Islamist Extremism and Terrorism in Indonesia:

A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah

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91-11-2674 2580

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Declaration

I declare that the dissertation entitled "ISLAMIST EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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... Dedicated to

Mummy and Papa....

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PREFACE

Jemaah Islamiyah is one of the longest standing Islamic Insurgency in Southeast Asia. It has steadily expanded its operational reach throughout the region, establishing cells in Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines and Thailand. Unlike the challenges and terrorism of past, Jemaah Islamiyah represents the birth of the first regional terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. Hence, the underlying idea of undertaking study is to understand the factors for the rise of JI and its dispersed regional network. Chapter 1 deals with the historical background of the study. It highlights various enduring factors such as ethnic-religious structure, nature of Geography, the rise of radical Islamism in the region, accessibility of external forces, the role of pro democratic parties and the nature of the regimes in the region have entrenched terrorism, particularly associated with religious extremism in the region.

The chapter II is a study that attempts to understand and unravel the growing network of JI with other radical groups across the region. The terrorist challenge was essentially national in character, with groups attempting to either secede from the central government to form a new state or to force the central government to adopt policies but with regional network formed by JI, what is new is the expanses of their extra national goals and linkages. It further depicts that large number of community run boarding schools, mosque, marital ties and friendship become a major source of network by JI for recruitment purpose.

The chapter III attempts to bring into light the Islamist ideology of JI that is largely militant in character. The ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah is a key drive in framing its structure, recruitment and strategies. The second part of the chapter is related to the operation of JI, which first came to public attention after the Bali bombing. Furthermore, it demonstrates in detail about all the major operation of JI. The last section of this chapter deals with structure of JI, which exhibits the characteristics of both formal and networked organization.

The chapter IV attempts to deal with the counter terrorist strategies with special mention to Indonesian measures. It further attempts to unravel the response of countries in the

region to terrorism that is generally varied along with variation in the intensity of their concern about the threat of their own stability and domestic politics. In general Singapore, Malaysia and Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and shared intelligence with the U.S and Australia, whereas Indonesia and Thailand begun to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threats to their citizens.

The chapter V is the conclusion.

The present study is based on historical and analytical method including the content analysis. The sources of this study include primary documents and the reports published by the Government of Indonesia, Singapore and other international organizations. In addition to this a wide variety of secondary sources including books and journal articles, periodicals, dissertations, research papers, newspaper reports and internet resources have been utilized for the purpose of investigation and analysis.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

AJAI	*Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (It* also stands for *Jemaah Islamiyah)*
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency, U.S
DDII	*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*
DI	*Darul Islam*
DIN	*Daulah Islamiyah Nusantaran*
GAM	*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*
ISD	Internal Security Department
KMM	*Kumpulan Mujahidin/Militant Malaysia*
MASYUMI	*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	*Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia*
MNLF	Moro National Liberation front
NII	*Negara Islam Indonesia*
PPP	United development party
TII	*Tentara Islam Indonesia*
UN	United Nations
U.S	United States of America

Chapter 1

Historical background of Jemaah Islamiyah

The aim of this chapter is to examine the historical background of JI along with focusing on the key factors that led to the origin of this notorious organization. This chapter gives special mention to the Darul Islam movement as JI is known to be emerged from remnants of this rebellion which started in 1940s. The following study also examines the role of Islam in political and radical Islamist organization.

The *Darul Islam* (DI) Movement

The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state, and the movement was responsible for several uprisings through the 1950s and 1960s in Indonesia.[1] Although was suppressed and forced to operate underground during the late mid 1960s, several armed militant organizations formed from the group in the mid to the late 1980s, one of these was Jemaah Islamiyah.[2]

Darul Islam began to take form as a movement under the leadership of Sekarmdji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, a charismatic Muslim politician. His political career began at the age of 18, when he was admitted to the Sekolah Dolter Java, a secondary Dutch institution for medical training in Surabaya. Although he was fortunate enough to be admitted to this institution, he was not able to complete the medical course, as he was expelled from this school after four years of preparatory study for carrying out political activities.

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[1] Stuart Koschade (2006). "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counter terrorism and Intelligence", *Studies in conflict and terrorism*, vol.29, no.6, pp.559-575

[2] Ibid

In 1925, Kartosuwirjo became a member of young *Islamieten* (the young Muslim union) and because of his active role in the organization he was elected as chairman.[3] It was during this period, that he came in contact with H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, the Charismatic leader of Sarekat Islam. Kartosuwirjo was also one of the principle organizer of *Hizabulla* (the array of Allah) a militia set up during Japanese occupation and later against Dutch re-occupation.[4]

The former leader of *Sarekat Islam party* opposed the nationalist's agreement with the Dutch (linggarjat, reunite and round table), and appealing to various Islamic oriented Laskar (militias) forces to start a military conflict.[5] As a part of agreement the republican government ceded West Java to the Dutch, on the condition that the Silimangi division based there could be taken away from Central Java. However, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed Darul Islam in West Java while other independent Islamic guerrillas in West Java continued their own campaign against Dutch proclaiming it a jihad. Eventually an armed rebellion broke out against republic forces in 1948 and in August the following year, based on Sharia law, it declared the creation of *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesia Islamic state), with Kartosuwirjo as commander-in chief.

When the Dutch left Indonesia, the movement still believed in the pursuit for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. After having failed to achieve it through constitutional means, Section of the *Hizbullah* established armed faction called *Tentara Islam* Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic army. Kartosuwrijo accused the moderate and largely secular nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta of committing crime against Islam as they have rejected Islam as the sole foundation of the State.[6] .

Darul Islam reached its peaks in 1950's and posed severe challenges to the Sukarno regime. The rebellion probably had the greatest impact between 1957- 1961. It receives a significant boost when rebellion increased in provinces such as South Sulawesi and Aceh,

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[3] S.Seobardi (1983), "Kartosuwirjo and the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia", *Journal of Southeast Asia studies* vol.14, No.1, pp.112
[4] ibid
[5] Bilveer Singh(2007), *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the war on terror to Islamist Extremists*, London: Praeger security international press, pp.124
[6] Adam Schwarz (1999), *A nation in waiting: Indonesia's search for stability*, Australia: Allen and Unwin.pp.169

who joined the Darul Islam movement in 1951 and 1953 respectively. The South Sulawesi was led by Kahar Muzakhar while in Aceh wasted by Dand Zereveh.

Intensive army operation against Darul Islam from the late 1950's combined with the defection of key field commanders, robbed the movement of much of its potency.[7] Sukarno's authoritarian role through the implementation of martial law in 1957 marked the reversal of fortunate for Darul Islam. However, after 1960's, Darul Islam movement started to lose its strength when some of its followers were caught. Kartosuwirjo was eventually captured and executed for treason in 1962, after which the movement largely collapsed.[8] Thus, Darul Islam became leaderless and seemed to have been defeated. In 1966, with Suharto coming to power, General Ali Murtopo tried to reactivate Darul Islam but this, and several other attempts, failed to revive the Darul Islam movement. However, in 1974 Darul Islam re emerged, three leaders of Aceh, Java and South Sulawesi met in Jalan Mohani, in Thajung prior, Jakarta and re-established a simple structure of Darul Islam, led by Dand Beureueh as Imam and Gaos Taufik as military commander. Since, then Darul Islam keeps continues to pursue its aims of an Islamic state of Indonesia, however, it has ceased to be violent.

However, despite the grouping dismantled, underground networks have persisted. In the 1970's and 1980's, there was occurrence of Islamic terrorism attributed to the group known as Komando Jihad. They started operation in May 1976 in the provinces of North, South and West Sumatra and Lumpung by launching grenades and bombs until the arrest of their key leaders such as Goas Taufik in mid-1977 and of Timsar Zubil. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the founders of Jemaah Islamiayh were also among the detainees. In the mid-1977, nearly 200 persons were arrested by the Indonesian security authorities who were alleged to be the member of Komando jihad. The leaders of the Komando jihad who were arrested to be the referents of Darul Islam, revealed on information at the time of trial that there joint struggle was against communism.

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[7] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, UK: Edward Elgar publishing limited, p.5

[8] Djik C. Van (1981), Rebellion under the banner Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp.94

Some Indonesian specialists portray Komando jihad as an elaborate military Intelligence "Sting" operation devised to flush out Darul Islam radicals.[9]

New network of Darul Islam activists gradually came into existence and organized around the activities of an influential *Quranic* boarding school, the Pesantren *Al-Mukmin* in the village of Ngruki outside of Solo, Central Java. The school was founded in 1973 by two *Ulama*, Abdulla Sungkar and 'Abu Bakar Ba'asyir which had greater degree cross over between the partisan of the Darul Islam movement and the groups of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar Ngruki network. The two considered themselves to be the ideological heirs of the founder of Darul Islam movement.

Aceh Conflict

The conflict in Aceh is not a new story but originated in the politics of the long struggle against Dutch colonialism and in the distinct history of the province. Having violently opposed Dutch colonial rule for decades, the Acehnese were finally forced (in the early 1900s) to surrender to an uncomfortable peace with the colonizers. The Dutch kept their troops stationed in Aceh until the Japanese invasion of 1942. In 1948, with the help of the Netherlands, the province was annexed by the newly-created Indonesian state. Five years later, in 1953, Aceh declared itself as a part of *Dar al-Islam* (the Muslim world), rebellion that erupted in parts of Java and in Aceh, a movement that wanted Indonesia to became Islamic states, but it never advocated the independence of Aceh. It is easy to understand why the Indonesian nation-state has denied independence to Aceh. Jakarta wishes not only to preserve national unity, but also to develop other areas of Indonesia

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[9] International crisis group (26 August 2003), "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: damage but still dangerous", *ICG Asia report* No.63, Jakarta and Brussels, p.5, Accessed 3 January 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/063%20Jemaah%20Islamiyah%20in%20South%20East%20Asia%20Damaged%20but%20 Still%20Dangerous.ashx.

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using profits derived from exploitation of the oil and gas deposits in Aceh as it supplies 50 percent of Indonesian oil and gas.

The movement had been politically undermined when the central government granted Aceh 'special region' (Darerah Istimewa) in 1958, providing for the local autonomy over religion, customary Law and education.[10] Aceh was free from conflict for many years, but problem began to crop up when President Suharto's New Order regime intensified centralized rule from Jakarta. Matters worsened when the discovery of large petroleum resources in northern Aceh in 1971 brought an even tighter grip over the local economy and politics by outside elements.[11] Although the province experience rapid economic growth from petroleum production but they were not receiving any adequate benefits for the development. For instance, in 1997-98, the central government collected more than 32 trillion Rupiah and gave to Aceh only 290 billion Rupiah.[12] Despite its great wealth, Aceh has remained one of the most underdeveloped provinces in Indonesia. During their struggle for independence, human rights have systematically been disregarded as they have been pillaged, raped, and disappeared. In August 1998, Indonesia's own national Human Rights commission reported that 781 people in Aceh had been victims of military atrocities.[13] Jakarta's transmigration policy, which relocates workers from the overcrowded Java to other islands, is disliked. As a result of transmigration, Javanese immigrants populate the mountains and the industrial zones on the coast of Aceh, cutting off Acehnese access to the fish and rice necessary for survival. Perhaps most essentially, religion has dominated concerns for independence. Acehnese take issue with the fact that while Indonesia is 87 percent Muslim, it is not an Islamic state. The Acehnese have made several attempts to establish an Islamic state and continue to aspire to this goal.

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[10] Nazarauddin Sjamsuddin (1985), *The republican revolt: A study of Acehnese rebellion*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.43

[11] Stephen Sherlock (2003), Conflict in Aceh: A military solution?, *Foreign affairs*, Defence and Trade Group, Department of Parliamentary Library, p.5, Accessed 9 January 2010, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2002-03/03cib32.pdf.

[12] Michael R.J Vatikiotis (1993), *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, London: Routledge, pp.184

[13] David martin (ed)(2004), *Globalisation and the New Terror: The Asia Pacific Dimension*, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp.218

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The strong local Islamic identity and resentment against Jakarta contributed to the founding of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 1976.[14] It was led by Hasan M. Di Tiro, a member of the old Acehnese aristocracy. Throughout its history; Aceh's aspirations for self-determination and autonomy have continually been repressed. Thousands have been forced to leave their homes due to targeting by Indonesian military operations. They have been forbidden to write in their own language, and their freedoms of expression, religion, and culture have been repressed. Due to these violations, the Free Aceh Movement, the leaders of this movement has been living in exile in Stockholm.

From 1989, Aceh was declared a military operation zone (*Daerah operari militer*) an, acronym which became synonyms with a time of violence and unrestrained and unaccountable military action.[15] Amnesty international reported that between 1989 and 1992 alone about 2000 people were killed in military operation in Aceh.[16]

After the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, there was a general tide of sentiment that the abuses of the New Order Regime should be exposed and compensation would be made. The new democratically elected President Abdurrahman Wahid called for a new and different approach for reconciliation. Soon after he came to office in October 1999 he established an independent commission to investigate violence in Aceh and a number of junior officers and soldiers were convicted over some case of killings of civilian.[17] Furthermore, a Truth and National Reconciliation Commission was established to investigate human rights abuses, present and past, throughout Indonesia.

May 12, 2000: Representatives of the Stockholm-based Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government sign a Formal Accord in Geneva, Switzerland.[18] This agreement is the culmination of secret negotiations which had begun earlier. It marked the first step toward peace in the strife-torn Aceh province, where guerrillas had been waging war for independence for almost a quarter of a century. Moreover, he emphasized that his government had no intentions of a troop withdrawal or of conducting a

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[14] Ibid, pp.217
[15] Stephen Sherlock (2003), op.cit, p.5
[16] Andrew Tian Huat Tan, op.cit, p.5
[17] Stephen Sherlock (2003), op.cit, p.5
[18] Anne Desgranges (Fall 2000), "Aceh: Conflict and Reconciliation," *Cultural Survival*, Accessed 16 January 2010, http://www.culturalsurvival.org

referendum on Aceh independence. Wahid's refusal to grant self-determination was consistent with his concern for maintaining national unity, one of the Five Principles, or *Pancasila*, the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. In contrast, GAM leaders, who also desired peace, considered the agreement a precursor to an independent Aceh Islamic state. On June 2, fifteen days after the signing of this historic accord, fighting between Aceh rebels and Indonesian forces was scheduled to be suspended for an initial period of three months.

A cession of hostilities Agreement signed in Geneva on 9 December 2002, between Indonesia and the GAM begun to unravel in April 2003, as violence escalated in Sumatra's northern most province, where resistance had simmered for over 25 years.[19]

In May 2003, Martial Law was implemented in Aceh which effectively killed off any advances made in the peacemaking and peace building efforts in the previous years.[20] Martial law was removed after a year and replaced by the civil emergency, but soon this martial law was then removed in May 2005, without changes in the dynamics of the conflict situation.

A New peace initiative under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was signed in August 2005. In greed on ceasefire; the grant of wide measures of self government to the province of Aceh and a 70% share for the Aceh province of the revenues from natural resources located within its territory; the disarmament and demobilization of GAM's armed combatants; the with drawl of half of the Indonesian soldiers and police that were stationed in the region;[21] and the holding of the elections for key duty holders in Aceh Administration.

The election that took place in Aceh in December 2006 saw former GAM members Ishwandi Yusuf and Muhammed Nazar win the elections.[22] Both men ran as an

[19] Rita Smithkipp (Jan/Feb 2004), "Indonesia in 2003: Terror in Aftermath", *Asian Survey*, vol.44, no.1, pp.18-25
[20] Andrew Tian Huat Tan, op.cit, p.254
[21] Marcus Mietzener (2006), The Politics of Military Reform in Post Suharto Indonesia: Elite conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance, *East- West Centre Washington*, pp.50. Accessed 18 January 2010, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS023.pdf.
[22] Ligkaran Survie Indonesia (Dec 2006), Aceh district lead elections Quick Count. Accessed 23 January 2010,

independent actor. Subsequently some faction of GAM, such as that led by Malik Mahmud had formally registered themselves as local parties in the province and since then normalcy to some extent has been attained in the province of Aceh.

In the security literature that discusses terrorism and Islam in Southeast Asia, one come across three different typologies- the fundamentalist, extremist and terrorism.

Understanding fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism is a term used to describe religious ideologies which is seen as advocating a return to the "fundamentals of Islam". Graham fuller describe Islamic fundamentalism not as distinct from Islamism, but as the subset, "the most conservative element among Islamists"[23]

Islamic fundamentalism focuses on Islamic revivalist movements which adhere strictly to the Quran and Islamic law, *Sharia*. They are those people who are well- versed in the religious tenets and heritage. The Islamic fundamentalists knows whereupon in Islam to draw reference to justify their ideology. Fundamentalist stated that Quran is the unadulterated world of God. They further propagated that Islam is based on the Quran, *Hadith* and *Sunnah* and this view is commonly associated with *Salafism*.

The Southeast Asian Islamic fundamentalism push for *Sharia* and the Islamic state but simultaneously holds contradictory views vis-à-vis secular and democratic forms of government.

Islamist extremism

The term Islamism is considered to acquire its contemporary connotations from the French academia in the late 1970's. From French, it migrated to the English language in the mid-1980 and in the recent years, the term has been widely used in academia circles.

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http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:AKE72y9wursj:www.conflictcentrecovery.org/bin.aceh_pilk ada_dynar.pdf

[23] Graham E Fuller (2003), *The future of political Islam*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.43

Islamism is a twentieth century phenomena, which centers on the demand for the establishment of Islamic state. Islamism is an ideology that instructs man's complete adherence to the puritan form of Islam. It focuses on an effort to turn Islam, a religion and civilization, into an ideology. Islamist extremism lays less in Islam and more in the reconstruction of Islam for political purpose by declaring "*jihad*" and justifying any means to achieve the supposed Islamic ends.[24]

The Islamism, attempts to claim that political sovereignty belongs to God in which *Sharia* equates to state law and that it is religious duty on all Muslims to create a political entity that reflects it all.[25] In other words, it is the whole body of thought in which Islamic society is integrationist, conservative and even revolutionary.

An important characteristic of Islamism is expressed in terms of its goal, to bring unity to the Muslim world. It further stated that, once liberated, Muslim countries should cooperate closely to further their common interests of worldwide community of Muslims. Some Islamists, however want to remove existing national frontier altogether so as to politically unite Muslim across the boundaries.

The most widespread form of Islamism is the effort to build an Islamic society from the ground up by means of advocacy, social mobilization and preaching.[26] They choose schools, legal aid societies and professional associations that they found and through which they preach their message of Islamic renewal to the wide population. Thus, they try to win the support of the majority Muslim population, with the aim to pressurize the government to consent to their demands.

The concept of Islamism is controversial as it posits a political role for Islam and also at the same time its supporters believe that their view merely reflects Islam and Islam cannot be political. A writer for the International Crisis group on the other hand,

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[24] Bilveer Singh(2007), op.cit, pp.16

[25] New Quilliam Report (15 Dec 2009), British prisons are incubating Islamist Extremism, Accessed 28 Jan 2010, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/index.php/component/content/article/582

[26] John Calvert (2008), *Islamism: A documentary and a reference guide*, Westport Conn: Greenwood press, p.2

maintains that the conception of "political Islam" is unhistorical as well as "self serving".[27]

Islamism is a huge change from traditional Islam. We need to focus on the fact that Islam refers to a religion and culture in existence; it is the youngest of the major world religious while Islamism is a political and religious phenomena linked to the greater events of previous century. Islamism is a total transformation of Islam, it also facilitate the tenets of modernization. It is not a medieval agenda but it is in response of various political, economic and social stress of the twentieth century. The establishment of the Islamic state is seen as politically and socio-economically useful as it would provide a foundation for the better government and system. It further propounded that under such a condition justice and equality will prevail and an environment will be created which demands total, compliance to god in all endeavors of life.

Islamist extremism and terrorism anchored on one of the most important religious, philosophies and ideologies in the world, namely Islam. As long as Islam is used to mobilize support for the cause of extremism and terrorism, there is every possibility that the adherents of Islam, the second largest religion in the world, will strengthen or intensify their religion at any cost.[28]

Defining Terrorism

One of the key methodological problems associated with the study of terrorism is the lack of its one agreed definition. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of terrorism. Moreover, the International community has been slow to formulate a universally agreed, legally binding definition of this term. Despite an overwhelming emphasis on terrorism, scholars suffer from vagueness in defining terrorism and largely fail to discuss the meaning of the events and connection they

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[27]International crisis group (2005). "Understanding Islamism" , *Middle East, North Africa Report* No. 37, p.3. Accessed 31 Jan 2010,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Understanding%20Islamism.ashx.
[28] Bilveer Singh (2007), op.cit. p.3

describe.[29] Since 1937, the League of Nation failed to reach the consensus on the draft convention that defined Terrorism. The United Nation general Assembly has also unsuccessfully grappled with this question.[30]

In his book, "Inside terrorism" Bruce Hoffman offered an explanation of the term terrorism. Terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotation that is generally applied to one's enemy and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore.[31]

The word terrorism first became famous during the French revolution. In contrast to its contemporary usage, at that time terrorism had a positive connotation. It was designed in such a way to consolidate the new government's power by threatening counter revolutionaries and all other rebels for whom the new regime was regarded as the 'enemies of the people'. Ironically, terrorism in its original context was closely associated with the ideas of democracy and virtue. The meaning of terrorism had changed in the 1930's. It was now used to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed against government and more to describe the practice of mass oppression employed by totalitarian states and their dictorial leader against their own citizen. Following the Second World War, terrorism regained the revolutionary connotation with which it is most commonly associated today. It was during this period that politically correct term of the 'freedom fighter' came into fashion as a result of the political legitimacy that the international community accorded to struggles for national liberation and self-determination. During the late 1960's and 70's, terrorism continued to be viewed within the revolutionary context. However, this usage now expanded to include the nationalist and ethnic separatist group outside the colonial or neo-colonial framework as well as radical, entirely ideological motivated organization. Although the revolutionary cum ethno nationalist separatist and ideological-exemplars continue to shape our most basic understanding of the term, it was not long before terrorism was being used to denote broader, less distinct phenomena. By the 1980's, terrorism became associated with a type

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[29] Natasha Hamilton Hart (2005). "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert analysis, Myopia and Fantasy", *The Pacific Review*, vol.18. no.3, pp.303-325.

[30] Damien Kingsbury (2005), *Violence in between: conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, pp.58

[31] Bruce Hoffman (2006), *Inside terrorism*, New York: Columbian University Press, pp.23

of secret warfare, whereby weaker states could confront more powerful rivals without the risk of revenge. The usage of the term, in the early 1990's further blurred by the introduction of two new buzzwords: Norco terrorism and the gray area phenomena. The terrorist attack on September-11, 2001, inevitably redefined "terrorism" yet again, the year acknowledged as marking the advent of modern international terrorism.

Even in the contemporary scenario, due to the lack of commonly accepted definition of the term terrorism has created serious problem in coordinating and combating terrorism. Scholars such Ehmidt and Jogman in their book 'political terrorism' cited 109 different definitions which they obtained in the survey of leading academics.[32]

Even the U.S department of the state report pattern of global terrorism 2001, is of the view that no single definition of terrorism is universally accepted. Different scholars and organization have different views and definition of terrorism. For the U.S congress, "act of terrorism" means an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is the violation of the criminal laws of the U.S or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of U.S or any state. The United State government in its U.S national security strategy (NSS) defined terrorism as pre-mediated, politically motivated violence against innocents.[33]

Although Southeast Asia has been designated by U.S after 9/11 terrorist attack in New York as the 'second front' in the global war on terrorism, differences over the question of one agreed definition of terrorism also existed among the scholars in Southeast Asia. Some of the Southeast Asia authors have made it clear that the definition of the term cannot be viewed narrowly nor it is agreeable to a set of generalization. Roots of the rebellion, in the view of some scholars lie within the failure of the state, including not merely failure of nation building and territorial governance, but the state' s practice of

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[32] Alex P Schmidt and Albert L Jongmanetal (2005), *Political terrorism*, Amsterdam: Transaction book, p.5

[33] George W Bush. 2002. *The national Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington DC,* the White house, p.5, Accessed 7 Feb 2010,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf.

terror as a political instrument on ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, while terrorism has always been associated with rebellion, most scholars understand terror as a means not an end, given that state uses it as well.[34]

Southeast Asia has a long history of religion oriented terrorism in the region. In particular, the region has been threatened by armed Islamist groups who declared war against various central governments with the goal of either gaining greater political autonomy or outright secession. Southeast Asia has experienced numerous internal conflicts since de-colonization after 1945 with the legitimacy of the state being questioned from those who belong to different ethnic or religious groups or those who carried different political ideology. The experience of the communists and separatist insurgencies that effected many states in Southeast Asia after 1945 has deeply absorbed the region with the notion of comprehensive security approaches in countering such rebellion.

