

**ARMS BUILD UP IN INDIAN OCEAN
REGION, A CASE STUDY OF EAST
CENTRAL AFRICA**

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Certified that the Dissertation entitled, "Aims Build up in the Indian Ocean Region - A Case Study of East Central Africa (Central East Africa)" submitted by Mr Etukuri Bala Showry, in fulfilment of nine credits out of the total requirements of twenty-four credits, for the award of Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) of this University, is his original work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or of any other University.


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P_R_E_F_A_C_E

Contemporary world order with its characteristics Super Power rivalry and the burgeoning Non-Aligned Movement has many regional and international overtones and manifestations that it has become interestingly relevant and important to focus attention on these as that of the present dissertation. Indian Ocean region with its enormous natural and human resources, both on land and the oceanic surface, has been a strategic region of the world connecting the developed and the developing parts of the world or in colonial days the core with its periphery. In spite of disappearance of the colonial cover, the nations of the region still manifest those pattern, of course in different hues and shades. Neo-colonialism is well entrenched because of under-development and technological backwardness and dependence on the outside world.

Many economic and politico-territorial issues are part of the colonial legacy in various forms and intensity. Afro-Asian realm abounds with such examples and there are many delicate geopolitical areas which are susceptible to any conflict, bilateral in nature and exacerbated by external interferences. Whole of East Africa, West Asia, South Asia and South East Asia replete with such

examples and situations. The case of East Central Africa or Central East Africa is remarkable on many account, i.e. in terms of colonial legacy, under-development in socio-economic terms, political ambivalence and immaturity and inter-state and inter-tribal contending issues and bilateral border problems etc. All this has resulted into growing external interference and conspiracies and collaboration which has initiated as well as heightened the arm race in the region which is incapable of maintaining any arms-level in terms of their Gross National Products.

The nation-states which form the Central East Africa (East Central Africa) realm are Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, covering a total area of 1.8 million sq. km. and population of 56.0 million (1980). They were part of Germany (Rwanda), Belgium (Burundi), British (Tanzania) in succession after Portugal and Germany, British (Kenya and Uganda) and have inherited certain traits. Rwanda and Burundi form part of the great African rift valley and are known as 'land of almost ideal beauty', whereas Kenya is located on the eastern Coast of Africa with some known maritime activities. Uganda as a typical case of hinterland land-locked state and Tanzania as the melting pot of more than 100 tribes have typical equatorial regimes.

The majority of the Central East African people fall below the poverty-line and are agricultural and rural

in character with main cash crops of coffee, cotton, tobacco, tea, sugarcane etc. They have either very weak industrial base or dominance of tertiary activities. The network of means of communication and transport is skeletal in character and does not encourage industrial balanced development.

Considering the socio-economic fabrics of these nation-states and political instability, the theme which is being discussed in the present dissertation is important, both as affecting the basic interests of these countries as well as their foreign relationship and future stakes in developing secured territorial limits. One cannot justify the arm-race in which these countries are involved and wasting their natural assets but what one can prescribe and preach is peaceful co-existence and regional co-operation. For this they have to forestall any foreign interference and conspiracy and to develop climate of mutual trust, confidence and co-operation.

Information and data base is secondary in nature and collected through various yearbooks, monographs and newspaper clippings and other general literature on Indian Ocean, contemporary world order and Super Power rivalry, multi-nationals, arms-transfer and trade etc. The thesis is divided into the following chapters:

First Chapter	-	Introduction
Second Chapter	-	Regional Issues and Conflict Zones
Third Chapter	-	Emergence of East Central African Nations
Fourth Chapter	-	Arms Build-up in East Central African Regions
Fifth Chapter	-	Limited Resources and Future Plans

Introduction being the first chapter, the Second Chapter deals with the regional issues and conflict zones. The colonial legacy and the emergence of nation states in the Indian Ocean region and their bilateral issues and conflict situations are discussed.

Geography, Economy, types of Governments, foreign policy pattern and development problems of the East Central African or Central East African states form the subject matter of third chapter.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the Arms build-up in East Central Africa, defence capabilities and requirements, arms purchase and defence spending of these five countries are discussed in detail.

In the fifth chapter, resource constraint and burden of arms build up on their economy and interest of the non-regional powers are analysed.

It is hoped that the present dissertation has sufficient focus on this very interesting but less known region of the Indian Ocean region which has recently become geopolitically and geostrategically significant.

Acknowledgement:

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My thanks are due in no small measure to my wife Susan who kindled my inspiration all these years, and remained a source of strength. I am deeply indebted to all my family members for their wishes and assistance. I will be failing in my duty if I do not express my gratitude for the spontaneous help and assistance provided to me by Sri Nisankara Rao Venkata Ratnam, Member of Parliament.

The library staff of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Indian Council of World Affairs and Jawaharlal Nehru University, extended their help in collecting the required material and I sincerely thank them.

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(E. B. SHOWRY)

developed countries.¹ Therefore, it has become one of strategically important regions in the world politics.

Historical Developments

Since time immemorial Indian Ocean has been significant throughout the history. The earliest navigator to India has been from the Egypt maritime expedition to the Indian Ocean around 2300 B.C. To follow were the people of Mesopotamia who sailed across the Indian Ocean. Thereafter the Greeks especially Alexander was the first who established international trade routes. Eudoxus visited India in 119 B.C. and established direct maritime links between India and Egypt. The Romans from 5th century B.C. to 6th century A.D. and from 5th century A.D. to 10th century A.D., Vijaya Empire of Indian subcontinent enjoyed the naval supremacy in the area of Indian Ocean region which later disappeared due to the conflict between the Chola and Vijaya Empires and emergence of the Muslim Supremacy in the region. During 16th century the Mughal emperor Akbar held sway over the Indian waters.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to come to India by sea route in 1498.² In 16th century the Portuguese

1 P.K.S. Nambodiri, J.P. Anand and Sreedhar, Intervention in Indian Ocean, p. 110.

2 V.K. Bhasin, Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p. 5.

could not resist the well organized Dutch forces. In 17th century the British conquered the Dutch and the French colonies in this region. British naval supremacy was there to stay until the Second World War. In the wake of disintegration of their empire, the British decided to withdraw from this region, but they kept certain islands in the Indian Ocean region, e.g. British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) for maintaining their military surveillance over the region.

In 1966 the British and Americans made an agreement to build up joint military forces and finally it gave passage to American dominance after 1966.

Super Power Rivalry

/external
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presence
in the

From the very beginning the Indian Ocean has witnessed an ever increasing tensions and instability and all the littoral states belonging to the developing Third World have experienced this in various forms. With the passage of time even the /Indian Ocean has increased many fold.³ It finally resulted into Super Power rivalry, for which the main causes are⁴

- (a) the erosion of British naval power and emergence of US military might in the region;

3 J. Singh, Strategic Analysis, vol. 3, no. 8, November 1984, p. 791.

4 V.K. Bhasin, Super Power Rivlary in Indian Ocean (Preface).

- (b) the emergence of China as a major power and the rise of economic power of Japan;
- (c) the developments of Diego Garcia as a nuclear base by the Americans; and
- (d) the regular appearance of USSR fleet in the Indian Ocean.

As Super Powers, the USA and USSR are playing an important role in the world by giving economic and military aid to various countries to draw them towards their influence. All this has increased instability and led to the external powers' involvement. They exert pressures in several forms over littoral countries to have full say in their political, economic, military, technological and administrative aspects.⁵

US Strategy

The US strategy can be seen with its military operation in the Indian Ocean region conducted by its Central Command. Mainly the western strategy began with the British decision to withdraw its forces from the region by the late 1960s. This coincided with the development of the American Polaris A-3 submarine launched missiles which became ready for deployment at a suitable location in the Indian Ocean region.

5 P.K.S. Namboodiri, "Intervention in the Indian Ocean", Strategic Analysis, vol. 8, nos. 2-3, May-June 1983, pp. 129-36.

The strategic interest for the development of their submarines was against the Communist countries, namely Soviet Union and China. Hence the US considered the areas of Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal as their suitable places and same interest and strategy led to establishment of especially at Diego Garcia as a strategic nuclear military point. Allies, specially NATO partners joined the US moves in this region and they further strengthened their military presence.

From the view of diplomacy, the US is the major supplier of arms to the countries of the Indian Ocean. The reasons for the arms supply to these states are:

- (1) to protect US economic interest;
- (2) to employ or threaten force in the Middle East;
- (3) to secure the Indian Ocean for their air and sea routes;
- (4) to intervene in matters of littoral states with a view to keep them along with them; and
- (5) to balance the Soviet forces in this region and to attain a superiority.⁶

To legitimise all this, the US has made an agreement with UK and it was announced at Washington and London on 15 December 1970 stating that a naval communication facility would be

⁶ P.K.S. Namboodiri, Intervention in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p. 95.

established on the island of Diego Garcia and the facilities would consist of communication and minimum support facilities. According to the announcement the base was meant for US naval communication system to support British and American ships and aircrafts in the Indian Ocean. The facility would also serve as "an Intelligence Listening Post" to monitor the movements of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia is planned for multipurpose uses. It is to match the growing Soviet presence in the region, as it got enormous strategic advantage with the opening of Suez Canal. The Soviet Union was able to transfer its fleet from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, which is not so easy in the case of the USA.

US Economic Stakes

Despite the region of the Indian Ocean rich in minerals, marine food, oil and raw materials, it depends upon the developed countries for economic developments. Therefore the expansion of American trade has led to investment of some billions of dollars in this region. The US trade with this region has overtaken its economic interaction with the European Economic Community and accounts for more than one fourth of all US foreign trade and commerce. So the Indian Ocean region constituted a billion dollars market for the US finished goods. The following table shows the trade of US with Asia, Africa and Australia:

Table I

US Trade During the Period 1965, 1970 and 1980

(All products: Total value in million US dollars)

	Asia		Africa		Australia	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
1965	3,386	2,032	766	555	822	450
1970	4,726	3,557	987	802	1,116	783
1980	32,271	29,997	6,133	29,478	4,645	2,819

Source: Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1985, pp. 120-36.

Soviet Strategy

Indian Ocean region is still politically immature and economically underdeveloped or at least developing. Due to these circumstances and also with the opening of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union has entered the region in a very big way. It started with the 1968 visit of a naval squadron of warships and two auxiliaries from the Soviet Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok.⁷ The Soviet navy has

⁷ Adm. A.K. Chatterji (Rtd), "Soviet Strategy in Indian Ocean", Seminar on Indian Ocean, 18 February 1974, pp. 1-2.

laid mooring buoys over a wide area, namely Malagasy, Mauritius, Seychelles and the east coast of Africa.

The Soviets are providing substantial military and economic aids to various countries around the Indian Ocean region to create friendship and influence. The aim of giving this type of aid is to weaken or destroy the political and ideological influence of other countries especially China and the USA. It is well known fact as assessed by other countries that the Soviet Union has acquired base facility at Socotra island near the Horn of Africa to watch and prevent the activities of the USA and China.

But the Indian Ocean is not a suitable area for the operation of Russian ballistic missile submarines against the USA and Chinese targets. Even though the Soviet has to keep warships and submarines in the Ocean in order to keep track of the American submarines with their devastating potential and for neutralizing them, as and when necessary. To fulfil its aims and objects of its development in the Indian Ocean region, the Soviet Union has acquired base facilities in the Yemenese Red Sea Port of Hodeida, at Barbara in Somaliland and also has made an agreement with Mauritius and established tracing facility on the island and also had base facility at Singapore.

The nature of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region is different from that of the western powers

in that it is more transitory. However, the Soviet Union at present is believed to have an average 25 ships in the Indian Ocean at any time.⁸ In addition, the Soviet Union operates a few specialized ships in the south-west Indian Ocean for the recovery of space crafts. Another aspect is that of increase in the quantum of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean region since 1968 is generally in proportion to the overall increase in the quality and quantity of Soviet naval forces all over the world.

The Soviet navy was small in size and was supplementary to the Army up to the Second World War, which was meant for land operations nearest to the coast. But with the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet, Sergy Y. Corshokov, as a Commander-in-Chief of the navy in 1956, it started to build up an ocean-going navy capable of carrying out strategic tasks for the fleet.

The main objectives in the case of Indian Ocean region are:

- (1) to achieve and maintain strategic balance with the US;
- (2) to extend its influence, both in military and economic sense throughout the world in competition with the US and the other western powers;
- (3) to curtail as far as possible the influence of Communist China.

⁸ Jasjit Singh, "Geopolitics and Super Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean", Strategic Analysis, vol. 3, November 1984, p. 812.

So due to the expansion of the Soviet influence and power in respect of economy, diplomacy, and security, its political role began in the Indian Ocean region since 1956. While the activities of the Soviet navy were mainly connected with the tests of rockets and space satellite tracking in this region, some port facilities are usually associated with the programmes of military and technical assistance.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean also includes a large number of oceanographic research vessels. The research vessels can intercept communication between the US communication base at Australia's North West cape and the submerged US Polaris submarine. The Soviet Union achieved its desire to have the world's largest oceanographic as well as fishing fleets, and that too, located in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet's Economic Status

The Indian Ocean region is industrially backward. So it requires economic assistance to develop its economic status. Therefore, these countries offer good chance to the Soviet Union as a Super Power to enter in the form of economic power.

The Soviet Union involved in Asian affairs as an Asian power and due to this reason the volume of trade and commerce grew with Asian countries and also frequency of

the Soviet shipping vessels, in the Indian Ocean.⁹ Moreover the industrial revolution in the 19th century gave further impetus to the European colonial power to exploit the natural resources and raw materials of these colonies in this region and to find easy markets for their finished goods.

The following table shows the trade of the Soviet Union with Asia, Africa and Australia:

Table 2

USSR Trade during the Period 1965, 1970 and 1980

(All products: Total value in US million dollars)

	Asia		Africa		Australia	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
1965	476	449	329	210	2	95
1970	659	622	580	487	2	89
1980	4,337	3,140	1,380	1,018	14	1,279

Source: Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1985, pp. 120-36.

