

# **RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR OF 2008 AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS**


*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University*

*In partial fulfilment of the requirements*

*for award of the degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**MANIDIPA MISTRI**



**Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies**

**School of International Studies**

**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

**New Delhi- 110067**

**2012**



# JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

School of International Studies  
New Delhi - 110067

Date: 20/7/2012

Tel. : 2670 4365  
Fax : (+91)-11-2674 1586

Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies

## DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR OF AUGUST 2008 AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS," submitted by me, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

*Manidipa*

**MANIDIPA MISTRI**

## CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed to the examiners for evaluation.

*Aj Patnaik*  
**Prof. Ajay Patnaik**

**Chairperson, CRCAS**



**Chairperson**  
Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
JNU, New Delhi - 110 067

*Arun Kumar Mohanty*  
**Prof. Arun Kumar Mohanty**

**Supervisor**

**PROFESSOR**



Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi - 110067

*Dedicated to*

**MAA & BABA**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

*It is my great pleasure to convey my heartiest gratitude and humble acknowledgement to all of those who in many ways always helped me in my journey of life.*

*First of all, I express my deep sense of gratitude to my guide **Prof. Arun Kumar Mohanty** for his impeccable guidance, continued support and valuable suggestions throughout this work. He not only accepted my topic but also examined the drafts with remarkable promptness and with meticulous care. He provided me many insightful thoughts. I am very thankful to him for his continuous support in spite of his busy academic schedule. I am also thankful to all the teachers of Russian and Central Asian Studies.*

*I would like to express my thanks to my roommate **NEHA** who always encouraged me by her 'never say die' spirit and all my friends for their encouragement and co-operation.*

*And of course my **LOVELY PARENTS** deserve a special mention for their unconditional love, guidance, affection, care, support and engorgement towards overcoming this journey. The remarkable saying by my **BABA** 'it's a long way to go; so you should not be afraid of anything' and the unconditional faith of my **MAA** always motivated me in my work.*

*I would like to convey my love and thanks to my brother **HIMADRI** and sister-in-law **SHELLY** for always encouraging and giving me support.*

*Last but not the least; I thank my best friend **RAJENDRA** for always being there for me in times of difficulties. His practical suggestions helped me to remain focused in my aim in life.*

*Finally, I would like to thank everyone who was important to the successful realization of this dissertation as well as expressing my apology that I could not mention personally one by one.*

*ERRORS! They are so many. They are mine.*

*Manidipa Mistri*

*New Delhi*

*20<sup>th</sup> July, 2012*

# CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Preface i

Abbreviations ii

## **Chapter I :**

**Introduction.....1-19**

Ethnicity.....1

Ethnic Conflict.....2

Causes of Ethnic Conflicts.....3

Definition of War.....4

History of Russia –Georgia relation.....6

Origin of Russia-Georgia conflict.....8

Theoretical Perspective.....9

Rationale and Scope.....11

Research Questions.....12

Hypotheses.....13

Existing Literature.....13

Research Methodology.....17

Chapterisation.....18

## **Chapter II:**

**Evolution of Russia-Georgia Relation and the History of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.....20-47**

Ossetia’s Incorporation into Russia.....21

Georgia’s Incorporation into Russia.....21

Abkhazia’s Incorporation into Russia.....22

First Conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia.....22

Conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia.....	23
Secessionist Movement in South Ossetia during 1990s .....	25
Peace-Keeping Operation.....	27
Secessionist Movement in Abkhazia.....	27
Peace-Keeping Operation in Abkhazia.....	29
Causes of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia.....	30
A New Stage in Russia-Georgia Relationship (1999-2003).....	38
Turning point in Russia-Georgia Relationship.....	40
Beginning of August War 2008.....	41
Debates Regarding the War.....	46

**Chapter III:**

**Reasons behind the War and Its Impact on CIS Security Scenario .....48-73**

Reasons behind the War.....	50
(i) Ethnic Reason behind the War.....	50
(ii) Moscow’s Foreign Security Policy.....	51
(iii) Political Factors behind the War.....	52
(iv) Geo-political Factor behind the War.....	53
(a) Georgia’s Geo-political Significance.....	54
(b) Geo-political Goals of Russia.....	55
(c) Russia’s Strategic Goals.....	56
(v) Role of External Players behind the War.....	57
(a) Role of US Advisers and Special Forces.....	58
(b) Role of NATO.....	58
(c) Role of Israel in Georgia.....	59
Russian Perspective of the War.....	60
Georgian Perspective of the War.....	61

Implications of the War for CIS countries.....	63
Reaction of CIS countries to the War.....	69

**Chapter IV:**

**Russia-Georgia Military Conflict and Need for New Security Paradigm in Europe.....74-108**

Military Implications of the War from European Security Perspectives.....	79
International Reactions to the War.....	87
(i) Response from the International Organizations.....	90
(ii) Response from International Non-Governmental organizations.....	94
(iii) Response from Baltic States.....	94
(iv) Response from Other Countries.....	95
(v) Countries Supported Independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.....	100
Search for New Security Paradigm in Europe.....	101

**Chapter V:**

**Conclusion.....109-116**

**Appendices:.....117-128**

Map 1.1-Early Georgian States CA.600-150BC.....	117
Map 1.2-Georgian States CA.150BC-600AD.....	117
Map.1.3-Georgian States CA.830-1020.....	118
Map.1.4-Georgia: 1089-1125.....	119
Map.1.5-Georgia: 1184-1230.....	119
Map.1.6-Georgian States CA. 1450-1515.....	120
Map.1.7- Georgia CA. 1516-1555.....	120

Map. 1.8-Caucasus CA. 1555-1639.....	121
Map. 1.9- Georgia CA.1762.....	121
Map. 1.10-Georgia: 1810.....	122
Map. 1.11-Georgia: 1916.....	122
Map. 1.12-Georgia: 1919-1921.....	123
Map. 1.13-Georgia; 1921-1931.....	123
Map. 1.14-Georgia.....	124
Map. 1.15-South Ossetian Territory under Georgia.....	124
Map. 1.16-Ethnolinguistic Groups in Caucasus Region.....	125
Map. 1.17-Pre- context of 2008 War.....	125
Map. 1.18-Military Conflict between Russia and Georgia.....	126

<b><u>Table:</u></b>	<b>1.1 International Response to the War.....</b>	<b>99</b>
----------------------	---	-----------

<b><u>References</u></b> .....	<b>127-147</b>
--------------------------------	----------------



## **PREFACE**

The historic relationship between two neighboring countries, Russia and Georgia dates back to 18<sup>th</sup> Century. History also shows that, tensions between Russia and Georgia are nothing new; but it aggravated from 1992, during the secessionist movement in Abkhazia. Russia supports Abkhazia in its movement which is not at all acceptable by Georgia. Even in case of South Ossetia's problem with Georgia, Russia always supports the first one. Hence, the long standing tensions between these two countries finally turn into a war in August 2008.

Although the war looks very small but the effects of it are not so small; the whole world is surprised by this war. This research intends to critically study the various issues involved with this war. The research pattern is as follows; it is divided into five substantive chapters.

The first chapter tries to give a brief introduction about ethnicity, ethnic conflict; side by side it also discusses about the history of Russia - Georgia and also theoretical perspective of the war. The chapter deals with some research questions. Next, it discusses about the rational and scope of the study and tries to build two hypotheses. Finally it gives an idea about the existing literature and about the research design.

The second chapter begins with the historical review of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. It tries to give a brief idea about the phase of incorporation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia into Russian territory. The chapter also deals with the secessionist movement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Next chapter intends to discuss about the various causes of the war and it also tries to emphasize on the impact of the war on CIS countries. The chapter highlights the reaction of the CIS countries too.

Fourth chapter deals with the impact of the war on European security and it emphasizes on the issue of new security paradigm in Europe.

Finally, the last chapter tries to establish the research hypotheses with the help of the previous chapters.

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

A.I	Amnesty International
BTC	Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan
BP	British Petroleum
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
GUAM	Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
KGB Security	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRC	People's Republic of China
RF	Russian Federation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SSR	Socialist Soviet Republic
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
USA	United States of America
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations
UK	United Kingdom
WTO	World Trade Organization

# **Chapter- 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The world politics is surrounded by various issues; it actually deals with the relationship among various nation states, governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations and with different international organizations. Today's world politics includes the discussion of democracy, nation building, and comparative politics and also issues of ethnic conflict management. In the age of globalization, problems related to ethnic issues are growing and sometimes the issues of ethnic conflict can create a war like situation. So, before discussing about any specific war, it is important to know the roots behind the creation of the war. Hence the August war of 2008 between Russia and Georgia created a very complicated situation for the world politics; here it is necessary to understand the root of this war. Many feel that the ethnic sentiment of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was one of the reasons behind the origin of this situation. Now, while discussing about mentioned ethnic conflict; it is important to know what ethnicity is, what is ethnic conflict or what could be the causes of ethnic conflict?

### **Ethnicity**

An economist once quoted. "If you are born poor, you may die rich. But your ethnic group is fixed" (Economist, May 14-21, 2005, 80). Ethnicity can be understood in two different ways. As, the Associate Professor of Michigan University Varshney. A pointed out that, popularly it is being understood that ethnic groups are racial or linguistic groups. But it is a kind of narrow understanding about ethnicity; ethnicity is something which has a broader meaning also. Donald (1984: 41-54) suggests, "all conflicts based on ascriptive (birth-based) group identities, real or imagined—race, language, religion, tribe, or caste—can be called ethnic".

Varshney pointed out that, "ethnic conflicts can range from the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland and the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India

to the black-white conflict in the United States and South Africa and the Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia, the Quebecois problem in Canada and the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka, and Shia- Sunni troubles in Pakistan”.

He again says that the first examples of this are very much religious in nature; the second one is racial, third is linguistic and fourth is sectarian. But broader discussion of ethnicity shows that in whatever forms it may take; religious, tribal, racial or linguistic; it can't change their intensity. The major issues are using of various terms like; “ethnic community”, “ethnic groups”, “ethnie” , “identity groups”, “minority” are being used differently.

Gursel says, “Ethnic groups are historically given collectivities or psychological communities whose members share a persisting sense of common interest and identity that is based on some combination of shared historical experience and valued cultural traits - beliefs, culture and religion, language, ways of life, a common homeland”.

### **Ethnic Conflict**

Although the study of ethnic conflict is becoming very important in recent time; but the concept of ethnic conflict is not new. From the 1960s various ethnic groups are fighting for their recognition, for their territorial integrity in Africa and Asia. But as Gursel G.I pointed out during the Cold War period ethnic problems were not given so much attention but the end of the Cold War period was surrounded by nationalist, ethnic, and religious conflict in Eurasia.

Ethnic diversity has various consequences; it has its impact on economic, social and political sphere.

According to Gursel, “Ethnic conflicts within a state belong to identity conflicts that are a type of internal conflicts. Besides identity conflicts there are other types of internal conflicts such as ideological conflicts, governance conflicts, racial conflicts and environmental conflicts”.

Samuel P. Huntington discussed about conflicts on the basis of culture and religion in his theory “Clash of Civilization”. He believed that in the post cold war era the primary reason of conflict will be religion and culture and for the need of that discussion he described the concept of different civilization and also about their cultural identity. According to Michael (1993:5), “an ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, economic, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities.” All kinds of ethnic conflicts are different from each other; some ethnic groups demands independence from the existing states, some wants recognition of the interests of the minority groups and some wants autonomy.

Gursel pointed out, “The protagonists in the most intense ethnic conflicts want to establish their independence or autonomy, as the case of Kurds, some ethnic groups of the former Soviet Union. Other ethnic conflicts arise from efforts by subordinate groups to improve their status within existing boundaries of a state rather than to secede from it”.

He has given the example of black South Africans; who wants majority control of the state. Fearon and Laitin (2003) mentioned no less than 58 ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 1999 which causes 51% of the total number of civil wars.

### **Causes of Ethnic Conflicts**

Causes of ethnic conflict can be various. Now a day’s most of the independent states are composed of various ethnic groups and as Gursel G.I says this kind diversity creates numerical challenges for the Governance. Most seriously problems occur when states do not want to legalise the recognition of those ethnic groups within their territory and even if they do still they have to fight to deal with this diversity (Stavenhagen 1996:197). According to Lake and Rothchild, “by itself ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict”. Gursel G.I believes that most of the time ethnic groups try to make their demands through political parties and they do it peacefully. But different scholars view the causes in different ways. Some believe that the reason of ethnic conflict is the collapse of authoritarian rule. According to them in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union such kind of conflicts occurs because of the collapse of authoritarian rule.

Many scholars pointed out those ethnic conflicts can happen in two different levels; one is systemic level and another one is domestic level. The systemic level emphasises on the nature of security systems of the ethnic group and on their concern for security. On the other hand the domestic level discusses about the responsibilities of states for its constituents and also about the impact of democratization and nationalism on inter-ethnic relations (Gursel).

According to Caselli and Coleman (2011), “Less visible and newsworthy, but quite possibly much more pervasive, is non-violent ethnic conflict. Non-violent ethnic conflict can take multiple forms. In some countries ethnic groups compete through overtly ethnic parties, vying for power. In others a dominant group discriminates against and exploits the others”.

Both of them have given the example of Esman (1994:229) who said, “When an ethnic group gains control of the state, important economic assets are soon transferred to the members of that community”. Sometimes ethnic conflict can be a reason for war. In that context it is very important to know what does basically war mean.

### **Definition of War**

Now the definition of war is not so much simple, many theorists described it differently. Cicero defines war broadly as “a contention by force”; Hugo Grotius adds that “war is the state of contending parties, considered as such”; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: “By war is meant a state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued;” According to Karl von Clausewitz, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. So, it seems that the definition varied, such as: Karl von Clausewitz thinks, ‘politics only involves state and the war is basically a reflection of political activity’, by turning it we can say that war only involves states activity. On the other hand by *Webster’s Dictionary* ‘War’ is defined as ‘a state of open and declared, hostile armed conflict between states or nations, or a period of such conflict. This captures a particularly political-rationalistic account of war and warfare, i.e., that war needs to be explicitly declared and to be between states to be a war’. Rousseau argued that, “War is constituted by a relation between things,

and not between persons...War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State..." (*The Social Contract*). It is also said that the war is an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities. Classical war is basically international war, like a war among different states, for example the two world wars.

Now the second factor is what the main causes behind war are. Again here the opinion varied, according to some the man is not free to choose his actions, and then war can take place. In another case theorists claim that, 'man is a product of his environment- however that is defined- but he also possesses the power to change that environment.' They also think that 'mankind' as a whole is subject to inexorable forces that prompt him to wage war.

The third factor is the relationship between human being and war. Here Thomas Hobbes tried to give an idea, "During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man." (*Leviathan*, 1.13) Locke did not agree with Hobbes's complete anarchic and total warlike state but he also thinks that human being always will be there to take the advantage of the lack of legislation and enforcement. Kant on the other hand viewed, "War...seems to be ingrained in human nature, and even to be regarded as something noble to which man is inspired by his love of honour, without selfish motives." (*Perpetual Peace*). Kenneth Waltz regarding this said, "While human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war, it cannot by itself explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not". (*Man, War, and State*)

The next question is war and morality. We know that in social system morality involves the activities of both individual and groups. War on the other hand as group activity involves the question of responsibility, obedience etc. But the question arises that does nation are responsible for the concept of war or the powerful bodies who declare war, are responsible? The question of morality and war is basically linked with the concept of 'just war'. It is basically a military action which is justified as



right action for legal reasons. And many a time powerful nations or bodies have misused the concept of just war.

To-days international politics has witnessed various incidents of war. Russia-Georgia war which took place in August 2008 is one of them. Before discussing about the war, we should have some idea about the history of Russia and Georgia's relation.

### **History of Russia-Georgia Relation**

The nation of Georgia was first unified as a kingdom under the Bagrationi dynasty in the 9th to 10th century, arising from a number of predecessor states of ancient Colchis and Iberia. The kingdom of Georgia flourished during the 10th to 12th centuries, and fell to the Mongol invasions and Armenia by 1243. By 1490, Georgia was fragmented into a number of petty kingdoms and principalities, which throughout the Early Modern period struggled to maintain their autonomy against Safavid and Ottoman domination until Georgia was finally incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1801. However after a brief bid for independence with the Democratic Republic of Georgia of 1918–1921, Georgia was part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic from 1922 to 1936, and then formed the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

October Revolution was followed by a bloody civil war in Russia during which several outlying Russian territories were declared independence. Georgia was one of them; proclaiming the establishment of the Independent Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) on May 26, 1918. The new country was ruled by the Menshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party, which established a multi-party system in sharp contrast with the "dictatorship of the proletariat" established by the Bolsheviks in Russia. It was recognised by Soviet Russia (Treaty of Moscow [1920]) and the major Western powers in 1921.

Georgia gained independence as a result of Soviet disintegration in 1991. The first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia stoked Georgian nationalism and vowed to assert Tbilisi's authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia with its five million

inhabitants (two thirds of which are Georgians) shares borders in the north with Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Chechnya and Dagestan) and in the south with Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgian territory was split up in the sixth century and then was conquered and united by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Then Georgian princes sought Russian protection and as a result Georgia came under Russian territory in the first half of the nineteenth century. Caucasus region stood as both a battle field (between Persia and Turkey) and a buffer zone (Jackson 2003).

From the very outset of Yeltsin's reign, in 1992, Georgia became Russia's most serious strategic and foreign policy problem in the Caucasus( Jackson,2003). The basic reason was Abkhazia at the eastern shores of the Black Sea, where armed clashes had already broken out in the year 1989. In 1990, Abkhazia opted for independence and chose its own president after Zviad Gamsakhurdia had been chosen president of Georgia. There were two ethnic territorial wars between the central government of Georgia and separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; which ended with the victory of the latter, the establishment of de facto independent but unrecognized states and a refugee crisis. This period was also had to deal with a civil war between Gamsakhurdia's supporters (the zviadists) and a new government led by Eduard Shevardnadze, former Communist leader of Georgia and foreign minister of the USSR. The fledgling civilian government has also struggled with warlords and their militias. This political turmoil has been accompanied by a nearly complete economic collapse. However, this instability was followed by an almost miraculous recovery in 1995-'97.

After Gamsakhurdia the new government invited Eduard Shevardnadze to become the head of a State Council. In effect of that call, president, in March 1992, put a moderate face on the somewhat unsavoury regime that had been established following Gamsakhurdia's ouster. In August 1992, a separatist dispute in the Georgian autonomous republic of Abkhazia escalated when government forces and paramilitaries were sent into the area to quell separatist activities. The Abkhaz fought back with help from paramilitaries from Russia's North Caucasus regions and alleged covert support from Russian military stationed in a base in Gudauta , Abkhazia. In September 1993 the government forces were suffered a catastrophic defeat, which led

to driving out of entire Georgian population of the region. Around 14,000 people died and another 300,000 were forced to flee. Ethnic violence also flared in South Ossetia but was eventually quelled; although at the cost of several hundred casualties and 100,000 refugees fleeing into Russian-controlled North Ossetia. In south-western Georgia, the autonomous republic of Ajaria came under the control of Aslan Abashidze, who managed to rule his republic from 1991 to 2004 as a personal fiefdom in which the Tbilisi government had little influence.

However, throughout 1998 the country was haunted by an extremely unpleasant string of episodes; which may or may not lead to a new cycle of general instability but which nonetheless create a fear of such a cycle.

### **Origin of Russia-Georgia Conflict**

Despite problems on some specific issues; Russia and Georgia largely enjoyed a positive atmosphere of relation in high level meeting of 2004. Although the permanent low-intensity conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was deteriorated in the same 2004; when the new Georgian president Saakashvili decided to unite all of Georgia; which in turn inevitably drew Russians deeper into the separatist conflicts. In the awake of Saakashvili's attempt to subjugate Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2004, the tone of the bilateral relationship between Russia and Georgia was changed. Saakashvili accused Russia of "double standards" when it was fuelling separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by offering Russian citizenship to the inhabitants (RFE/RL Newslines,2004).

The issue of Russian military bases in Georgia has been linked to other bilateral issues in the relationship and has largely been locked. The problem of the valley Pankisi Gorge in Russia-Georgia relations is basically a border problem linked to the Chechnya wars. Chechnya had figured seriously in relations between Russia and Georgia at various occasions before the outbreak of the second Chechnya war.

Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008; when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but

intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had taken control of the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. This war took the world by surprise.

It is basically a kind of realistic approach where both the countries were trying to gain its power over each other. Thus here the policy of declaring the war is actually representing the realistic approach of the behaviour of states.

### **Theoretical Perspective**

Theoretically the whole incident of Russia- Georgia war of 2008 is linked with concept of realism. Broadly speaking through the idea of realism we can analyse the whole incident and reasons behind the breaking out of war. But In that context we should know first, what is realism?

Realism is a concept which basically came in to focus after the Second World War. According to the realist theory, international politics is driven by the struggle for power; in which state is the main actor and ‘sovereignty is its distinguishing trait.’ As realist theory states that no state should depend on other states or institutions for their security; it is the nature of every state to gain power to achieve its own security. It is also believed that the state with more power has more capability to survive; as international politics is anarchical in nature in which each sovereign state consider itself as the highest authority and they don’t want to recognize the power of other states. In anarchy it is impossible for any state to preserve its existence, unless it gains power for its own protection. Moreover as human nature; international politics too is power driven and often this power struggles create war like situations.

We have many examples of struggle for power; such as Peloponnesian War, which was basically a conflict between two great powers of the ancient Greek World, Athens and Sparta. In Morgenthau’s time too there were various example of power struggle, like Soviet Union and Hungary in 1956. The cold war between East and West is too

an example of gaining control over the rest of the world. The Russia- Georgia conflict (2008) is another example of the concept of realism. Here, Georgia sends its troops to South Ossetia to prove its power; which from Georgia's perspective to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. On other hand, Russia took steps and helped South Ossetia for their own security. The western intervention in this conflict made Russia insecure about its own security. Moreover NATO's move towards post -Soviet states was a matter of serious concern for Russia. In this situation it was necessary for Russia to take a step to for its own territorial security and to gain more power to prevent the western influence over post-Soviet states.

Although realist theorists have some difference of their own, for example: according to Classical realist like Machiavelli, Thucydides, Morgenthau international politics is power driven because it has its roots in human nature.

Morgenthau said, "Politics is governed by laws that are created by human nature. The mechanism we use to understand international politics is through the concept interests, defined in terms of power.

On other hand according to the Structural realist like: Rousseau, "*It is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity.*" Waltz also said that anarchical nature of international system creates the self help situation in which the state wants to maximize its power for its own security.

But in spite of difference between Classical and Structural realism, the two schools of realist theorists agreed on one point that the States need to maximise their power for their own security. In the case of Russia- Georgia too it's the anarchical nature of international politics that force Russia to take some steps, as Georgia took the step in the name of territorial integrity. So, the realist theory explains the Russia-Georgia military conflict in its own way.

## **Rationale and Scope**

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, various changes took place in Russia; many post Soviet states have gained independence and these developments played very important role in day to day world politics. Georgia is one of the states which got independence in 1991 and ever since the Soviet disintegration; the bilateral relationship between Russia and Georgia started having some issues. The August war was the continuation of that conflict. The war of August 2008 between Russia and Georgia is not as simple as it may looks; as each military conflict has a history of its own. So the aim of this study is to explore the specific reasons behind this war.

Another factor behind focusing the Russia- Georgia war as a case study is because it took the whole world by surprise and it has shaken the security paradigm of the CIS and Europe. The war was short in period but its impact was long standing. Because of this war the west has to think once again about its policies toward post-Soviet states. Georgia also has to rethink about its western orientation of joining NATO. This war once again proves that Russia has the desire and capability to defend its interests and it shows that Russia is an important global power.

At present Russia is also one of the major issues of discussion in European politics because of European Union's high dependence on Russian energy. So, even if Europe wants, still it can't ignore the importance of Russia in world politics. On the other hand Russian economy is in resurgent path which has enhanced its global ambition and status. The study of Russia-Georgia conflict is also important because of the growing problem between these two states which affects European security scenario.

Moreover, after month of war Russian President gave an idea of New Security Paradigm in Europe; which created tension in western hemisphere; as through the new Comprehensive Security Treaty, Russia wants to be an equal partner in security treaty like USA. Through this idea of new security paradigm Russia also wants to increase the position of CSTO. All these are very important issues in world politics. So, the discussion of this topic has enough relevance for international politics.

The August War had lot of impacts on CIS countries. Because of this war some of the CIS countries have changed their domestic politics and changed their attitude towards Moscow as well as western countries. This study will focus on all these issues to get a clear idea. Moreover the study will also cover some of the areas which literature survey failed to discuss clearly; like the international response of the war or the opinion of the CIS countries regarding the war etc. The rationale of the study is also to conceptualize the security implications of this war. This study will focus on all major factors of this war and it will try to analyse the reaction of international communities on the war. It'll also point out the reasons behind ethnic conflict in Georgia and various factors behind the ties between Moscow and Tbilisi.

Another reason for focusing this issue is that it has been noticed that during this war several external players too played a very influential role. The aim of the study is to give a clear idea about all those. The study will also deals with the reasons behind the ethnic conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and intend to give emphasis on the Russian and Georgia both version of the war while analyzing this.

As the geo-political factor played a very important role in this whole incident; the aim of the study is to give emphasis on that issue too. It'll discuss the Russian geo-strategic aim in pre and post war time.

### **Research Questions**

The study will try to answer the following research questions:-

1. It is quite clear that Georgia tried to build a closer relation with the Western countries and it wanted to get NATO membership which is not acceptable by Russia. Hence, the discussion will try to answer that did Georgia's western orientation and its inclination towards NATO become major factor for Russia and Georgia war?
2. History shows that from the earlier period Georgia was unable to understand the need of ethnic minority in South Ossetia and it created quite difficult situation for both the countries. Thus, the study will try to find out that did

Georgia's inability to understand the aspiration of ethnic minority in South Ossetia played a catalyst role to the August War?

3. It has been clear that external players played an important role in this war. So, the research work will try to find out the role of the external players for fuelling this war.
4. The result of this war created a greater security threat for the European countries. The discussions will try to answer, what are the security ramifications of this war for European countries?
5. The 2008 August War created security impact on the CIS countries too. Hence, the study will find out the answer what are the major security implications of this war for CIS countries?

