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**PKI (PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA-
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA)
DURING THE PHASE OF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY (1950-1957)**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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It is certified that the dissertation entitled 'PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia-Communist Party Of Indonesia) during the phase of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957)' submitted by Mr. P.K. Sanal Kumar, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy, is a bonafide and original work to the best of our knowledge and may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.



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C O N T E N T S

	Pages
PREFACE	iii - iv
CHAPTERS	
I INTRODUCTION	1 - 22
II DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO MADIUN REVOLT	23 - 40
III PKI DURING THE EVE OF TRANSFER OF POWER	41 - 56
IV PKI DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY PHASE	57 - 73
V CONCLUSIONS	74 - 77
APPENDIX I,	78 - 80
II	81- 82
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	83 - 85

P R E F A C E

In Indonesia, awareness of Marxism came largely through influences from the colonial power itself. It was through Dutch literature, in contact with radical politicians and in Dutch Universities that Indonesians were first attracted to Marxism.

The influence of Marxism in Indonesia understandably took special forms under the impact of certain indigenous conditions and of the nationalist movement. Apart from the cultural impact, class structure of Indonesian Society, particularly during the colonial period, the emergence of a Western-educated elite, a growing social and economic unrest, and nationalist movement also helped to create an atmosphere receptive to Marxism.

As a revolutionary party, Marxist-Leninist theory formed the doctrinal basis for the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI - Indonesian Communist Party). Marx's basic idea of class struggle in an industrial society between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and Lenin's concept of a vanguard party system to spearhead a proletarian revolution formed the foundation of the PKI's ideology. To these were added aspects of Mao-Tse-Tung's thought, particularly with regard to the national liberation struggle of the peoples in the

(ii)

Third World.

Mao's revolutionary model, a variant of Leninism, especially the two-staged strategy of Democratic and Socialist revolution, was apparently adopted by Aidit. In rejecting 'Peoples War', while building the PKI into a huge mass organisation during the 'Democratic Stage', Aidit ostensibly sought to combine Maoist 'New Democracy' with Musso's 'New Road'.

In early nineteen twenties the PKI was the largest and most significant Marxist party in Indonesia. Its history is filled with problems, arising primarily from the dichotomy between Marxist Ideology as represented by the Comintern on the one side and the realities of the Indonesian situation, on the other. These problems form the essential background not only to the development of the PKI itself but also to the role of ideas of Marxist origin in the larger stream of Indonesian nationalism.

After its suppression in 1926-27 PKI started flourishing during 1935, even though it worked as an illegal party. The reprisals against the PKI following the Madiun revolt in 1948 virtually crushed the party, when it was clearly liquidated from the

(iii)

Indonesian politics. Significantly this was the period of intense national movement for freedom.

After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the PKI again reemerged as a political party devoted to the cause of emancipation of the working class. A change in the basic policy, that was followed in the past, could be seen after 1950, where the PKI became more powerful than any other nationalist party.

The adaptation of the revolutionary movement to parliamentary democracy was the cardinal change that took place during this 1950, under the leadership of Aidit.

The PKI achieved this success by a variety of techniques; by extending their control and influence first in the trade union movement, then in the peasant and youth organisations and in several minor parties which represented special local or radical interests; by carefully wooing of, and playing on the factional quarrels in the PNIS; by campaigning ceaselessly to isolate Masjumi; by exploiting the numerous crisis that beset the national leadership including the upheavals in the armed forces ; by nurturing a relationship with President Sukarno.

The overriding feature of the PKI ideology was the 'Indonesianisation' of Marxism-Leninism. In Aidit words, this was the 'integration' of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution.

I shall be failing in my duty if I do not record my special gratitude to late Professor Vishal Singh, Dean of SIS, who had always been a source of inspiration and guidance to me.

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INDONESIA



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

C H A P T E R 1

INTRODUCTION

The dawn of the 20th century witnessed the rising of Communist ideas all over the world. After the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 Communist philosophy based on Marxian doctrine influenced the Colonies which were under the colonial yoke for a prolonged period of exploitation. To fight and overthrow the colonial rulers people of the suppressed colonies inspired by the Communist ideas, founded communist parties in there own countries. As in India, the people of Indonesia formed Communist Party very early in the 1920's for fighting against colonialism and imperialism. It became full-fledged after the Second World War.

The emergence of PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia-Communist Party of Indonesia) in Indonesia during the 1920's deserve more importance as it was the first time that a Communist Party was founded in Asia. The reaction of the people in Indonesia against the colonial rule resulted in the founding of Communist Party in Semarang, Central Java, on May 23, 1920. Communist ideas, not much in vogue till 1920's among the people of Indonesia, inspired the Indonesian toiling masses against the Dutch Colonial Rule.

PKI was a revolutionary party which strove for the displacement of colonial rule by revolutionary methods. The rebellion that took place in 1926-27 was put down by the Dutch Government and forced the PKI into underground

work. From its hiding it came again to the fore in the Indonesian Independence struggle during 1940's. It supported Sukarno for proclaiming independence in August 1945. But fate was against the party when it was crushed in the wake of the Madiun rebellion in September-December 1948. PKI was extirpated from the Indonesian politics.

After it was suppressed in 1948 PKI entered the Indonesian politics with a novel tactics in 1950's. It adapted itself to a new system of parliamentary democracy which eventually pronounced the PKI as one of the third largest Communist party in the world. A tactical change in the revolutionary methods could be seen during this parliamentary period.

Despite frequent suppressions and a strict ban on its activities, the PKI grew as a massive party not on the basis of revolutionary methods but on the strategy based on peaceful struggle for socialism. This strategy was applied through 'broad alliances' and 'fronts' as well as ruling coalitions with other parties. A change in tactics caused the party to grow progressively.

This dissertation gives the causes and circumstances that led the PKI to adopt and support parliamentary democracy which was against the principles of a revolutionary movement.

In the Introduction and Background it gives the importance of the study of the PKI and also an account of its founding and causes that led to its growth. It also

depicts the activities of the PKI from 1920 to 1945.

The second chapter elucidates the Declaration of Independence in 1945 and the Party's role in the national movement. It ends with the 'Madiun Affair' in 1948, whence the PKI was decimated and proscribed.

An account of the PKI's role in the period of transfer of power is given in the third chapter. It covers the period from 1948 to the complete independence in 1949.

The Fourth Chapter examines the PKI's adaptation to parliamentary democracy. As a revolutionary party it changed its revolutionary tactics and adopted a policy of support to parliamentary democracy.

Forced by the then prevailing situation, the PKI embraced the parliamentary path, for its development. The reasons that prompted it to choose the parliamentary path is given in the conclusion of this dissertation.

This study is based on secondary English language sources, books, articles in journals, periodicals, and newspapers; it has a historical analytical framework.

The Appendices contain a list of abbreviations, a chronology of incidents, and a map of Indonesia.

BACKGROUND

A knowledge of the politico-social and geographical position and situation would be useful to understand the historical background of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). After it was founded in 1920 it flourished and influenced the toiling masses. During the colonial rule it also strove for the liberation of Indonesia from the colonial yoke. The revolts that were organized by the PKI during this time should be considered as part of the early nationalist movement, though not organized for overthrowing the colonial yoke¹.

Geographically, Indonesia is not one land mass. It is made up of numerous chain of islands not clustered together but scattered all over the vast area. It can be said that it is a conglomeration of more than 13,000 islands, having 150 million people and crowning Indonesia as the fifth largest populated nation in the world². Most of them are crowded in the island of Java,

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1. Harry J. Benda & Ruth T. McVey, The Communist uprising of 1926-27 in Indonesia : Key documents (Ithaca, New York, 1960), p.11.
 2. Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism. The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (London, 1984), p. 45.

one of the world's most densely populated agricultural area.

Indonesia is strategically located on the trade route between Europe and East Asia. It is rich in raw materials like, oil, tin, bauxite, coal, timber and rubber etc. About 70% of the population are engaged in agriculture.

Indonesia is the largest Islamic country in the world. There are also Hindus, Budhists and some Christians. The national language is Bahasa Indonesia. There are over 350 ethnic groupings having 250 individual languages.

COLONIZATION

During the 16th century the portuguese arrived in Indonesia. In the following century the Dutch came and founded Dutch East India Company which monopolized the trade later. Under the command of Cornelis de Houtman, the Dutch arrived in Bantam in June, 1569. Due to conflict with the Portuguese and Indonesia, they returned to Netherlands in 1597. The next year a Dutch fleet under Jacob van Neck arrived in Malacca in March 1599, where they were well received by the local people. After that the Netherlands continued sailing to Malacca for spice trade.

By the proposal of the State-General the United East India Company (VOC - Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) was formed. The VOC first occupied Ambon in 1605 and established their first trading centre in Bantam in 1603³.

The sole aim of the Dutch was to make maximum profit in trade and it was fully confined to the spice of Malacca. Later they moved to the trading centre Java, where they obtained trading privileges from the native rulers. To avoid arousing competition from the Javanese, Arabs, Chinese and non-Dutch European traders and to ensure implementation of agreement made with local rulers most suited to its own interest, the company gradually found it necessary to intervene politically more and more decisively over wider and wider areas of Java⁴. Java at that time was not politically united, and Mataram, the largest of the Javanese states during this period had been seriously weakened by civil wars.

3. In March 1602, the competing companies which were trading with the Indies were merged into one, forming VOC. It was granted a charter by the State General which gave them quasi-sovereign power, including the right to wage war, build fortresses and conclude treaties throughout Asia. Its headquarters were located in Amsterdam (see Ricklefs, M.C.), p.25.

4. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, London, 1969), p. 3.

Coming with an aim of Commercial enterprise the Dutch finally conquered the Indies politically. They ruled over Indonesia for about 350 years. This long rule changed the political, cultural and social systems of Indonesia.

Though Japan came in Indonesia in 1942, it was welcomed by the people of Indonesia, since Japan was an Asian country. But the policy pursued by them in Indonesia was entirely against the interests of the Indonesian people. After two years it was felt that the Japan also wanted to colonize the Indies. However, the fall of Japan in the Second World War, helped Sukarno, the PNI leader, to declare Independence. This declaration of Independence was the result of a strong nationalist movement. The beginning of the 20th Century saw the birth of the Indonesian nationalist movement. The happenings in other parts of the world nourished the national consciousness of the intellectuals⁵ in Indonesia.

5. R.A.A. Yasudipura, "A tragedy of my people" Voice of Free Indonesia, no. 28, August 1946, p. 10.

NATIONALISM

The awakening of national consciousness among the Indonesians is interlinked with the changes that occurred in Asia after 1900⁶. The modernization of Japan had made a great impression upon many Indonesians. Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 was hailed throughout colonial Asia. Japan in these days was a great example for all Asian nationalists. This example encouraged the Indonesian leaders to seek equal rights with the European inhabitants of this country.

