

**IMAGE OF THE ENEMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE
GERMAN AND THE BRITISH PROPAGANDA-A
COMPARATIVE STUDY**

*Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, '**IMAGE OF THE ENEMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE GERMAN AND THE BRITISH PROPAGANDA, COMPARATIVE STUDY**', submitted by **URVASHI GAUTAM** in partial fulfillment of requirements for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is my original work and has not been previously submitted, in part or full, for the award of any other degree of this or of any other university.



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All the illustrations in this dissertation have been mainly taken from the German Propaganda Archive, www.psywarrior.com and <http://ww2poster.co.uk/posters/> available online. The pictures are not meant for publication and if ever published later; it would be done with proper permission. Shortcomings if any are my own.

Urvashi Gautam.

Abbreviations

AIR	All India Radio
ARP	Air Raid Precautions
ARP	Air Raid Precautionary Scheme
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDM	<i>Bund Deutscher Mädel</i> (The League of German Girls or League of German Maiden)
CPI	Communist Party of India
DGI	Director General of Intelligence
DIB	Director Intelligence Bureau
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOI	Government of India
HH	Hamara Hindustan (Newspaper)
HJ	<i>Hitler Jugend</i>
HPF	Home Political Files, Government of India
INA	Indian National Army
INC	Indian National Congress
JM	<i>Jungmädelschaft</i>
KPP	Krishak Praja Party
MAS	Modern Asian Studies
MOI	Ministry of Information, Government of Britain
NAI	National Archives of India
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India
NSDAP	<i>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterparte</i> (The National Socialist German Workers' Party)
OKW	<i>Oberkommando der Whermacht</i> (Supreme Commando of the Armed Forces)
P.W	Prisoners of War
P.W.B	Psychological Warfare Division

PIO	Principal Information Officer
PSYPO	Psychological operations
PSYWAR	Psychological warfare
PWD	Psychological Warfare Division
R.A.F	Royal Air Force, UK
RAF	Royal Air Force
RDP	Radical Democratic Party
SEAC	South East Asia Command
USI	The United Service Institution of India, New Delhi
S.O.E	Special Operations Executive
NWFP	North West Frontier Provinces
IFBU	Indian Field Broadcasting Units
SOE	Special Operations Executive
RMVP	<i>Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda.</i>
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel Protection Squadron</i>

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Introduction

The present dissertation makes an attempt to examine the content and methods of propaganda carried out by the Germans and the British in the Second World War. This work seeks to explore in a comparative analytical form the chief elements of the rival propaganda, the tools adopted, the forms of visual message and the reception of audiences to which/whom their propaganda was addressed. Russia, Britain and Germany are three states who had developed elaborate mechanisms of propaganda. The tools/instruments of propaganda witnessed a revolutionary transformation during the first half of the 20th Century with the coming of new technology such as photography, broadcasting, cinema and documentary. The use of aeroplanes gave a new dimension as it was used by both the powers to drop leaflets and printed material in far flung areas.

Propaganda has been an important method in influencing public opinion but became an essential feature of the state policy during the war. It became a process of deliberate manipulation of beliefs, values and actions of the people by means of symbols, images, words, visual representations and audio messages or speeches. The rhetoric of language, arousal of emotion, dramatic presentations to involve the masses they all became an important components of propaganda. In modern propaganda campaigns, cultural tools have often been used to achieve political goals. The Germans under the Nazis skillfully demonstrated that.

Although the scale on which propaganda is practiced has increased dramatically in the twentieth century, the origin of the word can be traced back to the Reformation. Its employment increased steadily throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries particularly during the times of ideological struggle, as in the American and French Revolutions (for example, the Girondists distributed broadsheets among the enemy troops offering them rewards for desertion).¹ It is now generally recognized that official propaganda on a mass scale had its inception during the French Revolution. Clubs, newspapers broadsides, plays, pamphlets festivals costume interior

¹ David L. Sills (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* Vol.12, The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, USA, 1968, pp.-XVI.

decoration dances, speeches, songs, pictures, sculptures monuments and so forth were all used as various propaganda techniques.

Propaganda in the most neutral sense means dissemination and promotion of particular ideas. Propaganda is essentially about persuasion. The nature of propaganda differs according to the persons to whom it is directed and aims which it sets out to achieve. Propaganda to the home front is different from the one meant for the colonies and allied countries, and from that to neutrals. While propaganda to colonies, allied countries and neutrals differed markedly from that of enemy occupied countries. We can discern points of similarity between the operations of all the wartime propaganda organizations, Allied and Axis, but there were major differences as well. The war situation clearly affected the form propaganda took. The coming of modern technology extended the scope and the reach of modern propaganda to a new level during the twentieth century, audio and visual technologies made it trans-national and enabled it reach into enemy territories.

Propaganda has no longer been restricted to information alone but to a wide range of material gains and as was clearly evident as a means used by the Britons to mobilize the people of the colonies to participate in the Second World War. And perhaps more consequentially, propaganda was never solely equated with information, but also referred to a wide range of material benefits, which in context of damaging war covered a wide variety of items.²

In recent years cultural history is drawing greater attention from the modern historians than the earlier popular themes of social and economic history. Propaganda became an important tool to justify war. Enemy states not only tried to demoralize their opponents but also made desperate attempts to propagate their ideas for the purpose of moral boasting of its own forces and to win over the masses. It was during this time that 'propaganda' assumed extra significance.

Both democratic and authoritarian regimes of recent decades have reached with varying mixtures of warmhearted acceptance and coldhearted cynicism to such modern elaborations of ancient

² Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War*, London, Curzon-Routledge, 2001, pp.5-6.

insights. Military inventions and the spread of particularistic nationalism and attempts at democracy had caused the wars, social revolutions, and counterrevolutions to reach proportions that called for mobilization of entire national population. Hence in World War I, and even more in World War II, each major contending government made massive outlays for propaganda, both domestic and foreign, and much magic was attributed to various "propaganda techniques". Since then, almost every large state has had its ministry of propaganda (or ministry of culture, enlightenment, or international information) or some functional equivalent at least in wartime or when danger was acutely felt.³ There are numerous factors which a propagandist has to bear in mind while projecting its ideas and principles. These are governed by such features as:(1) to what ends (2) changes in world social systems (3) use of agents (4) choice of symbols (5) channels of propaganda (6) audiences (7) measurement of propaganda effects and (8) opposition and social control.

All forms of propaganda can be divided into the spoken and the writing word. War posters were displaced in every available place from shop windows to country gate posts from taxi cabs to trams and railway carriages. The primary objective of propaganda was to narrow down the gap between soldiers and civilians in a war not merely between professional armies but between whole nations locked in a moral combat. Propaganda was emerging as the principle instrument of official control over morale. At home propaganda was used to justify the needs for continuing the struggle until victory was secured, often by the vilification of the enemy through atrocity stories, or to explain the need for personal sacrifices in national interest. In enemy countries, it was used to persuade soldiers and civilians, by fair means and foul, that their sacrifices were unjust and unnecessary and to incite mutiny, revolt or surrender. Propaganda was used as a means to mobilize opinion at home and abroad, particularly in neutral countries.

In 1938 B.H. Liddell Hart wrote that large as the part played by propaganda in the war of 1914-18, there is every indication that it will find a still bigger role in any future "great war".⁴ This prophecy turned out to be true in the course of the Second World War. The widespread use of

³ .David L. Sills (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* Vol.12, The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, USA, 1968, pp.582-3.

⁴ Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (31 October 1895–29 January 1970), was an English soldier, military historian and leading inter-war theorist.

propaganda during the peace years by major powers suggests that the use of propaganda was becoming more persuasive. As mentioned by Philip M. Taylor in his article 'The New Propaganda Boom' it effectively pioneered as a weapon of warfare during the First World War.⁵ In the years that followed, propaganda became an established apparatus of peace time government. Of course, technological developments in today's world in such areas as broadcasting, the cinema and, more recently, television facilitated, if not encouraged, the increased use of official propaganda while simultaneously broadening its potential power in terms of the number of people that could be reached and influenced by it. This multiplication of the channels of communication, primarily of ideas and information for the people had enormous political implications. Here in order to persuade the masses and to seek the support of specific groups the official agencies for the first time made use of propaganda which was thinly disguised in the form of 'information', cultural, and public relations bodies, emerged during peacetime to persuade the masses to support specific groups. In a democracy this usually meant voting for a particular political group or a party while, in the totalitarian regimes, propaganda and agitation generally became inseparable. Propaganda in peace was commonly regarded in the English-speaking world as something which 'other people did' something 'distasteful' and associated with war, secrecy, and subversion.⁶

The dissemination of the Nazi Ideology through Nazi Propaganda as well as the British Propaganda in the Second World War has drawn attention of many historians. Z. A. B. Zeman asserted that the growth of the NSDAP from 'insignificant beginnings' to a truly mass movement 'was due to the skilful exploitation of propaganda techniques'. The traditional method of analysis has concentrated on the organization of the Nazi propaganda and the manipulative techniques employed. Without trying to delve further into the reception of propaganda, writers on the subject have generally assumed that Nazi propagandists invariably achieved their goals. Even Robert Herzstein's impressively detailed study referred to Nazi propaganda as 'the war that Hitler won'.⁷ The role of coercion in totalitarian states has been analyzed by several writers but, as Zeman points out, too little attention has been devoted to the role of persuasion. Some of the

⁵ Philip M. Taylor, The New Propaganda Boom, *The International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Jul., 1980, pp. 485-502.

⁶ Axis countries (Germany, Japan and Italy)

⁷ *The War That Hitler Won: The most Infamous Propaganda Campaign in History.*

principal media of persuasion, public speaking, broadcasting, the cinema, and journalism, as observed by him shows the nature, purpose and success of Nazi propaganda.⁸

Philip M. Taylor tries to draw the difference in the use of propaganda between the totalitarian regime (Germany) and a democratic regime (Britain). For him propaganda implied something sinister which was synonymous with the Nazi propaganda whereas the British did not resort to it during the peace war years. Historians of the victorious powers were eager to establish totalitarianism as the central concept in analyzing the Nazi Propaganda which is not very correct in every sense and here Taylor does the same. This may not be the case in all forms of Nazi Germany according to these English scholars was a 'totalitarian' society in which the population had been 'atomized' and 'mobilized' through a ubiquitous system of terror and sophisticated propaganda techniques.⁹ Thus it is essential to examine the assessment of its significance, however whether it shaped or merely directed and exploited public opinion is influenced by their approach to wider questions raised by the study of Nazi Germany, such as the question whether the Nazi state was a fully totalitarian dictatorship, or whether it also depended on a certain societal consensus.

Philip M. Taylor in his edited book *Britain and the Cinema in the Second World War* examines the wartime films as unabashed political propaganda devoted to single-minded endorsement of Churchill's leadership and his personal sense of manifest destiny against the Third Reich. Wartime film operating as an unmediated arm of the state ranging in purpose from the kindling of national support for an Anglo-American alliance to the inspection of the British past for previous examples of heroic responses to invasion scares and crises of national leadership. Other contributors view 'propaganda' in a less political but more problematic light.¹⁰

Philip M. Taylor in his other book *British Propaganda in the 20th Century* brings out all the weaknesses that the Nazis perceived in the republican system itself.¹¹ Examples chosen to illustrate the Nazi concept of film are Reifenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* (1935), Steinhoff's

⁸ Z.A.B Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*, London, Oxford University Press, 1973.

⁹ Philip M Taylor, *British Propaganda in the 20th Century*. Edinburgh University Press. and M.L Sanders, and Philip M Taylor, *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18*, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982.

¹⁰ Philip M. Taylor, *Britain and Cinema in the Second World War*, Palgrave and Macmillan, 1988.

¹¹ Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the 20th Century*. Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p.159.

Uncle Kruger (1941), Hippler's *The Wandering Jew* (1940), and Harlan's *Kolberg* (1945). These films have been selected by the author as representative of four of the major recurring themes of Nazi propaganda, the Fuhrer cult, Britain imperialism, anti-Semitism, and resistance in defeat.

Taylor in his article 'The New Propaganda Boom' mentions that a thorough and comprehensive attempt was made to disseminate the Nazi propaganda through various media. To give us an insight into the strong propaganda apparatus of the Nazis he quotes Herzstein, 'in 1943, a typical German civilian might awaken to radio propaganda, look at a calendar covered with the same slogans, get dressed, have lunch after reading a menu covered with propagandistic phraseology, then board a train covered with posters and placards. When he reached his destination, he might hear a loudspeaker blaring forth the *Wehrmacht* report of the day while he peered through store windows at fewer consumer goods and more window display posters.'¹²

Michael Balfour in his book, *Propaganda in War*, quite clearly demonstrates that the propaganda of Wellington House had 'duped' America into involvement on the Allied side in 1914 war. The British were conscious of their own wartime reputation so after the war, the British forfeited their initiative in propaganda by dismantling the Ministry of Information and Crewe House, leaving only the Foreign Office News Department to carry on the limited work considered necessary in peacetime. During the inter-war years, Britain was a bit cautious and it did not indulge in voracious use of propaganda. It was believed that it led to alienation at home front. Thus, for the sake of its own people British Propaganda machinery was dismantled to a very large extent, at the end of the First World War. The English historians have tried to highlight that Britain did not indulge in gluttonous use of propaganda to alienate people at the home front. This has been central to the historiography on propaganda.

Propaganda is an indispensable dimension of warfare. It seeks on the one hand to sway the enemy public and on the other to sustain the domestic morale of the people from which it emanates. Both Germany and Britain were conducting their propaganda activities during World War II under the influence of World War I. Michael Balfour is skeptical regarding the impact of

¹² Philip M. Taylor, The New Propaganda Boom, *The International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Jul., 1980 pp. 485-502.

British and German propaganda efforts during World War II. He sets out to give us a comparative study of the propaganda used by both the nations but the analysis of the British side is less extensive because of the scarcity of the primary sources. The propaganda had become the part and parcel of the Germans as well as the British governments. While the British made little use of 'atrocities propaganda', it often broadcasted the German treatment of the 'lesser races' in extermination camps. The people of Britain and the occupied countries were informed of the ground situation. However it is interesting to note the truth in World War II was not as potent a weapon as the lies of World War I.¹³

One of the important instruments of German and British Propaganda was cinema both at home front and in enemy countries. Totalitarian police states aspired absolute control of all media of mass communication in an attempt to control the public opinion. The cinema of the period provides a commentary on the Nazi state and its cultural mission. In one of the first speeches as Minister for Popular Enlightenment Joseph Goebbels declared that the German Cinema had the mission of conquering the world as the vanguard of the Nazi troops.

An important contribution to the field of study of propaganda has been made by David Welch. His books, *Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945* and *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, deals with cinema as a propaganda weapon. He examines how films were used to a great extent to disseminate state ideals among the masses. Welch believes that films had so far been the sphere of influence of critics, media sociologists and journalists but only in recent years historians have regarded them as a reputable primary source.

Welch in his chapter "War and the Military Image" says "war invariably produced an excess of good propagandist material, and Goebbels exploited it to the fullest". The other important propaganda tool was newsreels. The importance of the newsreel was that it offered the propagandist all the advantage of a modern communication medium as it was topical, periodical and universal. The 'enemy' is of great importance in film propaganda, as it not only provided an important target that could be attacked, but it also offered a scapegoat, the easiest means of

¹³M. Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

diverting public attention from genuine social and political problems at home. Cinema industries in Germany were gradually brought under state control and converted into instruments of official propaganda. Here Welch concentrates on wartime newsreels and notes how Goebbels first lured audiences into theaters with frothy features. His central themes suggest that “propaganda was a persuasive process initiated by governments, industries, interest groups, political lobbies, as well as individuals”¹⁴.

On the other hand the ‘democratical lies’ developed propaganda in a manner that instilled citizen loyalty, patriotism, war time productivity, and a fighting spirit. David Welch perceives that Nazi propaganda appeared more frequently in war time newsreels (*Deutsche Woehenschau*) than in feature films which retained their entertainment appeal. As the war progressed, the newsreels shifted focus from total victory (Victory in the West) to basic survival of the Third Reich. Content became less realistic, as it was cloaked in mythical claims of success. Welch notes that as early as 1941 the German people avoided newsreel by lingering outside the cinemas.¹⁵ Welch does not deal with all the feature films made during the Third Reich especially the ones that provided “escapist” entertainment. He also does not measure the success or failure of Nazi film propaganda. However, he thoroughly assesses the control mechanisms and the content and style of the films clearly marked for propaganda. Welch completely surpasses the entertainment movies which were made and does not give any evidence on them. David Weinberg in his article “Approaches to the study of film in the Third Reich: A Critical Appraisal” mentions that not more than twenty-five percent German movies produced annually under Nazism can be defined as propagandistic.

Kris Ernst and Speier Hans’s book *German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War* examines radio as a means of propaganda. In democratic countries the radio serves the customer; in Nazi Germany it served the government. The totalitarian propagandist prevented the Germans from acquiring any knowledge of war on their own. The Germans were expected to think, feel, and behave as the propagandist guided them. The listener was given the impression that people outside Germany were only concerned with German victory; all news

¹⁴ M. Kenneth R. Short, *Film & radio propaganda in World War II*, Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1983, p.3.

¹⁵ Welch David, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, Routledge , London/ New York 1993.

reporting in the world paid tribute to the German cause. The peoples of the occupied countries prospered under German occupation and showed gratitude to their chivalrous and merciful conquerors. The most important task of the German home radio was to keep high the morale of the population through thick and thin. This book points out that Hitler's appearances on the radio became rarer as the defeats mounted up, while Goebbels never gave up even during trying times. Throughout the period of defeat, Goebbels' upheld the prestige both of Hitler and of the entire Nazi regime.¹⁶

M. A. Doherty's *Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War* is a penetrating analysis of Goebbels' English language propaganda radio broadcasts aimed at the United Kingdom. It is based on an examination of material that originated from Hamburg in the years 1939-1945. One of Doherty's most significant contributions is to revisionist historiography of wartime Britain. Doherty demonstrated that Britons did not simply listened to 'Haw Haw' from a position of wry detachment. Some found sentiments they shared, whether in social criticism of Britain's slum conditions or in anti-Semitic invective.¹⁷

The recent historiography on propaganda generally focuses on its objectives, its various means and instruments, its machinery, its complex structure for disseminating ideas; propaganda for war and the extent to which propaganda was responsible for victory of the allies. While the subject of propaganda has drawn the attention of scholars, the theme of counter propaganda has received lesser mention. The Nazi propaganda has received more attention than its British counterpart. In most of the work done on the propaganda of both these nations, the focus has always rested on films, newsreels and radio.¹⁸ The various authors mentioned above focuses on the nature of the state of Germany and Britain while a comparison is made. The fact that Britain

¹⁶ Kris Ernst and Speier Hans, *German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, p.175.

¹⁷ M.A Doherty, *Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War*, Edinburgh, Columbia University Press, 2000.

¹⁸ *The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945* by James Chapman, *British War Films, 1939-1945: The Cinema And the Services* by S.P. MacKenzie, *British Cinema and the Second World War* by Robert Murphy and Neil Rattign's *This is England: British Film and the People's War 1939-1945. Britain Can Take It: The British Cinema in the Second World War* by by Anthony Aldgate, Jeffrey Richards.

was a 'democratic' regime and Germany a 'totalitarian' state has been over stressed while comparing the propaganda methods of both these nations.

The present work is an attempt to elucidate some general features, substance and principles of visual propaganda adopted by the Nazi state of Germany and the British during Second World War. The most important primary source used for this work is the visuals: pamphlets, posters, stamps, cartoons and various magazines of that period. In Hitler-Germany, posters were among National Socialism's most important forms of propaganda. Posters offered advantages over other forms of propaganda. Pamphlets or brochures could be thrown away unread, the radio could be turned off and political rallies could simply be ignored. But there was no escaping colourful, large size poster. It attracted attention some time or the other as one walked in the streets. It was one thing to hear about Hitler's strength of character, sincerity, honesty, simplicity, etc; it was quite another to see these qualities glaring down from a ten times life size portrait. If the passerby averted his eyes, he ran into Hitler around the corner. Hitler was ubiquitous in all inhabited place in Germany. Suddenly in the street on the opposite wall he stood-lantern jawed, erect, determined, puissant, grinding himself to defend Germany from "the Red terror" or "the Jewish Bacillus".¹⁹

Minister of Propaganda Goebbels instituted precise guidelines for the creation and distribution of propaganda posters. Text posters had to be short and to the point; one had to be able to read the contents within one minute, and red - 'the colour of the revolution' - had to be dominant. The pictorial posters contained minimum text and communicated their message cogently. Similarly the posters produced in Britain during the Second World War were an important visual archive. The images provided a valuable social and also an artistic commentary on life in Britain during the early 1940s. The posters are also instructive in political terms. The choice of subject matter indicates the priorities and preoccupations, of the wartime Government. The co-ordination of domestic propaganda in Britain during the Second World War was carried out mainly by the Ministry of Information, established at the outbreak of war in 1939. Its prime purpose was to sustain civilian morale and its functions included the production of propaganda posters both for

¹⁹ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, Hong Kong, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, p.24.

itself and for other branches of Government. These “weapons on the wall”, as they were sometimes known, were advantageous as they were cheaply produced and easily distributed. Posters were not the totality of Government wartime propaganda in Britain. They were often used as part of a coordinated campaign together with films, radio broadcasts, pamphlets, articles and advertisements in newspapers and magazines. For example propaganda films, like “The Eternal Jew” or “The Great Dictator” required posters to get across the crux of the movie. In the absence of modern technologies like, television or mobile phones radios, films and documentaries played an important role.

Propaganda posters were designed for a variety of locations, some for external display on street hoardings, others for display inside shops, pubs, factories and offices. But, wherever displayed, in order to be effective, posters had to achieve three main objectives they first had to attract the attention of those passersby; having done so they had to communicate their message clearly; and lastly that message should get imprinted on the memory.

Posters were one of the most important means of propaganda during the Second World War, as mentioned in the beginning posters are bound to capture more attention of the people. It is one of the most important primary sources for the period and was exploited by both these nations extensively both at home front as well as in enemy countries.

It is very difficult to examine the real outcome of propaganda used by these two nations. There are many scholars who in the past have highlighted the importance of propaganda in the Second World War. However, Michael Balfour does not believe that either side's propaganda had any appreciable impact upon the war's military outcome. He recognizes that propaganda does reflect the nature of a society and its government, but it did not necessarily affect the actual outcome of the war. Thus to rule out propaganda as ineffective would be inappropriate. Some authors refer to propaganda as ‘warfare by words’ which aptly delineates the position of these two nations during the era of world wars. Propaganda is mainly seen in pejorative implications. The aim of this work is to show how the ‘image of the enemy’ was created in the Second World War both by the Nazis and British. The connotation ‘enemy’ is not only restricted to the enemy countries but it also deals with the enemy at home front, like the Jews in case of Nazis.

The first chapter discusses the projection of the enemy at the home front and during the war. The first section deals with the German Propaganda Machinery and the means of propaganda dissemination during the Second World War. The second section deals with the important themes of propaganda during this period: anti-Semitism and indoctrination of youth. For instance, the anti-Semitic propaganda often collated with anti-Bolshevism during the phases of war when relations with Russia were strained. The chapter deals with the projection of 'enemy' to the youth during the course of war. The last section deals with the war propaganda by Nazis and how the propaganda altered during the war. The belief in the propaganda varied with the military vicissitudes. As when Germany was on the verge of losing the war, the call for 'total war' became a rallying point for the Nazis.

The Second chapter of my dissertation will focus on the audience of the British Propagandists primarily the Indian colony. Propaganda requires three basic things to be effective. The first one being the source, the second being the medium and the third being the audiences. As the source and medium differs respectively the audiences differs as well. Both nations had the task to placate different audiences. Britain had the major task of propagating its ideas to the British colonies, as to garner support from them. British colonies were one of the major sources of help both in terms of men and money during the Second World War. India was one such colony. So, it was very important for Britain to propagate their ideas and justify their actions in the War. This paper deals with the policies and programmes introduced by the British colonial State in India during the Second World War (1939-1941) in order to mobilize them for the war. The policies of propaganda and information control introduced by them to gather support against the Axis countries is assessed.

The third chapter tries to study in a comparative manner the propaganda adopted by both the nations and explains what forms of propaganda was similar and in what ways they were different. The various means and the motives which the Germans and British sought to achieve. Here one has dealt with mainly the propaganda campaign at the home front and how they targeted each other. The comparisons of similar themes and modes (films and radio) have enabled broad assessment of propaganda in both the nations. The use of propaganda was a means to determine public opinion and justify state actions. Germany on one hand had to appeal to the

people at home front to justify its war aims as well had the other task to promote campaigns for eugenics and the annexation of German peaking areas. After the outbreak of World War II, Nazi propaganda vilified Germany's enemies, notably the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, and exhorted the population to partake in total war. Conversely, Britain appealed to the people to support the war on moral grounds against the dictatorship of Hitler and projected fascism as a potent threat to democracy in the world. Britain has other task of mobilizing and luring the United States to enter the war. The chapter also discusses the three most important range of propaganda, 'white', 'black' and 'grey' and how both these nations resorted to each kind as and when needed. The last section deals with the reception of propaganda. The reception of British propaganda in colonies and the Nazi propaganda at home front.

The availability of primary source has been difficult. Internet proved to be a very important medium. The sources I have used for my first and third chapters are from the archives available online, the most important ones included, *German Propaganda Archives*, *Imperial War Museum London*, *Euro Docs* and *the National Archives, UK*. The sources included a number of wartime posters, pamphlets, cartoons, stamps, magazines, war time speeches, films and radio. For Britain the sources also include the Cabinet Papers (1939-45) from the National Archives, UK available online. The primary sources for the second chapter are Home Political Records (1939-1941) (*National Archives of India, New Delhi*), Private Papers and Manuscripts (*Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi*), India Office Collection, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, *A Phase of the Indian Struggle*, 1942, Linlithgow Collection, Office of the Medical Personnel (Army in India) Mission. New Delhi, 12th January, 1943. (Personal and Confidential), (1936-1943) and Newspapers *Microfilm*, *Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi*, *The Statesman*, 1939 September-April 1941 and Official Reports *United Service Institution of India, New Delhi* and the Externa Affairs files from the Ministry of Defence.

Chapter 1: German Propaganda in Second World War

Die Kunst der Propaganda liegt im Verständnis der emotionalen Ideen der großen Massen und bei der Suche, durch eine psychologisch richtige Form, die Art und Weise, die Aufmerksamkeit und von dort zum Herzen der breiten Massen.-Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf.²⁰

i) German Propaganda Machinery:

The first foundations for the management of the German people by the state had been laid down some time before the day of Goebbels's exultation. He had become the *Reichspropagandaleiter* of the party on 9 January 1929; his chance to strengthen his own position and to extend the powers of his office came in 1932. The section dealing with 'active propaganda' (Amt I) formed the core of the organization, dealt with the execution of political agitation, from the monster meetings with their problems of architectural design, accommodation, transport, etc. The propaganda was organized through a hierarchy which penetrated to the lower levels of party organization: the *Gupropagandaleiter* was responsible for five sections corresponding to those in the central office on the provincial level; lower down in the hierarchy, there were the *Kreispropagandaleiter*- the district director of propaganda- the *Ortsgruppenpropagandaleiter*, who worked on the level of local party organization., and finally the *Stuetzpunktpropandaleiter*- the cell leader. All these ranks led a separate existence from the rest of the party organization; the hierarchy was used for transmitting orders downward, and passing information 'situation reports', 'audience reports' etc upwards. Although the internal structure of party propaganda apparatus was often reshaped, and although its functions frequently overlapped with those of other party or after 1933, state departments, it gave Goebbels a unique position of power. It was further strengthened when he became the, in March 1933, the first Nazi Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.²¹

²⁰ 'The art of propaganda consists precisely in being able to awaken the imagination of the public through an appeal to their feelings, in finding the appropriate psychological form that will arrest the attention and appeal to the hearts of the national masses.'

²¹ Z.A.B Zeman , *Nazi Propaganda*, London, Oxford University Press, 1973,pp.38-42.

Propaganda occupied a focal position in the Nazi scheme of things when the party was still on the road to power. A directive by Hitler gave Goebbles the key position. The Ministry of Interior handed over to Goebbles the supervision of radio, films press, theatre; the protection of works of art and memorials and the regulations of state celebrations and holidays; the Foreign Ministry had to give up at any rate in theory the control of whole range of propaganda abroad. Centralization of all propaganda activities implied, for Goebbles, the elimination of every alternative source of information. In this respect, his most difficult task lay in the *Gleichschaltung* the achievement of uniformity of the press. The structure of State and Party organizations controlling propaganda in the Third Reich can be seen in the fig1.1.²²

As the economic crisis deepened, the propaganda appeal of the Nazis as economic saviors offering something to all was dramatically demonstrated by an 800 percent increase in the Nazi vote: the Nazis obtained 18.3 percent of the national total and 107 seats, and Hitler's group was the second largest in the parliament, exceeded only by the Social Democrats.²³ The entire period of the Nazi propaganda can be seen in three different heads when they were in opposition (1919-1933), in power (1933-1939) and at war (1939-1945). Most of the historians of this period have paid attention to the increased importance of propaganda after the First World War. Hitler in his autobiography has discussed in detail the importance of propaganda and has contributed an entire chapter on "War Propaganda". It was only in the Second World War that propaganda took a more organized form with the establishment of Ministry of Propaganda. Before 1933, the party publishing houses *Eher and Kampf-Verlag* issued dozens of books and pamphlets, some by Hitler, but most by other party leaders. There were a number of prolific writers such as Dietrich Eckart, Gottfried Feder, Alfred Rosenberg, Gergor and Otto Strasser and Richard Walther Darré.²⁴ There were a number of party newspaper and journals as well, which included the

²² *Ibid*, pp.42-45. (The source of the figure is David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York , Routledge , 1993)

²³ *Ibid*,p.167

²⁴ Some publications of the Eher and Kampf- Verlag includes *Wandlungen unseres Kampfes* Von R. Heydrich,, *Das Manifest zur Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes und Das Programm der NSDAP und seine weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken* von Gottfried Feder, *Was die Welt nicht Wollte* von Friedrich Stieve, *Der Führer antwortet Roosevelt Reichstagsrede vom 28. April 1939, Von Lemberg bis Bordeaux Fronterlebnisse eines Kriegsberichters* von Leo Leixner, *Tradition und Gegenwart Reden und Aufsätze 1936-1940 Blut und Ehre, IV. Band* von Alfred Rosenberg and *Landser lachen Fronthumour dieses Krieges*,

Voelkischer Beobachter, the *NS-Briefe*, the Strasser newspapers, *Der Angriff*, and the *NS-Monatshefte*, which published the programs, together with many theoretical writings.

The Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*- RMVPs), was established by a presidential decree, signed on 12th March 1933 and promulgated on the following day, which defined the task of the new ministry as the 'dissemination of 'enlightenment and propaganda within the population concerning the Policy of the Reich Government and the national reconstruction of the German fatherland'. Analysing the political function of propaganda in the Third Reich was further complicated by the fact that it was simultaneously channeled through three different institutions: the RMVP, the Central Propaganda Office of the Party, and the Reich Chamber of Culture. Moreover, the political structure of the Third Reich was based on the twin pillars of the Party and the State. With the creation of RMVP, propaganda became primarily the responsibility of the State, although its departments were to be supported and reinforced by the party's Central Propaganda Office (*Reichspropagandaamt*), which remained less conspicuous to the general public. Indeed, two institutions would often merge into one apparatus: not only would their respective organizations and responsibilities correspond closely, but many of the leading positions in the Ministry and *Reichspropaganda* were held by the same officials. Originally Goebbels had planned only five departments for the new ministry, to embrace radio, press, active propaganda, film and theatre and popular education, but by April 1933 it had acquired its basic structure and was divided into seven departments. During the war it reached to fourteen.²⁵

Kulturpolitik (cultural policy) was an important element in German life, but the Nazis were the first party systematically to organize the entire cultural life of a nation.²⁶ According to the Law setting up the Reich Chamber of Culture 22 September 1933, signed both by Hitler and Goebbels, the following chambers were established: a Reich Chamber of literature, Press, theatre, music, radio and creative arts. This particular law also makes mention of 'Law concerning the Establishment of a Provisional Film Chamber' of 14 July 1933. The Reich Chamber of Culture (*Reichskulturkammer (RKK)*) was under the supervision of the Reich

²⁵ David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York , Routledge , 1993,pp.23-5.

²⁶ *Ibid*,p.26.

Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.²⁷ The creation of the RKK was an excellent example of the process of *Gleichschaltung*. This was the term employed by the Nazis when they came to power, and referred to the obligatory assimilation within the State of all political, economic and cultural activities.²⁸

With the establishment of the Reich Chamber of Culture a sort of control mechanism was established as we have evidence from the certain laws passed by Goebbles later on it can be concluded that the Chamber acted as a sort of self-censorship for fear of losing their livelihood. On 13 May 1936 Goebbles issued a proclamation which banned the writing of critical reviews on the same night as the performance (*Nachtkritik*) and on 27 November 1936 Goebbles decided to ban all art criticism by confining critics to write only 'descriptive' reviews (*Kunsts Betrachtungen*).²⁹

However, while Hitler was preparing to launch his war, Goebbles was among the few party leaders who sought to avert it. Goebbles disapproval stemmed from his belief that the war would affect his own position. Goebbles fears were justified, for in the early years of the war The Ministry of Propaganda would be forced to share its responsibilities with the OKW and the Section for *Whermacht* Propaganda. The exigencies of war demanded of Goebbles a more intense concern with the tactics of propaganda and, moreover, a flexibility that could respond to changing military situations. His directive "Guidelines for the Execution of NSDAP Propaganda", issued at the outbreak of war, outlined the means he expected his staff to employ in disseminating propaganda. The means included the radio and newspapers, films, posters, mass meetings, illustrated lectures, and 'whisper' or 'person to person' propaganda (*Mundpropaganda*).³⁰

²⁷ Law setting up the Reich Chamber of Culture 22 September 1933, produced in David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York , Routledge , 1993,p.154-55.

²⁸ David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York, Routledge , 1993,pp.26.

²⁹ Banning of art criticism, 27 November 1936 produced in David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York, Routledge , 1993,p.168.

³⁰ David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York , Routledge , 1993,pp.90-1.

a) Means of Propaganda:

The Nazi's used propaganda in every form to persuade the German people that the ideology of the Nazi's was the one and only way to exist. Through posters, art, film, advertising, and industry, the Nazi's used design as a campaign for promoting their ideas. Propaganda was a necessary and successful method for the Nazi's to promote their ideology. They were successful in their display of propaganda because they focused on two simple methods of communication. First they simplified their largely complex issues into a basic principle that the masses could understand and quickly agree with. Second they used repetition as a tool by constantly repeating these simplified ideas to the masses the principles were reinforced again and again. Propaganda played a central role in securing and asserting Nationalist Socialist (NS) rule. In domestic policy it served as the most important means for imposing the NSDAP's demands for power as well as its ideological and political viewpoints upon the entire populace. It also worked to indoctrinate the people, to totally envelope them, and to manipulate them in line with the regimes purposes. Propaganda was however not only the instrument for domestic rule for the regime; at the same time it was-especially in wartime the government's means of exercising power in foreign policy. Therefore as Joseph Goebbles noted in his daily journal on May 10, 1942, news policy during the wartime had the purpose of waging the war, not of conveying information. According to Goebbles's ideas, propaganda had to "encompass domestic, cultural, economic, social and foreign policies-in other words, areas of responsibility that until that point had belonged to other ministries. In any state involved in war, propaganda must be constantly adjusted to the changing military situation. To some extent, this was easier in a 'closed' society, where the means of communication are more tightly controlled. In case of Nazi Germany the propaganda machine had been planning to meet the exigencies of war some eighteen months before the war was declared in September 1939. The war imposed considerable constraints on the political, social and economic structure set by Nazi regime. In the course of maintaining an effective link with the regime's leadership, propaganda had to convince the German people of their own cause and invincibility. But abroad it also had to win over neutral nations at the same time undermine the enemy's spirit of resistance.

