

**SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE  
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  
(1953-70)**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of requirements for the  
award of Degree of  
**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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1986**

## PREFACE

This essentially is a study of the initial formative phase of the non-aligned movement in international politics. As the Soviet Union was the first great power to encourage and support the non-aligned movement, Soviet policy towards it proved to be crucial. Therefore, in its detail, our study is really a study of Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement during the formative phase 1953-70.

Our study begins with identifying a framework for Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement. The chapter following it deals with the formative phase of Soviet policy until the beginning of sixties. Chapter-III is focused on the growth and development of Soviet policy during the 60's, issue-wise and time-wise. Chapter-IV is concerned with Soviet policy postures on various vital problems of the non-aligned movement itself. Finally, we have attempted to correlate our investigation so as to understand an overall Soviet policy towards the movement during well identified period, 1953-70.

The limitations of our study are deliberate. As for instance, the period chosen here is important both for the non-aligned movement and Soviet policy towards it.

Our study has broadly shown that Soviet policy towards the NAM during 1953-70 was based on community of interests with the essential objectives of the movement and Soviet foreign policy; however, ups and downs in Soviet policy are duly taken into.

The study is based on published primary and secondary sources as indicated in our presentation.

The completion of any work is a long and arduous process, which cannot achieve fruition without the help of many people serving in different roles. My debts are far too numerous to acknowledge completely. But there are number of persons whose direct and indirect contribution cannot be unmentioned.

I am bounden in gratitude to my reverend guide and Supervisor Prof. Zafar Imam who accepted me to work under him and subsequently offered scholarly guidance, uncommon encouragement and inspiration for the completion of this dissertation.

I am likewise grateful to Dr. S.K. Jha and Dr. Tulsi Ram who first aroused my interest in this area of study and helped me to better visualise and understand the problem with which this work is concerned.

My sincere thanks to Subodh Narayan Malakar, Matadin Gupta Ram Krishna Pandey and Subrat Keshari Rout for giving aid and advise whenever required.

My deep appreciation is also extended to my friends Chandra Shekhar Dubey, Warendra Kumar Karn, Shambhoo Kr. Singh and Narhari Das for their proof reading and generous help.

To my family members, I am deeply indebted for the aid and encouragement which have meant so much to me in the completion of this task.

Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Sarkar for his tireless and painstaking effort in typing. With his help I am able to submit it in time.

*Shambhuo*  
SHAMBHOO NARAYAN CHAUDHARY

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## **CHAPTER-I**

### **THE FRAMEWORK**

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, IDEAS AND  
CONCEPTS, SOVIET ASSESSMENT AT  
NON-ALIGNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL  
POLITICS.**

The fact is that the Soviet Union is an ideologically oriented State, is generally recognised. Ever since the formation of the Soviet State in October 1917, Soviet leadership has always emphasised that ideology - Marxism-Leninism - is a determining factor in its each and every policy; Soviet foreign policy is also considered to be no exception.<sup>1</sup> However, the nature and the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy in fast changing and complex world of ours can be argued.

An important element of Soviet foreign policy has been the Soviet policy towards the Third World. Originating the Soviet policy towards colonial and semi-colonial question it developed later after the Second World War into a full-fledged State policy towards the Third World, indeed, becoming an integral part of Soviet foreign policy.

One of the essential features of Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World during the post-Second World War period has emerged as Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement. Therefore, for a better understanding of Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement - thereby Soviet policy towards the Third World itself, our starting

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1. For an interesting discussion on this point, see Zbigniew Brezezinski, Ideology and Powers in Soviet Politics, New York, 1962.

point must necessarily be an identification of the framework of Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement. In this framework, ideas and concepts emerging out of ideological element of Soviet foreign policy as well as their historical background are important for our consideration.

The essential framework of Soviet foreign policy is determined by Marx's idea that international politics is really an international class-struggle in which nation-State play their role as conditioned by their class structure. Further in this class struggle one primary contradiction, namely the contradiction between capitalist system and its allies on the one hand and the Socialist system and its allies on the other, determines nature and intensity of such an international class struggle. Hence, the essential ideological framework of Soviet foreign policy can be seen in terms of an international class struggle waged by the Soviet Union and its allies against its main antagonistic force, namely the capitalist system and its allies. The Soviet Union has claimed that such an international class struggle must be waged on the basis of policies of peaceful co-existence of all states, while it is also considered that there are others socio-economic contradictions playing their role in it.<sup>2</sup>

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2. For detail discussion see, Zafar Imam, Ideology & Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia, Kalyani Publishers, Delhi, 1975, pp. 103-107.



One of the major social forces exerting its role in international politics is considered by the Soviets, as represented by the Third World countries, the former-colonies, semi-colonies and imperialism. The origin of such a formulation dates back to Marx.

Written back in 1847, Marx pointed out the connection between the struggle waged by the proletariat and the movement for national liberation. He says, - "The proletariat victory over the bourgeoisie means at the same time elimination of all national industrial conflicts that now give rise to enmity between the peoples. That is why the proletariat victory over the bourgeoisie sounds at the same time a call for all oppressed nations".<sup>3</sup>

Ever since the publication of Communist manifesto in 1848, the debate on colonial question was initiated. Initiators of the debate were Marx and Engels themselves. Referring India and China as models in their writings, they identified the potentialities of colonial states for the fight against capitalism. As Prof. Zafar Imam writes:

"Marx is the originator of the idea that the colonial and semi-colonial world are a potential force against capitalism in international politics and that the proletarian

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3. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, vol. 4, Moscow, p. 371.

revolution in Europe is interlinked with colonial emancipation in the East."<sup>4</sup>

Deriving from the idea of Marx and Engels, Lenin developed it into a full fledged theory. The Second Congress of the Comintern which adopted a resolution on national and colonial problems, was mainly based on Lenin's "preliminary Draft theses on the national and colonial question". For the national liberation movement, the significance of the Comintern and its decision is highly important. Most important is the fact that it has first, estimated the nature of the movement and its historical role as a revolutionary constituting an element of world revolution, and secondly, opened the eyes of the backward peoples for the possibilities of social progress based on the growing alliance of the national liberation forces and the world Socialist system.<sup>5</sup>

It worked on the assumption that the three important revolutionary forces exist in the world today, namely the world Socialist system, the international working class and national liberation struggle. If the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation and Social progress is to

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4. Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Non-alignment", International Studies, Vikas Publication, 1983, vol. 20, no. 1-2, p.446.

5. Y. Zhukov (ed.), The Third World - Problem and Prospects, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, pp. 254-55.

win, three forces must achieve unity and work in close contact and co-operation. Thus, Lenin, after the October Revolution, was greatly concerned to the old colonial debate and views and finally shaped it into a single organised concept that has been applied as a guide-line in its policy formation towards the Third World and the Non-aligned Movement.

Equipped with such ideas and concepts, Soviet policy towards the Third World gradually began. Soviet Russia entered the world arena as a sworn supporter of the national liberation movement. One of the very first documents, issued by the Soviet Government, - the Declaration of Rights of the working and exploited peoples - exposed notorious acts of colonial powers and proclaimed its support for the liberation of colonies and semi-colonies. Such a policy was further clarified and confirmed by Lenin's Thesis on the colonial and national question adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern held in 1920.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, a clear-cut Soviet policy of support and an encouragement to the national liberation movement of colonial and semi-colonial East emerged. The policy remained valid and active right through the end of Second World War inspite of the weakness of the Soviet State and

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6. The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings, Moscow, 1920, p. 579.

the hostility of imperialist powers.

One of the most important events, overtakes in post-Second World war politics, is the liberation of millions of people from the yoke of Western colonial powers. This historic event gives us many explanations. Explanation to the questions as to why did the old colonial masters gave up their idea of sustaining rule over subjugated states; what were the compulsions that led to granting liberation of the colonial people?

A simple answer, provided by non-Soviet writings, suggests that the long involvement of colonial powers in two world wars severely damaged their domestic and foreign capital. Intra-contradiction among their co-partners and post war economic crisis left no alternative in maintaining their military command over vast agitating peoples of colonial States. And therefore, they were compelled by their own conditions to <sup>unite</sup> ~~unite~~ century's chain of slavery and colonial boundage.

This explanation is partly true, but what constituted beyond that was the challenge of socialist system and its open support to the national liberation movement. Marxist-Leninist literature on the subject pinpoints that it could have created more difficulty in wining struggle against colonial powers if Russia had not emerged as a Socialist

State. According to it "the main decisive factor that has contributed to the success of the liberation movements of colonial peoples has been the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917, which released the vast latent energy of hundreds of millions and stimulated them to active participation in political affairs".<sup>7</sup>

Now with the benefit of historical hindsight it can be safely stated that Soviet policy of support and encouragement to the national liberation movement in the East did prove a crucial factor in the beginning of the disintegration of the world colonial system.<sup>8</sup>

From the above, we can easily see that the emergent countries of the Third World began to get involved attention from the Soviet Union. The immediate post-Second World War years also marked the beginning of the formative stage of the non-aligned movement. However, during 1947-50 the Soviet leadership failed to realize its potentiality; so much so that it even expressed torcs over the independence of the former colonial countries like India.<sup>9</sup> However, by the beginning of the fifties leadership began the process of reassessment and adjustment of its policy towards Third World and the Non-aligned Movement particularly.

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7. Y. Zbukov (ed.), op.cit., p. 13

8. See Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947, Eastman Publications, New Delhi,

The 20th Congress of Communist Party of Soviet Union, held in 1956, was also a landmark for Soviet policy towards Third World. By 1956 the non-aligned movement has also made considerable advance with the convening historic Bandung Conference held in 1955.<sup>10</sup> There were already indication that the Soviet Union no longer ignored the non-aligned movement.

The 20th Congress of CPSU was important. It assessed the prevailing world situation with pragmatic outlook, provided a well defined theory for its policy towards emerging States and finally took stride from confusion to confidence. Confusion lingering with its two camp theory gave way to the realization of present condition, in which Third force, i.e., the Non-Aligned Movement was seen as potential and powerful in shaping the fate of world politics. The report presented by the Congress says, "The present dis-integration of the imperialist colonial system is a post-war development of world historic significance. People who for centuries were blocked by the colonialists from the highway of progress followed by human society are now going through a great process of regeneration... we are witness of a

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10. See, Chapter II.

political and economic upsurge of the peoples of the South East Asia and the Arab East. The awakening of the peoples of Africa has begun... The new period in world history predicted by Lenin when the people of the East were playing an active part in deciding destinies of the whole world became a new mighty factor in international relations has arrived. In contrast to the pre-war period, most countries... are resolutely upholding their right to an independent foreign policy. International relations have spread beyond the bounds of relations among countries inhabited by the white race and are beginning to become genuinely world wide relations. The friendship and co-operation between the Eastern peoples who have thrown off the colonial yoke and the peoples of Socialist countries are growing and strengthening.<sup>11</sup>

From the above statement three main points can be drawn; firstly, in post-Second World War politics colonialism gave way to the national upsurges and liberation movement and thereupon the establishment of many new states with their independent foreign policies; secondly, independent foreign policies of these States were directed against world colonialism and imperialism, and lastly, the growing

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11. Khrushchev, N.S., Report of the Central Committee of CPSU to the 20th Party Congress, Feb. 14, 1956, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, pp. 21-23.

co-operation between Third World countries and Socialist States were logical since both of them stood for the same cause and concern. A close look of this analysis also reveals the fact that the Congress made an effort to revive the Lenin's principles of world revolutionary process, though in different manner and way.

Since 1956, Soviet Union renewed doctrines of different roads to Socialism and non-capitalist path of development. These doctrines were applied mainly in context of emerging powerful group of non-aligned countries.<sup>12</sup> Non-alignment was seen as a transitory phase of developing countries between capitalism and socialism. Socialist aid and support at this point of time was considered important in shaping them in its own way of life; which in long term would become closer to socialism. With this intention, the Congress spoke of the "identity of view" existing between the Soviet Union and the non-aligned States, viz., the preservation and consolidation of world peace and national independence.<sup>13</sup> The Congress decided to strengthen the friendship and co-operation with fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia and the consolidate the bonds of friendship and co-operation with the non-aligned and other countries which

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12. See, for detail discussion on the subject, Zafar Imam, 'Soviet View of Non-alignment', International Studies, Vikas Publication, Delhi, 1983, vol. 20, no. 1-2.

13. Report of the CPSU to the 20th Party Congress, op.cit., pp. 29-30.



stood for peace.<sup>14</sup> This also gave a clear-cut indication of the beginning of massive economic aid by Soviet Union to these countries to "help them to build up an independent national economy and to raise the living standard of their peoples without any political and military commitments".<sup>15</sup>

The basic change in Soviet policy brought by the 20th Congress enabled the Soviets to wrest the initiative from the Western powers in their relations with the non-aligned countries. Since then in non-aligned countries themselves, "the fund of goodwill and admiration for Soviet Union shot up to an all time high."<sup>16</sup>

Thus a clear-cut Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement emerged. Such a policy was an essential and integral part of an overall Soviet policy towards the Third World.

