

**Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement in Europe
1977—1983**

AMITABH MATTOO

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
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

New Delhi-110 067

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT IN EUROPE : 1977-1983" submitted by Mr Amitabh Mattoo in partial fulfilment for the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



PROF. M. ZUBERI
Supervisor



PROF. T. T. POULOSE
Chairman

Dated: 4th June 1986.

PREFACE

This dissertation might never have been written had the opportunity to experience the Anti-Nuclear Movement at its peak not occurred, during a visit to the United Kingdom in the winter of 1983-84.

I express my gratitude to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Bath, United Kingdom for literally flooding me with information on the Movement.

My greatest debt is of course to my Supervisor, Professor M. Zuberi. His academic depth and intellectual sweep combined with a wit, rare in such circles, served to inspire me constantly and made the otherwise tasking job of writing a dissertation extremely enjoyable.

Discussions with Venkatesh Verma helped clear my ideas and Sunil Adam, while not agreeing with many of the conclusions, gave some excellent suggestions.

And Mr Pahwa dispelled fears of my illegible handwriting by his near perfect typing.

Dated: June 4, 1986.


Amitabh Mattoo

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe during the end of the 1970s, with a firm social basis and spearheading other protest movements,¹ posed a series of important questions for social scientists.

To some it seemed to signify a transition from an earlier minor 'protest movement'² to a large scale 'Social Movement'.³ To other analysts it seemed to confirm a thesis which suggested that class struggle originates in a post-industrial society more due to alienative effects of subordination to technocratic decisions rather than mere material exploitation.⁴ The argument was extended to propose the fact that the Anti-Nuclear Movement had assumed the role of "the social movement" hitherto reserved by Marxist analysts to the industrial labour movement in an advanced capitalist economy.⁵

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- 1 Minor protest movements such as the Environmental Movement, the Feminist Movement etc.
 - 2 Protest Movements are limited in the change they desired as also in spatial expansion. They take the form more often than not of a 'Pressure Group'. See International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York), vol. 14, 1968, p. 439.
 - 3 Social movements are mass-based, seek a radically different social order and a change 'from the roots'. See *ibid.*, p. 440.
 - 4 See Alain Touraine, "Crises or Transformation", in N. Birnbaum, et al., Beyond the Crises (Oxford, 1977). Also see, A. Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London, 1973).
 - 5 Alain Touraine, *ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

This dissertation does not attempt to go into these questions per se. (It will attempt primarily to provide an analytical history of a movement which it sees as having tremendous consequences for the society and polity of the countries where it has manifested itself. And the study hopes to provide purposeful understanding of the movement's dynamics and dimensions. The role of public opinion, voiced through extra-parliamentary means, on policy formulation in liberal democratic states is also analysed.)

The dissertation has been divided into three parts. Each chapter is a complete whole in itself. Chapter I attempts to analyse the political events and social forces that led to the birth and evolution of the movement. Chapter II confines itself to examining the ideas that have been voiced by the movement and attempts at analysing the alternatives that have been articulated. Chapter III is devoted to a study of the impact that the movement has had on the countries of Western Europe in general, with two specific case studies of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. There exists no other comprehensive study of consequences - in terms of treating the Anti-Nuclear Movement in all of Western Europe as one whole.⁶ | The sources almost completely textual:

6 Various studies, however, have been made of specific countries such as Elin Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (Kent, 1984); and John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, ed., The CND Story (London, 1983).

primary sources such as the pamphlets and newspapers brought out by the movement have been consulted, all other sources are secondary. The study covers the years spanning from 1977, the year in which the Soviet Union deployed the first SS-20s to 1983, the year in which the NATO deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles started - the main issue that the movement was fighting against. The terminology used in the dissertation conforms to generally accepted social science vocabulary. Explanations, wherever needed to clarify concepts, are provided.

Analysing contemporary history has its problems, especially if the subject is as complex as a social movement: small events can alter the basis of the study completely. Nevertheless, it is a fascinating exercise - at the cost of sounding frivolous - like a game of chess. Once the opening moves have been made and the middle game is on board, a good player can visualize the shape that the game will take, but as in chess, so in analysis, one wrong move and the gambit fails. That there can be no general theory of social protest is a sine qua non of the individuality of each societal change but if the dissertation helps in providing even a small insight into the complex phenomenon of popular protest the researcher's objective will have been fulfilled.

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

The Anti-Nuclear Movement is a non-institutionalized challenge to the monopoly of the government in devising and implementing a defence policy which is seen as alien to the needs of the people.

An analysis of the origins of any social movement,¹ working on the assumption that societies are constantly experiencing change must identify not only the 'conditions' which are exceptional enough to demand responses outside the existing power structures and political institutions of the state but also the 'factors' responsible for creating these conditions.² Therefore, any attempt at understanding when and why protest takes roots outside the traditional grievance-solving mechanisms of the polity must concern itself with an understanding of the forces that have led to its growth.

1 For a detailed discussion on the origins of social movements, see John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York, 1973); Seweryn Braler and Sophna Slizar, Radicalism in the Contemporary Age (Cotarada, 1977); E.H. Carr, Studies in Revolution (London, 1962); and for more recent studies, Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Paley, Politics of Social Change : A Reader for the Seventies (New York, 1981).

2 John Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 33.

The underlying forces may be analysed in three stages - the impact of similar previous movements on the contemporary movement, the immediate issues and events that sparked off the movement, and the influence of super-structural factors,³ such as societal and cultural issues, on the Movement.

This pattern of analysis is of course far from being exhaustive. A more comprehensive study would need to include a socio-psychological study of the structure of the movement⁴ - the values and beliefs, aspirations and ideals, inter alia of the activists.⁵ Such a study is however beyond the scope of this chapter as it would alter its emphasis.⁶

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- 3 The term 'super-structural factors' is used only to distinguish those factors which have no direct causal relationship with the origins of the movement, yet contributed to its growth from issues which were basic to its evolution.
- 4 This point is made decisively by Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge, 1981).
- 5 See Alain Touraine, et al., Anti-Nuclear Protest - The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France (Cambridge, 1983). Arguing that the true nature of the movement can only be discovered by a dialogue between the participants and the sociologist, Touraine puts into practice the research methodology of 'sociological intervention'.
- 6 This chapter emphasizes general causes for the evolution of the Movement all over Western Europe and does not go into specific idio-syncracies of each region.

Background

For a researcher the roots of the subject are important especially so, if the subject is of contemporary history. It enables him to place not only the subject in a proper historical perspective and socio-political context⁷ but on the basis of the study of similar previous movements and the course they took to attempt a prediction of the future of the present movement. The temptation, nevertheless, to read too much into the past and prophesy far too much for the future has been scrupulously avoided.⁸

Even though history has numerous examples of Anti-war and Pacifist Movements,⁹ only the Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements of the late fifties and early sixties in Europe will be studied here to establish a background to the contemporary movement. The drastic change that nuclear

7 For a detailed analysis of the historical method see E.H. Carr, What is History? (London, 1972); Marc Bloc, The Historian's Craft (Manchester, 1963).

8 Michael Howard makes this point emphatically in his essay, "Reassurance and Deterrence", Western Defence in the 1980s, Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, 1982-83, pp. 309-24.

9 For a concise history of Anti-War and Pacifist Movements read Peter Brook, The Roots of War Resistance - Pacifism from Early Churches to Tolstoy (New York, 1981), and Max Plowman, The Faith called Pacifism (London, 1936).

weapons brought to traditional notions of war and peace is too well known for any elaboration.¹⁰

Forums such as the Pugwash Movement and the Stockholm Appeal will also not be studied here.¹¹ They have no doubt played a role in creating an awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons but they were never meant to assume the dimensions of a popular protest movement.

It should be noted that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) which was launched in Westminster, London, on 17 February 1958¹² was the single most important unit of the movement of the fifties and sixties (henceforth referred to as the Previous Movement) and is also the largest single group of the Contemporary Movement, most of the present leadership having played a significant role in the fifties and sixties.¹³

Perhaps the single most important point of departure from the Previous Movement lies in the geographical spread of the contemporary Movement. While the former was restricted

10 David C. Grompert, Michael Mandelbaum and others, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics (New York, 1977) gave a detailed analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on international politics.

11 They will be discussed in some detail in the section on superstructural causes.

12 The Times (London), 18 February 1958.

13 John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, ed., The CND Story (London, 1983), p. 149.

to the United Kingdom and to some degree the Federal Republic of Germany, the latter is spread all over Western Europe and even in some countries of Eastern Europe. "It is a mass movement of continental dimensions which mobilizes and moves people across borders, something quite exceptional even in the partly integrated Western Europe of today".¹⁴ Never before in the history of Western Europe has protest acquired such vast dimensions. "This is probably the first time that a mass movement has emerged simultaneously in all the countries of Western Europe. Not even the great wave of 1968 had this European scale and this spontaneous kinship of language."¹⁵

The geographical spread is partly due to the long-term impact of the crucial decisions taken in 1959.¹⁶ That those decisions contributed to failure as well success is a

14 Stanley Hoffman, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons : Reason and Unreason", Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, winter 1981-82, p. 328.

15 Lucio Magri, "The Peace Movement and Europe", in Edward P. Thompson and others, Exterminism and Cold War (London, 1982), p. 117.

16 In January 1959, a conference had been held in London and partly in Frankfurt which led to the establishment of a European Federation against Nuclear Arms. See Minnion and Bolsover, ed., n. 13, p. 17.

different matter.¹⁷

In order to distinguish between the structures of the two movements, it is essential to examine the political and social climate in which each originated. It will be useful to take for the sake of convenience the case of CND, a group common to both the Movements.

Socially, economically and culturally the 1950s in which CND had its first birth, were a watershed.¹⁸ On the economic front a new system had replaced the chaotic 'bad old days' of the late 1920s and 1930s period of depression. Keynesian techniques of economic management appeared to secure permanent employment and a steady economic growth.¹⁹ The material affluence which resulted from this economic success had profound consequences for the social and political

17 Minnion and Bolsover, ed., n. 13, quote Peggy Duff, the then General Secretary of CND to describe the limits of the Federation. "One was the refusal of the West-Germans to have any dialogue at all with Russians or East Europeans, for fear of being seen as pro-Communist. Another was a "ration" of two organizations from each country, which with other restrictions, was designed to keep out direct organizations, p. 17.

18 Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard, The Protest Makers - The British Nuclear Disarmament Movement of 1958-1965, Twenty Years On (London, 1980), p. 3.

19 Ibid., p. 3. See also G.D.N. Worswick and P.H. Ady, eds., The British Economy in the 1950's (London, 1962).

structures of industrialized countries. Particularly important was the growth of a new and unique culture; for the first time young wage-earners had the economic basis for independence which enabled them to reach out and build their own cultural autonomy.²⁰

Domestically this was a period of confusion and disillusionment in British left politics²¹ while the international situation was characterized by the 1956 Suez invasion and suppression of the Hungarian uprising, heightening the tension of the cold war.²²

The combined result of cultural and political crises also increased scepticism and mistrust of the old ideologies and old institutions.²³ After 1956 there was a new idealism ✓ in the air but few political issues to provide an outlet for it.²⁴ It was out of this vacuum that the nuclear disarmament

20 For an excellent discussion and analysis of cultural values of that time, see G. Melly, Revolt into Style: The Pop Arts in Britain (London, 1970), and Christopher Driver, The Disarmers (London, 1964).

21 The Labour Party had been internally divided between the 'Bevanite' Left and the 'Gaitskellite' Right. There was disillusionment with the communist parties especially after the Hungarian repression. The Right represented by the conservative party consolidated its hold on the British electorate by victories in 1951, 1955 and 1959.

22 For an account of the Cold War and its impact on the British, see Driver, n. 20.

23 Taylor and Pritchard, n. 18, p. 2.

movement erupted.²⁵ "What better symbol of the insane, corrupt crassly materialistic yet technologically sophisticated society could there be than the H-Bomb?"²⁶ Here was a cause indeed and the new generation - or a substantial portion of it flocked to its banners.

The CND was therefore born in a climate of well-being and in the context of a desire for a 'new' culture and the intensification of the cold war. The main participants were,²⁷ the 'angry youngmen' and the means that were adopted to channelize their crusade of morality²⁸ were through Anti-Nuclear demonstrations.

The Anti-Nuclear demonstrations reflected therefore a more spontaneous outburst of protest in moral and ethical terms rather than a serious concern for survival for a lack of faith in the Atlantic alliance or the superiority of the United States.²⁹

25 Ibid. See also Peggy Doff, Left, Left, Left (London, 1971).

26 A.G.R. Groom, British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974), p. 326.

27 The 1960 annual march to Aldermaston had 10,000 marchers of which most were youth. See *ibid.*, p. 386.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 400.

29 See Hoffman, n. 14, pp. 346-72.

The rebirth of the CND took place in 1980, a period of neither economic well-being nor or alliance stability. Recession and economic stagnation had badly affected the West European welfare state. Unemployment was rampant, inflation was on the rise and the second oil crisis of 1978-1980 had resulted in recession. There was not only little faith in old ideologies and institutions among the youth but also no new alternatives seemed to be emerging.³⁰ Politically detente was on its way out. The Soviet Union had intervened in Afghanistan, the United States had refused to ratify SALT II, the second cold war had begun and there was near strategic parity between the Super Powers. Electorally, there was a drift towards conservatism again.³¹ Environmental issues were causing grave concern and the environmental movement was gaining strength.³² Nuclear power and even its civilian

30 After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviets, the Russian brand of Marxism had lost much of its attraction. The Frankfurt school too lost most of its ground after May 1968 Paris student movement. With the intervention in Afghanistan and the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, Soviet socialism lost the charm it had left. Faith in the American model of capitalist development had been lost in the countries of West Europe which were encountering the 'evils of industrialization'. See for instance, for this point of view, Elim Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (New York, 1984).

31 In UK the Tories in West Germany, the CDU/CSO alliance in Holland and Belgium too, conservative coalitions were voted in.

32 See, "The Green Model" in Michael Barrett Brown, Models of Political Economy (Middlesex, 1984).

use was being challenged.³³ The Feminists were attempting to look for a ray of hope in a 'male dominated world', but were unable to achieve substantial gains.³⁴ The Church had started a new debate on its traditional stand of accepting deterrence within the framework of the old doctrine of 'just war'.

The most serious concern was, of course, about the fate of the Atlantic Alliance itself. Economically the United States, the major trading partner of West European states had started looking beyond the Atlantic towards Japan and South-East Asia for forging new trade links.³⁵ There was a growing and deep lack of faith in the American nuclear guarantee of an extended 'nuclear umbrella' of deterrence over Western Europe. That American strategists were attempting to de-couple Europe from the United States and would not be unwilling to have a limited nuclear exchange over Europe rather than risk the territory of the United

33 The accident at the Three Mile island contributed greatly to building up a pressure group against nuclear power.

34 The Women's Lib. Movement had been launched in the US and spread all over Western Europe. See for details, Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (New York, 1976).

35 A detailed study of the impact of recession is given in F.F. Ridley, ed., Policies and Politics in Western Europe and the Impact of Recession (Kent, 1984). See also Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance - Atlantic Relations in the 1980's (London, 1985), for a study of the thaws in the Atlantic Alliance, including economic relations.

States, was a fear which stemmed from stated policies of the United States³⁶ and little faith in arms control negotiations which were carried out on a bilateral basis by the two super powers.

In this period of disillusionment and instability there was a growing awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons and the resulting dangers of nuclear war. The awareness that extinction was a distinct possibility and that survival was itself in question had percolated down to the grass roots. The tremendous dissemination of knowledge that had taken place because of the 'media revolution' and publications of the various groups that comprised the Movement had resulted in the layman understanding the most intricate details of nuclear strategy and their critique.³⁷ The one single symbol of hope, in the European continent, seemed to come from Poland³⁸ where popular grass root forces seemed to be shaking

36 President Carter's statement and his now well-known Presidential Directive (PD) 59, which called for the capacity for flexible controlled retaliation against a full range of targets for any attack at any level seemed to indicate that deterrence meant limiting nuclear war, rather than preventing it.

37 Magri, n. 15, pp. 117-34, for a comparison of the structure of the two movements.

38 Hoffman, 14, pp. 327-47.

the foundations of a totalitarian state and this became for most of what was termed as the 'lost' generation³⁹ an inspiration from which they could draw hope.

Thus the contemporary Movement, even though it was at the focal point of other diverse protests which included the Feminists and the Environmentalists, was caused not as much by the conglomeration of the sectarian protests but in a climate which created a growing insecurity about survival itself. The membership unlike the previous Movement was not confined to the youth but included people from all ages and sections of society.⁴⁰ The Previous Movement had superficial roots and declined once piecemeal changes were implemented or a new avenue of protest discovered. Moreover, it relied primarily on the institutional mechanisms of the state itself. Again, the nuclear arms race had then still not escalated to a point of seemingly no-return and knowledge of nuclear strategy was still the monopoly of a few. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had not reached a level of parity in either nuclear weapons or nuclear technology and there was still faith in American military superiority. The Previous Movement,

39 Ronald Inglehart cited in Papadakis, n. 30, p. 1, calls the emergence of the Peace Movement a 'silent revolution' taking place in Western European States giving meaning to the aims and aspirations of a lost generation.

40 See Magri, n. 15, p. 118.

thus carried within its origins the reasons for its failure, unlike the contemporary one which might fail anyway, but is built on the strength of a greater awareness of knowing what it seeks to achieve and what it is fighting against.

Immediate Issues

The issue which sparked off the Movement was ostensibly the NATO decision⁴¹ to deploy Cruise and Pershing-II missiles in six West European countries and the breakdown of detente.⁴² It was ironical that a decision about which European governments had been much keener than the Americans themselves, and which had been initiated by their leaders⁴³ should provoke an outburst within the domestic political systems of these countries.