### **Hypotheses**

After the discussion the study will make an attempt to prove the following hypotheses:

1. Georgia's failure to meet the aspiration of ethnic minorities living in its territory and provocation by external players to act against Russian interest in Caucasus led to military confrontation between Russia and Georgia.
2. Russian victory in the war strengthened its geo-political position in the Caucasus as well as rest of the CIS region.

### **Existing Literature**

The literature available on this issue deals in various perspectives. Most of them are in the form of articles, research papers, books; some of them are reports also. The literature discussed the issue differently, like some cover the relation between Russia and Georgia after disintegration, some of them discusses the matter of ethnic issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and some deals with the various reasons behind the war.



According to the themes of my dissertation I would like to discuss the work of some of the authors like Marcel De Hass, James Sherr, Cornell Svante E, Starr S.Federick, Ruslan Pukov, Ronald D.Asmus, Goltz,T, Jackson, Popescu,N, Nana Sumbadze, Marshall,A.G, Talbot, A, Chicky, J.E, Rumer, E and Stent, A, Cornell, S.E, Gordadze,T, Tsereteli,M, Anar,V and others.

While discussing about literature it covers various perspectives, among those Goltz,T (2009) and Popescu,N (2006) covers the issue of secessionist movement in South Ossetia. The declaration of independence of Kosovo, the movement for independence of Tibet in China and all these influences the secessionist movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Goltz,T (2009) pointed out that the autonomous district of South Ossetia created problem for Georgia during Gamsakhurdia's period. South Ossetians are not the ethnic Georgian, the Georgian on the other hand treated them as 'new comer.' They could not enjoy all the privileges like other Georgians. They faced several other problems. They wanted to become independent in 1989 but Georgia did not support that. Popescu,N (2006) discusses that this problem end with the cease-fire agreement in 1992 and after the war of 1990 to 1992 it become de-facto independent.

Secondy,Popescu,N (2006) also discussed about the secessionist movement of Abkhazia. He stated that the conflict with Abkhaziais is the most serious problem. The most serious phase of conflict was August 1992 to September 1993. According to him Abkhazia is a very poor country and totally destroyed after the war. The real problem came in 1992. The author described how and for what reason the movement started in 1992.

Goltz,T (2009), Cornell, S.E (2001), Gordadze,T (2009) and Jackson(2003) discuss about bilateral relationship between Russia and Georgia. The war between Russia and Georgia is not a result of any certain reason, these four authors' deals with the ups and downs of Russia-Georgia relationship. Goltz, T (2009) discusses about the arrival of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. When he came to power in Georgia; he tried to control South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Jacson (2003) on the other hand pointed out the history of Georgia. Georgia in the sixth century spilt up and then again united and again in thirteenth century it was conquered by the Mongols. In the first half of the nineteenth

century the Georgian princes want Russia's protection for the security of Georgia. Cornell, S.E (2001) deals with the issue of independence of Georgia. Basically after the disintegration of Soviet Union three South Caucasus states got independence- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since the independence of these three countries the foreign policy of Russia went through various changes. Gordadze,T (2009) shows how after the independence of Georgia, Russia tries to keep the relation with Georgia and how they treated Georgia.

About the reason behind the August War different author deals differently. Marcel De Hass (2010) for example viewed this war as Moscow's foreign security policy. According to him it's basically a "part and parcel" of Moscow's security policy. He points out that after the incident of colour revolution in Georgia, the situation for Russia become quite problematic and as a result Russia become worried for its own security, moreover the Georgia's friendly attitude towards West made the it worse.

James Sherr, Nana Sumbadze both of them has given emphasis on political factor behind the war. After the recognition of Kosovo's independence, Russia become more active regarding the matter of Caucasus. Nana Sumbadze thinks that the war was the result of increasing tension between Russia and Georgia. The war affected not only these two countries but also the entire Caucasus.

George J.A, (2009) on the other hand discusses about the ethnic reason behind the war. He identifies that the war was also the reflection of ethnic separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to him sometimes in the form of political autonomy ethnic movement can lead to a war; which he thinks happened in case of the 2008 August War. Charles King 2008 also gives emphasis on the same reason.

Ruslan Pukov (2008) covers up the issue of military confrontation between Russia and Georgia. According to him there is no doubt that Georgia continuously developed its military capability but at the same time it is also true that no matter how much Georgia tries to develop its military equipment, it can be never compared with the Russian military forces. Georgia also has done a severe mistake by ignoring the possibility of Russian military intervention in South Ossetia in 2008. Cornell S.E,

Popanevski J. and Nilsson N 2008 also discuss on the same issue. They have discussed that the military action of Russia was not only against Georgia, it was basically against OSCE, the council of Europe and against NATO.

Ronald D. Asmus (2010) have mainly pointed out the role of the external players behind the war. He has made it clear that Georgia's western orientation to join NATO created a more vulnerable situation. Russia was not at all happy about this step of Georgia. Russia warned Georgia regarding this also. Cornell S.E, Popanevski J. and Nilsson N, (2008) has viewed that this war happened because of Russia's strategy towards Georgia. According to Marshall, A.G (2008) the US military advisers tried to build a good relationship with Georgia as it wanted to make Georgia a "new front" for war on terror.

Some of the authors have discussed about the impact of the war on CIS and European security. Such as: Tsereteli,M, Nichol,J, Anar,V, Rumer, E and Stent, A, Hamilton, R.E and others. Tsereteli,M (2009) have pointed out that the war of August 2008 has created lot of impact on the CIS countries. The after war situation became very difficult for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Ukraine. It has created problem for transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. Anar,V (2009) has shown that the war changes the domestic policies of CIS countries. Because of this war Azerbaijan has changed its understanding about democratic west. The defeat of Georgia makes Russian model of governance more attractive. Not only CIS countries, the war also affected the European security. Rumer, E and Stent (2009) cover up this issue. The war affected European security so badly that the US now thinking to modify their policy towards Russia. According to Mikhelidze, N 2009 this war brought in to focus a new kind nature of post-soviet space. Hamilton, R.E (2011) on the other hand has pointed out that directly or indirectly the war created a very difficult situation for Georgia and it created problems for NATO and US security policy too.

After the war Russia has given a suggestion for new security paradigm in Europe. Rotfeld,A.D (2009) has discussed about the treaty of New Security Paradigm, after discussing about the problems on October 2008 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev tried to build new comprehensive European Security Treaty. Through the new

security treaty Russia want to become as equal as US in the context European security scenario. Herpen, M.H.V(2008) viewed that through this new security treaty Russia wanted to increase the importance of CSTO and not only that he ends his discussion by saying that the another motive of this new security treaty was to divide NATO and to attack the excising treaties, such as OSCE and CFE.

### **Research Methodology**

The proposed study would be both analytical and descriptive in nature; the qualitative methods will be helping in this research. The ethnic, political, military aspects and many more will be used as qualitative tools. On the other hand according to the hypotheses the study will be using the ethnic problem, role of the external players, the geo-political factors as the independent variable and the whole incident of the war will be, the changing nature of the Russian foreign policy and also the changing nature of the domestic policies of the CIS countries will be using as a dependent variables.

Moreover the study will also take the help of historical methods while discussing about the post Soviet relationship between Russia and Georgia specially in the 1990s and after wards. It would be theoretical in nature also, while discussing about the reasons behind the war. Lastly, it will be a case study, because the research is dealing with a special incident which created great impact in international scenario. In this case study, it will be using both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will be government sources of Georgia and Russia and several reports of European Union, NATO, Work Bank Publications etc. Secondary sources will be books, Journal articles, research papers, News papers and internet sources and published and submitted M. Phil and Ph. D dissertations covering various discussion regarding Russia and Georgia conflict.

## **Chapterisation**

### **Chapter 1: Introduction**

The first chapter introduces the topic by providing a general introduction to develop a clear understanding of the issue at hand. Main focus of this introductory chapter is to guide through historical factors: as well as political back ground related to the war. Secondly the chapter focuses on the theoretical perspective of the war. It also tries to highlight the rationale and scope of the research and discusses some research questions. Lastly, the chapter deals with the existing literature and research methodology.

### **Chapter 2: Evolution of Russia-Georgia Relations and the ups and Downs**

Chapter two first of all would tries to describe the history of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. Next it focuses on the earlier relationship among Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and tries to highlight the phase of incorporation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia into Russian territory. It also deals with the issues of secessionist movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and in that given context it focuses on the cause of 2008 war.

### **Chapter3: Reasons behind the War and its Impact on CIS Security Scenario**

The third chapter begins with the discussion of various reasons behind the war; it mainly tries to focus on the political factors, ethnic factors, geo-political factors, role of external factors etc. Next it deals with the issue that how did August 2008 War created large amount of impact on CIS countries. Lastly, it emphasises how the CIS countries viewed this war and what was their post war reaction.

### **Chapter 4: Russia-Georgia Military Conflict and Need for New Security Paradigm in Europe**

Chapter four discusses about the military conflict between Russia and Georgia. Next it deals with the fact that how this war did created impact on European security

scenario. This chapter also focuses on the need new security paradigm in Europe and emphasises on international perspectives of the war.

### **Chapter 5: Conclusion**

This chapter reviews the research, providing an insight into the topic taken as a focus of the study and it tries to validate what has been stated in the hypothesis by taking the help of the previous chapters.

\*\*\*\*\*

## **Chapter-2**

### **EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATION AND THE HISTORY OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA**

Main focus of this chapter is to analyze the history of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. It also intends to discuss the earlier relationship among Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and discuss about the history of incorporation Of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Osetia into Russian territory. It focuses on the secessionist movement which was taken place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and in that given context tries to find out the cause of August War of 2008 and also gives a critical analysis of bilateral relationship between Russia and Georgia.

The military conflict between Russia-Georgia (2008) took the world in great shock and once again it became crystal clear that the existing issues between two countries are not over yet. The 2008 conflict makes the relationship more complex than in the past and it generates quite interesting international reaction towards South Ossetia. Historically Russia and Georgia have complex relationship and political and ideological differences resulted clash of different national interest.

From 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards Russia and Georgia are having a strategic relationship. During that period Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Persia were trying to gain control over the strategically important Caucasus region.

As, Gavrilov & Shepova (2009:140) emphasise that actually, “The Ossetians are the descendants of ancient Alanian tribes coming of Iranian origin. Some of them are Orthodox Christian and some (in certain regions in North Ossetia) are Moslems”.

According to some scholars Russia won the battle and established its control over Georgia, as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia. But even after that some facts remains unclear.

As Prof. Mohanty (2008:54) pointed out, “Notwithstanding the myth that the Christian principalities of Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia were forcibly incorporated into Russian empire unlike Muslims-inhabited territory that was merged into Russian territory through coercion”.

### **Ossetia’s Incorporation into Russia**

The Belgrade Treaty<sup>1</sup> of 1739 shows that Russia increased its territory in the South-East up to Kuban River and Russia was there before the Caucasus Mountain ridge but in spite of that because of lack of resources Russia was not interested to cross it. Several Christian principalities in that period requested for the protection to the Russian empire as they were facing difficulties by the Ottoman Empire and Persia (Prof. Mohanty 2008:54).

However in this way Ossetia incorporated with Russian Empire in 1774 and it was beneficial for both the countries because after the incorporation of Osetia into Russian territory, Russia got the legal allegiance of the country’s natural resources like- gold, silver, minerals etc. On the opposite side, it “received back the plain at the foot of Central Caucasus, river basins of Ardon, Fiagdon and Terek that considered to have been its historical territory since times immemorial” ( Gavrilov & Shepova 2009:140).

### **Georgia’s Incorporation into Russia**

Georgia’s incorporation into Russia was quite interesting in nature. The king of Georgia Erakli was in a vulnerable situation because of Persian invasion and oppression and to deal with that situation he merged his kingdom with Russian empire. After the death of Erakli Russia withdrew from Georgia, as once again Persia invaded the territory. In this vulnerable situation Georgia requested Russia to protect their territory and to recognize Georgia-12 and in this way Georgia incorporated into Russian empire in 1801 (Kluhevski 1911:339).

---

<sup>1</sup> The Belgrade Treaty is basically a peace treaty which was signed between Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Monarchy on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1739. This treaty ended the existence of Kingdom of Serbia by stopping the hostilities between Austro-Turkish War of 1737-1739.



## **Abkhazia's Incorporation into Russia**

The autonomous republic of Abkhazia has a history of its own. At the very earlier period between 9<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries BC Abkhazia was a part of the Georgian kingdom of Colchis (Braund 1994: 359). But in the 16<sup>th</sup> century just after the breakup of Georgian Empire the autonomous Principality of Abkhazia emerged. During 1570s Abkhazia came under the Ottoman rule and the majority of Abkhazian were converted into Islam. After that in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century there was a fight between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians for taking control of the Abkhazian territory; nevertheless from the Abkhazian side in 1803 they tried to build a relationship with Russia just after the Georgian incorporation into Russia and the story drastically changed when finally in 1811 Abkhazia incorporated with Russian empire ( Kaufman 1997: 91).

“Thus these three independent principalities with a history of hostilities among themselves merged into Russian empire separately and had no history of common inhabitation before they joined Russian empire” as quoted by Prof. Mohanty (2008:55).

## **First Conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia**

Just after the October revolution<sup>2</sup> in 1917 a congress of the Abkhazian people wanted to join the North Caucasus Mountain Republic. During this period Georgia tried to take the advantage of the ongoing civil war in Russia and tried to hold control over Abkhazia with the support of the German army and in the later stage they succeeded. Georgia implemented its nationalistic policy on Abkhazia; forced the Abkhaz people to implement Georgian language as the official language (Prof. Mohanty 2008:55).

---

<sup>2</sup> The great October Revolution is also known as the Great October Socialist Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution. It was basically a political revolution which happened in the year of 1917 in Petrograd. The October Revolution was led by the Bolsheviks who almost demolished the Russian Provincial Government and gave all the power to the local soviets which was dominated by the Bolsheviks themselves.

Regarding the pathetic situation of the Abkhaz people Prof. Mohanty (2008:55) also quoted, “Under the Georgianisation policy the Georgian population started to pour into the Abkhazia en-mass. This policy aggravated by endless pillage by the Georgian army angered the Abkhazian population, including the local Mingrelians. As a result when Soviet rule was established in Abkhazia in March 1921, it was welcomed by the local population mainly as the salvation from the Georgian tyranny and occupation”.

Abkhazia became the Soviet Socialist Republic or the SSR Abkhazia but in 1931 Joseph Stalin declared it an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. Although during the period of Joseph Stalin some negative aspects came in Abkhazia. Abkhaz schools were closed. After the death of Stalin the situation of the Abkhaz people improved; they have given a greater role to play in the republic and the Soviet Government helped to develop the Abkhaz culture specially the literature. Unfortunately in February 1932 Abkhazia lost its autonomous status (BBC News).

### **Conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia**

The root of Ossetia’s conflict with Georgia started from 1918-1921. According to Gavrilov & Shepova (2009:140) at that period, “The Menshevik Government in Georgia ruthlessly suppressed the Bolshevik-supported insurgency in South Ossetia (the Ossetians call it genocide)”. Prof.Mohanty (2008:55) pointed out that by a decree of VTSCIK, Council of People’s Commissions of Georgian Soviet republic South Ossetians autonomous republic was formed in April 1922. But various leaders of South Ossetia like Kulumbegov made it clear that South Ossetia faced so many problems within Georgia; he emphasised that the Ossetian people of South Ossetian Autonomous Region were excluded from colleges and universities and faced difficulties during the time of promoting administrative posts (Gavrilov & Shepova 2009:141). Not only that Georgian government took some policies to incorporate the minority; they forcefully changed the nationality of the Ossetians and ‘their geographical names also replaced by the Georgian name’ (Prof.Mohanty 2008:55).

According to O. Efendiyev, “South Ossetia was less economically developed than North Ossetia was due to the fact that the two autonomous entities were within two different union republics of the USSR-Georgia and Russia respectively”.

At the end of 1980s there was a violent nationalist movement took place in Georgia which basically tried to eliminate the autonomous region inside Georgia. Through this movement the Georgian declare that Georgia is for the Georgians only (Prof.Mohanty 2008:56). The first stage of conflict started during this time and it continued till 1990. In November 23<sup>rd</sup> 1989 a protest has been marched by the leadership of Gamsahurdya “to protect the Georgian population”. Problem occurs when the Soviet Government tried to control the protesters but the protesters involved themselves into collisions with the Ossetian population and the situation became worse when no negotiations took place. In this crucial situation Gamsahkurdya made a speech in which he said, “I shall bring an army of two hundred thousand men. No Ossetian will be left in the Samachablo<sup>3</sup> land. I demand that you had the Soviet flags down” (Gavrilov & Shepova 2009:145). Facing the vulnerable situation for the Ossetians South Osetia tried to preserve the rights of its people and the South Ossetian parliament took a resolution on 10<sup>th</sup> November 1989 for increasing the status of region from autonomous district to autonomous republic but incidentally the Supreme Soviet of GSSR declared it as anti-constitutional (Prof.Mohanty 2008:56). In this regard Gavrilov & Shepova (2009:142) pointed out that during the time of establishing the new government in Georgia all those did not agree with it were told to leave Georgia. In 1990 Georgia finally refused the judicial acts which were regarding its status within USSR constitutional norms; South Ossetia on the other hand in this situation demanded its sovereignty by claiming that till 1922 it was not a part of Georgia. At that period Chairman of the Helsinki group Zviad Gamsakhurdia was being elected as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia (Prof.Mohanty 2008:56).

---

<sup>3</sup> According to the Ossetian scholar V. Abayev ‘Samachablo’ was basically a term from the feudal past and it is not a synonym of South Ossetia. Historically it was a district in Shida Kartli, Georgia but now it lies within the disputed South Ossetian region.

In October 1990 Gamsakhurdia won 155 seats from 250 in the Supreme Council through “Roundtable/Free Georgia coalition”<sup>4</sup>. But it is important to note that all 34 political parties (including the Communists) contesting the elections were in agreement on one point:

“complete independence; or at least the demand for independence was the public stance of all politicians when confronted by electors, who often seemed to have more in common with rowdy soccer fans (or street mobs) than practitioners of Robert’s Rules of Parliamentary Order.”(Goltz 2009:16-17).

The first confrontation set the pattern for all to start and it was the Autonomous Republic of Adjara on the Turkish frontier. Gamsakhurdiya did not send any army but for the non practicing Muslims of Adjara he made it clear that they can’t have any ‘special status’.

“The Tension continued till Gamsakhurdia’s election as Chairman of Georgia’s Supreme Council (or Parliament) on November 14, 1990, and further expanded even after the March 31, 1991” (Goltz 2009 :17).

### **Secessionist Movement in South Ossetia During 1990s**

It was among these erstwhile neighbours that Gamsakhurdia’s nationalists began sowing the seeds of ethnic discord. The first step on the road to perdition came in the form of a 1989 proclamation that Georgian and not Russian (or Ossetian) would be the language of the land (ibid.pp:18).

The Autonomous District (as opposed to Republic) of South Ossetia created a different kind of problem for Gamsakhurdia and his nationalists. To begin with, the Ossetians (who call themselves Alans) were not ethnic Georgians, but regarded as Old Persian-speaking interlopers—having arrived in the central Caucasus mountains over a thousand years (or perhaps a mere five or seven hundred) ago qualifies the Ossetians

---

<sup>4</sup> The Helsinki Party of the Round Table/ Free Georgia coalition was basically led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, it was a new political bloc which was created in 1990.

as being “newcomers” and thus less entitled to the claim of being as native as the indigenous Georgians; despite of several kind of relationships for centuries like marriage among royals or ordinary people (ibid). After the war from 1990 to 1992 it became a de-facto independent republic. The conflict in South Ossetia (Georgia) lasted between 1990 and 1992 and claimed approximately a thousand lives. Problem occurs just after the election to council of people’s deputies of South Ossetia because Tbilisi was not involved in this matter and the decision of the election was taken place by Tskhinboli. In response of that Supreme Soviet of Georgia incorporated South Ossetia by eliminating its autonomous status and because of this 11<sup>th</sup> December 1990 clashes took place in Tskhinboli. On January 5<sup>th</sup> 1991 Georgia sent Interior Ministry troops and national guards to Skhinbali and the confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia reached to a new level (Prof.Mohanty 2008:57). After words the situation was deteriorated drastically and on 29<sup>th</sup> January 1991 the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia was arrested by the Georgian government and Georgia cut the power supply to South Ossetia. Later on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1991 a joint session took place in South Ossetia to restore the status to autonomous district and on 4<sup>th</sup> May 1991 South Ossetia wanted to change the republic status as well as wanted its sovereignty (Mann 2004:503). On the other hand during this time the presidential election took place in Georgia and the Supreme Soviet Chairman Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first President of Georgia.

However the massacre and the conflict continued. Regarding the impact of the conflict Prof. Mohanty (2008:57) said, “The bloody conflict continued resulting in gutting of 10 Ossetian villages. 209 people were killed between 6<sup>th</sup> January 1991 and 1<sup>st</sup> September 1991,460 people were injured and fate of 150 remained unknown. Many Georgians living in the conflict zone became victims of Ossetians revenge and many of them were forced to leave their native places and flee to Georgia”.

With the time, situation in both the places were more deteriorated much and on February 1992 Georgia attacked the residential areas of Skhinbali; it continued till 13<sup>th</sup> July 1992. Finally, the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetian republic took the decision of adopting the act regarding state independence on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1992.

### **Peace Keeping Operation**

The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement; Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia signed the joint agreement to resolve the Georgian-Ossetian conflict on 24<sup>th</sup> June 1992. As a result of the ceasefire agreement there is a “trilateral peacekeeping operation” consisting of Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops (Popescu 2006:2-3). Through this Peace-Keeping Forces of Russia-Georgia and South Ossetia the period of open military conflict ultimately ended (Toft 2003:18). A Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia (a Russian region) and Georgia oversee the security situation and pursue negotiations on conflict settlement.

### **Secessionist Movement in Abkhazia**

“He who has lost his homeland lost everything” —Abkhaz proverb

The creation legend of Abkhazia and Georgia is identical, “ a sad fact that has not led to unity and fraternity between the two peoples, but rather to a belligerent disputation of basic history and the denial of the very humanity of the other group” (Goltz 2009:21-22) .

Abkhazia is a secessionist entity that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union, are “unrecognised internationally, isolated from international developments, and very closely associated and supported by Russia”. However their democratic credentials could hardly be more different.

Abkhazia and Georgia have a very old territorial dispute; during 1989 there was a massive clash between them. According to the 1990 Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Abkhazian autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) it became a “sovereign socialist” country. The wider region formed part of the Soviet Union until 1991. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union ethnic tensions grew between Abkhaz and Georgians over Georgia's moves towards independence. This led

to the 1992–1993 War in Abkhazia that resulted in a Georgian military defeat, *de facto* independence of Abkhazia and “the mass exodus and ethnic cleansing” of the Georgian population from Abkhazia. The conflict in Abkhazia has been the most serious of the three as it claimed more than 10,000 lives between 1992 and 1994. The most intense phase of the conflict lasted from August 1992 to September 1993. The conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia became a war as the Abkhazian wanted their national and physical identity back. Real problem occurred when in August 1992, the Georgian government accused Gamsakhurdia's supporters of kidnapping Georgia's Interior Minister and holding him captive in Abkhazia.

“The Georgian government dispatched 3,000 troops to the region, ostensibly to restore order. The Abkhaz were relatively unarmed at this time and the Georgian troops were able to march into Sukhumi with relatively little resistance” (Mirsky 1996: 72).

The conflict was in stalemate until July 1993, when Abkhaz separatist militias launched an abortive attack on Georgian-held Sukhumi. They surrounded and heavily shelled the capital, where Shevardnadze was trapped. The warring sides “agreed to a Russian-brokered truce in Sochi” at the end of July, but it was collapsed in mid-September 1993 after a renewed Abkhaz attack. After ten days of heavy fighting, Sukhumi was taken by Abkhazian forces on 27 September 1993. Shevardnadze narrowly escaped death, after vowing to stay in the city no matter what. He was forced to flee when separatist “snipers” fired on the hotel where he was staying. Abkhaz, North Caucasian militants, and their allies committed numerous atrocities against the city's remaining ethnic Georgians, what has been dubbed in the “Sukhumi Massacre”. The mass killings and destruction continued for two weeks, leaving thousands dead and missing. Even after that Abkhazia was still only greater autonomous country, not independent. “Only after Tbilisi resorted to force and Russia provided military aid did Abkhazia represent its position of an independent Abkhazia as indivisible” (Toft 2003:87).

But the impact of the war was tremendous; it costs lot of casualties and devastations; the damage of the Abkhazian economy was estimated at\$11.5bn. Not only that the

war changed the composition of population; Georgia's military composition was supported by the local Georgians and the other population like Russians, Greeks, and Armenians supported Abkhazia (Prof. Mohanty 2008:59).

In spite of the 1994 ceasefire agreement and years of negotiations, the dispute has not been resolved. Basically "Abkhazia considers itself as an independent state called the Republic of Abkhazia" and on the other hand according to Georgia it is an autonomous republic called the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Now the status of Abkhazia is the main issue of the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict ( Art. 1, Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia).

### **Peace Keeping Operation in Abkhazia**

A 'Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict' was signed in April 1994 in Moscow.

However, "Outbursts of violence and some guerrilla activity persisted in Abkhazia well after the agreement. There is a Russia-led peacekeeping operation under a mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and under the supervision of the United Nations (UN Observer Mission to Georgia – UNOMIG)" (Popescu 2006:3).

The peacekeepers basically wanted to settle down the disputes by preventing the fight and they tried to create a situation so that the refugees could return back to Gali region.

In this context Prof. Mohanty quoted, "According to an addendum to the peacekeeping mandate, the Russian force was to counter the sabotage activity in the security zone jointly with the Abkhazian law-enforcement agencies".

Despite the long-term presence of the United Nations monitoring force and a Russian-led CIS peacekeeping operation, the conflict has continued on several occasions.



