

Role of Media During Humanitarian Crisis: A Case Study of Bosnia War

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Role of Media During Humanitarian Crisis: A Case Study of Bosnia War" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.



(Trupti Sahu)

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Finally, I owe complete responsibility for any error and inadvertent lapses, which might have occurred.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
JNA:	Yugoslav People's Army
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR:	United Nations Protection Force
BBC:	British Broadcasting Corporation
UN:	United Nations
Yugo:	Yugoslavia
D.O.P:	Date of Publications
IDPs:	Internally Displaced Persons
ICTY:	International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
UNICEF:	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OHR:	Office of the High Representative
NFZ:	No Fly Zone

IFOR:	Implementation Force
EUFOR:	European Union Peacekeeping Force
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EC:	European Community
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE:	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
SFOR:	The Stabilisation Force
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



Figure 3: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton Agreement




Figure 4: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina before Dayton Agreement

Introduction

Information is power. Media's traditional role of delivering information is irreplaceable. In most of countries and their societies, media enjoy a pivotal importance for the role it plays. Due to technological advancement, media's significance is on further rise across the world. The role played by media has also become extensive. It can bring an impact on, from the grassroots to the highest level of decision-making of a state. With having tremendous power in hand, responsibility automatically follows. The responsibility increases manifold when media have to deliver its duty during extra-ordinary situations. Here, this undertaken study makes an effort to understand how media perform its duty during a humanitarian crisis like Bosnia and Herzegovina War.

The meaning and nature of humanitarian crisis is needed to be understood before examining the media's role in it. For a detailed understanding, Bosnia and Herzegovina War (1992-95) will be taken into consideration as it is regarded as the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the post-Cold War scenario. It should be noted here that the Bosnia and Herzegovina humanitarian crisis will also be referred in the rest of the research work as 'Bosnian crisis' or 'Bosnian War' or 'Bosnia War' or 'Bosnian conflict'. Likewise, for media, the study will restrict itself to the Western print media, consisting of the 'Times (London)', the New York Times and the Time magazine. 'The Times' published from London since 1785, is popularly known in the UK as the 'London Times'. Earlier, it used to be known as the 'Times' as well. Other two media agencies such as: the 'New York Times' and the 'Time' magazine, which is usually referred as 'TIME' are published from the US.

The published news and views by the described English international dailies and magazine will be taken into consideration for analysis. The above newsletters have been considered because they are published from the US and the UK and these Western countries had a crucial role to play in Bosnian conflict. Other reasons behind considering these particular western media agencies will be dealt in detail later in the first chapter.

The objective of this research will be to understand the dynamics of some of the most important representatives of print media in global information dissemination. It can

also be helpful for an understanding about the factors and actors, which influence media agencies in terms of presenting information to the world. Here, the role of media agencies will be understood in the context of Bosnian crisis. Most importantly, the study will also make an attempt to evaluate how media performs its post-war responsibilities.

In order to understand the role of media during Bosnian crisis, the whole work will be divided into six chapters. The first chapter will present a general understanding about the humanitarian crisis and a theoretical perspective on how to evaluate the media's role. For this particular task, the literature in terms of books and journals will be taken into consideration.

The second chapter will deal with brief historical account of Bosnia, from early history to the post-Dayton period in terms of its political, economic and societal structure. A historical account is necessary for a complete and objective understanding. Books and journals will be the prime source to get historical information about the former Yugoslav republic.

The third chapter will talk about how media reported about Bosnia during pre-crisis situation for which the time period from 1990 to 1992 March will be considered. To evaluate media's role, the published contents of the above chosen dailies and magazine would be analysed and compared with their respective state's policies towards Bosnia. The information about states' policies will be obtained from literature sources like books and journals.

The fourth chapter will be all about how media reacted once the Bosnian War broke out. The three media agencies' articles including news and views from April 1992 to December 1995 will be discussed thoroughly. And the outcome will be compared with that of the pre-crisis period analysis and their states' policies to arrive at a conclusion about their objectivity in reporting.

In the fifth chapter, media's post-war responsibility will be evaluated after analysing the news and views published from 1997 to 2000. It would examine whether media was able to address problems and issues of the post-war Bosnian society.

The final chapter will include summarising of all the previous chapters and testing of hypotheses. Each chapter will be discussed on the basis of particular hypotheses, which will be discussed later.

Chapter 1

Understanding Humanitarian Crisis and Role of Media:

A Theoretical Approach

The notion of crisis as an analytical category has spread to every horizon in the twentieth century: society, the family, value system, the economy, the environment, the struggle with nature... ~Edgar Morin (1976) ~

Men make crisis. This is true, at least, in the modern age. As time proceeds, the nature of crises has been changing. There is also a dramatic rise in the number of crises the human beings face today. Earlier, nature used to be the main force behind bringing crises into human's life. Now, behind most of the crises at various levels, man or man-made institutions, organisations are responsible. Crisis is all pervading in today's situation. And man is in the continuous process of struggling to get rid of that tangle. Here the question comes-why to waste time, energy and lives in solving crises rather not trying to stop it from unfolding at the beginning? A quest to find an answer to this question can unfold many bitter truths about the intention of man and man-made institutions. However, the striving for an answer to the above question is the basis of this undertaken study.

Firstly, an attempt can be made to understand the meaning of humanitarian crisis and which should be followed by another attempt to know whether the social institutions take actions to contain such crisis. The task can be easier, if it is understood in the context of some examples. So, Bosnia War will be taken as a case study to represent the humanitarian crisis and media will be taken as the example of social institution.

Among all the humanitarian crises, why Bosnia War has been chosen as the case study for this research work? There are three reasons why Bosnian crisis has been chosen as the case study. These three reasons have been borrowed from Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997), who have also used the Bosnian crisis as the case study for their research about the 'reciprocity, bullying and international cooperation'. These three reasons given by Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) seem to fit well to this undertaken study as well. They are,

First it matters greatly to policymakers as it has become for better or worse a paradigm for the problem of regional conflict management in the post cold war era. Second, the complexity of the conflict and the repeated outside attempts to manage it provide numerous possibilities for triangular and bilateral response behaviours. Third, no consensus exist about the nature of the parties 'response patterns or the appropriateness of various possible great-power intervention strategies (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 515-529).

Before proceeding further to understand the topic, it is required to understand the dynamics of a humanitarian crisis like Bosnia War. To have a detailed understanding, the meaning of the 'humanitarian crisis' should be discerned and analysed first.

DYNAMICS OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

'Humanitarian crisis' is a colloquial term in today's world. It has been able to engage the intellectual community lately across the globe. Though, there is no dearth of literary works, but it is hard to find any particular definition for this concept. It has been defined differently by different communities and agencies according to the situations they encounter. In general, the humanitarian crisis can be understood as a situation, where massive humanitarian loss occurs due to disruption of social order. Armed conflicts, state's repression, epidemics, natural disaster, etc can be termed as humanitarian crises. However, the humanitarian crisis here refers to a social and political situation in which some particular communities felt unsecured in terms of their existence, economic condition, social and political rights. In other words, the humanitarian crisis could also be understood as "a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE) is a human-made crisis in which large numbers of people die and suffer from war, physical violence (often by the state), or displacement, and is usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger" (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999: 267-290).

The humanitarian crises are prevalent in many parts of the world due to many reasons. No state or society can think of keeping itself aloof or unaffected from those crises directly or indirectly. Today's world scenario is completely changed, which could be well understood from what Kofi Annan had said while receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. He said, "Today's real borders are not between nations, but between powerful and powerless, free and fettered, privileged and humiliated. Today, no walls

can separate humanitarian or human rights crisis in one part of the world from national security crises in the other” (Rieff 2002: 111-121).

Crisis has been a part of human being’s life in both individual and societal level since the civilisation began. However, focusing on the aspect of human sufferings of a crisis is a recent phenomenon. A drastic change could be noticed in the way the crises are seen and interpreted today. It is a welcome phenomenon that humanitarian aspect has been in focus, but at the same time it can give rise to negative consequences as well. To understand the negative side of humanitarian crisis, Kent (2004) should be quoted here. According to him, “Humanitarian affairs have become big international business. The 'humanitarian enterprise' occupies the attention of more and more bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations and finds itself a relative 'growth industry' when compared to development” (Kent 2004: 851-869).

To understand the change, the modern time period can be divided into three phases. They are- the crises that occurred before the Cold War, during the Cold War and after the Cold War. During these three phases, the world has seen different crises resulting from political instability and military warfare. Such crises have bridled gross human sufferings the world had seen never before.

The first phase refers to crises witnessed due to World War II, during which the warfare was classical. During this period, states were the players and were also responsible to tackle the crisis situation. Humanitarian organisations had to find some way of working with them. Likewise, the second phase refers to the Cold War era, during which a bi-polar power structure was witnessed. During this time, threats were potentially catastrophic but quantifiable and predictable to a great extent. However, the Cold War era could achieve order and stability as a result of superpowers, trying to avoid direct confrontation. Unlike the above two phases, the third phase that refers to the post Cold War period is much more ambiguous and uncertain. This period witnesses new threats from non-state actors¹ as well. Non-state actors can include the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Multi National Corporations (MNCs), religious groups, extremist groups etc. The post Cold-War situation could be well

¹The growing importance of Non-state actors in international politics has weakened the neo-realism paradigm and increased the importance of neo-liberal paradigm. Keohane’s seminar work ‘After Hegemony’ during mid seventies provided much theoretical justification for neo-liberalism, especially the role of international institutions in international politics. (Milner and Moravcsic)

understood from what James Woolsey, the former director of CIA had once described about the post Cold-War era. According to him the large dragon (U.S.S.R.) no more exists “but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. In many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of” (USA Congressional Record 2004: 34).

Following the end of the Cold War, there has been a strong trend towards identifying humanitarian considerations of crises. Most of today’s crises are the outcome of clashes among different civilizations, cultures and religions. The concept of warfare has become extremely vague. Concentrated clash of arms between armies is also a thing of the past. Rather, now warfare is being fought at a different level. Such chaos is also being seen as the result of ‘failing of the failed states’ (Holm 2002). For the growing number of crises in the world, Francis Fukuyama also point out at the weak or failed states as the root cause (Fukuyama 2004). The failed states refer to the situation, where the institutions like democracy is weak or absent. This situation can be found in many developing nations, who are at war within themselves. The same opinion has been presented by Auvinen and Nafziger (1995). According to them the role of the inter-national community is important as they first of all need to facilitate “widespread growth, support developing countries in reducing disparities in income and wealth, assist poor countries in adjusting to external and internal equilibria, promote good governance, and reduce trade in arms and weapons” (Auvinen and Nafziger 1995: 267-290).

Irrespective of variety of causes, the fact is that humanitarian sufferings are on rise. The beginning of the twentieth century saw ‘genocide against the Armenians’² and the century ended with ‘genocide against Tutsis’³. Not only the nature of crises has changed but also another unique trend is emerging to tackle such type of crisis. Now-a-days, military intervention by the third party is often used as a tool by the international community to contain the crisis. A long list of such examples can be found, like in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Albania, East Timor,

²Armenian genocide refers to the killings of Armenian population inside the Ottoman Empire during the World War One.

³Genocide against Tutsis refers to the mass killing of Tutsi minority by Hutu dominated government in Rwanda during 1994.

Kosovo etc, where the military intervention by a third party has occurred. Sometimes, the military interventions take place with the consent of warring parties and sometimes not.

This new concept of 'military intervention' has become the topic of intellectual debate. It seems to be emerging as an interesting research area, which can unveil many things in future. It is "wholly-new area of inquiry within academic international relations. Yet it offers, among other things, a chance to revisit a theme that is both perennial and arguably the hottest topic in international relations theory today" (Fixdal and Smith 1998: 283-312). On the viability of military intervention, there are differences of opinion. According to one section of thinkers and policy makers, there is nothing wrong in implementing the third party military intervention to contain a crisis in any part of the world. On the other hand, many make a stand against this concept.

According to Waal and Ommar (1994), by humanitarian intervention, a nation-state's sovereignty can be violated while giving many excuses. Humanitarian intervention "is an old concept that has been given a new lease on life with the end of the Cold War" (Waal and Omaar 1994: 2-8). Looking at the recent instances of military intervention, it is clear that the new concept can bear both intended and unintended consequences. There are millions of lives that could be saved in many parts of the world like in Bosnia, whereas, in Somalia, military intervention brought some deplorable outcome that faced severe criticism (Doctors Without Borders 1997).

Humanitarian crises can be debated on the ground of humanitarian intervention. To deal with the growing number of humanitarian crises, Fukuyama suggests "about transferring strong institutions to developing countries" (Fukuyama 2004: 17-31). This debate does not come under the scope of the study rather it would like to examine the role of some elements, which could have played a greater role in minimising the humanitarian loss during the Bosnian crisis. Here, the 'role of media' has been taken into consideration, which is believed, had the capacity to play a crucial role in containing the crisis in the beginning. Media as a social institution has tremendous capability in playing an effective role for the containment of crises. On the other hand, media agencies are also accused of thriving on crisis and are threatened by normalcy as well (Dagenais 1992).

Before evaluating the role of media during Bosnian war, it is necessary to choose a theoretical perspective as the basis of the study. A particular theory should guide the evaluation of the role played by media during Bosnian crisis.

MEDIA'S ROLE: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

An understanding about the linkage between media and society is the prerequisite to understand media's role during a crisis. As per the relationship between media and society is concerned, there are different approaches have been adopted since the time media came into existence as a social institution. In early period, media was considered as a national institution. The contents and practice of media were influenced by domestic political and social pressures. Media used to serve the national interest. Later, media agencies were portrayed as links between the ordinary members of the society and distant and inaccessible world affairs. Recently, media has been able to achieve a significant status in society while playing important roles. In present day scenario, media is regarded as a necessary institution in the modern social system. That is the reason why it is also regarded as the fourth pillar of a state.

Media has tremendous potential as 'propagating tool'. It can pull the strings of an individual or of a state by presenting the crude facts to its audience across the world. The technological advancement has even equipped media to evoke a global response to any happening at any corner of the world. In other words, media has made the world in to a single village by being a source of information, education and entertainment. According to the McBride report titled 'Many Voice One World', the total daily circulation of newspapers throughout the world is more than 400 million copies. This figure gives a picture until 1980, when the McBride report was released (UNESCO 1980). The circulation must have multiplied many times by twenty first century, which means media's role can have an impact in every corner of the world. With tremendous power in hand, media has also the responsibility to construct a society by giving the right and unbiased information to the people. Contrary to these beliefs, media is often accused of being biased and sensationalizing the public to increase their rating. However, in the following work, the experiment about media's role during a crisis should be carried out without any pre-conceived notion. By media it is to be understood as the Western English print media comprising of newspapers

and magazine as they are still considered as the strongest medium for disseminating information and forming public opinion.

With enormous power in hand, media is expected to act judiciously while reporting an incident or an event or a situation. Especially, during crisis like war, civil war or any other humanitarian crises described in the above, 'the role of media' becomes very significant. As the humanitarian crises are becoming complex in nature with the involvement of international community and other independent agencies, it will be interesting to observe how media play its role in a complex situation. "A complex humanitarian emergency is primarily the outcome of an institutionally uncompensated interaction between an unleashing societal event and a social system" (Bertrand 2000: 215-227). In such situation, the social institution like media's role is very important and the phrase 'role of media' should be understood in the light of the way of covering an incident, which should be devoid of any bias and without being influenced by factors and actors.

As it is already discussed in the above, the last decade was marked by several humanitarian crises like in Somalia, in Chechnya, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Burundi, in the Great Lakes region, in Kosovo, etc (Doctors Without Borders 1997). However, the above crises could evoke different responses in different parts of the world. The difference in response to the same event could be attributed to the way the media report such crises to a large extent. The understanding about media's role should be based on a theoretical approach, which will later help to evaluate media's response in an unbiased manner.

NORMATIVE MEDIA THEORIES

To understand how media agencies ought to or are expected to operate during a crisis, the study should be guided by a particular theoretical perspective. Media's responsibility towards society and society's expectation from media are usually articulated by the so-called public philosophies of communication. "These philosophies were initially dubbed social theories of the press and later became known as normative media theories" (Ossthuizen 2002). The central theme of this work will be guided by the normative theories of the press. There are a total of six

major normative theories, which provide a framework for media on how to play their role in a society (Siebert et al. 1956; McQuail 2000).

The normative theories of press are: the authoritarian theory, the free press theory, the social responsibility theory, the Soviet media theory, the development media theory and the democratic-participant media theory. Out of these six theories, first four theories have been given by Siebert et al in 1956. Later, other two theories have been added to Siebert et al. (1956)'s four-fold division (Ossthuizen 2002). Out of these six normative theories, the social responsibility theory will be largely taken into consideration to provide a direction to the proposed study. Rest of the theories could be applied only if the necessity arises. Before providing any elaboration about the social responsibility theory, all other normative theories should be discussed briefly.

The Authoritarian Theory

This theory is the oldest one among all mass communication theories and its origination can be retrieved from the “authoritarian climate of the late renaissance, and with the development of the printing press” (Oosthuizen 2002: 39). After the invention of printing press, this theory guided the media. During that period, press used to be regulated by the elite and highest authority of a society. It was used to “inform the people of what the rulers thought they should know and the policies the rulers thought they should support” (Siebert, et al 1963: 2).

In other words, it refers to a situation, where media was subordinated to the state power and they serve to the interest of the ruling class. The press did not enjoy liberty and freedom of expression. Existence of such type of press is rare in today's world. This theory can be valid only for societies, which are still ruled by monarchy, not by democratic value system. According to this theory of media, media agencies are expected not to do anything, which might undermine the authority and its established order.

The Free Press Theory

In the eighteenth century, the media theory, which was known as libertarian theory, is now known as the free press theory. This particular theory had come into existence after the printing press achieved freedom from the official control. It reversed the

situation, which was prevailed before nineteenth century. It changed the status of the press, which started functioning to search the truth rationally, but not guided by power and authority (Oostuizen 2002).

According to the libertarian theory, “the press is not an instrument of government, but rather a device for presenting evidence and arguments on the basis of which the people can check on government and make up their minds as to policy” (Siebert, et al 1963: 3). In most of liberal democratic societies, the print media functions on the basis of the principles of this theory. In simple words, this theory prescribes rights for individual to express his or her pinion freely, to publish whatsoever he or she likes to and to assemble and organise with others. This theory believes in the supremacy of the individual’s freedom of expression, truth, reason and progress. A free press has always been considered as an essential component of free and rational society (McQuail 2000).

In terms of maintaining the standards of free press theory, Siebert, et al (1963) points out at the fact that the US and the Great Britain had practised this theory while running their press for two hundred years. It had eventually, encouraged to consider the press as the ‘Fourth Estate’ in the governing process. On the other hand, other non-communist countries during the same period had given a lip-service to this theory. However, the twentieth century saw changes in the attitude, which will be known as social responsibility theory.

The Social Responsibility Theory

Social responsibility theory owes its origin to an American initiative, which formed the Commission on Freedom of the Press. This commission is also known as the Hutchins Commission (Rodriguez 2003). The commission was set up to inquire about the proper function of media in modern democracies under the supervision of Robert Hutchins, who was then president of the University of Chicago. The Commission held that the economic and technological advancement of the press had lowered the chances of access for individuals and diverse groups while failing to meet informational, moral and social needs of a society. At the same time, it also points out at how the rise of a powerful print media should have accountability. Eventually, “the document has become the guiding principle of the social responsibility theory of the press was a small book-138 pages- the product of 13 men, including the Pulitzer

prize-winning poet Archibald Mcleish and Harold Lasswell, who conducted some of the earliest research on mass communication” (Rodriguez 2003: 44).

According to McQuail (2002), social responsibility theory was a response to the criticisms faced by the classical liberalism during twentieth century, which was giving signs of monopolization in media due to laissez-faire system. In order to avoid monopoly in media, media had to re-evaluate their role in the society. Social responsibility theory is hailed as it provides numerous advantages, but at the same time it comes under debate for many shortcomings as well.

The concept ‘responsibility’ has been the centre stage of the intellectual debate since its inception. (McQuail 2002) From the liberal perspective, the particular theory is being criticized, which consider responsibility as a nice term, but in reality it is almost similar to authoritarian theory. Likewise, the left slams this theory by stating that it appears to be the ‘voice of people’, but actually it ‘keep the people silent and stupid’ while supporting the status-quo (McQuail 2002:184).

Sometimes, it is considered that there are only two theories of media exist, not four because the difference lies only on the balance between speakers and government. Enjoying absolute freedom is next to impossible for media in any part of the world. In such a situation dividing theories into many types, seems to be of no use. “ Whether the latter go by the labels of authoritarian theory, Soviet Communist theory or social responsibility theory, matters little. The real question is whether and when the balance will swing back to liberty” (McQuail 2002:191). The chapter does not intend to include the debate about the social responsibility theory in detail. Therefore the main features of social responsibility theory can be discussed briefly in the following.

According to this theory, firstly, media should accept and fulfil certain obligations to society, which can be achieved by setting high professional standards, truth, accuracy, objectivity and balance. Secondly, media should try to fulfil the above obligations while abiding by the law and established framework of the institutions. Thirdly, it should avoid whatever might lead to civil disorder, violence, crime or offence to any minority groups. Fourthly, media should be pluralist while keeping in mind the diversity of the given society. Media professionals should be accountable to society, employer and the market.

The Soviet Communist Theory

This theory came into the fore, following the 1917 Russian Revolution (Oosthuizen 2002). It can be said that the Soviet communist theory is the modification and development of the old authoritarian theory of media (Siebert et al. 1963). The Soviet Russian media along with media in other parts of Communist world saw a complete reorganisation, which was based on the basic postulates of Marx and Engels. The important idea on which this model was based was that the working class should control the media and media should work in the interest of the working class (proletariat).

