

TERRITORIALITY IN EUROPE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
DECLARATION


I declare that the Dissertation entitled "*Territoriality in Europe: A Critical Analysis*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Greece will push the French banks down the chute first; but German banks won't avoid it, and together will finish Italy off. With luck, Italy will suck Spain into the abyss; Portugal will follow Spain, and Ireland Portugal . . . Then continental banks lock their doors and the cash machine dry up. Minestrone kitchens appear on the streets of Rome. . . .When Greece defaults and defects without warning in April 2012, a Committee of European Salvation meets in Luxemburg and suspends all treaties.

- Norman Davies (2011)

The peace Treaties of Westphalia and Osnabruck (1648) established the legal basis of modern statehood (Ray, 1998) and by implication the fundamental rules or constitution of modern world politics. At the heart of the Westphalian settlement was agreement among Europe's rulers to recognize each other's right to rule their own territories free from outside interference. This was codified over time in the doctrine of sovereign statehood (Baylis, 2011).

In codifying and legitimating the principle of sovereign statehood, the westphalian constitution gave birth to the modern state system. It welded the idea of territoriality with the notion of legitimate sovereign rule. Westphalian sovereignty located supreme legal and political authority within territorially delimited states. Sovereignty involved the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified and supreme rule within a delimited territory (Baylis, 2011).

The treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 formally recognized state system in international politics. By Westphalia treaty of 1648, a system of rules establishing the rights and duties of states was signed. It established the 'territorial state' as the basis of the modern state system and emphasized international boundaries as legal territorial boundaries between one country and the other and asserting their sovereignty as well (Okhonmina, 2010).

The dream of the unification of Europe goes back at least to the fifteenth century, but it is the nastiness of the world wars in the twentieth century that established its urgent need in our time. The challenge was well described by W.H.Auden in early 1939: *In the nightmare of the*

dark, / All the dogs of Europe bark, / And the living nations wait, / Each sequestered in its hate (Guardian, 2012).

It is important to appreciate that the movement for European unification began as a crusade for cross-border amity and political unity, combined with freer movement of people and goods. Giving priority to financial unification, with a common currency, came much later and it has, to some extent, started to derail the original aspiration of European unity (Guardian, 2012).

The signing of the Treaty of Paris in April 1951 by the governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands began the process commonly referred to as European integration. This process has meant that the economies of participating states, and subsequently other areas, have been increasingly managed in common. Decisions previously taken by national governments alone are now taken together with other governments, and specially created European institutions.

Governments have relinquished the sole right to make legislation (national sovereignty) over a range of matters, in favour of joint decision making with other governments (pooled sovereignty). Other tasks have been delegated to European institutions. It was something of a surprise to academic theorists of International Relations when governments in Western Europe began to surrender their national sovereignty in some policy areas (Bomberg et al., 2008).

For the first half of the twentieth century, the nation state seemed assured of its place as the most important unit of political life in the western world, especially in Europe. As such, the process of European integration constituted a major challenge to existing theories and generated an academic debate about the role of the state territoriality in the process.

One of the most evident and academically-reviewed examples of modern political integration has materialized within the European continent over the past six decades. Afflicted by war and disagreement, conflict during the First and Second World Wars and into the Cold War era and even since the end of the Cold War, European nations endeavoured to prevent further international conflict on the continent. Subsequent to the failures of the League of Nations to rule out the certainty of World War II, leaders within Europe understood that the only way to ensure a permanent peace was to promote unbreakable and resilient economic relationships and ensure and secure unity in political purpose between European nations (Hellwig et.al.2011).

Starting with six nations participating in the European Coal and Steel Community's (1951) internal, tariff-free product marketplaces with an overarching governing body funded by the member-states, the process of European political integration has broadened its scope to encompass a functioning, treaty-bound supranational policy-making Parliament and a "President

of Europe” representing twenty-seven tax-paying member-state constituencies(Hellwig et.al.2011).

As Europe enters a new decade, what will become of the Europe’s prospects for further political integration? Is a drive towards a “federal Europe”—similar in structures of federalism to the United States of America—likely to occur? Are forces within Europe likely to encourage an extension—or demand a contraction—of European Union power and influence?

Austerity is undermining Europe’s grand vision. Economic policy is triggering disaffection among countries- the very thing the pioneers of unity hoped to erase.

-Amartya sen, Nobel Prize -winning economist.

The entire Europe is undergoing economic crisis, which is affecting the entire process of European territorial integration. ‘If the Euro fails, then not only the currency fails...Europe will fail, and, with it, idea of European Unity’ (Spiegel Online, 2010). With this strong comments the German Chancellor Angela Merkel radically described what she considered was at risk in what for the time being seems to be a long-lasting crisis not only of the Euro, but of the entire process of European integration itself. This statement was made as the European Union was dealing with the Greek sovereign debt crisis in May 2010 and repeated in September 2011(Financial Times, 2011).

According to the long time German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the current situation Europe is undergoing may well be regarded as crisis- the most serious in its history (Spiegel online, 2011), if a crisis is explained as a ‘situation that has reached an extremely difficult or dangerous point; a time of great disagreement, uncertainty or suffering’(Cambridge English Dictionary).

However, the Supranational Europe has demonstrated to be an exceptional strong and crisis-resikstant organization. It withstood the collapse of the European Defence Community project in 1954, France’s rejection of two British bids for accession in the 1960s, the empty-chair crisis precipitated by De Gaulle in 1965, the crisis concerning the UK’s contribution to the EU budget in the first half of the 1980s, the semi-destruction of the European Monetary System in 1992-93, and the defeat of several proposed new treaties in referenda in Denmark, Ireland, France and the Netherlands since the end of the Cold War (Webber, 2011). One who looks back at the integration process’s successfully absorption and recovering from every crisis would likely

agree with the European Union's founding father Jean Monnet's prediction that 'Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for these crises (Barber, 2010).

There was no empirical evidence of the European disintegration, when the crisis in 2011 seemed very serious or the integration process started to spool back. Still not a single member states left the European Union, on the contrary there are states waiting in queue to get into the integration process. There had still not been any perceptible formal or actual decrease in the European Union's decision making capacities. Instead of less integration, the euro crisis led to more economic policy integration. Thus the present situation generated no disintegrative outcome than the ones which are faced by the institution.

Although the reality that the European Union has successfully withstood all the earlier crises, does not ensure that it will again act equally competent to avert the present economic crisis, especially when the present one is more grave and crucial than the previous ones: 'there are moments in history when just because things were the same way in the past doesn't mean they will be that way in the future' (quoted in, Obama, New York Times, 2011). History reveals that the many counterparts of European Union could not resist and withstand and thus collapsed, it should not simply be presumed that Europe will challenge the fate experienced by the demised regional organizations.

Those theories which are 'pro-integration' tends to ignore the extent to which integration was made easy first by promising domestic political circumstances that is completely absent in many member states of the 21st century and second Germany's pro-integrationist policies, which now you cannot presumed to continue in the European integration process.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE STUDY :

In the discipline of political geography, territoriality refers to a form of behaviour that uses bounded space to control activities (Taylor, 1994). Territoriality is not specific to states; it is a common strategy to many individuals and groups, an "indispensable means to power at all levels: from the personal to the international (Sack, 1986). But among the many uses of territoriality, the modern state system has been the most comprehensive (Taylor, 1994).

In political theory definitions of the state have two aspects. One involves the exercise of power through a set of central political institutions. The other entails the clear spatial demarcation of the territory within which the state exercises its power. The former has been the uppermost in discussions of state society relations and the relative autonomy of the state in relation to other putative causes of social life. In international relations theory, however, the

second aspect has been crucial. It has been the geographical division of the world into mutually exclusive territorial states that has served to define the field of the study (Agnew, 1994).

Territory is so frequently a source of conflict because the state is fundamentally a place; its very existence and autonomy are rooted in territory (Mann, 1984). Territory provides a tangible basis for the exercise of state power by delimiting the human and physical resources over which the state has some control. Succinctly put, territory is at the heart of national identity and cohesion (Johnston et al., 1988). By extension, it is of supreme importance to the state (Anderson, 1986).

Yet the rise of the modern national state in the late eighteenth century also represented the triumph of the idea of national sovereignty. Completely national sovereignty implied a lack of restrictions on state action-even on the waging of war (Friedman et al., 1969). In an article examining the autonomous power of the modern state, Mann (1984), argues that the “territoriality of the state has created social forces with a life of their own.” One of these forces is state ideology of a people’s right to territory that is analogous to individual property rights within the western legal tradition. Under property law concepts, a property that once belonged to an individual cannot be taken away against that individual’s will and if it is taken away, the individual is entitled to restriction, either through return of the property or through compensation.

By extension of this line of logic, which is deeply embedded in the intellectually tradition out of which international law arose, if territory was controlled by a state at any time but that control was subsequently and involuntarily lost, an argument can be made that the state is entitled to restriction.

Modern political theories tend to understand geography entirely as territorial: the world is divided up into contiguous spatial units with the territorial state as the basic building block from which other territorial units derive or develop (Agnew, 1994). The state is an autonomous subject of international politics is the assumption that political authority is invariably exercised territoriality. The success of state sovereignty as an organizing principle of politics has much to do with its territorial underpinnings.

The modern concept of state is more rigid, involving several basic characteristics which Glassner and de Blij (1980) have identified as land territory, permanent resident population, state government and organized economy, circulation system, sovereignty and recognition. Political borders around the world and the number of states as well as the functions attributed to states and its governments have varied a lot in recent history. In Europe after the collapse in 1989 of the international order established by the cold war we observed four phenomena. First several

countries disintegrated (for e.g. USSR and Czechoslovakia), second, other countries delegated more power to local governments in response to an increasing demand for regional autonomy (for e.g. the UK and Italy), third, the European integration process enlarged its scope, because the European countries chose to give up sovereignty on prerogatives such as monetary policy historically held by national states (Alesina et al., 2001).

The territorial state as it is known to contemporary political theory developed initially in early modern Europe with the retreat of non-territorial dynastic systems of rule and the transfer of sovereignty from the personhood of monarch to discrete national populations. That modern state sovereignty didn't occur overnight or completely following the peace of Westphalia in 1648 is now well established.

The elevation of the territorial sovereignty of independent states to a position of primacy in international law can be traced back to the peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern system was developed (Shaw, 1986). Prior to this the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Westphalia instituted the legal concept of sovereignty which essentially meant that rulers or the legitimate rulers or the legitimate sovereign had to internal equals within a defined territory and no external superior as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign border.

The period leading up to the thirty years war marked the decline of a European political order based on the church, an intensification of international contacts and trade and rise in the power of secular authorities. Consequently, a body of ideas about international practices that began to take the shape in the first half of the seventeenth century became the basis for modern international law. These ideas were grounded in prior religious and philosophical tenets, of course, but their applications to juristically sovereign territorial states in Europe brought into being a set of legal principles that with the spread of the European state idea around the world, was to have global significance for the emerging international system of state.

Modern states are combining two principles that were originally separated: territoriality and sovereignty (Taylor and Flint, 2000). The first refers to the control of territories as a division of political power and second to the final and absolute authority in a political community. Typical for the territoriality of modern state is the reification of the state as a fixed unit of sovereign space, the polarity between domestic and foreign affairs and the conception of the state as a container of society (Agnew, 1994).

Taylor (1994) classifies the territoriality of the state by presenting it as a container of several relations. He distinguishes four basic tasks for the state container. The exercise of

military power (states as power container), the management of the economy (states as wealth container), the construction and maintenance of national identities (states as cultural container) and the provision of a welfare state (state as a social container). In addition, he underlines the crucial fact that states are plural. For the purpose he uses the term “territoriality” (Taylor, 1995). Spatial exclusiveness is the key characteristics of the state system. States are conceived as discrete entities, shown in different colours on world political maps.

Recent decades have seen witnessed several major geopolitical changes, including the breakdown of the bipolar geopolitical order, growing neo-liberalism and economic globalization , the European integration process and the emerging free trade areas around the world. The new kinds of political spaces and communities emerging in all continents would have been unthinkable some decades ago. States may have been the prime container of power, wealth and culture in the modern world order, but it is clear that these container have begun to leak in various ways. (Taylor, 1994).

It is being said that Europe has travelled much ahead and has overcome all the “territorial past” where all the boundaries between the states are claimed to be disappearing, as all the state territory is merging in the container of supranational structure. Where all the states have pooled their power and sovereignty into it. European integration and the expansion of the European Union since the 1950s have clearly been the most significant developments influencing European boundaries and borderlands.

European unification of different states with regard to transnationalism raises the question of territoriality with regard to participation and citizenship. First of all, transnational organisation creates a space for political participation that goes beyond national territories. They re-map a political community that is Europe, although transnational and therefore de-territorialized and or/re-territorialized. From this perspective, territory becomes a broader, unbounded space where nation-states and supranational institutions interact and where transnational networks build bridges between national societies and Europe (Kastoryana, 2005).

Indeed the territoriality of the state is increasingly challenged by transnational interactions. The present development, in the present state of globalisation, is characterised as “unbundling territoriality”. According to Taylor, the state remains the most important power and social container. The system of European integration alters territoriality in the member states; many pro-integration theorists argued that they do not fit the modern state model any longer. But does it reproduce state territoriality at a higher scale by integrating former states into a global

super state? European integration is generally presented as the most elaborated institutional form of integration ever achieved between democratic states.

Ernst B. Hass speculated on the concept of European integration as a model for wider regional integration, even for the formation of a universal community (Huglin, 1983). His conclusions were somewhat sceptical because he thought that the historical, political and cultural preconditions that permitted integration in Europe were probably unique and could not be reproduced in other contexts. However, he didn't seem to have any serious doubts as to the stability and further progress of integration in Europe itself (Hass. 1961).

Fifteen years later, Hass (1976) found that the theoretical effort of conceptualizing European integration as a process of regional cooperation "leading to ...some new order for the region which takes its own institutional form" and was becoming obsolete because the overall logic of a deliberate movement towards further integration was bound to fail under the turbulent spell of a novel degree of complexity and interdependence and a general lack of a faith in economic growth. Under such conditions, Hass concluded, "interdependence and integration cease to co-vary" and institutional tidiness is best forgotten."

In the meantime, even the most fervent advocates of European unification have been sceptical about the prospects of integration. Under such pressures as slowed growth, inflation, unemployment and monetary crisis, it is feared that even the past achievements of the European community may be endangered by a fall back to neo-national protectionism (Kohnstamm, 1981).

One conception of a singular European identity would set it constructed through a process analogous to that involved in the creation of territorial identities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whereas in the past the aim was to create those national identities, the project now would be to ascend them. Whereas the previously the "imagined community"(Anderson, 1982) was national in the new imagination it is to be European in its extent.

There is no doubt that for many people, there is now a much greater degree of awareness of the culture and lifestyle of other people elsewhere in Europe, a result of changes in consumption patterns, increased foreign travels on holidays and the images projected via the mass media. Such shared activity and communication spaces do not necessarily translate into a shared European consciousness, however, especially as the media typically present European issues through national lenses.

There are evident pressures from national states and their citizens to resist any further erosion of national identities as well as sovereignty not least those revealed in the division of the

Europe into European Union, then into Euro zone and non Euro zone. Indeed the electoral success of extreme right wing political parties in countries such as Austria and France for e.g. is suggestive of the territorial resurgence of more insidious and xenophobic nationalism (Hudson, 2000).

The issue of territorial identity has recently gained cultural and political significance. The demise of communism in the Eastern Europe, the German unification in Central Europe, and the Maastricht treaty in Western Europe are said to have awakened nationalistic sentiments and movements and processes of cultural, economic and political internationalization and globalisation are assumed to have caused not only increasing insecurity about national identity but also a loosening of the bond between collective and personal identity in Europe.

The further unification of Europe is regarded by many Europeans as a threat to the survival of national cultures and identities. They fear that the disappearance of the international borders between the European states may ultimately result in a loss of variety in national cultures and of distinct national identities. Further unification may cause problem of national identification (Arts and Holman, 2005). Survey research on the reasons why people voted 'no' in the referenda on the draft European constitution in the summer of 2005 shows that only a quarter of them opposed the European constitution because it threatened their national territorial identity.

Most of the opponents in Western Europe fretted about unemployment and other bread and butter questions. They worried about the shifting of factories and jobs to the low wage economies of Central Europe and workers from Central Europe entering Western labour markets. That public opinion emphasizes economic issues is understandable because for the past decade and more, the signatories' projects of Europe have been economic ones, in particular, the launch of single market in 1992 and a single currency in 1999. There is still a long way to go to a United States of Europe.

The citizens of the European countries have rarely had any involvement in the major political decisions made in their name. Negotiations leading up to the six major treaties saw public opinion play only a marginal role at best(McCormick, 1999). The institution of Europe is frequently accused of a lack of accountability. However according to the Maastricht treaty signed in 1992, one of the goals of European territorial integration is to create "an ever closer unification among the people of Europe, in which decision are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The treaty goes on to establish the framework of European citizenship. Every person holding the nationality of the member state shall be a citizen of the supranational European territorial state.

