

FOREIGN POLICY OF TAJIKISTAN, 1991-2008

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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**FOREIGN POLICY OF TAJIKISTAN, 1991-2008**” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.


Lal Ji Pal

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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(Chairperson)


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*Dedicated to
My
Grand Parents*

Acknowledgement


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Abbreviations

ASSR	: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
IRP	: Islamist Republic Party
DPT	: Democratic Party of Tajikistan
IRP	: Islamic Revival Party
CP	: Communist Party
CST	: Collective Security Treaty
CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty Organization
CIS	: Commonwealth of Independent States
CAREC	: Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
DCA	: Drugs Control Agency
EEC	: Eurasian Economic Community
EBRD	: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IMU	: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC	: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies
PFE	: Partenership For Peace
SCO	: Shanghai Cooperation organization
UTO	: United Tajik Opposition
WTO	: World Trade Organization

PREFACE

The international system is complex and interdependent. It means no state can live without interaction with world and thus, foreign policy is the key instrument of interaction with other nation-state. The working definition of foreign policy is as follows: “The foreign policy of a country is an instrument of self-preservation and self-extension in a word when a country always seems to be fighting for a dominance, resources and interests. Each states makes polices and decides upon actions according to its own internal processes, but its decision is shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interaction with them.”

The determinants of foreign policy are classified into internal factor and external factors. Internal factor are geography, natural resources, socio-political structures, industry and military establishment and external factors are regional and global powers, organization and other countries similarities and dissimilarities, information technology, world system etc.

The Twentieth Century was the most turbulent century. It witnessed two World Wars and its dusk saw the end of Cold War, which led to the demise of Soviet Union and the establishment of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). After the disintegration of the erstwhile USSR, this led to the emergence of globalization and the emergence of liberal–democratic values in the international system. The world became unipolar and the new world order had to deal with the emergent states of Central Asia. Central Asia is strategically important area.

The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. Soon after the dissolution of the former USSR, Tajikistan emerged as an independent sovereign republic on the map of the world. After independence Tajikistan became member of the international system. At that time the young independent state had nothing to do but to establish its own foreign policy, national security, etc. After independence Tajik Government has formulated its foreign policy according to its need and main aim was to achieve national interest.

The foreign policy of the republic can be divided into three main phase. These three phases are based on the orientations and major shift in the foreign policy of Tajikistan.

These three phases of Tajikistan foreign policy are-

- (1) The first phase of Tajik foreign policy covers the Civil War period.
- (2) The second phases starts after the Civil War and ended with the events of 11 September 2001.
- (3) Third phase of Tajikistan foreign policy begins with the twin towers incidents which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America. Since 9/11 the significant shift took place in the foAreign policy of the republic.

So far as Tajikistan's relations with other countries of the world are concerned Russia has an important place in the Tajik foreign policy. Since its independence, Tajikistan's foreign policy has focused on two main tasks; surviving as a nation and securing international assistance for maintenance of national security and its overall development. The Tajik Civil War (1992-97) led the country and regime highly dependent upon Russia for national and regional security. Russia supported Tajikistan's government at military, political and economic levels under the banner of peacekeeping force. These troops guaranteed not only Tajikistan's national security but also the security of the regime of President Emomali Rakhmanov since the late 1992. Tajikistan supported Russia's initiatives for close bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Central Asian region. Tajikistan's economic development remained heavily dependent on Russia's willingness to assist the Tajik leadership therefore, saw the limited Russian economic engagement and investment as a problem. At that time, Tajikistan was in urgent need of assistance for economic development. After the end of civil war, the developments after 9/11 brought new prospects for economic assistance and potential partnership with foreign governments and international organizations. Tajikistan developed relations with Western countries and also provided an opportunity to USA for its engagement in Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in particular.

During the following years, Tajikistan's foreign policy strengthened its relations with Western and Asian countries. US is assisting Tajikistan in recovering from its civil war legacy. After 9/11, they have broad based relationship, co-operating in areas as narcotics,

drug trafficking and smuggling, counter-terrorism, non proliferation, regional growth, energy and stability. US ensured Tajikistan to develop closer relation with IMF, World Bank and other financial institutions that could help in rebuilding process. US is also interested to develop co-operation in hydroelectric power sector.

Tajikistan's location makes it a gateway to Central Asia from Afghanistan for drugs, weapons, people and radical ideas. It is also crucial for transit in the opposite direction from having been a transit country during the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan for most material assistance to the anti-Taliban northern alliance. Tajikistan today, is taking part in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 1990s, Afghanistan was the more serious threat as failed state, turmoil, radical Islamism, weapons, drugs and rebel fighters spread out from Afghanistan territory by military intervention or support to Tajik rebel commanders. Uzbekistan is direct threat to Tajikistan as strong power due to its large population and army, to take unilateral measures against Tajikistan in order to ensure its own national security, using Tajikistan's energy dependence for political pressure, closing the Uzbek-Tajik border and restricting Tajikistan's contact with outside world.

Tajikistan policy towards neighboring country China and others has scope for co-operation in the field of hydroelectric power, Uighur ethnic radicalism in Xingjian border trade and market technology. China's foreign policy in Central Asia is not only intimately related to the strategy of "peaceful rise" but also to a particular, historically and geopolitically informed narrative of china's "inner Asia" power. China's "rise" focuses upon its potential impact upon the international relations and environment of Asia-Pacific to exclusion of China's significant continental frontiers (Robert S. Ross, 1988). China's strategic preoccupation with Central Asia has become an important expression of this grand strategy. Xingjian could play a major role linking the economics of china's and Central Asian states and once again become a hub of the 'Silk Road'. The integrity and security of China and Central Asian frontiers is demonstrated by the establishment of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.

The development of bilateral relations spurred on by the development of economic linkages was further strengthened by the identification of common interests in the historical and geopolitical relationship between Central Asia and China after both

Watershed movement of 1991 and then 9/11. It would seem that Central Asia will remain a “safe” axis for the continued of China’s strategy of peaceful rise” into the immediate future.

Republic of India is one of the countries, which recognized independence of a new Tajikistan, just after its independence. Tajikistan has a similar position with India and has consistently supported its initiatives and efforts on wide international platform of the UN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other organizations. Tajikistan and India have affirmed their interest in establishing constructive efforts in fighting against international terrorism in all its form and manifestations

Central Asian countries looked towards Muslim countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. They hope that close co-operation with Muslim countries would help them in overcoming their own economic crisis. Turkey and Iran provided different political models respectively a secular state in a Muslim society and a theocracy. It soon becomes obvious that in inter-state relations, ideologies were of minor importance compared to a sober pragmatic approach to the economic and political advantages of cooperation.

Tajikistan became the member of UN in 1992. Tajikistan has developed the close relationship with International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other international organization of the world. Besides Tajikistan is member of CIS, SCO, CSTO, OIC, OSCE, CAREC, North Atlantic Cooperation Council and partnership for peace of NATO. Tajikistan also has participated in the peacekeeping mission in Congo (2008) and other international problems like environmental, water problems, etc.

Tajikistan’s foreign policy has faced several challenges and problems. These challenges and problems include- religious radicalism, border issue, water distribution problem, Small arms smuggling, trafficking of drugs, child and women, migration, minority problems, and confrontation among the great powers, etc. These problems need the special attention because these are the major hurdles in the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations of Tajikistan with other countries of the world

The entire research work is divided into five chapters including conclusions.

In the first chapter deals with the different approaches and basic determinants of foreign

policy in theoretical framework.

The second chapter focuses on the determinants of the foreign policy of Tajikistan. Besides, chapter also sheds light on the different phases of the foreign policy of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The chapter third examine the Tajikistan's relations with the major countries of the world, Western powers, Russia, China, Islamic World and India etc. in the post-Soviet period.

The fourth chapter deals with the various challenges which Tajikistan has faced in the formulation of the foreign policy of the republic.

In the last chapter the whole study has been summarised in the brief.



Map of Tajikistan

Chapter-1

Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Aspect

In the present age of complex interdependence, no country, large or small, powerful or weak can afford to live in isolation. In the course of continuous interactions, nations are constantly changing, and are influenced by each other. Each state pursues lot of policies in order to create an environment in which its national interest can be preserved and promoted. Therefore, foreign policy becomes a crucial instrument to rationalize these objectives in the international arena. Foreign policy is primarily a project of a country's socio-economic and political compulsion in international politics.

George Modelski (1962) defines the foreign policy as “the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and adjusting their own activities to the international Environment” (Modelski 1962: 6-7).

Feliks Gross (1954) writes that even a decision to have no relations with a state is a foreign policy , which implies that even not to have definite foreign policy is also foreign policy. Foreign policy appears to be a series of responses made by the official decision makers to the international condition, but country to appearance, it is a much complex process (Gross 1954: 47-48).

Peter Calvert (1986) says that the base of any foreign policy is a state mission to maximize its value synthesis once it make a place in the international scene and generally interact with other states, each struggling for accomplishment of its own values derived goals(Calvert 1986: 1).

It is assumed that foreign policy is more important than other policy areas because it is closely associated with the national interests, rather than special interests and more fundamental values. Another important aspect of foreign policy making process is that since it evokes a different political response, it is generally accepted that political institution function differently when that confront foreign policy issues. In addition of

course different institutions are also involved in that same governmental agencies are concerned exclusively or substantially with foreign policy (Sills 1968: 530)

The theoretical aspects of foreign policy analysis have been examined keeping in mind the basic and fundamental determinants. James N. Rosenau (1981) has suggested nine preconditions for erective theorizing they are:

1. To think theoretically one has to avoid threading the task as that of formulating an appropriate definition of theory.
2. One has to be clear as to whether one aspires to empirical theory or value theory.
3. One must be able to assume that human affairs are founded on an underlying order.
4. One must be able to predispose to ask about every event every situation, or every observed phenomenon of what is it an instance.
5. One must be ready to appreciate and accept the need to sacrifice detailed description for broad observations.
6. One must be tolerant of ambiguity, concerned about probabilities and distrustful of absolutes.
7. One must be playful about international phenomena.
8. One must be genuinely puzzled by international phenomena.
9. One must be constantly ready to be proven wrong(Rosenau 1981: 20-31).

It is difficult task to strictly follow the preconditions mentioned by Rosenau in agreeing the foundation of various planks of foreign policy analysis because that human nature varies from person to person. Furthermore, the political set up of a polity, the social cultural and academic environment in which scholar is working once again vary from country to country.

In fact, foreign policy is an exercise in choice of end and mean on the part of a notion state in an international setting. This exercise involves two aspects. Firstly, the national

factors, the community presents the resources, opportunity and limitations for the exercise of foreign policy. Secondly, on the international Factors, a state acts in its own favor. Policy formulation is another aspect of the process. It is first and important duty of the policy makers to ascertain who is involved in the particular situation and should consider how many parties are there. What are their relationships? And who will be critical in determine the outcomes?

Determinants of Foreign Policy:

To analyze foreign policy of country one must study the domestic and international environment in which the policy makers operate and the other relevant variables which are permanent in nature. These variables are the *part and parcel* of the foreign policy process of a country. They are more responsive to change because human manipulation is involved in them. The same are relatively permanent in nature such as geography and natural resources. There are human factors also which in one way or the other determine the whole process largely quantitative in the case of population, and qualitative as regards national character, social structure, national morale, political institutions and experience and an affective and sound tradition of diplomacy. From these determinants and the instrumentalities of the policy making process, the substance of foreign policy derives and major historic policies and the vital interests of countries emerge (Thompson and Macridision 1967).

Foreign policy making is a dynamic process; normally change of government does not change the fundamentals of foreign policy of a state, though a revolution that brings change in political set up may result in drastic change. Why does it normally remain unchanged? It is because a number of factors determine foreign policy of state and many of them are static. There are some factors that do change, but their impact in shaping a country's foreign policy of a country is companied out of many factors and forces. All of them interact and determine the foreign policy. It is said that fundamentally foreign policy has its roots in the unequal historical background, political institutions, traditions, economic needs power factors, aspirations, peculiar geographical circumstances, and

basic set of values held by a nation.

James Rosenau (1981) includes geography, size economic development, culture and history, great power structure, alliances, technology, social structure, public opinion and government structure, as inputs of foreign policy (Rosenau 1981).

The basic determinants of foreign policy include geography, economic development, political traditions domestic milieu, international milieu, military strength and national character (Bandhopadyay 1980). He calls them as domestic environment and international environment. The basic determinants of foreign policy are -

Geography:

Geography is an important determinant in shaping of country foreign policy in area relating to military logistics trading patterns alliance patterns, membership of inter-governmental organically and various international forums, United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is more or less a permanent variable. The size of the state large enough to support a population, a climate that is neither excessively cold nor very hot a topography offering boundaries with natural barrier such as mountains, rivers and seas and a compact territory enable a country to make and implement independent foreign policy. Geography and terrain were very important assets before modern military machinery come into existence; which in turns shapes its foreign policy. An Indian philosopher Kautilya in his famous treatise "Arthshastra" has developed a theory of state behaviour partially based on geopolitical situation of a country. He was the view that a circle of states forming a kind of solar system and tending to gravitate towards one another as friends or come into collusion as enemies according to their respective positions in the circle (Reasel 1936: 45). Hans J. Morgenthau (1976) has also analyzed the importance of geography. He was of the opinion, "The most stable factor upon which the power of nation depends is obviously geography" (Morgenthau 1976: 110). Hence, the important components of geography are Location, Size, Climate and Topography and Natural Resource, etc.

Location:

The location is important to a nation state in a dual sense; geographically in terms of the temperate zones, and strategically in terms of its, neighbors and vulnerability to invasion location is consequently a primary geographical influence upon foreign policy. The connection between location and foreign policy as it has given birth to geopolitics. Founded as field of study by Sir Holdord Mackinder, who first set forth his theory in 1904, this offspring of the marriage of geographic and political concepts has at its best, contributed many insights (Hartman 1967: 47-48). British and Japan, though small in size, but became great nations because of their ability to use the oceans as highways of commerce.

Size:

Role of size of the territory in determining the foreign policy is another significant variable because it is closely related to geopolitical situation of country; it gives a state's army to retreat without surrender and has an advantage. Its importance lies in the location and disposal of critical population, economic, military and governmental facilities size as factor has its bearing on population military installations transportations routes and so on, but it may be a liability because at the same time it adds to difficulty of achieving notional unity effective administration and cultural integration (Palmer and Perkins 1970: 38).

Climate and Topography:

Climate and topological condition of a country are also significant in the context of geopolitical situation of a country. The term climate denotes weather patterns derived by averaging records of a country in a given place over a periods of time. The climatic conditions of a state is concerned, there should be sufficient heat a long enough growing season sufficient rain fall to feed the population, there needs to be soil of minimum quality in order for a country to produce enough food grains to save the population from

starving . Human organ functions more effectively in certain climatic conditions. These factors are helpful in strengthening the capability factor, which is main plank of country, is foreign policy. It is true that great power cannot be outside of the temperate zones (Wendzel 1977: 93).

As the human beings are directly involved in the foreign policy making process, it is quite certain that the climatic conditions of a state will have indirect bearings on their mind in one-way or other. If a country is not in a position to produce enough food grains and other essential commodities for its people as a result of drought crop failure; it will have purely a psychological effect on foreign policy makers.

Topography has had a significant role in modern political system, islands and physical barriers and communication sources have their own significance in the affairs of states although rivers, mountains Jungles and deserts are less significant obstacles in the modern world than in the past. The rivers would be helpful in strengthening the ports of a country and transportation system thorough a state. On the contrary, the international boundary sometimes creates commercial problems with another state. The fall of rivers is helpful for the production of energy and for the good irrigation facilities. They may foster natural calamity, they create obstacles in its way also. As a prime determinant of climate and rainfall, the topography has an obvious and significant impact on the economy and cultural values of a state (Palmer and Perkins 1970: 39-40).

Natural Resources:

The natural resources are important for economic development, international trade, national security war making power and large number of other variables having close relationship with domestic and international consequences: the policy makers utilize the natural resources for effective and success foreign policy.

The fair distribution of raw material is another important aspect of this issue. No state is self-sufficient in the world in the case of essential raw material and all states, therefore,

are heavily dependent on the foreign sources of supply. This dependent in the fact raise number of vital questions concerning the accessibility of their materials, control over the sea lanes or their routes from the source of supply, exchange and balance of payments problems, relation between states heeding the materials and states possessing them, trade restriction and other barriers to international commercial and significant security and political. The national capability of a country, "the factors of raw materials resources, critical and material shortage, production rates of basic materials, all help to furnish a rough index of power" (Hartman Fredrick H. 1967: 73).

The modern industrialized economy is totally dependent on critical resources like coal, iron and petroleum as well as wide variety of minerals. The policy-maker must keep in mind a number of important factors in formulating any foreign policy issue. It is very important that one must see whether the resources are actually tapped and put to use in an effective manner. Whether a state is having a political control over the territory rich in natural resources, then it receive maximum benefits from it. Resources reflect not only potentials but also limitations. The possession of natural resources is considered the backbone of a country's foreign policy process.

The technological progress has seriously lowered the geopolitical hypothesis that natural resources constitute an important element of national power and hence should be given due weightage as one of the significant determinant of foreign policy. Morgenthau is of the view that with the increasing mechanization of warfare, national power has become more and more dependent upon the control of raw materials in peace and war (Morgenthau 1976:115).

In the present time, circumstances the natural resources, which are the main source of materials need for the manufacturing of a gun to spoon, have always a ready international market. So, the possession of raw material and natural resources; and compulsion of economic growth determine the foreign policy. The political strength of a country is often measured in terms of economic strength hence this factor cannot be ignored while shaping the foreign policy. A weak industrial base has adverse effect on the effectiveness

of the country foreign policy.

History, Cultural and Societal Traditions:

History and traditions have significant influence on foreign policy making. “Traditional values may be described as those principles embodied in beliefs and practices which have been transmitted through successive generation and have been regarded as worthy of esteem and adaptation” (Appadorai 1981: 37).

High national morale makes for a successful conduct of foreign policy. A homogeneous society requires strong national unity and high morale sharp divisions in society between rich and poor, between different class, communities and castes, have communities adverse impact on foreign policy. Social cohesion, therefore, is another factor in shaping of successful foreign policy.

The development is inevitable because the inexorable law of Marxist science predict it, and the inexorable forces of ‘history’ are at work. Nevertheless Lenin insisted that it was the duty of Marxists to do all they could to accelerate the process: merely to sit back and wait for ‘history’ was a grave dereliction of the duty (Hugh Seton- Watson 1985: 9).

Political Traditions, Government and Leadership:

Political organizations, traditions, government and enlightened leadership contribute to the shaping of an effective foreign policy. The quality of leadership is an important factor. A farsighted Nehru who believed in democracy, an idealist Wilson, who wanted to end of all future wars acted as an important determinant in the formulation of foreign policies. On the other hand, leaders like Hitler, Mussolini or Saddam Hussein Promise a glorious future for their countries, but their policies often lead to disaster.

A democratic regime is in the long run for more effective than despotic system which shows only short term gains always influence the foreign policy. The perception of ruling elites, the imperatives of state building and ideologies of political parties are important

variables that influence foreign policy. As far as the role of political elites in the most of the societies is concerned, they always give due importance to the security of the national state.

The political party is related with foreign policy because foreign policy maker is a part of government. The model of foreign policy of a country is dependent on the party which in power. In case of coalition government, it would be more difficult to pursue a particular line of thinking because of the different attitudes to the various factions of the coalition. It is difficult to take policy decision in such situation ultimately; issue is more debated and finalized for public interest.

International Environment:

International milieu is one of the most important determinants of foreign policy. In any case, foreign policy is the sum total of decisions taken by a country to regulate the behaviors of other states, therefore, the international system at any given point of time has direct impact on foreign policies. The complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of the desire of state within the international community to achieve their own national interests and their consequent attitudes to international issues (Appadorai 1981).

As far as shaping of foreign policy is concerned, the role of international situation cannot be denied. During the balance of power system in the nineteenth century, conclusion of alliances, policy of buffer states and race of armament all were guided by the place a state in the international system. Every weak state always sought the help of an unattached power, known as balancer. The Cold War system did not leave any country's foreign policy unaffected. The fear of US atom bomb made the Soviet Union leader of Eastern Europe, and all of the countries in the region adopted socialism and accepted the Soviet leadership. India's propagation and adaptation of non-alignment was a clear response to the international setting represented by a bipolar world and the cold war by not ignoring number of variables.

The understanding nature and scope of international milieu are closely related with the

foreign policy process. The complex environment of international politics has transformed the making and execution of foreign policy more of an uncertain art than an exact science. The foreign policy maker take usually calculated risks in formulating their objectives and action programme while striving to maintain flexibility to react to actual circumstances as they unfold. The success of country's foreign policy depends on the accurate assessment of interests, intention and capabilities of both domestic and external environment (Padelford and Lincon 1976: 220-221).

Theories or Approaches of Foreign Policy:

In the international relations, there are multiple realities, which are true from different perspectives. On the empirical observation, these differences can be seen. A theory must be able to explain the relationships, behaviors and outcomes pertaining to any social phenomenon. Such an explanation does not exist in nature rather it depends upon the reasoning faculty of an individual and, therefore, it may vary from person to person. In international relations, since the actors are the nation-states, so the driving force for foreign policy is the national interest. It also has three important components: security, stability and status. Security is of prime importance in the unequal (anarchic for realists) international system. Stability is another important concern for a weak country as well as for a hegemon. An effective diplomacy is indispensable for a country to maintain its status; both for domestic and external settings.

An approach, in fact, consists of criteria employed in selection the problems or questions and the data for investigation. The character of an approach determines the character of generalization, explanation, predication and prescription – all of which are among the main function of theory. An approach is transformed into theory when its function extends beyond the selection of problems and data; about the subject under study. An approach is closely related to a theory. The word theory itself is full of ambiguity (Jenkin 1955:7).

Karl Popper (1950) says it as the consummation of explanation (Karl Popper 1950: 44-

53). The main function of theory is that there is no clear agreement on the question as to what should be explained and what can be explained. This is same problem to theory of international politics.

When the approach is used in the study of foreign policy, same theory emerges as an explanation of foreign policy as it is formulated and implemented in each country. A theory emerging in this way may be called long theory of foreign policy and international politics as the interaction of foreign policies would regard this theory of foreign policy as a theory of international politics (Stephan van 1994: 19).

Realist and Neo-Realist Approach:

Realism in international politics does not mean either the platonic doctrine, which attributes reality to the abstract ideas or the political doctrine of expediency with which Machiavelli is so often associated, or the philosophic doctrine of empiricism propounded by Locke. It is a set of ideas, which take into account the implications of security and power factors.

The basic assumption underlying the realist approach is rivalry and strife among the nations. There is a contest for power or influence always goes in international society and this contest cannot be controlled by international law or government. Therefore, the prime objective of foreign policy is to check the contest for power by diplomacy and statesmanship. Realism accepts for its guide the permanence and struggle for power. Thus, it is indifferent to the question of the relationship between means and ends in international politics. George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau are among the leading contemporary realists. Both of them start with the conviction that the national interest is more reliable guide to intelligent policy. Thus, on the question of relationship between the national interest and morality, Kennan projects the idea of what Robert Good calls "moral relativism". Morgenthau (1966) highlights the content of national interest was determine by political tradition and total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy.

The essence of Morgenthau's theory is contained in the six principles of political realism are:

- (1) Political Realism believes that politics like society in general is governed by objectives of laws that have their root in human nature.
- (2) The main signpost that helps, political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined as power.
- (3) Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but
- (4) Political realism, though not indifferent to morality, implies that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of state their abstract formulations, but those they must be modified in accordance with the requirements of concrete circumstances of time and place.
- (5) Political Realism refuses to accept any identification between the moral aspirations of particular nation and moral law, which govern the universe.
- (6) Political Realism maintained the autonomy of political spheres (Morgenthau 1962: 36-52).

This pessimistic view of how the world works can be derived from realism's five assumptions about the inter-state relations:

1. The first is that the international system is anarchic. Kenneth Waltz. (1979: 88-93). Sovereignty in states, there is no higher ruling body in the international system. There is no "government over government" (Claude Lévi-Strauss 1967: 14).
2. The second assumption is that states military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal although even if there were no weapons, the individuals of states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state.
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states, specifically, no state

can be certain that another state would not use its offensive military capability against the first.

