

**POPULATION POLICY
AND
WELFARE STATE IN INDIA**

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
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Certified that the dissertation entitled:
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P R E F A C E

The present crisis in the socio-political economic system is the manifestation of the deepening contradictions in the Welfare State "structures" in India. This is also reflected in the various social and welfare policies promulgated by the Government from time to time. The failure in tackling the so-called "population problem" is because of the contradictory nature of the policy on population. This point is always ignored by the so-called "liberals" and "independent analysts" (and of course by "official" population experts) as if population policy is independent of overall socio-economic policies. There is a dialectical relationship (not linear or dualist relationship as some liberals think) between population policy and developmental policies. Contradictions in development policies (which is determined by the overall socio-economic system) lead to the contradiction in population policy.

In recent times, the research in population policy is reduced to population "control" research. (The KAP studies, Communication-cum-Action Projects, Behavioural and Motivational Researches, etc.) The researchers who are undertaking studies and projects expensively funded by international organisations, multi and bi-lateral aid giving agencies are busy in finding the ways to "motivate" people for family planning (sterilization?). For these western philanthropists (aid givers), "our" population is a problem for "them" (but obviously not "our" poverty). Because these "growing numbers" might "put up" the "whole", whatever they produce (including natural resources).

We have discussed in detail the causes of failure of Family Planning Programmes in Indian "Welfare State" and it is compared with China (allegedly not a "soft-state") giving the whole lot of socio-economic data.

* * *

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Historically the intellectual task of socialist thought has been to rediscover by each new generation the true character and nature of the exploitative societies in its historical specificity of existence. Today this task for the academic remains as formidable as ever, because it is for them to comprehend the principles on which the society work.

But this analysis of the forces that determine the shape and nature of our societies is severely hindered by the present division of labour in the social sciences, where the investigation of our realities is parceled out among several closely knitted disciplinary kingdoms, i.e. economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, history and others (Blackburn 1979). Indeed, the disciplinary approach in the social sciences leads to a situation where the understanding of our realities is intrinsically and unavoidably fragmented, preventing the comprehension of both the totality and the underlying determinants of that totality. As a result of this division of labour in social sciences, political science, for example, does not deal with the basic economic forces while conversely, economy neglects and obscures the social class relations, and so on and so forth. Indeed, while the Hegelian dictum that "the truth is the whole" continues with an undiminished validity, the

disciplinary approach prevalent in today's social sciences perpetuates the one-sided tunnel vision that impedes our vision of totality. And to the same degree that the whole is always more than the sum of its parts, the explanation of our reality and its different components (including medicine and health services, family welfare etc., education, public/social policies etc.) is more — far more — than the mere aggregate of its sociological, economic, political, psychological and other explanations. Actually, it is not so much a question of more, but rather a question of different. And by this the comprehension of our societies and their medical (and health services including family welfare and other social policies etc.) realities requires not a unidisciplinary or an aggregate i.e. multidisciplinary approach, but an altogether different approach, in which the subject of analysis — (be it medicine or be it an important social policy like population policy) — is viewed as part of the larger social formation — society — of which it is a component, analysing the dialectical relationships between that part and the whole (Navarro 1976) [Parenthetical portions added by me]

This is the approach that is adopted all through the study. In contrast with prevalent patterns of orthodoxy, for example, not using a disciplinary analysis of the

components of society in order to later understand society; but rather, and as the Marxist method (neo-Marxism in its broadness) does, it is focused first on the analysis of the entire social system, (here, the nature of welfare state in India, India's path of development and the class nature of ruling classes in India/character of state power in India), and then use the understanding of the parts (Navarro 1976).

The focus here is to show how population policy and dialectically related social/developmental policies — the part — is determined by the same forces that determine society — the whole. And by society, it is meant, in the Marxist sense, "the social arrangements determined in the final analysis by a specific combination of social forces and relations of production" (Marx, Pp. 1973).

So the present study owes much to the traditions of "critical school" with its more philosophical emphasis, its focus on broader social structural context of medicine, health care and family welfare. This school is characterized by its early Marxist orientation (although by no means are all critical scholars Marxists) and a central concern with the issue of the controls a system of health and family welfare. Like most of the critical scholars we believe that a theory of population is impossible without a theory of society. In other words, an integrated study of

theoretical constructs of "a system of knowledge on population" becomes unscientific and ahistorical without an in-depth understanding of the underlying determinants of the social formation. And above all, population is not an abstract notion but an historical category, as the internal dynamics of population progressively advances with the changes in socio-economic and/or biological-demographic factors. At each historical stage the development of a population proceeds with a greater or lesser degree of intensity and undergoes specific changes in its manifestation conditioned by mode of production.

This fact is of paramount importance for the methodology of the cognition of the laws governing population, since mankind lives in various social conditions, which are changing and following one from another in historical sequence (Valentov 1999). That is why Marx and Engels denied that "the law of population is the same at all times and at all places". On the contrary, thus maintained, "every stage of development has its own law of population". (Capital Vol. 1) [This point is discussed in greater details in a later chapter.]

METHODOLOGY

We have already discussed in some extent the methodology adopted for the purpose of present study. As the

present study calls for a need of critical Sociology, it is worthwhile to discuss main currents prevalent in Academic and Administrative Sociology, so far as methodology is concerned.

Since the last part of the first quarter of the present century, conventional Academic Sociology began to be institutionalized within universities, it has held firmly to one operating methodological assumption, despite the other changes it has undergone. This assumption can be called "Methodological Dualism".

Methodological Dualism focuses on the differences between the social scientist and those whom he observes; it tends to ignore their similarities by taking them as given or by confining them to the sociologist's subsidiary attention. Methodological Dualism calls for the separation of subject and object, and it views their mutual contact with concern and fear. It enjoins the sociologist to be detached from the world he studies. It warns him of the dangers of "over rapport". It sees his involvement with his "subjects" primarily from the standpoint of its contaminating effect upon the information system (Gouldner 1971).

This flows from the conventional positivist premises that the self is treacherous and that as long it remains in contact with the information system, its primary effect is to bias or distort it. So, Methodological Dualism, in fine, based on the tacit assumption that the goal of sociology is knowledge conceived as information. This claim of "objectivity" in Academic and Administrative Sociology presents itself as "science", free from bias in its "absolute and pure" form; whereas Critical and Radical Sociology (including Marxism) is presented as "ideology".

This dichotomous interpretation flows from the understanding of the task of the social sciences, including Sociology as one of collecting information and evidence which can be ascertained independently of any political position or value judgement. Indeed, in the social sciences, the study of society and its component parts is assumed to be based on the simple accumulation of facts, from which theories are then, and only then, deduced. In this way, theories come to be regarded as hovering above the terra firma of established facts and empirically-tested hypotheses. The main assumption behind that dichotomy — an engagingly naive one at that — is that a realm of facts exists independent of the theories which establish their meaning. In other words, it is assumed that facts are on the one side, and theory on the other (Novarro 1976).

We do not believe in such an unscientific dichotomy, because theory already exists in the genesis, choice and interpretation of facts. In that respect, one is not built upon the other. The one is in the other. This point is further consolidated by Carr (1977), Gouldner (1971), Adorno (1950), Habermas (1980) and Hornblower (1937) and whole of the Critical School of Sociology (quoted in Rogers 1902) and the scholars like Leontal, Eric Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and others associated with it. Carr launched a vigorous attack upon empiricism, pseudo-objectivism and the subordination of historical analysis to moral stricture. Above all, Carr ^{de}~~de~~molished the exhausted dichotomy between 'facts' and 'interpretations' which was the cornerstone of latter-day positivism.....(which)...has always assumed that theory - 'interpretations' - will emerge after the collection of facts:- i.e. by induction (Jones, 1979)

This conservatism in Sociology continues as it still identifies with the "Golden Era" of Sociology in late nineteenth and early twentieth century which in fact an extension of 'Hegelianism's predominantly conservative and authoritarian cast' and with later sociologists' work like Comtean positivism, Durkheimian empiricism, Tonnies medievalism, Simmelian institutionalism, Weberian ideal - typical form as the highest social embodiment of rationality and comparative methods, Parsonian Functionalism and above all

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This is not confined to social sciences alone. Branches like population biology, population genetics, research in contraceptive technology, etc., also are growing disciplines in biological and medical sciences. Sophisticated data analysis for population statistics and use of computers for it devised. Various policy related issues like effect of various socio-economic indicators in fertility is also given equal importance. A great number of donor agencies, international research organisations are actively sponsoring such researches not to speak of governments where family planning is made official policies. As we are interested in policy as such we will only confine ourselves to the related issues with a theoretical construct for its holistic approach.

Health and population research, like most social research, has become more and more compartmentalized, with its practitioners turning into narrower and narrower specialities, superbly trained in their own fields, but with less and less comprehension of the total. (see Navarro 1976, emphasis added) But, as Suscozy and Garon (1960) have indicated, "Just as the whole is always more than the sum of the parts, so the unseeing of small truths about the social order itself". There is, indeed, a need for explanation of how the parts are related to each other, and it is

(Contd.....10)

Pareto's social Darwinism and Evolutionism, all of which in fact came as a reaction to the radical and critical thinking.

In 1920s this conservatism took a new turn with Soviet's official support to Marxism and as opposed to it America's huge sponsorship through funds to Academic Sociology. This internationalization of American Academic Sociology to other capitalist countries makes Sociology as an ideology in itself. This dominant trend in Sociology continues in all non-socialist countries including India.

So it is not surprising that the kind of orthodoxy and mediocrity prevails in Indian universities in Sociology legitimizes the "status quo" instead of acting as Social Criticism.

RESEARCH IN POPULATION SCIENCES (with particular reference to India)

Population research in recent times has given way to a number of specialities and super-specialities. Almost all the branches of social sciences have their specializations like historical demography, population economics, social demography, population education etc., and within themselves, there are super-specialities like migrational studies, distributional studies, fertility behaviour and many more.

(Contd...9)

in meeting this need that our empiricists have fallen short and, for the most part, have remained silent (Novarro 1976).

In India especially quantitative empiricism predominates in the field of population research. But let us emphasize that we are not belittling empirical studies neither we reject such studies by branding all of them as "positivist". In fact, throughout the present study we have borrowed heavily from the findings of empirical studies. In fact, "critique of positivism does not prevent us from recognising and promoting its technical achievements". (Horkheimer 1937). In fact while presenting a critique of (Hegelian) idealism which had dissolved the material world in the idea, Marx (1966) says, "they (Utopian theoreticians) no longer need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become the mouthpieces of this". Here, as is evident that in showing the new point of departure of science Marx has emphasized the change from human essence and other philosophical principles to the historical social relations which are empirically verifiable. Yet this new point of departure still appears unproblematic, as though it was simply a matter of turning towards reality, allowing empirical observation to bring out the inner connections of that reality

The concept of practice with which Marx argues

against the old materialism redresses the balance insofar as the external reality should be understood as a mere given object. (Larrain 1979)

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF POPULATION POLICY AND RESEARCHES IN POPULATION SCIENCES

It is impossible to bring social forces under deliberate control and guidance without a knowledge of their nature, and an understanding of the operation, direction and influence of these forces. In precisely the same way the channelling of processes of population development and regulation of the same demand a knowledge of their nature and an understanding of the patterns, essence, implications, operation and direction of these processes.

In its most general form population policy represents nothing other than direct or indirect influence upon population development. It constitutes part of state's socio-economic policy, but real scope for its implementation depends upon the degree to which the given society can satisfy the material and cultural needs of the population, the structure of which alters as population develops. This scope in its turn depends upon the level of development reached by the productive forces and the nature of the social relations which leave their decisive imprint upon the goal and aims of population policy.

Population policy can therefore be defined as activity specially aimed at regulating production and the reproduction of the main productive force — the subject of social production — i.e. man, the human population. Characteristics of each social formation are specific demands in population as a natural source of labour, and this fact is reflected in the features and implications of population policy characteristic of any particular formation. The population policy of a social formation consists of the following three main components: influence on working conditions (stipulation of the ages for starting and retiring from work, the provision of employment for the able-bodied population, the length of the working day and the working week, demands set for skills and specialised training etc.); influence on living conditions for all strata of the population (real wages or income levels, housing, the range of domestic services and cultural facilities provided, health care and its accessibility, provision of leisure time etc.); influence brought to bear on the fertility of the population (its social mobility, the natural renewal of generations, migratory mobility and population settlement).

(Valenty 1980)

So, if the socio-economic policy of the state is seen as the general, then population policy at theoretical level can be seen as the particular and demographic policy as the individual.

In other words, processes of economic, social and demographic reproduction are constantly at work within society. For this reason optimal correlations between economic and social processes at the one hand, and demographic ones on the other are necessary in order to achieve the most effective possible development of society (Volonty 1988).

As is discussed above, Population Policy including demographic policy is a component of the socio-economic policy of a country. As we have maintained in the beginning of this chapter, population policy cannot be studied without the study of socio-economic policy of any country because one is not simply built upon the other, the one is very much in the other.

Socio-economic policies, broadly termed as the path of development as pursued by the ruling classes of a country are carried out through several apparatuses or institutions. The state in India is the configuration of public institutions and their relationship whose primary role is the reproduction of an economic system based on private ownership of the means of production i.e. the capitalist economy.

An economic 'system' is 'a determined combination of specific modes of production, circulation, distribution and

consumption of material goods. In this combination, the mode of production of goods plays the dominant role. A mode of production is the combination of two structures, irreducible to one another: the productive forces and the relations of production. The notion of productive forces designates the set of factors of production, resources, tools, man, characterizing a determined society at a determined epoch which must be combined in a specific way to produce the material goods necessary to that society. The notion of relations of production designates the functions fulfilled by individuals and groups in the production process and in the control of the factors of production. For example, capitalist relations of production are relations between a class of individuals who have private possession of the productive forces and of capital, and a class of individuals without this property who must sell to the former the use of their labour power in exchange for a wage. Each class complements and presupposes the other. (Godelier 1979)

So, classes are antagonistic social groups defined by the place they occupy within the social division of labour as determined by specific social relations of production (Perlmutter 1974). It is important to stress that the place the social group occupies in the social division of labour — its class — determines its composition, hierarchy, status,

income, etc., and not vice versa. (Novarro 1983)

In all class-divided societies, the native force is class struggle and class power is the concentration of power. (Poulantzas 1974) Other forms of power, like those based on gender, race, caste, communal, religion, region are invested in class power and are mediated and reproduced as class relations. Class power traverses and utilizes other powers, assigning to them specific political significance. For example, the caste system is used by bourgeoisie (through landlords) to strengthen and reproduce its class dominance in all spheres of life. Because in India, there is indeed a consciousness that the highly exploitative relationship between landlord and those who work his land, is just, legitimate and "natural". And this is so because the traditional concept of relationship between groups in society is hierarchical and devaluing of physical labour. Labour is not rewarded on the basis of its value to society, but rather on the basis of traditional notions of inferiority and impurity. In India, the religious sanctioning of exploitative labour relations has become particularly formalized and openly justified by the notion of caste. This traditional valuation of labour on the basis of hierarchical cultural values rather than economic value legitimized the maximum extraction of agricultural production from the

direct producers. In brief, exploitations on the basis of class, race, gender, caste, etc., do not occur independently of each other, with each one reproducing itself separately from the others. (see Novarro 1983; Zubrigg 1984)

The nature of these institutions are conditioned by the nature of class alliance in any society which is determined by the mode of production. As for example, semi-feudal exploitation is actively pursued by the landlords and kulaks and it is legitimized through the institutionalization of various belief systems, like caste system, varna system etc. etc. and thereby landlords maintain their class power. Bourgeoisie actively support and propagate the landlords and the semi-feudal ideologies to maintain the status quo. The maintenance of this power base for bourgeoisie logically correlates an alliance with landlords. As we have seen above, these state apparatuses and institutions act in concert with the dominant bourgeoisie landlord class. But all forms of exploitation feed off one another and ultimately benefit the same ruling classes: the dominant bourgeoisie landlord classes. This point is discussed in greater details in the last part of the first chapter.

Our aim of discussing this is to explore the path of development pursued by the ruling classes in India after independence which is also manifested in the population policy.

In other words, the contradictions within the socio-economic system of a society has definitive bearing on the socio-economic policies, and consequently these contradictions are also manifested in the population policy, as we have already discussed that (in page no. 3-4) the latter is dialectically related to the former. Unfortunately in India the research in population lacks this holistic perspective. Even most of sensitive scholars avoid the central assumptions of the population policy as pursued by the government. The whole philosophy of population policy is reduced to ~~other~~ population "control" policy which is supposed to be attained through family planning programmes. The Ducharoot Conference gave the whole lot of new direction to the conventional research. It provided impetus to a growing sense of the urgent need to integrate population factors into development. The consensus that ached in Ducharoot was "Development is the best contraceptive". But the conference never chalked out the clear cut programme for the much talked about developmental policies. After all development "for whom" and "for what"? If the integration means just to integrate

these developmental programmes which are supposed to reduce fertility, then why there should be a population policy at all? Then let us have only population "control" policies. As Hefston (1980) comments on the conference: "It is not even made clear whether 'population policy' implies reduced or promoted population growth. And who can make anything out of a paragraph which states that in many parts of the world couples have more children than they want, while in others they have less than they want?" But it is equally not expected from an international forum to evolve the type of path of development for respective countries. It is for the individual countries to do the same.

The positive aspect of the conference was that "it was transformed from an intended pro-family planning manifestation to something quite different, namely a manifestation of the necessity to bridge the widening gap between developed and developing countries.

The conclusions drawn by Hefston is worth quoting here: "However, the main problem is nowhere the size of the population or its rate of growth. The real issue is that no development in the proper sense of the word takes place, a fact which is most often ignored. If real development occurs, all experience relates that a rapid reduction in fertility will follow. If no development takes place, on the other hand,

a rapid reduction in fertility is much more remote".

But as is already discussed in a class-divided society, the "real development" will take place if and only if there is radical transformation of society "to take a leap towards a qualitatively new, higher socialist socio-economic formation" (Dossal AR 1974) so as to detach the country totally from the "structural" dependency of the World Capitalist System and to make it free from all the neo-colonialist, neo-imperialist exploitations through the creation of a new international economic order.

WELFARE STATE AND POPULATION POLICY

The welfare state in post-World II in western countries and post-independence period is an outcome of the strength of the working class, which has forced the bourgeoisie to the dominant class in the class struggle explains why these services and interventions have (in addition to being useful and having a liberating function which makes them wanted) a control function -- a function, incidentally, of which the working class is frequently aware (see Novarro 1993).

We do not agree with the instrumentalist argument which views welfare services as determined primarily and

exclusively by the needs of the capitalist class. In this vision, welfare services are seen as primarily playing a role defined exclusively by capital. In this theoretical position, the components of welfare state (i.e. the welfare services which includes all the social policies including population policy) are seen as a set of instruments controlled by bourgeoisie. The working class is perceived to be "outside" of that instrument, i.e. the state and the welfare services. Needless to say, working class demands may trigger a state response, a response that is viewed as contributing to the legitimation of the overall system. The state is perceived as having the function of creating social peace and consensus (Offe 1982). The limitations of this position are three-fold: (a) it considers class struggle as taking place outside the state; (b) it regards the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie, who uses it to optimize its functions, i.e. capital accumulation and legitimation; and (c) it assumes that the working class is either dissatisfied (asking for more welfare services) or satisfied (when it receives more services). In the latter case, the state response is assumed to contribute to create a consensual social acceptance of the social order. However this dichotomy excludes the possibility that although the working class may not be in consensus and the social order may not be perceived as legitimate, still the working class

may not rebel because it does not see any alternative to the current order or it does not see itself as having the power to transcend the social order (see Thorburn 1980, Navarro 1983).

Whatever happens in the state is not a mere outcome of what the bourgeoisie want. (Navarro 1983). Working class has come a long way in wresting more and more control over the apparatuses and institutions of the state. That is why we do not subscribe the view that the modern welfare state is nothing but a metamorphosis of state monopoly capitalism, as some "orthodox" marxists believe (see Gosal 1975). Because the benefits to the working class of welfare services do not require elaboration, although it is undoubtedly the case that their particular forms have disadvantages as well yielding benefits (Harris 1983). In that way it is wrong to see the welfare services as important to the reproduction of labour power and which ensure the existence of a labour force which is educated, healthy and housed enough to meet capital's requirement. No doubt bourgeoisie get benefits from those, but working class, as we have already contended also get the benefit, although not in the same proportion.

This is not to say that welfare state is not a capitalist state, because the fundamental structures (including the apparatuses and institutions) are very much

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in fact, as for example, the institution of private property etc. etc. But to say that, because the strength of the working class which is (though subordinate to the dominant class) in a bargaining position now, the classical state monopoly capitalism has transformed to welfare state capitalism. That is why the role of academician should be to criticize and to attack the negative aspects of welfare state and its policies (it is elaborated in chapter two). As Ian Gough has put it, "once the contradictory nature of the welfare state and its contradictory impact on capitalism is appreciated, (as we have done in chapter two of this dissertation), then the political strategy all who work in it, use it or are concerned with it, can be refined. The positive aspects of welfare policies need defending and extending, their negative aspects need exposing and attacking (Gough 1983).

We do not view population policy as conspiracy of bourgeoisie to maintain and manage the "reserve army of labour" (Marxist dictum) who uses this policy only to optimize its functions i.e. capital accumulation and legitimation.

In this sense, it not only undermines the strength of the working class but also class struggle is seen as if

taking outside it. Because, state cannot be viewed as a monolith, and each institution and initiative must be understood in terms of the class struggle going around it. (Poulantzas 1974, Corrigan et al. 1981) As we will discuss later there was no population policy worth its name but only population "control" policy in 1952, and gradually developmental programmes were integrated and possible "linkages" with overall socio-economic policies were talked about and discussed. But still this remains a policy which is more suited for bourgeois class as a whole as just integration of some components and reformative measures here and there sporadically would not solve the problems of the working class. That is why we have attacked and criticized the negative aspects while recognizing its positive aspects (at least after emergency).

As we have been constantly maintaining, any positive change in population policy will be welcomed such as integration of Minimum Needs Programmes, Nutrition Programmes etc., which is no doubt insufficient in itself but is a step towards wresting gradual control from the bourgeoisie and getting an upperhand (obviously through "class struggle") in the negotiating table in the short run. This will lead to the incubation of "socialist consciousness" within the womb of a capitalist order which will lead to the ultimate liberation of the working class in the long run.

Chapter Two

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE STATE IN INDIA

The ideas underlying the welfare state are derived from many different sources. From the French Revolution came notions of liberty, equality and fraternity. From the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham and his disciples came the idea of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. From Bismarck and Beveridge came the concepts of social insurance and social security. From the Fabian socialists came the principle of the public ownership of basic industries and essential services. From Tawney came a renewed emphasis on equality and a rejection of avarice as the mainspring of social activity. From J.M. Keynes and the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission came doctrines for controlling the trade cycle and avoiding mass unemployment. From the Hobbes came proposals for abolishing the causes of poverty and cleaning up the base of the society. Many other thinkers, from Leonard Hobhouse to Richard Titmuss, have contributed to the stream of ideas flowing into the concept of the welfare state. Above and beyond the specific contributions from these sources were the efforts to awaken the social conscience by writers like Dickens, Ruskin and William Morris; by social reformers like Lord Shaftesbury and Chadwick; by Clerics such as Charles Kingsley, General Booth, Cardinal

Planning and Canon Barnett; by economists such as John Stuart Mill and Henry George (Robson 1976).

Robson traces back the history of philosophy of welfare state to French Revolutionary tradition and comes down to Keynes and contemporary scholars, without any reference to Marx and Marxists. But to put the whole thing comprehensively, Robson and his colleague liberals should also aware of the fact that 'welfare state' is also a victory of the class struggle in the sense that the so-called welfare and social services as promised a 'welfare state' with full employment (at least rhetorically) is the power of democratic and progressive forces in the world today. From slavery system to servile feudalist exploitation to capitalism (of course, colonialism and imperialism phase for most of the third world countries) and now to welfare state capitalism and historical "concessions" given by ruling classes over the period is the victory of the class struggle. To this point we will return later. We do not want to take a tough position like "I have long since given up debating with liberals, considering it a waste of time" (Andre Gunder Frank 1970) and we do not believe in such ultra-radicalism, but to account and acknowledge everybody's view is academic and "ignoring" is not at all academic. But the political implications of those things are of

far-reaching consequences, for which we have to fight in both fronts in theory (through academics) and practice (through politics).⁸

Now forty years later the intellectual position has changed. Sociologists of various political persuasions observe that the "welfare state" is a common phenomenon of all capitalist societies. In its most extreme form this view maintains that the "welfare state" is but one aspect of "industrial society" as such, be it capitalist, communist or any other. (Wedderburn 1965) It is a part of the "logic" of industrialization which "everywhere has its managers, its managed and a pattern of interaction". (Kerr et al. 1962)

LIBERALS DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION OF WELFARE STATE

Liberals view this as a "remarkable absence of an adequate, positive and comprehensive philosophy and there is no ideology that underlies the many policies and programmes that are supposed to form part of the welfare state. This lack of a political or social philosophy is not peculiar to Britain. It exists equally in other countries which are

⁸ Other channels are also wide open. So this should not be taken as only possible channel.

generally regarded as welfare states, such as Sweden, New Zealand or India. (Myrdal 1960) The liberals view welfare state as a "neutral" state without having any "ideology" of its own. In other words, state acts in the direction of "welfare for all" without positively discriminating to any particular social class of the society. In this way welfare state is not just a metamorphosis of earlier feudal and capitalist state but radically different from these. They view that welfare state has no adequate, positive and comprehensive philosophy but a liberal and "soft" state where all the groups, classes, strata, races, genders etc., get equal benefits of welfare measures these are provided by the state. Here we are going to discuss this in some greater details pointing to the contradictions of welfare state and how the fundamental principles which a capitalist state needs, still continue to be there in the modern welfare state, except of course as the name suggests, the welfare provisions that is provided by the state. But are the goals of the welfare state can be over met? Can the goals be realistically achieved without changing the basic structures of exploitation of any society? Are the welfare measures reaching to the people primarily for whom it is meant? These questions will be asked and challenged.

Marshall has pointed out that the "welfare state" is a catchword, which was "tied by somebody or other around the neck of the British society in the 1940s". (Marshall 1963) In the immediate post-war years the "welfare state" was generally regarded as an almost exclusively British phenomenon. From Britain the phrase made its way round the world". (Driggo 1961) It was identified as the "achievement" of the 1945 Labour government and it acquired in those years a "socialist flavour". Only critics of the far or idiosyncratic Left were to be found asking: what was "socialist" about it? In what ways had the capitalist system been fundamentally modified by it? Or, if not, by what other tests did it rank as a socialist achievement? (Widdarburn 1965)

Secondly, the welfare state, whatever it may mean, according to Robson, "expresses fairly adequately a conception of the state which differs vastly not only from the laissez faire state of the nineteenth century, but from all other states of which we have any historical record..... which involves a radical transformation of nineteenth century capitalist society in respect of the scope of public policy; the character of state action; the basic assumption concerning human motives and the social good; and the ultimate aim of our civilization. It differs substantially

in several respects from the traditional schools of thought, and still more from communist societies. (Robson 1957)

But the most important contribution regarding the nature of welfare state comes from Eberstein, Hobson and Brice. "The basic principles of welfare state are simple: first every human being is entitled to a minimum of national well-being such as clothing and decent living, second, expanding living standards are possible with the existing physical resources and scientific knowledge, and the third, the state has the right to act when private initiative fails." (Eberstein 1955) Elsewhere Eberstein accounts for two most essential principles i.e. 'minimum standard of living' to all community members and 'full employment' as the top social goal to be supported by public policy. (Eberstein 1970) According to Hobson, "it guarantees a minimum standard of subsistence without removing incentives to personal enterprise and it brings about a limited reduction of incomes by means of graduated high taxation, yet does not pretend to establish economic equality among its citizens. All are assured of an adequate help in case of old age, illness, unemployment or any other cause". (Hobson, see Agarwal 1967) Brice emphasizes on the minimum thorough political and social control of a socialist or a communist state (Brice 1960)

whereas Sturmy puts more emphasis on the collective responsibility towards the weaker sections of the community. (Sturmy 1959)

Marshall regards as the essential characteristics of the welfare state its intense individualism and its collectivism. The former confers on the individual an absolute right to receive welfare, the latter imposes a duty on the state to promote and safeguard the whole community, which may transcend the aggregation of individual claims (Marshall 1963). Elsewhere he observes that welfare state has not rejected the capitalist market economy but it gives only qualified approval. As a result "a kind of capitalism softened by an injection of socialism and many socialists disliked or mistrusted the mixture". (Marshall 1963)

With this preliminary ideas and views of different scholars, we would proceed to analyse the welfare state in its "inner core of structure/action". The main aim of this chapter will be to understand welfare state in its historical context and to conceptualize these theoretical paradigms in the context of India as a welfare state to understand various approaches to the study of nature of present Indian state; and at the same time to analyse India's path of development after independence.