In 2001, the European commission issued a white paper on European governance, which stressed the reinforcement of “European identity and the importance of shared values within the unified Europe. Thus the signatories of Maastricht treaty and subsequent institutional actions have established the basis for future integration around reducing the ‘democratic deficit’ within the union and extending the notion of a European citizenship. Surveys of European public opinion reveal very little evidence of any European identity or sense of European citizenship. Europeans still appear attached to their national identity and territory (Carey, 2002).

European states are undergoing rapid and fundamental changes in response to social political and economic events that are occurring both within and outside the region. These changes are far reaching in scope and ultimately are expected to result in a redefinition of Europe and what it means to be European. These changes are rooted in unfavourable economic growth trends in combination with high rates of unemployment and under-unemployment (World Bank, 2003), the collapse of the former soviet union in December 1991 and with it the sudden emergence of a large number of ‘new many poor and politically unstable’ European states (UN/ECE, 2001), added to the regions development challenges is accelerated migration into the region from ‘developing Europe’.

The response of the region’s leaders to the demands confronting them have been dramatic, a) the creation of an economic union of 15 of the region’s most robust economies (Gillingham, 2003), b) a plan to enlarge the enlarge European Union to 25 member states by the end of 2004 to include the most economically advanced of the newly independent states of the Eastern and Central Europe (Curzon et al, 1999), the adoption of the ‘euro’ as a single financial currency for the both current and new members of the European Union (Delson, 2001), trade liberalisation and in response to the especially profound economic challenges confronting several of the region’s largest economies, primarily Germany and France, a possible ‘temporary softening’ of the fiscal stability rules agreed to by all the members of European union as a condition of their accession to membership(UN/ECE, 2001).

The dramatic social, political and economic changes occurring in Europe today are likely to challenge all of the region’s long held assumptions. Chronically slow rates of economic growth, moderate inflation levels, high unemployment, declining export opportunities are placing enormous strains on the fiscal and political capacity of many of the region’s countries. Large scale migration into the region of persons from developing countries is changing fundamentally the ‘European fabric’.

Further, the political map of Europe itself has been changed by the sudden emergence of some 26 ‘new’ European states since 1991- the majority of which are considerably poorer than other parts of Europe and have had little as no recent experience in operating free market economics as democratic political systems (Estes, 2004).

Over the past decade, the process of European territorial integration has witnessed a dual trend: a downward spiral in public support for the integration project and a concomitant increase in opportunities for the public to express the concerns. We need only look at the recent popular rejections of the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands to see powerful role that public opinion can play in constraining the integration process. Moreover most European member states and the especially the six founding members have recently witnessed a significant drop in public support for European territorial integration (De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007).

Eichenburg and Dalton (2001) refer to this decline in popular support as the “Post-Maastricht Blues”, since the downturn occurred after the finalizing of the Maastricht treaty in December 1991. All in all, the ‘permissive consensus’ characterizing European politics in the 1970s and 1980s seem to have given way to what some scholars suggest is a constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Against this backdrop of rising conflict and salience over Europe, the interaction between citizen and elite attitudes becomes even more important for the future of European integration. We revisit the important debate on elite mass linkages by examining the way in which political contexts shape citizens’ attitude to Europe. Specifically, the focus on the role of political elites on both the extreme right and left of the political spectrum in mobilizing euro scepticism (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004).

Within Western European party systems, ‘Europhobia’ still constitutes the norms. Party politics in the EU-15 is characterised by a distinct pro-integration core of social democrats, liberals and Christian democrats that are ideologically inclined to endorse further steps of integration both economically and politically (Crum, 2007). So far Euro scepticism constitutes something of a touchstone of dissent (Taggart 1998). Strong opposition towards the integration process is often only found in the fringes of the left-right spectrum- the anti-European Union position of the British. Conservatives being the notable exception (Hooghe et al, 2002).

Although euro sceptic parties may be extreme in terms of their left/right positions, we demonstrate that these parties are a decisive force in swaying public opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European Integration among the mass public.

European territorial integration is increasingly coming under fire from both the right and the left. Many are quick to dismiss the gravity of this party based euro scepticism since, to date, it is a phenomenon largely relegated to the extremes of the political spectrum. It is suggested that this is unwise. Although Euro sceptic parties may be outliers in terms of their left/right position, it's been argued and demonstrated that these parties are a decisive force in swaying popular opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European integration among the mass public.

RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The European integration process is not easy to understand. As on one side it talks about the supranational and on the other side the on-going territorial demand on the space of Europe union particularly and on European continent generally, is on surge. The institution seems remote from the member state, its actions are complex and its policies on the supranational and state level is perplexing. To categorize Europe is not as simple as its attributes reflects in the form of a state as well as an international organizations, yet it does not representing either.

Its development is shaped and designed by increasing number of players who pose a challenging question about the existence of Europe, where it actually starts , where it ends , who defines what Europe is and what it does? What is the actual territorial limit of Europe? Who possess it? Whose control is exercised on the territory? From a free trade in coal and steel, its policy remit has expanded to cover monetary, regional, environmental, immigration, security and the list is endless.

The expansion of Europe as a supranational institution is posing a larger question about the sovereignty, territory, territoriality, democracy and the future of the nation-state. Studying and analysing European Unification means a lot more than a single institution of European supranational institution. Above that the nature and tendency of European unification is never stable, it never seems to be static in nature, on the contrary, the institution is always in motion, continuously emerging and expanding. Simultaneously the serious challenge coming under the carpet layer of Europeanization where many patches of territory are joined to form the supranational institution, but the patches in the form of territory seems fraying.

International students are interested in the European integration not just because of its practical relevance but because of its relevance as it manifests a most advanced form of political integration and multilateral cooperation in the form of supranational, where all the member states

transfer their territory, territoriality, nation-states' political activities, loyalties towards an overarching institution of supranational.

Thus understanding the European Unification will solve many questions about the future prospective of the territory, nation-state, and international organisation, supranational in particular, the effect of globalization and the role of the governments. Its dynamic character, complexity and expansion of territorial claims and territoriality also encourage studying it.

European territorial integration represents a political puzzle , as on one hand the different member states and governments have transformed from a mere comfortable group of economic group of six states to astonishingly twenty seven , forming world's largest trading block, accounting for 20% of global trade, having its own currency "euro" and a common foreign policy. Many more is waiting at the door of the European union with an admission form. Yet what often seems like a growing number of citizens express disillusionment within the European union. The continuous conflict for claiming territory in the form of gaining right wing populist, economic crisis forcing Germans and French and all the big states for asking their own economic territory. "Why do we pay our taxes for saving the PIIGS economy from sinking?" these countries are in the middle of Europe and so their collapse will inevitably mean the end of the euro as a single currency. This is turn will severely impair the political and economic clout of Europe in world affairs.

The European Integration has undergone continuous widening and deepening. The widening of its membership has been astonishing from a comfortable club of six members to twenty seven with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, including turkey knocking on the door. The challenges are immense in the form of institutional, economic, political, social, ethnicity, linguistically posing before the supranational institution of Europe.

The integration of the European states has deepened more with the member states have decided to pool their sovereignty in the sensitive area of justice of home-affairs. Where on the one hand European union is trying to represent itself before the international arena as leading representative in the area of climate change, foreign policy etc. Its capacity in the form of political and practical ability is continuously being challenged by the revolt among the regions, protest by the "Europeans" to have their own territory and shaking of economic pillars which are supporting the roof of the building of the supranational Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The role of emerging territoriality and territory have posed as a major challenge to the theories of European integration – the process whereby sovereign European states, relinquish (surrender or pool) national sovereignty to maximize their collective power and interests. Sustainable economic growth, employment and social and ecological development are the key objectives of European integration. But radicalization of the population manifesting in the form of, gaining popularity of the right wing populist across the European continent, emerging turmoil in European economies which is capable of shaking the legs of European table, escalating claims of separatist demanding for their own territory are posing serious question marks over the supranational institution of Europe.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

State territoriality is acknowledged in political geography as a very characteristic type of territoriality. Understanding the supranational Europe requires an assessment of the way integration alters state territoriality. If territoriality in the Europe reproduces the characteristics of state territoriality, it can be regarded as a state like entity. But if it produces a new kind of territoriality, it should be acknowledged as a new form of governance. Therefore this work scrutinise the territoriality of the Europe to assess whether it is different from the territoriality of modern states?

- Has the notion of territory, territoriality and sovereignty of the member states eroded with the conception of the supranational structure of the Europe?
- Is it just a paradox in the context of Europe, being a supranational and asserting sub-nationality, identity, territory and sovereignty within it?
- Are territories and territoriality merging in the container of supranational structure or there is a leakage in the container?
- Where the structure of the supranational Europe does stands in the era of globalization and resurgence of territory and territoriality?
- Why the supranational structure of Europe is unpopular among the “European citizens” even after European territorial integration is seen as the modern example of international organisation and cooperation?

HYPOTHESIS

With the growing resentment among the common “Europeans”, which is manifested in the form of protests, violence, bombing because of territorial sharing of sovereignty, territoriality, employment, race, ethnicity, taxation, language indicating the differences in the density of bonding among the member states , which is thinner at the grass root level and intentionally shown thicker at the supranational level. Expansion at the lower level and contraction at the upper level, result into the differences in the density, which would lead to the collapse of supranationality of Europe.

With the economic debt crisis is hovering the entire Europe and the big countries like **Germany and France** are predicting to the collapse of the Euro zone, because of the PIIGS economy crisis, the political structure would disintegrate of the European integration process.

METHODOLOGY

To understand the complex institution such as Supranational Europe, one needs conceptual tools. A theory helps to simplify the reality and gives a true picture of relationships between the things we observe. Several classical theories of European integration draw from international theory. They basically explain the broad development of European integration: that is, how and why nations with their territory choose to form European institutions and who or what determines the shape and speed of the integration process.

I would try to understand the territoriality and territorial development in Europe by employing different theories developed in the study of international relations such as Neo-functionalism, Liberal inter-governmentalism, New institutionalism, Policy networks, and Social constructivism and try to pull out the key assumptions and insights offered by each theory and to analyse where they stand now in explaining the emergence the territoriality across the European space. I would employ rigorous research to critically analyse the territoriality in the international arena and in European Union particular.

The method would deal with the study of how territory and territoriality developed over a period of time and get trapped into the web of supranational. The methodology will be adopted to accomplish is mainly analytical in nature. The analysis would be carried out based on survey of literature available and accessible.

The collected information and data from the literature survey will be carefully analyzed and synthesized. Inferences and conclusions will be drawn. Based on this analysis and suggestions would be made accordingly.

CHAPTERISATION

The first chapter would introduce the topic “Territoriality in Europe: A Critical Analysis.” In this chapter, the detailed study would be done to understand meaning of territoriality, the modern state formation in Europe and its journey to the unification of its member states and to the recent challenges the European Integration is facing territorially. The recent developments in the economic, political and social sphere are taken into consideration to review the subject matter and explore the territoriality in Europe.

The second chapter titled historiography of European territorial development and integration. would describe the formation of supranational Europe since the inception of modern states in the European land. Since, to analyze the theories of European integration through the lens of recent events European states undergoing, it would be very important to understand how the European states travelled such a long path, to where it stands now.

The third chapter titled theoretical understanding of European territorial integration, would describe and comprehend the European integration theories. With the help of these theories we would understand how European state transcends their territory to pool their sovereignty to a supranational Europe and what causes territorial integration of European states to form a supranational entity, if there is any.

The fourth chapter titled competing theoretical perspectives: on the conditions of European territoriality, would examine the existing theories of European integration on their with respect to the present situation, exploring the conditions under which they would predict the Europe to disintegrate into territorial states and assessing to what extent these conditions currently exist. It then provides a critique of these theories, of which the most optimistic, it argues, have an insufficiently comparative interspatial as well as inter temporal focus. It argues in particular, that what distinguishes Europe from other much less politically integrated regions primarily is the strong commitment to political integration of the region’s economically most powerful, ‘semi-hegemonic’ state, Germany.

The fifth and last chapter would conclude the study, by exploring the present territory in the supranational Europe. The study would be done by analyzing the European integration theories by testing them with the currents developments experiencing by the European states, and

would try to answer the findings as regard the research questions and address the hypotheses being proven or disproven.

Chapter 2

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

The European territorial Integration has undergone several phases of development and growth, various treaties has been signed. This chapter traces the history of the development of supranational Europe.

2.1 Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan was founded in June 1947 to grant financial aid to many European countries, after the Second World War, which was torn apart after the heavy losses in the world war. The main countries to benefit from this funding were Austria, Belgium - Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey (Kitzinger, 1963). It also led to the formation of the Organization for European economic cooperation. The plan given the basis for European cooperation and was supported by many people because assistance and cooperation was seen as a fundamental building block in the foundation of long term European Peace (Hobsbawm,E, 2006). There has been a lot of academic literature published which challenges the varying degrees to which the Marshall plan assist to develop the concept of the Europe, it is also not as simple as studying the effects but also the motivation behind the Marshall Plan. Many recognized it was simply a plan by the USA to check the spread of communism. Some also believe that the influence it had may have just been due to the natural development of the international economy at the time and that actually the amount of financial investment the USA made was not sufficient to bring about such considerable, rapid changes (James.H,2003).The crucial fact to consider is its position in founding necessary economic cooperation; it demonstrated many European countries the potential benefits of cooperation and laid many of the early foundations in the development of the Europe (Gowland,D and Dunphy,R and Lythe,C.,2006).

2.2 The Monnet Plan:

Monnet Plan was devised in 1945 to counsel the French government to reconstruct France via by means of German coal resources, mainly from the Ruhr area and Saar area .This was due to the fact that the Second World War made it clear that France is in requirement of economic reconstruction. More over this would check and halt Germany's exporting capabilities, advancing French international competitiveness. This plan was put into operation by Charles de Gaulle in 1946.

2.3 Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community

Jean Monnet was the sketcher of the Schuman plan. He completely believed that economic development and economic prosperity would be best attained at a European rather than National level (Cini, 2007). The Schuman Plan was the initiative plan for the European Coal and Steel Community. Monnet saw this plan as a path to achieve unified Europe (particularly rapprochement between France and Germany) and so the commencing of a process of sectorial integration. Discussions and consultation of the Schuman Plan were also a defining moment point in Adenauer's Westpolitik, as he was at last seen as a fellow European leader (Gillingham, 2003).Monnet was the chairman of the intergovernmental conference that drafted and outlined the ECSC treaty; as such Monnet was well placed to guide his ideas (Pinder, 1991). Monnets international experience directed him to the assumption that the High Authority should remain autonomous and self-governing from member states governments, as this would restrain its legitimacy. Of course this produced important questions from all corners about its presumed supranationality, and probable want of transparency. Monnet reacted by saying the Authority was still accountable to the assembly (later to become the European Parliament), which would ultimately become an elected chamber, able to examine the authority. Obviously this encouraged Monnet to consider the struggle himself and fellow federalists would face in front of Westphalian minded leaders (such as De-Gaulle) (Monnet, 1976). As a result of the collapse of the EDC, Monnet was enthusiastic on pushing for early approval of the ECSC/ Schuman Plan.

2.4 EURATOM (European atomic energy committee)

In acknowledgment of the fact that coal as a foundation for industrial power was deteriorating and atomic energy was seemingly taking primacy, Monnet proposed the creation of

a European atomic energy committee. Putting forward the idea while the ECSC was still in the stage of dialogue; Monnet intended to secure both the short-term goals of the ECSC and the long-term goals of a European federation. The essence of EURATOM was not all too foreign from the spirit and fundamental nature of the ECSC, but of course with coal and steel substituted with atomic energy. Although Monnet left the High Authority before the implementation of EURATOM, the initial propositions of Monnet's were carried forth by Spaak (Dinan, 2005).

2.5 European Coal and Steel Community

The European Coal and Steel Community was an international organisation ratified by six nations, looking for to unite Western Europe during the period of the Cold War. The European Coal and Steel Community (The ECSC) was founded under the Treaty of Paris 1951 was the maiden international treaty organization that was not only established on the ideologies of supranationalism, but it gradually evolved to becoming part of the European Union. It was based on the principles on a 'common market, common objectives and common institutions'. The ECSC treaty generates the structure of the production and allocation arrangement for coal and steel. It also provides a sovereign institutional system to manage it. Although it is limited to just coal and steel production during its existence, the ECSC had a significant effect on prime political and economic developments in Europe. The mission of the ECSC was for member states to contribute economic development to each other and to improve and develop living standards of member states through the institution.

The Treaties of Rome are known as one of the Founding Treaties. They established two communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom), both treaties were signed on 25th March 1957 and came into force on 1st January 1958. These are important treaties as they set up the foundations of the EU as we know it today.

