ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION IN RESOLVING DARFUR CRISIS IN SUDAN

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Declaration

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Role of African Union in Resolving Darfur Crisis in Sudan"** submitted by me for the award of master of philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university

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Certificate

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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TO

MY

PARENTS

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PREFACE

Sudan got independence in 1956 form Britain. It has been ruled by a series of unstable parliamentary governments and military regimes from 1965 to 1969 and 1985 to 1989 during the remaining time the Sudan has been ruled by the military regime which came to power through coup. All the government supported Karthum and it took important position in the world politics.

African Union has limited resource to resolve the problem of African continent. So, AU took assistance from outside world to resolve 'Darfur Crisis' by the two ways. One by AU's policy through the international community and another by the international community in Darfur such as UN, USA, India etc. That crisis can be resolved through sending more military force into Darfur

Chapter one focuses on meaning of Peacekeeping Force and challenges.

Chapter two would focus on the history of Sudan, Darfur crisis and Causes.

Chapter third would deal with the AU Peacekeeping Force in Darfur and role of international community. AU play active role through the international community due to limited resource.

Chapter four focuses on the evaluation of the AU and impact of AU's activities over Darfur crisis.

Chapter fifth would conclude the whole discussion and highlight the findings of this study.

List of Abbreviations

UNSCOB	:	United Nation Specified Commission on the Balkan.
UNCI	:	United Nation Commission of Indonesia
UNEF	:	United Nation Energy Force
LDC	:	Least Developed Country
SLMA	:	Sudan Liberation Movement Army
AU	:	African Union
OAU	:	Organization of African Union
PSC	:	Peace and Security Commission
UNMIS	:	United Nation Mission in Sudan
NATO	:	Non- Alignment Treaty Organization
EU	:	European Union
CPA	:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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Chapter-1

Introduction

One of the most important developments in the post-war history of international organization is peace keeping operations. It is the key prospect of developing and sustaining international Concern for maintaining international peace and security backed by collective action, although it is neither in accordance with the letter of the United Nations chapter nor anticipated by its makers. The United Nations was brought into being primarily as a "co-operative endeavor" on the part of many nations to seek security by collective action. To achieve this, the fonder of the United Nations recognized the necessity of leaving military forces of the disposal of the organization. They wrote in the chapter provisions in which they hoped, that it would bring them security and peace. But the realities of the international life made it impossible for the provision to be effective, the reliance United Nations found itself developing new devices to grapple with conflicting situations.

Under the charter of United Nations, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and is equipped with power to decide on a variety of coercive measures including enforcement action. Actually in the condition of cold war, the veto power possessed by each permanent member of the council was often more effective in preventing any organizations national action, than the power of all members to take action. Despite dangers inherent in the 'irresponsible' use of veto, there was hope that the Security Council would prove effectiveness.

The reason for the hope was that its decisions were to be backed by use of force under its own authority by armed forces drawn primarily from the great power themselves. In addition, provisions was made in the chapter, where other members of the organization could have by special agreement, to make armed forces were it organized collectively by the military staff committee of Security Council, composed of the chiefs of staff of permanent members. But since its inception, the military committee became deadlock

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once the issue of the contributions made by the great power themselves, to the collective force of United Nations. Their agreement merely reflected the general break up of their war time cooperation at the wake of the first cold war. In this matter Security Council could hardly use the provisions of 7 chapters in Iranian complaint or Syrian-Lebanon complaint. No enforcement action was taken or even proposed in any of the disputes accompanied by armed hostilities, for example (Indonesia, Palestine, and Kashmir).

The breakdown of the chapter based on collective security system resulted from the frustration of the Security Council, in the fulfillment of its primary responsibility to maintain peace and security (thanks to the cold war), led to an expedient "process of improvisation" to contain a conflict situation[1]. The failure of the chapter arrangement namely, 'enforcement action' during crises situation resulted in a gradual dynamic and organic evolution of an operational concept of peacekeeping operations. Although the term peacekeeping operations has not yet got any formal definition, except a formal recognition by the General Assembly in establishing a special committee on peacekeeping operations in 1965, but the uniqueness of the concept is that, without any specific definition its objection and goals are well achieved through its actual operations. It represents a pragmatic approach to United Nations crisis situations on the urgent need for an immediate 'collective response' to meet a particular crisis for stimulating extra chapter development.

In fact the generis of the operational concept of peace keeping operation could be traced a pattern of action which involved during the League of Nations experience. The League of Council, whenever confronted with situation of armed hostility, mainly concentrated its efforts, so far possible, on obtaining a ceasefire facilitates the process of mediation and conciliation it refrained from naming the party responsible for initiating hostilities and also from passing value judgments on the claims of different parties involved in the disputes. For instance, during the Grecco-Bulgarian crisis, the league council not only refused to accept the claims of parties involved in the disputes, but insisted on "both the

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[1] David. Wainhouse (1973).*International peace keeping at the cross road*. John Hopkins press, Baltimare, USA, p.48.

nations to withdraw their forces across their respective frontier and simultaneously t fix a neutral zone, and to appoint a neutral committee to investigate the incident"[2] and so on. But league council failed during crises which involved great power, because, its convent made no provision for the compulsory enforcement of its decisions Any decision which might required the use of force could be taken only with the unanimous approval of all members, including the states against which it has to be directed, Secondly, it was left to the contender themselves to interpret and comply with a ceasefire call and implement the precautionary measures that might have been laid down by the league council.

Despite the so called "improved machinery with teeth"[3] envisaged in the chapter, the United Nations, in practice, picked up the thread, where the League experience had left it.[4] Early experience showed up the imperfections and flows in the practice of leaving to contender themselves to interpret and comply with a 'ceasefire' call and implement the precautionary measures that might have been laid down by the Security Council. The outcome of this experience has been very promising. By this process of trial and error, the Security Council discovered the advisability as well as feasibility of establishing a United Nations observer group on the trouble spot. In Indonesia, the Security Council provided observers drawn from countries which maintained their consulates in the area. Similar arrangements were made in Greece too, where the governments represented on the United Nations special commissions on the Balkans (UNSCOP) supplied observers.

The observers in Indonesia like UNSCOB in the first year of the organization did not get remunerations of any kind and their expanses were met by their respective government.[5]

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[2] Wainhouse, D(1966), *Peace observations: A history and Forecast*, John Hopkins press, Baltimore, p. 49

[3] Saksena, K.P.,(1974), *"United Nations collective security: Historical Analysis"*, Sunrise, New Delhi, P. 371

[4] Saksena, K.P.(.1974), "Not By Design: Evolution of United nations for future" , *International Studies*, New Delhi, , vol-16. no.4, p.461

[5] Wainhouse, D(.1948), Security Council official records (SCOR) ,Yr 3, supplement for June 1*(UNDOC. 5/787):*, , no.2, p 30, *(UNDOC. 5/787):*, , no.2, p 301

Although it made available to the Security Council's Committee of good officer, that they would accept orders from the military and civilian authorities of their own respective countries and on others. They also made reports to their own respective governments. There was no one to coordinate or to exercise over-all supervision of the work of the observers. These naturally created difficulties remained till the participating national government was not willing to transfer their personnel outside control.

It took two years to establish the post of chief observer, who assumed the responsibility of the administrative re-organisation of the observer's team in Greece made a role for channel of communication between the delegations of the UNSCOB and the observer impersonal in matters relating to their duties.[6] It was also decided that their travel and subsistence allowance would be paid out of the United Nations budget. This was a step in the direction of internationalization on one side and reduction of sovereign control by member states of personnel who were their national. On the other sovereign members did not find any difficult to accept otherwise. When military observer was first introduced in Indonesia and Greece, they never accepted the idea of their nation's missions. In fact this change in their attitude occurred when they found it difficult to pay the expenses of the national working as the United Nations observers.

The day-to-day experience of the functioning of observer Groups must have to demonstrate the weakness of the traditional rule those groups should take instructions only from the government they were representing, from no one else. Thus, in 1949, the UNSCOB laid down the first meaning full ground rule in which observers should regulate their conduct with the internet of the United Nations in regard to the performance of their duties only from UNSCOB".[7] The UNSCOB report noted that the experience gained in 1948 has demonstrated that the need to clarify and define the scope

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[6] General Assembly Resolution 193-A (III), 27th November 1948, authorized UNSCOB to utilize service and good offices of one or more persons whether or not members of the special committee on Balkan, on the recommendation of the Secretary General, this arrangement cleared the way for appointment of chief observer by UNSCOB on the recommendation of the Secretary General, GAOR, session, 4, supplement 8, p.22 (UNDOC. A 935)

[7] Ibid p.22

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of United Nations observers works. A handbook of observers was issued which included broad general instructions, and key instructions. Among these instructions, they postulated that observers will be guided by the fact that "they are working for the highest international body, the United Nations. They should conduct their work with complete impartiality and accept instructions in regard to the performances of their duties only from the special committee (UNSCOB)". In Indonesia while the consular commission continued to maintain that its military observers would be subject of instructions from their respective governments alone, but the events moved in the opposite direction. After the second Dutch 'police action' (December 1948), the consequent increases in tension, the personnel of both the United Nations Commissions of Indonesia (UNCI) and the Consular Commissions found desirable in the interest of ensuring their own protection, the stress their connection with and United Nations.

The Military Executive Board of the Consular Commissions decided that its vehicles should fly the UN flag and be painted blue and white and that its personnel should wear armbands signifying their connection with the United Nations[8]. It was also given the name, "Netherland-Indonesian Manual for implementation of cessation hostilities". This way, the responsibility of the governments regarding observers, shifted to the United Nations. Now observers were no more representative of their respective government; rather they became individual specialists of United Nations Mission. They led to the practice of considering them as impartial servants of the United Nations rather than the representative of their government.

The next stage of enlargement in the functioning of observer groups was reached during the conflict over Kashmir, with its efforts at mediation between India and Pakistan, in Kashmir the United Nations established a commission (UNCIP) which went to the crucial areas to enquire into the facts about the conflict and to keep maintain Peace. But the commission found itself in a situation where it had to improvise its machinery to observer a cease fire too. The UNCIP had already obtained the services of the UN official, on

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[8]   SCOR. Yr.4 special supplement 5, (*UN doc 5/1373*), p.28-29

second men from Belgium, Lieutenant-General Maurice Delvoie, for a different purpose, viz, to advise the commission on a complaint by Pakistan alleging a marine military build up by India, in Kashmir[9].When he arrived in Kashmir on January, 2 1949 General Delvoie found that cease fire agreement between the two warring countries had taken effect a day earlier. In the changed circumstances, the commission designated him as the 'chief observer' of the ceasefire and the Secretary General supplied him with military personnel for his assistance, at the request of UNCIP. This arrangement was made with the consent of both conflicting parties involved in disputes. Thus the administration and organization of the observer team came under the chief observer's responsibility and the chief observer became the sole channel of communication between the delegation and observer personnel I matters relating to their duties.[10]

To sum up briefly, before the dramatic emergence of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), it became quite clear that the experience of the field observation the United Nations Special committee on the Balkans, the Security Council's Consular United Nations Temporary Commission (e.g. in Kashmir and Palestine) gave rise to UNEF in 1956.The early experiences and development set the guiding and organizing principles which influenced the peace keeping operations.[11]The major principles may be identified as follows: (1) the secretary general in consultation with the parties concerned, decides which state should be asked to provide military observers and no state had the 'right' to insist on being included;(2) the secretary general appointed the head of the observer mission who is from 'International Civil Servant', report directly to the Secretary General (3) the observers are considered ' experts' on the mission for United Nations for a specific period of time. Their respective governments are responsible for their salaries and national entitlements. The United Nations pay their travel expenses and subsistence

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[9] UN Doc. 5/1196, 10 January, 1949, PP. 12-13 cited in K.P Saksena .(.1974) "Not By Design: Evolution of United nations for future" , *International Studies,* New Delhi, , vol-16, no.4, p.461.

[10] Wainhouse, D. Security Council official records (SCOR) ,Yr 3, supplement for June 1948. *(UNDOC. 5/787):,* no.2, p.5

[11] UN Doc. 5/1196, 10 January, 1949, PP. 12-13 cited in K.P Saksena , .(.1974) "Not By Design: Evolution of United nations for future" , *International Studies,* New Delhi, , vol-16, no.4, p.465

allowances; (4) the observer serves as individuals and not taking responsibility of their respective national governments.

During the period of their service they are solely responsible to the head of mission and through him to the Secretary General. Their assignments are determined by the head of the mission and they take instruction only from him. (5) The observers are sent to specific areas of conflict with the consent of the parties concerned. (6) The United Nations Secretariat substitutes itself for National resources. It supplies the needed logistic support to the observation mission and it has progressively become the centralized coordinator and manager of all field missions.

Based on the above operative principles, the UNEF was only the next logical organizational development,[12] which became altogether more important because of its unique organization and modalities. It is, however, much more elaborates and sophisticated. The organizational development took place in the context of the crisis in the Middle East which erupted with the Angb-French-Israeli hostility against Egypt. The Security Council understands and could not measure up to the situation.[13] Under the authority of a general Assembly Resolution, the United Nations launched its first peace keeping operation[14] to meet a crisis in which two permanent members of the security council were directly involved. But the nature of function of the UNEF and the creation of which helped in mitigating the Suez crisis was essentially the same, non-fighting, impartial exercise, partaking of many characteristics of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The creation of UNEF paved the way for a variety of important elements of the operational concept of peace keeping operations. (1) the United Nations Peace Keeping Force should not include contingents from the five permanent members of the Security

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[12] Saksena, K.P.(1974),"Not By Design: Evolution of United nations for future", International Studies, New Delhi ,vol-16, no.4,.199

[13] Security Council Resolution119, Oct. 31, 1956, (5/3721)

[14] General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1). November 5, 1956

Council, through France and England were keen to include their contingents in the inception of preventive diplomacy because the idea of not including conflicting parties as well as permanent members in the UNEF because 'Efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside the sphere of differences the UN should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming in the first instance, at their strict localization.

Preventive action in such cases must, in the first place, air at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purpose, but might in turn lead to counter action from other side. The UN enters the picture on the basis of its non commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a guarantee in relation to all parties against initiative from others.[15] (2) The positive agreement or at least the acquiescence of a permanent member of the council is essential for the success of such United Nations peace keeping operation.

The dramatic emergence of UNEF and its vital use for full role in the crisis highlighted an operational concepts which United Nations had gradually evolved not by design over the years and generally unnoticed, the certain violence and perform pacifying mission and the pattern of action to exemplified in the creation and role of the UNEF increasingly became widely accepted way of dealing with conflicts in creation circumstances. The concept through not fully institutionalized, has displayed a "dynamic operational capability when it was used to deal with conflicts to peach in Lebanon, Jordon and in the Congo. It also revealed certain session's limitations in UN actions. Many new problems arise that made the Congo operation complicated, and very different from the previous crises. This called for a different guideline to tackle the situation.

During the Congo operation the peace keeping force, which had proved to be a non-partisan, non-fighting and non-interfering in Suez crisis in 1956 came to be characterized

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[15] Claude, Jr.(1965). *Sword into Plowshares. the problems and progress of international organization.*, University of London press, New York, p.286

otherwise.[16] It became the most controversial operation and raised unavoidable question marks about the concept like what should be the role of the Secretary General? Should the members of the UN give a blank cheque to the Secretary General in a peace keeping operation, so that 'he' can interpret the mandate in the way 'he' (Secretary General) whishes or Which of two organs of UN, the General Assembly or the Security Council is competent to authorize such operations? Should the great powers be allowed to acquire a operation preponderant role in the UN, when the operation is in the name of the entire international organization?