It could not however be forgotten that the present crisis was only a manifestation of a long-term crisis⁴⁴

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- 41 The 'dual-track' decision to modernize intermediate range missiles in Europe whose deployment was linked with arms control negotiations was taken at a meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers in Brussels in December 1979. The text of the NATO communique of 12 December 1979 is reproduced in Appendix 3.
- 42 The generally accepted time for the end of detente is traced to the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979, although some may prefer to trace it to the developments in the Horn of Africa in 1978.
- 43 It was in 1977 that Helmut Schmidt delivered the Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London where he emphasized the vulnerability of Western Europe from the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. See for text Survival (London), January-February 1978, pp. 2-10.
- 44 See Eliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crises of the Alliance", Foreign Affairs, winter 1982-83, pp. 79-86.

within the Atlantic alliance. There were primarily three dimensions to the present crisis: (a) Different views of detente, (b) strategic parity, and (c) economic rivalry.

Different Views of Detente

One of the fundamental tensions within the Atlantic alliance stemmed from differing American and West European perceptions of detente. The West Europeans were unable to accept the American rationale of a 'linkage' between detente in the Western hemisphere and the happenings in the third world.⁴⁵ Thus they could see no justification for relinquishing the fruits of detente because of the Soviet intervention in distant Afghanistan.

It should be made clear that for the Americans, detente was a 'parenthesis in its history'.⁴⁶ Detente for them was merely a less costly way to deal with the Soviet Union compared to the earlier policy of containment. It did justify a decrease in its military spending throughout most of the 1970s and allowed the US, in effect to renounce unilaterally the use of force as an instrument of its foreign policy.⁴⁷ But in substance, detente for the US still meant a reliance

45 Henry Kissinger was the first to advocate such a linkage.

46 Pierre Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense", Foreign Affairs, spring 1981, p. 819.

47 Ibid. P 820

on its military might and little in terms of trade and human relations.⁴⁸ Once the Americans gradually realized that detente had not been such a great pay off, they could afford to do without it. For the Europeans, however, the experience was different. From the beginning detente in Europe has meant a very concrete, day-to-day set of human and economic relationships.⁴⁹

It meant the stabilization of the territorial status quo on the continent and the continued safety of Berlin. Economically, it translated into an ample market for European industrial goods and much needed access to new sources of raw materials and energy. On a wide political plane detente allowed Europeans to enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre and provided a convenient setting in which Europe could safely assert its own identity. For West Germany specifically, Ostpolitik was a great boon.⁵⁰ It meant the return of 200,000 ethnic Germans from the East. Economically 45.5 per cent of all Western trade with the East was controlled by the Federal Republic. Compared to the US exports of 0.9 billion dollars

48 See Robert Tucker, "America in Decline : The Foreign Policy of Maturity", Foreign Affairs, fall 1979, pp. 449-84.

49 Lellouche, n. 46, p. 820.

50 A detailed discussion of Germany's benefits from detente are given in Fritz Stern, "Germany in a Semi-Guallist Europe", Foreign Affairs, spring 1980, pp. 867-86.

to the Soviet Union, West German exports amounted to 4.4 billion dollars in 1980. Further, the Trans-Siberian Yamal-Pipeline would account for more than 30 per cent of West Germany's natural gas needs.

It would, therefore, be natural that West Europe would resent the destabilization of relations at a time when even a simple cost-benefit analysis seemed to reveal the need to continue with detente and to further the economic and political fruits it was providing.

Strategic Parity

It was somewhere in the early 1970s that the Soviet Union acquired relative parity in nuclear forces with the United States. Consequently a Soviet threat to nuclear forces in Europe was perceived, which reached its high point with the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s in 1977.⁵¹

In the fifties and sixties there was not only sound faith in the American superiority but the West Europeans paid little attention to military requirements of nuclear forces. The deployment of these nuclear forces - as the fate of the Multi-Lateral Nuclear Forces (MLF) in the early sixties was more an instrument of Alliance policies than a real addition to military strategy. Today there is a definite lack of faith

51 This section relies a great deal on Christoph Bertram, "The Implication of Theatre Nuclear Weapons in Europe", Foreign Affairs, winter 1981-82, pp. 305-26.

in the American nuclear guarantee. In an age of nuclear parity, the West Europeans seem to believe that Washington appears unlikely to risk America's survival for the protection of Europe "despite ritual official assurances".⁵² The dilemma that European security presents can be summed up by the following points:

- (i) The allies began by emphasizing the need for more American nuclear weapons to strengthen their defences against the Soviet Union.
- (ii) The United States (subscribing to the theory of limited nuclear war) agreed to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's in addition to about 7,000 tactical weapons on West European soil. These are described as 'Theatre Nuclear Weapons' as opposed to strategic weapons in the hope that the USSR will, in the event of those weapons being used, respect the difference and not attack the United States directly.
- (iii) To act as a credible deterrent these weapons must be usable in certain conditions.
- (iv) However, even a controlled and 'limited' war in Europe would utterly destroy large amounts of area.

52 Hoffman, n. 14, p. 329.

53 The points are a summary of the discussion presented in Michael Stephenson and John Weal, Nuclear Dictionary (London, 1985).

(v) Therefore any rational defence policy of a European nation must ensure that the weapons are never used.


(c) Economic Rivalry

During the years of the formation of the NATO alliance, Western Europe was still undergoing the economic traumas of the Second World War. It was the US-sponsored Marshall Plan which helped the post-war stabilization and reconstruction of the economy of the West European countries. Not only was it in America's interests that West Europe remain stable but it was essential for it to have a large market for its goods.⁵⁴

From the late sixties and early seventies, things changed. Europe became a strong, economic competitor for the world market even in such large industries as steel. Being junior partners in an alliance is one thing and being a rival competitor is quite another. Resentment was felt on both sides of the Atlantic. More recently, a series of coincidental happenings have brought this boil of economic rivalry to head.

The twin oil crises created a world-wide recession, the effects of which were greater in Western Europe than anywhere else. The US economy, which was relatively less

54 See S.I.P. Van Campen, "NATO : A Balance Sheet After 30 Years", Orbis (Philadelphia), summer 1979, pp. 261-70.



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dependent on the OPEC countries, was able to stabilize itself. In such a situation the United States, instead of coming to the aid of its allies remained not only indifferent but positively unfriendly. It continued to forge new trade links with Japan and the South East Asian countries at the expense of its Atlantic allies.⁵⁵ Further, American banks charged exorbitant rates of interest on loans advanced to West European countries.⁵⁶

That the NATO decision to deploy the missiles was taken at a time when there was already a deep suspicion of American policies and attitudes, could only but result in a controversy. Some observers, for instance, believe that it was in this period of economic disenchantment that the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia perceived a divorce from matters related to defence, the decisions of which were in the hands of a distant ally whose confidence was now in doubt.⁵⁷

55 See Pierre Lellouche, n. 46, pp. 813-34.

56 See Hoffman, n. 14, p. 325. For further discussion about the economic tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic also see Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance - Atlantic Relations in the 1980's (London, 1983).

57 Howard, n. 8, pp. 309-24.

A little more needs to be said about the NATO dual track decision itself. It was novel in two respects: for the first time an American nuclear weapons programme was made dependent on prior allied consent, and the decision to deploy these arms was linked with an undertaking to negotiate their limitation through bilateral US-Soviet arms control.⁵⁸

First, before the new weapons were even produced America's allies were asked to commit themselves to deploy them on their territory. The significance of this novel procedure cannot be overstressed. To ask European non-nuclear countries to endorse a nuclear weapons programme inevitably forces them to protect that decision within their domestic political context and this naturally gives an opportunity for dissenters to create an uproar.

The second special feature of the 1979 decision was its two track nature: the military programmes were to be pursued as far as necessary, and arms control negotiations as far as possible. But while the first track constituted the Alliance's first multilateral nuclear production decision, the second was put firmly in the context of bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. Domestically, it meant that European governments obtained support for the first part of the

58 Bertram makes the points in his article, n. 51, pp. 305-26.

decision on the clear understanding that arms control negotiations would simultaneously be started. All the same, having no role to play in the actual negotiating process, coupled with suspicions concerning American intentions, popular support for the European government was found to be weaning.

Apart from these immediate issues, there was one more event which contributed in no small way to spark off the Movement: the grass roots movement in Poland⁵⁹ led by Solidarity. In an era marked by disenchantment and disillusionment, the resistance offered by the people of Poland against a Communist dictatorship, under the patronage of Soviet Union served to greatly inspire a people who too were in search for hope, idealism and a firm national identity.

Super Structural Factors

Apart from the issues which have been discussed there were other factors which may not have formed the causal 'base' for the evolution of the movement but influenced its growth to a substantial degree.

59 Stanley Hoffman sees the grass roots movement in Poland as an important reason for the evolution of the Anti-Nuclear movement. Hoffman, n. 14, pp. 327-46.

It was some twenty years ago that Marshall McLuhan prophecised that "The Medium is the Message",⁶⁰ and the contribution of the 'Media' in spreading the Anti-Nuclear 'Message' is a contemporary example. It was the printed and the spoken word as also the visual message - the media in all its forms - that helped to create a tremendous awareness, nay a fear close to paranoia, about the dangers of nuclear weapons and war. This was done at two levels: by the independent media as well as the message propagated by the Movement itself. The most interesting aspect of the latter is the way in which the information was communicated. The pamphlets,⁶¹ for instance, provided the most intricate military and scientific details in the simplest language and the clearest way.

In West Germany specifically, the alternative newspaper Taz⁶² played an important role "in coordinating the activities of the diverse strands of the Anti-Nuclear Movement".⁶³ In the United Kingdom, the CND Bulletin and the journal Sanity helped, not only in providing the latest

60 See Marshall McLuhan's magnum opus, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man (London, 1964), for a detailed treatment of the effect of Media on society.

61 A copy of a typical pamphlet is provided in the Appendix 7.

62 The role played by Taz on the Movement is presented very well in Papadakis, n. 30, p. 155.

63 Ibid., p. 137.

information on the nuclear front but also scathing critiques of 'establishment views'. Popular books such as Jonnathan Schell's Fate of the Earth,⁶⁴ became best sellers destroying the myths of a winnable nuclear war.

Motion pictures such as the long banned 'War Game by BBC',⁶⁵ 'Dr. Strangelove and the Bomb', and the more recent 'The Day After' helped in communicating to a receptive audience, not only the possibility of an accidental nuclear war but also the devastating consequences it could have. The role, thus played by the media in creating public awareness in support of the Movement cannot be over-emphasized.

The Anti-Nuclear Movement also served as a focal point for a broader movement seeking changes and alternatives in different spheres of society. Environmental groups were one of the largest components of the Movement, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany where the Green Party⁶⁶ combined environmental interests with the fight against nuclear weapons. The Environmentalists and the Anti-Nuclear

64 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (London, 1982).

65 The War Game is a film about a hypothetical nuclear attack on Britain, written and directed by Peter Watlows in 1965. According to the film critic of 'The Observer', "We are always being told that words of act cannot change the course of history. I believe this one can a ... it should be screened everywhere on earth."

66 The third chapter of this dissertation deals with the Green Party extensively.

activists had several issues in common. The former had begun voicing their concern against nuclear power and its so-called 'peaceful civil uses' much before the Movement had begun. The damage that nuclear leaks and waste were doing to the ecological balance was an important issue for both. But more importantly violence against the environment was seen as part of the same policy system which threatened the world to the point of extinction through nuclear weapons.

A substantial section of the feminists, too, saw it worth their while to throw in their lot with the Anti-Nuclear Movement.⁶⁷ In fact, in the United Kingdom the women's groups far exceeded any other single group. The common cause between women as an oppressed group and the disarmers is apparent. They share the same philosophy, have a stake in peace, and both want to redefine the 'role of man'. 'Let them not arm, but disarm to humanize himself'⁶⁸ is their slogan in order to enable all human beings to realize their full potential in freedom, free from the shadow of fear. The feminists look upon the forces that generate fear as an instrument of subjugation cannot but be inimical to the liberating process that would dispel ignorance. The power

67 This section owes a lot to Neerja Mattoo, The Feminists and the Peace Movement (Srinagar, 1985), unpublished. A comprehensive book of their writings is Dorothy Thompson, ed., Over our Dead Bodies - Women Against the Bomb (London, 1983).

68 Ibid., p. 27.

that these men enjoy over their victims springs from the fact that they have usurped their right to take decisions, they do so on their behalf, while keeping them submerged in a 'culture of silence'.⁶⁹

There are some other pressure groups within the Anti-Nuclear Movement whose services had hitherto been used for the establishment. These include a section of scientists and retired bureaucrats and generals. The kind of role that science should play in society has been an age old question with two fundamental set of opinions. One would hold that scientists restrict themselves to the quest for fresh discoveries without concerning themselves with societal matters. The other view is and this is what a substantial section of scientists within the movement feel that scientists cannot be like green house plants without a concern for the world outside. Their research should be geared towards fulfilling the needs of the society they live in and should not be in any way inimical to it.⁷⁰

To this end, for instance, the members of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) in the United Kingdom, have

⁶⁹ See Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Middlesex, 1972).

⁷⁰ See Joseph Rotbalt, ed., Scientists, The Arms Race and Disarmament (London, 1982).

provided the public with detailed information in simple language. More recently scientists have used their energies to discover the unknown effects of a nuclear war. The impact that the findings of the Cornell Group of Scientists,⁷¹ led by Carl Sagan, on the consequences of even a limited nuclear war, which were termed as Nuclear Winter, cannot be exaggerated.

It was in 1981 that a group of thirteen retired senior NATO officers, came together to form a forum called Generals for Peace and Disarmament.⁷² In 1983 they published a book which says: "No doubt it was painful for those who believed the world was flat to accept evidence that it was after all round. The time has come when we too, must accept the painful fact that the nuclear deterrents like the Emperor's new clothes, is a figment of the imagination."⁷³ Since then they have kept publishing occasional papers and

71 Their findings are published now in book form, Paul R. Ehrlich, The Nuclear Winter - The World After Nuclear War (London, 1985).

72 A major published work by them is Generals for Peace and Disarmament : The Arms Race to Armageddon - A Challenge to US/NATO Strategy (Worwickshire, 1984).

73 Ibid., p. 72.

books to voice their concern over the growing threat of a nuclear war.

The super-structural factors discussed above have played a role - a substantial one at that in spreading awareness of the dangers posed by the 'thermonuclear stockpiles'. In this manner they have indirectly helped the growth of the anti-nuclear movement.

...

IDEAS AND ALTERNATIVES

Social Movements need to provide not only a coherent critique of the system they fight to change but also a viable alternative. Only then can they pose a serious challenge.¹

A distinguishing feature of the contemporary Anti-Nuclear Movement is its attempt to provide an intellectual framework for opposition to nuclear weapons and not merely to mount a moral crusade against global annihilation.² Not only have fresh analyses of the global situations been made but cohesive critiques and well defined alternatives provided to established nuclear doctrines and strategies. Thus, even though the Anti-Nuclear Movement may have rejected and even denounced ideologies of the Eastern and Western blocs,³ it has acquired a Weltanschauung of its own.

It must be realized that the 'ideas' and 'alternatives' enunciated by the Movement are not found in one concise form either in the manifestoes/documents issued by the numerous

✓¹ See for example, John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York, 1973), for an elaboration of this point.

² One of the reasons for the failure of the '50s Anti-Nuclear Movement was because a majority of its members saw it as a moral/ethical crusade against nuclear weapons.

³ See, for example, European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal launched on April 25, 1980. Text in Appendix 5.

groups and organizations comprising the movement nor in any studies on them. From incidental pieces in popular journals, to serious academic writings, to interviews and speeches by its activists and leaders spread all over Western Europe,⁴ the alternatives purposed are often ambiguous and at times even conflicting. To give them, therefore, a precise, yet exhaustive and all-embracing, form would not only be an impossible task but would do great injustice to the dynamism and diversity⁵ of the Movement and its thought. The details provided below therefore should be seen only as general indicators and at times the lowest common denominator which most groups subscribe to.

I

THE MOVEMENT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ARMS RACE

A study of the background of the leaders and intellectuals of the Movement will reveal that a majority of them have had sympathies with the left, if not been members of various communist parties at one time or another. This is not surprising as the average age of the leadership of the Movement is above forty. Most of their youth and early

4 See Bibliography for the diversity of publications on the Movement.

5 See Appendix 6 for list of organisations comprising the Movement.

adulthood was spent in the turbulent sixties when protest in Europe was synonymous with different shades of Marxism looked upon by most as 'the' alternative.⁶ But in the present day Western Liberal democracies, Marxian antecedents are a negative factor which the leaders have to work to overcome. This becomes imperative for gaining popular support for the movement from people who are voting conservatives to power.

Therefore, the emphasis of the Movement's literature is on the belief that the question of survival does not rest in ideologies alone, but is a much larger human question. And even if the movement's writings may not expound the virtues of a 'market economy', positive steps have been taken not only to place on par the East and the West as far as the arms race is concerned, but also to refrain from a systemic analysis of the two blocs. The arms race as it exists today, is seen as a phenomenon beyond being simply the product of systemic idiosyncracies of either the East or the West. Even some communist parties which are supporting the Movement have taken public stands equating

6 For a detailed study of the protest in the sixties in Europe see for instance, J. Joll and D. Apter, eds, Anarchism Today (London, 1971), and Peggy Duff, Left, Left, Left (London, 1971).

7 At the peak of the movement's strength in 1983, Great Britain voted the conservatives with a great majority. In West Germany the conservative CDU/CSU alliance was elected.

the United States with the Soviet Union.⁸ The Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament⁹ made the stand explicit: "We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world."

What then were the causes for the accelerating arms race and what role was the Movement envisaged to play in curbing it?

Earlier theorists of the Movement such as Mary Kaldor,¹⁰ and Alva Myrdal¹¹ believe that the "main motivation

8 For example, see Signor Berlinguer's statement on behalf of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) quoted in Phil Williams, ed., The Nuclear Debate : Issues and Politics (London, 1984), p. 69. Also see PCI Foreign Section Chief Antonio Kubbi's statement quoted in Alva Myrdal, et al., Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament (Nottingham, 1981), asking for a withdrawal of SS-20's by the Soviet Union, p. 292.