9 T. T. Poulse, Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, p. 14.

British Strategy

The British came to India as a trading community and started towards East during the year 1660. Later on, they were very interested in building up factories with the establishment of the East India Company in 1662 at Bombay. There were open hostilities between French and English in the year 1745. And also there were naval battles between them, ultimately the British got success over the French during the period 1783-84. Thus the British established their authority in the Indian Ocean region and the Indian Ocean became the "British Lake". There was no challenge from any side of this region to the British authority until 1941.

In 1964 Britishers carried out an extensive survey of the Indian Ocean with a view to select suitable sites for the establishment of military bases in this region. This was the cause for the establishment of British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965 comprising the Seychelles and Chagos group of islands in the Indian Ocean region.¹⁰ Then the Anglo-American agreement has been made in 1966, to build up jointly their military powers to their entire territory and they build up the base in Diego Garcia also started around this time. According to them this base (Diego Garcia) is being used for communication facilities to help the UK and

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

US navy, air force, missile boats and airports to enable F-11 and C-5A US aeroplanes to land there.¹¹

British Diplomacy and Economic Linkages

The main aim of the British policy in the Indian Ocean region before World War I was to enforce its authority on India "the Jewel of the East" against other European contenders. To hold feet on Indian Ocean region, it made an agreement with the US to defuse its influence as a big power. In fact, by virtue of its control of the entrance into the Indian Ocean via Suez Canal, the British hold was stronger on the Indian Ocean up to the Second World War.

To develop its status in the economic sphere the British started as a trade community in India and found trade routes through the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean to India, Australia and China. These are very important trade routes for them. Through these sea routes the British exported their goods to various countries and imported raw materials from them. It was to protect these trade routes a British fleet was started in the Mediterranean and gradually moved towards the East. To develop its economic and political status in Asia and Australia it established colonies in these regions and achieved their goal of playing a prominent role in this region up to the modern period.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 95.

China's Stakes and Strategy

In the context of the Super Power status, China declared that "it will never become a Super Power". But its interest in this region will continue for geographical, political and revolutionary reasons. China has no capability for having an oceangoing navy. The Chinese navy is built, organised and employed for coastal defence. As a revolutionary power China has a global interest which it actively pursues. Broadly speaking, in its view Chinese global strategy is to "unite all those who were against the two Super Powers whom the Chinese believe as imperialists of different hues".

The Chinese are building an infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region due to the expansion of their naval strength, so that when the oceangoing fleet is ready they will be in a position to deploy their ships without difficulty. It was reported that China has a base facility at Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and a base in Pakistan as well as in Sri Lanka to whom they have supplied several gun boats. Recently it was reported that China has supplied patrol boats to Sri Lanka to suppress the movement of Tamil separatism at Sri Lanka. Besides, China is assisting other countries in the Indian Ocean region and specially South Yemen. Chinese ability to extend economic and military aid is also extremely limited and will continue to remain so because of Chinese inherent problem of population and poverty.

Japan's Stakes and Strategy

As the other states, Japan is also interested in this region due to the following reasons:

- (1) As one of the leading trading nation of the world and owner of the big merchant fleet, Japan uses the sea routes of the Indian Ocean much more than many. Its vital sea links with America and Europe are in this part of the world; and
- (2) Japan depends upon the countries bordering the Indian Ocean for markets and raw materials.

Japan's important fear is that the Super Power rivalry might lead to a disruption of the traffic in the Indian Ocean region. Hence, it takes the position that no outside power should try to extend its influence on any littoral states in this region. It thinks that the competition and rivalry among the powerful nations will not only gradually restrict the freedom of the littoral states but also jeopardize the freedom of the natives. By and large Japan is also in favour of the littoral states expanding their naval strength in order to secure peace and to maintain it in the area.

Most of the economic status of the Japanese depends upon the import of the natural resources i.e. bauxite, iron ore, natural rubber and petroleum from the region of the Indian Ocean. About 50 per cent of Japan's sea borne

trade is carried through the Indian Ocean routes. It also has one of the biggest merchant fleet in the world to support its expanding foreign trade. Foreign trade is one of the important sources of Japan's economic prosperity and strength. Its large population in the industrial cities (like Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe and Kitakyushu) depend upon an uninterrupted flow of raw materials from outside and of finished product to the markets of the world. For this purpose there are two sea routes for Japan, viz.

- (1) The Pacific route leading to the American continent and Australia; and
- (2) the Indian Ocean route leading to the Indian sub-continent, Middle East, Africa and Europe.

Japan requires petroleum from West Asia. Marine food is very important for Japan and for this Indian Ocean is a rich region. Therefore Japan is very interested in the region of the Indian Ocean. Japanese fishing boats visit practically many areas in the Indian Ocean region.

In conclusion, one could add that the Super Power and other powers have economic, strategic and other stakes in the region and each tries to out-vit others for economic and strategic gains.

The ways are different, some have physical presence in the form of strategic bases, both in waters and the littoral land; some have economic presence through

the various aid programmes and some have trade and commerce linkages. The Indian Ocean region has thus become a hot-bed of power-politics with ever growing tensions and conflicts.

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CHAPTER II

REGIONAL ISSUES AND CONFLICT ZONES

The British had enjoyed complete domination over the Indian Ocean region. Hence the region was known as the 'British Lake'. The main reason for its domination was its constant vigilance over and the containment of its European rivals. The region can be divided into five zones having various issues according to the nature and circumstances of the region:¹

- (1) Southern Africa
- (2) The Red Sea region
- (3) The Persian Gulf
- (4) South Asia
- (5) South East Asia

The Indian Ocean region encompasses a wide variety of people with different religions, cultures, histories, political and economic structures. Therefore, the issues and conflicts in this region can be expected due to the diversities among the people of the region. In the region there are about 37 littoral states and Islands and 16 hinterland countries. There were basically colonies of Western countries. So the intervention of western countries and their domination in

¹ P. Iqbal Cheema, Conflict and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean, p. 4.

this region led to the creation of regional issues and conflict zones.

The root cause of intervention of the western powers in the region was that the littoral states and hinterland countries are rich in mineral resources and have fertile land. The littoral states produce roughly 90 per cent of the world rubber, tea and jute, 60 per cent of tin and oil and its large deposit of gold, diamond, manganese, iron and copper. Its continental shelf has good fishing grounds. The condition of this region during the fifteenth century to eighteenth century was one of tragic histories. Foreign penetration had taken place due to local and regional conflicts. In the fifteenth century the local rivalries in the Malabar Coast in India favoured the Portuguese in their efforts to contain the powers of the Zamorin of Calicut. In the 18th century, the local rivalry between the Marathas on the one hand and the Moghuls and the Sindias on the other, helped the English in containing the emerging Marathas naval power. These internal rivalries, by permitting outside powers to pursue a policy of divide and rule once again favour foreign penetration in the Indian Ocean region.

If the foreign powers did not intervene directly or indirectly in the problems of the indigenous rules, the Korean war, the Indo-Pakistan wars, the Arab-Israeli wars could have been avoided.² The war in Vietnam could have been ended long

2 K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean, p. 108.

ago. A great deal of bloodshed in the Third World could have been avoided.

Southern Africa

It is the most explosive area on the shores of the Indian Ocean. Here the potential for conflict has already acquired dangerous proportions. The system has generated antagonism between the white government of South Africa and the black independent states on the whole of the continent of Africa.

The native black people felt that the apartheid system was an anathema for their destiny. South Africa itself is viewed as the last great bastion of white colonialism. The current situation in south is that the black majority are deprived by law of its basic rights and are subjected to extreme forms of racial discrimination. The vital point of the situation is the doctrine of white supremacy known as apartheid which was defined as a system of separate development. To solve their problem the black people launched several liberal movements like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and got a lot of regional support to their movements. The United Nations also passed resolutions giving public support to these movements and recommended that they should be rendered material help including arms aid to enable them continue their struggle. But till today the problem is unsolved.



The Red Sea Region

In this region on the African side, the conflict can be seen among the native states viz. Arab-Israel. Another conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the case of Eritrea, because the acute antagonism with political, ethnic and religious dimensions exists between them. The conflict originated as a result of the European scramble for Africa to breed ill-will between these two countries throughout the twentieth century. The Red Sea region has important for marine trade route which connects the Indian Ocean region to the Mediterranean region. Because of this reason the Super Powers had deep involvement in this region.

As a consequence of the Cold War initially and later the Arab-Israel conflict the problem has existed unsolved. These causes enhanced the strategic importance of this main artery linking Europe with the world of the Indian Ocean. The Asian side of this region is involved in the struggle for supremacy between Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen.

The Persian Gulf

In the region of the Persian Gulf it can be said that the Iran-Iraq war is the most dangerous conflict among the Gulf countries. The war is a new experience not only for the Gulf region but for West Asia as a whole, its most startling feature being that it is an undeclared war between

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the two developing and powerful Muslim states, which claim to be revolutionary and professing non-alignment.³

The conflict of these countries was conglomerated with religious and border dispute matters and also there was clear-cut variables between the two countries of historical, geostrategic, human, ideological, military, economic, domestic, regional, internal and diplomatic nature.

South Asia

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka account for nearly two thirds of the population of Indian Ocean countries. Despite its large reservoir of man power, the region is regarded as one of the poorest areas of the world. The new South Asian environment has been seen in the universal atmosphere due to the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country.

Since 1947 the South Asian scene had been bedevilled by the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan which reached its climax in the year 1971 in India-Pakistan war. Since the Simla agreement in 1972 the attitude of Pakistan underwent a radical change. Recently its co-operation with Punjab terrorists against India is intolerable. The issue between India and Bangladesh is the Farakka dispute over

³ A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iraq-Iran War", IDSA Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, July-September 1982, p. 65.

Ganga water. The relation between these two countries have been ebb and flowed with the change of governments in Bangladesh. The interference of Soviet Union in Afghanistan is a burning problem in South Asia.⁴

From the strategic point of view, Sri Lanka was regarded as important one. Because while maintaining good relations with India, Sri Lanka could develop good relations with China as well, of course their reasons are so many. It is its diplomacy. At present the problem in the international scene is the ethnic problem of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government is reiterating the Sri Lankan Government to solve the Indian Tamil ethnic problem with a view of the political solution and not by the military solution.

South East Asia

This region was attracted by the world attention since the time of World War II. This region consisting of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea has large resources of tin, iron, rubber, tea, sugarcane and some petroleum. Due to the involvement of Super Powers in this region, it indicates that the region is a source of tensions and focus of attention. The situation of South East Asia was complicated by extraordinary events of 1978 and 1979 when the Vietnam

⁴ R.G. Sawhney, "The Afghan Problem Quest for a Solution", Analysis, vol. 8, no. 8, November 1984, p. 732. Strategy

backed group forcibly took over Kampuchea and drove the Chinese supported Pol-Pot Government out of the capital.

Emergence of Nation States in Indian Ocean Region

The idea of Nation State originated in Western Europe in the sixteenth century and slowly spread to the rest of Europe and North America.⁵ The evolution of Nation State was accompanied by the development of a middle class and the rise of the spirit of secularism. That period was marked by a series of inter-religious and inter-sectarian conflict. The consolidation of the Nation State was possible in the nineteenth century with a nation's ability to mobilize large armies and an industrial structure providing weapons and necessary infrastructure which only the state could normally afford, which individual barons could not. The Nation State was not then necessarily bound on the consent of the majority nor was economic development its purpose.

The emergence of the Nation State has taken place in the Indian Ocean region after World War II. The condition of the natives of this region before World War II was absolutely hopeless and helpless due to colonisation. The nations were divided, disunited and made incompetent to live

5 K. Subrahmanyam, "Nation State Building in South Asia", Strategic Analysis, vol. 8, no. 10, January 1985, p. 908.

in the modern age despite the fact that the region is rich in minerals.

After World War II, a new wind of change awakened due to the sense of belonging together with historical memories, religion, language, ethnic and other operational factors. These factors helped them in social communication and bringing them together. In the sense most of the nation states are the result of historical evolution.

The independence of India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma and Pakistan, set in motion a new and powerful current of transformation. The natives were inspired by the atmosphere of national struggle i.e. anti-colonialism. They got spirit of nationalism and decided to drive out the foreign rulers. Once colonial occupation ended and power passed into the hands of local elite, the problem of developing a national identity began.

In South Asia, the process of Nation State building had been started in the year 1947. The Asian, African and Oceanian nations are at different evolutionary stages of their nationhood depending on their respective colonial and pre-colonial histories. At present there are 160 nation states in the international system. Out of these nation states, 60 per cent of the states have become sovereign after 1947. Most of them are micro states which cannot ensure their own security and have to rely on norms of

international behaviour to assure their continuance as sovereign states.

Within a nation system, language being the primary communication link, is a major factor in determining identity. The issue of tribal identity too is a major factor in national condition. The tribal insurgencies have become a part of the common experience in the nation state building all over South Asia, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma.

The emergence of the Nation State can be seen in the region of South East Asian countries based on the following factors:

- (1) The First World War impression.
- (2) President Wilson's fourteen points.
- (3) Victory of communism in Russia.
- (4) Central Asia seemed to bring the ideals of South East Asia's new leader within easy reach.

South East Asia's general ambition is to bring about the modernization of society which differed greatly from previous resistance movements in the past which was led by feudal factors or religious teachings, had been aiming at restoring the pre-colonial situation. These particular people of South East Asia increased their confidence based on some outside contribution to their ambition. In this aspect Japan is the first one. Another important event in this

area was struggle for freedom. The Chinese revolution was also caused by the renaissance movement of South East Asia.

Colonial Legacy and the Problems

The roots of the majority of the present local or regional conflicts in the Indian Ocean region can be partly traced to their colonial legacies. The Indian Ocean region faced so many disputes like the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Indo-Pak conflict, the formation question West Asia and North-East Africa and the racial and colonial problem in South Africa.

