

THE ANGOLAN CRISIS AND US INVOLVEMENT

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
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DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "The Angolan Crisis and US Involvement" submitted by Shambhu Nath Singh is in fulfillment of six credits out of the twenty-four credits for the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation, to the best of my knowledge, is a bonafide work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University.

I recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



(Prof. Anirudha Gupta)
Supervisor
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Chairman of the Centre

PREFACE

The post-second world war has witnessed two phenomenal developments: first, the great rapidity with which the colonies threw off their colonial domination and secondly, the internationalisation of politics or usually conflict situations manifested in the super-powers involvement. The study of "The Angolan Crisis and US Involvement", is an effort to analyse the above phenomenal developments in their specificities.

The dissertation, in its modest effort, tries to answer some significant questions: Why did the Angolan decolonisation lead to civil war and its internationalisation? What was the pattern of Luso-American ties? In what manner did it contribute to the sustenance of Portuguese colonialism? What were the significant lessons of Angolan independence, both to National Liberation Movements and forces impeding the march of independence in Southern Africa? To analyse the different facets of the above problems, the dissertation is divided into five chapters, excluding conclusion. Chapter I deals with the root cause of the Angolan crisis. Here, with its political and ideological basis, the politics of decolonisation and Portuguese colonialism are discussed. Chapter II deals with the factors influencing US policy in Angola. Also, an effort is made to assess the significance of South Africa United States Southern African policy. Chapter III explains Angolan policy prior to Nixon-Kissinger. The American will include the study of its NATO policy, globalism,

attitude towards decolonisation in United Nations, etc. Chapter IV is the comprehensive study of Nixon-Kissinger's policy in Angola. There is an effort to analyse the debacle of US policy in terms of either its diplomatic blunders or any deliberate political mismanagements. Chapter V helps in explaining the internationalisation of the Angolan crisis and US response to the role of each external actor. This is followed by the concluding remarks in Chapter VI.

The dissertation is primarily based on secondary sources. There is no study of any Portuguese source. However efforts are made to analyse the primary sources, wherever necessary. The Congressional debates, the UN resolutions, etc. are relevant primary sources.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor Anirudha Gupta who, despite his heavy commitments, was kind enough to go through and make necessary improvements in the dissertation. I am also thankful to my friends Mr Ashok Das and Mr Arun Patnaik for their necessary correctives and insights into the problem. I also acknowledge the necessary help provided by Mr Atul Rai, Miss Shefali Chaudhary, Miss Anju Dubey, Mr Amitabh Mishra, Mr Udai Shanker and others. Lastly, I must not forget the great enthusiasm and care with which Mr Yashwant has typed my dissertation.

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CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF THE ANGOLAN CRISIS

The Angolan crisis was the outcome of both the internal and external forces that manifested in the nature of Portuguese colonialism, rise of Angolan nationalism, civil war and the foreign intervention. All the above factors, especially the external intervention, made Angola the epi-centre of super-powers rivalry in 1974-75.

The Angolan crisis led to decolonization in Africa and furthered the cause of national movement in southern Africa. An analysis of the Nationalist movement would lead to the understanding of the following: (i) What factors were responsible for the late decolonization of Portuguese territories in Africa including Angola? Or what factors helped Portugal, a backward colonial capitalist power to maintain its colonial domination, especially when the developed ex-colonial powers had felt the indispensability of 'the wind of change'; (ii) Why did the Angolan war of independence culminate in civil war? Or what were the ideological inclinations, social base, class or ethnic - regional base that resulted in the three forces of Nationalist movement - Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), Uniao dos Naturais de Angola (UNITA)? Also it would explain the unsuccessful attempts to unite these liberation movements including the breakdown of the Alvor agreement that precipitated civil war.

and lastly (iii) what were the extra-systemic forces of external actors, both within and outside the continent, that contributed to internationalize the Angolan war of liberation, especially the role of United States of America? The different ideological cross-currents for decolonization, especially the Marxist vis-a-vis the liberal western approach on "The Wind of Change" helps in understanding the ideology of the three Nationalist movements and their external linkages. The Marxist approach would be a study of the arguments of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao. On the other hand, the western liberal attitude would emphasize on US perspective towards "self-determination", human rights, rule of majority and democratic values. This would be followed by the underlying themes of Portuguese colonial rule, the source of modern nationalism, its transformation from reforms to revolution, efforts for an united front and the ultimate victory of MPLA.

PART I

THE DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES THAT INFLUENCED THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA

1. Marxist Ideologies:

National liberations in terms of classical Marxian-Leninism are basically of two types:¹ first those led by

1 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1971), p.51.

the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie against colonial and imperialist oppression, and those led by the proletariat and the peasantry under the leadership of the Communist Party, again primarily against imperialism and foreign control, as well as against the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

Marx and Engels on the national and colonial issues not only questioned the bourgeois nationalism based on abstract principles like morality, freedom and justice but also battled against the ideologies of left doctrinarianism and petty-bourgeois anarchism of the Proudhinist. The national and the colonial questions as the concrete historical forces were reflected in Marx's understanding of nationalism in Ireland, the Balkans, Poland, USA, China and India. Marx and Engels analysed the Polish insurrection of Cracow (1846) as "an agrarian revolution",² that would weaken both the Tsarist Russia and the Holy alliance thereby giving a powerful spur to revolution in Russia and Germany.³ On the Irish question Marx analysed that the English bourgeoisie was fomenting national hostility between the working class of England and Ireland to weaken the revolutionary struggle of

2 F. Engels, "The Frankfurt Assembly Debates the Polish Question", in K. Marx and Engels, Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), vol.7, pp.351,373.

3 For details see Ibid.

the former.⁴ The need of Ireland was to achieve (1) self-government and independence from England, and (2) an agrarian revolution.⁵ In the American civil war, England favoured the reactionary slave owners of the south. In the first International, while Marx argued in favour of the revolutionary character of the North and the need of the English working class to align with it, the Proudhinist and the trade union bureaucracy⁶ argued that the Black National problem was the business of the American bourgeoisie.

4 The industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of England were interested in preserving Ireland as supplier of cheap labour. This was resented by the Irish people leading to frequent violent opposition. About Ireland Marx wrote to Engels, "The English reaction in England had its roots in the subjugation of Ireland", December 10, 1869. Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), p.219.

5 Ibid., p.214.

6 Back in 1858, Engels wrote to Marx, "The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately to the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and the bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie." Ibid., p.103. This argument of Engels was opposed by the leaders of the second international. The labour aristocracy was to become a basic feature of world imperialism and bulwark of the political influence of the social democratic parties in Europe. For details see Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), vol.15, p.245.

Marx and Engels foresaw the demise of Ottoman empire under the impact of the mass national movements in the Balkans, the influence of European colonial policy in Asia minor and North Africa and the revolution in Europe.⁷ In the Austro-Prussian war (1866), Marx and Engels urged the German working class to exploit the political crisis in Austria and Prussia and bring about a revolutionary character of Germany. Next, in the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71), Marx anticipated the preponderance of the German working class over the European working class thus enabling revolutionary Marxism to prevail over petty-bourgeois Proudhinism.⁸ Marx also urged the European working class to strike a blow at Bonapartist France.⁹ With the establishment of the Third Republic in France, Marx desired a united working class in Europe against the entire bourgeoisie.¹⁰

On the nature of the colonial revolt, Marx and Engels anticipated the idea of coupling the proletarian revolution of the West with the national liberation movements in the East.

7 Rostislav Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, Essays, Theory and Practice (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978), p.18.

8 Ibid., p.19.

9 Marx and Engels urged the revolutionary unity and solidarity of the European proletariat - German, French and English - against the Bonapartist.

10 R. Ulyanovsky, n.7, p.20.

About China, Marx wrote that, "the Chinese revolution (the Taiping rebellion) will cast a spark that will be followed by political revolutions on the continent."¹¹ Similarly, about India, Marx wrote: "To reap the fruits of new elements of society ... (created by the British) either the industrial proletariat supplements the ruling British bourgeoisie, or the Hindoos themselves shall overthrow the English yoke altogether."¹² Thus Marx and Engels regarded the colonial problem as perpetuating internal and external contradictions of capitalism.¹³ Thereby Marx and Engels linked the national and the colonial questions with the international proletarian movement.¹⁴ Further Marx argued that most nations would have to make

11 Marx Engels, Werke, ed. Berlin, 1969, S.97, 98, 100. Referred in Ibid.

12 Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India" in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, in three vols. (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), vol.1, pp.494, 498.

13 For details see Marx and Engels, n.2, p.331.

14 As Marx concluded on the development of Ireland and Poland, "any nation that oppresses another forges its own chain". For details see "confidential communications" in Karl Marx & Engels, n.12, vol.2, p.176.

two revolutions, first a bourgeois-capitalist and then a socialist one.¹⁵

However, it was Lenin who gave more importance to the national liberation movement in the colonies.

Lenin's View on National Liberation Movement

Lenin's analysis of the national movements in the East and the advancement of the revolutionary cause in Russia,¹⁶ a less developed capitalist state, led to modification of Marxism. First, Lenin concretized Marx's thought that the revolutions in the more backward countries would set off social struggle in the advanced West.¹⁷ Lenin argued that there was no need for revolutionaries in backward

15 However, Marx never indicated that every country would necessarily have to go through preordained stages of feudalism, capitalism and revolutionary socialism.

16 As Lenin wrote, "that long before the imperialist war", world capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia have finally aroused Asia and "the awakening of Asia and the beginning of the struggles for power by the advanced proletariat of Europe are a symbol of the new phase of world history", see "The Awakening of Asia", Collected Works, vol.19, p.86.

17 Thus Lenin said that it was imperative, first to determine the interests of the oppressed classes; second, to give special support to the peasant movement against all manifestations or survival of feudalism; third, to support the national liberation movement in the colonies and form a temporary alliance with the bourgeois democracy in the backward countries.

countries to wait. What mattered was the existence of the revolutionary situation and the ability of a disciplined, tightly organized party to mobilize the masses.¹⁸ Secondly, unlike Marx, Lenin denied the progressive role of the metropole bourgeoisie.¹⁹ He thereby cut Marx's doctrine of progress from its economic moorings.²⁰ Added to this, Lenin developed the embryonic thought of Engels, on the labour aristocracy. Marx anticipated that the worker's lot would steadily worsen. But Lenin argued that imperialism with its super-profits had enabled the capitalists to bribe some of their wage slaves and thereby split the worker's ranks, thus making the revolution in developed countries difficult.

Further, like Marx and Engels, Lenin emphasised that the proletariat in the capitalist countries and especially in the colonies should align with the national liberation movement, to smash the alliance of the imperialists with

18 The faith in an organized party structure was fully ascertained after the success of Russian revolution. For detailed analysis, see Boris Meissner, "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy : Ideology and Power Politics", Modern Age (US) VIII, Winter 1963-64, pp.7-24.

19 For details, see V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Imperialism and Imperialist War (1914-1917)", vol. V of Selected Works (New York, 1935), p.8.

20 L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire (New York, Hower Institution Press, 1971), p.58.

the feudal and reactionary forces.²¹

Also Lenin wrote, "The National Liberation Movement (in colonies and semi-colonies) are either already very strong or ... maturing ... the continuation will inevitably take the form of national wars against imperialism."²² These struggles in Russia, India and China, etc. which constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe would primarily influence "the final outcome of the world struggle."²³

But Lenin sought to provide socialist aid only to the "genuine revolution" in the colonies, viz. those in which the bourgeois is not working for the interest of the imperialist and also not against the revolutionary spirit of the broad masses.²⁴

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- 21 As Lenin wrote, "The socialists ... must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois - democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and assist their uprising, and if need be, their revolutionary war against the imperialist powers that oppress them." V.I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964), vol.22, pp.151-21.
- 22 For details see "The Janus Pamphlet", Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964), vol.22, p.310, Emphasis in original.
- 23 Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better", Collected Works (Progress Publishers, 1964), vol.33, p.500.
- 24 For details see, "The Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions to the Second Congress of the Communist International", Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964), vol.31, p.242. Similarly, Lenin had pointed out, "The several demands

However, the most important aspect of Lenin's thought was his analysis of modern imperialism - growth of finance capitalism and the nature of imperialist war. Finance capital was the shift from free competition to monopoly domination, the internationalisation of the economic links. Finance capitalism led to "supermonopolies" which arose on the basis of the new stage of world concentration of capital and production, in comparably higher than the preceding stages.²⁵ The competition among the supermonopolies perpetuated modern war. While analysing the class content of the Imperialist wars, Lenin wrote: "... we understand that the wars cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created...."²⁶ Thus the aggressive nature of imperialism made revolution in the colonial countries "impossible without violent revolutions".²⁷

Footnote 24 from previous page continued...

of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but only a small part of the general democratic (now general socialist) world movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected". "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Collected Works (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964), vol.22, p.341.

25 V.I. Lenin, Ibid., p.246.

26 "Socialism and War", Collected Works, vol.21, pp.301-2.

27 As Lenin wrote, "The peaceful development of revolution as a possibility was very seldom to be met with in the history of the revolution". Or, "there has not been any ruling class which has given way without a fight." Further, he wrote, "The reactionary classes themselves are usually the first to resort to violence to civil war; they are first to place the bayonet on the agenda." For details see Lenin, "State and Revolution", Collected Works, vol.25, p.388; in "The Tasks of Revolution", Collected Works, vol.26, p.64; in Lenin's speech at the "Presnya District Workers Conference", Collected Works, vol.28, p.361; in "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the the Democratic Revolution", Collected Works, vol.9, p.932.

Lenin's views were advancement over Marxism keeping in view the developments in capitalism. However, Lenin's emphasis on the vanguard party was not to undermine the decisive role of the masses.²⁸ Similarly, on the theme of export of revolution, Lenin affirmed the significant support of the masses.²⁹

Mao's Contribution to National Liberation Movement

Mao's Sinification of Marxism-Leninism with its emphasis on peasant-based revolution was to serve as an important impetus to liberation movements in many lesser industrialised underdeveloped colonies, including Africa. Mao's conception of revolution differed from Stalin. Stalin and Bukharin acknowledged the Koumintang as the legitimate bourgeois revolution and instructed the Chinese Communist Party to submit to Koumintang's guidance.³⁰ Mao opposed the alignment with Koumintang

28 Thus about the Bombay mass strike (1908) Lenin wrote, "In India, the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle", in "Inflammable Material in World Politics", Collected Works, vol.15, p.184.

29 "There are people who believe that the Revolution can break out in a foreign country by order, by agreement... We know that revolution cannot be made to order or by agreement, they break out when millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old ways any longer in "The Conference of Trade Unions and Factory Committees of Moscow", Collected Works, vol.27,p.480.

30 See Issac Deutscher, "Maoism ; Its Origin and Outlook" in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Revolution and Class Struggle (U.K. Fontana, 1977), p.195.

because he wanted to avoid the disaster of first United Front (1925-27). However, Mao was not against the United Front but he wanted to enter the alliance from the position of strength. Thus when the Japanese increased their imperialist domination in China in 1930's, Mao entered the alliance with the Koumintang.³¹ The new (second) United Front was forged by the communists from a position of new strength. The vanguard party CPC and the peasantry were soon to dominate the United Front.³² As a tactical move, this United Front was to inspire the National Liberation Movement. Next, Mao analysed that the situation in China not only showed the contradiction among the imperialists themselves but also between the imperialists and their Chinese agents.³³ The contradiction between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie after the Japanese expansionism in 1930's had become irreconcilable.³⁴

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- 31 Mao moderated his Yen-an regime and he appealed to the Koumintang for patriotic solidarity against Japan. Ibid., p.205.
- 32 It was because of the vacillating nature of the national bourgeoisie that Mao insisted that the leadership and control over the United Front should remain firmly in the hands of the vanguard of the working class and peasantry i.e. the CPC.
- 33 Mao, "Why China's Red Power Exist?", Selected Works (London, Lawrence and Wishart Limited, 1954), vol.1, p.65. Also see Deutscher, n.30, p.202.
- 34 For the 'contradictory nature' of the middle order national bourgeoisie, see Mao, "Analysis of the Chinese Society", Selected Works, Ibid., p.14.

The contradictions were developing daily. The task of Chinese Communist Party was to exploit the opportunity and eliminate the comprador class in the cities and the overlords in the villages.³⁵

But the most significant contribution of Mao was his evaluation of the revolutionary potentialities of the working class which had little to do with their population³⁶ than with post 1925-27 development. Whereas the ultra-leftists, denied that the Chinese revolution had suffered, Mao with Chen Tu-hsie argued that revolution was on a decline. Moreover, the prolonged stalemate between the defeated urban revolution and a paralytic counter-revolution would allow the peasantry to display its revolutionary energies.³⁷ This explains the establishment of

35 Mao, "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire", *Ibid.*, p.120. Also see Mao, "The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", *Ibid.*, p.99.

36 Mao estimated two million workers in large scale enterprises and ten million coolies, rikshaws, etc. See Mao, "Izbrannye Proizedeniya", (Moscow, 1952), vol.1, pp.24-25. Also, it should be mentioned that Mao never underestimated the working class and rather sought its conscious role in socialist upheaval.

37 Added to this, in 1930's, the Japanese aggression had dismantled industries in Shanghai and other cities. The workers dispersed, became declasses, or vanished into the country. Reproduced in *Deutscher*, n.30, p.204.

the Red Bases until the final stage when the cities would be "encircled" by the countryside.³⁸ The organized and protracted warfare was to be waged by a highly politicized people's army.³⁹

In 1946, Stalin believed that the internal contradiction of imperialism would drive it to make war on the USSR, and had warned Mao to avoid civil war, that would indirectly spark off a great power confrontation.⁴⁰ Mao believed that the imperialist aggression would arouse strong National Liberation Movements in Afro-Asian and Latin American countries creating the "intermediate zone" that would become the best line of Soviet defence and leading towards the ultimate victory of international socialism.⁴¹ This showed Mao's strong Leninist view of National Liberation.

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- 38 See Lin Piao for Mao's strategy on 'encircling the cities', "Long Live the Victory of the People's War", reproduced in A.D. Barnett, China After Mao: With Selected Documents (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967), p.216. Also see Isaac Deutscher, *Ibid.*, p.200.
- 39 As Mao commented, "The civil war in China is not a short but a protracted war". For details of organized guerrilla tactics see, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", n.33, vol.1, pp.175-254.
- 40 Stalin was not only skeptical about Mao's success, but also he was willing to use them as bargaining counter and pressurize Chang Kai-shek, whom he again considered as "his chief ally in Asia", see Isaac Deutscher, n.30, p.205.
- 41 See J. Gittings, "New Lights on Mao", China Quarterly no.60, 1974, p.754. *OK*

Mao criticised the possibility of "peaceful transition", in these newly independent States, as well as other areas of the world as advocated by Khrushchev in the XX Congress of the CPSU (1950). Mao argued that the bourgeoisie never surrendered power peacefully.⁴² The Sino-Soviet ideological schism further widened into Mao's characterisation of the USSR as 'social-imperialist power'.

The revolutionary ideas of Marx-Engels, Lenin and Mao influenced the national liberation movements in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc. In case of Angola, all the three liberation movements had limited ethnic base. But the MPLA was dominated by the urban and educated Angolans who served as the vanguard of the revolution. Perhaps the MPLA was more influenced by the Leninist ideology. On the other hand, the FNLA-UNITA proposed to encircle the towns from their rural-ethnic base (periphery). But, perhaps, it was UNITA which was more influenced by the Maoist ideology. A detailed analysis is made in Part III.

42 "It is a general view that the great revolution cannot avoid passing through civil war..." Mao's 'notes', Ch.13, quoted in J. Gittings, The World and China, 1922-72 (London, Eyre Methven, 1974), p.250.

Western Liberal Attitude Towards
Decolonization

Among several factors that influenced the need for decolonization, the intellectual colonial debate between the two world wars⁴³ was an important one. The colonial debate featured on both the political and economic gains of decolonization. The idea got momentum after the second world war.

The primacy of the economic demands led to politico-military conquest of colonies rephrased in the theme of 'survival of the fittest',⁴⁴ 'the paternalistic zeal of the civilizing mission'⁴⁵ or the burden of the English speaking Teutonic peoples 'to establish system where chaos reign,⁴⁶ as the ideological vehicles to legitimise colonialism. However, in case of Africa, the economic prospects were not bright, and "whatever be the motivating forces behind

43 For details see L.H. Gann and Peter Duignann, n.20, pp.40-42.

44 For details see Eric Hobsbawn, "The Losers" in Hamza Alavi and Theodor Shanin, Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies (London, Macmillan, 1982), pp.78-80.

45 See C. Rhode's, "In the White Only Parliament of a South African Province", quoted in *Ibid.*, p.72.

46 Albert Beveridge, The Race Advance (New York, 1903), quoted in *Ibid.*, p.74.

this adventure, the advanced capitalist world did not receive any supplementary benefit from the direct administration of these new territories."⁴⁷ A plausible cause for the scramble of Africa "after centuries of neglect" by Britain and other European Governments",⁴⁸ is that, "though the English capitalists may have little to gain through annexation ... they may have much to lose through annexation by (others)... The result may appear to be net loss... the loss or gain compared to the situation which would have prevailed had a rival succeeded in stepping in ahead."⁴⁹

The theme that imperialism as a 'whole' could gladly dispense with the cost of direct administration of its colonies was developed in the debates in the inter-war period. The Wilsonian Fourteen proposals, the Hobsonian negation of direct colonial control, the revulsion amongst British intelligentsia and the support to colonial rebellions by French communists, all produced general reaction against the classical colonialism. Now the colonial wars became renowned heroic tragedies.⁵⁰

47 Arghiri Emmanuel, "White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism", in Alavi and Shanin, n.44, p.89.

48 P.J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1963), p.17.

49 Paul M. Sweezy, quoted in Arghiri Emmanuel, n.47, pp.89-90.

50 See Gann and Duignan, n.28, p.75.

But it was the depression that further affected the climate of thought.⁵¹ The debate on colonialism produced broadly two views.⁵² The first, the moderate socialists, the bourgeois reformers, the pacifists in the Hobsonian tradition, contended that colonialism in the existing form did not pay. The second, the communist and the right wing anti-western school, thought that western colonialism paid too well. The first school became the basis for neo-colonialism and decolonization. It was opposed to the white settlers who wanted to continue the colonial domination in Africa.⁵³ The metropolitan powers now felt that they had a duty both to their African subjects and to the world at large. It was realised that better economic gains could be achieved by granting

51 As Albert Sarrant (the French colonial minister) commented in 1931, "Everywhere colonialism is an open crisis", quoted in Basil Davidson, Africa in Modern History (Great Britain, Allen Lane, Penguin, 1978), p.202. This crisis further worsened after the second world war. Now, 'old-colonialism' became politically and economically untenable for the neo-colonial developed capitalist countries.

52 For details see Gann and Duignan, n.20, pp.72-87.

53 For details see Leonard S. Woolf, Economic Imperialism (London, 1920) and Empire and Commerce in Africa : A Study in Economic Imperialism (London, 1919).

self-determination.⁵⁴ Thus a theory was propagated that capitalism was essentially pacific and imperialism was only the heritage of the autocratic state, the outcome of pre-capitalist forces.⁵⁵

Thus the underlying theme was to eliminate non-economic liabilities and the burden of direct political domination. Besides this passive attitude for decolonization, the extraordinary haste with which independence was granted in many cases, especially in Congo, is explained by the positive motive -- to steal a march on their own settlers who were threatened nearly everywhere to secede and form white states. The conspicuous absence or influence of these colonial debates in Portugal, under Fascist Salazar, was to explain its attitude towards decolonization, a sui generis.

American Perspective Towards Decolonization

After the second world war, both the superpowers were interested in decolonization.⁵⁶ While USSR favoured

54 Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism Facts and Figures on Colonies (New York, 1936), pp.10b, 11a, 12a, 14a, 14b, gives data to conclude that the colonial powers have better profits from the countries which are independent or have achieved self-determination.

55 For details see J.A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, trans. by Heinz Norden, etc. and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy (New York, 1951).

56 As Crawford Young writes, "Earlier, international rivalries had occurred between colonial powers. Now both major contenders were, in different degrees hostile to the perpetuation of the colonial system", in "Decolonization in Africa", see Gann and Duignan (ed.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.453.

National Liberation Movements on proletarian revolution, on the other hand, USA was influenced by Wilson's view on imperialism and self-determination. However, the American 'anti-colonial' attitude and 'democratic self-determination' was directed towards the classical colonialism of Europe.⁵⁷ Both the nature of the American revolution and its foreign policy would ascertain this fact.

The economic factors played a predominant role in the success of the American revolution.⁵⁸ It was "one of those great revolutionary wars..."⁵⁹ which dealt a mighty blow to feudal reaction. The American revolution was a bourgeois revolution or the world-wide movement from feudalism to capitalism and against dominant British capitalism which sought to stifle and restrict the young colonial capitalism.⁶⁰ This explains partly the American

57 The Americans were convinced that their country was born of the first revolt against colonialism, and that America was therefore natural. ^{any} of the Afro-Asian anti-colonial nationalism. See Crawford Young, *Ibid.*, p.453. Also see Gann and Duignan, n.43, pp.72-87.

58 For a synoptic view of the Nature, causes of the American Revolution, see Herbert Aptheker, The American Revolution, 1763-1783 (New York, International Publishers, 1960).

59 Lenin in his Letter to American Workers (1920).

60 This theme is developed in William Z. Foster, Outline Political History of the Americans (1951) and also, The Negro People in American History (1954), see Apthekar, n.58.



'anti-colonialism' which underwent amendments, into the compromise-concession formulae for the advantage of the propertied class.⁶¹ The American foreign policy broadly reflected this class-interest.

It is in this background that the American foreign policy of isolation (before 1945) and internationalism (post-1945)⁶² and its commitment to democratic self-determination, human rights, etc. have to be viewed. The new Republic required peace and security to consolidate the gains of the revolution, primarily the interest of the propertied class, hence isolationism or their non-involvement in European wars.⁶³ After the domestic consolidation the Monroe Doctrine (1823) was espoused which was anti-monarchical to safeguard the embryonic Republicans against Spain. The doctrine propagated the "Two Spheres Principle" --

- 61 For a detailed analysis, see Charles A. Beard, *The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of United States*, (1913: New York, Macmillan, 1961).
- 62 The phase of isolationism meant, negatively, passive neutrality or non-involvement in European wars through formation of permanent alliances rather than showing indifference to world events; and positively for 'hemispheric independence of the new world' and even temporary alliance (as in 1778 with France against British colonialism) for expedient national needs. On the other hand, internationalism warranted greater commitment and politico-military involvement through alliances, for the fulfilment of national interest.
- 63 Thus Wilson wrote, "Europe had a set of primary interests which have to us none, or a very remote, relation... It is our policy to steer clear of permanent alliances...", quoted in Charles A. Beard, *American Government and Politics* (New York, Macmillan, 1949), p.342. Similarly, Jefferson talked about abstention from "the eternal wars of Europe", quoted in *Ibid.*, p.343.

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that Europe and the new world were two distinct regions, physically isolated from one another⁶⁴ - a quid pro quo understanding with the colonial powers that one will not interfere in other's spheres of influence. Thus when Wilson sought America's entry into the League of Nations, the Congress opposed it as it would contravene the doctrines of Washington and Monroe.⁶⁵

The Monroe doctrine facilitated US imperialism to monopolise at the cost of the Latin American countries. The moral ideals justifying this were that America had "matured" and was under obligation to help backward peoples, establish order among them, civilize and christianize them, and to extend to them, "the blessings of liberty and self-government".⁶⁶

In the activities of the League of Nations, although America declined to become its member, it played an increasing part in the economic, social and humanitarian interests of

64 Robert J. Art, "America's Foreign Policy : A Historical Perspective", in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Delhi, Prentice-Hall, 1979), p.344.

65 This isolationism was so dominant in the American domestic affairs that during the presidential contest, in 1932, both the Republican and Democratic candidates reaffirmed it.

66 Charles A. Beard, n.63, p.347.

the League - avoiding only "political entanglements". Further, America propounded "the open door policy" in Philippines and China.⁶⁷ This was to offset its lack of colonies in the Afro-Asian continent. More important, in the American continent, it spoke overtly that disturbances in Latin America may finally require intervention by some "civilized nation" and that since European powers are forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine, to take a hand, the United States "cannot ignore this duty".⁶⁸ Thus, there is continuity in US foreign policy, which witnessed some shifts in emphasis due to the changed world situation.⁶⁹

67 The open door in China was an American solution of their conflicts over trade and concession in China. It was reinforced by the Nine Power Pact (1922) which bound US, Japan, UK, France and five others to respect, "the sovereignty, the territorial and the administrative integrity of China". This Pact symbolized political entanglements, contrary to the theory of isolationism but no hue and cry was raised. All this shows US concern to legitimise neo-colonialism.

68 Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Charles A. Beard, n.63, p.350.

69 On the debate between US's isolationists versus international policy, William Appleman Williams argues that there was actually no rapid change - that rural America was expansionist throughout the 18th and 20th centuries, and that the supposed change was a result of the perceived absence of continental new frontiers and open land. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, Delta, 1972). Also as Robert J. Art writes, "She switched from a passive isolationism to active neutrality", n.64, p.345.

The shift in the foreign policy was witnessed with the Atlantic Charter (August 1941). The call was "freedom and nothing but freedom". It was expected "let freedom come and everything would change".⁷⁰ Several factors - economic, political, social - explain the shift in US policy.⁷¹ The 'economy of trade' had given way to a new 'economy of extraction'. Now, US propagated that classical colonialism was not necessary for the capitalist development which the war itself had done so much to enlarge.⁷² Thus, the 'development' of the colonies was an imperative task of the West. Also, other lesser factors⁷³ influenced the idea of self-determination.

Besides "development" in the colonies, US emphasised upon the democratic institutions in the newly developed countries. This gave rise to the theories of political

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- 70 Churchill sought to make the promise of the Charter apply only to countries occupied by the Axis. But Roosevelt insisted that it was 'applied to all humanity'. The Times, 16 September 1941. However, this commitment of Roosevelt later appeared to be more rhetoric than real.
- 71 For details see Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (London, Longman Group Limited, 1972), pp.202-208.
- 72 The war period had given impetus to development of industries, trade and market in the colonies, thus increasing the capitalist profit.
- 73 American soldiers in colonies, blamed colonialism for the rampant poverty. Protestant Mission despised the constraints in Portuguese Africa. See Gann and Duihan, n.43, p.96.

development and modernization.⁷⁴ These theories manifested US ideological hegemony - negatively, to counteract communism, and positively to impress upon the ex-colonies that their future lay in western methods of development. As a result, there was increase in US involvement.⁷⁵

But contrary to US expectation there was political instability, military coups and social upheavals in the newly independent countries. US looked on the social upheavals with distrust. It sought to restore stability, and at times, in support of tyrannical and dictatorial regimes including Portugal -- an anti-thesis of human rights and democratic republican values for which it stood for. The experience in Congo showed that decolonization should be gradual, non-violent and beneficial to all sections of the society (including the privileged white settlers).⁷⁶

74 . The idea was that US knowhow could promote a capital "take-off", including Africa.

Regarding Africa, as early as 1948, John Foster Dulles reported that Africa could make Western Europe completely independent of Eastern European resources, and that should be the US aim, quoted in Basil Davidson, n.71, p.206.

75 "This policy", as Walter Lippmann wrote, "can be implemented only by recruiting subsidizing and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents (sic), and puppets, 'requiring' continued and complicated intervention by the US in the affairs of all the members of the coalition...", quoted in Ibid., p.208.

76 For details see, Chapters Third and Fourth.

Thus, US 'anti-colonialism' was directed against classical colonialism. US supported the Portuguese colonies for economic gains, geo-strategic interests and containment of Russian influence, although this meant undermining democratic values which were the very foundations of UN and US Republican institutions. US also sought to encourage and welcome those nationalists that were entirely loyal to the 'western values', or expressed the interests of an overall capitalist system now dominated by the USA. This explains US support to dictators, military governments, reactionary and FNLA-UNITA in case of Angola.

PART II

NATURE OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

Portugal's overseas adventure began in the 15th century. She was the first colonial power to contact Africa. Between 1482-1520, Portugal had close ties with Kongo kingdom, which were essentially economic,⁷⁷ though there appears to be

77 See David Birmingham, "The African Response to Early Portuguese Activities", in Ronald H. Chilcote (ed.), Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies (California, University of California Press, 1972), p.21.

an overall plan for the latter's westernization on a European model.⁷⁸

The Portuguese naval expansion notwithstanding its temporary subjugation to Spain in 1580⁷⁹ was instrumental in helping industrialization in Europe.⁸⁰ The expansion in Angola, however, was met with several constraints.⁸¹ As Portugal lost naval supremacy to other colonial powers and as she had a weaker capitalist system to sustain,

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- 78 Portugal attempted to send traders, missionaries, craftsmen, builders and other skilled men to Kongo as an attempt for "massive acculturation". For details see Jan Vansina, Kingdom of Savanna (Madison, 1966), p.37.
- 79 For a detailed study of Spanish domination and Portuguese decline, see James Duffy, Shipwreck and Portugal (Cambridge, 1956), and Charles E. Newell, A History of Portuguese (Princeton, 1952), pp.103-7.
- 80 For details see Jay O'Brien, "Portugal and Africa: A Dying Imperialism", Monthly Review, vol.26, no.1, May 1974, pp.20-21.
- 81 These constraints were 1) high mortality from tropical disease, 2) African hostility, 3) arid climate on the Luanda coast unsuitable for agriculture, 4) domination of slave trade, and 5) the inferior quality of European 'colonialists' that the Portuguese administration had brought in Angola. For details see David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola (Oxford, 1966), p.47.

Portugal realized that her commerce will now be primarily trade in human beings.⁸²

Unlike other European colonizers, who acquired slaves by barter, Portugal's low quality cloth products led her to enslave through warfare or by punishing chiefs for having failed to pay tributes, etc.⁸³ For the institutionalization of slave trade, Portugal introduced in the 16th and 17th centuries, a system of "donatarias" (territorial proprietorship)⁸⁴ and a paternalistic system of subservience over its African allies which was performed by a military

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- 82 Thus writes David M. Abshire, "Only commerce in human beings offered prosperity for the Portuguese in Angola", in "Rarely History, European Discovery and Colonization", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa: A Handbook (London, 1969), p.42.
- 83 Initially, the Portuguese began to acquire massive slaves in return for the palm cloth purchased by the Africans. However, as their trades deteriorated, they tried to gain more advantages and oust rivals, without trade, by imposing sovereignty and expecting tribute in a tradeable commodity, such as slaves. For details see Brimingham, n.77, pp.2-24. Jay O' Brien adds that the relationship between the Portuguese and the Africans was not that of a colonizer and a colonized, but one of gaining influence and trading advantages, mutually beneficial, and thus forming commercial monopolies, n.80.
- 84 The "donatarias" were entrusted through the crown for maintaining law and order. It had a three-fold purpose (1) to relieve internal population pressures of Portugal and economic poverty; (2) to achieve cultural integration; and (3) to ensure political hegemony. See R.H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (New Jersey, 1967), pp.7-8.

commercial group.⁸⁵ Besides this group, the Portuguese immigrants in Angola, the majority were backward peasants and ex-convicts.⁸⁶

Besides slave trade, the economic growth of Brazil increased the competitiveness of Portuguese traders and enabled them to cooperate with the British traders.⁸⁷

But the slave trade had no developmental content and it did not facilitate Portugal's economic growth. The trade was monopolized by few rich and powerful people who were only concerned with exchanging raw materials in the form of human labour for goods of a non-productive nature, rather than acquiring accumulation and investment.⁸⁸ The sub-standard

- 85 The military-commercial group extracted taxes in following forms: slaves, ivory, use of porters or later in currency. See D. Wheeler and Rene Pelisser, Angola (London, Pall Mall, 1971), pp.36-40.
- 86 Most of the Portuguese immigrants preferred Brazil than Angola. The nature of the Portuguese immigrants reflects the class and cultural cleavages in Portugal. The traditional Portuguese culture acted as an impediment to modernisation so that the masses with a national illiteracy rate and extremely low per capita income did not experience any fundamental social revolution. Wheeler and Pelissier, *Ibid.*, p.17. As late as 1965, Basil Davidson, wrote that agriculture absorbed more than 1/3rd of the whole working force but provided 1/5th of the gross national product. See n.71, p.133.
- 87 Brazilian tobacco and rum became the essential elements of commercial exchange. For details see Marvin Harris, "Portugal's Contribution to the Underdevelopment of Africa and Brazil", in R.H. Chilcote (ed.), no.77, pp.24, 209-24.
- 88 Basil Davidson, n.71, p.93.

quality of Portuguese products, unable to compete in international markets were dumped in the colonies. More important, in the colonies, especially Angola, the slave trade played havoc with the social and political structures.⁸⁹ Scared of slavery, the Angolans fled to relatively inaccessible, area, or migrated to neighbouring countries.⁹⁰

Two important events, the abolition of slave-trade and Brazil's independence, affected Portugal's economy. With the abolition of slave trade, Portugal pursued other methods of compensating its revenue, in the form of increased taxation of its African people and the transit duties from harbours.⁹¹ This initiated another phase of Portuguese expansionism in the Angolan hinterlands with Luanda, a major port city, providing the centre of penetration. The Angolan hinterlands were developed in agricultural regions. Sugar and coffee plantation was started in these areas in 1830's and 40's. It was soon to be complemented by rum and brandy. However, the agricultural plantation did not replace the flourishing contraband trade as a primary form of colonial exploitation.⁹²

89 The military conquest, to ensure slavery, was met with numerous Angolan resistance, especially from the Mbandu's.

90 These migrations, which led to the refugee problems, explains the support-base of the different liberation movements especially about FNLA and its politics as an extension of Zaire's.

91 Though slave trade was abolished, it did not immediately collapse. As late as 1843-44, about 2/3 of Angola's annual revenue came from traditional slave trade duties imposed at ports. See Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene Pelissier, n.85, p.52.

92 Ibid., p.54.

The demands of contraband trade, the plantation economy which required an adequate and constant supply of labour required new mechanisms of exploitation. The institution of slavery, though abolished, found its modified liberal version in the contract labour, legitimised in the 1899 Decree.⁹³ The contract labour was more exploitative.⁹⁴

Further, in administration, the emphasis of colonial domination shifted from military rule to civil circumspection. The provinces were divided into administrative divisions or districts and camaras (municipal council). To increase the economic potentialities of its colonies, Portugal granted "financial autonomy and decentralization" to Angola in 1920.⁹⁵

However, by the end of the 1920's, in the pre-Salazar phase, Angola was almost on the brink of bankruptcy.⁹⁶

93 It aimed "to acquire by labour the means of subsisting and of bettering their colonial condition."

94 It perpetuated wage discrimination between the white labourer and the native, who was paid the largest minimum possible. Unlike slavery, the employer had no obligation to his slaves. To escape this rigour, many fled to the bush, while some others purchased the certificates of Assimilados (see letters in B. Davidson, n.71. Also see Jay O'Brein, n.80 and James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (London, 1959), pp.254-5.

95 For details on colonial administration see James Duffy, *Ibid.*, pp.242-49.

96 See *Ibid.*, p.250; Wheeler and Pelisser, n.85, pp.67-68.

With inadequate capital,⁹⁷ trade deficit and lack of other superstructural requirements, Portugal was in no position nor was intending to provide any of these prerequisites for growth.⁹⁸ Angola was forced to be an agricultural-based colony.

During Salazar's period, the colonial administration was given a concrete shape. The concept of overseas province for Portuguese territories, which became popular after 1951, was initiated. The colonies were administered by the "regime do indigenato" headed by an overseas Governor-General and his legislative council.⁹⁹ The traditional policy of Portuguese paternalism was invoked and the administration was further subdivided into districts and circumscriptions. New laws were formulated to redefine the position of the assimilados and the natives. The civil law of 1926 aimed at leading the natives so that "the transformation from their own customs and their own habits may be gentle and gradual -- to the profitable development of their own activities and their

97 The majority of the Portuguese settlers were not rich farmer/nor capitalist, but petty traders and storekeepers.

98 Moreover, colonial Portugal was not economically self-reliant. The Methuen Treaty (1703) with Britain and further reinforced by the Madison Treaty (1899) had made Portugal subservient to British economy. It helped Britain to exploit Portuguese colonies, especially Brazil. And Angola had become a source of labour supply to Brazil. For the dependent nature of Portugal on Britain, see S. Sideri, Trade and Power (Rotterdam, 1970), pp.4-7.

99 For details of administration (1926-61) see Duffy, n.94, pp.280-3 and Gann and Duignan, n.56, p.181.

integration into the life of the colony, which is an extension of the mother country".¹⁰⁰ The law of 1926 was modified by the decrees of 1929, 1933 and 1954. All these echoed racial equality and assimilation. However, the identification of the human race as Portuguese, civilized Africans or assimilados and "non-civilized", reflected the perpetuation of racial inequality by the Portuguese.¹⁰¹ The educational pattern was also for the minimum degree of Europeanization.¹⁰² Thus, despite the role played by the missionaries, the assimilation process remained slow.

After the second world war, especially from late 1950's when Portugal had joined the United Nations, the consistent criticism of Portuguese rule in its self-claimed "overseas territories" at various levels in the UN forced Lisbon to introduce reforms and social welfare measures.¹⁰³

100 Silva Cunha, "O Sistema Portuguese", pp.140-41. Quoted in Duffy, n.94, p.293.

101 As far back as 1890's, the concept of "idigenato" or dual citizenship was laid down. Thus economic discrimination was accompanied by racial inequality. See Archibald Lyall, Black and White Make Brown (London, 1938), p.190.

102 The Portuguese distrusted the growth of an intellectual elite that would threaten the colonial domination. See Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Portuguese Colonialism in Africa : The End of an Era (Paris, 1974), pp.70-71. As a result of the education policy, in Angola as late as 1950's the illiteracy rate was 96-97 per cent. For details on education policy see Samuel and Bailey, "Education, Health and Social Welfare", in D.M. Abshire and M.A. Samuels, eds., n.82, pp.178-82; and Gann and Duignan, n.56, pp.188-89.

103 For detailed analysis on social reform, see Ferreira, *Ibid.*, pp.105-29.

The educational pattern was extended to increase literacy among the Angolans.¹⁰⁴ A detailed legislation (1955) was passed with regard to the hours and conditions of labour.¹⁰⁵ However, the violence of the system pervaded all the aspects of social relations and consequently deformed them.¹⁰⁶ In 1961, the Government abolished the legal distinction between the citizens and indigenous inhabitants. The Angolans could stay at home, if they desired.¹⁰⁷

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- 104 The number of primary schools had increased but only few passed the tests and practically none got to the University. Ibid., p.95. Also see Wheeler and Pelissier, n.85, p.135. Nevertheless, there developed a small group of African elites who formed the African petty-bourgeoisie, and encouraged alignment of the African officials and small-scale managers with Portugal. See Ferreira, Ibid., p.105.
- 105 About the several legislations passed and their implementation see Duffy, n.94, pp.318-28. Also see Basil Davidson, n.71, pp.123-7, 130-5. The types of labour could be classified into (1) correctional labour, (2) obligatory labour, (3) contract labour, (4) voluntary labour, (5) forced cultivation, and (6) emigrant or export labour.
- 106 Jay O'Brien, n.80 and Perry Anderson, "Portugal and the End of the Ultra-Colonialism, Part 2", New Left Review (UK) no.16, July-August 1962, pp.88-89.
- 107 After 1961, as Rene Pelisser writes, "Detente in the bush" had set in and Africans began to take up jobs if they needed money. See Wheeler and Pelissier, n.85, pp.6-7.

But the important development was the ambitious Overseas Development Plan, initiated after declaration of the colonies as "Overseas Territories" in 1951. The overseas development plan envisaged a balanced budget for development. The First Plan (1953-59) earmarked development of agriculture, mining, greater saving and investment, etc. It also included social welfare, education, labour rights, etc. Though Lisbon gave \$ 600,000 as long-term loan to Angola, the provincial administration could not mobilise adequate revenues and hence the goals of the First Overseas Development Plan remained unfulfilled.

The Second Overseas Development Plan (1959-65) established a National Development Bank. Portugal was to provide half the funds for development in private and public sectors. Portugal also gave additional finance during the transitional phase (1965-67) and also contributed in the Third Plan.¹⁰⁸ There was an intense economic control over the colonies. The National Planning Commission at Lisbon guided the Provincial Government budgets. Trade discriminations and other artificial barriers were maintained at a high degree in favour of Portugal.

108 For a detailed analysis, read Frank Brandenburg, "Development, Finance and Trade", in Abshire and Samuel, ed., n.82, p.227 (Table).

As a result of these development plans, in the 1960's, agriculture contributed to 20-25 per cent of the GNP, the secondary sector contributed to 4.7 per cent, and the tertiary sector about 69-72 per cent.¹⁰⁹ Under the transitional plan \$ 157.5 million were allocated for the improvement of the primary sector and development of the agricultural settlement projects.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the mining sector was mainly developed by private capitalists and the Government frequently became a minority shareholder with the authority to nominate directors to the corporate boards. Similarly, manufacturing of beverages and tobacco, textiles, cement, paper, etc,¹¹¹ were increased. Also construction, communication, trade, transport (The Benguela railway, Port Amboim Railway etc.) were developed.¹¹² The monarchy exchange systems worked through both the Portuguese exchange system and the foreign ones.¹¹³

109 For growth in agriculture and mining see Irens S. Van Dongen, "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in Abshire and Samuels, *Ibid.*, p.259. The primary sectors are agriculture and agro-products e.g. crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries. The mining, manufacturing, energy and construction are the secondary sectors. The tertiary sectors are transport, trade and finances (28 per cent), services (30 per cent), and administration, defence (9 per cent).

110 *Ibid.*, p.255.

111 For a detailed analysis, see Abshire, "Minerals Manufacturing, Power and Communication" in *Ibid.*, pp.298-306.

112 For growth of transport, communication, etc. see in detail, Brandenburg, "Transport System and Their External Ramification" in *Ibid.*, pp.320-7.

113 For detailed analysis of the exchange system, see *Ibid.*, p.233.

However, despite all these development plans both Angola and Portugal remained highly Agro-based.¹¹⁴ Portuguese African territories absorbed about 24 per cent of its export and supplied about 13 per cent of imports during 1959-64.¹¹⁵ By 1972, Portugal was importing 7.8 per cent of its total imports from Angola and exporting 6.5 per cent of its total exports to Angola.¹¹⁶ Despite these advantages and trade surplus and presence of large consortia like Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF) which dominated 1/10th of all the industrial assets, Portugal was not able to mobilize enough money for development of both the metropole and its colonies.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, though Angola's trade increased its profits were primarily from the Anglo-based industries, till in 1960's when foreign investment, especially from USA, UK, West Germany, France, etc. provided profits from the manufacturing sector, especially oil, diamond and hydro-power.

The Overseas Development programmes were also the result of the liberalization and encouragement given to

114 Robin Blackburn, "Lisbon - The Fall of Fascism", New Left Review, 1974, nos.87-88, pp.8-9.

115 Andrew Wilson Green, "Portugal and the African Territories : Economic Implications" in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n.82, pp.346-48.

116 Overseas Business Reports (USAO, October 1974, OBR), pp.74-82, 85.

117 Robin Blackburn, n.114, pp.8-9.

foreign investments in 1960's.¹¹⁸ Salazar's earlier protectionist policy had discouraged foreign capital.¹¹⁹ However, in 1960's, Salazar overcame his 'xenophobic policy of national capitalism' and Portugal embarked upon the new phase of 'imperialism on credit'.¹²⁰ This 'liberalization' trend was also reflected in Caetano African policy.¹²¹

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- 118 The external finance in the First Overseas Development plan was comparatively small, while in the second plan (1959-64) it arose to 25 per cent, in the Third Plan (1968-73), the Portuguese envisaged approximately 30 per cent non-Portuguese investments. See William Minter, "Portuguese Africa and the West", in US Congress House Report (US) no.18, Appendix 43, p.523. In the Third Plan, the total European and US investment would be \$283 million against Portugal's expenditure of \$ 283 million. Jennifer Davis, "Allies in Empire : Part I-US Economic Involvement", Africa Today (US) July-August 1970, p.7.
- 119 Lisbon's policy on private investment was the governmental control over its managing authority in governing board, etc. This irked many foreign investment and indirectly was to discourage them. Moreover, Portugal conscious of its weak economy, anticipated that foreign investment would lead to the ultimate loss of its colonies.
- 120 Antonio de Figueriredo, Portugal, Fifty Years of Dictatorship (Normondsworth, 1975), p.212.
- 121 Caetano's African policy included (a) Reorganization of the armed forces to provide greater operational effectiveness, (b) progressive administrative autonomy of the local governments within the Portuguese nation, (c) increased participation of the Africans in political and administrative sectors to give substance to Portugal's principle of a multi-racial state, and (d) acceleration of economic development through opening the door to foreign capital and skills. See Marvin Howe, "Portugal at War: Hawks, Doves and Owl", Africa Report (US) vol.14, no.7, November 1969, p.17.

As a consequence of the foreign investment, the rate of growth and exploitation of the natural and human resources in the colonies were increased. British investments predominated between 1910-23.¹²² In the 1960's, it was replaced by the US. The US investments were through loans,¹²³ investment in various projects, especially in the oil exploration¹²⁴ and diamond industry. Besides the important American companies i.e. Cabinda Gulf Oil, Boeing, Ford, etc., the other significant companies were ANGOL-PETRANGOL, British Leyland, ITT, Time, etc.