The essential concepts and ideas regarding the non-aligned movement, in particular, and the Third World, in general, remained valid and operative throughout the period of our study. The subsequent CPSU Congresses during this period further reiterated and clarified these ideas and

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14. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

15. Ibid., p. 27.

16. Hair, N. Parasaran, Non-alignment: History, Ideology, Prospect, in Karunakaran (ed.), Outside the Contest, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1963, p. 55.

concepts. For example, Central Committee Reports to the Twenty Second Congress says, "The national states have become even more active as an independent force on the world scene; objectively, this is in the main a progressive, revolutionary, and anti-imperialists force. The countries and peoples that are now free from colonial oppression are to play a prominent part in the prevention of new world war, the focal problem of today."<sup>17</sup>

Here may not be out of place to have a quick look at in relevant range of ideas and concepts regarding the nature of state in the Third World particularly those following the non-aligned policy. Analysing the nature and character of these states, the meeting of representatives of Communist and workers' parties held in Moscow in 1960, affirms, "... even where the prerequisites for carrying out immediate revolutionary socialist transformation were lacking, it was still possible for countries to continue and accomplish the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution and take the path of development leading through an intermediate stage of democratic transformation to socialism."<sup>18</sup>

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17. Quoted in K.P. Mishra (ed.), Non-alignment Frontiers & Dynamics, Vikas Publishing House, N.Delhi, 1982, p. 461.

18. Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy & Socialism, Moscow, 1961, p. 66.

In this statement, a general appraisal of the role of national bourgeoisie was given at first instance and thereupon assessed the nature of State democracy. According to it, since a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie remained interested in consolidating the political, economic and cultural independence of their countries, there still exist in the new States of Asia and Africa a basis for broad co-operation of all national and democratic forces - the working class, the peasantry, the progressive circles of the national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. It is this prospect that "provides the basis for the idea of State of national democracy as a State that expresses the interest not only one class but of a bloc of broad section of the people."<sup>19</sup>

The assessment of national democracy, brought at the time of Moscow meeting, concludes as "a states which consistently upholds the political and economic independence, fight against imperialism and its military blocs, and against military bases on its territory, a State which fights against the new forms of colonialism and participation of imperialist capital, a State which rejects dictatorial and despotic forms of government, a State in which the

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19. Thomas Perry Thornton (ed.), Third World in Soviet Prospective, Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 53.

people are assured broad democratic rights and freedom, the opportunity to work for enactment of an agrarian reforms and the realization of their democratic and social changes and for participation in shaping government's policy.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, in the light of above ideas and concepts, Soviet policy began to act at international scene particularly in the area of non-aligned movement. Indeed, the policy, shaped after 1950 onwards, was mainly concerned to deal with major issues of the world at practical level and to open a broad area of co-operation between socialist State and the State of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It later consolidated the ground of community of interests between itself and the non-aligned movement.

It is worthwhile to note that the process of unfolding, indeed, reassessment of ideas and concepts regarding non-aligned movement was deeply influenced by the very process of non-aligned movement. As a matter of fact, the period under study also marked a growing friendship and co-operation between them and the non-aligned movement, particularly its active adherents like India, Egypt and Indonesia.

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20. Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, op.cit., pp. 67-68.

From the above discussion, it clearly emerges that the Soviet's by mid-1950's began to regard the emergent countries of the Third World as a strong force in international politics. Such a development appears to confirm assessment put forward by Lenin in 1920 that the East is potential allies and strong third force to the Socialist system and in their international class struggle against capitalist system. The non-aligned movement was seen as concentrated expression of the need and aspiration of the national liberation movement of the Third World and a viable third social force operating in international politics objectively against capitalist system. From such a framework the very basis of Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement was seen in terms of community of interests between them and the non-aligned movement vis-a-vis the capitalist system. Later in seventies, the community of interests was seen as developing further towards the concept of the Soviet system being a natural ally of the non-aligned movement. However, the essential framework of Soviet policy towards non-aligned movement was operative during the period of our study, and became gradually an integral part of Soviet policy towards the Third World, in particular and Soviet policy in general.

## CHAPTER-II

### THE FORMATIVE PHASE OF SOVIET POLICY (1947-1961)

Assessment of the non-aligned movement during the first half of the fifties. Bandung Conference, activation of Soviet role in Third World and support to the foreign policy of the non-aligned countries. The significance of the Belgrade Conference 1961.

Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement has a historical origin. It has originated from Soviet policy of support and encouragement to the national liberation struggle of colonies and semi-colonies during the inter-war years which historically developed along with the process of the desintegration of the world colonial system. Beginning in 1947 with independent India and Pakistan the process of collapse of world colonial system has itself gone through various phases. In its first formative phase a number of emergent countries like India had to cope with the historical legacy of colonialism, although, they had begun to formulate their foreign policy on the basis of non-alignment. Later during the second phase, after 1947-52, they were able to deal with these legacies quite successfully and their non-aligned posture began to exert increasing influence in international politics.

It is interesting to note that Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement also developed as the non-aligned movement itself. However, there were obvious communication gap between the two for a number of reasons, be discussed in following pages. Broadly speaking, the formative phase of Soviet policy towards the non-alignment has developed in two stages, the period wise, during 1947-52, and 1953-61.

Here, below we propose to investigate these two phases of Soviet policy in sequence.

(i) The First Phase (1947-52):

Today the non-aligned movement is a global movement of almost all the Third World countries. However, looking back at its origin and development it is no exaggeration to suggest that it really all started with India and Jawaharlal Nehru's first historical declaration in September 1946. As a matter of fact, initial formative period 1947-52 began with really India which was the founder of the movement. Later after 1953, particularly when the Cold War penetrated in Asia and India's neighbourhood in the shape of the US-Pakistan defence pact and the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, more and more adherents came on the scene.

Therefore, it is logical to consider Soviet policy towards the non-alignment. With a view to a better understanding we must begin herewith examining India's non-aligned posture during this period, and Soviet response to that.

With the emergence of India as an independent sovereign State, the idea of non-alignment came into existence in international politics.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the first

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1. Bimala Prasad, 'Historical Background of Non-alignment' in K.P. Mishra(ed.), Non-alignment Frontiers & Dynamics, Vikas Publishing House, 1982.



official declaration of a policy of non-alignment came with the assumption of power by the nationalist leaders in India in 1946. Immediately after his assumption of duties as Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in the Government of India in September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that India would "keep away from power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past the world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale."<sup>2</sup> He stated that it was his government's policy to remain in the British Commonwealth of Nations and establish friendly relations with the USA and the Soviet Union.

Nehru's statement of such kind of policy was a reflection of many things existing at internal and external level. Prime Minister Nehru as well as a section of leadership in India did not like a doctrinaire view of capitalism and communism. Nehru was convinced that "in spite of differences between rival ideologies today, the point of similarities are growing and circumstances are bringing them nearer to each other. If fear was not present and threats and compulsions are not used, the process will be hastened."<sup>3</sup> According to him, since capitalism has changed

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2. Independence and After; A collection of more important speeches of J. Nehru from Sept. 1946 to May 1949, Delhi: Publication Division, 1949, p. 340.

3. Nehru, J., India Today and Tomorrow, New Delhi, 1958, p. 27.

for the good and also communism in some respects, so one need not be inclined to be extraordinary critical of either of them. On the contrary, he found in each of them such features as would commend themselves to India in the present circumstances.<sup>4</sup> In fact, this expression contained the Congress' concept of Socialist pattern of society of which the mixed economy was an important feature, based on some of the ingredients of both of the systems.

During the period 1946-50, the Cold War was to a great extent confined to Europe. As Lukacs pointed out: "The historical principles, viz., the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan and the policy of containment were all stated in the European context only. During the period from Yalta Conference to Korea the situation of Europe had hardened, it had become evident that Europe, and particularly Germany, was again the main area of Russian-American conflicts."<sup>5</sup> In such a situation Asia, by and large, was free from its effects. The policy of non-alignment expressed the Government of India's desire to be impartial about such issues of the Cold War as did not affect Asia in general and India, in particular. Handicapped by her own military weaknesses and domestic strains, India wanted to be aloof

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4. Nehru, J., "Basic Approach", AICC Economic Review, New Delhi, September 15, 1958.

5. Lukacs, J., The History of the Cold War, New York, 1961, p. 101.



from big blocs of Nations and did not consider it wise to get entangled in the problems of Europe which according to Nehru were "problems of power politics."<sup>6</sup> Therefore, regardless of implications to the balance of forces between great powers, efforts were made to judge each issue on its merits and not to take a partisan view of various problems in which the two world powers, i.e., USA and USSR were interested.

At the first instance, the Soviet Union under Stalin assessed it negatively and made a serious doubt to the intention of India's policy of non-alignment. He refrained to recognise India as a full independent State while making comment on India's independence, one of the Soviet ideologists, A. Dyakov wrote "The acceptance of Mountbatten plan (for partition) by the leaders of the Indian National Congress was a result of compromise deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism. The deal is based on concessions made by both sides."<sup>7</sup> It was viewed that Indian Government was represented by semi-feudal, landlords, and big bourgeoisie with their close ties with British and American monopolies.

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6. Nehru, J., Independence and After, op.cit., p. 232.

7. A. Dyakov, 'Partitioned India', op.cit.

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This view of characterizing India still as an Anglo-American colony found its expression on other grounds too. The existence of foreign capital in India, India's continuation in the British Commonwealth of Nations, etc., were considered as proofs of her dependent status. Soviet press reacted at the time when India, Pakistan and other new States decided to remain in Commonwealth. It says, "In 1947, India was divided into two States; 'enjoying equal rights', which were included in the British Commonwealth of Nations - the dominion of India and Pakistan. In January 1950 the dominion of India was proclaimed a republic headed by an elected President. This Republic, however, remained a part of the British Empire and recognized the hegemony of the king of England... Have the formal modifications actually altered the position of the colonial countries? In no way whatsoever. The dominant position of the England capital remained intact in all English colonies now called 'independent'. The English Firms are the real bosses in the colonial economies."<sup>8</sup>

Coming to the point of India's policy of non-aligned, Soviet scholars presented the same analysis as they preferred to say in the context of India's membership of Commonwealth. "... Under the present day conditions, the neutrality...

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8. New Times, Moscow, no. 43, Sept. 10, 1950, p. 30.

profits only the US and British imperialists who fear the active participation of the masses in the fight for peace, democracy and freedom."<sup>9</sup>

Changing Soviet perception of national bourgeoisie in Third World necessarily created a ground of confusion and mistrust. Consequently, it led to their isolation from Asian realities. This was not due to the sectarian Soviet appraisal of national bourgeoisie alone, but there was much more objective basis of the approach.

During the initial period of Soviet State, the leadership was mainly concerned with the security of the Bolshevik Revolution and protecting the new States from its internal and external foes. In order to achieve these objectives "the Soviet leadership adopted basically a defensive posture, seeking with all its energies, to secure the survival of Soviet State and to adopt its power base."<sup>10</sup> Lenin's idea of single multilevel world revolutionary process had been nearly forgotten in the pre-occupation of building socialism in one country.<sup>11</sup>

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9. Ibid.

10. Morten Schwartz, The motive forces of Soviet foreign policy: A Reappraisal, New York, 1970, p. 6

11. Zafar Imam, Ideology & Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia, op.cit., p. xiii.

The complexity of the post-war problems and frequent encounters with the war-time allies involved Russia more and more in the European situation. Major Soviet policy concentration on the West left them disconnected from the new developments of Afro-Asian States and created a considerable communication gap between them and emerging States.

Again, with the end of war, the war-time inter-allied co-operation had ceased. The West was being united to oppose tooth and nail the Socialist Revolutions in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Churchill gave expression to his anti-Soviet feelings in the famous Fulton Mo Speech, delivered on 6th March 1947, in which he pleaded for joint Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

Being threatened by capitalist-imperialist bloc of Nations, Soviet Union was trying to strengthen its position by seeking alliance with East European countries.<sup>13</sup> As proclaiming a leading guard of Socialist bloc, the Soviet Union took responsibility of countering the West and made itself busy in keeping the pace of balance of forces more and more confined to the European scene. Subtle confrontation between the Socialist and the capitalist-imperialist

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12. Naik, J.A., Soviet Policy Towards India - From Stalin to Brezhnev, Vikas Publication, Delhi, 1970, p. 32.

13. Norton Schwartz, op.cit.

blocs compelled Soviet leaders and scholars to remain adamant on their preoccupied notion of two camps theory. When the non-alignment was projecting itself as a Third group of international community, the Soviet Communist Party Secretary, Andre Zhdanov made it again clear that in new position of the world war political forces, the world were divided into two camps - imperialistic and anti-democratic camp on the one side, and the anti-imperialistic and democratic camp, i.e., Socialist camp on the other side.<sup>14</sup> It was all to say that except these two no 'Third road' existed.

The another basis for the negative Soviet perception of the Third World and the non-alignment can be cited in context of strong imperialist military and financial presence in many of these countries at the end of Second World War. USA as the leading imperialist power launched a subtle plan of economic and military aid under the guise of Truman Doctrine and Marshal plan. The main intention of the plan was to curbe the Communist influence among the emerging States. The plan succeeded at length in its mission.

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14. For detail discussion on Zhdanov's view of Two Camp Theory and its implication, see J.A. Naik, op.cit., p. 33.

When the Soviet Union was analysing Indian bourgeoisie, India's independence and finally its policy of non-alignment, all the above factors were around its mental state. Outcome of the analysis was not, indeed, positive. Mistrust prevailed and difficulties arose in the Soviet relations with Young Afro-Asian States.