To effectively enforce the ideals of the Nazi state designers were conscious of and manipulated to their advantage four key elements included in all the posters. They used imagery, typography and symbols, and directed specifically to their audience. It is important to remember that posters designed for the Nazi state had to follow strict guidelines in dealing with subject matter and choice of typography. Jeremy Aynsley describes the levels and policies of design under the third reich, “the design historian Gert Selle has argued that after 1933 the percepts of design worked on at least two levels, the official and the popular. On the one hand, official design policies allotted a central role to a controlled form of neo-classicism for specifically nationalistic purposes: catalogues of official exhibitions and their posters, for instance. On the other hand, in order to maintain a satisfactory level of consumption in the home market and for the employed urban classes to retain a standard of living to which they had grown accustomed, other German design of this period derived its identity from the modern, from Hollywood and streamlining. Often the pragmatic recognition that a modern Germany, even under National Socialism, needed a sustained consumer economy was disguised by Party rhetoric and official propaganda.”³¹

When Goebbles became Minister for Propaganda, the newspaper and film industries were still privately owned; the broadcasting system, however, had been State- regulated since 1925 by means of the Reich Radio Company (*Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft-RRG*). Although the Nazis had failed to gain access to this medium while in opposition, once in power the ‘coordination’ of German radio proved comparatively easy, despite a few initial setbacks. From the moment he assumed power, Goebbles recognized its propaganda potential and was determined to make the most of this relatively new medium. During the Weimar Republic, radio has been used by successive governments as a means of contacting German- speaking minorities (*Volkdeutsche*) living abroad. The technical mobilization of German radio as the ‘voice of the nation’ is a history of remarkable accomplishment. To increase the number of listeners, the Nazis persuaded manufacturers to produce one of the cheapest wireless sets in Europe, the VE 3031 or Volkempfänger (people’s receiver). The people’s radio was highly subsidized so that it would be affordable to all the workers. The long term aim was to install a set in every home in Germany. Indeed by the beginning of the war over 70 percent of all households owned a wireless set-the highest percentage anywhere in the world. The ‘people’s receiver’ were designed with a

³¹ Jeremy Aynsley., *Graphic Design in Germany: 1890–1945*. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2000, p.180.

limited range, which meant that the Germans who purchased them were unable to receive foreign broadcasts.³²

There are many studies on propaganda for war, but it is rare that we see the studies on how the German propaganda was transformed during this period, like in the sections dealing with the form propaganda took towards youth, the anti-Semitic propaganda and how did it evolve during the war years. Were they focusing on the war particularly, like the increase in the leaflets which blamed the Jews for the War. During the first year of the war Goebbles informed the RMVP that “propaganda had nothing to do to the truth! We serve truth by serving a German victory”.³³ This chapter deals with the themes of visual propaganda towards the people at home front and war propaganda. Firstly, the anti-Semitic propaganda and the changes it went throughout the course of the war. The next section deals with the indoctrination of the youth during the war years. The last section deals with the propaganda during war and how it changed to cater to existing military situations.³⁴

ii) Themes of Propaganda:

The themes of propaganda frequently shifted according to the state exigencies. Initially, it was primarily against the democratic republic of the Weimar for signing an unequal treaty surrounding virtually everything to the opponents at Versailles and for creating lawlessness and failed economy. The Jews were primarily responsible for all the failures of Germany. They along with other minorities were seen as the ‘real enemy’ inside Germany. The entire state machinery was deployed to carry out anti-Semitic propaganda. In the second phase of the Nazi rule, the themes of propaganda extended to project the anti-Communists activities, the economic recovery under the Nazis, the role and place of Women in Germany, the contribution of youth organizations in the building of New Germany, cultural regeneration and propagation of Nazi ideology. The rejuvenation of industry, the growth of armed forces, the policy of work creation and the Nazi solutions to the problem of unemployment provided rich material for successful

³² *Ibid.*

³³ David Welch, *Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945*, New York, Clarendon Press, 1983, p.236.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

propaganda campaign.³⁵ However, the coming of World War II brought the state sponsored propaganda to a war footing. This war not only broadened the scope of propaganda, introduced new tools for it but also changed the image of enemy and created new audiences for its reception, particularly outside Germany.³⁶

a)Anti-Semitism:

“Peoples, Awake! To end the misery,
Judah, the ancient enemy, must fall!
Ours is the victory over misery and death:
Freedom and peace for us all!” National Socialist poet. (1943).³⁷

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The Nazi ideology embraced a veritable plethora of mythical themes ranging from *Blut und Boden*, the heroic warrior, to the Bolshevik *Untermensch*, the ‘British plutocrats’ and the mystical concept of *Fuhrerprinzip*. But perhaps the most important element in Nazi world view was the myth of the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’. When Hitler came to power he needed the Jews as the permanent scapegoat on which those in the movement could work off their resentment; the Jew was manipulated to fulfill a psychological need for Germany. Nazi propaganda simply used the historical predisposition of the audience towards an anti-Semitic explanation for Germany’s cultural, economic, and political grievances. The historical hatred of the Jews was increased by the credence given inside the Party to the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’, according to which an international clique of Jewish conspirators were preparing to assume total domination over all nations of the world.³⁸

Anti-Semitism has been a constant theme of the Nazi Propaganda. Although during the Second World War the focus was not on anti-Semitic propaganda as the war period demanded to focus on the preparation of war. But, time and again there were anti-Semitic propaganda during the

³⁵ Alan E. Steinweis, *Art Ideology and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theatre and the Visual Arts*, London, The University of North Carolina Press, 1993,p.77.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ The source: “*Judendämmerung in aller Welt!*,” *Redner-Schnellinformation*,(Twilight of the Jews throughout the World), Lieferung 60, 18 May 1943. The Nazi Party depended heavily on speakers to get its message across, particularly when the party wanted to say things that would be awkward to say in the mass media, which were accessible to foreigners. The speakers needed to be kept up-to-date. The *Redner-Schnellinformation* [Speakers’ Express Information], published by the party propaganda headquarters, provided speakers with guidelines for immediate campaigns and this issue ends with this poem. <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/rsi60.htm> accessed on 12th April 2011.

³⁸ David Welch, *Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945*, New York, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp.237-8.



war, like categorizing the Jews as evil and how they were responsible for the war. One of the main aims of the Nazi Propagandist was to indoctrinate these ideals among the youth and they took special care to propagate such ideals among the youth. As we can observe in one of the “German Catechism” published for the instruction of young Germans had questions like:

Which race must the National Socialist race fight against? The Jewish race. Why?³⁹

According to the education plan in the BDM, the girls in the third year were to study: a People and its Inheritance of Blood which included subtopics such as: Racial Policies in the Third Reich, Law for the Preservation and Assistance of Families with Many Children, The Law to Prevent Genetically III Offspring and the Health Marriage Law and Opponents of Racial Thinking. Or as shown in one of the pamphlets (fig.1.2) the children were asked in class, how they would recognize the Jews and they would draw the numeral “6” which showed that the Jews were ugly, their nose was bent just like number 6. The other picture shows two Jewish lawyers talking how they tricked two women: (fig.1.3)

“Well, Colleague Morgenthau, we did a good piece of business today.” “Splendid, Colleague Silberstein. We took the lovely money from the two Goy women and can put it in our own pockets.”

Anti-Semitism was a constant theme of the texts of the school children and there were special stories to grasp the children’s attention as discussed in the section “Indoctrination of Youth”, like “*Die Judenfrage im Unterricht* (The Jewish Question in Classroom Instruction), *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid* (Don’t Trust A Fox in A Green Meadow Or the Oath of A Jew); and *Der Pudelmopsdachelpinscher* (*The Poodle-Pug-Dachshund-Pincher*).⁴⁰

This story comes from *Der Giftpilz*, (Fig.1.4) an anti-Semitic children’s book published by Julius Streicher, the publisher of *Der Stürmer*. “The Poisonous Mushroom” the story goes such as a mother and her young son were gathering mushrooms in the German forest. The boy finds some poisonous ones. The mother explains that there were good mushrooms and poisonous ones, and, as they go home, she explains to him that human beings in this world were like the mushrooms

⁴⁰<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/> accessed on 5th April 2011. German Propaganda Archive.

in the forest. There were good mushrooms and likewise there were good people. There were poisonous, bad mushrooms and likewise there were bad people. And we have to be on our guard against bad people just as we have to be on guard against poisonous mushrooms. That in dealing with bad people trouble may arise, just as when one eats a poisonous mushroom. One may even die!"They were the Jews! There were millions of non-Jews who do not yet know the Jews. So they had to enlighten people and warn them against the Jews. The young people, too, must be warned. The boys and girls must learn to know the Jew. They must learn that the Jew was the most dangerous poison-mushroom in existence. Just as poisonous mushrooms spring up everywhere, so the Jew was found in every country in the world. Just as poisonous mushrooms often lead to the most dreadful calamity, so the Jew was the cause of misery and distress, illness and death."The author then concludes the story by pointing the moral: "German youth must learn to recognize the Jewish poison-mushroom. They must learn what a danger the Jew was for the German *Volk* and for the whole world. They must learn that the Jewish problem involves the destiny of us all."⁴¹

There were the regular anti-Semitic propaganda visible during the Second World War, but we also have evidence of the mention of specific events pertaining to attack the Jews, be it considering them the evil or the ones responsible for the war, or the depiction of Jews having an alliance with the Communist. One such propaganda pamphlet (fig.1.5) released in late 1943 or early 1944, shows the Jew as the inciter of war, the prolonger of war. The pamphlet depicts strong fists, and one of the fists unveils the curtain to show the ugly Jew behind the curtains and thus, revealing that the Jews were behind the war and the prolonged struggle. At the bottom of the pamphlet it was printed "*Kriegsanstifter*" and "*kriegsverlängerer*" which can be translated to war mongers and the prolongers of the war. A Third Reich advertisement for this book with the headline "*Das Ostergeschenk für die deutsche Jugend*" (The Easter Gift for German Children) (fig1.6) which has a bright red cover and the malicious expressions of the two images accompanying the title, *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud auf seinem Eid* (Don't Trust A Fox in A Green Meadow Or the Oath of A Jew) was of an anti- Semitic book produced by the Nazis for the children. The one was a fox eager to trap his prey; the other was a Jew eager to swear a false oath under the Star of David. Bauer effectively uses the image of the

⁴¹The Source: Ernst Hiemer, "*Der Giftpilz*" (Nuremberg, *Stürmerverlag* 1938).
<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/story2.htm> accessed on 13th April 2011.

clever and deceptive fox, a figure that was based in antiquity and commonplace in European folklore. Greek legend considered the fox to be a creature of the Devil or even the Devil, himself.⁴²

Another on the same lines was to justify the “Invasion of Poland” as seen in (fig.1.8) The two-page article, published in early August 1939 by the *Illustrierter Beobachter*, just before the Nazi invasion of Poland, presents an unflattering portrait of Jews in Poland. The article entitled Europe’s plague spot: “The Polish Ghetto” and the article highlights that the Jews were at least 1/10th of the population and were dominating the economy of Poland. This was one of the articles to justify their invasion of Poland and later on there were articles and films on the same lines. Jews were compared with the epidemic plague and that they were devouring the entire Europe and were most concentrated in Poland. The article also points out the Jews were dominating the trade and all other economic activities in turn leading to the miserable plight of the Germans and the most important work in they engaged themselves was theft. ⁴³

So, these pamphlets tried to create the “image of the enemy” the Jews in case of this as the inciters of the war as well as justified their war moves by blaming the Jews. As during the war period the propaganda had to be associated with the war as the biggest enemy during that time was the “war”.

Another pamphlet on the similar lines can be seen as the one in (Fig1.9) was a part of Hitler’s speech of 30th January 1939 which was later on published just after the invasion of Soviet Union in 1941 and the opening stages of Holocaust. This was mainly to justify the two of the war activities, the first being the invasion of Soviet Union and the second Holocaust. ⁴⁴ Most of the propaganda during these years was to justify the war aims.

⁴² I have discussed the Nazi anti-Semitic book in detail in my section “Indoctrination of Youth”.

⁴³ The invasion of Poland by Germany, the Soviet Union, and a small Slovak contingent that marked the start of World War II in Europe. The invasion began on 1 September 1939, one week after the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and ended on 6 October 1939 with Germany and the Soviet Union dividing and annexing the whole of Poland. *Illustrierter Beobachter* (Illustrated Observer) was an illustrated propaganda magazine which the Nazi Party published. It was published from 1926 to 1945 and was published in Munich.

⁴⁴ Under the codename Operation “Barbarossa,” Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 in the largest German military operation of World War II. In July 1940, just weeks after the German conquest of France and the Low Countries, Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union within the following year. On December 18, 1940,

Der Stürmer ("The Attacker") was a weekly tabloid-format Nazi newspaper published by Julius Streicher from 1923 to the end of World War II in 1945. It was a significant part of the Nazi Propaganda machinery and was vehemently anti-Semitic.⁴⁵ If we look at some of the publications of the "*Der Stürmer*" (fig.1.10. to 1.14.) during the Second World War there were many headlines attacking the Jews, i.e. anti-Semitic propaganda was at its peak. Some of the headlines were like "Where one is ruled by the Jews, freedom is only an empty dream" (July 1939) or the cartoon shows a photograph of a Jew captioned "Satan." Streicher regularly used the old religious argument that the Jews were in league with the Devil. This issue appeared as the last German troops in Stalingrad surrendered, February 1943.⁴⁶ At the bottom of every page it was written in block letters "*Der juden unser unglück*" (The Jews are our misfortune) during the war years.⁴⁷

he signed Directive 21, the first operational order for the invasion of the Soviet Union. With 134 Divisions at full fighting strength and 73 more divisions for deployment behind the front, German forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, less than two years after the German-Soviet Pact was signed. Three army groups, including more than three million German soldiers, supported by 650,000 troops from Germany's allies (Finland and Romania), and later augmented by units from Italy, Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary, attacked the Soviet Union across a broad front, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. For months, the Soviet leadership had refused to heed warnings from the Western Powers of the German troop buildup along its western border. Germany and its Axis partners thus achieved almost complete tactical surprise. Much of the existing Soviet air force was destroyed on the ground; the Soviet armies were initially overwhelmed. German units encircled millions of Soviet soldiers, who, cut off from supplies and reinforcements, had few options other than to surrender. The Holocaust was the genocide of approximately six million European Jews during World War II, a programme of systematic state-sponsored extermination by Nazi Germany throughout Nazi-occupied territory. Of the nine million Jews who had resided in Europe before the Holocaust, approximately two-thirds perished. Some scholars maintain that the definition of the Holocaust should also include the Nazis' genocide of millions of people in other groups, including Romani ("Gypsies"), Soviet prisoners of war, Polish and Soviet civilians, homosexuals, people with disabilities, Jehovah's Witnesses and other political and religious opponents, which occurred regardless of whether they were of German or non-German ethnic origin. As the war started, large massacres of Jews took place. Pogroms (racial riots) were also encouraged by the Nazis, especially early in the war before the larger mass killings began. The first of these pogroms was *Kristallnacht* in Nazi Germany, often called *Pogromnacht*, or "night of broken glass," in which Jewish homes were ransacked in numerous German cities along with 11,000 Jewish shops, towns and villages.

⁴⁵ Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*. Belknap Harvard University Press, p. 228.

⁴⁶ The Germans attack on Stalingrad began on 19 August 1942. Stalingrad was a strategically important city in their campaign to occupy the south of Russia and take control of the Caucasus oilfields. The Red Army fought from inside the city, forcing the German soldiers into intense, house-to-house urban warfare under heavy shellfire from the German army and its allies surrounding the city. Then on 19 November 1942, a massive force including three entire Soviet armies counter-attacked from outside the city. Two more Soviet armies attacked the following day, 20 November. They smashed the German siege and encircled Stalingrad themselves, trapping 300,000 soldiers of the 6th Army inside. The defeat at Stalingrad threw Hitler's offensive in the Soviet Union into disarray, and was a turning point in the war in Europe. It was also one of the bloodiest battles in modern history. Nobody knows exactly how many people died at Stalingrad. On the German side, estimates put the number of dead from the 6th Army and its allies at about 300,000. The Soviet government never released accurate figures. A conservative estimate is that at least 500,000 Red Army soldiers died in the fighting.

⁴⁷ Julius Streicher was a prominent Nazi prior to World War II. He was the founder and publisher of *Der Stürmer* newspaper, which became a central element of the Nazi propaganda machine. His publishing firm also released

The World War II era cartoons from *Fliegende Blätter*, (Fig.1.15 to 1.17) a weekly German humor magazine. It's interesting that four weekly humor magazines survived into the war years (the others were *Lustige Blätter*, *Kladderadatsch*, and *Simplicissimus*), whereas the Nazi humor magazine *Brennessel* expired at the end of 1938. Some of the World War II era cartoons are from *Fliegende Blätter* and *Lustige Blätter* (figures from 1. 18 to 1.21). In one issue from 1942 the claim was that "International Jews" were pulling the strings that control all the Allied powers. The Jews image was created as they were siding with the Allies or a connection between Jews and Bolshevism was portrayed. The entire range of propaganda material was based on blaming the Jews for the current situation. In another issue from the same year a batch of Jewish barbers was shaving Roosevelt, who was holding a newspaper, titled *The New York Soviet Times*. It was in the year 1942 only that the political content Battle of Stalingrad began and the first time the full support of America to the Allies in military also began. It was also coupled with Russians bombing Berlin in August 1942 and the mass murder of Jews by gassing began at Auschwitz, thus, the linking of Jews to Stalin or Roosevelt was too obvious and the demand of the time. In one of the issues from 1943 (Fig.1.18) a Jew has his tentacles around England, Russia, the United States, and China entitled "The Polyp". The entire concept of Jews backing the Allied forces was exploited.

In some of the issues of *Lustige Blätter*, we see the anti- Semitic propaganda as shown in the fig.1.18 the caption reads: "*England Führung liegt in guten Händen*" (England was in good hands) and shows a Jew holding the hand of a British. Another issue from 1943 (fig.1.19) caption reads: "*Einer frißt den anderen der Jude frisse alle...*" (One eats the other and the Jew devours them all...) the cartoon promotes the Nazi claim that the Jews were behind World War II, having orchestrated it to destroy Nazi Germany and another issue from 1942 the caption reads: "America Candelbra" The anti-Semitic theme suggests that Roosevelt was serving the Jews. Another poster in Russian was probably from 1941, it can translated as follows: "Get the Jewish-Bolshevist warmongers out of Europe!" Thus, much of the war propaganda was based on themes like anti Jewish-Bolshevist or anti-Allies.

three anti-Semitic books for children, including the 1938 *Der Giftpilz* ("*The Toadstool*" or "*The Poison-Mushroom*"), one of the most widespread pieces of propaganda.

Goebbles maintained that the purpose of propaganda was to persuade the audience to believe in the viewpoint expressed by the propagandists. But if propaganda was to be effective it must, in a sense, always preach to those who were already partially converted. The Nazi attitude to the Jews was an excellent example of this facet of propaganda. It cannot be argued rationally that anti-Semitism was a result of National Socialism, or that Goebbles propaganda made Germans anti-Semitic but the fact remains that the Third Reich was responsible for an attempt at genocide of unparalleled scope and brutality. This situation can be attributed partly to the effects of propaganda itself and partly also closed political environment within which that propaganda was necessarily working. According to Hitler, the war was less a struggle among nations than a racial war to finish between 'Aryan' and 'Jew'.⁴⁸

In 1939, the first two anti-Semitic films were made *Robert und Bertram* and *Leinen aus Irland* both caricature the subhuman Jew within the framework of comedy. In both *Robert und Bertram* and *Leinen aus Irland*, Jews were stereotyped: despite being distinguishable by their repellent physical features, they also represent an economic and sexual threat to Western civilization because of their ability to assimilate themselves in different societies. In 1940, three major anti-Semitic films, *Die Rothschilds*, *Jud Süß* (fig.1.24) and *Der ewige Jude* (fig.1.23), were released in this manner and represent the RMVP's cinematic efforts to prepare the German public for the full scale extermination. By Goebbles's own definition of historical objectivity, the films exhibited showed 'Jewry as it was' and could not be accused of any particular bias. Other anti-Semitic films include "*Vom Bäumlein, das andere Blätter hat gewollt*" (From the little tree the other leaves). It was a short anti-Semitic cartoon produced in 1940 in the Nazi movie studio *Zeichenfilm GmbH*. The movie depicts a "golden tree" inhabited by little birds, whose leaves (all but one) were stolen by a caricature of a Jewish man: *Aber wie es Abend ward, ging der Jude durch den Wald, er steckt sie ein, geht eilends fort und lässt das leere Bäumlein dor...* "Forces Occultes, was another film commissioned in 1942 by the *Propaganda Abteilung*, a delegation of Nazi Germany's propaganda ministry within occupied France. It virulently denounces Freemasonry, parliamentarianism and Jews as part of Vichy's drive against them and seeks to prove a Jewish-Masonic plot.

⁴⁸ David Welch, *Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945*, New York, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp.204-5.

From August 1939 to June 1941, the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Goebbels and the Nazi propaganda machine dropped the assault on “Jewish Bolshevism.” However, the antisemitic propaganda continued, now directed at Great Britain, the United States, and the Jewish “men behind the scenes” (*Hintermänner*).⁴⁹

Der Schulungsbrief's issues were mainly anti-Semitic during this period. As seen in Fig.1.25 from 1942, the cover shows a German soldier attacking the Bolshevist dragon, with the caption: “The Reich and Europe are winning.” The lead article by Robert Ley begins:

“Like all creatures, a human being has to follow the laws of nature. The National Socialist principle that humanity is divided into races, and that the races vary in their nature, abilities, and accomplishments, is an accepted fact everywhere, despite all the Jewish attempts to deny it.” Another article blames Jews for Germany’s defeat in World War I, and includes a graphic cartoon of a Jewish hand stabbing a German soldier in the back. Another issue of the same magazine from the same year appeared as the Battle of Stalingrad was raging. Written by the head of the Nazi Party office on racial policy, it provides a racial analysis of Germany and its enemies. The United States and the Soviet Union, he argues, are racially mixed societies doomed to decline. The English people have maintained racial purity, but their upper classes have intermarried with Jews. Only the Germans have held to racial purity, and have strong leadership. Thus, Groß argues, Germany must inevitably win the war.”⁵⁰

A Nazi anti-Semitic book published late in the war authored by Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front. It was published in 1944.⁵¹ *Pesthauch der Welt* (The Pestilential Miasma of the World) the book went on to describe how Jew was evil. According to the book the mankind has named these battling worlds “good” and “evil,” “God” and “Satan,” “noble” and “crude,” “construction and destruction,” “life” or “death.” These were all ways of saying that nature was a constant process of coming and going, a constant transformation of forces and materials. The Jew was the enemy not only in his personal form, but rather even more in the Jewish mentality and in the Jewish approach to the world. *The Jew was such a parasite!* According to the book Hitler was right when he said that the final goal of the Jew was: “To control the world in order to *destroy the world*.” The second point the book made was that the Jews favoured Capitalism and

⁴⁹ Jeffrey Herf, “The ‘Jewish War’: Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* University of Maryland, College Park.

⁵⁰ *Der Schulungsbrief* was the Nazi Party’s monthly for political education. It attempted to present Nazi ideology in a way understandable to the masses. Party block wardens encouraged every household to subscribe.

⁵¹ The source: Robert Ley, *Pesthauch der Welt* (Dresden: Franz Müller Verlag, 1944). The Pestilential Miasma of the World. <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/pesthauch.htm> accessed on 15th April 2011.

the book also contained various quotes from Jews to authenticate. The book says that the war was against the Jewish Bolshevism.

“The struggle against Bolshevism will drive them even closer together. Jewish Bolshevism is at the gates, and must be fought, whatever the cost...What all the eloquence on European cooperation has not achieved, the Jew in his blindness will quickly hammer into the European peoples the knowledge that they must stand together in their battle against Bolshevism and in their battle against the Anglo-barbarians, that they share a common struggle against Judah.”

The Nazi Party's speakers needed to be kept up-to-date. To provide the necessary information, the party provided a variety of material. The Speaker Education Material was intended to provide information that could be used over the long term. The *Redner-Schnellinformation* (Speakers' Express Information), on the other hand, provided speakers with guidelines for the immediate campaign.⁵² An issue dated 5 May 1943, entitled “The Jewish Question as a Weapon at Home and Abroad”. The entire article dealt with how wrong it was to think that the Jews question has been solved in Germany. To think that way so dangerous and this war was a war of the Jews against Germany and its allies. Just as the domestic struggle in Germany had ended in an anti-Semitic revolution, so, too, this war must end in an anti-Semitic world revolution.⁵³

“The Jewish Question must be the central issue in the meeting waves of the immediate future. Each German must know that everything he suffers in this war, all the unpleasantness, shortages, overtime, bloody terror against women and children, and bloody losses on the battlefield, are the fault of the Jews. Each meeting must include the following line of thinking: The International Jew wanted this war. He possessed key economic positions within every enemy people and in every enemy nation, and used his power to ruthlessly drive the peoples into war.”

The article also suggests the profit the Jews had from this war, one of that was to earn money. And so they were interested in along war.

⁵² The Nazi Party's Central Propaganda Office, the *Reichspropagandaleitung*, published a monthly bulletin for speakers. It was designed to be kept in notebooks, divided by subject area. This is from the “Enemies of the State” section, and deals with the United States. The material was not confidential, though neither was it readily available to those who were not propagandists.

⁵³ The source: “*Die Judenfrage als inner- und außenpolitisches Kampfmittel*,” *Redner Schnellinformation*, Lieferung 57, 5 May 1943. German propaganda Archive.

In this article dated 9 May 1943, Goebbels again takes up the Jews. The article set the tone for a major anti-Semitic campaign. Nazi propagandists were told to look to this article for a model of how to spread anti-Semitism: *The War and the Jews*.⁵⁴

“Jewry wanted this war. Whether one looks to the plutocratic or the bolshevist side of the enemy camp, one sees Jews standing in the foreground as instigators, rabble-rousers and slave drivers. If the Axis powers lose the war in Europe, no power on earth could save Europe from the Jewish-Bolshevist flood.”

The Nazi Party’s Central Propaganda Office published a weekly poster designed for public display. A smaller version, about the size of a playing card, was also published. Many had anti-Semitic content. One of the flyers from the year 1942 quotes Stafford Cripps, who was Churchill’s former ambassador to Moscow in order to prove the alliance of Jews, America, England and Bolsheviks. Cripps is quoted:

“The Bolsheviks have the moral right to conquer Germany in order to give the German people the punishment they deserve!”⁵⁵

The two propaganda themes anti-Jewish and anti-Communist were intended to reinforce each other: Hitler knew it was necessary to focus the attention of the nation on a single enemy; it is possible that he thought of both the themes as equally effective. In practice however both had to be treated separately: the intensity of the anti-Semitic campaign could remain more even because its target was nebulous. The anti-Communist campaign, on the other hand had to be suspended or modified according to the demands of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ The economic situation was also exploited to the fullest. The Jews were propagated to be the hoarder of wealth and also supporters of Capitalism.

⁵⁴ The source: “*Der Krieg und die Juden*,” *Der steile Aufstieg* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1944), pp. 263-270. The Nazi Party depended heavily on speakers to get its message across, particularly when the party wanted to say things that would be awkward to say in the mass media, which were accessible to foreigners. The speakers needed to be kept up-to-date. The *Redner-Schnellinformation* [Speakers’ Express Information], published by the party propaganda headquarters, provided speakers with guidelines for immediate campaigns. This is a translation of an issue dated 18 May 1943, in the midst of one of the party’s periodic anti-Semitic campaigns. It formed the basis for public speeches throughout Germany.

⁵⁵ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/parole.html> accessed on 3rd March 2011.

⁵⁶ Zeman, Z.A.B, *Nazi Propaganda*, Oxford University Press, London 1973, p.102-3.

b) Indoctrination of Youth.

*von der Deutschen Jugend der Zukunft wünsch ich mir etwas anderes, als die Vergangenheit sich gewünscht hat. wir müssen einen neuen Menschen erziehen. Als es uns gelang, das deutsche Volk in einer Idee zu einen und es zu einer neuen Lebensform zu führen, das ist die größte Tat unseres Jahrhunderts für unser Volk. Adolf Hitler.*⁵⁷

Er allein, der die Jugend besitzt, gewinnt die Zukunft⁵⁸ -- Adolf Hitler, speech at the Reichsparteitag, 1935.

A feature peculiar to 20th –century dictatorships was their concern reaching the juvenile mind. Youth was to be courted by the state, trained, educated, organized, and finally marshaled. Already in Weimar period the Nazis had been successfully wooing the youth of Germany, who, during the 1920s, had been much neglected by the Weimar government.⁵⁹ In *Mein Kampf* Hitler confidently predicted that the children and youth of Germany could be won for all time to the movement. The process was to take place mainly propagandizing through education and involvement in the Hitler Youth organizations. From the beginning its propaganda was directed towards this generation. The Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach declared, ‘The NSDAP is the party of youth.’ Education therefore show us the way in which the movement attracted and held the enthusiasm of German youth. The overriding tenet of the Nazi educational philosophy was the political indoctrination of the youth. After all, it was to be this generation that would instill the Nazi *Weltanschauung* and to create the *Neuordnung* (New Order) in Europe.⁶⁰

Goebbels propagandists found the youth an easy prey. With unlimited appeal to the emotions and ruthless exploitation of their readiness to believe and follow, the Nazis had won the German youth several years before they assumed power. During these years the principle attraction for

⁵⁷From the German youth of the future I wish something else than the past has wished. We must educate new people (persons). When we succeeded in leading the German people in an idea to one and it to a new way of life, this is the biggest act of our century for our people quoted in Erwin Leiser , *Mein Kampf Eine Bilddokumentation der Jahre 1914-1945*,Germany, Beltz Athenaeum Verlag, 1995. Leiser was a German-born director, writer, and actor and made a documentary *Mein Kampf* , the present book is a picture documentation from the film and contain quotations.

⁵⁸ He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future!

⁵⁹ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed),*Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II* , Angus and Robertson Publishers,1975,p. 22.

⁶⁰ David Welch (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations*, London, Barnes and Noble Books 1983, p.65.

the young people was the “new comradeship of Hitler Youth”-the Hitler parade of uniforms, in marked contrasts to the drabness of everyday life in the Weimar Republic.⁶¹

From the 1920s onwards, the Nazi Party targeted German youth as a special audience for its propaganda messages. These messages emphasized that the Party was a movement of youth: dynamic, resilient, forward-looking, and hopeful. Millions of German young people were won over to Nazism in the classroom and through extracurricular activities. In January 1933, the Hitler Youth had only 50,000 members, but by the end of the year this figure had increased to more than 2 million. By 1936 membership in the Hitler Youth increased to 5.4 million before it became mandatory in 1939. The German authorities then prohibited or dissolved competing youth organizations. Anti-semitism was the overwhelming topic in every school curriculum. Indeed, the propaganda picture books published by *Der Stürmer*, the organ responsible for the dissemination of many of the anti-semitic publications during the Hitler years, demonstrate that anti-semitism was taught before children “were six or seven or eight.” By 1937, 97% of all teachers belonged to the National Socialist Teachers' Union. Every member of this union had to submit an ancestry table in triplicate with official documents of proof. Courses and textbooks in Nazi schools reflected the aims of Hitler. Of the topics that teachers were required to teach, the most important was racial theory, the Jewish problem. An example of racial propaganda in a math problem was the following:

"The Jews are aliens in Germany--in 1933 there were 66,060,000 inhabitants in the German Reich, of whom 499,682 were Jews. What is the per cent of aliens?"⁶²

The best example of the Jewish question as described in the Nazi curriculum was the *Die Judenfrage im Unterricht* (*The Jewish Question in Classroom Instruction*) and the following propaganda picture books that targeted young children: *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid* (*Don't Trust A Fox in A Green Meadow Or the Oath of A Jew*); *Der Giftpilz* (*The Poisonous Mushroom*); and *Der Pudelmopsdachelpinscher* (*The Poodle-Pug-Dachshund-Pincher*). “*Die Judenfrage im Unterricht*” was a pamphlet intended for teachers. This

⁶¹ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, , Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, p. 22.

⁶² <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007820> accessed on 20th April 2011.

pamphlet was given considerable publicity in *Der Stuermer*. The pamphlet was written by Fritz Fink and Julius Streicher goes on to mention in the introduction that (See Fig.1.27 to 1.32.)

“The National Socialist state demands that teachers teach German children about the racial question. For the German people, the racial question is the Jewish question....Racial science and the Jewish question must run like a red thread through education at every level. There is no subject in our schools from which valuable knowledge of the Jewish Question cannot be drawn in unexpected fullness....However young he may be, a child asks himself the reasons for this dislike and disgust and wants an explanation from his teacher.”⁶³

Throughout the pamphlet there were instructions to the teachers as to why they should include the “Jewish question” in the curriculum as it of utmost importance to justify the Nuremberg Laws as well as all the queries of the students, so that they will have no doubts in their minds. Teachers were also asked to give examples, like the one mentioned in this pamphlet was of “termites” and who when they allowed the infiltration of the foreigners, the foreigners on gaining abundance attacked them and wiped them completely. Teachers were asked to demonstrate the physical differences between Jews and the Germans, so that the children could see the stark difference. One of the concluding sub- headings was “Racial Defilement” and here the teachers were asked to mainly educate the young girls not to mix the Jewish boys and how the mixing led to an incorrigible impurity of blood.

The image of the Jew was created as something less than human, unnatural and immoral recurs throughout the Nazi propaganda picture storybooks for young children. Around the age of six, children were given primers, whose content focused upon camp life, marching, martial drums, boys growing up to be soldiers, etc. Even at this young age, it was obvious that as one principal of a German academic high school wrote: "Education in relation to weapons... is no special branch of general education; rather it is, in point of fact, the very core of our entire education." Along with these primers, children were given a supplement entitled *Trau keinem*

⁶³ Excerpts from the pamphlet are available on the site German Propaganda Archive, <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/fink.htm> accessed on 29th April 2011. Julius Streicher was the founder and publisher of *Der Stürmer* newspaper, which became a central element of the Nazi propaganda machine. His publishing firm also released three anti-Semitic books for children, including the 1938 *Der Giftpilz* ("The Toadstool" or "The Poison-Mushroom"), one of the most widespread pieces of propaganda, which purported to warn about insidious dangers Jews posed by using the metaphor of an attractive yet deadly mushroom. For further information on Julius Streicher and *Der Stürmer* you can have a look at). *Julius Streicher: Nazi Editor of the Notorious Anti-Semitic Newspaper Der Stürmer* by Randall L Bytwerk, *Goering: The Iron Man* by Richard J Overy, and "*Neuschöpfer des deutschen Volkes*". *Julius Streicher im Kampf gegen "Rassenschande"* by Franco Ruault.

Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid (Don't Trust a Fox in A Green Meadow or the Word of A Jew).⁶⁴

This supplement was written by an eighteen-year-old art student, Elvira Bauer, and was a basic educational tool that was typical of the material provided for young children. It was published in 1935/36 by *Der Stürmer* and went through seven editions. A hundred thousand copies of this picture book were in circulation. This storybook does not have a story in the traditional sense because it lacks an active plot. Its anti-Semitic theme, conveyed through primitive rimes and lurid illustrations, focuses upon a pre-conceived contrast between the German and the Jew, their history of animosity, and the establishment of a justification for the German war against the Jews.

Upon casual examination of the book, one's attention was immediately drawn to the bright red cover (fig.1.27) and the malicious expressions of the two images accompanying the title. The one was a fox eager to trap his prey; the other was a Jew eager to swear a false oath under the star of David. Bauer effectively uses the image of the clever and deceptive fox, a figure that was based in antiquity and commonplace in European folklore. Greek legend considered the fox to be a creature of the Devil or even the Devil, himself. While linking the Jew to this universal image of deceit, Bauer simultaneously draws upon another universal theme, loyalty to one's oath as it appears in the German fairy tale *Eid aufs Eisen*. *Eid aufs Eisen* might be translated as "absolute truth." *Eid* means "oath" and *aufs Eisen* literally means "on iron."

At school new subjects such as Race Science taught school children that Germans were superior to other races; and especially that Jews were to blame for Germany's problems. In the more traditional subjects, such as History, the Nazi version of the past was taught. Even in Maths the problems solved were about how much fuel a bomber would need to attack enemy cities. Teachers who objected were sacked. Many though willingly went along with these Nazi plans

⁶⁴ Mary Mills, Propaganda and Children during the Hitler Years available on <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/m/mills-mary/mills-00.html> accessed on 29th April. The supplement *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid* is available on the German Propaganda Archives, <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/fuchs.htm> accessed on 29th April 2011.

for education.⁶⁵ The other anti- Semitic book was *Der Giftpilz (The Poisonous Mushroom)*. Already discussed in the section on Anti-Semitism. (See fig.1.4).