The primary factor that caused to develop nationalism was the exploitation that continued in the colonial rule. The political, social and economic stratification among the Indonesians was very rigid. The Dutch occupied the apex of the power pyramid, the Chinese middle and the Indonesians the broad base⁷. In the economic and social spheres the Dutch discriminated against non-white community, employing Chinese as middle class buffer between themselves and the Indonesians.

6. Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara. A History of Indonesia (Hague & Bandung, 1959), p.341.

7. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism. A History (New York, 1963), p.5.

Two legal systems prevailed, one based on as in the Netherland and the other on the local laws. Another imposition was the introduction of 'Cultivation system'⁸, which changed the rural agricultural systems in the country.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Though the concept of nationalism began to grow before 1920's, it became more articulated after the formation of some organization which was politically and socially motivated. 'Boedi Oetomo' (Noble Endeavour) was the first nationalist organization that emerged about 1908. This movement was limited solely to the island of Java. It set as its task the spreading of education and general culture in the country. In 1912, there arose in another nationalist organization, the Sarekat Islam, founded by Haoji Samanhudi.

Isolated from the mass organizations, a small Social Democratic Party called ISDV (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging) was founded in 1914. It was rooted in the trade-union movement. Sneevliet,

8 At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Netherlands finances were depleted by the secession of Belgium. The Dutch turned to develop the island as a large-scale plantation. Indirect method was chosen; the regional and local aristocracy was bribed and it forced their subjects to produce both for consumption and for the Dutch.

9 Indonesia, vol. I, April 1966, p.52.

a Dutch Communist was active in the leadership¹⁰. The main aim of this organization was to propagate socialism in Indonesia and particularly to organize revolution¹¹.

BIRTH OF PKI

Partai Kounis Indonesia (PKI) was founded in Semarang, Central Java on May 23, 1920. This was less than three years after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In point of time the PKI was formed earlier than its Chinese counterpart and was therefore the oldest Communist Party in Asia.

The seeds of the PKI were planted by a Dutch Marxist, HJFM Sneevliet. By taking interest in the welfare of the unskilled and impoverished workers, Sneevliet initiated to mobilize the railway workers and their union VSTP (Rail and Tram workers union) and edited its new paper. Dissatisfied by the way of its function, later, he sought to form a proselytising group from the socialist faithful, already in Indonesia¹². They met in Surabaya, East Java

10 In 1913 HJFM Sneevliet (1883-1942) arrived in Indonesia. He had begun his career as a Catholic mystic, but had then turned to social democratic revolutionary ideas and trade union movement. He was later to act as the Comintern's agent in China under the alias G. Maring. In 1914 he founded ISDV. It could be said that the ISDV was the parent organisation of PKI.

11 Leslie Palmier, Communists in Indonesia, (London, 1973), p. 25.

12 Ibid., p.24.

in May 1914, and formed Indies Social Democratic Association, aimed at propagating socialism and organizing revolution in Indonesia.

Realizing that the European character will not attract the Indonesian masses to ISDV, Barrs, its principal propagandist, established the first Indonesian Socialist Group in Surabaya¹³.

During this time Sarekat Islam was getting organized in many areas of Java. In Sarekat Islam multiple membership was allowed¹⁴. Seeing that the Sarekat branches were moving in their own way, Sneevliet and Barrs planned to induct its members to ISDV. Among the individual members, Semaun¹⁵, was the most prominent. After the arrival of Semaun to Semarang the Sarekat branch became stronger than the Central Sarekat in Surabaya. Within a year the membership of the Sarekat Islam had grown 17,000 to 20,000. After reaching such an influential stage they began to challenge the Surabaya Central Sarekat Islam

13. Leslie Palmier, n.11, p.29.

14. It meant that a Sarekat Islam member could be a member of another party. There was no restriction. Later it was checked and passed a resolution that Sarekat Islam member could not be a member of the PKI.

15. Semaun was a sixteen year old boy, who worked in the State railway, Surabaya. He became the Secretary of local branch of Sarekat Islam.

Sneevliet was put on trial when he prescribed the Russian type of revolution that had broken out in 1917, to Indies, but later he was acquitted. It made some repercussions and some moderates in ISDV (Indische Social Democratische Vereniging-Indies Social Democratic Association) resigned in a body and formed ISDP (Indies Social Democratic Party). The ISDV then became an association of Leninists.

After the split in the ISDV, the Conference in May 1918 decided to establish itself as an Indonesian movement, not as an offshoot of its Dutch parent. It helped in the expansion of its membership. This decision led to conflict between the party headquarters in Europe and Indonesian branches. When it turned to be a fully Indonesian movement, the colonial government sought to discipline the revolutionary leaders by expelling them from Indonesia. Barrs was dismissed from his teaching post in October 1917, and a year later Sneevliet was expelled. In 1919 Barrs left for Europe. Until then most of the party places were taken up by new Indonesian recruits, among whom Darsono was the most prominent.

Still the tactics of infiltration to Sarekat Islam was going on. Darsono and Semaun found easy to make relations with the Sarekat Islam as they were Muslims. The multiple membership was constituted in such a way that members of Communist organisation formed a secret Sarekat Islam, for their own purpose. In West Java

a secret Sarekat Islam Association known as 'section B' was discovered¹⁶, with nebulous relations with the official organization.

In May 1920 the ISDV held its 7th Congress where it decided to change its name. An executive committee was elected for that purpose. By considering the party's nature and its importance to Indonesia, it renamed itself as 'Perserikatan Komunis di-India (PKI)¹⁷.

The PKI acclaimed much prominence in Sarekat Islam. The remaining members in the 'Section B' affair were loyal to the Semarang branch; and it was fully dominated by the Communist members. Involvement in labour problems by the Sarekat Islam afforded the PKI members chances to influence the trade union branches.

When it was felt that the Communists were infiltrating in the Sarekat Islam, its leaders decided to evict the Communists from the organization. For this purpose the sixth Congress of the Sarekat Islam was held in Surabaya in October 1921. It passed a resolution, prohibiting the party members from joining the Communist party¹⁸. Thus, the Communist members were expelled from the Sarekat Islam.

16. Leslie Palmier, n.11, p.38.

17. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State - Actor
The case of PKI (Hong Kong, 1982), p. 51

18. T.P.C., "Modern Nationalism in Indonesia"
Indonesian Review, vol. 3, p.209.

By 1924, the PKI was virtually a coherent political movement. It was an entirely indigenous organization. This time the name Indonesia had gained widespread acceptance, an indication of rising national consciousness. At its meeting in June of that year, the party changed its name to 'Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)¹⁹. It also decided to change the headquarters from Semarang to Batavia (Jakarta, then Djakarta).

PKI and its revolt against the Dutch

PKI became increasingly militant during 1923. In the initial stages, as an organization striving for the overthrow of the colonial power, it started strikes against the regime. Its first strike against the Dutch started in 1923. The issue of the strike was not so important as a protest; the party which was longing for an opportunity, tried to turn it into a general strike.

In 1923 the Government announced a new salary structure, unlike the previous single scale system of 1913. It discriminated between the Indonesians and European servants.

19. MacArthur F. Corsino, n.17, p.51.

In protest against this, the VSTP (Rail & Tram workers union) leaders met in Bandung and proclaimed a strike throughout the railway and tram network in the Indies. Though it aroused strong feelings, the strike ended quickly in disaster with Semaun arrested and all strikers dismissed. By placing the Railways under military control and forbidding VSTP from meeting, the dutch colonial government tackled the situation very quickly. It was estimated that between 2,500 and 13,000 workers participated in the strike.

With the lesson that the government would not brook opposition, the non-Communist labour organization withdrew from politics and functioned as professional association, while non-Communist political groups disintegrated. Only the Communists devoted as they were to revolution, remained a coherent force²⁰.

In its conference in June 1925 the PKI leaders decided that the constituent groups were to be composed of five men, not ten, as part of a re-organization of the party. Specific plans were also laid for the revolt. In this conference Alimin was reported to have discussed the tactics for unleashing the rebellion, calling for a strike wave centered on railways and harbours and harbours and culminating in a general strike²¹.

20. Leslie Palmier, n.11, p. 64.

21. Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca, New York, 1965), p.29¹,

The party then arranged a plan to organize strikes wherever it was strong, especially in railways and harbours and this should culminated into a general strike.

As a result, in July a number of PKI unions in Semarang staged major strikes. The fate was against the Party, because in that month the Governor General's conference had formulated a plan to curb the Party. Though on August 5, 1925, the PKI's headquarters appealed to its branches not to strike as the time was not yet ripe, the very day the Communist-led union decided to convert the strike into a general one.

The government reacted very severely. It suspended the right of assembly and prevented the unions to communicate with one other rendering it extremely difficult to control and plan the General Strike. Each union moved with its own plan and arrangement. In such a situation it was easy for the government to suppress the strike. The strike was crushed. The strikers lost their jobs and the union disintegrated. Several leaders of the PKI were arrested. Alimin, the planner of the revolt, took refuge in Singapore, where the PKI had opened an office earlier in that year.

This time one could see that the PKI was unsteadily organized. Perhaps the revolt in Semarang might have been successful, had the party been able to rely on a disciplined body of adherents. Instead of having acted according to the orders and decisions from the headquarters, the local leaders ignored the central directions and indulged in violence whenever they felt the occasions demanded it.

Another disastrous failure occurred in Surabaya. Being industrialised, this city harboured most of the Communist unions. The opportunity for revolution in this area was quite distinct as the party union had a dominant influence here. Unfortunately, a strike broke out in September and continued until December. The Police finally suppressed the strike. The main cause of the failure of this strike was that the union and the headquarters couldn't control its workers²².

Though the Party failed in those strikes against the colonial rule, it went forward with the idea of revolt in future. On December 25, both the PKI and its trade union arm, the VSTP, held important meetings, one at Prambanan, and the other not far away at Surakarta, both in Central Java.²³ After preparing a final plan for an

22. Leslie Palmier, n. 11, p.75.

23. Justus M. Van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Canada, 1965), p.16.

insurrection, it was decided to begin a six month strike to culminate in armed violence. For this, attempts were to be made to draw peasants and soldiers in on the Communist side. PKI had an invisible hand in the strikes, which outwardly were to demand a general wage increase and express popular grievances. If they received much support, the PKI would then launch its revolt, first in Padang (Central Sumatra) in order to expel the Dutch troops from Java. The VSTP thus decided to launch a rail strike in May, which would lead to revolution. To implement this plan, they decided to appeal to Moscow for help and delegated Alimin as courier, the Chief Proponent of revolution²⁴.