(ii) The Second Phase (1953-61):

The second phase of Soviet policy begins with indication of change. This indication was apparently seen in 1953 when the Soviet foreign Minister Melnikov praised India's policy of non-alignment and its significant role for resolving Korean conflict.

As a matter of fact that the non-aligned movement has also begun to change and develop. As the Cold War by 1953 came to Asia and in India's neighbourhood, India moved towards making non-aligned movement more organised. A process setting, finally culminated in the holding of famous Bandung Conference in 1955.

Moreover, India's posture of non-alignment began to shed confusion and hesitation. As a matter of fact, momentous changes in India's domestic policies also began during this period. For obvious fact, India as the founding member of non-aligned movement was not posed to play a very



active role in organising the movement and in making its breath felt in international politics. We again notice that Soviet policy towards non-alignment began to develop accordingly in its own ways. Soviet interests, indeed, involvement in the movement began to grow and develop. It was more coincidence that the Soviet programme of economic aid and military assistance to the Third World began to develop from the mid-fifties and it became more and more concentrated from the leading members of the non-aligned movement like India, Indonesia and Egypt. Moreover, an active political and diplomatic support to these countries was also marked.

It is logical for us to have a critical look at the development and growth of the non-alignment with a view to investigate corresponding action and posture that came from Soviet Union. With this scheme we should be able to investigate Soviet policy towards non-aligned movement during the second phase more purposefully.

Till 1950, the policy of non-alignment was confined to India and that too played a limited role. Internal and external troubles of many new Asian states prevented them from devoting full attention to definite foreign policies during this period. But nevertheless, common understanding on non-alignment was growing. In 1950, Thakin Nu, Prime Minister of Burma categorically stated about his country's

desire of keeping away from alignment politics and accepted the principles of non-alignment.<sup>15</sup> After Burma, this was followed by Indonesia. The protracted fight with the Dutch had prevented the Young Republic from devoting full attention to foreign affairs earlier, but yet the trends of her policy were not in doubt. The British and American policy of assisting the Dutch during the early years of Republic's fight for freedom were powerful factor that drove them away from alignment politics.<sup>16</sup>

During the next few years, relations with the Western bloc showed a sign of deterioration. The early pro-Western tendencies in many non-aligned nations suffered a severe setback. Western imperialism throughout the late fifties and early fifties remained powerful in Asia and Africa. In these periods, their general approach of treating the problems of non-aligned nations was neither conducive nor commendable. On almost all its important problems - colonialism, racism, trusteeship system, disarmament, military pacts, etc. - there seemed to be a positive clash of opinion and interest between the Western bloc and the non-aligned nations.<sup>17</sup> On its contrary, attitudes of the

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15. Speech by Prime Minister Thakin Nu, July 1950, From Peace to Stability.

16. Karunakaran, K.P. (ed.), Outside the Contest, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1963, p. 72.

17. Ibid., p. 53.

Soviet Union on these issues were sympathetic and co-operative. Consequently, a gradual feeling of closeness between the Soviet Union and the non-aligned states was being evolved.

In response to the changing stand and attitude of the non-aligned countries, Soviet Union brought an overall assessment of world situation in which it shared its views with the growing feeling and commitment of Afro-Asian States. In his report to the Nineteenth CPSU Congress, held in 1952, G.M. Malenkov, the Party Secretary, said, "The people of the colonies and dependent countries are offering more and more determined resistance to the imperialist enslavers. Evidence of the growing scope of the national resistance movement is provided in the struggle of the people of Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, and by the growth of national resistance in India, Iran, Egypt and other countries."<sup>18</sup>

Taking the note of political activities of Afro-Asian countries, Soviet policy was being modeled with an intention to eakout long existing gap of world war period and then to provide a wide scope of co-operation between

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18. New Times, no. 42, Supplement, 1952, p. 7.

the two forces of the world. The Soviet Union observed India's policy of non-alignment and its commendable role during the Korean crisis. Finally, the Soviet Foreign Minister Malenkov paid handsome tribute to India and its contributory role in dissolving the crisis. In August 1953, he said, "The stand taken by such big country as India is of great significance for the consolidation of peace in the East. India made her own significant contribution to the effects of the peace-loving countries directed to the ending of war in Korea."<sup>19</sup>

Hence, we find by the close of 1953, there was every indication that the passive phase of Soviet policy was over and the ground work for their new and active phase had begun.

Now the Soviet Union entered in new Afro-Asian arena with definite aims and objectives. Early breakthrough of nuclear monopoly of the West gave an impetus and real confidence to its policy for dealing with major issues of the world. By this time, the Soviet Union had been able to achieve a comparable balance of strength vis-a-vis the Western bloc. This balance was gradually tilting in favour of socialist bloc led by Soviet Union. Expansion of the

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19. Pravda, 9th August 1953, quoted in Harish Kapur, The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations, Geneva, 1972, p. 43.

area of Communist bloc and rise of national liberation movement made its task possible and easy. This was again bolstered with the entrance of Afro-Asian group in the United Nations. This was in no sense a deliberate and well organized group. Nevertheless, on matters of common interests and approaches, they came to develop method of consultation and co-operation with Communist bloc.<sup>20</sup>

In 1954, the non-aligned movement was first being conceptualized. Panchsheel, or the five principles of peaceful co-existence became its dictum in deciding relations with international communities. These five principles are:

- (i) Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (ii) mutual non-aggression;
- (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (iv) equality and mutual benefits; and
- (v) peaceful co-existence.<sup>21</sup>

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20. N. Parameshwaran Nair, Non-alignment: History, ideology, Prospects, in Karunakaran (ed.), op.cit., p. 37.

21. Extracts are available in Documents on International Affairs, 1954, London (R.I.I.A.), pp. 313-315.

They were first enunciated in the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet and then in the joint statement by the Prime Minister of India and China in 1954.

Panchsheela for the Soviet Union seemed dear to her heart. She observed its content carefully and found that the Socialist principles of inter-state relationships were incorporated in it. Now the Soviet Union was in quick to making favourable comment on the importance of Panchsheela. Soviet's official Newspaper Pravda, noted, "These can be no doubt that the acceptance of these important principles by the Asian as well as other countries would diminish the possibilities of war, serve to lessen tensions in the world community and improve the valuable co-operation between the countries."<sup>22</sup> Later, in February 1955, the Supreme Soviet issued an unprecedented declaration recommending the adoption of the five principles (Panchsheela) by all countries. The declaration says, "The relations between the States must be based on the principles of equality, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, non-aggression, and respect for each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national independence. The observance of these principles on which a number of States

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22. Pravda, July 1, 1954.

such the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China and India already based their relations with other countries, would guarantee the peaceful co-existence of States with different social and political system."<sup>23</sup>

This was actual official recognition to the principles of non-alignment and a turning point of its policy adjustment at that exigencies of time. What Lenin said years back in his policy formulation towards the West, was revived again during Khrushchev's period to meet new challenges of new societies in the East. Since the period of 1953, positive response had been given to each and every creative activity of the non-aligned states.

After Panchsheel, a landmark event in the development of the principles and proceedings of the non-aligned movement took place at the meeting of Afro-Asian States in Bandung. Bandung Conference held in April (18-24), 1955 was unique in its kind in which twenty-nine states of different background participated and discussed the common problems at length.

The Conference denounced racism and called for the elimination of all vestings of racism and colonialism and urged the implementation of the U.N. resolution on the

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23. New Times, no. 7, 1955, Supplement, p. 13.

problem of Palestine. It advocated for complete disarmament and the promotion of world peace and co-operation. Finally, the Conference agreed to 'ten principles',<sup>24</sup> on which their movement was to be launched in future. Panchsheela now incorporated in these principles. These ten principles are:

- (i) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the UNO;
- (ii) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
- (iii) recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
- (iv) abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of other country;
- (v) respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with charter of the UNO;
- (vi)  abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers;
- abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other country;

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24. Extracts of the proceedings and resolutions of the Conference are given in Documents on International Affairs, 1955, op.cit., p. 436.



- (vii) refraining from acts of threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
- (viii) settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of parties own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (ix) promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; and
- (x) respect for justice and international obligation.

The Bandung Conference was a source of satisfaction to the Soviet leaders. They paid adequate attention and made favourable comments on the proceedings of the Conference. On April 16, a special statement of the foreign ministry warmly hailed the conference and declared, "The peoples of the Soviet Union have complete understanding for the struggle of the Asian and African countries against all forms of colonial rule, for political and economic independence."<sup>25</sup> Apart from that messages of good wishes were sent by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the opening day of the Conference.

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25. Pravda, April 16, 1955.

Outcome of the Bandung Conference was endorsed by the Soviet Union with whole seriousness. It began to support and encourage the formative phase of the non-aligned movement at different levels and in different forms.

Within a year of Bandung, the historic 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in 1956. This Congress was important in many ways.<sup>26</sup> Taking the theoretical guidelines from its Party Congress, Soviet Union entered into the Afro-Asian arena and began to extend practical supports to the cause and interest of the non-aligned movement.

In 1956, Egypt, now independent and non-aligned State, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. Finally, President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Canal on July 26, 1956. In reaction to that, on October 29, the Anglo-French troops, with Israeli participation, launched armed attack on Egypt. The same day the Soviet Government issued a statement condemning Israel, Britain, and France of joint aggression on Egypt and warned of "the dangerous consequences that may follow from aggressive action."<sup>27</sup> The determined stand taken by the Soviet Union and its vigorous warning to the

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26. See Chapter-I.

27. New Times, no. 45, Supplement, 1956.

aggressors helped the Egyptian people safeguard their independence, and 'the imperialist gamble in Egypt came to an glorious end.'" 28

The Soviet Union also extended aid to revolutionary Cuba who lighted the torch of liberty under the very noses of the American imperialist. All counter revolutionary attempts against Cuba from foreign parts ended in failure in the face of firm stand of the Cuban people and the meaningful support of the Soviet Union.

Not only that, Soviet support to the cause of the non-aligned movement was extended inside the United Nations too. Of great significance for the liberation struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples has been the declaration on granting independence to colonial and semi-colonial people, adopted by the Fifteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly in December 1960, on the initiative of Soviet Union and of its allies. The Soviet draft declaration contained a demand "to grant immediately to all colonial countries, trusteeship territories and other non self-governing territories complete independence and freedom in the building up of their own national States in conformity with the freely expressed will and desire of their peoples. Colonial rule, colonial administration in all its

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28. Y. Zhukov (ed.), Op.cit., p. 266.

forms should be abolished completely so as to make it possible for the peoples of such territories to determine their destiny and form of government."<sup>29</sup>

Declaration on the granting independence to colonial countries and peoples exercised a powerful influence, stimulated colonial people to action, and fostered feelings of sympathy for their struggle in other countries. After getting the declaration adopted, the Soviet Union consistently worked for the implementation of the principles proclaimed therein.

The 15th UN General Assembly session was significant in the sense that it gave a new impetus to the growth and development of the non-aligned movement. During this session, all the prominent leaders of the movement assembled and expressed their opinions on the problems facing the world. Nehru, Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and Nkrumah held a special meeting in which they agreed to convene a Bandung type conference of all countries advocating non-alignment policy.

The meeting of the Casablanca powers in January 1961, further strengthen their feelings in convening the conference. Again, when President Tito met President Nasser in April 1961,

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29. Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly, Proposals by the USSR, September 23, 1960, New York, 1960, p. 88.

during the former's visit to the UAR, they finally took the decision to sound other non-aligned governments on the idea of a conference of non-aligned nations. The joint Communique issued at the end of this meeting between the two leaders held the view that consultations among the non-aligned countries are indispensable for consolidating world peace, safeguarding the independence of all nations and eliminating the danger of intervention in their affairs.<sup>30</sup>

Following the views and proposals of many non-aligned nations, the preparatory meeting was held in Cairo on June 5-12, 1961 to work out the agenda and the criteria for the issue of invitations to the proposed conference. Meeting was attended by representatives of Asian, African, European and Latin American States. The meeting drawn up the five point definition of non-alignment that states:

- (i) The country should have adopted an independent policy based on non-aligned and peaceful co-existence;
- (ii) the country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for national independence;
- (iii) it should not be a member of military pact in context of the East-West struggle;

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30. Text of Communique is given in Arab Observer, Cairo, 11(20), May 14, 1961, pp. 14-15.

- (iv) it should not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power in context of the East-West struggle; and
- (v) it should grant no military bases to foreign powers.<sup>31</sup>

The Belgrade Conference:

The first conference of the Head of the States or Government of non-aligned countries officially opened in Belgrade on September 1, 1961, attended by 25 members and three observers from Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador.

The Belgrade Conference took place in a complex international situation at the heat of the cold war. The attention of its participants was given to the pattern of preserving peace and averting the danger of a new world war. It was pointed out that "war between peoples constituted not only an anachronism but also a crime against humanity".<sup>32</sup> It rejected the view that war was inevitable and affirmed their faith that the "international community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch in human history", the principles of

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31. The Third World without superpowers, The Collected Documents of the Non-aligned Countries, vol. I, New York, 1978, p. 38.