Until as late as 1936 a number of youth organizations, such as Catholic Youth Boys and Boy Scouts, existed in Germany alongside the Hitler Youth. In that year Baldur von Schriach, leader of the Hitler Youth, gave an order that all these organizations were hence forth forbidden to take part in any form of organized sport. Now, if a young man belonged to the Catholic Youth or any other of the organizations apart from the Hitler Youth, all forms of organized sport- athletics, hiking, skiing, gymnastics, even camping- were denied him. In addition, Schirach forbade all members of youth movements (apart from Hitler Youth) to wear uniforms, together with badges, shoulder straps, lanyards, etc. They were also forbidden to march in formation, have their own bands, and carry flags, banners and pennants. These measures reveal the Nazis's understanding of the juvenile mind.⁶⁶

The Nazis organized the youth into four divisions under the Hitler Youth. For boys 10-14, there was the *Jungvolk*, and after that the regular Hitler Jugend, for girls 10-14 the *Jungmädel*, thereafter the *Bund Deutscher Mädel*. Nearly all German kids were members. Each group held meetings, generally biweekly. The task of the boys section was to prepare the boys for military service: At 10 joined the German Young People, until the age of 13 when they transferred to the Hitler Youth until the age of 18. Activities were dominated by physical rather than intellectual activities. By 1936, the 'military athletics' course they followed included: marching, bayonet drill, grenade throwing, trench digging, map reading, gas defence, use of dugouts, how to get under barbed wire and pistol shooting. Nazi beliefs about the need to conquer new territory (especially in Eastern Europe) and take land from people thought to be inferior played a key part in the education of boys.

The *Bund deutscher Mädchen* (German's Girl's League too had a monopoly of all sports for girls. They attended Youth Hostel Weekends. The task of the girls section was to prepare them for motherhood: Girls, at the age of 10, joined the League of Young Girls and at the age of 14 transferred to the League of German Girls. Activities were again dominated by physical ones.

⁶⁵http://www.pearsonschoolsandfecolleges.co.uk/Secondary/History/1416/EdexcelGCSEHistoryBSHP/Samples/EdexcelGCSESchoolsHistoryProjectSamplePages/SHP_sample_spreads.pdf accessed on 29th April 2011.

⁶⁶ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, , Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, p. 22.

Girls had to be able to run 60 metres in 14 seconds, throw a ball 12 metres, complete a 2 hour march and swim 100 metres. The rest of the activities were focused on domestic activities and looking after children. Nazi beliefs about race and the removal of those thought to be inferior played a large part.⁶⁷ There were stamps produced containing propaganda material as the one shown in Fig. 1.32, which has two children a boy and girl from the Hitler youth. The stamp reads: "Duty of Youth Day," 1943. This holiday was something of a rite of passage, on which new members were often admitted to the Nazi Party.⁶⁸

There were periodicals which provided them with guidance on how to train their groups. There were four periodicals in all (*Die Kameradschaft*, *Die Jungenschaft*, *Die Mädelschaft*, *Die Jungmädelschaft*). Beginning in 1938, each had two editions, A and B, aimed at different age groups.⁶⁹ *Das Deutsche Mädel* was the monthly illustrated Magazine for girls in the Hitler Youth organization. It clearly presents Nazi expectations for what girls should become. In contrast to the *Der Pimpf*, the corresponding magazine for boys, which suggests adventure and excitement, girls were to take quiet hikes, care for wounded soldiers, prepare for raising children, and work hard in factories. These were the front covers from 1936-1943. At ten, girls joined the *Deutsche Mädel*, the German Girls, part of the Hitler Youth organization. This article from summer 1943 tells girls that they too have duties to Germany.⁷⁰

"Ten-year-old girls are war children again, just as there were war children in the previous war. Be sure than people can see your enthusiasm, that your fathers and brothers at the front may be proud of you. One thing is expected of you. During your six month probationary period, during which you may not wear the scarf and tie, you must do everything you can to reach your goal. That may be in small things one asks of you, or in your eagerness to prepare for the Young Girl test [a physical fitness test], or during the achievement week during the summer vacation. You will constantly be able to prove your total commitment in service, sport, trips, meetings, war duty, etc. Even in the little things of everyday life, be loyal and dependable! You who want to become Young Girls must do all you can to be able to wear the scarf and tie as the outward signs of your membership in the Hitler Youth on 2 October, the anniversary of the first Reich youth rally in Potsdam."⁷¹

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ww2era.htm#Posters> accessed on 4th March 2011.

⁶⁹ <http://bytwerk.com/gpa/hitleryouth.htm> accessed on 1st May 2011. German Propaganda Archive.

⁷⁰ The source: Hilde Breitfeld "*Ihr habt die besten Vorbilder*," *Das deutsche Mädel*, March-April 1943,

⁷¹ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/dm3-43a.htm>. German Propaganda Archive.

A short touching story from one of the issues of *Das deutsche Mädel*, November-December 1943 (Fig. 1.38) goes like this the small kid has lost his father in the war and his father had promised to get him a rocking horse with a red saddle and a mane of red horse hair. But the Christmas just passed away and he didn't receive a gift from Santa, after his father was gone forever he wrote letters to Santa. But nobody fulfilled his desire and then came Liesel who was a member of the Young Girl and Fritz asked her if he would receive his gift this Christmas and Liesel acted as Santa and along with her other colleagues from the Young Girls made a rocking horse for Fritz. The whole conversation between Liesel and her friends show the sacrificing quality of the Young Girls, one of them was ready to give up her poetry album because it was made of red leather and the other hairs from her old milk cow.⁷²

Some of the other issues from the *Das deutsche Mädel* (figures 1.39 to 1.43) show the girls of the BDM performing their duties as the members of Hitler Youth. The issues were propagandizing some of the special occurrences of the war. Like, the one in the Fig. 1.98 (March-April 1943) the caption reads: "Once again in these weeks, following the will of the Führer, our ten-year-olds are joining the community of the Hitler Youth, gladly and cheerfully doing their duty wherever they are needed." This issue appeared just after the German defeat at Stalingrad. An interior article titled "You Have the Best Examples" tells girls what was expected of them as they join the Young Girls. The main aim of the issue was to promote the girls to join the Hitler Youth as after the defeat of Germany at Stalingrad so may the morale of the people were down and the number of youth willing to join the Hitler Youth must have declined so in order to encourage the girls to join the Hitler Youth, such an issue was printed.⁷³ Any issue from the war years can be seen as catering to the special events of the war.

This was the first issue (fig. 1.42 August 1941) to appear after the invasion of the Soviet Union. The caption reads: "Weary and ruined faces characterize the neglected children of the Soviet state. Cheerful and healthy on the other hand, the youth of Greater Germany are participating in sports festivals everywhere in the country."⁷⁴ Another issue of BDM (fig. 1.40) from May 1942,

⁷² <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/dm11-43a.htm> accessed on 12th April 2011. German Propaganda Archive. Please have a look at the appendix for the entire story.

⁷³ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/dm3-43a.html> accessed on 7th March 2011. German Propaganda Archive.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

the caption translates: “Bringing their full enthusiasm and the fresh strength of youth, our Labor Service girls were serving in the regained German territory in the East.”⁷⁵ Another issue from the same year (fig.1.41) the caption reads: “Just as German Red Cross nurses were constantly at work on all fronts to do their duty, so also young Norwegian girls cheerfully serve their comrades on the Eastern Front.” (Fig.1.43, Issue: July –August 1943)A Finnish woman serves coffee to the troops. The caption reads:

“I come from the north, where the danger of Bolshevism is much closer than it is here. It is not easy to stand watch there, but it is the task history has given to us.-Fanni Luukkonen, leader of the Lotta Svärd (a Finnish women’s volunteer organization).⁷⁶

All these issues tried to promote the feeling of sacrifice in the girls of Nazi Germany and how girls were contributing to the war and similarly any other girl could also participate in the war. The various issues of the *Wochenparole der HJ* (Fig.1.44 to 1.47) shows the constant appeal to the youth:

“Whether in school or the work place, or serving in the HJ or BDM, whether at home with your mothers: everywhere you have tasks that you must fulfill if you want to say that you are Adolf Hitler’s proper German boys and girls.” 18/1940: 1- 6 July.

The issues also ask the Youth to give their full support to the war. As mentioned in one of the issue from 1940 mentions that even if they were not, at the front of the great battle, the easier it must be for them to do everything they could do as their duty. The constant mention of the fact that the dead of the “Great War” had been avenged. The burden that their fathers had to bear after giving up a war they had not lost has been taken from them. They were armed for the final battle against England. The appeal to the German youth to remain loyal, ready to sacrifice, obedient and alert was made. The Youth bears Germany’s fate-Germany’s future or Germany’s decline was propagated.⁷⁷

The entire education plan of the Nazis was in such a way that through education they propagated Nazi ideals among the Youth since childhood. The “Pimpfs” were members of the Nazi organization for boys aged 10-14, part of the larger Hitler Youth organization. The introductory

⁷⁵ *Ibid*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ The Source: *Wochenparole der HJ* , German propaganda Archive.

chapter from the handbook for these boys contained a brief biography of Adolf Hitler, who was eulogised as the leader. Nearly every German boy had a copy of this book. All provided a brilliant reckoning with the measures of the black (conservative) and red (Marxist) governments of the day. They once again embarked on how Germany was engulfed into the misery of inflation and it reached its pinnacle in 1923. The whole chapter sounded like a eulogy to Hitler. The arrest of Hitler was made larger than life and how the compilation of *Mein Kampf* took place in the prison.⁷⁸ Another Chapter included: "Military service was the highest form of education for the Fatherland".

Another chapter from a 5th grade biology textbook for girls, published in the midst of the war, the first part of the book discussed genetics, spring, summer, fall, and winter in the forest, and the human body. The book then went on to apply these principles to human beings. Given what we know was going on in 1942, when this book was printed, it is clear that textbooks, too, were a part of propaganda.⁷⁹

The Laws of Nature and Humanity:

We have established that all creatures, plants as well as animals, are in a continual battle for survival. ...Plant eaters are prey for carnivores. The battle for existence is hard and unforgiving, but is the only way to maintain life. This struggle eliminates everything that is unfit for life, and selects everything that is able to survive. All the various habitats are heavily populated; every creature has to fight for its survival and wants to be a winner in this battle. This is summarized in the principle: Each individual wants to maintain its existence in the struggle for survival (self preservation instinct, fighting will, individuality).

The chapter went on to describe in full detail which animal uses his which organ for his protection or according to this chapter for his survival and the condition was not different for human beings Mankind, too, is subject to these natural laws, and has won its dominant position through struggle."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ The source: Reichsjugendführung, *Pimpf im Dienst* (Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag, 1938). <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/pimpfhitler.htm>.

⁷⁹ The source: Marie Harm and Hermann Wiehle, *Lebenskunde für Mittelschulen. Fünfter Teil. Klasse 5 für Mädchen* (Halle: Hermann Schroedel Verlag, 1942), pp. 168-173. Biology for the Middle School For 5th Grade Girls, <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/textbk01.htm>. German Propaganda Archive.

⁸⁰ The excerpt from the chapter: "We have seen that the laws of nature are built on a struggle for survival. The slow-moving herbivores (e.g., cows) have weapons, the speedier ones (e.g., horses or rabbits) use that speed to escape predators. The rabbit instinctively conceals the traces that lead to his den. As a prey, his eyes are to the sides of his

The chapter then embarked on the principle of man trying to preserve his species once he has won his struggle for survival.⁸¹

“The drive for maintaining the species is stronger than the instinct for self preservation. Plants sacrifice themselves for their seeds. Most insects die when they have reproduced. The female rabbit defends her young against hawks, often at the cost of her own life. A fox risks its life to secure food for its young. The life of the individual can be sacrificed to assure the continuation of the species. (The law of the species is stronger than that of the individual!)”⁸²

This is a chapter from a middle school geography textbook published in the midst of the war. It reviews Nazi actions after 1933 and summarizes the Nazi claim that Germany needed more living space. This was a major element of Nazi propaganda, *Lebensraum*. Late in the war, the Nazis were still planning what to do with the colonies they intended to regain.⁸³ (fig.1.48.)

The data hints to the fact that despite the great decrease in birth rate, the German people, with a population density of 133.5 for square kilometer, remained a crowded people. Other peoples with

head, while a carnivore's are to the front. The hedgehog has his needles, toads and salamanders have poisonous skins. Predators have keen senses, a powerful spring, sharp teeth, and claws. If we further consider protective coloring, camouflage, and other coloring (above all with young animals), and that each animal has different gifts in seeing and smelling that are appropriate for its needs, we can see everywhere that living creatures are well prepared for the battle for survival. (Compare offensive and defensive characteristics of the various animals!) Animals at our latitude have many characteristics that enable them to survive winter: storing food, hibernation, migration, winter pelts... The same is true for plants. Poisons of various types, irritants, thorns, and needles protect them from herbivores. (Remember the earlier examples!) Seeds that can survive the winter, roots, storage ability enable plants to survive the cold months. By ground leaves, growing high, pyramidal structure, leaf mosaics, climbing, winding, spreading (the dog rose), and plants seek the necessary light for their leaves.”

⁸¹ The fox builds a den for its helpless young and cares for them. The deer cares for its fawns, and the bat even carries its young with it through the air. Each spring we watch with fascination as the birds cleverly build their nests, hatch their eggs, and untiringly feed their young. Insects place their larvae in certain areas where food is available. Mosquitoes and dragon flies, for example, put them in water, the cabbage moth in cabbages, stag beetles at the base of old oaks.

⁸² Among all living creatures, we can see a further natural law: the production of numerous offspring. Nowhere on earth do we find a form of life that produces only one or two offspring (corresponding to the number of the parents). That would inevitably lead to extinction. The elephant has the longest period of procreation, from its 30th to 90th year. It brings about six offspring into the world. A scientist has calculated that even with this slow rate of reproduction, in the absence of the struggle for survival elephants would take over the entire world in a few hundred years. A single pair would produce 19 million descendants in 750 years. The struggle for survival leads most to perish. The blue titmouse has two broods of 10-13 a year, but their number is not increasing. The more threatened a creature is in the struggle for survival, the more offspring it must produce. The greater number of offspring is a necessary means of responding to the hard struggle for survival. Each habitat can disappear from one day to the next (arrival of a new predator, disappearance of a food source).

⁸³ The source: Reinhard Müller, *Deutschland. Sechster Teil* (München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1943), pp. 116-130. The main reason for the Nazi expansion into its neighboring western countries was built upon the principle of lebensraum. Even though it translates literally to mean only “living space,” lebensraum carried with it the desire for the Nazis to expand into other countries to provide living space for the growing German race.

a much smaller population density still have large colonial holdings that can accept their surplus population.

The text from the Geography had a section on the Danger of Germany's Geographical position the text read that Germany was situated in the middle (i.e. the heart of Europe The World War showed how grave a danger Germany's central position was. Germany was surrounded by enemies. All access to the seas and to neutral countries was blocked, which allowed for a successful hunger blockade. The National Socialist government drew the necessary conclusions from Germany's unfavorable central location, and took the steps necessary to ensure that Germany would never again find itself in a situation similar to that of the end of the World War. The part of the text headed as Building the New Germany.

The childhood of most of the children comprises of studies and sports. Nazi propaganda was trying to propagate through both the mediums as we see the indoctrination of the Nazi anti-Semitism or the preaching of the importance of a "pure race" dominated the text books and the Nazi education plan was planned to imbibe the youth with the existing war aims and the Nazi ideology which the primary goal of Nazi propaganda. It very interesting to see how the games were devised to meet the same goal, for example, the 1940 game, the "Stukas Attack".(Fig.1.34 & 1.35). The object of the game is to move one's pieces to the other side of the board (the enemy airbase) and back, avoiding enemy searchlights (in yellow) and flak (in red) along the way.⁸⁴

The Nazis published an extensive series of booklets on the war intended for the youth titled the *Kriegsbücherei der deutschen Jugend*. War library of the German Youth. There were 156 of them, appearing at weekly intervals from 1940 through December 1942. There were also fourteen special editions that were not for sale, rather used as rewards by the Nazi youth group. These were published at the end of the series. These booklets presented the war in an exciting manner, and often ended with an appeal to join the military.⁸⁵(See fig.1.49 to 1.52). The various issues dealt with subjects such as "Invasion of Poland", "Breakthrough to Oslo" Onward, and

⁸⁴ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ww2era.htm#Posters> accessed on 4th March 2011.German Propaganda Archive.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Ever Onward!" A story about the early months of the infantry campaign in Russia and "Bombs on Coventry": The attack on Coventry in November 1940.⁸⁶

Speaking on the occasion of Youth Film Festival for the winter 1940/41 held in 29th September 1940 in conjunction with the Hitler Youth, the League of German Girls, and the Reich Propaganda Office of the NSDAP, Goebbels discussed the duties of the German youth during the war. Goebbels explained that the Hitler Youth (HJ) and the League of German Girls (BDM) were taking on part of the parental role, since fathers were at war and mothers were working to support the troops.⁸⁷

"It is a good thing for the German youth to fully experience these great days. They should do their best for the war, giving their courage, their idealism, and their faith."

The aura of Hitler Youth was such that any boy and girl who was the member of the organization felt proud of themselves. They were groomed both mentally and physically to be fit to join the military later on and were indoctrinated since childhood through the elaborate and deeply entrenched propaganda machinery of Nazis which ranged from classrooms to library to the playground to their homes.

iii) War Propaganda:

In state involved in war, propaganda must be constantly adjusted to the changing military situations. Goebbels's immediate task once war had been declared was to counteract the negative opinions held by the population at home.⁸⁸ The image of the external enemy changed from the pre-war years to the War years. Interestingly, Britain was not considered an enemy till the actual outbreak of the War. Hitler personally admired British Empire and her domination of colonial races. Britain had eagerly accepted signing the Anglo-Germany Naval Agreement in June 1935. Without consulting her two allies, Britain had condoned German re-armament, which went ahead with greater momentum. The *Anschluss* with Austria (March 1938) was a personal success for

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ The source: "Die Jugend und der Krieg. Ansprache zur Eröffnung der Jugendfilmstunden in Berlin," *Die Zeit ohne Beispiel*. (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1941), pp. 324-330.

<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb33.htm>. accessed on 6th June 2011.

⁸⁸ Welch David (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations* London 1983, p.90.

Hitler when German troops moved in and Austria became a part of the Third Reich. It revealed the weakness of Britain and France, who merely protested but took no action. The British policy of appeasement by avoiding war and giving way to the demands of Germany, Italy and Japan. Hence, Britain did not figure in the German propaganda campaign. ⁸⁹The *Anschluss* was propagated a lot through the medium of pamphlets.⁹⁰

In the first years of the war, propaganda had a relatively easy task capitalizing on the *Blitzkrieg* victories. As the *Wehrmacht* launched its campaigns with astonishing success, the dominant theme became the futility of resistance to German military might. The broad theme of *Blitzkrieg* was applied in a variety of ways, depending on the target, but it was invariably accompanied by intimidation and fear. ⁹¹ Propaganda was able to advertise military victories and indirectly help to prepare an atmosphere, or exception, of new ones. In this way the propagandists served to support military campaigns by creating a confident and aggressive spirit at home challenging enemy leaders to reveal their military prowess in the arena of combat. Thus during the lightning victories in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, German belief in an early termination of the war was strengthened by a concerted propaganda campaign which recognized the lack of any widespread enthusiasm for the war and the desire of the population for an early peace. War invariably produces an excess of good propagandist material, and Goebbles was determined to control the cameramen whose responsibility it was to capture it. Such a concentration of resources permitted swift and economic reporting of events both at home and abroad. Reporting the war was the responsibility of the Propaganda *Kompaine Einheiten* (PK units) which was established in 1938. They were appointed by the RMVP but at the front they operated under the command of *Oberkommando der Whermacht* (OKW).⁹²

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ The *Anschluss* was the occupation and annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany in 1938.

⁹¹ Blitzkrieg means "lightening war". Blitzkrieg was first used by the Germans in World War Two and was a tactic based on speed and surprise and needed a military force to be based around light tank units supported by planes and infantry (foot soldiers). The tactic was developed in Germany by an army officer called Hans Guderian. He had written a military pamphlet called "*Achtung Panzer*" which got into the hands of Hitler. As a tactic it was used to devastating effect in the first years of World War Two and resulted in the British and French armies being pushed back in just a few weeks to the beaches of Dunkirk and the Russian army being devastated in the attack on Russia in June 1941.

⁹² Welch David (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations* London 1983, p.125-7.

Despite the rapid victory over Poland, the German population still remained to be convinced of the efficacy of such a war, especially as Britain and France had now entered the conflict. This cautious mood of somewhat offset, however by the astonishing advance of the *Wehrmacht* through the Low Countries, culminating in the surrender of France in May and June 1940. These campaigns serve to illustrate the extent to which Nazi radio propaganda in particular had been integrated into Nazi Germany's military operations. From the beginning of the war German radio had managed to build up large audiences in Europe who had grown suspicious of the statements of their home sources of information. The "radio *Blitzkrieg*" that was launched on Holland, Belgium and France in 1940 was timed to create a maximum fear and terror in order to undermine resistance. While "radio *Blitzkrieg*" was a technique that undoubtedly helped sow the seeds of defeatism in the countries that were about to be attacked by Germany, nonetheless such a campaign depended heavily for its ultimate success on the ability of the armed forces to validate their propaganda claims.⁹³

The first reactions in Germany to the victories in the West were ecstatic. Hitler's standing among the population reached its highest point with the signing of armistice with France on 22 June 1940. If ever there was widespread enthusiasm for the war in Germany, then this was probably the period when it existed. It even overshadowed the general discontent felt about the coal shortages and the workings of the rationing system.

The victory over France marked the high point of Nazi propaganda but was to prove the last great military success the Germans would celebrate. Seduced by military conquest supported by propaganda, German public opinion appears to have been convinced that Hitler was in command of the situation and the final victory seemed assured. Although there was a feeling of euphoria within the Germany, The SD reports reveal that there was still a strong desire to for an end to the war. Fuelled by a 'united Europe' theme the rationalized *Blitzkrieg* as 'liberating' Europe from the Jewish Bolshevik threat, the population was still able to be persuaded that all Hitler wanted from the war was a 'just and lasting peace and living space for Germans.'⁹⁴

⁹³ Welch David (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations* London 1983, p.90

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

After the failure to invade Britain in 1940, with Goring's *Lufwaffe* decisively checked in Battle of Britain, Hitler switched his attack in the following April and ordered his troops into Greece, Yugoslavia and then Egypt. On 22 June 1941, the Nazis unleashed 153 divisions on Russia. But by the beginning of 1942 Hitler had begun to lose control of the military situation. Despite hopelessly premature announcements of an early victory in the East, the Russians held Moscow, the Americans were now in the war and, having committed the fundamental error of waging war on two fronts, Hitler's shortcomings as a strategist were exposed.⁹⁵

The anti-Bolshevik concept was central to the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. The movement had developed and finally emerged from a struggle in which the Communist together with the Jew formed the main target of Nazi propaganda and violence. By 1924 anti-Communism was firmly established as one of the major themes of Nazi propaganda; as Hitler increasingly began regard himself as a crusader against Jews and Marxists. Stereotypes invariably come ready-made, having evolved, whether consciously and sub-consciously, over a considerable period of time. This was particularly the case with the anti-Bolshevik motif in Nazi propaganda. In 1933 the National Socialists were fully aware of the sources of their strength. By discovering the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy the Nazis not only found a scapegoat for the defeat of 1918 and the Versailles Diktat but also managed to appeal to long-standing fears of the German middle class by portraying the Bolshevik as the barbarian *Untermensch* (sub human). With this in mind, Antikomintern was founded under Goebbles' patronage in 1933, with the express intention of undermining the Communist international. The year 1936 saw an increase in the anti-Communist campaign; indeed, the Reichstag in September was devoted to it. Two treaties were signed in the late 1936 in quick succession. Germany and Italy signed a treaty (the Rome Berlin Axis), and, with Japan, both signed the Anti-Comintern Agreement. These treaties were intended by Hitler to rally other powers to resist the spread of world Communism. The Spanish Civil War also provided Goebbles with a further opportunity to exploit this theme by dividing international opinion into the desired polarity; the evil forces of Jewish Bolshevism on the one hand, revisited by the champions of Western civilization on the other. In the light of this long

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

history of antagonism towards the Soviet Union, the Nazi Soviet non-aggression pact, signed on 23 August 1939, came as something of a surprise.⁹⁶

Very little propaganda preparation had been made for the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941. However, once the offensive had been launched it provided Goebbles with the ideological cohesion that had been absent in Nazi Soviet pact in 1939. Bolshevism offered the Nazis certain advantages as a bogey. Initially they were able to rationalize the invasion of Russia as a defense measure against an imminent attack from barbaric Slaves from the East. Later, it proved to be a telling argument in favour of continued resistance. In this way they were able to link the fear and salvation motives intrinsic to the crusade against Bolshevik “sub-human” beings.⁹⁷

The German defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943 had clear effects on the Nazi propaganda campaign. For the first time, propaganda had to consider seriously the fact that Germans were beginning to wonder if Germany would lose the war. These were the directives put out by the party’s Central Propaganda Office (*Reichspropagandaleitung*) shortly after the defeat at Stalingrad that outline the propaganda campaign. The plan was received by a range of people involved in organizing and presenting Nazi propaganda, and is an interesting example of the propaganda system’s response to a major crisis. This pamphlet appeared in the spring of 1943, timed to go with an anti-Bolshevist propaganda campaign. It was one of the two anti-Bolshevist pamphlets issued during the campaign.⁹⁸

Although Goebbles fought against the excessive optimism of the reporting of the Russian war and the short-sightedness of the ‘sub-human’ propaganda, he was never able to overcome the basic contradictions intrinsic to anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Stalingrad not only represented a military defeat but also a propaganda fiasco of the first magnitude. As a result of the wholly

⁹⁶ Welch David (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations* London 1983, p.90

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Anweisung für antibolschewistische Propaganda-Aktion,” 20 February 1943. The document is the work of the Main Office (*Hauptamt*) for Propaganda. The original is at the Bundesarchiv Berlin (signature NSD 12/74). German propaganda Archive.

misleading campaign that was conducted throughout 1942, Goebbles' propaganda was in serious danger of losing all credibility with his own people.⁹⁹

The impact of Stalingrad on the morale of the German people cannot be over-estimated. It affected their attitude towards the war and created a crisis of confidence in the regime amongst broad sections of the population. Stalingrad marked a turning-point in Nazi war propaganda, as it allowed Goebbles finally to implement his drive for the total mobilization of all Germany's human resources for the war effort. The fate of the Sixth Army gave impetus to the radical idea he had been promising for some time-the proclamation of 'total war'. Goebbles was one of the few Nazi leaders who had realized as early as 1942 that final victory could only be achieved by a full mobilization of German resources incorporating every citizen. In particular, Goebbles attempted to create toughness in the civilian population by resorting to one of the oldest techniques of persuasion-the indoctrination of fear. Fear of the sub-human Bolshevik 'beast-man' endangering Western civilization (strength through fear), together with the 'total war', became the leitmotiv of his propaganda during 1943.¹⁰⁰

Hitler's decline as the Party's leading speaker left a gap which Goebbles began to fill. By 1943 Goebbles had become the principal spokesman for the regime. It is interesting to note that in his speeches he adopted a posture similar to that of Winston Churchill: he made no secret of the difficulties ahead, admitted that a German defeat was possible, and called for total involvement in the war effort. However, after the catastrophe of Stalingrad he was convinced of the need for some mass demonstration of national resistance. Strangely enough, the Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender' conceived at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 would provide the impetus he needed. Total war, he could argue, was the only alternative to total destruction. Writing in his diary on March 1943, Goebbles declared: 'Our slogan should be, now more than ever: Total War is the Imperative Need of the Hour'.¹⁰¹

The growing feeling of pessimism actually served Goebbles' short-term aims, for he was about to launch a new propaganda campaign based on 'strength through fear' and aiming to persuade

⁹⁹ Welch David (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations* London 1983, p.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

the German people and the West that a Bolshevik victory would be more dangerous than a compromise peace with the Third Reich. From 1943 onwards Nazi propaganda continued to insist that final victory was assured, however great difficulties. By invoking the *Untergangsmotif* and declaring that the war was an 'ideological fight to the death' Goebbles was once again appealing to Germans fears of the barbaric Bolshevik that he had employed so successfully in 1933. Wall posters throughout the Reich proclaimed the threat of impending doom should the nation fail to rise to the challenge: 'Hard Times, Hard Work, Hard Hearts', 'Victory or Bolshevism', "Total War-the Shortest War'. The Post Office also contributed to the war effort with the letter stamp 'Our Fuhrer Will Banish Bolshevism'. Curiously enough, it was a German military victory that posed a major problem for Goebbles. This was the recapture of Kharkov in March 1943. Goebbles chose to play this success down in case it aroused a false sense of security.¹⁰²

Both the anti-Bolshevik campaign and the propaganda line of exaggerated pessimism were greatly enhanced by the news of the discovery of the Katyn massacres in April 1943. The 'total war' campaign, the *Untergangsmotif* and the Katyn massacres, all served in their different ways to lift morale at a time of widespread war-weariness and gave the false impression of a people at one with its leadership.¹⁰³

The two propaganda themes anti-Jewish and anti-Communist were intended to reinforce each other. In practice however both had to be treated separately: the intensity of the anti-Semitic campaign could remain more even because its target was nebulous. The anti-Communist campaign, on the other hand had to be suspended or modified according to the demands of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The anti-Semitic propaganda was the most consistent during the entire Third Reich. It resonated through the entire period. During the war time and again it had to be molded to suit the existing situations. The indoctrination of youth was one of the most successful propaganda campaigns of the Nazis.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

Armin Lehman, in one of his interview has said that:

“My problem as a boy was that I never asked questions. I think it was a mixture of things in school and at Hitler Youth the indoctrination was that we have to more or less clean things up from the racial stand point that German was for the Germans and a Germans need more living space and members of the Nordic race are inferior and should be dominated.... I never looked for an explanation.”¹⁰⁴

Other young people enjoyed American ‘Swing Music’, which the Nazis hated. Some young people from working class areas of German cities formed gangs such as the ‘Edelweiss pirates’ who boycotted Hitler Youth activities and during the war attacked Hitler Youth patrols. At Munich University the White Rose movement produced anti-war leaflets and its leaders were executed in 1943. It is difficult though to be sure how many joined such groups. And how much support they had from other young people. This was because the Nazis controlled German newspapers and audio and crushed any groups of young people who openly resisted them. Thus resistance existed but it was defiantly overruled by the propaganda skill of the Nazis.

In one of the anti-Nazi propaganda newsreels William L. Shirer speaking on one of the youth propaganda movies says:

The mind of the youth is like a tablet; wiped and unrolled anything can be written on it. So, they begin their education of hate and death and war and conquer by taking child from his parents to Bund Deutscher Maedel....Every nation knows that its future reside in its youth, but no nation has known it better than Germany under Hitler and none has worked harder to impress its young people with the ideas of sacrifice.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Armin Dieter Lehmann was a Hitler Youth courier in the Führerbunker towards the end of Adolf Hitler's life, leaving shortly after Hitler committed suicide. He is said to have joined the *Deutsch Jungvolk* the junior branch of *Hitler Jugend* (Hitler Youth) . In January, 1945, he was sdrafted into the *Volkssturm*, the home defense. He was decorated (with the Iron Cross) for pulling battle-injured comrades out of the line of fire. He was selected by *Reichsjugendfuehrer* Artur Axmann to be a member of a *Hitler Jugend Helden* (Hitler Youth Heroes) delegation to visit the *Fuehrer* in Berlin on his birthday. He met Adolf Hitler in the Reich Chancellery garden (also known as the *Hinterhof* or backyard) outside his bunker on his last birthday, April 20, 1945. He became one of Hitler's last couriers as a member of Axmann's staff. During his duty as a courier inside and outside the bunker, he is said to have witnessed the final days of Hitler, Eva Braun, Martin Bormann, Joseph Goebbels and his family. Books about his childhood experiences in the *Hitler Youth* include *Hitler's Last Courier* and *In Hitler's Bunker* .He has also produced a documentary film about his experiences as one of Hitler's "boy-soldiers" titled "*Eyewitness to History*". The interview is available on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQmyDK0vxb4> accessed on 3rd May 2011.

¹⁰⁵ William Lawrence Shirer (February 23, 1904 – December 28, 1993) was an American journalist, war correspondent, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhYI3OfRUg4>.

During wartime, propaganda is vital. The value of labor and hard work becomes increasingly essential to the wartime effort, yet the average worker becomes increasingly dissatisfied with conditions. Propaganda becomes necessary to sustain morale in spite of the collapsing effect brought on by war. Propaganda does assume extra significance during the war. In Nazi Germany propaganda persuaded the people that the war was unavoidable and the success of the *Blitzkrieg* instilled faith in Hitler. War propaganda moulds itself according to the existing military situation. Thus the belief in the propaganda increased with the victory, and then it also slumped with a defeat. The defeat of Stalingrad made it hard to propagandize. It raised questions about the credibility of Axis success. The condition improved during the final two years of the war. The loss of Germany during the Second World War doesn't suffice the loss of German propaganda. The main aim of propaganda during the war is to mobilize people and to keep up the morale at the home front. The Nazi 'achievement' was not simply in mobilizing support but in maintaining it over a period of twelve year.






Fig. 1.1 The structure of State and Party organisations controlling propaganda in the Third Reich



„Die Juden-nase ist an ihrer Spitze gebogen. Sie sieht aus wie ein Sechser...“

Fig1.2 How to Tell a Jew: “The Jewish nose is bent. It looks like the number six...”



„Na, Herr Kollege Morgenthau, da haben wir beide wieder gemacht ein gutes Geschäft.“
 „Großartig, Herr Kollege Silberstein! Nun haben wir die beiden Goyas gebracht um ihr schönes Geld, und wir können es stecken in unseren Zock.“

Fig.1.3 “Well, Colleague Morgenthau, we did a good piece of business today.” “Splendid, Colleague Silberstein We took the lovely money from the two Goy women and can put it in our own pockets.”




Fig.1.4. “Der Giftpilz (The Poisonous Mushroom)”



Fig1.5 “The Jew: The inciter of war, the prolonger of war.” (late 1943 or early 1944) Artist: Hans Schweitzer (“Mjölfnir”).

Das Ostergeschenk für die deutsche Jugend!

Bestellzettel

Für den Günter-Verlag, Tübingen, Pfannenstiebs-
gasse 19/21, Postfach 302, erhalte von dem Bildersuch

„Trau keinem Sjuds auf grüner Heide ...“

gebunden RM. 1,60

in Heftform RM. 2,—

zusätzlich 40 Pfennig für Porto und Verpackung. Betrag anbei
in Briefmarken.

Name: _____

Wohnort: _____

Ort: _____

Erhältlich in jeder Buchhandlung.

44 Seiten hoch, 6 farbig illustriert


einfach gebunden RM. 1,60

in Heftform RM. 2,—

Fig.1.6 “Das Ostergeschenk für die deutsche Jugend.” Third Reich advertisement for this book with the headline “The Easter Gift for German Children.”



Fig.1.7. This was issued after regulations were introduced requiring all Jews still in Germany to wear a visible yellow star: “He who wears this symbol is an enemy of our people.”(27/1942)



A greedy and pitiless face. Eastern Jewry puts a very unpleasant face on Polish cities. This foreign body from the Orient arrived in large masses in Poland between 1250 and 1500, coming from Central and Western Europe. They control the markets in Poland.

Europe's Plague Spot:

The Polish Ghetto

Like a plague devouring the peoples, Jewry has spread throughout the planet. For the last hundred years, the center of the epidemic has been Eastern Europe, Poland above all. Although emigration has reduced their numbers by about half a million, there are still about 3.3 million, nearly a tenth of the entire population. The 1:10 ratio changes considerably, however, when one ignores the countryside and considers only cities. Our pictures were taken in Lodz, which is 33.5% Jewish.



Even half-grown lads have learned to haggle. These chaps are not even in elementary school yet, but they are already hunting for bargains.



It is hard to tell an Eastern Jew's occupation. The majority who call themselves "merchants" work occasionally. Thievery and moral depravity develop in the close quarters in which the Hebrew souls dwell.