4. The most basic motive driving state is survival states want to maintain their sovereignty.
5. States think strategically about how to survive in the international system. States are instrumentally rational. One of three assumption alone mandates that states will behave competitive the fundamental assumption dealing with motives say that states merely to survive, which is a defensive goal.

Whatever the statesman knows about the world of reality with which he has to deal is only a partial awareness of reality. Karl popper's criticism of historicism as being a deterministic theory about the nature and future of world also applies to the realist theory of international politics in general and to Morgenthau theory in particular (Karl popper 1957).

Neo-Realists or structural realists emphasize this, rather than human nature, as the starting point for their explanation of world politics. Because of anarchy, states are compelled to be constantly vigilant, watching out for impositions on their autonomy. The best way to protect a state's autonomy-and thus ensure its survival-is to amass power resources that can be used to deter or defend against other states. All states are similarly motivated and thus can be expected to do what is necessary to survive sometimes resorting to the use of armed violence against others to capture additional power resources that can be harnessed for the protection of the state.

Idealist Approach:

Idealist approach basically, regards power politics as only an abnormal or passing phase of history. Idealism is based on the general idea of evolutionary progress in society. This idea emerged in the eighteenth century and is acknowledge as the major source of

inspiration behind the American and French revolution in 1795. Condorcet wrote a treatise, which contained everything considered as the essential basis of idealism in international relations. He envisaged a world order characterized by the absence of war inequality, and tyranny, and marked by constant progress in human welfare brought about by the use of reason, education, and science.

Idealism presents a picture of the future international society based on the notion of reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. The idealist approach to international relations has always held with the help of education and international organization. The idealists argue that political struggles in the past have been not for power or influence, but between incompatible principles and ideals. Utopian offers three ways out of the problems of survival in the world of archaic power politics.

1. One is that moral nations should try to follow moral principles in their international behavior, abstain from all forms of traditional power politics and adopt politics of non-partisanship.
2. The second way is that effort should be made to see that the totalitarian forces cease to exist because, as the Utopians world like us to believe, the struggles so far have been between democratic and totalitarian states.
3. The third way is to abolish power politics though instituting a world government. This in the ultimate analysis the Utopian approach is tied up with the ideal of "world federalism" or "one world."

The intellectual foundations of international idealism can be traced from the nineteenth century. Benthamite rationalism, which was based upon the idea of the supremacy of reason. Understanding of international society could be acquired through right reason, that the public opinion was prepared for being molded in accordance with the demand of reason, and that the international society could be improved once the voice of reason is known. The reverberation of this agreement was heard in the exhortations of those who

propounded the doctrine of the harmony of interests (Wolfer 1951: 40). In the contemporary period of international politics, idealism was given renewed emphasis after the First World War under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson.

Marxist Approach:

Marxist approach to international relation is the analysis determined by the manner in which states are internally organized. In word of Marx and Angeles 'the relation of deferent nations among themselves depend upon the extant to which has developed its productive force , the division of labour and internal intercourse. B. S. Chimani says, "The foreign policy of states is integrally linked to its domestics policy and is articulated and executed in the matrix of a specific socio-economic formation based on a definite and dominant mode of production"(Chimani 2004: 123). Gramsci points out, "International relation intertwine with international relation of the nation states creating new, unique and historically concrete combination" (Gramsci 1971:182).

The Marxist view was established before the founding of the Soviet Union as a critique and response to capitalism. The foundation of the Marxist view is that the economic organization of a society determines the political and social system. A society founded on capitalism, with its free market and private ownership of wealth and property, is a society divided into economic/social classes. Essentially, there are two classes: owners and workers. The societal norms and political system built on a capitalist-based economy are designed to maintain the continued profit taking of the owner class. Elite interests will dominate politics, and the institutions of government will be designed and directed to keeping the workers in exploited, dependent position in order to preserve and increase the wealth of the owners. International system based on capitalism is also a system divided into the owners, or the "haves," and the workers, or the "have-nots" (Laura Neack 2008: 16). The institutions of the rich states such as their militaries are used to maintain the world capitalist system, which serves elite interests. International institutions, similarly, are used to maintain the system in favor of the wealthy class/states. Marxists look at foreign policy from the system and state levels. At the system level, the asymmetrical

relations between states are important. At the state level, Marxists study the common interests of economic elites in one state with the elites in another. Alternatively, they study how military capitalist industrial interests push a state into war. Group politics is important to Marxists, so we can find such explanations of foreign policy posed at the state and system levels.

System Theory Approach:

System theory is result of the behavioral revolution in social science. It developed out of the anxiety of the new social scientists to evolved a general body of knowledge by the integrating the various disciplines of social science. The origins of general system theory can be traced back to the thinking of Ludwig van Bartalanffy. General System theory has been in aspiration the consequence for a movement aimed at the unification of science and scientific analysis. The term system as a set of objects together with relationship between the objects and between their attributes (Hall and Fagen 1956: 18).

The system approach is based on the belief that it is possible to find out certain regular modes of behavior within the structure of political organism. Each small system can affect the working of a system larger than itself. For example, the foreign policy of the Russia affects the foreign policy of Tajikistan and is in turn also affected by the foreign policy of Tajikistan. This mutual relationship between the systems is called feedback, which may be both negative and positive. International system means such an agreement of international actors in which interaction are identifiable (Goodman 1966: 257-268).

According to James Rosenau (1961), "a system is considered to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts, which through interaction, are in relation to each other" (Rosenau 1961: 77).

Morton Kaplan (1957) believes that a System is most inclusive if it has such, recognizable necessarily opposed to each other. Kaplan holds that physical force is necessary, as last resort to keep the political system intact. He does not regard

international system as political system because the role of decision makers in the field of international affairs always governed by the basic consideration of national interest. He divides the set of international actors into two categories; national actors and supranational actors. The international system of international actors serves as a parameter in the international system, which could be treated as a parameter for the national system of action. Kaplan (1957) treats six models of major international system:

- 1) Balance of power system,
- ii) The loose system bipolar system,
- iii) The Tight bipolar system,
- iv) The universal actor system,
- v) The hierarchical international system, and
- vi) The unit of veto system.

The balance of power system worked in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an absolute system and it appeared as a rule of universal applicability. The conditions which may make the balance of power system unstable are the existence of essential national actor who does not play according to the rules of the game, the existence of a national actor whose essential national rule are oriented toward the establishment of same form of supranational organization, and failure in the decision-making system of national actors. If an essential actor aspires to some form of international or supranational hegemony, the balance of power system tends to change because supra nationality is inconsistent with the exclusive values of nationalism and such, national actors do not exploit their opportunities to the fullest possible extent. For example, Germany imposed heavy penalties on France after the France-Prussian war of 1970 but did not incorporate France as a part of Germany.

According to Kaplan, the most likely transformation of the balance of power system is into a bipolar system. He conceives of two type of bipolar system. In loose bipolar System, a group of smaller powers and non-aligned state, in which the existence of non-aligned states makes the power of the two manger actors loose, surrounds two super powers. The Tight bipolar system is one in which non- aligned states will have

disappeared and the system will operate around the two super powers. However, its stability will be granted only when both bloc actors are hierarchically organized; otherwise, the system will again tend to develop in to a loose bipolar system.

The universal international system; could develop because of the extension of functions of essential actors in a loose bipolar system. In this system, the universal actor like (US) is sufficiently powerful to prevent national interest. National actors will try to achieve their objectives only within the Framework of the universal actor. In this system, national Actors will attempt to increase their rewards and resource and widen the productive base of the national system.

The fifth model of Kaplan's is the hierarchical international system in which a universal actor absorbs practically the whole world and only one nation is left and. This hierarchical international System can be both directive and non-directive. It will be directive if it is formed as a consequence of world conquest by a national actor system like Nazi system and it will be non-directive if it is based upon political rules generally operative in democracies.

The sixth international is the unit veto system in which the weapons that existence of such a nature that any national actor can destroy any other before being destroyed it self. The essence of this system will be that each state will be equally able to destroy the others. The condition in which such a system is possible is the possession by all actors of the weapons of such a nature that any actor is able to destroy any other actor, even though at the risk of its own destruction.

It is an undeniable fact that study of international politics through the system approach is a reflection of changing character of national sovereignty and of the growing awareness that nations today can no longer behave as individual nations in an absolute arena. However, concept of international system raises certain methodological problems. Whether all nations of the world should be regarded as constituting, single international system or they should better be treated as participating units in various systems

simultaneously. Moreover, another problem is identification of the units or actor of international system (Cohen and Hilsman 1959: 361-82).

The Regional System Approach:

This approach relates to the international environment of state and the impact of the big powers engaging in the region and the neighbouring states most relevant to country's national security change at the regional level create both constraints and challenges for a government. Foreign policy change is the result of a government's effort to make the best of situation by adapting to new external circumstances or more actively promoting the interests of its country. The logic of this approach indicates that a higher degree of tension in the region (between the big powers or the regional states), as well as a larger asymmetry in the power relations between them, will increase the probability that the foreign policy will be cautious and constrained. Increased tension in relation to a neighbouring state may also force a government to seek support from big power if there is less tension in the system this will create better conditions for the small state to pursue a foreign policy of its own choice. If the big power balance starts to tilt to the disadvantage of former hegemony, a small power may initiate a balancing policy (Johnson 2006: 12).

The Domestic Consolidation Approach:

This perspective analyses foreign policy as following from a regime's efforts to strengthen its hold on power. Stephen G. Walker writes that in order to pursue domestic policy goals, a state may also act to establish, maintain a shared set of expectations or the allocations of values among other states (Walker 1987: 282).

Valerie M. Hudson, Rusan M. Sims and John C. Thomas (1993) have developed the idea that foreign policy is often linked to the regime's attempts to maintain or regain control over the domestic political exchange process. The policy makers define the national interests and interpret them in terms of the interests of the regime. They formulate foreign

policy largely autonomously in relation to society in the sense that they try to reduce the other interests' possibilities to influence the choice of foreign policy. The logic of the domestic consolidation approach is that a regime will pursue the policy and will continue as long as it considers this policy to be in its own interests and is able to pursue it. Thus, if the government has taken on balancing foreign policy, it will continue this policy as long as the policy is not threatened. Peter Katzensteign and Stephen krasher (1978) argue, a state's 'strength' or 'weakness', as defined in relation to society, are central to explaining foreign, policy (Jonson Lena 2006).

Game Theory:

Game theory approach represents an attempt at applying the art of model building to international Politics. The Theory of game has developed mainly mathematicians and economists. Martin Shubik, Osker Margen has recognised the importance of the game theory in international Politics.

The purpose of the game theory is to formulate principles, which could analyse social situations and identify the basis and the general characteristics of the behavior of actors. Rational behavior implies that each actor in international politics has been certain well-defined set of values and objectives and would decide his policy accordingly without any mistake. Thus, the game theory is a method of analysis and guide to selecting the best course of action or payoff. In the framework of the game theory, three principles have been identified. The first is called games with identical interest (positive sum game); the second is called games with opposite interests (zero-sum games), and the third is called game with mixed interest (Zero-sum-sum games). Games with identical interests are those, which are played by rational players on the basis of full co-operation. The games of opposite interests are those, which are played in situations no co-operation in mixed there is both co-operation and application. The game theory has five important concepts: 1) Strategy 2) Opponent 3) Pay off 4) Rules 5) Information.

The game theory analyses in term of conflict essentially in term of strategies (Snyder 1961: 381-90).

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The major weakness of the game theory is that it can be applied with some success only to cases of two people, zero sum games. However, in international politics there are few such situations. Most often, we have mixed games in international politics. Thomas Schelling (1968) has questioned the validity of the game theory in its zero-sum form. According to Schilling, the essence of international politics lies in the presence of conflict and mutual dependence, which demands some kind of co-operation or accommodation between the contending parties (Schelling 1968: 263-264).

The two most important kinds of game that have been suggested are “Chicken” and the “Prisoners dilemma”. In both the cases, it is presumed that there are two players who have two different types of actions; both leading to unwelcome result and are not able to decide which would yield less and undesirable consequences.

Bargaining Theory:

The concept of zero-sum game is valid only in the case of the game of war. But the study of international Politics, war is not the only phenomenon to be studied. A situation other than war, there are elements of co-operation and accommodation also. These situation are mostly “bargaining situations”. In which conflict and co-operation both are found (Verba 1961 50).

Thomas Schelling, Joseph Nye. Fredrick, Ernst Haas did systematic work on bargaining theory. Bargaining theory is extension of the orthodox game theory. Its methodology is same as game theory. But it seeks its application mainly in the field of international negotiations. In view of the fact that international negotiations have come to assume great importance in order to ensure a Successful means of the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. The economist in the context of bilateral monopoly has showed the greatest interest in the bargaining theory.

There have been some approaches adopted in developing theories of negotiations. First,

one is the orthodox approach, which requires that the preference schedules. This kind of bargaining theory presupposes that it is never rational during a negotiation to change one's own preference respect of the substance under negotiation. But some writers have suggested that in negotiation there is always bound to be a possibility of such a change (Burns Arthur Lea 1961:41). The abortive negotiations on disarmament in 1960 have been studied on the basis of this model. The manipulative bargaining aspect of strategic bargaining is relevant particularly to coercive objective in shaping due decision-making process of others.

Decision-Making Approach:

The decision-making theory is emerged in eighteenth century. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli produced formulations of the decision-making theory. In the twentieth century, the inspiration for this theory came from the formulations of the theories of games developed by John Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. During 1950s several writers like William Riker, James Robinson, Herbert Simon bought enrichment in the decision making approach, which acts as a major determinant in defining the relations between the states. They undertook a theoretical exploration of the behavior of the actor in international relations. They caught to provide a full description of the factors that shape and influence the actions of nation in international politics. Richard C Snyder (1954) chose to a focus of decision-making for the study on the processes of Policy formulation (Snyder Richard C. et. all 1954)

The decision making approach has two fundamental purposes. Identification of 'Crucial Structures' in the political realm, where change takes place, where decisions are made; and where actions are initiated and claimed out. The decision making approach proceeds with the assumption that the key to political action lies in the way in which foreign policy decisions are made. There were several different angles of decision-making approach. Harold and Margaret Sprout (1962) emphasis on the environment factor, personality factor, which has a psychological as well as an operational aspect(Harold and Sprout 1962). Their concern is not to justify a particular foreign policy action in the light of

decision-makers; perception of the environment but to see how for a better action could be take.

Bernard Cohen and R. Hilsman (1959) believe that a systematic analysis of foreign policy should be made in accordance with the international powers between official and non-official actors who participate in the formulation of foreign policy. Decision making approach is based upon the principle of indetermination but it fails to suggest as to which of the elements are relevant. Instead of this defect, decision-making approach contributes to foreign policy analysis (Cohen and R. Hilsman 1959).

The Societal Approach:

This perspective assumes that societal groups have an impact on foreign policy either, as the impact of lobby groups, or indirectly, through the threat these groups may constitute to the survival or consolidation of the regime. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (1993, 10) write that ‘a societal approach assumes that many foreign policy choices, like those concerning domestic policy, evoke societal division and political mobilization’. Thus, foreign policy choices are judged first and for most according to their effect on central decision maker’s political standing at home. Like for example Central Asian states like other, may face a choice between reforming and the regime being overthrown when discontented groups of people are set in motion. The basic assumption is that the dynamics within society like secular – political, religious political and ethnic-national, may make the government change its foreign policy either to suppress the opposition or in order to listen to it (Jonson Lena 2006: 14). The relationship between domestic political conflict and foreign policy behavior as a two step process: the influence of the two major factors- ‘Regime strengths and weaknesses’ and opposition group characteristics and activity,- on ‘Regime choice of response’ is considered a first step, while the influence of ‘regime choice of response’ on ‘foreign policy effects of response’ is considered a second step.

RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF STUDY

The purpose of the proposed study is to examine the development of Tajikistan's foreign policy during the different phases. The study also deals with the major factors which play significant role in the formulation of the foreign policy of the republic. The research would further like to investigate Tajikistan's bilateral and multilateral relations with the major countries of the world. It would also focuses on the challenges which Tajikistan has been facing in the process of the formulation of foreign policy.

HYPOTHESES:

- i) Geo-strategic location of the country, bodering Afghanistan and China has played a significant role in strengthening of Tajikistan relations with the major country of the world.
- ii) External players are trying to influence the foreign policy of the republic if unchecked they may destabilize the republic.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- 1) How geostatic location of Tajikistan has influenced the foreign policy of the republic.
- 2) Does there exist Tajikistan–Russia–India geo-strategic axis for counter balance to US- Pakistan-China?
- 3) What is the role and importance of Tajikistan in strengthening regional cooperation and solving problems?
- 4) What will be the role of Tajikistan in 'New Great Game'?
- 5) What is the role of Tajikistan in global organization?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The proposed study would be based on descriptive and analytical method of research. The proposed research would be based on primary and secondary source materials available in English Language. The primary source materials include various government documents and reports, resolutions, treaties, declaration and agreements, laws, speeches, and constitution of the republic, etc. The books, journals articles and materials available at website would be consulted for the study as secondary source materials.

Chapter 2

Foreign policy of Tajikistan: Determinants and Phases

The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. Soon after the dissolution of the former USSR, Tajikistan emerged as an independent sovereign republic on the map of the world. After independence, Tajikistan became member of the international system. As a member of International system foreign policy making process became the first priority of this newly emerged independent state to ensure its national security and to achieve its national interests.

In the aftermath of independence, Tajikistan adopted a foreign policy, which is connected with peace-loving traditions of Tajik people. The present foreign policy of Tajikistan is based on the foundation and development of mutual benefit of equal rights and contacts with all states and strives for strengthen of peace and international security.

“We, the people of Tajikistan, as an integral part of the world community, conscious of its duty and its responsibility to the past, present and future generations, understanding the need for sovereignty and development of their State, while recognizing the inviolable freedom and human rights, respecting the equality and friendship of all nations and peoples, challenges the establishment of a just society” (Preamble of Constitution of Tajikistan).

In the course of interaction, nations are constantly changing and influencing each other, each state pursuing a broad range of policies in order to create an environment in which its interest can be preserved. Foreign policy is a crucial instrument to rationalize these objectives in the international arena. It is primarily a projection of a country's socio-economic and political compulsion in international politics. Objectives of the foreign policy of every nation state is “maintaining the *security, stability* and *status* or in short, *national interest*. Therefore, according to Palmer & Perkins, “There is no real friend but only friend is national interest”.

To analyze a country's foreign policy, one must study the domestic and international environment in which the policy makers operate and the other relevant variables which are permanent in nature. These variables are the part and parcel of the foreign policy of a country.

What enables a small power, like Tajikistan, to change its foreign policy course? Charles Herman, identifies different levels or degrees of change. A less drastic level is change to the way in which major problems and goals that policy addresses may be replaced or simply abandoned. The foreign policy of Tajikistan is determined by the its internal factor like Geo-politics, Geo-economics, history and culture, political and societal structure, ideology of nation in favourable international environment with technology and common legacy and future ambitions. (Charles Herman, 1990: 05-06). Thus, in short we can say that there are two types of determinants of foriegn policy of country. There are internal and external factors which play major role in shaping the foriegn policy of a country.

Internal Determinants/ Factors:

Geography:

As late as the nineteenth century, Sir Halford Mackinder, the founding father of modern geopolitics, described Central Asia as the political center of the world because it enclosed more frontiers than any other region. "Whoever controlled Central Asia would wield enormous power: It is the greatest natural fortress in the world. Defended by polar ice caps, deserts, Arid table land and mountain ranges." The opening of new sea-lanes to Africa, India, China and the America rapidly changed the importance of Central Asia, reducing the traffic on the Silk route to a trickle. During the Nineteenth century, Russia and Great Britain vied for power, expanding their empires in the Asian landmass (Rashid, 2003: 188). This competition to establish superiority over the region is known as the Great Game.

Geography is most important determinant in shaping of country's foreign policy of a

particularly in the area of military logistics, trading patterns, alliance patterns, membership of inter-governmental organisation and various international forums, United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is more or less a permanent variable and in rare extraordinary cases, the changes occur in country's geo-strategic or geopolitical situation.

Location:

Tajikistan is small mountainous landlocked Central Asian country. Tajikistan shared border with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to north and west, China to east and Afghanistan to south. The Amudarya River originates from Tajikistan's southern border, passes through Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is situated at the "great silk trade route" which comes under Mackinder's *inner Asia*. The connection between location and foreign policy has given birth to geopolitics and founded as a special field of study by Halford Mackinder who first set forth his theory in 1904. This is an offspring of the marriage of geographic and political concepts (Hartman 1967: 47-48). Tajikistan is situated at the crossroad of great world civilizations like, Indo-Persian Turkish and Chinese civilization.

Although Tajikistan is smallest country among the Central Asian countries, but its geographical location gives it a crucial role for the security of Central Asia as a whole. It is a strategic country on the new global political map international and regional power will either compete in the modern version of a 'great game' with an enlarge number of players or cooperate to the benefit of Tajikistan. Tajikistan's location makes it a gateway to Central Asia from Afghanistan for drugs, weapons, people and radical ideas. It was also crucial for transit to the opposite ideas during the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan for material assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Today Tajikistan is taking part in the post-Soviet war reconstruction of Afghanistan (Jonson 2006: 10)

Size:

Tajikistan, with a population of some 6.5 million inhabitants (2003) and a territory of 143000 square kilometers, of which only 6.7 percent is arable land, is of course a small area. It is not the size of the unit, but the kind of relationship that is of interest here. Small states or small powers are special category since their specific position in relation to big power may make them behave in a special way. There are two approaches for a weak state choosing to compensate for its weakness- 'policies to isolate itself from power conflicts or policies in which it chooses to draw on the strength of other to insure its own security' (Rothstein, 1968: 23).

Population by ethnic group (2000 census):

Ethnicity	Number ('000) persons	%
Tajik	4,898.4	79.9
Uzbek	936.7	15.3
Russian	68.2	1.1
Kyrgyz	65.5	1.1
Lakaits	51.0	0.8
Turkmen	20.3	0.3
Tatar	18.9	0.3
Kongrat	15.1	0.2
Arab	14.5	0.2
Total (including others)	6,127.5	100

Source: The Europa World Yearbook, 2006.

Role of size in determining the foreign policy is another significant variable because it is closely related to geopolitical situation of country. It gives a state's army to retreat without surrender and has an advantage. Its importance lies in the location and disposal of critical population, economic, military and governmental facilities size as factor has its bearing a population military installations transportations routes, human capital and so on. However, in other hand it may be adds to difficulty of achieving national unity, effective

administration and cultural integration.

Climate and Topography:

Tajikistan's climate is continental, subtropical, and semi-arid, with some desert areas. The climate changes drastically according to elevation. However, the Fergana Valley and other lowlands are shielded by mountains from Arctic air masses, but temperatures in that region still drop below freezing for more than 100 days a year. In the subtropical southwestern lowlands, which have the highest average temperatures? The climate is arid, although some sections now are irrigated for farming. At Tajikistan's lower elevations, the average temperature range is 23° to 30°C in July and -1° to 3°C in January. The highest elevations of this range are in the east, near the border with Kyrgyzstan. That region is dominated by the peaks of the Pamir-Alay mountain system, including two of the three highest elevations in the former Soviet Union: Mountain Lenin (7134m) and Mount Communism (7495) meters. Tajikistan lies in an active seismic belt, severe earthquakes are common.

The term climate denotes weather patterns derived by averaging records of a country in a given place over periods of time. The climatic conditions of a state is concerned, there should be sufficient heat, sufficient rain fall to feed the population, there needs to be soil of minimum quality in order for a country to produce enough food grains. Food security and suitable condition give more independency as well as prosperity to country.

The climate of any country is a determining factor, it provide suitable environment for work. Tajikistan is the wettest of the Central Asian republics with the average annual precipitation for the Kafiristan and Vakhsh valleys in the south, being around 500 to 600 millimeters, and up to 1,500 millimeters in the mountains. At the Fedchenko Glacier, as much as 2,236 millimeters (of snow) falls each year. The Fergana Valley, the most densely populated region in Central Asia irrigated by the Syr Darya in its upper course, spreads across the northeastern arm of Uzbekistan and Northern Tajikistan. Rivers bring rich soil deposits into the Fergana Valley from the surrounding mountains, creating a series of fertile oases that have long been prized for agriculture.