The problem of colonial legacy is that the foreign powers had attempted to play the game of divide and rule. Because of this reason, some conflicts still remain unsolved. The following regions are facing the colonial problems:

- (1) South Asia
- (2) South East Asia
- (3) The Persian Gulf
- (4) The Southern Africa
- (5) The Bab Al-Mandeb

South Asia

The conflicts in South Asia are mainly due to the artificial divisions of homogenous sub-continent, viz. West Pakistan, East Pakistan, India and Princely States. The

colonial legacies resulted to the partition of the sub-continent as cited above. The other vital problem confronting the Indian sub-continent is the so-called Kashmir dispute. In this dispute Pakistan launched armed attacks in 1965 and 1971 to occupy Kashmir, but failed. Then it started the slogan 'Islamic Solidarity' and 'democratic right of self-determination' to acquire the remaining part of Kashmir.

South East Asia

The South East Asia faced a host of disputes since the end of the Second World War. The conflicts in this region are one of the conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia and second is the regional community problem of Muslim i-nsurgency in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago in the Philippines. The division leading to two decades of conflict for the unification of Vietnam has been the ideal example for the colonial legacy and its effects in this region.

The Persian Gulf

The main dispute which had created the conflict situation in the region was the border dispute between Iraq and Iran. Indeed the war between Iran and Iraq was quite a new experience to it and also for West Asia. The disputes on Kurdistan area and Satt-al-Arab's boundary are the problems of colonial legacy.

The Southern Africa

The important conflict in this region along the shores of the Indian Ocean is South Africa. Its situation is made complex by inter-relationship of two explosive forces, viz. (1) Anti apartheid movement, and (2) Anti-Colonialism.

Anti-apartheid Movement In South Africa the majority people are the black race. But the minority white people are ruling. There are civil restrictions on black people from the beginning despite so many African and Asian countries getting sovereignty in this modern period. "In South Africa one finds the extraordinarily obdurate crossbreed of Dutch, German, English, and French in white settler population refined on 'Cogineaus' white racism. And there in the Dutch reformed Church was baptized that unashamedly ugliest creation of the South African apartheid."⁶ (sic)

Anti-Colonialism More than thirty years ago the winds of change swept over the continent of Africa but for Namibia, there has been no change. Twenty years back most of the African countries won their freedom from various colonial powers, but Namibia was left as it was in a tragic situation. The importance of Namibia is its enormous mineral wealth.

6 M.M. Haries, "Namibia - Saga of Grim Struggle", Mainstream, Spl. issue, 17 April 1985, p. 9.

The Bab-Al-Mandeb

The area of Bab AL-Mandeb is consisting of two types of conflicts which area was surrounded by littoral states. The area was divided into two parts viz, (1) Asian Littoral States, and (2) African Littoral States.

Asian Littoral States: The creation and subsequent support given to Israel by the USA has been the most important scenario causing tension in this region. Arabs, who were the inhabitants of the erstwhile Palestine, consider that as the manifestation of the colonial legacy to maintain imperialism and dominance of the west. The remaining nations are facing the struggle for supremacy.

African Littoral States: In this area the littoral states had the conflicts over the demand for great Somalia and the problem of the Eritrean area.

Bilateral Issues and Conflict Situation

There are a number of bilateral issues in Indian Ocean region which create conflict situations. Some of them have even escalated into armed conflicts. One of the major bilateral issues is the dispute over national boundaries. This Indian Ocean region has a number of such conflicting situations. These include the boundary disputes between India and Pakistan, India and China, the then North and South Vietnam, and Iran and Iraq which led to fulfilled armed

conflicts. There are disputes over borders like India and Sri Lanka over Katchathevu island, India and Bangladesh over Moore islands, China and its neighbours, Iraq and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, North and South Yemen and Kenya and Somalia. While some of them have been settled by amicable means, quite a few of them still remain unsolved.

The borders of the newly independent states especially the African States were arbitrarily determined by the colonial powers without any concern for the geographic proximity, ethnic, cultural or religious considerations or natural boundaries. Moreover some of them are so tiny states that their survival as a political entity is very difficult. So most of the newly independent states are plagued with the identity crisis. The problem is more in the case of Africa because it consists of a number of tribes whose tribal loyalty is bound to affect to their loyalty to the concept of Nation State. This dichotomy creates conflicting situation.

The question of identity flares up conflicting situation. The crisis of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hindus in Bangladesh, Chinese in Malaya, Asian in Uganda and Christians in Sudan are some of the examples in which conflicts arose due to ethnic or cultural differences. Different systems of governments in this region also affect the situation. The countries of this region almost have all systems of governments

and they include parliamentary democracy, military dictatorships, monarchies and autocratic rules. Moreover, we have secular as well as fundamentalist states in this region and when they try to propagate the ideas across their natural borders, tensions and conflicts are unavoidable. Some states at times try or perceived as trying to expand their sphere of influence. Iran under Shah over the Persian Gulf, Libya over Chad, Egypt over Sudan, China over its neighbours, India over its neighbours, Syria over Lebanon are some of the examples where actual or perceived expansionist ideas create bilateral issues and tensions.

Arms Build-up

The concept of the arms build-up, which is here being used as a synonym to the military build-up includes (a) arms race, and (b) arms transfers phenomena as well as the other projects of military strength. The new term 'arms build-up' consists of a balanced meaning, as it includes both the domestic and the external aspects of arms in the Third World.⁷ The arms build up stands for all that constitute the coercive capacity and potential of the state, both in the aspects of its external manifestation in the

7 S.D. Muni, Arms Build up and Development, p. 7.

form of foreign and strategic policies and domestic uses as instrument of terror and repression.

The way of arms build-up and development interact with each other and the process of the development variable will be kept in order to work out the implications of arms build up for various developments and to see how various aspects of development impinge upon arms build up. To build up the arms, the country's capability is based on these four categories, (1) Military Expenditure, (2) Armed Forces, (3) Transfer of Arms, and (4) Arms production. In this connection, the Super Powers are well developed and their activities in the Indian Ocean region are dangerous to the Third World.

The decision to build up arms in Deigo Garcia by the US is a threat to the Third World. France appears to be thinking along similar lines, especially after its intervention in Zaire in 1977 and 1978.⁸ It subsequently created its own Rapid Development Force and currently maintains the second largest naval armada in the Indian Ocean.

Spending on Purchase of Arms and the GNP

The military expenditure in per capita terms and in relation to GNP and total governmental spending for leading spenders in the various Third World regions are given for the

⁸ Jasjit Singh, "Indian Ocean Geopolitics and Super Power Rivalry", Mainstream, vol. 23, no. 9, 27 October 1984, p. 10.

period of ten years i.e. from 1967 to 1976 (Table 1).

A large majority of the Third World countries have per capita GNP lower than \$ 500 and their military expenditure accounted for less than five per cent of GNP in 1976. Out of forty-three countries, twenty spent 2 to 4.99 per cent of GNP on defence, nineteen spent 1 to 1.99 per cent and nine spent less than 1 per cent. Among the Third World countries, Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan which deposit is very low per capita GNP spent between five and ten per cent of it on defence.

The leading countries in Third World in military expenditure were: (1) South Asia: India, Pakistan; (2) Far East Asia: Two Koreas and Vietnam; (3) Africa: Libya, South Africa and Nigeria; and (4) West Asia: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. As per the 1975 analysis Iran ranked seventh, Egypt eighth and Saudi Arabia eleventh as military spenders in the whole Third World.

The expenditure of military of West Asia was more than 50 per cent of the entire Third World military expenditure in 1976. And moreover it was more than thrice than that of any other Third World country. The comparison of defence expenditure for 1979-1980 is seen in Table 2.

Sources of Arms Supplies

The source of arms supplies is mainly from western powers. The US is playing an important role in the supply

of arms to the Third World countries, especially to the Gulf region. US military sales to Saudi Arabia totalled \$ 37 billion between 1976 and 1981.⁹ During the period 1980-84 the aggregate figure showed that the US is the leading arms supplier, accounting for almost 40 per cent of total arms exports. Seventy-nine countries were recorded as recipients of major weapons from the US.¹⁰

Next the USSR comes in the supply of arms to the Third World. The Soviet Union supplies the arms to the Third World, especially anti-US policy countries. Soviet sent arms aid and military personnel assistance to Egypt, Syria, South Yemen, Iran and Iraq due to Super Power rivalry. It also supplied arms to Vietnam. During 1980-84 the aggregate figures showed that the USSR is also the major arms supplier accounting for 32 per cent of the total arms exports. 40 countries were recorded as recipients of major weapons (see Table 3). Table 3 indicates the details of expenditure of the Third World, spending on purchasing arms from various countries.

France, Britain also are the major suppliers to the Gulf. According to Saudi Arabia deal report (October 1980)

9 Christopher S. Raj, "The Gulf and the R.D.F.", Strategic Analysis, vol. 7, nos. 2-3, June 1983, p. 148.

10 SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, p. 346.

a massive \$ 3.4 billion worth of arms have been supplied by France. Britain too contracted an arms deal with the Saudi Arabia for \$ 230 million. China has began sending heavy weapons to Thailand for the first time, including 130 mm artillery pieces, 37 mm anti-air craft guns and 85 mm anti-tank guns.¹¹ European countries and the powerful western power USA are supplying arms and military personnel assistance to the Gulf region. But the European countries do not like the Gulf to become a total dependence of the United States. Some Third World countries are capable for self-production of arms in various types. Table 4 indicates the position of each country and the group. Table 5 indicates the arms production group and the rank order of potential arms production of the Third World countries. Finally, the world military expenditure in constant price figures in respect of the Third World has been shown in Table 6.

¹¹ Strategic Digest, vol. 15, no. 12, December 1985, p. 1585.

Table 1

LEADING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE
OF GNP, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY
EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA

Region/Country		1967	1974	1976
	1	2	3	4
<u>West Asia</u>				
Egypt	a.	6.9	14.9	10.5
	b.	15.0	38.0	28.0
	c.	18.4	25.9	19.4
Iran	a.	6.9	118.9	12.2
	b.	48.0	108.0	207.0
	c.	32.5	36.3	16.8
Iraq	a.	10.3	15.7	10.4
	b.	78.0	155.0	114.0
	c.	32.5	36.3	16.8
Saudi Arabia	a.	11.1	5.1	19.4
	b.	403.0	228.0	922.0
	c.	23.1	22.7	23.1
<u>South Asia</u>				
India	a.	1.0	3.1	1.4
	b.	4.0	4.0	5.0
	c.	9.7	21.0	16.4

Table 1 (contd.)

		1	2	3	4
Pakistan	a.		6.0	5.7	5.7
	b.		4.0	9.0	9.0
	c.		20.5	29.8	25.2
<u>Far East</u>					
Indonesia	a.		2.6	2.9	3.6
	b.		4.0	6.0	7.0
	c.		24.7	15.1	15.9
Korea (N)	a.		14.0	8.1	9.6
	b.		57.0	47.0	56.0
	c.		N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Korea (S)	a.		3.9	4.4	4.1
	b.		11.0	22.0	36.0
	c.		22.9	38.3	37.5
Taiwan	a.		10.7	7.1	N.A.
	b.		61.0	64.0	83.0
	c.		48.7	39.9	N.A.
Vietnam (N)	a.		23.3	21.9	-
	b.		25.0	14.0	-
	c.		N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Vietnam (S)	a.		14.8	15.7	N.A.
	b.		30.0	39.0	N.A.
	c.		N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

Table 1 (contd.)

		1	2	3	4
<u>Africa</u>					
Algeria	a.	2.2	2.1	N.A.	
	b.	16.0	16.0	N.A.	
	c.	7.5	6.6	N.A.	
Libya	a.	1.6	2.2	1.6	
	b.	50.0	141.0	86.0	
	c.	5.7	6.6	4.0	
Morocco	a.	2.8	2.3	1.6	
	b.	11.0	16.0	19.0	
	c.	11.5	11.6	8.9	
Nigeria	a.	3.7	3.8	5.3	
	b.	8.0	15.0	23.0	
	c.	N.A.	13.9	12.3	
South Africa	a.	2.6	3.5	5.4	
	b.	31.0	48.0	69.0	
	c.	11.1	11.9	17.2	

Figures to each column are to be

- a. Percentage of GIP
- b. Military Expenditure
- c. Percentage of Central Government Expenditure

N.A. = Not Available

Sources: S.D. Hani, Arms Build Up and Development - Linkage in Third World (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1983), p. 19.

Table 2

COMPARISONS OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, 1979-1982

Country	\$ million ^b			\$ Per capita			% of Government spending ^c			% of GDP/GNP ^d	
	1979	1981	1982	1979	1981	1982	1979	1981	1982	1979	1982
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
<u>Asia</u>											
Bangladesh	157	153	177	2	2	2	20.1	18.4	20.6	1.4	1.6
Burma	190	180	209	6	5	6	24.3	31.2	35.0	3.6	3.5
China	14,590	9,853	9,464	15	10	9	17.8	15.4	15.8	6.8	4.2
India	4,024	5,264	5,556	6	8	8	20.4	22.6	27.6	3.0	3.3
Indonesia	1,653	2,713	2,870	12	18	19	13.7	12.3	12.4	3.2	3.3
Japan	9,120	10,728	10,361	79	91	87	5.3	5.2	5.2	0.9	1.0
Korea(N)	1,363	1,601	1,724	78	87	92	16.0	14.8	14.6	9.8	10.2
Korea(S)	3,181	4,235	4,324	85	111	110	29.5	36.3	36.0	5.2	6.0
Malaysia	1,165	2,037	2,132	85	141	144	16.0	17.4	17.7	5.7	8.2
New Zealand	345	495	476	111	158	151	4.6	5.3	5.1	1.6	2.0
Pakistan	1,278	1,857	1,829	16	22	21	34.9	51.4	45.6	6.4	7.1
Philippines	766	832	910	16	17	18	18.9	13.7	14.8	2.6	2.3

contd....