According to this theory, the working class ought to control the resources of production and all other means for which the means to mental production including media should also be controlled by the same class. Consequently, all media should be subject to control by working class in terms of obtaining membership of the Communist Party. According to the view of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “the Communist press were to have no profit motive. The absence of advertising was supposed to rid the media system of any capitalistic economic influence, enabling the media to publish the truth in support of working class interest” (Oosthuizen 2002: 43).

The main aim of the theory was to prohibit private ownership of the media so that the objective truth about both domestic and world affairs would come out. It was also expected to play a positive role in formation of a classless society. However, the above described postulates could be possible only in theory. In practical, media was controlled by the Communist Party, but not by the people or working class. Eventually, media turned out to be a propaganda tool for the party. In the mean time, this theory ceased to exist with the disintegration of Soviet Russia.

However, Oosthuizen (2002) points out that dissident voice are still not tolerated in Russia. Similarly, some of the principles of this theory are also seen in practice even today in countries like China, North Korea and Cuba (Oosthuizen 2002).

The Development Media Theory

This theory refers to the media situation in developing countries. There are some principles on which this theory is based are the result of some common situation and

challenges the developing countries face. According to this theory, media should have the role to encourage the positive development tasks put forward by established national policy. Media should enjoy freedom to an extent that it should not be a hindrance for economic priorities and developmental needs. National culture and language should be given importance by media's publications. On the other hand, media can be restricted or intervened by the state for the developmental end of the state. Here, collective ends are emphasised, not the individual ends.

The most of assumptions for this theory were articulated by the suggestions provided by the McBride Commission report. The Commission recommendations included, the using of media for national development, allotment of more space and time in the media of developed and industrialized countries about the happenings in developing nations, training to foreign journalists about the language and culture , history etc from where they report and etc. (UNESCO 1980, Oosthuizen 2002).

The Democratic Participant Media Theory

This theory is the most recent addition into the numbers of normative theories of media. The rise of this theory can be attributed to the need of a new form of media institution in present day scenario. However, it also faces challenges as it lacks full legitimization and incorporation into media institutions. The characteristics of this theory can be found in most democratic liberal societies. The central point of this theory lies with the needs, interests and aspirations of the active receiver in a political society. It rejects the need of a uniform, centralized, high cost media; rather it favours multiplicity, smallness, deinstitutionalization and locality.

This theory believes in giving individual and minority groups the rights of access to media and rights to serve media. This theory also argues that the democracy as a system of governance has failed because the real representation of people at grass root level is yet to be realised. In such a situation, the focus should shift to the system of participation of civil society, not the representative government. Accordingly, media should function on the same line.

GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA

The above normative theories provide a range of criteria, which can help to assess media's role in a society. In case the society in question faces a crisis situation like in Bosnia, then some change in the role of media could be expected. 'The role of media will vary greatly depending on the nature of the particular crisis and the nature of the particular society concerned' (Raboy, Dagenais 1992: 3). Irrespective of this fact, criteria proposed by social responsibility theory should not be avoided by media in any circumstances. The proposed research work will consider social responsibility theory as the main yardstick to evaluate media's role during Bosnian crisis.

The study will also consider some other criteria to evaluate the role of media. Such criteria could be borrowed from the suggestions given by numerous commissions and enquiries set up by the developed Western countries. Various commissions and enquiries have come up with their observations on how to assess media's role (McQuail 2000).

Firstly, media should be free and independent. The notion of absolute freedom is impossible, but media should build its safeguard to protect a degree of independence to maintain its professionalism in any situation. Media should preserve its independence to that extent, which can resist conformity to vested interest. Secondly, media have to be vigilant to maintain order and solidarity. It should not encourage or support any violent or aggressive form of behaviour, which can endanger national integrity. Thirdly, media and its policy should express its opinion in such a way that they should reflect the same diversity as they exist in that particular society. Fourthly, media should be evaluated from its objectivity and information quality (McQuail 2000). Apart from the social responsibility theory, the above suggestions given by McQuail (2000) can also be taken as the basis on which the rest of the research will be carried out.

METHODS OF EVALUATING MEDIA'S ROLE

Along with the theoretical approach, some particular methodologies should be used to evaluate the media's role in the following chapters. And analytical method fits well for this study. This analytical method will consist of two principles. They are- interpretation of contents and quantification of news and views, taken from the chosen

newsletters. The idea of using thus methodologies has been borrowed from Robinson (2000)'s work. According to him, some sample articles including news and views could be chosen and then analysed to have "a sense of the overall tone of reports." Such methods can give reliable conclusion (Robinson 2000: 613-633).

The analytical method is all about analyzing the available data objectively. This particular method has been adopted because it can be helpful when there is limited data available to examine. While adopting the analytical method, another important factor should be taken care of. It is about decoding the meaning of the use of various terminologies. "The words used to characterise a conflict, matter deeply. They often imply, the type of interpretation to be placed on it, and even the policy perception to be followed" (Roberts 1996: 177). The interpretation of terminologies concerning Bosnian crisis can be conducted in the following way that ethnic hatred, civil war and ancient hatred should be decoded as referring for non-intervention or partial intervention. Likewise, the word 'aggression; should be interpreted as seeking for outside military intervention (Hunt 1997).

Next, the analytical method will also include content analysis, which is another simple and effective means of measuring the change or deviation (Berger 1982). In content analysis "written documents are examined and objective analysis of messages ...is accomplished by means of explicit rules" (Harris 2001:191-208). This methodology has been used in social science research since ages. In the modern history of social sciences, Max Weber is known to have done "a large scale content analysis of the press, as early as 1910" (Harris 2001:191-208).

Any research structure needs a solid ground of theoretical approach. Without them, the research might become directionless. That is the reason why, this undertaken study will be guided by the above described normative theories. Especially, the social responsibility theory will be the guiding principle, when media agencies' role will be evaluated in terms of their living up to societal expectation. Likewise, the free press theory or the libertarian theory will be taken into consideration while evaluating about the biasness of media agencies.

Chapter 2

Basics of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In order to understand any happening in the world, knowledge of its historical background is necessary. As this study deals mainly with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nation needs to be understood historically in terms of its land, people, culture, religion, societal structure and political orientation. Bosnia and Herzegovina is only two decades old as a separate democratic country in the world political map. However, its history is closely juxtaposed with the history of the Balkan region and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a federation of six socialist Republics- Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro, which existed till 1990 under the Yugoslav umbrella.

Four major physical environments can be found in Yugoslavia, among which Balkan region is the largest (Singleton 1970). Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to the mountainous area of Balkan, which also includes Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The name of the region 'Balkan' has its origin from the Turkish word 'Balkan', which means a range of mountainous terrain (Singleton 1970). Likewise, Bosnia owes its name to the 'Bosna River', "which has its source just outside of Sarajevo and runs north into the Sava (Donia and Fine: 1994: 13). 'Bosnia' is a Serbo-Croatian word. North to Bosnia is the Pannonian region covering parts of Serbia, Croatia and Vojvodina. The rest are, two small regions consisting of islands and coastal plains (Singleton 1985).

As per Bosnia Herzegovina's history is concerned, it can date back to thousands years back. Here in this chapter, the history of Bosnia will be dealt in detail from the World War One to the savage war it experienced during 1990's. As a prelude to its modern history, Medieval Bosnia will also be included briefly.

EARLY BOSNIA

There are historical evidences, which prove Bosnia having civilisation since the Old Stone Age. Later, during the Neolithic period, Bosnia was inhabited by Illyrian tribes, who were later replaced by the Celtic migration. There is also evidence of fight between Romans and Illyrians. During the course of this pre-Slavic period, there are

enough proofs have been found that the region was populated by a number of different languages speaking populations. With the beginning of the Christian era, the lands covering Yugoslavia came under Roman occupation. In the middle of the fifth century, Huns came into the scene in ancient Yugoslavia, but were waned away following the death of their leader Attila. Slavs first appeared on the scene during this time. Yugoslavia's modern history began with Slavs making the region their homeland in accompany with Asiatic nomads- the Bulgars and the Avars. The majority of today's populations in Bosnia are the descendants of the Slavic migration of 6th and 7th century (Donia and Fine 1994).

Before the Ottoman Empire took this region into control, Bosnia had a very brief period of medieval glory during the ruling of Katromanic family. According to Donia and Fine (1994) during this period, Bosnia had its unique history and culture, which was shared equally by all its religious denominations. The multi ethnic and religious culture could be inferred from "their famous and enormous medieval tombstones", which were also known as 'Bogomil tombstones' or 'stecci'. Such structures used to be the contribution of all three of the Christian denominations then existing in Bosnia (Donia, and Fine 1994). This unique aspect of this period did not go well with the Papacy. Consequently, they became the victims of a crusade supported by the Pope. In order to escape persecution, many Bosnians embraced Islam when Turks came in. According to Tomasevich (2001), the first Turkish raids had occurred in 1386 and 1388. However, most of Bosnia was in Turkish hands by 1463. By 1528, Turks had completed their conquest of Bosnia. With the Ottoman conquest, Bosnia witnessed a new era in the country's history. "As the Turks advanced into Bosnian territory, two processes occurred: Bosnia was organized as a military frontier province, and much of the population was Islamized" (Tomasevich 2001: 473).

The cultural and political landscapes were changed during Turkish rule that lasted for four centuries. The most significant change took place in Bosnia's population make-up. A native Slavic-speaking Muslim community became the dominant ethno-religious group while Bosnian Christian communities started dwindling. According to the Yugoslav census of March 31, 1931, there were 2,323,491 people in Bosnia and out of them 44.2 percent population were Orthodox, 30.9 percent were Muslims, 23.6 percent were Roman Catholic (Tomasevich 2001). Apart from this population aspect,

another distinguished feature of this period was that Bosnia had experienced a prolonged period of stability, welfare and prosperity.

However, by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was becoming more and more feeble. Its economic backwardness along with its strategic geopolitical location had made it more vulnerable for outside invading powers. “By the mid-nineteenth century, Bosnia was westernmost remnant of Ottoman conquest, almost completely surrounded by younger or more powerful states, eagerly awaiting the demise of Ottoman rule” (Donia and Fine 1994: 88). Widespread rebellion by the people in the middle of the nineteenth century in Bosnia and Herzegovina eventually made it an easy prey for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Muslims were against the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire rather they wanted autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, Serbs also resisted and wanted to unite with Serbia (Tomasevich 2001). Finally, through the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Ottomans ceded administration of the country to the Austria-Hungary Empire.

Bosnians that consisted of different ethnicities, were dissatisfied with the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s administration. The discontent grew many more folds after the Austro-Hungarian government formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The simmering anger especially among Bosnian youths reflected, when a young Bosnian Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo. It proved to be a crucial event in history as it sparked off the World War I.

BOSNIA AND WORLD WAR I

Following the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo, Austria declared war against Serbia. Austrian Empire believed the assassin belonged to a youth group of Bosnia, but supported by Serbia. During this period, Bosnia witnessed a large number of revolutionary group emerging consisting of young Bosnians. One of them- Young Bosnia (*Mlada Bosna*) was well known and influential as well. “Mlada Bosna was a movement of young Slavs, whose members ranged from socialist revolutionaries to idealistic nationalists” (Singleton 1970: 44). Its adherents were mostly Bosnian Serbs, but included Muslims and Croats as well. It was formed before the WWI in Bosnian and Herzegovina with significant influence from Serbia. Under the banner of young

Bosnia, there were two other notable organisations such as: the 'Narodna Odbrana' and the 'Black Hand'. 'Black Hand' used Narodna organisation to infiltrate the arms and assassins into Sarajevo, which had also claimed the responsibility for the assassination of the Archduke. Austria-Hungary Empire declared war on Serbia, which gradually spread throughout Europe making it the World War One. The assassination had also widened the gap and antagonism between Serbs and Muslims, as many Muslims considered Serbs responsible for the World War One (Tomasevich 2001).



Political Situation

Once World War I began, Serbia was in an advantageous position to defeat Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was possible because Serbia was with allied side in the war. It had allies like Britain, Russia, France and later Italy and the US. By 1915, Serbia faced defeat in the battle field and fled over the mountains of Albania. However, taking advantage of the winning situation of the allied side, the Serbian government in exile claimed for a United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The claim was approved in the Corfu Declaration in Greece, which created the kingdom of Yugoslavia. For the first time, Yugoslav was recognised as a state with unitary power under the Karageorgevic dynasty.

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The animosity among various Slavs in the Balkans was high by the time the World War I began. It was difficult to imagine their co-existence. However, it could be possible following the World War I because following the fall of the Habsburg authority Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had no other way but to embrace the union with Serbia. The south Slavs including Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to meet in Belgrade, on November 28, to discuss a union with Serbia. By December 1, 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed under Prince Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevic (Donia and Fine 1994).

Despite the fact that the south Slavs including Bosnia and Herzegovina came under one umbrella called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the bitterness still remained among themselves. Serbia's reluctance to share power among other South Slav people aggravated the animosity. Especially, the Macedonians, Bosnians and Montenegrins were treated as junior members of the kingdom. There was no equal

national group status (Singleton 1970). The dissatisfaction grew among other ethnicities as a result of which the new constitution was promulgated in 1921. According to Singleton (1970), the new constitution also did not work in a society, which was at war with itself. Eventually, the kingdom was on the verge of disintegration, when King Alexander assumed power in 1929 only to be murdered by a member of Ustasa in 1934. He failed to solve the politico-social problems of Yugoslav society.

Economic and Social Status

Following a war, every country witnesses a harsh period in terms of its financial and social security. The similar fate Bosnia could also not avoid after the World War One. For two centuries, Bosnia had enjoyed its golden period during Ottoman's rule. There was evidence of prosperity during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but still their economy was an agrarian economy. The situation degraded after the Austro-Hungarian Empire took control of it. By the time the World War I was over, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a backward agrarian society. There was only sporadic industrial development in the region.

Following the WWI, the land reform was brought to improve the economic conditions of serfs, which was in pending since the Austro-Hungarian administration. This agrarian reform favoured serfs. According to the new reform, the land belonged to them, who tilled it (Tomasevich 2001). However, the reform could not be of much help because the economic crisis of the late thirty's hit hard Bosnian lives (Singleton 1970).

There was no concept of state social security for population. Only state employees had the opportunity to receive some welfare benefits. As per the education is concerned, there is no figure available to explain about the literacy percentage rate of Bosnia in particular. However, from Yugoslavia's literacy rate, we can infer about Bosnia to an extent. According to UNESCO, in 1931, 45% of the population over ten years old was illiterate. However, the distribution of illiteracy was uneven in the kingdom (Singleton 1970).

BOSNIA AND WORLD WAR II

By 1930's, the Nazi threat was imminent for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In order to avoid persecution, in March 1941, the royal government signed the tripartite pact with Germany and Italy, who were allies in the Second World War. According to the pact, Yugoslav states were to be considered as junior partner of dictatorship. However, Yugoslav people opposed this pact and preferred to go to war, which made Germany hostile against them. By April 1941, Nazi onslaught was random, which made the Royal government capitulate formally.

The Kingdom was divided among various allies against the Nazis, except for the independent state of Croatia. Croatia, which consisted of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was with the Nazis. During this period, the extreme nationalists, Ustasa came to the picture. Ustasa leader, Ante Pavelic had ordered atrocities against Serb speaking inhabitants of the independent region (Lampe 1996). Due to its own anti-Semitism attitude, rather than pushed by the Nazis, Ustasa "first tried to herd as many Serbs as possible into camps for expulsion to Serbia. Any resisters were killed. When expulsion became increasingly difficult, they killed many in their villages or dispatched them to one of several death camps" (Lampe 1996: 207). Serbian Orthodox Congregation was burned alive, while Catholic hierarchy of Bosnia and Croatia remained silent to stop such atrocities.

It is said that, the chaos of civil war was so much that the World War II could not do more harm than that to the region. The internal spat was enough to divide the Slavs to take sides in the World War II. All other groups of the south Slavs except, Slovenes, fought against Serbs, which was again on the allied side, while Croats supporting the German side. During this time of crisis due to both the World War and civil war, the charismatic wartime leader Josip Broj Tito came into picture.

Tito was the leader of Partisans, driven by the Communist ideology. By 1943, Partisans were in control of a large area of Bosnia and Dalmatia. On November 26, 1943, in Mrkojic Grad, the National Anti Fascist Council for the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established to liberate Bosnia from the Nazis. The Council was also the supreme organ of the government. At the same time, Anti Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia proclaimed a provisional government in which

Tito became the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. With the end of the Second World War, Tito's partisans liberated all the Slavs from the Nazi occupation and civil war including Bosnia. Sarajevo was liberated on April 6, 1945, which saw communism next in the order.

The foundation of a post war state was put forward on 29 November 1943 consisting of Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Exactly after two years, the monarch was abolished with the establishment of Communist dominated constituent assembly. Finally, on January 31, 1946, the first Communist constitution was approved for Yugoslavia, which confirmed a new structure for the post war state. As per the new structure, six republics were brought under Yugoslav federation. Apart from that, the autonomous status was given to two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were parts of Serbia. Based upon the ethnic and historical principles, the border line was drawn between republics. And the Communist Party of Yugoslavia became the supreme apparatus to run the new federation, which was renamed as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia can be seen retaining political monopoly till 1980's (Meier 1999).

BOSNIA UNDER TITO

Tito, the charismatic leader, who had great reputation at home and abroad as well, could manage to keep the federation stable during his lifetime. Significantly, even after his break from Cominform⁴ and spat with Stalin, Yugoslavia under Tito could evolve in its own way. However, Milovan Djilas (1981), once the close-friend of Tito, felt that the break from Moscow was a great blow to the leader psychologically and intellectually. "In those months he was fretful, easily agitated, and broke out suddenly into expression of intimacy and warmth towards his closest and most trusted comrades-an intimacy and warmth he had lost toward the end of the war and in the early post-war years" (Djilas 1981: 31). To make all the six republics stay peacefully under Yugoslav umbrella, Tito had instituted a constitutional amendment in 1974

⁴Cominform was officially known as Information Bureau of the Communist Workers' Parties, which was the first official forum of the international communist movement.

that decentralised the arrangements between the republics and the Yugoslav Federation.

The new constitution was later proved fatal, after the death of Tito, as it paved the way for nationalistic aspiration to arise in the absence of a unifying leader like Tito. Following the charismatic leader's death in 1980, animosity increased between two groups- the group that supported liberal ideology was represented by Slovenia and Croatia and the other group that supported conservative ideology, was represented by Serbia. During this course of tussle between two groups, Bosnia was in an uncertain stage because of its wide diversities in its population.

In case of Bosnia, Tito transformed Bosnia from a strictly agrarian society to an industrial republic. The most important aspect of Tito administration in Bosnia was that it gave recognition to Bosnian Muslims as a separate ethnic identity. Though Serbians were not happy with the decision, but Tito made them satisfied by making Belgrade as Yugoslavia's capital. With Tito's death in 1980, nationalistic aspirations started taking shape in whole Yugoslavia including in Bosnia. Tito was known for his unique capability on how to tackle the dissenting voices, but the leaders, who came next after him clearly lacked that quality. "... Although there is no doubt that the lack of a single leader of Tito's stature has not made it easy to silence the voices of dissension" (Singleton 1985). Eventually, such dissension would pave the way for one of the worst humanitarian tragedies in world history.

Society, Polity and Economy

Bosnia and Herzegovina was the third most populated republic of Yugoslavia in the post-war scenario. According to 1971 census, Bosnia had an estimated of 37,46,111 population out of which Muslims were 39.6%, Serbs constituted 37.2%, Croats were of 20.6% and others were 2.6% (Singleton 1985). From the figures, it is evident that Bosnia was a country, where multi ethnicities and cultures were the order of the society. In other words, the true reflection of diversities in Yugoslavia could be seen in Bosnia.

In terms of economy, the growth was witnessed after 1945. According to 1973 census, 13.2% of the total employed in Yugoslavia was from Bosnia. There was a shift from

agrarian economy to industrial developments. However, the growth of economy was slower in Bosnia and Herzegovina comparing to Slovenia and Croatia (Lampe 1996). For Bosnia, tourism sector flourished smoothly after the war. Especially, spa tourism was very popular. “‘Guest workers’ were back on holidays from Western Europe. And a larger number of Western tourists were now bringing significant income into the country” (Lampe 1996: 289).

The thriving economy witnessed major financial crisis after Tito. Following Tito’s death, Yugoslav federation was heavily debt ridden due to unrealistic demands of the republics and provinces. There was a need to go for financial reforms in terms of liberalization and privatization. However, “the agents of the political system were not prepared to undertake reforms in the direction of the liberalization of the economic system” (Meier, 1999: 11).

PRELUDE TO BOSNIAN CRISIS

Following the death of the great Yugoslav leader, Tito in 1980, ideological differences among republics were extended to economy and the future political structure of the federation. In terms of economy, Croatia and Slovenia were believers of liberal economy. They were in favour of bringing more private enterprises, whereas Serbia remained conservative. Likewise, in political aspect, Serbia strongly believed in centralised structure, whereas Slovenia and Croatia advocated for a loose confederation structure. These Yugoslav republics witnessed transition, but at a heavy cost. “Eight of the 28 post-communist countries had their transitions interrupted by protracted, large-scale war. The direct human and economic costs of large-scale were well known” (Horowitz 2003: 25-48).

During this course of confrontations between two groups, Bosnia in early days backed the stance of Slovenia and Croatia, but changed later. These differences were not enough to bring the republics into war as long as they were not linked with nationalist passions of the political leaders and ethnic prejudice of people. “High levels of prejudice in ethnic enclaves, played an important role in increasing ethnic tensions and facilitating the outbreak of war” (Kunovich and Hodson 2002: 185-212).