The element of topography of country like islands, physical barriers and communication sources has to own significance in the affairs of states. Although rivers, mountains, jungles and deserts are still significant in the modern world but it is diluted by globalisation and technological advancement. In Tajikistan's dense river network, the largest rivers are the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya; the largest tributaries are the Vakhsh and the Kofamihon, which form valleys from northeast to south-west across western Tajikistan. In the Soviet era, the Vakhsh dammed at several points for irrigation and electric power generation, most notably at Nurek, east of Dushanbe, where one of the world's highest dams forms the Nurek Reservoir. Tajikistan's second largest water body is the Kayrakum Reservoir. The rivers would be helpful in strengthening the ports of a country and transportation system thorough a state.

The Topography of the Tajikistan with high mountains dividing people in the Valleys, contributed to strong local identities, expressed in distinct regional dresses and customs, local languages. These identities were classified as leninabadis from the north (Sogd region); the Pamiris from Gorno – Badakhshan in the east; the Gramis from the Gram and Karategin valleys to the north-east of Dushanbe; the Kulyabis to the south-east of Dushanbe; the Hissaris from the Hissar district to the west of Dushanbe; and finally those from Kurgan-Tube to the south-west of the Capital (Djalili, 1998: 47).

History and socio-cultural Traditions:

Tajikistan is a young nation but old culture with many traditions. Its history has been marked by more than two thousand years of conflict, as the great empires of the past fought to control the commercial lifeline linking Europe and Asia by the Silk Route. Tajikistan is part of the geographical historical area which the Greeks called Transoxania and Arabs called Ma-wara'al-nahr. The famous Russian scholar Vasilii Barthold writes that there are provinces to the south of the Amu-Darya with which some portions of Transoxania were at time more closely connected them with Samerkand and Bukhara (Barthold 1978: 65).

The historical corridor between Bactria and Sogdiana was the Iron Gate, a defile about half way between Balkh and Samarkand. Alexander (329 B.C.) further developed Bactria as a central meeting place of routes connecting China, India, and the Western world. India could be reached either by a northern circuit through Bactria or by a longer southern route. The cultural patterns of the region came to be deeply influenced by the new Great colonists. American scholar H. Sidky(2000) concludes, 'Alexander invasion of Central Asia radically transformed the socio-political and economic picture of the region. (Sidky, 2000: 82).The highest military award of today's Tajikistan, the order of Bravery, is named after the Sogdian rebel leader, Spitmen who fought the invasion of Alexander the Great. Thus, history give nourishment to a struggle for national identity. Bactria and Sogdiana were conquered by nomads from the north east, whose forces continued southwards and had created the Kushan Empire. They extended their rule to India by taking Punjab, Kashmir, Sind, and Utter Pradesh. The most famous of the Kushan king was Kanishka who converted to Buddhism. Over Sogdiana the empire maintained only a form of suzerainty. In the Kushan Empire, three important civilizations the Chinese, Iranian and Indian met. Sogdiana developed into great commercial center for chines trade with the West. Extensive finds of Roman coins and products bear witness to the economic exchange that took place between East and West along the silkroad. The arrival of the turks set in motion a demographic and ethnolinguistic shift in the region. The Iranian culture and language continued to play a dominant role to control Asia. (Soucek,2000 :37).

The richness of the past from which the Tajik choose to trace their history and an alternative identities which are buried in their history. The future can never be a return to the past, but the past may offer guidelines for future policy. Thus, the framework for the national consiousness is crucial. In '*The Tajiks in the Mirror of history*' (Rakhamonov). written:

“We live in a time when many nations and nationalities are challenged to make a choice and to decide their fate”.

The Samani Empire is regarded as the first Tajik state, but official Tajik historiography

goes further back to trace a Tajik statehood, long before the Samanid epoch the Tajik had already established a number of states during ancient period. These were Bactria and Sogdiana, the Graeco-Bactrian state the Kushan and Ashkonid dynasties and the Khuttal Kingdom etc. These chain of events which forged the history of the Tajik nation (Rakhmonov, 1: 88). The history of Islam is a story of change and adaptation. (Ahamad Rasid 2006: 1) The collapse of the earthwhile Soviet Union opened the door for ethnic and cultural revivalism in Central Asia(Tajikistan). The socialist values which were forcibly imposed by Russian Communist are now being changed by replacing the old ones. Since 1985 , when Gorbachev introduced radical reforms the Central Asia people have been trying to revive their native culture in the region(Badan phool 2001:168).

History provides several options for Tajikistan's self-identification in international politics such as pan- Islamic, the Persian or Iranian, the local Central Asian, the European/Western, following from the Macedonian Greek heritage, and finally the European/Russian. All are embedded in history of the Tajik nation. According to persian source Tajiks were the original inhabitants of Central Asia, who had been rejected from the hinterland to the recesses of mountain by the more ambitious and belligerent Turks and Uzbeks(Shams-ud-din 2000:73)

Tajikistani SSR (Tajikistani Soviet Socialist Republic) had been the name of the republic of Tajikistan, when it was part of the USSR in March 1925. An autonomous Tajikistani Soviet republic is formed within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. In December 1929, The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic joined the Soviet Union as union republic. Perestroika and Glasnost brought changes in the politics of the Soviet Russian states, but nothing had changed in Tajikistan and Communists remained in power (Ahamad Rasid 2006).

History and traditions have significant influence on foreign policy making. "Traditional values may be described as those principles embodied in beliefs and practices which have been transmitted through successive generation and have been regarded as worthy of esteem and adaptation" (Appadorai,1986: 37).

High national morale is necessary for a successful conduct of foreign policy. A homogeneous society provides strong national unity and high morale and sharp divisions in society between rich and poor, between different class and communities have adverse impact on foreign policy. Social cohesion, therefore, is another factor in shaping of successful foreign Policy.

Constitutional basis:

So for as constitutional basis of foreign of the republicis concerned,

We, the people of Tajikistan, as an integral part of the world community, conscious of its duty and its responsibility to the past, present and future generations, understanding the need for sovereignty and development of their State, while recognizing the inviolable freedom and human rights, respecting the equality and friendship of all nations and peoples, challenges the establishment of a just society (**Preamble**). Republic of Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, legal, secular and unitary state. Tajikistan is a social state whose policy is directed at creation conditions ensuring an honourable life and a free development of an individual. "Republic of Tajikistan" and "Tajikistan" are interchangeable notions(**Article 1**). The state language of Tajikistan is Tajik. The Russian language is the language of international communication. All nations and ethnic groups residing on the territory of the Republic are free to use their native languages(**Article 2**). Tajikistan, pursuing a peace-loving policy, respects the sovereignty and independence of other states, formulates its external policy on the basis of international norms. Propaganda of war is prohibited. Tajikistan, obeying the supreme interests of people, can join commonwealths and other international organizations as well as leave them, and establish relations with foreign countries. The state cooperates with its compatriots abroad(**Article 11**).

President of the Republic of Tajikistan: Represents Tajikistan in the country and in the international relations;(**Article 69(1)**). Leads the external policy, signs international treaties and presents them for consideration to Majlisi Oli;(**Article 69(14)**). Upon approval of Majlisi Oli, appoints Heads of diplomatic missions in foreign countries and

representatives of the republic in international organizations;(Article 69(15)) and, Receives credentials of the Heads of diplomatic missions of foreign countries; (Article 69(16)).

Government and Politics:

The foreign policy has been determine by the nature of government that have been assigned the chief responsibility for its formulation and framework for making foreign policy and the frequency with which the institution are altered with formally or through usage, the rational institutional outlook has also focused an inter-agency coordination as technique for rationalizing the continuously unwieldy process of foreign policy formulation and agreement with government.

Social life in Tajikistan is developed on the basis of a political and ideological pluralism. No ideology, including religious, can be proclaimed as national ideology. Public associations are established and act in the framework of the Constitution and laws. State administers them with equal rights in their activities. Religious organizations are separated from the state and cannot interfere with the state affairs. Establishment and implementation of the public associations advocating race, national, social and religious enmity or calling for a forced overthrow of the constitutional Government and creation of armed forces are prohibited. (Article 8)

There are at least three important factors that shaped the political scene and made the political struggle much fiercer in Tajikistan than in other Soviet republic at the time. First, there are the regional divisions and tensions in Tajikistan that have become a basis for political factions and movements; Second, there is the turbulence around neighbouring Afganistan, which provides inspiration and later weapons and a safe haven for the opposition fighters; and third, there was the factor is Radical Islam, which is a part of the opposition (Djalili and Akiner 2000).

Political organization and political tradition also contribute to the government and enlightened leadership also contribute to the shaping of an effective foreign policy. For example, idealist Wilson who wanted to end all future wars. On the other hand leaders

like Hitler or Mussolini or Saddam Hussein promise a glorious future for their countries, but their policies often lead to disaster. A democratic regime is in the long run for more effective than despotic system which shows only short term gains always influence the foreign policy.

The perception of ruling elite the imperatives of state building and ideologies of political parties are important variables that influence foreign policy. There were factions and the top which wished to extend relations with Russian or the US to promote their own interests. It may be seen logical to expect that a reform minded government will opt for a Western orientated foreign policy and vice versa. In politics, decisions most often have to be taken more pragmatically.

The political party is closely related with foreign policy making. Defferent type of parties have different model of foreign policy when only one political party is allowed to work it. All foreign policy decisions are virtually made by the party organs and approval is only a formality, as the party politics is always considered supreme. It is also to be noted, that the primary characteristics of the foreign policy is the *continuity* and *change*; the basic or fundamental principles are all-pervasive; whereas the foreign policy changes according to the environment.

The Tajik Constitution prescribes a multiparty system. At the beginning of 2002, there were five registered political parties. Three party were represented in parliament after the 2000 parliamentary elections. These were the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the Communist party (CP) and the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). The political parties other than the ruling party are weak and worked under difficult conditions. Personal ties, kinship relations and regional affiliation continued to be more important to people than party affiliation. They have a general ideological platform but most of them have not developed party programmes or demands corresponding to the economic, social and political and foreign policy requirements of the Country. The regime faces the task of strengthening a national identity and bridgeng regional divisions. Since independence it has made more pronounced efforts to create a state ideology which will unite the national and override regional and clan divisions. (Lena Jonson 2006: 153).

Here, the concept of political Islam and Islamism becomes important. While 'Political Islam' relates only to use of religion in a general political context. Islamism relates political activities for the purpose of creating a theocratic state. Within Islamism, there is a further important distinction between 'moderate' and radical Islamism. The IRP, at the time it was created in 1990, was the outcome of the Islamic awakening among Soviet Muslims that had taken place in the late 1970's. In this process the 'Politicization of Islam' took place as Islam was used for political purposes by the opposition, as well as later by the regimes, to legitimize claims and demands. Religion is not the major factor as the regional factor which is considered to be the Most-important. The Islamic revival that emerged in the 1970's intensified during the years of perestroika, and the process accelerated after the break-up of the Soviet Union. As a result, the people of the region have made efforts to search for their heritage, identity norms and values (Jonson 2006: 44).

Tajikistan is in the process of creating a national identity, and for this purpose focusing on the national culture, national history and national Language. In the formulation of a national heritage, the Central Asian regimes refer to different aspects and periods of what is to a great extent the common history of the area in which boundaries have shifted over the centuries. This process is necessary to consolidate the state and an urgent task for a regime that is trying to consolidate its power. As Martha Brill Olcott writes, That, the leaders of each Central Asian state are looking to the past to write national histories which affirm their claims to statehood these efforts pose contemporary boundaries and reinterpreted historical one in no way coincide (Martha Brill Olcott, 2001: 38).

Economy and natural Resources:

Tajikistan had been the poorest republic in the Soviet Union and as a result of five years of civil war still ranked bottom among the former Soviet republics on all economic measures. Tajikistan has potential with its rich natural resources as hydropower, petroleum, uranium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten. Tajikistan has substantial gold reserves, one of the world's biggest silver deposits, hydro-electric power and commercially exploitable amounts of oil. (Guardian 1995:10).

Water is considered as Tajikistan's oil. Tajikistan's water resources create the basis for future hydro-energy sector that is capable not only of satisfying the country's own needs but also of exporting electricity to neighbouring countries. The Soviet's had started the constructions of large hydro-power stations in the 1970's but never finished them. The country's Aluminium factory was another unique resource, although bauxite had to be imported for its production. Only 6 per cent of the land is arable (of which 74 per cent is irrigated). Tajikistan is dependent on food imports. There are deposits of lead, zinc, wolfram, uranium and gold, but they have yet to be developed. In 1991 industry accounted for 19.6 per cent of national income(Deutsche Bank 2003: 1-9). (Deutsche Bank, Focus: Eastern Europe, 1993, no. 69: 1-9).

While the international support for the Tajiks regime to legitimize and consolidate the rule of Rakhmonov, the international economic aid and assistance is to give economic development the chance to take off. After independence, Tajikistan's economic development remained heavily dependent on Russia's willingness to assist. Tajik leadership therefore saw the limited Russian economic engagement and investment as a problem. To Tajikistan- in urgent need of assistance for economic development after the end of civil war development after 11 September brought new prospect for economic assistance and political partnership with foreign government and international organization. With foreign revenue precariously dependent upon exports of cotton and aluminum, the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. In financial year 2000, international assistance remained an essential source of support for rehabilitation programs that reintegrated former civil war combatants into the civilian economy, thus, helping keep the peace(Jeffries Ian 2003:274).

The ability of the government to respond the challenges and demands from society determines not only the course of event in the country but also capacity of the state to pursue a foreign policy of its own. A most crucial factor obviously remains the regime's capacity to faith corruption successfully by reforming-or be overturned. There is nothing to indicate that a serious anticorruption campaign, including reforms of governance, will

take place soon in Tajikistan.

According to estimates of International Monetary Fund, the Percentage of population living below the poverty line was as high as 83% in 1999, but also was down to 68% in 2003. Tajikistan was the poorest country in Central Asia following a civil war in 1991. After the civil war its economic development has been positive and Tajikistan now shows several positive indicators of Macro economics growth. The annual real growth rate since 2000 has averaged 9.7 percent, but the economy is still only about 50% of its size of 1989 (Country Report 2005: 10). Around 70 per cent of the state budget comes from Russia, there are 25,000 Russian troops protecting the border with Afghanistan and the defence minister is a Russian general. observers by the UN Security Council had authorized 40 observers in December 1994 to monitor the ceasefire(Jeffries, 2003:274).

The external involvement in Tajikistan has created opportunities for future economic and democratic reforms, but the standards of living for most of the population remains extremely low. The state of economy is well illustrated by the fact that out of population of 6.2 million inhabitants, some 600000 live in Russia as migrant labour. A potential for social unrest is thus embedded in the social and economic situation. The development of Tajikistan has to be studied as part of this regional subsystem. Moreover, Tajikistan has becoming an attractive partner for many Western and Asian countries, not least the US government. Although it has no large-scale resources of oil or gas, Tajikistan is rich in coal, marble, gold, silver, tungsten, lead, uranium and zinc, and has 65 percent of Central Asian resources (Bakhovadin, 2005: 124).

Tajikistan's economy grew substantially after the war. The GDP of Tajikistan expanded at an average rate of 9.6% over the period of 2000-2004 according to World Bank data. This economic growth is not, however reflected in improvements of the standard of living of the people. There are numbers of problems in society which affect daily life. A report published in December 1995 stated that the government had belatedly adopted measures to curb inflation, lift most trade controls and liberalize bread prices(Jeffries Ian 2003:274).

Tajikistan has introduced its own currency, the Tajik rouble, on 10 May 1995. The currency shortage has forced Tajikistan to use barter. The introduction of the new currency is part of a new economic recovery programme that includes a 250 per cent increase in state-subsidized bread prices in 2003 and is aimed at ensuring the rescheduling of \$731 million of foreign debt. (Jeffries, Ian, 2003: 273)

International Factors:

International milieu is one of the most important determinants of foreign policy. In any case foreign policy is the sum total of decisions taken by a country to regulate the behaviors of other states, therefore, the international system at any given point of time has direct impact on foreign policies. The complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of the desire of state within the international community to achieve their own national interests and their consequent attitudes to international issues .

The foreign policy of Tajikistan was intended both to legitimize and strengthen the rule of President Rakhmonov through international recognition and international assistance, and to promote the economic development of the country. The regime was able to pursue its foreign policy autonomously of society in the sense that there were no organized interests or groups strong enough to have an influence on foreign policy making. A crucial question for this study is whether the dynamics on the Central Asian regional scene contributed to improve the conditions for Tajikistan as a small power. As has already been pointed out, the accelerated foreign engagement in the sub-region as well as in the wider Central Asian region after September 2001 attacks on US has changed the geopolitical constellations. Thus, the external engagement created the conditions necessary for a more independent Tajik foreign policy.

International Terrorism:

During the decade of civil war and in the aftermath, Tajiks had generally become more committed Muslims, but the radical and political Islamicist overtones of the civil war era were gradually disappearing. People had gone back to their old ways. Whilst they were

deeply respectful of Islam, they were not ready for an overt political manifestation of it. There was the factor of radical Islam, which for at least a part of the opposition was an additional motivation (Soucek, 2000:117).

The Islamic revival that was already emerging in the 1970's intensified during the years of *Perestroika*, and the process accelerated during the break-up of the Soviet Union as the Societies in Central Asia searched for their heritage, identity norms and values (Jonson 2006: 44). The IRP, at the time it was created in 1990, was the outcome of the Islamic awakening among the Soviet Muslims that had taken off in the late 1970's. In this process the 'Politicization of Islam' took place as Islam was used for political purposes by the opposition, as well as later by the regimes, to legitimize claims and demands. Nevertheless, as it was perceived at the time, radical Islam was crucial factor, and many feared the outcome of this radicalism.

The ongoing Islamization of values in society points in the direction of more cooperation and exchange with the Muslim world including the Arab world. Most of the muslims and Arab regimes are, however politically conservative. Pan – Persian is not an evolving trend in Tajikistan. The Iranian/Persian orientation is strong and may strengthen due to the new emphasis on Tajikistan's relations to the south, and to the prospect for exports to and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.

The issue of relations between the state and religion is becoming more complex as new aspects emerge, challenging the secular constitutions, which prescribes a separation of politics from the religious affairs. The Islamization of values in Tajikistan has been going on since the late Soviet period, and the trend is especially strong among young people. This trend runs parallel to a trend of 'realization' of society in the sense of a return to the traditional norms and values of the countryside and towards what is defined as the original, Tajik national heritage.

After Public response in Tajikistan to the United States engagement after September 2001 has been positive. Great expectations ensured that the US engagement in Central Asia would boost economic development in the region. Independent public opinion surveys in Tajikistan during the period 2003-2005 showed that the image of the United States and its influence on Tajikistan remained generally positive, and many respondents stated that

they approved of measures taken by the United States in the fight against international terrorism.

There is a gap between a growing sense among the population of belonging to the cultural-religious world of Islam and the Western-oriented foreign policy of the Central Asian governments. This gap may take political form the day the ground for 'pragmatic evaluations of the United States' policy and presence disappears, when the US is considered to be acting only in its own interests and not in the interests of Tajikistan, and when Islamic solidarity comes to be equated with political solidarity with Muslims fighting in other parts of the world. In such a respective it would not take long before the issue of the Israel Palestine conflict also infected Central Asia. So far, Tajikistan is far from the scenario described by Kholidi. It is not difficult to paint different kinds of worst-case scenarios for Central Asia and Tajikistan.

The presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Bishkek and signed a declaration in 1996. The importance of fighting international terrorism, the illegal drugs trade, arms trafficking, illegal migration and other forms of transborder crime, separatism and religious extremism. The signatories also consider that creating a multi-polar world is the common path for development and will ensure long-term stability. 'Under pressure from Jiang Zemin, the following clause was inserted in the final Bishkek document: "Human rights should not be used as a pretext for interfering in a state's internal affairs"(CDSP 1999: 15).

Illegal Trade, Smuggling, Trafficking and Migration:

The drug trade across Tajikistan from Afghanistan is a crucial factor, determining the stage of the domestic scene in Tajikistan by providing a substantial source of revenues and influence. The drug trade feeds an overall corruption in society, and is often also a major factor behind feuds and turns in political life. It adds to tension and rivalry between groups, which compete for power and wealth (Cornell 2005: 751-60). A report of early November 1993 talked in terms of 778, 500 refugees outside Tajikistan, e.g. 339,000 in Turkmenistan, 144, 750 in Russia and 100,000 in Afghanistan (CDSP 1993: 44).

Central Asia has become a major route for Afghan opium and heroin travelling to Europe. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the trade of opium through Central Asia started in the early 1990s and heroin first appeared in 1995. According to the UN estimates that about one kilo in four goes through Central Asia. In 2002, drug trafficking of Afghan opiates generated \$2.2 billion in Central Asia equivalent to 7 per cent of the area's GDP. Tajikistan is affected far more than any other Central Asian country. In the country's authorities intercepted, almost 80 per cent of the total seized in the region. The fight against the growing drug plague is one of the few things on which Central Asian countries have brought themselves to co-operate. According to the UN, heroin addiction in Central Asia has been one of the fastest growing in the world since the late 1990s. (The Economist 2003: 64–5).

Phases of Tajikistan's Foreign Policy:

The foreign policy of the Republic of Tajikistan can be divided into three main phase. These three phases are based on the orientations and major shift in the foreign policy of Tajikistan. These three phases of Tajikistan foreign policy are:

1. The first phase of Tajik foreign policy covers the Civil War period:

Since independence in 1991, Tajikistan's foreign policy has focused on two main tasks-surviving as a nation and securing international assistance in order to maintain national security. At that time the young independent state had to establish its own foreign policy, national security, etc. After independence Tajik Government has formulated its foreign policy according to its own need and main aim was to achieve national interest. Tajikistan pursues a peace-loving policy, respects the sovereignty and independence of other states, and formulates its external policy on the basis of international norms, where propaganda of war is prohibited. Tajikistan is obeying the supreme interests of people, can join commonwealths and other international organizations as well as leave them and establish relations with foreign countries. The state cooperates with its compatriots abroad (**Article 11**).

The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) left the country and regime highly dependent upon Russia for national and regime security. It resulted in the former Soviet military troops staying in Tajikistan under the label of Russian peacekeeping forces on Commonwealth of Independent States mission, and an increase in the numbers of the former Soviet border troops to protect the Tajik-Afghan border. These troops guaranteed not only Tajikistan's national security but also, since the late 1992, the regime of President Emomali Rakhmonov. Tajikistan supported Russia's initiative for closer bilateral and multilateral security co-operation in Central Asia. The civil War and continued domestic turmoil reduced Tajikistan's external contacts and the close cooperation with Russia further contributed to its international isolation. If any country in central Asia was considered Russia's backyard, it is Tajikistan.

After independence, Tajikistan's economic development remained heavily dependent on Russia's willingness to assist. Tajik leadership, therefore, saw the limited Russian economic engagement and investment as major problems. To Tajikistan- in urgent head of assistance for economic development after the end of civil war – development after 11 September brought new prospect for economic assistance and political partnership with foreign governments and international organizations. The development improved the general security situation in the region as they provided a chance to normalize reduction with two neighbouring states, which had previously been considered major threats to Tajikistan's security, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In general, the post 11 September situation opened up new opportunities for Tajikistan to tackle its major security problems. Tajikistan was not only weak power but also weak states.

Since the early and mid-1990s, Iran has been actively involved in crisis management of both inter-state as well as intra-state conflicts beyond its borders. For example, Iran played an effective mediating role in the civil war in Tajikistan, beginning with a cease-fire agreement signed by the Tajik warring factions in Tehran in 1994. In August 1995, Iran played hosted to a successful peace summit attended by Tajikistan's president, Imamoli Rahmanov, and Abdollah Nouri, the leader of Tajikistan's Islamic Movement,

whereby both sides agreed to extend the cease fire and form a joint deliberative council to narrow their differences. Seeking to act as a reliable and honest broker, Iran maintained amicable relations with the opposing sides and never supported the Tajik Islamists' aspiration to create an Islamic state, even though it hosted the Tajik opposition leaders from 1993 to 1998 (Jeffries,2003:272).