The Southeast Asian region in particularly prone to Islamist oriented violence for number of reasons. The region is dominated by sizable presence of Muslims, amounting to a total more than 230 million. While just because the presence of Muslims does not translate into a threat but emergence of extremist Islamist concepts and ideology, has made the region vulnerable. In addressing the question of radicalization, politics driven questions tend to focuses on the processes of repression and frustration.[35]

Several factors have fostered and introduced a regional environment for terrorism. These include:

The Afghan experience has been vital to the recent development of more radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asia. This appeal was deepened by the process of international recruitment for the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan (1979) and many leaders of Southeast Asia's radical Islamic groups served or trained there. In addition, many Southeast Asians have studied in *Madrassas* (religious schools) either in Southeast Asian countries or overseas.

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[34] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), op.cit, p.5
[35] Natasha Hamilton Hart (2005), op.cit.

Religious fanaticism is prevalent in Southeast Asia. Some of the most violent terrorist groups in recent years have presented religion as a justification of their action. Most religion based explanations of terrorism maintain that the deployment of Islam as an emotive force to mobilize violence is distortion of proper religion teaching, and it is therefore radical and extremist version of Islam that are threatening.[36]

Social violence in Indonesia centers around intercommunal and secessionist stripe. As such there is no social policy to reduce violence other than police response. The dilemma of backwardness under which a vast majority of Muslim population live in extreme poverty, destitution, ignorance and diseases, leading to deep divisions between rich and poor within the Islamic world and as well as at international level.[37]

Economic rises which are measured by the size of economic contraction and the increase in poverty are directly associated with the level of violence. The vast majority of violence in Indonesia is related to financial worries, the economic financial crisis in 1997-99 effected Indonesia harder than any of its neighbor which cultivated in the fall of Suharto regime the following year and rise of many terrorist groups in Indonesia which were kept in control under his rule. The Asian financial crisis has also put pressures on regional governments and spending on crucial areas such as education has been restricted. This has increased the attraction of religious schools. Furthermore, well-funded Islamic radical movements have been able to offer financial support both to adherents and their families. This has had considerable appeal to those in outlying and economically disadvantaged areas.

Several additional factors make Southeast Asian states 'countries of convenience' for terrorist activists and groups.

Borders are often porous and immigration controls and-systems of administration are weak. The region is fairly accessible to outsiders, this facilitated to close communication with Islamic elsewhere in the world. Malaysia for example has not until recently required

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[36] ibid
[37] Bilveer Singh (2007), op.cit. p16

visas for anyone from Muslim countries which are members of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC).

Historically the region has been closely linked with the Muslim world, especially to the Middle East. There are long-standing economic and trade links between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, many of them outside normal financial channels and not readily monitored by governments. These have facilitated funds transfers from the Middle East and South Asia to radical groups in the region.

Criminal activity (including drugs traffic) is widespread in the region and can assist resources movement by radical groups. Further, Southeast Asia has large supplies of weapons, both indigenously produced and imported.

Lastly, most Southeast Asian government are weak and either corrupt or incompetent.[38]

A changing global environment and war on terrorism have shifted the attention to archipelago Southeast Asia. The region now appears to be more violent more potentially fragmented and more prone to religious and political violence than at any time in its post colonial history.

At the organization of Islamic conference (OIC) held in Kuala Lumpur in April 2002, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that "any deliberate attack on civilians should be classified as an act of terror". But some of the delegates did not agree as they had different perception. As the result, the final OIC Kuala Lumpur declaration on terrorism declared inter alia.

- We reject any attempt to link Islam and Muslims to terrorism as terrorism has no association with any religion, civilization and nationality.
- We unequivocally condemn act of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestation, including state terrorism, irrespective of motives, perpetrators and victims of terrorism poses serious threat to international peace and security and it is a grave violation of human rights.

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[38] Gerald Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (ed) (2007), *The history of terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, USA: University of California, pp.427

- We reiterate the principled position under international law and the charter of the United Nation of the legitimacy of resistance to the foreign aggression and the struggle of people under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self determination.[39]

The terrorist groups in Southeast Asia have taken the step to distort and mislead religious understandings. Terrorist tend to use weak countries as the location for their terrorist activities. For instance, Indonesia and Philippines are the countries where there is political instability, rebellion, ethnic clash, extremism etc.

Underlying features for the rise of Islamist militancy in Indonesia.

Islam in Indonesia

The Arabic word Islam, in fact, comes from the same Arabic root (-s-l-m) as the word peace.[40] The term means surrender because the religion requires absolute surrender to God. To be a Muslim person need only to prefer a belief in one God (*Allah*) and to surrender to the will of God, in which Mohammed is considered to be the messenger of God.

Indonesia is a nation comprising many ethnic groups with distinct culture, language and custom along with many different religions but the major religion of Indonesia is Islam. Approximately 90% of the population is Muslim, making it as a state with highest Muslim population in the world. Hinduism and Buddhism spread across the region in the 1st century A.D. and these two faiths dominated the country until the spread of Islam across the region. Up to the 13th century Islam was spread mostly by visiting merchants, fishermen and settlers from India, China and Arabic land. Violence did not play a major role in the spread of religion nor did it grow due to any organized missionary efforts,

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[39] Walter. H Kreamer and Dlamp Civillian (2004), *Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A growing challenge to regional peace, security and U.S interest*, U.S army war college Carlisle barrack, Pennsylvania, 17013 (USAWC strategy research project. p.9, Accessed 12 Feb 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423888.

[40] Jalil Roshan and Sharon Chadha (2006), *Jihad and International Security*, England: Plagrave Macmillan, p.9

though by the 14th century, Islam has become well established in some areas of Indonesia with majority of them is Sunni Muslim.

The radicalization of Islam in Indonesia is due to the role Islam played in both opposing Dutch colonialism till independence in 1940's and in eliminating communism in the 1960's. Religion and ethnic issues gained increasing significance. Historically, the region especially Indonesia has been closely linked with the Muslim world, like to the Middle East and the Arabs countries. Religious division based on Islam in the current situation have intensified ethnic differences and some religiously oriented groups are engaging in violent and extreme acts that pose a potentially serious long term threat and stability not only in Indonesia but also in the Southeast Asian archipelago.

In Indonesia there are two variation of Islam, the traditionalist and the modernist. Traditional Islam has taken hold in those areas where Islam first reached the population. One form of this is known as *kebatinan*, a mixture of several ideas borrowings as much as from ancient pre-Islamic ideas as from Islam. It followers are known as *Abangan*, from the Javanese word '*abang*' meaning red. Modernist Muslim or *Santri* refer to themselves as '*potinan*' or white Muslims and consider their beliefs more pure than those of Abangan. It was Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist who has popularized these terms Abangan and Santri to describe Islam in java.[41]

The Islamisation process in Indonesia was not that smooth. Some weeks before the declaration of independence, Sukarno introduced *Pancasila* to the people of Indonesia in a speech setting forth his vision for the new nation. The five principles were- the belief in one god, the unity of Indonesia, democracy by consultation and consensus, a just and civilized humanity and social practice for all. The inclusion of the seven words (*Dengan kewajiban untuk menjalankan syariah Islam untuk pemeluknya*) means obligation to live according to the Islamic law for Muslim, were supposed to be a part of the so called 'Jakarta charter', which was suppose to form the preamble of the Constitution but later it was dropped. Sukarno was worried that the inclusion of the seven words of the Jakarta

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[41] Terence Chong (2008), *Globalisation and its counter forces in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia studies, pp.261

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· Charter would have alienated non Muslims and Abangan Muslims which constituted an important vote bank for him.

The vast majority of Indonesia's Santri are associated with either the *Mohammadiyah* or *Nahdlatul ulama*. The two Muslim majority parties, *Masyumi* (Mohammadiyah supporters) and *Nahdlatul Ulama* participated in the first general election of Indonesia held in 1955. Masyumi was formed under the Japanese occupation on Indonesia. It was antagonistic both to the PKI and to President Sukarno, a secular nationalist who had opposed the attempts of various Islamic parties and organization to include *Sharia* law in the country's constitution. In the 1940's *Masyumi* turned cleric S.M Kartosuwirjo founded the Darul Islam movement, the most extreme component of Sukarno. At the time of its inception, it composed of two major Islamic organizations, the *Nahdlatul ulama* and *Mohammadiyah*. The later is considered to be more conservative of the two organizations, as *Nahdlatul ulama* is regarded as more liberal, tolerant and comfortable with the idea of secular state as well as with syncretism pattern of Islam. The relationship between *Masyumi* and *Mohammadiyah* were stable at the early decade of the post independence era but the split occurred between them later in 1960's. In 1950's, some *Masyumi* members joined the PRRI rebellion started against Sukarno, as a result of which *Masyumi* was banned in 1960's. Though, *Mohammadiyah* had continued its existence with an overlapping connection with united development founded in 1973 by merging all parties. The *Mohammadiyah* was obliged to weaken its Islamic identity during the Suharto era by adhering to the state secular philosophy of *Pancasila* as its sole philosophy.

The *Nahdlatul Ulama*, meaning the awakening of the *Ulama* was established in 1926 by Javanese *Ulama* concerned to strengthen Islam. It commands the support of some thirty million Indonesian Muslims mainly in Java. The *Ulamas* are the scholar legists of Islam, trained in religious sciences such as the Quran and interpretation of the religious law, *Sharia*. It promotes the cooperation between scholars of all school and propagates the understanding and practice of Islam in accordance with their doctrine. The *Nahdlatul Ulama* grew rapidly and actively participated in anti colonialist struggle by forming a coalition with Masyumi party from 1942 to 1949. However Nahdlatul Ulama decided to

campaign as an independent political party in 1952 and represented in a series of coalition government. It pragmatically avoided confrontation throughout the 1960's and 70's in political arena. In politics it primarily stressed on the need for maintaining good relation to ensure business contacts and also focused on its social and educational affairs as a religious association.

Their participation in the first general election confirmed that Sukarno was pushing for a pluralistic and inclusivistic philosophical foundation for the new state. In 1950, new constitution was introduced by him who emphasized on parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, in July 1959, Sukarno dissolved the constitutional assembly arguing that it had not been able to reach consensus on the Jakarta Charter after sitting for 3 and a half years, it lagged practical legitimacy and represented failed experiment.[42]

Ruling as a dictator and supported by the military, Suharto repressed the charter and reinstituted an ideology that was first proposed by Sukarno-Hatta nationalist leadership, namely, *Pancasila*. Under the rule of Suharto in the 1970's and 1980s, the social and the political role of Islam were repressed.[43] In order to weaken political Islam, Suharto gave no choice but forced the then eleven major political parties to band themselves in only 3 parties – PPP, PDI and Golkar Party with United Development or PPP being the only Islamic based political grouping. Radical Islamism on the other hand becomes important movement among the youth within certain mosques and Madrasas, a religious day school. The early 1980's saw a largely liberal and youthful reform movement, as Nahdlatul Ulama steadily gain ground to the point where, in 1984, its leading lights, Kiai Achmad Siddiqi and Abdurrahman Wahid, took charge of the national leadership. Ideological and realistic considerations drove this new leadership team to withdraw NU, as an organization, from direct involvement with PPP, and to argue in favor of new order government and since then it is dedicated to the promotion of democracy in Indonesia.

By the early 1990s, Suharto initiated a range of politically motivated moves to appease the "Islamic Grounds" launched new Islamic financial Institution co-opted Muslim elites,

[42] Damien Kingsbury (2005), op.cit, pp.58
[43] Vincent J.H. Houben (July 2003), "Southeast Asia and Islam", *The Annals*, vol.588, pp.158, Accessed 14 Feb 2010. http://ann.sagepub.com/content/588/1.toc

passed laws that enshrined the role of religious education and a greater power for *Shariah* courts in 1989, supported the launching of the ICMI in 1990.[44] Nahdlatul ulama, is seen as the voice of traditionalist Muslims, had been most vocal in criticizing the Suharto administration since the early 1990's. The reconciliation between Suharto and Abdurrahman Wahid, president of organization took place only in November 1996. The government started giving funds to the organization in large number. However his efforts were vague and insufficient to further sustain his rule. Soon after Suharto's fall more than nine Islamic parties participated in the elections in 1999, but as in the elections in 1955, these could not attain more than one third of the popular vote.[45] Since the end of his presidency, Indonesian constitution has been amended four times from 1999-2002. In the election, Islam based parties increased their appeal among Indonesian voters from 10% in the 1999 elections to 21.34%in 2004 election.[46] However, these limited gains by Islam parties will not act as a significant factor to Indonesian actions in the war against terror. Some Muslim groups only demanded the modification of article 29 of the 1945 constitution which would mandate the practice of Sharia for Muslims. The Islam defense front (FPI) mobilized thousands of its supporters outside the parliament building to demand the 1945 stipulation on Islamic law be included in any constitutional amendment.[47]

In the wake of 9/11 attack, Megawati Sukarnoputri visited President Bush in Washington and voiced support for America's new war against terrorism. As the domestic pressure from the radical Islamic group grew, Megawati within few months retreated from her earlier showed support to America. During this period, Indonesia was increasingly becoming grounds for breading groups for engaging in terrorism which is demonstrated from the number of terrorist attacks.

Dewan Dakwah

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[44] Hussin Mutalib (2008), *Islam in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian studies, pp.19
[45] Vincent J.H Houben (July 2003), op.cit, pp. 159
[46] Bruce Vaughn (Feb 2005), Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress, Accessed 16 Feb 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf
[47] Nadirsyah Hoseh (2007), *Sharia and constitutional reform in Indonesia*, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian studies, p.5

The Indonesia Islamic faith strengthening board, *Dewan Dakwah* Islamiyah Indonesia was established in 1967 to advance conservative conviction, which believes in promoting Sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The catalysts for the establishment of this organization were the various political standoffs that had blocked their ambitions to play politics, particularly in relations to their demands of rehabilitation of the Masyumi and the implementation of the Jakarta charter.

Muhammad Natsir, a former prime-minister and leader of Masyumi, established the Islamic preaching council to act as a vehicle for advancing the interest of conservative Islamist politics and blocking Christian expansion. It can be plausibly inferred that the decision of the former Masyumi leader to establish DDII was a strategic choice made to extricate them from this political impasse and, at the same time, avoid Suharto's pressure.[48]

DDII send students to Middle East, especially to Saudi Arabia and provided scholarships to them. These graduates later play a leading role in Indonesia's radicalization, especially in spreading *Wahhabism*, becoming leader of Tarbiyah and Dakwah Salafi.[49] The DDII was instrumental in establishing the roots of radicalism in Indonesia through its Mujahid training programme at the Salamam mosque at the institute of technology, Bandung.

DDII was initially concerned with the publication of series of religious papers. To negotiate diplomatically with the Suharto regime, which remained suspicious of it, DDII adopted various strategies. One was to mobilize religious preachers all over Indonesia to hear briefing by government officials about Suharto's policies.[50] Since the beginning of 1970's, DDII was worried about the existence of Islam in Indonesia due to the mounting spread and popularity of Christianity. DDII believed that Ali Murtopo, Suharto's most trusted advisor, who was often claimed to be the architect of the new order, worked hand in glove with the group of Chinese Roman Catholic political activists and intellectual

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[48] Muhammad Natsir (1998), *Politic: Melaki Jalur dakwah* , Jakarta: Abadi, pp.22

[49] Imadadum Rahmat M and Arus Baro (2005), *Islam Radikal: transmisi revevalisme Islam Timur engan Ke Indonesia*, Jakarta: Perbit erlangga, pp.80

[50] Noorhaid Hasan (2006), *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order*, USA: Cornell Southeast Asia Programme Publications, pp.39

assembled in the centre of strategic and international studies and intend on promoting Christians to prominent positions in the military and civilian bureaucracy.

Inspired by the spirit of global Islamic resurgence, DDII had become more strong and bold in criticizing openly the policies of Suharto's government, particularly through the pages of its *Abadi*. Subsequently, they faced the consequences as *Abadi* was banned in 1973 by the New Order regime of Suharto. DDII got the encouragement to reaffirm its position as an exclusively *Dakwa* movement due to Suharto's unwavering determination to marginalized Muslim politics and to eradicate its radical expression.

DDII gained grounds among the Muslims in Indonesia by exploring international Islamic issues through it mouthpiece, the monthly Media Dakwah. By 1980's, media Dakwah had adopted a harsh and sectarian stance, exposes anti-Islamic conspiracies and frequently carried out harsh critique of liberal Islamic thinkers. Further, its control over resources led DDII to assume a central position among Islamic organization in Indonesia. In negotiation for financial support, it served as a bridge between Saudi Arabia and a number of Muslim organizations in the region.

In 1987, the DDII sponsored the establishment of KISDI (*komite Indonesia untuk solidaritas dengan dunia Islam*) or the Indonesian committee for solidarity with the Islamic world. According to Martin Van businessmen, even though KISDI "claims as its founding date 1987 but its first public appearance was in 1990, around the same time that ICMI was established." KISDI led by Ahmad Sumargono and Lukman Haron, made its voice heard at number of occasions, representing the Muslim demand for the implementation of openly Islamic politics in Indonesia. KISDI were later to find a willing patron and rising star within ABRI, President Suharto's son –in –law, Prabowo Subianto. According to Robert Hefner:

....KISDI was originally established to heighten Indonesian sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians. Although genuinely concerned with Palestinian suffering. the KISDI leadership knew well that the Palestinian cause could be used as wedge to underscore differences between Muslims and the west. The campaign proved to be a brilliant recruitment strategy. Although most Muslims had long lost interest in Masyumi. many were deeply moved by the Palestinians plight. In promoting this issue, then. KISDI was unable to younger generation to the senior modernist cause.

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In the 1990's KISDI launched other, equally effective campaign in support of Muslims in Bosnia, Indian Kashmir, France and Algeria. A theme in all these campaign s has been the treachery of the west (especially the United States) and western hypocrisy in the enforcement of human rights. When Suharto intensified its courtship of conservative Islam in the early 1990's, he borrowed directly from KISDI's critique of human rights and liberal democracy. Through his aids, Suharto appealed to KISDI to aim its critique of human rights not only at western powers but at the domestic prodemocracy movement as well.[51]

ICMI

ICMI was projected to be an instrument of political Indonesian association of Muslim intellectuals (ICMI) was established in December 1990 in the east Java. President Suharto attended the inaugural function, as he intended to cultivate management for President Suharto, but subsequently it evolved into more than just a religious body for its members. It helped in providing a new focal point for Muslims of modern outlook with a nationalist economic agenda. ICMI became an institution in which various contemporary problems faced by Indonesian society in general and Muslims in particular, are discussed. It encourages open discussions of many topics which previously had been undermined. Themes like the inadequacies of contemporary economics, and the inequality of roles and responsibilities of the majority became main topics of discussion. Within ICMI, Muslim group consciousness of their being a majority was raised and the need to play a greater role in nation and state lives was emphasized. ICMI founders and members aimed to redevelop the self-esteem and dignity of the Muslim community, after a very long period of being treated as marginal.

B.J Habibie (Suharto's vice president) served as ICMI's president while Muslim scholars and political activists played crucial role in organizing the body. Imaduddin, who in the 1980's was harassed and eventually jailed by Suharto, was one of the key figures in founding of the ICMI. Muslim intellectuals and activists continued to play an important role but the resources available to them depended very much on how Suharto judged their utility. Under the patronage of Habibie, ICMI activists infiltrated the central government, been appointed to the ranks of government, civil services, police, military, industries and

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[51] Damien Kingsbury (2005), op.cit, pp.91

commerce. ICMI also opposed to the widespread economic and political influences of the catholic and ethnic Chinese community, ICMI affiliated officials ended government schemes that were seen as been beneficial to catholic and Chinese Indonesians. Within couple of years almost all of the important posts within ICMI were safely in the hands of technocrats loyal to Habibie. Progressive Muslim intellectuals such as Dawam, Nurocholish and Abdurrahman used this Islamic revival to promote tolerant, sophisticated, rational and well informed approach to Islam. Dawam, who was one of the prime movers in the formation of ICMI, was widely expected to become secretary general to the new organization, but he lost to the Habibie loyalists who quickly took of ICMI's upper echelons. Some of the intellectuals involved with ICMI, such as Nurocholish Madijd, were suspicious about the president enthusiasm and interest in the organization. Despite having helped draft the organizational original conceptual guidelines, Nurocholish along with other moderates were not comfortable about the organization's sudden rise, they felt that Suharto intended to make ICMI an instrument for his own political purpose. Habibie was of the view that ICMI is an open organization and is not exclusive and non-political. Moreover, he said "ICMI was established not to attain a win for Golkar or other political parties in the general elections." ICMI was established to solve problem faced by the whole society, especially the Indonesian Muslim community.

In 1998, the support of ICMI drained mainly due to the political defile of the post Suharto administration and its ties to Golkar party. Moreover, its support also deteriorated with the establishment of the opposition national mandate party headed by Amein Rias, a former ICMI luminary and head of Mohammadiyah. Amein Rias was forced to resign as the head of ICMI's council of experts as he became one of the most visible elements of opposition against Suharto's authoritarian government.[52]

At a time when the leading liberal Islamic intellectual, and NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid was forced to sue for peace and seek rapprochement with Suharto after spending the decade locked in battle with the president, in part because of his opposition to ICMI and Suharto's strategy of co-opting the Islamist and with popular, then ousted, PDI leader

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[52] Damien Kingsbury, op.cit, pp.93

Megawati Sukarnoputri at home considering her political future, Amein was once more free to speak his mind.[53]

The radical Islam in Indonesia has become increasingly synctrisized, influenced by the ideologue of the *Jamaat-e-Islami-* Pakistan by Abu-Al-Ala-Maududi and Sayyid Qutub's ideologue of the Muslim brotherhood. The operating assumption here is that the radical Islamist terrorism is rooted in Islamist ideology rather than in Islam.

Intellectual foundation of Islamism

Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by some of the more doctrinaire version of Islam, particularly the closely related to Salafi –Wahhabi streams. The financial power of Saudi Arabia has also helped in promoting *Wahhabism* in Southeast Asia through the funding of educational institutions. The religious instructions are very much focused on Salafi teachings, a return to pure Islam practiced by the prophet and his companions. It emphasized *Aqidah* (faith), *Tauhid* (oneness of God) and most of all Jihads, using classic Salafi text such as those by Ibn Taymiyya.

A close historical study of current day terrorism would indicate that they are identifiable important ideas. A belief shaping the intellectual foundation that is responsible for the current state of violence is spreading in the form of terror. It is therefore extremely important to focus on the ideas and belief system that have shaped terrorism in its contemporary shape.

There always were, of course, tendencies toward more orthodox and Sharia-based forms of Islam and periodic attempts to introduce more radical interpretations of the religion. The *Padri movement* in Sumatra in the 1820s and 1830s involved an effort to introduce Wahhabism by clerics returning from Mecca who had been influenced by Wahhabi teachings during the al-Sauds' first occupation of the city at the beginning of the nineteenth century. There were bursts of Muslim radicalism throughout Southeast Asia

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[53] Ibid, pp.94

during the European colonial period—armed jihads to liberate Muslim lands from the occupation of infidels.

Hassan al-Banna understanding of Islam is innovative. He does not present Islam as a parochial religion or system, but as a universal faith with a strong sense of universal mission. To his mind, Islam is not just a reform movement but a radical movement of change.[54]

Born into a poor family in southern Egypt in 1906, Banna was a school teacher who in 1928 founded Muslim brotherhood, which was considered to be the first of the modern Islamic fundamentalist movement. At Banna's antipathy towards western modernity soon moved him to shape the brotherhood into an organization seeking to check the secularist tendencies in Muslim societies by asserting a return to ancient and traditional Islamic values. When first established in 1928, the Muslim brotherhood attracted the support of only a few hundred people, but within just ten years its support base expanded exponentially, quickly claiming over 200,000 members. By the 1930's, the emphasis on Wahhabi Salafism was accompanied by a parallel interest in Islamism, in particular the combination of Wahhabi Puritanism in religious thinking and anti colonial nationalism in political thinking.

As brotherhood expanded during 1930's and extended its activities well beyond its original religious revivalism, Banna began dreaming a greater Muslim dream: the restoration of the caliphate and it was this dream, which he believed could only become a reality by mans of swords (jihad). Direct communication with the people in their homes, at their work and places of leisure added to that legitimacy, the quality of sincerity and personal touch. Under Banna's stewardship, the brotherhood developed a network of underground cells and waited for the order to get public with terrorism assassinations and suicide missions.

Thus, from the modest beginning, which did not especially distinguish it from the many religious societies which flourished in the capital, the society of the Muslim brothers grew, but with the outbreak of the Second World War, into one of the most important

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[54] Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi (1996), *Intellectual origins of Islamic resurgence in the Modern Arab World.* New York: Albany press, pp.264

political contestants on the Egyptian scene. However, its appeal was now felt in several countries as well.