The revenues collected from foreign investments financed the provincial budgets. These had two important results. The dependence of Portugal and its colonies kept on increasing on the Western countries, thereby reinforcing the role of foreign capital in the Portuguese world. Secondly, it also helped in the costly counter-insurgency wars, thus reinforcing the bonds of exploitations.

122 Britain had significant shares in the establishment of the Benguela Railway and DIAMANG enterprises between 1902-10. As late as 1972, the British investments in Benguela railway was 45 per cent. Over the years, British stake in Portuguese industry rose from 1.5 per cent (1960) to 27 per cent (1970). See Robin Blackburn "The Test in Portugal", New Left Review, nos.67-88, September-December 1974, p.8.

123 US gave loans through the Export-Import Bank, \$ 73,300,000 (1962-68), and \$ 18 million in 1970. Also American banks were involved with Portuguese Tette Alianca and Standard Bank of South Africa in colonies. For details see Minter, n.118, p.523.

124 The most important was the Gulf Oil Company which invested \$209 million by 1972.

In Lisbon, foreign investment further led to Portugal's dependency. It sowed the seeds of social conflict that resulted into the Lisbon bloodless coup of 25 April 1974. In its liberalization efforts as early as 1959, Portugal had joined EFTA (European Free Trade Association) to gain special and exclusive tariff advantages and so protect its 'fragile commercial structure from competition'.¹²⁵ Now, with the 'liberalization' programme, foreign capital increased rapidly.¹²⁶ The foreign funds helped Portugal to modernize its industry. Thus many small and medium-sized industries were replaced by big units. This reinforced monopoly and finance capital that got concentrated in the industrial sector of Portugal.¹²⁷ In 1972, Portugal joined the EEC. However, the set pattern of dependency and trade deficits of Portugal were not to be reversed and Portugal reeled

125 Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", Africa Report, vol.15, no.5, May 1970, p.10. Portugal had to classify its industrial products which were tinned fish, tomato juice and cork, as agricultural products in order to gain access to the EFTA markets.

126 By 1967, foreign capital invested in 163 new enterprises were worth 700 m escudos. Between 1970-74, it rose from approximately 2,000 m to 4,000 m escudos. Six hundred of the most important companies in Portugal were under foreign companies' control. See Pedro Soares, "Portuguese Fascism and Its Contradictions", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol.24, no.566, 4 November 1973, p.19. Soares was the member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Portugal.

127 Ibid. In fact many Ministers in Caetano's cabinet had shares in various industries and Banks controlled by foreign investment. See Ibid., pp.14-19.

under debts.¹²⁸

As a result of the industrialisation, a industrial class emerged to challenge the "old bourgeoisie" which held political power. The industrial bourgeoisie demanded increased liberalisation and integration of Portuguese economy with international capital and elimination of industrial control (conditionamento). Against this, the old bourgeoisie, which was agrarian-based, sought more time to bring agrarian reform to compete in the international market.¹²⁹ This led to the difference in the time factor on the colonial question. The "progressive" industrial capital was not ready to accept a "compromise government". All this limited Caetano's power as an arbitrator.¹³⁰

On the other hand, the increase in enterprises and production (48 per cent between 1960-66) failed to provide better wages to the workers and it remained four-five times

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- 128 Trade deficits in 1972 was 23,000 m escudos. The inflation rate was 21 per cent. The public debt was 50,000 m. escudos for which Portugal paid 3,000 m escudos annual servicing charges. For details see, *Ibid.*
- 129 Edvardo de Sausa Ferreira, "An Analysis of the Spinoia Affair", *Africa Today*, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1974, pp.70-71.
- 130 Earlier during Salazar, both these contending forces were weak and they had empowered Salazar to 'arbitrate' and solve their conflicts. Thus Salazar's authority was a "compromise government". Moreover, Salazar had acted as an "arbitrator" to prevent the weakening of the either class which might encourage the non-privileged class to power. For details see, *Ibid.*, pp.69-73.

less than the French and the German workers.¹³¹ This encouraged emigration to the neighbouring developed capitalist countries.¹³² The agricultural sector was mostly affected. The landholding system (1953-64) had reduced the number of farms. The concentration of land holdings under the corporative system had favoured the capitalists, the big landowners and foreign imperialists. Government's policy thus pushed the small and medium-sized landholders towards collapse.¹³³ As the agricultural products decreased, there was an increase in food imports. The food prices had to be maintained at low levels because of the workers' low wages. However, the prices of the consumer commodities remained beyond the purview of the common man, hence leading to discontent and inflation in Portugal.¹³⁴

131 Thus, writes Soares, "The working class and people of Portugal were compelled to suffer the inflation provoked by the colonialist war, the financial crisis of the capitalist system, economic stagnation in Portugal and the omnipotence of the monopolies", n.126, pp.14-19.

132 By 1975, 1.5 m Portuguese had emigrated with 700,000 to France and 115,000 to West Germany.

133 For details see Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Affairs(us) vol.54, no.2, January 1976, pp.253-4 and Pedro Soares, n.126, pp.19-20.

134 See Kenneth, *Ibid.*, p.254 and Pedro Soares, *Ibid.*, pp.19-20.

Thus an 'illusion' of development had been created. The frustration and discontent among the masses, especially the Armed Forces, was perpetuated by the costly inhuman colonial wars. The colonial policy of Caetano was to equate and identify the interest of the "Western civilization" with those of the Portuguese colonialists.¹³⁵ Caetano was not only conscious of the economic importance of the colonies¹³⁶ but viewed them as indispensable for Portugal's recognition as a great power.¹³⁷ As the perpetuation of the colonial domination required both human and money resources,¹³⁸ the counter-insurgency only led to

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- 135 Caetano considered Europeans essential for the development of, and to organize the Blacks. Blacks in his views were merely productive, elements organised and necessary auxiliaries.
- 136 Thus Caetano spoke, "Europe needs, like bread to eat, the raw materials and natural energies existing in Africa". February speech quoted in Ferreira, n.129, p.70.
- 137 "... Africa is for us a moral justification and a *raison d'être* as a power. Without it we would be small nation, with it we are a great power", Caetano, quoted in Perry Anderson, "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism", New Left Review, no.16, May-June 1962, pp.83-102.
- 138 The colonial war entailed a high defence budget. Portugal's budget on defence in the 1960's ranged between 40-50 per cent of the annual effective revenue and 6-7 per cent of the GNP. By 1972, the Portugal had spent nearly 17,000 m. escudos and lost 10,000. Portuguese troops. For details see Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", Africa Report, vol.15, no.5, May 1970, pp.10-11; John Morcum, "Three Revolutions", Africa Report, vol.12, no.8, November 1967, pp.9-17. Howe, n.121, pp.16-21; Pedro Soares, n.126, p.19.

both, the economic crisis, and the radicalisation of the Armed Forces.¹³⁹ Moreover, an "army career was becoming increasingly unattractive and there was evidence of decreasing employment of army officers.¹⁴⁰ The army officers resented the term of conscriptions which compelled them to spend three-four years in Africa.

Another impact of the modernization process (through the policy of liberalization) was that it led to atomisation of the Portuguese society and creation of several classes,¹⁴¹ including the black minority group,¹⁴² which

139 The radicalisation of the Armed Forces was due to the objective economic difficulties at home and the political character of the costly colonial wars. Secondly, they were also influenced by the socialist and the communist literatures including the ideas of Amilcar Cabral and the Che Guevara which were illegally and clandestinely circulated. As a result many showed sympathy for the liberation struggle. See *Ibid.*; Blackburn, n.114, pp.11-12.

140 In 1972-73 there were only 72 admissions to the military academy, compared to 257 in 1961-62; overall the number of admissions in the 60's averaged only half of those in the fifties, at a time when the Army needed more new officers than ever before. *Expresso* 17, August 1974, quoted *Ibid.*

141 There existed the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, salaried professionals and workers, petty bourgeoisie, sub-proletariat in the cities, and Latifundists (including large estate owners of North and small ones in South), modern capitalist farmers, semi-proletariat. These classes were "characteristic of capitalist countries at a comparable stage of development". Paul M. Sweezy, "Class Struggle in Portugal", *Monthly Review*, vol.27, no.4, September 1974, pp.3-5.

142 Lisbon had to compensate the loss of its skilled and semi-skilled Portuguese workers to neighbouring European countries by migrating the unskilled blacks. The colonial wars had also led to the outflow of manpower. Blacks were imported especially from Cape Verde islands. This gave birth to the black minority in Portugal. Kenneth Maxwell, n.133, pp.254-57.

made the perpetuation of the fascist domination difficult. The deteriorating socio-political crisis had affected foreign investment,¹⁴³ including the tourist sector.¹⁴⁴ The catholic church also resented the colonial policy and its silence over the growing anti-governmental criticisms, helped in Caetano's overthrow.

Above all, there was the growing consciousness among the masses about the evils of the Fascist rule and colonial exploitation. There was an influx of modern ideas and spread of western culture.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, the works of Spinoza¹⁴⁶ and the leftist literatures had

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- 143 Many foreign investments began to wind up their business while some which remained had to concede to the growing demands of the raise in workers' pay. This led to the rise into credits which created pressures for the nationalization of the banks. Ibid.
- 144 The tourist sector had absorbed 11.3 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force. The deflation of tourist market affected mostly the overseas workers. Further, the take over of the vacant houses alienated them from the regime. Ibid.
- 145 Figueredo, n.120, p.226.
- 146 Spinoza's book Portugal and Future exploded the myth of the civilizing mission and military maintenance of the colonies. He proposed the "Federal state solution", a political network to build the "Lusitanian Commonwealth" and persuade the colonies into a "pluri-national state". It provided a neo-colonial solution to Portugal's progress. For details read Hearings Before the 93rd US Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Africa, 2nd session, March 14, October 8, 9 and 22, 1974; The Complex of US-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup (Washington, 1974), Appendix 5; Ferreira, n.129, p.71.

created an overall milieu for change. The Portuguese were realizing the necessity of ending colonial wars.¹⁴⁷

The opportunity was provided in late 1973 by Caetano's decree which gave equal status to conscript officers. It led to the formation of the Armed Forces Movement. The AFM document of January 1974¹⁴⁸ announced a showdown with the authorities. The programme declared that it was necessary to overthrow the regime and convene a democratically elected constituent assembly.¹⁴⁹

An important aspect of the AFM movement was to find a political rather than a military solution to the colonial problem. The political programme for decolonization was carried forward by Spínola,¹⁵⁰ who was entrusted with power

- 147 Amílcar Cabral's speech in Dakar, 3 March 1968, summed up the changing perception of Portugal: "In the very heart of the Portuguese Government a realist tendency is showing itself, taking adequate means of making the extremists understand that the colonial war is not only useless but is irremediably lost in our country", in Revolution in Cabral (London, 1971), p.104.
- 148 It exploded the 'myth that our (Portugal's) forces are politically neutral' and challenged the role of the military in sustaining a disastrous war abroad and a dictatorial and repressive regime at home. It called for a 'political solution (of the colonies) which safeguards national honour and dignity'. Robin Blackburn, n.114, p.12.
- 149 The radical members had prevailed in the AFM and 'the programme to overthrow the Fascist regime' was primarily its handiwork. Ibid.
- 150 Decolonization was one of the 3-D programmes of Spínola which also included, Democratisation and Development.

after the bloodless coup of 25 April 1974.¹⁵¹ Though Spínola had to resign due to the various contending forces, in the AFM, the spirit for decolonization was never lost and rather reinforced.¹⁵²

PART III

MODERN NATIONALISM AND BIRTH OF AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA

The independence of Angola was not only the product of the contradictions in Portuguese colonialism but also of the revolutionary struggles launched by the Nationalist forces. Modern Nationalism in Angola had three sources: (A) Luanda-Mbundu Nationalism; (B) Bakongo Nationalism, and (C) Ovimbundu Nationalism.¹⁵³

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- 151 For details of the bloodless coup and the transfer of power, see Robin Blackburn, n.144, pp.5-48. Riva Pedro, "Portugal's Revolution", New World Review(US), vol.44, no.2, March-April 1971, pp.14-17. Gil Green, Portugal's Revolution (USA, 1976); Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and Dialectics of Liberation of Southern Africa", International Studies (New Delhi), January-March 1975, pp.5-10.
- 152 The paper does not propose to go into the details of the internal conflict within the AFM. For a detailed analysis, see Tad Szuloc, "Lisbon and Washington Behind the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Policy(US) no.21, Winter 1975-76, pp.3-62.
- 153 This division is according to John Marcum, The Luanda-Mbundu nationalism was essentially urban with elite leadership and the other two had rural peasant orientation. The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-62), vol.1 (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1969), Part I, Ch.1, 2, 3. Wheeler and Pelissier define the sources of Angolan nationalism into two: (a) the Angolan assimilados and their 20th century descendants, and (b) the rebel Ekongo princes and chiefs and their followers", n.85, p.86.

(A) Luanda-Mbundu Sources of Angolan Nationalism:

Portuguese expansion into the Angolan hinterlands (late 16th century) led to the Portuguese-Ndongo conflict (1575-1671). The Portuguese first reduced its ruler Ngola (1629) and later overthrew him. The Ndongo area eventually came to be known as Angola. In order to subjugate the Ndongo, the Portuguese had also to overcome the spirited opposition from its Queen Nzinga (1641-49) and the Kasanje, or the Mbundu refugees of Ndongo. The Kasanje had emerged by late 17th century as an important trading link. They "dominated large parts of the westward (slave) trade of central Africa."¹⁵⁴ With the Kasanje's subjugation, the West core of Mbundu had fallen to Portuguese' rule.

The Portuguese met another revolt in early 20th century from the Dembos led by Dembo Cazuengongo.¹⁵⁵ The Dembo area included important railroad links which served to spread political ideas and movement.

The above rebellions inspired the nationalists who made Luanda their centre of activity. Luanda had large European population¹⁵⁶ which consisted of liberals, Democrats de Angola, middle-class anti-Salazar who argued for reforms,

154 Birmingham, n.81, p.99.

155 John Marcum, n.153, p.16.

156 The population included army, officials, etc. For the estimate of Angola's white population see The New York Times, 5 May 1966.

and decentralization.¹⁵⁷ Also there were anti-Salazarists of Marxist inclinations who developed political consciousness among both the white and non-white classes.

The Portuguese also faced the opposition from the mulatto, an important section in Angola's urban centre. Luanda had 50,000 mulattos in 1960, and were engaged by the colonial administration as petty-professional, Angolan army and police.¹⁵⁸ The mulattos were divided on professions and education but they maintained their ethnic solidarity through the Lig Angolana (LA), a mulatto association established in 1913. The educated mulattos were discriminated against the Europeans, often less educated. This led to protest agitations under Jose de Fonte Pereira (1823-91), a crusading journalist. The European style protest agitation (1866-1923) was tolerated because of the "free-press" era of 1866-1923.¹⁵⁹ However, the failure of these protest agitations led some European Marxists and Mulatto "intellectuals" to base Angolan nationalism on class line.¹⁶⁰

157 See Marcum, n.153, p.17.

158 Wheeler and Pelisser, n.85, p.84.

159 Marcum, n.153, p.19. Also see Douglas L. Wheeler, "A Nineteenth Century African Protest in Angola: The Radical Journalism of Jose de Fontes Periera" (1823-91) in Ali Mazrui and Robert Rotberg, The Traditions of Black Protest in Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).

160 See Marcum, n.153, p.20.

The third and the largest component of Luanda's population was the Africans. A small African elite, the product of a restrained colonial education system, had emerged. They had become aware of the inherent social and economic injustices of the colonial system and hence made sporadic but cautious political protest. These assimilated had the educated mulattos established the Partido Nacional Africano (PNA) in Lisbon (1921) to bring reforms within the framework of Portuguese colonialism and demanded autonomy for Angola. But the Government imposed press censorship, political restrictions through the establishment of Estado Nova. As no tangible reforms took place some Luandans formed a Liga Nacional Africana (LNA) in 1929 which was the militant rebirth of earlier Lig Angolana.

After the second world war, several factors contributed to the increase in political consciousness.¹⁶¹ But the most important development was the establishment of the Angolan Communist Party (PCA) in October 1955. The aim of the PCA was the "ultimate conquest of independence".¹⁶² The PCA joined the Nationalist Front Party, the Partido de Luta dos Africano de Angola (PLUA) in early 1956. But soon the Young Marxists of PCA discovered that it was difficult to radicalize and control PLUA and so formed the Movimento de Libertico de Angola (MPLA) in December 1956.

161 For details see *Ibid.*, pp.24-27. Basil Davidson writes that one of the factors was Mensagem (message) or poetry which was "indirectly subversive of the whole established order", n.114, pp.157-58.

162 For details see *Ibid.*, p.27.

The MPLA manifesto argued for coalition of all nationalist and anti-colonial forces to overthrow Portuguese rule. It sought to invoke the broadest possible popular front to mobilise Angolans on "revolutionary lines" for national liberation. Smaller groups, Movimento de Libertacao (MLA) and Movimento de Independencia Nacional de Angola (MINA) also joined MPLA. Though MINA merged in MPLA (1958), MLA remained independent of the MPLA. Similarly, another militant student organisation of Angola, Movimento Angolano de Juventude Estudante (MAJE), which was soon broadened into wider youth movement, Frente Unido de Juventude de Angola (FUJA), claimed independence of actions from the MPLA or any other nationalist organisation. Another clandestine group, Exercito de Libertico Angola (ELA) or Angola Liberation Army also operated.¹⁶³ These organisations operated secretly and thought in terms of violent actions.

The increasing political activities of MPLA did not go unnoticed and it led to wide-spread repression, beginning from 1957. The waves of arrest in 1959, which led to the "trial of fifty" (1960), forced the MPLA leaders to become political exiles. The important leaders of MPLA in exiles included Dr. Agostinho Neto, Mario C. Pinto de Andrade and Variato da Cruz. Both Variato and Andrade became involved

163 For details on MLA, MINA, MAJE, FUJA, ELA see Ibid., pp.31-32.

in left-wing European politics, developed relationships with the French, Soviet and the Chinese communists.¹⁶⁴ In January 1960, MPLA participated in the Second All African People's Conference at Tunis. They joined the Movimento Anti-Colonialista (MAC) of Amílcar Cabral with Frente Revolucionaria Africana Para Independencia Nacional (FRAIN).¹⁶⁵ The MPLA unsuccessfully persuaded Holden Roberto of Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) to join the common front. This unity move was carried forward at the Conakry meet of 30 June 1960. All this reflects MPLA zeal to establish a single anti-colonial organic front.

Against the colonial authority, the MPLA warned the Portuguese for increasing repression in Angola and its refusal to grant self-determination which might provoke "bloody conflict".¹⁶⁶ At the UN, the MPLA made a successful attempt to persuade the General Assembly (November 1960) to reject the claim of Portugal that Angola was her overseas territory. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in favour of Angola (resolution 1514) which was considered by MPLA as a "moral victory".¹⁶⁷

164 See John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (New York, Walker and Co., 1965), p.126; and William E. Griffith, "Africa", Survey (London), January 1965, p.177.

165 Marcum, n.153, p.43.

166 MPLA "Declaration" (Conakry, October 25, 1960), quoted in *Ibid.*, p.44. About aids from China see The Mizan Newsletter, vol. 6, no.5, May 1964, p.6, quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.43.

167 Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.45.

(B) The Bokongo Sources of Angolan Nationalism:

The anti-colonialism of the Bokongo or the Kikongo-speaking people was the first Angolan peasant-based modern nationalist movement. In their first encounter, the Portuguese trounced the Mani Kongo opposition in 1665 (battle of Mbila). Portugal started temporary occupation of Sao Salvador (1659-70) in order to support the "fragile kingship" of Dom Pedro V.. But the illiterate king Dom Pedro V in 1684 was deceived into signing loyal submission to the Portuguese. This increased the dependency of the Dom Kongo rulers on the Portuguese and also became a source of resistance. This late colonisation explains the relatively less influence of Portuguese culture and politics on the Bokongo nationalism.

But the focal point of Bokongo resistance was the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) of London (1878) which had established itself firmly in the Kongo kingdom. In December 1913, Alvaro Buta, a catholic led a revolt against the king of the Kongo because of the latter's refusal to oppose new labour demands for Sao Tome. Except for a brief time, Chief Buta renewed his attack and on January 25, 1914 the Portuguese retaliated especially against the protestants.¹⁶⁸ with the

168 For a detailed account, see R.H. Carson Graham, Under Seven Congo Kings (London: Carey Press, 1930), pp.137-42.

suppression of the revolt, the faith of the Angolans toward a "divine interference" was lost. To escape the repression, many fled to the Congo which was later to become the centre of Bokongo resistance.

Another religious revolt was led by the Kimbanguists, who were connected with the BMS church. The Bokongo's resented the Portuguese moves to entrust the Kongo Kingship to Dom Pedro VII against the popular will.¹⁶⁹ They also became suspicious of the Portuguese catholic church, which helped the colonial authorities. This helped the protestant and BMS church to grow steadily and acquire the strongest protestant following (about 35 per cent Bokongos were protestant in 1950). To check the alarming increase of protestants, the Portuguese applied restrictive religious policies as a result the Angolans began to emphathize and identify themselves with the British and American missionaries who were fighting the local officialdom, and thus were thought to be potential liberators. Moreover, some Bokongos' petitioners' sent memorandum of political grievances to the American State Department.¹⁷⁰

Another effort to revive the authority of the crown was led by the Matadi group under Eduardo Pinock. The Portuguese wanted puppet rulers. But Pinock wanted

169 For more details see Marcum, n.153, p.54.

170 Ibid., pp.55-56.

greater autonomy. A compromise formula was evolved which soon failed. Chaos was further perpetuated by the sudden death of the Kong Dom Antonio III. The decision of not allowing concessions to the Matadi encouraged subversive activities.¹⁷¹

In order to revive the Kongo kingship into a modern institution, the centre of Bokongo political activity shifted from Sao Salvador and Matadi to Leopoldville. Both the Matadi and the Lepoldville sought help from the American Consulates at Leopoldville (1952). They also desired favourable interference of the UN. They requested the US to send a "mission of enquiry" to investigate conditions inside the Kongo and put themselves on record as opposing Communist penetration into their country.¹⁷² In another letter to USA (May 20, 1956) Necaca (a leading African Portuguese involved in the Catholic revolt of Euta) and Holden Roberto (who was an important leader of the Leopoldville group), asserted that historically and legally the Portuguese Kongo constituted a territory separate from Angola, to which it has unjustly been joined in 1884.¹⁷³

171 F. James Grenfell maintained that if the colonial authorities had handled the matter differently so as to allow the people more say in their own affairs, "some of the conditions in which subversive political organizations flourish would have been avoided". Quoted in Marcum, *Ibid.*, p.60.

172 From this bias against the communists on the one hand, and the faith in US on the other, some explanation about FNLA's pro-west attitude can be drawn.

173 From this the narrow attitude of FNLA and its ethnic bias on the question of Angola liberation can be explained.

The Matadi and the Leopoldville group, under the pressure of their militants, concretised into a formal political organisation, Uniao das Populaco'es do Norte de Angola (UPNA), in July 1957. In November 1957, the UPNA decided to send representatives abroad to lobby in Africa, in the US and at the UN.

At the conference of All African peoples in Accra (October 1958), the UPNA was criticised for "tribal anarchonism".¹⁷⁴ The idea of resurrecting the old Kongo Kingdom had evoked little enthusiasm from the African leaders present in the conference, including George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. As a result, under Holden's advice, the UPNA changed itself to Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) which called for the national liberation of all Angola.¹⁷⁵

174 See Marcum, n.153, pp.63-69.

175 UPA, "Drama of Angola" (Accra, December 1958, memo), quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.67. The UPA, Statutes, Article 2, read "that it is a political organisation formed for all Africans originally from Angola, without discrimination as to sex, age, ethnic origin or domicile", and aimed at installing a democratic regime for peasants and workers within an independent Angola.

Holden Roberto began his hectic activity to mobilise public opinion against the colonial rule. He developed good contacts in Ghana and Algeria and was greatly influenced by Frantz Fanon.¹⁷⁶ At the UN in close connection with the Guianan embassy, Roberto lobbied outside the UN that Angola was not part of Portuguese "overseas territories" and the latter had obligations under UN Charter, Art 73e, to grant them self-government. He gave a lengthy memorandum to the delegates of the Fourteenth General Assembly.¹⁷⁷ At New York Roberto utilised his time to develop contacts with the American Committee on Africa.¹⁷⁸ In January 1960, Roberto was elected as a member of the Steering Committee at the Second All-African People's Conference, held in Tunisia. But when the issue of unity with MPLA was discussed in the conference, Roberto refused to do so.

On the eve of Congo's independence, the UPA faced hostility from the Abakos of South Congo; Pan-Kongo ethnocentricists. However, favoured by Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, Holden Roberto began to broaden the base

176 For some details on Fanon's influence on Roberto see *Ibid.*, p.68.

177 UPA, Delegation Abroad (Memorandum) "To the Delegates of the 14th Session of the General Assembly" (New York, 1954, Mimeo), quoted in *Ibid.*, p.69.

178 *Ibid.* This explains pro-US linkages of UPA/FNLA.

of UPA. He got the facility to broadcast from Congo. Though conscious of ethnic rivalry, Roberto stressed that there was no "inferior and superior tribes", and Angola was not "a composite of tribes", but "one nation".¹⁷⁹

However, with the fall of Lumumba, which was a major setback to UPA, the Kasavubu government reduced Congolese help for fear that the UPA would "establish communism in neighbouring Angola". Roberto fled to Ghana to seek help. But Roberto was not only denied help rather declared an American agent.¹⁸⁰ This was a major political setback for Roberto. However, politics in Congo proved favourable for Roberto and once again he was able to organise the UPA from Leopoldville.

Besides UPA, another Bokango organisation, Assomizo, was established in 1956. The Assomizo tried an unsuccessful effort for unity with UPA. The Assomizo later transformed itself into Alizao.¹⁸¹ However, Alizao was soon to recede into political insignificance due to its emphasis on non-violent means to achieve independence.¹⁸²

179 Quoted from the broadcast of 6 September 1960. See *Ibid.*, p.87.

180 As Holden Roberto's speech before OAU, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Cairo (July 21, 1964) stated, "The Government of Ghana has given orders that we must not help you because you are in the pay of America".

181 For a detailed analysis of Assomizo (Alizao) politics, see Marcum, n.153, pp.80-83, 86-96, and 99-100.

182 *Ibid.*

(C) The Ovimbundu, Chowke and Related Sources
of Angolan Revolution

The Ovimbundu, Chowke, Lewena (sub-group of Ganguela) and Chanhama in central and South Angola formed the third stream of modern Angolan nationalism. Unlike the centralised Kongo Kingdom, the Ovimbundu which constituted the largest single ethnic tribe, were divided among a dozen kingdoms. The Portuguese began the systematic penetration of these areas in late 17th century. Though the Ovimbundu resisted the Portuguese occupation, they were quickly ensnared in the slave trade.

In the first three decades of the 20th century, the construction of the Benguela railway and the use of fertile land for farms encouraged European settlement, thus initiating urbanisation. The plantation economy had led to contract labour which was resented by the Ovimbundus. The popular resentment was exhibited in the anti-assimilationist religious cult.

The religious roots of Ovimbundu were both catholic and protestant. The catholic seminary spread the ideas of Christ, racial equality and hygiene among the rural populace. But the Europeans resented the popularity of the seminary which was forced to discontinue. The arbitrary expulsions from the seminary and the banning of their prototype peace corps left the educated seminarion with the only way of open protest. When the Portuguese

President Craveiro Lopes visited Nova Lisboa (June 1954) a small group of men distributed anti-Salazar leaflets and scrawled slogans all over the city condemning colonialism and demanding freedom.

Some of these seminarians were members of Associação Africana do sul de Angola (AASA). But soon the militant AASA members left the association because it was dominated by pro-Portuguese mulatto elites who were "more racist than the Europeans".¹⁸³ These dissenters formed a secret society or Juventude Crista de Angola (JCA). The JCA undertook to spread political and religious education among youths on the UN Declaration of Human Rights. However, the PIDE (Portuguese Repressive Secret Police) soon suppressed these clandestine activities. An effort to regenerate the JCA under Jao da Cruz Chisseva Kalutheto was also not successful. The young Christians were imprisoned and their activities smashed. It was in jail that Chisseva read UPA's articles and became its supporter.

The nationalist protest among the Portuguese missions started in the southern and central Angolans. A group, Organizacao Cultural dos Angolanos (OCA), including Jose Belo Chipenda, was established as a cultural association.

183 Jao Chisseva, quoted in Marcum, *Ibid.*, p.106.

The OCA became the nucleus of disseminating new ideas.¹⁸⁴

The severity of PIDE prevented the growth of well organized political movement in Libito-Nova-Lisoba area. However, the independence in Congo encouraged nationalist fervour. Lumumba had become a hero and people became hopeful of gaining freedom.¹⁸⁵ It also imbued Julio Chinovola Cacunda, a member of the Group Avante of Bie and his colleagues decided to launch an insurrection¹⁸⁶ movement of the contract labourers in southern Angola on April 2, 1961.

On the other hand in 1958 the Protestant Missions had sent an initial group of Ovimbundus students, mostly from peasant families. These small contingents of the Ovimbundus were exposed to a variety of new ideas. After returning home, these educated Ovimbundus became leaders of the nationalist protest movements. Jonas M. Savimbi, who later was to lead the UNITA, was one of these Ovimbundu Protestants.

In the south of the Umbundu country, the Portuguese had displaced the traditional Nheneka-Humbe from their agricultural fertile lands. The Portuguese were encouraged

184 It organized searching discussions on Western culture as well as on the problems of tradition versus modernization in African society. Though officially apolitical, the organization exposed young adults to outside ideas. Ibid., p.106.

185 Ibid., p.110.

to migrate to these fertile lands to cultivate small cereal and tobacco farms. By 1913 there were 2500 Portuguese residing near the vicinity of Sa de Bandeira, which was later to become the centre of Nationalist upsurge.

The nationalist protest was led by a group of politically and educated Nhaneka-Humbe of Sa de Bandeira. After the failure of 1948 uprising this group organised a local reform movement.¹⁸⁶ A local Goan lawyer, Eduardo Vitorio Pereira founded the Uniao dos Naturais de Angola (UNATA) in 1956 to demand political reforms. On the basis of the secrets provided by the AASA, the PIDE arrested and rusticated many UNATA activists. It led to collapse of UNATA.

In the south-east of Huila Plealo plateau, the pastrol Cunhama resisted the Portuguese penetration.¹⁸⁷ The Portuguese crushed the Cuanhoma rebellion (1904-15) and prohibited the educational and evangelical activities of the protestants.

186 Kassanga claimed that 1948 uprising was "organized and directed" under UNATA. Kassanga's testimony to UN, March 1965. Quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.113. For details on the reform movement see testimony of Marcos Kassanga in UNGA Document A/AC.104/SR 387, September 22, 1965, pp.10-11.

187 The Cuanhama-speaking Ovambo of South Angola launched an Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) in 1959 which was later to be expanded into the multi-ethnic SWAPO.

In the East, the Chokwe resisted the penetration of the Portuguese officials, including "backwoodsmen" during 1795. By the middle of 19th century, the Chokwe suddenly rose to topple the great Luanda empire from where they had come. The Portuguese had paid little attention for the economic and the educational development of the area. Due to the Portuguese repression, like the Bokongo natives, many of the Chokwes emigrated to Congo Katanga and other areas. At Mexico, they organized a Chokwe self-help association.

FROM REFORMISM TO REVOLT : SEQUENTIAL EXPLOSIONS

The faith of the liberation movement in Portuguese reformism was lost due to the latter's intransigence. Thus at the conference of Nationalist leaders from Portuguese colonies (December 6, 1960) held at London, Mario de Andrade of MPLA emphasized his party's desire for "a pacific solution to the colonial problem", but announced that owing to Portuguese intransigence, the MPLA would move "to direct action".¹⁸⁸ Andrade also spoke of the possibility to unite main Angolan national group and build "a liberation army on the pattern of Algerian National Liberation Army in near future."¹⁸⁹

188 As quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.45.

189 V. Sidenko, "The Last African Colonies", quoted in Ibid., p.21.

The possibility of a united "direct action" by MPLA, PAIGC and FRAIN was predicted by Abilio do souza in Moscow's communists.¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, in the beginning of 1961, the UPA also embarked on direct subversive action.¹⁹¹ This change in attitude in the UPA was due to (a) the failure in gaining any meaningful concessions from the Portuguese, (b) the influence of Fanon on Holden Roberto,¹⁹² (c) the belief that if there is an uprising in Angola and Mozambique, "Portugal will have no support, for its colonial system is known for being the most retrograde",¹⁹³ and (d) the colonial exploitation had led to socio-cultural fragmentation and created the conditions for violent protests.¹⁹⁴

190 Ibid.

191 Officially, the UPA did not change their policy of non-violence and denied that they refused to negotiate with the Portuguese. However, they realized that 'the dogma of the Portuguese Angola' was that "to each peaceful protest, the Portuguese military had replied with massive executions, deportations and repression", and thus forced the Angolans to use violence to achieve independence. World Outlook (Paris), vol.2, no.9, February 28, 1964, p.19. While the UPA and MPLA decided for direct action, the Alizo remained non-violent. It contributed to the break in FRAIN.

192 In Fanon style Roberto wrote to his cousin, "without bloodshed, liberation is not possible", first, however, it was necessary to see "what result we will obtain at UN". Letter from Accra dated January 26, 1959, quoted in Marcum, n.153, pp.68-69.

193 Letter from Accra dated April 19, 1959, quoted in Ibid.

194 About 2 million Africans were displaced: 800,000 subjects to forced rural labour, 3,50,000 faced joblessness and underemployment in urban areas and about 1,000,000 Angolan emigres were labouring in Congo, Rhodesia and South Africa. Estimates of Variato da Cruz, in World Outlook, n.191, p.21.

The revolt was manifested in three sequential explosions in 1961. It first occurred in the cotton area of Baixa de Cassange which experienced an economic recession due to fall of the world price of coffee and cotton. The fall in prices was followed by failure to pay African growers, then strikes, retaliatory beatings and arrests and, finally, by mid-February, mayhem and destruction throughout the countryside.¹⁹⁵ The members of a sect called Maria, embarked on an anti-colonial campaign and against the whole system of enforced cotton plantation. This religious crusade for "independence"¹⁹⁶ was brutally repressed by the Portuguese and many of the Marienes fled to Congo's Kwango province, what would later become a revolutionary support base for UPA military operations. But no African nationalist movement claimed credit for the localized and religious revolt of Cassange.¹⁹⁷

The second uprising was the attack on the Luanda Prison (February 4, 1961) with the aim of releasing political prisoners. Though the linkages of the attack on

195 For details see Rev. Malcolm Mc Veigh, "The Bullets of Civilization", Africa Today, vol.8, no.7, September 1961, pp.5-8; and "Labour in Chains", Africa Today, vol.8, no.8, October 1961, pp.9-11.

196 Marcum, n.153, p.125.

197 However, Mario de Andrade later claimed that the revolt had been organised by the MPLA nationalists. Quoted in Ibid., p.126.

Luanda prison and January 22 'Santa Maria' revolt is debatable,¹⁹⁸ the uprising gained world publicity. The attack was encouraged by the MPLA and later members of FUJA, ELA, UPA and JCA joined it.¹⁹⁹ The Portuguese blamed the "communist organizations" and "international subversive forces" for the violence.²⁰⁰ There was large-scale repression. The revolt failed partly due to the absence of modern arms, lack of long-term planned strategy and the treachery of some Africans.²⁰¹

But the most important revolt that thrust Angola into a protracted state of rebellion was the upheaval of March 15, 1961. The revolt was interpreted as the handiwork

198 John R. Cooley, mentions about "some coordination" between the Iberian revolutionary directorate and the MPLA in East Wind Over Africa (New York, Walker and Co., 1965), p.125. On the other hand, Captain Galvao who captured 'Santa Maria', maintains that he had no intentions of cooperating with anti-Portuguese independence movement in Angola. Santa Maria: My Crusade For Portugal (New York, The World Publishing Company, 1961), pp.224-26. James Duffy described the "Santa Maria" affair as "the symbolic beginning of the end for Portugal in Africa".

199 Though there are some disputes over February uprising, it is generally attributed to MPLA. See Marcum, n.153, p.129.

200 Ibid.

201 The MPLA charged that the treason of some Africans who were pro-Portuguese militated against the success of nationalist action. Quoted in Ibid., p.128.

of the "communists" and in sequel to "orders from Moscow", or a "skillful propoganda to separate Angola from Portugal" and weaken NATO.²⁰² Similarly Gann and Duignan presented it as "a communist-inspired war of national liberation", which was "well planned and organised" by the three elements, "members of the Congolese Force Publique who had fled the Congo after the mutiny of July 1960", "Angolan Nationalists", and "a small group of Angolan communists who had been busy forming a revolutionary army since 1959."²⁰³ However, the reports of a "communist conspiracy" are rather exaggeration of facts.

The strategy of the uprising was well planned, secret and an extension of the UPA's strategy for national liberation.²⁰⁴ In July 1960, Roberto sent UPA couriers to Nova Lisboa and Luanda to make contacts with and distribute party tracts among African soldiers. To the Security Council, Roberto gave a memorandum about the February

202 These were views expressed by South African and French journalists. See *Ibid.*, pp.130-31.

203 White Settlers in Tropical Africa (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), pp.139-40. Also see George Martelli, The Future in Angola (London, Congo-Africa, 1962), pp.4-5.

204 See Holden Roberto, "Angola and Portugal", quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.134. Also see "UPA memorandum to UN". Roberto also said to Josie Fanon, widow of Frantz Fanon, "Pay close attention to March 15th, the day of debate in UN, some very important thing is going to happen in Angola". World Outlook, n.191, p.19.

outbreak of violence and urged the General Assembly to press Portugal for an "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all troops and the liberation of political prisoners in Angola."²⁰⁵

The revolt started from a farm at Primavera. It soon spread all over leading to large scale violence, including the deaths of many European children and women. However, the UPA deplored the "extreme violence" on the European civilians and the assimilado community.²⁰⁶

The revolt lacked a long-term political and military objective.²⁰⁷ The Portuguese accelerated their repression with the coming of new battalions and the use of NATO weapons including the napalm bombs.²⁰⁸ Thus a "reign of terror" had begun.²⁰⁹ By the middle of July, the terrorist movement declined.

205 UPA memorandum to the Security Council, quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.138.

206 The New York Times, March 20, 1961. Also at the UN the UPA memorandum blamed the Portuguese for violence and Roberto made "a desperate and pressing appeal" for an impartial commission of enquiry for a visit to Angola to ascertain the responsibility for the events". UPA Memorandum, p.10, quoted in *Ibid.*

207 Basil Davidson, n.71, p.193.

208 For best account from Portuguese side, see Helió Felgas, Guerra em Angola (Lisbon, 1962); also "Sel Gavin Young" in The Observer (London), 20 August 1961.

209 McVeigh, n.195, p.7.

Thus Marcum sums up the March uprising, "that the Angolans underestimated the tenacity of the Portuguese and overestimated the responsiveness of the "Christien" west. The authoritarian Salazar government was immune to the sort of freely exercised domestic and international pressures of press and organized public opinion that had translated limited violence and UN debates into effective inducements for concessions in French policy toward Tunisia and Morocco. The tactics of 'Bourguibism' worked well against the French but not against the Portuguese."²¹⁰

THE STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP:
POLITICS OF THE DISUNITED FRONT AND GUERRILLA
STRUGGLE

The three sequential explosions discussed above had initiated the revolutionary guerilla struggle in Angola. Unfortunately the National Liberation Movements were disunited. A unified leadership could have bridged the cultural and social conflicts that became open and acute in 1960's. The lack of a unified leadership was instrumental in perpetuating the civil war.

There were several attempts to unite the National Liberation Movements. First, at Tunis on 31 January 1960, Holden signed a joint 'declaration of compromise' with

210 Marcum, n.153, p.146.

four representatives of FRAIN, a newly formed 'revolutionary front' including PAIGC, MPLA and Aliazo,²¹¹

The agreement could not continue for long because of Roberto's separate plans for the Kongo areas (March uprising) in total neglect of coordination, and the February uprising of 1961, which further hastened him to send several UPA men to Angola.²¹² Andrade blamed the failure to establish the common-front on two factors. (1) the foreign (meaning western) influence within the UPA, whose leaders sought exclusively Western association; and (2) miscalculations by both movements, each of which overestimated the breath of its Angolan support.²¹³

In another effort on 1 November 1960, in Leopoldville, rather than full merger, the representatives of UPA, MPLA, Aliazo and the Cabindan AREC reached an accord de principe for the formal creation of a cartel, or common front for close coordination of their activities. The agreement was in absence of Roberto. Roberto not only predicted its failure but also opposed the implementation of the tripartite agreement. He argued that the UPA must prepare its own militant programme and prevailed in the UPA to withdraw from the front.²¹⁴

211 For details see Marcum, *Ibid.*, pp.200-221. On the question of violent method of national liberation, Aliazo broke the alliance with MPLA. *Ibid.*, p.100.

212 Basil Davidson, n.71, p.207.

213 Marcum, n.153, pp.94-95.

214 *Ibid.*, pp.97-100.

In May 1961, another unity effort was made. Holden and Roberto accepted close cooperation in principle. Though nothing came out of it, the young militants of MPLA, Aliazo and UPA were not discouraged to form a Reassemblément Democratique de la Jeunesse Angolaise (RDJA) in December 1961. But unfortunately the UPA members were forced by their leaders to withdraw and RDJA collapsed.

Another important effort for unity was in late October 1966, under the pressure from OAU. The representatives of Holden's GRAE and MPLA decided to end fratricidal war between themselves and decided to form a joint committee under OAU auspices to study the possible basis for cooperation.²¹⁵ Holden denounced this agreement on the ground that his delegates were not empowered to sign it.

Thus the several attempts for unity were unsuccessful because of several factors. First, the leaders of different movements were too ambitious to share power. The disunity was more due to personal ambition rather than difference in

215 Basil Davidson, n.71, pp.213-14. The substantial points were:

1. Immediate end of all forms of hostile propaganda and supervision of the two movements by OAU representatives.
2. Immediate release of members of the two movements detained by one side or the other.
3. OAU to re-evaluate the situation in Angola and make recommendations to intensify a joint and more effective armed struggle.
4. Formation of a joint committee of MPLA and GRAE under OAU auspices.

ideology. This was especially true about Holden Roberto.²¹⁶ Secondly, there were differences in social and ethnic base of the liberation movements. Added to this was the difference in strategy to achieve independence. The failure of the February uprising had led MPLA to emphasise an organised arms supply, broadening of its mass base in Angola and unification of nationalist forces. On the other hand, the UPA believed in a misguided strategy. They applied Fanon's strategy without building consciousness among the masses. Their programme was not only concerned in agrarian radicalism,²¹⁷ but was also elitist and reformist.²¹⁸ Roberto believed that the issue when internationalised would force the Portuguese to withdraw. His limited vision showed undue faith on US diplomacy to persuade Portugal for decolonization.

216 Andrede asserted that it was personal ambition (of Roberto) and not ideology that prevented the UPA from joining the front with his party. See Marcum, n.153, p.221.

217 Ibid., p.223.

218 As Davidson writes, "Holden's leadership had acquired the trappings of Angolan nationalism without acquiring its dynamic.... a movement led by the traditional elite ... it became a movement led by modernising elite within the reformist structure of Congo...", n.71, pp.222-223.

Fourthly, their external linkages, especially UPA's pro-Congo and pro-American policy²¹⁹ perpetuated a cold war relationship between the MPLA-FNLA. Roberto's revolutionary potentialities were blunted and contributed to his "embourgeoisement". Finally, the recognition of GRAE by the OAU, with the former deliberately isolating the MPLA, further sharpened the difference.²²⁰

In the struggle for the revolutionary leadership, the shrinking social base of FNLA and the effective leadership of MPLA contributed to the latter's advantage. There was a division in the UPA over the violent and non-violent means to achieve independence. The moderates preferring a non-violent front formed the Movement de Defense des Interes de l'Angola (MIDA) on January 22, 1961.²²¹ Moreover, Roberto's negative attitude towards united front disillusioned some of his effective men into leaving the party e.g.

219 As a Congo Minister said, "Roberto was completely bourgeoisified owning four or five buildings in Kinshasa brought money which the Angolan liberation committee had placed ... and partly from American aid and Mobutu's aid." Ibid., pp.206, 214. Also, the L'Internationale (Paris), October 1962 drew similar conclusion, that the two types of national movements were (1) Bourguibists, who were bourgeoisie and pro-western; and (2) Castroists, who were socialist in orientation. The UPA "nationalists" fell within the first category, the MPLA "revolutionary leftists" within the second. Quoted in Marcum, n.153, p.219.

220 Davidson, n.218, p.213.

221 Marcum, n.153, p.98.

Anibal de Melo, Antoine Matsumona Alexander Taty, etc. More important, Jonas Savimbi, the Foreign Minister in GRAE resigned because Holden was a "flagrantly tribalist" and a US creation "to be held in reserve as a buffer inside a divided Angolan nationalism". Holden's pro-Congo linkages and the indiscipline of his army turned them increasingly into parasites on the surviving population.²²² Though UPA and FDA pro-Alizeo formed a united party, National Front of Angolan Liberation or FNLA, the above factors explain the shrinking social base of FNLA and limited to a lesser 'fronts' e.g. Kasai and Katanga. The FNLA in 1971 was successful only in maintaining a small fighting force in the Western Congo, based on the Camp at Kinkuzu (to seal off the MPLA activities) with infrequent short-range raids to retain their presence in northern Angola. Given their logistic and other advantages, these activities revealed little more than dismal failure.

On the other hand, the MPLA emerged as the most effective group. The activities of MPLA were recognized both by the Portuguese and their South African allies as creating terror for the colonial administration.²²³ The

222 Ibid., p.224.

223 See A.J. Venter, The Terror Fighter (Cape Town, 1969), pp.9-10.

Cuanze Operations of the MPLA (late 1967) was well reported in the newspaper.²²⁴ The MPLA was also actively involved in Cabinda and Eastern Angola.

The failure of the February 1961 uprising and the subsequent repression by the Portuguese had demoralised and weakened the MPLA. To broaden its revolutionary base and regenerate the Organization, Neto and other exile MPLA leaders started a string of clinics for the benefit of the refugees. Secondly, they laid the foundation of a new political structure. This was resented by Vario da Cruz who was ultimately expelled.²²⁵

The Congo regimes were suspicious of pro-communist linkages of MPLA. Moreover, their support to FNLA led to hostility against the MPLA. The MPLA clinic and office were closed in Congo (October-November 1963). Fortunately for MPLA, in the Congo-Brazzaville, the conservative Abbe Youlou was replaced by moderate radical government of Massema-Debat. This helped MPLA to establish its office in Congo-Brazzaville.

In its consistent effort to broaden the support-base of MPLA, 'the interior of the movement in the interior' was launched in 1964. The guerrilla activities in Cabinda were

²²⁴ See Noel Garford, The Star (Johannesburg), 13 May 1971.

²²⁵ Da Cruz retired to Algeria. He also went to China where, according to MPLA experience, he played a part in removing Chinese support. He further accused the MPLA of being pro-Russian and anti-Chinese. See Davidson, n.71, p.233.

increased with aids and training from Congo-Brazzaville, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.²²⁶ The Cabinda enclave was to become the main 'live' training ground for MPLA.

Other factors also encouraged MPLA. In 1964, the MPLA was recognised by the OAU. Secondly, the independence of Zambia (1964) helped MPLA to establish office at Lusaka in 1965. Under Neto's advice, the MPLA decided to open an eastern front. There was the systematic mobilisation of Luvale, Mbunda and Luchazi ethnic tribes in the eastern districts, later followed by their mobilisation in the north, west and south districts. There were several operations, the important ones in the Mexico and Cuando Cubango districts (18 March 1966); and the Lunde (8 May 1968).²²⁷ The MPLA had built a formidable front in Eastern Angola with Daniel Chipenda as its Commander.

Further, to structure the leadership, at the Mexico Conference (1968), the MPLA formed a Steering Committee while bringing better coordination of the political and military functions. It also stated its goodwill towards white individuals who wished to serve the cause of Angola.²²⁸ In 1970, Neto formulated the dual revolution to free and modernise the people against the traditionalism and the

226 Ibid., p.235.

227 For details see Ibid., pp.253-69.

228 Ibid., p.283.

Portuguese colonialism. He also espoused the 'wide united front' against the Portuguese colonialism.²²⁹

In 1970, Neto also introduced the centres of revolutionary instruction (CIR).