The Polish Economy -- a result of hundreds of years of Jewish "cultural labors." A street scene in Lodz.

Jewish professions are clear from post-war Germany, with the well-known attraction Jews have for commerce and the lucrative professions. 82.6% of dealers in agricultural produce are Jews, as are 94.7% of those in the textile trade, and 95.6% of those in leather and fur goods. But Jews make up only 3-4% of workers in Lodz and Warsaw.

Fig.1.8. Source: *IllustrierterBeobachter*, 31/1939.




Fig.1.9

“Wenn es dem internationalen Juden Tum Gelingen sollte die Volker noch einmal weltkrieg zu stürzen dann wird das ergebnis nicht der Sieg des Judentums sein sondern die vernichtung der Judischen rasse in Europa”. “If International Finance Jewry should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, the result will not be the victory of Jewry, but rather the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe.” (37 for 7-13 September 1941).



Fig.1.10 *Der Stürmer* Title: The Land of Freedom The cartoon caption: "Where one is ruled by the Jews, freedom is only an empty dream." July 1939 (Issue 19).



Fig.1.11 *Der Stürmer* Headline: The Mobilization of the People. The cartoon shows a photograph of a Jew captioned "Satan." This issue appeared as the last German troops in Stalingrad surrendered. February 1943 (Issue 9).



Fig.1.12 *Der Stürmer* Title: Anxiety The cartoon shows the world's Jews fearful of the truth. The headline is on the racial defilement theme. December 1942 (Issue :51.)



Fig1.13 *Der Stürmer* Title: Victory — Peace The headline in red calls for the death penalty for a Jew accused of sexual relations with a German woman. April 1942 (Issue 14)




Fig.1. 14 *Der Stürmer* Title: Why?

Caption: Why, for what purpose is the blood flowing?
 Behind the scenes, the Jew grins.
 That makes the answer clear:
 They bleed for the Jews. 18 May 1944 (Issue :29)




Fig.1.15 *Fliegende Blätter*, Issue 5, 1942. The caption translates as: “World Jewry: I put them all on stage at the same time, but Stalin is worn out already.”



Fig.1.16 *Fliegende Blätter* Issue #24/1942. The caption: “We’ve already shaved the finest gentlemen, kings, and emperors, but shaving you is a particular pleasure.”




Fig.1.17 *Fliegende Blätter*. Issue #17/1942. Roosevelt is surrounded by Jews. The caption: “The fighter for Christianity, surrounded by his managers.”



Fig.1.18 *Lustige Blätter*, Issue #27/1943. The caption: “The Polyp.” A Jew has his tentacles around England, Russia, the United States, and China.




Fig.1.19 *Lustige Blätter*, Issue #44/1940
 "England's Führung liegt in guten Händen"




Fig.1.20 *Lustige Blätter*, Issue: #29/1943 "Einer frißt den anderen der Jude friße alle..."
 The caption: "One eats the other and the Jew devours them all..."




Fig.1.21 *Lustige Blätter* Issue:#27/1942The caption: "American Candelabra."



Fig1.22 This anti-Semitic poster in Russian is probably from 1941. The caption can be translated as follows: "Get the Jewish-Bolshevik warmongers out of Europe!"




Fig.1.23 This 1940 poster advertises the Nazi anti-Semitic films, "The Eternal Jew."



Fig.1.24 *Jud Süß*, Nazi Propaganda.



Fig.1.25 January/February/March 1942. The cover shows a German soldier attacking the Bolshevist dragon, with the caption: "The Reich and Europe are winning."



Fig.1.26. The source: Prof. Dr. Groß, "Sieg der Rassenkraft" *Der Schulungsbrief*, (November/December 1942), pp. 66-67.




Fig.1.27 The source: Elvira Bauer, *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud auf seinem Eid* (Nuremberg: Stürmer Verlag, 1936).



Fig.1.28
But the Germans — they stand foursquare. Look, children, and the two compare, The German and the Jew. Take a good look at the two. In the picture drawn for you. A joke — you think it is only that? Easy to guess which is which, I say: The German stands up, the Jew gives way. The German is a proud young man, Able to work and able to fight. Because he is a fine big chap, For danger does not care a rap, The Jew has always hated him! Here is the Jew, as all can see, Biggest ruffian in our country; He thinks himself the greatest beau And yet is the ugliest, you know!



Fig.1.29 The Führer's Youth

The boys who are true Germans To Hitler's Youth belong. They want to live for their Führer, Their eyes are fixed on the future. Bigger and stronger they have become. The German heritage is theirs. The great and sacred Fatherland Stands today as it ever stood. From this picture may be seen, Hitler Youth in splendid mien, From smallest to the biggest boy. All are husky, tough, and strong. They love their German Führer And God in Heaven they fear. But the Jews they must despise! They're not like these boys, So Jews must just give way!




Fig.1.30.

*It's going to be fine in the schools at last,
For all the Jews must leave.
For big and small it's all alike.
Anger and rage do not avail
Nor utmost Jewish whine nor wail.
Away with all the Jewish breed.
'Tis the German teacher we desire.
Now he leads the way to cleverness,
Wanders and plays with us, but yet
Keeps us children in good order.
He makes jokes with us and laughs
So going to school is quite a joy.*




Fig 1.31.

*In far-off South is the country
Which cradled Jewish ancestry.
Let them go back there with wife and child
As quickly as they came! —
What a disgusting picture
Is shown by these Jews, so dirty and wild:
Abraham, Solomon,
Blumenfeld, Levinson,
Rebecca with little Jonathan,
Then Simon and also Aaron Kahn.
How they roll their eyes
As they march along.....*

*(On the signpost: "One-way road. Hurry,
Hurry. The Jews are our misfortune.")*




Fig.1.32. German children read an anti-Jewish propaganda book titles *Der Giftpilz* (The Poisonous Mushroom). The girl on the left holds a companion volume, the translated title of which is "Trust No Fox". 1938.- Stadtarchiv Nuernberg.



Fig.1.33 "Duty of Youth Day," 1943.



Fig.1.34.The Stukas Attack,the cover of the game.




Fig.1.35.The game itself is a variant of Chinese Checkers. The board, set up as shown in the fig. The object of the game is to move one's pieces to the other side of the board (the enemy airbase) and back, avoiding enemy searchlights (in yellow) and flak (in red) along the way. This is a 1940 German game titled "Stukas Attack."



Fig.1.36 Adolf Hitler *Jugend.Geht in. Gemeinchatsschule.*



Die Fig 1.37 *Jugend dient dem Fuhrer .Alle Zehnjahrigen In Die HJ.*



Fig1.38. November-December 1943. An article titled “Because Father Had Promised” tells how Hitler Youth members met the Christmas wish of a small boy.




Fig.1.39. March-April 1943. The caption reads: “Once again in these weeks, following the will of the Führer, our ten-year-olds are joining the community of the Hitler Youth, gladly and cheerfully doing their duty wherever they are needed.” This issue appeared just after the German defeat at Stalingrad. An interior article titled “You Have the Best Examples” told girls what is expected of them as they join the Young Girls.



Fig.1.40. May 1942. The caption translates: “Bringing their full enthusiasm and the fresh strength of youth, our Labor Service girls are serving in the regained German territory in the East”.



Fig.1.41 November 1942. The caption reads: “Just as German Red Cross nurses are constantly at work on all fronts to do their duty, so also young Norwegian girls cheerfully serve their comrades on the Eastern Front.”



Fig1.42
 August 1941. This was the first issue to appear after the invasion of the Soviet Union. The caption reads: "Weary and ruined faces characterize the neglected children of the Soviet state. Cheerful and healthy on the other hand, the youth of Greater Germany are participating in sports festivals everywhere in the country."



Fig.1.43 July -August
 1943. A Finnish woman serves coffee to the troops. The caption reads: "I come from the north, where the danger of Bolshevism is much closer than it is here. It is not easy to stand watch there, but it is the task history has given to us". Fanni Luukkonen, leader of the Lotta Svärd [a Finnish women's volunteer organization].




Fig.1.44. "Ob auf den Schulbänken, ob in der Werkstatt, in Dienst der HJ und BDM, ob zu Hause bei euren Muettern: überall habt ihr Aufgaben, die Ihr erfuellen mueßt, wenn Ihr von Euch sagen wollt, daß Ihr rechte deutsche Jungen und Maedel Adolf Hiltler's seid."

"Whether in school or the work place, or serving in the HJ or BDM, whether at home with your mothers: everywhere you have tasks that you must fulfill if you want to say that you are Adolf Hitler's proper German boys and girls." #18/1940: 1- 6 July



Fig.1.45. "In jedem gesunden und in jedem to gesunden Maedal steckt neben der Freude an Abenteuern ind der Achtung vor großen leistungen, die Bewunderung fuer die heldische Tat."

"In every healthy boy and every healthy girl, alongside the desire for adventure is respect for great achievements, for the heroic deed. The harder it is for you not to be at the front of the great battle, the easier it must be for you to do everything you can today wherever you are, to do your duty! Rudolf Heß" July 1940.



Fig.1.46. Die Toten eines nicht verlorenen Krieges tragen des Großen Krieges 1914-1918 sind gerächt! Die Last, die unsere vater nach Aufgabe mußten, ist von ihnen genommen . Die ganze Welt blickt voller Uchtung auf uns! Gerüstet stehen wir zum letzten kampf gegen England. Deutsche Jugend, lieb true, opferbereit, gehorsam und wach!

The dead of the great war of 1914-1918 have been avenged. The burden that our fathers had to bear after giving up a war they had not lost has been taken from them. The whole world looks at us with great respect! We are armed for the final battle against England. German youth, remain loyal, ready to sacrifice, obedient and alert!

Captain Ziersch/ Bearer of the Knight's Cross"

#24/1940: 19-25 August




Fig.1.47. The current generation bears Germany's fate — Germany's future or Germany's decline. Today our opponents scream: Germany shall decline! — We have but one answer: Germany will live, and therefore Germany will be victorious! Adolf Hitler #28/1940: 16-22 September Germany: People without Space.

Fig.1.48. People and Living Space Population Growth¹

Births in the German Reich

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1938
Live Births	1,469,834	1,739,437	1,758,253	1,996,139	1,924,778	1,599,287	1,144,151	1,440,879
Births per 1,000	37.2	39.3	35.7	35.6	29.8	25.9	17.6	19.2

Reich German Emigration 1871-1938

	1871-1880	1881-1890	1891-1900	1901-1910	1911-1920	1921-1930	1931-1938
Number of Emigrants	625,968	1,342,423	529,875	279,645	92,161	567,293	137,212

This interesting cover suggests that Germany needs more territory: “80 million Germans live on 580,000 square kilometers.” The illustration shows a crowded Germany. Germany had already absorbed Austria — but kids are being told that is not enough.

Source: *Die Kameradschaft* (A), #9 (8 February) 1939.

¹ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/textbk02.html> accessed on 8th march 2011.




Fig.1.49.“Before the Attk”This the first of the series and deals with the German attack on Poland.



Fig.1.50.“Breakthrough to Oslo.”



Fig.1.51.:“Onward, Ever Onward!” A story about the early months of the infantry campaign in Russia.



Fig.1.52. “Bombs on Coventry”: The attack on Coventry in November 1940.



Fig.1.53. This 1938 poster was issued shortly after the *Anschluss* with Austria. The caption: "One People, One Reich, One Führer."



Fig.1.54. Artist: Mjölner (February 1943)
"Victory or Bolshevist Chaos."




Fig.1.55. *Der Untermensch*.

Chapter 2: British Propaganda In Colonies: Second World War, A Case-Study of India.

"The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of warfare and the development of new weapons – aircraft and tanks – promise to give us increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological target.
Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, 1944.¹⁰⁶

This chapter deals with the British propaganda and its role in formulating the policies and programmes introduced by the British in its colony India during the Second World War (1939-1945) to mobilize them for the war. The policies of propaganda and information control introduced by them to gather support against the Axis countries is brought out. And finally how the propaganda was used to create a picture of the enemy by representing Germany as a threat to the democratic order. As *William Mazzarella* points out in his essay the greatest marketing challenge of all at that time was how *to convince a mass of people who no longer accept your sovereignty to lay down their lives for you.*¹⁰⁷ Instead of presenting propaganda as merely misleading information,' I would draw on *Philip Taylor's* interpretation as a combination of '*facts, fiction, argument or suggestion*'. Propaganda is no longer restricted to information alone but to a wide range of material gains and as was clearly evident as a means used by the Britons to mobilize Indians to participate in the Second World War. And perhaps more consequentially,

¹⁰⁶ Liddell Hart retired from the Army as a Captain in 1927 because of two mild heart attacks in 1921 and 1922, and spent the rest of his career as a writer. He worked as the Military Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph from 1925–1935, and of The Times, 1935-1939. He has published a number of works relating to this period. The major ones being *The Defence of Britain*, Faber and Faber, London, 1939; Greenwood, Westport, 1980, *The strategy of indirect approach* (1941, reprinted in 1942 under the title: *The way to win wars*), *The way to win wars* (1942) and *Strategy: the indirect approach*, third revised edition and further enlarged London: Faber and Faber, 1954, *The Rommel Papers*, (editor), 1953, *The Tanks - A History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors: Volumes I and II* (Praeger, New York, 1959), *The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart: Volumes I and II* (Cassell, London, 1965), *Why don't we learn from history?* (Hawthorn Books, New York, 1971), *History of the Second World War* (Putnam, New York, 1971), "Foreword" to Samuel B. Griffith's *Sun Tzu: the Art of War* (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), *The Other Side of the Hill. Germany's Generals. Their Rise and Fall, with their own Account of Military Events 1939-1945*, London: Cassel, 1948; enlarged and revised edition, Delhi: Army Publishers, 1965, *The Revolution in Warfare*, London: Faber and Faber, 1946, and *The Current of War*, London: Hutchinson, 1941.

¹⁰⁷ William Mazzarella, 'A Torn Performative Dispensation: The Affective Politics of British World War II Propaganda in India and the Problem of Legitimation in an Age of Mass Publics', University of Chicago.

propaganda was never solely equated with information, but also referred to a wide range of material benefits, which in context of damaging war covered a wide variety of items.¹⁰⁸

Sanjoy Bhattacharya has used this approach in his recent work on propaganda in Second World War.¹⁰⁹ This was, in somewhat simplified form, the brief that was handed to the makers of British World War II propaganda for India.¹¹⁰ As *Sanjoy Bhattacharya*, points out the existing studies dealing with the last decade of the British rule in India tend to treat, almost without exception, *the wartime period as a passing phase between the twin historical landmarks of provincial autonomy and sub-continental partition.*¹¹¹ Historians focus mainly on 'Quit India Movement', 'the Bengal Famine', and 'the Formation of Indian National Army'. As *Indivar Kamtekar* also argues i.e. not enough focus on war itself after the publication of the *Transfer of Power* series and the *Towards Freedom* project undertaken by the Indian Council of Historical Research, in historiography the drums of decolonialization and independence proved louder than the drums of war.¹¹² The focus was mainly on politics of nationalism but it neglected the War itself. Some historians have dealt with the War as *Indivar Kamtekar* in his article has analysed how the resources were mobilized as during the war the state's appetite for resources increases and how the war effort was run and its result.¹¹³ Economic and social history was effectively sidelined, or used to provide a somber backdrop to dramatic political events.¹¹⁴ *Sumit Sarkar* and *R.C Majumdar* dealt with the huge strains the war imposed on India.¹¹⁵ *Sugata Bose* and *Ayesha Jalal* focus on the catastrophic Bengal famine.¹¹⁶ *The New Cambridge History of India* also dealt with the devastating effects of the Second World War. If these historical writings deals

¹⁰⁸ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon-Routledge,2001),pp.5-6.

¹⁰⁹ P. M. Taylor, *Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 5 and Sanjoy Bhattacharya, 'British Military Information Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India during the Second World War', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 pp. 483-510, May, 2000.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*,p.1.

¹¹¹ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon-Routledge,2001),p.1.

¹¹² I Kamtekar,, 'A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939-1945', *Past & Present*, 2002, pp. 188-89 and Mansergh, Nicholas (ed) ,*Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power,1942-47*,12 vols,London,1970-83 and Partha Sarthi Gupta, , *Towards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India*, 3 vols.,Delhi, 1997.

¹¹³B. R Tomlinson ,*The New Cambridge History of India ,iii, The Economy of Modern India ,1860-1970*,Cambridge:South Asian Paperback EDn,Delhi,1998.

¹¹⁴ I Kamtekar,, 'A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939-1945', *Past & Present*, 2002, pp. 188-89.

¹¹⁵ Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India* ,1885-1947,Delhi,1983.

¹¹⁶ Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* ,Delhi,1999

with the above mentioned period they are mainly concerned with the army or the war-economy or the Indian National Congress. *Manjiri Kamat* in the review of *Sanjoy Bhattacharya's* book mentions: in contrast, despite several recent studies dealing with late colonial south Asia, the implications of the war on the state, society, economy and finally on the dissolution of the British empire has received only marginal attention.¹¹⁷ In any case, there are many important facets of the Second World War and its impact on British India which remain to be explored and that this gap was filled by *Sanjoy Bhattacharya's* book.

The existing historiography on the War focuses on the regions which were vulnerable to attack during this time, *Sanjoy Bhattacharya's* book focuses on colonial Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and eastern United Provinces, *B. Pati's* edited book has essays dealing with Bengal, Bombay presidency etc.¹¹⁸ These were the regions which were widely considered to be open to the threat of a Japanese invasion after December 1941. The period was a rather more important period for British propaganda in India as it was difficult to convince the Indians of War aims when they were disoriented by the idea of gaining independence. The whole complex process of propaganda "*was the onset of the process of sowing the seed of the view that "the road of India's freedom lies through the defeat of Fascism"*".¹¹⁹

The chapter argues that propaganda techniques witnessed a sea change with the Japanese entry into the War. Earlier it was very difficult to convince the people to give their support to the Allies as it had no direct implications. How was GOI trying to explain Allied war aims to the people in India and the focus is particularly on the dissemination of information, propaganda in princely states, propaganda directed towards youths and propaganda through visuals specially through pamphlets.

i) Dissemination of Information:

Much of the print propaganda targeted at the civilian audiences was produced and arranged by the agencies of the Government of India's Information and Broadcasting Department: The Public

¹¹⁷ Manjiri N Kamat, Review: Propaganda and Its Use: Colonial India at War, Reviewed work(s): *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* by Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 24 (Jun. 16-22, 2001), pp. 2137-2138.

¹¹⁸ B Pati (ed), *Turbulent Times: India, 1940-44*, Mumbai, 1998.

¹¹⁹ *The Statesman*, September 9, 1940, p. 9.

Information Bureau and to lesser extent, the organization of the All- India Radio. Apart from publishing pamphlets, leaflets and a fortnightly paper called the India Information, the Bureau liaised with the representatives of all the major Indian newspapers in order to secure the publicity for a wider range of official measures. A purely war time body was created in 1941, Civil Defence Department to assist its coordinators in their attempt to arrange the ARP publicity.

With the outbreak of War, the British Propaganda machinery swung into action to generate war-preparedness in India. The support of political parties in India to Britain's war effort became indispensable because the War made unusual demands on Indian Society and its resources.¹²⁰ When the Second World War broke out Lord Linlithgow and British Government declared its Indian empire at war against Germany in September 1939 without consulting any of the country's political party¹²¹. The declaration of India as a belligerent country did not go well with the people of India and so the political parties such as Indian National Congress were opposed to Britain's war effort. So, in the beginning the propaganda machinery had a mammoth task at its disposal which was not only of convincing people to support Britain's War effort but also counter the INC views, and not let people being alienated by them. An article from *The Statesman* which produced His Excellency's speech stated:

“...peril India will make her contribution on the side of human freedom as against the rule of force and will play a part worthy of her place among the great nations and the historic civilizations of the world”.¹²²

Linlithgow tried to make British aims clear to the Indians by mentioning that Britain suggested that India would have to take part in the war to find a place in international forums. Another remarkable thing in these speeches is that there were a number of speeches in newspapers which were given by Indians which was done may be to have a greater impact on the minds of the

¹²⁰ Srimanjari, *Through War and Famine, Bengal 1939-1945*, New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2009, p.3.

¹²¹ Lord Linlithgow was as a British statesman who served as Governor-General and Viceroy of India from 1936 to 1943.

¹²² *The Statesman*, September 4, 1939, page 9.

civilian population.¹²³ We come across a number of speeches by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee , Mr. J. N. Basu, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan and Mr. M. N Roy.¹²⁴

Between September 1939 and December 1941 India remained relatively unaffected by the travails of war. As Sanjoy Bhattacharya points out, military propaganda distributed amongst Indian troops, apart from criticizing the Congress's opposition to the conflict, tended to concentrate on appreciative descriptions of India's contributions to Allied efforts in the European and African theatres of war. An apt example was the 'War time syllabus for Geography, Citizenship and General Knowledge' for serving soldiers. In this, India's economic and material contributions were consistently emphasized and geography was taught by dividing the map of India 'from the manpower point of view', the 'raw material point of view' and the 'industrial point of view'. 'Citizenship and General Knowledge' were also taught through lessons on war funds, their importance and how they were raised.¹²⁵

In the initial stages of the War, the newspapers such as regularly conveyed the message that if Britain lost the War the consequences would be disastrous for India. Shrimanjari points out that they drew similarities between anti-Semitism and the anti- Indian attitude of the Fascists in order to instill the fear of the Germans. Government sources suggested that the racist comments attributed to Hitler such as "All Indians are niggards and treat them as such", could be used in the propaganda against him to show how unsympathetic Hitler was to the nationalist aspirations of Indians.¹²⁶

The tone of the official speeches in 1939 was to show Indians that it was a winnable war. There was this constant faith showed by the Allies in the undeterred participation of India by speaking very highly about India and its culture and civilization, which was done in order to have a psychological impact on the civilian population. We come across constant appeal from the

¹²³ Employees of the Government of India in most of the cases.

¹²⁴ Shyama Prasad Mookerjee was the Finance minister of Bengal Province during 1941-42. Muhammad Zafrullah Khan he was member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy of India during the years 1935 to 1941. With the declaration of World War II, M.N Roy condemned the rising totalitarian regimes in Germany and Italy, and supported England and France in the fight against fascism.

¹²⁵ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, 'British Military Information Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India during the Second World War', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, May, 2000, p.496.

¹²⁶ Srimanjari, *Through War and Famine, Bengal 1939-1945*, New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2009, pp.39-40.

Viceroy to the people of India for united action while addressing the joint session of the two houses of the Central Legislature, where he showed full confidence in the loyalty of India and the reason for Britain's participation in the war was to pursue the happiness and the wellbeing which should be the destiny of mankind.¹²⁷ The Viceroy also mentioned from the King's message the significance of the unanimity of the approach of all in India –the princes, the leaders of the great political parties, the ordinary man and woman and of the contributions, whether in offers of personal service of men or money that has reached him from the princes and people. So, Britain seems quite aware of the fact that the war required support from all factions irrespectively. Information as always played a very important part in this. Britain's mention of its resources and the support it had from other countries was done in order to show Indians how strongly they were placed against the Axis which was done in order to boost the moral of the Indian population. The entire mentioning of the resources of the Allies and the assurance that the British and the French empires could bear upon **decisive points** and the mention of the support of 20,000,000 British citizens in the self-governing Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand and South Africa, and the heart and moral convictions of India on the Allies side and the support and goodwill of United States was deliberate to sway the mass support in the favour of Allies in India..¹²⁸

Press censorship and proscription of leaflets and books became the order of the day. There was a whole lot of importance on reliable information, especially in regard to the war, being available in every quarter. In a speech the Governor of Calcutta declared that 'no news is good news' may sometimes be a source of comfort, but it is more often a source of danger. A dangerous or distressing situation can only be met if people are prepared to face realities. The Governor in his speech mentioned the disastrous case of France, whose rulers were afraid to tell them the whole truth. A dangerous or distressing situation can only be met if people are prepared to face realities. So, by making the information regarding the war available to the people of India Allies were trying to prepare people for the coming hardship.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ *The Statesman* , September 12,1939.

¹²⁸ *The Statesman*, October 9, 1939.

¹²⁹ *The Statesman*, December 4, 1940.

The war had affected the Broadcasting as profoundly as it had every other purposeful human activity. The production of radio propaganda for India remained centralized throughout the war.¹³⁰ The Central News Organization was set up on August 1, 1937. The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 gave an impetus to the development of the Organization. The Monitoring Service was set up in 1939 to monitor foreign broadcasts. In 1943, the External Broadcast Unit was set up under the Director of News. By 1945, the Central News Organization was handling news bulletins in different Indian languages as well as in the External Services.¹³¹ It had brought with it new and heavy responsibilities towards the listeners. The Indian broadcasting system as developed before the war, was designed to give an internal service and in a limited number of languages. Since, the war, however, every possible means of adjusting this system, both on the programme and on the technical side, had been adopted to meet the growing needs of the new situation. The Central News Organisation Mr. Bokhari said, had been expanded to give 28 news bulletins a day, and the number of languages served by AIR as well as the total transmission time had been increased considerably to meet the increased demand for up-to-date information about the war and for expert annotation of world events. They were now also broadcasting to listeners beyond the borders of India, and had recently started a weekly news service for the benefit of Indian listeners in England. Where direct transmission was not possible, recorded programmes were sent for use overseas.¹³²

During this period radio was one of the most important means of communication other than newspaper and they were making full use of it. The news of the war was discussed in great detail in hope that the people of India would not be misguided by the propaganda techniques of the Axis countries.¹³³ The senior district officials were supplied with wireless sets capable of running into short-wave broadcasts and asked to take these along during tours of the villages¹³⁴. AIR's broadcasts were complemented by the transmission from England, over short wave frequencies, of newsletters in English, Hindustani, Bengali Tamil and Gujarati by the British Broadcasting

¹³⁰ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon-Routledge, 2001), p.65.

¹³¹ <http://www.allindiaradio.org/airnews.html> accessed on 14th November 2010.

¹³² *The Statesman*, December 4, 1940, p. 10.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon-Routledge, 2001), p.70.

Corporation.¹³⁵ There were a number of shortcomings as the complexity and the cost of organization required to maintain battery powered sets in villages, most of which were un-electrified. This asserted the expansion of the wireless community listening scheme in rural villages. Thus the entire focus during this period was on the expansion of infrastructure and communication. A number of institutional changes were introduced by the GOI to overcome these problems as discussed in this chapter.

War propaganda through films was another important means of spreading information. The Central Board of Information arranged a number of special privileges for the import of 'suitable' propaganda films by distributors operating within India. Notable concessions were announced so as to encourage the relevant companies to order short documentary films, dealing with one of the aspects of the war. These were classed as 'educational films' and were thereby entitled to a full refund of customs duty. Other significant concessions were also provided. Distributors were, for instance, allowed to bring in a copy of a long feature film free of customs duty on top their normal import quotas, when they imported '*in the ordinary way of business*' films certified '*suitable for war purposes and propaganda*'. A film advisory board was set up the Central Board of Information also separately arranged the production of films. However, since it did not have the requisite equipment to do this in the first two years of the war, it was forced to collaborate with private organizations.¹³⁶ A full length film was circulated around the districts dealing with one aspect or another of the life and activities of the Indian soldiers. The plan was to induce recruitment and promote war effort through visual propaganda and money collected by exhibiting the film is to be paid into the war fund. The attempts to spread the scope of film publicity in rural areas threw up a set of problems. As the trucks fitted with projectors could only reach the areas accessible by road.

So, the official news tried to convince people that it was very important not to believe what the Germans say at the same time it was even more important to anticipate what they were leading up to. At the same time they propagated British propaganda machinery never attempted anything like this and the BBC only presented the facts and relied on the commonsense of the people.

¹³⁵ *The Statesman*, December 4, 1940.

¹³⁶ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon- Routledge, 2001).

There was no ban imposed on the listening of the Nazi propaganda so that people could differentiate between the true and false news and were not carried away by the anti-Allies propaganda.¹³⁷ While the production of print propaganda within the province increased considerably, the form and content of such material tended to be dictated by the Government of India's Information and Broadcasting Department. As a result of the expansion of the publicity networks in Eastern India, the provincial and District War committees were re-constituted and then asked to rearrange the distribution of leaflets, pamphlets and other publicity materials. The expansion process included employment of songsters in rural areas to sing songs and leaflets were distributed containing these songs through the watch and ward committees and village chowkidars in those villages where songsters were not available. Dramas related to wars were arranged by the Provincial and District War Committees and the magic lanterns shown by the touring officers in village fairs and other gatherings of in rural areas. However, this complex array of publicity network did not always function as smoothly as the officials hoped, with difficulties being caused by the presence of financial, manpower and supply constraints at all levels of administration. As evidenced from the official history of the Bureau of Public Information, the organization increased its staff between 1939-1945. Similar problems persisted at other local levels of administration as well. A single propaganda van was required to cover three districts at a time and the District War Committees were allotted an annual budget of mere hundred rupees.¹³⁸

Military interests played a dominant role throughout the Second World War in developing, or directing the establishment of, the censorship structures utilized by civilian administration. The civilian officials in charge of the censorship of wireless broadcasting, films and the Indian press were answerable to the military representatives posted at the Home Departments of the central and provincial governments of the District Headquarters. The Central Government had retained wide powers over wireless broadcasting, films and the Indian Press under the Government of India Act of 1935. This meant the provincial Governors General could prevent the transmission of programmes considered to be a '*grave menace to the peace and tranquility of India*'. Official control over all facets of broadcasting was ensured by the fact that all transmitting stations in

¹³⁷ The Statesman dated 9 December, 1939, p.11.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

India were controlled by the AIR, which was an arm of the Government of India's Information and Broadcasting Department. The challenge over the air waves came from a completely different source the various Axis radio stations in Germany, Italy, Rome, and Japan. To overcome this, the Government of India 'jammed' many of the broadcasts from the hostile nations by powerful transmitters located in the Allies. The GOI attempted to redress this shortcoming by arranging for some Air's short-wave transmissions to clash with the Axis Broadcasts. But the main responsibility to prevent people from tuning into enemy broadcasts was rested on the shoulders of the officials of the particular province. The very infrastructural constraints were almost like a boon in disguise for them as they prevented radio as becoming a medium of official propaganda; such as the shortage of wireless receivers, the high cost of wireless licenses, the lack of electricity in vast majority of villages and the high cost of maintaining battery-powered sets.¹³⁹

The censorship task related to films, books and newspapers was herculean as they were produced and distributed by a variety of private commercial establishment. In this case GOI sought to deal with the complexity of the task by delegating the responsibilities to the local administrations. Film Censorship, for instance, remained a provincial function throughout 1939-1945. Board of Censors in Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Lahore provided licenses to films without which they could not be exhibited at any theatre in India. District Magistrates were endowed with special power to suspend the certificate of any film which they considered unsuitable for local reasons. The existing press laws were strengthened further by defence of India Rules, which were brought into force immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War. The Emergency Power Ordinance of 1940, aimed at facilitating the suppression of any local or national 'revolutionary movement' vested further powers with the provincial authorities. Efforts were vested in creating such structures of censorship, proscribing the discussion of certain topics. The district administrators regularly banned meeting and processions organized by Congress members. It also impeded the events organized by the CPI, RDP and the Hindu Mahasabha. Thus, the dissemination of information was done by a whole lot of state control. The effectiveness of the

¹³⁹ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War* (London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon- Routledge, 2001).

censorship measures as well as the propaganda schemes deployed during this time was burdened by the acute shortage of manpower resources during the war.

There was a letter received from Batavia by air dated 21st December 1939 which mentioned that during the course of postal censorship in Singapore they came across a postcard by an anonymous listener who was expressing his gratitude towards the German Broadcasts for broadcasting in Arabic and for the policy taken the German against British Imperialism in particular, and the French generally.

ii)Projection of German Atrocities:

During this period (1939-1945) a lot of propaganda was vested in projecting the German atrocities to the people of India. A number of lectures were arranged by the Calcutta War Committee and central theme to all these lectures was German Atrocities and Nazidom and how it was of utmost important to rid the world of Nazi tyranny. The topic of the lecture was "*German atrocities in Poland*" and the speaker was Dr. Hironmay Ghosal, a professor of English Literature at the University of Warsaw and was in Poland during the German invasion of that country. Dr. Ghoshal gave a graphic description of the cruelties and the atrocities perpetrated by the German army. Dr. Ghoshal's wife (Halina Ghoshal) of Polish origin solicited in a brief speech India's sympathy for her "*persecuted and imprisoned motherland*"¹⁴⁰. Describing how Denmark, Holland, Belgium and other countries had been engulfed by the German power, Mr. J .N Basu who presided over the meeting said "*....We must be alert and must bend all our energies to avert the danger which looms ahead and win the war*". Mr. Basu was hinting at the fact that the war was fast approaching as the entire world was engulfed in this war, so it was important to defeat the Axis before India met a similar fate as any of these nations.

As M. N. Roy presiding at the C.P and Berar Youth Conference at Amraoti mentioned that India couldn't gain freedom in the midst of the enslaved world. He appealed to the youth of India that they should not be alienated by the narrow minded and anachronistic nationalism represented by the Congress. He wanted to convey that the fight was against Fascism which was dangerous for

¹⁴⁰ *The Statesman* ,December 8,1940,p.8.

the entire world and the meager chances of India gaining freedom would be thwarted if the Axis won the war. Thus the Government of India was able to initiate counter propaganda against the Congress which was the major opponent of the Allies war efforts in India.¹⁴¹

It was suggested that till the situation improves in this respect, the War Committee was to step back a little and remain on the background and that anti-Fascists propaganda be primarily conducted by other cultural institutions, persons, groups or parties and not by officials or their uncritical henchmen. Propaganda should be both by literature and touring. The appointment of civic guards was central to this as they remained in intimate touch with the people and were significant in moulding their opinion. Independent persons with social status or groups or parties intending to conduct anti-Fascists Propaganda was to be given full facilities to do so both on district and provincial level. They were to be helped in the production of such literature and touring of areas in their own names or platforms. All efforts to organize anti-Fascist rallies whether of the general type, or special ones such as labour, peasantry, cultural etc were to be promoted and efforts were made to have such rallies in each district. A Provincial War Board Executive fully popular in character was established.¹⁴²

A lot of propaganda was also adopted towards the working class as they comprise a major part of the civilians. The information given was Fascism was the greatest enemy of the working class. The countries in which Fascism was triumphant the condition of labour was deplorable the wages of workers were minimal and trade unions had been suppressed. In the near future, the war may come near to the Indian frontiers from the East as well as from the West. In that case, India will become the base of major military operations. The Central Joint War Committee of the Indian Red Cross Society and St. John Ambulances Association organized a large number of fetes in order to contribute to the War fund. The other means of collection of funds included organization of cricket matches.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ *The Statesman* , September 9,1940,p. 9.

¹⁴² War publicity in Indian States, Political Department, War Branch, File No.223-W/40, 1940, NAI, Delhi.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

iii) War Propaganda and the Indian Youth:

From the late nineteenth century the category of juvenile emerged as a distinct stage in the life and they were seen as pliable human, nation and empire building material. As *Anne Raffin* points out specially for Indo-China in World War II, war stimulates state-building, and the nature of the new institutions depends on the pre existing resources within civil society such as youth corps and cadres, which authorities incorporated into a new umbrella youth organization.¹⁴⁴ GOI sought to ensure that all ways and means adopted to inform the young people about the War and was not visible as a sinister propaganda.

In 1941 an essay competition was held by the Calcutta War Committee throughout Bengal in various educational institutions. The topic of the essay was "*Why this is India's War?*" The topic of the essay was such that here the Allies were not giving reasons why India should participate in the war but youths were required to give reasons for India's support in the war and thus the whole process of explaining the war aims was made easier. The competition was a part of the programme inaugurated in the province to stimulate war in the minds of the younger generation. Other methods adopted by the committee were circulation of a series of nursery rhymes in the vernacular incorporating a certain amount of simple propaganda among young children, a province wide recitation competition and a monthly examination in the classes of every high school on questions connected with the war. The information and the whole system of examination would have made them to do some fact searching. By making it a part of the syllabus or the system of evaluation the Department of Education, the correspondence between the Government of India and the British Residents gives us some insight into the propaganda for the youth.¹⁴⁵ The Residents received literature from time to time which they sent to the Superintendent of Education for study by the Boys, and it is known that the boys have been a very useful agency in spreading the news which went a great way in allaying alarms in the illiterate masses. The Resident of Chattisgarh State however complained that in Chattisgarh

¹⁴⁴ Anne Raffin, *The Integration of Difference in French Indochina during World War II: Organizations and Ideology concerning Youth*, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3 pp. 365-390, Jun., 2002.

