large in the public debate. Moreover, the worldwide financial crisis and recession have shown the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home (Pirog et al. 2011).

America has long been accustomed to following a rich man’s approach to national security. The country could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs. This is to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation’s security. The economy has constantly been there both to make available the funds and materiel for defense and to provide economic security for most families. Policies for economic growth and issues like unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems. It is largely separated from considerations of national security (Nelson et al. 2011).

The world, however, has changed. Globalization, the rise of China, the prospect of an unsustainable debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, the success of mixed economies with both state-owned and private businesses, huge imbalances in

international trade and capital flows, and high unemployment have brought economics more into play in considerations of national security. Conventionally the economy has entered into the national security debate through its impact on the nation's hard power: the funding of defense, the effectiveness of the defense industrial base, and the use of economic sanctions and other instruments as non-kinetic tools of warfare. The long-term efficacy of hard power, however, depends greatly on the capability of a country to provide for it through an ever growing and modern economy (Morrison et al. 2011).

The different dimensions of power are getting currency in the process of decision making especially in security thinking. Thus, soft power has an important role in the making of national security strategy. The ability of a country to generate and use its economic power and to project its national values are pivotal in national security. This, in turn, depends on long-term factors that contribute to economic growth and increase the total resource base available not only for defense but to provide economic security in the form of income and business opportunities for individuals. Economic growth depends on building human capital. It also depends on science, technology, and innovation. In addition, the increased integration of the U.S. economy into global markets means that U.S. security also depends on global economic stability, on a balanced international economy, the ability to coordinate key economic policies with other leading nations, and deterring threats to the international financial system. Soft power also enables the country to project American values through diplomacy, economic assistance, fostering democracy and human rights, and promoting sustainable development abroad. The national security council has had a major role in each of these elements of national security. The meaning of security has also been changed. Now security is achieved not only by military means but also by the whole of economy. In national security, the economy is both the enabler and the constraint (Levit et al. 2011).

AMERICAN SAVINGS AND CHINESE CONSUMPTION

Americans have a different life style where saving culture is not very strong. The more American households save, the less they consume, particularly of imports from China. Fewer American imports from China imply a lower level of exports from China unless that country can find substitute markets. This lower level of Chinese exports would have to be counterbalance by higher consumption within China in

order for them to maintain their high rate of economic growth. More consumption in China would tend to bring down their trade surplus and in combination with a higher savings rate in America help to bring down the American trade deficit. This would contribute to American economic growth and national security. However, in nominal dollar terms, the United States had the world's largest current account deficit at \$706 billion in 2008, while China had the world's largest current account surplus at \$426 billion. In fact, Nations that do not save enough to meet domestic investment run current account deficits and those that save more than they need for domestic investment run current account surpluses⁴³ (Cooper et al. 2011:56-57).

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In the age of globalization, the international trade is playing a larger role in national security considerations because of the flows of capital and wealth that it generates. The problem stems from the \$507 billion American trade deficit that must be funded by inflows of capital. The biggest problem is that much of it borrowed from trade-surplus countries like China, Japan, and the oil exporting countries in the Middle East. A partial effect of the chronic American deficit in trade is that wealth is being accumulated in China and elsewhere, which not only is changing the balance of economic power in the world but also is being used to build military capability. This promotes China's foreign policy goals that may be contrary to American interests. For many years, mainstream economic thinkers assured policymakers that trade deficits, particularly bilateral deficits, did not matter. They would correct themselves through adjustments in exchange rates and macroeconomic policies. Bringing balance into American international trade accounts, however, has turned out to more difficult than generally thought. It depends on changing behavior, not only of governments, but also of households and businesses in both the America and abroad (Nelson et al. 2011).

EXPORT MARKETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In the post-second World War period and specially the first three decades American economic power not only dominated international trade, but they could afford to overlook the protectionist policies of other nations, mostly those allied with

⁴³A current account deficit also reflects that a country consumes more than it produces, while a current account surplus indicates that a country produces more than it consumes. The current account includes trade in goods and services plus unilateral transfers such as remittances. The U.S. current account deficit, and China's current account surplus, both fell in 2009 as a result of the global economic slowdown.

Washington in the Cold War. This enabled Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore like countries to pursue a growth model led by exports. The export market of last option was none the else but America. The resultant economic growth and development of friendly nations provided gains for American national security. This compensated partly for the trade policies of governments that promoted exports and discouraged imports as well. However, as American deficit in trade has increased and the perception has risen that liberalized trade causes the loss of American jobs, many Americans have become cautious of the international trade agreements. Nevertheless, bringing balance into American international trade accounts requires either a lower level of imports or more American exports. More American exports may be generated by lowering trade barriers abroad. As with increased American savings and greater Chinese consumption, this relates directly to increasing American growth and enhancing American national security (Cooper et al. 2011).

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

This was a post-second World War creation. The civilian defense industry maintains a reciprocal dependency relationship with the security community. While the defense and intelligence community depends on the civilian defense industry to provide them with cost-effective and technologically sophisticated arms and equipment in the same way the industry depends on the government for contracts. Some current issues deal with dual-use technology, globalization, integrity of the supply chain mainly for parts, the maintenance of unused industrial capacity unique to the military, mergers and acquisitions among suppliers, the availability of skilled technical workers, and the influence of the industry in security policy are worth considering in the formation of NSS (Grasso et al. 2011:16).

THE NEW DEBATE

The new debate and discussions have focused on the range of issues from the threats of increasing terrorism to the economic crisis, immigration and migration to climate change, energy security to cyber security, possible threats of developing weapons of mass destruction by some non-responsible states or non-state actors to the NATO extension etc. Nevertheless, these serious and indispensable issues and the new equation that have been arisen because of the new security environment in the last two decades are noteworthy. The debate on national security has always had a concern on the approaches dealing with vital security issues. American central position must be

the pre-eminent condition in the adoption of any framework to deal with 'others'. In fact, the way to confront or to deal with the problems decides the future course of action. Therefore, various approaches, course of action and methodologies were adopted to solve the problems. Every approach justify the influence and dominance of the U.S. "with preventive military action, creating stability by using American military superiority for deterrence and containment, and working toward a more cooperative, rule-based international system backed by American power that is used in genuine concert with U.S. friends and allies" (Gelb 2003).

There is a contention for opting and pursuing an appropriate approach to national security in policymaking circle. The bipartisan spirit is decreasing day by day, the question of agreement and consensus is becoming more crucial. The concern about the readiness of forces to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War and post September 11 world were decisive not only in defense circle but also in civil administration. The aim to define an overarching concept of American national security policy to address the threats emerging today is not an easy deal. This would have a profound impact not only on U.S. success in the war against terror but also on transatlantic relations as well as the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and stability. The question of national security concept is related with the U.S. grand strategy as well. This has focused on managing bipolarity to exploiting primacy since the Cold War days. On the rhetorical level different administrations, have disagreements about strategy but only slight differences on objectives. This shows that in spite of the differences between Republican and Democrat's grand strategies, they have roughly common objectives and interests as far as beyond the territorial relations and achievements are concerned. Therefore, they may have their differences on means and to an extent on ways but agreement on interests (values & goals).

There has been some disagreements among presidents about strategy, at least on the rhetorical level, but scant disagreement on objectives. For Clinton the strategy was a multilateral approach if we can but unilateral if we must. However, for Bush Jr. it is the reverse. Going alone to attack on Iraq was criticized in terms of diplomatic strategy. Bush the second represented a sharp shift from Clinton. This move was not much appreciated in terms of security outcomes sought from strategy. After the Cold War, in national security thinking and objectives roughly no American leaders call up the value of primacy, empire, or hegemony. Multilateralism is not seen as an

alternative to American control, but as a vehicle for it, a practice in a world order where the United States is first among and above equals, not among them. The value of primacy is covered, unconsciously as well as in public rhetoric, by understatements and new metaphors, such as 'shaping the international environment'. No metaphor is more overworked than leadership that allows simultaneous denial and affirmation of dominance. Therefore, John Kerry, who regularly criticized Bush for unilateralism, declared that America was not put here to dominate the world rather have a higher calling to lead it. Nevertheless, the point, of course, was to get the world to where they want it to go, not to wherever some plebiscite of governments might take it. The U.S. never leaves the possibility of giving allies a veto over American actions. To many, the diplomatic process that ended the Cold War in the late 1980s seems one of grand cooperation, since it was marked by comparative calm and amity in superpower negotiations. There was actually very little cooperation, the West conceded nothing of significance, just pocketed a series of concessions by Gorbachev, and watched contentedly as first the Soviets East European Empire and then the inner empire of the Soviet Union itself collapsed. The Cold War ended not with a compromise peace, but with virtually total surrender by Moscow (Betts 2004:24).

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, American grand strategy evolved with little explicit debate. The exception to this drift was the Pentagon exercise in the last year of the administration of Bush the Elder to inform military planning for the post-Cold War world. The strategy to prevent the rise of potential competitors was drafted. This was also aimed to discourage advanced countries from challenging American leadership. Simultaneously the security commitments were extended to the countries that had been Soviet allies only a short time before.

Comprehensive notions of national security came into being only after the victory in the Cold War. It comes simply because the main military threat was eliminated. However, the military instruments remained popular. Though, a new minor threat of rogue states evolved due to vacuum left by Soviet collapse. The small-scale military actions also increased. The humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping tasks associated with world order became temporarily popular. The policing tasks in the Balkans grew into war over Kosovo. The strategic rationale for these operations, other than as charity, was dubious. Therefore, commitment receded when operations became costly without being conclusive, as in Somalia. Decisions on peacekeeping

simultaneously endorsed the function and stipulated conditions for fulfilling it that amounted to backing away.