The government, however, were systematically undermining the whole nationalistic movement by suppressing strikes and prohibiting the right of assembly. At the end of 1926, the government banished two the PKI's senior leaders.²⁵

Understanding that the legal political activities were not possible, the leaders decided at a meeting in Batavia held on January 13, 1926 that the revolution was the only hope. For this purpose, the Party chose another tactics, that the Party members themselves be divided into soldiers, spies and propagandists; the aim being to prepare for revolt.²⁶

24. Leslie Palmier, n. 11, pp. 76-77 .

25. Darsano, was permitted to exile himself to Russia. Alimin to Singapore.(See Leslie Palmer, p. 77).

26. Leslie Palmier, n.11, p. 77

The situation during this time was totally against the Party. The main problem was that the government was pursuing a severely repressive policy against the Party. In this phase, the party avoid even celebrating the 'May' day. But the government stepped forward by ceasing the revolutionary publications and formally disbanding it. The party was practically emasculated in the cities of Java. Disorganized and disbanded by the government, the Party headquarters lost control over its branches. This resulted in some sporadic cases of violence and the arresting of local Party leaders. In order to escape being supervised by the police, the Party shifted its headquarters from Balavia to Bandung.

Tan Malaka called Party leaders to Singapore, where he was exiled. It was attended among others by Vice Chairman, Supardjo. After his return from Singapore, Supardjo informed the Party about Malaka's decision to rescined the Parambanan decision to revolt. Though the Party executive agreed with Malaka's decision, they did not give up the plan altogether. The executive began to go to reverse. It sent messages to all its branches to review the situation and to discuss Malaka's proposal, warning that no action was to be taken to start an uprising. But the headquarters were unable to prevent any branch from taking action and the branches were going with their own decision.

Batavia branch went further at the end of the October. It secretly set up a rival headquarters for the Party. It decided to revolt on November 12, with some bomb-throwing incident. All these plans were kept secret from the headquarters at Bandung.²⁷

In Pekalongan, on the north coast of Java, the government arrested all the Communists in order to prevent the uprising. The secret message, informing the date of rebellion, sent from Batavia to Java was intercepted on the way. This made it easy for the government to suppress the rebellion, as the police had already known the date of uprising. Same was the fate of the Party in Central Java also.

Only in West Java did matters take more serious turn. The revolt assumed the appropriate garb of a holy war, with guns, knives and cutlasses. Communication lines were sabotaged and armed groups assaulted village heads, police and lower officials and set fire to official buildings. The only one European being killed was a Dutch railway official²⁸.

The revolt was suppressed. On November 17, the Attorney General ordered the arrest of all the persons known

27. Ibid., p. 79

28. Ibid., p. 81

to be Communists. Large numbers of persons were detained and the PKI and its affiliated bodies ceased to exist²⁹.

In West Sumatra the last stage of rebellion broke-out. The leaders were picked up and detained by the police. The date of the rebellion was not confirmed and disagreement on it went on. Finally, the local branches settled on January 1, 1927. The fighting spread rapidly. The rebels were better armed, and the fighting was heavier than in Java. By January 12, the rebellion collapsed under the police atrocities³⁰.

Around 13,000 persons were arrested. Some of them who were responsible for murders were shot down, 5,000 were put into preventive detention and 500 sentenced to exile in western New Guinea³¹.

After the 1926-27 rebellion, the party was compelled to operate underground for the next twenty years. Throughout this time they were having an illegal existence haunted by the police and prevented from being organised into an effective party.

In 1928 the 6th Congress of the Comintern was held. It considered the defeat of the PKI in the Indies. As a result a new policy based on opposition to bourgeois, i.e. non-Communist movement was formed. As part of this policy, Musso, by new the most prominent of the exiled PKI leaders, was sent from Moscow to Surabaya. With his

29. Ibid, p. 81.

30. Ibid, p. 81.

31. MacArthur F. Corsinco, n.17, p.53.

TH-1932



one year of detention in Surebays, he built up an underground Indonesian Communist Party, or an illegal PKI.

Malaka, with his Singapore Associates, Djamaludin Tamin, and Subekat formed a new party called Partai Republic Indonesia (PARI), in Bangkok in 1928. His aim was to train yet others and to build up a secret organisation. He intended to create a powerful organisation on Leninist lines for Indonesia, and at the same time not to be subordinate it to Moscow.

Both the organisations by Musso and Malaka did not achieve much success, for the government's anti-subversive apparatus proved superior to them. So the Communists started thinking in another direction. They formulated a policy of penetrating other organisations. They infiltrated into Partai Nasional Indonesia in 1927, then its successor, the Partindo of 1931, and "Gerindo" of 1937. 'Garindo' included two undisclosed Communists, Wikans and Amir Sjariffudin.

The suppression of Communist movement marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new one as regards the national movement in Indonesia was concerned. Although the leadership of the independence movements then passed into the hands of non-Communists, it is widely acknowledged that the Communist influence was one of the earliest and the most potent factors in stimulating nationalism in the Indies³².

32. Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. MacVey, n.1, p. 11.

C H A P T E R I I

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO MADIUN REVOLT

C H A P T E R II

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO MADIUN REVOLT

Coming of Japan and its Collapse

The Japanese invasion on January 10, 1942 sent a shock wave rippling through out the Indonesian nation. It, however, did not cause panic submission under the colonial administration. The people remained passive while the Japanese completed their conquest. On March 8, 1942 the Dutch in Java surrendered the Governor-General van Starkan borgh was arrested.¹ The triumph that made Japan achieved upon the combined Dutch, British, Australian and American fleets in the battle of Java sea was a surprise to the Indonesian people, for it was a victory of an Asian Country against a Western Power.

The hope that Japan, as an Asian country, would help for the Indonesian Independence became futile, when their policy later turned into one of exploitation of the Indies. The Japanese aim was to restructuring and redirection of Indonesian economy in order to support their war efforts and their plan for long term domination of East and South East Asia². This policy towards Indonesia had two priorities; to wipe out Western influences among them and to mobilise them in the interest of the Japanese victory. They intended to control Indonesia for their own political and economic interest.

1. M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, C.1300 to the Present (London, 1981), p.184.

2. Ibid, p.184

Japan's first attempt was to get the support of the masses so that they could indirectly control them without any resistance from them. For this purpose Japan's plan was an almost success when they launched a mass movement called a 'Tripple A' movement in Java. This was a name derived from the slogan of Japan, the leader of Asia, Japan, the Protector of Asia, and Japan, the light of Asia³. Through this movement Japan could easily prevent, to an extent, the national awakening for freedom, for which the Indonesians had been fighting in the Dutch colonial rule.

Since the Dutch had left, a radical change could be seen in the Indonesian body politic, within the three-and-a-half years of their rule. The policies pursued by them were not at all aimed at for the interest of the Indonesian people but to pose as their saviour and exploit them as much as possible.

By 1945, a thorough change in the structure of the government occurred, the Japanese themselves sketched the plan in such a way that more and more Indonesians were appointed in the civil as well as military posts. At the time of the Japanese invasion, almost all the jobs in the civil and military were in the hands of the Dutch and Eurasians. A sudden change occurred after the coming of Japan, when they inducted more and more Indonesian to the services. This was a planned aim of Japan that giving more participation to the

3. Ibid., p.190

Indonesians would lesser their resistance against them. Later, however, proved to be a miscalculated move on the part of the Japanese authorities.

Japan wanted to enlist the support of Indonesians National leaders in building a mass movement in its war effort. In 1942 however, the Japanese in Indonesia were still engaged in the glorious adventure of co-properity. With the support of the Japanese, the Indonesians formed 'POETERA' in early 1943⁴. It is an acronym derived from the full name 'Poesat Tenaga Rakjat' (Centre of Peoples' Power). The task of the poeters was to awaken the coscience of the people and secure their involvement in the state and the Japanese war efforts. It was under the close Japanese control, but four Indonesian were placed at the head, Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjir Dewantara and Kyai Haji Mas Mensur.

For giving the feeling that the Indonesians were also participating in the governmental functions, Japan did allow them to join the Army, something that was never allowed during the Dutch rule. Dutch army was contained only

4. S.Tas, Indonesia, The Under Developed Freedom
(translation from the Dutch by Derck S. Jordan)
(Pegasus, 1974), p.156.

Netherlands Indies Army. But the Japanese took a different view. Under the auspices of 'Poetera', an Army of volunteers was formed, named as Peta Soekarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air Peta -(Volunteer Army for the defense of the father-land). Peta was not formally a part of the Japanese military, but was intended to be an auxiliary guerilla force to resist an Allied invasion.

Though all these changes happened and the nationalists were co-operative with the Japanese, the nationalist leaders always voiced their urge for freedom. Seen from the Japanese point of view, however, the moves and plans were being implemented in accordance with the Japanese calculations and these were considered preparatory steps towards (capturing the way for) bringing all political activities under their direction⁵. The Japanese absorption is a policy of realing a large mass movement as an instrument to channel popular activities, crystalized in the so called Tripple A'-movement.

In September 1944, as Japan was facing defeat after defeat at the hands of the allied fleets and armies, it announced that Indonesia would be given independence in the future. In May 1945, when the end of Japanese rule co-proprosperity was in sight, the Japanese authorities in

5. Jan M. Pluvier, South East Asia from Colonialism to Independence (London, 1974)., p.217.

Indonesia set up a committee to investigate the problems surrounding the granting of Independence; two months later, under pressure from the nationalists and strong pressure from events in the military sphere, a committee was established in Java to actually prepare for Indonesian Independence⁶.

As the nationalist goal for independence seemed nearer realization there developed two groups, the underground and the visible, showing a marked difference of opinion. Independence by force or independence as a gift from Japan - this was the controversy between the two groups. The underground felt that if the independence was a gift from Japan, they would not get enough participation in the govt. Hence they wanted to avoid this situation of a grant of freedom.

The preparation for an Independent Indonesia had begun seriously in August 7, 1945 with the establishment of Independence Preparatory Committee, that had to arrange for the transfer of authority. In this connection Sukarno and Hatta paid visit to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Southern Areas, Marshal Teranchi, at his headquarters in Indonesia, where they were promised independence at an early date, and after that they returned to Java.

On the next day of their arrival the news that Japan had surrendered was heard. Actually the collapse of Japan led the nationalists to think whether they should wait for grant of independence from Japan or declare

6. S. Tass, n.4, p.163.

themselves as independent. At this crucial juncture the great national leader of Indonesia, Sukarno, hesitated as to what step should be taken to avoid bloodshed in the fighting.

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Japan's assurance to give independence in future came at a critical time when they were totally defeated in the Second World War. In this situation, the nationalists became more conscious about the declaration of independence by themselves. But to Sukarno, the exploitation of this situation might cause retaliation by Japan and it would lead to more fighting and bloodshed. To avoid war, Sukarno had to wait until the confirmation of Japan's defeat.

In the uncertainty of circumstances Sukarno was compelled by the youth organisations and anti-Japanese oriented nationalist groups to proclaim Indonesian independence. The other youth groups then took up the cudgels and when Sukarno and Hatta continued to insist upon assurance that the Japanese would not resort to action if a declaration of independence was made, they were kidnapped on August 16, 1945 by a group led by Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik. The incident was short-lived, for the hot-blooded youth groups

found themselves in a dilemma. Sukarno and Hatta stuck to their guns. Without their support, particularly that of Sukarno, the others were powerless. Sukarno was the only man with a national reputation, whose name was known in every village, whose word evoked an echo throughout the Indonesian territory and whose actions had lot of significance.