The situation became more volatile after Slobodan Milosevic came into power in December 1987. In early period of his political career Milosevic was a staunch Marxist. When Milosevic succeeded his friend Stambolic as chief of the Serbian Party and his friend became the President of Serbia, he was a “consistent and seemingly convinced defender of Tito's legacy. Especially among the older cadres "little Sloba" had a reputation for being an uncompromising communist (Djilas1993:81-96). His image as a Communist leader changed, after Serbia under his Presidency, extended its constitutional control over Kosovo and Vojvodina in March 1989. These two provinces had been declared autonomous provinces under the 1974 constitutional amendments by Tito. However, Milosevic's intention of bringing these two provinces under control alarmed other republics of Yugoslavia. By the beginning of 1990, while his aspiration for a ‘Greater Serbia’ was taking shape, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia were getting ready to secede away from the federation.

By December 1990, Slovenia held the referendum for independence from Yugoslavia, which received an overwhelming positive response. Likewise, Croatia also hinted of similar aspiration by adopting a new constitution on December 22, 1990 under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman. So, the disintegration of Yugoslavia could not alone be attributed to Milosevic's nationalism, rather the similar nationalistic aim of other republics' leaders were also responsible. “Serbian nationalism, in the authoritarianism and exclusivism epitomised by Milosevic, is very similar to the Croatian nationalism of Franjo Tudjman and the nationalism combined with Muslim radicalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Alija Izetbegovic. All three have contributed to the destruction of Yugoslavia” (Djilas1993:81-96).

Against this backdrop of a weak Yugoslav federation, Bosnia wanted to find some sort of middle path between two camps, represented by Serbia, on the one hand and Slovenia and Croatia, on the other (Sloan 1998). As explained earlier, Bosnia supported for a confederation political structure in early period, but later saw no other better option than staying with Serbs. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic came up with an idea of creating an “asymmetric community” (Sloan, 1998:13). According to his proposal, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro were to form the inner ring of Yugoslavia while Slovenia and Croatia had to have a loose association with it. Bosnia's lobby for building a multi-ethnic political structure can be attributed to its

diverse cultural and ethnic background. According to 1992 consensus, around 44 percent of the Bosnian population were Muslims, 33 percents were Serbs, 17 percents were Croats and around 5 to 6 percents were Yugoslav citizens. As the idea of the ethnic nation has been a permanent provocation to war, Bosnia could not escape the fate of brutal war (Pfaff 1993).

The situation in Yugoslavia was worsening with republics announcing their independence from Yugoslavia. As Slovenia and Croatia went for referendum for independence, Serbia also declared that it would no longer obey the Yugoslav Presidency. As Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on 25th June 1991, the war broke out in Slovenia and Croatia. Till the war broke out, the international community was considering the events as internal affairs, which needed to be resolved peacefully among the republics. However, the gravity of the situation was realized, as Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) attempted to take over Slovenia's border posts. The War lasted only for a week for Slovenia, whereas Croatia had to go through bloody war for years. As Slovenia was a compact as a state, the transition was smoother comparing to Croatia, which was divided on many ways and levels (Meier 1999).

In response to stabilise the situation, European Commission sent a ministerial Troika to hold talks with the leaders of republics and Yugoslav federation on 7th July 1991 in Brioni.⁵ At a time when efforts were made to bring a ceasefire to the Slovenian war, Croatia and Serbia were busy preparing a secret road-map to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between them. As per their secret talks, Milosevic and Tudjman had planned to carve up certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to add in to their respective republics and rest remaining as a buffer state. Being aware of such plans, Bosnian Muslims and their leaders declared their intention not to allow division at any cost. President Izetbegovic rather warned that such a solution would lead to a war (Meier 1999).

As the volatile situation came under control in Slovenia after the EC monitoring Commission was established, violence erupted in Croatia. With assistance of Serb

⁵ Brioni Accord was signed by representatives of the Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the political sponsorship of the EC.

dominated JNA and the Serbian government, Serbs in Croatia could establish their hold on one third territory of Croatia. Widespread violence was reported between Serbs and Croats. In response to this situation, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 25th September 1991 imposed an arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and arms to Yugoslavia. This decision made Bosnia more volatile and vulnerable.

Due to the arms embargo, Bosnian Muslims failed to arm themselves in order to face the future situation, whereas Bosnian Serbs were already well armoured by the JNA and Serbia proper. By that time, it was clear that the transition for Bosnia would be toughest owing to its population make-up (Meier 1999). However, then UN Secretary General appointed Cyrus Vance as his special representative for Yugoslavia. He was given the task to come up with a solution and make Serbia and Croatia agree for ceasefire and the deployment of UN armed peacekeeping forces. But Bosnia's condition was totally ignored. By March 1992, the UN established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for Croatia, which was headquartered in Sarajevo, but Bosnia remained unprotected. It was the victim of the international community's negligence as the UNPROFOR was already in Bosnia when violence erupted in its territory (Sloan 1998).

WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnian war was the longest and most savage amongst all the crises faced by other former Republics of Yugoslavia. Bosnian war was complex in nature and there were several reasons behind it.

The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, also known as Badinter Arbitration Committee, set up by the European Community on 27th August 1991, approved Croatia and Slovenia's independence, but not of Bosnia. Coming under pressure from Germany and Arbitration Committee's opinion, the EC finally said yes to independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 15th January 1992. In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Committee disapproved its application for independence from Yugoslavia federation. The Committee asked Bosnia in question to go for a referendum to prove public support. In order show the public support, Bosnia went for a referendum in February 1992 and the result was obvious (Meier 1999). As Bosnia

was the home to diverse ethnicities, Muslims and Croats voted in favour of the referendum, where as Bosnian Serbs boycotted the event. The Muslim dominated Bosnian government finally declared unilateral independence on 2nd April 1992. This development put Serbs and Muslims on a bloody confrontation mode.

The escalated violence between ethnicities compelled the UNPROFOR to change it's headquarter from Sarajevo as it was impossible to function from there. The better equipped Serbs (with the help from JNA) had already started shelling mortars and artillery to Muslim dominated areas. Around 120 peacekeeping UNPROFOR staff remained in Sarajevo, which was the only international presence in Bosnia, when the war broke out (Sloan 1998). On one hand, the situation had started deteriorating while on the other hand, the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts by international community were not coming for Bosnia. "As if that was not enough (referring to arms embargo), the UN refused to send any 'blue helmets' to Bosnia, on the grounds that there was no conflict there" (Meier 1999: 208). Due to negligence and lack of attention, Bosnia slid into bloodshed and was registered as one of the most dreadful humanitarian tragedies in world history.

The war, based on identity and ethnicity took ugly shape as ethnic cleansing started taking place in full swing in the Republic. Bosnian Serbs, instigated by the Serbian government and JNA, wanted to erase all the traces of non-Serbs in areas dominated by them. The ethnic cleansing was rampant, but the whole world came to know on one fine morning after a British journalist of 'Channel Four' reported about the Omarska detention camp⁶. The horrific images of detention camp and human sufferings were a wakeup call for the international community, as a result of which London Conference took place in 27th August, 1992.

In the London Conference, the EC and the UN decided to respect Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state while pressurising Serbs to end the hostility by putting down their heavy weapons under UN supervision (Meier 1999). The London

⁶During the war, an old mine at Omarska used by Bosnian Serbs as a Serb concentration camp, in which thousands of Muslims and Croats were tortured, hundreds killed during a four month period in 1992.

Conference also appointed Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen as the representatives to work for a negotiating settlement, which could bring an end to the conflict. Vance-Owen came up with a peace plan, which made Bosnia and Herzegovina to be divided on ethnic line. This plan could not be successful as Bosnian government did not agree to it.

The Vance and Owen plan is said to have caused great harm to the alliance of Croats and Muslims. These two ethnicities remained together until they had to fight against Serb forces, but the conflict mounted as the enemy side, (Serb forces) were brought under control to an extent by the international community. During 1993, the fight between Croats and Muslims were more barbaric.

In the mean time, UN had come up with many resolutions and sanctions, which could hardly have any impact on the deteriorating situation. Many enclaves with Muslim populations remained subject to Serb shelling. The NATO came into the picture after receiving authority from the London Conference. NATO took its first direct military actions against Serb forces after Serbia violated the UN administered No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. That was the first military campaign of the NATO till the date in August 1995. NATO's intervention forced Serbia to show willingness for peace talks.

NATO's intervention along with intense negotiations, the international community could convince three Presidents- Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia respectively, to sign the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14th December 1995, which is also known as the Dayton Accord. As per this peace accord, Bosnia remained one state with two entities. The Muslim-Croat federation was given 51 % of the territory of Bosnia, whereas Serb republic held 49%. NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was assigned the responsibility to implement the peace accord and stabilisation in the territories.

LIFE IN POST-WAR BOSNIA

The post-war life in Bosnia is equally harsh and painful like it was during the war period. For people, who have witnessed war closely and lost their near and dear ones, life has become harder. The life and situation of Bosnia comes alive in Graham

(1998)'s words, as he describes his own experience of 1996 and 1997. According to him,

This was 1996 and the peace was only five months old. Most of the day's journey was through ruins. Towns and villages gutted, some by armed conflict but most burned or blown up by one or other of the opposing ethnic forces. Bosansko Grahovo was a grim example. It had been a town of about 3,000 people, with small lumber mills and a furniture factory. On this first visit, there was not a living thing - except for one mournful dog standing in the snow by a row of demolished terrace houses" (Graham 1998: 204-220).

Life in post-war Bosnia was largely shaped by the Dayton agreement. The agreement could bring an end to the hostilities and paved the way for Bosnian people for a fresh beginning in a new political set up. The peace agreement divided the country into two political entities- the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For smooth functioning of these two entities under one nation, the presence of international peacekeeping mission was required. The deployment of around 60,000 IFOR men was necessary because trust and good will among various ethnicities did not exist anymore after the war.

As per the agreement, both the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been under constant supervision of various international peacekeeping missions following the war. Before the European Union peacekeeping troops (EUFOR) came for peacekeeping in December 2004, NATO-led IFOR had already been replaced by SFOR. However, EUFOR's mission changed from peacekeeping to civil policing in October 2007, with its presence reduced from nearly 7,000 to less than 2,500 troops. Troop strength at the end of 2009 stood at roughly 2,000 (CIA World Fact Book 2009).

Apart from achieving a durable ceasefire, other prime objective before Bosnia was to increase regional stability through confidence and security building measures, arms control and nation building process. Fresh from the war, the above noble objectives of the peace agreement seemed difficult to be realised, as there was lack of trust, political will in the post-war situation. Five years after the war, the dependency of Bosnia on international peacekeeping mission and other aids was so much that it was hard to believe about Bosnia's self rule. "If the process goes on, Bosnians may forget how to rule themselves" (Chandler 2000).

There is no doubt that Bosnia is better off today than what it used to be a few years ago. However, today, after fifteen years of war, Bosnia still needs the international policing to discharge its daily affairs. The need of international policing clearly points at the lack of trust among people, as the country as a whole is still heterogeneous in nature. According to the 2000 data, Bosniak⁷ constituted 48%, Serb 37.1%, Croat 14.3%, other 0.6% of the total population (CIA World Fact Book 2009).

In such a scenario, there is a great deal of scope for civil society to build peace and make progress, but the Dayton does not provide sufficient scope. According to Belloni (2001), the contribution of the civil society in maintaining peace, tolerance and co-existence of different ethnicities, has been extremely limited. For such a restricted contribution, the lack of international foresight can also be held responsible. "The post-war constitutional structure does not encourage local initiatives for peace-building and is ambiguous about the possibility of reconciliation among the three ethnic groups" (Belloni 2001:163-180).

There are other numerous problems grappling Bosnia. The contemporary policies of Bosnia are often accused of not giving any long term solution. Bosnia is more dependent on foreign aids rather than planning for a self-independent future (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005). The financial status of the country deteriorated more in 2009, as it was hurt by the global financial downturn. It faced a downturn in all its sectors including in GDP, exports, and employment.

Like any other post-war country, Bosnia is also struggling with corruption, unregulated economy, drugs and women trafficking. Money laundering and weak enforcement of law need to be addressed as soon as possible. Problems are many, but it is hard to arrive at a consensus between two political entities on how to deal with the situation. Another major challenge the Bosnian society faces is that how to make the internal displaced population feel secured to return to their native places and start afresh.

⁷Bosniaks are also known in the West as Bosnian Muslims, who belong to a particular south Slavic ethnic group. Bosniak has replaced Muslim as an ethnic term in part to avoid confusion with the religious term Muslim - an adherent of Islam)

Many intellectuals and policy makers feel that Bosnia should move to the next phase, beyond Dayton Agreement. “From the elimination of violence in Bosnia to the development of a heterogeneous, democratic and economically strong Bosnia- the current level of the US and western involvement must be reassessed” (Daalder and Froman 1999).

There is no doubt that Bosnia needs to go a long way. But, every plan has to take its complex history into account. In fact, history has to be considered while assessing any aspects of this country and that is the reason why this study has made an attempt to peep into its past. However, history is never unbiased. History of events or of any country is always historians’ interpretations. So, Bosnian history has been presented in this chapter by taking various historians’ accounts and interpretations in order to know the country with minimum bias. The history of Bosnia is vast in terms of its people, culture and religion. It is hard to express the eventful history of Bosnia in few pages. Due to limitation of space and time, its history has been put in nutshell from the early period to till the date. This historical understanding can be taken into consideration while evaluating the role of media in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

Media's Role during Pre-crisis Period

Their (journalists) only job in the public arena is to tell what is happening ...in any society, ignorance of the fact is always harmful ~UNESCO 1980:19. n.1~

In a crisis situation, ignorance of fact is suicidal. Pretension of ignorance is more dangerous. So, having access to authentic information at right time can be the prerequisite to resolving many crises. Especially, during a humanitarian catastrophe like Bosnia and Herzegovina War, free and unbiased dissemination of information is vital. And mass media is one of the prominent mediums, which can keep the world informed about the situation during a crisis.

Whenever a crisis strikes, media traditionally serves the role to urge people and international community across the globe to take actions for a solution to it. In order to make the international community take actions, mass media agencies are expected to bring forward the facts, figures and analysis of the situation objectively concerning the crisis to build a public opinion. However, since last twenty years, there has been a shift in media's emphasis on public discourse. "Objective presentations of facts, in-depth analysis of issues, and trends have been largely replaced by an emphasis on fast-paced, de-contextualised mini-dramas" (Milburn and McGrail 1992: 613-632).

In this changing scenario, it will be an interesting Endeavour to analyse the contents published by certain news dailies and magazine regarding Bosnian crisis. For the analysis, as already mentioned in the first chapter, two international dailies, the 'New York Times', the 'Times (London)' and the 'Time' magazine will be taken into consideration.

In this chapter, the contents of the undertaken newspapers and magazine from January 1990 to till March 1992 will be discussed and evaluated, which will be then followed by comparing them with the policies of the US and Europe to test whether their articles were influenced by states' policies. Before evaluation of these media representatives' articles, policies of the US, UN and Europe, especially focusing on the UK, will be discussed in detail. Here, the policies of these states and organisations

will be considered from 1990 to 1993 after which the war broke out full-fledged in Bosnia.

The objective of the analysis will be to understand the dynamics of global dissemination of information regarding Bosnian crisis. As the print journalism has transformed its style and has started intensifying the emotional and on-the-spot depictions, its role during Bosnia crisis will be worth analysing. This change in reporting has come at “the expense of analysis” (Hoge Jr 1994: 136-144). The analysis can also give a picture about whether media at all had played its role effectively to influence the international community. This exercise can provide insight into whether the Bosnian crisis was avoidable in case the international mediation or intervention could take place at the right time.

To find out whether media reporting during the pre-crisis period was just and sufficient, two types of methods can be used. First, an attempt can be made to find out the number of articles were published by the chosen dailies and magazine during the specific time period. Second, an analysis of the contents can be conducted to examine the objectivity of reporting. In order to test the objectivity, the outcome of the content analysis will be compared with the policies of some states and organisations, which has been discussed in the following.

BOSNIA POLICY OF THE USA (UNTIL 1993)

Bosnia and Herzegovina became an independent state only after April 1992, when it seceded away from Yugoslav Federation unilaterally. Until this declaration, most of US policies were directed towards the Federation of Yugoslavia (FRY) because Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of the federation. However, after the independence declaration by this former Yugoslav republic, the US faced dilemmas on its foreign policy towards the new state. Till Josip Broz Tito was alive, the charismatic leader who ruled Yugoslavia for 35 years, the US maintained an amicable relation with the federation (Meier 1999). After Tito broke away from the Cominform- the world body of all Communist regimes dominated by Soviet Russia, following the bitter spat with Stalin, Yugoslavia could earn more respect and importance from America. But, following Tito’s death, US’ negligence towards the federation and its republics was noticeable.

During the late 1980's and early 1990's, America's less attention towards Bosnia was inevitable. During this phase, many other crucial events like the fall of Berlin wall, collapse of East European Communism, invasion of Kuwait were taking place. The political changes Eastern Europe was witnessing stole all the attention of the US. The US was also facing the Gulf crisis⁸ for which it needed Soviet Union's co-operation. This might be another cause why the US was not willing to indulge in Yugoslav affairs in the early period of crisis as it could upset Soviet Russia, which had been sympathetic towards Serbs' cause. Apart from this, "surveys show that most Americans were uninformed about key aspects of the Bosnian conflict from the early days of that land's troubles through several years of armed conflict" (Rhine et al 2001: 592-607). So, many intellectuals argue that adequate international community's attention (especially of the US) to Yugoslav affair during early period could have made some positive difference. "While Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs were busily unravelling the fabric holding their federation together, the very time when wise, concerted outside actions could possibly have averted war, Washington was too busy elsewhere (literally) fighting other fires" (Halverson 1996: 4).

During the period from 1989 to 1990, the US adopted the policy of shedding its responsibility to Europe concerning Yugoslavia. This was the time when, the Federation was on the verge of disintegration as the nationalistic aspirations of most of republics were surfacing. Croatia and Slovenia were taking the lead for seceding away from Yugoslav, which again stole all the attention of the international community. The international community and media were so much concerned about Yugoslav unity that no one paid a heed to Bosnian situation. Particularly speaking, not only the US but for other international players also, Bosnia could not draw much attention in the pre-crisis period. The US' negligence to the events taking place inside Yugoslav federation during the beginning of 1990's will have a lot of implications for Bosnia later.

Until April 1992, when Bosnia declared independence, America seemed to expect the European Community to solve its 'localised' European problem (Halverson 1996:5). The US' inaction and indifference could be understood from the frustration George

⁸The Gulf crisis, also known as Gulf war was against Iraq by 34 nations with United Nations authorization following the Kuwait invasion by Iraqi forces on 2 August 1990.

Kenney, the former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of Yugoslav affairs in the State Department had once expressed. Kenney had joined the Yugoslav desk on February 1992 and resigned from his job on August 25 of the same year. Giving an account of the US policy on Bosnia in an interview, he said, “The administration’s approach has been to hide behind the EC and UN knowing that nobody was really going to do anything without the US pushing them” (Kenney and Berfield 1992: 639-654).

After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence following referendums in May, the US realised the gravity of the situation and that reflected in its policies to an extent. But, the measures taken by the international community remained limited to “strongly worded statements by the EC and the administration of US president George Bush” (Sloan 1998: 14). Although it was clear that disintegration of Yugoslavia was inevitable, the US seemed to be pitching for the federation’s unity. The then US President, George H. W. Bush⁹ clearly defended the unity of Yugoslavia. After five weeks the fighting broke out in Croatia and Slovenia, president Bush delivered a speech in Kiev, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, which gave a clear picture about his Administration’s policy for Yugoslavia. Bush said, “Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far off tyranny with local despotism. They will not add those, who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred” (Halverson 1996:5).

America’s opposition to unilateral independence declaration without any knowledge about the ground realities in Yugoslavia proved fatal for Bosnia. Moreover US’ intention to let Europe tackle the situation on its backyard made the situation worse. Many intellectuals and policy makers will be convinced that the US’ responsible policies for Yugoslavia and its rebellious republics could have a positive effect on the bloodshed that followed. President George H. W. Bush administration’s gesture towards Slovenia and Croatia, who were democracy-seeking and market-oriented republics, was strange. It gave both the sides- Serbia and rebellious republics a wrong signal due to which Serbia took it for granted to attack whereas the seceded republics thought of hastening the independence declaration process. This particular policy of the US was called as ‘original sin’ by Jonathan Eyal (Halverson 1996: 7).

⁹George H.W. Bush was the 41st President of the US.

It is a well agreed fact that there was almost no debate concerning any international intervention or mediation about Yugoslav matter in the beginning of 1990's, which made Bosnia vulnerable to plunge into bloodshed. There was hardly any pressure from any organisation or institution or state on America to act upon, or else the humanitarian loss due to Bosnian war could have been minimised to a great extent.

Once the war broke out in Slovenia and Croatia, the debate on the US policy started emerging. Reacting to the emerging debates, the US made efforts to be seen to act, but along with allies not unilaterally. Till autumn 1991, the US was not willing to approve any republic's independence. Rather, it wanted to contain the violence by taking riskless steps like economic and arms embargo. There was clear absence of right analysis of the causes behind problems in Yugoslavia, as a result of which Washington labelled Serbs and Yugoslavia People Army (JNA) as aggressors. The labelling was partially true because other ethnicities and their leaders were equally responsible for the problems that Yugoslavia was witnessing. Moreover, US' shedding of responsibility was so much that it approved the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia on April 7, 1992, only days after the EC did. By that time harm had already been done.