9 Launched on 28 April 1980 at a press conference in the House of Commons, United Kingdom, and based on a draft prepared by E.P. Thompson in consultation with the Russell Foundation Signatories including Tony Benn, M.P., Bruce Kent, leader of CND, Lord Brockway, Zhores Medvedev and leaders from Labour and Liberal parties as well as leaders from the Church. See Appendix 4 for text.

10 Kaldor is a Research Fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. She edits END Notes and is an activist of the CND. The Disintegrating West (London, 1979) is one of her major works explaining the cause for the decline of the NATO alliance.

11 Myrdal Alva, A winner of the Nobel Peace Prize is author of the classic, The Game of Disarmament (New York, 1976).

of the arms race between the Super Powers is for each to match the other in destructive capacity".¹² Apart from this fundamental action-reaction phenomenon which caused the arms race there were other forces which were contributing to its acceleration. Factors such as the "interservice rivalry and competition for shares of military budgets",¹³ "the military-industrial complex",¹⁴ "the momentum generated by research and development by the scientists",¹⁵ and "the bureaucratization of homicide"¹⁶ were listed and explained in great detail.

There remained, however, a fundamental flaw in this restricted analysis. If the arms race could be reduced to easily determinable factors, then not only could, theoretically, a government committed to disarmament bring about a total change in the situation but the purpose of the movement could be no more than to act as high level pressure group.

12 Ibid., p. 5.

13 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

14 This term was first used by President Eisenhower in 1961 and is now used extensively by Peace Researchers.

15 Lord Zuckerman, "The Deterrent Illusion", The Times, 21 January 1980.

16 Henry T. Nash, "The Bureaucratization of Homicide", in E.P. Thompson Dan Smith, ed., Protest and Survive (Middlesex, 1980), p. 62.

These analysts had seen the super powers caught in a vicious circle of their own making, which was further strengthened by a variety of factors. Even if this was sound academic analysis, as far as a tactical strategy for the Movement was concerned, it was nothing short of disaster. No movement could have mass support if the masses felt that institutions within the system could be tapped to bring about the desired change.¹⁷

E.P. Thompson¹⁸ in his now famous essay "Notes on 'Exterminism', the Last Stage of Civilization"¹⁹ was the first to attempt an explanation of the arms race not only in terms of the unwillingness but the inability of the governments to halt it. Thompson's essay makes the following points: The arms race as it exists today cannot be a subject of rational analysis. It may have had its roots in rational decisions

17 See J. Wilson, n. 1, for further discussion.

18 E.P. Thompson, Marxist historian and author of the classic work on working class consciousness, The Making of the English Working Class. Activist during the Movement of the 50s, founder of END, has written extensively on the Movement.

19 E.P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization", first published in New Left Review (NLR) (London), May-June 1980.

but the problem in its present form cannot be subject to "a single causative historical logic".²⁰ "What is justified as rational self interest by one power or the other becomes in the collusion of two, irrational";²¹ the nuclear weapons and "their attendant support systems ... grow of their own accord"²² and have thus acquired a relative autonomy; even though there may be various thrusts²³ which contribute to their acceleration, holistically it is a totally irrational phenomenon, and traditional categories are inadequate²⁴ to analyse the situation and it required a new category of analysis that of Exterminism.

20 E.P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization", in Edward Thompson and others, Exterminism and the Cold War (London, 1982), p. 1.

21 Ibid., p. 15.

22 Ibid., p. 5.

23 These thrusts in the United States, according to Thompson, may be observed as a "collective capitalist General Will for survival or expansion, whether as counter-revolutionary reaction to indigenous anti-imperialist movements in the Third World or whether in pursuit of interests and resources (notably oil) of the most old fashioned imperialist kind." Ibid. (p. 15). While in the Soviet Union the "incremental thrust is ideological and bureaucratic". (p. 19)

24 Traditional categories such as imperialism "predicate an active agent and a subjected victim: an exploiter and an exploited". This, Thompson points out, will be no longer useful to analyse the present situation. A nuclear war will not promote the interest of any country, class or elite. Ibid., p. 21.

Thompson argues that "Exterminism designates those characteristics of a society - expressed, in differing degrees, within its economy, its polity and its ideology - which thrust it in a direction whose outcome must be the extermination of multitudes".²⁵

The novelty of Thompson's thesis is that it is not restricted to examining the seemingly helpless nature of the situation but to offer the path of the Movement as an alternative. He believes that this gathering determinism can be combated only if there is a great mobilization based on understanding. This mobilization, he contends, should take place all over Europe since the heart of that continent remains the central locus of the opposing exterminist thrusts. According to him the Movement assumed great importance since "it strikes directly at the confrontation by initiating a counter-thrust, a logic of process leading towards the dissolution of both blocs, the demystification of exterminism's ideological mythology, and thence permitting nations in both Eastern and Western Europe to resume autonomy and political mobility".²⁶

At the level of pure academic analysis Thompson's work had flaws and has indeed been subject to severe

25 Thompson, *ibid.*, p. 20.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

criticism.²⁷ Its importance, however, lies not as much in its contribution to a better theoretical analysis of the arms race or to social science theory, but for providing a strategy with/ a coherent basis to the Movement. Thompson, with one stroke, was able to not only condemn governments and the futility of bilateral and multilateral negotiations but was able to "reassure" (to borrow Michel Howard's phrase) the teeming activists of the Movement of its need and importance. The European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal had earlier attempted to provide the Movement with a workable strategy but it was far too sketchy and fluid. Thompson's essay on the other hand was a serious analytical thesis. It combined the force to inspire and activate the masses, and also provoke an intellectual debate which in turn gave an ideological basis to the aims and efforts of the movement.²⁸

27 See for example Perry Anderson, In the Tracts of Historical Materialism (London, 1984), and Mike Davies, "Nuclear Imperialism and Extended Deterrence", in Thompson and others, n. 20, pp. 37-54.

28 The debate sparked off by Thompson's article, "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization", NLR, May-June 1980, caused a debate among left intellectuals from all over Europe. It was published in the form of a book - Edward Thompson and others, Exterminism and the Cold War (London, 1982). The contributors included Rudolph Bahro, Raymond Williams, Etienne Ballibar and John Cox.

II

THE MOVEMENTS CRITIQUE OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

This is one area in which the literature produced by the Movement assumed prolific proportions. At every level there are detailed analytical critiques of the nuclear strategic doctrine propounded by the super powers. By and large they are logically argued criticisms but some unfortunately are non-sequiters. At the fundamental level, however, there is an understanding which binds all heterogenous groups of the movement together. This basic understanding is that the Doctrine of Deterrence (together with the corollarries that strengthen it) which forms the main stay of establishment strategy has given rise to a highly unstable system and unless nuclear weapons can be outlawed from Europe a nuclear war is not only possible, but imminent.

The critique to the doctrine of Deterrence is provided as two levels -- the Logical/Strategic and the Ethical/Moral.

The 'logical' critique begins by questioning the concept of deterrence itself - "Deterrence theory carries a heavy burden of illogicality, paradox and dilemma".²⁹ The

29 Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, ed., Dangers of Deterrence - Philosopher's On Nuclear Defence (London, 1983), p. 2.

main arguments³⁰ given to prove that the deployment of missiles in Europe would lead to a failure of Deterrence are as follows. Deterrence, it is pointed out, rests on three expectations - the enemy will behave rationally; the threat which daunts him now will continue to be the most daunting he could face and, he will not find technical means by which he could counter-deter the threat. "Now taking these in reverse order, there are reasons to believe that the USSR is actually finding ways to deter the launching of medium range weapons at it from Western Europe. It is no mere political convenience which makes it to keep medium-range missiles in Soviet rather than Warsaw pact territory - for it is this which signals its determination to retaliate at the highest level if these weapons are attacked."³¹ Furthermore, "the arms race is arguably developing in a way that will eventually present the Soviets with a grave dilemma; to make an early preemptive strike at America or to wait for the Americans to strike first at them, or threaten them to do so.... If the first strike threat is not yet imminent, neither is it not, in the indefinite and unpredictable future".³² Finally,

30 It is impossible to include all the arguments used against Deterrence. One will include the major arguments used to show that Deterrence will fail because of the deployment of Cruise and Pershing Missiles in Western Europe.

31 Blake and Pole, ed., n. 29, p. 8.

32 Ibid., p. 30.

"the NATO's strategic stance of flexible response creates a situation of great uncertainty for both sides regarding the probable reactions of the other side. The Soviets would fail to take the most rational course of action, not out of an hysterical reaction to events but from sheer intellectual confusion".³³

The ethical and moral dimensions of deterrence have also been discussed in detail by scholars³⁴ in an outside the Movement but the inspiration was provided by the Church and some of its writings³⁵ and pronouncements.³⁶ The object of deterrence is to prevent war but it is inherent in the concept of deterrence that if the opponent is not frightened off, the weapons that constitute the deterrent will be used. The hope, always is that actual use will not be necessary, but if the deterrent is to be effective, use must always be seen as a possibility, not to be discounted by the opponent. This is seen by many as immoral. "It cannot be justified because an intention, however conditional, to do something intrinsically

33 Ibid., p. 9.

34 See for example Geoffery Goodwin, ed., Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence (London, 1982). Also see Marcus Raskin, "War, Peace and the Bishops", The Nation, 28 January 1983, p. 106; and L. Bruce Van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence", Foreign Affairs, spring 1983.

35 See for example, The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience (London, 1982).

36 See for example the Pastoral Letter by the American Catholic Bishop.

immoral is, itself by definition immoral. Sin is completed in act but begins in consent and the consent to act immorally even though the act is never performed is already sinful."³⁷

Deterrence has flaws and internal contradictions which the movement has brought out succinctly. But what remains the strong point of the establishment is that deterrence has survived over the past thirty odd years without breaking down. It has come close to it at times but never has it collapsed or given way completely to all-out confrontation between the two super powers. The movement has attempted to counter this albeit not very successfully. E.P. Thompson terms the establishment's proposition as counter-factual history³⁸ which as an exercise in historical logic is not necessarily disreputable but the exercises in this case are most trivial. That deterrence has prevented a major war in Europe is according to Thompson "a stupid proposition.... It is a counter-factual proposition which does not admit of proof, and, if we allow it some force it establishes nothing about the future".³⁹

37 The Church and the Bomb, n. 35, p. 98.

38 E.P. Thompson, "Deterrence or Addiction", in C.F. Barnaby and G.P. Thomas, ed., The Nuclear Arms Race - Control or Catastrophe? (London, 1982).

39 Ibid., p. 96.

This is not a very strong argument since an explanation based on formal logic may be theoretically sound but cannot subvert a time-tested remedy. That it may collapse in the future does not seriously concern the public of West European countries. This in fact is the biggest challenge that the Movement has had to face.

III

ALTERNATIVE DEFENCE STRATEGIES PROPOSED BY THE MOVEMENT

The movement in its quest to pose a successful challenge to the established order has come up with varied alternatives to the established strategic order of the NATO Alliance. The objective was to ensure that as broad-based as possible a popular front against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe was created. In this endeavour, alternatives range from the milder 'Nuclear Freeze' and 'No-first-Use' to the totally revolutionary 'Non-Violent Resistance'. The phrase 'To each his own' best sums up the attitude of the movement in proposing the variety of defence alternatives.

At a fundamental level the alternatives can be divided into two sets: those which envisage limited or some use of nuclear weapons and seek to bring changes within the NATO framework, and those which envisage change in a modified alliance structure or even outside the alliance framework by

means of unilateral decisions taken by individual countries. All proposals have one principle in common: they stress the defensive role of all weaponry. It is also important to note that alternate defence policies put more emphasis on the consideration that the legitimate security needs of any community cannot be defined without taking into account the security needs of other communities, including the acknowledged opponents.⁴⁰

The first set would include the following options:

- (a) No-first-Use, (b) Improved conventional defence; and
- (c) Nuclear Free Zones.

(a) No First Use

Also known as the inflexible response alternative, it envisages that the United States should follow the Soviet example and renounce first use of nuclear weapons.

The idea was first publicised by four American public figures in 1982.⁴¹ In 1983 four British scientists signed a similar report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).⁴² In the same year the Church of England Synod urged the British

40 Ben Dankbaar, "Alternative Defence Policies and the Peace Movements", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), vol. 21, no. 2, 1984, p. 142.

41 McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Alliance", Foreign Affairs, spring 1982, p. 126.

42 Lord Zuckerman, Lord Caver, Lord Flowers and Lord Gladroyn, Union of Concerned Scientists, No First Use (Cambridge, 1982).

government to adopt the policy of No-First-Use.⁴³

The proponents of the No-First-Use argue that nuclear weapons should be maintained only as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by the opponent, and defence should be based solely on conventional means. "A policy of no-first-use, especially if shared with the Soviet Union would bring new hope to everyone in every country whose life is shadowed by the hideous possibility of a third great twentieth century conflict in Europe."⁴⁴

"The only sane approach in the nuclear age is to fight on, conventionally as long as it might take and as costly as it may be. When the situation is finally restored, there will at least be peoples, cultures, and national structures".⁴⁵

A policy of No-First-Use would require a small number of invulnerable missiles. Advocates of this policy believe that the Warsaw Pact conventional superiority is exaggerated as far as the defense of Central Europe is concerned.⁴⁶

To make a No-First-Use policy really credible, they

43 General Synod Proceedings, CND Pamphlet (London, 1983).

44 Bundy, Kennan, McNamara and Smith, n. 41, p. 128.

45 Union of Concerned Scientists, No First Use (Cambridge, 1982), p. 26.

46 See Dankbaar, n. 40, p. 147.

stress the need to remove some weaknesses in NATO present position. Specifically, NATO should be able to decide more promptly on whether to mobilize and how to deploy its forces. Similarly NATO's ability to sustain military operations over a long period should be improved.⁴⁷

According to Rozemand and Siccama two prominent 'alternative defence' strategists such a policy has two components:

- (i) A defensive military posture with some potential for limited conventional conflicts, but clearly incapable of destroying its nuclear retaliation force.
- (ii) A clearly stated commitment to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the Soviet Union as soon as the number of civilian casualties in Central Europe surpasses an acceptable level.⁴⁸

Apart from rejection by the establishment there are few takers for the No-First-Use policy even in the Movement itself since it envisages a change more in terms of objectives rather than military structures, and furthermore, does not eliminate the use of nuclear weapons.

47 Ibid., p. 148.

48 S. Rozemond and J. Sicamma, quoted in Ben Denkbaar, n. 40, p. 148.

(b) Improved Conventional Defence

A series of options have been proposed to strengthen the conventional means of defence as an alternative to nuclear weapons. Some of the options include:

(i) Forward Conventional Defence or a Mobile Defensive-Offensive Strategy

This approach stresses the need for an improved air and armoured capability for taking war into enemy territory. It proposes to prepare a 'fire barrier' of about 4 km deep along the East-West border, i.e. a zone which is so inundated with fire-power that it is impossible to pass through. Early warning systems and surveillance sensors should be prepositioned and NATO forces should be ready to fire mine-laying rockets and other munitions into the zone at any time. Heavy and medium rocket launchers are to be positioned outside the main battle area, up to 150 km from the forward edge of the battle (FEBA).⁴⁹ Light artillery is to be placed between 6-15 km from FEBA and its missiles could possibly be guided to their targets by small combat units which should be deployed between them and the fire barriers.

49 Robert Hannig, quoted in Ben Dankbaar, n. 40, p. 149.

War games and other calculations have shown that this type of defence could completely block and destroy the first strategic echelon of Warsaw Pact forces. This proposal to make the defence of Western Europe is a purely European affair. Nuclear arms remain in this proposal solely in a strategic deterrent role, which can adequately be dealt with by British and French nuclear arms.⁵⁰

Boeker and Barnaby⁵¹ take a comparable position and propose to start with a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them and do not allow them to be stationed on their territory. Following that, all nuclear arms could be stationed at sea or on the territories of the nuclear powers. Their proposal for a conventional, 'non-provocative' defence also contains a fire barrier, but they put more emphasis on the role of highly mobile squads behind the first barrier.

(ii) Active in-depth Defence

This option envisages covering Western Europe with a network of self-contained units equipped with precision-guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and light infantry

50 Ibid., p. 149.

51 Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker, "Non-Provocative Non-Nuclear Defence of Western Europe", ADIU Report, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 6.

weapons. A detailed proposal by Horst Afheldt⁵² envisages a peacetime network of 310,000 'techno-commandoes' in twenty-men units each covering about twenty square kilometers. It is argued that each unit would be capable of destroying three tanks with short-range missiles or more with additional long-range weapons.⁵³

(iii) Nuclear Free Zone

This proposal which has become popular in the Movement merely reproduces the key thoughts of the plan put forth in the 1950s under the political framework of "disengagement" suggested by George Kennan⁵⁴ on the one side and the then Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki on the another.⁵⁵ It suggests that if the two superpowers are unable to desist from their chaotic arms build up and if the threat from ever more sophisticated weapons continues, then the reasonable thing would be to keep them as far from each other as possible and create a broad nuclear-free zone in between. The Russel Peace Foundation which sponsored the European Nuclear Disarmament

52 Horst Afheldt, quoted in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale, ed., Germany Debates Defence (Nottingham, 1983), p. 187.

53 Ibid., p. 189.

54 Quoted in Steinke and Vale, ed., n. 52, p. 180.

55 Ibid. p 181

Appeal⁵⁶ has in recent years popularized this idea; if this were to be possible "the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal" would be free of nuclear weapons.⁵⁷ The Olaf Palme Commission report has also advocated this idea.⁵⁸

The second set of alternatives includes the following options: (i) Neutrality, (ii) Unilateral Disarmament, and (iii) Non-violent resistance.