Table 2 (contd.)

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Singapore	529	789	922	222	323	373	23.4	20.0	22.9	5.7	II.A.
Taiwan	3,197	3,544	3,556	183	195	193	37.7	41.8	42.4	7.9	7.8
Thailand	1,554	1,669	1,822	34	35	38	29.9	25.8	25.3	5.7	5.0
Australia	3,373	4,901	5,028	232	328	331	8.9	10.3	10.1	2.8	3.2
<u>Africa</u>											
Cameroon	83	93	97	10	11	11	9.2	7.4	7.7	1.0	1.7
Ethiopia	432	440	N.A.	14	14	II.A.	42.2	34.0	N.A.	11.2	II.A.
Ivory Coast	97	92	93	12	11	11	6.8	6.6	7.2	1.1	1.2
Kenya	299	198	240	20	11	13	14.3	10.2	13.5	4.9	4.2
Nigeria	1,858	1,858	1,671	25	23	20	7.9	1.0	8.8	2.8	2.5
South Africa	2,458	2,863	2,676	86	95	86	16.7	16.2	15.4	4.3	3.8
Tanzania	505	316	307	28	17	16	30.5	19.1	16.4	11.2	6.3
Zaire	105	N.A.	N.A.	4	N.A.	N.A.	6.8	N.A.	N.A.	1.6	II.A.
Zambia	164	326	N.A.	29	55	II.A.	16.1	22.2	II.A.	4.9	N.A.
Zimbabwe	428	406	385	60	53	51	25.9	17.9	10.3	11.2	5.8

contd...

Table 2 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Middle East												
Algeria	727	807	848	40	41	42	9.7	9.6	9.2	2.2	1.9	
Egypt	1,715	2,100	2,495	42	48	56	13.1	15.0	14.9	9.5	8.6	
Iran	9,938	12,914	15,393	270	331	383	11.5	45.3	46.9	11.5	14.2	
Iraq	2,673	4,572	8,127	213	338	580	N.A.	6.8	N.A.	10.0	N.A.	
Israel	4,517	5,661	6,879	1192	1433	1711	33.0	38.9	44.6	29.8	35.7	
Jordan	440	490	462	141	146	132	25.7	24.6	24.8	17.2	12.1	
Kuwait	992	1,590	1,146	769	1089	735	16.7	8.4	8.0	4.1	5.7	
Lebanon	228	245	162	86	91	59	26.3	20.4	13.0	N.A.	N.A.	
Libya	473	557	709	165	180	220	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1.8	N.A.	
Morocco	923	986	1,328	47	48	61	16.6	16.4	20.3	5.8	9.0	
Oman	779	1,685	1,714	906	1832	1804	40.6	47.5	43.4	22.9	23.9	
Qatar	482	896 ^k	N.A. ^k	2097	3732 ^k	N.A. ^k	N.A. ^k	23.8 ^k	N.A.	N.A.	N.A. ^k	
Saudi Arabia	15467	24254	27062	1796	2602	2796	32.5	27.7	29.6	20.8	17.7	
Sudan	242	318	235	14	17	12	15.1	14.2	14.7	3.2	3.7	
Syria	2,110	2389	2,474	244	257	256	36.6	30.8	29.1	21.1	13.4	

cont d...

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Tunisia		362	211	239	58	32	36	14.8	8.4	9.8	5.0	3.0
UAE		1,480	2,270	2,430	1714	3346	3690	53.3	45.2	47.4	5.6	9.8
North Yemen		351	444	527	62	75	87	36.5	23.9	27.6	15.7	16.4
South Yemen		116	162	159	61	80	76	52.5	48.3	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

b : Current US dollar

c : Based on local currency

d : based on local currency

k : 18 months budget 1982-3.

Source: The Military Balance, 1984-85, pp. 140 and 141.

Table 3

SOURCE OF SUPPLY OF MAJOR WEAPONS TO THE
THIRD WORLD REGIONS

(Figures in US \$ million at constant (1975) Prices.
Shares in percentage. Figures may not add up to
total due to round off.

Country	1980	1984	1986-84	1980-84 Percentage of total exports to Third World
USA	5,577 (36.7)	4,685 (40.4)	27,662 (59.2)	48.2
USSR	6,538 (43.1)	2,532 (21.9)	22,170 (31.8)	76.8
France	1,144 (7.5)	1,242 (10.7)	6,335 (9.1)	80.6
U.K.	431 (2.8)	822 (7.1)	2,972 (4.3)	73.5
F.R. Germany	316 (2.1)	746 (6.4)	2,359 (3.4)	61.0
Italy	366 (2.4)	372 (3.2)	2,219 (3.2)	91.9
China	82 (0.5)	430 (3.7)	1,103 (1.6)	99.4

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, p. 346.

Table 4

Stages of Production Reached by Asian and African Countries Arms Producers,1984^a

Region/Country	Fighter L-Figh- ter Jet Trainer	Light planes Trans- port planes	Hell- copter	Guided missi- les	Major fighter ships Fast attack crafts	Small figh- ter ships	Sub- mari- nes	Main batt- le tank	Arti- llery	Light tank	Small arms	Group
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13

Asia

Burma	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	D
India	5	5	4	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	A
Indonesia	-	5	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	4	C
Korea (N)	(3)	-	-	-	5	5	3	(4)	4	4	4	B
Korea (S)	4	-	4	x	5	5	0	5	-	-	4	B
Malaysia	-	-	-	-	3	5	-	-	-	-	4	D
Pakistan	1	4	2	3	0	1	-	1	-	-	4	C
Philippines	3	5	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	4	C
Singapore	1	1	1	-	4	5	-	1	3	1	5	C ⁴⁵
Taiwan	4	5	3/4	5	4	5	-	1	5	5	5	B
Thailand	-	5	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	4	D

Table 4 (contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
<u>Africa</u>												
Nigeria	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	3	D
South Africa	4	4	1	5	4	5	3	1	5	5	5	B
<u>The Middle East</u>												
Egypt	3	5	3	5	5	5	-	-	3	5	5	B
Iran	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	4	D
Israel	5	5	1	5	5	5	-	5	5	5	5	A

Key to Production Stages:

- 0 = Planned
- 1 = Major overhaul and refurbishment capacity
- 2 = assembly
- 3 = licensed production of components
- 4 = licensed production of weapon systems (imports of sophisticated parts)
- 5 = indigenous design and production
- x = status unknown
- () = estimate
- = nil

a Only the most advanced projects in each category and for each country are registered here.

Key to groups:

- A = diversified and sizeable arms production
- B = production in most categories
- C = production in several categories
- E = limited production.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, p. 333.

Table 5

ARMS PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND POTENTIAL FOR 27
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Country	Arms Production Group	Rankorder of Potential arms production
1	2	3
Israel	A	8
India	A	2
Brazil	A	1
Argentina	A	5
South Africa	B	4
Thailand	B	6
Korea (S)	B	7
Korea (N)	B	N.A.
Egypt	B	10
Chile	C	12
Indonesia	C	9
Peru	C	21
Pakistan	C	19
Singapore	C	9
Philippines	C	15
Colombia	D	17
Mexico	D	3
Iran	D	20
Nigeria	D	23

Table 5 contd.

1	2	3
Burma	D	N.A.
Malaysia	D	22
Thailand	D	16
Venezuela	M.P.	11
Hong Kong	"	13
Algeria	"	18
Zimbabwe	"	24
Uruguay	"	25

N.A. = Not available

M.P. = Marginal Production

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, p. 340.

Table 6

WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN CONSTANT FIGURES
 (Figures are in US \$ mn at 1980 Prices & Exchange Rates)

Country	1974	1977	1980	1983
Total Middle East	28,481	37,256	40,695	[50,000]
Total South Asia	4,569	5,497	6,460	7,865
Total Far East	16,862	21,793	25,898	(30,912)
Total Africa	9,489	12,971	(13,555)	[14,100]
Total Oceania	3,976	3,848	4,270	4,868

Conventions: () Uncertain data

[] Estimated with a high degree of uncertainty

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, pp. 119 and 120.

CHAPTER III

EMERGENCE OF CENTRAL EAST AFRICAN NATIONS

The emergence of Central East African states has taken place in the second half of the twentieth century. The foreign settlers ruled this area up to 1960 and thereafter from 1960 to 1965 the indigenous rulers quarrelled with each other and occupied important positions. During the foreign rule the people of Central and East African States were deprived socially, economically and politically because the British administration from 1894 to 1960 was very suppressive and they kept the natives in a very deplorable suppressed situation. The development was a foreign word, not known to the natives of these countries. Therefore the main cause for the emergence of the Central and East African nations was the urge to govern themselves and develop their countries. It was the question of identification and independence from the colonial masters. Therefore the Central East African States got their identification from the foreigners during the period of 1960-1965.

Identification

The Central African States viz. Rwanda and Burundi got their identification when they were under the control of Germany and Belgium respectively. Indeed in 1916, Belgium

Congo forces defeated the Germans and occupied Burundi and Rwanda.¹ From 1923 to 1961, Burundi was the Southern half of the Belgium territory of Rwanda Urundi.

Burundi


In 1962 Burundi attained independence under the monarch. Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1966 Burundi has been subjected to military rule. Jean Baptist Bagaza, a young military officer, came to power in 1976 and suspended the 1974 constitution and transferred power to a 30-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, which was replaced by the Unite' Pour le Progres National (UPRONA) Central Committee in 1979. (see Chart of successive developments in Burundi).

Rwanda


The Germans took over the region of Rwanda in 1855. It was ceded to Belgium due to World War I and remained under the control of Belgium until the 1960s, which appointed Tutsi leaders for its administration. The Hutu leaders wanted independence from Tutsi domination and succeeded in their goal in 1962, and at the same time the Belgium trusteeship was ended, then the Rwanda became fully independence (see Chart of successive developments in Rwanda).

¹ Gregory R. Copley, Defence and Foreign Affairs - Hand Book (South America: Copley & Associates, 1981), p. 88.

SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURUNDI



SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA



Kenya

The identification of East African state, viz. Kenya was based on constructive work. The activities of nationalist leaders of Kenya made constructive work for recognition and it became a republic within the Commonwealth in 1964 (see Chart of successive developments in Kenya).


Tanzania

The identification of Tanzania began with the arrival of Portuguese rule. Tanzania consisted of two parts i.e. Tanzanyika and Zanzibar. The Zanzibar was separated from Oman in 1861 and became independent Sultanate. The mainland Tanzanyika was mandated by Germans to British after World War I and Britain changed the name of mainland to Tanzanyika. In 1946 the Tanzanyika became trust territory under British administration. Tanzanyika became independent in 1961 and Zanzibar got its independence in 1963. Tanzanyika and Zanzibar agreed to form a United Republic of Tanzania in 1964 (see chart of successive developments in Tanzania).


Uganda

The identification of Uganda was similar to the rest of two East African states. The British first came to this region in 1894. The indigenous leaders fought unitedly against the Britishers. The Uganda got its independence from Britain in 1962 (see Chart of successive developments in Uganda).


SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN KENYA



SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN TANZANIA



SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN UGANDA



With the consolidation of the identification in respect of Central and East African states the entire condition of the indigenous people was of apathy and despair before 1960. After the termination of foreign rule over these states, the local leaders fought against each other for their own recognition. Finally, the Central and East African states got its legitimate independence during the period 1960-65.

Geography of the Central East African States

The geography of any state indicates the location of the country, boundaries of the country, nature of the land and climate of the country. So the geographical outlines of Central African countries viz. Rwanda and Burundi are shaped in the form of human heart. Rwanda and Burundi are located in the central African rift valley, slightly south of the equator in one of the highest laying area of the continent. For these countries the boundaries -- East and West -- converge frontiers of Tanzania and Congo and with North Uganda. Rwanda and Burundi are 'a land of almost ideal beauty', the Switzerland of Africa. The climate of these two countries is generally hot and humid throughout the year. The annual temperature of both countries fluctuates around 68° F.

Kenya is situated on the eastern coast of Africa facing the Indian Ocean and bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, the

Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. Coastal colonies were built up in the 8th century by Arab traders. Uganda is bordered by Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. Uganda is a landlocked country. The borders of Tanzania are Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. Tanzania is located on the east coast of Africa.

Area, Population of Central East Africa

Rwanda and Burundi: Rwanda's area is 25,000 sq km (10,474 sq. miles). The land is almost all arable land, about 33 per cent is under cultivation, 33 per cent is pastureland. Burundi's area is 28,490 sq km (10,744 sq. miles). Its 37 per cent land is arable (67 per cent is cultivated), 23 per cent is pasture, 10 per cent scrub and forest and 30 per cent is others. Both countries' areas landscape consists of hills and valleys scattered with eucalyptus trees and banana groves. It is fertile land for the cultivation of food crops. The fertile region, was described by one writer Duke of Mecklenburge as "a land flowing with milk and honey".²

The people of these two countries are of various types. First, the inhabitants of the Rwanda are called Banyarwanda and Burundi are called Burundi. The population of Rwanda is 4,819,317 and the average annual growth rate is 2.9 per cent. Out of them 90 per cent is Hutu, 9 per cent Tutsi

2 Rele Lesarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 14.

and 1 per cent Twa (Pygmoid). In respect of religions, 45 per cent is Catholic, 9 per cent Protestant, 1 per cent Muslims and the rest is Animist. The population of Burundi is 4,366,000 and the average annual growth rate is 2.4 per cent. Among the people, 85 per cent are Africans, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Pigmy. Some non-African people are there. Out of them, 3,000 are European and 1,000 Asians. Here 60 per cent are Christians. The rest are mostly Animist and a small number of Muslims.