Until this point of time, the administration tried not to do much than what American public could support and expect. According to Eyal (1993), US government was aware of the situation in Yugoslavia in the early years of 1990's. It had the knowledge of an impending danger hovering over Bosnia and other Republics, which could be exploded at any time. "In fact as early as 1990, and a full year before battle was joined, western intelligence agencies predicted the war with great accuracy (the central Intelligence Agency was even right about the month). Yet nothing was done..." (Eyal 1993: 22-24). However, Warren Zimmerman, the US ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, defends the US action strongly. According to him

The US government strongly opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, largely because of our belief that it would lead to war. The Bush administration opposed the EC's decision in December 1991 to recognise Slovenia and Croatia and to offer recognition to Bosnia and Macedonia. Once that wrongheaded decision had been made, there was no Yugoslavia left. The issue then became how to protect Bosnian from war (Zimmerman, Kenney 1995: 142-144).

BOSNIA IN EC'S POLICY FRAMEWORK

The European Community (EC) as an international power realised the 'depth and seriousness' of the Yugoslav crisis much later, which would later prove fatal for Bosnia. Once the Community realised the urgency, it wanted to sort out the problem without any help from outside, hinting at the involvement of the US. The mood of the EC could clearly be deciphered from what the President of the EC Jaques Delors said in the summer of 1991. He said, "We don't interfere in American affairs. Hope they will enough respect not to interfere in ours" However, Jaques Delors' confidence to be able to deal with the situation could not be translated fruitfully into actions. The failure of the EC to mediate and solve the problem on their soil can largely be attributed to its lack of military and financial commitment. The EC's situation to deal with such a complex situation could be understood from the following quote.

When Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission, tried to mediate between the disputing Yugoslav parties in the spring of 1991, he promised that the EC would provide financial assistance and conclude a favourable trade agreement if the Yugoslavs compromised on restructuring the federation and avoided a break up. But the promise carried little weight because Delors did not have the authority to commit EC states and could not credibly deliver (Touval 1994: 44-57).

On May 25, 1991, when Slovenia along with Croatia had declared independence following a referendum, the EC had expressed its opposition to the declaration. According to many scholars, EC's stance could have encouraged the JNA to invade Slovenia to prevent the implementation of the declaration. To understand why the EC as an international power did not show much interest in the conflict, Bennet (1995) says that the national interests of the international community were not at risk. The fundamental reason for the failure was that "the great powers have not considered their national interest sufficiently threatened by the conflict" (Bennet 1995: 234).

To deal with the volatile situation in Yugoslavia, the EC had established a peace conference in The Hague on Yugoslavia under chairmanship of the former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. The objectives of the peace conference was appreciable, as for the first time an international actor was ready to develop a coordinated approach equally towards all the republics of Yugoslavia. However,

Carrington' Peace Conference¹⁰ lacked of military clout. According to Touval (1994), the EC members also never tried to understand the Yugoslav crisis on the basis of understanding its peculiarities, rather they looked for negotiations according to their respective domestic political considerations. Italy, Ireland and Germany favoured an interventionist approach, whereas, the UK and France always wanted to stay out of the conflict. All the above factors made the EC's effort of mediation to fall flat.

The increasing rift between members compelled the EC to establish a five-member judicial commission in August 27, 1991, headed by the French constitutional lawyer Robert Badinter¹¹ to consider the applications by Yugoslav republics seeking independence. It was evident that EC did not have a foreign policy with a clear vision concerning how to deal with conflicts like what was happening in Yugoslavia. The EC's lack of interest and seriousness for Bosnia was also evident in the way Yugoslav matters were not discussed at the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. Rather, the matter was "passed to the UN, precisely the institution whose involvement the EC had sought to avoid" (Eyal 1993: 22-24).

UK REFERS HISTORY FOR POLICY ON BOSNIA

British policy towards Bosnia during war and in the pre-war period faces criticisms from various quarters. During the above period, Britain is accused of adopting policies of appeasement and indifference. Many allege that policies of Britain were pro-Serbian. Like most international players, the UK also favoured the unity of the Yugoslav federation. This particular understanding of Britain seems to be guided by its historical experiences with Balkans and the situation prevailing in Northern Ireland.

The historical experience says that during 1870's, the then conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli did the right thing by deciding not to intervene in butchering of Bulgarians by Turks. Thus historical lesson seemed to have guided the

¹⁰Lord Carrington, the former British Foreign Secretary was appointed as chairman and co-coordinator of a proposed peace conference to bring the Yugoslav warring factions together on discussion table.

¹¹Robert Badinter was the president of the five-member Commission, also known as the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia or Badinter Arbitration Committee. The committee was appointed by the EC to provide legal advice on Yugoslavia splitting.

British politicians in the Yugoslav matter too (Gow 1997:89). The nature of the British policies could be understood by what Gow says, “The dispute within Yugoslavia was in the view of foreign office Minister of State Douglas Hogg, largely ethnic and historic” (Gow 1997: 89).

Apart from the historical reasons, Britain could draw a parallel between Northern Ireland and Yugoslav matter. “Any international role in the dissolution of the Yugoslav state had to be weighed against the possibilities of parties or organization outside the UK trying to take a role in resolving the troubles in Northern Ireland” (Gow, 1997:90). Among other factors to have shaped the UK’s policies were its membership of the EC. Being a member of the European Community, it had to be abided by certain rules and regulations to deal with the crisis situation.

UN’S AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE FOR BOSNIA

In the post cold-war scenario, UN experienced totally a new security situation. Yugoslavia became the testing ground for UN as it demanded an altogether different strategy to be adopted. This might be the reason why this international organisation faced more failures than successes in resolving conflicts. In the post Cold War scenario, UN mediation in resolving many crises has “extended the processes” or “aggravated many of those dispute” (Touval 1994: 44-57). According to Touval (1994), the International organisation lacks in dynamism in terms of strategy making on the negotiation table. It also has hardly any political leverage due to which “its promises and threats lack credibility”. Many also believe that the UN’s pre-war policy towards Bosnia was largely defined by neglecting attitude of the then Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The Secretary General believed that crisis situation in African states was more deplorable than what was happening in Bosnia or in other Yugoslav Republics. His belief had convinced him that the “lives lost in one place seem to matter more than lives lost in another. War in one country may get enormous attention, while elsewhere may be virtually ignored” (Boutros-Ghali 1996: 86-98). His attitude towards Bosnia in the early period fetched him severe criticisms. The UN under his tenure, seemed not be sure of its role, because it considered the problem in Yugoslavia as an ethnic conflict, needed to be resolved among themselves. However, the Balkan experience later made the UN learn many things about the post Cold-War era conflicts.

With the knowledge about policies of the above states, the analysis of the contents published by international media agencies can be conducted. Before venturing for an in-depth analysis, the logical question comes in to mind that why the international dailies and magazines have been considered for the study, but not the domestic media agencies of Bosnia. A satisfactory explanation could be found only after knowing the status and reach of Bosnian media enjoyed during and prior to the war.

CHOOSING INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

Instead of taking Bosnian media agencies into consideration the study chooses international print media representatives. There many reasons are behind this decision. The liberty and scope received by the media in today's federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was totally different from what it used be during the pre-crisis and crisis period (BBC 2010). Although there has not been much development in the quality of information the media cater in the post-war society, but many international organisations and their various initiatives have been trying to help for reconstruction and democratisation of the Bosnia media. Post-war economic stagnation has been the main hindrance for the existence of a free and strong press in the present Bosnia. Even though the condition of media at present is not laudable, but it was worse during the war period.

Bosnia-Herzegovina press had immense opportunity and potential during the early 1980s (just after Tito's death) to become an independent, vibrant and a free voice of the people, but suffered immensely after the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia started (Djilas 1993). Earlier to 1980's, the freedom enjoyed by press was not unhindered, as Bosnian was a republic of Communists ruled Yugoslav Federation. Like in other communist regimes, Yugoslavian press was not regulated by the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression completely. According to Djilas (1993), Marshal Josip Tito did not tolerate those, who were in favour of greater freedom of speech. Many were politically expelled for the same reason.

Area	Consumption of printing and writing paper per 1,000 inhabitants kg per year
Africa (excluding Arab States)	900
Northern America	66,900
Latin America	4,300
Asia(excluding Arab States)	2,600
Arab States	1,500
Europe	23,200
Oceania	11,000
USSR	4,900
World Average	9,000

Table No: 1, Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1977

Media suffered the most once the war began. Most of media turned into propaganda tools in the hands of authorities, armies and factions (BBC 2010). The press lost its independence and their reporting style became slanted according to ethnicity, culture and religion. With the help of party-controlled media, Milosevic led the nationalistic movement in Serbia (Djilas 1993).

Taking such a biased domestic media into consideration, it is not possible to arrive at any viable conclusion. Apart from the above perspective, there are several other reasons why the American and European media agencies have been taken into consideration.

Firstly, the tables in the side give a picture about the circulation and consumption of the printing news papers across the world (UNESCO 1980). Here it is clear that Europe and Northern America take the lead in both consumption and distribution of daily news papers. Though the facts and figures provide a picture during late 70's, but the trend still remains the same even today. A wide consumption and distribution capacity of the West for printed newsletters automatically have a larger audience.

The undertaken newsletters “are part of the powerful network of American and European news media that control “what much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news” (Kozol 2004: 1-38). Similarly, comparing to the Bosnian media agencies, American and European media representatives function in more free and democratic way.

Area	Percentage distribution of daily newspapers (circulation).
Africa (excluding Arab States)	1.0
Northern America	16.2
Latin America	5.6
Asia(excluding Arab States)	21.8
Arab States	0.7
Europe	28.2
Oceania	1.7
USSR	24.8
Table No: 2 , Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1977.	

Secondly, the described Western print media are believed to be equipped with latest technologies, which make their presence feel every corner of the globe. Especially, about the 'Time', Kozol (2000) points out that the magazine influences a wide range of people as nearly every public and academic library and schools subscribe it. Thus the undertaken newsletters have the potential to draw global attention towards an incident they consider to be important. Even though, the liberty, freedom and power the Western press practises and enjoys, it has also been accused of being biased.

Thirdly, the work is interested in evaluating those media agencies' roles, which are considered to be functioning in accordance with the principles of freedom of speech and objectivity. So, the study will have scope to show that these media agencies in reality are influenced, according to their states policies. According to Kozol (2000), the news magazines and dailies frame the conflict, which can justify their states' policies based on 'encroaching notion of globalisation'.

The McBride Commission's report (1980) titled 'many voices one world' by the UNESCO, has expressed concern about the neutrality of press as they receive

subsidies by their respective governments for their survival. Finding for an absolute neutral newspaper is next to impossible. This study will attempt to find out the degree of biasness in these news agencies while reporting a crisis, especially when their respective countries have a crucial role to play.

EVALUATING MEDIA'S ROLE

The evaluation of the role played by media in the pre-crisis period should be guided by some particular hypotheses. The first hypothesis of this chapter will be that the media agencies neglected Bosnia immensely during pre-war period. The second hypothesis is that the media representatives were biased in reporting i.e. they echoed their states' policies without pushing the international community to look at Bosnia seriously. Keeping these hypotheses in mind, the analysis of articles and contents of all the undertaken newsletters have been mentioned in the below.

THE TIMES (LONDON) ANALYSIS

As this chapter deals with the role of media during pre-war period, the published contents of the concerned daily have been considered from January 1990 to March 1992. Owing to some limitations in terms of space and time, all articles cannot be considered here. Therefore, the random selection of articles from the available archival resources has been adopted, which will be followed by both quantificational and contents analysis of the selected published materials.

The next important aspect of this evaluation process is deciding about the criterion to choose the articles from the archival resources. Here, a specific criterion has been considered according to which, only those articles have been taken in to account, which in their headlines contain any of these words like Balkans, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia or words related to Yugoslav developments. The reason behind choosing this particular criterion is that during the time period from 1990 to 1992 March, stories exclusively on Bosnia were a rare case. And during the mentioned time period, Bosnia was a very much part of Yugoslavia as a result of which, the information or any other developments about Bosnia used to be clubbed together with other republics and Yugoslavia.

To begin with the analysis, the foremost step is to select some articles randomly within the time frame from January 1990 to March 1992. Secondly, an attempt has been made to find out how many times the word 'Bosnia' or any other synonymous description of Bosnia has been mentioned in the contents of selected articles. Thirdly, an analysis of articles has been done while comparing them with their respective states' policies. The table number 3 represents a total number of 26 articles, which includes both news and views. In the left most column, the date of publication (DOP) of the particular article has been mentioned. The second column contains the title of the chosen articles followed by another four columns, which represents the number of time the word 'Bosnia', 'Serbia', 'Croatia' and 'Slovenia' have been mentioned in the particular article.

In the table no. 3, considering the titles of articles, it is clear that Bosnia has not made it to the headline even once comparing to other republics. In the contents of the stories, 'Bosnia' has been mentioned only in 8 articles comparing to other republics. Serbia and Croatia have been mentioned in all the 26 articles whereas Slovenia could make it in 21 articles. It is true that Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia were the epicentre of all the activities during the mentioned time period, but Bosnia was also vulnerable to what was going on in the federation. It is undeniable that Bosnia was showing all the signs of an imminent catastrophe by the end of 1991, but still could not attract media attention the way other two republics could do.

As it has already been discussed, the media owes some responsibility towards societies, the international media should have warned about the impending danger. By publishing much news and views about Bosnia, media should have tried to seek attention of the international community to keep the Bosnian situation under control in order not to allow it to explode. Even though many intellectuals and policy makers believe that violence in Bosnia was unavoidable, it should be admitted that the barbarity of civil war could have been minimised. However, the table clearly shows that Bosnia was clearly ignored by the media agency in the pre-war situation. In other words, negligence towards Bosnia by London, EC and UN reflected in media's reports in the pre-crisis period.

D.O.P	Title of the article	Bosnia	Serbia	Croatia	Slovenia
20-Jan-90	Communists in Yugo try to repair image	no	yes	yes	yes
22-Jan-90	Rift over party reform threatens Yugo unity	no	yes	yes	yes
30-Jan-90	Yugo govt. Seeks end to kosovo bloodshed	yes	yes	yes	yes
22-Apr-90	The general whips up Croatian nationalism	yes	yes	yes	no
24-Apr-90	Victory for Croat right could split Yugo	no	yes	yes	yes
17-May-90	Yugo threat to new parties	no	yes	yes	yes
3-Jul-90	Yugo unity hit by independent declaration	no	yes	yes	yes
27-Aug-90	Protest by Muslims brings break up of Yugo nearer	yes	yes	yes	yes
17-Oct-90	Yugo looks at option	yes	yes	yes	yes
20-Oct-90	Yugoslav nightmares	no	yes	yes	yes
5-Jul-90	Serbian mischief	no	yes	yes	yes
12-Dec-90	Yugo falling apart	yes	yes	yes	yes
7-May-91	Yugo army on alert after soldier dies in riot	no	yes	yes	no
25-Jun-91	Royal remedy to save Yugo	no	yes	yes	yes
27-Jun-91	World ignores Yugo's rebel republics	no	yes	yes	yes
28-Jun-91	Yugoslav tanks roll into two rebel republic	no	yes	yes	yes
5-Jul-91	Yugoslav ultimatum rejected by Slovenia	no	yes	yes	yes
6-Jul-91	EC imposes total arms embargo on Yugo	no	yes	yes	yes
1-Aug-91	Yugo army for all out war	yes	yes	yes	yes
6-Aug-91	Borders of greater Serbia starts to emerge	no	yes	yes	no
2-Sep-91	Yugoslav republics agree to ceasefire	no	yes	yes	no
9-Sep-91	A Balkan community	yes	yes	yes	yes
13-Sep-91	Civil war in Yugo: Serbs advance as DM defies state order	no	yes	yes	yes
8-Oct-91	Yugo air force jets attack Zagreb palace	no	yes	yes	yes
18-Nov-91	Zagreb leaders concede fall of Vukovar	no	yes	yes	no
27-Dec-91	Belgrade issues new dinars to beat dumping	yes	yes	yes	yes

Table No. 3: ‘Yugo’ should be read as Yugoslavia, D.O.P refers to Date Of Publication, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia should be read with adding the prefix of ‘mentioning of’. Articles from ‘Times’ have been analysed in the above table.

To observe the biasness of media more clearly, few articles can be taken into consideration for their contents analysis. In most of articles, it shows that the mentioning of Bosnia has been limited only to one or two sentences. Sometimes, the content about Bosnia has got restricted only to few words and the same information can be seen repeating in different articles of different days. For example- the article of 1st August 1991, titled, 'Yugoslavs army for all-out war' mentioned about Bosnia, but remained limited to only one sentence. The sentence said, "In Croatia, where guerrilla war raging and which threatens to spill into Bosnia, Serbs, Croats and Muslims are all arming themselves." Likewise, another article titled 'A Balkan Community' published almost a month later on 9th September 1991 also contained a line which said, "The war in Croatia could intensify or even spill over into Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Apart from these two instances, there remained only six articles in the table, where Bosnia has been mentioned, but has been restricted to few words. In most of the cases, Bosnia has been mentioned in terms of its diversity in population make-up and ethnicity. Not even in a single article, media reported or sought or criticised the policies of the UK or any other state or organisations on Bosnian developments. Rather, media throughout 1990, reported extensively on Yugoslav unity, while ignoring the individual republics. By 1991, Croatia and Slovenia grabbed media's attention, but Bosnia again failed to come into the limelight.

THE NEW YORK TIMES ANALYSIS

The New York Times' articles can be analysed in the similar fashion like that of the Times (London) in the above. The two hypotheses will shape the analysis. First, it will be tested that Bosnia was neglected in the pre-crisis period for which the quantificational analysis of articles will be adopted. Second, it will be held that the New York Times' news and views during pre-crisis period reflected America's policies for Bosnia of that period.

In case of this particular daily, the articles have been retrieved from online archival resources, where a database of articles from 1857 is available. The criterion of selecting these articles is based on by typing the word 'Bosnia' in its archival search

Time period	Total no of articles	Bosnia in heading
Jan-Feb	4	0
Mar-Apr	3	0
May-Jun	1	0
Jul-Aug	2	0
Sep-Oct	4	0
Nov-Dec	7	0
Table No 4: New York Times: 1990		

engine while mentioning the time frame from January 1990 to December 1990 and from January 1991 to December 1991. All the articles appeared as the result of this search process have been taken into consideration. The tables in the below provides information from which it can be inferred the importance Bosnia received during the pre-crisis situation.

In the table number 4 and 5, the first column represents the time line, the second column talks about the total number of retrieved articles within a given time period and the third column gives information about the number of times the word 'Bosnia' has appeared in the headings of the articles.

Time Period	Total no of articles	Bosnia in heading
Jan-Feb	4	0
Mar-Apr	3	0
May-Jun	14	0
Jul-Aug	15	0
Sep-Oct	28	1
Nov-Dec	25	1
Table No:5, New York Times: 1991		

Firstly, the table no 4 shows that not even a single article was published in the whole year of 1990 with having Bosnia in headline. The absence of exclusive story about Bosnia clearly gives the impression that the media agency did not consider Bosnian developments of much importance comparing to others republics throughout the year.

Likewise, the table number 5 represents data about the year 1991. It can be seen in table number 5 that Bosnia appeared in the headline only twice during the last months of 1991. One

of these two articles was published on December 28, titled 'Bosnia fears it's next in Yugoslav civil strife', where as the second one was published on 22nd September, titled, 'Big Troop Movements Alarm Bosnia'.

The New York Times reporting about Bosnia was not encouraging both in 1990 and 1991. There was a clear lack of reporting about Bosnian situation, even though this republic was most vulnerable for plunging into war.

Secondly, now the analysis of few articles' contents has been carried out to observe whether this particular media agency was biased in reporting.

An article titled 'One Yugoslavia or Six?' of January 31, 1990, said, "America's preferences should be reform, stability and unity, in that order" while referring to the unity of Yugoslavia. The similar ethos was expressed in many other articles as well. An article, 'How Yugoslavia Can Hang Together' published on December 3, 1990, expressed the same message. It said, 'Yugoslavia can remain intact only if all Yugoslavs adopt a policy of live and let live. That is more easily done within a confederation than outside it.' From the above examples, it is clear that the New York Times favoured the integrity of Yugoslavia. And interestingly, the US administration had also insisted Yugoslav Republics to stay together in 1990.

Innumerable instances can be found, where the situation in Yugoslav conflict has been described as civil war or ethnic war or tribal rivalry by the media agency. For example, the article titled "Old tribal rivalries in Eastern Europe pose threat of infection" published on October 13, 1991 can be considered. It described the situation in Yugoslavia by saying, "But with 1992 only months away and much of Eastern Europe wracked by nationalist fever, the virus of revived tribalism is proving somewhat contagious, and it threatens increasingly to infect Western Europe." Here, it can be noticed that media's interpretation of the situation in Bosnia quite matches with that of the US administration. The US and other Western countries described the situation in the Balkans by using terms like 'ethnic war' or 'civil war', with the aim to not to be involved in the matter. The US and UN portrayed the situation in the Balkan as an internal affairs of the republics while trying to stay out of the mess. And media also followed the same suit until bloodbath took place in full scale in Bosnia. The understanding of media about the Balkan crisis seems to be half baked and tilted towards the state policy. Without making an effort to understand the situation objectively, New York Times spoke the voice of the US.