Neutrality

This proposal is an alternative to membership of any alliance⁵⁹ based on three existing models -- the defence policies of Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Finland is offered as a model for countries in Eastern Europe seeking to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. It is deemed essential to enumerate the policies followed by these countries in order to understand the significance of the alternatives.

Sweden

It has a system of total 'defence' based on universal conscription (7½-15 months, with compulsory refresher

56 See Appendix 5 for text.

57 Steinke and Vale, ed., n. 52, p. 180.

58 Olaf Palme Commission Report, Common Security, A Programme for Disarmament (London, 1982).

59 Steinke and Vale, ed., n. 52, p. 181.

courses) a modern but limited navy and air force (no long-range bombers) and an extensive civil-defence programme providing deep shelters for the whole population. The total strength of the armed forces within seventy-two hours of mobilization is 800,000 - one tenth of the population. Military tactics envisage mobile resistance with five armoured brigades, and stubborn position defence by local units passing, if necessary, to guerrilla warfare. In Britain Sweden has been used as a popular example in the debate on the bomb.⁶⁰

Switzerland

It relies on a citizen army to create to mobilized strength of 625,000 (one tenth of the population) within forty-eight hours of mobilization - as in Sweden. The intention is to make the invasion discouragingly costly by confronting the invader with in-depth defence throughout the country.

Yugoslavia

It bases plans for indefinite defence on partisan (guerrilla) warfare in the tradition of the Second World War. Against an all-out attack by the invading force, the army would fight on conventionally for as long as possible in the

⁶⁰ See Defence without the Bomb, The Report of the Alternative Defence Commission (London, 1983).

northern plain and then pass to guerrilla operations in the mountains alongside the territorial force.

Finland

It follows a policy of neutrality and enjoys a healthy democracy, while maintaining a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Signed in 1948, its military clauses state that "in event of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finish territory, becoming the object of armed attack, Finland will, true to its obligations fight to repel the attack." The treaty differs from a military alliance agreement in that its military clauses are restricted to attack against Finland or through Finnish territory. Finland has a highly efficient 700,000 strong defence force without nuclear weapons operating a strategy of in-depth territorial and light mobile defence.

Unilateral Disarmament

This proposal envisages an individual country taking a unilateral decision to disarm itself. It is based on the following consideration: the fact, which history has demonstrated a thousand times over, that modern states in general in their competition with one another are constantly generating the cause and reasons for war itself. Therefore if a country would take the decision others would perhaps

follow suit.⁶¹

Non-Violent Resistance

Non-violent resistance is based on the following premises:⁶² (a) It respects the human being in every enemy soldier and endeavours to draw out this humanity through appropriate action and responses; (b) non-violent resistance seeks to make clear that security, and indeed the security of existence itself, is the concern of each and every individual in society, and that one cannot relieve oneself of this burden by relying on other persons or institutions in this matter; (c) non-violent defence means that resistance must be organized democratically. The most important implication of this premise is that the "humanist scruples" of non-violent resistance must include the enemy (i.e. the needs of the enemy must be respected and studied wherever possible). Only those interests may be defended that do not place the freedom and equality of those with other views in jeopardy. "Understood properly, non-violent defence calls for no less than a long and arduous process of re-education of man himself, of a man

61 Twenty questions and answers about CND, Pamphlet (London, 1983).

62 Achen Wilson, The Disarmers Handbook of Military Technology and Organization (Middlesex, 1983), p. 281.

conditioned for thousands of years in indifferent forms of the friend-enemy ethic: a tooth for a tooth, an eye for eye ethic."⁶³ For these reasons it would be difficult to introduce this concept as a general principle for society.

After the various alternatives articulated by the Movement have been enumerated, it is essential to examine their viability. It has already been stated that the Movement failed to evolve common alternatives. The only chords uniting all groups -- those of stopping the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II as the immediate aim and of a nuclear-free Europe as the larger aim, resulted in a totally uncompromising attitude of the movement which could only result in a zero-sum 'all' or 'nothing' situation. It would not be difficult to infer that a more cohesive group with consensus on all major issues would have been able to develop a more realistic bargaining and negotiating strategy which may have initially yielded piece-meal changes but would in the long run have been much more successful. The recent attempt to have an European equivalent of the American 'freeze' movement⁶⁴ with an attempt to harmonize 'unilateralist' and 'multilateralist' postures within the movement and emphasizing the need to freeze

63 Andreas Buroin in Steinke and Vale, ed., n. 52, p. 183.

64 See New Statesman (London), 1 November 1985, for further discussion on the Freeze Movement to be launched on 13 November 1985, in London.

all nuclear missiles at the present level has shown signs of being more successful.⁶⁵ This brings to light the question as to why the alternatives posed by the movement seem unviable? Some⁶⁶ argue that there are two basic problems: First, the general concept of alternative defence is far removed from political realities.⁶⁷ The offensive military systems of the super powers form the main component of their military strength. To expect them to change their respective military structures that will tremendously weaken their power basis in the context of the realities of the present international system is an utopian exercise.

Second, the alternatives provided by the movement are conceptually very weak when it comes to discussing the actual mechanisms for implementation and above all preservation

65 Will Howard, the Freeze Movement's national organizer in UK and former forward planner of CND, believes "that many people not in the peace-movement would support the Freeze". (New Statesman, 14 November 1985, p. 27). Howard insists that Freeze can attract supporters from right across the political spectrum, a belief partly borne out by the list of patrons which includes Denis Healey, Labour's foreign affairs spokesman, Dame Judith Hart, Labour M.P., and Paddy Ashdown, Liberal M.P.

66 For instance, Wilhelm Agrel, "Small but not Beautiful", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 21, no. 2, 1984, pp. 157-67, who is at the Lund University Peace Research Institute (LUPRI), for a detailed critique of alternative defence policies.

67 Ibid., p. 157.

of alternative non-offensive military organizations.⁶⁸ The complex interactions between science, technology, arms, industry, military services, and politicians do not indicate that the problem of an overall and definite guidance of the development of military technology can be achieved merely through a political decision. Therefore, Thompson's thesis suggesting a breakthrough achieved by a popular uprising of the masses is perhaps tactically and intellectually the most satisfying. But that this cannot be possible until a nuclear threat manifests itself in all sphere of life is borne out by the history of revolutionary change.

Ibid., p. 158.

CHAPTER III

IMPACT ON POLITICS : A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The litmus test for gauging the impact of a social movement must finally lie in the degree of success achieved in bringing about the change that it had desired. However, a contemporary movement which is still in the process of evolving, finding roots and a concrete social basis may not have induced 'actual' social change but still had tremendous consequences for the polity. Certain other indicators are required, therefore, to examine the influence that it generated.¹ ✓

✓ In a liberal-democracy these indicators would include, inter-alia, a study of election patterns reflecting whether or not there is any marked shift towards parties representing the interests or favourable to the aims and efforts of the Movement; independent, reliable opinion polls carried out showing not only the nature of the appeal of the movement and the degree of awareness on the issues raised by it, but especially so in a 'conservative'² society, the degree of acceptance of non-institutionalized forms of protest and

1 For a detailed treatment of social movements see J. Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York, 1973).

2 The term conservative is used here to denote a polity where centre-right parties are being voted to power signifying 'little' desire to alter the status quo.

finally, reactions to the movement by the main political and other institutions of influence in the state, including political parties, trade unions, and very importantly in Western Europe - the Church.

In the common immediate aim that had bound all the heterogenous groups of the Anti-Nuclear Movement together, that of attempting to stop the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe, they were not successful.³ The larger aim of a nuclear free Europe is no more closer than it was when the movement had begun.⁴

But it would be wrong if on this 'seemingly convincing' evidence it were concluded that the Movement was not only a dismal failure but that the politics of the countries remained unaffected and unchanged.

Two cases will be considered here: the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany to illustrate the impact that the Anti-Nuclear Movement is having on the politics of West European countries. They are perhaps not typical examples, since the Movement has not only been strongest in these countries but they have had a previous history of protest. Nonetheless they are studied here because the movement in these countries is most representative of the impact that a

3 By the end of 1983, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Italy had ratified the decision and deployment had started by 1985. The Parliaments of Belgium and the Netherlands too had accepted the decision.

4 With the Soviet decision to deploy SS-22 and SS-25 to counter the cruise and Pershing deployment, the situation is worse than it was before.

'Movement' such as this one can have on people and politics of liberal democratic states in an advanced capitalist stage.

United Kingdom

British thinking on nuclear weapons has been, over the years, a strange combination of 'idealism', pragmatic security considerations and an attempt to regain a declining British role in world politics.⁵ A protest movement is therefore not only a by-product of these forces but its success depends on the way it can satisfy them.

The Anti-Nuclear Movement in the United Kingdom is represented in 'real' terms by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) which remains the largest group.⁶ The CND is not a cohesive organisation. It had in 1982, all over the United Kingdom, some 1000 CND groups and an equal number of affiliated organizations.⁷ The organizations include elements from diverse backgrounds such as the 'Women Peace Alliance', 'Women for Life on Earth', to 'Quakers', the 'Peace Pledge

5 A.J.R. Groom, British Thinking on Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974).

6 The total membership of the CND was over 250,000 of which only 5,000 pay fees individually.

7 The women's groups which include the Women's Peace Alliance, Women for Life on Earth and Women Oppose the Nuclear Threat are the largest group. The Quakers with a membership of 20,000 come second.

Union', and the 'Anglican Pacifist Fellowship'.

CND Membership

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
National Membership	4,287	9,000	20,000	50,000	85,000
CND Groups	150	300	700	1,000	1,250
Affiliated Organizations	274	n.a.	n.a.	1,000	1,300

n.a. Not available

Source: Michael Stephenson and John Weal, Nuclear Dictionary (Essex: Longman, 1985).

The heterogenous composition of the Movement has contributed greatly to the spontaneity and strength of the organization, but as has been stressed before, it also remains its biggest weakness. The absence of common unifying perspective except at a very general level,⁸ do not allow for the development of a cohesive strategy. Before the problems of survival, substance and furtherance of the Movement are discussed it would be appropriate to list its concrete achievements.

⁸ See Chapter II for differing perspectives of the various groups of the Movement.

Civil Defence

The most effective campaign of the Movement in the United Kingdom has been against the government's civil defence plans and exercises. In fact it would be no exaggeration to conclude that one of the biggest boosts to the Movement in the US was given by the Government's own publications on civil defence.⁹ The foremost among them included Protect and Survive, Domestic Nuclear Shelters and Civil Defence.

Protect and Survive advised British citizens on how they should prepare in the event of an imminent nuclear attack. 'The preparations outlined in the Pamphlet were truly pathetic'.¹⁰ A 'scathing riposte' was given to it by a leader of the Movement.¹¹ The heat generated by it ironically brought home to millions of people what a nuclear war might mean and was probably one of the greatest conceivable promoters of the movement.

It was in the context of Civil Defence again that the Movement was actually able to make the government retreat

9 Michael Stephenson and John Weal, ed., Nuclear Dictionary (Essex, 1985), p. 30.

10 Ibid. p. 31

11 E.P. Thompson criticized the government pamphlet "Protect and Survive", in his essay in E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and Survive (Middlesex, 1980), pp. 9- 61.

on an important national issue - the Hard Rock national civil defence exercise,¹² which was planned in the United Kingdom for September-October 1982.

The first stage of the exercise involved a preparation phase followed by a response to the effects of a conventional attack on a civilian population.¹³ One major aim was to consider "the implications of self-evacuation by the general public".¹⁴ The second stage was to have included a simulated nuclear attack, a thirty-one hour, post attack 'survival' phase, and then a recovery phase starting twenty-eight days after the attack.¹⁵ The whole second stage would have had broad military involvement and would have included local voluntary organisations in the exercise.¹⁶

In an almost dramatic victory for the Movement, the exercise was cancelled by William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, on 14 July 1982,¹⁷ because 20 out of 54 county councils

12 'Hard Rock' was scheduled to be the biggest national civil defence exercise in thirteen years.

13 The Times (London), 15 July 1982, p. 1.

14 Ibid., p. 3.

15 Stephenson and Weal, n. 9, discuss this in great detail, p. 76.

16 John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, ed., The CND Story (London, 1983), p. 40.

17 In fact, Hard Rock is not the only nuclear plan the government have abandoned recently. Another is the projected development of Indent servicing facilities at Coulport, Scotland. See for details *ibid.*, p. 39.

refused to participate¹⁸ and as the main purpose was to exercise local authority personnel in conjunction with the military it was pointless to proceed.

For the CND who had planned their own reparte entitled, 'Hard Luck',¹⁹ which provided a cross-country breakdown, even to the village level, of the likely dead and injured from atwo hundred megaton attack, it was a major achievement.

Nuclear Free Zones

Following from the successful campaign against civil defence the other major breakthrough by the Movement was in the creation of Nuclear Free Zones.

After it had become clear that the first civil defence concern of the British government in the event of nuclear war would be population control, including the use of armed police, special courts and concentration camps, many

18 The Home Secretary coupled his retreat with a threat to introduce legislation that would compel local authorities to participate. Draft proposals for compulsion were sent out in November 1982. By the time of writing this chapter, the matter is still in a flux.

19 The basis of Hard Luck was work by a specialist group of CND - Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA). The scientists used accurate factual information and computers to inform every locality of the effects of nuclear attack on that area - damage to buildings, the number of dead from blast, burns and radiation and other information not supplied by the Home Office. See Philip Bolsover, "A Victory and a New Development", in Minnion and Bolsover, ed., n. 16, p. 89.

local authorities began to reappraise their own supposed role. Starting with the Manchester City Council in 1980, around 200 local authorities declared themselves as nuclear free zones.²⁰ As such they not only opposed the manufacture, deployment and use of nuclear weapons within their jurisdiction but some also rejected the transport of nuclear waste through their boundaries.²¹ No doubt the status of a 'nuclear free zone' is a gesture of protest since it expresses an intent on the part of the local authority rather than any ability to implement it. Nevertheless it articulated a consolidation of public opinion firmly against the deployment or use of nuclear weapons.

Apart from these two major achievements, the major breakthrough of the Movement has been in the creation of popular awareness of the other dangers of nuclear war by the tremendous dissemination of information.²² This is a non-quantifiable empirical category and the only relatively

20 For details of resolutions passed by the Manchester City Council and other City Councils, see Ken Coates, "Nuclear Free Zones in Britain", in Ken Coates, ed., END Paper - 2 (London, 1982), pp. 3-15.

21 Stephenson and Weal, n. 9, p. 112.

22 See Appendix 7 for typical example of CND's strategy for dissemination of information.

effective means of judging it are opinion polls which will be discussed later in this chapter.

It would be only appropriate now to analyse the reactions/impact/relations that the Movement has had and invoked on and from the three major parties; the Labour, the Liberal/SDP alliance and the Conservatives, as also the major trade unions and the Anglican Church.

Labour

The relation that the CND has had with the Labour Party has been over the years of a cyclical nature of closeness, disenchantment and disillusionment, closeness again and finally one of the redefining and questioning. There was almost complete dependence of the movement of the 1950s on the Labour Party²³ to promote its parliamentary interests. Even though in 1959 none of the parties including the Labour supported the CND's unilateralist stand,²⁴ in 1960 in a dramatic conference of the party, it decided to go unilateralist.²⁵ There had been a growing section within the party which had earlier been expelled from the Parliament²⁶ for

23 See for a detailed analysis of the relationship between the CND and the Labour Party, David Griffiths, "CND and the Labour Party", in Minnion and Bolsover, eds, n. 16, pp. 113-4.

24 Ibid., p. 18.

25 Ibid. p. 19

26 The five Labour M.P.s who were expelled included an important Labour Party leader, Michael Foot.

taking an anti-conservative stand on government's defence estimates and it was more a concretization of that attitude rather than a sudden surprise as it initially seemed. It was in 1960 that Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party leader, made his famous speech to say he would "fight, fight and fight again to save the party".²⁷ And he did. In 1961 the Labour Party changed its unilateralist position and gave the Anti-Nuclear Movement its greatest blow.²⁸ This change of stand has been seen by some as one of the most important causes for the failure of the Movement in the 1960s.²⁹ Thus, the complete trust that the Movement had once reposed in the Labour Party could never be regained. This in spite of the fact that the Party once again went unilateralist in the 1980, 1981 and the 1982 Party Conference.³⁰ What the Movement could not afford to forget was that the NATO dual track decision had been taken during the tenure of the Labour Government.³¹ Therefore it

27 Quoted in Christopher Coker, "Politics and the Peace Movement in Britain", in Phil Williams, ed., The Nuclear Debate (London, 1984), p. 52.

28 Frank Allaun, "In with a bang, out...", in *Minnion and Bolsover*, n. 16, p. 57.

29 The other reasons included the success of multilateralist arms control negotiations, dissipation of energy and resources of the movement towards protest against the Vietnam war as also the alienation of the public due to 'direct action' measures adopted by a section of the campaign.

30 David Griffiths, "CND and the Labour Party", in *Minnion and Bolsover*, n. 16, p. 133.

31 It was the government headed by Labour leader, James Callaghan, which had been party to the decision from the British side.

was essential that the Movement question its dependence on the Labour Party to meet its electoral ends, more so in the wake of its poor showing in the 1983 elections³² (where its manifesto made a commitment to make radical changes in NATO strategy albeit in consultation with its allies) in which Conservatives were voted in with a landslide margin.

The Labour Party itself seems to be entangled in a web of 'idealism' and 'pragmatism'. Traditionally, the Labour Party has remained Britain's vehicle for social protest.³³ Therefore, at one level it cannot afford to lose its command over the CND and at another, real politik cannot allow it to lose elections on idealistic causes.

The most radical stands taken by the Labour Party have been on the behest of the 'far left' within the party whose opinions it has attempted to "harmonize with the mainstream but it seems to be in a process of being completely alienated"³⁴ and not without reason. First, it has shown itself to be far better at the politics of protest than at the politics of power.³⁵ So far it has failed dismally to

32 In the 1980 election Labour Party got the smallest percentage of votes since the Second World War.

33 It has the largest number of unions affiliated to it and even now the Labour Party members form a large section of the CND.