This is also period of Central Asian regimes were challenged from within to a degree not seen before as demonstrated by the fall of the regime of President Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the riots in Andijan in the Uzbek part of Fargan valley in May 2005. Small states can exert influence and leverage on a larger state by appealing to mutual interest. The power of persuasion may be substantial if a small state can convince a larger power that a particular action is also in the interest of the bigger state. This may especially be the case if the small state has something to offer the larger state such as a strategic location, a valuable commodity or a prestigious political association. In this sense, strength on the part of the small state emanates more from relationship with the other states than by any raw measures of power. (Jonson, 2006: 83)

The central objective of newly independent Tajikistan's foreign policy was to maximize its opportunities by developing relations with as many states as possible. Particular diplomatic attention went to two groups of countries: the other former Soviet Republics, United States, European Union and Tajikistan's near neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, which are inhabited by culturally similar peoples. The development of friendly relations, cooperation and integration with the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains a firm priority of the foreign policy of Tajikistan.

II. The Second phase : starts from end of Civil War and ended with the events of 11 September 2001:

In the aftermath of the civil war Tajikistan need economic assistance by the international organisation as well as world power. A 'window of opportunity' open as the US increases its engagement in central Asia. During following years, Tajikistan's foreign policy was activated; its relations with Western and Asians countries expanded, and its

foreign policy was diversified. Its participation in US led anti-terrorist coalition became an instrument for Tajikistan to reach out to the world and its partnership with Russia was reduced in relative term. Although partnership with Russia remained important to Tajikistan, Tajikistan started to balance its policy in relation to Russia with the help of wider cooperation with other big powers. Tajikistan thus developed its foreign relations, although it is still bound by a framework of agreement with Russia, and Russia led security arrangements. Previous ties with Russia were kept but a new balanced foreign policy was the main aim of the Tajik Government. (Jonson, 2006:84).

Tajikistan is also developing its relations with Iran, China and India as well as with financial institutions. Although it is a close ally of Russia, Tajikistan's rapidly growing contacts with the outside world reflect the reconfiguring of international contact and cooperation in the region.

III. Third phase of Tajikistan foreign policy begins with the twin towers incidents, which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States:

Since 9/11, the significant shift took place in the foreign policy of the republic. The attacks led the United States to engage not only in Afghanistan but also in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is period of increasing foreign engagement and growing concern with geopolitical change in the region.

In spite of all difficulties, the country is now developing stakes and interests in a peaceful Tajikistan's realizing its dreams of and hopes for an economically sounder future. The analysis of the region, thus, concludes that Tajikistan will continue to do its best to open up for further cooperation and coordination with Russia.

The events of 11 September may have heralded a new U.S.-Russia partnership in the struggle against international terrorism but, at the same time Russia has a closer strategic partnership with Iran. This partnership is partly because Putin's Russia was dissatisfied with NATO despite the new "NATO-Russia Council," and Iran, Russia has been alarmed by the United States.

In this period of Central Asian regimes were challenged from within to a degree not seen before as demonstrated by the fall of the regime of President Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the riots in Andijan in the Uzbek part of Fargan valley in may 2005.

Chapter-3

Tajikistan's Relations with Major Countries of the World

The central objective of newly independent Tajikistan's foreign policy was to maximize its opportunities by developing relations with as many states as possible. Particular diplomatic attention has been given to two groups of countries: the other former Soviet republics and Tajikistan's near neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, which are inhabited by culturally related peoples. At the same time, Tajikistan pursued contacts with many other countries, including the United States, Turkey, and Pakistan. In 1995, Tajikistan opened its first embassy outside the former Soviet Union, which is in Turkey. The potential for political support and economic aid is at least as important in shaping Tajikistan's diplomacy, as are ideological and cultural ties.

Tajikistan is also developing relations with Iran, China, and India as well as with international organization and financial institutions. Although it is a close ally of Russia, Tajikistan's rapidly growing contacts with the outside world reflect the reconfiguration of international contact and cooperation in the region.

The ongoing Islamization of values in its society, points towards more cooperation and exchange with the Muslim World, including the Arab world. Most Muslim and Arab regimes are, however, politically conservative. Pan-Persian is not an evolving trend in Tajikistan. The Iranian orientation is strong and may strengthen due to the new emphasis on Tajikistan's relations to the south, and to the prospect for exports to and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.

What enable a small power to change its foreign policy course? Although, literally small in size may be a contributing factor for its relationship with the dominant power like Russia. Small state or small power is a special category since their specific position in relation to big power may make them behave in a special way. There are two approaches for a weak state choosing to compensate for its weakness- 'policies to isolate itself from

power conflicts or policies in which Turkey chooses to draw on the strength of other to insure its own security (Rothstein 1968: 23).

These policies are policy of bandwagon and policy of balancing. Most scholars agree that bandwagon is more common among all powers. The logic of bandwagon is a form of appeasement, and for a small state in the neighborhood of a power, it is highly probable that it will try to appease the large one. Roy Allison writes that, the preoccupation of local governments with regime security has also been an important factor encouraging Central Asian states to bandwagon with Russia. This concern has been sufficiently strong for them to be prepared to delegate some of their decision-making prerogatives to accommodate Russian preponderance. Russia has been willing to make military and financial contributions to the domestic political survival of rulers and ruling coalition irrespective of their political complexion or of normative concern (Ray Allison 2004: 469).

Tajikistan and Russia:

Tajikistan's foreign policy focused on surviving as state by securing international assistance for national security and economic development. During the year of civil war and turmoil, Tajikistan had been too weak to have any active foreign policy of its own. The Rakhmonov regime was dependent on Russia. Tajikistan was embedded in bilateral cooperation with Russia. The relations resulted into multilateral engagements after the creation of CIS in late 1991 and CSTO in 1992. The regional security situation, Tajikistan's own domestic fragility, and large Russian military presence in Tajikistan contributed to the strong Russian orientation of Tajik foreign Policy.

Like the other Central Asian republics, Tajikistan joined the CIS, which was created in December 1991 after the Soviet Union collapsed officially. Shortly before opposition, demonstrators forced President Rahmon Nabyev to resign in August 1992. He asked several presidents of former Soviet republics, including President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia, to help him stay in power. They refused this request. In the fall of 1992, the

increasingly embattled coalition government that succeeded Nabiyeu asked the other members of the CIS to intervene to end the civil war. However, such assistance was not provided. The wider context of the Soviet Union helped Tajikistan to develop as a nation although within the strict framework of the Soviet ideology. Moscow provided long-term economic investment and the Tajik SSR developed economically.

Throughout the mid-1990s, Russia played a role in independent Tajikistan by its military presence there, in the form of the 201 Motorized Rifle Division and the Border Troops. Russians also held important positions in the Dushanbe government itself, most notably the Ministry of Defense, which was led from 1992 to 1995 by Aleksandr Shishlyannikov. Yuriy Ponosov, who had a generation of experience, as a CPSU official in Tajikistan before the breakup of the Soviet Union, became Tajikistan's first deputy prime minister in March 1996.

The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) left the country and regime highly dependent upon Russia for national and regime security. It resulted in former Soviet military troops staying in Tajikistan under the label of Russian peacekeeping troops on Commonwealth of Independent States mission, and an increase in the numbers of former Soviet border troops to protect the Tajik-Afghan border. These troops guaranteed not only Tajikistan's national security but also, since the late 1992, the regime of President Emomali Rakhmonov. Tajikistan supported Russia's initiative for closer bilateral and multilateral security co-operation in Central Asian region. The civil War and continued domestic turmoil reduced Tajikistan's external contacts and the close cooperation with Russia further contributed to its international isolation if any country in central Asia was considered Russia's backyard, it is Tajikistan (Jonson Lena 2006: 1-2).

After independence, Tajikistan's economic development remained heavily dependent on Russia's willingness to assist. Tajik leadership therefore, saw the limited Russian economic engagement and investment as major problems. To Tajikistan in urgent head of assistance for economic development after the end of civil war development after 11 September brought new prospect for economic assistance and political partnership with

foreign government and international organization. The development improved the general security situation in the region as they provided a chance to normalize relations with two neighboring states, which had previously been considered major threats to Tajikistan's security, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In general the post 11 September situation opened up new opportunities for Tajikistan to tackle its major security problems.

The protection of the Russian minority in strife-ridden Tajikistan is a stated foreign policy goal of the Russian government. Russia's concern was eased somewhat by the conclusion of a dual-citizenship agreement between the two countries in 1995. Russia also has justified its active involvement in the affairs of Tajikistan by citing the need to defend the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border--and thus, the CIS--from penetration by Islamic extremism and drug trafficking.

In the 17th and 18th centuries local Khanates emerged – the Bukhara Emirate, the Khiva Khanate and Khokand Khanate. Most of the territory of modern Tajikistan is located in the territory of Bukhara, and a smaller part was in Kokand. During the second half of the 19th century, Russia expanded into Central Asia, and despotic and conservative nature of Bukhara, Emirate made it incapable of grasping the dramatic changes as this expansion preceded.

In June 1865, Russian troops conquered Tashkent, under Russian control, as a buffer against surprise attacks from the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate, as well as a convenient base for further action in Central Asia. Russia played on the contradictions and clashes between Khanates, waiting for the weakest party to turn to itself for support. In 1866 Russian troops invaded the Bukhara Emirate and conquered Irdzhar on the road to Samarkand and Khujand further to the east.

In the 1880's and 1890's Russia strengthened its control further. In 1895 Britain and Russia signed an agreement in London defining the 'spheres of Influence of the two countries in the region of the Pamirs. Russia gained direct control over the eastern

Pamirs, and Russian garrisons were established in 1897-98, at Khorog in Shugnan and at two locations in Vakhsh. The Agreement of 1895 was further strengthened by the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention, which created a strip of territory between the Pamir and Kashmir (the Wakhan Corridor) and attached it to Afghanistan (Soucek 2000:199).

From 1924 to 1929, Tajikistan was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) under the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. It was under the Soviet rule, that gave the Tajiks statehood and own geographical and political territory, and reinstated the Tajik language. Under the Soviet power, a modernization process was initiated. The wider context of the Soviet Union helped Tajikistan to develop as a nation although within the strict framework of the Soviet ideology. Moscow provided long-term economic investment and the Tajik SSR developed economically.

In the 1970's and early 1980's Moscow made major investment in power station for hydro-energy in order to exploit the riches of the republic, its water. These construction works started but had not been completed by the time the Soviet Union broke up. The highest military award of today's Tajikistan, the order of Bravery, is named after the Sogdian rebel leader, Spitmen, who fought the invasion of Alexander the great. Thus, history gave nourishment to a struggle for national identity.

Russia's role during the Tajik civil war can be described as initially passive from the side of the government, while the local Russian military engaged in the conflict against the opposition. When civil strife turned into civil war in May 1992, the Russian 201 Motorized Rifle Division, deployed in Tajikistan since the Soviet times, was ordered to remain neutral. Russia's prime concern was to support a regime that would bring stability and guarantee a continued role and influence for Russia had previously supported the Tajik democrats (Lena Jonson 2006: 44).

During 1996, Moscow and Iran began seriously to seek a political compromise that would end the civil war in Tajikistan. On 23 December 1996, an agreement was signed between President Rakhmonov and the UTO leader, said Abdullo Nuri, on the creation of

a Commission of National Reconciliation (CNR). The protocol of the agreement prescribed a referendum on a new constitution, a new electoral law, reform of the executive power to include representative of the opposition at all levels, and suggestion for the date of new elections to take place under UN and OSCE monitoring.

In 2001, the situation in the country remained fragile although it was stabilizing after the 1997 peace agreement. The situation during the year and a half after the parliamentary elections of spring 2000 was characterized by two features:

1. The power sharing arrangement of the general peace agreement was violated, as power was concentrated in the hand of president and timed to marginalize the opposition.
2. The regional imbalance that was the result of Rakhmonov's takeover of power was confirmed.

Although Tajikistan was willing in principal to develop relations with different states, as other Central Asian governments did, its vulnerability made it dependent on Russia. Russia was a guarantor of both Tajikistan's national security and survival of its regime. Cooperation with Russia and integration with states in the CIS, and first of all Central Asian States, were priorities for its foreign policy. The Tajik scholar Z.A. Dadabaeva reflected the hopes of the time that such an orientation would bring Tajikistan economy benefits. Referred in 2000 to the concept of "Eurassianism" and explain Tajikistan's identification and orientation, and also noted Tajikistan's efforts to reach out to the world market and to individual countries, among them European countries and the USA (Dadabaeva 2000: 61-65).

The idea of Tajikistan creating its own room for maneuver in foreign policy by extending its international contacts had already existed during civil war. By 1997, Iran was regarded as an important foreign partner, although it was in no way comparable to Russia. Circumstances, however, did not yet allow an independent Tajik foreign policy. Thus, although, president Rakhmonov and the Tajik Parliament officially stated a desire to

develop cooperation with any state independent of ideology, political system and religion Tajikistan's exchange with the outside world remained limited (Dadabaeva A. 2000: 66).

In first ten years of Independence, Tajikistan was bandwagoing with Russia in its foreign policy, and continued to do so after other central Asian states had started a balancing policy in relation to Russian by extending their contact with foreign government. Tajikistan's foreign policy was an answer to Turkey s difficult internal and external environment of turmoil and political radicalism on the rise in neighboring countries. The Tajik leadership tried to establish a foreign policy role which would make the country more valuable to Russia and thereby hope fully also allow it to become a beneficiary of Russian economic assistance.

In relation to Tajikistan's relationship to Russia, the trends in Tajik foreign policy will be defined in term of bandwagon with or balancing Russia. Wreaked by the five-year-long civil war, the Tajik leadership's capacity to influence its international environment during the 1990's was minimal. Tajikistan could at best react to event, its vulnerability in security terms can be compared to that of states of the third world, that are described as small or under developed nations, often susceptible to intimidation or manipulation by external powers (William Tow 2004: 463).

In October 2004, Russia and Tajikistan signed a series of agreements, which secured strong Russian presence not only in the Military sphere but also in the economic sphere. Russia concentrated its huge economic investment in the Tajik hydro-energy and aluminum sectors during the next five to seven years.

The US military presence was not large but it was dynamic factor that strengthened Tajikistan's aspiration to take responsibility for its own foreign policy and for the protection of its border with Afghanistan. Russia which had it seen its position and influence reduced during the 1990's and at first seemed to stand by passively as the US administration engaged in Central Asia after 2001, tried to take up the challenge. There was a strong media reaction in Russia to what was considered a Russian retreat from

central Asia. The Russian government tried to respond to this, and Russian policy towards Asia became more active from of 2002 (Jonson 2003:93-112). Although Russia's Central Asia policy was activated during 2002, this pattern seemed difficult to change (Jonson 2003: 63-82).

As early as the 1999, Russia under Putin had initiated a policy of strengthening the Collective Security Treaty as part of a general Anti-terrorist struggle in Central Asia. By the time, in 1993 Tajik Russian agreement on the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border was close to renewal. The Tajiks understood that there might be western assistance to be had if only Tajikistan were to take on responsibility for the border itself. During his visit to Tajikistan in April 2003 President Putin had declared that Russian was to maintain its military Presence in country as well as its presence of the border (Asia Plus: 2003)

Russian-Tajik border interaction is an irreplaceable element in the joint struggle against international terrorism and international drug trafficking. The Russia needed Tajikistan no less than Tajikistan needed Russia and pointed to the value of Tajikistan for Russian interest in Afghanistan: Tajikistan's role as an important partner for Russia and strong supporter of all Russia's integration related initiatives; its value for Russian as the only Persian-Speaking country in the otherwise Turkic- speaking community of Central Asia, and finally its geo-strategic location, which was crucial to Russian interests in Asia (Narodnaya gazeta: 2003).

The Tajikistan press were divided as to how for the outcomes was a victory for Tajik diplomacy or whether Russia had forced Rakhmonov's hand using among other things the conditions on which Tajik migrant labour could travel to Russia to work as leverage. Parallel, Tajikistan intensified its cooperation with NATO countries above all with regard to strengthening.

Tajikistan's capacity on 'soft Security' issues- preventing the transit of drugs, weapons and rebel Islamists across the border from Afghanistan. While Russia was a major partner in security and military affairs, its economic engagement in Tajikistan was small. The

development of 11 Sep. 2001 opened new prospects for economic co-operation in other direction. For the majority of the people in Central Asia, independence from the Soviet Communist system did not immediately translate into an urge for democracy, the market economy, or Western culture and consumerism.

One of the key tenets of the Soviet system had been that religion was incompatible with communism, and the Communists methodically set about repressing all forms of religious expression within the country. As the Soviet, empire fell apart, the people of Central Asia. Who had been forced to renounce or hide their religion for seventy-four years, at last saw an opportunity to reconnect spiritually and culturally with their Islamic past. In what analysts quickly came to call the “New Great Game” after the nineteenth-century rivalry between the empires of Tsarist Russia and Great Britain for control of Asia), Russia, China, and United States struggled to establish pipelines that would give them both access to natural resources and influence over the people of Central Asia.

Tajikistan remained heavily dependent on Russia for support, but Moscow was unable to provide sufficient economic aid to enable the country to overcome the ravages of the civil war. The West continued to ignore Tajikistan. It was not until 2001, nearly five years after the peace agreement was signed - that the international community began to realize the strategic importance of the coalition government in Dushanbe and the need to provide it with material help. The international community finally seemed to realize that Tajikistan was facing threats from the Taliban, the IMU, and that threats could affect them.

Russia continued to play a predominant role in Central Asia, but other great powers the United States and China also stepped in, forcing rapid geopolitical shifts in the foreign policies of the newly independent Central Asian states. Big power rivalry first emerged with the competition to exploit the oil and gas resources of the Caspian.

Sea and Central Asia, but it soon extended to other issues of strategic importance, such as how to maintain stability in a vast, fragile region that bordered so many disturbed

countries, particularly Afghanistan. The superpowers are finding things more difficult the second time round, and the game has changed. The leaders of the Central Asian regimes, each of whom has his own game to play, with his own rules, are refusing to be pawns in the superpower game.

Agreements with Russia did not indicate a sudden turn of Tajik foreign policy towards closer relations with Russia. Whether such a turn would take place depended on several other factors, to which we will return. Though the Russian influence on Tajik foreign policy making seems to be limited, there is most often a Russian link in the domestic power struggle in Tajikistan, as is illustrated by the negotiations over the aluminum sector, with the links between Deripaska and the mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, on the one hand, and the mayor of Dushanbe, Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev, and Gaffor Mirzoev, the former head of the Presidential Guard who controlled the aluminum factory at the time, on the other. Russia can thus, contribute to strengthen or weaken groups and factions in Tajikistan, but the conditions for their interference will be set by the domestic power play inside Tajikistan to the US factor, in summer 2005 it remained unclear whether the USA had come to stay or not. Much pointed in that direction, not least the global policy of US President George W. Bush (CDPSP 2005).

Tajikistan may turn to Russia for assistance if a post-Soviet 'velvet revolution' scenario comes closer and the Tajik regime fears for its political survival. In a long-term perspective, however, Tajikistan's choice of a pragmatic 'open door policy' after September 2001 is the policy any Tajik government will pursue when it is allowed to find its own way. Moreover, this endeavor of the small power in turn contributes to change the regional system. At their first summit, in Shanghai in 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

As for the foreign policy implications of the Iskandaróv case in the context of Russian-Tajik relations, it should be noted that. In the summer of last year, President Emomali Rakhmonov essentially broke with the policy he had adhered to in previous years- a policy of constant maneuvering between Moscow and the West. He made a clear choice

in favor of Moscow and allowed Russian big business to participate in the privatization of enterprise critical to Tajikistan economy-several large hydroelectric power stations and the Tajik Aluminum Plant. And a virtually the same time, a series of extraditions got under way, a circumstance that smacks very much of a behind-the scenes political deal (CDPSP 2005: 17).

Had Moscow learned from its mistakes, the next “color revolution” in the CIS would be a pro-Russian one. Until yesterday, the Tajik opposition was moderate, secular and more oriented toward Moscow than any other opposition force. Now, however, the Tajikistan of the future is lost to Moscow. Moreover, it is not just a matter of whether Russian business will manage to recoup its investments in the opposition; a revolution will occur all the same (CDPSP 2005: 18).

Tashkent–Military exercises code - named “Commonwealth Southern Shield 2000” have begun in Central Asia. The exercises are currently being held in Tajikistan, but they will later move to the mountains of Uzbekistan. Some 10,000 servicemen from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have been activated in the maneuvers, along with the Russian army’s 201st Division, which is stationed in Tajikistan, and Russian border troops deployed along the Tajik -Afghan border.

The Presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the countries of the customs Union – have held a meeting in Minsk. An attempt was made at the meeting to accelerate the establishment of a free trade zone, which is being held back by the Russian position. Tajik president Emomali Rakhmonov said with frustration that his country had fulfilled all the commitments it had assumed in joining the customs Union, implying that Moscow had not (CDPSP 2000: 21).

Why Russia is very deeply involved in Central Asian region? There are few basic reasons.

- i. Russia wants to show the former (Soviet) republics that its policy in the CIS

since the breakup of the USSR is basically unchanged, and that it intends to maintain and strengthen its leadership of the CIS.

- ii. Moscow is demonstrating to the US and the West that it has its own clearly defined geopolitical turf in Eurasia, which it will not relinquish under any circumstances.
- iii. Russia is signaling to not only the West but also China that, in seeking to draw Central Asia into its political orbit, it is by no means focused solely on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has two leaders- Moscow and Beijing. And that it has a key instrument in the form of the CSTO, something China does not have.
- iv. Finally, this represents an attempt by Russia to offset the steady erosion of its economic influence in Central Asia, especially in its relations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (CDPSP 2007: 21).

In April 2001, Tajik president Emomali Rakhmonov and Vladimir Putin finally reached an agreement in Moscow on establishing a Russian 'Air Base' in Tajikista. For the first time since the Soviet Union broke up, Russian frontline aviation is to be stationed in Khodzhent, a city near the border with Uzbekistan. However, in order to reach the theatre of military operations in the Ferghana Valley and in Kazakhstan, the attack aircraft will have to fly through Uzbek territory, something that President Karimov strongly opposed in the past. Kommersant has learned that after his talks with Anatoli Kvashnin [chief of the Russian general staff] those objections were withdrawn (CDPSP 2001: 5-6).

The events of 11 September 2001 enabled President Imamali Rakhmonov to carry out some long-overdue housekeeping. For example, around 15 per cent of the commanders in the powerful border control forces were recently sacked. The role of law enforcement organizations, the militia and judges are all now under review. Russia continues to keep its 201st motor rifle division in...Dushanbe and has agreed to set up a military base in the country...relations with Uzbekistan, through which Tajikistan's railway runs before reaching Kazakhstan and Russia, remain particularly difficult. In the past few years, the Uzbeks have accused Tajikistan of endangering their security by permitting drug

trafficking from Afghanistan and failing to prevent Islamists from attacking Uzbek territory. As a result of this, Uzbekistan decided to plant mines along its border, without informing the Tajik authorities of their location. To date they have killed at least fifty-five Tajik civilians (The Economist 2002: 59).

In a speech titled ‘The World in the 21st Century: Addressing New Threats and Challenges,’ Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov bluntly told members of the nongovernmental Council on foreign Relations in New York in 2005 that Russia would “respond sharply to the export of revolutions to the CIS countries, regardless of what colors they might be cloaked in –rose, blue, or grayish brown and crimson.” The Tajik authorities are thus seriously undermining the potential of the legal democratic opposition as it fights to win seats in parliament. Meanwhile, they are applying a different method to members of their own former “family of power.” Gen. Gafur Mirzoyev, former head of the presidential guard and former Internal Affairs Minister Yakub Salimov, both of whom were closely associated with President Rakhmonov in the 1990s, are currently on trial (CDPSP 2005: 17).

The United States:

Although the United States was the second country to open an embassy in Dushanbe, that outpost was evacuated in October 1992, at the height of the civil war, and was not reopened until March 1993. Beginning in 1992, anti-reformists and the opposition both sought support from the United States. Thus, a trip by Secretary of State James Baker to Tajikistan in February 1992 antagonized members of the opposition, who saw the visit as granting tacit approval to Nabyev's political repression. Relations with the opposition were improved somewhat a few months later, when a human rights delegation from the United States Congress met with several opposition leaders.

During the civil war, the United States provided emergency food supplies and medicines to Tajikistan, and independent Tajikistan continued the cooperative program on earthquake forecasting techniques that had begun with the United States during the Soviet

era. By the mid-1990s, United States policy toward Tajikistan centered on support for peace negotiations and on encouraging Tajikistan to develop closer relations with the IMF and other financial organizations that could help in the rebuilding process.