Pressure on Sukarno increased and the counter-pressure generated within his environment diminished. In this atmosphere of failing government, Sukarno eventually acted. A proclamation of Independence was drawn up and read by Sukarno to a small gathering in Batavia on August 17, 1945⁷. Sukarno became the President and Hatta, the Vice-President of independent Indonesia.

In Indonesia the Proclamation of Independence did not complete the first phase of the revolution. It rather marked the beginning of the process of taking over control by the nationalists. The days of the old aristocracy and collaborationists were numbered unless they could adapt themselves to the way in which the wind was blowing. Many of their sons had revolted both against the positions of their parents and against the Dutch. The younger

7. Jan M. Pluvier, n.5, p.365.

generation of intellectuals and administrators, some with roots in the aristocracy, had now acquired leading positions. Attempts to unite all parts of the colony - with different ethnic and religious groups, classes and social strata - against the Dutch imperialists, within a nationalist movement, kept them together. Their chief representative was president Sukarno.

Initially, Sultan Sjahrir, prominent leader of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) opposed the declaration of independence and he and most of the powerful group that backed him stood aside and refused to support Sukarno and Hatta and the new government they headed. After a short visit to Java they felt that Sukarno was backed by the people and then only Sjahrir accepted the request by Sukarno. From that moment he supported Sukarno and Hatta, as the leaders of the Republic.

After the Republic came into existence on August 17, 1945, Amir Sjarifuddin declared that the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia was the climax of their struggle⁸.

Within three weeks the new Republic had a constitution and Advisory Central National Committee of 135 members, a cabinet responsible to the President and the support of almost all politically significant groups in Indonesian

8. Amir Sjarifuddin, Voice of Indonesia (Djakarta), vol. 31, August 1946, p.5.

Society, including the anti-Japanese underground organisation⁹.

Having considered the suggestion by Sjahrir that there needed some changes in the Central National Committee (Komite Nasional Pusat Indonesia - KNIP), Sukarno was given more powers jointly with him. This meant that all legislation had to be approved by the KNIP as well as by the President.

Further more, an executive body called Working Committee was constituted which would be in continuous session and concerned with broad outlines of policy. Sjahrir was elected chairman and Sjarifuddin, Vice-chairman with the right to select 13 additional members. Sjahrir, however, filled it with almost all members from the underground men¹⁰.

Tan Malaka continued intrigues against Sukarno and Hatta. He demanded that they should resign on the ground that their standing had been so eroded they could no longer command national support. Malaka also requested Sjahrir for help. Sjahrir refused to support him. He also countered it by introducing the principle of cabinet

9. Herbert Feith, 'Indonesia' in George McT. Kahin, (ed.) Government and Politics in South East Asia, Ithaca, p. 199.

10. Leslie Palmier, Communists in Indonesia (London, 1973), p. 120.

responsibility to parliament on November 11, 1945. This way most of the cabinet members who were drawn from the collaborative group, were brought under control; and by doing so, it prevented Malaka's supporters from drifting towards him. Realizing that he himself was as much threatened as Sjahrir, Sukarno appointed Sjahrir as the Prime Minister. Sjahrir accepted the post on condition that he be given complete freedom to select the members of his cabinet¹¹.

Sukarno agreed and dismissed his own cabinet.

Sjahrir then formed the cabinet.

POSITION AND ROLE OF PKI

There were atleast three Communist groups in this period. One of these groups was the illegal PKI, which legitimately could claim continuity with the pre-War PKI. This group was officially restored by Mohamad Jusaf (a new Communist) in October 1945. This was two months after Sukarno, by then, the most popular nationalist leader, had proclaimed Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. It was this illegal PKI, which Aidit joined and which played a role, though an insignificant one in the resistance movement against the Japanese.

11. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca and London, 1969), p.168.

Some what linked to the illegal PKI was a second Communist movement, a curious Japanese-launched Marxist-Leninist organization under Subardjo. Subardjo was a former Marxist member of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI) affiliated with Tan Malaka. This movement carried out an intensive Marxist indoctrination of the Indonesian youth in the closing months of the Second World War. It emerged in 1945 as the largest Indonesian political and parliamentary organisation¹².

The third Communist group was the international Communist movement of Tan Malaka. By this time he had turned a foe of Moscow and of the pre-War PKI leaders. Disillusioned by Moscow's use of 'Comintern' to advance Soviet interests, Tan Malaka had quit the organization by 1922. Before his execution by the army units in 1949, Malaka had laid down a Marxist nationalist philosophy, not much different from Sukarno's socialism during the years of Guided Democracy¹³.

THE ARRIVAL OF TAN MALAKA

In 1945 Tan Malaka returned to Indonesia from a long exile in Russia. Tan Malaka, second only to Sukarno in

12. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State - Actor (Hongkong, 1982), p.56

13. Leslie Palmier, n.10, p.142

reputation in terms of the size of his following and his personal charisma, tried to displace Sukarno by legal manoeuvres and then by a coup d'etat¹⁴. The two leaders, Subardjo and Malaka, were ambitious to assume the top position in the Republic and at first separately and later jointly worked skilfully to attain them¹⁵.

Noting Sjahrir's initial refusal to back Sukarno, Tan Malaka contacted him immediately after his trip through the interior of Java. He proposed to him that the two of them join forces to overthrow Sukarno, Malaka would become the president, Sjahrir would emerge as Cabinet head and hold the portfolio of Defence, and Subardjo would share some of the Cabinet power.

By this time Malaka apparently believed he could rely on the support of the underground of Sukarni, and probably many of the armed units he now controlled or influenced. Presumably, Malaka reasoned that if Sjahrir and the powerful groups supporting him threw in their weight with the Sukarni group against Sukarno, they would be strong enough to overthrow him.

Sjahrir bluntly refused to take Tan Malaka's plan and suggested to him that if he had any illusion concerning his own popularity in contrast to Sukarno, he should take a trip through Java. After visiting

15. Kahin, n. 11, p.147.

through the interior of Java, Malaka was convinced that Sukarno was more popular than him¹⁶. Thereby, he saw the necessity for changing his own strategy.

Having failed in his scheme, Tan Malaka thought the need for getting the support of the masses of Indonesia. For this purpose he convened a meeting at Purwokerto in Central Java, where 300 delegates participated to strengthen national solidarity in support of the government. Calling for a monolithic unity, he stressed the need for the abolition of political parties, and end to all parties divisions. He demanded that the negotiations between the Dutch should be repudiated and all foreign property confiscated. At the meeting, it was decided to create a single political organization with Malaka at its head, thus enabling him to contend for the leadership of the Republic. This political organization was called Persatuan Perjuangan (PP).

The result of this call was that at the end an opposition popular front, 'Persatuan Perjuangan' (fighting front) was inaugurated at Surakarta in January 1946¹⁷.

16. Ibid, p.149.

17. Jan M. Pluvier, n.5, p.420.

Having gained much support and influence among the organization, Malaka demanded the dismissal of Sjahrir Cabinet because of the non-representative character of KNIP and the Cabinet. Sjahrir was forced to resign. Sukarno then handed the mandate to the leader of the Persatuan Perjuangan (PP). But opposition parties were unable to put up their candidate for forming the cabinet. It showed that the opposition was very weak. This failure to capture power was a sign of the PP's weakness and although the front continued to be a formidable competitor for popular support, this fact caused its downfall¹⁸.

Malaka again turned against the Cabinet. He convened a meeting in Madiun and declared that the Cabinet was unacceptable, and resolved to take the matter in to its own hands. In March 17, however, the government arrested him and his followers.

CABINET BY SJARIFUDDIN

After the resignation of Sjahrir, Sjarifuddin was elected as the Prime Minister. He was the leader of the pro-Communist wing of the Socialist party (where the non-Communist wing was led by Sjahrir). During his Prime Ministership, there was a considerable rise in the strength of the Indonesian Communist Party and

18. Jan M. Pluvier, n.5, p.421

groups of similar outlook¹⁹.

A Cabinet crisis ensued when the Renville Agreement was signed²⁰. The Masjumi and PNI, the major parties represented in the coalition government, made it clear that they would no longer support Sjahrifuddin as Prime Minister. After the withdrawal of support by them, Sjahrifuddin got only the backing from 'Sajap Kiri' (Left Front) and on January 23, 1948, he resigned as Prime Minister.

After this Sukarno thought of forming a presidential cabinet with a national, all Party character. It seemed to be the only means of creating quickly the strong leadership needed. Accordingly, president Sukarno appointed Dr. Mohammad Hatta, who was the Vice-president, to form the presidential cabinet. Hatta sought to form a national government enrolling all chief parties.

19. Herbert Feith, n. 9, p. 200.

20. Renville Agreement signed on January 18, 1948, provided for a cease-fire. According to it the Netherland would retain sovereignty until it was transferred to a United State of Indonesia of which the Republic of Indonesia would be a constituent part (see Kahlon, n.11, p.231)

COMING OF MUSSO

Musso, who was said to have stayed in the Indies in 1935 when he had set up the illegal PKI, arrived in Indonesia in August 11, 1948. After his arrival the Stalinist installed him as the Secretary of the PKI, putting aside Subardjo. Another change was that, Sjahrifuddin, who had been the Defence Minister and Prime Minister, declared publically that he had been a Communist since 1935, when he had jointed Musso's 'Illegal Communist Communist Party' in Surabaya²¹.

Musso's next step was to integrate the constituent organizations of the FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakjat - People's Democratic Front) into the PKI. On September 1948, a new Politbureau of the PKI was announced. Intending to make a revolution Musso changed his plan in order to exert pressure on the Government and, if necessary to resort to violence.

Musso, Sjarifuddin, Wikans and others had begun in a speech-making tour initiated to whip up support against the Government. In a very short time, however, they had to stop their canvassing. They, who had planned to mount a revolution in November, now found themselves obliged to fight in September.

21. Ibid, p.272.

Well aware of the influence of the FDR and Musso and knowing that if they seized power he would lose it, Sukarno announced the release of Tan Malaka and his followers from their in-carceration for the attempted coup of June-July 1946. From here onwards the final breach between the Communists and Sukarno-Hatta Government was probably hastened by the return of Musso²².

MADIUN AFFAIR

It may be a coincidence that trouble had broken out in September in Surakarta, where the pro-Musso and pro-Malaka forces faced one another. On Musso's side was the Army's Fourth Division of some five thousand men, and mainly marines and pesindo. For Malaka was the Barisan Banteng, of some two to two-and-half thousand troops. There was in addition one battalion of the Siliwangi division, the formation created by Sjahrir to protect the Government.