34 Coker, n. 27, p. 52.

35 Ibid., p. 53.

reverse a multilateralist counter-attack within the party based on the party's commitment to NATO. In this respect the Labour Party's present endorsement of CND has not conferred respectability on the movement as it did in the early 1960s.³⁶ Indeed, the opinion polls continue to show that a substantial percentage of Labour voters are not convinced unilateralists at all,³⁷ even though the majority of CND supporters are still labour voters.³⁸ Second, the far left, unlike the National executive, is saddled with unilateralism. Logically, as its own members have pointed out,³⁹ unilateralism is equivalent to withdrawal from NATO, for which public support is lacking, so unilateralism can only be sold to the public by fudging the issue which contributed to its defeat at the polls.

Despite this, throughout the 1970s, the Labour Party remained committed to unilateralism and the 1972 and 1982 party conferences carried resolutions which were almost as radical as those of the CND. Here is a sample of the said resolution:

"This conference is opposed to any British defence policy which is based on the use or threatened use of nuclear

36 Ibid. p 53

37 See Appendix 2 for details of opinion polls.

38 Coker, n. 27, p. 52.

39 Important members such as Dennis Healey and James Callaghan among others.

weapons either by this country or its allies and demands the removal of all nuclear bases from the country."⁴⁰

It is too early to judge what the future relationship of the Labour Party and CND will be like. The party which in the 1983 election manifesto attempted to weave the strands of unilateralism and militarialism into a single argument on the understanding that unilateralism and multilateralism had to go hand in hand⁴¹ if either one was to succeed, could fall into on disarmament negotiations and further distance it from the CND. The CND on its part has perhaps consciously decided not to put all its 'eggs in the Labour basket',⁴² and attempted to look beyond the party for instrumentalities required to implement its demands.

Liberal-SDP Alliance

The Liberals have had a large representation in the CND even in the days of the Previous Movement. This is not surprising, since the Liberal Party has had a long history of protest against war and methods used in war. In 1958, when CND

40 Coker, "Politics and the Peace Movement in Great Britain", in Williams, ed., n. 27, p. 55.

41 "The Labour Party Manifesto", The Guardian (London), 18 May 1983, p. 7.

42 David Griffiths, "CND and the Labour Party", in Minnion and Bolsover, n. 16, p. 33.

originated, the Liberals came closest to supporting it⁴³ even though in the then two-party dominated British politics the stand was not taken seriously.⁴⁴

In the seventies, with nuclear power becoming controversial as an energy source, the Liberal Party became the only 'major political party to oppose nuclear energy'.⁴⁵

The revival of CND in the eighties was in a climate in which the Liberal Party was much larger, more radical and getting more public attention than before.⁴⁶ At the party Assembly in September 1980, about 33 per cent of the delegates voted for complete, 'unilateral nuclear disarmament', but a resolution supporting NATO was narrowly passed. In September 1981 the party Assembly agreed by 752 to 485 votes to a resolution which declared that "the escalation and spread of nuclear weapons is the major threat to world peace"⁴⁷ and that "Britain should take the initiative in calling for a European nuclear free zone and opposing the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe"⁴⁸ and committing the Liberal Party

43 Minnion and Bolsover, n. 16, p. 18.

44 Robert Fyson, "CND and the Liberal-SDP Alliance", in Minnion and Bolsover, n. 16, p. 137.

45 Ibid., p. 139.

46 Ibid., p. 142.

47 Ibid., p. 148.

48 Ibid., p. 151.

"as a first step, to reject and campaign against the setting of cruise missiles in Britain".⁴⁹ Though this has remained the Liberal Party's official policy, this is not all there is to say about its stand.

The Assembly of 1981 also saw the forming, with an overwhelming majority, of an alliance between the Liberal Party and the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP) to contest the General Election as equal partners.⁵⁰ The founders of the SDP, it must be remembered, were former Labour ministers who had left the Labour Party,⁵¹ for inter-alia, its stand on unilateralism. This 'Gang of Four' and other subsequent MP's who left the labour were staunch opponents of the CND.⁵² This was to have tremendous consequences for all future stands of the Liberal Party alliance on disarmament and its view of the Movement.

In fact, the Liberal leader, David Steel, "anxious not to upset the new ally, publicly opposed the Liberal's anti-cruise policy immediately after the Assembly vote".⁵³

49 Ibid., p. 149.

50 The Guardian, 23 September 1980, p. 12.

51 Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, David Owen and William Rodgers found the Social Democratic Party (SDP) breaking away from the Labour.

52 See for a detailed treatment of the origins of the SDP, Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould? The Birth and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party (London, 1982).

53 Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (New York, 1984), p. 44.

Similarly, only three of the twelve Liberal members of parliament support the party's anti-cruise policy and most are staunchly against the CND.⁵⁴

The SDP, on the other hand, is the only party 'which has tried to retain public support for NATO by opposing measures which would raise the nuclear threshold and make a no-trust use policy possible'.⁵⁵ In fact, its leadership had advocated policies to raise defence expenditure in real terms.⁵⁶ As its leader, David Owen, suggested the SDP is more keen on the implementation of a ninety mile nuclear free zone in Central Europe - a proposal originally made by the Palme Commission.⁵⁷

Even though both the Liberals and the SPD have their own CND and Peace Groups, it would be difficult to envisage the alliance making any drastic changes in Britain's defence policy or taking an all-out stand in favour of the CND. With the appeasement policy followed by the Liberals vis-a-vis the SDP even the 1981 Assembly decision condemning the deployment of cruise missiles loses much of its weight.

54 The three M.P.s who support the Liberal anti-Cruise policy are David Alton, Bill Pitt and Richard Wainwright.

55 Malone, n. 53, p. 42.

56 Ibid., p. 43.

57 See the Olaf Palme Commission Report, Common Security (London, 1982).

Conservative Party

After Mrs Thatcher's resounding victory in the 1983 election⁵⁸ where the conservative party retained more support from the electors on defence than on any issue except inflation⁵⁹ it would be naive to expect the Party to respond positively to the CND or to hope for dissent to grow within it to an extent whereby it could pose any threat to the party's official stand of supporting NATO strategy and the dual-track decision. It speaks volumes for the confidence of the Conservative government that it took almost three years to even respond to the CND.⁶⁰ Apart from its total dismissal of unilateralism most of its criticism of the CND has been directed against the Labour Party. For instance, it saw Labour adopting double standards when "those who would willingly shelter beneath American nuclear protection while refusing to provide the bases in this country from which that protection can operate".⁶¹

However, largely due to CND initiatives, an organization, Tories against Cruise and Trident (TACT) was

58 The Conservatives were voted in with almost 51 per cent of votes.

59 On Defence it got more than fifty per cent support of the electorate, according to opinion polls.

60 Mrs Thatcher's Government responded to the CND only in the middle of 1982.

61 Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, attacked the Labour Party in the House of Commons in November 1982. Quoted in Coker, n. 27, p. 75.

formed,⁶² whose members 'voted conservative at the General Election but who nevertheless disagreed with its defence policy. Despite its claims that "40% of Conservative Voters, according to opinion polls, or five million people, have serious misgivings about the wisdom of allowing NATO to deploy Cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth with no ultimate British control",⁶³ it has yet to make a serious dent into either Conservative party politics or its official views on defence which by even the most critical estimates are represented by Margret Thatcher's government.

Trade Unions

All major trade unions⁶⁴ supported the previous Movement though over the years their sympathies with the Movement have, like the Labour Party, had a cyclical nature.

Frank Cousins, who was the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, the largest such union in the United Kingdom, during the late fifties and early sixties gave almost a carte blanche to the CND. Trade-Union

62 Toris Against Cruise and Trident (pamphlet) (TACT) (London, n.d.).

63 Ibid. P1

64 Including the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and other major unions such as National Union of Miners (NUM).

votes were instrumental in obtaining votes for unilateral disarmament both at the Trade Union Congress and Labour Party in 1961.⁶⁵ Although this was reversed at key trade union conferences and consequently at the TUC of 1961,⁶⁶ a generation of trade union activists had become committed supporters of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Their influence helped in changed circumstances to secure the adoption of unilateralist resolution by the 1972 and 1973 Labour conferences.⁶⁷

It was in the late seventies that with the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, the Trade Union Movement took up the issue of unilateral disarmament once again and the resolution was adopted by the TUC in 1981 and 1982⁶⁸ with unprecedented majorities as also in the Labour Party Conferences of the same year. After the Scarborough Conference of 1981 many unions, including the TGWU, remained loyal to unilateralism even if some did not.⁶⁹

It needs to be emphasized that the TUC is really an extension of the far left within the Labour Party and it is

65 Ruth Longoni and Walter Wolfgang, "CND and the Unions", in Minnion and Bolsover, ed., n. 16, p. 130.

66 Ibid., p. 134.

67 Ibid., p. 131.

68 Coker, n. 27, p. 56.

69 Some like the Shopkeepers, Railwaymen and Engineers Union's abandoned the unilateral position.

this nexus which is making the 'right' wing in the party assert itself.⁷⁰ The TUC is attempting to make the CND link economic issues with the issue of nuclear weapons. Even though CND has published pamphlets⁷¹ emphasizing the contradictions between disarmament and development it has resisted from taking up the slogan 'jobs not bombs'⁷² which the Trade Union wing of CND had adopted. Most CND members still believe that not only can this lead to a diffusion of effort but renouncing a single issue campaign and clubbing the problems of nuclear weapons with economic issues would alienate a vast section of its supporters.

The Church

The Church, which has never had a direct political role, still remains a strong influence in most West European countries. The United Kingdom is no exception. Decrees by the Anglican Church have continued to influence a vast section of its public. As with other institutions of the British political and social system the influence of the Movement has penetrated into the clergy too. The Anglicans, like the Roman Catholics, have over the years given religious legitimacy

70 Coker, n. 27, p. 57.

71 CND's pamphlet: The Arms Drain: Job Risk and Industrial Decline, by Jim Webb (London, 1981).

72 Coker, n. 27, p. 57.

to NATO strategy drawing inspiration from the teachings of St. Augustine and the doctrine of 'Just War'.⁷³

In recent years, however, there has been a debate within the Church over the controversial relationship between Ethics and Deterrence and though the Church has yet to take an official stand making Deterrence or the new deployment of missiles unacceptable to the teachings of Christianity, the heated controversy is symbolic of the impact that the CND is having on the Anglican Church.

The greatest catalyst for this debate were the contents of a report commissioned by the Board for Social Responsibility of the Anglican Church. The report entitled The Church and the Bomb,⁷⁴ which was published in 1982, was responsible for dividing the Church further. It advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United Kingdom maintaining that "deterrence was immoral".⁷⁵ The authors of the report urged the Government to cancel the Trident Submarines programme at once and phase out all nuclear weapons of British and American manufacture. They were "emphatic in their disapproval of the decision to deploy cruise missiles".⁷⁶ As one of the

73 See for a detailed treatment of this theme, Geoffery Goodwin, ed., Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence (London, 1982).

74 The Church and the Bomb, Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience (London, 1982).

75 Ibid., p. 98.

76 Ibid., p. 92.

authors put it: "Deterrence can only be morally acceptable if it is interim to disarmament and only if the weaponry is minimal. Cruise violates all the conditions because when it is deployed on a large scale, it will be virtually undetectable and so remove all hopes of arms control. Pershing is even worse ... it is a first strike weapons.... To kill is simply not there in the New Testament."⁷⁷ Such weapons, the report concluded, "cannot and could never be proportionate to the just cause and aim of a just war".⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the Church remains, since the days of Emperor Constantine's Conversion to Christianity and its acceptance of war as a necessary evil, one of the pillars of the political establishment and to dislodge its 'firm-foundations' would require more than a 'mere report'. In the debate that followed, the General Synod of the Church rejected the report. In the three choices that it faced; of accepting the Bishop of Salisbury's unilateralist approach; the status quo put forth by the Bishop of London; and a compromise between the two-articulating condemnation of first use but endorsing deterrence, it rejected the Salisbury's proposal by 338 votes to 100. However, the policy of a No-First-Use was adopted by a narrow margin of 275 votes to 222.

77 Paul Ostreicher, "CND and the Churches", in Mennion and Bolsover, ed., n. 16, p. 129.

78 The Church and the Bomb, n. 74, p. 98.

The Bishop of Salisbury and the authors of the report might not have been successful in getting their proposals accepted but they were able to sow the seeds of dissent within the Church. Indeed, four of the five dioceses which debated the Church and the Bomb supported its conclusions.⁷⁹ In the years to come, especially so after the new Synod is elected at the end of 1985, it would not be surprising to find, if not a revolutionary change in the attitude of the Church, at least a real debate and not a mere a priori acceptance of the decisions of the establishment.

Opinion Polls


A large number of public opinion polls carried out by independent agencies⁸⁰ during the 1970s and early 1980s have revealed three basic trends: (i) a gradual build up of awareness of the dangers of nuclear war and the threat from nuclear weapons, (ii) an opinion sympathetic to some of the specific goals of the Movement (such as the anti-cruise stand) yet hostile to the Movement's broader goal of unilateral nuclear disarmament and finally (iii) what in spite of (i) and (ii) above, the issue of the deployment of nuclear weapons was never the most important before the British public, even at the movement's peak.⁸¹

79 These were Southwack, Bristol, Birmingham and Rensington.

80 Harris Polls, Gallup Polls, etc.

81 See Appendix 2 for details of Public Opinion polls.

UNITED KINGDOM:
 REPLIES CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES, 1983-84.



Source: May 1983, Marplan; June 1983, National Opinion Polls; November and December 1983, January 1984, MORI, April and June 1984, Gallup. Cited in SIPRI YEAR BOOK - 1985.

✓ The substantial increase in knowledge of and concern about nuclear weapons is evident from the fact that while only 14 per cent of the respondents in the sixties saw a danger of nuclear war in the next ten years, as many as 39 per cent of the respondents in April 1980 saw it as a conceivable danger in the next decade.

Similarly, public opinion against the deployment of Cruise has been uniformly high, though there has been a slight decrease after the June 1983 elections and effective government propaganda. In April 1983 as many as 58 per cent of the respondents were against the deployment. Over the question of unilateral disarmament, support was more wanting. In 1982 only 22 per cent favoured unilateralism while 78 per cent were opposed to it. The most important revelation by the public opinion polls is that the issue of the deployment of cruise never became the most important that the British electorate were facing. At the height of the June 1983 election only 7 per cent of the public rated nuclear weapons the most important compared with 66 per cent naming unemployment and 14 per cent inflation. This showed that economic issues were still more important than issues which do not affect the public directly.

Strategy

The Anti-Nuclear Movement in the United Kingdom represented by CND has had three choices in terms of a

coherent strategy for the sustenance, furtherance and achievement of its goals. They were: (i) to use only non-institutionalized, direct action and civil disobedience methods and seek changes outside the established mechanisms of the state. This would include mass demonstrations, strikes, picketing, non-payment of taxes and breaking of state laws. However, this had a problem. Not only would it have to involve sustained participation by a committed following but it carried a great risk of alienating public opinion. One of the reasons for the fading out of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in the 1960s was 'direct action' which shocked a conservative people and even more recently the Miners strike lost sympathy after they began picketing. (ii) The second alternative was to combine non-institutional and institutional methods. It would mean relying on the Labour Party for electoral gains and using milder methods of protest on their own. This alternative too was not problem free. At the very first, even milder direct action could alienate the public but what was more important the Labour could after all not live up to the expectations reposed in it. Gaitskill's volte face in the early sixties was a painful reminder of the fact that the Party's business was to win elections and not lose them on moral grounds. It could also not be forgotten that the NATO two track decision had been

taken during the tenure of the Labour government. The third option for the CND was to form a political party of its own and hope to capture state power by fighting election. This would mean integrating themselves completely into the power structure of the polity which they had so far resisted. Further, no elections could be fought on single issue campaigns and that too issues which were not the most important the electorate was facing.⁸² Thus fighting an election would mean clubbing several issues together. On this account the CND had no pleasant memories: The Movement in the sixties had dissipated its energies in directing protest against the Vietnam war.

This dilemma of strategy could not quite be resolved by the CND and in times to come it will be this that will bother it most.

Federal Republic of Germany (FDR)

West Germany had until the NATO dual track decision had three 'fundamental debates on its security'.⁸³ The first dealt with its post-war rearmament and alignment with the West. The second debate took place in the backdrop of the FDR's

82 At the height of this Movement's campaign in 1983, issues such as unemployment and inflation were given more priority by the electorate.

83 See for a detailed discussion on West Germany's security debates: Rudolf Steinke and Michael Vale, Germany Debates Defence (New York, 1983).

membership of NATO and the first deployment of nuclear missiles on its soil. The first Anti-Nuclear Movements, which reached their high point in 1958, were in response to this decision. The third major debate revolved around the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and reached its high point in 1969-72 with the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin and the first Social Democratic - Free Democratic (SDP-FDP) coalition. The decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles gave birth to the fourth major debate and led to the spurt of contemporary Anti-Nuclear Movements.

At the face of it, the contemporary Anti-Nuclear Movements may seem disjointed from the previous debates on security but what must be realized is that they represent a culmination of trends which began in the late fifties with the industrial reconstruction of a post-war German economy and the search for not merely "a lost national identity"⁸⁴ but nothing less than a complete alternative system.⁸⁵ The damage done to the West Germany psyche by the almost complete suppression of a national profile and the total identification with the United States cannot be over-emphasized. For long the Germans have had to bear the "burden of guilt for Nazi

84 Gina Cower, "Continental Peace Movements", in Phil Williams, ed., Nuclear Debate (London, 1984), p. 73.

85 Elim Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (New York, 1984), p. 37.

misdeeds and the Movement represents an attempt to be seen in a new role as the 'harbingers of peace'.⁸⁶ The outbreak of the Movements also signified the setting in of contradictions within advanced capitalism. Contradictions which seek alternatives to the industrialization process in the Gandhian-Schumachairan intermediate-economy and appropriate technology framework.⁸⁷ The havoc that industrial pollution has played with the environment is perhaps greater in Germany than any other West-European country.⁸⁸ Thus in the FDR, the growth of the Movement, apart from sharing other common causes with the rest of the West European governments, had two idiosyncratic reasons: first, the search for a lost identity by what was mostly a post-World War II generation and two, a rejection of the American model of development and all that went with it.