Though the emphasis was laid down that the U.S. would not contract with the international community but the big exception to this insistence was the spread of contractual defense guarantees in Europe. The most demonstrated initiative to make ascendancy in world order as an objective was the expansion of NATO. Its transformation from a military alliance to a political club was initiated. The policy of engagement and enlargement was the focus in Bill Clinton's administration.

NATO moved into the power vacuum created by the USSR's implosion even before the European Union. The militarization of containment that began in the late 1940s has been replaced by the militarization of enlargement since the 1990s. Official rhetoric does not distinguish between national security and international security. A major declared adjustment of U.S. strategy reflects the elision of the objectives of the preventive war doctrine of Bush the Younger. However, that was mislabeled as preemption in general. The principle of preemption 'beating an enemy to the draw when he is preparing to attack' has natural appeal, especially about combating terrorists.

The new Bush strategy was about preemption and the unabashed endorsement of striking bad states that are not yet preparing an attack, however, was a big embarrassment. Most importantly, no Iraqi weapon of mass destruction was found to justify the American attack of 2003 in terms of self-defense. The administration was left only with liberation of oppressed people as the rationale for war.

Humanitarian aggression is popular only if it is cheap or if it coincides with strategic necessity. The fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War have changed American security priorities sharply. Before terrorists attacks on America their arguments about military charity were very different from the current one as, how often and how much to commit American power to settle ethnic conflicts, protect foreign populations from local enemies, and build stable states. The supporters of the comprehensive view of national security saw such charity as self-interest in the long run, since political as well as economic globalization would make the world safer and more profitable for the United States. However, terrorist attacks highlighted the downside of globalization. This was the repercussion against westernization and

American primacy. Now counterterrorism is the central national security priority. The strategy convergence is taking place prominently as in the Cold War, both cosmopolitan and nationalist conceptions of security are converging on similar strategies. The focus is given to aggressive collection of intelligence and the use of force to eliminate terrorists who can be located. Until the terrorist attacks on America, there was a debate about whether counterterrorism should be conceived primarily in terms of law enforcement or of war. The comprehensive world order view held the edge then, because terrorism was not yet perceived as a major threat. Though, countries like India were suffering from cross border terrorism severely. The FBI subordinated intelligence collection to the primary mission of apprehending and prosecuting terrorists as criminals. However, terrorist attacks settled the debate in a different direction. The law enforcement took a back seat to national security. The specter of shock of war in Korea again became relevant in policy making after a half-century. The fundamental objectives of world order and American power converged on strategies that emphasizing force.

CHINA IN THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

A country known for its size: largest population, third largest land area, fourth (nominal) or second (purchasing power parity) largest economy, second largest primary energy producer and consumer as well as is the largest carbon dioxide emitter (National Intelligence Council 2009).

The relation with China in post-Cold War era is crucial to the unipolarity of the United States. Chinese rise has compelled them to reformulate and reorient their strategy. Now Chinese economy has achieved the second largest status in the world after the United States. This is the result of their thirty years of fast-paced economic growth. Today China is driving global economic growth and has become an Asian economic hub. With economic success, China has developed significant global strategic influence as well. It is also engaged in an ambitious military modernization drive, including efforts to develop extended-range power projection capabilities and such advanced weapons as a stealth bomber. It continues to restrain all perceived challenges to the Communist Party's control on power (Lawrence & Lum 2011).

However, the experience shows that the rise of new powers produced rivalry and conflict. Currently America and China has a low level of strategic trust. The new

administration has constantly assured China that Americans welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs, and does not seek to prevent Chinese re-emergence as a great power⁴⁴. However, it has grappled with how to engage China on different issues that are affecting stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. They are also not clear about how to persuade China to address economic policies America perceive as denying a level to U.S. firms trading with and operating in China. These economic policies include Chinese currency policy, its alleged discrimination against foreign firms in favor of domestic ones, and its weak protections for intellectual property rights. The Administration has also wrestled with how best to force China on its human rights record. How to reconcile different approaches to address the climate change is also a problematic issue (Lawrence & Lum 2011).

However, both have cooperated to address global economic challenges and nuclear proliferation concerns related to Iran and North Korea. The bilateral relationship was characterized by significant discord in 2010. American points of friction included Chinese currency and industrial policies, reluctance to condemn a series of North Korean provocations, expansive claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea and ongoing suppression of domestic dissent. While Chinese points of friction included American arms sales to Taiwan, Obama's meeting with Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, American joint military exercises with South Korea in the Yellow Sea and their declaration of a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (Lawrence & Lum 2011).

However, both are attempting to make a common ground for common interests. Therefore, bilateral relationship between America and China is vitally important. The bilateral interests are now bound together much more closely now than even a few years ago. These extensive connections have made it increasingly complex for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, unintended costs. The Bush administration addressed these increasing inter-linkages by engaging with China, regularizing bilateral contacts and cooperation, and minimizing differences. The new administration has inherited not only more extensive policy mechanisms for pursuing Sino-U.S. policy, but a more complex and multifaceted relationship in which the stakes are higher and in which American action may increasingly be constrained.

⁴⁴ Although, the same assurance roughly has been given to India as well.

The Harvard historian Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2006: 74) has argued that, the belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.

However, economically both have become symbiotically entwined. A kinder, gentler trade policy would provide a constructive counterpoint to China's highly successful commercial diplomacy (Frost et al. 2008: 4). China is the second-largest American trading partner. It is the second largest holder of American securities and the largest holder of American Treasuries used to finance the federal budget deficit. This in fact, is positioning China to play a crucial role in American national security. Whilst, Chinese substantial levels of economic growth depends heavily on continued American investment and trade. This makes Chinese economy highly vulnerable to a significant economic slowdown in America. Guha (2008) points out that in the year following the outbreak of the credit crisis in 2007, trade accounted for roughly three-quarters of U.S. growth. However, other bilateral problems include difficulties over the status and well-being of Taiwan, ongoing disputes over Chinese failure to protect American intellectual property rights, the economic advantage China gains from not floating its currency, and growing concerns about the quality and safety of exported Chinese products. These provide a continuing set of diverse challenges. Probably these are the reasons why Moran (2008) argues that trade policymaking should be consistent with broad strategic concerns. Therefore, narrow the scope of export controls and visa denials; and improve the review of incoming foreign investments by developing and applying key judgments consistently, such as degree of dependence, foreign availability, and industry concentration, among others. China's alleged "dollar weapon" is not a weapon at all. In fact, China's export is heavily dependent of the U.S. import (Frost et al. 2008:9, 34). Chinese assertive foreign policy and continued military development also have significant long-term implications for American global power and influence.

During the Bush Administration, resumed military-to-military relations, cooperated on anti- terror initiatives, and worked closely on the Six Party Talks to restrain and chuck out North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. China's diplomatic leadership in the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving North Korea's nuclear challenge, also is well appreciated in Seoul. Yet China's growing economic influence in North Korea and its claim to the ancient territory of Koguryo, which includes large areas of ancient Korean kingdoms, have raised concerns that China's long-term interests and

objectives toward the peninsula may not correspond to those of South Korea (Przystup 2009:260). However, in spite of complications these and other programs of engagement are likely to continue in some ways under the new administration. While in energy sector America's role as guarantor of the freedom of the seas assumes a riskier and costlier burden. In the longer term, China's growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil may heighten Beijing's concern about U.S. control of the sea lines of communication. These concerns have led China to expand its influence along the routes connecting the Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, and South China Sea through a network of treaties, access to ports and airfields, and modernized military capabilities (Andres 2009:70). China may be a more attractive recipient since demand in the Asian markets is expected to grow some 8 million bbls/day in the next 15 years (Sabonis-Helf 2009:83). Therefore, this is significant that Hillary Clinton included the PRC in her first official trips abroad that included stops in Japan, Indonesia, South Korea as well in February 20-22; 2009. This ostensibly shows Chinese importance in terms of American national interests and security.

BRAZIL IN THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The economy Brazil has grown to be the eighth largest in the world. Slow growth rates have kept interest rates low in Europe and the United States, which has encouraged investors looking for higher returns to flood Brazil and other developing nations with foreign capital. In addition to fueling growth, these inflows are causing excessive appreciation of local currencies (Talley 2011). It has strengthened its power in Latin America. It has extended its influence to the broader region, and become ever more important on the globe. The new national security strategy regards Brazil as an emerging center of influence, whose leadership it welcomes to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues (NSS 2010).

Currently America-Brazil relations have normally been positive in spite of Brazilian prioritization of strengthening relations with neighboring countries and expanding ties with nontraditional partners in the developing South. However, some disagreements have emerged over the past few years, e.g. different policy approaches toward the situations in Honduras and Iran. Brazil also recognized Palestine as an independent state within its 1967 borders—setting off a wave of similar recognitions throughout South America (Goforth 2010). Brazil then voted against the U.N. Security Council resolution to impose sanctions, saying the council had “lost a historic opportunity to

peacefully negotiate the Iranian nuclear program”(Parsi 2010) Brazil and America continue to engage on a number of issues, including counternarcotics, counterterrorism, energy security, trade, human rights, and the environment.

Brazil’s first female president Dilma Rousseff has pledged continuity, maintaining generally orthodox economic policies while continuing to assert a role for the state in development. Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America with a gross national income (GNI) of \$1.6 trillion. In 2010, the value of Brazil’s exports reached some \$202 billion, contributing to a trade surplus of \$20.3 billion (Global Trade Atlas, January 2011). The country’s current economic strength is the result of a series of policy reforms implemented over the course of two decades that reduced inflation, established stability, and fostered growth. These policies have also enabled Brazil to better absorb international shocks like the recent global financial crisis, from which Brazil emerged relatively unscathed (The Economist, November 12, 2009).The country experienced a brief recession in 2009, causing an economic contraction of 0.6%, before rebounding quickly with estimated growth of 7.7% in 2010 (Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011).