In the Caucasus, “Abkhazia is poor, destroyed after the war, still living in a constant psychological expectation of war (which is not always groundless) , in a deep demographic crisis, quite rural, under economic blockade, isolated from the outside world geographically and politically, far from Europe, and in a region that is undemocratic and unstable” (Popescu 2006:1-2) .

### **Causes of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia**

When Kosovo<sup>5</sup> declared its independence on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008 thousands of angry Serbs took to the streets to protest the breakaway region’s secession from Serbia. Less than a month later, Chinese authorities battled Buddhist monk in Lhasa, the legendary capital of Tibet, where separatist resentment have been simmering since China occupied the Himalayan region more than 50 years ago. The protest was the latest flash points in some two dozen separatist “hot-spots”, the most active of roughly 70 such movements around the globe. They are part of a Post World War two independence trend that has produced a nearly fourfold jump in the number of countries worldwide, with 26 of those new countries emerging just since 1990. A handful has become de-facto states that are as yet unrecognized by the U.N., including Somaliland, Taiwan, South Ossetia and Nagorno- Karabakh.

With the disintegration of Soviet Union the leaders of ethnic regions in the successor states started demanding immediate cultural, political and economic autonomy from their new central governments. Majority of ethnic separatism occurred most consistently among the ethnic groups who had dominated autonomous regions during the time of Soviet period. But the extent of the demand was different across regional contexts and leaders and used varied means to achieve their stated goals.

---

<sup>5</sup>Kosovo is a southeastern European region. From the medieval period Kosovo was the center of attraction of the Serbian empire. However after long history Kosovo declared its independence on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008. United states, Turkey, Australia ,United Kingdom and some other countries recognize Kosovo as a sovereign and independent states but Russia did not recognize its independence and till 2010 no member of CIS,CSTO has recognized Kosovo’s independence. On the other hand till 1<sup>st</sup> June 2012 ninety one UN states have recognized its declaration of independence and now the Republic of Kosovo is a member country of IMF and World Bank.

“The separatist politics of state building in Russia and Georgia provides a series of puzzles for scholars and policy makers who seek to understand the causes of ethnic violence and ethnic peacemaking. First, why did some regional leaders demand more autonomy than others, and what factors did they consider when establishing strategies to achieve their desired outcome? Why did violence occur in some circumstances, but not in others? Second, once regions began a separatist policy, why did their demands change over time? Why did some violent struggles find resolution, while others never achieved political resolution? What factors affected resumption of violence after months or even years of peaceful coexistence? Third, as the Russian and Georgian states created or recycled governance structures, what factors have affected the development of state institutions overseeing center – periphery relations? Why did state governments respond to ethnic separatism with concessions in some cases and violence in others?” (Georfe 2009:13).

These questions are basically showing larger concerns about the causes of ethnic mobilization and conflict.

The experiences of Russia and Georgia provide some answers as to why violent ethnic separatism emerged in particular cases, but was avoided in others. In both countries, leaders of ethnic regions made their separatist strategies according to practical power and wealth, assessments of central government power, and informal structures like patronage that bound them together with central government leaders.

“Russia has been a player during and after the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. During the 90s Russia’s policies towards the conflicts were largely supportive of the secessionist forces, even if not always unambiguously so. The main type of Russian support was directed through conflict settlement mechanisms. Russian-led peacekeeping operations have de facto guarded the borders of the secessionist entities, helping to maintain a status quo that was favourable to the Secessionist sides. Peacekeepers allowed the secessionist elites to pursue state-building projects while deterring the metropolitan states from attempting to regain control of the regions” (Popescu 2006:2).

On the other hand Georgia throughout its history has been surrounded by internal and external strife and interference. Ronald Grigor Suny described Georgian politics as consisting of “local dynasts manoeuvring among the contenders for political hegemony, sometimes choosing the king, other times the great empires that bordered Georgia”. Religious and linguistic differences are the main difficulty for Abkhaz-Georgian relationship. The weakness of Georgia at the time of the USSR’s collapse created an opportunity for ethnic republics to engage in ethnic mobilization and separation and that weakness was such that it made bargaining over status difficult, and therefore less likely.

“The Georgian nationalism that helped spur its independence movement alienated its own ethnic minorities, especially the Abkhazians and Ossetians in their titular regions. Even before the full Soviet collapse, the South Ossetians moved toward secession. Abkhazia followed suit 2 years later. The subsequent wars were brutal and tinged with righteous anger on all sides, with each player protesting their own moral superiority in the lead-up and course of the bloodshed. Both wars were relatively short: fighting between Georgia and South Ossetia occurred sporadically from January 1991 to March 1992, with the bulk of violence occurring in spring 1991. The Abkhazian war lasted from August 1992 to July 1993” (George 2009:95).

“Ethnic separatism in Russia and Georgia occurred amid division of the spoils from Soviet dissolution.” This kind of separatist politics helped to strengthen governments as well as individuals.

“Ethnic regional elites calibrated the degree of separatism they would pursue and the mechanisms by which they would pursue it. Personal alliances between political leaders enhanced both regional position and central government tolerance” (ibid,pp:17).

Each of these factors increased or decreased the mobilizing capacity of that specific region. The starting point of separatist demands was the Soviet federal system, inherited by most post-Soviet states, which endowed certain ethnic groups with territorial status by constructing national territories for them.

“This institutional structure enhanced ethnic separatism by providing such regions with a moral argument for separatism, as well as an institutional structure through which they could organize their efforts” (ibid).

Mainly the regional power, political situation, central state capacity, and informal structures enhanced or diminished the likelihood of ethnic separatism and violence. These secessionist entities don't exist on the map. But in reality they do exist, and they have an impact on regional and European politics.

“Most politicians and observers take for granted the lack of democracy in these secessionist entities. But by their regional standards, some of the secessionist entities boast surprising levels of political pluralism. Certainly, all the secessionist entities are very far from functioning democratic entities. But the domestic politics in these secessionist entities should not be ignored, nor downplayed. They can tell an interesting story of how political pluralism fails or succeeds not only in a post-communist transition, but also in a post-war context” (Popescu 2006:1).

Ivan Sukhov says, “Russia now is reminiscent of a decaying ancient Rome that did not feel squeamish about handing over border provinces to barbarian federates.”

The immediate result of the dissolution of Soviet Union for the Caucasus was achievement of independence by the three South Caucasian states -Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

“Much as had been the case in 1918, the Caucasian states were set free of Russian control because of Russia's more pressing domestic problems and issues. In 1918, the Bolshevik Revolution needed to be consolidated before the new leadership could embark on a reconquest of the territories ruled by tsarist Russia; in 1991, the new liberal democratic Russia needed to be built and consolidated, necessitating a loosening of the grip on the peripheries. At both occasions, Moscow recognized the independent Transcaucasian states of

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and for a short period did not have any outright or direct ambitions on them”(Cornell 2001:323).

The differences between Russia and Georgia are nothing new; it was there in the period of Post Soviet Russia. The differences between the Georgian Mensheviks and the Russian Bolsheviks continued during and after the First World War. The Georgian Mensheviks did not support the Bolshevik led October Revolution. On 1922, the Federal Union of the SSR of Transcaucasia was established. From the beginning there were conflicts between Tbilisi and Moscow. After years of disputes the Stalinists took over Georgia. The fact is that the Soviet period did not destroy Georgian culture or the Georgian identity. During Stalin’s period from 1928 to 1953 Georgia was transformed more fundamentally than in any comparable period in its three thousand year history.

“Four centuries of resistance!”—so proclaimed thousands of leaflets distributed in Tbilisi by young Georgian activists during the August 2008 war with Russia.

“Analyzing Georgian-Russian relations solely in terms of resistance is understandable when Russian tanks were 40 km away from the country’s capital, but a more balanced assessment requires a more nuanced understanding of the question. The relationship between a local polity and an external center of power attempting to establish its domination is by necessity more complex, definitely equivocal, and essentially unstable”( Gordadze 2009:28-29).

“Throughout history, local rulers have made deals with empires, and their dependence has never been total. Phases of military conquest and crude repression have tended to be followed by a “hegemonic stage,” in which the dominant power seeks to co-opt local elites. This has even been known to end in a growing dependence of the imperial power on the local ruler. An eagerness to control the Caucasus and its central country, Georgia, has been a leitmotiv of all Russian empires. It was in the Caucasus that imperial pride and dreams of greatness were nurtured, and where Russia took refuge in order to deflect frustration away from its continuous resentment vis-à-vis the West .Being a hegemonic and nationality-based empire, the Soviet Union rehabilitated and in certain respects reinforced the role of local actors. The

Soviet experience was formative for those who took on the ambivalent and dual role of acting simultaneously as community leaders and imperial servants” (ibid).

During the years of Yeltsin’s presidency (1990s), Georgia was led by Eduard Shevardnadze who was a former high-level Soviet official. He had presided over Communist Georgia in the 1970s and 1980s before Mikhail Gorbachev brought him to Moscow. Gorbachev made him Soviet foreign minister. “Shevardnadze was a perfect example of a man who sought to reconcile in one life many different roles.” (ibid). Under his presidency and that of Yeltsin in Russia the relationship between Russia and Georgia started to be positive in some context. They vividly illustrated all the ambiguities and difficulties of a post-imperial conflict.

“Over the years that have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian foreign policy has gone through several readily discernible major phases. The immediate reaction to the dissolution of the empire that Moscow ruled was a state of confusion that lasted through the initial phase of the building of the Russian state”(Cornell 2001:324).

In the context of relationship with various countries Russia needed to define itself before defining any policy orientation towards its former dominions.

“De facto, this meant that Moscow relinquished control over the three South Caucasian republics both politically and militarily. However, there was no consensus in Russian political circles on this development. Official Moscow initially paid little attention to the former Soviet Union, instead attempting to direct Russia towards the west; opposition to this policy nevertheless grew quickly” ( ibid).

Georgia is a small but strategically important country in the Caucasus. The Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a radical nationalist who declared independence in April 1991. But after the collapse of Soviet Union because of his extreme nationalism and increasingly dictatorial leadership he lost the support of his colleagues in Tbilisi and he was ousted in a political coup and which was supported by Moscow in

December 1991. Hence, Shevardnadze returned to Georgia as leader in March 1992 and he was elected President in October.

“From the very beginning, a large portion of Georgian society was critical of Shevardnadze. Zviad Gamsakhurdia continued to enjoy substantial support, especially in the western part of the country, and Shevardnadze’s past led to the firm belief that he was closely tied to Russia, some seeing him as nothing more than a Russian figurehead. In fact, reality was much more complex. No doubt, Eduard Shevardnadze’s entire political career had been connected with the Soviet Union. He was a classically ambivalent figure, who knew how to take advantage of his local resources to gain a privileged place in an imperial system, but who also could use his imperial credentials to assert his power at the local level. As in many post-colonial transitions, he became the imperial servant who transformed himself into a post-imperial national leader. But in the beginning of the 1990s, Shevardnadze’s Russian credentials were ambiguous. Earlier, he had been closely associated with Gorbachev’s political team, but by 1992 this grouping had already been marginalized” (Gordadze 2009:31-32).

But from the starting he understood that he had to end the conflict that was started with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. South Ossetia wanted to reunite with North Ossetia and like its northern partner, officially become a part of the Russian Federation. This time Russia indicated that it was unwilling to see borders changed. This attitude of Russia gave Shevardnadze a scope to conclude an agreement; in which South Ossetia’s autonomy was formally recognized by Tbilisi and along with that he signed an agreement with Russia in July 1992 in which joint forces acted as peacekeepers and patrolled the border with North Ossetia. The two republics therefore remained separate but an uneasy calm was restored to the area.

On the other hand conflict in Abkhazia proved more difficult to settle. “Although only about 18% of the population was ethnic Abkhazian, separatists declared independence from Georgia in August 1992” (Grachev2008:197). With the increasing tension Shevardnadze sent some Georgian troops to the republic in the expectation of a victory.

“When Georgia failed to put down the uprising, Shevardnadze blamed Russian support for the separatists. As the conflict escalated in early 1993, Shevardnadze declared Russia and Georgia to be effectively at war” (Izvestiya, 17<sup>th</sup> March 1993).

In February it was said by Shevardnadze that “Russian aircraft had bombed residential quarters in the capital of Sukhumi killing sixty people” ( Izvestiya , 25<sup>th</sup> February 1993).“*Officially Moscow was neutral but Abkhazia was of considerable strategic importance to Russia. It was tempting for Moscow, after the problems in Sevastopol, to maintain its position in Abkhazia, on its southern border*” (Grachev 2008:197). The Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev acknowledged it and said ‘Russian troops should not leave Abkhazia because that would mean losing the Black Sea’ (The Observer,11<sup>th</sup> July 1993). “*Soon afterwards, Yeltsin made two speeches confirming the strategic importance of the region and the need for Russia to establish Russian bases in the Caucasus*” ( Dale 1996:127) . This time Russia was simply not willing to withdraw from the Caucasus region and risk the political vacuum being filled by forces antagonistic towards Moscow.

After all these issues a cease-fire brokered by Russia and the UN, was finally agreed at Sochi on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1993 but Abkhazia violated the cease-fire and this issue again started a new kind of problem.

“With the prospect of the total collapse of his country, Shevardnadze on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1993 made an appeal to Moscow to come to his rescue. Having played a part in destabilising Georgia, Moscow now came to the support of the government against the violently anti-Russian Zviadists. In November, eight warships were moved up from Sevastopol to a position off the Georgian coast and troops were deployed to free the port of Poti and to guard the main roads leading to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi”(Grachev 2008:198).

With the help of the Russian weaponry the Zviadists were quickly defeated and Gamsakhurdia committed suicide on New Year’s Eve 1993.



“The support of the Russian had its price, Shevardnadze was compelled to bring Georgia into the structures of the CIS and in February 1994 he allowed Russia the right to military bases in his country” (ibid). Because of so many ups and downs the Georgian economy had been devastated and Tbilisi depended on Moscow even to the extent of paying wages to its state employees.

### ***A New Stage in Russia-Georgia Relationship (1999-2003)***

During the end of 1990s and beginning of the 2000s Georgia’s foreign relations was quite unpredictable.

As Gordadze (2009:41) pointed out, “On the one hand, the country had become among the leading beneficiaries of U.S. foreign aid per capita globally. On the other, its biggest neighbour and former overlord was vigorously trying to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty through acts of destabilization and to extend its own influence there. One side was financing the formation of the country’s military forces by an impressive influx of money and specialists—in 2001–2002 American aid to the Georgian army represented two-thirds of the country’s military budget. Meanwhile, the other side sought to prevent Georgian nationals and citizens living in Russia from sending their savings home to their families. In fact, there is a certain irony to this picture in that the former is a culturally and historically alien ‘Anglo-Saxon’ superpower, while the latter supposedly a ‘spiritually and sentimentally’ close Orthodox brother”.

The second Chechen war began after Yeltsin and his informal circle, known as “the Family,” appointed a new prime minister, Vladimir Putin. This war presented a noticeable contrast to the first war in terms of the Russian government’s motivation and determination. During this war a dispute started between Russia and Georgia regarding the Pankisi Valley, on the territory of the latter. The cause of the clash was that Russia wanted Georgia’s airspace for the use of Russian air force and it also wanted that Georgia should allow the Russian border guards to control the Georgians’ side of the Chechen-Georgian border. But Shevardnadze refused Russia’s request. “He saw a serious risk that the Chechen conflict might be expanded onto Georgian

territory. Besides, bitter experience had taught the Georgian leadership that additional Russian troops on Georgian territory could be used as a Trojan horse” (ibid). But Russia was not happy with Georgia’s refusal and the relationship once again reached a bitter stage. “Russia replied by waging a propaganda campaign, alleging that the Pankisi Valley had become a major rear base for Chechen rebels” (Yalowitz and Cornell 2004:112). “Moscow accused Georgia, moreover, of serving as a transit country for global Islamist networks that were sending forces into Chechnya, and also of supplying weapons to the Chechen rebels” (Gordadze 2009:41).

“In the beginning of 2002, the disagreement deepened when president Putin as well as the ministers of defence and foreign affairs repeatedly voiced their disturbance regarding the presence of Chechen fighters in Georgia’s Pankisi Valley” (Has 2004b:196-198).

In September 2002 Putin instructed the General Staff to draft an operation to invade the Pankisi Valley. According to high Russian officials, an important cause for continuation of this conflict was found in the fact that Georgia was a free heaven for “Chechen resistance fighters” (Solovyev 2002). In 2002, Tbilisi finally sent security forces into the Pankisi Valley for restoring order. “Since then ‘Pankisi’ receded as an irritant in Georgian-Russian relations but remained a possible hotspot for a renewed dispute” ( Yalowitz and Cornell 2004:112).

In some cases Russia showed strong bitterness towards Georgia. Nevertheless Putin encouraged some kind of new foreign policy for international co-operation. He approved the US military presence in Georgia and in October 2002 and he signed an agreement with Georgia’s President in which some measures were discussed to lower the tension between both the countries.

## **Turing Point in Russia-Georgia Relationship**

Problem cropped up between Russia and Georgia in May 2005 when both the countries reached an agreement on the withdrawal of two Russian military bases from Georgia. After that the relationship between Russia and Georgia constantly deteriorated. The explosion in Russia's North Caucasus region cut off energy supplies to Georgia in January 2006 and it clearly demonstrated the country's dependence on Russian energy supplies. At the same time Georgia tried to replace the Russian peacekeepers deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by international contingents. Georgia was also seriously considering quitting the CIS as a reply to Russian bans on the import of Georgian wine, mineral water and other agricultural products. The situation became worse on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2006; it was a turning period for both Georgia and Ossetia but more than that this period was very much crucial for Russia and Georgia (Gavrilov & Shepova 2009:179). Tensions escalated high in July 2006 when Georgian parliament voted to expel Russian peacekeepers and demanded that they should be replaced by alternative international peacekeeping contingents.

Gavrilov & Shepova (2009:179) in this regard pointed out, "Georgia adopted a resolution on the Current State of Affairs and the Course of the Peacemaking Operation in the Territory of the Former South Ossetian Autonomous Region. This Resolution assessed the 14 year long activities by the Joint Peacemaking Force in extremely negative terms".

But Russia rejected it and said that the resolution of Georgian parliament was not legally binding. However even after that Georgia wanted to replace the Joint Peacemaking Force with NATO peacekeeping force (ibid).

In August 2006 the situation became worse when Georgian security forces attempted to secure the Kodori Valley to control the separatist area of Abkhazia where Russian peacekeepers were stationed. On 12th November 2006 most of the Ossetian population voted for South Ossetia's independence in a referendum. But Georgia and the Western states and also the international organizations like OSCE, EC etc did not recognize the referendum's results (ibid). After that in November 2006 Gazprom

more than doubled the price for Georgia as of 2007. March 2008 Georgia withdrew from Joint Control Commission for South Ossetia and Russia also lifted sanctions against South Ossetia and Abkhazia that was imposed in 1998. Once again the problem started to increase when in the middle of June 2008 a military training conducted by the North Caucasus Military District near Georgian border for practising the peace enforcement operation. On one hand the political relation decreased between Georgia and Ossetia and on the other side development of military preparations led to the situation towards an open armed conflict (Steve 2008:209). In August 2008, after a summer of rising tensions and exchange of gunfire, war broke out in South Ossetia. After Georgian troops moved into Tskhinvali, Russian forces crossed the de jure Georgian border from North Ossetia, recaptured Tskhinvali, and established control over the entirety of South Ossetia (including its predominantly ethnic Georgian villages) and a buffer zone past the regional borders. Russia also moved into Abkhazia and took control of Poti, one of Georgia's two major Black Sea port cities. Russia officially offered recognition to Abkhazian and South Ossetian statehood and indicated its plan to place military bases in both regions.

### **Beginning of August War 2008**

The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 lasted for five days. Casualties were modest. "By the standards of modern warfare, it was a small war. It was nevertheless a small war that shook the world"(Asmus 2010:4).

"The sequence of events that led to the Russia-Georgia war is a matter of political contention and shifting blame. Of course, the fog of war continues to obscure many details; staff documents are still secret on both the Russian and Georgian sides, as are figures on the exact number of men, tanks, and warplanes that were involved. However, there are good estimates on numbers and on the moves made by both sides in a short but eventful war" (Felgenhauer 2009:162).

It created the greatest crisis in European security since Serbian dictator Slobodan Miloshević 'unleashed the dogs of' ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in the 1990s and brought Russia and the West to the beginning of a new cold war.

“Amid growing tensions between Russia and Georgia and the continuing improvement of the Georgian military capability the Russian top brass began to consider an armed conflict with Georgia over the separatist region a distinct possibility. Nevertheless no special preparations were being made for a possible war. It was expected that in the event of a conflict, the forces stationed in the region-the North Caucasus Military District formations, the Airborne Assault Troops and the 4<sup>th</sup> Air Force and Air Defence Army would be able to cope on their own” (Lavrov 2008:40).

The ‘Caucasus 2008’ military exercise code engaged more troops than the previous year’s exercise but it was not much different from all the earlier exercises. At this time the notable change was that the greater emphasis placed on Abkhazia by Russian commanders.

“The main focus of the Georgian plans of attack against South Ossetia in 2008 was to advance very quickly deep into the regions territory. Using the overwhelming superiority of its beefed up army Tbilisi hoped to crush the main South Ossetian forces as quickly as possible, occupy the capital Tskhinvali and block the Trans-Caucasus Motorway to prevent the arrival of volunteers from Russia” (ibid.pp:42).

But the main weakness of the Georgian plan was that it completely overlooked the chance of the Russian army’s intervention in the conflict. They were not ready for a possible retaliation from the Russian troops. The fact was that Georgia thought Russia will not retaliate as its army is weak and it would be afraid of international reactions.

Lavrov (2008:43) in this regard viewed, “Neither had the Georgians taken any reasonable precautions to provide air defence cover for their attacking forces, even using the existing air defence capability. Soldiers had received no information to the effect that a clash with the Russian troops was a possibility. It is not at all clear why the Georgian Government was so confident that Russia would stand aloof”.

Maybe Georgia hoped that by offering Russia the safety guarantees for the Russian peacekeepers in the republic it could prevent the Russian involvement.

“Georgia also made plenty of mistakes that led to this war. President Saakashvili’s action was a desperate response to what he believed was the imminent threat of the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Georgian citizens, the possible loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia once and for all, a possible Russian assault on Tbilisi itself—along with his conviction that he would never survive politically if he stood by and did nothing. That still does not mean it was a wise choice” (Asmus 2010:10).

President Saakashvili started a war which allies had warned him not to start, a war that they would not support and that he could not win. The armed forces Georgia used for fighting were neither trained nor equipped in comparison with the Russian army. *“It is an old adage of military strategists that it is far easier to start a war than to successfully end one—as Tbilisi found it when it was subsequently forced to acquiesce to an unjust peace to survive.”*( Asmus 2010:10).

Russia on the other hand had serious apprehensions about Georgian plan for an attack against South Ossetia. The only crucial detail it did not know was the exact date of the operation. The Russian military command therefore made some preparations for helping South Ossetia whenever it is needed.

“On 7<sup>th</sup> August Georgian forces had responded to attacks by secessionist in South Ossetia, an ethnic enclave in northern Georgia by pummeling civilian areas in the region’s capital, Tskhinvali and seeking to retake the territory by force. Moscow which had supported the provinces’s secessionist government for more than a decade, retaliated with a full-scale invasion, sending aircraft and armoured columns into South Ossetia and targeting key military and transport centers inside Georgian proper. Russia also beefed up its military presence in Abkhazia another secessionist province in the north western corner of the country. When the Georgian attack on South Ossetia killed Russian soldiers and threatened the fragile status quo, Moscow intervened with lightning speed”( King 2008:2).

The unexpected Russian reply created difficult situation for Georgia; Georgia was ‘unprepared both strategically and tactically’ (Felgenhauer 2009:165).

“Russia, led by former KGB agent Vladimir Putin, managed to hide its preparations and intentions not only from the Georgians, but also from Western governments and intelligence services. The Georgian military was ready for a mobile, mostly offensive war either in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but not for simultaneous large scale combat with superior, heavily armed, and air-supported enemy forces invading from Abkhazia and Ossetia, in other words, on both fronts at the same time. As Georgian forces pushed north into South Ossetia during August 8, they may have been prepared to fend off a limited Abkhaz assault against the heavily fortified upper Kodori Gorge, but a full-scale Russian invasion over the Inguri River to occupy western Georgia was surely a surprise. Because of this huge strategic blunder, from the very first shot in August 2008, the Georgians had no chance of successfully repelling the Russians. Political and military disaster was inevitable” (ibid).

From the Georgian side as Commander-in-Chief President Saakashvili gave three orders to the military.

“These were, first, to prevent all military vehicles from entering Georgia from Russia through the Roki tunnel; second, to suppress all positions that were attacking Georgian peacekeepers and Interior Ministry posts, or Georgian villages; and third, to protect the interests and security of the civilian population while implementing these orders.”(ibid.pp:168-169)

An assessment of Russian performance in the war with Georgia must begin with an overview of Russia’s likely objectives for the campaign. Primary objectives seem to have been to end Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia permanently, to cripple the Georgian armed forces and to end Georgia’s drive to join NATO. Secondary objectives likely included weakening and possibly toppling the Saakashvili government, exerting a chilling effect on other former Soviet countries considering NATO membership, especially Ukraine, and demonstrating the capability and resolve to end what Russia saw as Western encroachment in its “zone of privileged interests.” Finally, it is likely that Russian objectives included an element of revenge for the Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which Russia had vehemently opposed and vowed to answer.

The five day war killed over hundreds, left thousands of refugees in temporary shelters and this war also brought Russia-US relationship to their lowest point since the dark days of the Cold War.

“For some of Russia’s neighbour such as Poland and the Baltic states the war symbolized the return of the old NATO. For Georgia, the Russian tanks that scarred the lush countryside were an affront to all that had been achieved since the Rose Revolution of 2003, including the creation of passably democratic institutions and the implementation of an unwaveringly pro-U.S foreign policy. For Russia, the war was a firm rejoinder to a reckless Georgian leadership and a chance to stand up to U.S influence in Moscow’s backyard” (King 2008:3).

The war had consequences not only for Georgia but for Washington, NATO, and the West more generally. It was also aimed against a European security system. There was various differences between Moscow and Georgia from very earlier period which may be encouraged Georgia to go West against the interest of Moscow (Lavrov 2008:43).