In the preamble for the EEC signing, states were being told that by signing this treaty it was showing that the founding members of the EEC were, 'determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. Highlighting the political agenda of the European community as well as the economical agenda as this has been discussed.

The European Economic Community (EEC) is more commonly referred to as the Common Market and in this agreement, all member states agreed to take down their tariff barriers, this was to enable free trade amongst those in the EEC. This was due to take place

within 12 years; however, this was shortened and thus by 1968 all tariffs for members of the EEC were abolished.

The EEC also established the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which essentially meant free trade on agricultural products within the EEC

The aim of the EEC was to create a common market, whereby there would be a removal of all barriers to trade within the union and a fixed custom tariff to promote trade. It built upon the idea behind the ECSC: that economic co-operation would lead to a peaceful Europe. The two new institutions of the EEC were the Council and the Commission. The Commission's role was to ensure the implementation of policy, represent the EEC in international negotiations and to propose new policy.

Neo-functional theory explains the establishment of the EEC with the process known as spill-over. This theory was pioneered by Ernst Haas, who explained spill-over as the integration of wider interest (political, economic) to form a common market. This explained the initial success of the EEC but failed to explain the 1960s. Another theory, known as liberal intergovernmentalism, was developed by Andrew Marsalis. This theory stated that the national interest - and specifically, national governments - controlled the EU policy setting agenda.

The EEC was to become known as the EC in the Treaty of Maastricht. This went on to form the basis of the first pillar of the European Union. Its responsibilities included the continual running of the internal market as well as the environmental, social and economic policy. This would also include the monetary union and policy dealing with immigration. This pillar would be supranational in nature.

2.6 The Fouchet Plan (1961-1962)

Through this plan, De Gaulle pursued the “Union of States” he envisioned. It favoured the idea for the six member states of the European Community to form a new intergovernmental organisation which would co-ordinate foreign and defence policy. The institutional framework of the plan outlined in the design included a Ministerial Council, a Commission of senior Foreign Ministry Officials and a Consultative Assembly of Delegated National Parliamentarians. The difficulty the member states encountered over efforts to reach an agreement caused Josef Luns concerns over the future of the European Community as well as the reaction the United States would have and the role Britain would have, if any, in the Community. The Fouchet Plan

collapsed after all, since a series of disharmonic meetings in the beginning of 1962 left little room for agreement and implementation.

2.7 The Single European Act

The primary aim of the Single European Act (SEA) was, to “add new momentum to the process of European construction so as to complete the internal market” (European Commission, 2007). It was felt that by enhancing co-operation and co-ordination within the Community, its international influence could be strengthened, thus allowing for more effective competition as a single economic entity against the United States of America and Japan (Bache & George, 2006). In order to achieve this, it was necessary to adapt the internal workings and decision making processes of the Community by amending the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Community. As will be seen, this largely involved changes to the relative powers of the institutions and the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (European Commission, 2007). From a theoretical perspective, the SEA arguably demonstrates the neo-functionalist concept of technical spill-over: harmonisation is achieved through necessary sequential policy development (McGowan, 2005).

The Single European Act was signed by the member states’ foreign ministers at the Inter-Governmental Conference in Luxembourg during February 1986. The main provisions of the SEA were as follows:

Economic Provisions (Dinan, 2005; McKenzie & Venables, 1991).

The establishment of the Single Market, defined as: “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (European Commission, 2007). This was to be achieved by:

1. Removal of physical barriers to the movement of people and goods (such as border immigration and customs posts).
2. The removal of technical barriers. That is, freedom of movement of:
 - a) Labour, skills and professions.
 - b) Capital and financial services.
 - c) Technology and intellectual property.
 - d) Public procurement (i.e. provision of utilities).
 - e) Common testing and certification of product standards.
 - f) Transport – de-regulation of the transport markets.
3. The removal of fiscal barriers (VAT and Excise duties)

4. A commitment in the preamble by member states to “transform relations as a whole among their States into a European Union”.
5. A commitment to the principle of future Economic and Monetary Union.
6. The introduction of Qualified Majority Voting for policy decisions concerning the Single Market.
 - a) With the exceptions of direct taxation and movement of people.
7. An extension of the powers of the European Parliament:
 - a) The establishment of the co-operation process for QMV policies – the right to amend.
 - b) The right of assent to future enlargements. (Dinan, 2005)
8. Formal recognition of the European Council. (European Commission, 2007)
9. Empowerment of the Council (having consulted the Commission and Parliament) to establish the Court of First Instance (Dinan, 2005).
10. The formalising of European Political Co-operation (Dinan, 2005)
 - a) Commission “fully associated” and Parliament “closely associated”.
 - b) The Commission responsible for ensuring that the external policies/actions of the Community were consistent with those agreed under EPC.

2.8 Treaty of Maastricht

The Treaty of Maastricht, formally known as the Treaty on the European Union, was signed by all the member states of the European Economic Community on the 7th February 1992 and came into full force on the 1st November 1993, after a difficult ratification period. 'By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called 'the Union" and within the Union the 'Three Pillar System'. Alongside this was the creation of the single currency, later named the Euro. The changes that were brought about by the Treaty of Maastricht were a result the member states' desire to supplement the Single European Act and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

One of the impacts of the Maastricht Treaty has been to influence relations with third countries outside the EU. After Maastricht the activities of the EU were expanded considerably and as a result states outside the EU no longer deal with individual member states, but deal with the EU as a single entity (Gowland, D, Dunphy, R and Lythe, C, 2006). This is exemplary of supranationalism, as by no longer dealing with individual member states third countries have

affirmed the EU as the centre of the European government in place of the individual governments of the Member States. Examples of the EU dealing with third countries as a single entity include the World Trade Organisation and the Kyoto Protocol (Gowland, D, Dunphy, R and Lythe, C, 2006).

Public opinion on the Treaty of Maastricht was almost evenly divided, with many referendums finding in favour of ratification by only a slight majority. This is because of the view that the Maastricht Treaty was going to reduce state sovereignty. With growing bitterness towards the EC, Maastricht typified Euro scepticism with people criticising the Treaty without any knowledge of what it was about (.Dinan.D, 2005). Further to this, the worries that the Treaty instilled in people were many and varied, ranging from: “the desirability of the EMU to the rigors of convergence, to voting rights for non-nationals, to the prospect of mass migration, to the likelihood of bureaucratic intrusion from Brussels. In most cases a perusal of the treaty’s unintelligible text merely reinforced popular antipathy towards it” (Dinan.D, 2005).

This clearly defines a sentiment shared by many within the EU, who fear that their cultural identity and integrity is endangered by the competences the Treaty attributes to the institutions of the Community and the prospects it gives for others within the Community. Popular opinion was divided even in countries where a commitment to European integration had existed for many years, such as in France. Pre-Maastricht it is argued that avidity for European integration was at its highest, but after Maastricht and the introduction of the EMU popular support began to decline (.Eichenberg, R and Dalton, 2007). Furthering popular discontent was economic instability and the failure of European intervention in Bosnia in (Dinan.D, 2005). France the referendum for the Treaty had a 70% turnout, with 51.05% voting in favour and 48.95% voting against (Dinan.D, 2005). These figures are illustrative of a divided public opinion on the Maastricht Treaty and were compounded by claims by the Front National that the Treaty would give up national sovereignty (Gowland, D, Dunphy, R and Lythe, C, 2006). This divided public opinion resulted in resolutions by the EC to “make the legislative process more transparent and ensured EU’s compatibility with the political aspirations of its citizens” by holding televised opening sessions and releasing transcripts of meetings (Dinan.D, 2005). This was clearly designed to create a connection with individuals within the Member States, and shows the EU acting once more as a supranational body, by trying to win popular support as a separate entity. Furthermore, it is argued by some that the Treaty of Maastricht is not a valid treaty as it has different terms from those agreed upon by Member States. This worryingly demonstrates that the EU has power it should not have and could help to support an argument by

Euro sceptics that the European Union has unlawfully obtained sovereignty, which should have been left in the hands of the Member States.

Maastricht established the legal base for a common defence and security policy (Gowland, D, Dunphy, R and Lythe, C, 2006). Which could in the future lead to a common defence force. This shows integration in areas beyond the economic ones of previous treaties and helps to illustrate how the Community is evolving into super state. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty introduced more instances of QMV (although the SEA did introduce QMV as well), which brings Neo-functionalism back to the forefront European integration. This is because it rebuts the argument intergovernmentalists make that Member States control the speed and extent of integration, as in some instances a Member State may vote against a resolution but it will still be passed. However, for Treaty Amendments unanimity is still required, so intergovernmentalism still holds true for an expansion of Community competence. Areas in which Maastricht introduced QMV are approximation of laws, conjunctural policy. Balance of payments and certain aspects of the economic policy (Cowgill, 1992).

Overall, it can be argued that the Treaty of Maastricht has led to a decline in support for the European Union, but has allowed it to operate as a supranational institution and streamline the process of integration. As was argued earlier, identity can be constructed over time and with integration into social and political and the creation of a European citizenship the Union is undoubtedly trying to create a "European" identity. Some would argue that Maastricht tried to achieve 'too much, too soon' (Eichenberg, R and Dalton, 2007), but it is possible that in the long-term the Treaty of Maastricht has helped us to progress from the traditionally state-centric approach and enter the era of a United Europe.

2.9 The Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on the 2nd of October 1997 and came into force on the 1st of May 1999. Its main changes were focused on the Treaty on European Union, created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its main areas of focus were increasing the democratic legitimacy of the European Institutions by increasing the powers of the European Parliament, Security and Justice Reforms including the introduction of a common foreign and security policy, the reformation of the three pillars of the EU and the reform of the institutions to better prepare them for the upcoming enlargement. The Treaty of Amsterdam is made up of 13 protocols and 3 huge sections, both introducing new articles and renumbering all the articles that

came previously. Article 1 amended the Treaty on European Union and discusses criminal and policy cooperation as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The following four articles amend the EC treaty and the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (now expired), the EURATOM treaty and the acts covering the election and operation of the European Parliament. The final provisions contain a further four articles. The treaty also set out to simplify the Community Treaties, removing obsolete articles and renumbering the others to try to make the massive document more easily read and useful.

Other chapters of the treaty dealt with more pressing concerns mainly affecting European Citizens, dealing with their legal and personal security, immigration and fraud prevention. The EU could now legislate on immigration and civil procedure in so far as it was necessary to ensure the free movement of persons, one of the 4 core freedoms of the EC.

Two major reforms occurred with regards to the institutions. The Co-decision procedure, involving the European Parliament and the European Council was changed in terms of scope, with Parliament now playing a much stronger role. The president of the Commission also now needs the personal trust of the European Parliament, which will then give them the power to lay down the Commissions policy guidelines more effectively and be able to actively choose members of the Commission with help from the national governments. This makes the Commission more politically accountable mainly as it is more accountable to the European Parliament. The treaty also allows the Member States to cooperate more closely, and encourages a multi-speed Europe, under a commission proposal, in areas where joint action can be taken, in so long as it does not undermine the Coherence of the EU or the rights and equalities of its citizens

Cooperation in the criminal justice systems of the Member States has also been improved, meaning States will now be able to coordinate their activities more effectively, creating a common area of “freedom, security and justice”, in addition to the original idea of creating a common economic area. The Schengen Agreements allowing EU Citizens to travel across borders without border controls, as not been incorporate in the EU law (excluding Ireland and the UK). Linked to this the Treaty of Amsterdam laid down new principles for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, emphasising projection of the EU's values to the world outside of it, and reforming its modes of action. Common Strategies will be laid down by the European Council and Qualified Majority Voting will be used to put them into effect. Certain restrictions exist on the use o this voting, and abstentions can be made “constructively”.

Also to ensure the EU was better recognised outside, a singular person was created, the High Representative for EU foreign Policy, so that outside actors had one person to go to when approaching the EU in terms of foreign policy. This put a “face and name” to EU foreign policy, and although Amsterdam did not provide for common defence in the EU, it did also increase peacekeeping responsibilities and humanitarian possibilities, forging closer links with the Western European Union Organisation.

The Treaty of Amsterdam laid the foundations for future revisions of the treaty, being followed up with the treaties of nice and then the proposed constitutional treaty, which was eventually scrapped and replaced with the proposed Lisbon treaty. The Treaty Attracted Criticism in many areas, mainly around democratic deficit, and the perceived short comings of its reforms.

The democratic deficit of the European Union was not fixed by this treaty. Negotiations preceding the treaty were primarily between governments and states, with no public participation, and the negotiations were held behind closed doors with again no transparency of discussion. The Europeans Parliaments power, although boosted by the treaty was not expanded into enough areas sufficiently. This was to be partly addressed by the Treaty of Nice. The Treaty did nothing to make it more understandable by the common citizen, and is a mess of 3 huge parts, and thirteen protocols, causing great difficulties when trying to interpret what its regulations are and thus how actors interacting with the treaty should behave. This was to be addressed by the Lisbon treaty. Also the heavy renumbering and restructuring of the treaty articles, although providing easier use for the future, caused confusion in the meantime as treaty articles had to be tracked down, using both the old and new numbers until people were used to the shifted article numbers.

The treaty also did not prepare the Union for the upcoming potential enlargement, and the institutions were poorly adapted to deal with this based upon this treaties revisions. Many states believed the intuitions were already unwieldy and inefficient even for the current 15 Member states, without even taking into account the potential for additional members. The composition of the Commission and the weighting of Member States votes and the use of Qualified Majority Voting were all not addressed, but were due to be in the Treaty of Lisbon. Also it was heavily criticised for not being a large enough step towards political Union. Competence in areas outside of the economic sphere was not expanded much, and Police and Judicial Cooperation, as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, remained weak and fledgling.

2.10 Treaty of Nice

The Treaty of Nice was agreed in December 2000 by the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and signed in February 2001. Paving the way for further EU enlargement, it provided a solution in further reforms to the institutions and decision making process which had been started at the Treaty of Amsterdam. The objective at Nice was clear: to deal with the 'Amsterdam leftovers' that is to say, finish the reforming of the institutions and to prepare the EU for further enlargement. The major changes made at Nice and the declarations and protocols annexed to it concerned further reform of the institutions and the decision making process. In preparation for enlargement it altered the composition of the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission, as well as increasing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (CFI) to mitigate the work load of the Court of Justice. In addition, to streamline the decision making process and make it more democratic, the Treaty extended both QMV and co-decision in the EU Community (1st Pillar) and improved conditions for achieving enhanced co-operation in all three pillars.

To the surprise of the international community the Treaty of Nice was initially rejected by Ireland in its June 2001 referendum, meaning that changes made at Nice would not be able to go ahead. This situation was later resolved as the Treaty succeeded in being accepted in a second referendum held in September 2002 (this time a Treaty that allowed for Ireland to opt out of any common defence policy.)

Arguments purporting Nice to be a failure include those claiming:

1. Enlargement could have legally continued without the Treaty.
2. The EP issued a statement summarising the general feeling that the Nice Treaty did not go far enough, failing to reform sufficiently. CAP, cohesion, tax regulation and social legislation were all ducked out on or scarcely addressed. Indeed the aim of the Treaty to simplify previous treaties was believed to have failed. Thus future Treaties will again be required to amend the system.
3. It was a technocratic treaty, centralising more power in the hands of unelected and unaccountable institutions.
4. Changes to voting in the Council were in favour of larger states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland) that received treble their original votes under QMV while smaller states received approximately only double.

2.11 The Single European Currency

The Euro has a history that dates back to the Rome Treaty in 1957, where it "laid the foundations for economic integration. This was the principal focus of the Treaty, and it was a conscious decision after the failures of the more ambitious attempts at European integration of the mid- 1950's" (P. Craig and G. de Burca, 1998). The Rome Treaty stated that it aimed to achieve "an even closer union amongst the peoples of Europe" (advfn.com) and it was perceived that a single currency was the way forward.

Ambitions for the Euro were furthered by The Single European Act of 1986; this modifies the Treaty of Rome by "setting up the framework for the Single European Market by increasing the Commission's powers and introducing qualified majority voting for a number of issues" (BBC News). The treaty continues to develop the Euro idea, as "article 8A clearly defines the objectives of the Act, which is to progressively establish the internal market over a period expiring on the 31st December 1992. The Single Market is defined as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movements of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this treaty" (europa.com) This act came into force the following year in 1987.

In 1992, Treaty of Maastricht was agreed upon and put into practice in 1993; this treaty was to build upon the acts passed with the Treaties of Rome and the Single European Act concerning the Euro. The Economic Monetary Union (EMU) "puts the finishing touches to the Single European Market. The member states must ensure co-ordination of their economic policies, provide for multilateral surveillance of this co-ordination, and are subject to financial and budgetary discipline. The objective of monetary policy is to create a single currency and to ensure this currency's stability and respect for the market economy"

2.12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

The EMU was about pooling of monetary sovereignty: "transferring the power to change interest rates and exchange rates from national governments (where it can be used with exclusive reference to national economic conditions) to the ECB (where it will be used to set policy for the eurozone as a whole)" (P.Lynch, N.Neuwahl and G.Rees, 2000). The Commission's slogan for the EMU was "one market, one money", "this was based on the link one currency and the single market. A single market would work better with a single currency. A single currency would enable businesses to save on menu costs, in the sense of not having to maintain differential prices for each market, thereby facilitating marketing strategies for the entire community" (P. Craig,

2002). This shows that the Commission's view on the single currency is that one currency would make it easier to develop a single market for the entire community.