32. Two Decades of the Non-alignment, Documents of the gathering of the non-aligned countries, 1961-82, Delhi, 1983, p. 5.

peaceful co-existence was emphasised as an alternative to "cold war and nuclear catastrophe".<sup>33</sup>

The statement on the danger of war and appeal for peace pointed to the already existing tension fraught with the possibility of a world war, which would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown. The conference sent message to the Heads of Government of the USSR and the USA and called on them to resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of any outstanding differences between them.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, the Belgrade Conference dealt with some important international issues that were the order of the day. These included the expression of solidarity with the struggle waged by the Algerian people for their freedom, self-determination and independence; the demand for the re-establishment of the right of the Arab people of Palestine; the denunciation of the repressive activities of the Portuguese colonialists in Angola; the demand for the withdrawal of French troops from Tunisia; denunciation of imperialist policy in the Middle-East and the policy of apartheid in South Africa; support for Cuban demands that the American base in Guantanam should be dismantled.

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33. Ibid.

34. Separate message had been issued to the Head of Government of USA and USSR, available in Documents of Belgrade Conference, ibid., p. 9.

Participants views colonialism as the source of conflict and wanted its earliest eradication.

Belgrade summit was the milestone in the history of the non-aligned movement. It gave a systematic, united and organic form to the movement. Apart from that, non-alignment as manifested at the conference, presented a "spark of fresh hope which resorted confidence... in that troublesome period".<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet's moves at this historic occasion was remarkable. While observing the composition of the conference, where out of its twenty-five members, five, Guinea, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Indonesia belonged to the Left, the Soviet Union saw a definite sign of co-operative stand between Socialist States and the non-aligned movement. To get this confirmed 'Khrushchev made direct approach to Yugoslavia and addressed letters to Nehru and Nasser' just on the eve of the conference.<sup>36</sup>

In the closing session, the conference addressed letters to the Heads of Government of the USSR and the USA saying that the non-aligned leaders were "distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the international

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35. Times, London, September 7, 1961.

36. See Indian Express, New Delhi, September 9, 1961.



situation and urged them to "resume negotiations on dividing issues and save the world from the danger of war."<sup>37</sup>

The letter to Khrushchev was brought by Nkrumah and Nehru. Premier Khrushchev responded well to the emissaries and said them that "in the world in these days many new important problems have come up and I will be glad to discuss them with you".<sup>38</sup>

Khrushchev in his reply to the letter of conference, described the view of his government as "concurring in many respects with the consideration set forth in the letter".<sup>39</sup> While giving full agreement to them he, too pointed out, 'talk would be useful only if statemen go to these talks with a serious desire and readiness and clearly realize that none can turn the tide of events which reflect the natural development of human society'.<sup>40</sup>

Soviet readiness to uphold the importance of the NAM and its first summit can be brought too by tracing the 1961 programme of CPSU in which it stated, "The national States

37. The Conference of the Heads of States or Government of Non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1961, p. 264.

38. Pravda, Sept. 7, 1961, p. 1; quoted in Naik, J.A., op.cit., p. 122.

39. 'Text of Reply', Times of India, Delhi, Sept. 24, 1961.

40. Ibid.

have become more active as an independent force on the world scene; objectively, revolutionary and anti-imperialist force. The countries and people that are now free from colonial oppression are to play a prominent part in the preservation of a new world war, the focal problem of today."<sup>41</sup> Indeed, behind such declaration and statements of support there lies the entire range of practical policies adopted by the Soviet Union in encouraging the movement during its formative period. The most crucial among these is the programme of aid and trade and general diplomatic support to the common issues, such as anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racialism.<sup>42</sup>

We have discussed above two distinct phases of Soviet policy towards the NAM.. The first phase was, indeed, not spectacular, but it may be regarded as probing exercise from either side. However, during the second phase, the non-aligned movement itself changed a process in which Soviet policy of support and encouragement to it did play significant role, the probing had ended. Both the sides saw a common interest in peace and development and

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41. Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, op.cit., p. 78.

42. Zafar Imam, 'Soviet Policy Toward Non-Alignment', in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed.), Prospect on Non-alignment, New Delhi, 1981, p. 218.

purposeful friendship. This was, indeed, a period when Soviet policy of support and encouragement to the non-aligned movement developed and a basis of common and convergent interests were found worth.

## **CHAPTER-III**

### **DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES DURING THE 60'S**

**Soviet policy towards major issues of the non-aligned movement - disarmament, decolonization, anti-racialism, and consolidation and security of the non-aligned movement. Significance of Cairo and Lusaka Conference.**

The Belgrade Conference formally launched the non-aligned movement. The movement was thus poised to play its role in world affairs and to come face to face with the complexity of international politics fast growing in the sixties. The policy orientation of the movement was quite clear, it was opposed to colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination; it was committed to general disarmament including nuclear disarmament and to world peace, it was against military blocs, establishment of bases in other countries and to use of force in dissolving disputes; and finally it has the aspirations for the socio-economic development of its members through their own chosen path. In general, it had the aspiration of bringing the two blocs nearer to negotiating table for dissolving world problems.

All the above objectives of the movement would certainly be considered as major issues of international politics during the sixties and after. It was precisely because of this that the translations of the above objectives into practice was not easy task for the NAM.

Moreover, by the mid sixties the very unity appeared to be jeopardized with regional conflicts like India-China war (1962), and Indo-Pak war (1965) were such symptoms. Moreover, some of the non-aligned members like Arab States were confronted with the explosive and volatile problem of Middle-East.

Looking at the scenario of international politics during the 60's the environment was certainly difficult for the non-aligned movement. Except, perhaps the Soviet Union and East European Socialist allies, suspicion and doubt about the usefulness of the movement was prevalent in the international dominating countries particularly, in the West.

The broad objectives of the NAM, as outlined above, certainly proved an attraction for the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that these were also in agreement with the objectives and goals of Soviet foreign policy. It was, thus, no mere coincidence that the founding trio of the NAM, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno, and later Nkrumah, were always appreciative of Soviet foreign policy towards the non-aligned movement.<sup>1</sup> The convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and non-aligned movement was, thus, obvious and the very basis of Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement can be seen in this light.

For the objective analysis of Soviet policy towards the NAM, we must investigate Soviet postures on the major issues in which movement was involved during the sixties. These major issues can be categorised as decolonization,

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1. These are the evident from important speeches of the foreign policy of non-aligned countries.

racism, disarmament and peace and development. It is because of the pre-occupation with these issues that the non-aligned movement developed further during the 60's being successes and failures for it. Unfolding of Soviet policy towards the movement during the sixties closely followed this pattern. We shall take these issues in sequence.

(1) Decolonization:

On the major issue of decolonization, the Soviet Union came out with a definite support and aid and kept on working along with the non-aligned countries. This can be said on the basis of speeches, statements and programmes issued time to time by the Soviet Union. For example, the draft of the 24th CPSU Congress says, "The goals of Soviet foreign policy consists in ensuring favourable international conditions for building Socialism and communism; in strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries; supporting the national liberation movement and engaging in all round co-operation with the young developing countries; consistently standing up for the principles of peaceful co-existence between States with different social system, giving a rebuff to the aggressive forces of socialism, and safeguarding mankind from another world war."<sup>2</sup>

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2. From the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress, March 1971, given in The CPSU Struggle for unity and Peace Forces, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 21.

To give a practical shape of the policy, the Soviet Union started working in combating colonialism and racism. Over the year, the Soviet Union offered moral and material support to the Algerian in its eight year struggle against France. Elsewhere in Africa, it aided one of the liberation movements in Rhodesia and supported the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in the struggle to free Namibia. In addition, Moscow also supported the African National Congress (ANC) fighting in South Africa. The Vietnamese fight in Indo-China, the popular Front for the liberation in Oman, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) struggle for homeland in Palestine, and revolutionary forces in Elsalvador are some of the examples of Soviet Union's active involvement in national liberation movement. Let us take up some of these cases here in judging actual position of Soviet policy towards the national liberation movement in general and toward the consolidation of security and stand of the non-aligned movement in particular.

In some of the earliest instances of Soviet involvement with the national liberation movement, the Soviet Union became the supporter of the Vietnam. Vietnamese fight against the French colonialism under the leadership of Hochi Minh was inspired and supported by the Soviet Union. At the 1954 Geneva Conference, convened after the decisive



French defeat at Dienbienphu, it supported a negotiated settlement for the region.<sup>3</sup> The Geneva accords resulted into the division of Vietnam into North and South. When the United States of America increased its commitment to the puppet regime of South Vietnam and 'dropped a bomb on North in 1965, the USSR declared her open support and threaten to send volunteers into combat'.<sup>4</sup> Further assessing the situation of the region, Leonid Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress declared, "The Soviet Union resolutely demands an end to the imperialist aggression against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Our country has been and will be an active champion of the just cause of the heroic peoples of Indo-China".<sup>5</sup>

The Popular Front for the liberation of Oman (PFLO) was significant for the levels of Soviet aid and support. The PFLO was created in 1964 to liberate its country from colonial sway. The Soviet Union, as it claimed the supporter the liberation struggle, provided maximum help to the movement. At the peak of hostilities in 1972 Moscow

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3. Carol A. Salvetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet Third World Relations, West View Press, 1985, p. 104.

4. Ibid.

5. L.I. Brezhnev, The CPSU Struggle for Unity Peace Forces, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 148.

gave arms and military training to the revolutionary forces and it continued to receive Soviet support in its struggle against the military presence of the USA and its allies.<sup>6</sup>

When PLO was given birth in 1964, the Soviet Union made an intension of its support to the just cause of the Palestine people. While continuing its commitment towards the movement of national liberation, 'it provided arms shipments to the Palestinian guarillas and referred to the Palestine Liberation Organization as a national liberation movement in 1969,<sup>7</sup> and recognized it as a true representative of its people.

During this period, USSR had sided with the non-aligned countries which fell victim to imperialist aggression and interference in its entire range of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The assistance of the Soviet Union enabled the people of Cuba to beat off the military provocation of the USA. The attempt to launch an attack at play a Giron was foiled and the USA was compelled to commit itself from attacks on Cuba.

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6. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Tass, June 18, 1982, pp. 7-8.

7. Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and Palestine Liberation Organization, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980, pp.7-8.

The Soviet Union also gave support to the popular government of Salvador Allende in Chile. She along with non-aligned countries assisted to ease the position of progressive government and peoples of Chile and expose and isolate ally, the Junta pinochet.

It would not be irrelevant here to deal with the case of Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu in India. Having exhausted all peaceful means for the liberation of these territories from Portuguese colonial rule, India directed its armed forces in December 1961 to take over these colonies and thus liberated them. Soon after receiving the news of the liberation of Portuguese colonial pockets in India, Khrushchev sent a message to Nehru in which he expressed his government's complete support to the Indian action. The message says:

"On behalf of the Soviet people, Soviet Government and myself, I send you, respected Mr. Prime Minister, your government and the people the warmest and sincere congratulations on the occasion of liberation of the age old Indian land - Goa, Daman, Diu - from the alien people and joining with the motherland.

... The determined action of the Government of India in liquidating the colonial pockets in its territory is completely lawful and rightful.

Soviet people unanimously support friendly India in this action and wish her every success in strengthening her independence." <sup>8</sup>

With almost all the same nature of problem Indonesia was facing. The Netherland, which ruled Indonesia Irian (known as New Guinea), tried to consolidate its separation from Indonesia by proposing in the UN in 1961 to grant it independence. But Indonesia was willing to reunify Indonesia - Irian with Indonesia. Relying on the support of the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries, Indonesia got the Netherland to conclude an agreement in 1962 on transferring to Indonesia's authority over Indonesia - Irian under temporary UN administration. In 1969, after free election in Indonesian Irian, the territory was reunited with Indonesia.

Middle East has been a smouldering focus of international tension. Israel with the help of its allies turned the region into hotbed. It applied unlawful means of war and aggression and occupied most of the lands of Arab peoples. The Arab peoples have been struggling for homeland and for the restoration of peace in the region. In their struggle and national liberation movement, the Soviet Union

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8. Pravda, December 22, 1961, p. 1. Extract is given in J.A. Naik, op.cit., p. 125.

offered maximum support both inside and outside the United Nations Organization.<sup>9</sup>

(2) Anti-Racialism:

Coming back to Soviet policy toward national liberation movement in Africa, it would be pertinent to trace out the situation prevailing in South Africa and thereby to investigate Soviet stands and approach mainly on anti-racial struggle launched by the UNO.

In South Africa's apartheid the United Nations has met with own anti-thesis. For apartheid repudiates almost universally everything that the United Nations stands for. It is not merely a 'form of racial discrimination',<sup>10</sup> it is also a system that permanently denies, "through laws, administrative decrees and practices... any role for the 19 million blacks (in South Africa) and confers on 4.5 million whites monopoly of economic, political and social powers".<sup>11</sup> Such a system, as stated by the International Court of Justice on Namibian issue, "is a violation of norm,

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9. For detail, see, Chapter-IV.

10. As general expression in the UN's General Assembly Declaration adopted in 1965.

11. Kadar Asmal, International Law and the Liquidation of Apartheid: Notes & Documents, Centre Against Apartheid, New York, October 1978, p. 1.

a rule, or standard of international community".<sup>12</sup> And, as the apartheid regime has over the years grown more aggressive both in its domestic and external policies, the world community has come to increasingly recognize the system to be a crime against humanity which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

On such a burning issue Soviet policy can be summarised by the statement made by Brezhnev: "There is no area in world politics where our party and the Soviet State would fail to work for justice, progress and peace. This is our approach to the struggle for freedom and democracy in distant Nicaragua and neighbouring Iran, to freedom struggle against racist oppression of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and ending apartheid in the Republic of South Africa."<sup>13</sup>

In fact, historical background explains the dynamism and determination of the Soviet Union in working with the General Assembly of the UNO to wage a war against colonial and racial domination world over. From early 1960 to 1970, the Soviet Union invariably stood up with the non-aligned

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12. International Court of Justice, Report 1971, Hague, p. 123.