“Moscow’s goal was to kill any chance of NATO ever expanding to Georgia or anywhere else along its borders and to dissuade other neighbouring countries from getting too close to the West. That can be seen in everything from the way the war was portrayed in the Russian press, to the graffiti left behind by Russian soldiers in Georgia, to the way Russian general officers on the ground talked about their mission to both Georgian and Western journalists. Russia’s response was designed to not only teach Georgia a lesson but the West as well. It was intended to demonstrate that Moscow was again a force to be reckoned with and that the days of Russian strategic retreat were over.”(Asmus 2010:5-6)

By not bothering to seek international support and then making no apologies for its step against Georgia, Moscow differentiated this war from previous cases in which outside powers have meddled in the Soviet Union’s old sphere of influence. NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo was more violent than Russia’s action into Georgia.



Although many Americans and Europeans remained sceptical of Russian accounts of the war but still the intervention in Georgia was very much popular in Russia.

“According to an opinion poll conducted by the respected Moscow based Levada Center , almost 80 percent of the Russian respondents approved of it. Over half blamed Georgia for initiating the conflict and identified the United States’ desire for influence in the Caucasus and the greater Black Sea region as the root cause. Naturally, the Abkhazians and the South Ossetians welcomed Russian soldiers as a shield against Georgian aggression” (King 2008:9).

### **Debates Regarding the War**

Various authors viewed the war in various ways. According to some authors it was a kind of invasion by Russia, at the same time others thought that Georgia started the chaotic situation and for some there was no preparation of war from any side; both countries were not prepared for the war. According to Felgenhauer a kind of strategic mismatch was there. The Russians and their separatist allies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia prepared and executed in August 2008 a war which the Georgians did not predict or expect. The Georgians, until they were plunged headlong into the fighting, appear to have prepared only for a replay of previous confrontations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions in the early 1990s, which had resulted in a military standoff with the separatist forces, who were supported to some extent by the Russian military and by so-called North Caucasian volunteers and Cossacks. But this time, the Russian military staged an all-out invasion, planning to totally decimate and destroy the Georgian military—in effect, a full demilitarization of Georgia, as well as to overthrow the hated pro-Western regime led by President Mikheil Saakashvili. For this purpose, the Russian staffs mobilized and prepared for action tens of thousands of servicemen from the Navy, Air Force, and Army.

“The Russian war plans also envisaged a possible escalation of the conflict with Georgia to involve the U.S. and NATO. In the actual fighting in August 2008, the separatist forces that the Georgians had seen as their main adversary played only a supporting role as a vanguard to the Russians, to engage and

draw the Georgian forces into combat. Subsequently their role shifted to that of an auxiliary infantry. This strategic mismatch in perceptions and planning produced a disastrous result for Georgia and threw Western policy-makers into disarray and created utter uncertainty over what to expect from Russia in the Caucasus or elsewhere. This confusion persists to the present” (Felgenhauer 2009:162-163).

From the Russian side Joenniemi (2011:104) pointed out, “Russia maintained that its engagement in the clash was all about peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. Russia, employing such concepts as ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’, arguably intervened in order to protect the two break-away provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia along with the Russian peacekeepers and Russian citizens in the region against Georgian abuses of power”.

In a different way, Russia tried to present itself as a responsible country with full of humanity which engaged in a local conflict as a ‘guardian’ of those in problem and more precisely a protector of the ‘value based’ international society . It followed the policies which was earlier advocated in other contexts by the US and EU. ‘It aspired against all odds for recognition as a major power by pursuing ‘liberal interventionism’, invoking explicitly normative arguments and advocating in general a European solution to the Caucasian problems’ (Gorenburg and Makarychev 2009:5).

\*\*\*\*\*

## **Chapter- 3**

### **REASONS BEHIND THE WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON CIS SECURITY SCENARIO**

Present chapter tries to give an insight to various reasons behind the war; like ethnic reasons, political reasons or geo-political reasons. It also focuses on the implications of the August War in context of the CIS countries and put an effort to engage with the view points of CIS countries regarding this war.

Mikhelidze (2009:5) discussed during the duration of the August war that the international community was gravely concerned with the unravelling situation. The West considered Russia's military action as unacceptable and criticized the Kremlin for using disproportionate force during the conflict, further it condemned Russia's decision to recognise the independence of Georgia's secessionist regions and called for a peaceful solution of the conflicts.

Because of the growing tension between Russia and Georgia and the continuing enhancement of the Georgian military capability; Russian top brass began to consider an armed conflict with Georgia over the separatist region a distinct possibility. All the Russian forces may have been scattered all across the North Caucasus District's large territory and their equipment may not have been brand new but they were still far superior to the Georgian army, both in terms of their "fighting ability and numerical strength"(Pukov 2008:18). On the other side the main focus of the Georgian plans of attack against South Ossetia in 2008 was to advance very quickly deep in to the regions territory by using the overwhelming superiority of its beefed up army. But the main weakness of the Georgian plan was that it completely overlooked the possibility of the Russian army's retaliation in the conflict. Russia had serious suspicion about Georgian plans for an attack against South Ossetia.

In the several months that preceded the invasion, Moscow's increasingly blatant provocations against Georgia led to a growing fear in the analytic community that it was seeking a military confrontation.

“Russia had for several years pursued increasingly aggressive and interventionist policies in Georgia and had employed an array of instruments that included military means, albeit at a smaller scale” (Cornell, Popanevski and Nilsson 2008:3).

After the military action against Georgia on August 8, Russia did score some initial successes in portraying the invasion as a response to a Georgian decision to militarily enter Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. It was Russia’s first military action against Georgia since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1978; and was also “against a member state of European institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and to that a country on track to integration with NATO” (ibid).

On the other hand from Russian perspectives Russia never initiated any of the ethnic conflict in Caucasus. In this regard Prof Mohanty (2008:60) viewed, “Russia virtually withdrew itself from the region voluntarily. However, it got entangled with all these conflicts in course of time with its sympathy lying with rebellious regions demanding sovereignty for reasons of its own. The absence of Russian diplomacy and diplomats in Caucasus provided the Russian military the much-sought after opportunity to play its role in the conflict”.

The Russian army generals viewed that they were almost forced to use their power against ‘aggressive demonstrators’ in Tbilisi in April 1989 (ibid). When in January 2004 Mikheil Saakashvili became the President of Georgia the member of his party humiliated Russian peace-keeping forces and Russian soldiers. In connection with that Prof. Monahty (2008:66) mentioned, “The Russian ambassador was once detained by Georgian Special Forces. Russia swallowed all this simply by issuing warnings to Tbilisi”.

The long awaited EU-fact finding mission report by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini on the August war was disclosed on September 30<sup>th</sup> 2009. The main aim of

the mission was to ‘investigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia.’ (Barthes 1997:16).

“It is concluded that although Georgia started the attack on Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, both parties Georgia and Russia are to blame for the build-up of tension. Russia is blamed for using military force to reshape borders, something which had become almost unthinkable in post-WWII Europe, and for using disproportional force at that.”(Companjen 2010:24)

### **Reasons behind the War**

In the summer of 2008, open war was broken once again in Georgia, a small multiethnic country along Russia’s Caucasian border. Although the August 2008 conflict was nothing new. In 1990, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the region of South Ossetia, then part of Soviet Georgia, fought a war of independence with the Georgian government. Both sides in that conflict signed a cease-fire which left the political question of Ossetian sovereignty unresolved.

#### **(i) Ethnic Reason Behind the War**

This war is possibly the result of ethnic conflict. It is viewed that this war is the reflection of ethnic separatism in South Ossetia. Most scholars of ethnic conflict implicitly or explicitly link the causes of ethnic mobilization with those that cause ethnic separatism; what causes groups to identify themselves as culturally distinct and pursue political agendas must also cause wars between such groups. According to that argument “the path to ethnic separatism, either in the form of political autonomy or violent secession, is a part of an ethnic mobilization process” (George 2009:15). South Ossetia incorporated into Georgia on 20<sup>th</sup> April, 1922 through some voluntary decision. According to the leaders of South Ossetia during the time of incorporation the people of South Ossetia faced various discriminatory attitudes by the Georgian Government. The Ossetians had to change their nationality and the Georgian government replaced their geographical name by the Georgian name. From this time onwards the secessionist conflict was started in South Ossetia (Prof. Mohanty 2008:55).

Before 2008 Moscow started supporting the secessionist Government of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for more than a decade, retaliated with full scale invasion, sending aircraft and targeting key military and transport centers inside Georgia. Russian troops basically played the role of peacekeepers under the terms of cease fires negotiation by the warring parties and the August war is the result of these. King<sup>6</sup> (2008:8) stated that this attack followed a period of intensive and mainly negative developments in Russia's relations with Georgia and, more significantly, in "Russia's relations with the West".

### **(ii) Moscow's Foreign Security Policy**

This war is not only the result of ethnic conflict, but also the result of security matter. After the incident of colour revolution in Georgia Russia was threatened about its security and was trying to build an image of strong power for its own security purpose. President Vladimir Putin adopted an assertive policy towards West and unfriendly neighboring countries like Georgia and Ukraine. On the other hand the Georgian government pushed relentlessly to change the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that caused security concern for Moscow.

The armed struggle had been visible for a long time and it is a "part and parcel" of Moscow's security policy during this war (Hass 2010:85). The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia has substantial implications not only for the security of Georgia, but also for the CIS countries and for Europe and the United States. The war basically demonstrated serious weakness in European security system. Indeed, it was increasingly apparent that the war formed a turning point in post-Cold War European politics.

---

<sup>6</sup> Charles King is Chair of the Faculty and a Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. His most recent book is *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*.

### **(iii) Political Factors behind the War**

Steps taken by the Russian leadership following the Western recognition of Kosovo's independence in February 2008, and the NATO Bucharest Summit in April brought the situation in the Caucasus to an entirely new level. The events of August 2008 were the culmination of a long preparatory period that began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, if not earlier.

“The war may have started in South Ossetia, however it embraced all of Georgia, if not the South Caucasus” (Cornell and Starr 2009:19). Gordadze concludes that the rough treatment of Georgia by Yeltsin's Russia led Shevardnadze to orient Georgia increasingly toward the West, which in turn prompted a Russian reaction, which began in the last years of Yeltsin's rule but accelerated significantly after Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999.

Sherr (2009:202) shows how even before the war the West had failed to respond to Russia's revival of a classically modern, real politic culture of security. The Georgia war simply brought this failure to the surface. According to him Russia had engaged in detailed planning for precisely the war that occurred, and that this planning had been underway for months, even years, prior to August 2008.

On the other hand Nana (2009:5) viewed this war as a political diplomatic policy of Russia. According to him the war was the culmination of increasing tensions between Georgia and Russia, a finale to the “creeping Russian annexation of Abkhazia and Ossetia”. This war affected the country, it changed the perceptions and feelings of almost all its inhabitants, but its impact can be assumed to be more dramatic on those who firsthand experienced fighting, were exposed to bombings, witnessed deaths, disfigurement of people and devastation of places. The August war was posed new implications and challenges not only for Georgia, but also for the wider Caucasus and beyond. “Since the August 2008 war a new geopolitical reality has been emerging in the Caucasus-Caspian region.” Beyond Georgia, the Georgian-Russian crisis posed challenges to other states in the region and to the region in general ( Nona 2009:12).

#### **(iv) Geo-Political Factor behind the War**

Russia took action against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued “strategic and geopolitical objectives,” which basically included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening of the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

“The Russian politico-military elites had focused on Georgia since the days of the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, whom they blamed, together with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Alexander Yakovlev, for the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union itself” (Cohen and Hamilton 2011:7)

After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia’s northern province of South Ossetia declared independence but failed to be internationally recognized. South Ossetia as well as Georgia’s other largely autonomous province, Abkhazia, had traditionally been allied with Russia. There have been long-standing tensions between South Ossetia and Georgia and a shaky ceasefire. In that situation Russia and Georgia both are equally interested about South Ossetia. South Ossetia, dominated demographically by the titular ethnic group (the Ossetians), borders the Russian Federation. During the time of the 2008 conflict, most Ossetians in South Ossetia identified themselves as citizens of an independent Ossetian state, but also held a kind of Russian citizenship. This situation was not at all acceptable to Georgia; it was a kind of territorial threat to Georgia. Russia and Georgia, as the two Soviet successor states with the most autonomous regions, both feared further “territorial disintegration” and this issue also played a very important role for the birth of 2008 war (George 2009:23).



### (a) Georgia's Geo-Political Significance

Georgia's strategic location is very much important. In case of geo-politics the key factor of the war was the strategic location of Georgia. It lies between Russia and Turkey, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, and above Iran and Iraq. The significance of Georgia as a strategic outpost cannot be underestimated. This is true, particularly when it comes to pipelines.

“The Baku Tblisi Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, the second largest pipeline in the world, travels from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to Ceyhan, a Mediterranean port city in Turkey. This pipeline creates a route that bypasses both Iran and Russia, to bring Caspian Basin oil resources “to the United States, Israel and Western European markets.”  
(Marshall 2008:1)

The US company, Bechtel, was the main contractor for construction, procurement and engineering, while British Petroleum (BP), is the ‘leading shareholder in the project’ (Marshall 2008:1).

Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>7</sup> blamed Russia by saying that “invasion of Georgia” was its “imperial aims.” Brzezinski blamed much of this on the “intense nationalistic mood that now permeates Russia’s political elite.” He also explained Georgia’s strategic significance, stating that “an independent Georgia is critical to the international flow of oil,” since the BTC pipeline “provides the West access to the energy resources of central Asia”.

Brzezinski warned Russia of being “ostracized internationally,” in particular its business elite, calling them “vulnerable” because “*Russia’s powerful oligarchs have*

---

<sup>7</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Polish-American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman who served as Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser, Barack Obama’s foreign policy adviser, co-founded the Trilateral Commission with banker David Rockefeller, and admitted to creating Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as a method of giving the Russians “their Vietnam”, had a few words to say about the situation in Georgia in a recent issue of Time Magazine.

*hundreds of billions of dollars in Western bank accounts,” which would be subject to a possible “freezing” by the West in the event of a “Cold War-style standoff.” (ibid).*

“Not only is Georgia of geostrategic importance to pipeline transportation routes, but it is also central to the West's strategy of encircling Russia and China in an effort to prevent their rise to super-power status. In 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had Pentagon officials like Paul Wolfowitz write up a plan for the US' strategy in a post-Cold War world. The goal was “to ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union,” specifically focusing on China and Russia.” (ibid).

The encirclement of Russia also had a great role in breaking the former Yugoslavia and also recognizing Kosovo as an independent nation (Patrick 1992:15).

#### **(b) Geo-Political Goals of Russia**

Some other observers warned that Russia’s increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia dispute. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly were granted “Russian citizenship and passports and most appeared to want their regions to be part of Russia” (Jim Nichole 2009:32). Moscow formulated far-reaching goals when it carefully planned over a period of at least two and a half years and possibly longer for replying Georgia, Dr. Ariel Cohen opined. These goals included:

- “Expelling Georgian troops and effectively terminating Georgian sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia prepared the ground for independence and possible eventual annexation of these separatist territories. These goals seem to have been successfully achieved.”(Cohen and Hamilton 2011:1)

By preventing Georgia from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Russia basically sent a strong message to Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to war.

- “Russia succeeded in attacking a state that, since April 2008, has been regarded as a potential candidate for NATO membership. The Russian assault eroded the effectiveness of the NATO umbrella in Eastern Europe, even though Georgia is not yet formally a member, since it became apparent that Moscow can use force against its neighbours with relative impunity. While it remains to be seen whether Georgia ultimately is accepted into NATO, some voices in Europe (especially in Germany and Italy), saw in the war a vindication of their opposition to such membership. Ukraine’s Victor Yushchenko administration stood tall in solidarity with Georgia, and has attempted to take steps to limit the movements of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, but had little domestic support for NATO membership. The Party of Regions effectively sided with Russia during the war, pointing out the disastrous results of Mikheil Saakashvili’s NATO enlargement policy for Georgia. The Yanukovich administration, which came to power in early 2010, legislatively enshrined Ukraine’s neutrality, including non-membership in NATO, and granted privileges to the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Ukraine until 2042”( *ibid*.pp:1-2).

However the EU avoided sanctions or negative conditionality towards Moscow. The US and EU accepted Russia’s peacekeeping monopoly in the region, although they could have demanded an internationalization of peacekeeping and administration in the secessionist regions. On the other hand GUAM, the security alliance uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, failed to react to the aggression towards one of its members.

(c) **Russia’s Strategic Goals**

- Russia is increasing its control of the Caucasus, especially over strategic energy pipelines. “If a pro-Russian regime were established in Georgia, it would have brought the strategic Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow’s control. By attempting to accomplish regime change in Georgia, Moscow is also trying to gain control of the energy and transportation corridor that connects Central Asia and

Azerbaijan with the Black Sea and ocean routes overseas—for oil, gas, and other commodities”(ibid.pp:2-3).

In 1999, Western companies had signed an agreement with Central Asian states to create the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and this corridor has allowed Azerbaijan and partly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, to bypass Russian-controlled pipeline networks and transport its oil from the Caspian Sea basin through Georgia and Turkey but without crossing Russian territory.

- “The growing output of the newly independent Central Asian states has been increasingly competing with Russian oil. By 2018, the Caspian basin, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is supposed to export up to 4 million barrels of oil a day, as well as a significant amount of natural gas. Russia would clearly like to restore its hegemony over hydrocarbon export routes that would considerably diminish sovereignty and diplomatic freedom of maneuver in these newly independent states” (ibid).

#### (v) **Role of External Players behind the War**

The George W. Bush Administration championed Georgia’s Western orientation and its eligibility for NATO. Moscow on the other hand had warned Georgia many times that its desire to “go West” would have consequences and that any cooperation on resolving the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would depend on Tbilisi’s deference to Russian demands and these factors made the situation more vulnerable (Ronald 2010:12). This war was also the result of strategic policy of Russia towards Georgia. Russia’s response was not a total response to the situation in South Ossetia, “it was also a move with strategic aims that far surpass South Ossetia” (Cornell and Nilsson 2008:5).

Some of the Russian statements have confirmed that Russian reaction was to punish Georgia for its pro-Western foreign policy, and to install a pro-Moscow government. Russia mounted a sophisticated disinformation campaign, accusing Georgian forces of

widespread human rights violation in South Ossetia, and gaining traction in the western media.

According to the Russian President Dimtry Medvedev Russia terminated the "eastward expansion of NATO" by going to war with Georgia in August 2008. In a meeting with military officers Vladikavkaz in southern Russia Medvedev said "If we had wavered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been different; a range of countries which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization tries to artificially "protect" would have been within it," as said in a report in RIA Novosti.

**(a) Role of US Advisers and Special Forces**

In 2002 hundreds of US Green Berets and roughly 200 Special Forces went to Georgia to train Georgian forces for “anti-terrorism and counter insurgency operations”.

In that context Marshall (2008:54) pointed out, “After having installed an American friendly and American educated puppet leader, the US developed closer ties with Georgia. Even as early as 2002, US military advisers were in Georgia in an effort to open up a “new front” in the war on terror, with Americans there to “train the Georgian army in how to counter militant activity.” Russia this time only warned that US involvement in Georgia could complicate the situation.

**(b) Role of NATO**

When pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia in 2004, the South Caucasus state had been pushing for entry into NATO about which Russia was not happy at all. It was said that at the Bucharest Summit of NATO, which took place in the spring of 2004, just a months before the Russian-Georgian War, the USA bowed to the pressure of some of its key European NATO allies such as Germany and France against the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to the Pact, because the Western Europeans were fearful that such a move could anger Russia. It was noticed that 1,200 US servicemen and 800 Georgians were to train for three weeks at a military base near the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. The training exercise created growing tensions

between Russia and Georgia, while the US was simultaneously supporting Georgia's bid to become a NATO member (Dyhouse 2002:24). The exercise was being held in cooperation with NATO with the visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Georgia, where she met with the President and stated that, "the future of Georgia is in NATO".

On July 15, 2008, in a report it was stated that 1,000 US troops in Georgia began a military training exercise with Georgian troops called "Immediate Response 2008" and it was also claimed that "Georgia and the Pentagon cooperated closely." After the brief military conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi in 2008, NATO shelved the idea of bringing Georgia into the alliance; stresses the Russian news agency. After US and Georgia began conducting joint exercises, the Russian Army began military exercises on the other side of the Caucasus mountains, involving up to 8,000 Russian servicemen ( Marshall 2008:55).

*"It was reported that US military instructors were in Georgia when the conflict with Russia began. Russia's envoy to NATO also accused NATO of encouraging Georgia to take the offensive against South Ossetia."* ( ibid).

### **(c) Role of Israel in Georgia**

It was reported that the Georgian tanks and artillery that captured the South Ossetian capital on August 8 were aided by Israeli military advisers. Israel basically selling arms to Georgia from a very long time and it is became the source of income for Israel. In the year when the conflict get started, the Georgian President had commissioned upwards of 1,000 military advisers from private Israeli security firms to train the Georgian armed forces and also offered instruction on military intelligence and security. Georgia at the same time purchased military equipment from Israel. Military co-operation between Israel and Georgia increased incidentally. Georgia's defence minister Davit Kezerashvili is a former Israeli who helped in the military co-operation between these two countries; in that context he said, "We are now in a fight against the great Russia and our hope is to receive assistance from the White House, because Georgia cannot survive on its own." (Harring 2008:13).

## *Russian Perspective of the War*

Immediately after the start of the ‘five days war’ between Georgia and the Russian Federation in August 2008, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting stated that everyone knows that the Georgian army launched an attack at 11.30 pm that night (August 7). Since then a great number of reports have agreed with this conclusion about the direct beginning of the war. The overall impression given by all these accounts is that both sides were well prepared and had in fact been mobilizing for quite some time, both politically and militarily, including carrying out major military exercises, while lying in wait for each other in order not to bear the blame for having started a war (Gahrton 2010:176-177). The reality was more complicated. The International Crisis Group gave the following summary after two weeks of the war:-

“Moscow’s initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale violence broke out there on 7–8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian leadership that was impatient negotiations process. But Russia’s disproportionate counter attack constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian–Western relations” (ibid).

From the historical point of view Companjen (2010:182) stated, “The Russians have had to sorrowfully see the Soviet Union fall apart in what looks like a definite end to 500 years of Russian Empire of which the last decades as a superpower offered an alternative to capitalism. At the very end of the 1980s, millions of Russian citizens suddenly found themselves on foreign territory in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In Georgia for example, about six percent of the population was Russian and in Abkhazia about fourteen percent. The Abkhaz coast, although formally Georgian territory was in the ‘life world’ of Russian people ‘their Riviera’. An important Russian military base is located there, as are many dachas (summer houses) of Russian generals”.

From the Russian perspective Companjen (2010:182-183) stated that, “Moscow has protected Georgia throughout history by incorporating Georgia first in the Czarist empire and later into the Soviet Union, thereby helping feudal Georgia to modernize. Georgia could show some gratitude for the

education received by Russia. The civil war of 1992/1993 was ended thanks to Russian intervention in the person of Yeltsin. The Russian Federation is sorry to see President Saakashvili follows such a pro-Western, pro-NATO course and that he has delivered 2,000 men for the second Iraq war”.

With the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline, Georgia moreover annoyingly interferes with Russia’s already fading monopoly of oil and gas deliveries to Eastern and Western Europe. The Russian Federation prefers the term ‘peace enforcement’ to ‘war’. Russia does not deny that mistakes were made, but claims these were not valid reasons for Georgia to ignore the ceasefire and begin an attack on Tskhinvali, South Ossetia. From a Russian perspective the truce was violated and many unnecessary civil casualties were caused (ibid).

### **Georgian Perspective of the War**

“The Caucasus has arguably been one of the regions of the Eurasian continent most affected by what in the last decade has come to be called the new world disorder” (Cornell 2001:1). Almost like Yugoslavia, it is the area of Eurasia mostly hit by ethno-political conflict and warfare. Indeed, of the eight instances of armed civil conflict that have occurred on the territory of the former Soviet Union, five have taken place in the Caucasus. The conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya , North Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and have together resulted in close to a hundred thousand deaths and an estimated two million six hundred thousand refugees and internally displaced persons ( Colville 1995:28).

“According to the Soviet Constitution of 1977, Georgia had the right to separate itself from the Soviet Union, but the three autonomous regions did not have the right to split off from Georgia”. Georgia did exactly the same in two steps: first on March 31, 1991 in a referendum for independence from the Soviet Union, and second on May 26th, 1991 in the first post-Soviet presidential elections in an independent Georgian Republic. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, appealing to “anti-communist feelings and nationalistic aspirations”, won the first Georgian presidential elections with 87 percent of the vote (Companjen 2010:184-186). When South-Ossetia declared its own elections in December 1991, the Georgian president totally cancelled the autonomy of



South Ossetia and sent troops there, it's called military intervention which he lost at the end.

On the other hand in July 1992, Abkhazian leader Ardzinba wrote a letter to Shevardnadze announcing that Abkhazia wanted to return back to the Constitution of 1925 when Abkhazia was an SSR with the SSR Georgia. A month later (14-16 august), Georgian troops were shot in Abkhazia because of crossing the Georgian-Abkhazian border unannounced looking for kidnapers. The Georgians shot back and the fight started. *"In spite of the Abkhaz being outnumbered by a majority of Georgians, the Abkhaz won the war with help and intervention of Russia and voluntary fighters"* (ibid). To end this war against both Abkhazian troops and against Gamsakhurdia fighting back, Shevardnadze decided to ask for help from the Russians and make a deal with president Yeltsin.

"All former Soviet Republics (such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the central Asian republics) had joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a commonwealth under leadership and economic-political influence of the Russian Federation, except for Georgia. Georgia would now become a CIS-member, Russia would get military bases in Georgia for a certain amount of time and with about 2,000 to 3,000 CIS-troops form a peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the UN and of the OSCE"(ibid).

From a Georgian perspective, Tbilisi offered various far-reaching proposals to Abkhazia and almost came to an agreement had it not been for the Russian Federation exercising power behind the scenes. For Tbilisi the return of the IDPs was a major point of negotiation ( Kouymjian 1995:12).