In early September, Senior Officers supporting Musso began to disappear. The PKI accused the GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat - Peoples Revolutionary Movement) of being responsible. Then on September 13, the leaders of the Barisan Banteng were kidnapped,

22. Justus M. Van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Progress and Tactics. (Vancouver, Canada, 1965), p.33.

while marines of the Fourth Division stormed the Siliwangi barracks. Fighting became general between the Pesindo and the marines on the one side, and the Barisan Banteng and Siliwangi Division on the other; it ended with the former having been driven out of Surekarta by September 17.

But on September 18, in the meanwhile Musso's Military supporters, took the military steps of plan to seize power and moved to Madiun, and took control of the town. This was done without the knowledge of the PKI's Politbureau²³. That very night Musso arrived at his house, and found that the revolt had started. The next day Sukarno asked the people to choose between him and Musso. Tan Ling Djie and Abdulmadjid, the henchmen of Musso, were arrested to Jogjakarta on that day. But the revolt did not last long.

On September 31, Madiun itself fell to the Siliwangi division. On October 28, the last rebel military unit was captured. After three days, Musso himself met his end in a skirmish. On December 1, Sjarifuddin was caught and a week later the army announced the end of the rebellion. It had placed under arrest some 35,000 persons mostly from irregular military formation.

23. Ibid, p.35.

C H A P T E R I I I .

P K I D U R I N G T H E E V E O F T R A N S F E R O F P O W E R

C H A P T E R III

PKI During the Eve of Transfer of Power

As a result of the Madiun Affair of September 1948, the PKI, as an organisation, had been virtually destroyed with the roots of the communist movement in Indonesia. Those who belonged to the party were afraid of expressing their identity as Communists, because they expected that the Republican Government would retaliate any time they were identified with party's role in Madiun rebellion.

After the Madiun rebellion in which almost all the leaders were killed, the party was in disarray for lack of leadership. The fatal blow to the party was the execution of Musso ¹ who was considered the main brain behind the rebellion. With the death of Musso, Tan Malaka emerged as the leader of the extreme left movement. He exploited this opportunity to handle the situation in his own favour so that he could easily become the leader of the party.

The masses, who were longing for an able leadership, accepted the political leadership of Tan Malaka. An uncompromising defender of August 17 proclamation and an aggressive opponent of compromise, Tan Malaka was a Marxist - Leninist, whose radical nationalism was unquestionable.

1 In August 1928, Musso, a leader of the Communists in the 1920's returned dramatically from a long exile in Russia and quickly succeeded in merging the Peoples' Democratic Front into an expanded Communist Party of which he assumed the leadership.

In the beginning of his work for influencing the masses, he founded Partai Murba from the G R R.² Though he had not held any position, he was the presiding genius to the party. By twisting his ideas, Malaka defined that the Murba party was based on religion, nationalism and socialism.³ Though this party was radical, it was also based on the ideology of nationalism.

Murba was based on the Leninist concept of democratic centralism.⁴ Tan Malaka coined the word 'Murba' and defined it as proletariat. The party declared its opposition to the trinity of "Fascism, capitalism and imperialism".

With his political support re-organised, Malaka went on the offensive. In criticising the Mohammad Hatta's government he used all the weapons, especially when it concerned negotiations with the Dutch. In the first instance itself Hatta, the Prime Minister, tried to suppress the Murba Party when Malaka criticised the Government policy.

He got an opportunity to oppose Mohammad Hatta, when the latter, in the course of negotiations with the Dutch, handed them a secret letter, implying that the republic would recognize their sovereignty for an interim period. One of Malaka's sympathisers in the Republican delegation conveyed

2 Murba was a federated group of Partai Rakjat (Peoples Party), Partai Rakjat Djelata, (Poor Peoples' Party) and Partai Indonesia Buruh Merdeka (Independent Indonesia Labour Party), See Satyavati S. Jhaveri, The Presidency in Indonesia Dilemmas of Democracy (Bombay, 1975) P.135 and see Palmir Communist Party in Indonesia (London 1973) p.139

3. Palmier, Communists in Indonesia (London, 1973) p.139.

4. Arnold Brackman, Indonesian Communism. A History (New York, 1963) p.103.

the contents of the letter to him and he immediately passed on the same to the army, who were naturally opposed to the Dutch control. The information also reached a group in the PNI, who as the party of civil servants, were equally concerned at the end of November, the civil servants opposed further talks with the Dutch.

Hatta retaliated very quickly. He ordered a ban on Murba, the party's newspaper at Surakarta, and revoked the licence for its radio station.

Again the People's Congress which had been scheduled to take place at Jogjakarta on December 24 was prevented from being held by Colonel A.N. Nasution who on instructions from the Government dated December 15 disarmed the irregular formations supporting Tan Malaka.

Dutch Attack on the Republic

While the internal struggle was going on, the Dutch attacked the Republic on December 18, 1948, following the day the Republican leaders of the Dutch demands to accept its sovereignty and control over its armed forces. Sukarno and Hatta and other Cabinet Ministers were captured.⁶ Type-written copies of the speeches to the Indonesian people prepared by Sukarno and Hatta before their arrest were circulated in the Jogjakarta area. They were taken to the island of Bangka the next day. The offensive against the Republic was condemned even by the so-called Parliament consisting of the members picked by the Dutch authorities in Indonesia.⁷ The day after

5. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca & London, 1973), p.11.

6. Satyavati Jhaveri, n.2, P.136

7. Ibid, p.137.

the military action, the Dutch-sponsored government of East Indonesia resigned and so did the similar govt. of West Java.

At first this had no effect on the Netherlands government. It refused to recognise the Republic any longer. But the Netherlands government was compelled to change its attitude in the face of world public opinion.

For a while Dutch troops had rapidly occupied the cities and towns of the Republic except the rural areas. The United States of America, which was canvassing against Communism had also a special interest in the Indonesian affairs, especially after the Madiun affair. The rapid advance of the Communists in China had induced the U.S. to exert itself more strongly to prevent the possibility of a Communist Indonesia emerging from the guerrilla warfare there in progress. It was evident that for some time to come at least, the Indonesian revolution would not go in a Communist direction. This realisation greatly affected the attitude of the U.S.⁸ In Washington it was realised that the colonial era was drawing to a close, and that in any case the U.S. had no interest in maintaining the monopoly of old colonial powers in developing countries. The U.S. threatened to curtail its Marshall Aid to Holland unless the country came to terms with the government in Indonesia, which was now friendly to the West and anti-communist.⁹ The United Nations adopted a similar position.

8. Jan M Pluvier, 'South East Asia'. From Colonialism to Independence (Kualalumpur, 1976), p.482.

9. Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism The Destruction of PKI in Indonesia (New Jersey, 1984) p.149

Though the leaders of the Republic were prisoners of the Dutch, for any workable settlement of the Indonesian problem their concurrence was indispensable. Even among the representatives in the Assembly for Federal Consultation (Bijeenkomstvoor Federal Overleg-BFO)¹⁰ there were sympathisers of the Republic who were of the view that in Indonesia and abroad the Republic was considered the symbol of the struggle for freedom. The leaders refused to oblige the Hague.

The Republic had worked out a strategy to continue guerrilla warfare and carry out scorched -earth tactics. This strategy was based on the premise that events must eventually work to the advantage of the Republic's cause. In the meantime they were eager to receive recognition by the international community and to arrive at some understanding with the B.F.O. states. They were not worried about the fact that the Netherlands no longer recognised the republic. They steadfastly refused to meet the representatives of the Hague while under detention or to sign any commitment abstaining from political activities. They were prepared to negotiate and arrive at a settlement with the Dutch only as free men, and as the representatives of the Government of the Republic.¹¹

10. Satyavati S.Jhaveri, n.2, p.138. In July, 1948, a Conference of the states and autonomous constitutional units created by the Dutch was called. This conference was known as Bijeenkomst Voor Federal Overlag(Federal Consultative Assembly-BFO)

11. Ibid, p.139.

At last, the Security Council intervened. The Dutch had no seat on the Security Council, and thus were unable to prevent it from discussing the Indonesian problem. So on January 28, 1949, the Council passed the resolution envisaging Indonesian Sovereignty subsequently after hectic negotiations, on May 7, the Dutch and Indonesians agreed to it.¹²

While on the one hand, the Republic was integrating the guerrillas into the army, on the other, it was rapidly urging to find an accommodation with the Dutch. Mohammad Rum, on behalf of the Republic, and Van Royan for the Netherlands, reached an agreement in July, 1949; Sukarno and Hatta were released from their imprisonment in Bangka, and a new Cabinet, the third Presidential Cabinet, was installed on August 4, 1949. The Roem-Van Royan accord not only promised to end the fighting but also to ensure the security of the Republic. For different reasons, however, it was opposed by both Sjahrir's Socialist Party and Leninists of various persuasions.

On December 14, 1949, the Indonesian Parliament ratified the Hague Agreement. And yet the date of December 27, 1949, is of great significance in the history of the Republic of Indonesia. For the first time, all the territories formally occupied by the Netherlands in the East Indies except West Irian came under the effective and

12. Leslie Palmier, Communists in Indonesia (London, 1973) p.141.

unchallenged control of the Indonesians. Indonesia was internationally recognized as a free and a sovereign Republic.

Revival of P K I

The period 1948-52 in party history was marked by disorganisation and factional disputes which gradually gave way to greater firmness and clarity of purpose as the Leninist wing of the Party gained control, bringing in new strength. Following the Madiun disaster, many party cadres went more or less underground for a while; younger party leaders, such as Aidit and Lukhman left the country and travelled in China and North Vietnam. Whatever influence the P.K.I. once had in the armed forces and para-military organisations lay shattered. According to the allegations of the PKI, the Hatta Government at the instigation of the Dutch who were trying to strangle the new Republic, staged a provocation in Madiun in September 1948,¹³ later the Government announced at the end of the Madiun uprising on December 7, 1949, that over 30,000 people were under arrest. Fortunately for the PKI, the Government at last indicated that it did not oppose the Communist Party as such but only those who had resorted to violence.¹⁴

13. Review of Indonesia - Vol. VII p.3.

14. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Progress and Tactics. (Vancouver, Canada, 1965), p. 45.

The rebellion was sharply condemned by those troops who had remained loyal to the Government. From this point of view the rebellion was not only a treason but a "stab in the back", weakening the Republic at a time when another Dutch attack could be expected at any time. As a result large sections of the army hitherto indifferent towards Communism or nationalism, were to adopt a lasting hostile attitude towards anything leftist.

LEADERSHIP UNDER TAN KALAKA

In these unfavourable circumstances, the coming of Tan Malaka, as the leader of the leftist party had made some repercussions upon the Communist ideologies and cadres. The Murba Party, under his leadership, became one of the organs which stood for extreme leftist ideas.