NEO-MARXIST ANALYSIS OF WELFARE STATE

Whether the welfare state has or has not meant a fundamental change in capitalist society is no more than a semantic disagreement about definitions. There is often confusion, too, between objectives themselves and the means of attaining those objectives. There is, though a central core of agreement that the welfare state implies a state commitment of some degree which modifies the play of market forces in order to ensure a minimum real income for all. By implication, if not explicitly, this is done to protect individuals against the hazards of incapacity for work arising through sickness, old age, and unemployment. There is also general agreement that the objectives of the welfare state will include a guarantee of treatment and benefit for sickness and injury and the provision of education. There is less agreement about whether the essential goal will also include the maintenance of full employment, economic growth or even ensuring, "that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services. (Driggs 1961, see Hoddorburn 1965, p. 120)

To explain the "welfare state" by means of Marxist political economy entails outlining both what Marxist economics is and the nature of the "welfare state", since it calls for bringing Marxist theory to bear on the elaborate

edifice of social policy, fiscal arrangements, state intervention and ideology which combine to constitute what we know as the "welfare state". The phrase 'welfare state' is itself a highly ideological, journalistic coinage, originally invented, it is believed, to be contrasted with the 'warfare state' of Nazi Germany (Wilson 1980). As Ian Gough observes: "The very term 'the welfare state' reveals the ideological nature of most writing about it. another way the object of our study is defined in terms of a theoretical tradition which we reject. Nevertheless, the phrase has entered our language and for the moment we must continue to use it". (Gough 1979). This has to be contrasted with liberals' assumption of welfare state that it has not got any ideology with it and lacks any socio-political philosophy. This gives the liberals an "illusion of absolute autonomy of state" and thereby they fail to understand the complexity of power groups operating in a capitalist state (welfare state capitalism).

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF WELFARE

"The welfare state is a product of the contradictory development of capitalist society and in turn it has generated new contradictions which every day become more apparent". (Gough 1979)

Gough has perceived two major contradictions within welfare state provision in a capitalist society. The first of these contradictions is the simultaneous tendency of welfare provision to be both progressive and coercive; it does provide needed services, yet these may come in authoritarian forms and contain coercive elements; secondly; 'the very scale of state expenditure on the social services has become a fetter on the process of capital accumulation and economic growth itself'. State expenditure on welfare supports capitalism yet simultaneously hinders it. (Wilson 1980)

Gough has given an account of the state in capitalist society and of the way in which political freedom creates the conditions in which exploitation can take place (itself a highly contradictory state of affairs). Accordingly Gough has defined welfare state as: "For the purposes of this work we shall characterize the welfare state as the use of state power to modify the reproduction of labour power and to maintain the non-working population in capitalist societies. (P. 44-45) For Gough, therefore, the welfare state is engaged in two actually separate or at least separable activities (although these are given a spurious unity since the distribution of the wage on which they immediately depend takes place within the family — an aspect of

welfare not discussed by Gough); these are the reproduction of the daily and of the generational labour force, and the redistribution of money goods and services to the non-working sections of the population (children, the old and the sick or otherwise disabled, as well as currently unemployed and often housewives, they represent a majority of individuals).

The most important contribution in this respect has come from Claus Offe. In a brilliant thesis Offe argues that as the welfare state has been the combined outcome of a variety of factors historically, which change in composition from country to country, it is exactly its multi-functional character, its ability to serve many conflicting ends and strategies simultaneously, which made the political arrangement of the welfare state so attractive to a broad alliance of heterogeneous forces. But it is equally true that the very diversity of the forces that inaugurated and supported the welfare state could not be accommodated for ever within the institutional framework which today appears to come increasingly under attack. The machinery of class compromise has itself become the object of class conflict.

Offe contends that although it would be nonsensical to deny the fact that the struggle for labour protection legislation, expanded social services, social security and

the recognition of unions led by the working-class movement for over a century now has brought substantial improvements of the living conditions of most wage earners, the socialist critique of the welfare state is, nevertheless, a fundamental one. It can be summarized in three points. The welfare state is said to be: (1) ineffective and inefficient; (2) repressive; and (3) conditioning a false (ideological) understanding of social and political reality within the working class. In sum, it is a device to stabilize, rather than a step in the transformation of capitalist society.

Firstly, in spite of the undeniable gains in the living conditions of wage earners, the institutional structure of the welfare state has done little or nothing to alter the income distribution between two principal classes of labour and capital. A huge machinery of redistribution does not work in the vertical, but in the horizontal direction, namely within the class of wage earners. A further point of the ineffectiveness of the welfare state emphasizes the constant threat to which social policies and social services are exposed due to the fiscal crisis of the state, which, in turn, is a reflection of both cyclical and structural discontinuities of the process of accumulation. The bureaucratic and professional force through which the welfare state dispenses its services is increasingly seen to be a source

of its own inefficiency. Bureaucracies absorb more resources and provide less services than other democratic and decentralized structures of social policy could.

Secondly, the reason why the bureaucratic form of administering social services is maintained in spite of its inefficiency and ineffectiveness, which becomes increasingly obvious to more and more observers must, therefore, be connected with the social control function exercised by centralized welfare bureaucracies. This analysis leads to the critique of the repressiveness of the welfare state, its social control aspect. Such repressiveness is, in the view of the critics, indicated by the fact that in order to qualify for the benefits and services of the welfare state, the client must not only prove his or her 'need', but must also be a 'deserving' client -- a client, that is, who complies with the dominant economic, political, and cultural standards and norms of the society. The heavier the needs, the stricter these requirements tend to be defined.

Thirdly, a major aspect of socialist critique of the welfare state is to demonstrate its political-ideological control function. The welfare state is seen not only as the source of benefits and services, but, at the same time, as the source of false conceptions about historical reality which have damaging effects for working-class consciousness,

organization and struggle. First of all, welfare state creates the false image of two separated spheres of working class life. On the one side, the sphere of work, the economy, production and 'primary' income distribution; on the other, the sphere of citizenship, the state, reproduction and secondary distribution. This division of socio-political world obscures the causal and functional links and ties that exist between the two, and thus prevents the formation of a political understanding which views society as a coherent totality to be changed. (Offe 1981)

Offe, within the framework of these three fundamental criticisms has found out various inherent contradictions at the structural level and manifest contradictions at the functional level. Offe has contended that the 'primary contradiction' in welfare state is of decisive importance -- is the fact that the various branches of welfare state are compelled to perform two incompatible functions vis-a-vis the economic subsystems: commodification and de-commodification (i.e. non-market, state policies).

Further Offe has recognized various other contradictions of welfare state such as that between legitimacy versus efficiency which he summarizes as follows:

There is only one point of general equilibrium in the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency, and the

harmonic balance is achieved if:

- i) the acceptance of the legitimating rules of democratic and constitutional regimes is reinforced by the material outcomes of governmental measures and policies;
- ii) if those measures and policies are 'efficient' in the only way a capitalist state can be efficient, namely, in successfully providing, restoring and maintaining commodity relationships for all citizens and for the totality of their needs.

But as is already discussed the causes of deviations from this 'harmony' is because of the various de-commodification state policies which have to be supplemented because of internal compulsions.

THE WELFARE STATE AND THE ECONOMY

The most important aspect that is undeveloped by classical Marxist scholarship is the analysis of the relationship, between the state and economy. On the other hand it did not present a developed theory of the manner in which capital accumulation affects the form of the state. Instead in key passages it has established a general framework for treating the issue in terms of a relation between the superstructure and an ultimately determinant base.

Laurence Harris has accounted for broadly two trends in the recent works concerning the interconnections between the state and capital accumulation. (Harris 1980)

Altvator and Yaffe argue that it is possible to derive the concept of the capitalist state and its relation to the economy in terms of the functions that it 'has to' perform for capital. (Altvator 1973 and Yaffe 1973) But, Holloway and Picciotto adopt a less functionalist approach. They argue that contradictions in state policy are associated with the fact that the capitalist state has to act in a context of class struggle where capital accumulation is predicated upon victories in the struggle rather than being an automation which simply sweeps all before it. (Holloway & Picciotto 1970)

Such kind of neo-functionalist teleological explanation which makes the complex questions over-simplified in an epistemological sense. This simplistic explanation polarises between theories of structure and theories of action.

Action theories of society base their explanations upon the activities of distinct subjects, individuals, interest groups or classes acting in pursuit of definite objectives. A Harrian variant of action theory would be an explanation of the welfare state which relies upon the consciously organised struggles of the working class and bourgeois class

in its creation; with each conceived as a 'class for itself' proletarian has demands and the bourgeoisie has needs and these have come together in particular ways to produce the welfare state.

Structure theories, on the other hand, explain social phenomena such as the welfare state by the anonymous forces of the social system without reference to the conscious action of classes or other agents. Such theories rely upon a specification of the functions that the welfare state performs for the education and reproduction of the capitalist system without considering the agency through which the welfare state is established class conflict is admitted as part of the capitalist system but, it is the needs of the system itself rather than the conscious actions of classes that bring about social changes like the establishment of the welfare state. The action/structure dichotomy has marked orthodox work in all the social sciences, and Marxist theory claims to overcome it, (Harris, 1960 p.245).

Now the unanswered questions are: why have such services been expanded, systematized and entrenched since the war, and why have they been provided through the state rather than private sector.

Most of the Marxist writings try to answer these questions in a teleological manner. In other words, there is a tendency towards historical analysis which, instead of

explaining developments, looks back from the present and assumes that everything that has happened in the path to the present had to happen. This tendency results from the weakness of the 'capital's needs/labour's demands' approach, if it is not adequate for explaining why welfare systems have developed in particular ways there is a temptation for those who use it to do so simply by looking back from the present and judging that everything there is so because of capital's needs or labour's demands. (Kerris, 1980, p.248)

These works in this regard worth to be mentioned - (SE, State Group, Ginsburg and Gough. The recurrent theme in their analysis is the interaction of both sides of class struggle, capital's needs and labour's demands. (See, CSE, 1979/Ginsburg, 1979/Gough, 1979) For example, Gough's central point revolves around "two factors of importance in explaining the growth of the welfare state: the degree of class conflict, and, especially the strength and form of working class struggle, and the ability of the capitalist state to formulate and implement policies to secure the long term reproduction of capitalist social relations".

The framework in which all Marxist writers on the Welfare State now work is one of trying to avoid each of the two extremes of the problems in structure/Action dichotomy. On the one hand there is functionalism of the view that the

welfare state exists because the capitalist system's structure requires the functions that it performs; on the other hand, there is the action theory perspective of the view that its original, development and limits arise from class conflict. Marxist analysis offers the way to treat the system and class conflict as an integrated whole rather than polar opposites. According to Gough: "the dichotomy between these two basic approaches to understanding the welfare state can be overcome within Marxist political economy. It has the merit over pluralist theories of social policy in situating the 'conflict' within an ongoing 'mode of production', and it has the merit over functionalist theories of social policy in relating the socio-economic 'system' (its structure and its development through time) to the class conflict which an integral feature of it. Of course, it does not simply sit these two theories side by side; both elements are developed within a completely different theoretical framework". (Gough 1979)

Practically speaking from both angles without falling in trap to relativism the welfare state performs certain functions for the structure at certain times and that cuts (in various welfare measures) in it perform a function at other times. In other words the markets for labour, commodities and finances do impose their own constraints upon the

development of the economy, the state and other aspects of society, and they would do so in an anonymous way even if trade unions, employers, traders and bankers did not play any organised political role on these markets. (Harris 1980)

In developing the concept of the state it has first to be recognised that the state is not only a political body but also has a significant economic aspects. Its branches are themselves economic agents involved in market forces. As an employer the state's branches have to buy labour-power in the labour market; they have to buy other commodities and in the case of nationalised industries sell them; and they have to borrow money. (Harris 1980)

In this direction Peter Leonard argues against the whole idea of separating: "too rigidly 'economic' from 'political' factors ... for the dynamics of the capitalist system, its need to accumulate and maintain profitability, is essentially one of the class struggle of the exploiters against the exploited. It is this struggle which fundamentally creates the 'economic' contradictions which governments, both social democratic and right-wing must face". (Leonard 1979)

However, it is true that it is difficult, and perhaps not too constructive in the field of welfare policy and provision, to separate out the economic, the political and the ideological.

The above questions are dealt with the subsequent sections of "The Welfare State in India" in this chapter and special descriptions regarding the welfare policies (including population policy, family welfare and women development policies) and its socio-political-economic implications are made in the chapter four.

SOCIAL POLICY AND CLASS INEQUALITY

Whether capitalism is still capitalism — that old dog of a controversy whose very refusal to lie down and die suggests that its objects remain no less alive — hangs in large part on the answers to two questions about the state: its role in production and its role in distribution. Of course the two cannot be kept apart; they are intertwined because capitalism as a mode of production is also a mode of exploitation. (Ustergaard 1978). So, the question regarding the limits of state action as a means to modify the patterns of exploitation — of "differential reward", set up by the property and market mechanisms of capitalist economy has to be analysed in greater extent.

Both right and left, however, realistically acknowledge the limits: the right when they claim to see before them already a creeping erosion of profit and pay incentives through misguided state benevolence; the left when they characterize the same benevolence as a set of only marginal

concessions, designed to sustain the long-run viability of private capital against its self-engendered exposure to the twin risks of inefficiency and popular disloyalty. But if there are, and must be, limits beyond which public welfare provision would wreck the engine of a capitalist economy whereabouts do they lie? To explore the ways in which state policy does or does not modify class inequality to identify if sketchily, the points on which it fits within, and also those on which it may reach out across, the distributional principles of a capitalist economy. The principles are: (Høstergaard 1978)

The first principle is that property gives its owner a recognized claim to a share in resource output that also (with well-known exceptions) gives owners a claim to share directly in resource management is crucially important in general, but relevant here only for one reason. The rationale for the right to consume merely by virtue of their ownership is that the return to capital constitutes the prime motor of economic enterprise: so, if private profit is to drive the wheels of production, it and the property from which it derives must constitute a means of private consumption. So this relation between private ownership of production and private consumption of resources contradicts with the philosophy of welfare state which assumes that production

may be based on capitalist lines (i.e. private ownership of means of production) and distribution and redistribution on social justice, transcending class sources of income.

The logical corollaries which follow from the above argument are, first, the right of anyone to a share of societal income is unconditional; it stands with no questions asked about their "contribution" or their "need". So the so-called "social justice in a welfare state" becomes more sort of a rhetoric of ruling class. Secondly, the criteria for the recipients is not clearly spelt out i.e. whether through work or some demonstration for need or directly through the membership of a population category recognized as in need. Thirdly, because property rights invariably include some right to transmit ownership to others by inheritance (or gift), they legally entrench a contradiction also to the notion -- the individual's place in the socio-economic order should reflect his/her own "merits" without avoidable influence of his/her circumstances of origin. When sociologists proclaim a triumph of "achievement" over "ascription" as the predominant criterion by which, in principle, individuals are placed in the hierarchies of modern societies, they rarely note the blunt incompatibility of that. Fourth, because property which yields substantial income -- property in productive assets -- is highly concentrated, only a small minority enjoy the prime benefits

of property principle; but their privilege contributes sizably to the overall inequality of distribution. (Wootergaard 1978, emphasis and analysis are ours)

The second principle is that the majority who do not own substantial income-yielding property must rely for their livelihood in the labour or to depend on others — usually related members of their own household — who do the same. So, just because the majority live by the second principle, while the minority who live by the first are not readily visible, the common dependency on the labour market as a fact of life is easily translated into popular acceptance of an "ethic of work", notwithstanding the immunity from the ethic conferred by property and on its owners. (Wootergaard 1978)

Inequality would not be ruled out (at least in a welfare state capitalism). But the burden of proof for their justification as either incapable or instrumentally necessary — would rest on public policy: the initial presumption would be against them above all against cumulative inequality as distinct from discrete and particular inequalities. With that as a counterfall, Wootergaard has spelt out five class-relevant objectives: (1970)

1. General Welfare

The objective to guarantee all citizens a minimum livelihood seems now to be an element in the welfare packages of all welfare states.

There is no principled definition of the "minimum" to be guaranteed; and it is liable to vary both between, and under different sub-schemes within, the two forms of guarantee — one being for the contingencies in life e.g. retirement in old age, illness, "involuntary" unemployment etc., and the other being for the "needy" people where the demonstration of the need on the initiative of the needy, sometimes which has been to impose a formal obligation on the authorities to seek out potential applicants. But there are three implicit understandings associated with it, which give some body to the term "minimum". First, the level of fall back livelihood, offered is officially conceived as the minimum acceptable — to a generalised "public", if not to the poor themselves. Second, while precisely for this reason it can be and normally is stepped up from time to time — indeed, may be index-linked — it is set at all times well below the level of livelihood associated with current average labour market earnings. Third in application especially to categories of recipient who otherwise arguably might be deterred from work, but by extension to others as well — it is intended to be set as rarely, if ever, to equal the current level of low grade wage earnings.

In Indian Welfare State, the Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) was implemented to provide general minimum for all.

This is designed according to the government to assist in raising living standards One of the programmes is Nutrition Programme (SNP) and (ii) the Mid-day Meals Programme (MDM). The objectives of the SNP are to provide the beneficiary 300 calories and 8-12 grams of protein for the age group 0-6 years and 500 calories and 25 grams of protein for pregnant women and nursing mothers. The programme of MDM is for school-going children in the age group of 6-11 years. The beneficiaries for the above programmes within a period of five years are 11 million and 20 million. The total outlay was 219 crores of rupees during Sixth Plan period.

As is evident from the above data, the programme which is supposed to be for the children and mothers those who live below poverty line. But the criteria fixed to be eligible to avail of this facility as is known 65 rupees per month per capita (which is government's definition of poverty line)

As we have already discussed the criteria fixed by the government is far below to maintain a square meal a day even. Additionally the nutrition programme to the beneficiaries gives them just 300 calories which is even far below the minimum requirement. Thirdly, in a country where more than 50 per cent live below poverty line, this programme

provides provision for just 30-31 million, which is roughly nine per cent of the total people, those who live below poverty line.

2. Equality of Opportunity

To provide for "equality of opportunity" or for means to reduce barriers to it is now, like provision for minimum livelihood in some version or other. The notion of equal opportunity proscribes a removal/diminution of "accidental" impediments to perfect competition among individuals for unequal rewarded places in the socio-economic structure. Success and failure in that competition, as it is postulated, should depend only on inherent "individual capacity" and "merit". The "accidental" impediments to be removed (or diminished) are those which stem — according to varying perceptions incorporated into policy — from socio-economic circumstances of birth and upbringing; from stigmatic "social labelling"; from territorial barriers and barriers of transformation. The notion proscribes, in the first instance, free mobility of individuals — economically, culturally, geographically. It also proscribes free access to housing unrelated to monetary purchasing power. The objective is most clearly represented in the formal gearing of public educational systems to "equal" selection for unequal destinations. But it is a mainstrand of purpose also in legislation — generally more recent — to remove

discrimination by caste, creed, colour, religion, sect, language and sex; in various "poverty" alleviation programmes like MDP etc. etc. and in various "priority area" policies like Tribal Development Policies, Desert Development Policies, meaningful employment to landless labourers and urban poor etc.

India, which is extremely hierarchical in nature on the basis "social" and "economic" status, the question of "equality of opportunity" becomes highly utopian, unless and otherwise radical socio-economic transformation is brought about by the exploited masses. Is it not interesting to talk about "equality of opportunity" on the basis of individual "capacity" and "merit" when a person who lives below poverty line is "in principle" (or "logically speaking") allowed to compete with an urban elite for any job in the "job market"? So far as the question of "barriers" which the welfare state claims to remove is concerned one thing becomes very clear. Do the western "affluent societies" able to remove the barriers after more than four decades of establishment of welfare state? The answer of this question lies in the fact that capitalism's general rules are contradictory in nature. Such as to talk about an "achieving society" and individual "merit, capacity and talent" and to make the right of inheritance attached to

property in law, which through generations becomes "ascribed status". An industrialist's son, when he takes over the firm as the right of inheritance becomes "ascribed" property which is in no way dependant on the market liberal's conception of "achievement" as "individual entrepreneurship qualities in a free market economy". Is it not as good as caste system which ascribes a man his position in the society by virtue of his birth?

In India, the talk of free mobility of individuals makes no sense: economically, culturally or geographically. Is it possible for individuals to go up in the social hierarchy because of the various power groups who are interested in perpetuation of their own class rule? For this we have to discuss in greater details the class character of state power in India which is dealt with in even greater details later in this chapter.

Last, but not the least, even the apparent concenance with capitalist principle of the goal of equal opportunity incorporated in so much contemporary social policy has failed to give it much impetus in practical effect.

That is because of the fact that implementation of any social policy ultimately rests with the bureaucracy. Though the kind of path of development is determined by the

class character of state power in any country; different "interest and power groups" represented by different "bourgeois political parties" pursue different social policies which ultimately suit to the particular class whom they represent. So the planning, allotment etc., depends upon the political party in power but the implementation part depends upon the administrative machinery.

In India, the huge bureaucratic set up decides the fate of the people at large. The higher echelons of bureaucracy are not capitalists but they are linked up with capitalist development as its regulators and beneficiaries (Chandhri 1985). The frontline bureaucratic bosses work directly for the political parties in power and negotiate with them for power, status and money through illegal means. Their political bosses give proteges to them and even give asylum at the time of crisis. In such a nepotistic and corrupt set up, whatever comes for the benefit of poor through different heads of developmental programmes gets absorbed (at least a sizeable chunk) in the long ladder of bureaucratic hierarchy. But the party in power does not have any interest to eliminate corruption for the simple reason that it has to satisfy the middle classes, bureaucrats and the various local power groups where the developmental programmes are supposed to be implemented. This politico-bureaucratic

decision-making and implementing apparatus works for the bourgeoisie and landlords to the much suffering of the poor people at large.

3. Individually Graduated "risk reduction"

As an alternative or significant supplement to provision of a general "guaranteed minimum" in need, welfare state social policies have increasingly turned to a provision of a graduated kind, which in effect incorporates a different objective: to make for greater continuity in the material conditions of individuals between periods of normal employment and periods when — by virtue of circumstances deemed to be wholly or largely outside their own control — they are out of work. Benefits are typically still tied to "contributions" made in the course of past employment, with corresponding symbolic endorsement of the "work ethic".

But that is also as far as any significant softening of class inequality goes. Because the rationale behind the above is to prevent an "excessive and/or debilitating" drop in level of living when individuals face short-term crises of unemployment or illness.

In India, especially the unemployment problem is very acute both educated and uneducated unemployment. Ruling class relates unemployment to the excessive population growth and the unemployed persons are treated as "unwanted".

In fact, this is the logical corollary to the capitalist path of development that India has pursued after independence. Sometimes unemployment is considered as the "healthy trend" in a capitalist economy. Because then the bargaining power of this "reserve army of labour" becomes redundant. And consequently, the demand for job increases which is used by bourgeoisie as a means of exploitation and ultimately the wage rate is kept in a very low level as the work force is subjugated at the mercy of bourgeoisie who negotiates the jobs for lowest possible wage and salary; the details of which and its ultimate effect on the fertility level in a society will be discussed in the third chapter.

4. Selective Equality of Condition

This specific objective can be identified in the social policy compendia of welfare states. To extract an "ideal type" from arrangements in reality never so clear cut, the aim here can be seen as that of insulating a particular area of life from control by the distributive principles of capitalism; and of seeking, within that area, equality of condition for all.

The clearest, indeed the only, approximate example is that of provision for health and medical services (and to some extent education). Public policy declared health an "essential" good; access to the medical and immediately

associated institutional means for its protection or restoration as equal right of all citizens, irrespective of income or other circumstances apart from medical need. Here was a conception of real "equality of citizenship" — not merely by virtue of nominal common participation in a scheme of national social "insurance"; but by virtue of a goal of substantive equality of conditions, though to be sought only in this selected field.

Equality of health could not and cannot be achieved without substantial reduction of the contextual socioeconomic inequalities which influence morbidity and mortality; reduction on a scale well outside the ends and means of accompanying social policy either then or now.

The Directive Principles of State Policy enjoin upon the state to ensure to secure the distribution of the material resources of the community so as to best to subserve the common good and operate the economic system in a manner that it does not result in the concentration of wealth and economic power to the common detriment.

The Constitution of India envisages the establishment of equal opportunity for the individual through its various provisions relating to equality in economic and social spheres of life, abolition of untouchability and privileges, protection against exploitation, right to adequate

means of livelihood, employment and education, and equitable distribution of wealth and economic power. (Agarwal 1967)

"There is nothing more destructive of hope and more inhibitive of effort than a feeling that the accident of birth or a poor start in life is likely to come in the way of a capable person rising in life in terms of economic and social status". (Third Five-Year Plan, 1962)

Is it not surprising to observe that a government who recognises "birth as an accident" (and of course that is true) and at the same time legitimises religio-superstitious approach in cultural and family institutions by enacting various personal laws (like Hindu undivided family law, Muslim personal law etc. etc.) Secondly, and most importantly the government who talks of a "poor" start in life should not be counted as an inhibitive factor for a capable person to grow in life" recognises private property succession transmission by inheritance to the so-called "legal successors".

"Equality of opportunity" is a logical corollary of "equality of access". There is much point to this argument, insofar as it identifies inherent contradictions in social policy: the tension between a radicalism of vision embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy (and the framework formulated by Dharia Committee for the Health Policy

after independence in 1946) and the reforming conservatism which characterized other social security legislation at the time.

Unrealistic though this was, the proponents of National Health Policy for independent India in 1946 dreamed of equality of health; and they made larger plans for curative as well as preventive medicine to that purpose than in fact materialized. (see Westergaard 1978, Jaffry 1977, Ganorji 1974, Dhore Committee Report 1946 etc.) There is more over little utility to an analogy with education. In both fields, it is true that equality of access has been postulated as an aim of policy but to different ultimate ends in education for the sake principally (and at best) of equalizing opportunities for eventual inequality; in health, exceptionally, with a hope of approximating equality of condition.

Even within the field of health, the goal of substantive equality has receded into elusiveness, both as the pressure from the contextual inequalities of the larger society have made themselves felt; and as the institutional devices to secure equal access have provided inadequate or in some respects indeed have been stripped down (Westergaard 1978, see also Zubrigg 1984 ch.III, Ganorji 1985, Ganorji 1982, Turchen 1981, Kolman 1983, Elling 1982).

In understanding the fundamental economic reasons why the egalitarian — obvious is not done, a deeper interpretation of who and what is responsible emerges. Within an economic structure which by its very nature need not, and indeed cannot give value to the health of the labouring majority, it becomes meaningless and even silly to "blame" the medical profession on any other particular group for the inappropriate distribution of health resources (Zubrigg 1982). As Navarro points out, "Health professionals generally take delegated power from other members of the corporate (resource owning/controlling) classes. The latter comprise the same individuals and groups who hold economic and political power throughout the society, not only the health system (Thus) the proper object of criticism and strategic action should be the nature of capitalist social organization rather than the medical profession." (Navarro 1981)

5. Diffuse Redistribution

An important part of the mythology surrounding the "welfare state" of the fifties (and later) which became incorporated in theories of radical transformation of capitalist society was that first, there had been a major reduction in the inequality of pre-tax income distribution; and second (although perhaps less widely held) that welfare state measures had made a major contribution to the further

reduction in inequality observable in post-tax income distribution. (Croaland 1956)

A "diffuse redistributive" objective; which is the gearing, actual or purported, of government measures to some mitigation of inequality, but in a manner that leaves the extent, purpose and boundaries of the redistribution to result undefined even by implication; is often tacked onto policies in large part directed to other ends. An obvious example is direct taxation. The "other ends" of that, of course, are to raise revenue and, to regulate levels of economic activity (Uustorgaard 1970)

Eminent scholars have been assessing the impact of the welfare state in the sphere of redistribution of income. Titmuss, Nicholson, Roddo and a host of scholars have made inquiries on this major topic. Nicholson in the context of Britain observes "There appears to have been little increase in the amount of vertical redistribution between 1937 and 1959". It has to be noted that Nicholson is talking about vertical redistribution and in 1959, about 15 years of establishment of welfare state.

Roddo has written that: "The problem is already a very real one in the highly industrialized developed countries in many of which there is a really fantastic inequality in the

ownership of property". Here as in case of India and other Third World countries which is very clear from the Table below:

Table 1 - DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME
(1964-65 and 1975-76)

Decile groups of population from bottom in %	Percentage share in total disposable income	
	1964-65	1975-76
0-20	7	7.0
20-40	11	9.2
40-60	15	13.9
60-80	20	20.5
80-100	47	49.4
Top 10 (90-100)	33	33.6

Sources: 1. NCAER 1966 (Gardner 1974) for 1964-65 data
2. World Bank (1985) for 1975-76 data.

Shockingly, the data in India shows increasing concentration in the hands of rich which means the relative condition of the bottom 40 per cent people is not changed at all.

There is, however, no evidence to support the view that the welfare state, as defined, is a significant factor contributing to growth of equality in capitalist society. There is limited evidence that in capitalist society there has been some reduction in the past forty years both in

inequality in the ownership of wealth and in the distribution of pre-tax income. As Rondo argues: "A man with much property has great bargaining strength and a great sense of security, independence and freedom; and he enjoys those things not only vis-a-vis his propertyless fellow citizens but also vis-a-vis the public authorities An unequal distribution of property means an unequal distribution of power and status even if it is prevented from causing too unequal a distribution of income".