The turn of events in 2001, Tajik government announced to open up its territory, if needed for over flights, landing and basing offered all available sites, and left it to the USA to state its preferences. On 3rd November 2001 during the visit of Dushanbe by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Rakhmonov publicly gave his consent to use of three military airfields in Tajikistan by the USA and its allies. Rakhmonov agreed for the exchanges of information on anti-terrorist operations and to the establishment of permanent military-to-military contacts between USA and Tajikistan. The new international situation and Tajikistan's participation in the US led anti terror coalition initiated a chain of events. In 2002, the USA lifted its ban on the export of weapons to Tajikistan. In February Tajikistan formally joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme - as the last of the states of Central Asia to do so and this provided further impetus to cooperation with USA and the other countries for membership of the PFP in civil emergency planning, scientific affairs, environmental programme and military reforms (BBC 2000: 18-24).

In November 2002, President Rakhmonov participated for the first time in a NATO summit meeting. In his speech, he stressed that participation in the PFP programme was considered one of the most important part of Tajik foreign policy. In Dec. 2002, Rakhmonov went on his first official visit to the USA and together with president Bush expressed a will for long term strategic partnership and future co-operation against the threat to security from international terrorism the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and drug trade (Zafar saidov 2003: 211).

The drastic improvement in relations between Tajikistan and the USA reflect Tajikistan's unique chance to implement a policy of reaching out to the world and to start pursuing a kind of multi-vector Policy, which it had previously been unable to pursue. In his speech at the end of December 2002, President Rakhmonov for the first time used the

concept the open door policy to characterize Tajik foreign policy (Zafar Saidov 2003: 3).

An open door policy reflected a pragmatic policy of cooperation with all states that were willing to cooperate with Tajikistan, above all economically. The Tajik government saw western interest as an opportunity to strengthen the regime, improve the security situation and secure assistance and investment for the economic development of the country. In February 2003, Rakhmonov for first time used term 'National interest' of Tajikistan (Jonson Lena 2006:59).

Slowly the concepts and strategies of an independent policy were taking form. The US military presence was not large but it was dynamic factor that strengthened Tajikistan's aspiration to take responsibility for its own foreign policy and for the protection of its border with Afghanistan. Russia which had it seen its position and influence reduced during the 1990's and at first seemed to stand by Passively as US administration engaged in central Asia After 2001 , tried to take up the challenge. There was a strong media reaction in Russia to what was considered a Russian retreat from Central Asia. The Russian government tried to respond to this, and Russian policy towards Central Asia became more active from of 2002 (Johnson 2003: 93-112).

The small US presence brought a new element into Tajik political life and debate. The new international attention brought hopes and expectations of future western assistance, but also an awareness on the part of the Tajik government that there were other options besides close alliance with Russia.

The United States could have stabilized the economy of Tajikistan with development funds, brought concerted pressure to end the conflict between Central Asia's republics. Instead, Washington was clearer about its enemies than its friends, designating two major regional powers- Russia and Iran- its rivals and competitors, whilst failing to identify a single regional power as an ally. In Central Asia corruption, poverty and other social ills are providing fertile ground for Islamic extremists, terrorist networking and drug and weapons trafficking that will have an impact in Russia, Europe and beyond, United states.

There was one positive development during the first months of the Bush administration. With the U.S. officers training the Uzbek army alongside Russian military advisers, and the first extension of the U.S. economic and military aid to Tajikistan a Russian satellite it became apparent that the United States and Russia no longer saw themselves as strategic competitors in the fight against the IMU and the Taliban but had become at least temporary strategic partners. This was partly an outcome of a joint working group on counterterrorism that Russia and the United States had set up in 2000 to oversee policy on everything from the Taliban to the Chechens and the IMU. In early 1990s Russian policy oscillated between the liberals around President Boris Yeltsin who wanted closer relations with the West-anchoring Russia's future in Europe at the expense of Central Asia, which they saw as a drain on Russian resources and hard-line nationalists and former communists who could not imagine life without the old empire. They renamed the former Soviet states "the near abroad" to differentiate them from the rest of the world.

Until 11 September 2001, the United States, China, Israel, and the NATO countries through NATO's Partnership for Peace program all provided military aid to help and rebuild the Central Asian armies. Although, the West largely provided nonlethal aid, such as training and funds, China and Russia supplied arms. Building up the depreciated military capacity of Central Asia's armies and training them in the modern techniques of counterinsurgency is clearly important, but this international aid has not come with significant economic and political riders.

Developing Central Asia's oil resources and building pipelines that will cross every country even those that have no oil is the most important tool the United States and other Western countries have to force the regimes to initiate social and political reform. The present competition between the big powers Russia, China, and the United States to exploit the energy resources of the region and build pipelines there needs to be converted into cooperation.

The major new development with regard to Tajikistan in the post 2001 situation was the USA's engagement in the country and Tajikistan's immediate preparedness to initiate

cooperation. Tajikistan viewed the US strikes against Afghanistan as being in accord with its own interests, since the Taliban had been regarded as a threat to Tajikistan's national security ever since they appeared on the Afghan scene. This was a new orientation and to what extent was it only a stronger determination on the part of the government to carry out a policy that has existed previously and could now be implemented, as the external circumstances changed? As already mentioned, ideas about a more diversified foreign policy had existed within the government for several years, Nevertheless, these ideas only became official policy after 2001, and then they contributed to bring about the kind of conscious reorientation of foreign policy.(Jonson 2006)

Thus, it is not enough to say that the political purposes remained the same all the time and the post-2001; Tajik foreign policy was only a revision of means and methods. There was something more, and the fact that the Taliban regime had fallen and foreign powers were engaging in the Central Asian region contributed to an understanding that the situation had changed and major security threats and problems had to be redefined. Tajikistan used the interest of the USA in contributing to strengthening the capacity of the Tajik border troops to bring about the agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian border troops from the Tajik-Afghan border.

Tajikistan's security cooperation with the USA grew substantially after September 2001. Although it remained limited to capacity building for border protection and combating drug trafficking, this cooperation was of crucial importance both for creating normal external conditions for Tajikistan and as a political factor supporting a more independent Tajik foreign policy.

The US factor in Tajikistan made the Tajik's 'open door' policy possible since the US presence attracted other governments to become involved in Tajikistan. Although, there was a competition for influence between the big powers and the regional powers, this had no negative impact in Tajikistan. Instead the improved relations between Russia and the USA, combined with the drastic increase in the US engagement as well as that of other Western and Asian countries on the global level, the new situation in Afghanistan and the prospects for Tajikistan's economic cooperation with Afghanistan all made regional

powers such as Iran, Pakistan and India more interested in Tajikistan, which could now be accessible across Afghanistan in the not-too-distant future. Thus, changes in the regional system created the external conditions, which made possible the shifts in Tajik foreign policy. 'Tajikistan offered an air base to the United States in 2001, but the Pentagon decided at the last moment to use instead the Manas air base in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan'(Jeffries 2003: 260).

Tajikistan has signed an agreement giving the US troops immunity from prosecution in the new International Criminal Court. Tajikistan is the fourth country to sign such a pact known as an Article 98 agreement with the United States. The others are Israel, Romania and East Timor (Jeffries 2003: 260).

A 'window of opportunity' opened as the USA increases its engagement in Central Asia. During 2001, Tajikistan's foreign policy was activated; its relations with western and Asian countries expanded, and its foreign policy was diversified. Its participation in the US led anti-terrorist coalition became an instrument for Tajikistan to reach out to the world in its partnership with Russia which was reduced in relative term. Although, partnership with Russia remained important to Tajikistan, it started to balance its policy in relation to Russia with the help of wider cooperation with other big powers. Tajikistan, thus, developed its foreign relations, although it was still bound by a framework of agreement with Russia, and Russia led security arrangements. Previous ties with Russia were kept but a new balancing foreign policy in relation to Russia was in making.

Yet in 2005, there were hardly any US investments, and trade between Tajikistan and the USA was almost nil. Besides, the USA was providing extensive economic development assistance and presenting a high political profile on democracy and human rights issues. Security cooperation between Tajikistan and the USA, as well as the EU, was increasing, yet there were no signs that any of them would be prepared to replace Russia as a security guarantor of Tajikistan. The USA's policy in Central Asia is a dual one. Its relations with Central Asian governments have developed as relations of strategic partners in a

common anti-terrorism endeavour, while at the same time the US administration has wanted to strengthen a process towards democratization in these countries.

Tajikistan and China:

Tajikistan and China share a common border on the high plateau of the Pamir but their respective territories near the border are thinly populated. A border dispute between them in the Pamir was mainly resolved by an agreement in 1999, and the remaining disagreements were overcome in 2002 (Jonson 2006: 85).

The main source of tension between China and Tajikistan is China's claim on part of Tajikistan's far eastern Gorno-Badakhshan region. Between 1992 and 1995, sixteen rounds of negotiations between China and a commission representing Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan failed to produce a border agreement. An interim agreement, scheduled for signing in April 1996, stipulated that no attacks would be launched across the border in either direction and that both sides would provide ample notice of military exercises in the area. Despite their border dispute, China and the post-civil war government of Tajikistan share hostility towards reformist political movements, especially those that could be stigmatized as Islamic fundamentalist. By the mid-1990s, this common ground had become the basis for a working relationship between the two governments.

Although regional powers such as Iran, China, Pakistan and India have a security interest in Central Asia in maintaining stability in the region, they have engaged mainly in the economic sphere. The China and Tajikistan in 1999 started construction work on a road between Khulma in eastern Gorno-Badakhshan and Karsu in the Chinese Xinjiang region. Since the Soviet times Tajikistan had no direct exit to China and the new road would open new prospects for bilateral relations.

During 2001 bilateral security cooperation between Tajikistan and China developed. By the opening of the Murgob-Khulma stretch of highway, this had direct security

implications for both countries. A bilateral agreement signed in 2004 provided for joint investigations and exchanges of information between their security agencies in fighting cross-border crime and smuggling and also permitted the Chinese agencies to pursue suspected terrorist on Tajik territory, to be present during trials in Tajikistan, and to ask question of defendant. Tajikistan's problems with protecting its border with Afghanistan after the Russian handover were an issue of direct concern to China.

In 2001, a Tajik-Chinese joint economic and trade commission had its first meeting. China gave economic assistance to Tajikistan in remained on a low level. Tajikistan's imports from China were all light industrial good and telecommunication equipment, while its exports to China consisted of metal, cotton fibers and aluminum. China had a direct interest in developing cooperation with Tajikistan, as it has with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which border the Chinese province of Xinjiang. For years the economically under developed Xinjiang had been a major problems for Chinese leadership. China feared separatism, extremism and terrorism from the Uyghur, a Turkic-speaking Muslim population group in the region.

In 1999 China had started to emphasize the development of trade with Central Asian countries as part of a developing Xinjiang and interesting the Central Asian neighbors in good neighborly relation with China became major priorities of China's is Central Asian policy. In late 2004 the stretch of highway from Murgob to Khulma finally opened, thereby connecting Khorog and Kashgar and direct flight started between Dushanbe and Urumchi. The road opened up important new prospect for Tajikistan to reach out to the world. It connects to the Karakorum highway, ruining through China to India and thus, also opens up the prospect of linking Tajikistan to Pakistan and of access to the sea. China also interested in Tajikistan's energy sector. When president Rakhmonov met Chinese Prime Minister Wein Jibao in China in November 2003, they discussed China's possible participation in the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power plant (Lena Jonson 2006:86).

Throughout the 1990s, China's main strategic aim was to ensure that the Central Asian

governments kept a tight lid on Uighur political activities on their soil, stopping the Uighur minorities from helping the Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province. The Central Asian states obliged China by shutting down Uighur publications and offices, arresting Uighurs who criticized Chinese policies, and keeping their borders with China open for trade whilst guarding against the export of arms, propaganda, or funds for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. Territorial disputes with Tajikistan remain unresolved; however, Beijing claims some 30 percent of Tajikistan's territory along their common border in Gorno-badakhshan, where there are huge gold deposits.

It was with the aim of settling these disputes that China took its most significant step in Central Asia, calling a summit meeting in Shanghai in 1996 between the five states that shared common borders: China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The summit resulted in a process of demilitarization and demarcation of the borders.

Tajikistan's relations with China developed during this period. For the opening of the road China and Tajikistan signed an agreement on military confidence-building in the region of their common benefits. Tajikistan may turn to Russia for assistance if a post-Soviet 'velvet revolution' scenario comes closer and the Tajik regime fears for its political survival. In a long-term perspective, however, Tajikistan's choice of a pragmatic 'open door policy'. Moreover, this endeavor of the small power in turn contributes to change the regional system. At their first summit, in Shanghai in 1996, Russia-China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan discussed border issues, which, subsequently expanded to include cooperation in efforts to combat ethnic separatism, international terrorism, crime and regional extremism.

Since 1991, China has built close bilateral trade and investment ties with all the Central Asian states, but until recently it avoided becoming involved in military and security pacts and tried to distance itself from the U.S.-Russia rivalry in the region. That is now swiftly coming to an end as the IMU and the Taliban recruit Uighur Islamic militants and separatists from China's only Muslim majority province, Xinjiang, and create growing political unrest through their guerrilla attacks against Chinese security forces.

Uighur separatists train in Taliban camps in Afghanistan, returning with arms and the idea of establishing a pan-Turkic state oriented toward Islamic Fundamentalism. Incidentally, China and Tajikistan have plans for substantial economic cooperation in the future. In order to develop its rather impoverished northwestern regions, China plans to build new transportation routes that will bypass Afghanistan.

This is very much to the liking of Tajikistan, which recently finished building a highway from Dushanbe to Kulyab via Kurgan-Tyube in record time and has just a couple dozen kilometers to go before reaching the Chinese border. Russia also has an interest in the transportation route, and these issues will be discussed at the next meeting, in Shanghai (CDPSP 2000: 18).

Tajikistan's President has discussed regional security and economic cooperation, Beijing, and Dushanbe have signed a border treaty, a legal cooperation treaty and a declaration on the regional situation. In the declaration, the parties express concern over the situation in Afghanistan and speak of their common interest in combating separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. India and China will lay the foundation for a new stage in its trilateral dialogue. In short we can say that it would serve their long term political and economic interest and could become a significant factor in strengthening strategic stability in the region and the world as well as in efforts to fight the new challenges confronting the three countries and all of mankind (CDPSP 2005:9).

Tajikistan and Iran:

In the Kushan Empire, three important civilizations the Chinese, Iranian and Indian met. Sogdiana developed into great commercial center for Chinese trade with the west. Extensive finds of Roman coins and products bear witness to the economic exchange that took place between East and West along the Silk Road. The arrival of the Turks set in motion a demographic and ethno-linguistic shift in the region. The Iranian culture and language continued to play a dominant role in Central Asia (Soucek Svata 2000:37).

When Tajikistan declared independence, Iran was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition, and the first to establish an embassy in Dushanbe. In 1992, Iran provided training for a group of Tajik diplomats from Tajikistan. After 1991, bilateral contacts in the mass media and in sports increased significantly, and Iran funded construction of several new mosques in Tajikistan. In the fall of 1992, Iran repeatedly offered to help mediate Tajikistan's civil war in cooperation with other Central Asian states. Although, such offers produced no negotiations, Iran did send food and set up camps for refugees from Tajikistan. After the civil war, relations between Iran and the new government in Dushanbe included efforts to develop periodic recriminations. Iran worked with Russia in attempting to negotiate a peace agreement between the Dushanbe government and the opposition. In July 1995, Tajikistan opened an embassy in Tehran, one of its few outside the former Soviet Union.

Some of Tajikistan's most important contacts with Iran in the early 1990s were cultural. For example, Tajikistan held an Iranian film festival, an exhibition of Iranian art, and two exhibits of Iranian publications. Dushanbe was the site of international conferences on Persian culture and the Tajik language. In the early 1990s, Iranian books and magazines became increasingly available in Tajikistan, and Dushanbe television carried programs from Iran. The main obstacle to such cultural contact is the fact that only a very small portion of the Tajikistani population can read the Arabic alphabet.

Despite the obvious ideological differences between the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran and the secular communist regime in newly independent Tajikistan, Nabiyeu actively cultivated relations with Iran.

The leading figures of the Islamic revival movement in Tajikistan say emphatically that whatever eventual form of Islamic state they advocate for Tajikistan, Iran is not the model to be followed. Part of the reason for this position is that Iran is predominantly Shia Muslim while Tajikistan is mainly Sunni, a distinction with important implications for the organization of the religious leadership and its relationship with the state. An

equally important reason is that the social structures of Tajikistan and Iran are considered too different for Iran's linkage of religious and political powers to be adopted in Tajikistan.

November 1991 foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati traveled to all five republics of Central Asia, reaping the most benefits in Persian-speaking Tajikistan, which was trying to counter Uzbek-Turkish influence, and Turkmenistan, which borders Iran and needed to find a sea outlet for its gas exports. Iran intervened briefly in the Tajik civil war, siding with The IRP, but quickly realized that it had to stay out of the conflict if it wanted to keep Russia as an ally.

Central Asian leaders felt comfortable dealing with Iran. Because of these ties Iran was clearly not involved in exporting Islamic radicalism. Russia and Iran were also united in their determination not to allow the United States to dominate energy exploration in Central Asia. Iran's caution in Central Asia is not just due to economics, other competent factor also works there.

The pragmatic Iranian mullahs realized early on that their Shia ideology would be unwelcome in Sunni Central Asia. Teheran has perforce limited its ideological agenda in the region, preferring to build state-to-state relations and trade ties rather than send Iran's Revolutionary Guards to promote Islamic revolution. Iran is presently the major supplier of arms and ammunition to the anti-Taliban alliance, and Tehran's willingness to stand up to the Taliban has won it greater appreciation in Central Asian capitals.

In order to return to the cultural roots," the president dropped the Slavic "ov" from his last name and christened himself Emomalii Rakhmon. "I would like to be called Emomalii Rakhmon, after my late father'. The president's desire to "return Tajikistan to their cultural roots". He concluded that all of his fellow citizens must "go by the historically correct spellings of their first and last names, as an important part of the Tajik people's national heritage. It should be pointed out that the Tajik government announced in 2006 that it was launching a "resolute war on poverty," vowing to "reduce it by 25%

by 2010.” It appears that, in order to help his government to achieve that goal; the president has launched a parallel war on affluence. Then, after more thought, the president decided to show his people a bright future. On 12 December 2006 of last year, Emomali Rakhmon “assigned the government specific tasks aimed at achieving a bright future for Tajikistan (CDPSP 2007).

Tajikistan and Afghanistan:

Tajikistan's relations with Afghanistan, the country with which it shares its long southern border, have been affected not only by the cultural and ethnic links between inhabitants of the countries but also by the way the Soviet regime tried to use those links to ensure the survival of a communist government in Kabul after 1979. The Soviets put Tajiks from Tajikistan in positions of power in the Soviet-backed Afghan government and sent propaganda publications from Tajikistan to Afghanistan. Afghans were brought to Tajikistan for education and communist indoctrination, and Tajiks served in the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.

Afghan-Badakhshan is considered as subgroup of the Tajiks. The situation in Afghanistan has an impact on Tajikistan as their common border extends for 1309Km. In 1895 the Pyandzh/Amudarya river became the boundary between the Russian and British spheres of interest, and both empires did their best to keep Afghanistan as buffer state. Tsarist policy tried to isolate Russian Central Asia from its neighbours in the south. The Soviets continued this policy and made it their objective to cut Central Asia off from the Muslim world and its neighbours to the south, and Afghanistan maintained its status as a buffer state between British and Russian interests after the Soviets secured power in Central Asia (Bennigsen Alexander 1989: 14).

In 1991, the political climate in Tajikistan allowed some citizens to criticize the war openly, although there was no reliable gauge of how widely this antiwar opinion was shared. Sharing a common history as part of the same empires for centuries, until the end of the Samanid Empire the territories that later become Tajikistan and Afghanistan, have

an extensive cultural heritage in common. The Tajiks are second largest Ethnic group in Afghanistan, constitute almost a quarter of the population, and are found in many part of Afghanistan, although they are concentrated in Badakh Shan, around Kabul and Heart in Rohistan and in the Panjshir valley.

Yet despite his concern about the situation there, Afghanistan paradoxically increases Rakhmon's imperviousness to Western pressure. Rakhmon's single most effective tactic since the civil war may well have been his emptying of the political space, thus depriving anxious or angry donor nations of an attractive alternative. He uses his proximity to a dangerous and fragile state that is at war with Islamic extremists to reinforce his implicit argument that only he should be allowed to set the pace of change. However, the glacial pace now if there is any change at all is undermining. Tajikistan offered scholarships for Afghan students in technical subjects and pledged to build bridges across the river Pyndzh (Rashid 2003).

On 13 September 2004, the ministers of economic affairs of the two countries signed a five-year trade agreement, and also signed to open up border trade at three points along the Tajik-Afghan border in Gorno-Badakha Shan at Iskashim, Khorog and Darvaz. Asia plus 10 November 04 prospect for joint Tajik Afgan exploitation of those resources and the export of Afghan gas to Tajikistan in future, thereby reducing Tajikistan's dependence on gas imported from Uzbekistan.

Rugged terrain and poor border enforcement make the Tajikistan- Afghanistan border very permeable. Beginning in 1992, border crossings--for private smuggling, to escape the Tajikistani civil war, or to obtain weapons for one side or the other in that war--became increasingly numerous. In August 2000, Tajik border troops in northern Tajikistan repelled an attempt by a group of armed terrorists to enter Tajikistan from a mountain gorge in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Russian border troops on Tajikistan's borders have to stave off a tidal wave of drugs. Attempts to bring heroin across the border from Afghanistan are becoming increasingly frequent (CDPSP 2000: 20).

By early 1993, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 50,000 to 70,000 refugees had gone from southern Tajikistan to northern Afghanistan. By 1994, many of them had returned home, although the exact number is not available. Relations between Tajikistan's post-civil war government and Afghanistan often were troubled through the first half of the 1990s. Tajikistan accused Afghanistan of complicity in cross-border attacks by exiled opposition members based in northern Afghanistan. In turn, Afghanistan accused Russian forces on the Tajikistan side of the border of killing Afghan civilians in reprisal attacks. The situation changed in late 1995 and early 1996, when Russia began to support President Burhanuddin Rabbani's faction in the ongoing Afghan civil war. Rabbani then tried to improve relations with the Dushanbe government and to mediate a settlement between it and the opposition.

This in turn could speed up economic development and political liberalization in Central Asia. Afghanistan has long been linked to Central Asia, historically and culturally. Over the centuries the two countries have been joined in various empires, and ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan come from the same stock as Central Asian Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen. The ethnic, social, cultural, and political ties between Afghanistan and Central Asia are, thus, deeply rooted and give and take between the two regions. In the twentieth century, guests in Afghanistan have included the rulers of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand after the Russian Revolution; Basmachis who were escaping the Bolsheviks; and members of the Tajikistan's civil war. And like the IMU, both the Basmachis and the IRP continued fighting their Central Asian wars from bases in Afghanistan. Indeed, fear of Pakistan's influence in the region has been a critical factor in the mobilization of the Central Asian states against the Taliban.

From the Tajik horizon, Tajikistan and Afghanistan together constitute the core of this regional cooperation in the making. Whether all Tajikistan's projects and plans for regional cooperation will be implemented in future depends on domestic developments in Afghanistan. A series of bombings in May 2005 signaled a tenuous situation as the parliamentary elections in September were approaching, causing some observers to talk in terms of an 'Iraqization' of the situation in Afghanistan. But there seemed to be slow

but gradual movement in the direction of the normalization and stabilization of the country factor of the internal dynamics in Tajikistan is concerned, President Rakhmonov seemed to have secured full control of the political life in the country in good time before the presidential elections that are to take place in late 2006. A process of “Tajikization” proceeded in society, encouraged by the nation-and state-building process.

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan:

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not only former Soviet republics with the heritage of a joint economic and transport infrastructure; but they also share a common cultural heritage. They are not only large Uzbek minority in Tajikistan but also a substantial Tajik minority in Uzbekistan. There are over 1 million Tajik in Uzbekistan. They are concentrated in the Surkhandarya, Samarkand and Bakhara regions (Bakhavadin and Dodikhudoev 2005: 126).

