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Conditions and Contexts of Meaning:
A Study of Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*



*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in
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degree of
Master of Philosophy*

By
Ved Mitra Shukla

Under the Supervision of
Dr. Dhananjay Singh



Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi – 110067, India
2009



Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067, India

CERTIFICATE

July 21, 2009

This is to certify that the dissertation titled **Conditions and Contexts of Meaning: A Study of Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*** by **Ved Mitra Shukla** of the Centre for English Studies, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, under my supervision for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is the candidate's original work and has not been previously submitted in part or full, for any other degree of this or any other university.

This dissertation may be placed before the Examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

Dr. Dhananjay Singh

(Supervisor)

Dr. DHANANJAY SINGH
Assistant Professor
Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067

Prof. S. K. Sareen

(Chairperson)


Prof. Santosh K. Sareen
Chairperson
Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110 067

DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

This dissertation titled **Conditions and Contexts of Meaning: A Study of Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*** submitted to the Centre for English Studies, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is a record of my *bona fide* work.

It has not been submitted in part or full, to any university for the award of any degree.

New Delhi
July 21, 2009


Ved Mitra Shukla
Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature &
Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi – 110067, India

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Ved Mitra Shukla
Centre for English Studies
School of Language, Literature &
Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi – 110067, India

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Grammar, in the West, aims to systematise the rules of a language, analyze its structure at the levels of sound, word, phrase and sentence, and discriminate the correct from the incorrect usage. However, in the Indian tradition, grammar, apart from doing these also deals with issues that go beyond the study of any particular language. The Indian grammatical texts constitute a philosophical discipline as well. The analysis of language in India triggers a number of queries: What is language? What is the linguistic denotation? What is the relationship between a word and its meaning? Do the words refer to a universal or particular, class or individual, forms or substance, etc.? How far meaning is a competent means? What is the relationship between (a) meaning and thought, and (b) meaning and reality? And to what extent verbal cognition is reliable? Such questions taken up by linguistic philosophers like Pāṇini (fourth century BC), Patañjali (second century BC) and Bhartṛhari (fifth century AD) form the crux of the Indian philosophy of language.

Language and philosophy share an intimate connection. Without a philosophical examination of the meanings and structure of language, one cannot easily learn with certainty the objective truth of the statements, nor can one usefully discuss abstract concepts. The philosophy of language seeks to understand the concepts expressed by language and to find a system by which it can effectively and accurately do so. Thus, it is the philosophical study of the use of language and the relations among language, language users, and the world. It also encompasses the philosophical study of linguistic meaning and the philosophical reflections on the nature and scientific status of linguistic theories.

The aim of the present work is to trace conditions and contexts of meaning in *Vākyapadīya*, i.e. the *magnum opus* work of Bhartṛhari. The search for conditions and contexts of meaning runs through the Indian discourse on language. The chief purpose of this search is disambiguation of the meaning through the relationship

between *word* and *world*, i.e. *nāma* and *rūpa*. These are two appearances of the ultimate truth variously called Om, Śabdabrahman, or Brahman. For the Indian philosophers of language, the entire lingual behaviour should be studied not only from the perspective of grammar but also from the philosophical point of view because language to them is also a source (*pramāṇa*) of knowledge. The study of conditions and contexts of meaning is easy to comprehend on the ground of the philosophy of language.

In the light of Indian philosophical developments if one considers the Western Philosophy, one can compare the formulations of Bhartrhari with the developments in the Western linguistic tradition beginning Frege (1848-1925), Russel (1872-1970) and Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Though, in the West, the enquiry into language stretches back to the 5th century BC with Socrates (469-399 BC) and Plato (427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC) and the Stoics (3rd century BC). Both in India and in Greece, linguistic speculation comes before the emergence of grammatical traditions of systematic description of language, which emerge approximately from the 7th century BC in India (Yāska) and from the 3rd century BC in Greece (Rhyanus):

The inquisitiveness about 'language' as a concept is as old as Indian culture itself. By saying so, I don't claim that in Western thought the concept of language and meaning was not discussed at all prior to the twentieth century 'linguistic turn'. Plato made significant contributions to the analysis of 'meaning' through his theory of 'Ideas'. But subsequently it never drew that much of attention. ...*Rgveda*, one of the oldest scriptures of India, contains innumerable insightful remarks about the nature of language and speech. (Patnaik 4)

The study of grammar and the linguistic philosophy have occupied central place in Indian thought from the *vedic* period (roughly 1500 BC) onwards with the worshiping of *vāk* (the essence of speech). What a speaker speaks and a listener listens is indeed a manifestation of the essence of speech responsible for all lingual behaviour. Whether it is a permanent whole conveying something in a flash or a composition of meaningful units each contributing its share to the association which is for sentence-meaning has been debated for long in Indian schools of philosophy of language.

After some earlier advancement in the area, Indian linguistic philosophy established itself in early medieval period of Indian philosophy (roughly 5th to 10th

centuries AD) with debates among various schools of thought. The “materialist” Mīmāṃsā School led by Kumāṛila Bhatta (roughly 7th century AD) and Prabhākara (7th century AD) claimed a separation of linguistic performance and meaning. The *sphoṭa* (holistic) grammarian school led by Bhartrihari held that word and meaning form an indivisible whole.

Among all the grammarian-philosophers, Bhartrhari is regarded as an outstanding figure in the history of Indian thought. His philosophy is unique and singular. Barring a few philosophers, like Mandana Miśra (8th century AD), Vācaspati Miśra (900-980 AD) or the school of grammar and rhetoric, the philosophy of Bhartrhari has few supporters and sympathetic exponents and elaborators in branches of Indian philosophy. However, Bhartrhari is a school in himself. He seems to have been the most criticized philosopher. In consequence of elaborate criticism against him, his fundamental philosophical work *Vākyapadīya* became the most extensive work in the medieval period, which represented the most fruitful epoch of Indian thought. Bhartrhari's works were so widely known that even the Chinese traveller I-tsing (635-713 AD), in the account of his travel written in 691 AD, mentions Bhartrhari as the grammarian-philosopher. As I-tsing writes, Bhartrhari was a Buddhist, wrote *Vākyapadīya-discourse* and *Peina*, and a commentary on *Mahābhāṣya* of Ṛatañjali, and died forty years before writing his account. We have also I-tsing's evidence to hold the view that Bhartrhari wavered between the ascetic life and secular life several times. But I-tsing's account was found by modern researchers to be faulty in certain details, perhaps for being based on oral information collected through his personal inquiries. Bhartrhari's works clearly establish that he was a follower of Brahmanic tradition and not a Buddhist (1997 9). Many stories about the philosopher are now a part of the folklore. According to one story, he was a king and brother of Vikramāditya or Śūdraka, who renounced the worldly life and became a *saṃnyāsin* (a forest dweller) towards the end of his life. Harihara in his drama *Bhartrharinirveda* presents him as a disciple of Gorakṣanātha from whom he learnt *yoga* and renounced the world. A cave in Ujjain is called 'Cave of Bhartrhari' falling in line with this tradition. Unfortunately, we do not know much about his personal history and his works do not throw much light on the matter. However, much of the evidence regarding Bhartrhari's date comes from Buddhist

sources. In his travelogue written in 691 AD, I-tsing (the Chinese Buddhist) reports that Bhartrhari died forty years before writing his travelogue. This would put Bhartrhari's death at either 650 AD (if the period of forty years is calculated from I-tsing's writing of his travels in India) or 630 AD (if the period of forty years is calculated from the beginning of I-tsing's at Nalanda). I-tsing also says that Bhartrhari was a contemporary of Dharamapāla, whose dates are well known as 530-561 AD. It makes his dating self-contradictory. More reliable evidence has come from a series of scholars who have uncovered quotations from Bhartrhari's works in Tibetan translations of Buddhist texts such as Diñnāga's *Pramāṇasmuccaya*. These show that Bhartrhari must have either lived before or have been a contemporary of Diñnāga whose dates are usually taken as 470-550 AD. Further indications from these Tibetan translations of Buddhist and from a sixth century Jaina writer, Siṃhasūrigani, suggest that Bhartrhari studied under the great grammarian of his day, Vasurāta. It is favoured by Puṇyarāja:

evam tāvat bhartṛharyādidarśanamuktam vasurāto bhartṛharer upādhyāh.
(Puṇyarāja on *Vākyapadīya* 2.484)

Vasurāta was a Brahmin and a brother-in-law of Balāditya, a pupil of the great Buddhist scholar Vasuvandhu (400 AD). In this way it is thought that Bhartrhari should be dated 450-500 AD. This date, however, may still be open to further change while the sequence of these writers (i.e. Vasuvandhu- Vasurāta- Bhartrhari- Diñnāga) seems fairly well established. There is difficulty not only in establishing Bhartrhari's date but also about the dates of his works or their order of appearances.

Among the major works attributed to him are his main philosophical treatise *Vākyapadīya* (*kāṇḍa* I, II, and III), *Vṛtti* (a commentary on the *Vākyapadīya-kāṇḍa* I and II), *Mahābhāṣyatīkā* and *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*. One more book *Trayaśataka-s* (i.e. *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vairāgya* and *Nīti-Śataka-s*) is attributed to him. But there is a question whether Bhartrhari, the author of *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vairāgya* and *Nīti-Śataka-s*, is the same person, who is the author of *Vākyapadīya*. The difference in the style would appear to disprove any identification, although there is nothing to suggest that a poet may not write a treatise on grammar in one style and compose a work like *Śṛṅgāraśataka*

in a different style (Pillai xiii). However, it is not our main concern in this work whether the book *Trayaśataka-s* is composed by Bharṭṛhari or not.

Śabdadhātusamīkṣā is an extinct work known to have been composed by Bharṭṛhari as mentioned by Somānanda in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and Utpalācārya in his commentary thereon. For Bharṭṛhari, *śabdadhātu-samīkṣā* means an inquiry into the root cause (*dhātu*) of *śabda*, i.e. Śabdabrahman, the Ultimate Reality, corresponding to what was expounded in *Brahma-kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*.

Another work *Mahābhāṣyatīkā* is a commentary in the form of observations and comments only on the points of interest. It is fragmentary extending up to the rule 1.1.53 of Pāṇini. Bharṭṛhari also wrote a commentary called *Vṛtti*. It is available for the first two *kāṇḍa-s* – for the first *kāṇḍa* in complete while the second is in fragments. In this commentary, he is called Harivṛṣabha (Murti 13-14).

As stated our chief concern is *Vākyapadīya*. We shall discuss *Vākyapadīya* and his philosophy of language. Bharṭṛhari's primary philosophical position is that language is intimately connected with the Ultimate Reality, i.e. Śabdabrahman. *Vākyapadīya* is, without any doubt, one of the most significant works in the Indian grammatical and philosophical tradition. It is the single most important work after the works of the three *munis*: Pāṇini, Kātyāyana (3rd century BC) and Patañjali. It is the certainly most widely cited early treatise concerning what scholars generally refer to as Indian "philosophy of grammar", not only among subsequent scholars in India in various schools of thought but also among modern scholars. It is divided into three books *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, (or *Āgama-samuccaya* i.e. "aggregation of doctrines"), *Vākya-kāṇḍa*, and *Pada-kāṇḍa* (or *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*, i.e. "miscellaneous"). The work is composed in *anuṣṭup* metre called *kārikā-s*. According to I-tsing, Bharṭṛhari had written a work, which the former calls *Vākya-discourse* which contained 700 *śloka-s*, and another called *Peina* (in 3000 *śloka-s*). Actually, I-tsing is referring to *Vākyapadīya* which becomes *Vākya-discourse* and *Peina* in his description. I-tsing's *Vākya-discourse* refers to the first two *kāṇḍa-s* (i.e. *Brahma-kāṇḍa* and *Vākya-kāṇḍa*) and his *Peina* is the third *kāṇḍa* in its Prakṛt form *Paiṇṇa*, i.e. *Prakīṇa*. He treats it as a separate work, as some ancient Indian writers also do. Vardhamāna, for

example, refers to Bhartrhari as the author of *Vākyapadīya* and *Prakīṇa* in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* (1140 AD):

*bhartṛharirvākyapadīyaprakīṇakayoḥ kartā mahābhāṣyatripādyā vyākhyātā
ca (2)*

Helārāja (10th century AD), in his commentary on the third *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, sometimes refers to his commentary on the first two *kāṇḍa*-s as a commentary on *Vākyapadīya*. But he was also aware that *Prakīṇakāṇḍa* was a continuation of the two *kāṇḍa*-s of *Vākyapadīya*. Bhartrhari himself, in *kārikā* 485 of the second *kāṇḍa*, says that the grammatical traditions would be fully discussed in the third *kāṇḍa*, making it quite clear that the third *kāṇḍa* is an integral part of *Vākyapadīya*:

*vartmanām atra keṣām cid vastumātram udāhṛtam |
kāṇḍe tṛtīye nyakṣena bhaviṣyati vicāraṇā ||*

The first two books of *Vākyapadīya* discuss the nature of creation, the relationship of Brahman, world, language, the individual soul (*jīva*), and the manifestation and comprehension of the meanings of words and sentences. The third book, i.e. *Pada-kāṇḍa*, deals with word-meanings viz. universal, particular property, etc. and space, time, act, case, person, gender, number, voice, faculties of import and word integration with meaning. This *Pada-kāṇḍa*, as available now, contains fourteen *samuddeśa*-s (chapters). The names of the fourteen *samuddeśa*-s are as follows: 1. *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, 2. *Dravyasamuddeśa*, 3. *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, 4. *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa*, 5. *Guṇasamuddeśa*, 6. *Diksamuddeśa*, 7. *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, 8. *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, 9. *Kālasamuddeśa*, 10. *Puruṣasamuddeśa*, 11. *Samkhyāsamuddeśa*, 12. *Upagrahasamuddeśa*, 13. *Liṅgasamuddeśas*, and 14. *Vṛttisamuddeśa*.

The number of *kārikā*-s, 700, of the first two *kāṇḍa*-s as mentioned by I-tsing is very close to the number of verses, 635, as available in the printed editions. But there is a discrepancy about the number of *kārikā*-s mentioned by I-tsing and found in the printed texts of *Pada-kāṇḍa*. If I-tsing's number is correct we are compelled to

believe that the third *kāṇḍa* as available to us is incomplete and should have many more *samuddeśa*-s to raise the number from 1300 to 3000 *kārikā*-s. In support of our belief Puṅyarāja attests the existence of three more *samuddeśa*-s called *Lakṣaṇa*, *Bādha* and *Upamā*. Bhartṛhari himself refers in his *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 2.76 to *Lakṣaṇasamuddeśa* wherein the arguments for and against the principles of interpretation are discussed. Puṅyarāja was quite aware of *Bādha* and *Upamā samuddeśa*-s as he mentions them in *Vākyapadīya* 2.76-77. For us these two sections are also lost. If I-tsing's statement is correct we have to presume that at least half of *Pada-kāṇḍa* or *Prakīrṇa-kāṇḍa* is lost to us.

The title *Vākyapadīya* is very suggestive. The elucidation on the problems of sentences (*vākya*) and word (*pada*) and the meaning revealed non-differently by them in the work justifies the title *Vākyapadīya*. The discussion on the concepts of *vākya* and *pada*, and their meaning is given in a way that provides a clear exposition of communication on the basis of how it is revealed in the mind by language. In *Vākyapadīya*, *śabda* (language) is accepted as discriminating awareness, or as a unit of distinct and self-determinate cognition. There are *kārikā*-s in which Bhartṛhari himself offers about the scope of the subject-matter of his treatise. In *kārikā*-s 24, 25 and 26 (of first *kāṇḍa*), Bhartṛhari specifies eight topics coming within the fold of his study. These are: "two kinds of meaning (*artha*): that which is obtained by analysis and that which is of a fixed character (*sthitakṣaṇa*), two kinds of word (*śabda*): that which is to be grammatically explained and that which is a means of explaining it (*pratipādaka*), two kinds of relation: causality and fitness to express the meaning and two kinds of result or purpose: spiritual merit (*dharma*) and the understanding of meaning" (Matilal 57). These are the eight subjects which are the whole content of *Vākyapadīya*. But these subjects are not taken in that order in which they are enumerated in *kārikā*-s 24, 25 and 26 of first *kāṇḍa*:

apoddhārapadārthāḥ ye ye cārthāḥ sthitalakṣaṇāḥ |
anvākhyeyās ca ye śabdā ye cāpi pratipādakāḥ ||
kāryakāraṇabhāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāḥ |
dharme ye pratyaye cāṅgaṃ sambandhāḥ sādhasādhuṣu ||
te liṅgaś ca svaśabdaiś ca śāstre 'sminn upavarṇitāḥ |
smṛtyartham anugamyante ke cid eva yathāgamam ||

As it is above mentioned that Bhartr̥hari himself wrote a commentary (called *Vṛtti*) of the first two *kāṇḍa*-s, there are some other commentators who also wrote commentaries in order to explain and clarify the text which is in the form of mnemonic verses and full of various doctrinal principles and concepts. These commentators are Vṛṣabhadeva, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja. Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary is called *Paddhati* which is the only ancient commentary on the *kārikā*-s and *Vṛtti* together. But now, it is available only in an incomplete form. Fortunately, Puṇyarāja's commentary on the second *kāṇḍa* is available to us in full. Puṇyarāja was acquainted with the *Vṛtti* and looked upon it as Bhartr̥hari's own commentary. Next commentator is Helārāja. He was a senior contemporary of Kaiyaṭa. He wrote his commentaries on all three *kāṇḍa*-s. His commentary on the first two *kāṇḍa*-s is known as *Śabdaprabhā* and on the third *kāṇḍa* is called *Prakāśa*. But not only *Śabdaprabhā* but also some portions of *Prakāśa* were lost. Helārāja's commentary was taken as an authority and quoted by Mādhavācārya (14th century AD), Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita (17th century AD) and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa (18th century AD). Thus, we find that the text of *Vākyapadīya* is not intelligible without these learned commentaries of Bhartr̥hari, Vṛṣabhadeva, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja.

There is no doubt that a work on Bhartr̥hari's philosophy may prove rewarding. Within the limited scope of my work many important issues regarding Bhartr̥hari's philosophy have been left out. It is above mentioned that the issue of conditions and contexts of meaning as discussed in Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya* is the chief concern of this work. This issue is taken on the ground of 'Indian philosophy of language because a query regarding meaning comes under the study of semantics and semantics is fundamental to linguistic philosophy. Therefore, the second chapter examines in two sections the basic principles of Indian philosophy of language (and locus of meaning) and the contribution of Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya* to Indian philosophy of language (and meaning).

In the third chapter, an elaborated account of the theory of *sphoṭa* is given in the background of Bhartr̥hari's views on *sphoṭa*. As an indispensable condition of meaning, Bhartr̥hari's (theory of) *sphoṭa* is taken up in this chapter. So as to make this take more comprehensible, his views on the nature of *sphoṭa* are projected

under the sections of *sphoṭa*: the *śabda*-dispositionality of mind (*śabda-bhāvanā*); *sphoṭa*: sentence or word; kinds of *sphoṭa*; nature of *sphoṭa*; *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*; Bhartrhari's views on the process of revelation of *sphoṭa*; *sphoṭa* and meaning bearing aspect of the word; *śabda* as a two sided entity; word as an entity without differentiation; Bhartrhari's view on the nature of *śabda*; and *sphoṭa* as a symbol.

In the fourth chapter other conditions and contexts of meaning are discussed. These are taken as tools of disambiguation through the interpretation of relationship between the expresser and the expressed. This chapter is divided in the four sections. In the first section, the meaning of *meaning* as it appears in *Vākyapadīya* is discussed. It is important to note here that the text not only deals with Bhartrhari's points of view on *meaning* but also other theories of meaning popular during his time that the philosopher refers in order to clarify his position on sentential meaning, i.e. *pratibhā-vākyārtha*. *Pratibhā-vākyārtha* ('the expressed' meaning) is presented as the most important factor after the *sphoṭa* (which is discussed in the previous chapter as 'the expresser') in the process of communication. In the second section, the plurality of meaning which is one of the main problems in interpreting communication and what the causes behind it is taken up. The third section is based on the conditions and contexts which are for determination of primary, secondary/intended and non-intended meanings. In the last section of this chapter, there is an attempt to interpret and reread *The Waste Land* (1922) of Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965), the most representative poem of the modern European literature, within the framework of Bhartrhari's theory of the conditions and contexts of meaning.

It is a fact that Bhartrhari represents the rich tradition of Indian philosophy of language in his work *Vākyapadīya* very well. This richness of Indian tradition particularly in the field of linguistic philosophy is recognised not only by the Indian scholars but also by the Western scholars. Here, as a Western scholar M. B. Emeneau is quote worthy who recommends to the western linguists to learn a lot from the rich tradition of Indian philosophy of language:

Certainly in one other slowly awakening department of Linguistics that is concerned with meaning the west still has to learn from India. Their grammarians, literary theoreticians and philosophers were all concerned with problems of meaning, and much was thought and written on the subject. Of this the West is for all practical linguistic purposes innocent. The Hindu treatises are in a difficult style and only a few in the west will be qualified to

deal with them, as Sanskritists, philosophers and linguistic scholars. Yet, the results are likely to be worth the efforts: It is the subject that can be recommended to aspirants. (151)

Chapter 2

Meaning in Indian Philosophy of Language

'We are not aware of the beginning and the end of the world.

Hence, the first and the last page of the manuscript have been lost.

(Kashani in Hadi 265)

Kalim Kashani, a Persian poet and poet-laureate at the court of Emperor Shahjahan, has presented an appropriate and beautiful simile when he compared this world with a manuscript which has lost its first and last page. This philosophical assumption requires us to find out the two lost pages in order to understand the phenomenology of existence. If the two pages are found out, many valuable pieces of information regarding the author of the manuscript, when it was written, what it was written for and so on could be traced easily. However, the facts vis-à-vis the untraced parts of the manuscript remain unanswered till these two pages are found out. The afore-mentioned parts can be located in the processes of association and disassociation of various phenomenologies regarding the ontological realities of creation. For this, one has to infer, one has to postulate the beginning and the end of the manuscript on the basis of whatever is available in the visible remaining parts. This attempt can be called philosophy.

It is noticeable that whatever questions disturb a philosopher regarding the world around us, the same questions he faces regarding the 'Language phenomenon' also. Language is intertwined to the reality it represents and the fundamental question is how the word represents the world. The linguist has been struggling with such issues since time immemorial, at least in the Indian context. What is language? What is the denotation of a word, what constitutes a meaning and what is the relation between the two? Was language created, if so, who created it and when? How does language function? What is the truth about language? Is there any end to this? How is the rapport between the speaker and the listener

established? In general, an attempt to answer these questions is 'Philosophy of Language'.

The present chapter examines in two sections the basic principles of Indian philosophy of language (and locus of meaning) and the contribution of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* to Indian philosophy of language (and meaning).

1.

Language is believed, in general, to be a multi-dimensional subject of inquiry. Various disciplines have developed to study the different aspects of language from different perspectives. Many scholars have tried to look at the central issues of language within the framework of philosophy, and in the study of philosophy itself language finds great relevance. The semantic concern or concern with meaning is at the heart of the philosophy of language.

A philosopher's concern with language can be distinguished from the concern which a philosopher of language feels. A philosopher who does philosophy of language views language more as a medium of thought and concentrates more on the theory of reference. But for one who is at first and foremost a philosopher of language, the use of language as a vehicle of communication is less important than language as a theory of meaning. A philosopher or more particularly an ontologist cannot but emphasize the question of language in the facts of experience. This anchorage occurs purely through reference. So, from this point of view, the division of language into referring and non-referring parts (or expressions and a theory of reference) receive at least greater attention. While 'referring' involves use of names and name-associated expressions, sentences cannot be counted among referring expressions. It is also noticeable that communication is carried on almost entirely through sentences. For communicative performance (i.e. a concrete linguistic act), analysis of a sentence into words or still smaller parts seems to be unnecessary. It is from the point of view of communication that sentence and its meaning receive greater attention or emphasis. If still the reference theorists or philosophers studying language are found to emphasize or study with equal importance the aspect of sentences and give primacy to them, it is perhaps due to their interests in truth. We cannot communicate by using sentences that are contradictory, but it does not seem

to be necessary that a sentence must be true or must be known to be so if we are to communicate anything through it. It is also believed that one's ontology is fixed not by names one may list but by the names occurring in true assertions. In fact, there is hardly any means of finding names in actual use except in the context of sentences. Thus, it is evident that "language is anchored to reality or world through the referring expressions occurring in the true sentences of it" (Mukhopadhyay 3). Hence, while a body of true sentences connected properly constitutes a theory, viz., theory of meaning or interpretation, the totality of things, correspondent to the referring expressions occurring in these sentences constitutes the ontology relative to that theory. Philosophers of language may and also draw on the results of the grammarians and the structural linguists' study of language towards confirmation of the truth or falsity of a sentence-communication. But, they are mostly interested in the phenomenon of communicative part only, i.e., the content of intentional states of belief, desire, hope, etc. Therefore, information in the context of communication is sometimes more than what can be captured by the notion of truth or truth-condition. Now, those who have special motivation of fixing ontology through the device of language may be called linguistic philosopher in a stronger sense; others are regarded just as philosophers studying language (Palit xiv-xv).