All there are much importance and still persistent because of lack of consensus among the permanent member of the Security Council regarding the role of Secretary General, member states of the UN who do not want to give up their options or to commit them either way. But they are interested to keep their options open. The financing question led to the establishment of special committee of 33 in 1965 to review the whole question. But the committee could not evolve any consensus. The United States of America has been opposed to the Soviet view that the Security Council alone has the responsibility to maintain international peace and security. In the changed circumstances, however, the USA would perhaps prefer the Security Council for authorizing peace keeping operation. During Korean crisis USA's attitude was different because of the majority it could readily muster in the General Assembly. Now because of nonaligned countries in General Assembly, it feels more secure while giving full responsibility.

On the question of financing again, there is no consensus. It is the reality of international politics. The foreign policy objectives of the U.S.A have been the outcome of the reality of the volatile situation or it developed in the Congo and to some extent because of its financial, diplomatic and logistic support. The whole out come shows the fact that still the management of international relations has not been able to escape itself from power politics is, because of the distribution of power is so unequal and there is so much gap,

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[16] Saksena. K.P.(1974), "Not By Design: Evolution of United nations for future", *International Studies*, New Delhi, vol-16, no.4, p.469

Thus, it has made it clear that regionalism is concerned not only with peace and security matter but also with economic and social issues. One phenomenon of the period since 1945 is the rapid growth in the number of inter-governmental regional organization which performs highly significant functions. But some have assumed and played important roles in world affairs.

Regional organizations are variously defined on the basis of geographical proximity of the members. According to beneath, "a regional organization is segment of the world bound together by a common set of objects based on geographical, social, cultural, economic or Political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for informal inter-governmental arrangements"[17].

Paddleboard defines" a 'regional organization in the sphere of International Politics as an association of states, based upon location in a given geographical area, for safeguarding or promotion of the participants. The terms of this association are fixed by the treaty or other arrangement.[18] According to Stoesingger, "A regional arrangement is a voluntary association of states that have developed faithly elaborate organizational tools to forge among them such bonds of unity". He asserts that, "a purely military alliance among nations that do not pursue the goal of political building is not a regional arrangement"[19].Robert Reinow has observed that geography is an important factor in the formation of regional Organizations in so far as it "fosters a sense of Cohesion, common vulnerability, common isolation, shared poverty of resources etc"[20].

Regional organizations may be classified in several ways bared on the nature and scope of their functions or memberships. One useful and instructive method of classification

[17] A. Le Roy Benneth.(1995), International organization, principles and issues. New Jersey, p.230.

[18] Norman J. Pudolford (1980),"Regional Organization and the United Nations". International Organizations, vol. 8.P.204

[19] John, G Stoessinger (1980), the Might of Nations, John Hppkine Press Baltimore, USA P.202.

[20] Robert Reinew (1970), Contemporary International politics, OUP, Oxford P.307.

has been developed by Lynn H. Miller, who divides all regional organization into three types-. 1. Co-operative 2. Alliance 3. Functional. And he uses the term "Multipurpose". Therefore it mainly has three types of Regional organization and multipurpose type regional organization[21].

The multipurpose Organizations are those whose broad aims and activities reach across the lines that divide political and military matter from those generally classifies as economic and social. Alliance type organizations are those whose military and political orientation is intended to provide security against the external actors. Functional type organization is those that promote economic social or political collaboration with little or no regard to security factors. The dividing line between all these organizations is some what orbiter and subjective and is determined by the range and variety of activities pursued by the regional organization.

1.2 United Nations Peacekeeping

1.2.1 The U.S. must press for Reform

One of the United Nations primary responsibilities in which Americans most agree is to help and maintain international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has been far more active in establishing peacekeeping operations. This steps increase in missions was reversed temporarily by the debacles in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, missteps in the missions led to necessary re-evaluation of U.N. peacekeeping. However, as troubling situations have arisen in recent years, mainly Africa, the Security Council has found itself under pressure to respond and "do something" The response, for better or worse, has often been to establish yet another peacekeeping operation.

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[21] Miller.L.H.(1970), *Regional organizations and Subordinate system, Eagle wood Cliffs*. and NJ: Prentice Hall. p357.

U.N. peacekeeping is now being conducted with unprecedented pace, scope, ambition, and increasing demands have revealed ongoing, serious flaws. Specifically, recent audits and investigations have uncovered substantial problems with mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in procurement for U.N. peacekeeping, and incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers over civilian personnel have been shockingly widespread.

While the U.N. has limited authority to discipline peacekeepers who commit such crimes, it has failed to take steps that are within its power to hold nations accountable when they fail to investigate or punish their troops' misconduct. The U.N. Security Council has also yielded to pressure "to do something" in situations like Darfur even though it violates the dearest lesson learned which emphasized in the 2000 report the panel on United Nations peace operations in which "the United Nations does not wage war."[22]

U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into the awareness of the limitations and weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping. This awareness is crucial, because there is little indication that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future. This requires the U.S. to press for substantial changes to address serious problems with U.N. peacekeeping. Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely to be continued and expand, undermining the U.N.'s credibility.

1.2.2 U.N Peacekeeping

Within the U.N. system. the U.N. C charter places the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security on the Security Council.[23]As a result, between 1945 and 1990, the United Nations established only 18 peace operations despite

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[22] U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security council, report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-s/2000/809, august 21, 2000,p.10,

[23] Accsessed on 24th June, 2009, URL: Charter of the United Nations, article 24, at http//www.un.org/peace/aboutun/charter (september10, 2008).

multitude of conflicts that threatened international peace and security too greater or lesser degree.

The Security Council has approved more than 40 new peace operations since 1990. Half of all current peacekeeping operations have been authorized since 2000. These post-1990 operations often have involved mandated beyond traditional peacekeeping in terms of scope, purpose, and responsibilities. Moreover, these missions often have been focused on quelling civil wars, reflecting a change in the nature of conflict from inter-state conflict between nations to intra-state conflict within states. According one estimate, 80 percent of all wars from 1900 to 1941 were conflicts between states that involved formal state armies, while 85 percent of all wars from 1945 to 1976 were within the territory of a single state and involved internal armies, militias, rebels, or other parties the conflicts.[24]

At the end of May 2008, there were 17 active U.N. peacekeeping operations and another three political or peace-building operations[25]

1.2.3 Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption

The U.N. as illustrated by the Oil for-food scandal and the more recent instances of mismanagement by the United Nations development in North Korea-has proven to be susceptible to mismanagement, fraud, and corruption. This also applies to U.N. peacekeeping respectively

The Secretariat procured more than $1.6 billion goods and services in 2005, mostly to support peacekeeping, which has more than quadrupled in size since 1999. An Office on intern oversight services audit of $1 billion in DPKO procurement contracts over period of six year period found least $265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.

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[24] Doyle, Michael W and Nicholas Sambanis(2006) *Making war and building peace: United Nations Peace Operations* Princeton University press. Princeton p.26

[25] The U.N. assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); U.N. integrated office in sierra Leone (UNIOSIL); and U.N. integrated office in Burundi (BINUB).

1.2.4 Sexual Misconduct

In recent years, there have been several harrowing reports of crimes committed by U.N personnel, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls. The most notorious of these reports have involved the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Indeed, allegation and confirmed incidents of sexual exploitation abuse by U.N. personnel have became depressingly routine, having occurred in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

Tragically, this does not seem to have addressed the problem adequately. Only this past May, the international non profit save the children accused aid workers and peacekeepers of sexually abusing young children in war zones and disaster zones in Ivory Coast, southern Sudan, and Haiti— which largely going unpunished. U.N. peacekeepers were most likely to be responsible for abuse. According to a report issued by save the children mention that, "Children as young as six are trading sex with aid workers and peacekeepers in exchange for food, money, soap and, in very few cases, luxury items such as mobile phones.

However, despite this action Secretary General Kofi Annan's announcement of a "zero tolerance" policy, the perpetrators of these crimes are very rarely punished, as was revealed in January 2007 news report on U.N. and troop contributors appropriately grants troop-contributing countries jurisdiction over military members who participate in U.N. peace operations, but little is done if these countries fail to investigate or punish those who are guilty of such crimes.

1.2.5 A political problem

The problems of mismanagement, corruption, and misconduct cry out for fundamental reform of the U.N. peace keeping structure to improve accountability and transparency.

However, corruption, mismanagement, and sexual misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers are not then only problems with U.N. peacekeeping.

The other problems are a political problem. The vast expansion of U.N peacekeeping with the possibility of even more operations on the horizon like the proposal for a new Somalia mission with up to 27,000, peacekeeper has lad some to point out that the U.N Security Council has gone "mandate crazy" in its attempts to be seen as effective and "doing something". The willingness of the council to approve missions where "there is no peace to keep" such as Darfur, Somalia, or Chad which violates a dearly learned lesson that U.N. peacekeepers are not war fighters.

Even situation short of war that may require a U.N. peace operation are still rife with danger, as illustrated by nearly 2,500 peacekeepers that have been killed in operations since 1948. They also involve great demands in resources, management, and personnel. Indeed, these operations have increasingly strained the ability of countries that are willing to provide peacekeepers, especially in Darfur, and worse, this investment may not be helping the situation.

Dr Greg Mills, director of the Johannesburg based Brent Hurst Foundation, and Dr. Terence McNamee, Director of publications at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI), have conducted several case studies of U.N. peacekeeping operations for a forth coming Heritage Foundation book. They have concluded that, in the cases of Lebanon and Democratic Republic of Congo, it is an open question whether the U.N. peacekeeping missions have contributed to resolving the situation or to exacerbating them.

1.2.6 Limited Success Stories

This is not to say that U.N. missions are never useful and should be rejected out of hand. U.N. missions have been successful in situations like Cambodia, where U.N. peacekeepers helped to restore stability by following dictatorship and civil war. Indeed,

no one wants another Rwanda, and the consequences of doing nothing could end in tragedy. But a long list of operations that have been less than successful indicates that the Security Council should be far more judicious when adopting decision to intervene.

Darfur is particularly relevant. The U.S has called the situation in Darfur "genocide." The U.N. did not come to the conclusion recognize the widespread human rights violations and suffering. After the African Union mission failed to curtail the violence and suffering, the U.N. peacekeeping force despite ongoing conflict and considerable evidence neither the rebels nor the government hacked forces were prepared to abide by a peace agreement. In some other using cases Protected by China's veto, Sudan started demanding that the peacekeepers should be African which made to a severe constraint on the number of available troops. The problems with these are that they are not enough trained and capable to meet the demand.

As a result, Jan Eliasson, the Secretary-General's special envoy for Darfur, told the Security Council that the situation in Darfur had deteriorated despite the efforts of U.N. and African Union troops. The recent decision of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to seek an indictment against the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir that if approved by the ICC pretrial chamber, leads to further complications.

In Darfur, the U.N. Security Council yielded to pressure to act. The massive suffering was occurring and would likely to have grown worse without U.N. backing and support for the AU peacekeeping efforts. However, that vastly complicates peacekeeping efforts, such as restricting U.N. peacekeepers for that mission to African nationals. The council also entered a conflict situation against the lesson of its own experience. It compounded the error by failing to adopt clear objectives, metrics for success, or an exit strategy.

Because of these failings, not mention the potential for deterioration toward broader conflict or a stiffening of resolve by President Bashir, if the ICC proceeds with its indictment that Darfur could very easily become the U.N.'s next spectacular failure.

1.2.7 The way ahead for U.N.

There are several actions that the U.N. and the Security Council can and should take to address the forgoing weaknesses. Specifically:

- Be more judicious in authorizing U.N. peacekeeping operations. The pressure to "do something" must not trump sensible consideration whether a U.N. presence will improve or destabilize the situation, which includes clearly establishing the objectives of the operations, ensuring that they are achievable, carefully planning the requirement for achieving them, securing pledges for providing what is needed to achieve them before authorizing the operations, and demanding an exit strategy to prevent the "perpetual mission" trap. This process should also apply in reauthorization of exiting mission, which is often rubber-stamping approach. If a mission has not achieved its objective or has not made evident progress toward that end after a lengthy period, the Security Council should asses whether it is serving a positive function in its deliberations, however, the council should recognize that short, easy missions are extremely rare. When authorizing a mission, the council should recognize that it may be there for a lengthy period if the council seems unlikely to persevere, it should consider not approving the mission.

- Transform the DPKO structure to enable it to handle increased peace operations demands and to plan for future operations more effectively. This requires more direct involvement of the Security Council; more staff, supplies, and training, and greatly improved oversight by an independent inspector general dedicated to peace operations.

- A key element of this should include transforming the DPKO to incorporate greater flexibility so that it can rapidly expand and contract to meet varying levels of peace operation activity. Current U.N. rules do

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not permit the necessary authority and discretion in hiring and shifting resources to meet priorities. A core professional military staff must be maintained and used, but the DPKO should also be able to rely on gratis military and other seconded professionals to meet exceptional demands on U.N. peace operations. This would readily provide the expertise and experience need to assess the requirements mandates under consideration, including troop numbers, equipment, timeline, and rules of engagement, both efficiently and realistically.

• Build up peacekeeping capabilities around the world, particularly in Africa, and further develop a U.N. data base of qualified, trained, pre-screened uniformed and civilian personnel available for U.N. operations. The U.N. has no standing armed forces and is entirely dependent on member states to donate troops and other personnel to fulfill peace operation mandates which are appropriate. Nations should maintain control of their armed forces and refuse to support the establishment of armed forces outside of direct national oversight and responsibility. However, the current arrangement results in an adhoc system plagued by delays; inadequately trained personnel, insufficient numbers of military troops, military observers, civilian police and civilian staff, inadequate planning, inadequate or non-functional equipment, and logistical gaps.

• The U.N. has established a standby arrangements system, wherein member's states make conditional commitments to prepare and maintain specified resources (military formation, specialized personnel services, material, and equipment) on "stand-by" in their home countries to fulfill specified tasks or functions for U.N. peace operations. This is their prerogative, but the resources committed under the UNSAS fall short of Needs.

• Implement a modern logistics system and streamline procurement procedures so that missions receive what they need when they need it. To be effective, procurement and contracting must "have a formal governance

structure responsible for its oversight and direction." as former Under-secretary-General for management Catherine Bertini advised Congress in 2005. Critically, the new logistics system the procurement system must be subject to appropriate transparency, rigorous accountability, and independent oversight accompanied by robust investigatory capabilities and a reliable system of inter justice.

- Implement mandatory, uniform standard of conduct for civilian and military personnel participating in U.N. peace operations. If the U.N. is to take serious steps to end sexual exploitation, abuse, and other misconduct by peacekeepers, they must do more than adopt a U.N. code of conduct, issue manuals, and send abusers home. The remedy should not involve yielding jurisdiction over personnel to the U.N. or to non-national judicial authority, but it should entail commitments by member states to investigate, try, and punish their personnel in case of misconduct.

U.N. peace keeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial, because this seems to be little indication that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future.