In most of the stories taken for consideration often present the view points of what the State's policymakers had to say, but not of others with a different opinion on the same subject. In the above described 28th December article, 'Bosnia fears it's next in Yugoslav civil strife', quoted various US diplomats' opinions, which explained the dangerous situation that prevailed in Bosnia. However, the story did not give an account for the need of that hour. It was quite clear from quotes that US knew the whole situation was worsening, but the report did not make effort to say that it needed international help in terms of intervention or mediation. The article of 22nd September 1991, 'Big Troop Movements Alarm Bosnia' also came up with a detailed report on sharply increasing tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina "since vast numbers of Serbian and Yugoslav Army troops had begun moving through the republic." However, it did not say a word about the need of international help.

Another noticeable aspect of the analysis is that all media reports were literally devoid of any mentioning of Serbia as the aggressor and Bosnia or other rebel republics as the victims. Till 1991, there was hardly any report that looked at Serbia as the culprit, rather focused on dissenting voices of Slovenia and Croatia. There was absence of 'aggressor- victim' thoughts, as it became a part of the US policy only after Bill Clinton came to power in 1993 (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 1997: 515-529). Until then US policy saw the conflicts from historical point of view while shedding responsibility on European counterparts. Media reports reflect exactly the similar policy change in its reporting style.

THE TIME MAGAZINE ANALYSIS

The contents of the 'Time' magazine will be analysed in similar manner like that of the New York Times. And the hypotheses for analysis will also remain same, as the particular magazine gets published from the US.

Time magazine has online archives of all the published articles of its previous issues since March 1923. With the help of its archival search engine, 1,533 articles could be retrieved, which contained the word Bosnia in somewhere in their contents including in the headlines. The search result was for the time period from March 1923 to March 2010. Out of these total number of articles, there were only six articles appeared to have been published within the time period from January 1990 to February 1992.

Firstly, the analysis points out that in 1990, only one article with Bosnia in the contents got published whereas five were published in different issues of 1991. The number of articles, published during the pre-crisis situation was meagre, which shows that this particular media agency did not pay attention towards Bosnia in the pre-war period.

Secondly, by analysing and comparing the content of articles with that of the US' policy, the media agency's objectivity has been tested in the following. The only article, published in 1990, 'Yugoslavia The Old Demons Arise' (Borrell 1990), gave a detailed account of the unrest in the former Yugoslavia, relating it to its history. The article was informative in nature about Yugoslavia's history, where Bosnia was mentioned only in one sentence, which was not sufficient to draw anyone's attention. The next article with Bosnia in its content was published after almost a gap of six months. The article of February 25th 1991 titled, 'Breaking Up Is Hard' (Birnbaum 1991), talked about Slovenia's referendum for independence and Croatia's preparation for the same. It mentioned about Bosnia while referring at Milosevic's dream of greater Serbia, but surprisingly did not talk about how Bosnians would react to it. The next article of May 27th 1991 titled, 'Yugoslavia: Dangerous Muddle' was also informative in nature in which, Bosnia was mentioned only once. It said, "But the federation itself has been stumbling toward dissolution since free elections last year installed non-Communist governments in the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia." In another article titled 'Yugoslavia: The Case for Confederation' of 12th August 1991, the magazine mentioned about Bosnia while informing, "Some 40,000 ethnic Serbs have fled across Croatia's borders, mostly into the Serbian province of Vojvodina and the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

From the above content analysis, it appears that the Time magazine's articles remained informative in nature. However, the information focused mostly on integration of Yugoslavia and other republics. There was no urgency shown in its reporting about Bosnian situation.

BOSNIA: VICTIM OF NEGLIGENCE

Though it is hard to believe, but it is true that Bosnia remained out of media coverage during 1990 and 1991. Except two articles, published by the New York Times during

the end of 1991, none of the undertaken media agencies gave Bosnia the space in their heading throughout two years of 1990 and 1991. The number of articles containing Bosnia anywhere in their contents was also limited to few articles, which has been presented in the above tables. The analysis also shows that media agencies focused on what was happening in other two former Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia and the integrity of Yugoslavia, but Bosnia was hardly mentioned.

From the analysis, it is also evident that the articles published by the undertaken news dailies and magazine reflect the attitude of their respective states. During the pre-crisis period, the US and the UK never gave importance to Bosnia, rather remained busy in preserving the unity of Yugoslavia. Even though, there was information available to the UK and the US about Bosnia's deteriorating condition, but they did not come up with certain policy or strategy for the republic. Media agencies treated Bosnian developments in similar fashion without making any effort to build pressure for active actions to contain the impending danger.

Chapter 4

Media's Role after the War Breaks Out

From the moment one asks oneself the question: is it really necessary to speak of this? One should not be practising journalism. ~Francois Giroud, Editor of L'Express~

World's media scenario is transforming fast in various aspects. The functioning and reaction of the post- twentieth century media is different than earlier. In today's world, media agencies claim to be more democratic while taking advantage of the right to freedom of expression vigorously. At the same time, they face criticisms on various fronts as well. They have been accused of not maintaining high normative standards in day-to-day functioning. Media is expected to adhere to the normative guidelines while informing their audience about happenings across the world. However, the normative charter, explained in the first chapter, no more guides the functioning of media. The value of freedom of expression, social responsibility, professionalism, providing authentic facts and giving equal space for both sides of a story, is fast fading away from the functioning domain of media. There are innumerable examples of developments across the world in which we can find such lapses.

Media's contribution in informing the world is unquestionable. Fast propagation of news and views has been possible due to the presence of well equipped mass media. However, when it comes to discharging the moral and social responsibility, media has failed in case of Bosnia War. The analysis of data in the previous chapter clearly shows that Bosnia never received enough attention of media until the bloodletting started. If media had paid a heed to what was happening in Bosnia in those early days then it could have made some positive difference to Bosnian history. Now, this chapter will examine how media played its role once the Bosnian War broke out.

The chapter will begin with the reaction of the world powers to Bosnian crisis, which will be followed by the analysis of media reports. The analysis is going to be based on some hypotheses about media's role during the war. Firstly, it has been hypothesised that media agencies were interested in Bosnian War only after it turned violent and bloody. In other words, it will be tested that war or war like situation could draw media's quick attention once the war was on, but not during the pre-crisis period. The

second hypothesis believed that media representatives gave ample space to Bosnia once the war became intense. So a dramatic rise in the number of articles during war-period could be noticed, comparing to the pre-crisis time. The third hypothesis states that the information given by media about Bosnia war was biased, as the presentation of facts and figures reflected their respective state's policies concerning the crisis.

The objective of this chapter will be to test these above hypotheses in terms of analysis of the contents and comparing them with their respective states' policies. The published news and views about Bosnia War will also be compared with that of facts and figures, taken from other sources of literature. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to have knowledge about the policies and reactions of the world players like the US, the UK, the EU and the UN for Bosnia War.

THE WORLD REACTS

Officially, the full-scale war broke out after Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia on March 3 1992. It was the third war in Yugoslavia, which was fought in Bosnia this time. "Unlike other two previous wars, it was not a straightforward war of secession by a single Bosnian people" (Oliver 2005: 10). The war was complex in nature.



The international community never took the worsening situation in this former Yugoslav republic seriously before it witnessed blood-shedding among different ethnicities. The whole world realised the gravity of the situation only after there was widespread killing and fighting broke out between two of its major ethnic communities, Serbs and Muslims. Until Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslav federation, the international community, especially the West tried its best to preserve the integrity of the federation. The West remained defiant on its stand about maintaining the integrity of Yugoslav till the horrors of Bosnian war became public. The West's attitude was like, "theirs wars were irrational, insensate, primeval, bloodletting, ours wars were fought for principles- democracy, freedom, God and free trade" (Rabia and Lifschultz 1994). According to Meier (1999), the West neglected and 'misunderstood' the ground realities in last two years of Yugoslavia for which the western diplomats should be blamed for. They have been accused of committing political error, lazy thinking and superficiality, "who bear their share of responsibility for the catastrophic errors of the West's policy in Yugoslavia" (Meier 1999).

The other prominent players of international community also reacted to the war only after it claimed thousands of lives. Apart from the West, the disturbing developments in the Balkans mattered maximum to Russia in international arena. Russia adopted a pro-Serbian attitude in its policy making towards Balkan for many factors. The evolution of Russia's Balkan policy can be understood in terms of five phases (Kubicek 1999-2000). The first phase began with 'last days of Soviet Union' during which Soviet Union tried hard to preserve Yugoslav unity. The other four phases are defined in terms of Russia's nostalgia for great power status and its harsh rhetoric and pragmatic policy (Hunter 2004). However, only in May 1994, Russia formally joined the US and the EU to increase the effort of international community against Serbia to end the two-year-old war in Bosnia.

Another important players of the international community, Japan as well as Germany were unwilling to take the burden in terms of sending troops for peace keeping in the post Cold War era. It preferred to help by signing checks rather than by sending troops (Haar 2001).

To have a brief idea about the turning points of Bosnian war and the responses it received from the international community can be understood from the following graphical presentation. The graphical presentation has been borrowed from the work of Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997). The following graph has been used for different purposes by Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) in their study, but here it has been used to have a clear picture of the war in a nutshell.

The figure 1 shows four potential break points, that is, times at which the international strategies and patterns of response may have changed. "The four points are the weeks ending 4/17/93, 2/12/94, 12/17/94, and 7/29/95 (hereafter, we drop the "week ending" designation, implied by a given date). Figure 2 in the below presents the weekly time series of international actions towards Serbia and vice versa for which the time series begins in the first week of March 1992 just before the outbreak of war in earnest." (Goldstein, Pevehouse 1997:515-529)



THE US' REACTION

The above graphs clearly show that there was not of much international intervention in the early period of the war. Thousands of civilians were dead and more than a million were homeless as a result of the war in Bosnia by August 1992. Despite the devastation taking place in Bosnia, the US was reluctant to take any definite steps as George W. H. Bush administration was facing criticisms for spending more time and money in foreign affairs rather than concentrating on domestic issues. Apart from that the impending presidential election kept the Bush administration busy and demanded more cautious steps in its foreign policy. This was one of the basic reasons behind

why Bush never wanted to commit any military presence for peace-keeping in the Balkans. "There was a marked reluctance to become involved as Yugoslavia disintegrated into civil war" (Cameron 2002).

The ambivalent attitude of the US could be well understood from what James Baker, the Secretary of State during Bush regime once said. According to him the US "did not have a dog in that fight" (Cameron 2002). The indifferent attitude of America towards Bosnia had come under heavy attack from the European Community (EC) as it thought that the US was trying to play safe while refusing to participate in the UN forces overseeing humanitarian aid distribution in Bosnia. Bush administration also came under criticism from the liberal democrats for failing to stop human rights violation in Bosnia.

With liberal democrat candidate, Bill Clinton took the charge as the 42nd President of the US on January 20th 1993 many international analysts expected a change in policy of the US towards Balkan events. Clinton in his inaugural presidential address on February 15, declared, "our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Theirs cause is America's cause" (Henriksen 1996:7). Such declaration made by the new President was able to generate hope among Bosnian Muslims as they were seeking international help to embrace democracy successfully. At the same time, Bosnians had the impression that the US would intervene immediately in the matter. However, in reality Clinton avoided and neglected foreign affairs. He was clearly preoccupied with domestic issues. "Had Western leaders, notably President Clinton, had the moral bottom to get up and say frankly that no decisive help would be forthcoming, the chances are that the Bosnians would have accepted the Vance-Owen plan that, for all its faults, gave them far more than they are likely to obtain today, whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield" (Rieff, 1995: 76-88).

There are scores of literature, which describes US' negligent attitude towards Bosnian war. It is said that US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was sent a confidential memorandum from one of his staff analysts, which clearly stated about the systemic use of force and violence by Serbs and forcible transfer of population in Bosnia in a manner which would create Serbian Bosnia (Hodge 2006). Moreover, it is also believed that the US had the knowledge of the Serb camps by May 1992, but

neither the US nor any major world powers reacted to them (Hodge 2006). Having possessed one of the strongest intelligence network systems in the world, the US cannot deny of its ignorance about the impending war in Bosnia. Despite having all the knowledge, it never made clear about its policy during the period of 1992-1993, which was crucial for Bosnian leaders, especially the Muslim population of the republic. "One great factor stood in the way of peace in Bosnia- Muslim anticipation of US support to alter military balance and help them win the war" (Sremac 1999:137). Moreover, the assurance from the Clinton Administration of using its military power in enforcing No-Fly Zone, in a way encouraged the Bosnian Muslim leadership not to negotiate for the Vance-Owen Peace plan. With the insistence of Europe, for the first time, Bosnian Muslim and Serb leaders had come for a face-to-face talk, but it was bound to be failed. One of the early reasons of failure was the US' elusive policy. In spite of warning from UN envoy Cyrus Vance, US officials met with Bosnian Muslim President Izetbegovic, who had flown to Washington leaving the negotiation table with the hope to get military help from US (Sremac 1999: 137).

By the time Clinton came to power, he already had a mistaken view that Geneva peace talks failed due to insufficient pressure on Serbs. Now, the administration started working on the idea that "it was time for Europe to step aside and let the US take lead" (Sremac 1999: 137). Now, the clear gesture from US was to treat Serbs as the aggressors, as a result of which, Serbs were put under more and more pressure.

The next major policy shift was witnessed with US favouring a military intervention in Bosnia. To give shape to this strategy, the first step was to call for lifting arms embargo imposed by the UN against Yugoslavia. And US had started covertly assembling and financing weapons to Bosnian Muslims before the official lifting or embargo (Farkas 2003). In support of military intervention, the second step of the US administration was with the introduction of 'safe havens'. The reality of safe havens was never understood properly by the US. For example, Srebrenica was a declared safe haven on April 13 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)¹². Despite its safe haven status, the mass killings were going on in the city for which, both Muslim

¹² "On 16 April 1993 the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter, adopted Resolution 819 demanding all parties treat Srebrenica and its surrounding as a 'safe area and requesting the secretary general take immediate steps to increase UNPROFOR's presence in Srebrenica.'"(Sloan 1998:23)

and Serb sides could be held responsible. Victims were from both the ethnicities. However, the US along with many other countries held Serb forces as the aggressor against Muslims. According to Farkas (2003), in order to create a scene of helplessness and draw attention of the US to intervene militarily, the Muslim leaderships did not allow its civilians to leave the city. This fact about safe havens was knowingly unknown to the US.

Another important aspect of US policy was to remain silent on the renewed fight between Croats and Bosnian Muslims. There were many Croat-run concentration camps for Muslims, but neither did it draw attention of media nor of the international players. Finally, after two-years of wait, the Clinton administration decided to enter into the conflict, but being from Bosnian Muslim side. The UN, without finding any other option had to give its nod for the US-led NATO intervention on January 28 1994. By February 1994, the NATO air attacks continued for one and half a year during which, Serbs position became feeble and it later led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.

EUROPE'S BOSNIA DILEMMA

Bosnian war was a significant turning point for the European Community. It alerted Europe about the changing nature of war. By the year 1992 February, the European Community had already turned itself into the European Union (EU) under the Maastricht Treaty with a clear political and economical vision. Despite being a union of all the major powers of Europe, it could not influence the Bosnian developments much. Arriving at a consensus was a very difficult task in the EU policy making, which was reflected in formulating initiatives and policies towards Bosnian war. The European powers believed more in soft measures to stop the war, as many of its powerful members like the UK and France, were strongly against any military intervention. Rather, their weapons to end the war were, through economic sanctions, discussions, negotiations and persuasions, which could yield though hardly any visible result. Thus it paved the way for the US to lead from the front in Bosnian affairs.

Until a British journalist of 'Channel Four' happened to get the pictures of the Omrska detention camp,¹³ the international community ignored the killings and violence incurred by Serbs. The horrific images of concentration camps reminded Europeans about their recent past that had seen millions perishing during Nazi genocide. The EU then came up with the London Conference that took place on 27th August, 1992. In this conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed and the European countries decided to approve the republic's independence. The conference also appointed Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen¹⁴ to work for a negotiating settlement between different ethnicities.

From February 1992 until the Dayton Agreement, European Community had attempted many times to help the warring sides to arrive at a peace- settlement. According to Momir (1995-96), four major mediation attempts have been made by the EC and they are - the EC Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was mediated by Jose Cutiliero and Lord Carrington. The mediation process went on from February to August in 1992. Secondly, the famous Vance-Owen peace plans under the joint initiative with the UN, which proposed for a loose federation of 10 cantons on ethnic lines, but was unsuccessful. The peace plan was declared dead by June 1993. The third attempt was through the Stoltenberg-Owen peace plan, which proposed to divide Bosnia into three parts on ethnic line, which was again a failure. Finally, the Contact Group mediation came into process in which representatives from the UN, EU, US and Russia participated to find a solution to the Bosnian crisis. This mediation initiative would finally precipitate into success in Dayton in 1995 November.

Out of these four mediations efforts, the attempts made along with the US only generated a lasting agreement between warring factions. From the beginning months of the war the EU had been trying for a successful mediation, but without fruitful result. There were many reasons behind its unsuccessful attempts as a peace negotiator. Firstly, most of its powerful members including France, Germany and

¹³ Omrska camp was a concentration camp run by Bosnian Serbs near a mining town of Prijedor in north of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, Muslim men and local Muslim government officials used to be detained under harsh condition.

¹⁴ Cyrus Vance, a former US Secretary of State was appointed as the UN special envoy for the peace negotiations along with Lord Owen, a former British Foreign Secretary, who represented EU on the peace talks.

London were not ready to take the burden financially, militarily or politically. Their cautious yet different steps failed EU to frame any strong approach towards Bosnia. Secondly, EC lacked military clout to impose a fear factor upon the warring parties in the Balkan. Without military capability, the endless number of mediation initiatives could not have an impact. Lastly, as already discussed in the above, the US' not-clear approach created illusion among Bosnian Muslim leaderships, due to which, they were not ready to negotiate on the table, rather hoped for military intervention by the US. The confusion and lack of consensus finally made the EU, as a failed mediator in Bosnia. At the same time, Bosnia War was stretching as Bosnia's Muslim leadership was hoping help from the West.

The Bosnians initially believed that if they could make the case that the Serbs were committing genocide; the signatories to the Genocide Convention of 1948 would come to their aid, as they were obliged to do by this treaty. They entertained similar expectations with regard to Article 5 1 of the U.N. Charter....They also believed, and this was perhaps their most damaging mistake, that because they were "civilized," "Western" people, other civilized, Western people in France, Germany, Britain, or the United States would not stand idly by as they were slaughtered (Rieff, 1995: 76-88).

THE UK'S POLICY

Now coming to the policies and attitude of the UK on Bosnian matters, it is said that Britain has been sympathetic towards Serbs in its policy-making on Yugoslav affairs. British policy towards Balkan developments in early 1990's can be well understood from, how the senior conservative MPs Bernard Braine and Julian Amery had debated in the House of Commons session in January-March, 1990. According to them, "Serbs had been Britain's allies in two world Wars, and would require a formidable international force to defeat them" (Hodge 2006: 30). Serbs had fought gallantly in the last two World Wars, being on the side of the British, and that was the reason why Britain, according to Sir Bernard Braine, "cannot be unsympathetic to the Serbs" (Hodge 2006). Irrespective of the concerns raised by various MPs, about the impending Bosnian crisis and other Yugoslav developments, the then British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hogg had brushed aside the topic. He said, "The matter is of critical importance." And the Yugoslav crisis was not aired fully in the House of Commons for over next six months (Hodge, 2006: 31).

Britain's reluctant attitude towards intervention in Bosnia can be understood in the light of its facing the secessionist movement in Ireland. Therefore, it did not want to

set any precedent, by approving secession of republics from Yugoslavia. Eventually, when the UN Security Council approved the expansion of UNPROFOR to 6,000 troops on September 14, 1992, Britain also contributed 1,800 troops into it. Many argue that the UK's peacekeeping contribution was with the intention of being in the forefront of international diplomacy and to live up to its foreign policy objectives.

The U K's role in Bosnian War is mostly remembered for its vociferous resistance to use of force, especially, the use of air strikes. In the beginning, UK opposed to the idea of military intervention by assessing Bosnian situation as the consequence of historical animosity among different ethnicities. "The British-driven quest for a negotiated settlement at all costs led in 1993 to a series of peace plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with progressively more emphasis on the minutiae division"(Hodge 2006:50). However, British quest did not match with that of the US new administration led by Clinton. Clinton administration had reservation about Vance-Owen peace plan, whereas UK wanted peace to be achieved through negotiations. Britain was even against the enforcement of the No Fly Zone (NFZ) over Bosnia and Herzegovina for which British Prime Minister John Major had urged US and France not to go for it.

Hence, with the failure of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans and worsening situation, the UK had to bring a change in its policy. But Britain remained opposed to air strikes proposed by the US till last. The UK's opposition to air strike was obvious because its troops were on the ground as a part of the UNPROFOR mission in Yugoslavia. Even, following the 1994 shelling of Sarajevo, "Michael Rose, the new British Commander of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, was reluctant for NATO to issue an ultimatum to Serbs to pull back their heavy weaponry or risk NATO air strikes" (Sharp 1997:32). British shift in policy making came, following the fall of Srebrenica and Serb attack on Gorazde, one of the six UN designated safe areas where British troops were deployed.

By July 1995, NATO toughened its warning to Serbs and at the same time Britain and France sent formal notice regarding the implementation Operation Deliberate Force by NATO to General Mladic, who led Bosnian Serb side. Mladic was warned that his side would be subject to massive air strikes in case any of the UN designated safe

areas is targeted. The Sarajevo market shelling on 28 August, which killed many civilians, created opportunity for the Operation Deliberate force to be implemented.

UN'S ROLE IN BOSNIA

In order to resolve the Yugoslav crisis including the Bosnia War, the UN had taken several steps, which could be categorised under two types such as preventive measures and resolving measures (Sloan 1998). However, none of its measures could be successful in stopping the war in Bosnia. Rather, the measures taken by the UN in different phases of the war have come under criticism from various fronts.