It also needs to be stressed here that the NATO two track decision of 1979 and the hostile response that it got from the West German public was also due to a hostile reaction to the breakdown of detente. For the West Germans, detente had been more beneficial than for any other West European country. It meant for them not only the firm setting in of

86 Cower, n. 84, p. 74.

87 See for a detailed study of this point of view, Charlene Spretnak and Fritzof Capra, Green Politics (London, 1985).

88 For instance the great environmental destruction that has taken place in the Black Forest area.

Ostpolitik, the return of thousands of exiled West Germans but also great economic boons. The West German exports to the Soviet Union amounted to 4.4 billion dollars compared to the United States exports of 0.9 billion dollars.⁸⁹

✓ It would now be appropriate to trace the structure and main features of the West German Anti-Nuclear Movement. The West German Anti-Nuclear Movement comprises of organizations which were a part of the earlier Green Movement which raised environmental issues, and of groups which were born as a direct response to the NATO dual-track decision. The foremost among them is the Green Party which was earlier on conglomeration of various environmental groups and now combines anti-nuclear interests with environmental issues.⁹⁰ The Feminists are also an important part of the movement. The 'Women's Initiatives for Peace' (AFF) which collected signatures for their 'petition for peace' had by May 1980 collected 80,000 signatures. Despite the small size of the core group, the AFF was able to reach out to people who felt as strongly as they did about the threat of nuclear war.⁹¹ The AFF was one

89 Apart from this the other fruits of detente included the Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline which would account for more than 30 per cent of West Germany's natural gas needs. See also Chapter I for details of the tension that the breakdown of detente caused within the NATO alliance.

✓ 90 An excellent work on the Green Party and its politics is Spretnak and Capra, n. 87.

91 For further details about the AFF see Papadakis, n. 85.

of the earliest decentralized initiatives which were formed in response to the NATO dual track decision. The opposition by women to the deployment of nuclear weapons has been matched by groups within the Church.

The Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste (ASF) which was formed in 1958 is one of the leading groups within the movement. It is funded to about thirty per cent by the Evangelical Church.⁹² Ever since 1974 the ASF has organized peace festivals and after 1980 onwards it has extended its activities by calling for "peace weeks all over the Federal Republic".⁹³ Further the provincial Synod of the Evangelical Church of West Berlin has equivocally given its support to the peace weeks.⁹³ The high point of the Anti-Nuclear Movement was reached when the German Evangelical Congress of June 1984 was converted into a massive display of the desire for peace and nuclear disarmament. On June 18, 1981 the ASF hosted a massive rally of over 80,000 people with different political affiliations but firmly opposed to nuclear weapons.⁹⁴ The ASF, inspired by the success of the rally worked out an appeal for a demonstration in Bonn with other groups including the

92 Ibid., p. 114.

93 Ibid., p. 120.

94 Cower, n. 84, p. 73.

Green Party under the motto 'all political contradictions must be integrated'.⁹⁵ The ASF became, thus the carrier of an appeal signed by 777 regional, local, national and international groups and organizations.⁹⁶

Among the other major contributors to the Movement is included the 'alternative' newspaper, Taz. It played an important role in coordinating the activities of the diverse strands of the anti-nuclear movement. Not only did it "offer up to date reports on the ill-timed, clumsy and even provocative statements and policies of the Reagan Administration in the United States in relation to the neutron bomb, the new range of nuclear missiles, and the remarks about the possibility of nuclear war limited to Europe, it also enabled even the smallest peace group in rural areas to feel that they were a part of a broader movement."⁹⁷

✓ The Green Party which had directed till now its protest towards nuclear power and energy saw the opportunity to combine with it the opposition to nuclear weapons and militarism.

One of the more important facets of the Movement in West Germany was the degree of support it got from the youth

95 Papadakis, n. 85, p. 137.

96 Spretnak and Capra, n. 87, p. 55.

97 Papadakis, n. 85, p. 137.

irrespective of political affiliations, that especially among those with a higher education. This seems to show that there is a strong element of conflict between old and a new elite more than a 'mere' conflict between two generations.⁹⁸

Support within the Anti-Nuclear Movement
for the withdrawal of American troops (%)

<u>Born after 1941</u>				<u>Born after 1941</u>		
<u>Age Groups</u>						
18-21	22-25	26-29	30-39	40-49	50-69	65+
22	26	11	15	11	10	8

Established Parties and Groups

Among the established parties the foremost, for our purpose, is the Green Party which along with other smaller groups is in the forefront of the Movement. It was therefore a great boost for the Movement when the Greens secured more than the required five per cent votes, essential for

98 Ibid., p. 140.

representation in the Bundestag, in the 1983 election.⁹⁹

Though there has been a growing dissent within the party over the strategy and tactics adopted by them, the Greens remain the most loyal supporters of the Movement, among the major parties of FRG.

The position of the Progressive Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been ambiguous.¹⁰⁰ During his tenure as Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt was the first West European leader to stress the need for modernization of NATO forces in West Europe in 1978. But now that the party is in opposition it has changed course under the pressure from party activists¹⁰¹ and following prescriptions from regional party conferences the national party adopted a different security policy at a special party conference at Cologne in November 1983. The SPD officially rejected the stationing of cruise and Pershing II missiles and voted against a parliamentary resolution welcoming this move.

99 The Green Party secured 5.6 per cent of votes which gave them 27 seats in the Bundestag.

100 Hartmut Grieve, "The West German Peace Movement : A Profile", in Werner Klafleiter and Robert Lpfaltzgraff, ed., The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States (Kent, 1985), p. 115.

101 Even during the time that the SPD was in office, an articulate minority among its rank and file had gathered around Erhard Eppler within the Anti-Nuclear Movement to espouse views opposed to those of the party leaders.

Its coalition partner, the Liberal Free Democrats were wrapped up in internal disputes on what strategy to follow to ensure the party's political survival.

The Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) who were voted into power in the 1983 elections voicing strong opposition to the Movement which "they regard as infiltrated, and manipulated, by Communist organizations".¹⁰² The CDU rejects the Anti-Nuclear Movement, especially because of "the harmful effect it has on relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States and on the Atlantic Alliance".¹⁰³

Most of the trade unions, on the other hand have articulated their opposition to nuclear missiles. This especially after the fall of the SPD government when "they no longer felt obliged to hold former Chancellor Schmidt's line".¹⁰⁴ This includes the 'Deutsche Gewekshafsbund' (DGB, the German Trade Union Congress) and its member unions. There are also attempts on both the unions and the Anti-Nuclear Movement's side to form "some sort of 'grand coalition', bringing together under one ideological roof demands for international peace through disarmament and demands for introduction of a thirty-five hour working week, as a means to

102 Grieve, n. 100, p. 116.

solve the problem of unemployment and to secure social peace at home".¹⁰⁵ Eastern Marches and May Day celebrations have witnessed this important coalition of peace and labour activists at work.

Opinion Polls

Public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany has had three facets. A growing discomfiture with nuclear weapons; a remarkable degree of support for the movement among the young and educated, and a distrust of specific NATO policies and yet a continuing 'general' confidence in the alliance system.¹⁰⁶


In October 1983 almost 28 per cent of respondents saw the "Threat of War" as among the greatest concerns, for themselves and the country while almost 38 per cent saw the danger coming from nuclear weapons. Further, more than 70 per cent of the respondents in May 1983 were against the deployment of new nuclear missiles in West Germany.

In opinion polls carried out in early 1983 as many 31 per cent of the respondents from the age-group 18-24 were already active or intending to be active in the Movement. Of these 30 per cent had had or were going for higher

105 Ibid., p. 117.

106 See Appendix 2 for details of Public Opinion polls.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
REPLIES CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES 1983-84.



Source: May 1983, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen; July 1983, INFAS; September 1983, INFAS; October 1983, Allensbach; November 1983, Gallup. Cited in SIPRI YEAR BOOK - 1985.

education. The number was far lower for higher age groups or low educational levels. This is however in sharp contrast to anti-NATO feeling which has never risen about 15 per cent while pro-NATO opinion is constantly about 75 per cent.

Strategy

The means used by the Anti-Nuclear Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany were distinctly different from those adopted by the Movement in the United Kingdom. This does not however mean to suggest that the strategy was either clear or controversy free.

When a large number of environmental groups decided to form the Green Party in 1979 they were doing so only to have representation in a decision making apparatus of the State. It was emphasized that the Greens would be a 'party against parties' and would build a 'grass roots democracy'. Measures to ensure that no one dominate the party included a 'two year rotation system'¹⁰⁷ in parliament, by which a sitting Green member in the Bundestaag would have to make way for an alternate. During this early period the strategy of the Movement remained one of relying on the Greens for electoral gains and building and mobilizing public opinion through organizations such as the ASF and AFF.

107 For details of the functioning of the Green Party see Spretnak and Capra, n. 87.

This 'ideal' situation continued for some time but after 1983 when the Greens got representation in the Bundestaag and it also became clear that there was little chance of the government relenting on the missile deployment issue, dissent grew. In what came to be known as a debate among pragmatists or realists and 'fundamentalists' or idealists,¹⁰⁸ between pragmatic options and utopian ideals the Greens came to the verge of a split.

The basic difference revolved around the functioning of the party itself. Could a party which was fighting for political power be structurally totally different from other parties? Was it sensible to have a two-year rotation policy which led to inexperienced members coming in for those who have just gathered experience? Was it not 'pragmatic' to compromise with other parties such as the favourable SPD and form a coalition rather than go in for an all or nothing situation? These questions were raised by the realists who stressed the need for bargaining, negotiating and compromising as a way to yield results.

The moot point was not however these changes, but whether the Green Party was going to allow itself to be

108 See *ibid.* for details.

integrated within the power structure of the polity. When voluntary, non-institutional environmental groups had decided to form a political party, the damage had already been done. It would be only a matter of time when the Greens fall the way of other political parties and the dream of 'grass roots democracy' will only remain a slogan to be mouthed.

...

CONCLUSION

Although the Anti-Nuclear Movement spearheaded other 'minor' protest movements, its strength lay, unlike the 1950s movement, in not only a facile mobilization based on a general 'moral' understanding of the dangers of nuclear war but a sustained participation against what was perceived as a specific threat to the security of Western Europe from the deployment of American nuclear missiles.

The movement evolved in a climate of economic stagnation in Western Europe during the second oil crisis (1979-80) and apprehensions within the NATO alliance concerning the efforts of the United States to forge greater economic and trade ties with Japan and South-East Asian countries at the expense of West Europe. The economic insecurity within the elite of Western European States manifested itself in a lack of confidence in the United States and was further aggravated by the breakdown of detente, the political and economic fruits of which had been reaped more by them than by the United States. (The Euro-Siberian pipeline being the most visible symbol of this discord.) In such a state of economic insecurity, defence naturally assumed crucial importance.

The bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia perceived a sense of alienation from matters related to defence, the decisions of which seemed to rest with the United States

whose bona fides were now in doubt. On the other hand, with rampant unemployment, lack of any 'seemingly' viable alternative and decay of old cultural values, the youth of Western Europe saw the only signs of hope coming from Poland, where popular protest led by Solidarity seemed to be shaking the foundations of a 'dictatorial' state. In this climate of insecurity, distrust and disillusionment, the NATO two-track decision gave the 'much-needed' impetus to spark off the Movement.

It was not so much what this decision meant in real terms as what it reflected, how it was viewed and its difference from other such previous decisions. It was one of the few occasions when a military decision of the alliance had the chance to be debated in public before actual implementation. As was with all other earlier decisions, this could only result in an uproar by dissident groups who would see an opportunity to stop the deployment through the creation of a favourable public opinion. The already existing 'alienation' among the elite was furthered through the decision which made the West European governments party only to its military aspects while the political dimensions, those of arms control negotiations, were on a bilateral-US-Soviet basis. Therefore, even though the modernization decision was linked with arms control negotiations, the West European governments were not to be a party to it. Ironical as it may be, the deployment

had originally been asked for by the West European governments themselves in a bid to strengthen 'extended deterrence' over their countries. The West European had become suspicious of American intentions. The suspicions became more widespread with President Carter's Presidential Directive (PD) 59 and various statements of President Reagan which tended to create the impression that the United States would not be unwilling to fight a 'limited' nuclear war over Europe if forced to choose between such a war and an 'all out' nuclear war which would inevitably include the territory of the United States.

In the realm of ideas, critiques and alternatives, the movement, while rejecting the ideologies of the Eastern and Western blocs has acquired, by default, a world-view of its own. There were two reasons for the movement taking pains to equate the East with the West: since the main thrust of the Movement's attack was against the United States and its NATO partners, as at least an academic exercise it was essential to put half the blame for the arms race on the Soviet Union. For, a movement working in conservative liberal democracies of Western Europe could ill afford to condone the Soviet Union. In addition, given the fact that most of the leaders of the Movement - especially in the United Kingdom - had Leftist, if not communist backgrounds, they had to guard themselves from alienating the public which was voting conservatives into power with landslide margins.

Initial attempts at providing a cohesive intellectual form to the aims and efforts of the Movement were not very successful. It provided coherent critiques of the existing system and logically explained the arms race in the form of an action-reaction phenomenon between the two Super Powers. The role of the Movement, however, was limited to that of a high-level pressure group. This was a fundamental flaw in the strategy of the Movement. No institutional means of protest would attract public support if it was felt that the existing institutions within the policy were adequate to bring about the required change.

E.P. Thompson's essay "Notes on Exterminism - The Last Stage of Civilization", and the debate it generated, was therefore a landmark in the Movement's search for a strategy of sustenance, survival and furtherance. It not only explained the arms race in terms of the unwillingness of the governments to negotiate but their inherent inability to do so. It further saw in the success of the Movement and the resulting breakdown of barriers between the two blocs as the only way to stem the tide of exterminism. It was the first time that the Movement had been seen not merely as a pressure group but as an end in itself and was, for this reason, quite an achievement as far as a coherent strategy for the Movement was concerned. The critiques provided against 'establishment'

of nuclear strategies, although detailed and exhaustive, had to work under a severe limitation - the fact that deterrence in whatever form has succeeded in averting a major war since 1945.

Concerning the Movement's alternatives, while numerous strategies have been formulated, some requiring little changes in the established order such as the No-First-Use proposal, the generally accepted proposals envisage large scale - almost utopian changes, doing away with nuclear weapons completely from Europe. The variety of groups that composed the Movement, ranging from environmentalists and pacifists to retired generals and bureaucrats made it impossible for them to agree on anything except a 'lowest common denominator' - of a nuclear free Europe - as the major aim and stopping the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles as the immediate aim. If the composition had not been so heterogeneous and, had the Movement agreed on a step-by-step bargaining and negotiating strategy requiring piecemeal social-engineering at each stage, the strategy might have been more successful.

With regard to the impact of the Movement on politics, though it had little influence on electoral behaviour in the United Kingdom, the Movement had profound influence on its polity. Not only did it force people to question and debate issues which had hitherto with minor exceptions, been

the monopoly of a few, but together with the miners' strike it forced a largely conservative electorate to come to terms with non-institutionalized forms of protest. It forced even the government to accept that the myth of civil defence which had been perpetuated by successive governments, was indeed a myth; there could be no possible civil defence against nuclear weapons. The revision of the government pamphlet, Protect and Survive and the cancellation of the 'Hard Rock National Civil Defence Exercise' in June 1982 were examples of the success of the campaign. The declaration of about 200 local authorities as 'nuclear free zones' and rejection of civil defence must also be taken into consideration. Undoubtedly, it is more gestural than real, nevertheless, it articulated a consolidation of public opinion against nuclear weapons.

The limited success of the CND was chiefly for the reason that the Anti-Nuclear Movement could never make the issue of nuclear weapons the most important public issue even during its peak of popularity. This was not surprising. The nuclear issue never affected the population directly. Issues such as unemployment and inflation naturally assumed primacy of importance.

Would it have been more sensible to club the nuclear issue with issues of unemployment and inflation? The CND, evidently believed that a clubbing of issues would diffuse

efforts. The Previous Movement had, after all, lost ground after protests against the Vietnam war had taken up most of its efforts.

Further, the strategy of the CND, despite all the academic effort that had gone into it, lacked cohesiveness and direction. There were three choices before it: to use only severe non-institutionalised 'direct-action' civil-disobedience methods and seek changes outside the established mechanisms of the state, or to use milder non-institutionalized forms of protest and rely on the Labour Party for electoral gains and inducing changes or to form a political party to contest elections for political power. If they adopted the first alternative of total civil disobedience, it carried with it a great risk of alienating public opinion. The 1950s movement had done that to its own peril. The more recent miners' strike which had public support initially, lost it after picketing began. The second alternative of a compromise between non-institutional and institutional means carried with it a twin risk of not only alienating the public but also the probable chance of the Labour Party not living up to the expectations. Gaitskill's volte face in the early sixties was a painful reminder of the fact that the Party's business was to win elections on political issues and not lose them on moral grounds. The third option of fighting elections on their own would result in

integrating themselves into the power structures of the polity completely.

The Anti-Nuclear Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand had considerable influence not only on the domestic political system but had important consequences, being a frontline state of NATO, for the alliance itself.

The Movement in West Germany was distinct from other Western European Movements in being, not only a 'real' focal point for a broader alternative movement seeking changes in the defence structure, as well as in the environmental, economic and social spheres. Secondly, it was an attempt to assert a suppressed national identity in a post-war economically reconstructed state. Thirdly, the role that the Media played was much more substantial: the 'alternative' newspaper Taz in fact co-ordinated the activities of all the different groups of the Movement and finally, the Evangelical Church came out directly (unlike the Church in the United Kingdom) in support of nuclear disarmament.