Philosophy (i.e. *darśana*) as understood in India comprises both a theory of being or ontological types and a theory of knowing including the means of knowledge (epistemology). All the aspects of philosophical inquiry, somehow, fall in between these two major theoretical enterprises. Theory of language, accordingly, stands either as ontology of language or logic that is an epistemology of it. Indian philosophers are involved in discussing whether language is a thing belonging to the category of quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), substance (*dravya*) or universal (*jāti*); they are also involved in discussing what a sentence means or what should be the analysis of sentences in the imperative mood. So far as the ontology of language is concerned, questions, in general, regarding *śabdanityatā* or *vedanityatā* have been raised and dealt with thoroughly. The related logico-epistemological questions which also attracted their thoughts were like *śabda-pratyakṣatva*, *śabdānumeyatva*, etc. The modern interpreters of Indian philosophy of language have nurtured the common idea that these questions presuppose the structure of language, and do not concern themselves with the structural and grammatical analysis of language. They

are more concerned with the functional and communicative aspect of language where meaning or interpretation plays a central role. Among the things discussed by the Indian philosophers of language are words, knowledge of words, word-meaning, knowledge of word-meaning, sentence, sentence-meaning, knowledge of sentence and knowledge of sentence-meaning.

Indian linguistic philosophers have been dealing with above mentioned topics for not less than 2000 years. In other words, we may say that the curiosity about 'language' as a concept is as old as Indian civilization itself. *R̥gveda*, one of the oldest texts of the world, contains innumerable insightful remarks about the nature of language (*śabda*) and Speech (*vāk*). It does not mean that the concept of language and meaning was not discussed in Western thought. Plato made significant contributions to the analysis of 'meaning' through his theory of 'Ideas'. But afterward it never drew that much of attention. It is realized that 'Philosophy of Language' has been a point of discussion in Western tradition after Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein i.e. for last 100-125 years or so.

There is no doubt that Indian grammarians, literary theoreticians and philosophers were all concerned with problems of meaning, and much was thought and written on the subject of language and meaning. Perhaps it causes the delineation of the subject and specification of the range or scope of its concept so comprehensive in the Indian thought. Not only grammarians like Bhartr̥hari, but logicians like Vātsyāyana, Mīmāṃsaka-s like Kumāṛila and Prabhākara, and literary theorists like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, and Buddhists like Dīnāga have offered their own explanations, widely differing from one another. Thinkers belonging to different philosophical schools propound various definitions of ideas related to linguistic philosophy in accordance with their objectives to explore and to establish basic theories they hold. But most of them assemble on the single platform accepting that the study of language, which forms a part of philosophy in general, is so far a study of language as means of communication or source of information. Undoubtedly, language as an accredited source of knowledge yields correct information for the hearer; and the hearer's knowledge in this case consists in his understanding the sentence or sentences uttered by a genuine speaker. Philosophy as *darśana* is taken to be the study of those special kinds of object, the knowledge of which is needed if one is to know the true nature of one's own self. Thus, it is evident

that language is studied in philosophy under either of its two aspects of being a means of knowledge or being a kind of knowable thing or ontological category. Grammar and linguistics as also philosophy of grammar study language primarily in its aspect of being language. Grammar is a system of rules that governs expressions. Contemporary philosophers are of the opinion that grammar concentrates more on the question of grammaticality of words or *padasādhutva* rather than the syntactic or semantic well-formedness of sentences prevalent mostly in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Śāstra-s.

The philosophical systems of India take up the problem of language as a part of their epistemological concern known as *pramāṇa śāstra*. The word *pramāṇa* is derived from the word *pramā* or *pra+√mā* which is used in philosophical parlance in the sense of proper knowledge or true knowledge. They draw a clear line of distinction between *jñāna* (cognition) and *pramā* (valid cognition). In Sanskrit, the word *jñāna* stands for all kinds of cognition, irrespective of the questions of truth or falsehood. *Pramā* is used to designate only a true cognition (*yathārthajñāna*) as distinct from a false one (*mithyājñāna*). A *pramāṇa* is unique cause or the instrument of a *pramā* (valid cognition). While analyzing the concept of *pramā* they categorize different methods or means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). However, there is no unanimity of views regarding the number of such valid methods of knowledge. Different philosophical systems conceive different number of sources of knowledge, which range from one to eight. The Cārvāka-s accepted only one *pramāṇa*, i.e., *pratyakṣa* (perception). The Vaiśeṣikā-s and the Buddhists posited two, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* (inference). The Sāṃkhya philosophers added *śabda* (verbal testimony) and, in this way, accepted three *pramāṇa*-s (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*). The Naiyāyika-s accepted four *pramāṇa*-s, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda* and *upamāna*, i.e. comparison. The Prābhākara-s added *arthāpatti* (postulation) to this list and made it five. The Bhāṭṭa School accepted six by adding *anupalabdhi* or *abhāvapramāṇa* (non-apprehension). The *paurāṇika* tradition accepted eight by adding two more to the above list, namely, *aitihya* (narration) and *sambhava* (possibility of inclusion). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that only first four *pramāṇas* are necessary to be accepted, and the remaining four could be included in those four only. Thus, *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), and *śabda* (verbal testimony) are accepted as the sources of valid knowledge, and *arthapātti*

can be included in *anumāna*, *anupalabdhi* is only an auxiliary cause for generating the knowledge of absence, and *aitihya* and *sambhava* can be included in *śabda* and *anumāna* respectively. So, it is obvious that all the schools of thought do not accord independent status to *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*. Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Sāṅkhya are such systems which admit the validity of *śabda pramāṇa* and carry on elaborate discussions on the nature of language and its functions. In this connection, it is remarkable to note that though Buddhism does not offer the status of independent *pramāṇa* to *śabda*, a very powerful analysis of the concept of language and meaning is found in Buddhist literature (the *apoha* theory of meaning, advocated by Buddhist logicians Diṅṇāga and Dharmakīrti). *Śabda pramāṇa* means the true and justified knowledge derived from *śabda*, referring to both words and sentences and justifications of accepting *śabda* or those words and sentences as *pramāṇa*, i.e., means towards justified true knowledge. It is distinctively different from the other methods of knowing. Unlike, the methods of perception, inference, etc., facts and sense-objects do not form the basis of such knowledge. As a linguistic means of knowledge its object is language itself. However, the traditional interpretation on the subject leaves us with the impression that it means nothing more than knowledge based on some form of 'authority'. Now, here it is a very important question whether *śabda* only means scriptural authority or more than. To answer this, a very brief discussion on the views of the different schools of Indian philosophy expressed about *śabda pramāṇa* is given below.

Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya School, recorded the four *pramāṇa*-s or accredited sources of knowledge. These are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upmāna*, *arthāpatt*, *anupalabadhi* and *śabda*. Thus, according to Naiyāyika-s, *śabda* is the last of the four accredited sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). *Śabda* has been defined differently in classical Nyāya, as we find it in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*, Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, etc. and modern Nyāya, as we find it in standard texts of Navyanyāya as *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, etc. But Gaṅgeśa, known as the father of Navya-nyāya, did not deviate from the tenets of classical Nyāya in substantive matter and followed Gautama in defining *śabda* as "*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*" (1.1.7). It means 'the assertion or instruction of a trustworthy person is *śabda*'. The word *āpta* may be applied to both, 'a reliable' human being and the God. Nyāya believes that the God is the creator of the *Veda*-s (the highest form of

scripture). Regarding the questions of a human *āpta*, Vātsyāyana specifies the following qualities: “He (who) has realized or perceived the *dharma*, he is engaged in making a statement in order to communicate objects or facts as he has perceived them” (Matilal 6). However, Nyāya offers higher status to the instructions and assertions to the Vedas, for they are unquestionably and unconditionally true. Such words concerning *dharma* (moral conduct) are the words of the God, hence authentic and uncontradictable. Even regarding the nature of human *āpta*, J. V. Bhattacharya argues that by *āpta* Vātsyāyana means not an ordinary person but a seer-teacher (*ṛṣi*), hence, his assertions are beyond doubt. Like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā talks of two types of linguistic sources - *laukika* (human) and *vaidika* (vedic or scriptural). But Kumāṛila, one of its exponents holds a different view. He accords the status of *śabda pramāṇa* only to the Vedic instructions. Even Prabhākara, another important *mīmāṃsaka*, who initially accepts *āpta vākya* as authentic, later on reduces it to *anumāna* (inference) for the validity of such assertions are inferred from the trustworthiness of the speaker. One noteworthy feature of Mīmāṃsā view of *śabda* is that it accords a special status to the *karmakāṇḍa* portion of the Vedas which is full of injunctive statements about sacrifices, rites and moral behaviour of man. For them Vedic statements are injunctive, not informative in nature. Sāṃkhya philosophers, on the other hand, hold a slightly different view about *śabda pramāṇa*. For them Vedic statements are the only statements which are free from all sorts of doubt, hence, self-valid. But their self-validity is due to the non-personal authorship of the Vedas. The Vedic words have a natural power to denote worldly objects and that power is communicated by *āpta*-s. “Hence, the self-validity of the Vedas is tested and lived by the *āpta*-s” (Radhakrishnan 301). Advaita Vedānta offers primacy to *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* because it is a means of acquiring philosophical knowledge (*pāramārthika tattvabhēdakatā*) and not empirical knowledge (*vyāvahārika*) which is acquired by means of perception, inference, etc. It also offers higher status to *veda-vākya*-s. But here *veda-vākya*-s do not refer to what is contained in *karmakāṇḍa*, but only the *vedānta* portions, which contain statements about the nature of the highest Reality. Śaṅkara (under *Brahma Sūtra*) while emphasizing the importance of scriptural assertions says that what can be known neither by perception nor by inference comes to be known through scriptures. And this constitutes the scripture-hood of the scriptures:

*pratyakṣenānumityā va yastūpāyo no budhyate
enam vidhanti vedana tasmād vedasya vedatā* || (2.1.1)

Here by *Śruti* or the Vedas he specifically refers to *mahāvākya*-s (great assertions) like *tat tvam asi* ('that thou art'), etc. They lead us to the ultimate form of knowledge that frees us from worldly expectations and desires, and forms the basis of our knowledge of the ultimate Reality (Brahma-jñāna).

In the Indian tradition, we find no clear indication about 'authority' as a source of knowledge in the sense the term is understood by medieval Western philosophers. Rather the Veda is called *apauruṣeya* (non-personal and authorless). Therefore, there is plenty of scope for ambivalence if the terms *śabda pramāṇa* and *āgama* are translated as 'verbal authority' and 'authority of the tradition' at all.

T. Patnaik, in her book *Śabda*, takes this issue of 'scriptural authority'. She quotes Dayakrishna who remarks, "The notion of Vedic authority is ...a myth" (9). She adds that a large number of thinkers do not want the 'myth' to be explored. If it means the unquestioning acceptance of Vedic assertions (without any scope for analysis and interpretation of their true meaning) then the traditionalists have wrongly assessed the Indian tradition. Interpretability is very much a part of it. So, within ancient texts and commentaries we notice varied and sometimes contrary interpretations of the same Vedic stanzas and lines. Bhartrhari, in his *Vākyapadīya*, offers us the finest examples of such variations in interpretation of meanings. He says that conflicting views, based on explanatory comments and similar passages, have been set forth by the exponents of Monism and Dualism:

*tasyārthavādarūpāṇi niśritāḥ svavikalpajāḥ |
ekatvinām dvaitinām ca pravādā bahudhāmatāḥ* || (1.8)

In his commentary following the verse, he goes on to elaborate the point further that due to the diversity of human intellect, diversity of speculations takes place. He cites several examples to illustrate his point. There is one such example to prove his point. In a famous *upaniṣadic* verse (*Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* 4.6) it is said that two birds, companions united together, occupy the same tree. Of the two, one eats the tasty fruit, while the other does not eat, only shines:

dvā suparṇa sayujā sakhāyā samānarī vṛkṣarī pariśasvajāte |
tayoranyaḥ pippalārī svādvattyanāśnannanyo'bhicākaśīti ||
(Īśādyāṣṭottaraśatopaniṣadaḥ 124)

It has been interpreted in different manners. To the Monist, “By two ‘birds’ the senses and the inner controller, the intelligence or the soul is meant.” And the Dualists interpret ‘two birds’ as “the differentiated consciousness full of seeds and the undifferentiated consciousness.” In fact, the idea of interpretability is as old as Indian culture itself. Yāska, one of the ancient etymologists, highlights this aspect when he says that without the interpretation of meaning Vedic statements are like “barren cow and mere illusion (*adhenumāyā*)”. The importance of interpretation in Indian tradition is evident from the fact that innumerable philosophical views flourished here, in spite of each claiming of following the Vedic lineage. Their views varied widely because they offered different interpretations of the Vedic passages or most often focused attention on this or that aspect of the Vedas which suited their own metaphysical model.

If we come to the specific texts the line of argument may become clearer. *Brahma Sūtra* is regarded as a text of Vedānta explaining content of the Upaniṣad-s. But Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja offer quite different versions of the same text. If Vedic statements had been considered as the embodiment of final truth, this freedom of interpretation would not have been there. These facts justify that the choice of the term ‘authority’ is a wrong one or else a myth that the traditionalists want to perpetuate at any cost.

The next question about the identification of *śabda-pramāṇa* with ‘verbal authority’ is that if *śabda-pramāṇa* means acquisition of knowledge by blindly accepting what the scriptures say, then why do Indian philosophers waste so much of time and energy in analyzing different dimensions of the concept of ‘language’? Indian philosophical literature is full of very rich and penetrating discussion about the nature of language, meaning, word-world relationship, speaker-hearer relationship and many more language-related issues. Many logical issues are raised within the scope of such discussions. These philosophers, who exhibit rare analytical keenness of judgment in their treatment of the concept of language, could not have been so dumb as to advocate dogmatic acceptance of the ‘authority’ of scriptures. The traditionalists may put some quotations in support of their stand. But this does not

provide much strength to their argument. There are plenty of statements and definitions found within the same texts, which are enough to challenge their viewpoint. It may be illustrated with some statements and definitions found in different texts about the nature of *śabda pramāṇa* and *śruti*. Sāṃkhya defines *śruti* as “knowledge obtained by analysis of meaning (*vākya janitam vākyaārtha jñānam śruti*)”. Similarly Śaṅkara puts emphasis on the analysis of meaning (*vākyaārtha vicāraṇā*) even in case of the highest form of knowledge (Brahmajñāna). He says that comprehension of Brahman is affected by the ascertainment of the meaning of Vedānta statement. This, to a large extent, disproves the traditionalists’ argument that Brahmajñāna is a matter of mystical experience only, and has nothing to do with language analysis.

Similarly, according to Sāṃkhya, Vedic statements are not anybody's assertions, but have a natural power to denote, and are communicated to common man by *āpta*-s only. So, *āpta*-s become the medium for the acquisition of scriptural knowledge. But any and every interpretation offered by *āpta*-s is not to be accepted dogmatically. In this context Aniruddha in his *vṛtti* on Vācaspati's *Tattva Kaumudi* says that huge giants do not drop from heaven simply because an *āpta*, or competent person says so and only sayings which are supported by reason should be accepted by him and others like you. Bhartṛhari very rightly points out that there is always the possibility of doubt in case of verbal authority because the intended meaning may not be correctly grasped by the hearer. There are many such instances where the emphasis is put on understanding of the correct meaning by language analysis and the application of reason. The traditionalists only present one side of the story without giving the other side any chance.

Still, the upholders of ‘authority’ of scriptures may be left with some more arguments in their favour. It may be argued that the scriptural assertions imply unquestioning acceptance because they are supposed to be uncontradictable and incorrigible. This type of knowledge is only assured by *śabda pramāṇa*. This is admitted by most of the schools of classical Indian systems. But such characterizations should not be understood at the surface level only. They have deeper significance. The non-contradictability and incorrigibility of scriptural assertions are due to the nature of these statements. According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, the Vedic statements are injunctive in nature and they do not inform

us about facts. They are commands (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*niśedha*). Such statements cannot be challenged, because such prescriptive rules cannot be negated, once accepted. Similarly, according to Nyāya Vedic statements are about *dharma* (which in broader Indian context means moral principles). Moral principles too are prescriptive by nature, hence, uncontradictable. On the other hand, for the Vedāntins (especially Advaitins) scriptural statements are non-empirical and philosophical by nature (*pāramārthika tattva*), so they cannot be contradicted by factual knowledge. They make a clear distinction between factual (*vyāvahārika*) and philosophical (*pāramārthika*) statements. Factual statement can contradict a factual statement, not a non-factual statement. That is why Vācaspati says that even a thousand scriptures cannot turn the knowledge of pot into the knowledge of cloth. In other words, the ways and means of acquiring factual knowledge are different from the knowledge acquired through linguistic means and scriptures. Scriptural statements have nothing to do with facts. Factual knowledge cannot contradict or correct the non-factual knowledge. So, it seems that there is no mystery surrounding the scriptural knowledge. It cannot at the same time be denied that there are many such verses and statements in philosophical texts of different systems which openly declare loyalty to Vedic words. But beyond this apparent dogmatism there lies means of ideas which are highly logical and analytical in nature. We cannot afford to neglect them while understanding the concept of *śabda pramāṇa*.

Against the view that where human convention is not acceptable, the divine convention may be invoked (as is done by Nyāya), Vyākaraṇa (in agreement with the Mīmāṃsā) affirms that the relation between words and meaning is eternal, underived and impersonal. T. R. V. Murti favours it. According to him there is no record of any such convention (human or divine), but the very idea of 'convention' itself presupposes language (321). Among the grammarians, Bharṭṛhari is chiefly concerned with establishing the authority of grammar. But it can be authority only if it gives valid knowledge about something. Therefore, Bharṭṛhari is led to make some observations on valid knowledge and how it arises. These things will be discussed later in this chapter. Pāṇini and Patañjali, the early grammarians, use *śabda* primarily in terms of spoken word. In the beginning of his *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali defines *śabda*. According to him *śabda* means those sounds, which when uttered to give rise

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to a complete awareness of an object with all its effects. Therefore, he actually takes up meaningful 'sounds' to be *śabda*:

yenocāritena sāsñālāṅgūlakakudākhuraviśāñinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ. athavā pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate tadyathā. Śabdaṃ kuru. ... tasmād dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ. (176)

He also quotes some instances in his favour, such as *śabdaṃ kuru*, *mā śabdaṃ kārṣṭh*, *śabdakāryayam māṇavakaḥ*, etc., and he notes that in all those applications the term *śabda* definitely means 'sounds'. These sounds are of generative type and with six types of transformation (*ṣaḍvikāra*) as it is natural with all existents generated and diminished after certain span of time. Keeping in mind this factor (transformative nature of *śabda*), grammarians have administered the process of *lopa*, *vikāra*, *vipariṇāma*, etc., known as Vyākaraṇa. Vedic utterances too happen to be subject to human endeavour at the time of *vinīyoga* and thereby need thorough follow up of Vyākaraṇa principles. The Vedas themselves originally stand as *apauruṣeya* neither subject to human utterances nor looking up to Vyākaraṇa for their proper applications. Hence, the very core of Vyākaraṇa texts is found to be diversified as empirical and non-empirical. Non-empirical pursuit of *śabda* has been illustrated in later Vyākaraṇa texts as 'Brahman' that reveals as beginningless (*anādī*), endless (*ananta*), non-transformational (*avikārī*), one, self-evident (*advitīya*), root-cause of this empirical world and the only 'Reality' (*parama*). The empirical aspect of *śabda* is generated by some physical endeavours known as *kaṇṭhatālvādyabhighāta*, i.e., drumming up of air inside one's body through the vocal channel existing from throat to palate. This *śabda* finds its real state in the highest Reality, Śabdabrahma, the non-empirical *śabda*. Existence of empirical *śabda* accrues the status of *vivarta* or non-real. Peculiarity of these *vivarta-śabda*-s or non-reals lies in the fact that they can activate Word-Meaning-Relation perfectly as the real one do.

In *Mahābhāṣya*, Vyākaraṇa has been declared as *pradhānāṅga* or the prime text among the six attributive Vedic texts known as Vedāṅga (Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chandaḥ and Jyotiṣa). Supremacy of Vyākaraṇa has been claimed since knowledge of this gives rise to *niṣkāraṇa dharma* or *dharma* of non-generated nature and thereby helps one achieving *abhyudaya* (the highest goal of

human life). The great grammarian intends to say: *apaśabda*-s are found to be more in number, while number of *sādhu śabda*-s is less to make proper application (*yathāvihita prayoga*) and, thus, attain *abhyudaya*. Uddyotakāra elaborates this position and commits that basic purpose of *śabdaprayoga* lies in specific understanding by the hearer; naturally, proper application of *śada* by the speaker, generating proper understanding in the hearer, must be well-devised following grammatical principles regarding *prakṛti*, *pratyaya*, etc. Sounds failing to keep up with grammaticality would never be regarded as source of proper understanding, and hence would be known as *apaśabda*. Grammaticality or *padasādhutva* is exclusively maintained by Vyākaraṇa by formulations and restricted applications. Therefore, Vyākaraṇa should be regarded as *pradhāna-dharmasādhana*, the chief condition towards achievement of *abhyudaya*, and retains its glorious position as an attributive text to the Veda. Grammatically correct words may contribute to proper understanding, but it is also a fact that grammatically incorrect words or improper utterances may decipher proper understanding without caring least about knowledge of grammar; moreover, grammatically correct words are those which retain proper 'word-meaning' relationship; therefore, grammatical connotations are relevant only in the cases of established or well-informed 'word-meaning' relationship; and this relationship, however, may not primarily depend on grammar. This very relationship or *sambandha* is coined as *siddha* or eternal and truthful along with *śabda* and *artha*. Following *śabdādvaita*, all this Word-Meaning-Relation may gain some sort of identical reality with the ultimate one, but, in the non-empirical stage only. Being *vivarta*, empirical Word-Meaning-Relation holds a reality comparable and rationally defensible from the ultimate one, whereby 'word' or *śabdā* is derived as *vyañjaka*, 'meaning' or *artha* as *vyañgya*, 'relation' or *sambandha* as *vyañgya-vyañjaka-sambandha* and the knowledge or understanding derived out of it as *abhivyakti*. These characteristics, noted above, are found in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*:

*grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā yogyatā niyatā yathā
vyañga-vyañjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ* || (1. 97)

Though grammatically correct words may contribute to proper understanding, it is remarkable that a meaningful sentence is not possible without *vyapekṣā* (a kind of *sāmarthyā*). Actually, meaningfulness of a sentence entirely depends upon a relationship between the parts of it, i.e. the words. The relationship is determined by

sāmarthya or propriety of the related parts. This propriety is often called *vyapekṣā*. While words become subject to *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *sannidhi* (proximity) and *yogyatā* (compatibility), there develops perpetual relationship or propriety towards construction of a meaningful sentence. Expectancy is defined as a particular sequence of *pada*-s without which the *pada*-s are not capable of generating the verbal understanding. For example, there is a sentence: *ghaṭam ānaya* ('Bring the pot'). This sentence consists these *pada*-s: *ghaṭa*, the accusative suffix *am*, *ā+√hi* and the personal suffix. Here, we understand the meaning because these *pada*-s are arranged in a particular sequence. If this arrangement is changed or disturbed, there will arise no understanding. For example, if *ghaṭa* and the accusative suffix *am* are written or pronounced as *am ghaṭa*, nothing could be understood. Therefore, *ākāṅkṣā* (a particular sequence of *pada*-s) is required for understanding the meaning of the expression.

Compatibility or *yogyatā* is defined as the feasibility of relation of one word-meaning to another. For example, in the sentence *jaleṇa siñcati* ('He irrigates with water'), there is a feasibility of the relation of the meaning of the word *jala* with the meaning of the instrumental case-suffix namely, *karaṇatva*, because irrigating a plant with water is quite feasible. But it is not true in the sentence *vahninā siñcati* ('He waters with fire'), because the fire cannot be the instrument of watering the plant. Hence, since there is no feasibility, there is no *yogyatā*.

Proximity is defined as uttering an expression without introducing time gap more than necessary. Thus, if someone utters the word *Devadattaḥ* today and the word *gacchati* tomorrow then no one will have verbal understanding that *devadattaḥ gacchati* ('Devadatta goes'). Thus, the units of the sentence should be uttered at an admissible interval of time. This is what is known as *sannidhi*.

In addition to these three requisites some logicians add the fourth *tātparyā* (intention) as an essential factor in the meaning of a sentence. For example, the sentence *saindhavam ānaya* can mean either 'Bring salt' or 'Bring a horse', and it is the speaker's intention that enables one to choose the appropriate sense under the given circumstances.