The above issues raise a fundamental question: is the welfare state a state to subjugate capital or is it a state which acts as an agency to work out policies which would subserve the interests of monopoly capital in the context of revolution of rising expectations by the masses? This topic is already discussed in greater details in the section "The welfare state and the economy", but this question here is again raised to take to the next section which will be exclusively devoted to Indian context where the state is supposed to act in the direction of building a "socialist pattern of society" while pursuing non-capitalist path of economic development through various liberal welfare "state" policies.

WELFARE STATE IN INDIA

India's experience is altogether different from western countries. After almost two centuries of direct subjugation by naked colonialists which in turn is altogether responsible for the overall underdevelopment of this sub-continent. The colonialists left behind themselves an underdeveloped country with a vast mass of poor people, an underdeveloped economy and made conditions for the 'structural' dependency for time to come. They divided the country on communal basis, and no wonder to make any of the parts that they have divided, their neo-colonies without their direct intervention. They of course succeeded and now it is quite clear and not a matter of surprise that Pakistan is a neo-colony of USA and UK with a fanatic and fundamentalist military dictator who purchases largest amount of military and defence materials from USA and UK apparently to use against a socialist state, Afghanistan and a democratic state India. Thanks for the great effort made by democratic forces in India that the ruling classes were at least do not have the guts to directly collaborate with imperialist powers at least politically which is reflected in India's foreign policy. But what about collaborations they have made otherwise and concessions they have given to imperialist western powers in past four decades of independence? Are not they posing threat to our internal policies through MNCs and

other so-called aids because of the capitalist path of development that India has chosen after independence? Who is responsible for this 'structural' dependence on "core" capitalist countries (which is known as imperialist power in classical Marxism)?

HISTORICAL ROOTINGS OF WELFARE STATE IN INDIA

In the immediate post-war years, when Labour government in Britain in 1945 swept in the general elections, the very concept of "welfare state" came into being. The years that followed the mid 1940s saw the liberation of India from direct clutches of British imperialism. So the Indian elites represented by Indian National Congress took the cue from Britain in establishing "welfare state" in India. This concomitant phenomena of British "welfare state" and Indian liberation gave way to take India in the British path of development: so much so that India's 'socialist flavour' in all social policies of Britain made in India with Jawaharlal Nehru commending the resolution of Avadi Session (1955) said, "Now the time has come when we should march forward. Let us work a welfare state." Elsewhere he said that "a socialistic pattern is socialism. Some people seem to make fine distinctions among socialistic pattern of society, Socialistic Pattern and Socialism. They are exactly the same thing without the slightest difference". (Agarwal 1967)

One only hopes, Nehru would have known the differences. In fact, we do not find slightest difference between "Nehruvian socialism" (or Nehruvian capitalist path of development) and "welfare state" capitalism both with "socialist flavour".

Indian liberals argued that, "the establishment of welfare state has been accepted as the ultimate object of our socio-economic policies. Some basic principles leading to its establishment have, in fact, been embedded in our constitution, particularly in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy". (Agarwal 1967)

This implies that "India is to develop into a welfare state, starting with equality of status and opportunity of all its citizens and tending continuously towards complete social, economic and political justice and elimination of all social barriers which tend to cause conflict between the various sections of the population". (Santhanao 1962)

The rhetorics do not stop there. Our parliamentarians proclaimed us a "Socialist Pattern of Society" as the objective of social and economic policies, when they adopted the following resolution in December 1954.

"The basic lines of advance under a socialist pattern of society must not be private profit but social gain and that the pattern of development and the structure of socio-economic relations should be so planned that they result not only in appreciable increase in national income and employment but also in greater equality in income and wealth.

Major decisions regarding production, distribution, consumption and investment — and in fact all significant socio-economic relationships must be made by agencies informed by social purpose. The benefits of economic development must accrue more and more to the relatively less privileged classes of society and there should be progressive reduction of concentration of incomes, wealth and economic power. The problem is to create a milieu in which the small man, who has so far had little opportunity of participating in the immense possibilities of growth through organised effort, is enabled to put to his best in the interest of a higher standard of life for himself and increased prosperity of the country."

The euphoria of independence and the commitment that INC made for the people of India by such resolutions sounded very impressive. "This has even inspired a distinguished Indian economist to do a small but academic experimental exercise in order to prove that, subject to some minor qualifications here and there, the creation of a socialistic pattern of society in India could be carried out over a twenty year period. (Patel 1966, see Chattopadhyay 1970)

So it is presumed that what we have in India after the withdrawal of the British rulers is a welfare state. As Venkatarangaiya puts it: "Our constitution is unlike most of the constitutions of the world insofar as it contains a special part enumerating the directive principles of state

policy These directive principles make it clear that our goal is a welfare and socialist state".

CLASS CHARACTER OF RULING CLASS IN INDIA

Given the conditions of economic backwardness in which an underdeveloped country finds itself at the hour of its emergence from colonial dependence, some amount of state intervention in the economy followed by the creation of nationalized sector is indispensable for its economic development. Such a step is even progressive if, besides creating conditions of rapid capital accumulation, it helps to fight feudal and semi-feudal production relations, monopoly capitalism and imperialism. Only then can we speak of the nationalized sector serving the interests of the nation as a whole. Otherwise the nationalized sector, through state capitalism, only serves the interests of the ruling capitalist class as a whole and its national and international allies. Whether the state intervention takes the first or the second form depends basically on which class wields state power and what is the nature of class contradictions prevailing at a given time. (Chattopadhyaya 1970)

In India state power, ultimately and on the whole, lies in the capitalist class (in alliance with the landlords). Given the relative weakness of this class, even though it is the strongest and the most mature in Asia outside of Japan,

and the fast-sharpening class struggles inside the country as well as the contemporary international situation, more particularly the triumph and consolidation of the Chinese Revolution, this class cannot pursue the logic of independent capitalist development however it might subjectively want to.

The reason is that in the given circumstances the contradiction between the capitalist class and the people -- mainly the working class and the peasantry -- has become primary and that between the capitalist class on the one hand and the semi-feudal interests and imperialism on the other is secondary; naturally, faced with increasing hostility of the working class and its allies, the bourgeoisie cannot afford to alienate itself from the landed vested interests at home and imperialism abroad. In a word the bourgeoisie cannot successfully carry out the basic anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tasks which the pursuance of independent capitalist development demands. This is amply reflected, on the one hand, in the compromising character of its so-called "land reforms" -- signifying its failure to implement what it itself promised earlier -- and, on the other, in its increasing dependence on foreign aid including foreign investments.

Here we must point out that the massive and over-increasing Soviet economic and military aid is not, unfortunately, proving capable of changing the political orientation of the Indian ruling class. The latter is, in fact, utilizing this aid to strengthen its bargaining position, in order to extract larger aid from the imperialist—mainly American — sources. Worse yet, through its aid to India the Soviet Union is in effect strengthening the position of the Indian ruling class even at the cost of the emerging revolutionary forces inside the country. Needless to add that this policy fits in perfectly with the Soviet Union's global strategy of isolating China.

In these circumstances, the state capitalist sector, instead of serving the interests of the people as a whole really has become an instrument of exploitation for the domestic and foreign monopoly capitalists and their allies. Indeed, the Indian ruling class is neither following the socialist path nor the so-called "non-capitalist path of economic development. It is trying to follow the capitalist path, though haltingly and increasingly compromising itself at every step with the semi-feudal elements at home and imperialism abroad. (Chattopadhyaya 1970, see also Kurian 1972, Habib 1972, Guha, Anandou 1972, Das Gupta, Diplob 1972, Pattanai, Prabhat 1972, Chattopadhyay, S. 1972, Pattanai, Uson 1972 & 1986, Dattalhoim, Charles 1962, Jash, P.C. 1969 & 1972, Dergman, U. 1974, also relevant works are Dagchi, Aniya 1980, Doodi A.R. 1975, 1983, 1984)

The present paper was aimed at analysis of welfare state as well as the path of development being pursued by the ruling classes in India.

As we have contended in a later chapter that there is inherent dialectical relationship between population and development and also "each mode of production has its own law of population" (Marx 1976) it is quite necessary to know the nature of classes in Indian capitalist society.

Most importantly, population policy which incorporates almost all developmental policies and social policies in any country, it was also necessary to know whether Indian "welfare state capitalism" increases inequality through various social policies and diffusion redistributive measures (which is known otherwise as the theory of "trickling down" in India) or really helped in decreasing the gap between rich and poor.

So, population policy which is a complex issue involving almost all social policies especially in a country like India, cannot be seen in isolation of the contradictions that are accentuated day by day through so-called welfare state social policies.

This calls for identification of sharer of state power in India which ultimately responsible for formulation and implementation of such policies.

If overall socio-economic structure and system has important bearing on fertility and welfare of the family at large, we are equally concerned about the policies that are being pursued by the government for the socio-economic development of the poor people.

Because here we want to clearly distinguish between population policy (defined in ch. 2 & 3); family planning and welfare and population "control" policy.

Chapter Three

MALTHUS/MALTHUSIANS AND MARX/ MARXISTS ON POPULATION

The debate is more than two centuries old - from the times of Condorcet, Townsend, Wallace etc. - but still finds itself in the boiling pot even more vigorously and getting hotter day by day. The prophecy of Parsons and Reverends of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw misery, human degradation, destitution, forlorn for the majority of mankind in the future to come, because according to "their" law of population: mankind's propensity to beget, would soon outstrip the earth's capacity to provide. Most outspoken and articulate of them is Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus who prescribed the panacea to avoid such kind of situation, in terms of preventive checks. If the working classes could be persuaded to exercise "moral restraint" then and only then the problem can be solved Malthus said, because the "sexual urge" of this strata of society is unrestrained and unrestricted. "In particular", it was impossible "to remove the wants of the lower classes of society". "The truth is", said Malthus "that the pressure of distress on this part of a community is an evil so deeply seated, that no human ingenuity can reach

it" (Malthus 1926). Half a century later Karl Marx - the man who kept the pot boiling and discussed the issue in its all directions and its implications the political, the economic, the social. Because until then the pamphlet of Malthus created so much of sensation that ruling classes who feared radical reformation of society got the true alibi for the conditions of the poor. In fact Malthusianism served the purpose of the ruling classes of the society alongwith the unproductive parasitic sections and their apologists.

"The real problem wasn't too many people on too little food, said Marx, but that private capitalists owned the means of meeting men's needs. Today this war of words roars on.

The professional ecologists chastise the political left for "blindly following the outdated Marxist line that the population problem can be ignored until we reform the economic system". And a new generation of unregenerate Marxists Yells back that "the population boppers only divert attention from the real issues and pave the way for world-wide race war and genocide". (Weissman 1971).

The debate is classic and classically dull.

But the issue won't disappear. Because of the debate many who have worked together against imperial adventure, poverty and racism now find themselves fighting each other across ill-defined barricades. Without the debate, many more - either fearful of the deep masses stirring below or preceived by the whole modern trip and anxious to end it with a quick cultural vasectomy - are making the population control movement into a far-too-holy crusade. The whole scene is scary, and perhaps more immediately dangerous than the life - and-death questions which the neo-Malthusians Confusedly pose and the Marxists contemptuously ignore. (Weissman 1971)

The aim of this chapter will be first of all to discuss Malthus's original position and Marx's criticism in some greater details because most of the work in this respect is sporadic and neo-Malthusians' sometimes misinterpret Marxist position. At the same time we have tried to formulate a theory of population for post-colonial societies in general and in the process we have given a critique of "orthodox" Marxist view on population, taking China as a case study.

The classical Marxist position never considered the environmental hazards involved in population growth. No doubt, capitalist anarchic production creates the pollution problem, but excessive population growth which is one of the many symptoms of such a system, will further to harm to the environment. In fact, rational population planning and environmental protection policies must be pursued together.

This kind of a situation was not envisaged in the period of classical Marxism. It was for later Marxists to work in this respect. But till recently no much work is done still gives a deterministic framework of population and family planning. Here we have given ecologists critique of orthodox Marxist position on population.

British Critical Scholar Weissman (1971) Comments :

"Even rationally organised and distributed, there might be now still be too little nourishing food for too many people, and even that balance at possibly disastrous cost to the entire eco-system. But equally, important to a holistic, ecological view, it is capitalism which creates this irrationality and hastens the destruction of the environment in most of the world, and without

destroying capitalism, neither green revolutions nor population control will put food in the mouths of these, who cannot afford to pay for it*.

If population is supposed to be the chief culprit in developing world for the misery of the poor, it is even less the chief culprit in the advanced countries. Yet pollution is now growing, by rough estimate, some six or seven times faster than population growth. Demands for power are growing about eight times faster. (Weissman 1971). The latter is also true for the elites of developing countries. If population has to be controlled, it should be more in so-called "developed" world and in developing world, this should be applicable to the rich more. As for pollution problems, the rich are more guilty than the poor.

Hopefully, the Marxists* will at this point be able to tear themselves away from their prejudices and welcome the ecologists as something other than 'ideological criminals'. For, even apart from their large following, the ecologists do bring a perspective which, integrated with Marx's emphasis on social class and economic process, might once again give the revolutionary movement a claim to ideological hegemony. (Weissman 1971)

* Here, the Marxists means the "Orthodox" Marxists who work in a "deterministic" framework and still adhere to some of the obsolete interpretations. These kind of reductionist arguments sometimes also termed as "vulgar" Marxism.

MALETTUS ON POPULATION :

Back in 1793 - a year in which the French Revolution was still conjuring up hopes of the perfectibility of man and of society (Weissman 1971) - the rulers of Britain were greatly alarmed by the enthusiasm for the French Revolution which was sweeping through the country. The Revolution was breeding dangerous thoughts, not only in the minds of intellectuals like Godwin and poets like Wordsworth, but also in the minds of the working people - the labourers, artisans and small shopkeepers of cities(Meek 1979)

"Everything, not this thing or that thing, but literally everything, was soaked in this one event". (Dobson, 1896).

Those who feared radical social reform fought back against those who hoped and worked for it. A regime of thought-control, terror and physical repression was instituted. But physical repression was not enough. Those who feared reform had also to take sides in the great battle of ideas which was raging at that time, in order to overcome the new notions of "the

1. The materials for this section is heavily drawn from "Marx and Engels on Population Bomb" by Ronald L. Meek (see the reference).

perfectibility of man and of the society" which were beginning to grip wide sections of the people.

To their aid, in 1798, came the Rev. T.R. Malthus with his famous 'Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society'. In the first edition of the Essay, Malthus maintained that the "Principle of population", was "conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind".

Here is a short summary, in Malthus's own words:

"The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.

By that law of nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.

This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence.

This difficulty must fall somewhere; and must necessarily severely felt by a large portion of mankind.

This natural inequality of the two powers of population, and of production in the earth and that great law of our nature which must constantly keep their effects equal, form the great difficulty that to me appears insurmountable in the way to the perfectibility of society. (Malthus 1926).

It will be seen that this argument is chiefly founded upon two propositions - that population when unchecked "increases in a geometrical ratio," "whereas "subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio". Upon the validity of these "ratios" the argument as a whole stands or falls. It is true that the emphasis on the "ratios" was toned down a little in later editions of the 'Essay', but it is true - as is often suggested by Malthus's modern admirers - that Malthus eventually came to set little store by them. (Smith 1951).

If the evidence for the geometrical ratio is unsatisfactory, that for the arithmetical ratio is even more so. In fact, Malthus adduces no evidence whatsoever for it - all that he does is to assert that it is - "the very utmost that even we can conceive", "that by great exertion, the whole produce of the

Island (USA) might be increased every twenty-five years, by a quantity of subsistence equal to what it at present produces. The most enthusiastic speculator cannot suppose a greater increase than this". (Malthus 1926). But this is merely an assertion, and by no means a proof. As Engels pointed out, it ignores (among other things) the fact that "science advances in proportion to the body of knowledge passed down to it by the previous generation, that is, in the most normal conditions it also grows in geometrical progression". (Engels U;1944)

The "arithmetical ratio" was in fact purely Chimerical. Later on Malthus's followers began to substitute the so-called "law of diminishing returns" for the discredited "arithmetical ratio" and Malthus himself relied increasingly upon this "law" in successive editions of his "Essay". But this does not save the "principle" from collapse, as will be discussed later.

As is referred earlier Malthus's ideas did not remain in the terrain of academicia. Its implications were far-reaching. The ruling class used this doctrine as an apology for the conditions of the working class prevailing then, and Malthusianism soon became a very powerful ideological weapon in the hands of the ruling class. "... That is his scientific meanness, his sin

against science, quite apart from his shameless and mechanical plagiarism. Malthus's scientific conclusions are considerate where the ruling classes in general and the reactionary elements among these ruling classes in particular are concerned, that is, he falsifies science on behalf of these interests. His conclusions are, however, inconsiderate where the oppressed classes are concerned. And it is not only that he is inconsiderate. He affects inconsiderateness, takes a cynical pleasure in his role, and exaggerates the conclusions - insofar as they are directed against those living in poverty - to an even greater extent than could be scientifically justified from his own point of view".

The hatred of the English class against Malthus - the "mountbank - parson", as Cobbett rudely calls him is therefore entirely justified. The people were right here in sensing instinctively that they were confronted not with a man of science but with a bought advocate, a pleader on behalf of their enemies, a shameless sycophant of the ruling classes. (Marx W. 1861-63, pub. 1952)

Notwithstanding these fairly obvious defects, the success of the "Essay" among the ruling classes

was immediate and considerable. It even led to measure public policy conclusions, such as abolition of "English Poor Laws" and introduction of "New Poor Laws". Not only did Malthusianism appear to prove that society was not "perfectible" but it also seemed to reveal that it was useless to attempt any major reform even within the present framework of society. In particular, it was impossible "to remove the wants of the lower classes of society". "The truth is", said Malthus, "that the pressure of distress on this part of a community is an evil so deeply seated, that no human ingenuity can reach it". All that can possibly be proposed, he argued, are "palliatives", such as the abolition of the poor laws.

Malthus was opposed to the Poor Laws from the beginning. "The poor-laws of England", he said in the first edition of the Essay, "tend to depress the general condition of the poor" because their tendency is "to increase population without increasing the food for its support". This theme received much greater stress in the second and subsequent editions. Malthus's work was more influential than that of any other single individual in helping to secure the passing of the new Poor

Law of 1834, a measure which was based above all on the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. The principle of population provided a "Scientific" basis for the "reform" of the Poor Law - and also a moral basis. In a notorious passage in the second edition of 'Essay' Malthus disposed of the idea that the poor had any "natural right" to support :

A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She take him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he do not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same favour... The guests learn too late their error, in counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great mistress of the feast, who, wishing that all guests should have plenty, and knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely refused to admit fresh comers when her table was already full.

This revealing passage was expunged from subsequent editions, but the basic idea behind it - that the poor are not entitled to claim relief as a right - was upheld by Malthus to the end. And not only had the poor no right to relief but they must also be punished for their poverty. "Dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful", said Malthus, and it ought to be made as disagreeable as possible.

These ideas were eventually incorporated in the new Poor Law of 1834, which abolished all "out-door relief" for the able - bodied, compelling the indigent to receive relief inside a workhouse, and thus forcing the weavers, petty craftsmen and casual farm labourers into the factories.

What Malthus was doing, in effect, was to postulate the existence of an independent and universal sexual instinct possessing this power, it was true, could not be conclusively proved, but it had the great merit that it could not be conclusively proved, but it had the great merit that it could not be disproved either. If the population of a given country did not in fact double itself every twenty-five years, this could simply be ascribed to the operation of "checks" of one kind or another. And we may at least agree with Malthus to

this extent, that human beings do possess a sexual instinct, that they are biologically capable of increasing at this rate, and that it is possible that under continuously favourable conditions they would in fact do so. But to talk about a tendency for them to do so, except in an extremely abstract sense of that word, is quite illegitimate. And of course, it is equally illegitimate to talk about a tendency for them to increase at a given rate, if only because both sexual desire and reproductive capacity display a very wide range of variation (Meek 1954).

In his preface to the second edition, Malthus stated that he had "endeavoured to soften some of the harshest conclusions of the first essay". But in actual fact the amount of "softening" was negligible. It is true that he now suggested that there might be some hope of improvement if the poor voluntarily delayed marriage, and therefore procreation, until they were in a position to support a family. But Malthus himself does not seem to have placed much reliance on his discovery of what is called "a preventive check" which did not resolve itself as all the other checks were alleged to do, into vice or misery, the check of "moral restraint". By "moral restraint" Malthus did not mean contraception

(which he regarded as a form of immoral restraint), but rather "abstaining from marriage till we are in a condition to support a family, with a perfectly moral conduct during that period. If the working classes could be persuaded to exercise "moral restraint" Malthus argued, then and only then would it be possible to prevent the hare of population from overtauling the tortoise of food supply.

The subsequent editions of the "Essay" was Swollen by the addition of a great deal of historical and statistical material (much of it of very dubious validity), and the "melancholy hue " remained just as melancholy as ever. Whatever the intentions of its author may have been, the Malthusian theory of population remained to the end what it had been at the beginning - an apology for the condition of the working people, and a warning against all attempts to ameliorate the condition of society. As such it did yeoman service during Malthus's lifetime (Meek 1954). And it is still doing yeoman service today, over a century-and-half (1834-1986) after Malthus's death.

MARX AND ENGELS ON MALTHUS

We have already quoted from Marx's Malthus as apologist in the earlier section (P.4-6) regarding his general criticism of Malthus, to which we will return again later. Now, let us consider Marx and Engels's recognition of Malthus's some premises and deductions as posed against some vulgar economist of their contemporary such as Bastiat and Say. For example, Marx praised Malthus for protesting against the extension of the working day. Again, we can infer from the number of times that elementary statements by Malthus are quoted approvingly in "Capital" that Marx admired his facility for expressing familiar classical propositions; and Marx was always prepared to admit that Malthus at least had "a certain interest in theoretical sophistication" (Marx: Theories of Surplus Value, Vol.3, 1963).

Particularly, Malthus was obviously superior to those economists who put forward "the pitiable doctrines of harmony in bourgeois political economy - i.e., the doctrines which suggested that there was no real conflict of interests between social classes under capitalism. Malthus at least had the merit of laying emphasis on the disharmonies - in fact as Marx says, "he clings to

them with paragonic satisfaction, amplifies them and blazons them forth".

"Malthus," Marx says, "is not interested in disguising the contradictions of bourgeois production, on the contrary, he is interested in emphasising them". But Marx did not consider this particular merit to be very outstanding one. For one thing, Malthus had not discovered the contradictions himself, and the reasons why he was interested in emphasizing them were hardly admirable.

Malthus's "Sin against Science" (see p. 3-4) above) according to Marx, took two main forms. First, it took the form of his "shameless and mechanical plagiarism". The charge of plagiarism, according to Meek, is notoriously difficult to bring home in cases where the text is not actually 'copied', since the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate use of another's work, and between the conscious and unconscious use of it, are often not easy to define. But in case of Malthus, each of his three major theoretical contributions - the theory of population, the theory of rent, and the theory of effective demand - had been substantially anticipated by earlier writers, and it must be admitted that this

series of coincidences is at least highly suspicious. Second is concerned with the blatantly "apologetic" character of his conclusions, as Marx points out on a number of occasions were generally either in the interest of the ruling classes as a whole as against the workers, or in the interests of the more reactionary sections of the ruling classes as against the more progressive sections. (Meek, 1971). This led a modern commentator to conclude, "Malthus, had other things in mind than a scientific treatise on population growth". (Smith 1951, p. 244-245).

On the "Theory of Population"

Malthus's theory, Marx and Engels, argued, tried to explain in terms of an "eternal law" certain phenomena which were in fact properly explicable only in quite different terms. The starting - point of this part of their criticism was their recognition of the fact that the actual phenomena which Malthus described and which he tried to account for - the widespread poverty and pauperism among the working people - were real phenomena which could not be ignored and which were crying out for an explanation. Malthus was "right, in his way", said Engels, "in asserting that there are always more people

on hand than can be maintained from the available means of subsistence", (Engels, 1844), although the pressure of population was really against the means of employment rather than against the means of subsistence. Malthus's critics might attempt to prove his principle of population to be wrong, but they could not "argue away the facts which led Malthus to his principle". (Engels, "Outlines", 1844). This explained in part why it was that the Malthusian 'theory, which had few pretensions to scientific profundity, was able to exercise such an enormous influence. Even apart from all questions of party interest, there was a presumption in favour of Malthus's explanation of the facts until a better one had been put forward.

To Marx and Engels, interested as they were in discovering the basic laws of social change, and in particular the "law of motion" specific to bourgeois society, any explanation of a phenomenon such as overpopulation under capitalism in terms of an "eternal law" was bound to appear superficial and inadequate. The mature position of classical Marxism on this point was stated by Engels in a letter to Laugel of March 1865, dealing specifically with Malthus :

"To us so-called "economic laws" are not eternal laws of nature but historical laws which arise and disappear; and the code of modern political economy, in so far as it has been drawn up with proper objectivity by the economists, is to us simply a summary of the laws and conditions under which alone modern bourgeois society can exist - in short the conditions of its production and exchange expressed in an abstract and summary way. To us also, therefore, none of these laws, in so far as it expresses "purely bourgeois conditions", is older than modern bourgeois society; those which have hitherto been more or less valid throughout all history only express just those relations which are common to the conditions of all society based on class rule and class exploitation. To the former belongs the so-called law of Ricardo, which is valid neither for feudal serfdom nor ancient slavery; to the latter belongs what is tenable in the so-called Malthusian theory". (Selected Correspondence of Marx and Engels).

And even in the case of those laws and conditions which have had a limited validity throughout the whole history of class society, Marx and Engels maintained that the most interesting and important thing about them

was the different ways in which they operated in different types of class society.

Thus Marx and Engels denied that "the law of population is the same at all times and at all places". On the contrary, they maintained, "every stage of development has its own law of population". (Capital, Vol. 1, P. xxix, author's preface).

It was not enough, of course, merely to assert this, it had to be proved. Marx and Engels do not seem to have made any direct attempt to formulate the laws of population appropriate to earlier forms of society. They considered that the most important job they had to do was to formulate the law of population peculiar to the present, bourgeois stage of development, and to demonstrate that this new, specific law fitted the contemporary facts better than the old, "eternal" law which Malthus had put forward (Meek, 1954).

The key-explanation in this regard is given by Marx in Capital, Vol. I which is summarised by Meek in the following paragraph.

To understand the reason for the emergence of "relative surplus - population" under capitalism, says Marx, one must consider the influence of the

growth of capital upon the lot of the labouring class. And here the most important factor is the composition of capital and the changes it undergoes in the course of the accumulation process. As accumulation proceeds, the value of the means of production (constant capital) tends to rise relatively to the sum total of wages (Variable Capital). "The accumulation of capital", says Marx, " ... is effected ... under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, under a constant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent". This relative diminution of the variable part of capital proceeds simultaneously with the progress of accumulation and the concentration of capital that accompanies it. Now "the demand for labour is determined not by the amount of capital as a whole, but by its variable constituent alone", so that the demand for labour "falls relatively to the magnitude of the total capital, and at an accelerated rate, as this magnitude increases". Although the demand for labour increases absolutely as the total capital increases, it does so "in a constantly diminishing proportion". Thus "it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a

relatively redundant population of labourers, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus - population". And after discussing briefly the various ways in which these changes may work themselves out, Marx sums the matter as follows:

The labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus - population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production; and in fact every specific historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone. An abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and only in so far as man has not interfered with them. (Capital, Vol. I)

It is on the basis of this central thesis that Marx goes on to discuss in greater detail, and with a wealth of historical illustration, the laws of the expansion and contraction of the "industrial reserve army" and the different forms which "relative surplus-

population" assumes in modern society. In so far as Malthus's theory attempted to explain the "over-population" peculiar to modern capitalism, then, this was Marx's main answer to him. (Meek, 1954).

On the "law of diminishing returns"

As mentioned above, it was not long before the so-called "law of diminishing returns" was brought in as the main theoretical foundation for the idea that food production only increases in (Malthusian) arithmetical ratio. In our own times, this "law" is generally formulated in a very general and abstract manner, in terms of the so-called "factors of production" - i.e., land, labour and capital. If we suppose that one factor or group of factors is held constant, and that to it is applied another factor or group of factors in successive equal amounts, then, it is said, after a certain point the successive amounts of output added with diminish. But the law was originally formulated with land as the fixed factor and labour and capital as the variable factors, and it is this particular application of the general "law" which is important in the present connection. Each additional investment of labour and capital in land, it is argued, must

necessarily produce after a point not a corresponding but a diminishing quantity of product. It is this "Universal" and "natural" feature of agriculture which was, and still is, often held to be largely responsible for the "over-population to be found in many parts of world.

It was in this "Law of diminishing returns", then, as Marx noted, that "Malthus found the real ground for his theory of population and ... his pupils now seek their final sheet anchor". "The area of land is limited - that is perfectly true", said Engels. But the labour power to be employed on this area increases together with the population; and even if we assume that the increase of output associated with this increase of labour is not always proportionate to the latter, there still remains a third element - which the economists however, never consider as important - namely, science, the progress of which is just as limitless and at least as rapid as that of population". (Engels, "Outline", 1844)

Lenin in his book on "The Agrarian Question and the Critique of Marx", puts forward a detailed Marxist criticism of the "law of diminishing returns". He is attacking Bulgakov, who "makes the 'law of, diminishing

returns' the cornerstone of his 'theory of agrarian development', "and uses it as the basis for what Lenin calls an "assured attempt to revive Malthusianism". Bulgakov, says Lenin, implies that technical progress in agriculture should be regarded as a "temporary" tendency, whereas the "law of diminishing returns" should be regarded as possessing "universal significance", an argument which leads Lenin to remark that "this is the same as saying that the stopping of trains at stations represents the universal law of steam transport, while the motion of trains between stations is a temporary tendency which paralyses the operation of the universal law of stopping". The "law of diminishing returns", says Lenin.