Kenya The area of Kenya is 582,750 sq km (224,860 sq. miles). Out of this land, 21 per cent is forest and wood land, 13 per cent is suitable for agriculture and 66 per cent grassland is adequate for grazing. The population of Kenya is about 15,660,000. The average annual growth rate is 3.6 per cent. The people of Kenya are native African, Asian, European, Arab and others. Out of them 97 per cent are native Africans, 2 per cent Asians, 1 per cent Europeans, Arab and others. Regarding the religions, 56 per cent are Animists, 36 per cent Christians and the rest are Hindus or Muslims.

Uganda The area of Uganda is less than the Kenya and Tanzania, and the percentage of population and average annual growth rate are also less. The area of Uganda is 235,690 sq. km. (91,110 sq. miles). Out of this land 21 per cent is covered with inland water and swamp including territorial waters of Lake Victoria, 21 per cent is cultivated land, 13

per cent is national parks, forests and game reserves, and 45 per cent is forests, wood and grass land. The population of Uganda is 13,457,000 and the average annual growth rate is 3.5 per cent. Among them 99 per cent is African, 1 per cent is European, Asian and Arab.

Tanzania: Tanzania's area is 939,652 sq. km (362,800 sq. miles). Out of this land, 6 per cent is covered with inland water, 15 per cent is cultivated land, 31 per cent grassland and 48 per cent is bush forest woodland.

The population of Tanzania is 17,634,000 and the average annual growth rate is 3 per cent. Tanzania's people are Africans, Asians, Europeans and Arabs. Out of these races, 99 per cent are native Africans consisting of over 100 tribes. The remaining 1 per cent are Asians, Europeans and Arabs. The people of the above races are 40 per cent Animist, 30 per cent Christian, 30 per cent Muslim on the mainland. But in Zanzibar almost all are Muslims.

Nature of Economy and Development Problems

The majority of the people of Central East Africa fall below poverty line, the average income being less than a sixth of the world average.³ As a mode of substance of

3 P.M. Desai, Development Issues in Africa (Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 1982), p. 3.

livelihood, livestock are more important. Yet it has little relevance to the national economy. Agriculture is also important for livelihood of these people.

The main major cash crops in these countries are coffee, cotton, tobacco, tea, livestock and main food crops are manioc, yams, corn, bananas, coconuts, wheat, rice, cassava, sugarcane etc. The major crops and cash crops are compulsory cultivation for these people. Commercial crops also included palm planting along the shores of lake Tanzanyika, and tobacco, barley and wheat in the regions of higher altitude. The Central and East African states are able to export some cash crops like coffee, cotton, tea, coconut products, cashewnuts and the commercial goods, petroleum products, soda ash, pyrethrum, sisal, diamonds etc.

The development problems in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are recognized in their social, economic and political aspects. The socio-economic conditions are very important to understand the problems faced by the people. The main problem is the weak industrial development. The growth of economy of most African nations is very slow and is a colonial legacy of unbalanced development. Substance and farm economy, pastoralism, craft industry and development of socio-economic infrastructure have at best received a little attention. Their inferior economic position in the modern economic sector and very limited educational background gave

them a 'proletarianism' outlook which marked them off sharply from both the intellectuals and the peasantry; yet this kept close psychological and residential connections with the rural sector for support of the rural masses.

The backwardness of transportation, telecommunication and domestic news agencies are also part and parcel of the development problems of Central and East African states. In Central African countries, there are no railway lines. In Eastern states of Africa, Kenya is consisting of only meter gauge railway line; Uganda is having all meter gauge which is single track, and only Tanzania is provided with meter gauge with double tracks. Telecommunication system is also not adequate and radio and T.V. provisions are rare.

Types of Governments and Foreign Policy Pattern

Types of Governments

The type of the Governments of Central and East African states is little different from state to state. All the countries are consisting of the common official title 'Republic', but in the case of Tanzania 'United Republic' is the official name.

Rwanda's government is presidential system in which military leaders hold key offices. The 1962 Constitution is implemented partly. The composition of Rwanda government is the President and a 16-member Cabinet.

Burundi's military government was exerted in 1966 in this state. Next, a republican Constitution was introduced in 1974 which was suspended in 1976. It was replaced by Central Committee in late 1979. Burundi's government consists of the President and a Council of Ministers. There is no legislature.

Kenya is a Republic within the Commonwealth and got independence in 1963. In Kenya the President is the Head of the State and Head of Government. He appoints Vice-President and Cabinet and the latter is responsible to parliament.

Uganda got independence from UK in the month of October 1962. The government is interim parliament and future presidential commission.

Tanzania's government pattern is different from other two eastern states of Africa. In fact, the name 'Tanzania' has come by the formation of two states i.e. the mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar. These two countries agreed to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. The type of government is a single party Republic. The President is elected to the office for a five-year term unless he dissolves the Assembly before its term ends, in which case he must resign and new concurrent election is to be held. The President has a wide range of independent powers.

Foreign Policy Pattern

One can write history, culture of the people, formation of government and problems of a country based on the availability of material. In the case of newly independent sovereign states of Africa, the foreign policy is more or less the same. In this context Dennis Austin says that "the study of foreign policies of the African states must be a doubtful exercise" since most of them were born only yesterday".⁴

Second important point is that in the short span of their life as sovereign independent states, the external policies of some of them have swung from one end to another and back, both in content and style. Third point is that there is difference between declaratory and operational aspects of foreign policies which is difficult to distinguish. And finally, there is the problem of generalisation to discuss the determinants of external behaviour of a single African country, let alone those of 50 odd sovereign independent states. Since their independence the African states are generally following the policies formulated earlier by their colonial masters. Their foreign policy is based on internal and external factors. To find out the stability in this foreign policy the domestic

4 Quoted in Olajide Auko, Foreign Policy of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 1.

setting is the most important as it indicates the nature and status of economy. Without any strong economic base at home, there will be no achievement in foreign policy to develop their countries. The Central and East African states have their relations in various aspects with foreign countries since their independence. So the pattern of foreign policy of each state is hereunder.

Rwanda: Despite it is a member of United Nations and Organisation of African Unity, it remained as one of the poorest countries in Africa. Therefore to develop its economic status, it had ties with Canada, US, Belgium, West Germany and also communist countries including USSR and China. It supported the liberation movement in South Africa. Its defence improvement and state infrastructural development are dependent upon its foreign policy with United States.

Burundi: The foreign policy of Burundi is more or less the same as of Rwanda. It seeks to develop its economic status with the assistance of Belgium, France, US and international organisations.

Kenya: The foreign policy of Kenya is openly aggressive on issues of decolonisation, non-alignment and liberation of African territories under racist regime. According to the essay of John Howell, in 1968 two major stands ran through Kenya's foreign policy. One is a radical stand in the international arena outside the East Africa, and second is a conservative stance within East Africa. His

argument is that it is meant to create national consciousness and national integration. Kenya is trying to solve its border dispute with Somalia through political solution.

It developed foreign relation in the economic aspect with Japan, US, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. Theoretically the principles of non-alignment can be seen in Kenya's relations, but its trade and aid suggests the existence of relatively strong economic and military ties with the West.

Uganda: Uganda has also been drawn into the affairs of its other neighbours, especially the Congo (now Zaire), the Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi, whose internal conflict have led to a large stream of refugees flowing into Uganda. After independence its foreign policy is to maintain peaceful relations with its neighbours. Its foreign policy is not like Kenya and Tanzania. It seeks independence, security, national identity, economic development and Pan-African solidarity in foreign policy spheres.⁵ To develop its economic status, Uganda had its main trade links with Britain, US & Kenya. It has received much of its technical assistance and capital aid from Britain. In 1969, the Russia and China provided loans to Uganda.

Tanzania: The foreign policy of independent Tanzania has been formulated in certain pronouncements made during the British rule. Its emphasis has been on the crucial relationship

5 Susan A urelia Gitelson, "Major Shifts in Recent Ugandan Foreign Policy", African Affairs, vol. 76, no. 304, July 1977, p. 362.

between domestic politics and foreign policy. The foreign policy of the new state, Good stated 'cannot be understood exclusively in the light of domestic necessities, unless the omnipresent task of state building is allowed to illumine the objectives and natives of foreign policy may be seen' which Weinstein argues is a positive instrument in the promotion of the nation's development for the sustenance of its political system or both.⁶ It maintains its foreign policy in the aspects of economy to develop trade and technical services. In view of the self-reliance in domestic and foreign policy the Arush declaration is important as it keeps national integration and identity in its foreign policy.

Tanzania is recognizing the limits of its power in the international system and the role of the Super Power as it did from the outset the presence of China as well as the continued influence of the former colonial power in Africa. So the moves of the Tanzania's foreign policy indicate its quest for principles. With its own principles, Tanzania opposed the colonialism in Africa and racism in South Africa.

Tanzania's application for inter-African politics exposes its commitments to racial equality and non-alignment to inter-African politics. Tanzania's policy is based upon fact that whatever efforts it may make cannot really escape the international environment in which it has to operate. It means

6 David H. John, Foreign Policy of African States, 1977. p-196

its military and economic weakness will, for the foreseeable future, continue to place some limits on its external behaviour.

Bilateral Issues

The bilateral issues in respect of arms and military assistance to the Central and Eastern states of Africa are being discussed.

The Central African countries had dealings with the western countries i.e. France, US and Italy to get aircrafts. The two countries, i.e. Rwanda and Burundi, had their agreements from 1961 to 1973 with the above countries. Rwanda received aircrafts during 1963 and 1973 from Belgium, West Germany, USA, Italy and France. Also, it has acquired the armoured fighting vehicles from Belgium in 1962.

The East African states had agreements to get aircrafts missiles and armoured fighting vehicles from western countries. The individual countries got various types of arms from various foreign countries.

Kenya got supplies during the period 1963-1973 from UK, Canada, France and USA. The main items are aircrafts, naval equipments and armoured fighting vehicles. Kenya signed a defence agreement in November 1963 including a treaty of friendship and co-operation in January 1979 with Ethiopia. Kenya and Somalia agreed in 1981 to control border incursions. The USA had signed a mutual defence and assistance agreement with Kenya in 1980.

Uganda also received military equipment on agreements from West Germany, Israel, UK, USA, USSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France and Italy during 1964-1973. The Soviet Union has given military aid to Uganda in 1980.

Tanzania had agreements with the western countries and USSR and China to get equipment for defence development. Tanzania had military assistance agreement with China and some pilots went to China for training.

National Perspective and Need for Arms Development

The nature of the governments and the country's territory are mainly responsible for the building up of the arms in the region. Almost half of African countries which number about 52 were ruled by military origin. They number about 22. Countries of mixed military and civilian origin number 3. Eighteen countries have been under military rule for more than a decade. At least 13 have had their regimes, being overturned by two or more military coups. And many of the remainders have been threatened by the attempted coups. There is definite element of instability and therefore the rulers, whether civil or military ensure by making huge investments on the arms-build up.

The power in most African states, both under military and civilian, is distributed and held on to by control of the state security apparatus and organized military force. The

vital cause to build up the arms in each country is to protect themselves from frequent coups and threats from outside, which may occur any time. The patterns of coups or the conflicts in African countries are the outcome which stems directly of the colonial rule and the incompetences of decolonialization and the artificial nature of many post-colonial states.

When the situation is covered by the jeopardy movements, it was necessitated to build and develop the arms, keeping in view the main points - security, internal repression, the need of ideology and national identity and imperialism. Because of these reasons the African military expenditure tripled between 1967 and 1976. As the percentage of Africa's gross national product devolved to military expenditure during 1967-76, incurred from 2.3 per cent to 3.4 per cent, which is the great increase than any other region except the near East.

Tanzania's share went up from 0.9 per cent to 3.5 per cent. The build up of forces in Uganda, Tanzania shook the government in Nairobi. A state government official explains: "In terms of all its neighbours, Kenya has the smallest armed forces. Its present equipment is of World War II vintage. No question about it, Kenya found itself at last in the Kenyan President 'Moi' who came to Washington for acquiring arms." The recent border fighting between the

East African communities had played havoc with the Tanzanian economy and necessitated heavy arms shipment to Dar-es-Salaam. African arms imports went up for \$ 200 million in 1967 to more than \$ 2 billion in 1976. During the 10-year span the percentage of total imports devoted to arms purchases by African countries is more than any other region in the world. It is an alarming and fragile situation which needs proper care and analysis.

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CHAPTER IV

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS

The defence capability of Central and East African states is by no chance competent in the modern world. Because till today the legacy of colonial military policy was existed in this region and still these states depend upon outside military forces, that too, even for the training purposes.

The capabilities in defence are based on the nature of the countries' resources i.e. source of income and training of human resources. When compared to the Third World countries, the Central East African countries are very poor despite having some natural resources to develop their defence capability. The defence capabilities of individual Central and East African states have been discussed hereunder.

Burundi

Burundi's defence capability is less. It has only 5,200 armed forces and moreover all services form part of the Army. It has to get development in defence at the cost of jeopardizing its economic development. It has two infantry battalions, one para-military battalion, one commando battalion and one armed car company. In its army some shoreland armed cars, Valid Armoured Personnel Carriers, Recoilless Launchers are there. Only 15 squad 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns are there.

Burundi's navy strength is very poor and has a strength of 50 men. It has only 3 Lambro Patrol boats with 2 in reserve. Burundi's Air Force strength is 3 times of its naval force strength. It has 150 men. It has 3 SF-260W counter insurgency, 3 DC-3, 2 DO-27 transport, 2 Gazelle and 3 Alouette III helicopters. Its para-military strength is 1,500.

Rwanda

Rwanda's total armed force is 5,500, out of which army strength is 5,000. All services of this country form part of the army only. The manpower and formation of this country's army is: 1 Commando battalion, one Reconnaissance squadron, 8 infantry companies and 1 Engineer Company. It has armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank guns and Blindicide Rocket Launchers. There is no naval capability. Its air force strength is 150. Rwanda's capability in air force is only 2 Defenders, 2SF-260 W counter insurgency, 1 Caravelle (VIP), 2 C-27, 2 Rallye 235 G Transports, 3 AM-3C liaison, 1 megister training aircraft and 6 SA-342 L, 2A Louettes III helicopters.