The unprecedented peace, scope, and ambition of U.N. peacekeeping operations have led to numerous flaws, limitations, and weaknesses that are serious and need to be addressed. The Bush administration and Congress need to consider carefully and request by the United Nations for additional funding for a system in which procurement problems have wasted millions of dollars and sexual abuse by peacekeepers is still occurring with fundamental reform. These problems have to be addressed as soon as possible so that the credibility of U.N. and the real principles it needs to address will be addressed.

Chapter- 2

Background of Darfur Crises

With an area of 2.5 million square kilometers Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and the ninth largest country in world. Its vast area includes stretches of tropical forests, marshlands, mountains In the Southern and Central parts to Savannah, stone and central Parts to Savannah, stone and sand deserts, and mountains in the north, east and west. The Nile, with its fertile banks, runs throughout the country, connecting its various parts. It shares its extensible boarders with nine countries.[26] The diversity of Sudan's geography is also reflected in its people, who are multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual. Like many others countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), Sudan has experienced many years of political lension and civil war since It become independent In 1956. Sudan's population in 2001 was estimated at 31.7 million[27]. Most of the country is sparely populated because of the arid conditions and the substantial rural urban migration.

The vast majority of population is poor, with an avenge per capita Income estimated at US S 395 in 2001[28]. This avenge masks wide regional disparities in eco9omlc and social development. Through well endowed with natural resources in relation to its population, Sudan's economic performance has been substantially below its potential.

Sudan has a vast and diverse agricultural resource base that provides means of sustaining a livelihood. Its irrigation schemes are among the largest in the world, producing cotton and food crops. Water resources included the Blue Nile and White Nile and other large

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[26] Countries bordering Sudan are Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Cango, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda.

[27] Populations numbers are estimated from the Central Bureau of statistics based on the last population survey from 1993, which estimated the urban population at 30%, and the rural population at about 70% including nomadic group.

[28] Source: "world Bank Development indicators", 2001.

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rivers. Although the climate varies from extremely dry in the far northwest to mostly tropical in the South.

Oil and gold are Sudan's most important mineral resources. Oil exploration first took place offshore in the red sea, where gas was found in 1974. Oil exploration on land began in 1975. There are significant forestry resources that can provide the basis for sustainable timber industry and wildlife tourism In the event of peace. Because of civil war, wildlife has been decimated, and care of parks and reserves has been undermined. Currently, forest resources are used mainly for gum Arabic production. Although more than 80 percent of the rural population depends on forest products, forestry accounts for less than 2 percent of GDP.

Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has undergone several phases with respect to socio-economic policies generally, and with respect to growth and poverty in particular. Sudan belongs to the group of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). But it has yet to quall 1r for support and debt relief under the HIPC — initiative, which was launched by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996.[29]

2.1. Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment is a term used to describe the policy changes implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the Bretton woods institutions) in developing countries. These policy changes are conditions (conditional ties) for getting new loans from the IMF or World Bank or for obtaining lower Interest rates on existing loans. Conditional ties are implemented to ensure that the money lent will be spent in accordance with the overall goals of the loan. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are created with the goal of reducing the borrowing country's receives its loan depends upon the type of necessity. In general, loans from both the World Bank and the IMF are claimed to be designed to promote economic growth, to generate income, and to pay off the debt which the countries have accumulated.

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[29] The HIPC-Initiative was enhanced In 1999 to provide faster, deeper and border debt relief. See: heavily indebted poor countries (HIPc) initiative — status of Implementation, a report prepared jointly by the staff of the IMF and the World Bank, August 20, 2004.

Through conditionalitles, structural adjustment programs generally implement "free market" programs and policy. These programs include Internal changes (notably privatization and deregulation); as well as external ones, especially the reduction of trade barriers. Countries which fail to enact these programs may be subject to severe fiscal discipline. Critics argue that financial threats to poor countries amount to blackmail; that poor nations have no choice but to comply.

SAP's are designed to Improve a country's foreign investment climate by eliminating trade and investment regulations, to boost foreign exchange earnings by promoting exports, and to reduce government deficits through cuts in spending. Although SAP differ somewhat from country to country, they Included:

a) A shift from growing diverse food crops for domestic consumption to specializing in the production of cash crops or other commodities (like rubber, cotton, coffee, copper, tin etc.) for exports;

b) Abolishing food and agricultural subsidies to reduce government expenditures;

c) Deep cuts to social programmes usually in the areas of health, education and housing and massive layoffs in the civil services;

d) Currency devaluation measures which increase import costs while reducing the value of domestically produced goods;

e) Liberalization of trade and investment and high Interest-rates to attract foreign investment;

f) Privatization of government — held enterprises.

The main argument behind the legitimacy of SAP is that SAPs are necessary to bring a developing country from crisis to economic recovery and growth. Economic growth driven by private sector foreign investment Is seen as the key to development. These agencies argue that the resulting national wealth will eventually "trickle down" or spread throughout the economy and eventually to the poor.

2.1.a. Structural Adjustment in Historical Perspective

Structural adjustment is a relatively recent phenomenon: In the decades following World War II, economic policy in the industrialized core reflected Keneslon economic Ideas that prescribed the taming of markets through macro economic Interventions.[30] In poor countries, much more direct state interventions in the economy were tolerated.

By the end of the 1970s, World Bank President Robert MC. Namara first coined the term structural adjustment. This term referred to a set of lending practices whereby governments would receive loans if they agreed to implement specific economic reforms.[31] Although it was not clear what this meant at the time, only a few years later, World Bank and IMP lending arrangements had begun to aim at an ambitious agenda in keeping with the free market revolution.

In 1970's the indebtedness of LDC (Least-developed countries) traced back to International Banks to invest in developing world. When global interest rates rose dramatically at the end of the 1970's these debts became unsustainable. The debt crisis made persuading governments to implement policy reforms easier because such reforms could be required as preconditions to bailout funds. Privatization was particularly attractive because it both satisfied multilateral lenders and provided much-needed revenues.

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[30] Ruggle J.G, International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order, In International Regimes, ed, S Kranser. 1983. P. 95.

[31] Kapur 0, Lewls J.P., The World Bank: Its first half centuiy. Washington DC. 1997. P. 505.

But there were increasingly courting foreign portfolios investors, who were more likely to be attracted to governments that provided strong guarantees to property rights and did not interfere excessively in markets.[32] Governments also came to rely on the advice of US —trained economists in high government posts, who tended to be believers In the need for market reforms.

The era of structural adjustment has been associated with a number of fundamental and seemingly irreversible social transformations.

2.1.b. The Sudanese Government Economic Policy for the Period (1956- 2000): A Review

2.1.b.i. Demand-Side Policies

Here we review the Sudanese governments' demand-side policies for the period 1956-2000. This period can be divided into Five distinctive sub-periods, as following:

i) 1956-1970; early expansionary polices to transform the back ward economy and the ten year plan.

ii) 1970-1978; Massive expansionary policies and resulting fiscal and monetary Imbalances.

iii) 1978-1985; IMF/World Bank involvement in the Sudanese economy arid the Economic Recovery Programmes.

iv) 1985-1992; Period of Economic and Political instability.

v) 1992-2000; Liberalisation policies and the Sudanese government's adjustment programmes under IMP monitoring.

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[32] Stalling, B, International Influence on economic policy: debt stabalization, and structure reforms. In the politics of Economic adjustment: International conflicts, and the state. ed. S Huggard, RI? Kaufman, 1992, p. 41..

Supply Side Policies (1956-2000) Here, we review in brief the Sudanese government's supply-side policies for the period of 1956-2000 and focused on the period 1978- 1985 (The IMF/WB Programmes), and 1992-2000 (the governments own adjustment programmes). We focus on pricing policies, tax policies, private investment policies, exchange rate policy.

2.1.b.ii. The pricing policy in Sudan was used, mainly, for three types of products

agricultural, Industrial and public services. The World Bank assigned a major role for the pricing policies. Agricultural product pricing was introduced in 1954. Despite its objective of promoting producers to increase production, the urban consumer and the government revenue maximisation remained the main policy targets while the rural producer was neglected. The government policy towards industrial products was to protect domestic products. Public services were distorted by Imposing low prices which failed to cover the public enterprises running costs causing increases in the budget deficit. The tax system in Sudan is highly distorted by widespread exemption and weak tax administration. This distortion continued to undermine all attempts to remove macroeconomic imbalances. Important attempts to review the tax system were undertaken during the period (1978-1985) and (1992-2000). However, very little was achieved during the first period due to the high growth of unrecorded underground economy and availability of foreign finance from abroad, which reduced pressure on the government to adopt tax reforms.

Private investment in Sudan started to grow rapidly during the British Administration in Sudan. This was followed by successful private investment In the period 1956-1970, especially in the large — scale mechanised rain-fed agricultural sub-sector. During the 1980s and early 1990s, private investment was further frustrated by political and economic instability. Private investment started to recover after liberalisation policies in late 1990s, mainly in the oil sector.

Exchange rate policies in Sudan are characterized by Inconsistency In objectives,

confusion, and loss of control over foreign exchange and payments, and the lack of proper maintenance. After Independence, the Sudanese government launched the Ten year plan for the period 1960/1961 to 1970/1971 to transform the backward economy. The plan was failed for political and economic reasons. The Ten year plan was followed by the Five Year Plan 1970/71- 1974/1975, and the six year plan 1977/1978- 1982/1983, both of which witnessed high level of government expenditure. During the period 1970-1978, the government followed expansionary policies and ambitious development plans that resulted In macro-economic Imbalances.

Convert Sudan into the "Bread-Basket of the Arab World" was adopted. This was an export - led agro Industrial strategy mainly for producing food stuffs, while promoting import substitution by producing wheat, sugar and other imported inputs. The starter failed to achieve its objectives for economic and political reasons.

The six year plan was abandoned and the government adopted a new type of economic policy under IMF/World Bank supervision in 1978. In June 1978, a first credit tranche of SDR 21 million was granted by the IMF to the Sudanese government, and tighter fiscal and monetary policy measures were introduced, resulting in devaluation of the Sudanese pound and pricing policies being revised.

On the implementation level of adjustment reforms, the government almost succeeded in meeting the IMF targets on the expenditure side throughout the period (1978-85). According to the World Bank (1985), this could be explained by the reduction of, and in most cases by the elimination of, budgetary subsidies. On the revenue side, the government implemented some reforms in order to introduce more elasticity into the revenue structure as well as to increase the amount of these revenues.

Moreover, a variety of policy changes were undertaken by the government to reduce monetary growth, control inflation, reduce the current account deficit, and meet major financing requirements. However the speed of economic decline had escalated dramatically during the IMF'/World Bank programmes (19784985).

GDP declined in real terms and the development expenditure as a percentage of GDP dropped by 50%. Government deficit tripled, reaching 15% of GDP In 1ë84-85.

The IMP attributed the failure of the monetary and fiscal measures In Sudan to the lack of 'Fiscal and Monetary discipline' and the personalized nature of lending. This was a sign of economic mismanagement and political struggle within the state. However, Sudan was hosting over half a million refugees from neighbors countries during this period. The situation was exacerbated; by four years of drought (1981-1984), a depression of Sudanese export in the same period, an increase in oil and input prices and the resumption of civil strife In the Southern region in 1983.

The period 1985-1991 was one of political and economic instability. The period witnessed four different government regimes, in turn, five developmental plans were launched during the period and most of them were not successful.

During the period 1992-1999, a major transformation of fiscal adjustment and structural reforms was undertaken by the government. The budget was reduced from 11.2% of GDP (on a cash basis) in 1992 to less than 1% of GDP in 1997. The exchange rates (official rate, parallel market rate and black market rate) were unified into one rate in 1998.

It is worth mentioning that this period has witnessed the implementation of an annual IMF staff-monitored programme (SMP) since 1997. The government has implemented a medium-term staff- monitored programme (MTSMP) for the period 1999-200 1. Economic performance under this programme was described by the IMF (2000) as 'the Sudanese authorities broadly achieved the macro-economic objectives of the first annual programme under the MTSMP. Growth is estimated to have reached 6% (IMF 2000).

2.2. Political development in Post independent Sudan Independent Sudan

Sudan was ruled by the joint coalition force of the Britain and Egypt from 1899 until achieving independence since 1956 Sudan has been ruled by a succession of unstable civilian and military government.

Table: 1

Composition of Different Member Party in Parliament after First General Election

Party	House of representative	Senate	No. nominal.	Total
UNP	50	21	10	31
Umma	23	4	4	-
SRD	9	-	-	6
Southern Party	3	3	3	-
Independent	9	1	3	4
Total	97	30	20	50

Source: Peter K Bechtold, *Politics in Sudan*, New York: Proger Publication, P 180.

2.2.a. 1953 General Election

Emerged as a ruling Party with 50 seats won in house of representative and 31 seats in senate out of 50 seats. They prove their clear majority in the both house in which Mr. Ismail Azhari was elected Prime minister in January, 1954. The Governor General signed the appointed day document which under the Salt-n Government acts[33] on 19/12/1955 Sudan declared itself to be an independent republic, Egypt and Britain recognized its independence on 1st January 1956[34] During the parliamentary session the ruling party (UNP) could not passed budget in the house representative so, vote of no

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[33] Henderson, K.D.D. (1956) Sudan republic Frederic a Proeger Publication.New York p. 10

[34] World Europe Book south of the Sahara, London 2004 p.1064

confidence was brought against prime minister. After this situation 21 member of NUP, with the support of Al-Mirghni, formed a new party called the people's Democratic Party (PDP). On 4th July 1956 a Umma party got supported by PDP turned under the premiership of Abdulla Khalis and Mirghani Hamza as his deputy for next two and 1/3 years.

2.2.b. Second National Election 1958

Many political parties participated in election. And the pre-elections alliance of PDP and Umma become a largest force into both house. As a result, the country's cotton crop export, which was the main economic resources complett failed and   because of it NDP could not win election in 1958 and made it clear that during the five year period from 1956 to 1954 the goverment. involved in the power politics ignored the public issues. During this period all the elected goverment. totally failed to serve public demand.

2.2.c. Military rule 1958-1964

The economic crises and instability of the government were the main factor therefore: army took over the power on November. 17, 1958 and general Abboud became the Chief of the army. Government main obsessive was to restore stability and clean administration. He called his fellows to keep the peace and carry as usual the civil servant his desk and the worker at his bench the farmers in his field and promised that the new government would continue to maintain cordial relation with the world in general and Arab world in particular.

The sovereignty was vested in the people which constitute authority in the council to delegate its legislative, Judicial and executive power with the command of army to the president. All judicial executive and legislative power shall be under the command of the army whose leader shall be president of Sudan.

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The new Govt. accepted its obligation under international law. The UN charters the constitution of the Arab League and banding Agreement. Recognized people's liberty, peace for co-existence, non interference in domesticaffairs. Free culture and commercial exchange and preservation of peace.[35]

During the military regime the civil war had been started between both the regions. The main reason behind the civil war, in which colonial power transfered of power to the northern Sudanese. All over the administer, including the police department, army under the northern region occupation the military regime steeped up the military, campaign booked by policy of Arabinizalion included the promulgation of mission army societies act of 1952 and the explosion of foreign Christian missionaries from southern Sudan.

Therefore, it is clear that this period (1955-1964) military govt has failed to remove the public problem and create the civil war between both regions, discrimination with Christian missionary and forcefully imposed of the Arabic or Muslim nonn in the southern region.

2.2.d. Third election 1965

The Constituent Assembly had convened on 10th June 1965 to approve the NUP UMMA coalition along with the other regional party, like the Southern Front and the Beja Congress, under the leadership of Mohammad Ahmad Mahjoub.