¹⁴⁵ Residents were official representatives of a European colonial power practicing indirect rule, usually diplomats and/or military officers, who lived and worked in smaller self-governing colonial entities or various protectorates and vassal states as a political advisor to the (usually native) ruler(s) and acted like an Ambassador of their own Government. In case of India they were British officials residing in Princely States.

States every effort was being made to disseminate the news, but as the material supplied was couched in language not easily comprehensible to younger students. He said that lectures and explanatory discussions therefore need to be arranged.¹⁴⁶

The whole notion of India's future at stake was quite visible in Mr. M. N. Roy's appeal to the Youth presiding at the C.P and Berar Youth Conference at Amraoti. "*India, he said, "cannot possibly be free in the midst of an enslaved world....Fascism and fight for Indian freedom is an integral part of the fight against Fascism"*. This was in response to the Congress view that India going to war with Nazi Germany for the sake of freedom was contradictory in itself because India was denied freedom itself.

The Government also tried to bring in a lot of schemes to lure young men to participate in the war. As the employment during the war was of a temporary nature many young men were not willing to go for emergency commissions as it was very likely that they would lose opportunities of civil employment once the war is over. Thus the government introduced this new scheme in which 50% of the annual vacancies occurring in the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service were to be left unfilled with a view to their being made available after the war to be filled by suitable candidates with war service. This decision applied equally to the recruitment of Indians and Europeans and to recruitment made in India and England. Due consideration was to be given to a certificate of good services from the military commander of the units in which the candidate served. Thus the surety of having a permanent job after the war made this scheme hit with the Indians. And another clause of a having a good service certificate for better employment opportunities made them perform efficiently.¹⁴⁷ As the War intensified in 1940 the Government announced an increase in pay and compensation for injury or death. The Government also took the help of news-bulletins through which the officers of the National Welfare units undertook propaganda work, in vernaculars to quash the rumors that opposed the enlistment.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶War publicity in schools, Political Department, War Branch, File no 223-W/40, 1940 National Archives of India (NAI), Delhi.

¹⁴⁷ *The Statesman*, March 14, 1941.

¹⁴⁸ Srimanjari, *Through War and Famine, Bengal 1939-1945*, New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2009, p.44.

iv) War Publicity in Schools:

In 1917 GOI, in response to the pressure from the educated Indians for officer's commission created the University Corps (UC), as a wing of the Indian Defence forces. The stated objectives of the UC were to train potential manpower for use in World War I. The University Training Corps (UTC) was raised by the remaining the existing UC in 1921. The Cadets of the UTC had no commitment for war service and the whole scheme was voluntary. Successful volunteer cadets were granted King's commissions, with the same privileges as were available to the king's commissioned Indian officers.¹⁴⁹

Therefore a number of Boy's units were established by the Indian Army which was mainly concerned to take a proposition of recruits at a younger and more malleable age and give them education and general training which will fit them later to become junior leaders or tradesmen according to their particular bent.¹⁵⁰ A number of military schools like Anti- Aircraft and Coast Defence Artillery School, School of Military Engineering, Army School of Signalling, Infantry School, Central Technical Training Centers, Cadet College, Tactical School, Staff College were established. The Cadet College was primarily educational in object rather than military or tactical. There were a number of other schools and colleges established such as Indian National War Memorial College, King George's Royal Indian Military Schools, Prince of Wales' Royal Indian Military College and Army School of Education.¹⁵¹

v) The problems of Princely States:

There were not a number of princely states which did not have an Information Bureau nor did they have any non-official newspapers published. Therefore, the Residents of a particular region in respect of "Cultural Articles" such as Victoria Library suggested that they should be appropriately be placed in States' libraries or reading rooms so as to reach the educated public.

¹⁴⁹ *Youth in Action* (NCC), Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2003, p.13.

¹⁵⁰ Reorganization of the Army and air forces in India. Report of a Committee set up His Excellency and the commander-in-chief in India. Volume One-Text, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, Printed by the Manager Government of India Press, 1945.

¹⁵¹ Reorganisation of the Army and air forces in India. Report of a Committee set up His Excellency and the commander-in-chief in India. Volume Two- Appendix and Index, USI., New Delhi, Printed by the Manager Government of India Press, 1945.

They could also be used by reliable lecturers as material for their addresses. Some articles were circulated to the teachers who explained the contents to the students in vernacular. The vernacular teachers were utilized to read and explain such literature to the villagers. The Jodhpur Government approved of a scheme of war publicity for schools and general public, through some senior boys and teachers aided by the Publicity officer. A war bulletin was also published as a supplement to the Jodhpur government gazette and separate copies were distributed to schools, hakims, jagirdars, local clubs institutions, libraries etc. Senior students and Teachers were deputed to neighboring villages during the holidays to read out the bulletin to people. The war bulletin contained following information: war aims, the British cause and war support, important speeches on war and weekly war news, etc. The headmasters of schools were instructed to address the students, at least once a week on topics concerning war on the basis of pamphlets, news sheets and cultural articles which the Residents of the particular region provided them with. A few pamphlets were prepared on the following topics as peasants and the war, student's duty during the war and what help teachers should render during the war¹⁵². The material which was distributed in schools, libraries and co-operative societies, reached a large portion of the public in the states. As the political files data suggests there was an increasing demand of cultural articles by residents of various princely states during this period. However, it was not, easy to reach to the rural population in those states where villages are very scattered and remote, but the village school masters, *kulkarnis* and *patils* were enlisted to do their bit, and *darbars* were of opinions that panicky rumors had been largely dissipated by the methods now employed.¹⁵³

News-bulletins, mostly bi-weekly, were widely circulated in most of the other states among schools, village officers and *panchayats*, and respectable private persons both in towns and villages. The printed word was supplemented in certain states by a considerable amount of oral propaganda by touring officials and influential well-informed non-officials who hold meetings and gave lectures. In Faridkot, for instance, selected non-officials toured the country side disseminating accurate news and views, and the state also had a propaganda lorry complete with radio set.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² War publicity in schools, Political Department, War Branch, File no 223-W/40, 1940 National Archives of India (NAI), Delhi.

¹⁵³ War publicity in Indian States, Political Department, War Branch, File No.223-W/40, 1940, NAI, Delhi.

¹⁵⁴ War publicity in schools, Political Department, War Branch, File no 223-W/40, 1940 National Archives of India (NAI), Delhi.

vi) War Publicity in the Indian States:

In consultation with the P.I.O a system for distributing propaganda material in the States was evolved whereby in the larger States, States' Information Bureau and in the smaller states the Political Agents accredited were responsible for distributing propaganda material. War publicity committees in Indian States received requests mainly for Indian Information (English, Urdu, and Hindi), Central Board of Information 'talking point' leaflets, War Pamphlets received from the Ministry of Information, London Weekly News Report from PIO and Texts of BBC Talks in the series "Britain Speaks" and Photogravure Reproductions relating to war. There was this proposal of translating the Indian Information in Tamil, Talegu, Malayam, Kanarese or other south Indian Languages if more than 1000 copies were demanded by the Residents.¹⁵⁵The resident who was the best judge of the local condition was allowed discretion in the distribution of the Guidance Notes.¹⁵⁶

Residents were complaining that the war situation was a fast moving affair and the articles ran out of date very soon. This was specially so in the case of the "extracts from the Turkish press". Which were meant for the Muslim public, but by the time the articles reached the residents it was outdated. So, a request was made by the Residents to make the speedy circulation of 'cultural articles'. GOI decided to ask the newspapers to ensure speedy circulation which had the advantage as they did not seem to stem directly from an official source. A ban on distributing articles which were not been reproduced in the British Indian Press had resulted in some of the articles not being distributed at all. However, India was very reluctant to publish such articles for fear of their appearing officially or otherwise inspired, for it had no approach to any foreign papers. It was easier for them to publish if these articles have been published in some British Indian newspaper. Each cultural article was given exclusively to one newspaper so that there may be no suspicion as to the source of supply.¹⁵⁷

Wireless broadcasts should be more colorful to allow of their being reproduced spontaneously by the public themselves in conversation and by the press in spare columns. Suggestions were

¹⁵⁵ War publicity in Indian States, Political Department, War Branch ,File No.223-W/40,1940.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

made regarding the Tamil broadcasts that they were not understood by Tamil labourers and so special Tamil talks for labourers should be arranged. Defence loans propaganda was another major issue discussed in the correspondence between the state and the Residents. It was suggested that in each major province there should be whole time man on the job to make contact with businessmen etc. Suggestion for the establishment of Information Bureau in a number of Indian states visually Indore, Bhopal, Dewas, Mysore, Kashmir, Kohlapur, Travancore, Cochin, Hyderabad and Baroda. Benaras Darbar also use their publicity van which had a wireless and Loud speaker for disseminating such information in public place in Ramnagar and for giving Hindustani news daily from London and Delhi. A large number of lectures were given by various lecturers thus disseminating information among less literate masses.¹⁵⁸

The Resident of Punjab State did not deal with matters outside the range of interests of the general public in the Punjab states. The people's main occupation was agriculture and they did not appreciate such refinements of the general war theme as the exact number of enemy air-craft shot down, or the tonnage of British shipping lost in certain week, or periodical and complicated estimates of the precise degree of likelihood of an enemy invasion of Great Britain. The most popular articles were those narrating the actual conditions, methods of repression, etc, in Germany and occupied countries, the rottenness of Nazi economy, racial theory and war aims and describing generally the disastrous results of Nazi domination. Of particular interests in this agency were such articles which referred to the expropriation of farmers from their land, the seizure of agricultural produce for military purposes and so on; an article which had been specially appreciated is that on 'how Hitler deceived the German farmers'. So, the suggestion was that more articles on India and its war efforts would be acceptable, if possible, and articles telling of pro-British sympathy and the practical expressions of that sympathy in Islamic countries would be of particular use for the Mussalman states in this Agency, especially Bahawalpur.¹⁵⁹

Although on the basis of propaganda, a movement was launched for voluntary boycott of enemy stations, it was possible that there were still private listeners listening at least occasionally to the

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ War publicity in Indian States, Political Department, War Branch, File No.223-W/40, 1940.

enemy stations. The other simple way to deal with the propaganda was the explanations of the situation by officials on convenient occasions, such as meetings whether held for general or war purposes, on the basis of their study of this literature. Similar explanations in village schools were done by touring educational officials.¹⁶⁰

The two features of Orissa State which were of peculiar importance from the point of view of war publicity was the general ignorance of English outside State officials, and the general passive loyalty of the population to their rulers and to the Crown. The scope therefore for English propaganda was not wide. In Bhopal publicity in Urdu was well organized and the *Nadeem*, an Urdu daily, was the chief instrument for propaganda. In Dewas Junior Branch the *Martand*, a Hindu Weekly, was published by the state, and was circulated in all villages. In Rewa the *Pratap* occupied a similar position. At Indore there was a publicity Department, which was originally conceived to publicise Indore State, but which was concerned also to watch the papers privately produced at Indore. These were small, but their general tone was mostly loyal and healthy. Every State in Central India had appointed an officer in charge of Publicity and attention was being paid to war propaganda more or less successfully every-where.¹⁶¹

vi) Propaganda through Pamphlets:

Pamphlets were an essential part of the Propaganda machinery during the period of Second World War. The extremely evocative graphics of the pamphlets were bound to grasp the instant attention of the masses. An example is this British leaflet coded "C" (Fig. 2.1) depicted an Indian tiger and the flags of the Allied nations. The back had a propaganda message in Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Assamese and English. The text is:

"India springs to action and side by side with Britain, America, Russia and China will trample underfoot the tyranny of Germany and Japan."¹⁶²

This propaganda leaflet showed the Nazi flag and the Japanese flag lying under the foot of the Indian tiger and the flags of the Allied nations hoisting high in air. It gave a sense of victory of

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² <http://www.psywarrior.com/AxisPropIndia.html> accessed on 17th April 2011.

Indian tiger over the Axis powers. The leaflet was colorful and the use of a tiger was deliberate in order to show the Indians were powerful, swift and quick. The text "India springs into action" represented India had launched a battle against the Axis powers and would soon trample them under its foot. The leaflet grasps instant attention and was very encouraging. Japan was an increasing threat to India after it entered the War, portrayal of Japan as an "enemy" was accelerated during this period.

Another propaganda leaflet was in the form of three patriotic cards in red, brown and blue (Fig.2.2) that depicted British naval convoys on the front, each in a different color with the text:

Britain Delivers the Goods-Thanks to the British Navy.

There were apparently several different texts on the back. One card coded 31-8244 had a BBC World Radio information message on the back. It listed most of the areas of the world including Pacific, North America, South America, Africa and the near and Far East. The times and wavelengths of the broadcasts were listed, and there were one set of broadcasts to India, Burma, Malaya and Australia. Another card had a short propaganda text in twelve languages; including Hindu, Urdu, Burmese, French, Arabic, English and others.¹⁶³

During the course of the war, the enemy dropped thousands of leaflets upon the Indians fighting for the British; they retaliated with propaganda leaflets and radio programs for those Indians who had joined the Germans and Japanese as part of their fight for liberation. The Psychological Warfare Division at Southeast Asia Command was not actually set up until 6 June 1944. But in the meantime and until July 1944 front-line propaganda was carried out by 5 units raised by the British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E), two in Arakan and three at Imphal. During this period the target was the battle area and lines of communication in Burma and propaganda was based on London directives and, when it was drawn up, on the joint Allied plan. Leaflet dissemination rose from 250,000 to one and one-half million a month and a most fruitful target

¹⁶³ <http://www.psywarrior.com/AxisPropIndia.html> accessed on 12th April 0n 2011.

were found in the Indian National Army whose reaction to the “surrender” campaign was enormous.¹⁶⁴

Another uncoded Allied leaflet (Fig.2.3) to the Indians quoted Gandhi. He called Bose “Quisling.” The front of the leaflet depicted Bose holding India in chains and passing it to a caricatured Japanese officer holding a bloody sword.¹⁶⁵ The text is: “Quisling Son of India”.

The back is all text and says in three languages:

To Indian Patriots I want Indians to oppose Japan to a man.
-Mahatma Gandhi Harijan, 21st June 1943.

This leaflet tried to evoke resentment against, Japan and Subhas Chandra Bose and the INA. This was a pamphlet depicting Subhas Chandra Bose a traitor, by calling him Quisling and the text at the back was in three language so, that it could reach to a lot number of people and the message was by Mahatma Gandhi, as he was very popular among the Indian population, so the pamphlet capitalizes on him to appeal to the Indian people not to support Subhas Chandra Bose and to oppose the Japanese.

Some of the known British codes for leaflets targeting Indian troops are “SH / (numerical)” for leaflets and “HH / (numerical)” for news sheets. It is believed that no more than 33 of the “SH” leaflets were produced. The last leaflet, SH/33, was entitled “Japan Surrenders.” The “HH” product was called *Hamara Hindustan*, a small four-page weekly newspaper with war maps and stories of the progress of the war both in Asia and in Europe. The last issue is HH/86 entitled “Japanese Surrender Notice.”¹⁶⁶

A very interesting Allied aerial leaflet (Fig.2.4) to Indian soldiers gives both sides of the argument for the Indians joining the Japanese to fight Britain. This is very strange propaganda because it actually made an argument for joining the Japanese, though certainly a weaker one than for refusing to join with them. The front depicts Subhas Chandra Bose riding a Japanese

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Vidkun Quisling was a Norwegian army officer and politician who was pro-Nazi and appointed Minister President after the German invasion of Norway. He ruled German-occupied Norway from February 1942 to the end of WWII. After the war he was tried for high treason and executed by firing squad. To be called a Quisling is to be called a traitor and collaborationist.

¹⁶⁶ <http://www.psywarrior.com/AxisPropIndia.html> accessed on 12th April 0n 2011.

bomb that is about to fall on an Indian family. The image implies that following Bose's philosophy of collaborating with the Japanese leads directly to dead Indian civilians killed by the Japanese.¹⁶⁷

The same message appears on the front and the back in four languages:

TO INDIAN PATRIOTS: Read what they say, and think! -MAHATMA GANDHI.
I have no desire whatsoever to woo any power to help India in her endeavor to free herself from the foreign yoke. There can be no question of my approval of Subhash Babu's policy. I want to resist with all my might the charge of inviting Japan to India.
I WANT INDIA TO OPPOSE JAPAN TO A MAN.
Harijan, June 21, 1942.

The Psychological Branch of Military Intelligence in the War Office, MI 7 (b) had established a sub-division specializing in conducting press propaganda to colonies and dominions. The branch studied a list of 200 papers supplied by the Royal Colonial Institute, and distributed the matter "thought suitable for each." Despite the selectivity, born out of PSYWAR needs, it was found that each article could have been used in about ten newspapers in different parts of the Dominion. The sister sub-division, MI composed a series of pamphlets on the role of the Indian regiments. The leaflets to the Indians were in a variety of languages. For instance, Burma and East Asia (Malaya, Singapore, etc.) had majority of Tamil population among Indians.¹⁶⁸ They wholeheartedly donated to Indian National Army so many of the leaflets were written in Tamil. Similarly, Bengali was a major language in eastern/north-eastern India so leaflets in that language were apparently dropped over Northeast India including the current Bangladesh. We don't know much about dissemination, there are evidences of leaflets written in Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, Hindustani, Nepali (similar to Hindi), and Tamil.¹⁶⁹

The British propaganda newspaper *Hamara Hindustan* was printed in Urdu. The first three pages were news, the fourth page, photographs. In the issue HH84, dated 20 August 1945 (Fig.2.6 and 2.5) the photographs on the last page were so interesting. They feature the "Big Three;" Truman, Churchill and Stalin. In addition, the paper depicted Lord Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek and

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ <http://www.psywarrior.com/AxisPropIndia.html> accessed on 12th April 2011.

General Douglas MacArthur.¹⁷⁰ The pamphlet attacked on three major Allied powers, Britain, Russia and United States and military chiefs of U.S.A, China and Britain.

Hamara Hindustan was a large (15" x 10") 4-page newsheet probably first produced and printed as early as January 1944 by General Headquarters, India. It bore no code serial number or date. The title banner was graphically different for nearly every issue. In the late summer it was reduced to 9" x 6 1/2." The new, reduced size first appeared in August and was coded "SHN" (SEAC Hamara Newsheet). The code was altered to "HH" in September.

Some of the stories were: Tojo is finished: Hitler is hunted Indians chase the Japs Sepoy gets Victoria Cross from King. Gureilla hit Japanese supply lines. War in the Pacific- lack of supplies kills thousands. Russians invading Germany. Punjab gives food grain".

This leaflet (2.7 & 2.8) is the usual German divide-and-conquer aimed at driving a wedge between the Indians and their British officers. The front of the leaflets depicts an officer talking to a girl in a peaceful Indian city. The text is:

Entry to the city is strictly prohibited. But who watches the officers?

The back of the leaflet depicted an Indian soldier dying in combat. The meaning is clear. Indians are being sacrificed by their officer corps. The text is:

Who commands this company? Company Commander Major Sarbuland. Where are all the officers? Can it be that they are strictly forbidden to serve on the front lines?

There was also a very short series produced right at the end of the war by the 2nd Mobile Printing Shop written in Hindustani and coded "2MPS/H". Only seven leaflets were known to have been disseminated. The text, was written in Urdu and English. Some of the text is:

A Government of India Communiqué says:

The Government is aware that many Indian prisoners of war have volunteered to co-operate with the enemy, because of the hardships and tortures to which they were subjected by the Japanese, and in the hope of being able to return to India, and that many of them have succeeded in escaping this way. The majority of these men has reported to the military or civil authorities on arrival in India, and has given the authorities much information about conditions in Jap-occupied territories. The Government wishes to make it clear that those who voluntarily give themselves up and tell our officers the full story truthfully, and whose

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

only offense was that they became volunteers, will be in no kind of danger, and will be allowed to go to their homes and meet their families as soon as possible. On the other hand, those who in attempting to carry out promises made to the enemy have engaged or do engage in espionage and subversive activities will be tracked down and punished with the greatest severity. Now is the time for you to come over to us. Seize this opportunity. You need not bring this paper with you, but you may do so if you wish. Please tell your friends that they can come over to us with or without a copy of this paper. This man is to be given a meal and take to an officer."¹⁷¹

The exact same message as above was placed on a second British leaflet coded SH/29. The leaflet was written in Urdu, Roman Urdu and English. The leaflet was stamped 14 May 1945. A great number of leaflets were prepared by the Southeast Asia Command. This command covered Burma, Ceylon, India, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya and Singapore. The leaflets had various codes. The four page newsletter *Lay-Nat-Thah* (Spirit of the Air) was coded SBN. SBN/1, Dated 23 September 1944, mentions that British troops chasing the defeated Japanese had occupied Sittaung. The newsletter was prepared by Forward Base, Psychological Warfare Division, and SEAC. This leaflet was clearly dropped on numerous countries to declare the defeat of the Japanese. It was printed in ten languages, including Hindustani.¹⁷²

In addition, some Indian troops who had escaped the Japanese were formed by British Force 136 in late 1943 into five platoons called the Indian Field Broadcasting Units (IFBU). They were assigned the task of propaganda patrols and raising the morale of civilians while attacking the Japanese with loudspeakers and small 2-inch by 3-inch leaflets fired from 2-inch mortars. A typical leaflet said in four languages:

Safe Conduct Pass: Notice to Allied Forces: The man who brings this is to be well treated in accordance with normal practice. South East Asia Command.¹⁷³

The loudspeakers played Japanese music and gave reports of Japanese defeats, laced with exhortations to desert. Force 136 was the cover name for the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and operated in South-East Asia from 1941 to 1945.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ <http://www.psywarrior.com/AxisPropIndia.html> accessed on 12th April On 2011.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Sanjoy Bhattacharya made an interesting point that wartime documents suggest that a similar surveillance network also made the GHQ (India) aware of the British troops' unwillingness to stay on in the subcontinent after the cessation of hostilities. It could, therefore, perhaps be justifiably argued that the British colonial state's information policies played an important, and independent, role in hastening the dissolution of the Raj in August 1947.¹⁷⁵ Thus, it is very difficult to deduce one outcome of the propaganda techniques adopted as the results were multifaceted starting from maximizing support base for the war to enhancing the process of gaining independence.

The British had launched an Indian Section in the Eastern Service of the BBC in London, which broadcasted in English and Hindustani. The DGI (Director General of Intelligence) noted the following:

“The Board considered whether it would be worth while letting provincial government’s kwon the position, but though we should be glad if tuning into Berlin could be stopped, we considered that the best advertisement for German Propaganda would be if it were to get about that we desired to stop people listening to it. If provincial government were addressed, there was a danger that they would take steps to bring pressure on restaurants keepers etc, through police; the fact that such pressure was being exercised could hardly kept quiet for long, especially as the orders would have to be communicated to subordinate police offers. We decided that on the whole it was better to leave matters as they were.”¹⁷⁶

In the above letter of correspondence between the GOI and the DIG it can be seen that there were several factors which effected propaganda policies. As, in this case the official was apprehensive to use force on the restaurant keepers as it would have led to resentment and thus paved the way for anti- propaganda. Thus, the British propaganda machinery in India, during the Second World War was very active and flexible as the need arose. The creation of the image of the ‘enemy’ was an extremely cautious process, which was to be carried out without alienating the people. In case of India the ‘enemy’ was ‘fascism’ it was projected as the biggest enemy of the democracy.

¹⁷⁵ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, ‘British Military Information Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India during the Second World War’, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 pp. 483-510, May, 2000.

¹⁷⁶ File No. 9945/H, External Affairs Department dated 23,01,1940, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.




Fig.2.1 India springs to action.



Fig.2.2 Britain Delivers the Good.



Fig.2.3 Quisling – Son of India.



Fig 2.4 BNS 29 - To Indian Patriots




Fig. 2.5.



Fig 2.6. HH/84 – First and Last Page.



Fig. 2.7 "Shahr men jana sakht mana hai"



日本降伏す。聯合國提示條件を承認。天皇は各地軍隊に對し抵抗中止の勅令を發せらる。(正式發表に依る)	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 10px;"><i>English</i></p> <p>Japan has surrendered. The Allied peace terms have been accepted. The Emperor is issuing orders ending resistance everywhere — OFFICIAL.</p>
	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 10px;"><i>Urdu or Hindustani</i></p> <p>Japan ne hathiar dal die hain. Itti-hadion ki sulah ki sharten man li gai hain. Japan ke shahinshah ne har ilaqe ki Japani faujon ko muqabla band kar dene ka hukm de dia hai.— SARKARI ELAN.</p>
	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 10px;"><i>Burmese</i></p> <p>ဂျပန်လက်နက်ချ၍ အရှုံးခံပြီ။ မဟာမိတ် တို့၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး စည်းကမ်းချက်များကို ဂျပန်က လက်ခံပြီးဖြစ်၏။ ဂျပန် စစ်တပ်များ နေရာတိုင်းတွင် ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကို ရပ်စဲစေရန် ဂျပန်ဘုရင်က အမိန့်ထုတ် နေသည်။ အစိုးရက အတိအလင်း ကျေညာကြောင်း။</p>
	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 10px;"><i>Japanese</i></p> <p>Le Japon s'est rendu. Les conditions de paix alliées ont été acceptées. L'Empereur donne des ordres pour mettre fin partout à la resistance. (OFFICIEL)</p>

Fig.2.9.Leaflet SA-1

Chapter 3: The German and the British Propaganda in Second World War (1939-1945): A Comparison.

*In Propaganda wie in der Liebe ist alles erlaubt was erfolgreich. Goebbles.*¹⁷⁷

The war served to increase the level of popular interest and participation in the affairs of the state. The gap between the soldier at the front and the civilian at home was narrowed substantially in that full resources of the state- military, economic and psychological had to be mobilized. In a state of total war, which required civilians to participate in the war effort, morale came to be recognized as a significant military factor, and propaganda slowly emerged as the principle instrument of control over public opinion and an essential weapon in the national arsenal. ¹⁷⁸Great Britain emerged from the World War I with the doubtful distinction of having employed propaganda better than any other nation. This was largely due to one man, Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, father of the yellow press. When the war was going badly in 1917, and he persuaded Prime Minister Lloyd George and the cabinet that skillful denigration of the Germans could stimulate the flagging energies of the British people. Lloyd George let him establish a propaganda department as Crew House. For the enemy, Northcliffe put into practice advice he had often vouchsafed, unheeded to the general staff- “The bombardment of the enemy mind was as important as bombardment by guns”. ¹⁷⁹

Formed on September 4th 1939, the day after Britain’s declaration of war, the Ministry of Information (MOI) was created that became the central government department responsible for publicity and propaganda in the Second World War. The initial functions of the MOI were threefold: news and press censorship; home publicity; and overseas publicity in Allied and

¹⁷⁷ In propaganda as in love, anything is permissible which is successful. Quoted in W.A Boelcke (ed.), *Kriegspropaganda 1939-1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium* (Stuttgart, 1966), p.21.

¹⁷⁸ Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia. 1500 to the Present*, ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp. XV-VI.

¹⁷⁹ Rhodes Anthony, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, pp.107-108. Within a year of the establishment of a propaganda department at Crew House, thanks to Northcliffe’s powerful newspaper conglomerate, he had convinced most of his countrymen that the Germans were ruthless

neutral countries. Planning for such an organization had started in October 1935 under the auspices of the Committee for Imperial Defence, largely conducted in secret; otherwise the government was publicly admitting the inevitability of war. Propaganda was still tainted by the experience of the First World War. The MOI was not, in general, responsible for propaganda in enemy and enemy-occupied countries, but it did liaise directly with the foreign office.¹⁸⁰ The MOI was principally for domestic consumption, and the Department of Propaganda to Enemy Countries, which later included enemy-occupied countries as well. Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was a British clandestine body supposed to work in harmony with the BBC and the Ministry of Information in London.¹⁸¹

The Executive was formed in August 1941, reporting to the Foreign Office. It was not until June 15, 1939, that the Prime Minister made his first public announcement of creating a new department under the name of the Foreign Publicity Department of the Foreign Office. This department was to include that section of the Foreign Office News Department which had previously been concerned with this work, but it was to be provided with additional staff. Chamberlain remarked that it was not the intention of the Government to found in peacetime a "Ministry of Information or Propaganda. Chamberlain summarised his policy thus: "The Ministry of Information 'will operate in war time; in peace conditions, after the necessary plans have been completed there will only exist a skeleton organisation, without which swift action would be impossible if an emergency arose."¹⁸²

The Ministry of Information was also responsible for producing publicity material. For this it included a campaigns Division, handling advertising and poster campaigns, and an Exhibitions Division designing and mounting anything from major exhibitions to small window displays, both at home and abroad. A Publications Division prepared and distributed a wide range of

¹⁸⁰ <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/theartofwar/inf3.html> accessed on 9th March 2011. The National Archives, UK..

¹⁸¹ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, , Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, pp. 107-110.

¹⁸² Cedric Larson, The British Ministry of Information, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn, 1941), pp. 412-431.

official illustrated books about the war, and promoted the circulation of British newspapers and periodicals abroad.¹⁸³

In Germany the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*- RMVPs), was established by a presidential decree, signed on 12th March 1933 and promulgated on the following day, much before the war has actually commenced which defined the task of the new ministry as the 'dissemination of 'enlightenment and propaganda within the population concerning the Policy of the Reich Government and the national reconstruction of the German fatherland'. Analysing the political function of propaganda in the Third Reich was further complicated by the fact that it was simultaneously channeled through three different institutions: the RMVP, the Central Propaganda Office of the Party, and the Reich Chamber of Culture. Moreover, the political structure of the Third Reich was based on the twin pillars of the Party and the State. With the creation of RMVP, propaganda became primarily the responsibility of the State, although its departments were to be supported and reinforced by the party's Central Propaganda Office (*Reichspropagandaamt*), which remained less conspicuous to the general public. Indeed, two institutions would often merge into one apparatus: not only would their respective organizations and responsibilities correspond closely, but many of the leading positions in the Ministry and *Reichspropaganda* were held by the same officials. Originally Goebbels had planned only five departments for the new ministry, to embrace radio, press, active propaganda, film and theatre and popular education, but by April 1933 it had acquired its basic structure and was divided into seven departments. During the war it reached to fourteen.¹⁸⁴ The Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda was established in March 1933, and has been functioning ever since at home and abroad. The British Ministry of Information, on the other hand, was not activated until the outbreak of the war in September 1939.¹⁸⁵

Modern dictatorships have never felt the need to shun the word as have democracies. Accordingly, the Nazis had a Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Soviets

¹⁸³ Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, pp.116.

¹⁸⁴ David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York, Routledge , 1993,pp.23-5.

¹⁸⁵ Cedric Larson, The British Ministry of Information, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn, 1941, pp. 412-431.

a Propaganda Committee of the Communist Party, whereas the British had a Ministry of Information and Americans an Office of War Information.¹⁸⁶ They were even conscious enough to avoid the word propaganda.

It was true that after World War I propaganda was widely associated with lies and falsehood. As a result of the innumerable lies, deliberate or otherwise, that were disseminated and believed during World War I, propaganda was inexorably associated with falsehood and was viewed by many as something to be ashamed of. In the immediate years following the end of the Great War, the Allies in particular quickly disbanded agencies that had been established for propaganda purposes. Other, less democratically inclined nations such as Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany viewed propaganda in a radically different light and used the new communications technologies as a means of manipulating mass opinion. As the British Information Service which was founded in 1941 as a part of a consolidation of the various British information offices working in the United States to combat American neutrality. The word “service” had been selected by the British ambassador Lord Lothian (1882-1940) as an alternative to the terms “propaganda” (taboo since World War I) and “relations”, which Lothian felt had been debased by both commerce and U.S government overuse.¹⁸⁷

There has always been a debate over the propaganda in a democratic country and in a dictatorship. Thus, the comparison between the propaganda adopted by both these nations is unavoidable. By the Second World War, Britain had emerged as a democratic country with the inclusion of adult franchise. The democracies did not have this advantage of preparation (such preliminary measures as were taken being obviously inadequate), which made their task all the more difficult when war broke out, and it was perhaps fortunate for political warfare agencies that their necessarily experimental stage occurred during the first two years of war.¹⁸⁸

The effective use of Propaganda by the British during the First World War was considered by the Germans to be the main reason for their defeat. This has been the central theme of the many

¹⁸⁶ Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp.XV-VI.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.40-1.

¹⁸⁸ *CAB 101/131*The Major Developments in Political Warfare throughout the War, 1938 – 1945, Y.M.Streatfield, 1949 Lee Richards, London, www.psywar.org.

works on propaganda by the German historians. In Weimar Germany, for example, the reputed success of Britain's Great War propaganda experiment, and especially the work of Lord Northcliffe's enemy propaganda department at Crewe House, was sufficiently well accepted to prompt men such as Ludendorff and Hitler to attribute defeat in 1918 not to the poor performance of the German army in the field but to the undermining of morale at home which had led to disintegration from within and that only a "stab in the back" had betrayed the German people in 1918. Thus, for propaganda reasons of his own, Hitler was quite prepared to pay tribute (in *Mein Kampf*) to what he called 'the very real genius' of British war propaganda. Thus, the enemy's successful use of propaganda was itself used as a form of propaganda to make the German people wary of becoming complacent and, therefore susceptible to information from outside sources.¹⁸⁹

The whole idea of "propaganda" in totalitarianism and the dictatorship was distinct in itself, but this chapter is an attempt to look at the various ways in which both these nations propagated on similar lines, mainly on the home-front. Both Germany and Britain had to perform the twin tasks of justifying the war aims at home and to convince people to contribute to the war effort. The primary source used mainly is "visuals" like posters, which had similar themes because war imposed similar strains on both the nations. There were a number of similar themes like, conservation, rationing, blackout, evacuation of children, to caution people not to let out secrets (i.e. "careless talks costs lives" in Britain and shadow campaign in Germany) and propaganda towards women which with a constant appeal to contribute to the war by taking up jobs. The second section deals with a comparison of audio-visual propaganda (films and radio). The similar modes of propaganda used by Germany and Britain. The last section of the chapter discusses the various types of propaganda like, "black", "white" and "grey" propaganda. The chapter sees the propaganda methods adopted by both these nations on the home front by the vilification of the "enemy", in this case counter-propaganda against each other. The propaganda was aimed at creating the picture of the enemy, to mobilize people for support.

¹⁸⁹ Philip M. Taylor, The New Propaganda Boom, *The International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Jul., 1980, pp. 485-502.

i) Diverse Portrayal of Common themes:

a) Conservation Posters:

A point of similarity can be found in the themes of the Propaganda during this period (1939-45) for both Germany and Britain. One such dominant theme was the “preservation of energy” so that it could be used for the war. The war imposed high strains and thus the people were encouraged to save and preserve in whatever way possible for the war. In Britain propaganda was deployed to encourage economizing in travel, saving waste paper, and obeying rationing.¹⁹⁰ The cost of waging total war imposed severe strains on Britain's limited economic resources, leading to appeals for public co-operation in financing the effort. This resulted not only in posters stressing the need for increased savings but also in campaigns against waste and unnecessary consumption, for the recycling of scarce materials, and for boosting food production from gardens and allotments.¹⁹¹ The propaganda film *They Also Serve* dealt with housewives' conservation efforts. People were also called to “make do” so that raw materials would be available for the war effort. Even an unattended kettle, boiling over, was waste. This was to be applied at work, as well, even though the firm was paying for wasted fuel. There were a numbers of posters on this line.

During the war, many materials that would have been commonplace and easy to produce during peacetime began to get scarce. Like the production and labor posters, many conservation posters also displayed images of battle and urged the average person to “do their part.” When they did not show battle, conservation posters, often depicted contributors cheerily giving to the war effort, pleased at being able to aid their government. In most cases, however, German citizens were reluctant to give up their luxuries. This type of propaganda was often titled “conservation propaganda”¹⁹² Like, waste paper required recycling to save shipping or another poster on saving paper showed a woman dressed in an industrial worker's clothes titled “from waste paper to munitions of war”(fig.3.2). Salvage operations were depicted as transforming scrap to weapons. An exhibition, “Private Scrap” was created to demonstrate the uses of scarp and underscore the link between civilian efforts and the military forces. Iron railings and aluminum

¹⁹⁰ Anthony Rhodes, Margolin Victor (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, p.116.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² <http://library.thinkquest.org/C0111500/ww2/german/naziprop.htm> accessed on 15th June 2011.

pots were targeted. Housewives' salvage efforts were presented militaristically, even depicting weapons by coming from women.¹⁹³

Same were the themes of propaganda for Nazis during the early years of the war. Posters such as this one (fig.3.1) advertised a paper drive, which were very common and were related to production propaganda posters. These types of posters urged German citizens to conserve materials for the war effort. The poster showed a young boy with a bundle of paper and at the bottom it was printed "*Altpapiersammlung* 1943, 4th April-24th April". It seems people were asked to collect waste paper and to increase the drive they had some conserving days to encourage people to do so. As, we can draw a line of similarity in both these posters was that the propaganda poster was meant for home fronts and so the both the poster depicts a "young boy" and "woman" in order to make them realize that by doing this they were contributing to the war.