"does not apply at all to cases in which technique is progressing and methods of production are changing, it has only an extremely relative and restricted application to cases in which technique remains unchanged. That is why neither Marx nor the Marxist refer to this "law" and why so much noise about it is made only by representatives of bourgeois science like Brentano, who are quite unable to rid themselves of the prejudices of the old political economy, with its abstract

eternal and natural laws. (Lenin) with the rejection of "law of diminishing returns", the Malthusian Principle is left without any theoretical basis.

The rejection of this "Law" also meant that the "Ricardian" theory of rent, which was originally founded upon it, required substantial amendment. The economists who first developed this theory (with the exception of Anderson) were under what Marx called a primitive misconception of differential rent... to the effect that it necessarily requires a progress towards worse and worse soil, on an ever decreasing productivity of agriculture". (Capital, vol. 2) In actual fact, Marx argued, this was not so. The law of rent, as laid down by Ricardo in its simplest form, apart from its application, does not assume the diminishing fertility of the soil but (in spite of the fact that the general fertility of the soil increases as society develops) only presupposes different degrees of fertility in different pieces of land, or different results from the successive application of capital to the same land (Selected Correspondence p. 29).

On the theory of Value and Surplus Value

One of the most important general charges which Marx and Engels made against Malthus was that when dealing with economic theory he was almost exclusively concerned with the superficial aspects of market phenomena, and not all interested in or even aware of the real social relationships lying behind them.

Meek suggests two alternative ways of looking at economic phenomena. First, one can "hold fast to the appearance", and accepts the explanations of these phenomena given by the capitalists themselves (and their apologists - the "bourgeoise" and "vulgar" economists) as the last word. Accordingly, the value of a commodity is determined by "what the market will bear"; so as to the value made up to the effect that includes compensation for the labour and raw materials purchased and for the depreciation of the buildings and machinery, plus an "addition" of profit at a 'definite' amount of percentage on the total capital that has laid out. Profit thus appears as something which is simply "added on" to the price of the finished commodity by the capitalist.

Or, second, one can try to go behind these appearances and penetrate to the real social relationships which ultimately determine them. The value of a commodity then appears, not as the expression of a relation between consumers and finished goods, but rather as the expression of a relationship between men as producers. And profit appears, not as something which is "added on" by the capitalist, but rather as something which is, as it were, secreted in the process of production, by virtue of the particular social relationship existing between wage labourers and capitalists.

The sole merit of Malthus's work on value and profit theory (the former argument), Marx argues, is the emphasis which he lays on the point, that, the capitalist's aim is not to produce commodities, but to produce profit; "the excess quantity of living labour for which the commodity is exchanged constitutes the source of profit". (Marx: Surplus Vol.3). and this merit is cancelled out again immediately by reason of the fact that when he proceeds to formulate his theory of value he "confuses the utilization of money or commodities as capital, with the value of the commodities as such".

What Malthus really does in this analysis, as Marx points out, is to transform all buyers into wage labourers, making them return to the capitalist more labour than is contained in the commodities; whereas in reality his profit is actually derived from the fact that, having paid for only a part of the labour contained in the commodities, he sells all the labour contained in them.

Commenting on Malthus concept of 'surplus value', Marx further adds :

The value of a commodity consists in the value which the buyer pays for it, and this value is equal to the equivalent (value) of the commodity plus an excess over and above this value, surplus value. Thus we arrive at the vulgar concept. Profit arises from the fact that a commodity is sold dearer than it is bought. The buyer buys it for a greater quantity of labour, or embodied labour, than it has cost the seller.

Concludingly, this much must be remarked that, in the work of Adam Smith, the superficial and the profound, both ways of looking at economic phenomena, are to be found side by side. In that of Ricardo, the profound predominates, which led later on to serve as

the foundation for the work "Ricardian Socialists", in spite of its many defects, and later for that of Marx and Engels, who held that the value of a commodity ought to be "measured" by the quantity of labour required to produce it (i.e. the amount of labour embodied in the commodity).

On the "Theory of Capitalist Crises"

For Malthus's theory of value, as was explained, led him to regard profit as "originating upon alienation", and from this it was only a short step to Malthus's famous apology for "unproductive consumers" and his explanation of capitalist crises in terms of a deficiency of effective demand. As Marx says, "a demand other than that of the workers, buyers other than the workers themselves, are necessary, or there would be no profit. Where are they going to come from? If they are themselves capitalists, themselves sellers, then we have.... (a) mutual swindling within the capitalist class--each nominally raises the price of the commodity which he sells to the other, and each gains as seller what he loses as buyer. Thus (according to Malthus) it is necessary to have buyers who are not sellers, in order that the capitalist (can)

realise his profit and sell the commodities 'at their value'. Hence the necessity of landowners, retired officials, holders of sinecures, parsons etc., not forgetting their lackeys and other hangers - on". (Surplus, vol. 3, 1862).

If capitalism is going to expand, said Malthus, then the class of "unproductive consumers" (and in particular landlords) must expand with it if crises are to be avoided, for crises are caused by a deficiency of effective demand which is inherent in the capitalist system. The root cause of crises, according to Malthus, was a contradiction in the sphere of exchange, which tended (if accumulation were too rapid) to prevent the amount of purchasing power distributed to consumers being sufficient to buy the commodities produced at prices which would give the capitalists a reasonable profit. (Meek, 1971)

Malthus, was not concerned to disguise the contradictions of bourgeois production, but rather to emphasise them - "on the one hand", as Marx said, "in order to demonstrate that the poverty of the working classes is necessary.... and on the other hand

in order to demonstrate to the capitalists that a well-fed tribe of church - and state servants is indispensable for the creation of an adequate demand for their commodities" (Surplus, Vol. 3, 1961-63).

Marx was quite prepared to give Malthus credit for emphasizing these contradictions - "the real contribution made by Malthus... is that he places the main emphasis on the unequal exchange between capital and labour... whereas Ricardo... leaves the origin of surplus - value obscure. (Marx: value, vol. 3, p. 14). From Malthus, Marx learned that there was no automatic mechanism to re-establish harmony between capitalists and workers. Demand could be defective with dire consequences for the workers as well as for the capitalist system. (Sherwood, 1985).

Malthus's theory of crises, like that of Sismondi (from whom much of it was probably borrowed), was essentially an "under consumption theory - i.e., a theory which puts forward a discrepancy between production and consumption as the basic cause of crises. In Capital, Marx wrote that the consuming power of society is "restricted by the tendency to accumulate, the greed for an expansion of capital... To the extent that the productive power develops, it finds itself at

variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest". He concluded that "the last cause of all crisis remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the entire society would be their limit", (Vol. 3 p. 236-237) "that it is precisely in the periods which precede crises that the workers' consumption rises", (Capital, vol. 2, p-473-476), "that underconsumption existed under the most diverse economic systems, whereas crises are the distinguishing feature only of one economic system - the capitalist system. (Engels, Anti-During, p.314).

One of the factors counterbalancing the tendency toward crises of underconsumption was the existence of Malthus's unproductive consumers. In a passage that could almost have been written by Malthus himself, (Sherwood 1935), Marx said, "Over against this overproduction on one side must be placed overconsumption on the other, production for the sake of production must be confronted by consumption for the sake of consumption. What the industrial capitalist has to surrender to landlords, the state, creditors of the state, the church, and so forth, who only consume revenue, is an absolute diminution of his wealth, but

it keeps his lust for enrichment going and thus preserves his capitalist soul". (Surplus value Vol. 2, p. 578).

Marxian theory attributes crises to another contradiction, namely, the contradiction between the social character of production (socialized by capitalism) and the private, individual mode of appropriation, which is otherwise "anarchy of production" (Lenin in 'Economic Romanticism' p. 63-64).

Stalin concludes as follows: "If capitalism could adopt production, not to the obtaining of the utmost profit, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the masses of the people, and if it could turn profits not to the satisfaction of the whims of the parasitic classes, not to perfecting the methods of exploitation, not to the export of capital, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants, there would be no crises. But then capitalism would be no crises. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. To abolish crises it is necessary to abolish capitalism. (Stalin's Report to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B) p. 18-19 and 'Economic Problems of socialism in U.S.S.R. pp. 42-46).

MALTHUSIANISM & NEO-MALTHUSIANISM TODAY

From Sadler, who maintained that, Malthus is not 'the Simple-minded virtuous man of Miss Martineau, rather he is the advocate of a theory that could we but trace its effects, it would be found that it has already been the means of inflicting greater mischiefs than any error ever received, and that it threatens still deeper evils" (Sadler, 1830) and other contemporaries and immediate successors, Malthusianism Neo-Malthusianism and Anti-Malthusianism has come a long way. "In our own times" comments Meek, "new doctrines concerning "the perfectibility of man and society", scientific rather than utopian in character, have come to guide the practical day-to-day activities of large sections of mankind. Inspired by Marxism, tremendous social revolutions have occurred in Soviet Union, China and the Peoples Democracies - ... In those countries where capitalism still holds sway, those who fear radical social change are again facing a challenge, but a challenge far stronger than anything of which their predecessors in Malthus's time ever dreamed. Once again it is necessary for them to fight back not only on the physical plane, but also in the

realm of ideas. And to their aid, faithfully as always, has come the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus. The main theoretical weapons which Malthus used against the progressive classes of his own time are being taken from the armory of reaction, dusted and polished, and used against the progressive classes of today". (Meek, 1971).

The modern Malthusians in a much more sophisticated and polished form envisage the same prophecy as that of Malthus's, that world population is almost going to outstrip world food and other natural resources supplied. The American biologist Paul Ehrlich, under the sensational title "The population Bomb" writes prophetically, "In the 1970s the world will undergo famines - hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs em upon now". (Ehrlich, 1968)

Within a year of its publication, however, reality (once more) reputed the Malthusians doleful prophecies. The bad years of 1965-66 were followed in 1967-68 by a marked upturn in production of cereals in a number of Asian countries from the Philippines to Turkey and (what is especially important) in such

very large countries as India. (Guzevaty, 1978).
To this point we would back again in greater details).

Taking a slightly earlier version, the American populationist William Vogt says, "Never before, in history, have so many hundreds of millions teetered at the edge of the precipice. (Vogt, 1949). "There are too many people in the world", says Vogt, "for its limited resources to provide a high standard of living". Such ideas as these, it is evident, are useful weapons against those who feel that if the world in fact teetering at the edge of a precipice today it is for a very different reason. Vogt knows very well that it is becoming increasingly difficult to present the basic Malthusian principle as if it were purely "natural law which it is quite impossible for man to circumvent. He realizes that it is no longer plausible, if it ever was, to deny that political and economic factors are fundamental, and that in so far as the relation between population and food supplies does at the moment constitute a real problem in certain countries, it cannot be effectively solved except on the basis of radical political and economic changes.

Throughout the book, he contrives to give the impression that the wasteful utilization of the land is primarily due to "demographic" causes, i.e. to the excessive growth of population as such, and only secondarily to political and economic causes. His judgement is that "unless population increases can be stopped, we might as well give up the struggle". (Vogt. p 949, p. 279). To take in terms such as these, of course, is to disguise the primary causes of the trouble by giving them a status which is subordinate (or at the best equal) to that of the secondary causes. (Meek 1954).

This led Meek to conclude in the hands of writers like Vogt the Malthusian principle of population becomes more or less openly a weapon in the Cold War. (Meek 1971, emphasis added). Interestingly an Indian crucial sociologist D. Banerji puts this point quite emphatically, of course, from a very different perspective and frame of analysis.

".... ironically, the population growth among the oppressed people has unwrittengly given them a potent weapon to wrest their democratic rights to form their oppressors". (Banerji, 1985 p. 413)* That is to say whereas Malthusianism is a weapon in cold war for bourgeoisie, population growth itself has become

* Details of which will be discussed in the next chapter.

the counter -weapon for poor to bargain their rights.

Regarding India, Vogt says "in all the world there is probably no region of greater misery, and almost certainly none with less hope". It is now worthwhile to quote Josue de Castro from his all time masterpiece "the Geopolitics of Hunger". "Here is the death sentence that William Vogt, standard-bearer of the neo-Malthusians, serenely pronounced upon those great hunger makers, the Chinese: "... there is little hope that the world will escape the horror of extensive famines in China during the next few years. But from the world point of view, these may be not only desirable but indispensable"... Whether, as Vogt asserts, the famished themselves create the hunger, or whether the guilty are those who go in for neo-Malthusian theories while they defend and benefit from an imperialist economy". (Josue de Castro 1977).

Regarding Soviet Union, we are told that she is "certainly overpopulated; there is little possibility that she can raise her people to our (i.e. the American) status". (Vogt 1949) We are giving this short comparative table for the reference of Vogt - like neo-Malthusians prophely.

Table - 1

		<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>U.K.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>
% rate of growth per year ^e	1. Population	1.5	0.5	1.5
	2. Food production ^a	2.0	2.8	3.9
	3. Domestic demand for food ^{b, c}	1.6	0.7	3.0
Kcal. per capita per day	4. Dietary Energy Supply ^{c, d}	3330	3190	3280
	5. % of requirements of above in (A)	125	126	131
	6. Protein Supply (gms. per capita per day)	106	92	101
	7. Income distribution (Highest to lowest 20%)	7.5	5.7	-

a. Food component of crop and livestock production only (i.e. excluding fish)

b. Calculated on the basis of growth of population & capita income, and estimates of income elasticity of farm value of demand (FAO, Rome 1971)

c. Total food, including fish.

d. 1969-1971 average

e. Exponential trend 1952-72

f. Revised standards of average requirements (Physiological requirements plus 10% for waste at household level)

g. 1962-1972

SOURCE : TIR 1975/World Bank 1985/FAO, Rome 1971

In addition to above there is still unemployment in U.S.A. and about one-tenth of people are living below poverty line which is virtually absent in Soviet Union. But the main purpose Vogt's book comes to gone with the following. "The major threat in Asia", Vogt. writes, "... is mounting population pressure in the Soviet Union". (p.239). The Malthusian principle can be used, in addition, to discourage attempts to assist these "overpopulated" countries (Meek 1971) where it finds "overpopulation" says Vogt, the FAO of the UN should include contraception programs in its conservation and food - production programs, and "should not ship food to keep alive ten million Indians and Chinese this years, so that fifty million may die five years hence". (p. 261).

And above all, Malthusian principle can be used as justification for American "leadership" of Western imperialist world. As Vogt. says, "Unless we (i.e. Americans) are willing to place fifty million British feet beneath our dining room table we may well see famine once more staluing the streets of London, and and hand in hand with famine will walk the shade of that clear-righted English clergyman, Thomas Robert Malthus".

Another "neo-Malthusian" of British variety, more subtle and sophisticated and therefore more dangerous, who use Malthusian doctrine in order to reveal a so-called "ethical dilemma of science". Professor A.V. Hill, in his presidential address said :

Had it been possible to foresee the enormous success of this application, would humane people have agreed that it could better have been held back, to keep in step with other parallel progress, so that development could be planned and orderly? Some might say, yes, "biological view that if men will breed they must be allowed to die like rabbits, until gradually improving education and the demand for a higher standard of life teach them better. Most people would still say no. But suppose it were certain now that the pressure of increasing population, uncontrolled by disease, would lead not only to widespread exhaustion of the soil and other capital resources but also to continuing and increasing international tension and disorder, making it hard for civilization itself to survive: Would the majority of humane and reasonable people then change their minds? If ethical principles deny our right to do evil in order that

that good may come, are we justified in doing good when the foreseeable consequence is evil?"

(Hill, 1952 as quoted in J.D. Bernal)

The dilemma is a real one, and cannot be resolved by any simple expedient. (The Advancement of Science 1952).

The most striking aspect of Hill's speech is that he reduces the "unresolved dilemma by simple expediency" to a question of "change of minds", which is otherwise known in modern population sciences Targen "intervention of scientists to change the fertility behaviour of uneducated masses". Is it just psychological behaviour of some unhumane and unreasonable people that led to population bomb as the neo-Malthusians like Vogt and Ehrlich perceive.

The "real dilemma" lies in the fact that neo-Malthusians believe - that population "naturally" increases faster than the supply of food, and that war and famine and disease (the Malthusian "check") are therefore the inevitable lot of mankind.

Neek accounts for the "real dilemma" of Vogt and his British Associations: When science is applied under

given set of social and economic condition peculiar to imperialism at a certain stage in its development, it is found that as a result of this application evil sometimes appears to issue from good. Are we then to revise the doctrine of the sanctity of the individual human life, as Sir Charles Galton Darwin (in "The Next Million years" 1952) suggests, and deliberately restrict the application of science? Or are we to stick to our traditional ethical conceptions?

But there is in fact an alternative to it, is to do away with imperialism. The demand that we resolve the "dilemma of science" under the present system, one might say (adapting a well-known dictum of Marx's), is the demand that we reject the system which lands us in such a dilemma, by accepting the Malthusian theory of population, which enables Prof. Hill to transform into a "Lilemma of Science" something which is in fact a dilemma of the capitalist system.

The basic principle of Malthus can no longer be plausibly presented by the modern Malthusians, as if it were purely a "mathal" law which it is quite impossible for man to circumvent, e.g. it has become perfectly obvious in the course of the last century and a half that insofar as certain areas of land have declined fertility this has very largely been the fault not

of nature but of man himself - or, rather, of systems of land ownership and forms of social organization based on exploitation which encourage the squandering of natural resources. Susan George writes : "they are going hungry especially for lack of justice: We have seen that in UDCs those with the least land produce, proportionally, the most food... (individual country figures and detailed discussion will be done in a later chapter).... But the worst is yet to come and it relates directly to the population problem: a mere 2.5 per cent of landowners with holdings of more than 100 hectares control nearly three quarters of all the land in the world - with top 0.23 per cent controlling over half". (George, 1976/FAO, 1960). "First, that of the 50 per cent of the globe's soil which can be cultivated, only 10 per cent is being used; and second, that production per acre in most of the world could be greatly increased by rational agricultural practices". (de Castro, 1952).

Lastly, quoting Meek, the authority par excellence on Marx & Engels and Malthus in this section of the chapter we want to make the message clear": it is becoming increasingly difficult for the "neo-Malthusians" to deny that political and economic factors

are at least relevant to the question of the relation between population and food supplies. What has to be denied by the modern Malthusians, therefore, is that political and economic factors are fundamental, and that insofar as the relation between population and food supplies does at the moment constitute a real problem in certain countries, it cannot be effectively solved except on the basis of radical political and economic changes, some modern Malthusians therefore assert that man has been "tricked" (presumably by socialists) into "seeking political and/or economic solutions for problems that are political, economic, social, geographic, psychological, genetic, physiological etc. (Vogt, 1949). To take in such terms as these, of course, is to disguise the primary causes. As Lenin once remarked, "critical flirtation with Malthusianism inevitably results in a descent to the most vulgar bourgeois apologetics. (Selected Works, Vol. 12, 43).

Law of Population and its Control

For a long time there was "an unholy alliance" between conservative catholic "barbrugers" and

"orthodox" Marxists. The former includes almost all religious fundamentalists who reacted sharply against making abortion legal, otherwise known as Anti-abortionists, while the latter includes the Anti-Malthusian groups, Marxists and some scholars belonging to "critical" school.

The aim of this section will be to clarify some of the crises in the paradigmatic theoretical areas for a long time by Marxists and of course, wide prevalence of neo-conservatism within catholics.

With the rise of New Left Movement in West, the Marxist and leftist intellectuals started discussing the theoretical confusions in many spheres. The awful population growth in China and its impact in the Chinese socialist economy led many Marxist intellectuals inside as well as outside China to re-think Chinese population policy. We would rather say that it is a dismal failure of a socialist government to fore-see the far-reaching consequences of its rampant population growth. Of course, this does not amount to failure of the system which is much more successful in all the spheres, but timely population planning also would have made the system more self sufficient and successful.

**CHINA: CLARIFYING IDEOLOGICAL OBSTACLES AND
THEORETICAL CONFUSIONS :**


The causes of China's Rapid Population Growth:

Tien Xueyuan, a member of the standing council of China Demographic Society accounts the following causes for China's rapid population growth and opined: The economic, social, medical and even psychological aspects of the issue have been studied and the explanation has been found in such things as the lack of economic development, cultural backwardness, fental thinking and erroneous population policies... Taking this tortuous course of development into consideration, I attribute the following causes :

1. The objective cause of the blind increase in population in China's economic backwardness. According to the principles of historical materialism population reproduction is fundamentally conditioned and determined by the development of the reproduction of material goods. However, the restriction placed upon population growth by the reproduction of material goods varies according

to the level of development of the productive forces. When the productive forces are extremely backward and when the basic means of subsistence are not sufficient, the mortality rate increases proportionately with the level of poverty, and starvation causes reductions in the population. When the development of productive forces outstrips the basic living requirements, the situation reverse, and poverty causes population increase. Marx, in his analysis of the relative population surplus under capitalism, pointed out, "In fact, both the number of births and deaths and the absolute number in the family are inversely proportional to the level of wages, that is the amount of the means of subsistence possessed by each kind of worker", and that, "poverty creates population".

2. The historical cause for the blind increase in China's population is ferdal ideology. China is a country in which ferdal society lasted over 2,000 years. Concepts of private ownership based on small-scale production and a set of ferdal moral standards both had a strong impact on child birth. It was considered not only a



sign of "blessing" but also of "good moral conduct" to have many sons. Few children were seen as a punishment for evil doing and of scorn for "breaching the family line". Very powerful forces of public opinion and social pressure were at work within the society and especially in rural areas to promote a blind increase in population. One of the major factors governing the multitude of births was thus the desire for male offspring.

The economic and ideological factors must be examined very carefully and, while it seems that the economic factor is the basic one, the ideological influence must not be under-estimated. Within any given period, the two factors may stimulate each other, may counteract each other, or one may, in certain aspects, play a more prominent role than the other.

3. The direct cause for the blind increase in China's population growth was the one-sidedness of the population theories and policies that prevailed in the past. Not long after 1949, the party and government began to pay attention to the population problem. In the mid- 1950-58, they advocated

th the control of population growth. But influenced by Soviet views, China's population theory took it as a dogma from the very beginning that continuous growth was the socialist law of population. All ideas which contravened this dogma were denounced and population theory became very one-sided. The theory that the more people a nation has, the more production there will be, the more production there is, the more accumulation there is, the faster development there will be became the orthodox population theory in China.

Only in the 1970s did the population problem begin to receive considerable attention. With the recognition of the seriousness of the problem, more clearcut policies aimed at limiting the population began to emerge. A socialist economy develops in a planned and proportionate way. It objectively calls for a planned development of human reproduction too.

Other policies, particularly inappropriate economic policies, have also had their impact on population growth. For example, repeated denunciation of bourgeois right since the "Great Leap Forward" led

to negation of the principle of "to each according to his work". The "supply system" and the "communist wind" were both promoted for a time. Food grain, private plots and housing land have all been given out on a per capita basis. All these things dampened people's enthusiasm for having more children. The equal per capita allocation of housing and of living subsidies for the less well-off wage earners in the cities was another factor pushing population growth.

As a result of which the population growth in China assumed the following main characteristics :

1. A high rate of increase
2. A steady increase in the Population Base Number (PNB)
3. A young population
4. The predominant size of the rural population.
5. A high population density and uneven distribution. (Xueyuan Tian, 1981).

Many important points are being made above about the rampant population growth in China. The problems they are facing are - in the sense that the same

problems are being faced by almost all developing countries especially in India where the economic backwardness and semi-fendal ideologies still continue.

But an important point of difference between the two countries has to be made - about the fundamental nature of state and society in China and India which is already discussed, but its effect in population policy, and population lined developmental policies and the success and failure of population control measures in China and India respectively will be discussed immediately in the next chapter.

Whether Control Population in Capitalist Societies? :

We have already seen in the first chapter, the ruling class in India, instead of fighting against fendal ideology actively supports and gives concession to the reactionary fendalists and landlords, because of the very nature of power group. The bourgeoisie - landlord class clique actively supports and collasorates to promote the fendal ideologies and crushes all the progressive movements in the country.

In such a situation, where pre-capitalist and capitalist mode of production exists side by side it has become almost impossible to formulate a population theory for this post-colonial "dependent" economy.

Now, this is not the place to discuss the polemics whether capitalist mode of production is dominant or pre-capitalist mode of production is dominant, but it is a fact that the capitalist path of development after independence has been compromising with landlords inside and imperialists outside.

Theoretically, it would have been in the interest of indigeneous bourgeoisie inside the country to fight against the feudalists and their ideology as Ricardo points out that "the interest of landlord is always opposed to the interest of every other class in the community. His situation is never so prosperous, as when food is scarce and dear ; Whereas, all other persons are greatly benefited by procuring food cheap". (Ricardo, 1821).

But it is the Malthusian protection of "unproductive consumers", "parasitic classes" that leads the capitalists in the third world countries to serve the interests of landlords in particular.

As we have already discussed in second chapter (please refer pages to) about dualistic vs. dialectic unity thesis of under development wherein we concluded :

"To treat the economy and society of the third world as capitalist would be a gross over-simplification of the reality which, (as pointed out by Andre Gunder Frank 1969) and developed by Immanuel Wallerstein 1974 e.g. for the criticisms and other approaches in the developmentalist' school, chapter 2) reflects on the one hand the conservation of some forms of feudalism in the subsistence sector and the introduction of capitalism on the other sector. To affirm such dualistic relations of production, however, does not mean maintaining a dualistic thesis. Dualism implies that no connections exist between the modern or progressive sector and the closed or traditional sector. What we are arguing is as follows : (Xaxa 1985).

"that servile exploitation was accentuated and consolidated by the very tendency of the enterprising modern sector to maximise profits. This means that the modernity of the advanced sector is the function of the backwardness of the other". (Laclau 1971). It is in

this sense that development (in industrial and modern sector) generates underdevelopment (in non-capitalist agricultural subsistence sector).

While dualistic thesis has its own shortcomings, the dialectical relationships theory' doesnot explain the objective condition of the third world relations of production. The latter only simplifies the reality by saying the third world economy as capitalist.

In fact as we noted in first chapter, the political interest of indogeneous bourgeoisie and economic interest (in terms of getting cheap labour in the imperial countries) of the imperialists and neo-colonialists, which leads to collasorate with fendalists in the third world countries. The existing land relations (which is predominantly semi-fendal in character) in the third world countries is also responsible for the dependence of indogeneous bourgeoisie on imperialist because of various factors, a few of which are - the small size of market for mass consumption goods resulted from low purchasing power of the vast masses of people, demand for high technology and as a result, growth of high capital intensive heavy and

luxury industries and most importantly because of landlord - bourgeoisie combine (in India especially) there is a limitation of the government to collect revenue through direct taxes which puts a constraint on public investment. This leads to deficit financing crisis and retardation of private capital investment and the dependence on imperialism increases consequently.

This semi-feudalism in agriculture puts constraints in land reforms and in this backward sector characteristically the predominant inputs are land and labour. Production in the advanced sector is based on the application of modern techniques, and hence depends on capital in a crucial way.

Firstly, in India, there is a small 'capitalist' sector and large 'subsistence' sector and there is dialectical relationship between these two sectors. But due to § - § time to time mechanisation of agriculture the rural labour (the agricultural population) provides the basis for the population to move from agriculture into industry and from the countryside into cities, where as it is already discussed there is no employment due to capital - intensive industries.

So alongwith fighting against capitalism (in the form of opposing capital - intensive industries and demanding for labour - intensive projects) it would be wise to see that no more addition to the existing surplus labour takes place.

At the present context, in the subsistence sector which uses little or no capital but where the prevailing level of labour input is very large, any excess of labour is not going to increase the output in this sector (until and otherwise radically the modes relation of production is not changed). So, the excess labour which is left unemployed, creates problems and retards economic growth. So, in order to avoid China kind of situation it is advisable to control population alongwith fighting against semi-feudalists, and other feudal remnants.

Surplus Labour Due to Low Consumption :

Secondly another version of the surplus labour argument is based on the hypothesis that low agricultural productivity is due to poor consumption levels of farm families. It is suggested that poor, low-nutrition diets lead to low levels of energy and initiative and

that in consequence the actual work content of a typical man hour of labour service in agriculture tends to be sub-standard (Leibenstein, 1957). The conclusion is drawn that of a part of the labour force is taken off the land and if simultaneously the per capita consumption of the remaining workers were to increase, total agricultural output need not fall. Thus the argument turns on the distribution of the food supply among fewer workers in agriculture leading to an increase "in total effective force of the remaining labour force". (Schultz 1964).