Brazil’s current and previous administrations have demonstrated significant interest in America-Brazil relations. Trade and energy have especial considerations in their relationship. Quite a few legislations were introduced including a bill (S. 587) that would have provided \$6 million to expand the bio-fuels cooperation. Another bill (H.R. 5439) that would have offset American contributions to a fund for Brazilian cotton farmers, created because of a World Trade Organization dispute by reducing subsidy payments for American cotton farmers. In fact, these issues are crucial in American-Brazil relationship (Meyer 2011).

Thus, we have an impression that much of the current NSS ‘architecture was designed to meet the global security challenges of the post-World War II context, and may not be appropriate for addressing 21st-century challenges. That architecture includes the organizations, structures, and processes that govern decision-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities. National security strategic guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms of guidance, are a key element of that system (Dale 2008). However, there is a growing need to reform the U.S. government’s national security system.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE U.S. AND RUSSIA

International relations provide quite a few approaches through which analysts and scholars view the Post-Cold War U.S.-Russian national security strategies. Realists focus on Russia's absolute or relative decline, republican liberals on its flirtation with and subsequent retreat from democracy, while liberals on its integration into the global trading and financial system (Krebs 2010). However, in general these theoretical viewpoints overlook the importance of identity and narrative. Therefore, the complexity in U.S.-Russia relations is compounded by contradictory American and Russian perceptions. Questions like Soviet Union/Russia's failure to sustain a super power status and its resurgence are in currency for last two decades. In fact, this debate provides an idea to formulate and analyze the national security strategies.

REALITY AND NARRATIVES

There is no dearth of examples in history when many great powers have accepted their own decline. The Ottoman Empire or Austro-Hungarian even ceased to be states. The Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Great Britain have acknowledged their demotions while remaining sovereign states⁴⁵ (Krebs 2010). Therefore, this is very significant to consider that, why post-Cold War Russia was able to sustain the myth of its great power status and even in its darkest days kept faith in its renewal. One possible answer is that Russia, especially in its first decade of this century, lacks a 'competitive marketplace of ideas'. Its leaders are free to engage in 'myth-making' whilst the opponents, i.e. politicians, journalists, and activists, who are brave enough to speak out, are subjected to harassment to any extent (Snyder & Ballentine 1996).

The Soviet Union lost its extended territorial dominance and dissolved without the physical defeat of a 'hot' war. Geoffrey Blainey argues that war is repeatedly the great clarifier that puts myths to the test and sorts truth from pretension (Blainey 1988). 'Defeat' in war is a tangible marker of decline, while for material and psychological reasons, great powers that suffer defeat in war cannot pretend to retain their claim of former status. Powers, which avoid defeat in war can sustain 'myths of resurgence' and preserve their national pride. They go to lengths to show (to) others

⁴⁵ Though, France, at least in the Gaullist narrative, never really came to accept its second-tier status (Krebs, 2010).

that the narrative of their irrevocable fall does not hold, rather than fade away peacefully. This might help explain why Russia can espouse the narrative (the foundation stone of national security strategy) it does (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003).

The British experience of post-War era has some lessons for Russian situation (Reynolds 2000). The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two great axes of international politics (Barnett 1986). Britain's leaders and populace narrated their own status as one of the 'Big Three' either during or after the War. They were exerting itself as a power more energetically than at any time outside the world wars (Reynolds 1989). However, leaders were very aware of the widespread perception of decline, and this showbiz activity was perhaps intended precisely to convince the world that even after everything they remained a great power. Maintaining the status was an "unquestioned priority" of the post-War Attlee government (Butler 2002). In fact, Russia and its leaders are engaged in the same situation for the last two decades. Putin and others are striving to retain that status in the same manner.

British failure in the postwar years to abandon its aspirations to be a great power lasted until the mid-1960s, when at last it succumbed to economic realities. Sometimes they have been called as "great power complex" (Callaghan 1997). Russia experienced the same in the first decade of post-Cold War era and today she is also not less than as a 'great power complex'.

The explanation of narrative convergence or divergence requires an analysis of the whole range of issues and developments of the post- Cold War era. Moreover, this is not merely a theoretical question. It potentially has great significance for policy formulation and its projection as well. To make a better understanding on why American and Russian post-Cold War narratives have differed, may also help to identify the forces as well as issues that get in the way of their alignment.

NARRATIVE DIVERGENCE

RUSSIAN NARRATIVES

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian dominant narratives regarding the U.S. have shifted over time. Some Russians reproduced the American narrative through embracing the discourse of free-market capitalism, democracy, and, to an extent Western triumph. The most important change comes when they start accepting Russia's subordinate role. However, the scene was not without the powerful voices of

dissent. The nationalist as well as communist did not comply with the narratives of liberalism's triumph. Even reformers have been blamed for having hastened the Soviet Union's downfall. Many refused to accept the enduring consignment to second-rank status in world politics. With Vladimir Putin's ascent, nationalist dissent had become dominant by the end of the 1990s. However, it did not entail any rejection of previous discourses on democracy and free market, and more so neither it was a promise to return to a Soviet political-economic model. Rather, Putin and Medvedev offered a narrative characterized by a discontinuation between democratic and modernizing present and stultified Soviet past. They have blamed the Soviet Union's "closed society and totalitarian political regime" for making the country "an industrial and raw materials giant . . . (that) proved unable to compete against post-industrial societies" (Medvedev 2009)⁴⁶.

However, this approach does not reject the existing international norms and organizations. Rather, Putin and Medvedev have repeatedly affirmed Russian desire to integrate into the existing system, especially regional organizations and alliances but simultaneously they never forget to call for a democratization of international politics. However, on the other hand, this narrative has differed significantly from the post-Cold War U.S. narratives where they refuse to accept American international dominance as a fact and as the natural or rightful structure of international politics. They also refuse to Russian consignment to the rank of regional power and its exclusion from the rank of global or great power as well as the inevitability or permanence of Russia's relative weakness. Putin and Medvedev have devoted very little rhetorical attention to narrate the past two decades in general and the Soviet past specifically. Rather, they have emphasized their rich history and traditions that inform the present and future. However, the mythical Russia they summon belongs to no specific time or place. They invoke the Soviet Union only to mark a clear contrast to the present. They represent Russia as having undergone an irreversible transformation. As Putin has stated, "a new country, and at the same time a very ancient one". Yet, Russian leaders still present a certain rhetorical ambivalence. Post-Soviet Russia is symbolized as having embraced democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, whilst the Soviet leadership is attacked for its self-isolation, imperialism,

⁴⁶ Russia's posture changed strikingly in Summer 2009, when the United States and Russia reached an agreement to permit U.S. overflights to Afghanistan, and continued in December 2009 with Medvedev's support for the expansion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

totalitarian ideology, and self-destructive militarism. Nonetheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union is represented as a tragedy and disaster (Frye et al. 2010).

Since 2000, considering the present structure of global politics, they have represented the state as a great power temporarily fallen on hard times, or in Putin's ironical formulation, a rich country of poor people. In fact he has advanced from the beginning a vision of Russian renewal. He declared that it was his task, to restore the country's prestige and leading role in the world and to return Russia to international respect. In his 'Open Letter to Voters', he stated that Russia is far more than just a reduced map of the Soviet Union; it is a confident power with a great future and a great people. While by the mid-2000s, Russian leaders have started to speak more assertively. Putin (2003) affirmed that Russia had returned to its rightful, recognized place among the ranks of the truly strong, economically advanced and influential nations⁴⁷. It had a unique status and special responsibilities as one of the world's leading powers. It is fundamentally because of its immense stock of nuclear weapons and swift economic and moral revival⁴⁸ (Colton et al. 2010).

However, Russian national interests and foreign policy remain linked with global developments. Their army and power-projection capabilities were in match. The relation with the world was of great importance for them and for the entire international system. Thus, what Russia claims and be worthy of, Putin pronounced, was a partnership with the United States, entrenched in equal rights and mutual respect. This might be seen as the background of American moves to "re-set" the relationship with Russia (Krebs 2010).

When Medvedev has taken charge of the cradle, he simply credited Putin with dramatically changing Russia's international standing. Putin and Medvedev narrated Russia's post-Cold War setback, its substantial swift renewal, and recovery of historical standing to offer a vision of an assertive Russia. They emphasized on a world with a polycentric international system. That system would be a truly democratic model of international relations that would not allow any one country to dominate in any sphere. Russian leaders reject the relevance of unipolarity, both as an

⁴⁷ Putin made this declaration at his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, May 16, 2003. See also Putin's speech at the 58th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 25, 2003.

⁴⁸ Putin referred to Russia in this capacity in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, May 10, 2006. See also Putin's Annual Address, April 18, 2002, May 26, 2004, and April 25, 2005; speech to an enlarged conference at the foreign ministry attended by the heads of Russian diplomatic missions abroad, July 12, 2002; press statement on Iraq, April 3, 2003.

alleged portrayal of the world system's structure and an aspiration. Hegemony is an American pretense and unnecessary arrogance (Colton et al. 2010).

In Russian thinking, unipolarity was merely a proposed but unattractive mode of organizing the international system. It could not be an accurate description of the world system. It was materially impossible and thus had never been put into practice. He made obvious that emerging multi-polarity and the growing role of multilateral diplomacy was an objective development, a historical inevitability (Putin 2007). Medvedev puts forward Russia as a leading architect of a new global regime. He emphasizes the need for a proper collective security system where states renounce violence. However, this vision of a leading role was articulated by Russia in a self-assigned and self-styled manner (Legvold et al. 2010).

