

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN ✓

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BIBEKANANDA NAIK

**SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR SOUTH, SOUTH-EAST, AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
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Bibeknanda Naik
(BIBEKANANDA NAIK)

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CHAPTER - I

BUREAUCRACY IN DEVELOPING POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Public bureaucracy - the cutting edge of government - is an indispensable organ in every political system. As an army of expert and efficient civil servants it is mainly associated with the implementation of governmental policies formulated by political decision-makers thereby occupying a strategic position between political leaders and the citizens. The bureaucratic norms which have developed in the western political systems forbid the public bureaucrats to participate in active politics, though they are influential in policy-making matters. It is also incumbent upon the political leadership to ensure that their decisions are executed in a rational, universal, egalitarian and impersonal manner through a neutral and depoliticized bureaucracy. On the other hand, the civil servants are also required to serve their masters faithfully irrespective of their personal predilections and keep their political opinions away from being projected in-to their jobs. This 'neutrality' and harmonious relationship between politicians and administrators are prerequisites for the smooth operation and sustenance of any viable political system. Thus Max Weber rightly pointed out:

"The genuine official ... will not engage in politics. Rather, he should engage in impartial 'administration'

The honour of civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant's remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-denial in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces."¹

But the concept of 'neutrality' as an accepted administrative norm and the existence of a 'depoliticized' bureaucracy is not a spontaneous occurrence in the western political system. It is rooted in the political development of these nation states and has been shaped by several other factors which characterize the western political systems. First, the system of governmental organization is highly differentiated and functionally specific, the allocation of political roles is by achievement rather than ascription which reflects general characteristics of the society. Secondly, procedures for making political decisions are largely rational and secular. The power positions of traditional elites have been considerably eroded and the appeal of traditional values greatly weakened. A predominantly secular and impersonal system of law reflects this orientation. Thirdly, there is

1. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 58.

a high correlation between political power and legitimacy, resting upon a sense of popular identification with the nation-state which is wide-spread and effective. Such a system makes a prolonged discrepancy between power and legitimacy less likely and is more efficient in the sense that power relationships are often translated into legitimizations and less frequently outside the political sphere. And, finally, popular interest and involvement in the political system is wide-spread, but this does not amount to active participation by the citizenry in general in political decision-making.

In such societies political system as a whole is relatively stable and mature, and bureaucracy is more fully developed. Thus the role of bureaucracy in the political process is fairly clear and the line of demarcation between the bureaucracy and other political institutions is generally definite and accepted. Moreover, the bureaucracy in a modernized polity will be subject to effective policy control by other functionally specific political institutions and this helps in confining the bureaucracy to its own sphere of operation thereby contributing to its neutrality and non-involvement in political matters. This is also largely due to the fact that the bureaucracy and its competitor institutions, particularly, the party system have developed more or less simultaneously over a considerable period of time and so, the political growth is much more balanced.

But such conditions are absent in most of the developing political systems or the new nations that have emerged since World War II. In these political systems the persons occupying higher administrative posts of the government find themselves in strong power positions vis-a-vis other political actors and as a result instead of remaining 'neutral' they tend to play a decisive role in political matters. This fact derives from the circumstances that are unique to the socio-political structure of the new states and the nature of their political development.

The newly independent states despite their differences in location, resources, population, history culture, religion and a multitude of other factors, share ^{one} thing in common. All of them are caught up in a process of social change and share a generalized consensus of the objectives - the twin goals of nation building¹ and socio-economic progress - towards which the change should be directed.²

First, achievement of nationhood in most of the emerging areas is not an easy task. In Europe, the movement toward nationalism was largely one of uniting under one government, people already speaking a single language. Most of the developing states are artificial entities in the sense

2. Paul, E. Sigmund, Jr. eds., The Ideologies of Developing Nations (New York, Frederick, A Praeger, Inc., 1963).

that they were products of colonial activity rather than pre-existing political loyalty. Their boundaries, likewise, are often drawn by imperial powers without regard to ethnic groupings, excluding people with close cultural ties and including minority groups who opposed to assimilation with other groups. Thus, it strains the growth of a nation-state.

Among the societies of the new states, although to very unequal degrees, the status of human being is very much a function of his kinship connection and in certain of these societies, of his caste membership and his group affiliations. This stands in the way of his becoming a citizen in a political society. The extended kinship system and caste both confine the loyalties and the capacity for loyalty to a narrow, locally, circumscribed range. They inhibit the flow of loyalty to the larger territory and to the population which inhabits it and potentially constitutes the nation.

Moreover, the economic and social underdevelopment of the new states of Asia and Africa shows itself in the size and structure of their urban middle classes. These differ markedly from the middle-class of the advanced countries. Although they have numerous small retail traders, they are largely illiterate and have assimilated little modern culture or economic skills. In a number of new states, the larger enterprises in commerce and finance are ethnically distinct from the rest of the population. Where there is a native

capitalist class it may be a microscopic segment of the entire population. The new states are also proportionately under-populated in the whole range of modern middle class professional occupation i.e. teachers, physicians, scientists, engineers etc. This is partly a function of the structure of the underdeveloped economy of the new states which they have inherited from their colonial masters and partly a function of long preemption of such posts by Europeans. Lower level civil servants, clerks, in commercial firms and lawyers, make up a disproportionately large share of the more or less educated urban middle class of the new states.

The wide-spread and relative feebleness of the intervening strata between the most powerful and most wealthy-foreign business men, and quasi-feudal landlords on the one hand and the least powerful and the poorest in the other-makes the feeling of remoteness from centre of things more pronounced among the poor; it also heightens the sense of separateness between the modern section of the population and the traditional, less educated or utterly uneducated strata. There is a wide spread divergence in the styles of life and the associated outlooks of these with modern (western) education and those without it. The educated have received their education in modern schools in which they have been taught by the western or westernized native intellectuals. Many of them have been educated in the west, and

these represent the standard by which the other educated persons measure themselves. In dress, in tastes, and much more importantly, in their attitude towards their lives they diverge considerably from the ordinary members of their societies. This attenuates the sense of affinity necessary for the development of modern political society and hampers its further growth. It makes for mutual alienation and a failure of mutual identification.

Thus in almost every aspect of their social structure, the societies in which the new states must be based are characterized by this 'gap'.³ It is the gap between the very rich and the mass of poor, between the educated and the uneducated, between the modern and traditional that has serious implications on the political set up and the political processes of the new states.

First and foremost, political leadership is concentrated in a minute segment of the population in most of the developing countries. The governing elite, in the sense of those wielding major decision making power in the political system, tends not only to be small in number, but also to be separated socially and culturally as well as politically from the bulk of the citizenry. This group educated in western ways became quite sophisticated in the tactics and techniques of

3. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (Mouton: The Hague Paris, 1969), p.30.

political power. The colonial rulers, perhaps not fully aware of the implications of their actions, frequently encouraged this development by establishing schools, and universities in the colonies or by permitting aspiring sons of the traditional native elite to study abroad.⁴ As time passed, the educated native class became a group of significant size. They have broad beliefs in nationalism and national unity, anti-colonialism and in the goal of socio-economic progress of their countries carried out at the most rapid rate possible. They tend to be intellectuals of their countries, many of whom were trained in the West and came to admire it and yet turn against the West in their policies. They do so exactly because they admire it and at the same time see the West and denying them through colonialism, the opportunity to make their own country more like the West.⁵ From this group emerged the leadership which successfully organized a political party with mass support - using modern techniques of communication and co-ordination. The establishment of strong native organization, foreshadowed the end of western domination in these countries⁶ and led to the independence of colonies in Asia and Africa.

Due to their association with and the belief in the

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4. H.F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistani Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.7.
 5. John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Willey & Sons Inc., 1962), p.48.
 6. Goodnow, n.4, p.7.

western liberal democracy, the elite of the most of the newly liberated countries tries to follow the western model. But the institutions which are borrowed from the west became alien to the societies of underdeveloped countries in which they are transplanted. The reason being the social structures are not yet fully matured due to the permeation of traditional values to accommodate the political institutions of the developed nations. And there remains a political divergence between the governing elite and the mass of citizenry which was further aggravated by the caste, religious, ethnic and regional disparities. These factors often surface in the politics and impedes smooth functioning of the western political institutions.

Moreover, during the colonial period politics was mainly oppositional in the sense that it was channelized only in the way of undoing the colonial domination. But the leaders were not well-trained in the art of running the democratic institutions or had not developed and consolidated a set of norms on which the political system would operate. Thus one of the side effects of the parochialism of kinship, caste loyalty makes it more difficult to create stable and coherent nationwide parties. Parties tend, rather to be cliques or aggregations of bosses and their clients overlaid upon a regional or tribal base. Thus the political parties which were formed after the western pattern came to function in a different political milieu. Moreover, mass suffrage

demands that parties establish direct and animate contact with their supporters and sympathisers. A party is required to reach every segment of society to broaden its base. Thus the validity of a political party rests on the extent to which it undertakes the task of national integration by reconciling local regional, linguistic communal and tribal conflicts. Also they have to legitimize the system by making themselves acceptable to the people as legitimate instruments for the exercise of political power. It also depends on their preparedness to accept the verdict of election thereby creating a tradition of parliamentary democracy.

Judging the merits of parties in the light of above considerations it seems that political parties of most of the newly independent countries are not yet prepared to perform those tasks.

The leadership crisis is also another factor which to a large extent affects the viability of a political party. During the struggle for independence "Strong personality emerged and provided the leadership for the national party of liberation. When his efforts culminated in nationhood he became the charismatic leader, and the symbol of nationalism.⁷ The stability of the party he leads is determined, in large part, by the ability and durability of this charismatic leader. As long as he can play a vigorous role each political group senses that it could only lose support by

7. Ibid., p.12.

openly opposing the great leader; therefore, it operates with him in the hope of influencing his decisions and gaining access to governmental posts of authority and prestige.⁸

After the charismatic leader has left the political stage, however, his nationalistic independence party begins to disintegrate as one faction after another defects. This tendency results, in parts, from the stresses of modernizing a backward nation. The unity of the party evaporates on the problems of taxation, land reform, federalism, constitutional revision and when allocation of funds to specific programmes are concerned. The intricacies involved in resolving such problems are usually far beyond the understanding of overwhelming proportion of the population and frequently beyond the understanding of those who have been elected to replace national leadership. Loyalty is transferred to a religious leader, a tribal chief, a local or provincial politician or even to the local landlord. As a result of these disintegrative factors several minority parties replace the majority party. Even these minority parties are not cohesive units; they are bound together by self interests more than by any programme or ideology. Typically, the party leaders wish to protect their own interests by preventing positive governmental action. Some time they

8. Ibid., p.13.

were motivated by a design to have a share of the prerequisite office - the status of seat in the legislative body and perhaps also a remunerative post in the government. There may be frequent shifts of party loyalties if it seems advantageous. Since the following of politician is loyal to him rather to a party, it is easy for the leaders to shift his party allegiance to further his personal goals without having to worry about defeat at election time. Thus the net result is a high degree of political instability.

In this political environment the relative power of the bureaucratic elite increases primarily because there is no political party strong enough to exercise effective supervision over the administration. Unless political parties have established their legitimacy and hegemony over the bureaucracy the latter tends to arrogate to itself more authority than it is permitted under a democratic political system. In a developing country, the bureaucracy being the best literate, advanced, efficient and well organized section of government servants, it enjoys virtual monopoly in terms of expertise, knowledge of rules and procedures. Moreover, in post-Independence, periods the activities of the state have increased manifold in order to give substance to their political freedom in economic terms. Thus the political executive tend to lean heavily on the bureaucracy for advice, guidance and counsel even in policy formulation,

not to speak of policy implementation which is genuinely the responsibility of bureaucracy.

Also the bureaucracy in developing country is apt to have a generous measure of operational autonomy which can be accounted for by the convergence of several forces, usually at work in a recently modernizing nation. Colonialism was essentially the rule by bureaucracy with policy guidance from remote sources, and this pattern persists even after the bureaucracy come to operate under the new leaders of an independent nation. Groups capable of competing for political influence or of imposing close controls over the bureaucracy are few and far between, so that often it is able to move into a partial power vacuum.

In post-Independence period political initiative was said to rest with "the people" or atleast with their representatives. There was a desire to impose political control over the governmental machinery. To ensure control the new leaders reason all policies must originate with the party in power. Moreover, the bureaucracy must be policed by the political leaders to guarantee that policies not be disturbed along colonialist line in the process of implementation. But this is not achieved because the gap between the people's servants who man the bureaucracy and the people's representatives who form the corps of the political executives tends much in terms of educational levels, rural and urban back-

ground, economic levels and environmental influences. This hampers the process of adjustment between the two.

The civil servants also remain committed to principles of colonial style of administration. Although their organizations usually diverge in many respects from the Weberian model of rational bureaucracy their ideals reflect the prescriptions laid downⁱⁿ civil service training manuals: a hierarchically structured bureaucracy with orderly progression through the ranks and strictly observed lines of authority, its personnel recruited according to merit, impeccable in its technical competence and impervious to political influences.⁹ Commitment to political neutrality and aloofness, however, is not complete, for, many civil servants tend to interpret from the colonial experience that policy making is a function or even an exclusive prerogative of the bureaucracy. Trained for paternalistic service, under colonial rule, they consider themselves not only the most capable but the most proper agency for national progress in the post colonial period. Accordingly their inclinations and ideological commitments are not directed towards democratizing the governmental system or sharing their authority with new political forces.

Moreover, in many of these societies, well-knit and

9. David Horowitz, Three World Development (Oxford University Press, 1972), p.404.

and well-organized bureaucratic structure precedes electoral democracy. In some of these societies under the impact of colonial rule, bureaucracy precedes political parties. Many of the developing societies have stable bureaucracies and an unstable party system. The result is that bureaucracy is not only manned by the modernizing elite of these societies, it also provides stability and continuity to an otherwise unstable system of government. Bureaucracy already has firm roots while other structures of politics are struggling to establish themselves. While political leadership, party organizations, the electoral system and the elected legislatures, all are in a state of flux, bureaucracy continues to provide permanent leadership in the administration.¹⁰ This leads in most of the newly independent countries to a bureaucratic rule, often with the backing of the army its natural ally. It also hinders the growth of emerging political institutions due to the traditional hatred which bureaucracy harbours towards the democratic principles. As the new state is exposed to various hazards which often threaten its existence, the bureaucracy assuming the role of a self-appointed guardian tries to perpetuate an authoritarian rule thereby further impeding its political growth. To this general trend Pakistan was no exception as it is evident from its experience during post-Independence period.

10. C.P. Bhambri, Bureaucracy and Politics in India (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1971), p.56.

Pakistan as one of the nations in South Asia which achieved independence from Britain in the early post-war years had to go through severe trials to achieve and maintain its nationhood. One factor which distinguishes it from almost all other newly established nation is its commitment to the religious ideology of Islam; a commitment which constitutes the ideological foundation stone for the new nation. After a referendum the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was divided on the basis of religion and the areas whose inhabitants were mostly Muslim were combined to form Pakistan. The North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan and West Punjab constituted the West Pakistan. Bengal was split—the eastern part forming the eastern wing of Pakistan state. This geographical distance between the two wings which were separated from each other by more than one thousand miles of Indian territory, was one of the most peculiar features of Pakistan. Sixty per-cent of the population was Bengali and lived in the Eastern wing, while political power was concentrated on the West. This was further aggravated by the cultural divergence and the lack of political unity in western wing. There are serious language and cultural differences among the various regions of West Pakistan. Moreover, the hold of Muslim League the party which fought for separate Pakistan over the ranks was slender. The Punjabi landlords had been extremely hostile to the League, where as in the Frontier Province the League was a novelty, its support coming from petty-bourgeois.

sections consisting of contractors, shopkeepers, civil servants and traders etc. in the city of Peshawar. In Sind, the League had grown but was split between the landlords and their opponents whereas in the Pathan countryside it had no roots since the Khudai Khidmatgars of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan retained their following among the peasants. Moreover, Baluchistan became a part of the new state after its ruler had signed the accession documents without taking into account the opinion of the people. The Baluch nationalism, in subsequent period, became a major problem in Pakistan's political unity and it still lingers on.

On economic front Pakistan was a largely agricultural country and had inherited from the British a feudal, colonial economy. Forty-one percent of the industrial establishments are devoted to the processing of agricultural raw materials and were in seasonal operation. Out of the 1414 industrial enterprises which Pakistan inherited only 314 were situated in East Pakistan.¹¹ Pakistan economy were in the grip of Indian capitalists (Tata, Birla, Dalmia) and British imperialism, the latter holding a dominant interest in trade and in the credit system of Pakistan. The agriculture was also in a state of stagnation. A large proportion of the population lived on land where agriculture was dominated

11. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? (Penguin Books Ltd., England, 1983), p.43.

by feudal property relations. The land was filled in the most primitive manner by peasants who were exploited by a handful of tyrannical landlords.

Thus, one of the pertinent features of Pakistan society was mass impoverishment and the consequent educational backwardness. This shows the weakness in civil society which makes the state all powerful.¹² And this was the state which was dominated by a rigid bureaucracy steeped in colonial tradition. Thus in order to analyse the role of bureaucracy in Pakistan politics it is necessary to focus on the nature of bureaucracy in its formative stage and the factors which shaped its behaviour.

12. Ibid., p.44.

CHAPTER - II

NATURE OF BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN

The administrative system of Pakistan which was carved out of Indian Civil Service of British Raj faced manifold problems soon after partition. One of these problems was the acute shortage of experienced personnel which was experienced in the decision-making at a high level of Government. This problem was largely due to the fact that the Muslims' representation in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) was meagre and the higher Civil-services in the undivided India were predominantly British and Hindu. During the first quarter of 1947 the Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian Political Service (IPS) had a strength of 1157 officers (not including Burma). Of these 101 or 9 per cent were Muslims.¹ Disproportionate representation of Muslims in administration is further corroborated by the fact that "in the entire Interim Government of India on the eve of partition there was not one Muslim Officer of the rank of Secretary. There were only four officers of the rank of Joint Secretary".² Further, when independence came in 1947, an Indian or British officer

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1. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in La Palombara ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.365.
 2. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service", Pacific Affairs, vol.XXXI, No.2, 1958, p.137.

serving in ICS was permitted to choose whether to serve in India or in Pakistan. Of 101 Muslim ICS-IPS of 1947, 95 opted for service in Pakistan; the others remained in India or retired. The net result was that the total strength of ICS-IPS talent in Pakistan at partition was 157 officers. But the figure 157 has limited significance for only 136 of these officers were available for administrative service in Pakistan.³ Nearly half of these were British officers, most of whom left during the first two years of independence. Thus, fewer than twenty officers in service during the first two years had more than fifteen years experience. Half of the officers had less than a decade in service.⁴

Thus, after partition most of the higher posts in Pakistan remained unfilled or were filled by inexperienced personnel. And in this situation the small number of experienced Muslim civil servants, alongwith a few British officers who were persuaded to remain in Pakistan, exerted great influence.⁵ Moreover, the partition and the subsequent crises which engulfed Pakistan, posed a challenge to the handful of bureaucrats to prove their worth. The partition resulted in

3. Palombara, n.1, p.365.

4. Ibid., p.368.

5. H.F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Yale University Press, 1964), p.29.



mass migration and bloodshed which weighed heavily on the new born state. It has been estimated that 65,00,000 Muslim refugees came to Pakistan, and 5,50,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan. About 5,00,000 Muslims lost their lives or were abducted.⁶ In this exchange of persons Pakistan obtained a surplus of cultivators and artisans but lost most of its merchants, clerks, accountants and professors. The state operated rail-road, and post and telegraph services constituted the most difficult problem.