"The war also demonstrated the weaknesses of NATO and the EU security system, because they provided no efficient response to Russia's forced changing of the borders and occupation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member state"( Cohen and Hamilton 2011:7).

### **Implications of the War for CIS countries**

The 2008 August war pointed out some ‘new strategic realities’ of the Black Sea/Caspian Region.

According to Tsereteli (2009:6) “These realities have been driven by overly ambitious Russian policies and have weakened Western strategic interests in the region. The conditions created immediately after the war appeared more favourable to Russia and less favourable to other nations in the region, most notably Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Ukraine”.

The August war between Russia and Georgia shows some kind of risks in the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also pointed out the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is very much vital to global and European energy security.

“The most important point is that while the corridor has a tremendous potential to augment its transit capabilities with new pipelines, railroads, marine and air ports, the security of the South Caucasus transportation corridor cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, Western countries will need to ensure stability and security in the region in order for the corridor to meet its full potential” (ibid).

The war’s impact was felt first and foremost across the wider Black Sea region. Western diplomatic intervention came late and rescued a democratically elected Georgian government teetering on the edge of disintegration. A wider escalation of the conflict across the region or into a new East-West military confrontation or a new cold war was prevented. In that sense, Western diplomacy can claim to have prevented regime change in Tbilisi as well as a new East-West crisis. Yet the United States and Europe failed to reverse Moscow’s military gains on the ground or restore the political status quo ante as it had first hoped. A close partner of the United States and a candidate country for NATO was invaded, and neither Washington nor the Atlantic Alliance did much to come to its assistance.

Some observers stated that the recent Russia-Georgia conflict basically harms both countries. Nichol (2009:11-12) in that context stated that, “In the case of Georgia and South Ossetia, the fighting reportedly resulted in hundreds of military and civilian casualties and large-scale infrastructure damage that set back economic growth and contributed to urgent humanitarian needs. In the case of Russia, its seemingly disproportionate military campaign and its unilateral declaration of recognition appeared to harm its image as a reliable and peaceable member of the international community. Russia also reported that its military operations and pledges to rebuild South Ossetia were costing hundreds of millions of dollars”.

The Russia and Georgia war affected policy approaches of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States', including Azerbaijan. “*The war significantly changed Azerbaijanis' perceptions of the democratic West and negatively impacted their perceptions of the United States and the European Union*” (Anar 2009:1). Since 1994 Azerbaijan had allowed Western companies to develop its gas and oil resources but after the war it decided to lower its reliance on the trans-Caucasus oil pipeline from its port of Baku to Georgia and make a small but permanent increase in oil shipments to Russia and Iran. “*We don't want to insult anyone . . . but it's not good to have all your eggs in one basket, especially when the basket is very fragile,*” said the vice-president of Azerbaijan's state oil company. Because of this war Azerbaijan also forced to strengthen its security measures to avoid political instability.

“Georgia's defeat and the subsequent political turmoil demonstrated the viability and stability of the sovereign democracy and made the Russian model of governance more attractive to the people of Azerbaijan. The five-day war between Russia and Georgia dramatically changed the political situation in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan was not directly involved in the conflict, the war nevertheless forced Baku to re-evaluate its foreign and domestic policies. Moscow's successful military intervention in Georgia forced Azerbaijan to distance itself from the United States to avoid antagonizing a belligerent Russia” (ibid).

The unsuccessful attempt of the Western countries-the United States in particular-to respond in this war created a large-scale public disappointment among Azerbaijanis. The crisis also *"generated new sources of instability for the entire post-Soviet space, not only because it highlighted a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the fore the limits of Western policies in what Kremlin views as its sphere of influence"*(ibid). For Azerbaijan the post war situation basically means that it could become the next site where U.S.-Russian rivalry will arise. The Russian government's step to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia created a fear on Azerbaijan that Moscow would try to give similar support to the ethnic Armenian population in the region of Karabakh if Azerbaijan tries to be close to the West.

Russia-Georgia War has great impact on foreign policy of many of the CIS members. But at the same time this war has an impact on the domestic politics of the CIS countries. According to the realist theory 'States are unitary actors and that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy'.

"Unfortunately, the complexity of the problem in Azerbaijan has made it difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign politics. The absence of any visible developments in domestic politics, the silence of political scientists and public figures, and an inactive and docile public has coalesced to limit research on the problem" (Valiyev 2009:1).

The war significantly influenced Azerbaijan's foreign policy. As Valiyev (2010:1) pointed out that, "Two years since the end of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war have represented a critical stage in Azerbaijan's foreign policy. The war generated a new source of instability and forced most of the states of post-Soviet Eurasia to re-evaluate their foreign policies. Azerbaijan, for its part, has tried to avoid antagonizing Russia and has been cautious with regard to its ambitions for membership in either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Some might describe Azerbaijan's policy as a kind of "Finlandization," akin to the Finnish pursuit of neutrality after World War II in the face of a hostile Soviet Union".

It is said that Azerbaijan's foreign policy can be considered as a "silent diplomacy," by which it is basically improving its role in international scenario. *"During this time, Baku has taken some bold actions that indicate its policy is not dependent on regional powers and that its interests are to be taken into account"* ( ibid).

Kazakhstan on the other hand wanted to enter into talks with Moscow on "new export pipelines to Russia" now that its Georgia route had become less secure."(Gorst 2008:50).

According to Kassenova<sup>8</sup> (2009:4), "The Georgia-Russia war became a source of major dilemmas for Astana. On the one hand, Kazakhstan, as Russia's closest strategic partner, was to support Moscow. On the other, Russian actions endangered the westbound export route for Kazakhstani oil and Kazakhstani investments in Georgia. The South Caucasus corridor to Europe was suddenly closing up. The subsequent recognition by Russia of separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states also hit the nerve of Kazakhstani leadership, which was carefully watching for any threats and challenges to Kazakhstan's territorial integrity<sup>9</sup>. In addition, such recognition would discredit Kazakhstan in the eyes of the West on the eve of its OSCE chairmanship in 2010. The EU specifically asked the Kazakhstani government not to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia".

Kazak President Nazarbayev met Prime Minister Putin during Olympics in China and he criticized Georgia 'for resorting to force and failing to consult other CIS members'. Nazarbayev also emphasised on solving the problem by using international law and he expressed support to Russia's position (ibid).

---

<sup>8</sup> Dr Nargis Kassenova is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP). Nargis received her MA and PhD in Political Science from Nagoya University (Japan). In her dissertation she explored the conceptual and operational aspects of Kazakhstan's national security since independence.

<sup>9</sup> As a young country with a multi-ethnic population, Kazakhstan is vitally interested in the maintenance of the principle of territorial integrity. Fears of Russian separatism in the north of the country that were strong in early 1990s have subsided but have not been fully eliminated.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced Georgia's withdrawal from the regional grouping (Commonwealth of Independent States) of ex-Soviet states after the five-day war with Russia in South Ossetia in 2008, in a public speech in the capital Tbilisi. The former Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine are members of the CIS. Russian and Georgian experts told that Georgia's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had no impact on the country's economy. On August 14, the Georgian parliament voted unanimously to withdraw from the regional organization. The CIS Executive Committee received the official notification on August 18, and Georgia's withdrawal came into focus after 12 months.

Andrei Areshev, deputy head of Russia's Strategic Culture Foundation, said "Georgia's withdrawal from CIS was merely to show Georgia's political protest against Russian-dominated organizations in the ex-Soviet space." Georgian political analyst Gela Vasadze said Georgia's withdrawal from CIS "was the least painful issue for Georgia in relations with Russia in the past two years." "After Georgia's relations with Russia grew worse, the CIS failed to solve any pressing problems. Georgian president's participation in CIS summits was a positive factor in itself, but all [activities] were confined to personal contacts. That's why Georgia barely noticed the withdrawal from CIS," the expert said.

"The impact of the war on the existing transportation infrastructure and current transit volumes was important, but limited. At the same time it is of utmost importance to assess the impact of the war on the future of the corridor, since substantial volumes of both oil and natural gas are expected to be shipped despite all the disruption and damages caused by the war. First of all, it is important to realize what is at stake here. In terms of the oil, it is the potential flow of an additional 1.5 million bpd. In terms of natural gas, it is at least 30-40 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan and perhaps from Kazakhstan to feed pipelines destined for Europe. This is also about the transportation of grains, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and many other products and commodities" (Tsereteli 2009:15).

In this matter “the first announcement came from the Kazakh Agriculture Minister Akylbek Kurishbayev”. He told lawmakers at the time of hearing in Astana that Kazakhstan had already dropped plans of building a grain terminal in Georgia’s port town of Poti. According to the agriculture minister “the current situation in Georgia” after the 2008 war with Russia is the reason for this decision.

“Additional negative news came on September 24 when it was reported that Kazakhstan dropped its oil refinery plans in Georgia. The representative of the KazMunaiGas stated that decision was not linked to politics and was strictly based on commercial merits. Russia’s Transneft also suggested that Azerbaijan should use the Northern route for transportation of oil, and Gazprom even offered for the Azerbaijani government to purchase all the natural gas that the country can produce” (ibid.pp:16).

On the positive surface, there was an opinion by KazTransOil, broadcasted by ‘BBC and the Russian news agency Interfax’. It confirmed that KazMunaiGaz has not given up its plans to invest in the port of Batumi and an oil terminal in Georgia to achieve the planned volumes of 9.2 million tons of oil and oil products. *“It is no secret that Kazakhstan currently relies almost exclusively on Russian routes for oil exports and Moscow has been reluctant to expand its pipelines. Kazakhstan is expected to start production at its giant Kashagan field on the Caspian shore by 2013, thereby increasing demand for export routes”* (ibid.pp:17).

Another important development was the November 14 agreement between Georgia and Azerbaijan for the supply of Azeri natural gas to Georgia for the next 5 years. This agreement basically reflected Azerbaijan’s decision to decline the Russian offer of purchasing all of Azerbaijan’s gas production, despite the commercial attractiveness of the offer.

“Azerbaijan’s decision had profound political significance for both the current developments in the region and the future of Caspian natural gas supplies to Europe. Azerbaijan’s government is already working on an upgrade of its rail system to accommodate additional cargos” (ibid).

It also provided 200 million dollars of concession loans to Georgian Railways to construct the Georgian section of the line. The railroad is planned to become operational in 2011 and by 2012 the volumes of shipment through the corridor are expected to grow by 15-20 percent.

### **Reaction of CIS Countries to the War**

The August War of 2008 has created a great deal of tension in the whole international scenario. This was a war that had implications not only for Georgia but for Washington, NATO, and the West. In case of CIS countries there is a difference in their opinion about this war. Some recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and others do not.

“55% of respondents expressed strong approval and another 29% mild approval for the actions of the Russian government in the Caucasus. Only 2.5% expressed disapproval. Over half of respondents were in favour of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remaining independent states recognized by Russia. Fewer than 5% were willing for them again to become autonomous regions within Georgia. Over a quarter (27%) thought that Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be incorporated into the Russian Federation”(RIANOVOSTI,22<sup>nd</sup> August 2010).

Among the CIS countries this opinion varied differently-

- Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Just after hearing the appeals from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on 25<sup>th</sup> August 2008 the Federation Council and State Duma passed motions calling upon President Dmitry Medvedev for recognizing the independence of both the states and for establishing diplomatic relations. The next day President signed decrees to recognize the independence of both the countries as sovereign states, At the same time he also gave a speech in which he said,



“Western countries have rushed to recognize Kosovo’s illegal declaration of independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that to tell the Abkhazian’s and Ossetian’s (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. In international relations, you can’t have one rule for some and another rule for others” (RIANOVOSTI, 25<sup>TH</sup> August 2008).

- According to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan this country is not going to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states any time soon but he supports their resident’s right to self determination. According to him Armenia will not recognize the independence of these two countries because it did not support the independence of Kosovo and Nagarno- Karabakh Republic also (Regnum News, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- Like Armenia Azerbaijan also stated that it will not change its position and they recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity (TODAY.AZ, 27<sup>TH</sup> August 2008).
- In case of Belarus the whole incident was little bit dramatic. At first on August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2008 the Belarusian Ambassador Vasily Dolgolyov said that Belarus will recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia very soon. The Belaurian President also expressed support for Russia. Then President Lukashenko suggested to take this issue at the CSTO Collective Security Council Summit on 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008 (RIANOVOSTI,8<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

After that the President suggested that the issue would be in focus after the Parliamentary Election 28<sup>th</sup> September 2008. On 25<sup>th</sup> September the President of Abkhazia and the President of South Ossetia requested the Belarusian President for recognizing their independence officially. But in January 2009 it was declared that the Belarusian parliament will debate on this issue on 2<sup>nd</sup> April. After all these Belarus decided not to recognize the independence of both the countries. It is viewed that EU has rewarded the Belarusian President for not recognizing the two states. It was also viewed that if Belarus

recognizes the independence of both the countries then it can lose the Eastern Partnership (RIANOVOSTI, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2009).

- Kazakstan also did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev his country can understand Russia's stand in this matter. He also said that "Russia's actions were directed to protect the residents of long suffering regions. In response Russia could either ignore or prevent the bloodshed" (News.trendaz.com, 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2008).

But in October 2008 Kazak Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin stated that territorial integrity is the key factor in international law and because of that fact neither it could recognize Kosovo nor it could recognize the other two countries (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). According to Kazakstan they consider that the borders are already defined and so it will not going to recognize any new states (Orenburg.kp.ru 2008, Gorelov M, 2<sup>nd</sup> October).

- Kyrgyzstan on the other side has not given any opinion till now. Kyrgyzstan's ambassador said to Belarus at a conference on 27<sup>th</sup> August 2008 that all the legal aspects should be measured. According him first of all they should study all the aspects, listen to analysts, observer, counsellors of state. Because the issue is too fresh to give any opinion, they can't give their opinion so early (National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of Belarus, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- In case Moldova there is a difference of opinion in the country itself. The government of Moldova announced that it would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because the country itself faced this kind of issue in case of Transnistria. But on the other hand, Gagauzia an autonomous region of Moldova passed a resolution for recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (AlertNet , 29<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- According to a report of Moscow Times the President of Tajikistan stated that it supports Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He said, "Our

countries are natural strategic partners.....which envisions.....support for each other's actions" (The Moscow Times, 1<sup>st</sup> September 2008). He also said that he thinks that Russia and Georgia should discuss their problems and solve it through political and diplomatic measure (China View, 30<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

- Regarding the matter of recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia there is a problem in Ukraine itself. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister said that Kiev has taken a very strong principled position to support Georgia's territorial integrity and Sovereignty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also said that this recognition of the independence is a gross violation of norms and principles of the international law, bilateral and multilateral agreements basically in particular the United Nations and Helsinki Accords. According to Ukraine it is in the principle of the Commonwealth of Independent States to respect the territorial integrity of other CIS states, here this is about Georgia's territorial integrity. According to them it is actually violation of international law. The President of Ukraine stated that his country will not support Russia's decision (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 26<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

But on the other hand, the parliament of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea passed a resolution in which they supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and they urged the Ukrainian Parliament for accepting the independence of both the states (Financial Times, 17<sup>th</sup> September 2008). But on October 2009 Ukrainian Ambassador stated that they will neither recognize Kosovo nor Abkhazia nor South Ossetia in any case. On 4<sup>th</sup> June 2010 Ukrainian President said, "I have never recognized Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Kosovo's independence. This is a violation of international law" (KyivPost, 4<sup>th</sup> June 2010) .

- Follow a regular session of the Uzbekistan-EU Cooperation Council Uzbekistan said that they have not reached a decision on recognition yet (RIANOVOSTI, 16<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

The CIS countries gave their response in various ways. On the other hand the leaders of CSTO member states expressed their “deep concern” about the August 2008 War.

Regarding the matter Rozanov and Dovgan (2010:17) quoted that, “Georgia’s attempt to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia by force that led to numerous casualties among the peaceful population and the peacekeepers and grave humanitarian consequences. They supported the active role of Russia in assisting peace and co-operation in the Caucasus, called for provision of reliable security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and not to apply double standards in the assessment of the ensuing situation”.

So by viewing these aspects of conflict it became clear that like every other nations Russia and Georgia also have ups and downs in their relation in the context of international scenario; which does hamper their political and social stability and also creates problematic situation for other countries including the CIS nations. CIS countries too became fractured in their opinion on issue of the recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Not only that this war had its impact on the foreign policy of various countries like Azerbaijan, Russia etc and at the same time it created difficulty in relations among Russia and other Western Countries. This war created difference of opinion among various international organizations also. Thus it is being said by various political thinkers that the “little” August War shook the whole world.

\*\*\*\*\*

## **Chapter-4**

### **RUSSIA-GEORGIA MILITARY CONFLICT AND NEED FOR NEW SECURITY PARADIGM IN EUROPE**

This chapter intends to discuss about military conflict and its security implications in the context of European countries and also about the need for new security paradigm in Europe. It would try to focus on the international perspective.

The war which started on 7<sup>th</sup> of August 2008 between Russia and the former Soviet republic of Georgia created devastating consequences. Almost 2,000 people are believed to have been killed, according to reports given by both sides. Tens of thousands have been injured or driven from their homes by shelling and air attacks. A regime in Tbilisi which was basically US backed sent troops into South Ossetia and carried out bombing attacks on the capital of Tskhinvali in an attempt to establish Georgian control over that region, which has exercised ‘de facto self-rule’ since the breaking up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia has deployed “peacekeeping” troops in the region, which is basically linked with Moscow against the Georgian government and also President Mikheil Saakashvili (World Socialist Website, Talbot A, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2008). There are fundamental disagreements on both sides as to the causes of the war. An independent investigation funded by the European Union has viewed that both Russia and Georgia are equally responsible for the conflict “Georgia by launching a large scale military offensive in South Ossetia, and Russia by supporting separatist forces who were responsible for a number of provocations before the start of the August war” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2012).

The August War of 2008 between Russia and Georgia is basically the result of the long-escalating tensions. It was nothing new; there was long standing tension between Russia and Georgia regarding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from a very early period. As Talbot, A (2008) pointed that, “It can be understood only in the context of US foreign policy in the former Soviet republics and the former

Yugoslavia.”After the break-up of the Soviet Union, US tried to make Russia very weak and tried to diminish its influence in the former Soviet space.

In this regard it was said by Talbot (2008), “The dismemberment of Yugoslavia, encouraged by both the US and the Western European powers, was directed above all against Moscow, which had long considered Belgrade an important ally. This reached a culmination in the 1999 US-led NATO air war against Serbia, followed in 2000 by the toppling of the Milosevic regime in the first of the US-engineered colour revolutions of this decade. Saakashvili was brought to power in Georgia by the so-called ‘Rose Revolution’<sup>10</sup> of 2003. Like the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2005 in Ukraine, it was engineered by Washington to place a pro-American regime in power on Russia’s doorstep. Since the US-engineered regime change in Georgia, Washington has flooded the country with military aid and deployed 160 military advisers to build up its armed forces”(World Socialist Website, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

On the other hand, US basically wanted to incorporate the former Soviet republics into NATO for creating military bases and for using anti-missile defence systems on Russia’s borders.

Talbot (2008) viewed that, “Underlying the military confrontation is US imperialism’s drive to isolate Russia and establish American hegemony over the energy resources of Central Asia and their transit routes through the Caucasus, utilizing the Saakashvili regime as its cat’s paw. The Russian ruling elite, for its part, is seeking to reassert its control over a region that was ruled by Moscow for two centuries before the break-up of the USSR”(ibid).

---

<sup>10</sup> The Revolution of Roses or the Rose Revolution in Georgia was basically a protest over a rigged parliamentary election in 2003. Later this protest turns into a huge political issue. Tens of thousands demonstrators protest against the parliamentary election. By fearing a civil war like situation Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze deployed hundreds of soldiers in Tbilisi. At that point student demonstrators decided to give red roses to the soldiers and that’s why it is called Rose Revolution. However as a result of this protest Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze had to resign from his post on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2003. Soldiers laid down their gun and finally Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze had to resign from his post on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2003.

For increasing its influence in the former Soviet republics President Bush promised to give Georgia the NATO membership at the NATO summit of 2008. But the NATO allies in Western Europe did not give the permission of doing so. In their view these kinds of steps could be ‘unnecessary provocations’ against Russia and Russia is a country on which they depend for energy supplies (World Socialist Website, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2011).

In true sense the tension between Russia and Georgia over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia became severe after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia. After the independence of Kosovo Russian President decided to use this example for supporting the Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists against Georgia. For this purpose Moscow started to sign Russian passports to the citizens of both the region.

Talbot (2008) stated that, “The eruption of military conflict between Russia and Georgia was all but inevitable given the highly aggressive and provocative character of US policy in the region and the nationalist and expansionist aims of the Putin regime in Moscow. There is little doubt that Washington gave Tbilisi the green light to attack South Ossetia. The Georgian offensive came only weeks after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Tbilisi and held talks with Saakashvili. Rice denounced Russia during her visit and reiterated US backing for Georgian membership in NATO” (World Socialist Website, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

The Russian and Georgian war and their military performances in that were basically ‘mirror images’ of each other. Russia’s strategy for that war was practically well planned and properly resourced; it gave Russia some advantages at the operational level of war and also helped them to solve various problems at the “tactical level”. On the other hand the Georgian military was “well-trained” and “well-equipped” at the small-unit level and fought well in tactical engagements, but the nature of their strategic and operational planning and the unplanned way in which the war policies were conceived and implemented that basically created problems for them and to a very large extent failed their efforts. However, this operation held by Georgia was described as “spontaneously” planned by the Georgian officers, with “no reserve

designated, no fire support or engineer plans written, and the main effort commander selected only hours before the war began”(Cohen and Hamilton 2011:8).

If we do a deep analysis of the war then well-conceived Russian and also the Georgian efforts could be seen.

“At the strategic level, Russia was able to execute a combined political-military strategy that isolated Georgia from its western partners while setting the conditions for military success. At the operational level, these advantages were parlayed into success by the early commitment of a decisive amount of forces to the theatre of operations and sufficient, if not especially elegant, operational coordination. At the tactical level, despite disadvantages in capabilities at the small-unit level and use of tactics that exposed its forces to the risk of higher casualties, the offensive-mindedness, superior numbers, and speed of Russian forces committed to the fight overwhelmed their enemy and translated into battlefield victory”(ibid.pp:7).

It was reported that Russian forces attacked beyond the borders of South Ossetia, and made air attacks on the Georgian town of Gori and as a result of which sixty people were killed in two apartment blocks. It was also reported that Russian jets bombed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline but could not damage it. Not only that, the air attack also affected Tbilisi airport and the military facilities around the airport. On the other hand Georgians claim to have shot down six Russian jets.

*“While the Russian armed forces had retained significant elements of their Soviet strategic, operational, and tactical heritage, the Georgian armed forces had jettisoned Soviet doctrine and purged the vast majority of the Soviet-era military leadership”*. This shows us that there was no ‘intellectual resistance’ in the Georgian military as well as this meant that there was no ‘reservoir’ of military experience. In case of Georgia majority of the leadership in the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence was under 40 and had ‘matured professionally in the post-Soviet period’. Hence, if we make a comparison between Russian and Georgian efforts then it’ll show us that the strategic plan, operational planning and its implementation helped Russia to overcome the ‘tactical disadvantages’, on the other hand in case of Georgia



the 'tactical advantages' failed to overcome the operational and strategic disadvantages, especially in case of changing the position of the senior leadership which was basically 'radical' by nature. This kind of issues increased problems for Georgia itself (ibid).

It was noticed that day by day the conflict started spreading out into the other parts of Caucasus, as forces of Abkhazia, another Russian-backed breakaway republic, launched attacks on Georgian positions in the upper Kodori Gorge.

Talbot (2008) said that, "Russian jets were reported to be supporting the Abkhaz ground troops. A war on three fronts seems to be opening up as the Abkhazian border, South Ossetia and the area of Gali and Zugdidi come under attack from Russian and Russian-backed forces. Georgian President Saakashvili has appealed for a ceasefire and for international help to open up corridors for the evacuation of wounded and trapped civilians" (World Socialist Website, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

The refugees who were forced to come into Russia described their experience; they gave an idea about how Tskhinvali and surrounding villages were attacked by the heavy bombardment from Grad missiles. 'There are claims of Georgian atrocities against the civilian population (ibid).

According to Talbot (2008) US and Western allies gave a very hypocritical response regarding the Russian and Georgian war. The then US president George W. Bush demanded "an end to Russian bombing". He also declared that, "Georgia is a sovereign nation and its territorial integrity must be respected" (ibid).

But he failed to show his concern regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, his attack on Iraq and Afghanistan and US's support for the secession of Kosovo are also responsible for that.

Republican presidential candidate John McCain likewise placed the entire blame for the war on Russia, saying, "For many years, I have warned against Russian actions that undermine the sovereignty of its neighbours".

European Union expressed an anti Russian view point. It showed “commitment to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Georgia” and asked Russia to respect Georgia’s borders.

In response to that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the other hand said, “Those who have been supplying arms to Georgia, I believe they should feel part of the blame for the loss of life of civilians, including many Russian citizens and peacekeepers. I think those who have been appeasing Mr. Saakashvili’s aggressive intentions and who helped create a feeling of impunity among the Georgian leadership should think twice” (ibid).

### ***Military Implications of the War from European Security Perspectives***

The short lived war which took place in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia was the result of 17 years of tensions between Russia, its neighbours and the West about the future of Eurasia. This conflict helped the Western countries to understand that without closer cooperation between America and Europe a more productive relationship with Russia is almost impossible.

In this connection Rumer and Stent (2009:18) stated that, “The war also demonstrated that the US commitment to Europe is still a critical component of European security and cohesion. As the Allies embark on the search for a reinvigorated Russia policy, they will have to rethink the premises of earlier policies. They will also have to confront head-on the differences between the way much of Europe views Russia and how it is perceived in Washington. If they cannot resolve these differences, or at least agree to disagree on some issues, it will be difficult to craft an effective and unified Western policy. Moreover, they will also have to respond with care to the mixed signals emanating from Moscow”.

The small war which took place between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 has had huge implications. It even has its implication on the ground, sea and air in that particular area where it was fought. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and the

recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have complicated the Euro-Atlantic security agenda.