All this is understandable only in the backdrop of the Cold War status and rivalries. For them, it is not easy to go conveniently far from the Soviet status and transform themselves into a democratic structure. Although, it is unfortunate when American leaders forget the military might of Russia. They are not out of the story of great-power politics. Their national security strategy explicitly reveals that they hold a vision of global politics where Russia remained a leading power.

AMERICAN NARRATIVES

Since the end of the Cold War, Russians and Americans have articulated somewhat different narratives about the post-Cold War structure of world politics as well as Russia's future. In American narratives, the end of the Cold War denotes a clear victory for American power and values. Amongst U.S. policy-makers, there was little dissent from Francis Fukuyama's triumphalist commentary on how liberalism and democracy had emerged from the Cold War, and importantly without ideological competitors.⁴⁹ Those who stand up at the tone of Bush administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, which starts with a pronouncement that the great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for national success,

⁴⁹Implicit agreement with Fukuyama held even as U.S. officials shied away from his unfortunate phrase, "the end of history," as did Anthony Lake in the 1993 speech cited below. This was also true even among those on the left and the right who, for different reasons, believed Cold War competition could have been avoided if the United States had pursued a different policy (whether more conciliatory or more hard-nosed) early on. Even intellectual critics who assailed the "errors of endism" questioned Fukuyama's presumption of the *permanence* of liberalism's triumph, not the *fact* of that triumph (Krebs 2010).

freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. They should have to remember that Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake⁵⁰ (1993) proclaims that the victory and idea of freedom has universal appeal⁵¹. However, America stood alone after the Cold War.

American debate on how the country should relate to the world in the 1990s had no consensus at all. The projections varied significantly about how soon new competitors would arise. In a unipolar international system, America was the victorious, reigning hegemon; what Lake puts it that Americans are the dominant power. However, this was not the common tone in between scholars and to extent policy makers as well. The worries of a challenge to U.S. primacy from Japan had abated, as the Japanese economy remained mired in the doldrums. In other words Japan no longer a likely peer competitor. However, Chinese rise is clearly identifiable, but many forecast U.S. dominance for the near future (Zakaria 1996). Some, including U.S. foreign policy expert Strobe Talbott⁵², have fear of a revanchist Russia and cautioned (Goldgeier 1999). In fact, through the initial years of the Clinton administration, officials tended to acknowledge Russia as a fellow great power. However, as 1990s wore on "American supremacy in global affairs only grew larger and Russia's status as a major power dropped precipitously" (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003).

The end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to see Russia in a different manner rather to label it as an adversary only. Thus, policy makers more often find Russia as a state of economic opportunity. While, at the same time another group of political elite labeled Russia a nation of politically volatile and corrupt rather than as a future competitor (Legvold 2001; Matlock Jr.1996). The Clinton administration's dismissal of Russian apprehension over NATO enlargement in general and NATO's air war over Kosovo specially displays the leading approach, which emerged in the

⁵⁰ Implicit agreement with Fukuyama held even as U.S. officials shied away from his unfortunate phrase, "the end of history," as did Anthony Lake in the 1993 speech cited below. This was also true even among those on the left and the right who, for different reasons, believed Cold War competition could have been avoided if the United States had pursued a different policy (whether more conciliatory or more hard-nosed) early on. Even intellectual critics who assailed the "errors of endism" questioned Fukuyama's presumption of the *permanence* of liberalism's triumph, not the *fact* of that triumph [Krebs, 2010].

⁵¹ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nssintro.html>;
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html>.

⁵² After his 1995 conversion to support of NATO enlargement, however, Strobe Talbott cited the prospect of Russian revanchism as a reason *for*, not against, enlargement.

1990s toward Russia. Russia gets lesser important position to U.S. policy than domestic politics and grand strategy.

These divergent narratives may have complicated post-Cold War U.S. - Russia relations. It might help explain Russia's sensitivity to America's relationship with countries in the former Soviet Union, and military bases there after 2001.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRENDS AND VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

The last phase of Clinton era has experienced a steep 'spiral downward' trend in the U.S. - Russia relationship, which continued until Barack Obama has taken oath in office except for a short period of the last quarter of 2001 when America was seriously stricken by terrorist attacks. This stumbling relationship was abated by the help of some contentious issues for Russia specifically and the whole world in general. The last Iraq war plans to expand and enlarge the NATO organization and its allies, American rigid approach to install and establish a missile defense system in Europe in the name of Iranian future missile attacks and of course, American unilateral decisions to intervene in the internal matters only facilitated that downward relationship. Although, souring relationship of these two giants was neither justified nor reasonable. In addition, this was not in favor of the U.S. national interest in corroboration with their new grand strategic approach. While on the Russian part, this was the time to consolidate the state, society and institutions rather to engage or entangle themselves in any kind of 'serious strategic rivalry' to begin a new Cold War.

Though, "total oil consumption has declined significantly" (Levi 2010) even then, the U.S. has to manage its energy demands and 'strategic petroleum reserves'. In fact, 'they stockpile crude oil but do not stockpile petroleum products.' India and China are striving to develop their strategic reserves. Thus, the 'confluence of oil, gas, and national security' is crucial among policy-makers. Now energy security and development are two sides of one coin. Russia could make wealth and profitable business from this transaction. Other issues like nuclear energy and weapons, puzzle of climate change, and fighting against different kind of terrorist activities are also crucial for both nation-states. Cooperation is the best solution to tackle these issues. In fact, oil and gas are not only required for development but also playing crucial role as energy weapon in the international politics. However, policy of strategic petroleum

reserves mitigating the effects of this weapon for major countries. Russia in recent past has shown its strength by cutting off oil and gas supplies to its neighboring countries on price issues that makes the question of safe and secured supply of energy products relevant. European dependence could be seen as a serious security issue. Legvold's (2010:7) argument that, "Concerns about oil and gas supplies generate a complex mix of competitive impulses and grounds for cooperation" is appealing in this context. Thus, economic as well as political impacts of this issue are worth concern.

New economic developments and demand for a new financial system, requirement or demand for the new European security architecture and mechanism, and the question of 'sphere of influence' especially in the post-Soviet space are significant in strategy consideration and policy formulation for both the countries. The real territorial border and perception of the Soviet era extension in Russian minds creates a dichotomy for Russian security crafters, while Americans perceive this situation as an opportunity for extension of their influence in their new grand strategic framework. This makes a big challenge before both of them as far as their national security perspective is concerned. For the U.S. it is a question of dominance perception whilst Russia receives it in physical context. The Russo-Georgian war of the August 2008, issues of military presence in Central Asia, and fight for oil and gas pipelines in the region along with new mood of NATO expansion around the Russian state stir up aggressive approaches in their strategies. In fact, post-Soviet space is a sensitive and central issue in Russian national security.

One of the most decisive subject matter in their security strategies is 'nuclear security'. This incorporates related issues of arms race/control and nonproliferation particularly. Iran and North Korea get attention every time, though these two are merely a focused symbol behind the whole gamut of nuclear related issues and the question of its extension (horizontal) as well as expansion (vertical) of that nuclear might. Dmitri Medvedev is calling attention for a new European security treaty, which has been responded positively by the new American administration, where nuclear theme would be a central point. This issue contains many related propositions; the

NATO extension⁵³ is only one of them. The conventional arms control and ballistic missile system are also vital issues.

Economy per se finds a central place in the national security strategy in both countries. Either policies related to economic ties with each other or in general, making good sense especially in the light of current crisis that shook the world without considering physical borders. Robert Legvold (2010) reveals complex and interwoven threads of issues, which pose many challenges before strategy crafters and generate complexities in current international system. The question of healthy civil society that is sensitive to human rights and democratic values is a perplex one. It has its own regional complexities and compulsions. There is no fix and all time accepted model to lay down this structure. In addition, not only culture and economy but 'cultural economy' and 'economic culture' as well makes a different environment and requirement in varied social structures. Though, technological and information revolutions has made an astounding structural change in the minds of people who desire a faster pace of change while stakeholders generally attempt to take a status quo approach and stand. All this makes the whole scenario dreadfully complex. A new call for global governance is popping up. International terrorism has no face. The old security instruments were mending for enemies that have an appearance, identity and structure, but are facing problems to challenge and counter to nameless and faceless nonstate actors. The problem of climate change is not far away from this complex situation. The most important point is that at various points these are inter-related and amalgamated as well.

The trade and commerce, energy security, international terrorism, cyber revolution, poverty, and other transnational issues along with global governance do not exist in watertight compartments. Sometimes it is difficult to dissect the causes and implications. For Russia the post-Soviet space has brought not only security but also a psychological problem of international status and prestige. All these issues separately or with one another open new 'complex pattern of converging and diverging' national interests of both focused nation-states for which Legvold (2010:7) appeals that they require 'anything but a simple policy approach.'

⁵³ The American literature make use of the suffix 'enlargement' while 'expansion' is commonly employed in Russian literature, but I found the term 'extension' more particular to signify both stands simultaneously.