The establishment of a capital for a nation of eighty million people in a few months would have been a remarkable feat under the most ideal circumstances. But the circumstances in Pakistan were far from ideal. A new government had to be set up where no central government existed before. Refugees had to be settled as best they could, abandoned lands had to be divided and put to cultivation. Law and order had to be established in the tribal areas, and an entire administrative apparatus had to be established to carry out the many functions of state power.

All these burden fell heavily on a handful of bureaucrats who took over the charge of administration. As Grovine puts it "the best tribute paid to the competence of the civil servants is the fact that Pakistan did not collapse in its first 90 days".⁷ The job of setting up Pakistan's administra-

6. Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London, Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1950), p.84.

7. Albert Grovine, "The Civil Service Under The Revolutionary Government In Pakistan", Middle East Journal, vol.19, (Spring 1965), p.322.

tion was largely taken up by two senior civil servants who had been members of the Indian Audit and Account Service - Ghulam Mohammad (later Governor General) and Choudhuri Mohammad Ali (later Prime Minister). For a time after partition the latter occupied the unique position of Secretary General of Pakistan. He set up and headed the entire Central Secretariat and also served as the Cabinet Secretary, Establishment Secretary and adviser to the Prime Minister. The political leaders were preoccupied with political questions in the first years of Pakistan's existence and they left administration to those most experienced on these matters-the civil servants - whose influence was particularly great because the Ministers were inexperienced.⁸ This increased power of top bureaucrats enormously.

Moreover, as the direct off-spring of ICS the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)⁹ consisting of a small group of retired ex-ICS members and a few British Officials ascribed itself a role which was be-fitting to that of the colonial age. The role of English and retired ICS Officers during pre-independence period had a permeative effect in the minds of the newly recruited CSP members even after independence. This influence derived its essence from the superiority the

8. K.B.Sayeed, The Central Government of Pakistan, 1947-51 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics and Political Science, McGill University, 1965), p.128. Quoted in Goodnow, n.5, p.29.

9. Civil Service of Pakistan was officially established in 1950.

ICS bureaucrats used to command due to their social background and also due to the amount of discretionary power they were allowed in administrative matters.

The "greatest civil service in the world" as the ICS has often been called recruited young Englishmen and later a small number of Indians and trained them carefully in a literary-generalist tradition which was presumed to impart the virtues of Platonic guardianship.¹⁰ In other words, the sole consideration guiding the recruitment and training of ICS cadres were geared to the imperialist needs of British in which maintenance of law and order had the first priority. They made serious attempt to fathom the socio-political environment, and to enhance their position they employed intermediaries by granting special privileges and opportunities to them.¹¹ Also they had the feeling that people of India were accustomed to having authority exercised by a governing class. Thus they recruited the "youths of a class which were expected to command respect in India".¹² Thus traditionally, the local recruits to the elite bureaucracy in British India came from the land-owning or from the urban rich and western educated

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10. Ralph Braibanti; Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan; a Critique of Sources, Conditions and Issues (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1966), p.98.
 11. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69 (Syracuse, N.Y. :Syracuse University Press, 1971) p.117.
 12. L.S.S. O'Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1901-30, (London; Frank Cass & Co., 1965), p.20.

privileged section of the society. Till the middle of the last century the civil servants who were responsible for administration and policy-making in British India were all British. They were nominated by The Directors of the East India Company. The introduction of open competition by the Charter Act of 1853 broadened the base of recruitment in England, but in India it remained as narrow as ever. This was due to uneven spread of education in India. Western education had been embraced only by the rich landed aristocrats, tribal chiefs etc., and only they could afford to spend much money for the education of their children abroad or in suitable public schools. Therefore, a very few rich people could send their sons to London for competitive examination. Moreover, through the system of nomination which continued till the 1930s the government brought into the service "youngmen of good family and social position". With their classical education and training the British Civil servants were happy establishing law and order and keeping the natives at bay, at the frontier of the Raj. They developed their own brand of self-righteous arrogance, and considered themselves agents of 'good government'. The good government to them was one which could keep crimes down, collect taxes and observe rules strictly. They maintained the Mughal tradition of sumptuous living and official pomp. When they worked in their offices they did it in an environment befitting a Nawab; on a policy matter they used to "speak from a noble and unattainable height, secure not only in the conviction that what they say

or do is right, what ever lesser mortals may imagine for theirs is the power and glory."¹³ The local recruits to the bureaucracy became socialised in the ethos of the civil service and they became highly influenced by the British manners and modes of life. While the landed gentry and other professional classes were relatively free to maintain contact with the people, the senior administrators had few such opportunities. They were inbred in exclusive "civil lines" colonies, that were well removed from the fret and struggle of common man's life.¹⁴ Thus, the attitudes of the public and public servants toward each other were enmeshed in a "complex tangle of awe and artificiality, distrust and disdain".¹⁵ This group of native bureaucrats formed a class who acted as the interpreter between the British and the Indian masses they govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and intellect."¹⁶ This socialization also became easier due to the

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13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, p.293.
 14. Hassan N. Gardezi, "Neo-colonial Alliances and Crisis of Pakistan", in Kathleen Gough and Hari P.Sharma edl, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (Monghly Review Press, New York and London, 1973), p.133.
 15. B.A.Abbas, "Experiences of Major Administrative Reforms for Development" Administrative Science Review (Dacca) 3 September, 1969, p.88.
 16. Emajuddin Ahmed, Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Pakistan and Bangladesh (University Press Ltd., Bangladesh, 1980), p.56.

upper class background of the native bureaucrats.

Thus the Indian Civil Service comprising British and native bureaucrats became most important instrument of British control in India. Members of this Service not only controlled district administration but also the Provincial and Central Secretariats. It may also be noted that Governorships of some of the provinces and particularly those which constituted West Pakistan later, were held by the members of this service. The basic characteristic of this system was that a central unitary structure was imposed on a heterogenous base consisting of regions, castes and tribes etc.¹⁷ In accordance with British practice, the police and military services were subordinated to civil authorities. Thus ICS officials were literally the men who ruled India responsible only to the Governor General of India and the British Government. Rival political institutions to control the bureaucracy were absent and civil servants enjoyed absolute autonomy in exercising their authority. In fact this small coterie of civil servants formed the 'steel frame' which sustained British rule in India.

Thus after partition the segment of ICS in British India, who eventually formed the 'inner circles' of the Civil Service

17. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (London, Oxford University Press, 1968), p.280

of Pakistan and of the bureaucratic elite was a class which was rigid and exclusive with distinctive outlook, attitudes and interests.¹⁸

This exclusiveness is also discernible in regional terms, since most of them were from one particular region of Pakistan i.e. West Pakistan and not from East Pakistan. For historical reasons the Muslims in Bengal remained backward both economically and educationally. It was in Bengal that the British established their domination first and to suit their imperial interests they completely transformed the existing socio-economic structure. In the process the Muslims in general and the Muslim aristocracy in particular were deprived of all kinds of privileges they were used to have as the ruling community. Thus as a result, in the eastern part of Bengal, the Muslims were absent from colleges and high schools. Only at the beginning of twentieth century a small Muslim middle class began to emerge in Bengal. For these reasons, there were only two ICS officers from East Pakistan and upto 1950 only seventeen new recruits entered the Civil Service of Pakistan out of a total of 175 such officers.¹⁹ Even in West Pakistan the disparity in representation in bureaucracy is clearly discernible among various regions. Whereas representation from Sind and N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan in the higher civil services was negligible, it was mainly dominated by

18. Nehru, n.13, p.294.

19. Ahmed, n.16, p.63,

Punjabis. This is because, fully one third of the officers available were in Punjab Government and were Punjabi by birth. Since the Punjab was a predominantly Muslim province, it was inevitable that they would have attained high positions before partition and that they would continue in senior positions after partition. Thus the allegation that Pakistan was dominated by Punjabi official-dom in the early years is partly true, but it was the inevitable consequence of historical factors and not the deliberate machination of any particular regional clique.²⁰ But this fact contributed to a large extent, to the compactness of the top-ranking though not the whole bureaucracy.

Even after independence the same trend continued and in reality there was no sharp discontinuity in the socio-economic or the regional background of the new recruits in Pakistan. Recruitment to the civil services remained extremely limited and the mode of entry continued to remain highly competitive. From 1950 to 1966, 2.48 per cent of those who applied for the examinations entered the Civil Services of Pakistan.²¹

Moreover, the recruitment policy was formulated in a way so as to ensure the entry of the members of well-off sections of society into the Service. A degree from a recognized University is the minimum qualification for appearing in the examination and the candidate have to be of ages

20. Palombara, n.1, p.365.

21. Ahmed, n.116, p.50.

between twenty-one and twenty-five. The examination does not seek to test the specialized knowledge because the philosophy of recruitment of general administrators in Pakistan is based on the view that "for sharing in the direction of government agencies a broadly trained mind is better than one filled with expert knowledge of a special field".²² The written examination consists of three compulsory subjects and thirty optional subjects ranging from pure mathematics and statistics to American history and sociology. The compulsory subjects total five hundred points. The candidate may choose a group of optional subjects whose aggregate value adds upto six hundred points. Those successful in the written tests must then take psychological and viva-voce tests whose combined value is three hundred points.²³ These two tests were "designed to assess their inherent tendencies and capabilities, their personal qualities and traits of character with special regard to their aptitude for Civil Service".²⁴ But the critics of the system point out that favouritism can enter the process at this point, thus

22. Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State, (Chicago, 1957), p.111.

23. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan" in Ralph Braibanti ed; Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Duke University Press, Durham N.C., 1966), p.258.

24. Rafiq Inayat, "The Civil Service Academy" in Inayatullah ed, Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan, (Peshwar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962), p.404.

vitiating the merit "objectively" determined. Moreover, the written and viva-voce parts of the examination are conducted entirely in English. Hence, demeanor, the use of English, and general background, certainly come to play in the viva-voce, and this would tend to give the advantage to those of upper social strata.²⁵

The occupational and income data of the parents of the civil servants reveal that they came from a high socio-economic background. More than twelve per cent of the CSP came from the high landowning families and about fiftynine per cent from the medium landowning families and about twelve per cent from professional groups. The parents of the thirtynine percent of the CSP officers belonged to higher income groups earning more than one thousand rupees per month and the parents of about sixtynine per cent of the officers used to earn more than five hundred rupees per month and above.²⁶

In addition to the upper-middle and upper class background, the CSP officers are also very much distinct by their high educational achievement in a backward country like Pakistan with very low literacy rate. In the 1961 census, only 19.2 per cent of the people over five years of age were found literate.²⁷ In higher education this situation was

25. Ralph Braibanti, n.23, p.259.

26. Ahmed, n.16, p.52.

27. Ibid., p.50.

more depressing. Since a bachelor's degree was the minimum qualification, the base became even narrower. From 1950 to 1966 approximately 1,63,000 persons received bachelor's degrees from ten universities of Pakistan, and from among them 410 CSP officers and about 700 other officers were recruited.²⁸ A large number of them were educated in foreign universities prior to joining the service. These facts reveal that the civil servants were a highly educated group in the society and extremely exclusive.

Even the quota system²⁹ which was introduced in 1950 to minimise the regional disparity failed to achieve the desired objective. It was primarily because of two reasons; first the Muslim refugees from India had established legal domicile in areas where local candidates were few or poorly trained and they were not able to compete with the former. Secondly between the two wings of Pakistan there was a continued disparity in the fields of education both in quality and quantity.³⁰

28. Braibanti, n.23, p.262.

29. Quota system introduced in the Civil Services is as follows:

1. Merit 20%, 2. W.Pakistan 40%, 3. E.Pakistan 40%.
- West Pakistan allotment of 40% is divided as follows:
1. Punjab and Bahawalpur 23%, 2. Sind, Khairpur, N.W.F.P. Frontier States, Baluchistan, Baluchistan States, Tribal Areas 'Azad Kashmir' -15%, 3. Karachi-2%.

Sources: National Assembly Debates of Pakistan, vol.3, Part.II, 1963, pp.901-2.

30. C.P.Bhambri and M.Bhaskaran Nair, "Socio-economic Background of Higher Civil Service in Pakistan", South Asian Studies, vol.6, No.1, January 1971, pp.59-60.

Moreover in the post-independence period the CSP preserved, meticulously, the cohesive strong, corporate spirit which was the hall-mark of British ICS. This was achieved by two structural means: firstly, by the significant role which British officers played in determining the bureaucratic system and its direction of change; and, secondly, by the presence of retired ICS veterans in the CSP composition, which became the chief source of British bureaucratic style.

Some fifty British officers remained in Pakistan's service, and after independence about twenty-eight of the administrative talent available for administrative (as against of judicial) work in the higher bureaucracy was that of British officers. The proportion of British officers diminished sharply, however, and by 1954 only thirteen CSP cadre assigned to administrative work remained. Thereafter there was a continued attrition until in 1965 only three British officers remained.³¹

But the physical disappearance of British officers from Pakistan bureaucracy would not result in equally definite disappearance of British administrative norms. It is significant that British officers retained the Secretary's position in the Establishment Division from the declaration of

31 Braibanti, n.23, p.245.

independence until 1961 except for a brief period in 1959. Moreover, former ICS officers were to hold that important station until 1970.³² It was this office which formulated basic policy and perpetuated the ethos of the ICS. The establishment Division of Cabinet Secretariat was the personnel department of the Federal Government. It was the focal point of all divisions pertaining to the administration of the civil services. It played a predominant role in deciding mode of the entrance examinations, in transferring and promoting officers, in training them both in Pakistan and abroad and in deciding the controversial questions relating to the CSP. The Central Public Service Commission³³ has only the role of conducting the selection of persons for appointment of the services.

Within the CSP, the former ICS officers were very much a class apart. In respect of their education in England, training under experienced British officers, higher pay scale which they enjoyed and, more importantly, the important positions they occupied in the administrative hierarchy, they were different from the non-ICS, CSP officers of comparable rank. But this detachment does not separate the values of the entire group. On the contrary, there is a strong galvanic attraction toward values and behaviour of ICS officers

32. Lawrence Ziring and Robert La Porte, Jr. "Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two views". Asian Survey, vol. XIV, No. 12, p. 1089.

33. Central Public Service Commission was known as Federal Public Service Commission by 1950 and again became Central Public Service Commission in 1962 Constitution.

from all these below. The social chasm merely enhances the glamour of the scene of the upper side.³⁴

It is also of greater importance that these former ICS officers are also in an unparalleled position to mould the behaviour, attitudes and bureaucratic style of the entire ministry in their charge. They are, in turn, the chief sources of radiation of their own bureaucratic dispositions which are essentially British in derivation. The same pattern is found, though with less intensity, in the provincial secretariats, where a small proportion of the secretariship are held by ICS officers but where they staff the most important posts.

Further, the most important factor responsible for the diffusion and perpetuation of colonial values in the bureaucracy was the nature of training the elite cadre received. In post-independence period the British way of training the ICS officers was faithfully imitated in Pakistan. The whole scheme was designed to shape a civil servant's life to fit the role of a ruler. The cadres were kept small and entrance into services was limited to university graduates between twentyone and twentyfive years of age.

The underlying policy in regards to age-limits in Pakistan proceeds largely on the principle that youngmen who would choose public service as a profession must enter the service at an early age, and are not too old to have lost the

34. Braibanti, n.23, p.251.

flexibility of mind which is necessary for shaping them into competent civil servants.³⁵ These were admitted in small batches of not more than thirty probationers a year and were trained as a group for one year in a residential academy described by an American observer as "baronial" very much like Haileyburry.³⁶ The locale of the training was grandiose, the setting was lordly and the environment was marked by feudal distinction. The Civil Service Academy at Lahore was housed in a large handsome building which was at one time the official residence of the Crown's representative in the Punjab with well laid-out gardens and lawns all round. The young 'probationers' lived there and, in a sustained course of one year, came under the direct daily class room influence of the best in the ICS tradition. The surroundings and furnishing were more British than Pakistan; and even the most unimaginative probationer must have sensed that he was indeed, one of the heirs and successors of the former rulers.³⁷ They were always reminded that they were not mere students but the members of the CSP and were enjoined to uphold the traditions. Great emphasis was placed on western style social graces, dress, manners and conversational elegance. Formal dress was necessary and once a week they had to wear evening dress at

35. Chaudhuri Mazaffar Ahmed, The Civil Service in Pakistan, (National Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1969), p.114.

36. Braibanti, n.23, p.100

37. Goodnow, n.5, p.165.

dinner. They had to be members of Lahore Gymkhana which was at one time the exclusive preserve of the British ICS officers. Many evening socials were organized with a view to teaching western 'etiquette' to the new recruits; the text books were western and Shakespeare, Locke and Blackstone were the basic referents.³⁸

In the Academy the training programme began at 6.00 A.M. with an hour of horse-back riding. It was a part of the training programme because the British ICS officers were trained in it. The practice continued because it was considered a part of the culture of the landed aristocracy of the Punjab. The course and the syllabus of the training programme were designed neither to instil in the minds of the probationers a desire to carry on research or an extended study of any aspect of national life, nor to develop a high degree of professionalism. But in one respect it was quite successful in that the young recruits of diverse socio-economic background were welded into a corporate group with its elan and sense of tradition. "The group living and the curriculum format, their detachment from the mainstream of social and political activities, the constant reminders that they were the members of a well-knit group of patriarchal guardians and an emphasis on "Sartorial splendour" served to develop

38. Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.110.

a corporate spirit among themselves and alienate them from the larger society."³⁹ The Academy had been credited with so much success in this respect that its detractors claimed that the probationers after completion of the training programme did not behave like Pakistanis.