13. Leonid I. Brezhnev, Pages from his life, Allied Publishers, Indian edition, 1979, p. 173.

states in UN debate on the issue of racism and white minority rule and channelized the world opinion in favour of peace, justice and anti-racialism. It is, therefore, no accident of history that between 1960-66 the United Nations adopted a resolution on granting of independence to colonial countries and also the covenants on elimination at terms of racial discrimination (1965), in which it (the UN General Assembly) declared that "any doctrine of differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous and that there is no justification for racial discrimination in theory and in practice anywhere."<sup>14</sup>

Due to its long spell of struggle the world body has been able to establish new rules of international law and practices regarding:

- (i) The right to self-determination and racial equality of all peoples and communities;
- (ii) the legitimacy of particular government that violates accepted laws of nations in regard to human rights;

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14. Extracts is given in Anirudha Gupta, 'South Africa, Human Rights and the United Nations', India Quarterly vol. XXXVIII, nos. 3 & 4, Jul-Dec. 1982, p. 335.

- (iii) the legality of the struggle by oppressed peoples of South Africa against apartheid; and
- (iv) extension of the struggle against apartheid to include those powers and multinational co-operations which support or collaborate with apartheid, and thus constitute the main liquidation of the racist regime.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, until the Soviet Union along with new Afro-Asian members dared to challenge old assumptions underlying different forms of racial and colonial domination, the basic direction of international law had continued to be governed by those very states which utilised military forces to suppress the desire for independence, emancipation and freedom of people. Its consistent effort brought a definite possibility of making world opinion strong against the racial crime in South Africa and elsewhere in the world.

(3) The Issue of Disarmament:

The struggle to end the arms race and achieve disarmament is one of the main tasks for preserving world

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15. Anirudha Gupta, ibid.



peace. The non-aligned movement has been striving for this goal since the very beginning of the movement. The role of the non-aligned movement in promoting disarmament was at its peak in the early 1960's perhaps both due to "the clan of the movement in its formative period and the intense cold war then raging."<sup>16</sup>

This has been also a major objective of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Explaining the stand of the Soviet Union on the issue, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Today, this objective is more vital than ever. Mankind is tired of sitting upon mountains of arms, yet the arms race spurred on by aggressive imperialist group is becoming more intensive."<sup>17</sup>

Since the end of Second World War, numerous proposals have been discussed in regard to the reduction of conventional and nuclear arms and to preserve the world peace. In making such proposals, the role played by the Soviet Union deserves to be verified.

In the first post-war years, for the first time in 1946 in the UN, the Soviet Union took the initiative to

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16. Kaushik, Brij Mohan, 'Non-alignment and Disarmament', Strategic Analysis, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, Delhi, Jan. 1985, p. 989.

17. Leonid Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress, Moscow, 1976, p. 41.

put forward proposals for the renunciation, for destruction of their stockpiles, for prohibiting the propaganda of war and for reduction of armaments and arm forces. The aim of these proposals was to strengthen the security of all nations and to halt the arms race. Resolution 1(1) was adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946, establishing an Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission was to report to the Security Council and to make specific proposals:

- (i) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
- (ii) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
- (iii) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons adopted to mass destruction; and
- (iv) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against hazards of violation and evasion.<sup>18</sup>

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18. Official Records of the General Assembly, first session, Extract given in Julie Dahlitz, Nuclear Arms Control, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 11.

After 1948, history of armament and its control took different shape when the Soviet Union was coming out with one proposal after another, for disarmament and prohibition of atomic weapons, the Western countries took it as a sign of weakness on the part of the Soviet Union as one did not at that time possess nuclear weapons. And so the Soviet Union produced its own atomic weapons in September 1949. According to some scholars, the Soviet Union was compelled under those circumstances to produce its atomic bomb, to be able to defend itself, to ward off and put an end to the US atomic blackmail.<sup>19</sup>

Even after manufacturing its own atom bombs, the Soviet Union continued to take active participation for banning the production of nuclear weapons and for destroying the stockpiles already made.

But Soviet policy to associate India and other non-aligned nations in talks with the big powers on Asian issues and disarmament question had developed in the post Stalin days. The initiative and willingness of the Soviet Government to associate non-aligned states with disarmament talks, in a sense, was landmark of its seriousness of purpose.

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19. For example, see, N. Ranganathan, Nuclear Holocaust or World Peace, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, p.42.

In the midst of the Suez crisis, the Soviet Union issued a statement on November 17, 1956 on "Disarmament and reduction of international tension" in which it put forth its proposal for simultaneous reduction of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their existing stocks. To carry out this disarmament task, it called a conference of the Big Four plus India and stated that such a summit should lead to a further bigger conference in which representatives of the Warsaw and NATO countries would participate along with those of India and the Peoples Republic of China.<sup>20</sup>

As the Western leaders rejected the Soviet Government's proposal, the conference was not held.

On January 8, 1958, Bulganin addressed a letter to Nehru, along with one to Nasser, in which the Soviet Premier made a well-thought out move of acquainting his government's disarmament proposal to the non-aligned leaders.<sup>21</sup> Further he made the suggestion that a conference of such non-aligned nations as India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Australia be convened to consider the deteriorating situation in the world and hoped that the result of such a

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20. New Times, no. 48, Supplement, 1958.

21. Full text of the letter was published in Pravda, January 15, 1958.

meet of the non-aligned countries would contribute to the solution of the problem.

The real business for disarmament started during this period in the disarmament committee appointed by the UN General Assembly. The Fourteenth UN General Assembly session appointed a Ten Nations Disarmament Committee. Due to opposition of the leading Western powers the non-aligned countries were not included in that Committee.<sup>22</sup> The Soviet Union was not satisfied with the composition of the Committee members and so in May 1960 the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee was wrecked by the withdrawal of Soviet delegation from it.

Behind such a move, the main motto of the Soviet Union was to get involved the non-aligned states by their active participation in the issues like disarmament so that a meaningful solution could be derived. With this purpose the Soviet delegation proposed, at the Sixteenth UN General Assembly session in November 1961, the appointment of a fresh UN Committee with the inclusion of non-aligned members in it. Finally, the Soviet purpose was

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22. News and Views from the Soviet Union, no. 27, 1957, pp. 5-7.

materialized when the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was formed with inclusion of five Warsaw Treaty powers, Five NATO powers and eight non-aligned States.<sup>23</sup>

Though many obstacles had been placed by the West in pushing back the progress of eighteen member disarmament committee, however, the consistent efforts of the Soviet Union, its allies and the non-aligned States brought a major achievement on August 5, 1963 when 'The Test Ban Treaty' was signed by U.K., USA and Soviet Government.

After the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, a series of statements and negotiations were held to reduce the fear psychosis of nuclear war. In 1964 unilateral statements were issued by nuclear holding powers regarding reduction of fissionable materials production. On April 20, 1964, Premier Khrushchev made a statement in which he said:

"... having carefully weighed up all the data relating to the nuclear potentials of the Soviet Union, on the one hand and, the nuclear power member of NATO on the other, the Soviet Government has taken the following decisions:

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23. These eighteen members were: The USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the USA, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, India, the UAR, Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico and Sweden.

- (i) To stop straitway the construction of two new large atomic reactors for the production of plutonium;
- (ii) during the next few years to reduce substantially the production of uranium-235 for nuclear weapons; and
- (iii) to allocate accordingly more fissionable materials for peaceful uses in atomic power stations, medicine and in the implementation of major scientific-technical project including the distillation of sea water.<sup>24</sup>

The above statement reflects the desire and willingness of Soviet Government to achieve the goal of peace and to keep mankind out of danger from nuclear holocaust. This can be confirmed by investigating various Soviet proposals and initiatives during the entire period of 1960-70.

Among other treaties on arms control and disarmament 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', signed in July 1968, is of great importance. The treaty affirmed that "the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind

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24. Documents on Disarmaments 1964, United States Arms control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1965. Excerpt is given in Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control Agreement, SIIPRI, Praeger, 1983, p. 143.

by nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such war and to take measures to safeguard the security of people."<sup>25</sup>

In bringing all such treaties, proposals and negotiations, the role played by Soviet Union was purposeful. It had been striving to put an end to the nuclear arms race, to freeze production of nuclear weapons as a first step to proceed further on reduction of such weapons already manufactured. In this process, it took help and support from its socialist allies and non-aligned states both inside and outside the UN forum.

Thus, the Soviet policy on disarmament was directed in a way that it drew support and sympathy from non-aligned movement throughout the period. It may even be argued that such a Soviet policy on disarmament made the non-aligned movement more and more conscious on this vital issue.

#### The Cairo and the Lusaka Conference (1964-1970):

After analysing Soviet policy and its action on vital issues of the non-aligned movement, it would be pertinent now to bring out main contents of the declarations of two

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25. Treaty series, vol. 729, United Nations, New York, Excerpt is available in Jozeb Golbat, ibid., p. 158.



summits made by the non-aligned movement in Cairo (1964) and Lusaka (1970) respectively. This would give us clarity as to what extent the Soviet policy and its action matched basic task of the NAM in the trouble torn period. And thereby to verify the hypothesis that there was a wide range of convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the non-aligned movement during the period under study.

The second conference of the NAM held in Cairo on October 5-10, 1960 was represented by 41 non-aligned countries and 9 observers of different parts of the globe. The conference reiterated adherence to the principles and goals of the movement as formulated in the declaration of the first summit, and adopted the programme for peace and international co-operation.

Elaborating on the declaration of the Belgrade Conference and citing resolutions, delegates declared that the only possible way to strengthen peace was the peaceful co-existence of the States with different social and political system on the basis of fundamental principles laid down at the time of the conference.

Compared with the first conference, the non-aligned countries outlined in greater detail their attitude to the problems of eliminating the vestings of colonialism and liberating the peoples from foreign domination. The

Conference came to conclusion that "colonialised people may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations."<sup>26</sup> They also said that the participating countries recognized the national movement of the peoples as being authentic representatives of the colonial peoples. In other words, the non-aligned countries formalised the right of the national liberation movements to armed struggle and, after recognizing these movements as the sole representatives of their peoples, gave them an opportunity to take part in the non-aligned movement.

First time in the Cairo Conference, proposal for peace zones was put forward.<sup>27</sup> It also called upon all States to accede to Moscow Treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons, and to abide by its provisions in the interest of peace and welfare of humanity.<sup>28</sup>

In regard to problems pertaining to the struggle waged by the national liberation movements the conference adopted prominent resolution and pledged to eradicate all

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26. Two Decades of Non-alignment, op.cit., p. 18.

27. Ibid., p. 22

28. Ibid., p. 23.

vestings of colonialism and to combine all their efforts to render all necessary aid and support to the peoples struggling against colonialism and neo-colonialism. For instance, in the first section of the programme for peace and international co-operation the conference sharply censured all types of colonialist and imperialist policy supported the efforts of the organization of African unity to establish peace in Congo, denounced Portugal's colonialist policy and called for the rupture of diplomatic relations with that country. Censure was passed on the policy pursued by the racist minority in Rhodesia, while the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination and independence was reiterated. The conference confirmed the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland and declared its utmost support for their liberation struggle. It also expressed their support for the UN resolution on sanction against South Africa and for the first time called on all countries to break diplomatic, consular and other relations with the South African racist.

Thus, we find that the Cairo Conference of non-aligned movement shaped a more viable form of action in regard to peace, disarmament and decolonization. Its dedication and commitment to the common cause of mankind became apparent and so they were ready to give a daring fight to every source of tension prevailing in the world.

After the Cairo, the non-aligned summit was supposed to be held in 1967. But due to various pressing problems faced by non-aligned countries at that time, meeting was not held on stipulated time. After a gap of six years, the member countries got together in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, in 1970. The third conference of the Heads of the State and Government of non-aligned countries was, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the participants, a great success. Present in the South African country, surrounded on almost all by the colonial possessions of Portugal and Rhodesian racialists, were 63 delegations (nine of them as observers) - more than at the former similar meetings in Belgrade and Cairo.

In the "Declaration of peace, independence, economic development, co-operation and democratization of international relations"<sup>29</sup> the delegations formulated the basic aims of their policy; the ensuring of world peace and peaceful co-existence through strengthening the role of the UN; abolition of colonialism and racialism which deny equality of people and dignity of man; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the ending of arms drive and subsequent total disarmament; the struggle for economic independence

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29. Two Decades of Non-alignment, op.cit., p. 45.

and co-operation among states on the basis of equality and mutual advantage.

The conference, emphatically denounced the US aggression in Indo-China and Israeli aggression in the Middle East. A resolution on Middle East calls for an immediate evacuation of the Israeli troops from the seized territories. "The occupation of the territory of three sovereign and non-aligned countries is as impermissible as the continuation of the policy of the scandalous use of force and of occupied territories for imposing solution,"<sup>30</sup> the resolution says.