Thus by 1971, the MPLA had formidable fronts in Eastern Angola. Western and North-Western Angola, in Cabinda and some areas of North Angola. The period 1961-71 is also noticeable for MPLA-FNLA internecine conflicts. On November 23, 1961, the MPLA troops under Feriera were treacherously murdered by the FNLA. Holden Roberto himself confirmed that "he had in fact given orders to intercept and annihilate MPLA columns that were trying to infiltrate into Angola."²³⁰ Many MPLA activists were tortured at the Kinkuzu camp of the FNLA. The Congo regimes helped the FNLA in murdering the MPLA activists.²³¹

After resigning from UPA, Jonas Savimbi first gave a call for a united front to all 'valid' nationalist organisations. He seemed to have dwelt with the idea of joining MPLA. But soon Savimbi announced the formation of Uniao para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in

229 Neto on MPLA broadcasting station, 29 August 1960, quoted in B. Davidson, n.71, p.279.

230 Ibid., pp.211-12. Also see Marcum, n.153, p.214.

231 It included Benedicto, who had led the Luanda uprising. The confinement of the MPLA activists at the Kinkuzu prison cell was confirmed in Neto's statement in Brazzaville, 3 January 1968. Quoted in Ibid., pp.240-41.

March 1966 with himself as President. The Zambian independence helped Savimbi to collect UPA supporters among refugees in Western Zambia and send some of them to eastern Angola in 1966-67. However, the sporadic operations of UNITA in Terveira de sonsa on the Katanga border, Mexico and Bie towns, had inadequate political and military preparations. Unfortunately for Savimbi, the explosion of the Benguela railway was resented by Zambia and led to his expulsion from Lusaka in 1968. However, this loss was possibly compensated by the Chinese aid to UNITA.

Towards the Angolan Crisis and the Ultimate Victory of MPLA

The April coup of 1974 did not radically change the power structure at Lisbon. Though the communists in the power coalition gained temporarily, their dominance was soon undermined. Economically, the structure remained unchanged. Politically, the emerging industrial capitalists had replaced the old bourgeoisie which had supported the fascist rule. The reforms during Caetano had not extended the spheres of liberty and the right of political dissent. But a significant development was that the post-coup governments in Lisbon had accelerated the process of decolonization in the colonies. The principle of self-determination and independence was affirmed by the subsequent governments at Lisbon. Thus after Salazar's resignation,

Premier Gonsalves affirmed that it must be a just process of decolonization which would not lead to neo-colonialism.²³²

Unlike Guinea, Cape Verde and Sao Tome islands and Mozambique, where the transitions to independence were achieved without civil war, the independence in Angola witnessed a violent civil war. The violence was partly due to the reluctance of the Liberation Movements for a permanent functioning of any united front and partly due to the external actors that complicated the situation (detailed analysis for external forces is dealt in Chapters IV and V).

The three liberation movements had indulged into fratricidal war rather than to unite themselves against Portugal. On the eve of the Lisbon coup, none of the three liberation movements could individually command majority support in Angola. Although the MPLA was most active, it seems that the FNLA had some military and logistic advantages.²³³ The MPLA was weakened in 1973 when Daniel Chipenda rebelled accusing Neto of indulging luxury in his travel tours and at the cost of ignoring his troops in the bush. This led the Soviets to conclude

232 Africa Diary (New Delhi), 20-26 August 1974, pp.7094-5.

233 See Christopher Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola", African Affairs (London), vol.75, no.299, April 1976, p.140.

that the leadership was divided and shifted its aid to Chipenda who seemed more active to capture power. This was only a temporary loss as the Soviet Union soon realized its mistake and began refunding MPLA under Neto. A similar defection occurred in 1975 under Joacquiun Pinto da Andrade who accused Neto of "presidentialism" and concentrating power in his hands.

To solve the problem of transfer of power, Portugal and the three liberation struggles signed the Alvor agreement (January 16, 1975). Angola was to be independent on November 11, 1975. A transitional government was set up to draft the constitution and electoral laws, registering of voters and holding a general election before the end of October 1975. The transitional government was headed by a Presidential Council composed of one representative from each of the three movements, while the twelve ministerial portfolios were split evenly between the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and the colonial authorities.

However, the Alvor agreement broke down initiating fratricidal war among the liberation movements. Each movement attempted to capitalize and exploit the situation to widen its area of control. FNLA launched an attack on MPLA to capture Luanda. By March 1975 the FNLA appeared to be at an advantage. But soon the Soviet-Cuban help to MPLA reversed the fate. Meanwhile China which had begun to

fund FNLA and also gave some aid to UNITA strategically, withdrew. In its June 1975 meeting, the OAU decided that all the three movements had an equally valid claim to sharing of power in Angola's independence. The US increased its covert aid to FNLA-UNITA through Mobutu's Zaire. South African troops also entered southern Angola in aid of FNLA-UNITA. This was followed by the landing of the Cuban paratroopers and Soviet military advisers in favour of MPLA. On November 11, 1975, the day of Independence, MPLA not only controlled Luanda but also the majority of the areas. FNLA-UNITA also formed its rival government. However, by the beginning of February 1976, and several non-Africans recognized MPLA's government as the true representative of the Angolan people.

Conclusion:

From the analysis of Parts I-III, certain generalisations can be made. The late and violent decolonization of Angola was the result of Portugal's insensitive attitude towards decolonization (till April 1974) and the disunited national liberation movement. Unlike Britain and France, in Portugal there was an absence of both the anti-colonial intellectual movement and strong metropole bourgeoisie to argue for decolonization and neo-colonial expansion. If US had little pressure exerted on Portugal for decolonization, Portugal feared that decolonization would reduce it to a

small European power like Spain. The colonies provided an outlet to the domestic pressures - both civilians and military sections - to migrate to colonies. This temporarily lessened tensions at home. Moreover, decolonization would mean introducing reforms at home and hence weaken the domination of 'Estado Nova'. But ultimately it was the colonial war that led to domestic resentment and bloodless overthrow of the Fascist rule. The colonial war had attenuated the conflict between Portugal (metropolis) and national liberation movement (periphery). Secondly, it perpetuated internal crisis in Portugal. Thirdly, it also favoured the drive towards the neo-colonialist path of development.²³⁴

In fact 'liberalization' of trade relationship toward neo-colonialist path had started in late 1950's. This had led to increasing foreign investment in Angola. Previously, the foreign economic investments in Angola operated through Lisbon. Now, after 1950's, they established direct links with the colonies. Portugal with its weak socio-economic

234 This is in accordance with Johan Galtung's analysis that decolonization can only take place, if (a) negative relations were to develop between the two centres; (b) disharmony of interest between the periphery and the centre of the centre were to increase, (c) the goal orientation of the centre were to change, in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), vol.8, 1971, pp.108-9.

structure and social backwardness could not compete with the developed capitalist countries. Thus Portugal became a middleman in the 'dependence' syndrome. It moved to the stage of a semi-peripheral nation in a "tri-model" system.²³⁵

The disunity among the National Liberation Movements that invited foreign intervention was due to their ethnic diversity and ambitions of their leaders. However, it is difficult to label the three movements as "tribalistic" on the basis of their 'ethnic-base'. All the three liberation movements emphasised the restoration of the national identity and the liberation of the entire Angolans without any discrimination of sex, age or tribe.

The three liberation movements were committed to the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism. It would be difficult to label the liberation movements as either "pro-imperialist" or "pro-communists". Holden Roberto was no doubt pro-Zaire but not a stooge of Mobutu. Roberto expected US to play a significant role in Angola's decolonization. His association with Fanon, Amillar, Cabral, China, etc. also proves that he was not an American stooge. On the other hand Neto was no doubt inclined towards Communist parties of Portugal.

235 See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World : The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy", African Studies Review (Michigan), vol.17, no.1, April 1974, pp.1-26.

Soviet Union and Cuba but he also sought help from China and America. Neto not only repudiated the "Communist" label but also said, "I dislike these classifications. I am not a communist, I am not a socialist, I am first of all a patriot."²³⁶

The liberation movements were willing to receive aid from any source even from 'the Devil'.²³⁷ None of the three liberation movements, at least till the declaration of independence, were overtly communist. Both China and the Soviet Union as well as the countries of the West, had supported, at one time or another, all the three liberation movements and at times even their splinter-group and break away factions (for details see Chapters IV and V). It was only after the breakdown of the Alvor Agreement that the three liberation movements, in order to dominate the independence of Angola, aligned after the different external actors, to be labelled as pro-US or pro-USSR.

236 Africa Research Bulletin, July 1975, vol.12, no.7, 15 August 1975, pp.370-76.

237 Neto spoke in these terms. See *Ibid.*

CHAPTER II

FACTORS SHAPING US FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WITH EMPHASIS ON ANGOLA

A study of the US southern Africa policy - National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) - indicates that several factors shaped US foreign policy. The NSSM 39 was the first planned option of US African policy. It was implemented by Kissinger which accounted for the debacle of US African policy.²

Broadly there are four factors shaping US southern African policy:

- I Material and economic benefits;
- II Strategic perspective including containment of Soviet influence in the region;
- III Influence of non-governmental agencies; and
- IV Moral factors and ideological intensity.

These factors will explain the dilemmas of the foreign policy makers in supporting self-determination, majority rule, decolonization, human rights, anti-apartheid on the one hand and, on the other, the support to minority white regimes especially South Africa and the fascist Portuguese colonies.

1 For the economic, strategic factors and pressure group politics explaining the basis of NSSM 39, see Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (ed.), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa & NSSM 39 (USA, Lawrence Hill & Company, 1976), pp.23-24. Also for the major actors influencing politics in Southern Africa see "Southern Africa : Change or Continuity"?, Issue(*W*)vol.VII, 1977, p.20.

2 For details see Chapter IV.

1. Material and Economic Benefits

The increase in the US imports, especially of strategic materials, from the developing countries,³ which according to some in the age of energy and mineral crisis,⁴ has made Africa significant for US and the western world. Southern Africa is important because it accounts for 65.20 per cent of the world's total production of cobalt; 62.60 per cent of diamonds; 60.70 per cent of gold; 49.10 per cent of platinum, 46.30 per cent of vanadium, 20.50 per cent of manganese; and 14.80 per cent of uranium.⁵ The US imports

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- 3 The increased imports include 100 per cent rubber, 100 per cent tin, 90 per cent bauxites, 84 per cent niobium, 79 per cent cobalt, 62 per cent fluorspar; 43 per cent oil and oil products, 41 per cent mercury, 33 per cent silver, 31 per cent tungsten, 28 per cent manganese ore, 17 per cent copper and 10 per cent iron ore. The bulk of these raw materials comes from Nigeria, Zaire, Gabon, Algeria, South Africa, Liberia and Zambia. From A. Gromyko, "The USA - The Mainstay of Neo-Colonialism in Africa", International Affairs (Moscow), October 1980, p.23. Also see Table 2.
- 4 As Anthony Harrigan remarked "The US is not only facing an energy crisis in the mid and late 1970's but a mineral crisis as well. Access to strategic minerals will be an increasingly serious national concern..." in "Security Interests in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean", Strategic Review (4) Fall 1973, p.19.
- 5 Though the view that the developed countries do not find alternative sources of supply of these minerals has been challenged, yet their relative 'dependence' on Southern Africa for these strategic materials remains. See G. Loewenstein and Sean Gervasi, "Southern Africa in the World Economy", The Forces of Africa, Diversity and Progress : Repression and Struggle - Report of Special Study Missions to Africa, February-March 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1972), Appendix 41, pp.464-71 486. Also see Table 1(a) and Mohammed A El-Khawes and B. Cohen (ed.), n.1, pp.34-35.

eleven minerals from all of Africa (see Table 1). Ten of these: chromium, cobalt, manganese, bauxite, antimony, columbium, cobalt, vanadium, platinum, gold, petroleum, are commodities for which US must rely on imports for more than 35 per cent of consumption and for which African nations are major suppliers⁶ (also see Table 1(b). Besides raw materials, Africa is also important for US corporations, markets, arms, technological and economic aids. The zone of US economic benefits can be broadly sub-divided into two: (a) African states, including Angola, and (b) South Africa.

1. Minerals from Africa Imported to US

Outside South Africa and Rhodesia, the US import of important raw materials were from Zaire for cobalt (37 per cent), Nigeria for oil (17 per cent) and columbium (10 percent), Guinea for bauxite (16 per cent), Zambia for copper, etc. Tables 2 and 3 give data of African exports to US and other western countries. Nigeria became the most important black independent country because it is the second largest supplier of imported crude oil to the US. Moreover, the surplus from oil for infrastructural projects,

6 Gordon Bertolin, "US Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade and Raw Materials" in J.S. Whitaker (ed.), Africa and US: Vital Interests (New York: N.Y. Univ. Press, 1976).

the economic strength of Nigeria which has made it one of the most important OAU member, etc. have further increased the significance of Nigeria to US

Angola:

Angola has important reserves of petroleum, tin and rubber; diamond, phosphate, sulphur and copper. Cabinda has oil and phosphate reserves; copper deposits are found in Cuanza (North districts), diamond prospects are in South-Western Angola, etc. (see Table 1c). The expansion of foreign investment in Angola began with the liberalization of policy in late 1950's,⁷ which especially led to American predominance. The US replaced Britain as the leading foreign investor in Angola. US first expanded its mineral imports of oil after the concessions given to Gulf oil in 1957. Largely, because of the Gulf oil company, the US was already Angola's second major supplier in 1968 (with 11.8 per cent of imports), outflanked by Portugal but followed closely by West Germany (11.1 per cent), Britain (8.9 per cent).⁸

7 This marked the third stage of Angolan dependence. The first two stages were: (i) 1910-28, the establishment of Benguela Railway and DIAMANG. The leading trading and investment partner was Britain; (ii) 1928-46, the production of cotton and copper were increased. See William Minter, "Imperial Network and External Dependence: Implications for the Angolan Liberation Struggle", Africa Today(U.S.) vol.2, no.1, Winter 1974, pp.25-39.

8 Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (ed.), n.i, p.50.

South Africa:

South Africa has important mineral reserves which exist outside the Soviet Union and China. These minerals are corundum, industrial diamonds, chromite, platinum, uranium,⁹ US is dependent upon South Africa for manganese (12 per cent), chromium (36 per cent), vanadium (59 per cent), antimony (22 per cent), and gold and diamond (see table 2). Table 3 gives the US consumption of these minerals. For six of these minerals - gold, platinum, manganese, antimony, vanadium, and chromium - more than two-thirds of world's resources are concentrated in the white-ruled states of Southern Africa and either the Soviet Union or China.¹⁰ Thus South Africa is important for US mineral imports.

2. Investment

Table 4 gives US direct investment in Africa as compared to its worldwide investment. The US investment in Africa is only a small part (3 per cent of the total overseas investment) as compared to Europe (41 per cent), Canada (25 per cent) and Latin America (17 per cent). The US investments in independent Africa are primarily in extractive industries (about two-thirds), especially in Nigeria, Liberia, Zaire, Gabon and Kenya.¹¹ The US investment and returns from rest

9 South Africa has two-third of world's gold, more than 50 per cent of world's diamonds, more than 3/4th of the world's uranium. Donald Woods, "South Africa's Face to the World", Foreign Affairs(U), 1977-78, p.528. Also see Gordon Bertolin, n.6, pp.35-48.

10 Ibid.

11 For details see Ibid., p.23.

of Africa was 7 per cent and 20-27 per cent, respectively.
(see Table 5).

Angola

The foreign investment in Angola has increased rapidly after 1965. Further concessions were given to foreign investment in Angolan petroleum. Besides the Gulf Oil Company which gave \$ 96.7 million (1968-72) to Angola, there was also an additional contract in 1972 for exploitation of sulphur, helium and carbon dioxide with the other oil companies, namely Angola-Ranger Oil Company of Cheyenne, Superior Oil Company of Huston, Calesberg Resources Corporation of Los Angeles, ANGOL-PETRANGOL, etc.¹² The concessions in other mineral extraction were diamond for US companies like Diversa, Incorporated, Diamond Distributors of New York and DIAMUL; Phosphate for firms like COPAN, whose one-third share is of Rockefeller groups; copper extraction for the companies like the Great Lakes Carbon Corporation of New York; and rubber and fine manufacturing for MABOR company.

South Africa

The largest concentration of US investment in Africa is in South Africa. The total US investment in South Africa has multiplied from less than \$300 million to over \$1.7 billion (1966-76).¹³ In 1976, the US investment was \$1.66 billion or

12 For details see Mohammed A. El-Khawas & B. Cohen (ed.), n.1, pp.49-50.

13 Ann Siedman, "Why US Corporations should get out of South Africa", Issue, vol.X, nos.1&2, Spring/Summer, 1980, p.81. Also see Gordon Bertolin, n.6, p.23.

36 per cent of the total in the African continent. Fifty per cent of the US investments in South Africa is in the manufacturing sector while less than 10 per cent is in mining.¹⁴ The US firms directly finance about 17 per cent of all foreign investment and 25 per cent of transnational corporate investment in South Africa which constitutes 40 per cent of all South African manufacturing investment, including in several critical sectors.¹⁵ Some 340 South African firms are American owned.¹⁶ More important, 50 per cent of all US investments in South Africa is owned by four firms - General Motors, Mobile, Texaco and Ford - which happen to be four of the five largest corporations in America in terms of sales. Out of the fifty corporations in America, twentynine have operations in South Africa.¹⁷ The average returns on US investment in South Africa are 15.20 per cent of the total investment in Africa (see Table 5).¹⁸

14 Ann Siedman, *Ibid.*, p.18.

15 *Ibid.*

16 William J. Folz, "US Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints", Political Science Quarterly (US), vol.92, no.1, Spring 1977, p.50. Also see Anirudha Gupta, "Southern Africa: The Internal Variables", ISDA (New Delhi), vol.IX, no.4, April-June 1977, p.341.

17 Gordon Bertolin, n.6, p.28.

18 Regarding South Africa, F.T. Haner rates it as "very high", on most of his scales which measures the degree of safety of foreign investments. One of the basic criteria used is 'political stability'. Quoted in Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict (SIPRI-Stockholm, Sweden, 1976), p.40.

3. Bank Investment

Table 6 gives a comparative data of US banks' investment in the world and Africa. In independent African countries, the banks' loans are \$ 972 million as compared to 720 million in South Africa (about 40 per cent).

4. Trade

Table 7 gives detailed data of US foreign trade. In 1976, merchandise trade with Africa was nearly \$18 billion, or about 7.6 per cent of the total world trade. Between 1970-76, the US trade with Africa has tripled in export and increased by the times (in import). US exports include food, capital goods, heavy machinery and manufactured goods. US imports from independent Africa are primarily from energy producing states, including Angola.

Angola:

The US export to Angola increased from \$ 11 million (1960) to \$ 62 million (1974), though it decreased in the year of Angolan crisis to \$ 53 million (1975). The US import to Angola increased from \$ 26 million (1960) to \$ 378 million (1974) and it kept on increasing to \$426 million even during 1975) (see tables 7 and 8).

South Africa:

The important US exports to South Africa are computers, communications equipment and aircraft.¹⁹ Until 1976, about

19 Mohammed A. El-Khawas and B. Cohen (ed.), n.1, pp.36-40.

one-third of American imports from Africa were from South Africa. Unlike in the other independent African states, the balance of trade shows that US has a large surplus with South Africa, nearly half a billion dollars (Table 9). This trade surplus makes South Africa a major economic interest in this area.²⁰

Western Allies in Africa

There is growing involvement and dependence of Western countries on African resources, especially Britain, France, West Germany and Japan. Over 75 per cent of Africa's trade is with the Western industrial democracies (see Table 1(b)), including strategic and vital materials.

Although US is a predominant trading partner with Portugal and Angola, other West European countries have also significant ties and the trend was further strengthened after July 1974 agreement between Portugal and the European Common Market.²¹

20 Ibid., p.87.

21 Writing in 1979-80, Peter Jay had argued about the growing independence of Western allies from the US economic dominance. "Regionalism in Geopolitics", Foreign Affairs, 1979-80, p.491. But the competition between US and its Western allies is of non-antagonistic in nature. However, its allies' interdependence on African resources and markets also influence US policy makers. For the concept of US "Friends as Foes", by Immanuel Wallerstein, Foreign Policy(US), nos.39-40, 1980, pp.119-31.

II. Strategic Perspectives of US including Containment of Soviet Influence in Southern Africa

The strategic importance of Southern Africa originates from the economic 'significance' (as discussed above) and the maritime and naval commercial routes and choke points. The possible threats to its strategic interests extends from "low-level" threats posed by "neutral" black regimes willing to provide the USSR Navy with bunkering facilities to "high-level" threats such as Soviet naval presence in a "liberated" South Africa.²² Similarly, William J. Foltz, points out that Southern Africa's non-economic strategic interests for the US, each of which has potentially very different policy ramifications are (i) US-USSR mutual nuclear deterrence; (ii) protection of the shipping lanes, (iii) competition for political and military influence in Southern African countries.²³

As a natural sequel to the super-power arms race, the use of the Indian ocean for hiding submarines and the possible deployment of Poseidon submarines and Trident I or Trident III missiles, makes the coastal states of Africa, important for US and USSR. Moreover, as US has important

22 For details see Geoffrey Kemp, "US Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Whitaker (ed.), n.6, pp.131-40.

23 W. Foltz, n.16, pp.56-57.

naval bases to protect in the Indian ocean, including Diego Garcia, it is used as an argument for the mainland back-up facility.²⁴

For US the cape route is a vital commercial sea lane for raw material and as a route for deploying maritime forces into the Indian Ocean - Persian Gulf - Regarding commercial shipping, the cape route is one of the world's prime strategic sea lanes of communication (SLOC) essentially because of the deployment of super-tankers which can deliver, with lesser cost, oil to western countries than a smaller vessel transiting by way of the Suez Canal. Sixty per cent of the oil transportation from the Gulf to Western countries passes through the cape. Thus in situations of either maritime or crisis scenarios when the cape route will not be used it will create serious economic problems to the Western allies. Also militarily, the cape route is important for the entry of US naval ships in the Indian ocean from the South Atlantic and vice-versa.

Thus, the Cape route and other communications refueling centres in South Africa are regarded as important for US. South Africa is viewed in its historical role as

24 See US House of Representatives, Hearings before the sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83rd Congress, second session, Proposed Expansion of US Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean (Washington, D.C., 1974).

a guarantor of cape trade routes.²⁵ Further, South Africa is perceived as providing stability in an unstable continent. Stability and peace are necessary pre-requisites for the flourishing of US corporations. Also South Africa provides cheap black labour in the ex-Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.²⁶ Thus with its superior economic infrastructure and arms technology (possibly the only nuclear power in the continent), South Africa is viewed by a section of the Americans as 'deputy peace-keeper' for the US.²⁷ The unconditional support of South Africa during the World War and the Korean War, and its role of containment of communism, including any internal change in Southern Africa that could jeopardise the interest

25 Although written in 1979-80, it can be argued that US had recognised South Africa's geo-strategic role of policing the cape-route ever since the beginning of second world war. Garrick Uttley, "Globalism or Regionalism", Adolph Papers (UK) no.154, Winter 1979-80, p.2.

26 As Siedman writes, "South Africa's oppressive regime ensures profitable business for US and other corporate interest by holding down the wages of the masses of the population", n.13, p.84.

27 R. Milne, "US Draws on South Africa for Stability", The Star Weekly, 26 May 1979,

of the West, especially the US,²⁸ has been over-emphasised by a section of policy-makers in their defence of South Africa.

Thus in financial and strategic terms Southern Africa has become an integral part of the western system. The NSM 39 had also underlined the global realities and strategic factors of this region.²⁹ This explains the arms shipment to 'the white regimes' which were expected 'to stay'. A 1975 SIPRI publication estimated that \$622.5 million worth of arms flowed into South Africa from US and Western Europe between 1950-72 (also see Table 10). It also explains the importance of Azores base and the Portuguese colonies to the American cold-war defense planning.³⁰ The importance of the Azores was manifested during the Yom Kippur War (1973) when Portugal was the only NATO ally to help US lift arms to Israel.³¹

28 As Gromyko writes, "The essence of US policy is support for South Africa so as to maintain it as a bastion of anti-communism". Further he quotes Melvin Price, the Chairman on Armed Service Committee who visited South Africa, "Our visit is because of our interest in defence matters". Foreign Affairs, vol.50, no.3, p.648. See Gromyko n.3, p.27. Similarly, John Marcum assigns South Africa a sub-imperialistic role within the whole region, in "South Africa and Portugal", Issue, vol.IV, no.2, Summer 1974, p.10.

29 Mohammed A. El-Khawas and B. Cohen (ed.), n.1, p.24.

30 Jose Sherehif, "Portugal's Strategic Territories", Foreign Affairs, vol.3, no.3, 1953, pp.321-25.

31 Mohammed A. El-Khawas and B. Cohen (ed.), n.1, p.52.

Thus, the strategic-economic importance explains the Luso-American linkages of the decision-makers to accept option 2 of NSSM 39. More important, it explains the US arms export to South Africa, and Rhodesia, despite sanctions³² and also US export of arms and Herbicides and training facilities to Portugal (see Tables 11 and 12 and 13) which were so instrumental in maintaining colonial domination, ostensibly for NATO interest.

III. Influence of Non-Governmental Agencies

The policy makers at Washington are also influenced by non-governmental agencies or the 'special interest' of the pressure groups.³³ In post-world war phase, the internestic issues e.g. trade, tariffs, monetary arrangements, food, population, energy policies, foreign investments, pollution and health, etc. have led to great interdepartmental competition for representation in foreign policies. The

32 For details see Michael Klare, "Evasion of the Embargo: How the US Arms South Africa and Rhodesia", Issue vol.9, 1979, pp.42-46.

33 The distinction between national interest and special interest are not nearly sharp. In one sense, the very essence of politics is to determine which special interest will gain the power or authority to define the national interest. See Glen Thomson, "Interest Structure, Decision-making Processes and US Foreign Policy", International Studies vol.18, 1979, p.595.

growing complexity in foreign policy has replaced the 'consensus'³⁴ by pluralism of interests claiming to embody the national interest and the pluralism of groups and institutions.

Among the various interest groups, the business group is one of the most important. Its importance has been recognized both by an American President, who said "the business of America is business", and a member for Secretary of Defence, who stated: "What is good for our country is good for General Motors and vice-versa."³⁵ However, the business groups often indulge in bribery in addition to lobbying and Naisen.³⁶

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- 34 This consensus was mainly on security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence for which the interest groups had little special concern.
- 35 Quoted in Marian Irish and Rike Frank, US Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace Jowitch, 1975), p.158. Similarly, William Danhoff writes, "US foreign policy during the post-war era was initiated, planned and carried out by the richest, most powerful and most internationally minded owners and managers of major corporations and financial institutions." G. William Danhoff, "Who made American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963?" in David Horowitz, ed., Corporations and Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p.25.
- 36 The securities and exchange commission disclosed that the Gulf oil corporations alone delivered \$ 4.2 million in bribes to foreign politicians in 15 countries, New York Times, 3 May 1975, p.15.

But there exists intense competition among the business groups and more often they are frequently divided and counteracted by each other.³⁷ The trade with the communists have also divided the business groups. In fact, the pressure from the business groups was a factor in US recognition of the Soviet Union (1934).³⁸ More recently, the prospect of large purchases of wheat and other western exports led many business groups, including the more conservative National Foreign Trade Council to liberalize trade with Soviet Union.³⁹

With regard to foreign aid, the business groups desire greater control over the uses to which foreign aids are consumed.⁴⁰

37 For details see Barry B. Hughes, Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1978), p.158.

38 For details see Donald C. Blaisdell, American Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Ronald Press, 1957), p.255. Bernard Cohen provides a different and very credible interpretation of the recognition, arguing that Roosevelt orchestrated the public providing the economic argument in support of real-politik policy. The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston, Little Brown, 1973), pp.179-80.

39 For details see "Declaration of the 58th National Foreign Trade Convention", National Foreign Trade Council, 10, Rockefeller Plaza (New York, N.Y. 10020, November 15-17, 1971), p.10. Also see Hughes, n.37, p.161.

40 Hughes, *Ibid.*

In summary, although no specific industries dictate the foreign policy, the business class as a whole does influence the general internationalist framework of US foreign policy. Some individual corporations or industries do influence US policy towards countries in which they have a major interest.

2. The Military Industrial Complex (MIC)

In his farewell speech, D. Eisenhower recognised the threat posed by the MIC. The MIC is an important interest group because it generates profit and employment for about 7.5 million people,⁴¹ and some 2072 retired military officers.⁴²

However, Hughes argues that the MIC does not dominate foreign policy. First, the relationship between concentrations of defense spending and congressional foreign policy shows weak relationships.⁴³ Secondly, defense spending since the early 1950's has declined. The non-Vietnam defense spending has declined in absolute terms since 1964.⁴⁴

41 Ibid., p.175.

42 Omer L. Carey, ed., The Military-Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1969), p.58.

43 See Charles Gray and Glen Gregory, "Military Spending and Senate Voting", Journal of Peace Research,⁽⁵⁾ 5(1968), pp.44-54; and Stephen A. Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the House of Representatives", Journal of Conflict Resolution⁽⁵⁾ vol.13, no.3, September 1969, pp.358-69.

44 Barry Blechman, et.al., Setting National Priorities: The 1975 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p.72.

However, the truth is that the MIC has played a very significant role in the maintenance of massive defense spending.⁴⁵

3. Agriculture

The agricultural and farm organizations, despite their decrease in population from 8 per cent to 6 per cent, have opposed restrictions on agricultural products and have played an important role in US expansionist policy in Latin America and elsewhere.⁴⁶

The important labour organisations, American Federation of Labour (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) are protectionists. They are critical of MNC's overseas investments,⁴⁷ subsidized export of American technology, production and jobs,⁴⁸ and the 'one-sided detente'.⁴⁹ The protectionism of the labour organisations reflects their anti-communism stand which influences the policy-makers.

45 William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York, Random House, 1969).

46 For further details on agricultural production see Ibid., pp.408-9. As Appleman stated: "The primary force producing the war against Spain was the market place expansionist outlook generated by the agricultural majority of the country".

47 For details see Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmon (eds.), The New Sovereigns (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

48 Labor Looks at Congress, 1975, AFL-CIO Legislative Report, Pub.no.77 (March 1976), pp.27-28, quoted in Hughes, n.37, p.166.

49 Labour Looks at Congress, 1973, AFL-CIO Legislative Report, January 1979, pp.104-10, quoted in Ibid., p.167.

4. Religious Organizations

The religious organizations e.g. the Zionist organization of America or the National Council of Churches of the Protestants, etc, have also played an important role in shaping US foreign policy. In Angola, the United Presbyterian Church and other Church groups started a drive in 1971 to force Gulf oil to suspend its cabinda operation.⁵⁰

5. Citizen Groups

The Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the National Association for Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), and the American Negro Leadership Conference in Africa (ANLCA) with their leaders, James Farmer, Martin Luther King Jr. are important citizen groups representing the different shades of rightist and leftist attitudes. While the ADA had opposed US involvement in Vietnam, the ACA wanted to bypass a UN embargo on Rhodesia and both the NAACP and ANLCA favoured majority rule in the African colonies.⁵¹

Besides these, the women organizations, the veterans and military associations, the press, the foreign lobbies, are important interest groups influencing decision-makers.

50 Mohammed A. El-Khawas and B. Cohen (ed.), n.i, p.52.

51 See Ibid.

The public opinion also influences the decision-makers and the popularity or unpopularity of the American President becomes noticeable during the crisis scenarios. However, there appears to be no significant electoral control by the general public and the legislature in case of Africa, over the foreign policy. The decision makers act more in accordance with their own policy beliefs. Thus, in the absence of any strong countervailing civilian opinion, the US African policy is an exclusive affair of the executive.

IV. Moral Factors and Ideological Intensity

The moral and the ideological factors of the US policy makers manifest their dilemma in choosing between human rights, self-determination, majority rule, anti-apartheid, on the one hand, and defending the minority white regime in Southern Africa, on the other. The politico-ideological factors of US attitude towards decolonization are explained in Chapter I. With regard to South Africa, besides the strategic-economic importance, her active participation in favour of the allies and US during the wars is projected by pro-South Africans to show that it is a moral imperative for US to support the regime. Thus US maintains its rhetoric (usually sans action) in favour of self-determination and against apartheid and continuing its linkages with South Africa.

The above four factors compete among themselves for greater representation in US African policy. An analysis of the nature of US foreign policy will help us to underline its motive force in Angola.

The Geo-Strategic Interest and US Imperialist Intervention

In order to explain the American intervention in the developing countries and its support to the white minority government in Southern Africa, scholars have given different interpretations to the US economic, strategic and political interests. According to some scholars, including both conservative and the Marxists, the economic and strategic factors explain US vested interest in the Third World. The Globalists argue that for strategic considerations, security of the cape-route and other surveillance and communication centre, restraining Soviet Union to perpetuate 'change' in the region or to acquire access to resources that are 'vital' for the West.⁵²

Similarly, on economic grounds, Heather Dean argues that US corporate necessity for secure access to strategic, Third World raw materials, is the 'dynamics of American imperialism'.⁵³

52 Hens and Cottrell, Soviet Shadow Over Africa (USA, 1980), p.89.

53 Heather Dean on Analysis of the Policy Commission, the Ford Foundation's Resources for the Future (RFF), and several data concludes that US dependency on foreign suppliers makes it necessary for her to maintain regimes in power that are under her total control. However, Dean argues that US economy is not dependent on overseas raw materials because it is capitalist, but

On the other hand, some Marxist scholars argue that US overseas expansion is an 'institutional necessity'⁵⁴ because of the need of corporate sectors (i) to defend their capacity to exact oligopolies rent, (ii) a defensive reaction when production could no longer be expanded at home, (iii) to minimize its global tax burden and protect itself from the competition; (iv) the recycling profit motive of capital (surplus from Third World "exported" to US). Thus as long as American corporations exercise their virtues of inventiveness and aggressiveness, their government will feel inclined to preserve an international system that facilitates foreign economic expansion.

The "inherent" logic of "institutional necessity" implies that no fundamental reform of US foreign policy is possible and US has no choice but to intervene in areas where US economic interests are threatened, since those interests are crucial for the survival of the capitalist system.

footnote 53 continued from previous page..

because it is a high growth mass consumption economy in "Scarce Resources : The Dynamics of American Imperialism" in Andrew Mack, David Plant and Ursula Doyle (ed.), Imperialism, Intervention and Development (London, Croom Helm, 1979), pp.143-59.

54 See T.H. Moran, "Foreign Expansion as an Institutional Necessity for US Corporate Capitalism", in Mack, Plant, Boyce (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp.160-78.

However, Miller Barnett and Alapatt, who are also critical of US interventions, argue that reform is possible because the alleged economic imperatives simply do not exist.⁵⁵ The US economic interests in the Third World 'cannot' be crucial to the survival of American capitalism (and corporatism because they are too small, and rather relatively very insignificant.⁵⁶ Militarism is more politico-military oriented rather than economic. Few businessmen favour US intervention and those favouring it do so on a political and strategic viewpoint. Thus despite the unfriendly government, the Gulf oil was able to maintain its economic links with Angola. Regarding the threat of USSR to US strategic interest, in Southern Africa, it is argued that (a) if Soviet Union is determined to disrupt oil, it would be far more effective to stop it in the straits of Hormuz, (b) interrupting the flow of oil is an act of war and not something the Soviet Union is likely to treat as just another way to apply diplomatic or political pressure; (c) oil can be interrupted for only few months;

55 They are influenced by Kautsky. For details see, "Does the US Require Imperialism?" in Mack Plant, Doyle (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp.179, 193.

56 See Gordon Bertolin, n.6, p.49. Moreover linkages between political and economic relations and cites Nigerian policy favouring MPLA government in the OAU which was contradictory to US interest., p.51. However, this generalization of Bertolin seems to be too simplistic. Also see Foltz, n.16, pp.47-64.

(d) Soviet Union's own large merchant marine and fishing fleet constitute counter-hostages, and (e) the Soviets have offensive strategic concerns in this region and less in the realm of fantasy, it would desire to deprive the military facilities of the West.⁵⁷

Although intervention may not be necessary for the survival of American capitalism, it may, however, still be both profitable and convenient for American capitalists. Thus counterrevolutionary policies may be economically motivated. But this is not to negate the contribution of other factors - political, strategic, moral etc. in the formulation of the counterrevolutionary policies. And the "relative autonomy" of politics, ideology should not be undermined to the primacy of the economic factors.⁵⁸ Though economic factors are most 'influential', it is the perception of leaders and decision makers to what importance they assign to other factors - that ultimately contributes for the foreign policies making. This analysis will help in explaining the 'shift' in Kissinger's African policy after the Angolan debacle.

57 Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa", in J.S. Whitaker, ed., n.6, pp.153-86.

58 As Michael Barratt Brown writes "while there may be good original economic grounds for policies pursued, the whole structure of institutions, ideas and purposes built up from these grounds takes on a life of its own and becomes its own justification". After Imperialism (London, 1963), p.204.

CHAPTER III

US INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA BEFORE NIXON

The United States involvement in Africa was essentially a post-second world war phenomenon. Prior to the war, the United States involvement was minimal or non-existent through the Christian missionaries,¹ or some utopian humanitarian efforts to settle the Africans in America to their native continent,² or their direct involvement during the Boer war,³

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- 1 The American missionaries were protestants and their teachings provided some impetus to the protestant movements e.g. the Bokongo Nationalism against the catholic Portuguese authorities. For details see Tom Gallagher, Portugal : A Twentieth Century Interpretation (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1933), pp.52, 93-4, 126-9; John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol.1 (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1969), p.187.
 - 2 For details on the Liberian experiment, see Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire (California: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1971), pp.169-70.
 - 3 The debate on US attitude in the Boer war and its consequence is provided by Thomas J. Noer and John H. Ferguson, see Thomas J. Noer, Britain, Boer and Yankee : The United States and South Africa 1870-1914 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1978) and John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939). For details see G. Shapperson, "Note on Negro Influence on the Emergence of African Nationalism", Journal of African History,⁽¹⁵⁾ nos.1&2, 1960, pp.299-312.

or the Wilsonian doctrines of self-determination,⁴ mandatory system, etc. Between the two world wars, the American conception of "anti-colonialism" was reflected in the Atlantic Charter. After the war, as Roosevelt emphasised, decolonization was to embrace "all humanity".⁵

In case of Angola, as early as 1943, links between Portugal and US were formalized despite Salazar's sympathies for the Axis powers. As part of the Luso-American agreement, which was an extension of cold war politics, United States established temporary military base on the Azores and acknowledged Portuguese sovereignty over all her colonies.⁶

The support to fascist Portugal, which was justified on strategic grounds, on the one hand, and the US commitment to the Atlantic charter for decolonization, on the other, spelt the contradiction in US African policy. Initially, this

4 For the debates on the Wilsonian principles see Daniel Smith, The Great Departure : The United States and the World War I (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965); William Lions, "The United States and the African Peace Settlement of 1919 : The Pilgrimage of George Louis Boer", Journal of African History, vol.4, 1963, pp.413-33; Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century Crafts, 1964), p.665; N. Gordon Lewis, Woodrow Wilson & World Politics : Americans' Response to the War and Revolution (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968).

5 See Basil Davidson, Africa in Modern History (London: Penguin, Allen Jane, 1978), p.202. Also see Chapter I, Part I.

6 William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (New York, 1972), p.39.

contradiction was latent, but as the cold war progressed it became explicit and overt. The United States-Angolan policy shows this contradiction. It showed the tilt in favour of the colonial masters and their so-called 'legitimate' interest in the colonies.

The US African policy in Angola, before Nixon, can be subdivided into the following phases: (i) 1946-54, when Portugal was only a member of NATO and not of UN; (ii) 1955-60, when Portugal became a member of UN; (iii) 1961-63, the so-called 'shift' in US African policy during Kennedy; (iv) 1963-68, the return of the US old policy of indifference towards decolonization in Southern Africa.

I. 1946-54:

The US perspective towards decolonization favoured countries "without(any) distinction" which were "prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty".⁷ Under this category Roosevelt favoured decolonization of India, Morocco, etc. Sub-Saharan Africa lacked 'preparedness' for decolonization. Also, the US emphasis on 'liberty' was of 'western type' so that the newly independent states

7 See Cordell Hull's statement, Memoirs, vol.II (New York, 1948), p.1485, quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger (ed.), Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy - The UN and Sub-Saharan Africa, vol.V (New York, McGraw-Hill Company, 1973), p.541.

proclaiming neutrality were distrusted as harbouring communist feelings.⁸ In case of Africa, to Dulles, distrust for neutralism was added the indigenous socialism proclaimed by the African leaders. This further led America only for verbal support to African freedom.⁹ Moreover, in the cold-war context, Africa was not a crisis area, rather it was expected that Africa's mineral wealth could help rebuild the prosperity of war-torn western Europe. It was in this respect that the US-African connection was explained by John Foster Dulles "... US financial and technical aid in developing the African colonies ... Africa could make Western Europe completely independent of Eastern European resources, and that should be the aim". Meanwhile, Portugal was admitted to the NATO, on the ostensible strategic needs of air defense.¹⁰

Thus John Foster Dulles had set two themes regarding US African policy: (a) Eurocentric view of Africa; (b) Need of Africa's 'preparation' for decolonization. These two themes remained predominant in the US African policy.

8 Thus John Foster Dulles declared that neutralism and non-alignment are immoral.

9 Thomas J. Noer, "Non-Benign Neglect : The United States and Black Africa in the Twentieth Century", in Haines and Walker (ed.), American Foreign Relations (London, France Printer Ltd., 1981), p.279.

10 Sunday Times, 4 July 1948, quoted in Davidson, n.5, p.206.

In 1960, George C. McGhee explained the US African policy in cold war terms and Eurocentricism:

In the light of the many critical problems which confront us today and against the background of the great struggle between the Communist nations and those of the free world, this area occupies comparatively little space ... the fact that it is a region in which we have few direct responsibilities. Other nations, chiefly those with whom we are associated under the NATO are directly responsible ... 11

Further he pointed out that US should not be alarmed over any possible Communist threat in Africa:

Communism as such appears to have made no substantial progress in the area ... since three-fourths of the continent's inhabitants are under European control ... Africa is firmly associated with the free world. 12

Also McGhee espoused that:

maximum results will be obtained only by combining the African people's traditional and intuitive knowledge of their country with the European and American heritage of scientific and industrial advance,

and added that

the greatest danger to the full realization of their (African) economic, social and spiritual development lies in the menace of Communist imperialism... 14

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- 11 George McGhee (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs) address "On United States Interest in Africa", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C., USA Govt. Printing Press, 1951), June 19, 1950.
- 12 George McGhee, "Africa's Role in the Free World", Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, p.97.
- 13 Ibid., p.101.
- 14 Ibid.

Regarding the 'non-violent' decolonization and 'preparedness' for decolonization, McGhee said:

Immediate independence is not the cure for all colonial problems... and the traditional policy of the US to support orderly movements towards self-government, because the premature independence for primitive, uneducated peoples can do them more harm than good. 15

Similarly, Henry A. Byrode, Secretary, endorsed 'the evolutionary development' towards self-determination because:

(a) withdrawal of the foreign influence from a territory not yet capable of independent existence...will create a power vacuum, an area of weakness which invites internal disorder...;

(b) when the dependent peoples attain self-determination, we want it to be real... to maintain their independence against the new Soviet imperialism and any other form of tyranny. If a few additional years of evolution can make the difference between the self-determination that endures and a reversion to dependency or chaos, the years will not be wasted...;

(c) the dependent people are capable to develop governments which can truly represent their interests, protect their liberties, and promote social and economic progress; (d) a sudden break in the economic relations might seriously injure the European economies upon which our Atlantic defense system depends... the rights of the dependent peoples should not be subordinated to the European interest ... but finding ways to increase the strength of both and to preserve the legitimate European interest in foreign territories; and (e) self-determination involves obligation... of interdependence .. towards increasing association and co-operation among all free nations and races. 16

15 Ibid, p.99 (emphasis is added).

16 Henry A. Byrode (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs), "On the World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies", Department of State Bulletin, November 16, 1953, pp.555-60.(emphasis is added).

The above causes were used to justify US indifference to decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. In case of Portuguese territories, the US cemented its alliance with Portugal (1951 Azores base agreement). The military and economic aid strengthened the position of the repressive regimes both in Lisbon and its colonies. Secondly, during Truman and Eisenhower administrations, US provided diplomatic support and defended publicly the totalitarian regime and on numerous occasions reiterated Portugal's right to its "overseas province".¹⁷ Further, the US helped to popularize the 'myth of Lusotropicalism'. Thus Dean Acheson enthusiastically endorsed Lisbon's efforts to "create a multi-racial society".¹⁸ As late as 1971, George Kenan reiterated support to Portugal.¹⁹

Thus the US African policy (1946-54) favoured the interests of the European colonial powers with 'the classic masterpiece of ambiguity on the question of self-determination'.²⁰

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- 17 Alien Issacmen and Jennifer Davis, "United States Policy towards Mozambique since 1945 : The Defense of Colonialism and Regional Stability", Africa Today (US), January-March 1978, vol.25, pp.29-55.
- 18 Quoted in Franco Noguera, The Third World (London, 1967) , pp.11-17.
- 19 "The situation in the great Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique differs fundamentally from that prevailing in South and South West Africa in that the central issue is not the race.." "Hazardous Course in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs^(US) vol.49, no.2, January 1971, p.230. Also see Byrode, n.16, p.659.
- 20 See Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, Harper & Row, 1963), pp.320-21.

In its policy towards Portugal, US supported the interlocking Portuguese proposition of racial egalitarianism and its self-legitimising legal fiction or claim that its colonies were 'overseas provinces'. This legal fiction was to thwart any effort for UN investigation about oppressive conditions and obligation on the part of Portugal to take measures that would lead to ultimate independence in the colonies (Art 73e).²¹

II. 1955-60:

After ten years of effort, Portugal was finally admitted to the UN.²² The years between 1955-60 witnessed the increasing consciousness among Afro-Asian countries to struggle for independence. In the UN, the newly independent countries and the Socialist nations challenged Portugal's claim that its African territories were overseas provinces. Further they criticised the Portuguese repressive measures and its principles of discrimination in the colonies. They pointed out that the Portuguese constitution of 1953 incorporated the previous Colonial Act without substantial change. Although under the new constitution Mozambique and Angola were known as overseas provinces, the status of the inhabitants had not changed.²³

21 For the official legal position see Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portugal (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1963), pp.139-88.

22 Portugal was admitted with 56 votes to none. For details see General Assembly (G.A.) 555th plenary meeting, resolution 995(x) as recommended by 41 powers and adopted in 14 December 1955.

23 Yearbook of the United Nations/(USA, UN Publications, 1957). Also see n.21, p.290.

US for the first time recognised the Communist threat in Africa.²⁴ To counter communism, it became significant to collaborate and demonstrate conclusively the 'superior values of the free world ideals' and the need to pump more developmental aids to the newly independent African countries. It was important to impress upon the African leaders that 'orderly progress towards the extermination of discrimination lay with the United States'.²⁵ But most of the independent African states were in North Africa. Nevertheless, the US had recognised the 'potential force of nationalism' and the need 'to know these (African) leaders better' and develop "peoples to peoples" diplomacy for closer association.²⁶ It also espoused social harmony and orderly law enforcement to solve the racial problems. The administration avoided being identified with any conflicting factions in Africa.²⁷

24 Report by Vice-President Richard M. Nixon to President Dwight B. Eisenhower on the Emergence of Africa. As Nixon stated "it would be a great mistake to be complacent about this situation because the Communists are top men in the fields of diplomacy, intrigue and subversion into the African area." Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1957, p.638.

25 Ibid., pp.636-37.

26 Speech by Deputy Secretary Joseph Palmer on "Emerging Africa", Department of State Bulletin, June 16, 1958, pp.995-96.

27 Address on the Problems and Prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa, by Joseph Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1957, p.932.

Between 1955-60, the UN General Assembly passed series of measures demanding the independence of the colonies. The UN also established a Fourth Committee which recommended two draft proposals to ensure that the member states give information about colonies or "non-self-governing territories" (Art 73e). Unfortunately, the drafts were not accepted in the General Assembly.²⁸ In 1959, the General Assembly passed the resolution 1467 (XIV) to establish a Committee of Six to enumerate principles for Art. 73(e). However, the most significant resolution was passed on 14 December 1960, which called for "immediate steps to be taken by the member states to grant independence."²⁹

28 For details see General Assembly 11th session, plenary meetings 657, Fourth Committee meetings 551, pp.615-23. The recommendations of the Fourth Committee A/3531 and Add.1. was rejected on 20 February 1957 by the General Assembly meeting 657 by the roll-call vote of 35/35/5. For the second draft resolution see General Assembly 12th session, plenary meetings 722, Fourth Committee, meetings - 670-79, 687-94. The Draft Resolution III, as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/3733, was not adopted by the General Assembly meeting 722 (26 November 1957) because it failed to obtain the required two-third majority vote. Also see Year Book of UN 1956, n.23, pp.290-93, and Yearbook of UN 1957 (USA, UN Publications, 1958), pp.290-96.

29 Resolution 1514 (XV) was a 43 power draft resolution (A/1323 and Add.1-6); adopted (89/0/9), 947th plenary meeting of the G.A., December 14, 1960, pp.1273-74.