Following the Yugoslav matter was brought before the Security Council, the UN in one of its first measures, took some preventive actions that included the imposition of economic sanctions, arms embargo and other restrictions on former Yugoslav republics. After economic sanctions failed to bear any fruit, it went for putting an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The UN- imposed arms embargo, could give rise to intense debates among states, policy makers and intellectuals. Whether the embargo aggravated the plight of Bosnian Muslims has been one of the subject of discussion till day. Many believed that the arms embargo strengthened Serbia's position in the war, whereas Muslims did not get a chance to arm themselves against the well-armed Serbs. The arms embargo helped Serbs and Croats within weeks after the war broke out to annex three –fourth of Bosnian territory while evicting millions civilians forcefully. Bosnians found themselves helpless to resist Serbs advancement.

The UN's decision about arms embargo fetched it severe criticism in terms of its irrational decision making. "While heavily armed Serbian and Croatian nationalists forces consolidated their territorial claims, westerns powers in the European community and the UN security Council through their appointed mediators, worked at the drafting board to translate these military conquests into blueprints for the dismemberment of Bosnia" (Ali and Lifschultz 1994: 367-401).

The above preventive steps by the UN were evidently not fruitful, as they could not stop the war from unfolding. With time and analysis, it has been seen that without employing other means in terms of military threat, such sanctions are ineffective. Many even relate the UN's unsuccessful attempt to prevent the war, with that of the

indifferent attitude of then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He faces his share of criticism from various groups, intellectuals and organisations.

As the situation in Bosnia was a crisis of different nature in the post-Cold War era, the international community found itself in a confusing and challenging situation. It was evident that some of the world powers never wanted to be involved in another conflict just after two World Wars and the prolonged Cold War. In such a situation, UN also seemed confused about its role in a conflict like Bosnia, which reflected in the steps and measures taken the Secretary General. "In Bosnia this Secretary General forfeited the organisation's principal asset : its moral standing to speak out on the great issues of the day: Boutros-Ghali never could find his compass in Bosnia, and his failure went hand in hand with pretensions about the dawn of a new age for the United Nations" (Ajami 1996: 162-164)

Following the unsuccessful bid to stop the war from unfolding, the UN's measures during the war period could be divided under three broad categories. They are-"peace-keeping operations, the provision and delivery of humanitarian assistance and imposing limits on the conduct of hostilities" (Hampson 1996: 157). As for the peace-keeping operation is concerned, the UN had its UNPROFOR troops present in Bosnia, when the war broke out. This presence of the UN was the only international presence during the beginning of the crisis.

MEDIA'S REACTION

The war formally began in April 1992 following Bosnia and Herzegovina went for a referendum to be independent from Yugoslavia. Months before the referendum, there were enough signs and symbols of Bosnia sliding into a war. Until the war turned violent, neither international community nor media seemed interested in any happenings in Bosnia. Media's meagre coverage of Bosnia during 1990-91, reflects media's attitude towards pre-war Bosnia. For the media community, it can be said the war began only after the Channel Four journalists released the photo of concentration camp. The media suddenly became hyper-active for Bosnia and went on comparing the situation in Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims, with the Jews holocaust during World War II.

The hype and concern, shown by media can be questioned as, why media agencies were silent for so long? If the genocidal activities were carried in former Yugoslav state then, how it could go unreported. It must have taken time for planning, preparation and execution. Throughout this preparatory time, what media was doing? The Western media can't claim of its ignorance about the killings as many of their representatives were already present in the Balkans for Slovenian and Croatia war.

The world at large may not think much of its chances and many politicians in the West and at the United Nations, seeing no other way for the fighting in the Balkans to ever end, may long for its defeat. But such an expectation owes as much to the fact that the Bosnian slaughter is largely absent from the front pages of Western newspapers and the lead stories on the evening news as to any change in the situation on the ground in Bosnia (Rieff 1995: 76-88).

Today's media's interest is not defined by the normative charter, rather driven by popularity. With this assumption, media reports will be analysed and quantified, to be compared with that of pre-war media analysis.

The analysis will be guided by two hypotheses, undertaken for this chapter. According to the first hypothesis, it will be assumed that Bosnia received media's attention only after the war became bloody. In other words, there was sudden surge of media reports about Bosnian developments after the instances of bloodshed, killings and human sufferings increased. Secondly, it will be hypothesised that media agencies were influenced by states polices, which had consequently made them biased in their reporting of Bosnia War. Like in the previous chapters, these hypotheses will be tested by analysing the reports from the New York Times, Time magazine and the Times (London) in the following manner.

THE NEW YORK TIMES ANALYSIS

In order to have an idea about the space, Bosnia received during the war period by the New York Times, data have been put in tabular form in the next page, which will help to compare how the New York Times' emphasis on Bosnia increased sharply comparing to pre-war period. The searching criterion of articles from the New York Times archival resources has remained same like in the previous chapter. All the articles have been taken into consideration, after typing 'Bosnia' in the search engine of article archives.

The table for the year 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 presents the number of articles, which were published during the specific mentioned time period. In the table for 1992, the data has been recorded from March onwards (not January), because the war is considered to have begun only after the March referendum for independence. The second column of tables represent total number of articles, which included news, views or any other piece of writing that included the word 'Bosnia' in their contents. Those articles have also been considered, where the word 'Bosnia' has occurred, even once in their contents. The third column of the table represents the number of articles, in which Bosnia has been mentioned in their headings.

Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
Mar-Apr	85	24
May-Jun	195	34
Jul-Aug	317	70
Sep-Oct	193	40
Nov-Dec	264	32

Table No 6

Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
Jan-Feb	369	76
Mar-Apr	369	89
May-Jun	449	96
Jul-Aug	301	69
Sep-Oct	248	38
Nov-Dec	163	19

Table No 7

Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
Jan-Feb	368	82
Mar-Apr	310	50
May-Jun	201	42
Jul-Aug	180	31
Sep-Oct	184	33
Nov-Dec	294	78

Table No 8

Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
Jan-Feb	170	32
Mar-Apr	188	36
May-Jun	307	77
Jul-Aug	328	68
Sep-Oct	376	78
Nov-Dec	441	118

Table No 9

Firstly, it is clearly seen from the above tables that there was no dearth of articles about Bosnian developments during the war period. The number of articles increased sharply after Mar-April period. During 1993, the highest numbers of articles were published, as the bloodletting and fighting was becoming intense and the world was becoming aware of Bosnia War. As the heaviest fighting started drawing concern from across the globe, the media seemed to be pouring news and views describing every bit of development in Bosnian situation.

Such vigorous attention on war like situation is more often, driven by their intention to compete with other media organisations in terms of increasing circulation. This aim is achieved by providing news and views on events, which could draw attention of a wider audience. As extraordinary situation usually draw quick attention of people, news paper try to take advantage of that situation by providing wide coverage. And such an intention could be one of the reasons, why the New York Times had increased its coverage of Bosnian war sharply during 1993. If the data provided by a website (<http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2008/03/accelerating-decline-of-new-york-times.html>), based on the New York Times annual report, is to be believed then the circulation figure of the concerned daily, substantiate the assumption. According to the data, the circulation of the New York Times was highest during 1993 comparing to the years ranging from 1993 to 2007.

Secondly, an analysis of some reports, published regarding Bosnia, should be considered to see, whether media reports about Bosnian situation were unbiased. As Bosnia slid into war, following the referendum on 1 March 1992, it would be appropriate to consider the reports, published during a time period from March 1 to March 7, 1992. This analysis will help to have an insight into the policy of media during early days of war and whether it matched with the US policy.

A total of 4 articles were published by the New York Times from March 1 to 7, 1992. In all the four articles, no sense of urgency about Bosnian situation was being conveyed to the world. Out of these four articles, two articles, published on 1 March, titled, 'Death Cast Shadow on Vote in Yugoslav Republic' and 3rd March article, titled, 'Rebel Serbs Disrupt Travel into Yugoslav Republic', talked about violence, but they did not hint about the intensity of the situation, which would later turn into

full scale-war. According to the existing literature, the killings and shelling among ethnicities had already begun by that time.

Another point is to be noted that the New York Times did not emphasise on the necessity of UN peacekeeping presence in Bosnia in the beginning of crisis. In its 7th March article, titled, 'Vance Ends Yugoslav Trip: Confident That U.N. Plan Will Proceed', talked about 14,400 UN peacekeeping forces to be deployed in Croatia, but it did not mention about the need of Bosnia. Like the international community was indecisive and negligent about Bosnia during early days of war, the articles also reflected the same attitude of negligence.

Next, in order to examine, whether the media agency's stance on Bosnian war changed with that of US policy, an analytical comparison can be conducted among the articles and their contents. The newspaper's outlook towards Vance and Owen's peace initiative can be taken as an example and put into test.

In the beginning, the news agency did not adopt any critical attitude towards Vance-Owen Peace initiative. This can be proved by analysing few articles. The 7th March 1992 article, titled, 'Vance Ends Yugoslav Trip: Confident That U.N. Plan Will Proceed' can be considered. It stated, "United Nations officials traveling with Mr. Vance, said the leaders of all three ethnic groups in Bosnia, including the Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, had told him that they would continue negotiations toward a peaceful Bosnian settlement" (Burns 1992). The excerpt did not give any hint of its, being critical to their initiative. The news paper's positive attitude towards Vance's peace plan could be gauged from another 8 March 1992 article, titled, 'A Chance to Say Yes or No to Fresh Disaster'. The article said, "The best news for Mr. Vance, who has become a folk hero here for his five months of tireless peacemaking, was that Bosnia did not explode in the wake of the popular vote for independence last weekend, despite tense days of bomb explosions and barricades" (Burns 1992). Both the articles in the above show some optimism about the peace initiative under the supervision of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. However this optimistic attitude could be seen changing from 1993.

Now, few articles from 1993 should be analysed to see, whether New York Times' policy changed, as the new presidency had come to the power in the US in the same year. The Clinton administration had a shift in its policy making on Bosnia; from an

ambivalent onlooker to an aggressive intervener. The change in the tone of the New York Times about Vance-Owen plan can also be noticed from its editorial, titled 'Lord Owen's Googly', which was published on 4th February 1993. The editorial warned the US of signing the peace plan by saying, "It will soon become apparent that if he did sign on to the plan urged by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, he would be asked to provide U.S. troops for a mission impossible -- to join U.N. peacekeepers who have no authority to disarm the warring parties or to enforce a peace that none of them -- Serbs, Croats or Muslims -- intend to live with" (Editorial 1993). Likewise, another article of 5th February 1993, 'On My Mind, The Crime of Vance and Owen' talked about the dreadful consequence the peace plan would have, on the Balkan. It said, "Vance-Owen would take years to work out fully. Considering that the inhabitants have spent centuries killing each other, that is not long. The Muslims, Serbs or Croats could scuttle it any time, and return to war" (Rosenthal 1993).

The analysis of the above articles clearly suggests that the New York Times' stand on Vance-Owen peace plan changed with time and was in compliance with the US administration's policy.

During the year 1992, there was no major discussion or clarification over the policy towards Bosnia, but the trend changed with the new administration came to power. For example, throughout the month of March, a total of 17 articles were published out of which, only three articles mentioned about US policy towards Bosnia and other republics. There was not a single article, which explained or debated or discussed about US policy, rather limited by saying, Washington would follow EU suit. In a period, when the danger was already hovering over Bosnia, was not it necessary for the media organisation to seek clarification from administration to inform the world about its policy?

For further clarification, the New York Times' reports can be tested to see whether media agency was biased, in reporting war crimes during Bosnian war. For example, the literature (not from media sources) claims that on January 30, 1993 Bosnian Muslim forces launched an all out attack on Serbian positions in Sarajevo following the rejection of Vance-Owen peace plans by Muslim leadership (Sremac 1999). The New York Times in one of its article of 31st January 1993, 'On Bloody Day in Sarajevo, Relief at Halt on Talks', reported about violence following the peace plan

rejection, but did not mention about Serb casualties. It said about ‘the carnage in which 25 people died under Serbian shells’, but never mentioned about the loss incurred to Serbs by Bosnian Muslims the same day (Burns 1993). Likewise, another incident can also be taken as example. After US declared on 11th February 1993, it’s pushing for a strong NATO role in Bosnia, Muslim forces launched an attack on Serbian suburb of Ilidza in Sarajevo which caused many casualties, but it went unreported in media (Sremac 1999). The New York Time in its next day report, titled, ‘Bigger U.S. Peace Role Leaves Bosnians Split’ did not mention about any Serb casualties, rather it just mentioned, “The infantry attacks by the Bosnians prompted heavy shelling of civilian districts of the city, with at least 20 people reported killed and 50 wounded” (Burns 1993).

Most of articles concerning war casualties published after 1993 informed about how the Muslims were being butchered or massacred by Serbs. It will be an uphill task to find a story which would describe the agony of Serbs. In a war, both the warring sides face casualties. However, in the case of Bosnian war, there was no dearth of reports about Muslims’ suffering, but a conspicuous absence of information on Serbs’ casualties could be noticed in New York Times reporting.

THE TIME MAGAZINE ANALYSIS

The similar methodology will be adopted here, like in the New York Times analysis in the above. The tables in the following, represent the number of articles were published by the ‘Time’ magazine, during a specific time period. The retrieving of articles, from its archive, has been accomplished through a particular online criterion, like it has been described in the above for the New York Times case.

Table No 10

1992, Time Magazine	
Date Line	Total Articles
Jan-Feb	0
Mar-Apr	3
May-Jun	13
Jul-Aug	25
Sep-Oct	11
Nov-Dec	21

Table No 11

1993, Time Magazine	
Date Line	Total Articles
Jan-Feb	24
Mar-Apr	26
May-Jun	39
Jul-Aug	24
Sep-Oct	25
Nov-Dec	14

1994, Time Magazine	
Date Line	Total Articles
Jan-Feb	23
Mar-Apr	17
May-Jun	20
Jul-Aug	10
Sep-Oct	19
Nov-Dec	27

1995, Time Magazine	
Date Line	Total Articles
Jan-Feb	9
Mar-Apr	11
May-Jun	21
Jul-Aug	26
Sep-Oct	32
Nov-Dec	34

Table No 12**Table No 13**

From the tables no(10, 11, 12, 13), it can be seen here, 'Bosnia' was totally absent from its reporting during January-February in the year of 1992. An impending war or war like situation in Bosnia could not draw attention of the magazine. Only after the West recognised, the war had begun in Bosnia in March-April, the magazine started giving some space for Bosnia. A total of three articles were published during March-April publications. Out of these three articles, the 20th April article titled "What is left of Yugoslavia" was a very short article of around 200 words, which just gave information, "the 12-member European Community and the U.S. have recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." The second

article informed about the killings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without emphasising on the gravity of the situation in the former Yugoslav republic. The last article of the taken time frame, 'Yugoslavia: Another Vote To Leave' on March 16, was an informative article again, which neither criticised nor appreciated the international community's effort to bring back Bosnia on track.

From the above analysis and tables, it is clear that by early 1992 there was not much of discussion about Bosnia. By middle of the same year, the number of articles in its publications increased as the blood shedding increased in Bosnia. The maximum time Bosnia was in the discussion during 1993 and 1995. During 1993, the Bosnia had witnessed heavy fighting between Serbs and Muslims, whereas in 1995, fighting as well as the peace process was successful.

Secondly, the particular media agency's stance on Bosnia war can be seen changing from time to time. Before the Clinton administration had come to power, no article talked about the US policy on Bosnia. There was no debate about it rather Bosnia hardly got space in its publications. However, by 1993, its article pitched in favour of military intervention. Here the point should be noted that by 1993, the Clinton Administration, which had newly come to the power, was strongly in favour of a military intervention. It seems that the magazine echoed the administration's stance in its articles. It can be proved by analysing few of its articles. An article, published on July 13 1992 clearly advised the US, not to go for military intervention. The article titled, 'Saving Bosnia-At What Price' said, "So far, however, public opinion in the U.S. and Western Europe has not seen any strategic or humanitarian interests at sufficient risk to justify the sacrifice of one soldier's life" (Church 1992). The shift in its stance can be noticed from the article, titled, 'Srebrenica Succumbs', which was published on April 26 1993. It stated, "That option cannot and should not be lightly considered, since armed intervention could end the humanitarian aid effort that is keeping hundreds of thousands of Bosnians alive."

The magazines' reporting can also be tested further, taking its articles on war crime into consideration. After 1993 onwards, there was no dearth of articles, describing unspeakable amount of sufferings, the Bosnian Muslims had faced, but it became an unspeakable difficulty to find out the casualties, Serbs had faced during the conflict. Every single article gave a grim picture about Muslim refugees, Muslim displaced and

Muslim civilians. Then, what about the Serb casualties? Pick up any article with a heading about war casualties and sufferings, the contents will only give a one sided picture about Muslim sufferings. For examples- an article, titled, 'Unspeakable: Rape and War' on February 22, 1993 stated, "It is not known how many rapes have been committed since the fighting began in the breakup of Yugoslavia. Serbs are undoubtedly committing most of the rapes at the moment; they have also seized the most land." Take any other article like, 'How 51 Kids Died' of January 25, 1993, or 'Aggression 1, International Law 0' of July 27, 1992, they all talked about Bosnian Muslims' agonies caused by Serbs. Serbs are the aggressor- the Clinton administration's labelling, well reflected in the media agency's reporting.

THE TIMES (LONDON) ANALYSIS

Comparing to its pre-war coverage, there was no dearth of reporting about the Bosnian developments, from April 1992 to 1995. The number of articles increased, as war became more intense and barbaric. From the analysis of the concerned daily in the post-referendum period, it is evident that Bosnia had found a place in its everyday publications in different stories. The detailed number of articles, published during four years of war has not been presented, due to limitation of space and time. However, it would be analysed, whether the Times (London) was biased or inclined towards the UK's policy. The objectivity of the daily can also be tested by analysing the reports on war-crimes and sufferings during the war.

It is already discussed that Bosnian Muslim leaderships cooperated with neither Vance-Owen Plan nor Owen- Stoltenberg peace plan, at the behest of the US' indication. Both the peace plan, initiated and favoured by the EC and the UK failed, for which Clinton administration was held responsible to an extent, as it was signalling of military intervention, from Bosnian Muslims side. On the backdrop of this, some articles published by the 'Times (London)' can be analysed.

An article titled 'Muslim leaders poised to remove Bosnia President', published on 25th June 1993, gave an account of the differences existed in the seven members of Bosnian Presidency, who represented in Owen-Stoltenberg peace talks. The article critically discussed, why Bosnian president, Izetbegovic was absent in the peace

meeting. Likewise another article of 27th June, titled, 'Clinton's Follies Set the Stage for a Bosnian Coup', directly accused the Clinton administration of adopting elusive interfering policies. It stated, "The breach in Bosnian leadership highlights the of Clinton's bizarre intervention at the EC-Summit in Copenhagen last week...At a stroke Clinton drove a wedge between the allies and gave fresh hope to Izetbegovic that West need its people to fight on". From these articles, it can be summarised here, the Times (London) was critical of the US' stand on Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace initiatives. Here, the daily's stance seemed to be matching with what policy the UK had adopted. The UK was in favour of such negotiations among warring parties, rather than going for intervention. From the very beginning in 1992, the 'Times (London)' had been against intervention, which once stated, "the Government should not disguise its limits and risks."

Whether Times London was biased in reporting the sufferings during war, should be evaluated by analysing few articles. An article, titled, 'Muslim offensive turns war against Serbs in Bosnia' on September 28 1992, reflected the atrocities on Serbs by Muslims. A January 18, 1993 article, titled, 'Belgrade Accuses Muslims of Attack and Returns Fires,' gave the account of both sides. Another story, 'Serb Forces Move South to Bolster Creaking Defences,' published on 30th December 1992, informed about Serbs' fighting. The use of the word 'defence' can be interpreted as adopting sympathetic attitude towards Serbs. At the same time, it also reported about Muslim sufferings in the war. The article, 'Reckoning time in valley of death' on 17th April 1993, informed about shelling by Serb forces, which had destroyed thousands of Bosnian mosques. Another story, 'Anguish of Bosnians' of 26th June 1993, talked about Muslims' sufferings, while narrating the plight of a refugee Muslim woman, who had fled Slovenia.

From the above analysis, it appears that the daily's stance on Bosnian issues were similar to that of the UK. Especially, its critical attitude towards American intentions and supporting non-interventionist approach match with the UK policy to a great extent. Even though it appears that the news paper's policy was in compliance with London's stand on Bosnian developments, it is difficult to say that the news agency followed the reporting style, which suited the state. So, a comparison of war-period and pre-war period reporting could make the picture clear. In the pre-crisis period, the

daily initiated no debate on Bosnian issues. Once the US made it clear about its interventionist intention by 1993, the daily gradually started supporting a non-interventionist approach, similar to UK's. About the reporting of war crimes and sufferings, the daily seemed sympathetic towards Serbs (UK was also sympathetic to Serbs till the beginning of 1995), but it did not ignore Muslim sufferings as well. Here, a balanced reporting concerning war crime could be noticed.

The normative charter, which should guide the media agencies while reporting about a crisis-stricken region and its people, has taken a back seat for the New York Times, Times (London) and Time magazine in their reporting of Bosnia War. The volatile situation, created by the Bosnia War, needed to be handled very carefully. However, from the above analysis of all three media agencies' reporting, it rather gives completely a different picture. The three media agencies were interested only after Bosnia witnessed bloodbath. Moreover, their reporting styles reflected their respective states' stand on Bosnian crisis.