The policy implication of the above is multi-folded. If a 'part of the labour force is taken off the land' and the 'distribution of the food supply among fewer workers in agriculture is actually implied, it has to be suggested that any increase in rural work force (agricultural population) will lead to mass unemployment, but this has to be done (i.e. the stopping of any further increase in population through birth control measures) has to be combined effectively with the need for improved food, nutrition, health and sanitation in rural areas, which deals with our basic question of population and development. The most important contribution in this respect comes from Maurice H. Dobbs;

"Let us suppose that a programme of building a railroad or a series of power stations is launched in an agricultural country, and that previously agriculture has been the only form of productive activity. Then, if all the active labour of the community had been previously employed productively upon the land labour could only be transferred to construct the railway or the power stations at the expense of a fall in consumption per head... If, however there had previously been a surplus of labour in agriculture, lacking employment on the land (or at least employed very unproductively) then the transfer of labour to building a railway or a power-station would involve no reduction (or at most a negligible reduction in agriculture output; and the capital construction could take place without any necessary fall in consumption per head". (Bobb 1951, p. 40).

The policy recommendations of transfer of labour from unproductive (or meagrely productive) sector to construction sites is based on the two main assumptions: (1) that there is enough employment in construction site (or sometimes industrial site in urban area but as Muruse (1967) prints out "the utilization of Surplus labour appears much more

feasible in construction than in industryⁿ) and all the surplus labour in agriculture can be absorbed there. (ii) There is no urban over-population problem (i.e. slum/ghetto population is not a pressing problem in urban area).

This typical problem exists in both China and India. But China to a considerable extent solved this problem because of two factors -

- i) socialist planning, and
- ii) successful implementation of birth control measures

But in India, in both cases i.e. agricultural/rural labouring population and urban labouring/slum population is increasing and above all both due to failure of planning and unsuccessful birth control measures the problem is accentuating day by day. So it would be wiser to recommend to take effective population control measures along with the fight for socialism.

Finally, whatever the mode of social production, population reproduction is determined by its economic requirements and, ultimately, by the need for labour power as determined by the development of the productive

forces. Under the capitalist mode of production, labour power becomes commodity, and the absolute law that capital must seek profit regulates the need for labour power, thereby regulating population reproduction. As Karl Marx wrote "... capital regulates the production of the labour force itself, the production of human masses, which it exploits, according to its exploitative needs". Capital's need for labour power is, in the final analysis determined by the level of development of the productive forces, while capitalist production was still based on handicrafts, labour, and little change had taken place in the means, methods and techniques of production, the development of the productive forces was in the main determined by increases in labour. However, after machinery came into extensive use in capitalist production, advances in science and technology were followed by increases in the technical composition of production, relative diminution of capital's need for labour power calls for corresponding reductions in the rate of natural increase. This is a situation that applies to socialist production as well as to capitalist production. (Zheng 1931). So in third world countries if this is the situation, alongwith the fight for socialism to

cut themselves off from the capitalist world system and to do away with its structural underdevelopment, it is most necessary that the development of productive forces in these countries must occur concomitantly with the reductions in the rate of natural increases.

CONCLUSION :

Now, it is almost certain that population control per se is not Malthusianism, as is increasingly recognised by Marxists all over the world. As, one need not subscribe to Marx's belief that production can be increased indefinitely to see that it is now a long way from reaching its upper limit.

We must not be frightened by the ghost of Malthus, or, as I prefer to call it, the Malthusian scarecrows - for nothing brings his theory more vividly to mind than those grotesque figures that peasants set in the middle of their fields to ward off the birds. In the eyes of the neo-Malthusians, the population of the world is no band of hungry sparrows but a cloud of locusts that threatens to devour the entire produce of their garden... To combat this meanance to the secure

food supply and general standard of living now enjoyed by the rich, the neo-Malthusians of the world raise the scarecrows of their theories of overpopulation - but these theories have no more substance than phantoms. (de Castro 1977, p. 68). At the same time we don't want to take a fatalist position, as Habone who says : "In fact, I have got a feeling that to change the system we are going to have to get a little closer to chaos, by even a greater explosion of population in these countries (Maione 1973, p. 19) and "that is why population policies are opposed by revolutionaries... (Soers 1974, p. 106).

When science (of Marxism) becomes a dogma, it tends to become sverchic and fatalistic. But in that case the scientific interpretation of history and the fight for socialism will, I am afraid, be going to remain more utopia than reality.

TOWARDS "ECOLOGIST - MARXIST THEORY OF POPULATION POLICY"

Lastly, we will end up the discussion with a brief note on ecological critique of population growth.

The works done in this respect can be classified broadly in three categories -

- i) Alarmists who make from laden forecasts and projection about the depletion of resources.

Meadows' (1971) in the report of the "club of Rome" for example, uses the systems dynamics' for extrapolating into the next century the curves of five variables, namely world population, natural resources, food production, industrial production, and pollution, in order to show that in the absence of a serious reordering of our priorities, human beings will breed, consume, and foul the earth to such - level that they will revert back to semi-barbarism of the Middle ages. The report calls for forestalling this epic disaster by a quick world reduction of population growth and industrial production. (Ganguli, 1974). Such kind of "futurism, described at times as the blending of art and science or of intuition and computerized prediction, yields forecasts which often have the bizarre quality of Old Testament prophecies" (Ganguli 1974).

In the same year (1972), another band of prophets the editors of "The Ecologist" produce the now famous

"Blueprint for Survival" which is exceedingly alarming and obviously without any scientific rationality. And there are many more. A growing number of literature can be found regarding the maximum "carrying capacity" of land - i.e. the number of people or animals that an area of land can support on a sustainable basis, limited quantity of energy to a ever growing number of people and the evil effects of these on environment etc. etc.

ii) Secondly, the populists who challenge the very concept of wibanization and industrialization. In fact, most of the theorizers in this category see the whole lot of problems - social, economic, political, ecological etc. (including population, unemployment, crime etc.) - because of industrialization. The history of populist socialism goes back to Robert Owen in Britain, Proudhon in France and Herzen in Russia. All of them argued more or less in terms of development of small-scale enterprises, cottage industries, villages of co-operative production under the control of the rural communes. Theorists of such rural cooperative certainly envisaged a growth in economic wealth but this was to be distributed equally throughout the workforce. 'Development' could occur then, under the control of

village artisans and farmers under the control of village artisans and farmers - 'free and equal' workers - rather than through the anarchy and horror of rampant industrial capitalism or through the bureaucratic excesses of Central Government. (Webster 1984).

In India, Gandhi and other nationalists like Jayaprakash Narayan, Vinoba Bhave, to mention a few argued for such kind of economic growth. Gandhi's vision of socialism in fact based on cottage industry, and because of his popularity during freedom struggle Khadi, Chruha etc. became national and nationalist symbol. But Gandhiji's dreams never came true. But the actual shape of this kind of socialism came into being in East African state of Tanzania under the charismatic leadership of President Julius Nyerere. One might suggest that Nyerere has the political power that a figure like Robert Owen would have liked, to establish a national programme of cooperative socialism. 'Arusha Declaration' of 1967 and Nyerere's text 'Socialism and Rural Development' laid out the principles for a policy of rural based populist socialism built through village co-operatives, the 'Ujamaa' or 'family hood' scheme, which is basically anti-capitalism, anti-urbanism and anti-industrialism in nature.

But Nyrere's naivety and populism proved to be a disaster as Webster comments: "As in the early 1960s, Tanzania is now dependent on overseas capital and foreign aid. Self-reliant populist socialism is very far from the reality in the Tanzania of the mid-1980s" (Webster 1984). This happened because of absence of "strong state intervention and the establishment of an effective industrial sector" (Kitching 1982). Secondly, this kind of growth not only under utilizes the potential resources (human as well as natural) but also gives little scope for the unrestricted growth of productive forces, which is a must for all societies.

The aim of discussing this in the context of population is as follows :

Contemporary socio-economic problems like hunger, poverty, unemployment, housing, en masse migration to urban areas which in turn creates concentration of population in a relatively smaller area, slum-problems, clustering of industries at one place, juvenile delinquency, crime, drug addiction, alcoholism, and there are many more, are the problems of capitalist mode of production as we have been emphasizing, but not due to

industrialization and urbanization per se. So, path of development based on anti-industrialism, anti-urbanism will accentuate the problem, as we discussed in case of Tanzania and to some extent China after the early years of liberation. Such kind of populist socialism and romantic Maoism are equally detrimental for the progress of society as in that case the growth of productive forces is impeded and at the same time transition becomes very slow. Even outside populist socialist thought one still finds traces of anti-urbanism and anti-industrialism. In some of the third world countries. In some countries where the semi-feudal forces - to a smaller extent in India also - are in state power, they take such kind of planning policies.

Relative overpopulation, under consumption and over production, poverty, malnutrition for many and affluence of a few and regional disparity (including rural-urban, intra-state) are the problems of capitalism and not of urbanism or industrialism. So the people who find the fault in the latter, tend to divert the attention from the former exploitative system.

But everybody would agree at least in one aspect that in any society overindustrialization and to some extent overurbanization (which is virtually absent in socialist societies, because of conscious central planning efforts) leads to the imbalance in eco-system as a whole, which is responsible environmental hazards. So if there is any addition to the existing population, the need will be more for various products and it is also not a safe bet to believe in infinite capacity of productive forces and technology.

In each and every society the development of productive forces is not the same and it is wrong to think also that in all socialist societies the technological development will be the same. Taking the case of Russia and China, one finds there is wide gap in this respect. China with a labour surplus agrarian socialist economy and Russia with a labour shortage capital intensive heavy-industry-based socialist economy cannot be compared. And on the top of it the pace of technological development is definitely slow in case of China as compared to Russia.

Industrialization (and modernization) based on capitalist path of development tends "to produce and

consume the non-necessary" (Marcuse 1968) for the parasitic classes of society where as essential and non-luxurious commodities for mass-consumption gets neglected, as in the former case much more profit is involved. So the "question at the moment is not of restriction of the growth of our production level but of redirection of consumption" (Fromm 1955). Once the level of "legitimate consumption" for all has been reached, there is no rationality behind the objective of a "never-ending increase of production". (Ganguli 1974).

The question of human needs has also to be viewed in the perspective of man's symbiotic harmony with the natural environment, which is a deeper source of the stability and enrichment of man's vital life and his higher nature. (Ganguli 1974). The quality of life in the future will be deeply coloured by what happens to our effort to repair the damage to our environment and conserve its beauty and balance. So in order to create an environment, conducive to the "pacification of both man and nature", as Marcuse puts it, we have to make conscious effort for the preservation of both by mindful use of the latter and maintaining the highest quality of former. As Rene Dubos (1965) puts it :

Food, natural resources, supplies of power, and other elements involved in the operation of the body machine and of the individual establishment are not only factors to be considered in determining the optimum number of people that can live on earth. Just as important for maintaining the human qualities of life is an environment in which it is possible to satisfy the longing for quiet, privacy, independence, initiative and some open space".

We agree completely with the critical scholars like Mercuse and Eric Fromm and to some extent with the scholars like Ganguli and Dubos so far as the question of population and environment is concerned. At the same time we have strong reservation against the populist socialists' position in this respect who take an anti-industry and anti-urban because in our opinion with a rational policy planning in a non-exploitative system the apparent problems will disappear. As we are of the view that in a socialist system only the quality of the population and environment both can be maintained to the highest extent and concomitantly any further growth of population above the optimal level should be stopped.

Two types of environmental degradation may be distinguished. There is pollution caused by poverty, which finds its manifestation mostly in extractive activities, and pollution caused by affluence, which is mostly the result of consumption activities. "Most developing countries are confronted with the former type of destruction, while the developed countries fall in the latter category of pollution. (Tabbah 1983)

Such kind of interpretation makes the complex issue of ecology totally simplified and leads to vague generalizations. The former which Ashok Khosla calls the "pollution of poverty" is not a natural phenomena but both poverty and pollution are the results of anarchic capitalistic production and industrialization. The danger to the "health of the eco-system" as Ashok Khosla (1974) sees it, in the so-called "pollution of poverty" is the product of complex historical social formations.

The latter termed as the "pollution of affluence" is also too generalized and simplified a concept which does not differentiate between different social classes within a system. It is projected as if the developed world is homogeneous group of societies and as if there

is no class division in each of the developed society. After all, in an "affluent society" all people are not affluent and there is distinct class division within it.

iii) Thirdly, the radical ecologists who are genuinely concerned about environmental degradation and argue to protect the earth from soil erosion, deforestation and pollution. These scholars are equally critical of capitalism and its anarchic overproduction, irrational industrialization and urbanization. In fact, the ecologist-Marxist work in this respect is very few. As is already discussed in the introduction part of this chapter and above, in a predominantly agrarian economy, any addition to the already surplus labour means more has to be produced for the fulfillment of their needs. But there is a limitation to the capacity of land for supporting population and it cannot be infinity at any point of time. "Probably the most important factor in agriculture is land degradation. Land degradation resulting from soil erosion and soil loss by water and wind, salinisation and alualisation, waterlogging, depletion of plant nutrients/organic matter, deterioration of soil structure and pollution,

can lead to partial or total loss of productivity". (FAO, 1982) Though we are quite sceptical about other FAO studies dealing with population supporting capacities etc., the above study deals with future pollution problems and considers "soil conservation an important aspect of agricultural management". (Agarwal 1985). In addition, there is also industrial pollution and other kinds of pollution.

On the other hand, because of over-consumption of energy and other resources, the industrialised countries (though all of them are not in same position to afford it) face much more challenges of environmental degradation than the developing nations. Pollution hazards in the former case is immediate and tangible where as in the latter case it is slow but much more harmful.

As Johnson (1973) has said: The population explosion is a global problem, and it is socially, economically and scientifically absurd and dangerous to see it only as a problem of poor nations whose consumption of world resources and output of pollution is relatively a slight. This opinion... insists that

despite their relatively small annual increase, the richest nations account for an important part of the population problem because their resource - use and environmental impact per head is between 30 and 60 times that of the average south Asian peasant".

There is no reason to deny that there may be developed countries with a very dense population, for which there would be obvious advantages if the present population growth could come to a stop soon on which would even benefit from a population size smaller than the present one. It should be remembered that with modern technology man requires much more space than in an earlier period. Nor least motor cars claim much space" (Hogston)

Ecologists, as discussed above, contend that population should be controlled in both the "developing" as well as "developed" countries, which we agree in its broadness.

Chapter Four

A SOCIOLOGICAL ENQUIRY INTO INDIAN POPULATION POLICY

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT - A DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP

In the last chapter, it was contended that population reproduction is fundamentally conditioned and determined by the development of the reproduction of material goods. However, the restriction placed upon population growth by the reproduction of material goods varies according to the level of development of productive forces.

So, the dialectical relationship between population and economic development explained by Marx not only applies to a capitalist society but is also of some general significance. Today, the birth and natural increase rates of most economically less developed countries are much higher than the rates in developed countries. In 1980, the World's birth rate was estimated at 28 per thousand, breaking down to 16 per thousand in the developed countries and 32 per thousand in the developing countries. The world's natural increase rate stands at 19 per thousand, with 20 per thousand for the developing countries and, less than one-third of that figure, 6 per thousand, for developed countries (World Population Data Sheet 1980)

for means to achieve agrarian reform, to modernize industry and agricultural production, and to raise the level of education and culture (Guzovatos 1974 p.22) As the nations of the world in congress assembled said, "Population policies are constituent elements of socio-economic development policies, never substitutes for them." (World Population Conf. para 14d 1974)

So, in our opinion, "in most poor countries large-scale fertility declines cannot be expected until the living conditions of the majority of the population improve enough so that they no longer consider large families necessary for economic reasons" (Tabbarah p 16 1974). There are surely a number of aspects of development that can reasonably be expected to have the effect of reducing fertility. These are talked about all the time : popular education, equality for women, income equalization, & improvements in employment especially for women, extension of social security and old-age benefits, reduction of infant mortality, encouragement of social mobility, rural modernization and increased agricultural productivity, extension of children's rights and elimination of child labour, increased incomes and living standards, improved health services, industrialization with special reference to employment of women, reform of land tenure systems, better housing, urbanization, new roads, inheritance laws, and elimination of polygamy and a few might have still overlooked. (as enlisted in Borelean, Bernard based on views of different authors 1975). In short, those "overall

ideological consciousness all enormously influence economic development. Population growth and economic development are complementary, interdependent and act as constraints on each other (Jingzhi 1981)

The above analysis can be contrasted with neo-Faltheusians' assertion that population growth is the root cause of economic underdevelopment in third world countries, and neo-Keynesians' assertion that population "is an autonomous factor of economic growth" with a "decisive significance" for social development" (Hansen 1954). Their view on population policy has got ideological underpinnings, and acts as the apologists of imperialism, neo-colonialism and capitalism (and feudalism if needed so).

In our opinion, economic underdevelopment of a particular class in the society is not a scourge but a scandal and hunger is a man-made plague. Population control is no substitute for economic development. Poverty and hunger can only be cured by breaking away from the 'structural' dependence on the satellite countries and fighting against capitalist expropriation. As it is pointed out, "lowering the birth rate will not itself free developing countries from the need to search vigorously

*cf. Hansen, who concludes that there is a disparity between the economic structure and the changed reproduction regimes in both industrial & developing countries (Sudoplatov 1978)

continuing affinity and strong links of the ruling elites of India with their counterparts abroad - particularly in the western industrialized countries - almost every facet of the social, economic and cultural activities in India has been considerably influenced, if not actually controlled, by the bigger global system." (Banerji 1974) That is the reason, abject poverty in India continues to play a very obvious role in the factors governing population growth. In a book review of Josue de Castro's book, 'The Geopolitics of Hunger', "Journal of Economic Literature" (1978) says "Analyzing hunger as 'the biological manifestation of underdevelopment', the author develops two theses (i) hunger is a man-made plague, and (ii) starvation causes overpopulation, not the reverse." (This point is further elaborated in a later section separately).

The population problem is an extremely complex one, relating to every aspect of daily life and production. In the final analysis, however, the population is a socio-economic one, and economic conditions are determining factors in regard to changes in population patterns. At the same time, since the population is the heart of society, labour is the key aspect of production and all developments in technical expertise are made by men, therefore, the size of the population, the level of culture and technology, and the degree of

In India, because there has not been a great development in the productive forces, because of its historical "Structural" dependence on imperialist and colonialist countries due to their own economic interests, as discussed in the last chapter. More than three hundred years of colonial exploitation "violently cut short India's economic revolution and forced the country back to a medieval economy and into permanent starvation". (de Castro 1977, p.328). Whatever crafts or nascent industrial development existed were promptly crushed by the British, who used the most reactionary class of feudal landlords as the social base of their power. (Baran 1957 p.146). As a result of which, most industrial production is still only semi-mechanized and agriculture remains almost totally manual. And the "small capitalist enclave" after transfer of technology through FNCs and comprador bourgeoisie becomes the inhibiting factor in the development of other sectors.

But even after the hallucinating political independence in India in 1947, it has not been followed by economic independence. The same ruling clique who symbolized "the illusions of independence" before 1947 continues to rule the country, even after 39 years of victory over direct colonial intervention and "because of the colonial heritage and the

social policies that do most to promote social justice".
(Casey p 24 1973 & WPC para 32c 1974)

Population policy objective cannot properly be set in isolation of other social economic objectives", and "decision-making in population must be integrated in the decision-making process of development". (Tabberoh 1974)

If a woman finds it essential to limit her number of children, she should also be given the right to education, a productive job, a stable economy, a meaningful social standard and other fruits of a well-planned development. Population control means that people are controlled by others, family planning means that people control themselves. The two concepts are irreconcilable. (Gondesten 1980)

As Banerji puts it, "..... for controlling population growth, a family planning programme is a mere component of a wider spectrum which has to embrace a combination of programmes for dealing with different social and economic problems of the country. Problem control (is) considered - rather simplistically - to be a precursor of development in other social and economic fields." (Banerji, 1974)

THE RECENT HISTORY OF POPULATION GROWTH IN INDIA

DYNAMICS OF INDIA'S DEMOGRAPHY

"Demography is the social science that studies the regularities governing the phenomena and processes occurring in the structure, distribution, movement, and dynamics of population, proceeding from social, economic, and also biological and geographical factors, reasons and conditions. Demography develops population theories, the policy of population and envisages future changes in respect of a country's population, towns and cities, regions, areas and the globe as a whole." (Uralnie 1976) The rhythmic and periodical nature of phenomena is as inherent in society as a mode of reproduction of actual life, which always determines society's historical advance. Since demographic phenomena and processes depend on social and historical conditions and are unable to exist outside them, they cannot therefore be studied in isolation from the historical phase of society's development, from the historical phase of society's development, from the social and economic formation.

The aim of this section would be to understand the various factors and indices that affect the growth of population in India. The detailed analysis and long term implications will be examined in the next sections.

Table 1 : Population Growth in India, 1951 - 81

Year (Census)	Total Population in millions			Decennial change %	Geometric Growth	Sex Ratio (Males per 1000 females)	Density per km ²	% of Urban to total
	P	M	F					
1951	361.0	185.5	175.5	+ 13.31	+1.26	946	117	17.29
1961	439.2	226.3	212.9	+ 21.64	+1.98	941	142	17.97
1971	548.1	284.0	264.1	+ 24.88	+2.24	930	173	19.91
1981	605.2	354.4	330.8	+ 25.00	+2.28	933	216*	23.31

* The density has been worked out on comparable data

Source : Registrar General, India / Directorji 1985

**Table 2 Numbers and Shares of the Population
of the World, Asia and India***

	ESTIMATES & CENSUSES				FORECAST		
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Whole World, millions	2525	3037	3696	4432	5242	6117	6988
Asia, millions (excluding USSR)	1390	1692	2111	2579	3058	3949	3993
% of World Population	55.0	55.7	57.1	58.2	58.3	60.0	57.1
India, millions	361	439	548	684	821	961	1083
% of World Population	14.3	14.5	14.8	15.4	15.7	15.8	15.5
% of Population of Asia	26.0	25.9	26.0	26.5	26.8	27.1	27.1

* Source: I. Petrov, V 1984

As is evident from the above Table No.2, India accounts for high share of the population of Asia and mankind, continues to do so, and will possibly even increase its share by the beginning of the 21st century.

Again as is evident from Table 3 (in the next page) the share of India's population is now six and half times more than its share of the world's area. No other country of this size or equal to India in territory has such a ratio. In 1950, the ratio between area and population was 1 : 6.

Table 3. The Share of the Big Countries in the Area and Population of the World in 1980 and their Average Density *

Countries	Area		Population		Area & Pop Ratio	People Per sq. k.m.
	Sq. k.m. ml.	%	ml.	%		
WORLD	138.9	100.0	4432	100.0	1 : 1	33
INDIA	3.3	2.4	684	15.5	1 : 6.5	208
USSR	22.4	16.5	265.9	6.0	2.8 : 1	12
CANADA	10.0	7.4	24.5	0.6	12 : 1	2.5
CHINA	9.6	7.1	995	22.4	1 : 3	104
USA	9.4	6.9	223	5.0	1.4 : 1	24
BRAZIL	8.5	6.3	122	2.8	2.2 : 1	14
AUSTRALIA	7.7	5.7	14.5	0.3	19 : 1	2

* Source : Victor Petrov 1984

BIRTH AND DEATH RATES

Table 4 Birth and Death Rates and Expectation of Life at Birth (Census)

Decade	Rate per 1000 Population ¹		Expectation of Life at Birth		
	Birth	Death	Males	Females	Combined
1941-51	39.9	27.4	32.4	31.7	32.1
1951-61	41.7	22.8	41.9	40.6	41.3
1961-71	41.2	19.0	46.4	44.7	45.6
1971-81 ²	37.2	14.8	NA	NA	NA
1983-84 ³	33.3	12.5	55.1	54.3	54.7

1. By reverse survival method

2. Provisional

3. Hand book of Health Statistics of India 1985 (Source)

Source : Registrar General, India / Banerji 1985

The birth and death rates in India has shown the positive sign. The birth rate has declined by 8.4 and death rate has declined by 10.3 from 1951-61 to 1980-84. The life expectation has increased remarkably by 22.7 years from 1941-51 to 1980-84.

The other demographic and socio-economic indices with detailed analysis will be made in the section "Linkage between Development and Fertility Control".

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULATION CONTROL IN INDIA

It is very interesting to trace the cord between British and American colonialist Malthusians and their Indian counterparts in the pre-independence India.

The first organization formed out of the birth control movement and the one which put birth control in the limelight in Britain, was the Malthusian League in 1877. Its purpose was to politically legitimize birth control knowledge and to promote it. Bradlaugh, a militant atheist, was president, and Mrs. Besant, an ardent feminist and later a Theosophist, was secretary. Interestingly, Mrs. Besant and Thomas Malthus both dealt with India, though their influence in population thought there (in India) could not have been great. Malthus

lectured at Hailbury the British academy for the Indian Civil Services. Annie Besant became an early associate of Mohandas Gandhi in his freedom movement. "Her Mahatma, of course, was Malthusian of sorts, an advocate of continence as the path to prudent fertility." (Cemerath 1936)

After the take over by the Society of Constructive Birth Control under the leadership of a physician Dr. Marie Stopes of Malthusian League in 1927, the birth control movement took on a new individualism and family welfare emphasis, with slogans like planned parenthood, child spacing, and family planning. (Peterson 1969 p.988)

In United States Margaret Sanger's efforts paid back and then went on to win the first legitimation for birth control in her country in 1913. She launched "The Birth Control Review" and started the first clinic in Brooklyn, N.Y in 1916, a research bureau, and a propaganda group in 1921 she founded the American Birth Control League. In 1942 this was renamed as the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. In 1952 in India Margaret Sanger joined another persuasive woman, Lady Rama Rau of Bombay to form IPPF, which has been a force behind the contemporary family planning movement across the world.

In India P.K. Wattal, an ideologue of Malthusians and a colonial civil servant in 1916 propounded the view that a reduction of the birth rate was a precondition for a decrease in the death rate in general and in the infant mortality rate in particular, as well as for a rise in the standard of living of the people. (Wattal 1916 see Dasal 1903) And was followed by some other Indian scholars.

However, this overpopulation thesis was revised by several others (like Karve 1936, Mukharjee 1938, Ganguly 193 and Gyanchand 1939 etc).

They argued that overpopulation was only a symptom of the underlying malady of arrested economic progress during British rule. They wanted the state to play a positive role in promoting economic and cultural progress. At the same time, they recognised the need for controlling population growth through the generation of social and economic conditions conducive to the general adoption of methods for limiting family size.

Some of the Indian nationalist freedom fighters and intellectuals also held the same view. Bipin Chandra has given a detailed account of Indian leadership view (Chandra 1966 and 1932). The prominent among them are G.V. Joshi, Dadabhai Naoroji, N.G. Chandavarkar, S.H. Danoojee, R.C. Dutt and P.C. Ray.

Quite often the British administration put the blame for poverty on the size and growth of the population which by rapidly outrunning the means of subsistence made poverty inevitable (Lord Curzon, speeches) "Above all, what land is exposed to such imminent danger by the overflow of population of large districts and territories whose inhabitants are yearly multiplying beyond the numbers which the soil is capable of sustaining" (Lord Dufferin 1888)

The Indian leadership rejected this contention in its entirety. Banerji in his seminal work "Poverty and the British Rule in India" (1901) denied that the Indian people were multiplying very fast, or that India was overpopulated, or that the size and growth of its population were responsible for its poverty. He contended that a growing population is not incompatible with increasing wealth since population multiplied much faster in many of the West European countries including England, than in India and yet their material welfare also increased instead of decreasing. In a brilliant article G. V. Joshi unravelled the true nature of India's 'overpopulation' in 1990. He contended that 'increase of numbers is per se not necessarily or always an evil, as Malthusian writers assert but conceded that 'when a country reaches the limit of its material resources of production and no further development by the application

of science, skill or labour is possible, such increase constitutes a great evil and will have to be provided against'. (Joshi 1912) So, "to talk of overpopulation at present is just as reasonable as to cut off a man's hand and then to aunt him that he was not able to maintain himself or move his hands". (Naraji 1901) In these circumstances it was said the theory of overpopulation was a mere attempt 'to divert public attention from the real issues' and added 'a distressful insult to agonising injury (Ray 1901).

The conclusion was obvious. During colonial ruling of the country it was argued that the source of mischief lay "not so much in the fact of an alleged overpopulation as in the admitted and patent evil of underproduction" (Joshi 1912 emphasis added)

The All India Women's Conference advocated birth control as far back as in 1932. (Rains 1968 see Banerji 1985). In 1938, the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru strongly supported family planning as a state policy to encourage the limitation of children in the interests of social economy, family happiness and national development. The sub-Committee's report was adopted and published by the party in 1947. (National Planning Committee, 1949, also see Banerji 1985; Shah 1947; Desai 1983)

POPULATION IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS :

The aim of this section would be to critically analyse the family planning/welfare and population control programmes without going to descriptive details of the programmes. References will be given to different reorganisations made from time to time and strategies and slogans adopted to achieve the so-called 'target'. In a special section we will also discuss the 'compulsions and coercion' in population control programmes and to analyse : what makes the state to cling such heinous and odious strategies.

THE FIRST PLAN :

After independence, in the very first Five Year Plan, the 'urgency' of the problem of family planning' was clearly recognised. (Government of India, 1951 henceforth GOI) Thus India became the first nation in the world to adopt family planning as a national policy. No other nation has received so much money, technical assistance, and equipment from the family planning establishments. And no other nation has spent so much of its own funds on family planning as India (Demereth, 1976). The First Five Year Plan held that, "in the short run, in the earlier crucial stage of development, in view of the shortage of capital rather than of labour force, a rapidly growing population was apt to become more a source of embarrassment than of help to a programme of raising standards of living".