On 17th June 1966 there was emergence of factionalism with the ruling party OF UMMA. Under the leadership of Sayyid D. Sadiq open criticism of Prime Minister Mahjoub's becme visible after few day UMMA party parliamentary group decided an overwhelming majority to withdraw their support from the Govt. because UMMA party's leader for Eg. Sadiq-al-Mehdi won by election in which parliament UNP wanted Mahjoub as prime minister of the country. But Mahjoub refused to resign; for that a vote

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[35] KDO Henderson OP. cit, pp 240-257

of no confidence was called in July 25th 1966in which he won 126-130 margins. Sadiq al mehdi decided appointment his to prime minister position with competent young men. He started comprehensive programmed to resolve the emerging problem at national Ismail al Azhari was fearful of Sadiq's growing reputation in 1967. Al Azhari-di-mehdi lost a vote of confidence in the constituent assembly on May 15, 1947 and he resigned to the post. The former Prime Minister M.A. Mahjoub once again become prime minister with the support of NUP, PDP three southern grouping and one group of UMMA party.

Soon after, next election came up in 1968 and election commission listed 28 political parties. The result with the formation of government under prime minister ship of Mahjoub the support of new cola lion govt. of DUP and the Iman of the UMMA party. Particularly the of NEIMIR and role of left parties between, 1969-1985.

The military coupled by Colonel Jaffar Neimiri formed of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) consisting of the one lieutenant colonel, seven Major's and the retired former chief justice of the high court, Babikir Awadallah[36]. After RCC, all political parties were banned and their leader arrested Abdul Ghalia Mahjoub, the secretary general of the Sudanese communist party LATTER addressed political rallies in the support of the military govt. without any opposition.[37]

There were two major institutions one was the communist party and second was the army. Neimeir had opened the close relationship with the south union and adopted the policy of sweeping nationalism of business and bank. He built close relationship with Egypt and Libya.[38]

Neimiri formed a communist party namely the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), and the communist was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The governments

[36] Bechtold. Op cit, pp. 240-257

[37] Ibid

[38] Peter Woodward.(1970) The Horn of Africa (tourist publisher London, New York!(66) PP. 43-44.

Commitment to regional administration autonomy for the south and creep minister for southern affair under the minister ship of technocrats Abdul Aler.

RCC launched a new programmed providing for more popular participation in govt. referendum. For voting on the presidency announced, to be hold in early September the referendum was dully carried out and on October 10^{tt} which annaunceed radio andurman that 986 % of the election voted "yes" to president Neimiri with the 3 389 374 votes and 56 514 vote in the against "no" when he became the cheated president. Itter the separate meeting was condtuctedwith southern leaders in exit to a conference in Addis Ababa in 1972.

An agreement between representative of southern Sudanese Librarian movement and the Govt. was reached on 27th Feb. 1972. on 3rd march 1972 the Addis-Ababa agreement on self govt. for the southern promise and on the 12th march 1972 a ceasefire was declared in the south.

2.3. Geography of Sudan

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a territory covering about 2.5 million square kilometers bordering Egypt in north, the red sea Eritrea and Ethiopia in the east, Uganda, Kenya and the Democratic republic of Congo in the south, and the central African republic, Chad and Libya in the west. The Sudan has an estimated population of 39 million inhabitants. About 32% of the population is urban, 68% rural and about 7% normal. Islam is the predominal religion particularly in the north. While Christianity and system of govt there are having multiple levels of administration with 26 state (wilayaat) subdivided in approximately 120 localities.

2.4. Social condition in Sudan

- **Economic:** The Sudan is considered a Least Developed Country (LDC) and ranks 139 in the UNDP's human development index.[39] There is no adequate national road grid that connects the country and large part the Sudan relies on agricultural and postural subsistence economy. However, commercial agriculture, industrial development as well as limited exploitation of natural resources in particular fallowing the discovery of oil in the central/southern part of the country, have developed in recent years. From the time of British colonization to date the focus of attention has been on both the central region where the blue and white Nile meet, since development and construction WAScentered in Khartoum, and on the fertile region of El Jezira where long fiber cotton has been cultivated as the country's main crop.

- **Economic summery GDP/PPP (2005):** $ 84.93billion, per capita 100in which real growth. Rate 7.7% inflation 11%, unemployment 18.7%(2002), available land: 7% agriculture: cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, millet, wheat ,gum Arabic, sugarcane, cassava, mango, papaya, bananas, sweet potatoes, sesame, sheep, livestock. Labor force 11 million 1996 agriculture 80% industries 7% and govt. 13% (1998). Industries- oil cotton ginning, textiles, cement edible oil, sugar, soap, distilling. shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceutical, armament, automobile. Light truck assembly.

- **Natural resources:** Petroleum, small reserves of iron ore copper chromium ore zinc, tygsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower.

- **Major trading partners:** China, Japan Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, India, Germany, Australia (2004)[40]

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[39] See 2004 UNDP Human development report, Access Oct 2008. URL: http://www.undp.org./extema ne presp/net/01/10102 pdf.

[40] Infoplease.com (op cit)

2.5. Social Status of Sudan

The population of the Sudan is made up of a multitude of tribes and its inhabitants speak more than 130 languages and dialects. An Islamic-African Arab culture has emerged over year and has become predominant in the north of the country The language is now spoken throughout most of the country and constitutes "lingua francia" for most Sudanese.

Population, Ethnic composition and Economic index:- Population (2007)   42 292 929 (growth rate: 2.5%) birth rate 33.9/1000; infant mortality rate 59.6/1000 life expectancy 59.3 density per 59 mi : 46 Language Arabic (official), Nubians, bedwie, diverse, dialect of Niloric, nilo hermitic, sudanic, languages English.

Ethnicity/Race:- Black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%. Religions:- Islam, Sunni, 70%, (in north) indigenous 25%, Christian 5%, mostly in south and Khartoum.

Literacy rate:- 61% (2003)

2.6. Darfur

The Darfur region in the western part of the Sudan is a geographical 4 largeest area comprising approximately 25,000 square kilometers with an estimated population of 6 million persons Darfur borders with Libya, Chad and Central African Republic. Since 1994 the region has been divided administrate into 3 states of north south, and west Darfur like all other state in the Sudan,and each of the three states in Darfur is governed by Governor (wali), appointed by the central govt. in Khartoum, and supported by local administration-major urban centers include the capitals of the 3 Darfur states, Nyala in

south Darfur, El Geneina in west Darfur, and the capital of north Darfur, E Fashir, which is also the historical capital of the region in additional, there are few major towns spread out over the entire region which serve as local administrative and commercial centers. The majority of the population, however, lives in small villages and hamlets, often composed of only a few hundred families. The economy of the three Darfur states mainly on subsistence and limited industry farming as well as cattle herding.

2.6.a. Main cause of Darfur crises

Initially, both ecological and transformation have has impact on inter tribal relation. Darfur is part of great share region and while it has some agricultural area. Particularly around the Jebel Marrah Plateau, and in the most of region remains arid desert land drought and desertification had impact in the 70 and 80 and the fight for resources become more intense. In particular, tension between agriculturalist and cattle herders was affected. Cattle herders in search of posture and water often involved the field and orchards of the agricultural led to bloody clashes as described below corridor that were agreed upon amongst the tribes to facilitate the movement of cattle for many years were not fertile land become scarce settled peoples tolerance of the seasonal visitors diminished.

Secondly, Drought and desertification had it impact not only on Darfur but the entire region of the Sahara which led to increased migration of nomadic groups from Chad, Libya and other states into the more fertile areas of Darfur and is generally not disputed while this immigration was initially absorbed by the indigenous groups in Darfur, combined with tougher living condition during the drought led to clashes and tensions between the new comers and the locals.

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2.6.b. The conflict in Darfur

The conflict in Darfur is complex and a full analysis lies outside the some of this study. Nevertheless, to understand the challenges facing the byAU's peacekeepers, some basic elements of the history and the people for Darfur should be kept in mind.

The notion of race and ethnicity is relatively new phenomenon in Darfur. There has been much mixing over the centuries, with internal migration and intermarriage between Arabs and Africans quite common. This echo other recent ethnic identity conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans where groups co-existed for decades and people "changed" identity easily and frequently, and until politicians steeped in and "froze" ethnic identities to exploit their racially or ethnically-based ideologies.

It was only in the 1980s when severe droughts struck Darfur that ethnic identity and racial classifications started to harden. Previously, nomadic herders and pastoral farmers had a mutually beneficial relationship, through trade, pasturage rights and access to water, they regulated their dealings so that each side benefited. Farmers had their fields naturally fertilized and could buy animals for meat, while herders could graze their animals obtain water and water for goods otherwise unobtainable. A traditional dispute resolution process was accepted and followed to regulate the inevitable disagreements. While not perfect or paradise, the different groups in Darfur largely got along.

When conflicts erupted between farmers and herders/nomads in mid-1980s drought and famine, there were very few government services available to ease the consequences of the struggle over diminishing resources. Tensions built over the next few years as a harsh and strict Islamist regime took power in Khartoum in 1989, led by Omar al-Bashir. Weapons flowed into Darfur as both sides sought to protect their assets (herds, livestock, crops, water holes_ because the government was incapable of providing protection. Meanwhile ,right next door to Darfur, Libya's leader colonel Muamimar Gaddafi was backing efforts by various Arab groups across the Sahel, but especially in neighboring Chad, to create an "Arab Belt". Not only guns were imported to Darfur, but also an

increasingly racist ideology of Arab supremacy. "Janjaweed leaders are among those4 said to have been trained in Libya.

The combination of historical neglect, increasing polarization and continuing struggle over land, water and grazing routes, helped explain the attacs by rebels from the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) on the El Fasher airport in north Darfur in April 2003 which launched the current and most deadly phase of this conflict."Unrelenting poverty has been transformed into violence by misgovernment and imported racisms". In addition, rebels in Darfur saw that the Naivasha Peace Agreement of 2002 ending the 20 years war in the South which threatened to marginalize Darfur even further. All the focus shift to the power sharing agreement between North - south and dividing the new oil wealth between them. The rebels saw that violence had "worked" in the south and they were determined that Darfur get its share of the new oil money flowing into Khartoum's coffers. The government panicked because it knew its army could not immediately handle this new front while many of its soldiers were still deployed in the volatile south.

Violence escalated when the Bashir government decided to arm the Janjaweed and other government allied tribes. Two reasons explain this decision. First, the Sudanese government has frequently resorted using proxies tohelp and fight its battles, especially south in the Nuba mountains where militias, armed and supported by the military, fought government opponents. Second, many soldiers in Sudanese military come from Darfur and the government did not trust their loyalty, fearing that if they asked to fight against family and friends, they would refuse.

Violence continued throughout 2003 and into 2004. in which number of villages burned by the military and the Janjaweed militias grew, the international community belatedly took note. Perhaps it was the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in April 2004 that finally galvanized attention, if not action. In September 2004 Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, called the Sudanese government's war in Darfur genocide, the first time ever that a US senior Government official used the term to characterize another government's behavior. This obligated the US to take action to stop the genocide under

the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide which the US has ratified. A few months later the US congress passed a resolution also branding the conflict genocide.

The United Nations Security Council passed resolution of1564 in late 2004 calling for a commission of inquiry on genocide in Sudan. In January 2005 the commission reported to the Secretary-General and the Council: The government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international Human Rights and Humanitarian Law amounting to crimes under international law Government forces and militias WHO conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. The commission of inquiry based on the information had obtained. conclude that genocide had occurred but did not rule out the possibility pending further investigation.

Chapter 3

Role of African Union in Darfur

3.1. African Union

The organization of African Union was founded in 1963 for the peace security and economic decolonized African contentment. This organization was successfully decolonization of Africa but it can not established peace and security in the Africa for a long term. So this organization remove from the Africa contentment and was established a new African organization by replacing on the OAU which one African Union.

AU founded on 2003 with the pan African ideals to play active role to found it. The OAU was the major factor in causing its birth apartheid in South Africa. Otherwise the OAU was weak and disunited by the disputed over Western Sahara (involving Algeria, Morocco Mauritania and France), the Shaba rebellion (the attempted Invasion of Zaire), the invasion of Benin and the Agade war against Somalia. Overall the organization was seen to have failed to respond to serious intra Africa conflict or act as a pan-African body against foreign intervention.

OAU was having limited capability to resolve the problem of Africa. Only few provisions deal the African problem in structure. Sudan's all African supreme tribunal, a permanent OAU Security Council to be created with specific peace keeping conflict resolution and standing military force.

OAU General Security had too little authority to resolve the conflict. (despite the extension of power in 1977) OAU could not interfere in the domestic affair. So this organization could not succeed to resolve the African problem. AU was founded to the replace of OAU.

AU Charter Article - 3: The act reaffirms the principles of domestic sovereignty and non intervention. Specifically it stipulates the defense of sovereignty territorial integrity and independence of the member state Article (3)& (4), provision i.e right to intervention in the domestic affair. We discuss principal of AU:-

1.   Peace full resolution of conflict between member state of the union through appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Union Assembly. (Artical 4)

2.   Prohibition of the use or threat of force among member state of the Union (Artical 4 (f))

3.   Peaceful coexistence of member states and right to live in peace and security (Artical 1)

4.   Respect for democrat principles human right, the rule of law, and good government Article .4 M

5.   Respect for the sanctity of human life and condemnation and rejection objective of promoting stability and democrat principal of institution for good government.

3.1.a. Eco Objective and Principal

—   1.   Established, the necessary condition in which the continent to play its right full role of the global economy and in the international negotiation.

2.   Promote sustainable development at the economic level as well as the integration of the African economic.

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3.   Promote co-operation in all field of human activity to raise the living standard of African people.

4.   Coordinate and harmonies and the policy between the existing future of the regional economic community for the gradual attainment of the objective of the union.

3.1.b. Socio-cultural Objective and Principals

1.   To accelerate the social integration of the African continent.

2.   Promotion of social Justice and respect for the sanctity of the human life.

3.   To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all field in particular in science and technology.

4.   To work wit relevant intervention partners in the eradication and preventable disease and promotion of good health condition.

5.   See generally Zdenek Cervenk Colin Legum, the organization of AU Unity in 1978, the challenge of foreign intervention 11 Feburay. 1978.

3.2. Efforts for Resolving the Darfur's Crisis

The Darfur crisis has been classified as the worst crisis in recent time. In fact the United Nations has dubbed it "the world's worst humanitarian disaster". [41] since the beginning

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[41] "Darfur crisis has complex development with no immediate solution", URL WWW . News VOA.com imf Org/extema/nepresp/net/01/10102 pdf. accessed 16 October 16 2008

of the uprising in Darfur, the UN estimates that nearly 70,000 civilians have killed and more than a million and half other displaced.

The international crisis groups said since beginning of 2007, over 240,000 people have been newly displaced or re-displaced kidnapping and sexual assault of women by government forces and associated militias as well as rebel group have continued. Humanitarian agencies, which have helped ensure the survival of over four million war-affected Darfurians, find themselves the direct target of violence. With the attacks against them having risen by 150 per cent over the previous year, they have been forced to pull out of many areas and reduced to providing assistance via footnote needed in and out' operations in some areas, often by helicopter. Violence against them comes from all sides:like government militias, non-signatory rebels, Sudan liberation Army/Minni Miniwa (SLA/MM) forces and internally displaced persons themselves. But the crisis remains unsolved. We shall look at the different efforts to know why they have failed.