In fact, both have to achieve their strategic objectives. This propels them to ‘reset’ the relationship. Except on, few occasions both are cautious and alert for last two decades to cement the relationship. After a brief period of romanticism experienced by Russian state, pragmatism started to get its hold on Russian soil. From Yeltsin to Putin it has continued growth that is getting currency in Obama’s administration today. Yeltsin’s pragmatism “sought global economic integration for leverage in changing the domestic political economic system” while Putin observes that economic growth is instrumental to the core objective of establishing Russia as an influential, autonomous, and accepted great power (Wallander 2005). Whilst Obama’s pragmatism is “not hewing precisely to the traditional realist school of international relations, with its strict assessment of balance of power imperatives, the president and his Russia team appear to be pursuing a policy informed by Realpolitik” (Salzman, 2010). Although, this is not a sudden change and many voices have been gathering around since August 2008. This was acknowledged as a turning point among strategy planners to reorient their policy approach. There may be overt consensus on alleged shared values but behind the door, it only provides an opportunity to interact on other issues. Medvedev as well as many scholars and analysts have given a call for shared interests rather than values (Graham; Shevtsova 2009). Dmitri Trenin (2008) observes that, “Washington needs to think strategically about Moscow, not ideologically or theologically.”

American national security strategies in the first decade were anecdotal to their projected values; even democracy promotion has lost its previous credit in world politics. Although, this was always a strong and better convincing export and political instrument to deal with ‘others’ and presumably it will remain so in future in various degrees. Russia also gets involved with this phraseology. Major changes in world economy and politics compel to change the strategies or pragmatic strategies accommodate these changes.

Russia in 1991 and now, these are two different configurations in her history. When the whole world was plunged in global financial crisis and terrorism, they continued the trend to strengthen their economy, which prompted them to lay down the assertive policies in their NSS. The catastrophic terrorism created a situation before the U.S. to reorient her strategy towards not only Russia but India and its adversaries as well. The climate change, renaissance of nuclear issue and energy security has created a

situation where they need to fundamentally reframe and reorient their strategies. Their enormous stakes motivate them to cooperate with each other to achieve their objectives and to be well in their strategies. Salzman (2010) recalls the Hart-Hagel Bipartisan Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia that notes, “An American commitment to improving U.S.-Russian relations is neither a reward to be offered for good international behavior by Moscow nor an endorsement of the Russian government’s domestic conduct. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the importance of Russian cooperation in achieving essential American goals.” In fact, America is making a call for Russia simply because of its strategic operational reasons, though Russian historic superpower status, which militarily still continues is not in oblivion state of thinking. Therefore either it “deserves” or not but William Burns (2009) reaffirmed that “Russia matters.”

For last two decades, America at least in its expression is interested in making Russia a global stakeholder as well as responsible actor. This shows her dominant and victorious mindset of the Cold War. However, after a brief interval Russia has started to assert its equal status in a Westphalian system. Their permanent engagement rather than on specific issues was a major consideration in both the countries. Their bilateral and global concerns are equally significant regarding their status as global actors. Hillary Rodham Clinton goes on to make her orientation on balance away from a multipolar to a “multi-partner world” (2009). To achieve and advance global interests’ hedging of great powers has no place rather cooperation of major power is required and this tendency was demonstrated in both NSS. This can be perceived as Russian aspiration and American acceptance at least in their strategies. Obama’s (2009) statements reaffirm those developments as he said, “[T]he pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game—progress must be shared.” However, this does not go much beyond the Democrats’ grand strategy. The most contentious issue throughout the post-Cold War period has been the NATO’s extension; this and alternate pipelines routes to Europe shows the European security concerns. However, trade and commerce has been shaping these security issues for last two decades. Question of NATO is very much related to the Eurasian security and energy-rich Caspian Basin that has a connection with the post-Soviet space.

A continuation of dilemma is perceived in their strategies on issues like broad-based strategic partnership, extensive bilateral cooperative agenda or selective engagement

through nonproliferation and security. The U.S. strategy crafters have shown extra concern over the authoritarian political system. The concern over democracy and rule-of-law deficit has been shown explicitly however; new approaches are making efforts to remove the hurdles of value-gap against the possibility of potentially productive cooperation. Currently debate in NSS is that whether broad partnership is fruitful or they should go for selective engagement approach.

However, there are areas where cooperation is necessary or rather, indispensable, but considering of Russian behavior and policy choices, the U.S. is hesitant in pursuing a broad strategy of engagement and cooperation. Salzman (2010) quotes Sestanovich (2008) in this connection, “Suddenly, saying that Washington has to cooperate with Moscow when possible and push back emphatically when necessary no longer seems a fully satisfactory formula. Determining the right balance between cooperating and pushing back – between selective engagement and selective containment – has become the main task of U.S. policy toward Russia.” The Russo-Georgian war has served the reason that the values-gap creates the situation where broad engagement is unrealistic and should not be taken as an objective (Sestanovich 2006). In spite of that that the policy of “re-set” has been opted, to move that proves the progressive strategy mind-set or comprehensive partnerships. This was necessary to prevent despair of Bush era. Dmitri Trenin points out,

The opinion that has predominated in our country to this day that the “reset” is above all Washington’s apology for the mistakes of the earlier Bush Administration and their rectification certainly does not correspond to the idea of the current team in the White House. For example, in our country the concept of the “reset” is understood as almost the willingness in current conditions to accept the Russian point of view of the situation in the Near Abroad, which essentially is wishful thinking (Trenin in Strokan & Sidorov 2009).

Zero-sum game or taking directly a realist position is roughly absent in the NSS. It means the advancement of American objectives without considering ideals is not the case at least today. The energy, post-Soviet space and democracy are important in many ways. Hart-Hagel commission (March 2009) reports, “Securing America’s vital national interests in the complex, interconnected, and interdependent world of the twenty-first century requires deep and meaningful cooperation with other governments. . . . And few nations could make more of a difference to our success than Russia. . . . Rapid and effective action to strengthen U.S.-Russian relations is critically important to advancing U.S. national interests” (Salzman 2010). However, it differs on the post-Soviet space, which finds prominent place in Russian strategy. In some

ways economic value of collaboration finds at least one way in energy sector whether Russia manipulates energy flows for political purposes or not.

Aslund and Kuchins (2009) supports focus on values and is less interested in the argument that there is no contest between ideals and interests however supports all moves that promote cooperation to achieve strategic objectives. Russian conduct makes only secondary thought against the basic agenda, which proves pragmatism of NSS. Now Russia is out of that romanticism and presents her interests and concerns eloquently. While, in case of major differences, America has wide-open choices to go for selective cooperation. Today neo-containment is not a good move, and the argument that Russia is a revanchist power with neoimperial intentions, intent on undermining U.S. objectives and manipulating its energy resources for political gain (Cohen 2009). On the other hand, he does have the idea that Russia could be a valuable strategic partner but is not in support of pursuing extensive cooperation. Aron (2009) unlike Ariel Cohen, places less emphasis on the value-gap and focuses instead on ways in which the Kremlin's political ideology precludes meaningful cooperation. Aron's argument is based on that, historically, "the substance and extent of U.S.-Russian rapprochement depend first and foremost on the ideology of the regime in the Kremlin and its vision of the country's national interests." The way Kremlin leadership understands Russia's national and strategic interests sets Russia's moves that has found place in their NSS. The national security strategy is going away from Soviet ideology. Moreover, it is heading toward new significant ideological as well as political evolution in Moscow. This leaves more rooms for cooperation on national interests. Moreover, in this respect, issues like strategic nuclear arms control; European security; economy; energy security; questions of democracy and human rights; and transnational global concerns have their proper place in the NSS.

STRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP

Both countries in their NSS follow the way shown by ambassador's meet⁵⁴ in September 23, 2008, i.e. "the new administrations in Washington and Moscow must create an improved institutional framework for consultations and negotiations and for implementation of the programs and initiatives this agenda will require. Our experience suggests that such machinery will require attention and support from our

⁵⁴ Alexander Bessmertnykh, James Collins, Yuri Dubinin, Arthur Hartman, Jack Matlock, and Thomas Pickering ((September 2008).

Presidents.” Attention and priority given in the U.S. NSS shows resemblance with James Collins (2008) arguments that, ‘if we are to take any lessons from previous chapters in the history of U.S.-Russia relations, it is the absolute requirement to give their conduct priority, structure, and above all consistent attention.’ The approaches toward each other require significant presidential leadership and support from Congress and Duma. Previously, however, a personal presidential relationship without much bureaucratic engagement has led to an over-personalization of Relations. Now NSC is getting more involved. The agenda set by NSS is providing more opportunity to lessen the over personalization of countries relation.

In fact, policy implementation comes under the bureaucratic realm rather than the executive. Thus, the structuring of relationship to an extent depends on establishing channels for lower level officials to be in touch with their counterparts. Therefore, permanent bilateral forums may make a difference. In July 2009, the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission was established that is only a starting point not the end. This commission shall “serve as a new foundation for this cooperation”. It will comprise ‘working groups on development and the economy; energy and the environment; nuclear energy and security; arms control and international security; defense, foreign policy and counterterrorism; preventing and handling emergencies; civil society; science and technology; space; health; education; and culture’(July 6, 2009). The working Groups are charged to meet “regularly” and make reports to the commission coordinators at least twice a year, and reports to the presidents at least once a year. The commission has expanded to include a group on the environment, and all of the groups are moving forward.

This kind of development reflects a sign and hope for a better understanding and future but it is also true that not everything is going to be solved very soon and easily. Those complications have their historical baggage in their Cold War status and rivalries. However, the emergence of China, India and other countries as predominant players in the international system has created a situation where both need to reorient their strategies. Selective, extensive or meaningful cooperation, progressive strategy or strategy of engagement and cooperation, founding commissions and including non-conventional issues in bilateral talks, making relations institutional rather than personal presidential, restricting ideology and making national interests as their first priority etc. are the outcome of this new security environment.