2.13 The 2004 Enlargement

The 1st May 2004 saw ten states join the European Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia & Slovenia. Bringing the number of member states from 15 to 25 members it was the biggest enlargement the EU has ever seen. Commentators hailed this enlargement “the big bang” (BBC.co.uk, 2001) not only due to its magnitude but because of the significance of former Soviet bloc states becoming members, thereby signifying an end to the Cold War division of Europe between East and West. The accession of Cyprus to the EU is also significant given the implications for the Turkish application for EU membership.

2.14 The Evolving Enlargement Doctrine

Over the process of European integration a gradual body of what amounts to an enlargement ‘doctrine’ has been established to help steer the process of enlargement through a mutually acceptable path for the Union and its member states. Traditionally the process of enlargement was founded upon the content of the treaties, the *acquis communautaire* and the established procedure of accession negotiations. The 2004 enlargement saw the addition of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ which placed heavier demands upon aspirant EU states than previous enlargements, both politically and economically, with the monitoring and assessment of candidates’ credentials practised on a larger scale. (Michalski, 2006)

2.15 The Impact of the CEE states on Enlargement Doctrine - 'The Copenhagen Criteria'

In anticipation of the “big bang” enlargement which would see new democracies from Central & Eastern Europe seek EU membership, member states felt the need to “spell out the conditions for membership more explicitly in order to protect the Union framework from a dilution of objectives, a fragmentation of policies, and a breakdown of institutional structures.” (Michalski, 2006) Adding to the prior requirements of European identity and mainly economic principles, the European Council agreed in June 1993 to accept the candidacy of the CEE states

on fulfilment of what has become known as the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen criteria led to accusations that the Union had ‘raised the bar’ to membership due to demanding fulfilment of criteria that had never previously been asked of applicants, not only this but the regular assessment and evaluation of candidates readiness for membership was to be assessed on an unprecedented scale. (Michalski, 2006)

The fifth enlargement was also unique in its use of a Pre-Accession strategy in which the EU provided assistance in preparing candidate states for membership with various financial, agricultural, structural and administrative instruments such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development), ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), Twinning and TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office) (Michalski, 2006). The EU had not only raised the bar to membership but was also monitoring much closely the preparedness of candidate states for joining the EU, with various policy and monitoring instruments adopted to this end.

2.16 The Central & Eastern European Enlargement

The beginnings of the historic CEE enlargement can be traced back to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The process of enlargement eastward was a daunting one due to the amount of applicants and their make-up as previously Communist, centrally-planned, economies transforming into democracies utilising market economics. O’Brennan (2006) describes how CEE states opportunistically presented their case for membership with reference to the values of European integration embodied within the treaties. With the collapse of Communism and the possibility of Eastern European states joining their integrated Western counterparts, the CEE states could finally ‘Return to Europe’. The Union’s first response to the collapse of Communism and the plight of CEE states came in the Strasbourg Summit of December 1989 where the European Council declared it had a ‘special responsibility’ for CEE states. Despite this initially swift and benevolent response toward Eastern integration, the road toward enlargement was an immense challenge for the Union and “Given its own political and economic constraints, inevitably the EU could not meet all of them in a timely, effective, and generous fashion.” (Dinan, 2005).

2.17 Copenhagen to Copenhagen

The Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 heralded a new phase in the enlargement process, with the European Council finally stating that the CEE candidate states will eventually become members of the EU subject to meeting the Copenhagen criteria also endorsed by the European Council at this summit. From 1994 to 1996, the Europe Agreements came into force and ten CEE states submitted their applications for membership.

As part of the Agenda 2000 report, the European Commission was asked to produce an assessment of each candidate's readiness for membership, known as the Opinions. These were presented in July 1997 and concluded that none of the candidates were completely ready for EU membership but that enlargement should take place in waves – with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus recommended for first-wave accession negotiations starting in 1998. (Michalski, 2006)

Amid concerns over the Kosovo war, the strategy of enlargement in waves was abandoned in favour of assessing each candidate on its own merit, with the European Council formally deciding at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 to invite second wave candidate states (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta) to begin accession negotiations in 2000 (O'Brennan, 2006).

Assisted by the pro-enlargement Swedish presidency, the European Council announced at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001 a breakthrough in accession negotiations and a timetable for the completion of negotiations by 2002 and membership for candidates by 2004 in time for participation in the European Parliament elections (O'Brennan, 2006).

In October 2002 the Commission recommended accession by 2004 for 8 of the CEE states apart from Bulgaria and Romania. The Brussels European Council meeting in October 2002 finally resolved issues over CAP reform and the financing of enlargement to remove the biggest obstacle to conclusion of negotiations. This allowed negotiations to be formally ended at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, much of the credit of which goes to another pro-enlargement EU presidency of the Danish. (Dinan, 2004)

With agreements and negotiations all tied up, the Accession Treaty was signed in Athens on the 16th April 2003 and on completion of successful referendums amongst the CEE signatories plus Malta and Cyprus, the 2004 enlargement was finalised at the accession ceremony in Ireland on the 1st of May 2004.

2.18 A Constitution for Europe

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (or Constitutional Treaty) was a draft treaty formulated during the 2002-2003 European Convention. It was written with the aim of overturning the previously enacted series of treaties in favour of a single constitutional document. The draft treaty was approved by the leaders of the Member States in June 2004, but was rejected by Dutch and French voters in national referenda in 2005.

The central idea behind the Constitutional Treaty was a means of resolving the legitimacy deficit at the heart of the European Union. By anchoring the Union in a formal constitution, it was hoped that a common political culture would emerge. Without central constitutional symbols and a constitutionally framed European political sphere, it would be impossible for shared political values or a strong sense of solidarity between Europeans to emerge.

2.19 The 2007 Enlargement

The 2007 enlargement of the European Union saw Bulgaria and Romania join on 1 January 2007. The two countries signed the Treaty of Accession on 25 April 2005 in Luxembourg, and were confirmed to join on 26 September 2006.

Upon enlargement, both states have been represented in the institutions of the European Union. 2007 saw two new appointments to the Barroso Commission. Bulgarian liberal Meglena Kuneva was appointed Commissioner for Consumer Protection, and Romanian technocrat Leonard Orban became Commissioner for Multi-lingualism.

Bulgaria and Romania are also represented in the European Parliament. The 785-strong chamber has 18 Bulgarian members and 35 from Romania. Each country held elections in 2007, on 20 May in Bulgaria and on 25 November in Romania. Prior to these elections, these countries MEPs were the appointments of their respective national governments, in place before accession.

Both member states are scheduled to have their first presidencies of the European Council, with Bulgaria in the second half of 2018, and Romania in the second half of 2019, with Austria holding the presidency for the six months in between.

2.20 Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon came into force on the 1st December 2009 and amended the current EU and EC Treaties. The Treaty provides the tools and methods needed for the European Union to develop and grow in the future and continue to meet the demands of citizens

The Treaty provides for the new positions of the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council. Who will manage the EU's external affairs? In November 2009 little known Baroness Cathy Ashton was appointed as the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or the EU's "foreign minister" as the media like to call it (Timesonline.co.uk, November 2009). Baroness Ashton will be responsible for overseeing the EU's external affairs and will support by the newly formed European External Action Service. Herman Van Rompuy has been selected to be the President of the European Council which will enhance visibility of the EU. To compliment these two new positions the EU will be recognised as a single legal personality.

Thus it has been seen that present day Europe has been evolved through a variety of treaties and summits.

Chapter 3

THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION

Theories of European integration propose description of how and why supranational domination has progressed. While there are certainly numerous different causes and factors which have played a crucial part to the development of the Europe, this chapter particularly focuses on theories of European integration like neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism as well as some new theories of integration which seek to explain the development of supranational Europe (Cini, 2003). Though federalist and functionalist theories presented a remarkable normative account of integration, their use in describing the progress of the Europe is regulated as they have been succeeded by newer, more inclusive theory. The development of the Europe is in itself an arguable term; for what constitutes development? For the purpose of this chapter, development of Europe will be in meaning to the rise of supranational institutions combined with the deepening and intensification of inter-state relations within the Europe (Cini, 2003).

One of the major theory of European integration, Neo functionalism propounded in the mid 1950's by American scholars who initially attempted to theorise the new forms of regional co-operation during the phase of the Second World War. The theory was in the beginning progressed as a 'grand' theory of international relations in an attempt to clarify regional integration processes. However, European political and economic integration was more appropriated to the study and so the approach turned out to be increasingly Eurocentric and less appropriate to other field of regional integration. Neo-functionalism mainly deals itself with the process instead of the end result of integration. "Perhaps the most important (and most discussed concept in the neo-functionalist armoury was the idea of 'spill-over' which was used to depict the mechanisms supposedly driving processes of regional integration." (Cini, 2003). Haas' concept of spill-over is essentially the way in which increased collaboration between states necessitates integration in one policy area which consequently has a blow on effect, creating pressures for further integration in neighbouring policy areas. "Spill-over refers to a situation where co-operation in one field necessitates co-operation in another;" effectively it is continues process of integration (Rosamund, 2000).

Differences can be extracting between different types of spill-over. Functional spill-over is co-operation in one policy area requiring co-operation in other similar areas in order for the preliminary policy area function to function efficiently. Political spill-over is found where policies become un-resolvable linked to each other, not through necessity but instead as part of a bargaining process whereby states approve mutual support for each other in negotiations in supposed package deals. Developed spill-over could be measured unintentional integration, where integration is not the chief motive but rather the effect of assigning authority to supranational institutions. Lindberg and Scheingold suggest “by and large most national governments are concerned with achieving concrete economic and welfare goals and will view integration only as a means to these ends.”(L.Lindberg & S. Scheingold, 1970). The foundation of the supranational Europe is thus seen rather as an unintentional result of power allocation.

The process of elite socialization is an feature of neo-functionalism which proposes that people involved on a regular basis in supranational policy making will be likely to develop European loyalties and preferences (Pentland, 1973). The bureaucratic elite in turn attempt to persuade their national elites of the benefits of supranational co-operation and their loyalties change from their national institutions towards European institutions. Likewise, neo-functionalists presumed a development in the creation of supranational interest groups increasing in response to the establishing of supranational institutions to alter policy decisions.

While neo-functionalism offered a sufficient explanation for the expansion of the ECSC and the development of the European Community till the period of 1960's, critics disagree that it is empirically feeble as it failed to explain the collapse in integration from this period. The want of continual integration during the 1970's propose the neo-functionalist forecast of a steady intensification of political integration was inaccurate. “Neo-functionalism appeared to mis-predict both the trajectory and the process of European commission evolution.”(Moravcsik, 1993). Theoretical critiques of the theory brought up three objections to the theory. Firstly, that elite socialization is comparatively not important. Taylor comments that states were themselves ‘aware of the need to ensure that they had reached their quota of European civil servants.’(Taylor, 1984). Secondly,that the regional integration of the Europe should be recognised with an admiration and awareness of deepening integration in the international realm not just only in Europe. Thirdly, critics recommended that greater meaning should be assigned to the nation state and regional co-operation should be examined as intergovernmental institutions ’(Taylor, 1984).

Although the progress of the European Community did observe a renewed popularity in neo-functional theory. The Single European Act and objective of the single market commemorated a renewal in economic and political co-operation in Western Europe which seemed to once again track the spill-over consequence proposed by neo-functionalists. Although, the new method to neo-functionalism takes a new, “‘transaction-based’, theory approach which pull attention to the increasing levels of transactions such as commerce, travel, communications across European borders which results in increases demands for European-level regulation.” (A. Stone Sweet & W. Sandholtz,1998). An example mentioned by many of the theorists is the issue of the European Court which now has got supremacy over national legal systems and which perform an important role in the construction of a supranational community.

Intergovernmentalism appeared during the 1960’s as an evaluation of neo-functionalism and federalist assumption that the European Community was on the way to becoming a state in its own right. Intergovernmentalism claims that “European integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states.”(Hix,1999). The theory is affected by classical international relations theory with neo-realist perspectives on the function of the state and interstate bargaining. Neo-realists admitted that within the anarchic international system there is possibility for order and international co-operation as a process of state survival and that the supranational Europe is an institution which can minimise anarchy. Intergovernmentalists recommend that while sovereignty stays with individual member states within the Europe, it might be in the states’ interests to surrender their sovereignty and assign certain powers to European institutions. The consequence of this is that “governments seek integration as a way of solving problems that they have in common.”(Rosamund,2000). Instead of transferring of sovereignty, intergovernmentalists consider European co-operation more as handing over of power to ease out the working of European intuitions empowering them work to more effeciently and provide them greater credibility.

Extracting from intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, bases itself on the proposal of two level games. To begin with, policy preferences within the domestic realm of the state and secondly, interstate negotiations in the international realm. “National executives play games in two arenas more or less simultaneously. At the domestic level, power seeking/enhancing office holders aim to build coalitions of support among domestic groups. At the international level, the same actors seek to bargain in ways that enhance their positions domestically by meeting the demands of key domestic constituents.”(Rosamund,2000). Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism observes supranational Europe as an

intergovernmental regime crafted to deal economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination. The theory recommends that all decisions made by the supranational Europe are effectively the consequence of negotiations between states.

Liberal intergovernmentalism understands co-operation between states as a result of the requirement for integration from the nation state being met by the supply of integration from interstate negotiations. Policy preferences at a national level are restrained by the interests of leading, usually economic, groups within society and national governments stand for their interests in international forums. Moravcsik considers therefore that national interests develop from the domestic politics of member states. The supply of integration concentrates around governments negotiations with each other in an effort to achieve the upper hand. Institutional delegation is the component within liberal intergovernmentalism which suggests that supranational institutions are founded to ease out efficient interstate bargaining; "To secure the substantive bargains they had made...governments delegated and pooled sovereignty in international institutions for the express purpose of committing one another to cooperate"(Moravcsik,1999). This shows their dedication to the bargaining process and discourages disobedience.

The liberal intergovernmentalist approach has been questioned for having too narrow a focus, avoiding day to day politics and focussing only on high profile policy changing cases that without doubt prove the theory correct. Critics point indicated in cases where majority voting rather than international negotiations concern, liberal intergovernmentalism may not give such clear outcome. Critics would also recommends that Moravcsik's notion of the state is too narrow and simplistic as it concentrate too much on economic apprehension and fails to realize that the supranational Europe is much more of a multi level polity than the two level polity of Moravcsik's theory. Moravcsik's understating of the importance of supranational institutions within European integration has also been criticised; "Moravcsik's portrayal of the Commission as exercising a role of little more than a facilitator in respect of significant decision making has attracted particular criticism, with numerous empirically based studies claiming to show the Commission does exercise an independent and influential decision making role."(Nugent,1999). Critics proposed that the through policy entrepreneurship, the Commission can have an manipulate policy outcomes.

In addition to the traditional neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches to the development of the EU, there has been a change to new styles of theoretical work which, rather than attempting to build up grand theories have been more interested in developing intermediate

theories in an effort to explain aspects of the ‘phenomenon’ of the supranational Europe. These theorists would recommend that previous theory has been asking the wrong questions. “What merits attention and attention is the process through which the Europe delivers authoritative outputs and not the ‘big picture’ question of what the Europe is becoming.”(Cini, 2003). Contemporary theorists are more interested in describing policy process and the workings within the system which they considered as more useful. On the other side neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist theorists considered integration to be the dependent variable, the position of Euro-polity has now shifted. Instead of attempting to explain integration, European integration has now become the independent variable, which is believed as a factor which could explain the integration phenomena.

The recent theories of integration are least beneficial in explaining the development of the Europe as their focus tends to be much broader and has shifted from thinking of the Europe purely in terms of integration. Using international relations theory, new theories look at the function of the Europe from a ‘policy supplier’ perspective. These theories looking forward to answer questions more of policy; why and how policy change is put into practice and the effects for Europe and the wider world rather than the development and course of the Europe.

Theories of integration can be useful to assist in establishing an understanding of the various components of European Union development. Although, no theory in itself offers a completely sufficient and inclusive description for the multidimensional and uneven development of the Europe. Various integration theories provide explanations for different stages and patterns of the development.

Intergovernmentalism can describe the process of interstate negotiations and how domestic goals can pick up the pace European integration but, the theory is not fully conclusive and concentrates only on politics between member states executives. The development of the Europe is clearly much wider than that. On the other hand, new neo-functionalists such as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz admit the broader integration outside interstate negotiations, accepting that all transactions within the Europe in communications, travel and trade are crucial to the development of the Europe itself. The increased transactions develops interdependency and thus the development of the Europe. While many would object the significance of traditional neo-functionalist theory to integration today, there is no doubt that a transaction based account of integration can describe much of the process of development.