"This assumption might or might not be legitimate. The trend in population cannot be altered quickly and any reduction in birth rates may well be neutralised by a corresponding reduction in death rates (GOI 1952 underline added)

It is worth to be discussed the First Five Year Plan in greater depth in order to know the policies of our earlier nationalist and socialist-oriented leaders and planners which is said to be declining in the recent time.

With the enunciation of a population policy in the First Plan, the initiative in matters of birth control propagation passed to the Central Government. The programme of the plan was modest and the principal measures envisaged were (i) provision, in government hospitals and health centres (ii) field experiments on different methods of family planning (iii) family planning (population) education and also emphasis on reproductive patterns, attitudes and motivations, interrelation between social, economic and population trends and physiological and medical aspects of fertility control (GOI 1952). In practice, the emphasis of the programme during the first plan was on the propagation of the rhythm method.

In the first place, this cannot be called a population policy as Desai has contended since the subject of all social phenomena is population, a population policy touches all the movements of the totalities of all other socio-economic developmental and welfare policies. In this case, the dialectical "linkages" between population and development is completely missing. In any case, it is

Plan suggested that a reduction in the rate of population increase could be achieved only a reduction in the birth rate based on the realization of the need for family limitation by the people on a wide scale.

SECOND PLAN PERIOD :

The Second Plan held that arresting the trend of rapid population increase was a pre-condition for achieving rapid improvement in incomes and levels of living (GOI 1956).

The Second Plan created a Family Planning Directorate in Health Ministry and posts of Family Planning Officers at the State level. Its pacification of the programme included (i) promotion of family planning knowledge and practice (ii) establishment of family planning clinics (iii) distribution of modern contraceptives through clinics and other agencies (iv) promotion of sterilization by providing for free operation facilities, cash compensation for incidental expenses and loss earnings, and the organization of mass camps (GOI 1956). In substance, this was a clinic approach to the spread of family planning practice (Dossal 1983)

THIRD PLAN :

The findings of 1961 Census dramatically brought home the higher rate of population growth in India and the urgent need for controlling it. Responding to this, in the Third Plan, the objective of stabilizing the growth

of population was posited as at the centre of planned development (Benerji 1971). The programme strategy was buttressed by introducing, on a nationwide scale, extension education in family planning. Emphasis was added on community acceptance of the small family norm so that group influences are generated for motivating individual couples to take to family planning. This strategy was designed with the objective of reducing the birth rate from 41 per thousand in 1963 to 25 per thousand as expeditiously as possible (GOI 1968) and ultimately to reach 90 per cent of the married couples. What created hope for the success of programmes was the introduction of the IUCD (Intra-Uterine Contraceptive Device or the loop) in 1965.

An interesting aspect of the development of these programmes is the reflection of the approaches of satellite countries (western imperialist countries) in the peripheral countries (Developing Third World Countries). That means whatever slogans are shouted in western countries get echoed here without any indigenous input.

and
 In the fifties/in the early sixties, following the tradition of the planned parenthood movements of western countries, family planning clinics were established in urban and rural areas in India. When, however, it was realised that the outreach of such clinics is very limited, again taking the cue from the community development movement in

the USA an extension wing was added to these clinics (Rains 1963 see Banerji 1985). This led to the wide deployment of an enormous army of family planning extension workers, when IUCD was projected (GOI 1961).

The Third Plan, therefore, devoted considerable attention to spelling out the programme, means and logistics of mounting the family planning movement (Mitro 1974)

FOURTH PLAN PERIOD :

Thereafter, as Desai points out "the approach to the population policy reacquired its welfare orientation (Desai 1983 underline added). He quotes approvingly an excerpt from the draft Fourth Plan : "Under Indian conditions the quest for equality and dignity of man requires as its basis both a high rate of economic growth and a low rate of population increase. Even far reaching changes in social and economic fields will not lead to a better life unless population growth is controlled. Limitation of family is an essential and inescapable ingredient of development" (GOI 1968).

When the IUD Programme introduced in the Third Plan (in 1965) proved inadequate, a 'target-oriented' time-bound programme, adopting casetaria approach was projected. (GOI 1968; Banerji 1971 p 17). This involved : (a) offer of

monetary incentives to doctors, motivators and acceptors; (b) mobilisation of government functionaries belonging to all departments, including revenue collection staff, for family planning work; and (c) exerting administrative pressure on field workers to ensure that they attained certain predetermined family planning targets. When this again proved inadequate, recourse was taken, in the early seventies to the Mass Vaccination Camp approach (National Institute of Family Planning 1973.) This involved extensive use of the district administrative machinery along with enhanced incentives and a massive publicity device.

The mass camps retained their popularity for a while and individually they grew in size, attractions at times active involvement of several other government departments, handling routine administrative work, in their organisation. For example, the famous Ernakulam camp of 1971-72 was organised, under the leadership of the head of the district administration with great fanfare in the style of a carnival (Govt. of Kerala 1971) The camp style of canvassing family planning acceptance withered away but left behind it an excessive bureaucratisation of the programme which has not only persisted but also dominated it at times (Dossal 1983). Commenting on this Banerji (1985) writes : "A matter of still greater concern has been the response of not-so-light-weight

academics, political and social leaders, and others who are not part of family planning establishments to the distortions in the family planning programme. The Ernakulam Mass Vasectomy Camp of 1970 (Krishnakumar 1971) provides a good example.¹⁰ Saneerji aptly questions the opaqueness of the communist state government of Kerala allowed the collector of Ernakulam, a very dynamic individual, to use all his powers, including revenue powers and developmental patronage, to 'motivate' people to accept vasectomy. It was lean agricultural season and the World Bank/USFPA/SIDA (Sweden) came forward with extra funds (from the usual Rs.10 to well above Rs.100 plus 'gifts' in kind) to attract people; and mass communication media were used extensively to provide support to the camp (Saneerji 1985 p.242)

As is noted earlier, with the 'mass camps' losing importance, the manoeuvrability of the programme was greatly lessened and it came to a virtual standstill in 1973-74. After its disillusionment with the camp, the programme had in any case become increasingly concerned with quantitative achievements, leaving an impression that its welfare content had been eroded (Doss 1989).

Interestingly however, the undercurrent of concern for the welfare aspects of the programme was quite evident in the Fourth Plan's approach to population control. That plan made family planning a centrally sponsored and financed

multi-sided programme to control the rate of growth of population. This programme increasingly involves enormous finances and an elaborate institutional set up employing a large body of personnel.^o (Thereby) a medical position correlation is assumed by the planners between small family and quality of life, particularly welfare and happiness.^o (And also) Based upon certain major assumptions with regard to the relation of the size of population, the rate of growth of population and the rate of economic and social development^o (Desai AR 1980).

What is important here, as pointed out by Ramakrishna Mukherjee a proper appraisal of the family planning programme can be made only if we clearly understand the assumptions underlying the government's intention to adopt it as a national policy, and increasingly making it top priority, a crash priority in its overall developmental strategy : (Mukherjee 1978 see Desai A.R 1980).

From the inception, Government of India (henceforth GOI), along with all the Third World Countries, as well as the prime "aid" giving, developed imperialist countries of the First World, have assumed that the chief reason for backwardness, underdevelopment and the inability of the Third World countries (TWCs) to cross the threshold of take-off

and become developed, prosperous societies, is the runaway population of these countries, experiencing a demographic transition, due to rapid decline in death rate not paralleled by similar decline in birth rate (Desai A.R 1980). To sum up; it is assumed by the government as well as the donor countries that "if this unprecedented trend in population increase is not controlled within a specific time period the economy and society may stagnate, or even experience degeneration" (Mukherjee 1970 Desai* 1975)

Shockingly, even before emergency the self-proclaimed "welfare state" talked about population explosion. It might sound unbelievable but even official documents used terms like "prevention and defusement" of the "population bomb" and the "demographic time bomb". (see GOI 1969) In fact, coercion was not entirely new to the Emergency period (1975-76) "Even before this event, in the war against naxal" coercion was being used in various covert forms in different places. Sometimes it was revenue staff, sometimes it was the jail authorities, sometimes it was the judicial system and sometimes it was the police force which was used to force unwilling persons to accept sterilization (Bansaji 1977).

At the time of launching the national family planning programme, in the early 1950s, the GOI had enunciated what was termed as "guiding principles" for development of the

programmes. These were

- 1) The community must be prepared to feel the need for the services in order that these may be accepted, when provided.
- 2) Parents alone must decide the number of children they want and their obligation towards them.
- 3) People should be approached through the media they respect and through their recognised and trusted leaders, and without offending their religious and moral values susceptibilities.
- 4) Services should be made available to the people as near to their doorsteps as possible.
- 5) Services have greater relevance and effectiveness if made an integral part of medical and public health services and specially of maternal and child health programmes (GOI 1960).

A decade and a half later, when the family planning programme had reached a distinct watershed, a new policy was formulated which underlined the need for having concurrent social and economic development as an important element of a population control policy. Health, nutrition and family planning was visualised as a single package which, in turn, formed the bigger package of the Minimum Need Programme of the Fifth Five Year Plan (Singh 1975 p.2 see Banerji 1980)

Ramakrishna Mukherji sums up the grounds of the central assumption of "Population Control" in the following pithy terms (Dossal 1980) "Hence, family planning to reduce the couple-children ratio appears to be needed on two main counts (1) the population growth rate affects adversely the present rate of economic growth, as measured by, say, GNP per capita. It thus does not lead to economic development. (2) The rapid increase in population creates difficulties to provide adequate education, health facilities, social and cultural amenities etc.; in order to bring the people on par with those in the 'developed' countries. It thus affects the course of 'social development'. (Mukherji 1970).

So, a great confusion is created by the ruling classes in India with regard to the main objective which prompts government to undertake and increasingly concentrate on this programme as a top priority one. An ambiguous double talk is employed from the beginning and an attempt is made to blur distinction between family planning as a self-generating voluntary programme and family planning as a population control movement (Dossal AR 1980).

Lippe and Collins in their profound and conformative book "Food First : Beyond the Myth of Scarcity" comments "Family Planning as a valuable social service to facilitate

individual self-determination and "a legitimate way to increase people's real options having the goal of providing every couple access to the tools necessary to choose the size of their family, is crucially different from family planning programs of hunger by limiting population growth". But here one should clearly lay bare the control assumption underlying the family planning movement launched by the rulers of the Third World countries, and actively abetted by advanced First World countries headed by the USA. (Lopez & Collins 1977 see Dossal AR 1980).

In one of the most profound and information articles, Debabor Banerji has analysed the "political economy of population control in India (1988) titled as the same writes : As a logical corollary to a policy which asserts that changes in social and economic fields could take place only after the growth of the population is curbed; use of pressure, force and monetary enticements had come to be accepted as a "legitimate" means to "motivate" people to take to birth control" P.83)

"Instead, however, of bringing about the long overdue structural changes to honour the commitment it had made to the masses of the population of the country, as early as in the mid-1950s, the political leadership actually used the threat of population explosion to justify the system.

The bogey of population explosion was not only used as a very convenient alibi to explain away its failure to keep its promises to the masses, but was also used to justify launching, with very active inspiration, support, guidance and often naked pressure from foreign agencies, a mass campaign which was specifically directed towards curbing births. While the upper classes continued to thrive at the cost of the masses, the masses were told that their lot could not be improved unless the population growth was curbed. (Ganzerl 1980).

In this section we have highlighted the need to identifying the central assumption underlying the family planning movement launched by the GOI. As is pointed out the "numbers" are always projected against the poverty and hunger of "teeming millions" without going for radical socio-economic transformation. As is discussed in the first Chapter it follows from the nature of ruling classes and path of development they pursued after independence. In order to perpetuate their class-rule, ruling classes cling to such rationalization and exert pressure at the instance of their western godfathers.

In the next section we would discuss the process implementation and assessment of the family planning programme in early 1970s based on some authentic and

sourceful studies, which will help us to understand the image and achievements of the programme upto mid 70s.

THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAMME UPTO PRE-EMERGENCY PERIOD :

Source of Data : Apart from the issues concerning assessment of the programme in terms of indices for attainment of welfare or attainment in the form of indices such as number of sterilizations, IUD insertions and use of conventional contraceptives, couple protection and births averted, there is also a need to assess the actual process of performance of these programmes. Unfortunately, there are substantial difficulties in acquiring the data needed for such an assessment, much greater than is the case of assessments in the two former cases.

Most of the studies discussed below were conducted in early 1970s. Some of the studies discussed below are extensive and explorative based on observations and primary data collection and others are case studies taking one village only. The studies discussed are :

- 1) Debabar Banerji's study based on direct observation of 11 Primary Health Centres and 19 villages located in different parts of the country. The span of the study is

as long as 10 years from 1972 to 1981. This includes the detailed data on the way the intensified family planning programme carried out in 1976 in those villages and how this traumatic experience influenced the attitudes of the population in the subsequent years. The emergency and post-emergency study is further discussed on a later section. (Gonorji 1971, Gonorji 1973, Gonorji 1977, Gonorji 1982, Gonorji 1985).

ii) G.D. Mishra and colleagues' study in five districts of rural Uttar Pradesh conducted in 1971-72, which gives a system analysis OF FAMILY PLANNING IN RURAL INDIA (G.D. Mishra et al 1977 & 1982)

iii) Richmond Mandani's study of a village in Punjab (Mandani 1972) related studies like 'Khanno Study' (Wyon & Gordon 1971) and recent study of the same village by Mani Nag and Neeraj Kek (1986) is also included for an indept discussion.

iv) Djurfeldt and Lindberg's study of the introduction of western medicine in a Tamil village where they have included a section to study the meaning of family planning for the villagers (1973 and 1975).

Interestingly in recent time enormous literature has grown up based on studies on fertility decline in Korea, sometimes comparing with Sri Lanka and/or Chinese experience. Some of the studies which are relevant for our purpose will be discussed later on

Various seminars, discussion forums also have been arranged in past somech years in India and abroad. Papers and recommendations have been presented based on primary/secondary studies conducted by various population research centres located at Bangalore, Lucknow, Gorada, Delhi, Dharwad, Gandhigram, Patna, Pune, Trivendrum, Bhubneswar, Wottair, Gauhati, Chandigarh, Ghopai, Udaipur and also by various IITs, IIRs, development research organizations like CBS, Trivendrum, ISEC, Bangalore and above all International Institute for Population Studies, Bombay and Centro of Social Medicine and Community Health of J.N.U., New Delhi. But the most important contributions in recent times have come from Population Research Centre, Bangalore, I.I.P.S, Bombay, ESMACH, New Delhi, IIT, Bombay and CBS Trivendrum etc.

Special studies related to methodology, fertility, morbidity and mortality, migration, urbanization, special group studies, socio-economic systems and related policy matters, population statistics and censuses have been conducted by the above institutes.

A study which is equally important for our purpose here is the study jointly sponsored by JCU/ICSSR/IIPS and conducted by two experts in this field Ashok Mitra and S. Mukerji (1980) titled "Population, Food and Land Inequalities in India, 1971". Apart from those, various

international organizations, private donors, bilateral governments, multilateral donors (like WHO, ECFAE, UNICEF, UNFPA, ID World Bank etc) have also conducted various studies in this direction.

Our main concern here will be to include major studies which have got extensive social science inputs, as we are more interested in Population Policy matters and never to confine ourselves within the decimal points and purely technical methodology tools and kits.

Lastly, while discussing the studies we would not discuss much about methodology, detailed imperial data collected, but to analyse the inferences they have drawn and recommendations they have made based on their own conclusions.

THE 1971 ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAMME : (Dance JA 1971/1965/1969)

Community Motivation : Community motivation for participation forms the very core of the programme, which it seems has been used too casually, in too loose a manner without adequate understanding of the complete processes involved.

'Motivation' was thought to be some sort of magic wand which could be used by anybody to make everybody accept family planning (Mathew 1969). No wonder the motivations

of fertility are oversimplified. Even the motivations of family planners is missed. This over-simplification even disregard, is evidenced in the usual "training courses",for family planning to work, there is first the question of motivating thousands of poor country nationals who staff program organisations. (Demerath, 1976) Banerji further identifies the burden of the field staff personnel to handle a large population.

Utilization of Services :

What is the performance of the "Organised Sector and the Voluntary Agencies?

At the central level, data concerning performance of these sectors were grossly inadequate, if not totally lacking. He concludes from the analysis of the data available that, " not even one-fifth of the capacity of the existing institutions providing family planning services bear utilised. There is thus quite a substantial waste of technical manpower, equipment and funds - all at a time when such resources were in short supply (Banerji 1985)

ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES :

Some of the major requirements for preparing personnel for new roles are : -
(produced from Banerji 1985 in short forms)

- i) A well formulated programme, which is applicable and acceptable under existing conditions which also requires

clear definitions of the role of each category.

- (ii) Development of training curricula for each category of workers.
- iii) Preparation of trainers.
- iv) Motivation of the trainees to learn new skills so that they can effectively perform their role.
- v) Readiness on part of the programme organisers to provide full support to the trained personnel to make use of the new skills.
- vi) Continuous evaluation of the performance with proper feed back arrangements.

Data have been presented (Benerji 1971) to demonstrate that training activities continue to be deficient on all six counts. Most of the training activities have become almost an empty ritual (Benerji 1985)

QUALITY OF EVALUATION :

The very fact that even elementary evaluation data concerning the performance of different sectors of the programme are not available at the level of policy formulation provides an indication of the quality of the second United Nations Mission (1969 : 13) has underlined the need for strengthening the evaluation machinery.

Similar Evaluation Reports are prepared by first United Nations Mission of 1966 and two studies of the Programme Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission PEO, PC & ? (GOI 1965). If, however evaluation means measurement of achievement of predetermined goals, none of these studies can be categorised as evaluation of the programme since none of the reports gives any indication that the recommendations have been based on scientifically collected objective data.

Still then, events subsequent to implementation of these recommendations revealed that they did not yield the desired results (Banerji 1971 p.72).

QUALITY OF RESEARCH :

Because of the crucial importance of the programme opened up new fields for research posing new challenges to research workers. Because of the crucial importance of the programme and the considerable resources that were made available for research, there ought to have been a virtual renaissance in the field of research on policy formulation, programme planning, and programme implementation and evaluation. Newer research tools such as systems analysis, operational

research, work study, and PERT, could have been used to great advantage. However, only one type of research, which gained importance because it happened to be in tune with the research background of some of the key foreign consultants held the spotlight. This went under the queer name, 'Communication-action-research'. This type of research was even criticised by Government of India (1956) and some of the critical scholars in this field, (Banerji 1969, Krishnamurthy 1968, Rao 1974). Styces (1962) has described social science research in family planning as "Spotty, uncoordinated and noncumulative."

The Second United Nations Advisory Mission of 1969 also underlined the need for improving the quality of research.

The failure of the research workers to find answers to crucial operational problems left the field open to the lay administrators to find answers by using the age-old administrative methods.

ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT I

The Administrative Reforms Commission (GOI 1969) and some other eminent authorities in public administration (eg. IIPA 1968, GOI 1966, GOI 1968) have pleaded for a

reorientation of administrative practices in India to enable the administration to meet the new patterns of demands created by social, political, economic and technological changes of modern times.

However, the Indian administration, despite the pressure put on it during the last three decades, has not been able to discard its colonial traditions. It has been claimed that the generalists alone possess the superior managerial and political skills required for taking policy decisions. (Khosla 1968).

Following these traditions, the Ministry of Health, has been headed by a generalist and the top technical man, the DGHS, is relegated to the position of heading an attached office of the ministry.

A SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAMME :

(Nishra et al 1962; Nishra et al 1977 also
Benerji 1985 for the discussion of above)

Since 1971, a group of keen researchers from IIT Bombay and Department of Population Planning of De University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi have been engaged in a research project concerning the implementation of the Indian family planning programme in

in the rural areas of the Allahabad Division of Uttar Pradesh during the pre-emergency period in the five districts namely, Allahabad, Etawah, Farrukhabad, Fatehpur and Kanpur, which covered a population of over 10 million according to the 1971 census (Mishra 1977).

The primary purpose of this research has been to understand the functioning of the programme at its operational level and to provide an organisational perspective to the determinants of the programme performance. The importance of the study lies not so much in any single piece of information which is provided, as in the overall approach which it adopted.

The researchers have identified to respond to three critical needs : 1) the need to conceptualize the essential interrelatedness of factors pertaining to the rural populations; the implementation agencies, and the wider environment within which they exist, 2) the need to explore a broad range of organisational issues, and 3) the need to examine both systems and organisational issues within an empirical framework.

These three major concerns have led us to gather data from a variety of sources using a range of methods (Mishra et al 1982).

The researchers identified three major components in defining the family planning programme as a system :

- (a) the villagers on the client; (b) the staff on family planning workers who interact with the villagers; and
- (c) the larger administrative system of which the workers form a part (see Banerji 1985)

The most significant conclusions are derived directly from the emphasis upon "interrelatedness". A sizeable number of problems that have been encountered in the effort to implement a family planning programme each of which is important in and of itself, and not isolated but interrelated that is, they are systemic in nature (Mishra 1982).

The three guidelines that are of crucial importance in discussing future courses of action for family planning. These are (1) the strategy chosen for client transactions has to be suited to the client population (2) the organising strategy chosen for client strategy; and (3) the organising strategy has to be suited to the institutional context within which it is implemented.

RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT POPULATION DEBATE :

Family planning cannot be more than a small part of the solution to the problem of poverty in Uttar Pradesh, in India,

or in any other part of the world.

It is relatively easy to define a client strategy that should work in theory but cannot be implemented by the existing structures (Mishra 1977).

In conclusion they commented, "we argue that development and family planning are interrelated both in a normative and an empirical senseour persistent emphasis of the role of the socio-cultural, economic and political conditions of the rural society in UP and the nature of bureaucracy attests to the relevance which we attribute to the influence of developmental factors upon family planning programmes. Furthermore, our finding that literacy is the single most important determinant of village level family planning acceptance explicitly supports the important influence of the factors of socio-economic development upon family planning programmes". (Mishra 1982)

The conclusions of Mishra and his colleagues are supported by those of the study of 19 villages (Banerji 1973, Banerji 1982 Banerji 1985, Mishra et al 1982).

Frequent references will be made in subsequent chapters and sections to the above study of 19 villages and other important studies those were listed earlier in this chapter. Because it is not possible within the limited space and time of the present work to discuss all the listed studies separately.

FIFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN :

Earlier reference has been already given to 'health, nutrition and family planning were visualised as a single package which, in turn, was part of the still bigger package of the Minimum Needs Programme of Fifth Plan (Karan Singh 1975).

Here we would try to focus on the Fifth Plan period with special reference to Bucharest Conference, 1974 and the whole of the emergency period. A critique of the emergency excesses and the reasons and consequences will also be discussed after this section.

Commenting on Draft Fifth Plan Book Nitro held :

"In retrospect, the third and fourth plan approaches might read as though they suggested that reduction of the birth rate, irrespective of the social, cultural, and economic milieu, was a straight function of the clinic and current contraceptive technology. That such a view is still widely held and even stridently adumbers and sought to be imposed is a measure of the powerful lobby in this regard.

But the quickness with which the "Draft Fifth Plan" corrected the perspective bears testimony to the Indian planners' comprehension of this highly complex issue.

"the primary objective during Fifth Plan is to provide minimum public health facilities integrated with family planning and nutrition for vulnerable groups- children, pregnant women and lactating mothers. It will be necessary to consolidate past gains in the various fields of health, such as communicable diseases, medical education, and provision of infrastructure in the rural areas". (GOI, 1974).

Just before emergency at the World Population Conference held at Bucharest in 1974, the then Union Minister of Health asserted (Singh 1975) :

"Population policy is thus one of the several vital instruments for securing comprehensive social development and it cannot be effective unless certain concomitant economic policies and social programmes succeed in changing the basic determinants of high fertility. It has truly been said that the best contraceptive is development".

This was in line with the viewpoint presented at the conference by most developing countries (let me add the socialist camp also, see Guzevaty 1974), that population policy must be broad-based and should form an integral part of development planning (Dossal PB 1983)

This policy was strongly endorsed by the then Prime Minister in her address to the National Population Conference held in the same year in New Delhi.

"All workers of the family planning movement do not always fully appreciate the integral relationship between general development and family planning. When we reappropriated some funds to strengthen our rural health services, and there was a reduction in the percentage of the funds allocated under the separate head of family planning, there was an outcry. This was misrepresented by the international press to suggest that we were giving up our family planning programmes (Sanyal 1975).

Here the crucial point is to note : WHO created the outcry for whom? The western "philanthropists", who are "genuinely" interested in development of the third world through their birth control policies? (to use Ashish Bose's terminology IBCM : International Birth Control Mafia?) (Bose 1985)

Is it not the same IBCM at whose instance the Orwellian birth control measures were implemented during the same year i.e. 1975?

Why is she fearing the international press if she is convinced that it is a rational policy to link developmental programmes with population policy? Who is representing the international press and why are they so interested in our family planning programmes instead of (and at the cost of) our developmental programmes?

The answers to those questions will be discussed in the very next section of this chapter.

Anyway, the position rapidly changed after 1974-75. Yet another population "control" policy was formulated in April 1976 in the wake of the declaration of the National Emergency (GOI 1976). This included setting eight per cent of the central assistance to state plans specifically against performance in family planning freezing representation in central and state legislature on the basis of the 1971 census for the next 25 years, raising the age at marriage to 18 for girls and 21 for boys, higher monetary compensation, higher priority for girls' education upto the middle level and to child nutrition. For the first time, the Union Government allowed some states, which felt that the facilities available to them were adequate, to initiate legislation for compulsory sterilization.

Devolution Authoritarianism and Capitalist Crisis in Indian Economy †

After the heroic assertion in Bucharest Conference regarding India's commitment to developmental measures for fertility decline, back home, Karon Singh, must have felt quite enlightened and complacent.

After the promulgation of emergency, a new national population policy was adopted which recognized that "the real enemy was poverty" in which a frontal attack was mounted by the Fifth Plan's NRP. It proceeded, however, to assert that "simply to wait for education and economic development to bring about a drop in fertility is not a practical solution.....the time factor is so pressing, and the population growth so formidable, that we have to get out of the vicious circle through a direct assault upon this problem as a national commitment" (Singh 1976).

Reference to use of police, revenue staff, jail authorities to catch people from slums, ghettos, pavements and footpaths; village corners for sterilization has already made. As contended by Ghorji force and pressure was not entirely new to India but it used to

take various covert forms in different places (Banerji 1977). But this trend culminated during the emergency period of June 1975 - March 1977 in the use of naked force to physically catch hold of individuals and forcibly sterilize them on a scale which is perhaps unprecedented in human history.

Needless to say, a frustrated government at the instance of International Birth Control Radio, let loose on the poor people on all counts in a desperate bid to avoid crackdown of a shattering economy. Historical experience has shown that the authoritarian tendency in any capitalist political-economic system increased as the crisis deepens. In the wake of great depression in 1930s the ugly face of fascism in Germany took its classical form and concomitantly, the working class of western imperialist countries experienced a regular cut down in their political freedom. This is what happened in case of India also in mid-seventies. The western imperialist block who could not find their voices heard in Bucharest Conference due to predominance of third world and the socialist block, determined to do outside the precincts of such a conference.

The semi-champion of third world - India who echoed its progressive voice in Bucharest, during emergency, in collaboration with international agencies did what was

exactly expected from it. It is quite significant that the President of World Bank, who visited India during emergency, "paid tribute to the political will and determination shown by the leadership at the highest level in intensifying the family planning drive with rare courage of conviction". (GOI 1976) Here the point to be noted is that none of the multilateral donors who are directly involved in population activities like UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, UN Advisory Missions, UNESCO came to hail or eulogize the programme. After all World Bank was very much concerned about the crisis in Indian economy, as India is the largest borrower of World Bank. They hailed emergency and the forcible sterilization which they thought would recover India from immediate collapse of economy. They succeeded with active collaboration of Indian bourgeoisie and landlords and their political power base represented by Indian National Congress. But thanks to the democratic consciousness of the people of India, they had to withdraw emergency and that is not enough they returned back to their "own bases" after a shameful defeat in the general elections.

This particular aspect is missed by most (if not all) of the scholars in India. India's path of development, the class character of ruling class in India, contradictions in the very socio-political-economic system and the deepening crisis of capitalist economy all has to be analysed separately in order to analyse the emergency situation and the ruling classes' excessive emphasis on population control. Can we separate population policy of any country from the very nature of socio-economic system? A historical analysis always leads to wrong conclusions, as in case of emergency excesses. People these who saw coercion in family planning must by this time have come to know that this tendency in the political system still exists because it is inherent in the very nature of the system.

The new government headed by the son of the same emergency Prime Minister and brother of the emergency criminal on whose "sympathy-vote" he has come to power did not even hesitate to defend emergency when pressmen approached him on the occasion of 10 years of promulgation of emergency in June of 1985 and he said if such a situation arises I will have to impose emergency again !!!

So this tendency of authoritarianism always continues as the crisis deepens.