Throughout the preceding discussion, we find that to have 'an ultimate meaning' is the chief purpose of the Indian linguistic philosophers through some conditions and contexts. As noted above, the situation with regard to the production

of 'an ultimate meaning' is simple. There is a knower and a knowable, i.e. an object to be known. The knower gets the knowledge of that object, and he knows it through some means. Thus, the knower is the *pramātā*, the knowable the *prameya*, the knowledge the *pramiti*, and means of such knowledge the *pramāṇa*. There is no difference of opinion with regard to this situation. The disagreement may be noticed only with regard to the concept of these elements. But, we focused only on *pramāṇa* element and especially on the nature of *śabda pramāṇa*. *Śabda pramāṇa* has some conditions for being an accredited source of valid knowledge. These are the speaker, a speaker of facts, i.e. an *āpta*; and the listener, one who knows Word-Meaning-Relation towards construction of a meaningful sentence. And construction of a meaningful sentence is not possible without the four conditions, i.e. *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *sannidhi* (proximity), *yogyatā* (compatibility) and *tātparya* (intention).

2.

*na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte |
anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate || (Bhartrhari.1.123)*

The primacy of language as the object of philosophical reflections has been accepted by Bhartrhari in *Vākyapadīya* because cognition is confined only to language. According to Bhartrhari, the language we speak is the medium of the self-expression of the ultimate Reality communicated through all meaning-bearing words. It leads us across the external appearance to the core of reality which is the source of the underlying unity beneath everything. This approach depends for its validity upon the pre-supposition that the real is a luminous Truth which needs to be discovered by every speaker and every speech. The real breaks-forth (*sphuṭ*) through the medium of speech (*śabda*). This *śabda* is not merely a means to a truth or reality but it is the Truth and Reality. The awareness of this fact leads one to the realization of the meaningfulness of Being.

Bhartrhari begins his philosophical exploration with the identification of *śabda* (word) with Brahman. Whatever is associated with our understanding of the empirical world shows the elements of plurality. Yet all these are word-generated. Therefore, they are equipped with a cover or binding of a common essence. In Bhartrhari's vision this essence is *śabdatattva*. It is the ultimate principle of unity, hence the

ultimate Reality, the Brahman. In *Bhartrhari*, K. A. S. Iyer, referring to *vṛtti*, explains the reason why Brahman is considered to be the *śabdatattva*:

...the universe is really Brahman who creates all objects and phenomena in the form of words. Just because all that Brahman creates has the form of word, therefore Brahman itself must be of the nature of word. The fact that Brahman is called *akṣara*, phoneme is also an indication of its being the world-principle. As everything else, the phoneme also emerges out of Brahman. They exist potentially within the individual, as one with the self, without any sequence. ...they are uttered. Brahman is called *śabdatattva* because all phenomena assume the form of the word and also because it manifests itself as the uttered phonemes for the purpose of communication. (101)

It is noticeable that Bhartrhari gives great value to the concept of 'unity' in his metaphysical system. Therefore, Śabdabrahman signifies supreme unity rather than supreme existence. All along his attempt has been to show how the pluralities of the phenomenal world direct us towards an ultimate form of unity. And this ultimate form of unity is the basis of Bhartrhari's metaphysics of language. Bhartrhari expounds this view in the first five *kārikās* of *Vākyapadīya*. In the very first *kārikā* of first *kāṇḍa* he says:

*anādi nidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadaḥśaram |
vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ || (1.1)*

("The Brahman is without beginning and end, whose essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds. [K. A. S. Iyer, *Vākyapadīya* 1]")

This very first *kārikā* means that the whole phenomenon of material existence is only an appearance (*vivarta*) of the speech principle which is identical with the Ultimate Reality (Brahman). Conception of Brahman as the word principle or the identification of Brahman with the *śabdatattva* forms the central theme of *Vākyapadīya* which gives a kind of unity to the whole text. *Vṛtti* clarifies Bhartrhari's point saying that the Word-Absolute has the dual aspects of unity and diversity, but, of these the former alone is real, while the later is merely apparent. The second *kārikā* also develops the same vision. He adds in the first *kārikā* that Brahman though described in the Vedas as one is divided on the basis of its powers, and although it is not different from its powers appears to be different:

*ekam eva yadāmnātam bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt |
apṛthaktve'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktvene'va vartate || (1.2)*

Hence, the *kārikā* makes it clear that the speech essence which is the Ultimate Reality has neither beginning nor end and is unchanging, but on the basis of its various powers such as time, which (though in essence indifferent with it) seems to be different, the phenomenal world appears as evolutionary and pluralistic. It manifests it without losing its oneness. The opening verses of *Vākyapadīya* present the transcendent Reality which is beyond all limitations of time and space. This Reality is labeled significantly as Brahman as well as *śabdatattva*. It is both *anādi* (*beginningless*) and *anidhana* (*endless*). It is *akṣara* (*imperishable*). *Akṣara* also signifies phonemes, indicating that the very essence of Brahman itself is the Word-Principle. While it refers to the imminent nature of *śabdatattva*, *anādinidhanam* refers to the transcendent aspect of the Śabdabrahman.

In the third *kārikā* of the first *kāṇḍa*, Bhartr̥hari says that time is the most important and an inherent power of the Absolute. It is One, but divisions are superimposed on it. All the different kinds of changes which bring about multiplicity in Being depend on it:

adhyāhitakālāṃ yasya kālāsaktim upāśritāḥ |
janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ || (1.3)

But it does not mean that the *śabdatattva* is limited by time, but the eternal timeless appears as changing owing to the working of time factor. As stated in the fourth *kārikā* Brahman is the non-dual source of all multiplicity that comes into existence. In other words the underlying attribute of the manifolds, Brahman includes all multiplicity. "It manifests itself as the experiencer, the experienced and the experience itself" (K. A. S. Iyer 99):

ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā |
bhoktṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ || (1.4)

Thus, the *śabdatattva* is the root of worldly manifestations. As it is non-spatial, it is also indivisible. It is eternal in the sense that it is the timeless reality of all that exists in time. This undifferentiated and unchanging Reality, beyond determinations of thought and words is non-relational as there is no other entity with which it could be related or associated. It is immutable as it transcends space, time and causality. It has neither a beginning nor an end. Bhartr̥hari also refers to that aspect of the

eternal reality which transforms itself into speech as words and their meanings and into matter as the different subjective and objective elements of the phenomenal world. Nevertheless, these transformations do not affect the true essence of Reality.

Bhartrhari also establishes *śabdatattva* on the basis of tradition (*āgama*), inference (*anumāna*) and perception (*pratyakṣa*). *Āgama* is the most authoritative of all means of knowledge according to Bhartrhari. He presents many passages from ancient texts which proclaim *śabda* as the principle from which everything originates in which it exists and into which it merges on destruction. Brahman is the essence of *śabda*. It creates the universe through *śabda*. Universe and Brahman, which are identical ultimately, are manifested by *śabda*. Bhartrhari also finds support from the knowers of the tradition who hold that everything is a modification of *śabda* and that the universe is the first transformed from the *śabda*:

śabdasyapariṇāmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ |
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavartata || (1.120)

Bhartrhari says that just as thinkers of other schools, while explaining causality, saw that properties of cause continue in the effects; and have declared it as the source of everything, either the mass of atom or primordial Matter, or the collection of powers rooted in nescience or something which has no birth and no change but merely substratum of appearance, in the same way in the scriptures also, the word in which the power of Enjoyer and Enjoyed are submerged has been declared to be the cause of the world in many ways. In other words, the attributes and qualities of cause or manifestor persist through its effects or manifestations. On the basis of observation of the nature of effects we can infer the nature of cause. For example, the curd as the effect of milk retains some of the qualities of milk. On the basis of the observation of 'ward-loaded' nature of phenomenal concepts, we can infer that the cause of the world is of the nature of the word.

Bhartrhari argues that the cause of the universe must be of the nature of *śabda* because all objects are known through their words and because all cognitions are invariably intermixed with *śabda*. That all objects of knowledge are of the nature of *śabda* is evident from the fact that the knowledge of the word is indispensable for knowing the object. Unless the word is known, the object cannot be comprehended.

Also, when the name is known, the object is held to be known irrespective of its existence or non-existence in the external world. Since the object that shapes the cognition is of the nature of *śabda*, cognition is also of the same nature. Bhartṛhari declares that there does not arise any cognition which is not fused with *śabda*:

*na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte |
anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate || (1.23)*

Bhartṛhari gives an elaborate account of the all-pervasive role of *śabda* in the universe. He says that 'it is the word which sees the object, it is the word which speaks, it is the word which reveals the object which was lying hidden and it is on the word that the multiple worlds rests.' (*Vākyapadīya*, *vṛtti* under 1.118, trans. by K. A. S. Iyer 106) All differentiation of the world depends on *śabda* because it distinguishes and interprets that which would otherwise be a mere undifferentiated mass of existence. Objects are recognized and given name through *śabda* which also gives form to cognitions. In other words, the power which is based on words controls this universe. This universe which has a single Intelligence as its soul is perceived as manifold through the word as the eye:

*śabdeṣv evāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsya nibandhanī |
yannetraḥ pratibhātmāyaṁ bhedarūpaḥ pratīyate || (Bhartṛhari 1.118)*

All cognitions are intertwined with *śabda*. Even the vague perception of objects whose specific features are not noticed is known by pronouns like 'this' or 'that'. In other words, the world of the knower exists only as presented by *śabda* or as the meaning of *śabda*. Consequently, even conventionally unreal things like a fire-circle (*alātacakra*), celestial-city (*gandharvanagara*) and such others are cognized when presented by *śabda*:

*atyantamatathābhūte nimitte śrutyapāśrayāt |
dṛśyate 'lātacakrādau vastvākāranirūpaṇā || (Bhartṛhari 1.130)*

This *kārikā* offers us sufficient hints about Bhartṛhari's way of looking as the word-world relationship. The function of the word is to convey the meaning. But to

'mean' is not to refer to existent objects. According to Bharṭṛhari the words do not directly refer to the objects but to the idea or concept of the object.

Regarding this peculiar stand about the word-object relationship, he offers further justifications. He argues that 'objects' become distinct and identifiable entities once they are subsumed under a word or name. Otherwise the world of objects is indistinguishable and an unidentifiable 'something'. In other words, distinction is made between one object and another on the basis of 'words' or names assigned to them. Bharṭṛhari further adds that verbalization is not an invariable condition of our knowledge of the external world. In support of this connection he offers the example of a mute's or a child's perception. In such cases there is a scope for cognition and perception but not for verbalization. The cognitions of babies are also fused with *śabda*. Babies are able to understand and react to other's speech because they are born with *śabdabhāvanā* or linguistic predispositions:

ādyah kāraṇavyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṃ samīraṇam |
sthānānām abhighātaś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām || (Bharṭṛhari 1.122)

Bharṭṛhari takes the concept of *śabdātattva* as basic and primary. With the help of this he develops a non-dualistic (*advaita*) and holistic world-view. *Śabda* in Bharṭṛhari's view pervades not only all perceptual knowledge but also inferential judgments. The intellectual powers which human beings possess are ultimately the functions of *śabda*. The ability to reason with others or transmit thoughts is based on the power of *śabda*. Whatever may be the metaphysical presupposition, its establishment and comprehension is based on *śabda*:

svamātrā paramātrā vā śrutyā prakramyate yathā |
tathaiva rūḍhatām eti tayā hy artho vidhīyate || (Bharṭṛhari 1.129)

It is a central point for Bharṭṛhari how one reality transforms itself into the phenomenal level of plurality and the nature of change that characterizes the world of particularities. To discuss this issue, the theory of causation may be taken. As per this theory, the transformation of the transcendental to the phenomenal is possible. As Bharṭṛhari himself says in the first verse of *Vakyapadiya* that "from the *Śabdabrahman* the creation proceeds". In the Indian philosophical tradition, those

who subscribe to the view that “effect is the cause transformed” are called *satkāryavādin-s*. Hence, Bharṭṛhari’s view comes under the fold of the above theory. But, again the theory has been interpreted in two ways. Those who believe that the effect is the real transformation of the cause are called *parināmvādin-s*. According to them the cause changes its nature to become the effect, whereas the *vivartavādin-s* are of opinion that the transformations from the cause to the effect are apparent. The nature of the cause remains unchanged, and cause is non-different from the effect. The Advaitins, especially Śaṅkara, is the chief protagonist of the latter theory. There is no unanimity of opinion amongst modern scholars as to the real nature of Bharṭṛhari’s theory of causation. Bharṭṛhari’s use of the term *vivartate* in the introductory verse seems to settle the issue. Bharṭṛhari in the *vṛtti-s* of *Vākyapadīya* offers a *vivartavādin* interpretation of the nature of transformation.

There is another meaning of change, i.e., the change at the empirical level. We find that Bharṭṛhari has tried to explain the plurality by having recourse of the concept of *śakti* (power) inherent in the word-principle. Thus, in the very second *kārikā* of *Vākyapadīya*, he presents the One as having no second. It manifests itself as distinct and manifold, having an independent status as it were, through the working of various powers. These powers are of diverse sorts, some of which are direct and others indirect, and though they are identical with *śabdattva*, they seem to be different from it. To the relation of these powers with the source, the *śabdattva*, Bharṭṛhari declares that all the powers are identical with *śabdattva*. In ‘Jāṭisamuddeśa’, first section of third *kāṇḍa*, Bharṭṛhari confirms it and says:

sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvaṃ ekasyaiveti nirṇaye |
bhāvānām ātmabhedasya kalpanā syād anarthikā || (3, 1.22)

Bharṭṛhari treats the *kālaśakti* (time power) as the supreme of all the powers of the Absolute because it controls all other powers of *śabdattva* by presenting them in a particular temporal order.

The creation of the objects of the universe occurs in the first instance through the creative power. *Kāla* is not different from Brahman but is that aspect of Brahman which brings manifested objects to being in a sequence. When such time-sequences appear as differentiated objects then time as a power seems to be different from

Brahman, but really it is not. Through time things come to be and through time things pass away. Time is the efficient cause by which Brahman controls the cycles of the universe. In a separate section on time called 'Kālasamuddeśa', Bhartṛhari illustrates the creative process of time like that of a wire-puller in a puppet-play:

*tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate |
pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate || (3, 9.4)*

Just as the wire-puller is in complete control of the puppet play so *kāla* has full control over the running of the world. Ordinary cause and effect processes cannot operate unless time-power infuses them with life-force.

Again in the third verse of the 'Kālasamuddeśa' time is said to be the cause of activities like creation, existence and destruction of beings:

*utpattau ca sthitau caiva vināśe cāpi tadvatām |
nimittaṃ kālam evāhur vibhaktenātmanā sthitam || (3, 9.3)*

Time permits (*abhyanujñā*) some things to appear at a particular time and prevents (*pratibandha*) others from appearing. On the one hand by its permissive function, time allows things to be born and to continue in existence and on the other hand, it obstructs the inherent capacities of objects with its preventive function and *jarā* (old age) is then experienced:

*jarākhyā kālaśaktir yā śaktyantaravirodhinī |
sā śaktiḥ pratibadhnāti jāyante ca virodhinaḥ || (3, 9.24)*

Time, which is one due to its activity of growth and decay, attains the states of past, present, and future. Thus, when an action ceases, time, conditioned by that action is called past. When something is about to happen, time, conditioned by that event is called future. When action has been initiated but is not yet completed, time is then called present:

*kriyopādhiś ca san bhūta- bhaviṣyadvartamānatāḥ |
ekādaśābhir ākārair vibhaktāḥ pratipadyate || (3, 9.37)*

In this way time is experienced into past, present, and future. The appearance of the universe, which is really without sequence (3, 3.81), as something with sequence is because of time:

*nirbhāso pagamo yo 'yaṃ kramavān iva drśyate |
akramasyāpi viśvasya tat kālasya viceṣṭitam || (3, 9.46)*

Innumerable problems may arise in connection with the use of tense forms. For example, one problem discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* is - how can the present tense be used in regard to eternal things? Another question that comes up is with regard to the use of two words expressive of two different tenses in the same sentence. These tense forms cannot be understood without reference to Time. Besides, all our linguistic expressions refer either to the past or to the present or to the future. They present the arrangement of events in Time. Therefore, Bharṭṛhari conceives time as the effective cause of the phenomenal world.

It is also noteworthy that he is concerned with the explanation of the nature of Time as far as it comes within the purview of the linguistic representation of the Reality. For him, Brahman, as the Word-Principle, is an intrinsically dynamic reality and the universe as a whole is to be understood as its manifestation under the form of temporal becoming. In this way, Bharṭṛhari presents a consistent account of the relation between the one and the many; the unity and the multiplicity.

Thus, Bharṭṛhari, the propounder of *śabdādvaitavāda*, develops the metaphysical significance of Vyākaraṇa, in consonance with the epistemological part. For him, Śabda being the only reality is *svataḥ-pramāṇa*, self-expressive and self-evident. *Vyavahārikaśabda*-s, too, gain self-evidence without holding any independent existence. As Bharṭṛhari says:

*satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhīyate || (3, 2.2)*

In accordance with his theory, he classifies *śabda* into four classes, viz., *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikharī*. *Śabda* or *vāc*, that figures as *abhidhāna* and *abhidheya*, is called *vaikharī*, *madhyamā vāc* is referred to as a cognitive state of *śabda*, being the cause of *vaikharī* or figurative one; *paśyantī* is regarded as

mūlaprakṛti or the original *śabda* lying at the core of all *śabda*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, and *parā vāc* is of transcendental nature, *anirvacanīya* or indescribable, the ultimate reality behind the whole scheme of *vāc*:

*vaikharyā madhyamāyās ca paśyantyās caitad adbhutam |
anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ param padam || (1.143)*

Both Eastern and Western philosophers, who take the speech element to be verbal-utterances, which for Bharṭṛhari are an articulatory form of language, i.e., *vaikharī*, consider their nature and function to be the sole content of philosophical investigation. Communication for Vaiyākaraṇa-s is awareness revealed by language (*śabda*) in the mind of the audience, and they contend that language infuses cognition. Articulate utterances are a very significant level of language, because the idea of correctness (*sādhutā*) and non-correctness (*asādhutā*) of the forms of the words are decided on the basis of it. Ordinary persons cannot acquire any cognition without the help of it, and we are so accustomed in our usual communication that we identify it with language and confine language to it. However, there are instances of *yogin*-s and other gifted persons who get knowledge even without hearing the utterances. Such instances cannot be explained if we limit *śabda* to *vaikharī*.

Madhyamā is inner-*śabda*, the being (thought) revealed in the mind when manifested by articulated utterances. It figures in or is revealed in the mind of the hearer after hearing the verbal-utterances and in the mind of the speakers when they intend to speak. *Śabda* in the mind of speakers may be in sequence or without sequence. When it assumes sequence after being revealed in the mind, it is *madhyamā-śabda*. It is subtler than *vaikharī* and is inaudible to the audience, unless manifested through articulated utterances. Bharṭṛhari has given utmost importance to *madhyamā-śabda* and has called it *sphoṭa*. Verbal noises (*dhvaniyān*) are only tools in revealing the *sphoṭa*, and the meaning, in Bharṭṛhari's philosophy, is revealed only by *sphoṭa*.

Paśyantī is the subtlest of the three forms of speech. As it is subtle, there is no occasion for any distinction of language and meaning at the *paśyantī* level of speech. It is sequenceless and is manifested (when one intends to speak) at the level of *madhyamā* first and then is articulated at the level of *vaikharī*. *Paśyantī* is the

pure consciousness level of speech and is known by implication as the foundation of other levels of speech.

There is a controversy among the interpreters of Bhartr̥hari on the issue of *parā-vāk* as one of the levels of speech. According to the philosophers of Tantra and Vedānta, *parā-vāk* is the subtlest form of speech, subtler than *paśyantī*. The commentator, Helārāja has not distinguished *parā* from *paśyantī*. According to him, *paśyantī*, being one and undivided consciousness, is called *parā*. It is interesting that Bhartr̥hari who is well-versed in the *vedic* and *tāntrika* tradition has not enumerated *parā* as one of the levels of speech. Thereby, Bhartr̥hari illustrates *śabda* as *upādāna* or material cause, and *upādeya* or effect emerges out of that *upādāna*. This *upādāna* may be taken as *vaikharī*, the speech sound or an articulate form of language:

dvāvupādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ |
eko nimittaṃ śabdānām aparō 'rthe prayujyate || (1.44)

Bhartr̥hari maintains the theory denoted by the *vārttika* – *siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe*. It means that words, meanings and their relations are described as timeless (*siddhe*) by the sages, who are the authors of the *sūtra*-s, the *vārttika*-s and the *bhāṣya*-s:

nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ |
sūtrāṇām sānutantrāṇām bhāṣyāṇām ca praṇetr̥bhiḥ || (1.23)

And at the same time, he records two variations of *śabda*, two of *artha*, two of *sambandha* and two of *phala* (results incurred by *śabdārtha-sambandha* known as *siddha*). As named one by one in *Vākyapadīya*, first *kāṇḍa*, they are:

Artha: (i) *apoddhāra*; (ii) *sthitakṣaṇa*.

Śabda: (i) *anvākyeya*; (ii) *pratipādaka*.

Sambandha: (i) *kāryakāraṇābhāva*; (ii) *yogyabhāva*.

Phala: (i) *dharma*; (ii) *jñāna*.

apoddhārapadārthāḥ ye ye cārthāḥ sthitalakṣaṇāḥ |
anvākhyaś ca ye śabdā ye cāpi pratipādakāḥ ||
kāryakāraṇabhāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāḥ |
dharme ye pratyaye cāṅgaṃ saṃbandhāḥ sādhasādhasu ||
te līṅgaiś ca svaśabdaiś ca śāstre 'sminn upavarṇitāḥ |
smṛtyartham anugamyante ke cid eva yathāgamam || (24-26)

The commentator says that these are the eight subjects which are the whole content of the *Vākyapadīya* and the science of grammar. In a very brief manner, we will try to discuss these eight subjects.

Bhartrhari has mentioned two sorts of word-meaning (*padārtha*). *Sthitalakṣaṇa padārtha* is sentential-meaning and some word-meanings which are fixed in character, because its nature does not change with the different analytic derivations. Some word-meanings are such words that reveal a complete sentential-meaning. For example, the meaning 'Deities make it rain' of the word '*varṣati*' is fixed. *Apoddhārapadārthāḥ* is that word-meaning which is not fixed in character. It is known through the process of dividing and deriving the word differently into different roots/stems and suffixes. Vṛṣabha, a commentator of *Vākyapadīya*, has defined the term *apoddhārapadārthāḥ* through four different derivations. In all the four derivations *apoddhārapadārthāḥ* is concerned with the meaning of words acquired by grammatical analysis of individual sentential-meanings. The word-meaning, if conveyed by the word as a whole, is called *sthitalakṣaṇa padārtha* but if the word-meaning is derived on the basis of the grammatically-analyzed parts then the meaning is called *apoddhārapadārtha*. *Apoddhārapadārtha* is concerned with the explanation of meaning of a word through the theories or rules of grammar, and that is the reason as sentence-holist like Bhartrhari, accepts it as a device for helping beginners to understand the indivisible whole.

There are two classes of *śabda*: *anvākhyaś śabda* and *pratipādaka śabda*. *Anvākhyaś śabda* is that which is to be grammatically explained. This explanation includes analysis by separating the base from prefix or suffix. This base may be nominal base or verb-root. But this explanation is not possible for every word. There are also such words which cannot be analyzed in above mentioned way or such type of analysis of those words is the least acceptable. Such words are included in the

second category, i.e., *pratipādaka śabda*. *Pratipādaka śabda* conveys the meaning in a direct way and does not expect the grammatical analysis of base from prefix or suffix. For example, there is a word *ḍittha* which means a wooden elephant. It falls into the category of *pratipādaka śabda* because it does not expect any grammatical analysis to convey its meaning. But the word *kartṛ*, meaning 'doer', falls into the category of *anvākhya śabda* because it expects the grammatical analysis to convey its meaning.

There are two kinds of relation between word and meaning (*sambandha*), which are causality (*kāryakāraṇābhāva*) and capability to express the meaning (*yogyabhāva*). In *kāryakāraṇābhāva sambandha* the word is the cause of the meaning and the meaning is the effect of the word. In *yogyabhāva sambandha* the word has the capability to express the meaning itself. It is from the time immemorial.

The results or purposes, i.e., *phala*, are the spiritual merit (*dharma*) and the understanding of meaning (*jñāna*). In language we find correct words as well as incorrect words. Bhartṛhari says that results of correct words are the spiritual merit (*dharma*) and the understanding of meaning (*jñāna*), both, while incorrect words are only for understanding of meaning.

Accordingly, he suggests two types of *nityatā* in *śabda* as: (i) *kūṭasthanityatā* and (ii) *vyavahāranityatā*. Bhartṛhari says that whether words are eternal or otherwise, their beginning is not known. As in the case of living beings, there is continuity and their point of beginning cannot be determined:

nityatve kṛtakatve vā teṣām ādir na vidyate |
prāṇinām iva sā caiṣā vyavasthānityatocyate || (1.28)

Vṛṣabha comments that two views are expressed in regard to words in this verse: (i) they are eternal and, therefore, already existent and manifested at the time of use, and (ii) they are produced at the time of use and disappear again. Finally, he commits that *upādānaśbda*-s are of two types, viz., (i) *śabdanimitta* and (ii) *arthanimitta*; first one has been referred as *dhvani* and the second one as *sphoṭa*.