Another resolution 1541(XV) enumerated twelve principles of the governance about Art 73(e).³⁰ Resolution 1542(XV) declared nine Portuguese territories as non-self-governing or under Article 73(e).³¹

On most of these resolutions, the US abstained (resolutions 1514(XV), 1542 (XV)) or opposed every measure which challenged the prevailing Portuguese interpretations or criticized Lisbon's policy (resolutions 1467(XIV), 1541 (XV)).³²

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- 30 Resolution 1541(XV) was recommended by the Fourth Committee (A/4651) adopted (69/2/21), 948 plenary meeting of the G.A., December 15, 1960, p.1292.
- 31 Resolution 1542 (XV) was draft resolution II recommended by the Fourth Committee (A/4651), adopted (89/0/9), 948th plenary meeting of G.A., December 15, 1960, p.1293.
- 32 The US justification for abstaining on the resolutions was that (1) the resolution was completely silent on the important contributions which the administering powers have made in the advancements of dependent peoples towards the self-government or independence; (2) it treats the question of preparation for independence as wholly irrelevant. The importance of this point was further felt after the Congo crisis; (3) para 4 of the resolution seems to preclude even legitimate measures for the maintenance of law and order; (4) paragraph 5 has a very strong statement that only complete independence and freedom is the acceptable political goal for dependent peoples. However, all these logics seem to be very insubstantial. Supplementary report by Senator Wayne Morse to the Foreign Relations Committee on the US in the UN - 1960 - A Turning Point, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1961), pp.23-24.

The Portuguese interpreted these resolutions as a direct follow-up of the Bandung Conference and the Manifesto which was later institutionalised by the UN in the 12 principles, the subsequent anti-colonial Declaration and the Committee of the Seventeen to which UK, USA and USSR were elected.³³ On the contrary, Portugal argued that Article 73(e) did not apply to it as Unitary constitution included both the territories of Europe and its overseas.³⁴ Moreover, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira invoked the philosophy of miscegnation and said:

.... all ethical groups ... should constitute a different and autonomous political power, that each group shall necessarily have to be in a conflict. This philosophy seems to my delegation as being rather outmoded, and represents the flagrant denial of the reality we find in the great and progressive nations of the world, where a combination of many races and cultures has made possible their outstanding contribution to civilizations... 35

33 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (London, Eyre & Spottiswoods, 1970), p.190.

34 Portugal argued that it had a unitary constitution and from a legal as well as de facto point of view, the European and the overseas provinces were under the same organs of sovereignty. Year Book of UN 1956, n.23, p.290. For details see Franco Nogueira, n.18, pp.139-88. Patricia Wohlgenmth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations", International Conciliation (New York), no.545, November 1963, pp.21-31.

35 Franco Nogueira, n.18, p.158.

The policy during Eisenhower showed the continuity in American policy for over-emphasising the Communist threat and hence supporting the fascist regime of Portugal. The American policy makers were insensitive to the African needs and were overwhelmed by cold war ethos.³⁶ It was not until Kennedy that some support to the national liberation movements could be achieved.

36 See Vernon McKay, n.22. Also see Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood Cliffs., N.J. Prentice Hall, 1967). Emerson concludes that "American fascination with the menace of Communism impaired the ability to understand what moved the African political leaders and to establish sympathetic and mutually satisfactory relations with them". Similarly, William Attwood remarked that US "remained largely isolated from the new African leadership, interacting as little as possible with the new African leadership at the UN or at the White House receptions". The Red and the Blacks (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p.16. Senator Wayne Morse was even more critical, "... our policy makers in the Pentagon Building are not sufficiently sensitive about the policies and practices of some of the colonial powers in respect to human rights of the indigenous people whom they rule and dominate. In the name of military defense, the US has spent huge sums of money for bases and military installations in dictator countries, resulting in greater economic benefit to colonial powers and dictators", n.32, pp.13, 16. For other liberal critiques of American policy in this period see Walter Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1963), and Chester Bowles, Africa : Challenge to America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).

III. 1961-63:

The US African policy in 1961-63, whether it initiated 'New Frontiers'³⁷ or only a cosmetic change,³⁸ was the outcome of two factors - the February and March uprisings of 1961 in Angola and the sympathetic gestures of Kennedy's administration.³⁹

The choices before the Kennedy administration were (1) aid the incumbent, (2) aid the insurgents, or (3) attempt to conciliate the protagonists. The option of total involvement really did not exist for total non-involvement would have helped "the stronger party" (usually the incumbent) "to suppress the weaker", regardless of the "merit of the case".⁴⁰

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- 37 Arthur M. Schlesinger views that the New Frontier altered the passive policies of Eisenhower and shifted America from support of colonialism to an African-oriented policy. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965).
- 38 Waldemar Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).
- 39 As Marcum writes, "in 1961 the outbreak of nationalist insurgency in Angola, followed by Guerrilla warfare in Guinea (1963) and Mozambique (1964) forced the issue upon Washington's consciousness. This was more so at the advent of the new administration, John F. Kennedy...., in "The Politics of Indifference, Portugal and Africa: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy", Issue (Mas.) vol. II, no. 3, Fall 1972, p. 9.
- 40 George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 23-24.

Thus a degree of involvement, however passive or marginal, became inevitable.⁴¹ Walter Lippmann also approved of the change in American policy.⁴²

This explains the United States support to the joint draft declaration on Portuguese colonies in the Security Council (15 March 1961). Though US deplored the violence in Luanda, its representative Adlai Stevenson recognised that the disorder (in Angola), if not alleviated, would lead to many unfortunate and dangerous consequences. The best course for Portugal was to co-operate with the United Nations. Implicit in Stevenson's address was to initiate educational, social and economic development or political socialization in these colonies for the ultimate acceptance of western model of decolonization.⁴³

41 John Marcum, n.39, pp.9-10.

42 To have abstained in the Security Council vote, as Lippmann argued, would have left the Soviet Union "as the only great power in the white man's world which took the other side". If the US had by abstention supported the Portuguese colonialism "timidly and apologetically", he added, "what an image" that would have been of the leadership of the 'free world', in New York Tribune, March 22, 1961. Similarly, Arthur Krock viewed March 15, 1961, as "a reversal of fundamental past policy", New York Times, March 21, 1961, quoted in John Marcum, n.1, p.182.

43 For details see Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the UN Security Council, March 15, 1961, "The Problems of Angola", Department of State Bulletin, April 3, 1961, pp.497-99.

The resolution of March 15, 1961: (a) called on Portugal to introduce reforms that would enable the Angolans in achieving self-determination, (b) proposed creation of a sub-committee to study conditions in the territory, etc. But it failed to obtain the necessary votes despite US and USSR support.⁴⁴

At the General Assembly's fifteenth session (20 March 1961), "the situation in Angola", was included in the item for discussion. But Portugal opposed it because (a) the Security Council had already discussed the matter in detail, (b) its inclusion would violate Article 2(7) of the Charter, (c) the San Francisco Conference had unanimously agreed that nothing contained in Chapter IX of the Charter, which Articles 55 and 56 relating to fundamental rights and freedoms, could be giving authority to the organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of Member State.⁴⁵

On 13 April 1961 the thirty-six Afro-Asian countries' joint resolution, similar to the Security Council, except that the sub-committee of five would examine the statements

44 The resolution received more abstentions than votes in favour (5/6/0). See George Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized", in David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (ed.), Portuguese Africa: A Handbook (London: Pall Mall, 1969), p.380. Also see Year Book of UN (Y.U.N.), 1960 (UN Publications, N.Y., 1961).

45 Y.U.N., 1960, *Ibid.*, pp.138-39.

made before the assembly rather than the Council and would report to the Assembly, was approved as resolution 1603(XV). US supported it along with USSR, China, etc.⁴⁶

Schelisinger writes that Salazar was warned in advance about US support to the resolution and in Security Council debate Adlai Stevenson politely insisted that America 'would be remiss in its duties as a friend of Portugal', if she failed to encourage the gradual advancement of all Portugal's subject peoples towards full self-determination.⁴⁷

On the request of the 42 member States, the matter on Portugal was once again discussed in the Security Council (6 June 1961). The spokesman in the Council for the 42 member States argued that the situation in Angola had further deteriorated. A resolution was passed in the Security Council which called upon Portugal to act in accordance with the resolution 1603 (XV) and desist forthwith from repressive measures in Angola.⁴⁸

46 For details see Res. 1603 (XV), A/L.345 and Add 1-5. G.A. meeting 922 on 20 April 1961.

47 Schelisinger, n.37, p.490. The term used was self-determination and not independence. Moreover, Stevenson expressed faith in Portuguese "solemn obligation to undertake the systematic and rapid improvement of the people of its territories" and the need to avoid Congo situation through "step-by-step planning". See n.43.

48 For details see Resolutions S/4835/Rev.1 adopted by the Council on 9 June 1961, meeting 1956 by 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions.

Despite these actions, the Portuguese government did not cooperate with the UN directives. The Sub-Committee's report (20 November 1961) also regretted Portugal's negative attitude toward the UN recommendations.⁴⁹ It continually refused to recognise the UN's competence to voice judgement on the constitutional status of its 'overseas provinces' and, therefore, was reluctant to submit any annual information on economic, social and educational conditions in the territory.⁵⁰

On the other hand, to further express their solidarity with the liberation movement, US reduced their planned delivery of NATO defense arms to Portugal from \$ 25 million to \$3 million during 1961.⁵¹ US also denied publicly that the NATO equipment had been involved.⁵²

49 See Y.U.N., 1961 (USA, UN Publications, 1962).

50 For details see Res. 1699(XVI), Non-Compliance of Portugal with Ch XI of the Charter and Res. 15/42(XV) of the G.A., draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee (A/4998) as a whole, adopted (90/3/2) 1083rd plenary meeting, December 19, 1961, p.1105. Also see Mohammed El-Khawas, "Mozambique and the United Nations", Issue (USA), vol.II, no.4, Winter, 1972, p.30.

51 US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, 82nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: US Govt. Printing Office, 1961), p.879, quoted in Marcum, n.1, p.184.

52 On being challenged by the Liberian representative, the US representative, Jonathan Bingham, replied that he had no apologies to make since NATO armed furnished by the US were not being used in Angola, in U.N.G.A.(XVI), Fourth Committee, 1201 meeting, November 8, 1961, quoted in Marcum, Ibid.

The Portuguese viewed these US votes "with greatest apprehension"⁵³ and even 'privately threatened' to leave the alliance at Norway's Ministerial meeting of the NATO (8 May 1961).⁵⁴ Next, Portugal hired a New York public relations firm, Selvage and Lee, to build up American support for its cause.⁵⁵ The Selvage and Lee Company mobilised the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs. It propagagated that the Angolan revolution was racist and barbaric and inspired and organised by the external communist forces.⁵⁶

The General Assembly resolution 1742 (XVI) on 30 January 1962, criticised the repressive measures in Angola and appealed to UN members to refrain from any aid or support to Portugal. Further, it asked the Special Committee of 17 to give its most urgent considerations

53. George Martelli, n.44, p.380.

54. Marcum, n.1, p.183.

55. See Ibid., p.185. Also see Marcum, "The Angolan Rebellion: Status Report", Africa Report (New York), vol.9, no.2, February 1960, p.6.

56. Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Communists and Angola (Boston, 1961), quoted in Marcum, n.1, p.185.

to the speedy achievement of Angola's independence.⁵⁷ However, this support of US to liberation struggle proved temporary. By mid-1962 the Kennedy administration retreated from its role as a critic of Portuguese colonialism. The 'shift' to old policy could be noticed in Stevenson's address on March 5, 1962, in the General Assembly when he mentioned about "the benefits of colonialism" and the effort to "create conditions under which the people of Angola, building on the positive elements of the past, can determine their own destiny, including their future relations with the Portuguese nation".⁵⁸ In May 1962, J. Wayne Fredericks further reiterated the pro-Portuguese policy:

Our votes in the UN on Angola should not be regarded as hostile to Portuguese interests. If we have not agreed with Portugal on certain issues, this does not mean that we intend to destroy in any way the spirit of constructive leadership... (of the NATO).⁵⁹

57 US moved an amendment for the speedy achievement of "self-determination and independence" (instead of the achievement of independence", by the people of Angola). This was rejected because of the failure to obtain the required vote. See Y.U.N. 1961, p.94. The effort to make the term "self-determination" equivalent with independence was not without an US ulterior motive. It reflects its views on the problem of decolonisation.

58 Department of State Bulletin, vol.46, no.1184, March 5, 1962, pp.386-87. (emphasis is added).

59 Fredericks (Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs), "The Impact of Emergence of Africa on American Foreign Policy", Department of State Bulletin, vol.46, no.1196, May 28, 1962.

In November, the US proposed in the General Assembly to send an UN Rapporteur to Angola and Mozambique.⁶⁰ The Portuguese were prepared to receive such an observer but the Nationalists rejected it arguing that the circumstances demanded immediate remedy and the United States action was a delaying tactics.⁶¹ Further, regarding Portugal's diversion of NATO arms, the US argued that (a) it is impossible to control all arms transactions taking place through private channels, but nevertheless, US had undertaken measures to prevent the commercial exports of arms to the area; (b) US arms are also being used by the Angolan National Liberation Fronts; (c) NATO is a co-ordinating body solely to increase the effectiveness of the defense of the NATO area.⁶²

60 For full text of the US draft resolution (undated November 1962, mimeo) see Marcum, n.1, p.269. The resolution was also circulated in General Assembly, 18th December 1962. In introducing this draft resolution US representative Jonathan B. Bingham emphasised that it was of the utmost importance that the draft which was the result of an understanding between his government and that of Portugal reached at a very high level, should not be amended, if it was to succeed in its purpose. Y.U.N. 1962, p.92. (Emphasis is added to signify the Luso-American 'reprochement').

61 Holden Roberto, quoted in Marcum, n.1, pp.269-70.

62 Jonathan B. Bingham, "Claims of Portuguese Arms Diversion Unfounded" (US Delegation Press Release, 4107). Also see Department of State Bulletin, vol.48, no.1230, January 21, 1963, pp.104-5.

Finally, on 14 December 1962, the US voted against the resolution which demanded sanctions against Portugal.⁶³ The US also voted against the General Assembly resolution which called on the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the demand of independence to the colonies.⁶⁴

Two important constraints on Kennedy explain the retreat in the US foreign policy. First, the air and the naval facilities in the Azores was to expire on December 31, 1962. The Berlin crisis had further increased the importance of the Azore base. Second, Kennedy had to seek the support of the Republicans for the Senate ratification of a US-Soviet nuclear test ban treaty. Thus in the ensuing external and domestic constraints the United States was eager to renew the contract of Azores base. Other secondary factors like the disillusionment from Congo, lobbying of Selva and Lee and its propaganda of 'Communist invasion' of Angola, the Departmental infightings and the

63 See G.A. resolution 1807 (XVII), 14 December 1962. The special Committee on Territories under Portuguese reported that NATO arms have been "exclusively used to suppress the people of Angola". A/5160, August 15, 1962, p.142.

64 See G.A. resolution 1819 (XVII), 18 December 1962. US opposition to the above two resolutions "Left the way open for the Soviet Union to argue with enhanced justification that only NATO assistance to Portugal and explicitative western economic interests in its colonies could account for the Salazar Government's ability to pursue its colonial war". Marcum, n.1, p.276.

prevalence of the European Bureau over its African counterpart, etc. also contributed to the retreat in Kennedy's African policy.⁶⁵

Portugal reacted to the US moves with "traditional tactics", and "injured silence".⁶⁶ President Salazar broke this silence in May when he publicly blamed both the US and the Soviet Union for Portugal's colonial difficulties. He further charged the Super Powers with "ideological interference" and with giving military, financial and political support to Portugal's enemies. He said that Portugal was confronted with a costly and difficult war in Africa, which it was fighting "not without alliances but without allies."⁶⁷

To assuage Lisbon, US sent diplomatic messages. As early as January, Secretary of State Dean Rusk travelled to Lisbon to smooth ruffled feelings.⁶⁸ The US delivered approximately four and half millions in military aid.⁶⁹

65 See Marcum, *Ibid*, pp.271-72.

66 The New York Times, April 1, 1962, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.270.

67 The New York Times, May 29, 1962, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.271.

68 The New York Times, January 29, 1962, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.273.

69 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, 84th ed. (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1963), p.259.

Further US purchased thirtyseven million dollars worth of Angolan coffee during the year.⁷⁰ Kennedy sent his Presidential envoy, George Ball in August 1963 to persuade Salazar.⁷¹

Portugal on the other hand tried its level best to extract maximum from USA.⁷² Not content with the concessions, Lisbon did not sign the long-term contract for American use of the Azores and permitted US to use it on ad hoc basis, thus retaining ongoing leverage against any 'pro-African' shift in US policy.

The Security Council adopted a resolution on 31 July 1963 which, among other things, called on Portugal to promulgate an unconditional amnesty and negotiate with with political parties of Angola.⁷³ USA abstained along with

70 US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, "United States Agricultural Imports from Angola, 1962, 1963 and 1964" (Washington, D.C.: September 1965, mimeo), quoted in Marcum, n.45, p.273.
 See George Ball, The Discipline of Power (London, The Bodley Acad, 1968), pp.245-59.⁷¹
 Thus Kennedy's aide, Theodore Sorensen, complained that Lisbon even tried to "dictate his (US) African policy". Quoted in Marcum, "The Politics of Indifference : Portugal and Africa, A Case Study in American Foreign Policy", Issue, vol.II, no.3, Fall, 1972, p.10.⁷²

73 See Resolution S/5379, adopted by the Council on 31 July 1963, meeting 1949, by 8/0/3 (USA, France, and UK abstained).

UK and France. The justification for the abstention was that (a) though situation in the Portuguese territories was of concern, it was not a threat to international peace and security; (b) the granting of the right to self-determination, the time and situational factors rested with the administering authority, and (c) the possibility of the discussion between the African States and Portugal for peaceful decolonization was not yet exhausted and should be further explored.⁷⁴

In December the General Assembly approved of the Security Council's resolution and wanted its implementation.⁷⁵ The Security Council accepted the General Assembly resolution and reiterated its stand of 31 July 1963.⁷⁶

As a result of this 'retreat', the US lost sympathy of the national liberation movements which Kennedy administration had initially encouraged. Thus, Eduardo Mondlane

74 See Y.U.N. 1963, p.484.

75 G.A. Res. 1913(XVIII) adopted on 3 December 1963, meeting 1270, by roll-call vote of 91/2/11. The US abstained along with UK, France, Brazil, etc. () US unable to agree with the request that the Security Council should take substantive measures, hoped that as a result of negotiations conducted in good faith, Portugal might be persuaded to put the provisions of the draft resolutions into effect. Y.U.N. 1963, p.487.

76 There was separate vote on Portugal's non-compliance with the Council resolutions of 31 July 1963. 7/0/4 (US abstained with Brazil, France, UK). The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted 10/0/1. France only abstained. See S/5481, meeting 1083, 11 December 1963.

saw the contradiction in the US policy and concluded that:

.... activities of the USA are not obvious connivance with Portugal but also raise suspicions of connivances with the imperialist Government of the Republic of South Africa ... On the basis of the fact above, we are forced to conclude that when our people finally rise up to take arms against Portuguese imperialism, the USA, like the Republic of South Africa, will contravene against us in support of Portugal. 77

Thus Mondlane had clearly discerned the 'unholy alliance'. Moreover, the African leaders had also begun to doubt US commitment to self-determination. As a result, "by 1962 numerous African leaders who had welcomed Assistant Secretary William's visit in 1961 as a portent of great things to come were beginning to wonder whether the New Frontier was all public relations and no help."⁷⁸

Kennedy's African policy has three views. First, the supporters of Kennedy argued that "his middle course was not just a matter of cynical pragmatism but did express substantive conviction as well as tactical necessity".⁷⁹ Second, the critics argue that Kennedy was a rigid cold warrior locked in a bipolar world view. Far from supportive of independence he was a counter-evolutionary convinced that only the American political and economic model was appropriate

77 Quoted from a press conference release by the Central Committee of FRELIMO in Dar-es-Salaam, 12 June 1964, see Issecman and Davis, n.17, p.35.

78 Vernon McKay, n.20, p.113.

79 Leon Schlesinger, n.37, pp.490-91.

for the Third World.⁸⁰ Similarly Martin Gurtov argued that the decolonization of Africa forced America to make a choice between self-determination and the oft-proclaimed need for the North Atlantic Unity against international communism. Pressures from domestic liberals forced Kennedy to publicly proclaim concern for Africa, but there were no major differences between his actions and the pro-colonial policies of Eisenhower.⁸¹ Similarly Prof. M. S. Venkatramani concludes that Kennedy was a staunch anti-communist and during his Presidential speech he criticised Eisenhower for his failure to prevent "the communists". Kennedy was convinced that US should, with maximum possible speed, develop a "counter guerilla" capability. Thus he directed the National Security Council (NSC) on 1 February 1961 to build "counter guerrilla forces" so that it can be used in "various areas of the world ... (to) arrive at a determination of the goals which we should get in this field".⁸²

80 Bruce Miroff, *Fragmatic Illusions : The Presidential Politics of John Kennedy* (New York: David McKay, 1976).

81 Martin Gurtov, *The United States against the Third World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1974).

82 The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mc George Bundy) and the Secretary of Defense (Robert Mc Namara), National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), no.2, 3 February 1961; NSAM no.56, 28 June 1961, US House, 92 Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Armed Services, Committee Print, *United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-67 : Study Prepared by the Department of Defense* (Washington, 1971), vol.11, p.17, 174. Quoted in M. S. Venkatramani, "The Ford-Kissinger Safari in Angola : Ramifications of Africa Policy", *Foreign Affairs Report* (New Delhi), vol. XXV, nos.9-10, September-October 1976, pp.139-40.

The above considerations led Kennedy to adopt anti-communist or anti-Soviet postures and establish some ties with Holden Roberto.⁸³

However, Ibezim Chukwumerije argues that although Kennedy was unable to substantially increase economic aid for Africa or end colonialism, he was at least sensitive to African leaders and showed sincere affection. Kennedy's major innovations were stylistic.⁸⁴

John Marcum also argues that Kennedy's temporary support to independence was discounted because of the pressures of the military leaders, the use of Azore base, the influence of the "Europeanists" in the State Department, and fear about revolution, like Cuba. Thus America, on the one hand, persuaded Portugal to guarantee self-determination, and on the other hand, pressurised Africans to abandon violence. This policy succeeded in antagonising both sides in the struggle.⁸⁵

To conclude, although Kennedy's policy was not a 'fundamental shift' in US African policy, it nevertheless

83 Ibid.

84 The New Frontier and Africa, 1961-63 (State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1976), quoted in Thomas J. Noer, n.9, p.281.

85 Marcum, n.1. pp 278-74.

had certain attributes to its credit.⁸⁶ Even his most severe critics concede that he had "a genuine affection for Africa and its people (and an) understanding of non-alignment", and American support was crucial in preserving Congo's unity which was one of (his) most substantial achievements".⁸⁷ More important, despite the 'retreat' in favour of Portugal, Kennedy was able to adopt a Security Council resolution favouring arms embargo in South Africa.⁸⁸

86 The most important attributes were Kennedy's emphasis on diversity in foreign policy and the recognition of neutralism as not immoral. "The style of politics had taken something of a turn (Neutralism was no longer viewed as immoral) but the fundamental thrust (competition with Soviet expression) remained unaltered. The United States continued to adhere to its basic objective of maintaining the western-led international system and its support for the UN initiative in the Congo was interpreted as a sign of the Kennedy administration's resolve in this regard." Donald Rotchild, "US Policy Styles in Africa" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rotchild, Robert J. Lieber (ed.), Eagle Entangled: US Foreign Policy in the Complex World (New York, Longmen, 1979), p.308.

87 Richard J. Walton, Cold War & Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New York: Viking Press, 1972).

88 For details see S/5471 which was adopted unanimously on December 4, 1963 by the Security Council. While condemning apartheid in South Africa, Adlai E. Stevenson spoke that "... the Council should ensure that ... apartheid comes to an end - not in bloodshed but in peace and freedom..." He further elaborated US approach to South Africa: "The enduring solution cannot be imposed. The change must be brought about primarily by the South Africans themselves, whites and blacks; change through peaceful means; to create external conditions and mobilize public opinion in such a way that South Africans will be left in no doubt that the more they segregate their neighbours, the more they isolate themselves and these conditions must be created within the framework of our (UN) Charter? See Stevenson's speech in Security Council on December 4, 1963. (US/UN.press release 4328) or Department of State Bulletin, vol.50, no.1282, January 20, 1964, pp.92-95.

IV. 1964-68:

The 'retreat' in US African policy was further consolidated to Portugal's advantage due to various factors, including the geo-strategic compulsions of the Azores. First, US was disillusioned by the political instability in the newly independent African countries, which helped the "Eurocentrics" in the administration to argue for peaceful, gradual and 'prepared' decolonization in Africa. Secondly, Africa was simply eclipsed by the US involvement in Vietnam hence growing non-commitment in the internal affairs. As Jean Herskovits writes, "For once self-interest and idealism did not contradict - but they reinforced an ever further downgrading of African policy on the official side."⁸⁹ Thirdly, domestic factors e.g. growing unemployment, social tensions, race riots and, above all, blacks who preoccupied with their own problems were less interested in the African matters, all contributed to the less concern for Africa.⁹⁰

89 Adrain Guleke, "Southern Africa and the Super Powers", International Studies (London), Autumn 1980, vol.56, no.4, p.650.

90 Other factors such as decline in the prestige and influence of the United Nations following the Congo Operation, the 1961 decision of the International Court of Justice against Ethiopia and Liberia in the South West Africa case, the closure of the Suez Canal after the Middle East War of June 1967, reaction against coloured immigration in Britain, also contributed to the decreasing interest of major world powers (including US) in Africa. For details see, Adrain Guleke, Ibid.

On 3 July 1964, the Special Committee passed a resolution condemning Portugal for its refusal to implement the UN resolutions especially non-compliance of resolution 1514(XV). It requested the Security Council to take necessary action, and the sub-committees to accelerate the foreign economic aids. US abstained because (i) the condemnation of the Portuguese Government itself, as distinct from its policies, was unprecedented, (ii) such a condemnation would hardly help in the effort to reconvene talk between the Portuguese and the African leaders, (iii) the resolution virtually ordered the Security Council to take certain actions, and (iv) that foreign economic activities in the Portuguese territories were prejudicial to the political interest of the people concerned, was objectionable.⁹¹

The matter was discussed at the Security Council (14-22 November 1965). Most of the members agreed that the Council should consider further measures but suggestions varied as to the appropriate actions. US denied the charge that Portugal was assisted by NATO arms.⁹² In the Security Council, the resolution to boycott Portuguese goods could not be adopted because of the failure to get the required

91 Y.U.N. 1964, p.448.

92 For details see Y.U.N. 1965, pp.605-08.

vote. US was one of its significant abstainer.⁹³

At the General Assembly, the resolution urged all member states and all specialized bodies, including IMF, IERD, etc., to refrain from establishing diplomatic relations, economic trade and technical aids with Portugal.⁹⁴ US opposed resolution 2107 (XX) along with UK, South Africa, etc. because such provision was tantamount to the application of Chapter VII of the Charter and it also encroached upon the area of the Security Council.⁹⁵

In 1966, the Special Committee by the roll-call vote of 18 to 1, with 3 abstentions, called on all states to implement the resolution 2107 (XX) for economic sanctions on Portugal.⁹⁶ For the implementation of resolution 2107 (XX), the General Assembly adopted the resolution on

93 The votes being 4 in favour, 0 against and 7 abstentions (4/0/7). The amended text was finally accepted by 7 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions (US, UK, France and Netherlands). For details see Res. 218 (1965), as proposed by 7 powers S/6953/Rev.1 and as amended by Uruguay S/6965 adopted by the Council on 23 November 1965, meeting 1260.

94 Resol. 2107 (XX) as submitted by Fourth Committee, A/6209, adopted by Assembly on 21 December 1965, meeting 1407 with vote 66/26115.

95 See Y.U.N. 1965, n.92, pp.610-11.

96 Y.U.N., 1966, (USA: UN Publication, 1967), p.610.

12 December 1966 (regarding arms sanction on Portugal) and on 13 December 1966 (regarding economic sanctions).⁹⁷ US opposed all these resolutions.

In 1967, in the Special Committee debates, replying to the charges made in regard to the role of US economic interests, the US stressed that only a relatively modest amount of US private investment in the trade with the territories under Portuguese administration was involved. It opposed the Special Committee draft resolution for the implementation of arms and economic sanctions against Portugal.⁹⁸ The General Assembly reaffirmed its faith in the earlier resolutions,⁹⁹ adopted a resolution, which, among other things, called on the suspension or expulsion of Portugal from the NATO.¹⁰⁰ US opposed the resolution because it violated the statutory responsibilities of IERD and other specialized agencies. Although US regretted over Portugal's non-compliance to UN resolutions, it gave the oft-repeated argument that US arms were not being used

97 Res. 2184(XXI).

98 Y.U.N. 1967 (USA: UN Publication, 1968), p.714.

99 For details see G.A. Res.2270 (XXII), submitted by Fourth Committee, A/6908, adopted on 17 November 1967, meeting 599 roll-call vote 82/7/21. US, UK, Australia and South Africa, etc. opposed it.

100 G.A. Res. 2288(XXII) as proposed by Fourth Committee A/6393, adopted on 7 December 1967, meeting 622 roll-call vote 91/2/17. US, UK, France, etc. abstained. Also see, n.98., pp.718-22.

and those used were manufactured during Second World War and available through private purchases, to which it had no control. Moreover, such US-produced arms were used by both sides.¹⁰¹

In 18 December 1968, the General Assembly adopted the resolution 2425 (XXIII), which deplored the states not implementing the provisions of resolution 2288(XIII).

The US in the General Assembly debate argued that it was erroneous to assume that the private foreign investment was prejudicial to the interests of the recipient countries. US argued that the General Assembly had adopted a series of resolutions seeking to encourage private foreign investments in the developing countries. A second erroneous assumption was that private investment thrived best in dependent areas, and a third was that the holding of the dependent territories was desirable for the prosperity of the metropolitan power. On these grounds, () US tried to justify its abstention on resolution 2425 (XXIII).¹⁰²

Outside the UN, the US followed its policy of supporting the Portuguese colonialism. It recognised "the contribution made in Africa by Portugal, and believes it is important that Portugal continues to contribute to the stability and progress

101 See Ibid., pp.715, 717, 721.

102 G.A. resolution 2425 (XXIII), as proposed by Fourth Committee, A/7423, adopted by the Assembly on 18 December 1968, meeting 1747, by recorded vote 87/2/19. Also see Y.U.N. 1968, pp.726-27.

in that continent." Further, ☁ US showed confidence in Portugal's gradual decolonization and expected that "because of the rapid political changes in Africa, in the last decade, continued Portuguese presence in the continent can best be assured if it undertakes an accelerated program of political, economic and social reforms, designed to advance all peoples of the territories towards the exercise of self-determination".¹⁰³

Thus during the Johnson administration, the traditional policy of "non-benign neglect" and Eurocentric African policy was formulated for the peaceful, gradual achievement of "self-determination" rather than independence of the colonies. Very few Americans, except few like Waldemar Nielsen or Arnod Girvikin asserted re-examination of the US-Southern African policy and more support for the

103 Department of State Publication, 8074, October 1968, quoted in William Minter, "Allies in Empire : Part III - American Foreign Policy and Portuguese Colonialism", Africa Today (Denever), 1970, pp.34-36.

African side. 104

104 As Nielsen concludes that while it is still possible to play both sides at the moment, wisdom dictates more support for the Africans. A sound policy may involve Portugal's exclusion from the NATO, and restriction on the flow of American private investment; non-military aid to the liberation movements, thus "checking the drift of the nationalist movements into bitterness, extremism and growing dependence on Communist support", in Great Powers in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p.358. Similarly, Arnold Girvikin argues that US has fewer constraints and more freedom of action on its foreign policy making than in any other. The Administration should go beyond its accepted 'Kennan-Lippmann Thesis on the limitations of US capacity' in Africa and fulfil the needs of the 'rising expectations' of the Africans by providing more developmental aids. Rather than consider Africa as of "residual interest", the US should give full support to self-determination. As Girvikin wrote, "Several of our NATO allies have time and again taken positions and followed policies in conflict with our own with respect to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, China, the test-ban treaty, trade with Soviet Union, etc., without the US pulling the NATO house down. So too in Africa, we have long supported self-determination for African colonies without the UK, France or Belgium tearing the alliance apart. Portugal may react differently but ... its disaffection would hardly seem crucial to the alliance's (NATO) future" in "Lost Goals in Africa", Foreign Affairs (USA), vol.44, no.1, 1965, p.118.

CHAPTER IV

THE NIXON-FORD-KISSINGER ENTANGLEMENT (MISJUDGEMENT) IN ANGOLA : FROM "NON-BENIGN NEGLECT" TO POLITICS OF 'ACCOMMODATION' (1969-76)

The US African policy during 1969-76 underwent metamorphosis in form rather than content. These phases can be labelled as continuation of 'non-benign neglect' or minimum entanglement followed by containment-confrontation (1969-74), then containment-crisis management (19 December 1975-11 February 1976), and finally accommodation (post-February 1976).¹ The analysis of the memorandum NSSM-39, the UN debates on Portuguese colonies, the Senate-Congressional debates and the sub-committee reports etc. will enable us to understand these phases of US Angolan policy.

Nixon's Policy Towards Angola (1969-73)

The trends outlined in the US Angolan policy during Nixon's predecessors i.e. non-benign neglect of Africa not only continued but "further accelerated after Richard Nixon entered the White House".² This 'acceleration' was the outcome

- 1 See Donald Rotchild, "US Policy Styles in Africa : From Minimal Engagement to Liberal Internationalism" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rotchild, Robert J. Liever (ed.), Eagle Entangled : US Foreign Policy : in a Complex World (New York, Longman, 1979), pp.304-35. Also see Robert M. Price, "US Policy Toward Southern Africa", in Govendolen M. Carter & Patrick O'Meara (ed.), International Politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington, Indian University Press, 1982), pp.45-88.
- 2 M.S. Venkataramani, "The Ford-Kissinger Safari in Angola : Ramifications of American Policy", Foreign Affairs Report (Delhi), vol.XXV, nos.9-10, September-October 1976, p.135.

of 'conservative' perspective of Nixon-Kissinger to disregard the developmental aids to Africa (hence non-benign neglect)³ or extend only little sympathy to African national liberation movements for the accomplishment of US vital interests through the exercise of 'realpolitik'.⁴

Soon after becoming President in 1969, Richard Nixon ordered a re-examination of American policy towards Southern Africa. It was felt that until then the United States had no coherent policy, that decisions regarding Southern Africa were made on an ad hoc basis, and that US was content to remain aloof as long as the Soviet Union and China made no sudden move to produce 'change' and hence alter power relations in Southern Africa. The Kennedy-Johnson administration

3 Some argued that the chief reason Kissinger paid so little attention to Southern African issues prior to the Angolan civil war was that he had to deal with urgent problems more directly pertinent to the US national interest, others maintain that, in contrast to his thorough knowledgeability about European affairs, his knowledge of Africa was scant. Mohamed Al-Khawas, "Kissinger on Africa : Benign Neglect?", A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, 7:1, 1974, p.3. Quoted in Mohamed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (ed.), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (USA, Lawrence Hill & Co.), p.21.

4 Kissinger was a "hard-nosed" realist and pragmatist. He was a proponent of "stability", "balance" and "understanding" with the strong on the basis of frank acknowledgement and respect for their vital interests. He had little sympathy for national liberation movements. See M.S. Venkataramani, n.2, p.135.

was criticised for its precarious combination of moralistic public rhetoric and limited, quite diplomatic entreaty, which had been a total failure.⁵ Hence the administration felt it prudent to formulate a coherent policy, especially in the anticipation of the potential volatile nature of Southern Africa, as it then tended to emerge in future.

In 1969, under the direction and guidance of Kissinger, the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa prepared a comprehensive review of US-Southern Africa policy with an assessment of (1) "background and the future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the US interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the US."⁶ The study (National Security Study Memorandum - NSSM 39) was completed in August 1969 and kept 'secret',⁷ but unfortunately leaked, which embarrassed the State Department. The Group after consideration of the different variables⁸ - eco-strategic, political, pressure groups, etc. influencing

5 John Seiler, "The Failure of US Southern African Policy", Issues, vol.II, no.1, Spring 1972, p.21.

6 Memorandum by Henry Kissinger to Secretaries of State and Defense and CIA Director, April 10, 1969 (NSSM 39) quoted in Mohamed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (ed.), n.3, p.22.

7 See Ibid.

8 For details see Ibid., pp.22-25.

US interest in Southern Africa - arrived at five policy options. Option 1 was "closer association with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests", on the ground that the US is incapable of influencing white attitudes and policies anyway, and that the political costs could not be excessive.⁹ Option 2 advocated "broad association with both black and white states in an attempt to encourage moderation in the White States, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tension and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in area". Option 3 was for "limited associations with white states and the continuing association with blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific and strategic interest in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issues which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problem of the Region". Options 4 and 5 referred respectively to "dissociation from the white regimes with closer relations with black states in an effort to enhance our standing on racial issue in Africa and internationally", and "dissociation from both black and white states

9 Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa", Issue, vol.II, no.3, Fall 1974, p.64.

in an effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area".¹⁰

Although the NSC staff did not endorse any specific policy option, the more detailed outline given to the option 2 suggests that they were inclined to favour it. Since option 3 was merely the continuation of the policies inherited from two previous Democratic administrations,¹¹ it was doubtful if Nixon would accept it. Criticised by some American conservatives for "its precarious combination of moralistic public rhetoric and limited quiet diplomatic entreaty",¹² option 3 was widely regarded by both African and whites as "expedient and hypocritical".¹³ Options 1,4,5 -

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- 10 Mohamed El-Khawass & Barry Cohen, n.3, pp.84-85. Also see Lockwood, *Ibid.*, pp.64-65. Further see Adrain Guleke, "Southern Africa and the Superpowers", International Affairs (London), Autumn, 1980, vol.56, no.4, pp.651-52.
- 11 The NSSM 39 specifically described option 2 as "a codification and extension of present policy", n.3, p.109. Also see Guleke, *Ibid.*, p.652.
- 12 John Seiler, n.5, pp.21-22.
- 13 As the NSSM 39 conceded, "our condemnation of whites hurts us with them, yet fails to satisfy the blacks, exposing us to pressures for more decisive measures, n.3, p.111. Also see Lockwood, "both sides see the US as doubleminded hypocrite, unwilling to make a choice between interests and political credibility in Southern Africa", n.9, p.65.

calling for either disengagement or total association in favour of US backing of one party in the conflict - could never seriously have been considered as policy alternative in view of US economic, scientific and strategic interests at stake. As big-power politics were already active, especially the Soviet and Chinese aid to National Liberation Movements, it was conceivable that the Nixon administration - which had its backing of industrialists, Southern Democrats and Northern Conservatives - would seriously consider either becoming neutral or siding with the liberation movements; to do so might jeopardise the profitable American investment and trade in South Africa and Angola as well as cutting off US access to rare materials and to the Indian Ocean and Azores.

The American NSC study was distinctly sanguine about the stability of the white regimes in Southern Africa. Indeed, the assumption that the white redoubt would remain intact underpinned the whole report. Thus, it stated:

There is no likelihood in the foreseeable future that liberation movements could overthrow or seriously threaten the existing white governments. Rebel activities may expand or contract from time to time, but there will be definite victory or defeat resulting from the guerrilla activities. In the longer run the most likely prospect is a continuation of present trends - a rise in activity of the number of incidents - but no conclusive results. 14

Further:

The NSC study was less complacent about stability in Black ruled states - 'Zambia shows latent instability for tribal reasons, and may face internal crisis'. The other important conclusion of the study was that 'the Soviets appear to afford Africa a low priority at present and can be expected to limit the extent of their commitment and involvement'. 15

The premise was obvious: "The whites are here to stay, and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists."¹⁶

In choosing the 'tilt', the Nixon administration preferred a further 'tilt' in favour of the Portuguese

15 Ibid., p.84.

16 Ibid., p.126. Similarly, Lockwood writes, "Option 2 is built on a new acquiescence in the fundamental permanence and ever desirability of South African power... the outward thrust of South Africa to become accepted as a legitimate African State.... is seen as a key to the relaxation of tension in the area, and thus a protection of US interests... the US should work to encourage a closer relationship between the black and white states....", n.9, pp.64-65. Also Venkataramani writes that the "General Postures" in US policy choice, (option 2) was for "selective relaxation of our (US) stance towards the white regime, so as to induce the latter to move in the direction of "liberalisation" in respect for Black demands", n.2, p.136.

colonial regime while rejecting open identification with it.¹⁷ Though the State Department denied any change in policy, the 'tilt' in favour of white regimes was noticeable. David Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State, in his Chicago Speech, signalled that the US would be prepared to accept licence applications for sales of VIP jet planes to South Africa's military, indicating a new flexibility in the US arms embargo.¹⁸ In fact, this 'flexibility' had been anticipated by South African Foreign Minister who commented that 'as the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves'.¹⁹ By early 1973, Chairman Diggs of the House Sub-Committee on Africa was openly referring to NSSM 39 as the memorandum that had "launched the so-called communication policy".²⁰ As a result of this 'shift', the US refrained from condemnation of South Africa's denial of a visa to Arthur Ashe.²¹

17 As Venkataramani writes, "The six options... covered the spectrum from a very substantial "tilt" towards the white regimes to a similar "tilt" towards the black liberation movements... the "tilt" had all along been, in real terms... towards the white regimes. The issue, therefore, was 'whether that tilt should become more pronounced and public'. Ibid., p.136.

18 See David Newsom's testimony in Implementation of US Arms Embargo, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 10 and 22nd March and 6 April 1973, pp.145 and 159, quoted in Lockwood, n.9, p.63.

19 Quoted in Colin Legum and John Drysdale (eds.), African Contemporary Record, 1968-69 (London: Africa Research Limited, 1969), p.317.

20 See n.18, pp.68 and 171. Also see El-Khawas and Cohen n.3, p.29.

21 See Lockwood, n.9, p.63.

Several factors explain the US decision-makers' choice of option-two. The NSSM 39 identified four types of US interests in Southern Africa, namely, political, economic, strategic and scientific.²²

Regarding the American political interests, the study realised that 'politically conscious blacks elsewhere in Africa and the world' and 'many others in the non-white world' deeply resented the continuation of discrimination by the whites in Southern Africa and "in varying degrees, (tended) to see relationships of outside powers with the white regimes of southern Africa... our standing with African and other states on issues in the United Nations and bilaterally." The US interest would be increasingly threatened if violence in the area escalated. The study also apprehended that black-white schism in Southern Africa could have an impact on America's domestic racial relations.

But what influenced the policy-makers was the significant vital - 'other tangible interests' - economic and strategic factors (discussed in detail in Chapter II). Though the study realized that there was a contradiction between the political and the "other tangible interests" and highlighted the dilemma arising out of the desire to reconcile these conflicting interests, it 'tilted' in favour of the white-minority regimes. The policy-makers had disregarded

22 For details see Ibid., pp.86-88.

both the aspiration of the national liberation movement and the apprehension that ties with the colonial and settler regimes in Southern Africa might, in the long run, jeopardise American relations with other African and Third World countries.

The decisive factors which led the US policy-makers to this conclusion can be explained in the emergence of South African political, economic, military powers as the most significant counterrevolutionary force in Southern Africa. By 1964, the South African Government had successfully crushed all internal resistance to its rule. This led to the restoration of confidence among foreign investors, which had significantly declined following the Sharpsville massacre (21 March 1960) and its aftermath. Far from appearing politically unstable, South Africa had now appeared more stable in an otherwise turbulent continent. Events elsewhere in Africa exposed on the other hand the weakness and apparent unreliability of the African nationalism. Of these the more important were the continuing instability in the Congo - which was not ended by the Tshombe Government's use of white mercenaries - mutinies in East Africa (1964), a series of military coups in West Africa (1966), including two in Nigeria and civil war, Rhodesian unilateral declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 11, 1965. All these events except perhaps the last, which Pretoria opposed strengthened South Africa's position. Other developments, such as the decline in the prestige and influence of the United Nations following the

Congo operation, the weakness reflected in OAU's determination to bring decolonization beyond Zambezi river, the 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice against Ethiopia and Liberia in the South-West African case, the closure of the Suez Canal after the Middle East war of June 1967, race riots in the United States, and the reaction against coloured immigration in Britain, also worked in South Africa's favour.

In addition, by the late 1960's the interest of the world's major powers in Africa was at low ebb. Moreover, the growing detente in Super-Power relation provided US to further 'tilt' towards the white regimes, which otherwise might have strongly provoked the USSR.

The 'tilt' in US Angolan policy towards Portuguese colonialism was reflected in the UN debates and the subcommittee reports. Speaking at the Preparatory Committee for the 10th Anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries, US Ambassador Seymour M. Finger chided:

... most of the members of the United Nations became independent through peaceful means, and while such peaceful means remain possible - however slow it may be (emphasis is added), we are convinced that such peaceful means are in the best interest of everyone concerned.

Further, he showed confidence in affecting self-determination through cooperation with colonial powers:

... though it may appear elementary to say so, it would also be wise not to slander those countries whose cooperations are considered important in achieving the objective of resolutions to be adopted.....

Thus Portugal was assigned 'central role' for the desired result of self-determination in Angola.

Also, Seymour exploded the 'myths' that colonies are an economic necessity for the administering power - and strategic interest of certain major nations are closely linked to the status quo. He denied that US has any strategic interest in the area and expressed confidence that "... our strategic interests (would not be damaged) if the peoples of Angola and Mozambique were to achieve self-determination". Lastly, Seymour carried the theme further that "most overseas military bases are located in the independent countries, as a result of "a mutuality of defense and security interests."²³ On 20 November 1969, the General Assembly, received the manifesto on Southern Africa adopted by the OAU (Sixth Ordinary Session, September 1969). The resolution adopted by the General Assembly extended co-operation to OAU for intensifying international efforts for the elimination of Apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism.²⁴ US supported this resolution.

23 United States Mission to the United Nations. Press Relations USUN-41 (69), 17 April 1969. Also see Department of State Bulletin, ^(USA 1979) Vol. 60, no. 1561, 26 May 1969, pp. 451-54.

24 For the text see Res. 2505 (XXIV), proposed by 48 powers, A/L 575, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1969, meeting 1815, by roll-call vote 113/2/2. Also see Y.U.N. 1969, pp. 147-52.

However, ○ US abstained on the resolution 2507 (XXIV) adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November 1969.²⁵ In the discussion in the Fourth Committee, all Members expressed their disillusionment over the lack of progress in decolonization in South Africa. There were different approaches with regard to building of pressure on Portugal for decolonization. US, among others, hoped that the manifesto on Southern Africa could provide the basis for peaceful solutions. But US did not support the resolution which condemned the South African intervention in the Portuguese territories and the collaboration of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal in perpetuating Portuguese domination.²⁶ The US representative explained its abstention that:

... the resolution would not lead toward that goal (of self-determination)... (rather it) negates the spirit of manifesto (of OAU)... and will only serve to discourage reconciliation.... It was a serious error in tarring the Portuguese with the same brush of racism.... (as the) regime of Ian Smith and South Africa... tends to push the Government of Portugal towards (the latter)... 27

In the light of the subsequent developments, especially the debacle in Angola, it is rather easy to criticise the NSC study on its acceptance of an entirely false premise but

26 Y.U.N. 1969, pp.706-07.

27 US Abstains on UN resolution On the Portuguese Territories - Statement of Seymour M. Finger in the Fourth Committee, November 14, 1969, US/UN Press Release 160. Also see Department of State Bulletin, vol.61, 29 December 1969, pp.641-42.

even considering that period itself, it appears to lack foresight. Thus, in assessing possible African reaction to US policy, there was no mention of Nigeria, the giant of the continent with its potential importance as a major oil exporter, nor was there any attempt to assess the significance, or consequences of Soviet support for the Federal side in the Nigerian civil war. While Chinese aid to Tanzania and Zambia was mentioned, there was no analysis of possible Soviet responses in the light of the growing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Also, there was no attempt to assess the cost to Portugal of continuing stalemate in its African wars.²⁸

What finally becomes glaringly obvious in NSSM 39 is the complete lack of concern over the aspirations and fate of the African people. The document makes it clear that the US had no genuine interest in solving racial and colonial conflicts in Southern Africa; American involvement in the area was not a matter of choice on the part of Washington but of necessity created by the worldwide attention given to these problems. The US became involved not out of commitment to fundamental human rights and basic democratic principles but "because other countries have made it so."²⁹ Thus the

28 Guleke, n.10, p.653.

29 Donald F. Mettenry, "Statement on South Africa and Namibia", Issue, vol.5, no.3, 1975, p.60.

study reflected not only ethnocentrism (that considerations of kith and kin are far stronger than the principle of American democracy) but also coloured vision of "violence".³⁰

US also abstained on the resolution condemning the foreign and other economic interests impeding the implementation of the Declaration of Granting of Independence to colonial countries.³¹

In 1970, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions. Resolution 2621 (XXV) adopted by the Assembly, among other things, drew the attention of the Security Council to the need to give careful considerations to the question of imposing sanctions upon Portugal.³² Resolution 2646 (XXV) sought to bring about complete elimination of racial discrimination and racism.³³ Resolution 2703 (XXV) reaffirmed the inalienable

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- 20 As writes Badi G. Foster, "The use of violence in South East Asia, the Carribean, Latin America, and the Middle East by the United States in the past decade suggests that the question of violence is strongly coloured by underlying attitudes concerning the nature and capabilities of Africans and other non-white people" in "US Foreign Policy Toward Africa: An Afro-American Perspective", Issue, vol.II, no.2, Summer 1972, p.50.
- 31 Res. 2554(XXIV), as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/7858, adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1969, meeting 1831, by the accorded vote 80/2/81.
- 32 Res.2621(XXV), as recommended by Special Committee A/8086, adopted by the Assembly on 12 October 1970, meeting 1862, by the recorded vote of 86/5/15.
- 33 Res.2646(XXV), as recommended by the Third Committee A/8163, adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 1970, meeting 1915, by votes 17/10/11.

rights of the people of the dependent territories on the exploitation of their resources and condemned the foreign economic interests impeding the implementation of resolution 1514(XV).³⁴ Resolution 2674(XXV) and 2714(XXV) reaffirmed that the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners should be applied to all Angolan political prisoners on the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and called upon Portugal to eradicate the practice of xibalo or forced labour in its African colonies.³⁵ Resolution 2708(XXV), among other things, welcomed the withdrawal by financial groups in certain states from participation in the Cabora Bassa project in Mozambique but requested Government which had not done so to prevent companies under their jurisdiction in participating in that project or in the Cunene River Project in Angola.³⁶ Resolution 2708(XXV), among other things, requested the Member States to take necessary measures to prevent the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries operating against the national liberation movements, and strongly

34 Res.2703(XXV) as recommended by the Fourth Committee A/8243, adopted on 14 December 1970, meeting 1928, by the recorded vote of 85/11/12.