Kenya

Kenya is consisting of 13,650 strong armed forces divided into Army, Navy and Air Force. Its army is 13,000 with 2 brigades (one with 2 infantry battalions and one strong with 3 infantry battalions), 2 armed battalions,

1 armed reconnaissance battalion, 2 artillery battalions, 2 engineer battalions, 1 independent air cavalry battalion, 6 infantry battalions, 1 para-military battalion, 76 battle tanks (model 3) 30 AML 60 30-90; 8 shoreland armed cars, 50 UR-416, 12 Panhard M-19 etc.¹ The strength of the navy of Kenya is 650 men. There are 4 Brooke Marine FAC (G), 2 with Gabriel SSM, 3 Vosper 31 metre (Simba) large patrol craft. Kenya has its naval base at Mombasa. The air force of Kenya was disbanded in 1982. The capability of Kenya in respect of air force is inventory 28 combat aircrafts, 2 F-5F fighter ground attack, 5 BAC-167 strike meters, 12 Hawk T52 coin, 5 DHC-4 Caribou, 6 DHC-5D Buffals, 1 Turbo commander, 1 Navajo light transport, 14 Bulldog 103 training aircrafts etc.

Uganda

Uganda's population itself is less. So the defence capability of this country is inadequate even among the three eastern regions. The army strength of this country is 18,000. There is a plan to increase it to 20,000. It has 3 brigades headquarters and some 18 infantry battalions. Another type of battalion is IOT-34/-54-55. There are 3M-4 main battle tanks. It is maintaining OT-64 and Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers, 40 23mm, 40mm anti-aircraft guns. It has a strength of 100 men out of army persons for its air force. There are 6 AS-202 training aircrafts. Uganda has its para-military forces consisting of Armed Police Special Force of 3,000.

¹ The Military Balance, 1985 (London: IISS, 1985), p. 78.

Tanzania

Tanzania is bigger in area, population and defence capabilities than the rest of the eastern states of Africa, i.e. Kenya and Uganda. Its total armed force is 40,350. Out of this strength of the army is 38,500. The remaining 20,000 is in the navy and air force. Tanzania's Army headquarters has two divisions, besides 8 infantry brigades, 1 tank battalion, 2 field artillery battalions, 2 anti aircraft artillery battalions, 2 mortar battalions, 1 surface to air missile with SA-3, SA-6, 2 anti-tank battalions, 2 signals battalions. Now it has 30 Chinese type 59 Main Battle Tanks, 30 Chinese type 62 Main Battle Tanks, 20 (BRIM-2) Scout Cars. It maintains guns in the size of 82 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm and 120 mm mortars. Most of the anti-aircraft guns are Chinese.

Tanzania's navy force has 850 men. For its navy it imported foreign armaments from Germany (GDR) and China. It has 10 FAC(G), 6 Chinese Shanghai-II, 4 GDR P-6, 4 Chinese Huchawan Hydrofoil FAC(T), and 12 Coastal Patrol Crafts. It has a naval base at Dar-es-Salaam and Zanzibar. Tanzania's air force has seen a little progress among the East African states. Its forces have to get adequate training abroad. Its air force strength is 1,000. There are 29 combat aircrafts. It has also 3 Chinese fighters squadron. Aircrafts meant for fighting are 11 F-7, F-6 and F-4. It has one transport squadron. Tanzania's intention to develop its air force can be seen the way how it is providing facilities to its air force for training abroad. There are trainers i.e. 2 MIG-15 UTI,

6 Cherokee, 6 Cessna 310, 2 404. It also had helicopter Nos. 2-Bell 47G, 5AB-205, 6AB-206 (on order AN-26, AN-32 transport aircraft). Tanzania maintains para-military forces and marine units. It has citizens militia of 50,000.

All Central and East African states need defence requirements in army, air force and navy. The East African state, Tanzania, is developing its relations with foreign countries to improve its defence capacity and is having training facilities in foreign countries. In Central African countries, Burundi and Rwanda are very poor in defence capabilities. So the Central East African states have to improve to strengthen its defence. More defence expenditure is indispensable to these regions to develop the defence capabilities.

Local Resources and Training of Human Resources

The local resources and training of human resources are not solely the concern of states on continent itself. The facilities for training of defence are very less, and almost all the African states depend heavily for training and equipment on the developed countries.² If these countries depend upon the developed countries for military training and assistance, it may lead to threats to stability and drain on local economic

² David Wood, "The Armed Forces in African States", (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 3.

resources. The sophisticated equipments are financially expensive to maintain, besides putting unnecessarily strain on the limited reservoir of technically trained manpower. Small proportion of the Gross National Product, even less than 2 per cent, spent on arms and equipments may have an inflationary effect on a weak economy, because so little of the expenditure benefits local supplies.

Training of human resources could not be developed in the native states properly. The indigenous army is still being trained at various foreign countries. The weakness of military and economy of the concerned country are affected by the involvement of Great Powers and this type of involvements since 1964 can be seen in African countries, especially in the starkest possible wars. Thus it is clear that the stability of Africa in respect of training of human resources is strictly dependent upon foreigners. This particular situation depends today on two reasons, viz. (1) on the willingness of local armed forces to behave in a politically responsible fashions; and (2) on the ability of the major powers to inhibit the supply of sophisticated arms and so prevent local arms races. The local resources of Central and East African states is mainly dependent on economic development. Particularly all the economic analysis of development problems in Africa comes out with the conclusion that a necessary condition for faster industrial growth in most countries is a larger size of market, and that

the small economic size of most African countries is a severe handicap in establishing industry. The East African Common Market (of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) has in large part been preserved through the Treaty for East African Co-operation which came into effect on 1 December 1967.³

Due to lack of technological development in Africa the local resources and training of human resources are less. Now the world technological progress is likely to make possible a big step forward in bringing African countries into closer communication with each other. With the development of technology the industries can produce substitutes for imported light consumer goods and might offer more labour intensive possibilities when established to cater for the domestic markets than would be the case when they produce for regional or sub-regional markets.

By and large the industrial development in East and Central Africa was less pronounced than North and West Africa. Therefore in the growth of the economy in the East and Central African states, the importance has been given to the basic facilities such as power, transport, communication and water supply for the expansion of industry. However, Africa is a producer of variety of the raw materials which go to the making of long list of intermediate goods that in turn are used in manufacturing in the continent.

³ J.S. Uppal and R.S. Louis, Africa Problems in Economic Development (New York: The Free Press, 1972). p. 20

Training by Foreign Experts

The countries of East and Central Africa are not full-fledged in their defence capabilities. From the beginning their development in defence depend upon foreign experts, because till the year 1960 the African countries are under the control of colonial powers. After their independence the African states were started to know the development of their defence components. Due to lack of knowledge in technology the Central and East African countries are acquiring defence knowledge by getting training from foreigners.

Kenya: Britain's base in Kenya was evacuated by 12 December 1964. Under an agreement of March 1964 the British army will continue to train Kenyans and the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy will use Kenyan facility. Britain agreed to provide air, logistical and technical support for the operations in the North East frontier. Kenya has another defence agreement with Ethiopia for training facility. There are reports that some students from Kenya were sent to Eastern Europe in April 1964 under the auspices of political party KANU, for military training. Some other reported to have had guerrilla warfare training in China and also there were over 50 Kenyan officers and NCOs undergoing military training in the United Kingdom.

The United States has also given military assistance to Kenya to upgrade Kenya's defence capabilities. This has

consisted primarily of communication equipments, ammunition, spare parts and training. In 1980 Kenya agreed to grant the US rights of access to military and port facility.⁴ Basing on this decision, the Kenyan Government got opportunity to expect more and substantial military assistance from United States.

Uganda: Uganda received basic military equipments from Britain before independence. Now all the British officers have been withdrawn. But some Ugandan army personnel are under training in Britain. Uganda had an agreement with Israel to give training to its personnel for the air force. A few cadets of Uganda are getting training in India and Pakistan. The Government of North Korea has sent a small team of defence officers to Uganda for training purposes. Its neighbouring country, Tanzania, provides instructors under a defence pact signed in August 1981.

Tanzania: To expand its army and to strengthen it, Tanzania have arms and training facilities from various countries in the past including Britain, West German, USSR, Netherland and Indonesia. US security assistance is confined to educational training. Tanzania rejected British proposals of military aid in March 1964, and all British officers have now been withdrawn. However, some Tanzanians cadets are now being trained in the United

⁴ Gregory R. Copley, Defence and Foreign Affairs, p. 338.

Kingdom. In 1965 there were Chinese military units in Tanzania but now they have left. Moreover some small number of arms, anti-tank guns heavy machine guns were supplied from China to Tanzania before Zanzibar revolution. The Soviet Union has also given training to the army of the mainland and Zanzibar. The Canadian Government has also agreed to provide staff for a military academy in Tanzania.

Burundi and Rwanda The Central African countries (Burundi and Rwanda) were trained with the troops of Belgians. Burundi has a 40-member Belgium troop for advising on training and equipment. The spending on this assistance is BF 25 millions. In the case of Rwanda, about 30 Belgian officers and NCOs remain as advisers. The estimated cost of this military assistance for 1965 was BF 14 millions.

The post-independence period of the African states shows the deterioration of defence strength in view of the economic development priorities. So these countries had some defence pacts, agreements with various western countries to improve their defence capabilities. The African nations are acquiring new military capability at uneven rates, and this trend together with non-African countries intervening on the continental affairs spoils, rather than solve the inter-state military conflicts.

Infrastructure Development for Armed Forces

The infrastructure development of land forces, air forces and naval forces of Central East African countries is slowly taking place of improvement from the colonial period till date. Actually these countries are not in a position to develop the defence capability with their own technology and equipment. They are dependent upon other developed countries. After acquiring the knowledge of invention of armaments in various types relating to land, air and naval forces, they are in a position to show their national inventories and armour artillery in service.

Kenya: Kenya invented and developed its infrastructural equipment of land, air and naval forces including Star Pistols, Sterling sub-machine guns, Fabrique nationale, Fusil Automatique Le gere rifles, machine guns, Brandt mortars, Carl Gustars recoilless launchers, combat, Milan anti-tank guided weapons and swing fire anti-tank guided weapons. Its developed land force has brigades, armed battalions, armed reconnaissance battalions, artillery battalions and engineer battalions. Its naval development is not so competent but it is having Brooke Marine FAC(G) Gabriel SSM supplied by Israel.

Its air force was disbanded in 1982 and its inventory 28 combat aircrafts, Strike Master, Caribou, Buffilo, Turbo Commander are existing in the service at present. The equipment

in service is consisting of various types of weapons,⁵ Tanks, Reconnaissance Vehicles, anti-missile launchers and shorelands. There are also Towed Artillery multiple rocket launchers, light guns and anti-air systems.

Uganda: Uganda's infrastructural development in land, air and naval forces is less than that of Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda's national inventories are pistols, sub-machine guns, rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tanks and air defence.⁶ Hence, Uganda is improving its infrastructural development in land and air forces.

Tanzania: The East African states are developing the infantry weapons. Its national inventories in land, air and naval forces are the same, but there may be some difference in quantity. Tanzania's national inventories are pistols, sub-machines, rifles, machine guns, mortars and anti-tanks. Tanzania's armoured and artillery equipments in service are tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, towed artillery multiple rocket launchers and anti-air system.

5 F. Foss Christopher, Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1985-86 (New York: Jane's Publications, 1985), p. 906.

6 V. Hogg Ivan, Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1985-86 (New York: Jane's Publication, 1985), edn. 11, p. 930.

Burundi and Rwanda Among these two countries, the infrastructural development in land and air, and naval forces is lesser than the Eastern states of Africa, especially in the equipment in service. The equipment in service of Burundi in various weapons is in small numbers. They are reconnaissance vehicles, shoreland, armoured personnel carriers, Valid Panhard, Towed artillery multiple rocket launchers. In the case of Rwanda it has only one armoured personnel carriers and two Towed artillery multiple rocket launchers.

The infantry weapons recorded as national inventories are the same in the case of Burundi and Rwanda. Burundi and Rwanda have pistols, sub-machine guns, rifles, machine guns, mortars and anti-tanks. Therefore the Central African states also are improving their infrastructural development in land, air and naval forces at their level best. Hence the East African states are comparatively developed in the infrastructural development of land, air and naval forces.

Sources of Supplies

The African countries are not developed economically and politically. To acquire adequate knowledge and to improve their strength in defence, these countries depend upon developed western and West European countries. At present condition of these countries shows its near total dependence on others. Besides these countries are not well developed economically. They

are ready to face the expenditure to invest on purchasing the arms. The following table is indicating the value of arms transferred to the Central and East African states by the major suppliers during 1974-1978:⁷

Table 1

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICAN STATES BY THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS

(million current 1980 dollars for 1974-78)

Recipient country	Total	USSR	FRA	FRG	Italy	US	Czl.	UK	PRC	Canada	Others
Burundi	15	15	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rwanda	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Kenya	100	-	-	5	-	50	-	40	-	5	-
Uganda	120	110	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	180	110	-	-	5	-	-	-	30	-	40

⁷ Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Arms for Africa (Toronto: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1983), pp. 8-9.

In 1974 Tanzania's dependence for arms has been shifted from the People's Republic of China to USSR. Tanzania played a major role as an avenue of transit in the Rhodesian conflict. Most of the weapons deployed were from China only. Up to the end of the year 1979 there was no significant USSR's advisory role in Tanzania. But in 1980 Tanzania purchased some tanks, artillery and aircrafts from the USSR. Tanzania, thereby, showed a desire to maintain links with USSR as an arms purchaser. Many of the African states appear to ignore the critical diversion of financial and human resources that such a programme represents. In addition such development is not possible without the assistance in the form of technology transfer, licencing, and co-production, agreements of some industrial states that demand political influence for arms already supplied.