The ideas of Hassan al-Banna and Abu-Al-Ala-Maududi gave birth to modern Islamic movement which rediscovered the Islamic basis upon which life is build. In 1928, Maududi authored a book entitled 'jihad in Islam', which had an important impact against the English idolaters and the enemies of Islam everywhere. Maududi's other books which included towards understanding (1932), the problem of nationalism (1937), and Muslim and the present political crisis (1939) introduced key concepts such as 'Theo-democracy' and sketched out the cardinal ideas of Islamism.[55]

According to Banna and Maududi, Islam is a comprehensive way of life. Today Islam is progressing forcefully while secularism is falling rapidly. While Islam attracts people who are looking for justice, secularism is losing major footholds and has lost its ability to defend itself except by violence. Thus, secular state has lost its legitimacy.

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian and a member of Muslim brotherhood. His thoughts were deeply influenced by Maududis' revolutionary radicalism. The major premise of Qutb' ideology is that the entire world has lapsed into a state of *Jahiliyyah*, Intellectual and moral darkness such as established in Arabia before the advent of Islam. It is because all are ruled by the law of man rather than law of god. Qutb's advocated violent jihad, his innovation is that, he provided theological basis for violent jihad against Muslim government as well. He further stated that all Muslim government is heretical, because they do not follow or obey the rule of the law, Sharia. He was of the view that jihad must be carried out in all countries, that do not obey Sharia law.

The spread of radical ideologies of Hassan al-Banna, Abu-Al-Ala-Maududi and Sayyid Qutb in Southeast Asia that made their appearance in the region in the recent decades have led to the growth of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia. The most radical and notorious group among all Southeast Asian terrorist groups; Jemaah Islamiyah is inspired by *Wahhabism* and *Qutbism*. In accordance with the *Qutbiyyah-type* thinking there was a

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[55] Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (1999), *The Politics of Post Suharto Indonesia*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, pp.48

need to wage a war against infidels and their supporters in order to defend Islamic order, even if they happened to be Muslims. While Wahhabism on the other hand represents a narrow reformist teachings of Islam that is variously described as strict and puritanical.

The radicalization of Jemaah Islamiyah's ideology was not only in terms of adopting violence to achieve its goals but also to resort extreme violence in terms of targeting. In addition, there was a clear expansion of goals in Jemaah Islamiyah's ideology that includes the establishment of Islamic state nationally, regionally and eventually a global *khalifah*. In totality, Jemaah Islamiyah lays less on Islam and more in the reconstruction of Islam for political purpose.

Chapter 2

Terrorist Networks of Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asian Archipelago with special mention to Indonesia

This chapter examines Jemaah Islmaiyah's network with other radical Islamic groups of Southeast Asian region that seeks to establish an Islamic State in the region. It argues that Jemaah Isamiyah dispersed all over the region, which comprises one of the major factors for the organisation to sustain itself and remain active despite the arrest of its key leaders. It further explore in detail about *Madrasas* or Islamic schools as well as about the marital ties between Jemaah Islamiyah's members that consist of the major epicentre of recruitment and ultimately, ensures JI's regenerative capacity.

The main threat posed by terrorism in Southeast Asia resides with Jemaah Islamiyah, which in the 21st century emerged to be more violent and more potentially fragmented than at any time in its post colonial history. Due to its violent nature, Jemaah Islamiyah was added to the United Nations 1267 Committee's list of terrorist organization on 25 October 2002 under U.N Security Council resolution 12671.[1]

Jemaah Islamiyah, Arabic phrase meaning Islamic group or Islamic community, is a Southeast Asian militant Islamic organisation dedicated to the establishment of a *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic state) in the Southeast Asian region. Jemaah Islamiyah has become the most important and even key element in the discourse of terrorism in Southeast Asia. The name Jemaah Islamiyah dates to the late 1970's, but the experts are not certain if the name referred to a formal organisation or an informal gathering of like –minded Muslim radical group or a government label for Islamist malcontents. A close examination reveals that what is alleged to be a regional terrorist organisation, namely, Jemaah Islamiyah is spelled differently by different organisation and countries. In accordance with the Singaporean government, the most militant terrorist

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[1] UN press release SC/754, Committee's website,

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.http

organisation of the region has been spelled as "Jemaah Islamiyah".[2] The first word Jemaah is spelled in different ways like, Jema'ah or Jama'ah. Similarly, Islamiyah has been spelled as Islamiyyah or Islamiyah. Sheikh Abdullah Sungakar, the alleged brains and the founder of the organisation, described his organisation as 'Jama'ah islamiyah', which is the proper Arabic Transliteration.[3] According to the key documents of the organisation that was captured by the Indonesian security forces, the actual name of the group is "Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah," meaning "the organisation of Muslims". In this study, the term Al- Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah or AJAI for short, will be used and this refer to the same organisation that has been popularly described as Jemaah Islamiyah since 2001.[4]

Jemaah Islamiyah was founded sometime in 1992 or 1993 by former members of Darul Islam,[5] the two key Islamic clerics – Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto government. In 1972, Sungkar and Ba'asyir founded the Pesantren Al- Mukmin in Ngruki village in central Java in order to promote Wahhabi fundamentalist teaching.[6] Graduates of this school would later form the extremist hard core of the terrorist organisation.[7] Prior to this, they were two of the more extreme elements associated with Masyumi and DDII. Although they were never a part of the original Darul Islam, they were fully inspired from this rebellion and both had strong links to modernist Islam. Both men were born and raised in Java and were of mixed Arab- Javanese descent. In the 1950's, they became leader in *Gerekan Pemuda Islam Indonesian* (GPA) student group connected to Masyumi. Following the 1965-66 coup, Sungkar, who was chairman of the DDII and Ba'asyir began openly campaigning for an Islamic state. The two establish a radio station called radio *Dakwah Islamiyah Surakar* the Islamic proselytization radio of

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[2] White paper (January 2003), The Jemaah Islmaiyah arrests and the threat of terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, Accessed 18 Febuary 2010, http://www.mha.gov.sg/get_blob.aspx?file_id=252_complete.pdf.

[3] Abdullah Sungkar interview in Nida'ul Islam magazine, Feb-March 1997, Accessed 20 Feb 2010, http://www.Islam.org.au.

[4] Bilveer Singh(2007), *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist Extremists*, London:Praeger security international press, p.3

[5] Abuza Zachary (Winter 2009), "Jemaah Islamiyah adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.XVI, no.1, pp.15-26

[6] International crisis group (August 2002), "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia", Asia briefing, Jakarta and Brussels, Accessed 20 Feb 2010, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg58/icg58.pdf.

[7] Carlyle A.Thayer, New Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Accessed 22 Feb 2010, http://www.scribd.com/doc/18019093/Thayer-Terrorist-Leadership-in-Southeast-Asia

Surakarta but later the internal security apparatus shut down the radio station in 1975 for its anti government propaganda. It is well known that, both of them were criticising the Suharto's regime and making statements urging disobedience to secular authority. By the late 1970's, Suharto regime becoming more concerned about the militant Islamic organisation prevailing in the country, as it was becoming the main source for political opposition. This phase is been supported by a new wave of jihadist publication and sophisticated web sites that are aimed at birth the Jakarta's youth and middle class audience. As a recent ICG reports has acknowledged, Jemaah Islamiyah's current focus on the dissemination of information through a publication network is a direct effort to improve outreach and recruitment as a way of rebuilding the organisation.[8]

Sungkar and Ba'asyir were detained in the following year netted in the very organisation, Murtopo has encouraged. Murtopo appeared to have nothing more than a sting operation; the ploy had significant unintended consequences, as the ICG reports observe.[9] The operation set in the motion had several unintended consequences. It renewed or forged bonds amongst Muslim radicals in South Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java. It promoted the idea of an Islamic state in a way that the original Darul Islam leaders had perhaps not intended. That disorder was only beginning when Komando jihad was created.

Sungkar and Ba'asyir were tried in 1982 and sentenced to nine years of prison for subversion but subsequently there sentence were reduced three years and ten months. Further, a prosecution appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court in February 1985, which challenged the reduced sentence of Ba'asyir and Sungkar. Facing imminent re-arrest the men left Indonesia for Malaysia and settled Indonesian immigrant community in Johor. No longer living in Indonesia, they openly preached the Quran's ambitions of creating a unified Islamic state across all Southeast Asia. In Malaysia Sungkar and Ba'asyir re-established themselves and founded a religious school in Johor which propagated their extremist views. They managed to gain support from Malaysians, which gave them the strength to form their own organisation. They also

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[8] International crisis group (Feb 2008), "Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiayh Publishing Industry", Asia Report N147, Accessed 2 March 2010, http://www.crsisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/147-indonesia-jemmah-islamiyah-publlishing-industry&spell=1

[9] International crisis group (Dec 2002), "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network operates, Asia Report N 43, Accessed 12 March 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3efde0774.html

identified a number of sympathetic businessmen willing to take on Indonesian workers and supporting the establishment of an Islamic state. In the mid and the late 1980's, many members of Jemaah Islamiyah, including Sungkar and Ba'asyir along with Hambali joined the Mujahedeen in the resistance movement against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They were joined by radical Muslims from extremist group worldwide. Sungkar also recruited Darul Islam members to go to Afghanistan to join the war against the occupying Soviet forces. In Malaysia, he arranged for Darul Islam cadres from Indonesia to get training in the camp run by Afghan Mujaheedin commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf along the Pakistan –Afghan border.[10] The anti –Soviet Mujahedeen campaign in Afghanistan had a profound impact on Ba'asyir and Sungkar particularly in terms of directing their ideological orientation towards a more explicit region wide outlook. This opened the gateway for Jemaah Islamiyah members to be radicalised and exposed to armed jihad.

In 1992, a rift occurred and Sungkar led a breakaway faction that resulted directly in JI's creation as an organisation separate and distinct from Darul Islam. By 1993 or so, a decision was made to establish a region wide JI network, with Hambali and Abu Jibril tasked by Sungkar to set up the militant cells in Southeast Asia.[11] The precise reason for the split remains a matter of dispute. Both men appeared to have felt that Darul Islam was doing very little in pressuring the Indonesian state on Islamic issues or bringing about attidunal change with the Islamic community.[12] The Singapore branch of Jemaah Islamiyah was probably founded around 1993 when Ibrahim Maidin, a Singaporean religious teacher who first met Ba'asyir in the late 1980's, returned from Afghanistan after completing a short paramilitary training course. Jemaah Islamiyah's Malaysia branch was founded around 1994-95 under the leadership of Hambali.

Since the time of its inception, Jemaah Islamiyah was viewed to be more puritanical and militaristic discipline than Darul Islam. Sungkar and Ba'asyir's followers were formed into small groups of eight to ten people who would hold weekly meetings,

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[10] Sidney Jones (June 2005), "The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol.59, no.2, pp.169-178

[11] Bilveer Singh(2007), *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist Extremists*, London: Praeger security international press, pp.64

[12] International crisis group (Aug 2002), " Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the case of the Ngruki network in Indonesia", Asia briefing N 20, Accessed 23 Mar 2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-library/publications/detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c9-be1e-2c24-a6a8c70602

which include Quranic studies as well as activities to prepare members for jihad. Members of his first small cell included Riduan Isamiddin alias Hambali, Abdul Ghani, Jamsari, Suhauime Matsah, Adnan and Faiz Bafana.[13]

After the collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia.[14] End of Suharto's rule proved significant as all the formerly, restricted Islamic groups from across the political spectrum were suddenly allowed to operate freely. Being a fundamentalist Islamic organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah advocated the use of terrorism to attain political and religious goals. By the late 1990's, Jemaah Islamiyah was busy recruiting and training Muslim jihadists throughout all of Southeast Asia for the express purpose of perpetrating acts of terrorism. It also demonstrated the ability and willingness to inflict significant causalities on innocent civilians and those they believed to be allied western interest. The inability of Jakarta to retain control over Indonesia's outer island led to the eruption of Major Christian- Muslim clashes that by the end of 1990's, had plagued Maluku (Ambon) and Sulawesi (Poso) into what amounted to a full scale sectarian civil war. This outbreak of ethno-religious violence provided Jemaah Islamiyah with an ideal operational environment to recruit fighters.

Upon Sungkar's death in 1999, Ba'asyir took over as the community of Islam's spiritual leader, with Hambali controlling the field operations in the region. Subsequently, there appears to be a division between Ba'asyir and Hambali, with the former being unable to control the later. The more violent core led by Hambali began to take on a more proactive role in Jemaah Islamiyah and eroded Ba'asyir's capacity to led the organisation as he viewed Ba'asyir to be too accommodative, weak and too easily influenced by others. The faction led by Hambali, included other key leaders such as Azahari and Noordin Top believed that time has come for Jemaah Islamiyah to wage armed jihad and to take on the international system. They further believed that post Suharto period and the democratic transition in Indonesia made them convinced that a change of plan was also at hand. Despite the differences, they all shared the common belief that an Islamic state must be established in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia.

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[13] Anne Aldis and Graeme Herd (2007), *The ideological war on terror: Worldwide strategies for counter-terrorism*, London: Routledge, pp.115

[14] Sharif Shuja(2005), "Gauging Jemaah Islamiyah's threat in Southeast Asia", Terrorism Monitor, vol.3, issue.8,pp.3

Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

Due to the widening political space provided by reformasi, the activities of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir widened, as evident by the establishment of *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) or the Indonesian mujahidin council established in on August 7, 2000.[15] It is an organisation set up in order to constitute a political front for all group working, with the prime objective of converting Indonesia into an Islamic community. Its importance lays in the fact, that its founding leader was alleged to be the leader of the most dangerous terrorist group threatening Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah. It constitutes a political front for all groups in Indonesia working to establish Islamic law. MMI includes many Jemaah Islamiyah members but also many other with perfectly legitimate occupation. The Hambali led group believed that accommodation with a non-Islamic political system contaminate the faith of the group, Jemaah Islamiyah. According to the radicals, the concept of MMI, diverged from its aim set by Sungkar, they felt that it betrayed Sungkar's *Ijtihad* politics or political analysis that Jemaah Islamiyah should remain underground until the time was ready to move towards an Islamic state. Further, the more militant JI leaders felt that MMI's existence legitimated the secular and democratic Indonesian state and that JI members would be distracted from more important covert operations by the council's activities.[16]

After that Omar-al-Faruq confession appealed in time magazine September 2002, MMI-Jemaah Islamiyah held several meetings in quick succession in which Ba'asyir argued strenuously that bombing and the armed struggle for Islamic state should be put on hold for the time being because they would have to negotiate repercussions for the movement.[17] MMI in 2002, reportedly called the meeting with its Jemaah Islamiyah members in the Perak area of Surabaya: Lamongan and Mojokerta among other places, to discuss the possibility of bombing and argue that the movement was ripe to go forward because the US and Indonesia acting in concert could crackdown on Muslims activists. Ba'asyir was concerned that the timing was wrong. Some of the

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[15] Bilveer Singh (2007), op.cit, pp.64

[16] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, UK: Edward Elgar publishing limited, pp.73

[17] International crisis group (Nov 2002), *Indonesia background: how the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network operates*, ICG interview Surabaya, Asia report no.43, Accessed 8 April 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/043-indonesia-backgrounder-how-the-jemaah-islamiyah-terrorits-network-operates.aspx

Jemaah Islamiyah's members were also become uncomfortable with methods chosen by Hambali's followers and their unintended consequences. Internal debates over organizational and operational matters became important faultiness in dividing them into the pro-violence and the non-violence factions. Though it is not a terrorist organisation itself, the MMI has member from various terrorist organisation on its roll

Radicalised edition of Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah became prominent after the 12 October 2002 bombing of two night clubs in Bali Indonesia. Indonesian intelligence were initially reluctant to accept advise from other regional governments but since the two bomb blast rocked in Bali created a havoc, has given them added political clout internationally and domestically and eventually they accepted the existence of radical terrorist organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah and joined hands with other regional countries. Ba'asyir was arrested for plot to assassinate Megawati.[18] In 2003, Ba'asyir was again arrested by the court in Jakarta and received a four year jail sentence for the bombing of the J.W Marriott hotel in Jakarta. During the same juncture, more than thirty people were arrested who were alleged to be the member of Jemaah Islamiyah.

The investigation into the Bali bombing led to the arrest of Said Sungkar, youngest brother of Abdullah Sungkar and Ali Gufron, alias Mukhlas. Western and Asian security officials have identified Hambali as the network's main liaison to al Qaeda, making him the most wanted man in Southeast Asia.[19] Until his arrest, he played the most important leadership role in Jemaah Islamiyah as he was the group operational chief and was closely involved in several terrorist plots. Sources revealed that in the 1970's Hambali had been a special operations plant into Jemaah Islamiyah. His task was to build the financial structure of JI and the aim of the operation was to discredit political Islam. Hambali was also held responsible for organising the bombing of the churches on Christmas eve 2000, in which 18 people were killed, the bombing of the Marriott hotel in August 2003, helping fund the first jihad to Ambon and was linked

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[18] Transnational and non-state armed groups: Legal and Policy responses, Accessed 12 April 2010, http://www.armed-groups.org/

[19] Bruce Vaughn (Feb 2005), *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, CRS Report for Congress, Accessed 21 April 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf

to bombings in Manila in December 2000 in which 22 people were killed, as well as foiled bid to blow up embassies in Singapore in December 2001.[20]

Since 2004, JI has increased bombings, assassinations and raids on military and police facilities. By promoting sectarian attacks, it can broaden its definition of defensive jihad. President Yudhoyono has often reiterated·that he would keep up the pressure on JI and deal with terrorism firmly but despite strong measures to put halt on terrorist activities, second Bali bombing took place in 2005. In 2007, the group staged an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Sultan Kudrata that killed two civilians and injured thirty others.[21]

Apart from Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdullah Sungkar and Riduan Isamuddin aka Hambali, there are other high profile Jemaah Islamiyah leaders and field commanders which played crucial role in the recent time, particularly since 2001. The five main figures alleged to have close links with Jemaah Islamiyah are:

The first is Abu Jibril, who like Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was born in Java, the breeding ground of many Indonesian Islamic militants. He was a part of Darul Islam movement and student veteran of Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki. He coordinated Jihadi activities for JI. Jibril was a passionate recruiter for Jihadi Maluku and Ambon. Apart from recruiting personnel, he also organised weapon shipments from Thailand and transport for mujahedeen into the zones of conflict. In 1998, after the fall of Suharto's regime he returned back to Indonesia. He is a close aid of Ba'asyir and in charge of Indonesian JI treasury and money management. Jibril was arrested in Malaysia after he had been implicated in crimes committed by Kumpulan Mujahedeen (KMM) when the authorities cracked down on Islamic militants in the country. In 2004, he was released from Malaysia jail and returned to Indonesia.

Second is Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, is a JI member and explosive expert, who received military training at an Al-Qaeda camp on the Afghanistan –Pakistan borders. He is also reported to be a member of Moro Islamic liberation front (MILF). Among

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[20] Damien Kingsbury (2005), *Violence in between: conflict and security in archipelagic Southeast Asia*, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, pp.78

[21] Pierre Tristam (2007), *Jemaah Islamiyah, or "Islamic Congregation": Southeast Asia's branch of Al-Qaeda,* Country Reports on Terrorism, US State Department, Accessed 25 April 2010. http://middleeast.about.com/od/terrorism/qt/me081109c.htm

his intended were, US and Israeli Embassies, British and Australian High Commissions and Commercial building housing of US firms. They planned to launch an attack in December 2001/ January 2002 or April/may 2002, but the planned was uncovered by the authorities in December 2001.[22]

Abu Dujana, who was fluent in English and Arabic, headed JI military wing and was capable of assembling bombs and recruiting members. He had received weapon training from Pakistan and Afghanistan and fought with mujahedeen. There was also apparent that after 1996 Dujana spends time in Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) camps in southern Philippines, conducting training for JI and MILF members. Dujana has played a major role in several terrorist bombings in Southeast Asia, including the Marriot hotel bombing and Australian embassy bombing in 2003 and 2004 respectively. He was arrested in June 2007 in Java of the charges of plotting terrorist activities and sheltering the perpetrators of the Bali bombing.

Fourth, Mas Selamat bin kastari was believed to begin his involvement in the 90's, when he joined Darul Islam movement. By 1992, he had joined Singapore JI cell and later in the year was sent to Afghanistan for training. Mas Selamat had earlier been arrested in February 2003 in the island of Bintan, Indonesia. He was jailed for 18 months in 2003 for immigration offences. On 20th January, he was again arrested for using fake identity card in Java and deported to Singapore.

Fifth, Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra, was graduated with highest honours in 1990 from the *Madrasah Aliyah Negari* (MAN) in Serang. In 1998, he became head of a Banten wide association of Madrasas called HOSMA (*Him Punan Osis Madrashas Aliyah*). He was also known within the Madrasas association as religious activists and reportedly became radicalised by one of the teachers of his high school, former Darul Islam leader Kyai Saleh Aslaad. He was one of the prime suspects in the Bali bombing and was subsequently arrested on 21st November, 2002.

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[22] White paper, *The Jemaah Islamiyah arrests and the threat of terrorism* (Jan 2003), Ministry of Home affairs, Singapore, Accessed 26 April 2010,
http://www.mha.gov.sg/get_blob.aspx?file_id=252_complete.pdf.

Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jama'ah islamyah (PUPJI)

The "General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah" (PUPJI), JI's charter and operating manual, outlines the religious principles and administrative aspects underlining JI's primary objective of establishing, through armed struggle, an Islamic state in Indonesia and a regional Islamic caliphate.[23] In order to understand the gradual evolution, operations, key strategic premises and decision making process of JI, it is very important to have a vivid understanding of PUPJI. This reference manual also provides us with an insider's outlook into the structure and motivations of JI. PUPJI was captured by Indonesian security forces in Solo, central Java in December 2002. Issued by JI's central executive council (*Qiyadah Markaziyah*), it outlines the group's administrative structure and guiding religious principles, in addition to providing insights into its organisational development, membership, recruitment and operational strategy.[24] PUPJI also focussed on terrorist justification for the use of violence, that various aspects of terrorist campaign and jihadist websites and propaganda techniques. The PUPJI that was issued by the central leadership council of the JI in May 1996 was authored with the blessing of Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Mukhlas.

The document may be a projection of how J.I envisioned itself in the future. While the codified structure does not necessarily match reality or account for subsequent evolution, it provides important details concerning the goals and the modus Vivendi of the group.

In his book on JI, Nasir Abbas, yet another key JI operatives and former head of the organisation's territorial sub-division *Mantiqi* III- describes in detail both the pamphlet and its significance of the group.[25] The importance if PUPJI is undeniable for number of reasons: firstly, it is the most significant document by JI as an organisation. Its main function is to throw light on its fundamental principles, rules of engagement, procedural norms and targeted outcomes. Further, it is important because it outlines the group's religious vision and core mission. Major part of PUPJI deals

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[23] Ibid.
[24] Elena Pavlova (Nov 2006), *From Counter Society to Counter State: Jemaah Islamiayh according to PUPJI*, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, p.1
[25] Ibid, p.8

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with religion and portrays the organisation as belonging to the spectrum of Salafi Jihadist extremist outlook.

While other Islamist movements might share some of JI's objectives, PUPJI's pre-eminent focus on armed struggle as it preferred modus operandi for establishing Daulah islamyah and restoring the global Islamic caliphate places JI to a completely different category of groups.[26]

It is important to note that PUPJI was intended as a reference manual for senior JI cadres. Rather than as a booklet with specific instructions to all rank-and-file members, its content is geared towards providing religious, tactical and strategically directions to the top leaders. The handbook's primary objective is to map out the organisational structure and the operational trajectory of the group, while also ensuring that these components are synchronized with JI's religious values and core mission.[27]

PUPJI comprises a booklet of around 44 pages. It is written in a combination of Bahasa Indonesia and Arabic. It consists of a broad range of topics. The Quran and Hadith are frequently quoted in order to suite the working of the group from a religious perspective. For the most part, However, JI's guidelines is organised around four main themes. These are the principle for the methodology to establish the religion, PUPJI starts by listing the ten religious principles that comprises JI's Islamist worldview (*Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Dien*).[28] The methodologies to establish the religion, its principles are subsequently expanded into a religious vision and an ideological programme on how to achieve them (*Mamhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*).[29] The methodology for operations, an operational methodology follows, delineating the group's structural apparatus and core activities (*Manhaj Al-Amaliy*).[30] JI's constitution, a constitutional charter is also included, with the aim of clarifying the group's norms and procedure, chains of command, and decision making processes (*Nidhomul Asasiy*)[31]

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[26] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, UK: Edward Elgar publishing limited, pp.82

[27] Ibid, pp.79

[28] Ibid, pp.79

[29] Ibid, pp.79

[30] Ibid, pp.79

[31] Ibid, pp.79

The general manual, discusses how operations should be conducted. It emphasis planning: the operation should be planned and carried out according to the plan. It also outlines the schemes for guerrilla war: view, analyse and explore all aspects of life in the enemy's body and in the environment. The document calls for four stages of operation: planning, execution, reporting and evaluation. Along with this, the document also focuses on strength utilization, operation, intelligence operation and fighting operations. Lot of emphasis is placed on educational period including enlightenment, discipline, physical strength leadership development and weapon skills. The document also recognises the danger that the member can face.