Transaction based viewpoint provide probably the most comprehensive explanation to understanding the development of the Europe. There are parts of the development that cannot be

clarified by these theories. But being an entirely new institution and with no forerunner, theorising and predicting the future of an institution as complex as the Europe will inevitably be burdened with mistake.

3.1 Realism

Realists view as central questions the causes of war and the conditions of peace. They also regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations. According to classical realists, "structural anarchy," or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and it gives rise to the "security dilemma": in a self-help system one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question of *relative* capabilities is a crucial factor (Morgenthau, 1973).

Efforts to deal with this central element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive. Thus, unlike "idealists" and some "liberal internationalists," classical realists view conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than as a consequence that can be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed socio-political systems, or inadequate international understanding and education.

A third premise that unites classical realists is their focus on geographically-based groups as the central actors in the international system. During other periods the primary entities may have been city states or empires, but at least since the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), sovereign states have been the dominant units. Classical realists also agree that state behaviour is rational (Morgenthau, 1973).

The assumption behind this fourth premise is that states are guided by the logic of the "national interest," usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities. Although the national interest may vary according to specific circumstances, the similarity of motives among nations permits the analyst to reconstruct the logic of policymakers in their pursuit of national interests--what Morgenthau called the "rational hypothesis"--and to avoid the fallacies of "concern with motives and concern with ideological preferences." (Morgenthau, 1973).

Finally, the state can also be conceptualized as a *unitary* actor. Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the nature of the international system, their actions are primarily a response to external rather than domestic political forces. According to Stephen Krasner, for example, the state "can be treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interest of the society."(Krasner,1978). Classical realists, however, sometimes use domestic politics, especially the alleged deficiencies of public opinion, as a residual category to explain deviations from "rational" policies.

Realism has been the dominant model of international relations during at least the past six decades because it seemed to provide a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. Nevertheless, the classical versions articulated by Morgenthau and others have received a good deal of critical scrutiny. The critics have included scholars who accept the basic premises of realism but who found that in at least four important respects these theories lacked sufficient precision and rigor.

Classical realism has usually been grounded in a pessimistic theory of human nature, either a theological version (for example, Saint Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr) or a secular one (for example, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau). Egoism and self-interested behaviour are not limited to a few evil or misguided leaders but are basic to *homo politicus* and thus are at the core of a realist theory. But because human nature, if it means anything, is a constant rather than a variable, it is an unsatisfactory explanation for the full range of international relations.

If human nature explains war and conflict, what accounts for peace and cooperation? In order to avoid this problem, most modern realists have turned their attention from human nature to the structure of the international system to explain state behaviour (Claude, 1962).

In addition, critics have noted a lack of precision and even contradictions in the way classical realists use such core concepts as "power," "national interest," and "balance of power."⁹ They also see possible contradictions between the central descriptive and prescriptive elements of realism. On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate interests of other nations (Morgenthau, 1973).

Power plays a central role in classical realism, but the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables. Moreover, the distinction between "power as capabilities" and "usable options" is especially important in the nuclear age, as the United States discovered in

Vietnam and the Soviets learned in Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, even more dramatically illustrated the disjunction between material capabilities and political impact.

“The ‘International Relations’ story is in many respects a footnote to realism”, said Timothy Dunne(1997). Such is the regard and extensive acceptability of this theoretical legacy in the contemporary International Relations. Realists criticized strongly the follower of neo-Kantians ideology by saying them the idealists. They charged the liberal internationalism as a priori intangible conceptual principles the current condition could be freed and justified. Rather they argued, “The world imperfect as it is, from the rational point of view is the result of forces inherent in human nature.”(Morgenthau,1961).

So to understand and interpret the objective conditions, one should employ the pragmatic and empirical approach. For the realists there is nothing like and no place for any principles in International Relations except a system of checks and balance as Dunne puts it , “realism concerns only three issues: Statism, Survival and Self help.”

The realist particularly Morgenthau indicated that in spite of the outbreak of activities and theories of these liberals thinkers and their creation of League of Nations, they failed to prevent the arrival of another war in European soil. Morgenthau forcefully asked, “If the evil of conflict and war springs from the divisions of the world into detached and competing political units, will it be exercised simply by changing or reducing the lines of division?” For Morgenthau, the liberal internationalists desiring for surpassing the boundaries of both nation and state was like fumbling for heaven. As an alternative, he argued,

“The supranational forces such as universal religions, humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism and all other personal ties, institutions and organizations that bind individuals together across national boundaries are infinitely weaker today than the forces that unite people within a particular national boundary and separate them from the rest of humanity. This weakening is the result of nationalism.”(Morgenthau, 1961).

Does the notion of nation-state be simply conquered by the federalist desire alone? This is such a world whose growing force is the ambition of sovereign nations for power. The principle and objective law in the International relations is that nation states, for the promotion of their national interest, enhance their power.

According to Morgenthau there is no such thing like Internationalism of both liberal and socialist versions exist. In this realist logic, he denied the entire move that is allegedly proposed to go beyond the nation states. The liberal intergovernmentalism would always endorse the national interest of USA, with its emphasis on free trade and market economy and liberal

principles. On the other hand, actually the international force of communism in the Soviet Union, was promoting their national interest in the disguised form. Same thing applies with the international organizations of United Nations, where superpowers promote their own national interest, with the support of their allies.

In the same theoretical outlook, Morgenthau said to comprehend the process of European and federal formation. He observed at it from the traditional realist power sense. The European community is endeavouring a revolutionary attempt to resolve the long-standing political issue—the issue of national superiority of Germany (Morgenthau, 1961). Because of the ambitious and power grabbing nature of German state, the entire Europe had to witness and undergoes two successive disastrous wars. Since the alliance failed in preventing the growth of Germany in no war period, and succeeded only to overcome Germany in war with the motive if it were to stop Germany's power and control it. For Morgenthau, the rest of the western European states created a novel idea of controlling the horrific Germany, not choosing to war. Hence the European community for Morgenthau is,

“a revolutionary departure from the traditional methods by which inferior powers have try to counter a superior one. For instead of countering the potentially superior power by a system of alliances, the other notions of western Europe are trying to draw, as it were Germany into their arms in order to disarm it and to make to superior strength of Germany, innocuous.”(Morgenthau, 1961).

This handing over of community process into a mould of diplomatic strategy drew many political policies from other writers. Milward criticized this approach, had to state about the 20th century states as though they could regulate their foreign policies on such entirely realistic grounds is to explain the process of European Integration ‘as of choice of tactics in a board game and no more.’(Milward,1992).

For Milward, the European Community has apparently other functions as well which is exemplifying other aspirations and ideas. The purely diplomatic approach intent to the integration would overlook both the present conditions of the states and pressurize around which they have to act and react.

However, as the European community apparently appeared as successfully going toward the supranationalism, Morgenthau changed his outlook. Though he maintained his criticism on federalists, he acknowledged functionalist argument of transforming the nation states into some wider institutional arrangements.

“Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and moral requirement of the contemporary world.”(Morgenthau,1961).

Though he recognized and acknowledged the likelihood of transforming nation states into wider units which though would not through federal idealist saying of will and constitutional mode. On the contrary, he emphasised “a workable manipulation”(Morgenthau,1961) of the constant forces which have shaped the past, as they will in future. He observed such a workable manipulation in the functional theory. Supported it as ‘a spreading web of international activities and agencies in which and through which the interest and life of all nations would be gradually integrated.’(Morgenthau,1961).

3.2 Functionalism

Functionalists, in a wider sense, are also liberalists; but unlike their federal counterparts, functionalists’ fundamental principle is that of “form should follow function.”(Taylor and Groom, 1975). They don’t believe in any likelihood or value of attaining a union right through the political will of drafting a common constitution. They argued that the process if integration should be attained gradually and through informal process. Whereas the liberal federalists argued for development of a political institution through the determined effort of men and women will, the liberal functionalists, such supranational institutions has to grow in a gradual manner with experience and learning and not with a single loud bang.

David Mitrany, the founding father of functionalist school, also preoccupied with a head scratching question of ‘how to attain world peace? Like his fellow liberals in the interwar period. His mode of view was different for achieving that peace. He altogether detached himself from what he calls “federal fallacy”,(Mitrany,1975) and advocated a distinct and radical approach to achieve a ‘workable peace system’. In a true liberal character Mitrany criticized the “state-centric” realists approach to International Relations, more especially, the balance of power concept to attain peace and stability. He emphasised, like federalist, the instant transcendence of both nation and state.

These two concepts should not command and fix our way of thinking and activities. Rather to boost the cross border linkages and collaborations, these static, rigid boundaries should be opened up to ease the cross border movements. If people movement across the border takes place and within functional networks would consistently encourage a community sense among them. Thus the functionalist approach would promote the growth of such positive and

constructive common work, common habits and interests, by making the frontier lines irrelevant by superimposing them with a naturally induce growth of common activities and common administrative agencies(Mitrany quote in Morgenthau,1961)

Mitrany suggested instead for supranational or overarching federal states, there should be a policy of organizing multiple functional agencies and institutions to promote such cross-frontiers collaborations. He believed that the success of one functional linkage would lead to another and this process of spill over would continue, till the true world community materialize. Thus Mitrany's theory was based on two principles: organization of multiple functional institutions and they would lead spill over into another sector. The 'sum of these functions' must drive Europe toward an ultimate Integration and by not any supranational set up of any overarching state.

3.3 Neo Functionalism

The theory of neo-functionalism emerged in the mid 1950s; it is a theory of regional integration in a process by which countries remove barriers to free trade. Neo-functionalism helps to explain the integration theory of the Western Europe. The theory is tightly connected to the strategies of the integration of the founding fathers. Jean Monnet's approach to integration aimed at individual sectors in hopes of achieving spillover effects to further the process of integration it is also said to be followed by the early neo functional steps. Schmitter (1969) argues that Jean Monnet's methods of mutual recognition and piecemeal problem solving imbedded in the nature of neo-functionalism. Rosamond(2000) stated that "Neo-functionalism can be read at one level as a theory provoked entirely by the interactive activity among the original six member states" (2000). Further down, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni(2006) argues that neo-functionalism is a product of the behaviouralist turn in American social science which also focuses on institutional forms and behavior and process of integration . However at the time of the 'empty chair' crisis neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.

Neo-functionalism was developed by Earnings Haas who first brought the theory in 1958 in his work 'The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957' (Cini, 2004) the president of the Council on Foreign Relations and director of Policy Planning of the US

department of State. Haas' aims were to give an explanation to a regional integration of Europe after the Second World War. The theory was also aimed to explain the regional integration and development in the areas of economics cooperation in Latin America but it was Europe where political and economic integration was best developed therefore theory become closely associated with EU (Cini ,2004,)

Neo-functionalism reformulates the functionalist principles in the context of regional institutions. While functionalists view integration as an unpreventable result of development which imposes more functions on the states and pushed them to the cooperation with international functional institutions. However, integration in the view of neo-functionalists is that created institutions drives the integration further by inertia even if originally it was not aimed so. There is also a difference in the final results of the integration process between functionalists and neo-functionalists. According to the functionalists view the end result of the integration process is where there is a separate institutional organization performing their functions. Whereas for neo-functionalist everything is shifted to the one new center as the result of a "new political community" which arises (Haas 1958). Jean Monnet saw an increased European integration as the most important originator to a peaceful Europe. According to the neo-functionalism the importance of nationalism and national state will decline in the light of a central supranational state. There are three mechanisms that neo-functionalists view as a driving force of the integration process positive spill over, transfer of domestic alliances, technocratic automaticity.

With the declaration of 'retreat of nation-state in Europe', Ernst Haas introduced the Neo functional phase in European Integration theory. Unlike his predecessors, liberals and realist who emphasises on war and peace, he was the one who introduced the scientific base to the study of European study. Even the term "Integration" was first brought into the subject by him only. He explained it as, "a tendency towards a voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self consciously avoid the use of force in the relations between the participating units and group."(Haas, 1971).

Haas argued in the same tune of functionalist where he argued that to resolve the conflicts among the states, a new process and techniques have to evolve where states would voluntarily give up sovereign powers to attain integration among them. While the supporter of functionalism like Mitrany emphasised the role of cross-frontier functional institutions, whereas the Haas and other Neo Functionalists emphasized the special form of supranational organizations with its own power and jurisdictions. For this reason, Haas was criticised by Mitrany as an 'informal federalist', (Mitrany,1975)whose purpose was to form one supranational European state. In a

sense, he was right that the Neo Functionalists in a remote way merged those two streams of federal and functional successfully.

For Haas, it is both desirable and achievable to build a European state but by not the federal constitutional methods or 'will to a united Europe.' He placed his attention on 'interests and values' rather than relying on these 'altruistic' and 'idealistic condition. Integration, he says, "is a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre, whose institutions pose or demand jurisdiction over the pre existing national state."(Haas,1972). The elite of each nation and transnational technocrats are the two major forces which would accelerate the desirable transformation of loyalties and interests from national boundaries to a transnational setting (Haas,1964). The elite of the entire nation would coordinate themselves across the border to encourage their supposed interests. The technocrats would help such coordination of interest through their capability and develop institutions to protect, maintain and promote them. It is this combination of interest and institutions what Haas called Supranational (Haas, 1972).

Again Haas argued that the pooling of interests across the national borders and frontiers should be initially limited to economic matters only. The very process of integration could disrupt, if states started stretching into political and cultural spheres, since these are highly emotional, sentimental and controversial matters. However, at the same time, he did not restrict the integration process in economic sphere alone. He argued that it was expected that once the economic integration is attained and would become successful, it would spill over to other fields, which would fall, without any friction, into the process of integration. Thus Haas said, "supranationality symbolizes the victory of economics over politics."(Haas,1972). For which exactly he had to face a lot of criticism.

Hoffman well-timed reminded Haas that the success of economic integration not necessarily would spill over to the other field, to explain in his own words, 'high politics' of foreign and defence policies into the integrative spring. On the other hand, as Hansen demonstrated the efficiency of the European Integration in boosting the economic growth in the member states of the European Community has vigoured the potential of those states to take on independent actions in other areas of policy. Likewise Haas's confidence of the elite and technocrats to move forward the integration was also got criticized. Hoffman(Hoffman,1964) argued that the appearance of accomplishment of integration in 1960s was not because of the commitment of elites and technocrats to attain supranational institutions but rather due to the

assistance of American leadership and the conditions of cold war. It was thus this historical context that brought economic integration successfully in 1960s and not the elite agency.

In spite of these shortcomings, the Neo-Functional theory ruled supreme in the field of European Integration. Leaders like Jean Monnet and Henry spoke openly, adopted the basic principles of this theory and practised it too. However the transformation in 1970s, compelled Hass to announce the “the obsolescence of regional integration theory”.

3.4 Transactionalism

The transactionalist’s fundamental principle is that communication is the lone means of attaining the mutual significance, relevance and receptiveness, which differentiate “organised social groups from the random aggregation of individuals.”Deutsch, the prominent transactionalist theorist, introduced theories of cybernetics and general systems into the study of regional integration. Contrasting to the view of Hass, he believed that the process of integration takes shape when the population community of a particular region develops a sense of belongingness and sense of a single community and opt for such an agreement where common issues should be solved without choosing the way of physical coercion. He intended for finding a scientific inductive methodology, those conditions which are essential to enhance and maintain such social consensus.

He examined in detail ten case studies such as the unity of American states, the unification of England with Wales and Scotland, and German and Italian unification. Likewise he also examined the failure of achieving integration, for e.g. the failure in uniting Ireland with England, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy etc. After going through all these cases he deduced and suggested four background conditions for any integration process to succeed. Those were; mutual relevance of the units to one another, compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards, mutual responsiveness and some degree of generalized common identity and loyalty.

According to Deutsch, if all these conditions were fulfilled then an ‘amalgamated security community’ could be achieved. Where one who aspires only with peace and its maintenance, a ‘pluralist security community’ is attained. He recognised that the European Integration is in process to attain amalgamated security community whereas the NATO is seeking a pluralist security community. Thus the transactionalism does not argue for any kind of legal or institutional framework rather with the conditions, a sense of community, belongingness is necessary among the populations of a given region.

3.5 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

To Hoffmann, it is clear that there are actors other than national governments who are influential in the process of integration. In national politics, interest groups could affect government decisions, but he pointed out that they were not the only bodies to do so, as the party in office or officials from within the government would also assert pressure. He acknowledged however, that national governments were the key people who made the decisions, and that they could be seen to be especially powerful for two reasons. Firstly, as they had gained the legal sovereignty of their country, and linked to this, that had legitimacy in the form of being the only elected officials in the integration process. This opinion explains how it was the pursuit of national interest that led to supranational bodies gaining power.