In the wake of this discussion, it can be said that to favour any system by arguments and reasoning or to reject it, is not the proper field of philosophy. The

function of philosophy is not confined to logical justification or a logically consistent explanation. It deals with the clear exposition of the concept or cognition, as revealed in usual communication. It relies upon the cognitive bases rather than the logical bases. It is called Vyākaraṇa because it explains the cognition revealed in communication, through the use of analytic devices. It is analysis through which indivisible cognition is divided, and the discriminative knowledge of the concept free from religious, allegiances, confusions, etc., is accomplished through the process. All concepts are indivisible. Even the concept of divisibility is indivisible in its character, and the indivisible cannot be interpreted without its analysis. In the present discussion, our debate here is that Bharṭṛhari provides a philosophy free from metaphysical allegiances without feeling any philosophical requirement for a rejection of metaphysics. The aim of his philosophy is to explain communication (*vyavahāra*) as it is revealed in the mind by language. It considers 'communication' in terms of the knowledge revealed by language in the mind of the hearers. Accordingly, we view his *śabdādvaita* as sentence/cognitive-holism, a philosophy that emphasizes reflection on the problems of communication; a philosophy for which language is an inner, indivisibly and universally given being, and which explains meaning as a being non-differently revealed in the mind by language; a philosophy which is based on a holistic idea of non-difference between the being of language and that of meaning, and between language and cognition. It is a sort of holism for which philosophical reflections are not only concerned with, but also confined to the language and the meaning it reveals. It is a kind of philosophy that considers language and meaning as philosophical beings or beings of awareness.

The basic idea of Bharṭṛhari's holism is that all knowledge is possible by language, and that the knowledge isolated from language ceases to be knowledge. It takes up sentence as *sphoṭa*, the real unit of language. It foregrounds sentence-holism, as it considers words, roots/stems, suffixes, etc., as outcomes of grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence, useful for the understanding of ignorant and children who can only understand in a piecemeal manner. The indivisible language and the meaning it reveals are the only realities to which cognition and philosophical reflections are associated.

Chapter 3

Theory of *Sphoṭa* and the Condition of Meaning

ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā |

bhokṭṛbhoktavayarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ || (Bharṭṛhari 1.4)

It has been discussed in the last chapter that the *śabdatattva* contains within itself the seeds of the whole cosmos which originates from it, and manifests itself as the experiencer, the object experienced and the experience itself. Thus, the *śabdatattva* is the root of worldly manifestations, and whatever originates from it become actualities and present themselves as different not only from the One but also from one another. In the same way, communication is full of verbal utterances (a collection of discrete phonemes uttered in sequences) different from one another which signify all the objects of the universe (*sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate* - Bharṭṛhari 1.123). Now, the problem is: how the collection of discrete phonemes uttered in sequences manifest knowledge or meaning? So as to resolve the problem Bharṭṛhari, in the light of *ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā*, answers *sphoṭa*, i.e. an inner unit of cognition. Without *sphoṭa* no lingual behaviour is possible. There are some other conditions (discussed in the next chapter) which are necessary in order to acquire meaning or knowledge but not indispensable as *sphoṭa*. It is *sphoṭa* because of which meaning or knowledge of any verbal utterance is possible. Thus, *sphoṭa* should be taken up as the universal condition of meaning. In order to establish the importance of *sphoṭa*, Bharṭṛhari gives instances based on time-honoured experiences of seers and sages (*āgama*). For example, the fire, at first in the form of seed and unmanifested within the pieces of woods, is produced when the pieces are kindled to produce fire that burns, similarly, by the expectancy for speaking, the inner, sequenceless *sphoṭa* is manifested through the organs of speech in the form of verbal utterances (*dhvaniyān*):

araṇisthaṃ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam |

tadvac chabdo 'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnām kāraṇam pṛthak || (1.46)

The sequences involved in uttering and hearing of articulate utterances are imposed on the sequenceless *sphoṭa*; just as the different parts of a peacock are sequencelessly potent in its egg and is manifested in a sequence when the egg is hatched, *sphoṭa* is manifested through articulated utterances produced in a sequence by speaker's effort, when he intends to communicate:

āṇḍabhāvam ivāpanno yaḥ kratuḥ śabdasaṃjñakaḥ |
vṛttis tasya kriyārūpā bhāgaśo bhajate kramam || (1.51)

Manifested in this way, *sphoṭa* reveals itself as well as its meaning non-differently. Showing how *dhvani* is manifested by the sequenceless *sphoṭa*, Bhartrhari says that just as different parts of statue are perceived in a sequence first and, then, the unitary cognition of a single statue is cognized, similarly, different phonemes, when heard in a sequence, manifest sequenceless unitary *sphoṭa* in the mind of the hearers and, then, manifested so, it reveals itself in the mind:

yathaikabuddhiviśayā mūrtir ākriyate paṭe |
mūrtiyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabde 'pi dṛśyate || (1.52)

Verbal utterances spoken to convey meaning are produced by the efforts of the vocal-organ of the speaker and, a child, born in a society, observes the modes, tones, length (short, long, prolonged) and contents, etc., of the verbal utterances used by the elders of that society and, then, follows them in the manner when he intends to communicate. There are three factors involved in communication in the way a child learns it: (1) the observation of gestures, tones, etc., occurred in verbal-noises made by the elders when they communicate meaning; (2) things external or internal for which the verbal-noises, by proxy, are made by elders; and (3) posed relation between the verbal-noises and the things on account of which the word, by proxy, is taken to stand for them. But for a philosopher, investigating into the cognition revealed by language, there are two other utmost impotent elements involved in communication. They are (1) *sphoṭa*, the inner, meaning-revealing unit, and (2) the meaning revealed, non-differently by it, in the mind. These two are foundational elements of communications. According to Bhartrhari, they, in fact, are not two but non-different. In Bhartrhari's philosophy, meaning is not a separate being, but that which is non-differently revealed by the expresser. Thus, Bhartrhari,

by accepting the expresser (*sphoṭa*) as the being that non-differently reveals meaning, explains *sphoṭa mayam viśvam* (the world of communication is the world of *sphoṭa*).

The main problem in defining language (*śabda*) is basically concerned with the explanation of cognition as revealed in day-to-day communication. Bharṭṛhari has explained the problem of cognition by accepting *sphoṭa* as an inner meaning-revealing unit which is awareness in character. In other words we may say that his philosophy of language is philosophy of *sphoṭa*. His philosophy cannot be understood by one who does not understand his concept of revealing unit as an philosophical being because he has observed all the contents of *Vākyapadīya* from the point of view of cognition as figured out in the mind and, hence, *sphoṭa* as a cognitive-being is a being of awareness in character. K. A. Subramania Iyer, in his *Bharṭṛhari*, says:

. . . the *sphoṭa* doctrine arose as a solution to the problem of the understanding of meaning. The problem was how to explain the understanding of meaning from the sounds which are uttered in a temporal sequence. As they are not simultaneous and cannot co-exist, they cannot co-operate in order to convey the meaning. The doctrine of *sphoṭa* is the grammarian's solution of the problem. (160)

According to the Indian grammarians the manifest language, which is discreet and sequential, is only a realization in heard sound of the essential language, which is non-discrete (*akhaṇḍa*) and universally unchanging (*nitya*) in a speech community. It is this *śabda-tattva*, *sphoṭa*, non-partitive and invariant, which makes successful linguistic communication possible in spite of infinite phonetic variation, transitoriness of sounds (spoken words) and the mismatch between the spoken language's segmented and sequential organisation of meaning and the integral wholistic meaning in reality (Kapoor 183).

Now, the doctrine of *sphoṭa* has not been an illusory abstract idea in Sanskrit grammatical philosophy. It is true that the very doctrine is a highly important concept in Sanskrit grammatical philosophy. Matilal points out that 'the Indian grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa* has been acclaimed as one of the most important contributions to central problem of general linguistics as well as philosophy of language' (77). This *sphoṭa* theory was fully developed and systematized by the great grammarian-philosopher Bharṭṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*; but some of the ideas underlying this

theory can be found even in earlier grammatical and philosophical literature. It shows that the concept of *sphoṭa* is not originally offered by Bhartr̥hari. But it was he who used it as the fundamental concept for the study of language. Later grammarians have successfully developed the theory further and it is done so only on the basis of the ground work provided by Bhartr̥hari.

Things will be easier if we try to explain *sphoṭa* etymologically. The word *sphoṭa* is derived from the *bhvādi* root *sphuṭ*, which means manifested, burst-forth, opened, displayed, expanded, expressed, etc. In different derivations it is taken for different meanings. In the interpretation of '*sphuṭati yasmādarthaḥ saḥ sphoṭaḥ*,' it is that by which meaning is revealed (in this interpretation *sphoṭa* is a meaning-revealing *śabda*). According to the interpretation of '*sphuṭati sphuṭībhavati*,' it is that which is revealed when manifested by verbal utterances. In *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Mādhavācārya takes the word in two ways. Firstly, *sphoṭa* is 'that which expresses a meaning' (*sphuṭībhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭa arthapratyāyakaḥ*). Secondly, *sphoṭa* is 'that which is manifested by letters' (*sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphoṭa varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ*). Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa, in his *Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, has interpreted it as '*sphuṭatyarrtho yasmāf*, according to which it is the unit from which meaning is revealed. Bhartr̥hari, in his *Vākyapadīya*, defines *sphoṭa* as '*anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭaḥ*' (1.93), according to which it is the universal revealed by itself when manifested by several individual sounds (*dhvaniyān*). In this way, we can say that, on the one hand, it is related to the sound aspect of speech and, on the other hand, it is also related to the meaning aspect of speech. Puṅyarāja comments on the meaning of *sphoṭa* under a *kārikā* of *Vākyapadīya* that, from the point of view of communication, it is a sentence explained as manifested by a set of language-token and, from the point of view of learning language, it is the letter or word-*sphoṭa* to be manifested by several occurrences and instances involved in articulations and, hence, universal in all cases:

*eka eva nityaḥ padā'bhivyaṅgyo'khaṇḍo vyakti-sphoṭo jātishoṭovā
vācako'ṅgikārya iti siddhāntaḥ* (2.29)

In order to accommodate the theories developed later, the modern scholars interpret and translate the term *sphoṭa* into English, variously, in their own ways as the 'real-word', 'logos', 'real Language', the 'bearer of meaning' etc.

The first propounder of *sphoṭa* is Sphoṭāyana. Pāṇini has mentioned Sphoṭāyana in his treatise *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*avaṇ sphoṭāyanasya* - 6.1.123). There is no evidence, however, to show that Pāṇini knew anything similar to the *sphoṭā* theory, in spite of the fact that Haradatta, in *Padamañjarī* under Pāṇini's *sūtra* 6.1.123 (*sphoṭāyanaḥ sphoṭapratipādanaparo vaiyākaraṇācāryaḥ*), and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, in *Sphoṭavāda*, refer to the tradition ascribing this theory to Sphoṭāyana. But the indirect reference to the theory of *sphoṭa* can be traced in the view of Audumbarāyaṇa as mentioned in Yāska's *Nirukta*. Yāska has quoted Audumbarāyaṇa as an opponent to the eternity of speech and has given his own view on speech while classifying words into four categories (*nāma*, *ākhyāta*, *upasarga* and *nipāta*) which are different from the sound units of words. According to Audumbarāyaṇa, speech remains in the auditory organ of the speaker as well as the listener:

indriyanityaṁ vacanam audumbarāyaṇaḥ (6)

But Yāska disagrees with this view. According to him, speech is all pervasive:

vyāptimatvāt tu śabdasya (7)

The meaning of the speech is comprehended from the utterance because of its all pervasiveness. John Brough interprets this line of Yāska with the help of *kārikā*-s (342-43) of second *kāṇḍa* of Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya*. According to Brough, in this aphorism, Yāska wants to suggest that a sentence is a fundamental linguistic unit bereft of any obstruction (1952 74-76). In contrast to the interpretation offered by Brough, Nils Simonsson suggests that in the present context, Yāska refers to the two dimensions of sound occurring in the speech unit. The sound may be utterly small (*aṇīyas*) or 'transcendental' (*vyāptimat*). The first attribute represents the pure phonetic aspect in its individual capacity whereas the second one brings the meaning into account and therefore represents the semantic aspect of speech (1962 27).

Durgācārya, the commentator of the *Nirukta*, is more influenced by the post-Bhartrhari grammarians while interpreting Yāska. According to him, speech grasped through the intellect remains indivisible in form. It is manifested by the efforts of the speaker and enters into the ear of the listener. When it is translated into thought it reveals its meaning (7). As to how meaning comes from the sound, it is thought that *sphoṭa*, auditory grasped, conveys meaning. According to this view, Yāska considers *sphoṭa* as meaning conveying unit of speech. Simonsson interprets the term 'vyāptimat' in the sense of all pervasive meaningful segment of the speech and connects it with *sphoṭa* which represents the significative level of language.

A. N. Hota remarks that in the evolution of *sphoṭa* before Patañjali it is difficult to come to the conclusion that *sphoṭa* represents the meaning conveying word, because Yāska did not use the term *sphoṭa* and seemed to have known little about it. Audumbarāyaṇa also does not mention the term *sphoṭa* directly. His awareness of *sphoṭa* is speculated on the basis of the *sphoṭa* concept of Bhartrhari. Brough goes to the extent to state that Audumbarāyaṇa is the founder of *sphoṭa* theory and Vārtākṣa knew it (*Vākyapadīya* II. 342-343). Some other scholars like Pāṇini and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, however, attribute the origin of *sphoṭa* to Sphoṭāyana. It means that *sphoṭa* has a remote descent (2006 3).

The great grammarian Vyāḍi is mentioned by Kātyāyana (under Pāṇini's *sūtra* I.2.64), Patañjali and later grammarians. Some of the verses in *Vākyapadīya* are supposed to be quotations from Vyāḍi's work *Samgraha*. This might have contained some discussions about the *sphoṭa* theory; but the work is irretrievably lost to us, and nothing can be said definitely about it.

With the help of the preceded elaboration it can be concluded that pre-Patañjalian concept of *sphoṭa* is a bit incomprehensible in nature. It is associated to the two sided entity of speech which is popular among grammarians before. Nothing constructive can be speculated on the nature of *sphoṭa* in pre-Pāṇinian age because it is difficult to find even the word *sphoṭa* in pre-Pāṇinian literature representing something similar to the *sphoṭa* doctrine developed later.

In the reference of above mentioned remarks, this question is obvious as to why the later grammarians introduced the theory of *sphoṭa* in grammar. The

grammarians hold that *śabda* is eternal. Each *śabda* is a chain of different sound units. The word *gau* comprises two different sound units, i.e. *g* and *au*. When *g* sound is uttered, the *au* sound does not exist. When the sound *au* is uttered, the *g* sound vanishes. Thus, the combination of sounds is not possible itself. We cannot account for the simultaneity of sounds, and explain the units of word or sentence. To solve this difficulty, the grammarians devised the theory of *sphoṭa*. They state that the *sphoṭa* as a single meaningful entity is over and above the disjointed elements of different sound units which constitute complete utterance. *Sphoṭa* as an indivisible unit is suggested in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣyā*. According to him, *sphoṭa* signifies speech/language and the audible sound (*dhvani*) as its quality. The audible sounds may be variable depending on the speaker's mode of utterance, whereas *sphoṭa* as the unit of speech is not subject to such variations. It is important here to note that *vaiyākaraṇa*-s have paid much regard to *Mahābhāṣyā*'s definition of *sphoṭa* and have explained their philosophy of language on that basis. It is, therefore, necessary to give an account of *Mahābhāṣyākāra*'s definition in the light of Bhartrhari's view and that of his commentators. Bhartrhari develops the idea of *sphoṭa* on the basis of *āgama*, i.e. *śāstra*-s like *Mahābhāṣyā*. But it is noticeable that he is not only a linguist but also a linguistic philosopher. Therefore, for him *sphoṭa* is neither a meaning-bearing unit nor a linguistic sign. But from the linguistic philosopher's point of view it is something more than that. The true implications of Bhartrhari's version of *sphoṭa* theory will be clearer as we proceed in our discussion.

It is in *Mahābhāṣyā* of Patañjali that the first mention of the *sphoṭa* (as real language) occurs. Patañjali, while explaining Pāṇini's *sūtra*, i.e. *taparas tatkālasya* (1.1.70) in his *Mahābhāṣyā*, has used the word *sphoṭa* for real language (*madhyamā śabda*) and in another passage he has mentioned *dhvani* aspect of *śabda*. Thus, there are two aspects of *śabda*, i.e. *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. The *sphoṭa* is a permanent element of *śabda* whereas *dhvani* represents its non-permanent aspect. The *sphoṭa* is not audible like *dhvani*:

dhvaniḥ sphoṭas ca śabdānāṃ dhvanis tu khalu lakṣyate

alpo mahāṃś ca keṣāṃcid ubhayaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ. (Patañjali on 1.1.69)

The *sphoṭa* is manifested by articulated sounds. The *dhvani* elements of speech may differ in phonetic value with reference to the variation in the utterance of different speakers. Difference in speed of utterance and time distinctions are attributes of the *dhvani* which can not affect the nature of *sphoṭa* revealed by sound. When a sound passes from the speaker's lips, *sphoṭa* is revealed instantaneously. But before the listener comprehends anything, the *dhvani* elements manifest the permanent element of the *śabda*. So, *sphoṭa* comes first and the manifesting *dhvani* also continues to exist after the revelation of *sphoṭa*. That is why Patañjali remarks that *dhvani*-s are the attributes of *sphoṭa*:

evam tarhi sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvani śabdaguṇaḥ. (Patañjali on 1.1.69)

Patañjali points out that the *sphoṭa* which is revealed by the articulated sounds can be presented through phonemes only. A phoneme which represents *sphoṭa* remains the same in three different modes of utterance whereas *dhvani*-s (articulated sounds) differs in different utterances. It is just like the distance which remains the same even if it is covered by various means which travel slow, fast and faster. Patañjali gives the analogy of a drumbeat to explain the unaffected nature of *sphoṭa*. When a drum is struck it produces a chain of various sounds whose pitch can be observed by the distance it covers. The generated sounds may be of different sonorousness and durations. Hearing the sound of drumbeat one may travel twenty feet, another thirty feet and still another travel forty feet and so on. Though the sounds produced by beating of the drum differ, the drumbeat remains the same. Likewise the variations of sounds do not affect *sphoṭa*:

berīm āhatya kaścīd viṃśatipadāni gacchati, kaścīd triṃśat kaścīd catvāriṃśat. sphoṭaś ca tāvān eva bhavati, dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ. (Patañjali on 1.1.69)

Thus, the term *sphoṭa* may stand for a single phoneme (according to Patañjali). It represents the phonetic species of phonetically different sounds. While interpreting Pāṇini's *sūtra*, i.e. *kṛpo ro laḥ* (8. 2.18), Patañjali states that *l* (with all its phonetic species) is substituted for *r* (i.e. to all its phonetic species). The consonantal *l* and vocalic *l̥* come under *l-sphoṭa*, and consonantal *r* and vocalic *ṛ* come under *ṛ-sphoṭa*. Though, phonetically *l* and *l̥*, and *r* and *ṛ* are different, *l-sphoṭa* includes all

varieties of *l*-sounds and all varieties of *r*-sounds belong to the single *r-sphoṭa*. This *r* sound which is replaced by *l*-sound (*kalpita*) also means that the vocalic *r* is also replaced by vocalic *l* (*k/pta*). Thus, according to Patañjali, the single class of various articulated sounds which may not be comprehended by the listener is called *sphoṭa*. But articulated sounds as members of the single class-phoneme which may differ in phonetic values (like tempos and various modes of utterances) are known as *dhvani*-s. Here, *sphoṭa* stands for the phonematic pattern of the word (Raja 102-108):

, *athavobhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdīśyate, raśruter laśrutir bhavati.* (Patañjali on *śivasūtra* 3.4)

Thus, according to Patañjali, *sphoṭa* is a conceptual entity or generic feature of articulated sounds, either in the form of isolated phonemes or a series of phonemes. It is a permanent element of physical sounds which are transitory in nature, and which vary in length, tempo and pitch of the speaker. It is an actualised replica of ephemeral sounds, to which S. D. Joshi says as “auditory image of varied articulated sounds or sounds-image auditorily perceived” (10-11).

There is a belief that *sphoṭa* theory is adhered to by the grammarians to explain how meaning is understood from the sound. According to the later grammarians, there are two aspects of the word, i.e. the sound aspect and the meaning aspect. When the sound is uttered *sphoṭa* word is cognised through which the meaning is conveyed. But this proposition is not accepted by Patañjali. He does not state that *sphoṭa* word conveys meaning. The *sphoṭa* concept is restricted to the distinctive level or phonemic level of language. It is an auditory impression of the uttered sounds which stand for a class sound. It does not necessarily represent the significative or semantic level of language.

According to Patañjali, if a particular word is an instrument of a particular sense, then the sense conveyed by a word is the meaning of the said word. In the *pratyāhārāṇika* of *Mahābhāṣya*, *śivasūtra* 5 (*ha, ya, va, raḥ*), Patañjali stated his view on identification of phonemes. According to him, the phonemes may be meaningful or may not be meaningful under different conditions. A single phoneme in the form of roots (ex. *√i, eti, adheti, adhīte* etc.) noun bases or declinables (ex. *a* in *ābhyām*,

ebhiḥ, eṣu), affixes (ex. *a* in *aupagavaḥ, kāpaṭavaḥ* etc), *nipāta*-s (ex. *a* in *apeli, i* in *indram paśya* and *u* in *uttiṣṭha*) are meaningful. Again the meaningfulness of the phoneme is confirmed from the fact that if a phoneme disappears the sense of the word is lost:

*dhātava ekavarṇā arthavanto dṛśyante varṇavyatyaye
cārthāntaragamanān manyāmahe' rthavanto varṇā iti varṇānupalabdhou
cānarthagater manyamahe' rthavanto varṇā iti.* (Patañjali on *śivasūtra* 5)

But a single phoneme is meaningless if it is separated from the word. Sometimes the transposition, disappearance, addition and mutilation of phonemes cannot change the sense of the word. Therefore, a single phoneme belonging to a word which consists of many phonemes is not considered to be a meaning-bearing-unit:

*na hi prativarṇam arthā upalabhyante. varṇavyatyayāpāyopajana
vikāreṣvarthadarśanān manyāmahe' narthakā varṇā iti* (Patañjali on
śivasūtra 5)

According to Patañjali, the concept of *saṁghāta* (as a single entity) is an essential feature of meaningfulness. Sometimes, while phonemes belonging to a single phoneme word in their individual capacity convey meaning. But in most cases the phonemes which make up a word and when they are not isolated from a word convey meaning. This is to say that *saṁghāta* as a whole conveys meaning. It is an entity which blends isolated phonemes into a single structure to convey meaning. Therefore, by virtue of *saṁghāta* isolated phonemes grouped together can only be meaningful.

Logically it may be argued that if the whole (*saṁghāta*) is meaningful the parts (isolated phonemes) may be also meaningful. For instance, if one having eyes can see, a group of persons having eyes can also see. If sesame seed yields oil, a collection of sesame seeds can also yield oil. If one blind person cannot see, a group of blind persons cannot see either. This would mean that if the whole is meaningful its parts (phonemes) are also meaningful. But this logic does not hold well in case of *saṁghāta* which is a structured force of the phonemes. Here, the whole is to be regarded as a different unit from a mere collection of parts.

To explain the concept of *saṁghāta*, Patañjali gives the analogy of a chariot. A chariot is capable of moving when its parts are put together. If the parts are disconnected the chariot cannot move. So also the phonemes separated from the whole (*saṁghāta*) do not convey any meaning. Thus, *saṁghāta* is a unitary sequenceless entity which conveys meaning. Regarding the role of unity (*saṁghāta*), Patañjali, further, remarks that when a word is uttered, different sounds of individual phonemes do not remain together. They remain in the mind of the speaker and listener in a particular order, as they have been uttered. It is the simultaneous cognition of phonemes explaining the unitary notion of the word which conveys meaning (Tripathy 81-82).

It is, generally, held that Patañjali has used the term *śabda* in the sense of meaning bearing element which represents the chief character of *sphoṭa*. But in *Mahābhāṣya*, it is found that Patañjali has used the term *śabda* in the three different contexts (first, *arthasaṁpratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ*, second, *dhvani śabdaḥ* and third, *sphoṭa śabdaḥ*). In one context, he says that if an utterance brings about cognition of an object having dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, horn, etc. then it is known as a word, a cow. In this definition two terms, i.e. *uccārita* (uttered) and *saṁpratyaya* (cognition) are important. The definition indicates that a word has a two sided identity. One side represents the sound and the other meaning. Thus, according to this definition, when the *śabda* is uttered, it brings the idea of the thing meant. Here, he defines word as a meaningful sound. The second definition (*dhvani śabdaḥ*) lays emphasis on the phonetic character of a word. Patañjali makes another important statement about the nature of a word. According to this statement, *śabda* represents the auditory image of the sound revealed by the articulatory movements. Therefore, here, *śabda* stands for auditory sound. According to the third definition, the term *sphoṭa* is used to perceive sound which remains the same in all different modes of utterances, whereas the term *dhvani* stands for the speech-sound which is associated with individual peculiarities. Thus, it appears that Patañjali does not identify *sphoṭa* with the meaning bearing aspect of the *śabda*. K. K. Raja explains:

, Patañjali's conception of the *sphoṭa* was entirely different from that of the later grammarians. To him, the *sphoṭa* is not a single indivisible considered as the meaning-bearer, but only the unchanging sound unit, or a time-series pattern of such units. (103)

While S. D. Joshi thinks that *sphoṭa* of Patañjali is an auditory image of the sound (9-32), K. K. Raja believes it to be a unit of sound as either an isolated phoneme or series of phonemes which can be examined as a succession of sound-units (103).