In PUPJI, there are 15 chapters along with its preamble, constitutional explanation and conclusions. Chapter 3 illustrates that the organisation is led by an elected Amir and assisted by a *Majlis* (council) that Amir is authorised the appointment and dismissal. Chapter 5 deals with the selection and responsibilities of the *Qiyadah* Councils that advise the Amir. PUPJI clearly give weight age to the power of Amir, as it states that, there should be difference of opinion between the Amir and the majority of votes, the decision of the Amir prevails. Chapter 10 identifies the criteria for membership, responsibility, rights and duties of those who are eligible. Members should understand Islam; comprehensions of the teaching of *Allah* and loyalty towards Amir, Responsibility of the members include living a life solely according to Islamic principles, obeying the PUPJI, obeying the Amir and Shura, defending and protecting the Amir and brothers and not performing any act that endangers the Jemaah or community.[32]

In the introduction of the PUPJI, the central leadership council of JI wrote that god has outlined a number of set principles for mankind to lead their lives: first, the aim of man's creation is to worship Allah alone, consequently all worldly possessions, time, energy and thought must be channelled towards this end.[33]

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[32] Thomas. J Biersteker, and Sue. E Eckert (ed)(2007), *Countering the financing of terrorism*. New York: Routledge, pp.67

[33] Anne Aldis and Graeme Herd (2007), op.cit, pp.115

Second, human existence on earth is to serve as God's vice-gerent.[34] In this regard, man is required to prevent, eliminate all acts of corruption and implementation of a way of life which falls outside the domain of God's law.

Third, life on an earth is a test to filter and sieve members of the human race in order to determine who has performed the bests deeds, which are judged based on two fundamental requirements, namely sincerity towards God and emulating the prophet in life's endeavour.[35]

Fourth, the apostles of god were sent by him to establish the *Dien*. The meaning of 'establishing the *Dien*' or '*Iqomatid Dien*', according to the exegetes (*Mufassirun*), is to establish a way of life based on the unity of God (*Tauhid*) which relates to establishing Islam in all its aspects, as explained by the companion of the prophet Muhammad, Abdullah bin Umar, in his commentary of the *Surah al fateh*, which according to him include *Aqidah* (Islamic creed), *Ibadah* (act of worship) and *Mahajul-hayah* (way of life).[36]

According to PUPJI, the main objective of JI is to develop the resources and capabilities and the organization as a whole, in a 1997 interview, the founding father and first Amir (leader) of JI, Abdullah Sungkar, observed that such an outcome is to be achieved in three consecutive phases:

Quwwatul Adiqah (faith's strength)

Quwwatul Ukhuwwah (brotherhood's strength)

Quwwatul Musallaha (military strength)[37]

Files extracted from the computer Imam Samudra- a top JI field commander responsible for orchestrating the first Bali bombing- also contain information on PUPJI.[38] In court, PUPJI was applied as evidence in the trials of Lampung group the key suspect behind the first Bali bombing-and, even more prominently, that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged Amir and spiritual leader of JI. Even with regard to the violence, most terrorist attack conducted by the group bear the hallmarks of JI's

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[34] Ibid, pp.116
[35] Ibid, pp.116
[36] Ibid, pp.116
[37] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), op.cit, pp.83
[38] Ibid, pp.80

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manual. The Bali bombings, the Marriott hotel bombing, and the Christmas Eve bombings all share in the commonality of their being operations in which the PUPJI stipulated modus operandi of division of labour and cell compartmentalization, pre-operation team surveillance and post-operations team review have been dutifully implemented.

Epicentre of Jemaah Islamiyah recruitment: kinship, Madrasas, Mosque and Friendship

Jemaah Islamiyah is an elite organization and it is very selective in its membership, finding recruit is not a problem for the member of JI. Bonds cannot be easily broken even after few years of no contact with JI members. Individuals may become inactive but they rarely take a conscious decision to leave the Jamaah , and if the superior asks a favour, it is difficult to say no.[39] Recruitment is such a commander cadre based organisation based on personal ties. There are four central relationships: kinship, mosque, madrasas and friendship.

The superb analysis of Jones and the ICG has concluded that these kinship ties, including marital ties are the single most important determinant of membership in JI.[40] JI is made up of a complex web of familial relationship and marriages ties. For the most part, families can be expected to provide the unconditional support and protection needed by terrorist militants when they involve themselves in high risk activities. There have been numerous instances of family members of terrorist militants willingly put themselves at risk in order to keep their kin safe, whether it is withholding information from the authorities or simply by the way of giving refuge.

The use of sibling relationships in jihadi recruitment is to provide further ideological support for the recruits beyond the group itself. Sometimes two or more brothers are recruited for jihad, helping each other during an operation and providing each other inspiration and encouragement. This particular type of recruitment is an effective use of kinship to ensure deeper engagement with the cause and group.

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[39] International Crisis Group(May 2007), Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's current status, Asia Breifing 63, Jakarta/Brussel, Accessed 2 May 2010, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/30751/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/738C7 691-A22E-4587-88AA-CC4BAD62C47A/en/b063_indonesia_jemaah_islamiyah_s_current_status.pdf.
[40] International Crisis Group(Feb 2004), Indonesia Backgrouder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report N 74. Jakarta/Brussel, Accessed 2 May 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf

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Father and son relation is also important in this context, with an aim for regenerating JI, senior members sent their children to study in Pakistan and other Middle East countries, to study. During university break, some members of the group went to Afghanistan for a course in urban warfare. Abdul Rohim, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's son, was the cell leader in Karachi.

Establishing arranged marriages between members of JI families was the ideal way to forge permanent alliances for the organisation. While being genealogically related of course matter in kinship, notion of relatedness are just as significant in bringing to gather group of people who think and act alike. Marriages are a way to bring siblings and relatives into JI activities and reliability of a way is often a criterion for formal JI memebership.[41] The impeccable lineage of one's wife enhances a member's standing with the organisation and increases his network potential.[42] A number of marriages also took place between Indonesians and Malaysians. While this is obvious, given that so many Indonesian men were living in exile in Malaysia, this means that bonds between the Indonesian and Malaysian parts of the organisation are particularly strong. Similarly, various members of JI married the women from other religion. For instance, Hambali married a part-Chinese woman, Noralwizah Lee, who converted to Islam.[43]

Madrasas

Since the Bali attack in Indonesia, the Islamic religious school known as Madrasas, in Southeast Asia have been openly alleged to have ties with the terrorist organisation. Others maintain that most Madrasas have been blamed unfairly for producing terrorism. The word Madrasas generally has two meanings: in its more common literal and colloquial usage, simply means "school", in its secondary meaning, a Madrasas is an educational institution offering instruction in Islamic subjects including but not limited to Quran, the saying of the prophet Muhammad, jurisprudence and law. Of more than 14,000 schools in Indonesia, only a tiny number are committed to jihadist principles. Chief among these schools is Al- Mukmin,

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[41] Yanina Golburt (2004), An in-depth look at the Jemaah Islamiyah network, *Al Nakhalah*, Article. 2, Accessed 4 May 2010, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/fall2004/golburt.pdf.
[42] Ibid, p.2
[43] Noor Huda Ismail (Jan 2007), Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links, *Japan Focus*, Accessed 6 May 2010, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Noor%20Huda-Ismail/2318

widely known as Pondok Ngruki, founded by one of the most prominent leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir the graduates of this school became the most well-known names in Southeast Asian terrorism. Recruiting a potential terrorist into the JI is a slow process, developing over time as the recruiter slowly assesses the dedication of the recruit.

In all, there is a network of some 60-100 madrassas that Indonesian security believes are centers if JI recruitment, most of which are run and staffed by Ngruki alums or veterans of the afghan mujahidin.[44] Established slowly and methodically, these madrassas include Mutaqin Jabarah in Central Java, Darul syahadin and the Madrassah luqmanul hakiem in Kelantan, Malaysia and the Hidyatullah network, through east Kalimantan and south Sulawesi, which is where many of the Bali bombers were hiding when they were arrested.[45]

Peasantries serves to propagate JI teachings, provide religious and occasionally military training to recruits and shelter member, who are in transit or are seeking refuge from the law. In Singapore, Ibrahim Maidin used religious classes as a recruiting ground for new members into the JI. His lectures during classes followed JI's anti-Western *Darul Islam* ideology. During the course of instruction, Maidin would mix discussions on *jihad* and the plight of Muslims around the world with *Quranic* teachings. From there, the most promising recruits were placed in the pipeline for training in Malaysia and Afghanistan.

Mosques

The mosque is another major epicentre of JI recruitment, JI look for religious Muslims of certain age who come not just for Friday prayers, but to pray five times a day. They are than invited to private study sessions, in which they are slowly indoctrinated. This is a multi- stage process over the course of year in which their commitment and religious understanding is tested and evaluated.

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[44] Thomas. J Biersteker, and Sue. E Eckert (ed)(2007), op.cit, pp 76

[45] Ibid, pp.76

The Jemaah Islamiyah's network: domestic and regional

Even though JI was established in Indonesia and was largely led by Indonesian leaders, overtime, it has developed extensive network and relations with various radical groups, both nationally and regionally. The organisational model of JI is more likely to be that of affinity groups with the regional and functional divisions of responsibility, rather than a formal hierarchal structure with specific links and chain of command.

Jemaah Islamiyah's domestic partners and linkages

Laskar Jihad

Laskar jihad is one of the biggest and best organised militant groups with 52 branches throughout Indonesia and more than 50,000 members.[46] In contrast to the international orientation of JI, Laskar Jihad has an explicitly nationalist political agenda. In this, there is a close overlap between its goals and ideology with that of Jemaah Islamiyah. Even though the existence of this group was known long before, the conflict that started in Maluku since 1999 between Christians and Muslims, that claimed thousands of lives, brought this group to prominence. The Laskar Jihad sent thousands of men from Java and Sulawesi to Maluku to defend the Muslim community and since 2000, has regularly received attention for their insistent attacks on Christian populations on both the islands.

Laskar Jihad makes no secret of its ultimate ambition, which is to reform or transform all of Indonesia into an Islamic state a theocracy under the leadership of the clergy based on full implementation of sharia.[47] Laskar Jihad, or 'Holy War Warriors,' was founded in 2000 by Jafar Umar Thalib, who spent several years studying in Pakistan and fighting alongside the *Mujahidin* in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Jafar acknowledges that his group has ties with JI and Malaysia based *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM), a terrorist organization recently made well-known as *al Qaeda's* collaborators. Indonesia's National Intelligence Agency also claims to have evidence that *al Qaeda* fighters have been fighting on Sulawesi Island, where hundreds of Laskar members recently arrived to increase attacks on Christians.

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[46] White paper (January 2003), op.cit

[47] Kirsten E Schulze (2002), 'Laskar Jihad and the conflict in Ambon' , *The brown journal of world affairs*, Vol. 9, issue.1, pp.57-70

The Jihad warriors were believed to have undertaken military style training at a camp Monjul village near Bogor, on a seven hectare plot belonging to Al- Irsad foundation. The training supported by the section of the TNI officer's corps was opposed to the continuing presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. Laskar jihad was established as an extension of the special division of FKAWI, whose headquarters were located in Yogyakarta, with provincial and district branches scattered in almost every Indonesian province.[48]

Laskar jihad caught the public eye when it held a spectacular gathering at the Senayan Main Stadium in Jakarta in early April 2000, which was attended by about ten thousand participants, this gathering decided the "disaster" afflicting Maluku Muslims, who were perceived as being threatened by genocide.[49] With over 10,000 fighters, Laskar Jihad is the largest and most organized militant Muslim organization in Indonesia. It incited conflict on the eastern Indonesian islands in 2000 when it sent around 5,000 armed militia men to the Moluccas region with the mission of suppressing what it sees as Christian separatist movements. Laskar Jihad's classification of Christians there as *Kafir Harbi* or belligerent infidels, the most dangerous category of non-Muslims which gives them the religious basis to kill. Since its inception, the group has been blamed for the death of thousands and for the creation of massive refugee flows out of targeted cities.

In stark contrast to its tactical violence, Laskar Jihad proclaims a peaceful three-part mission: Social work, Muslim education and Security mission. Its growing membership attests to the sense of Islamic identity it provides to otherwise alienated Muslim men. In keeping with welfare function, LJ's entry into the conflict in Maluku initially came through its despatch of healthcare workers and teachers to the region. The group accomplish its social mission by providing medicine and food to refugees and teaching the Koran to Muslims. This is followed a breakdown of relations between Islamic and Christian communities, based on shifting patterns of demography, patronage and legal and criminal economic opportunities, in which

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[48] Noorhaidi Hasan (2006), *Laskar jihad: Islam, militancy and the quest for identity in the post new order*, USA: Cornell Southeast Asia programme publications, pp.17

[49] Ibid, pp.17

Christians had lost their traditional regional dominance during the New order.[50] However, when tasked to fight Christians, many volunteers have said they felt deceived because they had joined to assist in humanitarian activities.

The resignation of Suharto's presidency, led to the rise of conservative modernist Muslim organisation. Jakarta's non-interventionist policy with TNI, which is now under civilian control after decades of dictatorship ended with Suharto, has enabled generals to retain old links with radical group such as Laskar Jihad. The support which the militant group continues to receive from the highest levels of the Indonesian military ensures its survival. Supporters within TNI are believed to provide the group with funds and weapons, and to order Malaccan officials not to smash down on Laskar Jihad members. According to Western intelligence sources, Laskar Jihad was actually founded with underground backing of military hardliners who wished to undermine the post-Suharto reformist government of Abdurrahman Wahid. Jafar considered former president Wahid as anti-Islamic, claiming that his government was placed to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels.

Though Laskar Jihad claims to raise most of its funds from Muslim communities, it is also believed to be relying heavily on money mishandling by the Army. Furthermore, Laskar Jihad has evidently received money from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Afghanistan. Laskar Jihad continues to be a concern for the Indonesian government as it mediates peace talks between Muslims and Christians on the troubled islands.

The conflict of Ambon was thus only a starting point as can be seen from Laskar jihad's involvement in Poso (Sulawesi) in the latter part of 2001, where it engaged in violence against Christian groups. It was active in west Papua against pro independence activities, where it established training camps. Since the group is widely seen to be the prime perpetrators of the ongoing violence on these islands, the possibility of the peace remains blurred.

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[50] Damien kingsbury (2005), op.cit, pp.25

Laskar Jandullah

Laskar Jandullah, meaning "army of Allah" has been active in various violent incidents in Ambon, Poso and Sulawesi. Laskar Jandullah has been closely associated with a group that supports JI, namely *Komite Persiapan penegakan syariat Islam* (KPPSI) or the preparatory committee for upholding Islamic law directly led by Agus Dwikarna.[51] Not only this, it appeared to have links with Al-Qaeda and Moro National Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao.

The Poso region leader of LJ was Amno Dai, who had been a follower of Kahar Muzakkar during the Darul Islam rebellion. LJ was believed to have drawn its membership from three sources; Descendants, relatives and supporters of Darul Islam rebellion, a faction of the Indonesian Islamic student organisation *Himpunan Mahasiswaislam*, and Muslims from the Poso area. Laskar Jandullah mainly draws its recruits from the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. Laskar Jandullah gathers about 2,000 recruits to central Sulawesi. Mostly using bats and machetes, they support local Muslims in violent conflicts with Christians near the town of Poso, which have been occurring off and on since 1998, with heavy casualties on both sides.[52] Around this time, Laskar Jandullah forces attack about seven other Christian villages in the region. There are reports the Indonesian military sometimes joins these attacks and at other times fails to help the attacked villages. These attacks are little noticed outside of Indonesia, and the involvement of al-Qaeda-linked figures will not be publicly revealed. But there is pressure within Indonesia for the government to do something. More military units are bought in several days after the Sepe attack, and they largely quell the violence.[53]

In December 2002, six suspicious foreign men, believed to be Islamist militants, are detained in the area and then let go. Later, Laskar Jandullah is caught up in a bombing of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in the city of Ujung Pandang, in southern Sulawesi. The group plans further attacks, but it is divided by internal quarrels. Dwikarna, who was not present in the Sepe attack, is upset at the others for thoughtlessly filming themselves in the attack and then planning to use the footage for

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[51] Bilveer singh, op.cit, pp. 89
[52] Ken Conboy (2003), *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, Jakarta: Equinox publishing, pp. 224
[53] Human rights watch(Dec 2002), Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi, vol.14, no.9

propaganda purposes. Seyam will be arrested in Indonesia late 2002 and footage of the Sepe attack apparently will be found with him. Dwikarna was arrested in the Philippines in 2002 as well and sentenced to prison for illegal possession of firearms and explosives.[54] Indonesian police have also arrested 18 people in connection with the Makassar bombings that occurred in December 2002. Eventually with Dwikarna's arrest, the violence in Sulawesi, come to an end that same year.

Laskar Mujahidin

Laskar Mujahidin is an armed militant organization with ties to JI through Abu Bakar Bashir's Pondok Ngruki *pesantren*. The first commander of Laskar mujahidin was Haris Fadillah alias Abi Dzar, the father in law of Omar-al-Faruq, a videotape featuring Fadilal encourages young Muslims to take up arms was distributed throughout Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Philippines and was shown during informal religious classes by clerics with alleged ties to JI. Fadilal was killed in a battle with Christian militia in October 2000. Following Haris death, Arynato Aris took command of LM. This group works closely with JI and is offered referred to as the "armed forces of the Ngruki network".[55] Its focus was the Muslim/Christian struggles in Ambon and Maluku. In 2000 the group numbered 500 men. While LM was linked to laskar jihad through the MMI, they maintained separate operations in and around Ambon and Poso and were known to clash with soldiers and police. The general training and capability of Laskar Mujahidin was higher than that of the larger Laskar Jihad, with whom they often clashed. Many of the leaders within Laskar Mujahidin had fought with the MILF in southern Philippines and favored to conduct hit-an-run style attacks. The nature of this Laskar Mujahidin, with its focus on ethnic Christian issues inside Indonesia, allows JI to focus its energy that could possibly develop into split due to their shift toward a pan-Islamic ideology. The mission of Laskar Mujahidin ensures a steady supply of work for those who are not as concerned with Western encroachment as much as they are domestic issues.

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[54] ibid
[55] International crisis group (2000), op.cit

Front Pembela Islam (FPI)

FPI and its militant group, Komando Laskar were founded in 1998 by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihad and KH Misabhul Anam at Pesentren at *al-umm ciputal* in south Jakarta.[56] Many believe that the FPI has something to do with their espousal of violence, ranging from petty crimes to extreme actions. There are calls by Indonesians, even from moderate Muslims, for the regulation of the group, if not its subsequent ban throughout the country. Habib Syihab boasted having several thousand members and even demanded an end to diplomatic relations with the United States. The aim of this organization is to take an active role in improving and maintain faith and morale of Muslims as well as to take initiative in building social, political and legal infrastructure that is in line with Islamic Shariah. In its early day, FPI served mostly as the alternative for Indonesian military, the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* attacking student protesters at anti government demonstration. FPI is believed to have several thousand members spread across 22 provinces, through the capital Jakarta, constitutes its principal area of strength and major theater of operation.[57] The FPI has an extensive network of Islamic religious schools and organization as well as numerous councils. It has a formal leadership hierarchy with five components: the *Syariat* council, the advocacy council, the honorary council and the council of advisers.[58] Rizieq was arrested in 2002, as he was found guilty of inciting hatred, for which he received a sentence of seven months. Although FPI activities were temporarily frozen during his imprisonment but vigilante assaults resumed in 2003.

On April 2006 they attacked Playboy's office in Jakarta, Indonesia by throwing stones. They protested the very first publication of the magazine even though it contained no starkness and was considered tamer than other magazines already operating in the country for a while. In early 2006 there were public calls for the disbanding of the FPI. Nothing came out of them. On June 2008, National Monument Incident occurred, and FPI leader, Habib Riziq Shihab was again arrested.

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[56] Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa. William Rosenau and Leann Piggot (ed) (2009), *The evolving terrorist threat of Southeast Asia: a net assessment*, Rand publications, pp.71

[57] Ibid, pp 77

[58] Damien Kingsbury (2005), op.cit. pp.31

Mujahidin KOMPAK

The *Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* (KOMPAK), or the crisis management prevention committee is based in central Sulawesi, was established in 1998 under the guidance of DDII to provide relief assistance to people in conflict areas, such as Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi. KOMPAK formed as a splinter group of leaders from JI who grew impatient with perceived bureaucratic nature of that organisation. In contrast to JI focus on religious indoctrination, KOMPAK is focussed to train its member in Mindanao and Afghanistan, to fight as quickly as possible.

Jemaah Islamiyah used many of these charities between 1999 and 2001, during a period of sectarian bloodletting in the Moluccas Islands between Jemaah Islamiyah's paramilitaries and Christian and Hindu citizens. While KOMPAK often functions as the local agent of JI, the leadership reflects differences over longer term strategies on waging jihad as well as shorter term impatience. Agus Dwikarna was the head of the group called the committee to implement Sharia in South Sulawesi and number four official in Abu Bakar Ba'ayir's overt civil society organisation, the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI).[59] Of the thirteen regional directors of KOMPAK, at least three were top-level Jemaah Islamiyah operatives. KOMPAK, however, only came to the assistance of Muslim communities, which it worked to radicalize. KOMPAK officials, while acknowledging that they operate in regions struck by sectarian conflict such as Aceh, Poso, the Moluccas, and Bangunan Beton Sumatra, asserted that they improve the crises and provide necessary relief.

The Indonesian crackdown broke KOMPAK into dissimilar cells, but the organization did not cease its commitment to radicalization. In 2003, Indonesian forces arrested several KOMPAK leaders for their involvement in sectarian violence and terrorism; several others went underground. Indonesian prosecutors believe that one mid-level Jemaah Islamiyah operative, Abdullah Sonata, received 11 million rupiah (US$15,000) and 100,000 Saudi riyals ($36,500) in 2004 from a Saudi named Syeikh Abu Muhammad to finance militant operations and to send Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists to Mindanao. Other KOMPAK members obtained weaponry with which to initiate a new wave of sectarian bloodletting in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas. It

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[59] Thomas. J Biersteker, and Sue. E Eckert (ed)(2007), op.cit, pp 80

is clear, therefore, that the KOMPAK network, funded by Saudi charities, helped develop Jemaah Islamiyah. It also illustrates clearly that terrorist organizations can be created from social networks. On August 3, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Indonesian branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization, along with the Philippine branch and a Saudi director of the International Islamic Relief Organization, for financing terrorism, including Al-Qaeda.[60] While KOMPAK does not engage in conflict directly, its aid won support for Jemaah Islamiyah and its paramilitary organizations such as Laskar Jandullah and Laskar Mujahidin.

Regional partners and linkages

MALAYSIA

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM; Malaysian Mujahidin group)

The Kumpulan Mujahedeen Malaysia (KMM) or Malaysian Mujahedeen Movement is a radical group. The organisation was founded in 1995 by Zainon Ismail with the pan Islamic goal of forming an Islamic state in Southeast Asia and identified the secular government of the region, as its primary enemies.

Malaysian police assess the KMM to have 70 to 80 members. The Malaysian police continued to investigate more than 200 suspected Muslim militants throughout 2002. The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Wilayah Persukutuan, the federal territory comprising Kuala Lumpur. The KMM also has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians. The KMM deemed to threaten Malaysia's national security, including planning to wage a jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings and robberies and planning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. Several of the arrested militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahidin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Others are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines.

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[60] Abuza Zachary (Winter 2009), "Jemaah Islamiyah adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.XVI, no.1, pp.15-26

The KMM emerged publically in mid 2001 when Malaysian authorities used the internal security act to round up and detain several people they were involved in a plot to topple the Mahathir's government by force.[61] Other citizens were likewise detained without trial. The police and the conventional media repeated that these were the KMM members.

The KMM enjoys significant ties with the most violent regional Islamic organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah, which has bolstered its influence and operational capabilities. Its links with JI is a critical aspect of its ability to spread its influence and gain new members. Key JI leaders, such as its spiritual head Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, supposedly have provided spiritual guidance to KMM members. Singaporean officials also claim that JI members have also provided logistical and financial support to the KMM's terrorist activities in Indonesia. Southeast Asian officials believe that the KMM has been able to successfully spread its influence and augment its strength beyond Malaysian borders through its relationship with groups like JI. Certainly the overlap in associated between KMM and JI, has proved opportune for both groups given their shared ideology and objective and each has been more than willing to assist the other in operational planning and preparation.

The KMM's current lack of central leadership has hampered the group's ability to conduct operations but nonetheless it subsists largely due to its connections with JI and other regional groups as well as its own diffuse and decentralized network of cells.