This theory leaves nations with a much greater independence, and so integration happened on a level that was intergovernmental, only preceding to the degree the governments wished. He did however take note of the importance of the location of the state in the world structure, in much the same way realists do, and recognised this as another limitation on these governments. (Bache, George 2006)

Moravcsik built on the ideas of Hoffmann, and agreed with many of the key principles, such as the assumption that nations could be seen as rational and departing from realists approach to the state. He believed that the position governments entered into within international negotiations could be understood based on two factors. One was the economic interests within nation's interior, and the second was to understand how conflicting interests were resolved within the council of ministers. This was separated into two sections; agreement on a policy response and agreement on the institutional arrangements. Moravcsik's example involved monetary union (Moravcsik 1999), and he explained how without knowing the aims of the European Central Bank, it would not be feasible to understand negotiations regarding its constitution. This structure was used on 5 case studies; the Treaty of Rome (1955 – 58), the Common Agricultural Policy (1958 – 83), the European Monetary System (1969 – 83), the Single European Act (1984 – 88) and the Treaty on European Union (1988 – 91). Moravcsik arrived at the conclusion that national interests were concurrent to economic interests, ignoring any political bias and that any choices in favour of Europe came from the national governments, not supranational governments. He also realised that the negotiations would imitate the power of the states taking part, and that states allowing supranational bodies to make decisions were

attempting to ensure that all members would abide by these decisions. This rejected the confidence in the effectiveness of these organisations and also federalist ideology. (Bache, George 2006).

International Relations as a separate subject field and a distinct discipline owe a lot to liberal tradition and liberal thinkers. The liberals were the pioneers' serious scholars in making the International Relations on setting it on the firm foundations. Before the arrivals of liberal thinkers and scholars, the subject matter of International Relations were revolving around in studying and understanding the nature and dynamics of balance of power systems. The act of power balancing by the states was of central focus of their study and interest in International relations.

On the other side, the liberal scholars were putting their thought to explain, "What causes the war?" Can war be prevented? And is it possible to achieve a permanent, perpetual peace? The liberals demand was that the only purpose of the discipline of International Relations should be to search for achieving an ever lasting peace among the states in the International System. For the same purpose only, Jim George assembled these scholars under the banner of Neo-Kantian and this phase as Neo-Kantianism(George,1994).

The foremost aim according to the liberals, under the shambles of the First World War, was to question the well accepted clausewitzian idea of war, a doctrine of total war and war as an extension of diplomacy, as an instrument of foreign policy. The Allied Power waged war with Germany in 1914, the liberals argued; with the acknowledged intention of "a war to end war" that is a war for the peace. But did it led to the demise of the war. Absolutely not! Within 20 years all the states were again on the battle ground, for another war more destructible and disastrous than the previous one. H.G.Wells called this vicious cycle of war for peace, peace of war as 'drilling, trampling foolery in the heart of Europeans'.(Wells, 1939).

The First World War demonstrated the war has become disastrous and destructive on such a level, unthinkable a couple of centuries ago. So the liberals pushed the idea for the eventual end of war. Lord Bryce cautioned us in an appealing word: 'Unless we end war, War ends us'.(Wells,1939). In this context, for liberalists, the study of International Relations intended analyzing the causes of the war and come out with the practical methods to conquer this evil and achieve a long lasting peace. Different from the earlier diplomatic historical, the liberalists believed, that the study of international relations is just an academic exercise rather it is an examination of the possibility for our physical survival or rather an exercise of scholars and

intellectuals effort to decide what could be done to shun a collective destruction instigated by the so-called political elite who according to their principle, take action.(Krippendorff, 1982).

The Neo-Kantian desire for an ever lasting peace was the only intention and the driving force behind the setting up of institutions which are designed exclusively for studying the causes of the war. For the first time, a separate department for International Politics was set up at Aberystwyth in 1919. Hence Czemple announced 30th May as being the birth date of international Relations. Afterwards, The British Royal Institute of International Affairs, American Council of Foreign Relations and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were set up in 1920. The sole objective for the establishments of these institutions was to be studying scientifically the genesis of war and suggest solutions to prevent these wars to get reoccurred. Thus in the inter-war phase, the study of war and peace become the lone subject matter of International Relations.

It was in the same circumstances, Brails Ford published a book titled, “A League of Nation,” in 1916, in which he argued for setting up a supranational body which would regulate the affairs and relations of nations. Later Inspired and influenced from this book, Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States; led the United States in World War I, backing the formation of the League of Nations in 1919. The Wilsonian visualization of the future world order were moving around two axis: One that put emphasis on the formation of a supranational body of kind of League of Nations which would emphasize collective security instead of balance of power system and the other one that had emphasized on requirement of establishing a free trade agreement among the militaristic states, which would help in promoting peace and stability. For over two decades, these two aspects had become the foundations of liberal approach towards International Relations. Jim George clearly depicted this feeling as, “the League of Nations and The International Court of Justice, in this meaning, the institutional vanguard of the post-war liberal age in International Affairs.”(George,1994).

However, two succeeding historical war events have smashed the dreams of liberalist for achieving the everlasting world peace through their dream of supranational institutions and turned their design of new world order into ineffective and of no use. The fall down of weiner republic with the ascent of the power of Hitler in Germany and the succeeding fascist wave that moved across the European land, had made the supranational League of Nations insignificant and left with ineffective function. In the same time in the east, the collapse of the czardom and the succeeding socialist revolution in Russia had made the theoretical grounds of liberalism insufficient and ineffective. In this difficult situation the liberals opted for a rejuvenated

argument by emphasising for closer union of the states. H.G.Wells, displayed his liberalist sentiment as “the only way to organize world peace lies through a federation”.(George,1994).

At that point of time there were two schools arguing to explain for the causes of the war. Where one school argued that the war is among the capitalist nations is due to because of their tendency to compete to grow ;on the other side the second school argued that because of anarchy of the armed sovereign states and nonexistence of effective international law war takes place. The first school, led by Lenin, talked about the socialistic revolution which is the only solution to eradicate the capitalism which inherits the nature for war, which came to known as “critique of imperialism”. Thus Lenin provided the solution for preventing war in future through a radical shift from the existing political, social and economic conditions. On the contrary the liberal bourgeoisie war talking about the supranational states under which all the existing states could come and avoid the anarchical conditions in the international politics as the cause of the war or at least put them under an International law. The liberals were more contented compared to their counterpart by providing the solution of federal set up as an substitute to the anarchical conditions of International Politics.

The interesting thing to notice is that both the school argued for regionalism and explicitly favouring the notion of irrelevance of nationalism. Where Marx called for the workers of the world to unite by arguing that proletariat themselves have to make their own nation as they don't have any, on the other side liberals were also blaming the notion of nationalism as the cause of war and thus obsolete in the world scale.

...(sic) “ as being held today with something like religious fervour...and the evils of nationalism result from the excessive tyranny which these states exercise over their members and the lack of legal restraint in their relations with each other”.(Curry, 1939).

Hence they emphasized that till the international affairs are the battlefield of the purely national politics of sovereign states, the bigger issue related to mankind, in a holistic manner would be neglected. One scholar went to the extent of saying that “we need both an extension and a moderation of the group conscious at present associated with the nation”.(Curry,1939).

Where do we have to progress, when it at all ready, prepared to extent our consciousness of nation? The liberals would go for federal union. Federal system described by Clarence Streit in his popular book, ‘Union Now’ which he written during inter-war period as ‘a logical application to the whole world of liberal democratic government already discovered by mankind to the only way of combining liberty with order’.(cuury,1939).

Streit's book talked about three main theories: one for the existence of everlasting peace and creation of the world order, there is a necessity of world order. He, followed the path of hobbsian tradition argued that it was not possible to build an order in international arena, unless there is an overarching supranational body. Second the only international government which is both practical and harmonious with liberty and democracy is federal union. He aimed to form such a union through constitutional measures. For this he talked about the model constitution which is like based in USA, gave a rough idea of thematical issues of federal union. Lastly he argued, the concept of supranational entity should be initiated with the existing democracies rather waiting for the world to get ready. He believed that Europe is mature enough to shift towards such a federal union when compared to other continents. This euro-centric approach still to-date seems dominates the integration process.

3.6 Historical Institutionalism

Historical Institutionalism took up a position in between the two camps which are rational-choice and sociological institutionalism, by focusing on the effects of institutions over time (Thelen 1999, Pierson 2000 cited in Pollack 2009:127). In contrast to rational-choice approaches, scholars of historical institutionalism tend to reject 'functionalist' explanations for institutional design. Such functionalist explanations assume that institutions have been deliberately design by contemporary actors for the efficient performance of specific functions, such as the provision of policy-relevant information and little attention is paid to historical legacies. Scholars of historical institutionalism oppose this view, arguing that institutional choices taken in the past can persist, or become locked in, thereby shaping and constraining actors in time (Pollack 2009:127). Institutions therefore are 'sticky' and resistant to change, both because of the uncertainty associated with institutional design and because national constitutions and international treaties can impose significant transaction costs and set high institutional thresholds, such as supermajority or unanimous agreement for later reforms to be done (Pollack 2009:127).

Rational Choice institutionalism defining institutions as official narrow bodies and sets of judgements that exploit duties upon self – interested political players (Rosamond 2000: 115). Based on Hall and Taylor it is possible to show 4 features of this approach:

1. In general, they assume that the significant actors have a resolute set of desires or tastes, behave completely active so as to maximize the achievement of these preferences.

2. Rational choice institutionalism scholars tend to see political science as a sequence of united action problems. What avoids the players from taking a commonly – greater course of manners is the absence of conventional agreements that would guarantee matching conduct by others.
3. Highlight the role of tactical interaction in the resolution of state results. Following by that thinking actor's action is likely to be managed, not by detached historical compels , but by a planned calculus and, that this calculus will be thoroughly pretended by the actor's suppositions about how others are likely to act as well.
4. Difficulty of describing how organizations emerge. Intellectuals start by using assumption to appear at a stylized requirement of the operations that an institution presents(1996: 12 – 13).

Sociological Institutionalism defines institutions much more broadly to include informal norms and conventions as well as formal rules, emphasizing their capacity to socialize actors and thereby influence interests and identities (Rosamund 2000:204). Scholars of sociological institutionalism argue that such institutions constitute actors, thus shaping the way in which actors view the world. In contrast with rational choice models, in which actors are regarded as strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are taken as a given, sociological institutionalist accounts often start with the assumption that people act according to a logic of appropriateness, taking cues from their institutional environment, as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behavior for a given institutional environment (Pollack 2009:127). When referring to the European Union sociological institutionalist scholars have examined the process by which the EU and other institutional norms are diffused and shape the preferences and behavior of actors in domestic as well as international politics (Pollack 2009:127). Rosamund (2000:119) argues that for sociological institutionalists interests and identities are endogenous to (emanate from within) the processes of interaction that institutions represent, so that interests as well as the background for action are socially constructed, giving meaning to actors by institutional scripts. There are clear affinities between sociological institutionalism and social constructivism.

Chapter 4

COMPETING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: ON THE CONDITIONS OF EUROPEAN TERRITORIALITY

Since recent economic crisis has challenged and questioned the very structure of the European supranational institution, there is paucity of evidences which could suggest that Europe is going through de-territorialisation. The feasible approach to find out the whether the process of territoriality in Europe has kicked off is to analyse the changes in the variables which induced the process of integration of European states in past, under the roof of supranationality. This chapter would look at competing theories of European integration, comparing the explanations they have proposed for this process and evaluating to what extent the variables that each recognizes as having driven this process are still present, have waned or have disappeared. The European integration theories are discussed in ascending order, according to the extent to which at the time when they were developed, they were essentially optimistic concerning the Europe's future.

4.1 Realism

The current crisis the Europe is undergoing, whether it's economical, social or political, should be less shocking for realist international theorists than for the advocates of any other theories of European integration. Within no time, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the American realist John Mearsheimer presented Europe's future in extremely doubtful terms. According to Mearsheimer, if the Cold War comes to an end and the Red Army withdrew from Eastern Europe and American and British troops from Continental Western Europe- actions he expected were highly likely- the scenario for major crisis and war in Europe would 'increase markedly'(Mearsheimer, 1990 and Sjöblom, G.,1977).

He argued: 'if the present Soviet threat to Western Europe is removed and American forces depart for home, relations among the EC states will be fundamentally altered. Without a common Soviet threat and without the American night watchman, West European states will begin viewing each other with greater fear and suspicion, as they did for centuries before the onset of Cold War' (Mearsheimer, 1990).

Mearsheimer credited the failure of this situation to materialize in the decade subsequent his forecast to the fact that, contrary to his original anticipation, the US had kept its troops in Europe, though in lowered numbers, and NATO had survived (Mearsheimer, 2001). Even now certain a decade ago that the US would sooner or later pull out its troops from Europe, inciting 'more intense security competition among the European powers', Mearsheimer has for the time being become less sure that this situation will occur in reality, while kept on arguing that the US military existence is still the key explanation for Europe's peacefulness (Mearsheimer, 2001 and 2010).

From the lens of realist viewpoint like Mearsheimer, the disintegration of Europe would therefore most likely result from the US military withdrawal from the continent of Europe and a fall down of NATO. Nevertheless, in spite of decrease in the size of the US military presence in Europe, erratic apprehension in the trans-Atlantic military relationship, and ambiguity as to its future role, NATO has up till now continued the end of Cold War and even enlarged (Webber, 2011).

Moreover, ambiguity to the stability or dependability of the American obligation to European military security has so far directed to more rather than less security and defence cooperation among the European states. Even if at the stage of operational competence the supranational Europe's development has been limited and on some crucial issues, such as interference of military in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011, the European states were divided.

Opposite to what Mearsheimer expected, increasing disbelief among Europe's super powers over hard security matters is not at the core of Europe's present crisis. This side of the suspension of NATO that Mearsheimer expected, but that has not materialized. Realism does not produce any cause to fear that the supranational Europe might fall to pieces for the time being. The most negative theory regarding the long run feasibility of the Europe is built on a situation that declines to come true for the time being (Webber, 2011).

4.2 Classical Intergovernmentalism

Among all the theories propounded to explain the integration of Europe, intergovernmentalism is the one which is most alike to international relations realism. Similar to the realists in international politics, intergovernmentalism assign a far more principal role in the integration process to the Europe's big and powerful states than to the others. For Hoffmann, states, which are disagreed with the supranational organs such as the European Commission,

were also the crucial players. As in realist theories, nation-states could have different interests and in areas of security and foreign (high politics) would oppose the surrendering of policy making powers to supranational strongly much more powerfully than in the areas of trade and economics which are considered of low politics. Continuing integration not at all predetermined and the power and authority of supranational institutions stayed 'conditional, limited, reversible and dependent' (Hoffmann, 1966 in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006).

The central part of Hoffmann's analysis was reproduced in Moravcsik's 'intergovernmentalist institutionalist' approach (Moravcsik, 1991), but Moravcsik's 'intergovernmentalist institutionalist' was dissimilar from Hoffmann by evaluating in a different way the role of domestic-political and international-systemic variables and low and high politics in deciding the position of national governments on the issues of supranational Europe.

In Moravcsik's 'intergovernmentalist institutionalist' approach, the European integration is therefore dependent on the extent of convergence of the interests or preferences of the national governments of crucial member states by the necessity of domestic politics. Thus integration is not dependent on the structure of the international system as believed by realism. It should not be taken for granted that the convergence of the interests would also take place in future, as it had happened with regard to the Single European Act in the 1980s.

Nevertheless the two big powerful governments of Europe namely French and German's could convincingly intimidate to keep out the third big power, British from the process of integration and thus pressurize it to participate, a mutual Franco-German treaty could be adequate to keep the integration process on the movement (Webber, 2011).

Classical intergovernmentalism directs our consideration on the development and extent of convergence of the position of the German, French and British national governments as determinants of prospect of the integration of Europe. Development in these three governments relationship in the last two decades do not predict well for the Europe's future.

Rising British Euro-scepticism had made German-Franco threats to prevent the UK from the process of integration progressively more ineffective. It is not because that such threat cannot be put into practice, but quite because the British government has usually opted that, even if they were, the expenses of participation in mission of closer integration would surpass the gain. Therefore, closer integration- as with the Schengen Area and the Euro- has more and more attained a 'variable pattern' or 'multi-speed' pattern, with a group of radical member states introducing a project and the others consequently following it (Webber, 2011).

Despite the present crisis, the development of participation in such projects as the Euro, Schengen Accord and the Post Eastern enlargement Accord connected to the exchange of police data confirms to the progressing capability of Franco-German cooperation to produce strong centripetal effects that drag more and more member states, in spite of their preliminary reservations, to participate in closer integration. Evidently the Franco-German arrangements can rarely exercise a vital influence in Europe even after the enlargements of the member states after the post Cold War. Especially, when French and German governments form ‘two different poles in the Europe, surrounding of which other member states can come together (Webber, 1999 and Schild, 2010).