After completing the programme at the Academy and a period of field study, the probationers were sent to Great Britain for a year of further training and study at Oxford, Cambridge or London. This training in Britain was similar to that formerly imparted to the ICS officers. The 1949 batch of CSP received training in Australia and from 1950 all probationers spent a year at Oxford, Cambridge at London. The training and study in England had a broadening effect on the outlook of the civil servants and created a sense of affinity in values between ICS officers and the new probationers. Thus there is no serious generational chasm based on ideological differences between the ICS group and the most of new recruits. The care with which British bureaucratic values and social behaviour find common acceptance has a strong cohesive effect and tends to separate the entire CSP cadre from the remainder of the bureaucracy.

Interestingly enough, the indoctrination process does not end with the training but continues and encompass the entire length of the service of each member of the Civil

39. Ahmed, n.16, p.58.

Service of Pakistan. The CSP members make it a regular practice to keep contact at individual level. To cap it all, the CSP members had a national organization - the CSP Association which not only takes a leadership role to protect the interests of the entire CSP community but, at the same time, provides guidelines as to how the CSP members were supposed to conduct themselves in public. Thus, the indoctrination process was not a half hazard one but, a carefully conceived device to perpetuate the elitist character of CSP.⁴⁰

This elitist character of CSP is further reinforced by its exclusive monopoly over key policy-making and policy-implementing positions and by the structural organization and classification of the public services in Pakistan. The division of services into almost completely autonomous cadres subject to overall unifying central control is its most prominent characteristic.⁴¹ The services are divided into three categories: (1) there are central superior services which include such services as the Civil Services of Pakistan, the Police Service and Audit and Account Service, (2) the Provincial Civil Service which staffs largely, the lower levels of general administrative posts at the provincial level, and

40. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Civil Service of Pakistan As An Institution: Reasons for Resistance to Change", Indian Political Science Review, vol.3, No.2, July 1979, p.144.

41. Braibanti, n.10, p.235.

(3) the technical service. In addition to functional cadre divisions, there are class divisions of rank (I,II,III,IV) and spatial divisions (central and provincial).⁴² Among the various categories of service there has been very little exchange of membership. Serving at the apex of the administrative pyramid, the CSP has come to fill the vacuum created by the departure of ICS. The divisions between superior and subordinate services, originally designed to keep the power in the hands of the ICS officers has been maintained. The membership of the CSP has continued to be small and exclusive and many more posts have been reserved for CSP officers than there are members of this service.⁴³ The CSP officers, therefore, enjoy greater opportunity for a wide choice of administrative experiences and of posts than any other service.

42. V.Madan Mohan Reddy, "Role of Higher Civil Service in Canada and Pakistan - A Comparative Study of Two Commonwealth Countries", Indian Journal of Public Administration, vol.22, No.2, April-June 1976, p.162.

43. Year	<u>No. of CSP Officers</u>	<u>No. of Posts Reserved for CSP</u>
1947	158	244
1950	175	332
1954	258	519
1961	379	735

Source: Grovine, n.7, p.329.

To maintain and strengthen its exclusive and elitist character the CSP, with only one exception, refused to include members of other services within its cadres. Originally, fifteen or seventeen officers entered the CSP from provincial services in 1953 and 1954. Due to retirement, in 1965, only five such officers remained in service.⁴⁴ This group was hardly capable of challenging the prevailing ideology of the cadre, and indeed, was small enough to be regarded some what in the edges of the cadre. Moreover, within CSP, promotion was based on seniority alone and no amount of expertise or level of education was good enough for anyone to break this barrier and join the CSP at the middle or top level positions. The real reason behind the refusal was that the CSP feared that through lateral entry competent people from technical and other services would join the service thereby diluting its homogeneous character and minimising the possibilities of its original members to monopolize key and strategic posts. The prohibition of lateral entry showed the caste and closed nature of CSP. As an institution, it was not willing to risk "disruption" by allowing lateral entrants in, with whom the core members of the CSP might not agree on issues and thereby precipitating disharmony and confrontation.⁴⁵ This attitude of CSP has generated much

44. Braibanti, n.23, p.263.

45. Khan, n.40, pp.142-3.

hostility from the lower cadres of the services.

Another aspect of Pakistan bureaucracy which needs to be highlighted is the bureaucrats' attitude towards the politicians. This is important, for, the relationship of higher bureaucrats with the politicians in Pakistan after independence has, to a large extent, been influenced by the pattern of their relationship during the colonial days.

Representative institutions were introduced in British India after the second decade of twentieth and did not really become significant until the third decade was almost complete.⁴⁶ Upto this time administrators had few contacts with the politicians, who by and large represented different interests. The administrators duty involved serving his superior, and his calling required him to support authority irrespective of his personal preferences or feelings. Hence, the administrator, whether he be British or Indian, found his more important functions lay in upholding political order. This often meant suppressing political movements and imprisoning indigenous politicians.⁴⁷ Moreover, those Indian politicians who eventually assumed positions of political responsibility in Central or Provincial Governments from 1937 onwards i.e. after the Provincial elections were held under the Government of

46. Lawrence Ziring, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall of Ayub Khan", Asian Affairs, vol.8, No.5, May-June 1981, p.315.

47. Muneer Ahmed, The Civil Servant in Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.5.

India Act, 1935, found that their association, was normally with more senior administrators in the secretariats and virtually all men were British.⁴⁸ Thus, they were completely out of touch with those Indian civil servants who were holding junior positions in the civil service and who eventually opted for Pakistan thereby forming the corpus of Pakistani bureaucracy. As Egger points out, "The attitude of Civil Servants who did not have contact with political leaders, reflected rather faithfully the attitude of their British superiors, who in general accepted the necessity of representative institutions without developing any particular sympathy for the representatives."⁴⁹ Nowhere this problem was more alarming than in CSP's dealings with politicians in Pakistan. Given their own aversion to politics and contempt in which they used to hold the politicians it was not surprising that there was a wide gulf between the bureaucrats and politicians.

Administrators and politicians are participants in the same societal matrix. It would seem that each group is essential to the progressive development of the other,⁵⁰ while both are essential for the sustenance of a democratic political system. Hence what is required is the mutual rapport between the two and a commitment of one not to encroach upon other's

48. Ziring, n. 46, p. 315.

49. Rowland Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan (Karachi: Inter-Services Press, 1953), p. 5.

50. Ziring, n. 11, p. 116.

sphere of activities. But the CSP was rooted in past; its practices, and policies obsolete; and attitude unsuitable to requirements of a democratic set-up. And at the same time, it was a close-knit and powerful organization, far more matured than the emerging political institutions. Thus in a new-born state like Pakistan the levers of power tilted more towards bureaucracy and it came to acquire an upper hand in state apparatus.

The next chapter is devoted to the analysis of the political role of higher bureaucracy in Pakistan and the factors responsible for this development.

CHAPTER - III
ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN POLITICS
(1947-58)

In the Post-Independence period Pakistan followed the West Minister model of Cabinet Government. This was the natural out-come of the long-drawn British rule in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent which brought the political leaders of India and Pakistan in close touch with the operation of such a system. In the initial phase till 1956 Pakistan came to be governed by Government of India Act of 1935 as adapted under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which was known as the 'Interim Constitution' of the country.

Under Indian Independence Act the Constituent Assembly¹ was given two separate functions; to prepare a constitution and to act as a Federal Legislative Assembly or Parliament until that constitution came into effect. The entire field of governmental activity was brought under the control of the Cabinet which, responsible to the Constituent Assembly, became the real authority, and the Governor General was presumed to act on the advice of the Ministers. The public service was divided into a number of

1. As provided for in the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Constituent Assembly came into being in November 1946.

ministries each headed by a member of cabinet and assisted by a senior civil servant called a permanent secretary.² The Governor General or the Head of the State enjoyed similar status and position as his counter-parts in other Commonwealth countries. The vast discretionary power which he used to enjoy during pre-independence period was lapsed from 15th August, 1947, by the provisions of Indian Independence Act of 1947. His position was analogous to the position of the King in relation to the Cabinet in Great Britain.³ But in practice, the position of the Governor General in Pakistan was not that of a constitutional figurehead and he continued to enjoy wide and substantial powers under the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted in Pakistan. He was the executive head of the Federation of Pakistan and all executive actions of the federal government had to be expressed as taken in his name. Some of the key appointments were made by the Governor General. Thus, he had the right to appoint the Prime Minister, and other federal ministers; the Council of Ministers would

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2. V.Madan Mohan Reddy, "Role of Higher Civil Service in Canada and Pakistan-A Comparative Study of Two Commonwealth Countries". Indian Journal of Public Administration, vol.22, No.2, April-June 1976,p.156.
 3. M.A.Chaudhury, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Puthighar Ltd., Dacca, 1968),,p.151.

hold office during his pleasure.⁴ The Governor General had also power to appoint the principal military officers and the Governors who had authority to choose, summon and dismiss the provincial ministers. The most comprehensive of all was Section 92A⁵ of the Act which vested in the Governor General the power to take over the administration of the state through Governor by the proclamation of emergency in the province. Thus by his power to appoint and dismiss the Governors he could control and even suppress the provincial governments. Although a provincial governor was required to appoint a Chief Minister who had the support of the provincial assembly, he could dispense with both assembly and its cabinet if he had the cooperation of the Governor General.⁶ Thus in

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4. G. W. Chaudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1959), p.19.
 5. Section 92A, Indian Independence Act, reads as follows:
 "If at any time the Governor General is satisfied that a grave emergency exists where-by the peace and security of Pakistan or any part there of is threatened or that a situation has arisen in which the government of a province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation direct the Governor of a province to assume on behalf of the Governor General all or any power, vested in or exercisable by any provincial body or authority".
 Cited in Choudhury, n.4, p.28.
 6. H. F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) p.60.

theory the Government of Pakistan, though remained parliamentary in Nature, the balance of power between the Chief Executive, the Governor General and the Prime Minister, tilted more towards the former.

The real situation in Pakistan was that with the exception of second Governor General the role of the Governor General was unlike that of the constitutional figure-head. His position and powers depended essentially on the quality and the personality of the holder of the post.⁷ In Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the first Governor General. He was the architect of Pakistan, father of the nation, and a towering personality. Acceptance of Governor Generalship by Jinnah had great impact on the relationship between the Governor General and the Cabinet as well as with the legislature in the first year of Pakistan's political career. Even though, in a parliamentary system the position of the Chief Executive is primarily symbolic, politically non-active and usually powerless, Mr. Jinnah chose to become the Governor General and not the Prime Minister, thereby determining the real locus of power. He was chosen by the Muslim League which emerged as the representative organization of the

7. Choudhury, n. 4, pp.30-31.

Muslims of the Indian sub-continent after the plebiscitary elections of 1946, and as such Jinnah could say with ample justification that he was much a choice of the people as the elected head of any democratic state.⁸ This indicates that he had a conception of the role and status of the Governor General which was different from and during his life time the powers which he exercised were far beyond those normally associated with that office. He selected Liaquat Ali Khan, the leader of the majority party in the Federal Legislature as the Prime Minister. But Liaquat owed his leadership of the legislature to Quaid-e-Azam and not to the party. Jinnah also selected the members of the Cabinet and distributed port-folios among them. Liaquat had no say in the selection of his colleagues. Jinnah not only took the initiative in forming the Cabinet, and in formulating the policies of the Cabinet, he also presided over its regular meetings. He was also the Chairman of the emergency committee of the Cabinet and even, summoned and presided over the meetings in the absence of the Prime Minister.

Thus, Quaid-e-Azam was not a mere titular head of the state. In a sense, he was his own Prime Minister,

8. Ibid., p.31.

giving advice and taking decisions till the end of his life.⁹ Liaquat Ali Khan said, "Now that we have got Pakistan, he had not ceased to guide the destinies of the nation. In all important matters he still guides. It is his deep interest in the welfare of the people that he has made him take up much work on himself. We pray that we may have his wisdom and guidance for a longtime to come."¹⁰ The extensive powers were exercised with the consent of the Prime Minister as well as the concurrence of the Legislature. Jinnah also became the President of Constituent Assembly in accordance with the desire of the Cabinet and the Legislature.

Jinnah was the real head of the Government until his death in 1948. The Prime Minister could not be the central figure in the Government and all ministers were virtually overshadowed by the dominating personality of Jinnah. "The possibility of instructions proceeding from the Cabinet to the Governor General did not arise; it was in fact unthinkable. From the beginning it was assumed that the normal conventions of the office of the Governor

9. Chaudhury, n.3, pp.159-60.

10. Mustaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan (2nd ed. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963), p.24.

General could never apply to Mr. Jinnah.¹¹

Thus in the beginning Mr. Jinnah initiated a strong paternalistic executive rule¹² and the government became highly centralized which increased the power of the top bureaucracy. This was also to a large extent the result of the chaotic situation prevailing in Pakistan in 1947, which called for a strong firm executive action. Thus the confusion which existed virtually in every sphere of administrative activity left the bureaucrats in an extremely strong position and made the Chief Executive Jinnah heavily rely on them. Particularly, in the provinces, where most of the ministers had assumed office for the first time, the Governors and the civil servants were extremely powerful. Governors of the three of the four provinces (N.W.F.P., West Punjab and East Bengal) were British and members of the former Indian Civil Service. The Muslim League cabinets and the political machinery were handed over to the control of governors and bureaucrats¹³ because none of the Ministers in the central government or in provincial governments had

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11. Keith B. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), p.132.
 12. Robert La Porte, Jr. Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-making in Pakistan (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1971), p.42.
 13. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Change (New York, Praeger, 1980), p.26.

much experience in administering government departments. The only model of government that Pakistan leaders had known was that of the British vice-regal system in India under which the bureaucrats had exercised their powers most of the time without any interference from politicians. Faced with gigantic problems of refugee rehabilitation and law and order, and being dependent upon British Governors and civil servants who were steeped in vice-regal traditions of bureaucratic government, it was not surprising that Pakistani leaders thought that Pakistan could do no better than to follow the British vice-regal pattern.¹⁴

Like former Viceroy, Jinnah received fortnightly letters from his Governors which gave him a detailed account of everything ranging from intrigues in the provincial cabinets to details of refugee rehabilitation problem. As the direct agents of Quaid-e-Azam, they acted according to direct instruction from Jinnah and sometimes even short-circuited the ministers of the provinces where they presided.¹⁵ Two of the Governors used to preside over cabinet meetings of the ministries and even one was able

14. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan (Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967), pp.62-63.

15. L.R.R. Williams, The State of Pakistan (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p.38.

to allocate portfolios without the approval of the Chief Minister.¹⁶ This type of operation was not conducive to the growth of democratic government or provincial autonomy. The provisions of Government of India Act, 1935, which was criticised as anti-democratic during pre-independence periods was further used by the Central Government of Pakistan to dismiss ministries and clamp Governor's rule on the provinces.

After the demise of the Quaid-e-Azam on September 11, 1948, the issue was whether there was to be Governor General who would be the traditional non-political leader or whether the Prime Minister and his Cabinet would exercise real executive power. Liaquat Ali Khan, wielding the real power, as the successor of Jinnah, chose to become the Prime Minister which meant that the cabinet form of government was to become effective. Khwaja Nazimuddin the Premier of East Bengal and a career politician, who succeeded to the office of the Governor General, appeared to be willing to assume the customary privilege of the office without the authority, status and power that Jinnah had wielded.¹⁷ The political situation came to

16. C.P. Bhambri and M.B. Nair, "Bureaucracy in An Authoritarian Political System" in S.P. Varma and V. Narain ed., Pakistan: Political System in Crisis (Rajasthan University Press, Jaipur, 1972), p.81.

17. Chaudhury, n.3, p.62.

resemble cabinet government as Nazimuddin was appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister and the cabinet who exercised the real power.

But this shift in power at the central level did not impinge on the power of bureaucracy and the same process of bureaucratic ascendancy continued under Liaquat Ali Khan. Thus in 1949, when Muslim League was still in undisputed control of the government, the Constituent Assembly passed what was called the Public and Representative Office (Disqualification) Act popularly known as PRODA, under which the central or provincial government could dismiss a minister found guilty of corruption or misconduct by the tribunal of Federal or High Court Judges set up by the government. Under the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, the central government often resorted to Section 92A or used PRODA to dismiss defiant or corrupt provincial politicians. Thus under Section 92A the provincial Legislative Assembly of W. Punjab was dissolved in January, 1949, the government dismissed and the administration taken over by the Governor. The Premier of Sind Mr. M.A. Khuro was earlier dismissed on the charge of corruption and misconduct in April 1948. Subsequently, it remained the scene of its usual see-saw for political power between competing and intriguing politicians which resulted in several dismissals and ministerial charges during 1948-61. Only

the N.W.F.P. was an exception, thanks to the stable but severe regime of Khan Abdul Quiyam Khan.¹⁸ In East Bengal after Khwaza Nazimuddin assumed Presidentship, the Muslim League Party in legislature wanted to elect a leader for the post of Chief Minister but the provincial Governor was instructed by the Governor General to appoint Nurul Amin as the Chief Minister. Subsequently, H.S.suhrawardy formed a new political party - the Awami League Party - composed of a number of disenchanted Muslim Leaguers. This was the beginning of regional conflicts which dominated the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly.¹⁹

The people of Bengal were unhappy with Muslim League and Central Government chiefly on three scores: they were being ruled by civil servants belonging to West Pakistan whom they considered unsympathetic to the province; the Central Government had not given proper attention to their needs and problems; and Karachi was turning a deaf ear to their demand for making Bengali a state language.²⁰ Thus as early as 1948, it was reported: "feeling is growing among the Eastern Pakistanis that

18. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service" Pacific Affairs, (vol.XXXI, No.2,1958) p.131.

19. Dr. O.N.Malhotra, "Full Circle in Pakistan", India Background vol.2, No.16, July 1977, pp.707-8.

20. K.K.Aziz, Party Politics In Pakistan, 1947-58, (Islamabad, 1976), p.15.

Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a 'colony' of West Pakistan".²¹

Even during the period of Liaquat Ali Khan no serious attempt was made at setting up of democratic institutions or to prevent bureaucracy to actively interfere in the political processes. Had Liaquat wished he could have made a bid to establish political authority over the bureaucracy. But he was a man who had never exerted himself much in the field of administration and financial and economic policy; he was quite content to leave such policy making to officials while he pre-occupied himself with foreign policy (Liaquat was Foreign and Defence as well as Prime Minister), especially Kashmir and India. He was also faced with keeping together his fast disintegrating party, the Muslim League, of which he was President.²² Thus, as a result, during first five years of Pakistan's existence, the political situation left the bureaucracy in a position where it could have an effective "authority" if not actual control, over the, ministers and politicians".²³ This was primarily due to the power

21. Sayeed, n.14, p.64.

22. Hamza Alvi, "The Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan" International Socialist Journal (Rome, vol.3, No.14, March-April, 1960), p.174.

23. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol.1 (London, 1968), p.320.

and authority enjoyed by the first two leaders of the country.

But after Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in 1951, there was no nationally recognized leader to succeed him as the country's political chief. The leaders of Muslim League, the landlord politicians from West Pakistan lacked the imagination or resources to develop grass root support throughout the country or the skill and machinery to run the government.²⁴ "In the constituent Assembly and all the provincial legislature, the league had overwhelming majority and the main opposition was the group of Hindus. But they could never hope to oust the government. The non-League Muslims were also hard to find and were not keen to draw attention to themselves. Thus the monopoly of power soon gave rise to factions and internal conflicts inside the League.²⁵ Although, Pakistan had strong leaders there were too many of them and they were too strong for each other. What there often seemed to be was a total lack of loyalty to any ideal or set of principles or even to the country on the part of these party leaders. Thus it was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power.²⁶ Also the reactionary policies of the Muslim League, defended so aggressively and with so much self-confidence by some of the brasher leaders, led to a situation where the less

24. Sayeed, n.13, p.5.

25. Ahmed Hussain, Politics and People's Representation in (Feroz & Sons Ltd., Karachi, 1972), pp.24-25.

reactionary and progressive members began to leave the party. Mian Iftikharudin, a well known left wing leader resigned as Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation in the Punjab Government and set up a new radical party called Azad (Free) Pakistan Party. Opposition came from the Awami (People's) League, which had been set up in East Bengal by H.S.Suhrawardy, and the Jinnah Awami League, set up by the Khan of Mamdot, a rich landlord who had lost out in a faction fight with other landlords in the Muslim League, and had subsequently been removed as the Chief Minister of the Punjab in 1949. Thus, "while the League had been gradually sliding down towards the abyss of its extinction, it had simultaneously been giving way to the emergence of new power groups and parties in the political scene of the country. The immediate power group which came to acquire the authority in Pakistan's politics was the civil service."²⁷

Even most of Pakistan's basic problems remained unsolved. There were no general election during the uninterrupted four years of Liaquat Ali Khan and no constitution has been adopted. The disputes with India over Kashmir, the use of canal waters and refugee and evacuee property problems continued to contribute to the tense relations between

27. K.P.Mishra, M.V.Lakhi and Virendra Narayan; Pakistan's Search for Constitutional Consensus (Impex, India, New Delhi, 1967), p.17.

the two countries. Pakistan's economy seemed to have no sense of direction. Under these circumstances the cabinet picked up Ghulam Mohammad to be the new Governor General replacing Khwaja Nazimuddin. In these crucial times the cabinet evidently preferred to rely on an experienced administrator and ex-civil servant instead of a career politician.²⁸ But his choice was not at all happy one. Trained as a public accountant and having served in a number of princely states in British India, he had been brought into the Cabinet by Liaquat as technician in charge of Finance. Once in that position he had gained considerable political power, mostly by aligning himself with Punjab landlords. He had no affinity with the Muslim League politicians nor his training and background did he cultivate in him any respect for emerging political institutions of Pakistan.²⁹ On the other hand, the decision of the cabinet that Nazimuddin should step down to head of the government did nothing to establish the tradition that the Governor General should hold aloof from every day political life.³⁰ Thus bureaucracy's direct participation

28. Goodnow, n.6, p.69.

29. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-77 (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.21.

30. Callard, n.11, p.133.

in politics began with Ghulam Mohammad becoming the Governor General. The bureaucratic elite headed by him now wanted to transform the power structure by relegating the Muslim League politicians to a position of insignificance and by introducing new elements into the position of authority in the country.

Soon after his appointment as the Governor General the Bengali-Punjabi rivalry, inside the cabinet which was not wholly dormant in Liaquat's time exhibited itself fully. The Bengali group had a majority in the parliamentary party while the Punjabi group was aided by the Governor General and some senior bureaucrats who had scant regard for democracy. Nazimuddin appeared to be unequal to the critical and intriguing political situation and failed to provide effective leadership to the country. There were differences inside the cabinet and he could not dominate his cabinet or carry his colleagues with him. His open advocacy of Urdu as the only state language in Pakistan and refusal to recognize Bengali, in a public speech on 22 February, 1952, during his tour of the province led to a serious movement in East Bengal. It was a cultural movement and took violent turn in which some people lost their lives and many people suffered from long terms of imprisonment. A more serious problem arose at the same time in West Pakistan during 1952-53, orthodox religious groups in Punjab launched propa-

ganda and held demonstrations against Ahma-dis, a religious sect among Muslims who refused to accept that Muhammad was the last of the Prophets. Serious rioting occurred in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistan towns in February and March 1953. Economic conditions of the country had been steadily deteriorating, and measures which were taken to remedy the situation were proved to have been ill-conceived and inadequate, and they failed to stop the riot. It was obvious that the country was facing a crisis in several fields at the same time. The Governor General and his friends were alarmed at what they considered to be the incapacity of the government to take firm action. On April 17, 1953, the Nazimuddin Ministry was dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad though he still enjoyed the support of the majority of the members in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Dawn's comment that "on the night of April 17, 1953, a government headed by the President of Muslim League was flicked off like the ash from a cigar tip"³¹ was a dramatic confirmation of the bureaucracy's ascendancy to political powers. The initiative for the dismissal of Nazimuddin's government came mostly from civil servants and particularly from Iskander Mirza, who was then

31. Dawn, 27 October 1954.

Defence Secretary.³²

The dismissal of a Prime Minister by the Governor General, the first in Pakistan's short history abrogated the major conventions of Cabinet Government and Parliamentary supremacy.³³ First, the tradition of the impartiality and neutrality of the Governor General had been demolished. The Governor General, it seems, took part in party politics and identified himself, secretly though not overtly, with those elements in the cabinet who were opposed to the Prime Minister. This was clearly both unconstitutional and unparliamentary. Second, the convention of cabinet and party solidarity had been disregarded and finally, the role of the legislature as the maker and sustainer of the government had been seriously weakened. It was an action also directed against the legislature and was an assertion of supremacy of executive over legislature. As Wayne A. Wilcox put it:

The removal of Nazimuddin was tragic only in that the Constituent Assembly allowed the Governor General to dictate terms. Once the integrity of the chamber was breached, regardless of cause, representative government in Pakistan was irreparably weakened.³⁴

32. Sayeed, n.14, pp.70-71.

33. Aziz, n.20, p.12.

34. Wayne A Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, (London, 1963), p.171.

After dismissing the Nazimuddin's government from office, Ghulam Mohammad stepped out of his role as the formal and constitutional head of the state, and appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra, then Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, as Prime Minister. He was not a member of the legislature and as the nominee of the Governor General he owed his position entirely to Ghulam Mohammad. Even Bogra did not have much voice in selecting ministers in his cabinet and his ministers were chosen entirely by Ghulam Mohammad. Eight members came from Nazimuddin's cabinet and three members joined the cabinet at the intimation of the Governor General. The Prime Minister appeared to be not in the picture. Most of the decisions in the cabinet were taken by the Governor General in consultation with a group of influential ministers and he even presided over the meetings of the Punjabi coterie which was an inner cabinet.

In the provincial elections held in East Pakistan in 1954, the Muslim League, the ruling party was routed by the United Front (UF), led by the Awami League of H.S. Suhrawardy and the Krishak Sramik Party of A.K. Fazlul Huq. The defeat brought home to the Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly the fact that they had not properly represented the interests of East Bengal. On the other

hand, the Twenty Point Programme³⁵ on which the UF fought elections was a radical programme in any content. For the bureaucracy and the ruling clique of the centre it amounted to a virtual revolution.³⁷ According to their calculations "the UF had emerged as the most menacing challenge to the continued domination of Punjabi led ruling coterie. They had the fear that the UF might succeed in obtaining far-reaching provincial autonomy and thus stamp out the political economic exploitation by the Punjabis".³⁸ Thus the bureaucracy headed by Ghulam Mohammad and other bureaucrats who were now in complete control of the levers of power in the country, stepped in to suppress the democratic aspirations of the

35. It demanded equality between the provinces and provincial autonomy for East Bengal. Thus Point 2 demanded that all incomes derived from rent should be ended without compensation, and that surplus land be handed to landless peasants. Point 4 & 7 required that irrigation be improved, agricultural co-operative be set up and measures to boost agricultural production be implemented; Point 3 demanded that the jute trade be nationalized. Other points included requests that discrimination against Bengalis in the armed forces should cease and that naval headquarters be transferred to East Pakistan; that the various Safty Acts which allowed for imprisonment without trial be repealed and all political prisoners released; and that ILO conventions regarding labour be put into practice.

Source: Tariq Ali, Military Rule or People's Power (Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1970), p.61.

36. Ali, n.35, p.62.

37. J.K.Ray, Democracy and Nationalism on Trial: A Case Study of East Pakistan (Simla, 1968), p.108.

Bengali people. This was sought to be achieved by appointing Major General Iskander Mirza "a semi-fascist bureaucrat who had distinguished himself by aiding the British to crush the Pathans"³⁸, as the Governor in the Eastern wing. Iskander Mirza's administration in East Bengal wrote The Times was "remarkably like the administration of one of the bigger colonies"³⁹.

Soon after the coalition ministry was formed under the Chief Ministership of Fazlul Haq, the leader of Krishak Sramik Party (KSP), there were riots in industrialised areas between Bengali and non-Bengali Muslims. Although the Communist Party had won only four seats in the 309 man provincial legislature there were reports of increasing communist propaganda activities. Fazlul Haq, the new Chief Minister, was reported to have made a public statement that he was in favour of making Pakistan's eastern province an independent state.⁴⁰

At this point Governor General Ghulam Mohammad charged Fazlul Haq with 'treasonable activities, and under his emergency powers dismissed the entire provincial cabinet on May 30, 1954 - at a time when it enjoyed the overwhelming support in the East Pakistan Assembly. The mass suppression that ensued nearly 1300 persons were arrested -

38. Ali, n.35, p.63.

39. The Times, 2 December 1954.

40. Goodnow, n.6, p.62.

including a member of Fazlul Haq's cabinet and 32 other members of the recently elected provincial legislature. Fazlul Haq was placed under armed guard at his home. The press in Dacca, the Capital of the province, was subjected to pre-censorship. Army contingents in East Pakistan were reinforced and Pakistani Air Force planes dropped leaflets explaining the reasons justifying the government's action.

In the meantime, Mohammad Ali Bogra allied himself with the members of the group in the Constituent Assembly, who were strongly critical of Governor General's action following the dismissal of Nazimuddin's Cabinet. The Constituent Assembly grew impatient of the manner through which the Governor General began to exercise his power, and sought to place curbs on the power of the Governor General. In a melodramatic fashion, a bill was passed by the Constituent Assembly which provided that the Prime Minister could remain in the office as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the Federal Legislature. In other words, the Governor General on his own could not dismiss the Prime Minister. On October 24, 1954, the Governor General retaliated by proclaiming a state of emergency and dissolving the Constituent Assembly. Though Mohammad Ali Bogra was again asked to constitute new ministry, the real powers

now rested in the hands of administrators with the army standing behind them.⁴¹ The new cabinet was called a ministry of "all talents". The minister of Interior was Iskander Mirza, former Governor of East Bengal. General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army became the Defence Minister. Choudhury Mohammad Ali, formerly a civil servant, continued as the Finance Minister, an office to which he was appointed in 1951.

One of the best example of the Governor General's use of his powers to force the acceptance of an unpopular decision of great political and administrative significance occurred in 1954-55. In 1954 the Western Wing of Pakistan consisted of three provinces (Punjab, Sind, and North West Frontier Province) and a number of other units of which the most important were Khairpur, Bahawalpur and the Baluchistan State Union. With a view to eliminate East Bengal threat to West Pakistan based bureaucratic authority, the same group of civil servants and military officers forced the unification of West Pakistan into one province, euphemistically called 'One Unit'. The reasons for this move were well expressed in the famous 'Daultana Document' which stated, "A fragmented West Pakistan has really nothing to ask of East Pakistan because the realities of the situation in any conceivable constitutional pattern

41. Malhotra, n.19, p.709.

would already have given East Pakistan an incontrovertible superiority."⁴² The expert committee appointed to examine the various aspects of the proposal of One Unit included, G.Ahmad, Secretary, Ministry of Interior; Aziz Ahmed, Cabinet Secretary; and E.A.Franklin, the Cabinet Joint Secretary.⁴³ The ostensible purpose behind this scheme was to give West Pakistan more efficient administration. But in reality the West Pakistan rulers, through this scheme, were aiming at forestalling any possibility of domination by more populous eastern wing. Particularly, the Punjabis were apprehensive that even under the parity⁴⁴ system of representation in the Assembly, Bengalis might exploit the differences among the provinces in West Pakistan. If a Bengal ruled by the united front

42. T.Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development: Case of Pakistan, 1947-58 (Dacca, Green Book House, 1971), p.168.

43. Quoted in C.P.Bhambri and M.B.Nair, n.16, p.85.

44. In the middle of 1955, agreement was reached between the leaders of East and West Pakistan on a constitutional arrangement which included federal parity between the two wings. But this was almost immediately broken as the West Pakistan's leaders taking advantage of the division among East Pakistan's leaders provided for a much stronger Central Government in the constitution of Pakistan enacted in 1956.

Sources : Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests And Political Change: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

(New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1982),p.9.

combined electorally with smaller units of West Pakistan they would be in a permanent majority, and the privileged Punjabi elite, comprising landlords, businessmen and bureaucrats would stand to lose political and economic control.⁴⁵ The Bogra government totally dominated by these groups wanted to capture power both in the centre and in the One Unit Government and hence, by Section 92-A the Governor General eliminated all those Chief Ministers who opposed one unit formula. The Chief Minister of Sind, Bhawalpur, the N-W.F.P., and West Punjab fell from office one after another.⁴⁶

This manoeuvre provided a more effective counter-balance against the Bengali since it prevented them from making alliances with provincial sub-divisions of the West wing and thereby capturing political power at the centre. This administrative unification also further strengthened the hands of civil servants as it removed the politicians away from the locus of power i.e. the district.⁴⁷

The bureaucratic ascendancy at the central level reached its pinnacle when in August 1955, ill health forced Ghulam Mohammad to resign, and Iskander Mirza replaced him

45. Ali, n35, p.65.

46. Sayeed, n.14, p.134.

47. Masihuzzaman, District Administration and Other Essays (Manuscript, 1964) pp. 140-41

as acting Governor General. Being a civil servant he himself followed Ghulam Mohammad's ruthless policy of continuous intrigues to divide and defame the politicians. "His adroitness in confusing opponents", writes Rushbrook Williams "by playing one off against the other, and getting his own way in the end became proverbial."⁴⁸ Like Ghulam Mohammad, who disrupted the Muslim League in 1953, by dismissing Nazimuddin's ministry, Iskander Mirza also tried to break up the solidarity by trying to install those leaders who were not bound by any party discipline. Thus when the time for Chief Minister of West Pakistan arrived he nominated Dr. Khan Sahib, who did not belong to any party. He was willing to be kept in office by the Muslim League vote but did not want to join the party. "The issue involved in West Pakistan political crisis was clear: on the one side there was a parliamentary majority which demanded its democratic and constitutional right to form the cabinet and on the other hand was a nominated Chief Minister who wanted to stay in power against the decision of the majority members of the legislature".⁴⁸ In order to frustrate the plans of opposition Dr. Khan Sahib on April 23, 1956 announced the formation of a new political party, the Republican Party with the full backing of Iskander Marza. At the same time legisla-tive

48. Williams, n.15, p.153.

49. G.W.Choudhury, "Constitution of Pakistan", Pacific Affairs, vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1956, p.251.

branches of the new-born party were established in Provincial legislature as well as in the central legislature. Many politicians deserted Muslim League and joined the new party. Thus, the Republican Party came into being because of the splits within the Muslim League. It was formed largely to prevent certain Muslim Leaguers notably Khurram and Daultana (Khurram had been the Chief Minister of Sind and Daultana, of Punjab. Both were in Dr. Khan Sahib's cabinet until April 1956) from taking power. Apart from personal loyalties and enmities and a desire to remain in office there was little in common among the Republicans".⁵⁰ This was clear illustration of the President's antipathy towards the parliamentary system and his determination to appoint safe men in key positions.

In East Pakistan, the President could depend upon several influential members of the KSP. With a view to consolidate his influence over the politicians, he also disrupted the unity of the Awami League in East Bengal by offering offices to Suhrawardy and his followers who became willing tools in his hands to the detriment of Bengali interests. By disrupting organised political parties, offering lure of office to discredited politicians

50. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, (Cornell University Press, New York, 1965), p.491.

and gradually eliminating opposition to his bureaucratic set up, he consolidated his power to such an extent that there seemed to be no political force left to challenge his authority. The bureaucracy with the help of its political stooges hammered out a constitution in 1956 which gave enormous power to the President, and thus granted a constitutional legitimacy to the bureaucratic rule.

But this bureaucratic ascendancy was not going to last long as it came to be challenged by army though an apolitical force, yet was much more organized and more powerful. The army of Pakistan brought up in old British tradition kept aloof from politics in the initial stage. But as a disciplined force it was ready to support any government which was determined to maintain law and order. Thus in the precarious conditions obtaining in Pakistan after partition, it helped the Central Government who in order to prevent total breakdown sought the help of army. Later due to the deterioration of political situation, regional and sectarian intolerance, student problems, the call on the army became more pressing. The most prominent of all the instances of riots beyond the control of police were the riots in Karachi (1949), Dacca (1950), Anti-Ahmadi riots in Punjab (1953). The army was asked on all the occasions to control the situation and restore the

authority of the civil government. In fact, army was the natural ally of the civil bureaucrats and was always available on a standby basis if force was required. Had Ghulam Mohammad not enjoyed the support of the army he could not have dissolved the Constituent Assembly. In times of Iskander Mirza (Governor General from 1955 to 56 and President from 1956 to 58) it also assisted the authorities in other civilian matters. One of the most important jobs was the "Operation Closed Door" in 1957 which had as its objective the suppression of the extensive smuggling activity from East Pakistan to India. In these matters they carried out their assignments with efficiency and dispatch, and sometimes their work was compared with that of civil service much to the disadvantage of the latter.⁵¹

Thus one major implication of army taking part in civilian affairs was that if bureaucracy was to continue in power, it must have the long term support of the army. But gradually the situation deteriorated to such an extent that it even went beyond the control of baseaucracy.