The Movement was led in the FRG by the Green Party alongwith the ASF (a Church-sponsored organization) and the AFF (Women's peace initiative). The latter two contributed greatly to the Movement by launching a signature campaign

against nuclear weapons and thus building up public opinion in the remotest areas of West Germany.

Like the CND, the Green Party too failed to evolve a coherent and consistent strategy and thought and action. The crux of the controversy within the Green Party revolved around a conflict between utopian ideals and programmatic options. The Greens which had claimed to be a 'party against parties' saw an important section of its members wanting to compromise with like minded parties, such as the SDP, for short time gains. This section which came to be known as the 'realists', advocated a more practical approach to the politics of change, thus favouring, apart from an alignment with the SDP, a change in the rotation policy of the Greens' members in the Bundestaag and a shift from their non-compromise, no-bargain stand. This not only served to alienate a large section of members who came to be known as the 'fundamentalists' but also carried the risk of integrating the party completely within the power structure of the country. The 'fundamentalists' stand was, of course, on the other extreme. They demanded nothing short of an alternative system. Meanwhile domestic dissent within the FDR and its search for what was 'lost identity' served to alienate it from the United States, whose establishment intellectuals termed the country's 'independent' policies, 'semi-Gaullist'.

At the outset, the Anti-Nuclear Movements evolved in a period of a divorce of the elite of West European states from defence decisions. The gradual diffusion of the Movement over Western Europe was largely due to a resolution of this divorce. Fear of insecurity is the key to all West European defence needs. The Anti-Nuclear Movement grew because it successfully reflected those concerns, but it 'failed' because it was unable to provide a 'realistic' alternatives. Finally, two more points need to be made. First, ironical as it may seem, the Movements revealed that a social protest movement voicing concerns which do not affect the population directly must finally adopt institutional means in order to be successful. Secondly, the Anti-Nuclear Movement never acquired, in contradiction to the hypothesis advanced by post-industrial society theorists, the dimensions of 'The Social Movement' which would be at the vanguard of a class struggle. Economic issues, at least in the United Kingdom still assumed primacy of importance. Alienation from or subordination to technocratic decisions could at best disturb a population, not stir them drastically enough to react violently.

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APPENDICES

1. Chronology of Events
2. West European Opinion Polls
3. Text of NATO Communique, December 12, 1979
4. Facts About Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles
5. Text of European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal
6. List of the Members of the International Liaison Committee for European Nuclear Disarmament
7. Typical CND Pamphlet

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Appendix I

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1976

- 26 November - USSR and Warsaw Treaty States propose a no-first use policy
- 9-10 December - NATO Ministers reject Soviet no-first-use proposal.

1977

- French MSBS M-20 SLEMs replace older weapons. First deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.
- 17-18 May - Ministers on the NATO Defense Planning Committee agree to set up a long-term defense program (LTDP)
- 8-9 June - Nuclear Planning Group meeting on Ottawa notes continuing improvements in Soviet nuclear forces, including the SS-20, and discusses current and potential improvements in NATO nuclear weapons.
- 11-12 October - Ministers on the Nuclear Planning Group meet in Bari.

Italy to establish the NPG High Level Group (HLG) on TNF modernization within the context of the LTDP.
- 28 October - Chancellor Schmidt's speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

1978

- 7 April - Carter defers production of neutron bomb.

18-19 April - Nuclear Planning Group endorses modernizing NATO TNF.

23 May- 1 July - UN Special Session on Disarmament.

1979

11 April - Special Group established to study arms control aspects of theater nuclear systems.

18 June - SALT II signed by Carter and Brezhnev.

6 October - Brezhnev offers to limit deployment of SS-20 missile if NATO would defer decision to deploy new systems.

11-14 December - NATO dual task decision taken to both modernize theater nuclear forces and pursue arms control announcement that 1000 US warheads would be withdrawn from Western Europe.

21 December - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

1980

24 January - Special Consultative Group on Arms control involving theater nuclear forces established.

1 July - During talks in Moscow, Soviet President Brezhnev told Chancellor Schmidt that the Soviet Union would not persist with its insistence that NATO renounce its LRTNF-deployment plants before US-Soviet negotiations could begin to seek East-West limitations on such systems.

19 September - The Belgian Government indefinitely postpones a final decision on whether or not to accept the stationing of Cruise missiles on Belgian territory pending the development of arms-control negotiations between the United States and the USSR. The Government says it will re-examine the question every six months.

- 16 October - The United States and the USSR open preliminary talks in Geneva on theater nuclear force limitations.
 - 20 October - Greece reintegrated into the Alliance
 - 4 November - Ronald Reagan elected President.
- 1981
- 23 February - Brezhnev proposes a moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missile systems by both NATO and the USSR.
 - 19 April - Approximately 6000 antinuclear demonstrators protest the proposed NATO LRTNF deployments at NATO headquarters outside Brussels.
 - 21 June - The end of four-day demonstrations against NATO's TNF-modernization plans, and for a nuclear-free Europe. Demonstrations held by over 120,000 members of West Germany's major Protestant Federation.
 - 13 July - Secretary of State Haig outlines the principles of Reagan administration arms control policy: Arms control "cannot be the political centerpiece or the crucial barometer of US-Soviet relations".
 - 2 October - The Italian Chamber of Deputies approves, by a narrow vote, the Government's plan to allow cruise-missile deployment in Sicily under the NATO TNF-modernization plan. In the United States, President Reagan announces a series of strategic weapons decisions including the MX and B-I bomber.
 - 10 October - Over one-quarter-million people take part in an anti-nuclear demonstration in Bonn.

- 16 October - President Reagan quote the media "limited nuclear war" remarks.
- 21 October - Nuclear Planning Group deployment plans for NATO TNF.
 - US Defense Secretary Weinberger agrees with the group's endorsement of a zero option as the ideal objective of negotiations with the Soviet Union.
- 24 October - Approximately 200,000 people in Rome, and 150,000 in London gather in anti-nuclear protests.
- 25 October - Anti-nuclear demonstrations held in Brussels, Paris, Oslo, and East Berlin.
- 4 November - In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Haig says that NATO might fire a nuclear "demonstration" shot in the event of a war, to warn the Soviet Union of the risks of continuing the conflict.
- 18 November - President Reagan announces that the United States would seek total elimination of Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s in return for the cancellation of NATO's deployment plans. This became the so-called zero option.
- 21 November - Anti-nuclear demonstrations in Amsterdam attract over 300,000 participants. The Netherlands refuses to make final decision on deployment in the absence of arms-control negotiations.
- 30 November - The Theater Nuclear Force Reduction Talks open in Geneva.
- 6 December - Anti-nuclear demonstrations held in a number of West European cities.

1982

- February - President Brezhnev presents an arms control plan calling for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear weaponry in Europe.

- 16 March - President Brezhnev announces a unilateral Soviet freeze on further developments of intermediate range forces in Europe. This includes qualitative replacement of the SS-4 and SS-5 by the SS-20. The freeze is to last until an INF agreement is reached, or until the United States begins deployment of the GLCMs and Pershing II missiles.

- 23-24 March - NATO Nuclear Planning Group rejects Brezhnev proposal.

- April - At the Social Democratic Party Conference (SPD) in Germany, the Executive Committee Leadership drafts a resolution that would delay final-deployment decisions concerning the GLCM and Pershing II until the fall of 1983. The draft resolution also calls for the Geneva INF negotiations to eventually include British and French nuclear systems.

- 31 May - Spain joins NATO.

- 10 June - NATO Summit conference reiterates two-track decision in Bonn.

- 29 June - Strategic Arms Reduction talks begin.

- 14 October - It becomes clear at START talks that the two sides were not willing to reconcile their divergent positions.

- 22 November - Yuri Andropov makes fresh proposal. Reiterates freeze on nuclear arsenals of both countries as first step forward.
Reagan emphasizes the need to replace and modernize nuclear forces and also to proceed with the production and deployment of MX in dense pack formations at Wyoming.

- 7 December - Suspension of Danish payments towards the cost of deployment of US nuclear missiles in Europe passed by 49-13 votes.

- 9-10 December - A meeting of NATO foreign ministers affirmed the alliance's decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe in 1983 unless a satisfactory agreement is reached with the Warsaw Treaty Organization on arms control and disarmament.

- 15 December - Emergency debate in the British House of Commons on the NATO ministerial meeting of NATO Council. Neil Kinnock calls the issue disturbing.

- 1983

- 16 January - Foreign Minister Gromyko pays a 3-day visit to West Germany for discussion on progress of Geneva arms limitation talks.

- 2 February - Strategic arms limitation talks resumed in Geneva.

- 10 February - In UK, Church of England General Synod votes overwhelmingly against unilateral disarmament.

- 6 March - In West Germany, Christian democrats led by Chancellor Kohl gain resounding victory in general elections. Green Party gains 24 seats in the new Bundestag.

- 30 March - President Reagan announces proposal for reducing medium range land-based missiles in Europe -- shift of policy from 'Zero option'.

- 1 April - In UK, thousand of CND supporters take part in anti-nuclear demonstrations in Berkshire.

- 2 April - Gromyko suggests that British and French INF capabilities should be included in arms control negotiations.
- 9 June - General election in UK; Conservatives win overall majority of 144; Labour win 209 seats, smallest representation in any Parliament since World War II.
- 26 June - General Election in Italy resulted in a major setback for the Christian Democrats; 4 Aug Sr Beltino Crakl becomes Italy's first Socialist PM as head of coalition government.
- 4 July - Chancellor Kohl begins a 3-day official visit to Moscow.
- 6 July - In U.K. publication of White Paper: Statement on Defence Estimates which repeats Government's intention to deploy cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth in absence of agreement with the USSR.
- 19 July - Seven Greenpeace anti-Whaling protesters detained in Siberia, their ship Rainbow Warrior having been chased by a Soviet gunboat.
- 26 August - President Andropov offers to destroy 'a considerable number' of SS-20s in return for US commitment not to deploy new missiles in Europe.
- 6 September - Final document of European Conference on Security and Cooperation adopted by all 35 delegates and Madrid; it commits Governments to continuation of the Helsinki process.
- 2 October - In UK Neil Kinnock elected leader Roy Hattersley deputy leader of the Labour Party.
- 1 November - In UK Defence Secretary warns that demonstrators who get near cruise missile bunkers at Greenham Common could be shot.

- 14 November - In UK Defence Secretary announces arrival of first cruise missiles at Greenham Common; 15 November 141 persons arrested during demonstrations outside base.
 - 22 November - Bundestaag votes for deployment of Pershing missiles in West Germany.
 - 22 November - Norwegian Parliament approves the deployment of INF missiles in Western Europe.
 - 23 November - Soviet delegation withdraws from Geneva INF talks in protest.
 - 27 November - The Italian Defence Ministry confirms that cruise missiles components had arrived in Sicily.
-

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives, International Herald Tribune (Hong Kong), The Times (London), and The Guardian (London).

Appendix 2

WEST EUROPEAN OPINION POLLS

Table 2(i) The "Threat of War" and "Nuclear Weapons Among the Greatest Concerns for Yourself and Your Country, 1983-84.

	Threat of War			Nuclear Weapons		
	March 83	Oct. 83	May 84	March 83	October 83	May 84
FR Germany	16	28	14	42	38	15
France	34	44	47	19	26	26
Italy	44	35	56	33	38	39
Netherlands	33	37	—	47	49	--
Norway	31	37	30	42	40	31
Spain	48	39	49	29	30	33
United Kingdom	26	31	40	32	29	43
Weighted averages*	30	40	36	27	35	30

* Weighted by population

Note: Figures are the percentage of respondents naming them. Total may add up to more than 100 per cent owing to multiple answers given.

Source: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Harris Polls, A11A Release, Paris, 7 June 1984. Cited in SIPRI Yearbook, 1985.

Table 2(ii) Replies to the Question: "Here you see a Scale from 1 to 100 per cent. Can you tell me Where on this Scale you Place the Danger of a New World War in the Next 10 Years?", 1980-84

	Apr	October 81	Oct. 82	Oct. 83	Oct. 84
FR Germany	25	32	19	18	14
France	42	25	20	24	13
Italy	32	18	14	18	12
Netherlands	24	20	19	13	21
United Kingdom	39	21	17	17	14
Belgium	33	32	20	17	16
Denmark	18	..	10	15	13
Ireland	31	28	25	27	18
Luxembourg	15	27	19	14	15
Greece	-	8	9	12	10
EEC (average)	34	24	18	19	13

Note: Figures are the percentage of respondents indicating more than a 50 per cent chance that a new world war will break out in the next 10 years.

Source: Eurobarometer (EEC, Brussels), no. 22, December 1984, p. 11. Cited in SPIRI Yearbook 1985.

Table 2(111) Replies to the Question: "Which of the Following Things do you Feel are most Responsible for Current International Tensions", 1982-84

	Soviet military build-up			US military build-up			Superpower activity in Third World		
	Sept 82	Oct 83	May 84	Sept 82	Oct. 83	May 84	Sept. 82	Oct. 83	May 84
FR Germany	55	55	50	39	41	41	26	29	84
France	21	29	31	14	24	20	29	27	29
Italy	37	39	37	20	29	26	15	20	20
Netherlands	38	36	..	24	24	..	17	22	..
Norway	57	59	54	28	34	27	28	29	31
Spain	23	18	42	26	20	47	31	23	27
United Kingdom	33	43	47	15	24	37	16	22	32
Weighted averages*	32	47	42	18	28	27	20	28	25
Weighted averages excl. USA*	35	44	45	23	30	23	23	25	27

*Weighted by population

Note: Figures are the percentage of respondents naming them. Total may add up to more than 100 per cent owing to multiple answers given.

Source: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Harris Polls, AIIA Release, Paris, 7 June 1984. Cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1983.

Table 2(iv) Replies to the Questions, asked in the United Kingdom and FR Germany : "Do you think that US Policies Promote Peace or Increase the Risk of War" and "Do you think that the policies of the Soviet Union Promote Peace or Increase the Risk of War?"* 1982-83

	April 82	July 82	April 83	July 83	December 83
In the UK					
US Policies Promote peace	39	43	24	34	16
Increase risk of war	39	35	57	52	70
Soviet policies Promote peace	9	18	11	18	10
Increase risk of war	75	52	60	60	62
In FR Germany					
US policies promote peace	46	32	31	27	26
Increase risk of war	33	33	38	48	41
Soviet policies Promote peace	9	15	17	14	9
Increase risk of war	68	52	49	60	56

* The exact wording of the question is not available.

Note: Figures are the percentage of respondents, in each country, naming them.

Source: USIS Research Memorandum, 6 February 1984
(USIS, Washington, D.). Cited in SIPRI
Yearbook 1985.

Table 2(v) Replies to the Question: "In your opinion, which of these things are the most important to the future Security of Western Countries?", 1982-84

	Productive arms control talks			Continued dialogue and contacts with the USSR			Military balance with the USSR		
	Sept 82	Oct 83	May 84	Sept 82	Oct. 83	May 84	Sept. 82	Oct. 83	May 84
FR Germany	36	36	40	33	42	43	37	33	33
France	37	49	40	15	18	18	18	19	21
Italy	23	26	30	16	22	18	15	15	13
Netherlands	49	51	..	22	21	..	23	18	..
Norway	34	30	30	28	31	21	28	27	25
Spain	21	32	32	25	40	32	7	5	6
United Kingdom	21	36	42	19	36	36	24	27	32
Weighted averages*	26	34	31	23	35	30	21	27	22

* Weighted by population

Note: Figures are the percentage of respondents naming them.

Source: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Harris polls. AIIA Release, Paris, 7 June 1984. Cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1985.

TEXT OF NATO COMMUNIQUE
December 12, 1979

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1979;
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet divisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively. Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance because if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches and after taking note of the positions of certain members. Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-

launched system comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of substantive report to NPG Ministers in the autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military



relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes toward achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems.

This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along

the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the alliance:

- a. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.
 - b. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.
 - c. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet Land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.
 - d. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.
 - e. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.
10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms

control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

a. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

b. Success of arms control is constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results through negotiations.

FACTS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES

	Range	CEP	Warheads	Location	No. to be deployed
Pershing II	1800 km	40 m	One: Low kilo- tonnage	West Germany	108 between 1983-85
Cruise	2500 km	50 m	One: Low kilo- tonnage (select- able yield)	West Germany, Italy, UK, Belgium and the Netherlands	454 1983-88
SS-20	5000 km	5000 m	Usually three: 150 kilo- tonnes	Soviet Union (West of the Urab)	340 deployed since 1977

CEP = Circular Error Probable

Source: Cruise Pershing II in a nutshell Frank Balnaby and Stand Windass, March 1983.

Appendix 5

TEXT OF APPEAL FOR EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Launched on 28 April 1980

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a lamented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilized life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new, more 'usable' nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of 'limited' nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical

process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deathly dialectic.

We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged,

limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super-Powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of SS 20 medium-range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's organizations, trade unions, youth organizations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West' but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a transcontinental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow-Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilization by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organizations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.

Source: Thompson, E.P., Smith, Dan, Protest and Survive (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1980).

Appendix 6

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON COMMITTEE FOR
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENTNational or Regional Organisations

AUSTRALIA

Austrian National Union of Students
Gerhard Jordan
ARGE UFI
Christine Orovics

BELGIUM

CNAPD
Jean du Bosch
VAKA
Jan Turi
Luc Deliens

BRITAIN

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
Ken Fleet
Tony Simpson
END
Mary Kaldor
END Parliamentarians
Stuart Holland

SANA
Keith Barnham
West Yorkshire END
Michael McGowan
Fred Hasson
Hull END
Peter Crampton
CND
Bruce Kent
Jane Mayes

NORTHERN IRELAND

N. Ireland CND
Robin Wilson

SCOTLAND

Scottish CND
Priscilla Truss

SCAT
Ian Davison

DENMARK

Nej Til Atomvaben
Dagnar Fagerholt
Niels Gregersen
Rex Schade

FINLAND

Peace Committee of Finland
Johannes Pakaslahti
Mervi Gustafsson
Juhani Lehto
Committee of One Hundred
Folke Sundman
Tampere Peace Research Institute
Tapio Varis.