35 Res.2674(XXV), as recommended by Third Committee A/8178, adopted on 9 December 1970, meeting 1922, by recorded vote of 77/2/36. Res.2714(XXV), as recommended by Third Committee, A/1873/Add.1, adopted on 15 December 1970, meeting 1930, by roll-call vote of 79/1/34.

36 Res.2707(XXV), as recommended by Fourth Committee, A/8187, adopted by the Assembly on 14 December 1970, meeting 1928, by roll-call vote of 94/6/16.

deplored the attitude of those states which, in defiance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly on implementation of 1514(XV), continue to cooperate with the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia.³⁷

US abstained on resolution 2674(XXV) and 2714(XXV), thereby not even providing 'cosmetic' support to resolutions on Human Rights. It opposed the resolutions 2621 (XXV), 2703(XXV) and 2707(XXV), 2708(XXV). US opposed resolution 2621(XXV) because "not a single (US) amendment suggested" was accepted and the Program of Action lacked a "constructive approach" and pragmatism, as "the Security Council experience has shown (that it) cannot obtain the measure of support necessary to make them practicable".³⁸

In 1971, the General Assembly passed resolutions affirming the inalienable rights of the people under domination and implementation of Declaration of Independence

37 Res.2708(XXV), as proposed by 30 powers, A/1621, and as amended by Afghanistan, A/L.622, adopted by the Assembly on 14 December 1970, meeting 1929, by roll-call vote of 93/5/22.

38 Statement by Seymour M. Finger, US Alternate Representative to the U.N.G.A. and Text of Resolution on Implementation of Declaration on Decolonization. US/UN press release 137, 12 October 1970. Also see Department of State Bulletin, V-63, July-December 1970, p.635. Further see Schlisinger (ed.), Dynamics of World Power : A Documentary History of US Foreign Policy (1945-73), vol.V (New York, Chelsea House Pub. & McGraw Hill Company, 1973), pp.687-88.

[Resolution 2787 (XXVI), 2874 (XXVI), 2878 (XXVI)]. Resolution 2787 (XXVI), among other things, confirmed that colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, including methods of neo-colonialism, constituted a gross encroachment on the rights of peoples and on the basic human rights and freedoms.³⁹ Resolution 2874 (XXVI), among other things, reaffirmed the need for US material and moral support, especially the specialized agencies, to the national liberation movements in those territories, including in particular, the liberated areas.⁴⁰ Resolution 2878 (XXVI), among other things, endorsed the proposal in consultation with the OAU, to enable representatives of the national liberation movements in the colonial territories in Southern Africa, to participate, whenever necessary and in appropriate capacity, in its deliberation, relating to those territories.⁴¹

Other important resolutions on the elimination of discrimination in the colonies [2784 (XXVI)]⁴² and foreign


39 Res. 2787 (XXVI), as recommended by the Third Committee A/8543, adopted on 6 December 1971, meeting 2001, by recorded vote of 76/10/33.

40 Res. 2874 (XXVI), as recommended by the Fourth Committee A/8620, adopted on 20 December 1971, meeting 2028, by the recorded vote of 93/4/27.

41 Res. 2878 (XXVI), as proposed by 32 powers, A/L662 adopted on 20 December 1970, meeting 2028 by recorded vote of 96/5/18.

42 Res. 2784 (XXVI) as recommended by the Third Committee A/8542, adopted by the Assembly on 6 December 1971, meeting 2001, by the recorded vote of 93/5/15.

investments impeding the implementation of Declaration of Granting of Independence [2873 (XXVI)]⁴³ were also adopted in the General Assembly. But most important, resolution 2795(XXVI) approved the representatives of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau as associate members of the ECA. It noted with concern that constitutional reforms introduced in Portuguese territories (1971) were not intended to help in the achievement of self-determination and independence and further condemned the Portuguese indiscriminate bombing of civilians and ruthless wholesale destruction of villages. It urged Portugal to cease all attacks on the neighbouring countries of its territories in Africa.⁴⁴

 US voted against all the above resolutions. It voted against resolution 2787(XXVI) because "it contained tendentious and unrealistic statements".⁴⁵ It opposed resolution 2874(XXVI) because it encouraged "the politicization of the specialized agencies".⁴⁶ The resolution 2795(XXVI) was opposed on "legal and procedural grounds".⁴⁷

43 Res. 2873(XXVI), as recommended by the Fourth Committee A/8619; adopted on 20 December 1971, meeting 2028, by roll-call vote of 103/8/13.

44 Res. 2795(XXVI), as recommended by Fourth Committee A/8549, adopted on 10 December 1971, meeting 2022, by roll-call vote of 105/8/5.

45 Y.U.N. 1971, p.421.

46 Ibid., p.527.

47 Ibid., p.571.

In 1971, US made a series of unprecedented economic commitments totalling over \$435 million to Portugal, as a quid pro quo for the formal extension of the Azores Pact until February 3, 1974.⁴⁸ But many observers saw, the signing of Pact as simply an excuse for offering massive aids to Portugal, for the US had been utilising the base rights on the island without any formal agreement for several years.⁴⁹ The US also allowed the direct sales of Boeing 727s, 737s and 707s to Lisbon and these sales were financed through the Import-Export Bank.⁵⁰ Although David Newsome recognised that the Boeing could also be used for the military purpose, he refused to ban its export because "the sale of passengers transport planes to Portugal has not been deemed to come within the terms of our 1961 arms embargo".⁵¹ Similarly David D. Newsome, the Assistant

48 For details see the Statement of Congress Diggs to President Nixon Requesting Point by Point Reply on the United States-Portuguese Agreement, in Schlesinger, n.38, pp.1229-31.

49 As quoted in Issacmen and Davis, "United States Policy Towards Mozambique since 1945 : The Defence of Colonialism and Regional Stability", Africa Today (Denever), vol.25, January-March 1978, p.39.

50 For details see Jannifer Davis, "Implementation of the US Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues)", Hearing before the sub-committee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20, 22 March and 6 April 1973 (Washington, 1973), pp.78-80.

51 Daily Telegraph (London), 21 June 1971; Johannesburg Star, 25 June 1971.

Secretary for African Affairs elaborated on economic sanctions that "punitive economic measures are unpopular in this country (US)". We had experience in the problems of enforcement and control, and such measures are not workable "against countries which are important economic entities". Moreover, "the economic sanction against Rhodesia is a special case... a feasible short term measure... we do not see it as a precedent for other, different situations".⁵² This explains the repeal of the Byrd amendment and the tilt towards the white regime.

In 1971, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions on the implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization [2908 (XXVII)],⁵³ reaffirming self-determination and strongly condemning the policies of NATO and other powers which are assisting Portugal and other racist regimes [2955 (XXVII)]⁵⁴ condemning foreign economic interest impeding the implementation of Declaration of Decolonization [2979 (XXVII)]⁵⁵ providing material and moral support to the

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- 52 "A Look at African Issues at the UN" at Atlanta Press Club, Press Release 212, September 21, 1971, see Department of State Bulletin, vol.65, no.1685, October 11, 1971, pp.373-78. Also see "Southern Africa-Constant Theme in US Policy", Address by Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State before the Mid-American Committee, Chicago, June 28, 1972, pp.390-92.
- 53 Res.2908(XXVII), as approved by 55 powers A/L677, adopted on 2 November 1972, meeting 2078, by a roll-call vote of 97/5/23.
- 54 Res.2955(XXVII), as recommended by Third Committee, A/8736, adopted on 12 December 1972, meeting 2107, by recorded vote of 89/8/18.
- 55 Res.2979(XXVII), as recommended by Fourth Committee, A/8958, adopted on 14 December 1972, meeting 2110, by recorded vote of 106/6/15.

liberation movements, including support from the specialized agencies and other bodies of UN ⁵⁶ [2980(XXVII)]. Further, resolution 2918(XXVII),⁵⁷ among other things, gave "the representatives of the popular aspirations and of their entitlement to participation in international conferences dealing with all aspects of the territorial affairs.

The Security Council adopted two resolutions in 1972. Resolution 312 (1972), among other things, deplored the policies and actions of those states which continued to provide Portugal with military and other assistance.⁵⁸ US abstained in this resolution. The Security Council unanimously adopted another resolution which, among other things, enhanced the position of the liberation movements as quasi-sovereign entities of direct concern to the UN system.⁵⁹ The African states in the Council withdrew the resolution which would have banned NATO and other arms shipment used

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- 56 Res. 2980(XXVII), as recommended by Fourth Committee, A/8959, adopted on 14 December 1972, meeting 2110, by recorded vote of 98/4/24.
- 57 Res. 2918(XXVII), as recommended by Fourth Committee, adopted on 14 November 1972, meeting 2084, by roll-call vote of 98/6/8.
- 58 For details see Res. 312/1972, as proposed by 3 powers, S/10607/Rev.1, and further orally amended/Japan, ^{by} adopted on 4 February 1972, meeting 1639, by votes of 0 with 6 abstentions.
- 59 Res. 322(1972), as proposed by 3 powers S/10838/Rev.1 as further orally modified by sponsors, adopted unanimously by Council on 22 November 1972, meeting 1677.

by Portugal for repression in the colonies.⁶⁰ The resolution also decided to establish an ad hoc committee of five of its members to undertake investigation of the flow of arms to Portugal, and to report periodically to the Council. US expressed its reservation on the second operative paragraph - and hence wanted a separate vote - which called upon Portugal to cease forthwith its military operations and repression on its colonies.⁶¹

US opposed all the General Assembly resolutions discussed above. The opposition to resolutions 2979(XXVII), 2980(XXVII) was obvious as US had earlier also given a negative vote to such resolutions. Resolution 2955(XXVII) was opposed because US could not accept "the generally condemnatory language or the reference to NATO".⁶² Resolutions 2908(XXVII) and 2918(XXVII) were opposed because the provision requesting that all moral and material assistance to the liberation movements was "an invitation for the United Nations to endorse violence", and for "condemning Portugal for the use of napalm and chemical substances",⁶³ in

60 See Yassin El-Ayouty, "Legitimization of National Liberation : The United Nations and Southern Africa", Issue, vol.II, no.4, Winter 1972, p.38.

61 Y.U.N., 1972, p.591.

62 Y.U.N., 1972, p.437.

63 Ibid., p.595.

its colonies.

In 1973, the General Assembly passed resolutions against the foreign economic interests impeding the implementation of resolution 1514(XV),⁶⁴ and reaffirming the inalienable rights of the peoples in the colonies and granting of independence,⁶⁵ and further, calling the specialized agencies and other associations of the UN to provide material and moral support to the national liberation struggle.⁶⁶ Resolution 3113(XXVII) adopted in the General Assembly strongly deplored the policies of those states, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal, which continued to provide Portugal with military and other

64 Res.3117(XXVIII), as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/9424, adopted on 12 December 1973, meeting 2198, by recorded vote of 103/3/23.

65 Res.3163 (XXVIII), as proposed by 56 powers, A/L707, adopted by Assembly, 14 December 1973, meeting 2202, by recorded vote of 104/5/19. Also on the recommendation of the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, held in Oslo in April 1973, the resolution in favour of Declaration of Independence was adopted 3165(XXVIII), as proposed by 11 powers A/L709, adopted on 14 December 1973, meeting 2202, by recorded vote of 121/2/6.

66 Res. 3118(XXVIII), as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/9421, adopted on 12 December 1973, meeting 2198, by recorded vote of 108/4/17.

assistance. It condemned any attempt of Portugal to place any of the facilities of the territories under its domination at the disposal of NATO or any NATO members on a bilateral basis for military purposes. The resolution expressed satisfaction at the progress towards national independence and freedom being made by the national liberation movements in those territories, but through their struggle and through reconstruction programmes.⁶⁷

US opposed all the above resolutions, except abstaining on the resolution 3165 (XXVIII). Another important factor was that it opposed resolution 3117 (XXVIII) along with Portugal and South Africa. This triple negative vote reflects a noticeable 'unholy alliance'.

As a result of this noticeable shift in favour of the minority and white regimes in Southern Africa, US corporations taking cue from the Government increased their expenditures in the area. In Angola, in oil alone, apart from Gulf, there were other significant corporations by 1973 [For details see Chapter II]. The US Government raised no questions about the profitable consequence of a large flow of American capital and rather remained complacent which reflected their little regard for the UN resolutions

67 Res. 3113 (XXVIII), as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/9338, adopted on 12 December 1973, meeting 2198, recorded vote of 105/8/16.

on foreign economic interests impeding the implementation of the Declaration of Granting of Independence.⁶⁸ Secondly, the renewal of the Azores base provided an excuse to US to aid Portugal. This aid came at a critical time for the Caetano regime and bolstered his domestic control, though temporarily, and helped him to "meet the costs of colonial wars of Portugal and preserve the white minority".⁶⁹ Not only was there an increase in the total American budget for training Portuguese military personnel, which increased tenfold in case of Portuguese air force between 1971-72, but also US exports of herbicides, used by Portugal in repression of the liberation forces, jumped from \$28,000 to \$413,000, during the same period, an increase of 1500 per cent.⁷⁰ However, it should be noted that it was France

68 Thus wrote Weidi N. Mwasakafyuka, "The Southern Africa Scandal is possible and exists because of the role played by foreign economic interests from countries such as US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Canada and several other countries within the NATO alliance, the very countries which like to pose before the International Community as the Champions of freedom and democracy", in "Foreign Economic Interests - A Major Obstacle to Decolonization in Southern Africa", Objective : Justice^(NY) vol.4, 1972, p.16.

69 New York Times, 9 December 1971. The Agreement provided important psychological support to Caetano at the moment of its greatest crises. Also see Marcum, "The Politics of Indifference : Portugal and Africa, A Case Study in American Foreign Policy", Issue, vol.II, no.3, Fall 1972, p.16.

70 Statistics from the Implementation of the US Arms Embargo n.44, p.61. Moreover, the American officials admitted that they exercised no licencing controls over the export of Lethal chemicals, except to communist countries. The lack of control was acknowledged by Ruar H. Mayer, Director office of Export Controls on 20 March, 1973, before the House Sub-Committee on African Affairs.

and West Germany that were major arms suppliers to Portugal than US.⁷¹ As Robert A. Diamond and David Fonguet argue that there was decline of US military aid to Portugal from 1961, the US compensating itself with increased foreign investment in Lisbon and the colonies.⁷²

The renewal of the Azores pact is debatable, with significant arguments against it.⁷³ However, what clinched the issue in favour of Portugal was the anti-communism of

71 See Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portugal", Africa Report, May 1970, vol.15, no.5, pp.10-11.

72 The decline in US military aid to Portugal was 1961 - \$288.5 m, 1962-69 - \$34.7m, 1970 - \$1 m. "After Kennedy capitulated to the Salazar's blackmail on the Azores, Washington, -Lisbon relations slowly rose from the nadir reached in 1961, but the nature of relationship changed. US economic assistance to Portugal partly took the place of a declining flow of military aid", in "Portugal and the United States", Africa Report, May 1970, vol.15, no.5, pp.15-17.

73 Diamond and Fonguet argue that the value of Azores has been declining because of (a) invention of longer-range aircraft which no longer needs a stopping point in the Atlantic, (b) US official needs have shifted the use of Azores from air base to naval reconnaissance, and (c) US Defence planners are more interested in ways of removing men and material rapidly to areas of potential conflict (R.D.F.) and hence they regard foreign bases as desirable but no longer as essential. John Sieler condemned the Pact as, "moral and material bankruptcy of Nixon's Administration", n.5, p.21. Charles Diggs resigned his position on the American Delegation to the UN General Assembly in protest over the Azores accord. Americans' Democratic Action (ADA) strongly denounced the pact and a group of black Africanists organized the African Heritage Positive Action Committee to work with such political groups as the Black caucus in Congress in a long term effort to bring significant Afro-American pressure to bear on the formation of the US policy. Marcum, n.62, p.16. Also see Gil Fernandes, "The Azores over Africa", Africa Today, vol.79, no.1, Winter 1972, pp.4-6.

Dean Acheson, the outspoken partisan of white rule throughout Southern Africa (The New York Times, April 21, 1971) and Vice-President Spiro Agnew (who had also contributed a significant pro-Portuguese input), blended nicely with the pro-colonialism of Southern Solons such as Thurmond and Byrd.⁷⁴ In the absence of strong countervailing pressures, there was a systemic bias in favour of maintaining a foreign installation such as Lajes field. Like any defense establishment, the Pentagon opposed the dismantling of a useful facility, and like any government agency concerned about an unfavourable balance of trade, the Department of Commerce welcomed sizeable export-import bank loans. Thus the normal interplay of particular interests, unless subjected to the proving scrutiny of press or Congress, creates a momentum in favour of accommodations like the Azores accord.⁷⁵

1974-Till the Recognition of MPLA Government at the OAU Summit (February 1976)

During this phase, also known as the Ford-Kissinger Safari in Angola,⁷⁶ the US policy towards Angola will be assessed by (a) analysing the nature of US-Portugal relations

74 In April 1971, Senator Byrd inserted a speech entitled "Portugal's Policy in Africa", by Portugal's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rui Patricio, into the Congressional Record, see Congressional Record, vol.117, no.52, 92nd Congress 1st session (April 15, 1971), pp.S/4944-S/4949, quoted in Marcum, n.69, p.15.

75 Ibid.

76 M.S. Venkataramani, n.2.

after the Portuguese Revolution, (b) politics at UN for the decolonization of Angola, and (c) politics outside UN that exacerbated civil war and led to US miscalculations.

A. US-PORTUGAL BEHIND THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION:

While assessing the US-Portugal relation after 25 April 1974, the paper does not intend to go into details of the internal power-struggle in Portugal,⁷⁷ but will only underline the broad diplomatic nature of the Luso-American ties. As the Portuguese events unfolded since April 1974, the US had essentially three policy options to pursue. One was the "cold war" or the 'Chilean approach' centred on the maximal use of overt and covert intervention to stop Portugal's leftward drift. This policy was never seriously contemplated, partly because of the CIA's problems at home and the risk of highly adverse reactions of the world public opinion which might have aggravated the situation. Despite his pessimism, Kissinger never really favoured the "vaccination theory" with regard to the Portugal revolution.⁷⁸

77 For details, see Tom Gallagher, Portugal : A Twentieth Century Interpretation (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983), pp.191-226. Also see Tad Szulc, "Lisbon and Washington : Behind the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Policy (New York), no.21, Winter 1975-76, pp.3-62.

78 This theory is a policy of accepting communism in Portugal, to serve as a brutal warning to the Spaniards, the French, the Italians, and the Greeks that a Communist takeover could happen to them too, if they allowed the party to participate in their Governments, quoted in Tad Szulc, *Ibid.*, p.30.

The second option was to try and isolate Portugal. This was the policy toward which Kissinger was the most inclined, except when he abruptly changed his course in December 1974, announcing limited economic aid to Portugal. (These funds, incidentally, were not disbursed, for a variety of reasons, for at least a year). The third option which might be called "the Ambassador's policy", called for a greater effort to understand the Portuguese revolution and to support the moderates to the greatest extent possible. This was, in effect, vetoed by Kissinger.

However, instead of choosing any of these policies, he vacillated, probably distracted by other major events - Watergate Scandal, shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, disaster in Indo-China, etc. Kissinger was suspicious about the communists in the decision-making in Lisbon and so demanded the moderates to throw ^{out} the communists. However, Kissinger had no concrete policy towards Portugal and the American policy evolved sporadically and unevenly, reflecting the lack of a firm guiding hand at any level.⁷⁹ The mid-1975 shift towards a more moderate stance in Lisbon

79 As Tad Szulc writes, "The record of US policies toward Portugal since the April 1974 revolution, is thus one of oscillations, contradictions, uncertainties, unexplained shifts in policy and, above all, a lack of understanding of the immense complexities involved in Portuguese situation", Ibid., p.60.

was the product of domestic pressures and not a direct consequence of American economic pressures. Portugal, despite grave deterioration in her economy, still had about \$3 billion worth of gold in its reserves when Gonsalves fell.

Thus Kissinger had shown an unwarranted apprehension of leftist takeover in Portugal. Moreover, when it had seemed that Portugal was destined for a left-wing future, the newly established secessionist Azorean Liberation Front (ALF) under Jose de Almeida found its supporters from among the North American business circles and leading US politicians. However, the ALF did not carry forward their aims.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, both the above factors, fear of Leftist Lisbon and support to ALF demonstrates the prevalence of conservative, status quo Euro-African policy in US.

80 When the separatists discovered that much of the US support was actually coming from crime syndicates in the expectation that an independent mid-Atlantic State could be easily manipulated and turned into a world gaining Centre, they spurned the offered backing. Details about the Azorean crisis are contained in Brian McTigue and Fred Strasser, "1975 : Americanos, OAS e Almeida Reunem-Se em Paris para negociar a independencia doos Açores", Expresso, 14 November 1978, pp.1-6, quoted in Gallagher, n.77, p.219.

B. UN ON THE DECOLONIZATION OF ANGOLA (1974-75):

The attitude of Portugal underwent transformation after the April coup. This change of policy towards decolonization was reflected in the UN debates. However, before discussing the change, we would briefly analyse the Portuguese policy towards Angola.

Prior to the coup, the Special Committee discussed the situation in Angola. Most of the members present, among other things, demanded that the UN Commission of Inquiry should investigate the Wiriyamer massacre in Mozambique as early as possible.⁸¹ Also they desired the world community to condemn the Portuguese massacre. On the allegation of the massacre, Caetano recognised the possibility of extremes committed by the troops but denied any official policy authorizing brutalities against the civilian population.⁸² Further, he also rejected independence through the transfer of power to the liberation movements on the pretext that it would lead to a chaotic situation which would develop internationally and pose a serious threat to South Africa

81 See Res. 3114 (XXVIII), as recommended by Fourth Committee, A/1338, adopted on 12 December 1973, meeting 2198, by recorded vote of 109/4/12.

82 Broadcast speech of Caetano made on 26 July 1963, quoted in "Portugal's Colonial Policy : Excerpts from a United Nations Study", Objective : Justice, vol.6, no.2, April/May/June 1974, p.11.

and Rhodesia. US opposed the resolution 3114 (XXVIII) thus reinforcing its unholy alliance with Portugal, South Africa and Spain.

After the coup, on 24 July, the Chairman of the Special Committee received a communication from the representative of Portugal to co-operate with it. Portugal also invited UN Secretary-General to visit Lisbon. According to the new constitutional law no.7/74 of 17 July 1974 and President Spínola's speech, made on 27 July 1974, Portugal pledged to the Secretary General that it would co-operate with the UN in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter, the Declaration and relevant UN resolutions. Portugal also pledged full support for the territorial unity and integrity of each territory. Also, in the Special Committee, Portugal renounced categorically the colonialist policy of the previous regime.⁸³

Similarly, in the Fourth Committee, the Portuguese representative spoke that decolonization was the essential part of the process of democratization in Portugal (see Spínola's 3-D programme, Chapter I, part II). The United States representative expressed hope that the Angolan liberation movement would solve their differences and

83 Y.U.N. 1974, pp.812-13.

form a United Front. Also he spoke that

... the provisional Government in Portugal has had the wisdom to accept the need for change as well as the courage to accept it. 84

However, it seems that initially Portugal possessed no clear idea of how to bring Portugal out of the "colonial adventure" in Africa.⁸⁵ There were proposals to hold referenda and General Spinoza in his 11 June speech outlined several other alternatives, including confederation, federation and a Commonwealth.⁸⁶ However, it was on August 9 that Portugal spelled out in detail the decolonization process for Angola.⁸⁷ It mooted the idea of a provisional coalition Government. This idea crystallised during President Gomes regime and the need for an interim Government, on the Mozambican model, to be followed by the democratization of institutions through elections, were elaborated by Mario Soares at the UN.⁸⁸

- 84 Statement of Barbara M. White in Fourth Committee on October 11, 1974, "Progress Towards Independence of Portuguese Africa", Department of State Bulletin, vol.71, November 11, 1974.
- 85 Statement of Mr Ebangaki in Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), June 1974, 3224 AB, quoted in James Mayall, "Foreign Policy in Africa: A Changing Diplomatic Landscape", p.197 in Peter Jones, The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis (London, Croom Helm, 1975).
- 86 Africa Digest,^(UK) August 1974, p.63, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.198.
- 87 For details see ARB, August 1974, vol.11, no.8, p.3341.
- 88 "The Decolonization of Territories under Portuguese Administration", Objective: Justice, vol.6, no.4, Oct/November/December 1974, pp.2-5 & 7.

The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3294(XXIX) unanimously, which among other things, welcomed the declaration of the Portugal Government for accepting its obligations under the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and recognizing the rights of peoples to self-determination and independence, as well as it expressed readiness to cooperate in the work of the various United Nations bodies. The resolution also strongly deplored the subversive and criminal activities of the fascist and reactionary groups in Portuguese territories and requested Portugal to make an effort to put an end to such activities.⁸⁹

The General Assembly also adopted unanimously the resolution requesting the member states to grant economic, financial and technical assistance to territories under Portuguese control.⁹⁰

In 1975, on 20 January, the representative of Portugal transmitted to the UN Secretary-General the text of the Alvor agreement.⁹¹ According to the agreement, Angola constituted a single indivisible entity and till the proclamation of its independence (11 November 1975), all power was to be exercised

89 Res.3294 (XXIX), as recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/9939, adopted on 13 December 1974, meeting 2318.

90 Res.3340(XXIX), as recommended by the Second Committee, A/9886/Add.1, adopted on 17 December 1974, meeting 2323.

91 For details of the agreement see ARB, January 1975, vol.12, no.1, pp.3500-03.

by a High Commissioner, appointed by the President of Portugal, and by a Transitional Government to be inaugurated on 31 January 1975 and to be presided over by a Presidential Council of three members - one from each liberation movement. The members of the transitional cabinet were appointed in equal proportion by the three liberation movements and the President of Portugal. The Portuguese armed forces were to withdraw by 29 February 1976.

However, the Alvor agreement broke down leading to civil war in Angola. Portugal maintained a policy of strict active neutrality to defend the territorial integrity of Angola against separatism and outside interference. It hoped that the three liberation movements would overcome their ideological differences to unite together in the interest of the Angolan people. But the deterioration of the situation in Angola forced Portugal to adopt emergency measures, which had the sanction of the Security Council⁹² and the Special Committee. Further, Portugal called on the UN to provide assistance to Portugal to help it in the peaceful decolonization. However, Portugal made it clear that the call to the international community for assistance did not mean the internationalization of the conflict.⁹³

92 See S/11811 (A/102207) and S/11812, both of 21 May 1975.

93 Y.U.N., 1975, p.864.

US Response to the Angolan Issue outside the UN:
The Politics of Miscalculations (1974-January 1976)

The US Angolan policy outside the UN, especially during the Angolan civil war, which resulted in miscalculations, can be understood with the analysis of US response to the three phases of foreign intervention: (i) September 1974-January 1975; (ii) February 1975-January 1976; (iii) February 1976-UN recognition of Angola. During the first phase, the traditional US policy of benign neglect continued and US did not appear to be unduly concerned about internal developments in Angola. There was an air of confidence that the eventual Portuguese withdrawal would not necessarily take the Angolans out of the Western sphere of influence. Though US was concerned about the "seriously complicated" situation in Angola due to division among the three national liberation movements, Donald E. Easum, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, voiced no serious alarm or possible danger to American investments if the MPLA were to come to power.⁹⁴

94 "... the MPLA and Neto have been influenced by European Socialism (Marxism-Leninism specifically not mentioned) ... the classical socialist view of the role of foreign enterprise...were MPLA have a strong role to play in the future of the country....the potential contribution of foreign investment would be appreciated and respected and much needed by any newly independent country like Angola..." Testimony of Donald B. Easum in "Responses by Department of State to Questions from Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., "US House, 93 Congress, 2 session, Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations : Before and After the Coup (Washington, 1974), pp.94-5. For US view of decolonization of Mozambique, Guinea Bisean and Portugal's support to it, see, n.84.

Moreover, Easum did not say anything at all about the MPLA's relations with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, Easum indicated American satisfaction over the efforts of Zaire, Zambia, Congo and Tanzania to promote a settlement among the three Angolan groups. Eventually, in Mombasa (Kenya), the leaders of the three national liberation movements signed a joint declaration pledging to cooperate, in all spheres. Ten days later it was formalised into the Alvor agreement (January 15, 1975).

The second phase of foreign intervention in Angola can be sub-divided into the early covert and non-active involvement of external actors (February-10 August 1975) and the later covert-overt-active involvement of external actors in Angola (11 August 1975-10 February 1976). During the first part of the second phase, it seems that US had planned to secretly aid FNLA.⁹⁵ Probably helped by US and with Zaire's support FNLA initiated aggression on MPLA (23 March 1975) thus starting the first phase of civil war.⁹⁶

95 The Cincinnati Enquirer in an editorial (February 4, 1975) referred to Roberto's "close ties" with Zaire and added that the United States was helping him quietly. The Christian Science Monitor (Boston) reported that there was no evidence to indicate that the United States favoured any of the three liberation factions but as Roberto was backed by Mobutu, a favourite of the US, he appeared to many African observers to be candidate of the Americans too (25 Feb. 1975), quoted in Venkataramani, n.2, p.145. Further see "Prepared" statement of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, US Senate, 91 Cong., 2 Sess. Sub-committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Angola (Washington, 1976), pp.17 & 28. Testimony by Senator John V. Tunney of California, *Ibid.*, p.165.

96 See Venkataramani, *Ibid.*

During March-April 1975, Zaire-based and equipped troops of FNLA, with the cooperation of units of Zairean army drove out MPLA partisans from several districts of northern Angola. On the other hand, the MPLA appeared to be the most vulnerable of the three movements, partially due to Chipenda's defection and partly because of USSR stopping funds to it. The FNLA, by contrast, "had been moving troops across the Zairean border, and supported by ample funds from President Mobutu... it now has an impressive array of modern weapons."⁹⁷

However, the MPLA soon reversed its misfortune and in May drove out the FNLA out of the areas north and east of Luanda and, in June, took effective control of Cabinda. In June, Kenyatta made an effort to unite the three liberation movements. On 21 June 1975, the three movements signed an agreement "solemnly agreeing to renounce the use of force as way to solve problems and to honour all the obligations" undertaken in the meeting.⁹⁸

Unfortunately, the agreement soon broke down with fresh outbreak of fighting among the three movements; MPLA relatively stronger in Luanda, reportedly pushed out the FNLA and UNITA from the capital (July 12, 1975) and the

97 John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 54, April 1976, pp. 407-25. Testimony of John A. Marcum, US Senate, Angola, n. 95, p. 126. Also see The Times (London), 9 May 1975.

98 See International Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 June 1975, 23 June 1975.

Transitional Government came to an end. Meanwhile South African troops entered South Angola and occupied the towns of Calueque (August 3-6, 1975). On the other hand, on August 8, 1975, the FNLA troops were halted at Kingfangando, twenty km. north of Luanda by the MPLA troops. Holden Roberto, returning to Angola for the first time in fourteen years, announced "total war" against the MPLA and personally led FNLA troops but was badly beaten. On 21 August 1975, Jonas Savimbi also declared war on MPLA.⁹⁹ Thus a full-fledged civil war had started in Angola.

In the spring of 1975, the US considered possible policy options in its high-level Inter-Departmental Group. According to the report published in the New York Times, Kissinger was the only one favouring direct US involvement in Angola. William Colby, the Director of CIA, and James Pott, the Agency Official in charge of the African Affairs, reportedly also favoured stepped-up US aid to MPLA's rivals. On the other, Nathaniel Davis, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had a different opinion and he argued in favour of de-escalating the situation with the US forging a multinational diplomatic effort. He asserted that increased US aid would not enable the FNLA and UNITA to

99 Wilfred Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up (Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1980), pp.XXI-XXII.

defeat MPLA.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, he warned that the course of aiding the anti-MPLA factions would eventually result in the United States finding itself with the racist regime of South Africa as its only ally.¹⁰¹

The US decided to provide military assistance to the FNLA and UNITA forces through neighbouring Black African countries, especially through Zaire. President Ford approved the recommendations, probably on 18 July 1975.¹⁰² The whole operation was to be covert with arms being transferred by Zaire to FNLA and UNITA and Zaire receiving replacements.

The US covert action was resented by Nathaniel Davis and his differences with Kissinger over the Angolan crisis led to his transfer to Switzerland. Several other changes in the top officials were also reportedly made. Orders were issued "severely limiting to only a few of its key officials the distribution of classified cables and other documents relating to Angola."¹⁰³

100 As Davis opined, "Neither Savimbi nor Roberto are good fighters, in fact, they couldn't fight their way out by a paper bag. It's the wrong game and the players/got are the losers". New York Times, 14 December 1975.

101 Ibid.

102 Inference from Kissinger's statement, US Senate, Angola, n.95, p.17.

103 New York Times, 14 December 1975, 19 December 1975.

However, the NSC report stated that the document could not remain secret and politico-strategically covert aid was also not a viable policy.¹⁰⁴ Nathaniel Davis wanted politico-diplomatic pressures ("diplomatic option" of NSC study) on USSR - a 'Regionalist' view for its peaceful solution.¹⁰⁵

104 As NSC Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco argued that the covert intervention would not serve the larger US interests; that an attempted intervention could not be kept secret; and that a covert intervention would have to be circumscribed as a fall between two stools in any case - while the other side would escalate at will. Quoted in Nathaniel Davis, "The Angolan Decision of 1975 : A Personal Memoir", Foreign Affairs, vol.57, no.1, 1978, p.113. Similarly Seymour Brown writes, "The covert military action the CIA was recommending might lead to the increased intervention by the USSR and other foreign powers. The levels of violence will probably increase and with widespread tribal or racial massacres, US support for one or more of the indigenous rivals would become a major political issue in the US and an embarrassment internationally." The Crisis of Power : An Interpretation of US Foreign Policy during the Kissinger Years (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), p.170.

105 As opined N. Davis, "We felt that it (diplomatic option) would reflect our recognition that Angola was basically an African problem, and that Africans could and should play a major role in an Angolan solution". Ibid., p.112. Similarly, Senator Edward Kennedy subsequently wrote, "While criticising the overt action "either the Administration does not know or does not sufficiently understand the Angolan situation.... a wider civil war will almost create instability which may spill over into other countries..." He favoured four principles to avoid closely blunders by US (i) US should respect territorial integrity of Angola; (ii) all foreign involvement including our own (US) must be stopped; (iii) the three Angolan political parties should be treated equally, hence the simplistic ideological labels should not be hastily, and, therefore incorrectly attached to the parties, and (iv) Government and International bodies should provide humanitarian assistance to the three Angolan Parties to help rebuild Angola. US should follow a sine quo non policy to supply no arms to be used in Angola." "Angola : What America Should Do", Africa Report, vol.20, no.6, November-December 1975, pp.46-68.

He implored the Fourty Committee to face the implications. On the other hand, Davis said that "if we go in we must go in quickly, massively and decisively enough to avoid the tempting, gradual, mutual escalation that characterised the Vietnam during the 1965-67 period ... If we are to have a test of strength with the Soviets, we should find a more advantageous place."¹⁰⁶

However, despite the arguments against the covert aid, the Administration went ahead. The covert aid was briefed to the Congressional leaders. The 'briefing' exercise was skillfully planned so that the Administration, particularly Kissinger, was able to subsequently claim that an earnest effort was made "to determine the wishes of the Congress." Kissinger wanted no opposition to the covert action from those who were briefed.

Apparently the legislators believed that they were being briefed about a covert action of no major importance.¹⁰⁷ The amount mentioned under covert aid was "something under \$ 10 million" and the CIA official assured Joseph R. Bidon (Democrat, Bolware) that "the likelihood of it going beyond that amount was inconceivable." The CIA officials further

106 Ibid. Also quoted in Seymour Brown, n.104, p.134.

107 Senator Clark subsequently asserted that the Congress members "were not advised that their opinion was being sought", in "Angola : Congressional Briefings by the Executive Branch", US Senata, Angola, n.95, pp.23-24.

responded that the covert aid was secret and "there was no way it would be found out, so there would be no domestic embarrassment...."¹⁰⁸ Further, the State Department assured that there was no likelihood of embarrassment "as a consequence of any association with South Africa...."¹⁰⁹ A significant truth was that at the first CIA briefing and a subsequent one at the State Department, no emphasis was sought to be placed on the magnitude of the alleged Soviet arms aid to MPLA nor any reference to the Cuban role in Angola. As Senator Biden says:

The first time I sat with the CIA in a briefing and then later the State Department, the justification for involvement in Africa had nothing to do with the Soviet Union at that point. That was a low priority as stated to me. The high priority was that there will be destabilization of Africa because friendly African states will feel that may be we do not have to resolve to help them, specifically Zambia and Zaire were cited to me. 110

When Clark raised that it will be politically wise to raise the Angolan issue with the Soviets "before it got out of hand and the war escalated beyond hope...." and make a public issue of the external intervention in Angola, the

108 Ibid., pp.30-31.

109 Ibid., pp.32-33.

110 Quoted in Venkataramani, n.2, p.149.

State Department replied that

it was not the time to do it because we (US) did not have the bargaining chips to get them (the Soviet Union) out. What we had to do so was to go in much heavier and get a stalemate and then negotiate, then bring pressure to bear on them. 111

Military Situation in Angola (August 1975-February 11, 1976):

In the month of August 1975, the Angolan crisis was complicated with the South African intervention. According to the Defense Department "chronologically", the South African intervention began on 11 August 1975 "when a small force was deployed into Southern Angola as a security guard for the Cunene Hydroelectric Project". "In early September", testified Kissinger, "the poorly equipped UNITA forces turned in desperation to South Africa for assistance against the MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's ethnic areas in the South. South Africa responded by sending military equipment, and some military personnel without consultations with the United States."¹¹²

In the beginning of September 1975, the FNLA with the help of battalions, numbering 1,200-1,500 men from Zaire began an assault on Luanda from the North.¹¹³ The UNITA-South Africa

111 US Senate, Angola, n.95, pp.17 and 19.

112 Chronology - Cuban/South African Involvement in Angola (supplied by the Department of Defense), n.95, p.83. Also see "Prepared Statement of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State", US Senate, Angola, n.95, p.17.

113 Guardian, 1 September 1975. Also see Testimony of Senator Tunney, Ibid., p.165.

alliance (L112) had also some support of US as ascertained by John V. Tunney.¹¹⁴ However, any US-South African connection was repudiated by both Kissinger and Robert Ellsworth, the Deputy Secretary of Defense.¹¹⁵

On October 23, a mixed invasion force spearheaded by South African troops, the elements of the ELP (pro-Spinola Portuguese liberation Army), of Portuguese settler vigilants,

114 As Tunney stated, "Last October (1975), President Mobutu called Jonas Savimbi, to Kinshasa to discuss the military situations with an "American friend" and told him that while no American troops would be coming, direct military aid would be funneled through Zaire to him. Dr. Savimbi (who had been interviewed by Senator Tunney's aide) said that his "American friend" did not identify himself and he never saw him again, but quantities of American aid did not begin to arrive". Ibid.

115 Kissinger stated that the US did not encourage South Africa and had no prior knowledge of South African intervention, nor "military and diplomatic policy coordination between South Africa and the US (existed) either directly or indirectly through UNITA or FNLA." Similarly, Robert Ellsworth asserted that there had been no coordination with South Africa, "certainly on the military level". See Secretary Kissinger's "Answers to Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Clark", Ibid., p.53, Robert Ellsworth's Comment, Ibid., p.78.

FNLA under Chipenda and UNITA troops made an assault on MPLA forces.¹¹⁶ The operation known as "Drive to the North" was directed to link up in Luanda with the mixed force of Zaire-FNLA troops before November 11, 1975. Meanwhile the Observer reported on 9 November that Roberto had sent Chipenda to Namibia for talks with Colonel Cantos E. Castro, a Commander of Black troops, known as Flechar, who had fought on the side of the Portuguese.¹¹⁷ However, this rapid advance of anti-MPLA forces was effectively stopped by MPLA in a delaying action on the South bank of the Queve river, four hundred km. south of Luanda (on November 6, 1975).

On November 7, the first eightytwo Cuban combat troops arrived in Luanda. This helped the MPLA to overthrow the second much stronger assault on Luanda by the northern column (on November 10, 1975).

116 Burchett, n.99, p.xxii. Also see Diario de Lisboa who reported that between 800-1000 South African regulars as well as mercenaries under Chipenda were taking part in the operation. Quoted in Venkataramani, n.2, p.157.

117 See The Observer (London), 9 November 1975. The Times, 6 November 1975. The report added that a well known British Mercenary, Colonel Mike Hoare, who had close association with Mobutu, went to Angola to aid FNLA in capturing Luanda. Quoted in Venkataramani, *Ibid.*, p.157. However, it was only on January 18, 1976 that the first batch of British mercenaries were sent to Angola. Burchett, *Ibid.*, p.xxiv.

On November 11, 1975, Neto proclaimed the establishment of independent People's Republic of Angola. On the other hand, on November 12, 1975, Holden Roberto proclaimed independent People's Democratic Republic of Angola. Later, Roberto and Savimbi announced the Joint National Council for the Revolution with its headquarters at Huambo, Angola's second largest city. Meanwhile, the airlift of a reinforced Cuban special force battalion of 650 men, which started on November 7, was completed. The Soviet military advisers also began to arrive in Luanda. Partly because of the indispensable politico-strategic advice of the Soviet-Cuban military officers and partly because of the Tunney amendment which prohibited the Executive to pursue any covert-aid to anti-MPLA forces, the MPLA forces were encouraged to start a counter-offensive in January 1976. They liberated Uije (January 4, 1976) airbase of Negage (January 5), a port of Ambriz (January 12) and drove away the South African troops from towns of Cela, Santa Comba and Novo Redondo (January 21).¹¹⁸ Following their defeat at Uije and Negage and Cola, Santa and Comba and Novo Redondo, the Zairean and the South African troops began to retreat on January 12 and 21, 1976, respectively. By February 5, 1976, there ended mercenary activities in northern front and on February 8, 1976, the FNLA-UNITA troops abandoned their "capital" Huambo in favour of military "stronghold" at Bie which also fell four days after to MPLA

118 Ibid., pp.xxiii-xxiv.

forces (February 12, 1975). Thus by February 11, 1976, MPLA Government at Luanda had not only mobilized majority support in the OAU but rather it was also successful in extending its authority over the larger area of Angola.

US Covert Aid and Politico-Diplomatic
Miscalculations from 11 August 1975-10 February 1976:

During the initial period (August-October 1975) the Administration did not feel it necessary to provide the Congress with information about the magnitude of Soviet-Cuban involvement. Thus the matter of foreign intervention in Angola was not discussed during the September briefings.

But soon the Administration changed its story to justify the increase in its covert aid to anti-MPLA forces. Now the old justification about de-stabilization in places like Zaire and Zambia was dropped and threat to US economic interest in Southern Africa were being used as an alibi to increase the covert operation.¹¹⁹ But even in early October at a "closed" session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, CIA Director Colby and Under-Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco persisted in expounding the "bargaining chips" explanation for the Administration's course of not

119 See Senator Biden's comment, n.88, p.46. On the issue of the "sea lanes", see the testimony of Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense, *ibid.*, pp.61-62.

taking up the Angolan issue privately or publicly with the Soviets.¹²⁰

It was in "late October 1975" that Kissinger raised the Angolan issue for the first time with the Soviet Union. As the Secretary described it three months later, he expressed concern over the scale and purpose of the Soviet intervention in Angola.¹²¹

On November 6, 1975, Kissinger made his first reference to the role of Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola before the House Committee on International Relations. However, the significant fact is that even while publicly recognising the Soviet-Cuban interference in Angola, Kissinger gave an air of confidence that the situation did not provide a major or significant risk with USSR.¹²² But on 10th and 11th November, Kissinger's speech represented "the first phase of the artillery

120 As Senator Clark recalled "... the only way to get some bargaining chips was to go in there with a lot of money, military assistance and turn this situation around; and then we'll start talking to the Soviets." Ibid., p.143.

121 As Kissinger recalled, "We offered to use our influence to bring about the cessation of foreign military assistance and to encourage an African solution if they would do the same. Their responses were evasive but not wholly negative." Quoted in Venkataramani, n.2, p.161.

122 US House, 94 Congress, 2 session, Committee on International Relations, Hearings, International Security Assistance Act of 1976 (Washington, 1976), p.26.

barrage of rhetoric against the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola."¹²³ The next day President Ford also showed his concern. On December 2, 1975, US Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, asserted that Moscow's objective was to "colonize Africa" and he exhorted the African countries to resist the Soviet effort to "recolonize their continent."¹²⁴

But despite these verbal onslaughts, there were some clear signals both to the Congress and the Soviet Union concerning the limited nature of the Administration's indignation. Kissinger was confident that the Angolan situation would not lead to any conflict with Soviet Union and that "the US will not interfere militarily in Angola."¹²⁵

123 Venkataramani, n.2, p.162. Also see Questions and Answers following the Secretary Pittsburgh's Address, Press Release 562B, November 11, 1975. Department of State Bulletin, vol.73, July-December 1975, pp.765-69. As Kissinger stated, reason for not recognizing the MPLA "that (it) has managed to seize the capital city and seized the capital city by foreign assistance", and that "We favour a negotiation... a transitional Government...(and) support any move that keeps outside powers out of Angola." Ibid., p.768.

124 For Moynihan's comment see US House, 94 Congress, 2 session, Committee on International Relations, Hearings, International Security Assistance Act of 1976 (Washington, 1976), p.3.

125 The New York Times on 25 November 1975 had reported that after his Detroit Speech, Kissinger had stated privately that any large-scale US effort aimed at countering the Soviet Union was out of question.

On 9 December 1975, President Ford made his first formal proposal to the Soviet Government, suggesting that all foreign military intervention should be ended. But there was nothing in the US posture to deter the Soviet Union and Cuba from expanding their assistance to the MPLA, especially since they had recognized it after proclamation of Independence. Though the Soviets stopped airlift (9 December-24 December 1975) they soon resumed it on 25 December 1975. This Soviet pause was not the response to any so-called "warning" by the Ford Administration, public or private, but "a shrewd and sensible manoeuvre to assess the response of the Congress and the American public".¹²⁶

The Congress-Executive Discord over US Policy of Covert Operation : Bankruptcy of Kissinger's Over-Confidence:

Kissinger was overconfident of receiving a Congressional recognition of \$28 million covert aid to anti-MPLA forces. However, the results were contrary to expectations. The Tunney amendment was passed (54:22) prohibiting US covert aid to FNLA/UNITA forces.

The Congress was not ready to even support the 'limited nature' of US involvement in Angola. Several factors contributed to the success of Tunney amendment. There was a general

126 Venkataramani, n.2, p.163,

distrust for foreign intervention. Secondly, there was the absence of an Afro-American lobby to press action against USSR and Cuba. However, the most important factor was the "deep distrust" between the Congress and the Executive that clinched the amendment. As Thomas M. Frank and Edward Weisband argue that "it was neither lobbies - although they were a factor - nor concepts of world order which determined Congressional policy, but the state of executive - Congressional relations... (the) deep distrust of the Presidency and determination to "get a handle" on foreign policy decisions... (that) motivated the majority of the members."¹²⁷

During the early phase of the briefing of the Congress of US covert operation, there was no opposition. But from August 1975, the Congressional opposition against the covert aid increased. This was because of Clark's visit to Africa in August 1975. Clark was convinced that (a) the Angolan policy was alienating the most important African leaders, and (b) he was further convinced that Neto was not essentially more leftist or a captive of Soviet Union than someone like

127 Thomas M. Frank and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979), p.35. Similarly Venkataramani writes, "Many members of the Congress showed resentment at having been kept in the dark all along. Several of these who had been briefed felt that he had been placed in an embarrassing position and were anxious to demonstrate publicly their reservations concerning the Administration's course." Ibid., p.163.

Nyerere with whom US had learned to live in mutual tolerance, if not affection.¹²⁸ It was on this ground that Clark and Humphrey opposed the Administration's intention of providing \$20 million fund to Zaire under Security Supporting Assistance Programme¹²⁹ which did not have the consent of the Congress.¹³⁰

In December 1975, Clark focussed his opposition by introducing an amendment to the following year's assistance bill prohibiting all use of funds for covert activities in Angola. Clark's growing concern was being echoed by Senators Otis G. Pike (New York) who was Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, and Don L. Bonker (Democrat from Washington).