Being an arms supplier the US is playing a vital role in Third World, especially in African states. The US foreign aid programme in Africa, Asia and Latin America is of fairly recent origin. For over three decades, particularly in 1960s when most African states achieved independence, aid has been an instrument of US foreign economic policy.⁸ The foreign aid and development programmes in Africa began systematically only after World War II. After the war, Britain, France and to a lesser extent Portugal, extended economic assistance to their

⁸ Feraidoon Shams B., "American Policy: Arms aid in Africa", Current History, vol. 77, July-August 1979, p. 9.

colonial states.

The majority of the African states have not yet achieved the transition from colonial dependency to independence. Pervasive poverty, illiteracy, absence of entrepreneurs, drastic shortage of capital and stratification patterns based on ethnic problems permeated the social fabric of the states. And other sabotage activities like coups and counter-coups, separatist movements, armed campaigns and shifting alliances render many African societies unsuitable for viable economic change and development. Thus African problems are further aggravated by adverse climate and physical condition. Extreme heat and humidity in tropical zones impede development efforts. Under these circumstances economic productivity, industrialization and improvement in Africa's outlook cultivation methods become difficult task. Due to under-development of these countries' economy, they naturally seek foreign aid. Their development requires adequate capital resources, a cadre of educators, engineers, doctors, lawyers, technocrats and most important highly developed institutions of learning for scientific research.

Taking the advantage of all the causes for the under development of African states or the Third World countries the Super Powers are playing vital role by supplying arms. The USA and the USSR are the biggest arms traders. Together they supply some 70 per cent of the weapons exported to the Third World. France comes next, accounting for 12 per cent, then

Italy with 5 per cent and the United Kingdom with 4 per cent. The top five arms exporters have captured between them over 90 per cent of the global arms trade.

The latest report of arms supply is available in the case of France. The available data shows that France emerged as the biggest arms supplier to the Third World in 1984. French arms sales were over \$ 5 billion out of the total \$ 16.98 billion acquired by the Third World.⁹ (see Table 2) The big two, the US and the Soviet Union were able to sell arms worth \$ 2.8 billion and \$ 3.7 billion respectively.

Table 2

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERRED TO THIRD WORLD

Country	Value in million \$
France	5,645
Soviet Union	3,694
USA	2,823
Brazil	1,910
Britain	1,338

⁹ Sreedhar, "Arms Transferred to the Third World", Strategic Analysis, vol. 9, no. 5, August 1985, p. 539.

Total Spending on Percentage of GNP

The expenditure of arms is very important to a country. The Government will concentrate to allocate the amount for defence equipment. The military expenditure may rise basing on the necessity of arms to the country. The following points are responsible for the growth in military expenditures¹⁰

- (1) Security considerations
- (2) Internal repression
- (3) The inefficiencies of the budgetary process
- (4) The existence of a military industrial complex
- (5) The vested interest of the military establishment
- (6) Imperialism

For the security of a country, the Government will purchase the latest equipments. If there is no proper security to the country, especially in the military regimes, the anti-social elements or the outside power may take advantage to destroy the functions of the Government, and hamper the development of the country to get political power or economic influence in the country. So the country has to control the internal repressions. The military expenditure is motivated by the desire to ensure the geographical sovereignty of the nation, in terms of attempts at conquest from without and attempts at

¹⁰ David K. Mynors, The Economics of Third World - Military Expenditure (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979). p-16

separation from within. However, the military is also an important force in the maintenance of political sovereignty within a country. The need to develop the military strength in less developed countries is not primarily due to the fear of external aggression, but it is indispensable for maintaining their geographical unity.

In the budgetary process, defence budgeting is an organizational routine reflecting the interplay of strategic objectives and natural resource constraints. The state will decide how the natural resources will be allocated for the defence establishment. A number of less developed countries characterized by imperfect socialization and the inadequate establishment of civilian rule, have experienced increase in defence expenditure prompted by pressure from the military itself.

Uganda is a case as Lofchie (1972) has shown. Concerning himself primarily with Amin's seizure of power in 1971 he finds it necessary to go back to 1964 and the East African military in order to fully understand the nature of the coup d' etat. Kenya's policy was to remove the ring leaders and steps were taken to enhance the professional standing of the armed forces along conventional developed country lines. After 1964 there was a great tendency to educate indigenous officers at foreign military academies.

The reasons for the growth of military expenditure have been disclosed. The military expenditure, GNP, Central

government expenditure for the period 1973-1983, the arms transfers, total imports and exports (1973-83) and finally the value of arms transfer, cumulative for the period 1979-83 by major suppliers and recipient countries will be shown in the following tables (see table 3)

Table 3

MILITARY EXPENDITURE, GNP, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE, 1974-83 OF CENTRAL EAST AFRICA
(dollars in millions)

Country	Year	Military Expenditure		Military Expenditure		
		Current	Constant 1982	GNP	GGE	per capita constant 1982 dollar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Burundi	1974	11	20	2.5	11.4	5
	1977	18	26	2.7	12.4	6
	1980	33	38	3.6	17.8	9
	1983	41E	40E	3.2	16.1	8
Rwanda	1974	10	18	2.1	17.7	4
	1977	15	23	2.1	15.8	5
	1980	21	24	1.9	12.9	4
	1983	21E	20E	1.4	10.1	3

contd...

Table 3 (contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kenya	1974	32	59	1.4	6.7	4
	1977	77	113	2.4	11.1	7
	1980	213	248	4.4	15.3	15
	1983	138	133	2.1	6.9	7
Tanzania	1974	69	126	3.1	12.1	8
	1977	100	148	3.1	12.2	9
	1980	125	146	2.8	7.5	7
	1983	122E	117E	2.5	6.3	5
Uganda	1974	114	207	3.3	19.5	18
	1977	76	112	1.8	21.0	9
	1980	35	41	0.9	28.4	3
	1983	61	58	1.0	N.A.	4

E Estimate based on partial or uncertain data.

Source: World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1985, pp. 56, 69, 79, 83 and 84.

The value of the arms transfers and total import and exports for the period 1973-83 is indicated in Table 4.

Table 4

VALUE OF ARMS IMPORTS BY CENTRAL EAST AFRICA
DURING 1974-83

Country	Year	Arms imports © (million dollars)		Arms imports Total imports
		Current	Constant 1982	
Burundi	1974	0	0	0.0
	1977	10	14	13.5
	1980	10	11	5.9
	1983	0	0	0.0
Rwanda	1974	0	0	0.0
	1977	0	0	0.0
	1980	10	11	4.1
	1983	0	0	0.0
Kenya	1974	0	0	0.0
	1977	10	14	0.7
	1980	60	69	2.3
	1983	50	47	3.9
Tanzania	1974	20	39	4.0
	1977	60	88	8.0
	1980	80	93	6.3
	1983	30	28	N.A.
Uganda	1974	5	9	3.0
	1977	5	7	2.0
	1980	10	11	3.4
	1983	30	28	7.8

© To avoid the appearance of excessive accuracy, arms transfer data have been independently rounded, with greater severity for large numbers. Because of this rounding and the fact that they are obtained from different sources, world arms exports do not equal world arms imports.

Source: World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1985, pp. 98, 111, 121, 125 and 126.

Now table 5 indicates the value of arms transfer, cumulative for the 1979-83 by major supplier and recipient country.

Table 5

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS, CUMULATIVE 1979-83
BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO CENTRAL EAST AFRICA
(Millions current dollars)

Suppliers	Recipients				
	Burundi	Kwanda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Soviet Union	20	-	-	270	10
United States	-	-	60	-	-
France	10	-	110	-	20
United Kingdom	-	-	130	10	20
West Germany	5	5	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	30	-	-
China	-	10	-	40	-
Others	10	10	120	70	100
Total	45	25	450	390	150

Source: World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1985, pp. 131 and 132.

The major arms suppliers are the Super Powers followed by the West European countries. The motivation behind the supply of arms is to gain political or economic influence in Third World countries or to acquire military bases. The second category suppliers believe that selling weapons help their economies particularly in times of recession. And also important is that the economies of arms sale to be had from long production runs. By selling arms abroad producing countries reduce the cost of those same weapons for their own armed forces. Also countries want to recover the enormous research and development costs involved in modern weapon design and construction. And of course, commercial firms apply considerable political pressure on governments to persuade them to grant export licenses for this lucrative trade. Regarding the motivation of arms sales, Andrew Pierse stresses the political impact of the arms trade and "arms sales", he says, "are a barometer of politics among nations".¹¹

As alliances, the use of regional bases and the credibility of the threat of direct action decline, arms sales, he believes, acquire a new significance in world affairs a significance likely to increase in the foreseeable future. Pierse draws this conclusion for several reasons, because arms

¹¹ Frank Branaby, Future War, 1984, p. 150. Andrew J. Pierse has stated the above statement in his book The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 1982.

transfers will be a major element in increasing East-West competition in Third World, because the rise of regional powers will stimulate large arms purchases, and because the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries will, by creating a more fragmented world in which local military power will often be of greater importance within the Third World increase rather than decrease the incentives to acquire conventional weapons.

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CHAPTER V

LIMITED RESOURCES AND FUTURE PLANS

Central and East African states have limited economic natural resources. These include all land, forests, fisheries, animals, labour, water and mineral resources. On the other hand man-made resources are production inputs like capital, equipment and raw materials, man-made forests and waters, labour skills, technology and land improvement. The land resources help humanity with the nature and potential of agricultural and livestock production. So the livestock production and the land uses that are important for welfare and as revenue sources. Forests are a source of saw mills, pulp and paper, charcoal, fuel-wood and industries depend on wood products, including furniture workshops, boats making, fencing, electricity and telephone services.

Fisheries resources include oceans and inland lakes and rivers. The fishery resources from East and Central Africa have a good potential fish and fish products for internal consumption and export. Water and other energy resources in Africa are the lowest in the world. Because of the Sahara desert, the Kalahari desert, and the arid and semi arid areas in almost all parts of the continent, Africa has a great wealth and abundance of water resources.¹ The water resources include

¹ M. Wai Dunstan, Interdependence in a World of Unequals (Colorado: West View Press Boulder, 1982), p. 84.

renewable and non-renewable energy resources.

Renewable energy resources include hydropower, thermal power, solar energy, wind power, and ocean energy resources. Non-renewable energy resources include crude oil, natural gas, uranium and thorium. Apart from all the sources of the income, the average per capita income for Africa was \$166 in 1978. The figure of the per capita income indicates the bad condition of the Africa's place in the world progress.

The main occupation of Central and East African countries is agriculture. It is not enough to expand and improve agriculture through irrigation. Keeping this point in view the "Plan for Action" of the New International Economic Order recommends that particular attention be paid to strategic mineral resources that are essential for establishing basic industries that make intermediate products such as iron and steel, aluminium, base metals, petro-chemical products, fertilizers and cement. Moreover the mechanical power which can handle the marketing (agricultural output) storage arrangements and transport facilities are not increased. Due to this deficiencies in the food trade about 40 to 50 per cent of the food produced in these countries is wasted.

The sources of income in various aspects are very limited in Central and East African states as discussed above. Among the Central and East African countries Rwanda and Burundi are the least developed countries basing on their mineral,

agricultural and other resources. Even though the continent itself seems to be well endowed with resources, a disproportionate number of people in the population of the continent is under-nourished and under-privileged.² It is a situation where a continent is well endowed but the people are poor in situation of anomalous under development.

In general the national economies in Africa are very small. In thirty-eight African states the agricultural sector accounted for more than 20 per cent of GDP and fifteen states for more than 40 per cent. Because in most African countries the agricultural sector is very poor, to achieve such a high proportion of GDP requires extremely high proportion of workers engaged in agriculture and is a largely continent of agriculturalists.³ Regarding the future plan in terms of African economy as a whole, there is also a slow process of attempting to indigenize control and decision making in major industries and firms.

Burden of Arms Build up on Economy and Population

The burden of arms build up on economy is a vital issue to the regions of Central East Africa, because the economic condition of these countries is weak. But it is indispensable for each country to build up arms to protect the

2 Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition (London: Heinemann Ibadan, Nairobi, 1980), p. 72.

3 Ieuan LL. Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 116.

society from violence and invasions of others. These regions may not have capability of indigenous production of arms to tackle the critical problems. By purchasing weapons, these countries have to face the problem which is ultra-burden. Basing on the above condition up to 1980, the African arms import rose faster than in any other regions of the world. The gap between the most and least armed African states increased alarmingly. During the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a spate of military coups. Since then about half of the states in the region have been ruled by governments of military origin. Because of these coups in the early of 1970s the military expenditure of African countries continued to rise in spite of recession, reaching a peak in 1976-77, when they were approximately double to their level from 1970.⁴

It is true that the region has been badly hit by global economic crisis in the mid 1970s by a combination of external borrowing and internal adjustment in their economies without a major decline in GDP growth. But the effect of military spending on economic performance and whether increased spending in the 1960s and 1970s bears any responsibility for the economic crisis which has beset the region, are difficult to determine. Like military spending, arms transfers to the African continent rose sharply during 1970s, taking off and eventually declining in the early 1980s. Military spending or

4 SIPRI Yearbook, 1985, p. 296.

arms transfers to these African countries is an unavoidable issue during and after 1970s. Because the recycling of oil revenues had a major impact on African purchases of major weapons during and after the two "Oil Shocks" of the 1970s.

To build up arms, the Central and East African states are bearing burdens since their economic development continued to depend on foreign technology, training strategies and expertise. So the growth of the state depends on the form of expropriation, the only way funds could be gathered on an extensive scale from cultivators. Thus the burden to build up the arms within the country's economic capacity has been defused to various aspects of sources of income in these regions.