The political bankruptcy of the landlords and bureaucrats had reduced the country internally to a complete mess. Chronic political instability became the order of the day; majority formed during the day became minority at night due

51. Goodnow, n.6, p.101.

to intricate and backdoor political manoeuvring. Survival, more than any other thought, preoccupied the minds of the politicians.⁵² And away from the cesspool of political intrigue, important developments were taking place in the provinces. The Muslim League was again gaining popularity in West Pakistan and in East Pakistan the Awami League had fair chances of emerging as a majority party. Moreover, the peasant organizations were beginning to elicit an encouraging response from the peasantry in East and West Pakistan; industrial strikes were on the increase. These developments did not please the bureaucracy or Iskander Mirza. He thought that if elections were held under this state of affairs there was not much hope of stable government emerging in the provinces and in the centre. It was also clear to him that there was no prospect of his getting re-elected as the president. In addition to these factors influencing the President, there was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Ayub Khan, whose counsel weighed more heavily with the President, than that of any one else.⁵³ Ever since his appointment in January 1951, he had been in close contact with the political leaders and also with the top bureaucrats. Also, this

52. Khan Mohammad Mohabbat, "Civil Service of Pakistan As An Institution: Reasons for Resistance to Change" Indian Political Science Review, vol.13, No.2, July 1979, p.146.

53. Sayeed, n.14, p.92.

continued stay in office not only gave him chance to watch the polarization of politics from very close quarter, but also to consolidate his position in the Army.⁵⁴

The military's decision to interfere directly came only after it became apparent that Mirza had exhausted all possible political alliances⁵⁵, and that the national elections scheduled for 1959 would bring political forces to the forefront which were hostile to the bureaucratic military rule. Thus in a chaotic situation where central and provincial governments had been rendered in-capable of discharging their normal functions, pressure was being brought to bear upon Ayub by senior Generals that the time for drastic actions had come. Furthermore, there were also signs that the younger officers might stage a coup.⁵⁶ A broad tactical outline to impose Martial Law in the country was prepared and it received the approval of Ayub Khan. Thus, President Mirza staged a coup in October 7, 1958, dismissed cabinet that held the confidence of National Assembly suspended the Constitution and imposed Martial Law with the full backing of General Ayub Khan. But later he

54. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Second Revised Edition, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1976), p.81.

55. Shah D.Khan, "Military and Politics in Pakistan", Strategic Digest, vol.9, No.2, February 1979, p.98.

56. Williams, n.15, pp.182-83.

was forced to resign on October 27, 1958 and the mantle of presidency fell on Ayub's shoulders.

Thus the period 1947-58 was marked by bureaucracy's ascendancy in Pakistan's politics. Firstly, during the period of Mr. M-A. Jinnah and his successor Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan the Government became highly centralized and the top civil servants effectively controlled the entire administration in the provinces. Secondly, after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan the power of Muslim League steadily declined and the bureaucrats led by General Ghulam Mohammad and then by Major General Iskander Mirza captured the decision-making power in the central government. Political forces which were to put a check to growing power of bureaucracy were absent. In the West Pakistan the landlord-politicians by constant intrigues against one another often rendered themselves impotent against predominance of bureaucrats. In the East Pakistan since the political leaders were more powerful, and often championed the cause of provincial autonomy, the bureaucracy acted as the 'steel framework' in order to maintain the national unity of Pakistan, and perpetuated its authoritarian rule in the provinces.

Thus the administrators virtually ruled the country in partnership with army till 1958 where bureaucracy enjoyed the role of senior partner. But in the meantime, in

order to face the serious economic and political crisis it relied more and more on the army. This gradually strengthened the power of the army and resulted in the coup of Ayub Khan in 1958.

The military take over was followed by far-reaching changes in country's political and administrative structure. And it was now a different situation in which bureaucracy came to operate. So the following chapter would analyse the changes in administrative structure in Pakistan and its impact on the political role of bureaucracy.

CHAPTER - IV

BUREAUCRACY UNDER MILITARY RULES;
AYUB AND YAHYA PERIOD

The military coup of October 1958, was the direct result of the bureaucracy's failure to construct a viable party-system in Pakistan. The absence of a stable political party to run the state on parliamentary line created political instability which was further aggravated by widespread civil unrest, leading to a state of anarchy. This gave military the justification to intervene and to rule the country in the coming years.

After the promulgation of Martial Law and assumption of Presidentship by Ayub Khan, hold of bureaucracy on the levers of political powers did face a temporary set back, but it did not diminish altogether despite the fact that now the army was at the steering wheel. The military rule lasted for a decade and was marked by two different phases. The first period (1958-62) was dominated by the army; the generals were the senior partners in the dictatorship, ably backed by the civil service. The years that followed (1962-69) however, saw bureaucracy reasserting its dominant role in the country's politics: it was now senior civil servants rather than the military cohorts of Ayub Khan who determined the policy.

But change in the partnership between army and bureaucracy was not without stresses and strains. The capture of

political power by military had far-reaching impact on the political administrative set-up of Pakistan and particularly on the bureaucracy which had been on the front line since independence. Though a natural bond existed between these two institutions due to their colonial descendance, yet the military take-over posed a threat to hitherto existing bureaucratic supremacy. It was, partly because military had come to stay in power and, partly, because the regime held the CSP responsible for the misdemeanours of the politicians. The actions which the new government took was directed first towards the public servants, not because their moral stature was markedly inferior to that of the politicians, but because there were more of them, because they were closer to and had more dealings with the public. Moreover, instruments for disciplining government servants were close at hand whereas, in case of delinquent politicians, the instrument had to be devised. And of course, the politicians had departed, while the government officials were still performing their duties.¹

The initial step in this direction was the appointment of military officers in key civilian positions. Three senior generals from the army joined the Central Cabinet and within

1. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of Martial Law Administration, (Oxford University Press, London, 1967), pp.70-71.

one month of the declaration of Martial Law (October 7, 1958), 272 military officers were appointed either to administer civilian departments directly or to oversee the working of those civilian officers who were left in their places.² For the first time in history of the country, the civil secretaries in Karachi, Dacca and Lahore began to receive firm orders from the bosses in the cabinet. Moreover, the new regime was marked by considerable ideological ferment characterized by a comprehensive scheme to change across the entire spectrum of political and social life. One of the objectives of the regime was the cleaning-up of the public life of Pakistan.

Thus early in 1959 in rapid succession the Public Conduct Scrutiny Ordinance, 1959 and Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959 were promulgated. These authorized extraordinary screening procedures, defined the scope of "misconduct" and "inefficiency" and specified punishment.³ The goal of these measures was not only to weed out "undesirable elements" but also to deter the public servants from indulging in malpractices in the future. Included in this scheme of change was the reformation of the structure of civil

2. S.J. Burki, "Twenty Years of Civil Service of Pakistan: A Revaluation", Asian Survey, vol. IX, No.4, April 1969, p.247.

3. Karl Van Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.189.

administration in the country. For this purpose, a Pay and Service Commission was appointed by the government in August 1959. The Committee was headed by A.R. Cornelius, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The fact that Justice Cornelius had always been critical of the role of elite CSP clearly shows the anti civil service stance of the military regime in the initial phase. The action taken against many of the public servants were all the more significant in view of the fact that prior to the military regime, the tenure of the higher civil servants was protected by constitutional guarantees. These constitutional provisions were removed by a Presidential Order in March 1959. Further more, the actions against civil servants in 1959, were taken by military officers and by high-ranking civil servants acting with military 'encouragement'. Although there had been much talk of corruption and inefficiency prior to the 1958 revolution, the civil servants acting alone had never seriously tried to cleanse their own ranks.⁴

In this process, 1660 Federal Civil Service Officers were punished and 819 of them were dismissed or compulsorily retired. They ranged from a Charged Affairs abroad who was retired because of inefficiency to senior secretaries of

4. H. F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 254.

Government, police affairs and those belonging to the once notoriously corrupt supply department. Eightyfour of those punished were holding important posts and twelve among them were CSP Officers.⁵ In addition to the punishing of corrupt officials, the President and his top military deputies repeatedly spoke of the need for lateral recruitment, the creation and expansion of certain scientific career, services and promotion by merit rather than by seniority. All these ideas and actions of military regime created much tensions and anxieties in the higher bureaucratic circles.

Moreover, the humiliation the bureaucracy suffered in the hands of the regime resulted in considerable decline in its prestige which was further evident from an editorial of the government censored press which read:

"However depressing it may be, the fact must be faced that during recent years, a stage had been reached where the honest men in the administration or public life rather than the corrupt were regarded as oddities. No branch of the administration could claim to be free of the curse; and from the chaprasis and petty clerks to the highest paid officials, each category of public servants bred so many blacksheep that in the eyes of the people, no one was really above suspicion. Things were so bad in certain offices that honest officials - and there are many who did not join the scramble for illegal gains - found it more embarrassing to work in this

5. New York Times, 8 July 1959, Quoted in
Ibid., p.252.

atmosphere and they were sometimes even discriminated against for refusing to play the politician's dirty game.

A section of Pakistan Civil servants has always imagined that Pakistan was created solely for their personal benefit, and not satisfied with accelerated promotions and inflated salaries they sought to a-mass wealth by every fair and foul means".⁶

The Martial Law was not intended to be a revolution as it was often called. But at least in one respect, it was a marked shift from the previous governments, because, the present administrations could claim that they could take quicker decisions. Thus the greatest contribution that General Ayub Khan made was that he removed a number of legal and political obstacles so that civil servants could carry on the day-to-day administration efficiently and implement policies designed to bring about social and economic development of the country as professed by the military government. But, indeed, Ayub could not always be sure that the civil service and the army could continue to remain loyal to a regime which did not have constitutional legitimacy. Thus, the only course open to him was to carry out the promise he had made when he had seized power - "to restore

6. Pakistan Times (Lahore), 16 November, 1958.

democracy - the type that people can understand and work",⁷ and, above all, to initiate the process socio-economic development which a backward country like Pakistan most desperately needed. He had certainly no intention of going back to the 1956 parliamentary constitution which according to him, was an unholy, wed-lock of the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the state in which the ultimate power for good government remained illusive, undefined and therefore, in-operative.⁸ He had made it clear that his intention was to convert the Martial Law" into a document which will form the basis of running the country.⁹

Thus in the new constitution (which was brought into being on June 8, 1962) the Government of Pakistan emerged as Mohammad Ali has described it, as a Government of the President, by the President, and for the President.¹⁰ The new constitution legitimized a condition of centralized rule endowing the President with overall powers. In 1962 constitution departed radically from the 1956 document. A "Controlled" National Assembly was provided and similar bodies

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7. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p.100.
 8. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, (Karachi, Pakistan Publication) I., p.96.
 9. Ibid., p.58.
 10. Dawn, 12 April, 1963.

were installed in the provinces. In an assembly elected under the system of Basic Democracies,¹¹ which obviously favours the government it was difficult to imagine that the government would face serious opposition. On the other hand, given the coercive and patronage powers of the Government, it was easier for it to mobilize the necessary support in favour of its policies. Moreover, debate and discussions were the only powers permitted to the legislators, power of the purse remained with the Chief Executive and he appointed Governors in both Provinces.¹²

Thus during Ayub's period, the constitutional framework had undergone a fundamental change from a parliamentary to a Presidential system. As administration is given a pre-eminent position in this centralized state, within administration the role of elite bureaucracy gradually became paramount. The fact that the retirement age of public servants was raised from fifty-five to sixty in 1962 constitution shows

11. On the first anniversary of the Military Government October 7, 1959, the President promulgated Basic Democracies Order. It provided a five-tier system of councils. With the Provincial Development Advisory Council was the highest range on the ladder and Union Councils in rural areas and Union Committees in the cities. The primary bodies were to be directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise with one councillor or Basic Democrat representing from 800 to 1500 persons. They were also given important function of electing the President and representatives of the people in the National and Provincial Assemblies.

Sources: Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1970), p.107.

12. Robert La Parte, Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-making in Pakistan (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1971), p.57.

that the regime could not easily afford to dispense with the services in view of the shortage of trained and experienced civil servants.¹³

Moreover as the Military Government gradually attained stability the civil service tried to cope with the changed environment. The initial crackdown had frightened the CSP into submission. It did not criticize the military and their plans largely because, it felt that whole-hearted acceptance was needed to safeguard its own positions. It also perceived that Ayub's take-over could well prevent the eruption of a more explosive revolution from below, which it saw coming in the anxious events before the martial law regime.¹⁴

On the other hand, the regime soon took care to restore the civil bureaucracy's confidence. Within a few weeks the army was sent to barracks; and following the initial shocks, the screening procedure was substantially relaxed.¹⁵ The civil servants' quick rehabilitation is indicated by the influential positions soon assigned to them by the Ayub regime. "Of the 280 members of the thirty-three commissions formed by the regime for the purpose of suggesting substantive

13. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis; Pakistan, 1962-68 (London, Oxford University Press, 1972), p.32.

14. Albert Grovine, "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan", Middle East Journal, vol.19, Spring 1965, p.324.

15. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure of National Integration (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972), p.58.

policy changes mainly 60 per cent were members of the civilian bureaucracy; only 6.4 per cent were military; and 5 per cent each were lawyers, judges and scholars. Politicians comprised barely 1.4 per cent of Commission's membership.¹⁶ Even the cabinet of Ayub Khan was basically civilian in nature since important portfolios like Finance, Commerce and Food and Agriculture were given in the hands of the members of bureaucracy.¹⁷

Moreover, the Establishment Division of the President's Secretariat changed the recruitment policy for the civil service and opened the CSP to young military officers - a privilege that the CSP had always denied to other civilian services. This was, indeed, a marriage of convenience while it lasted. Most of the army and navy officers who joined the Civil Service of Pakistan, had very close connections with the top echelon of the military hierarchy. No wonder, that the military developed a vested interest in preserving the separate identity of the civil services.

The Establishment Division tried to preserve the elitist status of the civil service by adopting a training

16. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, Duke University Press, N.C., 1966), pp.311-14.

17. C.P. Bhambrī and M.B. Nair, "Bureaucracy in Authoritarian Political System" in S.P. Verma and V. Narayan, ed., Pakistan: Political System in Crisis (Jaipur, Rajasthan University Press, 1972), p.89.

policy which provided the young civil servants with the sort of expertise most needed in a developing country. The adoption of the new policy was made possible by some of the decisions taken by the military rulers. In 1959, the central government discontinued the training programme under which all CSP recruits were sent to Oxford or Cambridge for one academic year. In stead, it favoured in-service training concept that had been so vigorously advocated by several American Public Administration experts. Three new institutions - The Pakistan Administrative Staff College at Lahore, the National Institute of Public Administration at Karachi, Dacca and Lahore, and the Pakistan Academies of Rural Development at Comilla and Peshawar were set up to accomplish this. These institutions were also supposed to serve the purpose of removing barriers between different services by offering equal opportunities of training to all civilian officers.¹⁸ But since the members of CSP were appointed as the directors (heads) of these institutes and were in control of Establishment Division¹⁹ they could seccessfully sidestep this egalitarian principle. "In 1964, the Establishment Division laid down the rule that young civil servants beginning with the batch of 1959, would be sent abroad for advanced training in economic community development, public administration and finance and accounting. By 1968, 67 officers of the Civil

18. Burki, n.2, p.249.

19. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Civil Service of Pakistan As An Institution: Reasons for Resistance to Change", Indian Political Science Review, vol.13, No.2, July 1979, p.141.

Service of Pakistan had studied in 17 American and British Universities. Most of these Officers obtained degrees or diplomas in economics, in Public Administrations, in Community Development and in Finance and Accounting".²⁰ The new regime, by supporting the civil servants from pursuing traditional fields, encouraged them to go into new and from their point of view, more pertinent disciplines. This change in training policy has made it possible for the CSP to base its claim to an elitist status on superiority in training rather than on inheritance from the ICS.

Changes were, also brought about on organizational level. In this context the organization in secretariat is of much importance. The Secretariat consists of ministries and divisions in the central government and both ministers and secretaries assigned to them. Within this larger secretariat is a smaller President's Secretariat consisting of six divisions; economic affairs, planning, scientific and technological research states and frontier regions, cabinet and establishment. The grouping of these divisions - some of which were formerly ministries - directly under the President, removed them from political, ministerial control and placed them exclusively within bureaucratic channels.

20. Burki, n.2, p.249.

Each of the divisions is headed by a secretary who may report directly to the President and the Cabinet Secretary is the co-ordinator of all secretaries of ministries and comparable units in the central government. Attached to the President's office is personnel secretariat consisting of about thirty-five persons under the direction of the President's personal secretary.

Traditionally, Secretaries to the Ministries had status rivalling if not exceeding that of ministers to whom they were nominally subordinate. This was a consequence of the fact that in imperial days secretaries were British ICS officers and ministers were Indian politicians. This relationship had not been completely changed although the ethnic and imperial differentials had been supplanted by other factors.²¹

During Ayub regime the power of Secretary was further augmented because during 44 months of the declaration of Martial Law there were no ministers heading the departments in the provinces and only a few ministers (frequently changed) in the central government. The administrative implications of so large a proportion of ministerial vacancies are worth considering. The first is that a ministerial vacancy

21. R. Braibanti, "Higher Bureaucracy in Pakistan", in R. Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic System Emergent from British Imperial Tradition. (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1966), p.335.

threw the policy and administrative direction of the ministry or the department to the secretary, who was responsible only to the cabinet secretary and the President. "Thus it eliminated political interference and assumed professional bureaucratic domination of both policy and execution".²² This happened to a remarkable degree in the central secretariat. It had also occurred by reducing former ministries or equivalents to divisions and grouping them directly under the President. By this means and through ministerial vacancies eight important ministries or equivalents were removed from political control. This same pattern was found in the provincial secretariats. In West Pakistan where there were eight ministers for sixteen departments four of the eight ministers held two portfolios each in East Pakistan, no minister held two portfolios and about thirty per cent of the ministerial posts were vacant. In both cases, much of the control was thereby thrust into exclusively bureaucratic channels. This situation was a temporary phenomenon as it was valid till September 1965, only seven months after elections. But even the fact that this situation prevailed for seven months after election is not without interest.

There is another element to be added here, namely,

22. Ibid., p.336.

the parliament secretaries, who though remained the voting member of the National Assembly, were responsible to the President. Since there were only six ministers but eighteen parliamentary secretaries, in most cases the parliamentary secretary worked with the secretary rather than with the minister. This contributed to a situation where-in political influence was sedated and controlled by professional bureaucracy without being eliminated entirely.