The Dutch armed attack on December 18, 1948 was a fatal and unexpected blow to the fortunes of the PKI. Mohammad Hattas' Government at that time retaliated against the captured communists who had participated in the Madiun Affair, by executing them, in the wake of the advance of Dutch troops. Among them the most prominent was Amir Sjahrifuddin, an ex-Prime Minister of the Republic.¹⁵

15. Leslie Palmier, n.12, p.140

The Dutch attack removed Tan Malaka's principal opponents, Sukarno and Hatta, from the scene on the one hand and the Stalinists, on the other. He moved quickly. On December 21, Radio Kediri, on the territory still held by the Republic, announced the arrival of the 'Father of the Republic'. Tan Malaka's programme, as he announced it later, consisted of out-right opposition to the Dutch and the Stalinists, based upon a united front of all parties and fighting organisations. Subsequently, Kediri fell into the hands of the Dutch troops on December 25, 1948, but Malaka himself escaped and quickly obtained great support in the country-side.

Malaka again came to the scene, following the Security Council resolution calling for a cease fire. While attempting to retrieve its reputation after the Madiun revolt, the PKI opposed the Security Council resolution and organised a few armed groups. They were used principally not to fight the Dutch or even the Republican force but to attack the supporters of the Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia-Council of Indonesian Islamic Parties).

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16. It will be remembered that Nasution had been charged by Hatta with disarming Malaka's irregular supporters in December 1948.

In addition to the popular support, Tan Malaka was receiving for his opposition to the Dutch, he also enjoyed the backing of the Fourth Division of the Republican Army, based on East Java and led by Colonel Sungkono.

Emboldened by his popularity, Tan Malaka denounced Hatta and Nasution for accepting the Security Council resolution. The breaking point became apparent in March, when a brigade of the Fourth Division led by Colonel Sungkono defected to Tan Malaka. Shortly after Malaka was arrested near Blitar; a clash ensued between the Brigade and the Division and Subarudinis' force was eliminated. On April 16, Malaka was put to death by the very Army Division which had supported him only a few months earlier.¹⁷

The great support Tan Malaka had created was not bequeathed to the Murba Party. As in the case of nearly all Indonesian political leaders, his backing was personal and disappeared with him, but his ideas lived on and his ghost must have looked with amused eye-brows on Sukarno, a decade later, adopting policies and attitudes to which Malaka had vigen birth.¹⁸

17. Arnold Brackman, n.4, p.118.

18. Leslie Palmier, n.12, p.142.

Disagreement against Rum-Van Royan accord was raised by Sjahrir's Socialist and Leninist-oriented leftist. Among the latter was a Mohamed Djoni¹⁹. To obtain support for his opposition to the Rum-Van Royan Agreement he capitalised on the natural resentment of the guerrillas scheduled for demobilization and convened a guerrilla congress for September 17, 1949 at Prambanam, near Jogjakarta, choosing the location in order to commemorate the 1926 revolt. But the Minister for Defence, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, was in no humour to put up with such nonsense. He ordered the congress to be disbanded and Djoni arrested.

After the death of Malaka, his supporters also protested against the Sukarno-Hatta compromise policy. In September Malaka's supporters in East Java, as ever intransigent, attacked the Dutch in violation of the cease-fire agreement, in hoping that this might involve the regular troops of the Republic. Other Malaka's supporters in Bantam in the West of the Java, led by one Chaerul Saleh, announced the formation of the People's Army on October 14, to fight against Sukarno's and Hatta's compromise policy with the Dutch. It was not until February 1950 that Saleh was finally arrested and his organisation broke up.

19. A Stalinist until 1947, he had then broken with the PKI in order to oppose the Linggadjati agreement and had found his own political party, the Red PKI to indicate that it was more aggressive than Stalinists themselves.

COMING OF ALIMIN

On August 10, 1949, Alimin emerged from hiding and in a press interview argued that the party as such was not responsible for the Madiun revolt, only irresponsible individuals were. Alimin's statement, notwithstanding, in fact, the Madiun revolt was planned, at least overtly, by the FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakyat - People's Democratic Front), first and then Musso and perhaps entirely by the latter. The irresponsible individuals were accountable only for the failure of the revolt and Alimin's argument was tantamount to saying that only the insubordinate should be punished, while, those who had not acted prematurely, and would have enjoyed the benefit of success if all had gone accordingly to plan, should be absolved from all blame.

All the same, Alimin showed the first signs of reorientation to new facts of life in Indonesia. Recognizing the new situation, he propounded a new theory which would both serve Russian interest and take into account the question of Indonesian Independence. Since the country was shortly to be no longer a colony, it was to be known as a semi-colony, and the focus of animosity was to be expanded from the Dutch in particular to Western in general and those who had links with them. Therefore, not all Indonesian capitalist were bad; only those who had links with the West were called compradores;

National Capitalist, petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers were all virtuous and should form a united front against the compradores and the West, known as 'foreign imperialist'. This was Alimin's adaptation of four-class coalition.

The Government announced that it would pardon all participants in the Madiun corp except the criminals²⁰. Following this, the party was permitted to resurrect itself as it became legal again.

The cabinet not only gave life to the PKI, they also gave it a cause, by permitting the Dutch to retain Western New Guinea. After getting freedom, with Sukarno becoming President and Hatta, the Prime Minister the PKI urged national unity against the West and the imperialist and urged Indonesia to co-operate with the Russian Block called the anti-imperialist nations.

FUNCTION OF PKI DURING THIS TIME

The Netherland Indies reaction to the Indonesians' demand for restoration of West Irian (Western New Guinea) in a way considerably helped the growth of the PKI. Sukarno pleaded for a strong action against the Dutch as they were not giving Western New Guinea. According to

20. Perhaps it accepted Alimin's special argument that all the members were not responsible except the irresponsible.

him, it would destroy the unity of the Republic. In these crucial circumstances, where Sukarno was against the Dutch, the PKI expressed its support for a PNI motion in the parliament, demanding that the Netherlands Indonesian Union be abrogated in reprisal for Dutch refusal to hand over the territory*.

Stalinists were reorganised after Musso's failure; a provisional PKI Central Committee had tried to keep up its activities. Most of them, however, were afraid of revealing their identity due to punishment by the government. An acting secretary General of the Party had been one Nagadman Hardjosubroto²¹.

Alimi's activities at this stage were entirely different from his earlier postures.

Alimin publically criticised not only Musso but also Stalin. This meant his deviation from Musso's "New Road" resolution. Soon after the 1948 debacle, they felt it would be a folly to have the PKI as a perpetual public reminder of the Stalinist "stab in the back". Rather they wished to work through Partai Socialist as the principal front, concentrating on the

21. Subarto had participated in the 1926 revolt, and had consequently been exiled until 1946.

Palmier, p.148.

urban working class and inveigling non-Communist Marxists into it.

This cautious policy did not endear itself to the younger members in the leadership, in particular of Njono the SOBSI Chairman. His opposition to the official policy of self-effacement was soon to be supported by the return of two members of Musso's politburo, Aidit and Lukeman.

PKI was, at this stage, only one of the three factions into which it had split. Another was made up of the Socialist and Labour parties. The first was led by Tan Ling Djie, who had been elevated to the General Secretariat of the PKI two years earlier by Musso, while Labour Party was led by Sakirman. But these two factions of the party were in fact twinned by the hidden third, an illegal PKI, which also maintained underground organisations. Thus Musso's "New Road" resolution enjoining a single PKI had been abandoned in favour of the policy expounded by the man he had demoted Alimin and Sardjono.

The turning point in the factional struggle came in September 1950, when upon the initiative of Surakarta Section Committee of the Party- the bodies of

had cautioned against this demonstration and the government also placed all manners of obstacles in the way, but the ceremony, attended by tens of thousands of members, leaders of the PKI and people from Surakarta and other regions, as the party history today put it, did take place. By this venture, Leninist group got much influence upon the party members.

The PKI made a new start in the late 1949 and its membership made a rapid expansion since 1950. If its activities before that year were confined to the urban proletariat, since then the PKI made a new start with its work among the rural population²³. At this very time, the party was undergoing an extremely important period of ideological and organisational rectification. This laid the basis for the strengthening of the Leninist leadership in the Central Committee in 1951, following which the Party grew from strength to strength to become the foremost political party within the country.

*** ***

23. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Peasant mobilization and political development in Indonesia".
Indonesia Quarterly, Vol.2, April 1977, p.105.

C H A P T E R I V

P K I D U R I N G T H E P A R L I A M E N T A R Y P H A S E

C H A P T E R IV

P K I DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY PHASE

In true sense, a parliamentary system was actually operating in the Republic of Indonesia only in 1949, when the process of complete transfer of power is over. A parliament was in existence and a cabinet was expected to be responsible to it.

After transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949, Sukarno became the President and Hatta, the vice-President. On the next day, on December 18, 1949 Sukarno, as the newly installed President of the Republic of United States of Indonesia, announced the name or the formateurs who were to select the first Cabinet. They were Dr Hatta, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Sultan Hamengkyu-Buwono IX of Jogjakarta and Sultan Hamid II of West Borneo. Sukarno instructed them to form a national Business Cabinet of experts, with due regard to the desires of the parties. After consultations among them, on December 20, a sixteen member sworn in as Cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Hatta.

HATTA CABINET DURING THE
PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD
DECEMBER 1949-AUG.1950

Hatta actually wanted to create a Cabinet in which members were appointed not on the basis of party representation. At the same time he wanted to keep the PKI out of

the Cabinet. Eventually seven among those who were in the Cabinet belonged to Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia - Council of Indonesian Islamic Parties), two to PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia - National Party of Indonesia), and one to Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia-Indonesian Christian Party). Except two or three, all others were not chosen on the basis of nomination by the executive council of the representative parties. Though some of them were party members, Hatta appointed those persons whom he found he could influence ¹.

Immediately following the transfer of sovereignty there developed a movement for the abolition of the Dutch-established states and for a demand for the quick establishment of Republic of Indonesia extending over the whole country.

In this unitarist movement, all parties were not equally active. The PKI played almost no role in it, being weak and organisationally dispersed. At the same time, it opposed outright the Sukarno-Hatta leadership of the state. It was the nationalist parties and national-communist Murba party which were most active in furthering and steering the movement against the state.

1. Herbert Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, London, 1973), p.50.

The Hatta Cabinet
Policies and Politics

The period of the Hatta Cabinet was one of power consolidation as well as political effervescence. It was a period of fast administrative action to regularise a confused and chaotic situation.

The Left opposition parties such as the PKI and Murba, hammered hard and effectively on the continuing power of foreign capital and the comprador character of the Hatta cabinet. Hatta's position throughout had been based solidly on the support of Masjumi and PNI.

Making a Constitution
for the Unitary State

By early 1950, it had become the principal task of the Hatta Cabinet to prepare for the establishment of a unitary Republic.

On May 19, 1950, the Committee for the preparation of the constitution of the unitary state was established under the joint chairmanship of Justice Minister, Professor Supomo, RUSI (Republic of United States of Indonesia) and Republican Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Hakim of the Masjumi. In July, the committee submitted its draft constitution which was accepted by both the Governments on July 20, and the constitution was ratified by the two bodies by August 14.²

2. Ibid, p.93.

On May 19, 1950, Charter of Agreement³ provided for a unicameral legislature and for a parliamentary cabinet. Further it established that President Sukarno would be President of the new state. On August 17, a new Republic of Indonesia was born.