But these efforts to effect a phase termination of the Clark amendment was suddenly outflanked by Senator Tunney, who, seeking re-election in a tight Democratic primary, pitted

128 Frank and Weisband, Ibid., pp.50-51.

129 SSAP was defined by the State Department as a "type of assistance to be used when there is a particular political or security situation which impacts on US interest", and as "primarily... concerned with helping to promote economic, political stability in a situation of instability". The definition was given by Philip Birnbaum, Assistant Administrator, Agency for International Development, US Senate, 94 Congress, 1 Session, Sub-Committee on African Affairs and Foreign Relations, Hearings, Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire (Washington, 1975), pp.7-8.

130 Letters of Humphrey and Clark to Kissinger, 1 August 1975, Ibid., p.42.

against anti-war activist Tom Hayden, wanted to somehow enhance his dove image. And Angola provided him with such opportunity and win him laurels as a 'man who saved US from the secretive Presidency's latest jungle quagmire". Helped by his legislative aide Mark Moran who mobilised others through aides of Senators Clark (Marian Albertson), Kennedy (Mark Schneider) and Cranston (Bill Jackson), Tunney successfully passed the amendment on 19 December 1975.¹³¹

The Administration indicated that it would be willing to go along if at least \$9 million were approved. But the effort proved futile. President Ford labelled the Senate vote as "a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends upon the United States". Kissinger, in an ABC interview said "if the US adopts a national policy that we cannot give either a military or economic assistance to peoples who are trying to defend themselves without American forces, then we are practically inviting outside forces ... and we are therefore undermining any hope of political and international order."¹³²

With the blockade on covert aid, there was a 'shift' in US approach to the problem. On 23 December 1975, Kissinger made a statement that signalled that US was not averse to living with the MPLA:

131 For details see Frank and Weisband, n.127, pp.50-53.

132 Ibid., pp.54-55.

We are prepared to accept any outcome in Angola..... we are not opposed to the MPLA as such... we would never have given any assistance to any of the factions, if other great powers had stayed out of it. 133

US at O.A.U.

Kissinger also tried to influence and lobby among African States at the OAU meeting in January 1976. He used the 'leverage of economic support' to mobilise African states in favour of US policy. To a certain extent Kissinger was successful as the OAU meeting ended inconclusively with 44 members divided equally (2 abstaining-Uganda and Ethiopia. For details see Chapter V) on the issue of recognition of Luanda Government under MPLA. Kissinger hailed this as "an unusual demonstration of solidarity". However, the important factor is that not one of the member states in OAU was willing to place itself on record as recognising or favouring the so-called Democratic Republic of Angola of FNLA-UNITA combine.¹³⁴ The South African intervention had proved a great liability

133 Text of Ford's statement, New York Times, 20 December 1975; Text of Kissinger's Press Conference of 23 December 1975, Official Text, United States Information Service, (New Delhi, 1976)

134 William E. Shaufele left for a ten-day visit in January 1976 to five Black African states to mobilise support for US policy. Ford's letter to Nigeria stated, "We cannot, however, stand idly if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists." Text in New York Times, 8 January 1975. The Presidential letter was not welcomed by any of the states where Shaufele visited.

and FNLA-UNITA could not wash away the taint of collusion with South Africa.¹³⁵

The increasing MPLA's control over the Angolan territories, the virtual withdrawal of Zairean and South African troops from Angola, the failure to mobilise the African states against the Soviet-Cuban intervention, or failure to arouse anti-Soviet feeling in Western Europe, etc. all contributed to the realisation that US had stumbled into a faux pas. Thus, when Kissinger gave a comprehensive exposition on US policy in Angola on 29 January 1976, before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, he virtually conceded that the policy had not been successful. He made a significant declaration that had implications for the future:

The United States must make it clear that Angola sets no precedent; this type of action will not be tolerated. This must be demonstrated by both the Executive and the Congress.... 136

During the period 17-25 February 1975, the PRA headed by President Neto was accorded recognition by France, Ireland, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Japan, Mexico and Peru. On 28 February, Mobutu announced joint communique with PRA and

135 William Shaufele acknowledged that some countries had extended immediate recognition to the People's Republic of Angola; several others "came along somewhat later because of South African intervention..." US Senate, Angola, n.95, p.195.

136 "Prepared Statement of Henry A. Kissinger", Secretary of State, Ibid., p.21.

added that the FNLA and UNITA would have to leave Zaire immediately "in order not to undermine relations between the two countries." (For details see Chapter V).

Although Kissinger stated on 1 May 1976, that US was "ready to open negotiations with the Angolan authorities regarding normalizing relations, including eventual economic cooperation,¹³⁷ it still did not embark upon full support to the PRA and procrastinated probably with the hope to mobilise support for FNLA-UNITA forces. When the matter of Angola's admission into UN was raised in the Security Council, US urged the Council to defer action on Angola's application to a date not later than 35 days in advance of the Assembly's 1976 session (scheduled on 21 September). The argument given was that such a procedure would maximize the chances for positive action by the Council and would permit the Assembly to act at the beginning of the session.¹³⁸

France, Italy, Japan and the UK had supported the US suggestion for deferral with the view that the delay would probably improve the chances of a favourable outcome. However, they did not wish to see Angola's admission delayed and hence voted in favour of Angola's admission.

But the United States vetoed the resolution on the ground that Angola did not meet the requirements for membership

137 Venkataramani, n.2, p.177. Quoted from n.100.

138 Y.U.N., 1976, p.305.

set forth in Article 4 of the Charter because of the continuing presence of Cuban troops.¹³⁹ US argument was that there was no justification for the presence of armed foreign troops in a truly independent African state.¹⁴⁰

But the contention of US was challenged by many members who supported Angola's application and said that the presence of foreign troops was irrelevant and extraneous and that many UN member states had foreign troops on their soil. Moreover, they argued that the requirements for Admission said nothing about foreign troops. Cuba and others noted that Cuban troops were in Angola on the invitation of the Angolan Government and that such action was in accordance with the Charter. The Angolan representative asserted that the matter of Cuban forces was strictly an internal affair. Similarly, Portugal felt that Angola, as a sovereign, independent state, should be admitted so that Angola can take full participation in international affairs.¹⁴¹

The use of veto in the Council was denounced by Benin, Libya and Tanzania.

139 On 23 June 1976, the six-power draft proposal was not adopted by the Council. The vote was 13:1 (US).

140 Y.U.N., 1976, p.306.

141 Ibid. China argued that although Angola had won its independence, its internal affairs were still being subjected to crude interference by the Soviet Social Imperialism.

The matter was again discussed at the Council on 22 November 1976.¹⁴² This time US abstained. Its representative argued that although it was hard to reconcile to the presence of massive contingent of Cuban troops which makes the independence of Angolan Government questionable, the US will not oppose the application. This was because of its consistent African policy to support for African solution to African problems and respect for the OAU. The OAU members had asked the US to facilitate Angola's admission.

However, a more plausible reason for US acquiescence to Angola's admission was that despite US negative vote in the Security Council, it would have been accepted by the majority in the General Assembly.¹⁴³ More important, it had become clear to the US that the anti-MPLA forces had petered out and hence to consolidate US economic-TNC's gains it would be wise to facilitate Angola's admission into UN. Moreover, the Lusaka speech of Kissinger was aimed at in this direction - to initiate dialogue with Black African states and proclaim "unequivocal commitment" for "self-determination majority rule, equal rights and human dignity

142 Res.397 (1976), as recommended by the Committee on Admission of New Members, S/12234, adopted by Council on 22 November 1976, meeting 1974, by 13/0/1. US abstained and China did not participate in the voting.

143 The G.A. Res. 31/44 as proposed by the 73 powers, A/31/L.22 and Add.1, was adopted on 1 December 1976, meeting 84, by recorded vote of 116/0/1 (US abstained).

for all peoples of Southern Africa", and "more developmental programmes to Africa".¹⁴⁴ This was the beginning of the "new Safari".¹⁴⁵

Before analysing the motive-interest of the US in the Angolan civil war, for better understanding, we would examine the two contending hypothesis: that US was little concerned about any African solution of Angola and hence helped in subverting the Alvor agreement (Hypothesis A); that US covert aid was to save 'detente' or any Super-Power conflict in Angola and was only reactive to the Soviet-Cuban build-up (Hypothesis B).

Hypothesis A:

The United States acted to subvert the Alvor agreement and it assisted the anti-MPLA elements, FNLA and UNITA to come to power and fill the 'vacuum' after the Portuguese withdrawal. With this view it used covert aid and funded Zaire. It encouraged Zaire and South Africa to intervene in favour of FNLA and UNITA.

Kissinger had adopted the NSSM 39, option 2 with some modifications. As the US policy 'tilted' in favour of the Portuguese, Nixon curtailed the CIA funds for the FNLA. In the beginning of 1970, Roberto received only \$10,000 per year. At the same time the CIA station was closed in Angola.

144 For details see, Kissinger, Lusaka Speech on 27 April 1976.

145 Venkataramani, n.2, p.171.

The friendship with the Portuguese was to be the keynote of American policy.¹⁴⁶

But after the Portuguese revolution, the United States moved quickly to strengthen the FNLA as decolonization appeared inevitable. In July 1974, the CIA began operating in Angola and funds were given to Roberto without the Forty Committee approval.¹⁴⁷ There is a probability that CIA had encouraged FNLA to seize power in November 1974.¹⁴⁸

Next, the US acted immediately to subvert the Alvor agreement by funding FNLA with an amount of \$300,000 on 22 January 1975. The FNLA was the strongest party at that time as it also received military help from China and Zaire. Though the Forty Committee refused \$1,00,000 to UNITA, by funding FNLA it accentuated the "existing advantage (of FNLA) over the other two movements".¹⁴⁹ This encouraged FNLA to capture power.

146 Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder", The New Republic^(US) vol.174, no.5, Issue 3186, 31 January 1976, p.20, and David Binder, The New York Times, 19 February 1977, p.9.

147 Viktor Sidenko, "The Nakuru Agreement", New Times, no.26, June 1975, p.16, and John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York, W.W. Norton, 1978), p.258. Stockwell states that the CIA opened a station in Angola in March 1975. See p.52.

148 Sidenko, *Ibid.*

149 Morris, n.146, p.21; Stockwell, *Ibid.*, p.67; and Seymour Hersh, The New York Times, 19 December 1975.

The Forty Committee sanctioned \$ 30 million as covert aid to FNLA, UNITA, Zaire, Zambia, the latter two being compensated for arms supplied to the anti-MPLA forces.¹⁵⁰ Another extra amount \$10.7 million in cash was authorized on 20 August and another \$ 7 million in late November 1975. Thus from January-November 1975, the covert aid to FNLA and UNITA was \$32 million which did not include \$16 million arms approved in July nor the sizeable quantity of arms to be sent into the war zone by Zaire.¹⁵¹ It also excluded CIA operating expenses and salaries.¹⁵²

The Angolan war led to increase in American aid to Zaire,¹⁵³ part of which was used for economic assistance and the other part was really a reward¹⁵⁴ (for funding the FNLA). Zaire was an important channel through which US indirectly funded anti-MPLA forces.

150 Morris, *Ibid.*, p.22; Stockwell, *Ibid.*, p.55. Of the \$30 million US fund, \$ 6 million in cash was authorized at once, \$ 8 million was authorized on 27 July 1975. The remaining \$ 16 million was exclusively for arms.

151 Arther Jay Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War : A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), p.83.

152 Stockwell, n.147, p.206.

153 For details see David Ottaway, *The International Herald Tribune*, 25 October 1975.

154 Klinghoffer, n.151, p.83.

The covert action in Angola was opposed by the NSC staff, especially Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who resigned in frustration.¹⁵⁵ Senators Clark and Humphery also protested against the covert aid to Zaire. Moreover, the presence of twelve American advisers, despite the prohibition by the Forty Committee, were training troops in Angola.¹⁵⁶

The US increased its arms aid during August-September 1975. By November 1975, the US was organising mercenaries from France, Britain, Portugal and America through the CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) and the CIA.¹⁵⁷

If Tunney's version of "American friend" who met Savimbi through Mobutu and the official versions of South Africa about US encouragement to intervene in favour of anti-MPLA forces are true, then the South African-Zairean-FNLA-UNITA nexus was established at the behest of the US.

Several West European states also helped US. Britain, France, West Germany and Belgium provided arms and funds to the FNLA and UNITA. These states also backed America diplomatically.¹⁵⁸ Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, met the Directors of French Intelligence in August 1975 to

155 See n.104, 105 & 106.

156 Stockwell, n.147, p.55.

157 Ibid., pp.222-24 and 259.

158 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 9 April 1976, p.27662.

co-ordinate policy.¹⁵⁹

Though the Tunney amendment blocked covert aid, there was still \$ 9 million left and the Americans hired mercenaries and armed exports to Zaire did not stop until January 29, 1976.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Kissinger indicated in late January 1976 that he would seek overt aid for the FNLA and UNITA.¹⁶¹ Saudi Arabia even supplied \$ 50 million to UNITA after the Senate vote.¹⁶²

The United States tried to take advantage of the detente relationship with the Soviet Union by not acting aggressively in Angola and it attempted to restrain Soviet behaviour with threats about terminating detente.¹⁶³ The Soviet Union commented that "detente has not nothing to do with it (helping MPLA)."¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, US tried to pressurise Soviet Union. It postponed three cabinet-level meetings with Soviet officials

159 Stockwell, n.147, p.192. See also Leslie Gleb, The New York Times, 10 March 1976.

160 Stockwell, Ibid., pp.233-34.

161 Jeremiah O'Leary, The Washington Star, 30 January 1976, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.151, p.85.

162 Senator Tunney made this assertion and repeated it before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, see US Senate, Angola, n.95, p.166. But William Shaufele and the Saudi Government denied about the Saudi aid. See Ibid., p.201.

163 K. Usalov, "Angola : The Triumph of the Right Cause", International Affairs (Moscow), no.5, May 1976, p.56.

164 For details see Chapter V.

on energy, housing and commercial ties.¹⁶⁵

US also tried to emasculate and weaken the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) by encouraging Gulf oil to stop production and stop paying the MPLA government. The shutdown of Gulf oil cost Angola almost \$1.5 million per day and seriously crippled the economy.¹⁶⁶

At the OAU, US also tried to influence pro-US African states restraining them from recognising MPLA government. The United States' plan was initially successful.

Thus US was a significant factor in the Angolan equation to aid and arm anti-MPLA elements and attenuate the civil war. It all exhibited the conservative, ethnocentric and status quo perspective of US towards decolonization.

Hypothesis II:

The US covert aid was due to the Soviet increasing involvement in Angola. The Soviet Union had violated detente and intervened in an area "distant from its primary interest". It frustrated all attempts of US for a diplomatic solution by its massive infusion of arms. US desired 'peaceful decolonization' in which the fate of Angola would be decided by the Angolans themselves. The Soviet Union obstructed US to implement its traditional policy.

As early as October 1974, the Soviet Union decided to provide arms to its ally in Angola. On the other hand, US attempted to prevent a war, and hence turned down arms

165 Klinghoffer, n.151, pp.86-87.

166 Ibid.

request from both the FNLA and UNITA in 1974.¹⁶⁷ When US increased its fund to FNLA, the amount \$3,00,000 sanctioned in January 1975 was not given till March so it clearly did not serve as a "trigger" for the massive Soviet arms deliveries that month.¹⁶⁸ On the other hand the Soviet Union had massively interfered with funds and weapons to MPLA even before US began its first serious involvement in July 1975. The Forty Committee meeting for covert aid was in response to the Soviet Union's build-up and appeals from Zaire and Zambia.

US resorted to covert aid because overt assistance would have embarrassed Zaire and Zambia. Secondly, it wanted to create conditions for eventual peaceful decolonization of Angola sans foreign involvement, including the Soviet Union. Moreover, it would have been difficult to back down from overt commitments and so covert method was the best alternative for reaching a negotiated settlement.¹⁶⁹

William Shaufele described American policies in Angola as "reactive" to Soviet Union with primary objective to respond to "an unprecedented application of Soviet Power", and

167 Testimony of Kissinger, US Senate, Angola, n.95, p.9.

168 Testimony of William Shaufele, Ibid., p.175. Also see Nathaniel Davis, n.104, p.120.

169 Kissinger interview, US News and World Report, LXXX, no.11, 15 March 1976, p.26, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.151, p.89.

the secondary objective as helping "our friends in black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention".¹⁷⁰ Both Kissinger and Ford indicated clearly in December 1975, that the United States will not commit direct involvement in Angola.

The United States was opposed to MPLA not because of its ideology. In fact, it had expressed confidence that MPLA's national interest and urge for development would lead to US-Angolan economic benefits. US had maintained diplomatic and economic relations with the Marxist state of Mozambique. What US opposed was the act of the Soviet Union to impose a government from outside. FRELIMO had come to power through "an essentially indigenous evolution".¹⁷¹

US did not approach the Soviet Union because it wanted to avoid any super-power rivalry over Angola. But when it became clear that there was no African solution, Kissinger made the first reference about Soviet involvement on 6 November 1975. Another reason why the United States refrained from mentioning about the Soviet Union is that in the initial period, before American build-up, the Soviets were at an advantage and could not possibly agree to cooperate.

170 Kissinger Press Conference, 9 December 1975, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, pp.10-11; Ibid., pp.89-90.

171 Kissinger Press Conference, 29 December 1975, Ibid.

The United States was anxious about Detente. Thus Kissinger called for a Soviet "policy of restraint" and joint US-Soviet efforts to end the war. But the Soviets did not respond positively to this overture.¹⁷²

Once the MPLA victory was assured and it received the recognition from OAU, the US moved quickly to seek a reconciliation with it. In February 1976, the Gulf and the Boeing were given permission to resume their economic relations with the PRA (MPLA government).

Thus US involvement, limited as it was, aimed for peaceful settlement of the Angolan issue. US tried to de-escalate the war, for it might have spilled over the neighbouring African states with which US had growing economic linkages. As compared to the total Soviet arms aid (\$300 million) US only funded \$32 million and the Cuban troops more than compensated for the actions of South African, Zairian and mercenary forces. The Soviet involvement in Angola was decisive and extensive as compared to the minimal role of the United States.¹⁷³

ANALYSIS

The following analysis can be made on the basis of the above facts:

172 Kissinger Speech in Deteriot, 24 November 1975, Ibid.

173 Klinghoffer, n.151, p.91.

First, Kissinger did not identify the extra-continental Powers involved in Angola nor the nature and extent of their interference in Angola. It was only on 23 September 1975 that he gave the first reference to the external intervention in Angola.¹⁷⁴

Next, it was only on 6 November 1975 that Kissinger made his first reference about Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola. Even then he deliberately refrained from mentioning the magnitude of Soviet-Cuban involvement. Moreover, when Kissinger and Ford increased their verbal denunciation of Soviet Cuban involvement in late November 1976, their speeches reflected the limits of US policy options in Angola - possibly a tacit acquiescence to Soviet-Cuban operation. Thus US had not raised the 'issue' either at the OAS meeting (for removal of economic sanction on Cuba) in July 1975 nor at US-USSR October 1975 meeting (for economic agreements). It had not pursued vigorous politico-diplomatic moves to support the Portuguese effort and the

174 "Events in Angola have been taking a distressing turn, with widespread violence. We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence", in, US Policy in Africa. Toast by Kissinger at a dinner honouring Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives of States, members of OAU, New York, 23 September 1975. See Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), vol.73, 1 December 1975, pp.777-78. Also see Richard P. Stebbings and Elaine P. Adam, American Foreign Relations : A Documentary Record, 1975, p.484.

OAU to promote a coalition government. By funding the FNLA as early as January 1975, US added to its advantageous position. It did nothing to restrain FNLA's aggression in March-April 1975. On the other hand, US never indicated clearly to USSR that it would guarantee a place for MPLA in the coalition. When the Alvor agreement finally broke down in July 1975 US did not help either Portugal nor OAU to initiate any African solution. Far from launching a major diplomatic effort, US initiated a concrete phase of covert aid. All during August-September 1975, when the Soviet-Cuban involvement was growing US did nothing to lodge any diplomatic protest. It was only after the Chinese had withdrawn that public identification of the "extra-continental intervention" was made.

The following plausible explanation can help us to explain the motives of Kissinger's deliberate silence (from fall of 1974 to 6 November 1975) over "foreign intervention" and "Soviet-Cuban involvement" in Angola.

First, it is argued that the US got involved in Angola ^{"more} for President Mobutu than (for) reasons of the Angolan situation".¹⁷⁵ Zaire was the key to US policy in

175 Senator Clark and Stephen Weisman, Angola Hearings, n.95, p.114. Leslie Gleb in New York Times also arrived at similar conclusion that "a major reason for the US involvement in Angola was to maintain good relations with Mobutu". Also Orbis Editor opined that Zaire's role carried much weight with the Ford Administration since it was "rapidly emerging as the most important American client in black Africa", vol.11, Winter 1976, p.218.

Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it appears that "the Ford Administration appears to have used Mobutu for whatever its own objectives at a very modest cost to itself."¹⁷⁶ (For details on US-Zairean relations see Chapter V).

Secondly, it seems plausible to state that US did not enter the Angolan war to defend the interest of Gulf oil. The Gulf had no problems with MPLA in Cabinda and had even provided \$100 million in royalties and taxes to MPLA in September 1975. In fact, the Gulf did not want the US to interfere in Angola.¹⁷⁷ Thus US policy clearly was not linked to the corporate interests.

Thirdly, Kissinger had a strong stake in maintaining detente and so he did not want to upset relationship with USSR.¹⁷⁸ Probably Kissinger wanted to demonstrate the benefits of detente to Schlesinger and other conservative critics. Thus US resorted to covert methods in Angola so that rudiments of detente could be preserved, American collaboration with South Africa could be concealed, and Zaire-Zambia would not be known in public for their active involvement in transfer of arms to FNLA and UNITA.

176 Venkataramani, n.2, p.168.

177 "CIA's secret War in Angola", Intelligence Report, Centre for National Security Studies, vol.1, no.1, December 1975, p.8, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.151, p.93.

178 See Bayard Ruslin and Carl Gerhman, "Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power", Commentary (NY) vol.64, no.4, October 1977, p.35.

However, the detente factor is argumentative and controversial. Had Kissinger been serious about detente solution in Angola, he would have acted according to "diplomatic option" of NSC Study (June 1975). If the covert aid was the best possible alternative to support anti-MPLA forces, in an environment of post-Vietnam debacle, it had its troude-loup. Its pitfalls were manifested when the Congress adopted Tunney amendment to avoid another Vietnam in Angola.¹⁷⁹

Another justification for the covert action is the "bargaining chips" argument that the Administration used. The "support effort" of the US for the anti-MPLA forces was to "get a stalemate" and force the advantageously placed MPLA-Soviet-Cubans to negotiate a peaceful solution. However, the concept that "bargaining chip" as a necessary precondition for diplomatic approach, or even a public ventillation of the issue, is not quite tenable.¹⁸⁰ First, the Ford Administration did not choose to raise the matter when the build-up was in its initial stages and when its dimensions were not such as to make the acquisition of a

179 As Klinghoffer writes, "This issue (covert aid) was double-edged, as covert means were also publicly discredited as CIA role in Chile and other states. Once the secret assistance to the FNLA and UNITA became known many Americans feared that Angola would escalate into another Vietnam", n.151, p.92.

180 Venkataramani, n.2, pp.166-68.

"bargaining chip" necessary. Secondly, the covert aid of \$32 million could hardly suffice to bring substantial pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba. Thirdly, the Gulf provided the MPLA around \$100 million in royalties and taxes, a sum greatly in excess of what the United States laid out for the support of the FNLA and UNITA. 181

Moreover, all during the preceding months, the Administration had continuously refrained from denouncing the MPLA. Politico-diplomatically also the "bargaining chips" explanation was self-defeating. As Marcum writes:

The accompanying notion that one should communicate intentions and concerns but allow free reign for others to miscalculate and take reckless risks defies any definition of sensible diplomacy. It betrays an obsessional, self-defeating pre-occupation with super-power global antics reminiscent of the grimmest days of the cold war. 182

Similarly, like Marcum, Venkataramani analyses US Angolan policy in Kissinger's "Obsessional pre-occupation" with US "global balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union". Kissinger's objective was to initiate or abet such actions as might evoke significant Soviet involvement in Angola. The same was to be played in such a fashion as not to endanger the basic framework of detente. Once the desired

181 See Klinghoffer, n.151, pp.89-92. The total USSR aid to MPLA was \$300 million.

182 Marcum, "Lessons of... Angola", Foreign Affairs, vol.54, no.3, April 1976.

level of Soviet Cuban involvement had taken place and China had withdrawn, the Soviet-Cuban interference would facilitate their identification as "sole culprits" in Angola. After a brief perfunctory "diplomatic effort" directed against the Soviet Union, for the sake of record, the United States would launch a vigorous propaganda onslaught against the Soviet Union and Cuba as "extra-continental interventionists". On the other hand, the defeat of FNLA-UNITA forces or MPLA victory was deemed secondary and not regarded as necessarily an unacceptable outcome. Further, the low level of South African intervention would provide a laboratory test of the reaction of the Black African states and would be valuable guide for the formulation of post-Angola US policy towards Southern Africa.¹⁸³

Thus Angola provided Kissinger an excellent opportunity to transfer the "interventionist" label on the Soviet Union and Cuba. Secondly, it was intended to create fear of possible Soviet "threat" and arouse the West European

183 Venkataramani, n.2, pp.165-71. Similar view about Kissinger's globalist approach to Angola is echoed by Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, The Cubans and American Anxieties", Foreign Policy,^(USA) Summer 1978, p.31.

allies from their growing inertness. Similarly, it would arouse the OAS state about the aggressive role of Cuba. Thirdly, the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola would make the Front-Line states even more receptive to US aid than before. Finally, it would enable the Administration to counter the Congress on any significant cut in the defense budget.¹⁸⁴

To conclude, the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger safari miscalculated entanglements in Angola had reflected the conservative, globalist-obsession to world problems.

184 Ibid.

CHAPTER V

US RESPONSE TO THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE ANGOLAN CRISIS

The role of the external actors not only led to crisis perpetuation in Angola at the regional level but rather internationalized it. The independence of Angola had been complicated by the action of the external powers. Several factors e.g. political, ideological, economic, geo-strategic had influenced the perceptions of the policy makers in specific manner in each of these countries. The chapter will analyse US' response to the roles played by different external actors.

Among the several external powers, the Socialist countries, especially USSR, Cuba and China had crucial roles in the Angolan affairs. At the outset, it should be mentioned that the diversity in Communist activity in Southern Africa is due to difference in their interest in the region. Three distinct groups, within the communist countries, can be distinguished on the basis of the amount of strife that has characterized their relations with one another. These groups are (1) the USSR, Cuba and the GDR; (2) Yugoslavia and Romania; and (3) China.¹

The second group of external actors are the African countries and the OAU. There were three significant Black

1 See David E. Albright, "The Communist States and Southern Africa" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (ed.), International Politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington, USA: Indiana University Press, 1982), p.3.

African states: Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia, excluding South Africa that supported the different national liberation organisations. In the OAU, the African states viewed the Angolan problem with conflicting perspectives. The role of Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Senegal were important in the OAU.

The third group of external powers, which played insignificant but noticeable role in Angola, consisted of UK, France and Belgium.

The 'Quasi-Alliance' of USSR, Cuba and GDR² in Angola

During the course of the 1970's, there emerged in the Southern African context a working relationship among the three communist states operating there. These countries, the Soviet Union, Cuba and the GDR, had the most dramatic expansion in the area, especially after their involvement in the Angolan crisis. After the Portuguese coup, the regional activities of these three communist states underwent both "quantitative and qualitative" change with a degree of co-ordination that did not exist previously. However, this collaborative relationship emerged gradually, rather than in one sweep. In fact, there were clear signs

2 As Albright writes, "Although this relationship is difficult to label because of its complexity, perhaps "quasi alliance" or "quasi-coalition" will suffice as shorthand". Ibid., p.4.

of differences in perspective between Cuba and the Soviet Union for more than a year after the April coup (1974). Cuba consistently supported MPLA from the mid-1960's but USSR wavered and for six months, following the coup, it suspended aid to Neto in favour of the Chipenda faction.

The Soviet Union in Angola

The involvement of Soviet Union in the Angolan crisis was not the manifestation of a spontaneous adventurist policy but the outcome of several factors. These factors are politico-ideological, geo-strategic and economic. Ideology is the most important factor that explains the Soviet behaviour in the third world countries. As Abbot A. Brayton writes, "It is evident that the Marxist-Leninist ideology, combined with tangible aid, facilitated the spread of Soviet influence in these (colonial penetration) countries",³ in Africa. (See Table 1 below):

Table 1

AFRICAN STATES PENETRATED BY THE SOVIET UNION^a

Colonial Penetrations	Leverage States	Targeted States
Algeria	Egypt	Benign
Angola	Guinea	Congo (B)
Equatorial Guinea	Libya	Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau		Mali
Mozambique		Somalia
		Sudan
		Uganda

(a) The Soviet Union has exerted substantial influence on these 15 African countries at some time or the other.

³ "Soviet Involvement in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies (UK), vol. 17, no. 2, June 1979, pp. 253-269.

Brayton defines his typologies:

(i) 'Colonial penetrations', where the Soviets gained influence by supporting a successful independence movement. In several such cases there was high level of Soviet activity after independence as to constitute penetrations;

(ii) The 'leverage states' were those which faced major internal or external confrontation, causing a troubled leader to turn to the Soviet Union for support, usually to include leverage against a foreign power. The Soviet Union had 'often gained at least temporarily' in these states;

(iii) 'targeted states' were those states whose penetration by the Soviet Union was planned in advance.

(1) Politico-Ideological:

USSR's support to MPLA was primarily political and ideological. Lenin had strongly advocated support to anti-colonial liberation struggles. He argued that the colonies were indeed imperialism's 'weakest link' and efforts should be made to weaken this weakest link. According to him, the national liberation movements of the Asian countries under the leadership of the indigenous bourgeoisie had a progressive and democratic character.⁴ The communist movements should

⁴ Lenin also said, "Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining strength. There the bourgeois is still siding with the people against reaction. Hundred of millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom". Lenin's famous article, "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia", May 1913, quoted in Albright, n.1, p.5.

help the "genuine" colonial liberation movements. Lenin concluded that an alliance between the Soviet Union and seething colonial masses, especially China and India, would make "the final victory of socialism" certain.⁵ Lenin himself had set the ideological basis of Soviet policy towards Europe's global imperialist systems, observing, once, that "the road to Paris goes through Calcutta and Peking".⁶ (For details see Chapter I). Africa barely rated a mention. It was only during Brezhnev's time that Africa was considered important for the USSR's policy-makers.

Stalin (1924-53) was disinterested in encouraging the anti-colonial liberation forces. He was critical of the national democratic revolutions. For him the Jawaharial Nehrus, Kwame Nkrumahs, Sukarnos and Ben Bellas were servants of their indigenous upper classes and, by definition, therefore, in league with their imperial masters. The simple generalisation of the bipolar world led Stalin to criticise the non-aligned movement as an imperialist mechanism against the socialist world. Thus USSR did not give any active support, both diplomatic as well as in development plans, to the newly independent countries.

5 Quoted in Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa : Background of East and West (Penguin, 1981), p.89.

6 Ibid., p.88.

N. Khrushchev (1953-64) revived Lenin's theory of the communist alliance with the turbulent colonial societies. He rejected isolationism of Stalin and announced at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956: "The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived."⁷ Khrushchev sought alliance with the third world countries. The anti-colonial and anti-imperialist bases of the Non-aligned Movement were necessary for the furtherance of international proletarian revolution. Thus the Communist Parties in these countries were to strengthen the national democratic and socialistic plans of the ruling political parties. The large numbers of the newly independent countries would not only provide significant help in the international bodies, including the UN, but their development plans with the technological and financial aid from USSR would wean them away from the imperialist bloc, hence weakening the 'imperialist chain'. Further, to strengthen the position of USSR, Khrushchev put forward the concept of peaceful 'co-existence' with the capitalist countries.

However, it was during Brezhnev period (1964-82) that USSR had significant roles to play in Africa. Brezhnev modified Khrushchev's global policies. He had to recognise

7 Morton Schwartz, quoted in "The USSR and the Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries", Survey (London), vol.19, 1973, p.211.

the emergence of a new factor, the role of China in the world-wide ideological and geo-political equation. China's growing influence among the African countries and her increasing support to the liberation forces was an important factor influencing the policy makers at Kremlin in the 1970's. Further, Brezhnev was interested in Detente or a better East-West relation. However, Detente did not preclude USSR from supporting liberation movements or defending their territories against unprovoked 'imperialists' attack. As Brezhnev said, "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish and cannot abolish or change, the laws of the class struggle."⁸ It was under these politico-ideological background that USSR gave an active support to MPLA in the civil war.

Except for two brief pause in 1964 and 1974, the Soviets gave consistent aid to MPLA since early 1960s. First, the Soviets supported MPLA because of its Marxist and progressive ideology. The genesis of MPLA (late 1950's) should be traced to the foundation of the Angolan Communist Party (October 1955) and to Angolan Marxist groups.⁹ The MPLA under Neto had been developing ties with the clandestine

⁸ Brezhnev on the 25th Congress of the Soviet Union.

⁹ For a definitive study of the Angolan national liberation movement in the 1960's see John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol.1 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969), p.28. (For details see Chapter I).

Portuguese Communist Party, particularly with its leader Alvaro Cunhal and Fidel Castro of Cuba. In 1964, Neto made his first trip to Moscow for assistance. Further, the Soviet Union was impressed by the urban-educated and relatively diverse social base of the MPLA.

Secondly, Holden Roberto's visit to the United States (1959) and his "closer ties with American public and semi-official organisations facilitated MPLA to come closer to USSR."¹⁰

Thirdly, the MPLA's offensive in the early 1960's received Khrushchev's public support.¹¹ Now, the Soviet Union provided both funds and intelligence services to MPLA.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was criticised by a large number of African countries and national liberation movements. But MPLA was one of the few defenders of Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia.¹²

The Soviets stopped aid to Neto's MPLA for a brief period in 1974 because of the internal conflicts within MPLA. USSR miscalculated that Neto's MPLA could not be successful

10 "Angola's National Forces", International Affairs (Moscow), no.3, March 1963, pp.116-17; and V. Midtsev and P. Yevsyukov, Pravda, 19 March 1962. Also see Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1975", Studies in Comparative Communism (Los Angeles), vol.XI, no.s.1&2, Spring/Summer 1978, p.5.

11 Pravda (Moscow), 16 June 1961.

12 See Valenta, n.10, p.7.

and so the aid was shifted to Chipenda's faction.¹³ However, USSR soon resumed aid to Neto's MPLA as it became clear that Chipenda could not win the MPLA factional struggle. The diplomatic volte-face by the Soviet Union occurred in the aftermath of the April coup (APM) and apparently on the advice of the Portuguese Communist Party.

The Soviets' involvement in Angola was also due to their growing disappointment with detente. The Soviets resented being excluded from the Middle East diplomacy (post-1973), their 'inadequate' economic gains from detente and inability of both Ford and Kissinger to deliver the commitments and promises woven into the detente package that Nixon and Brezhnev had agreed,¹⁴ all contributed to their losing faith in politics of 'crisis-management'.¹⁵ Angola provided an opportunity to reassert the Super-Power image of the Soviet Union.

13 David Albright views that, "these actions (stopping aid for brief period) reflected unmistakable Soviet doubts about the MPLA's general prospect. Subsequently, when it did resume arm supplies to Neto's forces, it plainly endorsed efforts to bring about a coalition government's embracing to all three Angolan "national liberation groups", n.1, p.6.

14 Alexander L. George, "Missed Opportunities for Crisis Prevention", in Alexander L. George (ed.), Managing US-Soviet Rivalry : Problems of Crisis Prevention (USA, Westview Press, 1983), pp.204-05.

15 Soviet Union interpreted that the great power competition be within the bounds of crisis management. Bharat Wariawalla, "Super Powers and the Angolan Conflict", in ISDA (Delhi), vol.IX, no.4, April-June 1979, p.407.

Another important but debatable factor is the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the politico-ideological urge to influence the newly independent countries and control the liberation movements. In this regard the Soviets had made unsuccessful efforts in the early 1960s, notably in Zaire, Ghana, Guinea and Mali. By 1973, Moscow had few worthwhile connections in black Africa, other than Somalia and unstable Congo-Brazzaville. On the other hand, the Chinese had steadily widened their friendly influence in Africa.¹⁶

China had particularly two successes: (1) close relationship with Tanzania, Zambia (the building of the Freedom Railway) and later with Zaire, and (2) its success in winning the confidence of the major liberation movements in Southern Africa. With the exception of ANC, all the major liberation movements (FRELIMO, ZANU, SWAPO) appeared to have found it easier to work with the Chinese than with the Russians.¹⁷ It was the Soviet concern over China's

16 For details see Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.54, no.4, July 1976, p.748.

17 Klinghoffer argues that for a while during the late sixties and early seventies, China tried to build up alternative liberation movements in Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe - Rhodesia but this policy was ineffective as the Soviet supported major organisations tended to predominate. China then toned down its direct rivalry with the Soviet Union by assisting many of the same movements. The Angolan War: A Study of Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), p.102.

successes in Africa that led Moscow to support even Amin's tyranny in Uganda and Quaddafi in Libya, despite his anti-communist stand.

Legum argues¹⁸ that if Moscow had been primarily concerned with neutralizing US aid, they could have invoked the Moscow accords to prevent the development of a situation which could lead to a military confrontation between them. But this would have meant leaving the field clear for the Chinese to spread their influence through FNLA and Zaire. Secondly, the Russian and Cuban contention that their military intervention was the result of the South African invasion is clearly an ex-post facto rationalization. The scale of the Soviet Cuban intervention increased sharply in early October three weeks before the South African forces entered Angola in any size. Thirdly, in support of the MPLA, the Russians gambled on the success of a minority part, and for a time defied the collective policy of the OAU, which favoured Government of national unity in an independent Angola. The Soviets even tried to enforce Idi Amin, the Chairmen of OAU, to break with his own organization and follow the Moscow line to recognize MPLA as the sole legal authority.

Similarly, David Albright writes:

The main factor behind the USSR's initial decision to back the MPLA in Angola in early 1975 seems to have been a desire to prevent the Chinese from becoming the dominant outside power in Southern Africa. 19

18 Legum, n.16, pp.750-52.

19 "Soviet Policy in Africa", Problems of Communism (Los Angeles), vol.XXVII, no.1, January-February 1978, p.34.

It is further argued that China's efforts to undermine the MPLA forced USSR to intervene in favour of the latter. China's hostile attitude dates back to the early sixties when it supported the anti-Neto, Viriato de Cruz faction and later funded the Chipenda faction of MPLA. On the other hand, China provided arms and training to FNLA and UNITA and collaborated with US.²⁰ By 1974, as compared to the Soviet aids to Africa (\$17 million), the Chinese aid amounted to \$ 237 million.

However, this 'China factor' should not be over-emphasized. Though the Soviet behaviour was conditioned more by the Chinese deeds than the American, it appears, however, that Chinese policy became a decreasingly relevant factor which was almost inconsequential by the end of the war. In 1974, the Soviets were certainly disturbed by China's growing influence in Southern Africa but the actual threat from China was not very great. The Soviets may have been over-reacting in Angola because of China's successful diplomatic overtures in Mozambique and funding of

20 According to Dick Clark, China delivered four hundred and fifty tons of arms to FNLA in August and early September 1974 and trained 5000 FNLA troops. Also China had given aids to UNITA ever since its formation (1966). See US Senate, 94 Congress, 2nd session, Sub-committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Angola (Washington, D.C., 1971), p.195.

FNLA-UNITA. In arms aid, air lift and sea transport capabilities, China was at a disadvantage and she did not have a useful ally like Cuba. Also, writes Bharat Wariavwalla:

The Soviets were concerned but not preoccupied with China and the present Soviet leadership believes that they have sufficient power to advance their interest without conceding anything of substance to Washington in order to gain either its neutrality or its support in the Soviet attempt to limit China's influence. 21

In the three-cornered US-Sino-Soviet rivalry, US as a balance between USSR and China was no doubt at an advantageous position. Moscow, too, chose to play this game but, of course, from a weaker diplomatic position.²² It was US rather than China that accounted first in Soviet Angolan policy.

Lastly, in politico-ideological terms, Angola was regionally important for training ANC and ZAPU guerrillas and for infiltrations of arms in the region. Besides a potential springboard for guerrilla movements in the region, Angola would help in the Soviet plan to prevent any possible South African rapprochement with moderate Black African

21 See n.15, p.407. For details also see articles by Bharat Wariavwalla, "From Defender to Balancer", China Report (Delhi), July-August 1970; "Balance of Imbalances", China Report, January-February 1976.

22 Ibid.

regimes such as Zambia or Zaire.²³ Above all, the South African intervention was a windfall gain that made the Soviet position even more secure.²⁴

(2) Geo-Strategic:

The geo-strategic consideration is another important factor influencing USSR's policy in Angola. The USSR's vital sea links are controlled by the third world countries. A major geo-strategic policy of USSR is to negotiate the use of anchorage, storage, refuelling and repair facilities and air-staging and overflight arrangements with the coastal third world countries.

Angola provided both the positive and negative geo-strategic aspects of USSR policy. Positively, Angola would help in the politico-ideological struggle against racism, apartheid and imperialist forces in Southern Africa. Negatively, Angola had global importance. The availability of the Angolan ports would enhance Soviet naval capabilities in South Atlantic. It might help the Soviet interdiction of western oil tankers and other commercial transport. Angolan ports will provide the Soviets the facilities for

23 Valenta, n.10, p.20.

24 Stevens, Christopher, "The Soviet Union and Angola", African Affairs (London), vol.75, no.299, April 1976, p.146.

serial surveillance of the South Atlantic.²⁵

These geo-strategic interests explain USSR's "considerable quantities of military equipments; various armaments, ammunitions, means of transportation and communications equipment" and "military personnel and political cadres" to the MPLA.²⁶ The Soviets provided shipments of arms to MPLA through Yugoslav, East Germany and Cuba.

(3) Economic Factors:

Linked to the geo-strategic interest was the economic importance of Angola. Moscow recognized that a top African priority was for coordinated programmes of development, for downstream industries needed either to process or manufacture indigenous primary products for stable inflation-proofed pricing for their commodities. There was emphasis on long-term trading accords, coupled with technical help.²⁷ Angola, under the MPLA, could provide such a trading term.

25 In this regard, the Chinese perspective was that the Soviets were planning to use Angola as a springboard for gaining control eventually of Western Europe. The Soviets stationed in Angola could strangle Western Europe economically and militarily. The Peking Review wrote, "Superpower rivalry in Africa is a 'peripheral war' in contending for Europe", quoted in Klinghoffer, n.17, p.76.

26 Solodovnikov's address at the International Conference of Support to the Nations of the Portuguese Colonies in Rome, June 27-29, 1970; quoted in Valenta, n.10, p.8.

27 Gavshon, n.5, pp.95-96.

Though USSR was not interested in oil import from Angola, the improved technology provided by USSR would enable independent Angola under MPLA to a position of bargaining with the West.

Thus the global and the regional factors influenced the Soviet intervention in Angola. Regionally, the Soviets had to support the anti-imperialist liberation struggles. The MPLA represented its politico-ideological viewpoint in Southern Africa. The failure of the Portuguese Communists after the April 1974 revolution, the growing aggressiveness of anti-MPLA forces (FNLA-UNITA, Zaire, South Africa, China), the long ties between MPLA and Cuba, and later urges to intervene, influenced the politico-ideological perspectives of the Soviet Union. Globally, the Soviets saw in the Angolan civil war the means of reversing recent international setbacks and embarrass the US. USSR had rightly anticipated that US domestic compulsions after the tragic incidents of South Vietnam, Watergate Scandal, Laos and Cambodia would prohibit it to directly intervene in Angola. The US success in the Middle East, in the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel and the virtual exclusion of the Soviets from Egypt had greatly irritated Moscow. The Soviet Union's interest in Angola was primarily politico-ideological. The potential Soviet threat to shipping has been exaggerated, especially by the South Africans. The Soviet Union had never interfered with such commodity movements elsewhere and is unlikely to do so off Southern Africa. (see Chapter II for details).

The Soviet-US conflict in Angola was typical manifestation of the super-power rivalry. They believed that direct participation could be avoided and the possibility of battle spilling over into neighbouring states was limited.²⁸ The super powers realized that Angola was perhaps a testing ground for an anticipated conflict over South Africa, hence they wanted to jockey for position during the early stages of the South African sweepstakes.

Chronology of the Soviet Intervention in Angola

After six months of the Portuguese armed coup, the Soviets resumed aid to MPLA.²⁹ However, it was during spring-summer of 1975 that the Soviet Union increased their aid to MPLA. On military level, Soviet supplies began arriving in Angola during March 1975.³⁰ At first the Soviets

28 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.79.

29 The Soviet aid to Neto was accompanied by the effort to endorse the Alvor agreement. See David Albright, n.1, p.6. However, Larry C. Napper argues that the Soviets only praised the Mombasa agreement (5 January 1975) but did not refer to the Alvor agreement or the Portuguese role in the transition process. Thus, while supporting the idea of a coalition regime, the Soviet Union left no doubt of its preferences should cooperation among the Angolan movements break, "The African Terrain and US-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia : Some Implications for Crisis Prevention" in Alexander L. George (ed.), n.14, p.159.

30 Christopher Steven, "The Soviet Role in Southern Africa", in John Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa After the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), p.48.

emphasised upon unity among the three movements and specifically called for an assertive Portuguese role in the restraining civil war.³¹ USSR was also favourable to coalition government. It criticized the "outside force" that provided assistance to the liberation movements. But soon the Soviet Union identified MPLA as the "general national movement" of Angola and denounced the FNLA and UNITA as reactionary organizations. Further, they accused China and US of planning "direct intervention" in Angola.³²

With the increasing military success of MPLA in July 1975, the Soviets stopped advocating a coalition. Moreover, it questioned the wisdom of FNLA-UNITA as partner in the transitional government. But the Soviet official stand showed ambivalence. A Soviet article maintained that MPLA was still ready to hold "business-like talk" with the other movements on "normalizing the situation in the country".³³

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- 31 TASS International Service, (Moscow), 14 May 1975 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union), 16 May 1975, pp.1-2, quoted in Napper, n.14, p.159.
- 32 Izvestia, 21 May 1975 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union, 22 May 1975), pp.1-3, quoted in Ibid.
- 33 Napper opines that the Soviet ambivalence appears to be resolved by October 20, when the Soviet media favourably reported Neto's statement that the Mombassa and Alvor agreements "cannot now be implemented because of the treacherous policy of the FNLA and the UNITA", TASS, 20 October 1975 (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union, 21 October 1975, p.1), quoted in Ibid., p.181.

However, after the South African intervention of October 23, the Soviet Union no more remained ambivalent. It stepped up Soviet-Cuban combat troops for Angola. The Soviet Union supplied \$ 200 million military aid and several hundred military advisors, 'co-ordinated' the logistical and economic support that proved indispensable to some fifteen thousand Cuban troops.³⁴ Now, the MPLA had the fourth largest army in Africa (only after Nigeria, South Africa and Somalia) with the third largest military expenditure (following that of Nigeria and South Africa).³⁵ Except for a brief "Soviet pause" during December 9-December 28 (details in Chapter IV), Soviet arms aid continued till MPLA consolidated its authority in Independent Angola.

Cuba:

Cuba's involvement in Angola was neither a radical departure in Cuban foreign policy nor Cuba acted as a Soviet surrogate. There was an independently motivated Cuban foreign policy towards Africa, and Cuba had ample incentives to send its

34 Vannemen and James "put the value of Soviet military support to \$300 million and the number of Soviet advisers as 400. William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East : From Algeria to Angola", Studies in Comparative Communism, vol.XI, nos. 1&2, Spring/Summer 1978, pp.67-68. Also see Jiri Valenta, n.10, p.27.

35 Christopher Steven, The Military Alliance, 1975-76 (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1975), pp.42-44.

troops to support the MPLA. Cuba performed five basic military roles³⁶ in Africa, and Cuba's action in Angola was not unprecedented. Thus William Durch³⁷ maintains that Cuba's "intentions" towards Africa remained constant but her "capabilities" increased during the seventies. In 1965, Neto met Che Guevara in Cuba. The Cubans responded by providing training facilities to the MPLA.

The Soviet Union was no doubt an important factor in influencing the Cuban foreign policy. But between late 1962 and early 1965, Cuba had basic disagreement with USSR over the approach to revolution in Latin America. Even after Castro's consolidation of power, the differences regarding development policies continued.³⁸ As the Soviets had significant economic and military investment in Cuba, simply cutting off aid to Cuba would not only lead to the collapse of the revolution but worse, drive Cuba into the Chinese camp.

36 These are (a) to train and advise the revolutionary movements in Africa; (b) assisting leftist African Government e.g. Congo and Guinea; (c) provisions of pilots e.g. in Algeria; (d) delivery of arms aid to the guerillas; (e) participation of Cuban troops in Combat e.g. in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau in favour of PAIGC. See Durch, n.34, p.35.