Though, as the concern of military intervention in Libya designated, the French and German governments cannot agree and work together at all times. Increasing political opposition in both France and Germany, to closer integration, as demonstrated by the results of the treaty referenda in France in 1992 and 2005 and the much recent controversy over the organization of the Euro crisis in Germany, has made the task difficult and processes of intervening Franco-German tension and the progression of Franco-German stance. Intergovernmentalism means that if an underlying failure occurs in Franco-German relations, this would definitely lead to European disintegration. Till autumn 2011, though, no such disintegration has taken place. Certainly, the Euro crisis had intensified the Franco-German teamwork, though the relationship appeared to be increasingly lop-sidedness- to Germany’s advantage (Schild, 2011).

4.3 International Relations Institutionalism

Institutionalist theories of international relations are cautiously hopeful for the integration of Europe. In spite of the matter that international relations institutionalist has the same opinion of realists that states are the prime actors in European as in world politics. They both do not partake the neo-functionalist viewpoint that international or regional organizations like the Europe could be significant players in their own right. Nevertheless, in opposite to realists, international relations institutionalists claim that such organizations can attain a high level of resilience or stability by helping states to surmount collective action problems, performing functions that these cannot, remarkably ‘facilitating the making and keeping of agreements through the provision of information and reductions in transaction costs’, observing compliance, lessening uncertainty and balancing expectations (Keohane, 1993).

However, international regimes can perform only if two requirements are fulfilled: 'Without a basis *either of hegemonic dominance or common interests*, international institutions cannot long survive' (Keohane, 1993). Institutionalists were nevertheless optimistic, as the Cold War came to an end that the Europe would prosper in the coming time. Keohane, for example, argued that 'Since common interests are likely to persist, and the institutions of the European Community are well-entrenched, ... the EC will remain a durable and important entity ... [It] will be larger and have greater impact on its members' policies in the year 2000 than it was when the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989' (Keohane, 1993). Keohane further said that his projection applied 'at least as long as continued cooperation will help governments attain their economic and political interests' (Keohane, 1993). In the same way, for institutionalists, international institutions had to be advanced and raised by the 'most powerful states' for them to be 'successful' (Keohane and Nye, 1993).

From an international relations institutionalist viewpoint, the crucial questions regarding to the Europe's future are therefore whether especially in the extended Europe there are adequately all-encompassing common interests connecting member states and whether, much as for intergovernmentalists, the 'most powerful states' – by which the US is as much denoted as the big three European members – keep on encouraging the integration process. The institutionalist literature does not state how the advancement of the incidence of common interests in the Europe could be established, excluding in a post-hoc fashion, according to whether and with what extent of easiness or difficulty the Europe has managed to make decisions. Although, if put the rest of the things being equal, increasing economic and other forms of interdependence may wield a countervailing effect, the post-Cold War expansion have surely boosted the Europe's socio-economic, cultural and political heterogeneity and therefore weaken the space of common interests among the member states. If common interests among member states should indeed be decreasing, then international relations institutionalists would anticipate the chance of European disintegration to have risen (Keohane and Nye, 1993).

The other crucial subject for international institutionalists is whether the 'most powerful states' still back and, in as far as they are European members, are willing to be restrained by the Europe. If this group contains the US, as it apparently does for Keohane and Nye (1993), potential for European integration may be less optimistic than they were before the ending of the Cold War. As shown, for example, by predominantly negative US reactions to European ambition to develop a military intervention capacity independent of NATO, American support for further European integration has grown more ambivalent during the last two decades. As the

Iraq war conflict indicated, the US continues to exercise considerable leverage over (non-Russian) Europe and trans-Atlantic conflicts normally also generate conflicts among European member states.

Among the ‘big three’ European members, as noted above, divergences of interest have grown between the UK, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, but these have not stalled the integration process or undermined the Europe, but rather led to the emergence of an increasingly differentiated Europe. From an international relations institutionalist as well as an intergovernmentalist perspective, the Europe’s future seems likely to ride on the evolution of the Franco-German relationship and especially on the capacity and willingness of the united Germany to underwrite the integration process in the same way that it did in the past. Institutionalists were struck by the extent to which as an international institution the EU had managed to shape Germany’s conception of its own interests in a ‘pro- European’ direction (Keohane and Nye, 1993). They certainly anticipated that the emergence of a ‘Europhobic’ Germany would have grave consequences for European integration.

If common interests should be waning and big powers should become less supportive of European integration, institutionalist theory would predict the end of European integration. Though, this may turn out to be a prolonged drawn-out process. For, even in the nonexistence of common interests, Keohane explains (1993), ‘organizational inertia, considerations of reputation, and connections to domestic politics mean that institutions often persist even when the conditions for their creation have disappeared’. In this situation, European disintegration would not happen suddenly, as a ‘big bang’, but considerably would be a gradual process of erosion, in which ever greater problems in accepting new legislation goes hand-in-hand with ‘an erosion of the existing *acquis* through creeping non-compliance and “institutional hypocrisy”’ (Iankova and Katzenstein, quoted in Scharpf, 2006).

4.4 Historical Institutionalism

Disapproving of intergovernmentalism, historical-institutionalist scholars of European integration make a case that, eventually, the capability of member governments to keep under control supranational organs such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice has declined and unification has become increasingly irretrievable. Pierson (1998) recognizes several factors that describe how ‘gaps’ in the capability of member governments to control

supranational actors appear: these actors' partial autonomy, the limited time horizons of political decision-makers in the member states, unexpected consequences, and changes in the preferences of the heads of member governments.

Once such gaps have appeared, member governments face an almost impossible task trying to fix them again, as the supranational actors resist them, the treaty-rooted institutional barriers to reversing them are high, and governments that do or would otherwise champion such changes are constrained by 'massive sunk costs' and by the high and rising price of exit, which makes any threat to leave the supranational Europe as a weapon to influence its policies increasingly implausible: 'While the governments of "sovereign" member-states remain free to tear up treaties and walk away at any time, the constantly increasing costs of exit in the densely integrated European polity have rendered this option virtually unthinkable' (Pierson 1998: 47).

The rationale of the historical institutionalism explains that the prolonged existence of the institution of supranational Europe, make it resistant from getting disintegrated. Although historical facts clearly indicates the disintegration of many regional or other international organizations failure to resist, thus collapsed (Mattli, 1999), the view that with the growing age of the institution, it also develops the resistance from complete disintegration is absolutely far-fetched. Though historical institutionalist believes that crisis could bring about 'relatively abrupt institutional change', however their concentration lies on the 'stickiness' of the historically developed institutional arrangements thus they give 'explanations of continuity rather than change' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

To characterize a pattern, Krasner, has employ a biological concept of 'punctuated equilibrium', in which elongated periods of stagnation are disturbed by 'short bursts of rapid institutional change' (Krasner, 1984). Although the historical institutionalist has not explained what they meant when by 'crisis' or the situation under which what they characterize as crisis , which could induce abrupt or radical changes, such as the de-territorialisation of Europe.

Therefore, it would be extremely challenging to conclude whether from an historical institutionalist viewpoint the European Union's present condition leads to a crisis that could trigger fundamental changes in the institution of European Union or may be its disintegration. However, as far as they accept the theoretical feasibility of extreme changes, though under rare circumstances, historical institutionalist analysis is reservedly more suspicious about the future of European integration than contemporary theories of neo-functionalism cum transactionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist.

4.5 Neo-Functionalism, Transactionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Ernst Hass and Karl Deutsch, who are related with the theories of Neo-functionalism and transactionalism respectively, both presented basically optimistic theoretical viewpoint on European integration. Though experiment and troubles of the supranational Europe in 1960s and 1970s made Hass and other scholars of Neo-functionalism learned that even more closer integration of Europe, politically, is feasible than ever. In the initial half of the 1970s, Hass acknowledged that the theory of regional integration all in all in total to be 'obsolescent' and scholars on the same wavelength proclaimed that not only 'spill-over' was feasible but also 'spill back' could be viable (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Schmitter, 1971 Hass, 1976).

As demonstrated in the work of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997), the recent neofunctionalist-cum-transactionalist theorizing, is to a great extent less unsure. In this point of view, European integration- is the result of unchangeable pattern increasing volumes of transnational exchanges, predominantly economic, but also other forms of exchanges, among the member national states to comply with more and more policy-making expertise to the European level, as the European level government structures develops in formal and informal rules and regulations. 'As transnational exchange rises, so does the societal demand for supranational rules and organizational capacity to regulate' (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997).

Once the stress created by the ongoing increased transnational exchanges, by the member states of Europe, leads to the formation of European governmental structures, exactly same as Hass explained the process of spill-over, a self-dependent, self-sufficient dynamic of institutionalization- procedure by which 'rules are created, applied, and interpreted by those who live under them'- starts to happen, fasten the member governments even more rigidly into the supranational Europe (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997).

Even if there is major economic crisis which could probably reduce the level of transnational economic exchanges in Europe, would not destabilize the European integration as it would make improbable by institutionalization. Sweet and Sandoltz argue that transnational relations 'will not drive the evolution of the Europe forever ... The more institutionalized supranational Europe's governance is, in any given sector, the more the Europe will, on its own, provide incentives to seek, and opportunities to pursue, additional supranational development. EU rules are increasingly dense; ambiguities and conflicts among rules are inevitable. Actors facing those ambiguities and conflicts in EU rules will want authoritative clarifications. The result will be to reinforce European organizations as arbiters of existing rules as well as

generators of new ones ... The European polity itself generates needs that will be met by enhanced supranational governance' (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999)

Moravcsik, the propounder of intergovernmental institutionalism, while signifying reconciliation between formerly opposing theoretical perspectives, has in the meantime arrived at likewise optimistic conclusions. Moravcsik acknowledged that the supranational Europe has developed a 'mature' constitutional order or 'constitutional settlement' that was not likely to be weakened, by any newborn challenges, to its 'functional effectiveness, institutional stability or normative legitimacy' (Moravcsik, 2008).

According to Moravcsik, the recent financial and sovereign debt crises, experienced by all the PIIGS economy, which affected the entire economic structure of the supranational Europe, did not endanger European integration, on the contrary, it led to a 'renewed European solidarity and seriousness of purpose', 'boosted the European project' and made the structure of Europe 'stronger than ever'(Moravcsik, 2009). Moravcsik stayed self-confident that the 'Cassandras....predicting the collapse of the Euro, if not the supranational of Europe itself' would be established incorrect (Moravcsik , 2010).

Moravcsik confidence, that the supranational Europe would survive, was based on his theory 'liberal intergovernmentalism' of European integration, which is later constructed on 'intergovernmental institutionalism'. There is a basic difference between these two theories of integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism argues that in recognizing European policy preferences, member states's economic policies act as a decisive factor. Its principal argument is that the 'increasing transborder flows of goods, services, factors, or pollutants create "international policy externalities" among nations, which in turn create incentives for policy coordination'(Moravcsik, 1993).

Moravcsik favoured the view that the member governments of Europe continued to be influential, whose power and authority is limited, independent of the Europe's supranational organs. The European member governments certainly do not all support cooperation to free trade and provide public goods, as their susceptibility to externalities differs, so regular and systematic political integration cannot simply be presumed (Moravcsik, 1993).

Nevertheless, escalating economic interdependence appears increasingly to close out other, one sided decision and to induce the member states to form or join together in closer integration. This is evident in Moravcsik's examination of Euro crisis. In related of which he argues that supranational Europe's member, because they "inhabit the world's most economically interdependent continent ... have no choice but to cooperate' and that France and

Germany must support Greece financially ‘to avoid a disastrous loss of confidence in French and German banks and bonds’ (Moravcsik, 2010).

4.6 The Prospect of European Territorial Integration: Analysis and Critique

After understanding the different competing theoretical perspectives on the European territorial integration, varied variables could be generated, which could have territorial disintegrative effect on the supranational Europe. With respect to the theory of Realism, Mearsheimer argued that the main factor of European integration is the distribution of military power. There could be a disintegrative effect, if NATO collapses which would lead to the multipolarity in Europe. What realism is actually projecting is that disintegration of Europe’s territory is unlikely, as long as United States keeps military presence.

It is the concerned preferences and interest of the three big European powers i.e. Germany, France and UK which is keeping the territoriality of Europe intact through their centripetal force, argues Moravcsik, the propounder of Classical Intergovernmentalism. If their interests declined or their preferences deviated then there would be danger on the supranational structure of Europe. But as long as France and Germany cooperate, as the theory is predicting, the territorial disintegration is too far to get materialized.

Keohone, the supporter of International relations Institutionalism theory, believes that the cooperation-facilitating role of the European institution, are responsible for the supranational Europe’s continuation. It would be success story, until if there is hegemonic dominance or will by any super power of Europe on the rest of the member states. This could be result in the decline of the member’s interests. Keohone through his theory completely agree and predicts that the European territorial integration is highly feasible. As long as Germany and France dominate the Europe, this fear of integration always hovers.

The pressure of ever-tighter institutions of Europe is leading to the cooperation of the member states towards the supra-structure of Europe. Historical institutionalism (Pearson; Thelen and Steinmo), claims that the territorial disintegration of Europe could be possible only when there is a very exceptional situation. Until or unless there is crisis or serious occasion in the European institution, but that would generally be induced externally.

Moravcsik in his theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism maintains that the supranational Europe's journey would be uninterrupted till the three big powers of Europe i.e. Germany, France and UK would be interdependent economically. They are the core members and are powerful enough to hold the periphery of the Europe's territory tightly. But the disintegrative factor is knocking at the door of the Europe, since there is an observable decline in the economic interdependence of these economies. There is also declining of interests among these members could be recognized. But since the interdependence is not so weak to snap, the territorial disintegration is not so feasible.

The European territorial disintegration is practically rejected by the Neo-functionalism/transactionalism(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz), even if there is serious crisis which could bring about collapse, the institutionalization would avert such move. The main factor which is surviving and developing the institution of territorial Europe is the spill over or transnational exchange and society. Disintegration could be presumed only when there would be weakening of transnational exchange and society or there is de-institutionalization.

If these theoretical variables are employed to generate the prospects as to the feasibility of European disintegration, the competing theoretical perspective could be segregated broadly into two categories. With the shortage of the unexpected process of collapse of economic interdependent, breakdown of transnational exchange in Europe in all levels, process of de-institutionalization, or a deep crisis that would crumple the very tightly held institutional arrangements of supranational Europe, the theories of neo-functionalism, transactionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism playing down the possibility of European territorial disintegration. On the other side suspicion about the supranational Europe is casted by the theories of international relations institutionalism and classical intergovernmentalism.

If observed from these outlooks then it seems that European integration is a much more a group phenomenon, balancing on the capacity of the interest of the member states, which has lessened with successive enlargement of the supranational Europe and on the level of hegemonic direction or coalitions of interests among the European Union's three big powers. But the coalition of these three big powers has weakened in as far as UK is concerned, which was unfavourable on generally most of the issues of closer integration, leaving the European Union's future in, progressively, more and more in the hands of the France and German partnership.

Ironically, realism in the version of Mearshiemer's perceives European future, in a very pessimistic way among all the perspectives of other theories of integration. This pessimistic

outlook developed from a situation, namely, the breakdown of NATO and the withdrawal of US military from Europe, at present scenario its materialization looks less feasible than that of the propeller of disintegration related with any of the other theories of European integration.

The resistance of the European Union and European integration's is demonstrated during the developments which have occurred in the last decade and particularly in recent times with the kicking off the Euro crisis, which gives ample empirical evidences as proofs to such theoretical perspective which talked about the continuation and spirit of European integration. However it would be too early to deduce that the boat of the European integration would sail through this crisis safely, unharmed.

4.7 The rise of national populist, right wing politics and the Europe's growing severe differences of opinion:

It has been seen during the last two decades that the public pressure has collapsed the liberal agreement created between the elites of the European Union to build much stronger integration and isolated European decision-making(Taaylor,2008; Majone, 2009). The domestic political opposition is observed in many member states, notably in UK, towards the European integration. However, there has been change in differences of opinions, which has lead to quality transformation in the European decision making, which started with the ending of the Cold War and post-Maastricht treaty.

Completely opposite to what Hass had predicted through neo-functionalism theory, transnational exchange has not succeed in bringing out the development of European political identity, as Stone and Sandholtz acknowledged, while stating that 'there is substantial room for supranational governance without an ultimate shift in identification(of loyalties and identities of actors....from the national to the European level) '(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998; Kuhn,2011).

Among the citizens of the member states, the Europeans, of supranational Europe, those who have 'deep economic and social ties with their counterparts across Europe' and gain from Europe 'materially and culturally'- account for not more than 10 to 15 per cent of the total European union population (Fligstein, 2008). In the analysis of Fligstein, it is estimated that there are two categories of citizens, one with the 'more shallow' relationship to Europe which comprises 40-50 per cent or virtually no relationship which accounted 40-50 per cent. With the result the lack of Europeans among the European Union citizens creates popular support for the

institution and the integration process is rested upon the development of economic variables. The belief, that in the post Maastricht period, the European Union is on a wide scale linked with the economic crisis, economic stagnation and austerity with the introduction of single currency, has diminished (Taylor, 2008).