A strong blow was dealt by the conference to the last bastion of colonialism in the South of Africa. Solidarity with the fighters for independence was one of the main features of the Lusaka Conference which was attended and addressed by representatives of many detachments of the anti-colonial movement. The delegates sharply and indignantly censured the Vorster and Smith regimes and the Portuguese colonial authority and their patrons. The non-aligned countries, says a resolution on apartheid and racial discrimination, condemned all those countries, especially the United States, France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and Japan for their political, economic and

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30. Ibid., p. 50

military co-operation with the South African Government, co-operation which encouraged that government in the pursuit of its racialist policy.<sup>31</sup>

The Conference pointed out the special responsibility of Britain for the existence and consolidation of the illegal regime to Rhodesia because London refused to adopt effective measures against the racialist government of Ian Smith. A decision was taken to give all round aid to the liberation forces of South Africa. The Conference placed concrete suggestions:

- (i) That measures be taken for more rapidly and fully carrying out the UN resolution on the liquidation of colonialism adopted ten years ago;
- (ii) that a programme be elaborated for the coming decade for economic development and for combating the arms race; and
- (iii) that the Indian Ocean be declared a peace zone and others.

The non-aligned countries once again came out in favour of the United Nations being a universal organization and demanded that the German Democratic Republic, the

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31. Ibid., p. 52

Korean People's Democratic Republic and Democratic Republic of Vietnam be presented in that organization.

In this way, Lusaka Conference was a milestone in strengthening and consolidating the position of non-aligned movement. The numerous prediction of the imperialist press to the effect that the policy of non-alignment had "died in Dares Salam (the preparatory meeting was held there in April 1970) and would be buried in Lusaka", were completely upset.<sup>32</sup> The Lusaka Conference had confirmed and strengthened the progressive tradition of the policy directed toward peace, security throughout the world, ensuring national sovereignty and economic growth of the developing countries. The emergence of the majority of the States represented in Lusaka was due to the anti-colonial revolution that swept throughout the revolutionary forces of the day.

Soviet response to both these non-aligned conferences was characteristic and in accordance with its policy and practice shaped throughout the period. When the Cairo Conference was opened in 1964, Soviet leaders encouraged the participants by giving extraordinary moral boost up and

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32. V. Korovikov, Lusaka: And Important Landmark, Pravda, Sept. 18, 1970.

congratulating it for the success of the conference. Addressing the Chairman of the Cairo Conference, the Head of the Soviet Government wrote that the people of the world rallying to "destroy the hot-beds of military conflagrations and subdue the madman who are trying to push the world into a thermo-nuclear catastrophe. The peoples are filled with determination to uphold the policy aimed at relaxing international tension, to pluckout the roots of colonial oppression and exploitation, and to secure a peaceful settlement of outstanding international problem." <sup>33</sup>

Again in his message to the Lusaka Conference, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Minister wrote, "In pursuing an anti-colonialist and anti-racialist course the conference in Lusaka can make a contribution to the improvement of the international situation, to the struggle for the removal from international relations of all elements that threatened the general peace, freedom and independence of people." <sup>34</sup>

These messages certainly underscored continuing Soviet commitment towards the non-aligned movement and its ideas. The fact that this was in sharp contrast to the Western responses to the conferences, was certainly not lost the adherence of the movement.

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33. Extract is given in Rias Tuzmukhamedov, Soviet Union & Non-aligned Nations, Allied Publishers, 1976, p. 24.

34. Ibid., p. 25.



Apart from Soviet postures on major objectives of the NAM, there were other important indications of continuing Soviet commitment. The most important was the fact that during the sixties Soviet economic aid and military assistance programme for the Third World became more and more concentrated on the active member of the non-alignment.<sup>35</sup> For an instance, during the latter part of sixties India, Egypt, and Indonesia received a large share of Soviet aid and military assistance.

After coup d'etat in Indonesia in 1965 other active non-aligned members like India, Syria, Iraq became major recipient of Soviet aid.

We have already discussed Soviet role in various crises in which active non-aligned members like India and Egypt were involved. Moreover, there were marked convergence of voting pattern in the United Nations and its various agencies in which USSR and non-aligned countries worked together on major global and regional issues.<sup>36</sup>

Beside also during sixties that bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the active members of non-aligned

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35. See Zafar Iman, Towards a model relationship: A study of Soviet treaties with India and other Third World countries, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 21-25.

36. For instance see Richard L. Jackson, The Non-alignment the UN & the Superpowers, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.

movement like Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania became close and extremely friendly. Thus, the grounds were laid in series of friendship and co-operation treaties that the Soviet Union entered later in the 70's with India, Egypt, Iraq and other Third World countries. This is interesting to note that in all these treaties Soviet support and commitment to the non-aligned movement reiterated.

From the above, it can be safely concluded that the sixties marked a continuing commitment of support and encouragement to the non-aligned movement from the Soviet Union. In fact, it became one of the important hallmark of the Soviet policy toward Third World.

However, it does appear that the Soviet Union did begin to consider non-aligned movement as lenient towards it. One indication here was Soviet idea of collective security in Asia first proposed in 1969.<sup>37</sup> For the cool response from the most of the non-aligned countries of Asia and growing the global tensions that erupted in first half of seventies (for example, Bangladesh war of 1970 and Middle East war of 1973) did appear as a corrective. However, Soviet policy of support and encouragement to the non-aligned movement particularly to its active adherents further developed in the seventies.

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37. For detail see, Chapter-IV.

## **CHAPTER-IV**

### **THE USSR AND PROBLEMS OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT**

**Pressure from the West on the Non-alignment, wide ranging problem of economic development and security of the non-aligned countries, as for example, Middle East crisis, etc.**

In earlier two chapters we have investigated the origin and development of Soviet policy towards the NAM during the period under study. We have pointed out that the development of Soviet policy was in fact an exercise in an application of Soviet framework of such a policy which we have discussed earlier in Chapter-I. We have also seen that Soviet policy developed in close parallel with the development of non-aligned movement itself and thus a basis of common and convergent interests between the USSR and the NAM began to be marked.

However, it would be incorrect to consider Soviet policy simply as a response and reaction to policies and programmes of the non-aligned movement and its leading and active members. It was also a policy based on the problems of the movement as perceived by the Soviet policy-maker and to make use of it for their own interest. For instance, once the USSR took the view that the NAM is viable third force in international politics representing aims and aspiration, a force whose interest coincided with those of Soviet Union, it was logical for the Soviet policy-maker to strengthen and encourage it. Later, by the end of seventies it did appear that the Soviet Union wanted the NAM to be drawn closer to itself and its allies and away from its main adversaries with capitalist system.

Such an aspect of Soviet policy toward the NAM would become clear, if we investigate various important problems which the NAM began to face during the course of development until the close of the sixties.

As it is obvious from our earlier chapter some of the major problems that the NAM faced during the period under study can be categorized:

- (i) Hostility and growing pressure from the West;
- (ii) regional conflicts and bilateral tension affecting the unity and strength of the movement; and
- (iii) growing concern for security and development felt by the members of the movement.

It may be pointed out that these problems may be considered as distinct from the major issues, global and regional, that came up before the movement during this period. As a matter of fact, the problems enumerated above were really internal problems generated by the movement itself.

The non-aligned States formed a united front only on certain issues. There were many disagreements and variations of non-alignment both between and within these nations, at different periods and different circumstances.

With the course of events followed in this period marked by drift and distrust for many NAM members. While more States and potential recruits to the NAM gained independence, they brought new problems as well. Military coups, particularly in Africa, became common place underscoring the vulnerability of political structures. Territorial conflict erupted between NAM members in Sahara, West Africa, South Asia and other part of Africa. Nigeria was torn by civil war. Colonial unrest continued in Southern Africa. In Middle East, Israel's attack on frontier states in 1967 compounded existing divisions and bitterness. India's tension with neighbouring States affected the potentiality and strength of the NAM. The series of events that took place during the period certainly set a pattern of mistrust and doubt between the countries of non-aligned movement.

The high point of their unity was on colonial and racial issues. As with the pace of time, the movement was getting accelerated against the West for their colonial policies, the pressure from the Western powers also becoming apparent. U.S. military action in the Dominican Republic in 1965, French's, Britain's and Portuguese's unwillingness to leave their colonial sway in Africa, continuing great powers' involvement in Congo crisis, Israel's attack on

the countries of Middle East and intensification of Vietnam war became source of tension. All the same time, the Western bloc remained active in diluting and diverting the purpose of the movement and tried to bring more Afro-Asian States under its orbit of military groupism on the pretext of their national security and economic development.

We shall now examine Soviet policy on these problems in a logical sequence so as to understand overall Soviet policy towards the movement.

#### Sino-Indian War (1962):

While starting with a brief glance of Soviet policy on Sino-Indian border conflict, it is important to mention that this conflict posed a serious challenge and threat to the very existence of the NAM. It brought its enemies and friends on the surface and put a question mark on its long existing out-look of global politics. And this is also to say that on this issue Soviet policy faced an uneasy dilemma of fraternalism and friendship. Being a Communist country, China was treated by the Soviet Union as fraternal and co-partner of world communist revolution and non-aligned countries like India was no more than a friend in its political strategy. Even then, it was a matter of choice

between right and wrong and an appropriate time to evaluate its own policy in maintaining consistency toward the cause of movement.

With the genesis of co-operation and conflict between India and China, Soviet policy had been active to give a positive direction to their relations. When in 1954 the Government of two countries, India and China negotiated the Panchsheel agreement, Soviet Union was the first to endorse it and to acknowledge with a sense that the agreement would bring peace and prosperity in Asia. But unfortunately this high hope proved temporal when "China started from 1956 onwards to nibble at Indian territory, to use force to establish their so-called claims on Indian territory and refused to discuss matters across the table, peacefully and through peaceful negotiations."<sup>1</sup>

In mid 1959 several skirmishes took place between Indian and Chinese patrols along the Himalayan border which brought to the world's attention the existence of dispute between Asia's two big nations. The first official Soviet comment appeared in Tass bulletin of September which said:

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1. T.N. Kaul, 'A modern example of imperialism', in China Vietnam and non-alignment, Krishna Menon Society, New Literature, Delhi, July 1979, pp. 9-10.



"The Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship... friendly co-operation between the USSR and India is successfully developing in keeping with the idea of peaceful co-existence... Its (the dispute's) inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful co-existence between States with different social system and prevent the strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity in the struggle for consolidation of national independence." <sup>2</sup>

Of course, with the use of phrases like 'fraternal friendship' and 'friendly co-operation' created a sense of doubt among Indian intellectuals and viewed that the Soviet Union was lenient towards China. But the fact that the Soviet intention was not contrary to the interest of India, a non-aligned country. This can be confirmed with the basis of fact that at the time of border dispute between India and China flared up, the Soviet had agreed to provide India some helicopters, which were clearly meant to be used in the Sino-Indian border regions. Over and above this the Soviet Union had entered into an agreement with India to sell a squadron of MiG-21 fighter planes to her and to assist for their manufacture in India. <sup>3</sup>

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2. Pravda, September 10, 1959

3. J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy Toward India, op.cit., p. 153.

No doubt, some variations in Soviet policy over the issue is also seen. But these must be observed in context of prevailing international situation at that time.

On October 1962, Soviet official paper Pravda published an editorial which spoke of "notorious Mc Mohan line" and supported Chinese stands for the end of conflict describing them as "constructive".<sup>4</sup>

This pro-Chinese statement issued by the Soviet Union at the time when the Cuban crisis erupted. United States of America blocked Cuba and posed a serious threat of nuclear war. It was the first major crisis which the world had seen at the screen of international affairs after Second World War. Soviet policy faced an adverse situation. Realizing the potentiality of threat, it needed help from all Socialist States and with this reason it refrained to annoy China for its support to India. For China, it was well-wished opportunity in fulfilling its aggressive plan over Indian territory. It did so, but in absence of Soviet presence in the region.

The flame of war continued for a week. Meanwhile, Cuban crisis was resolved. When Soviet Union turned to the Asian conflict it found China responsible for war. Taking

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4. Pravda, October 25, 1962.

the note of China's unlawful activities, the Soviet Union severely criticised China as an aggressor. In an official report, a Soviet ideologist Suslov remarked: "It is fact that when the Carribian crisis was at its hieght the PRC government extended the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian frontiers. No matter how the Chinese leaders try to belately justify their behaviour at that moment they cannot escape their responsibility for the fact that by their action they essentially helped the extreme reactionary circles of imperialism, thereby aggravating an already complicated and dangerous situation in the world."<sup>5</sup>

Finally, after loss of men and materials, the conflict was put out. It is presumed that China stopped her war with India, as she started it, on the basis of her own policy. But there is reason to believe that the Soviet Government did try to bring an early end to Sino-Indian war, and it appears, put some pressure on China toward this end.<sup>6</sup>

#### Indo-Pak War of 1965:

After Sino-Indian border conflict, the conflict between India and Pakistan took place in 1965. The long

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5. Suslov's report on "Struggle of CPSU for the unity of World Communist Party", New Times, no. 15, Supplement, 1964, p. 49.

6. J.A. Naik, op.cit.

existing mistrust and doubt between the two neighbouring States took an ugly shape and provided a ground for imperialist powers to convert the Asian land into a land of battle and war.