With the resignation of Hatta Cabinet and the ushering in of the unitary state, the period of transition to Independence was over. Throughout the period of this study, political power was in the hands of leaders who had been prominent or at least active in the struggle for independence.

P K I During this phase

The Partai Komunis Indonesia, like the PSI (Partai Sarekat Islam) and Murba Party had a clear ideological position and greater organisational cohesion than the general run of Indonesian parties. But PKI was still suffering from the effects of the Madiun Affair, which had resulted in the death of its principal leaders, and left the party in a position of semi-illegality.

During the period of Hatta's Cabinet, the PKI was in a helpless position. There were virtually no PKI members in important positions in the bureaucracy

3. In May, 1950, an agreement was reached between Hatta representing the RUSI Government and also the government of East Indonesia and East Sumatra on the one hand, and the RI's Prime Minister Abdul Halim on the other, to bring a unitary state into existence. This was known as Charter of Agreement.

During the mid 1950s, there was internal upheaval in the PKI. The few surviving leaders of the party, top leadership of the pre-Madiun days, men like Tan Ling Djie and Alimin Prawirodurdjns were losing control to a younger group of leaders, most prominently D N Aidit, M H Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman. It was this young communist leadership which emerged in January 1951 to have clear control of the Party.

From August 1950 onwards this younger group published articles in the Party's theoretical journal Bintaug Meral (Red Star) criticizing the Party's current strategies. In particular they demanded that the Communist controlled Partai Sosalis should be dissolved and its members brought openly into the PKI itself. They also condemned efforts being made to cooperate with Partai Murba, and called for a greater attention to Party ideology.

In fact during Hatta's Cabinet, the PKI was trying to re-establish itself under a new leadership. Though they were denied membership in the Cabinet, they acted as an opposition party, a very weak role at that

Natsir Cabinet
(September, 1950-March 1951)

The formation of the Natsir Cabinet may said to have begun immediately after the ceremonial inauguration of the unitary state, on August 17, 1950. On August 21, Sukarno exercised his prerogative and announced that the

foremanship should be entrusted to Mohamad Natsir,⁴ Chairman of the executive council of the Masjumi, the party with largest parliamentary representation. After this decision, Natsir started the politics of cabinet formation. His plan was that Masjumi should have greater influence in the Cabinet than PNI, though it had the second largest parliamentary strength.

Though he was instructed by Sukarno to form a Cabinet which was not confined to parties alone, Natsir firmly decided to form a cabinet without giving representation to PNI. For this purpose he took the cooperation of other small parties including a number of prominent non-party persons. As a result of this, PNI was moved into opposition, where it got the cooperation of Partai Murba and the PKI.⁵

Sukirman, leader of the Masjumi group, and the leader of the Nahdutul Ulama asserted that to leave PNI outside the government would create various parliamentary and bureaucratic obstruction and at the same time drive the PNI into the Communist group. These objections were brushed aside and no PNI members were included in the Natsir Cabinet. Interestingly, it was the first time since Sjahrir's first cabinet that PNI had been ousted from the cabinet.

4. Sathyavathi Jhaveri, Presidency in Indonesia, Dilemmas of Democracy (Bombay), p.174.

5. Ibid, p.174

This period a long tie between PNI and Masjumi, where the Masjumi-led Cabinets were severely criticised by the PNI and the opposition. There was considerable resentment by the opposition that Natsir Cabinet, like Hatta Cabinet before it, was making frequent use of its emergency power. Unfortunately, Natsir Cabinet resigned over the issues in March 1951.⁶

With PKI's support, PNI always opposed law policies of the Natsir Cabinet. The Government was defeated on a motion introduced in the parliament on the issue of electoral colleges for regional legislatures and municipal bodies,⁷ and there was a demand for its resignation. Still the Natsir continued in power. It resigned only when the support of the PIR(Persatuan Indonesia Raja-Greater Indonesian Union) was withdrawn.

PKI, at this juncture, was not very powerful and it could not stand alone as opposition. That is why it always took the help of the PNI, though it was not based on communist ideas. Here PKI's major role was to oppose Masjumi as much as possible by giving its support to PNI.

It was with the PKI's support indeed that the opposition succeeded in toppling the Natsir Cabinet in March 1951. The opposition formed a joint front, the BPP, and the PKI sensed the coming of a new dawn. Perhaps here were to be found the seeds of Communist-dominated front which Musso had been seeking⁸.

6. Ibid, p.181.

7. Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism- Destruction of PKI in Indonesia(New Jersey,1984)p.64.

8. Ibid, p.65.

The Sukirman Cabinet
(April, 1951-February, 1952)

With the resignation of Natsir Government on March 21, 1951, elite politics went again into the period of excitement of cabinet formation. After a prolonged discussion with the party representatives he instructed Mr Sastroamidjojo, a PNI leader and Chairman of Parliament to form a national coalition cabinet "on a broad basis", but he failed to form a cabinet with the participation of Masjumi and PNI.

Because of the disagreement between the PNI and Masjumi, Ali Sastroamidjojo, the PNI leader and formateur, failed to form a cabinet without Masjumi. This time PKI under Aidit and other vigorous young leaders who had taken over its leadership in January, pressed for a cabinet without including Masjumi.

Having failed to form a cabinet, Ali Sastroamidjojo reported it to Sukarno offered the opportunity to PNI's Chairman Sidik Djojokusarto and Chairman of Masjumi Party Council.

Dr Sukirman Wirjosandjojo Cabinet
(April 6, 1952 - February 23, 1953)

A prolonged discussion for the constitution of the Cabinet between Masjumi and PNI resulted in the agreement where PNI conceded Prime Ministership to Masjumi provided, as PNI demanded, Natsir and his followers would

not be included in the Cabinet. At last on April 6, Sukiman formed the Cabinet.

Sukiman , representing Masjumi, followed a severe policy towards the opposition parties, especially against the Communist Party. It would be correct to say that he pursued anti-communist policies.

In August the Government ordered extensive raids against its opponents in general and against communists in particular.

Despite trade union threats of confrontation, the government dared to retain a de facto prohibition on strikes, by introducing a regulation stipulating three-week obligatory notice and negotiations before a strike. The new law was passed as an emergency ruling, without proper treatment in parliament. ⁹

PKI was paralysed by the new wave of repression. Many of its leaders were arrested.¹⁰ Aidit, Lukman and Njoto managed to go underground. They chose quite a different line from Musso's in 1948. The Communists would not allow themselves to be provoked, but would continue to work openly.

The defensive tactics bore fruit. The PKI did not accuse all the ministers, and were careful to avoid those of PNI.

9. Olle Tornquist, n.7, p.65.

10. Ibid ,p.65

But Sukiman had an intention to suppress PKI, because he had a close working relationship with the U.S. Ambassador, H. Merle Cochran, who tried to woo Indonesia to a position of more active anti-Communism. Since the U.S. was concerned with the threat of communism expanding in South-East Asia, it was inevitable that American interest would manifest itself in the support of the young Indonesian nation¹¹. And this proved to be the undoing of the Sukiman Cabinet. On February 23, 1953, Sukiman Cabinet fell, because of its attempts to negotiate a mutual security aid agreement with the United States¹².

The Wilopo Cabinet
(April 1952-June 1953)

When the Sukiman Cabinet resigned, there arose a hopeful sense of anticipation of a new trend emerging in Indonesian politics. There was a hope for a firm and effective government. On the other hand, it was expected that there should be a Cabinet which could quicken the pace of development of the nation, above intra-factional politics.

11. Harold Walter Sundstrom, "United States and Indonesia" Afro-Asian Affairs, Vol.14, 1962, (Bombay, 1962, p.116.

12. Olle Tornquist, n.7, p.65.

After an abortive attempt by the two formateurs, Sidik Djojokusarto of PNI and Prawofo Mang Kwasmito of the Masjumi to form the Cabinet, Sukarno on March 19 appointed the PNI's Mr Wilopo as formateur. On March 31, Wilopo submitted the list of members of his Cabinet to the President.

The forming of Wilopo Cabinet led to two political developments, a) Nahatul Ulama seceded from the Masjumi; b) a change in the PKI's was that the turning point of policy in lending support to the PNI and President Sukarno and seeking to associate itself with the symbols of the nationalist revolution.¹³

Thus in the second half of 1952, PKI made numerous efforts to develop a new equation with the nationalist parties. Throughout the previous years of Hatta, Natsir, and Sukiman Cabinet party stood in outright opposition.

When it became clear that Wilopo would form a cabinet including Masjumi, the PKI Central Committee made an offer without precedent that it would support Wilopo, even if the PKI was not included in the Cabinet, and stressed the demand for release of prisoners and of lifting of the State of War and siege¹⁴.

During the period of the Wilopo Cabinet, Säkirman was the PKI's parliamentary leader. On April 29, the Public Workers Union and sent to Central Java, where he persuaded the union members to end the strike¹⁵.

13. Herbert Feith, n. 1, pp-233-235.

14. Ibid, p.238.

15. Ibid, p.238.

This was a time when the PKI was freely moving. D N Aidit first Secretary of the party, explained in the 32 anniversary meeting that it was PKI's duty to urge other parties to co-operate with the PKI in supporting 'a national united front', and ' a united front' among various groups, workers, peasants, intellectuals, artists, women, young people, and so on. On July 24, Aidit stated directly that the PKI supported Wilopo Cabinet, adding that it gave the party better chance for political activities than other cabinets.

Under this new tactics, the PKI changed its attitude towards the government and followed a policy of positive approach to the government. By giving national symbols and slogans, it made a new turn to the strikes, led by PKI-led union. The official party attitude toward Sukarno changed entirely. No longer was he termed as a collaborator with the Japanese. The dissidents were quite obvious when Sukarno at the same time started fully supporting the PKI.

The implications of this change in strategy were to become clear as the new policy worked itself out in the course of the next few years.

On the party's request, the prisoners arrested in August 1951 were freed and the most significant achievement was that the PKI was given freedom of movement. Despite these achievements, the future of the PKI was difficult to predict.

By its new strategy, the PKI widened the division existing between Masjumi and PNI. But PKI was exploiting this situation in order to regain its credibility because it was generally criticized that through Madium Affair, the PKI had betrayed the unity of the Republic at a time when the Dutch attack on the Republic seemed imminent.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the PKI's embrace of Sukarno was for the sake of political convenience. The PKI was clearly riding Sukarno's coat-tails towards a legal commanding of cabinet. But Sukarno was obviously using PKI for his own purposes. To the extent that the PKI needed Sukarno for protection and legitimacy, it constrained its revolutionary options.

First Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo
(July 1953 - July 1955)

After the abortive attempt to form a Cabinet by Mohamad Roem of Masjumi and Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro of the PNI on June 15, Sukarno chose PIR (Persatuan Indonesia Raja-Greater Indonesian Union) Chairman as the formateur. On July 31, President Sukarno announced the cabinet team in which Ali Sastreamidjojo was Prime Minister (PNI). The importance of this cabinet was that the Masjumi was not included in the cabinet for the first time after the period of revolution.

Cabinet supporters predicted that there would be healthy cooperation between cabinet and parliament. On the other hand, PKI leader Aidit, issued a statement entitled 'Glorious Victory' of Democracy over Fascism, in which he declared that people were very happy because this was the first cabinet to have been formed as a result of the pressures and demands of the people.

At this stage the PKI was supporting the Cabinet, as the Masjumi opposed it. The continued poverty of the people was to be laid at the door of imperialism, whose strong hold over the economy was still great. The Ali Cabinet was not to be blamed; the PKI maintained that Ali cabinet was relatively progressive, more than its predecessors¹⁶. PKI accepted in November 1954, the 'Pantjasila' as the political ideology of the Republic.

The PKI had made the fullest use of opportunities given to it during the period of the Ali Cabinet to organize freely on a large scale. The three PKI-led peasant organizations existing in the mid 1953 were fused into the BTI (Basisan Tain Indonesia-Indonesian Peasants Front).

15. Herbert Feith, n.1, p.354.

The Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet
(August 1954-March 1956)

Mohamad Hatta, who was the acting president on July 29, announced the names of three formateurs, Sukiman(Masjumi), Wilopo(PNI), and Assaat(New party). After they failed to form a cabinet, Sukarno appointed Burhanuddin Harahap of Masjumi to form a cabinet on the next day. Harahap became the Prime Minister. One particular factor of this Cabinet was that it excluded the PNI.

As this cabinet got only a short span of seven month in office, it was not in a controversial position though it had not included the PNI. As the election was approaching all parties were interest in keeping up their position in the elections. Finally, on September 8, the Information Minister announced the decision that the elections would be held on September 29.

The PKI leaders were trying to attain a better electoral position. In the course of their campaign, their main attack was on the Masjumi, calling them collaborators with the Japanese during their occupation and with the Dutch, during the revolutionary struggle. On March 3, 1956, Burhanuddin resigned.

Second Ali Cabinet
(March 1956-March 1957)

The elections of September 1955 heralded a new era of political stability necessary for a purposeful pursuit of national goals.

On March 8, 1956, President Sukarno named Ali Sastroamidjojo as formateur. By March 16, Ali Sastroamidjojo had succeeded in ironing out the differences and presented a cabinet list to the President. But the President asked him to reconsider his decision, because no PKI members were included in it. In a number of speeches made after parliamentary elections, he had urged the inclusion of all four larger parties in the post-election cabinet as a necessity for national unity. It was quite illogical, he repeatedly asserted, that 20% of the Indonesian electorate which had voted in favour of the Communists be isolated and excluded from the national mainstream. It would thus be a blow to the prestige of the President, if no Communists or Communist sympathisers were included in the cabinet. In spite of the fact that it was the President himself who had desired the representation of the PKI in the cabinet, the Masjumi and Ali Sastroamidjojo opposed it. Thus on March 20, Ali was sworn in as Prime Minister.

As a result of political party factionalism at this stage, increasing army influence upon the administration could be seen. Peace, stability and unity of the country was in peril.

Also, it was at this crucial stage that long enduring unity between Sukarno and Hatta was broken. Hatta resigned from the post of vice-President in December 1, 1956. The symbol of unity was no more. The Ali Cabinet also came to an end on March 14, 1957. Only one year of the cabinet life had brought far-reaching changes in the country's political constellation. What collapsed was the Parliamentary Democracy. Indeed it was more; it was the fall of Constitutional Democracy. Then Indonesia entered into a new phase of Democracy, called 'Guided Democracy'.

C H A P T
CONCLUSI

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The PKI which was founded in 1920 for fighting against the Dutch colonial power continued to be a nationalist-oriented party in the 1950's. The party, based on Marxist Leninist ideology, pursued a policy of revolutionary means till 1948 in order to overthrow the colonial power in Indonesia. Marxist-Leninist ideological approach to the problem of Indonesian national struggle for freedom were soon embraced by the Indonesian masses.

Since 1948, when the party was brutally crushed in the wake of the Madiun Affair, the PKI had to revive itself in the Indonesian politics. It was a turning point as far as the PKI was concerned. When new leaders like Aidit and Lukman understood the real problem in Indonesia, they had to adapt the party strategy themselves to the changing situations in the country. Realising that the old revolutionary process would not lead the party to success in the parliamentary phase in Indonesia. Aidit had to change the party policy in tune with the political atmosphere. Here one could see the change in the working of the party as well as the fundamental ideological difference.

The PKI's ideology was not remarkable for the theoretical concern or creativity. Like the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam, and unlike the Communist Party of China, the PKI was a practical party. Its programmatic statements were always concerned with the political task of the foreseeable future. Ideology, in the sense in which it is being used here, is not a static set of ideas but an evolving body of precepts, programmes, and policies. New ideas are added to the original stock to take account of the new situations and tasks confronted by the organisation.

Analysing the period from 1920 to 1948, it can be seen that the party was a failure, because, despite the very large number of adherents the party claimed, it proved completely inert and incapable of defending itself.

The immobility of the PKI in time of crisis could be traced to lack of adequate ideological indoctrination of its members and of those of its front organisations to the policy followed by the party leaders, and to the nature of the leadership itself.

In recruiting members to PKI, the emphasis was placed on quantity, virtually from the beginning of Aidit leadership he opted for a vast increase in numbers. It was presumed that if the peasants would give him their votes, he would provide them with material benefits. The fact was that he failed to impose adequate indoctrination and Communist-Marxist programmes for them.

Aidit even did not seem to have any Marxist programme in mind, because he never presented himself as a revolutionary leader. The mass organisation were superficially designed to mobilise sympathisers, who were not prepared to support the party directly.

The policy that was pursued by the party was also a failure. The groupings that were made by Aidit were not Leninist groupings of determined revolutionaries but organisations which would play according to the rules.

A policy failure could be seen in the year of 1957-58. It must be remembered that when Aidit launched his new style of party with loyalty to Sukarno as its core, the country was ruled by a parliament which had in firm intention to elections. Under these conditions, increasing the size of the PKI made sense, it was a road to power by constitutional means and made militance unnecessary. But

when Sukarno changed the policy towards Guided Democracy in which the President and the army became very powerful, the political parties were reduced in importance. Aidit supported Sukarno as if nothing had changed from 1952. It was a failure of policy of the PKI.

As far as leadership was concerned, there were no changes, especially after 1952, at least until 1958. Whether because they were totally identified or because they knew only this one stratagem, they continued to pursue it even when it was a source of weakness rather than strength.

Another conclusion it gives us that PKI lost the aspiration and support from the students community, and it is an astonishing fact that Aidit PKI failed completely to enlist the sympathy of the younger generation; as the lack of intellectual leaders from the Universities.

Appendix I

The course of events - A short Chronology

This short chronology is meant as a complement to the first Chapter, 'Introduction and Background'. It gives the reader an opportunity for orienting with the developments while reading the dissertation.

It includes only some of the most important events.

- 1912 - Sarekat Islam is formed, the first major anti-colonial movement in Indonesia.
- 1914 - ISDX, the Social Democratic Party was formed.
- 1920 - PKI was formed.
- 1926 - There was a Communist-inspired, attempted revolt in West Java.
- 1927 - Communist inspired attempted revolt in West Sumatra; The PKI is crushed.
 - The nationalists led by Sukarno start acquiring dominance over the anti-colonial struggle.
- 1942 - Japan occupied Indonesia.
- 1945 - The Japanese were defeated.
 - The British troops arrived.
 - The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17.
 - Sukarno initially became President, and Hatta, Vice-President.
 - There was armed struggle against the British and the returning Dutch.

- The PKI was resurrected.
- Coalition Government led by the Socialist Party leader Sutan Sjahrir was formed.
- 1946 - British troops left the country.
- 1947 - A popular front type of Government under the Socialist leader Amir Sjarifuddin was formed.
- 1948 - Sjarifuddin Government fell.
 - Musso arrived ; the P.K. re-examined and changed its stratagy.
 - The Madiun revolt took place between September-December, 1948.
- 1949 - Round-table agreement was reached with Holland in the Hague.
 - The Netherlands recognised the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
 - Vice-President Mohd. Hatta formed the new Government in December.
- 1950 - Unitary Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed.
 - Wide spread strike.
 - Natsir formed a new Government representing the Masjumi and PSI in September.
- 1951 - Opposition to Natsir inter-unites in coalition organ B P P.
 - Aidit quartet take over power in the PKI (BPP)
 - Anti strike lans.

- 1952 - New PKI analyses the strategy.
 - PKI gave critical support to the new PNI government led by Wilopo.
 - The NV broke away from the Masjumi.
- 1953 - Wilopo Cabinet falls, then comes Ali Cabinet.
 - PKI and Sukarno move more closer.
- 1954 - PKI holds its V Congress and lays down the new analyses and new strategy to be adopted.
- 1955 - PKI talks about struggle for a coalition government before the time for a popular democratic government.
 - PNI in the position.
 - Parliamentary elections(September).
- 1956 - Indonesia revokes Commander-in-chief of the Army.
 - PKI support Sukarno.
- 1957 - Sukarno's 'Konsepsi' speech(Feb.) in which he advocates a broad coalition government including the PKI and hints at the need for Guided Democracy.
 - PKI support Sukarno and the state of emergency.

Appendix II

Glossary and Abbreviations

Bintang Merah	Red Star, the PKI's theoretical organ.
B P P	Badan Permusjawaratan Partai-Partai - The advisory council of the political parties.
B T I	Barisan Tani Indonesia - Indonesian peasant front, the country's largest peasant organisation affiliated to the PKI.
Comintern	(Third) Communist International.
Gotong Royong	Mutual cooperation.
Harian Rakjat	People's Daily - The PKI's daily newspaper.
I S D P	Social Democratic Party that in 1914 grew out of the early trade union in Indonesia.
I S D V	Indische Social Democratische Verenigen.
Masjumi	Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia - Political Party of Muslims Organisation.
Partai Murba	During the late 1940's, a left wing nationalist party, thereafter less leftist- Murba- simple, ordinary.
Pemuda Rakjat	People's yough. PKI's Youth League.

- P K I Partai Komunis Indonesia-The Communist
Party of Indonesia.
- P N I Partai National Indonesia-National Party
of Indonesia, founded in 1927.
- P S I Partai Socialis Indonesia-The Socialist
Party of Indonesia founded in 1948.
- Sarekat Islam The Islamic movement, the first major
anti-colonial mass movement in Indonesia,
founded in 1912.
- S O B S I Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia-
Central Organisation of Indonesian Workers
affiliated to PKI.

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