37 Ibid.

38 Castro declared to build socialism and communism simultaneously and would base production on so-called moral incentives rather than on Soviet-style incentive, Ibid., pp.37-41.

Though there was some curtailment in Soviet oil deliveries to Cuba in first quarter of 1968, Moscow began to work through number of bid communists to redirect Cuban policy and finally reached an "accommodation".³⁹ Castro's support to the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia was manifestation of this accommodation. The politico-ideological differences between Soviet Union and Cuba should not be over-emphasised. It only points that Cuba was not a Soviet surrogate.

Secondly, politico-ideologically, besides being the Soviet ally, Cuban support to MPLA was due to the 'progressive' character of MPLA. Cuba was anxious to play a leadership role in the third world to further the cause of socialism.⁴⁰ The support given to the Algerian revolution provided the first Afro-Cuban contact.⁴¹ Guevara's tour of Africa (1964-65) "was to prepare the way for Cuba's direct military intervention."⁴² From military point of view Africa enjoyed an advantage over Latin America "because of its greater distance

39 Ibid., pp.40-41.

40 Gavshon writes, "Cubans had invested years of hard, unsung, ground-level effort into understanding the problems of the developing nations from Latin America through the Carribean, Middle East and Africa, then eastwards to Asia. It was an identification with a tri-continental spread...", n.5, p.108.

41 Maurice Halpein, "The Cuban role in Southern Africa", in John Seiler, Southern Africa after the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), p.26.

42 Ibid., p.29.

from the US and its greater possibilities for logistical support."⁴³ Africa, as Che Guevara further declared, was "one of the most important, if not the most important, battlefield against all forms of exploitation in the world."⁴⁴ Castro had several compelling reasons to take an initiative. He was increasingly apprehensive about US intentions and simultaneously skeptical about Soviet peaceful co-existence with the United States. The steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, which undermined the 'socialist unity', the failure of both the Soviets and Chinese to stop aggression in Vietnam gave an indication that neither Soviet Union nor the international communist solidarity was sufficient guarantee of Cuba's security.⁴⁵

However, the first Cuban sub-Saharan adventure in Congo was a disaster. Further, two internal changes within Cuba made possible the shift of what characterized Cuba's African policy from the 1960's to the 1970's. First, the Cuban economy recovered during the first half of 1970s, due to soaring world sugar price and, second, the Cuban armed forces

43 Daniel James, The Guevara, A Biography (New York, Stein and Day, 1969), quoted in Ibid., p.30.

44 Parkinson, Latin America, p.217, quoted in Durch, n.34, p.46.

45 Ibid.

underwent an important programme of specialization in the 1970s to become effective troops known as 'reservists'. Seventy per cent of the Cuban force engaged in Angola was reservist.⁴⁶ With regard to the Angolan conflict Cuba viewed it as a microcosm of the worldwide ideological struggle against capitalism, fascism and imperialisms. Castro stated that "the Angolan situation reminded him of the Spanish civil war."⁴⁷ Moreover, the decline in revolutionary activity in Latin America led to an upsurge in Africa. Castro called Cuba a "Latin-African nation". The African heritage of its black citizen was emphasized to extend aid to MPLA.

On the other hand, the failure to foment revolutions in Latin America led Cuba to change tactics. It pursued normalisation of relations with other states. In July 1975, the OAS responded to Cuba's moderate approach and terminated its diplomatic and economic sanctions. Even the US ended its sanctions against trade with Cuba. This reconciliation with US and OAS was partly to contribute to Cuba's limited role in Angola during the summer of 1975.

Also, like the Soviets, Cuba had rightly anticipated that its actions in Angola did not run the risk because the

46 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol.57, no.1, Fall 1978, p.94.

47 The Washington Star, 16 January 1976, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.17, p.115.

debacle at Vietnam would deter the US from direct involvement. US could not pressurise Cuba effectively as economic ties were lacking. Admitting that trade with US would be more "useful", he nevertheless stated that the aid to MPLA was more important than restored relation with the US.⁴⁸ After the Angola war, Castro maintained that Cuba's action in Angola was not contrary to detente and he expressed interest in improving relations with the US as long as Cuba could continue "struggling internationally".⁴⁹

The domestic and military institutional factors also encouraged overseas Cuban involvement.⁵⁰ As Edward Gonzalez notes:

In an era when the international security of Cuba is increasingly assured, and a better organized civilian sector makes fewer demands upon the resources of the armed forces, external missions give the military an additional *raison d'être*. This military mission tendency has in fact been one of the principal forces behind Cuban foreign policy in this decade. 51

Similarly, Domínguez writes that the military political influence remained high, so it was in a position to advocate a more vigorous policy in Africa.⁵²

48 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.116.

49 Ibid.

50 Durch, n.34, p.60.

51 Quoted in Ibid., p.66.

52 "The Cuban Operation in Angola : Costs and Benefits for the Armed Forces", Cuban Studies(/s)no.8, 1 January 1978, p.4.

Fifthly, the leftist government in Portugal was on the verge of collapse and Premier Gonsalves was in trouble. The Portuguese Government began to swing away from the communists towards bourgeois democracy. Cuba responded quickly to these events and from mid-August Cuba increased its aid to MPLA.

The South African intervention influenced or provided an alibi to Cuba to increase aids to MPLA. The Cuban press and Alarcon cited the South African move into the Cunene region in August as the first major step in external involvement.⁵³ Thus "Cuba began to give aid to Angola when a large part of its territory had already been seized by regular forces of the racist South African Republic."⁵⁴

But the two States were not responding to each other in the early stages of war till late as October 6, when their opposition became much more significant. Havana did not react seriously to South Africa's occasional raids into Angola to chase the SWAPO guerrillas. Cuba had consistently provided aids to MPLA. The Cuban sealift of June and South African seizure of the Cuenene river in August was a "coincidence" (William Shaufele's testimony before the subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).

53 Granma Weekly Review, 11 April 1976, p.9, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.17, p.113.

54 Castro speech on April 21, 1976, (USSR and Third World, vol.VI, nos. 2-3, April 1-July 31, 1976; 1973), quoted in Ibid., p.113.

Thus Gonzalez writes, "After Havana's initial decision to commit troops, the increase in Cuba's involvement was essentially incremental and reactive."⁵⁵

The presence of regular Zairian units in Angola since July was a problem for MPLA. The Cubans were instrumental in protecting Cabinda from Zairian attacks.

Thus the politico-ideological factors were the prime motivating force behind Cuba's involvement. Cuba did not try to exploit Angola. The support provided to MPLA was in five stages.⁵⁶ The Cubans (1) trained and armed MPLA in Congo and Cuba, (2) provided advisers to MPLA within Angola, (3) established military centers in four Angolan locations, (4) furnished troops for incorporation into MPLA units, and (5) dispatched intact military units for combat alongside the MPLA. The Cuban aircrafts went through three distinct states. From September 30-November 7, flights went to Congo; beginning November 8, flights went to Angola as well, and starting in early January, the airlift was augmented by Soviet transports flying from Cuba to Angola.

MPLA preferred Cubans as it was wary of becoming subject to Soviet dominance.⁵⁷ Cuba was unlikely to seek

55 "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy", Problems of Communism, vol. XXVI, no. 6, November-December 1977, pp. 10-11.

56 Klinghoffer, n. 17, p. 111.

57 Dominguez, n. 46, pp. 12-13.

strategic or economic benefits in return for its support. Unlike the Soviets it had provided consistent help to MPLA. Neto was sore over the Soviets' withdrawal of military assistance in 1973-74. There was also the linguistic affinity between Spanish-speaking Cubans and the Portuguese-speaking Angolans.

The Cubans successfully stalled the advance of FNLA and Zairian forces towards Luanda in early November and helped in stopping the advance of the South African and the UNITA forces from the South. The success of the Cubans was partly because of their sense of commitment and partly because of better military-strategic co-ordination of the Soviet-Cuban-MPLA forces. Cuba was more firmly behind the MPLA than was the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ It had less faith in the Alvor agreement, portrayed UNITA as an opponent at a very early stage, and did not encourage or verbally endorse moves towards conciliation of the three movements.⁵⁹ Cuba concealed its involvement till the first printed message in late December 1975 from Neto of its militant aid so as not to arouse the American public and thereby increase the probability of US military response.

58 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.120.

59 Granma Weekly Review, 21 December 1975, p.1, quoted in Ibid.

The independence in Cuban policy formulations was not inconsistent with the Soviet policy interests. Cuba was an indispensable ally of Moscow in Angola. Initially, the Cuban deployments to Angola do not seem to be a radical departure in Cuban policy, even though the level of effort exceeded any previous Cuban deployments. With the entry of the South African armoured column into the war, however, Angola entered a new phase and became qualitatively different from previous Cuban overseas expeditions.⁶⁰ The Cuban troops were not mercenaries but a part of the conventional army. Angola was Cuba's first conventional war. It enhanced Cuba's position among the socialist African countries.

The East German presence, though far less massive in terms of numbers was second in importance only to that of the Cuban one.⁶¹ GDR instructors trained military units, supervised air evacuation of MPLA wounded to the GDR and shipped "solidarity freight" - war material including heavy weapons and material supplies.

The Chronology of the Cuban Intervention in Angola

According to the "chronology" submitted by the Defense Department to the Senate Subcommittee in January 1976, "the first indication of introduction of additional Cuban

60 Durch, n.34, p.71.

61 See Albright, n.1, p.6.

personnel (in Angola) was received on 25 July 1975.⁶² From other sources it appears that the Soviets began to supply the MPLA with large quantities of military arms as early as April 1975.⁶³ In August, "the intelligence reports indicated the presence of Soviet-Cuban military advisers, trainers and troops, including the first Cuban combat force."⁶⁴ The second Combat troop (three ships) from Cuba arrived a month before the Portuguese withdrawal, on fourth, seventh and eleventh October 1975. The Cubans soon set up "four training centres" in the east and south of Luanda. Further, the Cuban paratroopers began to arrive in November for a final assault on FNLA-UNITA-Zaire-South Africa nexus.

China's Policy in Angola

China's African policy from 1949 till the death of Mao falls into two distinct phases; at the outset revolutionary and then competitive in an anti-Soviet sense. Though China was also concerned to have a countervailing presence along the African littoral of the Indian ocean and the economic

62 See n.20, p.83.

63 Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1976), p.30, quoted in Stevens, n.30, p.35.

64 Kissinger, quoted in Venketaramani, "The Ford-Kissinger Safari in Angola: Ramifications of American Policy", Foreign Affairs Report (Delhi), vol.XXV, nos. 9-10, September-October 1976, pp.150-51.

access to some of Africa's scarce strategic commodities, particularly copper from Zambia and Zaire, it was the politico-ideological factor that was primary. The changes in the politico-ideological perspectives towards international forces determined the two phases of China's African policy.

China's revolutionary zeal underlined its first phase. Zhou Enlai made his journey to Africa and concluded that 'revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent.' In providing aid, the Chinese policy vested on eight principles defined by Zhou in 1964.⁶⁵ The focus was to help mainly the poorer states of Black Africa and provide military assistance to insurgents, dissidents and liberation movements approved and often driven on by Peking (Beijing).

During the Cultural Revolution the policy tilted against the Soviets because China criticised Khrushchev's policy of coexistence and detente. Detente was detrimental to the proletarian internationalism. China was critical of the Soviet role in Algeria and Egypt. The second difference was over Moscow's blunt refusal to share nuclear weapons. But it was the boundary and other national interests that finally led to Sino-Soviet conflict. China became

65 For details see, Gavshon, n.5, p.129.

suspicious of Soviets' designs for world hegemonism. Mao postulated his 'Three Worlds' concept i.e. the formation of an 'anti-hegemonist front' of all 'second (industrialized) world' and 'third (developing) world' countries against the 'first world' super powers (Soviet Union and US). China disavowed any hegemonistic pretensions but also desired its ambition to lead the third world.

The Chinese aspirations towards modernization led them to improve economic and political relations with Washington. China discovered the phrase that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend".

Thus the political designs to counteract the Soviet moves in Africa became the motivating force for China. China decided to sacrifice some ideological purity for political payoffs.⁶⁶ This explains China-US-FNLA-Zaire-Zambia-South Africa-UNITA nexus. As Stevens also writes, "China's help has not been directed on the basis of 'communist/non-communist' appellations, but in reaction to Soviet aid (to MPLA)."⁶⁷

China provided support to all the three national liberation organizations. UNITA received Chinese aid from

66 K. Adelman, "Report from Angola", Foreign Affairs, vol.53, no.3, April 1975, p.569.

67 Stevens, n.24, p.139.

1972 and the same year Neto also visited China. China also began to fund FNLA in May 1974. It also sent military advisers to Zaire to train the FNLA troops. China responded to the Alvor Agreement favourably and hailed it as "an important victory in their fight against imperialism and colonialism". But it was also skeptical of the agreements and sharply criticized the USSR for "sabotaging the African people's unity and sapping their fighting will".⁶⁸ Zhou Enlai said, "The agreement takes a strenuous struggle to be implemented" and further warned that "neo-colonialist forces of various descriptions" were bound to "seek opportunities to make trouble and carry out sabotage".⁶⁹

But when the situation deteriorated due to civil war and the Alvor agreement broke down, China withdrew its support to FNLA-UNITA in July 1975 in response to the OAU's call for neutrality. China argued that since it was not in a position to deliver aid to the MPLA, it would be taking sides if it was left to support only the FNLA-UNITA.

However, other causes explain the Chinese action. First, Peking was not equipped to compete with the massive Soviet aid. China anticipated that the US would act decisively

68 Renmin Ribao, editorial of January 22, 1975; Peking Review, no.5, January 31, 1975, p.15. Quoted in Napper, n.29, p.159.

69 Zhou Enlai's message of January 22, 1975. Peking Review, no.6, February 7, 1975, p.4. Quoted in Ibid.

against the Soviet interference and a combined US-South Africa-Zaire aid to FNLA-UNITA forces would tilt the balance in the latter's favour. Secondly, it seems that China had lost confidence in FNLA's military capability and wanted to dissociate from that movement before an anticipated defeat.⁷⁰ It also wanted to avoid alignment with South Africa following the latter's large scale invasion in October.⁷¹ Lastly, it is probable that the Chinese, taking a much longer historical view of its role in Africa than Moscow, it believed that it would be able to achieve more in the long run by proving loyalty to OAU decisions.⁷²

China's policy toward Angola proved disastrous. First, China had supported the weaker liberation forces. China's assessment about US active involvement did not materialise. More important, the Angola experience brought an open dispute with its most important African ally - Tanzania. Above all, in terms of Sino-Soviet conflict in Africa, the Angolan war proved victorious for the Soviets. The Chinese tacit encouragements to South Africa's intervention

70 Klingoffer, n.17, p.107. Also see Gerald Bender, "Kissinger Failure", in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981), pp.109-15.

71 Joseph Kun, "Peking Censures Moscow's Involvement in Angola", Radio Liberty Research, RL 26/76 (January 19, 1976): 2, quoted in Klingoffer, n.17, p.107.

72 Legum, n.16, p.751.

had discredited it in the eyes of several African countries. Moreover, USSR proved that it could stand by its ally even to the extent of direct military involvement. China's role in the liberation of Angola had led to two contradictory opinions, Azinna Nowfor asserts that (1) the PRC is involved in Angola on the side of imperialism, (2) China sees the contention between the US and the Soviet Union as the prime motive force of history at this time, (3) China is denying the necessity of revolutionary civil war, (4) China is denying that things develop primarily as the result of their internal contradictions, and (5) China denies any necessity of external support from "international revolutionary forces."

However, C. Clark Kissinger points out that China's policy in Angola was consistently to oppose the intervention of all imperialists, support the three liberation movements and unite them. As a matter of fact, the MPLA received more assistance from China than the other two organizations. Secondly, with the Alvor agreement China immediately ceased arms shipment to all the three liberation groups. Although the imperialist instigated struggle, China continued its emphasis for urgent Angolan unity to achieve real national independence and to expel all foreign imperialists (including the Soviet social-imperialism). China asserted that the collapse of the Portuguese, rather than being the end to foreign imperialism in Angola, had

heralded a new period of intense imperialist rivalry in Africa, in which the Angolan people would have to face imperialists of incomparably greater strength than the Portuguese.⁷³

It would be a logical fallacy to conclude that China's policy was pro-imperialist. MPLA had received Chinese aid and even after Angola's independence the MPLA kept its door open. As Neto assessed China's role:

One must recognize that the People's Republic of China has played an important role in Southern Africa in sustaining the liberation movements of many countries. However, China has erred in certain cases, perhaps due to a correct analysis. Thus we have China supporting the reactionary secessions (as in Angola)... We hope wholeheartedly that a new analysis of the substitution would lead the Chinese to modify their attitude and support the only progressive forces in Angola. 74

The African involvement of Yugoslavia and Romania ^{as} dated/early as the 1960's.⁷⁵ In Southern Africa, Yugoslavia and Romania have operated independently of each other. Yugoslavia has maintained its non-aligned policy while

73 To use the Chinese phrase, "it does little good to drive the wolf away from the front door if in so doing he lets the tiger in by the back". For Kissinger views, see "China and Angola", Monthly Review (NY), vol.28, no.1, May 1976, pp.1-4.

74 Quoted in John S. Saul, "Angola and After", Monthly Review, vol.28, no.1, May 1976, p.12.

75 For details see Trond Gilberg, "Romania, Yugoslavia and Africa : 'Non-alignment and Progressivism'", in David E. Albright and Jiri Valenta, The Communist States and Africa, (USA, 1981), quoted in Albright, n.1, p.10.

Romania is a Warsaw Pact member. Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of parallelism in their enterprises in the region. The undertakings of the two have in many ways run counter to those of Soviet-Cuban-East German "quasi-coalition".⁷⁶

Yugoslavia, Romania in Angola

Yugoslavia helped MPLA, though not very actively. There is evidence that in April armaments shipped from Yugoslavia were arriving in Luanda intended for MPLA use.⁷⁷ The Soviet Union used Yugoslavian ships to provide arms aid to MPLA.

Romania developed contacts with all three movements and tried to effect a reconciliation. The FNLA and MPLA sent their representatives to the Eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November.⁷⁸ Romania welcomed the Alvor agreement and called for unity of the Angolan movement. But Rumania also supplied arms to the FNLA and UNITA in September 1974 and in May 1975, respectively. The MPLA probably obtained arms as Neto thanked Romania for its "material" support.⁷⁹

76 David E. Albright, n.i, p.29.

77 Financial Times, 1 May 1975. Also see Valenta, "Soviet Decision-making on the Intervention of Angola", in Albright and Valenta, n.75.

78 Marcum, John, The African Revolution, vol.II (Cambridge: Mass, MIT Press), pp.230 and 428.

79 Africa Contemporary Record, p.B530.

North Korea in Africa

North Korea was another socialist country which acted independently in the Angolan affair. North Korea's policy generally coincided with China but it was not the Chinese agent as it was developing its own interests in Africa and Asia.⁸⁰ The North Koreans assisted the FNLA, UNITA and Zairian army in a modest way. Its policy towards Angola evolved through its relationship with Zaire.

France, Belgium and Britain in Angola

The French ties with mineral-rich Zaire, oil-rich Cabinda explain its aid to FNLA of 10 million Franc interest-free loan.⁸¹ The Belgians similarly had ties with Zaire and they provided arms to the FNLA. Britain also helped FNLA-UNITA with mercenaries and other diplomatic aids.⁸²

The Continental African Actors

The important continental African actors were Zaire, Zambia, Congo Brazzaville and South Africa. Their roles were not only significant for Southern Africa but also for OAU and other external powers.

80 See Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: Norton, 1978), p.107. The French also helped FNLA-UNITA with mercenaries. Also see Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76", African Affairs, vol.77, no.308, July 1978, pp.307-86.

81 Quoted in Klinghoffer, n.17, p.47.

82 For West European diplomatic aids to FNLA-UNITA see Kessing's Contemporary Record, 19 April 1976, p.27662.

Zaire

Zaire's involvement in Angola can be broadly termed as pro-FNLA and anti-MPLA.⁸³ With two notable exceptions, the FNLA had always received staunch support from Zairian government. This was particularly true under the Cyrille Adoula (1961-64) and Mobutu regimes.⁸⁴

Several factors explain the pro-FNLA attitude of Zaire in Angola. First, Mobutu, for various domestic reasons, desired a peaceful Angolan border under a pro-Zairian government. The peaceful border would give him time to mould a new Zairian political system based on the glorification of the leader.⁸⁵ Border conflicts could disrupt this grand scheme. Thus a friendly Angola influenced pro-FNLA attitude in Mobutu. Zaire had a 1,500 mile common border with Angola with various important tribal groups, most notably Bakongo. The FNLA had its mass support among them (Bakongo). Further, Mobutu feared the Katangese rebels. Mobutu feared that an MPLA government could release the Katangese gendarmes and assist the Zairian exile, Antonio Gizenga.⁸⁶ Politico-ideologically, Mobutu found "the

83 Kissinger commented (January 16 Senate Testimony) that Zaire was backbone of FNLA since 1961.

84 For some detailed study see Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War, The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.20, no.3, Fall 1976, p.673.

85 Adelman, n.66, p.567.

86 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.52.

Afrocentric non-Marxist nationalism of the FNLA far closer to his preferences for "authenticity" than the mere Marxist doctrines of the MPLA".⁸⁷ Also Mobutu's interest in Angola stemmed from his family ties with Roberto.

Secondly, there were strategic economic factors influencing Zaire's policy. Zaire's main export item - copper - finds its vital outlet through the Beneguela railroad in Angola. Even under Portuguese rule when Mobutu was fully supporting the liberation movements, he continued to export almost 40 per cent of the copper through Angola, a figure which would certainly increase if potential conditions were favourable. Also Angola could supply much-needed foodstuffs to Zaire.⁸⁸ Most important, Cabinda was important politically as well as economically. Economically, Zaire coveted Cabinda's oil and its port facilities. Politically, Zaire supported the Luis Ranque Franque faction of FLEC and called for a Cabindan referendum on independence, although FNLA was opposed to Cabindan separatism.⁸⁹

87 John A. Morcum, "The Anguish of Angola", Issue, vol.4, Winter 1975, p.5. For Third World solidarity to be effective, Mobutu declared, "each country must accomplish victoriously a return to its own authentic identity", Elima (Kinshasa), 20,21,22 May 1972, quoted in Crawford Young, "Zaire's Southern Africa Policy", in Seiler (ed), Southern Africa After the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), p.199.

88 Adelman, n.66, p.567. However, this is not too plausible argument.

89 Le Monde (Paris), 10 May 1975, quoted in Klinghoffer, n.17, p.48.

Thirdly, internationally, Angola presented Mobutu with his first genuine opportunity for diplomatic grandeur.⁹⁰ Mobutu was anti-communist and he was concerned at the Soviet-Cuban aid to MPLA. Zaire desired a FNLA government and so was not seriously in favour of the Alvor agreement. In July, Zaire and Zambia turned to the US for assistance in preventing the USSR and Cuba from (1) imposing a solution in Angola, (2) becoming a dominant influence in South-Central Africa, and (3) threatening the stability of the area.⁹¹ It was Kaunda, not Vorster or Smith who referred to the Soviet Union and Cuba as the "plundering tiger and its deadly cub coming in through the back door."⁹²

It should be mentioned here that the Zairian factor was also responsible for the direct Soviet involvement in Angola. Although critical of Zaire's role in Angola, the Soviets did not break diplomatic ties with Zaire.

Zaire's anti-Sovietism stemmed from its pro-West attitude. Zaire was an important US ally in Southern Africa and received several aids. Zaire was also close to France because of the latter's interest in Cabinda oil

90 Adelman, n.66, p.567. Mobutu tried to attain a 'progressive' image and repudiated the allegation of being a US stooge. For this he established diplomatic links with China, North Korea, and visited even Cuba (15 April 1974) and other African states. He even tried to bring reconciliation between Amin's Uganda and Tanzania. For details see Young, n.87, pp.183-200.

91 Testimony of Kissinger before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, January 29, 1976, n.20.

92 John de St. Jorre, "South Africa : Up Against the World", Foreign Policy, nos.28-31, 1977-78, p.72.

and had similar approach of Cabinda's separatism. Spínola had concluded an accord designed to eliminate the Neto faction.⁹³ Further, Zaire was politically and ideologically against the Republic of Congo, which was pro-MPLA and an ally of Soviet Union and Cuba.

These factors explain the anti-MPLA attitude of Zaire. To undermine the authority of Neto, Zaire gave financial and arms aid to Chipenda and Andrade faction of MPLA. Further Mobutu patronized FLEC. This explains Zaire's offensive against MPLA ever since 1961 and especially during 1975. The support to FNLA would not only enable Zaire to a wide range of options in Angola but also counter the Brazzaville regime and the CNL (Comite National de Liberation) which was dedicated to overthrow the Zaire's regime.

Mobutu's policy showed a shift in late January (1976). Although he continued to support the Angolan coalition government, he no longer insisted on the inclusion of FNLA. By February, the MPLA had gained clear military advantage in Angola. Mobutu saw the futility of supporting anti-MPLA mercenaries in Zaire. The question of mutual security (as Mobutu was afraid of the Katangese gendarmes) became important for Zaire and both Mobutu and Neto agreed to

93 Ebinger, n.84, p.686.

establish diplomatic relations (February 28-29, 1976), thus according legitimacy to MPLA government in the region. Summing up Zaire's withdrawal, Crawford Young writes:

By the end of 1975 Zaire's carefully cultivated progressive image lay shattered (due to South African connection), its economy bankrupt, its army humiliated, its regime discredited. Zairian ties with China and North Korea, while not cut, diminished in significance since neither government was in a position to give sufficient diplomatic backing nor sufficient economic aid to ease Zaire's plight... Zaire had no choice diplomatically but to retrench and set its 1973 ambition aside for better times. 94

Zambia:

Zambia's foreign policy towards the Angolan affair had three phases. First, from 1961 till 1974 Zambia remained neutral, though it had similar economic and strategic interest in Angola as Zaire.⁹⁵ Politically, Zambia supported all the liberation movements e.g. MPLA/Neto, MPLA/Chipenda, and UNITA troops. MPLA had its office in Lusaka since 1968. Throughout the war and especially since the coup, Kaunda stressed peace and unity, which was keeping with his philosophy of African

94 While signing the treaty, Mobutu declared "(he) had no intention of helping FNLA or UNITA "crush the MPLA", the Zairian objective had been to "support the Angolan people... to give a mortal blow to the Portuguese colonialism", *Jeune Afrique*, no.790, 27 February, 1976, p.20, quoted in Crawford Young, n.87, p.209.

95 Zambia had some 600 miles border with Angola, some ethnic affinity with Angola's Ovimbundu, transportation problems and economic hardships, Zambia had to depend upon Benezuela and railroad and Libito port for export of its copper.

humanism and his desire for leadership among the new African states.⁹⁶ Kaunda desired a peaceful transition to Angolan independence as it would not hamper the railroad functioning and eliminate present labour problems in the Libito harbour resulting from political uncertainty and unrest.

During the second phase (1975 till January 1976), Kaunda condemned the Russian-Cuban involvement and became anti-Neto. The Chipenda faction was supported by him. Kaunda had welcomed the Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPLA, while Angola was under the Portuguese rule but opposed the aid extended after independence. Like Zaire, Zambia invited US aid to counter the Soviet interference in Angola. Zambia also provided aid to UNITA after pardoning it for its destruction of the Benzuela railroad in late 1960's. The war was "a Russian-Cuban victory" and Kaunda declared, "we see that the Governments which are socialist at home are imperialistic abroad ... Cuban and Soviet liberators should leave the task of liberating Africa to Africans." The Soviet role in Angola was described as analogous to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁹⁷

The support to UNITA was provided because of the fear that an MPLA victory could strangle Zambia economically,

96 Adelman, n.66, p.567.

97 The New York Times, 21 February 1976 and Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76 (New York: Africana, 1976), p.B389.

threaten its internal security by supporting dissident frontier population (the Shipanga's) and ruin the expanding dialogue policy with South Africa.⁹⁸ Zambia held similar view with South Africa over the Soviet-Cuban involvement and further said that South African involvement was the effect not the cause.⁹⁹ Zambia's dialogue with South Africa was to reach at a solution in Namibia. But, more importantly, the 'dialogue' was due to the significant trade ties with South Africa.

There was a shift in Zambia's foreign policy after the OAU summit in January 1976. Zambia not only reconciled to the MPLA government in Angola but rather praised the Soviet-Cuban victory as a significant one against imperialism.¹⁰⁰

The diplomatic volte face of Kaunda on 13 February can be explained in the collapse of UNITA-FNLA open warfare between UNITA's Ovimbundu army and Ngangela population (along Angolan-Zambian border) and UNITA's forces and Chipenda's Chokwe army. Further, Zambia's dialogue with South Africa had discredited it. After the South African interference, many African states began to criticize Zambia. The shift in Zambia's Angola policy towards the MPLA would somehow help Kaunda to improve his 'lost image'.

98 Ebinger, n.84, p.695.

99 C.L. Sulzherger, The New York Times, 31 December 1975.

100 Ebinger, n.84, p.695.

Congo-Brazzaville

The involvement of Cuba in Angola was to aid MPLA and Soviet-Cuban forces. The Cuban involvement can be divided into four distinctive time periods (1) 1960-63, (2) 1963-66, (3) 1966-71, and (4) 1971-76.¹⁰¹

During 1960-63, MPLA conducted a diplomatic political offensive in order to gain increased support. The conservative regimes in Congo were not helpful and MPLA planned a common strategy with FNLA which did not materialise. MPLA then sought diplomatic relations with the Socialist countries. However, by the end of 1963, the conservative Zairois Premier Adoula invited MPLA to Brazzaville in exchange for a de facto agreement that the MPLA would oppose Cabinda's independence and the annexation of Cabinda by Zaire.¹⁰²

After Youlou's overthrow (August 1963), the new radical regime of Massemba-Debat alarmed at the Chinese-trained guerrillas and launched a diplomatic offensive by inviting the Cubans. Thus began Cuba training of the Congolese paramilitary units as well as MPLA.

The MPLA began preparations in 1966 to open a new front in Western Zambia. However, in 1968, Nagouabi began to curtail the influence of all revolutionary groups, particularly the MPLA, due to domestic politics. The MPLA moved its headquarters to Lusaka.

101 Ibid., p.677.

102 Ibid., p.678.

Although the MPLA from 1968-72 continued to enjoy the use of Brazzaville as a lease, its domestic influence in the country was greatly reduced. After the unsuccessful coup bid by Diwara (February 1972), Nagouabi began to show pro-Chinese attitude. To regain Nagouabi's favour, the MPLA helped him in the extermination of Diwara's guerrilla forces.

In 1974 Nagouabi permitted Soviet-Cuban arms deliveries to MPLA to counteract the success of FNLA and Zaire. Nagouabi also visited Moscow (March 1975) and Cuba (mid-September).

Several politico-ideological and economic factors explain Congo's behaviour. Ideologically, Congo's Marxist ideology led Nagouabi to favour MPLA. Moreover, Nagouabi played an active role in arranging logistics for the movement of Soviet-Cuban arms. Secondly, the Cabinda oil was economically important for the staggering economy of Congo. Congo undoubtedly favoured an MPLA victory in Angola, but it had a serious conflict of interest with MPLA over Cabinda. Congo supported the V'Zita Henriques Tiago faction of FLEC. Congo had its own ambitions in Cabinda. It was opposed to any effort by either Angola or Zaire to incorporate the district. Nagouabi declared on August 7, 1975:

The People's Republic of the Congo wants a solution for Cabinda in which necessarily the aspirations of the population are taken into account. It will not accept a solution which will be imposed by force on Cabinda by the MPLA, 103

However, after the South African intervention in Angola, Nagouabi announced his total support for the MPLA that his army would block the Zairian and FLEC offensive into Cabinda. Nagouabi thereafter did not object to MPLA's policy of incorporating Cabinda. Probably relevant to this issue is the fact that prospects for Congolese oil development had suddenly improved so Cabinda was not essential economically.¹⁰⁴

Congo was indispensable for the Soviet-Cuban actions in Angola. However, Congo was not a puppet and it had even arms-agreement with China (September 14, 1971). The Congo had renewed a middle line in the intra-communist dispute.¹⁰⁵

Tanzania

Nyerere tried to maintain links with all the three liberation movements. Nyerere was more concerned with strengthening the anti-Portuguese forces. He tried the reconciliation with the liberation forces.

Nyerere permitted Soviet arms shipment through Tanzania and MPLA's office operated in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere realised that the military weakness of MPLA in 1973 had encouraged the Portuguese to shift troops from Angola to Mozambique. Nyerere met Roberto and persuaded the Chinese to increase

104 Ibid., p.58.

105 Ibid.

funds to strengthen the FNLA against the Portuguese. The Chinese increased their arms and advisers to FNLA in 1974. In April 1975, Nyerere met Kaunda and Seretse Khama to mobilise help for UNITA. The UNITA troops began to train in Tanzania. Thus Tanzania tried their best to strengthen the anti-Portuguese forces.

But primarily due to South Africa's growing involvement in Angola, in October 1975, Tanzania started moving towards a pro-MPLA position.¹⁰⁶ China pressurised Tanzania to be non-aligned though it did not use its military and economic aid programs as retaliatory weapons. But Tanzania recognized the PRA on December 5, 1975 and closed UNITA and FNLA offices in Dar es Salaam on December 10.

South Africa

South Africa's involvement in Angola should be analysed in its broader Southern African policy. Its intervention was both direct and dramatic, and objectives in Angola were both general and specific.¹⁰⁷ Specific interests related to economic concerns and its control over Namibia. The economic gains of South Africa over Namibia were extensive with regard to raw materials and labour force. Moreover, about 40 per cent of Namibian contract labour consisted of Ovambos from Angola.¹⁰⁸ Thus, South Africa was more concerned about any

106 Klinghoffer, n.17, pp.67-68.

107 Khawas El, Mohammad, "South Africa and the Angolan Conflict", Africa Today(US), vol.24, no.2, p.36.

108 Ebinger, n.84, p.685.

disturbance at Namibian-Angolan border or establishment of anti-South Africa government in Angola. Pretoria feared that the rise of the radical Ovambo nationalism would seriously jeopardize its Namibian Bantustan policy and might unleash political forces that would prove impossible to control.

Further, South Africa had its economic stakes in the Diamang diamond project and financed the Cunene River Development project which would supply water and power to Ovamboland, Grootfontein, the Tsumeb iron-ore facility, Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Rio Tinto Zine's mines iron ore facilities.

Thirdly, the politico-economic aspect of the "Outward Movement" was to build a network of economic relationship with the neighbouring states, despite their political difference with South Africa. The South African economy required a large market for export of its capital and manufacturing goods and raw materials to increase its productive capacity. Moreover, its economy was also interdependent on the industrialized West. Above all, US had important economic interests in Angola, the loss of which would weaken this interdependence.

Among the general interests, South Africa was concerned at the growing Soviet-Cuban influence in the region. It was opposed to the pro-Soviet MPLA and feared the Ovambo nationalis

It wanted to consolidate the "outward movement"¹⁰⁹ and act as a 'regional power',¹¹⁰ The aim of the "outward movement" was (1) to expand South Africa's military capacity, and (2) reduce the neighbouring countries' to a state of dependent relationship. Thus, after the Portuguese revolution, South Africa advocated the cautious policy of "live and let live". It established relationship with Mozambique for economic gains over "long term ideological antipathies". It also established secret contacts with Zambia.¹¹¹ However, in case of Angola South Africa feared that the MPLA government would pose a threat to its concept of detente in the area.¹¹²

The Soviet actions in Angola threatened the geo-strategic interests of US and South Africa. Both in strategic and arms aid, South Africa had become an integral part of the

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- 109 The "Outward Policy" was first propounded by Piet Cillie, editor of Die Burger, and from D.P. de Villers, Head of South Africa's legal team before ICJ. Cited in Seiler, n.87, p.101.
- 110 Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the Dialectics of the Liberation of Southern Africa", International Studies (Delhi), vol.14, no.1, January-March 1975, p.12.
- 111 John Seiler, n.87, p.103.
- 112 For further discussion on South Africa's detente policy, see Legum, "Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente" in Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, pp.A3, A15. Also see Jorre, n.92, p.69.

Western defence system and an unofficial partner of NATO. Thus it was necessary to see that the pro-US FNLA-UNITA forces were victorious.

The South Africans were encouraged by Zaire, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Senegal.¹¹³ These states feared the communist forces. It also seems that South Africa was encouraged to intervene because of US covert sanction to anti-MPLA forces.¹¹⁴

South African government was forced back on the defensive both politically and militarily. The initiative was taken out of its hands first by the failure of FNLA to capture Luanda, then by the size of Soviet Cuban commitment to MPLA Government and finally by the abrupt withdrawal of American support for its Angolan alliance.¹¹⁵

South Africa was not defeated in the war but started partial withdrawal in December 1975.¹¹⁶ Several factors explain this act. The MPLA victory, the weakness exhibited on the part of FNLA-UNITA forces and their internal conflict

113 The Washington Post, 25 January 1976. Also see John Seiler, "South Africa's Regional Role" in Seiler, n.41, pp.105-105; and Jorre, n.92, p.69.

114 Seiler, Ibid.

115 Jorre, n.92, pp.73-74.

116 The SADF soundly defeated Cuban forces in their few direct encounters, see Seiler, n.87, p.105.

leading to violent clashes, the decreasing enthusiasm on the part of Zaire to continue help to FNLA-UNITA were some of the factors. Moreover, in face of the remarkable success of the MPLA offence, South Africa was not prepared "to fight on behalf of the free world alone".¹¹⁷ The Angolan adventure had led to many differences in South Africa's domestic politics.¹¹⁸

Further, as Kasinghoffer opines,¹¹⁹ South Africa hoped that its intimation of withdrawal would have a moderating effect on the January 10-13 summit of OAU. It anticipated that the continued interference in Angola would further antagonize the African states in favour of MPLA. At the same time, it wanted to maintain its presence in Angola until after the summit so that UNITA would have a bargaining position strong enough to force a coalition government. On the other hand, the US wanted South African presence in Angola to use them as "a bargaining chip".¹²⁰ The South African withdrawal led to "a clear split within the military and the political hierarchy - with the "hawks" favouring continued support for FNLA and UNITA, and the growing number of "doves" arguing that South Africa should

117 Ibid.

118 See Robin Hallett, n.80, pp.393-84.

119 See n.17, p.54.

120 The Guardian, 16 January 1976.

return to its oft-stated policy dictum of non-intervention in the affairs of the neighbours.¹²¹

However, after complex negotiation, in which the British played a crucial role, South Africa withdrew completely in March. South Africa and Angola met on April 5 to negotiate on the question of border issue and the Cunene project.¹²²

South Africa's action in Angola was of a limited involvement. It did not exhibit its full military strength. The South African intervention was possibly the most traumatic event in its history, since the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century.... In the first time South African Army had been committed to fight in an African war, in which, "for the first time in their modern history white South African soldiers ended up as prisoners of war in African hands, possesses a certain distinctiveness."¹²³ However, the Angolan war had proved its Suez rather than Vietnam. It was not a 'trauma' of great magnitude.¹²⁴

121 Robin Hallet, n.88, p.381.

122 Russia and Nigeria also acting as intermediaries helped rapprochement between FRA and South Africa, the latter was assured by FRA's non-interference in Ruacana and Caluque. Hallet, n.80, p.384.

123 Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa (London, 1976), p.35.

124 Jorre, n.82, p.72.

The South African policy was based on four miscalculations.¹²⁵ First, the considerable increase in the Soviet-Cuban weapons and Cuban troops were not fully anticipated. This meant that a much larger commitment than originally planned would have been required. Second, given the emotional hostility to South African government, it was not desirable for even moderate states to publicly associate with the South African intervention. Third, the apparent hope of a coalition government through OAU deliberations was also an ideal expectation. Lastly, the South Africa grossly misunderstood the American commitment in Angola. Though there are evidence that South Africa and US exchanged intelligence information, and that US condemned Cuban interference and remained silent over South African activities, yet the expectation of continued US support was a misjudgement. Although South Africa was encouraged by US rhetorics and there existed some coordination between the two, yet South Africa had its own autonomy to determine the time period of its intervention and withdrawal. It did not act as a mere sub-imperialist power nor was the stooge of US. Moreover, United States criticism of South Africa's intervention had led to tensions in the South African-American relationship.

South Africa's intervention was counter-productive. First, there was internal opposition on the issue of illegally

125 See Hallet, n.80, pp.385-86.

sending recruits into Angola and \$133 million was spent on the Angolan war. South Africa's efforts for detente with black African states was severely jolted and many African States decided to support the MPLA once South Africa's role in Angola was known. The South African intervention had shattered the OAU consensus on the desirability of a coalition government, and a number of "progressive" African governments recognized the government established by the MPLA.¹²⁶ Thirdly, the FNLA-UNITA were also discredited because of their alliance with South Africa. Earlier UNITA had worked with SWAPO but its association with South Africa led SWAPO to collaborate with MPLA. On the other hand, the MPLA gained greater legitimacy.¹²⁷ South Africa's effort to establish a white cordon sanitaire along its northern borders with a string of stable black states was foiled. The Soviets, on the other hand, were benefited. Their credibility as an ally of national liberation received a boost.

Thus in the aftermath of the Angolan debacle, South Africa's main concerns¹²⁸ were (1) to mend its policy of detente with black Africa, a policy considerably undermined

126 Africa Research Bulletin, vol.12, no.11, 15 December 1975, p.3820.

127 Mohammad-al-Khawas, n.107, p.44.

128 As Angolan Prime Minister Lopodo Nasciments later said, "It was a great error, because their intervention gave us the right to ask for help elsewhere". Wilfred Burchett, The Guardian, 24 March 1976.

by Pretoria's first military intervention in an African nation; (2) to further prevent any Soviet gains in the region; and (3) to bring about the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The central political lesson was that the US particular and the West in general could no longer be trusted, hence there was increasing emphasis on its own (South African) interest without worrying much about Western views and possible reactions.¹²⁹

The Angolan Affair and Politics of OAU

The effort of OAU for the decolonization of Angola was initiated ever since 1963 when its African Liberation Committee (ALC) recognized GRAE, the ^{FNLA's} government in exile. The MPLA was recognized in 1964 and both the liberation movements received military and economic assistance from ALC. However, the UNITA established in 1966 was not funded till after the Portuguese revolution (May 1974) and finally, on January 9, 1975, UNITA was recognized de jure as equal to the FNLA and MPLA. This four-day OAU Conference at Mombasa was attended by Savimbi, Roberto and Neto.¹³⁰

129 John Seiler, n.87, p.106. South African intervention had been condemned all over the world. Zaire and Zambia dissociated themselves from South African military action which was most frustrating for South Africa. South Africa had expected support from Zaire and Zambia. Further, among the South African MPs, the mood was bitter. The West in general and the US-France in particular, had South Africa 'scandalously in the lurch'. Stanley Uys in The Guardian, 26 January 1976.

130 Africa Contemporary Record (1974-75), p.3537.

OAU tried reconciliation among the Angolan nationalists. In the Bukavia summit, July 27, 1974, the Presidents of Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and the Congo tried to bring unity among MPLA, FNLA and UNITA.¹³¹ However, they failed and the OAU could only adopt an even handed policy towards the three liberation forces. During the Alvor agreement (January 15, 1975), OAU supported it as a progressive step because the transitional government included the three movements.

OAU had more responsibility because the United Nation was largely excluded from the diplomatic process. The African states believed in resolving their own disputes through the OAU. They viewed UN actions in Congo-Leopoldville in the early sixties as a fiasco which should not be repeated.¹³² Moreover, all the three Angolan movements opposed the role for the UN with the MPLA being the most vehement and UNITA, the least.¹³³

The African states were divided over the Angolan affair. The two groups were led by (a) Nigeria, which supported MPLA's recognition, and (b) Senegal, which desired

131 Ibid., pp. B575-B574.

132 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.61.

133 Ibid., p.62.

an united government with the FNLA-UNITA representation. Uganda's role was important because the Chairman of OAU was Idi Amin.

Amin was anti-MPLA and his political sympathies were evident before the Kampala summit. In 1974, he reportedly supplied arms to the FNLA and funds to UNITA. In January 1975, he indicated his support for Chipenda.¹³⁴ Further, there are indications that during 1974, there was a tacit alliance between Zaire and Amin in which Amin would support Zaire's interest in Angola for which Mobutu would mobilise support for Amin's Chairmanship of OAU.¹³⁵ Also, Amin invited anti-MPLA Luis Rangué Franque of PLEC to the Kampala Conference.

However, Amin handled out the OAU Chairmanship properly on most occasions.¹³⁶ He never advocated recognition of the Nova Lisboa (Huambo) government and always included the MPLA in his plans for the government of national unity. Amin tried national unity by establishing a conciliation commission. He even abstained on the crucial vote on Angola and did not try to block OAU's recognition of the PRA after the summit.

134 Marcum, n.78, p.221.

135 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.62.

136 Ibid., p.68.

Amin acted independently of the Soviet Union despite large Soviet arms and financial aids to Uganda. USSR tried to persuade Amin to recognize the PRA. Amin threatened to break diplomatic relations with USSR (November 9, 1975) and even expelled Zekharov, the USSR Ambassador on November 10, 1975.¹³⁷

However, it should be mentioned that Amin's Angolan position was not always anti-Soviet and anti-MPLA. His anti-MPLA attitude was to favour Zairian interests. But at the same time Amin had also condemned South Africa's intervention. On December 30, 1975, he said that the Soviets were not interfering in Angola but responding to MPLA's call to "drive away the aggressors" or South Africa.¹³⁸ In Fexx, Uganda recognized PRA, although Amin did not force Neto to include Roberto and Savimbi into the political fold.

Nigeria had denounced Soviet intervention just three days before Angolan independence.¹³⁹ But Nigeria became pro-MPLA in late November and recognized PRA (27 November 1975). Nigeria explained this 'shift' due to presence of

137 Kampala Radio, November 1975 (BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 4, November 11, 1975; B/6-9), see Klinghoffer, n.17, p.66.

138 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 December 1979, 1975-B/7, see Ibid., p.68.

139 Christopher Stevens, "Soviet Union in Angola", in Seiler, ed., n.41, p.52.

South African troops in Angola.¹⁴⁰ PRA was shortly recognised by Tanzania, Ghana and other states.

Although Nigeria was a close ally of US, it resented the US attempts to influence the OAU's deliberation process. However, there was no breakdown of relations between Nigeria and US.

In the emergency summit of January 10-13, 1976, Nigeria favoured the recognition of PRA. It praised USSR help to liberation movements. Senegal opposed Nigeria. It demanded a national united government and end to all external interference in Angola. Both the resolutions of Nigeria and Senegal received equal votes (22 each). Uganda abstained because it was Chairman and Ethiopia, because it was the host.¹⁴¹ The most striking feature of the summit "was the lack of unanimous condemnation of South Africa's involvement" since the pro-Western states refused to condemn South Africa unless Russia and Cuba were also condemned.¹⁴²

140 The Nigerian statement declared, "Current events in Angola must be seen in its right perspective - not just fighting between factions in Angola, but fighting between racialist South Africa and its backers and the MPLA", The Guardian, 19 December 1975.

141 Ethiopia was pro-MPLA but abstained, perhaps, because of the threat from Senegal's supporter to recognize the secessionist Eritrean liberation front, if Ethiopia voted for the Nigerian resolution.

142 The Guardian, 14 January 1975.

However, after some deliberations on February 11, 1976, the OAU recognized MPLA by a majority vote.

The OAU failed to reconcile the liberation forces. Its failure encouraged foreign intervention and foiled the attempt of a peaceful decolonization. The policies of Zaire and Congo were particularly important for the success of OAU policy because these states controlled the flow of external arms to the FNLA and the MPLA. In Mid-1974, Zaire and Congo tried for a unified coalition but by late 1974, Zaire and later Congo began to encourage the individual movements. OAU's interference in the Angolan affair would have contravened its Charter. But, on the other hand, OAU could not stop South African intervention. Moreover, its condemnation to external intervention was only partial. South Africa was only condemned and not Cuba. In fact, the three liberation movements did not desire OAU to resolve their conflict.¹⁴³ MPLA detested Amin. Any OAU peace-keeping force would have neutralised Luanda to MPLA's disadvantage. Similarly, the liberation movements did not seriously pursue the means for national united government, but rather worked to subvert it.

143 Klinghoffer, n.17, p.71.

ANALYSIS

The following analysis can be made:

(1) Soviet Union's involvement in Angola was primarily politico-ideological. Except for a brief pause, the Soviets gave aid to MPLA because of its progressive ideology and broad base. The China factor in case of Africa was an important impelling force for the Soviet involvement but it was more concerned with the activities of the anti-MPLA forces i.e. US, Zaire, Zambia, FNLA-UNITA. The Soviets had significant advantage over US in Angola e.g. MPLA's cohesiveness, Cuba's military-strategic commitments, etc. The victory of MPLA had enhanced the Soviet prestige in Africa. The Soviet gains from Angola were both "on the Super Power and regional level".¹⁴⁴

(2) Cuba - Like the Soviets, Cuba's involvement was also primarily politico-ideological. The Cubans were interested not only to support the MPLA but it provided an opportunity for Cuba to become the leader of the Third World. Cuba was not a Soviet surrogate but had its own independent action. The Cuban aid to MPLA became more direct and intensive in 1970s. The airlift and shipment of arms of Cuban force was like a conventional war and Cuba was greatly successful. Cuba had become a force to be reckoned in Africa.