(Important studies in this respect are Banerji 1974/1977/1980; Djurfoldt & Lindberg 1975/1980; Asok Mitra in India's Population & Aspects of Quality and Control", 1978, N.V. Madurai Mahmood 1976, Marika Visqinoy, Part I & II, 1982/1983, Pathe, V.P. 1981/1984 etc.)

SIXTH PLAN AND DRAFT SEVENTH PLAN :

The Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85) (GOI 1981) admits that the failure to attain birth rate targets adopted in earlier plans was "largely on account of our inability to carry forward the programme throughout the country with the active involvement of the people. Public enthusiasm and community participation in the programme which is necessary for its success has not been generated in adequate measure".

In an extensive review of the programmes, a new strategy was evolved for future implementation. Its important features being its emphasis on voluntarism, communication strategies, female literacy, population education, involvement of parliamentarians, linkages with the ministries, laws relating to minimum age at marriage, &c (see Banerji 1981)

(Draft)

The Seventh Five Year/Plan will be discussed in details in the next section; while discussing the working group report (1980). The target for reaching NRR of unity is fixed 2006 - 2011 A.D. instead by 2000 A.D. The goals fixed for the year 1990 :

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| i) Effective Couple Protection rate | = 42% |
| ii) CBR (per 1000) | = 29.1% |
| iii) CDR (per 1000) | = 10.4% |
| iv) Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000) | = 90% |
| v) Immunisation | = 100% |
| vi) Ante - natal care | = 75% |

PRESENT IMAGE OF THE PROGRAMME IN THE LIGHT OF MEXICO CONFERENCE :

After the traumatic experience of Emergency, the post-emergency government rejected all sorts of voluntarism. Nobody knows what would have happened if that government continued for long. In less than two years the government collapsed. But one welcome aspect of post-emergency government is that they recognised the need of a developmental related population policy (at least at the level of 'pen and paper'). But there was virtually no change in the existing organisational structure. As far as the management is concerned, because of persistence with an organisation incompatible with the task which it is

expected to perform, there has in fact been a distinct deterioration in the situation^o (Dangrji 1985).

The Area Development Projects which are supposed to provide health and family welfare services in infrastructural level are reduced to 'catch up' cases for sterilization. (As observed by the present researcher). "All these programmes of Area projects are under the complete control of the foreign agencies both in India and abroad. In bureaucratic circles the extension of reciprocal facilities is quite common. In the absence of data it is difficult to say how much such foreign aid has benefitted the managers of the aid givers and aid receivers. In this process we have also evolved a new breed of demographers, often quickly trained abroad through short term seminars and courses (and this breed includes high government functionaries and university Professors). (Bose 1985). The core of the area Development Projects is what is called the 'Model Plan'. Once again, the 'Model Plan' appears to be a very mysterious entity. There are very few, outside the government and the agencies concerned, who are familiar with the details. (Dangrji 1985).

MEXICO CONFERENCE :

The United Nations organised another International Conference on Population in Mexico City in August '84.

It reiterated the same issue these were come to fore during Bucharest Conference (1974) and a new 'Plan of Action' was chalked out which can be broadly classified in six categories : socio-economic development, the environment and population, the role and status of women, development of population policy, population growth, goals for health policies, infant, child and maternal morbidity and mortality. (Future, numbers 11-12, 1984).

Ashish Bose (1989) comments on this as follows :
 "..... at this Conference, India had a low profile. Interestingly enough, the US Delegation which had opposed the Indian viewpoint in 1974 took a somersault and made the following statement at the Mexico Conference :
 "First and most important, population growth, is of itself, a neutral phenomenon. It is not necessarily good or ill. It becomes an asset or a problem only in conjunction with other factors such as economic policy, social constraints, need for manpower and so forth..... population control programmes alone cannot substitute for economic reforms that put a society on the road towards growth, and, as an after effect, toward slower population increase as well.....Our primary objective will be to encourage developing countries to adopt sound economic

policies and, where appropriate, population policies and, consistent with respect for human dignity and family values... The United States does not consider abortion as an acceptable element of family planning programmes and will no longer contribute to those which it is a part⁹. (IPC 1984).

This dramatic change in U.S. official point of view has brought about shock waves in international and US funding agencies. The latest move on the part of the US seems to deny US aid to family planning programmes of China because of the coercive aspects of programmes.⁹

MARRIAGE GROUP'S REPORT ON POPULATION POLICY :

A Working Group on Population Policy was appointed by the Planning Commission on Oct. 20, 1970 with the following terms of reference:

- 1) To consider the demographic situation, achievements and perspectives and suggest a fertility control programme, along with possible levels of achievements, for the current and subsequent plan period including realistic demographic goals, highlighting the priorities, with particular regard to the factors which could lower the fertility rate.

- ii) To take an integrated look at the social, economic and environmental variables, related to fertility control and family welfare, and suggest appropriate measures and related developmental programmes;
- iii) To suggest how to integrate various schemes designed under the Revised Minimum Needs Programme which are run by different Ministries and State Governments so that the fertility control programme can be made more popular and effective by creating necessary linkages (GOI, PC, 1980).

The Working Group submitted its interim Report on March 12, 1979 and Final Report on May 30, 1980.

This is a welcome effort initiated by any government after independence for the first time, incorporating major components of any policy related to population only, at least within the present social structural set up.

Since its inception the whole concept of population policy was reduced to population "Control" policy with the whole political as well as administrative machinery was geared up to 'catch' cases for contraception and sterilization under the acronym 'family planning'. As we have already discussed it was only during Fourth Plan integration of Maternal and Child Health (MCH) sought

essential. Again, during Fifth Plan Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) was included as a major component (GOI, PC 1966 and 1974).

Pothe (1981) criticizes the terms of reference of the working group "indicating that the official concern with the population situation and policy still continues to be neo-Malthusian in that it still identifies the population problem with "a fertility control programme" (GOI, PC, Working Group Report on Population Policy, 1960, p.2-3, henceforth Report), as if other problems concerning the quantity and quality of population do not exist. As a result, it would not be strictly correct to look upon the working group as a report on population policy but only as a very limited study on fertility control programme."

Here one really wonders regarding Pothe's perception of neo-Malthusianism. It is clearly understandable that neo-Malthusianism is inherent in the development policy we have pursued after independence. It seems Pothe is obsessed with the idea of neo-Malthusianism vis-a-vis compulsion and coercion (especially during emergency) only. So there is nothing called, as he puts it "population policy and situation still continues to be neo-Malthusian", as it follows from the logical corollary of India's overall socio-economic policies. So the

fundamental problem is a structural one. And as we have discussed earlier unless and otherwise the existing structures are demolished by radical transformation of society thereby changing the every value-system that is prevalent; the problem will continue to exist. But we agree to the point that the terms of reference as spelt out concerns with only those social, economic and environmental variables which are related to fertility control and family welfare, and suggest only those related developmental programmes. In any case, working group could not have recommended any radical change in the path of economic development and the institutional set up in the country because of their limitations of defined terms and conditions.

So far discussing the Report in some greater details it would be worthwhile to underscore the important questions these should be answered in its proper context. Firstly, why did the government feel it necessary to integrate MCH and MNP with official Family Planning Programme? Had the government succeeded in anyhow achieving the targets in late 1960s, would they still be incorporated these developmental programmes in the Family Planning Programmes? Why did they appoint a working group as late as 1978 instead of formulating such a policy in 1951 itself?

It is quite understandable that the political leadership that has been ruling the country with the alliance of bourgeoisie-landlord since independence with short intervention of just two years is not interested in solving the basic problems of the large mass of population.

This is ingrained in the very path of development that is pursued after independence in order to continue their class rule. But as we have contended that the welfare state is an arena in which class struggles take place. We would argue that when looking at Indian society in this century the working class (and the oppressed peasantry in general) have always had a role to play in some aspects of these struggles - even though the form and content of this involvement will be different in different eras - be it anti-colonial struggle for independence during British rule in India or be it struggle against authoritarianism during emergency in mid 70s. The numerous peasant uprisings and industrial proletariats' militant strikes led to relinquishment of some power to the people.

And that is why precisely government talks ^{more} about developmental measures as compared to the earlier times.

In the absence of minimum needs of life for a vast mass of population the only weapon they can potentially use is their numerical strength, and "with this weapon, they will wrest more and more powers from the exploiting classes and ensure that social and economic prerequisites for a nationwide adoption of a small family norm are met." (Danzonji, 1980)

State as such cannot be viewed as a monolith, since each institution and initiative must be understood in terms of the class struggle going around it. (see Pohlantzas 19) Had there been no change of government after emergency the same ruling party could have continued with coercive measures and it is the power of democratic and progressive forces which compelled the subsequent government to discontinue the same heinous practice and at least recommended for the first time since independence to formulate a National Population Policy.

The Report opens with an optimistic note; "we are quite clear in our mind that fertility or population control is an issue much bigger than the official programme of family welfare and therefore it is to be viewed in terms of the national broader perspective on development as a whole".

While we will here appreciate the positive recommendations of the Report, the mistakes, shortcomings will be critically analysed.

DEMOGRAPHIC GOALS :

In a seminal paper on the Report, P.H. Reddy and P.J. Bhattacharjee (1981) have analysed brilliantly the demographic goals as spelt out by the working group. The material for this section is heavily drawn from the above source and other data also.

As a long-term demographic goal, the working group recommends a net reproduction rate (NRR) of one on unity by 1996 for the country as a whole and by 2001 for all the States. (Reddy et al 1981). The soundness and clarity of the concept of NRR and its feasibility will be discussed in details.

The concept of NRR is complex and the Report does not define the concept very clearly. It says "the NRR of unity on 1, implies that for a given set of conditions of mortality and fertility, on an average, a woman will be replaced by just one daughter and two child family will be the normative pattern in the society by the year 2001". (Report pr-36). Reddy and Bhattacharya says that : This is too simplistic

and somewhat misleading an explanation of MRR. The gullible planners and policy makers would be attracted by the two-child family becoming a normative pattern and would, in all probability, miss the all important phrase "for a given set of conditions of mortality and fertility". This phrase seems to have been deliberately used vaguely. (Reddy & Bhattacharya, 1981).

The report says that an MRR of one will imply a death rate of 9 per 1000 of population (para 37) and a birth rate of 29 per a 1000 of population (para 39). This seems to have misled the planners and policy-makers. But an MRR of one can also be achieved when birth and death rates are high. There is no consistent relationship between MRR on the one hand and birth and death rates on the other. So, MRR of unity, can also be achieved by increasing the present death rate without decreasing the present birth rate, which is unacceptable. But the concept of MRR has no advantage in that ^{it} takes into consideration not only birth rate but also death rate.

^aUnless and otherwise, quotation marks are put,

the shortened theme is presented in place of lengthy discussions in the matter for details see the references.

Over the years crude birth rate dropped less than 8 points despite all the care taken and targets set, but on the contrary death rate is reduced by 13 points. Thus, achievement in reducing birth rates and rates, or lack of it, so far seems to have little or nothing to do with the practice or failures set goals.

For at least two reasons reducing death rate is earlier than reducing birth rate. For one thing the demand by the people is much greater for services aimed at reducing death rate than for those aimed at reducing birth rate. Secondly, more developed technology is available to reduce death rate than to reduce birth rate.

To illustrate how gullible the concept of CRR, the following table will give some insights

Country	Year	Birth rate	Death rate	C.R.R.
Canada ¹	1964	23.9	7.6	1.66
India ²	1970	33.2	14.1	1.67
U.S.A. ¹	1955	24.7	7.3	1.60
	1945	23.4	10.0	1.13
	1950	23.5	9.5	1.44

Source : As quoted by Reddy & Bhattacharya (1981,
Population Centre, Bangalore)

1. U.N. Demographic Year Books, 1959, 1962 and 1965
2. G.O.I. Planning Commission Report, 1980

From the table on the preceding page, taking solely from the NRR angle one would be tempted to conclude that demographic situation was almost same in Canada in 1964, India in 1978 and in USA in 1955 but as is seen there is wide disparity in birth and death rates, which is as high as 33.2 and 14.1 in India in 1978 as compared to 23.9 and 7.6 in Canada in 1964 and 24.7 and 9.3 in USA in 1955 respectively.

Against the working group stipulates ".....no state in the country could have an NRR of more than one by the year 2001." Implicit in this stipulation is that an NRR of one is more desirable. Then an NRR of more than one, which always needs not and cannot be true. Suppose, NRR is increased to more than one by decreasing death rate by a point or so. Is it undesirable? Certainly not. As is evident from the above table, in USA though NRR was more in 1950 than in 1945 the population situation there was better in 1950 as compared to 1945. Because death rate in five years decreased by half-a-point from 10.0 to 9.5 while

birth rate increased by one-tenth of a point from 23.4 to 23.5.

Reddy and Bhattacharjee concluded : " In so far as we know, no country in the world has ever set its demographic goals in terms of NRR. The concept of NRR is used in academic exercises to measure small increases in theoretically stable population" (p.4) and further added "for more reasons than one, NRR" as a concept to set demographic goals is unsuitable. It is wise to set demographic goals in terms of birth and death rates which can be easily understood by all. The so-called technical demographers should take pride not in flabbergasting planners and policy makers with their demographic gobble-dycock but rather in translating complex concepts into easily understandable and easily measurable propositions" (Reddy et al p 7)

* The NRR indicates the number of daughters a new born girl will bear during her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific fertility rates and a fixed set of mortality rates. The NRR thus measures the extent to which a cohort of newborn girls will reproduce themselves under given schedules of fertility and mortality. An NRR of 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level : at this rate child bearing women, on the average, bear only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population (World Development Report, 1989)

Now turning to the question of the feasibility of the long term demographic goal of NRR of one that is a birth rate of 21 and a death rate of 9 per thousand people per year by 1996 for the country as and by 2001 for all the states. The hope of the working is obviously based on earlier population projections, most of which have fallen by wayside after the preliminary results of the 1981 census, and on "necessary will" (para 39). Putting it squarely, "we might ask whose "necessary will" is to be given: planners', policy-makers', peoples' or couples'?" (Reddy et al 1981 p8).

Further Reddy and Bhattacharjee were quite dubious of achieving a birth rate of 21 by 1996. They questioned aptly when our achievement in reducing birth rate in the past is less than half-a-point per year, would it be possible in bringing down the birth rate by almost one point annually? It means according to Report, the present 22 per cent of the eligible couples effectively protected by different methods of family planning should be increased to 60 per cent by 1996 and this involves a net annual increase of little more than 2 per cent. (Report Para 42) "But the Working Group has nothing to offer by way of a similar plan of

action to bring down the present death rate of about 14 to 9 by 1996. We realize that it is easier said than done^d. (Reddy & Bhattacharjee, 1981).

Now we are in a position to evaluate the performance of the programme and the dismal failure of achieving the target, as the documents for Seventh Five/Plan ^{Year} is available (GOI 1985)

- i) The effective couple protection achieved by March 1985 is of the order of 32 per cent as against Sixth Plan target of 36.6 per cent.
- ii) The crude birth rate has declined by about 8 points in 1966 to 33 in 1982 i.e. 0.5 percentage point average decline per year. (GOI 1985) This means the CBR continues to be exactly the same as was in 1978. (Report 1980) But the actuals in 1981 census showed a CBR of more than 33, and the World Bank showed the CBR for India in 1983 as 34 (World Development Report 1985). While the Population Reference Bureau puts it as 34 for mid-1985 estimate (PRB 1985).

The failure to achieve the target was attributed to the following factors :

- i) Lack of infrastructure facilities;
- ii) Relatively high targets;
- iii) Less than optimal use of available resources

- iv) Political, social, economic and cultural constraints
- v) High infant mortality rate, which has declined only moderately from around 125 during the 70's to 114 in 1980; it is still too high for couples to feel confident of survival of their children; and
- vi) The levels maternal and child mortality are still very high compared to that in other countries.

We do not know what is meant by the "official version" of "political, social, economic and cultural constraints"; neither the so-called "constraints" were elaborated in any details. Anyhow the points those were brought to fore by Reddy and Bhattacharjee in 1980-81 come to be true after the evaluation of Sixth Plan.

That is why Reddy and Bhattacharjee had warned against fixing up overambitious targets. "One is that policy-makers and programme administrators may become disillusioned and frustrated with their achievement if the targets set are not achieved and they may become complacent. This is not desirable. The other is that the disillusionment and frustration may prompt them to resort to coercion and compulsion in increasing the number of family planning acceptors and achieving the target of birth rate. And we all know how desirable it is."

POVERTY AND POPULATION :

Although hunger and poverty is a universal phenomena, the point we intend to discuss here is that, it is not due to any natural necessity. The study of poverty and hunger in different regions of the world shows that human societies are ordinarily brought to the starvation point by cultural rather than natural forces, that hunger results from grave errors and defects in social organisation, as ruling groups strive to preserve outdated structures. The reproduction of this historical phenomenon (i.e. poverty) cannot be understood unless we analyse it as the result of social relations which themselves must be placed in the context of a system of oppression, imperialism (DeCastro 1977, Maindani, 1976) Hunger due to the inclemency of nature is an extra-ordinary catastrophe, while hunger as man-made blight is a "normal" condition in the most varied parts of the world.

The history of man from the beginning has been the history of his struggle for daily bread. It is known from scientific observation that even after some hundred of thousands of years of striving at least two thirds of the world's population live in a permanent state of hunger (United Nations, 1962) More than three billions human

beings can still not find the means of escaping this most terrible affliction of society. Hunger has unquestionably been the most potent source of social misfortune, but our civilization has kept its eyes averted, afraid to face the sad reality. (De Castro, 1977). It is no matter of surprise after independence, all the official research funds were channelized to the study of role of Indian National Congress bare its "struggle" in "driving" Britishers out of this land. Official social scientists were kept busy in writing the history of INC and biographies of its "great" leaders, as if no other parties (political or otherwise) had any role in it. Political scientists, constitution experts, sociologists eulogised the newly framed constitution - its directive principles, its aim of achieving a welfare state, its great democratic character aimed at giving rights to the age-old exploited and oppressed masses. The path of development was termed as attaining the goal of a "socialist pattern of society". Non-violence, peaceful means of achieving the goal, the satyagraha etc. became the key slogans. Western countries for their imperialist interests counterposed Chinese ("Violent") Revolution to Indian freedom struggle. Both were supposed to "attain the same goal". But then came Indochina war after just a decade of

promulgation of Indian Constitution. All the slogans of non-violence fizzled out within days !! "unwanted" war was rationalised by our great "patriotic and nationalist social scientists" as "holy war" for the protection of the "mother land". (We do not want to go the polemics of who invaded whom first, and who was right and who was wrong, we maintain that the war costed heavily for India which otherwise could have invested in developmental projects).

Thus while war, independence became leitmotiv of Indian thought, hunger remained only a "vulgar sensation", (De Castro's phrase) the repercussions of which were not supposed to emerge from the realm of the subconscious. The conscious mind, with ostentatious disdain, denied its existence (De Castro 1977) (This paragraph is addressed to the socially conscious independent social analysts to break their silence ^{and fight} against this man-made plague called "hunger" — ^{because of} the interest of a section of society who gets profit from poverty) That is why perhaps as late as in early seventies the question of poverty taken up by social scientists taken in India.

HUNGER AND POVERTY AS THE CAUSE OF OVER POPULATION :

The crucial point of this essay is the arrangement that overpopulation. This idea sounds paradoxical, since hunger, an agent of deterioration and death, seems unlikely to provoke

Hobster Johnson and Raleigh Darlowe established the equally significant fact that between 1936 and 1947 half of the increase in the world's population occurred in the far east. She wrote : It is a disconcerting fact that in the areas where population growth has been most rapid , people receive only about 2,000 calories a day. It seems, therefore, that this insufficient diet is related to human fertility. (Johnson et al 1954).

The exaggerated multiplication of humanity through excessive fertility, then is partially, a problem of specific hunger - one of the strangest aspects of the phenomenon of universal hunger. Hunger is responsible for the over production of human beings, excessive in number and inferior in quality, who are hurled blindly into the demographic metabolism of the world. This manifestation of hunger is of primary importance, since it provides a biological basis for the theory that specific hunger is the cause of overpopulation. The bodily mechanism through which chronic hunger exerts its disturbing and debasing force on the demographic evolution of human societies is involved with their economic and social life (de Castro (1977)



on excessive increase in population. But in reality this just what happens.

Having demonstrated that hunger is not due to natural reasons, but due to structural (and cultural) reasons, both nationally and internationally in the following studies it is demonstrated that high fertility and hunger (obviously due to poverty and malnutrition) are correlated to each other.

Taking figures from United Nations Statistical Annual (1967) Jesus de Castro concluded as follows : -

If we compare the birth rate with the consumption of proteins, (and especially with the percentage of calories supplied by animal proteins) we find a correlation between the two, the fertility going down as the consumption of such proteins rises.

The same can be demonstrated taking latest available figures i.e. 1983. Obviously, there is not an absolute correlation in all cases because many factors besides nutrition affect the mechanisms of fertility and birth. Similar researches are done by various scientists with various animals in laboratories which confirms de Castro's assertion.

Povarty and Population Control

The strength of the motives for having children vary from class to class, major motives can be classified as follows broadly :

- i) Children make the home happy.
- ii) Children are a source of future income.
- iii) Children are an insurance against old age.

(Rao 1976, Mandani 1972, UN Study 1961)

Motive (i) is universal motive and applicable to all the classes of society.

MOTIVE (ii)

S.K. Rao has summed up the expected motivation for various classes as (I) to be strongest among peasants and petty bourgeoisie i.e. small peasants who cultivate land mostly with family labour; petty traders carpenters, weavers and generally people who live by household industry. This class is characterised by self-employment and usually enjoy a higher income level than the workers. (II) This motive is likely to be weaker among workers consisting of

landless labourers in rural areas, coolies, and industrial manual workers in urban areas. This class is characterised by dependence on others for employment and a low income level. (III) The motive is weakest in case of capitalist class comprising big traders, industrialists and capitalist farmers. This class is characterised by the fact that its members are employers and live by ownership of property. (IV) The motivation is equally weak as in the case of capitalist class as the Professional classes, who enjoy fairly high income, higher than classes of workers and peasants; they, however, desire their income by doing jobs which require skills through education, etc. It thus includes civil servants, skilled personnel like doctors, engineers, etc. (S.K. Rao 1976).

Now we come to most important part of the section; if the above is so; it is a fact: And it is not surprising that the empiricists will argue for intervention in these classes I and II classified above to motivate them to take to small family norm, which in turn will solve the problems of the individual families as well as the problems of the country as a whole. But we would

start the discussion by asking questions why is so? After all why the workers and peasants want to have a large family?

Imrana Gadeer comments: "The factor which decides the economic value of children and people's view on saving through birth control, is primarily the living condition of the people. For almost half the population living below the poverty line, there is never enough to live on even if there are more than two earning members in the family. Their major problem is how to survive from day to day and not that of saving". (Gadeer 1976).

Two major components emerge from the analysis so far the economic formation of the family is concerned. One is that of the "cost" of the children in terms of the cost involved in bringing up the children in Indian families and another is that of the "benefit" additional children in terms of the economic contribution to the family. We will discuss the components separately. The third component which is equally important is that of guarantee of the children survival in the poor families.

Cost of bringing up the Children :

Susan George compares the cost of bringing up a child for a Western family with that of a family in Third World as follows :

"But why", you are entitled to ask as a media-influenced Westerner, "do the poor persist in having more children than they can afford? The answer is, "they don't". Another baby for you means visits to the clinic, powdered milk, prams, snow suits, orthopaedic shoes, and disposable nappies, followed by an expensive education and myriad other outlays. When you finally get your costly progeny on its own feet, does it contribute to your income?... Another baby for a poor family means an extra month to feed - a very marginal difference" (George, 1976)

The group of families consisting of the daily wage workers, the landless agriculture labourers and some marginal farmers, spend 80 percent of their per capita expenditure on food and still do not get the minimum required calories. With the remaining 20 per cent they barely manage to get their fuel,

clothing and housing facilities. (Dandekar 1971). Hunger is the way of life for most of these families. For the first two years babies are brought up on mother's milk and eat out of her share of food. It is only for about 6-8 years that parents have to feed children, by which time they begin to help the family in small ways either by doing the household work or earning a little (Qadeer, 1976).

The small family norm originates from a Westernised urban, middle-class setting. In towns, the family has to subsist on the salary of the father only (town children are improductive consumers much longer than those in the rural regions) and as a consequence the living standard is inversely related to the number of children. Ideally, they should be put through high-school, and perhaps University, and their studies must be financed by the father's salary. The more children, the smaller the share of the cake for each child. (Lindberg et al. 1980).

As is already discussed it is only in professional classes and fixed salary income groups, less the number of children, less is the burden for parents.

Economic Contribution of Children :

Allegedly important motives for high fertility in India are the contributions of children to the family's income, while the parents are themselves working, and in old age when they can no longer work. This is the subject of major importances not least for the Indian family planning programme, which has tried to persuade people to have less children on the grounds that they will be better off if they do. But would they really be better off? Are people active against their own best interests? Or are they in fact having many children because they will thereby become richer, not poorer? (Cassen 1978).

Mahmood Mandani conducted a study in Manupur village of Punjab in 1970. Manupur, a relatively prosperous region of the Punjab and a part of the same area as the "Khanna Study".

Mandani interviewed Manupur people of all occupational groups and castes. With the exception of high-caste non-agricultural families and some big landowners, most of those interviewed attributed such well-being as they possessed to their large f

families. He concluded that: "Because children, particularly sons, are useful as a source of household and paid labour and as an insurance against various risks including various risks including old-age disability, they want as many children as possible and, hence family planning does not make sense to them. (Mamdani 1971, see Nag Kak, 1986). The conclusion drawn by Mamdani is of very profound importance. He argued strongly that the material condition of most villagers was such that "they want large families" and "more important, they want them because they need them", and hence "had they practised contraception, most of the villagers would have wilfully courted economic disaster".

Mahmood Mamdani violently attacks Khanna study and asserted that the Khanna contraceptive programme was a total failure. (Khanna study was aimed at studying the long term effect of an action-cum-research project on family planning. It was carried out by Harvard School of Public Health in eight villages (including Manugur) around Khanna during 1954-60, mainly to popularize form tablets and condoms, see, Wynn and Gordon 1971).

In a recent study of the same village (Manupur) by Neeraj Kak and Moni Nag observed (at least claimed to observe) the following changes :

"We found to our surprise that within a short span of 12 years, the perception of villagers regarding the value of children and their family planning behaviour had changed drastically".

They have attributed this change of attitude towards family size can be linked mainly to a decline in economic value of children - actual as well as perceived by parents. The data collected indicate that the following three inter-related aspects of development have played the crucial roles: The introduction of modern agricultural technology; institutional innovation ; and expansion of formal education, particularly among girls.

Here through the study recognises the fact that Punjab has in fact benefitted the most from Green Revolution, he never goes deep into the study of who benefitted the most and whether Green Revolution has contributed to the impoverisation of the rural poor in Punjab. He does not study this, nor he takes note

of numerous studies on this aspect.

They claim that they have interviewed the same person whom Mandani had interviewed in 1970, but it gives the benefit of doubt that after all why did they pick up a person from a well-to-do family (at least in Manipur). The person happened to be a retired military man and owned 11 acres of land (one does not know how many acres he owns now). Based on his statement they have generalised the whole of Punjab. There are thousands of methodological errors and they in the whole article talk about tractors, electrical machinery, chemical fertilizers and Weed Killers, (p.2) as if the each and every family owns all these new agriculture technology. Only he gives a passing reference to the fate of service castes (e.g. Black Smiths who, he admits, suffered economically by introduction of this new technology.

They conclude: "We have observed that, within 12 years, Manipur came a long way towards the reality of population control and did so through development processes other than land reform". (Nag & Kak 1985, emphasis added).

As is already discussed the study has numerous methodological errors and the demonstrable data is also not given, they have generalized as saying, "the lessons learned from these studies should be used when formulating population and development policies suitable for India".

Moni Nag et al. might have surprised the so-called "change of attitude of villagers", but are not surprised at the "attitude" of Moni Nag, a Population Council man, as he is as the policy complication of this study has got profound ideological implications - to push through population control without radical socio-economic programmes, such as land reform (as they themselves write, see p. 3).

Sheila Zabrigg in this respect observes: Children are, for the landless and minimally landed families, their only source of security - not only for parents in old age, but also for the immediate security of the family as a whole. Young children often become an economic asset to a family long before their nutritional needs represent an unmanageable burden; ... And families must hope for sons

because daughters will be 'lost' to the family after their marriage... During this period of acute unemployment, the earnings of children who had jobs in local match-making and fireworks factories (during the severe drought in mid - 1970's in Tamil Nadu) became an even more precious - and in many cases, sole-source of income for the poor. This message, to be sure, is not lost on the labouring families.

Likewise, tragic plight of the elderly, left without sons to care for them is evicent even to this day. On several occassion... (it is)... witnessed elderly poor people, with easily treatable illness, die alone and unattended in their mud homes, simply because there were no surviving children/grand-children to care them".

Ashok Mitra, has provided the most cogent, most thoroughly worked out reasons for the above factors.