Independent Tajikistan has troubled relations with the two neighboring former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, a situation that began long before independence. In the 1980s, a dispute over two scarce resources in Central Asia, water and arable land, soured relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In June 1989, the situation burst into spontaneous, grassroots violence over competing claims to a small portion of land. That conflict led to mutual recriminations that continued until a settlement was reached in 1993. Tensions were heightened in 1992 by Kyrgyzstan's fear that the Tajikistani civil war would spill over the border, which had never been defined by a bilateral treaty. Despite tense relations between the two republics, Kyrgyzstan attempted to negotiate an end to Tajikistan's civil war, and it sent medicine and other aid to its beleaguered neighbour. After the civil war, Kyrgyzstan sent a contingent of troops to Tajikistan as part of the joint CIS peacekeeping mission.

The administrative border of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is not demarcated. There are disputed areas. But many places are now impassable because of the minefields. Historically, no borders have ever existed on the territory of the post-Soviet states in

Central Asia, before the region was conquered by Russia neither in the 19th century nor during Soviet times, when only administrative borders existed. However, Uzbekistan is now trying to break this tradition. Consequently, the border problems could even further exacerbate the already tense relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (CDPSP 2000: 11).

After the civil war, Uzbekistan's attitude toward Tajikistan became increasingly ambivalent. One aspect of Uzbekistan's policy continued its earlier effort to prevent the opposition from taking power in Tajikistan; a 1993 cooperation treaty between the two countries, stipulating a role for Uzbekistan's air force in the defense of Tajikistan--which has no air force of its own--manifested that concern. However, the government in Tashkent was increasingly displeased that the dominant factions among the victors in Tajikistan's civil war were much less amenable to Uzbekistan's leadership than were the factions that had controlled Tajikistani politics before the war. By 1995, the Uzbekistan government was urging the government in Dushanbe to be more conciliatory toward the opposition in postwar peace talks.

The highway across northern Tajikistan was used by Uzbekistan to connect Tashkent with Fergana valley. In order to be independence of Tajikistan for these connections, Uzbekistan stated a huge road project, which completed in 2002. The problems at borders are several. Firstly, each state has its border posts and checking routines. Seconds, the new transit regulations introduced after independence mean high tariffs for international transit. Third, freight transport across borders involves a struggle with bureaucracies since several ministries have to permission for transit, with both lengthy procedures and high cost as the result (Jonson 2006: 116).

Border disputes between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are special aspect of the border problem. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, territorial problems have resurfaced, although both government has made no 'historical claims' on territory, although for many Tajiks the inclusion in Uzbekistan of Samarkand, Bukhara and some other historic cities of the Zerafshan valley was great injustice.

Central Asia's water comes from the Amudarya and Syrdarya, which spring from the Pamir and the Tian Shan mountains and cross several countries until they reach the Aral Sea. Dams were built in the Soviet time to store the water in reservoirs and use it for agriculture or hydroelectricity. Over 90 percent of the available water is used for irrigation. Independence resulted in the end of centralized management, but the Central Asian states set up an interstate commission on water coordination for the joint management of water resources. 80% of Central Asia's water comes from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but these states are allowed to withdraw less than 15 percent of the water, and have to restrict their generation of hydropower in the winter in order to store water for summer. They complain that they are paid by the downstream countries, on the other hand consider that they are overcharged for the Hydroelectric power (The Economist 2003).

The agreement between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Asian Development Bank in March 2004 on a project to modernize the ageing regional power transmission system inherited from soviet times gave hope of a solution to this problem (BBC 2004). Three circumstances contributed to open up completely new prospect for Tajikistan - the USA's engagement, its encouragement of regional development between Afghanistan and the neighbors and the interest of regional powers in developing the transport infrastructure.

Tajikistan's relations with Uzbekistan remained on a low level, and although, there are certain improvements in their bilateral relations during 2002, tensions between them continued. Tajikistan's policy was obviously to reduce its dependence on Uzbekistan by finding alternatives to the importing of Uzbek gas and transit across Uzbek territory 2004.

Tajikistan pointed the finger directly at Uzbek agencies as being responsible for the rebellion. Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, director of the Russia Defense Ministry's Chief Administration for International Military Cooperation promptly denied the Uzbek spokesman's allegations against Russia and declared that "Russia is pursuing a restrained

policy and lowering its level of military activity, especially on the territory of the Commonwealth countries or in regions bordering on them (CDPSP 2007: 15-16).

Bakiyev “ As president of Kyrgyzstan, I endorse this proposal...Tajikistan can create such a union in Central Asia-one that would serve primarily to deepen economic and political ties and strengthen security – the peoples of our countries could only benefit (CDPSP 2007: 10).

The government of Tajikistan reached an agreement with the United Tajik Opposition on disbanding all unofficial armed units and placing opposition detachments under the authority of the ministry of defence. The field commanders who originally came from Uzbekistan refused to accept it. One such detachment tried to break out of Tajikistan and make its way to Uzbekistan across Kyrgyz territory. Kyrgyzstan asked Uzbekistan for military assistance. On 15 August (year), four aircraft bearing Uzbek Air Force markings bombed villages in Tajikistan’s Garm and Dzhirgatal districts near the borders with Kyrgyzstan (CDPSP 1999: 17).

Tajikistan's relations with Uzbekistan present a contradictory picture. On the one hand, Tajik intellectuals have criticized Uzbekistan for discrimination against its Tajik minority. In response, citing fears of Islamic radicalism in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan closed its Tajik-language schools in mid-1992. On the other hand, anti-reformists in both republics have maintained good relations based on the interest they shared in the defeat of reformers in Tajikistan in the early 1990s. Uzbekistan gave military support to the factions that won Tajikistan's civil war and closed its border with Tajikistan in the fall of 1992 to prevent opposition refugees from the civil war from fleeing to Uzbekistan.

The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan repeatedly extolled the value of regional economic and environmental cooperation in the early 1990s. In reality, however, only limited progress was made toward such cooperation. Oil and natural gas producers Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan interrupted fuel deliveries to Tajikistan, in the hopes of improving the terms of the sales agreements that

had prevailed under the Soviet system. With consumer goods generally in short supply, Tajikistan has taken measures to prevent citizens of the neighboring republics from purchasing such items from Tajikistani stockpiles. Tajikistan also is wary of regional water use plans that might increase the share of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in water emanating from Tajikistan.

Tajikistan and Turkey:

Timur, a Muslim Turk, seized power in Transoxania, ending Chaghatayid rule in the region. The Borders of Timuride state of 1405 stretched from the Black sea coast almost as far west as the Mediterranean, across the Caspian Sea. The Timuride period is characterised by 'the co-existence of two strains of high culture, which established Persian on one hand the new Turkic on the other (Soucek, 2000: 126). In 1500, Uzbek khan, the founder of the Shaybanid Dynasty (1500-1599) and descent of Genghis Khan ended the Timuride dynasty. The greater part of Central Asia now passed to the control of the nomadic Uzbeks from the Kipchak Steppe. They were Sunni Muslims and 'had been sufficiently exposed to Arab Persian Islamic culture to ensure a fundamental continuity'(Soucek, 2000: 149). Turkey's involvement in Tajikistan, however, has been rather limited because the two countries could not have a common cultural heritage. Tajikistan has expressed its interest in cooperation with Turkey in education, science and culture (Badan Phool 2001:177).

As far as population are concerned, the north-east of Afghanistan and south of Tajikistan can then be considered as one single and vast entity, which ethnic politics and socio-economic evolution have made evolve differently on either side of the frontier (Hyman 1997:123).

Turkey was first state to recognize the independence of the Soviet Central Asian republics. At the time there was a great euphoria in Turkey. Western government were also eager to promote the relevance for the Central Asians of the Turkic secular, democratic state model based on a free market economy, in order to pre-empt the

expansion of Iranian influence in Central Asia (Mozaffari Mehadi 1997:108-109). Moreover, a spin-off tension between Turkey and Russia in Transcaucasia are bound to have a spin-off effect on between the two in Central Asia. Central Asia is an area of vital security interest to Turkey. Pan- Turkism has as its goal the establishment of some form of the Turkic people (Mozaffari Mehadi 1997: 105).

In March 1992, a broadcasting agreement was reached with all Muslim countries of the area to allow Turkey to telecast satellite TV Transmission. After agreement “A new Turkish Television station was set up and it started telecasting to all Turkic republics” (Turkkaya Ataov 1997:69).

The adoption of Latin alphabet in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and Arabic alphabet in Tajikistan, is a process of evolution and consolidation of the ethnic affinity and has launched joint newspapers with Uzbek and Turkmen state. Turkey has also sought to institutionalize the pan-Turkic drive for economic integration or common market. The Central Asian leaders who realized that they were initially expecting politely rejected this. The countries of the region need Marshal plan-type package (an economic package which was given by the US to rebuild Western Europe following the World War II) to rebuild the Central Asian infrastructure. But Turkey is not in a position to provide such type of economic assistance due to its own economic weakness (Badan Phool 2001: 177-178).

Turkish officials are also interested in cultivating ties with non -Turkic Tajikistan. In September 1995 President Demirel visited Dushanbe where he spoke of the need to develop a stable and peaceful ‘Eurasia’. The Tajik President, Imamali Rakhmanov, urged Demirel to use his influence to bring about peace in Afghanistan. The Turkish President’s trip to Tajikistan immediately followed by an official visit to Mongolia led the Turkish press to speculate wildly that Turkey was interested in the formation of a ‘Eurasian’ as opposed to a ‘Turkic Union’ (Yani Yuzyil 1995). Even the then Prime Minister, Demirel, when touring the region in the spring of 1992, referred to the prospects of forming an ‘association of independent Turkic states’. The corresponding figures for Tajikistan were

appreciably lower, than other countries of the Central Asia (Economist Intelligence Unit Country report 1995: 17-18).

The Central Asians were also not prepared to antagonize Russia by committing themselves fully to exclusively Turkic bodies or formations. Since late 1991, there has been heavy diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the newly independent Turkic state of Central Asia. In the 1994-1995 academic year, 40 places in Turkish education establishments were reserved for the first time for Tajik students (Winrow G. M. 1997: 105).

No state is a monolithic entity. Foreign policy decision-making and its implementation is not left in the hands of one individual. In the making of the foreign policy of a relatively democratic state, inputs are bound to come from various government ministries, opposition political parties, interest groups, business lobbies and other agencies and public opinion. This may at times lead to contradictory policies and inconsistent behaviour by a particular state. However, overall, an outside observer is usually still able to perceive the general thrust of the foreign policy of a state towards another state or group of states (Winrow G. M. 1997: 105).

The Turkish MFA is eager to promote peace, stability and democracy in Central Asia. According to the Ministry, Turkey aims to facilitate the integration of the Central Asian Turkic states with the rest of the world by sponsoring and assisting them in their applications to join various international bodies. If necessary, Turkey will inform western states of the specific problems the Central Asians might be encountering.

In 1991, Turkey had high hopes of becoming the most influential player in the region because the Turks were linked both ethnically and linguistically to the people of Central Asia. Turkish internationalists dreamed of a contiguous Turkic-speaking bloc stretching from the Mediterranean to China. Turkey was also encouraged by the United States and NATO, who wished to see Central Asia follow the Turkish model of pro-West, capitalism, and secularism, the U.S. diplomats urged the Central Asian leaders to emulate

Turkey, suggesting that they travel to Turkey to see how a modern secular Muslim nation flourished.

Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia:

Central Asia's Muslim neighbors have always had competing foreign policy aims or aims set by Islamic radicals at home that have kept them from taking constructive action in the region. The weakening of borders and administrative capacity combined with the mobilization of transnational networks and the organization of transnational armed groups creates ideal conditions for the growth of a contraband war economy based on looting, smuggling, or trafficking in drugs, arms, or even human beings. These economic activities create interests in perpetuating the networking of weak states and conflicts that create opportunities for profit.

Saudi Arabia is active in the Central Asian republic since February 1992, when prince saud-al-faisal visited Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in order to make a preliminary assessment of the religious, political and economic situation in those republics. Saudi Arabia's religious services have so far been limited to the promotion of the Arabic language, pilgrimage renovation of historic mosques in the region. Saudi Arabia has also dispatched teachers to the region to enhance the understanding of the tenets of Islam and Quran, and a million copies of the holy Quran have been sent for distribution in the Central Asian state (The Economist 1998: 28). However, in comparison to the Soviet period, the gathering at mosques on religious prayers, the proportion today appears to be larger and for wide spread.

Saudi Arabia has neglected state-to-state relations with Central Asia, instead allowing Saudi Islamic charities and groups that promote Wahhabism to pursue a policy of funding Islamic groups, mosques, and madrassas, and sponsoring people coming to Mecca for the annual hajj (pilgrimage). Saudi Islamic charities have provided Central Asia with missionaries, scholarships, and Islamic literature, including millions of copies of the Koran translated into native languages. The Saudis provided funds to the IRP during the

civil war in Tajikistan to keep them from joining with Iran, and the Saudi regime has not attempted to stop the lavish funding of the IMU from the Saudi-Uzbek Diaspora in Mecca and Medina.

Saudi Arabia is using its huge resources and religious influence in Central Asian. It has heavily invested in renovating and building of new mosques, distributing copies of Quran, constructing dormitories for Muslim visitors to Samarkand, Center for Islamic studies in Tashkent, and religious teachers in Dushanbe, and buying of word processors in Arabic in Tajikistan. The Islamic bank has promised to give financial aid to Tajik religious students. There is report that there were only 18 mosques in the entire Tajikistan in 1989, but, some 200 new ones have been constructed since (Badan Phool 2001:178). The main aim of these countries is to establish their brand of socio-economic, political, cultural and religious modal in the region. The Islamic fundamentalism is a serious threat to the region, which can be curbed by the internal force of the Central Asian societies.

Saudi foreign policy tends to be run based on personal relationships and the patronage of domestic groups like the Ulema, making it almost impossible to frame a coherent national-security policy. Multilateral Islamic organizations have also failed to play a more positive role in Central Asia. The most important Islamic multilateral organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which has the support of fifty-three Muslim countries, has done little to try to ease tensions in Central Asia or mediate between the Uzbek government and the IMU, just as it has failed to mediate between the warring parties in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan and Pakistan:

It has Pakistan's distinct misfortune to have needed foreign allies far more than they have, ever needed Pakistan. The long –standing rivalry with India, largely, explain Pakistan's eagerness to develop relations with Central Asia (Hyman A. 1994:86-87).

Tajikistan developed security cooperation with other regional powers above all on the soft security issues of terrorism, separatism, religious extremism and crime. Iran,

Pakistan, India have no direct borders with Tajikistan, even so they all share a common history as part of them once belonged to one and the same empire. To Pakistan, stability in Tajikistan and along its borders is relevant both with regard to Pakistan's interests. In Afghanistan and also of course for the possible implication for the conflict in Kashmir during 2004 specific aspects of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the drug trade were worked out between Tajikistan, India, Pakistan. In early 2005 an agreement was signed between Tajikistan and Pakistan which included in particular joint investigation, warning, and the exchange of information between the security agencies of two countries (Asia plus 2005).

Iran like Pakistan had interest in developing the hydro-energy sector of Tajikistan. Both Iran and Pakistan were member of the organization for economic cooperation of several Muslim countries, created in 1997 (Tajikistan joined it 1992). Musharraf's myopic foreign policy since he seized power in a military coup in 1999 did much to further alienate Pakistan's northern neighbors. Even more than the battlefields of Afghanistan, the madarssah education and the culture of jihad would inspire the ideologically committed Islamic radicals for future fighting in Central Asia. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Zia ul Haq's references to the need for strategic depth in Central Asia as well as Afghanistan took on a greater significance. For a time it appeared to some Pakistanis that the Islamic revival in Central Asia and the civil war in Tajikistan would blow away the present generation of the Soviet trained Central Asian leaders. The distance from Dushanbe to Karachi by road is only 1,700 miles compared to 2,125 miles to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, 2,625 miles to Rostov-on-don in western Russia, and 5,940 miles to Vladivostok in eastern Russia.

Ironically, it was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the most liberal, secular leader in Pakistan's recent history, who delivered the coup de grace to a new relationship with Central Asia. The weakening of state authority, not just in Pakistan but also across the entire region, would enable their business interests and Islamic agendas to flourish.

Tajikistan and India:

Alexander (329 BC) further developed Bactria as a central meeting place of routes connecting China, India, and the Western World. India could be reached either by a northern circuit through Bactria or by a longer southern route. The cultural patterns of the region came to be deeply influenced by the New Greek colonists. American scholar H. Sidky concludes 'Alexander's invasion of Central Asia radically transformed the socio-political and economic picture of the region (Sidky 2000: 82). The road from India went through the Khyber Pass into the Kabul valley. From there access to Bactria was possible via the Bamiyan or Panjshir valleys.

Bactria and Sogdiana were conquered by nomads from the north east, whose forces continued southwards and had created the Kushan Empire. They extended their rule to India by taking Punjab, Kashmir, Sind, and Utter Pradesh. The Kushan Empire (1st 4th AD) came to include not only northern India but also almost. The present day Afghanistan's large part of Central Asia and East Turkistan. The most famous of the Kushan king was Kanishka who converted to Buddhism. Over Sogdiana the empire maintained only a form of suzerainty (Gibb H.A.R. 1923:2).

In the Kushan Empire, three important civilizations the Chinese, Iranian and Indian met. Sogdiana developed into great commercial center for Chinese trade with the west. Extensive finds of Roman coins and products bear witness to the economic exchange that took place between East and West along the Silk Road.

Land locked and Mountainous Tajikistan is geopolitically important for India as well as international actors. Tajikistan is a Central Asian state which came under the 'heart-land theory' of Macynnder and Spykman who point out that "Geography determines the politics" and India which is located at the cross road of Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and Far East as well as India and Central Asian Countries. Tajikistan and India are historically and socio-culturally very close to each other. Both have heterogeneous and

secular society. Tajikistan is geo-strategy location and rich mineral and natural resources. On the other hand, India is emerging global economic and political player. India focused on three mutual interests- Economic co-operation, terrorism and challenges of political stability, issues of regional security and strategic order. Tajikistan is important to India because of its geo-strategic location and India is important for Tajikistan because of its emerging as a power in economic and international political image and as required power. Tajikistan and India have number of commonalities that make closer relationship likely. As far as the relationship between India and Tajikistan is concerned, it is based not only on old historical ties, but also on a similarity of worldviews, common threat perceptions, a high degree of mutual confidence and the aspiration to build modern secular, pluralist and democratic polity. The Central Asian states, including Tajikistan, perceive no threat form India. Therefore, India should further enhance her defense cooperation with Tajikistan. At the same time, Tajikistan wants India to play an important role in its economic life, especially, in the energy sector; India needs to evolve a coherent strategy in this regard (Sanjay Kumar Pandey, 2007: 64).

Tajikistan is 'one' who passed out civil war 1992-1997. The common concern about the threat of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism found reflection in the declaration further development of friendly relationship between the Republic of India and Republic of Tajikistan signed during the state visit to India of Tajik President E.S. Rahmonov from 11 to 16 December 1995. The declaration, in part, reads: "Both sides agree that long term and stable relations of friendships and mutually beneficial co-operation between the two countries meet the fundamental interests of the two countries and the two peoples... they are convinced that the it is necessary for multi-ethnic pluralist states to co-operate actively to preserve state structure from the threat of terrorism, extremism and separatism" (M.M. Puri 1997).

The joint declaration signed by former Prime Minister Vajpayee and Tajik President Rakhmonov during the former's visit to Tajikistan in November 2003 made a pointed reference to "steady progress in defence exchanges and the intent to intensify relations in this area". There have been reports that India is helping build an airbase in Tajikistan at

Ayne that first Indian air base in other country. Indian air force engineers are repairing and upgrading the runway. Tajik President said that Indian military transport aircraft had participated in military exercises in Tajikistan and Rakhmonov declared "I would like to state for the record that we will continue military co-operation between the two countries in all areas. The sides were pleased to note the steady progress in defence exchanges and the intent to further intensify the relation in this area in future (Sanjay Kumar Pandey, 2007: 52).

President Rahmonov's third visit to India from 6-10 August 2006 has taken the relationship a step further. The Joint Declaration of Further Development of Relations, Friendship and Cooperation between two countries were signed. The declaration emphasized that the two countries would work for closer cooperation in the field of technology, particularly in information and communication technology, agricultural and exploration and development of mineral resources. The parties welcomed the signing of programme of cooperation between the academy of sciences of Tajikistan and the department of science and technology of Government of India for period 2006-08 (<http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2006/08/07jd.01.htm>).

In 2003, during the visit of Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee called for increasing bilateral trade between two countries. The vast hydro-electric potential of Tajikistan was identified as a major area of cooperation. To encourage joint ventures and investment India announced of financial package of \$40 million, which included a credit line of \$25 million to use for industrial and infrastructure projects. (Sangtuda I & II and Rogun) at Bakash and Pijanji rivers. The Indian offer to assist Tajikistan in rehabilitating Vorzob I is a good step in expanding and strengthening cooperation in energy sector. There is thus huge potential for the co-operation in this sector (Gulshan Sachdeva 2007: 114). However, in bringing Tajik hydroelectricity to Indian route needs laying down hi-tension transmission line. If Tajikistan, Pakistan and India could agree to build a common electricity grid, this could be a win-win situation for expanding regional economic co-operation. In such a case, the issue of laying down transmission lines could be addressed and it could reach India via Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Tajik President Emonali Sharifovich Rahmenov visited New Delhi during August 6-10, 2006 on a state visit at the invitation of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The visit was preceded by the meeting of the bilateral inter Government Commission July 31-August 1, 2006 and India-Tajikistan Joint Working Group JWG meeting on counter terrorism (August 3-4, 2006) both held in New Delhi. The two countries share common values such as secularism, tolerance and strong opposition to the forces of fundamentalism and terrorism. Tajikistan and India are faced with wide range of international terrorism, extremism, and narcotic trafficking. These are serious problems, which cannot leave unconcerned. Tajikistan also cooperating with international solidarity with regard to the struggle against terrorism and extremism like that of India (Nasriddinov 2007: 145).

Tajikistan relation, opens up new prospect for deepening mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries and widens the basis for mutually beneficial partnership, nothing that the both realize the necessity for pooling their joint efforts for the welfare and interests of their people and for peace and stability in the region and the world, Desirous to widen multifaceted contact between the two countries and their people, affirming their commitment to the principle of tolerance, harmony and diversity in society and importance of dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes.

Given their responsibility for promoting peace, stability and security in the region and the world, recognizing the close inter-linkage between stability and security of the Central Asian region and the Indian sub-continent and the need for maintaining a secure and peaceful environment for development of the countries in the region, desirous of further strengthening people to people ties, Indo-Tajik relation must need to be strengthened with the passage of time.

In the final analysis, Indo-Tajik cooperation would be an important part of the international coalition against religious extremism and international terrorism. The real threats to Central and South Asian Security and stability come from such forces.

Dushanbe has supported the Indian point of view on various regional and global issues, extends full support to India's permanent membership at the UN Security Council and for the resolution of Jammu and Kashmir issue through bilateral talk between Delhi and Islamabad. Energy, information technology deepening of bilateral cooperation in area of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be important areas in Indo-Tajik economic cooperation with high potential for success.

Tajikistan is a member of all the important security and economic groupings (CSTO, SCO, ECC and other as well) and active in the Central Asian region. Tajikistan, thus, occupies an important place in the ongoing "great game" in the region. It is against this backdrop that enhanced relations between India and Tajikistan together have been playing a positive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which has been the breeding ground for international terrorists and religious extremist forces ably supported by their in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Tajikistan and European Union:

The preceding discussion can have one of two purposes. First, it can simply inform the EU presidency on some of the realities of domestic politics across the region. By identifying some of the potential pitfalls of domestic politics it can help European statesmen to avoid them. At the same time, because it treats these realities as normal aspects of the development of new states and their evolution towards more democratic systems, it can put some of the current problems in a broader and more positive perspective. Second, it can provide the context for more active EU programs and activities designed to foster the gradual evolution of these polities in directions compatible with European practice. If the arguments presented herein are correct, they suggest that progress towards democratization can be achieved by 1) fostering party-to-party contacts between legal political parties from Central Asian countries and counterparts in Europe 2) promoting direct parliament-to-parliament contacts between Central Asia and European countries, and 3) concentrating on election practices, especially parliamentary elections.