PHILIPPINES

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

The cooperation between JI and MILF is most evident in the area of training. Sometime in 1997, MILF allowed JI to set up its own training facility within camp Abu Bakar. This camp was known as camp Hudaybiyya and was run by Indonesian JI members.[62]

[61] Marika Vicziany, Neville Wright and Peter Lentini (2004), *Regional security in Asia pacific: 9/11 and after*, UK: Edward Elgar publishing limited Glensanda House, p.3
[62] White paper (January 2003), op.cit

The MILF was formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, separated from the Moro National Liberation Front, advocating a more moderate and appeasing approach toward the government. Salamat among others had a close connection with JI leaders, which not only having being actively involved in mujahidin struggle in Afghanistan but also shared common radical ideology. Recent reports indicate that JI members continue to train MILF militants and that JI members are still undergoing paramilitary training on Mindnao.[63] Activists from JI have been caught up in many attacks in the Philippines. In 2002, Indonesian senior JI member and link to MILF, Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi was arrested, although he managed to escape from the custody in July 2003.[64] Al-Ghozi was killed the following October by police in Mindanao.

MILF has stronger religious components than the MNLF, with its leaders drawn from a group of Muslims educated in religious schools in the Middle East. Divisions along generational lines have emerged among Moro's since the 1960s. Many young Muslims, disappointed with the old leaders, stated that *Datu* and Sultans were unnecessary in modern Islamic society.

In January 1987, the MNLF signed an agreement abandoning its goal of independence for Muslim regions and accepting the government's offer of autonomy. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the next largest faction, refused to accept the accord and started a brief offensive that ended in a ceasefire later that month. The MILF has an estimated armed strength of between 10,000 to 11,000 (according to the Philippines government) and 40,000(according to various western estimates) and has been held responsible for highly visible terrorist bombings in Manila (in 2000 and 2001) and Davao City (2003).

After breaking off peace talks in Manila in April of 2000, the MILF also mounted several terrorist against Philippine security and civilian targets. Philippine officials also suspect MILF operatives conducted bombings in Manila, including two at popular shopping malls in May. The MILF observed a cease-fire since 2003 although the Philippine government has attributed some terrorist attacks to the organization.

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[63] Terence Chong (ed) (2008), *Globalisation and its counter forces in Southeast Asia,* Singapore: Institute of southeast Asian studies, pp.269

[64] Dmien Kingsbur (2005), op.cit. pp 42

The MILF deny any involvement and claim that bombings attributed to them were committed by splinter groups not under their control.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Abu Sayyaf means 'father of the sword' in Arabic. The Abu Sayyaf group was originally known as the mujahedeen Commando Freedom fighters (MCFF) founded in the mid 1980s, when it was known as *Al-Harakat –ul Al Islmiyah* (AHAI), and was renamed Abu Sayyaf group in the late 1980s, and formally in 1991.[65]

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic terrorist group operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the much larger Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurazak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998. The ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The group's stated goal is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims, but the ASG primarily has used terror for financial profit. The ASG today has been driven from its traditional base of support on Basilan island to Mindanao where it has made common cause with JI remnants, al-Qaeda trained foreign terrorist and radical elements in several of the MILF's base commands.[66]

Between 1991 and 1997, ASG conducted a total of 67 terrorist attacks. In April 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including ten Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including US citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. In January 2002, in the wake of the US 'war on terror', some 1,200 US troops arrived in the Philippines to support the government's operation against ASG. U.S. and Philippine authorities blamed the ASG for a bomb near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed a U.S. serviceman. In February 2004, Khadaffy Janjalani's faction bombed Super Ferry 14 in Manila Bay, killing 132. In March 2004, Philippine authorities arrested an ASG cell

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[65] Damien Kingsbury, op.cit,pp.47

[66] Terence Chong (ed) (2008), op.cit, pp.269

whose bombing targets included the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The ASG also claimed responsibility for the 2005 Valentine's Day bombings in Manila, Davao City, and General Santos City, which killed eight and injured more than 150. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, replaced him as the nominal leader of the group. In September 2006, Janjalani was killed in a gun battle with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Radullah Sahiron is assumed to be the new ASG leader.

Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda, at least among certain factions. In August 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines began "Operation Ultimatum," a sustained campaign that disrupted ASG forces in safe havens on Jolo Island in the Sulu archipelago, and resulted in the killing of ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani in September 2006 and his deputy, Abu Solaiman in January 2007. In July 2007, the ASG, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) engaged a force of Philippine marines on Basilan Island, killing fourteen, of which ten were beheaded.

THAILAND

There are five important terrorist groups in Thailand that are worth mentioning, these include- the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, New Pattani united liberation organisation, *Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani* (GMIP), the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* and *Jemaah Salafi*. Out of these five, GMIP and *Jemaah Salafi* have close ties with Jemaah Islamiyah.

The *Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani* (GMIP) also known as the Pattani Islamic Mujahidin Movement, or the Pattani Islamic Holy Warriors Movement, is said to be possibly the only significant armed band operating in the lower South of Thailand. Since the September 11 terror attacks on the United States, the international terror group al-Qaeda has injected money and insurgency know how into militant groups in various countries enabling them to climb out of their dormant state and grow rapidly. In June 2003, Thai police arrested three Thai Muslims, as well as one from Singapore, some of whom later admitted to be members of Jemaah Islamyah. Thai military intelligence sources suspect that, in the attempts to annex southern Thailand, Kumpulan Mujahedeen Malaysia, based in Terengganu, helped to revive the local separatist groups GMIP and *Barisan Revelusi Nasional* (BRN). With support from the

Malaysian militants, GMIP and BRN have been transformed into insurgency groups with a regional agenda departing from their past goal of carving out a Pattani state.

Malaysia's Al-Ma'unah wants to set up an Islamic state in Malaysia. Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front want an Islamic state in Indonesia. Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front want to form an independent Muslim state in the Muslim enclave of Mindanao in southern Philippines, while Barisan Revolusi Nasional and Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani want to do so in southern Thailand

SINGAPORE

Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah

The Singapore JI branch was started by Ibrahim maidin, a religious teacher. He was inducted in JI by Abu jibril in 1988-89. Ibrahim maidin took the bai'ah under Ba'ayir and was subsequently appointed as the leader of JI in Singapore.[67] The existence of this group came to known when the Singapore authorities caged 13 members of the group that were planning to take on a series of bombing in Singapore.

The threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah is compounded by its development as a network that ignores national boundaries. It stretches over several countries in the region and has formed links with other Muslim extremist groups to further its goals. The various terrorist organisation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, southern Thailand and Singapore operating at varying levels of efficacy, allows them to continue, which not only seem irresolvable in the foreseeable future, but may be implied in the structure depicts that they have a regenerative capacity.

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[67] White paper (January 2003), op.cit

Chapter -3

Operation, Ideology and Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

Radical Islamist Ideology

Since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, the world has been facing one of the greatest challenges, which is the threat of the transnational terrorism. Ethnic and religious violence in Southeast Asia has different in intensity throughout the last five hundred-plus years. Today, radicals adopting an idea of universal jihad have induced the regional religious conflict in Southeast Asia. They have manipulated the legacy of violence into a campaign against the West and its allies. Dramatic events such as the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings and connections to both World Trade Centre attacks displayed the effectiveness of efforts by certain radical elements within Southeast Asia to promote the goal of universal jihad. Recent insight into the operations of these radical groups provided a picture of a loose, trans-national web of like-minded organizations that not only share Ideology but also information, facilities, funding, training and personnel.[1]

JI ideology refers to the comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which JI makes sense of the world,[2] although much of the JI ideology relies on the Quran, the Sunnah and the interpretation of venerable forefathers (*Salafush-Sholih*), it must be stressed that it is by no means representative of the views held by all Muslims scholars. It depicts that JI ideology has its limitation. In their understanding of Islam. JI preaches the need to practice Islam in its totality, which is referred-to as "*Islam Kaffah*".[3] Throughout the history JI ideology exhibited a remarkable ability to adapt itself to changing circumstances, to incorporate new ideas and to apply it to new strategic and political ends. The key leaders of JI, such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Hambali, Abu Jibril among others appeared to have undergone

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[1] Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhry (March 2009), "Madrassa: Breeding Ground Of Jihadist," Accessed 11 June 2010, http://www.modernghana.com/newsp/208749/1/pagenum5/madrassa-breeding-ground-of-jihadists.html

[2] Terence Chong (ed) (2008), *Globalisation and its counter forces in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of southeast Asian studies

[3] Rohan Gunaratna (March 2005), The Ideology of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah, Accessed 12 June 2010, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/27180/ichaptersection_singledocument/55F9E5B7-B046-4283-B649-023F0D0022CE/en/07_IdeologyAlJamaah.pdf.

metamorphosis as far as their ideology was concerned. They were essentially followers of Darul Islam and wanted to realize the dream of creating Indonesia as an Islamic state, however, overtime, their goal expanded to convert Southeast Asia into an Islamic region.

Adherents of radical Islamic ideologies are a small minority in Indonesia.[4] There always were tendencies toward more orthodox and Sharia-based forms of Islam and periodic attempts to introduce more radical interpretations of the religion. The Padri movement in Sumatra in the 1820s and 1830s implicated an effort to introduce *Wahhabism* by clerics returning from Mecca who had been influenced by Wahhabi teachings during the al-Sauds' first occupation of the city at the beginning of the nineteenth century. There were explosion of Muslim radicalism throughout Southeast Asia during the European colonial period armed jihads to liberate Muslim lands from the occupation of infidels. With the beginning of the twentieth century, in Indonesia, the vast majority of Muslims became affiliated with an organisation called Muhammadiyah, which was founded in 1912 as a reformist movement that advocated individual interpretation of the Quran over the acceptance of traditional interpretation laid down by Ulama.[5] Muhammadiyah has long been an intellectual conservative organisation with strong reactionary elements. By the 1930's, the emphasis on Wahhabi- *Salafism* was accompanied by a parallel interest in Islamism. In particular, the combination of Wahhabi Puritanism in religious thinking and anti colonial nationalism in political thinking led Muhammadiyah, to be increasingly attracted to the embryonic Islamist ideas of Hassan al- Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Abu Ala Maududi, who would later found *Jamaati-e-Islami*, currently the oldest political party in Pakistan also heavily influenced Muhammadiyah's leader around this time, both directly through his writings and indirectly through his influence on Hassan al-Banna's thought.[6] Maududi's early books, which included *Towards understanding Islam* (1932), *the problem of nationalism* (1937), and *Muslim and the present political crisis* (1939, introduced key

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[4] Angel M Rabasa (March 2005), Radical Islamist Ideologies in Southeast Asia, Accessed 12 June 2010, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/27174/ichaptersection_singledocument/DB5488EA-20E4-437D-A878-C58B7348FEAC/en/03_RadicalIslamist.pdf

[5] Scott Helfstein (2009), *Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia*, Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC), New York: West Point, pp.33

[6] Ibid, pp.34

concepts such as 'Theo Democracy' and sketched out cardinal ideas of Islamism.[7] Its ideology puts a premium on jihad, particularly the struggle, often include by means of terrorism against opponents. Jihadi Islamism combines pre modern Saudi Wahhabi Islam with the more recent ideas of Sayyid Qutb and his Egyptian Muslim brotherhood movement of particular significance is Qutb's doctrine of *Jahiliyya*, which see all human society as having being brought back to state of spiritual ignorance and depravity since being ruled by human authority rather than Allah embodied in Sharia, derived from Quran. Contacts with Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, a terrorist splinter group of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood could have influenced the Indonesian radicals to move beyond the goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia to the concept of a pan-Islamic caliphate

The legacy of religious violence that provides a foundation for the current Southeast Asian pan-Islamic movement gained momentum after the Second World War with the Darul Islam (Islamic State) rebellions in Indonesia, led by Kartosuwirjo. The Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Java started in the aftermath of Indonesia's separation from the Dutch government. The leaders of the movement were primarily from the urban middle-class who believed the *Umma* (Muslim community) needed to return to the Quran and Hadith in order to eliminate impurities within Islam.

In more recent years, the growth of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia has been catalyzed by the worldwide Islamic revival and the arrival of funds and ideologies from the Middle East. Funding has allowed extremist groups to expand their activities and to make inroads into the largely moderate system of Indonesian religious education. This inflow has, in turn, accelerated a process of the displacement of indigenous culture by Arab religious and social practices and the growth of international Islamist networks reaching from the Middle East into Southeast Asia. The widespread awareness of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East has generated greater polarisation among Southeast Asian Muslims and facilitated the most notorious group, JI to form networks with its likeminded groups.

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[7] Robert W. Hefner (Oct 1997), "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological rivalries among Indonesian Muslims," *Indonesia Quarterly*, vol.64, pp.77-103

One of the most important groups that share common ideological orientation with Jemaah Islamiyah is Laskar Jihad. Like JI, Laskar jihad's ideology is deeply conservative, opposing democracy or a female head of the state as incompatible with Islam, and is influenced by anti-Zionist and Christian conspiracy theories. Laskar Jihad was inspired by Saudi-style Wahhabi teachings. At the heart of the Laskar Jihad's agenda was the imposition of Sharia law in Indonesia. Laskar Jihad leader Ja'afar Umar Thalib presided over an illegal Islamic court in Ambon that condemned an adulterer to death by stoning the first recorded application of Islamic criminal law (*hudud*) in modern Indonesian history.

Some Indonesian scholars have noted that Islamic extremism in their country has been connected with clerics of Arab and more specially Hadrami (Yemeni) origin—such as Laskar Jihad leader Ja'afar, founders of JI Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar and the Islam Defenders Front chief Muhammad Habib Rizieq, among others.[8] The Arab Diaspora, particularly its newer elements, may serve as either a link or disguise for missionaries or terrorists arriving from the Middle East. There is considerable evidence that Middle Eastern influences have shaped the ideology of most, if not all, of the Indonesian militant movements.[9]

Two events in the latter part of the 20th century that further spread Islamic radicalism and Islamic terrorism were the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979-1989 and the expansion of the *Jihadist-Salafi* movement supported both directly and indirectly by the Saudi-based Wahhabi sect of Islam. *Wahhabism* has been used as a vehicle by radical *Jihadist-Salafis* to spread a violent riot against all who do not support their beliefs. Jihadists are radical Muslims seeking revolutionary change to political and social order dedicated to violence and terrorism. They actively support or conduct activities directed toward the realization of their goals. A systematic understanding of the Muslim history of jihad and its application in the Soviet-Afghan War, as well as the rise of *Wahhabism* is an important part for increasing the ability of radical Muslim groups in Southeast Asia.

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[8] Angel Rabasa (May 2005), "Radical Islamist ideologies in Southeast Asia," Current trends in Islamist Ideology, vol.1, Accessed 15 June 2010, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/radical-islamist-ideologies-in-southeast-asia

[9] ibid

The Soviet-Afghan war was perhaps the most significant event in the development of an international terrorist network. In the case of Southeast Asian groups, all the key figures went to Afghanistan to participate in jihad and experience the glory of defeating the Soviets. In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda taught these key figures sophisticated terrorist tradecraft and expertise. After they returned to Southeast Asia, they transferred the skills to other members of their organizations. Their shared experience training in Afghanistan also fostered links among these leaders, and between them and their Al-Qaeda trainers and mentors. The Islamists in Southeast Asia maintained their links and continued to travel into Afghanistan. The Madrassas formed the ideological front line against the Soviets, acting as recruiting grounds for potential Mujahidin. Once in Afghanistan, Mujahidin began a process of transformation, receiving training in various terrorist tradecrafts and establishing bonds of brotherhood with their comrades-in-arms that would allow them to carry jihad home.

Wahhabism is a late-18th century Islamic movement that forms the basis of the present Saudi Arabian state. It is also the foundation of the teaching going on at thousands of Madrassas or Pesantren in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and elsewhere. It promotes a precise interpretation of the Quran and Hadith that has served as an educational and normative tool for the Islamic radicals that feed into terrorist organizations. Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab, the religious founder of the *Wahhabiyya* movement (Wahhabism), opposed any form of innovation in Islam, and called for a return to the roots of Islam. He developed an ideology that sought to reform Islam by returning to its roots and eliminating any distortions. He believed jihad could and be carried out against any other Muslims who did not support his belief. The relationship between the Salafi movement and Wahhabism is quite complicated and does not fall within the scope of the overview provided in this analysis. In many ways, Wahhabism is part of the Salafi movement within Islam. Salafis also promote a return to the roots of Islam and are violently opposed to religious innovations adopted by Sufi and Shi'a thinker.[10]

Saudi nationals formed the initial core cadre of Wahhabi missionaries who have proselytized throughout the Muslim world. Their teachings have had a significant effect on the population of Southeast Asia. Its conservative, assertive brand of Islam

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[10] Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhry (March 2009), op.cit

has found great appeal, especially in the predominantly Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. Tens of thousands of Southeast Asian Muslims have travelled abroad to study in Islamic universities, on the other hand, Southeast Asian governments have no idea how many of their citizens have studied in or are currently enrolled in these Madrassas.[11]

Wahhabi-Saudi diffusion of local Islamic communities often starts with infrastructure investments in the local community. A general approach is the construction of mosques, often funded by Saudis. It is true that Wahhabi Madrassas have become primary breeding grounds for terrorists. The problem is that, the Saudi-backed Madrassas is the only form of education open to young men. International terrorist organizations have gone through these schools and used them as a cover to preach their extreme form of hatred of the West. Students within the schools who appear to be open to their ideology are identified and selected for further indoctrination. Access to training camps is critical to the broadcast of operational tradecraft to the next generation of jihadists, but the camps also have an equally important role in facilitating the dispersal of ideology and the indoctrination of recruits.

The JI has rejected the idea of working within the political system, either through election and participation in parliament or through cooperation with other political forces, including Islamist forces that seek to have Islamic law applied in the country.[12] Abdullah Sungkar believed that cooperation with such forces or political regime was un-Islamic and "could corrupt the faith".[13] the proposal of Faud Ansyari, who later became the secretary of MMI, to work through the Indonesian parliament or support Islamist parties, instead of working outside the system was strongly denied by Sungkar.

The *Wahhabi-Salafi* orientation of JI was clearly Evident in Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's exposition of what he thought were the key principle of Islam.[14] He stated that in this

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[11] ibid

[12] Diaa Rashwan (2007), "The Spectrum of Islamist Movement," Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp.95

[13] Ibid, pp.95

[14] Bilveer Singh(2007), *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist Extremists,* London: Praeger security international press, pp. 76

regard five key pillars are crucial to understand. First, "Islam (*din*) was based on the law for living and these were the teachings of god transmitted to his messenger, the Prophet." According to him, the corridors of Islam should not be only limited to religion. Second, "Since Islam is a religion from god, man had no right to interfere, intervene or amend it. If anything, man's action should be judged, at least for Muslims, by the yardstick of Islamic religion." Third, "Islam should be proselytized through *Dakwah,* peacefully, winning over adherents through discussions and advice, and not through force or inducements." Fourth, "Islam condones the use of force to defend itself. However, Islam is attacked through weapons, and then the religion condones and legitimises the use of force." Fifth, "the propagation, promotion and protection of the religion are the duty of the government, not just individuals. The state, through its power and authority, can do far more than an individual. If a country has a Muslim majority, it is only right that *Sharia* be adopted and implemented."[15]

Religion is perhaps the most important motivated factor for Jemaah Islamiyah operatives. Religion text was quoted selectively to educate and motivate JI's member. In the hands of JI's ideologues, Islam became weapon, inciting many to the call of Jihad. In JI, they wanted to be convinced that they had discovered 'true Islam', and that they could be freed from endless searching. They believed they couldn't do wrong in the eyes of God as JI leaders legitimated the group's agenda and action through their reading of the Holy Scriptures. The psychological profile of JI members suggested that they were inclined to indoctrination and control needed a sense of belonging without a close attachment. Fears of divine reckoning and hope for the reward of the hereafter were instilled by charismatic lectures causing member to view JI's struggle as synonyms with Islam.[16] As with all jihadist organization, religious study is an integral part of the training and indoctrination process in Jemaah Islamiyah. JI teachers would employ the tactic of inserting into their lectures quotations from the Quran and Hadith discussing jihad and the plight of Muslims. Obscure language and code names were used in the indoctrination process, which helped to create a strong sense of group identity and commitment.

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[15] Ibid, pp.76

[16] White paper (January 2003), The Jemaah Islmaiyah arrests and the threat of terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, Accessed 16 June 2010, http://www.mha.gov.sg/get_blob.aspx?file_id=252_complete.pdf

A reliable theme in the radical discourse is the morality of force to further the goals of Islam from attacks or to promote its good image. According to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir:

Defending Islam is both a duty and obligation. While death is certain, yet there are different kinds of death. Some are of low or high quality and others somewhere in the middle. For Islam, the highest value of death comes to a person when he/she dies a martyr or *mati sahid*. Undertaking suicide is forbidden by Islam as this is done by people who have lost all hopes in living. However, a martyrdom death is highly valued and prized. When one dies for Islam, one gets closer to god as his chosen one. This is what all *jihadists* strive for and is permissible in Islam. Since the day of the prophet, the idea of dying for Islam was to weaken the enemy, both directly and indirectly. As long as these goals are achieved, than death is not in vain. It is highly valued and hence, should be both encouraged and praised. It emanates from higher intensions and ideals with the sole purpose of getting closer to god and to defend the Islam in the face of attacks from its enemies.[17]

PUPJI also offers an insight into the basic concept of JI ideology. According to JI expert Zachary Abuza, the concept of purifying violence is central to the JI ideology. Religious violence is seen as an act of cleansing of sins, particularly important in the case of JI members who were formerly criminals and are now seeking rescue. Since the Jemaah Islamiyah came to the attention of the outside world in 2001, about 300 militants, including much of the leadership, have been arrested across Southeast Asia. The arrests have damaged, but not destroyed the ability of the organization to conduct terrorist operations. Participation in these jihads is an important element in the group's ideological consolidation.

The JI Operation

Despite the common branding of the Bali Bombing, 2002 as the first act of suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia, it is worth noticing that the tradition of self sacrificial military operations in the region is far from new. According to some of the historians, warriors in Northern Sumatra, Mindanao and Sulu carried out suicide attack against colonilizing forces over the span of several centuries. These, off course, were not in the form of suicide bombing, but rather *Fidayeen* attacks with edged weapons in which a single fighter would run up to the enemy forces, trying to kill as many as possible before himself being killed.[18] The first actual suicide bombing in the region

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[17] Bilveer Singh (2007), op.cit, pp.77

[18] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, UK: Edward Elgar publishing limited, pp.108

than occurred in 1951, when a young communist suicide volunteer assassinated Frencg Brigadier General Charles Marie Chanson in Sadec, Indonesia by detonating grenade in his pocket.[19]

In the bombings in Bali in October, one of the bombs was carried in a backpack into a club by a suicide bomber named Iqbal. The Bali bombing, comprising three separate bombings in the tourist area of Kuta was the first mass-casualty terrorist attack in Southeast Asia, as well as the worst terrorist occurrence in Indonesia's history. It was also the first suicide bomb attack in modern Indonesian history and represented another step in the introduction of Middle Eastern terrorist techniques into Southeast Asia. Other major recent terrorist attacks in Indonesia, includes, the August 2003 vehicle bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and the September 2004 car or truck explosion outside the Australian embassy, the second Bali bombing in October 2005 and the Marriot and Carlton Hotels bombing in Jakarta in July 2009 which killed nine people.

After the fall of Suharto, Ba'asyir concluded that the more open political environment in Indonesia offered opportunities to pursue the JI's objectives through apparent as well as secret means. Consequently, together with other Muslim activists, in August 2000 Ba'asyir summon the founding congress of an above-ground front organization, the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia MMI), composed of people who hold dual membership in JI and MMI, as well as members of other radical Indonesian Islamist groups.

Around 1999 or 2000, the JI leadership stepped up efforts to recruit more JI members into the operations cells and to prepare them for military training. Many religious schools were converted into operations cells and many members were send for training in Afghanistan or Mindanao. In observance with this instruction, the Singapore JI network disbanded its *Dakwah* (missionary) and other non-operations cells and deployed its members for training. In Malaysia, the JI training also changed from fitness type training to terrorism-related training. The first indication of the Operationalisation of this instruction in the JI network was in 1999, when JI formed a regional alliance of *jihad* or *mujahidin* group called the Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Coalition). The JI *Amir* Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had initiated this alliance in

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[19] Ibid, pp.108

the hope that the groups could cooperate and share resources for training, procurement of arms, financial assistance and terrorist operations. The groups in this alliance included the MILF, an unnamed self-exiled Rohingyas group based in Bangladesh and an unnamed *jihad* group based in South Thailand. The objective was to unite the militant groups in the region and to use this podium to realise the Daulah Islamiyah. Rabitatul Mujahidin reportedly met 3 times between 1999 and late 2000; all the meetings held in Malaysia amidst great privacy. Sometime in 2000, Rabitatul Mujahidin decided to attack Philippines interests in Indonesia. The bomb that subsequently went off outside the Philippine Ambassador's home in Jakarta in August 2000 killed 2 and injured 20.[20] ~~The bombing injured the ambassador and killing his security guard and an innocent bystander.~~ Hambali was apparently the brain behind this attack, which was authorized and co-ordinated by the Rabitatul Mujahidin. Hambali chooses two separate groups to implement the bombing. The bombing injured the ambassador and killing his security guard and an innocent bystander.