Indo-Pak border conflict had an adverse affect on the infra-structure of the NAM. Most of the Arab countries manifested a pro-Pak attitude during Indo-Pak war.<sup>7</sup> Even Nasser could not escape this criticism. During the war, the attitude of Nasser was criticised by some Indian opposition leaders for showing pro-Pak attitude. However, Nasser's attitude was favourable to India, when compared to other Arab countries. In Casablanca summit-conference of Arab States held from September 13 to 17, 1965, Nasser opposed all moves to brand India as "aggressor", and refused to accept pro-Pak reference in Joint Communique. He had taken the same view at the UN also.<sup>8</sup>

Analysing the entire background of Asian politics and scenario of the NAM, the Soviet Union once again came forward with a policy to end the war and to restore peace in the region. Soviet's involvement and its role on the issue needs to be clarified so much so to allocate its hindsight interests and mottos.

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7. T.S. Subba Rao, Non-alignment in International Law & Politics, Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1981, p. 79.

8. Rahman, M.M., The Politics of Non-alignment, New Delhi, 1963, p. 231.

In 1964, Soviet leadership was changed. Khrushchev and Bulganin were replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin team. Though new leadership had no such constraints like Cuban crisis, Sino-India border conflict or a direct conflict with the West which Khrushchev had to face. As detente in Europe was brought after 1962, the way for Brezhnev was clear. However, its policy in context of Asian region needed tactical steps. Chinese collaboration with U.S. imperialism and her target to root-out Soviet hold from Asia was entirely a new development in international politics. Soviet policy on this part of globe may be seen in this background of politics.

As the Soviet Union occupied the fact that China was no more its ally and from the Chinese policy it came to be realized that China with USA was trying to bring Asia into a orbit of imperialist operation, it added a new approach to its policy in dealing with Asian issues. In accordance with this new approach Pakistan was taken into confidence for its meaningful relations with that country. The main intention behind this policy was to take Pakistan away from US military network and thereby to restore peace and trust in the continent.<sup>9</sup>

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9. For an interesting discussion on the subject, see, J.P. Jain, Soviet Policy Toward Pakistan & Bangladesh, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1974, Chapter-IV.

By 1965, the Soviet Union had achieved a considerable success in its long-cherished aim of establishing an understanding with Pakistan without undermining the decade old cordial relations with India. The Soviet policy of friendship with both of the countries came to be tested during 1965 war.

In September 1965, when an armed conflict between India and Pakistan erupted, the Soviet Premier Kosygin sent message to both Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri pleading for the 'immediate cessation of military operation'. Kosygin pleaded that "in the present grave situation, the main emphasis should not be placed on the question of the cause of conflict or of ascertaining who is right who is wrong. The main effort should be concentrated on halting the tank and silencing the gun".<sup>10</sup> He expressed also the willingness of Soviet Government to lend its good offices in this matter if parties so desired.

Subsequently, a Soviet scholar, I. Belyaev, also made a plea for ending the conflict "as it is a war between two peoples who were one people and lived in one country. India before it was divided in 1947", Belyaev added, "must

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10. Pravda, September 12, 1965.

not be allowed outside forces to use religion to play one against the other to serve their own vested interest".<sup>11</sup>

With a interest of restoring peace and stability on the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet Union took initiative to bring the two warring nations to the negotiating table. Finally, these two countries met at Taskent from January 3 to 10, 1966 to end the gunbattle and to conclude reliable peace treaty.

Indeed, the Soviet Union played a significant role in bringing about agreement between India and Pakistan which was eventually signed by them on January 10, 1966. This declaration had two fold objects - firstly the immediate resumption of normal friendly relations between India and Pakistan, and, secondly, to evolve a procedure for settlement of all disputes between them through peaceful means. As Kosygin remarked that "It laid down the real foundation for a creation of peace in the most important area of Asia."<sup>12</sup> And so it was a meaningful effort in realization of friendly relations between and among Asian States.

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11. Cited by Bhagat Vats, Foreign Intrigues Against India, New Delhi, 1967, p. 137.

12. Soviet Review, New Delhi, January 14, 1966.

Moreover, Taskent represented a great diplomatic victory for Moscow vis-a-vis both China and the USA, Peking in particular. It made the Soviet presence felt in the Indian subcontinent and confirmed the status of the USSR as an Asian power. While the Chinese image was tarnished as one of a mischief maker, that of the Soviet Union, as a peace-maker, received a boost.<sup>13</sup> As a result, Soviet influence was greatly enhanced in the entire Indian subcontinent and Moscow was able to consolidate its ties with India and Pakistan.

#### The Middle East Crisis:

The international situation in the Middle East in this period was marked by two basic trends: firstly, by the further unfolding of the liberation movement and the consolidation of the independence of Middle East countries, and, secondly, by increasing interference on the part of the Western powers with the object of enslaving the Middle East countries.

The Western powers viewed the Middle East as a key strategic area. They feared that the consolidation of Arab

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13. J.P. Jain, Soviet Policy Towards India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, op.cit., p. 82.



National independence would impede their plans and end the undivided region of their oil monopolies. They were, therefore, eager to crush the liberation movement. The Western powers expected to achieve their goals by creating military bloc. Britain assumed the initiative. In 1955, it formed the Baghdad Pact, making a politico-military alliance between Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Pakistan and Iran.

Though United States of America did not enter the bloc, but behind the scenes American diplomats helped to found the Baghdad alignment and later collaborated with many of its organs, particularly with military commission. Through this pact, Western powers built up a massive pressure on independent States of the region which followed the line of non-alignment and non-aligned principles.

By middle of 1960's, Middle East became the centre of tension and war. Aggressive policy adopted by Israel posed a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Arab peoples particularly of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. The war of 1967 is one of the example reveals how Zionist Israel with the collaboration of Western allies was prepared to annex the independent States of Arab peoples.

In all its manner and character the Middle East crisis was different from those of the conflicts like Indo-Pak, Iran-Iraq and Ethiopia-Somalia. As Prof. Zafar Iman puts

it, "in essence it is not seen as a characteristic crisis of Third World, arising out of the border conflict, historical animosities, irrendist claims, it has qualitatively different ramifications."<sup>14</sup> According to him, this ramification is linked with Soviet's classification of world politics, i.e., the clash between two systems, socialism and capitalism-imperialism, and the clash between national liberation movement and colonial, neo-colonial powers.

Beyond the above, there may be some other factors, but the theme is by this conflict and war the very existence of non-aligned movement in the region was badly threatened. The non-aligned countries were anxious for the early solution of the problems. In all its conferences from Belgrade to Lusaka, the movement expressed serious concern towards the issues and made effort to unite and fight for peace and independence and against war and aggression.

Soviet policy toward Middle-East and on its issues and problems was not different from that of its policy toward non-aligned movement as such.

In 1948, the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize Israel. However, it was done on the

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14. Zafar Imam, 'Soviet View of Superpower Rivalry in the Third World Today: The Middle East Model', in The USSR in Transition, issues and themes, edited by R.R. Sharma, Atlantic Publication & Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, p. 89.

consideration that the Jewish struggle was anti-imperialist and it was directed against Britain, then the leading imperialist power already playing a key role in cold war politics.<sup>15</sup>

As Israel began to show its real face of aggression and bellicosity, the Soviet Union took itself away from Israel and finally in 1951 it broke off even formal diplomatic relations. From early fifties, it began to tilt toward the Arab world.

The role of the Soviet Union as supporter of the Arab countries was especially apparent in 1956 at the time of the British, French and Israeli aggression against Egypt. In its declaration of October 31, 1956, the Soviet Government vigorously condemned the aggression. During the discussion on this question in the Security Council and at the special session of the UN General Assembly, the representative of the Soviet Union supported Egypt's for an immediate end to this aggression and thus strengthened the hand of non-aligned movement.<sup>16</sup>

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15. Gromyko's speech in the U.N. General Assembly, Nov. 26, 1947, extract is given in The USSR & Middle East, Documents, Moscow, 1972, pp. 42-50.

16. For general survey of the Soviet involvement in the Middle East, see Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East, New York, Macmillan, 1969.

After the failure of the Suez affairs, the next victim of imperialist policy was Syria. In 1957 the direct threat of armed intervention hung over Syria. Taking the note of this development, the Soviet Union tried to expose these aggressive designs against Syria and assured its support and help to that country in its fight for independence and security.

A new attempt by the colonial forces to resort the position they had lost in the Arab East made in 1958, when United States landed troops in Lebanon, and Britain landed troops in Jordan. Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan was in turn a preparation for armed intervention in Iraq to restore the reactionary regime over thrown by the Iraqi people. In this situation, the Soviet Union defended with determination the interest of the Arab peoples.<sup>17</sup>

Imperialist and Zionist pressure continued to resort to the most devious and subversive activities in order to paralyse the Arab struggle for liberation. Political blackmail, economic pressure, the organization of mutinies and anti-governmental conspiracies, the continuing provocations by Israel against neighbouring Arab States kept on increasing.

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17. Problems of Third World - A short collection of Foreign Policy Documents, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.7.

In course of number of years, a broad and new aggression was made on June 5, 1967 against the Arab countries, chiefly against the progressive and non-aligned States in the front line of Arab Liberation Movement - Egypt, Iraq and Syria. This was inspired by imperialist powers and executed by Israel.

At the eve of attack, the Soviet Union issued a statement saying, "Today, June 5, 1967, Israel began military operation against the United Arab Republic, thus forming an act of aggression. The armed forces of the UAR are fighting against the Israeli forces that have invaded the territory of the UAR... The Soviet Union, true to its policy of aiding peoples who are victims of aggression and States that have freed themselves from colonial oppression, declares its determined support of the governments and peoples of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Jordan and other Arab States and expressed confidence in the success of their just struggle for their independence and sovereign rights." <sup>18</sup>

Condemning aggression on the part of Israel, the USSR demanded of the Israeli Government to cease military

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18. Statement of the Soviet Government, in a Short Collection of Foreign Policy Documents, USSR & Arab World, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.

operation against the Arab States as a first and urgent measure to the solution of military conflict.

In an another statement issued by the Soviet Union and its allies on November 27, 1969 expressed their concern over Middle East crisis and declared, "The peoples of the world must force Israel to withdraw her troops from the conquered Arab territories. Without the settlement of this question there can be no firm and just peace in the area. Together with other questions, the question of guaranteeing the legitimate rights and interest of the Arab people of Palestine, who are waging a courageous national liberation anti-imperialist struggle, must also fairly be resolved."<sup>19</sup>

With the help of above mentioned stands and statements, one can reach on conclusion that the Soviet policy on Middle East crisis was directed in support of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle launched in this period. Expressing his view, Prof. Zafar Imam also writes, "The historical origin of Soviet policy in the Middle East is the consistent Soviet claim for supporting and encouraging Arab movements against imperialism. This historical origin indeed has influenced the very framework of Soviet policy toward the Middle East."<sup>20</sup>

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19. Ibid., p. 151

20. Zafar Imam, Soviet View of Superpower Rivalry in the Third World, Middle East Model, op.cit., p. 94.

Yet while there has been agreement that the Soviet Union plays an important role in the Middle East, no such consensus exists as to the USSR's goal in the region. Some Western observers contended that the main Soviet goal is an offensive one<sup>21</sup> - to dominate the Middle East in order to deny its oil, strategic communication routes, and other asserts to the United States and its allies. A contrary to this view holds that the Soviet aim is primarily defensive, to prevent the region from being used as a base for an attack upon the Arab peoples and the USSR. The other hypotheses place Soviet objectives somewhere between these two.<sup>22</sup> The Soviet leaders themselves have justified their activities in terms of its proximity to the southern border of the USSR and in terms of their responsibility as leaders of the world revolutionary and national liberation movements. Whatever the ultimate goal of Soviet policy - here we see it basically as defensive. To this end the USSR extended large amounts of economic aid, together with military assistance and diplomatic support, to a number of Middle East States in an effort to independent domestic and foreign policies of these States.

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21. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 1.
  22. For a general discussion of possible Soviet objective, see, A.S. Becker and A.L. Horelick, "Soviet Policy in Middle East", Rand Publication, R-504-FF, 1970, pp. 63-4.

### Problems of Economic Development:

Tracing the panorama of Soviet's role on different aspect of issues of non-aligned movement, it becomes clear that the object of its policy during the period was to defend the movement from the pressure of Western powers and thereby to secure its friendly relations in the Third World. If we calculate ideology with real politics, conclusion can be derived that Soviet policy saw a sign of advantage only in support to the cause and demand of non-aligned movement whose enemies and friends were the same to that of the Soviet Union. To substantiate this view, two other aspects need to be discussed namely, the problem of economic development and question of regional security and defence affecting the members of the non-aligned movement.

The background against which the non-aligned movement arose for an economic restructuring of third world bring back to the past colonial set up of relations based on inequality and discrimination.

During the colonial period, these countries were part of a system devised to bolster the economies of capitalist societies. The imperialist countries practised division of labour, they abolished the colonies to be content with supplying raw materials and importing the finished products manufactured in the metropolitan countries. The imports and



exports of the colonies were integrated with the functioning of the capitalist laws of market mechanism. In this process, the economy of every colony turned into export oriented and the external factors became dominant in all its operational part of economy. As a consequence not only the colonies were thinned economically but they also developed a "dependent" status, vis-a-vis the colonizers.<sup>23</sup>

Dependencies of the colonies was total. Non-alignment in the economic field, therefore, means achievement of economic independence by establishing a self-reliant economy which is possible only if the non-aligned countries structurally delink themselves from the capitalist world order.