NUCLEAR SECURITY

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

Legvold finds nuclear proliferation and nuclear security as the focal point of discussion in the U.S.-Russia strategies not only towards each other but also to the whole security environment. A difficult task of ‘nuclear zero’ goal of Obama and Medvedev is taking place in discussions and debate. Both had a desire to prevent the treaty vacuum that is why the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was replaced by a new one. The ‘joint understanding’ paved the way to follow-on Treaty, which has been finalized in March 2010. This limits the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 for each country. It requires few noteworthy reductions apart from those agreed to in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT). The new version acknowledges a link between offensive and defensive systems (ballistic missile defense or BMD), but does not ‘officially’ limit the development of “missile defense systems”. In fact, missile defense remains the most contentious issue (Barry 2009). Therefore, it is obvious that the U.S. Senate maintained the stand that it would not ratify a treaty that limits missile defense; whereas their counterpart kept option open that, they would not come forward to one that does not address the missile defense. However, the new administration decided to continue ‘talk on missile defense’, whilst Hillary Clinton and Anders Fogh Rasmussen have supported the cause on a joint missile defense system⁵⁵. Although in

⁵⁵The two sides signed the new START treaty in Prague on April 8, 2010. The first formal hearings on the treaty on the U.S. side took place on May 18, 2010. President Medvedev and President Obama have agreed, “Ratification (by the Senate and the Duma) should be simultaneous.” Although START I contains a provision for an automatic five-year extension, the United States and Russia elected not to implement it. Instead, they have stated that the existing treaty will apply “voluntarily” until the new treaty is ratified. Although SORT does not expire until 2012, it relies on START for its verification procedures, and it lost much of its underpinning upon the expiry of the earlier treaty.

The State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, ratified the new START treaty on January 25, 2011 that limits the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, by a vote of 350 to 96, with one abstention. Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed the treaty in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010. The text of the treaty signed by the Russian and U.S. presidents was unaltered by the Duma vote. The U.S. Senate ratified the new START treaty on December 22, 2010. The new treaty will be valid for 10 years if no new agreement on the reduction of and limitations on strategic offensive armaments is achieved during that period. This treaty replaces the START I Treaty of 1991, which expired on December 4, 2009. It also replaces the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed on May 24, 2002. The new treaty sets maximum limits on the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States, i.e. 1,550 deployed warheads for each side, which is approximately one-third smaller than the SORT treaty level. 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed submarine-based ballistic missiles and deployed heavy bombers, which is half the START level. 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed and non-deployed launchers of submarine-based ballistic missiles, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Each side will have the right to choose the makeup and structure of its own strategic offensive armaments, exchange

some corners, it has been observed as upholding the Cold War relations since both had already begun to reduce unilaterally their stockpiles. Iran's nuclear issue was not absent from prospects. The August 2008 Georgian war was crucial along with an opposite reality that Russia needs a new treaty more than the United States. Furthermore, one very ostensible question among scholarly circle was that how both the nations could use their advantage in the nuclear sphere to broaden and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime itself. This includes reviving existing international treaties and negotiating new ones, increasing security at nuclear facilities worldwide, and securing weapons-grade fissile material in third-party countries. Obama and Medvedev are committed on nuclear cooperation that entails a commitment to collaborating on research for proliferation-proof nuclear technology, growth of safe nuclear energy, and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Both extend their support to the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with verification measures (Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev April & July 2009).

123 AGREEMENTS

Furthermore, both the Presidents have pledged to “work to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy” (Joint Statement April 1, 2009). This refers to the 123 Agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation, signed by Bush and Putin in May 2008. It was just before Medvedev became the President of Russian Federation. However, this agreement draft was submitted to the U.S. Congress for its ratification but in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, ratification was suspended (September 2008). This agreement has a provision by which nuclear weapons scientists would work together to develop a proliferation-proof nuclear energy facilities. Moreover, the agreement would pave the way to reframe their nuclear cooperation and future strategy. It would allow a commercial advantage to both the countries that can help to strengthen the economic ties. However, there was an argument against the ratification that was based on Iranian nuclear question. The administration resubmitted the agreement to Congress on May 11, 2010 and passed in December 2010. This enters into force from January 11, 2011.

of data, notifications, remodeling and elimination, inspections, verification procedures and confidence building measures. The new verification mechanism will be simpler and less expensive than the one provided by the START I Treaty, but it will ensure irreversibility, verifiability and transparency of the reduction process.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

On the other hand, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was rejected by the Senate in October 1999 and further blocked during the George W. Bush administration. On October 15, 2010, the United States and Russia submitted a joint draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly, which called for the swift entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty⁵⁶. The CTBT is a "zero-yield"⁵⁷ treaty (Kissinger 1999)⁵⁸. Though, ratification⁵⁹ of the CTBT draft agreement might have a little realistic benefit, keeping in mind that the United States ceased nuclear testing in 1992. George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn (January 2008) have written that the Senate should initiate a bipartisan process "to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states."⁶⁰ This would be a significant symbolic gesture signifying an overall commitment to the nonproliferation (Taubman 2009). In fact, two of the main obstacles to the U.S. ratification have been the question of verification, whether violations of the ban can be detected. A "very low-yield tests would be difficult to detect, and an agreement to ban them would raise serious questions about its verifiability" (Kissinger 1999), along

⁵⁶ <http://www.projectforthechtbt.org/projectnews/UNRussiaUNGAResolution>

⁵⁷ there is no agreed definition of a "zero yield" nuclear test; and Russia (and possibly China) does not conform to the U.S. definition of absolutely zero yield, enabling them to benefit from such tests while the U.S. adheres to a stricter standard and (presumably) falls behind in knowledge.

⁵⁸ <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NucNews/message/697>

"...When I was involved in test-ban negotiations, it was understood that testing below a certain threshold was required to ensure confidence in U.S. nuclear weapons. It also was accepted that very low-yield tests would be difficult to detect, and an agreement to ban them would raise serious questions about its verifiability. The CTBT is a "zero-yield" treaty. This makes the CTBT a different agreement from the one I was involved in negotiating. As a result I told members of the Foreign Relations Committee that I was not prepared to provide them with an analysis of the CTBT until I updated my knowledge on the testing issue."

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⁵⁹ The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a non-partisan, non-profit organization established in 1971 to promote public understanding of arms control issues and to advocate effective nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional arms control solutions. ACA publishes the monthly journal, *Arms Control Today*. Daryl G. Kimball has served as ACA's executive director since 2001. He previously served as security programs director for Physicians for Social Responsibility (1989-1997) where he helped lobby for the U.S. nuclear test moratorium legislation of 1992 and negotiation of a zero-yield CTBT. Kimball was executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers (1997-2001) where he led a group of NGOs in their efforts to win support for U.S. CTBT ratification; 2008.

⁶⁰ "Toward a nuclear weapons free world," George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 4, 2007. For the first time, senior statesmen in the United States, the UK, Russia, China, and India have talked seriously about the need to eliminate all nuclear weapons, from all nations. The trend began with two *Wall Street Journal* op-eds in 2007 and 2008 by former secretaries of state George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former secretary of defense William Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn.

with a resistance to international treaties that regulate aspects of national defenses (Joseph Nye 2009)⁶¹. If we take the technical perspective, the issue of verification has been largely overcome, as Jessica Mathews (2009)⁶² remarks, “a global monitoring system has been built that can detect an explosion as small as one-tenth of a kiloton, and 10 times smaller in many critical regions.” Amongst some sort of hurdles, many current and past officials from Republican and Democrats are now supporting the ratification of the draft agreement (Robert Gates 2008)⁶³.

In the meantime, Obama has made ratification of CTBT a focal point of his agenda for moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons⁶⁴. While Hillary Clinton argues that “[b]ringing the treaty into force will strengthen and reenergize the global nonproliferation regime and, in doing so, enhance our own security⁶⁵.”

IAEA AND NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

In addition to all this, the influence of both countries in the field of nonproliferation may be useful to strengthen and sharpen the regulations of multilateral and multinational organizations like International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) what Obama and Medvedev wished to support in their joint statement in July 2009. They further added that these two countries could provide a joint team of experts to help the IAEA. This would help responding to requests from countries seeking to comply with their obligation to secure all nuclear weapons and materials (UN Resolution 1540). The move to strengthen the Agency’ has had a long-standing support of different international groups like the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission⁶⁶, the National Research Council (NRC)⁶⁷ of the National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). NRC-RAS have their joint action as well. They have suggested that integration of multinational organizations, like the IAEA and G8 will help to manage the nuclear regime through various programs (the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction or the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation)⁶⁸. Therefore this kind of involvement and support by these two’ might help establish universal standards

⁶¹ <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4A084627-18FE-70B2-A8D8BD619BFFF486>.

⁶² <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/opinion/22iht-edmathews.html>.

⁶³ http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf

⁶⁴ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

⁶⁵ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129366.htm>

⁶⁶ <http://www.wmdcommission.org/>

⁶⁷ http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11302.

⁶⁸ http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10928.

regarding radioactive materials as a way to prevent the illegal transfer of hazardous goods. All this has a consideration of spent-fuel facility located in Russia's borders. One such facility, in Angarsk, is already operational and is overseen by the IAEA. This (spent-fuel) facility could help to supply third parties with nuclear fuel while preventing them from developing reprocessing facilities, which would allow them to extract plutonium. This may be a cost-effective way of placing fissile material under more secure control that is one important objective of the Agency'. Moreover, Russia had a proposal to reprocess Iranian spent fuel in a joint Russian-Iranian facility within Russia⁶⁹.