As Mikhelidze (2009:7) stated that, “The war highlighted that the frozen nature of the South Caucasus conflicts was a chimera, even if the war may have entrenched further the frozen nature of peace processes in the region. The crisis generated new sources of instability for the entire post-Soviet space, not only because it highlighted a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the fore the limits of Western policies in what Kremlin views as its sphere of influence”.

However, in the perspective of military implications of the war, basically it shows the improvement in capabilities and also the weakness of both the sides. Although both the countries had taken different kinds of training and collected different kinds of weapons in spite of that the weakness of both the countries were quite similar to some extent, although it's very surprising but it's true. For long time there was a sense of enmity between Western world and Russia. In this situation the war basically demonstrated the enhanced power of Russia and Kremlin's desire to strengthen order and control over Russia.

The war revealed various weaknesses of both Russia and Georgia. As Cohen and Hamilton (2011:8-9) pointed out that, “Politically, the war temporarily but seriously undermined the stability of Georgia, exposed latent but deep divisions within NATO on the wisdom of future enlargement, and left Russia temporarily isolated diplomatically, both for its disproportionately violent treatment of Georgia and for its recognition of the self-proclaimed independence by the Georgian secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This monograph focuses on the military performance of the Russian armed forces during the war; it examines the defence reform effort that resulted; it reviews and analyzes geopolitical repercussions of the first post-Soviet Russian war beyond its borders; and it draws political and military implications for future NATO and U.S. policy toward Russia and the former Soviet Union”.

The Russian-Georgian war demonstrated the need for changing the European security architecture which was established over the past 18 years. President Medvedev was focused on the underlying foreign policy principles for changing the European security scenarior , that would take the security interests of not only Eurasian states but the members of the EU and NATO as well. 'The aim is to drive wedges in the NATO Alliance in order to attenuate its collective security strength' (Chicky 2009:3).

Talbot (2008) on the other hand stated that, "The eruption of war in the Caucasus, containing the threat of a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia—the two biggest nuclear powers—reflects the extraordinarily tense and explosive state of international relations. The sharpening of conflicts between the major powers is itself a product of the deepening economic crisis of world capitalism, which finds its most concentrated expression in the decline in the global economic position of the United States. The reckless and provocative character of US foreign policy, and its increasing reliance on military violence, is bound up with the attempt of the American ruling elite to offset its economic decline by utilizing its continued military dominance" (World Socialist Website, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

Dmitri Trenin, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and deputy director of its Moscow center, issued the following warning in a piece published on the *Washington Post* web site, "So far, each step in the Caucasus drama has put the conflict on a yet higher plane. The next step will no longer be just about the Caucasus, or even Europe. Remember the Guns of August".

The Russia-Georgia military conflict affected not only these two countries but also the immediate neighbourhood. Turkey, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, the Central Asian States, Central and Eastern Europe, Venezuela, China and Taiwan and other countries were concerned by this military confrontation. Georgia was the "poster child" for the Bush administration's Freedom Agenda and because of that Russia's actions affected the prestige of the United States as well. On the other hand, U.S. has played a very important role to train the Georgian army and equipping much of its tactical military

capability but also US had supported Georgia's decision for receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)<sup>11</sup> (Chicky 2009:4).

Analysing the whole episode it can be said that the Russian military action was not at all designed as a punishment to Georgia, it was basically Russia's reply against the activities which was sponsored by U.S. for so long. As it is pointed out, "It is rather to be seen as a message to the U.S. that Russia can act at will against Georgia or any other U.S.-interests in Eurasia with some confidence that there would be little action in return" (ibid).

By looking at the Russia's response it is also said, "U.S. must show resolve in the face of this new Russian assertiveness. This is even more important as the U.S. is the "shining city on a hill" for aspiring democracies throughout the world and to those who desire democracy and freedom but live in un-free countries. Continuous support for Georgia's democratic aspirations and its national desire to join Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security organizations is therefore essential. The U.S. has legitimate interests throughout Eurasia and its regional policies are not based upon zero-sum thinking. However, even if the U.S. has the desire to find ways to work with Russia, it should not shirk from achieving its interests despite their possible unpopularity in Moscow"(ibid).

The war showed that Russia's assertive and aggressive security and foreign policy created challenges for US and NATO. Before the August war, NATO's agenda covered the Afghanistan issue, missile defence, NATO expansion, Kosovo, CFE etc. This was a war that was not only against Georgia but also against Washington, NATO, and the West more generally. Not only that it was also against European security system which was against Moscow's interest and which was influencing

---

<sup>11</sup> The Membership Action Plan is basically a NATO launched programme for advice, assistance and practical support tailored for that countries who want to join the alliance. But participation into MAP does not give any guarantee for future membership by the alliance. Countries joining in the MAP have to submit individual annual national programmes for their possible future membership and this annual report may cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects.

Georgia to go west. Moscow basically wanted to reduce the chance of expansion of NATO towards the former Soviet states.

Some of the observers believe that the decision of Bucharest Summit<sup>12</sup> was not at all related with the issue of offering Georgia 'The Membership Action Plan (MAP)' but it was rather a provocation for Russia to take step against Georgia because of its desire to take NATO membership. NATO does not accept membership of a country which has territorial disputes. So, the war which is followed by Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence gave a heavy blow to Georgia's aspiration for NATO membership. This was clearly reflected in Bucharest Summit.

Chicky (2009:5) viewed that, "NATO has been struggling to find ways of dealing with a resurgent Russia. Prior to August, Brussels' issues with Russia were largely rhetorical. The only states that regularly expressed concerns about Russian intentions and actions were the U.S., the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania. However, other NATO members, highlighting the differing perspectives between the newer and older members of the Alliance, considered these concerns as unnecessarily alarmist".

After the military confrontation between Russia and Georgia, NATO and its alliances have re-evaluated their opinion about Russia. It is pointed out that 'Russian actions in Georgia may put a monkey wrench in NATO's continuing efforts to build capacities for expeditionary operations, such as in Afghanistan'. For the newer members of NATO the situation will be more complex if the Russians withdraw from the CFE Treaty<sup>13</sup> regime and the Treaty regime collapses, and then there will be a new emphasis on building territorial defence capabilities. (ibid)

---

<sup>12</sup> The 20<sup>th</sup> NATO Summit or Bucharest Summit was held in Bucharest, Romania on 2<sup>nd</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> April 2008. With the hope of playing an important role in the stabilization of Southern Europe Albania, Croatia were invited to join but due to the naming disputes with Greece Republic of Macedonia it was not invited to join the alliance. The Bucharest Summit also discussed about giving offer to Georgia and Ukraine regarding joining into Membership Action Plan but in the later stage NATO members decided to review this issue in December 2008.

<sup>13</sup> The treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed on November 1990. The treaty tried to establish a military balance or tried to give equal limits for the two groups of state parties of Cold War era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact. It suggested providing

It is also viewed that, “Russia’s behaviour necessitates internal NATO reorientation on how to balance expeditionary COIN capabilities with the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of military operations in defending a member nation under Article V. As a final aspect of the Article V issue, NATO may want to re-examine the NATO-Russia Founding Act in which it states that NATO would not permanently base substantial combat forces on the territory of new NATO members. This review is contingent upon Russian behaviour, particularly with regard to the Baltic States as well as Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine” (ibid).

It is very much important for NATO to give emphasis on its relationship with Ukraine, South Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia in particular. In the recent scenario, especially by giving emphasis on the post August war phase, it is being said that the traditional NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships is useful but proved insufficient in case of Russia because it used military force to demonstrate its “privileged position” in the former Soviet space (ibid.pp:16).

By looking to this phase Chicky (2009:16) stated that, “Georgia battered; Moscow’s eyes have turned to Ukraine (and Azerbaijan). The Alliance will need a unified position on how to bolster Ukraine from Russian mischief making, which will require U.S. leadership. Increased NATO attention to Azerbaijan is also necessary to protect its vital energy infrastructure. As NATO reassesses its strategic posture vis-à-vis Russia, it may now be prudent for Sweden and Finland to consider seriously joining NATO”.

The problem between Russia and the West is not new; the truth is that the bitterness between both was increasing day by day especially from the post cold war era. Not only President Putin discussed this during the Munich conference of 2007; but also President Boris Yeltsin in April 1994 warned (in a speech to senior echelons of

---

equal ceilings for ‘major weapons and equipment systems.’ The treaty was signed by twenty two states; sixteen NATO member states of that time- Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United states and six Warsaw Treaty states of that period-Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union.

Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service) that "ideological confrontation is being replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics" and added that "forces abroad" wanted to keep Russia in a state of "controllable paralysis." This speech of his and also several others shows the "end of the era of romanticism between Russia and the West". And this factor marked the end of West's "Russia first" policy and its "discovery of the newly independent states as actors in their own right". It also coincided with NATO's first intervention in Balkan conflicts (Sherr 2009:202).

For United States, the Russian–Georgian war creates a broad range of change in East-West relations; it basically ends the phase of a relationship that started with the "blossoming of perestroika" in the USSR, "gained momentum" from the time of collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and eventually the Soviet Union itself. The relationship was in relatively greater difficulty during Yeltsin years but still it was able to survive and "regained momentum" in the starting of Bush–Putin era. For almost two decades, US makes a kind of policy toward Russia which was guided by a commitment to make a diplomatically good relation with and try to integrate Russia with the West ( Rumer and Stent 2009:14).

It is pointed out that, "The war and its aftermath sent the United States back to the drawing board, seeking to re-define the relationship with a different Russia than it had initially anticipated. Three consecutive US administrations, of Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, built their policies toward Europe, Russia and other former Soviet states on the premise that Europe's old divisions would eventually be erased. Russia and the former parts of the Soviet empire would join Europe whole and free, at peace with itself and its neighbours, projecting stability and prosperity far beyond its borders"(ibid).

USA thought that the changes in Russia will bring it more close to the West. The Clinton administration emphasised the theory of liberal internationalism: that "democratic states are more productive and reliable partners than authoritarian countries and that a purely interest-based relationship had its limits." US believed that "shock therapy" was the only to ensure a democratic transition and it has helped Russia to adopt a rapid transition to a market economy through 'shock therapy'.



Although from the very beginning USA and Russia have different nature of thinking; but still United States and its European allies wanted to build Europe's new security architecture with Russia as its easternmost pillar, and the distance between the old NATO and Russia was over and several new members joined the alliance.

In this context it is quoted that, "NATO's eastward progression was not intended, Alliance leaders reassured Moscow, against Russia, but designed to expand the zone of stability, security and prosperity toward it. New structures were created to include Russia: the NATO–Russia Council<sup>14</sup> and its precursor NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council, the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and Russian participation in the G7 and G8" (ibid).

Russia from the very beginning disagreed with the NATO. It was promised since Mikhail Gorbachev's time that NATO will not expand 'one inch'. But after that West started to ignore Russia's interest especially in the 1990s and pressurized Moscow to accept an agenda which it had already rejected.

Rumer and Stent (2009:22) stated that "It became clear as the 1990s wore on that American assumptions about Russia's development trajectory were unrealistic. Yet a changed Russia was eventually expected to occupy its rightful place in the transatlantic community and become a key member, an integral part, eventually embracing its values and its interests".

---

<sup>14</sup> The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was basically established in 2002. It is mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint action and joint decision. Within the NRC the each NATO member states and Russia work as a equal partners on security issues of common interest. But because of the August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia the alliance suspended formal meetings of NRC and cooperation in some areas. But cooperation continued in some key areas, like: counter narcotics and the fight against terrorism. In the later period of March 2009 practical cooperation was taken.

## *International Reactions to the War*

The Russia-Georgia war increased tensions between Russia and the West. The overall Western goal was to shore up the independence and viability of Russia's neighbours. The main aim of Vladimir Putin's foreign policy, and Dmitry Medvedev's, was to restore Moscow's influence in its neighbourhood and decrease the presence of American and European influence in Eurasia.

The war also pointed out the differences between the United States and key European allies. "Washington pointed to a long chain of Russian actions prior to the war, including deployment of troops to Georgia's separatist regions, violations of Georgian airspace, discrimination against ethnic Georgians in Russia, and trade sanctions on Georgian goods, arguing that this left no doubt that the war was a continuation of a deliberate Russian policy. The goals of that policy are well known: restoration of Russia's sphere of influence or 'privileged interests', as President Medvedev called it in the aftermath of the war; an end to NATO's eastward expansion; and recognition on the part of the West that Russia is a great power that has to be treated as an equal, with interests that need to be respected" (ibid).

But many EU members, not the newest ones believed that Georgia was equally responsible for this war. "Although they were dismayed by what they viewed as a disproportionate Russian response, they were more sympathetic than Washington to the Russian version of events."(ibid)

"The August war highlighted that some NATO members do not share the US view of what constitutes legitimate Russian interests. While many in Washington have argued that Russia's neighbours have every right to pursue a Euro-Atlantic orientation, including membership in NATO and the EU, the consensus in Berlin and Paris (albeit not in Warsaw or Tallinn) is that Russia will inevitably have a droit de regard in the former Soviet space and that there are limits to how far the West can venture into this area without provoking a Russian reaction that could threaten Western interests" (ibid).

Although the EU didn't support Russia for its action and lacked comprehensive policy in its neighbourhood but still its opinion was different from those George W. Bush administration and the two main US presidential candidates, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama. The European forced Russia to engage as soon as possible for the need of finding a solution of the conflict; which reflected that America and Europe have different stories in their relations with Russia. For Europeans, Russia is a large, sometimes awkward and difficult neighbour; with whom they are fated to live side by side and with whom they must interact on a sustained basis. Engagement and partnership are the only option. Europe and Russia have become increasingly interdependent economically, especially in energy, and Europe is projected to become increasingly dependent on imports of Russian natural gas over the next decade. The EU and Russia are linked by a robust network of political, human and commercial ties.

The conflict has a broad range of implication both 'literally and figuratively'. In terms of loss of lives although it is hard to count but still it is estimated that the range was from dozens to the hundreds.

Smith (2008:11) pointed out, "In terms of figurative carnage the conflict inflicted a sizeable wound on NATO's relationship with Russia. As soon as NATO announced it was suspending future meeting of the NATO-Russia council until Russia pulled its forces out of Georgia, Russia decided to halt cooperation with the alliance indefinitely. NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and other areas now hang in the balance".

Earlier in February 2008 when US and Europe recognized Kosovo's independence Russia did not support it and during that period onwards tension increased between Russia and NATO partnership. However, the Russia-Georgia conflict created a debate inside of NATO Headquarters regarding the NATO enlargement.

In this context Smith (2008:13) viewed, "Both proponents and opponents of MAP believe that the Russia-Georgia conflict vindicated their original position. Those countries that supported MAP for Ukraine and Georgia argued that had that process been set in motion, the war between Russia and Georgia

would not have happened. However, those countries that opposed MAP, notably Germany and France, claim that had NATO offered MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, the alliance could have been faced with the disastrous choice of going to war with Russia or imploding in the face of Russian aggressor”.

France played a very claver role in international politics scenario by viewing, “Don't ask us who's good and who's bad here. We shouldn't make any moral judgments on this war. Stopping the war, that's what we're interested in”. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy who was also holding the position of EU presidency from 16<sup>th</sup> May 2007 to 15<sup>th</sup> May 2012 viewed at the European Parliament on October 21, 2008 that, Russia’s reaction to Georgia’s “inappropriate actions” in South Ossetia was “disproportionate”. According to him US’s position is different from them.

He said, “We saw the war as a completely disproportionate reaction from the Russians in the case of the conflict with Georgia, and I use this word – disproportionate – because it was disproportionate to intervene as the Russians did in Georgia. And I also use the word ‘reaction’, because [Russia’s] reaction was disproportionate but that was because there was a preceding inappropriate action, and Europe has to be fair. Europe shouldn't hesitate to step out of the ideological framework to put across a message of peace” (Civil Georgia, 28<sup>th</sup> October 2008).

The French president met with Medvedev and tried to stop the advancement of the Russian troops in Georgia. However after several meeting on 12<sup>th</sup> August 2008 with Putin and Medvedev he changed his position drastically and got involved in the outcome of the conflict. He with the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev made six point principles agreement. Although this agreement has been criticized but “it was put forward in a state of emergency by the French presidency on August, 12<sup>th</sup> after the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and NATO reacted but too little”. Sarkozy from his side tried his level best; he has done maximum the EU and France could do and this position enabled Sarkozy to be regarded as one of the important world leaders (Aver 2011:4).

In case of United Kingdom (UK) the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown requested EU for reviewing ties with Russia and he again requested that EU must support Georgia and others who faced 'Russian aggression'. Regarding Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Prime Minister Gordon Brown said, "My message to Russia is simple: if you want to be welcome at the top table of the organizations such as the G8, OECD and WTO you must accept that with rights" and he added. "Russia can not pick and choose which rules to adhere to" (Bloomberg.com, Meyer H, 31<sup>ST</sup> August 2008).

The 2008 August war affected the whole international politics. International reaction to the war came not only from many nations but also from NGOs and the non-state actors. Though the conflict was started in South Ossetia but latter it was spread elsewhere of Georgia. It is being said that the August 2008 war was having a humanitarian impact and was also affected the financial market of Russia and Georgia both.

### ***(i) Response from the International Organizations***

Among the international organizations the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)<sup>15</sup> said to make a humanitarian corridor for helping the wounded and the civilians from Tskhinvali. According to them they sent some amount of medicine and medical supplies to the conflict zone.

The ICRC stated "*the ICRC has officially reminded Georgia and Russia of their obligation under international humanitarian law to protect civilians and distinguish at all times between the civilian population and those taking a direct part in the hostilities. The four Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocol 1 and the*

---

<sup>15</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross is a humanitarian organization which is based in Geneva, Switzerland. ICRC has the right to protect the victims of international and internal armed conflicts; the victims could be wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians. This organization is a part of the International Red Cross Movement and it has won Noble Peace Prize three times-1917, 1944 and 1963.

*customary rules and principles of international humanitarian law are all applicable in this situation*”(E-break Time, 8<sup>TH</sup> August 2008).

On behalf of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)<sup>16</sup> Alexander Stubb the chairman of this organization stated, “OSCE is the only organization that has infrastructure in the area and which can immediately deploy military observers and humanitarian assistance to manage the conflict” (ibid).

According to an article that was published in The Hindu, Russia got diplomatic support from People’s Republic of China (PRC) and also from the other member states of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China basically supported Russia’s policy towards Georgia but it did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Radyuhin V, 29<sup>TH</sup> August 2008-The Hindu). SCO<sup>17</sup> summit at Dushanbe on 28<sup>th</sup> August issued a joint statement which called upon all the parties for solving the South Ossetia conflict through peaceful dialogue. According to some western source SCO was created to respect every country’s territorial integrity and it was stated that, “*The participants (of the SCO summit) underscore the need for respect of the historical and cultural traditions of each country and each people, for efforts aimed at the preservation, under international law, of the unity of a state and its territorial integrity*” (Mark T, 28<sup>TH</sup> August 2008). On 29<sup>th</sup> August 2008 it was said by the Russian and Western sources that SCO group “refused to back Moscow in its conflict with Georgia and to support Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (ibid).

---

<sup>16</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a security oriented intergovernmental organization. First it was established as the CSCE (Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe) on July 1973 and then it become OSCE on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1995. It works on the issues like arms control, human rights, and freedom of the press, conflict prevention, crisis management, post conflict rehabilitation and fair elections. This organization is an ad-hoc organization under the United Nation Charter (Chapter- viii).

<sup>17</sup> Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental mutual security organization. It was first established as the Shanghai five in 1996. China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan was the then members of Shanghai five. But after the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001 the organization renamed as Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SCO works on the area of terrorism, separatism, economic cooperation, cultural cooperation and military activities.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)<sup>18</sup> also supported “Russia’s active role in the provision of peace and cooperation in the region.”

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated, “It denounces the military actions taken by Georgia against South Ossetia and stresses the necessity to avoid such situation in the future. The statement highlights the key points, has all the necessary verifications, including condemnation of Georgia’s military actions against South Ossetia. It stresses the need to do the best in order not to admit similar attempts at using force for solving conflicts and evaluates events in the conflict zone. It condemns the policy of double standards and admits the dangers in the conflict zone” (Ria Novosti, 9<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

During the summit of CSTO Kazakhstan and other members viewed that they are “deeply concerned by Georgia’s attempt to use force in order to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia” and they are requesting other states to have “balanced and objective, devoid of double standards, assessment of the situation in the Caucasus”. However, CSTO did not recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Kassenova N 2009:3). The Armenian foreign minister said that they support Russia’s role to build peace and cooperation in the region. The Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha stated in Yerevan. “The present situation is driving Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the collective security system”. He also said, “South Ossetia and Abkhazia can’t successfully and steadily develop without a collective security system, without the backing of other states” (Lenta.ru, 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

United Nations on the other hand was very much worried about the situation created by the August war. On 7<sup>th</sup> of August the Secretary General of UN requested both the parties to avoid any kind of situation that might create any further problem in that

---

<sup>18</sup> Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military organization which was established on May 1992. Presently it is an observer organization at the United Nations General Assembly. Current members of this organization are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined CSTO in 1994 but then in 1999 it withdrew from this organization. After some years in 2006 it rejoined the organization but very recently in 28<sup>TH</sup> June 2012 once again it left the group.

situation. On 8<sup>th</sup> August there was an emergency session was held to discuss the situation, it was basically requested by Russia (Civil Georgia, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2008). The session failed but it expressed its concern over the conflict. Russia tried to establish three resolutions at the UN Security Council and said all the sides to renounce the use of force. But United States and United Kingdom did not support them. Hence in an interview the president of UN General Assembly Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann said Georgia's action was basically a kind of aggression against South Ossetia which violated the UN Charter (Russiatoday.com, 19<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

Amnesty International (A.I) on the other hand published a report of sixty nine pages in November 2008 in which it blamed both Russia and Georgia for the violation of international law.

In case of European Union, the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy who was holding the presidency of EU said on 9<sup>th</sup> August, "EU and USA will send a joint delegation to try to negotiate a cease fire (Lemonde, 9<sup>th</sup> August 2008). After that Sarkozy tried to influence Russian Prime Minister Putin not to overthrow the Georgian government and "hang Saakashvili by the balls."(The Times, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2008). However it is viewed, "at first glance what seemed as fundamental disagreements among the EU members, in fact turned out to be pragmatism and an interest-based approach among the European countries towards Russia in the longer time perspective".

Seven foreign ministers of the G7<sup>19</sup> member states- Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom gave a joint statement on Georgia on 27<sup>th</sup> August 2008. They stated that "Russia's decision has raised questions about its commitment to peace and security in the Caucasus". On the other hand they also said, "Russian action has prevented further destabilization in the Caucasus region (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 29<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

---

<sup>19</sup> G7 or Group of Seven is an international finance group. It began in 1975 with the informal meetings with the leaders of major industrialize countries of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, United Kingdom and United States. G7 is continuously giving focus on the areas of where it can promote global economic growth and stability.



### **(i) International Non-Governmental Organizations**

The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)<sup>20</sup> on 29<sup>th</sup> August 2008 gave a statement and said, “*We congratulate Abkhazia for her calls for self determination have been formally taken into consideration. With Abkhazia’s right to self determination acknowledged starts a long and slow process which can eventually lead to the admittance of Abkhazia to the United Nations*”(UNPO.org, 29<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

Abkhazia and South Ossetia both of them are not the member of International Organization for Standardization (ISO). According to the ISO rule it will issue a new code to Abkhazia and South Ossetia only when it can be a state party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice or it could join the United Nations (ISO.org, 28<sup>th</sup> March 2009).

### **(ii) Response from the Baltic States**

The Baltic States released some joint statements regarding the 2008 clash between Russia and Georgia. Ene Ergma, Gundars Daudze and Ceslovas Juršenās the presidents of parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued a joint declaration in which they expressed great concern over the events in Georgia.

They stated, “We are calling on the international community to decisively condemn actions of Russia and to promptly take all necessary steps to stop the war and bring the parties to the negotiation table. Justification of Russia’s actions in Georgia by the need to protect its citizens is unacceptable. Alleged reasons for taking up a war against Georgia raise concerns about the future in

---

<sup>20</sup> Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization is a non-governmental international organization which was established on 11<sup>th</sup> February 1991. It works on the area of minority issues, unrecognized or occupied territories etc. The aim of this organization is to protect the human and cultural rights of the members, non-violent solutions of any kind of conflict which is affecting its member countries and preserve the environment of the members.

every state with Russian citizens living on its territory. We are concerned and disappointed with the actions and behaviour of Russia, as an important actor in the politics of the region and the whole world, which will inevitably have effects on further bilateral and multilateral relations with this country. Russia's military aggression against another sovereign state and actions contradicting the statements of its leaders raise serious doubts about the reliability and consistency of Russia as a partner”(Riigikogu-The Parliament of Estonia, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

Poland and the Baltic States-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together also issued a joint declaration in which they pointed out Russia's action against Georgia as an 'aggression'.