The first clearly JI terrorist operation was likely to be the one mounted in December 2000 which involved the simultaneous bombing of churches in several Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve.[21] More than 30 bombs were set to explode at the same time at Christian churches or the homes of clergy. The teams strike 38 churches in 11 cities in Indonesia in an effort to stimulate conflict between Christians and Muslims. Nineteen people were killed and around 120 were injured. The Christmas Eve bombings involve perhaps JI's most ambitious operational planning. Envisioned by Hambali and approved by Ba'asyir, the bombings were planned by Hambali and his hand-picked team of jihadists the bombs are crude, often killing the jihadists who try to detonate themselves.

The Rizal Day bombing is a joint venture between JI and the MILF. The origins of the bombing lay with Hambali's direction to al-Ghozi to buy explosives from the MILF. Hambali approves the bombing and provides them with the funding. Eventually, Al-Ghozi successfully carried out five simultaneous explosions in Manila on December 30, 2000, the Rizal Day holiday

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[20] White paper (January 2003), op.cit

[21] ibid

Santa Ana church bombings are a continuation of Hambali's strategy of bombing churches to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims. Imam Samudra directs a six-person cell that includes Christmas Eve and PAR bomber. The cell organised simultaneously attacks on the Santa Ana Catholic Church and the HKBP Protestant church on 22 July.[22] Funding for the bombing was materialised through the treasurer of Mantiqi I

The Atrium Mall bombing was part of Hambali's strategy of fomenting conflict between Christians and Muslims. The target was aimed at Christian worshippers on the upper floor of the Atrium Mall. Imam Samudra directed the attack the bomb prematurely exploded, injuring 196.

The overall project was planned and co-ordinated by Hambali. Two Singapore JI members participated in this operation. They went to Johor for briefings before making their way to Batam to execute the bombings. In the same month, JI also bombed the Light Railway Train in Manila in which 22 people were killed. According to the Philippines police investigations, JI bomb-maker Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi was responsible for the bombing. Fathur revealed that this bombing assignment was funded by the JI.

The initial plans of Singapore JI members to attack targets in Singapore dates back to the mid 1990s, long before the events of September 2001. Preparations for attacks intensified after 11 September 2001. In October 2001, Ibrahim Maidin conducted a survey of selected JI members to measure their willingness to carry out various tasks for the *jihad* cause in Afghanistan. These tasks included offering prayers, contributing money and ideas, undertaking damaging activities inside and outside Singapore, and sacrificing one's life for the cause. Several operations cells of JI were actively involved in preparing for attacks against targets in Singapore. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks later inspired *fiah* Ayub to be directly involved in the facilitation of the attacks. The various plans for attacks in Singapore involved a range of targets from Western organization to local possessions. [23]

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[22] Scott Atran and Marc Sageman (2006), "Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist," Database project, Accessed 18 June 2010, http://groups.csail.mit.edu/belief-dynamics/MURI/papers07/case1_netevolve.ppt

[23] White paper (January 2003), op.cit

Hambali's aim was to create a situation in Malaysia and Singapore, which would be conducive to overthrowing the Malaysian Government and provoking a revolution that would turn Malaysia into an Islamic state. Hambali's plan was to attack key Singapore installations and to represent them as acts of aggression by the Malaysian Government. Hambali's hope was that Muslims in both Malaysia and Singapore would then respond to calls for *jihad* and turn Malaysia and Singapore into another Ambon.

After 11 September 2001, the JI members of *fiah* came up with a plan to use truck bombs to attack targets in Singapore, including the US and Israeli Embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions and commercial buildings housing US firms.[24] The plan was to launch the attacks in December 2001 or April 2002. Singapore JI members had already taken steps to obtain 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate for the manufacture of the truck bombs when they were arrested in December 2001.

From around the mid-1990s, Singapore JI members had considered attacking US naval vessels in Singapore. These plans were revitalized in early 2001 when two foreign operatives approached a Malaysian JI leader, who in turn approached Singapore JI members, for information on US military vessels in Singapore. The JI also considered several Singapore targets for attack. These potential targets included water pipelines, the Changi Airport and the radar station at Biggin Hill among others.[25] These targets were in fact surveyed and some of them photographed on several occasions between 1999 and 2001. Singapore JI leaders took this goal so seriously that they actively sought terrorist training for their members in Afghanistan, Mindanao and even Kashmir. To prepare for these spell, Singapore JI leaders would conduct pre-course ideological preparations as well as physical and survival training at several locations in peninsular Malaysia. Some of the major terrorist operation of JI is as follows:

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[24] Michael Richardson (2005), "Maritime related Terrorism: Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, What next from the International jihadist Network?" Accessed 20 June 2010,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/PDF/maritime-related_terrorism.pdf

[25] Terrorist arrests in Singapore, Singapore Government, Accessed 20 June 2010,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/cna/arrests/press_020919.htm

Bali Bombing

In February 2002 a meeting was held in Thailand between Hambali and several other men including one Mukhlas, where the topic of attacking soft targets like bars and nightclubs instead of hard targets like embassies were discussed. In April of the same year Mukhlas returns home to Tengglun to begin planning the attack with his younger brother Amrozi, they make the decision to target Bali. Five months later Amrozi buys the chemicals necessary for the attack in Surabay, and from there travelled to Denpasar. It was also decided that Imam Samudra was named as the field commander for the Bali attacks. Mukhlas also appointed Idris, the Bali's cell deputy commander, to help with the logistics. L 300 Mitsubushi van was brought by Amrozi along with the bomb material and transported to Bali. The job for making the bomb was entrusted in the hands of former Malaysian University lecturer Dr. Azahari and Indonesian electronics expert Dulamartin. Ali Imron had disclosed that the bomb makers user 900 kg of Potassium chlorate, 150 kg of Sulphur, and 75 kg of Aluminium to create the van bomb, which tore apart the Sari club.

On October 12, 2002 a suicide bomber exploded himself inside a bar along the beach in Bali killing 9 people. As people fled out onto the streets in panic, another suicide bomber detonated a Van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd.[26] The attack was the worst terrorist incident in the history of Indonesia, with 202 civilians dead and more than 100 wounded. A few miles away a bomb exploded at the U.S. consulate about a minute after the van exploded, however no one was injured.

Seven days later the purported radical spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was arrested by police. Subsequently, on 5 November Amrozi was arrested in East Java where he admitted to possession of the van responsible for the blast and also buying the explosives used. He also implicated his brother Mukhlas in the ownership of the van. Three days later al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the Bali attacks. On 21st November Police arrested the suspected field coordinator of the bombings, Imam

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[26] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), op.cit

Samudra, while trying to flee Malaysia, then on 3rd December Mukhlas, the older brother of Amrozi, was arrested.[27]

The JI's commitment to the global jihad is tied with intense feelings of hatred for the United States and the West. Bali bombing mastermind Imam Samudra, defended the Bali terrorist attack as "a manifestation of Islamic solidarity between Muslims not limited by geographic boundaries." He said that he wanted to carry out God's order to defend the weak so that "American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of Muslims is expensive and valuable." Another Bali defendant, JI operations chief Mukhlas, stated during his trial that all Westerners were "dirty animals and insects that need to be wiped out." A violent Islamist website provides a justification for the Bali bombing, purportedly from files recovered from Samudra's computer.[28]

J.W Marriott Hotel, Jakarta blast, 5 August 2003

Despite the arrest of the alleged leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and the perpetrators of the Bali bomb blasts J.W Marriott Hotel bombing occurred on 5 August, 2003 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The attack came two days before a verdict in the trial of the Bali nightclub bombers. Indonesian authority was convinced that JI was responsible for the Marriott bomb, which was similar to those set off in Bali. Investigators further uncovered that charred remains of a battery used to power the bomb and said it was similar to the ones used in a series of bombings against Christian churches on Christmas Eve 2000, in which 19 people were killed.

The Marriott bombing differs slightly from previous bombings in that there is a wave of arrests before the bombing actually takes place from late April to August 2003

Hambali was hiding in Thailand during the initial preparations for the bombing, but remains in communication with JI's chief bomb-maker, Azhari. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir approved of Hambali's activities, and Toni Togar was selected to take part in the new bombing plot. Hambali had already set a precedent for a secret team pursuing jihad on its own. In January 2003, Muhammad Rais, Noordin and Azahari Husin shifted to Bengkulu. The next stages of the operation took place in February 2003 when the

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[27] Bali Nightclub Bombing April 2005), Global Security Organization, Accessed 20 June 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/bali.htm

[28] Angel Rabasa (May 2005), op.cit

explosives were transported from Dumai to Bengkulu. After the explosives safely reached Bengkulu as unaccompanied baggage on an intercity bus, they were stored at the house of Sardona Siliwangi, another Ngruki student and JI member. At the time, Sardona, who was working with Asmar Latin Sani, opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin.[29] In late April 2003, Mohamed Ihsan also known as Idris, who was involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings transported the explosives again. In May, he and Toni Togar robbed a bank in Medan on 6th May to raise funds for the project.

One can see the determination of this outfit when on 4 June 2003, in Lampung, the final team was put together: Noordin, Azhari, Ismail, Asmar Latin Sanib and Masrizal bin Ali Umar also known as Tohir, another Pondok Ngruki graduate and a Luqmanul Hakiem teacher who was a close friend of Rais. Noordin assigned the tasks and explained that he was in charge; Azhari was field commander and Ismail his assistant. Asmar and Tohir would be in charge of renting the house, buying the vehicles and getting the explosives to Jakarta. Asmar had agreed to be the suicide bomber. When they got to Jakarta, they split into two teams to survey four possible targets. Azhari and Ismail examined the Marriott and a Citibank branch; Noordin and Tohir looked at the Jakarta International School and the Australian International School. Eventually they decided on the hotel because of the American brand name and the fact that it was easy to reach. The bombing took place on 5 August when Asmar had driven a Toyota Kijang van into the Marriott hotel driveway.

The explosive device used in Jakarta bombing consisted of six plastic boxes containing 'black powder' weighing 19 kilograms each with the aim to create maximum causalities. According to investigators, the bomb was personally detonated via a mobile phone by Dr. Azahari Bin Husin, JI's bomb maker who escaped from the scene on the back of a motorcycle.[30]

A suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside the lobby of the JW Marriott Hotel, killing 11 people and injuring 150. All those killed were Indonesian with the exception of one Dutch businessman, one Danish and two Chinese tourists. The hotel

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[29] International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Network," Asia Report N 114, Accessed 21 June 2010, http://merin.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Terrorism5May06.pdf.

[30] Andrew Tian Huat Tan (2007), op.cit

was viewed as a Western symbol, and had been used by the United States embassy for various events.

A Toyota Kijang, bought on 20 July 2003, from a Jakarta businessman, was loaded with explosives and driven through the taxi stand in front of the Marriott Hotel. As the security guard of the hotel approached the vehicle, talked briefly and when turned around, Asmar triggered the bomb. It is still not clear if the explosion was accidental, set off by remote detonation or a timer exploding prematurely. However, Indonesian investigators believed that the suicide bomber had blundered in the operations by activating the bomb too early and too far away from the hotel lobby front.[31] Security sources have disclosed that a Kamikaze act at the hotel lobby front could have killed at least 200 people, given the lunchtime crowd in the adjoining coffee house.[32] If the vehicle had kept a course heading straight for the lobby the damage would undoubtedly have been more severe. The blast radius was visible along the shattered windows of nearby buildings. Out of the 11 people killed in the bomb explosion, most of them were Indonesian hotel security guards and taxi drivers and awaiting passengers at the hotel front. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack and the perpetrators are known to have trained in al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Two days later after the bomb explosion, Amrozi was sentenced to death. Subsequently, On 15 August, the U.S. announced the capture of Hambali, the purported organizer of the Bali bombings. On 9 September 2003 Imam Samudra was handed the death sentence, and on 2 October 2003 Mukhlas was sentenced to death as well. The Indonesian Authorities wanted to send out a message that such terrorist acts would not be tolerated and all efforts would be made to destroy such outfits that purported acts of violence. Indonesia could not afford domestically and externally to have such extremist elements impact its image as a democratic state.

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[31] Bilveer Singh(2007), pp.116

[32] Ibid, pp.116

2004 Australian Embassy Bombing

Over a year later, on 9 September 2004, a nearly identical suicide truck bombing took place at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 11 people, including the suicide bomber and injuring more than 180. The model of the bombing was a similar one.

Suspicions fell immediately on Malaysian Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, both of which were Asia's most wanted men and a member of the al-Qaeda-linked JI terror group, who had been linked to numerous bombings including the Bali attack in 2002.The Australian Embassy is the first JI bombing led entirely by Top, without funding from Hambali. Azahari driving a suicide truck bomb within several hundred metres from the target, then handing over the wheel to the suicide bomber, which himself remotely detonating the device and escaping on the back of the motorcycle. Azhari again serves as the second-in-command. This is the second of three major bombings that Top and Azhari lead. This results from Top's direct appeals to Ring Banten and Kompak, two jihadist organizations in Indonesia. This depicts that, the Australian Embassy bombing involves an extensive network of jihadists that are not part of JI.

Australian embassy staff escaped relatively unharmed in the suspected suicide attack, which ripped apart the heavily-fortified gates of the mission, shattered thousands of windows and left a deep hallow in the road outside. Instead those killed were mainly Indonesians, including police and embassy security staff, cut down in the road by the explosion just four metres from the front gates of the compound. The massive blast, heard up to 15km away, tore the glass fronts off nearby office towers and showered flying glass into the embassy building, causing minor injuries among mission staff. A police post outside the embassy gates was completely destroyed, killing at least three officers. Afterwards, the road was plagued with bloodied corpses, burnt debris, glass and the twisted wreckage of motorcycles, cars and a police truck, destroyed as it sat parked outside the embassy gates.

In this case, Australia chosen was a target for its role in supporting the U.S invasion of Iraq. In addition the timing of the attack was also striking as in previous cases, the attack took place between August and October, a period was becoming known in Southeast Asia as Jemaah Islamiyah bombing season.

The Australian Embassy operation suffers a series of arrests, in March 2005, Irun Hidayat, a religious teacher, were sentenced to three years in jail for helping to motivate others to carry out the act of terrorism.[33]

The Second Bali bombing, October 2005

A series of bomb exploded in Bali on 1 October, 2005. The blasts were on two terrorist locations. One of the blasts struck at the Kuta Square shopping mall in central Kuta. Another two bombs exploded at Warungs along the Jimbaran beach, one of which was near the Four Seasons Hotel. These areas are generally popular with Western tourists. Twenty three people, including three suicide bombers were killed, with more than hundred injured.

According to Indonesia's head of counter-terrorism, Major General Ansyaad Mbai, early evidence indicates that the attacks were carried out by at least three suicide bombers in a similar fashion to the 2002 bombings. The leftovers of backpacks and excessively damaged bodies are believed to be evidence of suicide bombings. The remains also give a possibility that backpacks were hidden inside the target restaurants before detonation.

The bombings occurred the same day that Indonesia cut its fuel subsidies resulting in gas prices rising by 675% and just two days before the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and 11 days before the third anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombing. The attack came during the school holiday period in some states of Australia, when an estimated 7,500 Australians are believed to have been visiting Bali. Following the 2002 Bali bombings, in which more Australians than any other nationals were killed and injured, and the 2004 bombing of Australia's Embassy in Jakarta, the latest attacks received widespread coverage in Australia and were criticised by some officials, such as Federal Opposition Leader Kim Beazley, as an attack on Australians.

The attacks bear the hallmarks of the active terrorist network JI, which is believed to be responsible for several bombings in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing. Major General Mbai identified Malaysian men, already wanted in

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[33] Bilveer Singh (2007), op.cit

connection to previous bombings in Indonesia, as the suspected masterminds of the attacks. The chief suspect was Azahari Husin, a member of JI who was an engineering expert and former academic with a doctorate from University of Reading. Husin was nicknamed the "Demolition Man" and was thought to have collaborated with the second suspect, Noordin Mohammed Top, a bomb maker. Azahari was killed in a police raid in November 2005, while Noordin has been killed after a lengthy and violent blockade against the Indonesian police chief on 16 September 2009.

Following the attacks Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who is alleged to be JI's spiritual leader, released a statement from his prison cell, condemning the attack. But he added that the bombings were a sign of God's displeasure with the Indonesian government. He further stated that the government should bring themselves closer to God by implementing his rules and laws because these happenings are warnings from God for all of us.

J.W Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings, July 2009

Inspite of stringent action against people involved in terrorist activities, bombs were found in Marriot and Carlton Hotels in Jakarta in July 2009. The first bomb was detonated at the Marriott at 7:47 a.m. local time at the lounge in the lobby, near a meeting of foreign business people. The second bomb was detonated at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel 10 minutes later, on a second floor restaurant. At least nine people, including some foreigners, have been killed in two bomb blasts at luxury hotels in the Indonesian capital Jakarta and at least 48 people were injured. The bombing occurred barely two weeks after President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono won the Presidential elections on 7 July 2009.

Structure of JI

Jemaah Islamiyah was formed in 1992-93, but till 2000, it did not engage in any of the terrorist activities and spend most of its time in training, recruiting, indoctrination, and building up a region wide network of cells with specific functions such as procuring explosives and participating in sectarian conflict. Most of the information on the structure and organisation of JI has been published by government that have captured JI operatives. One of the most important sources in this regard has been the information provided by the Singaporean government following the arrest of number

of JI operatives in 2001 and 2002. A more accurate and detailed picture of the JI organisational structure emerged following the capture of the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Islamiyah* (PUPJI) in the late 2002 in Indonesia.

JI exhibits characteristics of both formal and networked organisation. Although in relation to other Islamic militant organisation JI has a clear authority structure with defined rights, duties, responsibilities and geographical command, JI has fits into a network model. JI has formed an integral part of the 'leaderless' organisation, while at the same time basing its inner workings on a commander-cadre cellular organisation.[34]

Organisationally, JI is led by an Amir, or spiritual leader. Abdullah Sungkar was the first Amir but following his demise in 1999, this is believed to have been passed out to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. When Ba'asyir became more active in MMI, the charge was taken over by Abu Rusdan, alias Thoriquddin as caretaker Amir until he was arrested. Since then, Abu Dujana was believed to have taken over as the caretaker of Amir of JI.

In carrying out his duties, *Amir* is assigned by the *Majlis Qiyadah* (MQ or leadership council), *Majlis Syuro* (MS or Consultative council), *Majlis Fatwa*(MF or Fatwa council), and *Majlis Hisbah* (MH or *Hisbah* council), *Majlis Mantiqiyah* (Mantiqi leadership council) and *Majlis Qiyadah Wakalah* (*Wakala* leadership council). Amir is the most powerful figure in the JI, who appoints all the key officers and decide on the key operations. For instance that member of MQ, MS, MF and MH are appointed by *Amir*.

Jemaah Islamiyah established a geographically based hierarchy with defined responsibilities and decision making procedures. The leader (Amir), a leadership council (Markaz) and consultative councils (Shura) oversaw four geographic divisions (Mantiqi). Each Mantiqi divided into smaller sub-groups, which administered Jemaah Islamiyah activity appropriate to their area.

Mantiqi I - Mainland Malaysia, Singapore, Sumatra and southern Thailand (For fund-raising)

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[34] Thomas. J Biersteker, and Sue. E Eckert (ed)(2007), *Countering the financing of terrorism*, New York: Routledge, pp.66

Mantiqi II - Java, Sumatra, Bali, other islands of Indonesia (jihad)

Mantiqi III - Philippines, Kalimantan, Borneo, Sulawesi (for training)

Mantiqi IV - Australia and Papua (for fund-raising)

Mantiqi leaders met as a member of Qiyadah Markaziay (central command), where operational decisions were made. However, operational cells increasingly demonstrate autonomous decision making, suggesting the hierarchical structure of JI not binding and some JI members may act independently. While parts of this structure have been disrupted since late 2001, including through the arrests of key leaders, JI retains a flexible hierarchical administration. Mantiqi I provided most of the leadership until about 2003 and these men were internationalist oriented, close to al-Qaeda. Mantiqi I is now on its knees and key cadres of JI are being drawn from Mantiqi II who are more Indonesia focused, less interested in the Middle East, want to establish Sharia state in Indonesia. This may lead to fewer attacks on Western targets in Indonesia. M1 was initially led by Riduan Isamudin and later became JI's head of operations, also known as Hambali he was captured in July of 2003 in Thailand. Upon his capture by the authorities, he was subsequently replaced by Mukhlas who also in December 2002 was captured by the Indonesian authorities and executed for the 2002 Bali Bombings. Till 2009, M1 was headed by Noordin Top, a Malaysian born and a leading "bomb expert" for JI

Mantiqi are comprised of operational elements called *wakalah* controlled by a *Qoaid wakalah*. The *wakalah* represents an intermediate level of authority that provides command and control for JI operatives active within a specific location or region. There appears to be no standard organizational structure; rather, each *wakalah* varies according to location and the apparent support it enjoys from the local populace. Although there is no information pointing to a standardized organization of *wakalah* within the JI, information obtained by the Singapore ISD after the disruption of the JI Singapore *wakalah* and Operation JIBRIL can be used to provide insight into one organization that might be indicative of how other *wakalah* are structured. In the case of the Singapore *wakalah*, there were upwards of 80 members, 25 of which could be considered operatives. The unit was subdivided into five functional components: Operations, Security, Missionary work, Fundraising, and Communications. Within the operations component there were four sub-cells, or *fiah*, comprised of three to four

men who carried out investigation missions. Attacks were to be conducted by *fiah* brought in from outside the organization. This method of organizational tasking allowed the *wakalah* to conduct operations with a certain level of operational security and to manage its operatives, ensuring specially trained personnel were tasked appropriately. The operatives involved in investigation, for example, would not necessarily be privy to planning conducted by the *fiah* that was tasked with an attack. Personnel involved in missionary work and fundraising would have no idea about operations. In the case of arrest or capture, this method of compartmentalization would help prevent the entire *wakalah* from being rolled-up in a rapid manner.

Organizational Chart of Jemaah Islamiyah

Mantiqi *I* (M1): Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Sumatra

M1 is the oldest organization within JI, covering Malaysia, Singapore, and Southern Thailand. It was organized and managed by Hambali until mid-2002 when control passed to Ali Gufron, alias Mukhlas, after Hambali was forced to go into hiding by the Singapore Internal Security Division (ISD) disruption of Operation JIBRIL.

Malaysian Branch

The Malaysian branch of M1 is the largest formation within JI and has an estimated 200 members.[35] Faiz Bafana ran the branch until his arrest in 2002. The branch sub-divided Malaysia into six *wakalah* covering the country and was responsible for the oversight of the Singapore *wakalah* as well. The Malaysian *wakalah* operate out of Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Kuantan, Perak, Kelantan, and Negri Sembilan. Five primary functions have been identified and associated with the Malaysian branch: initial indoctrination and training of new personnel, coordination of *jihad* activities for the Maluku region, establishment and management of front companies, procurement of weapons and bomb making material, and liaison with its legal affiliate, *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* (KMM). [36]

Training and indoctrination was carried out at a JI facility in Negri Sembilan. Located in southern Malaysia, the facility was used to provide initial indoctrination for JI recruits before they would be sent on for military training at *Al-Qaida*-run camps in Afghanistan. Abu Jibril coordinated *jihad* activities for the JI. Jibril was a passionate recruiter for *jihad* in Maluku and Ambon. Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin, the *qoiad wakalah* in Singapore during Operation JIBRIL, was an early recruit of Jibril.[37]

To support operations, the Malaysian branch owned and operated at least four front companies in the country. Konsojaya was a palm oil export company set up by Hambali, ostensibly to export oil to Afghanistan. Hambali utilized this company in 1993 to channel escape money to Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan in the Philippines

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[35] Abuza Zachary (2003), *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of terror*, United Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp50

[36] Ibid, pp.51

[37] N Ridly (2002), *Organized, Money Laundering and Terrorism*, New York: Cambodia University Press, pp.199

after the World Trade Center bombing. Though Hambali was involved with the start-up of Konsojaya, he relied on another JI operative for the operation of other front companies. Yazid Sufaat, a biochemist and former Malaysian military officer, was responsible for the establishment and management of JI Malaysia's other front companies. Between 1993 and 1996, Sufaat established Green Valley Medicine, Infocus Technology, and Secure Valley. Green Valley Medicine was the front used to purchase and store ammonium nitrate earmarked for the vehicular bombs in Operation JIBRIL. Through Infocus Technology, Sufaat provided support for the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Sufaat's activities in support of JI operations ended in December 2001, when he was arrested by Malaysian authorities on his way back from Afghanistan. The Malaysian security forces identified Sufaat through his role in Operation JIBRIL.