The increasing sentiments of anti European and Euro sceptical, has given the way for the emergence and growth of right wing political parties to gain ground in Europe, which is increasingly evident with their rising number in the European legislatures, which are completely against the European integration. These political parties have acquired power to such an extent that in some member states, they can influence make or break the ruling governments (Spiegel Online, 2011).

It is now become increasingly difficult for the 'pro-European' ruling parties to ignore the sentiments and demands of right wing populist whose numbers are on rise in the legislatures of many member states, as their stance is politically threatening to the integration process. The capability of the national populist parties is expanding at the European level, as their participation in government formation has become essential (Spiegel Online, 2011).

With the tilting of European political power weighing scales towards the anti-European political forces, the capability of the state governments to manage the European Union agenda – which is prerequisite for the fulfilment of the demand of economic interdependency which would transfer its role politically further to integration promoting decisions, has been wear down. The reason being, firstly, all the state governments are in tremendous pressure to legalise European Union decisions which causes the amendments in the treaty. This movement of member states makes the institution susceptible and thus attracts the mood swing of the public opinion, which is making the future of the European integration fragile (Spiegel Online, 2011).

Euro crisis demonstrated the second reason for growing popularity of the right wing populist. As the national governments had to implement forcefully the decisions of the European Union, such as the measure of austerity, in spite of public protest, mass anger, wide scale strikes called the capacity of the national governments implementation of rules into question. The effect of, economic crisis was already felt even before the crisis of post-2008. With the wild protest across Europe against the governments and violence breaking out among the people of Europe especially the young unemployed youths, reminds French President Sarkozy, to warn with the threat of repetition of 'pan-European May 1968'(Philips, 2008).

Such behaviours of European mass would restrain the national governments willingness to make or to implement austerity measures for the sake of 'Europe'. This has created a wide rift,

on the side of member states, between the fulfilling the requirement of the domestic politics and obligation of recognizing the European Union's decisions. This apprehension was clearly demonstrated with the going back of Greece in respect of the austerity measures when put into operation in return of the financial aid as well as the suspicion on the side of creditor whether they will keep their promise of aid in future also.

European Union has entered into the unknown territory since with the implementation of single currency, euro. With the radicalism developed in the member states, the threat, which would disintegrate one or other side disintegrate the European Union has significantly increased. European integration theories which are propounded before and just after the Cold War have undermined the European Union's susceptibility and overstated its resistance in the precarious economic and political scenario.

4.8 Germany: Rising semi hegemonic European power. Its role in the European territorial integration

For Moravcsik (Liberal Intergovernmentalism) increasing the levels of transnational exchange and for Sweet Stone and Sandholtz (Neo-functionalism/transactionalism), increasing economic interdependence, progressively more and more limiting the scope of policy options receptive to member governments and compelling them to agree in options that bring about closer integration. Scepticism raised by interspatial comparative analysis on whether European integration is as vigorous institution as neo-functionalist, transactionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist viewpoints propose.

Although there is a close link between the levels of intra-regional trade and political integration which is shown by the cross-regional comparison. Therefore, in 2008, 42.5 per cent of intraregional trade is accounted, of overall trade in East Asia and 40 per cent in North America, approximately two-thirds of the figure for the member countries of European union, which was around 64 per cent (Shih and Chang, 2009). Although, the trade done between the APEC's 21 member states, is to some extent higher proportion of their, on the whole, trade than between the member states of European Union.

In East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and North America, the intensity of trade policy and other kinds of cooperation, have actually increased during the last decades, advocating the fact that indeed the increasing levels of economic interdependence and economic exchange compel and pressurize governments to institutionalize their economic bonds. On the other hand, the political

integration are not even distantly comparable of Europe with the East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and North America (Katzenstein, 1997).

Apparently the effect of increasing levels of economic exchange and interdependence on political integration is intervened and limited by other superseding factors. Therefore the political exceptionalism of Europe cannot be ascribed to an exceptionally incorporated regional economy. Europe's political integration can be understood from the factor of 'benevolent leading country' which explains the most from the rest of the factors, more than economic variables, which is observed by the comparative analysis of cross regional variations with respect to political integration (Mattli, 1999).

Mattli defined through his analysis the prerequisite conditions which makes the regional integration successful as the 'extent to which integration groups manage to match their stated integration goals'; he recognized such existence of circumstances as one of the two crucial descriptive variables, the same conditions stated by Cohen also for successful survival of multinational monetary unions (Mattli, 1999; Cohen, 1998).

Mattli recognized the other rare flourishing trade region of integration like the European Free Trade Association, before it successfully declined with the incorporation of UK in the European union in 1973 or the NAFTA – would not have turned to reality, unless the leading member states' support to such integration. In these cases UK in the EFTA and US in NAFTA played a crucial role in integration of such trade region according to Mattli's account.

But in these both cases, the 'stated integration goals' of member states was much more restricted than those member states who are associated with the European union. Since neither US before becoming a part of NAFTA nor UK before getting associated with EFTA, aimed to form anything else than a free trade area. European union is different from these two free trade regions with respect to political integration in the sense that of the absence of any 'leading states' and non existence of extraordinary exalted level of economic integration but instead contrary to other leading member of regional powers, Germany in the case of Europe- has followed a drastic programme which involves in the formation of a quasi-federal European state.

Based on the hegemonic stability theories of international relations, Mattli analysed that, the leading regional powers execute two crucial functions in terms of political integration. They act first as a 'focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies' and help and second by means of financial assistance, to 'ease tensions that arise from the inequitable distribution of gains from integration' (Mattli, 1999).

The reason behind the poorer member states regularly persistence, upon a condition for their association in polices of not only the liberalization of the European market and the monetary integration which showed in the Maastricht treaty, is the function of ‘regional paymaster’ played by the Federal Republic in the European union which contributes the largest share in the European budget. This step was influential for the materialization of the Common Agricultural Policy, which became the reason for the France to join in the integration process (Lange, 1992).

The recent economic crisis of Europe is averted for the time being, only, when the temporary and permanent bail-out funds were formed in 2010 and 2011 to prevent the Euro zone from collapsing. In which Germany contributed more than one-fourth of the budget that is 27 per cent. Germany’s power to make or break the Euro Zone or the entire concept of the Europe is rested on the fact when Chancellor Merkel enters in the room, to discuss the economic crisis which is hovering around on Europe with conservatives European leaders, everyone ‘fell silent’ (Rachman, 2011).

If historically seen, Germany has not offered continuously, ‘focal point’ for the European policies, rules and regulations. On the contrary it has put back the decision on France on vital issues. However, with the enlargement of Eastern Europe, it took up as a ‘central network position’ in the process of European negotiation (Naurin and Lindahl, 2008). European policies do not indicate excessive preferences given to Germany. It is not the dominance or hegemonic power of Germany, but compromise and consensus, which govern the process of decision making (Achen, 2006; Schneider et al.2006).

As long as the European institutions assure the German organization to gain access to a large European market and save Germany from getting isolated against the danger of diplomacy, such existence, provides Germany with the advantages of economic and political gain, which far weigh the contribution of Germany in the net budget of Europe. Though Germany does not affect the decision process, but as a regional paymaster, it does act more as a semi-hegemonic as to characterised itself as hegemonic power in Europe (Achen, 2006; Schneider et al.2006).

The sustenance of German support to the process of European integration is dependent on the fact of Europe’s deep reliance on Germany’ financial power, which is keeping the European Union survived. Though since the late 1990s the position of Germany’s strong role towards the notion of ‘pro-European’ has grown weaker and ambiguous (Schieder, 2011). With the Germany’s bailing out of the debtor states in the Euro-Zone, turned the press, public

emphatically hostile. Public opinions become more divided and precarious situation developed for the entire notion of Supranational Europe.

To the transfer of more extra policy making capabilities to the supranational Europe is being resisted, likewise, by the federal states. Though the recent European treaties are not contrary with the basic laws of Germany, declared by the Federal Constitutional Court, its decision seems to limit the level to which more powers may be transferred to the supranational Europe from the national level. It is now clearly demonstrated in numerous political parties of Europe which believes and their roots are in 'Anti-European' or 'Euro-sceptical' which are gaining popularity across the breadth and length of Europe. Particularly parties which have acquired this ideology are the Bavarian Christian Social Union, Free Democratic Party and the Left Party (Schieder, 2011). The discussion about Europe among the political leaders has become more interest based and less idealistic, which is signalling the generational changes in the elite class of German politics (Paterson, 2011; Becker and Maurer, 2009).

Although, still, no deep seated proposal change has took place in the European policy of Germany. In the early period of the euro crisis, the interior minister of Germany has cautioned other members of the supranational Europe that it was going ahead to protect and look after its interests robustly and 'act just as other European countries do in Brussels', with a caution he further added 'this will not make it automatically anti-European'(Financial Times, 2010).

As compare to other member states, the political strain above the governing centre-right coalition, over the changing of the fundamental outlook of European policy orientations is weaker. In Germany there is, yet, no party with anti-European, national-populist viewpoint and even the major opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party, also the Greens have remained pro-European. Governments and opposition leaders, similarly, recognizes in their discussion that Germany has got geopolitical interests as well as economic interest in backing the European integration. This of course is linked to the economic dependency on export by Germany to the rest of the member states to the European markets and also the political dependency on Europe to moderate anxiety among the neighbouring states and prevent the possible diplomatic isolation of Germany (Ewing and Dempsey, 2011).

In the coming times it seems possible that, the next German federal government will be formed by red-green coalition, it will support for European integration, pro-European', more than the existing governments. Thus there would hardly be any change in the paradigm of Germany's European policy in the coming years. If the red-green coalition comes to power, it has to face the centre-right opposition which could make it feel confined to the domestic political

calculations to acquire a notably more oppositional stance towards the European union and European integration. If the economic dependency of export of Germany to the European market shifted to Asian market, then this inducement would become more strong and could disturb one of the pillars supporting German pro Europeanism((Ewing and Dempsey, 2011).

Thus to the continuation of Europe integration the support of the Germany is very essential. But Germany's solo commitment is not sufficient to keep the process of integration moving confirming the fact that it is no more than a semi hegemonic in the Europe. As other hegemons dominate their region like US in North America or Russia in CIS or India in South Asia for that matter, Germany with the share of 27 per cent in Euro-zone and accounting for one-fifth of European Union GDP, does not rule the European region at least economically.

Single headedly it could not rescue the debtor European economies out of the economic crisis as it does not have that much financial capacity nor it could act as an exclusive paymaster of European Union. Such issue can be dealt only by the cooperation of the member states whose governments may be more firmly restrain by the growing disagreement on European Union issues than the German. More than Germany, French participation is also crucial in rescuing the debtor economies out of crisis as it make up roughly fifty per cent of the Euro zone economy, combined with Germany.

The financial aid for the debtor states by Germany is less challenged or questioned in France than in Germany itself, yet, there is no any danger in near time that Germany would not find sufficient strong member states to handle this crisis. If there is some kind of reconciliation related to ideological and practical-political between the mainstream and right wing populist as a result of the progress of the National Front, then the long term French support to the European integration cannot be presumed than the German.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Europe has traversed a long path in the way of territorial integration, which started with the Westphalia treaty where initially the sovereignty of each state of Europe had been recognised. From there it reached to the level of supranationality, where the states are talking about the erasing of boundaries, borders between the states of Europe, so that they all come together to join to create a supra-territory. The very fascinating and paradoxical thing about European territorial integration is the same states which fought with each other in the past, were enemy to each others are now talking about the resilient supra-territory to form a single, unbreakable 'Europe'.

But the recent economic crisis, of which some claimed the biggest one after the Great Depression of 1930s, has questioned the very structure of the institution of Europe. It implicitly exposed the susceptible nature of the supranational Europe. the crisis carried with it not just the huge recession in the European market on whose legs the roof of the supranational Europe is resting, but also, unemployment particularly among the young 'Europeans', collapsing of many banking systems, implementation of austerity measures particularly to the culprit economies of PIIGS. All this led to some, members of Europe, turn ugly which was manifested in racial attacks; bombing, wide scale strikes etc.

It is very challenging to visualize about the de-territorialisation of Europe, from where it would slip back to the period of Westphalia, when it had been the "States of Europe". But it would be unwise to rule out such situation in the coming years. "History repeats itself". Even if the supranational Europe shatters into the pieces of states, it would start with the failure of Euro Zone, of which some states of supranational Europe are members. One should not forget that almost all the economically sound states are its members, who are driving engines of the Europe particularly Germany and France.

Euro zone formation, a zone of single currency, is one of the highest developed steps in the territorial integration, taken by the few states for further closer integration. But the waves of crisis has fractured the euro zone, so much so that it forced the head of the largest economy of Europe, Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel, to utter "If the Euro fails, then not only the

currency fails...Europe will fail, and, with it, the idea of European Unity”(Spiegel Online, 2010). This single statement reveals that the entire design of ‘Europe’ is based on the pillars of economy. Economy is the driving force of further integration.

How economically and politically powerful, Germany is, can be sensed when it provided 27 per cent of total budget of bail-out funds, created to rescue the debtor states of Europe. Since in the early paragraph, it was understood that with a single negative declaration from Germany regarding the European prospect, could jeopardize the entire concept of supranational Europe, the dream of ‘One Europe’. Thus, it is doubtful that supranational Europe would endure for long if Germany decreases its obligation particularly in the financial matters, for a good number of years, towards European integration. Although no such things could be observed from the side of Germany’s European policy in recent time, neither just rounds the corner.

However it is possible that in the coming years, a substantial change could be seen. But now it seems that Germany would go for a balanced approach. Neither it would tackle the issue of Europe with a strong attitude as a type of its European policy of Britishization nor would it keep on agreeing on the intensification measures hesitatingly and unwillingly, for further profound integration of Europe. This attribute of Germany, which is the ‘paymaster’ of Europe, could demonstrate some peculiar steps in such situation.

Since all the PIIGS economy were on the verge of bankruptcy, and could have collapsed economically and politically, if proper measures would not have taken by Germany and France in proper time. Though it bailed out the debtor countries, but the problem is not solved yet, it is just deferred for a short period of time. The real catastrophe is yet to appear if proper actions will not be taken timely. Since the funds will be generated by the taxation of citizens of Germany and France and rest of all the members of Europe to save the European economy from getting collapsed, and so, with it its political integration.

So in coming years it would dictate the euro zone with its own preferences, which would fulfil its own interests. All the members have to pay the price if they want Germany to lead the engine of European’s economic and political integration. If Germany adopts this measure, it would hold the ‘hegemonic’ position in Europe, as America in North America and India in South Asia, besides being the paymaster of the European region.

Hegemonic Germany would then play a crucial role in the management of supranational Europe, where it would decide the enlargement or restriction of members in the institution. Such move would fulfil its preferences and provide it with a ‘power of veto’. So in crucial decision, the interest of Germany would be given highest priority, as it already favouring for the

process of intergovernmental decision making. Such move would indicate Germany support for its union method, where the autonomy and power is given to member states and European council and less prominent role would be given to the European commission- a supranational structure instead of following the previous community method.

It is now well established that the Euro Zone policy process is not practicable after the crisis, and so it also negates the situation of enlargement of the supranational Europe which would make it much more unmanageable and would paralyse the entire process of decision making. Less the members, more would be the power of influence the members. Thus it may encourage a new type of strong integration policy which would lead to much more territory. It would ensure that the new territorial integration would be small, manageable, less interconnected by rearranging the existing supraterritory. Though such ideas were already conceive, although not implemented, it's now only waiting for its official acceptance particularly in respect to the Euro zone (Scharph, 2010; Henkel, 2010).

Nonexistence of any supranational harmonization over the issue of such idea by powerful central organs, such development would expected to lead to a union of states instead of a federal Europe conceived on a Franco-German 'hard core' that was once supported by 'pro-European' leaders of Germany(Fischer,2000). Germany would try to influence the policy of European integration or on the matter of supranational Europe, which could lead to antagonism towards Germany may develops in rest of the member states, possibility of resurrection of 'German Question', of whose reconciliation only the integration of Europe is envisaged (Guillebaud,2011).

Theories of European integration like historical-institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism-cum-transactionalism hypothesizing that collaboration between European states is for the time being so greatly institutionalized and the linking of states through economic integration that join them together are so resilient that it would not be feasible to project the disintegration of Europe. Whereas theories of international relations institutionalism and classical intergovernmentalism don't predict that European idea is destined to fail or there would be disintegration of Europe. Instead the endurance of Europe and the process of continuation of European integration is reliant on the obligation and adherence of Germany, which though very much present, but it seems that the case would not be same in the future as convinced as it was before the ending of the Cold war and the division of Germany. This idea though is too less negative as the original neo-functionalism propounder Hass, viewed Germany. He was

convinced that with the reunification of Germany was a process itself which closed the door of European integration further.

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