The most crucial thought on American stand is that even the potential of a country becoming a nuclear power is unacceptable to them, whilst Russia has largely held that only an immediate threat represents a violation of the nonproliferation regime. These two interpretations only widen and make complications in their strategies to come closer. In fact, America replaced a generic (nonspecific) standard with a normative one where they treat some cases of proliferation, e.g. (notably) Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as unacceptable violations; while others like India and Israel are acceptable one. In spite of the differing interpretations, Russian collaboration is the best and presumably only way to make strides against proliferation. However, it looks unavoidable in case of 'problematic states' like Iran and North Korea.

IRAN

In American perspective, Iranian case is especially worrying. Bush administration had given top priority to secure Russian assistance on ending Iran's nuclear program. New administration has same spirit to resolve the Iranian conundrum, but is less optimistic than their predecessors about the amount of influence that Moscow wields over Tehran. In addition, Russia has a diverse set of interests with Iran that prevents it from ever exerting pressure on that what America desires.

However, America in its strategy always makes every effort primarily to deal with any state on one-to-one basis and especially in Middle East. Thus, engaging Iran directly rather than rely on Russia's questionable influence or intent for making progress is also not out of question⁷⁰. The Hart-Hagel Commission (March 2009)

⁶⁹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html?ref=world>.

⁷⁰ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/01/iran-nucleargeneva-talks>.

believes that the U.S. should strive “to make Russia an American partner in dealing with Iran and the broader problem of emerging nuclear powers” (Salzman 2010). They frame the need to cooperate on Iranian issue within the larger context of curbing proliferation and that phrasing appeals to the Russian generic interpretation of proliferation. The departure from previous strategy comes with the new administration by recognizing Iran’s right to nuclear energy. Obama (April 5, 2009) argued that:

My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. However, in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. The Islamic Republic can take that path. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.

Similarly Hillary Clinton (September 2009) reiterates Obama’s position in the UN General Assembly. Whereas, their revelation en route to G20 (September 2009) summit (Pittsburgh) that Iran has a second covert ‘uranium enrichment plant’, however, gives them a reason to toughen its stand and turn away from engagement (Shear and Karen DeYoung 2009)⁷¹. This was happened together with the UN Security Council approval of a U.S.-led resolution approaching for more determined efforts to work for a nuclear weapons free world, though with Russian support. What was interesting from strategic standpoint, the resolution did not mention Iran or North Korea by name⁷². The U.S. remains publicly committed to engage Iran diplomatically, however, the future action and the role America will expect Russia to play, depend on many other factors like the P5 + 1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and the European Union’s approach toward the issue⁷³.

Medvedev has signaled, somewhat indifferently, that he might be acquiescent to harsher sanctions but this should be proven needed. America in its strategy remains hopeful for Russian support⁷⁴.

Despite the talks in October 2009, Iran turned down the agreement to send its fissile material to France or Russia for reprocessing. Iran announced in February 2010 that it would begin enriching uranium for use in a medical reactor⁷⁵. This has led America,

⁷¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289.html?hpid=topnews>.

⁷² <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092403708.html>.

⁷³ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/01/AR2009100101294.html>.

⁷⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/middleeast/28russia.html?ref=europe>
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/europe/07prexy.html?src=tw&tw=nytimesworld>.

⁷⁵ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?scp=2&sq=iran%20nuclear%20&st=cse>.

Russia, and several other nations to call for stricter sanctions on the Islamic Republic. However, Russia has been quoted as saying that they would not complete the sale of an S-300 air defense system to Iran if “it leads to destabilization in any region⁷⁶.” Yet, they have advocated the reason that the contract has some technical difficulties with the system and as soon as those complications remove, the sale commitment would have been completed. A serious assessment of those complications is required to address them properly. However, ultimately, Iran is the lesser issue but the national interests of these two giants are the main cause of disagreement to which Iran has given an opportunity to discuss and debate.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

The concept of a “Europe whole and free,” played the pivotal role throughout most of the post-Cold War era behind the argument of NATO extension. This extension is not against the Russia and rather it enhances the European security⁷⁷. Russia by no means supports the NATO membership action plan (MAP) and her [re]action against Georgia could be witnessed as its strong disagreement towards the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the newly established states in the post-Soviet space. In European security, Russian stakes are decisive. Russian call for new European security architecture is significant in the light of their disagreement with NATO’s approach to extend itself in the post-Soviet space, which is not new. In spite of the speech of Putin as a potential partner, their aversion to this alliance is not a secret at all.

In June 2008, Medvedev called for an international conference to reform European security. Georgian war further reaffirmed their advocacy. Russian demands do not come under the U.S. strategy and interests since Russia apparently seeks to reconstruct the security architecture with “legal’[ly] binding commitments,” as opposed to only political obligations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)⁷⁸. In its next step, he circulated a draft on European security treaty; however, it has held only negative reaction largely⁷⁹. Yet, currently there is a widespread agreement on the need to engage on the issue⁸⁰. This idea has been getting

⁷⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/02/24/world/international-uk-russia-iran-lavrov.html>.

⁷⁷ <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1826>

<http://www.gmfus.org/event/rice-russia.cfm>

⁷⁸ <http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2009/transcripts.html>.

⁷⁹ <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml>.

http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Unveils_Proposal_For_European_Security_Treaty/1891161.html.

⁸⁰ <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/83465.htm>.

currency in between American, Russian, and European scholars, analysts, and policy makers, whilst quite a few 'track II' schemes are making way to address the question⁸¹.

The OSCE is managing the 'Corfu Process', started in June 2009 "to tackle European security challenges with concrete steps to restore confidence⁸²." Although, the long term implications are not clear but keeping in mind the American common men's support for withdrawal from Iraq the U.S. has now endorsed the Corfu Process, and Hillary Clinton advocated the need to revisit standing security arrangements (Jan. 2010).⁸³ She stated, "The institutions that guarded Europe's and North America's security during the 20th century were not designed with 21st century threats in mind. . . . Tanks, bombers, and missiles are necessary but no longer sufficient to keep our people safe. . . . The transatlantic partnership has been both a cornerstone of global security and a powerful force for global progress. Now we are called to address some of the great challenges in human history. And to meet them, we are required to modernize and strengthen our partnership." She speaks of a comprehensive definition of security, though, in line with OSCE principles, which encompasses nuclear weapons, conventional arms, climate change, human security, and energy security (keeping focus on supplies). Above all, she emphasized that security is "indivisible."

However, when Russia is talking and taking stands on a new security-architecture for Europe, drawing attention to Clinton's view is worthwhile, as she explains, "security in Europe must be indivisible. For too long, the public discourse around Europe's security has been fixed on geographical and political divides. Some have looked at the continent even now and seen Western and Eastern Europe, old and new Europe, NATO and non-NATO Europe, EU and non-EU Europe. The reality is that there are not many Europes; there is only one Europe. And it is a Europe that includes the United States as its partner. And it is a Europe that includes Russia." This not only shows the importance of Europe for the U.S. but also its 'bridge value' to consider Russia.

⁸¹ The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative", at: www.carnegieendowment.org/easi.
<http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/conferences/conferences-2009/towards-a-new-euro-pean-security-architecture/> and The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative at: www.carnegieendowment.org/easi.

⁸² http://www.osce.org/cio/item_1_38493.html.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>.

⁸³ http://athens.usembassy.gov/steinberg_corfu.html.

Clinton advocated clearly that security is no longer zero-sum, and that the problem of European security will not be solved until Russia feels invested in, not alienated from, the existing system. The plan is to bring Russia back into compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and strengthening the NATO-Russia Council. Russia suspended its adherence to CFE in late 2007, after nearly a decade of conflict with NATO over ratification of the Adapted CFE and the Istanbul Commitments⁸⁴.

The revived CFE would complement the Corfu Process on developing new European security architecture. A majority of the key players in Euro-Atlantic security are signatories to the treaty. The CFE ensures a strategic balance among European powers. In light of the South Caucasus and especially Russia and Georgia, preventing future buildups of forces is crucial to European security. America is interested in Parallel Actions plans by which NATO countries would ratify the Adapted CFE, and Russia would simultaneously fulfill the Istanbul Commitments⁸⁵.

Russia has a fundamental concern for flank limitations. The NATO allies and the Baltic States may show their commitment towards this issue. Russian peacekeepers in Moldova are a concern for the West. These are big issues. Rasmussen has stated that maintaining communication throughout stressful periods is crucial to building confidence and eventually rebuilding damaged relations⁸⁶. The first requirement is to create “normal relations” between Russia and NATO. Hillary Clinton (February 22, 2010) emphasized that,

We intend to use the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for frank discussions about areas where we disagree. We will use it to press Russia to live up to its commitments on Georgia and to reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. We will use it to challenge the assertion put forward in Russia’s new military doctrine that NATO’s enlargement and its global actions constitute a military danger to Russia. We will also use the Council to advocate on behalf of human rights and individual liberty – these are principles and values that Russia committed to uphold when it accepted the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

⁸⁴ The Istanbul Commitments were stipulations for bringing the 1999 Adapted CFE into force. These stipulations include Russia’s withdrawal of “treaty-limited weapons and military forces” from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and from Transdniestria in Moldova (Footnote in Salzman 2010).

⁸⁵ This arrangement will require additional negotiations that take into account the changed European security landscape. Therefore, NATO should work on Russian withdrawal from Moldova first, given that the issue of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be far more complicated and will likely necessitate resort to the Geneva process or similar multilateral options (Footnote in Salzman, 2010).

⁸⁶ “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning,” speech by the NATO secretary-general, at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/NATO_Rasmussen.pdf.