Singapore Branch

Until his arrest in December 2001, the *wakalah* in Singapore was led by a local condominium manager named Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin.[38] He had received military instruction in 1993 through the *Al-Qaida mujahidin* training program in Afghanistan. Maidin gradually shifted from being the operational leader to more of a spiritual leader, with operational control of the *wakalah* passing to Mas Selamat bin Kastari. Kastari ran the Singapore *wakalah* operations on his own after Maidin's arrest by the Singapore ISD in December 2001. Indonesian authorities on the island of Bitan apprehended Kastari on 3 February 2003.

As the founder of the Singapore JI *wakalah,* Maidin worked to instill a high degree of discipline and operational security awareness in his recruits. Before they were sent to Afghanistan for *Al-Qaida* training, each of the recruits passed through the Negri Sembilan camp. At least two of the Singapore operatives, *Fiah Musa* members Mohammad Ellias and Mohammad Nazir, were nominated for specialized training in one of three areas: ambush and assassination operations, sniper operations, or field engineering.

JI Singapore's three operational *fiah* were named *Ayub, Musa,* and *Ismail.* Initially, these cells were established to provide logistical support for attacks carried out by

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[38] Ibid, pp.187

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specialists brought in from outside the country. Most of the cell members were educated, middle-class men who did not display any of the outward appearances of radical Islamists. About one-third of the 31 men detained by the ISD possessed above-average intelligence. All of them had received secular educations prior to falling in with Maidin's *Wahhabi* preaching.

The first, and oldest, operational cell was called *Fiah Ayub*. Its leader was a 39-year-old printer named Mohammed Khalim Jaffar. Khalim was recruited into the JI after attending Maidin's religious classes in 1989 or 1990. The other two members of *Fiah Ayub* were Hashim bin Abas and Ja'afar bin Mistooki. *Fiah Musa* was led by the 29-year-old Mohammad Ellias, a manager and former lance corporal in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), and 27-year-old Mohammed Nazir bin Mohammed Uthman, a ship traffic assistant who had served in the Singapore Coastal Defense Force (SCDF). Fiah Ismail was the newest addition to JI Singapore, having been formed after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Its leader was Halim bin Hussain, a 42-year-old supervisor who had performed his national service with the Singapore constabulary.

The Singapore *wakalah* was disrupted in December 2001 by the Singapore ISD because of its activities in support of Operation JIBRIL. Planning and targeting activities for Operation JIBRIL began as early as 1997.[39] The operation grew from a plan conceived by Khalim to attack U.S personnel in Singapore into a target package with six distinct plans orchestrated by Hambali with the approval of Mohammad Atef and other high-ranking *Al-Qaida* members in Afghanistan.

Thailand Branch

The Thailand branch of M1 recently came into the spotlight with the arrest of Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, on 16 May 2003 and Maisuri Haji Abdulloh, his son Muyahi Haji Doloh, and Waemahadi Wae Dao on 10 June 2003. The four were charged with plotting attacks on foreign embassies and tourist locations throughout Thailand. Arifin bin Ali was former trainer at Camp Abu Bakar in the Philippines and a member of the Singapore *wakalah* who fled the country for Thailand after the collapse of Operation JIBRIL. Prior to his own arrest, Singapore *qoaid wakalah* Mas

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[39] Singapore government Press Statement on ISA Arrests, 11 Jan2002, Accessed 21June 2010, http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=Mjgz-HVbv3ryeWc%3D

Selamat Kastari tasked Ali with organizing the Thailand *wakalah* and gathering the remnants of the Singapore group. Ali established himself at *Poh Noh* (Thai Islamic School) Islam Burana Tohno in Narathiwat, southern Thailand run by Maisuri Haji Abdulloh and set to coordinating attacks within the country. Maisuri Haji Abdulloh received military training at a facility in Libya. Abdulloh brought his son Muyahi into the operations. The fourth man arrested by Thai authorities was Waemahadi, a doctor and drugstore owner. Under the direction of Ali, the Thailand JI group developed plans to execute car bomb attacks against the U.S, U.K, Australian, Israeli, and Singaporean embassies in Bangkok. The group also targets soft-targets heavily trafficked by westerners, including Khao San Street, Soi Nana, and the Sukumvit Market area in Bangkok. Other unspecified targets were developed in Phuket and Pattaya, both major sites for western tourists.

Mantiqi II (M2): Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)

Outside of information gathered through interrogations of captured Bali bombing suspects, little is known about the *Mantiqi* that holds responsibility over most of Indonesia beyond its connection with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI). Abdullah Anshori, alias Abu Fatih, is the *qoaid Mantiqi*. He is a long-time associate of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, having been arrested along with him by the Suharto regime for radical Islamic activities in the 1980s.[40] Under Anshori, M2 was closely involved in anti-Christian activities in Maluku and Ambon. The MMI connection comes from its chairman, Ifran Suryahadi Awas. Awas is the younger brother of Abu Jibril.

The MMI was founded in August 2000 by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ifran Awas, and Mursalin Dahlan. Its stated goal is the creation of a *Darul Islam* along the lines of JI doctrine. Ba'asyir felt the post-Suharto openness of the Indonesia government called for the creation of an overt organization to bring together the various radical Islamic groups within the region. It is through the MMI that JI has attempted to take advantage of this new openness to advance its *Darul Islam* ideology. Aside from its overt activities, MMI has been used as a financial conduit to funnel money to radical Islamic causes throughout the region. Despite its use as a financial channel, the MMI is far from being a coordinating and directing body for Islamic terrorism, as some

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[40] Leslie Lopez (Aug 2002), "portrait of the Radical network in Asia," Wall Street Journal, pp.14

pundits claim. With a membership of around 50,000, it is far too large of an organization and serves primarily as a consensus building mechanism; an attempt by Ba'asyir to bring various Islamic groups within Indonesia and Southeast Asia into the fold of JI ideology.

Mantiqi III (M3): **Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Southern Philippines**

M3 has served as a major logistics node for the JI since its establishment in the mid-1990s. The ongoing conflict between the Philippine government and separatist Moros in the southern Philippines has created a setting in which weapons, explosives, and equipment is readily at hand for those with the money to buy them. Until January 2002, M3's leader was Fathur Rohman al-Ghozie. Nasir Abbas took over M3 after his arrest. Al-Ghozie was born on Java in 1971. It was at Al-Maududi where he was recruited into JI and began establishing the links that would make him the leader of M3. The Philippine-based *Moro Islamic Liberation Front* (MILF) also had several members training at the *madrasa Al-Maududi* at the same time. One of them was Saifullah Yunos, alias Mukhlas, a Filipino national who would later become a MILF Special Operations Group (SOG) commander and an accomplice in the metro Manila bombings of 2000.

In 1998, Al-Ghozie was sent to the MILF training facility Camp Abu Bakar on Mindanao where he taught explosives and bomb making for six months. In October 2000, Al-Ghozie returned to the Philippines where he aided his MILF contacts in procuring explosives for the metro Manila bomb attacks on 31 December 2000 in which five explosions within a short period killed 22 people and injured over 100 others.[41]

The main function for M3 was its coordination with MILF training bases in the southern Philippines. The MILF run Camp Abu Bakar in the Mindanao province of Mindanao would become a major focal point for JI training from 1995 until the Philippine Army overran it in 2000. Within the camp were three sub-camps for international terrorists. Al-Ghozie taught classes in Camp Hudaybiyya and Camp

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[41] N Ridly (2002),op.cit, pp 199

Vietnam, both serving JI Malaysians and Indonesians.[42] After the loss of Camp Abu Bakar, M3 shifted its training operation to a camp some 10 miles outside Poso in Central Sulawesi. The Poso camp was established by an Indonesian JI member named Parlindungan Siregar with the help of a Spanish *Al-Qaida* leader, Imad al-Din Barakat Karkas, alias Abu Dada. Run by Omar Bandon, a Veteran of Afghanistan, the camp consisted of eight to ten small villages with small arms ranges and combat tactic training areas. Authorities were apparently unaware of the existence of the Poso camps until the arrest of *Al-Qaida* member Luis Jose Galan Gonzales in Spain. Gonzales admitted to receiving military training, under JI supervision, at the Poso camp in July 2001. Until its closure after 11 September 2001, Indonesian intelligence estimated that at least 200 Arabs trained at the facility.[43] It is unknown how many JI members passed through the Poso camp during its operation.

Mantiqi 4: Australia and Papua

Mantiqi 4 is the newest organization within the JI and is subordinated to M2 on Java. Little is known about the scope of the group's activities or its structure, though recent Australia counterterrorism successes have begun to develop an initial picture of JI operations within the country. Abdul Rahmin Ayub is thought to be the *qoaid wakalah* in Australia. Ayub and his family left Australia for Indonesia shortly after the 12 October 2002 bomb attacks in Bali. He was recently identified as taking part in a high-level JI planning meeting in Indonesia during April 2003. The Australian branch operates out of the Dee Why suburb in Sydney. From within this suburb, the Australian wakalah has conducted extensive fund-raising campaigns to procure arms and material.

JI is now a very horizontal organization of many autonomous and compartmentalized cells. Noordin Mohammad Top wrote an eighty- two pages tract based on the theoretical model espoused by Abu Musab al-Suri, Al-Qaeda's leading terrorist, on how to establish loosely affiliated jihadic cells.[44] Abu Dujan told CNN in Jailhouse

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[42] Raymond Bonner(Oct 2002), "Southeast Asia remains fertile for Al-qaeda," New York Times,p.1, Accessed 22 June 2010, http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/10/27/southeas.html

[43] ibid

[44] Abuza Zachary (Nov 2007), "The State of Jemmah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five years after Bali," The Jebsen centre for counter terrorism studies research Briefing series, vol.2, no.1, Accessed 23 June 2010,

interview, it will continue to exist and continue to move on with its plans.....when a part of it is cut off, (In this case) the head is cut off, there will be replacement, and it is only natural.[45]

The regional Mantiqi structure now describes an Indonesian- centric organization. Beneath the leadership body, the Makaz, are now four sections: religious training, Tabiyah education, logistics and Sariyah or military operation. Sariyah was divided into four regions on the island of Java, known as Isnobas. In addition, there were three geographical commands for Indonesia: the west area Mantiqi, the east area mantiqi and the Poso mantiqi.[46] The geographical focus demonstrates that Indonesia JI's clear area of operation.

After the Bali bombing, Hambali estimated that JI was still four or five years away from having and adequate cadre in terms of quality and quantity. Mantiqi I was the only one that was properly developed, Mantiqi 2 and 3, by contrast suffered major personal shortfalls and Mantiqi 4, which had been recently created to cover Papua and Australia, consisted of less than two dozen Indonesian residing in Australia.

JI spent lot of time in laying the groundwork for a long term sustainable environment. Many of the cells are sleeper cells or agents. This means that the individual within the cell are waiting to be activated.[47] Meanwhile they lead normal lives, far from any connection with terrorist activities. This is what makes individual of a cell so hard to detect and one may say they live undercover.[48]

The existence of such a cell structure as found in contemporary terrorism makes it really difficult for the regional countries to detect them, who are dependent on the conventional method of counterterrorism.

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http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/JCCTSstateJemaahIslamiayhTerrorism Insurgency-Southeast-Asia-Five yearsAfterBali.pdf

[45] ibid

[46] ibid

[47] Rikcoolsnet (2008), *Jihadi Terrorism and Radicalization challenge in Europe*, Belgium: Ashgate Publishing Llimited, pp.55

[48] Ibid, pp.55

Chapter 4

Counter Terrorism Strategies

Much of what we know about Terrorism in Southeast Asia depends on what police, intelligence and Military officials in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the United States have chosen to reveal to selected journalists and academics.[1] In addition, much of the information used in studies of terrorism can be traced to confessions made by individuals held in detention and interrogated under condition that undermine the credibility of their confession.[2]

Southeast Asia presents a unique challenge for those prosecuting the war on terror. Southeast Asian efforts to curb terrorism have been weighed down by the existence of porous maritime borders. The relative short distance separating those nations, makes trans- national terrorism a reality, and exacerbates difficulties in maintaining border security. Certainly more damaging has been a documental regional history of corrupt government administration and military organisation, making it difficult for the countries to engage in military-to- military assistance. In addition to this, Southeast Asia has a large portion of the world's Muslim population including Indonesia, the most populace Muslim country in the world. The problem of terrorism has hampered all the countries of the region especially, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, who have undertaken various measures and strategies. The US 'war against terrorism' faces a challenge in Southeast Asia. Developing an effective counter terrorism strategy to deal with well connected terrorist organisation requires capabilities beyond pure military might. Integrated interaction between US departments of state agencies is important. Most of all the Southeast Asian states need to cooperate among themselves in order to have a coordinated approach towards this menace

The adaptative nature of terrorism makes the counter strategy to tackle terrorism extremely difficult. Terrorist groups like, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has a capacity to identify and exploit weaknesses in security arrangements and they continually seek

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[1] Natasha Hamilton Hart (September 2005), "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and Fantasy," *The Pacific Review,* vol.18, no.3, pp 303-325

[2] ibid

new methods to defeat counter measures. Success in the global war on terrorism placed temporary constraints upon JI leadership. Terrorism and counter terrorism has become a high priority in Indonesia. Several bomb explosions since the fall of New Order government in 1998, such as those in J.W Marriott and Ritz hotel in Jakarta on17 July 2009, were alleged to have been conducted by JI depicting the continuous threat of terrorism. JI is one of the longest standing Islamic insurgencies in Southeast Asia with operational reach throughout the region.

The exact size of JI remains difficult to accurately ascertain. Initial estimates range from a few hundred to five thousand. Regional efforts to detain JI members have significantly reduced the number of active operatives and leaders. Despite these efforts, authorities feel the group is still strong. Recent estimates reports suggested that, about three thousand JI members, two thousand of which resides in Indonesia and rest are dispersed all over the Southeast Asian archipelago.[3] All the Southeast Asian governments have committed themselves to antiterrorism policies even though their commitments vary from one country to another.

Indonesian Counter-Terrorism

Before the destruction of the World Trade Centre building in New York on 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombing attack in 2002, Indonesia continues to deny and reject the allegation that Indonesia was home to groups or individuals who were part of a regional terrorist network. The government officials also rejected the allegations about the possible links between Indonesian radical groups and international terrorist networks. It seems that, the Indonesian Government has been reluctant to act resolutely against these networks for fear of a Muslim backlash.[4] However, The Bali blast was the turning point in Indonesian history in combating terrorism as subsequently after the attack the Indonesian police arrested more than 500 alleged terrorists. No country deserves more credit for improving its counterterrorism operations and capabilities than Indonesia. While terrorism will

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[3] Abuza Zachary (April 2004), "Learning by Doing: Al-Qaeda's Allies in Southeast Asia," *Current History,* pp 173, Accessed 25 June 2010,
https://secure25.securewebsession.com/currenthistory.com/purchase/index.php

[4] Yoon Young-Kwan (2005), "Towards a new Security Order in Pacific Asia," *Pacific Asia* 2022, pp.178-191, Accessed 25 June 2010, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/PacificAsia2022/2022_Young-Kwan.pdf.

never be eliminated, Indonesia has developed a strong and effective counterterrorist force, while at the same time consolidating its democratic transition. However, apart from its successes in counterterrorist measures, the Indonesian government have simultaneously faced failures at different junctures of time.

The Indonesian government has established the general framework of principles and policies to combat terrorism in the country. The general framework has six principles such as: supremacy of law, indiscrimination, independence, democracy, coordination and participation.

Supremacy of law means that the legal framework is always the basis for action. Before the Bali bombing, Indonesia had ratified four international instruments related to combating terrorism namely, convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of Aircraft (1970), and Convention for the Suppression of unlawful acts against safety Aviation (1979), Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) and Biological Weapon Convention (1972). Additionally, Indonesia has also signed the International Convention for the suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) and has implemented two resolutions of the Security Council (1368/2001, 1373/2001).[5] The Indonesian government issued two regulations: they are- Government regulation in Lieu of law No. 1/2002 on the eradication of criminal act of terrorism and No. 2/2002 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism in relation to the bomb explosion incident in Bali, 12 October 2002.[6] The Indonesian government has also established a new Anti-Terrorism law (law No. 15/2003), which constitute strong and comprehensive measures in dealing with the terrorist threats.[7] These laws define the acts of terrorism which can be prosecute by the government, cover persons, Indonesian citizens, committing terrorist acts in Indonesian and foreign countries, towards foreign countries from Indonesia and vice-versa.

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[5]Robert Eryanto Tumanggon (2007), "Indonesia's Counter Terrorism Policy", UNISCI Discussion papers, Madrid Espana, pp. 95, Accessed 27 June 2010, http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/767/76701506.pdf

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

Independence means that while it is necessary for international cooperation to combat terrorism but in doing so, Indonesia would maintain its independence in reaching conclusions and taking actions. Thus, the Indonesia government would not be ordered by the foreign powers but rather by professional and accurate proofs.

Indiscrimination means that all citizens would be treated equally before the anti – terrorism law and government will not be prejudiced and focus its operation towards particular group.

Coordination is very important in fighting terrorism. Coordination reflects that the threat of terrorism is cross sector and cross boundary in nature, therefore the effort to overcome it must also be cross sector and interstate. The coordinator should harmonise sector functions, in order to make them more efficient and effective.

Democracy means that the government recognised that the wider authority to combat terrorism also opens the potential for the abuse of the authority. This means that the government will try to find right balance for government authority without abandoning democratic principle.

Participation reflects the belief that the war on terrorism cannot be won if it is the only communities and the public and the government, is necessary for the country to be free from terrorism.

The strategy of 'war on terrorism' applied by the Indonesian, authorities can be categorised as 'indirect strategy' since it seeks to archive a result by methods other than military victory.[8] The concept of indirect strategy, first explained by Andre Beaufre a military Frenchman, that the object of an indirect approach is the achievement of the military victory. In contrast, the essential concept of indirect strategy is that it emphasis the achievement of the objectives predominantly methods other than the military.[9] In one of his writings *a 'la* strategy, he further state that one of the characteristics of indirect strategies that of freedom of action. The main task is to

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[8]Andre Beufre (1994), *Indirect strategy in the Nuclear age, In Gerald Chaliand: The Art of war in the world history: From Antiquity to the Nuclear age.* Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp 1023

[9] Ibid, pp.1027

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make sure that the extent of the area of freedom of action, while at the same time reducing to the minimum that is available to the enemy.

The pressure on Megawati Sukarnoputri had started since 27 August when thousand of member of FPI (Front Pembela Islam) launched a demonstration in front of the Indonesian parliament. They demanded the renewal of the Jakarta Charter on Islamic law in the 1945 Constitution obliging Indonesia's Muslim to observe Sharia law.[10] The uncertainty in Megawati's government's attitude was also related to the nature of her government as weak government. There have been cases where the government, especially in relations to impacts of the September 11 on the country, was not able to reinforce its own decisions and policies. A key committee of the House of Representatives has issued a statement condemning the US attacks and urging the government to do likewise.[11]

The Megawati administration was considered by many as a weak government, though number of important counter-measures has been taken by the government during her tenure. Her administration received a wakeup call after Bali bombing and launched a series of action that initiated Indonesia's war on terror. The bombing forced president Megawati to accept the existence of radical militant group in the country and political courage to combat the terrorists. Within six days, she issued two decrees to address the terrorist threat. The 1945 constitution authorised the president to issue government regulation in Lieu of Law. The regulation defined terrorism broadly as the use or threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear or to create causalities by forcibly taking the freedom, life and property of others.

After receiving assistance from the U.S government, Indonesian police established a new special anti-terrorist unit called Detachment-88. This unit, working together within all components within the Indonesian police and other state departments and agency, began to pursue the perpetrators. As a result of this, a month after the Bali bombing, Indonesian police arrested the first suspect for the Bali bomb blasts, a

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[10] Rizal Sukma (2002), "Indonesia and the September 11 attacks: Domestic reactions and implications", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, vol.xxx, no.3. pp.273

[11] Damien Kingsbury and Lesley Mc Culloch (Nov 2001), " Terrorists and Freedom Fighters," *The World Today*, vol.57, no.11, pp.13-14

mechanic called Amrozi bin Nurhasyim Amrozi.[12] In December, Mukhlas was nabbed and his brother, Ali Imron, was arrested a month later in January 2003. Idris was also taken into police custody in June 2003.

However, more crucial to Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts was the setting up of the Task Force on Counter-Terrorism (TFCT) —or in Indonesian, *Satuan Tugas Anti-terror*, or *Tim bomb* for short- which was established in October 2002 following the first Bali bombing.[13] While Detachment 88 is a part of the CIB, TFCT is an autonomous body whose prime mover is Major General. Established under then-police chief Da'I bachtiar, even though it is an ad hoc organisation, according to a senior TFCT officer, its success is due to the minimal bureaucracy, instant decision making and tremendous flexibility that has accounted for most of Indonesia's counterterrorism success, including the arrest of the two Bali bombers, those involved in the Jakarta bombings of hotel Marriott and Kuningan.[14]

The bombing of the Kuta and Jimbaran areas, 2005, which claimed at least 22 lives, was the major blow to the government of Susilo bambang Yudhoyono as he tried too hard to improve country's international image and international security through the enactment of certain policies. President Susilo was once praised by member of the international community, particularly the United States, for cracking down on terrorism.[15] But the Bali attacks were more than just a problem of security and terrorism as it exposed Indonesia' s weaknesses in its intelligence networking which highlighted country's weakest link in the fight against terrorism and also in fading Indonesia's business and investment environment. President was of the view that acts of terrorism will not only ruin the international image of Indonesia, but also undermine the stability of the nation.

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[12] BBC News (Nov 2008), Timeline: Bali bomb trails, Accessed 28 June 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3126241.stm

[13] Bilveer Singh (2007), *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist Extremists*, London: Praeger Security International, pp.124

[14] Ibid, pp 124

[15] Bantarto Bandoro (2005), "Current Events: Bali bombing and the fight against terrorism", The *Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 33, no.4, pp.324

The bombing in Kuta and Jimbaran area prompted many to realise that closer cooperation and sharing of information between agencies is indeed necessary if similar attacks are to be avoided in the future. It further resulted in an extensive debate over the role of intelligence in preventing the future acts of terrorism. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's idea that the military should be involved in the fight against terrorism is assumed to be based on rationale that majority of the population look to the government to provide a safe and secure environment.[16]

Indonesian security forces deserve credit for developing an elite counterterrorism police force firmly in civilian hands, Densus-88 (Detachment-88). The force, created in 2003, is well-trained, well-paid, well-led and free of the endemic corruption that permeates much of Indonesia's police and bureaucracy.[17] In November 2006, with the help of TFCT, JI's master bomb-maker, Dr. Azahari bin Hussin, was killed and his cache of 23 bag bombs was seized. That set the organization back a year. Counterterrorism operations in July 2007 led to the arrests of top JI leaders, including Zarkasih, the group's spiritual leader, as well as seizures of large supplies of explosives. In July 2008, a ten-person cell in Pekenbaru, Sumatra was taken down with the cooperation of Singaporean security forces. On July 17, 2009 JI was finally able to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks by detonating bombs in two luxury hotels in Jakarta.

In September 2009, the Indonesian government submitted revisions to its anti-terrorism law in Parliament. The proposed changes included lengthening the period of detention without trial from seven days to two years, should the suspect's activities be deemed to endanger Indonesia's security. The second proposed amendment would give the government the right to detain people and a group that glorify terrorism and openly incite violence against religious minorities.[18] The bill is still being debated. Though the police have had an anti-incitement law at their disposal, until lately they have not had the political cover to use it.

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[16] ibid

[17] Abuza Zachary (2010), "Indonesian Counter Terrorism: The Great Lead", *Terrorism Monitor*, vol.8, issue 2. p1. Accessed 30 June 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_2_03.pdf

[18] ibid

Above all, counterterrorism is perceived as politically legitimate because it has not come at the expense of the rule of law or democracy. In Indonesia, counter intelligence actually strengthens democracy and rule of law. Counterterrorism operations were successful for other reasons as well. In a mid-2007 raid on a JI safe-house, a document that outlined JI's new structure was recovered. That document identified Poso, Sulawesi, as a central front in the group's regeneration. Poso, along with Ambon province, was the scene of intense sectarian bloodletting from 1998-2001, which continued to simmer through 2004-05. Though the conflict turned off out of local reasons, JI quickly became involved and escalated the degree of violence. Thousands of people were killed in the bloodshed that JI used to set up a network of paramilitary forces and Islamist charities. Indeed, many in JI had long supported such a strategy, deeming the Qaeda-style campaign of bombing Western interests to be counter-productive to the group's interests. That document, along with the arrest of several JI operatives, convinced the government to take sectarian violence seriously and not to let these conflicts worsen. But after documents were recovered that explicitly identified the conflict zones as the centres of JI's regrouping, the government has been very proactive.