"By the vast majority of households in this country a large family size is still looked upon as an asset. First as a means of acquiring more earners in the family, however marginally. Second, as a means

of sharing household chores and family enterprise from very young ages to release the adults to try for fuller employment and higher wages. Dr A.K.N. Reddy of the I.I.Sc., Bangalore, maintains that a poor household needs as many as 4.5 children to forge and collect fuel by way of brushwood, leaves and twigs and dung just to meet its very modest domestic energy needs. Third, as a means of abundant caution against loss of family members through death which can come suddenly at all ages, particularly at infancy or at young ages. On the assumption that the probability of a son being born of a pregnancy is 50 : 50 and having regard to the high prevailing infant and toddler mortality, a couple has to have a statistical minimum of 4.5 children to assure the survival of a son beyond childhood. Fourth, as a means of subsistence, help and company in old age. Fifth, as a means of emotional satisfaction in such stages of poverty. Sixth, as a benefit whose value is great but whose costs by way of maintenance, upbringing and education, are hardly perceived at all, for a child can with a little luck start earning as early as for 8. Few people at their levels of poverty,

in rural and urban areas, can afford to remain unemployed for even a whole week. As a result, population growth and the increasing size of the labour force have led to work sharing and a perpetuation of low income levels. It is difficult for a poor family, to whom an extra child is the only cheap capital asset that it can think of to perceive (a) how a smaller family is going to improve its lot, because of the limited scope for improvement, (b) how less children will lead to greater savings for itself and for the nation, because there is little scope for saving through higher earnings, (c) how fewer children can mean anything but a lessening of its strength in the struggle for existence. More children especially sons, still mean a net inflow of wealth from children to parents over life-time". (Mitra, 1977 also see Mitra 1978)

For a vast mass of people, life is a continuous and a grim struggle for existence. Under these circumstances, as D. Banerji puts it aptly: "This huge Chumu of humanity has no choice open to it, nothing to look forward to, and a surplus of fresh human stock is the only tangible capital that can be invoked. If they

agree to have only three children, who is going to guarantee that these children would not die and they would live a healthy life? Who is to guarantee that they will get a better deal from society and their living conditions will be any better than what they are". (Banerji 1974)". They have thus no stake in the survival of the system and, therefore, no stake in curbing births. ... (After all) They have little to lose if the system is blown up by a population explosion. (Banerji, 1980).

Conclusion :

Most of the studies clearly reveal that unless the government evolves an adequate plan for economic and social development, and further consciously work out an infrastructure of social amenities and opportunities or assurance for employment, earning, and social security for the people, the family planning programme would only become a weapon of aggression on poor. (Desai A.R. 1980).

But unfortunately our most of the sensitive scholars do not squarely confront the issue, viz.

whether the government wedded to planning based on capitalist mixed-economy postulates can really elaborate an infrastructure so essential for families to transfer family planning programmes as a self-generating, voluntarily adopted programme. (see A.R. Desai 1980)

The welfare state in India which is just another form of capitalist state to accommodate new demands of capital and to incorporate some concessions of working class in the fear of radical overthrow of the system is in the face of severe crisis. In order to avoid it the ruling classes more and more succumb to the pressure of international capital as well as domestic capital and reactionary feudal remnants. So the need of the hour is to wrest more and more control from the ruling bourgeoisie-landlord alliance, making each sphere of activity as a means of class struggle. So far as population problem is concerned, "to concentrate on reducing birth and child mortality rates before economic and socio-political issues are concretely addressed is to confuse and ignore most fundamental questions. (Zubrigg 1980). As it is a matter of understanding the "Problems of Population and

not the Population Problem", since the problem is not of numbers but of socio-economic and political formations which they built around themselves (Qadeer 1976).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The failure of the Family Planning Programme evidently increases along the lines predicted by Samir Amin as follows :

The world-wide birth control campaign in the developing world expresses the fears of the "developed world" in the face of the danger of a radical challenge of the international order, by the peoples who are its first victims. In the extreme case the development of the spontaneous trends of the present system would require the reduction of the population of periphery. The contemporary technical and scientific revolution within the context of this system, in fact, excludes the prospect of productive employment of the marginalized masses in the periphery. The failure of "voluntary" birth control methods must thus lead to considering much more violent methods, ultimately

coming close to genocide. (Amin 1971).

This prospect makes it imperative for the progressive forces in India to fight the neo-Malthusian ideology of population control, and to fight for a Family Planning Programme with democratic objectives and working methods. (Djurfeldt & Lindberg 1980).

Before such authoritarian tendencies are repeated as was the case during Emergency in 1975-1977, the progressive forces of the country has to work shoulder to shoulder to resist any such heinous design of the ruling classes.

Chapter Five

C O N C L U S I O N

Contrary to the big claims about the authenticity of the "eurocentric" demographic transition theory which categorizes countries based on economic progress — fertility rates, China has made breakthrough in its persuasion for low fertility rates through higher efficiency, productivity and above all equality. This is again not to undermine the positive, demonstratable aspects of demographic transition theory which in recent years has been re-interpreted many a time. (see Caldwell 1993). In the beginning of the last chapter we contended that population and development are dialectically related, and development means not the increase in GDP or per capita income but development to the higher social formations in its holistic aspects which guarantees equal, indiscriminate, unstratified and undifferentiated development of one and all in the society.

Even the most radical literature in population talks about integration of developmental programmes with population policy, as if there is a linear relationship between the two. In other words if adequate development takes place then the "rampant" population growth will "automatically" stabilize and they attribute the "population explosion" and "baby boom" to the non-integration of

such programmes so far. But as our experience shows no country has automatically achieved this. Without going to the details, this much can be said that western countries including Japanese experience cannot be and must not be imposed to all other countries as these countries have extracted the benefits, the most, from colonialism in its classical era and imperialism as it is known now.

These metropolitan "core" countries directly and indirectly exploit the peripheral "satellite" countries. As "most of the former colonies was by the time of independence well integrated into the international capitalist system. Colonial policies were aimed at maximizing the extraction of raw materials and foodstuffs required by the metropole. Thus the colonial economy was entirely geared to and dependent on the need of the colonial power. The dependency structure remains largely in tact even today." (Egosa 1980) In this way the population in these countries are exploited in many ways. If epicentric ^{circular} layers are being constructed around the metropolitan "core" capitalist countries we find more structurally dependent the countries are, more they are exploit. But there is hardly any effect on the local elites and for its own gain and class rule it collaborates with imperialism. And for cheap labour, raw materials and profit maximization the imperialist powers take the help of the local elites and after all without them

they cannot have their business in the local countries. It is the working class which ultimately is exploited. So there cannot be any real development if the present class rule continues. The solution of this problem lies in the total radical transformation of the socio-economic system and in the process to get detached from the age-old "structural dependency" on the imperialist countries as in the case of China, Cuba and many other countries and not by the linear development model as is perceived by many academicians.

It is often said that western countries do not have population problem because of the unprecedented development they have achieved. But the most important thing they fail to discuss is that the huge surplus they extract from imperial and neo-colonial countries help them to finance almost all developmental projects. The welfare measures provided to the people in the first world is at the cost of the third world. If the recent theories are true, then it is said that the huge colonial surplus from India helped in the capital formation during industrial revolution in Britain during mid-nineteenth century. So these countries afford such costly measures and projects at the cost of third world. Still the condition of the working people even in the first world should be seen vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. And above all,

they have still the problems of unemployment, poverty and as the consequence of which massive social problems arise ranging from drug-trafficking to student unrest and the crime rate is increasing in still higher proportions. As Hofsten (1980) in his article "Is there a population problem in the industrialized countries?" Comments: There is no reason to deny that there may be developed countries with a very dense population for which there would be obvious advantages if the present population growth could come to a stop soon or which would even benefit from population size smaller than the present one. So there is already a population problem in terms of environmental hazards and capitalist over-production and "its effects rest with political and economic realities and not with the growth of the population". Considering the spectacular all round success in the East European socialist countries and to a considerable extent success in Cuba, China, the obvious conclusion is that as far as population problem is considered, it is the question of socio-cultural structure that ultimate matters but not as neo-Malthusians claim, the resource-population imbalance, whether in short run or long run or not even through the so-called population-development linear equation which is supposed to induce demographic transition.

CHINA AND INDIA : A COMPARISON

We will end the present discussion with a sketchy comparison between China and India — in their all round achievements and failures.

We definitely do not agree with the contention of R.H. Casson (1978): "There is a growing literature comparing contemporary India with China, which stems in part from a desire to see how successful a revolutionary society has been in coping with many of the same problems that India faces". "Making economic comparisons of India and China has late become something of an industry, if on yet a small scale one. Its main motive does not always seem to have been the search for truth by dispassionate enquiry. Rather radical economists have tried to demonstrate the superiority of a revolutionary society; Indian nationalists sought to dispel the implications of invidious contrasts; cold warriors attempted to belittle Chinese achievements". (Richman 1975, Ushakov 1975, Joon 1975, Gittings 1976, Aird 1974, Orleans 1972, as quoted in Casson 1978)

Here we want to make it clear that we do not have any intention to be a partner in Casson's "small-scale industry", neither we are romantic about China per se. Our intention is not just to refute such "vulgar" nationalists,

let alone Subramanian Swamy answer (and admit) for himself and so also others (as is evident from his most recent articles in the "Frontline" and his forthcoming book: "A Comparative Perspective of the Economic Growth in China and India : 1870-1904). [see Swamy 1973 and 1986]

As the major focus given in the present study to hunger and poverty, this factor will be discussed first.

Jesus de Castro wrote in 1956 with remarkable foresight, "socio-economic developments since 1949 justify the belief that the new China's struggle against ^{hunger} can be victorious, that will be able to vanquish for ever the thousand year old spectre of starvation". Among these "socio-economic developments" were the restoration of peace-time conditions; the breaking of links with Imperialist powers, including the revocation of treaties and repudiation of foreign debts; agrarian reforms; and fantastic strides in public health, even the hygienic recycling of human excrement. In 1957 de Castro visited China and saw for himself that "the population showed almost none of the classic symptoms of hunger", signs he was used to encountering in the other underdeveloped countries of the world — a striking success indeed. (Dorlan 1977) In 1973 de Castro, providing an update on conditions in some important areas of the world and with the help of data demonstrated that: the

now China, whose hunger has been wiped out thanks to a socio movement respectful of the country's past and to the implementation of methods, "that involved neither miracle fertilizers nor automation"; India, symbolic of "the illusion of independence", whose the progress of intensive agriculture known as the "Green Revolution" remains suspect, despite its apparent success. (Derlan 1977, emphasis added)

In a recent article by the Economic Times Research Bureau (June 1986) titled, "Has China eliminated poverty?" which says: "..... it is a fact that China has banished hunger, disease, high birth and death rates, general illiteracy and constant fear of destitution and starvation which haunt the very poor in other developing countries".

So far as the question of poverty is concerned, it is claimed that there are still 100 to 112 million lives below poverty line, based on various estimations (see C.T.R. B. 1986, Suany 1985, World Bank 1985). This is because of the rural-urban inequality break up of which estimated at one per cent in urban area and 12 to 18 per cent in rural area, totalling to 10% to 11 per cent, as compared to 33% in India which is almost 45 per cent. The article goes on to say: "Between 1952 and 1982, China's per capita national income grew at an average annual rate of 4 per cent, while since 1979 the per capita income grew at an enviable

6.8 per cent per annum. In an attempt to improve living standards and eliminate poverty the Chinese government has set targets of quadrupling the gross value of industrial and agricultural output between 1960 and 2000, and increasing per capita income from around 300 dollars to 600 dollars (about 5 per cent per annum). Given their track record, this does not seem an impossible target. Whereas the same article says elsewhere that "the alleviation of poverty is a far cry in India".

Table 1 - Number and Percentage of People below the Poverty Line in China and India

	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>All India</u>	
1960-61	40.0	50.0	42.0 (186 m.)	Dandekar and Rath
1967-68	-	-	40.0 (247 m.)	
1972-73	54.1	41.2	51.5 (290 m.)	
1977-70	51.2	30.2	40.3 (305 m.)	Planning Commission
1983	49.4	20.2	37.4 (337 m.)	
(An estimate)	41.3	47.3	42.6 (307 m.)	L.T.R.D.
			<u>All China</u>	
1982	12 to 13	1	10 to 11 (100 to 112 m.)	

Sources: INDIA: Economic Times 1986
 CHINA: Sources quoted above.

Secondly, the economic growth which is vital for our study will be discussed. The majority of estimates put annual G.D.P. growth rates between 4 and 6 per cent for 1952-70 and somewhat lower for 1957-70 (Casson 1970). Subramanian Swamy makes the figure 2.6 per cent for 1952-70 and 1.7 per cent for 1957-70. (Swamy 1973) His work has however been seriously criticized. (Parkins 1974, Ashbrook and Nai-Ruenn Chen in US Congress 1975) But we have the 1970 figures themselves, the main basis of which is a statement of Chou En-lai in conversation with Edgar Snow — the figures are very hard to interpret. (Laloo? 1976). Swamy (1986) in a recent article admits, "Calculating the changes in G.D.P. in constant 1970-71 purchasing power parity prices, I have estimated the growth rate for the period 1952-04, in Indian prices, at 5.0 per cent per year for the Chinese economy, and 4.0 per cent per year for the Indian economy". Based on present trend C.I.A. has estimated average annual growth rate of G.D.P. as 6.6 and 5.0 per cent respectively for China and India (CIA 1986) Official data for India suggest that Indian total product grew at 3.7 per cent in 1952-70 and at 4 per cent in 1957-70.

China's total output of foodgrains (usually defined to include sweet potatoes and other staples) has fairly consistently been about double that of India, and the output per head in China has on average been about that of India.

There was not much additional acreage to be brought under the plough of China after 1949 as there was in India during the 1950s. Thus virtually all China's agricultural growth has been by productivity increases; since it began at a higher level as well it is arguable that this represents the greater achievements. (Byres and Nelson 1976)

China is today the world's largest producer of foodgrains leaving the traditional leaders like USA and the largest quantity of wheat and USSR way behind. It also produces cotton and has emerged as the world's sixth largest producer of sugar. This is remarkable achievement for a country which till recently resorted to high imports and had highest population growth rates. Now the total value of agricultural output in 1984 jumped to 361 billion Yuan, higher by 14.5 per cent over 1983. Total grain output in 1984 touched an impressive 407 million tonnes and was higher by 5.1 per cent over the 1983 level of 387 million tonnes. The overall picture is similarly encouraging except soyabean which showed a marginal fall of 0.7 per cent in 1984 over 1983. (Table 5). Similarly as is evident from the following

tables, the spectacular success in Chinese economy and regular crisis in Indian economy, speak for themselves, e.g. in 1971 China (97.6) was much less than India (102.1) and the world (90.5) so far as FAO index number of per capita food output (1974-76 = 100) is concerned but it now has taken a stupendous figure of 114.6 (China) which is much above than 101.6 (India) and world (103.5) and in fact India's condition is worsening, which is deteriorated from 102.1 in 1971 to 101.0 in 1982 (see table 2)

We have seen similar conclusion for the period of pro-sovietism though not with the same spectacle. That is because of mismanagement and miscalculation during cultural revolution and any way in a transitional phase during socialist reconstruction such type of take-off in the economy bound to take some time.

Table - 2 : FAO Index Number of Total
and Per Capita Food Output
(1974-76 = 100)

Year	Total			Per Capita		
	World	China	India	World	China	India
1971	91.3	90.1	93.2	98.5	97.6	102.1
1973	95.6	94.6	97.7	99.3	98.4	102.3
1979	110.5	116.8	108.9	103.0	110.1	100.5
1980	110.5	116.6	114.8	101.3	108.6	103.8
1981	114.0	120.3	121.6	102.7	110.6	107.8
1982	116.8	126.2	116.9	103.5	114.6	101.6

Table - 3 : FAO Index Numbers of Total
and Per Capita Agricultural Output
(1974-76 = 100)

Year	Total			Per Capita		
	World	China	India	World	China	India
1971	91.6	89.9	93.7	98.9	97.3	102.6
1973	95.9	95.0	97.9	99.6	98.8	102.4
1979	110.1	116.1	109.1	102.7	109.5	100.6
1980	110.0	116.7	114.5	100.9	108.7	103.6
1981	113.8	121.3	121.1	102.6	111.5	107.4
1982	116.2	127.5	116.8	103.0	115.8	101.6

Table - 4 : India and China
Comparison of Yields

Year	kg/HA								
	Cereals			Rice/Paddy			Wheat		
	World	China	India	World	China	India	World	China	India
1974-76	1954	2498	1179	2471	3509	1692	1684	1643	1310
1980	2158	2947	1350	2761	4143	2000	1883	1889	1436
1981	2233	3091	1403	2837	4334	1974	1890	2107	1630
1982	2307	3303	1304	2871	4607	1744	2009	2283	1686

Table -5 : China Agricultural Output

Crops	(million tonnes)					
	1982	Per cent increase over 1981	1983	Per cent increase over 1982	1984	Per cent increase over 1983
Grain	353.4	8.7	387.3	9.6	407.7	5.1
of which						
Paddy	161.2	12.0	168.9	4.8	178.1	5.4
Wheat	68.4	14.7	81.4	19.0	87.7	7.7
Soyabean	9.0	- 3.2	9.8	8.9	9.7	- 1.0
Cotton	3.6	21.3	4.6	27.8	6.0	30.4
Oil bearing crops	11.8	15.8	10.6	-10.2	11.9	12.3
Sugarcane	36.9	24.3	31.1	-15.7	39.7	27.7
Jute	1.0	-15.9	1.0	-	1.5	50.0

Source for Tables No. 2, 3, 4 & 5: Centro for Monitoring the Indian Economy/The Economic Times Research Bureau 1986/World Bank Country Economic Report on China 1985.

China's record has been superior to that of India both in its rate of increase and character ^{of industrial growth.} Progress has been uneven as is well known and was even poor in the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution periods. But if one looks back to 1950, one finds a remarkable similarity in the situations inherited by India and China at independence and liberation: indices of output per head in physical terms in coal, steel, cement, electric power, chemical fertilizers, cotton cloth and yarn and crude oil were extremely close for the two countries; but China has in the ensuing twenty-five years acquired a lead in all of them and a considerable one in most cases. (Byres and Nolan 1976).

One might add that the advances in these sectors are especially promising from the point of view of future industrial growth (Casson 1970). Nevertheless the pace of industrial growth in China is accepted as having been sustained at a level of about 3 per cent annually up to the early 1970s, with excellent long term prospects (Schreck and Chen 1975), while India's industry ... has really been struggling.

Recent data show that the industrial growth rate was 0.5 in 1979 in China, but it has taken a quantum jump to 14.0 in 1984 despite depression in this respect observed in 1981. (Gulo 1986) As compared to the above, India's growth

rate during Sixth Plan was 5.5 per cent, shockingly even less than trend growth rate of 6 per cent witnessed in the earlier three decades.

Whereas based on present trend, it is estimated that the growth will be as high as 10.0 per cent in 1985 for China but the target fixed for Seventh Plan is 0 per cent for India. Even this meagre target, it is sure, can not be achieved as the growth rate fixed for Sixth Plan was 7 per cent but achieved growth rate was 5.5 per cent which is even lower by 0.5 per cent as was in previous Plans. (GPI, Planning Commission, Seventh Plan 1985).

Table 6 - China : Index of Industrial Production
(1980 = 100)

Year	Index	Growth rate (% ago)
1970	84.7	-
1975	91.9	8.5
1980	100.0	8.0
1981	104.1	4.1
1982	112.1	7.7
1983	123.9	10.5
1984	141.2	14.0
1985 (estimated)	160.6	10.0

Source: World Bank: Country Economic Report on China
1985.

Before going for an analysis of China's success in family planning programmes and achievements in health and fertility related indices, let us have a look at comparative analysis of overall economic performance up date and expected to achieve by 2000 A.D. of India and China. (Table 7)

Table 7 - India & China : Now and by 2000

		<u>Now</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>India</u>
In 1983	{ Population (million)		1019	733
	{ Area (000 sq.km.)		9561	3200
	{ GNP per capita (US \$)		300	260
Average Annual Growth rate (per cent) (1973-83)	{ GNP per capita (1965-83)		4.4	1.5
	{ Inflation		1.7	7.7
	{ Agriculture		3.5	2.2
	{ Industry		8.4	4.3
	{ Services		4.5	6.1
	{ Energy Production		5.7	7.7
	{ Energy Consumption		5.4	6.6
	{ Exports		27.7	4.9
	{ Imports		30.9	2.8
	In 1984	{ Exports (US \$ million)		24,091
{ Imports (US \$ million)			25,950	14,652
{ Current Account Balance 1983 (US \$ million)			4,460	- 2,700
Total reserves minus gold (SDRs million)				
	i) 1970		1,195	4,630
	ii) 1984		15,503	5,950
	iii) 1985 (June)		11,605	6,200

		<u>China</u>	<u>India</u>
		<u>By 2000</u>	
	Population (million)	1242	994
Average Annual Growth Rate 1980 = 2000	{ Population	1.2	1.0
	{ Labour force	1.8	2.1
	{ G.D.P.	6.6	5.0
	{ Industrial Output	7.0	8.0
Energy Require- ments	{ Electricity	960-1290 (TWh)	424-465 (b. kWh)
	{ Coal (million tonnes)	1400	100
	{ Oil (million tonnes)	200	73
Exports	{ Total exports (US \$ billion)	103	46
	{ Exports of manufacturers "	70	32

Source: The Economic Times, Mid-Year Review, 15 Jan 1986

Another point is significant in this context is regional disparity. China in 1949 was as riddled with social and economic problems as India. Its cities had similar extremes of wealth and equality and its countryside of destitution and oppression. (Gordon 1970).

The need to maximize agricultural production has led China in initial year of liberation to the highest rates of agricultural growth being maintained in areas of highest productivity. While marketing and price policies redistribute food output the regional distribution of production is changing only slowly. (Dyres and Nolan 1976) The development of small scale rural industry is thought to have been fairly effective in recent years in China — certainly more so than the often ill-judged initiatives of the Great Leap — but this has had more effect on the balance within regions than between them. There has also been considerable stimulation of small town development to countervail the big urban centres. Wage differentials between rural and urban occupations have been narrowing (since the 1960s at least, they were widening in 1950s). (Gossan 1970) In general China has controlled the rural urban divide; it has done a great deal to improve the economic situation of rural life by spreading health and education and social facilities, but also by encouraging rural incomes to rise while restraining growth of urban incomes (Dyres and Nolan 1976). Additionally many of the poorest in rural area are among the first to introduce the production responsibility system and have benefited from rapid growth in crop production. Poor areas of eastern and southern China have become richer by switching to crops

like cotton rather than sticking to foodgrains which was unsuitable under their existing agro-climatic conditions. (E.T.R.O. 1966)

But in India due to capitalist mode of production which by its very nature creates clustering of industrial development makes enclaves of urban units and industrial units and these "enclaves" known as advanced sectors.

The modernity of the advanced sector is centered on industry, urban services or the production of export commodities in large scale units. The backward sector consists of peasant agriculture with a large subsistence component, a low level of technological development, under-utilization of labour and an archaic social organisation (as defined by Arthur Lewis 1954). These two sectors are interdependent and there is a dialectical unity between them (Kohli 1985) and these sectors are definitely not autonomous having dualist character as contended by the whole school of underdevelopment after Frank (1969), Wallerstein (1974) and many others. In fact, it is argued that servile exploitation was accentuated and consolidated by the very tendency of the enterprising modern sector to maximize profits. This means that the modernity of the advanced sector is the function of the backwardness of the

other. (Lacina 1971). It is in this sense that development generates underdevelopment. (Kotkin 1985)

So the disparity has gradually increased day by day. The percentage living below the poverty line in rural areas is 50.02 whereas in urban areas 35.19 as compared to 40.13 for all India. Similarly there is wide disparity in between various states. The percentage of poverty line for Orissa and Tripura is as high as 66.40 and 59.73 respectively whereas it is only 4.11 for Nagaland and 15.13 for Punjab. Similar is the case in other variables and indices. (GOI 1985)

CHINA'S REMARKABLE SUCCESS IN FAMILY PLANNING

According to official data, the rate of natural increase of population fell from 27 per 1000 in the second half of the 1960s to 13 in the late seventies. (Penkner 1985) The latest data of World Bank estimates the rate of natural increase of population in 1965 was 26 and in 1983 was 8.

As in the very beginning we contended that, contrary to the "eurocentric" demographic transition theory China has made remarkable success in respect of declining total fertility rate. As Penkner (1985) has commented, "what makes China's achievement in this respect unique is that, unlike in the present day low-fertility countries, a significant fall in birth rate came before it crossed a threshold

level of socio-economic development, as reflected in a high level of industrialization and urbanization, change in the occupational structure and rise in per capita income and living standards. At the beginning of the eighties 69 per cent of China's labour force was engaged in agriculture and allied activities; more than three-fourths of its population lived in rural areas; and the GNP per capita was only 310 dollars."

Here, in this concluding part, we are going to discuss the above achievements more closely.

In recent times, there is a burgeoning literature on China's achievements in family planning. Most of them deal with various fertility-related developments in China and try to compare it with India or any other developing countries, the policy implication of which will be to follow the 'Chinese model' of implementing the birth control policies.

But the most important thing they happily miss (deliberately or otherwise) is to put the question squarely. That is to ask: Are the developing countries prone to socio-economic structures conducive to such change? The studies only talk about China's achievements in some fields of economy or polity and try to relate these variables with

Demographic Transition Theory (DTT), sometimes they succeed and most of time they fail. These studies suffer from the ahistorical nature of their analysis. As in the first chapter, we have seen, that ahistorical studies not only unscientific but also its call for "pseudo-objectivity" and "value-free" social science only perpetuates statusquo. Because after studying the developmental achievements in China, they recommend for those changes without a change in structure of the present system in most of the developing countries. We will give a comparative quality of life (which are demographically significant) in India and China in

Table - 8

	China	India	Year
1. Per capita income (dollars)	300	200	1993
2. Life expectancy (years)	67	55	1993
3. Infant mortality (per 1000)	30	93	1993
4. Birth rate (per 1000)	19	34	1993
5. Death rate (per 1000)	7	13	1993
6. Population per physician	1,740	3,000	1993
7. Calories (per day)	2,562	2,047	1992
8. As percentage of requirement	93	109	1992
9. Literacy (%)	56	34	1993
10. School enrolment (%)			
i) Primary	100	79	1993
ii) Secondary	35	30	1993
iii) Higher	1	0	1993

Sources: i) World Development Report (1995)
 ii) Guany, S. (1985)

There is a vivid account in the works of Demerath (1976), Casson (1970) and many others regarding the achievements in China. These writers have suggested to apply Chinese "societal model" in the context of India. (Demerath 1976). But Casson goes far in saying: "For China's achievements are mainly a product of its revolution. If such a revolution is unthinkable in India, the value of looking at its results becomes uncertain". The ideological underpinnings of writers like Casson is quite explicit.

In this stage there is no point on harping giving individual attentions to many variables that affects fertility rates of a country but to see whether these variables can be achieved by formulating 'models' for each of the variables (as the neoclassical economists claim) or by changing the economic base of the society on which social, legal, political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. As Marx has pointed out in 'A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy': "(The) relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of (the) material powers of production. The set of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of the society — the real foundation on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness

correspond The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life With the change on the economic base the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed".

As the population policy planners these days talk about implementing 'chinese model' for the solution of the population problems of the "developing" world. But they should know that it is not the question of their neo-classical models but the question of the different "social systems" altogether.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Sociology^o instead of acting as the "social critician" of the present unjust social order, works for the perpetuation of status quo. (Dottomaro 1975) As Hamolink points to the empirical school and administrative school as "repressive science" because he says its "basic aim is control over reality" and to the critical school as "emancipatory science" in that its "basic aim is liberating the potential reality" so as to facilitate "a creative co-learning process in the generation of new realities". (Rogoro 1982, emphasis added)

^oHere the term 'sociology' is used broadly to refer to "empirical", "administrative", schools of Chicago and Harvard which is otherwise known as "American Academic Sociology".

The present work owes much to the "critical school" of sociology with a broad neo-Marxist framework, which never bifurcates itself from the theory and practice. So if our arguments "have any validity, they must be capable of translation into political strategy". (Gough 1983, see also Mishra 1984) This is not to say as some radicals believe that "nothing can be changed until the revolution takes place". (like that of Carpenter, Figlio, Ehrenreich) Because this abusive interpretation belongs to the realm of sectarian polemics rather than rigorous debate. To understand the great importance of state power in reproducing social power relations does not mean that all revolutionary activities should focus on the state or that all meaningful changes need to be postponed until the day of revolution. A limited understanding of what capitalism, socialism and communism are and a limited awareness of the problems of transition between the modes of production and forms of social relationships (in each and every institution) lead to the easy stereotyping of Marxist positions prevalent among radicals. (Navarro 1983)

The state cannot be viewed as a monolith, since each institution and initiative must be understood in terms of the class struggle going around it. We would argue that when

struggles — even though the form and content of this involvement will be different in different cases. Consequently we see these state apparatuses as constructed directly under the influence of class struggle and not simply by the ruling class. (Corrigan 1981, see also Poulantzas 1980) Reformulation of the pre-conditions for socialism as that which Waller (1971) presents: "The criticism and alteration of the "superstructure" have a new and decisive importance for the movements of liberation It would be necessary to include socialist democracy, socialist justice, socialist ethics and a 'socialist consciousness' among the components of a socialist society to be 'incubated' within the womb of a capitalist order."

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