She reveals on common security and common interests that:

At the same time, we should use the Council to advance our common interests, including the indivisibility of our common security.... [W]e have agreed to cooperate in training counternarcotics officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia. And Russia is now allowing NATO to transit non-lethal goods across its territory in support of our ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations. And we hope to extend that cooperation to other fields, again, most notably in the area of missile defense⁸⁷

The U.S. is interested to institutionalize Ukrainian place as a neutral one thus, they have started to talk about Finlandization⁸⁸ of Ukraine and to provide appreciate security guarantee as well. The newly designed Annual Membership Program (ANP) appears to be serving the role of a MAP with Georgia as regards the country's development goals. In practical terms, significant domestic political instability and ongoing border disputes in both Georgia and Ukraine currently render both countries ineligible for NATO membership. However, to resolve the larger question of Georgia and Ukraine's ultimate wishes to join NATO is important for both the nations. Russia continues to view NATO primarily as an adversary and a security threat, the question of NATO's standing "open door policy" will remain an obstacle in the U.S.- Russian relationship (Salzman 2010)⁸⁹. Dmitri Trenin (2008) argues, "NATO's expansion has reached safe limits, and any move in the direction of Ukraine and Georgia is fraught with real danger." The open door must be closed and remain closed. Russia virtually maintained the strategy to get unsaid veto over intra-alliance decisions and NATO is not out of that question when the post-Soviet space is concerned. However, still in American strategy, they have emphasized their support of both Georgia and Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO, provided its members agree and the countries meet accession requirements.

⁸⁷ Hillary Clinton, "Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar," Ritz-Carleton Hotel, Washington, D.C., February 22, 2010, transcript available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/02/137118.htm>.

⁸⁸ **Finlandization** is the influence that one powerful country may have on the policies of a smaller neighboring country. It is generally considered to be pejorative, originating in West German political debate of the late 1960s and 1970s. As the term was used in Germany and other NATO countries, it referred to the decision of a country to not challenge a more powerful neighbor in foreign politics while maintaining national sovereignty. Commonly in reference to Finland's policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but could refer to similar international relations, such as Denmark's attitude toward Germany between 1871 and 1940, and Taiwan's relation with China since 2008(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization>).

⁸⁹ In an interview with a French paper in February 2010, President Medvedev declared, "The issue is that NATO's endless enlargement, by absorbing countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, or who are our immediate neighbors, is of course creating problems because NATO is after all, a military bloc." Medvedev was indicating that the rapprochement between the United States and Russia in recent months has in no way alleviated Russia's objection to continued NATO enlargement. For more, see Conor Sweeney, "Medvedev Objects to 'Endless' NATO Expansion," Reuters, February 25, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61O2OQ20100225>.(Salzman).

An alternative missile defense installation in Europe, regarding European security, is a crucial area of contention between Russia and the United States. However, the stand in new administration was soft than it had been under the Bush administration. The line of action was fixed on the basis that they would pursue missile defense in Europe only if the technology proved effective and the threat proved definitively. This is a better way to assess the mood and approach of Russia, which has no compromise on that issue. The decision not to push ahead with the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic was expected to improve U.S.-Russian relations. However, the reasons given by administration are rightly diplomatic and expected that the change in course resulted from updated intelligence about Iranian missile capabilities rather than Russian objections to the planned system (Baker 2009).

Based on a new threat assessment of Iran's short-range and medium-range missile capabilities, the administration now intends to pursue a four-phased adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. The plan relies on "distributed interceptor and sensor architecture" that obviates the need for the fixed radar system in the Czech Republic, and it uses alternate interceptor technology that does not necessitate the fielding of ground-based interceptors originally slated for Poland. Instead, the new system will first deploy the sea-based Aegis Weapon System and other mobile components. Later stages may include land-based elements, but the second phase is not set to begin until around 2015(Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy 2009).

The administration is simultaneously exploring missile defense cooperation with Russia (Rasmussen 2009). The decision to suspend work on the current missile defense system in Europe yet to be analyzed properly in which Poland and the Czech Republic in the new plan for missile defense have agreed to cooperate (Mitchell; Graham 2009). Still the main question is how best to counter a potential Iranian missile strike. Medvedev has demonstrated cautious optimism about the decision to suspend missile defense in Europe, but phases 3 and 4 of the new system are equally unacceptable. However, Romania had agreed to host missile interceptors for the new system, a development that sparked considerable concern in Russia. Therefore, either they include bilateral, multilateral or track II diplomatic channels to resolve the issue, this has proven really complicated and interrelated as well.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

GREAT POWER STATUS MATTERS! This is the fundamental phrase around that Russian and American national security strategy revolves. If one is striving to achieve its previous Cold War status, the other is making all its efforts to retain that. Both have divided the whole world in two blocks for more than four decades. It was not only their military might but financial and economic aid policy behind that division as well. The world has changed rapidly but many equations are same. The physical (re)sources are still focused areas. However, human capital is taking new shape and importance in the new globalized world.

For some, end of the Cold War was a sudden demise of the Soviet Union while for others it was a calculative outcome of the policies as well as security strategies adopted and advanced by the United States of America. The perceptions and narratives may differ in between scholarly and administrative circles. However, at the end of the 1980s, it appeared that a systems-transforming process was on the move in the Soviet Union and the Cold War would not be a continued reality. A fundamental discourse instantaneously affected was diplomacy. All renowned actors took stock of the situation, new aspiring actors emerged and new relations had to be forged. The prospects of creating new practices opened up (Neumann 2002).

Russia's fall from the rank of the global super power accomplishes up to some degree the national interests of the United States. Thus, offering conciliatory measures and acknowledging Russia's legitimate regional interests as a regional power would make a difference. Taking Russia down a notch may be destabilizing. We know that the stability of Europe before World War I rested on a shaky balance between reality and the pretense of Austro-Hungarian great-power status. When Britain, were no longer willing to maintain that façade, the system crashed (Paul Schroeder 1972). The same probability I find in Russia's great-power status and American approach towards the Near Abroad and Europe. However, currently it does not appear that the U.S. is going to rest on the myths of Russia's great-power status, and possibility of third world war does not appear in future, even then, Schroeder's argument should still be seriously considered.

In fact, “nothing is more likely to occasion a major war than a threat to the existence or *great-power status* of an essential actor” (Schroeder 1972) and hard-nosed policies may be provocative. However, allowing Russia to maintain its global-power pretensions, even indefinitely, may not be especially costly. The U.S. can weigh the costs and benefits of accession to Russian demands and concession. On the other hand, the U.S. has discovered since 9/11 that it has little control over how it is perceived by foreigners, how the events of 9/11 are understood abroad, how the ‘War on Terror’ is interpreted, and how the invasion of Iraq and the operation in Afghanistan are narrated elsewhere (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003).

The reputational considerations are important motivator of state behavior. The desire to be perceived as a legitimate and responsible international actor explains in part why states comply (to the extent that they do especially these two powers) with international law (Guzman 1972). However, permitting Russia to maintain its pretensions as great power is by no means costless.

To be a great power is to have a reputation for strength, resolve, and global influence. Beyond that, great-power status seems to confer benefits that exceed bilateral relationships. Great powers set ‘the rules of the game’: the international arena is populated with institutions and norms that reflect the desires of the great powers (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). Thus states aspire to that status with good reasons, and some may invest resources in developing nuclear weapons, precisely because they believe this is a prerequisite for international recognition as a great power (Sagan 1997:73-80). If states are willing to take on substantial costs to acquire that reputation, such status is most likely of value, and the U.S., seemingly, has an interest in denying that status to states whose interests’ conflict with its own and who will press for revisions to the international order (Mercer 1996). The key question is the extent to which the Russian vision of global politics and institutions differs from the American vision.

Americans themselves might consider telling a different story of global politics since the Cold War’s end. This alternative might cast America’s Cold War victory in less grand ideological terms (no end of history in sight), recognize the limits of American power, depict global politics as multipolar or even non-polar (rather than unipolar), and vivisect post-Cold War American discourse that characterizes the United States as “the last remaining superpower” and “the indispensable nation”; it might depict the

imperative of maintaining U.S. hegemony or primacy as yet another instance of what Senator J. William Fulbright called “the arrogance of power.” This reframing might bring Russian and American narratives into alignment, and it is a more achievable end (Krebs 2010).

Apart from previous analysis the first and foremost requirement for the development of a national security policy and national security strategy is an adequate policy framework. That would detail the main sectoral priorities and fundamental values, legal basis, and role of key actors in national security policy making and implementation. The framework should include a policy process for the security sector and base the policy on accountability, participation, and a culture of inclusivity that is based upon democratic principles and defining the relationship and hierarchy between security organizations and civil authorities. This should be an accessible process that guarantees transparency, efficiency, and ownership.

The existing constitutional framework and accompanying national security legislation should be examined to ensure that they define the basic responsibilities of each security actor. The law should also mandate civilian control over security forces. There should be an authorization of the chain of command for policy implementation, force employment decisions, separation of civil policing and internal defence. Lastly, that must define the principles on which security actors base their actions.

The legal or constitutional framework should also include clauses for the role of the legislature in national security policy formulation and supervision. Legislatures, and in particular the relevant policy and financial oversight committees, should have a legal basis for access to information on security sector issues. Similarly, legislators should have a say in declaring war and have the capacity to oversee budget decisions and expenditure for the security sector. The legislature may also be given authority to approve of the nomination of senior security sector officials, whether in the civilian executive branch or senior ranks of the security forces. The legislature should also be able to advise on and approve of decisions on executive emergency powers. The policy process should be managed and administered in a credible fashion where the process ensures legitimacy by being continuously reviewed to ensure it adheres to specified standards, guarantees appropriate participation (ownership) and where debate helps to address conflicting aims and views. Finally, the law should prohibit military interference in politics.

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