In this way, we can conclude that Patañjali has not used the term *sphoṭa* while discussing meaning. Kaiyaṭa and other later grammarians try to read into Patañjali's statement the theories later. According to them, Patañjali's first definition (*arthasampratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ*) refers to a single indivisible meaning-bearing-unit called *sphoṭa*.

But in fact this *sphoṭa* of Patañjali is an intermediary between sound and sense. The sound elements, which are uttered, have a united image of their own before their actual manifestation. This unified image or conceptual entity of the sounds uttered is *sphoṭa*. It can be heard by the auditory organs, but can be grasped by the intellect. Though in existence, *sphoṭa* precedes the sounds revealed to the listener's ear in manifestation it follows the sounds. It works as a channel between thought and sound (*dhvani*). But it is more akin to the sound and hence its nature is phonetic and not semantic.

This *sphoṭa* is fixed in nature in contrast to the sounds which are associated with individual peculiarities. It stands for a class of sounds of particular phoneme (phonetic pattern). As it is bereft of sequence (*samghāta*), it cannot be associated with meaning. It is the conceptual form of the physical sound which operates in phonetic level of language. Patañjali's concept of *sphoṭa* is altogether different from those of later grammarians who consider *sphoṭa* as meaning-conveying word (Hota 10-11).

K. K. Raja says that 'very little is known about the linguistic discussions in India during the period after Patañjali and before Bharṭṛhari. From the many references to the various theories on many a linguistic problem mentioned in the *Vākyapadīya* it is certain that the period was one of active speculation. The *sphoṭa* theory of Bharṭṛhari is the culmination of many such attempts in the solution of the linguistic problems that were worrying scholars in the various philosophical schools' (109). By all means, Bharṭṛhari discussed the concept of *sphoṭa* in an exhaustive manner. In his *Vākyapadīya*, he has stated his own view along with the views of

others without mentioning their names. It is difficult to demarcate the actual nature of *sphoṭa* without the proper understanding of Bhartr̥hari's linguistic philosophy of meaning which has been taken in the last chapter. In his *Bhartr̥hari*, K. A. S. Iyer says that "Bhartr̥hari does use other words also in the course of his exposition of the subject" (156). The use of the term *śabda* in different senses namely *pada*, *vākya*, *sphoṭa*, *dhvani*, *nāda*, *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* pose certain difficulties to determine the actual nature of *sphoṭa*. K. A. S. Iyer, further, says "to note two of them particularly, namely, *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*, because they are the special names of the two aspects of the expressive word mentioned in *Vākyapadīya* 1.44" (157). Bhartr̥hari says that in the words, which are expressive, the learned scholars discern two elements. These are *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. *Sphoṭa* is the cause of the real word which is used to convey the meaning and the other is *dhvani*:

dvau upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ |
eko nimittam śabdānām aparō' rthe prayujyate || (1. 44)

Although, they (*sphoṭa* and *dhvani*) may appear to be essentially different, they are really identical. According to Iyer, they are differentiated in the mind and yet integrated like two sides of the same coin which constitute the *sphoṭa*. What Bhartr̥hari emphasizes is the meaning bearing or revelatory function of the *sphoṭa*, which is eternal. The apparent difference is seen due to the various external manifestations of the single internal *sphoṭa*.

The term *sphoṭa* occurs nine times in the first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya* (*kārikās* 49, 75, 77, 81, 83, 97, 102, 103, 106). Out of nine times, only once (*Vākyapadīya* 1.49) it is used in relation to the term *śabda* (word). However, in the first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya* (*kārikās* 47), the term *śabda* is identified with *sphoṭa*. Both, ancient and modern scholars have identified the meaningful *śabda* with *sphoṭa*. But Bhartr̥hari has interpreted *sphoṭa* contrary to the tradition handed down by Patañjali. He seems to borrow it from the lost work of Vyāḍi. However, Bhartr̥hari develops it in greater detail. The actual nature of *sphoṭa* of Bhartr̥hari can be determined by carefully studying his statements in *Vākyapadīya*. An elaborated account of his view on the nature of *sphoṭa* is discussed under the following sections: 1. *Sphoṭa*: the *śabda*-dispositionality of mind (*śabda-bhāvanā*). 2. *Sphoṭa*: sentence or word? 3. Kinds of

sphoṭa. 4. Nature of *sphoṭa*. 5. *Sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. 6. Bhartrhari's views on the process of revelation of *sphoṭa* 7. *Sphoṭa* and the meaning bearing aspect of the word. 8. *Śabda* as a two sided entity. 9. Word as an entity without differentiation. 10. Bhartrhari's view on the nature of *śabda*. 11. *Sphoṭa* as a symbol. 12. Conclusion.

1.

itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā |

yāṃ pūrvāhitasamkāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate || (Bhartrhari 1.121)

Bhartrhari says, “*sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate*” (1.123). Whatever in the form of knowledge exists in this universe is due to *śabda*. If someone takes this term *śabda* as a language in a general sense, it will be difficult to explain how a child's cognition is possible because language is not accepted as given to it since birth. Bhartrhari does not talk about language in a general sense but for him language (*śabda*) is *chabdo 'pi buddhisthaḥ* (*śabda* which is in mind – 1.46) and *pūrvāhitasamkāro* (the accumulated experience of the past – 1.121). Thus, the explanation of a baby's cognition, whose auditory and vocal senses are not yet matured to an extent of hearing and speaking, cannot be given without accepting the innate position of language. As such, it, for Bhartrhari, is universally given in the mind as a potency on account of which the mind comprehends its pain and pleasure. It has also been proved by the modern science that a newly born child comprehends the feelings of its pain and pleasure. Not only that, its efforts to communicate its pains and pleasures can well be observed in its act of crying, smiling, etc. It knows, though it cannot speak, because its organs of speech are not matured to that extent. That a child cries to communicate its feeling cannot be explained if speech dispositionality (*śabda-bhāvanā*) of the mind is not accepted:

ādyaḥ kāraṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṃ samīraṇam |

sthānānām abhighātaś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām || (Bhartrhari 1.122)

Śabdabhāvanā is present in the child, and is cultivated progressively by the observation of the use of words by elders of the society in which it is born. Speech dispositionality, being a cultural sphere of consciousness, is renderable in different

language-tokens of one's own touch without a change in its awareness of character. It is not justified to accept that utterances are momentary, instantaneous and individuals differing in different communities. Rendering of utterances implies a constant content and that constant universal is given ubiquitously. According to Bhartrhari, *sphoṭa* is the constant content which when manifested by different tones and speeches of the same sense of different language, reveals itself first and then meaning is revealed non-differently by it. Tokens like *gauḥ* in Sanskrit, *gāya* in Hindi, 'cow' in English, as Bhartrhari would say, manifest the same *sphoṭa* on account of which the same meaning (cow) is cognized by the persons having the observation of the uses of those tokens. This shows that the same content is manifested through different tokens of different language communities and, manifested by them, it reveals itself as the expresser from which its expressed is revealed non-differently.

2.

The question on the take of *sphoṭa* as a sentence or as a word exists due to the problem of translation to the some extent. The Sanskrit word *śabda* is generally translated into English as 'word' and, as such, one may ask: whether *sphoṭa* is a word or a sentence? The second *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya* deals with the question whether it is the sentence (*vākya*) or the word (*pada*) that constitute the primary unit of language. Bhartrhari calls the upholders of the sentence *vākyavādin-s*, i.e. the Grammarians, and the upholders of the word as *padadarśins*, i.e. the Mīmāṃsakā-s:

abhedapūrvakābhedāḥ kalpitā vākyavādibhiḥ |

bhedapūrvān abhedāṃs tu manyante padadarśinaḥ || (2.57)

In contrast to the Mīmāṃsakā-s who conceive the sentence-meaning or the complete thought as resulting from the summation of the individual meanings, Bhartrhari understands *sphoṭa* primarily as an indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense. For Bhartrhari, *sphoṭa* being a complete meaning-revealing unit is a sentence. It is added that it is difficult for ignorant and children to understand the sentence and in order to make it understandable to them, it is divided, artificially, into

different components of it by the process of grammatical analysis, i.e. *apoddhāra*. The divisions of the indivisible sentence, acquired through grammatical analysis, are conventionally taken as real components of the indivisible sentence. Children and ignorant understand the indivisible through the divisions conventionally taken as real and, thus, the indivisible sentence is explained as a get-together of such components.

Thus, Bhartrhari has the word *śabda* for an indivisible unit, which from the point of view of accomplishment of communication, is sentence and from the point of view of explaining the structure of language to ignorant and children is 'word'. In the philosophy of Bhartrhari, the word *śabda* and *sphoṭa* are synonymously used for a complete expresser, that is sentence, and the word *pada* for words. However, if there is a use of the word *śabda* for word (*pada*) or for suffixes, etc., it is only with a sense that they are parts of the *śabda*, i.e. sentence or language, and that they are also language (*śabda*) if a complete meaning is revealed by them. This fact can be distinguished from Bhartrhari's observation on indivisible sentence which is awareness in character, the grammatical analysis of it in words, and words into roots and suffixes. Explaining cognition by words in usual communication, he strongly states that a word, or even a letter, functions as sentence, if they successfully perform communication. An isolated word cannot be expressive of a specific or complete meaning and if only a single word causes cognition of a complete meaning that meaning cannot be the meaning of an isolated word but of a sentence. In these cases the words are used either as compound which are explained as integrated sentence (*vigraha vākya*) or as single-word expressions, by which the complete unit is revealed. Thus, it is clear that when the word *śabda* is used for a unit conveying a complete meaning (a specified universal), it, for Bhartrhari, functions either as a sentence or as a compound, conveying integration of meaning, but when it is taken as a discrete word, its independent meaning is decided as universal in a very general sense. In cases of the former, expectancy for the completion of a unitary meaning is satisfied, but in the case of the latter, the expectancy for the completion persists. Only in this way, the differences between the terms (*śabda* and *pada*) and their meanings can be distinguished in the philosophy of Bhartrhari.

3.

In his *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari does not mention the kinds of *sphoṭa* directly. It is only in his *vṛtti* that three kinds of it are clearly mentioned. These are *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*:

*varṇāpadavākyaaviṣayāḥprayatnaviśeṣasādhyā dhvanayo varṇa pada
vākyaśhyān sphoṭān punaḥpunarāvīrbhāvayanto buddhiśvadyāropayanti
(vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.82)*

All *sphoṭa*-s are based on two principles. These are ideas or concepts (which are indivisible) given in the mind and the universals in their kinds. It is according to their association with different sets of token that they are classified in different kinds. A *varṇa-sphoṭa* is accepted as the cause of identical cognition of a letter (*varṇa*) as letter (*varṇa*) in all its occurrences and instances. Similar is the reason behind *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*:

anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā (vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.93)

When we take the point of the kinds of *sphoṭa*, it is noticeable that division of an indivisible is impossible. So as to help the beginner's understanding of the indivisible, these divisions of the *sphoṭa* are analyzed artificially. However, Bhartṛhari has mentioned only three of its kinds as mentioned earlier. It is with Nāgेश, the author of *Sphoṭavāda*, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣa, the author of *Śabdakaustubha*, and Kṛṣṇamācārya, Nāgेश's commentator (in his *Subodhinī Tikā*), that we find the mention of eight and more than eight, approximately twelve kinds of *sphoṭa* with two primary, namely (1) *vyakti*, and (2) *jāti*. *Vyakti-sphoṭa* is divided in two: (1) *sakhaṇḍa*, and (2) *akhaṇḍa*. *Sakhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in three: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in two: (1) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (2) *vākya-sphoṭa*. Similarly, *jāti-sphoṭa* is divided in three: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa*.

The basic logic behind these divisions of *sphoṭa* is based on the view that *vyakti* (individual) like *jāti* (universal) is accepted as eternal and, thus, *varṇa*, *pada*

and *vākya* in the theory of individualists are eternal archetypes of the fleeting atoms of sound. Again the *pada* and *vākya*, in the system of Vyākaraṇa, are taken as indivisible unit having no sequence and units constructed out of association of letters and words respectively. From the constructionist's point of view these units are depths of language tokens on the basis of which identical cognition of them in their several occurrences and instances is accomplished.

4.

For Bhartrhari, *sphoṭa* is the inner, indivisible, universally and eternally given being (which is awareness in nature). Without it no type of lingual behaviour is possible. Without it not only a grammarian cannot create a word for us as we intend to speak, but also our very intention to speak would be possible. Articulate utterances, for Bhartrhari, are only instrumental in manifesting *sphoṭa*. The expression of meaning, as such, cannot be explained only on the basis of fleeting verbal utterances. Expression implies an expresser and, therefore, the *sphoṭa* (an inner language) as a given expresser is accepted by Bhartrhari. The cognition, recognition and memory in order to be recalled, known and interpreted also require the given position of language. If otherwise, no cognition, no memory or recognition will be possible as language is awareness and awareness cannot be divided; it is indivisible.

Though, uttering and hearing, both are inevitably involved in the act of communication, the accomplishment of cognition by the process of uttering and hearing is dependent on the manifestation of the meaning-revealing unit that is *sphoṭa*. Meaning, as we have seen, is not an external entity but a being revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa* in the mind. Thus, our communication is confined to the beings which are revealed non-differently by the *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* in the role of the expresser expresses the meaning of verbal utterances.

According to Bhartrhari, *sphoṭa* is a universal being. Bhartrhari has defined universality of *sphoṭa*. The universal, according to him, is that which is manifested by

many individuals falling under it. In this way, *sphoṭa* is a universal because it is manifested by the many individuals which are words and letters:

anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā |
kaiś cit vyaktaya evāśya dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ || (1.93)

According to this definition, a sentence is the universal of words, words universal of letters, and letters are the universal of articulated phonemes. In another way Bharṭṛhari interprets the universality of *sphoṭa*. This interpretation is that on account of which identical cognition in its several instances and occurrences are revealed. This interpretation of universality is wide in its range and is applicable not only to sentence-*sphoṭa* but to word and letter also. The logic behind accepting *sphoṭa* as universal is very plain. The same word 'cup' is used for a number of individual cups (long, sort, etc.). It is used even for individuals, past or destroyed, and also for those yet to be produced. This fact cannot be explained if *sphoṭa* as universal is not accepted. The cognition of word as word and identical conception revealed by the word in all its occurrences and instances can also not be explained without admitting it as universal.

Bharṭṛhari designates *sphoṭa* as Śabdabrahman. The logic behind designating *sphoṭa* as Brahman is that it, like the Advaitin's Brahman, is self-luminous and illuminates itself and its meaning and hence, is the foundational Reality of the world of cognition and communication. As Brahman for the Advaita philosophers is the ultimate Reality of the universe, language (*śabda*), for Bharṭṛhari is the ultimate principle of the world of communication and of the metaphysical world as well.

5.

Sphoṭa and *dhvani*, for grammarians, are involved as soul and body in the accomplishment of communication. However, their status is different. *Sphoṭa*, for grammarians, is a meaning-revealing-inner unit that is the expresser. It is the cause of cognition of meaning while *dhvani* is only a tool in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*.

The indivisible sequenceless *sphoṭa* is revealed when manifested by *dhvani* that is articulated in a sequence. *Dhvani* represents the uttered sound units. In simple terms *dhvani*-s are the individual letter sounds which suggest something. This something which is indicated by the *dhvani*, according to Bharṭṛhari, is the *śabda* (*sphoṭa*, the real word). *Sphoṭa*, according to him, is always intimately related to sound (*dhvani*). We cannot have *sphoṭa* without *dhvani* (sound). The sounds which are produced at the contact of articulatory organs manifest *sphoṭa*. As soon as the sounds are produced the *sphoṭa* is cognised instantly. Since the sounds reveal *sphoṭa*, they are manifesters and *sphoṭa* is manifested – “*vyarṅgyavyaṅjakabhāve 'pi tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ*” (Bharṭṛhari 1.97). In the *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 76 of the first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, Bharṭṛhari discusses an inner distinction within the *dhvani*-s. *Dhvani*-s in their first moment (that is at the time of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*) are *prākṛtadhvani*-s (primary sounds). *Prākṛtadhvani*-s are those sounds without which the form of the *sphoṭa* would remain unmanifested and, therefore, unperceived. As for Bharṭṛhari the primary sounds can be short, long or prolonged in duration (i.e. *hrasva*, *dīrgha* and *pluta*). Sequence and durability are properties of *dhvani* which are wrongly known by imposition as the property of the indivisible *sphoṭa* also. Bharṭṛhari says that just as a reflection formed in water appears (due to the activities of the water) to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the *sphoṭa* and the sound (of speech):

pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt |
tatpravṛttim ivānveti sa dharmāḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ || (1.49)

R. C. Pandeya finds the spoken language and other means of expressions as shadows of the real mental language. Therefore, in his *Problem of Meaning*, he says:

Our spoken language, which is regarded by the people as the only language, is only shadow language having no existence of its own. ...It is affective and communicative only because it is an expression of the real language. People mistake our spoken language to be the real language because they fail to recognise the reality behind it. The verbal form of language is not real language. It is only an expression (*dhvani*) of the language *par excellence*. (80-81)

The initial movements of articulatory organs produce primary sounds which in turn reveal *sphoṭa*. But when vibrations stop, the production of sounds does not cease. At this stage, a series of sounds which come out from the initial sounds are identified as *vaikṛtadhvani*-s (secondary sounds). The secondary sounds do not in any way affect the quality of the *sphoṭa* already manifested by the primary sounds. Hence, they are external to the *sphoṭa*. In *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartr̥hari says that after the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, the secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance, but the intrinsic nature of the *sphoṭa* is not affected by them:

śabdasyordhvamabhivyakter vṛttibhedam tu vaikṛtāḥ |
dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate || (1.77)

These secondary sounds help in the continued perception of *sphoṭa*. It is explained by the analogy of a flame. As one flame lights another flame and that flame still another and the process goes on, similarly one sound which manifests *sphoṭa* produces another sound and that sound produces still another sound. Each subsequent stage in the chain of sounds continues to reveal the same *sphoṭa*:

anavasthitakampe'pi karaṇe dhvanayo'pare |
sphoṭād evopajāyante jvālā jvālāntarād iva || (1.106)

The idea is that when the speaker engages in the phonetic act s/he produces some sounds. The sounds belonging to the first moment are primary sounds. As soon as the listener hears the primary sound s/he perceives the *sphoṭa*. But the perception does not stop abruptly. It lasts for a short time in quick speech, a little longer in speech of medium speed, and still longer in slow speech. The sounds in the succeeding moments (*vaikṛtadhvani*) which have the same duration of the sounds of first moment continue to reveal *sphoṭa*. The duration of perception of *sphoṭa* through secondary sounds depends upon the difference in the speed of utterance. The continued perception of *sphoṭa* through the secondary sounds cannot be explained unless we assume that the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. But, the difference in speed (slow, medium, and rapid) associated with the secondary sounds is not attributed to the *sphoṭa*.

Sometimes it appears that *sphoṭa* has temporal distinctions (*kālabheda*). But this is not correct. The sound varies. Its utterance may take either less or a little more or still more time on the basis of which it can be short, long or prolonged respectively. In reality the temporal distinction belongs to the sound. But as sounds and *sphoṭa* are perceived simultaneously, the difference is not conspicuous. Therefore, the property of sound (such as length, pitch, etc.) is wrongly felt to be associated with the manifested *sphoṭa* which is in reality free from such distinction. As Bhartrhari says:

sphotasyābhinnakālasya dhvanikālānupātinaḥ |
grahaṇopādhibhedena vṛttibhedam pracakṣate || (1.75)

Besides the *prākṛta-vaikṛta* distinctions, Bhartrhari also speaks of another distinction, i.e. the distinction between *dhvani* and *nāda*. In the *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 47 of the first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, *nāda* is looked upon as a gross form of *dhvani*-s:

tacca sūkṣme vyāpini dhvanau karaṇavyāpāreṇa pracīyamāne
sthūlenabhrasarighātavadupalavhyena nādātmanā prāptavivartena.

6.

On the process of revelation of *sphoṭa* Bhartrhari says that just as the fire which is within the churn sticks is the cause of the other fire, similarly, the word which is in the mind of the speaker becomes the cause of the different expressive words:

araṇistham yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam |
tadvac chabdo 'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnām kāraṇam pṛthak || (1.46)

The sources remain in the intellect before their production. As soon as the sounds are produced by the articulatory organs, the *sphoṭa* is revealed. But the listener cannot understand *sphoṭa* immediately. Each individual sound unit contributes something to the total perception of *sphoṭa*. The first sound unit reveals *sphoṭa* vaguely, next unit a little more clearly, still next more clearly. This process

continues till the last sound perceives *sphoṭa* absolutely. Thus, *sphoṭa* is progressively revealed by each successive sound. Bharṭṛhari expresses it in this way:

yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍhatvam upagacchate |
āvṛtṭyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtṭi nirūpyate ||
nādair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha |
āvṛttaparipākāyām buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate || (1. 82, 84)

The process of comprehension of *sphoṭa* has been compared to a student's attempt to memorise a Vedic verse by heart. His first recitation provides a vague impression of the verse and the subsequent recitation gives a clearer impression. The last recitation fixes the verse fully in memory. Similarly, the perception of each sound unit progressively reveals *sphoṭa*. When the final sound is uttered it leads to the cognition of the *sphoṭa*:

yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍhatvam upagacchate |
āvṛtṭyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtṭi nirūpyate || (1.82)

7.

There are two groups of scholars holding different views on the *sphoṭa* as the meaningful aspect of the word. Some scholars are prominent among those who believe that the *sphoṭa* represents a meaningful aspect of the language. According to these scholars, it stands for the meaning-bearing value attached to the speech units. But some scholars hold an opposite view. Especially, S. D. Joshi says that the *sphoṭa* concept of Bharṭṛhari represents the auditory level of language (1967 15-51). The *sphoṭa* stands for auditorily grasped speech units which may not be semantically understood.

In fact, Bharṭṛhari nowhere relates *sphoṭa* with the meaning. He never uses the meaningful *śabda* (word) as a synonym of *sphoṭa*. Sastri (1959), Iyer (1969) and Raja (2000) etc. identify *śabda* with *sphoṭa*. It has generated much controversy. They depend on the commentaries of Kaiyyata, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Harivṛṣabha and

Maṇḍana Miśra etc. for their interpretation. These commentators are greatly influenced by the interpretations of *sphoṭa* later developed by the Mīmāṃsaka-s headed by Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa and the Neo-*Naiyāyika*-s. The followers of both these systems explain the *sphoṭa* concept of Bharṭṛhari in the light of meaning conveying speech unit.

It is very difficult to say why these great traditional commentators jumbled up the meaningful *śabda* with *sphoṭa*. Probably the confusion has arisen in the mind of the later scholars because they identify Bharṭṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa* with meaningful *śabda*.

The most important issue for the school of grammar is "what constitute the meaning-unit of language?" In criticising the Mimāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya view that the individual letters or words of a sentence generate the meaning (Bharṭṛhari 2.15-17), the grammarians point out that the letters of a word or the words in a sentence die away as soon as they are pronounced. So that when we arrive at the last letter of a word or the last word of a sentence, the previous elements have all vanished. How then can the meaning of the whole word or sentence be cognized? It is replied that memory holds the trace or hint of the letters and word and this still does not help since as only one thing can be cognized at a time in our mind. The traces (in memory) will only replay the serial presentation of the original parts and no whole meaning will be generated. Therefore, grammarian says that since meaning is a single or unitary whole so also its generating condition must likewise be a whole. On this assumption the *sphoṭa*-theory is advanced. The separate utterances of a word or words of the sentence merely manifest the *sphoṭa* or the meaning-whole.

Thus, the *sphoṭa* which is manifested through the articulate sounds, according to Bharṭṛhari, has undergone different interpretations in the works of the opponents. The statements having phonetic or distinctive level of language in Bharṭṛhari's work are metamorphosed into semantic level in their works. This metamorphosis is due to the varying nature of the term *śabda*. Therefore, there is a need to discuss Bharṭṛhari's views on *śabda*, that is in the next section.

8.