They said, “We strongly condemn the actions by the Russian military forces against the sovereign and independent country of Georgia. Following the unilateral military actions of the Russian military forces, we will use all means available to us as Presidents to ensure that aggression against a small country in Europe will not be passed over in silence or with meaningless statements equating the victims with the victimisers”( Yanukovych , Official Website. 12<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

### ***(iii) Response from Other Countries***

The international politics is basically surrounded by different kinds of view point of different countries. The response for Russia-Georgia war is not an exception of that, regarding this war different countries have given their view point according to their own understanding and own benefits. Like:

- Australia and Austria urged Russia to respect Georgia's territorial integrity. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd called for an immediate ceasefire and Austrian Foreign Minister said that Russia should respect Georgia's territorial integrity, considering the UN resolution (Sydney Morning Herald, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

- Albania said that they recognize the sovereignty of Georgia. According to Albania Russia's decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is "totally unacceptable" (China View, 28<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- On behalf of Bangladesh the Foreign Advisor Iftexhar Ahmed Chowdhury stated, "This outbreak of violence is a matter of deep concern for the international community including Bangladesh. We hope for an early cessation of hostilities" (China View, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- In case of Brazil the Foreign Ministry released a statement in which it was stated that Brazil has a great concern over the issue that was happened between Russia and Georgia. According to them Brazil never supports the use of violence and support the peaceful solution of the conflict. They also stated, "*Brazil urges the parties involved to seek dialogue, for an immediate cease-fire and reconciliation in order to restore peace and security in the region, based on International Law*" (Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- In case of India till now it is holding a neutral position although it is expressing its concern over the situation (AsiaNews.it, 28<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- China on the other hand played a very diplomatic role for giving its opinion regarding the Russia-Georgia clash 2008, they also called for an 'Olympic ceasefire'.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China said on behalf of China and stated, "China expresses grave concern over the escalation of tension and armed conflicts in South Ossetia. China calls upon relevant parties to keep restraint and cease fire immediately. We sincerely hope relevant parties resolve their disputes peacefully through dialogue, so as to safeguard regional peace and stability"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

People's Republic of China very diplomatically supported Russia's action towards Georgia but it did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

- Cuba on the other hand from the very beginning recognized the legitimacy of South Ossetia. The Cuban President Raul Castro said, "*When the USSR disintegrated, South Ossetia, annexed by force by Georgia, with which it shared neither nationality nor culture, retained its status as an autonomous republic with its local authorities and its capitol, Tskhinvali*". According to him, "It is a false claim that Georgia is defending its national sovereignty". (Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- Hungary was totally against of Russia's action in this war. It termed Russia's action as 'imperialist abuse of raw power' (Political Capital, 14<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- Israel recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia. The Israeli Ministry Foreign Affairs viewed in a statement on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008, "*Israel is following with great concern the developments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and hopes the violence will end. Israel recognises the territorial integrity of Georgia and calls for a peaceful solution*" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- Czech Republic from the very beginning was a critic for Kosovo's independence. From the time of Kosovo's independence Czech Republic was worried about its consequences, because it had an idea from that time onwards that Kosovo can be an example for other separatist minded regions. The then Czech President Vaclav Klaus stated, "It gave Russia a strong justification for its actions (in Georgia)". Not only that he also said, "I refuse to accept this widespread, simplified interpretation which paints the Georgians as the victims and the Russians as the villains. I also reject the Georgia-Russia conflict is a strong argument for the installation of a U.S. radar base in the

Czech Republic as part of a missile defence system” ( Lazarova, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2008,Current Affairs). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in a statement said that it had great concern about the incident and requested the international community to try to solve the matters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

- Saudi Arabia on the other hand reflected a positive kind of response towards Russia. The Secretary of the Saudi National Security Council Bandar bin Sultan said the then President Putin that Saudi Arabia can understand why Russia took this kind of action and they supported Russia’s action towards Georgia (Gazeta.ru,4<sup>th</sup> September 2008).
- Turkey being a neighbour of Georgia was very much worried for the whole situation. Prime Minister Erdogan called for an immediate cease fire. Turkey also agreed to help Georgia by supplying 30-40 MW of electricity. Abdullah Gul, the current President of Republic of Turkey had a conversation with Dmitry Medvedev , and in that Abdullah Gul showed Turkey’s sympathy for the mass deaths of civilians in South Ossetia and also shows its ‘desire to facilitate the implementation of the conflict resolution principle that all the parties had agreed to’ (NTV News Channel, 14<sup>th</sup> August 2008).
- In case of Germany the deputy Foreign Minister Gemot Erler blamed Georgia for violating international law by breaking a 1992 ceasefire agreement with Russia. He said he could understand Russia’s reaction. But the German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave her view quite diplomatically, in some point she did not support Russia by saying, “to say that I found some of Russia's actions disproportionate and in particular think the presence of Russian troops in Georgia proper is not sensible. Russian troops should withdraw from central areas in Georgia”. But according to her some of the Russia’s actions were quite right. The Foreign Minister Steinmerer stated that the international community should prevent the tensions, violence and should take steps to stop spreading the tension throughout Caucasus (Federal Foreign Affairs, Germany, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2008).

- Syria expressed support to Russia’s stand. The President of Syria Bashar al-Assad said that USA was using double standards towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to him west was basically ignoring the rights of the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he also stated, “In a situation when Georgia started the war, the position of Russia...was absolutely right” (Press TV, 21<sup>ST</sup> August 2008).

**TABLE:-1.1 International Response to the War**

<b>Countries recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia</b>	<b>Countries supported the action of Russia against Georgia</b>	<b>Countries did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia</b>
Russia Nicaragua Venezuela Tuvalu Nauru Nagorno Karabakh Transnistria	Syria Saudi Arabia Kazakhstan China Cuba	Australia Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan United Kingdom Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Albania Hungary Israel

(iv) **Countries Supported Independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia**

There are five UN member states that recognize the independence of South Ossetia. Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu and Nauru are the five countries who supported South Ossetia.

On 14<sup>th</sup> August Venezuelan Government gave a statement in which it said that the Georgian attack against the South Ossetian people was unacceptable and totally “planned, set and ordered by the United States Government”. According to Venezuela Russia behaved legitimately to preserve the lives of South Ossetians and Russians (RIANOVOSTI, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2009).

Nicaraguan President said it would recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and welcomed them as newest member of the world community of independent states (Emol, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2008).

Except from them three non-UN member countries also supported the independence of South Ossetia; they are- Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh (Lenta.ru, 16<sup>th</sup> December 2009).

In case of Abkhazia there are five UN member countries that recognize its independence- Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu, Nauru and three non-UN member countries- South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh; they also recognize the independence of Abkhazia (RFE/RL, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2011).

## *Search for New Security Paradigm in Europe*

After a very difficult and problematic period in transatlantic relations, the 2008 US presidential election increased hopes of improving ties between Europe and the United States and more structural approach for dealing with some of the more troubling issues facing the Alliance. The US Vice President Joe Biden promised closer cooperation with America's allies and re-engagement with Russia at the Munich Security Conference. According to the European continent the most challenging factor for their foreign policy is to achieve a good relationship with Russia while maintaining friendly relations with other former Soviet states.

On 8 October 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, the President of the Russian Federation, offered an initiative at the World Policy Conference in Evian which was organized by the French Institute of International Relations. After discussing the developments and problems of the global political situation since the collapse of the bipolar system, Medvedev agreed to propose new comprehensive European Security Treaty.

According to Rotfeld (2009:98), "The aim of the Treaty, declared the Russian president, would be to introduce 'uniform rules of the game' across the transatlantic area. The agreement would be legally binding and would provide security guarantees for all its signatories. A draft of the European Security Treaty was presented on 29 November 2009 and addressed to all the NATO, EU, and OSCE member states. Russia was thus proposing a new security architecture".

According to Rumer and Stent (2009:36), "Moscow understands the differences between the US and European perspectives and has pursued policies that reinforce them." In fact before the Georgia war, Medvedev's first important foreign-policy speech in Berlin in June 2008 included a proposal to redesign the entire Euro- Atlantic security architecture on the basis of each country's 'naked' national interests. According to him this new pact would must be a 'regional pact' based and it would be based on the principles of UN charter. (Herpen 2008:4)



In that speech Dmitry Medvedev said, “Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (...), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organizations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties” (ibid).

Rumer and Stent (2009:43) stated that, “Reactions in the United States to this ambitious and amorphous proposal ranged from polite puzzlement to outright dismissal. However, the Germans immediately responded that this was an issue on which Europeans should engage Russia, and other countries have followed suit. Medvedev’s idea can be traced to the 1954 Soviet proposal for an all-European security framework agreement. Subsequent iterations of that scheme, particularly the one that led to the 1975 Helsinki agreement, contained persistent themes which some Russian spokesmen have described as key elements of the current appeal”.

“Securing a sphere of influence, legitimising post-1945 borders and promoting economic ties between Europe’s two halves were the Kremlin’s key goals in negotiating the Helsinki accords. But the accords also contained provisions – the ‘Basket Three’ – intended to foster closer humanitarian ties and greater social contacts between the two halves of Europe. Despite early concerns that the accords would legitimise the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, they played a decisive role in undermining the very gains that Moscow had tried to consolidate, and contributed to the fall of the Iron Curtain”(ibid).

It was viewed that Helsinki accords, which became a very important forum for the West to engage the Soviet Union on human rights helped to create the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) expanded its activities to establish a new Office of Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights just after the end of communism and some of the post-communist states also started to emerge at the same time.

“Its election monitoring activities have become increasingly controversial in many of the post-Soviet states, including Russia, and it did not monitor the 2007 Duma elections or the 2008 presidential election. In recent years, Russian officials and Kremlin-connected pundits have hinted that Russia might withdraw from the OSCE, now viewed in Moscow as an instrument for the West to act against Russian interests. The Medvedev proposal appears to be an attempt to create a ‘son of OSCE’ without the Basket Three provisions for democracy-building, a system in which Russia, Europe and the United States would be equal partners, but which does not concern itself with the internal organisation and politics of members states”(ibid).

Medvedev criticised the ‘NATO-centric’ approach towards European security in October 2008 at Evian, France. He also suggested several basic principles for a new security treaty: “inadmissibility of the use of force in international relations; guarantees of ‘equal security’; and the impossibility of one state or international organisation having ‘exclusive rights’ to maintain peace and stability in Europe”.

The Russian idea saw a positive sign in 2009; only after the end of Russia-Georgia war; which was forced Europe to build a new security paradigm, in which West needs to take Russia as an equal partner. But in the absence of an active joint US–European effort to engage Russia on this particular issue, Russian proposal did create some other tension within the alliance; especially in awake of if Moscow’s bilateral diplomacy with selected European capitals.

“Versions of the Russian proposal circulating in some European capitals call for countries to sign a renunciation-of-force agreement and for reiteration of the principles on which the United Nations is based. Some versions envisage the creation of a UN Security Council-type directorate made up of the larger European states that would run this new Euro-Atlantic organisation, reinforcing the impression that, for many of the Russian foreign-policy class, the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe remains an attractive model”(ibid).

Recently on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2012 Prime Minister Putin has given a view point in which he said that, “I am convinced that global security can be achieved only together with Russia and not by trying to sideline her, weaken her geopolitical position and damage her defence capacities.” This speech was basically for USA and NATO. According to Putin, the understanding of national security today “fundamentally differs” between NATO and the U.S.A on the one hand and Russia on the other.

Rumer and Stent (2009:48) said that, “Sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic argue that Russia is trying to dilute NATO and the OSCE, and that Moscow’s ultimate aim is to supplant these organisations with a new Euro-Atlantic security treaty legitimising its sphere of influence. Even if Russia does not succeed in getting rid of the organisations, Moscow could divide the Alliance sufficiently to weaken the core transatlantic security institutions”.

But there is some lack of specificity in this proposal which basically offers a chance to think deeply regarding how to engage Russia more productively on these matters. Because this engagement or any new agreement could help to change nature of Russia’s relationship with some of the western countries, not only that it could ensure that Russia becomes a ‘stakeholder’ in a stable and secure Europe. If Russia could feel that the West was treating it as an equal, it could not blame west for ignoring its interest in Europe. ‘Not engaging seriously with the Kremlin on its initiatives would be irresponsible’ (ibid).

Recently Putin in a statement said, “We will consistently root our policy in our own interests and objectives, and not resolutions dictated by others, Russia is only reckoned with when it is strong and firmly stands on its feet”.

According to Herpen (2008:7) there are some hidden objectives of Russia behind the New European Security concept and these are:

Russia wants to introduce China as a ‘countervailing extra-European power alongside the US.’ It can be strange for some countries but Russia could say that although Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are the Central Asian countries

but they are also participating in the OSCE that deals with security and co-operation in Europe.

“Moscow to give the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security organization in which Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members, an equal say in European affairs with NATO. The American presence in Europe would be balanced by another extra-European power: China. But, at the same time, Russia would not want to grant China too much importance, because the Russian-Chinese partnership possesses a number of ambiguities”(ibid).

The second objective of Russia could be to increase the importance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has its roots in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

“This ‘Mini- Warsaw Pact’ in which Russia – in contrast to the SCO - is the uncontested leader and in which seven former Soviet states are members, is not only militarily more integrated than the SCO, but it also has an equivalent of NATO’s Article 5, defining a mutual defense obligation”(ibid).

The third objective of Russia behind this New Security Paradigm in Europe is to divide NATO. Russia shows a very intelligent attitude for choosing the timing for this. It has chosen a time when Bush administration was very much unpopular in Europe and while Mr. Bush’s tenure was almost over and there was no new administration in Washington out yet. Even if any new government came out then also it needed some time to adjust with all the political situations.

More over as Herpen (2008:24) pointed out, “Many European NATO allies are disaffected with the Bush Presidency and feel overstretched by the unwinnable guerilla war in Afghanistan. Their response to the Russian occupation of Georgia has been extremely weak. For Moscow, this situation has opened a window of opportunity. At the moment of the transition of power in Washington, the moral status of the US leadership is at a historic low, while

the weakness of the US is aggravated by the turmoil of the global banking crisis”.

At the same time the situation in Europe was also not so good, it was expected that the Lisbon Treaty would increase the power of EU in the field of foreign policy, but it failed to do that.

“Moscow knows that its initiative will be met with mistrust by the Baltic states, Poland, and the UK. But it intends to play a subtle game, trying to win support for its plan in the leading European capitals. Even if Medvedev’s proposal would not lead to a conference, the fact of proposing the plan would, as such, already fulfil one of its objectives: to divide the NATO allies”(ibid).

The fourth objective of Russia was to tackle NATO. Medvedev in his speech in Berlin said, “Absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups”. The individual NATO member states were also invited. It was true that a treaty which was signed by individual member states couldn’t enable Moscow to stop NATO’s decision but it was helped Moscow to influence the decision making process of the Alliance and it even stopped implementing decisions. Russia basically wanted to establish an additional international legal structure for the Euro-Atlantic area in order to bind NATO’s decisions (ibid).

The fifth objective was probably the most important, which was to give Russia a basis in international law in order to claim Russian variant of Monroe doctrine which is applicable to Russia’s Near Abroad policy.

In his Berlin speech Medvedev said, “It is enough to recall the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. But that agreement failed to work and shared the sorry fate of the League of Nations. In today’s world, when no one wants war in Europe and we have all been made wiser by the lessons of the twentieth century, such an agreement has a better hope of success”.

The last, objective of Medvedev's proposal was to attack some already existing European Security Treaties, such as the OSCE and the CFE Treaty.

Medvedev said in his Berlin speech, "An organization such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilization's newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organization. The problem is not just in the organization's own incomplete institutional development but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics".

According to Medvedev the CFE treaty was equally old fashioned. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1990. It was one of the most important treaties for the security and stability in Europe.

Herpen (2008:25) stated that, "It has limited conventional military equipment in the region between the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals and has implemented confidence building measures, such as prior notification of troop movements and military maneuvers, and surprise inspections. The Treaty established 'central zone limits' and regional 'flank limits' in order to prevent destabilizing force concentrations". But according to Russia it has some faults of its own.

After discussing all these facts it can be said that the small military conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi has created a larger effect on European security perspectives. The US interventions in the war made the situation more complex. This military conflict affected the market economy of both the countries as well as it took whole the international politics in a great amount tension. Although each country viewed the war differently but still the total number of mass death and the chaotic situation which was created by the war became the most vulnerable situation for all. There is no doubt that this little but highly affected military conflict made the situation very difficult especially for Russia and Georgia. Both the countries got little bit of support but at the same time both of them were criticized very badly for their action. Not only Russia and Georgia but also NATO and its allies were being criticized. USA is first of all pointed out for its recognition of Kosovo which was according to some political

thinker influencing factor for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and then it was being criticized for its action in Russia-Georgia military conflict. On the other hand Russia's plan for new security paradigm in Europe created another dramatic situation for not only the European countries and the west but also for the Asian countries as well. Regarding this new plan there is a great doubt about whether Europe needs this new security paradigm or not and whether Russia is doing it for its own benefit or for the benefit of international politics. However it is very clear that the military conflict of August 2008 changed the scenario of international politics very crucially.

\*\*\*\*\*

## **Chapter-5**

### **CONCLUSION**

In post 2008 war period, trouble in bilateral relationship of two neighboring countries Russia and Georgia have reached in a new height. But as earlier said, this trouble is not a contemporary phenomenon. From the historical point of view, conflicting issues between Russia and Georgia existed from the Lenin's period. Which even can be traced in the bitter struggle of Russian Bolsheviks and Georgian Mensheviks; which actually is considered as initial point of conflict between two countries. After the disintegration of Soviet Union, Georgia got independence and the situation got more aggravated. The 2008 August War was a result of all those earlier factors coupled with some new problems. By looking at the internal problem between Moscow and Tbilisi several western countries started to use the situation for their own benefit and this makes the whole scenario more vulnerable.

The first hypothesis in the study is that- Georgia's failure to meet the aspiration of ethnic minorities living in its territory and provocation by external players to act against Russian interest in Caucasus led to military confrontation between Russia and Georgia. The second one is Russian victory in the war strengthened its geo-political position in the Caucasus as well as rest of the CIS region. In earlier chapters while dealing with the various issues of Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 an effort has been made to establish the mentioned hypotheses.

Chapter two dealt with the historical facts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. It shows how these three countries were incorporated into Russia from very early period. It discusses how the Georgian rulers seek Russian protection and came under Russian territory in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Secondly, this chapter discusses about secessionist movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; it also shows how the independence of Kosovo and movement in Tibet has influenced the secessionist movement in South Ossetia. Effort has been made to show that how during the period of Gamsakhurdia the Ossetians, who call themselves Alans, faced problems. Georgians identified them as 'newcomers' and they were treated as second class



citizens. Intention of South Ossetia to become an independent autonomous republic has a history from 1989 itself but Georgia refused to give it an autonomous status. But after a dispute, spanning from 1990 to 1992 it became the de-facto independent country; during this conflict it has lost thousands of lives. During 1989 the problem became more severe when Gamsakhurdia declared that Georgian would be the language of the land not Russian or South Ossetian. So It can be clearly found that the problems between Georgia and South Ossetia are nothing new.

Apart from South Ossetia, Georgia has old problem with Abkhazia and the conflict with Abkhazia was the another serious problem during 1990s. A 'Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict' was signed in April 1994 but in spite of those agreements the internal problems between Abkhazia and Georgia could not be solved and the guerrilla activities were continued in Abkhazia. It has also been seen that although the creation of legend of Georgia and Abkhazia is identical but still two groups have problems because they tried to deny the existence of other group. From the history it can be said that the secessionist entities in Abkhazia was basically emerged after the disintegration of Soviet Union. In post disintegration period as Georgia moves towards its independence, ethnic tension between Abkhazia and Georgia was increased and the result of this is the 1992-'93 war in Abkhazia. After the war Abkhazia claimed itself as the Republic of Abkhazia and on the other hand Georgia called it the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and this difference resulted as the major point of confrontation became between Abkhazia and Georgia.

Thirdly, this chapter deals with the causes of ethnic separatism in Russia and Georgia both. It shows how after the disintegration of Soviet Union the issues of ethnicity turned into a vulnerable direction. History shows that especially with the disintegration USSR the ethnic regions in the successor's states started to demand cultural, political and economic autonomy from their own new central governments. On the other hand, problems in Georgia too were of similar nature. For example, religion and linguistic differences were the key issues of conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. While other analysts believe that the internal weakness of Georgia, at

the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union, helped to broaden the separatist movement.

Fourthly, the chapter discusses about with bilateral relationship between Russia and Georgia before and after the Soviet disintegration. It shows that the problem between Russia and Georgia is nothing new. It was there even before the disintegration of Soviet Union, for example Georgian Mensheviks did not support the Bolshevik revolution. However after disintegration Georgia got independence. During Yeltsin's period the relationship between the two countries became comparatively better. But as the conflict grew, the relationship status of both the countries again got deteriorated. Because of various internal problems Georgia faced a huge economic crisis in the 90s and that time Georgia was dependent on Moscow for paying wages to its state employees. At the end of 90s and beginning of 2000 Georgia's relationship with Russia took a new shape. During 2000 to 2001 Georgian military started to get support from America. During Putin's time in second Chechen war a dispute started between Russia and Georgia regarding the Pankisi Valley. But during that same period Putin, also took some foreign policy decisions which were good for international cooperation. He reconciled to US military presence in Georgia and signed an agreement with Georgia's President to lower the tension between both the countries. But after 2005 the relationship between both the countries were worsened. In 2006 the explosion in Russia's North Caucasus region cut off Georgian energy supplies and the Georgian security forces tried to secure the Kodori Valley to control the separatist area of Abkhazia where Russian peacekeepers were stationed and this thing makes the situation worse. By discussing all these study covers the ups and downs in relationship between Russia and Georgia.

Fifthly, the chapter focuses on the 2008 August war between Russia and Georgia. Although the war lasted for only five days but it was not as small as it looked like. It created an impact internationally. It also created serious crisis in European security system. This time the Russian commanders show greater emphasis on Abkhazia. Later, the chapter also explained how Georgia overlooked Russia's adherence to help South Ossetia militarily as well. Regarding the war there are various kind of opinion

prevails, some says it's a kind of invasion by Russia, according to some there was actually no preparation of war from any side. But the point is whatever the reasons, in this war many people were died and it left many refugees in temporary shelters. This war also turns the wind in negative way regarding US-Russia relation.

Chapter three begins with the discussion of various reasons behind the war. It tries to establish the political, ethnic and military factors of this war and also the geo-political factor behind the war. While discussing the reasons of the August war, the chapter also tries to point out Moscow's foreign security policy regarding the factor of the war. Then it tries to give a view point regarding Russian perspective and Georgian perspective of the war.

Secondly, the chapter analyses the role of the external factor behind the war. The discussion includes role of NATO, role of US advisers and Special Forces, role of Israel in Georgia. Regarding the role of NATO it tries to show how Georgia's western orientation to join NATO affected adversely the relationship between Russia and Georgia. From 2004 onwards the South Caucasus states has been pushing to join NATO and Russia was not happy with that fact. Not only that, in July 2008 US started a military training exercise in Georgia with Georgian troops and this issue created tension between Russia and Georgia. In case of US advisers and Special Forces we can see that in the early period of 2002 US military advisers tried to make Georgia as 'new front' in the war on terror concept and this involvement of US make the situation more and more complicated. Not only US, it was noticed that to some extent Israel was also tried to influence Georgia against Russia. Georgia purchased military equipment from Israel and tanks and artilleries were aided by Israeli military advisers.

Thirdly, the chapter deals with geo-political aspects of the war and Russia's geo-political advantage from the war. Russia took a step against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued "strategic and geopolitical objectives," it basically includes de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening of the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It also point out that Georgia's strategic position is very much important, and in case of the Baku Tblisi Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Georgia's significance can't be denied. On the

other hand by discussing Russia's geo-political advantage from the war it shows the point that by preventing Georgia from its desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Russia wanted to send a strong message to Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to war. After the war Russia is also increasing its control over the Caucasus. In the matter of oil pipeline it gets more advantage than earlier.

Fourthly, the chapter discusses about the impact of the war in the context of CIS countries. Basically the war has a great impact on whole international politics but the CIS countries as a neighbour of Russia and Georgia suffered a lot. In the earlier period Georgia was also a part of CIS but in later stage it withdraws from that group. Realistically after war period was more favourable to Russia than others and Russia was in driving sit of situation. But this war created difficulty in the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. The wider black sea region suffered maximum because of this war. This war changed the whole situation of South Caucasus. It affected the domestic politics of CIS countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan etc. Because of this war Azerbaijan's perception of 'democratic west' has been changed a bit. Its relationship with the west too changed in some extent. This War has a great impact on foreign policy, energy projects, and the clash of geopolitical interests of the CIS countries.

Fifthly, the chapter discusses the views of the CIS countries regarding the war. The little war of 2008 almost shook the whole world and while discussing about the war different countries gave different opinion, even the CIS countries viewed this war differently. Some CIS countries supported Russia for its action, some did not and some countries just diplomatically taken a neutral position. Some CIS countries recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia like-Tajikistan and Russia; but at the same time regarding this issue there were several internal disputes in some countries, like in Ukraine. But not only Ukraine, Moldova is also in the same situation. Belarus on the other hand created a dramatical situation, first it decided to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia but in later stage it did not recognize both the countries. Kazakhstan did not recognize the independence. Although the opinion varied but there is no doubt that to some extent the defeat of

Georgia in this war and the unbalanced condition of Georgia after the war made the Russian model of governance more attractive to the people.

Hence, by discussing this entire factor the second and third chapters help to establish my first hypothesis, i.e., how and why the secessionist movement started in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and then how Georgia failed to meet the aspiration of ethnic minorities living in its own territory. The second chapter shows how the Georgian Government forcefully tried to change the nationality of the Oassettians. The study also focuses on the role of external factors against Russia's interest and it played a major role behind the military confrontation. Thus these two chapters with the help of each other try to establish my first hypothesis.

The last chapter proves the last hypothesis with the help of second and third chapters. This chapter starts with the military conflict between Russia and Georgia. The conflict basically started when Tbilisi sent some troops in South Ossetia for establishing Georgian control over the territory. Russia from that time started taking some steps against Georgia. The war between Russia and Georgia is not a result of a single factor; actually it's a result of prevailing broad range of tension between them.

Next, the chapter discusses about the implications of the war in the context of European security. Earlier it has been discussed how the five day war which took place between Russia and Georgia created impact on CIS countries, not only CIS countries it basically affected more or less the entire world politics. The European states are not an exception from that; the war has a great impact on European security also. The negative kind of relationship between Russia and West is not a new phenomenon but this war shows the west, the increasing capacity and increasing power of Russia. It pointed out them, Russia is not going to accept any kind of interference in their own internal matter; it shows them that Russia is capable enough to respond any kind of activity against them. The war was basically a response against the US activities which was taking place for so long. This war proved that by no means Russia was not willing to allow NATO's eastward expansion and its demand

for new security paradigm in Europe; which change the whole European security context.

Thirdly, the chapter deals with the issue of new security paradigm in Europe. After the war it has been cleared to Europe that it's very difficult to build a good relationship with Russia as well as with other former Soviet states. Hence after the war the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev discussed about the problems of global political system and from that discussion he gave an idea of new European security system and also tried to establish a treaty called New European security treaty. Actually it has been noticed that there is a difference among the Russian, US and European security perspectives. In post war scenario Moscow suggested an entirely new Euro- Atlantic security architecture on the basis of each countries national interest. Russia wanted this new security architecture because it does not like the NATO-centric approach of European security and it wants to be an equal partner in European security scenario. On the other hand Russia tried for this new security treaty because it wanted to divide NATO and Russia was also having an objective to increase its importance in Collective Security Treaty Organization. The objective of Medvedev proposal also was to attack the earlier existing security system of Europe.