3.2.a. Humanitarian ceasefire agreement

The HCA was signed on 8ᵗʰ April, 2004 in N'djamena, Chad. It was under the auspices of the African Union. The N'djamena agreement required the government to neutralize the armed militias. The agreement itself was badly flawed neither comprehensive nor professionally negotialated. For example, there was no requirement for the combatants to submit orders of battle or their current positions, and monitoring was stretched far too thinly. Fighting still occurred between the government and the two insurgent groups, while the Janjaweed continued in its target of civilians. Government forces the Janjaweed which did not stop in their burning of villages after the ceasefire was signed, and the ethnic cleansing campaign persisted despite repeated high-level visits to the region. Despite the flaws and the inadequacy of the agreement, the political leadership of the regional body should be commended as it showed greater commitment at resolving the crisis. The new created peaces and security council of the regional body made Darfur a test case of its ability to play a central role in preventing and resolving conflict across the continent.

3.2.b. The Addis Ababa Negotiations

The political organizations by the AU opened on 15th July 2004 in Addis Ababa were a positive step despite the numerous problems they encountered. They were convened at short notice, and the joint delegation of Senior SLA and JEM leaders that was expected never arrived, leaving only a small rebel team that put forward sit preconditions for the government to fulfill before the insurgents would enter direct negotiations:

> ➢ A timetable for Janjaweed disarmament;

> ➢ Creation of a commission of inquiry to establish accountability for war crimes;

> ➢ Consultation on the venue for the next round of talks;

> ➢ Full and unfettered humanitarian access to Darfur;

> ➢ Release of all political detainees and prisoners of war; and,

> ➢ Cessation of attacks on the rebels and the civilian population,[42]

3.2.c. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556

On 30 July, 2004 the UN passed a resolution imposing an arms ban on all non-state actors in Darfur. This equated the JEM and Sla insurgent with the Janjaweed. The resolution pledged support for the AU ceasefire team and political processes, and urged the parties to resume political negotiation. The key point was article 6, which specifically demanded that within 30 days the government satisfy its commitment to disarm the Janjaweed and hold accountable to those Janjaweed responsible for human rights abuses and violations of international law. The resolution did not achieve its intended aim as it was too weak to influence Khartoum's calculations. This being several members of the council according to the ICG, expressed concerns about interference with Sudanese sovereignty, and the United States, which introduced it and wanted a unanimous vote in

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[42] Demands23 Auguest 2004 made by the rebels group before they wil go into negotiations. See ICG *Africa Reports No. 83* , P.16

which the resolution represented the lowest common denominator[43]. The government of Sudan saw the resolution as a 'declaration of war' and threatened to fight any foreign military.

3.2.d. Signing of plan of action

Less than a week after the Security Council resolution on 5th August 2004. The secretary general's special representative for Darfur signed a 'plan of action" for government of Sudan. The plan acknowledged that Khartoum would be unlikely to meet its commitments within 30 days, thus undermining any incentive the government had to implement the Security Council's demands and provide council members with a rationale for not taking action when their deadline expires. The plan provided that the government could prove its good faith by taking steps against the Janjaweed, setting up safe zones for the displaced and ordering its armed forces to respect its earlier general commitments, while being put under no particular pressure to take immediately effective specific action. The plan does not provide a solid set of benchmarks against which the Security Council can readily measure performances and take stronger remedial measures if dissatisfied; as such, it looks more like an escape route than a discipline upon the government and those in the council reluctant to put more pressure upon it.

3.2.e. February 2006 Tripoli Agreement

Libya has played a highly significant, and inconsistent, role in Darfur since the conflict began, culminating in its function as host of the peace talks. At various times it has shown a significant ability to influence all rebel groups and push them towards participation in a broader political process. Simultaneously it has given the NCP diplomatic cover to resist international pressure and efforts to strengthen the peacekeeping operation. The Tripoli agreement included a border monitoring mechanism, backed by Libyan military, but it never got off the ground and was seen by many

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[43] Ibid

international as simply as attempt by Libya to ward off a possible deployment of UN forces along its borders. Libya then tried to support a quadripartite monitoring mechanism including Eritrean, Chadian and Sudanese observers. While there were reports earlier in the year of a small number of Eritrean and Libyan observers in Adre (Chad) and Geneina (Sudan), of nothing substantial has come of this. This effort did not succeed as ICG noted that "as elsewhere in Africa, Libyan actions have been motivated in part by Qaddafi's desire to be powerful regional player and mediator but the proximity of the conflicts Chad and Darfur and their domestic impact have triggered a more sustained effort than elsewhere".[44]

3.2.f. The Darfur peace agreement

The DPA signed under African Union auspices on 5th May 2006 between Sudan's government and the faction of the insurgent Sudan liberation army led buy Minni Arkou Minawi. The DPA consists of three protocols power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements, as well as a chapter laying out the framework for a "Darfur –Darfur dialogue and consultation". The agreement and the three rebel group then, with the government followed more than two years of difficult negotiations between the government and the three rebel groups then, with the government of Nigeria facilitating. However, DPA was still-born even before it could be put to use, as two of the three rebel movements. The SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) and the justice and equality movement, did not accept it, and, therefore, were not signatories to it. Abdel Wahid, leader of SLA/AW, demanded more direct SLA participation in implementation of security arrangements and was also dissatisfied with the DPA's provisions for political representation and a victim's compensation fund. On the other hand, JEM maintained that the protocols on power and wealth sharing did not adequately address the conflict's root causes. The structural inequities between Sudan's centre and its periphery that led to the rebeletion in 2003, indeed, the DPA, according to the ICG, rather than resolving the

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[44] International crisis group, op. cit, p.24

conflict "compounded it by accelerating the break-up of the insurgency into smaller blocs along loose ethnic lines".[45]

3.2.g. Peacekeeping efforts by Africa Mission in Sudan(AMIS)

The Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS)- initially the ceasefire commission (CFC)- was established by the African union (AU) as a monitoring mission in April 2004 following the signing of the humanitarian ceasefire agreement of Sudan (GoS), and two rebel movements from the Darfur region, the Sudan peoples Liberation movement/ Army (SPLM/A) and the justice and equality movement (JEM), as an observer mission, AMIS comprised 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. At the 17th peace and Security Council meeting in July 2004, the mission was enlarged to make provision for a staff of 3320. On 20 October 2004, the AU peace and security commission (PSC) further enhanced AMIS to include assistance for confidence building, protection of civilian and humanitarian operations and observance of all agreements signed since the N'djamena agreement of 8th April. Moreover, the mission equally said to be facing some critical challenges. The first challenge is the huge disparity between the numbers of personnel and the actual number on the ground, second is the increasing violence by the Janjaweed against IDP camps and villages as happened on 28 September 2005 at the Aro Sharow IDP camp, and by the rebels against GoS and AMIS troops as happened on 8th October when SLA rebels killed three AU soldiers and two civilian drivers, and a JEM splinter faction detained 38 others. Third is the unraveling of the north-south comprehensive peace agreement, which is at greater risk following the death of the southern SPLM.

3.2.h. United Nations Resolution 1706

The security council vide resolution 1706 (2006) on august 31, 2006 decided to expand the mandate of the United Nations mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to include its

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[45] International Crisis group: "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement". Policy briefing No. 39, June 2006, p.1

deployment to Darfur, without prejudice to its existing mandate and operations, in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur peace agreement. The council invited the consent of the Sudanese government of national unit for that deployment, and called on member states to ensure an expenditious deployment. It requested the Secretary-General to arrange the rapid deployment of additional capabilities to enable UNMIS to deployment in Darfur.

Acting under chapter VII of the United Nations charter, the council authorized UNMIS to use all necessary means as it deemed within its capabilities, to protect United Nations personnel facilities, installation and equipment; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations, humanitarian workers, assessment and evaluation commission personnel; to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur peace Agreement by armed groups, without rejudice to the responsibility of the government of the Sudan; to protect civilian under threat of physical violence; and to seize or collect or related material whose presence in Darfur was in violation of the agreements and the measures imposed by resolution 1556, and to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate.[46]

The council also decided that the mandate of UNMIS would be, among others, to support and implement Darfur for Peace Agreement and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease fire on the Conflict in Darfur, including by, monitoring and verifying the implementation by the parties to those agreements; observing and monitoring moments of armed groups and redeployment of forces in area of UNMIS deployment by ground and aerial means; investigating violation of the agreements and reporting them to the ceasefire commission; monitoring cross border activities of armed group along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the central African republic; and ensuring an adequate human rights and gender presence, capacity and expertise with in

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[46] See council on foreign relations in http:www.cfr.org/publication/11406;- accessed on December 5, 2007.

the mission to carry out human right promotion, civilian protection and monitoring activities, including particular attention to the needs of women and children. [47]

The African Union (AU)/United Nation (UN) hybrid forces for Darfur and the African Union (AU)/UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which is set to replace the AU's African mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established by the Security Council in July 2007 will eventually comprise 19,555 military and 6432 police personnel, making it one of the largest UN peace keeping mission in History. It is widely hoped that hybrid force will be more affective in protective civilian in Darfur than AMIS, which was made of just 7000 troops. The troops are accepted from Burkina Faso, Egypt, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Other potential contributors are Bangladesh, Jordan, Nordic countries, Nepal and Thailand.[48] The force which is due to deploy in Darfur by December 31, 2007 at the latest is faced with logistics problems. This has made UNAMID force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai to call on the international community to do something. He said no country had yet donated any of the 24 helicopter required for the force to be able to work efficiently. He said that under such circumstances the mission faced "a Herculean task ". Gen Agwai appealed to the international community to make up the shortfall. In his words, "if we want to see and to the suffering Darfur... this is now the time to stand up and be counted among the friends and do everything possible to help us have the resources that the required to assist and help the people[49]".

3.2.i. The October 2007 Sirte Libya talks

The UN and AU convened Darfur peace talk in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007. But all was predictable, no progress was recoded and prospects for future negotiation were

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[47] Ibid

[48] IRIN Africa, "Sudan; Hybrid forces for Sudan setup base" Assessed from http://www.irnnews.org/report.aspx? reportId = 75077

[49] General Martin Luther Agwai in www.punchontheline.com. accessed on 26th November 2007.

unclear. There were many reasons for the failure in Sirte. Key rebel leaders did not show up, as various internal divisions persisted, including tension between commander on the ground and political leader abroad. Many rebels also doubt the good faith and impartiality of the UN and AU, given the nature of there dealing with Khartoum. Issues of representation remain vexed and Darfurians in the camps and civil society were largely unrepresented, ensuring that the voices of those suffering most would be unheard. Moreover, the choice of venue was disastrous. Libya Muamar Gadaffi, who has for decades fomented violence on both side of the Darfur/Chad, border, poisoned the atmosphere early on, and gained instant notoriety for suggesting that Darfur genocide was "a quarrel over a camel."[50] His further suggestion that the catastrophe in Darfur was merely a tribal issue and his consequent resistance to international protection efforts, played directly into Khartoum's negotiating hand. But the most disturbing consequence of the collapse of the Sirte talks was the boost it gave to Khartoum, which appeared with a full delegation, and proceeded to indulge in fulsome talk about being prepared to make peace. Knowing full well that there would be no adequate or coherent rebel representation, the regime clearly saw this as the perfect opportunity for a significant propaganda victory. We have seen from the above studies that the various steps taken by the international community to resolve the Darfur crisis have not worked because of impediments thrown at each step. Since, they have failed to achieve the goal, it is necessary for the international community, notably the UN and AU, to evolve new strategy for the resolution for Darfur's crisis.

African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 by replacing of the OAU because OAU could not resolve the problems of African states. Nevertheless, the AU too inherited the problem of limited resources to resolve the problems of Africa. AU took assistance from the international actors such as United Nations, United States, China, European Union and India. Thus the international community played active role in resolving the problems of African states. Prominent among these problems is the Darfur crises with aid Such as money, food, army and arms on whole world consumes of the Darfur quit war due to

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[50] Eric reeves "Darfur peace talks in Libya produce only an emboldened Khartoum", accessed on 5th December, 2007URL www.Sudanreeves.org/home/indes.cfm7 action.

poor condition of the people. So, I emphasized here to resolve Darfur crises by the two ways one by AU's policy through international community, and another by international community in Darfur crises such as USA, Russia, AU and India. AU are playing Active role through the UNSC, AU and UN are passing many resolution to the Darfur crises which started from 2003 to till now 2009.

3.2.j. Policy of AU for Darfur Crises

The policy of African Union has multiple facets. In Darfur the policing, humanitarian needs and peace negotiations are the major tasks that the African union deals with.

3.2.k. AU Civilian Police

International civilian policy is a Vitol component of any modern, complex peace keeping operation like the AMIS mission in Darfur. Police is an important need in the security spectrum providing trained personal that knows how to defuse tense situation, advice on securing public order and provided guidance to local police on how to observe human right with the public. Soldiers, in many cases, are not trained to interact with unarmed civilians or to use anything less than deadly force in most situations.

3.2.l. The Tasks of Civilian Policies

- Assist in the development of proactive public confidence building measures.
- Establish and maintain contact with government policy authorities.
- Establish and maintain contact with community leaders to receive complaints or seek advice on issues of concern.
- Observe, monitor and report the effective service delivery of the Sudanese police,
- Investigation and report all matters of government police non compliance as provided in the mandate and

- Monitor and verify the provision as security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of exiting IDP Comps[51].

International civilian policy are facing extra challenge in Darfur, nearly two million people went out side of the Sudan. Kenya, Egypt and in world are lived like a refuge there. This people went out of the Sudan due to militant attack on the village, girl's man women and cattle's. So they moved from the Sudan toward safe place. Mean while, several group splintering and fighting each other in addition to government force, only complicate the situation. Mainly to protect civilian has a challenge most seasoned international police officers.

AU, like the UN in many earlier peace operations belatedly realized the importance of stationing competent, well-trained police officers in the near IDP Camp's UN officials are familiar with AU Start up mission said "the AU had no clue on police issues they said there was no major role for policy and they never even would have considered a police component it the UN had not recommended it".

The AU had never had a police component before. They had no operational plan or recruiting criteria. The UN civilian policy division in department of peace keeping operation offered a concept of operation and guidelines on recruiting, training, logistics and deployment. The UN even shared its roster of African policy that has peacekeeping experience but the AU did take advantage of this valuable resources.

This HCA agreement was signed on 8 April 2004 between Chad and African Union in Ndjamena. This agreement wanted neutralize of armed military. The agreement itself was badly followed neither comprehensive not professionally negotiated for example, there was no requirement for the combatants to submit orders of battle or their current positions, and monitoring was stretched for too thinly. Fighting still occurred between the government and insurgent groups, while the Janjaweed continued in its target of

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[51] Anis Civpol (July2005), 'Commissioner to the under secretary for peace- keeping of the UN.

civilian. Government forced Janjaweed but did not stop in their burning of villages after the ceasefire was signed, and the ethnic cleansing comparing persisted despite repeated high level visit to the region. Despite the flaws and inadequacy of the agreement, the political leadership of the regional body commended as it showed greater commitment at resolve the crises. The newly created peace and security council of the regional body commended as it showen greater commitment to resolve the crises on the newly created peace and security council of the regional body which made Darfur a test case of ability to play a central role in preventing and resolving conflict across the continent.