The term *śabda* is used in different contexts in order to represent different aspects of a word. But *śabda* is essentially a two sided entity. It is related to the sound aspect and the meaning aspect. One side of it represents 'sound' and the other, the content of speech unit. It is indicated by Bharṭṛhari. When he says that 'just as a reflection formed elsewhere (i.e., in water) appears, due to the activities of the water, to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the Word and the speech-sound (1.49). The sounds which the speaker utters manifest meaning conveyer speech unit. It is indivisible and sequencesless. It also absorbs the reflection of the object.

When a word is used to refer to a thing meant, the word reveals the thing meant and at the same time reveals its own form. For instance, when the word '*agni*' is uttered it refers to the thing meant fire as well as the phonetic form *a-g-n-i* after which the suffix *dhak* has been prescribed (Pāṇini 4.2.33). Similarly, the term *vṛddhi*, when uttered, conveys its own form, and also stands for grammatical technical meaning, namely *āt* and *aic* etc. So when the words '*agni*' and *vṛddhi* stand for their own form, they are known as *samjñā* and when both the terms stand for the thing meant they are known as *samjñin* the object to which the designation is given.

The two sidedness of the word is analysed from the linguistic point of view. Every linguistic expression has two levels, i.e. phonetic and semantic. This phonetic level is the external aspect of the word. This is produced by the vocal organs in the form of sound-pattern known as *prākṛtadhvani* (primary sound). This *prākṛtadhvani* has time sequence. Raja thinks that the sound-pattern is one side of the word whose other side is *sphoṭa*. Here, Raja identifies *dhvani* (*prākṛta*) with the sound pattern which manifests *sphoṭa* (2000 116-117). But, according to Joshi, the sound-pattern is different from the phonemic-pattern of the sound which remains the same in all different modes of utterances, that is identical with *sphoṭa* (1967 20).

The internal *śabda* which is the mental equivalent of an articulate sound conveys meaning and it is called *sphoṭa*. It is an internal linguistic symbol. Both Iyer and Raja hold the same view with regard to the twin aspect of *śabda* (word). What K. A. S. Iyer refers by 'sound', Raja explains it as sound-pattern. But both believe that the meaningful aspect of the word is *sphoṭa*.

9.

The twin aspects of the word remain in the intellect in an undifferentiated state. Bhartrhari discusses this proposition in *kārikā*-s (45-47, 53, 84 and 90) of first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*. Just as a full grown peacock remains in the egg in potential stage contracting its peculiarities, similarly the twin manifestation of the word is essentially one in unmanifested form. The unified word is revealed through a series of sounds. The process of emergence of the word has been compared with the painter's vision before he paints a picture. At first he has a vague idea of the picture. In this stage, parts of the picture are differentiated. Then he has a mental vision of the whole picture. After that he paints it part by part. Similarly, the hearer perceives the word differentiated when the last sound in the series is heard. The *sphoṭa* is cognised progressively by the perception of each sound. The cognition of series of sounds finally leads to the full perception of the word:

yathaikabuddhiviṣayā mūrtir ākriyate paṭe |

mūrtiyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabde 'pi dṛśyate || (Bhartrhari 1.52)

K. A. S. Iyer thinks that *sphoṭa* is identical with the word in its meaning bearing capacity which is taken as a unity (1969 157). Kaiyyaṭa interprets Patañjali's definition of *śabda* in the light of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. He holds that *sphoṭa* is sometimes known by the term *śabda* (Bhartrhari 1.77), *pada* and *vākya*. All of them stand for meaning bearing unit (Bhartrhari 1.88). The *vṛtti* possesses the same view:

varṇapadavākyaaviṣayāḥ prayatnaviśeṣadhyā dhvanayo
varṇapadavākyaākhyān sphoṭān punaḥ punar āvirbhāvayanto
buddhisvadyāropayanti. (vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.82)

The concept of *sphoṭa* emerges as a solution to the problem as to how meaning comes from the articulated sounds. The sounds uttered by the speaker manifest *sphoṭa* which conveys meaning.

10.

K. A. S. Iyer's attempt to identify *śabda* with *sphoṭa* appears to be incongruous. Bhartrhari has used the term *śabda* in different senses. In one case only, amongst all of them, does the term *śabda* bear the traits of *sphoṭa*.

(i) In some cases the term *śabda* represents the ultimate reality (Bhartrhari 1.1-2).

(ii) Again in other cases the term is used to denote meaning conveying unit. The *śabda* stands for the conceptual word which remains in the intellect, i.e. *buddhistha śabda* (Bhartrhari 1.46, 47, 53 and 84). In this capacity *śabda* is an undivided single speech unit (*eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusamḥṛtiḥ* - Bhartrhari 2.1). It is used to communicate sentence that cannot be broken into smaller linguistic units so far as its meaning conveying aspect is concerned. The term *śabda*, here, represents the significative or meaning bearing aspect of language.

(iii) In some other contexts again Bhartrhari has used the term *śabda* to represent distinctive aspect of language. Here, *śabda* stands for auditorily grasped sound by a listener (Bhartrhari 1.44, 55 and 58). The *śabda*, which is auditorily perceived, may be identified with *sphoṭa* but not in all respects as Iyer thinks. The term *śabda* is a two sided entity. One side of it represents phonemic sound-pattern which may be identical with *sphoṭa* whereas, the other side represents the meaning.

Thus, we have two different phrases: *dhvani śabda* (sound word) and *arthasampratyaśabda* (meaning-conveying word). *Sphoṭa* is related to *dhvani* but not necessarily of the communicative aspect of language. The *sphoṭa* represents a class of universal sounds where as *dhvani* represents a particular sound. The relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* is that of manifest and manifested (*vyarigyavyañjaka bhāva*).

11.

On the basis of modern linguistic findings, Brough has given a strikingly new interpretation to the *sphoṭa* concept of Bhartrhari eliminating altogether

Śabdabrahman. He also thinks that the term *śabda* is mistranslated as sound. The study appears in "Theories of General Linguistics in Sanskrit Grammarians".

Brough claims that Bhartrhari describes language in its three aspects, i.e. *prākṛtadhvani*, *vaikṛtadhvani* and *sphoṭa*. The *prākṛtadhvani* is a stage before the articulated sound comes into existence. It is associated with temporal distinction. It represents the phonological structure, or the sound pattern. It may also represent class sounds of which individual sounds are members. The *vaikṛtadhvani* is a sound of individual instance, which is actually spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. It includes all sorts of differentiations in the speed of utterance. The *sphoṭa*-aspect of language is an integral linguistic symbol. It conveys meaning, though, it can neither be pronounced nor written, only we can name it as *sphoṭa* (1951 40).

Though, Brough emphasises that the *sphoṭa* of Bhartrhari deals with the description of the semantic aspect of language, his stand is different from that of Iyer. Iyer (as in his *Bhartrhari*) believes that when the speaker utters sounds the *sphoṭa* is revealed which conveys meaning (1969 159). But, according to Brough, *sphoṭa* is a symbol of meaningful segment of the word. He holds that a word, as a collection of phonemes in particular order, cannot express meaning because the sounds have no function to connect themselves with the meaning (1951 33-38). Therefore, to represent a meaning bearing aspect of language a separate entity is required which should not be identified with the group of sounds. This entity, which is manifested by the group of sounds, conveys meaning. This is *sphoṭa*. When one utters sounds by the articulatory organs the sounds fade away leaving a conceptual entity as a whole which is single and indivisible. Raja has been greatly influenced by Brough's interpretation. He concentrates on the *sphoṭa* aspect of the word which has further two aspects, namely significant (that which means) and signifie (that which is meant). These two aspects are dependent on each other. Among these two aspects of *sphoṭa* the significant one represents the phonematic pattern (acoustic image or physical entity or auditory image or *la-langue*). This acoustic image or phonematic pattern of the sounds is the conceptual entity of the actual uttered sounds (2000 122). S. D. Joshi justifies this 'acoustic image' as *sphoṭa* itself. This term is borrowed from De Saussure. The term 'signifie' represents the idea or the 'meaning'. Thus both the 'acoustic image' and the idea constitute the superstructure of *sphoṭa* collectively.

But Raja is not fully satisfied treating *sphoṭa* as a sign. He adds that the *sphoṭa* is somewhat different from the sign. It is a timeless, indivisible meaning-bearing symbol. The features of the sound are super-imposed upon the *sphoṭa* because of our inability to distinguish between sound and symbol (2000 123).

12.

Various scholars have attempted to define the term *sphoṭa*. Thus, according to G. Sastri, the original conception of *logos* best conveys the meaning of *sphoṭa*. In his *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, he states that the concept that *logos* stands for an idea as well as a word wonderfully approximates to the concept of *sphoṭa* (102-103). In *The Principal Upaniṣads*, Radhakrishnan sees *sphoṭa* as an indivisible idea with its dual form of *śabda* and *artha* (674). T. Manickam finds *sphoṭa* as an inner perception which being a unitary principle links the subjective realms of cognition (1982 102). Along with Greek conception of *logos* Coward finds the Platonic notion of the innate idea also as approximately to *sphoṭa* (1976 450). Sometimes the word 'symbol' is used to denote the technical term *sphoṭa*. As K. Raja suggests the term symbol seems to be more ambiguous and *sphoṭa* should be understood more in the sense of a linguistic sign (2000 97). All these views point to one and the same *sphoṭa*, a latent unitary medium which forms the content of all words. Although, Bharṭṛhari follows the tradition of the Grammarians' School, he develops the *sphoṭa* doctrine probably against the background of the Mīmāṃsākā-s, since Vedā-s are eternal the words of which they are composed also have to be eternal. In opposition to this theory of eternalness of the words, Bharṭṛhari holds that it is the meaning rather than the word that is eternal. All words in his view ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman which he calls *śabdātattva*. In order to make clear this truth he established the concept of *sphoṭa*, which looks for a more philosophical and transcendental grasp of the depth level of the Vedic revelation.

Bharṭṛhari¹ presents his theory of *sphoṭa* as a solution to the traditional problem of meaning. Hence, in Bharṭṛhari's view, a word consisting of letters and syllables cannot directly convey its significance. A word or a sentence is to be considered not as a concatenation made up of different sound units arranged in a

particular order, but mainly as a single meaningful symbol. According to him there is an eternal element called *sphoṭa* corresponding to each word that underlies the constituent letters and has no component parts. It is this unitary, unchanging *sphoṭa* latent in the word, which, being evoked as the letters and syllables are successively uttered or heard, produces the cognition of its meaning.

Chapter 4

Conditions and Contexts of Meaning

"Hey, man! Please call me a taxi." said the fat man at the coffee place.
 "Okay," said the doorman, "You're a taxi, but you look more like a truck to me." (*thecoffeeplace.com*)

In the context of this conversation, it is possible to derive more than one meaning for the statement "Please call me a taxi." In this humorous joke, the purpose of the doorman is not to disobey the fat man but to make a fun by exploiting an important feature of language, i.e. "understanding the concept of meaning from the hearer's stand point" (Patnaik 78). The above mentioned statement is also an appropriate example to show the importance of the holists' theory of sentential-meaning (*vākyārthavāda*) who are against the word-meaning theory of the constructionists (*padārthavādin-s*) because to interpret sentential-meaning only on the basis of word-meaning (*padārtha*) cannot be helpful to accomplish the communication. The sentential meaning derived by doorman is based on the constructionists' theory of sentential meaning (*padārthavāda*) and not on the holists' theory of sentential-meaning (*vākyārthavāda*). Therefore, in the above mentioned statement, we face the problem of meaning. This debate between the constructionists and the holists as addressed by Bhartrhari in his *Vākyapadīya* is analyzed in this chapter.

Due to the problem in the understanding of meaning (or communication) situations in our day-to-day life become more problematic when we come to determine what truth is. Such situations are artistically exploited in literary compositions from the very ancient times. For instance, it is very well employed in the great epic *Mahābhārata*. In *Mahābhārata*, on the 15th day of the Mahābhārata-war, Kṛṣṇa asks Yudhiṣṭhira to proclaim that Droṇa's son Aśwathāmā has died, so that the invincible and destructive Kurū commander would give up his arms and thus

could be killed. Bhīma proceeds to kill an elephant named Aśwathāmā, and loudly proclaims that Aśwathāmā is dead. Droṇa knows that only Yudhiṣṭhira with his firm adherence to the truth could tell him for sure if his son had died. When Droṇa approaches Yudhiṣṭhira to seek to confirm this, Yudhiṣṭhira tells him that *Aśwathāmā is dead...*, then, *the elephant*, but this last part is made inaudible by the sound of trumpets and conchshells being sounded as if in triumph, on Kṛṣṇa's instruction. Yudhiṣṭhira cannot make himself tell a lie, despite the fact that if Droṇa continued to fight, the Pāṇḍavas and the cause of *dharma* itself would lose. When he speaks his half-lie, Yudhiṣṭhira's feet and chariot descend to the ground momentarily. Droṇa is disheartened, and lays down his weapons. He is then killed by Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna.

Multiple meaning of a sentence during communication raises too many questions. How does a single statement become a source of multiple meaning? Is there no control of determining a meaning of a word? Can we 'derive any meaning that is preferred by us? If it is not so, what are the conditions and contexts of meaning? These are so fundamental questions in the field of semantics that Sanskrit scholars have tried to solve from the ancient times in India:

One of the most remarkable features of Indian way of looking at language is that all the systems of thought conceive language as communicative. The other important feature is, understanding the concept of meaning from the hearer's stand point. ... They undertake to examine the different shades of meaning which the hearer encounters, such as literal meaning, intended meaning, contextual meaning, metaphorical meaning, suggestive meaning etc. They also undertake to examine certain common linguistic features such as the use of homonyms, synonyms and ambiguous words. And they also offer clues for discerning the meaning of ambiguous words. (Patnaik 78)

This chapter is divided into the four sections. In the first section, the meaning of *meaning* is discussed as it relates to Bhartr̥hari's discourse on *meaning*, which itself is a theoretical response to the popular theories of meaning of his time that he incorporates in order to establish his theory of sentential meaning, i.e. *pratibhā-vākyārtha*. In the production and reception of speech, *pratibhā-vākyārtha*, which is 'the expressed' meaning, is presented as the most important aspect after the *sphoṭa*, and discussed in the last chapter as 'the expresser.' In the second section, the plurality of meaning which poses problems in the interpretation of communication will be taken up along with the causes of such plurality. The third section is based on the conditions and contexts which are for determination of primary, secondary/intended

and non-intended meanings. In the last section of this chapter, there is an attempt to interpret and reread *The Waste Land* of T.S. Eliot which is one of the representative poems of the modern European literature within the framework of his theory of the conditions and contexts of meaning.

1.

One of the chief objectives of Bhartr̥hari's philosophy of language is to explain communication, especially as it is accomplished by sentential meaning, i.e. *vākyārtha*. As discussed in the last chapter, Bhartr̥hari takes the sentence as the inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing unit of communication. Therefore, Bhartr̥hari is a sentential holist and has established the theory of sentential meaning as an indivisible unit, i.e. *pratibhā* (indivisible flash), by refuting the constructionists' theory. By constructionists, we mean those who deny the independent being of sentence and who try to interpret sentential meaning only on the basis of word-meanings, i.e. *padārthas*. In *Vākyapadīya*, five types of constructionists' theories of sentential meaning have been critically examined by Bhartr̥hari and his commentators. Bhartr̥hari has proved these theories to be insufficient in explaining sentential meaning as it figures in the mind through language. These five types of constructionists' theories are discussed by Puṇyarāja in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya*. These theories are: (1) *Sansarga* (relation of word-meanings) (2) *Nirākāṅkṣa padārtha* (word-meanings reposed for fulfilling expectancy for the completion of a sense) (3) *Prayojana* (intention) (4) *Sansr̥ṣṭa* (mutually related word-meaning) and (5) *Kriyā* (word-meaning causing an imperative 'to do or not to do', i.e. a certain action):

saṁsarge, sansargavaśādvṛtseṣā vasthite padārthe ca vākyārthe'bhīhitān vayah. sansr̥ṣṭe kriyāyām cānvitābhīdhānam. ... prayojane tvabhīhitānvaya eva. pratibhāyām tvaikarasaiva pratipattiriti na tatra kācid abhīhitānvayānvitābhīdhāna carcā. (Puṇyarāja on 2.1-2)

Puṇyarāja broadly categorized these theories of the constructionists in two groups: (1) *abhīhitānvayavāda* (expression precedes relations) and (2) *anvitābhīdhānavāda* (relation precedes expression). *Sansarga*, *nirākāṅkṣa padārtha* and *prayojana* theories are based on describing sentential meaning by assuming

'expression precedes relation', i.e. *abhihitānvayavāda*, while the latter two (*sansrṣṭa* and *kriyā*) believe in 'relation precedes expression', i.e. *anvitābhidhānavāda*. Bhartrhari refutes these constructionists' theories. He says that there is no part in meaning because meaning is an indivisible unity and awareness in nature. For him, meaning is not a syntactical but semantic unit of the nature of awareness:

*śabdasya na vibhāgo 'sti kuto 'rthasya bhaviṣyati |
vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedam avidvān pratipadyate || (2.13)*

Bhartrhari propounds a unique theory of sentence-meaning, which, in his own terminology, is *pratibhā-vākyārtha*. *Pratibhā* (the flash/ revelation of meaning in the mind) is not constructed. It is given universally and is revealed non-differently by language in the mind. There are three different concepts of sentential meaning. These are *abhihitānvayavāda*, *anvitābhidhānavāda* and *akhaṇḍavākyārthavāda*, i.e. Bhartrhari's *pratibhā-vākyārtha*.

Here, it is necessary to mention that a theorist's interpretation of a concept is inevitably related with his assumption regarding convention. It can undoubtedly be said that the differences of looking at sentential meaning differently are also based on the differences in the assumptions regarding convention. As far as Bhartrhari is concerned, convention is neither the meaning of a word or a sentence, nor does it produce the meaning of a word or a sentence. For Bhartrhari, meaning is always a meaning of language, which is naturally fit for conveying a number of meanings (*sarve sarvātha vācakāḥ*). For example, in the very opening of this chapter, a sentence is given "please call me a taxi" whose meaning cannot be derived with the help of convention in the context of the joke. Therefore, it is true that meaning is always the product of language. Bhartrhari says that convention of the use of words for a certain meaning only specifies the use of the words, or it delimits a meaning out of different meanings conveyed by a word in a sentence. Convention functions as a regulative or a restrainer to the fitness of the word to a certain meaning, but the meaning, in every case, is the meaning of a word or a sentence itself. The observation of the uses of an expression specifies only the meaning conveyed popularly or unpopularly by it. In other words, convention specifies that the expression or the words in the expression retain the popular/unpopular meaning, out of the various meanings likely to be expressed by that word or expression. Thus, for

Bhartrhari, convention is instrumental in restraining the fitness of the word on the basis of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word.

We find that the differences among *abhihitānvayavādin-s*, *anvitābhidānavādin-s* and *akhaḍavākyaṛthavādin-s* are essentially embedded in their different views regarding convention. For *abhihitānvayavādin-s*, what a baby observes as a unit of meaning in the utterance of an elder is a word, and, hence, they accept words as independent units. On the basis of word as the primary unit, they explain sentence and sentential meaning as outcome of an association of the words and word-meanings respectively. *Anvitābhidānavādin-s*, though they also assume word as the primary meaning-conveying unit, accept convention with sentential-meaning. They do not believe in the independent existence of the sentence as a meaning-conveying unit. Sentential meaning for them is not the meaning of a sentence, but of words conveying naturally related word-meanings. There is no need to accept sentence for explaining sentential meaning:

*ṣarvabhedānugūṇyaṃ tu sāmānyam apare viduḥ |
tad arthāntarasaṃsargād bhajate bhedarūpatām || (2.44)*

For grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇas*), communication is accomplished neither by one-to-one putting together of word meanings, nor by mutually related word-meanings. But in the accomplishment of communication, *sphoṭa*, the meaning revealed by it (*pratibhā-vākyaṛtha*), relation between the word and its meaning, and convention are essential elements. Before a discussion on awareness or flash of meaning that figures in the mind once speech is uttered or heard (*pratibhā-vākyaṛtha*), it is important to have an analysis and evaluation of the different Indian constructionist theories of sentential meaning as discussed by Bhartrhari and his commentators.

Firstly, we take up the theory of expression precedes relation, i.e. *abhihitānvayavāda*. For a group of Mīmāṃsaka-s and Naiyāyika-s who consider word (*pada*) as a meaning-conveying unit, sentential meaning is nothing but an association of meaning of words expressed in a syntactical structure. For them, first, the words express their independent meaning and, then, by expectancy, proximity and compatibility the word-meanings are associated, and they call that association sentential meaning. These theorists do not accept sentence and sentential meaning

as an independent unit of communication. They distinguish sentential meaning (*vākyārtha*) from expressive meaning (*vācyārtha*). Expressive meaning, for them, is the meaning of words because words are the only expressive units.

Association of word-meanings as sentential meaning (*sansargavākyārtha*) is a known form of *abhihitānvayavāda* frequently referred to by Bharṭṛhari in the context of interpreting rival theories on sentential meaning (*vākyārtha*). According to *sansargavādin's* interpretation, the meaning expressed by words (in an expression) is cognized first and, then, such known word-meanings are connected together by expectancy, etc. This connection or association of word-meanings (*sansarg padārtha-s*) is sentential meaning. In other words, the words independently express universals and when these universals are associated in memory, sentential meaning, which is individual (over and above the meaning of words), is cognized and is known as one emerges out of association. In *Vākyapadīya*, the concept of the meaning of the sentence according to the theory of the *abhihitānvayavādin-s* is stated:

*kevalena padenārtho yāvān evābhidhīyate |
vākyasthaṃ tāvato 'rthasya tad āhur abhidhāyakam ||
saṃbandhe sati yat tv anyad ādhikyam upajāyate |
vākyārtam eva taṃ prāhur anekapadasaṃśrayam || (2.41-42)*

For example, the meaning expressed by the word *vīraḥ* is 'brave', a universal quality, and that by the word *puruṣaḥ* is man, a universal noun (*puruṣattva*). However, when these words are expressed in a particular form, the two concepts, *vīraḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* are connected as qualifier-qualified for an individual meaning 'a brave man', which stands as a common base of the meanings of the words *vīraḥ* and *puruṣaḥ*. For this theory, the word disappears after expressing their independent meaning, but their meanings, as resurrected in memory, are associated, and this association is the sentential meaning. The expressive meanings¹ according to this theory are the meanings of words and it is not the relation of words but the association of word-meanings (*padārtha-s*) by expectancy, etc., that is called sentential meaning (*sansargārtha*).

Bharṭṛhari also refers to *nirākāṅkṣapadārtha vākyārtha* (word-meaning fulfilling expectancy for completion of a unit meaning as sentential meaning) as one of the forms of constructionists' theories. In this theory, sentential meaning (*vākyārtha*) is the word-meaning (*padārtha*) satisfying expectancy involved in the

cognition of a complete meaning unit. The word-meanings, if qualified by other meanings, are reposed for an individual meaning when, by expectancy, it is connected with the meanings of other words of the expression. This reposed word-meaning is sentential meaning. For instance, the words *rāmaḥ* and *gacchati* in the expression *rāmaḥ gacchati* (Rama goes) express their own meanings (universal) first and then, by expectancy a connected meaning; the universal is reposed for an individual meaning. The meaning reposed for a culminated meaning is sentential meaning (*viśeṣaviśrāntārtha*). A number of actions may be expected from the agent (*rāmaḥ*), but, when connected with the action *gacchati*, the expectancy for other actions or aspects is removed. Similarly, any agent expects the action *gacchati* but when connected with the agent *rāmaḥ*, the expectancy for any other agent except *rāmaḥ*, is removed. Thus, the word-meaning that removes expectancy for a complete meaning is sentential meaning.

In *prayojanavākyārtha*, i.e. purport or intention as sentential meaning (another form of *abhihitānvayavāda*), word-meaning (*padārtha*) is expressive meaning, and the meaning of a sentence is the purpose involved in the use of the words:

abhidheyaḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ prayojanam |
yasya tasya na sambandho vākyānām upapadyate || (Bhartrhari 2.113)

The concept of purport or intention as sentential meaning can be clearly understood with reference to the famous expression *gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*. The expressive meaning of the word *gangāyām* is 'on the river Ganges,' and the meaning of the word *ghoṣaḥ* is 'residence'. The expressive meanings of the words are cognized first. As a 'stream of water' cannot be the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) of the residence of a family, the purport of the expression reveals the meaning of the word *gangāyām* connected with *ghoṣaḥ* as the 'residence on the bank of the stream of water (*gangātaṭe*).' Thus, for this theory, the intention of the speaker involved in using the words is the sentential meaning, which is known neither by expectancy nor by inference, but by the purpose involved in the use of the expression.

In this way, we find that all the forms of *abhihitānvayavāda*, which have been discussed above, admit, in some way or the other, that sentential meaning is not an expressed one. Expressed meaning, for *sansargavādin*-s, is the association of word-

meaning; for *nirākāṅkṣapadārthavākyārthavādin-s*, it is the reposed meaning of words that satiate expectancy for an individual meaning; and, for *prayojanavādin-s*, it is the purpose lying in using the expression (words) and is known by secondary force or by inference. They are all grouped as *abhihitānvayavāda* because they, in general, accept that words are independent expressers and their expressed (meanings) are known first, and then the words are associated for a particular meaning. Thus, all forms of *abhihitānvayavāda* believe in the principle that 'expression precedes relation.'