Another important aspect of the secretariat had been the continued separation of policy making and executive functions. The secretary of the ministry confined his function to policy-making, planning, direction and control; he left technical considerations and implementation to attached departments and other subordinate offices. This system had been roundly criticised by technically oriented officials as they come to feel that technical considerations were not given due emphasis and were not only demeaned the prestige but subordinated at every turn to ICS-CSP Secretaries who were not equipped to deal with technical matters. "The Economic pool - a supra-administrative service which could draw its members from all the civil services made it possible for technical financial officers to man positions in the ministries of Finance, Economic, Commerce Affairs etc."²³ By dividing such technical ministries as Health, Labour and Social Welfare, Industries and National Resources, and

23. Burki, n.2, p.248.

Agriculture and Works into divisions, it was possible to appoint as division head a joint secretary who was a technical officer. The admission of technical executive in a few positions may appear in-consequential but in actuality it was very important for it admitted such technical incumbents to the inner circle of the secretariat for the first time. Beyond that it was not much of an effort to diminish the power of elite bureaucracy, for division heads were still responsible to the secretary of the ministry, who in almost all cases was generalist CSP Officer.

In the provincial secretariats the same pattern had also been manifested. Here the ministerial vacancies and enlargement of the Chief Secretary's staff had removed important sectors of activity from the political arena and the administrative domination was even greater than in the centre. Since department secretaries had been of varying seniority and had come from various cadres, there had been a tradition of somewhat more direct control and co-ordination by provincial Chief Secretary. The role of secretaries expanded as the provinces became responsible for the execution of a larger sphere of governmental programme. Likewise, the responsibilities of provincial secretaries in local government increased, as they came to supervise division commissioners in their substantive spheres. The existing administrative tiers - i.e. Secretariate, Directorates (equivalent to

to attached departments in the Central Government), divisions, districts and sub-divisions were retained and divisions, especially, were strengthened. More 'functional authority' was allocated to lower levels of government, while retaining policy authority in the provincial secretariat. These adjustments were characteristic of administrative modernization in Pakistan which was to suit the requirements of Ayub regime. But it did not amount to the sacrifice of ultimate generalist and bureaucratic control and any revolutionary departure from pre-partition structure.

There was fundamental change in the attitude of the civil servants which helped them to maintain their superior status. The civil servants changed their former law and order outlook to an orientation favouring development especially rural development.²⁴ The orthodox bureaucracy had always been accused of being anti-democratic and showing little enthusiasm for transferring responsibilities to the elected local bodies. But during Ayub's period it abandoned this approach towards community development and came out in full ^{SUPPORT} of "democratic decentralization" and "economic development from below". The fact that Ayub regime incorporated these old cliches into its political and economic programme no doubt helped the CSP to adopt a more sympathetic approach toward local self-government and community development. Also the Basic Democracies Order of 1959, gave the civil servants

24. Jahan, n.15, p.59.

working in the divisions and districts "controlling power" over the new local bodies. Under the system created by the Order, CSP Commissioner presided over the Divisional Councils and CSP (or Provincial Civil Service) Deputy Commissioners were the Chairman of the District Councils. It is not surprising therefore, that the CSP displayed such enthusiasm in setting up local bodies under the system of Basic Democracies. "The system of Basic Democracies stopped the erosion of power of the CSP; by being the undisputed leaders of the local communities the civil servants commanded authority not as the agents of law and order, administration but as the representatives of an "avowed" welfare state".²⁵ And with the launching of the massive Rural Works Programme in 1962, aimed at developing the rural areas by further activating the local councils the CSP Divisional and District Administrators obtained a new lever of power: control over developmental funds. These funds had been released every year by the Government to the district administrators for financing small development schemes formulated by the local councils. Thus the isolation and aloofness of the past gradually slackened and the civil servants came to "play the role of a guide, educator, practical thinker and

25. Burki, n.2, p.250.

innovator.²⁶ Moreover, the quick rise of entrepreneurial elite under the regime eroded the civil servants' hold on urban areas. Through the control of Basic democracies and the works programme, the civil servants found a new base of power, the rural gentry.²⁷

Thus during the regime Ayub Khan, the bureaucracy did undergo certain changes which were brought about at the initiative of the military leadership. In the initial phase the actions of Ayub Khan may be interpreted as an attempt to "socialize the bureaucrats in a new pattern of a political nature, reducing their power and privilege".²⁸ But taking into account the overall power and status of bureaucracy, however, it is apparent that he failed in all these attempts. During the forty-four months of martial law extending from October 7, 1958 to June 8, 1962, the political process was kept in abeyance. Even after restoration of constitutional government in 1962, followed by the emergence of political parties, politicization had been sedated so that its interference with administrative modernization was minimal.²⁹

26. L.Ziring "The Administration of Basic Democracies", in Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed. Administrative Problems of Pakistan (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press), p.43.

27. Jahan, n.15, p.59.

28. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-69, (Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1971) pp.140-41

29. Braibanti, n.21, p.350.

This sedation was accomplished by an indirect electoral system, the retention of elements of classic unitary state, the paramountcy of administrative process and the partial curtailment of public liberties. Thus, the CSP officers found this environment more congenial to operate. The military regime under General Ayub Khan, though it professed a revolution which primarily intended for public consumption, was satisfied with minor tinkering of the CSP.³⁰ The Pay and Service Commission which was appointed by the regime made proposals for integration of various services and the creation of a national service, abolition of special privileges of CSP and reduction of CSP's control on the departments manned by specialists. It was clearly a revolutionary document and given these drastic goals it is not surprising that the Report was put in cold storage during Ayub's tenure. Infact, the Ayub government continued to rely upon the Civil Service of Pakistan as an instrument of the vice-regal, colonial-style that it inherited and encouraged.³¹ As regards the CSP, it jealously guarded its prerogatives and privileges, and during the Ayub period, successfully sidestepped efforts at integration and reform. Given the limitation of political party activity, the CSP remained the

30. Khan, n.19, p.146.

31. Robert La Porte, Jr., "Pakistan and Bangladesh", in Robert N.Kearney, ed., Politics and Modernization in South East Asia (New York, Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975), p.123.

dominant organization and continued its management of law and order, the colonial legacy inherited from its British overlords.³²

But, however, this centralized administrative system was not a fool-proof mechanism and, gradually, it developed a number of serious troubles. Because of the lack of effective control by elected representatives, the bureaucracy became corrupt and inefficient. Favouritism and nepotism grew unchecked, as also incompetence and red-tapism. Further, Ayub Khan and his coterie introduced a new vice in the administrative machinery. During his regime for the first time, political faithfuls began to be rewarded with public offices. The moment the process of giving posts to people on political considerations rather than on merit started, the quality of administration began to fall rapidly. People with no administrative experience and requisite qualifications, were put in positions of power. The result was two fold: "first, the quality of administrative work suffered and inefficiency set in; second, administration did not remain politically neutral which is necessary both for the sake of efficiency and public confidence".³³ People who got public offices by dint of political loyalty grossly misused their

32. Lawrence Ziring, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall of Ayub Khan", Asian Affairs, vol.8, n.5, May-June 1981, p.312.

33. Pakistan Observer, 12 February 1971.

power and played ducks and drakes with public money. They committed all sorts of wrong behind the shield of their political masters. A large number of political appointments were made in government's autonomous bodies with power to manage their own finance, free from the delaying bureaucratic snarl in the government. This affected their quality of work in the long run. Even the permanent services were politically infiltrated. Many politically motivated appointments were made in them - a fact which has a lot to do with the rampant inefficiency and corruption which came to characterize the bureaucracy during the last days of Ayub regime. Added to it was an attitude of contemptuous arrogance towards the rest of the community in the services, founded upon the conviction of absolute superiority over every one with the possible exception of Ayub Khan himself.³⁴ This incurred much displeasure and hostility from the lower ranges of the administration. And, indeed, Ayub's down-fall was due in no small measure, to the activities of his favourite bureaucrats.³⁵ As Ayub Khan used bureaucracy to serve his short term political ends, the result was that the latter themselves became a vested interest group and misused power against the popular interest and created mass dis-satisfaction against the regime.

34. Feldman, n.13, p.256.

35. Statesman (Delhi), 9 December 1969.

The simmering discontent resulting from suppression of civil liberties, and created out of the political and economic disparities between the two wings led to a strong demand for regional autonomy by the Eastern wing. This assumed the character of a mass upsurge against the regime towards the end of 1967. Ayub unable to tackle the situation had to step-down from Presidency on March 25, 1969. Thus the bureaucracy was, now confronted with a different situation which threatened its power. The CSP, though, collaborated with the regime, had worked out an institutional arrangement which was designed to out-last any one military-turned-civilian leader. Hence, although, most of the political appointees and loyal CSP Officers might have regretted the departure of Ayub Khan, the collective bent of CSP was to ensure a smooth transfer of leadership.³⁶

Thus after the collapse of Ayub regime General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army was brought to power by the military supported by the civilian bureaucracy. The second martial law which was declared on the day Ayub resigned, was very much a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the military elite to maintain the position which had been threatened by the mass movement of 1968-69.³⁷

36. La Porte, n.12, p.72.

37. Jahan, n.15, p.186.

BUREAUCRACY UNDER YAHYA KHAN:

The rule of Yahya Khan from 1969 till the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the emergence of civilian government under Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was only a transitory phase. His regime never tried to bring about any change in the overall political frame-work handed down to him by Ayub. As a political leader he cannot be compared with his predecessor. Unlike Ayub, he never had the plan to transform socio-economic set-up of Pakistan, and his rule was mainly to meet the crisis situation obtaining in Pakistan. But, even his short tenure was quite significant in the context of military bureaucracy relationship. The political set-up under Ayub was heavily bureaucratized in order to perpetuate his one-man rule with the result that bureaucrats played a decisive role at the level of decision-making.

And infact, one of the causes of Ayub's down-fall was believed to have been over dependence on senior civil servants. The new regime was determined to avoid similar mistakes and, therefore, made sure that no senior bureaucrats were able to get near Yahya Khan.³⁸ Thus, military personnel rather than bureaucrats came to play prominent role at the level of decision-making. The men immediately next to Yahya Khan were General S.G.M. Peerzada, as the Principal Staff

38. G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (Bloomington, Indian University Press, 1974), p.49.

Officer, and General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Army Chief of Staff. The significant thing is that access to the Chief Martial Law Administrator were usually through them as he gradually passed on to them more and more responsibilities. Other people around him were Lt. General Gul Hassan, Chief of the General Staff, and Major General Ghulam Umap, Chief of National Security.³⁹ Thus with the advent of Yahya Khan the Government conspicuously took a military cast.

After his assumption of Presidentship on March 31, 1969, it was felt that he would form a civilian cabinet with the members of the former Presidential Cabinet of Ayub Khan. But he dashed hope of a civilian cabinet by appointing a council consisting of the three military leaders who had been assisting him in enforcing martial law. The Council of Administration which he himself headed included his three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators - Lt. General Abdul Hamid Khan, Vice Admiral S.M. Hasan and Air Marshal Noor Khan.⁴⁰ Moreover, he appointed his top Martial Law aides in West and East Pakistan.

The regime's organization was such that civilian functions were to be performed alongside military ones. On April 1, 1970, the President dissolved the One-Unit persona-

39. Kenneth Espana Bauzon, "Breakdown of a Military Regime: The Case of Pakistan (1969-71)", Asia Quarterly No.2, 1977, p.127.

40. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 4 April, 1969.

lity of West Pakistan and restored the four provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Thereafter, on April 22, the Governors assigned to the province, including East Pakistan recommended the dissolution of Basic Democratic System" of local government. This was replaced by a system where in committees would have to be elected by the people strictly on the basis of adult franchise. The provinces were under the administration of a Governor, who was appointed by the President. The Governor's powers, however, were undermined by the parallel functions of Martial Law Administrators (MLAs) at provincial level. The Governors, though, they were mostly officers occupying a civilian office, were, nevertheless, subordinated to the Head Quarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (HQMLA) in Rawalpindi. While the Governors were responsible for the civil administration, ultimate responsibility belonged to the MLAs.⁴¹

President Yahya Khan's first step to clean up the administration was taken in June 1969 when he called upon the senior government servants and officials to submit declarations of their assets on prescribed forms of the most detailed character.⁴² In the subsequent period what followed was a major purge of civil bureaucrats by Yahya Khan. A

41. Bauzon, n.39, p.126.

42. Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-71, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p.25.

major probe into the civil service was ordered by the President and the reviewing committee was asked to submit recommendations for its re-organization within three months. It was not the kind of probe Ayub himself had ordered on assuming power in 1958. At that time it had been merely a screening operation. But now it was mainly aimed at punishing the top bureaucrats who, according to Yahya Khan, "not only played politics for the greater part of the twenty-two years since independence but whose activities came to be considered as one of the prime cause of public resentment and demonstration that led to the overthrow of President Ayub Khan".⁴³

In the process of scrutiny President Yahya Khan suspended no fewer than 300 senior civil servant in Pakistan on charge of corruption, abuse of authority and other forms of misconduct.⁴⁴ Mr. Altaf Gauhar, the most powerful civil servant during the Ayub regime, who was also among the principal architect of its doom, figured prominently in the list of those on whom the axe had fallen. "Of the central quota among the suspended bureaucrats nearly fifty per cent of them belonged to provincial civil services - the largest contingent consisted of members of the central engineering service. But the number of officers belonging to CSP was

43. Hindustan Times (Delhi), 14 November 1969.

44. Times of India (Delhi), 8 December 1969.

as high as thirty eight. Other officials included sixteen high police officers, eleven members of the Pakistan Taxation Service and equal number of senior functionaries in Customs and Excise.⁴⁵ Since among the suspended officials thirty eight belonged to CSP, which had been enjoying high position in Pakistan, their ouster badly shook public confidence in the administrative organization and led to growing demand for reform.⁴⁶ Thus, the President Yahya Khan set up a special committee to consider whether the various administrative services - among them civil, police, foreign, taxation and postal - could be amalgamated. But these sorts of reform measures could not be taken further due to the political instability during this period.

Thus, the bureaucracy under General Yahya Khan faced the real threat to its power, and given the political situation in the country, it was not in a position to survive the shock and reassert its dominance, as it did during Ayub period. The suspension of large number of senior bureaucrats by Yahya Khan, also typifies the changing relations between bureaucracy and military. The homogeneity between military and bureaucratic elite which existed previously was the product their upper class back-ground and western-orientation in terms of education and training. They had their roots

45. Statesman (Delhi), 9 December 1969.

46. New York Times (City Edition), 7 June 1970.

in colonial era and their functions as two important institutions were complementary in sustaining dictatorial form of government even after independence. But the homogeneity was, now, severely damaged. A greater divergence of class origin, educational level and outlook - between the senior bureaucrats and the ranking army officers was discernible towards the end of sixties. Also with the absence of popular leadership as a third party to mediate between these two forces their differences became sharper, and hence harder to resolve. This led to the subordination of one by the other rather than a partnership of equals.⁴⁷ This reflected in the accentuated anti-civil service bias of the army officers during Yahya Khan's period. Thus, the rule of Yahya Khan marked the beginning of the decline in the power of bureaucracy which also equally affected its role as a political force in the country's politics.

47. Eqbal Ahmed, "Pakistan: Signpost to a Police State", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.4, No.4, p.428.

CHAPTER - V

BUREAUCRACY UNDER CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT
(1971-77)

A study of the political role of the Bureaucracy from 1971 until 1977 has to focus on two major changes that had occurred in the Pakistan's political scene. The first one was the break-up of Pakistan leading to the independence of Bangladesh and its impact on administrative set-up of Pakistan, and second, the emergence of civilian government under the leadership of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the series of administrative reforms carried out by his government.

The success of Bangladesh liberation struggle and Pakistan's military defeat at the hands of Indians greatly undermined the prestige of army. The responsibility for the defeat which was taken as a national humiliation by all sections of Pakistanis was ascribed to military which had been managing the state in the preceding decade. It also adversely affected the bureaucracy, the main ally of military during Ayub period. The highhandedness of top civilian bureaucrats during Ayub period was still alive in the minds of people and the purges during Yahya Khan of the senior bureaucrats had not been able to efface this feeling. Further the partition of Bangladesh led to dislocation and disorga-

nization of both military and civil service with the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) declining from a total strength of about 500 prior to war to 320.¹ The CSP had suffered even a greater loss of prestige and status than military.² Thus, the aversion towards military bureaucratic rule was translated into a popular movement for the restoration of democracy and popular participation in governmental processes. Though the military regime had little interest in democracy, it was not in a position to tide over the popular pressure. Thus it had no other way but to hand-over power to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP) on 20 December 1971.

On the other hand, Bhutto's political success in December 1970 elections reflected the political, social and economic discontent which prevailed among the middle-class and lower middle-class in the West Pakistan to a certain extent this discontent manifested itself in an anti-elitist feeling upon which Bhutto, through his advocacy of "Islamic-Socialism", was able to capitalize. His rural supporters (mostly landless labourers) wanted land; his urban

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1. Robert La Forte, Jr., 'The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Twenty Years of Power and Influence', Asian Survey, vol. XVI, No.12, December 1974, p.1098.
 2. Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision making in Pakistan, (Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1971), p.121.

supporters (middle-class professionals and urban labourers) wanted employment and better wages. Broadly, the demands for political participation, participation opportunities were the demands that were articulated into the Bhutto's government which was considered as an agency for changing the status quo. And one obvious target for change was the existing structure of bureaucracy. Bhutto thought that the concept of the "neutrality" of bureaucracy was a colonial legacy. He believed in committed bureaucracy which should act as an agency of the party to implement its policies and programmes.³ Bhutto's PPP in its manifesto expressed its lack of confidence on the prevailing concept of bureaucracy and preferred a liberal, dynamic bureaucracy "not based on the old British colonial pattern".⁴ He was against the unmaintainable, abominable status quo and promised an end to corruption and maladministration. The ideas and proposals in administrative reform which was regarded as an urgent matter were best exposed in PPP's manifesto:

"The present system of Administration is a legacy of colonial rule; any modification introduced were to promote the interests of groups holding the levers of powers within government and administration; the administration has thus become its own master."⁵

3. Dr. K.L.Kamal, Pakistan: The Garrison State (New Delhi, Intellectual Publishing House, 1982), p.46.

4. Nazim, Babus, Brahmanas and Bureaucrats; A Critique of Administrative System in Pakistan (Lahore, People's Publishing House).

5. Ibid., p.11.

On March 20, 1973, addressing the nation by Radio and T.V., Bhutto announced the termination of what he chose to call "Naukarsahi".⁶ The use of such terms and the context in which they were employed were clearly aimed at enlisting the support of a population grown weary with administrative inaction and apparent indifference. Thus Bhutto's declaration was met with a positive response which no doubt reinforced his popular standing. This was specially true among the intelligentsia who sensed new opportunities when Prime Minister Bhutto noted, "the country would no longer condone a system which elevated the 'generalist' above scientist, technicians, professional expert, artist or teachers."⁷ The PPP manifesto and Bhutto's subsequent speeches made it clear that a "Socialist regime will need a different structure of administration",⁸ and only those dedicated to hard work would be welcome; it was also made clear that numerous top officials would have to go given their association with former regimes. When Bhutto came to power, he found the CSP powerful and well entrenched. Of the 300 senior positions permanent secretaries in the central and provincial governments, chief secretaries of the provinces, heads of the public corporations, commissioners of

6. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan Bureaucracy: Administrative Reforms", Asian Survey, vol. XIV, No. 12, December 1974, p. 1088.