The great potential of such activity is gradually to loosen the grip on the region's political life now exercised by clans, regional elites, and economic (Frederick S. Starr 2006:26)

With the exception of Kazakhstan, all the national leaders are beset by a sense of their own weakness and of their government's lack of resources. Only if the EU shows itself willing to engage with these issues can it expect cooperation from the Central Asian side on political reform. This means taking measures that will help address the real security concerns of these new states and it means investing in their economies and infrastructures to promote economic growth. It is entirely possible for the EU to advance the cause of political evolution in Central Asia, but only if it is prepared also to take an active role in the region's security and economic development (Starr 2006:26).

Tajikistan used the interest of the European Union (EU) in contributing to strengthening the capacity of the Tajik border troops to bring about the agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian border troops from the Tajik-Afghan border. Tajikistan's security cooperation with the EU grew substantially during these years. Although it remained limited to capacity building for border protection and combating drug trafficking, this cooperation was of crucial importance both for creating normal external conditions for Tajikistan and as a political factor supporting a more independent Tajik foreign policy.

Instead of working to create a strategic vision, Western policy makers have largely concentrated on two elements that they hoped would shore up stability in the region, to the exclusion of other important factors: the building up of Central Asia's armies to help them fight insurgency and the exploitation of energy resources in clouding the creation of new pipelines to provide economic incentives for the regimes to improve social conditions at home.

Chapter-4

Challenges to Tajikistan's Foreign Policy

Tajik foreign policy has various challenges and problems, these are - religious radicalism, border issue, water distribution problem, smuggling, human trafficking, migration, minority problems, competition and presence of great powers in the region, etc. These problems create a hurdle to strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations of Tajikistan. The first proper official visit of NATO Parliamentary Assembly led by Vitalino Canas, Vice-Chairman of the Committee visited Dushanbe, Tajikistan on 20-22 April 2009. Discussions focused on the impact of the situation in Afghanistan on Tajikistan, and Tajikistan's potential contribution to stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Tajikistan's "open door" foreign policy, and, in particular, its relations with Russia, China, Iran, and NATO; the challenges posed by drug trafficking, religious extremism and terrorism to stability in Tajikistan and the Central Asian region; and water and energy issues in Central Asia (Marc Angel: 2009).

Religious Extremism and International Terrorism:

The history of Islam is a story of change and adaptation. Since the seventh century, followers of The Prophet Muhammad have fanned out to spread his message throughout the known world. Muslim nomadic tribes-often originates in Central Asia-carried the word across the steppes and mountains of the vast Eurasian landmass, some peacefully as they drove their caravans of goods along the ancient Silk Route, others by conquest. In Western thought, heavily influenced by the medieval Christian Crusaders with their own ideas about "holy war"- jihad has always been portrayed as an Islamic war against unbelievers. Before September 11, 2001, this new phase in the long history of Islamic fundamentalism had gone largely unnoticed in the Western world. But to define these attacks solely as acts of terrorism misses the point of the new political phenomenon at work amongst small groups of extremists around the Muslim world (Ahmed Rashid

2002: 1).

Besides, the combination of strong ethnic loyalties and tribal life-style in the past also becomes influencing factor in the Islamic orientation of the region. It is a fact that Islam had been redefined in Central Asian republics to suit the ethnic and tribal peculiarities of the regions. After the disintegration of the former USSR, Islam and Islamic practices were revived in the region. The observance of various Islamic practices and rituals in Central Asia such as daily five-time prayers (*namaz*), fasting during month of *Ramadan*. Observation of the main family rituals such as circumcision, religious, marriage and burial, which were done secretly during the Soviet period, have been legalized (Alexander Benningsen 1989: 89-91).

The most important Impact of Gorbachev's reform policy on Central Asia is the "Islamic Revivalism". The floodgates of Islamic Revival were opened in 1987. It was socio-cultural and religious Phenomenon, as people of the region wanted to demonstrate their culture. Due to religious freedom, a number of Mosques from 160-5000 were opened in 1990-91. Growing political opposition from nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist supported the economic reform in Central Asia (Badan Phool 2001: 70-71).

The revival of Islamic customs and traditions has been greatly influenced by the Afghan *Jihad* and the religious broadcast from Iran. The countries USA, Russia China and India believe that the strengthening of the Islamic factor in the Central Asian republics can bring about a change in the political and economic condition of the region, and consequently, create stability in the region. Religious extremism is not only danger for Central Asia, Russia and Europe, where the growing harvest of afghan heroine is causing social problems. It is also a potential impact on internal stability (ICG Report Asia 2004).

There are three main directions in which Islam in Central Asia might develop:

1. Islam could become a political force
 - a. The creation of Islamic states

- b. The use of Islam as a legitimizing force by the ruling secular elites
2. Islam can become an ethnic identity, based on respect for the historical legacy.
3. Islam could become a religious identity, the focus of a process of spiritual renewal (a forward-looking rediscovery of faith as a vital component of human existence (Akiner Shirin 1997: 46).

The Islamic revivalism in Central Asian republic is not uniform. It varies considerably from republic to republic. There are many ethnic groups such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks. They all have their own tribal legacies. So, the responses to Islamic revivalist movement are different from one group to another. Above all the West should make every effort to not present Muslims with a perceived choice between repressive secular government supported by the West and repressive anti-Western government run by Islamists in other words, between Iran and Uzbekistan or between Taliban and Turkmenistan (Walker Edward W. 2003: 21).

Islamism is the most potent ideology of resistance in the world today. It is and will remain a central security concern for Western and non-Islamist governments in the majority Muslims regions, including the five Soviet successor states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). In Central Asia today: as in much of the Muslim world, nationalism, socialism and liberalism have exhausted their capacity to mobilize militant opposition to existing regimes.

Tashkent went so far as to drop bombs on Tajik and Kyrgyz territory, main part of its border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and dispatch troops into Kyrgyz and Tajik territory to seize alleged "Wahhabis" without the Kyrgyz and Tajik government permission. Supported by Russia and China, government in the region began to cooperate more closely to combat Islamic terrorism principally through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Walker Edward W. 2003: 28).

Tajik President's Rahmon and many speakers mentioned the impact of the civil war on

Tajikistan's society, and, how it influences, Tajikistan's policy towards extremist religious groups. Given this experience from the civil war, the threat that extremist religious groups would attempt to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan is of great concern to Tajik authorities. However, Tajik officials also stressed the fact that Tajikistan is the only country in the region in which an Islamic party is allowed to operate and is even represented in the Parliament (Angel: 2009).

The most direct political role played by an Islamic party in post-Soviet Central Asia is in Tajikistan. The Tajik people have a long history of adherence of canonical Islam and its institutional, as well as well-established informational Islamic network such as the Sufi tariqats. These tradition and network survived Sovietisation and by the end of the Soviet period underground Islamism had greater presence in the republic than in any other region of the USSR. In the 1980s Tajikistan's underground Islamists were inspired by the *mujahedeen* resistance to Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and above all by the legendary "Lion of the Panshir" Ahmad Shah Masoud, who was the ethnic Tajik (Walker Edward W. 2003: 34).

Tajikistan experienced a rapid and widespread Islamic revival during *perestroika*, and by early 1990 Islamist organisations emerged from underground. In October 1990, the founding congress of the IRP was held in Dushanbe. Initially banned, the party was legalised shortly after independence in late 1991. A moderate Islamist party, the IRP called for the establishment of a democratic and secular state that would respect freedom of religion. Islamisation of society would take place gradually, through the raising of Islamic consciousness among the Tajikistan's Muslims. Only then would a transition to an Islamic republic and adoption of the *shari'a* take place.

By early 1992, the political situation in Tajikistan became highly volatile. The candidate of Soviet era *nomenklatura*, Rakhmon Nabiyev, won the presidential election of 1991, but a coalition of democratic, nationalist and Islamist parties charged that the election had been rigged. The IRP and its allies, who at one point seized control of the

capital, were driven back to their strongholds in the mountains north and east of the capital, and in some cases found safe haven in Afghanistan.

At inception, the civil war, thus, had an ideological hue to it- a neo-communist *nomenklatura* pitted against moderate Islamist, democrat and nationalists. Ideology was only part of the story, however, and as time passed it represented an increasingly less important part. The more important cleavage, however, was regional with an alliance of Tajiks from Garm province and *pamiris* from the remote highland of Gorno-Badashkn. As the conflict progressed even these complex, opaque line of cleavage become increasingly blurred, and the country degenerated into semi-anarchy warlordism and crime fueled by smuggling, hostage taking, narcotics trafficking, and production. The mounting chaos in Afghanistan that followed the collapse of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul in 1992 also contributed to the intensity and duration of the Tajik civil war (Walker Edward W. 2003: 34).

Today, more Tajik than any other Central Asian nationality identify themselves as Muslim believers. Nevertheless, war wearing together with appalling economic condition, have created a majority hostile to program of radical social transformation, including Islamist one. The limited support for Islamism is suggested by the fact that the IRP own only 7.5 percent of the vote in parliamentary election in 2000, well behind Rakhmonov's party (which won handaly in reasonably fair election) and also behind the Communist party. The IRP itself is increasingly fractious and politically compromised by its participation in government. The more radical (but as of yet nonviolent) Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) party has supplanted the IRP as the most popular Islamist party in the country particularly in the north and among Uzbeks (Walker Edward W. 2003: 36).

The principal challenge in Tajikistan today is the difficulty the central government is experiencing in exercising its writ over large part of Tajik territory. There have been periodic bombings assassination, kidnapping and clashes between militia groups and governments forces. Its political economy is dominated by the narcotic business and

warlordism, which in many respects are breaking down traditional solidarities of clan, village and region. Rakhmonov is under pressure from Uzbekistan to crack down on Islamists, particularly in North. In July 2002 he traveled to Sogd and Castigated local officials for failing to curb Islamist agitation. He also moved to isolate the IRP politically. In addition Tajikistan's political stability is tied in part to the political fate of Afghanistan. If socioeconomic conditions in Afghanistan do not improve and the international community allow it to sink back into anarchy, effort to restore order in Tajikistan will prove even more difficult.

The deep roots of instability in Central Asia can be found in the regions dire socioeconomic condition. Population pressures, land scarcity, depletion of water resources, environmental degradation and widespread corruption, drug smuggling and addiction, growing inequalities, extremely high unemployment and above all poverty and insecurity give Central Asians many sources for grievances. While Islamist recruit from all segments of society rural and urban, poor and middle class, young and old, men and women – militants are typically young unemployed who feel that their life opportunities are meager (International Crisis Group Asia Report 2001: 18).

Lena Jonson writes three possible direction of protest will be dealt with secular Political, religious-secular, and ethnic-national. To this picture of protest should be added the discontent and frustration at the top of society, among circles around the president. The reasons for their protest, frustration and demands may be related to on going struggle for personal power at the top, but the behaviors of these people and the response by the regime may add to the dynamics of protest in society. Tajik leadership intention to develop reform programme is a precondition for attracting donors and investors and receiving international aid, assistance and credits (Jonson 2006:00).

On 11 September, 2001 Vladimir Putin stated that:

“Today the United States was confronted with an unprecedented act of aggression on the part of international terrorism. What happened today underscores once more the urgency of Russia's proposal that the international community join forces to combat terrorism, the plague of the twenty-first century. Russia knows

first hand what terrorism is? And for that reason we understand the feelings of the American people more than anyone. You have our support” (The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press 2001: 4).

13 September 2001: Moscow agreed to work with NATO in seeking to “unite the entire international community in the struggle against terrorism”. Russia had officially pledged co-operation in fighting what President Vladimir Putin called a “common enemy” (Jeffreys Ian 2003: 260).

Border issues:

Inter-state cooperation above all implies joint efforts at the boundaries of the cooperating state. As Andrea Chandler put it, 'borders are the point at which the state's authority ceases; hence, they become a place where the state's power is vulnerable. Border controls arise from the states attempts address vulnerability. It is significant that none of the Central Asian states ever historically existed within their present borders prior to the Soviet era. The particular delineations of the borders are fairly artificial; they were the creation of the Soviet Marxist theory of economic and political development for under developed region this is not to say, however, that there is no basis in historical fact for the claim of nations of Central Asia to national self-determination and statehood (Gleason Gregory 2001:1090). Today, several borders, particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been established not by legal demarcation but by popular usages. However, popular usages have not legitimized many of these borders.

Tajikistan officials similarly objected to Uzbekistan unilateral border survey. In June 2000 the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan governments signed a memorandum to set up a joint intergovernmental commission on the delimitation of their state border. The delimitation was to be based on the existing administrative territorial border. The goal was to establish a framework for cooperation between border guards on the issue of customs, migration and other form of control (Gleason Gregory 2001: 1090).

In September 2000, despite protests from Tajikistan, the Uzbek government began

mining some portions of the common border with Tajikistan as counterinsurgency measures. Kyrgyzstan borders the border of particularly problematic in the Fargana valley lies within the territory of Uzbekistan but it on the north and east and south, by Tajikistan. While the Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan border is 990 km long. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan borders in the Farghana Valley zig-zag back and forth across the valley's main roadways. The valley main east-west road and rail transit routes pass through northern Tajikistan out to Uzbekistan. As a result, all traffic and freight repeatedly crosses several international borders. Monitoring of these and other Central-Asian borders is doubly complicated in an age of globalisation when people, capital, goods, services and ideas can move more swiftly across frontiers than ever before. Interdicting borders can address some short-term security concerns, but only at the cost of many of the benefits of globalization (Gleason Gregory 2001: 1077-1095).

A key obstacle to tackling the problem of drugs crossing the Tajik border from Afghanistan is the Tajik government's absolute intransigence about any form of international cooperation with Afghanistan. Despite repeated efforts by the broader international community to break a Tajik-Afghan cross-border strategy, it is invariably the Tajiks who refuse to participate in such schemes - never the Afghans. Until official cooperation between the two nations is endorsed throughout the Tajik government, the only cross-border synergies will remain of a corrupt and criminal nature.

The Central Asia borders do not represent 'natural' jurisdictions if one bears in mind that the area's natural resources are inherently international. The region's two main river systems, the Syr-Darya and the Amu -Darya, each pass through international borders in the year way to Aral Sea.

The interests exist between upstream and downstream users in the preferences for any 'irrigation regime' as opposed to 'energy regime'. Downstream user prefer to store water in the hydroelectric reservoirs to save it irrigation use during the dry summer months while upstream user prefer to generate hydroelectric power during dry summer months. Central Asia arid region and many of the countries rely heavily on agriculture as a source

of foreign exchange and generator of employment; water; energy and agriculture therefore link the interests of all other countries of region. As Rajan Menon (1997) noted, 'because no one Central Asian state has power to ward off Russian domination, the only alternative is multilateral or bilateral alliances (Menon Rajan 1997:175).

In 1993 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan commenced a diplomatic dialogue concerning their common borders. On 26 April 1996, the president of the five border countries met in Shanghai to sign a package of 14 agreements on border issues. The Shanghai Accord, as it soon came to know, constituted a breakthrough in establishing a framework for border normalization in the region (Gregory Gleason 2001:107-131). At the meeting in June 2000, the government leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had acknowledged that the commitment to, the mechanism for and the result of inter-state cooperation had been insufficient to key problem.

The physical threats to Tajikistan have come from its neighbours- first and foremost Afghanistan but also Uzbekistan. From the early 1990's Afghanistan was the more serious threat as failed state; turmoil radical Islamism, weapons, drugs, and rebel, fighters spread out from Afghan territory. By military intervention and support to Tajik rebel commanders, Uzbekistan also constituted a direct threat to Tajikistan's national security. A strong power with large population and Central Asian's largest Army, Uzbekistan continued to take unilateral measure against Tajikistan in order to ensure its own national security, there by meddling in Tajik Affairs. Using Tajikistan's energy dependence for political pressure, closing the Uzbek-Tajik border, and restricting Tajikistan's contact with the outside world. K.J. Holsti is of the opinion that "small" states gained trading privileges and all sorts of diplomatic concessions from those nations with great economic wealth and military power. (Holsti 1982: 171).

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brought together international, regional, and local public and private representatives in Bishkek to "explore the forms and methods of partnerships, the role of the banking sector and NGOs in the

struggle against terrorism, the role of religious organizations, educational awareness raising, and the role of media in combating extremism.” (Forst Patrick 2009) The conference was hosted by the Western-based OSCE, but involved the UN, CIS, CSTO, and the SCO. I wonder how the latter’s representatives felt about this comment from OSCE ambassador. According to Andrew Tesoriere; “Human rights and rule of law are central to counter-terrorism strategy. To undermine them is to play into hands of the terrorists. A successful counter-terrorist strategy supports dialogue, diversity and tolerance within society. It does not block them.” (Forst Patrick 2009)

Water Distribution Problem:

Another major regional challenge relates to the management of water and energy resources. Tajikistan has vast water resources, yet these are still largely untapped. Tajik Minister for Energy and Industry Sherali Gulov presented his country’s plans to address the current severe seasonal water shortages. A key project is the completion of the construction of the Rogun dam, a project that is, however, strongly opposed by neighboring Uzbekistan, citing concerns regarding the potential impact of this project on its own water supplies. Several Tajik officials stressed how tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were a major impediment to a regional solution on this issue, although, in their view, the development of such new energy projects would boost economic growth in the region, and thereby benefit all countries (Marc Angel:2009).

The UNESCO ‘vision’ 2025 presented in The Hague 2000 is an optimistic proposal for water management in Central Asia. According to the plan 20 Cubic kilometer has been allocated for Aral Sea so that the fast-shrinking Aral Sea can be stabilized at its current size. The Aral Sea is a landlocked lake in Central Asia. The lake is today divided into two separate bodies of water. The decline of The Aral Sea has considerable impact on ecological, social and economical structures and systems that were traditionally established in the deltas of lake. The diminished size and increased salinity of the lake has caused a decline in the biodiversity in flora and fauna. Its is hoped that the use of

more efficient technology in agricultural production will bring a saving of the water and that implementation of technical changes will lead to a decline of water use (Everett-Heath Tom 2003: 247).

Before independence, environmental discourse in Central Asia pointed to the malfunction of the cotton sector. National leaders and international organizations focused on simple negotiations sets, however, such as water and energy and avoided more complicated negotiation like water energy and agriculture would have issue of environmental protection. (Everett-Heath Tom 2003: 247).

Klotzli indicate that conflicts might be sparked not only by disputes over the volume of water used by the upstream and downstream states, but also by the quality of water available to the downstream state and by issues of sovereignty over water reservoir. After independence the control and use of hydro-technical assets became the politicised. Confrontation over sovereignty rights also been reported between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Karakumuskiy reservoir) (S. Klotzli 1996). Ethnic minorities living in the contested regions fuel such disputes over water. It is astonishing that an agreement over water resources was reached in this early stage of nation building. Nationalistic policies and strategies to secure sovereignty over territorial resources are very common among new nation states, as can be seen in the drive for food self-sufficiency in all the new Central Asian countries.

The major environmental issues in Tajikistan are concentration of agricultural chemicals and salts in the soil. There need to be cross-border institutions that “promote economic development and inter ethnic cooperation and monitor potential conflict The lack of an integrated approach to economic development amongst the Central Asian republics is also increasing the danger of a water war in the near future. During the Soviet era huge reservoirs and a complex irrigation system were built to carry melting snow-water from the mountain ranges of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to irrigate the vast cotton plantations of Central Asia. These irrigation systems were fully integrated from the Chinese border to

the Ural Mountains, but the creation of new states and border controls has disrupted the flow of water. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have used water as a weapon to forestall punitive actions by their neighbors, for example, when Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies to Bishkek and the Kyrgyz threatened to cut off water supplies to Uzbekistan's irrigation canals.

Economic Challenges:

In December 2002 president Rakhmonov termed his foreign policy as an 'open door' policy. This defined a policy that was open to cooperation and exchange with all possible states in an effect, above all to develop Tajikistan economically. The policy emanated from disillusionment with Russia's will to engage in Tajikistan economically, even though both countries are members of the Eurasian Economic Community and have signed numerous declaration and decisions on economic co-operation and integration. The development of Tajikistan's foreign policy during the first years after 11 September event, have been described as a formative period of Tajik foreign policy.

According to estimates of International monetary fund, the Percentage of population living below the poverty line was as high as 83% in 1999, but also was down to 68% in 2003. Yet since the civil war its economic development has been positive and Tajikistan now shows several positive indicators of Macro economics growth. The annual real growth rate since 2000 has averaged 9.7 percent, but the economy is still only about 50% of its size of 1989. Growth (2007): 7.8%, unemployment (official, 2007): 2.1% (Country Report, 2005). Cotton dominates agriculture, but it would be useless to change without technology and market.

This economic growth is not, however, reflected in improvements of the standard of living of the individual citizen. There are numbers of problems in society which effect daily life. Discontent and economic frustration are spreading among the population, as people perceive the spread of economic corruption and the widening gap between rich and poor, as well as between regions. The system for obtaining permits to start a business

is overly complicated and riddled with corruption (ICG Asia Report, 2003 No. 51: 14).

Transparency International's global Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 ranks Tajikistan 150 out of 180 nations, with No. 1 being perceived as least corrupt. Meanwhile, the World Bank ranks it 153 out of 178 in its global "Ease of Doing Business" survey, and 176 in protecting investors, making the country a tough sell to potential investors.

"The IMF case is only one example of the country's financial policy on the decline," said Tohiri Abdujabbor, an economist at the Tajikistan International University. "But the very sad thing is that the story with the IMF has finally dissuaded potential investors from investing their money in Tajikistan." (Vadim 2008).

Indeed, U.S.-based investors pulled out of a transmission project in Tajikistan earlier this year. Other investors are also getting cold feet. Chinese entrepreneurs withdrew from a hydropower project on the Zarafshon river and the UK-based Commonwealth & British Mineral Ltd. sold its controlling interest in JV Zeravshan LLC, a Tajik gold mining and exploration company.

In April, visiting French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner told journalists that investors:

"need to trust in the government structures. If there is no such trust, then the flow of investment will be small. We are ready to assist Tajikistan in resolving these issues." He added, "As a friend of Tajikistan I can say that unless structural changes are undertaken, we will not be able to attract investment into the country's economy. I cannot make French businessmen invest their money in Tajikistan against their will. Therefore, help us so that we can help you." (Vadim 2008).

Table: Indicators of Tajikistan's Economy

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
<i>GDP Growth</i>	10.2	9.5	10.1	10.6	6.7	8.0	6.0
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	2.3	2.2	2.2				
<i>Inflation</i>	38.6	10.2	17.1	7.1	7.1	7.0	7.0
<i>Current Account balance</i>	-6.7	-2.7	-1.3	-4.0	-3.7	-4.5	-4.5
<i>Exchange rate to Dollar</i>	2.4	2.8	3.1	2.9	3.1		

Tajikistan is now a failed state and weak economy providing poverty to the citizens of the country. Russia should help and other European countries should help them to revive their economy. European Union can give some bailout package to Tajikistan quickly. Because CIS countries are rich with oil and gas resources, European, and US should come forward and give economic aid to Tajikistan quickly. NGOs, particularly Management Sciences for Health, efforts to curb the spread of infectious diseases within Afghanistan and across its borders into Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The piece discusses the work of NGO's to help coordinate the aforementioned government's ability to stop such contagious diseases, such as HIV, tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, polio, and the avian influenza.

Political Challenges:

The Tajik authorities have also continued to restrict freedom of speech. The civil war, in which many journalists were killed, has had a devastating impact on the country's media. In recent years, many independent newspapers have been forced out of circulation. A positive development has been the launch of three independent TV stations in the cities of Isfara, Panjakent, and Istaravshan. Nonetheless, harassment of independent media, the detention of journalists, and self-censorship, remain widespread features of Tajikistan's

media landscape. Moreover, the new laws in 2007 on NGOs and freedom of association, both of which make existing provisions harsher, have been severely criticised by the competent international bodies.

A most crucial factor obviously remains the regime's capacity to fight corruption successfully by reforming-or be overturned. Sad to say, there is nothing to indicate that a serious anticorruption campaign, including reforms of governance, will take place soon in Tajikistan. The place for this discussion of Tajik foreign policy, it seems that any government that comes to power in Tajikistan will try to use the new opportunities for regional cooperation. In spite of all the difficulties, the country is now developing stakes and interests in a peaceful Tajikistan's realizing its dreams and hopes for an economically sounder future. The analysis of the region thus concludes that Tajikistan will continue to do its best to open up for further cooperation towards co-ordination towards Russia will remain, although it is inevitable that this direction will no longer be a priority for Tajikistan.