Another important poster relating to preservation in both the nations promoted the salvage of kitchen waste.) (fig.3.3). People were asked to separate their trash so, that the pigs could be fed from it. American correspondent Lothrop Stoddard noted in October 1939: "Every family's duty is bound not to waste anything. So, each German kitchen had covered pail into which goes all the garbage that can be served to pigs...what we in America call "trash" must be carefully segregated into the following categories: newspapers, magazines, or other wastes."¹⁹⁴

The Germans worked to gather as much old material for the war effort as possible. The poster (fig.3.5) was for a 1943 clothing drive, which says "Get rid of all your old clothes and shoes". Another similar poster (fig.3.6) from Britain showed a women going through her wardrobe and the caption reads:"make do and mend". The MOI had prepared a leaflet telling people everything they need to know about unpicking and re-knitting garments, darning clothes, and even making

¹⁹³ The war department and the ministry of food applied great imagination to supporting and encouraging efforts on the home front. The foundation stone of the combined effort was the famous 'Dig for Victory' campaign to promote the home production of fruit and vegetables. Guidance leaflets and books were issued on a wide range of topics covering the growing and cooking of every imaginable thing. The imaginative innovators conjured uncomplicated and tasty meals for every occasion from simple ingredients. The standard bearers for the campaign, were a pair of cartoon characters, 'Potato Pete and Dr Carrot' and the jewel in the crown of their promotion was Potato Pete's recipe book. The book focused on the flexibility of the humble spud and offers an amazing range of recipes to satisfy the needs of the day.

¹⁹⁴ Terry Charman, "*The German Home Front 1939-45*", Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.48.

the corset last longer. The curtains were cut up to make skirts and dresses. Unwanted jumpers were unraveled and knitted into something else.¹⁹⁵

Another similar theme of the “Conservation propaganda” included the conservation of energy, like in case of Britain the posters like “switch of the light” or “telegraph less” or “was your journey really necessary”(fig.3.8,3.9 and 3.12). Because the war limited other options, the bus system was overloaded, and posters urged that people walk for short distances, to ease the burden. For train journeys, posters urged consideration of whether the trip was necessary and the importance of food and ammunition carried by train. Another 1940 poster (fig.3.13) was part of the Nazi energy conservation campaign. The figure in black, the “coal thief,” was the symbol of wasted energy. The text reads:

“There he is again! He’s always hungry, his sack is always empty. Greedily he skulks around the oven, the stove or the dripping faucet. He sneaks around the window, the door or the light switch, stealing what he can. He steals from armaments production, which every little needs bit he steals from city and countryside. Catch him! Read more about it in the newspapers.”

Both the nation persuaded people to save in all means possible and all the posters from Britain, mainly showed a lady. The Squander Bug campaign simply urged spending less.¹⁹⁶ (See fig.3.7) This was very famous in Britain. A Point of distinction can be made here in case of these as Britain encouraged people to buy “war bonds” it was not the same in Germany. Britain issued a number of posters encouraging people to buy war bonds. In the United Kingdom, the National Savings Movement was instrumental in raising funds for the war effort during both world wars. During World War II a War Savings Campaign was set up by the War Office to support the war effort. Local savings weeks were held which were promoted with posters with titles such as “Lend to Defend the Right to be Free”, “Save your way to Victory”, “War Savings are Warships”

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p 148. During the Second World War, the British National Savings Committee became concerned that inflated prices were being paid for scarce consumer goods and believed that the money would be better spent on savings certificates to finance the war. The Committee felt that a way to ridicule indulgent spending was needed, without being boring or high-handed. To meet this need, Boydell produced a series of six sketches depicting an imp-like creature named the 'Money Grub' that could 'push, pull, scratch, bite and steal'. The character was intended as a positive alternative to endless government warnings on what *not* to do, for example 'Don't waste fuel' or 'Don't waste paper'. Instead, the Squander Bug's speech balloons encouraged shoppers to waste their money on useless purchases, accompanied by captions urging consumers to fight or starve the creature. The character eventually gained swastika tattoos all over.

and “Kill by war savings”. The Nazi regime never attempted to convince the general populace to buy long-term war bonds as had been done during the First World War. The Reich government did not want to present any perceived form of public referendum on the war, which would be the indirect result if a bond drive did poorly. Rather, the regime financed its war efforts by borrowing directly from financial institutions, using short-term war bonds as collateral. German bankers, with no demonstration of resistance, agreed to take state bonds into their portfolios. Financial institutions transferred their money to the Finance Department in exchange for promissory notes. Through this strategy, 40 million bank and investment accounts were quietly converted into war bonds, providing the Reich government with a continuous supply of money.¹⁹⁷

b) Rationing: Germany and British: Second World War.

The rationing system in Germany was very strict during this period to save for the war. Germans were urged through a heavy domestic propaganda campaign, once a month to eat a cheap “*Eintopf*” (one pot) Sunday meal and donate the money thereby saved to the Winter Relief Fund or to other welfare “charities”. The *Eintopf* was also eaten in Reich Chancellery as mentioned by William Shirer “*Eintopf*—one-pot-day this Sunday. Which means all you can get for lunch was a cheap stew. But you pay the price for a big meal for it, the difference going to the Winter Relief, or so they say. Actually it goes into the War chest.”¹⁹⁸ Actual clothes rationing was introduced on 16 November 1939. Each German was issued with a *Kliederkarte* (clothing card). The one with the first year of the war consisted of coupons totaling 100 points; with so many to be clipped off for each rationed item. There were 150 points on the card for the second year of the War, and 120 points for the third year of the war, but the number required to for each article of clothing had so changed that one bought the same on each card.¹⁹⁹ In wartime Germany the shortage of raw materials severely handicapped the manufacture of shoes. With the exception of wood for soles, no really durable substitute for leather was found. Consequently considerable effort went into drives and schemes to collect and re-use old leather.²⁰⁰ This poster dates to early

¹⁹⁷ Götz Aly, and Jefferson Chase, *Hitler's beneficiaries: plunder, racial war, and the Nazi welfare state*. New York: Macmillan. 2007, p.294-98.

¹⁹⁸ Terry Charman, “*The German Home Front 1939-45*”, Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.48.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p.49.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p.51.

in the war. A farmer smashes the blockade. The Allied blockade of Germany during World War I had seriously hurt the war effort. The poster claims that Germany's food supply was secure in the new war. The text: "Farmer! You are a soldier in the battle of production." (fig.3.17). The entire propaganda by both the nations focused on the increased production for war.²⁰¹

Same was the case in Britain "rationing" was of utmost importance and lot of propaganda was directed towards it. In 1939 Britain only grew enough food to feed one person in every three, Nazi U-boats threatened to starve the country into defeat. But it was not just food - Britain brought many other things from abroad (notably sugar, tea, fruit, oil, rubber and wood) and now all these supplies were threatened by the U-boat attacks. The government needed to control the supply of many things that were going to be in short supply. It could not risk the public anger if there were shortages, and prices went up, and only the rich could afford things. So rationing was introduced, it was similar to the "rationing system" introduced in Germany.²⁰²

Recipes were spread for cooking efficiently and nutritiously on the restricted diet with many substitutions. The Ministry of Food urged that it was not clever to take more than your share. While bread was not rationed, wholemeal bread was encouraged. Propaganda also publicized that pregnant women could get orange juice and vitamin pills by bringing their ration books and medical certificate to the Food Office. The increasing technological basis of war meant that the progress of the war was more reliant upon the worker in the Second World War than it had ever been before. Within a maritime nation, raw materials were hugely important. Calls to 'make do' and recycle in order to reduce the amount necessary imports led to almost every family in the nation joining 'The home salvage corps'.²⁰³

As salvage poster, from 1942 appeals to join the Home Salvage Corps', with cartoon figures of two women with munitions and scrap containers. The cartoon showed that the salvage of scrap was important to the war effort, particularly the production of armaments. Fougasse noted that the importance of 'every scrap' statistics given in Advertiser's Weekly in February 1943 noted

²⁰¹ Terry Charman, "*The German Home Front 1939-45*", Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.52.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ INF 3/220,1942. The National Archives, UK, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/> accessed on 5th June 2011.

that a single chop bone, weighing 2oz, could supply two rounds of ammunition for RAF hurricane guns.²⁰⁴ Clean paper, rags, bottles, old metal, broken furniture or just about anything else that was thrown away. City collectors used to come around for this segregated trash at regular intervals.”²⁰⁵

People got a ration book full of coupons which allowed them to buy just a limited amount. Petrol was rationed after September 1939. Butter, sugar, bacon, paper and meat were rationed from early 1940. By the end of the war; half Britain's food was rationed. People needed ration coupons to buy clothes after June 1941. People saved up their coupons to buy things such as lard (to make pastry). One side effect of rationing was a flourishing 'black market' where people could buy things, secretly, off ration at high prices. Another poster which supported the cause of saving food as shown in the fig.3.11, urged people not to save food and used both the leading figures in both the nations to get its message across, it says “it’s better to eat less under Churchill than to eat pie under Hitler”.²⁰⁶

The government set up a 'Grow Your Own' (fig.3.16) campaign. Farmers were encouraged to plough up as much land as they could. The Women's Land Army was mobilised to provide workers in place of farm workers who had been called up. Posters also encouraged growing gardens. The difficulties of the Battle of the Atlantic led to the slogan "Dig for Victory!" (fig.3.18) Another important poster on the same lines was “victory harvest” (fig.3.15) which showed a female harvesting with a smile. Every garden was used for this purpose. Because potatoes were grown this way, the character "Potato Pete" was created to remind people that potatoes did not take up room on ships. Radio broadcasts urged that it be a form of recreation, not wartime sacrifice. Another poster (fig.3.14) from Germany from the year 1943 was issued by the *Reichbeitsgemeinschaft Schadenverhütung*, an organization that promoted safety. “Protect the harvest. It ensures victory!” A careless farmer ignited a fire that, without the prompt intervention of a second person, could have led to disaster. The poster hint to the fact that

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p.53.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

growing food was of utmost importance and should be done with utmost care as in case of the Britain.²⁰⁷

Public parks, bomb sites and railway embankments were used as allotments. Household­ers were told to use their gardens to grow vegetables, and many people kept rabbits and chickens. People formed Pig Clubs, and shared the meat when the pig was slaughtered. Food waste was collected in pig bins to feed to the pigs. In 1940 the government set up the Ministry of Food, under Lord Woolton. It issued information to try to help people accept the food shortages. This included: a morning radio programme (*The Kitchen Front*) gave housewives recipes on how, for instance, to make a 'tasty' dessert out of potatoes, without flour, sugar or lard. One government tip was use liquid paraffin (a laxative) instead of lard in baking the effects were devastating. Lord Woolton spoke on the radio. He was cheerful and treated housewives like he was speaking to his daughters. He told them what food was good for them and their families; many people trusted him and liked him. Propaganda, such as jolly adverts in newspaper, bright posters and catchy phrases and rhyme 'the sight of potato peelings hurts Lord Woolton's feelings'. Cartoon characters 'Potato Pete' and 'Dr Carrot' were used to encourage people to eat more foods that were not rationed. The government encouraged people to use alternatives wherever possible they used SPAM instead of ham, and British flour (which was poor quality and grey) instead of American flour (which was white). The government encouraged recycling and salvage to try to make the most efficient use of resources: In July 1940 it held a metal collection - supposedly to make airplanes. The aircraft factories were not short of metal, but the government wanted people to feel that they were 'doing their bit'.²⁰⁸

The Women's Voluntary Service and a children's club called COGS collected things house to house like bottle tops, old iron, paper, wool and bones (used to make explosives and fertilizer). The COGS children had an anthem 'There'll always be a dustbin' which was sung to the tune of 'There'll always be an England'. People gave their pots and pans, cut off their iron railings, threw out their sewing machines etc. Many people offered their false legs (which were made from high-quality aluminium) to make airplanes. To save cloth, the government passed

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p.147-52.

laws forbidding men's clothes to be made with turn-ups, wide lapels or double-breasted. Women's skirts were made straight and shorter. The clothes were labelled with a government 'utility mark', and were therefore known as utility clothing. (There was also simple, 'utility furniture'.)The government set up clothes swap shops, where you could take old clothes and take away new ones. They were especially popular with poor people with growing children. It became fashionable to wear simple and old-fashioned clothes, to show you were 'doing your bit' for the war effort these were called the 'austerity' (time of shortage) fashions. The government ran a campaign to try to persuade people to use only 6 inches (15 cm) of water in their baths, to try to save on the coal needed to heat it up.²⁰⁹

c) Blackout

Another similar theme for propaganda for both the nations during the Second World War was "Blackout". On the 1st September 1939, two days before the outbreak of war, Britain was blacked out. The Blackout imposed on all civilians in all cities was absolute. No chinks of light no see through curtains, no car headlights. Even the red glow of a cigarette was banned. Britain was plunged into complete darkness. Before the outbreak of war the Air Ministry had forecasted that Britain would be exposed to sudden air attacks that would cause high civilian casualties and mass destruction from enemy night bombers. To counter this threat it was widely agreed that if man-made lights on the ground could be put out then the enemy would find it difficult to navigate and pinpoint their targets. It was believed that if Blackout controls were introduced, it would make the enemy bombers job more difficult. Indeed as early as July 1939, Public Information Leaflet warned civilians that everybody would need to play their part and ensure that the Blackout regulations were properly enforced during the Blackout periods. Some homes had gas lamps, but by the 1940s gas lights were a bit old fashioned. Many homes had electric light. Every window had 'black curtains', which were drawn at night. If not, the ARP warden came along, shouting 'put that light out'. 'Blackout curtains' stopped light from rooms showing from outside. There were no street lights either. The idea was to stop lights from towns guiding enemy planes to drop bombs. Poster enumerated what to do when traveling in a blackout. Flashlights

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p.147-52.

were to be shone down, to avoid blinding people. Care should be taken while crossing roads. When getting off a train, it was necessary to check that the door opened on the platform.²¹⁰

With the introduction of the Blackout came stringent regulations and harsh punishment for people that did not adhere to these rules. The local A.R.P. could report anyone to the local authorities if any sign of a light was seen. Being reported could lead to a hefty fine or in some cases an appearance in court. Pedestrians were reminded also that they should always walk facing the traffic and that they should carry or wear something white. There were numerous posters asking people to hail a bus or tram they should shine a torch on their hands (fig.3.20) or another poster mentioned that they should never alight from a moving bus.(fig.3.22) Armbands were also worn that were luminous in the dark. These were exposed to the daylight to absorb light and emitted light in darkness. The following poster (fig.3.24) reminded motorists of how they should prepare and use their car in the Blackout. It told them that they should display no interior lights and use a slit mask (comprising of 3 horizontal slits) for the headlamp, an ingenious invention introduced in 1940. Indicators had to be dimmed and the red rear lamp also had to be reduced.²¹¹

Same was the case in Germany it was very important to inform the people about the Blackout. Blackout was a common phenomenon in Germany as well. Posters like, "*Der Feind sieht dein Licht. Verdunkeln!*" (Fig.3.21)The enemy sees your light. Darken)" were common. Another poster showed a skeleton on an air plane symbolized the dead, and the ball in its hand was the bomb. At the same time the scenery was absolutely unreal because the sky was cloud-covered, but air raids were performed mostly with clear sky. So, the clouds were a symbol for another "thunderstorm" coming up over Germany, respectively the poster claimed that the enemy had hidden himself in the clouds, or the enemy had brought the thunderstorm clouds to Germany. During darkening there were guards walking through the streets controlling the darkening of every window if any light would be visible. Houses with failing darkening were noted and fixed a posting with the blaming text: "This house is badly darkened" (German: "*Dieses Haus ist schlecht verdunkelt!*" fig.3.19). So police spy society was developed on and on and it can be

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p 111.

²¹¹ INF 3/220,1942. The National Archives, UK, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/> accessed on 5th June 2011.

admitted that this procedure also was performed in other countries and also on the allied side with the exception of "USA" which had no air raid with the exception of Pearl Harbor in Pacific. The poster as shown in the Fig.3.19. The text reads:

"Dieses Haus ist schlecht verdunkelt! Dadurch sind nicht nur seine Bewohner, sondern auch die Nachbarn gefährdet. Der Feind wirft seine Bomben dort ab, wo er einen Lichtschein bemerkt. Luftschutzwart und Hausbewohner werden aufgefordert, selbst dafür zu sorgen, dass auch in diesem Hause die Verdunkelung schnellstens und restlos durchgeführt wird. Dieser Anschlag wird erst entfernt werden, wenn alle Wohnungen und das Treppenhaus - auch nach der Hofseite - einwandfrei verdunkelt sind."²¹²

"This house is obscured bad! Not only are its inhabitants, but also the neighbors at risk. The enemy throws his bombs from where he noticed a light shining. Air raid warden and residents are invited to take precautions and to ensure that even in this house .Obscuration is carried out quickly and completely, this stop will be removed until all the flats and the staircase even after the courtyard are blacked out properly." Through such pamphlets people were asked to take "blackout" very seriously because it not only endangered the person who does not observed it carefully but also others around.

Another German Poster again from 1940 (Fig.3.23) "*Licht ist das sichere Bombenziel*", (Light is the safest bomber's target") The text reads:

"Es ist festgestellt worden, dass die feindlichen Flieger im westlichen Grenzgebiet fast ausschliesslich nachts angreifen und ihre Bomben dort planlos abwerfen, wo sie einen Lichtschein erkennen können. Es ist deshalb Pflicht eines jeden, die Verdunklung schnellstens durchzuführen im eigenen Interesse sowie im Interesse des gesamten Volkes, das es gilt, vor jedem Schaden aus der Luft zu bewahren. Was besonders für das Grenzgebiet gilt, gilt in dem gleichen Masse für das Heimatgebiet. Auch dort muss alles vermieden werden, was bei nächtlichem Einflug des Gegners irgendein Ziel für seinen Bombenwurf bieten könnte."²¹³

²¹² "This house is badly darkened! By this not only the residents of this house are in danger, but also the neighbors. The enemy drops its bombs where a light can be seen. Air raid guard and residents are wanted providing darkening of the house as fast as possible and absolutely completely. This posting will be removed only when all flats and the stair house - also to the court's side - will be darkened perfectly."

²¹³ "It could be confirmed that the hostile air planes in western parts of the country are attacking only during the night and let drop their bombs without any concept where can be seen a light. So everybody has its duty to darken its dwellings as fast as possible in its own interest and in the interest of the whole folk to beware it from any harm from the air. What counts above all for the border region also counts for the home land. There has to be omitted also all that could provoke an intrusion in the night and a bombing provoked by any target. This situation was at the beginning of air raid war when English air planes arrived German air space but did not know where they were, so they let drop their bombs on isolated light targets."

"It has been ascertained that the enemy air attack in the western border area almost exclusively at night and drop their bombs there haphazardly, where they can see a light. It was therefore the duty of everyone, the blackout perform quickly in their own interest and in the interest of the entire people who must be preserved, from any damage from the air. What was especially true for the border area was in the same mass for the home area. Even there, everything must be avoided, which provide for nightly ingress of the enemy any target for his bomb-throwing could." The pamphlet informed the people that "Blackout" was the easiest way to avoid bomb attacks. In most cities and towns kerbs and street-crossing were painted luminous white and cellar grating everywhere covered with the bulky sandbags, streaked with white paint. Flashlights became scarce as reserve stocks had been sold out weeks before the war in anticipation of the blackout. For those in possession of a flashlight, special regulations stipulated that bulbs had to be dark blue, or bulb casings covered with black or red paper. It seemed that practically every German wore a phosphorous button on his or her red coat, so that "thousands of small buttons glowed and bobbed along the Kurffuerstendamm each night". Enthusiastic Nazi Party members wore phosphorous buttons in the shape of the swastika.²¹⁴

d) Labour and Recruitment:

Another similar theme was: Labour. The poster (Fig.3.25), from Germany which reads as "You are the Front!" advertised the significance of labor and production. Germany, which maintained a highly mechanized army of tanks, required additional production in order to combat the Allied forces. Posters like this, which demonstrated the importance of labor, were extremely common after the beginning of the war, when increased production really became necessary. Once the Reich leaders realized that their current forces would not be enough, the push for additional labor war strengthened. Other posters of a similar type often portrayed a union between soldiers and workers, or urged workers to "do their part" in the war effort while displaying graphic scenes of battle. Posters of this type often displayed muscular men at work, because masculine strength was thought to inspire confidence. This type of propaganda, also known as production or labor propaganda was a sizable chunk of the German propaganda effort. Another Nazi propaganda

²¹⁴ Terry Charman, "*The German Home Front 1939-45*", Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.42.

poster (fig.3.27) “Labor Comrade. You work with us. Keep up your strength” shows an industrial worker shaking hands with a soldier.

Similar propaganda poster from Britain showed an industrial worker, helmeted and holding an electric drill, appears behind a squadron of fighters in formation, above a shot down German aircraft.(Fig.3.26) The image, with the slogan ‘Remember- they’re relying on you’, emphasized Churchill’s message that factory workers were ‘soldiers with different weapons but with the same courage’. Many campaigns were produced which were intended to develop a ‘spirit of personal responsibility’ in every industrial worker. In wartime, production crises made headline news, and the question of productivity was key, particularly in 1941 and 1942 (when the Ministry of Production was formed). A brightly colored image of four industrial workers, (fig.3.28) dressed in appropriate work-gear. In March noted that outside the factory the object of propaganda was ‘to create and foster the belief that it was a privilege to be engaged on war work’, thus stimulating recruitment. This image included an older man, not eligible for war service, and a young woman: conscription for all single women between twenty and thirty was not introduced until the National Service (No 2) Act in December. As in this image, campaigns targeted at women needed to bridge the gap between appearing fashionable and glamorous and being dressed correctly for the job.²¹⁵

e) Careless talks Costs Lives

One of the most important propaganda themes in case of both the nations was to caution people against the spies and to not let out any secrets. The “Careless talks cost lives”(fig.3.32, 3.34) in case of Britain and the “Shadow Campaign” in Germany cater to this through a publication of a number of posters on these lines during the war. One of the posters by Fougasse showed two garrulous women housewives sitting in a bus, with Hitler and Goering seated primly behind them, listening.²¹⁶

In February 1940 a nationwide campaign was launched that warned the general public against loose talk and the dangers of unwittingly giving information to enemy sympathizers. The slogan "Careless Talk Costs Lives" was born. The Ministry of Information was responsible for

²¹⁵ Cab21/156, 1941The National Archives, UK, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/> accessed on 17th June 2011.

²¹⁶ Terry Charman, “*The German Home Front 1939-45*”, Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.110.

distributing two and a half million posters to offices, shops, public houses etc. Other memorable posters included "Keep Mum, she's not dumb!"(fig.3.30) and Norman Wilkinson's "A few careless words...." All the posters issued at this time were a breath of fresh air compared to the Ministry of Information's earlier efforts, which included the lengthy and rather formal slogan "Do not discuss anything which might be of national importance. The consequence of any such indiscretion may be the loss of many lives." The best known images from this series were which depicted people giving away secrets in everyday situations (e.g. sitting on the bus, not seeing caricatures of Hitler, Goebbels and Goering sitting behind them).²¹⁷

Careless talk propaganda discouraged talking about sensitive material where it could be overheard by spies, showed either an Axis eavesdropper or depicted a death caused by such information leaking. It was also intended to prevent morale sapping rumors from spreading. This also was the theme of the film *The Next of Kin*. Originating in a 1940 campaign with the catchphrase 'Be Like Dad, Keep Mum',(fig.3.36) the best known image from this campaign was the 1942 poster 'Keep Mum, She's Not So Dumb' by the architect and artist Gerald Lacoste. It depicted a glamorous blonde woman reclining, and officers from each branch of the Armed Forces about her talking to each other. It was implied that the officers were talking military secrets, on the (wrongful) assumption that the woman was only a "dumb blonde" and so will not pass these secrets on to the enemy.²¹⁸

One of the last major Nazi propaganda campaigns was the "Shadow Campaign" of the first half of 1944. It was intended to encourage people to be alert to enemy spies. There was an entry in Goebbels's diaries dated 12 October 1943 in which he approves the outline of the campaign. The shadow campaign began on 1944 which portrayed a black shadow (fig.3.33). The goal of the campaign was to put an end to irresponsible chatter that could aid the enemy.²¹⁹ Nazis also produced a number of posters in this respect. Another poster (fig.3.29) from fall 1943 also encouraged silence. The caption: "Shame on you, chatterer! The enemy is listening. *Schäm dich, schwätzer* shame on you, gossip Enemy hears you, silence is mandatory. This cartoon was part

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ Tony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, *Britain Can Take It: British Cinema in the Second World War*, Edinburgh University press. p.99.

²¹⁹ "Parolen für die Mundpropaganda," *Rüstzeug für die Propaganda in der Ortsgruppe*, #2 (1944), pp. 14-15, and "Tatsachenberichte zur Schattenaktion," *Rüstzeug für die Propaganda in der Ortsgruppe*, #3 (1944), pp. 19-23. <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/pst.htm> accessed 13th July 2011. German propaganda Archive.

of a propaganda campaign to make people cautious about talking in public, since enemy spies might be listening. The man was about to give the details of the latest gun, but his girlfriend warns him not to speak about it. Propaganda poster "Take care of spies - take care during talks" ("*Achtung Spione - Vorsicht bei Gesprächen*", 1939) (fig.3.31). A black shadow with the hat can be seen which portrayed the enemy spy; the cartoon was the part of the "shadow campaign".

f) Evacuation of children

Posters urged children to be sent from London. Both pamphlets and posters urged that evacuated children were not to be brought back. Many were, in fact, brought back during the "phoney war", and the government redoubled efforts to persuade them to let the children stay. Others praised those who took such children in, such as depicting a housewife in a line of uniformed women as she welcomed children. The government knew that cities would be bombed, and thought that gas would be used. A million coffins were prepared. It was feared that many child casualties would affect morale, so pressure was put on parents to send the children away to the safety of the countryside (fig.3.37, 3.38, 3.39 & 3.40) both in Germany and Britain. Families gathered at railway stations. A label was tied to the children giving their destination. The evacuations began on 1st September 1939. Some parents refused to allow their children to leave, but amazing numbers sent them away. Over one million evacuees left London by train. School children travelled with their teachers. Children under five went with their mothers. Pregnant women were also evacuated. Government propaganda put immense pressure on parents to send their children to the 'safety' of the countryside.²²⁰

This poster dates from 1942-1943. Allied bombing of German cities had increased to the level that children in cities were being sent to the countryside for safety. The German term *Kinderlandverschickung* translates as "sending children to the countryside." The poster encouraged parents to register their children aged 3-14 for the program, which was not compulsory. (fig.3.39) Posters both from Britain and Germany requested mothers to send their children to safety. Evacuation posters were quiet similar in both Germany and Britain as in fig.3.37 and 3.38 both the posters asks mothers to send their children to safety.

²²⁰ The British Home Front Pocket Book, Ministry of Information. 1940.
http://www.conwaypublishing.com/?page_id=192 accessed on 7th June 2011.

g) Propaganda towards Women:

In 1939, women made up more than half of the population a proportion which grew, of course, as more and more men went abroad on active service. It is important to realise that 'the part women played in the war' was not just about the things they did specially. Everything that happened on the Home Front happened at least equally to women; women were involved in almost every aspect of the war. We find a systematic propaganda campaign for women and notice elements of similarity in Britain and Germany in terms of recruitment propaganda or in evacuation an appeal was made to women.²²¹

It was the women who had to help in evacuation, took their children to the station, wove them off, and bore most of the emotional pain of the parting., (pregnant women and mothers with babies were evacuated themselves) bore the brunt of the extra cleaning, bed-wetting, cooking and problems in the host homes. Posters on women wanted for evacuation services were rampant. They kept the home going and brought up the children while the men were away fighting. They were required to stand in rationing queue for the groceries, the butcher's, (and after an air raid) for washing and water etc. They learned how to cook interesting and nutritious meals on rations without essentials such as flour or lard, wear 'utility clothing' (which used a minimum of cloth so no frills or turn-ups)'make do and mend' socks, skirts etc. Women unraveled old woollens and knitted new clothes, or made new coats out of old blankets. Women's magazines gave hints to women how to use cup hooks and bottle tops to make jewellery, use bicarbonate of soda as under-arm anti-perspirant, burnt cork as mascara and Reckitt's Blue (a laundry whitener) to give grey hair a 'blue rinse'. In Coventry women took their children to sleep in the fields for fear of bombing. In Britain women mainly worked as Women's Voluntary Service (WVS), Air Raid Wardens, Auxillary Territorial Service (ATS), Women's Auxillary Air Force (WAAF), Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS), Special Operations Executive (SOE) (known as Secret Agents or Spies), Entertainers. An advertisement in *The Times*, September 12 1941, by the Ministry of Labour and National Services showed that 200,000 ATS were required urgently.²²² Another poster encouraging women to join the Queen Mary Army Auxillary Corps (fig.3.43.) appealed women to "enlist today" and the poster reads: "The Girl behind the man

²²¹ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p.152.

²²² Terry Charman, "*The German Home Front 1939-45*", Barrie and Jenkins Ltd, Britain, 1989, p.112-16.

behind the gun". The whole idea was make them realize that they were contributing to the war effort on a large scale.²²³

During the raids; women drove ambulances, worked as telephone operators or despatch riders, did fire-watching and worked as ARP wardens and nurses volunteered for the Women's Voluntary Service (WVS) in 1939, 10,000 women a week joined; they set up tea canteens in bombed areas, looked after shock victims, helped with First Aid and manned Incident Enquiry posts. In 1941, the government started to conscript single women aged 20-30 into war work in the Auxiliary Services or industry. Married women were encouraged to volunteer. Women joined the Women's Land Army to help farmers whose labourers had joined up - about 80,000 women became 'Land Girls', (see fig.3.43) of whom 1,000 worked as rat-catchers, and 6,000 joined the WLA Timber Corps. There were many posters encouraging women to work in factories quoting one such poster: "Women of Britain Come into factories". The poster depicted a woman standing with open arms as if she was flying and above her a trail of aeroplanes was shown, this poster indicated the liberation and independence of women.²²⁴

Propaganda towards women was similar in Germany. The Third Reich, contrary to popular belief, had similar roles for women. The *SS-Helferinnen* were regarded as part of the SS if they had undergone training at a *Reichsschule* SS. Women also served in auxiliary units in the navy (*Kriegshelferinnen*), air force (*Luftnachrichtenhelferinnen*) and army (*Nachrichtenhelferin*). In the Air Force, they handle combat duties shooting down Allied warplanes. Hundreds of women auxiliaries (*Aufseherin*) served for the SS in the camps.²²⁵

The poster from late in the war the text translates as: "Mothers! Fight for your children!" Note that the mother portrayed has four children, consistent with the Nazi goal of encouraging as many births as possible. (fig.3.42).A poster put out by the Ministry of Food in Britain read: 'Medals' were awarded for thing such as 'making delicious dishes from home-grown vegetables', 'trying fresh-salted cod', 'acting on recipes and hints from Kitchen Front wireless talks', 'saving all bread crumbs ... and making crisp rusks', and 'going without, rather than pay unfairly high prices for foods that may be scarce'. Another poster showed a British woman wearing a medal: it

²²³ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p.153.

²²⁴ Susan Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939-1945*, p.148-52.

²²⁵ Leila J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Women For War: German and American Propaganda, 1939-1945*, 1979, pp.102-4.

read medals for housewives. The British housewife was shown helping to make a second front the kitchen front- against Hitler. A mother in Nazi Germany was awarded a bronze, silver, or gold cross depending on the number of children she had borne. Eight or more entitled the woman to a gold cross, six or seven for silver, and four or five for bronze.²²⁶

The *Frauen Warte* was the Nazi Party's biweekly illustrated magazine for women. Its circulation was 1.9 million. It was one of the most important means of propaganda towards women. An issue from May 1939 was "A Mother's Day issue". The issue included a note to the readers explaining why "a women's magazine was necessary during the war". An article titled "Ready to Die/Ready to Live" promoted having children, even during war. Another dealt with the experiences of children in camps. And there were articles on gardening, fashion (with a pattern), and home economics. The cover painting captioned "Comrades", a nurse stood in front of two soldiers, one of whom was wounded. Interior articles dealt with the Bolshevik threat, the blessed future of German children once Germany won the war, the works of nurses on the Eastern front, and two pages of Soviet cartoons. : "German women always know that it was a matter of the existence or nonexistence of their people. Total war was the demand of the hour. Everybody help!" This issue appeared after Goebbels' "Total War Speech" in February 1943, and just before Hitler's birthday. The lead article, titled "Strength from Love and Faith," aimed at encouraging German woman to work hard as a kind of birthday present for the *Führer*. Other articles from the issue April 1943 discussed women in factory work, German youth working in the East, and provided fashion suggestions and household hints.²²⁷

ii) Manipulating Public Opinion through Radio and films.

Radio

Modern technology has placed at the disposal of political warfare new techniques which in the previous wars were not available, or available only to a limited extent. Notably it has created broadcasting which did not exist as an instrument in the First World War.²²⁸ Of all the channels through which propaganda flows, radio was the most effective in preventing or in accelerating social change. By radio the propagandist could bring his voice and all the persuasive power of

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/fw.htm> accessed on 10th June 2011. German propaganda Archive.

²²⁸ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 17th June 2011.

his emotions to millions of people, and with the speed of light.²²⁹ When Goebbles became Minister for Propaganda, the newspaper and film industries were still privately owned; the broadcasting system, however, had been State- regulated since 1925 by means of the Reich Radio Company (*Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft-RRG*). Although the Nazis had failed to gain access to this medium while in opposition, once in power the ‘coordination’ of German radio proved comparatively easy, despite a few initial setbacks. From the moment he assumed power, Goebbles recognized its potential propaganda and was determined to make the most of this relatively new medium. During the Weimar Republic, radio had been used by successive governments as a means of contacting German- speaking minorities (*Volkdeutsche*) living abroad. The technical mobilization of German radio as the ‘voice of the nation’ was a history of remarkable accomplishment. To increase the number of listeners, the Nazis persuaded manufacturers to produce one of the cheapest wireless sets in Europe, the VE 3031 or *Volkesmpfänger* (people’s receiver). The people’s radio was highly subsidized so that it could be affordable to all the workers. The long term aim was to install a set in every home in Germany. Indeed by the beginning of the war over 70 percent of all households owned a wireless set which was the highest percentage anywhere in the world. The ‘people’s receiver’ were designed with a limited range, which meant that the Germans who purchased them were unable to receive foreign broadcasts.²³⁰

Goebbles had once said that radio would do for the 20th century what newspapers had done for the 19th. Before 1933, the big German cities all had their radio stations emitting their own programmes. In contrast to this decentralization, Goebbles concentrated the control of all broadcasting in Berlin, under his Propaganda Ministry, which was, significantly sometimes referred to as the *Befehlszentrale*, the center for issuing orders. The communal listening was also encouraged, in the factories, offices, restaurants, cafes, even at street corners. When a speech by a Nazi leader or an important announcement was to be made, factories and offices had to stop work so that everyone could listen. In 10,000 restaurants throughout the Reich, when the announcement “*Der Führer spricht*” was made over the radio, diners felt embarrassed to go on

²²⁹ Clyde R. Miller, Radio and Propaganda, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 213, New Horizons in Radio (Jan., 1941), pp. 69-74.

²³⁰ David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, London/ New York, Routledge , 1993,p.

masticating while the harsh and familiar sound reverberated the room.²³¹ Posters were one of the means employed to propagate the “people’s receiver” as seen in one of the posters which states: “*Ganz Deutschland hört den Führer mit dem Volkempfänger* (“All Germany hears the *Führer* on the People’s Receiver”).