FRANCE

CODENE
Sylvie Mantrant
Bernard Ravenel
Anne Guillon

MPDL
Clause Bourdet
CEDETIM
Bernard Dreano
Jean-Louis Peyroux

GREECE

KEADEA
George Dolianitis

AKE
 Michael Peristerakis
 Stelios Babas
 Asteris Stangos

WEST GERMANY

Humanist Union
 Anna Elminger

Alternative List
 Walther Grunwald
 Ulrike Mietzner

Arbeitskreis
 Ruth Stanley
 Jurgen Graalfs
 Rudolf Steinke

SPD Left Parliamentary Group
 Wert Weisskirchen

Bremen END

Michaela von Freyhold

Die Grunen
 Dieter Esche
 Roland Vogt

BBU
 Joe Leinen

Europegio
 Helmut Schoneweihs

Women for Peace
 Eva Quinstorp
 DFGVK-Berlin
 J. Lange
 Federation of NVA Groups
 H. Karbach

HOLLAND

IKV
 Mient Jan Faber
 Wolfgang Muller

Women against Nuclear Arms
 Marianne Van Ophuysen
 Stop the Neutron Bomb
 Nico Schouten
 Frans Van Driel

PSP
 Ben Koelemen
 Lieke Thesingh

PVDA
 Maarten van Traa
 Willemien Ruygrok

ICELAND

Campaign against Military Bases
 Clafur Grimsson

IRELAND

Irish CND
 Dermot Nolan

ITALY

Umbrian Peace Committee
 Maurizio Lalleroni
 Giampiero Rasimelli

PCI
 Antonio Benetollo
 Renzo Gianotti

Coordinamento dei Comitati per la Pace

Luciana Castellina
 Roberto Galtieri

DP (Democrazia Proletaria)
 Stefano Semenzato

ACLI
 Claudio Gentili

ARCI
 Giani Squittieri
 Lega Ambiente
 Enrico Testa
 Archivio Disarmo

Ornella Caccio
 International League for the Rights and Freedom of Peoples
 G. Garlini
 Giancarla Codrignani

P. Venturini
National League for Disarmament
Luigi Anderlini

NORWAY

No to Nuclear Weapons
Jon Grepstad

PORTUGAL

UEDS
Cesar Oliveira

SPAIN

Comision Anti-Otan
Lola Albiac
Francisco Penas
Fernando Salaz Vazquez

MDPL
Marisa Rodriguez
Young Socialists
Magdy Martinez
Jesus Baca
Peblo Inglesias Foundation

CAPD
Zoaquin Antuna
ARI
Manuel Azcarate
Carlos Zaldivar

BASQUE COUNTRY

Euskadiko Ezkerra
Esteban Eguren
Ramon Penagearicano

SWEDEN

Labour Movement Peace Forum
Gunnar Lassinanti

SPAS
Rainer Santi
Aaron Tovish
Elisabeth Olsson

SWITZERLAND

Swiss Peace Council
 J. Binder
 M. Heiniger
 W. Meyer

YUGOSLAVIA

League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Peoples
 Bogdan Osolnik
 Milos Djukic

TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS

AGENOR
 John Lambert
 Carla Ferrari

European Scientists for Nuclear Disarmament
 Roger Rusack
 Christ of Wetterich
 Charling Tao

Trade Unions for END
 Tony Topham
 Walt Greendale

Nuclear Free-zone Network
 Lydia Merrill
 David Browning

European MPs for Nuclear Disarmament
 M.F. Baduel Glorioso (I)
 Bodil Boserup (DK)
 Ann Clwyd (UK)
 Win Griffiths (UK)
 A-M Lizin (B)
 Marisa Rodano (I)
 Protogene Veronesi (I)
 Bruno Ferrero (I)
 Roland Boyes (UK)

Pax Christi International
 Etienne de Jonghe

Quaker Council for European Affairs
 Angele Kneale

War Resisters International
 Jan Rutgeerts
 John Hyatt

INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

Ted Edwards (Bradford University)
 Marcelo Curto (Socialist Party, Portugal)
 Mats Hellstrom (Social Democratic Party, Sweden)
 Rudolf Bahro (Die Grunen)
 Albert de Smaele (Security Zone in Europe)
 M. Achilli (PSI)
 L. Granelli (D.C.)
 Fritz Roll (SPD)
 Mike Cooley (CAITS)

OBSERVERS

FLM (Italian Metalworkers)
 Gigi Pannozzo
 S.P. (Belgian Fl. Soc. Party)
 Jacques Vantomme
 Dirk Drijbooms
 CGIL (General Confederation of Italian Workers)
 Silvia Boba
 OCV (Belgium)
 Robert de Gendt
 Quaker Peace and Service (Britain)
 John Endersby
 Peter Jarman

BRUSSELS LIAISON

Carla Ferrari (Agenor)
 Giovanni Dolce (Secretariat, European Parliament
 Communist and Allied Group)
 Marie-Francoise Wilkinson

Source: END Papers - 7 (London, 1984).

30 QUESTIONS...



AND ANSWERS ABOUT CND 

1 What is CND?

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is

a British peace movement which started in 1958 as a result of public outrage both against nuclear weapons and against the testing of such weapons in the atmosphere.

2 What are its aims?

CND's aims are set out in its Constitution. It opposes all weapons of mass destruction, especially the British ones for which we are responsible, but has as its final aim 'complete and general disarmament'. This is

a United Nations goal, meaning that we work for a world in which no country can attack another because as a minimum it will not have the military means to do so.

3 Does CND believe in change by violence?

No. Its demonstrations have always been peaceful, and its spirit is of non-violence,

especially when direct action (fasts, sit-ins, tax refusal, etc.) has been undertaken.

4 Is it unilateralist or multilateralist?

This is a false distinction which is played upon by those who want to divide the peace movement. CND, realising how little has so far been achieved by negotiation, nevertheless supports all genuine disarmament processes both by negotiation (multilateral, bilateral, regional) or through the United Nations. At the same time it believes that every country can and should take its own disarmament steps, here and now, without waiting for agreement by anyone else.

In Britain today that means at least rejecting Trident submarines or any 'independent' British nuclear weapons or American Cruise missiles. Ending arms sales abroad, promoting peace education in universities and schools, and supporting redeployment schemes for those in military industries are only a few of the many other steps which our country could take without prior agreement with any other country.

5 Wouldn't independent action like this make us weaker to an attacker?

Not at all. The world has enough weapons to blow everyone up many times over. Both the Americans and the Russians could cut back on their nuclear arsenals at once without any negotiations and without the slightest loss to what militarists call 'security'. In fact, the only way out of the vicious spiral of the arms race is to act for peace and so encourage others. British

nuclear weapons are not genuinely independent, are vastly expensive, encourage others to join the nuclear gang and can present no real threat to either superpower. To use them would invite our annihilation. They did nothing to deter the Argentines from occupying the Falkland Islands!

6 How does CND see the 'Soviet threat'?

Realistically, unlike the simplistic position of our critics which leads them to accept the inevitability of nuclear weapons, and perhaps nuclear war. No one can prove that a Soviet threat does not exist – but, at the same time, political and economic consider-

ations make a military move by the Warsaw Pact outside their present area of influence in Europe very unlikely. Even if one believes in a 'Soviet military threat', nuclear weapons are worse than useless for defending the populations of the west.

7 Does CND oppose NATO ?

CND looks on both the major military blocs of East and West as sharing responsibility for the arms race as they feed on the fear of

the other. CND works for the dissolution of both and is therefore opposed to NATO and aims at a British withdrawal.

8 Is CND pacifist?

Some members certainly are, and the Society of Friends (the Quakers) is perhaps the largest of the pacifist groups. But most are not and believe in some forms of

military defence. All are agreed that present world military policies protect no one but only make nuclear calamity more likely. CND has supported discussions about alternative defence systems – not all of which are military.

9 Does CND support the Soviet Union?

CND does not support countries – it rejects militarism everywhere. Thus CND opposes new Soviet military developments like the SS20, and it has condemned the invasion of Afghanistan. But, because it regularly tries to show how the arms race looks from the

Soviet side and so often exposes Western military propaganda, it is denounced by Western militarists as being pro-Soviet. It believes in dialogue with all sides including the Warsaw Pact countries and their peoples.

10 Why isn't there a CND in Russia?

It is claimed by the USSR and similar countries that peace and disarmament are the policy of their governments and hence there is no need for a CND in those countries! In fact, CND doesn't believe that the idea of either disarmament as a unilateral process or of peace movements critical of their own governments has been accepted in these societies.

We welcome the signs that such independent movements are now emerging, especially in East Germany, and believe that our strategy can create a situation of greater detente and

co-operation, which in turn will help the democratisation of these countries. From the Russian point of view, they see themselves encircled and confronted with two hostile blocs – China and NATO – , and in that atmosphere self-criticism is seen as disloyalty.

But, before we get too self-righteous about our freedoms, it is well to remember that in many parts of the Western military bloc – from South Korea to Turkey – no 'independent' peace movements could possibly exist.



30

QUESTIONS...

AND ANSWERS ABOUT



11 Why do you think CND can succeed when there are no unilateralists in the Kremlin?

There aren't many unilateralists in Whitehall, or the Pentagon for that matter. Nevertheless, clearly the idea of unilateralism as a way of doing things is acknowledged as a genuine and important part of the disarmament process in the Final Document of the 1st United Nations Special

Session on Disarmament of 1978 – a document which our country is supposed to accept. Our problem is to create the conditions in which a unilateralist approach becomes the dominant one. No one suggests that any 'side' should give up all military defence overnight. We believe that every country can take independent unilateral first steps.

12 Why is CND opposed to 'Civil Defence'?

CND is opposed to 'Civil Defence' for two reasons. In the first place, for Britain, with so many targets, there can be no genuine civil defence. Even the Government has admitted that, in the sort of attack we might expect, thirty million people could die at once. Yet we are told to hide under the stairs and to whitewash our windows! The effect, if not the aim, of these absurd recommendations is to make nuclear war seem inevitable and even 'normal'. More importantly, (unlike neutral countries

where protection against radio-active fallout makes sense), when a nuclear weapon country starts to take 'Civil Defence' seriously, it is actually telling the other side to improve its missiles. Deterrence rests on a system – quite immoral – of taking hostages. The hostages are the civilian populations of 'the enemy'. Pretending to protect the hostages actually speeds up the arms race. The only real defence is to put every effort into ending the arms race.

13 Is CND opposed to nuclear energy?

Its constitution does not mention nuclear energy and, in its early days, many CND members did support what was then called 'Atoms for Peace'. Now, because of the obvious risks of nuclear proliferation and

the links between nuclear power and the nuclear weapons programme, the great majority of CND members are opposed to nuclear energy and have passed several Conference resolutions to that effect.

14 Wouldn't disarmament as proposed by CND create unemployment?

Not if redeployment into useful work is planned. It has been shown many times that money spent on non-military sectors of industry creates more jobs and less inflation. CND actively supports the movements for the conversion of military industries to socially useful production, and

sees this as important both for jobs in Britain and for the development of the poor countries of the world. It is in these poor countries especially that the arms race, because of the waste of talent and money involved, is already hurting millions who could have a decent life.

15 Is CND political?

Certainly, because CND wants to end the arms race and to influence political

decisions. But it is not PARTY political. In CND there are members of all the major parties and even organised groups such as Labour CND and Liberal CND.

16 What are local nuclear-free zones, and does CND support them?

The idea of local nuclear-free zones was launched in this country by Manchester City Council in 1980. Over 140 local authorities have now so declared themselves. In practice they are refusing to co-operate with government 'Civil Defence' plans, raising objections to government military planning applications, opposing nuclear waste

dumping and passage, co-operating with CND and other peace groups in making local authority facilities available, beginning to work for a fundamental change in attitudes to war by peace education in schools, and promoting twinning schemes with local authorities in other countries.

17 What does CND mean by a 'European Nuclear-Free Zone'?

CND believes that disarmament will only be achieved if we get on with it now – that's the meaning of unilateral disarmament. In Europe we believe that, instead of watching a 'numbers game' in Geneva between the two superpowers, we should be clearing the

weapons out of Europe, country by country, to create a nuclear-free Europe, east and west, which would then have a powerful effect on the peoples and ultimately on the governments of the USA and the USSR.

18 But isn't CND just like the people who wanted to appease Hitler in the 1930s?

On the contrary, those who were responsible in the 1930s for the rise of Hitler were those Western militarists who ruined the Disarmament Conference of 1932, made Hitler's rise inevitable and then made money out of helping to arm him in the expectation that he would attack Russia.

In the quite different circumstances of the 1980s CND is simply saying that nuclear 'deterrence' cannot last, that the world has weapons enough to destroy itself many times over and that it is the arms race itself which is our real enemy.

19 Is CND international?

There are CND organisations in Ireland, Scotland and Wales but not in other countries, because most countries already have their own peace organisations, many of which have a similar approach to CND. CND is affiliated to the United Nations Association and the International Peace Bureau. It has taken a special interest in the

two United Nations Disarmament Sessions of 1978 and 1982. Since the start of the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign in 1980, CND has made strong links with other European movements, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, and meets regularly with European peace workers.

20 What has the United Nations said about the arms race and its dangers?

In 1978 the United Nations, in a report accepted unanimously, declared, "**Mankind is confronted with a choice – we either curb the arms race or face annihilation**". In other

words, the UN, like CND, believes that the dangers of doing nothing are far greater than any risks on the road to peace.

21 Is CND only concerned with nuclear weapons?

No, it is concerned with all weapons and all methods of peacemaking from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade to the promotion of peace education. Nevertheless, CND believes that the major threat to the world is the massive stockpile of 50,000 nuclear weapons, most of which

are in the arsenals of the two superpowers. Its main efforts are aimed at getting rid of these instruments of mass destruction. In particular CND campaigns against a British 'independent' nuclear weapon of any sort, against nuclear bases in Britain and against the introduction of yet more nuclear weapons like the Cruise missile, into the country.

22 Does CND make statements about human rights?

CND is a disarmament movement and it tries to stick to that single aim, although many members, under other hats, are very active on human rights issues. One of the present CND Council members, for instance, is an ex-chairperson of British Amnesty. CND condemned the suppression

in Poland and in earlier days the American presence in Vietnam. CND has, however, from time to time, made itself unpopular by pointing out that human rights violations are not only to be found in 'the East', and that those working for peace must apply the same judgements to countries of the West, the East and the 'non-aligned' bloc.

23 What are its methods?

CND aims to mobilise the majority of people in this country and to inform them about the risks of nuclear war. Film shows, debates, rallies, leafletting, discussions, petitions, street theatre, contacts with MPs and councillors, letters to the press, school

visits, are all basic to the ordinary work of CND. At the same time, CND has special groups working with churches, trades unions, doctors, scientists, teachers, young people and many in other areas. CND is a very broad-based movement.

24 Is CND run by Communists?

There are communists in CND just as there are christians, feminists and pacifists. And of course many communists are sharply critical of the USSR. CND is not run by any single group, and the question itself sounds

like witch-hunting. Members of CND support its constitutional aims, which are critical of both the superpowers, as are many of the resolutions passed at annual conferences.

25 How many members are there?

At the moment there are over 41,000 national members, and hundreds of

thousands of people who have joined local CND groups but are not national members.

26 How is CND organised?

CND is administered by an annually elected Council which meets quarterly and on which there is a strong representation from the 15

regions and the many groups which make up each region. The Council selects an Executive responsible to it.

27 Who pays for it?

The bulk of CND income comes from membership subscriptions and donations and from the sale of booklets, badges, etc.

CND receives no outside money from any fund or organisation East or West, unlike some major British organisations critical of CND, which receive substantial funding from the British Government.

28 Has CND had any success already?

Yes. The opinion polls show that an increasing number of people agree with our ideas. The start of the talks in Geneva over the new European nuclear weapons and Reagan's 'zero-option', however minimal their likely outcome, show that we and the other disarmament movements in Europe have started to have a political impact. Similar movements to ourselves in Holland and Belgium have meant that their

governments have been forced to postpone their acceptance of Cruise missiles. In America the 'Freeze' campaign has been greatly encouraged by the European peace movement, and is having a major impact on American politics. In Britain as a result of CND pressure, the Home Office has actually had to cancel, or at least postpone, its autumn 1982 major 'civil defence' exercise — Hard Rock.

29 Can anyone join?

Certainly, as long as he or she accepts the constitution and aims of the Campaign.

CND is a movement with thousands of members. It is democratically organised, and to be effective it needs as many active members as possible.

30 How can I join?

Simply fill in a membership form and return to CND, 11 Goodwin Street, London N4.

CASH MEMBERSHIP FORM



- Adult £6
- Couple £9
- Student £3
- Youth CND (21 and under) £1
- Unwaged £2
- Please put me in touch with my local group.

Name

Address

I enclose for one year's membership.

Donation £ Total £

Cheques and Postal Orders to CND. Return to CND, 11 Goodwin Street, London N4 3HQ

BANKERS ORDER FORM

To the Manager of..... Bank Ltd.

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Please pay the Co-operative Bank Ltd., 110 Leman Street, London E1 (code 080308) for the account of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (A/c No. 50036163) the sum of £..... on the day of 198 and thereafter every Month/Quarter/Year* until otherwise notified.

Signed..... (*Delete as appropriate)

Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)

Address.....

Account No.....

Please return completed Bankers Order form to CND

We also have a Giro Account No. 525604006
Ask for a separate form for SANITY subscriptions.

YOUR LOCAL GROUP CONTACT IS:

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 11 Goodwin Street, London N4. Telephone 263 0977

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