This Negotiation organized by the AU that opened on 15 July 2004 in Addis Ababa with positive step despite the numerous problems they encountered. There were joint delegation of senior SLA and JEM leaders that was expected never arrived leaving only a small rebel team that put forward 6 preconditions for the Government to fulfill before the insurgents would enter direct negotiation.

- A timetable for Janjaweed Disarmament Commission Humanitarian access to Darfur.
- Creation of a commission for inquiry to establish accountability for war crimes.
- Full and unfettered humanitarian access to Darfur.
- Consultation on the venue for the next round of talk.
- Release of all political detainees and prisoners of war and
- Cessation of attack on the rebel and the civilian population. [52]

These points were in line with commitment the government had already agreed, that these subsequent under taking with UN. However, call for implementation of the ceasefire was complicated by that agreement ubiquity at the signing ceremony in Ndjamena on 8 April 2004. President Idris derby of Chad added at the last minute that at the insistence of

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[52] Demand (23August 2004) made by the rebels group before they will go into negotiation. Se *ICA Africa report* no. 83. . P-16

government delegation "clause for the cantonment of all rebel force"[53]. This was not included in the public version of the document, and it was not recognized by the rebels. However, the governmental delegations at Addis Ababa, repeatedly, responded to JEM and place their fighter in cantonments. It must however repeatedly fighter in responded to JEM place cantonment. It must however be emphasizes that while demobilizing rebel force is a necessary outcome of any successful talk it is unlikely that it can be a starting point. This point was stressed by an SLA official "we adamantly refuse to canton our force before political negotiation before the government implements their commitment".[54] The talk closed after two day without direct meeting between the government and rebel delegation.

The Secretary General special representative for Darfur signed a "plan of action" with the government of Sudan on the demanded by the AU. The plan acknowledged that Khartoum would unlike to meet its commitments with in 30 days, under, mining any incentive by the governments to implement the Security Council demand and providing council member with a rational for not taking action when their deadline expires. The plan provided that the government could prove its good faith by taking steps against the Janjaweed, setting up safe zone for the displaced and ordering its armed forces to respect the ceasefire. Essentially, the government did not more than repeat its earlier general commitment while being put under no particular pressure to take immediately effective specific action. The plan does not provide a solid set of benchmarks against which the Security Council can readily measure performance and take stronger remedial measures. IT dissatisfied, a look more like an escape route than discipline upon the government and those in the council reluctant to put more pressure upon it.

However, there are positive specific plan of action, namely the request to AU Ceasefire Commission to monitor and report on to the governments commitments. This expands to

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[53] ibid.,

[54] International crises group *Africa report no.* 83 OP. Cit P-10

commissions mandate and would seem to increase the like hood of government compliance. But other are causes for concern in a particular the government's obligation to "identify and secure safe area." For the internally displaced in Darfur, Khartoum has proven unwilling to provide security for the majority of displaced in the comps it control. The new language could be used to justify forced relocation of IDP as part an effort to get them in to "safe area" and AU. UN international parties must ensure that the process is fully transparent.

3.3. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)

The DPA signed under the African Union (AU) auspices on May 2006 between Northern Sudanese government and Southern Sudanese government (a rebellion government) which made a faction of the insurgent Sudanese liberation army led by mini Arkou Miniawi (SLA/MM). The DPA consists of three protocols power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangement. The agreement followed more than two years of difficult negotiation between the government and 3 rebel groups. Government of Nigeria facilitating however, the DPA, was still born before it could put to use, as two of the three rebel movement, the SLA faction of Abdul Wahid Mohammed Nur (SLA AU) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) did not accept it and, therefore were not signatories to it. Abdul Wahid wanted implementation of these security arrangements and was also dissatisfied with DPA's provision for political representation and victim's compensation fund-on the other hand in which JEM maintained that the protocols on power and wealth sharing did not adequately address the conflict's root cause. The structural inequities between Sudan's centre and periphery that has lead to the rebellion in 2002 indeed. The DPA according to the ICG rather than resolving the conflict "compounded it by accelerating the break-up of the insurgency in smaller block along loose ethnic".[55]

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[55] International crises group(2006) "Darfur's fragile peace agreement ", policy briefing no.39, June 20, P.1 .

Another reason that made DPA to fail was its lack of modalities and implementation of government for disarmament of the Janjaweed militias and the voluntary and safe return of refugees and internally displaced person to the villages. Its comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangement required the parties to disarm themselves, a task usually left for peace keeping wile requesting AMIS to verify and monitor the processes of the redeployment, assembly and disarmament. This required robust monitoring but AMIS had too few troops with too little mobility and firepower with inadequate intelligence comp ability to do it properly, member of the AU mediation teamed AMIS official in Abuja Admitted openly that AMIS as currently constituency cannot fulfill these tasks yet the DPA contains no re reference to UN takeover of peace keeping responsibility. The ICG opined that the international community was in a hurry to package peace in Darfur region without taken in to cognizance variable needed to achieve that.

In essence, there is a very real danger that the international community, in its agreement to get added, has brokered one that is structurally week without the good faith of the parties particularly of the of the government and without effective fulfillment by AMIS of it verification and patrolling roles, the DPA is destined to fail".foot not neded.

The DPA also failed as neither the national congress party and the ruling party in Khartoum, in which rebel movement wanted the Darfur. Darfur dialogue and consultation process begin a prescribed in the DPA's because both the viewed it as a threat NCP feared an comprehensive process might general unity among Darfurians and endanger it survived strategy. As it has been using livid and rule tactics survive, the rebels saw the process as potentially weakening their logistically as movement representing the interests of Darfur.

3.4. Peace keeping effort by African mission in Sudan (AMIS)

The African union founded the African mission in Sudan (Amis) and ceasefire commission (cfc)- to resolving Darfur crises between two rebel movement from Darfur region, the Sudan people liberation movement/army (SPLM/A) and justice and equality

movement (JEM). This mission, Amis comprised so military observers and a protection force of 600 troops at the 17th peace and Security Council meeting in July 2004. The mission makes provision for the staff of 3320. The AU peace and security commission, protection of civilian and humanitarian operation and observance of all agreement signed since the Ndjamena agreement of 8th April.

The AU gradually increased that 6171 military personal and 1560 civilian policy— AMIS's first phase of deployment ended on June 2005 and on 20 May comprising 452 military observers, 1732 troops, 40 CFC member international support staff, 413 civilian policy personnel and member of the Darfur integrated task force. The second phase was supposed of the 6171 military personnel with and appropriate civilian component including up to 156000 civilian police. The third phase which was supposed to be decided in September 2005 is follow personnel. The mission which was primarily charged with protecting internally displaces spread across Darfur hampered by some weakness which included command and control logistical support and operational practice.

3.5. The mission facing some challenge

1.   First challenge is the huge disparity between the number of personnel and actual number on the ground.

2.   Second is the unraveling of the north-south comprehensive peace agreement which is a greater risk following the death of southern SPLM.

3.5.a. The October 2007 Sirte Libya Talk

The UN and AU concerned Darfur peace talks in Sirte Libya on October 27, 2007 but all was predictable with no progress recorded and prospected for future negotiation are unclear. There were many reasons for the failure in Sirte key rebel leaders who did not show up as various internal divisions persisted, including tension between commander on

the ground and political leaders abroad. Many rebels also doubt that the good faith and impartiality of the UN and AU, given the nature of their dealing with Khartoum. Issues of representation remain vexed, and Darfurians in the camps and civil society were largely unrepresented, ensuring that the voiced of those suffering most would be unheard. Moreover the choice of venue was disastrous Libya's Muamar Gadaffi who for decade's fomented violence on both sides of Darfur - Chad border, poisoned the notoriety. For suggesting that the Darfur genocide was "a quarrel over a camel" his further suggestion that catastrophe in Darfur was merely a tribal issue and his consequent resistance to international protection effort, payee into Khartoum negotiation hand. But the most disturbing consequence of the collapse of the Sirte talk was the boost it given to Khartoum which appeared with a full legislation, and proceeded to indulge in fulsome talk about being prepared to make peace. By Knowing full when that three would be no adequate or coherent rebel representation, the opportunity for significant propaganda victory.

3.6. Role of International Community

In the interim, thousand of people are killed and displaced, and although there is no adequate plan or strong commitment from the international community to deal with the crisis. Many international communities are playing to deal this problem.

3.6.a. NATO

After several consultations on June NATO Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer announced that NATO agreed to help airlift troop into Darfur and to provide logistical support. The addresses on the most important weaknesses in many African military are the ability to transport large number of soldiers across great distances and to sustain them once in place. The "strategic life" capacity of most African defense forces is virtually non existent. NATO promised to transport 5,000 additional AU troops and Greece was one of the first NATO members to step forward, providing two c-130 transport planes from July

to September 30, 2005[56] and September 21 NATO extended to October. 31 the duration of it support to AMIS allow the transpiration remaining 3 battalion to Darfur.

3.6.b. Role of French in Darfur

In the military sphere France has moved from a strategy of direct military international to one which favors African owned process and indirect assistance. It has eschewed unlit and international in the internal affairs of African country, but retains agreement to defend them to interven in Darfur in 2007[57]. Frame also offer support to AU/UN hybrid force in Darfur (UNAMID).

3.6.c. Role of India in Darfur

India has been cleared to dispatch 2500 of troops back in Africa for peace keeping work. This comes 8000 extra troops to the UN PK mission in Congo. A feather in India's cap was the appointment of General R.K Mehta as military adviser to the UN department on PK operation recently.

India's overwhelming presence among the team of blue beret in different part of the world is one of the strongest weapons in its arsenal of ferment seat in the UNSC in which more than 74000 Indian troops have participated in 41 of the 59 peace keeping[58] operation since the inception of the UN. At present, India contributes to eight of the 16 ongoing UN peace keeping missions.

3.6.d. Role of China in Darfur

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[56] "Greece to-contribute military transport planes to Darfur" Sudan tribune June 23, 2005

[57] *African research bulletining*-17439, Feb. 29th 2008.

[58] Times of India, 25 Oct . 2006.

Some in the west have recently begun referring to the 2008 Beijing Olympic as the "Genocide Olympics" because of China's continued business ties with Sudan and its reluctance to intervene decisively in the Darfur, or has the explosive charge of complicity in genocide blinded observers to china's aid and quiet diplomacy in Sudan? Global outrage is growing over the massacre in Darfur; Beijing is not exempt from the feeling. But thee is a significant difference between China and the west in approaching the issue. China's approach toward the Darfur crisis takes the long view. It perceives the root causes of the turmoil as poverty and a lack of resources, which have led to decades of fighting between local tribes and ethnic groups over basic necessities, such as water resources, land, and infrastructure. Therefore, china's approach to solve the long-lasting conflict in Darfur region was to provide comprehensive development assistance in addition to humanitarian aid.

Beijing has agreed to offer $10.4 million of humanitarian aid to Darfur and delivered half of the aid during its special envoy's trip to Sudan in May. Beijing also has invested $30 million in a dam project in the northern part of the Darfur, as well as provided goods and generation, and other necessities for economic development. China also planed to send 275 military engineers to UN force this month to implement initial stages of the Kofi Annan peace plan, which boisters African union peacekeeping forces in Darfur.

The lack of progress in stooping the massacre and the slow effect of the development aid has left China in an awkward position. On the one hand, due to its foreign policy principle of non interference, as well as its investment in Sudan, Beijing traditionally has been reluctant to put strong pressure on Khartoum, believing that wielding sticks would only interest in Sudanese oil gives it persuasive power over Khartoum.

However, China's political influence in Darfur should not be overvalued. At the same time Beijing's investment in Sudan provides economic leverage.and it also makes Beijing a hostage. Consistent with its non interference foreign policy, China does not attach political conditions to its economic relationship with Khartoum, thus making it a more credible partner to Sudan.

In the face of increasing pressure from the international community, China may consider bolder options. However, the rest of the world should not simply play the blame China game. Thee is a linkage between the Darfur crisis and Beijing Olympics, it should lie in the west and China together using the spirit of the Olympics for mutual understanding, friendship, solidarity, and fair competition-with their sympathetic hearts to collectively create a better future for Darfur.

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3.6.e. European Union

On Nov. 8, a UN-appointed commission of inquiry arrived in the Darfur region of western Sudan, to determine whether the slaughter was close to 100,000 over the past six months constitutes genocide. While this three month mission slowly goes about its business, Darfur continues to disintegrate into a horror zone of killing fields, mass rapes and ethnic cleansing. For a brief moment on September, 16, the European Union seemed to draw a line in the sand. On that day the European Parliament declared that the action of the Sudanese Government in Darfur were "tantamount to genocide," and EU ministers threatened sanctions "if no tangible progress is achieved" in meeting UN demands to halt the killing. Yet nearly three months later, two things remain clear: first, Khartoum has done nothing constructive to end the slaughter and, second, neither has the European Union.

The World Health Organization's latest report states that more than 70,000 people per month will continue to die if adequate relief does not reach those affected. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, more have been victims of brutal, often organized, gang rapes, and almost a million people have been driven from their homes. Yet on the 10th anniversary

of the Rwandan genocide, the world community has again chosen to watch, wait and, so far, do nothing.

Unsurprisingly, the United Nations has epitomized this paralysis. Although, the issued of two resolutions ordering Khartoum to disband the Janjaweed militias and halt the killings. The Security Council's demands have been roundly ignored, because they fail to include any penalty for noncompliance. The African Union has played a more active role and in Darfur since august. But both their numbers and their mandate (which does not include the protection of civilians) are glaringly inadequate to stop genocide. The United States, in July was the first nation to invoke the term "genocide" has also taken a pass on Darfur. Fresh from its second invasion of a Muslim country in three years, and with little chance of mustering the political capital for leading an intervention into a third, Washington has been distressingly mute in its calls to arms. But with its tarnished image in the Muslim world, and with Pentagon strained from deploying more than a quarter-million troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout Asia, a bogged down America is ill-equipped to lead the charge into eastern Africa anyway.

Enter the European Union. While the United States is hamstrung militarily and politically by its current global commitments, the same cannot be said for the E.U. nations. Moreover, many have maintained a strong presence in Africa for centuries. Yet Europe's real "commitment" to Africa appears to be a façade. The truth is that not one soldier saluting an E.U. flag is being readied for a trip to the Sudanese desert. With the assets of 25 member states, 450 million people and a quarter of the world's gross national product, the European Union does not lack resources, manpower or motive. Rather, the reasons why the European Union has not intervened in Darfur. First, because the United Nations has not authorized an intervention, the European Union has no felt inclined to go in "unilaterally." But, ignoring the fact that E.U support would almost certainly induce a UN about-face, Military intervention to confront a serious humanitarian crisis—even without UN authorization—has traditionally been viewed as lawful by most European Government.

The second reason the European Union has not intervened even more inexcusable, precisely because it is of its own making. In 1993 the European Union consolidated its disparate foreign policy arms into a common Foreign and security policy (CFSP), pledging to finally "speak with one voice" for a united Europe. But "speaking" appears to be all this body is capable of. Under the Maastricht Treaty CFSP actions require the unanimity of all EU member states, an upper-majority that but eliminates the possibility of collective armed intervention. By defect or design, this allows member states to voice their concerns and then excuse their inaction as bowing to the judgment of the whole. In effect the European Union has fashioned a foreign policy mechanism by which inaction is virtually automatic even in the face of genocide.