Goebbles in one of his speeches talks of radio as the eighth great power (“*Der Rundfunk als achte Großmacht*,” speaking on the occasion of inauguration of the 10th German Radio Exhibition Open he said:

With the opening of this exhibition, a systematic campaign to advertise for new radio receivers begins. We will use the knowledge of propaganda we gained in the past years. Our goal is to double German radio listenership. That will result in a financial foundation that will not only enable radio to carry on its mission, but also will support the entire intellectual and cultural life of the nation. We will strengthen the stage, film, music, and publishing, providing a firm financial foundation.²³²

Another technique used was the “radio warden” for each block of houses or apartment buildings. This Party member would encourage his neighbors who did not own a radio to buy one (sometimes he would lend them the money to do so); otherwise, to listen to important speeches in his or a friend’s home. He sent regular reports on their reactions to the broadcasts. Thus radio warden became of special importance during the war when he reported those listening to foreign broadcasts. Between 1933 and 1939 the number of private radio sets in Germany quadrupled. The radio was also important for influencing foreign opinion. Other nations could prohibit the import of Nazi written propaganda, but it was much harder to interfere with a radio broadcast. The Nazis made good use of short- wave transmissions to the Americas. From 14 hours weekly in 1933, foreign broadcasts rose to 58 hours in 1939. Daily, 130 German transmitters broadcast 180 foreign news programs in 53 languages.²³³

²³¹Victoria Margolin (eds),*Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, Anthony Rhodes, Angus and Robertson Publishers,1975, pp.26-7.

²³² Joseph Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Großmacht,” *Signale der neuen Zeit. 25 ausgewählte Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1938), pp. 197-207, available on <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb56.htm> accessed on 7th March 2011. German propaganda Archive.

²³³ *Ibid.*

British were not behind in exploiting the medium of broadcasting for propaganda to the fullest. Britain's national broadcasting organization has served as the propaganda arm of the British government overseas- and occasionally at home as well. During the buildup leading up to and throughout the World War II BBC external services multiplied to include a plethora of languages, broadcasting to Allied, enemy and neutral territories alike. The BBC sought to gain a reputation for credibility as a news service. This contrasted with the totalitarian approach to propaganda and ensured that when the British really needed to lie, it was likely to be believed.

Radio, as the most effective method of disseminating propaganda, has taken its place alongside diplomacy, economic pressure and military power as one of the accepted instruments of foreign policy. Prior to the present conflict, radio propaganda was peculiarly a weapon of totalitarian power politics. But since the war actually began all the belligerents, totalitarian and democratic states alike, have made departments of radio propaganda integral parts of their war machines. On the home front, both armed forces and the public were exhorted to unity and spurred on to sacrifice. To neutral countries were transmitted skits, topical talks and news, while enemy firesides and cantonments were bombarded with arguments, facts and allegations calculated to weaken morale. Radio propaganda has been employed, not merely as a gradual process of molding the minds of peoples, often far from the scene of conflict; it also has become an instrument in actual battle. Thus the Nazis have used the radio as a dynamic weapon, a practical aid to attack and invasion. On the eve of battle the enemy's morale was weakened when radio broadcasts from Germany demonstrate that German spies everywhere, seeing all, knowing all, reporting all. The miracle of radio has made it much easier than before to spread propaganda in enemy territory. The methods formerly used, such as dropping leaflets from airplanes or free balloons, were very limited in range and influence. Radio, however, penetrates the enemy frontier without difficulty. In fact, it circles the earth seven times in a single second. The Nazis early prohibited Germans from listening to foreign stations. The British did not; indeed, the British newspapers very obligingly noted the hours when the famous Lord Haw Haw could be heard. Lately in England, however, such listening has been discouraged as "unpatriotic." Incidentally, each side announces over the radio the names of newly captured prisoners of war in

order to encourage. In the campaign against enemy morale, enemy civilians were told of the corruption of their leaders in peace and their inefficiency in war.²³⁴

In Winston Churchill, too, the British have had a spokesman without a peer elsewhere for confident, measured eloquence interspersed with flashes of irony and wit. Moreover, the elementary facts of the war were such as to predispose the American listener against any one pleading the German cause. In the last war, the Germans could never live down the rape of Belgium, the submarine warfare, the use of poisonous gas. Similarly no amount of opera or diverting chats by Lord Haw Haw from Berlin can explain away the Jewish pogroms or the ruthless destruction of Rotterdam. In the second place, there was the practical matter of the radio audience. Here, too, the British enjoy great advantages. From scattered evidence it would appear that not more than 10 or 15 percent of American listeners regularly tune in on short-wave broadcasts from Europe. Probably most of the listeners to German and Italian short-wave signals were immigrants or members of the first generation of American-born. As a matter of fact, most students of the subject believe that the main object of Nazi and Fascist radio propaganda was to maintain or cultivate the loyalty of these groups, and, at the same time, to send directions to sympathizers and "Fifth Columnists" as to the kind of propaganda these were to spread throughout the country. Such listeners, however, represent only a small fraction of the American public. On the other hand, many of the British short-wave programs were re-broadcast in this country. By the fall of 1940, a total of 88 American stations were relaying BBC news, and one of the major American chains, the Mutual Broadcasting System, was giving re-broadcasts of BBC news, and even a certain number of topical talks. In addition, Canadian stations easily audible in many parts of the United States were giving more complete renditions of London transmissions, and naturally their own views on the war, practically identical with those of England herself. This immensely valuable avenue of approach the Canadian radio cannot be matched by the Germans. Another advantage enjoyed by the British over the German radio was a reputation for reliability. German and Italian broadcasts were marked by numerous cases of misrepresentation, misstatement or downright falsehood, but it was rare that one finds the BBC wandering from the truth. The BBC may not always give the whole truth, and it may suppress or postpone the announcement of particularly bad news. And, naturally, it will present the most favorable

²³⁴ John B. Whitto, *War by Radio*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp.584-596.

interpretations of events and causes. But, by and large, its broadcasts have maintained a high degree of accuracy.²³⁵

The German and British radios were as different as the lawyer who manufactures evidence, and the one who, while making out the best possible case for his client, refrains from directly unethical practices. There was much evidence to the effect that the American public considers the reports from London as much more reliable than news from Berlin. The tendency to ignore everything coming out from a belligerent country as "mere propaganda" was folly. The crucial question was whether the fact was true and the appeal was sound.²³⁶

During the defensive period of war, the function of broadcasting was to build the audience, to retain its confidence and to sustain its morale. This the B.B.C. did with notable success, it established the reliability of its news; it made itself the trusted friend of news-starved Europe. It must, however, always be borne in mind that that service was provided not as an act of philanthropy but with a deliberate purpose as an instrument of war. The powerful instrument of European broadcasting was like a battle fleet in which millions have been invested, but which was useless unless they were prepared to risk it in battle. In the offensive period which began as soon as the myth of the invincibility of the German military machine was challenged, i.e. when at the first sign of effective resistance both in the Battle of Britain and the Battle of Russia, broadcasting ceased to be passive and became belligerent; it became an instrument not of publicity but of propaganda. The technique of radio had made it possible to create either: actual freedom stations (where the resources were available, which was rarely the case within enemy or enemy-occupied countries) or to produce the illusion of a freedom station operating within that country or a freedom-of-action station which need not necessarily pretend to be within any given country.²³⁷

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 13th June 2011

²³⁷ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 13th June 2011

Films

Movies were a unique medium in the third Reich, occupying a position midway between the cultural arts such as music and literature and methods of direct political communications such as radio and the press. Films produced under the Nazis defy simple categorization and generalizations about historical cause and effect. Many films of the Nazi era were found neglected, decomposed, destroyed by the Allied occupation, by the German officials to erase past. Interest in German films developed to locate the Nazi ideology and its dissemination through films.²³⁸

The cinema was Goebbles foster child. Because the Nazis considered the cinema such a powerful medium, its personnel –actors, directors, electricians, cameramen etc-were immediately made to take oath of loyalty to the Fuehrer. Goebbles took personal interest in all films made during the Third Reich, and often intervened personally to make a change or an addition. The best known films of the Nazi era were anti-Semitic films like *Robert und Bretram* and *Lenin aus Ireland* (1939), *Die Rothschild*, *Jud Suess* (1940), *Der Ewinge Jude* (1940). The film *Die Rothschild* dealt with British plutocracy based on capitalist ethos, shown to depend upon Jewish conflict. The film was not an unqualified success, reflected political uncertainty of the time, as German relationship still uncertain. Propaganda misfired, had to be withdrawn after two months. History films were prominent during this period. *Heart of the Queen* (1940) dealt with the life of Mary Queen of Scots her betrayal and execution by Elizabeth. Directed by Carl Froelich form Ufa. Others films like *The Fox of Glenarvon* (1940) and *My life for Ireland* (1941), directed by Max W. Kimmich portrayed the Irish struggle for freedom against the British. *Titanic* (1943) showed the capitalist intrigues of the English upper classes that caused the ill-fated voyage. Goebbles immediately withdrew it as he felt a sympathetic wave doomed British passengers.²³⁹

According to David Weinberg there are three major approaches to the study of German Cinema; the first is concerned with the structure of German movie industry and the governmental control

²³⁸ M.S Phillips, The Nazi Control of the German Film Industry, *Journal of European Studies* March 1971 1: pp.37-68.

²³⁹ David Weinberg, Approaches to the Study of Film in the Third Reich: A Critical Appraisal, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Historians and Movies: The State of the Art: Part 2 (Jan., 1984), pp. 105-126.

of film making, the second approach is ideological and emphasizes film content. Its proponents argue that the films were instrumental in helping Nazi leadership realize its unshakable goals of world conquest and the third approach investigates the impact of Nazi sponsored films, upon the German populace. In 1939, threat to Goebbles authority, led to production of blatantly propagandistic films under the Minister's personal supervision obsession of Hitler and Goebbles with movies is well documented. The nature of Goebbles control over the Nazi film policy is examined in detail by Gerd Albrecht's study. He concludes that Goebbles was involved intensively with the conceptualization and production of propaganda films in general and weekly newsreels in particular. This is seen as a product of crisis period. Albrecht's study suggests that the government policy at least in its inception was largely determined by its commitment to *Gleichschaltung* coordinated all institutions under Nazi control, a view not endorsed by Wolfgang Becker. He argues in the opposite. For him, the magic purpose of the Nazi administration of movie production was to rescue it from economic collapse and ruin.²⁴⁰

Films under Nazi era had dualistic function: it was a means of persuading and communicating the Nazi ideology and at the same time it was also spectacle. There is a debate among film critics (like Siegfried Kracauer, Sabine Hake, Erwin Leiser, David Welch, Linda Schulte Sasse, Julian Petley etc) concerning the distinction between – *Tendenzfilme* (films exhibiting strong Nationalist Socialist tendencies) and *unterhaltung* films (pure entertainment). Kra Cauer thinks all Nazi films are more or less propaganda films, even the mass entertainment ones also.

David Welch have pointed out, German films made during the Third Reich prior to the outbreak of World War II paint a more sympathetic, though not completely positive picture of the British than do those made after 1939. Films like *A Man Must Return to Germany* and *The Riders of German East-Africa*, both made in 1934 and set during the First World War, portray the British as a foe to be respected. And with two 1940 productions, *The Rothschilds*, which describes the emergence of a so-called "Jewish-British Plutocracy," and *The Fox of Glenarvon*, cataloguing the brutal British oppression of the Irish, full-blown anti-British propaganda had emerged. The culmination of the anti-British program was reached with the production of three films set in Africa. *Ohm Kruger* and *Carl Peters* were both released in 1941. The former portrays President Paul Kruger's tenacious fight against British domination in South Africa and British atrocities

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

during the Boer War. Two years later the third film, *Germania*, showed the British to be a heartless and opportunistic colonial power. The British have imperialistic ambitions, make exploitative diplomatic and military pacts with other nations to further these ambitions, use war and the threat of war to realize their goals and are inveterate liars and therefore cannot be trusted.

The British have imperialistic ambitions. Following the successful invasion of Poland, the newsreels reveal a decided switch in the portrayal of the Poles. Whereas they were once the perpetrators of atrocities against a helpless ethnic German population living within their borders, they suddenly become the unfortunate dupes of the British. The Poles were seduced into war to further British interests; but after Polish soldiers were interned in Nazi prisoner of war camps, they said they were happy that the British could no longer exploit them (14 September 1939). At first blush the newsreel genre may seem poorly suited to Goebbels's exhortation to present propaganda indirectly so that it does not appear intended. And the newsreels do indeed convey most of their message in a blatantly propagandistic manner. Nevertheless, there are a few scenes where the viewer was left to draw the conclusion. The message that the British are liars was generally conveyed by directly calling them liars, but on several occasions the lie was merely demonstrated by the juxtaposition of an image or a statement that obviously contradicts a British assertion.²⁴¹ Thus, the main aim was to create a deceptive image of the enemy, i.e. British.

The entire debate related to the theory and practice of propaganda and it examines Nazi film propaganda as a reflection of NSDAP ideology. David Welch tries to trace various components of ideology which recur in the Nazi cinema, especially during the war- the intent, content and its historical context as well as the public reactions. It is argued that even the entertainment films were a diversion, to sustain morale and provide opportunities of escape from hard life. Welch argues that the Third Reich was a highly politicized society, in which even apolitical became significant.

Great Britain entered the war with well, trained group of documentary film makers. The film division of MOI made a series of weekly films lasting five minutes each to be shown all over the country, interpolated into the normal program. The titles are self – explanatory- "*Salvage of a Smile*", "*Hospital Nurse*", "*Speed the Plough*". More important documentary films were made by

²⁴¹ Christian W. Hallstein "Creating the enemy: anti-British Nazi film propaganda". West Virginia University Philological Papers. FindArticles.com. 16 Jul, 2011.

the Crown film Unit. A few, such as *Men of the Lightship*, aimed patently at stirring up feelings against the Germans. Lightships have always been regarded as exempt from attack in time of war, but the Nazis-according to this film- disregarded the chivalrous code. Other documentaries featured British courage or military prowess. Some films had a purely utilitarian purpose: how to get more eggs from your hens, how to breed rabbits for extra meat, how to enjoy a Waltoon pie (Lord Waltoon was helpless Minister for food), how to dig and hoe. Many feature films focused on the personal experience of war. The heroine of *They a Serve* was a suburban housewife who quietly assumed all burdens of daily life to free her men for the front and the factory.²⁴²

Just as the real shooting war was beginning in earnest, there appeared in April and May 1940 three films which in different ways reflected the lack of decisive action to date. Carol Reed's *Night Train to Munich* was a straightforward 'escape' piece, but like *Pastor Hall*, directed by John and Roy Boulting, it is interesting in that it re-creates scenes of a Nazi concentration camp. The third film, Michael Powell's *Contraband*, featured an exiled German actor Conrad Veidt playing the part of a Danish sea captain who becomes involved in a spy chase in London. In terms of historical theme, the film most worthy of attention is *Pastor Hall* which was based on the life of Martin Niemoller. This story of a Lutheran priest who defies the Nazis and wins sympathetic support from a general of the old school and even from an SS officer with a conscience presented an unfulfilled hope that internal resistance to the regime would bring about its destruction.

The situation was seen in reverse in a further Powell film, *One of our Aircraft is Missing*, in which an RAF crew escapes from occupied Holland. Here the issue of Dutch resistance to fascism provides a main background, with the principal threat coming from a Dutch collaborator who has to be blackmailed into silence. In this film, of course, the disguised airmen do reach their home country again.

Each in a very different way, three notable films distributed in 1942 still showed up fears about the chances of espionage and infiltration. In fact, German spy activity was a total failure in Britain and as soon as the war began to turn in favour of the allies the possibility of betrayal

²⁴² Anthony Rhodes, Victor Margolin (ed), *Propaganda The Art of Persuasion: World War II*, London, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1975, pp. 26-7.

receded, though obviously the strictest form of security had to be maintained about military operations. Charles Frennd's *The Foreman Went to France* was initiated about the middle of the previous year when Britain was still fighting the western war alone and it had a basis in a real incident, although the events themselves were fictitious. Thorold Dickinson's *The Next of Kin* was a 'careless talk' film on a larger scale than the Ministry of Information's efforts and it was released three months before the Dieppe raid. In the film, a commando excursion to France was betrayed, though it succeeds in the end, and in the real war there were unfounded rumors about the enemy's prior information on the costly adventure at Dieppe.²⁴³

A rather similar, and earlier, venture put out by the Ministry of Information was Harry Watt's *Target for Tonight*, released in 1941. Again this was scarcely a feature film in the traditional sense, but it does have an imaginary plot, acted by real RAF personnel, and it was possible that the approach had some influence on the commercial industry. No conventional features about the bombing of Germany were made during the war and in general the theme was avoided afterwards, the moral implications of the offensive having now become a matter for controversy. If the mobilization of the British people for war effort on the home front was one of the most striking aspects of the era, as historians believe, it is perhaps most easily studied in visual form by examining just those official documentaries which had minority appeal. Only one commercial feature, *Millions like Us*, directed by Frank Launder and Sidney Gilliatt and released in 1943, said much about the employment of women in factories.²⁴⁴

Gilliatt's *Waterloo Road*, which appeared at the beginning of 1945, anticipated in its style the post-war Ealing Studios type of film which seemed to be more firmly rooted in real life on the street. It also recognized that not all the British during the war were behaving so well. It saw the first portrait in film of the 'spy', played here by Stewart Granger as the self-centred dodger and confidence trickster who operates the black market and steals the wives of soldiers away from home.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Tony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, *Britain Can Take It: British Cinema in the Second World War*, Edinburgh University press. p.112.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

They reached a wider public than the documentaries and made up a part of the country's mainstream form of entertainment. Gradually they had come to incorporate in their plots some of the thoughts and feelings of ordinary British people, a community of citizens at war, as well as reflecting some of the divisions which still existed in that society and some of the more illusory views which the British held about themselves.²⁴⁶

iii) Reception of Propaganda:

Both nations had the task to placate different audiences. Britain had the major task of propagating its ideas to the British colonies, as to garner support from them. British colonies were one of the major sources of help both in terms of men and money during the Second World War. India was one such colony. So, it was very important for Britain to propagate their ideas and justify their actions in the War. On the other hand Germany had the major task of justifying its war aims to the home public.

In the absence of public opinion surveys and other means of qualifying reactions to propaganda, accurate measurement is naturally impossible. The course of the maintenance of wartime morale was an aim common to both the nations, the task of British propaganda apparatus was markedly simpler. Building upon the general acceptance of a just and necessary war in defence of existing optimism, the job of British propaganda in maintaining both civilian and military morale was a relatively easy and straightforward one. German propaganda, on the other hand, was far more difficult task.²⁴⁷

Nazi propaganda had a remarkably easy task in the foreign policy arena before 1938. For one thing the population, that Germany had been maltreated by the Allies at the end of the war, and on equally generally held fear that Germany was threatened by a ring of hostile nations. Little changed by September 1939 when, as is also generally known, the German people showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the opening of armed conflict with the invasion of Poland. However, propaganda was certainly effective in persuading the bulk of the population that the

²⁴⁶ Clive Coultass, British Feature Films and the Second World War, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Historians and Movies: The State of the Art: Part 2 (Jan., 1984), pp. 7-22.

²⁴⁷ David Welch (ed), *Nazi Propaganda. The power and the limitations*, London, Croom Helm, 1983, pp.180-2.

war had been unavoidable and had been forced upon the Germans. Hatred of enemies, without and within, was heightened through an intensified emphasis on German identity. And an almost religious loyalty to the *Fuehrer* surpassed all previous levels of trust in political leadership. In neither case, of course, were all sections of the society convinced. The Nazi aim to mobilize the German people in the cause of the nation meant the displacement of all class, religious or regional allegiances through massively heightened national self-awareness and the release of national energies.

The Nazi Regime set great store by racial propaganda to instill in the population the need for racial purity-the fourth pillar of the restructures value system of the intended new society. Yet even here, close to the core of Nazi ideology, the evidence –difficult and unclear directions- suggests that propaganda was by no means as effective as has frequently been assumed. Moreover, the difficulties of propaganda in altering rather than merely reinforcing existing values were reflected in the problems encountered in attempting to undermine Christian and humanitarian attitudes. This can be graphically seen in responses to a further deadly strand of Nazi racial-eugenic policy, the so called ‘euthanasia programme’ of 1939-41. As is well known, the ‘euthanasia action’ was carried out in secret-itself testimony to the fact that the Regime did not regard the population as ideologically prepared to welcome the ‘action’ but the secret was an open one. There were certainly phases of propaganda success and themes which were undoubtedly highly effective.²⁴⁸

The central aim of German propaganda before 1939 had been to prepare the German people psychologically for war. In this aim it can be said to have partially, but not wholly, successful. From September 1939 the chief aim switched to the preservation of morale during the war. The propaganda campaigns during the war period were successful at times but it also had setbacks like the Stalingrad was a propaganda disaster.²⁴⁹

In case of Britain the attainment of state’s goal, that is, the effective mobilization of the war-effort, was ultimately achieved by the selective targeting of public relations and censorship schemes at specific audiences in the face of enormous logistical, manpower and resource

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.* pp.184-94.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* pp.192-201.

constraints.²⁵⁰ But to what extent they were successful is a difficult thing to assess. The reception of British propaganda in India during the Second World War can be classified as imperative. World War II drew upon the human and material resources of the colonies on an unprecedented scale. In 1939, the British Indian Army consisted of one hundred eighty nine thousand soldiers. By 1945, India had contributed two and half million men to British Indian Army; 28,538 to the Royal Indian Air force; thirty-thousand to the Royal Indians Navy; and ten thousand women Auxiliary Corps. India emerged as the major production centre for food grains and materials like jute, which was used largely in packing for commercial and military purposes.²⁵¹ More than two million men joined the Indian Armed Forces during the Second World War.²⁵² India did participate in this war fully with men, money and resources. But the success of the propaganda techniques does not depend on this as there were a number of other complexities which arose during this time. In case of India, however the long standing conflicts between the nationalist movement and the British Government provided a dangerous opening for fascist propaganda. On April 1, 1942 according to a German Broadcasts, Subhas Chandra Bose, one of the most prominent Indian leaders and a former Mayor of Calcutta, India largest city, urged his countrymen to rely on Axis arms for their emancipation from British rule.²⁵³

The official propaganda failed to destroy the political legitimacy of the Congress party during this time. The reactions of other political parties baffled the government further. For instance, the CPI's refusal to criticise the Congress Working Committee despite the former's 'pro-war' stance. This failure of isolating the Congress leadership in turn caused a shift in the official propaganda policies against the Congress. The cracks in the structure of the colonial state can be observed through an analysis of its wartime policies of propaganda and information. The centrally directed policies were quite often unpopular in the localities. The wartime alliance between the government of India and the CPI is a good case in point. Local communist cadres continued to agitate around local issues despite the party's 'pro-war' stance. This made it difficult for local bureaucrats to treat them with the leniency desired by the central government, leave alone using them to oppose the Congress.

²⁵⁰ Sanjoy Bhattacharya, *Propaganda and Information in Eastern India, 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War*, London South Asia Series/School of Oriental and African Studies: Curzon- Routledge, 2001, p.202.

²⁵¹ Srimanjari, *Through War and Famine, Bengal 1939-1945*, New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2009, p.17.

²⁵² I Kamtekar, 'A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939-1945', *Past & Present*, 2002 p.190.

²⁵³ Michael Greenberg, 'India's Independence and the War', Vol. 15, No. 2, *Pacific Affairs*, Jun., 1942, p.165.

As regard the question of the effect produced in the states by the publicity material sent to them, it is difficult to give a precise answer. Unquestionably, the people of the state were thoroughly anti-Nazi, and public opinion and confidence were healthier than at any time since the invasion of Norway, but it is hard to assess the proportions in which this can be ascribed to the success of the improvement of the Britain's war prospects and to the dissemination of correct information about the war. There is however, no doubt that the publicity arrangements contributed considerably to the present more stable feeling by educating public opinion on the right lines.²⁵⁴ Publicity was being given as far as possible to the material being received and was having the desired effect in as much as the public was now getting a correct perspective of the war situation and was consequently becoming less credulous and less amenable to the German Propaganda. In general the material supplied was proving useful in correcting false impressions and contradicting rumours, in familiarizing the general public with the reasons for the war and its progress, and in emphasizing the good reason which existed for optimism regarding the final result and which in turn made the people of India to participate in the War. But it is also seen that it was the propaganda and information adopted by the GOI that made the nationalist tendencies even more viable.²⁵⁵

iv) The Range of Propaganda:

The Germans referred to the British as the "perfidious Albion" and provided accounts of allied use of dum-dum bullets, mutilation, and brutality, as well as the use of "savages" from Africa and Asia to fight civilized peoples. The Germans also referred to the British naval blockade as an "atrocious". Britain, however, is justifiably regarded as deploying atrocity propaganda with more intensity and more skill than most. Tales of the spike-helmeted Germans "Hun" cutting off the hands of children, boiling corpses to make soap, crucifying prisoners of war, and using priests as clappers in cathedral bells were widely believed by the British public, particularly after the Bryce Commission, which has been established to look into these claims, concluded that many were true.²⁵⁶ As mentioned by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*:

²⁵⁴ War publicity in Indian States, Political Department, War Branch, File No.223-W/40,1940.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁶ Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*. ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp.23-5.

Propaganda must not investigate the truth objectively and, in so far as it favorable to the other side, present it according to the theoretical rules of justice; but it must present only that aspect of truth which is favorable to its own side.²⁵⁷

The source of propaganda is likely to be an institution, organization, group, or individual. Sometimes there was complete openness about the source of propaganda, while on other occasions it was necessary to conceal the source's identity in order to achieve certain objectives.²⁵⁸ Propaganda can be divided into three main groups according to the source from which it emanate. Propaganda can be overt and apparently (but never actually) objective; or it can be covert and by every possible device, subversive. Overt propagandists must conform to the policy or intentions of the Government or Governments for which they speak; covert propagandists were *the franc tireurs* in the "War of Ideas," disowned and where necessary, disreputable, conforming only to pre-determined Political Warfare plans.²⁵⁹ "White" propaganda may be defined as that issued by an acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of a government. For instance, every airdropped issue of the World War II propaganda newspaper, *Frontpost*, bore the legend, in German, "Published by American troops in Western Europe." White propaganda was associated with overt psychological operations. It does not hide its origin.²⁶⁰

Although there was no attempt to conceal the origin of "gray" propaganda, neither was the source specifically identified. A World War II example was the joint UK/US Political Warfare Executive (PWE) / Office of Strategic Services (OSS) newspaper, *Nachrichten für die Truppe* (News for the Troops). It was never identified as an Allied product, but German readers knew very well that Allied aircraft (and especially the US Special Leaflet Squadron) were dropping the newspaper.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Mein Kampf, p.169.

²⁵⁸ Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp.23-5

²⁵⁹ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 14th June 2011.

²⁶⁰SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.), Balck postcards of World War II. <http://www.psywar.org/postcards.php> accessed on 15th June 2011.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

"Black" propaganda, the type associated with covert psychological warfare operations, purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. Examples include forged identity cards and ration coupons, counterfeit currency, and propaganda letters and postcards. During World War II, black propaganda accounted for approximately five percent of the material packed into leaflet bombs, with the other ninety-five percent being various kinds of gray and white propaganda. In this way, substantial quantities of black propaganda were distributed. "Black" propaganda (sometimes referred to as "covert" propaganda) tried to conceal its own identity by purporting to emanate from someone or somewhere other than the true source. In black propaganda not only there was deliberate distortion but the identity of the source was usually concealed, the task of the analyst was a demanding one. During the early phase of World War II the Nazis operated at least three radio stations that sought to give the impression that they were broadcasting somewhere in Britain. One of the stations was called Radio Free Caledonia and claimed to be the voice of Scottish nationalism; another referred to itself as the Workers' Challenge Station and disseminated unorthodox left-wing views; a third, the New British Broadcasting Station, provided news bulletins and comments in the style of the BBC but with a concealed pro-German bias. The aim of black propaganda was to undermine the morale of the British people—particularly during the Battle of Britain.²⁶² Just as there was secret radio, there were secret leaflets. Those did not carry the authority or the imprimatur of the British or Allied Governments. Like the Freedom Station, they appeared to originate in the country of distribution. Such leaflets were directed to specific ends; they were insinuated into the country through agents. They were not dropped by the R.A.F.²⁶³

The type of propaganda distributed altered considerably in August 1943. Up until then they had dropped what was called "White" propaganda. That consisted of news, messages from the Allied Governments and the like; its origins and motives were obvious to the finder. The new type of propaganda to be disseminated was classed as "Black". This was highly secret and subversive material produced by a small section of the Political Warfare Executive (P.W.E.). Its target was German troops and civilians in Germany and France; its object "to assist military operations by

²⁶²Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp.41-2.

²⁶³ Secret, Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 13th June 2011.

softening the spirit of resistance, by encouraging motives of local and individual self-interest at the expense of national and Party loyalties, and by stimulating action in conflict with German military interests.” The propaganda appeared to be of German origin, including counterfeit documents, bogus newspapers, subtly altered Nazi posters, etc., or it appeared to be the work of an anti-Nazi resistance organisation, producing stickers with agitatory slogans, leaflets on how to desert and other anti-Nazi, anti-war messages. A particularly effective “Black” item, produced by P.W.E., and distributed by the “M” Balloon Unit was a miniature booklet printed on Bible paper. The cover had the title, “*Krankheit Rettet*,” (“Illness Saves”), and the contents showed various ways of faking different diseases and illness to escape military service. The German authorities thought of this as a dangerous piece of propaganda as it was translated into English and used in leaflets dropped on Allied troops in Italy. The majority of “Black” was distributed through secret channels, by agents of the Special Operations Executive and other Allied secret services. The “M” Balloon Unit was also considered an adequate vehicle for dissemination but the leaflets they were to drop were more of a grey nature rather than absolute “Black”.²⁶⁴

During the Second World War, Britain's main "dirty tricks" propaganda agency was the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), a unit of the British Foreign Office. This psychological warfare agency invented and distributed "black" propaganda disinformation to boost morale among anti-German British and Americans, and to promote anti-German sentiment in neutral countries. Its work also included manufacturing and distributing bogus German documents.²⁶⁵

During the war years, British agencies produced and disseminated a wide range of anti-German propaganda lies. According to one suggested story, the Germans were using poison gas to secretly kill off their own wounded soldiers. This manufactured "rumor," designed to mislead and demoralize the German public, was proposed by Britain's Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in October 1941.²⁶⁶ Even some of the more bizarre propaganda stories had proved remarkably durable over the years. A good example was the wartime fable that the Germans were manufacturing oil and soap from the bodies of murdered Jews, a report that became an important

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 13th June 2011.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

feature of Jewish and Allied war propaganda. Two major Jewish agencies, the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Congress, energetically promoted this lie.²⁶⁷

German black propaganda usually took advantage of European racism and anti-Communism. For example, on the night of April 27, 1944 German aircraft under cover of darkness (and possibly carrying fake Royal Air Force markings) dropped propaganda leaflets on occupied Denmark. These leaflets used the title of *Frihedsposten*, a genuine Danish underground newspaper, and claimed that the "hour of liberation" was approaching. They instructed Danes to accept "occupation by Russian or specially trained American Negro soldiers" until the first disorders resulting from military operations were over.²⁶⁸

At the same time the Nazis resorted to "White Propaganda" as well. A widely held belief claims that propaganda was a process that camouflages its origin, its motive, or both, and that it was conducted for the purpose of obtaining a specific objective by manipulating its audience. Propaganda, however, may also be open and overboard. As, the establishment of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, soon after Hitler assumed power in 1933. White propaganda was largely conducted by an identifiable government agency. The information in the message tends to be accurate (although not necessarily verifiable) since any suggestion that the message might be false would undermine the credibility of the source. The message was intended to convince an audience of the superiority and justness of a particular regime or ideology. Thus, while the message disseminated was largely truthful, it was slanted to favor the value system of the propagandist.²⁶⁹

Since the beginning of the war, the techniques of "black radio" were developed effectively.²⁷⁰ Later in the war the British (who sometimes conflated black propaganda with political warfare) set up their own black radio station, which claimed to be an official German radio station run by German soldiers for those on western front. At the same time leaflets in the form of newspapers were dropped over the German lines purporting to originate from the

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Robert Rowen, A paper presented to the New York Military Affairs Symposium, April 2003. The CUNY Graduate Center <http://bobrowen.com/nymas/radioproppaper.htm> accessed on 16th June 2011.

²⁶⁹ Nicholas J. Cull, David H. Culbert and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, ABC CLIO, 2003 NY: Allworth Press, 2000, pp.41-2.

²⁷⁰ Secret , Copy no. 40. Political Warfare Executive The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare, www.psywar.org accessed on 13th June 2011.

nonexistence German resistance organizations. In addition, fake ration cards and other ingenious devices were also employed. Black propaganda, by definition, seeks to deceive and encompasses all types of deception- from leaflets, posters, and postage stamps to radio and television stations and now even internet.²⁷¹

As BBC and Radio Berlin are examples of the white propaganda through radio at the same time Radio Concordia (France, 1940) and official German Radio (It's a British pretending to be an official German Radio). One month after the attack on Poland, Goebbels' Ministry for the Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda added to its domestic and international services a third section: Bureau Concordia. As the Phoney War evolved into the conquest of France, the French heard unidentified radio stations which seemed to be Communist urging pacifism and peace and messages that "France was weak, Germany was strong, and Britain was using France for its own imperialist purposes. The station would "reveal" deficiencies in the French armament industry and express concern for the country's future if the army lost their spirit. Shortly after the Fall of France, Goebbels launched the New British Broadcasting Station, an early project of William Joyce, before he became Lord Haw Haw. The Germans also ran stations intended for North American listeners, such as Radio Debunk operating from Bremen claiming to be "the Voice of All Free America" transmitting from the Midwestern United States.²⁷²

The chapter looks at mainly the propaganda at home front both in Germany and in Britain. The propaganda in both the countries had a lot of similar themes like the conservation poster, blackout, careless talk costs lives, evacuation and propaganda posters towards women but the portrayal was varied. As in case of Britain almost all the propaganda posters had Hitler or Goering in the poster. Like in case of posters on "careless talks costs lives" showed Hitler in the background trying to listen to two women talking sitting on the bus. The propaganda posters of both the nations were mainly colored and had very few words to elucidate the message. The main aim of propaganda posters from both the nations was to capture the immediate attention of the masses. Posters had an advantage over the other means of propaganda like pamphlets as it could be understood by illiterate people as well. As mainly the posters from the nations did try to

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.42.

²⁷² Robert Rowen, A paper presented to the New York Military Affairs Symposium, April 2003. The CUNY Graduate Center <http://bobrowen.com/nymas/radioproppaper.htm> accessed on 16th June 2011.

explain their message through the picture and it was not always necessary to read the texts. Like for example, (fig.3.3) one of the conservation posters from Britain, which promoted the drive to save kitchen waste for the pigs, shows a number of pigs, and at the bottom there was a bin and “thanks” was written on the bodies of the pigs. Same was the case in Germany; the various posters produced as a result of the “shadow campaign” (fig.3.33) showed a black shadow in the background which signified the “enemy”. The creation of the image of the enemy was the most important task of the propaganda posters.

The propaganda modes were also similar in case of audio-visual propaganda as I have discussed films and radio. With the coming in of modern technologies like radio, the dissemination of propaganda became easier to a very great extent. Radio was not at their disposal during the First World War so it was fully exploited in the Second World War. The censorship of all other means of enemy propaganda was easier like posters and pamphlets could be stopped from reaching the people but it was extremely difficult to deal with the enemy broadcasts. BBC had the advantage of being an authentic source in comparison to the Axis broadcasts. BBC was more reliable source of “white propaganda” which gave them an edge over Nazi broadcasts which were generally considered as false reporting. So, whenever Britain wanted to propagate a lie it was generally believed to be true.

Films were another similar mode of propaganda dissemination. Through films the image of the enemy was portrayed, in case of German the enemies included Jews, communists, capitalists and Allies. So, all the propaganda films hinted at one of these enemies. As mentioned by David Welch Nazi propaganda appeared more frequently in war time newsreels (*Deutsche Woehenschau*) than in feature films which retained their entertainment appeal. As mentioned by David Weinberg in his article “Approaches to the study of film in the Third Reich: A Critical Appraisal” that not more than twenty-five percent German movies produced annually under Nazism can be defined as propagandistic. Whereas, the historians mostly tend to rule out the entertainment factor of the German films and they consider all the films made during this period to be propagandistic in one manner or the other. The films produced by Britain also had an entertainment quotient and the enemies mostly in case of Britain were Germans and films to certain historical films to encourage people at home front and to keep the morale high.