7. Pakistan Times, 21 August 1973.

8. Nizim, n. 4, p. 11.

divisions and deputy commissioners of districts - 225 were occupied by members of CSP.⁹ The Constitution of 1956 and 1962 gave the civil servants recourse to courts order provisions that protected their rights while in service. While the constitutional guarantees gave an exceptional sense of security to all civil servants, when combined with the system of reservations of posts for one part of the bureaucracy, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), they created what Bhutto called the 'Brahmins'¹⁰ of the administrative structures. Such concentration of power amongst a small group of people was resented by members of other services as well as by the politicians. For a number of reasons, some of them personal and some of them political, Bhutto could not afford to let such a great deal of power repose in the civil bureaucracy. He had experienced both the power of the civil service and its arrogance. As Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ayub's Cabinet Aziz Ahmed a prominent member of the CSP who was also the permanent secretary of the Ministry helped him to reorient Pakistan's foreign policy from a total commitment to the West to a relatively neutral position between the US, Soviet Russia and China. Once Bhutto was out of power, members of the

9. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1980), p.99.

10. Ziring, n.6, p.1087.

same bureaucracy were able to demonstrate the effectiveness of a bureaucracy in frustrating a renegade politician. S.M. Yusuf, a CSP, the successor of Aziz Ahmed in the foreign ministry helped to reorganize the ministry so that those bureaucrats who remained loyal to Bhutto were removed from the positions of any importance. Finally, the Divisional Commissioners, under orders from CSP chief Secretaries - Manzur Elahi in Sind and Afzal Agha in the Punjab - used a combination of laws to prevent Bhutto from holding heavily attended public meetings.

Bhutto's personal conflict with a number of civil servants and the need to limit the power of the bureaucracy to allow a greater degree of freedom to the politicians were two important reasons for administrative reforms of 1973. He had other motives as well for bending the steel frame. The concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, made possible by the constitution of 1973, could not be brought as long as a powerful civil service continued to exercise "great deal of independent discretion." Thus in order to assert the supremacy of the elected leaders Bhutto thought it necessary to curtail the power of bureaucracy drastically. He also wanted to open position in government to the supporters of the politicians in power. And finally, another factor was the ideological conflict between the senior bureaucrats and a number of influential

leftists in the Bhutto government. The left wanted to bring about a fundamental change in the structure of Pakistani society. A number of civil servants opposed these policies. For the ^{left} to be able to implement its programme it was clear that not only did the CSP have to be eliminated but the strength of the services had also to be reduced.

Bhutto began his tenure with the wholesale dismissal of some 1300 civil servants.¹¹ Twice he made big purges in Pakistan's bureaucracy, and either dismissed or demoted most of the officers with whom he ever had confrontation or whose loyalty he ever suspected. He violated most of the norms of placements, promotions, transfer, etc. and gave some prestigious assignments to junior officers or to the persons not belonging to the civil service of Pakistan.¹² He also eliminated the privileged position of the CSP and the other central services. Neither his interim constitution (adopted in April 1972) nor the constitution adopted in April 1973 included guarantees afforded to the civil service in 1956 and 1962 constitution.¹³ The withdrawal of constitutional guarantees and making the civil servants answerable to the head of the administration were

11. La Porte, n. 2, p. 118.

12. Kamal, n. 3, p. 46.

13. La Porte, n. 2, p. 120.

steps taken to reduce the power of bureaucracy. Once all the Ordinances and Acts aimed at reforming the civil administration were on the books¹⁴ and once the CSP had been abolished the senior civil servants could no longer act with the degree of independence that was available to them under the previous administrations. The diminution in the power of the civil bureaucracy made possible the concentration of powers in the hands of the Prime Minister.

In April 1972, he formed Administrative Reforms Committees which was entrusted with the task of overhauling the bureaucracy and to review the past effort on Administrative reforms. The Committee's Report stressed "Specialization, functional qualifications and equality of opportunity."¹⁵

Correspondingly, the reforms introduced by Bhutto's government were channeled in various ways: All the services and cadres would be merged into a unified grading structure, with equality of opportunity for all who entered the service at any stage, based on required professional and specialized

14. The New Administrative Structure was created with the promulgation and/or passage of the civil servants Ordinance 1973 (XIV of 1973), Service Tribunals Ordinance, 1973 (XV of 1973), the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1973 (XVI of 1973), The Civil Servants Acts, 1973, The Service Tribunals Act 1973, The Federal Public Service Commission Act, 1973 etc. Sources: Burki, n.9, p.215.

15. Ziring, n.6, p.1086.

competence necessary for each job; All "Classes" among government servants would be abolished and similarly replaced by a unified grading structure; The use of 'service' labels would be discontinued forthwith; the unified structure would enable promotions to higher posts throughout the range of public service, through horizontal movements from one centre to another; There would also be scope for out-of-turn promotions ^{of} exceptionally able officers; The correct grading of each post would be determined by job evaluation; and there would be provisions for entry into government service for talented individuals from private sector in the fields; such as banking, insurance, industry and trade.¹⁶

Thus on September 14, 1973, the civil service and the police service of Pakistan (PSP) ceased to exist as separate services. In the name of President of Pakistan ^{these} All Pakistan services were merged into All Pakistan unified Grades. No purge was intended by the notification and all officers who held the positions in the CSP and PSP prior to the announcement were appointed in their existing post to the All Pakistan 'Unified Grades'.

This was an important action from several different points of view. First, the government fully intended to retain the great majority of officers associated with these

16. Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (Delhi Vikash Publishing House, 1978), p.127.

now defunct services. Their privileged and protected status, however, was terminated. They were to be given new functional categories and their future made dependent on meritorious performance. Competition rather than reservation appeared to be the key concept in the new arrangement. Officers in senior posts, however, were not to be retained where there was any hint of dissatisfaction at the political level. Thus, high ranking members of the CSP were first to go. Heretofore, distinguished officers such as S.G.Ahmed, M.H.Sufi, D.K.Power, M.A.Qarni, Qamarul Islam, Manzoor Illahi, Rifat Pasha Sheikh, Inayatullah, Abdul Qayam, and Ali Hasan were all notified of their impending retirement.¹⁷

Another aspect of the new administrative system was opening of the heretofore closed cadres so that horizontal movement between them would be possible. In this way technical personnel could take up position in the posts reserved strictly for the generalists. This also made it possible for outstanding officers to earn out-of-turn promotions. On the whole the grading of each post was to be done through scientific job evaluation and seniority ceased to be a principal consideration.

Provision had also been made for entry into govern-

17. Ziring, n.6, p.1090.

ment service through lateral appointment especially talented persons in the private sector were being recruited for key positions in defence procurement, finance, industrial management and other domestic and international commerce. Such lateral appointments were given immediate status, while career officials who once held these posts were forced to serve their alien superiors. The government sought to spread its recruitment not over the scientific, engineering, medical, teaching and general professional communities. In the latter, serious efforts were made to draw economists and accountants into government services.

These reforms were significant because they were intended to modify the composition of the civil bureaucracy and to remove the more obvious elitist selection, replacement and promotion practices that had persisted since the independence. As Bhutto claimed, these measures would help to elevate the status of a specialist such as an engineer, doctors, technician, professor etc. in comparison with a generalist civil servant. This would obviously diminish the power of CSP in the bureaucracy which it enjoyed previously. Given PPP's concern with the building of a new political order it was a necessary step, for PPP could not tolerate a government within the government which was what CSP represented. However, behind the reform there was a strong political motive to harm the opponents of PPP and to reward its loyalists. According to opposition the govern-

ment's plan would raise an army of stooges to help in fostering fascism and all civil servants being the humble servants of the ruling landlords."¹⁸ The bureaucrats were already demoralized because Bhutto had struck at them unpredictably without due process as though the purpose was to terrorize all rather than to punish a few. Bhutto even created a spy system to faithfully report to him about the deeds or misdeeds of the functionaries. In 1972 he built specialized sections of the state apparatus such as the Federal Security Force (FSF) which acted as a political police for the PPP regime, in order to reduce his reliance on army on law and order situation.¹⁹ The force was headed by veteran policemen and the foot-soldiers were recruited from unemployed sections of the urban youth, armed with repressive powers and weapons. Moreover, the bureaucracy was rapidly losing its esprit-de-crops, for Bhutto was placing it with a large "non-professional" political element, that is with party hacks and personal favourites. The imbalances and tensions within the bureaucracy as a whole increased drastically as it split more clearly between its

18. La Porte, n.1, p.1102.

19. The FSF had a total strength of nearly 14000 men in 1974, with about 8000 stationed in Punjab and 6000 in N. W. F. P.

Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1976), p.264.

civil service and national security wings. It should be noted that the latter was the expanding modernizing sector within the bureaucracy; its personnel, proficiency and powers were being rapidly increased. This marked the trend towards using bureaucracy as vehicle for militarizing the civilian life. "It undoubtedly, formed the backbone of the emerging 'police state' during the regime of Bhutto".²⁰ Thus, during the period of Bhutto the bureaucracy was terrorized manipulated and deprofessionalized in order to make it an instrument of eliminating opposition. This greatly affected the role of bureaucracy as an autonomous unit and considerably reduced its power to play any effective role in politics.

But subsequently, after the departure of Bhutto from the political scene in 1977, Pakistan again went back into the grip of military dictatorship. This was the logical outcome of the way in which Bhutto managed the state of affairs during his rule. In fact, the third round of martial law government in Pakistan was clearly related to various developments during the preceding six years of civilian rule under Bhutto.

When Bhutto assumed power the whole state was in doldrums, and he put all the blame on bureaucrats and army

20. Eqbal Ahmed, "Pakistan: Sign-post to a police state", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.4, No.4, (1974), p.428.

generals for Pakistan's misfortune. The successive moves which he took against these two groups were clearly motivated to reduce their power and to ensure maximum freedom for the political leadership in the decision-making. All his measures were quite effective in eliminating the "steel frame" nature of bureaucracy,²¹ as a result of which the role and participation of civil services, as a whole, in the national decision making became more restricted than during the previous regimes. But it led to a situation where a handful of Bhutto's favourite officers, gradually became real decision-makers and thus he failed to eliminate the bureaucratic influence completely. One glaring harm Bhutto did was to destroy the public accountability and replacing it by personal loyalty. He politicized bureaucracy and also bureaucratized politics²² in order to perpetuate his personal rule.

Likewise he took several steps to prevent the return of general to Pakistan's political stage where they had been dominant since 1958.²³ He reorganized the command structure in order to put it under stronger civilian control. He limited the tenure of the service chiefs, retired

21. La Porte, n.2, p.121.

22. Kamal, n.3, p.47.

23. Willian L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime", Strategic Digest, vol.9, No.5, May 1979, p.278.

many senior officials and passed over others in making appointments, in order to ensure the personal loyalty of the top military leadership.²⁴ Among those purged were General Gul Hasan and Air Commodore Rahim Khan, and other army officers who had dominated the government before and during the Bangladesh crisis. Significantly, General Tikka Khan, the "butcher of Bangladesh" escaped purge and became commander-in-chief of the Army and upon retirement, Bhutto's Advisor on Military Affairs. In the end, he promoted General Aai-Ul-Haq, known even then, for his ultra-Right connections, to become Chief of Army Staff, superceding four more senior generals.²⁵

Thus, Bhutto's strategy in creating a 'post-military state', however, was patrimonial rather than institutional. He extended his personal control over the bureaucracy as well as the military, and as one official later described

24. "During his first four months in power, Bhutto relieved from services 27 army officers of Brigadier rank, and above, 7 naval officers of Commodore and above, and 7 Air Force Officers of Group Captain rank and above".

Source: Rizvi, n.19, pp.261-62.

25. Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.8, No.4, 1978, p.484.

it "he acted as if all of Pakistan was his own personal jagir (feudom)".²⁶ During his six years tenure he never tried to establish democratic institutions which would have acted as an effective countervailing force against the army's participation in politics. -On the other hand, Bhutto's populist slogans of 'Islamic Socialism' was not pleasing to the 'military-bureaucratic patricians of Pakistan's political order. Yet they tolerated him because he was the only leader in the country having mass popular support, they relinquished power in his favour being fully aware that he was the only political leader standing between them and a state of complete chaos. For his part, Bhutto mistook their temporary subservience for permanent weakness. Thus he became extremely vulnerable as soon as his support began to drain away.²⁷

The policy Bhutto government followed on economic front was responsible to a large extent for the erosion of his mass base. During his rise to power he was successful in drawing various sections -the rural and urban labourers, middle-class intelligentsia, and students - to PPP's fold

26. Richter, n.23, p.278.

27. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, (Penguin Book Ltd., England, 1982), p.128.

with a promise to bring about radical social change. But after assuming power he tried to deal with the economic situation in a feeble and half-hearted way. Moreover, for political expediency, he entered into alliance with those sections against whom he had built up ^{his} leftist image. The land ceiling was only a step to reduce the concentration of lands in the hands of landlords, but in no way, it was a revolutionary solution to the peasants' problem. His excited rhetoric of 'Islamic Socialism' raised the political consciousness of the peasants but the land reforms introduced by the new regime utterly failed to destroy the grip of landlords, who, particularly in Sind, constituted the PPP leadership. Moreover, the decision to impose state ownership over the wheat-flour, rice-milling and cotton milling industries, far from being a left ward move was in reality designed to aid the rural gentry by removing the links between the middlemen and the rural middle-classes. It had caused a great deal of resentment among the small business interest.²⁸ Thus the failure of PPP government to destroy the grip of landlords in the country side or to prevent their entry into PPP constituted a rank betrayal of those whose votes had elected it to the office in 1970.²⁹

28. Burki, n.9, p.177.

29. Ali, n.27, p.105.

In the absence of change in the countryside the changes in industrial sector proved to be superficial. The nationalizations of the banks and insurance companies and the take over of thirty-one large business (including iron and steel, heavy-engineering, motor vehicle assembly, chemicals etc) frightened the industrialists. This led to massive decline in investment and a flight of capital, but brought no real improvement in living standards for for vast majority of urban dwellers. The government's emphasis on large-scale projects had diverted resources from those that could have helped to absorb labour from growing pool of unemployed. Small businessmen, middle class farmers, industrial labour, the urban unemployed and urban poor had all supported Bhutto and the PPP in 1970. Now they found themselves being badly hurt by regime's economic policies; some by the rise in the prices of basic consumer goods, some by the inability of economy to provide jobs they needed and some by a sharp erosion in the profits they managed to obtain from their modest enterprises. With the exception of urban poor, all other groups were to join first the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) the organization that was to spread its umbrella over nine opposition parties, and later to support the movement that eventually sent Bhutto out of power.³⁰

30. Burki, n.9, p.178.

The sweeping victory of PPP in March 1977 general elections gave the opposition parties (Pakistan National Alliance) a feeling that Bhutto and his followers had massively rigged the elections to his favour. Stunned by its defeat at polls the opposition first decided to boycott the provincial elections. However, Bhutto again went ahead with provincial polls where the PPP once again won handsomely. On March 11, a day after the elections to the provincial assemblies, the PNA decided to go to the streets 'to protest against widespread electoral fraud that had been perpetrated on the nation. This was followed by a mass agitation to topple the government of Bhutto. As this de-stabilization campaign got under way one got the impression that ground was being prepared covertly for a take-over of the movement by Ultra-Rightist elements.³¹ The impression became unmistakable as one examined the composition of the so-called 'democratic movement' led as it was by political parties of extreme Right viz. the Jama' at-i-Islami, Jami'at-i-Ulema (JUI), the Muslim League (ML) and Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Tehrik). Moreover, the demands of the 'movement' were indicative of its temper and purpose; significantly, the chief demand was the Army- the same army whose bloody deeds in Bangladesh and Baluchistan were well known - should form the government and ensure free and

31. Ahmed, n.25, p.477.

fair elections. This situation provided army with another opportunity to regain its lost position. Thus before any political settlement could take place between the warring factions the army seized the country on 5th July 1977 with General Zia-ul-Haq, the Commander-in-Chief being appointed as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.

CHAPTER - VI

BUREAUCRACY UNDER GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S REGIME

General Zia's declaration of martial law vindicated the predominance of army in Pakistan's political scene and in a crisis situation it was the army and not the civil service which was to preserve the status quo by capturing political power. The bureaucracy as a close knit institution has, in fact, lost its autonomous power and vitality. The series of measures taken by Bhutto to place his loyal men in the significant positions had considerably undermined its morale and even after General Zia came to power no attempt was made to resuscitate its vitality. Rather since the time of Ayub Khan it had become a practice of the leaders of one regime to find scape-goats in top bureaucrats for the misdeeds of previous regime. In this context General Zia's government was also no exception. After coming to power he cancelled all irregular appointments made by Bhutto's government by two Presidential Ordinances issued in March 19, 1978.¹ The ordinances covered all political appointments and those made without any regard to maximum qualifications laid down for government appointments. Further, in an address to top officials of Central Government in Islamabad

1. Hindustan Times, 20 March 1978.

in October 1979, Zia said his government was determined to eliminate what he called the virus of politicization from the bureaucracy and to rid it of external loyalties. But he made it clear that unlike the former martial law regimes and Bhutto administration which had indulged in large scale purges of the civil services his government would provide them with a sense of security. At the same time he sought the help of military personnel and bureaucrats to run his government. All Pakistan key economic portfolios were concentrated in the hands of tough minded Army Generals and bureaucrats in the new non-party political cabinet formed in April 1979. Of the thirteen ministers in the new cabinet six were connected with armed forces.² Lt. General Fiaz Ali Chisti and Lt. General Ghulam Hasan both army corps commanders, who in some people's view could pose a threat to Zia's own position, had each been given important portfolios.³ Mr. Ghulam Ishque Khan, probably the most powerful civilian in Martial Law Government, adds the Commerce Ministry and Deputy Chairmanship of the Planning Commission to his existing portfolios of Finance. In his military-bureaucratic set-up the generals have an edge over the bureaucrats in decision-making and, in fact,

2. Financial Times, 23 April 1979.

3. Ibid.

all the decisions emanating from Gen. Zia are influenced to a considerable extent by his generals. For instance, "regarding the postponement of elections, he had been informed in no uncertain terms by the six corps Commanders - General Chisti, Iqbal, Jehanzeb, Sarwar Khan, Ghulam Hassan and Ghulam Mohammad - that elections could not be held. It was these Generals, in addition to Zia, who constituted the highest decision-making body in the period that followed the declaration of martial law".⁴ With the law flowing from Generals on top, the bureaucracy and police have come to enjoy unfettered power and are above law for the common man. In fact, the civil service has become a party of army, running the country on its behalf after the suppression of all political parties. But its authority and power compared to that of army has declined considerably, and even the top bureaucrats are now being increasingly dependent on their military patrons. Thus unlike during Ayub Khan's period when the bureaucracy was in effective command of the country, it has now become a body of yes-men only assisting the military regime in the administrative matters.

4. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive ? The Death of a State (Penguin Books Ltd., England, 1983), p.136.

CHAPTER - VII

CONCLUSION

The political role of bureaucracy in Pakistan has been analysed in the light of bureaucracy's role in the developing political systems of newly independent countries. This is markedly different from the bureaucracy in the developed political systems operating within the parameters of Western liberal democracy. In these systems, the political institutions such as bureaucracy and party system have developed over a long span of time. Moreover, they operate within a society having a composite cultural set up and a set of political norms which guide the functioning of their institutions. Hence the mutual adjustment between these institutions have been achieved to a greater degree. The political principles governing these developed politics include 'neutrality'¹ of bureaucracy as an essential administrative norm to confine bureaucracy to its own sphere of operation and to ensure the smooth functioning of the system. In the developed societies, the ethics of citizenship behaviour keeps politics and bureaucracy as distinct identities which enables the political system to maintain its supremacy over the administrative

1. Discussed in Chapter I, pp.1-2.

sector.² But on the contrary, the developing political systems are conspicuous by the unbalanced growth of their political and administrative institutions.³ This is the consequence of prolonged colonial occupation which has left a permanent imprint on the politico-administrative structures of these societies. Colonialism was primarily the rule by bureaucracy controlled by remote metropolitan power. It was mainly geared to ensure the economic exploitation and political domination of colonies and hence bureaucracy was used as a powerful instrument to prevent the growth of other social and political forces hostile to colonialism. The colonial state is, therefore, equipped with a powerful bureaucratic apparatus and with governmental mechanisms that enable it to subordinate the native social classes. Thus the post colonial society inherits that over developed state apparatus and its institutionalised practices through which operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.⁴

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2. U.C.Ghildyal, "Bureaucracy in a Developing Society", in A.Avasthi and R.K.Arora ed., Bureaucracy and Development: Indian Perspective (New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1978), p.17.
 3. C.P.Bhambri, Bureaucracy and Politics in India, (New Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1971), p.56.
 4. Hamza Alvi, "The State in post-Colonial Societies; Pakistan and Bangladesh", in Kathleen Gough and Haqri P.Sharma, edl, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (London, Monthly Review Press, 1973), p.147.

Moreover, achievement of political freedom does not lead to abolition of colonial bureaucracy. Rather, it comes to play a new role in a different political milieu—a role that is supposedly dynamic and suitable to needs and aspirations of an independent people. But due to the fact that bureaucracy is deeply rooted in the colonial period, its style of behaviour essentially remains the same even after independence. Given the bureaucracy's traditional antipathy towards democratic principles, it also tries to impede the growth of other emerging political institutions.⁵ On the other hand, in post-colonial societies, the institutions necessary to regulate the functioning of bureaucracy are based on a shaky foundation. This was due, in large part, to the complexity in the socio-economic structure of these societies, which is marked by class divergence; regional disparities; ethnic, religious and cultural differences.⁶ These factors often surface in the politics and, as a result, in these societies there is a lack of well established set of political values and norms, national consensus and a stable party system.⁷ Moreover, the political leaders of the newly

5. Discussed in Chapter I, p.15.

6. Ibid., pp.5-7.

7. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Political system of Pakistan (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p.128.

independent states, due to prolonged colonial rule, get in touch with the functioning of liberal democratic government. At the same time their western education⁸ creates in them an affinity for the liberal ideas and democratic institutions. Thus in the post-independence period they try to adopt the same model of government for the governance of their own country, although they lack practical experience in this field. On the other hand, the imposition of a political system more suitable to the developed societies of west, on a relatively backward society whose socio-economic and cultural set up is not yet matured to accommodate such a system, creates chronic political instability.⁹

This creates a 'political vacuum' which comes to be filled by the higher bureaucracy- the best literate, advanced, efficient and well-organised section of government servants who plays a decisive and dual role in policy formulation and its implementation. Trained for paternalistic service under colonial rule, the civil servants consider the formulation of state policies as their exclusive prerogative and become hostile towards democratising

8. H. F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), p.7.

9. Discussed in Chapter I, p.12.

the governmental system or sharing their authority with other political forces.¹⁰ Moreover, in developed political systems based on a relatively homogeneous societies in which values are well settled, the bureaucratic disposition is likely to be a refinement, rather than a variation of values held by the public masses. But in heterogeneous societies or in former colonial societies, in which the mass values are different from those of the ruling elite, the problem assumes dimensions of great magnitude, and is compounded by the fact that such societies rarely have the restraints on Bureaucracy which exist in developed political system.¹¹ Thus most of these newly independent states are subject to a bureaucratic rule, often with the backing of army-its natural ally. As these states with strong fissiparous tendencies start functioning as single political entities, they get exposed to various hazards which often threaten their existence. This provides bureaucracy with a sanction to play the role of a self-appointed guardian and to perpetuate its authoritarian rule, thereby further impeding the state's political growth.¹² This tendency is clearly discernible in the role

10. Ibid., p.14.

11. Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis", In Anayatullah, ed., Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan (Peshawar, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962), p.194.

12. Discussed in Chapter I, p.15.

of bureaucracy in Pakistan.

After partition, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) formed out of the former Indian Civil Service (ICS) consisted only a little over hundred officers. This was the result of low representation of Muslims in ICS of British India.¹³ Though these officers were mainly drawn from lower rungs of ICS they came to fill all the top posts in the administration and thus wielded considerable power and influence from the beginning. They were the sole agency to shoulder gigantic problems which Pakistan faced due to dislocations caused by partition, two-way flow of refugees and the geographical and linguistic division of East and West Pakistan.¹⁴ In a state of chaos, the whole administrative fabric was set-up anew under the supervision of these handful of bureaucrats with active cooperation of entire body of men in the administration.¹⁵

Moreover, these officers had been brought up in the old British traditions of exercising maximum discretionary

13. Discussed in Chapter II, p.19.

14. Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A comparative Perspective (New Jersey, Princeton Hall, Inc., 1966), p.79.

15. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69 (Syracuse, N.Y. Syracuse University Press, 1971), p.124.

power with minimum political interference.¹⁶ This tradition continued even after independence when British and native ex-ICS officers occupied all the strategic posts in the administration including the Establishment Division which determined all the important policies regarding the CSP. Thus the gradual attrition¹⁷ of these officers due to retirement did not cut off the cultural linkage between the CSP and ICS. Rather, a special care was taken by senior bureaucrats to transmit the colonial ethos of ICS to the new CSP recruits by designing the examination system and the training manual after ICS pattern. The mode of examination to CSP was formulated in a way so as to ensure the entry of well-off sections of the society with an western orientation.¹⁸ Moreover, the training manual - the group living, horse-riding, emphasis on western style social grace and mannerism, and contact with veteran ICS officers in daily class room had a cementing effect on the minds of young probationers and injected in them a corporate spirit very much typical of ICS.¹⁹

16. Discussed in Chapter II, p.26.

17. Ibid., p.32.

18. Ibid., pp.28-30.

19. Ibid., pp,34-37.

Thus the CSP steeped in colonial tradition, found a fertile ground to operate in independent Pakistan. Under the dominant leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General, and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, Pakistan witnessed a phase of strong centralised executive rule in which the senior bureaucrats effectively dominated the entire administration at the centre as well as in the provinces.²⁰ In West Pakistan, the landlords politicians busy in their constant intrigues against one another, took little care to spread political control over bureaucracy or to reform its nature.²¹ Rather, the civil service was the only stable party which Jinnah, Liaquat relied upon and which was often used to punish erring politicians or to dismiss the provincial ministries by the imposition of Governor's rule.²² In East Bengal the political leaders often championed the cause of provincial autonomy and resented the strong administrative control exercised from the centre.²³ This trend was perceived by the central

20. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Change (New York, Praeger, 1980), p.126.

21. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Civil Service of Pakistan As An Institution: Reasons for Resistance to Change, Indian Political Science Review, vol.13, No.2, July 79, p.145.

22. Discussed in Chapter III, p.53.

23. Goodnow, n.8, p.43.

government as a threat to national integration and hence in East Bengal bureaucracy acted as the "steel frame", in order to preserve national unity and solidarity of Pakistan.

After the death of Jinnah in 1948 and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the league faced a serious leadership crisis. A second line of leadership necessary to fill the void created by the departure of the two prominent leaders was absent in League. Moreover, intra-party conflicts cropped up as there was a keen contest among the politicians to rise to power.²⁴ Thus the power of Muslim League steadily declined as it was split into several factions which gave ample scope to bureaucrats to capture political power at the centre.

The bureaucracy's direct interference in political matters started in 1951 when Ghulam Mohammad was appointed as the Governor General with the concurrence of the Muslim League Cabinet.²⁵ and it further increased during the tenure of Iskander Mirza who succeeded him in 1955. These two bureaucrats virtually ruled the country from 1951 to 1958 with the full backing of the army. In fact since 1951 when General Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, the role of Military in the decision-making of Pakistan started increasing.²⁶ It is

24. Discussed in Chapter III, p.4 56.

25. Ibid., p.58.

26. Ibid., pp.73-74.

true that, armed forces in Pakistan were disciplined, well-equipped and had no rivals in terms of physical power.²⁷ But in spite of its strength there was no indication that its leaders wished to take over the responsibilities of government administration. The senior officers, trained by the British had been taught to eschew politics and to take their orders from the duly constituted civil authorities.²⁸ Traditionally they had not been called upon to restore public order when the police had been unable to do so, but they had withdrawn from this policing role at the first opportunity. But in Pakistan, from 1951 onwards, the armed forces increasingly assisted the civil authorities in controlling riots, maintaining law and order, and in several other civilian matters.²⁹ Its role in the decision making became prominent when in 1954, General Ayub Khan was admitted to Mohammad Ali Bogra's Cabinet, as the Defence Minister. Moreover, army and bureaucracy were allied by tradition, since the British civil and military officers worked together in cooperation and harmony. They shared a western oriented educational background and most

27. Goodnow, n.8, p.105.

28. Ibid., p.106.

29. Discussed in Chapter III, pp.71-72.

of them came from the same sections of the society and from similar upper and upper-middle class families.³⁰ Thus military acted as a junior partner of bureaucracy, always ready to help at the time of crisis. Politicians and political parties which provided a facade of parliamentary government were manipulated by them and were installed or expelled or from office as it suited to the bureaucratic military oligarchy.³¹ But subsequently the mismanagement of state led to serious economic and political crisis and, discontent against bureaucratic military rule started building up among the masses. Militant workers' and peasants' organisations sprang up in different parts of the country. Towards 1958, there was an increase in the number of industrial strikes. All Pakistan Peasants' Association formed in January 1958 under the popular leadership of Maulana Bhasani demanded abolition of landlordism and eviction of tenants from land.³² This was clearly a crisis situation, which was further exacerbated by a clamour for regional autonomy by Bengali people. In a situation when pressure against bureaucratic military rule was gradually mounting from below, the oligarchy could perceive its adverse impli-

30. Goodnow, n.8, p.108.

31. Alvi, n.4, p.152.

32. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1970), p.83.

cations on the impending general elections in 1958. The situation certainly posed a challenge to ^{the} power of the bureaucracy and military. Thus in order to tackle the situation bureaucracy had to lean on army's support. This provided the military led by General Ayub Khan to intervene directly and seize state power by force and abolish the parliamentary government through which the threat was to channelized.³³

A major implication of the coup of Ayub Khan on 7th October 1958, was that it formally reversed the pattern of relationship between army and bureaucracy with the latter being relegated to a subordinate position.³⁴ Ayub, in order to legitimize his rule sacrificed some of the senior bureaucrats who had been holding important posts in the government.³⁵ But soon he found bureaucracy an asset to sustain his centralised and authoritarian regime.³⁶ The changes brought about by his government were intended to modernize the bureaucracy in order to fulfill the requirements of his regime. But in no way it could alter the bureau-

33. Alvi, n.4, p.152.

34. Discussed in Chapter IV, p.77.

35. Ibid., pp.79-81.

36. Ibid., p.84.

cratic status quo or reduce its power.³⁷ As the military government gradually attained stability a liaison developed between military and bureaucracy - a relationship marked by ultimate military paramountcy but total reliance on civil component for all administrative spheres.³⁸ With the curtailment of political activities, the bureaucracy being rid of political interference could reassert its independent status and continued to dominate the decision-making during Ayub Khan period.

But subsequently the homogeneity between the military and the bureaucratic elite declined with bureaucracy rapidly losing its esprit-de-corps. This was the result of growing divergence of class origin, educational level, and outlook between the senior bureaucrats and the ranking army officers. The colonial tie that had existed previously between the two gradually slackened as there was continuous change in the social composition and ideological outlook of the officers corps. The Sandhurst and MA graduates of the British period, due to usual process of retirement and promotions, were being replaced in command positions by those who received emergency

37. Ibid., pp.86-93.

38. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan" in R. Braibanti ed., Asian Bureaucratic System Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1966), p.328.

or temporary commission during the Second World War. They came predominantly from middle peasant, small landholder or urban middle-class families. They harbour a particular dislike for the higher civilian bureaucracy and blame it for ills of the country much in the same way as their predecessors blamed politicians and parliamentary institutions.³⁹

This difference in outlook was marked by the anti-civil service bias of General Yahya Khan, the successor to Ayub, who purged many civil servants and gave military personnel a pre-eminent position in the decision-making.⁴⁰ This was also, partly, due to some of the senior bureaucrats whose highhandedness during the rule of Ayub Khan had incurred much public discontent leading to mass opposition against his regime. Thus during the short tenure of Yahya Khan from 1969 to 1971, the gap between military and bureaucracy widened much to the disadvantage of the latter.⁴¹

With the dismemberment of Pakistan and independence of Bangladesh the civil service suffered a physical damage with a decline in its membership. Further, it also had to

39. Eqbal Ahmed, "Pakistan: Signpost to a police State" Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.4, No.4, 1974, p.426.

40. Discussed in Chapter IV, pp.101-4.

41. Robert La Porte, Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1971), p.118.

share the blame along with military for misfortune of Pakistan, which lowered its prestige considerably. The final blow against bureaucracy was dealt by Bhutto government which assumed power after getting a popular mandate in 1970 elections. With the establishment of a responsible government under a strong and stable political leadership of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the civil service was placed at the tap and not at the top.⁴² Given the preoccupation of Bhutto government to establish political paramountcy over political and administrative institutions, he overhauled the entire administrative structure and abolish the special power and status of elite civil service of Pakistan. He either dismissed or demoted most of the civil servants with whom he ever had confrontation or whose loyalty he ever suspected.⁴³ Different grades in the services were merged together into a single unified grade.⁴⁴ With the CSP losing its superior position in the administrative structure. Bhutto claimed that these changes were essential to give substance to his socialist principles in concrete terms, and in this context bureaucracy was regarded as a vehicle for bringing about radical social change. But all these attempts at

42. V.Madan Mohan Reddy, "Role of Higher Civil Service in Canada and Pakistan - A Comparative Study of Two Commonwealth Countries". Indian Journal of Public Administrations, vol.22, No.2, April-June 1976, pp.157-8.

43. Discussed in Chapter V, p.112.

44. Ibid., pp.113-4.

administrative reorganization had strong political overtones. All the appointments and promotions inside bureaucracy were intended to put his loyal persons in the key positions. He also built specialized sections of the state apparatus such as the Federal Security Force (FSF), which acted as a political police for his regime. Bhutto expanded and modernized the National Security Wings of bureaucracy thereby destroying its monolith character.⁴⁵ Thus during the period of Bhutto, though his loyal officers influenced the decisions taken by his government, bureaucracy as a whole was terrorised and reduced to a mere instrument of personal power. This greatly affected its role as an autonomous unit and considerably reduced its power to play any effective role in politics.⁴⁶

But after the departure of Bhutto from the political scene, Pakistan again went back to the hands of military. The third round of Martial Law government under Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, was clearly related to various developments during the preceding six years of civilian rule. Bhutto's failure to create viable political institutions, inflation, economic stagnation and the perceived adverse effects of government policies of nationalization and reform; the mobilisation of large number of people in March 1977 elections; and the serious damage to government legitimacy and prestige which

45. Ibid., p.117.

46. Ibid., p.118.

resulted from the 'rigging' charges and the ensuing civil turmoil.⁴⁷ All these factors are responsible for the erosion of the mass support which Bhutto had enjoyed previously. This gave military the opportunity to reassert its supremacy and capture the political power by force.

Even after the establishment of military government under General Zia-Ul-Haq in 1977, no attempt was made by the ruling junta to revive the pattern of relationship between Army and bureaucracy that had existed during Ayub Khan period. Rather the decision-making apparatus at the central and as well as on the provincial level came to be dominated by military Generals who were closed to General Zia.⁴⁸ As for the bureaucrats, they were only subject to command from their military superiors in the government without having any significant authority in decision-making.

But at present under Zia regime, there is a new trend which if continues, may destroy the separate identity of bureaucracy as an institution. Since 1977, the regime of General Zia has been becoming more dictatorial with imposition of stringent rules and regulation on the people, and by the

47. Willian L. Ritcher, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime", Strategic Digest, vol.9, No.5, May 1979, p.278.

48. Discussed in Chapter VI, pp.127-8.

implementation of a system of law, that is typical of medieval period. Thus with democracy becoming gradually elusive the regime is confronting increasing challenge from the people for the restoration of democracy. The recent Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) consisting of different political parties is a culmination of the simmering discontent of the people. Thus, as the challenge to the military regime of Zia is mounting, the military is gradually increasing its participation in the civilian affairs. This is clearly evident from the composition of bureaucracy in Zia regime. In 58 districts of Pakistan, one-third have superintendents of Police from military, another one-third have collectors from military, and the rest being metropolitan areas, have military men occupying high civilian positions. Other services, too have many military hands. Many Secretaries, additional secretaries, joint secretaries in the government are from the military.⁴⁹ Thus one implication of this trend is that if the military rule is going to prolong in future by suppressing the people's opposition to the regime the infiltration of military personnel into civilian bureaucracy is likely to increase thereby swamping the officers from the civilian sectors. This will gradually result in militarization of civilian bureaucracy with the civil service losing its autonomous existence.

49. Kuldip Nayar, "Pakistan: Land of Fear and Hate", Sunday (Anand Bazar Publication) 25-31 December 1983.

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