Chapter 5

Evaluating Media's Role in Post-Dayton Period

The Dayton Peace Accords is crucial in Bosnia and Herzegovina's modern history. It brought an end to the more than three years of bloody war. The peace agreement, inked fifteen years ago, was already a late response to the situation, Bosnia and Herzegovina was undergoing. By that time, more than a million of people were already killed during the war in the country, which was once a favourite picnic spot for many Europeans. The conflict forced more than 2.2 million people to flee from their homes to save their lives. In the post World War II era, the displacement was the largest in Europe, which could cause panic among many developed and neighbouring states (UNHCR). The war is over, but the suffering of displaced and refugees continues till the day. The war that has given them scars in their mind and soul refuse to fade away. Moreover, "Research shows, the states that have experienced once armed conflict, particularly a civil war, are more apt to undergo such violence again (Hartzell 1999, Meernik 2005: 271-289). So, the question arises, whether the Dayton Accords has been successful, so many years after?

The subject of this chapter is not to delve into detail, whether Dayton is successful. Rather, the concerned chapter considers the Dayton Agreement as a ground-baking development after which, the course of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina was expected to be normal. However, in reality like in any other war-ravaged country, Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people had to endure more difficulties in their lives, but in different levels.

The bloody war ended, but struggle began for a decent living. Bosnia and Herzegovina saw, many countries and organisations pouring aids for the survival of its people. The war ravaged country received millions of dollars for reconstruction and rebuilding of its civil society. More than a decade has been passed, but the war-torn country faces many challenges till the day. The agony and animosity between different ethnicities, still exists in its society, which makes it impossible to make Bosnia and Herzegovina again a multiethnic state. The political solution of making and bringing two entities of Republic of Sparska and Federation of Bosnia and Croats under one umbrella yet looks fragile. The economy, which has been heavily

dependent on foreign aid, is failing to be self sufficient, which in long term multiplying the problems for it. There seems peace prevailing in the place of bloody war, but will it continue to exist in the absence of the international military presence? There scores of questions arise for which there are no specific answers. After all, the Dayton was also like an experimental treaty like many other attempts to stop the war. All the initiatives failed because, “complicated wars involving many factions have been found to be harder to solve in a lasting way than wars with only two sides” (Fortna 2004: 269-292). Only Dayton Agreement could grant success, as it included military threat against the warring factions. In the post-Dayton period, there was no intense fighting and bloodletting, but scores of problems were there. Therefore, a discussion on such problems from a time period from 1996 to 2000 will be followed by media report analysis.

The main objective of this chapter will be to evaluate, whether media put enough efforts to bring the plight of this post-war country into limelight. To realise the objective, some hypotheses will be adopted and put into test. The first hypothesis will be that a sharp fall in the publishing of articles about Bosnia was noticed, comparing to war-time reporting. According to the second hypothesis, once the war was over, media also lost its interest from the same country. Thirdly, it will be hypothesised that the post war issues were driven by their respective states' policies, from where they were published. To arrive at a conclusion, the post-war problems will be discussed, followed by the analysis of the news and views, published by the ‘Times (London)’, The New York Times and Time magazine. And the time period should be considered from January 1996 to December 2000.

SOCIAL MALADIES

The Dayton Agreement has certainly helped the Bosnian society to rebuild itself to an extent. After more than a decade, Bosnia still faces various social maladies. The soul and spirit of Bosnian people are yet to forget their bitter pasts. The tragic episode of their past, still bears devastating effect on the lives of millions of people. The fragile peace, brought by the Dayton Agreement, was at the cost of the divisions in every aspect of their lives, from the territory to population. Comparing to today’s situation in Bosnia, the condition during the first five years after the war, was in a more depressing state. As this chapter proposes to consider the time period from 1996 to 2000, the struggle of Bosnia and its people will be discussed of the same time period.

The social life includes an array of aspects of peoples' life, but here only some significant aspects will be discussed.

Problems of Refugees and IDPs

According to the UN refugee organisation (UNHCR), Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed more than two millions of people fleeing from their native places to save lives during the violent war from 1991 to 1995. So, the Dayton Accords guarantee the refugees¹⁵ and Internally Displaced Persons¹⁶ (IDPs), the right to return to their home of origin. In a bid to make Bosnia again a multiethnic state, the Dayton talks about refugees and IDPs and their safety at a number of levels, which is one of its foundational principles. Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, divided into two chapters and consisting of 18 articles, is completely dedicated to the right and welfare of refugees and IDPs.

Table No 14

Residing In Bosnia and Herzegovina			
Refugees			7,257
Asylum Seekers			480
Returned Refugees			971
Internally displaced persons			124,529
Returned IDPs			7155
Stateless Persons & various			60,496
Total Population of Concern			194,448
Originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina			
Refugees			74,366
Asylum Seekers			1,159
Returned Refugees			971
Internally displaced persons			124,529
Returned IDPs			715
Various			50,496
Total Population of Concern			252,236
As at January 2009,		Source:UNHCR/Governments	

¹⁵The Convention relating to the status of refugees provides the definition of a refugee.

¹⁶Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people forced to flee their homes but, who, unlike refugees, remain within their country's borders.

All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.....The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion (The General Framework Agreement 1995: Annex 7: Chapter 1; Article 1 and 2).

In pen and paper, the refugees and displaced persons have been guaranteed all sorts of protection, but in reality, the picture is different. The table in the above represents the data about returned refugees and IDPs in the following years of war. From the table, it is clearly evident that refugees and displaced persons returned to their native places in large numbers. However, after 15 years of implementation of Dayton, there are refugees and displaced persons yet to come to their native places. The latest figure, provided by the UNHCR (2010), shows that by 2009 January, there were thousands of people were yet to be settled. The UN in one of its articles, pointed out that “113,000 Bosnians displaced from their homes and 7,000 refugees from Croatia, many of whom are living in collective centres” till the date (UN News Centre 2010).

For the returned refugees and displaced persons, the ruined economy, infrastructure and security were the main challenges they faced in their daily lives.

1. Population of concern to UNHCR, end of year

Category	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Refugees [*]	-	-	-	-	40,000	40,000	65,645	38,152	32,745	28,022
Asylum-seekers ^{**}	-	-	-	3	-	-	22	80	366	457
Returned refugees ^{***}	1	99	815	100,618	120,852	129,073	31,783	18,715	18,665	41,705
Internally displaced	1,290,000	1,282,587	1,097,800	760,146	816,000	836,430	809,545	518,252	438,253	367,491
Returned IDPs	58,360	29,570	43,385	59,347	80,172	70,775
Various/others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1,035,212	1,035,073	950,380	634,546	570,221	508,450

^{*} UNHCR estimates for most industrialized countries. ^{**} Pending applications. 1993-1995: data available for industrialized countries only. ^{***} Also based on country of asylum reports.

Table No 15

Many families have dared to come back to their native places, but only to find that other temporary occupants, living in their place. In a war-torn country like Bosnia, the law and order system does not function properly. Such situations do not encourage displaced people to come back to their native places, as getting back their property is also an uphill task. Various types of problems, the returned displaced people face, as the “local courts are not offering any remedy to the original owners, being overloaded with cases and in many locations not functioning effectively....Returning refugees and displaced persons are finding it extremely difficult and time consuming to obtain a judgment in their favour”(Cox 1998: 599-631).

Apart from the illegal occupation of their property, many yet not feel secured if their home is located near other houses of different ethnicities. The lack of trust and security is yet to be re-instilled among different ethnicities and IDPs. By 2000, many refugees and IDPs were yet to return to their original places, from collective camps and slums. Despite the life in such collective centres, is difficult, where many people were crammed in small living places with lack of basic amenities and facilities, they fear to come back home (UNHCR).

Despite the pressure from the host country, thousands are unwilling to return. One year after the war ended, they became unwelcomed guests for the host country where they had to flee. Sometimes, they were being forcefully sent to their home country by the host country. For example, “the German pressure to send more than 300,000 refugees home, let alone pressure on the more than 500,000 scattered elsewhere, has been resisted until now (Woodward 1997: 29-31).

Women Related Issues

During the time of war, women pay a heavy price from various perspectives. During the period of conflict, they are used as tools. Sexual violence against women was one of such crimes, which was committed during the Bosnian war. Though the use of sexual violence as a tool was not a new concept, but it came to focus during Bosnian war. “It was not until sexual atrocities were committed during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that consistent references began to appear throughout the UN to the problem of sexual violence during armed conflict. Security Council resolution 798

of 18 December 1992 referred to the "massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (UN: Women 2000).

Mass rape of women during the warfare was one of the gravest crimes committed, but traumas continue to hunt many women till the day. As Serbs were largely seen as the aggressor in Bosnian war, they were also blamed for committing most of rape crimes against Bosnian Muslim women. On contrary, Serbs also claim their women being raped by Muslims. The chapter does not intend to go into detail about this debate. However, it accepts the fact that the mental trauma and agony the rape victims face irrespective of ethnicities and regions should be addressed by media and should be considered as an important post-war issue.

According to the Amnesty International report (2009), only 18 cases concerning rape and sexual abuse have been tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, ICTY, since 1993. Another 15 such cases have been processed and 12 people convicted before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2005. The numbers of cases, which have been tried, are meagre comparing to the number of women raped during the war. According to various reports, an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 women were being raped or sexually abused during the war. The war is over, but the psychological disorder and trauma faced by such women, is enormous in Bosnian society. There is no doubt that post-war grievances of rape victims were enormous, but lacked attention. Instead of getting them help, they face social stigma. Another reason for such lack of attention "is the fact that until recently, refugee issues have tended to be separated from human rights in legal systems and debates (Beyani 1995: 29-35).

Child and Education

Children are another vulnerable group, which was affected by the war, the most. Despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a signatory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989, but it failed to protect them in reality. Bosnia, which had first signed the UN

Convention in 1993, had to restate its commitments again by signing of the Dayton Agreement on 21 November 1995.

Bosnian war was a prolonged period during which thousands have taken birth, but their births have not been registered due to several reasons. According to UNICEF (2010), this fact has been admitted by the Ombudsman's offices of both the political entity of the republic, as they had conducted researches in some of their municipalities. Children, whose births have not been registered automatically, become deprived of their rights and facilities in the present situation. For a long term solution, children, the future of the society, should have had access to basic rights like education. However, the figures provided by UNICEF (2010) state that "each year four percent children in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not enrol in the primary school while one third of children do not attend the secondary education" (UNICEF 2010). For such lagging in education sector, the UN agency holds the absence of an inclusive, non-discriminatory education system, responsible.

The educational system is discriminatory in nature, as it reinforces the prejudice and intolerance and isolation of minority groups. This emerging trend in both the entities will have a disastrous effect, on the future of their society. A research conducted by the OSCE, has reinstated the fact- discrimination against children exists in schools, based on ethnic, cultural or religious grounds.

Trafficking

In South East Europe including Bosnia and Herzegovina, the trafficking in human beings, has virtually become a million dollar industry. This has been expressed in the 'Trafficking in Persons Report 2010' by the United States (UNHCR 2010). Like every other war-ravaged society, Bosnia and Herzegovina has turned into a safe haven for drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and the base of well-organised criminal networks. Just after the war, the republic witnessed an unprecedented increase in sex tourism, porn industry, various types of smuggling and forced labour. For various types of trafficking, Bosnia and Herzegovina was earlier used as a transit and destination country, but now it has become a country of origin.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

After a prolonged war, no one could expect Bosnia to have more than a devastated and debt ridden economy. After Dayton, the international help was the only resource and hope for Bosnia to rebuild itself. With the aim of ethnic reconciliation, “the international community devoted substantial resources; for example, about \$1,200 per person was made available for the rebuilding of the country, or about nine times the Marshall Plan” (McMohan 2004/05: 569-593). Irrespective of massive help from outside, the Bosnian economy faced primarily three types of challenges. Those are “the post-war reconstruction, the transition from Yugoslav-style communism, and the creation and maintenance of institutions capable of sustaining a market economy” (Daaldar and Froman 1999:106-113).

In terms of reconstruction, Bosnia has been able to live up to the expectation, but in other two aspects, it is lagging behind miserably. According to Daaldar and Froman (1999), the complex system of overlapping institutions is responsible for such sluggish performance of the economy. Apart from such complexities, financial corruption and delay in the process of creating the cumbersome Dayton prescribed economic institutions, have been repelling factors for the foreign corporate investors. At the same time, foreign aids, instead of helping the Bosnian economy, it is harming the economy of Bosnia in a long run.

Financial Aid


According to an old saying, "if you give a man a fish he will eat for a day, but if you teach him how to fish he will never be hungry." This saying certainly seems true for Bosnian economy. The amount of aid Bosnia has received aftermath war, is unprecedented, comparing to other post-conflict regions in the world. However, the more aid it has received the chances of becoming self independent, has lessened over the years. “After \$4.5 billion of multilateral commitments in 1996-98 and a massive inflow of bilateral aid, the Bosnian economy is scarcely more viable than it was when the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995” (Steil and Woodward 1999: 95-105). From the above quote, it is evident that by 2000, Bosnian economy was still an underdog and till day the picture remains the almost same. “Even the most intrepid foreign investors, such as McDonald s, have all but given up on trying doing business there. Without major reforms, private inflows cannot take the place of the foreign assistance

that will taper off in the next few years. Indeed, it is easy to imagine a situation in which the economy, rather than becoming sustainable, just grows smaller and poorer as the aid dries up” (Daalder and Froman 1999:106-113).

Until Kosovo crisis, Bosnia enjoyed large-scale aid from Western countries, but the trend changed after Kosovo crisis. The donors had to reassess their capital-intensive approach to meet Kosovo’s expectations (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 737-746). The following graph shows how Bosnia has been provided the developmental aid and relief aid by the US in the post-conflict years. Many intellectuals and activists groups accuse such help directly or indirectly help the US firms.

According to the report, “around “80 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) contracts and grants go directly to American firms.

“Foreign assistance programs have helped create major markets for agricultural goods, create new markets for American industrial exports and meant hundreds of



thousands of jobs for Americans” (Daalder and Froman 1999: 106-13). The EU and individual European states have also committed massive relief and developmental aid, but the economic growth has not yet got the real boost. Unless, it goes for the financial reforms, its growth can’t be termed as real growth. Many argue therefore that “rather than providing temporary life-saving aid, humanitarian assistance has become the de-facto policy of a world that is unwilling to take decisive action to address the underlying causes of global poverty” (Jamieson 2005:151-170).

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Bosnia and Herzegovina, now politically operates as a single state. However, there multi levels of political structure exist inside this young democracy, as per the Dayton Agreement. The foremost and the most important such structural level is the division of the state into two political entities with considerable autonomy. These two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were largely created as per the territory held by two warring parties. These two entities enjoyed enormous power comparing to the state, but it has declined with the passing year. The presidency of the state is held by the directly elected member on rotational basis, among three major ethnicities, for a period of eight months.

Another important feature of the post-Dayton state is that there is a High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with many governmental and legislative powers, in a bid to successful implementation of peace process, prescribed by the Dayton Accords. "The 1995 Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) provides legal foundations for the international community to intervene in practically every sphere of Bosnian affairs, from organizing elections to supervising local authorities, from human rights monitoring to implementing regional arms control programs (Belloni 2001: 163-180).

In the aftermath of war, Bosnian politics was largely dominated by political parties, which stood for their respective ethnic groups - Muslims, Serbs and Croats. In other words, the democratisation process in the state was heavily dependent on the institutionalisation of ethnic division. This politicization of ethnicity has also been proved as the main obstacle for the success of Dayton and democratisation. Till today, there is marginal support for the political parties those who do not represent any particular ethnicity. During 1997 September Municipal elections, such political outlook was clearly visible as the non-national parties (not favouring any particular ethnicity) could win only 6 % of the seats in the whole country.

The post-war emerging trend in politics has been concern for the international community for which many frameworks and measures have also been implemented. The organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been closely working with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to create a non-

nationalistic political atmosphere and political pluralism at every level. By giving Bosnia the status of a potential candidate for the European Union, it has also been lured to come up with more institutional reforms and constitutional amendments for a more integrated and better-functioning Bosnian state. There is need of fundamental reforms in social and economic sectors for which the international community can help Bosnia (Bildt 2001). Irrespective of some helps by the international community, the political situation seems to be worsening. The disagreement at the higher level has been main hurdle to reach agreement on the key issues.

In such a scenario, the role of civil society is encouraged for the reconciliation among ethnicities. The confidence on the role of civil society is a recent phenomenon. For sustainable peace, the involvement of the civil society is considered now-a-days indispensable (Belloni 2001). According to Shriver Jr (2001), if people of Bosnia want to live peacefully then the civil society has to learn tolerance and develop respect for each other irrespective of ethnicity, religion and culture. For this law and institutions can play a vital role.

MEDIA ANALYSIS

During the war period, there was no dearth of news and views published by media agencies. Bosnia received ample space in their publications regularly. With the war came to an end, whether such media agencies' response for Bosnia changed? Whether Bosnia's post-war problems were highlighted by media with same zeal? Whether their post-war reporting was unbiased? Finding answers to these questions will be the main basis of analysis.

THE NEW YORK TIMES ANALYSIS

In order to evaluate the role of the New York Times in the post-war scenario, some of its articles and their contents should be analysed critically. The analysis of contents will be guided by some hypotheses concerning the role of the New York Times in post-war scenario. Firstly, it can be hypothesized that the concerned daily did not provide enough space for the war-torn country comparing to the importance Bosnia received during war-time. The second hypothesis is that the particular media representative failed to bring the real issues of a war ravaged country and its people, rather remained focused on the activities of US's military presence. These hypotheses should be tested by analysing the contents, published from 1996- 2000.

To test the above hypotheses, articles retrieved from the online archives of the newspaper should be considered. For retrieving articles, the same method has been used like described in the previous chapters. Taking in to account the first hypothesis, data have been collected to see, whether the number of articles has decreased with time. The tables in the following page present the number of articles, published by the daily about Bosnia on weekly basis, just after the Dayton Peace Agreement was inked.

The table for November-December 1995, January 1996, February 1996 and March 1996 i.e table no 16, 17, 18, 19 provide data on numbers of articles, published by the concerned daily. The data of these four tables can provide an insight into the pattern of space Bosnia was given after the war. For further validation of the pattern, numbers of articles, published during 1997 January and 1998 January, have also been taken into account. (See table no 20 and 21)

From the first four tables i.e. Nov-Dec (1995), January (1996), February (1996), and March (1996), it is evident that the number articles started tapering after the war. During Nov-Dec (1995) period, the Dayton Peace Agreement was agreed, which announced an end to the war. And it can be seen from the tables that the maximum number of articles were published during this same time period after which the number gradually declined. Bosnia's appearance in the headlines of the news papers can be seen to have decreased significantly. The exclusive stories on Bosnia decreased dramatically by 1997 and 1998, which is evident from the last two tables.

Comparing the data with that of war-time, the number of articles did not decrease dramatically in the next few months after the Dayton. By, 1997 and 1998, there was noticeable decline in the number of articles and particularly of articles with Bosnia in their heading. As per the number of articles was concerned, there was no dramatic decrease in overall writing about Bosnia.

To test the second hypothesis, now a qualitative analysis of the contents of some random articles can be done. For this purpose, articles published from January 1 to 31 of the year 1996 can be taken in to account. The purpose behind choosing this particular time period is that it was just a week after the war came to an end. This was the time period, when there were innumerable numbers of post-war issues, like it has been described above in the chapter, needed to be addressed before the world. This

was the time, when bereaved people of a war-torn country, expected media to tell their agonies, irrespective of their ethnicities, religion and culture.

Within the taken time period of one month (from January 1 to 31, 1996), a total of 41 articles were published, which contained 'Bosnia' in their headings. Out of these 41 articles, 7 articles (excluding three letters to the editor) were published in the first week of the taken time period. All the seven articles' contents should be analysed before forming any opinion.

Nov-Dec 1995, New York Times			
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline	
Nov23-29	54		19
Nov30- Dec6	72		21
Dec 7- 13	67		16
Dec 14- 20	64		23
Dec 21- 27	57		17
Dec 28- 31	32		7

Table No 16

January 1996, New York Times			
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline	
1-7	40		11
8- 14	41		9
15-21	44		12
22 -28	32		7
29-30	19		6

Table No 17

February, 1996, New York Times			
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline	
1-7	33		11
8- 14	36		7
15-21	27		6
22 -28	27		7

Table No 18

March, 1996, New York Times			
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline	
1-7	24		3
8- 14	21		3
15-21	29		10
22 -28	32		4

Table No 19

January 1997, New York Times		
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
1-7	20	3
8-14	17	0
15-21	11	1
22-28	18	2

Table No 20

January 1998, New York Times		
Date Line	Total Articles	Bosnia In Headline
1-7	9	1
8-14	7	1
15-21	6	1
22-28	7	2

Table No 21

The first article, published on January 1, titled, 'G.I. Hurt in Bosnia Is Said to Be in Good Condition', gave information about the first American casualty in NATO led mission in Bosnia. The article began with, "An American soldier wounded when his vehicle hit a land mine on Saturday was in good spirits today ..." (Fisher 1996). The second article of the same date, 'Up at Last, Bridge to Bosnia Is Swaying Gateway for G.I.'s', talked about the beginning of the American role in mission of Bosnia. It started by declaring, "The first American tanks rolled into Bosnia early this afternoon on a floating ribbon of a bridge across the swift-moving Sava River, marking the end of a problem-plagued engineering project and the real start to the American role in the mission here" (Fisher 1996). The third article published on 2nd January, titled, 'Bosnia Bridge Just the First Headache', again described about the ability of the US military in fixing problems in a war-torn country like Bosnia. The story begins by informing that "Not since World War II has crossing a river posed such a challenge to the United States military" (Schmitt 1996).