144 Stephen, "The Soviet Union's Role in Angola", in Seiler, ed., n.87, p.50.

(3) China's involvement in Africa was also primarily politico-ideological as it supported all the three liberation movements. However, the anti-Sovietism became an important factor.¹⁴⁵ But China was primarily against the Soviet social hegemonism. This explains the Chinese aid to FNLA-UNITA. China withdrew from Angola partly because it anticipated an active US involvement and partly because it did not want to associate directly with South African action. The debacle in Angola had consequently discredited China among the African states, especially Mozambique. Even Tanzania's policy in late November 1975 was contrary to the Chinese policy of supporting FNLA-UNITA.

The Intervention of Communist Countries in Angola and US Response

Among the several communist countries, the USSR, Cuba and China played an active role in Angola. The role of foreign intervention became important because till the formulation of Alvor agreement, none of the liberation movements was capable of capturing power or liberate Angola

145 While comparing China's involvement in Angola and Zimbabwe, Gerald Segal writes, "Anti-Sovietism put China on the right side in Zimbabwe but on the wrong one in Angola", "An Assessment of the Great Power Triangle" in Gerald Segal, ed., The China Factor : Peking and the Superpowers (London, Croomhelm, 1982), p.161.

individually. The foreign intervention, especially the Soviet Cuban financial and military aid, enabled MPLA to capture power. US deliberately kept silent over the magnitude of "extra-continental actors" in Angola and did not mention the Soviet-Cuban increasing involvement in favour of MPLA. Far from criticising the Soviets and Cubans or pursuing constructive diplomatic pressure on the Soviets for a peaceful solution, US concluded a five-year trade agreement with the Soviet Union on 20 October 1975. President Ford hailed it as "a positive step in our relations with the Soviet Union".¹⁴⁶ At the OAS meeting which had begun on 16 July 1975, US voted in favour of the amendment along with 15 other countries, thus removing sanctions against Cuba.¹⁴⁷ This shows that either Kissinger underestimated the threat from Cuba in Angola or wanted to buy time for his "bargaining chips" theory. Thus the official recognition of any threat to pro-US forces in Angola was not recognised till the crisis had perpetuated and it had got beyond the control of Kissinger.

146 New York Times, 21 October 1975.

147 The American public had no knowledge about the Cuban involvement. This is evident from different statements of the Press which emphasized upon the growing normalcy with Cuba. See Venketramani, n.64, p.151.

On the other hand, when US identified the "extra-continental actors" that do not wish Angola "any good", it mentioned about the Soviet Cubans only and deliberately omitted China. Though China had withdrawn, it had played a very significant role in Angola. US did not recognize it as a threat to 'its interest'. The deliberate silence of US in identifying the "extra-continental actors" can be explained as follows:

US was confident that the covert aid to anti-MPLA forces would help it to reach a 'military stalemate' and then enable US to arbitrate or negotiate with the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, US was confident about the victory of the FNLA-UNITA. South Africa operations in August-October 1975 had expected a favourable outcome that would increase its bargaining capacity. Alexander L. George argues that Kissinger's visit to China in mid-October 1975 was partly responsible for the delay¹⁴⁹ (in entering into private negotiation with the Soviets). Alexander L. George argues that it is possible that Kissinger may have received intelligence indications¹⁵⁰ that a substantive argumentation of Cuban military forces was underway and that it

148 See Alexander L. George, n.14, p.210.

149 Ibid., p.211.

150 According to John Stockwell, n.80, pp.213-16.

was urgent to try to head off this significant escalation by delaying with the Soviets. Whatever is the justification for delaying the negotiations (even private) with the Soviets, Kissinger identified the 'extra-continental actors' only after China had withdrawn and the hope of an anti-MPLA victory had diminished. Kissinger had miscalculated Soviet motivation. He did not anticipate that substantial Cuban forces, assisted logistically by the Soviet Union, would intervene in the nick of the time to reverse the expected outcome of the civil war when the FNLA-UNITA were on the verge of ousting the MPLA from Luanda.¹⁵¹

However, it would be too simplistic to state that there was co-ordination between US and China or that China was performing a proxy role enabling the United States to stay away from unpleasantness and to content itself by making a modest financial term to the group supported by China. In all probability, it seems that there existed some complimentary role between US and China in supporting anti-MPLA forces and Zaire till China finally recalled its military advisers from Zaire who were training FNLA in October 1976.

In response to the Communist countries, especially Soviet Union and Cuba, Kissinger had overlooked several

151 Kissinger had underestimated the potentialities of "reserve" forces in Cuba that proved so important for the MPLA victory. See Dominguez, n.46, p.64.

factors: (i) the growing Soviet disappointment with detente; (ii) that covert assistance would trigger increased Soviet aid to the MPLA; (iii) the possibility that Moscow might suspect the US-Zaire-China axis in Angola, (iv) the magnitude of the Soviet-Cuban involvement that would override his "damage-limiting" strategy. What Ford-Kissinger proposed to the Soviets in November might have been better received in January-February or even in June for less damaging outcome. The Angolan debacle was a missed opportunity.¹⁵²

(4) In the African continent Zaire, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville played significant roles. But the most active role was played by Zaire. However, Mobutu's original bid for African leadership in 1973 came at a time when all the three factors ran in Zaire's favour: domestic support was high, the copper price was at its peak, Chinese and US support was substantial, and Soviet regional influence was at its nadir. In the post-Caetano phase, first, the US-Sino-Soviet international relationship defined and constrained Zaire's foreign policy; second, the international economy, with its shifting market price for copper and affected the freedom of Zairian foreign policy; and thirdly, the changing degree of stability and Mobutu's changing perceptions of security

152 Alexander L. George, "Angola: The Missed Opportunity" in Alexander L. George, ed., n.14, p.156.

affected the expansiveness or reticence of Zairian diplomacy.¹⁵³ Zaire's involvement in Angola was due to the economic, political and ethnic factors. Zaire was politically opposed to Congo and MPLA and economically interested in the Cabinda oil, transportation through Benezuela railroad, etc. However, after March 1976, Zaire reached an accommodation with MPLA.

(5) Like Zaire, Zambia had also economic interest in Angola. But Zambia remained neutral, helping the three liberation movements, till the direct Cuban involvement when it became anti-Soviet and pro-FNLA-UNITA. Zambia was suspicious of the sinister designs of Soviet-Cuban and MPLA forces in the region. However, Zambia soon reconciled with MPLA.

(6) Congo Brazzaville support to MPLA was politico-ideologically motivated. Politically, Congo was opposed to Zaire and FNLA. Ideologically, Congo was close to MPLA. Also, economically, Congo was interested in Cabinda and had desired its autonomy. However, it soon reconciled to the MPLA's idea of integration of Angola after South Africa's intervention.

(7) Tanzania sought to help all the liberation forces. However, the South African intervention forced Tanzania in favour of MPLA. Here Tanzania differed from its close ally China. Tanzania's role in Angola was the extension of Nyrere's concept of decolonization.

153 Crawford Young, n.87, p.210.

(8) South Africa's involvement was economically and politically motivated. Economically, South Africa was concerned to maintain its exploits in Namibia. Politically, it feared the establishment of Communist pro-Soviet government in Angola and withdrew primarily because of the anticipated US support did not materialize. Its intervention alienated large number of African states. However, in 1976 there was some understanding between South Africa and Angola.

(9) The role of OAU exhibited its weakness and the division of the African states even on prime question such as decolonization. Though Amin was anti-MPLA, as a Chairman of OAU, he tried to play a neutral role in the recognition of FRA.

The Intervention of African States in Angola and US Response

The African states which actively intervened in Angola were Zaire, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville and South Africa. The request for help from Zaire and Zambia provided the grounds for justification for US involvement in Angola.

Although Zaire was pro-US, Mobutu raised a public outcry about CIA plot to overthrow him and demanded withdrawal of the US ambassador, Dean R. Hinton.¹⁵⁴ There is no evidence to substantiate this allegation of CIA plot. It is noteworthy that there was no sharp criticism from

154 For details see Ibid., p.208.

the State Department concerning Mobutu's allegations.¹⁵⁵ To appease Mobutu, Kissinger sent the ex-Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance to Kinshasa. Vance made two visits and was successful in establishing rapprochement and Mobutu "now privately sent word that he needed US help to meet a Soviet-Cuban effort to establish dominance in the region."¹⁵⁶ The US Administration increased the assistance package to Zaire (\$60 million, including \$20 million as SSAP - see Chapter IV). However, this aid was opposed by many Congressmen, including Senator Clark.

However, it was the US-South African relation which was the most intriguing. Both Kissinger and Robert Ullsworth denied any collusion with South Africans (for details see Chapter IV). However, there was no 'positive discouragement'¹⁵⁷ to the South African attacks in Southern Angola ever since August 1975.¹⁵⁸

155 Venketaramani, n.64, p.158.

156 Ibid., p.159.

157 Warivwalle, n.15, p.411.

158 South Africa explained that its action in Angola had the blessing of several African countries as well as at least one "free world" power. As to the identity of the "free world" power, South African cabinet ministers hinted on the number of occasions that this was the United States. Even before the Angolan civil war broke out, "The Guardian" reported on 19 December 1975, "American military collaboration with South Africa had been increasing", Hallet, n.80, p.362.

Kissinger procrastinated to initiate 'private talks' with Dobrynin during his China visit which indicates that US expected an anti-MPLA victory under the leadership of South African troops. There is further evidence to suggest that Kissinger may have encouraged the South African intervention.¹⁵⁹ Whether he did or not, it is quite likely that the two prongs of the military attack on Luanda were coordinated and tuned to take Luanda before November 11.¹⁶⁰ Though it is difficult to establish US-South Africa's direct linkages in the Angolan civil war, probably a negative relationship did not exist.

159 See John A. Marcum, n.78, pp.268-273. Daniel Moynihan admitted that there was convergence in policy between the two governments but denied any coordination with South Africa. Statement of Moynihan, 14 December 1975. Quoted in Ernest Aaroch and Tony Thomas, Angola, the Hidden History of Washington's War (New York, 1976), p.109. - Quoted in turn from Hallet, *Ibid.*, p.353.

160 For details see Stockwell, n.80, pp.163-168.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The decolonization process had two components: the demand of the subject people for independence and the inability or unwillingness of the imperial power to resist it. In case of Angola, the late and violent decolonization was due to nature of both the Portuguese colonialism and the Angolan nationalism.

The dynamics of Portuguese colonialism was the manifestation of its social forces. During the mercantile phase, Portugal was the leader of the adventure-seeking colonies. But in the later phase of capitalist development, Portugal lost its advantage to Britain and other European countries. With its weak economy and bad quality of products, Portugal could not compete with others, hence continued its mercantile dominance over its colonies. It lacked capital and so could not pursue finance-imperialism. Portugal detested foreign investment. The small amount of foreign investments, before the liberalization of economy in 1950s, were channelled through the Government agencies. On the other hand, the political structure was fascist and not conducive to foreign investment or neo-colonial exploitation. Most important, Portugal could not pursue decolonization while maintaining the totalitarian political structure at home and vice-versa. Added to this, Portugal did not witness any 'liberal-intellectual' anti-colonial criticism as in Britain and America.

When Portugal sought neo-colonial exploitation in the 1960s (the liberalization of its economy), it attenuated its social contradiction. Portugal could not pursue neo-colonial gains on the one hand and still maintain classical colonial dominations for long. The changes in its economic structure led to the rise of industrial-commercial bourgeoisie against the old-rural based bourgeoisie. The costly colonial wars further sharpened the social contradictions. All these culminated in the Armed Force Movement. The AFM accelerated the process of decolonization.

Portugal had sought to legitimize its ultra-colonialism through the ideological tools of 'Lusotropicalism' defined in terms of 'Portugal's racial egalitarianism', or 'pluri-cultural harmony of its political doctrine'. Lusotropicalism was the assimilation process through which the Angolans were detribalized and Portuguesized to ^{be} finally be integrated into the metropole society. In its self-proclaimed version, Portugal qualified itself as superior to other colonial powers in terms of 'racial tolerance'. Lusotropicalism was also different from apartheid and white-minority regime of South Africa. However, to most non-Portuguese, 'Lusotropicalism' was a romantic myth (at best) or an invidious lie (at worst) used to obscure the realities of Portuguese colonialism. US believed in the ethnocentric rationality of Portugal's 'Lusotropicalism'. Both Portugal and South Africa

were apprehensive that sanctions might be extended to include themselves and they were determined to show that trade sanctions are an ineffective weapon for inducing political change or decolonization.

But the Portuguese colonial policy, though not devoid of 'racial bias', was different from South Africa in one aspect. Unlike the South Africans, the Portuguese attended UN Security Council meetings and defended their view that the overseas territories formed an integral part of Portugal. Further, the Portuguese agreed to hold talks with the African representatives and even invited UN to investigate in its African territories.

Angola was the first to initiate the national war of liberation in Portuguese Africa. But, while Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique achieved independence in 1974, Angola achieved independence a year later in 1975. Most important, the Angolan independence was preceded by a civil war and external intervention. The disunity among the national liberation organizations of Angola was due to the leadership ambitions, the different ethnic-social base of the three movements and their different external linkages. It was the last factor that attenuated the civil war.

Different ethnic-social base or the communal tripolarity of the movements was due to their specific area of operation. The three movements were not successful, to any great extent,

in mobilising tribes outside their socio-regional base. The FNLA was active in Bakongo Land of Northern Angola, adjoining the borders of Zaire, while UNITA was active in Ovambo-land of Southern and Eastern Angola. Though MPLA was able to open an "eastern front" near the Zambian border, beside its support-base in Cabinda, Luanda and other areas of Northern Angola, its leadership also reflected an ethnic orientation. In the First National Congress (December 1962), the ten-member steering committee was composed of five Mbundus and five Mesticos, and though a decade later the MPLA cited "Angolan heroes" from other ethnic communities, the movement's senior leadership remained heavily Mbundu and Mestico.

In general, ethnocentrism persisted most significantly in the rural-based movements of FNLA-UNITA. They were less influenced than the MPLA by the integrative imposition of the Portuguese culture. To a considerable extent, ethnocentrism, though genuinely rooted, represented a dependent variable encouraged by divide and rule politics of the Portuguese.

Thus the dichotomy between the urban-acculturated intellectual MPLA and the rural-ethno-populist FNLA embittered political differences. The fear of political and cultural domination by the Portuguese educated mesticos explained FNLA/UNITA antipathy towards the MPLA.

The external linkages of the Angolan movements also led to their political differences. FNLA was pro-West, though it had also sought support of the Chinese. It tilted towards US partly because of its pro-Zairian attitude and partly due to its protestant support. The presence of the Bakongo refugees in Southern Zaire and family relationship between Mobutu and Roberto and politics in exile from Zaire explains FNLA's pro-Zaire linkages. On the other hand, MPLA has initially sought US aid but failed and had tilted towards the Soviet Union and Cuba. MPLA had also received support from China. But MPLA was pro-Congo-Brazzaville which irked Mobutu. Lastly, the UNITA had received support from China and Zambia. But the exigencies of the civil war forced UNITA to accept the South African help.

Added to this, there were ideological differences. Roberto distrusted Communist links and the political base of his operation was from Zaire. On the other hand, the MPLA and UNITA were influenced by Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and preferred to operate within Angola. But as independence approached, UNITA dropped its Maoist rhetoric and adopted a conciliatory posture to influence and seek the support of the leaderless white community.¹ The MPLA, due to its links with

1 John Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule" in Helen Kitchen (ed.), Africa: From Mystery to Maze (Canada; USA, Lexington Books, 1976), p.95.

Portugal's Communist Party, enjoyed some advantages at Lisbon.

But despite these ideological differences, the Angolan movements were nationalist. They had similar objectives to 'violently overthrow' the Portuguese colonialism. They had adopted the violent strategy to achieve independence because of their frustration with the democratic methods and the intransigence of Portugal to grant self-determination and independence. As Jan Pettman writes:

The liberation movements began, as did most African nationalist movements, as mass parties committed to non-violent protests and constitutional demands. In the early sixties, Southern African Parties found the road to peaceful change closed, their leadership decimated, their followers harassed, their demands decried all political or moral legitimacy. They became by default, parties of revolution. They claimed the right to rebel, labelled their own violence 'defensive' and justified because they were given no choice but surrender or revolt. 2

Thus the nationalists were forced to pursue violent strategy. The national liberation movements politicised both the masses within the colonies and evoked anti-colonial

2 "Race conflict and liberation in Africa" in Ralph Pettman, Moral Claims in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1973) p.137. Also see, Robert Blackey, "Contrast in the Theories of Revolution for Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies (London), vol.12, no.2, 1974, pp.291-309.

war ethos among the Portuguese administrative and military officers. It proved to be one of the most important factors for the demise of the Caetano regime. Hence, "by the curious logic, the African war which had initially aroused a nationalist sentiment in support of Salazar's policies now provided a rallying point for the opponents of the regime."³ The AFM assumed the character of the popular uprising. Another important development was that "the collapse of the Caetano regime had demonstrated, for the second time in recent African history, the truth of the proposition that in guerrilla warfare political victory is not directly related to military success."⁴

The MPLA was better organized and their appeal was strongest among the urban poor, the intellectuals and the African Government employees. The radicalisation of the Luanda slum dwellers, the musseques, who indulged in frequent strikes after the fall of Caetano, also proved helpful to the MPLA, in thwarting the FNLA attack on Luanda. The MPLA had also strategic control of Luanda, other important sea outlets and the oil rich Cabinda. Politico-ideologically also

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- 3 Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the Dialectics of Liberation in Southern Africa", International Studies (Delhi), vol.14, no.1, January-March 1975, p.5.
- 4 James Mayall, "Foreign Policy in Africa : A Changing Diplomatic Landscape", in Peter Jones, ed., The International Year Book of Foreign Policy Analysis (London, Croom Helm, 1975), p.197. The first victory was that of FLN in Algeria.

the MPLA was more clear in its objective to establish a socialist Angola than FNLA or UNITA. As Thomas H. Henriksen writes:

Aiming at a classless society, the PAIGC, FRELIMO and the MPLA worked for a social revolution... their purpose was to integrate the rural population into the political process so as to redefine social and economic relationships.⁵

With this clear vision, MPLA tried to mobilise the rural population. Unlike the FNLA which blundered into political mobilisation from Zaire, the MPLA operated within the country and hence had been more popular than the other two factions. However, it was the Soviet-Cuban military operation that tilted the war in favour of the MPLA. Unlike the Soviet-Cubans, Zaire, South Africa and the United States lacked the commitment to establish FNLA-UNITA in Luanda.

The independence of Angola had pushed the frontiers of racism and colonialism further South of Zambezi. For the first time the vulnerability of the white power in Southern Africa had become apparent. On the one hand, it had encouraged the nationalist forces in Rhodesia and Namibia and, on the other, psychologically, the whites in Rhodesia and Namibia became uncertain about their dominance. As G. Arrighi and

5 "People's War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.14, no.3, 1976, p.382.

John S. Saul had analysed:

The periphery of the Southern African Complex (i.e. the Portuguese territories) is undoubtedly the weakest link. If the struggle in these countries get momentum, the financial and, above all, the white man power resources of the Centres (South Africa and Rhodesia) can be considerably strained, thereby easing the more complex task of seizing power in the latter...⁶

In case of Southern Africa, the significant involvements of United States were in Congo (1960s) and Angola (1975-76). The United States ostensibly advocated anti-colonialism and support for democratic rights or majority rule. But, it was the prevalence of the 'other tangible interests', the economic, geo-strategic and the political, that undermined US commitment for decolonization or majority rule. The American policy of isolationism, later 'open door policy' and Eurocentric African policy were primarily influenced by its other tangible interests.

The Globalist or Eurocentric African policy of US became explicit in the post-second world war phase. The American enthusiasm for decolonization remained shortlived. Moreover, on the question of self-determination, US modified its proposal to assuage its western colonial allies while drafting the charter of UN. The first priority was now preservation of peace rather than the elimination of colonialism. As sums up

6 "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa", The Socialist Register (London), 1969, p.157.

Ali Mazrui:

There was from the start an implicit clash in the interpretation of the charter between the requirements of security (including, if necessary, the preservation of the imperial peace) and human rights as conceived by colonial subjects and the newly independent states who campaigned on their behalf. 7

This clash explains the Eurocentric and counter-insurgency postures of US. Further, the counter-insurgency was explained in the domino theory that communist influence would spread across the globe with one country serving as the spring-board for subverting and then taking over the next.

US involvement in Africa remained a neglected area because of the absence of any possible communist threat till the inception of Kennedy's administration. During his Chairmanship of the Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs (1959-60), Kennedy had emphasised:

... in Africa leaders twenty years ago quoted Jefferson and Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Today in many cases these leaders look east to Peking and Moscow. They basically lost their confidence in us. They don't see US as a great revolutionary country which is on the move. 8

7 Towards a Pax Africana (London, 1967), p.130.
Quoted in Mayall, Africa, the Cold War and After (London, Elek Books, 1971), p.73.

8 Quoted in John Marcum, "The Angolan Rebellion : Status Report", Africa Report (New York), February 1964, vol.9, no.2, p.3.

But Kennedy's enthusiasm was sapped soon and the 'brief-shift' in US African policy towards self-determination was overwhelmed by its concern for politico-strategic gains or NATO 'compulsions'. US voted for arms sanction against South Africa but did not make similar concessions to African demands in case of Portugal. The United States could not vote for the General Assembly resolutions deploring NATO military aid to Portugal for use in the territories without admitting what it had officially denied all along - that military aid from the US and other NATO powers has been diverted by Portugal to her colonies. Even the development of detente did not ensure any increased US involvement in Africa. Africa still remained an European concern till the first attempt towards a concrete African policy was made during Nixon-Kissinger.

Thus prior to Nixon, US African policy manifested the politics of 'non-benign neglect'. The 'brief shift' during Kennedy was "a change in posture rather than a change of policy". Kennedy contrived to change the emphasis, if not the substance of the American policy. The African leaders had misjudged Kennedy's rhetoricism for action.

Meanwhile, Detente, NAM and OAU helped the African States to further highlight the demand of decolonization in Southern Africa. Both the Super Powers were supporting African concern for NAM and OAU. Thus, "all the three goals

(OAU, NAM and Decolonization) ... were applauded by the governments of United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other."⁹

At the UN, United States defended its Eurocentric status quo policy by advocating 'preparedness' and the 'gradual peaceful decolonization'. The failure of the 'premature' decolonization in Congo provided an alibi to America to provide any active support to the Angolan decolonization. Like the mandatory system, US invoked the policy of 'preparedness' or 'apprenticeship' to defend its pro-colonial policy in Southern Africa. But this policy of 'preparedness' i.e. colonies had to undergo western politico-administrative training before attaining self-administration and independence "represented a betrayal not a discharge of imperial responsibility".¹⁰ Resolution 1514 (XV) had stated that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as pretext for delaying independence." US voted against or abstained on all the resolutions subsequently demanding the implementation of resolution 1514(XV). Similar policies were followed towards resolutions discouraging all UN members, especially NATO, to export arms to Portugal or

9 Mayall, n.7, p.106.

10 Ibid., p.74.

discouraging financial institutions that perpetuated colonial exploitation in Portuguese colonies, etc.

During Nixon-Kissinger, although for the first time an attempt towards a concrete US Southern African policy was made by adopting the modified version of NSSM 39, the tilt towards the white minority regimes was further reinforced. The post-Vietnam phase in the American policy was the 'period of introversion' but it had an important globalist anti-communist undertone. The line of thinking was that "foreign policy is essentially global strategy and...domestic considerations and pressures should not be allowed to impinge on it."¹¹

As a result of this globalist approach, the Administration not only undermined the potentials of the liberation movements in Southern Africa but also labelled most nationalist liberation movements as "communist stooges", and if successful in wresting power from a colonial regime, would inevitably pursue an anti-Western policy. Kissinger deeply distrusted the revolutionary groups, considering them as a threat to his design of international tranquility, which depended upon stable relations among the big powers. Kissinger's policy recommendations derived from three NSSM assumptions: (1) if violence in the area escalates, US interest will increasingly

¹¹ The Washington Post, 12 September 1973. Quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (USA, Lawrence Hill & Company, 1976), p.29.

be threatened; (2) the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them, and (3) there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.

The United States' involvement in the Angolan civil war underwent three phases. Initially, US had 'minimum entanglement' in Angola till it decided to give substantial covert aid to the anti-MPLA forces (July 1975). From July 1975 till 19 December 1975, the United States followed the policy of 'containment-confrontation'. During its initial phase, the confrontation attitude was kept at a low key till the victory of the MPLA became certain (October-end, 1975). However, the nature of the confrontation still lacked any overt military commitment and was only limited to the US verbal denunciation of the Soviet-Cuban interference on the international level. On the domestic level, Kissinger tried for the increase in the covert aid. But the Tunney amendment (19 December 1975) cut-short Kissinger's plan and ended the phase of confrontation. This was followed by the phase of containment-crisis-management. Now US ironically campaigned for a coalition government and did not extend its recognition to the PRA ostensibly due to the presence of Cuban troops. Earlier, the United States had

paid least attention to the coalition government and even shortsightedly repudiated its NSSM 39 assumptions that violence (due to the failure of the Alvor agreement) would pose a threat to US economic interest. This phase of crisis-management was manifested in the United States diplomatic manoeuvrability against the recognition of FRA at the OAU summit (January-February 1976). However, the US effort failed and the FRA received recognition at the OAU meeting. US now resorted to the policy of 'accommodation' to assuage the black aspirations and African demands. This 'tilt' in the US African policy was reflected in Kissinger's Lusaka speech (1976). Also known as the phase II of Kissinger's African policy, the change toward conciliation and cooperation was deemed essential in order to moderate mounting third world hostility. In Kissinger's words:

The radicalization of the Third World and its consolidation into an antagonistic block is neither in political nor our economic interests. A world of hostile bloc is world of tension and disorder. 12

US intervened in Angola partly due to the strong anti-MPLA elements, FNLA-UNITA-Zaire-South African nexus, and partly because of its design to earn the world-wide condemnation

12 Latin America, Europe and America, A Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, June 17, 1976. (Washington, D.C., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1976), p.3. Quoted in Donald Rotchild, "US Policy Styles in Africa" in K. Oye, D. Rotchild, R.J. Lieber (ed.), Eagle Entangled: US Foreign Policy in the Complex World (N.Y., Longman, 1979).

of Soviet Union and Cuba as 'interventionists' in Angola. US expected a military stalemate in Angola which would provide an opportunity to arbitrate and force the USSR to an unfavourable compromise. Secondly, the world-wide condemnation of the Soviet Union would enable Kissinger to arouse the complacency of the West European Governments about the Communist threat. It would also lead to the condemnation of USSR by the African states and so bring them closer to the United States. Perhaps the administration had become overconfident after the Mayaguez incident of 1975 which had gained it public support. But the Tunney amendment proved otherwise.

Angola was an acid-test of foreign policy, its ability to obtain domestic support Kissinger misjudged badly the political volatility of the secret issues of the foreign policy. Angola, as the Administration tirelessly pointed out, was not Vietnam. But the parallels of civil war and covert involvement were too close for the Congress to appreciate the distinction. 13

The comparative analysis of US attitude towards decolonization of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau would reveal significant points. First, all these states were

13 Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola : Pathology of a Blunder", The New Republic (Washington), 31 January 1976, pp.20-23. Emphasis is added.

Marxists and pro-communists. Next, they had attained their independence through violence. But these trends agitated against the basic premise of NSSM 39 (assumptions one and three). While US intervened in Angola, it accepted the changes in Mozambique. Perhaps, US could have also intervened in Mozambique, as in Angola, if there was a contending pro-US liberation movement to counter the FRELIMO and also the willingness on the part of Zaire-Zambia-South Africa to intervene in favour of the pro-US liberation movements. Further, the absence of any great US economic interest that felt threatened with the establishment of FRELIMO Government also explains US acceptance of Mozambique's independence.

In sum, the most fundamental weakness of US policy in Angola was its total disregard for the realities of the African politics. Washington misjudged the character and capabilities of the Angolan Nationalist movements, jeopardized the future of the regime it sought to support (Zambia and Zaire) and contributed to a further weakening of Africa's aggregate capacity to mount sanctions against external intervention. Above all, American policy failed completely to reckon with the negative importance of South Africa in African politics. The more the United States came to depend on tacit cooperation with South Africa to stem Soviet penetration, the more the United States opened the way to Soviet intervention by removing the risk of United African opposition.

US also blundered into overconfidence. First, it was overconfident that the eventual Portuguese withdrawal would not necessarily take the Angolans out of the western sphere of influence. Secondly, the Congress would not vote against the demand for the increase in covert aid to FNLA-UNITA. Another overconfidence was reflected in US ability to extract concession and manipulate the Communist powers, Soviet Union and China in the triangular diplomacy. As Gleb opines:

Kissinger seemed to have exaggerated his ability to extract advantages from the Sino-Soviet split. That schism made both the Communist countries eager to improve relationships with US. But there is less evidence that Kissinger was able to pry any extra-concessions from either of them by pursuing his 'triangular diplomacy'." 14

On the other hand, the Soviet involvement in Angola had greatly enhanced its prestige and power in Africa. Although Colin Legum opines that by supporting the MPLA the Soviet Union laid itself "open to the accusation of not abiding by specific OAU policy in Angola",¹⁵ the recognition of MPLA at the February 1976 OAU meeting proves

14 Leslie H. Gleb, "Kissinger: a Flawed Strategist, Brilliant Tactician" in Thomas C. Peterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy since 1914, vol.II (USA, Heath & Company, 1978), p.518.

15 "The Role of the Big Powers" in Colin Legum and T. Hodges, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa (London: Rex Collins, 1976), p.17.

the limitation of such an allegation. Similarly, in terms of super-power relations, Alexander L. George opines that the "overall Soviet interest" was of "shortsighted opportunism" and "blunder of first magnitude" because "their (Soviet Union) behaviour in Angola inflicted heavy damage on what remained of the detente relationship."¹⁶ However, the United States not only continued the SALT talks but also entered into economic relationship with USSR. This proves that the detente relationships were not "heavily damaged." Moreover, detente was not a restraint on the Soviet Union to carry forward or support the struggle against racism and colonialism.

China's role had evoked both criticism and praise. The Chinese were praised by Kaunda as "Angels" in contrast with the Russian "devils" because of China's "leading source of material assistance in the liberation struggle."¹⁷ On the other hand, the "revolutionary pragmatism" of the Chinese African policy (till early 1970s) was slightly undermined because of its flawed strategy in Angola and had led to some

16 "Missed Opportunities for Crisis Prevention" in Alexander L. George, ed., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983), p.199.

17 Quoted in Anirudha Gupta, "The Angolan Crisis and Foreign Intervention", Foreign Affairs Reports (Delhi), January-December 1976, p.26.

differences with its closest African ally, Tanzania. But soon this loss in prestige was compensated with the dominance of the pro-Chinese liberation forces in independent Zimbabwe (1980). Hence the Angolan debacle only proved a brief nightmare for China.

South Africa had recognised the FRELIMO government immediately after Mozambique's independence and even hailed the former 'terrorists' as 'pragmatists'. In case of Angola, however, South Africa intervened to perpetuate the civil war. South Africa's intervention was probably to demonstrate that the West could depend upon it during Communist incursion in southern Africa. Probably also, Angola provided an opportunity to South Africa to establish closer association with black Front line states, Zaire and Zambia and demonstrate that they could depend upon it militarily and economically. However, the South African intervention proved counterproductive. In terms of super-power rivalry, the importance of South Africa as the 'bastion of anti-communism' could be accepted in the initial period of cold war. It was ironic that with the normalization of Super-Power relations and the consolidation of Detente, South Africa was still able to project itself as the bastion of the West against communism. US accepted this explanation of South Africa because of Kissinger's obsession with the theory of dominoes, globalism and conservatism.

On the global level, the Angolan crisis manifested the Great Powers confrontation on a scale not witnessed in Africa since the Congo crisis. The Super-Power proxy conflict in Angola also demonstrated that the Third World is a grey area where detente is not applicable. Even Kissinger recognised that "for the first time in many years", it introduced an active Great Power rivalry in Africa and "US has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit."¹⁸ However, for the Afro-Asian and the Third World diplomacy Angola, signified a "historic victory of non-alignment"¹⁹ and demonstrated that the OAU, despite its ideological differences, was still united against racism (South African intervention) and colonialism.

On the African level, the Angolan war of independence had proved that (a) the era of foreign mercenaries has come to an end, (b) the internal division within African countries or liberation movements invites foreign intervention, (c) the transfer of power without a viable understanding between the outgoing rulers and the incoming rulers

18 Quoted in Seymour Brown, The Crises of Power : An Interpretation of US Foreign Policy during the Kissinger's Years (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), p.135.

19 Anirudha Gupta, "Angola : Historic Victory of Non-Alignment", Mainstream (Delhi), vol.XIV, no.24, 14 February 1976, pp.11-12.

may prove, disastrous, (d) the anti-colonial struggle with mass support can indeed assert itself against internal and external intervention, and (e) the African countries fear less the 'tyranny of communism' than the South African racist intervention. The liberation struggles are essentially concerned with the fight for national emancipation and restoration of fundamental human rights.

Table 1

AFRICAN PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES OF CERTAIN RAW MATERIALS

Mineral	% of World Production (1974)	% of World Resources ^a
Antimony	South Africa (22%); Morocco (3%)	South Africa (6%)
Bauxite	Guinea (8%); Other (1%)	Guinea (26%); Cameroon(4%); Ghana (2%) ^b
Chromium	South Africa (26%); Rhodesia (8%); Madagascar (2%)	South Africa (71%); Rhodesia (26%)
Cobalt	Zaire (58%); Zambia(10%); Morocco (6%)	Zaire (18%); Zambia (8%)
Columbium	Nigeria (6%)	Zaire (3%); Kenya (3%); Uganda (2%); Nigeria (2%); Other (2%) ^b
Gold	South Africa (61%); Ghana (2%)	South Africa (53%)
Manganese	South Africa (17%); Gabon (10%); Other (4%)	South Africa (42%); Gabon (2%)
Petroleum	Nigeria (4%); Libya(3%); Algeria (2%); other(1%)	Libya (4%); Nigeria (2%); Algeria (2%); Other(1%) ^b
Platinum	South Africa (49%)	South Africa (47%)
Uranium	South Africa (14%); Niger (5%); Gabon(3%)	South Africa (16%) ^c ; Niger (2%); Other (2%) ^d
Vanadium	South Africa (46%)	South Africa 32%) ^e

a Resources are known deposits, whether economical or not at current prices and technology. Reserves are that portion of resources recoverable under present conditions.

b Reserves only

c Production and resource figures for South Africa include Namibia (Southwest Africa)

d Figures exclude USSR

Source: US Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1974; US Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1975; US Geological Survey, Professional Papers 817 and 820.

Table 1(a)

PRODUCTION OF MINERALS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA¹
AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD PRODUCTION

Mineral	1967	1968	1969
Gold	68.3	68.8	68.8
Gem diamonds	62.2	64.0	63.6
Industrial diamonds	54.4	52.9	64.3
Cobalt (contained)	55.9	57.0	56.7
Chromite	32.1	31.7	31.5
Vanadium ² (ore and concen.)	31.1	25.9	29.4
Platinum group metals	26.4	25.5	28.4
Vermiculite	30.2	29.0	30.7
Antimony	21.5	27.3	27.9
Copper (ore and concen.)	23.4	21.8	22.0
Uranium ³ (contained)	17.9	17.1	17.0
Manganese ⁴ (ore)	12.8	13.9	14.4
Beryllium ⁵ (Beryl)	7.0	8.7	10.4

1. Includes South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zaire, and Malagasy Republic.

2. Namibia production is of lead vanadate concentrate. South African production is of vanadium pentoxide.

3. "Free world" production only.

4. Percentage of Mn. concentrate differs according to country.

5. 1967 figures for Rhodesia taken from US import data.

Source : Minerals Yearbook, 1968 and 1969, US Department of Interior.

Table 1(b)

AFRICAN RESERVES AND EXPORTS AND WESTERN IMPORT DEPENDENCE
(Base Year 1976-77)

	African % of non- communist reserves	African % of non- communist imports	US Import as % of consump- tion*	EEC Import as % of consumption
Antimony	18	36	43	95
Asbestol	9	29	85	97
Bauxite	30	12(?)	83	74
Chrome	98	51	90	100
Columbium	7	22	100	100
Cobalt	61	86	90	100
Copper	15	33	13	81
Gold	61	83	56	85(?)
Iron Ore	1	13	26	79
Manganese	79	61	98	100
Phosphate rock	40	55	-	99
Platinum group	98	85	89	100
Vanadium	92	88	25	99

*US. figures are for net import reliance and reflect domestic recycling.

Source: Africa's role in world mineral supply, 1974-77, (Special Studies, Div., Mineral Bureau, Department of Mines of Republic of South Africa, June 1973). Philip Crowson, Non-Fuel Minerals and Foreign Policy (London RIIA, 1977), US Bureau of Mines, Commodity Data Summaries, 1980.

Table 1(c)

ANGOLA : MINERAL PRODUCTION, 1967-71
(Value in Million escudos)

Minerals	1967		1969		1971	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
Diamonds (carats)	1,288,501	1,176.7	2,021,332	2,005.7	2,413,021	1,701.8
Iron ore (tons)	1,154,303	41.0	5,447,657	1,085.4	6,157,819	1,293.0
Manganese (tons)	33,180	4.7	29,170	7.3	23,000	7.7
Rock asphalt (tons)	27,043	1.2	39,182	2.2	56,100	3.1
Salt (tons)	77,687	16.3	80,181	15.7	90,284	23.0

Source : Excerpts from the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization, on Activities of Foreign Economic and Other. See Objective and Justice, vol.6, no.1, January/February/March 1974, p.40.

Table 2

US IMPORT DEPENDENCE ON CERTAIN RAW MATERIALS

Mineral	%age of Imported ^a	Major African Sources ^b
Columbium	100	Mineria (10%)
Manganese	99	Gabon (32%), South Africa(12%)
Cobalt	98	Zaire (37%) ^c
Chromium	91	South Africa (24%); Rhodesia (12%)
Bauxite	85	Guinea (16%)
Platinum group metals	80	South Africa (68%) ^d
Antimony	56	South Africa (22%)
Gold	45	N.A.
Vanadium	36	South Africa (59%)
Petroleum	35	Nigeria (17%); Algeria (7%); Libya (6%)

a Source : Minerals and Materials : A Monthly Survey, US, Bureau of Mines, September 1976; 1975, figures.

b Source : US Imports for Consumption and General Imports; US Department of Commerce; 1975 figures; "major" is defined as greater than 5%.

c Another 22% comes from Belgium, the major original source of which is Zaire.

d Another 27% comes from Great Britain, the major original source of which is South Africa.

NA - Not available.

Table 3

STOCKPILE : INVENTORIES FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES

Commodity	Months' Consumption in US Govt. Stockpiles	Months' consumption in US private stocks
Antimony	*	8
Bauxite	7	3
Chromium	26	8
Cobalt	30	1
Columbium	4	7
Manganese	39	20
Petroleum	*	2
Platinum	10	6
Uranium	*	31
Vanadium	1	4

Note : Stockpile levels are for December 1975, except antimony and uranium (12/74) and petroleum (12/76). Months' consumption was calculated using 1974 consumption levels, since they represent peak usage to recent years.

* No strategic stockpile

Source : CBO, US Raw Materials Policy : Problems and Possible Solutions, p.38.

US Bureau of Mines, Minerals & Materials: A Monthly Survey, May 1977.

US Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1974.

Table 4

US DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD
(Cumulative book value at the year-end
millions of dollars)

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Total, All Areas	11,788	32,778	49,217	78,217	124,212	137,244
Africa, total	287	925	1,904	3,482	3,996	4,467
South Africa	140	286	528	868	1,582	1,665
Other Africa	147	639	1,376	2,614	2,414	2,802
Libya	a	99	424	1,012	65	362
Liberia	16	139	201	187	334	348
Nigeria	b	b	b	b	535	341
Other	131	401	751	1,415	1,480	1,750

a Less than \$ 500,000

b Totals for Nigeria were included in the "Other" category until 1973.

Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1963; September 1966; November 1971;
August 1977.

Table 5

EARNINGS* ON US DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD (in Millions of Dollars)

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Total, all areas	1,766	3,566	5,431	8,789	16,434	18,843
% of investment	15.0	10.9	11.0	11.2	13.2	13.7
Africa, total	47	33	380	846	651	794
% of investment	16.4	3.6	20.0	24.3	16.3	17.8
South Africa	28	50	101	139	139	202
% of Investment	20.0	17.5	19.1	16.0	8.8	12.1
Other Africa	19	-17	279	707	512	592
% of investment	12.9	-2.7	20.3	27.0	21.2	21.1
Libya	a	b	235	564	174	214
% of investment			55.4	55.7	267.7	59.1
Liberia	15	b	17	16	53	45
% of investment	94.0		8.5	8.6	15.9	12.9
Nigeria	c	c	c	c	284	192
% of investment					83.1	56.3
Other	4	b	27	127	d	140
% of investment	3.1		3.6	9.0		8.0

*Earnings is the sum of the US share in the net earnings of subsidiaries and branch profits.
a) Not available; b) The breakdown by country is not available, but the negative earnings were completely accounted for by heavy investment in North Africa, West Africa showed earnings of 12.8%. (c) Nigeria was included in the "Other" category until 1973. (d) Less than \$500,000 (less than 1% of investment).

Source: Survey of Current Business, December 1953; August 1962; September 1966, November 1971; August 1977.

Table 6

**21 LARGEST BANKS U.S. CLAIMS ON RESIDENTS
OF SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES* (in million of dollars)**

World	66,381
Africa	1,692
Algeria	534
Egypt	177
South Africa	720
Zaire	162
Zambia	99

* As of December 31, 1975, loans not guaranteed by EXIM Bank of US corporations.

Source : Hearings - Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sub-committee on Multinational Corporations, "Multinational Banks and US Foreign Policy", pp.128-30.

Table 7

U.S. FOREIGN TRADE (Millions of Dollars, f.a.a. value)

	1955		1960		1965		1970		1975		1976	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
World	15,518	11,382	20,500	14,654	27,346	21,366	43,226	39,963	107,591	96,140	114,997	120,677
Africa	588	619	766	535	1,224	875	1,579	1,111	4,949	8,305	5,206	12,639
South Africa	260	96	277	108	438	225	563	288	1,302	841	1,348	925
Other *	328	523	488	427	786	650	1,016	823	3,647	7,464	3,858	11,714
Nigeria	11	36	2	40	74	59	129	71	536	3,282	770	4,938
Algeria	13	6	24	1	21	5	62	10	632	1,359	487	2,209
Libya	4	a	42	a	64	31	104	39	232	1,046	277	2,243
Angola	12	32	11	25	13	48	38	68	53	426	35	264
Egypt	78	25	150	31	158	16	81	23	683	28	810	93
Gabon	b	b	b	b	5	10	7	9	59	197	46	190
Ghana	7	50	26	53	36	59	59	91	100	150	133	155
Ivory Coast	b	b	b	b	11	46	36	92	78	160	64	248
Zaire	b	b	b	b	70	38	62	41	188	67	99	189

a Less than \$ 50,000

b Data not given separately

Source : U.S. Foreign Trade : Import Trade by Country, January 1956; January 1961; December 1965;
U.S. Foreign Trade : Export Trade by Country, January 1956, January 1961, December 1965.
Highlights of US Export-Import Trade, December 1970; December 1975; December 1976.

Table 8

US TRADE WITH AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA (in millions of dollars)

	EXPORTS						IMPORTS					
	1960	1965	1970	1972	1973	1974	1960	1965	1970	1972	1973	1974
Total	793	1,229	1,580	1,577	2,306	3,659	534	878	1,111	1,595	2,583	6,617
Algeria	28	21	62	98	161	315	1	9	10	104	215	1,091
Angola	11	13	38	26	33	62	25	48	69	90	167	578
Cameroon, Federal Republic of	(x)	7	19	37	15	20	(x)	13	25	24	30	27
Central African Republic	(x)	1	1	1	3	1	(x)	10	6	7	8	7
Egypt	151	158	77	75	225	455	32	15	23	17	26	70
Ethiopia	12	22	26	24	25	33	27	64	67	58	79	66
Gabon	(x)	5	7	13	19	33	(x)	11	9	11	12	162
Ghana	17	36	59	44	63	77	52	59	91	80	90	126
Ivory Coast	(x)	11	36	22	69	49	(x)	46	92	92	108	95
Kenya	(x)	24	34	26	39	49	(x)	13	23	27	26	39
Liberia	36	39	46	41	46	70	39	51	51	52	72	96
Libya	43	65	108	85	104	139	(a)	30	39	116	216	1
Malagasy Republic	3	4	7	11	15	7	13	29	32	37	40	60
Mauritania	(x)	4	4	5	9	11	(x)	2	1	1	1	(a)
Morocco	36	56	89	58	113	184	10	6	10	11	14	20
Mozambique	10	9	22	16	32	32	5	7	18	26	34	45
Nigeria	26	74	129	114	151	286	40	60	71	271	652	3,286
South Africa, Republic of	288	438	553	602	745	1,160	108	226	290	326	377	609
Sudan	7	15	7	18	39	64	5	7	12	12	9	27
Tanzania	(x)	7	12	12	11	51	(x)	11	24	21	27	26
Tunisia	22	44	49	55	60	87	(a)	2	3	8	33	21
Zaire	(x)	71	62	37	110	145	(x)	48	41	43	71	68
Zambia	(x)	(x)	31	34	39	68	(x)	(x)	2	3	6	6
Other	103	103	89	119	163	253	174	77	59	110	213	226

x : not applicable; a : less than \$ 500,000.

Source : US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, July 1975.

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Table 9

BALANCE OF TRADE (Millions of Dollars)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
World	4,136	5,845	5,980	3,263	11,451	-5,680
Africa	-31	230	349	469	-3,355	-7,433
South Africa	164	169	213	275	462	423
Other Africa	-196	61	136	194	-3,817	-7,856
Nigeria	-25	-37	16	57	-2,745	-4,168
Algeria	7	23	15	52	-727	-1,722
Libya	4	42	33	65	-814	-1,966
Angola	-20	-24	-35	-30	-373	-229
Egypt	53	119	142	58	655	717
Gabon	a	a	-5	-2	-138	-144
Ghana	-43	-26	-23	-32	-50	-22
Ivory Coast	a	a	-35	-56	-82	-154
Zaire	a	a	32	21	121	-90

*Date not given separately.

Source : US Foreign Trade: Import Trade by Country, January 1956; January 1961; December 1965.
US Foreign Trade: Export Trade by Country, January 1956; January 1961; December 1965.
Highlights of US Export-Import Trade, December 1970; December 1975, December 1976.

Table 10

THE NUMBER AND THE VALUE OF AIRCRAFT SOLD
TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1965-1972

Year	Number	Value (In Dollars)
1965	235	34,548,530
1966	208	4,519,595
1967	353	23,438,360
1968	200	30,398,139
Total	1,076	92,904,644
1969	284	62,503,604
1970	180	25,627,562
1971	135	70,357,608
1972	144	80,485,712
Total	743	218,974,486

Source : Implementation of the US Arms Embargo,
Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa,
House Committee on African Affairs, 93rd
Congress, 1st Session, March 20, 22 and
April 6, 1973.

Table 11

EXPORTS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
TO ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND PORTUGAL: 1965-1972

Year	Angola		Mozambique		Portugal	
	No.	Value	No.	Value	No.	Value
1965	5	209,940	1	23,177	5	7,021,428
1966	7	248,196	-	-	1	14,667
1967	16	360,647	-	-	7	14,132,912
1968	11	303,556	1	105,122	14	25,370,505
1969	5	211,056	2	7,576,956	9	7,753,035
1970	12	477,797	21	808,030	10	16,458,548
1971	23	513,908	1	5,143,175	9	10,487,256
1972	-	-	13	881,678	10	57,936,468
Sub-total 1965-68	39	1,122,339	2	128,299	27	46,539,512
Sub-total 1969-72	40	1,202,761	37	14,409,839	38	92,635,307

Source : Bureau of the Census, FT-410 Export Statistics.

Table 12

NUMBER OF PORTUGUESE MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINED
BY THE US FISCAL YEAR 1968-1972 INCLUSIVE

Year	ARMY		A/E Force		NAVY		Total
	US	Overseas	US	Overseas	US	Overseas	
1968	6	4	1	-	63	-	74
1969	3	25	7	-	95	-	130
1970	8	29	2	-	49	-	88
1971	6	31	3	45	18	-	103
1972	6	30	10	17	16	-	79
1973	15	35	12	17	15	-	94
Total :	44	154	35	79	256	-	568

Source : Implementation of the US Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March 20, 22; April 6, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p.89.

Table 13

US EXPORTS OF HERBICIDES TO ANGOLA,
MOZAMBIQUE AND PORTUGAL, 1962-72
(in millions of dollars)

Year	Angola	Mozambique	Portugal
1969	2	-	57
1970	43	28	344
1971	-	88	115
1972	39	413	151
Total :	84	529	667

Source : "Portugal Afrique : La Guerre de L'OTAN"
Jeune Afrique No.705, July 13, 1974, p.64.

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