Lastly, the chapter discusses about international response to the August war. The war which took place between Russia and Georgia has got various kind of response. Through this war Moscow basically wanted to establish its influence on the former Soviet states and at the same time it wanted to decrease the importance of European politics from these states. Now when we discussed about the international response then it can be various response, like- response from the international organization, response from each countries etc. In respect of the international organization it has been noticed that most of the international organization suggested a peaceful conversation to solve this problem. The members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization supported Russia; on the other hand OSCE said it can deploy humanitarian assistance in war affected area. CSTO supported Russia's action towards Georgia. Amnesty International and United Nation both blamed Russia and Georgia equally and requested to take any kind of harmful action.


Like various international organization, different states have also given various responses. The Baltic States have given some joint statements. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania showed great concern over the situation. Australia and Austria on the other hand said Russia should respect Georgia's territorial integrity. Cuba respects South Ossetia's legitimacy and according to it Georgia's claim of territorial integrity is basically a false claim. Several other countries have given opinion according to their own role in international politics and according to their own interest. Some played very diplomatic role by not giving any particular opinion. Syria, Saudi Arabia on the other hand gave a positive kind of response towards Russia.

This chapter with the help of two earlier chapters help to establish the last hypothesis. The second chapter shows how after the war Russia's geo-political position has become stronger. The next chapter helps to understand how the CIS countries reacted and what is Russia's position is there in the CIS countries after the war and the last chapter helps us to understand the European perspective and also the international perspectives. These three chapters all together prove that Russia won some strategic geo-political goals after the war; that means the war strengthen Russia's geo-political role in the Caucasus as well as rest of the CIS region. Russia gave a proposal for new European security system in which it can able to have equal status like US. This war proved that Russia has enough capability to deal with its matters and it is not going to accept any western influence against Russia's interest. In short the war made a strong geo-political base for Russia.

\*\*\*\*\*

## Appendix-I

**Map-1.1-Early Georgian States CA.600-150 BC**



Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html>

## Appendix-II

**Map-1.3-Georgian States CA:150 BC-600 AD**




Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html>



## Appendix-III


Map-1.3-Georgian States CA.830-1020



Source- <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html>

## Appendix-IV

Map-1.4-Georgia: 1089-1125



Source- <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=1>

## Appendix-V

Map.1.5-Georgia: 1184-1230



Source- <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=1>

## Appendix-VI

**Map.1.6-Georgian States CA.1450-1515**



Source- <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=1>

## Appendix-VII

**Map.1.7-Georgia CA.1516-1555**



Source- <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=1>

## Appendix-VIII

**Map.1.8-Caucasus CA.1555-1639**



Source-<http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## Appendix-IX

**Map.1.9-Georgia CA.1762**



Source-<http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## Appendix-X

Map.1.10-Georgia: 1810



Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?pag=2>

## Appendix-XI

Map.1.11-Georgia: 1916



Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## Appendix-XII

Map.1.12-Georgia: 1919-1921



Source-<http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## Appendix-XIII

Map.1.13-Georgia: 1921-1931



Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## Appendix-XIV

Map.1.14-Georgia



Source: <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/ge.htm>

## Appendix-XV

Map.1.15-South Ossetian Territory under Georgia



Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SO1.jpg>

## Appendix-XVI

**Map.1.16-Ethnolinguistic Groups in Caucasus Region**



Source: [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caucasus\\_ethnic.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caucasus_ethnic.jpg)

## Appendix-XVII

**Map.1.17-Pre context of 2008 War**




Source: [http://kelsocartography.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/p1-am535a\\_georg\\_20080810213620.gif](http://kelsocartography.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/p1-am535a_georg_20080810213620.gif)



## Appendix-XVIII

**Map.1.18-Military Conflict between Russia and Georgia**



Source: <http://www.aboutgeorgia.ge/maps/historical.html?page=2>

## REFERENCES

(\* indicates a primary source)

Adomeit, Hannes and Heidi Reisinger (2002) *Russia's Role in Post-Soviet Territory: Decline of Military Power and Political Influence*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

Akiner, S. (ed.) (2004) *The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security*, Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon.

Alar Net (2008), "Moldova rejects recognition of Georgian region", 29<sup>th</sup> August, [Online:web] Accessed 16 February, 2012 URL: <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/>

Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell (2009) "No Way To Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, no. 1 (January).

Allen, W. E. D (1932) *A History of the Georgian People*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

.....(1971) *A History of the Georgian People*, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Allison, R (2008) "Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to Coerce Georgia to Peace", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, no.6, pp-1146-1171.

Amirahmadi, H (ed.) (2000) *The Caspian Region at a Crossroad: Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy and Development*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Arashidze, I (2007) *Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

AsiaNews.it (2008), “*Moscow seeks allies on Georgia, but China and fear separatism*”, 28<sup>th</sup> August, [Online: web] Accessed 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2012 URL: <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Moscow-seeks-allies-on-Georgia,-but-China-and-India-fear-separatism-13074.html>

Asmus, R. D (2010), “*A Little War that Shook the World-Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West*”, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Astrov, A (ed) (2011) *The Great Power (mis) Management-Russian-Georgian War and its Implications for Global Political Order*, England: Ashgate Publishing limited.

Auty, R. M. and de Soysa, I. (eds) (2006) *Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Lessons Not Learned*, London: Routledge.

Babak, V (ed.) (2004) *Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Sources and Documents*, London: Frank Cass.

Baev P.K (2011) “Medvedev Reflects on the Georgia War”, *Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia, Daily Monitor*, 8(152).

Bahry, Donna (2005) “The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional Sovereignty in Russia”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 127–46.

Bailes, A (2003) *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Baev, P.K (2008) “From West to South to North: Russia Engages and Challenges its Neighbours”, *International Journal*, Vol.63, No.2, (Spring), pp.291-305.

Baker, Peter, and Susan Glasser (2005) *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*, New York: Scribner.

Barany, Zs (2006/2007) "The Politics of Russia's Elusive Defence Reform", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.121, No.4, (Winter), pp.595-627.

Barry, Ellens (2008) "Georgia's Battered Face in a Separatist Republic." *New York Times*, November 1.

.....(2008) "Soviet Union's Fall Unraveled Enclave in Georgia" *New York Times*, September 6.

Bayev, P (1997) *Russia's Policies in the Caucasus*, London: Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Bayev, P. K. and Berthelsen, O (1996) *Conflicts in the Caucasus*, Oslo: Institutt for Fredsforskning.

Beissinger, M. R (2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

.....(2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,.

Bertsch G.K , Craft C, Jones S.A, Beck M (eds) (2000), "*Crossroads and Conflict Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*", Routledge: New York.

Belopolsky, H (2009) *Russia and the Challengers-Russian Alignment with China, Iran and Iraq in the Unipolar Era*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Blagov, Sergey (2006) “Putin to Tbilisi: Our Peacekeepers are Staying Put”, *Eurasia Insight*, 27 June, URL: [www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062706.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062706.shtml)

Blank, Stephen (2005) “Is Russia a Democracy and Does It Matter?”, *World Affairs*, MCLVII, no. 3 (Winter), pp. 125–136.

..... (1995) “Russia and Europe in the Caucasus”, *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, (Winter), pp. 622–645.

Bochorishvili, T., Sweet, W. and Ahern, D (eds) (2005) *Politics, Ethics and Challenges to Democracy in ‘New Independent States’*, Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Brass, Paul R (1991) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Brubaker, Rogers. (2004) *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Buys, C.G (2008) “Introductory Note to the International Court of Justice’s Order for Provisional Measures in Georgia vs Russian Federation”, *International Legal Materials*, Vol.47, No.6, pp.1010-1012.

Bryer, A (1988) *Peoples and Settlement in Anatolia and the Caucasus, 800–1900*, London: Ashgate.

Castillo, J (1997) “The Dilemma of Simultaneity: Russia and Georgia in the Midst of Transformation”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 160, No.1, (Summer), pp.34-42.

Champain, P., Klein, D. and Mirimanova, N. (eds) (2004) *From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus*, London: International Alert.

Chayes, Abram. and Antonia Handler Chayes, (1997) "Transition and Conflict: Russian and American Perspectives On the Former Soviet Union", in Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Lara Olson (ed.) *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chenoy, A (2008) "Russian-Georgian Confrontation", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.43, No. 34, pp.17-18, August.

China View (2008), "*Bangladesh calls for early cessation of hostilities between Russia and Georgia*", 8<sup>th</sup> August, [Online:web] Accessed 12 March, 2012 URL: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/10/content\\_9131521.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/10/content_9131521.htm)

.....(2008), "Tajikistan urges Russia, Georgia to solve conflict through political, diplomatic means", 30<sup>th</sup> August, [Online:web] Accessed 24 February, 2012 URL: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/30/content\\_9739259.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/30/content_9739259.htm)

Chivers, C.J (2009) "Russia Keeps Troops in Georgia, Defying Deal", *New York Times*, 2 April, 2009, URL: [www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/europe/03georgia.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/europe/03georgia.html)

Chorbajian, L., Donabedian P. and Mutaflan C (1994) *The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books.

(\*) CIA World Fact book (2011) *Georgia*, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html>

Civil Georgia (2008), "*UN Security Council to discuss S. Osetia*", 8<sup>th</sup> August, [Online:web] Accessed on 14 March, 2012 URL: <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18948>

Coene, F (2010), *The Caucasus-An Introduction*, New York: Routledge Publication.

Cooley, A (2009), “Behind the Central Asian Curtain: the Limits of Russia’s Resurgence”, *Current History*, 108 (720), pp. 325-332.

Cooley, Alexander and Lincoln A. Mitchell (2009) “No Way To Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations”, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 1, (January) pp. 27–41.

Coppieters, B. and Legvold, R. (eds) (2005) *Georgia after the Rose Revolution*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cornell, S.E. and Starr S.F (eds) (2009) *The Guns of August 2008-Russia’s War in Georgia*, Central Asia and Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University.

Cornell, Svante E (2002) “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective” *World Politics*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 245–76.

Cornell, Svante E., Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson (2007) *Learning from Georgia’s Crisis: Implications and Recommendations*, Washington D.C. and Stockholm: CACI & SRSP Policy Paper.

Cotter, John M (1999) “Cultural Security Dilemmas and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 106–31.

Croissant, M (1998) *The Armenia–Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*, London: Praeger.

Deyermond R (2008), *Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Ebel, R. E. and Menon, R (eds) (2000) *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Engelbrekt, K and Nygren, B (ed) (2010) *Russia and Europe-Building bridges, digging trenches*, Abingdon: Routledge Publication.

Erickson, John (1999) “Russia Will not be Trifled With: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies” in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (ed.) *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy*, London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Evangelista, M (2002) *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Fairbanks, Charles H (2004) “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2 (April), pp. 112–115.

Farrell, W. B., Kay, B., Philips, A. and Robertson, L (2002) *Georgia Conflict Assessment*, Washington, DC: ARD.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 75–90.

Feldbrugge, F. J. M (1992) “The Law of the Republic of Georgia”, *Review of Central and East European Law*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 367–75.

Financial Times (2008), “*Crimea urges recognition of Georgia separatists*”, 17<sup>th</sup> September, [Online: web] Accessed 12 March, 2012 URL: [http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news\\_id=fto091720081150380939](http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto091720081150380939)

Funch, L. and Krag, H (1994) *The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads*, London: Minority Rights Group.

Gachechiladze, R (1995) *The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics*, London: University College of London Press.



Gahrton, P (2010) *Georgia Pawn in the New Great Game*, New York: Pluto Press.

Gall, C. and de Waal, T (1998) *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*, New York: New York University Press.

Gammer, M (ed.) (2008) *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus*, London: Routledge.

.....(ed.) (2008) *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder*, London: Routledge.

Geistlinger, M (ed.) (2008) *Security Identity and the Southern Caucasus: The Role of the EU, the US and Russia*, Vienna: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.

Gellner, Ernest (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

George J.A (2009), *"The politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia"*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gibler, Douglas M. and Jamil A. Sewell (2006) "External threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 413–431.

Gorodetsky G (eds) (2003) *"Russia Between East and West-Russia's Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the 21<sup>ST</sup> Century"*, London: Frank Cass.

Gray, Colin (2009) *National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities*, Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.

Green, J.A and Waters, C.P.M (2009) *Conflict in the Caucasus-Implications for International Legal Order*, England: Macmillan Distribution Ltd.

Gregory, P (2004) *Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation to the First Five-Year Plan*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harman, J and Ahern, D (2008) "Russia's Global Perspective: Defining a New Relationship with Europe and America", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol.19, pp.3-8.

Hass M.D (2010), "*Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century-Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*", Abingdon: Routledge Publication.

Herzig, E. (1999) *The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Heywood, Paul (1997) "Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives", *Political Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 417–35.

Hill, Fiona and Omer Taspinar (2006) "Turkey and Russia: An Axis of the Excluded", *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 1, (Spring).

Hopf, T (2005) "Identity, Legitimacy and the Use of Military Force: Russia's Great Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.31.pp.225-243, December.

Horowitz, Donald L (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Huntington, Samuel P (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

(\*) International Crisis Group (2008) “Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia”, *Europe Report*, No.193, 5 June, URL: [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5469](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5469)

(\*).....(2004) “Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia” *Europe Report*, no. 159, 26 November 2004, URL: [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3128](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3128)

(\*).....(2007) “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly”, *Europe Report*, no. 183, 7 June 2007, URL: [www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ICG/fl1e68999963124126bde07bd4d6de41b.htm](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ICG/fl1e68999963124126bde07bd4d6de41b.htm)

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008) *The Military Balance 2008*, London: Routledge.

Ishkanian, A (2008) *Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia*, London: Routledge.

Jack, Andrew and Tom Warner (2004) “Georgia’s Colourful President Tells of Reunification Plans”, *Financial Times*, May 8.

Jack, Andrew (2002) “Russia Wins One Bloody Battle But the War Goes On”, *Financial Times*, October 28.

Jervalidze, L (2006) *Georgia: Russian Energy Policy and Implications for Georgia’s Energy Security*, London: GMB Publishing Ltd.

Karagiannis, E (2002) *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: Routledge Curzon.

Karny, Y (2000) *Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Quest of Memory*, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Katz, R (2006) *The Georgian Regime Crisis of 2003–2004: A Case Study in Post-Soviet Media Representation of Politics, Crime and Corruption*, Stuttgart: Ibidem.

Kaufmann, R (2000) *Kaukasus: Georgien, Armenien, Aserbajdschan*, Munich: Prestel.

Kenez, p (2006) *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

King C (2008) “The Five Day War-Managing Moscow After the Georgian Crisis”, *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 6, pp. 2-11.

.....(2008) *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

.....(2001) “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, *World Politics*, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 524–52.

King, Charles. (2004) “A Rose among Thorns: Georgia Makes Good”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 1–6.

Kolga, M (2001) *The Red Book of the Peoples of the Russian Empire*, Tallinn: NGO Red Book.

Kriokrian, Onnik (2008) “Georgia: Blogging the War”, *Global Voices*, 28 August 2008, URL: [www.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/28/georgia-blogging-the-war/](http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/28/georgia-blogging-the-war/)

Kumar, R. (2008) “From Kosovo to Georgia: The US, NATO and Russia”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.43, No.36, pp.24-25, 27, September.

KyivPost (2010), “*Yanukovich: recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Kosovo violates international law*”, 4<sup>th</sup> June, [Online: web] Accessed 12 May, 2012 URL: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/yanukovich-recognition-of-independence-of-abkhazia.html>

Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild (1996) “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 41–75.

Lanskoy, Miriam and Giorgi Areshidze (2008) “Georgia’s Year of Turmoil”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 160–161.

Legvold, Robert (2005) “Introduction: Outlining the Challenge”, in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (ed.) *Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press

Lemarchand, Rene, and Keith Legg (1972) “Political Clientelism and Development”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 4 pp. 149–78.

Libaridian, G (1999) *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence*, Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books.

Lipman, Masha (2006) “‘Enemy’ Schoolchildren in Moscow”, *Washington Post*, 20 October.

Lynch, D (2000) *Russian Peace-Keeping Strategies in the CIS-The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malfliet, K. Verpoest, L and Vinokurov, E. (ed) (2007) *The CIS, The EU and Russia-The Challenges of Integration*, USA: Studies in Central Eastern Europe.

Mankoff, J (2009) *Russian Foreign Politics- The Return of Great Power Politics*, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Masih, J. and Krikorian, R (1999) *Armenia: At the Crossroads*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

Mastyugina, T (2009) *Post-Soviet Non Traditional Wars-The South Caucasus*, Moscow: Centre for Strategic and Political Studies.

Matveeva, A (1999) *The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Politkovskaya, A. (2001) *A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya*, London: Harvill Press.

Matveeva, A. and Hiscock, D. (eds) (2003) *The Caucasus: Armed and Divided*, London: Saferworld.

Melvin, N (2007) *Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union*, Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Menon, R. (ed.) (1999) *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Twenty-First Century Security Environment*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Menon, R. and Nodia, G. (eds) (1999) *Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: The Twenty-First Century Security Environment*, New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2008), "Statement of the MFA of Ukraine in connection with the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia", 26<sup>th</sup> August, [Online: web] Accessed 4<sup>th</sup> March, 2012 URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/ua/news/detail/14990.htm>

Mitchell, Lincoln (2008) *Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mohanty, A (2008) "Genesis of Russia-Georgia Conflict", *Eurasian Foundation*, vol.2, no.2, pp.53-68.

Motika, M (ed.) (2000) *Caucasia between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 1555–1914*, Wiesbaden: Reichert.

(\* ) NATO (2007) *Joint press point: with NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili*, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_8137.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_8137.htm?selectedLocale=en)

(\* ).....(2008) *NATO Secretary General's statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia*, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_7760.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_7760.htm?selectedLocale=en)

(\* )..... (2008) *NATO ships in Black Sea on routine visit, unrelated to Georgia crisis*, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_43524.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43524.htm?selectedLocale=en)

National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of Belarus (2008), "Independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia needs thinking about, Kyrgyzstan Ambassador says", 27<sup>th</sup> August, [Online web] Accessed on 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 2012 URL: <http://law.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf/NewsBelForInt/AED0FB8D9CCC9780C22574B200478C56?OpenDocument>

News.trendaz.com (2008), "Kazakhstan Concerns of Negative Influence of Conflicts on Regional Security: Ambassador", 3<sup>rd</sup> October, [ Online: web] Accessed 18 April, 2012 URL:[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_recognition\\_of\\_Abkhazia\\_and\\_South\\_Ossetia#cite\\_note-164](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia#cite_note-164)

Nodia, Ghia (1995) “Georgia’s Identity Crisis”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 104–16.

Nodia, Ghia (1998) “Dynamics of State-Building in Georgia”, *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 6–13.

Nuriyev, E (2007) *The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics*, Berlin: LIT.

Nygren, B (2008) “*The Rebuilding of Greater Russia- Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*”, Abingdon: Routledge Publication.

.....(2008) *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy towards the CIS Countries*, London: Routledge.

Orenburg.kp.ru (2008), “Kazakhstan will not recognize South Ossetia”, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, [Online: web] Accessed 16 April, 2012 URL: <http://orenburg.kp.ru/online/news/147460/>

Papava, Vladimer (2006) “The Political Economy of Georgia’s Rose Revolution”, *Orbis*, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 657–67.

Pelkmans, Mathijs (2006) *Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Petrov, Nikolai (2002) “Seven Faces of Putin’s Russia: Federal Districts as the New Level of State—Territorial Composition”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 73–91.

Pouliot, V (2010) *International Security Practice*, New York: Cambridge University Press.



.....(2010) *International Security in Practice-The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pukhov R (eds), (2008) *The Tanks of August*, Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

Reuters (2008), “*U.S urges talks and an end to violence over South Ossetia*”, 8<sup>th</sup> August, [Online: web] Accessed 14 March, 2012 URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/08/uk-georgia-ossetia-usa-idUKSP24176320080808>

RIANOVOSTI (2008), “*Russian upper house seeks independence for Georgia’s rebel region*”, 25<sup>th</sup> August, [Online: web] Accessed 15 March, 2012 URL: <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080825/116254039.html>

.....(2008), “*Belarus will soon recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia*”, 8<sup>th</sup> September, [Online: web] Accessed 15 March, 2012 URL: <http://ria.ru/politics/20080908/151063444.html>

.....(2008), “*Security Council keen to hear Abkhaz, S. Ossetians views-Russia*”, 16<sup>th</sup> September, [Online: web] Accessed 23 February, 2012 URL: <http://en.rian.ru/world/20080916/116857725.html>

.....(2009), “*Belarus to consider recognizing S.Ossetia, Abkazia on April 2<sup>nd</sup>*”, 22<sup>nd</sup> January, [Online: web] Accessed 15 March, 2012 URL: <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090122/119751541.html>

RIIGIKOGU- The Parliament of Estonia (2008), “*Declaration of Presidents of Parliaments of the Baltic States*”, 10<sup>th</sup> August. URL: <http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=50815>

Roeder, Philip G (1991) “*Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization*”, *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 196–232.

Rosen, R (1999) *Georgia: A Sovereign Country of the Caucasus*, Hong Kong: Odyssey.

Ross, Cameron (2000) "Federalism and Democratization in Russia", *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 403–20.

(\*) Saakashvili. M (2009) *Annual Report*, The President of Georgia, Tbilisi [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/Documents/AnnualReports?p=4953&i=1>

(\*).....(2010) *Annual Report*, The President of Georgia, Tbilisi [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/Documents/AnnualReports?p=4954&i=1>

.....(2008) "Answering Russian Aggression", *Washington Post*, September 23.

Sambanis, N and Wohl, J.S (2009) "What's in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War", *International Security*, Vol.34, No.2, pp.82-118.

Scholtbach, A. P. and Nodia, G (2007) *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects*, Delft: Eburon.

Sestanovich, S (2008) "What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding of US-Russian Relations", *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 6, pp. 12-28.

Sherlock, T (2007) *Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post Soviet Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Socor, V (2011) “Medvedev Proud of Russia- Georgia War on Third Anniversary”, *Jamestown Foundation- Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 8(155)

Suny, R. G (1994) *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, 2nd edn, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Tavernise, Sabrina (2008) “Survivors in Georgia Tell of Ethnic Killings”, *New York Times*, August 20.

Tekin, A and Williams, A (2011) *Geo-Politics of the Euro Asia Energy Nexus-The European Union, Russia and Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The Moscow Times (2008), “S. Ossetia talks of joining Russia”, 1<sup>st</sup> September, [Online: web] Accessed 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 2012 URL: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/s-ossetia-talks-of-joining-russia/370554.html>

The Sydney Morning Herald (2008), “Australia calls for ceasefire in Georgia”, 10<sup>th</sup> August, Accessed on 24<sup>th</sup> May, 2012. URL: <http://news.smh.com.au/national/australia-calls-for-ceasefire-in-georgia-20080810-3suq.html>

Tishkov, Valery Aleksandrovich (1999) “Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 571–591.

TODAY.AZ (2008), “Azerbaijan’s positions remains unchanged, we recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity”, 27<sup>th</sup> August, [Online: web] Accessed 15 March, 2012 URL: <http://www.today.az/news/politics/47215.html>

Treisman, Daniel (1997) “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order”, *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 212–49.

Trenin, D. V. *et al* (2004) *Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Trenin, Dmitry (1996) "Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region", in Bruno Coppieters (ed.) *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, Brussels: VUB University Press.

Trenin, D (2006) "Russia Leaves the West", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.85, No.4, pp.87-96, July-August.

(\*) United Nations (2002) *Resolution 1427*, United Nations Security Council, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/500/43/PDF/N0250043.pdf?OpenElement>

(\*).....(2008) *The situation in Georgia Resolution 1839*, United Nations Security Council, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/544/25/PDF/N0854425.pdf?OpenElement>

Vasconcelos, Alvaro. (ed.) (2009) *The European Security Strategy 2003–2008: Building On Common Interests*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Waters, C (2005) *The State of Law in the South Caucasus*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wheatley, J (2005) *Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union*, London: Ashgate.

Whitman, R.G and Wolef, S (2010) "The EU as a Conflict Manager? The case of Georgia and its Implications", *International Affairs*, Vol.86, no-1, pp.87-107.

Whitmore, Brian (2008) "Scene At Russia-Georgia Border Hinted At Scripted Affair", *RFE/RL*, 23 August, URL: [www.rferl.org/content/Russia\\_Georgian\\_Scripted\\_Affair/1193319.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Georgian_Scripted_Affair/1193319.html)

Wooden, A.E and Stefes, C.H. (ed) (2009) *The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and Caucasus*, New York: Routledge Publication.

(\*)World Bank (2003) *Georgia -An Integrated Trade Development Strategy*, World Bank Publication, [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/12/16/000090341\\_20031216104201/Rendered/PDF/272640GE.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/12/16/000090341_20031216104201/Rendered/PDF/272640GE.pdf)

(\*).....(2003) *Revisiting reform in the energy sector : lessons from Georgia*, World Bank Publications [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/02/26/000090341\\_20040226154626/Rendered/PDF/279300PAPER0Revisiting0reform.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/02/26/000090341_20040226154626/Rendered/PDF/279300PAPER0Revisiting0reform.pdf)

(\*).....(2009)*The World Bank's Strategy in Georgia: 2010-2013*, World Bank Publications [Online: web] Accessed 5 October, 2011 URL: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/GEORGIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:301758~pagePK:141132~piPK:141105~theSitePK:301746,00.html>

Wu, Y.S (2010) "Russia and the CIS in 2009: Pillar of the System Shaken", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No.1, pp. 76-88, January/February.

.....(2011) "Russia and the CIS IN 2010", *Asian Survey*, Vol.51, No.1, pp.64-75, January/February.

Zubok, V.M (2007) *A Failed Empire-The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, USA: The University of North Carolina Press.

Zürcher, C (2007) *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*, New York: New York University Press.

\*\*\*\*\*