The next fourth article, published on 3rd January, 'Civilian Effort for Peace In Bosnia Seen Lagging', finally gave a glimpse of problems Bosnians were facing. The fifth article came after a gap of three days on 7th January with the title, 'Muslims and Croats Clash in Southwest Bosnia', which finally talked about something other than America's interest. However, this article also failed to mention about the problems, civilian were facing. On the same day another two articles (sixth and seventh article) appeared with titles, 'WITH CHARLIE COMPANY; G.I.'s Meet Bosnia Serb Troops, but Gingerly' and 'NATO's Missing Partner in Bosnia'. The earlier article talked of

American soldiers, who for the first time “drove through this hilly Serbian-controlled town, a dozen miles from the mountains that NATO bombed last summer” (Fisher 1996). Likewise, the later one was about Carl Bildt’s late arrival in Bosnia as the first High Representative and demanded a more focused attention.

From the above analysis, it can be inferred that the particular media agency did not pay much heed to the Bosnians’ problems, comparing to US military forces’ problems and achievements on Bosnian mission. It is not harmful, until a media agency decides to inform the people of the state about their military forces, deployed in a foreign land, but not at the cost of totally ignoring the plight of war ravaged people.

There is no doubt that Bosnia was facing scores of difficulties during the above mentioned period, just weeks after the war ended formally. In such a situation, a war-ravaged country needs media attention, which can report both their sufferings and success stories. However, the above analysis clearly indicates at the noticeable absence of such stories about Bosnia, rather they were overloaded with information on US military and America. To strengthen this point of conclusion, a week’s report from both year of 1997 and 1998 can be analysed. A total of only 3 articles containing Bosnia in their heading were published during one week of period from January 1-7 in 1997. These three stories talked about Bosnian government, people and its rebuilding, but only in the context of how US’ help for Bosnia. From January 1-7 in 1998, only one article appeared with Bosnia in the heading, which was again a story about US military in Bosnia.

THE TIME MAGAZINE ANALYSIS

The similar hypotheses, like in the New York Times, will be taken for this concerned magazine and will be tested by analysing their contents, published following the war until 2000. From January to December 1996, there could be found a total of 127 articles in which, Bosnia was mentioned. From January to December 1997, 29 articles were found to be published by the magazine, with Bosnia in their contents. In the year of 1998, 32 articles, whereas in 1999, 33 articles were published, in which Bosnia can be found at least once in their contents. The number of articles decreased to 22 in 2000. From the above numerical data, it is clear that the number of articles started

decreasing from 1997. However, it cannot be said that a drastic decrease has occurred comparing to war-period.

For the second hypothesis, analysis of articles should be begun from 1996. As it is not possible to analyse each and every article of the year due to constraints of space and time, the January 15 issue can be considered. The reason to choose the particular issue is that Bosnia was the main focus in its 'world' section. There four articles in total were published in this section.

The first article, titled, 'Bosnia: Warm Welcome, Cold Feet,' talked about how the US military forces were spending days away from home during the New Year celebration. It expressed its sympathy by saying that "It was not a particularly pleasant way to start the New Year for any of the nearly 2,000 troops who arrived at Tuzla air base as the vanguard of U.S. peace enforcers" (Simmons 1996). The second article, titled, 'Bosnia: Generals For Hire', though pondered on Bosnia, but from the US perspective. The theme of the article revolved around private companies doing all kinds jobs for the US government and in that context it suggested the government to let companies hire generals for the Bosnian mission. It said, "There is one particular aspect of its mission that is crucial but that it is loath to carry out. So the very 1990s solution is likely to be hiring a private company to do the job instead" (Mark et al 1996). The third article, titled, 'Bosnia: Now Its Serb Against Serb,' centred around the loss of faith of Serbs on their leader, Radovan Karadzic. It failed to mention about the problems, Serbs were facing in real life. Likewise, in the last article of the section, titled, "Unearthing Evil," there were accounts of Serbs' atrocities against Muslims during war. However, there was not any mentioning of Serbs, being tortured and buried by Muslims or Croats' torture on Muslims or vice versa. It rather, described in chilling words that, "In a savage twist on that reputation, eyewitness accounts speak of a 1992 Serb campaign of systematic murders that allegedly culminated in the destruction of bodies at a former Bimeks animal-feed plant" (James et al 1996).

During January 1997, the magazine never published even a single article on Bosnia. However, in January 1998, two articles were published. Out of these articles, one titled, 'The Next Balkan War', devoted wholly on Balkans, including Bosnia, but restricted on the ethnic hatred, which was still raging in the republic, but did not mention about other problems.

During the whole year of 2000, there 18 articles were published, which contained the word 'Bosnia' in their contents at least once. Out of this total number of articles, 9 articles were about the forthcoming US presidential election debates, which happened to mention Bosnia as in issue of the debates. Only two articles were about the happenings of Bosnia, but not about the developmental issues concerning Bosnia's reconstruction.

THE TIMES (LONDON) ANALYSIS

The hypotheses for the Times (London) will also remain similar like in the case of Time and New York Times. To test the first hypothesis that there was a decrease in the number of articles, published by the daily, in the post-war period, the data will not be presented here in the tabular form due to some limitations in the availability of data. However, from the available data, still a change in the pattern of publications of articles on Bosnia could be noticed. A clear indication was there that the number of articles decreased with the time after the war.

The second hypothesis for this daily is that the particular media representative failed to bring the real issues of a war ravaged country and its people, rather remained focused on its stand about Bosnia and its critical attitude towards US policies. Some articles, after a random selection, can be analysed to test this hypothesis.

The Times (London) reported in one of its article in 1996 titled, 'Clinton approved Iran's secret arms deal with Bosnia,' the US might face embarrassment over the latest revelations that US had knowledge about the shipments of arms and ammunition from Iran. The last part of this article contained a small separate paragraph of fifty words, which informed that 18 Serb prisoners were freed from Bosnian jail. The last paragraph of the article could have been given more space, as it was a significant development, which could create goodwill among different ethnicities.

Likewise, in another article of 26th April 1996, it was again reported, 'Iran trained the hit squad to hunt war suspects'. This article was critical of Iran's act. In the last paragraph of this article, it talked, "leaders of Bosnia's Muslim-Croat federation agreed here yesterday to create joint police force and set up a network of human rights monitor." The information, given at the end, was important, but too small to draw any

attention. Brodie (1997) informed the world that Bosnian Municipality elections in 1996 were funded by Iran in his article, 'Iran cash funded Bosnian election victory, says CIA'. It said, Bosnian President Izetbegovic was delivered half million dollars in cash. Here, also there was a small paragraph at the end informing "Bosnian Serbs seeking to bolster their claims to statehood are holding up mail destined Serb controlled territory."

It can be noticed that the Bosnian developments were squeezed in a corner of the report, while giving more importance to matters concerning the US and Iran, who overtly or covertly had relationship with Bosnia. It can be mentioned here that the UK had been critical of Iran's covert role in Bosnia, since the war period. And UK claims that the US had information about all the covert activities of Iran, but still it remained silent. These above articles reflected the UK's critical opinion about US and Iran.

For a clearer picture, some articles can be analysed from 1997. The article of 4th January 1997, 'Protestors spurn Milosevic concession', informed that the Serb leader's credibility was in question. Another article, 'Isolated Bosnian Serb leaders may seek UK asylum' on 21st July 1997, talked about the power struggle between then Bosnian president Biljana Plavsic and hard-line clique of Radovan Kardzic. The 24th July 1997 article, titled, 'Legal delays & buck-passing let war crime suspects get away,' talked of war-crimes. The article, titled, 'Divided they stand' on 19th August 1997, said about power struggle among Bosnian Serb at US behest. From these articles, it appears that the daily came up with some reports, which solely talked about the developments about Bosnian situation on higher political level with having importance for the international community, but not of any problems, the civil society was facing at grass root levels.

From the analysis of articles of all three publications, a concluding picture can be drawn. In case of the New York Times, it remained focus on US military presence in Bosnia and other incidents or events of America interest. Issues, related to Bosnians' sufferings, took a back seat. Such type of news remained limited only to a small first paragraph, which was then followed by the information in the whole article about America's role or stand on Bosnian issue. The Time magazine's reports reflected a similar attitude that of the New York Times. In case of the Times (London), articles published during the post-war period especially in 1996 often talked about the follies

committed by the US government during the war period. It gave space for the domestic developments in Bosnia, but hardly covered other than the high-level political issues. Many reports were about damning the US policy or criticising its stance, which seemed to be reflecting the UK policy.

Chapter 6

Conclusion- A Critical Assessment

The Dayton Peace Agreement that ended four years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be soon celebrating 15th anniversary. The peace had come to Bosnia after a prolonged period of barbaric warfare. The world, however, still remembers those violent scenes of the war. The pictures of long queue of refugees, emaciated men in concentration camps, half destroyed buildings and deserted market places have not faded from people's memory. And for Bosnians, the harrowing past haunts them every moment of their lives, till today. Such human sufferings ask only one question- why and what went wrong?

Not any single individual or event or state or ideology can be held responsible for what happened in Bosnia. At the same time, each of them has to accept moral responsibility for what happened with many innocent lives. The Bosnia war was the cumulative effect of many causes, which directly or indirectly made this former Yugoslav republic plunge into bloodshed. The lack of economic and social reforms, which had remained pending since Tito's time, had already created a heated base. Only a spark was needed to begin the war, which was provided by Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic. They skilfully manipulated things for their self-vested nationalistic aspirations. They used the historical myth of animosity between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims as a tool to instigate hatred. Such ill intentions were overtly clear, but the so-called international community remained conspicuously silent.

Once the war was on, the role of many organisations and states came under question. A savage war was lingered for years in the backyard of Europe, but its laid-back attitude gave a wrong message to the initiators of war. By the time it reacted, Bosnia was already raging in irreconcilable ethnic hatred. The US, so-called the most powerful state of the world, wanted to shed its responsibility on Europeans. After it decided to come to the picture, millions had already lost their lives. The United Nations, the nodal international agency to decide the course of action to contain any extraordinary situation, remained toothless. Last, but not the least, social institution like media could not live up to their normative standards, as they preferred presenting

their own interpretations about Bosnia, not the actual facts. All such causes made a vicious chain of reaction, which eventually pushed Bosnia to witness a savage war.

Bosnia War was the beginning of a new phase in the world history. It marred the euphoric mood and optimism, created after the end of the Cold War. Bosnia War disillusioned the West, which had just given the concept of 'the end of history'. Rather, the savage war in Bosnia became a turning point in the world history. It was a wake-up call for the international community and it made clear to them that the 'new world order' would bring new challenges.

The main challenge before the international community is now to understand the changing nature of conflicts and wars. In this new type of warfare, the enemies are neither visible nor quantifiable, but still they claim millions of lives. "From 1990-2000, 2 million children died in wars, 3 times the total number of American soldiers were killed throughout history. In 20th century wars, it was generally safer to be a soldier than a civilian" (Jamieson 2005: 151-170). To deal with this new situation, the significance of the role, played by social bodies and institutions like media, NGOs, civil society etc has increased to a great deal. This emerging trend created interest in examining the role of media during a humanitarian crisis like Bosnia and Herzegovina War.

And the last five chapters have been devoted to analyse the role of media during Bosnian crisis. The course of analysis in each chapter has been shaped by the undertaken hypotheses of the study. A total of five hypotheses have been set to be tested. Firstly, it has been hypothesised that the Bosnian crisis was a testing ground for the international English print media to prove its social responsibility. Secondly, it has been held that media neglected Bosnian situation in the pre-war period. According to the third hypothesis, it is believed that the media paid attention only after the crisis turned bloody. The fourth hypothesis says that media agencies were influenced by their respective state's policies while reporting Bosnia War. The last and the fifth hypothesis points out, media lost interest in Bosnia, once the war was over and failed to bring about its post-crisis issues before the international community.

All these five hypotheses have been tested, one by one in the previous chapters, to arrive at a conclusion. And testing of these hypotheses have been conducted in every phase of the crisis, based on the outcomes of analysis of articles, published by the

New York Times, the Times (London) and the Time magazine. This chapter makes an attempt to summarise the results of all the previous chapters on a common platform and then critically evaluate them to form an opinion about the role played by media before, during and after the Bosnia War.

BOSNIA WAR: A REAL TESTING GROUND FOR MEDIA

The first hypothesis- Bosnian crisis was a testing ground for the international English print media, has been tested by looking at the Bosnian crisis from every perspective. There were four reasons due to which it can be said that Bosnia provided a suitable ground to test the role of media.

Firstly, it is evident from the analysis that the nature of Bosnian crisis was complex and different. In the post-Cold-War era, it posed a challenge for the West. The West was facing an overwhelming situation at that point of time, because many other events in the Gulf, in former East European Soviet Union countries, were happening. A balanced response was needed from the West, but it failed to deliver. The Western countries had the possession of knowledge of worsening situation in Bosnia, but remained inactive till the Bosnian developments threatened their hegemonic power and security. In such a situation, media agencies' role was important. There was scope for media to build pressure against the international community, especially the West, to give attention to Bosnia too.

Secondly, the Bosnian war was fought for four years, before coming to an end. The period of conflict was longer and strategically important, as it witnessed many countries like the US and the UK experiencing change in leadership. In case of the US, the Bush Administration's tenure ended in the late 1992 and the Clinton Administration came to power by early 1993. Similarly in the UK, John Major's government had just come to power in 1990 following the Margaret Thatcher led conservative government. It is a fact that with the change in the leadership, policies of the governments also change. So, such a situation provides enough opportunity for a research to examine the media's role in different setups and environments.

Thirdly, the lack of consensus among Western countries, concerning the policy making for Bosnia, made the situation worst. For example- the US preferred an interventionist approach in dealing with the problem, where as the European

Community believed in taking soft measures like economic sanctions and providing aids. Inside Europe, the prominent powers like France, Germany and UK had again points of differences among themselves. All the international players were driven by their own interests. So, it was natural for those countries to interpret Bosnian developments according to their needs. But, the media's role, here, was instrumental because, it was the only medium through which, people could know the real situation and problems, Bosnia was facing. This was the demand of the time for media. But, how far media succeeded in it, became the quest of the research.

Fourthly, Bosnia War provided a unique example of regional conflict management in the post-Cold War era in which, there was scope for media to play a crucial role. From the four above reasons, it appears that Bosnia war is a real testing ground on which, media's role could be analysed.

MEDIA NEGLECT PRE-WAR BOSNIA

The second hypothesis- the international print media neglected Bosnia in the pre-war period, has been tested by analysing the attitude of all the three media agencies towards Bosnia during the pre-crisis period.

From the beginning of 1990 to February 1992, none of the newsletters were interested in Bosnia. This was the time period, when Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence and Bosnia was gearing up to follow the same. From Bosnia's ethnic composition and strategic location, it was known to every concerned international player and institution that the consequences would be severe, if the republic had decided for independence. In such a situation, the role of media was immense and significant. It was the social responsibility for media to at least address and discuss about the impending danger on Bosnia in their publications. However, the analyses give, rather a contrast picture about media's performance.

The Times (London) has given the least attention to Bosnia, comparing to other three former Yugoslav republics-Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia has never been appeared in the heading of their articles, published during the undertaken time. In most of their reporting, the description of Bosnia remained limited to few words or sentences. Bosnia was mostly mentioned in the context of its diverse culture, religion

and ethnicities. No serious thought about Bosnia's future was reflected in their writings of pre-crisis period. The New York Times similarly adopted an ambivalent attitude towards Bosnia in the pre-crisis period. The year 1991 saw 21 articles published by the New York Times in which Bosnia was mentioned, but it could not make to the headline even a single time. In 1991, the number of articles increased to around 90, but only in two articles, Bosnia was mentioned in the headlines. The negligence attitude towards Bosnia was more visible in case of Time magazine. Only one article could be found throughout 1990 in which, a piece of information about Bosnia was squeezed in a corner. The number of article increased decently in 1991 to seven, but not a single article with Bosnia as the main theme, could be found.

By summarising the outcome of three newsletters, it can be said that media agencies were negligent of Bosnian developments in the pre-crisis situation. Bosnia was never discussed seriously by all the three newsletters. Media was overwhelmed by the disintegration of Yugoslav Federation and the independence declaration by two rebellious republics (Slovenia and Croatia). Meanwhile, the media agencies, however, forgot about the impending danger raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina and they waited till it exploded into bloodshed.

MEDIA LOOK, AFTER BOSNIA TURNS BLOODY

The third hypothesis- media paid attention only after the crisis turned bloody, has been tested by making a comparison in terms of space, received by Bosnia in the pre-crisis period and after the war broke out.

In case of the New York Times, a dramatic increase in the number of articles has been found. For example- the New York Times has published only one and two articles, having Bosnia in their headings, in the year of 1990 and 1991 respectively. Comparing to these numbers, the same news daily has again published 200 articles, with Bosnia in heading, during 1992 (from March to December). The number of exclusive story on Bosnia has increased manifold in 1993 and 1994, when the war had become more intense. The highest numbers of articles containing Bosnia, anywhere in the contents, were published during the period of May-June 1993 and Nov-Dec of 1995. Such a sharp increase in the number of articles could also be noticed in the Time magazine. During two years of time in 1990 and 1991, the magazine has come

up with only six articles containing Bosnia in their contents. The number of articles has increased in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 to 73, 152, 116 and 133 respectively. The same trend can be found in the Times (London) as well. A dramatic increase in the number of articles coincides with that of the period and happenings, when heavy fighting between Serbs and Muslims in 1993, 1994 had taken place. Therefore, it can be concluded that media representatives were interested only when Bosnia was witnessing its worst humanitarian loss.

MEDIA BECOME BIASED ON BOSNIA

As per the fourth hypothesis- media agencies were influenced by their respective states policies in reporting Bosnian War, is concerned, the outcome of the analysis in previous chapters proves it positive.

From the analysis in the previous chapters, it is clearly evident that the New York Times changed its policy in accordance with the US policies on Bosnia war. For example- the daily was not critical about Vance-Owen Peace initiative till late 1992. However, it became a hard critique of the same peace plan in the beginning of 1993. It should be noted here that the US, under Bush administration, was not critical of the peace process, initiated by the EC, but policy changed with Clinton coming to power in early 1993. It clearly shows that media's writings reflected the US' stand. The Times (London), on the other hand, supported the peace initiative from the very beginning, while opposing any type of intervention in Bosnia. It remained critical of US, when the Clinton Administration did not show interest for the Vance-Owen deal. Here, the Times (London)' stance matched with that of the EC and particularly of the UK. The Time magazine's published materials on Bosnia also reflected a supportive attitude towards the policies adopted by the US. Before Clinton came to power, the magazine never took a stand on Bosnian issue, but it started pitching for intervention only after 1993.

To strengthen the argument, all the three newsletters' way of reporting about war crimes has also been considered. The New York Times conspicuously ignored the casualties faced by Serbs, while highlighting the plight of Bosnian Muslims. This attitude of the daily was again in compliance with the US, which had labelled Serbs as the aggressor and Muslims as the victims. The similar stance could be seen, taken by the Time magazine. On the other hand, the Times (London)' reports about war-

crimes, gave a balanced view about the fighting and casualties. It did not ignore the sufferings of Serbs caused by Muslims and at the same time, it reported about Muslim casualties caused by Serbs.

From the above summary of analyses, it can be said that the New York Times and the Time magazine were completely biased in their reporting about Bosnian crisis. The state's (US) policies influenced their writings. For the Times (London), it can be said that the daily was partially biased, because its reporting were in compliance with that of the UK, but at the same time it was balanced while reporting war-crimes.

MEDIA SHIFTS FOCUS AS WAR ENDS

The last hypothesis- media lost interest in Bosnia, once the war was over and it failed to address the post-crisis issues, before the international community, has been tested by discussing the post-war problems of Bosnia, followed by analysis of reports of three newsletters, to see whether they have given space to such issues in their daily publications.

A gradual decrease in the number of articles, exclusively about Bosnia, has been noticed in the New York Times' reporting. From 23rd November 1995 to 31st December 1995, just after the inking of the Dayton, 103 articles with Bosnia in the heading, were published. However, the number of articles tapered significantly in the following months. 45 stories, exclusively on Bosnia, were published in the month of January 1996, 31 articles in February and 20 in March of the same year. The dramatic decrease can be seen in the next two years, as 6 and 5 numbers of articles were published in 1997 and 1998 respectively. The Time magazine also followed the same pattern like the New York Times. A total of 127 articles with Bosnia in their contents, have been found to be published by the magazine, within the time period from January to December 1996. In 1997 and 1998, the number of articles decreased to 29 and 32 respectively. The number decreased to 22 in 2000.

The analysis of the post-war reporting of the newsletters brings out the fact that the dailies and the magazine were highly attentive towards their respective country's peacekeeping mission, stationed in Bosnia. Every bit of their soldiers' movement was reported almost every day, but problems, faced by Bosnian people took a back seat.

All the above five hypotheses have been, more or less, tested positive of their claims. So, it can be said that media, though existed as a social institution, but lacked in normative standard, in its functioning during Bosnia War. In a crisis-situation, when media's objectivity and responsibility matters the most, media faltered badly at living up to the expectation of the society and the moral standards, set by itself. The summary of all the chapters, points at the fact that sensational news and views receives first priority of the media, followed by other information. And when their respective states are involved in the crisis, the expectation from media to deliver unbiased information is a futile hope.

In the age of breaking news, it is not the normative standards, but other actors and factors, which decide what the readers should read. In case of this study, states' policies and sensational value of the events determined media's role in Bosnia War. And their aggressive performance during the war-period started dying down, as the war-stricken society entered into a gloomy and uneventful phase, which is called the post-war period.

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