On the basis of this discussion, *abhihitānvayavāda* seems right from the aspect of teaching language to a child. A sentence is taught as a construction by a set of words used in a syntactical order, and so a sentential meaning is an outcome of an association of different word-meanings related as a qualifier-qualified. However, this stand becomes indefensible, if observed from the point of view of convention and accomplishment of communication by language. Convention is communication-oriented and communication is accomplished by the sentence as a whole unit without a separate awareness of parts, letters, words, etc. As a complete unit of communication, it is sentential meaning which is known independent of the meaning of the words. As *abhihitānvayavādin-s* accept word as an independent unit of language, their theory goes against convention and cognition by *sphoṭa*.

Like *abhihitānvayavāda*, second theory of constructionists, i.e. *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, also assumes word as an independent unit as expresser of meaning, but unlike them, this theory presumes that a word does not express a discrete meaning of its own, but a related word-meaning. In this theory, it is held that although words have their own independent meanings, yet when they are used for communication, they express a related meaning, which for them is sentential meaning. There are two forms of *anvitābhīdhānavāda*. These are *sansṛṣṭavākyārtha* (mutually related word-meanings) and *kriyāvākyārtha* (action/imperative 'to do or not to do').

According to the first form, i.e. *sansṛṣṭavākyārtha*, an expression is always an expression of mutually related meanings and is defined by the theorists as the beginning-word (*ādyapadam*), which is the primary or central word of a set of words used in a syntactical rule. The beginning-word conveys the given association of

word-meanings and this connected meaning, conveyed by that beginning-word, is defined by their theories as sentential meaning. The beginning-word expresses connected meaning (*vākyārtha*) and, hence, sentential meaning is expressed meaning of the beginning-word:

*viśeśāśabdāḥ keṣāṃ cit sāmānyapratirūpakāḥ |
śabdāntarābhisambandhād vyajyante pratipatṛṣu || (2.17)*

For example, the speaker speaks the primary or central word 'door' out of a set of words for the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' and the listener cognizes the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' only by the word spoken ('door'). This shows that the speaker speaks the word conveying a related meaning and listener understands the same if s/he hears the words. Even if the speaker speaks the complete sentence *dvārampidheri* ('shut the door'), the hearer knows the whole meaning ('shut the door') only by the word *dvāram* (door) because the beginning word *dvāram*, being the central word of the expression, expresses a qualified meaning, i.e. sentential meaning:

*yadyekenapadena sakalavākyārthasyā śeṣaviśeṣaṇakhacitasyāvagatiḥ
tadottareṣāṃ padānām niyamāyānuvādāya voccaraṇamsyāt. (Puṅyarāja on
2.18)*

In the second form of *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, i.e. *kriyāvākyārtha* (action/imperative), an action is the sentential meaning. This meaning is expressed by the verb (*ākhyāta*). As action is expressed by the verb, the exponents of this form define the verb as sentence and action expressed by it as sentential meaning. An action is a specified meaning because the verb expressive of action also expresses an agent (because no action without an agent is possible), an object (because action is inevitably associated by an accusation), time (an action takes place in a time on the basis of which present, past and future of the action is known), number (the action performed is specified as singular, plural, etc.) and a person (on the basis of which the person of the action is known). As the verb expresses a connected denotation or qualified meaning, *anvitābhīdhānavādin*-s take it as expresser of sentential meaning:

*ākhyātaśabde niyataṃ sādhanam yatra gamyate |
tad apy ekaṃ samāptārtham vākyam ity abhīdhīyate || (Bhartṛhari 2.326)*

For example, in the expression *rāmaḥ taṇḍulam pacati* ('Rama cooks rice'), the verb *pacati* itself expresses the connected meaning (of the other words – *rāmaḥ*, i.e. agent and *taṇḍulam*, i.e. object). Words other than the verb are only instrumental in the ascertainment of the related meanings already expressed by the verb and their meaning being related with the action are also known by the application of the verb alone:

kriyā vinā prayogeṇa na dṛṣṭā śabdacoditā |
prayogastvanuniṣpādī śabdārtha iti manyate || (Bhartṛhari 2.124)

After discussing the forms of *abihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, it can be said that while *abihitānvayavādin*s lay down primary importance on the independent meaning of isolated words and assume sentential meaning as a secondary signification emerging out of the association of independent word-meanings, *anvitābhīdhānavādin*-s emphasize sentential meaning as having the primary importance and explain words expressive of connected meaning. It can be accounted for the merits of *anvitābhīdhānavādin*-s that sentential meaning, for them, is the expressive meaning and that communication is accomplished by it. However, the method by which they explain sentential meaning opens the door for many logical and cognitive problems. For example, the assumption of *sansṛṣṭavākyaṛthavādin*-s that the beginning word expresses the meaning of the whole sentence is not justified. In Sanskrit, the words in a sentence are not independent, and if their order is changed, it changes neither the sentence nor the sentential meaning. It is difficult to determine not only the beginning word, but also the word expressive of the connected meaning. For instance, '*rāmaḥ gṛham gacchati*', '*gacchati rāmaḥ gṛham*' and '*gṛham gacchati rāmaḥ*' are the same sentence, but from the point of view of the beginning word as sentence, they should be different sentences which are conveying different meanings. Another problem is that if the notion 'the beginning word expresses sentential meaning' is accepted, other words of the sentence will be useless and it can be questioned: what is the need of the other words if the whole meaning is expressed only by the first word spoken (Tiwari 193-194)?

Thus, we find that these theories (*abihitānvayavād* and *anvitābhīdhānavād*) aim at explaining sentential meaning by assuming words as expressive of mutually

connected meaning and centre their arguments around showing how the words express a qualified meaning, i.e. sentential meaning (*vācyārtha*). Those who believe in the theory of 'expression precedes relation' assume that word-meaning is qualified with association by factors like expectancy, proximity, compatibility, etc. but those believing in the theory of 'relation precedes expression' seem contented with assuming words as expressive of mutually connected denotation. Now, we take up the third theory of sentential meaning that is *pratibhā-vākyārtha*. It is based on the grammarians' views.

We have discussed in the last chapter that the *sphoṭa* is the expresser. The existence of the 'expresser' may be questioned if an 'expressed' (meaning) is not present. What is an 'expressed'? For grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*-s), a sentence is an inner, indivisible and a real unit of awareness in nature, i.e. *sphoṭa* and an expressed (sentential meaning) is that which *sphoṭa* reveals non-differently. A flash of awareness in the mind, for which Bhartr̥hari uses the word *pratibhā*, is sentential meaning. Thus, *sphoṭa*, for Bhartr̥hari, is real language; it is a distinct flash of awareness (*sampratyaya*-idea), which is *pratibhā*, which is indivisible, and is non-different from the expresser who reveals it:

*vaiyākaraṇasyākhaṇḍa evaiko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭalakṣaṇo vākyam
pratibhaiva vākyārthaḥ.* (Puṇyārāja on 2.1-2)

Pratibhā as the general meaning of all sentences or even words (if complete meaning is revealed by words) is cognition or awareness and non-different from *sphoṭa*. It is only from the sense of duality that *sphoṭa* is called the expresser from the point of view of language, and *pratibhā* is called the expressed from the point of view of meaning. But, both figure in the mind non-differently and indivisibly. *Pratibhā* can not be perceived by senses. Therefore, it, in-itself, can be said neither as 'this' nor, as 'that' by indication. However, it (being awareness in itself) cannot be denied only on the ground of its imperceptibility. As a flash or awareness revealed by *sphoṭa* in mind, it is veridical cognition. Even a rejection of it requires *pratibhā*, as a veridical cognition of that. It is self-proved. *Pratibhā* (as a sentential meaning) is always known as being or idea revealed by language.

It is already said in this chapter that *sphoṭa*, the meaning revealed by it (*pratibhā-vākyārtha*), relation between the word and its meaning, and convention are

essential elements in the accomplishment of communication. Now, the question that needs to be addressed is if *pratibhā* and *sphoṭa* as units of awareness are given in the mind, what is the need of convention? Convention plays a very important role in the cognition by language in ordinary communication. Although *sphoṭa*, *pratibhā* and even the relation between the two, for grammarians, are given, yet communication needs convention, or else, it cannot be accomplished. Convention does not produce meaning. A word being potency is fit for expressing all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) and it is convention that specifies the use of the word to a specific or fixed meaning. Thus, convention is a delimiting factor of relation. It delimits the use out of various meanings expressed by language. Convention functions as a restraining and not as a foundational factor, because the meaning-revealing unit is always the *sphoṭa*. It is through verbal utterances, symbols, signs, marks, etc. that convention is established.

In this way, *pratibhā* is taken as a complete unitary meaning revealed by *sphoṭa*. It is obvious that throughout the discussion on *pratibhā* as a complete unitary meaning or flash of awareness, we have always kept the accomplishment of communication in view and have come to the conclusion that meaning is cognized in ordinary communication (*vyavahāra*) as a flash of awareness. If meaning is an idea or thought-object revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*, it is right to use the term *pratibhā* and accept the existence of meaning as being revealed or figured in the mind by language. It also seems right to say that the cognition of meaning as *pratibhā* figured in the mind by a sentence is always veridical, a unitary or complete and clear, distinct and revealed awareness.

As a philosopher Bhartṛhari has a goal for explaining the activities of all living creatures as expressed by language. His explanations are based on this point that it is the *sphoṭa* (the expresser) which can only reveal meaning (the expressed), i.e. *pratibhā*. It is another thing that *pratibhā* may be revealed through the verbal utterances or the impressions of past lives (as we find in the cases of babies) or directly (as in cases of *yogin-s*). However, in all the cases, it is revealed by *śabda* (*sphoṭa*).

Apart from flashes revealed in communication and the cognition of babies, there are six other types of flashes. These are: (1) *Svabhāva* (as it is revealed in

animals and birds by their very nature). 2) *Caraṇa* (as it is revealed in persons realizing their well-being by constant moral practices). (3) *Yoganimittapratibhā* (as it is revealed to the *yogin*-s without any medium). (4) *Viśiṣṭopahitapratibhā* (as it is revealed when handed down to one by the person having gifted wisdom). (5) *Abhyāsanimittapratibhā* (as it is revealed in a person by the practices inherited from his parents). (6) *Adṛṣṭapratibhā* (as it is revealed to one by his *adṛṣṭa*, i.e. the impression of the merits of previous lives).

In this way, Bhartr̥hari finds himself in a position to explain not only the cognition revealed by language in an act of in communication and the cognition of *yogin*-s revealed directly by *sphoṭa* in their minds, without a mediation of language as communication, but also the activities of birds, insects, jewel-smiths, and extraordinary activities performed by gifted persons. He strongly accepts that all cognition is cognition by *sphoṭa*. This *sphoṭa* is present in all living creatures. He propounds that the world of cognition is the world of flashes figuring in the mind. It is *pratibhā*, which in all creatures, serves as the cause of the incentive to all sorts of action (*pratibhāmayam ayam viśvum*).

Thus, for Bhartr̥hari, sentential meaning is *pratibhā-vākyārtha* (awareness or flash that figures in the mind by language). The linguistic communication is possible when the expression is indivisible. Through the sentence the worldly communication takes place. According to Bhartr̥hari the concept of indivisibility refers to the unitary character of meaningful speech units. These speech units cannot be further subdivided into smaller meaningful units. The division of a sentence into phonemes, stems, roots and suffixes is considered to be fictitious from the point of communication. But for the grammatical use only a sentence structure can be assumed to have constituent parts, and these parts, therefore, cannot be utilized for the purpose of communication. Bhartr̥hari has this notion of indivisibility when he states that there are no phonemes in the word, and no words in the sentence:

*pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca |
vākyāt padānām atyantam pravibhāgo na kaś cana || (1.73)*

So far as the communication of meaning is concerned the whole expression is taken as a single indivisible unit. The phrases, i.e. *eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ* (the one

indivisible word), *jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī* (the universal inhering in the collection of words) and *kramo buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ* (the unification of mind) support the above mentioned idea of indivisibility:

*ākhyātaṃ śabdasaṃghāto jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī |
eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ ||* (Bhartrhari 2.1)

It means that in a sentence all parts merge themselves to bring out a single entity losing their separate identity. As the sentence is indivisible and without parts, so is its meaning. Bhartrhari has used the term *pratibhā* in order to represent the indivisible sentential meaning. This unified principle of *pratibhā* is for explaining how a hearer understands a sentence or communication. Thus, *pratibhā* is a single semantic unit of integrated language which cannot be further divided into smaller semantic units which is the real *akṣaṇḍavākyaṛtha* of Bhartrhari. It is also clear that the main objective of Bhartrhari's linguistic philosophy of the *sphoṭa* (sentence as the expresser) and *pratibhā* (sentential meaning as the expressed) is to accomplish the communication.

2.

Now, the interpretation of the world of communication (that is the world of language and meaning) may be problematic for us on the basis of the grammarians' *sūtra*-s, *vārttika*-s and *bhāṣya*-s in which it is said that a fixed (*niyata*) word denotes a fixed meaning. According to them, a word is a meaning-revealing, inner and universally given (*nitya* or *siddhā*) language (*sphoṭa*) and the meaning is what is revealed non-differently by it in the mind. The world of language and meaning is a self-restrained world of ideas or thought-objects revealed by language itself. It is a self-restrained being as it is not an outcome of abstraction from external existence, but a being revealed in the mind, by language, independently of external things. The relation between the given language and the meaning is also given in the mind:

*nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ |
sūtrāṇāṃ sānutantrāṇāṃ bhāṣyāṇāṃ ca praṇetṛbhiḥ ||* (Bhartrhari 1.23)

The problem is: how can plurality of meaning of a word be explained if 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' is taken in view? If all meanings are meanings of a word then the question arises – what is the basis of meanings other than the fixed meaning conveyed by the word? It seems apparently contradictory to accept many meanings of the word, if eternity of word-meaning relation is taken into account. The problem of an epistemological justification of many meanings of a word may also not be ignored because of the fact that meaning, for Bhartrhari, is what the word reveals, and the word does not reveal many meanings simultaneously. But, there is no doubt that in all natural languages we come across the problem of varied shades of meaning. Bhartrhari takes this issue and tries to solve the problems arising out of the peculiarities of the linguistic usage. Bhartrhari says that it is the function of grammar (*vākaraṇa*) to interpret all system of thoughts (1.15). Thus, in order to interpret communication, grammarians, by assuming the word and its meaning obtained by grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence as realities, interpret the problems concerning the word and its different meanings. If the word obtained by grammatical analysis of a sentence is accepted as real, there can be two perspectives to observe its meaning: (i) the meaning of a word as an independent meaning-conveying unit; (ii) the meaning of the word in a sentence.

From the perspective of the meaning of a word as an independent unit, a word is an expresser (*vācaka*) of an expressed (*vācya*) that is given, and hence, the fixed or primary (*mukhya*) meaning of a word. The word, separated from the sentence, by grammatical analysis, is considered fit for expressing a fixed (*niyata*) meaning, without any effort, logical implication, recollection and other factors:

*svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate ||
tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā || (Bhartrhari 3.1.6)*

For Bhartrhari, the expressive meaning of a word is universal (the word 'cow' denotes 'cowness'), on the basis of which the meaning of a word from that of other words is distinguished.

A word, used in a sentence, conveys a meaning that varies according to various allegiances and intentions of the users. The various meanings of a word are categorized as *mukhyārtha* (fixed or primary meaning), *gauṇārtha* (intended-meaning) and *nāntariyakārtha* (non-intended but close to the primary meaning).

Bhartrhari's discussion on *mukhyārtha*, *gauṇārtha* and *nāntarīyakārtha* is concerned not only with his explanation of the meaning of a word in a sentence, but also of sentential meaning.

Bhartrhari has discussed the problem of many meanings of a word from the points of view of (1) *śabda-ekatvavādin-s* (who consider the unity or sameness of a word used for different meanings), (2) *śabda-nānātvavādin-s* (who consider the word as different if used for different meanings), and (3) *vaiyākaraṇa-s'* own holistic view that reconciles the above two.

The theory of *śabda-ekatvavāda* is discussed in the second *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*. It is said that this theory accepts the unity or non-difference of the word in spite of its different uses for different meanings. The word is not changed even if it is used for many meanings. The unity of word is original or primary. The separateness of word which is due to the different uses is artificial or unreal:

gotvānuṣaṅgo vāhīke nimittāt kaiś cid iṣyate |
arthamātram viparyastam śabdaḥ svārthe vyavasthitaḥ ||
tathā svarūpam śabdānām sarvārtheṣv anuṣajyate |
arthamātram viparyastam svarūpe tu śrutiḥ sthitā || (255-256)

In *Vākyapadīya*, there is an example in the support of *śabda-ekatvavāda*. According to that, the word 'cow', the expresser of 'cowness', does not differ from the word 'cow' when used for 'cowherd'. The 'cowness' by some similarity is imposed on cowherd and, thus, the word 'cow' secondarily denotes it. According to this view, the same word conveys many meanings by *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra*. In *śabdopacāra*, with the difference of popularity and unpopularity of the use of a word, the same word is taken as the conveyor of different meanings. For example, the word 'cow' is popularly used for 'cow' and un-popularly for 'cowherd' (Bhartrhari 2.250). In *arthopacāra*, the word, in all of its uses, remains the same and only its meaning is treated differently. According to the commentator Puṇyarāja, *arthopacāra* is of two kinds: (1) *svarūpopacāra*, (2) *vāhyārthopacāra*. In both of the kinds, the word remains the same; only its treatment is different. In first kind of *arthopacāra*, the word, in all of its uses, remains the same only its form is treated differently, and, in second kind, its meaning is treated differently.

An explanation of the problem of plurality of a word and meaning from the point of view of *śabda-nānātvavādin-s* shows that they, unlike *śabda-ekatvavādin-s*, assumes the plurality of word if it is used for different meaning:

*ekatvaṃ tu sarūpatvāc chabdayor gauṇamukhyayoḥ ||
prāhur atyantabhede 'pi bheda mārgānudarśinaḥ || (2.257)*

For example, the word *hari* in Sanskrit is used for deities (Viṣṇu, Śiva, Indra etc.), for human person like Bhartṛhari, for animals (lion, monkey, frog, etc.). The word *hari* used for God Viṣṇu is different from the word *hari* used for God Indra and so on. In all uses the word serves as the expresser (*vācaka*) of independent meaning (*vācya*). For this view, the unity of the word, in its several uses, is imagined on account of resemblance and, hence, unreal.

In order to illustrate the significance of this theory, in explaining certain expressions of the Vedas, Bhartṛhari has mentioned an example of *sāmidheni* hymns of which the repeated hymns are considered to be original; they function independently from other *sāmidheni-s* involved in a *sāmidheni* sacrifice:

*sāmidhenyantaraṃ caivam āvṛttāv anuṣajyate |
mantrās ca viniyogena labhante bhedaṃ ūhavat || (2.258)*

From the point of view of grammarians, the plurality of meaning is also taken for explanation. The grammarians presuppose that a complete meaning is expressed by a sentence, which is the indivisible unit of communication, and not by an isolated word. If a complete meaning is revealed by a word, in that case, it also serves as a sentence. Words are acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, and the analyzed words, in grammar, are treated as independent meaning conveying units. A fixed meaning of a word is that which it reveals directly in the mind after the utterances are heard. If the word, analyzed from the sentence point of view, is accepted as a meaningful unit, the meaning that it reveals (may be universal or individual) is distinguished as the primary meaning of a word and others, known consequently by implication, are secondary.

3.

Bhartrhari, on the basis of above-mentioned theories which are helpful to understand the plurality of word and meaning, clarifies the distinction between primary and secondary meaning and discusses the conditions for determination of the intended or secondary-meaning, i.e. *gauṇartha*, and the non-intended meaning, i.e. *nāntarīyakārtha*.

Firstly, we take up the conditions for the determination of secondary or intended meanings (*gauṇartha*) as discussed by Bhartrhari. He discusses them with the help of different theories which were popular at his time. Some of these are given below:

(1) Purpose, Situation-context and Proximity of another Word, i.e. *arthaprakaraṇa śabdāntarasannidhāna*: Bhartrhari, in second *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, presents a theory regarding *gauṇartha*. According to this theory, meaning is decided on the basis of factors like purpose, context of using a word and its association with meanings of other words of a sentence:

*arthaprakaraṇāpekṣo yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha |
yuktaḥ pratyāyaty arthaṃ taṃ gauṇam apare viduḥ || (2.264)*

For example, the meaning of the word 'cow' in the sentence 'cow reads' is known by means of the purpose (of referring a dull and foolish cowherd), situational context (reading) and the proximity of the word with another word (person who reads). Cowherd is known by the efforts made on the basis of the expressed meaning of the word 'cow', and, hence, secondary.

(2) Similarity (*sādṛśya*): It is also in the second *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya* that the expressive meaning of word is primary and the meaning emerged by imposition of primary on other meanings is secondary (*saṃbandhisadṛśād dharmāt taṃ gauṇam apare viduḥ* - 273). For example, the expressive meaning of the word 'cow' is 'cowness', and, hence, primary. On account of some similarity (in dullness etc.) the meaning of the word 'cow', i.e. cowness, is imposed on 'cowherd', which is taken as the secondary meaning of the word 'cow'.

(3) Inversion (*virodha*): In *kārikā* no. 247 of second *kāṇḍa*, it is said that the secondary meaning is revealed by the word on the basis of the reversion of primary meaning:

*viparyāsād ivārthasya yatrārthāntaratām iva |
manyante sa gavādīs tu gauṇa ity ucyate kva cit ||*

For example, the meaning of the word 'great' in the expression 'mercy is not expected from a great man like Shylock', is used in inversion (*viparyāya*) and is considered as a secondary meaning of the word 'great'.

(4) Form and Potency/Action (*rūpa-śakti*): In *kārikās* no. 275, 276 and 277 of the second *kāṇḍa*, it is taken up that the word denotes a fixed form (*rūpa*) and action (*śakti*). The words plough (*hala*), sword (*khaḍga*) and pestle used for clearing rice (*musala*) denote instruments having fixed forms and specific actions using them, but if they are applied for forms and actions different from those for which they are popular, then the meanings, they convey, are considered secondary. For example, the word *khaḍga* in the expression *vanāta bṛhacchṛṅgaḥ khaḍgānīyatām* (bring a sword, a wild animal having horns like sword from the forest) conveys a form and action different from that of the popular denotation (sword) of the word *khaḍga*, and, hence, it is the secondary meaning of the word *khaḍga*.

(5) More or Less Degree of the Properties (*nyūnādhikyabhāva*): Those who accept external objects as the denotation of word consider the sense of more or less of the properties of the object indicated by the word as the basis of distinction between primary and secondary meanings. For example, the word 'cow' if used for cow conveys more degree of the properties of the cow like dullness, voraciousness, carrying of loads, etc., and hence, is primary, and if the word 'cow' is used for cowherd it denotes a lesser degree of those properties, and, hence, is secondary.

(6) Base and Based (*nimitta-nimitti*): The fixed meaning of a word that serves as the base (*nimitta*) of other meanings is primary, and, for the theorists, it is an expressive meaning. The meaning which is understood on the basis of expressive meaning or which is based on it (*nimitti*) is secondary:

*svārthe pravartamāno 'pi yasyārthaṃ yo 'valambate |
nimittaṃ tatra mukhyaṃ syān nimittiṃ gauṇa iṣyate || (Bharṭṛhari 2.267)*

For example, the expressive meaning of the word 'cow' is 'cowness' (for universalists) that is imposed on 'cowherd' and, thus, it serves as the basis of the meaning 'a dull and stupid fellow (like cow)' that is secondary meaning (*nimitti*).

Besides the above mentioned conditions, Bhartrhari has mentioned the dull-witted people's criterion for deciding primary and secondary meanings of a word also. This criterion is based on the perception of actual state of affairs, different from their imaginary appearances. He has given a number of instances for clarifying position. For example, the word water is used for water that is touched and taken and not for the mirage that cannot be touched or taken. Again the peculiar quality of a rope is to tie, which cannot be performed by snake, the peculiarity of which is to bite. On the basis of these examples, it can be said that the real or actual state of the objects, if conveyed by words, is taken as the primary and their use for imaginary appearance is secondary.