As far as the defence burden is concerned, the developed country sample displays quite a strong negative correlation. High burdens are associated with lower, rather than high incomes. The economy of Central and East African states is low percentage. The people of these countries have to face the expenditure of arms by purchasing or if it is possible to get a little production within states. In these countries arms production programmes are also motivated by economic rationale. It may also provide an incentive for technical manpower to remain in the country and to reduce the brain drains. The motives for producing arms is that the most important factor driving Less-Developed Countries to produce arms can be summarized quite easily; autonomy, that is,

freedom of action in the domestic and international spheres.⁵ Therefore even if it is a burden on expenditure of their country, the motivation to build up the arms is indispensable and incentive spirit to strengthen their defence capability.

Level of Foreign Indebtedness

By getting loans, purchasing the weapons and the expenditure for self production, the states have to invest a good amount. Naturally when the government is investing such huge amount on arms, it can have the bilateral agreements with the foreign countries to meet the expenditure. So that these Central and Eastern states of Africa had the debts by this particular aspect. These countries will repay the amount in kind or cash as the case may be as per the agreement. Now the East African countries especially Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and the Central African countries -- Burundi and Rwanda -- have foreign debts basing on its condition and necessity. The condition and necessity of these countries have forced them to go into the indebtedness by getting loans, purchasing the arms for its defence development and some material for its self-production.

The condition of these countries is the development from colonialization to independent governments, famines, diseases and under-development in agriculture. When the people

⁵ James Everett Ketz, Arms Production in Developing Countries (Toronto: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1984), p. 4.

are suffering from these bad conditions, the civil disobedience will appear and increased corruption and general breakdown of law and order pose a new flash point of conflict.

Due to the above conditions and to settle the problems, the debt services will be started. The debts and debt service charges of Third World countries have now reached the levels which threaten the banking system and financial centres of the world. The African countries of Central and East are poor, despite they have to pay the interest also for which they got loan from developed countries. These countries' heavy debt burden arose through the combination of modest development ambition and external events beyond the control of these countries.

In 1960s and early 1970s most debts were incurred for development work. This was very often infrastructural and thus not directly revenue earning on very long terms plans. But the debts incurred for long term capital investment are now by no means the whole of the problem or indeed the major part of it. For these debts the African countries have to pay the high interest from their poverty not from their abundance. The oil shocks of 1973 onwards are also the main causes for these debts. Africa as a whole has a debt of between 150 and 200 billion US dollars; of this over 90 billion dollar is owed by sub-Saharan Africa alone.⁶

⁶ Julius K. Nyerere, "Africa and the Debt Crisis", African Affairs, vol. 84, no. 337, October 1985, p. 491.

According to World Bank's report of 1984 the low income of Africa, between 1973 and 1981, is due to loss of about 23 per cent in purchasing power of its exports to buy manufacture. In addition, the oil price changes during this period had an equal if not more adverse affect on level of resource available for domestic consumption and investment. Therefore the levels of indebtedness is based on the concerned country's nature of condition and necessity at that time. Kenya's foreign debt is 1 \$ = sh 12.102 for the year 1982-83,⁷ Tanzania's debt is 1 \$ = sh 9.762 for the year 1982-83.⁸ Uganda's foreign debt was \$ 215 million for the year 1977. The Central African States' debts have been reported by the World Bank as follows: Burundi has foreign debts of \$ 64 million for the year 1975, and Rwanda's foreign debt was \$ 13 million for the year 1974.

Development Plan in Arms

The general notion of arms development includes arms race and arms transfers as well as other projects of military strength. Military development is an ongoing process, and that can be measured only by a relative manner. Armed forces are never totally developed or under-developed. Instead, they are found adequate or inadequate for deterring threats to the

7 Director and his Staff of International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 78.

8 Ibid., p. 83.

security of nation and for defending its interests when such deterrence fails. As Leopold Senghor has said: "The need for security is a major point of national awareness in all African states".⁹ And also Adam Smith has said: "The first duty of sovereign that of protecting the society from violence and invasions of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force."¹⁰

Therefore the development of arms is the duty of a country to protect its subjects and govern them with security. In this connection, the military situation in Africa is dynamic, a situation in which African military situations are constantly changing in size, in scope and in nature, and the East and Central African countries are modernizing the strength of their armed forces.

The Central and East African countries are concentrating the arms development especially at three levels, viz. (1) Strategic level, (2) operational level, and (3) Tactical level. At the strategic level the armed forces of a nation is to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force. Available military resources are applied to attain specific goals or counter specific threats in the operational level. Specific techniques are used by

9 Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa (London: West View Press/Boulder, 1984), p. 3.

10 Adam Smith has stated this in his book The Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, p. 186.

small units individually to carry out the directive generated at the tactical levels.

The myth of military as 'nation building' is composed of two parts, both pertaining to the alleged contribution of the military to economic development. The first part deals with the impact of military spending on economic growth, the second imputes contributions to human resources, and infrastructure through technical training and civic action projects. The problem with the myth of nation building is that it ignores the primary function of the military in national defence and attempts to justify military expenditure or assistance as "very important nation building efforts". Those nations, such as Tanzania, that have emphasized the development role over the defence role have had rude awakenings when engaged in conflicts.

Therefore the level of arms development planned in respect of Central and East African countries is improving step by step to strengthen the defence capabilities. African military as a whole have evolved from lightly armed infantry units into mechanized forms and emerging air and sea forces. Through the acquisition of sophisticated conventional weapons, some of these forces are developing potential combat capabilities that compare favourably with those of the industrialized nations supplied weapons.

These arms transfers, together with the doubling of African military expenditure in every five years and the

presence of foreign troops in increasing numbers, will determine the course of African military development over the next quarter of a century. Arms exports to Africa from the developing world generally can be expected to increase over the next decade, and much of this growth will be attributed to the expanding markets of a new set of suppliers, the newly industrialized countries. They will be seeking stronger ties with the non-aligned world markets for armaments industries to improve balance of payments and of course to seek political influence.

Future Interests of Super Powers

The US navy is planning for further development of the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago as a basing facility for US task force or fleet in the Indian Ocean. This programme is scheduled to cost about \$ 170 million for a four-year period beginning in 1981, with an initial cost of \$ 78 million. Yet Kenya is some 2,500 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, about the same distance as Diego Garcia, and could serve only as a supporting area for development to the Arabian peninsula Persian Gulf Littoral. Kenya's airport could also be used for supporting US air operations in the North-Western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. In Kenya, the United States gained access rights for wider use of facilities. US naval forces, especially, Carrier Forces, have been calling at the Ke-nyan Port of Mombasa for years.

The Soviet Union interest in Central and East African countries is to keep with the current balance of power, so the USSR is also competing with the US activities in Central and East African countries for base facilities, political influence and economic benefits. Since the west has enjoyed significant influence in these regions, Moscow is using a tactic which it has employed successfully elsewhere. It is attempting to gain a foothold on an area controlled by the US. In a practical sense, the Soviet presence will, therefore, carry more weight during periods of peace and will act as a counter to western military intervention in the area, though that will probably not occur in the wake of the American involvement in Vietnam.

In this way the Soviet Union has gained a political advantage among the littoral states and the Central African states by supporting the concept that the Indian Ocean should be a Zone of Peace, which precludes the establishment of military bases by all non-regional powers. It can be said that Moscow has been responding to American naval activity in these regions, though it would be difficult to prove how much of its increase can be attributed to action by Washington. For the most part, Soviet naval activities are seen to be oriented towards keeping a small force in these regions that can be enlarged during crisis. As the Russians already have a number of economic interest in these regions, they may, by giving

loans and supplying arms, develop stronger ones. Any consideration of Soviet military activities in this region must weigh the possibility that it is aimed at injuring the interest of the United States.

The British and French decisions have been based primarily upon economic arguments and these powers have already considerable colonial interest in these regions. Still both the states continue to have important trade and investment interest in these regions. Chinese presence in these regions would probably be directed initially against the USSR especially submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles, like similar US vessels, would pose a serious threat to Moscow's heartland, if deployed into the Northern Indian Ocean region.

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CONCLUSION

Arms build up in Indian Ocean region is a vital issue to the littoral and hinterland states. In view of the rich sea-bed and littoral resources, both living and non-living, the powerful Western nations attached immense importance to the Indian Ocean region. The area of the Indian Ocean mattered in the global strategy pertaining to the nuclear warfare. It is the power-struggle which has figured prominently in recent times. It is also a fact that the region is under-developed. The people of this area have to depend on others to develop their resources and wealth for the well-being of the people. Naturally, the region has become the cock pit of power politics and economic interference in the guise of the economic aid for development.

Being a Super Power, the US is playing an important role. The Soviet Union continues to give aid and supply the weapons to various countries in this region either to weaken or to destroy the political and ideological influence of the US and its allies. The two Super Powers are trying to gain influence among the Third World countries by siding with one against the other in case of conflicts and fuel to fire. They supply arms to their allies to counteract against one another. The result is that within the region, the countries have piled up arms, specially the case of the Gulf countries needs to be focussed here. The region has become most instable

and full of conflicts and tension. In response to this, the littoral NAM nations have time and again desired to have lasting peace in the region. They have raised this in several UN meetings and NAM summits. However, the super powers continue to add more tension in the region, both militarily and diplomatic.

Today we can see the colonial legacy in the form of border disputes and underdevelopment in this region. Some of the border disputes have remained unsolved, especially between Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, and Kenya and Somalia. Imperialism has left many economic, political and social problems in this region. Most of the countries of Indian Ocean have remained immature and dependent on developed countries for science and technology for economic development. Among the littoral states, the Central and the East African countries are under-developed, mainly because they were under military administration before and after their independence. The polity of such countries is mostly instable and being plagued with revolts and coups, the cases of many African countries like Uganda could be cited. The Central and East African states' condition is so backward in every aspect, e.g., there exists no good transportation and communication facilities, which may help in the process of integration and economic development. Regarding the defence capabilities they are very weak, and they import lot of armaments from developed

countries to strengthen their military capabilities to defend their territory. Keeping in tune with its low per capita income, Burundi spends just about 3 per cent of GNP, for its defence. Its arms import bill during 1973-1983 was \$ 78 million (constant 1982). Out of this, about \$ 48 million worth of arms have come during 1979-1983. Soviet Union is a major arms supplier to Burundi.

Unlike other countries under study Rwanda's defence expenditure has been gradually declining. Its per capita expenditure fluctuated between 3 to 1.4 per cent of the GNP in 1973-1983. For that Rwanda's military bill is a lowest among the Central and East African countries and its arms import during 1973-1983 was just \$ 30 million.

The defence expenditure of Kenya has shown increase from 1977. This is evident from the figures of the share of GNP, share of Central Government expenditure and per capita expenditure. From \$ 57 million in 1973, it went up to \$ 257 million in 1979 and it gradually declined, and in 1983 it reached \$ 133 million, which in other words means 2.1 per cent of GNP. During 1973-1983, Kenya's arms import bill was more than \$ 600 million (constant 1982). Out of the total more than \$ 450 million was during 1979-83. About one third of Kenya's arms requirements come from its ex-colonial power, i.e. Great Britain.

In case of Uganda the period 1973-1977 is very important for evaluating the military expenditure. Its per capita defence expenditure was between \$ 13 and 18 (constant 1982). During this period, its share in GNP was between 2.6 and 3.3 per cent. But after 1977, there was gradual decline in real defence expenditure as percentage of GNP fell to 1.0 per cent in 1983 and per capita expenditure fell down from \$ 13 to \$ 4 (constant 1982), and this period marked the departure of Idi-Amin, however it has never been static. It was \$ 9 million in 1973, \$ 115 million in 1975, \$ 7 million in 1977 and \$ 16 million in 1982 (at constant 1982).

In the case of Tanzania, there is gradual increase of defence expenditure since 1973. From \$ 87 million it went up to \$ 202 million in 1978 and reached a peak of \$ 470 million in 1979 (constant 1982). Subsequently, there is a gradual decline in defence expenditure. Its defence expenditure as percentage to GNP during 1973-1983 was between 2.2 to 3.8 per cent except in 1978 and 1979 when it went up to 4.1 and 9.1 per cent, respectively. In 1974, it was 0.6 per cent and in 1979 it was 19.9 per cent. Tanzania's arms import bill was about 7 per cent of its total import from 1973 to 1983. Major supplier of arms to Tanzania was the Soviet Union, supplying almost three-fourth of Tanzania's arms import. For example, during 1979-1983, the Soviet Union supplied arms worth of \$ 279 million out of the total import bill of \$ 319 million.

Even though these countries appear to spend more on arms, however, the figures speak differently. Between 1979 and 1983, the developing Third World received arms worth more than \$ 130 billion. Out of this, the share of Africa alone was \$ 28 billion, which in other words was about one-fourth of the Third World arms import bill. However, out of \$ 28 billion the share of the five countries under study comes to just over \$ 1 billion, and the two big importers, namely, Kenya and Tanzania, account for \$ 860 million, leaving less than \$ 200 million for Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

The foreign policy of these countries is almost similar. These countries got their independence in 1960s. The regional issues dominate their concern and the race and colour still matter. The apartheid problem in South Africa is anathema for South African black people. Its impact also will create some racial aggressiveness in the Central and East African countries. The impact of one country's coup will affect another country's administration. Another thing common which matters domestically and externally is the military regime. Therefore with the internal problems and external threats these countries have been forced to maintain security over and above economic development issues.

The Central and East African states are economically backward, due to the huge investment in military expenditure. The concept of the welfare is totally ignored. Their economy

is weak and the industrial sector does not exist. The economic planning and development is geared towards primary sectors and are development politically instable and immature and the administrative machine is rather too weak or lop-sided, either to have economic development or the social transformation; in true spirit of the terms. However, the desire for modernization and political influence in world politics may lead to a proper climate in the near future. Nature is rich but there is an absence of right efforts to take advantage of nature's bounty.

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