After the death of Amrozi there is the changing perception among Islamic leaders about the extent terrorist have manipulated religious teachings in order to justify the killings of innocent people. Indonesia has gained support to some extent from most clerics to denounce suicide bombings and other terrorist activities as against Islam. The death of bomb-maker and financier Noordin Top in a September, 2009 Densus-88 raid was a blow to JI. He was a very charismatic individual and it takes a special skill set to be a recruiter for suicide bombers. He had strong organizational skills and ran a network flexible enough to sustain him all these years. He was a financier with links to Middle-East financiers and was clearly a proponent of an al-Qaeda ideology when many JI members were beginning to see such a strategy as counter-productive. Noordin Top's operational savvy will be hard, but not impossible, to replicate. Based on the information gathering, sharing and exchanges, the Indonesian government had been able to unveil and prevent several plans of JI terrorist attacks. As the head of Densus-88, Brigadier General Tito Karnivian said Indonesia's success was based on "law enforcement, prosecution and the judicial process. We do not use the military

approach".[19] Since many of the JI key leaders have been imprisoned and killed, the organizational structure of JI has been considerably damaged and weakened.

In spite of the success, the Indonesian authority acknowledges that the JI threats have not been totally eradicated. After the key perpetrators of the Bali bombing were captured, several other bombings occur that demonstrate that JI is damaged but still active. As response to the Bali bombing and countering the terrorist threat from JI and other violent Islamist radical and extremist groups in the future, Indonesia needs a sound strategy.

The emergence of new terrorist threats, spreading extremist ideology and widespread recruiting by militant groups in prisons has prompted a rethink of Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy and its famed program of reaching out to convicted militants and rehabilitating them. But recent police operations connected with the Jakarta hotel bombings of 2009 and the Aceh-based terrorist cell uncovered this year have revealed that 14 of those arrested or killed had previously been detained or imprisoned. Abdullah Sunata, a ringleader of the Aceh cell allegedly plotting to assassinate the president, was released from prison early for good behaviour despite his central role in the Australian embassy bombing in 2004. He remains at large.

According to the commander of Indonesian police's elite Detachment 88 counter-terrorism unit, Tito Karnavian, new recruits are springing up to replace those arrested as terrorist cells constantly evolve. "Recruitment is still going on. We cannot stop it. The ideology is still spreading," said Brigadier General Karnavian. [20] He further stated that, these are clandestine networks. When they meet with each other, they do it very discreetly, with the codes sometimes they have to arrange these secret appointments. But in prison they can convene and sit and discuss cleanly and safely.[21] They are secured by the government. The recruiting for the Aceh cell was done through prison visits as well.

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[19] Abuza Zachary (2010). Indonesian Counter Terrorism: The great lead, *Terrorism Monitor*, vol.8, issue .2, p 1. Accessed 3 July 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_2_03.pdf

[20] Tom Allard (June 5, 2010), Recruitment *in prisons of great concern*, Indonesian counter terrorism, Accessed 4 July 2010, http://www.smm.com.au/world/recruitment-in-prison-of-great-conern-says-indonesian-counterterrorist-heat-20100604-xknl.html.

[21] Ibid.

Indonesian security forces are realistic about the challenges ahead. Noordin's network was stronger than first thought and they have seen JI continue to recruit. While top operatives have been killed or arrested in the past few years, technical proficiency has been transmitted and a new generation of leaders is emerging. There has been no evidence of out-right factionalism, nor have there been any mass defections. JI clearly demonstrated its ability to learn and adapt. In addition to shifting its tactics, JI's leaders changed their operations in response to government security operations. In 2005, Noordin Top wrote a manual for cell maintenance and operations, which paralleled the philosophy of Musab al-Suri, a Syrian jihad ideologue who expressed a decentralized model of self-sustaining and autonomous cells driven by a common ideology.

Since 2004, JI has been moving into the provision of social service. The number of JI-related charities has proliferated, all with the government's approval. The government believes they can be weaned off terrorism, though disbeliever tends to see this as an opportunity to openly recruit and regroup until the security and political environment are more favourable. Indeed, many of these charities have expanded their international operations. The Medical Emergency Rescue Committee Indonesia (MER-C), for example, has been active in Gaza, despite the Egyptian government's attempts to expel them, as well as in southern Thailand.

In sum, the Indonesian leaders developed the political will to crackdown on JI, an institutionalized counterterrorism program which supported the rule of law and respected the country's democratic gains. While terrorism will remain a fact of political life in the world's largest Muslim country, its potential to jeopardize the state has decreased considerably.

Singapore counter -terrorism

The Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah is a part of a larger JI network cells in Indonesia, Malaysia and other parts of Southeast Asia. The Singapore network reports to a Malaysia based leadership structure called a regional *"shura"* or consultative council. Organisationally, the Singapore JI was organised into a number of functional groups. Among others, there was the operations group, involved in intelligence and military activities: the security group (*Tajnid*) tasked with ensuring the Singapore JI was

secured for infiltration and detection. The Economic/ Finance group, overseeing financial affairs; the Communication group, which managed electronic and non electronic linkages, including security; the *Dakwah/* missionary group, which imbibed its member with hard line teachings; and the Educational (*tarbiyah Rasmiyah*) Group, which focussed on general education and matters.[22]

To the credit of Singapore's countermeasures and their Internal Security Department (ISD), Singapore was the first country in the region to uncover the Jemaah Islamiyah presence. In December 2001, Singapore discovered a network of JI operatives planning large scale attacks against Western interests in Singapore. Its initial detention of JI operatives led to further arrests and the discovery of JI networks elsewhere in the region. Singapore has indeed arrested many members of JI, especially in the first 12 months after 9/11. With these arrests, and Singapore's strong support for the U.S, JI has a strong motive to retaliate back and attack Singapore.

Shortly after 9/11, Singaporean authorities launched aggressive operations to counter terrorist activities. On 6 January 2002, the Singaporean Internal Security Department arrested 15 people, of which 13 were members of JI for the terrorist related activities. At the time of the arrests, members of the group had been planning a series of bomb attacks in Singapore that would have had disastrous consequences. JI planned to attack a shuttle-bus that conveyed US military personnel and their families, the US and Israeli Embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions, commercial buildings housing US firms, and US naval vessels in Singapore.[23] In Singapore, members of the JI network arrested in December 2001 disclosed that their original vision of an Islamic Indonesia had in recent years expanded into a vision for a *Daulah Islamiya Nusantara* (Islamic state or archipelago) consisting of Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao, into which Singapore and Brunei would inevitably be absorbed.

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[22] Bilveer Singh (2007), *op.cit*, pp.104

[23] Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (2003), *The Jemaah Islamiyah arrests and the threat of terrorism*, Government of Singapore, pp 11-13, Accessed 4 July 2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/SingMHA_JIWhitePaper.pdf.

In August 2002, ISD arrested another 21 people, all of whom, except two, were members of JI.[24] ISD's assessment was that with the second batch of arrests and detentions in September 2002, the JI network in Singapore had been severely disturbed. However, the Singapore government was quick to realise that the threat from JI and other terrorist groups still existed and they needed to taken in consideration as evident from the bombings in Bali and the Philippines. It was imperative for the Singapore government to make their strategy available to their citizens because a major element in their fight against terror is involving their citizens and preparing them for their role in defending the country.

The Singapore ISA allows the government to detain and hold individuals, if they present a threat to Singapore's security, even if it is based on only suspicion. Detainees can be held up to two years, however, it can be extended in two year intervals and in doing so no trial is required.[25] This is a very powerful countermeasure that allows Singapore's counterterrorism teams to help stop any terrorist action in its newborn stages without waiting before it is too late. This has its own benefits. For instance, the ISA allowed Singaporean officials to detain and interview the JI members to understand their motives.

Singapore's strategy is broken down into 3 components: Prevention, Protection, and Response. However, those are largely the responsibility of the Singaporean government. Additionally, Singapore's strategy consists of Total Defence, efforts the citizens of Singapore can do to help protect the country.

A signature element of Singapore's countermeasures involves their reaching out to the international community for assistance. Singapore's counter -terrorism cooperation with other countries has been crucial in developing the region's ability to combat the terrorist threat. Working within the United Nations (UN) framework, Singapore helped pass the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001, which established a legal foundation for international action against terrorism. Singapore also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of

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[24] Ibid, p.1

[25] Vincent Corsi (2008) ,*The fight against terror: Singapore*, National Security Coordination Centre, Singapore, Accessed 4 July 2010, http://www.asiancrime.org/pdfdocs/Singapore_CT_Efforts_Corsi.doc

Terrorism in December 2001, ratifying it the following year.[26] Singapore has also worked very closely with the United States on the issue of countering terrorism. Singapore is a leading participant in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral effort to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction which have the potential to be misused by so called"rogue states"and terrorists

Singapore has been aggressively following policies which would prevent terrorists from finding funds essential for their operations. As has been noted by analysts, although many of the terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia are motivated by local agendas, many have benefited from logistical and financial support from international terrorist groups.[27] The UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has given empowered Singapore government to declare illegal terrorist assets without a criminal conviction. Singapore is known for its very strong electronic surveillance methods. The State Department stated that Singapore utilizes "extensive networks" for conducting close observation and "highly sophisticated" capabilities to scrutinize telephone and other private conversations. Additionally, no court warrants are required for such operations. As for the internet, Singapore laws allow the government to monitor all internet use, and the government does closely monitor internet activities.[28]

Singapore has also worked closely with other Southeast Asian countries in sharing intelligence in order arrest key terrorists within the region. For instance, Thailand arrested Arifin Ali, a senior member of the Singaporean JI cell. Additionally, Indonesia arrested and handed over to Singapore Mas Selamat, the Singapore JI cell leader.[29] This was a major arrest and capture.

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[26] Vincent Corsi (2008), op.cit

[27] Aurel Croissant and Daniel Barlow (2007), "Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and government responses in Southeast Asia", Studies in conflict and terrorism, vol.30, no.2, pp134

[28] Bruce Vaughn (Feb 2005), Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress, Accessed 6 July 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31672.pdf

[29] Global Security Organisatrion, " Jemmah Islamiyah," Military, Accessed 6 July 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ji.htm

Malaysia counter terrorism strategies

Malaysia has used ISA to detain the suspected terrorists. In the same manner, anti-money laundering laws, a task force to deal with terrorism, and support for international counter-terrorism measures have been adopted by Malaysia as well as all the countries of ASEAN. Malaysian government has also adopted strict measures against Islamic schools as they were providing the fertile grounds for the fundamentalists, extremists and terrorists to operate. Not only must the private Islamic schools be registered with the Ministry of Education, but even more important, every school curricular is to be scrutinized to ensure that it is in line with the national curriculum.[30] In November 2003 Malaysia passed new counter-terrorism laws that were widely criticized by local human rights groups for being vague and overbroad. Critics claim that the laws put the basic rights of free expression, association, and assembly at risk. Malaysia persisted in holding around 100 alleged militants without trial, including five Malaysian students detained for alleged terrorist activity while studying in Karachi, Pakistan.[31]

The Philippines Counter Terrorism Measures

The Philippines government has adopted number of important strategies and policies to counter terrorism. Philippines government is the strongest supporter of the US 'war on terror' and even agreed to deploy the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. On 29 September 2001, the then president of Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo established the Inter-Agency Task Force against International Terrorism to identify and neutralize suspected terrorists. On 29 September 2001, the Philippines Congress passed the Anti Money Laundering act. On 21 October 2001, President announced a 14 pillar approach to combat terrorism, including the establishment of a cabinet committee on International Security as the leading anti terrorist body, called on the armed forces and police to address terrorist violence, sought regional consensus with

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[30] Rommel C.Banlaoi (2004), *War on terrorism In Southeast Asia*, Manila: Rex Books, pp.50

[31] Cambridge International Model United Nations (2007), The Definition Of Terrorism, Accessed 7 July 2010, http://www.cumun.co.uk/committees/xiiipdfs/disec-terrorism.pdf

Malaysia and Indonesia in the war on terror, and held accountable all public and private organisations that may be abetting terrorism.[32]

ASEANs Counter Terrorism Approach

ASEAN was established in 1967 and is based on the following principles which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves.

ASEAN occupies a central position in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Cooperation among the member states of this multilateral consortium carries the promise of the region- wide coordinated effort to combat terrorism.[33] Despite of the fact that initially in the aftermath of Bali bombing the ASEAN states acted unilaterally or bilaterally with extra regional actors, primarily the United States, the ASEAN as an organisation began to display greater regional cohesion with concrete steps towards greater consultation and cooperation such as intelligence sharing and joint training of Law Enforcement.

ASEAN's initial steps to create a unified threat perception on terrorism were taken on November 5, 2001, when its member states signed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The main points of the declaration were as follows:

- Declaring that terrorism posed a "formidable challenge" to "regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development";

- Condemning the 9/11 attacks and "(considering) such acts as.....an assault on all of us";

- Rejecting " any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race";

- "Review(ing) and strength(ing) .....national mechanism to combat terrorism";

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[32] Ibid

[33] Jonathan T Chow (2005), ASEAN counter terrorism operation since 9/11, *Asian Survey*, vol.45, no.2, pp.302-321

- Calling for enhanced information and intelligence sharing and regional cooperation on law enforcement;

- Calling for ASEAN members to sign, ratify or accede, to "all relevant anti terrorist convention including the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism";

- Declaring that " the United nations should play a major role" in combating terrorism at international level";

- Declaring ASEAN's intent to discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase SEAN's role and involvement with international community....to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour.[34]

In May 2002, ASEAN produced the work programme to implement the Plan of Action to combat transnational crimes which laid out comprehensive set of strategies for addressing transnational crime at the regional level; including terrorism.[35] This programme identified the primary strategic courses of action: information sharing, legal and law enforcement cooperation, institutional capacity-building, training, and extra-regional cooperation.

The Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, have been a warning to ASEAN countries that regional counter terrorism efforts were still inadequate. Subsequently, after a month, in November, the 8th ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh took place, where the group issued a declaration that mostly reiterated the joint declaration to counter terrorism of a previous year. The new Declaration on terrorism by the 8th ASEAN summit is as follows:

- Condemning the "heinous terrorist attack in Bali";

- "Denounce (ing) once again the use of terror....for whatever cause";

- "Deplore (ing) the tendency in some quarters-to-identify terrorism with particular religious or ethnic group";

[34] ASEAN, *2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to counter terrorism*, no.5, 2001, Accessed 8 July 2010, http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm

[35] ASEAN (Oct 2001), Joint *Communiqué of the third ASEAN ministerial meeting on transnational crime*, Accessed 8 July 2010, http://www.aseansec.org/5621.htm.

- Commend (ing) our law enforcement authorities for the cooperative work that has resulted in the arrest of persons plotting to commit acts of terrorism;

- Resolving to "carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to counter terrorism and to "intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist group in the region."[36]

A treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matter was signed by the eight ASEAN countries on November 28, 2004. At the summit, the countries agreed on 32 Articles with a desire to improve effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of the parties in the prevention investigation and permitting to member states to seek assistance from one another in criminal investigations pertaining to 190 different serious offences. It is the only ASEAN's legally binding agreement related to counterterrorism.

However, ASEAN states remain slow to ratify key terrorist conventions especially the treaty suppressing terrorist finances. Nevertheless, a breakthrough occurred at the January 2007 ASEAN summit that agreed on an ASEAN convention on counter terrorism. Convention on Counter Terrorism may pave the way for a more legally binding approach to counterterrorism cooperation. The main points of the convention are as follows

- Recalling the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of international law, the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to counter terrorism and relevant resolutions of the United Nations on measures aimed at countering international terrorism, and reaffirming our commitment to protect human rights, fair treatment, the rule of law, and due process as well as the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia done at Bali on 24 February 1976;

- Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group;

- Recalling also the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism and the Declaration on Terrorism adopted at the ASEAN Summits in 2001 and 2002 respectively;

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[36] ASEAN (Nov 2002), *Declaration on terrorism by ASEAN Summit,* Accessed 9 July 2010, http://www.aseansec.org/13154.htm

- Reaffirming the need, among others, to work towards the conclusion of an ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, and an ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, and the establishment of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty as envisaged by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord;

- Realising the importance of identifying and effectively addressing the root causes of terrorism in the formulation of any counter terrorism measures;

- Reiterating that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever, and by whomsoever, is a profound threat to international peace and security and a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity for ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020;

- Reiterating the need to improve regional cooperation on counter terrorism and undertake effective measures through deepening cooperation among ASEAN law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities in countering terrorism;[37]

In November 2007, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Charter; essentially paving the way for ASEAN to be a rule based organization committed to fulfilling its various obligations and collective decisions. The signing of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007, seeks to establish ASEAN as a legal entity and formally move the region towards an EU-style economic community by 2015, will, once ratified, greatly increase ASEAN's institutional capacity and ability for autonomous action, including in the field of counterterrorism.

Thus, in sum, the member states have differed in their perception and methods to combat terrorism. The ability of Jemaah Islamiyah to shift smoothly across borders to form sophisticated networks with domestic militant groups and to continue with bombings in the region, demonstrates inconsistencies in the domestic legal system and security priorities of the ASEAN states. Each have adopted different policies and strategies but simultaneously accepted an urgent need to overcome the menace of terrorism and it is this desire that in turn influenced their positions towards greater cooperation and coordination.

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[37] ASEAN (Jan 2007), Convention on Counter Terrorism, 10 July2010, http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Jemaah Islamiyah has been severely smashed in the recent years of counter terrorists operations. The Bali investigation and the discovery of PUPJI by the central Java police have led to the far greater understanding of their network operations, command and control structure, leading to the subsequent arrests. Despite being on the run JI has been able to penetrate four major terrorist 2003), the Australian embassy (Sep 2004), second Bali bombing (Oct 2005) and the Marriot and Carlton Hotels Bombing (July 2009). These attacks have been carried out at regular long interval, which demonstrates that they do not have the manpower, resources or capabilities to penetrate attacks frequently and at a faster rate. Simultaneously, it also suggests that JI is damaged but not completely destroyed, it still have a capability to carry out violent attacks throughout the Southeast Asian region.

The determination of Jemaah Islmaiyah to spark violence and jihadist activities cannot be disassociated from the Indonesia's transition towards electoral democracy, which facilitated an opportunity for different radical groups to operate. Looking at the lives of Abu Bakar Ba'ayir, Abudullah Sungkar and other key leaders of JI one can realize that even they did come from authoritarian environment, their period of radicalization and mobilization took place in the relative freedom of Malaysia. Thus, the problem of Southeast Asian terrorism only surfaced once Indonesia had democratized.

However, the fact remains that the collapse of Suharto's regime provided a structure for political opportunity that allowed various groups and interest to register them and demand greater acceptance. Simultaneously, many Islamic groups arose to negotiate and contest the new space created in the post authoritarian Indonesian public sphere. The government and the pro democracy groups like the *Mohammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul ulama* have worked to promote the discourse of Democracy and expressed their concern about the threat of terrorism that had spread across the country. While, some of the most radical groups for instance, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the Hizbut Tahir Indonesia (HTI), the Laskar Jihad (LJ), *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) among other organizations

rejected participating in public sphere and instead called for Jihad and establishment of Islamic state in Indonesia.

This episode comprises of an inevitable consequences of the inappropriate management of religious diversity by the state. In the absence of social cooperation and cultural pluralism, had allowed mutual suspicion and distrust in Indonesian society in the post authoritarian era to explode to bloody communal conflicts that has eventually dispersed to all parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago.

Islamic consciousness has been on rise since the late 1970's. The expansion of formal education, the desire for public association, debate in an atmosphere of tightening political repression and economic advancement were all factors that contributed to an increases gathering around Islam. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998 Indonesia still experiences much instability, and although political Islam has gained a higher profile, it is internally divided.

The rise of the militant Islamic groups gave remarkable boost to the explosion of radical religious discourses that had threatened Indonesia's reputation for practicing a tolerant and moderate form of Islam. Prior to the Bali bombing and subsequent attacks in Southeast Asia, the conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia and Islam in Indonesia in particular was different from Islam in Middle East and other Muslim countries. But In this respect, it is vivid now that the political Islam in Southeast Asia is inspired from the external influences. Such influences from Middle East when combined with forces of globalization serve to strengthen radical Islam because they undermine state sovereignty. Additionally, the main channel for this inflow was the many students and religious teachers who studied in the Middle East, as well as many Middle Eastern Teachers who visited the region to spread the new ideology of Sharia oriented Islam.

A violent Islamists have been portraying a confused understanding of the religion, Islam. Terrorism and violence has never and will never be a part of Islam which is based on the spirit of love for peace. The confusion resulted from the misunderstanding of the concept of Jihad. Armed Jihad is just one temporary aspect of Jihad, the broader, permanent meaning being a peaceful struggle to perform good deeds for the sake of *Allah*. This

emphasis on armed Jihad needs to be overcome and Muslims should return to the foundation of their religion.

It is very important for the governments of the region to understand the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism, which constitutes the main factor for the growth and recruitment of JI. Further, understanding political Islam assist the governments in figuring out how Muslims are transformed into extremists and terrorists. JI's ideology is based on distinctive anti non- Muslim sentiments and is not true to the principles of Islam. Such ideology has contributed towards misconception of Islam among Non-Muslims. On the other hand the perception has also been formed by the Muslims in Southeast Asian region that the war against terrorism is more like a war against Muslims. The most important step in this regard is to stop equating Islam with terrorism. To have a united voice against terrorism, the moderate Muslim majority of the region must remain well organized. Conflicting views on religious issue must be prevented from budding into terrorism when the solution is not found. The challenge is to maintain institutions of authority for Muslims to refer for enlightenment. The present situation in the 21st century requires Islam to have the potential to provide solution to contemporary problems. Further, radical extremism and terrorism must be checked and their ideology must be countered to discourage them from causing physical and material destruction.

The regional terrorist network challenged conventional wisdom that political violence associated with militant Islamic group was an internal domestic issue. As in the contemporary scenario radical Islamic groups have attained a regional character by advocating their objective for the establishment of Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Unlike the terrorism and challenges of the past in the region, Jemaah Islamiyah represents the origin of the first regional terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. Had JI leadership remained in Indonesia, it might have remained a local radical group. After the leaders moved their base to Malaysia, support they got from the Muslims in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and southern Thailand made JI leadership expand their mission across the region.

In order to attain its goal of forming an Islamic state in the region, Jemaah Islamiyah leaders have formed alliances with other militant Islamic groups to share resources for

training, financial assistance and to promote cooperation. Jemaah Islamiyah's core members are bound together by history, ideology, education and marriage. Using the powerful nature of religion, Jemaah Islamiyah philosophy has been able to transcend ethnicity and nationality.

Although in the past several years the central command lost some of its top members including Hambali, Noordin Top and Dr. Azhari among others and the organization had experienced over 300 arrests in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, JI remains extremely dangerous due to its widespread network. The network alliances of JI domestically and regionally means that, even if the JI members lie low for the time being, other groups can work with JI members that exist outside the organization and undertake acts of violence. However, JI can work with any other Islamic community that share the same principles and goals because any leader of *Mantiqi* and *Wakhalah* can establish relations with other organization with the permission if the leader of JI.

Conditions in Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular for the JI and other radical groups are becoming extremely difficult. There has also been a change in attitude towards terrorism in the recent past. Political and religious leaders who were initially reluctant about the home grown terrorism now support strong counter terrorism efforts. The threat of JI has compelled most of the Southeast Asian states to adopt various measures to contain terrorism. Indonesia has tried more terrorists than any other country in the Southeast Asian Archipelago. The governments of the region have invested in developing their operational counter terrorist capabilities as well as expansion of their intelligence communities and enforcement authorities. As a result, governments were able to monitor a large number of suspected terrorist and conduct timely arrests. Nonetheless, there was little or no investment in strategic counter terrorism.

The region has witnessed the tightening of laws to deal with many Human right groups arguing that democracy and liberty have often tended to be sacrificed at the cost of law enforcement. The Southeast Asian countries have increasingly realized that the danger posed by JI is regional in character and individually they are unable to manage its threat. Apparently, there is increasing cooperation between some members states even though the collaboration due to different national priorities, is still largely limited. Furthermore

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there are also conflict and issues between the government and the region that limits cooperation as far as terrorism is concerned.

Despite the efforts of Most of the regional Governments to counter terrorism, the ability of Jemaah Islamiyah to shift smoothly across borders to form sophisticated networks from many years demonstrates the failures of the government to eradicate the menace of terrorism completely. It means much is needed to be undertaken domestically and regionally in order to win the war against terrorism. There is a need for Southeast Asian region to depict to the international community that it is able to manage the terrorist threat in a real manner. Nationally, there is a need for different agencies, especially police, military and intelligence to work together and to compete with each other. The creation of the regionwide consensus to coordinate efforts would go a long way towards centralizing the effort against terrorism. ASEAN governments have signed many agreements, yet when it comes to the crux, there are serious difficulties. In addition to the existing policies there is a need for protocol on what to do when a terrorist and terrorist suspect is being caught. Lastly, the countries of the region must have one consensus on who the terrorist are and what acts constitute terrorism, so that various intelligence agencies act prudently, and ensure that another Bali bombing type of incident does not happen.

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