The main issue before non-aligned countries was, how to start the process of independency and by which method. As most of the non-aligned countries viewed at that time that the self-reliant economies could be built creating a powerful State sector capable of pushing forward the development process and accelerating the pace of change. But this task was not so easy and for this they needed help and support from Socialist world whose transaction of economy was supposed to be based on mutual interest and advantage.

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23. Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.

The Soviet policy framed in this period was directed in accordance with the principles of peaceful co-existence. This policy of peaceful co-existence opened up a greater possibilities for economic assistance for developing and non-aligned countries. The intention behind it was to overcome their backwardness, to end domination of foreign capital and to promote an independent line in foreign policies; e.g., non-alignment. In addition to this the Soviet Union viewed that with the help of such economy these countries could play an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist role in those countries of the Third World where internal progressive forces were quite powerful, Soviet help and support could be crucial in transition to non-capitalist path of development. In its view that the possibility of transition to this path had increased considerably on account of existence of the world socialist system.<sup>24</sup>

In the light of above outlook, the Soviet Union extended its economic aid and trade with non-aligned countries. Initially, these had been granted in the form of loans at concessional rate of interest ranging between one to three per cent. Loans were generally granted for projects in

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24. R. Ulynovsky, Socialism and newly independent Nations, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 61-62.

public sector and preferably in basic and key industries and sectors.

System of bilateral trade based on the local currency as means of payment following the principle of balanced trade was the second tool.

Soviet economic relations with non-aligned countries was free from the crisis of foreign exchange as it did not require convertible currency for trade and it did not create payment imbalances. On the basis of long term bilateral trade agreements, this system tended to reduce uncertainty and fluctuation at international trade of Third World. In fact, it provided a secured market for exports of these countries on the one hand, and provided assured supply of some essential imports on the other.

By 1970, the Soviet Union was a party to agreements with 34 third world countries whom it provided an extensive credits on favourable terms.<sup>25</sup>

Apart from that, the Soviet Union was also providing technical aid for over 600 industrial and other projects, more than 220 of which were already in operation.<sup>26</sup> A substantial number of these projects were heavy industry plants,

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25. Y. Zhukov, Third World: Problems & Prospect, op.cit., p. 221.

26. Ibid.

highly important for the industrial development of newly liberated countries.

As the above mentioned facts are well-known to us, there is no need here to go into details for tracing the case of these individual States which were benefitted by such kind of economic interaction. However, the main gist is that the Soviet aid and support and its economic relations with non-aligned countries laid down the foundation of their self-reliant economy. Subsequently, with this material base the non-aligned movement gained confidence and came forward against the existing colonial set up of economic management and raised their demand for new international economic order.

#### Soviet Idea of Collective Security in Asia:

Having achieved a considerable progress toward detente in Europe the Soviets were eager to improve the political climate in an area contiguous to their southern borders inhabited by preponderant majority of the world. This was reflected in its proposed idea of collective security in Asia.

The idea of collective security was mooted by Brezhnev for the first time on June 7, 1969 at the international

conference of Communist and workers parties held in Moscow. He remarked that "the burning problem of current international situation do not conceal from our view a system of collective security in areas of the globe where the danger of another world war, of armed conflicts, is concentrated. Such a system is best replacement for the existing military groups... We are of the opinion that the cause of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."<sup>27</sup>

Brezhnev's statement gave three indications of Soviet thinking - first an Asian collective security viewed as a long term task of foreign policy, secondly, it was intended to replace the existing system of military groupism and thirdly, the depth of crisis and rift created by imperialist power in Asian zone of non-aligned countries was presumed to bringing the question of collective security to the forefront of inter-Asian relations.

Further, two more significant moves added an operational dimension to the Brezhnev's concept - regional mutual co-operation among Asian States, and Asiatic character of collective security.

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27. Extract is given in V. Pavlosky, Collective Security: The Way to Peace in Asia, International Affairs, Moscow, July, 1972, p. 23.

The Soviet Union viewed regional co-operation as first step toward achieving the goal of collective security in Asia. It viewed that the exchange of political information and the consultations between States, particularly in situations dangerous to peace would have very beneficial effect on the situation in Asia as a whole and on the relations between States.

For the above mentioned purpose, Soviet Premier Kosygin on visit to Pakistan had declared on May 30, 1968, that "the Soviet Union would like to see India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and States of the region developing mutual relations of friendship and constructive co-operation. The Soviet Union would do utmost to facilitate this."<sup>28</sup>

Regarding Asiatic character of collective security, the Soviet Union emphasised the need of Asian affinity and thereby to create a system arising from its own experience and problems.

Now further dealing with some other aspects of this idea, there is need to bring out the basic principles on which the entire idea of collective security is based.

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28. The Times of India, Delhi, May 31, 1969.

There are four principles:

- (i) Renunciation of the use of force in the relations among States. Solution of dispute between countries through negotiations and peaceful means.
- (ii) Respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing national frontiers.
- (iii) Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.
- (iv) Extensive development of economic, cultural and scientific and other forms of co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage.<sup>29</sup>

These principles of collective security on Asian continent proposed by the Soviet Union are recorded in the UN Charter, the Declaration of Bandung Conference which subsequently incorporated with the principles of non-aligned movement, and other documents pertaining directly to Asia.

Justification of the idea of collective security was derived by the Soviet Union from certain basis and objective situation existed at that time.

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29. These principles have been declared by Brezhnev at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Union in Moscow in March 1972. Extract is given in H.D. Malaviya, World Peace and Soviet Policy, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1976, p. 112.

Vladimir Kudryavstov, Pravda's political comentator takes note of many armed conflicts that have occurred in Asia since the World War Second, some of them "the immediate outcome of armed interferences of imperialist forces while other have been 'vestings' of the period of colonialization."<sup>30</sup>

Vladimir considered at that time two seats of military danger for the world on the Asian continent - Vietnam and Middle East. According to him both are results of imperialist aggression or intervention in which a host of Asian States have been involved directly or indirectly through the aggressive blocs knocked together by the US imperialist circles. It is the neo-colonialist ambitions of the United States and former colonial countries of the West that have turned South Asia and Middle East into the hotbeds of tensions and conflicts. The neo-colonialists are interested in exploiting the "inexhaustable source of industrial and agricultural raw materials of Asia in its cheap man-power and its extremely profitable market."<sup>31</sup>

An another Soviet writer Pavivsky gives more or less the same account and says, "to the clearly expressed desire of Asian people for peace and co-operation, imperialism above

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30. Vladimir Kudryavtsev, 'Road to Peace and Security in Asia', New Times, no. 33, 1972.

31. Ibid.



all US imperialism counter-posed the colonial policy of 'divide and rule', the policy setting one nation against another."<sup>32</sup>

From the above two statements, one can conclude that the Soviet Union marked two contrary forces at work in Asia - the anti-imperialism of newly liberated nations which inspired the desire for unity, integrity and co-operation and the imperialist and neo-colonialist forces led by the United States that divided and scattered these integrated impulses.

While placing its idea of collective security in Asia, the Soviet Union expected favourable response from the non-aligned countries like, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. So far its contents were not designed to contain any individual State of the region, its aspiration was high. But in practice, response from the non-aligned States was very slow. It was precisely because of lurking suspicion and doubt over the character of proposed collective security. It was presumed by the several non-aligned States that through Asian collective security the Soviet Union tried to contain China.<sup>33</sup> Though, time and again, Soviet leaders made it clear that Soviet's intention was not to place one country against another but contrary to that it wanted to promote

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32. Pavlovsky, op.cit.

33. For detail see, A.G. Noorani, Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1975.

co-operation and cordial relations among Asian States which would, in long term, bring permanent peace, security and stability in the region. As far as the non-aligned States were concerned, they were not willing to implement Soviet idea in practice because of the suspicion and doubt working behind it. Consequently, it was far from having practical shape. Nonetheless, the idea of collective security was an effort of Soviet policy to have a cordial and friendly relations with non-aligned States of Asia so much so to promote mutual interests and advantages between and among the Asian States and itself.

From the above, it can be said that the Soviet role in the problems of non-aligned movement was positive. Such a nature of Soviet role certainly provided much needed support and encouragement for the NAM from a leading power like the Soviet Union. Soviet's confidence in the effectiveness of the NAM and its viability in international affairs also in turn grew.

As seen earlier the Soviet Union showed no hesitation in supporting the non-aligned countries vis-a-vis others at the regional and global level. Indeed, it increased its commitments, economic, military, and political to the active member of the non-aligned movement. Moreover, it threw its weight in promoting unity and strength of the movement.

Above all, the Soviet Union saw a common interest between the NAM and itself and its allies.

However, some awareness was certainly noticeable in the Soviet Union about the growing problems of the non-alignment, particularly pressure from the West, threat to its unity and security and development. Some of the leading members of the NAM with whom Soviet Union also developed close and friendly bilateral relations.

In totality, Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement became distinct and an important feature of overall Soviet policy towards the Third World. There was every indication by the close of the sixties that such a policy was not entirely and solely dictated by East-West relationship; on the contrary, it had the potentials of acquiring an autonomous character in Soviet foreign policy in general and Soviet policy to the Third World in particular.

## **CHAPTER-V**

## **CONCLUSION**

It is generally agreed that the non-aligned movement has considerably influenced post-Second World War international politics. Symbolizing the aims and aspirations of all countries that had suffered in the past from some form of colonial domination and exploitation, it originated and developed on the basis of common interests of all these countries. Gradually through the decades of fifties and sixties it developed itself into an action oriented programme. In spite of its many internal difficulties and a hostile international environment, it began to command attention from all those nations and social forces who aspired for peace and change and development of human race, particularly its poor and deprived majority.

The Soviet Union was the first Great power that recognized the potentials of the movement, although it did waste some valuable years, 1947-52 in doing so. Since then, a clear-cut Soviet policy towards the non-aligned movement began to develop and grow; so much so that it gradually became an integral part of Soviet Third World policy, in particular, and Soviet foreign policy, in general.

In the preceding pages, we have studied the beginning and development of Soviet policy until the decade of the sixties. For a better understanding of Soviet policy, we

have first inquired into the very framework which appears to determine such a Soviet policy and the pace of its development. In fact, it can be said that Soviet policy itself was an exercise in applying such a framework to concrete policy and posture on issues and problems of non-aligned movement.

We have shown that after initial cold-shouldering of the emerging outlines of the movement, the Soviet Union by 1953 began to support and encourage it. A clear indication here was the activation of Soviet programme of economic aid, military assistance and political support to the Third World countries, particularly the non-aligned one, among them. Later by the end of the fifties, such a programme became heavily concentrated on active members of the NAM, like, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Guinea and Cuba.

The Belgrade Conference of the NAM (1961) formally launched the movement with its adherents ranging from Cuba on the one hand, and Saudi-Arabia on the other, while countries like, India, Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia playing a leading role. It may be argued that the presence of some of the allies of the Soviet Union, like, Cuba and North Vietnam were an added attraction for the Soviet Union.

Later in the sixties, the movement was confronted with a host of problems. We have earlier identified major problems, like, decolonization, disarmament, anti-racialism and security and development. Yet the movement continued to grow on the basis of common interests of all its members on such vital issues as decolonization, disarmament, anti-racialism and economic development.

We have shown in the preceding pages that the Soviet support and help was marked in all these major problems and issued before the non-aligned movement. As a matter of fact, these provide the necessary details about Soviet policy towards the NAM.

Soviet commitment to the NAM must be seen also against the background of the fact that the non-aligned movement itself always disclaimed any marked pro-Soviet bias. Indeed, on some occasions during the period under study, it was even critical of the Soviet Union. The instances here are the assumption of nuclear test and erection of Berlin Wall, the Hungarian and Czech crises. Some of the notable leaders of the non-aligned movement like, Nehru and Nasser were also critical of Soviet system and its ideology - Marxism-Leninism. However, the Soviet Union did not over-react and it continued its policy of support and encouragement to the non-aligned movement.

We must here pose the question as to why did the Soviet Union pursued such a policy? The obvious answer is that the Soviet Union found in the NAM common and convergent interests while pursuing its own well defined foreign policy's goals and objectives, particularly in the Third World. The short term goal was obviously to gain support and sympathy of the non-aligned countries for its policy of peaceful co-existence and general and complete disarmament. The long term goal appears to be making non-alignment more and more slinky towards the Soviet Union and its allies and away from historical, economic and political linkage of the movement with capitalist system. It can easily be seen atleast at the level of the short term goal, there was marked convergence of interests between the NAM and the Soviet Union. Besides, Soviet support of the NAM provided much needed impetus to the development of the movement particularly, it was confronted with hostility and cold-shouldering of the West. In other words, both sides appear to have gained during the period of study.

Soviet policy of support and encouragement to the NAM has then emerged as an exercise and continuity of its policy towards it, and by the end of the sixties it has become an integral part of the Soviet - Third World policy,



in particular, and Soviet foreign policy, in general. However, Soviet policy -makers certainly appeared to be aware of growing problems of the movement. Later development in Soviet policy towards the NAM during the seventies and beyond, appear to confirm such an understanding. Yet it is true to say that by the end of sixties Soviet policy towards the NAM was poised for an autonomous role in Soviet foreign policy, and not to continue totally dependent on Soviet relations with the capitalist system, i.e., the West.



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
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