The decisive question is how the population responds to the problems politically organized protest can be expected to be difficult to develop for some time to come, not only because democratic rights in the country are very restricted but also because a large number of men at their most productive age are working in Russia as migrant labourers. In a traditional society women will hardly be the first to take the streets. The nature of protest and level of support is not only affected the making of domestic policy but also foreign policy.

A most crucial factor obviously remains the regime's capacity to face corruption successfully by reforming-or be overturned. There is no serious anti corruption campaign, including reforms of governance. The place for this discussion of Tajik foreign policy, it seems that any government that comes to power in Tajikistan will try to use the new opportunities for regional cooperation. The lack of competent state officials would be a major problem in a small country with limited intelligential, even without corruption. The problems, are particularly bad in judiciary. People who lacked the necessary

qualification, however, were given licences after having paid bribes (ICG Report Asia 2001:14).

Regionalism is the major problem of Tajikistan's problem. the civil war erupted largely due to failure to include elites from regions other than northern Sogd province in government, but, it brought elites from to Southern Kulyab district to power (ICG Report Asia 2001: 30).

Illegal Trade, Arms Smuggling, Drug and Human Trafficking:

According to the 2000 UN Convention against Trans-national Organized Crime, the "smuggling of migrants" shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (Laczko Frank and Elzbieta Gozdzia 2005: 10).

By the end of the 1990s, a wider and more inclusive approach was developed, resulting in a broader definition of trafficking, which was included in the "United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime", adopted by the UN General Assembly in late 2000. It states that:

Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (Laczko Frank and Elzbieta Gozdzia 2005: 10).

Drug trafficking remains a major problem throughout Central Asia, and particularly in Tajikistan, which shares a 1,400 Km border with Afghanistan. Although Tajikistan ranks high in the amount of drugs seized on its territory, this only represents a small amount of Afghanistan's estimated production. Tajikistan's authorities were thankful for the many assistance initiatives they benefit from this area. President Rakhmonov stressed that

Tajikistan could play the role of a buffer zone against threats coming from Afghanistan, including drugs and terrorism, but for this it needed continuous international support in training and equipping its border guards.

The drug trade across Tajikistan from Afghanistan is a crucial factor determining the stage of the domestic scene in Tajikistan by providing a substantial source of revenues and influence. The drug trade feeds an overall corruption in society, and is often also a major factor behind toxic and turns in political life. It adds to tension and rivalry between groups, which compete for power and wealth (Cornell Svante E. 2005: 751-760).

On 25–26 August 1999: the presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet in Bishkek (the capital of Kyrgyzstan) under the banner of Shanghai Five. The five countries are called the 'Shanghai Five', named after the Chinese city where a treaty on easing border tension was signed in 1996. A declaration which were signed are the importance of fighting international terrorism, the illegal drugs trade, arms trafficking, illegal migration and other forms of trans-border crime, separatism and religious extremism. The signatories also consider that creating a multi-polar world is the common path for development and will ensure long-term stability. (Jeffreis Ian 2003:260).

The government of Tajikistan co-hosted with the EU the conference for participating Central Asian states and international delegations to present their priorities in regards to border patrol and the narcotics trade. The Conference concluded with the official delegations' agreement to a Partnership Declaration, which emphasized 'the importance of strengthening cross-border co-operation and developing and implementing national border management and national drug control strategies.' Rather broad, but we can hope some pragmatic progress was achieved as well.

Role of External and Regional Powers:

The small state of Tajikistan is equally important for the global players of both Russia

and the United States. It is important to Russia as its forward positions in the region, historically blocking hostile entry into Central Asia from the outside. Its significance to the US can be seen from the presence of American military in the Central Asian region (Eugene Rumer, et al., 2007: 88-89). The region may be changing less than a cursory glance would suggest. Russia's influence in the region was waning steadily well before the September 11 attack, while the influence of United States in the region was steadily on the rise (Martha Brill Olcott 2003: 3). One man's loss can be another man's gain, and it seemed might be the case with the Central Asian states in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Foreign Minister Zafiri told the delegation that "the security and the stability of Central Asia depend entirely on the situation in Afghanistan". Tajikistan has already developed joint initiatives with Afghanistan, including a small training initiative for officers of the Afghan army led by the Tajik Ministry of Defense with US assistance, and co-operation between the Tajik Drugs Control Agency and Afghan authorities on border management and counter-narcotics. Tajikistan also agreed to serve as a transit route for non-military cargo bound for Afghanistan. Mr. Zafiri and other government officials stressed Tajikistan's readiness to go even further in assisting with stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (Marc Angel: 2009).

Till summer 2005 it remained unclear whether the USA had come to stay or not. Much pointed in that direction, not least the global policy of US President George W. Bush. Yet in 2005 there were hardly any US investments, and trade between Tajikistan and the USA was almost nil. Rather the USA was providing extensive economic development assistance and presenting a high political profile on democracy and human rights issues. Security cooperation between Tajikistan and the USA, as well as the EU, was increasing, yet there were no signs that any of them would be prepared to replace Russia as a security guarantor of Tajikistan. The USA's policy in Central Asia is a dual one. Its relations with Central Asian governments have developed as relations of strategic partners in a common anti-terrorism endeavour, while at the same time the US administration has wanted to strengthen a process towards democracy in these countries.

Minority and Ethnic Problems:

The implication of multi-ethnic character of Tajikistan is most crucial factor in the geopolitical map of Central Asia. In this context, three important aspects circumstantiate the prevailing reality: language, religion and socio-cultural life style. Central Asia as a whole and Tajikistan in particular, is graciously endowed with the attributes of multi-lingual and multi-ethnic and multi-religious phenomena. The Tajiks are Asians, while the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians are European in origin. Religiously, the native Tajiks are believers of Islam, while Europeans are largely of Orthodox Christian stock. The Tajiks speak *farsi* language, while the Uzbeks, Turkmen and Kyrgyz, who live in Tajikistan, speak their respective languages, which are of Turkic origin. This division is the backdrop against which the complicated ethnic scenario in Tajikistan must be examined (Dash P. L. 1999; 149).

A crucial factor that compounds the Tajik ethno-cultural scenario is the sizable presence of Zoroastrians in Tajikistan the only state in the region with such a conglomerate of believers. The believers shrank back to the mountainous areas and continued to adore their religion, which thrived unnoticeable among this specific ethno-religious group. The sway of *glasnost* under Gorbachev provided them with the opportunities of freely coming up to practice Zoroastrianism.

However, the crux of the ethnic problem encompassed not only the small minorities, but big ethnic groups, who lived side by side with the Tajiks. Over this plain, surfaced the Uzbek-Tajik animosity. This almost stagnation in the growth rate of Uzbek population in Tajikistan speak of two things: i) there might have been mass migration of Uzbeks from Tajikistan due to various reasons, which is very likely; and ii) there have been mass assimilation of the Uzbeks with the Tajiks, which seems highly improbable. While such aspects as religion and ethnicity dominate the scene, the implications of religious adherence are discernible with Islamic revivalism, sweeping across Central Asia (Dash P. L. 1999; 151). The fundamental difference between the Uzbeks and the Tajiks is

their adherence to different sects of Islam. The Tajiks are believers in the teachings of Imam Ja'far Sadiq, whose sect called *shi'as* and the Uzbeks are the followers of Imam Abu Hanifah who are called *sunni*. The basic divide between the two had widened in the wake of the demarcation of territories by the Soviets in the mid-twenties when they decided to keep two prominent Tajik cities – Bukhara and Samarkand – in the Uzbek fold. In these cities, the inhabitants were largely Tajiks and the cities themselves were famous centres of Asian Islamic culture and civilization.

Ever since 1926, when the boundaries were re-drawn, the Tajiks have been pursuing in vain a claim on these Uzbek cities, that were once their own. This unending territorial dispute is event specific and must not be confused with the overlapping cross-border settlement of ethnic groups, which is a visible phenomenon in Central Asian states. In a lucid analysis of the parameters of Uzbek-Tajik conflict, six pervasive dimensions were covered in a recent research in which the author has encompassed such vital aspects of mutual animosity as language, economy, culture, religion, nationalism and land transfer (Mobin Shorish, 1994: 57-67).

In Tajikistan, the ethnic groups are of two types – Asiatic and non-Asiatic. The condition of non-Asiatic minorities of Tajikistan is even more difficult than that of the one indigenous to Central Asia. They are descendants either of those who forcefully moved away from their ancestral homeland during the Stalin periods. They are considered as virtually '*second rate citizens*' and have only limited chance to hold public office or compete for a job with a member of Tajik majority holding the same merit. The Russians had enjoyed a '*privileged*' position during the Soviet era and occupied important positions even at local level are now dictated and discriminated by the Tajiks. They are perceived as 'watchdogs' of former imperial government of Moscow.

Similarly, the Jews, another significant minority have also become subjected to harsher attacks and persecutions. They have been part of the Tajik society since the middle ages and have adopted many local customs. But many Tajiks falsely believes that Jew have hoarded tremendous sums of money and caches of valuables and are planning to take

them out of country. Consequently violent incident against them have been witnessed.

In the emerging majoritarian framework of politics, ethnic minorities have overall a perilous time in Tajikistan. Almost all of them are passing through a critical phase of degradation, degeneration and/or de-recognition of their cultural and political rights have become an integral part of the present Tajikist

Chapter- 5

Conclusion

Tajikistan became independent in December 1991. After independence, it started to formulate its foreign policy in accordance with its national interests. Tajikistan's foreign policy focused on surviving as state by securing international assistance for National security and economic development. During the year of civil war and turmoil, Tajikistan had been too weak to have any active foreign policy of its own. The Rakhmonov regime was dependent on Russia. Tajikistan was embedded in bilateral and multilateral co-operation with Russia and the CIS in late 1991 and in the Collective Security Treaty after 1992. The regional security situation, Tajikistan's own domestic fragility, and large Russian military presence in Tajikistan contributed to the strong Russian orientation of Tajik foreign Policy. Although Tajikistan was willing in principal to develop to develop relations with different states, as other Central Asian governments did but its vulnerability made it dependent on Russia. Russia and all Central Asian states were priorities for its foreign policy.

Russia's role during the Tajik civil war can be described as initially passive from the side of the government, while the local Russian military engaged in the conflict against the opposition. Russia prime concern was to support a regime that would bring stability and guarantee a continued role and influence for Russia had previously supported the Tajik democrats .In first ten years of Independence Tajikistan was bandwagon with Russia in its foreign policy, and continued to do so after other Central Asian states had started a balancing policy in relation to Russian by extending their contact with foreign government.

It is also equally true that Tajikistan's multi-dimensional ties with Russia do not detract it from a calculated and gradual drive for de-Russification. However, the process of de-linking Russia from the Central Asian region in general and Tajikistan in particular, is slow, but it is discernible. It is said that by maintaining a politico-military and economic presence in Central Asia, Russia has succeeded in keeping a strong foothold in the entire

region. While supporting a coalition between the Kulabis and the Gharmis, Russia has been diplomatically maintaining its hold on the Islamic opposition and its Iranian Protagonists.

Tajikistan may turn to Russia for assistance if a Post-Soviet 'velvet revolution scenario comes closer and the Tajik regime fears for its political survival. In a long-term perspective, however, Tajikistan's choice of a pragmatic 'open door policy' after September 2001 is the policy of Tajik government will pursue when it is allowed to find its own way. Moreover, this endeavour of the small power in turn contributes to change the regional system.

The drastic improvement in relations between Tajikistan and the USA reflect Tajikistan's unique chance to implement a policy of reaching out to the world and to start pursuing a kind of multi-vector Policy. . The US factor in Tajikistan made the Tajik 'open door' policy possible since the US presence attracted other governments to become involved in Tajikistan. An open door policy reflected a pragmatic policy of cooperation with all states that were willing to cooperate with Tajikistan, above all economically. The Tajik government saw Western interest as an opportunity to strengthen the regime, improve the security situation and secure assistance and investment for the economic development of the country. In fact in February 2003, Rakhmonov for first time used term 'National Interest' of Tajikistan.

Although there was a competition for influence between the great powers and the regional powers, this had no negative impact in Tajikistan. Instead the improved relations between Russia and the USA, combined with the drastic increase in the US engagement as well as that of other Western and Asian countries on the global level, the new situation in Afghanistan and the prospects for Tajikistan's economic cooperation with Security cooperation between Tajikistan and the USA, as well as the EU, was increasing, yet there were no signs that any of them would be prepared to replace Russia as a security guarantor of Tajikistan. The USA's policy in Central Asia is a dual one. Its relations with Central Asians governments have developed as relations of strategic partners in a

common anti-terrorism endeavour, while at the same time the US administration has wanted to strengthen a process towards democracy in these countries. The West, especially USA, clearly see that the developments in Central Asia do not directly affect them. As for US is concerned, its policy in Central Asia has been its determination to obstruct any Central Asian rapprochement with Iran.

The participation of President Rakhmonov in the Partner for Peace (PFP) programme was considered one of the most important parts of Tajik foreign policy in Nov 2002 and in Dec. 2002; President Bush expressed a will for long term strategic partnership and future co-operation against threat to security from international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the drug trade. While bilateral relations with individual NATO countries are strong.

The development of Tajikistan's foreign policy between 2001 and 2005 reflects not only the great changes in the region but also the way in which a small state such as Tajikistan was able to use the window of opportunity provided by the international situation and thereby try to find its own way in international politics. In case studies of the foreign policy of big states in situations of drastic change of the international environment will increase the understanding of when, how and why small states will change their foreign policy. In order to lessen the pains of transformation, the inflow of foreign capital and technology from the developed Western countries is a necessary pre-condition. The country responded favourably to some extent but a lot remain unachieved. Development of the mountain regions of Tajikistan is impossible without long-term perspective for a comprehensive and harmonious socio-economic development.

Tajikistan share common borders and ethnic group with China. Their cooperation subsequently expanded to include efforts to combat ethnic separatism, international terrorism, crime and regional extremism. For China, working with Tajikistan is an additional trump card in the fight against separatists in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the northwest, a region inhabited by Muslim Uygurs. Tajikistan and China

have plans for substantial economic cooperation in the future. In order to develop its rather impoverished north-western regions, and to build new transportation routes that will bypass Afghanistan. This is very much to the linking of Tajikistan, which recently finished building a highway from Dushanbe to Kulyab via Kurgan-Tyube. There are many advantages in the entry of China into the Central Asian market. Russia use the existing infrastructure and past connections and its resources will not materially help this region to develop. But china's attitude is based on a self sustaining dynamism that sees it to its advantage to develop Central Asia and integrate it into its own economic orbit.

China apart from being an immediate neighbour and an emerging global power has substantial economic and trade ties with Tajikistan. However, declarations of friendship notwithstanding, the Tajik leaders are also nervous about China's growing power and may consider India as a potential counterweight. Pakistan's association with the Taliban makes them uncomfortable too. It is significant that although the two countries talk about similar views on regional and international issues, the Tajiks have refrained from endorsing Pakistan's position on Kashmir. But Pakistan's Potential as a possible transit route and market for hydro energy definitely attracts Tajikistan. This shows that Tajikistan has cultivated fairly close relations with both China and Pakistan.

As far as the relationship between India and Tajikistan is concerned, it is based not only on old historical ties, but also on a similarity of world views, common threat perceptions, a high degree of mutual confidence and the aspiration to build modern secular, pluralist and democratic polity. The Central Asian states, including Tajikistan, perceive no threat from India. Therefore, India should further enhance her defence cooperation with Tajikistan. At the same time, Tajikistan wants India to play an important role in its economic life, especially, in the energy sector; India needs to evolve a coherent strategy in this regard.

On the global political map, India is emerging as a world power. Tajikistan is witness to the fast rate of development of India's economy and highly values the achievements of

her experts in the field of high technologies, especially Information Technology (IT). India's ancient and rich history, culture and art are also admired. Tajikistan holds in high esteem the firm and resolute stand taken by India regarding international terrorism and religious extremism. Both countries are working closely together tackling these threats.

The idea of Tajikistan creating its own room for more ever in foreign policy by extending its international contacts had already existed during civil war. By 1997 Iran was regarded as an important foreign partner, although it was in no way comparable to Russia. It is not a Turk state in contrast to other Central Asian states. Tajikistan is wedged between immediate neighbours Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Millions of Muslims living in Xinjiang province of China have created a constant challenge. Beijing has "its own Chechnya" in the Western region of the country. India and Pakistan are "distant neighbours" of Tajikistan, a quasi-state in the words of Michel Hammer, which can survive and be maintained only through the benevolence and indulgence of its neighbours. An orientation towards Afghanistan, Iran and to some extent also India and Pakistan. A stronger Tajik emphasis on relations with these latter countries is in line with the present trend of Tajikistan's national self-identification as a country that belongs to a national – cultural sphere of Iranian languages and cultures. There is a whole region that is now willing to cooperate-Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, China and India.

Due to Afghanistan factor made regional powers such as Iran, Pakistan and India are more interested in Tajikistan, which could now be accessible across Afghanistan in the not-too-distant future. Thus, changes in the regional system have created the external conditions and have which made possible the shifts in Tajik foreign policy.

The relations between Tajiks and Uzbek government are at present not healthy, and the Central Asian orientation is not a first choice of policy option, in spite of official statements. Even so, in future the Central Asian orientation will most probably strengthen the Tajik foreign policy. From the Tajik horizon, Tajikistan and Afghanistan together constitute the core of this regional cooperation in the making. Whether all Tajikistan's

projects and plans for regional cooperation will be implemented in future depends on domestic developments in Afghanistan. The Shanghai five has steadily become a wide-ranging military, security, and economic pact. The fighting international terrorism, the illegal drugs trade, arms trafficking, illegal migration, separatism and religious extremism.

Thus, the foreign policy of Tajikistan has been influenced by factors related to its immediate and distant neighborhood as well as its geostrategic situation in turbulent Central Asia. Its foreign policy has largely centered on the articulation of national security interests and stability in the region. Clear lines of geographical, economic, social, ethnic, sub-ethnic, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity have been found to exist in Tajikistan. The population, however, has remained fundamentally secular. Tajikistan has largely stemmed the tide of radical Islam. It has successfully evolved an independent foreign policy despite Russia's bid for 'Patrimony' and the Uzbek assertion for 'hegemony'.

After 9/11, the world has realized the international terrorism cannot be tackled by methods used in the past. Rather, collective international efforts are the need of the hour. In the 1990s, Tajikistan was one of the first post-Soviet republics to prepare it self to tackle international terrorism. It Become a 'buffer' state in the spread of this threat to other countries of the region. During this period, the threat posed by terrorism. Tajikistan shares a common border of about 1400 km with Afghanistan, which has become the cradle for training of terrorist. Therefore, since its creation, Tajikistan has actively supported the international anti-terrorist coalition and its action in Afghanistan. Therefore, Tajikistan has consistently supported the strengthening of communication and expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation between the Central Asian states. Moreover, the development of positive processes in Afghanistan would create favorable opportunities such as realization of long-term transport-communication projects with access to seaports. New multiple transport corridors and the revival of routes along the Great Silk Road should generate a common interconnected transport corridor and enable

reliable access to prospective markets.

Commonality of interests among various centres enumerated above makes Tajikistan not only a vital field of co-operation in the realm of commerce, trade, defence, culture and diplomacy but also equally in the arena of keen competition; and as a result of this confrontation and tension. Since all nations act in their self-interests, the new Central Asian states including Tajikistan will remain presumably no exception. The national interests are likely to clash in Central Asia with the present polycentric interests of many other countries. This scenario of competition and co-operation on the one hand confrontation, conflict, tension on the other will have overbearing impact on the region in the foreseeable future. Changes in economic growth pattern in Central Asia should result in a shift from 'growth from above' to 'growth from below'. Agriculture once again will become the backbone of the economy, and should be made intensive and lucrative by increasing private incentives emphasising food production.

Another direction of regional cooperation would be the realization of the programme for rational use of water resources and effective utilization of power resources of Central Asia. This region is generously endowed with natural resources, of which fresh water is one. Water is vital for the economies, individuals, and the environment in Central Asia. But water bodies are asymmetrically distributed-90% is concentrated in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan occupies the eighth place in the world with over 60% of stocks of water. In the long-term, Tajikistan could turn out to be one of the leading exporters of this kin of energy at the regional and world levels. Therefore, it is in the interest of present and future generations to undertake rational and optimal use of water resources. The annual potential for generating hydroelectricity has been estimated at 527 billion KW. Based on a Tajik initiative, the UN declared 2003 as the International Year of Fresh Waters to increase awareness of the problem and to promote coordinated efforts and a common strategy. In subsequent years, this initiative was developed by Tajikistan and a proposal as made to declare 2005-2015 as the International Decade of Fresh Waters. The Proposal has been approved by the UN General Assembly, which passed a corresponding

resolution. This initiative stresses that water is a vital resource of mankind and needs to be promoted as a peace creator and as a source for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Hence, the traditional elements of the society belonging to an economically unfavourable region could easily be influenced by ecological agenda put forth by the movement for Islamic resurgence of Tajikistan. The inter-locked issues of ecology, economy and culture accounts for today's turmoil in Tajikistan.

The present day Tajik man is a product of history: the revolution, technological advancement, planned endeavours of the leaders of the erstwhile Soviet state and persistence of the old tradition and values. Thus, we see in the Tajik society, the element both continuity as well as change which link it with not only modern but also the post-modern world of great technological- communicational revolutions. Tajikistan's foreign policy has been impacted by its great historical-cultural past, present politico-military formulations and, above all, by economic needs and security concerns. The multiplicity of external influences, which were heavily punctuated by long-drawn foreign intervention simultaneously, collided with other internal developments such as the emergence of religions extremism, civil war and frequent use of drug money in expanding terrorist bases. Other influential factors are political instability, ethnic exclusivity and clan rivalries.

The Central Asia region occupies an important geopolitical and economic position, serving as the 'bridge' connecting Asia and Europe. The "Great Silk Road", which connected Europe to China and India, also passes through this region. For a long time, Central Asia was the centre of religion, culture and science of the Islamic world. Today, it is considered one of the richest regions of the world due to abundant energy resources, both hydrocarbon and hydroelectricity.

Tajikistan is well poised to become an important transport link connecting countries of

Central Asia and the CIS with the economically powerful and fast-growing regions of Southeast and South Asia. In 2004, the Dushanbe-Khorog-Murghab-Kulma pass with an exit to the Karakorum highway was completed. This highway has connected Tajikistan with Pakistan, India and countries of the Asia-Pacific region and would stimulate regional trade.

Even though being a landlocked country, Tajikistan is very important from security point of view and strategic geography. For a long time, Central Asia remained at the remote periphery in international affairs. However, since the beginning of the present century, gradually, this region has become one of the centres of intersecting global political and economic processes. But, it should not be allowed to become a place for geopolitical competition and formation of military-political blocks. The abundant natural resources and economic potential of Central Asia should be open to everyone who wishes to increase the well-being of people inhabiting the region.

Tajikistan's foreign policy is determined by its geo-strategic position and other factors such as- mutual benefit, equal rights, and contributes ones towards the strengthening of world peace and international security, to this end Tajikistan is a signatory to most international treaties, protocols, conventions, etc. It is an active member of many international and regional organizations, like as member of the United Nations, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central Asian Economic Alliance, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Economic Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization of Islamic Conference, International Monetary fund (IMF), World Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank and the Islamic development Bank, It is also a participant in NATO's Euro Atlantic Partnership council and in partnership for peace Program.

To promote stability, security and sustainable economic development under the prevailing conditions of globalization and in the face of many modern threats to peace,

the only proper response is cooperative efforts at the regional and international levels. It is noteworthy that the three largest and most powerful countries of the world the US, Russia and China have been engaged in Tajikistan. After 9/11, Tajikistan turned into a central player in the US-led "War on Terror". Russia has engaged in managing Tajikistan's security issues and in guarding its borders under the CIS Security Treaty arrangements. In this connection, Central Asia appears to be beyond history for a significant role in shaping the destiny of the 21st century. The 21st century will be the era of Asia. No doubt Russia was, is and will continue to be an Asian power. Russia expands its involvement in the Asia-Pacific in the efforts to integrate the whole region. Tajikistan progressively building up its relations with the continent's leading states: Russia, China, India, Japan, Iran and others. Of course, Tajikistan with the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent states will continue to be top priority for Russia foreign policy. The first decade of the 21st century will be critical in creating an updated look for a 'commonwealth' that is capable of becoming an influential regional organisation that serves as a catalyst for prosperity and cooperation throughout the post-Soviet zone.

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