Chapter-4

Evaluation of African Union Peace keeping in Darfur

4.1.AU's Positive Imperative

Although AU did not succeed to resolve the Darfur issues it is trying and well on its way given constrains it has. It took many, policies and plans. Many international actors are also playing active role as UN, US focus on the AU's positive imperative On the Darfur issues are as following.

4.1.a. Temporary Accompaniment

AU troops did not establish outposts in the town or village in Darfur. After a rebel attack and a government counter attack in the town of Towila in November 2004, nine AMIS military observers arrived to document what had happened although, troops were unnamed they spend whole night on cost in the town and gave their region to starving local women. Yet when the time come for them to return to EL Fasher the next day the people of Towila said they that would stay there only if the AU did, "they must stays. Said a local resident it otherwise we can't stay."

4.1.b. Mediation and Conflict Resolution

AU allowed with international agency post many resolutions to resolve over water, land, livestock and much other personal matter. AMIS soldier, often from societies that have similar traditional processes involving tribal elders, know the importance of reestablishing these procedures in light of all the upheaval crowed and under supplied IDP camp. One AMIS commander hold regular meeting with the Sheikh in the various IDP camps in the sector air grievances and concern which they greatly appreciate.

4.1.c. Assistance to UN Human Rights Officers

UNHIS and AMIS agreement in July 2005 that Amis provided humanitarian aid and escort to UN. AMIS provided information to UN about the Sudan in the written request from UNMIS human right officers approve the proposed travel. Both will be investigated and share information about the Darfur[59]. The high commissioner for refuges Antonia arrived in Khartoum on 23 April 2007 on his second visit to Sudan. He meets with AU and local authority of Sudan to return. People from the outside of Sudan[60].Human right and humanitarian officer are working closely with international and military to peace and security[61].

4.1.d. Good Quality Troops

AU posses a high quality troops. The training and discipline of the soldier were good, especially in the officer coops. US UN and frown were provided military trained for the African peace keeping mission in whom AU was prevented on the requirement of soldier in the military. Troops chosen for duty in Darfur must meet stringent qualification[62] they must have no negative marks on their discipline record and have tested negative for the hive virus. Unlike many UN peaces operation where scandals have been able to avoided these Many Cases. But as AMIS expand along with demands placed on the AU from other Peace Keeping operation in south Sudan Congo and Somalia in it major problem for the AU peace keeping force for AU in Africa.

4.1.e. Improved Capacity to Address Child Protection issues

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[59] Monthly report of secretary general August2005, UN December 5/2005/523 2005, Para 14.

[60] DPI peace and Security Section, 23 April 2007

[61] www. Accsws Oct 2005 URL www.ndedu ndmag/sp2005 loesher html

[62] Ibid

AU started a one day child protection training program for all military officer children on rights and inter agency standing committee principle applying to child protection. This program has operated for more than 6 month.

4.1.f. Advocacy Against the use of Child Soldiers

The recruitment of child soldiers is very bad history and there is no harmony. AMIS commander know that SLM/A recruited young boys. Which us soldiers which is against the convention on the right of the child and the optional protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Sudan is signatory to all of there treaties and thus, is bound by their prohibition on the use of child soldier. It is also a war crime under the statue of internal criminal court. UNECEF and AMIS will share information of recruitment in some sectors in north Darfur.

4.1.g. Provision of Security for Small-Scale IDP Returns

UNHCR reported that displaced population has returned, and AMIS will provide security to returns people and AU AMIS will closely work with international organization and UNHCR.

4.1.h. Protection through Direct Interaction with Beneficiaries

IDPs and Sudanese police dashed after an incident in the market left an IDP shot dead by the policy, which was followed by looting, tension had already been high since the Goverment. Imposed a trading ban on Kalama camp. preventing any commercial trucks from entering the camp to distribute or sell goods. The IDP understandably, did not want the Sudanese police to involved in firewood patrol and a meeting with AU, UN representation and NGO camp managers to critical on the commercial ban and requested compensation for the responses from the government.. In the Zolingei IDP camps direct intervention with women through the camp managers resulted in an initiative where the

IDP appointed representative to be contact people for the AMIS in the morning and join them on the patrols. This would more comfortable in approaching AMIS soldiers when they see them in area.

4.1.i. Collaboration of Female Civpol and Female Sudanese police

While capacities are needed to train Sudanese female police officers, they are now deployed in some camps in north Darfur. In one camp female AU civpol and female Sudanese police officer work together to identify protection which need of IDP women.

4.1.j. Promotion Information Sharing and Joint Planning in Protection Working Groups

As part for the inter agency response in Darfur protection working groups comprised of UN agencies and NGO which meet weekly to discuss protection concern including freedom of movement, return and access to humanitarian assistance. AMIS participation has been inconsistent, and in violence about AMIS contribution have initiative, increase information sharing and confidence building between the humanitarian community and AMIS. This has covered the gamut of protection physical safety areas to humanitarian freedom of movement.

4.2. Short Comings of AU action in Darfur

4.2.a. Slow and Cumbersome Command and Control

Although many African soldier have lot of peace keeping experience with UN and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This has not been evident in AMIS. The Unwieldy bureaucracy at AU headquarter hampered all aspect of deployment and there is no institutional expertise for peace operation yet in the AU.

4.2.b. High Turnover of Sector Commanders and Limited Experience Within the Command Structure

Thee have been 3 different sector commanders, since Zolingei sector opened in January 2005 in Geneina, and 3 different commander since oct 2004 for many commander, this AU mission is their first operational experience restrict AMIS ability to understand the complexities of their area of responsibility, development a relationship with the local authorities rebel groups, beneficiary and with the NGO/UN community.

4.2.c. Inadequate Planning and Management Capacity

Coordination is poor, which affected every aspect of the mission, especially logistics. For example,7 fuel tanker are sent from Khartoum to Darfur every weeks and yet this number has not change even though the size of the mission has more than double, meaning there is not enough fuel to support the increased number of troops. AMIS soldiers have run out of food and fuel even before the fuel crises of august 2005, caused by the Shut-down of Khartoum's in which only Jell-fuel refinery was maintained.

4.2.d. Logistical Shortcoming

There was no real logistics plan. The first 3 military observers had one satellite phone and no vehicle or lodgings when they arrived[63] Troops lived in rented private house for several month units the American engineering firm pacific Architectural engineer constructed camps and arrangement for food water, power launder service. AMIS civpol also initially lived in private rental housing unit facilities were created for them on bases; their housing need should have been for seen. The number of vehicles aircraft and the capacity to re-supply and repair all equipment is grossly inadequate as equipment is military officer working in Darfur staled "the AU limited capacity to move large number of troops quickly, they have no armed brigades, not even mechanized infantry.

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[63] Apian- Mensah (2006), "AU's critical assignment in Darfur" *Africa afire vol* NO 2

4.2.e. Lack of Rule of Engagement (ROE) Governing Amis's use of Firearms or Force

This is inexcusable, specially since AMIS troops have been fired at least eight time, including one incident when a team leader was shot in the neck and had . Medically evacuated to Khartoum to specialized surgery. On oct. 8, 2005 five Amis soldiers and 2 civilian drive were killed in an ambush south of Nyala in south Darfur, Amis first fatalities rules of engagement are included in July 2005 draft sop, but force commander and sector commanders will have to insure that their troops fully understand the Roe8 once are finalized so that they will apply them consistently throughout Darfur

4.2.f. Poor coordination of outside assistance

NATO, the EU and bilateral officers of assistance to address the severe logistical short coming started to pour in the summer of 2005., AF AU first, the AU was overwhelmed with offers to help but could not manage the processes at point 3of different countries were offering helicopter and no one could get a response from the AU on How/when/where deliver them. The AU provided little information on mission priorities and needs and donors just took over. This situation has improved, in august 2005 a technical support based in Addis Ababa chaired by the European Union has formed the group processes request and streamline support from NATO and individual states described more fully.

4.2.g. Weak Financial Over Sign

There is no audit frail for expenses no spreadsheet showing money coming in and how it is spent. One senior UN official described the AU Mission's handling of finances as money going into a black hole some donors, particularly the EU are starting to demand greater transparency and accountability.

4.2.h. Poor Data Management

AU needs comprehensive and timely data. Information on attack, number of killed wonders patrols, humanitarian aid, safe and un safe road, size of military, number livestock stolen or missing but people have limited data about the event. UN also who work closely with Auuand AMIS have poor data about the event of Darfur.

4.2.i. Lack of Good Intelligence Information

AU working lack of planning infrastructure in Darfur which meant that there was no routine way together and analyzing intelligence on either the government forces or their military or the various rebel groups. Good intelligence is vital in Darfur, yet, AMIS capacity together, analyzes and act on in formation has been very weak. AU does not understand the importance of having an intelligence call and of structure to intelligence according to a former advisor, there is no routine way to get intelligence on either the rebels or the govt. force and no infrastructure to assemble and analyze information about the combatants. One UN field safety officers say that there is lack of strategic intelligence "data paralysis"

4.2.j. Poor Gender Blower Within AMIS

AS April 2005 of a total of 454 military observers only two were women. As of august 2005 only 126 out of 812 civpol were women, there are no female officer within AMIS for which Arabic made a first language and only recently have the sector been able to hire female translation This poor gender balance inhibits Amis from fully understanding the population it there to protect.

4.2.k. Insufficient Coordination between Amis Military and Civpol

Civpol rely on the AMIS protection force for their movement but they are not currently integrated into military planning structure. In the Zolingei sector, when firewood patrol were consuming to much of the protection force patrol capacity civpol could not continue patrols for El Shebab Camp attempts were made to integrate govt. policy into the patrol to lesson the strain on military personnel but this created a backlash within the IDP community. One peace keeping advisor commented that the AU lack sufficient expert to be able to identify ways of maximizing the use of their resources to be proactive and to undertake strategic measures to prevent attack.

4.2.l. Inconsistent Relationship with NGO and Agencies

In Prices Day AMIS shared information about the human right or humanitarian AMIS say that information could not shared and classified. But actually. Govt. of Sudan was responsible for the violence and Amis did not want to show details to the government.

4.2.m. Little Experience and no Established for Interacting Systematically with NGO

AU have second peace keeping force experience in Africa so, it is successful to solve the problem of Darfur[64]. AU has not a good infrastructure to resolve the Darfur crises. With out civilian military center officers or a strong civilian component with expertise in humanitarian assistance and human right, NGO have found it difficult to Liaise with the AU on issues of concern this is slowly changing information began shared CIMIC centers are being established and liaison officer from AMIS have started to hold regular meeting with the government of Sudan. The UN human right officer and humanitarian agencies.

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[64] Roy Naviida (2007), Consequence of AU in Darfur .*Africa Affairs* Vol. NO 2

4.2.n. Slow Build-up of Amis civilian component

The team was entirely a military one for month. Civilian policy arrived only in early 2005 and then in very small number in which AMIS humanitarian and human Right officer were deployed to the capital of Darfur three state only in late 2005 there are still gender expert while civilian are charge of this mission and, this is not apparent from either the mission's structure or its ethos.

4.3. Challenges Facing by AU in Darfur

Darfur is the second largest most complex initiative Burundi Darfur is a larger as France, with few possible road rudimentary system and feeble power and water resources life is harsh in the best of time facing many challenges which are following:-

1. Many people are going to neighbor country like Chad, Kenya as UN say that more than 1 million people displaced. [65]

2. AU have limited troops to resolve the problem of Darfur so AU took and from outside of such like India, US, UK and provided such assistance to AU to protect the Darfur crises.

3. There were still killing, and more movement of rape and banditry by the army men and rebel operational. The Janjaweed militia and Sudanese government soldier have committed most of killing. By AMIS own count. On April 2005, in specific incident it had investigated, 512 to 700 people killed who attributed to Janjaweed militias.

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[65] UN report no 11 2007

4.   AU has a problem in Darfur money. AU took assistance from out side of AU such as. USA, UK, etc. but the EU a demanded greater transparency and accountability.

5.   AU are facing troop problem and are taking troop from the out side of AU such AS India, UK, USA as India sent 7000 military force Sudan. AU are taking lot of Assistance to resolve the Darfur crises such agency EU UN. NATO etc. Coming to resolve the Darfur crises a resulted a poor coordination among the international agency to resolve the Darfur crises.

6.   Among several operational challenges facing AMIS are:-
- •   Trained, cohesive and motivated forces.
- •   Large well equipped and well supported killing force.
- •   Force deployed in large and dispersed areas.
- •   Widespread, not concentrated killing.
- •   Hospitable terrain   in killing forces in the ideal for ambushes
- •   Difficult terrain to move troops and supplies to affected area.

7.   The huge disparity between the number of personnel and the actual number on the ground.

8.   Increasing violence on, the Janjaweed against IDP Camps and villages as happened on 28 Sep 2005 at the Aro Sharow IDP camp and by the rebels against GoS and AMIS troop as happened on 8 Oct when SLA rebels killed 3 AU soldiers and 2 civilian drivers and a JEM Splinter Faction detained and. 38 other.

9.   The Unraveling of north south comprehensive peace agreement which is all greater risk following the death of southern SPLM.

4.4. How to Resolve the Problem

4.4.a. Addressing the land-issue

Since it has been proven that access to land is one of the fundamental causes of the Darfur crisis, and there is the need to address the issue of frontally. The issue of land came about as a result of extended drought from the mid 1970s through the early 1980s there were large population movements of pastoralists from northern Darfur and Chad into the central farming belt, just at a time when the agricultural use of land was expanding and intensifying with Fur and (one of the ethnic groups in Darfur region) other agriculturalists selling to the internal market of the urban centers of Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan. As temporary movement merged into permanent settlement. By pastoralists who had lost their livestock, conflicts development between the immigrants and settled population.

Therefore, there is the need to address the issue of land as articulated in the Darfur peace agreement. According to ICG report, "the DPA already has created a mechanism, the Darfur land commission, to revise land tenure/use policies and rules; as well the arbitrates land disputes. However, the negotiations should expand its power to incorporate a commission, of inquiry with a clearly defined mandate and backed by laws enabling it to address land expropriation and augment the local courts and the land commission's arbitration function. Commenting on the desirability to settle the land issue as a sine-qua-non to peace in Darfur, allafrica.com opined that a sustainable peace needs to find a long-term settlement for land and power issues, including how to handle the-historical land ownership system in Darfur, since it was sultanate and to find long-term solutions for the landless Arab tribes which have fuelled the Janjaweed.

4.4.b. Revisiting the 2006 Darfur peace Agreement

The only sustainable solution the Darfur crisis is peace. The international needs to support a single peace processes that revisits the Darfur peace agreement in a meaningful way. Negotiations must be inclusive and the international community must avoid the deadline diplomacy which contributed to the failure of the 2006 agreement. The envisaged negotiations and dialogue should be widened to include groups such as women and Arab tribal groups, in order to avoid more fragmentation among parties to the conflict and the danger of new insurgencies. The reason why the various talks on the peace processes have not succeeded is the exclusiveness of other relevant stakeholders. A displace Darfurians local community leader, Al-Bashir Al-Nagi, told Reuters about his feeling and frustration when he said that they were not invited on October 26 for talk in Sirte Libya. In his words, he said "there is no representative for us there. No one came consulted us, if some of us were present at the talks it would help them succeed. They leaving them out, he predicted that the planned talks are "not going to succeed. They will fail like the last ones."[66] Also, a Sheikh Malloch Brown, during his visit to displaced persons camp in south Darfur on the need for them to be active participants in peace talks. The Sheikh told Brown "we would like to participate in the peace-building process". [67]

4.4.c. Need to address the regional security issues

The Darfur conflict has not remained within its own borders and has become a great regional security issues. Northern and southern Kordofan parts of Sudan have been increasingly affected. Chad and central Africa republic have felt the impact, with the former receiving the majority of the refugees. The AU/UN mediation has identified Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Egypt all as integral players with considerable influence over rebel movement, the NCP or both, and thus critical to the success of any peace negotiations.