For *nāntarīyakārtha*, the terms used by Bhartrhari are *anya* (meaning different from primary and secondary) and *avivakṣitārtha* (non-intended meaning known by closeness of the primary meaning). It is his commentator Puṇyarāja who uses the term *nāntarīyakārtha* for such a meaning known by the closeness or nearness of the primary meaning (*Vākyapadīya* 2.298-314). It is a third category of meaning of the word which is neither an expressed (*mukhyārtha*) nor the intended (*gauṇārtha*) but non-intended (*avivakṣitārtha*). For Bhartrhari, all meanings are meanings of words and a word expresses all meanings (*sarvesarvārthavācakāḥ*). He does not accept any other meaning-producing force, such as secondary force (*lakṣaṇa-śakti*) and close-to-primary force (*vyañjanā-śakti*) and explains all kinds of meanings as meanings of the word. The word *gauḥ* in its intended uses, like *gauḥ paṭhati* ('cow reads'), conveys a foolish and dull person, and in its expressive uses like, 'cow grazes,' it denotes 'cowness'. Other meanings like gender, number, person, etc. that are closely connected with the primary meaning of the word 'cow' are also revealed by the same word, though, these meanings are left aside, as there is no expectancy for those meanings, in the use of the word. These non-intended or non-expected meanings (*avivakṣitārtha*) of a word are the *nāntarīyakārthas* of the same word. Bhartrhari has elaborated *nāntarīyakārthas* on the basis of two kinds of instances. These are suggestive (*jñāpaka*) and instrumental (*kāraka*). In the second *kāṇḍa* of

Vākyapadīya (*kārikā* 298-299), he says that as the lamp enlightens not only specific objects but also many other objects, in the same way, the word also (incidentally) conveys meanings other than that operative one which causes the primary meaning.

For *kāraka*, in *kārikā* 300 and 301 of the second *kāṇḍa*, he says that just as the churning of two kindling sticks performed to produce fire produces also the unintended smoke (which has the same cause as the fire), similarly, when a certain meaning which is to be conveyed is intended (when using a word), the word also conveys the unintended meaning due to its proximity with the intended one.

Thus, we find that Bhartr̥hari, in his *Vākyapadīya* (especially in the second *kāṇḍa*), discusses different popular views available on varied interpretation of metaphorical meaning of words in Indian philosophical literature. The possibility of metaphorical transfer of words is most often based on similarity or contiguity, and shifts in meaning. In such cases, a distinction must be made between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning; otherwise the force of the metaphor will be lost. It should be kept in mind that, for Bhartr̥hari, the primary unit of meaning is a sentence, not a word. And he also believes that the meaning is not necessarily grasped from the knowledge of individual words used in a sentence. Some of the popular views regarding the question of the distinction between the primary and metaphorical meaning of words are stated by Bhartr̥hari. The distinction between the primary and secondary meaning is based on the relative frequency of the usage. The meaning with which a word is frequently and generally used is the primary meaning. Regarding the primary meaning, Bhartr̥hari has attributed a theory to Vyādi in which it is said that the primary meaning of a word is that which is well-known; and which only depends on its form. But the secondary meaning is established with effort, with the help of some context. According to yet another view, words refer to the qualities. That object which possesses these qualities to a greater extent is called the primary meaning and the other is called the secondary meaning. Bhartr̥hari does not support this view, because this is not the pattern followed in our actual usage. Another view regarding this distinction is totally different. According to it, the metaphorical or secondary usage is based on similarity. "Devadatta is a lion" means that Devadatta possesses those qualities which are similar to that of a lion. But Bhartr̥hari's stand regarding the issue is different. According to him the metaphorical meaning or any other form of intended meaning can be deciphered only in the context of a sentence,

and the particular situation in which the sentence is uttered as it is earlier discussed. Bhartr̥hari argues that words as such cannot have metaphorical meaning. It is only the sentence and the context of utterance which can determine whether the sentence expresses the literal meaning or metaphorical meaning.

Concluding the whole discussion, it can rightly be remarked that Bhartr̥hari's trend of observing the problem of plurality of meanings of words is based on grammarians' assumption that 'all meanings are meanings of a word'. The grammarians' thesis of 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' on the one hand, and, that 'any word expresses any meaning' (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) on the other hand, may seem to be dichotomous for those who are not well-versed with Bhartr̥hari's trend of looking at meaning as communicative being.

As Bhartr̥hari emphasizes the role of sentence as the primary conveyor of meaning, he offers a detailed account of deciphering the intended meaning by the hearer. Bhartr̥hari was one of the earliest philosophers who recognized this peculiarity of natural language. The speakers can use the words to use the literal sense and also to express some intended sense. Therefore, Bhartr̥hari gives an account of how meaning can be precise with the help of contextual factors, as well as syntactical factors. Here, it is noteworthy that, six contextual factors figure in *Bṛhaddevatā kārikā*:

*arthāprakaraṇāllīṅgādaucityāddeśakālataḥ |
mantrēsvarthavivekaḥ syādītareṣviti ca sthitiḥ || (2.118)*

These are *artha* (purpose), *prakaraṇa* (the subject matter under discussion), *liṅga* (gender), *aucitya* (propriety), *deśa* (place); an indication from another place and *kāla* (time). These are the contextual factors for determining the meaning of the *vedic mantra*-s or the expressions in the classical language. Bhartr̥hari agrees that we determine the meaning of utterances not only by external words in sentences but also by the manner of the speech, the expression of speechless face, speakers movements, situations, propriety, place and time. It means that a sentence has external and internal forces. These too are contextual factors:

*vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād aucityād deśakālataḥ |
śabdārthāḥ pravibhajante na rūpād eva kevalāt || (Bhartr̥hari 2.314)*

The word *prakaraṇa* is to be understood in a wider sense. It means various types of circumstances. The meanings of the words are determined according to sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time and not according to external form only. The primary word-meanings are determined by the connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning, context, indication, presence of another word, suitability, place, time, gender and accent etc. in the case of obscurity:

saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā |
arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ ||
sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ |
śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ || (Bharṭṛhari 2.315-16)

By giving these views about the factors, Bharṭṛhari lays down the foundation of a type of suggestion like *abhidhāmulā vyañjanā* (suggestion based on the power of the denotation). From the above discussion it is clear that the ascertainment of meaning is made possible in the context of spoken language. The sentence is the ultimate reality of speech, and its meaning is *pratibhā* which is self-complete, indivisible as a semantic unit and without sequence. By means of it, one can communicate the words and the words-meanings rendered themselves subservient to the sentence and sentence-meaning respectively. The sentence appears as a sudden flash of understanding. The individual word-meanings function only as a means of revealing *pratibhā*.

Bharṭṛhari has recorded fourteen contextual factors in determining the sense in doubtful cases. They are: (1) Association (*saṃsarga*), (2) Dissociation (*viṣagoga*), (3) Mutual association (*sāhacarya*), (4) Hostility or opposition (*virodhita*), (5) Purpose (*artha*), (6) Context of situation (*prakaraṇa*), (7) Indicatory sign (*liṅga*), (8) Proximity with other words (*śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ*), (9) Capability (*sāmarthyā*), (10) Propriety (*aucitī*), (11) Place (*deśa*), (12) Time (*kāla*), (13) Grammatical gender (*vyakti*), and (14) Accent (*svara*). Now, we discuss all these fourteen contextual factors one by one:

(1) Association (*saṃsarga*): It means 'close connection of one individual object with another.' The word *hari* may be used to mean various things. It is the name of God Viṣṇu, it may also mean monkey. But the term conveys the meaning of Viṣṇu when it is used in association with 'conch and discus.' Therefore by *hari* it clearly means lord Viṣṇu. *Hari* is a very elastic word in Sanskrit. Its meanings range

from Viṣṇu, Indra, Yama, the sun and the moon down to a lion, a horse, a monkey, a serpent and a frog.

(2) Dissociation (*viprayoga*): It is separation as contrasted with *saṃsarga*. The word *dhenu* may mean a cow or a mare. But the sentence “*dhenu* without calf” is unambiguous, because the phrase “without calf” implies a dissociation which makes it clear that we are talking of a cow which is now without a calf.

(3) Mutual association (*sāhacarya*): When somebody says ‘Rāma and Lakṣman went to forest’, we decipher that ‘Rāma’ means the brother of Lakṣman. When we decipher that ‘Rāma’, here means the brother of Lakṣman, and not Balarāma (the brother of Kṛṣṇa) or Paraśurāma. Here the meaning of Rāma is recognized on the basis of mutual association of Rāma with Lakṣmana.

(4) Hostility or opposition (*virodhitā*): It may also be called contrary nature or dissimilarity or enmity. The word *chāyā* means ‘beauty’ or ‘shade’. But in the compound phrase *chāyā* and *āloka* (light), the meaning of *chāyā* obviously implies ‘shade’. This is because of the opposition of meaning between the light and shade. Matilal says that all these four factors can be called the general determination of meaning through association. It is mostly a case of psychological association (25).

(5) Purpose (*artha*): *Sthāṇu* means a pillar or Lord Śiva. In the sentence “worship *sthāṇu*” the purpose of the speaker is obviously served when the term is understood in the latter sense.

(6) Context of situation (*prakaraṇa*): Appayadīkṣita defines ‘*prakaraṇa*’ as ‘*vaktṛśrotṛbuddhisthitā*. There is a sentence “*devo jānāti sarvam*” which means ‘my lord knows everything.’ Whether the term *deva* means ‘king’ or ‘god’ is to be decided from the context. Another example “Bring me *saindhava*” where at the time of eating, *saindhava* should mean ‘salt’, and at the time of going out, it should mean a ‘horse’. Here the context determines the intended meaning of *saindhava*.

(7) Indicatory sign (*liṅga*): It is a significant expression which supplies the factor needed by another expression to complete its sense. Some signs may be present in larger context. In the context of Vedic passages “*aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhātī*” (the wet pebbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term *aktāḥ* (wet) is not clear, since the pebble could be made wet with many different liquids. In

the larger context of a ritual, the meaning of the word is that pebbles which are soaked in clarified butter. We have to understand it as an example of indicatory sign.

(8) Proximity with other words (*śabdasyānyasya sannidhi*): It is the use of a word having a meaning logically connected with only one of the possible meanings of the ambiguous word, e. g. *devasya purārāteḥ* (of the god, the enemy of the cities). This is also a case of association. But it is not a case of psychological association. In such cases, physical proximity or syntactical connection is meant. The 'God, the destroyer of cities' refers to Lord Śiva. Here the proximity or association of 'God' restricts the meaning to Śiva, otherwise 'king' can also be meant by 'destroyer of enemy's cities.' In this connection it is of interest to note the theory of meaning of a word which is determined by its collocation, developed by Firth in his essay 'The Modes of Meaning'. According to this theory the meaning of a word is determined by its collocation with other words; in certain collocations a word may have one meaning, and in certain other collocation, a different meaning (118-49).

(9) Capability (*sāmarthya*): In the sentence "the cuckoo is intoxicated by *madhu*", the meaning of *madhu* should be the spring season and not honey. The former sense of *madhu* (spring) has the capacity to intoxicate (in a poetic sense) a cuckoo. Puṇyarāja also gives an example in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya* (2.316). In this example, it is said that "a girl without a waistline" (*anudarā kanyā*) should be taken in the sense of "a girl with a narrow waistline" as far as the poetic sense is concerned.

Here, it is noticeable that capability (*sāmarthya*) must be distinguished from purpose (*artha*) and indicatory sign (*liṅga*). Purpose and indicatory sign appear to be the same as capability. The distinction among them is that this purpose refers to a fruit which is to be obtained in the future on account of the power which it presupposes. Capability refers to a power, which has already manifested its result in someone else. Indicatory sign refers to a characteristic which belongs to oneself.

(10) Propriety (*aucitī*): *Aucitī* means propriety or fitness. In the sentence "*pātu vo dayitāmukham*" which means "may your beloved's *mukha* protect you," '*mukham*' is a multi-meaning word, expressing among other things favourableness, an opening, the mouth, commencement and a means. The line refers to those who are smitten with love. Only the favourableness of their beloveds is fit to protect them.

The faces of their beloveds are not likely to give them any solace, if those faces show signs of anger. Therefore, *aucitī* restricts the expressive power of *mukham* to favourableness.

Appayadīksita and Jagannātha point out that *artha*, *sāmarthya* and *aucitī* practically mean the same thing as all three are based on the *kārya-kāraṇ bhāva* (relationship of causality). The distinction among them lies in the way in which this relationship of causality is conveyed. Thus, in *artha* the *kārya* (effect) is expressed by the dative, in *sāmarthya* the *kāraṇ* (cause) is denoted by the instrumental and in *aucitī* the *kārya-kāraṇ bhāva* (relationship of causality) is known from the juxtaposition of the words themselves owing to the capability they possess.

(11) Place (*deśa*): It means a place where a particular word is uttered. In the sentence “*bhātīha paramēśvara*,” (here, *paramēśvara* shines), the reference to the place (here) shows that by the term *paramēśvara* is meant ‘king’ and not the god Śiva.

(12) Time (*kāla*): It is the time-factor notion of an individual object. The sentence ‘*citrabhānu vibhāty asaū*’ means ‘*citrabhānu* is now shining’. Here, the meaning of *citrabhānu* may differ due to the time-factor. If the reference is made during day-time, the word *citra-bhānu* in the sentence would mean the ‘light of fire’ and if said during night-time, it would mean ‘moon’.

(13) Grammatical gender (*vyakti*): The term *mitra* in Sanskrit means ‘sun’ when used in the masculine gender, and ‘friend’, when used in the neuter gender. In some cases grammatical devices can resolve ambiguity.

(14) Accent (*svara*): The meaning of a Vedic passage depends on the proper accent used. Thus, the term *indraśatru* with accent on the last syllable means “killer of Indra”. When the first syllable is accented it means “one whose killer is Indra”:

mantra hīnḥ svarato vaṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha |
sa vāgvajro yajamānaḥ hinasti yathendraśatru svarato 'parādhāt ||
(*Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, 5.52)

These are the contextual factors that determine the fixed meaning of a word in the case of ambiguities. It is the context that helps us in understanding elliptical sentences. Similarly contextual factors decide whether a word should be taken in its primary sense or in its secondary sense.

The entire list given above is not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the contextual factors are determined by keeping the peculiarities of Sanskrit language in mind. But it is obvious that Bhartrhari takes into account the grammatical factors, syntactical, psychological factors, contextual factors (both verbal and non-verbal), for determination of the intended meaning. Among them the psychological and contextual factors definitely play a crucial role in the identification of intended meaning. Bhartrhari gives a limited yet more broad-based list of contextual factors. He says that the meaning of an expression is not to be determined merely by its form but by contextual factors also. These factors are more universal in nature and are not related to a specific language (in this case Sanskrit). If we go by the spirit of what Bhartrhari says about the problem of word-meaning relation and communicability of language, it becomes clear that he deals with these problems in a comprehensive manner.

Bhartrhari refers again and again to the importance of contextual factors in the determination of the meaning of expressions. It is the context that helps us in understanding elliptical sentences. Similarly contextual factors decide whether a word should be taken in its primary sense or in its secondary metaphorical sense.

4.

One of the chief objectives of Bhartrhari's linguistic philosophy is to interpret the communication. For this, he has ventured to discuss above mentioned theories in his *Vākyapadīya*. He has also proved his theories by applying them on the spoken Sanskrit language of his time in order to interpret communication. In this section, in order to examine the universality of his theory, an English composition is taken for reinterpretation with the help of Bhartrhari's theories especially within the framework of the contexts and conditions for determination of primary, secondary/intended and non-intended meaning. This composition is *The Waste Land* (1922) composed by Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965). This is taken up because of two reasons. The first reason is its language and diction, and second, its interpretation which is difficult but not obscure.

The language of *The Waste land* is largely the contemporary common speech as actually used and spoken in different societies in the modern metropolitan

London. It possesses the qualities which we generally call 'prosaic strength', 'exactness' and 'urbanity'. But at the same time it is full of experiments in the handling of words and phrases which by their unique and unprecedented juxtapositions suggest much wider, deeper and new areas of meanings, and as such immensely enlarge the scope of poetry.

This poem is known one of the most difficult poems of English literature. There are many reasons which make it difficult. The difficulty results from the fact that the poet had to mirror a civilization infinitely more complex and intricate than the previous one, and the intricacy of his poetry is but a reflection of the conditions of life on which his sensibility had to operate. Rendering of new conditions, required the use of new techniques, and the very 'novelty' of his poetry creates difficulty. The difficulty of his poetry arises from his borrowings on an unprecedented scale. His poetry abounds in allusions, references, quotations, and literary reminiscences which bewilder and perplex the readers. Another source of difficulty in his poetry is the careful and exact compression or condensation which he adopted. All connecting links, all the grammatical signs of connection and order, which serves as sign-post for the guidance of the readers, are ruthlessly eliminated. Thus, Eliot's poetry is not a toy for the masses. It is a difficult poetry for the mentally mature and an understanding of it is the ultimate reward of consummate scholarship.

Above discussed two qualities of Eliot's poem are helpful to prove the applicability of Bhartrhari's theories, especially of contexts and conditions of meaning. As one of Bhartrhari's chief aims is to interpret communication, this poem will be an appropriate tool in order to exploit his one chief aim (i.e. to interpret communication) because, in the poem, a large part of the contemporary common speech as actually spoken in the sophisticated society in the modern metropolitan cities has been used. The possibility of multilayer of meaning which causes difficulty in the present poem will open up to Bhartrhari's contexts and conditions of meaning for disambiguation.

Bhartrhari has discussed different conditions given by different theories popular at his time for the determination of the primary and secondary meanings of a word or sentence. Among those, some conditions, such as *arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasannidhāna* (purpose, situation-context and proximity of

another word), *nimitta-nimitti* (base and based), *nyūnādhikyabhāva* (more or less degree of properties), *sādrśya* (similarity) and *virodha* (inversion) may be taken for the interpretation of *The Waste Land*.

The extreme allusiveness of Eliot's style is one of the many sources of difficulty in interpretation. His allusions have an extraordinary wide range, covering several mythologies, literatures and religions. They cover the wisdom and philosophies, both of the East and the West. It is called Eliot's 'poetic shorthand' which is a device for linking the contemporary waste land with places and scenes in history, myth and legend, by the use of phrases, fragments of quotations, allusions etc., from poets and authors of different ages and countries. Thus, the use of the phrase 'unreal city', in the following passage from the first canto named 'The Burial of the Dead', links up London with Paris, the city of Baudelaire, and with Dante's *Limbo*:

Unreal city
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many
I had not thought death had undone so many.
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled,
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet. (60-65)

The concluding part of this passage is a mosaic of quotations and allusions, and in this way the poet has shown that all wars are one war, all cities are one city, and all human failure is one failure. In this way the topical is universalized. But here, our concern is how the reader derives this meaning. When we apply *arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasannidhāna*, we find that it becomes easy for us to determine the secondary meaning of the quoted passage. The meaning of the phrase 'unreal city' in the passage (Unreal...his feet.) is known by means of the purpose (of referring the universalized topical), situation context (A crowd flowed over London Bridge) and the proximity of the phrase (unreal city) with another phrase (London Bridge). In other words, the meaning of the quoted passage is not spontaneously revealed or expressed by the phrase 'unreal city'. The meaning is known by the efforts made on the basis of another expressed popular meaning of the phrase 'unreal city', and, hence, the meaning is secondary.

Other conditions like *nimitta-nimitti*, *nyūnādhikyabhāva* and *sādrśya* can also be applied on other allusive passages in order to determine the primary and secondary meaning as *arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasannidhāna* is applied.

To conclude, conditions and contexts of meaning as mentioned in *Vākyapadīya* by Bhartrhari are for the determination of meanings through the interpretation of communication. These should be applied universally. It is also clear that the objectives of literature cannot be fulfilled without the knowledge of contexts and conditions of meaning.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

It is the *word* through which the *world* can be known. In other words, without the language no kind of knowledge is possible. It is the language through which not only the truth but falsity can also be expressed. What is the Ultimate Reality behind all the expressed truths and falsities? In the answer of this question, the philosophical investigation of language paves the path for the philosophy of language.

It is Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya* which contains reflections on the subject-matter of language and grammar in a way that raises the study of these to the rank of the philosophy of language. One of the chief objectives of Bhartr̥hari's philosophy of language is to interpret communication. This communication should be taken up in the sense of entire lingual behaviour because Bhartr̥hari as a philosopher has a goal for interpreting the communication of all living creatures which comprise not only those who communicate through mediums like the language-tokens but those also who without the mediums for example birds, *yogin-s*, babies, insects, etc. So as to accomplish the communication, he discusses the need of the *expresser* or real language (*sphoṭa*) and the *expressed* (*pratibhā vākyārtha*). It is the *expresser* without which no lingual behaviour can be imagined and if there is no lingual behaviour, there is no meaning. In the present study, the *sphoṭa* has been taken as the universal or indispensable condition of meaning.

It can be said that the language-tokens standing by proxy for things and the *sphoṭa* expressive of meaning are separate not only essentially and existentially, but also functionally. The language-tokens are means for manifesting the *sphoṭa*, which, when manifested by them, reveals itself and its meaning as well. The tokens are outer manifestations of the *sphoṭa* and are manifested by the expectancy caused by

the *sphoṭa*. The language-tokens which are due to the expectancy may be understood as a condition for the disambiguation of meaning through the interpretation of the communication. In other words, the meaning is revealed by the *sphoṭa* when the latter is manifested by the language-tokens due to the expectancy which is also caused by the *sphoṭa*. But this condition cannot be as indispensable as the *sphoṭa* because, without the language-tokens, the meaning can be revealed only by the *sphoṭa* in the cases of *yogin*-s, babies, etc. On this basis, Bhartr̥hari has mentioned six kinds of flashes of meaning. These are named as *svabhāva*, *caraṇa*, *yoganimittapratibhā*, *viśiṣṭopahitapratibhā*, *abhyāsanimittapratibhā* and *adr̥ṣṭapratibhā*.

It is noticeable that the issue, i.e. the conditions and contexts of meaning, in this work is one of the main issues of Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya*. The chief purpose of the search for conditions and contexts of meaning is due to the call for disambiguation of meaning through understanding the relationship between the sentence and its meaning. The possibility of pluralities of meanings from a single sentence produces ambiguities in the interpretation of communication as well as in the comprehension of a literary text. The pluralities of meanings as discussed in *Vākyapadīya* may be taken up under the three categories. These are the primary, i.e. the expressive or fixed meanings (*mukhyārtha*), secondary/intended meanings (*gauṇārtha*) and non-intended meanings (*nāntariyakārtha*). The study of the conditions and contexts of meaning provides grounds for the determination of primary or fixed meanings, secondary/intended meanings and non-intended meanings. Bhartr̥hari in his *Vākyapadīya* has discussed different conditions for the determination of the primary, secondary and non-intended meanings such as purpose, situation-context and proximity of another Word, i.e. *arthaprakaraṇa śabdāntarasannidhāna*; similarity (*sādṛśya*); inversion (*virodha*); etc.

Bhartr̥hari also mentions fourteen determinants of fixed or expressive meaning of a word in a context. The fixed meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa* in the mind just after its manifestation by utterances. This meaning is the expressive or the primary meaning of the word. The primary meaning serves as the ground for the cognition of secondary/intended and non-intended meanings. If the primary meaning of a word, in a sentence, is not conveyed in order to understand the sentence, its

secondary/intended and non-intended meanings are decided on the basis of its primary meaning with the help of contexts and conditions of meaning like *arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasannidhāna* (purpose, situation-context and proximity of another word), *nimitta-nimitti* (base and based), *nyūnādhikyabhāva* (more or less degree of properties), *sādṛśya* (similarity), *virodha* (inversion), etc. It is remarkable to note here that these conditions and contexts function for determination of the intended and non-intended meanings on the basis of primary or fixed meaning of a word and not of inference and memory. Therefore, Bharṭṛhari gives fourteen determinants of meaning of a word in a context such as association (*saṃsarga*), dissociation (*vipragoga*), mutual association (*sāhacarya*), hostility or opposition (*virodhita*), purpose (*artha*), context of situation (*prakaraṇa*), indicatory sign (*liṅga*), proximity with other words (*śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ*), capability (*sāmarthya*), propriety (*aucitī*), etc.

The fixed meaning of the word used in the sentence cannot be decided only on the basis either of the form of the word or of the very general meaning of the word, because the form of the word may remain fixed in all its different uses. The fourteen determinants of fixed meaning of a word in a context as mentioned in *Vākyapadīya* have a very important role in the interpretation of communication and literary texts. Thus, Bharṭṛhari's philosophy interprets the issue of different meanings of a word on the basis of primary or fixed meaning of the word revealed in the mind. The determination of the secondary or non-intended meaning of a word in a sentence is not problematic, if the word is used for its primary or expressive meaning. The problem of the determination of the meaning of a word arises only if the expressive meaning of a word is not favourable in that use. It can be said that secondary and non-intended meanings of the word are known by imposition of primary meaning and by closeness to the primary meaning of the word respectively.

It is also found on the basis of the nature and functions performed by all determinants of meaning that these determinants comprise certain psychological, grammatical, syntactic and semantic grounds and are helpful in the determination of contextual meaning of a word in a sentence. Context helps in the determination of the contextual meaning. It should not be considered as a meaning-revealing unit. In Bharṭṛhari's philosophy, the *sphoṭa* can only be the meaning-revealing unit.

Lastly, almost all determinants of meaning, which are discussed in *Vākyapadīya*, are tested by the commentators of text and other Indian scholars by applying to Sanskrit literature. However, it does not mean that these determinants are only applicable to Sanskrit literature. They may also be applicable to the literature of other languages in order to remove ambiguities regarding meaning, as attempted in this work.

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