Both Germany and Britain resorted to Black propaganda methods simultaneously, but BBC always had an edge over Radio Berlin and was considered authentic.

Conclusion

A detailed analysis of the nature, themes and tools of German and the British propaganda brings out certain interesting parallels as well as dissimilarities. Propaganda was a ceaseless feature of the totalitarian Germany which changed its theme and tone with the course of the war. Initially German propaganda was based on 'personality cult' (the famous poster; *ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*), anti-Semitic, anti-communist, anti-liberal, anti-democracy and the image of the enemy was based on one of these. It was replaced later by Allies evils of Capitalism and imperial exploitation. Whereas British had two fold strategy, one for allied partners and other for colonies.

During the war, antagonistic messages were interspersed with emotions of honor and righteousness providing a powerful emotive cause. In order to promote a negative image of the 'enemy', two rival nations often reinforced it with rhetoric about their own righteousness and tried to muster support for their respective beliefs. The attempt was to demonize the other, even if it meant resorting to lies or falsifying information. Every aspect of propaganda was directed in a manner that served the best interest of the nation involved in it.

According to the Nazi leaders Germany lost the World War of 1914-1918 because it did not recognize the danger of enemy propaganda. So, they were extremely conscious about this fact in the Second World War. Goebbels believed that propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an effective medium. Hitler had developed his own theory of propaganda much before the coming of the Second World War. It was based on the presumption that the receptivity of the masses was limited, their intelligence questionable, and their memory was short-lived. Hence, for propaganda to be effective, it should be precise and must harp on few slogans.

Both Germany as well as Britain was conscious of the "importance" of propaganda and thus it was imparted on a massive scale during the Second World War. The propaganda of both the nations was aimed at creating a particular image of the enemy at home as well as abroad. As discussed in the first chapter between 1939 and 1945 Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and dozens of

other Nazi officials and propagandists consistently depicted the war as one waged between Nazi Germany and an actually existing international Jewish conspiracy. This idea was repeated in numerous secret directives concerning how press should cover and unfold events. The Jewish War was a key theme of dozens of propaganda essays, pamphlets, text-books and magazines. Posters and wall newspapers in public places integrated text and striking imagery to disseminate anti-Semitism.

The two propaganda themes anti-Jewish and anti-Communist were intended to reinforce each other. In practice however both had to be treated separately: the intensity of the anti-Semitic campaign was more or less steady. The anti-Communist campaign, on the other hand had to be suspended or modified according to the demands of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The common themes vilifying Jews projected them as those favouring Capitalism and sharing an alliance with Bolsheviks and Allied nations. The indoctrination of youth was one of the most successful propaganda campaigns of the Nazis. The programming of the Youth began even before they were born. Nazi Germany motivated 'mothers' to raise their kids, inculcating Nazi ideals.

In the period of War, propaganda gained momentum. The value of labor and hard work became increasingly essential to the wartime effort, but the average worker becomes increasingly dissatisfied with conditions. Propaganda was necessary to sustain morale in spite of the collapsing effect brought about by war. In Germany Nazis persuaded the people that the war was unavoidable and the success of the *Blitzkrieg* instilled faith in Hitler. War propaganda moulded itself according to the existing military situation. Thus the belief in the propaganda increased with the victory, and it slumped with defeat. The defeat of Stalingrad made it hard to propagandize. It raised questions about the credibility of Axis success. It also shook people's implicit faith in German propaganda. The loss of Germany during the Second World War doesn't suffice the loss of German propaganda. The main aim of propaganda during the war was to mobilize people and to keep the morale at the home front. The Nazi 'achievement' was not simply in mobilizing support but in maintaining it.

The British war had two main functions: a) destroying the moral force of the enemy's cause b) sustaining and eventually enforcing conviction of the moral force of their cause; by co-

operating with the other arms to prepare the way for and to exploit the effects of the military and economic offensive. These functions were complementary; and underlying common aim of weakening the resistance of their enemies and of maintaining the morale of their people and the confidence of their friends. In both, the cases counter-propaganda played an important part. In the colonies the effective mobilization of the war-effort, was ultimately achieved by the selective targeting of public relations and censorship schemes at specific audiences in the face of enormous logistical, manpower and resource constraints by Britain. Publicity was being given as far as possible to the material being received and was having the desired effect in as much as the public was now getting a correct perspective of the war situation and was consequently becoming less credulous and less amenable to the German Propaganda. In general the material supplied was proving useful in correcting false impressions and contradicting rumours, in familiarizing the general public with the reasons for the war and its progress, and in emphasizing the good reason which existed for optimism regarding the final result and which in turn made the people of India to participate in the War. The British propaganda machinery in India, during the Second World War was quiet functional and flexible according to the need of the hour. The creation of the image of the enemy was an extremely cautious process, which was carried out without alienating the people. As far as the “enemy” was concerned in case of India it was projected that “fascism” was the biggest enemy of democracy.

The propaganda in both the countries had a lot of similar themes like the conservation, rationing, blackout, careless talk costs lives, evacuation and propaganda posters towards women but the portrayal is varied. As in case of Britain almost all the propaganda posters had Hitler or Goering in the poster. In case of posters on “careless talks costs lives” showed Hitler in the background trying to listen to two women talking sitting on the bus. The propaganda posters of both the nations were mainly colored and had very few words to elucidate the message. The main aim of propaganda posters from both the nations was to capture the immediate attention of the masses. Posters had an advantage over the other means of propaganda like pamphlets as it could be understood by illiterate people as well. The posters from the nations tried to explain their message pictorially and it was not always necessary to read the texts. For example, (fig.3.3) one of the conservation posters from Britain, which promoted the drive to save kitchen waste for the pigs, shows a number of pigs, and at the bottom there was a bin and “thanks” was written on the

bodies of the pigs. Same was the case in Germany; the various posters produced as a result of the “shadow campaign” (fig.3.33) showed a black shadow in the background which signified the “enemy”. The creation of the image of the enemy was the most important task of the propaganda posters. The creation of the image of the enemy was such that it evoked hatred among the masses and thus justified the war cause.

A Point of distinction can be made here in the case of Britain. The British government encouraged people to buy “war bonds” which was not the same in Germany. Britain issued a number of posters encouraging people to buy war bonds. In the United Kingdom, the National Savings Movement was instrumental in raising funds for the war effort in both the world wars. The Nazi regime never attempted to convince the general populace to buy long-term war bonds as had been done during the First World War. The Reich government did not want to present any perceived form of public referendum on the war, which would be the indirect result if a bond drive did poorly. Rather, the regime financed its war efforts by borrowing directly from the financial institutions, using short-term war bonds as collateral. So, both these nations had different means to deal with the existing financial burden and thus the propaganda towards this cause was also different.

The propaganda modes of the two countries were also similar in case of audio-visual publicity as discussed in the section on films and radio. With the coming in of modern technologies like radio, the dissemination of propaganda became easier to a very great extent. Radio was not at their disposal during the First World War so it was fully exploited in the Second World War. The censorship of all other means of enemy propaganda was easier to implement in case of posters and pamphlets as these could be stopped from reaching the people. However, it was extremely difficult to deal with enemy broadcasts. BBC had the advantage of being an authentic source when compared to the Axis broadcasts. BBC war reports were considered more reliable and a source of “white propaganda” and gave them an edge over Nazi broadcasts. The latter were generally believed to be carrying out false reporting. In case of BBC broadcasts even a lie could pass off as a truth.

Films were another effective mode of propaganda dissemination. As mentioned by David Welch Nazi propaganda appeared more frequently in war time newsreels (*Deutsche Woehenschau*) than

in feature films which retained their entertainment appeal. This work supports David Weinberg's view that not more than twenty-five percent German movies produced annually under Nazism can be defined as propagandistic. Whereas, the historians mostly tend to rule out the entertainment factor of the German films and they consider all the films made during this period to be propagandistic in one manner or the other. The films produced by Britain also had an entertainment quotient and the enemies mostly in case of Britain were Germans. Other films included certain historical films to encourage people at home front and to keep the morale high. Both Germany and Britain resorted to 'Black' propaganda methods simultaneously, but BBC always had an edge over Radio Berlin and was considered more authentic.

Thus, it can be said, that during the war period the nature of the state whether it was a 'democratic' country or a 'totalitarian regime', did not make a significant difference. War imposed similar strains on both the nations. The two nations worked within the same paradigm of propaganda methods. War demanded both the nations to resort to similar propaganda themes and tools in order to firstly demonise the image of the 'enemy' and secondly to mobilize people to support the war and sacrifice for the ongoing struggle. Although it cannot be denied that the degree of propagandist control varied to some extent, yet the war propaganda tends to blur the difference between the 'nature' of the two states.



Fig.3.1.German:
This 1943 poster promotes a paper drive.



Fig.3.2.British. "From waste paper to munitions of war"



Fig.3.3 British Propaganda Pamphlet to save the Kitchen waste.



Fig.3.4 British. "Put out your paper for salvage"



Fig.3.5: German "Get rid of old cloth and shoes!"



Fig.3.6 British. "Go through your wardrobe".





Fig.3.7 British. "Squander Bug".

Switch off that LIGHT!



LESS LIGHT - MORE PLANES

Fig.3.8 British. "Switch off that light".



Fig.3.9. British. "Is your journey really necessary".



Fig.3.10 British "Squander Bug".




Fig.3.11 British. "Don't waste food".



Fig.3.12 British. "Telegraph Less".



Fig.3.13. German. This 1940 poster was part of the Nazi energy conservation campaign.



Fig.3.14. German. "Protect the harvest. It ensures victory!"



Fig.3.15 British. "Victory Harvest"




Fig.3.16 British. "Grow your own food".



Fig.3.17. German. "Farmer! You are a soldier in the battle of production."




Fig.3.18. British. "Dig on for Victory".

Dieses Haus ist schlecht verdunkelt!

Dadurch sind nicht nur seine Bewohner, sondern auch die Nachbarn gefährdet. Der Feind wirft seine Bomben dort ab, wo er einen Lichtschein bemerkt.

Luftschutzwart und Hausbewohner werden aufgefordert, selbst dafür zu sorgen, daß auch in diesem Hause die Verdunkelung schnellstens und restlos durchgeführt wird.

Dieser Anschlag wird erst entfernt werden, wenn alle Wohnungen und das Treppenhaus — auch nach der Hofseite — einwandfrei verdunkelt sind.

Fig.3.19. German. "Dieses Haus ist schlecht verdunkelt".

IN THE BLACKOUT

 A British blackout poster. It shows a close-up of a hand holding a lit match, with the flame illuminating the scene. In the background, the front of a bus or tram is visible. The text "IN THE BLACKOUT" is written in large, bold, black letters at the top. At the bottom, the text reads "To hail a bus or tram shine a torch on to your hand". A small circular logo is visible in the bottom right corner.

Fig.3.20. British In the Blackout.



Fig.3.21.German. Der Feind sieht Dein Licht.Verdunkeln!



Fig.3.22.British Don't Alight from a moving bus.

Licht ist das sicherste Bombenziel

Darum achte auf vollständige Verdunklung!

Es ist fälschlich zu denken, daß die feindlichen Flugzeuge im weitesten Gebiete fast ausschließlich nachts angriffen und ihre Bomben dort einfach abwerfen, wo sie einen Lichtschein erkennen können. Es ist beständig Blitze eines jeden, die Verdunklung schaffens durchzuführen im eigenen Interesse sowie im Interesse des gesamten Volkes, das es gilt, vor jedem Einbruch aus der Luft zu bewahren. Was gefährlich für das Gesamtgebiet gilt, gilt in dem gleichen Maße für das Einzelgebiet. Auch dort muß alles vermieden werden, was bei nächstem Einbruch des Gegners irgendein Ziel für seinen Bombenwurf bieten könnte.




Fig.3.24. British. Look out in the Black-Out.

Fig.3.23. German. Licht ist das sicherste Bombenziel.




Fig.3.25 German. *Du bist front.*



Fig.3.26. British. Remember they are relying on you.



Fig.3.27. German.: "Labor Comrade. You work with us. Keep up your strength.



Fig.3.28. British. Four industrial workers



Fig.3.29.German.“Shame on you, chatterer! The enemy is listening. Schäm dich, schwätzer shame on you, gossip Enemy hears you, silence is mandatory. (1943)



Fig.3.30.British. Keep Mum she is not so dumb.




Fig.3.31. German. Shadow Campaign.




Fig.3.32 British. Carelss talk Costs Lives.



Fig.3.33. German. Another suspicious scene in a pub... "Pst! The enemy is listening."



Fig.3.34. British. Careless Talks Costs lives.



Fig.3.35. German: "Achtung Spione - Vorsicht bei Gesprächen" in 1939 apr.



Fig.3.36. British. Careless talks costs lives.



Fig.3.37 German "The air terror continues. Mothers, send your children to safety!"(1944)




Fig.3.38.British. Mothers Send them out of London.



Fig.3.39. German. *Kommt mit die Kinderlandverschickung.*



Fig.3.40. British. Evacuation poster.




Fig.3.41.Enlist today.



Fig.3.42.: "Mothers! Fight for your children!"



Fig.3.44 Join the Women's Land Army.



Fig.3.44 Hilf Siegen als Luftnachrichtenhelferin

Chronology of Second World War

1939

September 1, 1939 - Nazis invade Poland.

September 3, 1939 - Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand declare war on Germany.

September 17, 1939 - Soviets invade Poland.

September 27, 1939 - Warsaw surrenders to Nazis; Reinhard Heydrich becomes the leader of new Reich Main Security Office (RSHA).

September 29, 1939 - Nazis and Soviets divide up Poland.

In October - Nazis begin euthanasia on sick and disabled in Germany.

November 30, 1939 - Soviets attack Finland.

1940

March 12, 1940 - Finland signs a peace treaty with Soviets.

March 16, 1940 - Germans bomb Scapa Flow naval base near Scotland.

April 9, 1940 - Nazis invade Denmark and Norway.

May 10, 1940 - Nazis invade France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; Winston Churchill becomes British Prime Minister.

May 15, 1940 - Holland surrenders to the Nazis.

May 26, 1940 - Evacuation of Allied troops from Dunkirk begins.

May 28, 1940 - Belgium surrenders to the Nazis.

June 3, 1940 - Germans bomb Paris; Dunkirk evacuation ends.

June 10, 1940 - Norway surrenders to the Nazis; Italy declares war on Britain and France.

June 14, 1940 - Germans enter Paris.

June 16, 1940 - Marshal Pétain becomes French Prime Minister.

June 18, 1940 - Hitler and Mussolini meet in Munich; Soviets begin occupation of the Baltic States.

June 22, 1940 - France signs an armistice with Nazi Germany.

July 1, 1940 - German U-boats attack merchant ships in the Atlantic.

July 10, 1940 - Battle of Britain begins.

July 23, 1940 - Soviets take Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

August 13, 1940 - German bombing offensive against airfields and factories in England.

August 17, 1940 - Hitler declares a blockade of the British Isles.

August 23/24 - First German air raids on Central London.

August 25/26 - First British air raid on Berlin.

September 3, 1940 - Hitler plans Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of Britain).

September 7, 1940 - German Blitz against Britain begins.

September 27, 1940 - Tripartite (Axis) Pact signed by Germany, Italy and Japan.

October 7, 1940 - German troops enter Romania.

November 14/15 - Germans bomb Coventry, England.

November 22, 1940 - Greeks defeat the Italian 9th Army.

1941

March 27, 1941 - A coup in Yugoslavia overthrows the pro-Axis government.

April 3, 1941 - Pro-Axis regime set up in Iraq.

April 6, 1941 - Nazis invade Greece and Yugoslavia.

April 17, 1941 - Yugoslavia surrenders to the Nazis.

April 27, 1941 - Greece surrenders to the Nazis.

May 24, 1941 - Sinking of the British ship Hood by the Bismarck.

May 27, 1941 - Sinking of the Bismarck by the British Navy.

June 4, 1941 - Pro-Allied government installed in Iraq.

June 22, 1941 - Germany attacks Soviet Union as Operation Barbarossa begins.

July 12, 1941 - Mutual Assistance agreement between British and Soviets.

July 31, 1941 - Göring instructs Heydrich to prepare for the Final Solution.

August 14, 1941 - Roosevelt and Churchill announce the Atlantic Charter.

September 3, 1941 - First experimental use of gas chambers at Auschwitz.

December 7, 1941 - Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor; Hitler issues the Night and Fog decree.

December 8, 1941 - United States and Britain declare war on Japan.

December 11, 1941 - Hitler declares war on the United States.

December 19, 1941 - Hitler takes complete control of the German Army.

1942

January 20, 1942 - SS Leader Heydrich holds the Wannsee Conference to coordinate the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question."

Late March, 1942- Cripps Mission.

May 8, 1942 - German summer offensive begins in the Crimea.

In June - Mass murder of Jews by gassing begins at Auschwitz.

June 4, 1942 - Heydrich dies of wounds.

June 21, 1942 - Rommel captures Tobruk.

July 1-30 - First Battle of El Alamein.

July 3, 1942 - Germans take Sevastopol.

August 7, 1942 - British General Bernard Montgomery takes command of Eighth Army in North Africa.

August 12, 1942 - Stalin and Churchill meet in Moscow.

August 17, 1942 - First all-American air attack in Europe.

September 13, 1942 - Battle of Stalingrad begins.

October 18, 1942 - Hitler orders the execution of all captured British commandos.

November 11, 1942 - Germans and Italians invade unoccupied Vichy France.

1943

January 2/3 - Germans begin a withdrawal from the Caucasus.

February 2, 1943 - Germans surrender at Stalingrad in the first big defeat of Hitler's armies.

March 2, 1943 - Germans begin a withdrawal from Tunisia, Africa.

April 19, 1943 - Waffen-SS attacks Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto.

May 7, 1943 - Allies take Tunisia.

May 16, 1943 - Jewish resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto ends.

May 16/17 - British air raid on the Ruhr.

June 11, 1943 - Himmler orders the liquidation of all Jewish ghettos in Poland.

July 24, 1943 - British bombing raid on Hamburg.

August 12-17 - Germans evacuate Sicily.

November 18, 1943 - Large British air raid on Berlin.

November 28, 1943 - Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin meet at Teheran.

1944

January 6, 1944 - Soviet troops advance into Poland.

March 18, 1944 - British drop 3000 tons of bombs during an air raid on Hamburg, Germany.

April 4, 1944 - Battle of Kohima

May 12, 1944 - Germans surrender in the Crimea.

May 15, 1944 - Germans withdraw to the Adolf Hitler Line.

June 5, 1944 - Allies enter Rome.

June 13, 1944 - First German V-1 rocket attack on Britain.

August 7, 1944 - Germans begin a major counter-attack toward Avranches.

August 25, 1944 - Liberation of Paris.

August 31, 1944 - Soviet troops take Bucharest.

October 2, 1944 - Warsaw Uprising ends as the Polish Home Army surrenders to the Germans.

November 24, 1944 - French capture Strasbourg.

1945

February 4-11 - Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin meet at Yalta.

February 13/14 - Dresden is destroyed by a firestorm after Allied bombing raids.

March 30, 1945 - Soviet troops capture Danzig.

April 30, 1945 - Adolf Hitler commits suicide.

November 20, 1945 - Nuremberg war crimes trials begin.

Appendix

1. Adolf Hitler's first Anti-Semitic Writing September 16, 1919.

[September 16, 1919]

Dear Herr Gemlich,

The danger posed by Jewry for our people today finds expression in the undeniable aversion of wide sections of our people. The cause of this aversion is not to be found in a clear recognition of the consciously or unconsciously systematic and pernicious effect of the Jews as a totality upon our nation. Rather, it arises mostly from personal contact and from the personal impression which the individual Jew leaves--almost always an unfavorable one. For this reason, anti-Semitism is too easily characterized as a mere emotional phenomenon. And yet this is incorrect. Anti-Semitism as a political movement may not and cannot be defined by emotional impulses, but by recognition of the facts. The facts are these: First, Jewry is absolutely a race and not a religious association. Even the Jews never designate themselves as Jewish Germans, Jewish Poles, or Jewish Americans but always as German, Polish, or American Jews. Jews have never yet adopted much more than the language of the foreign nations among whom they live. A German who is forced to make use of the French language in France, Italian in Italy and Chinese in China does not thereby become a Frenchman, Italian, or Chinaman. It's the same with the Jew who lives among us and is forced to make use of the German language. He does not thereby become a German. Neither does the Mosaic faith, so important for the survival of this race, settle the question of whether someone is a Jew or non-Jew. There is scarcely a race whose members belong exclusively to just one definite religion.

Through thousands of years of the closest kind of inbreeding, Jews in general have maintained their race and their peculiarities far more distinctly than many of the peoples among whom they have lived. And thus comes the fact that their lives amongst us a non- German, alien race which neither wishes nor is able to sacrifice its racial character or to deny its feeling, thinking, and striving. Nevertheless, it possesses all the political rights we do. If the ethos of the Jews is

revealed in the purely material realm, it is even clearer in their thinking and striving. Their dance around the golden calf is becoming a merciless struggle for all those possessions we prize most highly on earth.

The value of the individual is no longer decided by his character or by the significance of his achievements for the totality but exclusively by the size of his fortune, by his money.

The loftiness of a nation is no longer to be measured by the sum of its moral and spiritual powers, but rather by the wealth of its material possessions.

This thinking and striving after money and power, and the feelings that go along with it, serve the purposes of the Jew who is unscrupulous in the choice of methods and pitiless in their employment. In autocratically ruled states he whines for the favor of "His Majesty" and misuses it like a leech fastened upon the nations. In democracies he vies for the favor of the masses, cringes before the "majesty of the people," and recognizes only the majesty of money.

He destroys the character of princes with byzantine flattery, national pride (the strength of a people), with ridicule and shameless breeding to depravity. His method of battle is that public opinion which is never expressed in the press but which is nonetheless managed and falsified by it. His power is the power of money, which multiplies in his hands effortlessly and endlessly through interest, and which forces peoples under the most dangerous of yokes. Its golden glitter, so attractive in the beginning, conceals the ultimately tragic consequences. Everything men strive after as a higher goal, be it religion, socialism, democracy, is to the Jew only means to an end, the way to satisfy his lust for gold and domination.

In his effects and consequences he is like racial tuberculosis of the nations.

The deduction from all this is the following: an anti-Semitism based on purely emotional grounds will find its ultimate expression in the form of the pogrom. An anti-Semitism based on reason, however, must lead to systematic legal combating and elimination of the privileges of the Jews that which distinguishes the Jews from the other aliens who live among us (an Aliens Law). The ultimate objective [of such legislation] must, however, be the irrevocable removal of the

Jews in general. For both these ends a government of national strength, not of national weakness, is necessary.

The Republic in Germany owes its birth not to the uniform national will of our people but the sly exploitation of a series of circumstances which found general expression in a deep, universal dissatisfaction. These circumstances however were independent of the form of the state and are still operative today. Indeed, more so now than before. Thus, a great portion of our people recognizes that a changed state-form cannot in itself change our situation. For that it will take a rebirth of the moral and spiritual powers of the nation.

And this rebirth cannot be initiated by a state leadership of irresponsible majorities, influenced by certain party dogmas, an irresponsible press, or internationalist phrases and slogans. [It requires] instead the ruthless installation of nationally minded leadership personalities with an inner sense of responsibility.

But these facts deny to the Republic the essential inner support of the nation's spiritual forces. And thus today's state leaders are compelled to seek support among those who draw the exclusive benefits of the new formation of German conditions, and who for this reason were the driving force behind the revolution--the Jews. Even though (as various statements of the leading personalities reveal) today's leaders fully realized the danger of Jewry, they (seeking their own advantage) accepted the readily proffered support of the Jews and also returned the favor. And this pay-off consisted not only in every possible favoring of Jewry, but above all in the hindrance of the struggle of the betrayed people against its defrauders that is in the repression of the anti-Semitic movement.

Respectfully,

Adolf Hitler.

Source: Eberhard Jäckel (ed.), *Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905-1924* (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 88-90. Translated by Richard S. Levy.

(<http://www2.hnet.msu.edu/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/hitler2.html> accessed on 12th April 2011.)

2. Program of the National Socialist German Workers' Party.

The program of the German Workers' Party is an epochal program.

The leaders reject the idea of setting up new goals after those included in the program have been achieved merely in order to make possible the further existence of the Party by artificially inducing discontent among the masses.

1. We demand the union of all Germans in a Great Germany on the basis of the principle of self-determination of all peoples.
 2. We demand that the German people have rights equal to those of other nations; and that the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain shall be abrogated.
 3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the maintenance of our people and the settlement of our surplus population.
 4. Only those who are our fellow countrymen can become citizens. Only those who have German blood, regardless of creed, can be our countrymen hence no Jew can be a countryman.
 5. Those who are not citizens must live in Germany as foreigners and must be subject to the law of aliens.
 6. The right to choose the government and determine the laws of the State shall belong only to citizens. We therefore demand that no public office, of whatever nature, whether in the central government, the province, or the municipality, shall be held by anyone who is not a citizen.
- We wage war against the corrupt parliamentary administration whereby men are appointed to posts by favor of the party without regard to character and fitness.
7. We demand that the State shall above all undertake to ensure that every citizen shall have the possibility of living decently and earning a livelihood. If it should not be possible to feed the whole population, then aliens (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.

8. Any further immigration of non-Germans must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have entered Germany since August 2, 1914, shall be compelled to leave the Reich immediately.

9. All citizens must possess equal rights and duties.

10. The first duty of every citizen must be to work mentally or physically. No individual shall do any work that offends against the interest of the community to the benefit of all.

Therefore we demand:

11. That all unearned income and all income that does not arise from work be abolished.
Breaking the Bondage of Interest

12. Since every war imposes on the people fearful sacrifices in blood and treasure, all personal profit arising from the war must be regarded as treason to the people. We therefore demand the total confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all trusts.

14. We demand profit-sharing in large industries.

15. We demand a generous increase in old-age pensions.

16. We demand the creation and maintenance of a sound middle-class, the immediate communalization of large stores which will be rented cheaply to small trade's people, and the strongest consideration must be given to ensure that small traders shall deliver the supplies needed by the State, the provinces and municipalities.

17. We demand an agrarian reform in accordance with our national requirements, and the enactment of a law to expropriate the owners without compensation of any land needed for the common purpose. The abolition of ground rents, and the prohibition of all speculation in land.

18. We demand that ruthless war be waged against those who work to the injury of the common welfare. Traitors, usurers, profiteers, etc., are to be punished with death, regardless of creed or race.

19. We demand that Roman law, which serves a materialist ordering of the world, be replaced by German common law.

20. In order to make it possible for every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education, and thus the opportunity to reach into positions of leadership, the State must assume the responsibility of organizing thoroughly the entire cultural system of the people. The curriculum of all educational establishments shall be adapted to practical life. The conception of the State Idea (science of citizenship) must be taught in the schools from the very beginning. We demand that specially talented children of poor parents, whatever their station or occupation, be educated at the expense of the State.

21. The State has the duty to help raise the standard of national health by providing maternity welfare centers, by prohibiting juvenile labor, by increasing physical fitness through the introduction of compulsory games and gymnastics, and by the greatest possible encouragement of associations concerned with the physical education of the young.

22. We demand the abolition of the regular army and the creation of a national (folk) army.

23. We demand that there be a legal campaign against those who propagate deliberate political lies and disseminate them through the press. In order to make possible the creation of a German press, we demand:

(a) All editors and their assistants on newspapers published in the German language shall be German citizens.

(b) Non-German newspapers shall only be published with the express permission of the State. They must not be published in the German language.

(c) All financial interests in or in any way affecting German newspapers shall be forbidden to non-Germans by law, and we demand that the punishment for transgressing this law be the immediate suppression of the newspaper and the expulsion of the non Germans from the Reich.

Newspapers transgressing against the common welfare shall be suppressed. We demand legal action against those tendencies in art and literature that have a disruptive influence upon the life of our folk, and that any organizations that offend against the foregoing demands shall be dissolved.

24. We demand freedom for all religious faiths in the state, insofar as they do not endanger its existence or offend the moral and ethical sense of the Germanic race.

The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity without binding itself to any one particular confession. It fights against the Jewish materialist spirit within and without, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our folk can only come about from within on the principle:

COMMON GOOD BEFORE INDIVIDUAL GOOD

25. In order to carry out this program we demand: the creation of a strong central authority in the State, the unconditional authority by the political central parliament of the whole State and all its organizations.

The formation of professional committees and of committees representing the several estates of the realm, to ensure that the laws promulgated by the central authority shall be carried out by the federal states.

The leaders of the party undertake to promote the execution of the foregoing points at all costs, if necessary at the sacrifice of their own lives.

Source: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/naziprogram.html> accessed on 12th June 2011.

3. Appendix 3.

Das deutsche Mädel was the Nazi Party's illustrated magazine for girls. At ten, girls joined the Deutsche Mädel, the German Girls, part of the Hitler Youth organization. This article from November 1943 is an example of how girls should behave.

Because Father Had Promised

We all know that the bridges have been burned behind us, that we can no longer go back. There is but one slogan for the youth: Forward! —Artur Axmann

Little Fritz sat in the corner and played with his wooden animals. Father had carved them for him in his spare moments at the front and brought them home on his last leave. And the boy would have a rocking horse, too, a proper big one with a red saddle and a mane of real horse hair. He would bring it when he came back, the father had promised. Then he was gone forever —

He remembered the promise when his mother told him the news. "I won't get my rocking horse," he had said sorrowfully. What did he know of death and dying, of his mother's pain. What did he know of the people who came to her dressed in black, who held her hand, who stroked her hair. All he could think of was a rocking horse with a red saddle.

The letters he left for Santa Claus on the window ledge did no good. Since father was gone, Santa Claus didn't seem to hear him any more either. Last Christmas had passed with no rocking horse. And now Christmas was only a few weeks away...

Fritz sat quietly in the corner and wondered what to do. Should he write Santa Claus again? Perhaps he had not found the last letter. Then he thought of Liesel, who would come in the afternoon. She stayed with him and played while mother was working at the factory. Liesel was a member of the Young Girls, and a good Young Girl always knows what to do.

So Liesel got the full story about the rocking horse. "Do you think Santa Claus will bring me one this year? He must have forgotten last year!" Fritz kept talking: "And that is what I wanted to ask you. Do you think that I should write Santa Claus again? Maybe he didn't get my last letter."

At first Liesel didn't know what to say. Fritz's question had completely surprised her. She thought for a moment, then had an idea. "You know, Fritz, write Santa Claus again. But don't put the letter on the window sill. Give it to me. I will put the letter where Santa Claus will certainly find it."

Fritz did a somersault and then hugged Liesel around the neck and danced around the room with her. "I knew you would know what to do, you're the best and smartest person in the whole world!"

"I have a job for Santa Claus," Liesel said at the next Young Girls meeting, and held up the letter. "It is quite personal." Everyone was curious and asked "From whom?" and "What does it say?"

Heide, the group leader, took the letter and read it. At first, no one was sure what to do. The Young Girls at the work benches stopped hammering, sawing and filing. They stood around Heide, who was talking about a rocking horse with a red saddle and a mane of real horse hair. And Liesel, standing next to her, talked about "her Fritz", whose father had promised him that rocking horse, but who died in Russia. "The boy is always thinking about the rocking horse, and believes in the power of Santa Claus," Liesel said.

"We have to make a rocking horse for the boy," Heide said. But how? "We've made enough little horses, but a big horse like that is something else."

"Hanna said: 'I know a carpenter who could give us a nice piece of rounded wood. All we need is the horse hair and the saddle.'" "I can give up the binding of my poetry album," cried Uschi. "It is made of pretty red leather."

"...And I'll pull out some hairs from our old milk cow," said Eva. Everyone laughed.

Everyone got her job. One had to work on the hind quarters; others had to make the glass eyes, the leather saddle and the hair.

The weeks passed by. The Young Girls worked hard. The toys for the Christmas market were done, but they had not forgotten their duties as "Santa Claus."

The rocking horse was finished at the last meeting before Christmas. It had long strong legs and rocked on two old coat hangers. They all stood about the splendid horse, admiring its flowing tail, its flaring nostrils, its shiny glass eyes and its red saddle.

On Christmas Eve, the little boy stood in speechless joy before the presents on the table. The Christmas tree stood with all its glittering decorations, and under it was a wonderful rocking horse with a red leather saddle and a long tail of real horse hair.

Source: *Das deutsche Mädel*, November-December 1943. German Propaganda Archive. (<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/>)

4. Appendix 4.

This card was prepared by the Main Culture Office of the Nazi Party's *Reichspropagandaleitung*, or Central Propaganda Office. It was intended for the wives and mothers of those who had died during the war — of whom there were millions by 1944. The card consists of quotations from Hitler, Goebbels, Herbert Sailer, and the words of a German mother. The goal is to suggest that the dead have not died in vain, that despite the Nazi thought that this life is all there is, somehow life endured beyond the grave.

The Earth Will Bear Fruit once More

The earth rests, whatever else may happen.
The streams flow pure from their source.
A forest grows grass and sheaves rustle.
Birds fly up. The earth rests.

You rest in it. Your bed is a green meadow.
A hill of earth warms you.
The rain waters you. Hundreds of seeds sprout
And bear fruit, then turn, like you, to dust.

And once again the earth bears fruit,
For nothing perishes that is surrounded by it.
Friend, believe, do not complain.
The victory of life is the meaning of the world.

Herbert Sailer


Source: "*Den Müttern und Frauen unserer Gefallenen zum Muttertag 1944*," prepared by the *HauptKulturamt of the Reichspropagandaleitung* 1944.

<http://bytwerk.com/gpa/muttertag1944.htm>.

5. Appendix 5. The organizational chart for the Hitler Youth, and supplements a page on the program for educating girls within the Hitler Youth.

Source: *Organisationsbuch der NSDAP*, 4. Auflage (Munich: Frans Eher, 1937), p. 443. German Propaganda Archive.

Hitler-Jugend (HJ.)



6. Appendix 6.

Horst Wessel Lied: The Horst Wessel Lied ("Horst Wessel Song"), also known as *Die Fahne Hoch* ("The flag on high", from its opening line), was the anthem of the Nazi Party of Germany, chosen to glorify Horst Wessel as a Nazi martyr. Horst Wessel (October 9, 1907 – February 23, 1930) was a German Nazi activist who was made a posthumous hero of the Nazi movement following his violent death in 1930.

*Die Fahne hoch die Reihen fest geschlossen
S. A. marschier't mit ruhig festem Schritt
Kam'raden die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen
Marschier'n im Geist in unsern Reihen mit*

*Die Strasse frei den braunen Batallionen
Die Strasse frei dem Sturmabteilungsmann
Es schau'n auf's Hackenkreuz voll Hoffnung schon Millionen
Der Tag fur Freiheit und fur Brot bricht an*

*Zum letzten Mal wird nun Appell geblasen
Zum Kampfe steh'n wir alle schon bereit
Bald flattern Hitler-fahnen Uber allen Strassen
Die Knechtschaft dauert nur mehr kurze Zeit*

*Die Fahne hoch die Reihen fest geschlossen
S. A. marschier't mit ruhig festem Schritt
Kam'raden die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen
Marschier'n im Geist in unsern Reihen mit*

(Translation)

Flag high, ranks closed,
The S.A. marches with silent solid steps.
Comrades shot by the red front and reaction
march in spirit with us in our ranks.


The street free for the brown battalions,
The street free for the Storm Troopers.
Millions, full of hope, look up at the swastika;
The day breaks for freedom and for bread.

For the last time the call will now be blown;
For the struggle now we all stand ready.
Soon will fly Hitler-flags over every street;
Slavery will last only a short time longer.

Flag high, ranks closed,
The S.A. marches with silent solid steps.
Comrades shot by the red front and reaction
march in spirit with us in our ranks.

Source: German propaganda Archive. (<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/>)

Maps




Map 1 with the Participants in World War II:

Dark Green: Allies before the attack on Pearl Harbour

Light Green: Allied countries that entered the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.


Orange: Axis Powers



Map 2. The Axis-controlled territory in Europe at the time of its maximal expansion (1941–42).



Map.3 This map shows the position of various European countries during the period of World War II.



Map.4.

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Der Ewinge Jude (1940)

Titanic (1943)

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