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[66] Ibid

[67] Ibid

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They are also potential spoilers, and it has been challenge for the mediation to balance their competing interests. It is necessary, therefore, for the international community to get firm commitment from the neighboring states to desist from their acts of fuelling the conflicts through their support to either of the parties in the conflict. The support given to the rebel movements or the NCP has made the conflict not abate, as shown in this report. Bringing these regional actors together is critical to any successful strategy. To this end the ICG has called for international cooperation on the issue arguing that. "Without intense international engagement and cooperation, the crisis will continue ravaging Darfur and destabilizing the entire region". [68]

4.4.d. Facilitating the expeditious deployment of AMIS and UNAMID

Darfur crisis come to an end as envisioned by the international community, it is necessary and important to facilitate the expeditious deployment of AMIS and UNAMID since their formations, have not been able to perform their expected roles because of movement throughout Darfur. This is highly desirous as both AMIS and UNAMID since there formations have not been able to perform their expected roles because of the impediments put on their ways by the GoS to be informed about the deployment of AMIS and UNAMID troops is an impediment to their operations and mandates. This issue was brought to the fore by the head of UN peacekeeping operations. He said that Sudanese objections and delays were threatening the viability of the mission. Among other demands, Sudan wants advance notice of troop movements and to be able to shut down communications. [69]

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[68] ICG< July 26, 2007 "A strategy for comprehensive peace in Sudan". Africa report no. 130, p.15

[69] Darfur mission "Behind Schedule"-AU-UN commander in http://www.dailyTrustonline.com ,December 3, 2007

4.4.e. Provision of Logistics to UNAMIS (Hybrid force)

As a corollary to the above, there is the need to provide logistics to UNAMIS to enable and discharge its mandate adequately. Lack of logistics, equipment and other wherewithal has hampered its operation. Equipment issues risked undermining the credibility of the joint force as it lacked crucial elements including a ground transport unit, in which 18 transport helicopters and six helicopters for light tactical purposes. This has made the force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai, to ask the international community to assist with the necessary resources. He said "if we want to see an end to the suffering in Darfur this is now the time to stand up and be counted among the friends and do everything possible to help us to have the resources that is that is required to assist and help the people."

4.4.f. Holding the GoS accountable to the act of genocide perpetuated against the people of Darfur

The suggestion is plausible as the GoS which has not shown any seriousness in protecting the people of Darfur. President Omar Bashir of Sudan has not shown humane and honest disposition to the plight of the people of Darfur. He denied the UN and increased participation which geared towards bringing lasting peace to the region claiming that it was Sudan's internal matter. Yet he could not rescue a part of the people and meant to govern to avoide death. The issue of sovereignty of a nation or internal matter should not count when countries encroach on the basic rights of their citizen. The UN and other international bodies must rush to defend such people. The Westphalia vocabulary of sovereignty should not be considered crucial any more because the world has changed drastically Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali, former UN secretary General, reflected on sovereignty by stating:

Respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of obsolete and exclusive sovereignty, however, has

passed; its theory has never matched reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of god internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

Botorous Ghali's rejection of the exclusiveness of sovereignty should be emphasized, especially when two condition exist. First is when a state experiences chaos or breakdown of government. This situation will consequently lead to greater violence, and perhaps conflict with another state. Secondly, the sovereignty of a country could be violated when the state is practicing state-run terrorism and genocide against its citizens. Hitler's actions demonstrate an example of situation in which state sovereignty should not be respected. Hitler came to power through democratic means. Once he consolidated his power he engaged in ethnic cleansing. The holocaust, on of the shameful experiences of humankind, should always remind us that state-run terrorism against its citizens should not be tolerate. Should we wait in the name of sovereignty until another Hitler appears to awaken us to the dangers of closing our eyes to state torture? The answer is, No! the international community should evolve a way of intervening and resolving the conflict using Botorous Ghali's hypothesis.

4.4.g. Pressing for the establishment of a Runctioning ceasefire and or Equal importance the Revitalization of the Moribund Peace

The international community is a matter of fact press for the establishment of a functioning ceasefire and revitalization of the moribund peace process, as necessary new peace talks would be best served by freezing further efforts to apply the DPA's political and wealth-sharing provisions. The AU/UN mediation team should prepare by building international consensus, andworking to unify the rebel movements, broadening participation from key Darfur constituencies and drawing lessons learned from the mediation process on the comprehensive peace agreement signed between the southern rebel movements and the NCP led government in Khartoum. For this the ICG suggested that a new international approach should be applied on Khartoum by the US, China and

other members of the UN Security Council and member states of the AU and UN. This include

1. Apply effective pressure on all sides-but particularly on the NCP- to abandon attempts to achieve a military victory;

2. Support AU/UN mediation as the sole international forum for pursuing a peaceful Darfur settlement; ___

3. Develop consensus for a political strategy, including the application of punitive measures against those responsible;

4. Apply targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, and key NCP leaders who have already been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur and encourage divestment campaigns;

5. Authorize through the security council a forensic accounting firm or a panel of experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated businesses so as to pave the way for economic sanctions against the regime's commercial entities, the main consult for financing NCP-allied militias in Darfur;

6. Explore sanctions on aspects of Sudan's petroleum sector, the NCP, main source of revenue for waging war in Darfur, to include at least bars on investment and provision of ethnical equipment and expertise; and

7. Begin immediate planning for enforcing a no-fly zone over Darfur by French and U.S. assets in the region, with additional NATO support; obtaining consent of the Chad government to deploy a rapid-reaction force to that country's border with Sudan; and planning on a contingency basis for a non-consensual deployment to Darfur if political

and diplomatic efforts fail to change government policies, and the situation on the ground worsens.[70]

4.4.h. Avoiding same mistakes

The Darfur peace agreement failed because of hurried attempts to secure a deal and get UN peacekeepers in. they did not get a deal with UN peacekeepers. Instead security rapidly worsened in Darfur. Fragmented rebel faction targeted humanitarian groups to kit themselves out with vehicles, sate3lite telephones and other necessities to assert their presence in th battle for Darfur. The people who ended up worst off were the civilians, who found themselves deprived of humanitarian assistance for periods of time when aid agencies had to suspend operations. Many in humanitarian circles are concerned that the same mistake not be made again. If a majority of rebel factions can cement the ties that were nurture in Arusha. Tanzania, and with the 11th December, 2007 meeting convened in Canada b the UN special envoy on Darfur, Jan Eliasson,[71] then peace may have a real chance in Darfur.

Governing of Darfur by the UN: It has been proven at different times b various NGO's and international bodies that the GoS is neck deep in the Darfur conflict. by supporting and arming the Janjaweed, thus abdicating in its responsibility of protecting the lives and well-being of all Sudanese. To this end, it is hereby suggested that Darfur region should come under the administration of the United Nations as it was done in Kosovo during the Balkan war of the 90s. The administration of the region b the UN would cease after elections and signing of comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between the GoS and the rebel movements. The war between southern Sudan and Khartoum came to an end in 2003 after the signing of CPA.

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[70] See ICG's April 2007 report focused on the Darfur conflict and *July 2007 report on building a comprehensive peace throughout Sudan*

[71] Accsessed on Dec 20007 URL .WWW .Aljareezanews.com. /extema/nc/prspp/net/01/10102pdf

Conclusion

The US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, declared on October 10, 2005 that UN Security Council did not need more briefings of Darfur. "Why isn't the council talking more about steps it could take to something about the deteriorating security situation? That's what the council should be talking about....."[72]

The situation is dire, with the first AMIS causalities, the first militia attacks on IDP camps, the first hostage-taking of AMIS personnel and the evacuation of UN humanitarian and human staff from West Darfur—all of this over a two-week span in late September-early October. The AU has 6,781 troops and police in Darfur and this is not enough to protect the nearly two million who have been chased from their homes and who now rely entirely on international protection and humanitarian assistance.

To enhance the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the international community should:

1. Increase immediately the number of troops in Darfur to at least 20,000 and provide the requisites financial and logistical assistance. If the AU is not able to manage this increase, the UN, NATO or the EU should assumed responsibility for the operation. In particular, the UN could merge AMIS with UN peacekeeping forces in southern Sudan, or NATO and the EU could contribute forces those of AMIS.

2. Strengthen the mandate of the troops in Darfur so that they have clear responsibility to protect civilian and IDPs, insure the safe delivery of the humanitarian assistance and support the safe return of IDPs and refugees to their home.

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[72] Judy Aita, "us wants action, not words for Durfur," Washington file, us department of state, accessed on 11th October 2005. http://usinfo.state.gov.

3.   Enhance support to AU special envoy for the Darfur talks and increase pressure on the govt. of Sudan and the warring parties to negotiate a peace agreement.

To strengthen the existing AMIS mission, or whatever mission that may emerge, the AU, UN and international community should:

1.   Enhance the mission capacity in logistics, communications, transferred, intelligence gathering and analysis, coordination and planning.

2.   Strengthen the mission's headquarters' capacities in command, planning conducting joint operations and information management.

3.   Improve the operational capacities:

- Increase available aircraft to accelerate the transport of troops and through out Darfur.

- Increase the number of vehicles for military and police;

- Provide satellite surveillance to enable quick reaction to threats to IDPs and peacekeepers.

- Introduce night patrols

- Insure continues presence in and around IDP camps, especially those known to be high-risk. AMIS has been able to sustain 24 hours presence in only 2 camps.

4.   Clarify the rule of engagement to authorize peacekeepers to use force to protect themselves and civilian in danger and adopt immediately standard operating procedures. Initiatives that have led to increased protection of IDPs and civilian should not depend on the creativity and bravery of individual commanders but should rather become standard for the entire mission. All senior officers, including sector commanders should be full briefed to insure consistent application of RoE and SoPs.

5.   Enhance the civilian component of the mission in Khartoum, El Fasher and in each sector. Increase the number and quality of political affairs officers Amis, especially in Khartoum El Fasher and provide military and police officers with analyses of the political situation so that military planners are fully aware of the political context and the likely political impact of AU peace Negotiations and Amis operations. Increase the number of humanitarian and human rights civilian officers for each sector and insure they have clearly defined roles, resources and reporting lines. Recruit sexual and gender-based violence experts.   __

6.   Enhance support for CIMIC officers to operate effectively and consistently in all sectors. This will require improved training for CIMIC officers.

7.   Improve training of AMIS troops, especially senior officers. While programs like the US African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) have improved the skills of African officers, they are too short and reach to few. One expert has called for a doubling in the intensity of training per unit. Training should cover coordination, command and information management, as well as how best to product IDPs, in particular vulnerable groups like women, children the elderly and the disabled.

8.   Improve coordination and communication between AMIS soldiers and police. As the nature of the conflict has changed from full-scale battles to hit and run attacks on IDPs camps, aid convoys, and people trying to return home, greater expertise in public security and criminal investigation is required. To enhance police effectiveness, soldiers must share information and plans, and operate jointly. __

9.   Raise the quality of AMIS police officers. Use tools provided by the UN police unit which cover recruitment and screening of candidates, training police

for a work in peacekeeping operations, planning, coordination with military and humanitarian actors, and oversight and advocacy with the authorities.

10.	Address the gender imbalance of AMIS. Increase the number of qualified female soldiers, ceasefire monitors and police. As of July 2005, there were only 2 female military observers out of 454, and only 126 female police officers out of 816. More qualified female interpreters should also be recruited as essential for investigating sexual and gender-based violence.

11.	Seize opportunities to promote accountability of Sudanese soldiers and police. Training for armed forces and police on Sudanese criminal law and procedures should be introduced. This should be linked with a government commitment to hold its agents accountable for violating the law. If the government of Sudan does not keep this promise. The training should suspend; otherwise it could provide an alibi or "cover" for government misconduct.

12.	Use ceasefire reporting more strategically, issue more public republic reports and be frank in presenting findings and recommendations to the government of Sudan and other warring parties. In particular, lack of commitment by the government to disarm militia groups, interruptions in humanitarian aid efforts by warring parties and abuses and violence against women should be publicity reported.

13.	Develop a public information strategy to explain the mandate, how AMIS intends to implements it and how people can assists peacekeepers. The strategy should also make the AMIS mandate clear to international humanitarian and human right actors.

The Humanitarian Community Should:-

1.   Strengthen cooperation and information sharing with AMIS. Clarify procedures for sharing information to enhance AMIS'S reporting and advocacy and its ability to plan deployment and patrols. Undertake joint advocacy on human rights and humanitarian law principles and strengthen mechanism to harmonize and develop common protection interventions, for example, involve AMIS CIVPOL in designing strategies for preventing sexual and gender based violence and pursuing justice for the victims.

2.   Work more closely with AMIS to assess to violability of IDP returns. UNHCR and IOM should increase AMIS' understanding of their respective agreements with the Sudanese government, engage AMIS in a "return working group" and monitor and share information on population movement.

3.   Ensure that the UN Collaborative Response in Darfur accelerate training programs for the AU on the Guiding Principles on internal Displacement, protection, sexual and gender based violence, agency mandates and human rights. Likewise, the humanitarian community and particularly UN agencies should increase training for humanitarian personnel on civilian-military affairs.

4.   Work jointly with the AU on confidence building measures, reconciliation strategies and building of the capacity of government authorities, including the Sudanese police. The UN should involve the AU in rule of law, human rights training and legal aid initiatives.

5.   Formalize cooperation between the UN department of Safety and Security and AMIS. This should mean developing mechanisms for information sharing and coordination in order to increase the security of UN staff and promote a more secure environment for relief operations.

The government of Sudan, the party that is most responsible for the conflict and its horrific consequences on its own citizens, has the primary "responsibilility to protect" and is the key to peace and security. Yet, the government continues to authorize attacks and has failed to disarm militias. The international community has so far failed to convince the government to honor the ceasefire agreements.

The new government comprised for the first time of representatives of southern Sudan, has a chance to break with the policies that have led to devastation in Darfur. No government is monolithic, especially coalitions like the current one in Sudan. The challenge is to identify those who support change and then reinforce their efforts, otherwise, the conflict will continue.

As some of the government's own militias spin out its control and the drain on its resources increases, it is in the government's own interest to end the conflict and undertake the following steps:

1.   Disarm and disband all militias in Darfur. Turn over for prosecution all militia and members of the armed forces implicated in committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or serious violations of human rights,

2.   Abide by the AU protocols and Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.

3.   End all ceasefire violations and military flights in Darfur.

4.   Promote a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and relief operations.

5.   Accelerate procedures to allow vehicles and other equipment to reach AMIS.

6.   Allow AMIS peacekeepers to have full access all areas of Darfur. UN human rights officers and ICRC should have unconditional access to all prisons and detention centers, including those in rebel-held territories.

Many of these recommendations apply as well to Darfur's rebel groups who held to account for the acts they commit against humanitarian aid convoys, AMIS peacekeepers,

non-combatants and other violations of the ceasefire, the law of war and international human rights standards.

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